,illustration ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason ,by ,immanuel ,kant ,translated by ,j4 ,m4 ,d4 ,meiklejohn ,contents ,preface to the ,first ,edition 7#agha7 ,preface to the ,second ,edition 7#aghg7 ,introduction ,i4 ,of the difference between ,pure and ,empirical ,knowledge ,,ii4 ,the ,human ,intellect1 even in an ,unphilosophical ,state1 is in ,possession of ,certain ,cognitions 8 priori04 ,,iii4 ,philosophy stands in need of a ,science which shall ,determine the ,possibility1 ,principles1 and ,extent of ,human ,knowledge 8 priori0 ,,iv4 ,of the ,difference ,between ,analytical and ,synthetical ,judgements4 ,v4 ,in all ,theoretical ,sciences of ,reason1 ,synthetical ,judgements 8 priori0 are contained as ,principles4 ,,vi4 ,the ,universal ,problem of ,pure ,reason4 ,,vii4 ,idea and ,division of a ,particular ,science1 under the ,name of a ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,i4 ,transcendental ,doctrine of ,elements ,first ,part--,,transcendental ,,sthetic #a4 ,introductory ,,section ,i4 ,,of ,,space #b4 ,metaphysical ,exposition of this ,conception4 #c4 ,transcendental ,exposition of the ,conception of ,space4 #d4 ,conclusions from the foregoing ,conceptions4 ,,section ,,ii4 ,,of ,,time #e4 ,metaphysical ,exposition of this ,conception4 #f4 ,transcendental ,exposition of the ,conception of ,time4 #g4 ,conclusions from the above ,conceptions4 #h4 ,elucidation4 #i4 ,general ,remarks on ,transcendental sthetic4 #aj4 ,conclusion of the ,transcendental sthetic4 ,second ,part--,,transcendental ,,logic ,introduction4 ,idea of a ,transcendental ,logic ,i4 ,of ,logic in ,general ,,ii4 ,of ,transcendental ,logic ,,iii4 ,of the ,division of ,general ,logic into ,analytic and ,dialectic ,,iv4 ,of the ,division of ,transcendental ,logic into ,transcendental ,analytic and ,dialectic ,,first ,,division--,,transcendental ,,analytic ,,book ,i4 ,analytic of ,conceptions4 #b ,chapter ,i4 ,of the ,transcendental ,clue to the ,discovery of all ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding ,introductory #c ,section ,i4 ,of the ,logical ,use of the ,understanding in ,general4 #d ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,logical ,function of the ,understanding in ,judgements4 #e ,section ,,iii4 ,of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding1 or ,categories4 #f ,chapter ,,ii4 ,of the ,deduction of the ,pure ,conception of the ,understanding ,section ,i4 ,of the ,principles of a ,transcendental ,deduction in general #i ,transition to the ,transcendental ,deduction of the ,categories4 #aj ,section ,,ii ,transcendental ,deduction of the pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding4 ,of the ,possibility of a ,conjunction of the manifold representations given by ,sense4 #aa4 ,of the ,originally ,synthetical ,unity of ,apperception4 #ab ,the ,principle of the ,synthetical ,unity of ,apperception is the highest ,principle of all exercise of the ,understanding4 #ac ,what ,objective ,unity of ,self-consciousness is4 #ad ,the ,logical ,form of all ,judgements consists in the ,objective ,unity of ,apperception of the ,conceptions contained therein4 #ae ,all ,sensuous ,intuitions are subject to the ,categories1 as ,conditions under which alone the manifold ,content of them can be united in one ,consciousness4 #af ,observation4 #ag ,in ,cognition1 its ,application to ,objects of ,experience is the only legitimate use of the ,category4 #ah ,of the ,application of the ,categories to ,objects of the ,senses in general4 #bj ,transcendental ,deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding4 #bb ,result of this ,deduction of the ,conceptions of the ,understanding4 #bc ,,book ,,ii4 ,analytic of ,principles ,,introduction4 ,of the ,transcendental ,faculty of judgement in ,general4 ,,transcendental ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,faculty ,,of ,,judgement ,,or1 ,,analytic ,,of ,,principles4 ,chapter ,i4 ,of the ,schematism at of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,system of all ,principles of the ,pure ,understanding4 ,section ,i4 ,of the ,supreme ,principle of all ,analytical ,judgements4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,supreme ,principle of all ,synthetical ,judgements4 ,section ,,iii4 ,systematic ,representation of all ,synthetical ,principles of the ,pure ,understanding4 ,chapter ,,iii ,of the ,ground of the ,division of all ,objects into ,phenomena and ,noumena4 ,,appendix4 ,,second ,,division--,,transcendental ,,logic ,,transcendental ,,dialectic4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,of ,transcendental ,illusory ,appearance4 ,,ii4 ,of ,pure ,reason as the ,seat of ,transcendental ,illusory ,appearance4 ,,transcendental ,,dialectic--,,book ,i--,,of ,,the ,,conceptions ,,of ,,pure ,,reason4 ,section ,i--,of ,ideas in ,general4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of ,transcendental ,ideas4 ,section ,,iii4 ,system of ,transcendental ,ideas4 ,,transcendental ,,dialectic--,,book ,,ii--,,of ,,the ,,dialectical ,,procedure ,,of ,,pure ,,reason4 ,chapter ,i4 ,of the ,paralogisms of ,pure ,reason4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,antinomy of ,pure ,reason4 ,section ,i4 ,system of ,cosmological ,ideas4 ,section ,,ii4 ,antithetic of ,pure ,reason4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the ,interest of ,reason in these ,self-contradictions4 ,section ,,iv4 ,of the necessity imposed upon ,pure ,reason of presenting a ,solution of its ,transcendental ,problems4 ,section ,v4 ,sceptical ,exposition of the ,cosmological ,problems presented in the four ,transcendental ,ideas4 ,section ,,vi4 ,transcendental ,idealism as the ,key to the ,solution of ,pure ,cosmological ,dialectic4 ,section ,,vii4 ,critical ,solution of the ,cosmological ,problem4 ,section ,,viii4 ,regulative ,principle of ,pure ,reason in relation to the ,cosmological ,ideas4 ,section ,,ix4 ,of the ,empirical ,use of the ,regulative ,principle of ,reason with regard to the ,cosmological ,ideas4 ,i4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,composition of ,phenomena in the ,universe4 ,,ii4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,division of a ,whole given in ,intuition4 ,,iii4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,deduction of ,cosmical ,events from their ,causes4 ,,iv4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,dependence of ,phenomenal ,existences4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,ideal of ,pure ,reason4 ,section ,i4 ,of the ,ideal in ,general4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,transcendental ,ideal 7,prototypon ,trancendentale74 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the ,arguments employed by ,speculative ,reason in ,proof of the ,existence of a ,supreme ,being4 ,section ,,iv4 ,of the ,impossibility of an ,ontological ,proof of the ,existence of ,god4 ,section ,v4 ,of the ,impossibility of a ,cosmological ,proof of the ,existence of ,god4 ,section ,,vi4 ,of the ,impossibility of a ,physico-,theological ,proof4 ,section ,,vii4 ,critique of all ,theology based upon ,speculative ,principles of ,reason4 ,appendix4 ,of the ,regulative ,employment of the ,ideas of ,pure ,reason4 ,,ii4 ,transcendental ,doctrine of ,method ,chapter ,i4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason4 ,section ,i4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in the ,sphere of ,dogmatism4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in ,polemics4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in ,hypothesis4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in ,relation to ,proofs4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,canon of ,pure ,reason4 ,section ,i4 ,of the ,ultimate ,end of the ,pure ,use of ,reason4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,ideal of the ,summum ,bonum as a ,determining ,ground of the ,ultimate ,end of ,pure ,reason4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of ,opinion1 ,knowledge1 and ,belief4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,architectonic of ,pure ,reason4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,history of ,pure ,reason4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition #agha ,human reason1 in one sphere of its cognition1 is called upon to consider questions1 which it cannot decline1 as they are presented by its own nature1 but which it cannot answer1 as they transcend every faculty of the mind4 ,it falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own4 ,it begins with principles1 which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience1 and the truth and sufficiency of which are1 at the same time1 insured by experience4 ,with these principles it rises1 in obedience to the laws of its own nature1 to ever higher and more remote conditions4 ,but it quickly discovers that1 in this way1 its labours must remain ever incomplete1 because new questions never cease to present themselves2 and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience1 while they are regarded by common sense without distrust4 ,it thus falls into confusion and contradictions1 from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors1 which1 however1 it is unable to discover1 because the principles it employs1 transcending the limits of experience1 cannot be tested by that criterion4 ,the arena of these endless contests is called ,metaphysic4 ,time was1 when she was the queen of all the sciences2 and1 if we take the will for the deed1 she certainly deserves1 so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter1 this title of honour4 ,now1 it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her2 and the matron mourns1 forlorn and forsaken1 like ,hecuba3 ,modo maxima rerum1 ,tot generis1 natisque potens444 ,nunc trahor exul1 inops4 --,ovid1 ,metamorphoses4 xiii ,at first1 her government1 under the administration of the dogmatists1 was an absolute despotism4 ,but1 as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule1 her empire gradually broke up1 and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy2 while the sceptics1 like nomadic tribes1 who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living1 attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities4 ,but their number was1 very happily1 small2 and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices1 although on no settled or uniform plan4 ,in recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled1 and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding--that of the celebrated ,locke4 ,but it was found that--although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience1 a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims--as this genealogy was incorrect1 she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty4 ,thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism1 and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it4 ,at present1 as all methods1 according to the general persuasion1 have been tried in vain1 there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism--the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world1 but at the same time the source of1 or at least the prelude to1 the re-creation and reinstallation of a science1 when it has fallen into confusion1 obscurity1 and disuse from ill directed effort4 ,for it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries1 the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity4 ,besides1 these pretended indifferentists1 however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools1 unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions1 which they profess to regard with so much contempt4 ,at the same time1 this indifference1 which has arisen in the world of science1 and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last1 is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection4 ,it is plainly not the effect of the levity1 but of the matured judgement#a of the age1 which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge1 ,it is1 in fact1 a call to reason1 again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks--that of self-examination1 and to establish a tribunal1 which may secure it in its well-grounded claims1 while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions1 not in an arbitrary manner1 but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws4 ,this tribunal is nothing less than the ,critical ,investigation of ,pure ,reason4 #a ,we very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age1 and of the decay of profound science4 ,but ,i do not think that those which rest upon a secure foundation1 such as mathematics1 physical science1 etc41 in the least deserve this reproach1 but that they rather maintain their ancient fame1 and in the latter case1 indeed1 far surpass it4 ,the same would be the case with the other kinds of cognition1 if their principles were but firmly established4 ,in the absence of this security1 indifference1 doubt1 and finally1 severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought4 ,our age is the age of criticism1 to which everything must be subjected4 ,the sacredness of religion1 and the authority of legislation1 are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal4 ,but1 if they are exempted1 they become the subjects of just suspicion1 and cannot lay claim to sincere respect1 which reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public examination4 ,i do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems1 but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason1 with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience2 in other words1 the solution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics1 and the determination of the origin1 as well as of the extent and limits of this science4 ,all this must be done on the basis of principles4 ,this path--the only one now remaining--has been entered upon by me2 and ,i flatter myself that ,i have1 in this way1 discovered the cause of--and consequently the mode of removing--all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself1 in the sphere of non-empirical thought4 ,i have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason1 by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind2 ,i have1 on the contrary1 examined them completely in the light of principles1 and1 after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell1 have solved them to its perfect satisfaction4 ,it is true1 these questions have not been solved as dogmatism1 in its vain fancies and desires1 had expected2 for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts1 and of these ,i have no knowledge4 ,but neither do these come within the compass of our mental powers2 and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions1 whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations4 ,my chief aim in this work has been thoroughness2 and ,i make bold to say that there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its solution1 or at least the key to its solution1 here4 ,pure reason is a perfect unity2 and therefore1 if the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth1 we must reject it1 as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others4 ,while ,i say this1 ,i think ,i see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt1 when he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant2 and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philosophical programme1 in which the dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul1 or the necessity of a primal being4 ,such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience2 while ,i humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power4 ,instead of any such attempt1 ,i confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought2 and ,i do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition1 because it has its seat in my own mind4 ,besides1 common logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason2 and it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go1 without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience4 ,so much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution of the present task4 ,the aims set before us are not arbitrarily proposed1 but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself4 ,the above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry4 ,as regards the form1 there are two indispensable conditions1 which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason1 is bound to fulfil4 ,these conditions are certitude and clearness4 ,as regards certitude1 ,i have fully convinced myself that1 in this sphere of thought1 opinion is perfectly inadmissible1 and that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded1 as of no value in such discussions4 ,for it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon priori grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary2 much more is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure priori cognition1 and to furnish the standard--and consequently an example--of all apodeictic 7philosophical7 certitude4 ,whether ,i have succeeded in what ,i professed to do1 it is for the reader to determine2 it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons1 without determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges4 ,but1 lest anything he may have said may become the innocent cause of doubt in their minds1 or tend to weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise produce--he may be allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty1 although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work4 ,he does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a whole1 and in regard to its ultimate aim4 ,i know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of the faculty which we call understanding1 and at the same time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use1 than those undertaken in the second chapter of the 8,transcendental ,analytic10 under the title of ,deduction of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding2 and they have also cost me by far the greatest labour--labour which1 ,i hope1 will not remain uncompensated4 ,the view there taken1 which goes somewhat deeply into the subject1 has two sides4 ,the one relates to the objects of the pure understanding1 and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective validity of its priori conceptions2 and it forms for this reason an essential part of the ,critique4 ,the other considers the pure understanding itself1 its possibility and its powers of cognition--that is1 from a subjective point of view2 and1 although this exposition is of great importance1 it does not belong essentially to the main purpose of the work1 because the grand question is what and how much can reason and understanding1 apart from experience1 cognize1 and not1 how is the faculty of thought itself possible8 ,as the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect1 and has thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis 7although1 as ,i shall show on another occasion1 this is really not the fact71 it would seem that1 in the present instance1 ,i had allowed myself to enounce a mere opinion1 and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold a different opinion4 ,but ,i beg to remind him that1 if my subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which ,i aimed1 the objective deduction1 with which alone the present work is properly concerned1 is in every respect satisfactory4 ,as regards clearness1 the reader has a right to demand1 in the first place1 discursive or logical clearness1 that is1 on the basis of conceptions1 and1 secondly1 intuitive or sthetic clearness1 by means of intuitions1 that is1 by examples or other modes of illustration in concreto4 ,i have done what ,i could for the first kind of intelligibility4 ,this was essential to my purpose2 and it thus became the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the second requirement4 ,i have been almost always at a loss1 during the progress of this work1 how to settle this question4 ,examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary1 and1 in the first sketch of the ,critique1 naturally fell into their proper places4 ,but ,i very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task1 and the numerous problems with which ,i should be engaged2 and1 as ,i perceived that this critical investigation would1 even if delivered in the driest scholastic manner1 be far from being brief1 ,i found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations1 which are necessary only from a popular point of view4 ,i was induced to take this course from the consideration also that the present work is not intended for popular use1 that those devoted to science do not require such helps1 although they are always acceptable1 and that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose4 ,abb ,terrasson remarks with great justice that1 if we estimate the size of a work1 not from the number of its pages1 but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of it1 it may be said of many a book--that it would be much shorter1 if it were not so short4 ,on the other hand1 as regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition1 connected under a single principle1 we may say with equal justice3 many a book would have been much clearer1 if it had not been intended to be so very clear4 ,for explanations and examples1 and other helps to intelligibility1 aid us in the comprehension of parts1 but they distract the attention1 dissipate the mental power of the reader1 and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole2 as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system1 and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its articulation or organization--which is the most important consideration with him1 when he comes to judge of its unity and stability4 ,the reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate with the present author1 if he has formed the intention of erecting a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science1 according to the plan now laid before him4 ,metaphysics1 as here represented1 is the only science which admits of completion--and with little labour1 if it is united1 in a short time2 so that nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically4 ,for this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason1 systematically arranged4 ,nothing can escape our notice2 for what reason produces from itself cannot lie concealed1 but must be brought to the light by reason itself1 so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek4 ,the perfect unity of this kind of cognitions1 which are based upon pure conceptions1 and uninfluenced by any empirical element1 or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate experience1 renders this completeness not only practicable1 but also necessary4 ,tecum habita1 et nris quam sit tibi curta supellex4 --,persius4 ,satirae iv4 #eb4 ,such a system of pure speculative reason ,i hope to be able to publish under the title of ,metaphysic of ,nature#b4 ,the content of this work 7which will not be half so long7 will be very much richer than that of the present ,critique1 which has to discover the sources of this cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility1 and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice4 ,in the present work1 ,i look for the patient hearing and the impartiality of a judge2 in the other1 for the good-will and assistance of a co-labourer4 ,for1 however complete the list of principles for this system may be in the ,critique1 the correctness of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent4 ,these cannot be presented priori1 but must be gradually discovered2 and1 while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the ,critique1 it is necessary that1 in the proposed work1 the same should be the case with their analysis4 ,but this will be rather an amusement than a labour4 #b ,in contradistinction to the ,metaphysic of ,ethics4 ,this work was never published4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,edition #aghg ,whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes the progress of science1 we shall be at no loss to determine4 ,if we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits1 unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow2 if we find them1 after the most elaborate preparations1 invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached1 and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths1 we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark4 ,in these circumstances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel1 in order to arrive at any results--even if it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which1 without reflection1 have been proposed for its attainment4 ,that ,logic has advanced in this sure course1 even from the earliest times1 is apparent from the fact that1 since ,aristotle1 it has been unable to advance a step and1 thus1 to all appearance has reached its completion4 ,for1 if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discussions on the mental faculties1 such as imagination and wit1 metaphysical1 discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude1 according to the difference of the objects 7idealism1 scepticism1 and so on71 or anthropological discussions on prejudices1 their causes and remedies3 this attempt1 on the part of these authors1 only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science4 ,we do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits and allow them to run into one another4 ,now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of perfectly clear definition2 it is a science which has for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of all thought1 whether it be priori or empirical1 whatever be its origin or its object1 and whatever the difficulties--natural or accidental--which it encounters in the human mind4 ,the early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the narrowness of its field1 in which abstraction may1 or rather must1 be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic distinctions1 and in which the understanding has only to deal with itself and with its own forms4 ,it is1 obviously1 a much more difficult task for reason to strike into the sure path of science1 where it has to deal not simply with itself1 but with objects external to itself4 ,hence1 logic is properly only a propdeutic--forms1 as it were1 the vestibule of the sciences2 and while it is necessary to enable us to form a correct judgement with regard to the various branches of knowledge1 still the acquisition of real1 substantive knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences properly so called1 that is1 in the objective sciences4 ,now these sciences1 if they can be termed rational at all1 must contain elements of priori cognition1 and this cognition may stand in a twofold relation to its object4 ,either it may have to determine the conception of the object--which must be supplied extraneously1 or it may have to establish its reality4 ,the former is theoretical1 the latter practical1 rational cognition4 ,in both1 the pure or priori element must be treated first1 and must be carefully distinguished from that which is supplied from other sources4 ,any other method can only lead to irremediable confusion4 ,mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects priori4 ,the former is purely priori1 the latter is partially so1 but is also dependent on other sources of cognition4 ,in the earliest times of which history affords us any record1 mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science1 among that wonderful nation1 the ,greeks4 ,still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this science to strike into1 or rather to construct for itself1 that royal road1 as it was for logic1 in which reason has only to deal with itself4 ,on the contrary1 ,i believe that it must have remained long--chiefly among the ,egyptians--in the stage of blind groping after its true aims and destination1 and that it was revolutionized by the happy idea of one man1 who struck out and determined for all time the path which this science must follow1 and which admits of an indefinite advancement4 ,the history of this intellectual revolution--much more important in its results than the discovery of the passage round the celebrated ,cape of ,good ,hope--and of its author1 has not been preserved4 ,but ,diogenes ,laertius1 in naming the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration--elements which1 according to the ordinary opinion1 do not even require to be proved--makes it apparent that the change introduced by the first indication of this new path1 must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that age1 and it has thus been secured against the chance of oblivion4 ,a new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man 7,thales1 or whatever may have been his name7 who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle4 ,for he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure1 as it lay before his eyes1 or the conception of it1 as it existed in his mind1 and thus endeavour to get at the knowledge of its properties1 but that it was necessary to produce these properties1 as it were1 by a positive priori construction2 and that1 in order to arrive with certainty at priori cognition1 he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he had himself1 in accordance with his conception1 placed in the object4 ,a much longer period elapsed before ,physics entered on the highway of science4 ,for it is only about a century and a half since the wise ,,bacon gave a new direction to physical studies1 or rather--as others were already on the right track--imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this new direction4 ,here1 too1 as in the case of mathematics1 we find evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution4 ,in the remarks which follow ,i shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science4 ,when ,,galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the inclined plane1 when ,,torricelli caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water1 or when ,,stahl1 at a later period1 converted metals into lime1 and reconverted lime into metal1 by the addition and subtraction of certain elements2#c a light broke upon all natural philosophers4 ,they learned that reason only perceives that which it produces after its own design2 that it must not be content to follow1 as it were1 in the leading-strings of nature1 but must proceed in advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws1 and compel nature to reply its questions4 ,for accidental observations1 made according to no preconceived plan1 cannot be united under a necessary law4 ,but it is this that reason seeks for and requires4 ,it is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws1 and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles that it can have any real utility4 ,reason must approach nature with the view1 indeed1 of receiving information from it1 not1 however1 in the character of a pupil1 who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him1 but in that of a judge1 who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose4 ,to this single idea must the revolution be ascribed1 by which1 after groping in the dark for so many centuries1 natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress4 #c ,i do not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental method1 of which1 indeed1 the first steps are involved in some obscurity4 ,we come now to metaphysics1 a purely speculative science1 which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience4 ,it deals with mere conceptions--not1 like mathematics1 with conceptions applied to intuition--and in it1 reason is the pupil of itself alone4 ,it is the oldest of the sciences1 and would still survive1 even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism4 ,but it has not yet had the good fortune to attain to the sure scientific method4 ,this will be apparent2 if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset4 ,we find that reason perpetually comes to a stand1 when it attempts to gain priori the perception even of those laws which the most common experience confirms4 ,we find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances1 and to abandon the path on which it had entered1 because this does not lead to the desired result4 ,we find1 too1 that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves1 but that1 on the contrary1 this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests--a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground1 in which1 at least1 no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession4 ,this leads us to inquire why it is that1 in metaphysics1 the sure path of science has not hitherto been found4 ,shall we suppose that it is impossible to discover it8 ,why then should nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after it1 as if it were one of our weightiest concerns8 ,nay1 more1 how little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason1 if it abandons us in a matter about which1 most of all1 we desire to know the truth--and not only so1 but even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms1 only to betray us in the end8 ,or1 if the path has only hitherto been missed1 what indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation1 and to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our predecessors8 ,it appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural philosophy1 which1 as we have seen1 were brought into their present condition by a sudden revolution1 are sufficiently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them1 and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating them1 so far as the analogy which1 as rational sciences1 they bear to metaphysics may permit4 ,it has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects2 but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects priori1 by means of conceptions1 and thus to extend the range of our knowledge1 have been rendered abortive by this assumption4 ,let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics1 if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition4 ,this appears1 at all events1 to accord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view1 that is to say1 of arriving at the cognition of objects priori1 of determining something with respect to these objects1 before they are given to us4 ,we here propose to do just what ,,copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements4 ,when he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator1 he reversed the process1 and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved1 while the stars remained at rest4 ,we may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects4 ,if the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects1 ,i do not see how we can know anything of them priori4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition1 ,i can then easily conceive the possibility of such an priori knowledge4 ,now as ,i cannot rest in the mere intuitions1 but--if they are to become cognitions--must refer them1 as representations1 to something1 as object1 and must determine the latter by means of the former1 here again there are two courses open to me4 ,either1 first1 ,i may assume that the conceptions1 by which ,i effect this determination1 conform to the object--and in this case ,i am reduced to the same perplexity as before2 or secondly1 ,i may assume that the objects1 or1 which is the same thing1 that experience1 in which alone as given objects they are cognized1 conform to my conceptions--and then ,i am at no loss how to proceed4 ,for experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires understanding4 ,before objects1 are given to me1 that is1 priori1 ,i must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions priori4 ,to these conceptions1 then1 all the objects of experience must necessarily conform4 ,now there are objects which reason thinks1 and that necessarily1 but which cannot be given in experience1 or1 at least1 cannot be given so as reason thinks them4 ,the attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted1 and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things priori that which we ourselves place in them4#d #d ,this method1 accordingly1 which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher1 consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment4 ,now the propositions of pure reason1 especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience1 do not admit of our making any experiment with their objects1 as in natural science4 ,hence1 with regard to those conceptions and principles which we assume priori1 our only course will be to view them from two different sides4 ,we must regard one and the same conception1 on the one hand1 in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding1 on the other hand1 in relation to reason1 isolated and transcending the limits of experience1 as an object of mere thought4 ,now if we find that1 when we regard things from this double point of view1 the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason1 but that1 when we regard them from a single point of view1 reason is involved in self-contradiction1 then the experiment will establish the correctness of this distinction4 ,this attempt succeeds as well as we could desire1 and promises to metaphysics1 in its first part--that is1 where it is occupied with conceptions priori1 of which the corresponding objects may be given in experience--the certain course of science4 ,for by this new method we are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of priori cognition1 and1 what is more1 to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie priori at the foundation of nature1 as the sum of the objects of experience--neither of which was possible according to the procedure hitherto followed4 ,but from this deduction of the faculty of priori cognition in the first part of metaphysics1 we derive a surprising result1 and one which1 to all appearance1 militates against the great end of metaphysics1 as treated in the second part4 ,for we come to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience2 and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this science4 ,the estimate of our rational cognition priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena1 and that things in themselves1 while possessing a real existence1 lie beyond its sphere4 ,here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the test4 ,for that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned1 which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves1 in order to complete the series of conditions4 ,now1 if it appears that when1 on the one hand1 we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves1 the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction1 and that when1 on the other hand1 we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us1 does not conform to these things as they are in themselves1 but that these objects1 as phenomena1 conform to our mode of representation1 the contradiction disappears3 we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment2 we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them1 or as they are given to us1 but in things as they are in themselves1 beyond the range of our cognition4#e #e ,this experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of the ,chemists1 which they term the experiment of reduction1 or1 more usually1 the synthetic process4 ,the analysis of the metaphysician separates pure cognition priori into two heterogeneous elements1 viz41 the cognition of things as phenomena1 and of things in themselves4 ,dialectic combines these again into harmony with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned1 and finds that this harmony never results except through the above distinction1 which is1 therefore1 concluded to be just4 ,but1 after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make any progress in the sphere of the supersensible1 it still remains for our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the unconditioned1 to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience from a practical point of view1 and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphysics4 ,speculative reason has thus1 at least1 made room for such an extension of our knowledge3 and1 if it must leave this space vacant1 still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up1 if we can1 by means of practical data--nay1 it even challenges us to make the attempt4#f #f ,so the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies established the truth of that which ,copernicus1 first1 assumed only as a hypothesis1 and1 at the same time1 brought to light that invisible force 7,newtonian attraction7 which holds the universe together4 ,the latter would have remained forever undiscovered1 if ,copernicus had not ventured on the experiment--contrary to the senses but still just--of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies1 but in the spectator4 ,in this ,preface ,i treat the new metaphysical method as a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the first attempts at such a change of method1 which are always hypothetical4 ,but in the ,critique itself it will be demonstrated1 not hypothetically1 but apodeictically1 from the nature of our representations of space and time1 and from the elementary conceptions of the understanding4 ,this attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics1 after the example of the geometricians and natural philosophers1 constitutes the aim of the ,critique of ,pure ,speculative ,reason4 ,it is a treatise on the method to be followed1 not a system of the science itself4 ,but1 at the same time1 it marks out and defines both the external boundaries and the internal structure of this science4 ,for pure speculative reason has this peculiarity1 that1 in choosing the various objects of thought1 it is able to define the limits of its own faculties1 and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself1 and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics4 ,for1 on the one hand1 in cognition priori1 nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself2 and1 on the other hand1 reason is1 in regard to the principles of cognition1 a perfectly distinct1 independent unity1 in which1 as in an organized body1 every member exists for the sake of the others1 and all for the sake of each1 so that no principle can be viewed1 with safety1 in one relationship1 unless it is1 at the same time1 viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason4 ,hence1 too1 metaphysics has this singular advantage--an advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do with objects--that1 if once it is conducted into the sure path of science1 by means of this criticism1 it can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions1 and can thus complete its work1 and leave it for the use of posterity1 as a capital which can never receive fresh accessions4 ,for metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as determined by these principles4 ,to this perfection it is1 therefore1 bound1 as the fundamental science1 to attain1 and to it the maxim may justly be applied3 ,nil actum reputans1 si quid superesset agendum4 ,but1 it will be asked1 what kind of a treasure is this that we propose to bequeath to posterity8 ,what is the real value of this system of metaphysics1 purified by criticism1 and thereby reduced to a permanent condition8 ,a cursory view of the present work will lead to the supposition that its use is merely negative1 that it only serves to warn us against venturing1 with speculative reason1 beyond the limits of experience4 ,this is1 in fact1 its primary use4 ,but this1 at once1 assumes a positive value1 when we observe that the principles with which speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits lead inevitably1 not to the extension1 but to the contraction of the use of reason1 inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sensibility1 which is their proper sphere1 over the entire realm of thought and1 thus1 to supplant the pure 7practical7 use of reason4 ,so far1 then1 as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative reason within its proper bounds1 it is only negative2 but1 inasmuch as it thereby1 at the same time1 removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason1 it possesses a positive and very important value4 ,in order to admit this1 we have only to be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure reason--the moral use--in which it inevitably transcends the limits of sensibility1 without the aid of speculation1 requiring only to be insured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it in contradiction with itself4 ,to deny the positive advantage of the service which this criticism renders us would be as absurd as to maintain that the system of police is productive of no positive benefit1 since its main business is to prevent the violence which citizen has to apprehend from citizen1 that so each may pursue his vocation in peace and security4 ,that space and time are only forms of sensible intuition1 and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as phenomena2 that1 moreover1 we have no conceptions of the understanding1 and1 consequently1 no elements for the cognition of things1 except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to these conceptions2 that1 accordingly1 we can have no cognition of an object1 as a thing in itself1 but only as an object of sensible intuition1 that is1 as phenomenon--all this is proved in the analytical part of the ,critique2 and from this the limitation of all possible speculative cognition to the mere objects of experience1 follows as a necessary result4 ,at the same time1 it must be carefully borne in mind that1 while we surrender the power of cognizing1 we still reserve the power of thinking objects1 as things in themselves4#g ,for1 otherwise1 we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance1 without something that appears--which would be absurd4 ,now let us suppose1 for a moment1 that we had not undertaken this criticism and1 accordingly1 had not drawn the necessary distinction between things as objects of experience and things as they are in themselves4 ,the principle of causality1 and1 by consequence1 the mechanism of nature as determined by causality1 would then have absolute validity in relation to all things as efficient causes4 ,i should then be unable to assert1 with regard to one and the same being1 e4g41 the human soul1 that its will is free1 and yet1 at the same time1 subject to natural necessity1 that is1 not free1 without falling into a palpable contradiction1 for in both propositions ,i should take the soul in the same signification1 as a thing in general1 as a thing in itself--as1 without previous criticism1 ,i could not but take it4 ,suppose now1 on the other hand1 that we have undertaken this criticism1 and have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses1 first1 as a phenomenon1 secondly1 as a thing in itself2 and that1 according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding1 the principle of causality has reference only to things in the first sense4 ,we then see how it does not involve any contradiction to assert1 on the one hand1 that the will1 in the phenomenal sphere--in visible action--is necessarily obedient to the law of nature1 and1 in so far1 not free2 and1 on the other hand1 that1 as belonging to a thing in itself1 it is not subject to that law1 and1 accordingly1 is free4 ,now1 it is true that ,i cannot1 by means of speculative reason1 and still less by empirical observation1 cognize my soul as a thing in itself and consequently1 cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which ,i ascribe effects in the world of sense4 ,for1 to do so1 ,i must cognize this being as existing1 and yet not in time1 which--since ,i cannot support my conception by any intuition--is impossible4 ,at the same time1 while ,i cannot cognize1 ,i can quite well think freedom1 that is to say1 my representation of it involves at least no contradiction1 if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two modes of representation 7the sensible and the intellectual7 and the consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and of the principles which flow from them4 ,suppose now that morality necessarily presupposed liberty1 in the strictest sense1 as a property of our will2 suppose that reason contained certain practical1 original principles priori1 which were absolutely impossible without this presupposition2 and suppose1 at the same time1 that speculative reason had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all4 ,it would then follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the speculative affirmation1 the opposite of which involves an obvious contradiction1 and that liberty and1 with it1 morality must yield to the mechanism of nature2 for the negation of morality involves no contradiction1 except on the presupposition of liberty4 ,now morality does not require the speculative cognition of liberty2 it is enough that ,i can think it1 that its conception involves no contradiction1 that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature4 ,but even this requirement we could not satisfy1 if we had not learnt the twofold sense in which things may be taken2 and it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits4 ,for this result1 then1 we are indebted to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things in themselves1 and establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena4 #g ,in order to cognize an object1 ,i must be able to prove its possibility1 either from its reality as attested by experience1 or priori1 by means of reason4 ,but ,i can think what ,i please1 provided only ,i do not contradict myself2 that is1 provided my conception is a possible thought1 though ,i may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities4 ,but something more is required before ,i can attribute to such a conception objective validity1 that is real possibility--the other possibility being merely logical4 ,we are not1 however1 confined to theoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement1 but may derive them from practical sources4 ,the positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in relation to the conception of ,god and of the simple nature of the soul1 admits of a similar exemplification2 but on this point ,i shall not dwell4 ,i cannot even make the assumption--as the practical interests of morality require--of ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 if ,i do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight4 ,for to arrive at these1 it must make use of principles which1 in fact1 extend only to the objects of possible experience1 and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phenomena1 and thus rendering the practical extension of pure reason impossible4 ,i must1 therefore1 abolish knowledge1 to make room for belief4 ,the dogmatism of metaphysics1 that is1 the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism1 is the true source of the unbelief 7always dogmatic7 which militates against morality4 ,thus1 while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to posterity1 in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in accordance with the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 still the value of such a bequest is not to be depreciated4 ,it will render an important service to reason1 by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that random groping after results without the guidance of principles1 which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies4 ,it will render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth1 by leading the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science1 instead of wasting them1 as at present1 on speculations which can never lead to any result1 or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions4 ,but1 above all1 it will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion1 by showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by the ,socratic method1 that is to say1 by proving the ignorance of the objector4 ,for1 as the world has never been1 and1 no doubt1 never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another1 it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm1 by closing up the sources of error4 ,this important change in the field of the sciences1 this loss of its fancied possessions1 to which speculative reason must submit1 does not prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity4 ,the advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure reason are not at all impaired4 ,the loss falls1 in its whole extent1 on the monopoly of the schools1 but does not in the slightest degree touch the interests of mankind4 ,i appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist1 whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul after death1 derived from the simplicity of its substance2 of the freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature1 drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective and objective practical necessity2 or of the existence of ,god1 deduced from the conception of an ens realissimum--the contingency of the changeable1 and the necessity of a prime mover1 has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of the schools1 to penetrate the public mind1 or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions4 ,it must be admitted that this has not been the case and that1 owing to the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculations1 it can never be expected to take place4 ,on the contrary1 it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling1 which exists in the breast of every man1 that the temporal is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature4 ,in like manner1 it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination1 gives rise to the consciousness of freedom1 and that the glorious order1 beauty1 and providential care1 everywhere displayed in nature1 give rise to the belief in a wise and great ,author of the ,universe4 ,such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind1 so far as they depend on rational grounds2 and this public property not only remains undisturbed1 but is even raised to greater importance1 by the doctrine that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of general human concernment than that to which the great mass of men1 ever held by us in the highest estimation1 can without difficulty attain1 and that the schools should1 therefore1 confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally comprehensible and1 from a moral point of view1 amply satisfactory proofs4 ,the change1 therefore1 affects only the arrogant pretensions of the schools1 which would gladly retain1 in their own exclusive possession1 the key to the truths which they impart to the public4 ,quod mecum nescit1 solus vult scire videri4 ,at the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without its knowledge--,i mean1 the ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,this can never become popular and1 indeed1 has no occasion to be so2 for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths4 ,on the other hand1 since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation1 it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and1 thus1 to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure1 sooner or later1 to cause even to the masses4 ,it is only by criticism that metaphysicians 7and1 as such1 theologians too7 can be saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines4 ,criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism1 fatalism1 atheism1 free-thinking1 fanaticism1 and superstition1 which are universally injurious--as well as of idealism and scepticism1 which are dangerous to the schools1 but can scarcely pass over to the public4 ,if governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned1 it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science1 as well as for those of society1 to favour a criticism of this kind1 by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis1 than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools1 which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs1 of which the public has never taken any notice1 and the loss of which1 therefore1 it can never feel4 ,this critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition2 for pure cognition must always be dogmatic1 that is1 must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles priori--but to dogmatism1 that is1 to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition1 derived from 7philosophical7 conceptions1 according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing--without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles4 ,dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers1 and in opposing this procedure1 we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity1 nor yet to scepticism1 which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics4 ,on the contrary1 our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely priori1 to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason1 and must1 therefore1 be treated1 not popularly1 but scholastically4 ,in carrying out the plan which the ,critique prescribes1 that is1 in the future system of metaphysics1 we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated ,,wolf1 the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers4 ,he was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles1 of clearly defining our conceptions1 and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny1 instead of rashly jumping at conclusions4 ,the example which he set served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation which is not yet extinct in ,germany4 ,he would have been peculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific character to metaphysical studies1 had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of the organum1 that is1 of pure reason itself4 ,that he failed to perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age1 and on this point the philosophers of his time1 as well as of all previous times1 have nothing to reproach each other with4 ,those who reject at once the method of ,wolf1 and of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science1 to change labour into sport1 certainty into opinion1 and philosophy into philodoxy4 ,in this second edition1 ,i have endeavoured1 as far as possible1 to remove the difficulties and obscurity which1 without fault of mine perhaps1 have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute thinkers4 ,in the propositions themselves1 and in the demonstrations by which they are supported1 as well as in the form and the entire plan of the work1 ,i have found nothing to alter2 which must be attributed partly to the long examination to which ,i had subjected the whole before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case4 ,for pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is nothing isolated or independent1 but every ,single part is essential to all the rest2 and hence1 the slightest imperfection1 whether defect or positive error1 could not fail to betray itself in use4 ,i venture1 further1 to hope1 that this system will maintain the same unalterable character for the future4 ,i am led to entertain this confidence1 not by vanity1 but by the evidence which the equality of the result affords1 when we proceed1 first1 from the simplest elements up to the complete whole of pure reason and1 and then1 backwards from the whole to each part4 ,we find that the attempt to make the slightest alteration1 in any part1 leads inevitably to contradictions1 not merely in this system1 but in human reason itself4 ,at the same time1 there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of the doctrines contained in this work4 ,in the present edition1 ,i have endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the sthetical part1 especially with regard to the conception of time2 to clear away the obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding2 to supply the supposed want of sufficient evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure understanding2 and1 lastly1 to obviate the misunderstanding of the paralogisms which immediately precede the ,rational ,psychology4 ,beyond this point--the end of the second main division of the 8,transcendental ,dialectic0--,i have not extended my alterations1#h partly from want of time1 and partly because ,i am not aware that any portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among intelligent and impartial critics1 whom ,i do not here mention with that praise which is their due1 but who will find that their suggestions have been attended to in the work itself4 #h ,the only addition1 properly so called--and that only in the method of proof--which ,i have made in the present edition1 consists of a new refutation of psychological ,idealism1 and a strict demonstration--the only one possible1 as ,i believe--of the objective reality of external intuition4 ,however harmless idealism may be considered--although in reality it is not so--in regard to the essential ends of metaphysics1 it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume1 as an article of mere belief1 the existence of things external to ourselves 7from which1 yet1 we derive the whole material of cognition for the internal sense71 and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question4 ,as there is some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in the text1 ,i propose to alter the passage in question as follows3 8,but this permanent cannot be an intuition in me4 ,for all the determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are representations and1 as such1 do themselves require a permanent1 distinct from them1 which may determine my existence in relation to their changes1 that is1 my existence in time1 wherein they change40 ,it may1 probably1 be urged in opposition to this proof that1 after all1 ,i am only conscious immediately of that which is in me1 that is1 of my representation of external things1 and that1 consequently1 it must always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this representation does or does not exist externally to me4 ,but ,i am conscious1 through internal experience1 of my existence in time 7consequently1 also1 of the determinability of the former in the latter71 and that is more than the simple consciousness of my representation4 ,it is1 in fact1 the same as the empirical consciousness of my existence1 which can only be determined in relation to something1 which1 while connected with my existence1 is external to me4 ,this consciousness of my existence in time is1 therefore1 identical with the consciousness of a relation to something external to me1 and it is1 therefore1 experience1 not fiction1 sense1 not imagination1 which inseparably connects the external with my internal sense4 ,for the external sense is1 in itself1 the relation of intuition to something real1 external to me2 and the reality of this something1 as opposed to the mere imagination of it1 rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience as the condition of its possibility4 ,if with the intellectual consciousness of my existence1 in the representation3 ,i am1 which accompanies all my judgements1 and all the operations of my understanding1 ,i could1 at the same time1 connect a determination of my existence by intellectual intuition1 then the consciousness of a relation to something external to me would not be necessary4 ,but the internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined1 though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness1 is itself sensible and attached to the condition of time4 ,hence this determination of my existence1 and consequently my internal experience itself1 must depend on something permanent which is not in me1 which can be1 therefore1 only in something external to me1 to which ,i must look upon myself as being related4 ,thus the reality of the external sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal1 in order to the possibility of experience in general2 that is1 ,i am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to my sense as ,i am that ,i myself exist as determined in time4 ,but in order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects1 external me1 really correspond1 in other words1 what intuitions belong to the external sense and not to imagination1 ,i must have recourse1 in every particular case1 to those rules according to which experience in general 7even internal experience7 is distinguished from imagination1 and which are always based on the proposition that there really is an external experience4--,we may add the remark that the representation of something permanent in existence1 is not the same thing as the permanent representation2 for a representation may be very variable and changing--as all our representations1 even that of matter1 are--and yet refer to something permanent1 which must1 therefore1 be distinct from all my representations and external to me1 the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of my own existence1 and with it constitutes one experience--an experience which would not even be possible internally1 if it were not also at the same time1 in part1 external4 ,to the question ,how8 we are no more able to reply1 than we are1 in general1 to think the stationary in time1 the coexistence of which with the variable1 produces the conception of change4 ,in attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible as possible1 ,i have been compelled to leave out or abridge various passages which were not essential to the completeness of the work1 but which many readers might consider useful in other respects1 and might be unwilling to miss4 ,this trifling loss1 which could not be avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits1 may be supplied1 at the pleasure of the reader1 by a comparison with the first edition1 and will1 ,i hope1 be more than compensated for by the greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands4 ,i have observed1 with pleasure and thankfulness1 in the pages of various reviews and treatises1 that the spirit of profound and thorough investigation is not extinct in ,germany1 though it may have been overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a licence in thinking1 which gives itself the airs of genius1 and that the difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the science of pure reason to which these paths conduct--a science which is not popular1 but scholastic in its character1 and which alone can hope for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value4 ,to these deserving men1 who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid exposition--a talent which ,i myself am not conscious of possessing--,i leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the statement of my doctrines4 ,for1 in this case1 the danger is not that of being refuted1 but of being misunderstood4 ,for my own part1 ,i must henceforward abstain from controversy1 although ,i shall carefully attend to all suggestions1 whether from friends or adversaries1 which may be of use in the future elaboration of the system of this ,propdeutic4 ,as1 during these labours1 ,i have advanced pretty far in years this month ,i reach my sixty-fourth year--it will be necessary for me to economize time1 if ,i am to carry out my plan of elaborating the metaphysics of nature as well as of morals1 in confirmation of the correctness of the principles established in this ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 both speculative and practical2 and ,i must1 therefore1 leave the task of clearing up the obscurities of the present work--inevitable1 perhaps1 at the outset--as well as1 the defence of the whole1 to those deserving men1 who have made my system their own4 ,a philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise1 and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages1 while the organic structure of the system1 considered as a unity1 has no danger to apprehend4 ,but few possess the ability1 and still fewer the inclination1 to take a comprehensive view of a new system4 ,by confining the view to particular passages1 taking these out of their connection and comparing them with one another1 it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions1 especially in a work written with any freedom of style4 ,these contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others1 but are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole4 ,if a theory possesses stability in itself1 the action and reaction which seemed at first to threaten its existence serve only1 in the course of time1 to smooth down any superficial roughness or inequality1 and--if men of insight1 impartiality1 and truly popular gifts1 turn their attention to it--to secure to it1 in a short time1 the requisite elegance also4 ,k,,nigsberg1 ,april #aghg4 ,introduction ,i4 ,of the difference between ,pure and ,empirical ,knowledge ,that all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt4 ,for how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses1 and partly of themselves produce representations1 partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity1 to compare to connect1 or to separate these1 and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects1 which is called experience8 ,in respect of time1 therefore1 no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience1 but begins with it4 ,but1 though all our knowledge begins with experience1 it by no means follows that all arises out of experience4 ,for1 on the contrary1 it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions1 and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself 7sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion71 an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense1 till long practice has made us attentive to1 and skilful in separating it4 ,it is1 therefore1 a question which requires close investigation1 and not to be answered at first sight1 whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience1 and even of all sensuous impressions8 ,knowledge of this kind is called priori1 in contradistinction to empirical knowledge1 which has its sources posteriori1 that is1 in experience4 ,but the expression1 8 priori10 is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started4 ,for1 in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience1 we are wont to say1 that this or that may be known priori1 because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience1 but from a general rule1 which1 however1 we have itself borrowed from experience4 ,thus1 if a man undermined his house1 we say1 8he might know priori that it would have fallen20 that is1 he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall4 ,but still1 priori1 he could not know even this much4 ,for1 that bodies are heavy1 and1 consequently1 that they fall when their supports are taken away1 must have been known to him previously1 by means of experience4 ,by the term 8knowledge priori10 therefore1 we shall in the sequel understand1 not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience1 but such as is absolutely so of all experience4 ,opposed to this is empirical knowledge1 or that which is possible only posteriori1 that is1 through experience4 ,knowledge priori is either pure or impure4 ,pure knowledge priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up4 ,for example1 the proposition1 8,every change has a cause10 is a proposition priori1 but impure1 because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience4 ,,ii4 ,the ,human ,intellect1 even in an ,unphilosophical ,state1 is in ,possession of ,certain ,cognitions 8 priori04 ,the question now is as to a criterion1 by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition4 ,experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a manner1 but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise4 ,now1 in the first place1 if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception1 it is priori4 ,if1 moreover1 it is not derived from any other proposition1 unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity1 it is absolutely priori4 ,secondly1 an empirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute1 but only assumed and comparative universality 7by induction72 therefore1 the most we can say is--so far as we have hitherto observed1 there is no exception to this or that rule4 ,if1 on the other hand1 a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality1 that is1 admits of no possible exception1 it is not derived from experience1 but is valid absolutely priori4 ,empirical universality is1 therefore1 only an arbitrary extension of validity1 from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases1 to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all2 as1 for example1 in the affirmation1 8,all bodies are heavy40 ,when1 on the contrary1 strict universality characterizes a judgement1 it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge1 namely1 a faculty of cognition priori4 ,necessity and strict universality1 therefore1 are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge1 and are inseparably connected with each other4 ,but as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgement1 or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing proof than its necessity1 it may be advisable to use the criteria separately1 each being by itself infallible4 ,now1 that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements which are necessary1 and in the strictest sense universal1 consequently pure priori1 it will be an easy matter to show4 ,if we desire an example from the sciences1 we need only take any proposition in mathematics4 ,if we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding1 the proposition1 8,every change must have a cause10 will amply serve our purpose4 ,in the latter case1 indeed1 the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an effect1 and of a strict universality of the law1 that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear1 were we to derive it1 like ,hume1 from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes2 and the habit thence originating of connecting representations--the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective4 ,besides1 without seeking for such examples of principles existing priori in cognition1 we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself1 and consequently prove their existence priori4 ,for whence could our experience itself acquire certainty1 if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical1 and consequently fortuitous8 ,no one1 therefore1 can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first principles4 ,but1 for the present1 we may content ourselves with having established the fact1 that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure priori cognition2 and1 secondly1 with having pointed out the proper tests of such cognition1 namely1 universality and necessity4 ,not only in judgements1 however1 but even in conceptions1 is an priori origin manifest4 ,for example1 if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience--colour1 hardness or softness1 weight1 even impenetrability--the body will then vanish2 but the space which it occupied still remains1 and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought4 ,again1 if we take away1 in like manner1 from our empirical conception of any object1 corporeal or incorporeal1 all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it1 still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance1 or adhering to substance1 although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object4 ,compelled1 therefore1 by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us1 we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition priori4 ,,iii4 ,philosophy stands in need of a ,science which shall ,determine the ,possibility1 ,principles1 and ,extent of ,human ,knowledge 8 priori0 ,of far more importance than all that has been above said1 is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience1 and by means of conceptions1 to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object1 seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds4 ,and just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere1 where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance1 lie the investigations of reason1 which1 on account of their importance1 we consider far preferable to1 and as having a far more elevated aim than1 all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena4 ,so high a value do we set upon these investigations1 that even at the risk of error1 we persist in following them out1 and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the pursuit4 ,these unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are ,god1 freedom 7of will71 and immortality4 ,the science which1 with all its preliminaries1 has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics--a science which is at the very outset dogmatical1 that is1 it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking4 ,now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned1 it seems nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with the cognitions we possess1 without knowing whence they come1 and on the strength of principles1 the origin of which is undiscovered4 ,instead of thus trying to build without a foundation1 it is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the question1 how the understanding can arrive at these priori cognitions1 and what is the extent1 validity1 and worth which they may possess8 ,we say1 8,this is natural enough10 meaning by the word natural1 that which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of thinking2 but if we understand by the term1 that which usually happens1 nothing indeed could be more natural and more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long unattempted4 ,for one part of our pure knowledge1 the science of mathematics1 has been long firmly established1 and thus leads us to form flattering expectations with regard to others1 though these may be of quite a different nature4 ,besides1 when we get beyond the bounds of experience1 we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter2 and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that1 unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction1 we hurry on undoubtingly in our course4 ,this1 however1 may be avoided1 if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions1 which are not the less fictions on that account4 ,mathematical science affords us a brilliant example1 how far1 independently of all experience1 we may carry our priori knowledge4 ,it is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of intuition4 ,but this circumstance is easily overlooked1 because the said intuition can itself be given priori1 and therefore is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception4 ,deceived by such a proof of the power of reason1 we can perceive no limits to the extension of our knowledge4 ,the light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air1 whose resistance it feels1 might imagine that her movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space4 ,just in the same way did ,plato1 abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding1 venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it1 into the void space of pure intellect4 ,he did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts2 for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support1 as it were1 whereon to rest1 and on which he might apply his powers1 in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress4 ,it is1 indeed1 the common fate of human reason in speculation1 to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible1 and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid one or no4 ,arrived at this point1 all sorts of excuses are sought after1 in order to console us for its want of stability1 or rather1 indeed1 to enable ,us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation4 ,but what frees us during the process of building from all apprehension or suspicion1 and flatters us into the belief of its solidity1 is this4 ,a great part1 perhaps the greatest part1 of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the conceptions which we already possess of objects4 ,by this means we gain a multitude of cognitions1 which although really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which 7though in a confused manner7 was already thought in our conceptions1 are1 at least in respect of their form1 prized as new introspections2 whilst1 so far as regards their matter or content1 we have really made no addition to our conceptions1 but only disinvolved them4 ,but as this process does furnish a real priori knowledge1 which has a sure progress and useful results1 reason1 deceived by this1 slips in1 without being itself aware of it1 assertions of a quite different kind2 in which1 to given conceptions it adds others1 priori indeed1 but entirely foreign to them1 without our knowing how it arrives at these1 and1 indeed1 without such a question ever suggesting itself4 ,i shall therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge4 ,,iv4 ,of the ,difference ,between ,analytical and ,synthetical ,judgements4 ,in all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is cogitated 7,i mention affirmative judgements only here2 the application to negative will be very easy71 this relation is possible in two different ways4 ,either the predicate ,b belongs to the subject ,a1 as somewhat which is contained 7though covertly7 in the conception ,a2 or the predicate ,b lies completely out of the conception ,a1 although it stands in connection with it4 ,in the first instance1 ,i term the judgement analytical1 in the second1 synthetical4 ,analytical judgements 7affirmative7 are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity2 those in which this connection is cogitated without identity1 are called synthetical judgements4 ,the former may be called explicative1 the latter augmentative judgements2 because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the subject1 but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions1 which were thought already in the subject1 although in a confused manner2 the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it1 and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein4 ,for example1 when ,i say1 8,all bodies are extended10 this is an analytical judgement4 ,for ,i need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it1 but merely analyse the conception1 that is1 become conscious of the manifold properties which ,i think in that conception1 in order to discover this predicate in it3 it is therefore an analytical judgement4 ,on the other hand1 when ,i say1 8,all bodies are heavy10 the predicate is something totally different from that which ,i think in the mere conception of a body4 ,by the addition of such a predicate1 therefore1 it becomes a synthetical judgement4 ,judgements of experience1 as such1 are always synthetical4 ,for it would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on experience1 because in forming such a judgement ,i need not go out of the sphere of my conceptions1 and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary4 ,that 8bodies are extended0 is not an empirical judgement1 but a proposition which stands firm priori4 ,for before addressing myself to experience1 ,i already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judgement1 and ,i have only to extract the predicate from the conception1 according to the principle of contradiction1 and thereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgement1 a necessity which ,i could never learn from experience4 ,on the other hand1 though at first ,i do not at all include the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general1 that conception still indicates an object of experience1 a part of the totality of experience1 to which ,i can still add other parts2 and this ,i do when ,i recognize by observation that bodies are heavy4 ,i can cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the characteristics of extension1 impenetrability1 shape1 etc41 all which are cogitated in this conception4 ,but now ,i extend my knowledge1 and looking back on experience from which ,i had derived this conception of body1 ,i find weight at all times connected with the above characteristics1 and therefore ,i synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate1 and say1 8,all bodies are heavy40 ,thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body1 because both conceptions1 although the one is not contained in the other1 still belong to one another 7only contingently1 however71 as parts of a whole1 namely1 of experience1 which is itself a synthesis of intuitions4 ,but to synthetical judgements priori1 such aid is entirely wanting4 ,if ,i go out of and beyond the conception ,a1 in order to recognize another ,b as connected with it1 what foundation have ,i to rest on1 whereby to render the synthesis possible8 ,i have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what ,i want4 ,let us take1 for example1 the proposition1 8,everything that happens has a cause40 ,in the conception of 8something that happens10 ,i indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes1 and from this ,i can derive analytical judgements4 ,but the conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception1 and indicates something entirely different from 8that which happens10 and is consequently not contained in that conception4 ,how then am ,i able to assert concerning the general conception--8that which happens0--something entirely different from that conception1 and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it1 yet as belonging to it1 and even necessarily8 what is here the unknown ,x1 upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found1 out of the conception ,a a foreign predicate ,b1 which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it8 ,it cannot be experience1 because the principle adduced annexes the two representations1 cause and effect1 to the representation existence1 not only with universality1 which experience cannot give1 but also with the expression of necessity1 therefore completely priori and from pure conceptions4 ,upon such synthetical1 that is augmentative propositions1 depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge priori2 for although analytical judgements are indeed highly important and necessary1 they are so1 only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis1 and this alone is a real acquisition4 ,v4 ,in all ,theoretical ,sciences of ,reason1 ,synthetical ,judgements 8 priori0 are contained as ,principles4 #a4 ,mathematical judgements are always synthetical4 ,hitherto this fact1 though incontestably true and very important in its consequences1 seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind1 nay1 to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures4 ,for as it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of contradiction 7which the nature of every apodeictic certainty requires71 people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of the science also were recognized and admitted in the same way4 ,but the notion is fallacious2 for although a synthetical proposition can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction1 this is possible only when another synthetical proposition precedes1 from which the latter is deduced1 but never of itself4 ,before all1 be it observed1 that proper mathematical propositions are always judgements priori1 and not empirical1 because they carry along with them the conception of necessity1 which cannot be given by experience4 ,if this be demurred to1 it matters not2 ,i will then limit my assertion to pure mathematics1 the very conception of which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and priori4 ,we might1 indeed at first suppose that the proposition #g #e #ab is a merely analytical proposition1 following 7according to the principle of contradiction7 from the conception of a sum of seven and five4 ,but if we regard it more narrowly1 we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one1 whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both4 ,the conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five2 and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will1 still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve4 ,we must go beyond these conceptions1 and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two--our five fingers1 for example1 or like ,segner in his ,arithmetic five points1 and so by degrees1 add the units contained in the five given in the intuition1 to the conception of seven4 ,for ,i first take the number #g1 and1 for the conception of #e calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition1 ,i add the units1 which ,i before took together to make up the number #e1 gradually now by means of the material image my hand1 to the number #g1 and by this process1 ,i at length see the number #ab arise4 ,that #g should be added to #e1 ,i have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum #g #e1 but not that this sum was equal to #ab4 ,arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical1 of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers4 ,for it will thus become quite evident that1 turn and twist our conceptions as we may1 it is impossible1 without having recourse to intuition1 to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions4 ,just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytical4 8,a straight line between two points is the shortest10 is a synthetical proposition4 ,for my conception of straight contains no notion of quantity1 but is merely qualitative4 ,the conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly an addition1 and by no analysis can it be extracted from our conception of a straight line4 ,intuition must therefore here lend its aid1 by means of which1 and thus only1 our synthesis is possible4 ,some few principles preposited by geometricians are1 indeed1 really analytical1 and depend on the principle of contradiction4 ,they serve1 however1 like identical propositions1 as links in the chain of method1 not as principles--for example1 a a1 the whole is equal to itself1 or 7ab7 -- a1 the whole is greater than its part4 ,and yet even these principles themselves1 though they derive their validity from pure conceptions1 are only admitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition4 ,what causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgements is already contained in our conception1 and that the judgement is therefore analytical1 is merely the equivocal nature of the expression4 ,we must join in thought a certain predicate to a given conception1 and this necessity cleaves already to the conception4 ,but the question is1 not what we must join in thought to the given conception1 but what we really think therein1 though only obscurely1 and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these conceptions1 necessarily indeed1 yet not as thought in the conception itself1 but by virtue of an intuition1 which must be added to the conception4 #b4 ,the science of natural philosophy 7physics7 contains in itself synthetical judgements priori1 as principles4 ,i shall adduce two propositions4 ,for instance1 the proposition1 8,in all changes of the material world1 the quantity of matter remains unchanged02 or1 that1 8,in all communication of motion1 action and reaction must always be equal40 ,in both of these1 not only is the necessity1 and therefore their origin priori clear1 but also that they are synthetical propositions4 ,for in the conception of matter1 ,i do not cogitate its permanency1 but merely its presence in space1 which it fills4 ,i therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter1 in order to think on to it something priori1 which ,i did not think in it4 ,the proposition is therefore not analytical1 but synthetical1 and nevertheless conceived priori2 and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy4 #c4 ,as to metaphysics1 even if we look upon it merely as an attempted science1 yet1 from the nature of human reason1 an indispensable one1 we find that it must contain synthetical propositions priori4 ,it is not merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect1 and thereby analytically to illustrate the conceptions which we form priori of things2 but we seek to widen the range of our priori knowledge4 ,for this purpose1 we must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the original conception--something not identical with1 nor contained in it1 and by means of synthetical judgements priori1 leave far behind us the limits of experience2 for example1 in the proposition1 8the world must have a beginning10 and such like4 ,thus metaphysics1 according to the proper aim of the science1 consists merely of synthetical propositions priori4 ,,vi4 ,the ,universal ,problem of ,pure ,reason4 ,it is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem4 ,for in this manner1 we not only facilitate our own labour1 inasmuch as we define it clearly to ourselves1 but also render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking4 ,the proper problem of pure reason1 then1 is contained in the question3 8,how are synthetical judgements priori possible80 ,that metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction1 is only to be attributed to the fact that this great problem1 and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgements1 did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers4 ,upon the solution of this problem1 or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge priori1 depends the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics4 ,among philosophers1 ,david ,hume came the nearest of all to this problem2 yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient precision1 nor did he regard the question in its universality4 ,on the contrary1 he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause 7principium causalitatis71 insisting that such proposition priori was impossible4 ,according to his conclusions1 then1 all that we term metaphysical science is a mere delusion1 arising from the fancied insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience1 and to which habit has given the appearance of necessity4 ,against this assertion1 destructive to all pure philosophy1 he would have been guarded1 had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality4 ,for he would then have perceived that1 according to his own argument1 there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science1 which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions priori--an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him4 ,in the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge priori of objects1 that is to say1 the answer to the following questions3 ,how is pure mathematical science possible8 ,how is pure natural science possible8 ,respecting these sciences1 as they do certainly exist1 it may with propriety be asked1 how they are possible8--for that they must be possible is shown by the fact of their really existing4#i ,but as to metaphysics1 the miserable progress it has hitherto made1 and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward1 far as regards its true aim1 can it be said that this science really exists1 leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence4 #i ,as to the existence of pure natural science1 or physics1 perhaps many may still express doubts4 ,but we have only to look at the different propositions which are commonly treated of at the commencement of proper 7empirical7 physical science--those1 for example1 relating to the permanence of the same quantity of matter1 the vis inertiae1 the equality of action and reaction1 etc4--to be soon convinced that they form a science of pure physics 7physica pura1 or rationalis71 which well deserves to be separately exposed as a special science1 in its whole extent1 whether that be great or confined4 ,yet1 in a certain sense1 this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given2 in other words1 metaphysics must be considered as really existing1 if not as a science1 nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind 7metaphysica naturalis74 ,for human reason1 without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge1 unceasingly progresses1 urged on by its own feeling of need1 towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason1 or principles derived therefrom2 and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics4 ,it will always exist1 so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation4 ,and now the question arises3 8,how is metaphysics1 as a natural disposition1 possible80 ,in other words1 how1 from the nature of universal human reason1 do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself1 and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well as it can8 ,but as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself1 for example1 whether the world had a beginning1 or has existed from eternity1 it has always met with unavoidable contradictions1 we must not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to metaphysics1 that is1 with the existence of the faculty of pure reason1 whence1 indeed1 some sort of metaphysical system always arises2 but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats4 ,we must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions1 or on the ability or inability of reason to form any judgement respecting them2 and therefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason1 or to set strictly defined and safe limits to its action4 ,this last question1 which arises out of the above universal problem1 would properly run thus3 8,how is metaphysics possible as a science80 ,thus1 the critique of reason leads at last1 naturally and necessarily1 to science2 and1 on the other hand1 the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions1 against which others equally specious can always be set1 thus ending unavoidably in scepticism4 ,besides1 this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity1 because it has not to do with objects of reason1 the variety of which is inexhaustible1 but merely with ,reason herself and her problems2 problems which arise out of her own bosom1 and are not proposed to her by the nature of outward things1 but by her own nature4 ,and when once ,reason has previously become able completely to understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets with in experience1 it will be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted application to objects beyond the confines of experience4 ,we may and must1 therefore1 regard the attempts hitherto made to establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent4 ,for what of analysis1 that is1 mere dissection of conceptions1 is contained in one or other1 is not the aim of1 but only a preparation for metaphysics proper1 which has for its object the extension1 by means of synthesis1 of our priori knowledge4 ,and for this purpose1 mere analysis is of course useless1 because it only shows what is contained in these conceptions1 but not how we arrive1 priori1 at them2 and this it is her duty to show1 in order to be able afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of experience1 to all knowledge in general4 ,but little self-denial1 indeed1 is needed to give up these pretensions1 seeing the undeniable1 and in the dogmatic mode of procedure1 inevitable contradictions of ,reason with herself1 have long since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time4 ,it will require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from within1 and opposition from without1 from endeavouring1 by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed1 to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason--a science from which every branch it has borne may be cut away1 but whose roots remain indestructible4 ,,vii4 ,idea and ,division of a ,particular ,science1 under the ,name of a ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,from all that has been said1 there results the idea of a particular science1 which may be called the ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,for reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge priori4 ,hence1 pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely priori4 ,an organon of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all pure cognitions priori can be obtained4 ,the completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason4 ,as this1 however1 is demanding a great deal1 and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible1 or1 if so1 in what cases2 we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure reason1 its sources and limits1 as the propdeutic to a system of pure reason4 ,such a science must not be called a doctrine1 but only a critique of pure reason2 and its use1 in regard to speculation1 would be only negative1 not to enlarge the bounds of1 but to purify1 our reason1 and to shield it against error--which alone is no little gain4 ,i apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects1 so far as this mode of cognition is possible priori4 ,a system of such conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy4 ,but this1 again1 is still beyond the bounds of our present essay4 ,for as such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical priori1 but of our analytical priori knowledge1 it is of too wide a range for our present purpose1 because we do not require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand1 in their full extent1 the principles of synthesis priori1 with which alone we have to do4 ,this investigation1 which we cannot properly call a doctrine1 but only a transcendental critique1 because it aims not at the enlargement1 but at the correction and guidance1 of our knowledge1 and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge priori1 is the sole object of our present essay4 ,such a critique is consequently1 as far as possible1 a preparation for an organon2 and if this new organon should be found to fail1 at least for a canon of pure reason1 according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason1 whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason1 might one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically4 ,for that this is possible1 nay1 that such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being completed1 is evident4 ,for we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects1 which is infinite1 but solely with the mind1 which judges of the nature of objects1 and1 again1 with the mind only in respect of its cognition priori4 ,and the object of our investigations1 as it is not to be sought without1 but1 altogether within1 ourselves1 cannot remain concealed1 and in all probability is limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly estimated1 according to its worth or worthlessness4 ,still less let the reader here expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason2 our present object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself4 ,only when we make this critique our foundation1 do we possess a pure touchstone for estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on this subject2 and without this criterion1 the incompetent historian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others with his own1 which have themselves just as little foundation4 ,transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science1 for which the ,critique of ,pure ,reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically1 that is1 from principles1 with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building4 ,it is the system of all the principles of pure reason4 ,if this ,critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy1 it is only because1 to be a complete system1 it ought to contain a full analysis of all human knowledge priori4 ,our critique must1 indeed1 lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge4 ,but from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves1 as also from a complete investigation of those derived from them1 it abstains with reason2 partly because it would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis1 since this process is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the synthesis1 to which our critique is entirely devoted1 and partly because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction1 with which1 after all1 we have at present nothing to do4 ,this completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions1 as well as of the deduction from the conceptions priori which may be given by the analysis1 we can1 however1 easily attain1 provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions1 which are to serve as principles of the synthesis1 and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting4 ,to the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 therefore1 belongs all that constitutes transcendental philosophy2 and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy1 but still not the science itself2 because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge priori4 ,the principal thing we must attend to1 in the division of the parts of a science like this1 is that no conceptions must enter it which contain aught empirical2 in other words1 that the knowledge priori must be completely pure4 ,hence1 although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions priori1 yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy2 because1 though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain1 pleasure1 desires1 inclinations1 etc4 7which are all of empirical origin71 at the foundation of its precepts1 yet still into the conception of duty--as an obstacle to be overcome1 or as an incitement which should not be made into a motive--these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter1 in the construction of a system of pure morality4 ,transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason4 ,for all that is practical1 so far as it contains motives1 relates to feelings1 and these belong to empirical sources of cognition4 ,if we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a science in general1 it ought to comprehend1 first1 a ,doctrine of the ,elements1 and1 secondly1 a ,doctrine of the ,method of pure reason4 ,each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions1 the separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize4 ,only so much seems necessary1 by way of introduction of premonition1 that there are two sources of human knowledge 7which probably spring from a common1 but to us unknown root71 namely1 sense and understanding4 ,by the former1 objects are given to us2 by the latter1 thought4 ,so far as the faculty of sense may contain representations priori1 which form the conditions under which objects are given1 in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy4 ,the transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science of elements1 because the conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are thought4 ,i4 ,,transcendental ,,doctrine ,,of ,,elements4 ,,first ,,part4 ,,transcendental ,,sthetic4 ,i4 ,introductory4 ,in whatsoever mode1 or by whatsoever means1 our knowledge may relate to objects1 it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition4 ,to this as the indispensable groundwork1 all thought points4 ,but an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us4 ,this1 again1 is only possible1 to man at least1 on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner4 ,the capacity for receiving representations 7receptivity7 through the mode in which we are affected by objects1 objects1 is called sensibility4 ,by means of sensibility1 therefore1 objects are given to us1 and it alone furnishes us with intuitions2 by the understanding they are thought1 and from it arise conceptions4 ,but an thought must directly1 or indirectly1 by means of certain signs1 relate ultimately to intuitions2 consequently1 with us1 to sensibility1 because in no other way can an object be given to us4 ,the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation1 so far as we are affected by the said object1 is sensation4 ,that sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition4 ,the undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon4 ,that which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation1 ,i term its matter2 but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations1 ,i call its form4 ,but that in which our sensations are merely arranged1 and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form1 cannot be itself sensation4 ,it is1 then1 the matter of all phenomena that is given to us posteriori2 the form must lie ready priori for them in the mind1 and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation4 ,i call all representations pure1 in the transcendental meaning of the word1 wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation4 ,and accordingly we find existing in the mind priori1 the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general1 in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations4 ,this pure form of sensibility ,i shall call pure intuition4 ,thus1 if ,i take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it1 as substance1 force1 divisibility1 etc41 and also whatever belongs to sensation1 as impenetrability1 hardness1 colour1 etc42 yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition1 namely1 extension and shape4 ,these belong to pure intuition1 which exists priori in the mind1 as a mere form of sensibility1 and without any real object of the senses or any sensation4 ,the science of all the principles of sensibility priori1 ,i call transcendental sthetic4#aj ,there must1 then1 be such a science forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements1 in contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought1 and which is called transcendental logic4 #aj ,the ,germans are the only people who at present use this word to indicate what others call the critique of taste4 ,at the foundation of this term lies the disappointed hope1 which the eminent analyst1 ,baumgarten1 conceived1 of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to principles of reason1 and so of elevating its rules into a science4 ,but his endeavours were vain4 ,for the said rules or criteria are1 in respect to their chief sources1 merely empirical1 consequently never can serve as determinate laws priori1 by which our judgement in matters of taste is to be directed4 ,it is rather our judgement which forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles4 ,on this account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as designating the critique of taste1 and to apply it solely to that doctrine1 which is true science--the science of the laws of sensibility--and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of the ancients in their well-known division of the objects of cognition into aiotheta kai noeta1 or to share it with speculative philosophy1 and employ it partly in a transcendental1 partly in a psychological signification4 ,in the science of transcendental sthetic accordingly1 we shall first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty1 by separating from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding1 so that nothing be left but empirical intuition4 ,in the next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation1 so that nothing may remain but pure intuition1 and the mere form of phenomena1 which is all that the sensibility can afford priori4 ,from this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition1 as principles of knowledge priori1 namely1 space and time4 ,to the consideration of these we shall now proceed4 ,,section ,i4 ,of ,space4 #b4 ,metaphysical ,exposition of this ,conception4 ,by means of the external sense 7a property of the mind71 we represent to ourselves objects as without us1 and these all in space4 ,herein alone are their shape1 dimensions1 and relations to each other determined or determinable4 ,the internal sense1 by means of which the mind contemplates itself or its internal state1 gives1 indeed1 no intuition of the soul as an object2 yet there is nevertheless a determinate form1 under which alone the contemplation of our internal state is possible1 so that all which relates to the inward determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time4 ,of time we cannot have any external intuition1 any more than we can have an internal intuition of space4 ,what then are time and space8 ,are they real existences8 ,or1 are they merely relations or determinations of things1 such1 however1 as would equally belong to these things in themselves1 though they should never become objects of intuition2 or1 are they such as belong only to the form of intuition1 and consequently to the subjective constitution of the mind1 without which these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any object8 ,in order to become informed on these points1 we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space4 ,by exposition1 ,i mean the clear1 though not detailed1 representation of that which belongs to a conception2 and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception as given priori4 #a4 ,space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences4 ,for1 in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me 7that is1 to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which ,i am72 in like manner1 in order that ,i may represent them not merely as without1 of1 and near to each other1 but also in separate places1 the representation of space must already exist as a foundation4 ,consequently1 the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience2 but1 on the contrary1 this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation4 #b4 ,space then is a necessary representation priori1 which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions4 ,we never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space1 though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it4 ,it must1 therefore1 be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena1 and by no means as a determination dependent on them1 and is a representation priori1 which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena4 #c4 ,space is no discursive1 or as we say1 general conception of the relations of things1 but a pure intuition4 ,for1 in the first place1 we can only represent to ourselves one space1 and1 when we talk of divers spaces1 we mean only parts of one and the same space4 ,moreover1 these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space1 as the component parts from which the aggregate can be made up1 but can be cogitated only as existing in it4 ,space is essentially one1 and multiplicity in it1 consequently the general notion of spaces1 of this or that space1 depends solely upon limitations4 ,hence it follows that an priori intuition 7which is not empirical7 lies at the root of all our conceptions of space4 ,thus1 moreover1 the principles of geometry--for example1 that 8in a triangle1 two sides together are greater than the third10 are never deduced from general conceptions of line and triangle1 but from intuition1 and this priori1 with apodeictic certainty4 #d4 ,space is represented as an infinite given quantity4 ,now every conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations1 which1 therefore1 comprises these under itself2 but no conception1 as such1 can be so conceived1 as if it contained within itself an infinite multitude of representations4 ,nevertheless1 space is so conceived of1 for all parts of space are equally capable of being produced to infinity4 ,consequently1 the original representation of space is an intuition priori1 and not a conception4 #c4 ,transcendental ,exposition of the ,conception of ,space4 ,by a transcendental exposition1 ,i mean the explanation of a conception1 as a principle1 whence can be discerned the possibility of other synthetical priori cognitions4 ,for this purpose1 it is requisite1 firstly1 that such cognitions do really flow from the given conception2 and1 secondly1 that the said cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given mode of explaining this conception4 ,geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically1 and yet priori4 ,what1 then1 must be our representation of space1 in order that such a cognition of it may be possible8 ,it must be originally intuition1 for from a mere conception1 no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception1 and yet this happens in geometry4 7,introd4 ,v47 ,but this intuition must be found in the mind priori1 that is1 before any perception of objects1 consequently must be pure1 not empirical1 intuition4 ,for geometrical principles are always apodeictic1 that is1 united with the consciousness of their necessity1 as3 8,space has only three dimensions40 ,but propositions of this kind cannot be empirical judgements1 nor conclusions from them4 7,introd4 ,,ii47 ,now1 how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves1 and in which our conception of objects can be determined priori1 exist in the human mind8 ,obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only1 as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected by objects1 and thereby of obtaining immediate representation1 that is1 intuition2 consequently1 only as the form of the external sense in general4 ,thus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility of geometry1 as a synthetical science priori1 becomes comprehensible4 ,every mode of explanation which does not show us this possibility1 although in appearance it may be similar to ours1 can with the utmost certainty be distinguished from it by these marks4 #d4 ,conclusions from the foregoing ,conceptions4 7a7 ,space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves1 nor does it represent them in their relations to each other2 in other words1 space does not represent to us any determination of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves1 and would remain1 even though all subjective conditions of the intuition were abstracted4 ,for neither absolute nor relative determinations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong1 and therefore not priori4 7b7 ,space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense1 that is1 the subjective condition of the sensibility1 under which alone external intuition is possible4 ,now1 because the receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects1 it is easily understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the mind previous to all actual perceptions1 therefore priori1 and how it1 as a pure intuition1 in which all objects must be determined1 can contain principles of the relations of these objects prior to all experience4 ,it is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space1 extended objects1 etc4 ,if we depart from the subjective condition1 under which alone we can obtain external intuition1 or1 in other words1 by means of which we are affected by objects1 the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever4 ,this predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us1 that is1 are objects of sensibility4 ,the constant form of this receptivity1 which we call sensibility1 is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us1 and when abstraction of these objects is made1 is a pure intuition1 to which we give the name of space4 ,it is clear that we cannot make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things1 but only of the possibility of their existence as far as they are phenomena4 ,and so we may correctly say that space contains all which can appear to us externally1 but not all things considered as things in themselves1 be they intuited or not1 or by whatsoever subject one will4 ,as to the intuitions of other thinking beings1 we cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition1 and which for us are universally valid4 ,if we join the limitation of a judgement to the conception of the subject1 then the judgement will possess unconditioned validity4 ,for example1 the proposition1 8,all objects are beside each other in space10 is valid only under the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition4 ,but if ,i join the condition to the conception and say1 8,all things1 as external phenomena1 are beside each other in space10 then the rule is valid universally1 and without any limitation4 ,our expositions1 consequently1 teach the reality 7i4e41 the objective validity7 of space in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as object1 and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves1 that is1 without reference to the constitution of our sensibility4 ,we maintain1 therefore1 the empirical reality of space in regard to all possible external experience1 although we must admit its transcendental ideality2 in other words1 that it is nothing1 so soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves4 ,but1 with the exception of space1 there is no representation1 subjective and referring to something external to us1 which could be called objective priori4 ,for there are no other subjective representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions priori1 as we can from the intuition of space4 7,see #c47 ,therefore1 to speak accurately1 no ideality whatever belongs to these1 although they agree in this respect with the representation of space1 that they belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of sensuous perception2 such a mode1 for example1 as that of sight1 of hearing1 and of feeling1 by means of the sensations of colour1 sound1 and heat1 but which1 because they are only sensations and not intuitions1 do not of themselves give us the cognition of any object1 least of all1 an priori cognition4 ,my purpose1 in the above remark1 is merely this3 to guard any one against illustrating the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insufficient1 for example1 by colour1 taste1 etc42 for these must be contemplated not as properties of things1 but only as changes in the subject1 changes which may be different in different men4 ,for1 in such a case1 that which is originally a mere phenomenon1 a rose1 for example1 is taken by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself1 though to every different eye1 in respect of its colour1 it may appear different4 ,on the contrary1 the transcendental conception of phenomena in space is a critical admonition1 that1 in general1 nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself1 and that space is not a form which belongs as a property to things2 but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves1 and what we call outward objects1 are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility1 whose form is space1 but whose real correlate1 the thing in itself1 is not known by means of these representations1 nor ever can be1 but respecting which1 in experience1 no inquiry is ever made4 ,,section ,,ii4 ,of ,time4 #e4 ,metaphysical ,exposition of this ,conception4 #a4 ,time is not an empirical conception4 ,for neither coexistence nor succession would be perceived by us1 if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation priori4 ,without this presupposition we could not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and the same time1 or at different times1 that is1 contemporaneously1 or in succession4 #b4 ,time is a necessary representation1 lying at the foundation of all our intuitions4 ,with regard to phenomena in general1 we cannot think away time from them1 and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time1 but we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phenomena4 ,time is therefore given priori4 ,in it alone is all reality of phenomena possible4 ,these may all be annihilated in thought1 but time itself1 as the universal condition of their possibility1 cannot be so annulled4 #c4 ,on this necessity priori is also founded the possibility of apodeictic principles of the relations of time1 or axioms of time in general1 such as3 8,time has only one dimension10 8,different times are not coexistent but successive0 7as different spaces are not successive but coexistent74 ,these principles cannot be derived from experience1 for it would give neither strict universality1 nor apodeictic certainty4 ,we should only be able to say1 8so common experience teaches us10 but not 8it must be so40 ,they are valid as rules1 through which1 in general1 experience is possible2 and they instruct us respecting experience1 and not by means of it4 #d4 ,time is not a discursive1 or as it is called1 general conception1 but a pure form of the sensuous intuition4 ,different times are merely parts of one and the same time4 ,but the representation which can only be given by a single object is an intuition4 ,besides1 the proposition that different times cannot be coexistent could not be derived from a general conception4 ,for this proposition is synthetical1 and therefore cannot spring out of conceptions alone4 ,it is therefore contained immediately in the intuition and representation of time4 #e4 ,the infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one time lying at the foundation4 ,consequently1 the original representation1 time1 must be given as unlimited4 ,but as the determinate representation of the parts of time and of every quantity of an object can only be obtained by limitation1 the complete representation of time must not be furnished by means of conceptions1 for these contain only partial representations4 ,conceptions1 on the contrary1 must have immediate intuition for their basis4 #f ,transcendental ,exposition of the ,conception of ,time4 ,i may here refer to what is said above 7 #e1 #c71 where1 for or sake of brevity1 ,i have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition1 that which is properly transcendental4 ,here ,i shall add that the conception of change1 and with it the conception of motion1 as change of place1 is possible only through and in the representation of time2 that if this representation were not an intuition 7internal7 priori1 no conception1 of whatever kind1 could render comprehensible the possibility of change1 in other words1 of a conjunction of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object1 for example1 the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the same thing in the same place4 ,it is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing1 that is1 after each other4 ,thus our conception of time explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowledge priori1 as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion1 which is not a little fruitful4 #g4 ,conclusions from the above ,conceptions4 7a7 ,time is not something which subsists of itself1 or which inheres in things as an objective determination1 and therefore remains1 when abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of things4 ,for in the former case1 it would be something real1 yet without presenting to any power of perception any real object4 ,in the latter case1 as an order or determination inherent in things themselves1 it could not be antecedent to things1 as their condition1 nor discerned or intuited by means of synthetical propositions priori4 ,but all this is quite possible when we regard time as merely the subjective condition under which all our intuitions take place4 ,for in that case1 this form of the inward intuition can be represented prior to the objects1 and consequently priori4 7b7 ,time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense1 that is1 of the intuitions of self and of our internal state4 ,for time cannot be any determination of outward phenomena4 ,it has to do neither with shape nor position2 on the contrary1 it determines the relation of representations in our internal state4 ,and precisely because this internal intuition presents to us no shape or form1 we endeavour to supply this want by analogies1 and represent the course of time by a line progressing to infinity1 the content of which constitutes a series which is only of one dimension2 and we conclude from the properties of this line as to all the properties of time1 with this single exception1 that the parts of the line are coexistent1 whilst those of time are successive4 ,from this it is clear also that the representation of time is itself an intuition1 because all its relations can be expressed in an external intuition4 7c7 ,time is the formal condition priori of all phenomena whatsoever4 ,space1 as the pure form of external intuition1 is limited as a condition priori to external phenomena alone4 ,on the other hand1 because all representations1 whether they have or have not external things for their objects1 still in themselves1 as determinations of the mind1 belong to our internal state2 and because this internal state is subject to the formal condition of the internal intuition1 that is1 to time--time is a condition priori of all phenomena whatsoever--the immediate condition of all internal1 and thereby the mediate condition of all external phenomena4 ,if ,i can say priori1 8,all outward phenomena are in space1 and determined priori according to the relations of space10 ,i can also1 from the principle of the internal sense1 affirm universally1 8,all phenomena in general1 that is1 all objects of the senses1 are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time40 ,if we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all external intuitions1 possible only by virtue of this internal intuition and presented to us by our faculty of representation1 and consequently take objects as they are in themselves1 then time is nothing4 ,it is only of objective validity in regard to phenomena1 because these are things which we regard as objects of our senses4 ,it no longer objective we1 make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition1 in other words1 of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us1 and speak of things in general4 ,time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our 7human7 intuition 7which is always sensuous1 that is1 so far as we are affected by objects71 and in itself1 independently of the mind or subject1 is nothing4 ,nevertheless1 in respect of all phenomena1 consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our experience1 it is necessarily objective4 ,we cannot say1 8,all things are in time10 because in this conception of things in general1 we abstract and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things4 ,but this is the proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of objects4 ,if we add the condition to the conception1 and say1 8,all things1 as phenomena1 that is1 objects of sensuous intuition1 are in time10 then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality priori4 ,what we have now set forth teaches1 therefore1 the empirical reality of time2 that is1 its objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be presented to our senses4 ,and as our intuition is always sensuous1 no object ever can be presented to us in experience1 which does not come under the conditions of time4 ,on the other hand1 we deny to time all claim to absolute reality2 that is1 we deny that it1 without having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition1 absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property4 ,such properties as belong to objects as things in themselves never can be presented to us through the medium of the senses4 ,herein consists1 therefore1 the transcendental ideality of time1 according to which1 if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition1 it is nothing1 and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves1 independently of its relation to our intuition4 ,this ideality1 like that of space1 is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations1 for this reason--that in such arguments or illustrations1 we make the presupposition that the phenomenon1 in which such and such predicates inhere1 has objective reality1 while in this case we can only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical1 that is1 regards the object as a mere phenomenon4 ,in reference to this subject1 see the remark in ,section ,i 7 #d7 #h4 ,elucidation4 ,against this theory1 which grants empirical reality to time1 but denies to it absolute and transcendental reality1 ,i have heard from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that ,i conclude that it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these considerations are novel4 ,it runs thus3 8,changes are real0 7this the continual change in our own representations demonstrates1 even though the existence of all external phenomena1 together with their changes1 is denied74 ,now1 changes are only possible in time1 and therefore time must be something real4 ,but there is no difficulty in answering this4 ,i grant the whole argument4 ,time1 no doubt1 is something real1 that is1 it is the real form of our internal intuition4 ,it therefore has subjective reality1 in reference to our internal experience1 that is1 ,i have really the representation of time and of my determinations therein4 ,time1 therefore1 is not to be regarded as an object1 but as the mode of representation of myself as an object4 ,but if ,i could intuite myself1 or be intuited by another being1 without this condition of sensibility1 then those very determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes1 would present to us a knowledge in which the representation of time1 and consequently of change1 would not appear4 ,the empirical reality of time1 therefore1 remains1 as the condition of all our experience4 ,but absolute reality1 according to what has been said above1 cannot be granted it4 ,time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition4#aa ,if we take away from it the special condition of our sensibility1 the conception of time also vanishes2 and it inheres not in the objects themselves1 but solely in the subject 7or mind7 which intuites them4 #aa ,i can indeed say 8my representations follow one another1 or are successive02 but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a succession1 that is1 according to the form of the internal sense4 ,time1 therefore1 is not a thing in itself1 nor is it any objective determination pertaining to1 or inherent in things4 ,but the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought against our doctrine of time1 and that too by disputants who cannot start any intelligible arguments against the doctrine of the ideality of space1 is this--they have no hope of demonstrating apodeictically the absolute reality of space1 because the doctrine of idealism is against them1 according to which the reality of external objects is not capable of any strict proof4 ,on the other hand1 the reality of the object of our internal sense 7that is1 myself and my internal state7 is clear immediately through consciousness4 ,the former--external objects in space--might be a mere delusion1 but the latter--the object of my internal perception--is undeniably real4 ,they do not1 however1 reflect that both1 without question of their reality as representations1 belong only to the genus phenomenon1 which has always two aspects1 the one1 the object considered as a thing in itself1 without regard to the mode of intuiting it1 and the nature of which remains for this very reason problematical1 the other1 the form of our intuition of the object1 which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself1 but in the subject to which it appears--which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object4 ,time and space are1 therefore1 two sources of knowledge1 from which1 priori1 various synthetical cognitions can be drawn4 ,of this we find a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations1 which form the foundation of pure mathematics4 ,they are the two pure forms of all intuitions1 and thereby make synthetical propositions priori possible4 ,but these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our sensibility1 do therefore1 and as such1 strictly determine their own range and purpose1 in that they do not and cannot present objects as things in themselves1 but are applicable to them solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous phenomena4 ,the sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity1 and if we venture out of this1 no further objective use can be made of them4 ,for the rest1 this formal reality of time and space leaves the validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken2 for our certainty in that respect is equally firm1 whether these forms necessarily inhere in the things themselves1 or only in our intuitions of them4 ,on the other hand1 those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space1 whether as essentially subsisting1 or only inhering1 as modifications1 in things1 must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself4 ,for1 if they decide for the first view1 and make space and time into substances1 this being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers1 they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities1 infinite and eternal1 which exist 7yet without there being anything real7 for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real4 ,if they adopt the second view of inherence1 which is preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers1 and regard space and time as relations 7contiguity in space or succession in time71 abstracted from experience1 though represented confusedly in this state of separation1 they find themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathematical doctrines priori in reference to real things 7for example1 in space7--at all events their apodeictic certainty4 ,for such certainty cannot be found in an posteriori proposition2 and the conceptions priori of space and time are1 according to this opinion1 mere creations of the imagination1 having their source really in experience1 inasmuch as1 out of relations abstracted from experience1 imagination has made up something which contains1 indeed1 general statements of these relations1 yet of which no application can be made without the restrictions attached thereto by nature4 ,the former of these parties gains this advantage1 that they keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical science4 ,on the other hand1 these very conditions 7space and time7 embarrass them greatly1 when the understanding endeavours to pass the limits of that sphere4 ,the latter has1 indeed1 this advantage1 that the representations of space and time do not come in their way when they wish to judge of objects1 not as phenomena1 but merely in their relation to the understanding4 ,devoid1 however1 of a true and objectively valid priori intuition1 they can neither furnish any basis for the possibility of mathematical cognitions priori1 nor bring the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with those of mathematics4 ,in our theory of the true nature of these two original forms of the sensibility1 both difficulties are surmounted4 ,in conclusion1 that transcendental sthetic cannot contain any more than these two elements--space and time1 is sufficiently obvious from the fact that all other conceptions appertaining to sensibility1 even that of motion1 which unites in itself both elements1 presuppose something empirical4 ,motion1 for example1 presupposes the perception of something movable4 ,but space considered in itself contains nothing movable1 consequently motion must be something which is found in space only through experience--in other words1 an empirical datum4 ,in like manner1 transcendental sthetic cannot number the conception of change among its data priori2 for time itself does not change1 but only something which is in time4 ,to acquire the conception of change1 therefore1 the perception of some existing object and of the succession of its determinations1 in one word1 experience1 is necessary4 #i4 ,general ,remarks on ,transcendental sthetic4 ,i4 ,in order to prevent any misunderstanding1 it will be requisite1 in the first place1 to recapitulate1 as clearly as possible1 what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general4 ,we have intended1 then1 to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena2 that the things which we intuite1 are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition1 nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us2 and that if we take away the subject1 or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general1 then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time1 but even space and time themselves disappear2 and that these1 as phenomena1 cannot exist in themselves1 but only in us4 ,what may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us4 ,we know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them1 which is peculiar to us1 and which1 though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being1 is so to the whole human race4 ,with this alone we have to do4 ,space and time are the pure forms thereof2 sensation the matter4 ,the former alone can we cognize priori1 that is1 antecedent to all actual perception2 and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition4 ,the latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition posteriori1 that is1 empirical intuition4 ,the former appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility1 of whatsoever kind our sensations may be2 the latter may be of very diversified character4 ,supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree of clearness1 we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves4 ,for we could only1 at best1 arrive at a complete cognition of our own mode of intuition1 that is of our sensibility1 and this always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject1 namely1 the conditions of space and time2 while the question3 8,what are objects considered as things in themselves80 remains unanswerable even after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world4 ,to say1 then1 that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs to them as things in themselves1 and this under an accumulation of characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot distinguish in consciousness1 is a falsification of the conception of sensibility and phenomenization1 which renders our whole doctrine thereof empty and useless4 ,the difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with content4 ,no doubt the conception of right1 as employed by a sound understanding1 contains all that the most subtle investigation could unfold from it1 although1 in the ordinary practical use of the word1 we are not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in the conception4 ,but we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary conception is a sensuous one1 containing a mere phenomenon1 for right cannot appear as a phenomenon2 but the conception of it lies in the understanding1 and represents a property 7the moral property7 of actions1 which belongs to them in themselves4 ,on the other hand1 the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could belong to an object considered as a thing in itself1 but merely the phenomenon or appearance of something1 and the mode in which we are affected by that appearance2 and this receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility1 and remains toto caelo different from the cognition of an object in itself1 even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom4 ,it must be admitted that the ,leibnitz-,wolfian philosophy has assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations into the nature and origin of our cognitions1 inasmuch as it regards the distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely logical1 whereas it is plainly transcendental1 and concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity1 but the content and origin of both4 ,for the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in themselves1 but1 in fact1 gives us no knowledge of these at all4 ,on the contrary1 so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective nature1 the object represented1 with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition1 entirely disappears1 because it was only this subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a phenomenon4 ,in phenomena1 we commonly1 indeed1 distinguish that which essentially belongs to the intuition of them1 and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being1 from that which belongs to the same intuition accidentally1 as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general1 but for a particular state or organization of this or that sense4 ,accordingly1 we are accustomed to say that the former is a cognition which represents the object itself1 whilst the latter presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof4 ,this distinction1 however1 is only empirical4 ,if we stop here 7as is usual71 and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon 7as we ought to do71 in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found1 our transcendental distinction is lost1 and we believe that we cognize objects as things in themselves1 although in the whole range of the sensuous world1 investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may1 we have to do with nothing but phenomena4 ,thus1 we call the rainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower1 and the rain1 the reality or thing in itself2 and this is right enough1 if we understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense1 that is1 as that which in universal experience1 and under whatever conditions of sensuous perception1 is known in intuition to be so and so determined1 and not otherwise4 ,but if we consider this empirical datum generally1 and inquire1 without reference to its accordance with all our senses1 whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object as a thing in itself 7the raindrops of course are not such1 for they are1 as phenomena1 empirical objects71 the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental2 and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena1 but even their circular form1 nay1 the space itself through which they fall1 is nothing in itself1 but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition1 whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown4 ,the second important concern of our sthetic is that it does not obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis1 but possess as undoubted a character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory which is to serve for an organon4 ,in order fully to convince the reader of this certainty1 we shall select a case which will serve to make its validity apparent1 and also to illustrate what has been said in #c4 ,suppose1 then1 that space and time are in themselves objective1 and conditions of the--possibility of objects as things in themselves4 ,in the first place1 it is evident that both present us1 with very many apodeictic and synthetic propositions priori1 but especially space--and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at present4 ,as the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically priori1 and with apodeictic certainty1 ,i inquire3 ,whence do you obtain propositions of this kind1 and on what basis does the understanding rest1 in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths8 ,there is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions1 as such2 and these are given either priori or posteriori4 ,the latter1 namely1 empirical conceptions1 together with the empirical intuition on which they are founded1 cannot afford any synthetical proposition1 except such as is itself also empirical1 that is1 a proposition of experience4 ,but an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of necessity and absolute universality1 which1 nevertheless1 are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions4 ,as to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions1 namely1 through mere conceptions or intuitions priori1 it is quite clear that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions1 but only analytical ones1 can be obtained4 ,take1 for example1 the proposition3 8,two straight lines cannot enclose a space1 and with these alone no figure is possible10 and try to deduce it from the conception of a straight line and the number two2 or take the proposition3 8,it is possible to construct a figure with three straight lines10 and endeavour1 in like manner1 to deduce it from the mere conception of a straight line and the number three4 ,all your endeavours are in vain1 and you find yourself forced to have recourse to intuition1 as1 in fact1 geometry always does4 ,you therefore give yourself an object in intuition4 ,but of what kind is this intuition8 ,is it a pure priori1 or is it an empirical intuition8 ,if the latter1 then neither an universally valid1 much less an apodeictic proposition can arise from it1 for experience never can give us any such proposition4 ,you must1 therefore1 give yourself an object priori in intuition1 and upon that ground your synthetical proposition4 ,now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition priori2 if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the universal condition priori under which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible2 if the object 7that is1 the triangle7 were something in itself1 without relation to you the subject2 how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle1 must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself8 ,for to your conceptions of three lines1 you could not add anything new 7that is1 the figure72 which1 therefore1 must necessarily be found in the object1 because the object is given before your cognition1 and not by means of it4 ,if1 therefore1 space 7and time also7 were not a mere form of your intuition1 which contains conditions priori1 under which alone things can become external objects for you1 and without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves nothing1 you could not construct any synthetical proposition whatsoever regarding external objects4 ,it is therefore not merely possible or probable1 but indubitably certain1 that space and time1 as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal experience1 are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions1 in relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena1 and not things in themselves1 presented to us in this particular manner4 ,and for this reason1 in respect to the form of phenomena1 much may be said priori1 whilst of the thing in itself1 which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena1 it is impossible to say anything4 ,,ii4 ,in confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as well as internal sense1 consequently of all objects of sense1 as mere phenomena1 we may especially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations4 7,the feelings of pain and pleasure1 and the will1 which are not cognitions1 are excepted47 ,the relations1 to wit1 of place in an intuition 7extension71 change of place 7motion71 and laws according to which this change is determined 7moving forces74 ,that1 however1 which is present in this or that place1 or any operation going on1 or result taking place in the things themselves1 with the exception of change of place1 is not given to us by intuition4 ,now by means of mere relations1 a thing cannot be known in itself2 and it may therefore be fairly concluded1 that1 as through the external sense nothing but mere representations of relations are given us1 the said external sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the object to the subject1 but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself4 ,the same is the case with the internal intuition1 not only because1 in the internal intuition1 the representation of the external senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied2 but because time1 in which we place1 and which itself antecedes the consciousness of1 these representations in experience1 and which1 as the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the mind1 lies at the foundation of them1 contains relations of the successive1 the coexistent1 and of that which always must be coexistent with succession1 the permanent4 ,now that which1 as representation1 can antecede every exercise of thought 7of an object71 is intuition2 and when it contains nothing but relations1 it is the form of the intuition1 which1 as it presents us with no representation1 except in so far as something is placed in the mind1 can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity1 to wit--its presenting to itself representations1 consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself2 that is1 it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form4 ,everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far phenomenal2 consequently1 we must either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense1 or the subject1 which is the object of that sense1 could only be represented by it as phenomenon1 and not as it would judge of itself1 if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity1 that is1 were intellectual4 ,the difficulty here lies wholly in the question3 ,how can the subject have an internal intuition of itself8 ,but this difficulty is common to every theory4 ,the consciousness of self 7apperception7 is the simple representation of the 8ego02 and if by means of that representation alone1 all the manifold representations in the subject were spontaneously given1 then our internal intuition would be intellectual4 ,this consciousness in man requires an internal perception of the manifold representations which are previously given in the subject2 and the manner in which these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity1 must1 on account of this difference 7the want of spontaneity71 be called sensibility4 ,if the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what lies in the mind1 it must all act that and can in this way alone produce an intuition of self4 ,but the form of this intuition1 which lies in the original constitution of the mind1 determines1 in the representation of time1 the manner in which the manifold representations are to combine themselves in the mind2 since the subject intuites itself1 not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously1 but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected1 consequently1 as it appears1 and not as it is4 ,,iii4 ,when we say that the intuition of external objects1 and also the self-intuition of the subject1 represent both1 objects and subject1 in space and time1 as they affect our senses1 that is1 as they appear--this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances4 ,for when we speak of things as phenomena1 the objects1 nay1 even the properties which we ascribe to them1 are looked upon as really given2 only that1 in so far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject1 in the relation of the given object to the subject1 the object as phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself4 ,thus ,i do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me1 or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness1 although ,i maintain that the properties of space and time1 in conformity to which ,i set both1 as the condition of their existence1 abide in my mode of intuition1 and not in the objects in themselves4 ,it would be my own fault1 if out of that which ,i should reckon as phenomenon1 ,i made mere illusory appearance4#ab ,but this will not happen1 because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous intuitions4 ,on the contrary1 if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation1 it becomes impossible to avoid changing everything into mere appearance4 ,for if we regard space and time as properties1 which must be found in objects as things in themselves1 as sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence1 and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved1 inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite things1 which are nevertheless not substances1 nor anything really inhering in substances1 nay1 to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the existence of all things1 and moreover1 that they must continue to exist1 although all existing things were annihilated--we cannot blame the good ,berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances4 ,nay1 even our own existence1 which would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity as time1 would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance--an absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of4 #ab ,the predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object itself in relation to our sensuous faculty2 for example1 the red colour or the perfume to the rose4 ,but 7illusory7 appearance never can be attributed as a predicate to an object1 for this very reason1 that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it only in relation to our sensuous faculty1 or to the subject in general1 e4g41 the two handles which were formerly ascribed to ,saturn4 ,that which is never to be found in the object itself1 but always in the relation of the object to the subject1 and which moreover is inseparable from our representation of the object1 we denominate phenomenon4 ,thus the predicates of space and time are rightly attributed to objects of the senses as such1 and in this there is no illusion4 ,on the contrary1 if ,i ascribe redness of the rose as a thing in itself1 or to ,saturn his handles1 or extension to all external objects1 considered as things in themselves1 without regarding the determinate relation of these objects to the subject1 and without limiting my judgement to that relation--then1 and then only1 arises illusion4 ,,iv4 ,in natural theology1 where we think of an object--,god--which never can be an object of intuition to us1 and even to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition1 we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time--and intuition all his cognition must be1 and not thought1 which always includes limitation4 ,but with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as things in themselves1 and such1 moreover1 as would continue to exist as priori conditions of the existence of things1 even though the things themselves were annihilated8 ,for as conditions of all existence in general1 space and time must be conditions of the existence of the ,supreme ,being also4 ,but if we do not thus make them objective forms of all things1 there is no other way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of intuition--external and internal2 which is called sensuous1 because it is not primitive1 that is1 is not such as gives in itself the existence of the object of the intuition 7a mode of intuition which1 so far as we can judge1 can belong only to the ,creator71 but is dependent on the existence of the object1 is possible1 therefore1 only on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is affected by the object4 ,it is1 moreover1 not necessary that we should limit the mode of intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man4 ,it may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect agree with man 7though as to this we cannot decide71 but sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility1 for this very reason1 that it is a deduced 7intuitus derivativus71 and not an original 7intuitus originarius71 consequently not an intellectual intuition1 and this intuition1 as such1 for reasons above mentioned1 seems to belong solely to the ,supreme ,being1 but never to a being dependent1 quoad its existence1 as well as its intuition 7which its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects74 ,this latter remark1 however1 must be taken only as an illustration1 and not as any proof of the truth of our sthetical theory4 #aj4 ,conclusion of the ,transcendental sthetic4 ,we have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy1 namely1 the question3 8,how are synthetical propositions priori possible80 ,that is to say1 we have shown that we are in possession of pure priori intuitions1 namely1 space and time1 in which we find1 when in a judgement priori we pass out beyond the given conception1 something which is not discoverable in that conception1 but is certainly found priori in the intuition which corresponds to the conception1 and can be united synthetically with it4 ,but the judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make1 never reach farther than to objects of the senses1 and are valid only for objects of possible experience4 ,second ,part--,,transcendental ,,logic ,,introduction4 ,idea of a ,transcendental ,logic4 ,i4 ,of ,logic in ,general4 ,our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind1 first of which is the faculty or power of receiving representations 7receptivity for impressions72 the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations 7spontaneity in the production of conceptions74 ,through the first an object is given to us2 through the second1 it is1 in relation to the representation 7which is a mere determination of the mind71 thought4 ,intuition and conceptions constitute1 therefore1 the elements of all our knowledge1 so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them1 nor intuition without conceptions1 can afford us a cognition4 ,both are either pure or empirical4 ,they are empirical1 when sensation 7which presupposes the actual presence of the object7 is contained in them2 and pure1 when no sensation is mixed with the representation4 ,sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition4 ,pure intuition consequently contains merely the form under which something is intuited1 and pure conception only the form of the thought of an object4 ,only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are possible priori2 the empirical only posteriori4 ,we apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions1 in so far as it is in some way affected2 and1 on the other hand1 we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations1 or the spontaneity of cognition1 understanding4 ,our nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous1 that is1 it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects4 ,on the other hand1 the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous intuition is the understanding4 ,neither of these faculties has a preference over the other4 ,without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us1 and without the understanding no object would be thought4 ,thoughts without content are void2 intuitions without conceptions1 blind4 ,hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous 7that is1 to join to them the object in intuition71 as to make its intuitions intelligible 7that is1 to bring them under conceptions74 ,neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function4 ,understanding cannot intuite1 and the sensuous faculty cannot think4 ,in no other way than from the united operation of both1 can knowledge arise4 ,but no one ought1 on this account1 to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each2 we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them4 ,we therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility1 that is1 sthetic1 from the science of the laws of the understanding1 that is1 logic4 ,now1 logic in its turn may be considered as twofold--namely1 as logic of the general1 or of the particular use of the understanding4 ,the first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought1 without which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible1 and gives laws therefore to the understanding1 without regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed4 ,the logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of objects4 ,the former may be called elemental logic--the latter1 the organon of this or that particular science4 ,the latter is for the most part employed in the schools1 as a propdeutic to the sciences1 although1 indeed1 according to the course of human reason1 it is the last thing we arrive at1 when the science has been already matured1 and needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion2 for our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a science of these objects can be established4 ,general logic is again either pure or applied4 ,in the former1 we abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised2 for example1 the influence of the senses1 the play of the fantasy or imagination1 the laws of the memory1 the force of habit1 of inclination1 etc41 consequently also1 the sources of prejudice--in a word1 we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise1 because these causes regard the understanding under certain circumstances of its application1 and1 to the knowledge of them experience is required4 ,pure general logic has to do1 therefore1 merely with pure priori principles1 and is a canon of understanding and reason1 but only in respect of the formal part of their use1 be the content what it may1 empirical or transcendental4 ,general logic is called applied1 when it is directed to the laws of the use of the understanding1 under the subjective empirical conditions which psychology teaches us4 ,it has therefore empirical principles1 although1 at the same time1 it is in so far general1 that it applies to the exercise of the understanding1 without regard to the difference of objects4 ,on this account1 moreover1 it is neither a canon of the understanding in general1 nor an organon of a particular science1 but merely a cathartic of the human understanding4 ,in general logic1 therefore1 that part which constitutes pure logic must be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes applied 7though still general7 logic4 ,the former alone is properly science1 although short and dry1 as the methodical exposition of an elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be4 ,in this1 therefore1 logicians must always bear in mind two rules3 #a4 ,as general logic1 it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of the understanding1 and of the difference of objects1 and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought4 #b4 ,as pure logic1 it has no empirical principles1 and consequently draws nothing 7contrary to the common persuasion7 from psychology1 which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding4 ,it is a demonstrated doctrine1 and everything in it must be certain completely priori4 ,what ,i called applied logic 7contrary to the common acceptation of this term1 according to which it should contain certain exercises for the scholar1 for which pure logic gives the rules71 is a representation of the understanding1 and of the rules of its necessary employment in concreto1 that is to say1 under the accidental conditions of the subject1 which may either hinder or promote this employment1 and which are all given only empirically4 ,thus applied logic treats of attention1 its impediments and consequences1 of the origin of error1 of the state of doubt1 hesitation1 conviction1 etc41 and to it is related pure general logic in the same way that pure morality1 which contains only the necessary moral laws of a free will1 is related to practical ethics1 which considers these laws under all the impediments of feelings1 inclinations1 and passions to which men are more or less subjected1 and which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated science1 because it1 as well as applied logic1 requires empirical and psychological principles4 ,,ii4 ,of ,transcendental ,logic4 ,general logic1 as we have seen1 makes abstraction of all content of cognition1 that is1 of all relation of cognition to its object1 and regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each other1 that is1 the form of thought in general4 ,but as we have both pure and empirical intuitions 7as transcendental sthetic proves71 in like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical thought 7of objects74 ,in this case1 there would exist a kind of logic1 in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition2 for or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought 7of an object71 would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of empirical content4 ,this kind of logic would also examine the origin of our cognitions of objects1 so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the objects themselves2 while1 on the contrary1 general logic has nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions1 but contemplates our representations1 be they given primitively priori in ourselves1 or be they only of empirical origin1 solely according to the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the process of thought1 in relation to each other4 ,consequently1 general logic treats of the form of the understanding only1 which can be applied to representations1 from whatever source they may have arisen4 ,and here ,i shall make a remark1 which the reader must bear well in mind in the course of the following considerations1 to wit1 that not every cognition priori1 but only those through which we cognize that and how certain representations 7intuitions or conceptions7 are applied or are possible only priori2 that is to say1 the priori possibility of cognition and the priori use of it are transcendental4 ,therefore neither is space1 nor any priori geometrical determination of space1 a transcendental ,representation1 but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of empirical origin1 and the possibility of its relating to objects of experience1 although itself priori1 can be called transcendental4 ,so also1 the application of space to objects in general would be transcendental2 but if it be limited to objects of sense it is empirical4 ,thus1 the distinction of the transcendental and empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions1 and does not concern the relation of these to their object4 ,accordingly1 in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which relate priori to objects1 not as pure or sensuous intuitions1 but merely as acts of pure thought 7which are therefore conceptions1 but neither of empirical nor sthetical origin7--in this expectation1 ,i say1 we form to ourselves1 by anticipation1 the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition1 by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely priori4 ,a science of this kind1 which should determine the origin1 the extent1 and the objective validity of such cognitions1 must be called transcendental logic1 because it has not1 like general logic1 to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction1 but concerns itself with these only in an priori relation to objects4 ,,iii4 ,of the ,division of ,general ,logic into ,analytic and ,dialectic4 ,the old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner1 so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance1 and consequently the vanity of their whole art1 is this3 8,what is truth80 ,the definition of the word truth1 to wit1 8the accordance of the cognition with its object10 is presupposed in the question2 but we desire to be told1 in the answer to it1 what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition4 ,to know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence4 ,for if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer1 it is attended with the danger--not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it--of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers1 and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one 7as the ancients said7 8milking the he-goat1 and the other holding a sieve40 ,if truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object1 this object must be1 ipso facto1 distinguished from all others2 for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it relates1 although it contains something which may be affirmed of other objects4 ,now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cognitions1 without distinction of their objects4 ,but it is evident that since1 in the case of such a criterion1 we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition 7that is1 of all relation to its object71 and truth relates precisely to this content1 it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition2 and that1 accordingly1 a sufficient1 and at the same time universal1 test of truth cannot possibly be found4 ,as we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter1 we shall say3 8,of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter1 no universal test can be demanded1 because such a demand is self-contradictory40 ,on the other hand1 with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form 7excluding all content71 it is equally manifest that logic1 in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding1 must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth4 ,whatever contradicts these rules is false1 because thereby the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought2 that is1 to contradict itself4 ,these criteria1 however1 apply solely to the form of truth1 that is1 of thought in general1 and in so far they are perfectly accurate1 yet not sufficient4 ,for although a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form1 that is1 not self-contradictory1 it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand in agreement with its object4 ,consequently1 the merely logical criterion of truth1 namely1 the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason1 is nothing more than the conditio sine qua non1 or negative condition of all truth4 ,farther than this logic cannot go1 and the error which depends not on the form1 but on the content of the cognition1 it has no test to discover4 ,general logic1 then1 resolves the whole formal business of understanding and reason into its elements1 and exhibits them as principles of all logical judging of our cognitions4 ,this part of logic may1 therefore1 be called analytic1 and is at least the negative test of truth1 because all cognitions must first of an be estimated and tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their content1 in order to discover whether they contain positive truth in regard to their object4 ,because1 however1 the mere form of a cognition1 accurately as it may accord with logical laws1 is insufficient to supply us with material 7objective7 truth1 no one1 by means of logic alone1 can venture to predicate anything of or decide concerning objects1 unless he has obtained1 independently of logic1 well-grounded information about them1 in order afterwards to examine1 according to logical laws1 into the use and connection1 in a cohering whole1 of that information1 or1 what is still better1 merely to test it by them4 ,notwithstanding1 there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this--an art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding1 although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient--that general logic1 which is merely a canon of judgement1 has been employed as an organon for the actual production1 or rather for the semblance of production1 of objective assertions1 and has thus been grossly misapplied4 ,now general logic1 in its assumed character of organon1 is called dialectic4 ,different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art1 we may safely infer1 from their actual employment of it1 that with them it was nothing else than a logic of illusion--a sophistical art for giving ignorance1 nay1 even intentional sophistries1 the colouring of truth1 in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated1 and their topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions4 ,now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning1 that general logic1 considered as an organon1 must always be a logic of illusion1 that is1 be dialectical1 for1 as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions1 but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding1 which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects1 any attempt to employ it as an instrument 7organon7 in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating2 any one being able to maintain or oppose1 with some appearance of truth1 any single assertion whatever4 ,such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy4 ,for these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic dialectic1 in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion1 and we wish the term to be so understood in this place4 ,,iv4 ,of the ,division of ,transcendental ,logic into ,transcendental ,analytic and ,dialectic4 ,in transcendental logic we isolate the understanding 7as in transcendental sthetic the sensibility7 and select from our cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin in the understanding alone4 ,the exercise of this pure cognition1 however1 depends upon this as its condition1 that objects to which it may be applied be given to us in intuition1 for without intuition the whole of our cognition is without objects1 and is therefore quite void4 ,that part of transcendental logic1 then1 which treats of the elements of pure cognition of the understanding1 and of the principles without which no object at all can be thought1 is transcendental analytic1 and at the same time a logic of truth4 ,for no cognition can contradict it1 without losing at the same time all content1 that is1 losing all reference to an object1 and therefore all truth4 ,but because we are very easily seduced into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the understanding by themselves1 and that even beyond the boundaries of experience1 which yet is the only source whence we can obtain matter 7objects7 on which those pure conceptions may be employed--understanding runs the risk of making1 by means of empty sophisms1 a material and objective use of the mere formal principles of the pure understanding1 and of passing judgements on objects without distinction--objects which are not given to us1 nay1 perhaps cannot be given to us in any way4 ,now1 as it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding1 this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding1 and attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge synthetically1 affirm1 and determine respecting objects in general4 ,in this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical4 ,the second part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion1 and this critique we shall term transcendental dialectic--not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion 7an art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling71 but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use4 ,this critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties1 and invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental principles1 and show that the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgements made by the pure understanding1 and to guard it from sophistical delusion4 ,,first ,,division4 ,,transcendental ,,logic4 ,,transcendental ,,analytic4 #a ,transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding4 ,in order to effect our purpose1 it is necessary3 7#a7 ,that the conceptions be pure and not empirical2 7#b7 ,that they belong not to intuition and sensibility1 but to thought and understanding2 7#c7 ,that they be elementary conceptions1 and as such1 quite different from deduced or compound conceptions2 7#d7 ,that our table of these elementary conceptions be complete1 and fill up the whole sphere of the pure understanding4 ,now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts4 ,the completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the priori cognition of the understanding1 and through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form the said whole2 consequently1 only by means of their connection in a system4 ,pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from everything empirical1 but also completely from all sensibility4 ,it is a unity self-subsistent1 self-sufficient1 and not to be enlarged by any additions from without4 ,hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea2 and the completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that belong to it4 ,the whole of this part of transcendental logic consists of two books1 of which the one contains the conceptions1 and the other the principles of pure understanding4 ,,book ,i4 ,analytic of ,conceptions4 #b ,by the term ,analytic of ,conceptions1 ,i do not understand the analysis of these1 or the usual process in philosophical investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves1 according to their content1 and so making them clear2 but ,i mean the hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself1 in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions priori1 by looking for them in the understanding alone1 as their birthplace1 and analysing the pure use of this faculty4 ,for this is the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy2 what remains is the logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general4 ,we shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human understanding1 in which they lie1 until they are developed on occasions presented by experience1 and1 freed by the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to them1 are set forth in their unalloyed purity4 ,chapter ,i4 ,of the ,transcendental ,clue to the ,discovery of all ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding ,introductory #c ,when we call into play a faculty of cognition1 different conceptions manifest themselves according to the different circumstances1 and make known this faculty1 and assemble themselves into a more or less extensive collection1 according to the time or penetration that has been applied to the consideration of them4 ,where this process1 conducted as it is mechanically1 so to speak1 will end1 cannot be determined with certainty4 ,besides1 the conceptions which we discover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in order and systematic unity1 but are at last coupled together only according to resemblances to each other1 and arranged in series1 according to the quantity of their content1 from the simpler to the more complex--series which are anything but systematic1 though not altogether without a certain kind of method in their construction4 ,transcendental philosophy has the advantage1 and moreover the duty1 of searching for its conceptions according to a principle2 because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity1 and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea4 ,a connection of this kind1 however1 furnishes us with a ready prepared rule1 by which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding1 and the completeness of the system of all be determined priori--both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance4 ,section ,i4 ,of the ,logical ,use of the ,understanding in ,general #d ,the understanding was defined above only negatively1 as a non-sensuous faculty of cognition4 ,now1 independently of sensibility1 we cannot possibly have any intuition2 consequently1 the understanding is no faculty of intuition4 ,but besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition1 except through conceptions2 consequently1 the cognition of every1 at least of every human1 understanding is a cognition through conceptions--not intuitive1 but discursive4 ,all intuitions1 as sensuous1 depend on affections2 conceptions1 therefore1 upon functions4 ,by the word function ,i understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common representation4 ,conceptions1 then1 are based on the spontaneity of thought1 as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions4 ,now1 the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them4 ,as no representation1 except an intuition1 relates immediately to its object1 a conception never relates immediately to an object1 but only to some other representation thereof1 be that an intuition or itself a conception4 ,a judgement1 therefore1 is the mediate cognition of an object1 consequently the representation of a representation of it4 ,in every judgement there is a conception which applies to1 and is valid for many other conceptions1 and which among these comprehends also a given representation1 this last being immediately connected with an object4 ,for example1 in the judgement--8,all bodies are divisible10 our conception of divisible applies to various other conceptions2 among these1 however1 it is here particularly applied to the conception of body1 and this conception of body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us4 ,these objects1 therefore1 are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility4 ,all judgements1 accordingly1 are functions of unity in our representations1 inasmuch as1 instead of an immediate1 a higher representation1 which comprises this and various others1 is used for our cognition of the object1 and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one4 ,but we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements1 so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging4 ,for it is1 according to what has been said above1 a faculty of thought4 ,now thought is cognition by means of conceptions4 ,but conceptions1 as predicates of possible judgements1 relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object4 ,thus the conception of body indicates something--for example1 metal--which can be cognized by means of that conception4 ,it is therefore a conception1 for the reason alone that other representations are contained under it1 by means of which it can relate to objects4 ,it is therefore the predicate to a possible judgement2 for example3 8,every metal is a body40 ,all the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered1 when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements4 ,and that this may be effected very easily1 the following section will show4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,logical ,function of the ,understanding in ,judgements #e ,if we abstract all the content of a judgement1 and consider only the intellectual form thereof1 we find that the function of thought in a judgement can be brought under four heads1 of which each contains three momenta4 ,these may be conveniently represented in the following table3 #a ,quantity of judgements ,universal ,particular ,singular #b #c ,quality ,relation ,affirmative ,categorical ,negative ,hypothetical ,infinite ,disjunctive #d ,modality ,problematical ,assertorical ,apodeictical ,as this division appears to differ in some1 though not essential points1 from the usual technique of logicians1 the following observations1 for the prevention of otherwise possible misunderstanding1 will not be without their use4 #a4 ,logicians say1 with justice1 that in the use of judgements in syllogisms1 singular judgements may be treated like universal ones4 ,for1 precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all1 its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest4 ,the predicate is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general conception1 and had extent1 to the whole of which the predicate applied4 ,on the other hand1 let us compare a singular with a general judgement1 merely as a cognition1 in regard to quantity4 ,the singular judgement relates to the general one1 as unity to infinity1 and is therefore in itself essentially different4 ,thus1 if we estimate a singular judgement 7judicium singulare7 not merely according to its intrinsic validity as a judgement1 but also as a cognition generally1 according to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions1 it is then entirely different from a general judgement 7judicium commune71 and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a separate place--though1 indeed1 this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgements in reference to each other4 #b4 ,in like manner1 in transcendental logic1 infinite must be distinguished from affirmative judgements1 although in general logic they are rightly enough classed under affirmative4 ,general logic abstracts all content of the predicate 7though it be negative71 and only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the subject4 ,but transcendental logic considers also the worth or content of this logical affirmation--an affirmation by means of a merely negative predicate1 and inquires how much the sum total of our cognition gains by this affirmation4 ,for example1 if ,i say of the soul1 8,it is not mortal0--by this negative judgement ,i should at least ward off error4 ,now1 by the proposition1 8,the soul is not mortal10 ,i have1 in respect of the logical form1 really affirmed1 inasmuch as ,i thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings4 ,now1 because of the whole sphere of possible existences1 the mortal occupies one part1 and the immortal the other1 neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which remain over1 when ,i take away the whole mortal part4 ,but by this proceeding we accomplish only this much1 that the infinite sphere of all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is excluded from it1 and the soul is placed in the remaining part of the extent of this sphere4 ,but this part remains1 notwithstanding this exception1 infinite1 and more and more parts may be taken away from the whole sphere1 without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul4 ,these judgements1 therefore1 infinite in respect of their logical extent1 are1 in respect of the content of their cognition1 merely limitative2 and are consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgements1 because the function of the understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure priori cognition4 #c4 ,all relations of thought in judgements are those 7a7 of the predicate to the subject2 7b7 of the principle to its consequence2 7c7 of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other4 ,in the first of these three classes1 we consider only two conceptions2 in the second1 two judgements2 in the third1 several judgements in relation to each other4 ,the hypothetical proposition1 8,if perfect justice exists1 the obstinately wicked are punished10 contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions1 namely1 8,perfect justice exists10 and 8,the obstinately wicked are punished40 ,whether these propositions are in themselves true is a question not here decided4 ,nothing is cogitated by means of this judgement except a certain consequence4 ,finally1 the disjunctive judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other--a relation not of consequence1 but of logical opposition1 in so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other4 ,but it contains at the same time a relation of community1 in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cognition4 ,the disjunctive judgement contains1 therefore1 the relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition1 since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other1 each contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition4 ,take1 for example1 the proposition1 8,the world exists either through blind chance1 or through internal necessity1 or through an external cause40 ,each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world2 all of them taken together1 the whole sphere4 ,to take the cognition out of one of these spheres1 is equivalent to placing it in one of the others2 and1 on the other hand1 to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest4 ,there is1 therefore1 in a disjunctive judgement a certain community of cognitions1 which consists in this1 that they mutually exclude each other1 yet thereby determine1 as a whole1 the true cognition1 inasmuch as1 taken together1 they make up the complete content of a particular given cognition4 ,and this is all that ,i find necessary1 for the sake of what follows1 to remark in this place4 #d4 ,the modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function1 with this distinguishing characteristic1 that it contributes nothing to the content of a judgement 7for besides quantity1 quality1 and relation1 there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement71 but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in general4 ,problematical judgements are those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible 7ad libitum74 ,in the assertorical1 we regard the proposition as real 7true72 in the apodeictical1 we look on it as necessary4#ac ,thus the two judgements 7antecedens et consequens71 the relation of which constitutes a hypothetical judgement1 likewise those 7the members of the division7 in whose reciprocity the disjunctive consists1 are only problematical4 ,in the example above given the proposition1 8,there exists perfect justice10 is not stated assertorically1 but as an ad libitum judgement1 which someone may choose to adopt1 and the consequence alone is assertorical4 ,hence such judgements may be obviously false1 and yet1 taken problematically1 be conditions of our cognition of the truth4 ,thus the proposition1 8,the world exists only by blind chance10 is in the disjunctive judgement of problematical import only3 that is to say1 one may accept it for the moment1 and it helps us 7like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take7 to find out the true proposition4 ,the problematical proposition is1 therefore1 that which expresses only logical possibility 7which is not objective72 that is1 it expresses a free choice to admit the validity of such a proposition--a merely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding4 ,the assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth2 as1 for example1 in a hypothetical syllogism1 the antecedens presents itself in a problematical form in the major1 in an assertorical form in the minor1 and it shows that the proposition is in harmony with the laws of the understanding4 ,the apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined by these very laws of the understanding1 consequently as affirming priori1 and in this manner it expresses logical necessity4 ,now because all is here gradually incorporated with the understanding--inasmuch as in the first place we judge problematically2 then accept assertorically our judgement as true2 lastly1 affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding1 that is1 as necessary and apodeictical--we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many momenta of thought4 #ac ,just as if thought were in the first instance a function of the understanding2 in the second1 of judgement2 in the third1 of reason4 ,a remark which will be explained in the sequel4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding1 or ,categories #f ,general logic1 as has been repeatedly said1 makes abstraction of all content of cognition1 and expects to receive representations from some other quarter1 in order1 by means of analysis1 to convert them into conceptions4 ,on the contrary1 transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of priori sensibility1 which transcendental sthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions of the understanding1 without which transcendental logic would have no content1 and be therefore utterly void4 ,now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure priori intuition1 but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's receptivity1 under which alone it can obtain representations of objects1 and which1 consequently1 must always affect the conception of these objects4 ,but the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner1 received into the mind1 and connected1 in order afterwards to form a cognition out of it4 ,this ,process ,i call synthesis4 ,by the word synthesis1 in its most general signification1 ,i understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition4 ,this synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but priori 7as that in space and time74 ,our representations must be given previously to any analysis of them2 and no conceptions can arise1 quoad their content1 analytically4 ,but the synthesis of a diversity 7be it given priori or empirically7 is the first requisite for the production of a cognition1 which in its beginning1 indeed1 may be crude and confused1 and therefore in need of analysis--still1 synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content1 consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention1 if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge4 ,synthesis1 generally speaking1 is1 as we shall afterwards see1 the mere operation of the imagination--a blind but indispensable function of the soul1 without which we should have no cognition whatever1 but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious4 ,but to reduce this synthesis to conceptions is a function of the understanding1 by means of which we attain to cognition1 in the proper meaning of the term4 ,pure synthesis1 represented generally1 gives us the pure conception of the understanding4 ,but by this pure synthesis1 ,i mean that which rests upon a basis of priori synthetical unity4 ,thus1 our numeration 7and this is more observable in large numbers7 is a synthesis according to conceptions1 because it takes place according to a common basis of unity 7for example1 the decade74 ,by means of this conception1 therefore1 the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary4 ,by means of analysis different representations are brought under one conception--an operation of which general logic treats4 ,on the other hand1 the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions1 not representations1 but the pure synthesis of representations4 ,the first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the priori cognition of all objects1 is the diversity of the pure intuition2 the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second2 but this gives1 as yet1 no cognition4 ,the conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis1 and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity1 furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object1 and these conceptions are given by the understanding4 ,the same function which gives unity to the different representation in a judgement1 gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition2 and this unity we call the pure conception of the understanding4 ,thus1 the same understanding1 and by the same operations1 whereby in conceptions1 by means of analytical unity1 it produced the logical form of a judgement1 introduces1 by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition1 a transcendental content into its representations1 on which account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding1 and they apply priori to objects1 a result not within the power of general logic4 ,in this manner1 there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of the understanding1 applying priori to objects of intuition in general1 as there are logical functions in all possible judgements4 ,for there is no other function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those enumerated in that table4 ,these conceptions we shall1 with ,aristotle1 call categories1 our purpose being originally identical with his1 notwithstanding the great difference in the execution4 ,,table ,,of ,,the ,,categories #a #b ,of ,quantity ,of ,quality ,unity ,reality ,plurality ,negation ,totality ,limitation #c ,of ,relation ,of ,inherence and ,subsistence 7substantia et accidens7 ,of ,causality and ,dependence 7cause and effect7 ,of ,community 7reciprocity between the agent and patient7 #d ,of ,modality ,possibilitymdash2,impossibility ,existencemdash2,non-existence ,necessitymdash2,contingence ,this1 then1 is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of the synthesis which the understanding contains priori1 and these conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding2 inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable1 in other words1 think an object of intuition4 ,this division is made systematically from a common principle1 namely the faculty of judgement 7which is just the same as the power of thought71 and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure conceptions1 respecting the full number of which we never could be certain1 inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search1 without considering that in this way we can never understand wherefore precisely these conceptions1 and none others1 abide in the pure understanding4 ,it was a design worthy of an acute thinker like ,aristotle1 to search for these fundamental conceptions4 ,destitute1 however1 of any guiding principle1 he picked them up just as they occurred to him1 and at first hunted out ten1 which he called categories 7predicaments74 ,afterwards be believed that he had discovered five others1 which were added under the name of post predicaments4 ,but his catalogue still remained defective4 ,besides1 there are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility 7quando1 ubi1 situs1 also prius1 simul71 and likewise an empirical conception 7motus7--which can by no means belong to this genealogical register of the pure understanding4 ,moreover1 there are deduced conceptions 7actio1 passio7 enumerated among the original conceptions1 and1 of the latter1 some are entirely wanting4 ,with regard to these1 it is to be remarked1 that the categories1 as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding1 have also their pure deduced conceptions1 which1 in a complete system of transcendental philosophy1 must by no means be passed over2 though in a merely critical essay we must be contented with the simple mention of the fact4 ,let it be allowed me to call these pure1 but deduced conceptions of the understanding1 the predicables of the pure understanding1 in contradistinction to predicaments4 ,if we are in possession of the original and primitive1 the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added1 and the genealogical tree of the understanding completely delineated4 ,as my present aim is not to set forth a complete system1 but merely the principles of one1 ,i reserve this task for another time4 ,it may be easily executed by any one who will refer to the ontological manuals1 and subordinate to the category of causality1 for example1 the predicables of force1 action1 passion2 to that of community1 those of presence and resistance2 to the categories of modality1 those of origination1 extinction1 change2 and so with the rest4 ,the categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility1 or with one another1 afford a great number of deduced priori conceptions2 a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant1 but in this place a perfectly dispensable1 occupation4 ,i purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise4 ,i shall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for the doctrine of method1 which is to form a part of this critique4 ,in a system of pure reason1 definitions of them would be with justice demanded of me1 but to give them here would only bide from our view the main aim of our investigation1 at the same time raising doubts and objections1 the consideration of which1 without injustice to our main purpose1 may be very well postponed till another opportunity4 ,meanwhile1 it ought to be sufficiently clear1 from the little we have already said on this subject1 that the formation of a complete vocabulary of pure conceptions1 accompanied by all the requisite explanations1 is not only a possible1 but an easy undertaking4 ,the compartments already exist2 it is only necessary to fill them up2 and a systematic topic like the present1 indicates with perfect precision the proper place to which each conception belongs1 while it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up4 #g ,our table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance1 which may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific form of all rational cognitions4 ,for1 that this table is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy1 nay1 indispensable for the sketching of the complete plan of a science1 so far as that science rests upon conceptions priori1 and for dividing it mathematically1 according to fixed principles1 is most manifest from the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the understanding1 nay1 even the form of a system of these in the understanding itself1 and consequently indicates all the momenta1 and also the internal arrangement of a projected speculative science1 as ,i have elsewhere shown4#ad ,here follow some of these observations4 #ad ,in the 8,metaphysical ,principles of ,natural ,science40 ,i4 ,this table1 which contains four classes of conceptions of the understanding1 may1 in the first instance1 be divided into two classes1 the first of which relates to objects of intuition--pure as well as empirical2 the second1 to the existence of these objects1 either in relation to one another1 or to the understanding4 ,the former of these classes of categories ,i would entitle the mathematical1 and the latter the dynamical categories4 ,the former1 as we see1 has no correlates2 these are only to be found in the second class4 ,this difference must have a ground in the nature of the human understanding4 ,,ii4 ,the number of the categories in each class is always the same1 namely1 three--a fact which also demands some consideration1 because in all other cases division priori through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy4 ,it is to be added1 that the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first4 ,thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity2 limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation2 community is the causality of a substance1 reciprocally determining1 and determined by other substances2 and finally1 necessity is nothing but existence1 which is given through the possibility itself4 ,let it not be supposed1 however1 that the third category is merely a deduced1 and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding4 ,for the conjunction of the first and second1 in order to produce the third conception1 requires a particular function of the understanding1 which is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first and second4 ,thus1 the conception of a number 7which belongs to the category of totality7 is not always possible1 where the conceptions of multitude and unity exist 7for example1 in the representation of the infinite74 ,or1 if ,i conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance1 it does not follow that the conception of influence1 that is1 how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance1 will be understood from that4 ,thus it is evident that a particular act of the understanding is here necessary2 and so in the other instances4 ,,iii4 ,with respect to one category1 namely1 that of community1 which is found in the third class1 it is not so easy as with the others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgement which corresponds to it in the table of the logical functions4 ,in order to assure ourselves of this accordance1 we must observe that in every disjunctive judgement1 the sphere of the judgement 7that is1 the complex of all that is contained in it7 is represented as a whole divided into parts2 and1 since one part cannot be contained in the other1 they are cogitated as co-ordinated with1 not subordinated to each other1 so that they do not determine each other unilaterally1 as in a linear series1 but reciprocally1 as in an aggregate--7if one member of the division is posited1 all the rest are excluded2 and conversely74 ,now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things2 for one thing is not subordinated1 as effect1 to another as cause of its existence1 but1 on the contrary1 is co-ordinated contemporaneously and reciprocally1 as a cause in relation to the determination of the others 7for example1 in a body--the parts of which mutually attract and repel each other74 ,and this is an entirely different kind of connection from that which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect 7the principle to the consequence71 for in such a connection the consequence does not in its turn determine the principle1 and therefore does not constitute1 with the latter1 a whole--just as the ,creator does not with the world make up a whole4 ,the process of understanding by which it represents to itself the sphere of a divided conception1 is employed also when we think of a thing as divisible2 and in the same manner as the members of the division in the former exclude one another1 and yet are connected in one sphere1 so the understanding represents to itself the parts of the latter1 as having--each of them--an existence 7as substances71 independently of the others1 and yet as united in one whole4 #h ,in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more leading division1 which contains pure conceptions of the understanding1 and which1 although not numbered among the categories1 ought1 according to them1 as conceptions priori1 to be valid of objects4 ,but in this case they would augment the number of the categories2 which cannot be4 ,these are set forth in the proposition1 so renowned among the schoolmen--#8,quodlibet ens est ,,unum1 ,,verum1 ,,bonum4' ,now1 though the inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions1 and though it is allowed only by courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics1 yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of time1 however empty it seems to be1 deserves an investigation of its origin1 and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the understanding1 which1 as is often the case1 has only been erroneously interpreted4 ,these pretended transcendental predicates are1 in fact1 nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all cognition of objects1 and they employ1 as the basis for this cognition1 the categories of quantity1 namely1 unity1 plurality1 and totality4 ,but these1 which must be taken as material conditions1 that is1 as belonging to the possibility of things themselves1 they employed merely in a formal signification1 as belonging to the logical requisites of all cognition1 and yet most unguardedly changed these criteria of thought into properties of objects1 as things in themselves4 ,now1 in every cognition of an object1 there is unity of conception1 which may be called qualitative unity1 so far as by this term we understand only the unity in our connection of the manifold2 for example1 unity of the theme in a play1 an oration1 or a story4 ,secondly1 there is truth in respect of the deductions from it4 ,the more true deductions we have from a given conception1 the more criteria of its objective reality4 ,this we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks1 which belong to a conception as to a common foundation1 but are not cogitated as a quantity in it4 ,thirdly1 there is perfection--which consists in this1 that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the conception1 and accords completely with that conception and with no other4 ,this we may denominate qualitative completeness4 ,hence it is evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition are merely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them4 ,that is to say1 the three categories1 in which the unity in the production of the quantum must be homogeneous throughout1 are transformed solely with a view to the connection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of consciousness1 by means of the quality of the cognition1 which is the principle of that connection4 ,thus the criterion of the possibility of a conception 7not of its object7 is the definition of it1 in which the unity of the conception1 the truth of all that may be immediately deduced from it1 and finally1 the completeness of what has been thus deduced1 constitute the requisites for the reproduction of the whole conception4 ,thus also1 the criterion or test of an hypothesis is the intelligibility of the received principle of explanation1 or its unity 7without help from any subsidiary hypothesis7--the truth of our deductions from it 7consistency with each other and with experience7--and lastly1 the completeness of the principle of the explanation of these deductions1 which refer to neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis1 restoring analytically and posteriori1 what was cogitated synthetically and priori4 ,by the conceptions1 therefore1 of unity1 truth1 and perfection1 we have made no addition to the transcendental table of the categories1 which is complete without them4 ,we have1 on the contrary1 merely employed the three categories of quantity1 setting aside their application to objects of experience1 as general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with itself4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,of the ,deduction of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding ,section ,i4 ,of the ,principles of a ,transcendental ,deduction in general #i ,teachers of jurisprudence1 when speaking of rights and claims1 distinguish in a cause the question of right 7quid juris7 from the question of fact 7quid facti71 and while they demand proof of both1 they give to the proof of the former1 which goes to establish right or claim in law1 the name of deduction4 ,now we make use of a great number of empirical conceptions1 without opposition from any one2 and consider ourselves1 even without any attempt at deduction1 justified in attaching to them a sense1 and a supposititious signification1 because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective reality4 ,there exist also1 however1 usurped conceptions1 such as fortune1 fate1 which circulate with almost universal indulgence1 and yet are occasionally challenged by the question1 8quid juris80 ,in such cases1 we have great difficulty in discovering any deduction for these terms1 inasmuch as we cannot produce any manifest ground of right1 either from experience or from reason1 on which the claim to employ them can be founded4 ,among the many conceptions1 which make up the very variegated web of human cognition1 some are destined for pure use priori1 independent of all experience2 and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction1 inasmuch as1 to justify such use of them1 proofs from experience are not sufficient2 but it is necessary to know how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience4 ,i term1 therefore1 an examination of the manner in which conceptions can apply priori to objects1 the transcendental deduction of conceptions1 and ,i distinguish it from the empirical deduction1 which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon2 consequently1 does not concern itself with the right1 but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner4 ,we have already seen that we are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions1 which nevertheless agree with each other in this1 that they both apply to objects completely priori4 ,these are the conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility1 and the categories as pure conceptions of the understanding4 ,to attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain1 because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this1 that they apply to their objects1 without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them4 ,consequently1 if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary1 it must always be transcendental4 ,meanwhile1 with respect to these conceptions1 as with respect to all our cognition1 we certainly may discover in experience1 if not the principle of their possibility1 yet the occasioning causes of their production4 ,it will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition1 and for the production of experience1 which contains two very dissimilar elements1 namely1 a matter for cognition1 given by the senses1 and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter1 arising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought2 and these1 on occasion given by sensuous impressions1 are called into exercise and produce conceptions4 ,such an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility2 and we have to thank the celebrated ,locke for having first opened the way for this inquiry4 ,but a deduction of the pure priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way1 seeing that1 in regard to their future employment1 which must be entirely independent of experience1 they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience4 ,this attempted physiological derivation1 which cannot properly be called deduction1 because it relates merely to a quaestio facti1 ,i shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cognition4 ,it is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions and by no means an empirical one2 also1 that all attempts at an empirical deduction1 in regard to pure priori conceptions1 are vain1 and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of these cognitions4 ,but although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure priori cognition is a transcendental deduction1 it is not1 for that reason1 perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely necessary4 ,we have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and time1 by means of a transcendental deduction1 and we have explained and determined their objective validity priori4 ,geometry1 nevertheless1 advances steadily and securely in the province of pure priori cognitions1 without needing to ask from philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception of space4 ,but the use of the conception in this science extends only to the external world of sense1 the pure form of the intuition of which is space2 and in this world1 therefore1 all geometrical cognition1 because it is founded upon priori intuition1 possesses immediate evidence1 and the objects of this cognition are given priori 7as regards their form7 in intuition by and through the cognition itself4 ,with the pure conceptions of understanding1 on the contrary1 commences the absolute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction1 not only of these conceptions themselves1 but likewise of space1 because1 inasmuch as they make affirmations concerning objects not by means of the predicates of intuition and sensibility1 but of pure thought priori1 they apply to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility4 ,besides1 not being founded on experience1 they are not presented with any object in priori intuition upon which1 antecedently to experience1 they might base their synthesis4 ,hence results1 not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use1 but that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal2 inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of the categories1 to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition--and1 for this reason1 we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful4 ,the reader1 then1 must be quite convinced of the absolute necessity of a transcendental deduction1 before taking a single step in the field of pure reason2 because otherwise he goes to work blindly1 and after he has wondered about in all directions1 returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started4 ,he ought1 moreover1 clearly to recognize beforehand the unavoidable difficulties in his undertaking1 so that he may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved1 or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path2 because we have a choice of only two things--either at once to give up all pretensions to knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience1 or to bring this critical investigation to completion4 ,we have been able1 with very little trouble1 to make it comprehensible how the conceptions of space and time1 although priori cognitions1 must necessarily apply to external objects1 and render a synthetical cognition of these possible1 independently of all experience4 ,for inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us1 that is1 be an object of empirical intuition1 space and time are pure intuitions1 which contain priori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena1 and an priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity4 ,on the other hand1 the categories of the understanding do not represent the conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition2 objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these1 and consequently without any necessity binding on the understanding to contain priori the conditions of these objects4 ,thus we find ourselves involved in a difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility1 that is to say1 we cannot discover how the subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity1 in other words1 can become conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects2 for phenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any help from the functions of the understanding4 ,let us take1 for example1 the conception of cause1 which indicates a peculiar kind of synthesis1 namely1 that with something1 ,a1 something entirely different1 ,b1 is connected according to a law4 ,it is not priori manifest why phenomena should contain anything of this kind 7we are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience1 for the objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated priori71 and it hence remains doubtful priori1 whether such a conception be not quite void and without any corresponding object among phenomena4 ,for that objects of sensuous intuition must correspond to the formal conditions of sensibility existing priori in the mind is quite evident1 from the fact that without these they could not be objects for us2 but that they must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity of thought is an assertion1 the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered4 ,for phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought2 and all things might lie in such confusion that1 for example1 nothing could be met with in the sphere of phenomena to suggest a law of synthesis1 and so correspond to the conception of cause and effect2 so that this conception would be quite void1 null1 and without significance4 ,phenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition2 for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought4 ,if we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations by saying3 8,experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in phenomena1 and presents us with abundant opportunity of abstracting the conception of cause1 and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception02 we should in this case be overlooking the fact1 that the conception of cause cannot arise in this way at all2 that1 on the contrary1 it must either have an priori basis in the understanding1 or be rejected as a mere chimera4 ,for this conception demands that something1 ,a1 should be of such a nature that something else1 ,b1 should follow from it necessarily1 and according to an absolutely universal law4 ,we may certainly collect from phenomena a law1 according to which this or that usually happens1 but the element of necessity is not to be found in it4 ,hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity1 which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis2 for it is no mere mechanical synthesis1 by means of addition1 but a dynamical one2 that is to say1 the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the cause1 but as posited by and through the cause1 and resulting from it4 ,the strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws1 which obtain through induction only a comparative universality1 that is1 an extended range of practical application4 ,but the pure conceptions of the understanding would entirely lose all their peculiar character1 if we treated them merely as the productions of experience4 ,transition to the ,transcendental ,deduction of the ,categories #aj ,there are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other1 and1 as it were1 meet together4 ,either the object alone makes the representation possible1 or the representation alone makes the object possible4 ,in the former case1 the relation between them is only empirical1 and an priori representation is impossible4 ,and this is the case with phenomena1 as regards that in them which is referable to mere sensation4 ,in the latter case--although representation alone 7for of its causality1 by means of the will1 we do not here speak7 does not produce the object as to its existence1 it must nevertheless be priori determinative in regard to the object1 if it is only by means of the representation that we can cognize anything as an object4 ,now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects2 firstly1 intuition1 by means of which the object1 though only as phenomenon1 is given2 secondly1 conception1 by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought4 ,but it is evident from what has been said on sthetic that the first condition1 under which alone objects can be intuited1 must in fact exist1 as a formal basis for them1 priori in the mind4 ,with this formal condition of sensibility1 therefore1 all phenomena necessarily correspond1 because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all2 that is1 can be empirically intuited and given4 ,now the question is whether there do not exist1 priori in the mind1 conceptions of understanding also1 as conditions under which alone something1 if not intuited1 is yet thought as object4 ,if this question be answered in the affirmative1 it follows that all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions1 since1 if they are not presupposed1 it is impossible that anything can be an object of experience4 ,now all experience contains1 besides the intuition of the senses through which an object is given1 a conception also of an object that is given in intuition4 ,accordingly1 conceptions of objects in general must lie as priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition2 and consequently1 the objective validity of the categories1 as priori conceptions1 will rest upon this1 that experience 7as far as regards the form of thought7 is possible only by their means4 ,for in that case they apply necessarily and priori to objects of experience1 because only through them can an object of experience be thought4 ,the whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all priori conceptions is to show that these conceptions are priori conditions of the possibility of all experience4 ,conceptions which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience are for that very reason necessary4 ,but the analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction1 but only an illustration of them1 because from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity4 ,without their original applicability and relation to all possible experience1 in which all objects of cognition present themselves1 the relation of the categories to objects1 of whatever nature1 would be quite incomprehensible4 ,the celebrated ,locke1 for want of due reflection on these points1 and because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience1 sought also to deduce them from experience1 and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt1 with their aid1 to arrive it cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience4 ,david ,hume perceived that1 to render this possible1 it was necessary that the conceptions should have an priori origin4 ,but as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object--and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might1 perhaps1 by means of these conceptions1 be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to it--he was forced to drive these conceptions from experience1 that is1 from a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective--in one word1 from habit4 ,but he proceeded with perfect consequence and declared it to be impossible1 with such conceptions and the principles arising from them1 to overstep the limits of experience4 ,the empirical derivation1 however1 which both of these philosophers attributed to these conceptions1 cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific priori cognitions1 namely1 those of pure mathematics and general physics4 ,the former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance--7for if reason has once undoubted right on its side1 it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits1 by vague recommendations of moderation72 the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism--a natural consequence1 after having discovered1 as he thought1 that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy4 ,we now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason between these two rocks1 to assign her determinate limits1 and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity4 ,i shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are4 ,they are conceptions of an object in general1 by means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgement4 ,the following will make this plain4 ,the function of the categorical judgement is that of the relation of subject to predicate2 for example1 in the proposition3 8,all bodies are divisible40 ,but in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding1 it still remains undetermined to which ,of these two conceptions belongs the function ,of subject and to which that of predicate4 ,for we could also say3 8,some divisible is a body40 ,but the category of substance1 when the conception of a body is brought under it1 determines that2 and its empirical intuition in experience must be contemplated always as subject and never as mere predicate4 ,and so with all the other categories4 ,section ,,ii ,transcendental ,deduction of the pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding ,of the ,possibility of a ,conjunction of the manifold representations given by ,sense #aa4 ,the manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous--in other words1 is nothing but susceptibility2 and the form of this intuition can exist priori in our faculty of representation1 without being anything else but the mode in which the subject is affected4 ,but the conjunction 7conjunctio7 of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses2 it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition1 for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation4 ,and as we must1 to distinguish it from sensibility1 entitle this faculty understanding2 so all conjunction whether conscious or unconscious1 be it of the manifold in intuition1 sensuous or non-sensuous1 or of several conceptions--is an act of the understanding4 ,to this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis1 thereby to indicate1 at the same time1 that we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves4 ,of all mental notions1 that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects1 but can be originated only by the subject itself1 because it is an act of its purely spontaneous activity4 ,the reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act1 and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction1 and that analysis1 which appears to be its contrary1 must1 nevertheless1 always presuppose it2 for where the understanding has not previously conjoined1 it cannot dissect or analyse1 because only as conjoined by it1 must that which is to be analysed have been given to our faculty of representation4 ,but the conception of conjunction includes1 besides the conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of it1 that of the unity of it also4 ,conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold4#ae ,this idea of unity1 therefore1 cannot arise out of that of conjunction2 much rather does that idea1 by combining itself with the representation of the manifold1 render the conception of conjunction possible4 ,this unity1 which priori precedes all conceptions of conjunction1 is not the category of unity 7 #f72 for all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgement1 and in these functions we already have conjunction1 and consequently unity of given conceptions4 ,it is therefore evident that the category of unity presupposes conjunction4 ,we must therefore look still higher for this unity 7as qualitative1 #h71 in that1 namely1 which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgements1 the ground1 consequently1 of the possibility of the existence of the understanding1 even in regard to its logical use4 #ae ,whether the representations are in themselves identical1 and consequently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and through the other1 is a question which we need not at present consider4 ,our ,consciousness of the one1 when we speak of the manifold1 is always distinguishable from our consciousness of the other2 and it is only respecting the synthesis of this 7possible7 consciousness that we here treat4 ,of the ,originally ,synthetical ,unity of ,apperception #ab ,the 8,i think0 must accompany all my representations1 for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought2 in other words1 the representation would either be impossible1 or at least be1 in relation to me1 nothing4 ,that representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition4 ,all the diversity or manifold content of intuition1 has1 therefore1 a necessary relation to the 8,i think10 in the subject in which this diversity is found4 ,but this representation1 8,i think10 is an act of spontaneity2 that is to say1 it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility4 ,i call it pure apperception1 in order to distinguish it from empirical2 or primitive apperception1 because it is self-consciousness which1 whilst it gives birth to the representation 8,i think10 must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations4 ,it is in all acts of consciousness one and the same1 and unaccompanied by it1 no representation can exist for me4 ,the unity of this apperception ,i call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness1 in order to indicate the possibility of priori cognition arising from it4 ,for the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations1 if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness1 that is1 as my representations 7even although ,i am not conscious of them as such71 they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness1 because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me4 ,from this primitive conjunction follow many important results4 ,for example1 this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations and is possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis4 ,for the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited1 and without relation to the identity of the subject4 ,this relation1 then1 does not exist because ,i accompany every representation with consciousness1 but because ,i join one representation to another1 and am conscious of the synthesis of them4 ,consequently1 only because ,i can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness1 is it possible that ,i can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations2 in other words1 the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity4#af ,the thought1 8,these representations given in intuition belong all of them to me10 is accordingly just the same as1 8,i unite them in one self-consciousness1 or can at least so unite them02 and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations1 it presupposes the possibility of it2 that is to say1 for the reason alone that ,i can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness1 do ,i call them my representations1 for otherwise ,i must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which ,i am conscious4 ,synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions1 as given priori1 is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself1 which antecedes priori all determinate thought4 ,but the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves1 nor can it be1 as it were1 borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception1 but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself1 which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining priori and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception4 ,this principle is the highest in all human cognition4 #af ,all general conceptions--as such--depend1 for their existence1 on the analytical unity of consciousness4 ,for example1 when ,i think of red in general1 ,i thereby think to myself a property which 7as a characteristic mark7 can be discovered somewhere1 or can be united with other representations2 consequently1 it is only by means of a forethought possible synthetical unity that ,i can think to myself the analytical4 ,a representation which is cogitated as common to different representations1 is regarded as belonging to such as1 besides this common representation1 contain something different2 consequently it must be previously thought in synthetical unity with other although only possible representations1 before ,i can think in it the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptas communis4 ,and thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the understanding1 even the whole of logic1 and after it our transcendental philosophy2 indeed1 this faculty is the understanding itself4 ,this fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is indeed an identical1 and therefore analytical1 proposition2 but it nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition1 without which the identity of self-consciousness would be incogitable4 ,for the ego1 as a simple representation1 presents us with no manifold content2 only in intuition1 which is quite different from the representation ego1 can it be given us1 and by means of conjunction it is cogitated in one self-consciousness4 ,an understanding1 in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness itself1 would be intuitive2 our understanding can only think and must look for its intuition to sense4 ,i am1 therefore1 conscious of my identical self1 in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in an intuition1 because ,i call all of them my representations4 ,in other words1 ,i am conscious myself of a necessary priori synthesis of my representations1 which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception1 under which rank all the representations presented to me1 but that only by means of a synthesis4 ,the ,principle of the ,synthetical ,unity of ,apperception is the highest ,principle of all exercise of the ,understanding #ac ,the supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was1 according to our transcendental sthetic1 that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time4 ,the supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical unity or apperception4#ag ,to the former of these two principles are subject all the various representations of intuition1 in so far as they are given to us2 to the latter1 in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness2 for without this nothing can be thought or cognized1 because the given representations would not have in common the act ,of the apperception 8,i think0 and therefore could not be connected in one self-consciousness4 #ag ,space and time1 and all portions thereof1 are intuitions2 consequently are1 with a manifold for their content1 single representations4 7,see the ,transcendental sthetic47 ,consequently1 they are not pure conceptions1 by means of which the same consciousness is found in a great number of representations2 but1 on the contrary1 they are many representations contained in one1 the consciousness of which is1 so to speak1 compounded4 ,the unity of consciousness is nevertheless synthetical and1 therefore1 primitive4 ,from this peculiar character of consciousness follow many important consequences4 7,see #ba47 ,understanding is1 to speak generally1 the faculty ,of cognitions4 ,these consist in the determined relation of given representation to an object4 ,but an object is that1 in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united4 ,now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them4 ,consequently1 it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object1 and therefore of their objective validity1 and of their becoming cognitions1 and consequently1 the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself4 ,the first pure cognition of understanding1 then1 upon which is founded all its other exercise1 and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition1 is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception4 ,thus the mere form of external sensuous intuition1 namely1 space1 affords us1 per se1 no cognition2 it merely contributes the manifold in priori intuition to a possible cognition4 ,but1 in order to cognize something in space 7for example1 a line71 ,i must draw it1 and thus produce synthetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold1 so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness 7in the conception of a line71 and by this means alone is an object 7a determinate space7 cognized4 ,the synthetical unity of consciousness is1 therefore1 an objective condition of all cognition1 which ,i do not merely require in order to cognize an object1 but to which every intuition must necessarily be subject1 in order to become an object for me2 because in any other way1 and without this synthesis1 the manifold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness4 ,this proposition is1 as already said1 itself analytical1 although it constitutes the synthetical unity1 the condition of all thought2 for it states nothing more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to connect them1 as my representation with the identical self1 and so to unite them synthetically in one apperception1 by means of the general expression1 8,i think40 ,but this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every possible understanding1 but only for the understanding by means of whose pure apperception in the thought ,i am1 no manifold content is given4 ,the understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition1 in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness1 in other words1 an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist1 would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness1 an act of which the human understanding1 which thinks only and cannot intuite1 has absolute need4 ,but this principle is the first principle of all the operations of our understanding1 so that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding1 either of one such as should be itself intuition1 or possess a sensuous intuition1 but with forms different from those of space and time4 ,what ,objective ,unity of ,self-consciousness is #ad ,it is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold1 given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object4 ,on this account it is called objective1 and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness1 which is a determination of the internal sense1 by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united4 ,whether ,i can be empirically conscious of the manifold as coexistent or as successive1 depends upon circumstances1 or empirical conditions4 ,hence the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of representations1 itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly contingent4 ,on the contrary1 the pure form of intuition in time1 merely as an intuition1 which contains a given manifold1 is subject to the original unity of consciousness1 and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the 8,i think10 consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding1 which lies priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis4 ,the transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid2 the empirical which we do not consider in this essay1 and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in concreto1 possesses only subjective validity4 ,one person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing1 another with another thing2 and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical1 is1 in relation to that which is given by experience1 not necessarily and universally valid4 ,the ,logical ,form of all ,judgements consists in the ,objective ,unity of ,apperception of the ,conceptions contained therein #ae ,i could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give of a judgement4 ,it is1 according to them1 the representation of a relation between two conceptions4 ,i shall not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition1 in that it suits only for categorical and not for hypothetical or disjunctive judgements1 these latter containing a relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselves--a blunder from which many evil results have followed4#ah ,it is more important for our present purpose to observe1 that this definition does not determine in what the said relation consists4 #ah ,the tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only categorical syllogisms2 and although it is nothing more than an artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions 7consequentiae immediatae7 among the premises of a pure syllogism1 to give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a conclusion than that in the first figure1 the artifice would not have had much success1 had not its authors succeeded in bringing categorical judgements into exclusive respect1 as those to which all others must be referred--a doctrine1 however1 which1 according to #e1 is utterly false4 ,but if ,i investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgement1 and distinguish it1 as belonging to the understanding1 from the relation which is produced according to laws of the reproductive imagination 7which has only subjective validity71 ,i find that judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unit of apperception4 ,this is plain from our use of the term of relation is in judgements1 in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective unity4 ,for this term indicates the relation of these representations to the original apperception1 and also their necessary unity1 even although the judgement is empirical1 therefore contingent1 as in the judgement3 8,all bodies are heavy40 ,i do not mean by this1 that these representations do necessarily belong to each other in empirical intuition1 but that by means of the necessary unity of appreciation they belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions1 that is to say1 they belong to each other according to principles of the objective determination of all our representations1 in so far as cognition can arise from them1 these principles being all deduced from the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception4 ,in this way alone can there arise from this relation a judgement1 that is1 a relation which has objective validity1 and is perfectly distinct from that relation of the very same representations which has only subjective validity--a relation1 to wit1 which is produced according to laws of association4 ,according to these laws1 ,i could only say3 8,when ,i hold in my hand or carry a body1 ,i feel an impression of weight02 but ,i could not say3 8,it1 the body1 is heavy02 for this is tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the object1 that is1 without distinction as to the condition of the subject1 and do not merely stand together in my perception1 however frequently the perceptive act may be repeated4 ,all ,sensuous ,intuitions are subject to the ,categories1 as ,conditions under which alone the manifold ,content of them can be united in one ,consciousness #af ,the manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily under the original synthetical unity of apperception1 because thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible 7 #ac74 ,but that act of the understanding1 by which the manifold content of given representations 7whether intuitions or conceptions7 is brought under one apperception1 is the logical function of judgements 7 #ae74 ,all the manifold1 therefore1 in so far as it is given in one empirical intuition1 is determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgement1 by means of which it is brought into union in one consciousness4 ,now the categories are nothing else than these functions of judgement so far as the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them 7 #i74 ,consequently1 the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories of the understanding4 ,observation #ag ,the manifold in an intuition1 which ,i call mine1 is represented by means of the synthesis of the understanding1 as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness1 and this takes place by means of the category4#ai ,the category indicates accordingly that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure self-consciousness priori1 in the same manner as an empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition1 which is also priori4 ,in the above proposition1 then1 lies the beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding4 ,now1 as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone1 independently of sensibility1 ,i must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given1 in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category4 ,in what follows 7 #bb71 it will be shown1 from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility1 that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category 7according to #af7 imposes on the manifold in a given intuition1 and thus1 its priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established1 the purpose of our deduction will be fully attained4 #ai ,the proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition1 by means of which an object is given1 and which always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited1 and also the relation of this latter to unity of apperception4 ,but there is one thing in the above demonstration of which ,i could not make abstraction1 namely1 that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding1 and independently of it4 ,how this takes place remains here undetermined4 ,for if ,i cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive 7as1 for example1 a divine understanding which should not represent given objects1 but by whose representation the objects themselves should be given or produced71 the categories would possess no significance in relation to such a faculty of cognition4 ,they are merely rules for an understanding1 whose whole power consists in thought1 that is1 in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition from a very different quarter1 to the unity of apperception2 a faculty1 therefore1 which cognizes nothing per se1 but only connects and arranges the material of cognition1 the intuition1 namely1 which must be presented to it by means of the object4 ,but to show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings1 that it produces unity of apperception priori only by means of categories1 and a certain kind and number thereof1 is as impossible as to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgement and no more1 or why time and space are the only forms of our intuition4 ,in ,cognition1 its ,application to ,objects of ,experience is the only legitimate use of the ,category #ah ,to think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing4 ,in cognition there are two elements3 firstly1 the conception1 whereby an object is cogitated 7the category72 and1 secondly1 the intuition1 whereby the object is given4 ,for supposing that to the conception a corresponding intuition could not be given1 it would still be a thought as regards its form1 but without any object1 and no cognition of anything would be possible by means of it1 inasmuch as1 so far as ,i knew1 there existed and could exist nothing to which my thought could be applied4 ,now all intuition possible to us is sensuous2 consequently1 our thought of an object by means of a pure conception of the understanding1 can become cognition for us only in so far as this conception is applied to objects of the senses4 ,sensuous intuition is either pure intuition 7space and time7 or empirical intuition--of that which is immediately represented in space and time by means of sensation as real4 ,through the determination of pure intuition we obtain priori cognitions of objects1 as in mathematics1 but only as regards their form as phenomena2 whether there can exist things which must be intuited in this form is not thereby established4 ,all mathematical conceptions1 therefore1 are not per se cognition1 except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things which can only be represented conformably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition4 ,but things in space and time are given only in so far as they are perceptions 7representations accompanied with sensation71 therefore only by empirical representation4 ,consequently the pure conceptions of the understanding1 even when they are applied to intuitions priori 7as in mathematics71 produce cognition only in so far as these 7and therefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them7 can be applied to empirical intuitions4 ,consequently the categories do not1 even by means of pure intuition afford us any cognition of things2 they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition4 ,that is to say1 the categories serve only to render empirical cognition possible4 ,but this is what we call experience4 ,consequently1 in cognition1 their application to objects of experience is the only legitimate use of the categories4 #ai ,the foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance1 for it determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the understanding in regard to objects1 just as transcendental sthetic determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition4 ,space and time1 as conditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to us1 are valid no further than for objects of sense1 consequently1 only for experience4 ,beyond these limits they represent to us nothing1 for they belong only to sense1 and have no reality apart from it4 ,the pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this limitation1 and extend to objects of intuition in general1 be the intuition like or unlike to ours1 provided only it be sensuous1 and not intellectual4 ,but this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our intuition is of no advantage2 for they are then mere empty conceptions of objects1 as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means of discovery4 ,they are mere forms of thought1 without objective reality1 because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of apperception1 which alone the categories contain1 could be applied1 for the purpose of determining an object4 ,our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and meaning4 ,if1 then1 we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be given we can in that case represent it by all those predicates which are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to it2 for example1 that it is not extended1 or in space2 that its duration is not time2 that in it no change 7the effect of the determinations in time7 is to be met with1 and so on4 ,but it is no proper knowledge if ,i merely indicate what the intuition of the object is not1 without being able to say what is contained in it1 for ,i have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure conception of understanding could be applicable1 because ,i have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to it1 but am only able to say that our intuition is not valid for it4 ,but the most important point is this1 that to a something of this kind not one category can be found applicable4 ,take1 for example1 the conception of substance1 that is1 something that can exist as subject1 but never as mere predicate2 in regard to this conception ,i am quite ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought1 if empirical intuition did not afford me the occasion for its application4 ,but of this more in the sequel4 ,of the ,application of the ,categories to ,objects of the ,senses in general #bj ,the pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in general1 through the understanding alone1 whether the intuition be our own or some other1 provided only it be sensuous1 but are1 for this very reason1 mere forms of thought1 by means of which alone no determined object can be cognized4 ,the synthesis or conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates1 we have said1 only to the unity of apperception1 and is for this reason the ground of the possibility of priori cognition1 in so far as this cognition is dependent on the understanding4 ,this synthesis is1 therefore1 not merely transcendental1 but also purely intellectual4 ,but because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind priori which rests on the receptivity of the representative faculty 7sensibility71 the understanding1 as a spontaneity1 is able to determine the internal sense by means of the diversity of given representations1 conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception1 and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensuous intuition priori1 as the condition to which must necessarily be submitted all objects of human intuition4 ,and in this manner the categories as mere forms of thought receive objective reality1 that is1 application to objects which are given to us in intuition1 but that only as phenomena1 for it is only of phenomena that we are capable of priori intuition4 ,this synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition1 which is possible and necessary priori1 may be called figurative 7synthesis speciosa71 in contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general1 and is called connection or conjunction of the understanding 7synthesis intellectualis74 ,both are transcendental1 not merely because they themselves precede priori all experience1 but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other cognition priori4 ,but the figurative synthesis1 when it has relation only to the originally synthetical unity of apperception1 that is to the transcendental unity cogitated in the categories1 must1 to be distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction1 be entitled the transcendental synthesis of imagination4 ,imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition4 ,now1 as all our intuition is sensuous1 imagination1 by reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding1 belongs to sensibility4 ,but in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity1 which is determinative1 and not1 like sense1 merely determinable1 and which is consequently able to determine sense priori1 according to its form1 conformably to the unity of apperception1 in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sensibility priori1 and its synthesis of intuitions according to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination4 ,it is an operation of the understanding on sensibility1 and the first application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition1 and at the same time the basis for the exercise of the other functions of that faculty4 ,as figurative1 it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis1 which is produced by the understanding alone1 without the aid of imagination4 ,now1 in so far as imagination is spontaneity1 ,i sometimes call it also the productive imagination1 and distinguish it from the reproductive1 the synthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical laws1 those of association1 namely1 and which1 therefore1 contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of priori cognition1 and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy1 but to psychology4 ,we have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense 7 #f71 namely--how this sense represents us to our own consciousness1 only as we appear to ourselves1 not as we are in ourselves1 because1 to wit1 we intuite ourselves only as we are inwardly affected4 ,now this appears to be contradictory1 inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves2 and therefore in the systems of psychology1 the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception1 while we1 on the contrary1 carefully distinguish them4 ,that which determines the internal sense is the understanding1 and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition1 that is1 of bringing this under an apperception 7upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself74 ,now1 as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition1 and is unable to exercise such a power1 in order to conjoin1 as it were1 the manifold of its own intuition1 the synthesis of understanding is1 considered per se1 nothing but the unity of action1 of which1 as such1 it is self-conscious1 even apart from sensibility1 by which1 moreover1 it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of sensuous intuition4 ,thus1 under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagination1 the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject1 whose faculty it is2 and so we are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby4 ,apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense4 ,the former1 as the source of all our synthetical conjunction1 applies1 under the name of the categories1 to the manifold of intuition in general1 prior to all sensuous intuition of objects4 ,the internal sense1 on the contrary1 contains merely the form of intuition1 but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold therein1 and consequently does not contain any determined intuition1 which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination 7synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal sense71 which ,i have named figurative synthesis4 ,this we can indeed always perceive in ourselves4 ,we cannot cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought1 nor a circle without describing it1 nor represent the three dimensions of space without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one another4 ,we cannot even cogitate time1 unless1 in drawing a straight line 7which is to serve as the external figurative representation of time71 we fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold1 whereby we determine successively the internal sense1 and thus attend also to the succession of this determination4 ,motion as an act of the subject 7not as a determination of an object71#bj consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space1 if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form1 is that which produces the conception of succession4 ,the understanding1 therefore1 does by no means find in the internal sense any such synthesis of the manifold1 but produces it1 in that it affects this sense4 ,at the same time1 how 8,i who think0 is distinct from the 8i0 which intuites itself 7other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible71 and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject2 how1 therefore1 ,i am able to say3 8,i1 as an intelligence and thinking subject1 cognize myself as an object thought1 so far as ,i am1 moreover1 given to myself in intuition--only1 like other phenomena1 not as ,i am in myself1 and as considered by the understanding1 but merely as ,i appear0--is a question that has in it neither more nor less difficulty than the question--8,how can ,i be an object to myself80 or this--8,how ,i can be an object of my own intuition and internal perceptions80 ,but that such must be the fact1 if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the phenomena of external sense1 can be clearly proved by the consideration that we cannot represent time1 which is not an object of external intuition1 in any other way than under the image of a line1 which we draw in thought1 a mode of representation without which we could not cognize the unity of its dimension1 and also that we are necessitated to take our determination of periods of time1 or of points of time1 for all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in outward things4 ,it follows that we must arrange the determinations of the internal sense1 as phenomena in time1 exactly in the same manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space4 ,and consequently1 if we grant1 respecting this latter1 that by means of them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally1 we must also confess1 with regard to the internal sense1 that by means of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves2 in other words1 as regards internal intuition1 we cognize our own subject only as phenomenon1 and not as it is in itself4#ba #bj ,motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science1 consequently not to geometry2 because1 that a thing is movable cannot be known priori1 but only from experience4 ,but motion1 considered as the description of a space1 is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in external intuition by means of productive imagination1 and belongs not only to geometry1 but even to transcendental philosophy4 #ba ,i do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves4 ,every act of attention exemplifies it4 ,in such an act the understanding determines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which it cogitates1 conformably to the internal intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding4 ,how much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will be able to perceive in himself4 #ba ,on the other hand1 in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold content of representations1 consequently in the synthetical unity of apperception1 ,i am conscious of myself1 not as ,i appear to myself1 nor as ,i am in myself1 but only that 8,i am40 ,this representation is a thought1 not an intuition4 ,now1 as in order to cognize ourselves1 in addition to the act of thinking1 which subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception1 there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition1 whereby this manifold is given2 although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon 7much less mere illusion71 the determination of my existence#bb ,can only take place conformably to the form of the internal sense1 according to the particular mode in which the manifold which ,i conjoin is given in internal intuition1 and ,i have therefore no knowledge of myself as ,i am1 but merely as ,i appear to myself4 ,the consciousness of self is thus very far from a knowledge of self1 in which ,i do not use the categories1 whereby ,i cogitate an object1 by means of the conjunction of the manifold in one apperception4 ,in the same way as ,i require1 for the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from myself1 not only the thought of an object in general 7in the category71 but also an intuition by which to determine that general conception1 in the same way do ,i require1 in order to the cognition of myself1 not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that ,i think myself1 but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself1 by which to determine this thought4 ,it is true that ,i exist as an intelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis1 but subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction called the internal sense4 ,my intelligence 7that is1 ,i7 can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the relations of time1 which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the conceptions of the understanding and consequently cognize itself in respect to an intuition 7which cannot possibly be intellectual1 nor given by the understanding71 only as it appears to itself1 and not as it would cognize itself1 if its intuition were intellectual4 #bb ,the 8,i think0 expresses the act of determining my own existence4 ,my existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness2 but the mode in which ,i must determine my existence1 that is1 the mode in which ,i must place the manifold belonging to my existence1 is not thereby given4 ,for this purpose intuition of self is required1 and this intuition possesses a form given priori1 namely1 time1 which is sensuous1 and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable4 ,now1 as ,i do not possess another intuition of self which gives the determining in me 7of the spontaneity of which ,i am conscious71 prior to the act of determination1 in the same manner as time gives the determinable1 it is clear that ,i am unable to determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being1 but ,i am only able to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought1 that is1 of my determination1 and my existence remains ever determinable in a purely sensuous manner1 that is to say1 like the existence of a phenomenon4 ,but it is because of this spontaneity that ,i call myself an intelligence4 ,transcendental ,deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding #bb ,in the metaphysical deduction1 the priori origin of categories was proved by their complete accordance with the general logical of thought2 in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility of the categories as priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general 7 #af and #ag74;,at present we are about to explain the possibility of cognizing1 priori1 by means of the categories1 all objects which can possibly be presented to our senses1 not1 indeed1 according to the form of their intuition1 but according to the laws of their conjunction or synthesis1 and thus1 as it were1 of prescribing laws to nature and even of rendering nature possible4 ,for if the categories were inadequate to this task1 it would not be evident to us why everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to those laws which have an priori origin in the understanding itself4 ,i premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension ,i understand the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition1 whereby perception1 that is1 empirical consciousness of the intuition 7as phenomenon71 is possible4 ,we have priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition in the representations of space and time1 and to these must the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon be always comformable1 because the synthesis itself can only take place according to these forms4 ,but space and time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition1 but intuitions themselves 7which contain a manifold71 and therefore contain priori the determination of the unity of this manifold4#bc 7,see the ,transcendent sthetic47 ,therefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifold without or within us1 consequently also a conjunction to which all that is to be represented as determined in space or time must correspond1 given priori along with 7not in7 these intuitions1 as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of them4 ,but this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of the manifold of a given intuition in general1 in a primitive act of consciousness1 according to the categories1 but applied to our sensuous intuition4 ,consequently all synthesis1 whereby alone is even perception possible1 is subject to the categories4 ,and1 as experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions1 the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are therefore valid priori for all objects of experience4 #bc ,space represented as an object 7as geometry really requires it to be7 contains more than the mere form of the intuition2 namely1 a combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility into a representation that can be intuited2 so that the form of the intuition gives us merely the manifold1 but the formal intuition gives unity of representation4 ,in the sthetic1 ,i regarded this unity as belonging entirely to sensibility1 for the purpose of indicating that it antecedes all conceptions1 although it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to sense1 through which alone1 however1 all our conceptions of space and time are possible4 ,for as by means of this unity alone 7the understanding determining the sensibility7 space and time are given as intuitions1 it follows that the unity of this intuition priori belongs to space and time1 and not to the conception of the understanding 7 #bj74 ,when1 then1 for example1 ,i make the empirical intuition of a house by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception1 the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of this act1 and ,i1 as it were1 draw the form of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space4 ,but this very synthetical unity remains1 even when ,i abstract the form of space1 and has its seat in the understanding1 and is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition2 that is to say1 the category of quantity1 to which the aforesaid synthesis of apprehension1 that is1 the perception1 must be completely conformable4#bd #bd ,in this manner it is proved1 that the synthesis of apprehension1 which is empirical1 must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apperception1 which is intellectual1 and contained priori in the category4 ,it is one and the same spontaneity which at one time1 under the name of imagination1 at another under that of understanding1 produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition4 ,to take another example1 when ,i perceive the freezing of water1 ,i apprehend two states 7fluidity and solidity71 which1 as such1 stand toward each other mutually in a relation of time4 ,but in the time1 which ,i place as an internal intuition1 at the foundation of this phenomenon1 ,i represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold1 without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an intuition as determined 7in regard to the succession of time74 ,now this synthetical unity1 as the priori condition under which ,i conjoin the manifold of an intuition1 is1 if ,i make abstraction of the permanent form of my internal intuition 7that is to say1 of time71 the category of cause1 by means of which1 when applied to my sensibility1 ,i determine everything that occurs according to relations of time4 ,consequently apprehension in such an event1 and the event itself1 as far as regards the possibility of its perception1 stands under the conception of the relation of cause and effect3 and so in all other cases4 ,categories are conceptions which prescribe laws priori to phenomena1 consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena 7natura materialiter spectata74 ,and now the question arises--inasmuch as these categories are not derived from nature1 and do not regulate themselves according to her as their model 7for in that case they would be empirical7--how it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself according to them1 in other words1 how the categories can determine priori the synthesis of the manifold of nature1 and yet not derive their origin from her4 ,the following is the solution of this enigma4 ,it is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its priori form--that is1 its faculty of conjoining the manifold--than it is to understand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with the priori form of our sensuous intuition4 ,for laws do not exist in the phenomena any more than the phenomena exist as things in themselves4 ,laws do not exist except by relation to the subject in which the phenomena inhere1 in so far as it possesses understanding1 just as phenomena have no existence except by relation to the same existing subject in so far as it has senses4 ,to things as things in themselves1 conformability to law must necessarily belong independently of an understanding to cognize them4 ,but phenomena are only representations of things which are utterly unknown in respect to what they are in themselves4 ,but as mere representations1 they stand under no law of conjunction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes4 ,now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination1 a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis1 and sensibility1 manifoldness of apprehension4 ,now as all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension1 and this empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental1 consequently on the categories1 it is evident that all possible perceptions1 and therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness1 that is1 all phenomena of nature1 must1 as regards their conjunction1 be subject to the categories4 ,and nature 7considered merely as nature in general7 is dependent on them1 as the original ground of her necessary conformability to law 7as natura formaliter spectata74 ,but the pure faculty 7of the understanding7 of prescribing laws priori to phenomena by means of mere categories1 is not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a nature in general1 as a conformability to law of phenomena of space and time1 depends4 ,particular laws1 inasmuch as they concern empirically determined phenomena1 cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws1 although they all stand under them4 ,experience must be superadded in order to know these particular laws2 but in regard to experience in general1 and everything that can be cognized as an object thereof1 these priori laws are our only rule and guide4 ,result of this ,deduction of the ,conceptions of the ,understanding #bc ,we cannot think any object except by means of the categories2 we cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions4 ,now all our intuitions are sensuous1 and our cognition1 in so far as the object of it is given1 is empirical4 ,but empirical cognition is experience2 consequently no priori cognition is possible for us1 except of objects of possible experience4#be #be ,lest my readers should stumble at this assertion1 and the conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it1 ,i must remind them that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by the conditions of our sensuous intuition1 but have an unbounded sphere of action4 ,it is only the cognition of the object of thought1 the determining of the object1 which requires intuition4 ,in the absence of intuition1 our thought of an object may still have true and useful consequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject4 ,but as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination of the object1 in other words1 on cognition thereof1 but also on the determination of the subject and its volition1 ,i do not intend to treat of it in this place4 ,but this cognition1 which is limited to objects of experience1 is not for that reason derived entirely1 from1 experience1 but--and this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of the understanding--there are1 unquestionably1 elements of cognition1 which exist in the mind priori4 ,now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated4 ,either experience makes these conceptions possible1 or the conceptions make experience possible4 ,the former of these statements will not hold good with respect to the categories 7nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition71 for they are priori conceptions1 and therefore independent of experience4 ,the assertion of an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio aequivoca4 ,consequently1 nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative 7which presents us with a system1 as it were1 of the epigenesis of pure reason71 namely1 that on the part of the understanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience4 ,but with respect to the questions how they make experience possible1 and what are the principles of the possibility thereof with which they present us in their application to phenomena1 the following section on the transcendental exercise of the faculty of judgement will inform the reader4 ,it is quite possible that someone may propose a species of preformation-system of pure reason--a middle way between the two--to wit1 that the categories are neither innate and first priori principles of cognition1 nor derived from experience1 but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence1 which were so ordered and disposed by our ,creator1 that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which regulate experience4 ,now1 not to mention that with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes1 the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them1 is a conclusive objection to it4 ,the conception of cause1 for example1 which expresses the necessity of an effect under a presupposed condition1 would be false1 if it rested only upon such an arbitrary subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation4 ,i could not then say--8,the effect is connected with its cause in the object 7that is1 necessarily710 but only1 8,i am so constituted that ,i can think this representation as so connected1 and not otherwise40 ,now this is just what the sceptic wants4 ,for in this case1 all our knowledge1 depending on the supposed objective validity of our judgement1 is nothing but mere illusion2 nor would there be wanting people who would deny any such subjective necessity in respect to themselves1 though they must feel it4 ,at all events1 we could not dispute with any one on that which merely depends on the manner in which his subject is organized4 ,short view of the above ,deduction4 ,the foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the understanding 7and with them of all theoretical priori cognition71 as principles of the possibility of experience1 but of experience as the determination of all phenomena in space and time in general--of experience1 finally1 from the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception1 as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility4 ,i consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to this point1 because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions4 ,as we now proceed to the exposition of the employment of these1 ,i shall not designate the chapters in this manner any further4 ,,book ,,ii4 ,analytic of ,principles ,general logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition4 ,these are1 understanding1 judgement1 and reason4 ,this science1 accordingly1 treats in its analytic of conceptions1 judgements1 and conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding4 ,as this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of cognition1 whether pure or empirical1 and occupies itself with the mere form of thought 7discursive cognition71 it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason4 ,for the form of reason has its law1 which1 without taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is employed1 can be discovered priori1 by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its momenta4 ,transcendental logic1 limited as it is to a determinate content1 that of pure priori cognitions1 to wit1 cannot imitate general logic in this division4 ,for it is evident that the transcendental employment of reason is not objectively valid1 and therefore does not belong to the logic of truth 7that is1 to analytic71 but as a logic of illusion1 occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the name of transcendental dialectic4 ,understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental logic a canon of objectively valid1 and therefore true exercise1 and are comprehended in the analytical department of that logic4 ,but reason1 in her endeavours to arrive by priori means at some true statement concerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible experience1 is altogether dialectic1 and her illusory assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic ought to contain4 ,accordingly1 the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the faculty of judgement1 for the instruction of this faculty in its application to phenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding1 which contain the necessary condition for the establishment of priori laws4 ,on this account1 although the subject of the following chapters is the especial principles of understanding1 ,i shall make use of the term ,doctrine of the faculty of judgement1 in order to define more particularly my present purpose4 ,,introduction4 ,of the ,transcendental ,faculty of judgement in ,general ,if understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules1 the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these rules2 that is1 of distinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule 7casus datae legis74 ,general logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgement1 nor can it contain any such4 ,for as it makes abstraction of all content of cognition1 no duty is left for it1 except that of exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions1 judgements1 and conclusions1 and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the understanding4 ,now if this logic wished to give some general direction how we should subsume under these rules1 that is1 how we should distinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them1 this again could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule4 ,but this rule1 precisely because it is a rule1 requires for itself direction from the faculty of judgement4 ,thus1 it is evident that the understanding is capable of being instructed by rules1 but that the judgement is a peculiar talent1 which does not1 and cannot require tuition1 but only exercise4 ,this faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother wit1 the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate4 ,for although education may furnish1 and1 as it were1 engraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds1 yet the power of employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself2 and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is1 in the absence or deficiency of this gift of nature1 secure from misuse4#bf ,a physician therefore1 a judge or a statesman1 may have in his head many admirable pathological1 juridical1 or political rules1 in a degree that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science1 and yet in the application of these rules he may very possibly blunder--either because he is wanting in natural judgement 7though not in understanding7 and1 whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto1 cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto ought to rank under the former2 or because his faculty of judgement has not been sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice4 ,indeed1 the grand and only use of examples1 is to sharpen the judgement4 ,for as regards the correctness and precision of the insight of the understanding1 examples are commonly injurious rather than otherwise1 because1 as casus in terminis they seldom adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule4 ,besides1 they often weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality1 independently of particular circumstances of experience2 and hence1 accustom us to employ them more as formulae than as principles4 ,examples are thus the go-cart of the judgement1 which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to dispense with4 #bf ,deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called stupidity2 and for such a failing we know no remedy4 ,a dull or narrow-minded person1 to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of understanding1 may be improved by tuition1 even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned4 ,but as such persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement1 it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned who in the application of their science betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want4 ,but although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of judgement1 the case is very different as regards transcendental logic1 insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the latter to secure and direct1 by means of determinate rules1 the faculty of judgement in the employment of the pure understanding4 ,for1 as a doctrine1 that is1 as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the understanding in regard to pure priori cognitions1 philosophy is worse than useless1 since from all the attempts hitherto made1 little or no ground has been gained4 ,but1 as a critique1 in order to guard against the mistakes of the faculty of judgement 7lapsus judicii7 in the employment of the few pure conceptions of the understanding which we possess1 although its use is in this case purely negative1 philosophy is called upon to apply all its acuteness and penetration4 ,but transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity1 that besides indicating the rule1 or rather the general condition for rules1 which is given in the pure conception of the understanding1 it can1 at the same time1 indicate priori the case to which the rule must be applied4 ,the cause of the superiority which1 in this respect1 transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except mathematics1 lies in this3 it treats of conceptions which must relate priori to their objects1 whose objective validity consequently cannot be demonstrated posteriori1 and is1 at the same time1 under the obligation of presenting in general but sufficient tests1 the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with those conceptions2 otherwise they would be mere logical forms1 without content1 and not pure conceptions of the understanding4 ,our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain two chapters4 ,the first will treat of the sensuous condition under which alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employed--that is1 of the schematism of the pure understanding4 ,the second will treat of those synthetical judgements which are derived priori from pure conceptions of the understanding under those conditions1 and which lie priori at the foundation of all other cognitions1 that is to say1 it will treat of the principles of the pure understanding4 ,,transcendental ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,faculty ,,of ,,judgement ,,or1 ,,analytic ,,of ,,principles ,chapter ,i4 ,of the ,schematism at of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding ,in all subsumptions of an object under a conception1 the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the conception2 in other words1 the conception must contain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it4 ,for this is the meaning of the expression3 8,an object is contained under a conception40 ,thus the empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a circle1 inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated in the former is intuited in the latter4 ,but pure conceptions of the understanding1 when compared with empirical intuitions1 or even with sensuous intuitions in general1 are quite heterogeneous1 and never can be discovered in any intuition4 ,how then is the subsumption of the latter under the former1 and consequently the application of the categories to phenomena1 possible8--,for it is impossible to say1 for example3 8,causality can be intuited through the senses and is contained in the phenomenon40--,this natural and important question forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement1 with the purpose1 to wit1 of showing how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to phenomena4 ,in all other sciences1 where the conceptions by which the object is thought in the general are not so different and heterogeneous from those which represent the object in concreto--as it is given1 it is quite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the application of the former to the latter4 ,now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing1 which on the one side is homogeneous with the category1 and with the phenomenon on the other1 and so makes the application of the former to the latter possible4 ,this mediating representation must be pure 7without any empirical content71 and yet must on the one side be intellectual1 on the other sensuous4 ,such a representation is the transcendental schema4 ,the conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of the manifold in general4 ,time1 as the formal condition of the manifold of the internal sense1 consequently of the conjunction of all representations1 contains priori a manifold in the pure intuition4 ,now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category1 which constitutes the unity thereof1 that it is universal and rests upon a rule priori4 ,on the other hand1 it is so far homogeneous with the phenomenon1 inasmuch as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold4 ,thus an application of the category to phenomena becomes possible1 by means of the transcendental determination of time1 which1 as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding1 mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former4 ,after what has been proved in our deduction of the categories1 no one1 it is to be hoped1 can hesitate as to the proper decision of the question1 whether the employment of these pure conceptions of the understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental2 in other words1 whether the categories1 as conditions of a possible experience1 relate priori solely to phenomena1 or whether1 as conditions of the possibility of things in general1 their application can be extended to objects as things in themselves4 ,for we have there seen that conceptions are quite impossible1 and utterly without signification1 unless either to them1 or at least to the elements of which they consist1 an object be given2 and that1 consequently1 they cannot possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without regard to the question whether and how these may be given to us2 and1 further1 that the only manner in which objects can be given to us is by means of the modification of our sensibility2 and1 finally1 that pure priori conceptions1 in addition to the function of the understanding in the category1 must contain priori formal conditions of sensibility 7of the internal sense1 namely71 which again contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object4 ,this formal and pure condition of sensibility1 to which the conception of the understanding is restricted in its employment1 we shall name the schema of the conception of the understanding1 and the procedure of the understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the pure understanding4 ,the schema is1 in itself1 always a mere product of the imagination4 ,but1 as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition1 but merely unity in the determination of sensibility1 the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image4 ,thus1 if ,i place five points one after another4444 this is an image of the number five4 ,on the other hand1 if ,i only think a number in general1 which may be either five or a hundred1 this thought is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image a sum 7e4g41 a thousand7 in conformity with a conception1 than the image itself1 an image which ,i should find some little difficulty in reviewing1 and comparing with the conception4 ,now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image to a conception1 ,i call the schema of this conception4 ,in truth1 it is not images of objects1 but schemata1 which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions4 ,no image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general4 ,for the generalness of the conception it never could attain to1 as this includes under itself all triangles1 whether right-angled1 acute-angled1 etc41 whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere4 ,the schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought1 and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space4 ,still less is an object of experience1 or an image of the object1 ever to the empirical conception4 ,on the contrary1 the conception always relates immediately to the schema of the imagination1 as a rule for the determination of our intuition1 in conformity with a certain general conception4 ,the conception of a dog indicates a rule1 according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general1 without being limited to any particular individual form which experience presents to me1 or indeed to any possible image that ,i can represent to myself in concreto4 ,this schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form1 is an art1 hidden in the depths of the human soul1 whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil4 ,thus much only can we say3 8,the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination--the schema of sensuous conceptions 7of figures in space1 for example7 is a product1 and1 as it were1 a monogram of the pure imagination priori1 whereby and according to which images first become possible1 which1 however1 can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate1 and are in themselves never fully adequate to it40 ,on the other hand1 the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image--it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category1 conformably1 to a rule of unity according to conceptions4 ,it is a transcendental product of the imagination1 a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense1 according to conditions of its form 7time7 in respect to all representations1 in so far as these representations must be conjoined priori in one conception1 conformably to the unity of apperception4 ,without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding1 we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation of them according to the order of the categories1 and in connection therewith4 ,for the external sense the pure image of all quantities 7quantorum7 is space2 the pure image of all objects of sense in general1 is time4 ,but the pure schema of quantity 7quantitatis7 as a conception of the understanding1 is number1 a representation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one 7homogeneous quantities74 ,thus1 number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition1 by means of my generating time itself in my apprehension of the intuition4 ,reality1 in the pure conception of the understanding1 is that which corresponds to a sensation in general2 that1 consequently1 the conception of which indicates a being 7in time74 ,negation is that the conception of which represents a not-being 7in time74 ,the opposition of these two consists therefore in the difference of one and the same time1 as a time filled or a time empty4 ,now as time is only the form of intuition1 consequently of objects as phenomena1 that which in objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves 7,sachheit1 reality74 ,now every sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill time1 that is to say1 the internal sense in respect of the representation of an object1 more or less1 until it vanishes into nothing 7 #j negatio74 ,thus there is a relation and connection between reality and negation1 or rather a transition from the former to the latter1 which makes every reality representable to us as a quantum2 and the schema of a reality as the quantity of something in so far as it fills time1 is exactly this continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time1 as we descend in time from the sensation which has a certain degree1 down to the vanishing thereof1 or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity thereof4 ,the schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time2 that is1 the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination of time2 a substratum which therefore remains1 whilst all else changes4 7,time passes not1 but in it passes the existence of the changeable4 ,to time1 therefore1 which is itself unchangeable and permanent1 corresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence1 that is1 substance1 and it is only by it that the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time47 ,the schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which1 when posited1 is always followed by something else4 ,it consists1 therefore1 in the succession of the manifold1 in so far as that succession is subjected to a rule4 ,the schema of community 7reciprocity of action and reaction71 or the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents1 is the coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the other1 according to a general rule4 ,the schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general 7as1 for example1 opposites cannot exist together at the same time in the same thing1 but only after each other71 and is therefore the determination of the representation of a thing at any time4 ,the schema of reality is existence in a determined time4 ,the schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time4 ,it is clear1 from all this1 that the schema of the category of quantity contains and represents the generation 7synthesis7 of time itself1 in the successive apprehension of an object2 the schema of quality the synthesis of sensation with the representation of time1 or the filling up of time2 the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each other in all time 7that is1 according to a rule of the determination of time73 and finally1 the schema of modality and its categories1 time itself1 as the correlative of the determination of an object--whether it does belong to time1 and how4 ,the schemata1 therefore1 are nothing but priori determinations of time according to rules1 and these1 in regard to all possible objects1 following the arrangement of the categories1 relate to the series in time1 the content in time1 the order in time1 and finally1 to the complex or totality in time4 ,hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding1 by means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination1 amounts to nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense1 and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception1 as a function corresponding to the internal sense 7a receptivity74 ,thus1 the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only conditions whereby our understanding receives an application to objects1 and consequently significance4 ,finally1 therefore1 the categories are only capable of empirical use1 inasmuch as they serve merely to subject phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis1 by means of an priori necessary unity 7on account of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original apperception72 and so to render them susceptible of a complete connection in one experience4 ,but within this whole of possible experience lie all our cognitions1 and in the universal relation to this experience consists transcendental truth1 which antecedes all empirical truth1 and renders the latter possible4 ,it is1 however1 evident at first sight1 that although the schemata of sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories1 they do1 nevertheless1 also restrict them1 that is1 they limit the categories by conditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding--namely1 in sensibility4 ,hence the schema is properly only the phenomenon1 or the sensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category4 7,numerus est quantitas phaenomenon--sensatio realitas phaenomenon2 constans et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon--aeternitas1 necessitas1 phaenomena1 etc47 ,now1 if we remove a restrictive condition1 we thereby amplify1 it appears1 the formerly limited conception4 ,in this way1 the categories in their pure signification1 free from all conditions of sensibility1 ought to be valid of things as they are1 and not1 as the schemata represent them1 merely as they appear2 and consequently the categories must have a significance far more extended1 and wholly independent of all schemata4 ,in truth1 there does always remain to the pure conceptions of the understanding1 after abstracting every sensuous condition1 a value and significance1 which is1 however1 merely logical4 ,but in this case1 no object is given them1 and therefore they have no meaning sufficient to afford us a conception of an object4 ,the notion of substance1 for example1 if we leave out the sensuous determination of permanence1 would mean nothing more than a something which can be cogitated as subject1 without the possibility of becoming a predicate to anything else4 ,of this representation ,i can make nothing1 inasmuch as it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing possesses which must thus be valid as premier subject4 ,consequently1 the categories1 without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for the production of conceptions1 but do not represent any object4 ,this significance they derive from sensibility1 which at the same time realizes the understanding and restricts it4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,system of all ,principles of the ,pure ,understanding ,in the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement is justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for synthetical judgements4 ,our duty at present is to exhibit in systematic connection those judgements which the understanding really produces priori4 ,for this purpose1 our table of the categories will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance4 ,for it is precisely the categories whose application to possible experience must constitute all pure priori cognition of the understanding2 and the relation of which to sensibility will1 on that very account1 present us with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding4 ,principles priori are so called1 not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of other judgements1 but also because they themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions4 ,this peculiarity1 however1 does not raise them altogether above the need of a proof4 ,for although there could be found no higher cognition1 and therefore no objective proof1 and although such a principle rather serves as the foundation for all cognition of the object1 this by no means hinders us from drawing a proof from the subjective sources of the possibility of the cognition of an object4 ,such a proof is necessary1 moreover1 because without it the principle might be liable to the imputation of being a mere gratuitous assertion4 ,in the second place1 we shall limit our investigations to those principles which relate to the categories4 ,for as to the principles of transcendental sthetic1 according to which space and time are the conditions of the possibility of things as phenomena1 as also the restriction of these principles1 namely1 that they cannot be applied to objects as things in themselves--these1 of course1 do not fall within the scope of our present inquiry4 ,in like manner1 the principles of mathematical science form no part of this system1 because they are all drawn from intuition1 and not from the pure conception of the understanding4 ,the possibility of these principles1 however1 will necessarily be considered here1 inasmuch as they are synthetical judgements priori1 not indeed for the purpose of proving their accuracy and apodeictic certainty1 which is unnecessary1 but merely to render conceivable and deduce the possibility of such evident priori cognitions4 ,but we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical judgements1 in opposition to synthetical judgements1 which is the proper subject of our inquiries1 because this very opposition will free the theory of the latter from all ambiguity1 and place it clearly before our eyes in its true nature4 ,,system ,,of ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,the ,,pure ,,understanding ,section ,i4 ,of the ,supreme ,principle of all ,analytical ,judgements ,whatever may be the content of our cognition1 and in whatever manner our cognition may be related to its object1 the universal1 although only negative conditions of all our judgements is that they do not contradict themselves2 otherwise these judgements are in themselves 7even without respect to the object7 nothing4 ,but although there may exist no contradiction in our judgement1 it may nevertheless connect conceptions in such a manner that they do not correspond to the object1 or without any grounds either priori or posteriori for arriving at such a judgement1 and thus1 without being self-contradictory1 a judgement may nevertheless be either false or groundless4 ,now1 the proposition3 8,no subject can have a predicate that contradicts it10 is called the principle of contradiction1 and is a universal but purely negative criterion of all truth4 ,but it belongs to logic alone1 because it is valid of cognitions1 merely as cognitions and without respect to their content1 and declares that the contradiction entirely nullifies them4 ,we can also1 however1 make a positive use of this principle1 that is1 not merely to banish falsehood and error 7in so far as it rests upon contradiction71 but also for the cognition of truth4 ,for if the judgement is analytical1 be it affirmative or negative1 its truth must always be recognizable by means of the principle of contradiction4 ,for the contrary of that which lies and is cogitated as conception in the cognition of the object will be always properly negatived1 but the conception itself must always be affirmed of the object1 inasmuch as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to the object4 ,we must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the universal and fully sufficient ,principle of all analytical cognition4 ,but as a sufficient criterion of truth1 it has no further utility or authority4 ,for the fact that no cognition can be at variance with this principle without nullifying itself1 constitutes this principle the sine qua non1 but not the determining ground of the truth of our cognition4 ,as our business at present is properly with the synthetical part of our knowledge only1 we shall always be on our guard not to transgress this inviolable principle2 but at the same time not to expect from it any direct assistance in the establishment of the truth of any synthetical proposition4 ,there exists1 however1 a formula of this celebrated principle--a principle merely formal and entirely without content--which contains a synthesis that has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up with it4 ,it is this3 8,it is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time40 ,not to mention the superfluousness of the addition of the word impossible to indicate the apodeictic certainty1 which ought to be self-evident from the proposition itself1 the proposition is affected by the condition of time1 and as it were says3 8,a thing ,a1 which is something ,b1 cannot at the same time be non-,b40 ,but both1 ,b as well as non-,b1 may quite well exist in succession4 ,for example1 a man who is young cannot at the same time be old2 but the same man can very well be at one time young1 and at another not young1 that is1 old4 ,now the principle of contradiction as a merely logical proposition must not by any means limit its application merely to relations of time1 and consequently a formula like the preceding is quite foreign to its true purpose4 ,the misunderstanding arises in this way4 ,we first of all separate a predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing1 and afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite1 and hence do not establish any contradiction with the subject1 but only with its predicate1 which has been conjoined with the subject synthetically--a contradiction1 moreover1 which obtains only when the first and second predicate are affirmed in the same time4 ,if ,i say3 8,a man who is ignorant is not learned10 the condition 8at the same time0 must be added1 for he who is at one time ignorant1 may at another be learned4 ,but if ,i say3 8,no ignorant man is a learned man10 the proposition is analytical1 because the characteristic ignorance is now a constituent part of the conception of the subject2 and in this case the negative proposition is evident immediately from the proposition of contradiction1 without the necessity of adding the condition 8the same time40 ,this is the reason why ,i have altered the formula of this principle--an alteration which shows very clearly the nature of an analytical proposition4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,supreme ,principle of all ,synthetical ,judgements ,the explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a task with which general logic has nothing to do2 indeed she needs not even be acquainted with its name4 ,but in transcendental logic it is the most important matter to be dealt with--indeed the only one1 if the question is of the possibility of synthetical judgements priori1 the conditions and extent of their validity4 ,for when this question is fully decided1 it can reach its aim with perfect ease1 the determination1 to wit1 of the extent and limits of the pure understanding4 ,in an analytical judgement ,i do not go beyond the given conception1 in order to arrive at some decision respecting it4 ,if the judgement is affirmative1 ,i predicate of the conception only that which was already cogitated in it2 if negative1 ,i merely exclude from the conception its contrary4 ,but in synthetical judgements1 ,i must go beyond the given conception1 in order to cogitate1 in relation with it1 something quite different from that which was cogitated in it1 a relation which is consequently never one either of identity or contradiction1 and by means of which the truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned merely from the judgement itself4 ,granted1 then1 that we must go out beyond a given conception1 in order to compare it synthetically with another1 a third thing is necessary1 in which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can originate4 ,now what is this tertium quid that is to be the medium of all synthetical judgements8 ,it is only a complex in which all our representations are contained1 the internal sense to wit1 and its form priori1 time4 ,the synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination2 their synthetical unity 7which is requisite to a judgement71 upon the unity of apperception4 ,in this1 therefore1 is to be sought the possibility of synthetical judgements1 and as all three contain the sources of priori representations1 the possibility of pure synthetical judgements also2 nay1 they are necessary upon these grounds1 if we are to possess a knowledge of objects1 which rests solely upon the synthesis of representations4 ,if a cognition is to have objective reality1 that is1 to relate to an object1 and possess sense and meaning in respect to it1 it is necessary that the object be given in some way or another4 ,without this1 our conceptions are empty1 and we may indeed have thought by means of them1 but by such thinking we have not1 in fact1 cognized anything1 we have merely played with representation4 ,to give an object1 if this expression be understood in the sense of 8to present0 the object1 not mediately but immediately in intuition1 means nothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience1 be that experience real or only possible4 ,space and time themselves1 pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical1 and certain as it is that they are represented fully priori in the mind1 would be completely without objective validity1 and without sense and significance1 if their necessary use in the objects of experience were not shown4 ,nay1 the representation of them is a mere schema1 that always relates to the reproductive imagination1 which calls up the objects of experience1 without which they have no meaning4 ,and so it is with all conceptions without distinction4 ,the possibility of experience is1 then1 that which gives objective reality to all our priori cognitions4 ,now experience depends upon the synthetical unity of phenomena1 that is1 upon a synthesis according to conceptions of the object of phenomena in general1 a synthesis without which experience never could become knowledge1 but would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions1 never fitting together into any connected text1 according to rules of a thoroughly united 7possible7 consciousness1 and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception4 ,experience has therefore for a foundation1 priori principles of its form1 that is to say1 general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena1 the objective reality of which rules1 as necessary conditions even of the possibility of experience can which rules1 as necessary conditions--even of the possibility of experience--can always be shown in experience4 ,but apart from this relation1 priori synthetical propositions are absolutely impossible1 because they have no third term1 that is1 no pure object1 in which the synthetical unity can exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions4 ,although1 then1 respecting space1 or the forms which productive imagination describes therein1 we do cognize much priori in synthetical judgements1 and are really in no need of experience for this purpose1 such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing but a busy trifling with a mere chimera1 were not space to be considered as the condition of the phenomena which constitute the material of external experience4 ,hence those pure synthetical judgements do relate1 though but mediately1 to possible experience1 or rather to the possibility of experience1 and upon that alone is founded the objective validity of their synthesis4 ,while then1 on the one hand1 experience1 as empirical synthesis1 is the only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all other synthesis2 on the other hand1 this latter synthesis1 as cognition priori1 possesses truth1 that is1 accordance with its object1 only in so far as it contains nothing more than what is necessary to the synthetical unity of experience4 ,accordingly1 the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is3 8,every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience40 priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the formal conditions of the priori intuition1 the synthesis of the imagination1 and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transcendental apperception1 to a possible cognition of experience1 and say3 8,the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience1 and have1 for that reason1 objective validity in an priori synthetical judgement40 ,section ,,iii4 ,systematic ,representation of all ,synthetical ,principles of the ,pure ,understanding ,that principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure understanding1 which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that which happens1 but is even the source of principles according to which everything that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily subject to rules1 because without such rules we never could attain to cognition of an object4 ,even the laws of nature1 if they are contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the understanding1 possess also a characteristic of necessity1 and we may therefore at least expect them to be determined upon grounds which are valid priori and antecedent to all experience4 ,but all laws of nature1 without distinction1 are subject to higher principles of the understanding1 inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the latter to particular cases of experience4 ,these higher principles alone therefore give the conception1 which contains the necessary condition1 and1 as it were1 the exponent of a rule2 experience1 on the other hand1 gives the case which comes under the rule4 ,there is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles for principles of the pure understanding1 or conversely2 for the character of necessity1 according to conceptions which distinguish the latter1 and the absence of this in every empirical proposition1 how extensively valid soever it may be1 is a perfect safeguard against confounding them4 ,there are1 however1 pure principles priori1 which nevertheless ,i should not ascribe to the pure understanding--for this reason1 that they are not derived from pure conceptions1 but 7although by the mediation of the understanding7 from pure intuitions4 ,but understanding is the faculty of conceptions4 ,such principles mathematical science possesses1 but their application to experience1 consequently their objective validity1 nay the possibility of such priori synthetical cognitions 7the deduction thereof7 rests entirely upon the pure understanding4 ,on this account1 ,i shall not reckon among my principles those of mathematics2 though ,i shall include those upon the possibility and objective validity priori1 of principles of the mathematical science1 which1 consequently1 are to be looked upon as the principle of these1 and which proceed from conceptions to intuition1 and not from intuition to conceptions4 ,in the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to possible experience1 the employment of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical1 for it is directed partly on the intuition alone1 partly on the existence of a phenomenon4 ,but the priori conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible experience absolutely necessary1 those of the existence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves contingent4 ,hence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of absolute necessity1 that is1 will be apodeictic2 those1 on the other hand1 of the dynamical use1 the character of an priori necessity indeed1 but only under the condition of empirical thought in an experience1 therefore only mediately and indirectly4 ,consequently they will not possess that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former1 although their application to experience does not1 for that reason1 lose its truth and certitude4 ,but of this point we shall be better able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles4 ,the table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of principles1 because these are nothing else than rules for the objective employment of the former4 ,accordingly1 all principles of the pure understanding are3 #a ,axioms of ,intuition #b #c ,anticipations ,analogies of ,perception of ,experience #d ,postulates of ,empirical ,thought in general ,these appellations ,i have chosen advisedly1 in order that we might not lose sight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and the employment of these principles4 ,it will1 however1 soon appear that--a fact which concerns both the evidence of these principles1 and the priori determination of phenomena--according to the categories of quantity and quality 7if we attend merely to the form of these71 the principles of these categories are distinguishable from those of the two others1 in as much as the former are possessed of an intuitive1 but the latter of a merely discursive1 though in both instances a complete1 certitude4 ,i shall therefore call the former mathematical1 and the latter dynamical principles4#bg ,it must be observed1 however1 that by these terms ,i mean just as little in the one case the principles of mathematics as those of general 7physical7 dynamics in the other4 ,i have here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding1 in their application to the internal sense 7without distinction of the representations given therein71 by means of which the sciences of mathematics and dynamics become possible4 ,accordingly1 ,i have named these principles rather with reference to their application than their content2 and ,i shall now proceed to consider them in the order in which they stand in the table4 #bg ,all combination 7conjunctio7 is either composition 7compositio7 or connection 7nexus74 ,the former is the synthesis of a manifold1 the parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other4 ,for example1 the two triangles into which a square is divided by a diagonal1 do not necessarily belong to each other1 and of this kind is the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can be mathematically considered4 ,this synthesis can be divided into those of aggregation and coalition1 the former of which is applied to extensive1 the latter to intensive quantities4 ,the second sort of combination 7nexus7 is the synthesis of a manifold1 in so far as its parts do belong necessarily to each other2 for example1 the accident to a substance1 or the effect to the cause4 ,consequently it is a synthesis of that which though heterogeneous1 is represented as connected priori4 ,this combination--not an arbitrary one--,i entitle dynamical because it concerns the connection of the existence of the manifold4 ,this1 again1 may be divided into the physical synthesis1 of the phenomena divided among each other1 and the metaphysical synthesis1 or the connection of phenomena priori in the faculty of cognition4 #a4 ,,axioms ,,of ,,intuition4 ,the principle of these is3 ,all ,intuitions are ,extensive ,quantities4 ,,proof4 ,all phenomena contain1 as regards their form1 an intuition in space and time1 which lies priori at the foundation of all without exception4 ,phenomena1 therefore1 cannot be apprehended1 that is1 received into empirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a manifold1 through which the representations of a determinate space or time are generated2 that is to say1 through the composition of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifold 7homogeneous74 ,now the consciousness of a homogeneous manifold in intuition1 in so far as thereby the representation of an object is rendered possible1 is the conception of a quantity 7quanti74 ,consequently1 even the perception of an object as phenomenon is possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition1 through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous manifold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated2 that is to say1 all phenomena are quantities1 and extensive quantities1 because as intuitions in space or time they must be represented by means of the same synthesis through which space and time themselves are determined4 ,an extensive quantity ,i call that wherein the representation of the parts renders possible 7and therefore necessarily antecedes7 the representation of the whole4 ,i cannot represent to myself any line1 however small1 without drawing it in thought1 that is1 without generating from a point all its parts one after another1 and in this way alone producing this intuition4 ,precisely the same is the case with every1 even the smallest1 portion of time4 ,i cogitate therein only the successive progress from one moment to another1 and hence1 by means of the different portions of time and the addition of them1 a determinate quantity of time is produced4 ,as the pure intuition in all phenomena is either time or space1 so is every phenomenon in its character of intuition an extensive quantity1 inasmuch as it can only be cognized in our apprehension by successive synthesis 7from part to part74 ,all phenomena are1 accordingly1 to be considered as aggregates1 that is1 as a collection of previously given parts2 which is not the case with every sort of quantities1 but only with those which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive4 ,on this successive synthesis of the productive imagination1 in the generation of figures1 is founded the mathematics of extension1 or geometry1 with its axioms1 which express the conditions of sensuous intuition priori1 under which alone the schema of a pure conception of external intuition can exist2 for example1 8be tween two points only one straight line is possible10 8two straight lines cannot enclose a space10 etc4 ,these are the axioms which properly relate only to quantities 7quanta7 as such4 ,but1 as regards the quantity of a thing 7quantitas71 that is to say1 the answer to the question3 8,how large is this or that object80 although1 in respect to this question1 we have various propositions synthetical and immediately certain 7indemonstrabilia72 we have1 in the proper sense of the term1 no axioms4 ,for example1 the propositions3 8,if equals be added to equals1 the wholes are equal02 8,if equals be taken from equals1 the remainders are equal02 are analytical1 because ,i am immediately conscious of the identity of the production of the one quantity with the production of the other2 whereas axioms must be priori synthetical propositions4 ,on the other hand1 the self-evident propositions as to the relation of numbers1 are certainly synthetical but not universal1 like those of geometry1 and for this reason cannot be called axioms1 but numerical formulae4 ,that #g #e #ab is not an analytical proposition4 ,for neither in the representation of seven1 nor of five1 nor of the composition of the two numbers1 do ,i cogitate the number twelve4 7,whether ,i cogitate the number in the addition of both1 is not at present the question2 for in the case of an analytical proposition1 the only point is whether ,i really cogitate the predicate in the representation of the subject47 ,but although the proposition is synthetical1 it is nevertheless only a singular proposition4 ,in so far as regard is here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous 7the units71 it cannot take place except in one manner1 although our use of these numbers is afterwards general4 ,if ,i say3 8,a triangle can be constructed with three lines1 any two of which taken together are greater than the third10 ,i exercise merely the pure function of the productive imagination1 which may draw the lines longer or shorter and construct the angles at its pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 the number seven is possible only in one manner1 and so is likewise the number twelve1 which results from the synthesis of seven and five4 ,such propositions1 then1 cannot be termed axioms 7for in that case we should have an infinity of these71 but numerical formulae4 ,this transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena greatly enlarges our priori cognition4 ,for it is by this principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its precision to objects of experience1 and without it the validity of this application would not be so self-evident2 on the contrary1 contradictions and confusions have often arisen on this very point4 ,phenomena are not things in themselves4 ,empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition 7of space and time72 consequently1 what geometry affirms of the latter1 is indisputably valid of the former4 ,all evasions1 such as the statement that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of construction in space 7for example1 to the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines or angles71 must fall to the ground4 ,for1 if these objections hold good1 we deny to space1 and with it to all mathematics1 objective validity1 and no longer know wherefore1 and how far1 mathematics can be applied to phenomena4 ,the synthesis of spaces and times as the essential form of all intuition1 is that which renders possible the apprehension of a phenomenon1 and therefore every external experience1 consequently all cognition of the objects of experience2 and whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former1 must necessarily hold good of the latter4 ,all objections are but the chicaneries of an ill-instructed reason1 which erroneously thinks to liberate the objects of sense from the formal conditions of our sensibility1 and represents these1 although mere phenomena1 as things in themselves1 presented as such to our understanding4 ,but in this case1 no priori synthetical cognition of them could be possible1 consequently not through pure conceptions of space and the science which determines these conceptions1 that is to say1 geometry1 would itself be impossible4 #b4 ,,anticipations ,,of ,,perception4 ,the principle of these is3 ,in all phenomena the ,real1 that which is an object of sensation1 has ,intensive ,quantity1 that is1 has a ,degree4 ,,proof4 ,perception is empirical consciousness1 that is to say1 a consciousness which contains an element of sensation4 ,phenomena as objects of perception are not pure1 that is1 merely formal intuitions1 like space and time1 for they cannot be perceived in themselves4#bh ,they contain1 then1 over and above the intuition1 the materials for an object 7through which is represented something existing in space or time71 that is to say1 they contain the real of sensation1 as a representation merely subjective1 which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject is affected1 and which we refer to some external object4 ,now1 a gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness is possible1 inasmuch as the real in this consciousness entirely vanishes1 and there remains a merely formal consciousness 7 priori7 of the manifold in time and space2 consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the production of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement1 that is1 from the pure intuition #j onwards up to a certain quantity of the sensation4 ,now as sensation in itself is not an objective representation1 and in it is to be found neither the intuition of space nor of time1 it cannot possess any extensive quantity1 and yet there does belong to it a quantity 7and that by means of its apprehension1 in which empirical consciousness can within a certain time rise from nothing #j up to its given amount71 consequently an intensive quantity4 ,and thus we must ascribe intensive quantity1 that is1 a degree of influence on sense to all objects of perception1 in so far as this perception contains sensation4 #bh ,they can be perceived only as phenomena1 and some part of them must always belong to the non-ego2 whereas pure intuitions are entirely the products of the mind itself1 and as such are cognized in themselves4--,tr ,all cognition1 by means of which ,i am enabled to cognize and determine priori what belongs to empirical cognition1 may be called an anticipation2 and without doubt this is the sense in which ,epicurus employed his expression prholepsis4 ,but as there is in phenomena something which is never cognized priori1 which on this account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition1 that is to say1 sensation 7as the matter of perception71 it follows1 that sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at all anticipated4 ,on the other hand1 we might very well term the pure determinations in space and time1 as well in regard to figure as to quantity1 anticipations of phenomena1 because they represent priori that which may always be given posteriori in experience4 ,but suppose that in every sensation1 as sensation in general1 without any particular sensation being thought of1 there existed something which could be cognized priori1 this would deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense--special1 because it may seem surprising to forestall experience1 in that which concerns the matter of experience1 and which we can only derive from itself4 ,yet such really is the case here4 ,apprehension#bi1 by means of sensation alone1 fills only one moment1 that is1 if ,i do not take into consideration a succession of many sensations4 ,as that in the phenomenon1 the apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation1 sensation has therefore no extensive quantity2 the want of sensation in a moment of time would represent it as empty1 consequently #j4 ,that which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation is reality 7realitas phaenomenon72 that which corresponds to the absence of it1 negation #j4 ,now every sensation is capable of a diminution1 so that it can decrease1 and thus gradually disappear4 ,therefore1 between reality in a phenomenon and negation1 there exists a continuous concatenation of many possible intermediate sensations1 the difference of which from each other is always smaller than that between the given sensation and zero1 or complete negation4 ,that is to say1 the real in a phenomenon has always a quantity1 which however is not discoverable in apprehension1 inasmuch as apprehension take place by means of mere sensation in one instant1 and not by the successive synthesis of many sensations1 and therefore does not progress from parts to the whole4 ,consequently1 it has a quantity1 but not an extensive quantity4 #bi ,apprehension is the ,kantian word for preception1 in the largest sense in which we employ that term4 ,it is the genus which includes under i1 as species1 perception proper and sensation proper--,tr ,now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity1 and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation #j1 ,i term intensive quantity4 ,consequently1 reality in a phenomenon has intensive quantity1 that is1 a degree4 ,if we consider this reality as cause 7be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon1 for example1 a change71 we call the degree of reality in its character of cause a momentum1 for example1 the momentum of weight2 and for this reason1 that the degree only indicates that quantity the apprehension of which is not successive1 but instantaneous4 ,this1 however1 ,i touch upon only in passing1 for with causality ,i have at present nothing to do4 ,accordingly1 every sensation1 consequently every reality in phenomena1 however small it may be1 has a degree1 that is1 an intensive quantity1 which may always be lessened1 and between reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of possible realities1 and possible smaller perceptions4 ,every colour--for example1 red--has a degree1 which1 be it ever so small1 is never the smallest1 and so is it always with heat1 the momentum of weight1 etc4 ,this property of quantities1 according to which no part of them is the smallest possible 7no part simple71 is called their continuity4 ,space and time are quanta continua1 because no part of them can be given1 without enclosing it within boundaries 7points and moments71 consequently1 this given part is itself a space or a time4 ,space1 therefore1 consists only of spaces1 and time of times4 ,points and moments are only boundaries1 that is1 the mere places or positions of their limitation4 ,but places always presuppose intuitions which are to limit or determine them2 and we cannot conceive either space or time composed of constituent parts which are given before space or time4 ,such quantities may also be called flowing1 because synthesis 7of the productive imagination7 in the production of these quantities is a progression in time1 the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate by the expression flowing4 ,all phenomena1 then1 are continuous quantities1 in respect both to intuition and mere perception 7sensation1 and with it reality74 ,in the former case they are extensive quantities2 in the latter1 intensive4 ,when the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted1 there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena1 and not properly a phenomenon as a quantity1 which is not produced by the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind1 but by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing4 ,for example1 if ,i call thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money1 ,i employ the term quite correctly1 inasmuch as ,i understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in standard silver1 which is1 to be sure1 a continuous quantity1 in which no part is the smallest1 but every part might constitute a piece of money1 which would contain material for still smaller pieces4 ,if1 however1 by the words thirteen dollars ,i understand so many coins 7be their value in silver what it may71 it would be quite erroneous to use the expression a quantity of dollars2 on the contrary1 ,i must call them aggregate1 that is1 a number of coins4 ,and as in every number we must have unity as the foundation1 so a phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity1 and as such always a continuous quantity 7quantum continuum74 ,now1 seeing all phenomena1 whether considered as extensive or intensive1 are continuous quantities1 the proposition3 8,all change 7transition of a thing from one state into another7 is continuous10 might be proved here easily1 and with mathematical evidence1 were it not that the causality of a change lies1 entirely beyond the bounds of a transcendental philosophy1 and presupposes empirical principles4 ,for of the possibility of a cause which changes the condition of things1 that is1 which determines them to the contrary to a certain given state1 the understanding gives us priori no knowledge2 not merely because it has no insight into the possibility of it 7for such insight is absent in several priori cognitions71 but because the notion of change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena1 which experience alone can acquaint us with1 while their cause lies in the unchangeable4 ,but seeing that we have nothing which we could here employ but the pure fundamental conceptions of all possible experience1 among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted1 we dare not1 without injuring the unity of our system1 anticipate general physical science1 which is built upon certain fundamental experiences4 ,nevertheless1 we are in no want of proofs of the great influence which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of perceptions1 and even in supplying the want of them1 so far as to shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw4 ,if all reality in perception has a degree1 between which and negation there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees1 and if1 nevertheless1 every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations2 no perception1 and consequently no experience is possible1 which can prove1 either immediately or mediately1 an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon2 in other words1 it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time4 ,for in the first place1 an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception2 secondly1 such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any single phenomenon1 and the difference of the degrees in its reality2 nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of any phenomenon4 ,for if even the complete intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real1 that is1 if no part thereof is empty1 yet because every reality has its degree1 which1 with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon unchanged1 can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing 7the void71 there must be infinitely graduated degrees1 with which space or time is filled1 and the intensive quantity in different phenomena may be smaller or greater1 although the extensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and unaltered4 ,we shall give an example of this4 ,almost all natural philosophers1 remarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter of different kinds in bodies with the same volume 7partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight1 partly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bodies in motion71 conclude unanimously that this volume 7extensive quantity of the phenomenon7 must be void in all bodies1 although in different proportion4 ,but who would suspect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical hypothesis--a sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid8 ,yet this they do1 in assuming that the real in space 7,i must not here call it impenetrability or weight1 because these are empirical conceptions7 is always identical1 and can only be distinguished according to its extensive quantity1 that is1 multiplicity4 ,now to this presupposition1 for which they can have no ground in experience1 and which consequently is merely metaphysical1 ,i oppose a transcendental demonstration1 which it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces1 but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned presupposition that we cannot explain the said difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces4 ,this demonstration1 moreover1 has the merit of setting the understanding at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner1 if the explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis4 ,for we perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters altogether different1 so that in neither of them is there left a single point wherein matter is not present1 nevertheless1 every reality has its degree 7of resistance or of weight71 which1 without diminution of the extensive quantity1 can become less and less ad infinitum1 before it passes into nothingness and disappears4 ,thus an expansion which fills a space--for example1 caloric1 or any other reality in the phenomenal world--can decrease in its degrees to infinity1 yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty2 on the contrary1 filling it with those lesser degrees as completely as another phenomenon could with greater4 ,my intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference of matters1 in regard to their specific gravity2 ,i wish only to prove1 from a principle of the pure understanding1 that the nature of our perceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible1 and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a phenomenon as equal quoad its degree1 and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive quantity1 and this1 too1 on the pretended authority of an priori principle of the understanding4 ,nevertheless1 this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into transcendental philosophy has rendered cautious4 ,we must naturally entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phenomena1 and consequently the possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself--abstraction being made of its empirical quality4 ,thus it is a question not unworthy of solution3 8,how the understanding can pronounce synthetically and priori respecting phenomena1 and thus anticipate these1 even in that which is peculiarly and merely empirical1 that1 namely1 which concerns sensation itself80 ,the quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical1 and cannot be represented priori 7for example1 colours1 taste1 etc474 ,but the real--that which corresponds to sensation--in opposition to negation #j1 only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a being 7ein seyn71 and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical consciousness4 ,that is to say1 the empirical consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from #j to every higher degree1 so that the very same extensive quantity of intuition1 an illuminated surface1 for example1 excites as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illuminated4 ,we can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon1 and represent to ourselves in the mere sensation in a certain momentum1 a synthesis of homogeneous ascension from #j up to the given empirical consciousness1 ,all sensations therefore as such are given only posteriori1 but this property thereof1 namely1 that they have a degree1 can be known priori4 ,it is worthy of remark1 that in respect to quantities in general1 we can cognize priori only a single quality1 namely1 continuity2 but in respect to all quality 7the real in phenomena71 we cannot cognize priori anything more than the intensive quantity thereof1 namely1 that they have a degree4 ,all else is left to experience4 #c4 ,,analogies ,,of ,,experience4 ,the principle of these is3 ,experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of ,perceptions4 ,,proof4 ,experience is an empirical cognition2 that is to say1 a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions4 ,it is therefore a synthesis of perceptions1 a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception1 but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consciousness2 and this unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses1 that is1 of experience 7not merely of intuition or sensation74 ,now in experience our perceptions come together contingently1 so that no character of necessity in their connection appears1 or can appear from the perceptions themselves1 because apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition1 and no representation of a necessity in the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together1 is to be discovered therein4 ,but as experience is a cognition of objects by means of perceptions1 it follows that the relation of the existence of the existence of the manifold must be represented in experience not as it is put together in time1 but as it is objectively in time4 ,and as time itself cannot be perceived1 the determination of the existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their connection in time in general1 consequently only by means of priori connecting conceptions4 ,now as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity1 experience is possible only by means of a representation of the necessary connection of perception4 ,the three modi of time are permanence1 succession1 and coexistence4 ,accordingly1 there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena1 according to which the existence of every phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time1 and these antecede all experience and render it possible4 ,the general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness 7perception7 at every time1 consequently1 as this unity lies priori at the foundation of all mental operations1 the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time4 ,for the original apperception relates to our internal sense 7the complex of all representations71 and indeed relates priori to its form1 that is to say1 the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time4 ,now this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time--a necessity imposed by the priori transcendental unity of apperception1 to which is subjected all that can belong to my 7i4e41 my own7 cognition1 and therefore all that can become an object for me4 ,this synthetical and priori determined unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the rule3 8,all empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time02 and the analogies of experience1 of which we are now about to treat1 must be rules of this nature4 ,these principles have this peculiarity1 that they do not concern phenomena1 and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof1 but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence4 ,now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined priori in such a manner that the rule of its synthesis can give1 that is to say1 can produce this priori intuition in every empirical example4 ,but the existence of phenomena cannot be known priori1 and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence1 we could not cognize that existence determinately1 that is to say1 we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others4 ,the two principles above mentioned1 which ,i called mathematical1 in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic phenomena1 relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility1 and instruct us how phenomena1 as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception1 can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis4 ,consequently1 numerical quantities1 and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity1 can be employed in the one case as well as in the other4 ,thus1 for example1 out of #bjj1jjj illuminations by the moon1 ,i might compose and give priori1 that is construct1 the degree of our sensations of the sun-light4#cj ,we may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive4 #cj ,kant's meaning is3 ,the two principles enunciated under the heads of 8,axioms of ,intuition10 and 8,anticipations of ,perception10 authorize the application to phenomena of determinations of size and number1 that is of mathematic4 ,for example1 ,i may compute the light of the sun1 and say that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon4 ,in the same way1 heat is measured by the comparison of its different effects on water1 c41 and on mercury in a thermometer4--,tr ,the case is very different with those principles whose province it is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules priori4 ,for as existence does not admit of being constructed1 it is clear that they must only concern the relations of existence and be merely regulative principles4 ,in this case1 therefore1 neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of4 ,thus1 if a perception is given us1 in a certain relation of time to other 7although undetermined7 perceptions1 we cannot then say priori1 what and how great 7in quantity7 the other perception necessarily connected with the former is1 but only how it is connected1 quoad its existence1 in this given modus of time4 ,analogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent in mathematics4 ,in the latter they are formulae1 which enounce the equality of two relations of quantity1 and are always constitutive1 so that if two terms of the proportion are given1 the third is also given1 that is1 can be constructed by the aid of these formulae4 ,but in philosophy1 analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations4 ,in this case1 from three given terms1 ,i can give priori and cognize the relation to a fourth member1 but not this fourth term itself1 although ,i certainly possess a rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience1 and a mark to assist me in discovering it4 ,an analogy of experience is therefore only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects 7phenomena7 not as a constitutive1 but merely as a regulative principle4 ,the same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought in general1 which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition 7which concerns the form of phenomena71 the synthesis of perception 7which concerns the matter of phenomena71 and the synthesis of experience 7which concerns the relation of these perceptions74 ,for they are only regulative principles1 and clearly distinguishable from the mathematical1 which are constitutive1 not indeed in regard to the certainty which both possess priori1 but in the mode of evidence thereof1 consequently also in the manner of demonstration4 ,but what has been observed of all synthetical propositions1 and must be particularly remarked in this place1 is this1 that these analogies possess significance and validity1 not as principles of the transcendental1 but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding1 and their truth can therefore be proved only as such1 and that consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories1 but only under their schemata4 ,for if the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves1 it would be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning them synthetically priori4 ,but they are nothing but phenomena2 a complete knowledge of which--a knowledge to which all principles priori must at last relate--is the only possible experience4 ,it follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim than the conditions of the empirical cognition in the unity of synthesis of phenomena4 ,but this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding1 of whose unity1 as that of a synthesis in general1 the category contains the function unrestricted by any sensuous condition4 ,these principles will therefore authorize us to connect phenomena according to an analogy1 with the logical and universal unity of conceptions1 and consequently to employ the categories in the principles themselves2 but in the application of them to experience1 we shall use only their schemata1 as the key to their proper application1 instead of the categories1 or rather the latter as restricting conditions1 under the title of 8formulae0 of the former4 ,a4 ,,first ,,analogy4 ,principle of the ,permanence of ,substance4 ,in all changes of phenomena1 substance is permanent1 and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished4 ,,proof4 ,all phenomena exist in time1 wherein alone as substratum1 that is1 as the permanent form of the internal intuition1 coexistence and succession can be represented4 ,consequently time1 in which all changes of phenomena must be cogitated1 remains and changes not1 because it is that in which succession and coexistence can be represented only as determinations thereof4 ,now1 time in itself cannot be an object of perception4 ,it follows that in objects of perception1 that is1 in phenomena1 there must be found a substratum which represents time in general1 and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by means of the relation of phenomena to it4 ,but the substratum of all reality1 that is1 of all that pertains to the existence of things1 is substance2 all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only as a determination of substance4 ,consequently1 the permanent1 in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined1 is substance in the world of phenomena1 that is1 the real in phenomena1 that which1 as the substratum of all change1 remains ever the same4 ,accordingly1 as this cannot change in existence1 its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished4 ,our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive1 is ,consequently always changing4 ,by it alone we could1 therefore1 never determine whether this manifold1 as an object of experience1 is coexistent or successive1 unless it had for a foundation something fixed and permanent1 of the existence of which all succession and coexistence are nothing but so many modes 7modi of time74 ,only in the permanent1 then1 are relations of time possible 7for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time72 that is to say1 the permanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself1 in which alone all determination of time is possible4 ,permanence is1 in fact1 just another expression for time1 as the abiding correlate of all existence of phenomena1 and of all change1 and of all coexistence4 ,for change does not affect time itself1 but only the phenomena in time 7just as coexistence cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself1 seeing that in time no parts are coexistent1 but all successive74 ,if we were to attribute succession to time itself1 we should be obliged to cogitate another time1 in which this succession would be possible4 ,it is only by means of the permanent that existence in different parts of the successive series of time receives a quantity1 which we entitle duration4 ,for in mere succession1 existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing1 and therefore never has even the least quantity4 ,without the permanent1 then1 no relation in time is possible4 ,now1 time in itself is not an object of perception2 consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time1 and consequently also as the condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions1 that is1 of experience2 and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably4 ,therefore1 in all phenomena1 the permanent is the object in itself1 that is1 the substance 7phenomenon72 but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or substances1 consequently to its determinations4 ,i find that in all ages not only the philosopher1 but even the common understanding1 has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all change in phenomena2 indeed1 ,i am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact4 ,only the philosopher expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner1 when he says3 8,in all changes in the world1 the substance remains1 and the accidents alone are changeable40 ,but of this decidedly synthetical proposition1 ,i nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof2 nay1 it very rarely has the good fortune to stand1 as it deserves to do1 at the head of the pure and entirely priori laws of nature4 ,in truth1 the statement that substance is permanent1 is tautological4 ,for this very permanence is the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phenomenon2 and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there is something permanent1 of the existence of which the changeable is nothing but a determination4 ,but because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical1 that is1 cannot be drawn from conceptions1 inasmuch as it concerns a synthetical proposition priori1 and as philosophers never reflected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience1 and therefore cannot be proved except by means of a deduction of the possibility of experience1 it is no wonder that while it has served as the foundation of all experience 7for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition71 it has never been supported by proof4 ,a philosopher was asked3 8,what is the weight of smoke80 ,he answered3 8,subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes1 and you will have the weight of the smoke40 ,thus he presumed it to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter 7substance7 does not perish1 but that only the form of it undergoes a change4 ,in like manner was the saying3 8,from nothing comes nothing10 only another inference from the principle or permanence1 or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena4 ,for if that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time1 it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time1 must be determinable by means of it alone4 ,hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon1 only because we suppose its existence in all time1 a notion which the word permanence does not fully express1 as it seems rather to be referable to future time4 ,however1 the internal necessity perpetually to be1 is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been1 and so the expression may stand as it is4 8,gigni de nihilo nihil2 in nihilum nil posse reverti10#ca are two propositions which the ancients never parted1 and which people nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin1 because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves1 and that the former might be inimical to the dependence 7even in respect of its substance also7 of the world upon a supreme cause4 ,but this apprehension is entirely needless1 for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience1 the unity of which never could be possible1 if we admitted the possibility that new things 7in respect of their substance7 should arise4 ,for in that case1 we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time1 to wit1 the identity of the substratum1 as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity4 ,this permanence is1 however1 nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world4 #ca ,persius1 ,satirae1 iii4#hc-hd4 ,the determinations of a substance1 which are only particular modes of its existence1 are called accidents4 ,they are always real1 because they concern the existence of substance 7negations are only determinations1 which express the non-existence of something in the substance74 ,now1 if to this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence 7for example1 to motion as an accident of matter71 this existence is called inherence1 in contradistinction to the existence of substance1 which we call subsistence4 ,but hence arise many misconceptions1 and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined4 ,meanwhile1 by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding1 it is impossible to avoid separating1 as it were1 that which in the existence of a substance is subject to change1 whilst the substance remains1 and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical4 ,on this account1 this category of substance stands under the title of relation1 rather because it is the condition thereof than because it contains in itself any relation4 ,now1 upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change4 ,origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct4 ,change is but a mode of existence1 which follows on another mode of existence of the same object2 hence all that changes is permanent1 and only the condition thereof changes4 ,now since this mutation affects only determinations1 which can have a beginning or an end1 we may say1 employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical3 8,only the permanent 7substance7 is subject to change2 the mutable suffers no change1 but rather alternation1 that is1 when certain determinations cease1 others begin40 ,change1 when1 cannot be perceived by us except in substances1 and origin or extinction in an absolute sense1 that does not concern merely a determination of the permanent1 cannot be a possible perception1 for it is this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the representation of a transition from one state into another1 and from non-being to being1 which1 consequently1 can be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which is permanent4 ,grant that a thing absolutely begins to be2 we must then have a point of time in which it was not4 ,but how and by what can we fix and determine this point of time1 unless by that which already exists8 ,for a void time--preceding--is not an object of perception2 but if we connect this beginning with objects which existed previously1 and which continue to exist till the object in question in question begins to be1 then the latter can only be a determination of the former as the permanent4 ,the same holds good of the notion of extinction1 for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time1 in which a phenomenon no longer exists4 ,substances 7in the world of phenomena7 are the substratum of all determinations of time4 ,the beginning of some1 and the ceasing to be of other substances1 would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time2 and in that case phenomena would relate to two different times1 in which1 side by side1 existence would pass2 which is absurd4 ,for there is only one time in which all different times must be placed1 not as coexistent1 but as successive4 ,accordingly1 permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena1 as things or objects1 are determinable in a possible experience4 ,but as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary permanence1 and with it of the substantiality of phenomena1 we shall find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel4 ,b4 ,,second ,,analogy4 ,principle of the ,succession of ,time ,according to the ,law of ,causality4 ,all changes take place according to the law of the connection of ,cause and ,effect4 ,,proof4 7,that all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes1 that is1 a successive being and non-being of the determinations of substance1 which is permanent2 consequently that a being of substance itself which follows on the non-being thereof1 or a non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof1 in other words1 that the origin or extinction of substance itself1 is impossible--all this has been fully established in treating of the foregoing principle4 ,this principle might have been expressed as follows3 8,all alteration 7succession7 of phenomena is merely change02 for the changes of substance are not origin or extinction1 because the conception of change presupposes the same subject as existing with two opposite determinations1 and consequently as permanent4 ,after this premonition1 we shall proceed to the proof47 ,i perceive that phenomena succeed one another1 that is to say1 a state of things exists at one time1 the opposite of which existed in a former state4 ,in this case1 then1 ,i really connect together two perceptions in time4 ,now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition1 but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination1 which determines the internal sense in respect of a relation of time4 ,but imagination can connect these two states in two ways1 so that either the one or the other may antecede in time2 for time in itself cannot be an object of perception1 and what in an object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it4 ,i am only conscious1 then1 that my imagination places one state before and the other after2 not that the one state antecedes the other in the object4 ,in other words1 the objective relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception4 ,now in order that this relation may be cognized as determined1 the relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary1 which of them must be placed before and which after1 and not conversely4 ,but the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity1 can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception2 and in this case it is the conception of 8the relation of cause and effect10 the former of which determines the latter in time1 as its necessary consequence1 and not as something which might possibly antecede 7or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow74 ,it follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of phenomena1 and consequently all change1 to the law of causality1 that experience itself1 that is1 empirical cognition of phenomena1 becomes possible2 and consequently1 that phenomena themselves1 as objects of experience1 are possible only by virtue of this law4 ,our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive4 ,the representations of parts succeed one another4 ,whether they succeed one another in the object also1 is a second point for reflection1 which was not contained in the former4 ,now we may certainly give the name of object to everything1 even to every representation1 so far as we are conscious thereof2 but what this word may mean in the case of phenomena1 not merely in so far as they 7as representations7 are objects1 but only in so far as they indicate an object1 is a question requiring deeper consideration4 ,in so far as they1 regarded merely as representations1 are at the same time objects of consciousness1 they are not to be distinguished from apprehension1 that is1 reception into the synthesis of imagination1 and we must therefore say3 8,the manifold of phenomena is always produced successively in the mind40 ,if phenomena were things in themselves1 no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of our representations how this manifold is connected in the object2 for we have to do only with our representations4 ,how things may be in themselves1 without regard to the representations through which they affect us1 is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition4 ,now although phenomena are not things in themselves1 and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized1 it is my duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena themselves1 while the representation of this manifold in apprehension is always successive4 ,for example1 the apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me1 is successive4 ,now comes the question whether the manifold of this house is in itself successive--which no one will be at all willing to grant4 ,but1 so soon as ,i raise my conception of an object to the transcendental signification thereof1 ,i find that the house is not a thing in itself1 but only a phenomenon1 that is1 a representation1 the transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown4 ,what then am ,i to understand by the question3 8,how can the manifold be connected in the phenomenon itself--not considered as a thing in itself1 but merely as a phenomenon80 ,here that which lies in my successive apprehension is regarded as representation1 whilst the phenomenon which is given me1 notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these representations1 is regarded as the object thereof1 with which my conception1 drawn from the representations of apprehension1 must harmonize4 ,it is very soon seen that1 as accordance of the cognition with its object constitutes truth1 the question now before us can only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth2 and that the phenomenon1 in opposition to the representations of apprehension1 can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them1 if it is subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension1 and which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold4 ,that in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension1 is the object4 ,let us now proceed to our task4 ,that something happens1 that is to say1 that something or some state exists which before was not1 cannot be empirically perceived1 unless a phenomenon precedes1 which does not contain in itself this state4 ,for a reality which should follow upon a void time1 in other words1 a beginning1 which no state of things precedes1 can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself4 ,every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows upon another perception4 ,but as this is the case with all synthesis of apprehension1 as ,i have shown above in the example of a house1 my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from other apprehensions4 ,but ,i remark also that if in a phenomenon which contains an occurrence1 ,i call the antecedent state of my perception1 ,a1 and the following state1 ,b1 the perception ,b can only follow ,a in apprehension1 and the perception ,a cannot follow ,b1 but only precede it4 ,for example1 ,i see a ship float down the stream of a river4 ,my perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river1 and it is impossible that1 in the apprehension of this phenomenon1 the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream4 ,here1 therefore1 the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined2 and by this order apprehension is regulated4 ,in the former example1 my perceptions in the apprehension of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation1 or vice versa2 or ,i might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition1 by going from left to right1 and from right to left4 ,accordingly1 in the series of these perceptions1 there was no determined order1 which necessitated my beginning at a certain point1 in order empirically to connect the manifold4 ,but this rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens1 and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary4 ,i must1 therefore1 in the present case1 deduce the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena1 for otherwise the former is quite undetermined1 and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from another4 ,the former alone proves nothing as to the connection of the manifold in an object1 for it is quite arbitrary4 ,the latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon1 according to which order the apprehension of one thing 7that which happens7 follows that of another thing 7which precedes71 in conformity with a rule4 ,in this way alone can ,i be authorized to say of the phenomenon itself1 and not merely of my own apprehension1 that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein4 ,that is1 in other words1 ,i cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order4 ,in conformity with this rule1 then1 it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule1 according to which in this event follows always and necessarily2 but ,i cannot reverse this and go back from the event1 and determine 7by apprehension7 that which antecedes it4 ,for no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point1 although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time2 from a given time1 on the other hand1 there is always a necessary progression to the determined succeeding time4 ,therefore1 because there certainly is something that follows1 ,i must of necessity connect it with something else1 which antecedes1 and upon which it follows1 in conformity with a rule1 that is necessarily1 so that the event1 as conditioned1 affords certain indication of a condition1 and this condition determines the event4 ,let us suppose that nothing precedes an event1 upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule4 ,all sequence of perception would then exist only in apprehension1 that is to say1 would be merely subjective1 and it could not thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede1 and what ought to follow in perception4 ,in such a case1 we should have nothing but a play of representations1 which would possess no application to any object4 ,that is to say1 it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon from another1 as regards relations of time2 because the succession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort1 and therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession1 and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary4 ,and1 in this case1 ,i cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow one upon the other1 but only that one apprehension follows upon another4 ,but this is merely subjective1 and does not determine an object1 and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object--not even in the phenomenal world4 ,accordingly1 when we know in experience that something happens1 we always presuppose that something precedes1 whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule4 ,for otherwise ,i could not say of the object that it follows2 because the mere succession in my apprehension1 if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding1 does not authorize succession in the object4 ,only1 therefore1 in reference to a rule1 according to which phenomena are determined in their sequence1 that is1 as they happen1 by the preceding state1 can ,i make my subjective synthesis 7of apprehension7 objective1 and it is only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible4 ,no doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the procedure of the human understanding4 ,according to these opinions1 it is by means of the perception and comparison of similar consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the understanding is led to the discovery of a rule1 according to which certain events always follow certain phenomena1 and it is only by this process that we attain to the conception of cause4 ,upon such a basis1 it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical1 and the rule which it furnishes us with--8,everything that happens must have a cause0--would be just as contingent as experience itself4 ,the universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it4 ,indeed1 it could not possess universal validity1 inasmuch as it would not in this case be priori1 but founded on deduction4 ,but the same is the case with this law as with other pure priori representations 7e4g41 space and time71 which we can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experience1 only because we had already placed them therein1 and by that means1 and by that alone1 had rendered experience possible4 ,indeed1 the logical clearness of this representation of a rule1 determining the series of events1 is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience4 ,nevertheless1 the recognition of this rule1 as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time1 was the ground of experience itself and consequently preceded it priori4 ,it is now our duty to show by an example that we never1 even in experience1 attribute to an object the notion of succession or effect 7of an event--that is1 the happening of something that did not exist before71 and distinguish it from the subjective succession of apprehension1 unless when a rule lies at the foundation1 which compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other1 and that1 indeed1 it is this necessity which first renders possible the representation of a succession in the object4 ,we have representations within us1 of which also we can be conscious4 ,but1 however widely extended1 however accurate and thoroughgoing this consciousness may be1 these representations are still nothing more than representations1 that is1 internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time4 ,now how happens it that to these representations we should set an object1 or that1 in addition to their subjective reality1 as modifications1 we should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective reality8 ,it is clear that objective significancy cannot consist in a relation to another representation 7of that which we desire to term object71 for in that case the question again arises3 8,how does this other representation go out of itself1 and obtain objective significancy over and above the subjective1 which is proper to it1 as a determination of a state of mind80 ,if we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective representations1 and what new importance they thereby receive1 we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain manner1 and of subjecting them to a rule2 and that conversely1 it is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time of our representations1 that objective significancy is ascribed to them4 ,in the synthesis of phenomena1 the manifold of our representations is always successive4 ,now hereby is not represented an object1 for by means of this succession1 which is common to all apprehension1 no one thing is distinguished from another4 ,but so soon as ,i perceive or assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state antecedent1 from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule1 so soon do ,i represent something as an event1 or as a thing that happens2 in other words1 ,i cognize an object to which ,i must assign a certain determinate position in time1 which cannot be altered1 because of the preceding state in the object4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i perceive that something happens1 there is contained in this representation1 in the first place1 the fact1 that something antecedes2 because1 it is only in relation to this that the phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time1 in other words1 exists after an antecedent time1 in which it did not exist4 ,but it can receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that something existed in the foregoing state1 upon which it follows inevitably and always1 that is1 in conformity with a rule4 ,from all this it is evident that1 in the first place1 ,i cannot reverse the order of succession1 and make that which happens precede that upon which it follows2 and that1 in the second place1 if the antecedent state be posited1 a certain determinate event inevitably and necessarily follows4 ,hence it follows that there exists a certain order in our representations1 whereby the present gives a sure indication of some previously existing state1 as a correlate1 though still undetermined1 of the existing event which is given--a correlate which itself relates to the event as its consequence1 conditions it1 and connects it necessarily with itself in the series of time4 ,if then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility1 and consequently a formal condition of all perception1 that the preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time 7inasmuch as ,i cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding71 it must likewise be an indispensable law of empirical representation of the series of time that the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the succeeding time1 and that the latter1 as events1 cannot take place1 except in so far as the former determine their existence in time1 that is to say1 establish it according to a rule4 ,for it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity in the connection of times4 ,for all experience and for the possibility of experience1 understanding is indispensable1 and the first step which it takes in this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear1 but to render the representation of an object in general1 possible4 ,it does this by applying the order of time to phenomena1 and their existence4 ,in other words1 it assigns to each phenomenon1 as a consequence1 a place in relation to preceding phenomena1 determined priori in time1 without which it could not harmonize with time itself1 which determines a place priori to all its parts4 ,this determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of phenomena to absolute time 7for it is not an object of perception72 but1 on the contrary1 phenomena must reciprocally determine the places in time of one another1 and render these necessary in the order of time4 ,in other words1 whatever follows or happens1 must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in the foregoing state4 ,hence arises a series of phenomena1 which1 by means of the understanding1 produces and renders necessary exactly the same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible perceptions1 as is found priori in the form of internal intuition 7time71 in which all our perceptions must have place4 ,that something happens1 then1 is a perception which belongs to a possible experience1 which becomes real only because ,i look upon the phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time1 consequently as an object1 which can always be found by means of a rule in the connected series of my perceptions4 ,but this rule of the determination of a thing according to succession in time is as follows3 8,in what precedes may be found the condition1 under which an event always 7that is1 necessarily7 follows40 ,from all this it is obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of possible experience1 that is1 of objective cognition of phenomena1 in regard to their relations in the succession of time4 ,the proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the following momenta of argument4 ,to all empirical cognition belongs the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination1 a synthesis which is always successive1 that is1 in which the representations therein always follow one another4 ,but the order of succession in imagination is not determined1 and the series of successive representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively4 ,but if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension 7of the manifold of a given phenomenon71 then the order is determined in the object1 or to speak more accurately1 there is therein an order of successive synthesis which determines an object1 and according to which something necessarily precedes1 and when this is posited1 something else necessarily follows4 ,if1 then1 my perception is to contain the cognition of an event1 that is1 of something which really happens1 it must be an empirical judgement1 wherein we think that the succession is determined2 that is1 it presupposes another phenomenon1 upon which this event follows necessarily1 or in conformity with a rule4 ,if1 on the contrary1 when ,i posited the antecedent1 the event did not necessarily follow1 ,i should be obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my imagination1 and if in this ,i represented to myself anything as objective1 ,i must look upon it as a mere dream4 ,thus1 the relation of phenomena 7as possible perceptions71 according to which that which happens is1 as to its existence1 necessarily determined in time by something which antecedes1 in conformity with a rule--in other words1 the relation of cause and effect--is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgements in regard to the sequence of perceptions1 consequently of their empirical truth1 and therefore of experience4 ,the principle of the relation of causality in the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of experience1 because it is itself the ground of the possibility of experience4 ,here1 however1 a difficulty arises1 which must be resolved4 ,the principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in our formula to the succession thereof1 although in practice we find that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in the same time1 and that cause and effect may be simultaneous4 ,for example1 there is heat in a room1 which does not exist in the open air4 ,i look about for the cause1 and find it to be the fire1 ,now the fire as the cause is simultaneous with its effect1 the heat of the room4 ,in this case1 then1 there is no succession as regards time1 between cause and effect1 but they are simultaneous2 and still the law holds good4 ,the greater part of operating causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects1 and the succession in time of the latter is produced only because the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment4 ,but at the moment when the effect first arises1 it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause1 because1 if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be1 the effect could not have arisen4 ,here it must be specially remembered that we must consider the order of time and not the lapse thereof4 ,the relation remains1 even though no time has elapsed4 ,the time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely vanish1 and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous1 but the relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according to time4 ,if1 for example1 ,i consider a leaden ball1 which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in it1 as a cause1 then it is simultaneous with the effect4 ,but ,i distinguish the two through the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both4 ,for if ,i lay the ball upon the cushion1 then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface2 but supposing the cushion has1 from some cause or another1 a hollow1 there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball4 ,thus1 the law of succession of time is in all instances the only empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antecedent cause4 ,the glass is the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface1 although the two phenomena are contemporaneous4 ,for1 as soon as ,i draw some water with the glass from a larger vessel1 an effect follows thereupon1 namely1 the change of the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a concave1 which it assumes in the glass4 ,this conception of causality leads us to the conception of action2 that of action1 to the conception of force2 and through it1 to the conception of substance4 ,as ,i do not wish this critical essay1 the sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition priori1 to be crowded with analyses which merely explain1 but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions1 ,i reserve the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future system of pure reason4 ,such an analysis1 indeed1 executed with great particularity1 may already be found in well-known works on this subject4 ,but ,i cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks on the empirical criterion of a substance1 in so far as it seems to be more evident and more easily recognized through the conception of action than through that of the permanence of a phenomenon4 ,where action 7consequently activity and force7 exists1 substance also must exist1 and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena4 ,very well4 ,but if we are called upon to explain what we mean by substance1 and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle1 the answer is by no means so easy4 ,how shall we conclude immediately from the action to the permanence of that which acts1 this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of substance 7phenomenon78 ,but after what has been said above1 the solution of this question becomes easy enough1 although by the common mode of procedure--merely analysing our conceptions--it would be quite impossible4 ,the conception of action indicates the relation of the subject of causality to the effect4 ,now because all effect consists in that which happens1 therefore in the changeable1 the last subject thereof is the permanent1 as the substratum of all that changes1 that is1 substance4 ,for according to the principle of causality1 actions are always the first ground of all change in phenomena and1 consequently1 cannot be a property of a subject which itself changes1 because if this were the case1 other actions and another subject would be necessary to determine this change4 ,from all this it results that action alone1 as an empirical criterion1 is a sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality1 without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of substance by a comparison4 ,besides1 by this mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires4 ,for that the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away1 all origin and extinction1 cannot itself 7in the sphere of phenomena7 arise and pass away1 is a sound and safe conclusion1 a conclusion which leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in existence1 and consequently to the conception of a substance as phenomenon4 ,when something happens1 the mere fact of the occurrence1 without regard to that which occurs1 is an object requiring investigation4 ,the transition from the non-being of a state into the existence of it1 supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed in the phenomenon1 is a fact of itself demanding inquiry4 ,such an event1 as has been shown in ,no4 ,a1 does not concern substance 7for substance does not thus originate71 but its condition or state4 ,it is therefore only change1 and not origin from nothing4 ,if this origin be regarded as the effect of a foreign cause1 it is termed creation1 which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena1 because the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience4 ,if1 however1 ,i regard all things not as phenomena1 but as things in themselves and objects of understanding alone1 they1 although substances1 may be considered as dependent1 in respect of their existence1 on a foreign cause4 ,but this would require a very different meaning in the words1 a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as objects of possible experience4 ,how a thing can be changed1 how it is possible that upon one state existing in one point of time1 an opposite state should follow in another point of time--of this we have not the smallest conception priori4 ,there is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers1 which can only be given empirically2 for example1 knowledge of moving forces1 or1 in other words1 of certain successive phenomena 7as movements7 which indicate the presence of such forces4 ,but the form of every change1 the condition under which alone it can take place as the coming into existence of another state 7be the content of the change1 that is1 the state which is changed1 what it may71 and consequently the succession of the states themselves can very well be considered priori1 in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of time4#cb #cb ,it must be remarked that ,i do not speak of the change of certain relations1 but of the change of the state4 ,thus1 when a body moves in a uniform manner1 it does not change its state 7of motion72 but only when all motion increases or decreases4 ,when a substance passes from one state1 a1 into another state1 b1 the point of time in which the latter exists is different from1 and subsequent to that in which the former existed4 ,in like manner1 the second state1 as reality 7in the phenomenon71 differs from the first1 in which the reality of the second did not exist1 as b from zero4 ,that is to say1 if the state1 b1 differs from the state1 a1 only in respect to quantity1 the change is a coming into existence of b -a1 which in the former state did not exist1 and in relation to which that state is ,o4 ,now the question arises how a thing passes from one state a1 into another state b4 ,between two moments there is always a certain time1 and between two states existing in these moments there is always a difference having a certain quantity 7for all parts of phenomena are in their turn quantities74 ,consequently1 every transition from one state into another1 is always effected in a time contained between two moments1 of which the first determines the state which the thing leaves1 and the second determines the state into which the thing passes4 ,both moments1 then1 are limitations of the time of a change1 consequently of the intermediate state between both1 and as such they belong to the total of the change4 ,now every change has a cause1 which evidences its causality in the whole time during which the charge takes place4 ,the cause1 therefore1 does not produce the change all at once or in one moment1 but in a time1 so that1 as the time gradually increases from the commencing instant1 a1 to its completion at b1 in like manner also1 the quantity of the reality 7b - a7 is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last4 ,all change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality1 which1 in so far as it is uniform1 we call a momentum4 ,the change does not consist of these momenta1 but is generated or produced by them as their effect4 ,such is the law of the continuity of all change1 the ground of which is that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible1 but that1 notwithstanding1 the state of a thing passes in the process of a change through all these parts1 as elements1 to its second state4 ,there is no smallest degree of reality in a phenomenon1 just as there is no smallest degree in the quantity of time2 and so the new state of reality grows up out of the former state1 through all the infinite degrees thereof1 the differences of which one from another1 taken all together1 are less than the difference between #j and a4 ,it is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this principle in the investigation of nature4 ,but how such a proposition1 which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature1 is possible completely priori1 is indeed a question which deserves investigation1 although the first view seems to demonstrate the truth and reality of the principle1 and the question1 how it is possible1 may be considered superfluous4 ,for there are so many groundless pretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure reason that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such1 and without a thoroughgoing and radical deduction1 to believe nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence4 ,every addition to our empirical knowledge1 and every advance made in the exercise of our perception1 is nothing more than an extension of the determination of the internal sense1 that is to say1 a progression in time1 be objects themselves what they may1 phenomena1 or pure intuitions4 ,this progression in time determines everything1 and is itself determined by nothing else4 ,that is to say1 the parts of the progression exist only in time1 and by means of the synthesis thereof1 and are not given antecedently to it4 ,for this reason1 every transition in perception to anything which follows upon another in time1 is a determination of time by means of the production of this perception4 ,and as this determination of time is1 always and in all its parts1 a quantity1 the perception produced is to be considered as a quantity which proceeds through all its degrees--no one of which is the smallest possible--from zero up to its determined degree4 ,from this we perceive the possibility of cognizing priori a law of changes--a law1 however1 which concerns their form merely4 ,we merely anticipate our own apprehension1 the formal condition of which1 inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena1 must certainly be capable of being cognized priori4 ,thus1 as time contains the sensuous condition priori of the possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that which follows it1 the understanding1 by virtue of the unity of apperception1 contains the condition priori of the possibility of a continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena1 and this by means of the series of causes and effects1 the former of which necessitate the sequence of the latter1 and thereby render universally and for all time1 and by consequence1 objectively1 valid the empirical cognition of the relations of time4 ,c4 ,,third ,,analogy4 ,principle of ,coexistence1 ,according to the ,law of ,reciprocity or ,community4 ,all substances1 in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same time1 exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action4 ,,proof4 ,things are coexistent1 when in empirical intuition the perception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other1 and vice versa--which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena1 as we have shown in the explanation of the second principle4 ,thus ,i can perceive the moon and then the earth1 or conversely1 first the earth and then the moon2 and for the reason that my perceptions of these objects can reciprocally follow each other1 ,i say1 they exist contemporaneously4 ,now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time4 ,but time itself is not an object of perception2 and therefore we cannot conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time1 the other fact1 that the perception of these things can follow each other reciprocally4 ,the synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject when the other is not present1 and contrariwise2 but would not show that the objects are coexistent1 that is to say1 that1 if the one exists1 the other also exists in the same time1 and that this is necessarily so1 in order that the perceptions may be capable of following each other reciprocally4 ,it follows that a conception of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phenomena 7existing1 as they do1 apart from each other1 and yet contemporaneously71 is requisite to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its foundation in the object1 and to enable us to represent coexistence as objective4 ,but that relation of substances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is in the other substance1 is the relation of influence4 ,and1 when this influence is reciprocal1 it is the relation of community or reciprocity4 ,consequently the coexistence of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than under the precondition of their reciprocal action4 ,this is therefore the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience4 ,things are coexistent1 in so far as they exist in one and the same time4 ,but how can we know that they exist in one and the same time8 ,only by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference1 that is to say1 that it can proceed from ,a1 through ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 to ,e1 or contrariwise from ,e to ,a4 ,for if they were successive in time 7and in the order1 let us suppose1 which begins with ,a71 it is quite impossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with ,e and go backwards to ,a1 inasmuch as ,a belongs to past time and1 therefore1 cannot be an object of apprehension4 ,let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena each is completely isolated1 that is1 that no one acts upon another4 ,then ,i say that the coexistence of these cannot be an object of possible perception and that the existence of one cannot1 by any mode of empirical synthesis1 lead us to the existence of another4 ,for we imagine them in this case to be separated by a completely void space1 and thus perception1 which proceeds from the one to the other in time1 would indeed determine their existence by means of a following perception1 but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one phenomenon follows objectively upon the first1 or is coexistent with it4 ,besides the mere fact of existence1 then1 there must be something by means of which ,a determines the position of ,b in time and1 conversely1 ,b the position of ,a2 because only under this condition can substances be empirically represented as existing contemporaneously4 ,now that alone determines the position of another thing in time which is the cause of it or of its determinations4 ,consequently every substance 7inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect of its determinations7 must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance1 and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself4 ,that is to say1 substances must stand 7mediately or immediately7 in dynamical community with each other1 if coexistence is to be cognized in any possible experience4 ,but1 in regard to objects of experience1 that is absolutely necessary without which the experience of these objects would itself be impossible4 ,consequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena1 in so far as they are coexistent1 stand in a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other4 ,the word community has in our language#cc two meanings1 and contains the two notions conveyed in the ,latin communio and commercium4 ,we employ it in this place in the latter sense--that of a dynamical community1 without which even the community of place 7communio spatii7 could not be empirically cognized4 ,in our experiences it is easy to observe that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can conduct our senses from one object to another2 that the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies produces a mediating community between them and us1 and thereby evidences their coexistence with us2 that we cannot empirically change our position 7perceive this change71 unless the existence of matter throughout the whole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions we occupy2 and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous existence of these places only through their reciprocal influence1 and thereby also the coexistence of even the most remote objects--although in this case the proof is only mediate4 ,without community1 every perception 7of a phenomenon in space7 is separated from every other and isolated1 and the chain of empirical representations1 that is1 of experience1 must1 with the appearance of a new object1 begin entirely de novo1 without the least connection with preceding representations1 and without standing towards these even in the relation of time4 ,my intention here is by no means to combat the notion of empty space2 for it may exist where our perceptions cannot exist1 inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto1 and where1 therefore1 no empirical perception of coexistence takes place4 ,but in this case it is not an object of possible experience4 #cc ,german ,the following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation4 ,in the mind1 all phenomena1 as contents of a possible experience1 must exist in community 7communio7 of apperception or consciousness1 and in so far as it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent and connected1 in so far must they reciprocally determine the position in time of each other and thereby constitute a whole4 ,if this subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis1 or to be applied to substances as phenomena1 the perception of one substance must render possible the perception of another1 and conversely4 ,for otherwise succession1 which is always found in perceptions as apprehensions1 would be predicated of external objects1 and their representation of their coexistence be thus impossible4 ,but this is a reciprocal influence1 that is to say1 a real community 7commercium7 of substances1 without which therefore the empirical relation of coexistence would be a notion beyond the reach of our minds4 ,by virtue of this commercium1 phenomena1 in so far as they are apart from1 and nevertheless in connection with each other1 constitute a compositum reale4 ,such composita are possible in many different ways4 ,the three dynamical relations then1 from which all others spring1 are those of inherence1 consequence1 and composition4 ,these1 then1 are the three analogies of experience4 ,they are nothing more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time1 according to the three modi of this determination2 to wit1 the relation to time itself as a quantity 7the quantity of existence1 that is1 duration71 the relation in time as a series or succession1 finally1 the relation in time as the complex of all existence 7simultaneity74 ,this unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical2 that is to say1 time is not considered as that in which experience determines immediately to every existence its position2 for this is impossible1 inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of perception1 by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other4 ,on the contrary1 the rule of the understanding1 through which alone the existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards relations of time1 determines for every phenomenon its position in time1 and consequently priori1 and with validity for all and every time4 ,by nature1 in the empirical sense of the word1 we understand the totality of phenomena connected1 in respect of their existence1 according to necessary rules1 that is1 laws4 ,there are therefore certain laws 7which are moreover priori7 which make nature possible2 and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience1 and by virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes possible4 ,the purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us the unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena under certain exponents1 the only business of which is to express the relation of time 7in so far as it contains all existence in itself7 to the unity of apperception1 which can exist in synthesis only according to rules4 ,the combined expression of all is this3 8,all phenomena exist in one nature1 and must so exist1 inasmuch as without this priori unity1 no unity of experience1 and consequently no determination of objects in experience1 is possible40 ,as regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of these transcendental laws of nature1 and the peculiar character of it we must make one remark1 which will at the same time be important as a guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and likewise synthetical propositions priori4 ,had we endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically1 that is1 from conceptions2 that is to say1 had we employed this method in attempting to show that everything which exists1 exists only in that which is permanent--that every thing or event presupposes the existence of something in a preceding state1 upon which it follows in conformity with a rule--lastly1 that in the manifold1 which is coexistent1 the states coexist in connection with each other according to a rule1 all our labour would have been utterly in vain4 ,for mere conceptions of things1 analyse them as we may1 cannot enable us to conclude from the existence of one object to the existence of another4 ,what other course was left for us to pursue8 ,this only1 to demonstrate the possibility of experience as a cognition in which at last all objects must be capable of being presented to us1 if the representation of them is to possess any objective reality4 ,now in this third1 this mediating term1 the essential form of which consists in the synthetical unity of the apperception of all phenomena1 we found priori conditions of the universal and necessary determination as to time of all existences in the world of phenomena1 without which the empirical determination thereof as to time would itself be impossible1 and we also discovered rules of synthetical unity priori1 by means of which we could anticipate experience4 ,for want of this method1 and from the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof of the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the empirical employment of the understanding1 has it happened that a proof of the principle of sufficient reason has been so often attempted1 and always in vain4 ,the other two analogies nobody has ever thought of1 although they have always been silently employed by the mind1#cd because the guiding thread furnished by the categories was wanting1 the guide which alone can enable us to discover every hiatus1 both in the system of conceptions and of principles4 #cd ,the unity of the universe1 in which all phenomena to be connected1 is evidently a mere consequence of the admitted principle of the community of all substances which are coexistent4 ,for were substances isolated1 they could not as parts constitute a whole1 and were their connection 7reciprocal action of the manifold7 not necessary from the very fact of coexistence1 we could not conclude from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former as a real one4 ,we have1 however1 shown in its place that community is the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of coexistence1 and that we may therefore properly reason from the latter to the former as its condition4 #d4 ,,the ,,postulates ,,of ,,empirical ,,thought4 #a4 ,that which agrees with the formal conditions 7intuition and conception7 of experience1 is possible4 #b4 ,that which coheres with the material conditions of experience 7sensation71 is real4 #c4 ,that whose coherence with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is 7exists7 necessary4 ,explanation4 ,the categories of modality possess this peculiarity1 that they do not in the least determine the object1 or enlarge the conception to which they are annexed as predicates1 but only express its relation to the faculty of cognition4 ,though my conception of a thing is in itself complete1 ,i am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely possible1 or whether it is also real1 or1 if the latter1 whether it is also necessary4 ,but hereby the object itself is not more definitely determined in thought1 but the question is only in what relation it1 including all its determinations1 stands to the understanding and its employment in experience1 to the empirical faculty of judgement1 and to the reason of its application to experience4 ,for this very reason1 too1 the categories of modality are nothing more than explanations of the conceptions of possibility1 reality1 and necessity1 as employed in experience1 and at the same time1 restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone1 not authorizing the transcendental employment of them4 ,for if they are to have something more than a merely logical significance1 and to be something more than a mere analytical expression of the form of thought1 and to have a relation to things and their possibility1 reality1 or necessity1 they must concern possible experience and its synthetical unity1 in which alone objects of cognition can be given4 ,the postulate of the possibility of things requires also1 that the conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our experience in general4 ,but this1 that is to say1 the objective form of experience1 contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for the cognition of objects4 ,a conception which contains a synthesis must be regarded as empty and1 without reference to an object1 if its synthesis does not belong to experience--either as borrowed from it1 and in this case it is called an empirical conception1 or such as is the ground and priori condition of experience 7its form71 and in this case it is a pure conception1 a conception which nevertheless belongs to experience1 inasmuch as its object can be found in this alone4 ,for where shall we find the criterion or character of the possibility of an object which is cogitated by means of an priori synthetical conception1 if not in the synthesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of objects8 ,that in such a conception no contradiction exists is indeed a necessary logical condition1 but very far from being sufficient to establish the objective reality of the conception1 that is1 the possibility of such an object as is thought in the conception4 ,thus1 in the conception of a figure which is contained within two straight lines1 there is no contradiction1 for the conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction contain no negation of a figure4 ,the impossibility in such a case does not rest upon the conception in itself1 but upon the construction of it in space1 that is to say1 upon the conditions of space and its determinations4 ,but these have themselves objective reality1 that is1 they apply to possible things1 because they contain priori the form of experience in general4 ,and now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and influence of this postulate of possibility4 ,when ,i represent to myself a thing that is permanent1 so that everything in it which changes belongs merely to its state or condition1 from such a conception alone ,i never can cognize that such a thing is possible4 ,or1 if ,i represent to myself something which is so constituted that1 when it is posited1 something else follows always and infallibly1 my thought contains no self-contradiction2 but whether such a property as causality is to be found in any possible thing1 my thought alone affords no means of judging4 ,finally1 ,i can represent to myself different things 7substances7 which are so constituted that the state or condition of one causes a change in the state of the other1 and reciprocally2 but whether such a relation is a property of things cannot be perceived from these conceptions1 which contain a merely arbitrary synthesis4 ,only from the fact1 therefore1 that these conceptions express priori the relations of perceptions in every experience1 do we know that they possess objective reality1 that is1 transcendental truth2 and that independent of experience1 though not independent of all relation to form of an experience in general and its synthetical unity1 in which alone objects can be empirically cognized4 ,but when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances1 forces1 action1 and reaction1 from the material presented to us by perception1 without following the example of experience in their connection1 we create mere chimeras1 of the possibility of which we cannot discover any criterion1 because we have not taken experience for our instructress1 though we have borrowed the conceptions from her4 ,such fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility not1 like the categories1 priori1 as conceptions on which all experience depends1 but only1 posteriori1 as conceptions given by means of experience itself1 and their possibility must either be cognized posteriori and empirically1 or it cannot be cognized at all4 ,a substance which is permanently present in space1 yet without filling it 7like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking subject which some have tried to introduce into metaphysics71 or a peculiar fundamental power of the mind of intuiting the future by anticipation 7instead of merely inferring from past and present events71 or1 finally1 a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men1 however distant they may be--these are conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to rest upon4 ,for they are not based upon experience and its known laws2 and1 without experience1 they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts1 which1 though containing no internal contradiction1 has no claim to objective reality1 neither1 consequently1 to the possibility of such an object as is thought in these conceptions4 ,as far as concerns reality1 it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility in concreto without the aid of experience2 because reality is concerned only with sensation1 as the matter of experience1 and not with the form of thought1 with which we can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies4 ,but ,i pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in experience1 and ,i purpose treating here merely of the possibility of things by means of priori conceptions4 ,i maintain1 then1 that the possibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se1 but only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general4 ,it seems1 indeed1 as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from the conception of it alone 7which is certainly independent of experience72 for we can certainly give to the conception a corresponding object completely priori1 that is to say1 we can construct it4 ,but as a triangle is only the form of an object1 it must remain a mere product of the imagination1 and the possibility of the existence of an object corresponding to it must remain doubtful1 unless we can discover some other ground1 unless we know that the figure can be cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of experience rest4 ,now1 the facts that space is a formal condition priori of external experience1 that the formative synthesis1 by which we construct a triangle in imagination1 is the very same as that we employ in the apprehension of a phenomenon for the purpose of making an empirical conception of it1 are what alone connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing1 with the conception of it4 ,in the same manner1 the possibility of continuous quantities1 indeed of quantities in general1 for the conceptions of them are without exception synthetical1 is never evident from the conceptions in themselves1 but only when they are considered as the formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience4 ,and where1 indeed1 should we look for objects to correspond to our conceptions1 if not in experience1 by which alone objects are presented to us8 ,it is1 however1 true that without antecedent experience we can cognize and characterize the possibility of things1 relatively to the formal conditions1 under which something is determined in experience as an object1 consequently1 completely priori4 ,but still this is possible only in relation to experience and within its limits4 ,the postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires perception1 consequently conscious sensation1 not indeed immediately1 that is1 of the object itself1 whose existence is to be cognized1 but still that the object have some connection with a real perception1 in accordance with the analogies of experience1 which exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience4 ,from the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its existence4 ,for1 let the conception be ever so complete1 and containing a statement of all the determinations of the thing1 the existence of it has nothing to do with all this1 but only with the question whether such a thing is given1 so that the perception of it can in every case precede the conception4 ,for the fact that the conception of it precedes the perception1 merely indicates the possibility of its existence2 it is perception which presents matter to the conception1 that is the sole criterion of reality4 ,prior to the perception of the thing1 however1 and therefore comparatively priori1 we are able to cognize its existence1 provided it stands in connection with some perceptions according to the principles of the empirical conjunction of these1 that is1 in conformity with the analogies of perception4 ,for1 in this case1 the existence of the supposed thing is connected with our perception in a possible experience1 and we are able1 with the guidance of these analogies1 to reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive4 ,thus1 we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of the attraction of the steel-filings by the magnet1 although the constitution of our organs renders an immediate perception of this matter impossible for us4 ,for1 according to the laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions1 we should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this matter1 if our senses were more acute--but this obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in general4 ,our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions1 and what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws1 extend4 ,if we do not set out from experience1 or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena1 our pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain4 ,idealism1 however1 brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately4 ,this is1 therefore1 the proper place for its refutation4 ,,refutation ,,of ,,idealism4 ,idealism--,i mean material idealism--is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either 77 doubtful and indemonstrable1 or 7#b7 false and impossible4 ,the first is the problematical idealism of ,descartes1 who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical assertion 7assertio71 to wit1 8,i am40 ,the second is the dogmatical idealism of ,berkeley1 who maintains that space1 together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition1 is a thing which is in itself impossible1 and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination4 ,the dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable1 if we regard space as a property of things in themselves2 for in that case it is1 with all to which it serves as condition1 a nonentity4 ,but the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental sthetic4 ,problematical idealism1 which makes no such assertion1 but only alleges our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate experience1 is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking1 for it observes the rule not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown4 ,the desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things1 and not mere fancies4 ,for this purpose1 we must prove1 that our internal and1 to ,descartes1 indubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of external experience4 ,,theorem4 ,the simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space4 ,,proof ,i am conscious of my own existence as determined in time4 ,all determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception4 ,but this permanent something cannot be something in me1 for the very reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something4 ,it follows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing without me4 ,consequently1 the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things external to me4 ,now1 consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time4 ,hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me1 inasmuch as the existence of these things is the condition of determination in time4 ,that is to say1 the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me4 ,remark ,i4 ,the reader will observe1 that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself1 and with more justice4 ,it assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things4 ,but1 as always happens1 when we reason from given effects to determined causes1 idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty1 for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves1 and that we ascribe it falsely to external things4 ,but our proof shows that external experience is properly immediate1#ce that only by virtue of it--not1 indeed1 the consciousness of our own existence1 but certainly the determination of our existence in time1 that is1 internal experience--is possible4 ,it is true1 that the representation 8,i am10 which is the expression of the consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts1 is that which immediately includes the existence of a subject4 ,but in this representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject1 and therefore also no empirical knowledge1 that is1 experience4 ,for experience contains1 in addition to the thought of something existing1 intuition1 and in this case it must be internal intuition1 that is1 time1 in relation to which the subject must be determined4 ,but the existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose1 so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only mediately and through external experience4 #ce ,the immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is1 in the preceding theorem1 not presupposed1 but proved1 by the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not4 ,the question as to the possibility of it would stand thus3 8,have we an internal sense1 but no external sense1 and is our belief in external perception a mere delusion80 ,but it is evident that1 in order merely to fancy to ourselves anything as external1 that is1 to present it to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense1 and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every act of imagination4 ,for merely to imagine also an external sense1 would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be determined by the imagination4 ,remark ,,ii4 ,now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance4 ,its truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a determination of time only by means of a change in external relations 7motion7 to the permanent in space 7for example1 we become aware of the sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation to the objects of this earth74 ,but this is not all4 ,we find that we possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a substance as intuition1 except matter4 ,this idea of permanence is not itself derived from external experience1 but is an priori necessary condition of all determination of time1 consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own existence1 and that through the existence of external things4 ,in the representation 8,i10 the consciousness of myself is not an intuition1 but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking subject4 ,it follows1 that this 8i0 has not any predicate of intuition1 which1 in its character of permanence1 could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the internal sense--in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition4 ,remark ,,iii4 ,from the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of ourselves1 it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external things involves the existence of these things1 for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination 7in dreams as well as in madness72 though1 indeed1 these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions1 which1 as has been shown1 are possible only through the reality of external objects4 ,the sole aim of our remarks has1 however1 been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only through external experience in general4 ,whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary must be discovered from its particular determinations and by comparing these with the criteria of all real experience4 ,finally1 as regards the third postulate1 it applies to material necessity in existence1 and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions4 ,now as we cannot cognize completely priori the existence of any object of sense1 though we can do so comparatively priori1 that is1 relatively to some other previously given existence--a cognition1 however1 which can only be of such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience1 of which the previously given perception is a part--the necessity of existence can never be cognized from conceptions1 but always1 on the contrary1 from its connection with that which is an object of perception4 ,but the only existence cognized1 under the condition of other given phenomena1 as necessary1 is the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality4 ,it is consequently not the necessity of the existence of things 7as substances71 but the necessity of the state of things that we cognize1 and that not immediately1 but by means of the existence of other states given in perception1 according to empirical laws of causality4 ,hence it follows that the criterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of possible experience--that everything which happens is determined priori in the phenomenon by its cause4 ,thus we cognize only the necessity of effects in nature1 the causes of which are given us4 ,moreover1 the criterion of necessity in existence possesses no application beyond the field of possible experience1 and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as substances1 because these can never be considered as empirical effects1 or as something that happens and has a beginning4 ,necessity1 therefore1 regards only the relations of phenomena according to the dynamical law of causality1 and the possibility grounded thereon1 of reasoning from some given existence 7of a cause7 priori to another existence 7of an effect74 8,everything that happens is hypothetically necessary10 is a principle which subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law1 that is1 to a rule of necessary existence1 without which nature herself could not possibly exist4 ,hence the proposition1 8,nothing happens by blind chance 7in mundo non datur casus710 is an priori law of nature4 ,the case is the same with the proposition1 8,necessity in nature is not blind10 that is1 it is conditioned1 consequently intelligible necessity 7non datur fatum74 ,both laws subject the play of change to 8a nature of things 7as phenomena710 or1 which is the same thing1 to the unity of the understanding1 and through the understanding alone can changes belong to an experience1 as the synthetical unity of phenomena4 ,both belong to the class of dynamical principles4 ,the former is properly a consequence of the principle of causality--one of the analogies of experience4 ,the latter belongs to the principles of modality1 which to the determination of causality adds the conception of necessity1 which is itself1 however1 subject to a rule of the understanding4 ,the principle of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as changes 7in mundo non datur saltus72 and likewise1 in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space1 any break or hiatus between two phenomena 7non datur hiatus7--for we can so express the principle1 that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a vacuum1 or which even admits it as a part of an empirical synthesis4 ,for1 as regards a vacuum or void1 which we may cogitate as out and beyond the field of possible experience 7the world71 such a question cannot come before the tribunal of mere understanding1 which decides only upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of empirical cognition4 ,it is rather a problem for ideal reason1 which passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and aims at forming a judgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes it1 and the proper place for the consideration of it is the transcendental dialectic4 ,these four propositions1 8,in mundo non datur hiatus1 non datur saltus1 non datur casus1 non datur fatum10 as well as all principles of transcendental origin1 we could very easily exhibit in their proper order1 that is1 in conformity with the order of the categories1 and assign to each its proper place4 ,but the already practised reader will do this for himself1 or discover the clue to such an arrangement4 ,but the combined result of all is simply this1 to admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all phenomena1 that is1 the unity of the conceptions of the understanding4 ,for in the understanding alone is the unity of experience1 in which all perceptions must have their assigned place1 possible4 ,whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality1 and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity1 are interesting enough questions1 and quite capable of synthetic solution1 questions1 however1 which come under the jurisdiction of reason alone4 ,for they are tantamount to asking whether all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and connected whole of a single experience1 of which every given perception is a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other phenomena--or1 whether my perceptions can belong to more than one possible experience8 ,the understanding gives to experience1 according to the subjective and formal conditions1 of sensibility as well as of apperception1 the rules which alone make this experience possible4 ,other forms of intuition besides those of space and time1 other forms of understanding besides the discursive forms of thought1 or of cognition by means of conceptions1 we can neither imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves2 and even if we could1 they would still not belong to experience1 which is the only mode of cognition by which objects are presented to us4 ,whether other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible experience1 and consequently whether some other sphere of matter exists1 the understanding has no power to decide1 its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given4 ,moreover1 the poverty of the usual arguments which go to prove the existence of a vast sphere of possibility1 of which all that is real 7every object of experience7 is but a small part1 is very remarkable4 8,all real is possible02 from this follows naturally1 according to the logical laws of conversion1 the particular proposition3 8,some possible is real40 ,now this seems to be equivalent to3 8,much is possible that is not real40 ,no doubt it does seem as if we ought to consider the sum of the possible to be greater than that of the real1 from the fact that something must be added to the former to constitute the latter4 ,but this notion of adding to the possible is absurd4 ,for that which is not in the sum of the possible1 and consequently requires to be added to it1 is manifestly impossible4 ,in addition to accordance with the formal conditions of experience1 the understanding requires a connection with some perception2 but that which is connected with this perception is real1 even although it is not immediately perceived4 ,but that another series of phenomena1 in complete coherence with that which is given in perception1 consequently more than one all-embracing experience is possible1 is an inference which cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience1 and still less without any data at all4 ,that which is possible only under conditions which are themselves merely possible1 is not possible in any respect4 ,and yet we can find no more certain ground on which to base the discussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that of experience4 ,i have merely mentioned these questions1 that in treating of the conception of the understanding1 there might be no omission of anything that1 in the common opinion1 belongs to them4 ,in reality1 however1 the notion of absolute possibility 7possibility which is valid in every respect7 is not a mere conception of the understanding1 which can be employed empirically1 but belongs to reason alone1 which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the understanding4 ,we have1 therefore1 contented ourselves with a merely critical remark1 leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel4 ,before concluding this fourth section1 and at the same time the system of all principles of the pure understanding1 it seems proper to mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality postulates4 ,this expression ,i do not here use in the sense which some more recent philosophers1 contrary to its meaning with mathematicians1 to whom the word properly belongs1 attach to it--that of a proposition1 namely1 immediately certain1 requiring neither deduction nor proof4 ,for if1 in the case of synthetical propositions1 however evident they may be1 we accord to them without deduction1 and merely on the strength of their own pretensions1 unqualified belief1 all critique of the understanding is entirely lost2 and1 as there is no want of bold pretensions1 which the common belief 7though for the philosopher this is no credential7 does not reject1 the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and conceit1 without the power of refusing its assent to those assertions1 which1 though illegitimate1 demand acceptance as veritable axioms4 ,when1 therefore1 to the conception of a thing an priori determination is synthetically added1 such a proposition must obtain1 if not a proof1 at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion4 ,the principles of modality are1 however1 not objectively synthetical1 for the predicates of possibility1 reality1 and necessity do not in the least augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed1 inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the object4 ,but as they are1 nevertheless1 always synthetical1 they are so merely subjectively4 ,that is to say1 they have a reflective power1 and apply to the conception of a thing1 of which1 in other respects1 they affirm nothing1 the faculty of cognition in which the conception originates and has its seat4 ,so that if the conception merely agree with the formal conditions of experience1 its object is called possible2 if it is in connection with perception1 and determined thereby1 the object is real2 if it is determined according to conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions1 the object is called necessary4 ,the principles of modality therefore predicate of a conception nothing more than the procedure of the faculty of cognition which generated it4 ,now a postulate in mathematics is a practical proposition which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves1 and produce the conception of it1 for example--8,with a given line1 to describe a circle upon a plane1 from a given point02 and such a proposition does not admit of proof1 because the procedure1 which it requires1 is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception of such a figure4 ,with the same right1 accordingly1 can we postulate the principles of modality1 because they do not augment#cf the conception of a thing but merely indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition4 #cf ,when ,i think the reality of a thing1 ,i do really think more than the possibility1 but not in the thing2 for that can never contain more in reality than was contained in its complete possibility4 ,but while the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position of thing in relation to the understanding 7its empirical use71 reality is the conjunction of the thing with perception4 ,,general ,,remark ,,on ,,the ,,system ,,of ,,principles4 ,it is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone1 but must always have an intuition1 by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding4 ,take1 for example1 the categories of relation4 ,how 7#a7 a thing can exist only as a subject1 and not as a mere determination of other things1 that is1 can be substance2 or how 7#b71 because something exists1 some other thing must exist1 consequently how a thing can be a cause2 or how 7#c71 when several things exist1 from the fact that one of these things exists1 some consequence to the others follows1 and reciprocally1 and in this way a community of substances can be possible--are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere conceptions4 ,the very same is the case with the other categories2 for example1 how a thing can be of the same sort with many others1 that is1 can be a quantity1 and so on4 ,so long as we have not intuition we cannot know whether we do really think an object by the categories1 and where an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them1 and thus the truth is established1 that the categories are not in themselves cognitions1 but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions4 ,for the same reason is it true that from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made4 ,for example3 8,in every existence there is substance10 that is1 something that can exist only as a subject and not as mere predicate2 or1 8,everything is a quantity0--to construct propositions such as these1 we require something to enable us to go out beyond the given conception and connect another with it4 ,for the same reason the attempt to prove a synthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions1 for example3 8,everything that exists contingently has a cause10 has never succeeded4 ,we could never get further than proving that1 without this relation to conceptions1 we could not conceive the existence of the contingent1 that is1 could not priori through the understanding cognize the existence of such a thing2 but it does not hence follow that this is also the condition of the possibility of the thing itself that is said to be contingent4 ,if1 accordingly2 we look back to our proof of the principle of causality1 we shall find that we were able to prove it as valid only of objects of possible experience1 and1 indeed1 only as itself the principle of the possibility of experience1 ,consequently of the cognition of an object given in empirical intuition1 and not from mere conceptions4 ,that1 however1 the proposition3 8,everything that is contingent must have a cause10 is evident to every one merely from conceptions1 is not to be denied4 ,but in this case the conception of the contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of modality 7as that the non-existence of which can be conceived7 but that of relation 7as that which can exist only as the consequence of something else71 and so it is really an identical proposition3 8,that which can exist only as a consequence1 has a cause40 ,in fact1 when we have to give examples of contingent existence1 we always refer to changes1 and not merely to the possibility of conceiving the opposite4#cg ,but change is an event1 which1 as such1 is possible only through a cause1 and considered per se its non-existence is therefore possible1 and we become cognizant of its contingency from the fact that it can exist only as the effect of a cause4 ,hence1 if a thing is assumed to be contingent1 it is an analytical proposition to say1 it has a cause4 #cg ,we can easily conceive the non-existence of matter2 but the ancients did not thence infer its contingency4 ,but even the alternation of the existence and non-existence of a given state in a thing1 in which all change consists1 by no means proves the contingency of that state--the ground of proof being the reality of its opposite4 ,for example1 a body is in a state of rest after motion1 but we cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the fact that the former is the opposite of the latter4 ,for this opposite is merely a logical and not a real opposite to the other4 ,if we wish to demonstrate the contingency of the motion1 what we ought to prove is that1 instead of the motion which took place in the preceding point of time1 it was possible for the body to have been then in rest1 not1 that it is afterwards in rest2 for in this case1 both opposites are perfectly consistent with each other4 ,but it is still more remarkable that1 to understand the possibility of things according to the categories and thus to demonstrate the objective reality of the latter1 we require not merely intuitions1 but external intuitions4 ,if1 for example1 we take the pure conceptions of relation1 we find that 7#a7 for the purpose of presenting to the conception of substance something permanent in intuition corresponding thereto and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this conception1 we require an intuition 7of matter7 in space1 because space alone is permanent and determines things as such1 while time1 and with it all that is in the internal sense1 is in a state of continual flow2 7#b7 in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the conception of causality1 we require the representation of motion as change in space2 in fact1 it is through it alone that changes1 the possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive1 are capable of being intuited4 ,change is the connection of determinations contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the same thing4 ,now1 how it is possible that out of a given state one quite opposite to it in the same thing should follow1 reason without an example can not only not conceive1 but cannot even make intelligible without intuition2 and this intuition is the motion of a point in space2 the existence of which in different spaces 7as a consequence of opposite determinations7 alone makes the intuition of change possible4 ,for1 in order to make even internal change cognitable1 we require to represent time1 as the form of the internal sense1 figuratively by a line1 and the internal change by the drawing of that line 7motion71 and consequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able to represent the successive existence of ourselves in different states4 ,the proper ground of this fact is that all change to be perceived as change presupposes something permanent in intuition1 while in the internal sense no permanent intuition is to be found4 ,lastly1 the objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived by mere reason1 and consequently its objective reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition1 and that external in space4 ,for how can we conceive the possibility of community1 that is1 when several substances exist1 that some effect on the existence of the one follows from the existence of the other1 and reciprocally1 and therefore that1 because something exists in the latter1 something else must exist in the former1 which could not be understood from its own existence alone8 ,for this is the very essence of community--which is inconceivable as a property of things which are perfectly isolated4 ,hence1 ,leibnitz1 in attributing to the substances of the world--as cogitated by the understanding alone--a community1 required the mediating aid of a divinity2 for1 from their existence1 such a property seemed to him with justice inconceivable4 ,but we can very easily conceive the possibility of community 7of substances as phenomena7 if we represent them to ourselves as in space1 consequently in external intuition4 ,for external intuition contains in itself priori formal external relations1 as the conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction1 and therefore of the possibility of community4 ,with the same ease can it be demonstrated1 that the possibility of things as quantities1 and consequently the objective reality of the category of quantity1 can be grounded only in external intuition1 and that by its means alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal sense4 ,but ,i must avoid prolixity1 and leave the task of illustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection4 ,the above remarks are of the greatest importance1 not only for the confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism1 but still more when the subject of self-cognition by mere internal consciousness and the determination of our own nature without the aid of external empirical intuitions is under discussion1 for the indication of the grounds of the possibility of such a cognition4 ,the result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles is1 therefore3 8,all principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than priori principles of the possibility of experience1 and to experience alone do all priori synthetical propositions apply and relate02 indeed1 their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation4 ,chapter ,,iii ,of the ,ground of the ,division of all ,objects into ,phenomena and ,noumena ,we have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and carefully surveyed every part of it1 but we have also measured it1 and assigned to everything therein its proper place4 ,but this land is an island1 and enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits4 ,it is the land of truth 7an attractive word71 surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean1 the region of illusion1 where many a fog-bank1 many an iceberg1 seems to the mariner1 on his voyage of discovery1 a new country1 and1 while constantly deluding him with vain hopes1 engages him in dangerous adventures1 from which he never can desist1 and which yet he never can bring to a termination4 ,but before venturing upon this sea1 in order to explore it in its whole extent1 and to arrive at a certainty whether anything is to be discovered there1 it will not be without advantage if we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave1 and to ask ourselves1 firstly1 whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with what it contains1 or whether we must not of necessity be contented with it1 if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to build upon2 and1 secondly1 by what title we possess this land itself1 and how we hold it secure against all hostile claims8 ,although1 in the course of our analytic1 we have already given sufficient answers to these questions1 yet a summary recapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction1 by uniting in one point the momenta of the arguments4 ,we have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself1 without borrowing from experience1 it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience4 ,the principles of the pure understanding1 whether constitutive priori 7as the mathematical principles71 or merely regulative 7as the dynamical71 contain nothing but the pure schema1 as it were1 of possible experience4 ,for experience possesses its unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding1 originally and from itself1 imparts to the synthesis of the imagination in relation to apperception1 and in priori relation to and agreement with which phenomena1 as data for a possible cognition1 must stand4 ,but although these rules of the understanding are not only priori true1 but the very source of all truth1 that is1 of the accordance of our cognition with objects1 and on this ground1 that they contain the basis of the possibility of experience1 as the ensemble of all cognition1 it seems to us not enough to propound what is true--we desire also to be told what we want to know4 ,if1 then1 we learn nothing more by this critical examination than what we should have practised in the merely empirical use of the understanding1 without any such subtle inquiry1 the presumption is that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour bestowed upon it4 ,it may certainly be answered that no rash curiosity is more prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which we seek1 before we have entered on the needful investigations1 and before one could form the least conception of its utility1 even though it were placed before our eyes4 ,but there is one advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner--this1 namely1 that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise1 and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition1 may exercise its functions very well and very successfully1 but is quite unable to do one thing1 and that of very great importance1 to determine1 namely1 the bounds that limit its employment1 and to know what lies within or without its own sphere4 ,this purpose can be obtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted4 ,but if it cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not1 it can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions1 but must lay its account with many humiliating corrections1 when it transgresses1 as it unavoidably will1 the limits of its own territory1 and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions4 ,that the understanding1 therefore1 cannot make of its priori principles1 or even of its conceptions1 other than an empirical use1 is a proposition which leads to the most important results4 ,a transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle1 when it is referred to things in general and considered as things in themselves2 an empirical use1 when it is referred merely to phenomena1 that is1 to objects of a possible experience4 ,that the latter use of a conception is the only admissible one is evident from the reasons following4 ,for every conception are requisite1 firstly1 the logical form of a conception 7of thought7 general2 and1 secondly1 the possibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply4 ,failing this latter1 it has no sense1 and utterly void of content1 although it may contain the logical function for constructing a conception from certain data4 ,now1 object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by intuition1 and1 even if a pure intuition antecedent to the object is priori possible1 this pure intuition can itself obtain objective validity only from empirical intuition1 of which it is itself but the form4 ,all conceptions1 therefore1 and with them all principles1 however high the degree of their priori possibility1 relate to empirical intuitions1 that is1 to data towards a possible experience4 ,without this they possess no objective validity1 but are mere play of imagination or of understanding with images or notions4 ,let us take1 for example1 the conceptions of mathematics1 and first in its pure intuitions4 8,space has three dimensions0--8,between two points there can be only one straight line10 etc4 ,although all these principles1 and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself1 are generated in the mind entirely priori1 they would nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena 7empirical objects74 ,hence it is requisite that an abstract conception be made sensuous1 that is1 that an object corresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming1 otherwise the conception remains1 as we say1 without sense1 that is1 without meaning4 ,mathematics fulfils this requirement by the construction of the figure1 which is a phenomenon evident to the senses4 ,the same science finds support and significance in number2 this in its turn finds it in the fingers1 or in counters1 or in lines and points4 ,the conception itself is always produced priori1 together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions2 but the proper employment of them1 and their application to objects1 can exist nowhere but in experience1 the possibility of which1 as regards its form1 they contain priori4 ,that this is also the case with all of the categories and the principles based upon them is evident from the fact that we cannot render intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to them without having recourse to the conditions of sensibility1 consequently1 to the form of phenomena1 to which1 as their only proper objects1 their use must therefore be confined1 inasmuch as1 if this condition is removed1 all significance1 that is1 all relation to an object1 disappears1 and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions4 ,the conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it4 ,but this 8how many times0 is based upon successive repetition1 consequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous therein4 ,reality1 in contradistinction to negation1 can be explained only by cogitating a time which is either filled therewith or is void4 ,if ,i leave out the notion of permanence 7which is existence in all time71 there remains in the conception of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject1 a notion of which ,i endeavour to realize by representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject4 ,but not only am ,i perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing1 ,i can make nothing out of the notion1 and draw no inference from it1 because no object to which to apply the conception is determined1 and we consequently do not know whether it has any meaning at all4 ,in like manner1 if ,i leave out the notion of time1 in which something follows upon some other thing in conformity with a rule1 ,i can find nothing in the pure category1 except that there is a something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing4 ,but in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect1 but1 as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of which ,i am quite ignorant1 the conception is not determined as to the mode in which it ought to apply to an object4 ,the so-called principle3 8,everything that is contingent has a cause10 comes with a gravity and self-assumed authority that seems to require no support from without4 ,but1 ,i ask1 what is meant by contingent8 ,the answer is that the non-existence of which is possible4 ,but ,i should like very well to know by what means this possibility of non-existence is to be cognized1 if we do not represent to ourselves a succession in the series of phenomena1 and in this succession an existence which follows a non-existence1 or conversely1 consequently1 change4 ,for to say1 that the non-existence of a thing is not self-contradictory is a lame appeal to a logical condition1 which is no doubt a necessary condition of the existence of the conception1 but is far from being sufficient for the real objective possibility of non-existence4 ,i can annihilate in thought every existing substance without self-contradiction1 but ,i cannot infer from this their objective contingency in existence1 that is to say1 the possibility of their non-existence in itself4 ,as regards the category of community1 it may easily be inferred that1 as the pure categories of substance and causality are incapable of a definition and explanation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of intuition1 the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other 7commercium7 is just as little susceptible thereof4 ,possibility1 existence1 and necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of manifest tautology1 when the definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding4 ,for the substitution of the logical possibility of the conception--the condition of which is that it be not self-contradictory1 for the transcendental possibility of things--the condition of which is that there be an object corresponding to the conception1 is a trick which can only deceive the inexperienced4#ch #ch ,in one word1 to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding object1 and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated1 if we take away sensuous intuition--the only intuition which we possess--and there then remains nothing but the logical possibility1 that is1 the fact that the conception or thought is possible--which1 however1 is not the question2 what we want to know being1 whether it relates to an object and thus possesses any meaning4 ,it follows incontestably1 that the pure conceptions of the understanding are incapable of transcendental1 and must always be of empirical use alone1 and that the principles of the pure understanding relate only to the general conditions of a possible experience1 to objects of the senses1 and never to things in general1 apart from the mode in which we intuite them4 ,transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result1 to wit1 that the understanding is competent effect nothing priori1 except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in general1 and that1 as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object of experience1 it can never overstep the limits of sensibility1 within which alone objects are presented to us4 ,its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena1 and the proud name of an ontology1 which professes to present synthetical cognitions priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine1 must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding4 ,thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object4 ,if the mode of this intuition is unknown to us1 the object is merely transcendental1 and the conception of the understanding is employed only transcendentally1 that is1 to produce unity in the thought of a manifold in general4 ,now a pure category1 in which all conditions of sensuous intuition--as the only intuition we possess--are abstracted1 does not determine an object1 but merely expresses the thought of an object in general1 according to different modes4 ,now1 to employ a conception1 the function of judgement is required1 by which an object is subsumed under the conception1 consequently the at least formal condition1 under which something can be given in intuition4 ,failing this condition of judgement 7schema71 subsumption is impossible2 for there is in such a case nothing given1 which may be subsumed under the conception4 ,the merely transcendental use of the categories is therefore1 in fact1 no use at all and has no determined1 or even1 as regards its form1 determinable object4 ,hence it follows that the pure category is incompetent to establish a synthetical priori principle1 and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of transcendental use1 and that beyond the sphere of possible experience no synthetical priori principles are possible4 ,it may be advisable1 therefore1 to express ourselves thus4 ,the pure categories1 apart from the formal conditions of sensibility1 have a merely transcendental meaning1 but are nevertheless not of transcendental use1 because this is in itself impossible1 inasmuch as all the conditions of any employment or use of them 7in judgements7 are absent1 to wit1 the formal conditions of the subsumption of an object under these conceptions4 ,as1 therefore1 in the character of pure categories1 they must be employed empirically1 and cannot be employed transcendentally1 they are of no use at all1 when separated from sensibility1 that is1 they cannot be applied to an object4 ,they are merely the pure form of the employment of the understanding in respect of objects in general and of thought1 without its being at the same time possible to think or to determine any object by their means4 ,but there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion which it is very difficult to avoid4 ,the categories are not based1 as regards their origin1 upon sensibility1 like the forms of intuition1 space1 and time2 they seem1 therefore1 to be capable of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects4 ,but this is not the case4 ,they are nothing but mere forms of thought1 which contain only the logical faculty of uniting priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition4 ,apart1 then1 from the only intuition possible for us1 they have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms1 space and time1 for through them an object is at least given1 while a mode of connection of the manifold1 when the intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting1 has no meaning at all4 ,at the same time1 when we designate certain objects as phenomena or sensuous existences1 thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves1 it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter1 considered in this their own nature1 although we do not so intuite them1 in opposition to the former1 or1 on the other hand1 we do so place other possible things1 which are not objects of our senses1 but are cogitated by the understanding alone1 and call them intelligible existences 7noumena74 ,now the question arises whether the pure conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in respect of these latter1 and may possibly be a mode of cognizing them4 ,but we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity1 which may easily occasion great misapprehension4 ,the understanding1 when it terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon1 at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself1 and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects4 ,now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides the categories1 it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions1 and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence1 a something out of the sphere of our sensibility1 for a determinate conception of an existence which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding4 ,if1 by the term noumenon1 we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition1 thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it1 this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word4 ,but if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition1 we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition1 an intellectual intuition1 to wit1 which does not1 however1 belong to us1 of the very possibility of which we have no notion--and this is a noumenon in the positive sense4 ,the doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense1 that is1 of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition1 consequently not as mere phenomena1 but as things in themselves4 ,but the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves1 because these possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time1 and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time4 ,where this unity of time is not to be met with1 as is the case with noumena1 the whole use1 indeed the whole meaning of the categories is entirely lost1 for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories is in this case incomprehensible4 ,on this point1 ,i need only refer the reader to what ,i have said at the commencement of the ,general ,remark appended to the foregoing chapter4 ,now1 the possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it is not self-contradictory1 but only by means of an intuition corresponding to the conception4 ,if1 therefore1 we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena1 we must have an intuition different from the sensuous1 and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word4 ,now1 as such an intuition1 that is1 an intellectual intuition1 is no part of our faculty of cognition1 it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience4 ,it may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation1 and cannot be applied1 but our conceptions of the understanding1 as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition1 do not extend to these4 ,what1 therefore1 we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense4 ,if ,i take away from an empirical intuition all thought 7by means of the categories71 there remains no cognition of any object2 for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated1 and1 from the existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me1 it does not follow that this affection or representation has any relation to an object without me4 ,but if ,i take away all intuition1 there still remains the form of thought1 that is1 the mode of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition4 ,thus the categories do in some measure really extend further than sensuous intuition1 inasmuch as they think objects in general1 without regard to the mode 7of sensibility7 in which these objects are given4 ,but they do not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of objects1 because we cannot assume that such can be given1 without presupposing the possibility of another than the sensuous mode of intuition1 a supposition we are not justified in making4 ,i call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction1 and which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given conceptions1 but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner4 ,the conception of a noumenon1 that is1 of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense1 but as a thing in itself 7solely through the pure understanding71 is not self-contradictory1 for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition4 ,nay1 further1 this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena1 and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition2 for things in themselves1 which lie beyond its province1 are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks4 ,but1 after all1 the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible1 and beyond the sphere of phenomena1 all is for us a mere void2 that is to say1 we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere1 but we do not possess an intuition1 indeed1 not even the conception of a possible intuition1 by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us1 and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically4 ,the conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use4 ,but it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion1 but is connected with the limitation of sensibility1 without1 however1 being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere4 ,the division of objects into phenomena and noumena1 and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite inadmissible in a positive sense1 although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division2 for the class of noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them1 and cannot therefore possess objective validity4 ,if we abandon the senses1 how can it be made conceivable that the categories 7which are the only conceptions that could serve as conceptions for noumena7 have any sense or meaning at all1 inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought1 namely1 a possible intuition1 is requisite for their application to an object8 ,the conception of a noumenon1 considered as merely problematical1 is1 however1 not only admissible1 but1 as a limitative conception of sensibility1 absolutely necessary4 ,but1 in this case1 a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our understanding2 on the contrary1 the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself a problem1 for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object1 not discursively by means of categories1 but intuitively in a non-sensuous intuition4 ,our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension4 ,that is to say1 it is not limited by1 but rather limits1 sensibility1 by giving the name of noumena to things1 not considered as phenomena1 but as things in themselves4 ,but it at the same time prescribes limits to itself1 for it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories1 and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely as an unknown something4 ,i find1 however1 in the writings of modern authors1 an entirely different use of the expressions1 mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis1 which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients--an acceptation in which1 indeed1 there is to be found no difficulty1 but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling4 ,according to this meaning1 some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena1 in so far as it is intuited1 mundus sensibilis1 but in so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought1 mundus intelligibilis4 ,astronomy1 in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the starry heaven1 may represent the former2 a system of astronomy1 such as the ,copernican or ,newtonian1 the latter4 ,but such twisting of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge1 to avoid a difficult question1 by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience4 ,to be sure1 understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena2 but the question is1 whether these can be applied when the object is not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is cogitated as given to the understanding alone1 and not to the senses4 ,the question therefore is whether1 over and above the empirical use of the understanding1 a transcendental use is possible1 which applies to the noumenon as an object4 ,this question we have answered in the negative4 ,when therefore we say1 the senses represent objects as they appear1 the understanding as they are1 the latter statement must not be understood in a transcendental1 but only in an empirical signification1 that is1 as they must be represented in the complete connection of phenomena1 and not according to what they may be1 apart from their relation to possible experience1 consequently not as objects of the pure understanding4 ,for this must ever remain unknown to us4 ,nay1 it is also quite unknown to us whether any such transcendental or extraordinary cognition is possible under any circumstances1 at least1 whether it is possible by means of our categories4 ,understanding and sensibility1 with us1 can determine objects only in conjunction4 ,if we separate them1 we have intuitions without conceptions1 or conceptions without intuitions2 in both cases1 representations1 which we cannot apply to any determinate object4 ,if1 after all our inquiries and explanations1 any one still hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories1 let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition4 ,it would1 of course1 be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an analytical proposition1 for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding1 but1 being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception itself1 it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to objects1 or merely indicates the unity of thought--complete abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given3 in such a proposition1 it is sufficient for the understanding to know what lies in the conception--to what it applies is to it indifferent4 ,the attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle1 for example3 8,everything that exists1 exists as substance10 or1 8,everything that is contingent exists as an effect of some other thing1 viz41 of its cause40 ,now ,i ask1 whence can the understanding draw these synthetical propositions1 when the conceptions contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in themselves 7noumena78 ,where is to be found the third term1 which is always requisite ,,pure site in a synthetical proposition1 which may connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical 7analytical7 connection with each other8 ,the proposition never will be demonstrated1 nay1 more1 the possibility of any such pure assertion never can be shown1 without making reference to the empirical use of the understanding1 and thus1 ipso facto1 completely renouncing pure and non-sensuous judgement4 ,thus the conception of pure and merely intelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its application1 because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be given1 and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for them serves only1 like a void space1 to limit the use of empirical principles1 without containing at the same time any other object of cognition beyond their sphere4 ,,appendix ,of the ,equivocal ,nature or ,amphiboly of the ,conceptions of ,reflection from the ,confusion of the ,transcendental with the ,empirical use of the ,understanding4 ,reflection 7reflexio7 is not occupied about objects themselves1 for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them1 but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions4 ,it is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to the different sources or faculties of cognition1 by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly determined4 ,the first question which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty of cognition do they belong8 ,to the understanding or to the senses8 ,many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclination2 but1 because reflection neither precedes nor follows1 it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding4 ,all judgements do not require examination1 that is1 investigation into the grounds of their truth4 ,for1 when they are immediately certain 7for example3 8,between two points there can be only one straight line071 no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found than that which they themselves contain and express4 ,but all judgement1 nay1 all comparisons require reflection1 that is1 a distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong4 ,the act whereby ,i compare my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates them1 and whereby ,i distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition1 ,i term transcendental reflection4 ,now1 the relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of identity and difference1 agreement and opposition1 of the internal and external1 finally1 of the determinable and the determining 7matter and form74 ,the proper determination of these relations rests on the question1 to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong1 whether to sensibility or understanding8 ,for1 on the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these relations4 ,before constructing any objective judgement1 we compare the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement1 and observe whether there exists identity 7of many representations in one conception71 if a general judgement is to be constructed1 or difference1 if a particular2 whether there is agreement when affirmative2 and opposition when negative judgements are to be constructed1 and so on4 ,for this reason we ought to call these conceptions1 conceptions of comparison 7conceptus comparationis74 ,but as1 when the question is not as to the logical form1 but as to the content of conceptions1 that is to say1 whether the things themselves are identical or different1 in agreement or opposition1 and so on1 the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of cognition1 to wit1 a relation either to sensibility or to the understanding1 and as on this relation depends their relation to each other1 transcendental reflection1 that is1 the relation of given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition1 can alone determine this latter relation4 ,thus we shall not be able to discover whether the things are identical or different1 in agreement or opposition1 etc41 from the mere conception of the things by means of comparison 7comparatio71 but only by distinguishing the mode of cognition to which they belong1 in other words1 by means of transcendental reflection4 ,we may1 therefore1 with justice say1 that logical reflection is mere comparison1 for in it no account is taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong1 and they are consequently1 as far as regards their origin1 to be treated as homogeneous2 while transcendental reflection 7which applies to the objects themselves7 contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations with each other1 and is therefore very different from the former1 because the faculties of cognition to which they belong are not even the same4 ,transcendental reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an priori judgement upon things4 ,we shall now proceed to fulfil this duty1 and thereby throw not a little light on the question as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding4 #a4 ,identity and ,difference4 ,when an object is presented to us several times1 but always with the same internal determinations 7qualitas et quantitas71 it1 if an object of pure understanding1 is always the same1 not several things1 but only one thing 7numerica identitas72 but if a phenomenon1 we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some other1 but1 although they may be in this respect perfectly the same1 the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference of these objects 7of sense74 ,thus1 in the case of two drops of water1 we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference 7quality and quantity71 and1 the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different places1 is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be numerically different4 ,leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in themselves1 consequently as intelligibilia1 that is1 objects of pure understanding 7although1 on account of the confused nature of their representations1 he gave them the name of phenomena71 and in this case his principle of the indiscernible 7principium identatis indiscernibilium7 is not to be impugned4 ,but1 as phenomena are objects of sensibility1 and1 as the understanding1 in respect of them1 must be employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally1 plurality and numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of external phenomena4 ,for one part of space1 although it may be perfectly similar and equal to another part1 is still without it1 and for this reason alone is different from the latter1 which is added to it in order to make up a greater space4 ,it follows that this must hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at the same time1 however similar and equal one may be to another4 #b4 ,agreement and ,opposition4 ,when reality is represented by the pure understanding 7realitas noumenon71 opposition between realities is incogitable--such a relation1 that is1 that when these realities are connected in one subject1 they annihilate the effects of each other and may be represented in the formula #c -#c #j4 ,on the other hand1 the real in a phenomenon 7realitas phaenomenon7 may very well be in mutual opposition1 and1 when united in the same subject1 the one may completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the other2 as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions1 or in the case of a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain4 #c4 ,the ,internal and ,external4 ,in an object of the pure understanding1 only that is internal which has no relation 7as regards its existence7 to anything different from itself4 ,on the other hand1 the internal determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are nothing but relations1 and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations4 ,substance in space we are cognizant of only through forces operative in it1 either drawing others towards itself 7attraction71 or preventing others from forcing into itself 7repulsion and impenetrability74 ,we know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space1 and which we term matter4 ,on the other hand1 as an object of the pure understanding1 every substance must have internal determination and forces4 ,but what other internal attributes of such an object can ,i think than those which my internal sense presents to me8 ,that1 to wit1 which in either itself thought1 or something analogous to it4 ,hence ,leibnitz1 who looked upon things as noumena1 after denying them everything like external relation1 and therefore also composition or combination1 declared that all substances1 even the component parts of matter1 were simple substances with powers of representation1 in one word1 monads4 #d4 ,matter and ,form4 ,these two conceptions lie at the foundation of all other reflection1 so inseparably are they connected with every mode of exercising the understanding4 ,the former denotes the determinable in general1 the second its determination1 both in a transcendental sense1 abstraction being made of every difference in that which is given1 and of the mode in which it is determined4 ,logicians formerly termed the universal1 matter1 the specific difference of this or that part of the universal1 form4 ,in a judgement one may call the given conceptions logical matter 7for the judgement71 the relation of these to each other 7by means of the copula71 the form of the judgement4 ,in an object1 the composite parts thereof 7essentialia7 are the matter2 the mode in which they are connected in the object1 the form4 ,in respect to things in general1 unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility1 the limitation thereof 7negation7 as the form1 by which one thing is distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions4 ,the understanding demands that something be given 7at least in the conception71 in order to be able to determine it in a certain manner4 ,hence1 in a conception of the pure understanding1 the matter precedes the form1 and for this reason ,leibnitz first assumed the existence of things 7monads7 and of an internal power of representation in them1 in order to found upon this their external relation and the community their state 7that is1 of their representations74 ,hence1 with him1 space and time were possible--the former through the relation of substances1 the latter through the connection of their determinations with each other1 as causes and effects4 ,and so would it really be1 if the pure understanding were capable of an immediate application to objects1 and if space and time were determinations of things in themselves4 ,but being merely sensuous intuitions1 in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena1 the form of intuition 7as a subjective property of sensibility7 must antecede all matter 7sensations71 consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena and all data of experience1 and rather make experience itself possible4 ,but the intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things themselves and determine their possibility2 an objection perfectly correct1 if we assume that we intuite things as they are1 although with confused representation4 ,but as sensuous intuition is a peculiar subjective condition1 which is priori at the foundation of all perception1 and the form of which is primitive1 the form must be given per se1 and so far from matter 7or the things themselves which appear7 lying at the foundation of experience 7as we must conclude1 if we judge by mere conceptions71 the very possibility of itself presupposes1 on the contrary1 a given formal intuition 7space and time74 ,,remark ,,on ,,the ,,amphiboly ,,of ,,the ,,conceptions ,,of ,,reflection4 ,let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding1 the transcendental place4 ,in this manner1 the appointment of the position which must be taken by each conception according to the difference in its use1 and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules1 would be a transcendental topic1 a doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure understanding and the delusions which thence arise1 as it would always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each conception properly belonged4 ,every conception1 every title1 under which many cognitions rank together1 may be called a logical place4 ,upon this is based the logical topic of ,aristotle1 of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves1 in order1 under certain titles of thought1 to observe what would best suit the matter they had to treat1 and thus enable themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of profundity4 ,transcendental topic1 on the contrary1 contains nothing more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction1 which differ from categories in this respect1 that they do not represent the object according to that which constitutes its conception 7quantity1 reality71 but set forth merely the comparison of representations1 which precedes our conceptions of things4 ,but this comparison requires a previous reflection1 that is1 a determination of the place to which the representations of the things which are compared belong1 whether1 to wit1 they are cogitated by the pure understanding1 or given by sensibility4 ,conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong1 whether as noumena1 to the understanding1 or as phenomena1 to sensibility4 ,if1 however1 we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects1 previous transcendental reflection is necessary4 ,without this reflection ,i should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions1 and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly1 that is1 upon a substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon4 ,for want of this doctrine of transcendental topic1 and consequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection1 the celebrated ,leibnitz constructed an intellectual system of the world1 or rather1 believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of things1 by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought4 ,our table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts1 and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of thought1 which rested upon naught but a misconception4 ,he compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions1 and naturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding distinguishes its pure conceptions one from another4 ,the conditions of sensuous intuition1 which contain in themselves their own means of distinction1 he did not look upon as primitive1 because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of representation and not any particular source of representations4 ,a phenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself1 although distinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form--the former with its usual want of analysis containing1 according to him1 a certain mixture of collateral representations in its conception of a thing1 which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish4 ,in one word1 ,leibnitz intellectualized phenomena1 just as ,locke1 in his system of noogony 7if ,i may be allowed to make use of such expressions71 sensualized the conceptions of the understanding1 that is to say1 declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract conceptions of reflection4 ,instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations1 which1 however1 can present us with objective judgements of things only in conjunction1 each of these great men recognized but one of these faculties1 which1 in their opinion1 applied immediately to things in themselves1 the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the former4 ,accordingly1 the objects of sense were compared by ,leibnitz as things in general merely in the understanding4 #ast4 ,he compares them in regard to their identity or difference--as judged by the understanding4 ,as1 therefore1 he considered merely the conceptions of objects1 and not their position in intuition1 in which alone objects can be given1 and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions--whether1 that is1 their object ought to be classed among phenomena1 or among things in themselves1 it was to be expected that he should extend the application of the principle of indiscernibles1 which is valid solely of conceptions of things in general1 to objects of sense 7mundus phaenomenon71 and that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature4 ,in truth1 if ,i cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as a thing in itself1 ,i cannot look upon one drop as different from another1 if the conception of the one is completely identical with that of the other4 ,but if it is a phenomenon in space1 it has a place not merely in the understanding 7among conceptions71 but also in sensuous external intuition 7in space71 and in this case1 the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of things1 and one place1 ,b1 may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place1 ,a1 just as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each other4 ,difference of place without any other conditions1 makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena1 not only possible in itself1 but even necessary4 ,consequently1 the above so-called law is not a law of nature4 ,it is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions4 #bnd4 ,the principle3 8,realities 7as simple affirmations7 never logically contradict each other10 is a proposition perfectly true respecting the relation of conceptions1 but1 whether as regards nature1 or things in themselves 7of which we have not the slightest conception71 is without any the least meaning4 ,for real opposition1 in which ,a -,b is #j1 exists everywhere1 an opposition1 that is1 in which one reality united with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other--a fact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and operations in nature1 which1 nevertheless1 as depending on real forces1 must be called realitates phaenomena4 ,general mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in an priori rule1 as it directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of forces--a condition of which the transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing4 ,although ,m4 ,leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new principle1 he yet employed it for the establishment of new propositions1 and his followers introduced it into their ,leibnitzio-,wolfian system of philosophy4 ,according to this principle1 for example1 all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of created beings1 that is1 negations1 because these are the only opposite of reality4 7,in the mere conception of a thing in general this is really the case1 but not in things as phenomena47 ,in like manner1 the upholders of this system deem it not only possible1 but natural also1 to connect and unite all reality in one being1 because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than that of contradiction 7by which the conception itself of a thing is annihilated71 and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruction1 so to speak1 in which one real cause destroys the effect of another1 and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility4 #crd4 ,the ,leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding4 ,substances1 in general1 must have something inward1 which is therefore free from external relations1 consequently from that of composition also4 ,the simple--that which can be represented by a unit--is therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves4 ,the internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place1 shape1 contact1 or motion1 determinations which are all external relations1 and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself1 that is to say1 the state of representation4 ,thus1 then1 were constructed the monads1 which were to form the elements of the universe1 the active force of which consists in representation1 the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to themselves4 ,for the same reason1 his view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony1 and by no means as a physical influence4 ,for inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally1 that is1 with its own representations1 the state of the representations of one substance could not stand in active and living connection with that of another1 but some third cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the different states correspond with one another4 ,and this did not happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case 7systema assistentiae71 but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied and connected with all substances1 in which they necessarily receive1 according to the ,leibnitzian school1 their existence and permanence1 consequently also reciprocal correspondence1 according to universal laws4 #dth4 ,this philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time1 in which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility1 originated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection4 ,if ,i attempt to represent by the mere understanding1 the external relations of things1 ,i can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal action1 and if ,i wish to connect one state of the same thing with another state1 ,i must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect4 ,and thus ,leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances1 and time as the dynamical sequence of their states4 ,that which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of things1 he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them1 whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent intuition1 antecedent even to things themselves4 ,thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of things 7substances and their states7 in themselves4 ,but things were intelligible substances 7substantiae noumena74 ,at the same time1 he made these conceptions valid of phenomena1 because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition1 but sought all1 even the empirical representation of objects1 in the understanding1 and left to sense naught but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former4 ,but even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning things in themselves by means of the pure understanding 7which is impossible71 it could not apply to phenomena1 which do not represent things in themselves4 ,in such a case ,i should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensibility1 and so space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves1 but of phenomena4 ,what things may be in themselves1 ,i know not and need not know1 because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon4 ,i must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions of reflection4 ,matter is substantia phaenomenon4 ,that in it which is internal ,i seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies1 and in all the functions and operations it performs1 and which are indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense4 ,i cannot therefore find anything that is absolutely1 but only what is comparatively internal1 and which itself consists of external relations4 ,the absolutely internal in matter1 and as it should be according to the pure understanding1 is a mere chimera1 for matter is not an object for the pure understanding4 ,but the transcendental object1 which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter1 is a mere nescio quid1 the nature of which we could not understand1 even though someone were found able to tell us4 ,for we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something in intuition corresponding to the expressions employed4 ,if1 by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things1 it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves1 it is a silly and unreasonable complaint2 for those who talk thus really desire that we should be able to cognize1 consequently to intuite1 things without senses1 and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cognition perfectly different from the human faculty1 not merely in degree1 but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof1 so that thus we should not be men1 but belong to a class of beings1 the possibility of whose existence1 much less their nature and constitution1 we have no means of cognizing4 ,by observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature1 and no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time4 ,but those transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature1 we could never answer1 even although all nature were laid open to us1 because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense4 ,for herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility4 ,its application to an object1 and the transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objective1 lie too deeply concealed for us1 who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense1 consequently as phenomena1 to be able to discover in our existence anything but phenomena1 the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time earnestly desire to penetrate to4 ,the great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with each other in the understanding alone1 while it at the same time confirms what we particularly insisted on1 namely1 that1 although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of the pure understanding1 they are nevertheless the only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality1 that is to say1 which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions4 ,when we reflect in a purely logical manner1 we do nothing more than compare conceptions in our understanding1 to discover whether both have the same content1 whether they are self-contradictory or not1 whether anything is contained in either conception1 which of the two is given1 and which is merely a mode of thinking that given4 ,but if ,i apply these conceptions to an object in general 7in the transcendental sense71 without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or intellectual intuition1 certain limitations present themselves1 which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and render all empirical use of them impossible4 ,and thus these limitations prove that the representation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient1 but1 without sensuous determination and independently of empirical conditions1 self-contradictory2 that we must therefore make abstraction of all objects1 as in logic1 or1 admitting them1 must think them under conditions of sensuous intuition2 that1 consequently1 the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition1 which we do not possess1 and in the absence of which it is for us nothing2 while1 on the other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves4 ,for1 when ,i merely think things in general1 the difference in their external relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves2 on the contrary1 the former presupposes the latter1 and if the conception of one of two things is not internally different from that of the other1 ,i am merely thinking the same thing in different relations4 ,further1 by the addition of one affirmation 7reality7 to the other1 the positive therein is really augmented1 and nothing is abstracted or withdrawn from it2 hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction with or opposition to itself--and so on4 ,the true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of the understanding has1 as we have shown1 been so misconceived by ,leibnitz1 one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times1 that he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition1 which professes to determine its objects without the intervention of the senses4 ,for this reason1 the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these conceptions1 as the origin of these false principles1 is of great utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the understanding4 ,it is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it 7dictum de omni et nullo72 but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions which rank under it2 for the latter are particular conceptions1 for the very reason that their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general conception4 ,and yet the whole intellectual system of ,leibnitz is based upon this false principle1 and with it must necessarily fall to the ground1 together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which have thence originated4 ,leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that1 if in the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found1 it is also not to be met with in things themselves2 that1 consequently1 all things are completely identical 7numero eadem7 which are not distinguishable from each other 7as to quality or quantity7 in our conceptions of them4 ,but1 as in the mere conception of anything abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition1 that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be non-existent1 and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its conception4 ,the conception of a cubic foot of space1 however ,i may think it1 is in itself completely identical4 ,but two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in different places 7they are numero diversa72 and these places are conditions of intuition1 wherein the object of this conception is given1 and which do not belong to the conception1 but to the faculty of sensibility4 ,in like manner1 there is in the conception of a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an affirmative2 and merely affirmative conceptions cannot1 in conjunction1 produce any negation4 ,but in sensuous intuition1 wherein reality 7take for example1 motion7 is given1 we find conditions 7opposite directions7--of which abstraction has been made in the conception of motion in general--which render possible a contradiction or opposition 7not indeed of a logical kind7--and which from pure positives produce zero #j4 ,we are therefore not justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement and harmony1 because no contradiction is discoverable among its conceptions4#ci ,according to mere conceptions1 that which is internal is the substratum of all relations or external determinations4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i abstract all conditions of intuition1 and confine myself solely to the conception of a thing in general1 ,i can make abstraction of all external relations1 and there must nevertheless remain a conception of that which indicates no relation1 but merely internal determinations4 ,now it seems to follow that in everything 7substance7 there is something which is absolutely internal and which antecedes all external determinations1 inasmuch as it renders them possible2 and that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any external relations and is consequently simple 7for corporeal things are never anything but relations1 at least of their parts external to each other72 and1 inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal sense1 this substratum is not only simple1 but also1 analogously with our internal sense1 determined through representations1 that is to say1 all things are properly monads1 or simple beings endowed with the power of representation4 ,now all this would be perfectly correct1 if the conception of a thing were the only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition4 ,it is1 on the contrary1 manifest that a permanent phenomenon in space 7impenetrable extension7 can contain mere relations1 and nothing that is absolutely internal1 and yet be the primary substratum of all external perception4 ,by mere conceptions ,i cannot think anything external1 without1 at the same time1 thinking something internal1 for the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given things1 and without these are impossible4 ,but1 as an intuition there is something 7that is1 space1 which1 with all it contains1 consists of purely formal1 or1 indeed1 real relations7 which is not found in the mere conception of a thing in general1 and this presents to us the substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone1 ,i cannot say3 because a thing cannot be represented by mere conceptions without something absolutely internal1 there is also1 in the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions1 and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation4 ,for1 when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition1 there certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general1 through which alone the external is possible4 ,but this necessity1 which is grounded upon abstraction alone1 does not obtain in the case of things themselves1 in so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as express mere relations1 without having anything internal as their foundation2 for they are not things in themselves1 but only phenomena4 ,what we cognize in matter is nothing but relations 7what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal74 ,but there are some self-subsistent and permanent1 through which a determined object is given4 ,that ,i1 when abstraction is made of these relations1 have nothing more to think1 does not destroy the conception of a thing as phenomenon1 nor the conception of an object in abstracto1 but it does away with the possibility of an object that is determinable according to mere conceptions1 that is1 of a noumenon4 ,it is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists solely of relations2 but this thing is simply a phenomenon1 and cannot be cogitated by means of the mere categories3 it does itself consist in the mere relation of something in general to the senses4 ,in the same way1 we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto1 if we commence with conceptions alone1 in any other manner than that one is the cause of determinations in the other2 for that is itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation4 ,but1 as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition1 we lose altogether the mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its place1 that is1 the form of sensibility 7space72 and yet this mode antecedes all empirical causality4 #ci ,if any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge1 and to say1 that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition to each other1 it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and non-sensuous reality1 that it may be understood whether the notion represents something or nothing4 ,but an example cannot be found except in experience1 which never presents to us anything more than phenomena2 and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does not contain anything negative--a proposition nobody ever doubted4 ,if by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means of the pure categories1 without the need of the schemata of sensibility1 such objects are impossible4 ,for the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition1 whereby objects are given2 and1 if we make abstraction of the latter1 the former can have no relation to an object4 ,and even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our own1 still our functions of thought would have no use or signification in respect thereof4 ,but if we understand by the term1 objects of a non-sensuous intuition1 in respect of which our categories are not valid1 and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge 7neither intuition nor conception71 in this merely negative sense noumena must be admitted4 ,for this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all things1 but only to objects of our senses1 that consequently its objective validity is limited1 and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition1 and thus also for things that may be objects of it4 ,but in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical1 that is to say1 it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible1 nor that it is impossible1 inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous1 or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories--a mode of intuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object4 ,we are on this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility1 and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought1 that is1 of noumena1 inasmuch as these have no true positive signification4 ,for it must be confessed of the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the cognition of things in themselves and1 without the data of sensibility1 are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding4 ,thought is certainly not a product of the senses1 and in so far is not limited by them1 but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed purely and without the intervention of sensibility1 for it would then be without reference to an object4 ,and we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thought2 for the representation thereof is but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours1 both of which are consequently themselves problematical4 ,the conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object1 but merely a problematical conception inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility4 ,that is to say1 this conception contains the answer to the question3 8,are there objects quite unconnected with1 and independent of1 our intuition80--a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be given4 ,that answer is3 8,inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction1 there remains room for other and different objects40 ,the existence of these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied1 in the absence of a determinate conception of them1 but1 as no category is valid in respect of them1 neither must they be admitted as objects for our understanding4 ,understanding accordingly limits sensibility1 without at the same time enlarging its own field4 ,while1 moreover1 it forbids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phenomena1 it cogitates an object in itself1 only1 however1 as a transcendental object1 which is the cause of a phenomenon 7consequently not itself a phenomenon71 and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality1 or as substance 7because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an object7--an object1 therefore1 of which we are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us1 whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility1 or1 if this were taken away1 would continue to exist4 ,if we wish to call this object a noumenon1 because the representation of it is non-sensuous1 we are at liberty to do so4 ,but as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our understanding1 the representation is for us quite void1 and is available only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intuition1 thereby leaving at the same time an empty space1 which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experience1 nor of the pure understanding4 ,the critique of the pure understanding1 accordingly1 does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are presented to us as phenomena1 and to stray into intelligible worlds2 nay1 it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a conception of them4 ,the specious error which leads to this--and which is a perfectly excusable one--lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding1 contrary to its proper purpose and destination1 is made transcendental1 and objects1 that is1 possible intuitions1 are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions1 instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intuitions1 on which alone their own objective validity rests4 ,now the reason of this again is that apperception1 and with it thought1 antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of representations4 ,accordingly we think something in general and determine it on the one hand sensuously1 but1 on the other1 distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it4 ,in this case there remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought1 which is really but a logical form without content1 which1 however1 seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the object in itself 7noumenon71 without regard to intuition which is limited to our senses4 ,before ending this transcendental analytic1 we must make an addition1 which1 although in itself of no particular importance1 seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system4 ,the highest conception1 with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins1 is the division into possible and impossible4 ,but as all division presupposes a divided conception1 a still higher one must exist1 and this is the conception of an object in general--problematically understood and without its being decided whether it is something or nothing4 ,as the categories are the only conceptions which apply to objects in general1 the distinguishing of an object1 whether it is something or nothing1 must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories4 #a4 ,to the categories of quantity1 that is1 the conceptions of all1 many1 and one1 the conception which annihilates all1 that is1 the conception of none1 is opposed4 ,and thus the object of a conception1 to which no intuition can be found to correspond1 is nothing4 ,that is1 it is a conception without an object 7ens rationis71 like noumena1 which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality1 though they must not therefore be held to be impossible--or like certain new fundamental forces in matter1 the existence of which is cogitable without contradiction1 though1 as examples from experience are not forthcoming1 they must not be regarded as possible4 #b4 ,reality is something2 negation is nothing1 that is1 a conception of the absence of an object1 as cold1 a shadow 7nihil privativum74 #c4 ,the mere form of intuition1 without substance1 is in itself no object1 but the merely formal condition of an object 7as phenomenon71 as pure space and pure time4 ,these are certainly something1 as forms of intuition1 but are not themselves objects which are intuited 7ens imaginarium74 #d4 ,the object of a conception which is self-contradictory1 is nothing1 because the conception is nothing--is impossible1 as a figure composed of two straight lines 7nihil negativum74 ,the table of this division of the conception of nothing 7the corresponding division of the conception of something does not require special description7 must therefore be arranged as follows3 ,,nothing ,,as #a ,as ,empty ,conception without object1 ens rationis #b #c ,empty object of ,empty intuition a conception1 without object1 nihil privativum ens imaginarium #d ,empty object without conception1 nihil negativum ,we see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be reckoned among possibilities1 because it is a mere fiction--though not self-contradictory1 while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility1 inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself4 ,both1 however1 are empty conceptions4 ,on the other hand1 the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions4 ,if light be not given to the senses1 we cannot represent to ourselves darkness1 and if extended objects are not perceived1 we cannot represent space4 ,neither the negation1 nor the mere form of intuition can1 without something real1 be an object4 ,,second ,,division--,,transcendental ,,logic ,,transcendental ,,dialectic4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,of ,transcendental ,illusory ,appearance ,we termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance4 ,this does not signify a doctrine of probability2 for probability is truth1 only cognized upon insufficient grounds1 and though the information it gives us is imperfect1 it is not therefore deceitful4 ,hence it must not be separated from the analytical part of logic4 ,still less must phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical4 ,for truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object1 in so far as it is intuited1 but in the judgement upon the object1 in so far as it is thought4 ,it is1 therefore1 quite correct to say that the senses do not err1 not because they always judge correctly1 but because they do not judge at all4 ,hence truth and error1 consequently also1 illusory appearance as the cause of error1 are only to be found in a judgement1 that is1 in the relation of an object to our understanding4 ,in a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the understanding1 no error can exist4 ,in a representation of the senses--as not containing any judgement--there is also no error4 ,but no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws4 ,hence neither the understanding per se 7without the influence of another cause71 nor the senses per se1 would fall into error2 the former could not1 because1 if it acts only according to its own laws1 the effect 7the judgement7 must necessarily accord with these laws4 ,but in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth4 ,in the senses there is no judgement--neither a true nor a false one4 ,but1 as we have no source of cognition besides these two1 it follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding4 ,and thus it happens that the subjective grounds of a judgement blend and are confounded with the objective1 and cause them to deviate from their proper determination1#dj just as a body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line1 but if another impetus gives to it a different direction1 it will then start off into a curvilinear line of motion4 ,to distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the power which mingles with it1 it is necessary to consider an erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two forces1 that determine the judgement in two different directions1 which1 as it were1 form an angle1 and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones of the understanding and the sensibility4 ,in pure priori judgements this must be done by means of transcendental reflection1 whereby1 as has been already shown1 each representation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition1 and consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made apparent4 #dj ,sensibility1 subjected to the understanding1 as the object upon which the understanding employs its functions1 is the source of real cognitions4 ,but1 in so far as it exercises an influence upon the action of the understanding and determines it to judgement1 sensibility is itself the cause of error4 ,it is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory appearance 7for example1 optical illusion71 which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding1 and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of imagination4 ,our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory appearance1 which influences principles--that are not even applied to experience1 for in this case we should possess a sure test of their correctness--but which leads us1 in disregard of all the warnings of criticism1 completely beyond the empirical employment of the categories and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding4 ,we shall term those principles the application of which is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience1 immanent2 those1 on the other hand1 which transgress these limits1 we shall call transcendent principles4 ,but by these latter ,i do not understand principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories1 which is in reality a mere fault of the judgement when not under due restraint from criticism1 and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed to exercise its functions2 but real principles which exhort us to break down all those barriers1 and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of cognition1 which recognizes no line of demarcation4 ,thus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms4 ,the principles of the pure understanding1 which we have already propounded1 ought to be of empirical and not of transcendental use1 that is1 they are not applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience4 ,a principle which removes these limits1 nay1 which authorizes us to overstep them1 is called transcendent4 ,if our criticism can succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles1 those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience may be called1 in opposition to the others1 immanent principles of the pure understanding4 ,logical illusion1 which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason 7the illusion in sophistical syllogisms71 arises entirely from a want of due attention to logical rules4 ,so soon as the attention is awakened to the case before us1 this illusion totally disappears4 ,transcendental illusion1 on the contrary1 does not cease to exist1 even after it has been exposed1 and its nothingness clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism4 ,take1 for example1 the illusion in the proposition3 8,the world must have a beginning in time40 ,the cause of this is as follows4 ,in our reason1 subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition1 there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise1 which have completely the appearance of objective principles4 ,now from this cause it happens that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our conceptions1 is regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves4 ,this illusion it is impossible to avoid1 just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore1 because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter1 or1 which is a still stronger case1 as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards1 although he is not deceived by this illusion4 ,transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements1 and guarding us against it2 but to make it1 as in the case of logical illusion1 entirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its power4 ,for we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion1 which rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as objective1 while logical dialectic1 in the detection of sophisms1 has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the propositions1 or with an artificially constructed illusion1 in imitation of the natural error4 ,there is1 therefore1 a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason--not that in which the bungler1 from want of the requisite knowledge1 involves himself1 nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading1 but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason1 and which1 even after its illusions have been exposed1 does not cease to deceive1 and continually to lead reason into momentary errors1 which it becomes necessary continually to remove4 ,,ii4 ,of ,pure ,reason as the ,seat of ,transcendental ,illusory ,appearance ,a4 ,,of ,,reason ,,in ,,general4 ,all our knowledge begins with sense1 proceeds thence to understanding1 and ends with reason1 beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought4 ,at this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this1 the highest faculty of cognition1 and ,i confess ,i find myself here in some difficulty4 ,of reason1 as of the understanding1 there is a merely formal1 that is1 logical use1 in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition2 but there is also a real use1 inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles1 which it does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding4 ,the former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate conclusions 7consequentiae immediatae72 but the nature of the latter1 which itself generates conceptions1 is not to be understood from this definition4 ,now as a division of reason into a logical and a transcendental faculty presents itself here1 it becomes necessary to seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions4 ,in this we may expect1 according to the analogy of the conceptions of the understanding1 that the logical conception will give us the key to the transcendental1 and that the table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the conceptions of reason4 ,in the former part of our transcendental logic1 we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules2 reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles4 ,the term principle is ambiguous1 and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle1 although it is not in itself1 and as regards its proper origin1 entitled to the distinction4 ,every general proposition1 even if derived from experience by the process of induction1 may serve as the major in a syllogism2 but it is not for that reason a principle4 ,mathematical axioms 7for example1 there can be only one straight line between two points7 are general priori cognitions1 and are therefore rightly denominated principles1 relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them4 ,but ,i cannot for this reason say that ,i cognize this property of a straight line from principles--,i cognize it only in pure intuition4 ,cognition from principles1 then1 is that cognition in which ,i cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions4 ,thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle4 ,for the major always gives a conception1 through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a principle4 ,now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism1 and the understanding presents us with such general priori propositions1 they may be termed principles1 in respect of their possible use4 ,but if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in relation to their origin1 we shall find them to be anything rather than cognitions from conceptions4 ,for they would not even be possible priori1 if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition 7in mathematics71 or on that of the conditions of a possible experience4 ,that everything that happens has a cause1 cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens2 on the contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception4 ,synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply1 and they alone are entitled to be called principles4 ,at the same time1 all general propositions may be termed comparative principles4 ,it has been a long-cherished wish--that 7who knows how late71 may one day1 be happily accomplished--that the principles of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed2 for in this way alone can we find the secret of simplifying legislation4 ,but in this case1 laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself2 they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work1 and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions4 ,but how objects as things in themselves--how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined1 according to conceptions1 is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer4 ,be this1 however1 as it may--for on this point our investigation is yet to be made--it is at least manifest from what we have said that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding1 which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle1 but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical--is neither based upon mere thought1 nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone4 ,the understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules2 the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules 7of the understanding7 under principles4 ,reason1 therefore1 never applies directly to experience1 or to any sensuous object2 its object is1 on the contrary1 the understanding1 to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity priori by means of conceptions--a unity which may be called rational unity1 and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding4 ,the above is the general conception of the faculty of reason1 in so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of examples4 ,these will be given in the sequel4 ,b4 ,,of ,,the ,,logical ,,use ,,of ,,reason4 ,a distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately cognized and that which is inferred or concluded4 ,that in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles1 is an immediate cognition2 but that these angles are together equal to two right angles1 is an inference or conclusion4 ,now1 as we are constantly employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed to it1 we no longer remark the above distinction1 and1 as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense1 consider as immediately perceived1 what has really been inferred4 ,in every reasoning or syllogism1 there is a fundamental proposition1 afterwards a second drawn from it1 and finally the conclusion1 which connects the truth in the first with the truth in the second--and that infallibly4 ,if the judgement concluded is so contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from it without the meditation of a third notion1 the conclusion is called immediate 7consequentia immediata72 ,i prefer the term conclusion of the understanding4 ,but if1 in addition to the fundamental cognition1 a second judgement is necessary for the production of the conclusion1 it is called a conclusion of the reason4 ,in the proposition3 ,all men are mortal1 are contained the propositions3 ,some men are mortal1 ,nothing that is not mortal is a man1 and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first4 ,on the other hand1 the proposition3 all the learned are mortal1 is not contained in the main proposition 7for the conception of a learned man does not occur in it71 and it can be deduced from the main proposition only by means of a mediating judgement4 ,in every syllogism ,i first cogitate a rule 7the major7 by means of the understanding4 ,in the next place ,i subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule 7and this is the minor7 by means of the judgement4 ,and finally ,i determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule 7this is the conclusio71 consequently1 ,i determine it priori by means of the reason4 ,the relations1 therefore1 which the major proposition1 as the rule1 represents between a cognition and its condition1 constitute the different kinds of syllogisms4 ,these are just threefold--analogously with all judgements1 in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of a cognition in the understanding--namely1 categorical1 hypothetical1 and disjunctive4 ,when as often happens1 the conclusion is a judgement which may follow from other given judgements1 through which a perfectly different object is cogitated1 ,i endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a general rule4 ,if ,i find such a condition1 and if the object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition1 then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition4 ,from this we see that reason endeavours to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles 7general conditions71 and thus to produce in it the highest unity4 ,c4 ,,of ,,the ,,pure ,,use ,,of ,,reason4 ,can we isolate reason1 and1 if so1 is it in this case a peculiar source of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone1 and through which it can be applied to objects2 or is it merely a subordinate faculty1 whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions--a form which is called logical1 and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subordinated to each other1 and lower rules to higher 7those1 to wit1 whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the others71 in so far as this can be done by comparison8 ,this is the question which we have at present to answer4 ,manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of reason1 for the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself1 just as understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions1 and thereby introduces connection into it4 ,but this principle prescribes no law to objects1 and does not contain any ground of the possibility of cognizing or of determining them as such1 but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding4 ,the purpose of this law is1 by a comparison of the conceptions of the understanding1 to reduce them to the smallest possible number1 although1 at the same time1 it does not justify us in demanding from objects themselves such a uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding1 or in expecting that it will itself thus receive from them objective validity4 ,in one word1 the question is3 8does reason in itself1 that is1 does pure reason contain priori synthetical principles and rules1 and what are those principles80 ,the formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition will rest4 #a4 ,reason1 as observed in the syllogistic process1 is not applicable to intuitions1 for the purpose of subjecting them to rules--for this is the province of the understanding with its categories--but to conceptions and judgements4 ,if pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition of them1 it does so not immediately1 but mediately--through the understanding and its judgements1 which have a direct relation to the senses and their intuition1 for the purpose of determining their objects4 ,the unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience1 but is essentially different from this unity1 which is that of the understanding4 ,that everything which happens has a cause1 is not a principle cognized and prescribed by reason4 ,this principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason1 which1 without a reference to possible experience1 could never have produced by means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity4 #b4 ,reason1 in its logical use1 endeavours to discover the general condition of its judgement 7the conclusion71 and a syllogism is itself nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition under a general rule 7the major74 ,now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of reason1 and thus the condition of the condition be sought 7by means of a prosyllogism7 as long as the process can be continued1 it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is completed4 ,but this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason1 unless we admit that1 if the conditioned is given1 the whole series of conditions subordinated to one another--a series which is consequently itself unconditioned--is also given1 that is1 contained in the object and its connection4 ,but this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical2 for1 analytically1 the conditioned certainly relates to some condition1 but not to the unconditioned4 ,from this principle also there must originate different synthetical propositions1 of which the pure understanding is perfectly ignorant1 for it has to do only with objects of a possible experience1 the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned4 ,the unconditioned1 if it does really exist1 must be especially considered in regard to the determinations which distinguish it from whatever is conditioned1 and will thus afford us material for many priori synthetical propositions4 ,the principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will1 however1 be transcendent in relation to phenomena1 that is to say1 it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of this principle4 ,it is therefore completely different from all principles of the understanding1 the use made of which is entirely immanent1 their object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience4 ,now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows4 ,to discover whether the principle that the series of conditions 7in the synthesis of phenomena1 or of thought in general7 extends to the unconditioned is objectively true1 or not2 what consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understanding1 or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of reason1 and whether it is not1 on the contrary1 a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still higher conditions1 to approach completeness in the series of them1 and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of reason4 ,we must ascertain1 ,i say1 whether this requirement of reason has not been regarded1 by a misunderstanding1 as a transcendental principle of pure reason1 which postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves4 ,we must show1 moreover1 the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into syllogisms1 the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied--a proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio than of a postulatum--and that proceed from experience upwards to its conditions4 ,the solution of these problems is our task in transcendental dialectic1 which we are about to expose even at its source1 that lies deep in human reason4 ,we shall divide it into two parts1 the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason1 the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms4 ,,transcendental ,,dialectic--,,book ,i--,,of ,,the ,,conceptions ,,of ,,pure ,,reason4 ,the conceptions of pure reason--we do not here speak of the possibility of them--are not obtained by reflection1 but by inference or conclusion4 ,the conceptions of understanding are also cogitated priori antecedently to experience1 and render it possible2 but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena1 in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness4 ,through them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible4 ,it is from them1 accordingly1 that we receive material for reasoning1 and antecedently to them we possess no priori conceptions of objects from which they might be deduced1 ,on the other hand1 the sole basis of their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them1 as containing the intellectual form of all experience1 of restricting their application and influence to the sphere of experience4 ,but the term1 conception of reason1 or rational conception1 itself indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of experience1 because its object-matter is a cognition1 of which every empirical cognition is but a part--nay1 the whole of possible experience may be itself but a part of it--a cognition to which no actual experience ever fully attains1 although it does always pertain to it4 ,the aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension1 as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of perceptions4 ,if they contain the unconditioned1 they relate to that to which all experience is subordinate1 but which is never itself an object of experience--that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from experience1 and by the standard of which it estimates the degree of their empirical use1 but which is never itself an element in an empirical synthesis4 ,if1 notwithstanding1 such conceptions possess objective validity1 they may be called conceptus ratiocinati 7conceptions legitimately concluded72 in cases where they do not1 they have been admitted on account of having the appearance of being correctly concluded1 and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes 7sophistical conceptions74 ,but as this can only be sufficiently demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of reason1 we shall omit any consideration of it in this place4 ,as we called the pure conceptions of the understanding categories1 we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas4 ,these terms1 however1 we must in the first place explain and justify4 ,section ,i--,of ,ideas in ,general ,despite the great wealth of words which ,european languages possess1 the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception1 for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to himself4 ,to coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful2 and1 before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient1 it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages1 with the hope and the probability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds4 ,in this case1 even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain1 from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of it1 it is always better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning--even although it may be doubtful whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense--than to make our labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible4 ,for this reason1 when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception1 and this word1 in its usual acceptation1 is thoroughly adequate to the conception1 the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance1 we ought not to employ the expression improvidently1 or1 for the sake of variety and elegance of style1 use it as a synonym for other cognate words4 ,it is our duty1 on the contrary1 carefully to preserve its peculiar signification1 as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression1 and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very different import1 the thought which it conveyed1 and which it alone conveyed1 is lost with it4 ,plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses1 but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding 7with which ,aristotle occupied himself71 inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found4 ,ideas are1 according to him1 archetypes of things themselves1 and not merely keys to possible experiences1 like the categories4 ,in his view they flow from the highest reason1 by which they have been imparted to human reason1 which1 however1 exists no longer in its original state1 but is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence--which is called philosophy--the old but now sadly obscured ideas4 ,i will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression4 ,i shall content myself with remarking that it is nothing unusual1 in common conversation as well as in written works1 by comparing the thoughts which an author has delivered upon a subject1 to understand him better than he understood himself inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception1 and thus have sometimes spoken1 nay even thought1 in opposition to his own opinions4 ,plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out phenomena according to synthetical unity1 for the purpose of being able to read them as experience1 and that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them--cognitions which are nevertheless real1 and are not mere phantoms of the brain4 ,this philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is practical1#da that is1 which rests upon freedom1 which in its turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason4 ,he who would derive from experience the conceptions of virtue1 who would make 7as many have really done7 that1 which at best can but serve as an imperfectly illustrative example1 a model for or the formation of a perfectly adequate idea on the subject1 would in fact transform virtue into a nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and utterly incapable of being employed as a rule4 ,on the contrary1 every one is conscious that1 when any one is held up to him as a model of virtue1 he compares this so-called model with the true original which he possesses in his own mind and values him according to this standard4 ,but this standard is the idea of virtue1 in relation to which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples--proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which the conception of virtue demands--but certainly not as archetypes4 ,that the actions of man will never be in perfect accordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason1 does not prove the thought to be chimerical4 ,for only through this idea are all judgements as to moral merit or demerit possible2 it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral perfection1 however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature--indeterminable as to degree--may keep us4 #da ,he certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative cognitions also1 provided they were given pure and completely priori1 nay1 even to mathematics1 although this science cannot possess an object otherwhere than in ,possible experience4 ,i cannot follow him in this1 and as little can ,i follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas1 or in his hypostatization of them2 although1 in truth1 the elevated and exaggerated language which he employed in describing them is quite capable of an interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact and the nature of things4 ,the ,platonic ,republic has become proverbial as an example--and a striking one--of imaginary perfection1 such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker2 and ,brucker ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a prince can never govern well1 unless he is participant in the ideas4 ,but we should do better to follow up this thought and1 where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance1 employ new efforts to place it in clearer light1 rather than carelessly fling it aside as useless1 under the very miserable and pernicious pretext of impracticability4 ,a constitution of the greatest possible human freedom according to laws1 by which the liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty of every other 7not of the greatest possible happiness1 for this follows necessarily from the former71 is1 to say the least1 a necessary idea1 which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of a state1 but of all its laws4 ,and1 in this1 it not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature1 but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation4 ,for there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher1 than the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse experience1 which indeed would not have existed1 if those institutions had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas2 while1 instead of this1 conceptions1 crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from experience1 have marred and frustrated all our better views and intentions4 ,the more legislation and government are in harmony with this idea1 the more rare do punishments become and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain1 as ,plato did1 that in a perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary4 ,now although a perfect state may never exist1 the idea is not on that account the less just1 which holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution1 in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection4 ,for at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress1 and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realization1 are problems which no one can or ought to determine--and for this reason1 that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea4 ,but not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where ideas are operative causes 7of actions and their objects71 that is to say1 in the region of ethics1 but also in regard to nature herself1 ,plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas4 ,a plant1 and animal1 the regular order of nature--probably also the disposition of the whole universe--give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas2 that1 indeed1 no one creature1 under the individual conditions of its existence1 perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind--just as little as man with the idea of humanity1 which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions2 that1 notwithstanding1 these ideas are in the highest sense individually1 unchangeably1 and completely determined1 and are the original causes of things2 and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea4 ,setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher1 the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends1 that is1 ideas1 is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect4 ,but as regards the principles of ethics1 of legislation1 and of religion1 spheres in which ideas alone render experience possible1 although they never attain to full expression therein1 he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit1 which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very empirical rules1 the validity of which as principles is destroyed by ideas4 ,for as regards nature1 experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth1 but in relation to ethical laws experience is the parent of illusion1 and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what ,i ought to do1 from what is done4 ,we must1 however1 omit the consideration of these important subjects1 the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and dignity of philosophy1 and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of moral science4 ,for this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its confident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions4 ,our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason1 its principles and ideas1 that we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real worth4 ,but before bringing these introductory remarks to a close1 ,i beg those who really have philosophy at heart--and their number is but small--if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by those above1 to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification1 and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated--that the interests of science may not thereby suffer4 ,we are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation1 without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others4 ,the following is a graduated list of them4 ,the genus is representation in general 7representatio74 ,under it stands representation with consciousness 7perceptio74 ,a perception which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state1 is a sensation 7sensatio71 an objective perception is a cognition 7cognitio74 ,a cognition is either an intuition or a conception 7intuitus vel conceptus74 ,the former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual2 the latter has but a mediate relation1 by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things4 ,a conception is either empirical or pure4 ,a pure conception1 in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone1 and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image1 is called notio4 ,a conception formed from notions1 which transcends the possibility of experience1 is an idea1 or a conception of reason4 ,to one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions1 it must be quite intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an idea4 ,it ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of ,transcendental ,ideas ,transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions priori1 conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience1 or rather1 indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects4 ,the form of judgements--converted into a conception of the synthesis of intuitions--produced the categories which direct the employment of the understanding in experience4 ,this consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms1 when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions1 following the rule of the categories1 will contain the origin of particular priori conceptions1 which we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas1 and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of experience according to principles4 ,the function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a cognition according to conceptions1 and the syllogism itself is a judgement which is determined priori in the whole extent of its condition4 ,the proposition3 8,caius is mortal10 is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone2 but my wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under which the predicate of this judgement is given--in this case1 the conception of man--and after subsuming under this condition1 taken in its whole extent 7all men are mortal71 ,i determine according to it the cognition of the object thought1 and say3 8,caius is mortal40 ,hence1 in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a certain object1 after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a certain condition4 ,this complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called universality 7universalitas74 ,to this corresponds totality 7universitas7 of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions4 ,the transcendental conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned4 ,now as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions1 and1 conversely1 the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned2 a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned1 in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned4 ,to the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means of the categories1 the number of pure rational conceptions will correspond4 ,we must therefore seek for1 first1 an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject2 secondly1 of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series2 thirdly1 of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system4 ,there are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms1 each of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned--one to the subject which cannot be employed as predicate1 another to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself1 and the third to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a conception4 ,hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason--at least as modes of elevating the unity of the understanding to the unconditioned4 ,they may have no valid application1 corresponding to their transcendental employment1 in concreto1 and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the understanding how1 while extending them as widely as possible1 to maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and harmony4 ,but1 while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason1 we again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense with1 and which nevertheless1 owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse1 we cannot employ with safety4 ,the word absolute is one of the few words which1 in its original signification1 was perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey--a conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits1 and the loss--or1 which is the same thing1 the incautious and loose employment--of which must be followed by the loss of the conception itself4 ,and1 as it is a conception which occupies much of the attention of reason1 its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy4 ,the word absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsically4 ,in this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself 7interne7--which is1 in fact1 the least that one can predicate of an object4 ,on the other hand1 it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is valid in all respects--for example1 absolute sovereignty4 ,absolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all relations and in every respect2 and this is the most that can be predicated of the possibility of a thing4 ,now these significations do in truth frequently coincide4 ,thus1 for example1 that which is intrinsically impossible1 is also impossible in all relations1 that is1 absolutely impossible4 ,but in most cases they differ from each other toto caelo1 and ,i can by no means conclude that1 because a thing is in itself possible1 it is also possible in all relations1 and therefore absolutely4 ,nay1 more1 ,i shall in the sequel show that absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity1 and that1 therefore1 it must not be considered as synonymous with it4 ,of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible1 we may affirm that it is in all respects impossible1 and that1 consequently1 the thing itself1 of which this is the opposite1 is absolutely necessary2 but ,i cannot reason conversely and say1 the opposite of that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible1 that is1 that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity4 ,for this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with which the least conception cannot be connected1 while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations4 ,now as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher1 ,i trust that the proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him4 ,in this enlarged signification1 then1 shall ,i employ the word absolute1 in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect2 for the latter is restricted by conditions1 the former is valid without any restriction whatever4 ,now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely1 that is1 in all respects and relations1 unconditioned4 ,for pure reason leaves to the understanding everything that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination4 ,the former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category1 even to the unconditioned4 ,this unity may hence be called the rational unity of phenomena1 as the other1 which the category expresses1 may be termed the unity of the understanding4 ,reason1 therefore1 has an immediate relation to the use of the understanding1 not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience 7for the conception of the absolute totality of conditions is not a conception that can be employed in experience1 because no experience is unconditioned71 but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity1 of which the understanding has no conception1 and the aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the understanding4 ,hence the objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent1 while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must1 according to their nature1 be always immanent1 inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience4 ,i understand by idea a necessary conception of reason1 to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense4 ,accordingly1 the pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are transcendental ideas4 ,they are conceptions of pure reason1 for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions4 ,they are not mere fictions1 but natural and necessary products of reason1 and have hence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding4 ,and1 finally1 they are transcendent1 and overstep the limits of all experiences1 in which1 consequently1 no object can ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea4 ,when we use the word idea1 we say1 as regards its object 7an object of the pure understanding71 a great deal1 but as regards its subject 7that is1 in respect of its reality under conditions of experience71 exceedingly little1 because the idea1 as the conception of a maximum1 can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto4 ,now1 as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole aim1 and as in this case the approximation to a conception1 which is never attained in practice1 is the same thing as if the conception were non-existent--it is commonly said of the conception of this kind1 8it is only an idea40 ,so we might very well say1 8the absolute totality of all phenomena is only an idea10 for1 as we never can present an adequate representation of it1 it remains for us a problem incapable of solution4 ,on the other hand1 as in the practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action and practice according to rules1 an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto1 although only partially1 nay1 it is the indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason4 ,the practice or execution of the idea is always limited and defective1 but nevertheless within indeterminable boundaries1 consequently always under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection4 ,and thus the practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful1 and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary4 ,in the idea1 pure reason possesses even causality and the power of producing that which its conception contains4 ,hence we cannot say of wisdom1 in a disparaging way1 8it is only an idea40 ,for1 for the very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims1 it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the primitive condition and rule--a rule which1 if not constitutive1 is at least limitative4 ,now1 although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason1 8they are only ideas10 we must not1 on this account1 look upon them as superfluous and nugatory4 ,for1 although no object can be determined by them1 they can be of great utility1 unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding1 as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise--a canon which1 indeed1 does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions1 but which guides it more securely in its cognition4 ,not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions1 and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping1 so to speak1 and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason4 ,the explication of all this must be looked for in the sequel4 ,but setting aside1 in conformity with our original purpose1 the consideration of the practical ideas1 we proceed to contemplate reason in its speculative use alone1 nay1 in a still more restricted sphere1 to wit1 in the transcendental use2 and here must strike into the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories4 ,that is to say1 we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason1 that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically priori1 in relation to one or other of the functions of reason4 ,reason1 considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition1 is the faculty of conclusion1 that is1 of mediate judgement--by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible judgement under the condition of a given judgement4 ,the given judgement is the general rule 7major74 ,the subsumption of the condition of another possible judgement under the condition of the rule is the minor4 ,the actual judgement1 which enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case1 is the conclusion 7conclusio74 ,the rule predicates something generally under a certain condition4 ,the condition of the rule is satisfied in some particular case4 ,it follows that what was valid in general under that condition must also be considered as valid in the particular case which satisfies this condition4 ,it is very plain that reason attains to a cognition1 by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a series of conditions4 ,when ,i arrive at the proposition1 8,all bodies are changeable10 by beginning with the more remote cognition 7in which the conception of body does not appear1 but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception71 8,all compound is changeable10 by proceeding from this to a less remote cognition1 which stands under the condition of the former1 8,bodies are compound10 and hence to a third1 which at length connects for me the remote cognition 7changeable7 with the one before me1 8,consequently1 bodies are changeable0--,i have arrived at a cognition 7conclusion7 through a series of conditions 7premisses74 ,now every series1 whose exponent 7of the categorical or hypothetical judgement7 is given1 can be continued2 consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica1 which is a series of syllogisms1 that can be continued either on the side of the conditions 7per prosyllogismos7 or of the conditioned 7per episyllogismos7 to an indefinite extent4 ,but we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms1 that is1 of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions of a given cognition1 in other words1 the ascending series of syllogisms must have a very different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series1 that is1 the progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms4 ,for1 as in the former case the cognition 7conclusio7 is given only as conditioned1 reason can attain to this cognition only under the presupposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given 7totality in the series of premisses71 because only under this supposition is the judgement we may be considering possible priori2 while on the side of the conditioned or the inferences1 only an incomplete and becoming1 and not a presupposed or given series1 consequently only a potential progression1 is cogitated4 ,hence1 when a cognition is contemplated as conditioned1 reason is compelled to consider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their totality4 ,but if the very same condition is considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions1 which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a descending line1 reason may preserve a perfect indifference1 as to how far this progression may extend a parte posteriori1 and whether the totality of this series is possible1 because it stands in no need of such a series for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it1 inasmuch as this conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a parte priori4 ,it may be the case1 that upon the side of the conditions the series of premisses has a first or highest condition1 or it may not possess this1 and so be a parte priori unlimited2 but it must1 nevertheless1 contain totality of conditions1 even admitting that we never could succeed in completely apprehending it2 and the whole series must be unconditionally true1 if the conditioned1 which is considered as an inference resulting from it1 is to be held as true4 ,this is a requirement of reason1 which announces its cognition as determined priori and as necessary1 either in itself--and in this case it needs no grounds to rest upon--or1 if it is deduced1 as a member of a series of grounds1 which is itself unconditionally true4 ,section ,,iii4 ,system of ,transcendental ,ideas ,we are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic1 which makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms4 ,our subject is transcendental dialectic1 which must contain1 completely priori1 the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason1 and the origin of certain deduced conceptions1 the object of which cannot be given empirically and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty of understanding4 ,we have observed1 from the natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition1 in syllogisms as well as in judgements1 must have to the logical1 that there are three kinds of dialectical arguments1 corresponding to the three modes of conclusion1 by which reason attains to cognitions on principles2 and that in all it is the business of reason to ascend from the conditioned synthesis1 beyond which the understanding never proceeds1 to the unconditioned which the understanding never can reach4 ,now the most general relations which can exist in our representations are3 #ast1 the relation to the subject2 #bnd1 the relation to objects1 either as phenomena1 or as objects of thought in general4 ,if we connect this subdivision with the main division1 all the relations of our representations1 of which we can form either a conception or an idea1 are threefold3 #a4 ,the relation to the subject2 #b4 ,the relation to the manifold of the object as a phenomenon2 #c4 ,the relation to all things in general4 ,now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical unity of representations2 conceptions of pure reason 7transcendental ideas71 on the other hand1 with the unconditional synthetical unity of all conditions4 ,it follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes1 the first of which contains the absolute 7unconditioned7 unity of the thinking subject1 the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon1 the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general4 ,the thinking subject is the object-matter of ,psychology2 the sum total of all phenomena 7the world7 is the object-matter of ,cosmology2 and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable 7the being of all beings7 is the object-matter of all ,theology4 ,thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul 7psychologia rationalis71 of a transcendental science of the world 7cosmologia rationalis71 and finally of a transcendental doctrine of ,god 7theologia transcendentalis74 ,understanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these sciences1 even when connected with the highest logical use of reason1 that is1 all cogitable syllogisms--for the purpose of proceeding from one object 7phenomenon7 to all others1 even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis4 ,they are1 on the contrary1 pure and genuine products1 or problems1 of pure reason4 ,what modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental ideas are will be fully exposed in the following chapter4 ,they follow the guiding thread of the categories4 ,for pure reason never relates immediately to objects1 but to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding4 ,in like manner1 it will be made manifest in the detailed explanation of these ideas--how reason1 merely through the synthetical use of the same function which it employs in a categorical syllogism1 necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject--how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions1 and finally--how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of all beings3 a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree paradoxical4 ,an objective deduction1 such as we were able to present in the case of the categories1 is impossible as regards these transcendental ideas4 ,for they have1 in truth1 no relation to any object1 in experience1 for the very reason that they are only ideas4 ,but a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is possible1 and has been given in the present chapter4 ,it is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions1 and that it does not concern itself with the absolute completeness on the ,part of the conditioned4 ,for of the former alone does she stand in need1 in order to preposit the whole series of conditions1 and thus present them to the understanding priori4 ,but if we once have a completely 7and unconditionally7 given condition1 there is no further necessity1 in proceeding with the series1 for a conception of reason2 for the understanding takes of itself every step downward1 from the condition to the conditioned4 ,thus the transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of conditions1 till we reach the unconditioned1 that is1 principles4 ,as regards descending to the conditioned1 on the other hand1 we find that there is a widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the understanding1 but that a transcendental use thereof is impossible2 and that when we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis1 for example1 of the whole series of all future changes in the world1 this idea is a mere ens rationis1 an arbitrary fiction of thought1 and not a necessary presupposition of reason4 ,for the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions1 but not of its consequences4 ,consequently1 this conception is not a transcendental idea--and it is with these alone that we are at present occupied4 ,finally1 it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental ideas a certain connection and unity1 and that pure reason1 by means of them1 collects all its cognitions into one system4 ,from the cognition of self to the cognition of the world1 and through these to the supreme being1 the progression is so natural1 that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion4#db ,now whether there lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the logical and transcendental procedure of reason1 is another of those questions1 the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries4 ,in this cursory and preliminary view1 we have1 meanwhile1 reached our aim4 ,for we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcendental conceptions of reason1 from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers1 and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding2 we have exposed their origin and1 thereby1 at the same time their determinate number1 and presented them in a systematic connection1 and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason4 #db ,the science of ,metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries only three grand ideas3 ,,god1 ,,freedom1 and ,,immortality1 and it aims at showing1 that the second conception1 conjoined with the first1 must lead to the third1 as a necessary conclusion4 ,all the other subjects with which it occupies itself1 are merely means for the attainment and realization of these ideas4 ,it does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature1 but1 on the contrary1 for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature4 ,a complete insight into and comprehension of them would render ,theology1 ,ethics1 and1 through the conjunction of both1 ,religion1 solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason4 ,in a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement--the synthetical one--would be the most suitable2 but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it1 the analytical1 which reverses this arrangement1 would be better adapted to our purpose1 as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to us--psychology1 to cosmology1 and thence to theology4 ,,transcendental ,,dialectic--,,book ,,ii--,,of ,,the ,,dialectical ,,procedure ,,of ,,pure ,,reason ,it may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception1 although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws4 ,for1 in fact1 a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason1 is impossible4 ,for such an object must be capable of being presented and intuited in a ,possible experience4 ,but we should express our meaning better1 and with less risk of being misunderstood1 if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object1 which perfectly corresponds to an idea1 although we may possess a problematical conception thereof4 ,now the transcendental 7subjective7 reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason4 ,there must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses1 and by means of which we conclude from something that we do know1 to something of which we do not even possess a conception1 to which we1 nevertheless1 by an unavoidable illusion1 ascribe objective reality4 ,such arguments are1 as regards their result1 rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms1 although indeed1 as regards their origin1 they are very well entitled to the latter name1 inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason1 but are necessitated by its very nature4 ,they are sophisms1 not of men1 but of pure reason herself1 from which the ,wisest cannot free himself4 ,after long labour he may be able to guard against the error1 but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him4 ,of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds1 corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions present4 ,in the argument or syllogism of the first class1 ,i conclude1 from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold1 the absolute unity of the subject itself1 of which ,i cannot in this manner attain to a conception4 ,this dialectical argument ,i shall call the transcendental paralogism4 ,the second class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon1 and ,i conclude1 from the fact that ,i have always a self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side1 the truth of the opposite unity1 of which ,i have nevertheless no conception4 ,the condition of reason in these dialectical arguments1 ,i shall term the antinomy of pure reason4 ,finally1 according to the third kind of sophistical argument1 ,i conclude1 from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general1 in so far as they can be given1 the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general2 that is1 from things which ,i do not know in their mere transcendental conception1 ,i conclude a being of all beings which ,i know still less by means of a transcendental conception1 and of whose unconditioned necessity ,i can form no conception whatever4 ,this dialectical argument ,i shall call the ideal of pure reason4 ,chapter ,i4 ,of the ,paralogisms of ,pure ,reason ,the logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form1 be the content what it may4 ,but a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation1 and concludes falsely1 while the form is correct and unexceptionable4 ,in this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason1 and is the parent of an unavoidable1 though not insoluble1 mental illusion4 ,we now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions1 and yet must be reckoned with them1 but at the same time without in the least altering1 or indicating a deficiency in that table4 ,this is the conception1 or1 if the term is preferred1 the judgement1 8,i think40 ,but it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general1 and consequently of transcendental conceptions also1 and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental conception1 although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked1 inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness4 ,at the same time1 pure as this conception is from empirical content 7impressions of the senses71 it enables us to distinguish two different kinds of objects4 8,i10 as thinking1 am an object of the internal sense1 and am called soul4 ,that which is an object of the external senses is called body4 ,thus the expression1 8,i10 as a thinking being1 designates the object-matter of psychology1 which may be called 8the rational doctrine of the soul10 inasmuch as in this science ,i desire to know nothing of the soul but what1 independently of all experience 7which determines me in concreto71 may be concluded from this conception 8,i10 in so far as it appears in all thought4 ,now1 the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind4 ,for if the smallest empirical element of thought1 if any particular perception of my internal state1 were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science1 it would not be a rational1 but an empirical doctrine of the soul4 ,we have thus before us a pretended science1 raised upon the single proposition1 8,i think10 whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly1 and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy1 here examine4 ,it ought not to be objected that in this proposition1 which expresses the perception of one's self1 an internal experience is asserted1 and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon it1 is not pure1 but partly founded upon an empirical principle4 ,for this internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception1 8,i think10 which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible1 in which we say1 8,i think substance1 cause1 etc40 ,for internal experience in general and its possibility1 or perception in general1 and its relation to other perceptions1 unless some particular distinction or determination thereof is empirically given1 cannot be regarded as empirical cognition1 but as cognition of the empirical1 and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience1 which is certainly transcendental4 ,the smallest object of experience 7for example1 only pleasure or pain71 that should be included in the general representation of self-consciousness1 would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology4 8,i think0 is therefore the only text of rational psychology1 from which it must develop its whole system4 ,it is manifest that this thought1 when applied to an object 7myself71 can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof2 because the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience4 ,but we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories--only1 as in the present case a thing1 8,i10 as thinking being1 is at first given1 we shall--not indeed change the order of the categories as it stands in the table--but begin at the category of substance1 by which at the a thing in itself is represented and proceeds backwards through the series4 ,the topic of the rational doctrine of the soul1 from which everything else it may contain must be deduced1 is accordingly as follows3 #a #b ,the ,soul is ,,substance ,as regards its quality it is ,,simple #c ,as regards the different times in which it exists1 it is numerically identical1 that is ,,unity1 not ,plurality4 #d ,it is in relation to possible objects in space#dc #dc ,the reader1 who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these expressions1 taken here in their transcendental abstraction1 and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence1 will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel4 ,i have1 moreover1 to apologize for the ,latin terms which have been employed1 instead of their ,german synonyms1 contrary to the rules of correct writing4 ,but ,i judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity4 ,from these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology1 by combination alone1 without the aid of any other principle4 ,this substance1 merely as an object of the internal sense1 gives the conception of ,immateriality2 as simple substance1 that of ,incorruptibility2 its identity1 as intellectual substance1 gives the conception of ,personality2 all these three together1 ,spirituality4 ,its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection 7commercium7 with bodies4 ,thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter1 that is1 as a soul 7anima71 and as the ground of ,animality2 and this1 limited and determined by the conception of spirituality1 gives us that of ,immortality4 ,now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology1 which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason1 touching the nature of our thinking being4 ,we can1 however1 lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation 8i0 which cannot even be called a conception1 but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions4 ,by this 8,i10 or 8,he10 or 8,it10 who or which thinks1 nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought x1 which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates1 and of which1 apart from these1 we cannot form the least conception4 ,hence in a perpetual circle1 inasmuch as we must always employ it1 in order to frame any judgement respecting it4 ,and this inconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of1 because consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing a particular object1 as a form of representation in general1 in so far as it may be termed cognition2 for in and by cognition alone do ,i think anything4 ,it must1 however1 appear extraordinary at first sight that the condition under which ,i think1 and which is consequently a property of my subject1 should be held to be likewise valid for every existence which thinks1 and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly empirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal1 to wit1 that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares it to be1 that is1 as a self-conscious being4 ,the cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we necessarily attribute to things priori all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them4 ,now ,i cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means of external experience1 but solely through self-consciousness4 ,such objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking beings4 ,the proposition1 8,i think10 is1 in the present case1 understood in a problematical sense1 not in so far as it contains a perception of an existence 7like the ,cartesian 8,cogito1 ergo sum071 but in regard to its mere possibility--for the purpose of discovering what properties may be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the subject of it4 ,if at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings there lay more than the mere ,cogito--if we could likewise call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts1 and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self1 there would arise an empirical psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the internal sense and might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense4 ,but it could never be available for discovering those properties which do not belong to possible experience 7such as the quality of simplicity71 nor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on the nature of thinking beings3 it would therefore not be a rational psychology4 ,now1 as the proposition 8,i think0 7in the problematical sense7 contains the form of every judgement in general and is the constant accompaniment of all the categories1 it is manifest that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding4 ,this use of the understanding excludes all empirical elements2 and we cannot1 as has been shown above1 have any favourable conception beforehand of its procedure4 ,we shall therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology2 but we shall1 for brevity's sake1 allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connection4 ,before entering on this task1 however1 the following general remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument4 ,it is not merely through my thinking that ,i cognize an object1 but only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking consists4 ,it follows that ,i cognize myself1 not through my being conscious of myself as thinking1 but only when ,i am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought4 ,all the modi of self-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects 7conceptions of the understanding--categories72 they are mere logical functions1 which do not present to thought an object to be cognized1 and cannot therefore present my ,self as an object4 ,not the consciousness of the determining1 but only that of the determinable self1 that is1 of my internal intuition 7in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought71 is the object4 #a4 ,in all judgements ,i am the determining subject of that relation which constitutes a judgement4 ,but that the ,i which thinks1 must be considered as in thought always a subject1 and as a thing which cannot be a predicate to thought1 is an apodeictic and identical proposition4 ,but this proposition does not signify that ,i1 as an object1 am1 for myself1 a self-subsistent being or substance4 ,this latter statement--an ambitious one--requires to be supported by data which are not to be discovered in thought2 and are perhaps 7in so far as ,i consider the thinking self merely as such7 not to be discovered in the thinking self at all4 #b4 ,that the ,i or ,ego of apperception1 and consequently in all thought1 is singular or simple1 and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects1 and therefore indicates a logically simple subject--this is self-evident from the very conception of an ,ego1 and is consequently an analytical proposition4 ,but this is not tantamount to declaring that the thinking ,ego is a simple substance--for this would be a synthetical proposition4 ,the conception of substance always relates to intuitions1 which with me cannot be other than sensuous1 and which consequently lie completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought3 but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the ,ego is simple in thought4 ,it would indeed be surprising1 if the conception of 8substance10 which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements presented by intuition--so much trouble1 too1 to discover whether it can be simple 7as in the case of the parts of matter7--should be presented immediately to me1 as if by revelation1 in the poorest mental representation of all4 #c4 ,the proposition of the identity of my ,self amidst all the manifold representations of which ,i am conscious1 is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves1 and is consequently analytical4 ,but this identity of the subject1 of which ,i am conscious in all its representations1 does not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject1 by which it is given as an object4 ,this proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the person1 by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances4 ,to prove this1 we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition1 but synthetical judgements based upon a given intuition4 #d4 ,i distinguish my own existence1 as that of a thinking being1 from that of other things external to me--among which my body also is reckoned4 ,this is also an analytical proposition1 for other things are exactly those which ,i think as different or distinguished from myself4 ,but whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things external to me2 and whether therefore ,i can exist merely as a thinking being 7without being man7--cannot be known or inferred from this proposition4 ,thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as object1 by the analysis of the consciousness of my ,self in thought4 ,the logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object4 ,our ,critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous1 if there existed a possibility of proving priori1 that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances1 as such1 therefore1 possess the inseparable attribute of personality1 and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected with matter4 ,for we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense1 and have penetrated into the sphere of noumena2 and in this case the right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere1 of establishing ourselves1 and1 under a favouring star1 appropriating to ourselves possessions in it4 ,for the proposition3 8,every thinking being1 as such1 is simple substance10 is an priori synthetical proposition2 because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of it1 and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its existence1 and in the second place annexes a predicate 7that of simplicity7 to the latter conception--a predicate which it could not have discovered in the sphere of experience4 ,it would follow that priori synthetical propositions are possible and legitimate1 not only1 as we have maintained1 in relation to objects of possible experience1 and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself1 but are applicable to things in themselves--an inference which makes an end of the whole of this ,critique1 and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure4 ,but indeed the danger is not so great1 if we look a little closer into the question4 ,there lurks in the procedure of rational ,psychology a paralogism1 which is represented in the following syllogism3 ,that which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject1 does not exist otherwise than as subject1 and is therefore substance4 ,a thinking being1 considered merely as such1 cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject4 ,therefore it exists also as such1 that is1 as substance4 ,in the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in every relation1 consequently as it may be given in intuition4 ,but in the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards itself as subject1 relatively to thought and the unity of consciousness1 but not in relation to intuition1 by which it is presented as an object to thought4 ,thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a ,sophisma figurae dictionis4#dd #dd ,thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses4 ,in the major it is considered as relating and applying to objects in general1 consequently to objects of intuition also4 ,in the minor1 we understand it as relating merely to self-consciousness4 ,in this sense1 we do not cogitate an object1 but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject1 as the form of thought4 ,in the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects4 ,in the second1 we do not speak of things1 but of thought 7all objects being abstracted71 in which the ,ego is always the subject of consciousness4 ,hence the conclusion cannot be1 8,i cannot exist otherwise than as subject02 but only 8,i can1 in cogitating my existence1 employ my ,ego only as the subject of the judgement40 ,but this is an identical proposition1 and throws no light on the mode of my existence4 ,that this famous argument is a mere paralogism1 will be plain to any one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure understanding1 and the section on noumena4 ,for it was there proved that the conception of a thing1 which can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate1 possesses no objective reality2 that is to say1 we can never know whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception2 consequently1 the conception is nothing more than a conception1 and from it we derive no proper knowledge4 ,if this conception is to indicate by the term substance1 an object that can be given1 if it is to become a cognition1 we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition1 as the indispensable condition of its objective reality4 ,for through intuition alone can an object be given4 ,but in internal intuition there is nothing permanent1 for the ,ego is but the consciousness of my thought4 ,if then1 we appeal merely to thought1 we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance--that is1 of a subject existing per se--to the subject as a thinking being4 ,and thus the conception of the simple nature of substance1 which is connected with the objective reality of this conception1 is shown to be also invalid1 and to be1 in fact1 nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought2 whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is composite or not4 ,refutation of the ,argument of ,mendelssohn for the ,substantiality or ,permanence of the ,soul4 ,this acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul--it being granted that it is a simple being--cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition2 he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction1 or disappearance4 ,he endeavoured to prove in his ,phaedo1 that the soul cannot be annihilated1 by showing that a simple being cannot cease to exist4 ,inasmuch as1 he said1 a simple existence cannot diminish1 nor gradually lose portions of its being1 and thus be by degrees reduced to nothing 7for it possesses no parts1 and therefore no multiplicity71 between the moment in which it is1 and the moment in which it is not1 no time can be discovered--which is impossible4 ,but this philosopher did not consider that1 granting the soul to possess this simple nature1 which contains no parts external to each other and consequently no extensive quantity1 we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other being1 intensive quantity1 that is1 a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties1 nay1 to all that constitutes its existence4 ,but this degree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series of smaller degrees4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that this supposed substance--this thing1 the permanence of which is not assured in any other way1 may1 if not by decomposition1 by gradual loss 7remissio7 of its powers 7consequently by elanguescence1 if ,i may employ this expression71 be changed into nothing4 ,for consciousness itself has always a degree1 which may be lessened4#de ,consequently the faculty of being conscious may be diminished2 and so with all other faculties4 ,the permanence of the soul1 therefore1 as an object of the internal sense1 remains undemonstrated1 nay1 even indemonstrable4 ,its permanence in life is evident1 per se1 inasmuch as the thinking being 7as man7 is to itself1 at the same time1 an object of the external senses4 ,but this does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm1 from mere conceptions1 its permanence beyond life4#df #de ,clearness is not1 as logicians maintain1 the consciousness of a representation4 ,for a certain degree of consciousness1 which may not1 however1 be sufficient for recollection1 is to be met with in many dim representations4 ,for without any consciousness at all1 we should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we connect2 as we really can do with many conceptions1 such as those of right and justice1 and those of the musician1 who strikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music4 ,but a representation is clear1 in which our consciousness is sufficient for the consciousness of the difference of this representation from others4 ,if we are only conscious that there is a difference1 but are not conscious of the difference--that is1 what the difference is--the representation must be termed obscure4 ,there is1 consequently1 an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire disappearance4 #df ,there are some who think they have done enough to establish a new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls1 when they have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this subject4 ,such are those who affirm the possibility of thought--of which they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life--after this life has ceased4 ,but it is very easy to embarrass them by the introduction of counter-possibilities1 which rest upon quite as good a foundation4 ,such1 for example1 is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several substances2 and conversely1 of the coalition of several into one simple substance4 ,for1 although divisibility presupposes composition1 it does not necessarily require a composition of substances1 but only of the degrees 7of the several faculties7 of one and the same substance4 ,now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul--even that of consciousness--as diminished by one half1 the substance still remaining4 ,in the same way we can represent to ourselves without contradiction1 this obliterated half as preserved1 not in the soul1 but without it2 and we can believe that1 as in this case every thing that is real in the soul1 and has a degree--consequently its entire existence--has been halved1 a particular substance would arise out of the soul4 ,for the multiplicity1 which has been divided1 formerly existed1 but not as a multiplicity of substances1 but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it2 and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence1 which by this division alone has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence4 ,in the same manner several simple substances might coalesce into one1 without anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence1 inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the former substances4 ,perhaps1 indeed1 the simple substances1 which appear under the form of matter1 might 7not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other1 but by an unknown influence1 of which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance71 by means of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls1 as intensive quantities1 produce other souls1 while the former repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same sort4 ,i am far from allowing any value to such chimeras2 and the principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of the categories--that of substance1 for example--is possible4 ,but if the rationalist is bold enough to construct1 on the mere authority of the faculty of thought--without any intuition1 whereby an object is given--a self-subsistent being1 merely because the unity of apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite being1 instead of declaring1 as he ought to do1 that he is unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature2 what ought to hinder the materialist1 with as complete an independence of experience1 to employ the principle of the rationalist in a directly opposite manner--still preserving the formal unity required by his opponent8 ,if1 now1 we take the above propositions--as they must be accepted as valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology--in synthetical connection1 and proceed1 from the category of relation1 with the proposition3 8,all thinking beings are1 as such1 substances10 backwards through the series1 till the circle is completed2 we come at last to their existence1 of which1 in this system of rational psychology1 substances are held to be conscious1 independently of external things2 nay1 it is asserted that1 in relation to the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance1 they can of themselves determine external things4 ,it follows that idealism--at least problematical idealism1 is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system4 ,and1 if the existence of outward things is not held to be requisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in time1 the existence of these outward things at all1 is a gratuitous assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof4 ,but if we proceed analytically--the 8,i think0 as a proposition containing in itself an existence as given1 consequently modality being the principle--and dissect this proposition1 in order to ascertain its content1 and discover whether and how this ,ego determines its existence in time and space without the aid of anything external2 the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of a thinking being1 but with a reality1 and the properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the mode in which this reality is cogitated1 after everything empirical had been abstracted2 as is shown in the following table3 #a ,i think1 #b #c as ,subject1 as simple ,subject1 #d as identical ,subject1 in every state of my thought4 ,now1 inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition1 whether ,i can exist and be cogitated only as subject1 and not also as a predicate of another being1 the conception of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense2 and it remains undetermined1 whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not4 ,but in the third proposition1 the absolute unity of apperception--the simple ,ego in the representation to which all connection and separation1 which constitute thought1 relate1 is of itself important2 even although it presents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the subject4 ,apperception is something real1 and the simplicity of its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility4 ,now in space there is nothing real that is at the same time simple2 for points1 which are the only simple things in space1 are merely limits1 but not constituent parts of space4 ,from this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my ,ego as a merely thinking subject4 ,but1 because my existence is considered in the first proposition as given1 for it does not mean1 8,every thinking being exists0 7for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity71 but only1 8,i exist thinking02 the proposition is quite empirical1 and contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation to my representations in time4 ,but as ,i require for this purpose something that is permanent1 such as is not given in internal intuition2 the mode of my existence1 whether as substance or as accident1 cannot be determined by means of this simple self-consciousness4 ,thus1 if materialism is inadequate to explain the mode in which ,i exist1 spiritualism is likewise as insufficient2 and the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of the soul1 in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence apart from external objects4 ,and1 indeed1 how should it be possible1 merely by the aid of the unity of consciousness--which we cognize only for the reason that it is indispensable to the possibility of experience--to pass the bounds of experience 7our existence in this life72 and to extend our cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical--but in relation to every sort of intuition1 perfectly undetermined--proposition1 8,i think08 ,there does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves4 ,it is nothing more than a discipline1 which sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this region of thought1 to prevent it1 on the one hand1 from throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism1 and1 on the other1 from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism4 ,it teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this our human life1 as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation2 and to direct1 to a practical use1 our knowledge of ourselves--which1 although applicable only to objects of experience1 receives its principles from a higher source1 and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of experience and life4 ,from all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding4 ,the unity of consciousness1 which lies at the basis of the categories1 is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object2 and the category of substance is applied to the intuition4 ,but this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought1 by which no object is given2 to which therefore the category of substance--which always presupposes a given intuition--cannot be applied4 ,consequently1 the subject cannot be cognized4 ,the subject of the categories cannot1 therefore1 for the very reason that it cogitates these1 frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories2 for1 to cogitate these1 it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness--the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe4 ,in like manner1 the subject1 in which the representation of time has its basis1 cannot determine1 for this very reason1 its own existence in time4 ,now1 if the latter is impossible1 the former1 as an attempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking being in general1 is no less so4#dg #dg ,the 8,i think0 is1 as has been already stated1 an empirical proposition1 and contains the proposition1 8,i exist40 ,but ,i cannot say1 8,everything1 which thinks1 exists02 for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings possessing it1 necessary beings4 ,hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition1 8,i think10 as ,descartes maintained--because in this case the major premiss1 8,everything1 which thinks1 exists10 must precede--but the two propositions are identical4 ,the proposition1 8,i think10 expresses an undetermined empirical intuition1 that perception 7proving consequently that sensation1 which must belong to sensibility1 lies at the foundation of this proposition72 but it precedes experience1 whose province it is to determine an object of perception by means of the categories in relation to time2 and existence in this proposition is not a category1 as it does not apply to an undetermined given object1 but only to one of which we have a conception1 and about which we wish to know whether it does or does not exist1 out of1 and apart from this conception4 ,an undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that has been given1 only1 however1 to thought in general--but not as a phenomenon1 nor as a thing in itself 7noumenon71 but only as something that really exists1 and is designated as such in the proposition1 8,i think40 ,for it must be remarked that1 when ,i call the proposition1 8,i think10 an empirical proposition1 ,i do not thereby mean that the ,ego in the proposition is an empirical representation2 on the contrary1 it is purely intellectual1 because it belongs to thought in general4 ,but without some empirical representation1 which presents to the mind material for thought1 the mental act1 8,i think10 would not take place2 and the empirical is only the condition of the application or employment of the pure intellectual faculty4 ,thus1 then1 appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience--a cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity2 and thus is proved the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of thought4 ,but1 in this interest of thought1 the severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant service1 by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience4 ,she has thus fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary4 ,now1 this can be accomplished in only two ways4 ,either our proposition must be proved apodeictically2 or1 if this is unsuccessful1 the sources of this inability must be sought for1 and1 if these are discovered to exist in the natural and necessary limitation of our reason1 our opponents must submit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims to dogmatic assertion4 ,but the right1 say rather the necessity to admit a future life1 upon principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of reason1 has lost nothing by this renunciation2 for the merely speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of men4 ,it stands upon the point of a hair1 so that even the schools have been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it and spinning it like a top2 and even in their eyes it has never been able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory4 ,the proofs which have been current among men1 preserve their value undiminished2 nay1 rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power1 by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason4 ,for reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province--the arrangement of ends or aims1 which is at the same time the arrangement of nature2 and1 as a practical faculty1 without limiting itself to the latter1 it is justified in extending the former1 and with it our own existence1 beyond the boundaries of experience and life4 ,if we turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world1 in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle that no organ1 no faculty1 no appetite is useless1 and that nothing is superfluous1 nothing disproportionate to its use1 nothing unsuited to its end2 but that1 on the contrary1 everything is perfectly conformed to its destination in life--we shall find that man1 who alone is the final end and aim of this order1 is still the only animal that seems to be excepted from it4 ,for his natural gifts--not merely as regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them1 but especially the moral law in him--stretch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and advantage1 that he feels himself bound to prize the mere consciousness of probity1 apart from all advantageous consequences--even the shadowy gift of posthumous fame--above everything2 and he is conscious of an inward call to constitute himself1 by his conduct in this world--without regard to mere sublunary interests--the citizen of a better4 ,this mighty1 irresistible proof--accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a purpose in everything we see around us1 by the conviction of the boundless immensity of creation1 by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge1 and by a desire commensurate therewith--remains to humanity1 even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed to establish the necessity of an existence after death4 ,conclusion of the ,solution of the ,psychological ,paralogism4 ,the dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason 7of a pure intelligence7 with the conception--in every respect undetermined--of a thinking being in general4 ,i cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience1 at the same time making abstraction of all actual experience2 and infer therefrom that ,i can be conscious of myself apart from experience and its empirical conditions4 ,i consequently confound the possible abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self2 and ,i believe that ,i cognize what is substantial in myself as a transcendental subject1 when ,i have nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness1 which lies at the basis of all determination of cognition4 ,the task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking2 because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from this communion 7after death71 and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of the word1 although occupying itself with an object of experience--only in so far1 however1 as it ceases to be an object of experience4 ,but a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our system4 ,the difficulty which lies in the execution of this task consists1 as is well known1 in the presupposed heterogeneity of the object of the internal sense 7the soul7 and the objects of the external senses2 inasmuch as the formal condition of the intuition of the one is time1 and of that of the other space also4 ,but if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ internally1 but only in so far as the one appears externally to the other--consequently1 that what lies at the basis of phenomena1 as a thing in itself1 may not be heterogeneous2 this difficulty disappears4 ,there then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the question--how a community of substances is possible2 a question which lies out of the region of psychology1 and which the reader1 after what in our analytic has been said of primitive forces and faculties1 will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human cognition4 ,,general ,,remark ,on the ,transition from ,rational ,psychology to ,cosmology4 ,the proposition1 8,i think10 or1 8,i exist thinking10 is an empirical proposition4 ,but such a proposition must be based on empirical intuition1 and the object cogitated as a phenomenon2 and thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul1 even in thought1 is merely a phenomenon2 and in this way our consciousness itself1 in fact1 abuts upon nothing4 ,thought1 per se1 is merely the purely spontaneous logical function which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition2 and it does not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon--for this reason alone1 that it pays no attention to the question whether the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual4 ,i therefore do not represent myself in thought either as ,i am1 or as ,i appear to myself2 ,i merely cogitate myself as an object in general1 of the mode of intuiting which ,i make abstraction4 ,when ,i represent myself as the subject of thought1 or as the ground of thought1 these modes of representation are not related to the categories of substance or of cause2 for these are functions of thought applicable only to our sensuous intuition4 ,the application of these categories to the ,ego would1 however1 be necessary1 if ,i wished to make myself an object of knowledge4 ,but ,i wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking2 in what mode my ,self is given in intuition1 ,i do not consider1 and it may be that ,i1 who think1 am a phenomenon--although not in so far as ,i am a thinking being2 but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought ,i am a being1 though this consciousness does not present to me any property of this being as material for thought4 ,but the proposition1 8,i think10 in so far as it declares1 8,i exist thinking10 is not the mere representation of a logical function4 ,it determines the subject 7which is in this case an object also7 in relation to existence2 and it cannot be given without the aid of the internal sense1 whose intuition presents to us an object1 not as a thing in itself1 but always as a phenomenon4 ,in this proposition there is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of thought2 there is also the receptivity of intuition1 that is1 my thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself4 ,now1 in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the employment of its logical functions as categories of substance1 cause1 and so forth2 not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an object in itself by means of the representation 8,i10 but also for the purpose of determining the mode of its existence1 that is1 of cognizing itself as noumenon4 ,but this is impossible1 for the internal empirical intuition is sensuous1 and presents us with nothing but phenomenal data1 which do not assist the object of pure consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate existence1 but are useful only as contributions to experience4 ,but1 let it be granted that we could discover1 not in experience1 but in certain firmly-established priori laws of the use of pure reason--laws relating to our existence1 authority to consider ourselves as legislating priori in relation to our own existence and as determining this existence2 we should1 on this supposition1 find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity1 by which our actual existence would be determinable1 without the aid of the conditions of empirical intuition4 ,we should also become aware that in the consciousness of our existence there was an priori content1 which would serve to determine our own existence--an existence only sensuously determinable--relatively1 however1 to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible world4 ,but this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational psychology4 ,for this wonderful faculty1 which the consciousness of the moral law in me reveals1 would present me with a principle of the determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual--but by what predicates8 ,by none other than those which are given in sensuous intuition4 ,thus ,i should find myself in the same position in rational psychology which ,i formerly occupied1 that is to say1 ,i should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions1 in order to give significance to my conceptions of substance and cause1 by means of which alone ,i can possess a knowledge of myself3 but these intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of experience4 ,i should be justified1 however1 in applying these conceptions1 in regard to their practical use1 which is always directed to objects of experience--in conformity with their analogical significance when employed theoretically--to freedom and its subject4 ,at the same time1 ,i should understand by them merely the logical functions of subject and predicate1 of principle and consequence1 in conformity with which all actions are so determined1 that they are capable of being explained along with the laws of nature1 conformably to the categories of substance and cause1 although they originate from a very different principle4 ,we have made these observations for the purpose of guarding against misunderstanding1 to which the doctrine of our intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed4 ,we shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the sequel4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,antinomy of ,pure ,reason ,we showed in the introduction to this part of our work1 that all transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical arguments1 the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal species of syllogisms--just as the categories find their logical schema in the four functions of all judgements4 ,the first kind of these sophistical arguments related to the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations in general 7of the subject or soul71 in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms1 the major of which1 as the principle1 enounces the relation of a predicate to a subject4 ,the second kind of dialectical argument will therefore be concerned1 following the analogy with hypothetical syllogisms1 with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon2 and1 in this way1 the theme of the third kind to be treated of in the following chapter will be the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general4 ,but it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism produced in the mind only a one-third illusion1 in regard to the idea of the subject of our thought2 and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary proposition4 ,the advantage is completely on the side of ,pneumatism2 although this theory itself passes into naught1 in the crucible of pure reason4 ,very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective synthesis of phenomena4 ,here1 certainly1 reason establishes1 with much plausibility1 its principle of unconditioned unity2 but it very soon falls into such contradictions that it is compelled1 in relation to cosmology1 to renounce its pretensions4 ,for here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us--a perfectly natural antithetic1 which does not require to be sought for by subtle sophistry1 but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls4 ,it is thereby preserved1 to be sure1 from the slumber of a fancied conviction--which a merely one-sided illusion produces2 but it is at the same time compelled1 either1 on the one hand1 to abandon itself to a despairing scepticism1 or1 on the other1 to assume a dogmatical confidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions1 without granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question4 ,either is the death of a sound philosophy1 although the former might perhaps deserve the title of the euthanasia of pure reason4 ,before entering this region of discord and confusion1 which the conflict of the laws of pure reason 7antinomy7 produces1 we shall present the reader with some considerations1 in explanation and justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of this subject4 ,i term all transcendental ideas1 in so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena1 cosmical conceptions2 partly on account of this unconditioned totality1 on which the conception of the world-whole is based--a conception1 which is itself an idea--partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of phenomena--the empirical synthesis2 while1 on the other hand1 the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things gives rise to an ideal of pure reason1 which is quite distinct from the cosmical conception1 although it stands in relation with it4 ,hence1 as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology1 the antinomy of pure reason will present us with the transcendental principles of a pretended pure 7rational7 cosmology--not1 however1 to declare it valid and to appropriate it1 but--as the very term of a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates1 to present it as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and experience4 ,section ,i4 ,system of ,cosmological ,ideas ,that we may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these ideas according to a principle1 we must remark1 in the first place1 that it is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental conceptions take their origin2 that the reason does not properly give birth to any conception1 but only frees the conception of the understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience1 and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical1 though it must still be in connection with it4 ,this happens from the fact that1 for a given conditioned1 reason demands absolute totality on the side of the conditions 7to which the understanding submits all phenomena71 and thus makes of the category a transcendental idea4 ,this it does that it may be able to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis1 by continuing it to the unconditioned 7which is not to be found in experience1 but only in the idea74 ,reason requires this according to the principle3 ,if the conditioned is given the whole of the conditions1 and consequently the absolutely unconditioned1 is also given1 whereby alone the former was possible4 ,first1 then1 the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned2 and they may be arranged in a table according to the titles of the latter4 ,but1 secondly1 all the categories are not available for this purpose1 but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series--of conditions subordinated to1 not co-ordinated with1 each other4 ,absolute totality is required of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series of the conditions of a conditioned2 not1 consequently1 when the question relates to the descending series of consequences1 or to the aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences4 ,for1 in relation to a given conditioned1 conditions are presupposed and considered to be given along with it4 ,on the other hand1 as the consequences do not render possible their conditions1 but rather presuppose them--in the consideration of the procession of consequences 7or in the descent from the given condition to the conditioned71 we may be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or not2 and their totality is not a necessary demand of reason4 ,thus we cogitate--and necessarily--a given time completely elapsed up to a given moment1 although that time is not determinable by us4 ,but as regards time future1 which is not the condition of arriving at the present1 in order to conceive it2 it is quite indifferent whether we consider future time as ceasing at some point1 or as prolonging itself to infinity4 ,take1 for example1 the series m1 n1 o1 in which n is given as conditioned in relation to m1 but at the same time as the condition of o1 and let the series proceed upwards from the conditioned n to m 7l1 k1 i1 etc471 and also downwards from the condition n to the conditioned o 7p1 q1 r1 etc47--,i must presuppose the former series1 to be able to consider n as given1 and n is according to reason 7the totality of conditions7 possible only by means of that series4 ,but its possibility does not rest on the following series o1 p1 q1 r1 which for this reason cannot be regarded as given1 but only as capable of being given 7dabilis74 ,i shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the conditions--from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more remote--regressive2 that which proceeds on the side of the conditioned1 from the immediate consequence to the more remote1 ,i shall call the progressive synthesis4 ,the former proceeds in antecedentia1 the latter in consequentia4 ,the cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the totality of the regressive synthesis1 and proceed in antecedentia1 not in consequentia4 ,when the latter takes place1 it is an arbitrary and not a necessary problem of pure reason2 for we require1 for the complete understanding of what is given in a phenomenon1 not the consequences which succeed1 but the grounds or principles which precede4 ,in order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with the table of categories1 we take first the two primitive quanta of all our intuitions1 time and space4 ,time is in itself a series 7and the formal condition of all series71 and hence1 in relation to a given present1 we must distinguish priori in it the antecedentia as conditions 7time past7 from the consequentia 7time future74 ,consequently1 the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned1 relates merely to all past time4 ,according to the idea of reason1 the whole past time1 as the condition of the given moment1 is necessarily cogitated as given4 ,but1 as regards space1 there exists in it no distinction between progressus and regressus2 for it is an aggregate and not a series--its parts existing together at the same time4 ,i can consider a given point of time in relation to past time only as conditioned1 because this given moment comes into existence only through the past time rather through the passing of the preceding time4 ,but as the parts of space are not subordinated1 but co-ordinated to each other1 one part cannot be the condition of the possibility of the other2 and space is not in itself1 like time1 a series4 ,but the synthesis of the manifold parts of space--7the syntheses whereby we apprehend space7--is nevertheless successive2 it takes place1 therefore1 in time1 and contains a series4 ,and as in this series of aggregated spaces 7for example1 the feet in a rood71 beginning with a given portion of space1 those which continue to be annexed form the condition of the limits of the former--the measurement of a space must also be regarded as a synthesis of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned4 ,it differs1 however1 in this respect from that of time1 that the side of the conditioned is not in itself distinguishable from the side of the condition2 and1 consequently1 regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical4 ,but1 inasmuch as one part of space is not given1 but only limited1 by and through another1 we must also consider every limited space as conditioned1 in so far as it presupposes some other space as the condition of its limitation1 and so on4 ,as regards limitation1 therefore1 our procedure in space is also a regressus1 and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a series of conditions applies to space also2 and ,i am entitled to demand the absolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as well as in time4 ,whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to be answered in the sequel4 ,secondly1 the real in space--that is1 matter--is conditioned4 ,its internal conditions are its parts1 and the parts of parts its remote conditions2 so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis1 the absolute totality of which is a demand of reason4 ,but this cannot be obtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts1 whereby the real in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter1 that is to say1 the simple4 ,consequently we find here also a series of conditions and a progress to the unconditioned4 ,thirdly1 as regards the categories of a real relation between phenomena1 the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable for the formation of a transcendental idea2 that is to say1 reason has no ground1 in regard to it1 to proceed regressively with conditions4 ,for accidents 7in so far as they inhere in a substance7 are co-ordinated with each other1 and do not constitute a series4 ,and1 in relation to substance1 they are not properly subordinated to it1 but are the mode of existence of the substance itself4 ,the conception of the substantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the transcendental reason4 ,but1 as this signifies nothing more than the conception of an object in general1 which subsists in so far as we cogitate in it merely a transcendental subject without any predicates2 and as the question here is of an unconditioned in the series of phenomena--it is clear that the substantial can form no member thereof4 ,the same holds good of substances in community1 which are mere aggregates and do not form a series4 ,for they are not subordinated to each other as conditions of the possibility of each other2 which1 however1 may be affirmed of spaces1 the limits of which are never determined in themselves1 but always by some other space4 ,it is1 therefore1 only in the category of causality that we can find a series of causes to a given effect1 and in which we ascend from the latter1 as the conditioned1 to the former as the conditions1 and thus answer the question of reason4 ,fourthly1 the conceptions of the possible1 the actual1 and the necessary do not conduct us to any series--excepting only in so far as the contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned1 and as indicating1 according to a law of the understanding1 a condition1 under which it is necessary to rise to a higher1 till in the totality of the series1 reason arrives at unconditioned necessity4 ,there are1 accordingly1 only four cosmological ideas1 corresponding with the four titles of the categories4 ,for we can select only such as necessarily furnish us with a series in the synthesis of the manifold4 #a ,the absolute ,completeness of the ,,composition of the given totality of all phenomena4 #b ,the absolute ,completeness of the ,,division of given totality in a phenomenon4 #c ,the absolute ,completeness of the ,,origination of a phenomenon4 #d ,the absolute ,completeness of the ,,dependence of the ,,existence of what is changeable in a phenomenon4 ,we must here remark1 in the first place1 that the idea of absolute totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena1 and therefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things4 ,phenomena are here1 therefore1 regarded as given1 and reason requires the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility1 in so far as these conditions constitute a series--consequently an absolutely 7that is1 in every respect7 complete synthesis1 whereby a phenomenon can be explained according to the laws of the understanding4 ,secondly1 it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks in this serially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions4 ,it wishes1 to speak in another way1 to attain to completeness in the series of premisses1 so as to render it unnecessary to presuppose others4 ,this unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series1 when we endeavour to form a representation of it in thought4 ,but this absolutely complete synthesis is itself but an idea2 for it is impossible1 at least before hand1 to know whether any such synthesis is possible in the case of phenomena4 ,when we represent all existence in thought by means of pure conceptions of the understanding1 without any conditions of sensuous intuition1 we may say with justice that for a given conditioned the whole series of conditions subordinated to each other is also given2 for the former is only given through the latter4 ,but we find in the case of phenomena a particular limitation of the mode in which conditions are given1 that is1 through the successive synthesis of the manifold of intuition1 which must be complete in the regress4 ,now whether this completeness is sensuously possible1 is a problem4 ,but the idea of it lies in the reason--be it possible or impossible to connect with the idea adequate empirical conceptions4 ,therefore1 as in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in a phenomenon 7following the guidance of the categories1 which represent it as a series of conditions to a given conditioned7 the unconditioned is necessarily contained--it being still left unascertained whether and how this totality exists2 reason sets out from the idea of totality1 although its proper and final aim is the unconditioned--of the whole series1 or of a part thereof4 ,this unconditioned may be cogitated--either as existing only in the entire series1 all the members of which therefore would be without exception conditioned and only the totality absolutely unconditioned--and in this case the regressus is called infinite2 or the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series1 to which the other members are subordinated1 but which ,is not itself submitted to any other condition4#dh ,in the former case the series is a parte priori unlimited 7without beginning71 that is1 infinite1 and nevertheless completely given4 ,but the regress in it is never completed1 and can only be called potentially infinite4 ,in the second case there exists a first in the series4 ,this first is called1 in relation to past time1 the beginning of the world2 in relation to space1 the limit of the world2 in relation to the parts of a given limited whole1 the simple2 in relation to causes1 absolute spontaneity 7liberty72 and in relation to the existence of changeable things1 absolute physical necessity4 #dh ,the absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given conditioned is always unconditioned2 because beyond it there exist no other conditions1 on which it might depend4 ,but the absolute totality of such a series is only an idea1 or rather a problematical conception1 the possibility of which must be investigated--particularly in relation to the mode in which the unconditioned1 as the transcendental idea which is the real subject of inquiry1 may be contained therein4 ,we possess two expressions1 world and nature1 which are generally interchanged4 ,the first denotes the mathematical total of all phenomena and the totality of their synthesis--in its progress by means of composition1 as well as by division4 ,and the world is termed nature1#di when it is regarded as a dynamical whole--when our attention is not directed to the aggregation in space and time1 for the purpose of cogitating it as a quantity1 but to the unity in the existence of phenomena4 ,in this case the condition of that which happens is called a cause2 the unconditioned causality of the cause in a phenomenon is termed liberty2 the conditioned cause is called in a more limited sense a natural cause4 ,the conditioned in existence is termed contingent1 and the unconditioned necessary4 ,the unconditioned necessity of phenomena may be called natural necessity4 #di ,nature1 understood adjective 7formaliter71 signifies the complex of the determinations of a thing1 connected according to an internal principle of causality4 ,on the other hand1 we understand by nature1 substantive 7materialiter71 the sum total of phenomena1 in so far as they1 by virtue of an internal principle of causality1 are connected with each other throughout4 ,in the former sense we speak of the nature of liquid matter1 of fire1 etc41 and employ the word only adjective2 while1 if speaking of the objects of nature1 we have in our minds the idea of a subsisting whole4 ,the ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing ,i have called cosmological ideas2 partly because by the term world is understood the entire content of all phenomena1 and our ideas are directed solely to the unconditioned among phenomena2 partly also1 because world1 in the transcendental sense1 signifies the absolute totality of the content of existing things1 and we are directing our attention only to the completeness of the synthesis--although1 properly1 only in regression4 ,in regard to the fact that these ideas are all transcendent1 and1 although they do not transcend phenomena as regards their mode1 but are concerned solely with the world of sense 7and not with noumena71 nevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree far above all possible experience--it still seems to me that we can1 with perfect propriety1 designate them cosmical conceptions4 ,as regards the distinction between the mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned which is the aim of the regression of the synthesis1 ,i should call the two former1 in a more limited signification1 cosmical conceptions1 the remaining two transcendent physical conceptions4 ,this distinction does not at present seem to be of particular importance1 but we shall afterwards find it to be of some value4 ,section ,,ii4 ,antithetic of ,pure ,reason ,thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical propositions4 ,by antithetic ,i do not understand dogmatical assertions of the opposite1 but the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical cognitions 7thesis cum antithesis71 in none of which we can discover any decided superiority4 ,antithetic is not1 therefore1 occupied with one-sided statements1 but is engaged in considering the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes4 ,transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure reason1 its causes and result4 ,if we employ our reason not merely in the application of the principles of the understanding to objects of experience1 but venture with it beyond these boundaries1 there arise certain sophistical propositions or theorems4 ,these assertions have the following peculiarities3 ,they can find neither confirmation nor confutation in experience2 and each is in itself not only self-consistent1 but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason--only that1 unluckily1 there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition4 ,the questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this dialectic of pure reason1 are therefore3 #ast4 ,in what propositions is pure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy8 #bnd4 ,what are the causes of this antinomy8 #crd4 ,whether and in what way can reason free itself from this self-contradiction8 ,a dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must1 according to what has been said1 be distinguishable from all sophistical propositions1 by the fact that it is not an answer to an arbitrary question1 which may be raised at the mere pleasure of any person1 but to one which human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress4 ,in the second place1 a dialectical proposition1 with its opposite1 does not carry the appearance of a merely artificial illusion1 which disappears as soon as it is investigated1 but a natural and unavoidable illusion1 which1 even when we are no longer deceived by it1 continues to mock us and1 although rendered harmless1 can never be completely removed4 ,this dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of understanding in empirical conceptions1 but to the unity of reason in pure ideas4 ,the conditions of this doctrine are--inasmuch as it must1 as a synthesis according to rules1 be conformable to the understanding1 and at the same time as the absolute unity of the synthesis1 to the reason--that1 if it is adequate to the unity of reason1 it is too great for the understanding1 if according with the understanding1 it is too small for the reason4 ,hence arises a mutual opposition1 which cannot be avoided1 do what we will4 ,these sophistical assertions of dialectic open1 as it were1 a battle-field1 where that side obtains the victory which has been permitted to make the attack1 and he is compelled to yield who has been unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive4 ,and hence1 champions of ability1 whether on the right or on the wrong side1 are certain to carry away the crown of victory1 if they only take care to have the right to make the last attack1 and are not obliged to sustain another onset from their opponent4 ,we can easily believe that this arena has been often trampled by the feet of combatants1 that many victories have been obtained on both sides1 but that the last victory1 decisive of the affair between the contending parties1 was won by him who fought for the right1 only if his adversary was forbidden to continue the tourney4 ,as impartial umpires1 we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong side1 for the true or for the false1 and allow the combat to be first decided4 ,perhaps1 after they have wearied more than injured each other1 they will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good friends4 ,this method of watching1 or rather of originating1 a conflict of assertions1 not for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of either side1 but to discover whether the object of the struggle is not a mere illusion1 which each strives in vain to reach1 but which would be no gain even when reached--this procedure1 ,i say1 may be termed the sceptical method4 ,it is thoroughly distinct from scepticism--the principle of a technical and scientific ignorance1 which undermines the foundations of all knowledge1 in order1 if possible1 to destroy our belief and confidence therein4 ,for the sceptical method aims at certainty1 by endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind1 conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides1 the point of misunderstanding2 just as wise legislators derive1 from the embarrassment of judges in lawsuits1 information in regard to the defective and ill-defined parts of their statutes4 ,the antinomy which reveals itself in the application of laws1 is for our limited wisdom the best criterion of legislation4 ,for the attention of reason1 which in abstract speculation does not easily become conscious of its errors1 is thus roused to the momenta in the determination of its principles4 ,but this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to transcendental philosophy1 and can perhaps be dispensed with in every other field of investigation4 ,in mathematics its use would be absurd2 because in it no false assertions can long remain hidden1 inasmuch as its demonstrations must always proceed under the guidance of pure intuition1 and by means of an always evident synthesis4 ,in experimental philosophy1 doubt and delay may be very useful2 but no misunderstanding is possible1 which cannot be easily removed2 and in experience means of solving the difficulty and putting an end to the dissension must at last be found1 whether sooner or later4 ,moral philosophy can always exhibit its principles1 with their practical consequences1 in concreto--at least in possible experiences1 and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of abstraction4 ,but transcendental propositions1 which lay claim to insight beyond the region of possible experience1 cannot1 on the one hand1 exhibit their abstract synthesis in any priori intuition1 nor1 on the other1 expose a lurking error by the help of experience4 ,transcendental reason1 therefore1 presents us with no other criterion than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions1 and for this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between them4 ,and this we now proceed to arrange4#ej #ej ,the antinomies stand in the order of the four transcendental ideas above detailed4 ,,first ,,conflict ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,ideas4 ,,thesis4 ,the world has a beginning in time1 and is also limited in regard to space4 ,,proof4 ,granted that the world has no beginning in time2 up to every given moment of time1 an eternity must have elapsed1 and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in the world4 ,now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis4 ,it follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and that1 consequently1 a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence4 ,and this was the first thing to be proved4 ,as regards the second1 let us take the opposite for granted4 ,in this case1 the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent things4 ,now we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity1 which is not given within certain limits of an intuition1#ea in any other way than by means of the synthesis of its parts1 and the total of such a quantity only by means of a completed synthesis1 or the repeated addition of unity to itself4 ,accordingly1 to cogitate the world1 which fills all spaces1 as a whole1 the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed1 that is to say1 an infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of all co-existing things2 which is impossible4 ,for this reason an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given whole1 consequently1 not as a contemporaneously given whole4 ,the world is consequently1 as regards extension in space1 not infinite1 but enclosed in limits4 ,and this was the second thing to be proved4 #ea ,we may consider an undetermined quantity as a whole1 when it is enclosed within limits1 although we cannot construct or ascertain its totality by measurement1 that is1 by the successive synthesis of its parts4 ,for its limits of themselves determine its completeness as a whole4 ,,antithesis4 ,the world has no beginning1 and no limits in space1 but is1 in relation both to time and space1 infinite4 ,,proof4 ,for let it be granted that it has a beginning4 ,a beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not exist4 ,on the above supposition1 it follows that there must have been a time in which the world did not exist1 that is1 a void time4 ,but in a void time the origination of a thing is impossible2 because no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being1 in preference to that of non-being 7whether the supposed thing originate of itself1 or by means of some other cause74 ,consequently1 many series of things may have a beginning in the world1 but the world itself cannot have a beginning1 and is1 therefore1 in relation to past time1 infinite4 ,as regards the second statement1 let us first take the opposite for granted--that the world is finite and limited in space2 it follows that it must exist in a void space1 which is not limited4 ,we should therefore meet not only with a relation of things in space1 but also a relation of things to space4 ,now1 as the world is an absolute whole1 out of and beyond which no object of intuition1 and consequently no correlate to which can be discovered1 this relation of the world to a void space is merely a relation to no object4 ,but such a relation1 and consequently the limitation of the world by void space1 is nothing4 ,consequently1 the world1 as regards space1 is not limited1 that is1 it is infinite in regard to extension4#eb #eb ,space is merely the form of external intuition 7formal intuition71 and not a real object which can be externally perceived4 ,space1 prior to all things which determine it 7fill or limit it71 or1 rather1 which present an empirical intuition conformable to it1 is1 under the title of absolute space1 nothing but the mere possibility of external phenomena1 in so far as they either exist in themselves1 or can annex themselves to given intuitions4 ,empirical intuition is therefore not a composition of phenomena and space 7of perception and empty intuition74 ,the one is not the correlate of the other in a synthesis1 but they are vitally connected in the same empirical intuition1 as matter and form4 ,if we wish to set one of these two apart from the other--space from phenomena--there arise all sorts of empty determinations of external intuition1 which are very far from being possible perceptions4 ,for example1 motion or rest of the world in an infinite empty space1 or a determination of the mutual relation of both1 cannot possibly be perceived1 and is therefore merely the predicate of a notional entity4 ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,first ,,antinomy4 ,,on ,,the ,,thesis4 ,in bringing forward these conflicting arguments1 ,i have not been on the search for sophisms1 for the purpose of availing myself of special pleading1 which takes advantage of the carelessness of the opposite party1 appeals to a misunderstood statute1 and erects its unrighteous claims upon an unfair interpretation4 ,both proofs originate fairly from the nature of the case1 and the advantage presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists of both parties has been completely set aside4 ,the thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated1 by the introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given quantity4 ,a quantity is infinite1 if a greater than itself cannot possibly exist4 ,the quantity is measured by the number of given units--which are taken as a standard--contained in it4 ,now no number can be the greatest1 because one or more units can always be added4 ,it follows that an infinite given quantity1 consequently an infinite world 7both as regards time and extension7 is impossible4 ,it is1 therefore1 limited in both respects4 ,in this manner ,i might have conducted my proof2 but the conception given in it does not agree with the true conception of an infinite whole4 ,in this there is no representation of its quantity1 it is not said how large it is2 consequently its conception is not the conception of a maximum4 ,we cogitate in it merely its relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit1 in relation to which it is greater than any number4 ,now1 just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller1 the infinite will be greater or smaller2 but the infinity1 which consists merely in the relation to this given unit1 must remain always the same1 although the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized4 ,the true 7transcendental7 conception of infinity is3 that the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be completed4#ec ,hence it follows1 without possibility of mistake1 that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given 7the present7 moment cannot have elapsed1 and that the world must therefore have a beginning4 #ec ,the quantum in this sense contains a congeries of given units1 which is greater than any number--and this is the mathematical conception of the infinite4 ,in regard to the second part of the thesis1 the difficulty as to an infinite and yet elapsed series disappears2 for the manifold of a world infinite in extension is contemporaneously given4 ,but1 in order to cogitate the total of this manifold1 as we cannot have the aid of limits constituting by themselves this total in intuition1 we are obliged to give some account of our conception1 which in this case cannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts1 but must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a successive synthesis of the parts4 ,but as this synthesis must constitute a series that cannot be completed1 it is impossible for us to cogitate prior to it1 and consequently not by means of it1 a totality4 ,for the conception of totality itself is in the present case the representation of a completed synthesis of the parts2 and this completion1 and consequently its conception1 is impossible4 ,,on ,,the ,,antithesis4 ,the proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and the cosmical content is based upon the consideration that1 in the opposite case1 a void time and a void space must constitute the limits of the world4 ,now ,i am not unaware1 that there are some ways of escaping this conclusion4 ,it may1 for example1 be alleged1 that a limit to the world1 as regards both space and time1 is quite possible1 without at the same time holding the existence of an absolute time before the beginning of the world1 or an absolute space extending beyond the actual world--which is impossible4 ,i am quite well satisfied with the latter part of this opinion of the philosophers of the ,leibnitzian school4 ,space is merely the form of external intuition1 but not a real object which can itself be externally intuited2 it is not a correlate of phenomena1 it is the form of phenomena itself4 ,space1 therefore1 cannot be regarded as absolutely and in itself something determinative of the existence of things1 because it is not itself an object1 but only the form of possible objects4 ,consequently1 things1 as phenomena1 determine space2 that is to say1 they render it possible that1 of all the possible predicates of space 7size and relation71 certain may belong to reality4 ,but we cannot affirm the converse1 that space1 as something self-subsistent1 can determine real things in regard to size or shape1 for it is in itself not a real thing4 ,space 7filled or void7#ed may therefore be limited by phenomena1 but phenomena cannot be limited by an empty space without them4 ,this is true of time also4 ,all this being granted1 it is nevertheless indisputable1 that we must assume these two nonentities1 void space without and void time before the world1 if we assume the existence of cosmical limits1 relatively to space or time4 #ed ,it is evident that what is meant here is1 that empty space1 in so far as it is limited by phenomena--space1 that is1 within the world--does not at least contradict transcendental principles1 and may therefore1 as regards them1 be admitted1 although its possibility cannot on that account be affirmed4 ,for1 as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to evade the consequence--that1 if the world is limited as to space and time1 the infinite void must determine the existence of actual things in regard to their dimensions--it arises solely from the fact that instead of a sensuous world1 an intelligible world--of which nothing is known--is cogitated2 instead of a real beginning 7an existence1 which is preceded by a period in which nothing exists71 an existence which presupposes no other condition than that of time2 and1 instead of limits of extension1 boundaries of the universe4 ,but the question relates to the mundus phaenomenon1 and its quantity2 and in this case we cannot make abstraction of the conditions of sensibility1 without doing away with the essential reality of this world itself4 ,the world of sense1 if it is limited1 must necessarily lie in the infinite void4 ,if this1 and with it space as the priori condition of the possibility of phenomena1 is left out of view1 the whole world of sense disappears4 ,in our problem is this alone considered as given4 ,the mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the general conception of a world1 in which abstraction has been made of all conditions of intuition1 and in relation to which no synthetical proposition--either affirmative or negative--is possible4 ,,second ,,conflict ,,of ,,transcendental ,,ideas4 ,,thesis4 ,every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts2 and there exists nothing that is not either itself simple1 or composed of simple parts4 ,,proof4 ,for1 grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts2 in this case1 if all combination or composition were annihilated in thought1 no composite part1 and 7as1 by the supposition1 there do not exist simple parts7 no simple part would exist4 ,consequently1 no substance2 consequently1 nothing would exist4 ,either1 then1 it is impossible to annihilate composition in thought2 or1 after such annihilation1 there must remain something that subsists without composition1 that is1 something that is simple4 ,but in the former case the composite could not itself consist of substances1 because with substances composition is merely a contingent relation1 apart from which they must still exist as self-subsistent beings4 ,now1 as this case contradicts the supposition1 the second must contain the truth--that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple parts4 ,it follows1 as an immediate inference1 that the things in the world are all1 without exception1 simple beings--that composition is merely an external condition pertaining to them--and that1 although we never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of composition1 reason must cogitate these as the primary subjects of all composition1 and consequently1 as prior thereto--and as simple substances4 ,,antithesis4 ,no composite thing in the world consists of simple parts2 and there does not exist in the world any simple substance4 ,,proof4 ,let it be supposed that a composite thing 7as substance7 consists of simple parts4 ,inasmuch as all external relation1 consequently all composition of substances1 is possible only in space2 the space1 occupied by that which is composite1 must consist of the same number of parts as is contained in the composite4 ,but space does not consist of simple parts1 but of spaces4 ,therefore1 every part of the composite must occupy a space4 ,but the absolutely primary parts of what is composite are simple4 ,it follows that what is simple occupies a space4 ,now1 as everything real that occupies a space1 contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other1 and is consequently composite--and a real composite1 not of accidents 7for these cannot exist external to each other apart from substance71 but of substances--it follows that the simple must be a substantial composite1 which is self-contradictory4 ,the second proposition of the antithesis--that there exists in the world nothing that is simple--is here equivalent to the following3 ,the existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any experience or perception either external or internal2 and the absolutely simple is a mere idea1 the objective reality of which cannot be demonstrated in any possible experience2 it is consequently1 in the exposition of phenomena1 without application and object4 ,for1 let us take for granted that an object may be found in experience for this transcendental idea2 the empirical intuition of such an object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold with its parts external to each other1 and connected into unity4 ,now1 as we cannot reason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold to the impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object1 and as the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the establishment and proof of absolute simplicity2 it follows that this simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever4 ,as1 therefore1 an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any experience1 and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total of all possible experiences3 nothing simple exists in the world4 ,this second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim than the first4 ,the first merely banishes the simple from the intuition of the composite2 while the second drives it entirely out of nature4 ,hence we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception of a given object of external intuition 7of the composite71 but we were obliged to prove it from the relation of a given object to a possible experience in general4 ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,second ,,antinomy4 ,,thesis4 ,when ,i speak of a whole1 which necessarily consists of simple parts1 ,i understand thereby only a substantial whole1 as the true composite2 that is to say1 ,i understand that contingent unity of the manifold which is given as perfectly isolated 7at least in thought71 placed in reciprocal connection1 and thus constituted a unity4 ,space ought not to be called a compositum but a totum1 for its parts are possible in the whole1 and not the whole by means of the parts4 ,it might perhaps be called a compositum ideale1 but not a compositum reale4 ,but this is of no importance4 ,as space is not a composite of substances 7and not even of real accidents71 if ,i abstract all composition therein--nothing1 not even a point1 remains2 for a point is possible only as the limit of a space--consequently of a composite4 ,space and time1 therefore1 do not consist of simple parts4 ,that which belongs only to the condition or state of a substance1 even although it possesses a quantity 7motion or change1 for example71 likewise does not consist of simple parts4 ,that is to say1 a certain degree of change does not originate from the addition of many simple changes4 ,our inference of the simple from the composite is valid only of self-subsisting things4 ,but the accidents of a state are not self-subsistent4 ,the proof1 then1 for the necessity of the simple1 as the component part of all that is substantial and composite1 may prove a failure1 and the whole case of this thesis be lost1 if we carry the proposition too far1 and wish to make it valid of everything that is composite without distinction--as indeed has really now and then happened4 ,besides1 ,i am here speaking only of the simple1 in so far as it is necessarily given in the composite--the latter being capable of solution into the former as its component parts4 ,the proper signification of the word monas 7as employed by ,leibnitz7 ought to relate to the simple1 given immediately as simple substance 7for example1 in consciousness71 and not as an element of the composite4 ,as an element1 the term atomus would be more appropriate4 ,and as ,i wish to prove the existence of simple substances1 only in relation to1 and as the elements of1 the composite1 ,i might term the antithesis of the second ,antinomy1 transcendental ,atomistic4 ,but as this word has long been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal phenomena 7moleculae71 and thus presupposes a basis of empirical conceptions1 ,i prefer calling it the dialectical principle of ,monadology4 ,,antithesis4 ,against the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter whose ground of proof is purely mathematical1 objections have been alleged by the ,monadists4 ,these objections lay themselves open1 at first sight1 to suspicion1 from the fact that they do not recognize the clearest mathematical proofs as propositions relating to the constitution of space1 in so far as it is really the formal condition of the possibility of all matter1 but regard them merely as inferences from abstract but arbitrary conceptions1 which cannot have any application to real things4 ,just as if it were possible to imagine another mode of intuition than that given in the primitive intuition of space2 and just as if its priori determinations did not apply to everything1 the existence of which is possible1 from the fact alone of its filling space4 ,if we listen to them1 we shall find ourselves required to cogitate1 in addition to the mathematical point1 which is simple--not1 however1 a part1 but a mere limit of space--physical points1 which are indeed likewise simple1 but possess the peculiar property1 as parts of space1 of filling it merely by their aggregation4 ,i shall not repeat here the common and clear refutations of this absurdity1 which are to be found everywhere in numbers3 every one knows that it is impossible to undermine the evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions2 ,i shall only remark that1 if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain an advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices1 it is because it forgets that the discussion relates solely to ,phenomena and their conditions4 ,it is not sufficient to find the conception of the simple for the pure conception of the composite1 but we must discover for the intuition of the composite 7matter71 the intuition of the simple4 ,now this1 according to the laws of sensibility1 and consequently in the case of objects of sense1 is utterly impossible4 ,in the case of a whole composed of substances1 which is cogitated solely by the pure understanding1 it may be necessary to be in possession of the simple before composition is possible4 ,but this does not hold good of the ,totum substantiale phaenomenon1 which1 as an empirical intuition in space1 possesses the necessary property of containing no simple part1 for the very reason that no part of space is simple4 ,meanwhile1 the ,monadists have been subtle enough to escape from this difficulty1 by presupposing intuition and the dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility of space1 instead of regarding space as the condition of the possibility of the objects of external intuition1 that is1 of bodies4 ,now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena1 and1 as such1 they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all external phenomena4 ,the evasion is therefore in vain2 as1 indeed1 we have sufficiently shown in our sthetic4 ,if bodies were things in themselves1 the proof of the ,monadists would be unexceptionable4 ,the second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having opposed to it a dogmatical proposition1 which1 among all such sophistical statements1 is the only one that undertakes to prove in the case of an object of experience1 that which is properly a transcendental idea--the absolute simplicity of substance4 ,the proposition is that the object of the internal sense1 the thinking ,ego1 is an absolute simple substance4 ,without at present entering upon this subject--as it has been considered at length in a former chapter--,i shall merely remark that1 if something is cogitated merely as an object1 without the addition of any synthetical determination of its intuition--as happens in the case of the bare representation1 ,i--it is certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a representation4 ,as1 moreover1 the predicates whereby ,i cogitate this object are merely intuitions of the internal sense1 there cannot be discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose parts are external to each other1 and1 consequently1 nothing to prove the existence of real composition4 ,consciousness1 therefore1 is so constituted that1 inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the same time its own object1 it cannot divide itself--although it can divide its inhering determinations4 ,for every object in relation to itself is absolute unity4 ,nevertheless1 if the subject is regarded externally1 as an object of intuition1 it must1 in its character of phenomenon1 possess the property of composition4 ,and it must always be regarded in this manner1 if we wish to know whether there is or is not contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other4 ,,third ,,conflict ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,ideas4 ,,thesis4 ,causality according to the laws of nature1 is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world4 ,a causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena4 ,,proof4 ,let it be supposed1 that there is no other kind of causality than that according to the laws of nature4 ,consequently1 everything that happens presupposes a previous condition1 which it follows with absolute certainty1 in conformity with a rule4 ,but this previous condition must itself be something that has happened 7that has arisen in time1 as it did not exist before71 for1 if it has always been in existence1 its consequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time1 but would likewise have always existed4 ,the causality1 therefore1 of a cause1 whereby something happens1 is itself a thing that has happened4 ,now this again presupposes1 in conformity with the law of nature1 a previous condition and its causality1 and this another anterior to the former1 and so on4 ,if1 then1 everything happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature1 there cannot be any real first beginning of things1 but only a subaltern or comparative beginning4 ,there cannot1 therefore1 be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which originate the one from the other4 ,but the law of nature is that nothing can happen without a sufficient priori determined cause4 ,the proposition therefore--if all causality is possible only in accordance with the laws of nature--is1 when stated in this unlimited and general manner1 self-contradictory4 ,it follows that this cannot be the only kind of causality4 ,from what has been said1 it follows that a causality must be admitted1 by means of which something happens1 without its cause being determined according to necessary laws by some other cause preceding4 ,that is to say1 there must exist an absolute spontaneity of cause1 which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds according to natural laws--consequently transcendental freedom1 without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena on the side of causes is never complete4 ,,antithesis4 ,there is no such thing as freedom1 but everything in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature4 ,,proof4 ,granted1 that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense1 as a peculiar kind of causality1 operating to produce events in the world--a faculty1 that is to say1 of originating a state1 and consequently a series of consequences from that state4 ,in this case1 not only the series originated by this spontaneity1 but the determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the series1 that is to say1 the causality itself must have an absolute commencement1 such that nothing can precede to determine this action according to unvarying laws4 ,but every beginning of action presupposes in the acting cause a state of inaction2 and a dynamically primal beginning of action presupposes a state1 which has no connection--as regards causality--with the preceding state of the cause--which does not1 that is1 in any wise result from it4 ,transcendental freedom is therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect1 and such a conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be found in experience--is consequently a mere fiction of thought4 ,we have1 therefore1 nothing but nature to which we must look for connection and order in cosmical events4 ,freedom--independence of the laws of nature--is certainly a deliverance from restraint1 but it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule4 ,for it cannot be alleged that1 instead of the laws of nature1 laws of freedom may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature4 ,for1 if freedom were determined according to laws1 it would be no longer freedom1 but merely nature4 ,nature1 therefore1 and transcendental freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness4 ,the former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes1 inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby2 while it compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in conformity with law4 ,the latter1 on the contrary1 holds out to the understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes1 by conducting it to an unconditioned causality1 which professes to have the power of spontaneous origination1 but which1 in its own utter blindness1 deprives it of the guidance of rules1 by which alone a completely connected experience is possible4 ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,third ,,antinomy4 ,,on ,,the ,,thesis4 ,the transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the entire content of the psychological conception so termed1 which is for the most part empirical4 ,it merely presents us with the conception of spontaneity of action1 as the proper ground for imputing freedom to the cause of a certain class of objects4 ,it is1 however1 the true stumbling-stone to philosophy1 which meets with unconquerable difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned causality4 ,that element in the question of the freedom of the will1 which has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such perplexity1 is properly only transcendental1 and concerns the question1 whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous origination of a series of successive things or states4 ,how such a faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry2 for in the case of natural causality itself1 we are obliged to content ourselves with the priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed1 although we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing is possible through the being of another1 but must for this information look entirely to experience4 ,now we have demonstrated this necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena1 only in so far as it is required for the comprehension of an origin of the world1 all following states being regarded as a succession according to laws of nature alone4 ,but1 as there has thus been proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself originate a series in time--although we are unable to explain how it can exist--we feel ourselves authorized to admit1 even in the midst of the natural course of events1 a beginning1 as regards causality1 of different successions of phenomena1 and at the same time to attribute to all substances a faculty of free action4 ,but we ought in this case not to allow ourselves to fall into a common misunderstanding1 and to suppose that1 because a successive series in the world can only have a comparatively first beginning--another state or condition of things always preceding--an absolutely first beginning of a series in the course of nature is impossible4 ,for we are not speaking here of an absolutely first beginning in relation to time1 but as regards causality alone4 ,when1 for example1 ,i1 completely of my own free will1 and independently of the necessarily determinative influence of natural causes1 rise from my chair1 there commences with this event1 including its material consequences in infinitum1 an absolutely new series2 although1 in relation to time1 this event is merely the continuation of a preceding series4 ,for this resolution and act of mine do not form part of the succession of effects in nature1 and are not mere continuations of it2 on the contrary1 the determining causes of nature cease to operate in reference to this event1 which certainly succeeds the acts of nature1 but does not proceed from them4 ,for these reasons1 the action of a free agent must be termed1 in regard to causality1 if not in relation to time1 an absolutely primal beginning of a series of phenomena4 ,the justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act as the first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from the fact1 that all philosophers of antiquity 7with the exception of the ,epicurean school7 felt themselves obliged1 when constructing a theory of the motions of the universe1 to accept a prime mover1 that is1 a freely acting cause1 which spontaneously and prior to all other causes evolved this series of states4 ,they always felt the need of going beyond mere nature1 for the purpose of making a first beginning comprehensible4 ,,on ,,the ,,antithesis4 ,the assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality 7transcendental ,physiocracy71 in opposition to the doctrine of freedom1 would defend his view of the question somewhat in the following manner4 ,he would say1 in answer to the sophistical arguments of the opposite party3 ,if you do not accept a mathematical first1 in relation to time1 you have no need to seek a dynamical first1 in regard to causality4 ,who compelled you to imagine an absolutely primal condition of the world1 and therewith an absolute beginning of the gradually progressing successions of phenomena--and1 as some foundation for this fancy of yours1 to set bounds to unlimited nature8 ,inasmuch as the substances in the world have always existed--at least the unity of experience renders such a supposition quite necessary--there is no difficulty in believing also1 that the changes in the conditions of these substances have always existed2 and1 consequently1 that a first beginning1 mathematical or dynamical1 is by no means required4 ,the possibility of such an infinite derivation1 without any initial member from which all the others result1 is certainly quite incomprehensible4 ,but1 if you are rash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason1 you will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many fundamental properties of natural objects 7such as fundamental forces71 which you can just as little comprehend2 and even the possibility of so simple a conception as that of change must present to you insuperable difficulties4 ,for if experience did not teach you that it was real1 you never could conceive priori the possibility of this ceaseless sequence of being and non-being4 ,but if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is granted--a faculty of originating changes in the world--this faculty must at least exist out of and apart from the world2 although it is certainly a bold assumption1 that1 over and above the complete content of all possible intuitions1 there still exists an object which cannot be presented in any possible perception4 ,but1 to attribute to substances in the world itself such a faculty1 is quite inadmissible2 for1 in this case2 the connection of phenomena reciprocally determining and determined according to general laws1 which is termed nature1 and along with it the criteria of empirical truth1 which enable us to distinguish experience from mere visionary dreaming1 would almost entirely disappear4 ,in proximity with such a lawless faculty of freedom1 a system of nature is hardly cogitable2 for the laws of the latter would be continually subject to the intrusive influences of the former1 and the course of phenomena1 which would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly1 would become thereby confused and disconnected4 ,,fourth ,,conflict ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,ideas4 ,,thesis4 ,there exists either in1 or in connection with the world--either as a part of it1 or as the cause of it--an absolutely necessary being4 ,,proof4 ,the world of sense1 as the sum total of all phenomena1 contains a series of changes4 ,for1 without such a series1 the mental representation of the series of time itself1 as the condition of the possibility of the sensuous world1 could not be presented to us4#ee ,but every change stands under its condition1 which precedes it in time and renders it necessary4 ,now the existence of a given condition presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely unconditioned1 which alone is absolutely necessary4 ,it follows that something that is absolutely necessary must exist1 if change exists as its consequence4 ,but this necessary thing itself belongs to the sensuous world4 ,for suppose it to exist out of and apart from it1 the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning1 and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of sense4 ,but this is impossible4 ,for1 as the beginning of a series in time is determined only by that which precedes it in time1 the supreme condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time in which this series itself did not exist2 for a beginning supposes a time preceding1 in which the thing that begins to be was not in existence4 ,the causality of the necessary cause of changes1 and consequently the cause itself1 must for these reasons belong to time--and to phenomena1 time being possible only as the form of phenomena4 ,consequently1 it cannot be cogitated as separated from the world of sense--the sum total of all phenomena4 ,there is1 therefore1 contained in the world1 something that is absolutely necessary--whether it be the whole cosmical series itself1 or only a part of it4 #ee ,objectively1 time1 as the formal condition of the possibility of change1 precedes all changes2 but subjectively1 and in consciousness1 the representation of time1 like every other1 is given solely by occasion of perception4 ,,antithesis4 ,an absolutely necessary being does not exist1 either in the world1 or out of it--as its cause4 ,,proof4 ,grant that either the world itself is necessary1 or that there is contained in it a necessary existence4 ,two cases are possible4 ,first1 there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a beginning1 which is unconditionally necessary1 and therefore uncaused--which is at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena in time2 or1 secondly1 the series itself is without beginning1 and1 although contingent and conditioned in all its parts1 is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole--which is self-contradictory4 ,for the existence of an aggregate cannot be necessary1 if no single part of it possesses necessary existence4 ,grant1 on the other hand1 that an absolutely necessary cause exists out of and apart from the world4 ,this cause1 as the highest member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes1 must originate or begin#ef the existence of the latter and their series4 ,in this case it must also begin to act1 and its causality would therefore belong to time1 and consequently to the sum total of phenomena1 that is1 to the world4 ,it follows that the cause cannot be out of the world2 which is contradictory to the hypothesis4 ,therefore1 neither in the world1 nor out of it 7but in causal connection with it71 does there exist any absolutely necessary being4 #ef ,the word begin is taken in two senses4 ,the first is active--the cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect 7infit74 ,the second is passive--the causality in the cause itself beginning to operate 7fit74 ,i reason here from the first to the second4 ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,fourth ,,antinomy4 ,,on ,,the ,,thesis4 ,to demonstrate the existence of a necessary being1 ,i cannot be permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological argument1 which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the unconditioned in conception--the unconditioned being considered the necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series4 ,the proof1 from the mere idea of a supreme being1 belongs to another principle of reason and requires separate discussion4 ,the pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary being1 but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled1 whether this being is the world itself1 or quite distinct from it4 ,to establish the truth of the latter view1 principles are requisite1 which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena4 ,we should require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent beings--regarded merely as objects of the understanding1 and also a principle which enables us to connect these1 by means of mere conceptions1 with a necessary being4 ,but the proper place for all such arguments is a transcendent philosophy1 which has unhappily not yet been established4 ,but1 if we begin our proof cosmologically1 by laying at the foundation of it the series of phenomena1 and the regress in it according to empirical laws of causality1 we are not at liberty to break off from this mode of demonstration and to pass over to something which is not itself a member of the series4 ,the condition must be taken in exactly the same signification as the relation of the conditioned to its condition in the series has been taken1 for the series must conduct us in an unbroken regress to this supreme condition4 ,but if this relation is sensuous1 and belongs to the possible empirical employment of understanding1 the supreme condition or cause must close the regressive series according to the laws of sensibility and consequently1 must belong to the series of time4 ,it follows that this necessary existence must be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series4 ,certain philosophers have1 nevertheless1 allowed themselves the liberty of making such a saltus 7metabasis eis allo gonos74 ,from the changes in the world they have concluded their empirical contingency1 that is1 their dependence on empirically-determined causes1 and they thus admitted an ascending series of empirical conditions3 and in this they are quite right4 ,but as they could not find in this series any primal beginning or any highest member1 they passed suddenly from the empirical conception of contingency to the pure category1 which presents us with a series--not sensuous1 but intellectual--whose completeness does certainly rest upon the existence of an absolutely necessary cause4 ,nay1 more1 this intellectual series is not tied to any sensuous conditions2 and is therefore free from the condition of time1 which requires it spontaneously to begin its causality in time4 ,but such a procedure is perfectly inadmissible1 as will be made plain from what follows4 ,in the pure sense of the categories1 that is contingent the contradictory opposite of which is possible4 ,now we cannot reason from empirical contingency to intellectual4 ,the opposite of that which is changed--the opposite of its state--is actual at another time1 and is therefore possible4 ,consequently1 it is not the contradictory opposite of the former state4 ,to be that1 it is necessary that1 in the same time in which the preceding state existed1 its opposite could have existed in its place2 but such a cognition is not given us in the mere phenomenon of change4 ,a body that was in motion ,a1 comes into a state of rest non-,a4 ,now it cannot be concluded from the fact that a state opposite to the state ,a follows it1 that the contradictory opposite of ,a is possible2 and that ,a is therefore contingent4 ,to prove this1 we should require to know that the state of rest could have existed in the very same time in which the motion took place4 ,now we know nothing more than that the state of rest was actual in the time that followed the state of motion2 consequently1 that it was also possible4 ,but motion at one time1 and rest at another time1 are not contradictorily opposed to each other4 ,it follows from what has been said that the succession of opposite determinations1 that is1 change1 does not demonstrate the fact of contingency as represented in the conceptions of the pure understanding2 and that it cannot1 therefore1 conduct us to the fact of the existence of a necessary being4 ,change proves merely empirical contingency1 that is to say1 that the new state could not have existed without a cause1 which belongs to the preceding time4 ,this cause--even although it is regarded as absolutely necessary--must be presented to us in time1 and must belong to the series of phenomena4 ,,on ,,the ,,antithesis4 ,the difficulties which meet us1 in our attempt to rise through the series of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme cause1 must not originate from our inability to establish the truth of our mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a thing4 ,that is to say1 our objections not be ontological1 but must be directed against the causal connection with a series of phenomena of a condition which is itself unconditioned4 ,in one word1 they must be cosmological and relate to empirical laws4 ,we must show that the regress in the series of causes 7in the world of sense7 cannot conclude with an empirically unconditioned condition1 and that the cosmological argument from the contingency of the cosmical state--a contingency alleged to arise from change--does not justify us in accepting a first cause1 that is1 a prime originator of the cosmical series4 ,the reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast4 ,the very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the existence of a supreme being1 demonstrated in the antithesis--and with equal strictness--the non-existence of such a being4 ,we found1 first1 that a necessary being exists1 because the whole time past contains the series of all conditions1 and with it1 therefore1 the unconditioned 7the necessary72 secondly1 that there does not exist any necessary being1 for the same reason1 that the whole time past contains the series of all conditions--which are themselves1 therefore1 in the aggregate1 conditioned4 ,the cause of this seeming incongruity is as follows4 ,we attend1 in the first argument1 solely to the absolute totality of the series of conditions1 the one of which determines the other in time1 and thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned4 ,in the second1 we consider1 on the contrary1 the contingency of everything that is determined in the series of time--for every event is preceded by a time1 in which the condition itself must be determined as conditioned--and thus everything that is unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears4 ,in both1 the mode of proof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human reason1 which often falls into discord with itself1 from considering an object from two different points of view4 ,herr von ,mairan regarded the controversy between two celebrated astronomers1 which arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice of a proper standpoint1 as a phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a separate treatise on the subject4 ,the one concluded3 the moon revolves on its own axis1 because it constantly presents the same side to the earth2 the other declared that the moon does not revolve on its own axis1 for the same reason4 ,both conclusions were perfectly correct1 according to the point of view from which the motions of the moon were considered4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the ,interest of ,reason in these ,self-contradictions ,we have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the cosmological ideas4 ,no possible experience can present us with an object adequate to them in extent4 ,nay1 more1 reason itself cannot cogitate them as according with the general laws of experience4 ,and yet they are not arbitrary fictions of thought4 ,on the contrary1 reason1 in its uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis1 is necessarily conducted to them1 when it endeavours to free from all conditions and to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that which can only be determined conditionally in accordance with the laws of experience4 ,these dialectical propositions are so many attempts to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason4 ,there are neither more1 nor can there be less1 than this number1 because there are no other series of synthetical hypotheses1 limiting priori the empirical synthesis4 ,the brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion beyond the limits of experience1 have been represented above only in dry formulae1 which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions4 ,they have1 besides1 in conformity with the character of a transcendental philosophy1 been freed from every empirical element2 although the full splendour of the promises they hold out1 and the anticipations they excite1 manifests itself only when in connection with empirical cognitions4 ,in the application of them1 however1 and in the advancing enlargement of the employment of reason1 while struggling to rise from the region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas1 philosophy discovers a value and a dignity1 which1 if it could but make good its assertions1 would raise it far above all other departments of human knowledge--professing1 as it does1 to present a sure foundation for our highest hopes and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason4 ,the questions3 whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in space2 whether there exists anywhere1 or perhaps1 in my own thinking ,self1 an indivisible and indestructible unity--or whether nothing but what is divisible and transitory exists2 whether ,i am a free agent1 or1 like other beings1 am bound in the chains of nature and fate2 whether1 finally1 there is a supreme cause of the world1 or all our thought and speculation must end with nature and the order of external things--are questions for the solution of which the mathematician would willingly exchange his whole science2 for in it there is no satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of humanity4 ,nay1 it may even be said that the true value of mathematics--that pride of human reason--consists in this3 that she guides reason to the knowledge of nature--in her greater as well as in her less manifestations--in her beautiful order and regularity--guides her1 moreover1 to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving forces in the operations of nature1 far beyond the expectations of a philosophy building only on experience2 and that she thus encourages philosophy to extend the province of reason beyond all experience1 and at the same time provides it with the most excellent materials for supporting its investigations1 in so far as their nature admits1 by adequate and accordant intuitions4 ,unfortunately for speculation--but perhaps fortunately for the practical interests of humanity--reason1 in the midst of her highest anticipations1 finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and contradictory conclusions1 from which neither her honour nor her safety will permit her to draw back4 ,nor can she regard these conflicting trains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages at arms1 still less can she command peace2 for in the subject of the conflict she has a deep interest4 ,there is no other course left open to her than to reflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion in reason--whether it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding4 ,after such an inquiry1 arrogant claims would have to be given up on both sides2 but the sovereignty of reason over understanding and sense would be based upon a sure foundation4 ,we shall at present defer this radical inquiry and1 in the meantime1 consider for a little what side in the controversy we should most willingly take1 if we were obliged to become partisans at all4 ,as1 in this case1 we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion of truth1 and merely consult our own interest in reference to the question1 these considerations1 although inadequate to settle the question of right in either party1 will enable us to comprehend how those who have taken part in the struggle1 adopt the one view rather than the other--no special insight into the subject1 however1 having influenced their choice4 ,they will1 at the same time1 explain to us many other things by the way--for example1 the fiery zeal on the one side and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other2 why the one party has met with the warmest approbations1 and the other has always been repulsed by irreconcilable prejudices4 ,there is one thing1 however1 that determines the proper point of view1 from which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted and carried on with the proper completeness--and that is the comparison of the principles from which both sides1 thesis and antithesis1 proceed4 ,my readers would remark in the propositions of the antithesis a complete uniformity in the mode of thought and a perfect unity of principle4 ,its principle was that of pure empiricism1 not only in the explication of the phenomena in the world1 but also in the solution of the transcendental ideas1 even of that of the universe itself4 ,the affirmations of the thesis1 on the contrary1 were based1 in addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed in the series of phenomena1 on intellectual propositions2 and its principles were in so far not simple4 ,i shall term the thesis1 in view of its essential characteristic1 the dogmatism of pure reason4 ,on the side of ,dogmatism1 or of the thesis1 therefore1 in the determination of the cosmological ideas1 we find3 #a4 ,a practical interest1 which must be very dear to every right-thinking man4 ,that the word has a beginning--that the nature of my thinking self is simple1 and therefore indestructible--that ,i am a free agent1 and raised above the compulsion of nature and her laws--and1 finally1 that the entire order of things1 which form the world1 is dependent upon a ,supreme ,being1 from whom the whole receives unity and connection--these are so many foundation-stones of morality and religion4 ,the antithesis deprives us of all these supports--or1 at least1 seems so to deprive us4 #b4 ,a speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side4 ,for1 if we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner which the thesis directs1 we can exhibit completely priori the entire chain of conditions1 and understand the derivation of the conditioned--beginning from the unconditioned4 ,this the antithesis does not do2 and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a reception4 ,for it can give no answer to our question respecting the conditions of its synthesis--except such as must be supplemented by another question1 and so on to infinity4 ,according to it1 we must rise from a given beginning to one still higher2 every part conducts us to a still smaller one2 every event is preceded by another event which is its cause2 and the conditions of existence rest always upon other and still higher conditions1 and find neither end nor basis in some self-subsistent thing as the primal being4 #c4 ,this side has also the advantage of popularity2 and this constitutes no small part of its claim to favour4 ,the common understanding does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis--accustomed1 as it is1 rather to follow our consequences than to seek for a proper basis for cognition4 ,in the conception of an absolute first1 moreover--the possibility of which it does not inquire into--it is highly gratified to find a firmly-established point of departure for its attempts at theory2 while in the restless and continuous ascent from the conditioned to the condition1 always with one foot in the air1 it can find no satisfaction4 ,on the side of the antithesis1 or ,empiricism1 in the determination of the cosmological ideas3 #a4 ,we cannot discover any such practical interest arising from pure principles of reason as morality and religion present4 ,on the contrary1 pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and influence4 ,if there does not exist a ,supreme ,being distinct from the world--if the world is without beginning1 consequently without a ,creator--if our wills are not free1 and the soul is divisible and subject to corruption just like matter--the ideas and principles of morality lose all validity and fall with the transcendental ideas which constituted their theoretical support4 #b4 ,but empiricism1 in compensation1 holds out to reason1 in its speculative interests1 certain important advantages1 far exceeding any that the dogmatist can promise us4 ,for1 when employed by the empiricist1 understanding is always upon its proper ground of investigation--the field of possible experience1 the laws of which it can explore1 and thus extend its cognition securely and with clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction4 ,here can it and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper object--not only in itself1 but in all its relations2 or1 if it employ conceptions1 upon this ground it can always present the corresponding images in clear and unmistakable intuitions4 ,it is quite unnecessary for it to renounce the guidance of nature1 to attach itself to ideas1 the objects of which it cannot know2 because1 as mere intellectual entities1 they cannot be presented in any intuition4 ,on the contrary1 it is not even permitted to abandon its proper occupation1 under the pretence that it has been brought to a conclusion 7for it never can be71 and to pass into the region of idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions1 which it is not required to observe and explore the laws of nature1 but merely to think and to imagine--secure from being contradicted by facts1 because they have not been called as witnesses1 but passed by1 or perhaps subordinated to the so-called higher interests and considerations of pure reason4 ,hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of nature for the first--the absolutely primal state2 he will not believe that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains1 nor pass from the objects of nature1 which he can satisfactorily explain by means of observation and mathematical thought--which he can determine synthetically in intuition1 to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever present in concreto2 he will not concede the existence of a faculty in nature1 operating independently of the laws of nature--a concession which would introduce uncertainty into the procedure of the understanding1 which is guided by necessary laws to the observation of phenomena2 nor1 finally1 will he permit himself to seek a cause beyond nature1 inasmuch as we know nothing but it1 and from it alone receive an objective basis for all our conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws of things4 ,in truth1 if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a reason which mistakes its true destination1 which boasts of its insight and its knowledge1 just where all insight and knowledge cease to exist1 and regards that which is valid only in relation to a practical interest1 as an advancement of the speculative interests of the mind 7in order1 when it is convenient for itself1 to break the thread of our physical investigations1 and1 under pretence of extending our cognition1 connect them with transcendental ideas1 by means of which we really know only that we know nothing7--if1 ,i say1 the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit1 the principle advanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations1 and at the same time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of the understanding1 by the help of the only true teacher1 experience4 ,in obedience to this advice1 intellectual hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of our practical interests2 nor should we introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight4 ,for speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where than in experience2 and1 when we overstep its limits our synthesis1 which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience1 has no substratum of intuition upon which to build4 ,but if--as often happens--empiricism1 in relation to ideas1 becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its phenomenal cognition1 it falls itself into the error of intemperance--an error which is here all the more reprehensible1 as thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury4 ,and this constitutes the opposition between ,epicureanism#eg and ,platonism4 #eg ,it is1 however1 still a matter of doubt whether ,epicurus ever propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment of the understanding4 ,if1 indeed1 they were nothing more than maxims for the speculative exercise of reason1 he gives evidence therein a more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of antiquity4 ,that1 in the explanation of phenomena1 we must proceed as if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement in time2 that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience in reference to the material of which the world is posed2 that we must not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature2 and finally1 that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself--are principles for the extension of speculative philosophy1 and the discovery of the true sources of the principles of morals1 which1 however little conformed to in the present day1 are undoubtedly correct4 ,at the same time1 any one desirous of ignoring1 in mere speculation1 these dogmatical propositions1 need not for that reason be accused of denying them4 ,both ,epicurus and ,plato assert more in their systems than they know4 ,the former encourages and advances science--although to the prejudice of the practical2 the latter presents us with excellent principles for the investigation of the practical1 but1 in relation to everything regarding which we can attain to speculative cognition1 permits reason to append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena1 to the great injury of physical investigation4 #c4 ,in regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a party in this war of assertions1 it seems very extraordinary that empiricism should be utterly unpopular4 ,we should be inclined to believe that the common understanding would receive it with pleasure--promising as it does to satisfy it without passing the bounds of experience and its connected order2 while transcendental dogmatism obliges it to rise to conceptions which far surpass the intelligence and ability of the most practised thinkers4 ,but in this1 in truth1 is to be found its real motive4 ,for the common understanding thus finds itself in a situation where not even the most learned can have the advantage of it4 ,if it understands little or nothing about these transcendental conceptions1 no one can boast of understanding any more2 and although it may not express itself in so scholastically correct a manner as others1 it can busy itself with reasoning and arguments without end1 wandering among mere ideas1 about which one can always be very eloquent1 because we know nothing about them2 while1 in the observation and investigation of nature1 it would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter ignorance4 ,thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong recommendations of these principles4 ,besides1 although it is a hard thing for a philosopher to assume a principle1 of which he can give to himself no reasonable account1 and still more to employ conceptions1 the objective reality of which cannot be established1 nothing is more usual with the common understanding4 ,it wants something which will allow it to go to work with confidence4 ,the difficulty of even comprehending a supposition does not disquiet it1 because--not knowing what comprehending means--it never even thinks of the supposition it may be adopting as a principle2 and regards as known that with which it has become familiar from constant use4 ,and1 at last1 all speculative interests disappear before the practical interests which it holds dear2 and it fancies that it understands and knows what its necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe4 ,thus the empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all popularity2 and1 however prejudicial it may be to the highest practical principles1 there is no fear that it will ever pass the limits of the schools1 or acquire any favour or influence in society or with the multitude4 ,human reason is by nature architectonic4 ,that is to say1 it regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system1 and hence accepts only such principles as at least do not incapacitate a cognition to which we may have attained from being placed along with others in a general system4 ,but the propositions of the antithesis are of a character which renders the completion of an edifice of cognitions impossible4 ,according to these1 beyond one state or epoch of the world there is always to be found one more ancient2 in every part always other parts themselves divisible2 preceding every event another1 the origin of which must itself be sought still higher2 and everything in existence is conditioned1 and still not dependent on an unconditioned and primal existence4 ,as1 therefore1 the antithesis will not concede the existence of a first beginning which might be available as a foundation1 a complete edifice of cognition1 in the presence of such hypothesis1 is utterly impossible4 ,thus the architectonic interest of reason1 which requires a unity--not empirical1 but priori and rational--forms a natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy4 ,but if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations of interest1 and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason1 attending only to their content1 irrespective of the consequences which follow from them2 such a person1 on the supposition that he knew no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or other of the conflicting doctrines1 would live in a state of continual hesitation4 ,today1 he would feel convinced that the human will is free2 to-morrow1 considering the indissoluble chain of nature1 he would look on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be all-in-all4 ,but1 if he were called to action1 the play of the merely speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream1 and practical interest would dictate his choice of principles4 ,but1 as it well befits a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain periods of time to the examination of its own reason--to divest itself of all partiality1 and frankly to communicate its observations for the judgement and opinion of others2 so no one can be blamed for1 much less prevented from1 placing both parties on their trial1 with permission to end themselves1 free from intimidation1 before intimidation1 before a sworn jury of equal condition with themselves--the condition of weak and fallible men4 ,section ,,iv4 ,of the necessity imposed upon ,pure ,reason of presenting a ,solution of its ,transcendental ,problems ,to avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant boasting and self-conceit1 and at once to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him4 ,there are1 however1 sciences so constituted that every question arising within their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge already possessed1 for the answer must be received from the same sources whence the question arose4 ,in such sciences it is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance2 a solution is absolutely requisite4 ,the rule of right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible cases2 otherwise1 the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null1 for we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know4 ,on the other hand1 in our investigations of the phenomena of nature1 much must remain uncertain1 and many questions continue insoluble2 because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation4 ,now the question is3 ,whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question1 relating to an object presented to pure reason1 which is unanswerable by this reason2 and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain1 so far as our knowledge extends1 and must give it a place among those subjects1 of which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to enable us to raise a question--faculty or materials failing us1 however1 when we attempt an answer4 ,now ,i maintain that1 among all speculative cognition1 the peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question1 relating to an object presented to pure reason1 which is insoluble by this reason2 and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance--the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties--cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer4 ,for the very conception which enables us to raise the question must give us the power of answering it2 inasmuch as the object1 as in the case of right and wrong1 is not to be discovered out of the conception4 ,but1 in transcendental philosophy1 it is only the cosmological questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to the constitution of their object2 and the philosopher is not permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable obscurity4 ,these questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas4 ,for the object must be given in experience1 and the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea4 ,if the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown2 if the question1 for example1 is whether the object--the something1 the phenomenon of which 7internal--in ourselves7 is thought--that is to say1 the soul1 is in itself a simple being2 or whether there is a cause of all things1 which is absolutely necessary--in such cases we are seeking for our idea an object1 of which we may confess that it is unknown to us1 though we must not on that account assert that it is impossible4#eh ,the cosmological ideas alone posses the peculiarity that we can presuppose the object of them and the empirical synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be given2 and the question1 which arises from these ideas1 relates merely to the progress of this synthesis1 in so far as it must contain absolute totality--which1 however1 is not empirical1 as it cannot be given in any experience4 ,now1 as the question here is solely in regard to a thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in itself1 the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not be sought out of the idea1 for the question does not regard an object in itself4 ,the question in relation to a possible experience is not1 8,what can be given in an experience in concreto0 but 8what is contained in the idea1 to which the empirical synthesis must approximate40 ,the question must therefore be capable of solution from the idea alone4 ,for the idea is a creation of reason itself1 which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us to the unknown object4 #eh ,the question1 8,what is the constitution of a transcendental object80 is unanswerable--we are unable to say what it is2 but we can perceive that the question itself is nothing2 because it does not relate to any object that can be presented to us4 ,for this reason1 we must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology as answerable and as really answered2 for they relate to the transcendental subject of all internal phenomena1 which is not itself phenomenon and consequently not given as an object1 in which1 moreover1 none of the categories--and it is to them that the question is properly directed--find any conditions of its application4 ,here1 therefore1 is a case where no answer is the only proper answer4 ,for a question regarding the constitution of a something which cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate1 being completely beyond the sphere of objects and experience1 is perfectly null and void4 ,it is not so extraordinary1 as it at first sight appears1 that a science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the questions that may arise within its own sphere 7questiones domesticae71 although1 up to a certain time1 these answers may not have been discovered4 ,there are1 in addition to transcendental philosophy1 only two pure sciences of reason2 the one with a speculative1 the other with a practical content--pure mathematics and pure ethics4 ,has any one ever heard it alleged that1 from our complete and necessary ignorance of the conditions1 it is uncertain what exact relation the diameter of a circle bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbers8 ,by the former the sum cannot be given exactly1 by the latter only approximately2 and therefore we decide that the impossibility of a solution of the question is evident4 ,lambert presented us with a demonstration of this4 ,in the general principles of morals there can be nothing uncertain1 for the propositions are either utterly without meaning1 or must originate solely in our rational conceptions4 ,on the other hand1 there must be in physical science an infinite number of conjectures1 which can never become certainties2 because the phenomena of nature are not given as objects dependent on our conceptions4 ,the key to the solution of such questions cannot1 therefore1 be found in our conceptions1 or in pure thought1 but must lie without us and for that reason is in many cases not to be discovered2 and consequently a satisfactory explanation cannot be expected4 ,the questions of transcendental analytic1 which relate to the deduction of our pure cognition1 are not to be regarded as of the same kind as those mentioned above2 for we are not at present treating of the certainty of judgements in relation to the origin of our conceptions1 but only of that certainty in relation to objects4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 escape the responsibility of at least a critical solution of the questions of reason1 by complaints of the limited nature of our faculties1 and the seemingly humble confession that it is beyond the power of our reason to decide1 whether the world has existed from all eternity or had a beginning--whether it is infinitely extended1 or enclosed within certain limits--whether anything in the world is simple1 or whether everything must be capable of infinite divisibility--whether freedom can originate phenomena1 or whether everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of nature--and1 finally1 whether there exists a being that is completely unconditioned and necessary1 or whether the existence of everything is conditioned and consequently dependent on something external to itself1 and therefore in its own nature contingent4 ,for all these questions relate to an object1 which can be given nowhere else than in thought4 ,this object is the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of phenomena4 ,if the conceptions in our minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to these problems1 we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object itself remains hidden from and unknown to us4 ,for no such thing or object can be given--it is not to be found out of the idea in our minds4 ,we must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself1 which is an insoluble problem and in regard to which we obstinately assume that there exists a real object corresponding and adequate to it4 ,a clear explanation of the dialectic which lies in our conception1 will very soon enable us to come to a satisfactory decision in regard to such a question4 ,the pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to these problems may be met with this question1 which requires at least a plain answer3 8,from what source do the ideas originate1 the solution of which involves you in such difficulties8 ,are you seeking for an explanation of certain phenomena2 and do you expect these ideas to give you the principles or the rules of this explanation80 ,let it be granted1 that all nature was laid open before you2 that nothing was hid from your senses and your consciousness4 ,still1 you could not cognize in concreto the object of your ideas in any experience4 ,for what is demanded is not only this full and complete intuition1 but also a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality2 and this is not possible by means of any empirical cognition4 ,it follows that your question--your idea--is by no means necessary for the explanation of any phenomenon2 and the idea cannot have been in any sense given by the object itself4 ,for such an object can never be presented to us1 because it cannot be given by any possible experience4 ,whatever perceptions you may attain to1 you are still surrounded by conditions--in space1 or in time--and you cannot discover anything unconditioned2 nor can you decide whether this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the synthesis1 or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning4 ,a whole1 in the empirical signification of the term1 is always merely comparative4 ,the absolute whole of quantity 7the universe71 of division1 of derivation1 of the condition of existence1 with the question--whether it is to be produced by finite or infinite synthesis1 no possible experience can instruct us concerning4 ,you will not1 for example1 be able to explain the phenomena of a body in the least degree better1 whether you believe it to consist of simple1 or of composite parts2 for a simple phenomenon--and just as little an infinite series of composition--can never be presented to your perception4 ,phenomena require and admit of explanation1 only in so far as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception2 but the sum total of that which is given in phenomena1 considered as an absolute whole1 is itself a perception--and we cannot therefore seek for explanations of this whole beyond itself1 in other perceptions4 ,the explanation of this whole is the proper object of the transcendental problems of pure reason4 ,although1 therefore1 the solution of these problems is unattainable through experience1 we must not permit ourselves to say that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted4 ,for the object is in our own mind and cannot be discovered in experience2 and we have only to take care that our thoughts are consistent with each other1 and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as a representation of an object empirically given1 and therefore to be cognized according to the laws of experience4 ,a dogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory but impossible4 ,the critical solution1 which may be a perfectly certain one1 does not consider the question objectively1 but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the cognition upon which the question rests4 ,section ,v4 ,sceptical ,exposition of the ,cosmological ,problems presented in the four ,transcendental ,ideas ,we should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical answer to our questions1 if we understood beforehand that1 be the answer what it may1 it would only serve to increase our ignorance1 to throw us from one incomprehensibility into another1 from one obscurity into another still greater1 and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable contradictions4 ,if a dogmatical affirmative or negative answer is demanded1 is it at all prudent to set aside the probable grounds of a solution which lie before us and to take into consideration what advantage we shall gain1 if the answer is to favour the one side or the other8 ,if it happens that in both cases the answer is mere nonsense1 we have in this an irresistible summons to institute a critical investigation of the question1 for the purpose of discovering whether it is based on a groundless presupposition and relates to an idea1 the falsity of which would be more easily exposed in its application and consequences than in the mere representation of its content4 ,this is the great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions addressed by pure reason to itself4 ,by this method we easily rid ourselves of the confusions of dogmatism1 and establish in its place a temperate criticism1 which1 as a genuine cathartic1 will successfully remove the presumptuous notions of philosophy and their consequence--the vain pretension to universal science4 ,if1 then1 ,i could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and perceive1 before ,i entered on the discussion of the subject at all1 that1 whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of phenomena it favoured--it must either be too great or too small for every conception of the understanding--,i would be able to comprehend how the idea1 which relates to an object of experience--an experience which must be adequate to and in accordance with a possible conception of the understanding--must be completely void and without significance1 inasmuch as its object is inadequate1 consider it as we may4 ,and this is actually the case with all cosmological conceptions1 which1 for the reason above mentioned1 involve reason1 so long as it remains attached to them1 in an unavoidable antinomy4 ,for suppose3 ,first1 that the world has no beginning--in this case it is too large for our conception2 for this conception1 which consists in a successive regress1 cannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed4 ,grant that it has a beginning1 it is then too small for the conception of the understanding4 ,for1 as a beginning presupposes a time preceding1 it cannot be unconditioned2 and the law of the empirical employment of the understanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher condition of time2 and the world is1 therefore1 evidently too small for this law4 ,the same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding the extent1 in space1 of the world4 ,for1 if it is infinite and unlimited1 it must be too large for every possible empirical conception4 ,if it is finite and limited1 we have a right to ask3 8,what determines these limits80 ,void space is not a self-subsistent correlate of things1 and cannot be a final condition--and still less an empirical condition1 forming a part of a possible experience4 ,for how can we have any experience or perception of an absolute void8 ,but the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the unconditioned be an empirical conception4 ,consequently1 a finite world is too small for our conception4 ,secondly1 if every phenomenon 7matter7 in space consists of an infinite number of parts1 the regress of the division is always too great for our conception2 and if the division of space must cease with some member of the division 7the simple71 it is too small for the idea of the unconditioned4 ,for the member at which we have discontinued our division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the object4 ,thirdly1 suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance with the laws of nature2 the causality of a cause must itself be an event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause1 and consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions a parte priori4 ,operative nature is therefore too large for every conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events4 ,if we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events1 that is1 of free agency1 we are driven1 in our search for sufficient reasons1 on an unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical law of causality1 and we find that any such totality of connection in our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical conception4 ,fourthly1 if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary being--whether it be the world or something in the world1 or the cause of the world--we must place it in a time at an infinite distance from any given moment2 for1 otherwise1 it must be dependent on some other and higher existence4 ,such an existence is1 in this case1 too large for our empirical conception1 and unattainable by the continued regress of any synthesis4 ,but if we believe that everything in the world--be it condition or conditioned--is contingent2 every given existence is too small for our conception4 ,for in this case we are compelled to seek for some other existence upon which the former depends4 ,we have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis1 and consequently for every possible conception of the understanding4 ,why did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this and1 instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or of falling short of its true aim1 possible experience1 say that1 in the first case1 the empirical conception is always too small for the idea1 and in the second too great1 and thus attach the blame of these contradictions to the empirical regress8 ,the reason is this4 ,possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions2 without it a conception is merely an idea1 without truth or relation to an object4 ,hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard by which we are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea and fiction of thought1 or whether it relates to an object in the world4 ,if we say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is too large or too small1 the former is considered as existing for the sake of the latter1 and requiring to be adapted to it4 ,among the trivial subjects of discussion in the old schools of dialectics was this question3 8,if a ball cannot pass through a hole1 shall we say that the ball is too large or the hole too small80 ,in this case it is indifferent what expression we employ2 for we do not know which exists for the sake of the other4 ,on the other hand1 we cannot say3 8,the man is too long for his coat02 but3 8,the coat is too short for the man40 ,we are thus led to the well-founded suspicion that the cosmological ideas1 and all the conflicting sophistical assertions connected with them1 are based upon a false and fictitious conception of the mode in which the object of these ideas is presented to us2 and this suspicion will probably direct us how to expose the illusion that has so long led us astray from the truth4 ,section ,,vi4 ,transcendental ,idealism as the ,key to the ,solution of ,pure ,cosmological ,dialectic ,in the transcendental sthetic we proved that everything intuited in space and time1 all objects of a possible experience1 are nothing but phenomena1 that is1 mere representations2 and that these1 as presented to us--as extended bodies1 or as series of changes--have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought4 ,this doctrine ,i call ,transcendental ,idealism4#ei ,the realist in the transcendental sense regards these modifications of our sensibility1 these mere representations1 as things subsisting in themselves4 #ei ,i have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism1 to distinguish it from material idealism1 which doubts or denies the existence of external things4 ,to avoid ambiguity1 it seems advisable in many cases to employ this term instead of that mentioned in the text4 ,it would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of empirical idealism1 which1 while admitting the reality of space1 denies1 or at least doubts1 the existence of bodies extended in it1 and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion4 ,the supporters of this theory find no difficulty in admitting the reality of the phenomena of the internal sense in time2 nay1 they go the length of maintaining that this internal experience is of itself a sufficient proof of the real existence of its object as a thing in itself4 ,transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition--as intuited in space1 and all changes in time--as represented by the internal sense1 are real4 ,for1 as space is the form of that intuition which we call external1 and1 without objects in space1 no empirical representation could be given us1 we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real4 ,the case is the same with representations in time4 ,but time and space1 with all phenomena therein1 are not in themselves things4 ,they are nothing but representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind4 ,nay1 the sensuous internal intuition of the mind 7as the object of consciousness71 the determination of which is represented by the succession of different states in time1 is not the real1 proper self1 as it exists in itself--not the transcendental subject--but only a phenomenon1 which is presented to the sensibility of this1 to us1 unknown being4 ,this internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a self-subsisting thing2 for its condition is time1 and time cannot be the condition of a thing in itself4 ,but the empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt1 and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or fancy--although both have a proper and thorough connection in an experience according to empirical laws4 ,the objects of experience then are not things in themselves1 but are given only in experience1 and have no existence apart from and independently of experience4 ,that there may be inhabitants in the moon1 although no one has ever observed them1 must certainly be admitted2 but this assertion means only1 that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some future time4 ,for that which stands in connection with a perception according to the laws of the progress of experience is real4 ,they are therefore really existent1 if they stand in empirical connection with my actual or real consciousness1 although they are not in themselves real1 that is1 apart from the progress of experience4 ,there is nothing actually given--we can be conscious of nothing as real1 except a perception and the empirical progression from it to other possible perceptions4 ,for phenomena1 as mere representations1 are real only in perception2 and perception is1 in fact1 nothing but the reality of an empirical representation1 that is1 a phenomenon4 ,to call a phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either that we must meet with this phenomenon in the progress of experience1 or it means nothing at all4 ,for ,i can say only of a thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and experience4 ,but we are speaking here merely of phenomena in space and time1 both of which are determinations of sensibility1 and not of things in themselves4 ,it follows that phenomena are not things in themselves1 but are mere representations1 which if not given in us--in perception--are non-existent4 ,the faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity--a capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representations1 the relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and time--the pure forms of sensibility4 ,these representations1 in so far as they are connected and determinable in this relation 7in space and time7 according to laws of the unity of experience1 are called objects4 ,the non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely unknown to us and hence cannot be intuited as an object4 ,for such an object could not be represented either in space or in time2 and without these conditions intuition or representation is impossible4 ,we may1 at the same time1 term the non-sensuous cause of phenomena the transcendental object--but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility1 considered as a receptivity4 ,to this transcendental object we may attribute the whole connection and extent of our possible perceptions1 and say that it is given and exists in itself prior to all experience4 ,but the phenomena1 corresponding to it1 are not given as things in themselves1 but in experience alone4 ,for they are mere representations1 receiving from perceptions alone significance and relation to a real object1 under the condition that this or that perception--indicating an object--is in complete connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity of experience4 ,thus we can say3 8,the things that really existed in past time are given in the transcendental object of experience40 ,but these are to me real objects1 only in so far as ,i can represent to my own mind1 that a regressive series of possible perceptions--following the indications of history1 or the footsteps of cause and effect--in accordance with empirical laws--that1 in one word1 the course of the world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the condition of the present time4 ,this series in past time is represented as real1 not in itself1 but only in connection with a possible experience4 ,thus1 when ,i say that certain events occurred in past time1 ,i merely assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience1 from the present perception1 upwards to the conditions that determine it according to time4 ,if ,i represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time1 ,i do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all experience2 on the contrary1 such a representation is nothing more than the notion of a possible experience1 in its absolute completeness4 ,in experience alone are those objects1 which are nothing but representations1 given4 ,but1 when ,i say they existed prior to my experience1 this means only that ,i must begin with the perception present to me and follow the track indicated until ,i discover them in some part or region of experience4 ,the cause of the empirical condition of this progression--and consequently at what member therein ,i must stop1 and at what point in the regress ,i am to find this member--is transcendental1 and hence necessarily incognizable4 ,but with this we have not to do2 our concern is only with the law of progression in experience1 in which objects1 that is1 phenomena1 are given4 ,it is a matter of indifference1 whether ,i say1 8,i may in the progress of experience discover stars1 at a hundred times greater distance than the most distant of those now visible10 or1 8,stars at this distance may be met in space1 although no one has1 or ever will discover them40 ,for1 if they are given as things in themselves1 without any relation to possible experience1 they are for me non-existent1 consequently1 are not objects1 for they are not contained in the regressive series of experience4 ,but1 if these phenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the cosmological idea of an absolute whole1 and when we are discussing a question that oversteps the limits of possible experience1 the proper distinction of the different theories of the reality of sensuous objects is of great importance1 in order to avoid the illusion which must necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of our empirical conceptions4 ,section ,,vii4 ,critical ,solution of the ,cosmological ,problem ,the antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dialectical argument3 8,if that which is conditioned is given1 the whole series of its conditions is also given2 but sensuous objects are given as conditioned2 consequently4440 ,this syllogism1 the major of which seems so natural and evident1 introduces as many cosmological ideas as there are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of phenomena1 in so far as these conditions constitute a series4 ,these ideas require absolute totality in the series1 and thus place reason in inextricable embarrassment4 ,before proceeding to expose the fallacy in this dialectical argument1 it will be necessary to have a correct understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it4 ,in the first place1 the following proposition is evident1 and indubitably certain3 8,if the conditioned is given1 a regress in the series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required40 ,for the very conception of a conditioned is a conception of something related to a condition1 and1 if this condition is itself conditioned1 to another condition--and so on through all the members of the series4 ,this proposition is1 therefore1 analytical and has nothing to fear from transcendental criticism4 ,it is a logical postulate of reason3 to pursue1 as far as possible1 the connection of a conception with its conditions4 ,if1 in the second place1 both the conditioned and the condition are things in themselves1 and if the former is given1 not only is the regress to the latter requisite1 but the latter is really given with the former4 ,now1 as this is true of all the members of the series1 the entire series of conditions1 and with them the unconditioned1 is at the same time given in the very fact of the conditioned1 the existence of which is possible only in and through that series1 being given4 ,in this case1 the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition1 is a synthesis of the understanding merely1 which represents things as they are1 without regarding whether and how we can cognize them4 ,but if ,i have to do with phenomena1 which1 in their character of mere representations1 are not given1 if ,i do not attain to a cognition of them 7in other words1 to themselves1 for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions71 ,i am not entitled to say3 8,if the conditioned is given1 all its conditions 7as phenomena7 are also given40 ,i cannot1 therefore1 from the fact of a conditioned being given1 infer the absolute totality of the series of its conditions4 ,for phenomena are nothing but an empirical synthesis in apprehension or perception1 and are therefore given only in it4 ,now1 in speaking of phenomena it does not follow that1 if the conditioned is given1 the synthesis which constitutes its empirical condition is also thereby given and presupposed2 such a synthesis can be established only by an actual regress in the series of conditions4 ,but we are entitled to say in this case that a regress to the conditions of a conditioned1 in other words1 that a continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined2 that1 if the conditions are not given1 they are at least required2 and that we are certain to discover the conditions in this regress4 ,we can now see that the major1 in the above cosmological syllogism1 takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification which it has in the pure category1 while the minor speaks of it in the empirical signification which it has in the category as applied to phenomena4 ,there is1 therefore1 a dialectical fallacy in the syllogism--a sophisma figurae dictionis4 ,but this fallacy is not a consciously devised one1 but a perfectly natural illusion of the common reason of man4 ,for1 when a thing is given as conditioned1 we presuppose in the major its conditions and their series1 unperceived1 as it were1 and unseen2 because this is nothing more than the logical requirement of complete and satisfactory premisses for a given conclusion4 ,in this case1 time is altogether left out in the connection of the conditioned with the condition2 they are supposed to be given in themselves1 and contemporaneously4 ,it is1 moreover1 just as natural to regard phenomena 7in the minor7 as things in themselves and as objects presented to the pure understanding1 as in the major1 in which complete abstraction was made of all conditions of intuition4 ,but it is under these conditions alone that objects are given4 ,now we overlooked a remarkable distinction between the conceptions4 ,the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition1 and the complete series of the latter 7in the major7 are not limited by time1 and do not contain the conception of succession4 ,on the contrary1 the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in the phenomenal world--subsumed in the minor--are necessarily successive and given in time alone4 ,it follows that ,i cannot presuppose in the minor1 as ,i did in the major1 the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented2 for in the major all the members of the series are given as things in themselves--without any limitations or conditions of time1 while in the minor they are possible only in and through a successive regress1 which cannot exist1 except it be actually carried into execution in the world of phenomena4 ,after this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly employed in maintaining cosmological assertions1 both parties may now be justly dismissed1 as advancing claims without grounds or title4 ,but the process has not been ended by convincing them that one or both were in the wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without valid grounds of proof4 ,nothing seems to be clearer than that1 if one maintains3 8,the world has a beginning10 and another3 8,the world has no beginning10 one of the two must be right4 ,but it is likewise clear that1 if the evidence on both sides is equal1 it is impossible to discover on what side the truth lies2 and the controversy continues1 although the parties have been recommended to peace before the tribunal of reason4 ,there remains1 then1 no other means of settling the question than to convince the parties1 who refute each other with such conclusiveness and ability1 that they are disputing about nothing1 and that a transcendental illusion has been mocking them with visions of reality where there is none4 ,the mode of adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided upon its own merits1 we shall now proceed to lay before our readers4 ,zeno of ,elea1 a subtle dialectician1 was severely reprimanded by ,plato as a sophist1 who1 merely from the base motive of exhibiting his skill in discussion1 maintained and subverted the same proposition by arguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the other4 ,he maintained1 for example1 that ,god 7who was probably nothing more1 in his view1 than the world7 is neither finite nor infinite1 neither in motion nor in rest1 neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing4 ,it seemed to those philosophers who criticized his mode of discussion that his purpose was to deny completely both of two self-contradictory propositions--which is absurd4 ,but ,i cannot believe that there is any justice in this accusation4 ,the first of these propositions ,i shall presently consider in a more detailed manner4 ,with regard to the others1 if by the word of ,god he understood merely the ,universe1 his meaning must have been--that it cannot be permanently present in one place--that is1 at rest--nor be capable of changing its place--that is1 of moving--because all places are in the universe1 and the universe itself is1 therefore1 in no place4 ,again1 if the universe contains in itself everything that exists1 it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other thing1 because there is1 in fact1 no other thing with which it can be compared4 ,if two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent impossible1 or arbitrary condition1 both--in spite of their opposition 7which is1 however1 not properly or really a contradiction7--fall away2 because the condition1 which ensured the validity of both1 has itself disappeared4 ,if we say3 8,everybody has either a good or a bad smell10 we have omitted a third possible judgement--it has no smell at all2 and thus both conflicting statements may be false4 ,if we say3 8,it is either good-smelling or not good-smelling 7vel suaveolens vel non-suaveolens710 both judgements are contradictorily opposed2 and the contradictory opposite of the former judgement--some bodies are not good-smelling--embraces also those bodies which have no smell at all4 ,in the preceding pair of opposed judgements 7per disparata71 the contingent condition of the conception of body 7smell7 attached to both conflicting statements1 instead of having been omitted in the latter1 which is consequently not the contradictory opposite of the former4 ,if1 accordingly1 we say3 8,the world is either infinite in extension1 or it is not infinite 7non est infinitus702 and if the former proposition is false1 its contradictory opposite--the world is not infinite--must be true4 ,and thus ,i should deny the existence of an infinite1 without1 however affirming the existence of a finite world4 ,but if we construct our proposition thus3 8,the world is either infinite or finite 7non-infinite710 both statements may be false4 ,for1 in this case1 we consider the world as per se determined in regard to quantity1 and while1 in the one judgement1 we deny its infinite and consequently1 perhaps1 its independent existence2 in the other1 we append to the world1 regarded as a thing in itself1 a certain determination--that of finitude2 and the latter may be false as well as the former1 if the world is not given as a thing in itself1 and thus neither as finite nor as infinite in quantity4 ,this kind of opposition ,i may be allowed to term dialectical2 that of contradictories may be called analytical opposition4 ,thus then1 of two dialectically opposed judgements both may be false1 from the fact1 that the one is not a mere contradictory of the other1 but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full and complete contradiction4 ,when we regard the two propositions--8,the world is infinite in quantity10 and1 8,the world is finite in quantity10 as contradictory opposites1 we are assuming that the world--the complete series of phenomena--is a thing in itself4 ,for it remains as a permanent quantity1 whether ,i deny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of its phenomena4 ,but if we dismiss this assumption--this transcendental illusion--and deny that it is a thing in itself1 the contradictory opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one2 and the world1 as not existing in itself--independently of the regressive series of my representations--exists in like manner neither as a whole which is infinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself4 ,the universe exists for me only in the empirical regress of the series of phenomena and not per se4 ,if1 then1 it is always conditioned1 it is never completely or as a whole2 and it is1 therefore1 not an unconditioned whole and does not exist as such1 either with an infinite1 or with a finite quantity4 ,what we have here said of the first cosmological idea--that of the absolute totality of quantity in phenomena--applies also to the others4 ,the series of conditions is discoverable only in the regressive synthesis itself1 and not in the phenomenon considered as a thing in itself--given prior to all regress4 ,hence ,i am compelled to say3 8,the aggregate of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite nor infinite2 and these parts are given only in the regressive synthesis of decomposition--a synthesis which is never given in absolute completeness1 either as finite1 or as infinite40 ,the same is the case with the series of subordinated causes1 or of the conditioned up to the unconditioned and necessary existence1 which can never be regarded as in itself1 and in its totality1 either as finite or as infinite2 because1 as a series of subordinate representations1 it subsists only in the dynamical regress and cannot be regarded as existing previously to this regress1 or as a self-subsistent series of things4 ,thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears4 ,for the above demonstration has established the fact that it is merely the product of a dialectical and illusory opposition1 which arises from the application of the idea of absolute totality--admissible only as a condition of things in themselves--to phenomena1 which exist only in our representations1 and--when constituting a series--in a successive regress4 ,this antinomy of reason may1 however1 be really profitable to our speculative interests1 not in the way of contributing any dogmatical addition1 but as presenting to us another material support in our critical investigations4 ,for it furnishes us with an indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena1 if our minds were not completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the ,trancendental sthetic4 ,the proof would proceed in the following dilemma4 ,if the world is a whole existing in itself1 it must be either finite or infinite4 ,but it is neither finite nor infinite--as has been shown1 on the one side1 by the thesis1 on the other1 by the antithesis4 ,therefore the world--the content of all phenomena--is not a whole existing in itself4 ,it follows that phenomena are nothing1 apart from our representations4 ,and this is what we mean by transcendental ideality4 ,this remark is of some importance4 ,it enables us to see that the proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries--are not fallacious1 but grounded on the nature of reason1 and valid--under the supposition that phenomena are things in themselves4 ,the opposition of the judgements which follow makes it evident that a fallacy lay in the initial supposition1 and thus helps us to discover the true constitution of objects of sense4 ,this transcendental dialectic does not favour scepticism1 although it presents us with a triumphant demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method1 the great utility of which is apparent in the antinomy1 where the arguments of reason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force4 ,and although the result of these conflicts of reason is not what we expected--although we have obtained no positive dogmatical addition to metaphysical science--we have still reaped a great advantage in the correction of our judgements on these subjects of thought4 ,section ,,viii4 ,regulative ,principle of ,pure ,reason in relation to the ,cosmological ,ideas ,the cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in the world of sense1 considered as a thing in itself4 ,the actual regress in the series is the only means of approaching this maximum4 ,this principle of pure reason1 therefore1 may still be considered as valid--not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual1 but as a problem for the understanding1 which requires it to institute and to continue1 in conformity with the idea of totality in the mind1 the regress in the series of the conditions of a given conditioned4 ,for in the world of sense1 that is1 in space and time1 every condition which we discover in our investigation of phenomena is itself conditioned2 because sensuous objects are not things in themselves 7in which case an absolutely unconditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition71 but are merely empirical representations the conditions of which must always be found in intuition4 ,the principle of reason is therefore properly a mere rule--prescribing a regress in the series of conditions for given phenomena1 and prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned4 ,it is1 therefore1 not a principle of the possibility of experience or of the empirical cognition of sensuous objects--consequently not a principle of the understanding2 for every experience is confined within certain proper limits determined by the given intuition4 ,still less is it a constitutive principle of reason authorizing us to extend our conception of the sensuous world beyond all possible experience4 ,it is merely a principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as is possible for human faculties4 ,it forbids us to consider any empirical limits as absolute4 ,it is1 hence1 a principle of reason1 which1 as a rule1 dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical regress1 but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior to the empirical regress what is given in the object itself4 ,i have termed it for this reason a regulative principle of reason2 while the principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions1 as existing in itself and given in the object1 is a constitutive cosmological principle4 ,this distinction will at once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive principle1 and prevent us from attributing 7by a transcendental subreptio7 objective reality to an idea1 which is valid only as a rule4 ,in order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure reason1 we must notice first that it cannot tell us what the object is1 but only how the empirical regress is to be proceeded with in order to attain to the complete conception of the object4 ,if it gave us any information in respect to the former statement1 it would be a constitutive principle--a principle impossible from the nature of pure reason4 ,it will not therefore enable us to establish any such conclusions as3 8,the series of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself finite10 or1 8,it is infinite40 ,for1 in this case1 we should be cogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality1 an object which is not and cannot be given in experience2 inasmuch as we should be attributing a reality objective and independent of the empirical synthesis1 to a series of phenomena4 ,this idea of reason cannot then be regarded as valid--except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions1 according to which we must proceed from the conditioned1 through all intermediate and subordinate conditions1 up to the unconditioned2 although this goal is unattained and unattainable4 ,for the absolutely unconditioned cannot be discovered in the sphere of experience4 ,we now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can never be complete4 ,there are two terms commonly employed for this purpose4 ,these terms are regarded as expressions of different and distinguishable notions1 although the ground of the distinction has never been clearly exposed4 ,the term employed by the mathematicians is progressus in infinitum4 ,the philosophers prefer the expression progressus in indefinitum4 ,without detaining the reader with an examination of the reasons for such a distinction1 or with remarks on the right or wrong use of the terms1 ,i shall endeavour clearly to determine these conceptions1 so far as is necessary for the purpose in this ,critique4 ,we may1 with propriety1 say of a straight line1 that it may be produced to infinity4 ,in this case the distinction between a progressus in infinitum and a progressus in indefinitum is a mere piece of subtlety4 ,for1 although when we say1 8,produce a straight line10 it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum2 because the former means1 8,produce it as far as you please10 the second1 8,you must not cease to produce it02 the expression in infinitum is1 when we are speaking of the power to do it1 perfectly correct1 for we can always make it longer if we please--on to infinity4 ,and this remark holds good in all cases1 when we speak of a progressus1 that is1 an advancement from the condition to the conditioned2 this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity4 ,we may proceed from a given pair in the descending line of generation from father to son1 and cogitate a never-ending line of descendants from it4 ,for in such a case reason does not demand absolute totality in the series1 because it does not presuppose it as a condition and as given 7datum71 but merely as conditioned1 and as capable of being given 7dabile74 ,very different is the case with the problem3 8,how far the regress1 which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions1 must extend02 whether ,i can say3 8,it is a regress in infinitum10 or only 8in indefinitum02 and whether1 for example1 setting out from the human beings at present alive in the world1 ,i may ascend in the series of their ancestors1 in infinitum--or whether all that can be said is1 that so far as ,i have proceeded1 ,i have discovered no empirical ground for considering the series limited1 so that ,i am justified1 and indeed1 compelled to search for ancestors still further back1 although ,i am not obliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them4 ,my answer to this question is3 8,if the series is given in empirical intuition as a whole1 the regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds in infinitum2 but1 if only one member of the series is given1 from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality1 the regress is possible only in indefinitum40 ,for example1 the division of a portion of matter given within certain limits--of a body1 that is--proceeds in infinitum4 ,for1 as the condition of this whole is its part1 and the condition of the part a part of the part1 and so on1 and as in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivisible member of the series of conditions is not to be found2 there are no reasons or grounds in experience for stopping in the division1 but1 on the contrary1 the more remote members of the division are actually and empirically given prior to this division4 ,that is to say1 the division proceeds to infinity4 ,on the other hand1 the series of ancestors of any given human being is not given1 in its absolute totality1 in any experience1 and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member of this series to one still higher1 and does not meet with any empirical limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the series4 ,but as the members of such a series are not contained in the empirical intuition of the whole1 prior to the regress1 this regress does not proceed to infinity1 but only in indefinitum1 that is1 we are called upon to discover other and higher members1 which are themselves always conditioned4 ,in neither case--the regressus in infinitum1 nor the regressus in indefinitum1 is the series of conditions to be considered as actually infinite in the object itself4 ,this might be true of things in themselves1 but it cannot be asserted of phenomena1 which1 as conditions of each other1 are only given in the empirical regress itself4 ,hence1 the question no longer is1 8,what is the quantity of this series of conditions in itself--is it finite or infinite80 for it is nothing in itself2 but1 8,how is the empirical regress to be commenced1 and how far ought we to proceed with it80 ,and here a signal distinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent4 ,if the whole is given empirically1 it is possible to recede in the series of its internal conditions to infinity4 ,but if the whole is not given1 and can only be given by and through the empirical regress1 ,i can only say3 8,it is possible to infinity1 to proceed to still higher conditions in the series40 ,in the first case1 ,i am justified in asserting that more members are empirically given in the object than ,i attain to in the regress 7of decomposition74 ,in the second case1 ,i am justified only in saying1 that ,i can always proceed further in the regress1 because no member of the series is given as absolutely conditioned1 and thus a higher member is possible1 and an inquiry with regard to it is necessary4 ,in the one case it is necessary to find other members of the series1 in the other it is necessary to inquire for others1 inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress4 ,for1 either you do not possess a perception which absolutely limits your empirical regress1 and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete2 or1 you do possess such a limitative perception1 in which case it is not a part of your series 7for that which limits must be distinct from that which is limited by it71 and it is incumbent on you to continue your regress up to this condition1 and so on4 ,these remarks will be placed in their proper light by their application in the following section4 ,section ,,ix4 ,of the ,empirical ,use of the ,regulative ,principle of ,reason with regard to the ,cosmological ,ideas ,we have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the conceptions of reason or of understanding4 ,we have shown1 likewise1 that the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason1 resting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as things in themselves4 ,it follows that we are not required to answer the question respecting the absolute quantity of a series--whether it is in itself limited or unlimited4 ,we are only called upon to determine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress from condition to condition1 in order to discover1 in conformity with the rule of reason1 a full and correct answer to the questions proposed by reason itself4 ,this principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the extension of a possible experience--its invalidity as a principle constitutive of phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently demonstrated4 ,and thus1 too1 the antinomial conflict of reason with itself is completely put an end to2 inasmuch as we have not only presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite statements of reason1 but have shown the true meaning of the ideas which gave rise to these statements4 ,the dialectical principle of reason has1 therefore1 been changed into a doctrinal principle4 ,but in fact1 if this principle1 in the subjective signification which we have shown to be its only true sense1 may be guaranteed as a principle of the unceasing extension of the employment of our understanding1 its influence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for the priori determination of objects4 ,for such an axiom could not exert a stronger influence on the extension and rectification of our knowledge1 otherwise than by procuring for the principles of the understanding the most widely expanded employment in the field of experience4 ,i4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,composition of ,phenomena in the ,universe ,here1 as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems1 the ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit1 and consequently no experience of a condition1 which is itself absolutely unconditioned1 is discoverable4 ,and the truth of this proposition itself rests upon the consideration that such an experience must represent to us phenomena as limited by nothing or the mere void1 on which our continued regress by means of perception must abut--which is impossible4 ,now this proposition1 which declares that every condition attained in the empirical regress must itself be considered empirically conditioned1 contains the rule in terminis1 which requires me1 to whatever extent ,i may have proceeded in the ascending series1 always to look for some higher member in the series--whether this member is to become known to me through experience1 or not4 ,nothing further is necessary1 then1 for the solution of the first cosmological problem1 than to decide1 whether1 in the regress to the unconditioned quantity of the universe 7as regards space and time71 this never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in infinitum or indefinitum4 ,the general representation which we form in our minds of the series of all past states or conditions of the world1 or of all the things which at present exist in it1 is itself nothing more than a possible empirical regress1 which is cogitated--although in an undetermined manner--in the mind1 and which gives rise to the conception of a series of conditions for a given object4#fj ,now ,i have a conception of the universe1 but not an intuition--that is1 not an intuition of it as a whole4 ,thus ,i cannot infer the magnitude of the regress from the quantity or magnitude of the world1 and determine the former by means of the latter2 on the contrary1 ,i must first of all form a conception of the quantity or magnitude of the world from the magnitude of the empirical regress4 ,but of this regress ,i know nothing more than that ,i ought to proceed from every given member of the series of conditions to one still higher4 ,but the quantity of the universe is not thereby determined1 and we cannot affirm that this regress proceeds in infinitum4 ,such an affirmation would anticipate the members of the series which have not yet been reached1 and represent the number of them as beyond the grasp of any empirical synthesis2 it would consequently determine the cosmical quantity prior to the regress 7although only in a negative manner7--which is impossible4 ,for the world is not given in its totality in any intuition3 consequently1 its quantity cannot be given prior to the regress4 ,it follows that we are unable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical quantity in itself--not even that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum2 we must only endeavour to attain to a conception of the quantity of the universe1 in conformity with the rule which determines the empirical regress in it4 ,but this rule merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit to our series--how far soever we may have proceeded in it1 but always1 on the contrary1 to subordinate every phenomenon to some other as its condition1 and consequently to proceed to this higher phenomenon4 ,such a regress is1 therefore1 the regressus in indefinitum1 which1 as not determining a quantity in the object1 is clearly distinguishable from the regressus in infinitum4 #fj ,the cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the possible empirical regress1 upon which its conception is based4 ,and as this regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress1 still less a determinate finite 7absolutely limited71 it is evident that we cannot regard the world as either finite or infinite1 because the regress1 which gives us the representation of the world1 is neither finite nor infinite4 ,it follows from what we have said that we are not justified in declaring the world to be infinite in space1 or as regards past time4 ,for this conception of an infinite given quantity is empirical2 but we cannot apply the conception of an infinite quantity to the world as an object of the senses4 ,i cannot say1 8,the regress from a given perception to everything limited either in space or time1 proceeds in infinitum10 for this presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity2 neither can ,i say1 8,it is finite10 for an absolute limit is likewise impossible in experience4 ,it follows that ,i am not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience--the world of sense2 ,i must limit my declarations to the rule according to which experience or empirical knowledge is to be attained4 ,to the question1 therefore1 respecting the cosmical quantity1 the first and negative answer is3 8,the world has no beginning in time1 and no absolute limit in space40 ,for1 in the contrary case1 it would be limited by a void time on the one hand1 and by a void space on the other4 ,now1 since the world1 as a phenomenon1 cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a thing in itself2 it must be possible for us to have a perception of this limitation by a void time and a void space4 ,but such a perception--such an experience is impossible2 because it has no content4 ,consequently1 an absolute cosmical limit is empirically1 and therefore absolutely1 impossible4#fa #fa ,the reader will remark that the proof presented above is very different from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of the first antinomy4 ,in that demonstration1 it was taken for granted that the world is a thing in itself--given in its totality prior to all regress1 and a determined position in space and time was denied to it--if it was not considered as occupying all time and all space4 ,hence our conclusion differed from that given above2 for we inferred in the antithesis the actual infinity of the world4 ,from this follows the affirmative answer3 8,the regress in the series of phenomena--as a determination of the cosmical quantity1 proceeds in indefinitum40 ,this is equivalent to saying3 8,the world of sense has no absolute quantity1 but the empirical regress 7through which alone the world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions7 rests upon a rule1 which requires it to proceed from every member of the series1 as conditioned1 to one still more remote 7whether through personal experience1 or by means of history1 or the chain of cause and effect71 and not to cease at any point in this extension of the possible empirical employment of the understanding40 ,and this is the proper and only use which reason can make of its principles4 ,the above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of phenomena4 ,it does not1 for example1 forbid us1 in our ascent from an individual human being through the line of his ancestors1 to expect that we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair1 or to admit1 in the series of heavenly bodies1 a sun at the farthest possible distance from some centre4 ,all that it demands is a perpetual progress from phenomena to phenomena1 even although an actual perception is not presented by them 7as in the case of our perceptions being so weak as that we are unable to become conscious of them71 since they1 nevertheless1 belong to possible experience4 ,every beginning is in time1 and all limits to extension are in space4 ,but space and time are in the world of sense4 ,consequently phenomena in the world are conditionally limited1 but the world itself is not limited1 either conditionally or unconditionally4 ,for this reason1 and because neither the world nor the cosmical series of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given1 our conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through the regress and not prior to it--in a collective intuition4 ,but the regress itself is really nothing more than the determining of the cosmical quantity1 and cannot therefore give us any determined conception of it--still less a conception of a quantity which is1 in relation to a certain standard1 infinite4 ,the regress does not1 therefore1 proceed to infinity 7an infinity given71 but only to an indefinite extent1 for or the of presenting to us a quantity--realized only in and through the regress itself4 ,,ii4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,division of a ,whole given in ,intuition ,when ,i divide a whole which is given in intuition1 ,i proceed from a conditioned to its conditions4 ,the division of the parts of the whole 7subdivisio or decompositio7 is a regress in the series of these conditions4 ,the absolute totality of this series would be actually attained and given to the mind1 if the regress could arrive at simple parts4 ,but if all the parts in a continuous decomposition are themselves divisible1 the division1 that is to say1 the regress1 proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum2 because the conditions 7the parts7 are themselves contained in the conditioned1 and1 as the latter is given in a limited intuition1 the former are all given along with it4 ,this regress cannot1 therefore1 be called a regressus in indefinitum1 as happened in the case of the preceding cosmological idea1 the regress in which proceeded from the conditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously and along with it1 but discoverable only through the empirical regress4 ,we are not1 however1 entitled to affirm of a whole of this kind1 which is divisible in infinitum1 that it consists of an infinite number of parts4 ,for1 although all the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole1 the whole division is not contained therein4 ,the division is contained only in the progressing decomposition--in the regress itself1 which is the condition of the possibility and actuality of the series4 ,now1 as this regress is infinite1 all the members 7parts7 to which it attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate4 ,but the complete series of division is not contained therein4 ,for this series1 being infinite in succession and always incomplete1 cannot represent an infinite number of members1 and still less a composition of these members into a whole4 ,to apply this remark to space4 ,every limited part of space presented to intuition is a whole1 the parts of which are always spaces--to whatever extent subdivided4 ,every limited space is hence divisible to infinity4 ,let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed in limits1 that is1 a body4 ,the divisibility of a body rests upon the divisibility of space1 which is the condition of the possibility of the body as an extended whole4 ,a body is consequently divisible to infinity1 though it does not1 for that reason1 consist of an infinite number of parts4 ,it certainly seems that1 as a body must be cogitated as substance in space1 the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as substance4 ,for we may and ought to grant1 in the case of space1 that division or decomposition1 to any extent1 never can utterly annihilate composition 7that is to say1 the smallest part of space must still consist of spaces72 otherwise space would entirely cease to exist--which is impossible4 ,but1 the assertion on the other hand that when all composition in matter is annihilated in thought1 nothing remains1 does not seem to harmonize with the conception of substance1 which must be properly the subject of all composition and must remain1 even after the conjunction of its attributes in space--which constituted a body--is annihilated in thought4 ,but this is not the case with substance in the phenomenal world1 which is not a thing in itself cogitated by the pure category4 ,phenomenal substance is not an absolute subject2 it is merely a permanent sensuous image1 and nothing more than an intuition1 in which the unconditioned is not to be found4 ,but1 although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon1 as a mere occupation or filling of space1 it is not applicable to a whole consisting of a number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum--that is to say1 an organized body4 ,it cannot be admitted that every part in an organized whole is itself organized1 and that1 in analysing it to infinity1 we must always meet with organized parts2 although we may allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum1 may be organized4 ,for the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phenomenon is given only in and through this infinity1 that is1 an undetermined number of parts is given1 while the parts themselves are given and determined only in and through the subdivision2 in a word1 the infinity of the division necessarily presupposes that the whole is not already divided in se4 ,hence our division determines a number of parts in the whole--a number which extends just as far as the actual regress in the division2 while1 on the other hand1 the very notion of a body organized to infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided4 ,we expect1 therefore1 to find in it a determinate1 but at the same time1 infinite1 number of parts--which is self-contradictory4 ,for we should thus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be completed in any regress--which is infinite1 and at the same time complete in an organized composite4 ,infinite divisibility is applicable only to a quantum continuum1 and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility of space1 ,but in a quantum discretum the multitude of parts or units is always determined1 and hence always equal to some number4 ,to what extent a body may be organized1 experience alone can inform us2 and although1 so far as our experience of this or that body has extended1 we may not have discovered any inorganic part1 such parts must exist in possible experience4 ,but how far the transcendental division of a phenomenon must extend1 we cannot know from experience--it is a question which experience cannot answer2 it is answered only by the principle of reason which forbids us to consider the empirical regress1 in the analysis of extended body1 as ever absolutely complete4 ,concluding ,remark on the ,solution of the ,transcendental ,mathematical ,ideas--and ,introductory to the ,solution of the ,dynamical ,ideas4 ,we presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form1 and we endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contradiction on the part of reason1 and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion--namely1 by declaring both contradictory statements to be false4 ,we represented in these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as belonging to the conditioned according to relations of space and time--which is the usual supposition of the common understanding4 ,in this respect1 all dialectical representations of totality1 in the series of conditions to a given conditioned1 were perfectly homogeneous4 ,the condition was always a member of the series along with the conditioned1 and thus the homogeneity of the whole series was assured4 ,in this case the regress could never be cogitated as complete2 or1 if this was the case1 a member really conditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member1 consequently as unconditioned4 ,in such an antinomy1 therefore1 we did not consider the object1 that is1 the conditioned1 but the series of conditions belonging to the object1 and the magnitude of that series4 ,and thus arose the difficulty--a difficulty not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of the two parties1 but simply by cutting the knot--by declaring the series proposed by reason to be either too long or too short for the understanding1 which could in neither case make its conceptions adequate with the ideas4 ,but we have overlooked1 up to this point1 an essential difference existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas--two of these indicating a mathematical1 and two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena4 ,hitherto1 it was necessary to signalize this distinction2 for1 just as in our general representation of all transcendental ideas1 we considered them under phenomenal conditions1 so1 in the two mathematical ideas1 our discussion is concerned solely with an object in the world of phenomena4 ,but as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of the dynamical conceptions of the understanding1 and their adequateness with ideas1 we must not lose sight of this distinction4 ,we shall find that it opens up to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved4 ,for1 while in the first two antinomies1 both parties were dismissed1 on the ground of having advanced statements based upon false hypothesis2 in the present case the hope appears of discovering a hypothesis which may be consistent with the demands of reason1 and1 the judge completing the statement of the grounds of claim1 which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory state1 the question may be settled on its own merits1 not by dismissing the claimants1 but by a comparison of the arguments on both sides4 ,if we consider merely their extension1 and whether they are adequate with ideas1 the series of conditions may be regarded as all homogeneous4 ,but the conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these ideas1 contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous 7presupposed in every quantity--in its composition as well as in its division7 or of the heterogeneous1 which is the case in the dynamical synthesis of cause and effect1 as well as of the necessary and the contingent4 ,thus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no other than a sensuous condition is admissible--a condition which is itself a member of the series2 while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition1 which is not a member of the series1 but1 as purely intelligible1 lies out of and beyond it4 ,and thus reason is satisfied1 and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series of phenomena1 without introducing confusion into or discontinuing it1 contrary to the principles of the understanding4 ,now1 from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of phenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena1 arises a result which we should not have expected from an antinomy4 ,in former cases1 the result was that both contradictory dialectical statements were declared to be false4 ,in the present case1 we find the conditioned in the dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned1 but non-sensuous condition2 and thus satisfaction is done to the understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the other4#fb ,while1 moreover1 the dialectical arguments for unconditioned totality in mere phenomena fall to the ground1 both propositions of reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification4 ,this could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a mathematically unconditioned unity2 for no condition could be placed at the head of the series of phenomena1 except one which was itself a phenomenon and consequently a member of the series4 #fb ,for the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition which is itself empirically unconditioned4 ,but if it is possible to cogitate an intelligible condition--one which is not a member of the series of phenomena--for a conditioned phenomenon1 without breaking the series of empirical conditions1 such a condition may be admissible as empirically unconditioned1 and the empirical regress continue regular1 unceasing1 and intact4 ,,iii4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,deduction of ,cosmical ,events from their ,causes ,there are only two modes of causality cogitable--the causality of nature or of freedom4 ,the first is the conjunction of a particular state with another preceding it in the world of sense1 the former following the latter by virtue of a law4 ,now1 as the causality of phenomena is subject to conditions of time1 and the preceding state1 if it had always existed1 could not have produced an effect which would make its first appearance at a particular time1 the causality of a cause must itself be an effect--must itself have begun to be1 and therefore1 according to the principle of the understanding1 itself requires a cause4 ,we must understand1 on the contrary1 by the term freedom1 in the cosmological sense1 a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a state2 the causality of which1 therefore1 is not subordinated to another cause determining it in time4 ,freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental idea1 which1 in the first place1 contains no empirical element2 the object of which1 in the second place1 cannot be given or determined in any experience1 because it is a universal law of the very possibility of experience1 that everything which happens must have a cause1 that consequently the causality of a cause1 being itself something that has happened1 must also have a cause4 ,in this view of the case1 the whole field of experience1 how far soever it may extend1 contains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature4 ,but1 as we cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects1 reason creates the idea of a spontaneity1 which can begin to act of itself1 and without any external cause determining it to action1 according to the natural law of causality4 ,it is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom is based upon the transcendental idea1 and that the question of the possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the consideration of the truth of the latter4 ,freedom1 in the practical sense1 is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses4 ,a will is sensuous1 in so far as it is pathologically affected 7by sensuous impulses72 it is termed animal 7arbitrium brutum71 when it is pathologically necessitated4 ,the human will is certainly an arbitrium sensitivum1 not brutum1 but liberum2 because sensuousness does not necessitate its action1 a faculty existing in man of self-determination1 independently of all sensuous coercion4 ,it is plain that1 if all causality in the world of sense were natural--and natural only--every event would be determined by another according to necessary laws1 and that1 consequently1 phenomena1 in so far as they determine the will1 must necessitate every action as a natural effect from themselves2 and thus all practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental idea4 ,for the latter presupposes that although a certain thing has not happened1 it ought to have happened1 and that1 consequently1 its phenomenal cause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our will--a causality capable of producing effects independently of and even in opposition to the power of natural causes1 and capable1 consequently1 of spontaneously originating a series of events4 ,here1 too1 we find it to be the case1 as we generally found in the self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass the bounds of possible experience1 that the problem is properly not physiological1 but transcendental4 ,the question of the possibility of freedom does indeed concern psychology2 but1 as it rests upon dialectical arguments of pure reason1 its solution must engage the attention of transcendental philosophy4 ,before attempting this solution1 a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline1 it will be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the settlement of the question4 ,if phenomena were things in themselves1 and time and space forms of the existence of things1 condition and conditioned would always be members of the same series2 and thus would arise in the present case the antinomy common to all transcendental ideas--that their series is either too great or too small for the understanding4 ,the dynamical ideas1 which we are about to discuss in this and the following section1 possess the peculiarity of relating to an object1 not considered as a quantity1 but as an existence2 and thus1 in the discussion of the present question1 we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of conditions1 and consider merely the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned4 ,the question1 then1 suggests itself1 whether freedom is possible2 and1 if it is1 whether it can consist with the universality of the natural law of causality2 and1 consequently1 whether we enounce a proper disjunctive proposition when we say3 8,every effect must have its origin either in nature or in freedom10 or whether both cannot exist together in the same event in different relations4 ,the principle of an unbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal world1 in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature1 is a well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits of no exception4 ,the question1 therefore1 is3 8,whether an effect1 determined according to the laws of nature1 can at the same time be produced by a free agent1 or whether freedom and nature mutually exclude each other80 ,and here1 the common but fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure of reason4 ,for if phenomena are things in themselves1 freedom is impossible4 ,in this case1 nature is the complete and all-sufficient cause of every event2 and condition and conditioned1 cause and effect are contained in the same series1 and necessitated by the same law4 ,if1 on the contrary1 phenomena are held to be1 as they are in fact1 nothing more than mere representations1 connected with each other in accordance with empirical laws1 they must have a ground which is not phenomenal4 ,but the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or determinable by phenomena2 although its effects1 as phenomena1 must be determined by other phenomenal existences4 ,this cause and its causality exist therefore out of and apart from the series of phenomena2 while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of empirical conditions4 ,such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause1 and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary consequence--a distinction which1 stated in this perfectly general and abstract manner1 must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure4 ,the sequel will explain4 ,it is sufficient1 at present1 to remark that1 as the complete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable law of nature1 freedom is impossible--on the supposition that phenomena are absolutely real4 ,hence those philosophers who adhere to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling the ideas of nature and freedom4 ,possibility of ,freedom in ,harmony with the ,universal ,law of ,natural ,necessity4 ,that element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous1 ,i may be allowed to term intelligible4 ,if1 accordingly1 an object which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition1 but by means of which it is capable of being the cause of phenomena1 the causality of an object or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different points of view4 ,it may be considered to be intelligible1 as regards its action--the action of a thing which is a thing in itself1 and sensuous1 as regards its effects--the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world4 ,we should accordingly1 have to form both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of such a faculty or power--both1 however1 having reference to the same effect4 ,this twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible experience4 ,phenomena--not being things in themselves--must have a transcendental object as a foundation1 which determines them as mere representations2 and there seems to be no reason why we should not ascribe to this transcendental object1 in addition to the property of self-phenomenization1 a causality whose effects are to be met with in the world of phenomena1 although it is not itself a phenomenon4 ,but every effective cause must possess a character1 that is to say1 a law of its causality1 without which it would cease to be a cause4 ,in the above case1 then1 every sensuous object would possess an empirical character1 which guaranteed that its actions1 as phenomena1 stand in complete and harmonious connection1 conformably to unvarying natural laws1 with all other phenomena1 and can be deduced from these1 as conditions1 and that they do thus1 in connection with these1 constitute a series in the order of nature4 ,this sensuous object must1 in the second place1 possess an intelligible character1 which guarantees it to be the cause of those actions1 as phenomena1 although it is not itself a phenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense4 ,the former may be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon1 the latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself4 ,now this active subject would1 in its character of intelligible subject1 be subordinate to no conditions of time1 for time is only a condition of phenomena1 and not of things in themselves4 ,no action would begin or cease to be in this subject2 it would consequently be free from the law of all determination of time--the law of change1 namely1 that everything which happens must have a cause in the phenomena of a preceding state4 ,in one word1 the causality of the subject1 in so far as it is intelligible1 would not form part of the series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense4 ,again1 this intelligible character of a thing cannot be immediately cognized1 because we can perceive nothing but phenomena1 but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with the empirical character2 for we always find ourselves compelled to place1 in thought1 a transcendental object at the basis of phenomena although we can never know what this object is in itself4 ,in virtue of its empirical character1 this subject would at the same time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality1 and1 as a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world1 its effects would have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena4 ,eternal phenomena must be capable of influencing it2 and its actions1 in accordance with natural laws1 must explain to us how its empirical character1 that is1 the law of its causality1 is to be cognized in and by means of experience4 ,in a word1 all requisites for a complete and necessary determination of these actions must be presented to us by experience4 ,in virtue of its intelligible character1 on the other hand 7although we possess only a general conception of this character71 the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences1 and from all phenomenal determination4 ,moreover1 as nothing happens in this subject--for it is a noumenon1 and there does not consequently exist in it any change1 demanding the dynamical determination of time1 and for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes--this active existence must in its actions be free from and independent of natural necessity1 for this necessity exists only in the world of phenomena4 ,it would be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effects in the world of sense from itself1 although the action productive of these effects does not begin in itself4 ,we should not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves1 because they are always determined by prior empirical conditions--by virtue of the empirical character1 which is the phenomenon of the intelligible character--and are possible only as constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes4 ,and thus nature and freedom1 each in the complete and absolute signification of these terms1 can exist1 without contradiction or disagreement1 in the same action4 ,exposition of the ,cosmological ,idea of ,freedom in ,harmony with the ,universal ,law of ,natural ,necessity4 ,i have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem1 in order to enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the course which reason must adopt in the solution4 ,i shall now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of this solution1 and to consider them in their order4 ,the natural law that everything which happens must have a cause1 that the causality of this cause1 that is1 the action of the cause 7which cannot always have existed1 but must be itself an event1 for it precedes in time some effect which it has originated71 must have itself a phenomenal cause1 by which it is determined and1 and1 consequently1 all events are empirically determined in an order of nature--this law1 ,i say1 which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience1 and of a connected system of phenomena or nature is a law of the understanding1 from which no departure1 and to which no exception1 can be admitted4 ,for to except even a single phenomenon from its operation is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain4 ,thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes1 in which1 however1 absolute totality cannot be found4 ,but we need not detain ourselves with this question1 for it has already been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which reason falls1 when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series of phenomena4 ,if we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of transcendental idealism1 we shall find that neither nature nor freedom exists4 ,now the question is3 8,whether1 admitting the existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena1 it is possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedom--or1 whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible80 ,no phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series4 ,every action1 in so far as it is productive of an event1 is itself an event or occurrence1 and presupposes another preceding state1 in which its cause existed4 ,thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series1 and an absolute beginning is impossible in the sensuous world4 ,the actions of natural causes are1 accordingly1 themselves effects1 and presuppose causes preceding them in time4 ,a primal action which forms an absolute beginning1 is beyond the causal power of phenomena4 ,now1 is it absolutely necessary that1 granting that all effects are phenomena1 the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a phenomenon and belong to the empirical world8 ,is it not rather possible that1 although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected with an empirical cause1 according to the universal law of nature1 this empirical causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality--its connection with natural causes remaining nevertheless intact8 ,such a causality would be considered1 in reference to phenomena1 as the primal action of a cause1 which is in so far1 therefore1 not phenomenal1 but1 by reason of this faculty or power1 intelligible2 although it must1 at the same time1 as a link in the chain of nature1 be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world4 ,a belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary1 if we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of natural events1 that is to say1 their causes4 ,this being admitted as unexceptionably valid1 the requirements of the understanding1 which recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena1 are satisfied1 and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may proceed in their regular course1 without hindrance and without opposition4 ,but it is no stumbling-block in the way1 even assuming the idea to be a pure fiction1 to admit that there are some natural causes in the possession of a faculty which is not empirical1 but intelligible1 inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical conditions1 but purely and solely upon grounds brought forward by the understanding--this action being still1 when the cause is phenomenized1 in perfect accordance with the laws of empirical causality4 ,thus the acting subject1 as a causal phenomenon1 would continue to preserve a complete connection with nature and natural conditions2 and the phenomenon only of the subject 7with all its phenomenal causality7 would contain certain conditions1 which1 if we ascend from the empirical to the transcendental object1 must necessarily be regarded as intelligible4 ,for1 if we attend1 in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world of phenomena1 to the directions of nature alone1 we need not trouble ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental subject1 which is completely unknown to us1 stands to these phenomena and their connection in nature4 ,the intelligible ground of phenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions4 ,it has to do only with pure thought2 and1 although the effects of this thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena1 these phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete explanation1 upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with natural laws4 ,and in this case we attend solely to their empirical and omit all consideration of their intelligible character 7which is the transcendental cause of the former7 as completely unknown1 except in so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol4 ,now let us apply this to experience4 ,man is a phenomenon of the sensuous world and1 at the same time1 therefore1 a natural cause1 the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws4 ,as such1 he must possess an empirical character1 like all other natural phenomena4 ,we remark this empirical character in his actions1 which reveal the presence of certain powers and faculties4 ,if we consider inanimate or merely animal nature1 we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous manner4 ,but man1 to whom nature reveals herself only through sense1 cognizes himself not only by his senses1 but also through pure apperception2 and this in actions and internal determinations1 which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions4 ,he is thus to himself1 on the one hand1 a phenomenon1 but on the other hand1 in respect of certain faculties1 a purely intelligible object--intelligible1 because its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity4 ,these faculties are understanding and reason4 ,the latter1 especially1 is in a peculiar manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties1 for it employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects1 and by means of these determines the understanding1 which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own conceptions1 which1 like the ideas of reason1 are pure and non-empirical4 ,that reason possesses the faculty of causality1 or that at least we are compelled so to represent it1 is evident from the imperatives1 which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers4 ,the words ,i ought express a species of necessity1 and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man4 ,understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is1 or has been1 or will be4 ,it would be absurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in which it stands2 indeed1 the ought1 when we consider merely the course of nature1 has neither application nor meaning4 ,the question1 8,what ought to happen in the sphere of nature80 is just as absurd as the question1 8,what ought to be the properties of a circle80 ,all that we are entitled to ask is1 8,what takes place in nature80 or1 in the latter case1 8,what are the properties of a circle80 ,but the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action1 the ground of which is a pure conception2 while the ground of a merely natural action is1 on the contrary1 always a phenomenon4 ,this action must certainly be possible under physical conditions1 if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought2 but these physical or natural conditions do not concern the determination of the will itself1 they relate to its effects alone1 and the consequences of the effect in the world of phenomena4 ,whatever number of motives nature may present to my will1 whatever sensuous impulses--the moral ought it is beyond their power to produce4 ,they may produce a volition1 which1 so far from being necessary1 is always conditioned--a volition to which the ought enunciated by reason1 sets an aim and a standard1 gives permission or prohibition4 ,be the object what it may1 purely sensuous--as pleasure1 or presented by pure reason--as good1 reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin4 ,reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience1 but1 with perfect spontaneity1 rearranges them according to ideas1 with which it compels empirical conditions to agree4 ,it declares1 in the name of these ideas1 certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take place2 and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions4 ,for1 in the absence of this supposition1 it could not expect its ideas to produce certain effects in the world of experience4 ,now1 let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that reason does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena4 ,in this case it must--pure reason as it is--exhibit an empirical character4 ,for every cause supposes a rule1 according to which certain phenomena follow as effects from the cause1 and every rule requires uniformity in these effects2 and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause--as a faculty or power4 ,now this conception 7of a cause7 may be termed the empirical character of reason2 and this character is a permanent one1 while the effects produced appear1 in conformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly limit them1 in various forms4 ,thus the volition of every man has an empirical character1 which is nothing more than the causality of his reason1 in so far as its effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule1 according to which we are enabled to examine1 in their several kinds and degrees1 the actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these actions1 and in this way to decide upon the subjective principles of the volition4 ,now we learn what this empirical character is only from phenomenal effects1 and from the rule of these which is presented by experience2 and for this reason all the actions of man in the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character1 and the co-operative causes of nature4 ,if1 then1 we could investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind1 there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty1 and recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions4 ,so far as relates to this empirical character1 therefore1 there can be no freedom2 and it is only in the light of this character that we can consider the human will1 when we confine ourselves to simple observation and1 as is the case in anthropology1 institute a physiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions4 ,but when we consider the same actions in relation to reason--not for the purpose of explaining their origin1 that is1 in relation to speculative reason1 but to practical reason1 as the producing cause of these actions--we shall discover a rule and an order very different from those of nature and experience4 ,for the declaration of this mental faculty may be that what has and could not but take place in the course of nature1 ought not to have taken place4 ,sometimes1 too1 we discover1 or believe that we discover1 that the ideas of reason did actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man2 and that these actions have taken place because they were determined1 not by empirical causes1 but by the act of the will upon grounds of reason4 ,now1 granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena2 can an action of reason be called free1 when we know that1 sensuously1 in its empirical character1 it is completely determined and absolutely necessary8 ,but this empirical character is itself determined by the intelligible character4 ,the latter we cannot cognize2 we can only indicate it by means of phenomena1 which enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical character4#fc ,an action1 then1 in so far as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause1 does not result from it in accordance with empirical laws4 ,that is to say1 not the conditions of pure reason1 but only their effects in the internal sense1 precede the act4 ,pure reason1 as a purely intelligible faculty1 is not subject to the conditions of time4 ,the causality of reason in its intelligible character does not begin to be2 it does not make its appearance at a certain time1 for the purpose of producing an effect4 ,if this were not the case1 the causality of reason would be subservient to the natural law of phenomena1 which determines them according to time1 and as a series of causes and effects in time2 it would consequently cease to be freedom and become a part of nature4 ,we are therefore justified in saying3 8,if reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena1 it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects40 ,for the condition1 which resides in the reason1 is non-sensuous1 and therefore cannot be originated1 or begin to be4 ,and thus we find--what we could not discover in any empirical series--a condition of a successive series of events itself empirically unconditioned4 ,for1 in the present case1 the condition stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena--it is intelligible1 and it consequently cannot be subjected to any sensuous condition1 or to any time-determination by a preceding cause4 #fc ,the real morality of actions--their merit or demerit1 and even that of our own conduct1 is completely unknown to us4 ,our estimates can relate only to their empirical character4 ,how much is the result of the action of free will1 how much is to be ascribed to nature and to blameless error1 or to a happy constitution of temperament 7merito fortunae71 no one can discover1 nor1 for this reason1 determine with perfect justice4 ,but1 in another respect1 the same cause belongs also to the series of phenomena4 ,man is himself a phenomenon4 ,his will has an empirical character1 which is the empirical cause of all his actions4 ,there is no condition--determining man and his volition in conformity with this character--which does not itself form part of the series of effects in nature1 and is subject to their law--the law according to which an empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist4 ,for this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous origination1 all actions being phenomena1 and belonging to the world of experience4 ,but it cannot be said of reason1 that the state in which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state determining it4 ,for reason is not a phenomenon1 and therefore not subject to sensuous conditions2 and1 consequently1 even in relation to its causality1 the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason1 nor can the dynamical law of nature1 which determines the sequence of time according to certain rules1 be applied to it4 ,reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the human will4 ,each of these is determined in the empirical character of the man1 even before it has taken place4 ,the intelligible character1 of which the former is but the sensuous schema1 knows no before or after2 and every action1 irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands with other phenomena1 is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason1 which1 consequently1 enjoys freedom of action1 and is not dynamically determined either by internal or external preceding conditions4 ,this freedom must not be described1 in a merely negative manner1 as independence of empirical conditions1 for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena2 but it must be regarded1 positively1 as a faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events4 ,at the same time1 it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place in reason2 on the contrary1 reason1 as the unconditioned condition of all action of the will1 admits of no time-conditions1 although its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena--a beginning which is not1 however1 absolutely primal4 ,i shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example1 from its employment in the world of experience2 proved it cannot be by any amount of experience1 or by any number of facts1 for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions4 ,let us take a voluntary action--for example1 a falsehood--by means of which a man has introduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life of humanity1 which is judged according to the motives from which it originated1 and the blame of which and of the evil consequences arising from it1 is imputed to the offender4 ,we at first proceed to examine the empirical character of the offence1 and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to the sources of that character1 such as a defective education1 bad company1 a shameless and wicked disposition1 frivolity1 and want of reflection--not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed at the moment of the transgression4 ,in this the procedure is exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of causes which determine a given physical effect4 ,now1 although we believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances1 we do not the less blame the offender4 ,we do not blame him for his unhappy disposition1 nor for the circumstances which influenced him1 nay1 not even for his former course of life2 for we presuppose that all these considerations may be set aside1 that the series of preceding conditions may be regarded as having never existed1 and that the action may be considered as completely unconditioned in relation to any state preceding1 just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new series of effects4 ,our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of reason1 which requires us to regard this faculty as a cause1 which could have and ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the culprit1 independently of all empirical conditions4 ,this causality of reason we do not regard as a co-operating agency1 but as complete in itself4 ,it matters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this causality1 the offence is estimated according to its intelligible character--the offender is decidedly worthy of blame1 the moment he utters a falsehood4 ,it follows that we regard reason1 in spite of the empirical conditions of the act1 as completely free1 and therefore1 as in the present case1 culpable4 ,the above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions1 that in it no change takes place--although its phenomena1 in other words1 the mode in which it appears in its effects1 are subject to change--that in it no preceding state determines the following1 and1 consequently1 that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws4 ,reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all times2 but it does not itself exist in time1 and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist4 ,it is1 relatively to new states or conditions1 determining1 but not determinable4 ,hence we cannot ask3 8,why did not reason determine itself in a different manner80 ,the question ought to be thus stated3 8,why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain phenomena in a different manner80 ,but this is a question which admits of no answer4 ,for a different intelligible character would have exhibited a different empirical character2 and1 when we say that1 in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken1 the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood1 this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority--permissive or prohibitive--of reason4 ,now1 reason is not subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time2 and a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of phenomena to each other--for these are not things and therefore not causes in themselves--but it cannot produce any difference in the relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason4 ,thus1 then1 in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which produced them1 we arrive at an intelligible cause1 beyond which1 however1 we cannot go2 although we can recognize that it is free1 that is1 independent of all sensuous conditions1 and that1 in this way1 it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena4 ,but for what reason the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain circumstances1 it is beyond the power of our reason to decide4 ,the question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the following would be3 8,why does the transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in space80 ,but the problem1 which we were called upon to solve1 does not require us to entertain any such questions4 ,the problem was merely this--whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition in the same action4 ,to this question we have given a sufficient answer2 for we have shown that1 as the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition from those of the latter1 the law of the one does not affect the law of the other and that1 consequently1 both can exist together in independence of and without interference with each other4 ,the reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom1 as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena4 ,for1 not to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental character1 nor have been limited to the discussion of pure conceptions--all attempts at inferring from experience what cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws1 must ever be unsuccessful4 ,nay1 more1 ,i have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom2 for this too would have been a vain endeavour1 inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere priori conceptions4 ,freedom has been considered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental idea1 by means of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned1 involving itself1 however1 in an antinomy with the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of the understanding4 ,that this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion1 and that nature and freedom are at least not opposed--this was the only thing in our power to prove1 and the question which it was our task to solve4 ,,iv4 ,solution of the ,cosmological ,idea of the ,totality of the ,dependence of ,phenomenal ,existences ,in the preceding remarks1 we considered the changes in the world of sense as constituting a dynamical series1 in which each member is subordinated to another--as its cause4 ,our present purpose is to avail ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable phenomena1 that is1 to a necessary being4 ,our endeavour to reach1 not the unconditioned causality1 but the unconditioned existence1 of substance4 ,the series before us is therefore a series of conceptions1 and not of intuitions 7in which the one intuition is the condition of the other74 ,but it is evident that1 as all phenomena are subject to change and conditioned in their existence1 the series of dependent existences cannot embrace an unconditioned member1 the existence of which would be absolutely necessary4 ,it follows that1 if phenomena were things in themselves1 and--as an immediate consequence from this supposition--condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena1 the existence of a necessary being1 as the condition of the existence of sensuous phenomena1 would be perfectly impossible4 ,an important distinction1 however1 exists between the dynamical and the mathematical regress4 ,the latter is engaged solely with the combination of parts into a whole1 or with the division of a whole into its parts2 and therefore are the conditions of its series parts of the series1 and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous1 and for this reason1 as consisting1 without exception1 of phenomena4 ,if the former regress1 on the contrary1 the aim of which is not to establish the possibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts1 or of an unconditioned part of a given whole1 but to demonstrate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from its cause1 or of the contingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily1 it is not requisite that the condition should form part of an empirical series along with the conditioned4 ,in the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present dealing1 there exists a way of escape from the difficulty2 for it is not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true in different relations4 ,all sensuous phenomena may be contingent1 and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence1 and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series1 or1 in other words1 a necessary being4 ,for this necessary being1 as an intelligible condition1 would not form a member--not even the highest member--of the series2 the whole world of sense would be left in its empirically determined existence uninterfered with and uninfluenced4 ,this would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies4 ,for1 while in the consideration of freedom in the former antinomy1 the thing itself--the cause 7substantia phaenomenon7--was regarded as belonging to the series of conditions1 and only its causality to the intelligible world--we are obliged in the present case to cogitate this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense 7as an ens extramundanum72 for otherwise it would be subject to the phenomenal law of contingency and dependence4 ,in relation to the present problem1 therefore1 the regulative principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an empirically conditioned existence--that no property of the sensuous world possesses unconditioned necessity--that we are bound to expect1 and1 so far as is possible1 to seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series of conditions--and that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series1 or in regarding any existence as independent and self-subsistent2 although this should not prevent us from recognizing the possibility of the whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible1 and for this reason free from all empirical conditions4 ,but it has been far from my intention1 in these remarks1 to prove the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being1 or even to evidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the existence of all sensuous phenomena4 ,as bounds were set to reason1 to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions and losing itself in transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete presentation2 so it was my purpose1 on the other hand1 to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical understanding1 and to protest against any attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility of things1 or declaring the existence of the intelligible to be impossible1 merely on the ground that it is not available for the explanation and exposition of phenomena4 ,it has been shown1 at the same time1 that the contingency of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary1 although purely intelligible condition1 that no real contradiction exists between them and that1 consequently1 both may be true4 ,the existence of such an absolutely necessary being may be impossible2 but this can never be demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous phenomena1 nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue the series at some member of it1 or to seek for its cause in some sphere of existence beyond the world of nature4 ,reason goes its way in the empirical world1 and follows1 too1 its peculiar path in the sphere of the transcendental4 ,the sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena1 which are mere representations1 and always sensuously conditioned2 things in themselves are not1 and cannot be1 objects to us4 ,it is not to be wondered at1 therefore1 that we are not justified in leaping from some member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense1 as if empirical representations were things in themselves1 existing apart from their transcendental ground in the human mind1 and the cause of whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series4 ,this would certainly be the case with contingent things2 but it cannot be with mere representations of things1 the contingency of which is itself merely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than that which determines phenomena1 that is1 the empirical4 ,but to cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena1 as free1 moreover1 from the contingency of the latter1 conflicts neither with the unlimited nature of the empirical regress1 nor with the complete contingency of phenomena4 ,and the demonstration of this was the only thing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy4 ,for if the condition of every conditioned--as regards its existence--is sensuous1 and for this reason a part of the same series1 it must be itself conditioned1 as was shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy4 ,the embarrassments into which a reason1 which postulates the unconditioned1 necessarily falls1 must1 therefore1 continue to exist2 or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the intelligible4 ,in this way1 its necessity does not require1 nor does it even permit1 the presence of an empirical condition3 and it is1 consequently1 unconditionally necessary4 ,the empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption of a purely intelligible being2 it continues its operations on the principle of the contingency of all phenomena1 proceeding from empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions1 themselves empirical4 ,just as little does this regulative principle exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause1 when the question regards merely the pure employment of reason--in relation to ends or aims4 ,for1 in this case1 an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous phenomena1 and its existence1 necessary and independent of all sensuous conditions1 is not inconsistent with the contingency of phenomena1 or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical conditions4 ,concluding ,remarks on the ,antinomy of ,pure ,reason4 ,so long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of conditions in the world of phenomena1 and the satisfaction1 from this source1 of the requirements of reason1 so long are our ideas transcendental and cosmological4 ,but when we set the unconditioned--which is the aim of all our inquiries--in a sphere which lies out of the world of sense and possible experience1 our ideas become transcendent4 ,they are then not merely serviceable towards the completion of the exercise of reason 7which remains an idea1 never executed1 but always to be pursued72 they detach themselves completely from experience and construct for themselves objects1 the material of which has not been presented by experience1 and the objective reality of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical series1 but upon pure priori conceptions4 ,the intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may be conceded1 as a transcendental object4 ,but we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain distinct predicates relating to its internal nature1 for it has no connection with empirical conceptions2 nor are we justified in affirming the existence of any such object4 ,it is1 consequently1 a mere product of the mind alone4 ,of all the cosmological ideas1 however1 it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us to venture upon this step4 ,for the existence of phenomena1 always conditioned and never self-subsistent1 requires us to look for an object different from phenomena--an intelligible object1 with which all contingency must cease4 ,but1 as we have allowed ourselves to assume the existence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field of experience1 and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by beings which are themselves intelligences--no other course remains for us than to follow analogy and employ the same mode in forming some conception of intelligible things1 of which we have not the least knowledge1 which nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical conceptions4 ,experience made us acquainted with the contingent4 ,but we are at present engaged in the discussion of things which are not objects of experience2 and must1 therefore1 deduce our knowledge of them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself1 that is1 from pure conceptions4 ,hence the first step which we take out of the world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation of a necessary being1 and to deduce from our conceptions of it all our conceptions of intelligible things4 ,this we propose to attempt in the following chapter4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,ideal of ,pure ,reason ,section ,i4 ,of the ,ideal in ,general ,we have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind1 except under sensuous conditions2 because the conditions of objective reality do not exist in these conceptions1 which contain1 in fact1 nothing but the mere form of thought4 ,they may1 however1 when applied to phenomena1 be presented in concreto2 for it is phenomena that present to them the materials for the formation of empirical conceptions1 which are nothing more than concrete forms of the conceptions of the understanding4 ,but ideas are still further removed from objective reality than categories2 for no phenomenon can ever present them to the human mind in concreto4 ,they contain a certain perfection1 attainable by no possible empirical cognition2 and they give to reason a systematic unity1 to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate1 but can never completely attain4 ,but still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the ,ideal1 by which term ,i understand the idea1 not in concreto1 but in individuo--as an individual thing1 determinable or determined by the idea alone4 ,the idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes not only the advancement of all the powers and faculties1 which constitute our conception of human nature1 to a complete attainment of their final aims1 but also everything which is requisite for the complete determination of the idea2 for of all contradictory predicates1 only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man4 ,what ,i have termed an ideal was in ,plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind--an individual object present to its pure intuition1 the most perfect of every kind of possible beings1 and the archetype of all phenomenal existences4 ,without rising to these speculative heights1 we are bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas1 but ideals1 which possess1 not1 like those of ,plato1 creative1 but certainly practical power--as regulative principles1 and form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions4 ,moral conceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of reason1 because an empirical element--of pleasure or pain--lies at the foundation of them4 ,in relation1 however1 to the principle1 whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law1 and consequently when we attend merely to their form1 they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason4 ,virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity are ideas4 ,but the wise man of the ,stoics is an ideal1 that is to say1 a human being existing only in thought and in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom4 ,as the idea provides a rule1 so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy4 ,thus the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of action1 with which we may compare and judge ourselves1 which may help us to reform ourselves1 although the perfection it demands can never be attained by us4 ,although we cannot concede objective reality to these ideals1 they are not to be considered as chimeras2 on the contrary1 they provide reason with a standard1 which enables it to estimate1 by comparison1 the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to it4 ,but to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in the world of experience--to describe1 for instance1 the character of the perfectly wise man in a romance--is impracticable4 ,nay more1 there is something absurd in the attempt2 and the result must be little edifying1 as the natural limitations1 which are continually breaking in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea1 destroy the illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is good in the idea1 which hence appears fictitious and unreal4 ,such is the constitution of the ideal of reason1 which is always based upon determinate conceptions1 and serves as a rule and a model for limitation or of criticism4 ,very different is the nature of the ideals of the imagination4 ,of these it is impossible to present an intelligible conception2 they are a kind of monogram1 drawn according to no determinate rule1 and forming rather a vague picture--the production of many diverse experiences--than a determinate image4 ,such are the ideals which painters and physiognomists profess to have in their minds1 and which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for appreciation4 ,they may be termed1 though improperly1 sensuous ideals1 as they are declared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions4 ,they cannot1 however1 furnish rules or standards for explanation or examination4 ,in its ideals1 reason aims at complete and perfect determination according to priori rules2 and hence it cogitates an object1 which must be completely determinable in conformity with principles1 although all empirical conditions are absent1 and the conception of the object is on this account transcendent4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,transcendental ,ideal 7,prototypon ,trancendentale7 ,every conception is1 in relation to that which is not contained in it1 undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability4 ,this principle is that1 of every two contradictorily opposed predicates1 only one can belong to a conception4 ,it is a purely logical principle1 itself based upon the principle of contradiction2 inasmuch as it makes complete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the logical form of the cognition4 ,but again1 everything1 as regards its possibility1 is also subject to the principle of complete determination1 according to which one of all the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it4 ,this principle is not based merely upon that of contradiction2 for1 in addition to the relation between two contradictory predicates1 it regards everything as standing in a relation to the sum of possibilities1 as the sum total of all predicates of things1 and1 while presupposing this sum as an priori condition1 presents to the mind everything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence from the relation it bears to1 and the share it possesses in1 the aforesaid sum of possibilities4#fd ,the principle of complete determination relates the content and not to the logical form4 ,it is the principle of the synthesis of all the predicates which are required to constitute the complete conception of a thing1 and not a mere principle analytical representation1 which enounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a conception4 ,it contains1 moreover1 a transcendental presupposition--that1 namely1 of the material for all possibility1 which must contain priori the data for this or that particular possibility4 #fd ,thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to a common correlate--the sum-total of possibility1 which1 if discovered to exist in the idea of one individual thing1 would establish the affinity of all possible things1 from the identity of the ground of their complete determination4 ,the determinability of every conception is subordinate to the universality 7,allgemeinheit1 universalitas7 of the principle of excluded middle2 the determination of a thing to the totality 7,allheit1 universitas7 of all possible predicates4 ,the proposition1 everything which exists is completely determined1 means not only that one of every pair of given contradictory attributes1 but that one of all possible attributes1 is always predicable of the thing2 in it the predicates are not merely compared logically with each other1 but the thing itself is transcendentally compared with the sum-total of all possible predicates4 ,the proposition is equivalent to saying3 8,to attain to a complete knowledge of a thing1 it is necessary to possess a knowledge of everything that is possible1 and to determine it thereby in a positive or negative manner40 ,the conception of complete determination is consequently a conception which cannot be presented in its totality in concreto1 and is therefore based upon an idea1 which has its seat in the reason--the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect exercise4 ,now1 although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility1 in so far as it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything1 is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may constitute this sum-total1 and we cogitate in it merely the sum-total of all possible predicates--we nevertheless find1 upon closer examination1 that this idea1 as a primitive conception of the mind1 excludes a large number of predicates--those deduced and those irreconcilable with others1 and that it is evolved as a conception completely determined priori4 ,thus it becomes the conception of an individual object1 which is completely determined by and through the mere idea1 and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason4 ,when we consider all possible predicates1 not merely logically1 but transcendentally1 that is to say1 with reference to the content which may be cogitated as existing in them priori1 we shall find that some indicate a being1 others merely a non-being4 ,the logical negation expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a conception1 but only to the relation of one conception to another in a judgement1 and is consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the content of a conception4 ,the expression not mortal does not indicate that a non-being is cogitated in the object2 it does not concern the content at all4 ,a transcendental negation1 on the contrary1 indicates non-being in itself1 and is opposed to transcendental affirmation1 the conception of which of itself expresses a being4 ,hence this affirmation indicates a reality1 because in and through it objects are considered to be something--to be things2 while the opposite negation1 on the other hand1 indicates a mere want1 or privation1 or absence1 and1 where such negations alone are attached to a representation1 the non-existence of anything corresponding to the representation4 ,now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined1 without cogitating at the same time the opposite affirmation4 ,the man born blind has not the least notion of darkness1 because he has none of light2 the vagabond knows nothing of poverty1 because he has never known what it is to be in comfort2#fe the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance1 because he has no conception of knowledge4 ,all conceptions of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced conceptions2 and realities contain the data1 and1 so to speak1 the material or transcendental content of the possibility and complete determination of all things4 #fe ,the investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught us much that is wonderful2 but the most important lesson we have received from them is the discovery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation to the universe--an ignorance the magnitude of which reason1 without the information thus derived1 could never have conceived4 ,this discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the determination of the aims of human reason4 ,if1 therefore1 a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of the complete determination of things--a substratum which is to form the fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied1 this substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of reality 7omnitudo realitatis74 ,in this view1 negations are nothing but limitations--a term which could not1 with propriety1 be applied to them1 if the unlimited 7the all7 did not form the true basis of our conception4 ,this conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing in itself1 regarded as completely determined2 and the conception of an ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being1 inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory predicates1 which indicates and belongs to being4 ,it is1 therefore1 a transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete determination of everything that exists1 and is the highest material condition of its possibility--a condition on which must rest the cogitation of all objects with respect to their content4 ,nay1 more1 this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is capable2 because in this case alone a general conception of a thing is completely determined by and through itself1 and cognized as the representation of an individuum4 ,the logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive syllogism1 the major of which contains the logical division of the extent of a general conception1 the minor limits this extent to a certain part1 while the conclusion determines the conception by this part4 ,the general conception of a reality cannot be divided priori1 because1 without the aid of experience1 we cannot know any determinate kinds of reality1 standing under the former as the genus4 ,the transcendental principle of the complete determination of all things is therefore merely the representation of the sum-total of all reality2 it is not a conception which is the genus of all predicates under itself1 but one which comprehends them all within itself4 ,the complete determination of a thing is consequently based upon the limitation of this total of reality1 so much being predicated of the thing1 while all that remains over is excluded--a procedure which is in exact agreement with that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the objects in the conclusion by one of the members of the division4 ,it follows that reason1 in laying the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its determination of all possible things1 takes a course in exact analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms--a proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all transcendental ideas1 according to which they are produced in complete parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by the human mind4 ,it is self-evident that reason1 in cogitating the necessary complete determination of things1 does not presuppose the existence of a being corresponding to its ideal1 but merely the idea of the ideal--for the purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete determination1 ,the ideal is therefore the prototype of all things1 which1 as defective copies 7ectypa71 receive from it the material of their possibility1 and approximate to it more or less1 though it is impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection4 ,the possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived--except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality1 which must be considered to be primitive and original4 ,for all negations--and they are the only predicates by means of which all other things can be distinguished from the ens realissimum--are mere limitations of a greater and a higher--nay1 the highest reality2 and they consequently presuppose this reality1 and are1 as regards their content1 derived from it4 ,the manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest reality1 which is their common substratum2 just as all figures are possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space4 ,the object of the ideal of reason--an object existing only in reason itself--is also termed the primal being 7ens originarium72 as having no existence superior to him1 the supreme being 7ens summum72 and as being the condition of all other beings1 which rank under it1 the being of all beings 7ens entium74 ,but none of these terms indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to other things1 but merely that of an idea to conceptions2 and all our investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard to the existence of this being4 ,a primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an existence which is derivative1 for the latter presuppose the former1 and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it4 ,it follows that the ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple4 ,the deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal being cannot1 strictly speaking1 be considered as a limitation1 or as a kind of division of its reality2 for this would be regarding the primal being as a mere aggregate--which has been shown to be impossible1 although it was so represented in our first rough sketch4 ,the highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total of the possibility of all things1 and the manifold nature of things be based1 not upon the limitation of the primal being itself1 but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it4 ,and thus all our powers of sense1 as well as all phenomenal reality1 may be with propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects1 while they could not have formed parts of the idea1 considered as an aggregate4 ,pursuing this track1 and hypostatizing this idea1 we shall find ourselves authorized to determine our notion of the ,supreme ,being by means of the mere conception of a highest reality1 as one1 simple1 all-sufficient1 eternal1 and so on--in one word1 to determine it in its unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate4 ,the conception of such a being is the conception of ,god in its transcendental sense1 and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a transcendental theology4 ,but1 by such an employment of the transcendental idea1 we should be over stepping the limits of its validity and purpose4 ,for reason placed it1 as the conception of all reality1 at the basis of the complete determination of things1 without requiring that this conception be regarded as the conception of an objective existence4 ,such an existence would be purely fictitious1 and the hypostatizing of the content of the idea into an ideal1 as an individual being1 is a step perfectly unauthorized4 ,nay1 more1 we are not even called upon to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis1 as none of the deductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in general--for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary4 ,it is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of reason2 we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic1 that we may have it in our power to give a rational explanation of this illusion1 as a phenomenon of the human mind4 ,for the ideal1 of which we are at present speaking1 is based1 not upon an arbitrary1 but upon a natural1 idea4 ,the question hence arises3 ,how happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced from a single possibility1 that1 to wit1 of the highest reality1 and presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being8 ,the answer is ready2 it is at once presented by the procedure of transcendental analytic4 ,the possibility of sensuous objects is a relation of these objects to thought1 in which something 7the empirical form7 may be cogitated priori2 while that which constitutes the matter--the reality of the phenomenon 7that element which corresponds to sensation7--must be given from without1 as otherwise it could not even be cogitated by1 nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind4 ,now1 a sensuous object is completely determined1 when it has been compared with all phenomenal predicates1 and represented by means of these either positively or negatively4 ,but1 as that which constitutes the thing itself--the real in a phenomenon1 must be given1 and that1 in which the real of all phenomena is given1 is experience1 one1 sole1 and all-embracing--the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole1 and it is upon the limitation of this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects1 their distinction from each other and their complete determination1 are based4 ,now1 no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects1 and these can be given only in connection with a possible experience2 it follows that a thing is not an object to us1 unless it presupposes the whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the condition of its possibility4 ,now1 a natural illusion leads us to consider this principle1 which is valid only of sensuous objects1 as valid with regard to things in general4 ,and thus we are induced to hold the empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things1 as phenomena1 by leaving out this limitative condition1 to be a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general4 ,we proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of all reality1 by changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole--a dialectical illusion1 and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience as an individual thing1 containing in itself all empirical reality4 ,this individual thing or being is then1 by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption1 substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of the possibility of all things1 the real conditions of whose complete determination it presents4#ff #ff ,this ideal of the ens realissimum--although merely a mental representation--is first objectivized1 that is1 has an objective existence attributed to it1 then hypostatized1 and finally1 by the natural progress of reason to the completion of unity1 personified1 as we shall show presently4 ,for the regulative unity of experience is not based upon phenomena themselves1 but upon the connection of the variety of phenomena by the understanding in a consciousness1 and thus the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability of all things1 seem to reside in a supreme understanding1 and1 consequently1 in a conscious intelligence4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of the ,arguments employed by ,speculative ,reason in ,proof of the ,existence of a ,supreme ,being ,notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels1 to form some presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for the complete determination of its conceptions1 the idealistic and factitious nature of such a presupposition is too evident to allow reason for a moment to persuade itself into a belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its own thought4 ,but there are other considerations which compel reason to seek out some resting place in the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned1 which is not given as an actual existence from the mere conception of it1 although it alone can give completeness to the series of conditions4 ,and this is the natural course of every human reason1 even of the most uneducated1 although the path at first entered it does not always continue to follow4 ,it does not begin from conceptions1 but from common experience1 and requires a basis in actual existence4 ,but this basis is insecure1 unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary4 ,and this foundation is itself unworthy of trust1 if it leave under and above it empty space1 if it do not fill all1 and leave no room for a why or a wherefore1 if it be not1 in one word1 infinite in its reality4 ,if we admit the existence of some one thing1 whatever it may be1 we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily4 ,for what is contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing1 which is its cause2 and from this we must go on to conclude the existence of a cause which is not contingent1 and which consequently exists necessarily and unconditionally4 ,such is the argument by which reason justifies its advances towards a primal being4 ,now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be admitted1 without inconsistency1 to be worthy of the attribute of absolute necessity1 not for the purpose of inferring priori1 from the conception of such a being1 its objective existence 7for if reason allowed itself to take this course1 it would not require a basis in given and actual existence1 but merely the support of pure conceptions71 but for the purpose of discovering1 among all our conceptions of possible things1 that conception which possesses no element inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity4 ,for that there must be some absolutely necessary existence1 it regards as a truth already established4 ,now1 if it can remove every existence incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute necessity1 excepting one--this must be the absolutely necessary being1 whether its necessity is comprehensible by us1 that is1 deducible from the conception of it alone1 or not4 ,now that1 the conception of which contains a therefore to every wherefore1 which is not defective in any respect whatever1 which is all-sufficient as a condition1 seems to be the being of which we can justly predicate absolute necessity--for this reason1 that1 possessing the conditions of all that is possible1 it does not and cannot itself require any condition4 ,and thus it satisfies1 in one respect at least1 the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity4 ,in this view1 it is superior to all other conceptions1 which1 as deficient and incomplete1 do not possess the characteristic of independence of all higher conditions4 ,it is true that we cannot infer from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the condition of all other things--must possess only a conditioned existence2 but as little can we assert the contrary1 for this supposed being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its existence4 ,the conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary being4 ,the former conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter2 but we have no choice1 we are obliged to adhere to it1 for we find that we cannot do without the existence of a necessary being2 and even although we admit it1 we find it out of our power to discover in the whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims to such a distinction4 ,the following is1 therefore1 the natural course of human reason4 ,it begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being4 ,in this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence4 ,it then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all conditions1 and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things--in other words1 in that which contains all reality4 ,but the unlimited all is an absolute unity1 and is conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme2 and thus reason concludes that the ,supreme ,being1 as the primal basis of all things1 possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary4 ,this conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory1 if we admit the existence of a necessary being1 and consider that there exists a necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions4 ,in such a case1 we cannot make a better choice1 or rather we have no choice at all1 but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality1 as the highest source of the possibility of things4 ,but if there exists no motive for coming to a definite conclusion1 and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fully weighed both sides--in other words1 when we are merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know about the question1 and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know--the above conclusion does not appear to be so great advantage1 but1 on the contrary1 seems defective in the grounds upon which it is supported4 ,for1 admitting the truth of all that has been said1 that1 namely1 the inference from a given existence 7my own1 for example7 to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable2 that1 in the second place1 we must consider a being which contains all reality1 and consequently all the conditions of other things1 to be absolutely unconditioned2 and admitting too1 that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed1 without inconsistency1 absolute necessity--it does not follow from all this that the conception of a limited being1 in which the supreme reality does not reside1 is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity4 ,for1 although ,i do not discover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being--an element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions--,i am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned2 just as ,i am not entitled to affirm1 in a hypothetical syllogism1 that where a certain condition does not exist 7in the present1 completeness1 as far as pure conceptions are concerned71 the conditioned does not exist either4 ,on the contrary1 we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally necessary1 although we are unable to infer this from the general conception which we have of them4 ,thus conducted1 this argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary being1 and must be in every respect without result4 ,this argument continues1 however1 to possess a weight and an authority1 which1 in spite of its objective insufficiency1 it has never been divested of4 ,for1 granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us1 which1 as based on the ideas of reason1 deserve to be respected and submitted to1 although they are incapable of a real or practical application to our nature1 or1 in other words1 would be responsibilities without motives1 except upon the supposition of a ,supreme ,being to give effect and influence to the practical laws3 in such a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions1 which1 although objectively insufficient1 do1 according to the standard of reason1 preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter4 ,the equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical addition2 indeed1 ,reason would be compelled to condemn herself1 if she refused to comply with the demands of the judgement1 no superior to which we know--however defective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be4 ,this argument1 although in fact transcendental1 inasmuch as it rests upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent1 is so simple and natural1 that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value4 ,we see things around us change1 arise1 and pass away2 they1 or their condition1 must therefore have a cause4 ,the same demand must again be made of the cause itself--as a datum of experience4 ,now it is natural that we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme causality1 in that being1 which contains the conditions of all possible effects1 and the conception of which is so simple as that of an all-embracing reality4 ,this highest cause1 then1 we regard as absolutely necessary1 because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it1 and do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it4 ,thus1 among all nations1 through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of monotheism1 to which these idolaters have been led1 not from reflection and profound thought1 but by the study and natural progress of the common understanding4 ,there are only three modes of proving the existence of a ,deity1 on the grounds of speculative reason4 ,all the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense1 and rise1 according to the laws of causality1 from it to the highest cause existing apart from the world--or from a purely indeterminate experience1 that is1 some empirical existence--or abstraction is made of all experience1 and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from priori conceptions alone4 ,the first is the physico-theological argument1 the second the cosmological1 the third the ontological4 ,more there are not1 and more there cannot be4 ,i shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path--the empirical--as on the other--the transcendental1 and that it stretches its wings in vain1 to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative thought4 ,as regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments1 it will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason1 in the progress of its development1 attains to them--the order in which they are placed above4 ,for it will be made manifest to the reader that1 although experience presents the occasion and the starting-point1 it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and is the goal of all its struggles4 ,i shall therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental argument1 and afterwards inquire what additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition of the empirical element4 ,section ,,iv4 ,of the ,impossibility of an ,ontological ,proof of the ,existence of ,god ,it is evident from what has been said that the conception of an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea1 the objective reality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason4 ,on the contrary1 this idea serves merely to indicate a certain unattainable perfection1 and rather limits the operations than1 by the presentation of new objects1 extends the sphere of the understanding4 ,but a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold2 for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable1 while the conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of such a being4 ,philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being1 and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving whether--and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable1 not to mention that its existence is actually demonstrable4 ,a verbal definition of the conception is certainly easy enough3 it is something the non-existence of which is impossible4 ,but does this definition throw any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to cogitate the non-existence of a thing--conditions which we wish to ascertain1 that we may discover whether we think anything in the conception of such a being or not8 ,for the mere fact that ,i throw away1 by means of the word unconditioned1 all the conditions which the understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as necessary1 is very far from making clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally necessary ,i think of something1 or really of nothing at all4 ,nay1 more1 this chance-conception1 now become so current1 many have endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite needless4 ,every geometrical proposition--a triangle has three angles--it was said1 is absolutely necessary2 and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the conception of such a being meant4 ,all the examples adduced have been drawn1 without exception1 from judgements1 and not from things4 ,but the unconditioned necessity of a judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing4 ,on the contrary1 the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned necessity of a thing1 or of the predicate in a judgement4 ,the proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three angles necessarily exist1 but1 upon condition that a triangle exists1 three angles must necessarily exist--in it4 ,and thus this logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions4 ,having formed an priori conception of a thing1 the content of which was made to embrace existence1 we believed ourselves safe in concluding that1 because existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception 7that is1 under the condition of my positing this thing as given71 the existence of the thing is also posited necessarily1 and that it is therefore absolutely necessary--merely because its existence has been cogitated in the conception4 ,if1 in an identical judgement1 ,i annihilate the predicate in thought1 and retain the subject1 a contradiction is the result2 and hence ,i say1 the former belongs necessarily to the latter4 ,but if ,i suppress both subject and predicate in thought1 no contradiction arises2 for there is nothing at all1 and therefore no means of forming a contradiction4 ,to suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles1 is self-contradictory2 but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible4 ,and so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being4 ,annihilate its existence in thought1 and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates2 how then can there be any room for contradiction8 ,externally1 there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction1 for a thing cannot be necessary externally2 nor internally1 for1 by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself1 its internal properties are also annihilated4 ,god is omnipotent--that is a necessary judgement4 ,his omnipotence cannot be denied1 if the existence of a ,deity is posited--the existence1 that is1 of an infinite being1 the two conceptions being identical4 ,but when you say1 ,god does not exist1 neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed2 they must all disappear with the subject1 and in this judgement there cannot exist the least self-contradiction4 ,you have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is annihilated in thought along with the subject1 no internal contradiction can arise1 be the predicate what it may4 ,there is no possibility of evading the conclusion--you find yourselves compelled to declare3 ,there are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated in thought4 ,but this is nothing more than saying3 ,there exist subjects which are absolutely necessary--the very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish4 ,for ,i find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with all its predicates1 leaves behind a contradiction2 and contradiction is the only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure priori conceptions4 ,against these general considerations1 the justice of which no one can dispute1 one argument is adduced1 which is regarded as furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact4 ,it is affirmed that there is one and only one conception1 in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory1 and this is the conception of an ens realissimum4 ,it possesses1 you say1 all reality1 and you feel yourselves justified in admitting the possibility of such a being4 7,this ,i am willing to grant for the present1 although the existence of a conception which is not self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the possibility of an object47#fg ,now the notion of all reality embraces in it that of existence2 the notion of existence lies1 therefore1 in the conception of this possible thing4 ,if this thing is annihilated in thought1 the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated1 which is self-contradictory4 #fg ,a conception is always possible1 if it is not self-contradictory4 ,this is the logical criterion of possibility1 distinguishing the object of such a conception from the nihil negativum4 ,but it may be1 notwithstanding1 an empty conception1 unless the objective reality of this synthesis1 but which it is generated1 is demonstrated2 and a proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible experience1 and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction4 ,this remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding1 from the possibility of a conception--which is logical--the possibility of a thing--which is real4 ,i answer3 ,it is absurd to introduce--under whatever term disguised--into the conception of a thing1 which is to be cogitated solely in reference to its possibility1 the conception of its existence4 ,if this is admitted1 you will have apparently gained the day1 but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology4 ,i ask1 is the proposition1 this or that thing 7which ,i am admitting to be possible7 exists1 an analytical or a synthetical proposition8 ,if the former1 there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence2 but then the conception in your minds is identical with the thing itself1 or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be possible1 and then inferred its existence from its internal possibility--which is but a miserable tautology4 ,the word reality in the conception of the thing1 and the word existence in the conception of the predicate1 will not help you out of the difficulty4 ,for1 supposing you were to term all positing of a thing reality1 you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence1 and this you merely repeat in the predicate4 ,but if you confess1 as every reasonable person must1 that every existential proposition is synthetical1 how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without contradiction8--a property which is the characteristic of analytical propositions1 alone4 ,i should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical mode of argumentation1 by a strict definition of the conception of existence1 did not my own experience teach me that the illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate 7a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing7 resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration4 ,a logical predicate may be what you please1 even the subject may be predicated of itself2 for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement4 ,but the determination of a conception is a predicate1 which adds to and enlarges the conception4 ,it must not1 therefore1 be contained in the conception4 ,being is evidently not a real predicate1 that is1 a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing4 ,it is merely the positing of a thing1 or of certain determinations in it4 ,logically1 it is merely the copula of a judgement4 ,the proposition1 ,god is omnipotent1 contains two conceptions1 which have a certain object or content2 the word is1 is no additional predicate--it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject4 ,now1 if ,i take the subject 7,god7 with all its predicates 7omnipotence being one71 and say3 ,god is1 or1 ,there is a ,god1 ,i add no new predicate to the conception of ,god1 ,i merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates--,i posit the object in relation to my conception4 ,the content of both is the same2 and there is no addition made to the conception1 which expresses merely the possibility of the object1 by my cogitating the object--in the expression1 it is--as absolutely given or existing4 ,thus the real contains no more than the possible4 ,a hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars4 ,for1 as the latter indicate the conception1 and the former the object1 on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter1 my conception would not be an expression of the whole object1 and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it4 ,but in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars--that is1 in the mere conception of them4 ,for the real object--the dollars--is not analytically contained in my conception1 but forms a synthetical addition to my conception 7which is merely a determination of my mental state71 although this objective reality--this existence--apart from my conceptions1 does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars4 ,by whatever and by whatever number of predicates--even to the complete determination of it--,i may cogitate a thing1 ,i do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement3 ,this thing exists4 ,otherwise1 not exactly the same1 but something more than what was cogitated in my conception1 would exist1 and ,i could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence4 ,if ,i cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one1 the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists2 on the contrary1 the thing exists--if it exist at all--with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception2 otherwise not that which was cogitated1 but something different1 exists4 ,now1 if ,i cogitate a being as the highest reality1 without defect or imperfection1 the question still remains--whether this being exists or not8 ,for1 although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception1 there is a defect in its relation to my mental state1 that is1 ,i am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is possible posteriori4 ,and here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent4 ,if the question regarded an object of sense merely1 it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing4 ,for the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience2 while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience4 ,at the same time1 this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception1 although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind4 ,but if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone1 it is not to be wondered at1 that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility4 ,whatever be the content of our conception of an object1 it is necessary to go beyond it1 if we wish to predicate existence of the object4 ,in the case of sensuous objects1 this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions2 but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought1 because it must be cognized completely priori4 ,but all our knowledge of existence 7be it immediately by perception1 or by inferences connecting some object with a perception7 belongs entirely to the sphere of experience--which is in perfect unity with itself2 and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible1 it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining4 ,the notion of a ,supreme ,being is in many respects a highly useful idea2 but for the very reason that it is an idea1 it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things4 ,it is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist4 ,the analytical criterion of possibility1 which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions1 cannot be denied it4 ,but the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an priori judgement cannot be formed1 because these realities are not presented to us specifically2 and even if this were to happen1 a judgement would still be impossible1 because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience1 to which the object of an idea cannot belong4 ,and thus the celebrated ,leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish upon priori grounds the possibility of this sublime ideal being4 ,the celebrated ontological or ,cartesian argument for the existence of a ,supreme ,being is therefore insufficient2 and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas1 as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash account4 ,section ,v4 ,of the ,impossibility of a ,cosmological ,proof of the ,existence of ,god ,it was by no means a natural course of proceeding1 but1 on the contrary1 an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools1 to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object corresponding to it4 ,such a course would never have been pursued1 were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress1 and that1 as this necessity must be unconditioned and priori1 reason is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy1 if possible1 this requirement1 and enable us to attain to the priori cognition of such a being4 ,this conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens realissimum1 and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a better defined knowledge of a necessary being1 of the existence of which we were convinced1 or persuaded1 on other grounds4 ,thus reason was seduced from her natural courage2 and1 instead of concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum1 an attempt was made to begin with it1 for the purpose of inferring from it that idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to complete4 ,thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument1 which neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity1 nor sustains the scientific examination of the philosopher4 ,the cosmological proof1 which we are about to examine1 retains the connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality2 but1 instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary existence1 like the preceding argument1 it concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality4 ,the track it pursues1 whether rational or sophistical1 is at least natural1 and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding1 but shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect2 while it contains1 at the same time1 the outlines of all the arguments employed in natural theology--arguments which always have been1 and still will be1 in use and authority4 ,these1 however adorned1 and hid under whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment1 are at bottom identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss4 ,this proof1 termed by ,leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi1 ,i shall now lay before the reader1 and subject to a strict examination4 ,it is framed in the following manner3 ,if something exists1 an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist4 ,now ,i1 at least1 exist4 ,consequently1 there exists an absolutely necessary being4 ,the minor contains an experience1 the major reasons from a general experience to the existence of a necessary being4#fh ,thus this argument really begins at experience1 and is not completely priori1 or ontological4 ,the object of all possible experience being the world1 it is called the cosmological proof4 ,it contains no reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects1 by which this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds2 and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof1 which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar constitution of our sensuous world4 #fh ,this inference is too well known to require more detailed discussion4 ,it is based upon the spurious transcendental law of causality1 that everything which is contingent has a cause1 which1 if itself contingent1 must also have a cause2 and so on1 till the series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary cause1 without which it would not possess completeness4 ,the proof proceeds thus3 ,a necessary being can be determined only in one way1 that is1 it can be determined by only one of all possible opposed predicates2 consequently1 it must be completely determined in and by its conception4 ,but there is only a single conception of a thing possible1 which completely determines the thing priori3 that is1 the conception of the ens realissimum4 ,it follows that the conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in which we can cogitate a necessary being4 ,consequently1 a ,supreme ,being necessarily exists4 ,in this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most extreme character4 ,we shall postpone an investigation of this argument for the present1 and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress1 and appeals to the agreement of two witnesses1 the one with the credentials of pure reason1 and the other with those of empiricism2 while1 in fact1 it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice1 for the purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness4 ,that it may possess a secure foundation1 it bases its conclusions upon experience1 and thus appears to be completely distinct from the ontological argument1 which places its confidence entirely in pure priori conceptions4 ,but this experience merely aids reason in making one step--to the existence of a necessary being4 ,what the properties of this being are cannot be learned from experience2 and therefore reason abandons it altogether1 and pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conception1 for the purpose of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary being ought to be1 that is1 what among all possible things contain the conditions 7requisita7 of absolute necessity4 ,reason believes that it has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens realissimum--and in it alone1 and hence concludes3 ,the ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being4 ,but it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity1 that is1 that we may infer the existence of the latter from that of the former--a proposition which formed the basis of the ontological argument1 and which is now employed in the support of the cosmological argument1 contrary to the wish and professions of its inventors4 ,for the existence of an absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone4 ,but if ,i say3 8,the conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this kind1 and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of a necessary being10 ,i am obliged to admit1 that the latter may be inferred from the former4 ,thus it is properly the ontological argument which figures in the cosmological1 and constitutes the whole strength of the latter2 while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further use than to conduct us to the conception of absolute necessity1 being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any determinate existence or thing4 ,for when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character1 we must abandon the sphere of experience1 and rise to that of pure conceptions1 which we examine with the purpose of discovering whether any one contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being4 ,but if the possibility of such a being is thus demonstrated1 its existence is also proved2 for we may then assert that1 of all possible beings there is one which possesses the attribute of necessity--in other words1 this being possesses an absolutely necessary existence4 ,all illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they are presented in the formal manner employed by the schools1 which we now proceed to do4 ,if the proposition3 8,every absolutely necessary being is likewise an ens realissimum10 is correct 7and it is this which constitutes the nervus probandi of the cosmological argument71 it must1 like all affirmative judgements1 be capable of conversion--the conversio per accidens1 at least4 ,it follows1 then1 that some entia realissima are absolutely necessary beings4 ,but no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another1 and what is valid of some is valid of all4 ,in this present case1 therefore1 ,i may employ simple conversion1 and say3 8,every ens realissimum is a necessary being40 ,but as this proposition is determined priori by the conceptions contained in it1 the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity4 ,but this is exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument1 and not recognized by the cosmological1 although it formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning4 ,thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 is not only1 like the first1 illusory and inadequate1 but possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi--professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal1 but bringing us back1 after a short circuit1 to the old path which we had deserted at its call4 ,i mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions1 which transcendental criticism does not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate4 ,i shall merely enumerate these1 leaving it to the reader1 who must by this time be well practised in such matters1 to investigate the fallacies residing therein4 ,the following fallacies1 for example1 are discoverable in this mode of proof3 #a4 ,the transcendental principle3 8,everything that is contingent must have a cause0--a principle without significance1 except in the sensuous world4 ,for the purely intellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition1 like that of causality1 which is itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world4 ,but in the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere4 #b4 8,from the impossibility of an infinite ascending series of causes in the world of sense a first cause is inferred02 a conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in the sphere of experience1 and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere4 #c4 ,reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds1 with regard to the completion of this series4 ,it removes all conditions 7without which1 however1 no conception of ,necessity can take place72 and1 as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions1 it accepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of the series4 #d4 ,the logical possibility of a conception of the total of reality 7the criterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction7 is confounded with the transcendental1 which requires a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis--a principle which again refers us to the world of experience4 ,and so on4 ,the aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere conceptions--a proof which must be ontological1 and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable4 ,with this purpose1 we reason from an actual existence--an experience in general1 to an absolutely necessary condition of that existence4 ,it is in this case unnecessary to demonstrate its possibility4 ,for after having proved that it exists1 the question regarding its possibility is superfluous4 ,now1 when we wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being1 we do not look out for some being the conception of which would enable us to comprehend the necessity of its being--for if we could do this1 an empirical presupposition would be unnecessary2 no1 we try to discover merely the negative condition 7conditio sine qua non71 without which a being would not be absolutely necessary4 ,now this would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning1 from a consequence to its principle2 but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single being1 the conception of which must consequently contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity1 and thus entitle me to infer this absolute necessity priori4 ,that is1 it must be possible to reason conversely1 and say3 ,the thing1 to which the conception of the highest reality belongs1 is absolutely necessary4 ,but if ,i cannot reason thus--and ,i cannot1 unless ,i believe in the sufficiency of the ontological argument--,i find insurmountable obstacles in my new path1 and am really no farther than the point from which ,i set out4 ,the conception of a ,supreme ,being satisfies all questions priori regarding the internal determinations of a thing1 and is for this reason an ideal without equal or parallel1 the general conception of it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things4 ,but the conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existence--which was the purpose of all our inquiries2 and1 although the existence of a necessary being were admitted1 we should find it impossible to answer the question3 ,what of all things in the world must be regarded as such8 ,it is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all-sufficient being--a cause of all possible effects--for the purpose of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with regard to phenomena4 ,but to assert that such a being necessarily exists1 is no longer the modest enunciation of an admissible hypothesis1 but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty2 for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary must itself possess that character4 ,the aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute necessity1 or a conception which shall contain that idea4 ,if the one is possible1 so is the other2 for reason recognizes that alone as absolutely necessary which is necessary from its conception4 ,but both attempts are equally beyond our power--we find it impossible to satisfy the understanding upon this point1 and as impossible to induce it to remain at rest in relation to this incapacity4 ,unconditioned necessity1 which1 as the ultimate support and stay of all existing things1 is an indispensable requirement of the mind1 is an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay4 ,even the idea of eternity1 terrible and sublime as it is1 as depicted by ,haller1 does not produce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and terror2 for1 although it measures the duration of things1 it does not support them4 ,we cannot bear1 nor can we rid ourselves of the thought that a being1 which we regard as the greatest of all possible existences1 should say to himself3 ,i am from eternity to eternity2 beside me there is nothing1 except that which exists by my will2 whence then am ,i8 ,here all sinks away from under us2 and the greatest1 as the smallest1 perfection1 hovers without stay or footing in presence of the speculative reason1 which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other4 ,many physical powers1 which evidence their existence by their effects1 are perfectly inscrutable in their nature2 they elude all our powers of observation4 ,the transcendental object which forms the basis of phenomena1 and1 in connection with it1 the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions1 are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision2 the fact is there1 the reason of the fact we cannot see4 ,but an ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable1 because the only credential of its reality is the need of it felt by reason1 for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical unity4 ,an ideal is not even given as a cogitable object1 and therefore cannot be inscrutable2 on the contrary1 it must1 as a mere idea1 be based on the constitution of reason itself1 and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution4 ,for the very essence of reason consists in its ability to give an account1 of all our conceptions1 opinions1 and assertions--upon objective1 or1 when they happen to be illusory and fallacious1 upon subjective grounds4 ,detection and ,explanation of the ,dialectical ,illusion in all ,transcendental ,arguments for the ,existence of a ,necessary ,being4 ,both of the above arguments are transcendental2 in other words1 they do not proceed upon empirical principles4 ,for1 although the cosmological argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice of reasoning1 it did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience1 but upon pure principles of reason--in relation to an existence given by empirical consciousness2 utterly abandoning its guidance1 however1 for the purpose of supporting its assertions entirely upon pure conceptions4 ,now what is the cause1 in these transcendental arguments1 of the dialectical1 but natural1 illusion1 which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme reality1 and hypostatizes that which cannot be anything but an idea8 ,what is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason1 of admitting that some one among all existing things must be necessary1 while it falls back from the assertion of the existence of such a being as from an abyss8 ,and how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly to itself1 and from the wavering condition of a timid and reluctant approbation--always again withdrawn--arrive at a calm and settled insight into its cause8 ,it is something very remarkable that1 on the supposition that something exists1 ,i cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily4 ,upon this perfectly natural--but not on that account reliable--inference does the cosmological argument rest4 ,but1 let me form any conception whatever of a thing1 ,i find that ,i cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary1 and that nothing prevents me--be the thing or being what it may--from cogitating its non-existence4 ,i may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis1 while ,i cannot cogitate any single or individual thing as necessary4 ,in other words1 ,i can never complete the regress through the conditions of existence1 without admitting the existence of a necessary being2 but1 on the other hand1 ,i cannot make a commencement from this being4 ,if ,i must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of existing things1 and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual thing as in itself necessary1 the inevitable inference is that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves--otherwise an internal contradiction would result2 that consequently neither of these principles are objective1 but merely subjective principles of reason--the one requiring us to seek for a necessary ground for everything that exists1 that is1 to be satisfied with no other explanation than that which is complete priori1 the other forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness1 that is1 to regard no member of the empirical world as unconditioned4 ,in this mode of viewing them1 both principles1 in their purely heuristic and regulative character1 and as concerning merely the formal interest of reason1 are quite consistent with each other4 ,the one says3 8,you must philosophize upon nature10 as if there existed a necessary primal basis of all existing things1 solely for the purpose of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge1 by pursuing an idea of this character--a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate2 while the other warns you to consider no individual determination1 concerning the existence of things1 as such an ultimate foundation1 that is1 as absolutely necessary1 but to keep the way always open for further progress in the deduction1 and to treat every determination as determined by some other4 ,but if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally necessary1 it is impossible that anything which is empirically given should be absolutely necessary4 ,it follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary as out of and beyond the world1 inasmuch as it is useful only as a principle of the highest possible unity in experience1 and you cannot discover any such necessary existence in the would1 the second rule requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves deduced4 ,the philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as contingent2 while matter was considered by them1 in accordance with the judgement of the common reason of mankind1 as primal and necessary4 ,but if they had regarded matter1 not relatively--as the substratum of phenomena1 but absolutely and in itself--as an independent existence1 this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared4 ,for there is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence2 on the contrary1 it can annihilate it in thought1 always and without self-contradiction4 ,but in thought alone lay the idea of absolute necessity4 ,a regulative principle must1 therefore1 have been at the foundation of this opinion4 ,in fact1 extension and impenetrability--which together constitute our conception of matter--form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phenomena1 and this principle1 in so far as it is empirically unconditioned1 possesses the property of a regulative principle4 ,but1 as every determination of matter which constitutes what is real in it--and consequently impenetrability--is an effect1 which must have a cause1 and is for this reason always derived1 the notion of matter cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being1 in its character of the principle of all derived unity4 ,for every one of its real properties1 being derived1 must be only conditionally necessary1 and can therefore be annihilated in thought2 and thus the whole existence of matter can be so annihilated or suppressed4 ,if this were not the case1 we should have found in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of unity--which is impossible1 according to the second regulative principle4 ,it follows that matter1 and1 in general1 all that forms part of the world of sense1 cannot be a necessary primal being1 nor even a principle of empirical unity1 but that this being or principle must have its place assigned without the world4 ,and1 in this way1 we can proceed in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their existence from other phenomena1 just as if there existed no necessary being2 and we can at the same time1 strive without ceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our deduction1 just as if such a being--the supreme condition of all existences--were presupposed by the mind4 ,these remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of the ,supreme ,being1 far from being an enouncement of the existence of a being in itself necessary1 is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason1 requiring us to regard all connection existing between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause1 and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena4 ,we cannot1 at the same time1 avoid regarding1 by a transcendental subreptio1 this formal principle as constitutive1 and hypostatizing this unity4 ,precisely similar is the case with our notion of space4 ,space is the primal condition of all forms1 which are properly just so many different limitations of it2 and thus1 although it is merely a principle of sensibility1 we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing--as an object given priori in itself4 ,in the same way1 it is quite natural that1 as the systematic unity of nature cannot be established as a principle for the empirical employment of reason1 unless it is based upon the idea of an ens realissimum1 as the supreme cause1 we should regard this idea as a real object1 and this object1 in its character of supreme condition1 as absolutely necessary1 and that in this way a regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle4 ,this interchange becomes evident when ,i regard this supreme being1 which1 relatively to the world1 was absolutely 7unconditionally7 necessary1 as a thing per se4 ,in this case1 ,i find it impossible to represent this necessity in or by any conception1 and it exists merely in my own mind1 as the formal condition of thought1 but not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence4 ,section ,,vi4 ,of the ,impossibility of a ,physico-,theological ,proof ,if1 then1 neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the existence of the ,deity1 we can make the attempt by the only other mode--that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of the phenomena of the present world1 their constitution and disposition1 and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of the existence of a ,supreme ,being4 ,this argument we shall term the physico-theological argument4 ,if it is shown to be insufficient1 speculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea4 ,it is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding sections1 that an answer to this question will be far from being difficult or unconvincing4 ,for how can any experience be adequate with an idea8 ,the very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it4 ,the transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so immeasurably great1 so high above all that is empirical1 which is always conditioned1 that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception1 and in vain seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned1 while examples1 nay1 even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical synthesis4 ,if the ,supreme ,being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions1 it must be a member of the empirical series1 and1 like the lower members which it precedes1 have its origin in some higher member of the series4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we disengage it from the chain1 and cogitate it as an intelligible being1 apart from the series of natural causes--how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from the former8 ,all laws respecting the regress from effects to causes1 all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world1 and1 apart from them1 are without significance4 ,the world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order1 variety1 beauty1 and conformity to ends1 that whether we pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction1 or into its illimitable divisions in the other1 whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations--even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach1 we find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost its force1 and number its power to reckon1 nay1 even thought fails to conceive adequately1 and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without power of expression--all the more eloquent that it is dumb4 ,everywhere around us we observe a chain of causes and effects1 of means and ends1 of death and birth2 and1 as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in which we find it1 we are constantly referred to some other thing1 which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause1 and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness1 unless we admit that1 besides this infinite chain of contingencies1 there exists something that is primal and self-subsistent--something which1 as the cause of this phenomenal world1 secures its continuance and preservation4 ,this highest cause--what magnitude shall we attribute to it8 ,of the content of the world we are ignorant2 still less can we estimate its magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible4 ,but this supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind1 what is there to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible8 ,this we can easily do1 although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract conception1 by representing this being to ourselves as containing in itself1 as an individual substance1 all possible perfection--a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands parsimony in principles1 which is free from self-contradiction1 which even contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in experience1 by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and system1 and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience4 ,this argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect4 ,it is the oldest1 the clearest1 and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity4 ,it animates the study of nature1 as it itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source4 ,it introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself have discovered them1 and extends our knowledge of nature1 by directing our attention to a unity1 the principle of which lies beyond nature4 ,this knowledge of nature again reacts upon this idea--its cause2 and thus our belief in a divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction4 ,for these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed4 ,the mind1 unceasingly elevated by these considerations1 which1 although empirical1 are so remarkably powerful1 and continually adding to their force1 will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle speculation2 it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty1 the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe1 and rises from height to height1 from condition to condition1 till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned author of all4 ,but although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility of this procedure1 but have rather to commend and encourage it1 we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits1 apart from favour or support by other arguments4 ,nor can it injure the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist1 and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the properties of a belief that brings calm and content into the mind1 without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection4 ,i maintain1 then1 that the physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 that it must entrust this to the ontological argument--to which it serves merely as an introduction1 and that1 consequently1 this argument contains the only possible ground of proof 7possessed by speculative reason7 for the existence of this being4 ,the chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow3 #a4 ,we observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose1 executed with great wisdom1 and argument in whole of a content indescribably various1 and of an extent without limits4 #b4 ,this arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world--it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute2 in other words1 the nature of different things could not of itself1 whatever means were employed1 harmoniously tend towards certain purposes1 were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a rational and disposing principle1 in accordance with certain fundamental ideas4 #c4 ,there exists1 therefore1 a sublime and wise cause 7or several71 which is not merely a blind1 all-powerful nature1 producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity1 but a free and intelligent cause of the world4 #d4 ,the unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world1 as portions of an artistic edifice--an inference which all our observation favours1 and all principles of analogy support4 ,in the above argument1 it is inferred from the analogy of certain products of nature with those of human art1 when it compels ,nature to bend herself to its purposes1 as in the case of a house1 a ship1 or a watch1 that the same kind of causality--namely1 understanding and will--resides in nature4 ,it is also declared that the internal possibility of this freely-acting nature 7which is the source of all art1 and perhaps also of human reason7 is derivable from another and superhuman art--a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism4 ,but to neither of these opinions shall we at present object4 ,we shall only remark that it must be confessed that1 if we are to discuss the subject of cause at all1 we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the analogy subsisting between nature and such products of design--these being the only products whose causes and modes of organization are completely known to us4 ,reason would be unable to satisfy her own requirements1 if she passed from a causality which she does know1 to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which she does not know4 ,according to the physico-theological argument1 the connection and harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form merely1 but not of the matter1 that is1 of the substance of the world4 ,to establish the truth of the latter opinion1 it would be necessary to prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony and order1 unless they were1 even as regards their substance1 the product of a supreme wisdom4 ,but this would require very different grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art4 ,this proof can at most1 therefore1 demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world1 whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works1 but not of a creator of the world1 to whom all things are subject4 ,thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task before us--a demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient being4 ,if we wish to prove the contingency of matter1 we must have recourse to a transcendental argument1 which the physico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid4 ,we infer1 from the order and design visible in the universe1 as a disposition of a thoroughly contingent character1 the existence of a cause proportionate thereto4 ,the conception of this cause must contain certain determinate qualities1 and it must therefore be regarded as the conception of a being which possesses all power1 wisdom1 and so on1 in one word1 all perfection--the conception1 that is1 of an all-sufficient being4 ,for the predicates of very great1 astonishing1 or immeasurable power and excellence1 give us no determinate conception of the thing1 nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself4 ,they merely indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and the observer1 who compares it with himself and with his own power of comprehension1 and are mere expressions of praise and reverence1 by which the object is either magnified1 or the observing subject depreciated in relation to the object4 ,where we have to do with the magnitude 7of the perfection7 of a thing1 we can discover no determinate conception1 except that which comprehends all possible perfection or completeness1 and it is only the total 7omnitudo7 of reality which is completely determined in and through its conception alone4 ,now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of the world he contemplates bears 7in its extent as well as in its content7 to omnipotence1 into that of the order and design in the world to the highest wisdom1 and that of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of a ,supreme ,being4 ,physico-theology is therefore incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of the world1 and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology--a theology which is itself to be the basis of religion4 ,the attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the path of empiricism4 ,and yet this is the path pursued in the physico-theological argument4 ,what means shall we employ to bridge the abyss8 ,after elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power1 wisdom1 and other attributes of the author of the world1 and finding we can advance no further1 we leave the argument on empirical grounds1 and proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it4 ,from this contingency we infer1 by the help of transcendental conceptions alone1 the existence of something absolutely necessary2 and1 still advancing1 proceed from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof--the conception of an all-embracing reality4 ,thus the physico-theological1 failing in its undertaking1 recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument2 and1 as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise1 it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason1 although it at first professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its entire procedure upon experience alone4 ,the physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument1 and to look down upon it1 with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature1 as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists4 ,for1 if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments1 they will find that1 after following for some time the path of nature and experience1 and discovering themselves no nearer their object1 they suddenly leave this path and pass into the region of pure possibility1 where they hope to reach upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations4 ,gaining1 as they think1 a firm footing after this immense leap1 they extend their determinate conception--into the possession of which they have come1 they know not how--over the whole sphere of creation1 and explain their ideal1 which is entirely a product of pure reason1 by illustrations drawn from experience--though in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object1 while they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience4 ,thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological1 and this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a ,supreme ,being2 and as besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason1 the ontological proof1 on the ground of pure conceptions of reason1 is the only possible one1 if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all4 ,section ,,vii4 ,critique of all ,theology based upon ,speculative ,principles of ,reason ,if by the term theology ,i understand the cognition of a primal being1 that cognition is based either upon reason alone 7theologia rationalis7 or upon revelation 7theologia revelata74 ,the former cogitates its object either by means of pure transcendental conceptions1 as an ens originarium1 realissimum1 ens entium1 and is termed transcendental theology2 or1 by means of a conception derived from the nature of our own mind1 as a supreme intelligence1 and must then be entitled natural theology4 ,the person who believes in a transcendental theology alone1 is termed a deist2 he who acknowledges the possibility of a natural theology also1 a theist4 ,the former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 but at the same time maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental1 and that all we can say of it is that it possesses all reality1 without being able to define it more closely4 ,the second asserts that reason is capable of presenting us1 from the analogy with nature1 with a more definite conception of this being1 and that its operations1 as the cause of all things1 are the results of intelligence and free will4 ,the former regards the ,supreme ,being as the cause of the world--whether by the necessity of his nature1 or as a free agent1 is left undetermined2 the latter considers this being as the author of the world4 ,transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a ,supreme ,being from a general experience1 without any closer reference to the world to which this experience belongs1 and in this case it is called cosmotheology2 or it endeavours to cognize the existence of such a being1 through mere conceptions1 without the aid of experience1 and is then termed ontotheology4 ,natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of the world1 from the constitution of1 the order and unity observable in1 the world1 in which two modes of causality must be admitted to exist--those of nature and freedom4 ,thus it rises from this world to a supreme intelligence1 either as the principle of all natural1 or of all moral order and perfection4 ,in the former case it is termed physico-theology1 in the latter1 ethical or moral-theology4#fi #fi ,not theological ethics2 for this science contains ethical laws1 which presuppose the existence of a ,supreme ,governor of the world2 while moral-theology1 on the contrary1 is the expression of a conviction of the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 founded upon ethical laws4 ,as we are wont to understand by the term ,god not merely an eternal nature1 the operations of which are insensate and blind1 but a ,supreme ,being1 who is the free and intelligent author of all things1 and as it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity1 we might1 in strict rigour1 deny to the deist any belief in ,god at all1 and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing--the supreme cause of all other things4 ,but1 as no one ought to be blamed1 merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining a certain opinion1 as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted the opposite1 it is more correct--as it is less harsh--to say1 the deist believes in a ,god1 the theist in a living ,god 7summa intelligentia74 ,we shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all these attempts of reason to establish the existence of a ,supreme ,being4 ,it may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or cognition as knowledge of that which is1 and practical knowledge as knowledge of that which ought to be4 ,in this view1 the theoretical employment of reason is that by which ,i cognize priori 7as necessary7 that something is1 while the practical is that by which ,i cognize priori what ought to happen4 ,now1 if it is an indubitably certain1 though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth1 that something is1 or ought to happen1 either a certain determinate condition of this truth is absolutely necessary1 or such a condition may be arbitrarily presupposed4 ,in the former case the condition is postulated 7per thesin71 in the latter supposed 7per hypothesin74 ,there are certain practical laws--those of morality--which are absolutely necessary4 ,now1 if these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being1 as the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power1 this being must be postulated1 because the conditioned1 from which we reason to this determinate condition1 is itself cognized priori as absolutely necessary4 ,we shall at some future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 but also1 as themselves absolutely necessary in a different relation1 demand or postulate it--although only from a practical point of view4 ,the discussion of this argument we postpone for the present4 ,when the question relates merely to that which is1 not to that which ought to be1 the conditioned which is presented in experience is always cogitated as contingent4 ,for this reason its condition cannot be regarded as absolutely necessary1 but merely as relatively necessary1 or rather as needful2 the condition is in itself and priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition1 by reason1 of the conditioned4 ,if1 then1 we are to possess a theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing1 we cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than priori by means of conceptions2 while it is impossible in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in experience4 ,theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be discovered by means of experience4 ,it is opposed to the cognition of nature1 which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be presented in a possible experience4 ,the principle that everything which happens 7the empirically contingent7 must have a cause1 is a principle of the cognition of nature1 but not of speculative cognition4 ,for1 if we change it into an abstract principle1 and deprive it of its reference to experience and the empirical1 we shall find that it cannot with justice be regarded any longer as a synthetical proposition1 and that it is impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists to something entirely different--termed cause4 ,nay1 more1 the conception of a cause likewise that of the contingent--loses1 in this speculative mode of employing it1 all significance1 for its objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from experience alone4 ,when from the existence of the universe and the things in it the existence of a cause of the universe is inferred1 reason is proceeding not in the natural1 but in the speculative method4 ,for the principle of the former enounces1 not that things themselves or substances1 but only that which happens or their states--as empirically contingent1 have a cause3 the assertion that the existence of substance itself is contingent is not justified by experience1 it is the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative manner4 ,if1 again1 ,i infer from the form of the universe1 from the way in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other1 the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the universe--this would again be a judgement of purely speculative reason2 because the object in this case--the cause--can never be an object of possible experience4 ,in both these cases the principle of causality1 which is valid only in the field of experience--useless and even meaningless beyond this region1 would be diverted from its proper destination4 ,now ,i maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless1 that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological truths1 and1 consequently1 that a rational theology can have no existence1 unless it is founded upon the laws of morality4 ,for all synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent in experience2 while the cognition of a ,supreme ,being necessitates their being employed transcendentally1 and of this the understanding is quite incapable4 ,if the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to a ,supreme ,being1 this being must belong to the chain of empirical objects--in which case it would be1 like all phenomena1 itself conditioned4 ,if the possibility of passing the limits of experience be admitted1 by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect to its cause1 what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure8 ,certainly not the conception of a ,supreme ,being1 because experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects1 and it is only an effect of this character that could witness to the existence of a corresponding cause4 ,if1 for the purpose of fully satisfying the requirements of ,reason1 we recognize her right to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary being1 this can be admitted only from favour1 and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration4 ,the physico-theological proof may add weight to others--if other proofs there are--by connecting speculation with experience2 but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological cognition1 and gives it a right and natural direction1 than establishes a sure foundation for theology4 ,it is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only of transcendental answers--those presented priori by pure conceptions without the least empirical admixture4 ,but the question in the present case is evidently synthetical--it aims at the extension of our cognition beyond the bounds of experience--it requires an assurance respecting the existence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds1 to which no experience can ever be adequate4 ,now it has been abundantly proved that all priori synthetical cognition is possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a possible experience2 and that the validity of all principles depends upon their immanence in the field of experience1 that is1 their relation to objects of empirical cognition or phenomena4 ,thus all transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is without result4 ,if any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of our analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time honoured arguments1 he at least cannot decline answering the question--how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the help of mere ideas4 ,if he talks of new arguments1 or of improvements upon old arguments1 ,i request him to spare me4 ,there is certainly no great choice in this sphere of discussion1 as all speculative arguments must at last look for support to the ontological1 and ,i have1 therefore1 very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason4 ,without looking upon myself as a remarkably combative person1 ,i shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of speculative theology4 ,and yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of procedure4 ,i shall1 therefore1 restrict myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate1 from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of knowledge1 how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely priori1 and to carry it to that point where experience abandons us1 and no means exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our conceptions4 ,in whatever way the understanding may have attained to a conception1 the existence of the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis1 because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the conception4 ,but it is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception1 without the aid of experience--which presents to the mind nothing but phenomena1 or to attain by the help of mere conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or supernatural beings4 ,but although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 it is of the highest utility in correcting our conception of this being--on the supposition that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means--in making it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of intelligible objects1 clearing it from all that is incompatible with the conception of an ens summun1 and eliminating from it all limitations or admixtures of empirical elements4 ,transcendental theology is still therefore1 notwithstanding its objective insufficiency1 of importance in a negative respect2 it is useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure ideas1 no other than a transcendental standard being in this case admissible4 ,for if1 from a practical point of view1 the hypothesis of a ,supreme and ,all-sufficient ,being is to maintain its validity without opposition1 it must be of the highest importance to define this conception in a correct and rigorous manner--as the transcendental conception of a necessary being1 to eliminate all phenomenal elements 7anthropomorphism in its most extended signification71 and at the same time to overflow all contradictory assertions--be they atheistic1 deistic1 or anthropomorphic4 ,this is of course very easy2 as the same arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm the existence of a ,supreme ,being must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial4 ,for it is impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no ,supreme ,being1 as the ground of all that exists1 or that this being possesses none of those properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical qualities of a thinking being1 or that1 as the anthropomorphists would have us believe1 it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of experience4 ,a ,supreme ,being is1 therefore1 for the speculative reason1 a mere ideal1 though a faultless one--a conception which perfects and crowns the system of human cognition1 but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason4 ,if this defect is ever supplied by a moral theology1 the problematic transcendental theology which has preceded1 will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the conception1 by the complete determination of it which it has furnished1 and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense1 and not always in harmony with its own ideas4 ,the attributes of necessity1 infinitude1 unity1 existence apart from the world 7and not as a world soul71 eternity 7free from conditions of time71 omnipresence 7free from conditions of space71 omnipotence1 and others1 are pure transcendental predicates2 and thus the accurate conception of a ,supreme ,being1 which every theology requires1 is furnished by transcendental theology alone4 ,,appendix4 ,of the ,regulative ,employment of the ,ideas of ,pure ,reason ,the result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our ,transcendental ,analytic1 namely1 that all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless1 but it at the same time teaches us this important lesson1 that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits1 and that transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the understanding4 ,there exists this difference1 however1 that while the categories never mislead us1 outward objects being always in perfect harmony therewith1 ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions1 the severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the fallacies which they induce4 ,whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers1 when once we have discovered their true direction and aim4 ,we are entitled to suppose1 therefore1 that there exists a mode of employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent2 although1 when we mistake their meaning1 and regard them as conceptions of actual things1 their mode of application is transcendent and delusive4 ,for it is not the idea itself1 but only the employment of the idea in relation to possible experience1 that is transcendent or immanent4 ,an idea is employed transcendently1 when it is applied to an object falsely believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it2 immanently1 when it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the sphere of experience4 ,thus all errors of subreptio--of misapplication1 are to be ascribed to defects of judgement1 and not to understanding or reason4 ,reason never has an immediate relation to an object2 it relates immediately to the understanding alone4 ,it is only through the understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience4 ,it does not form conceptions of objects1 it merely arranges them and gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible4 ,reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole purpose of producing totality in the different series4 ,this totality the understanding does not concern itself with2 its only occupation is the connection of experiences1 by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established4 ,the object of reason is1 therefore1 the understanding and its proper destination4 ,as the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions1 so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas2 as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding1 which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone4 ,i accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas1 that they cannot be conceptions of objects1 and that1 when thus considered1 they assume a fallacious and dialectical character4 ,but1 on the other hand1 they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects--as regulative ideas1 directing the understanding to a certain aim1 the guiding lines towards which all its laws follow1 and in which they all meet in one point4 ,this point--though a mere idea 7focus imaginarius71 that is1 not a point from which the conceptions of the understanding do really proceed1 for it lies beyond the sphere of possible experience--serves1 notwithstanding1 to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension4 ,hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition1 just as objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it4 ,but this illusion--which we may hinder from imposing upon us--is necessary and unavoidable1 if we desire to see1 not only those objects which lie before us1 but those which are at a great distance behind us2 that is to say1 when1 in the present case1 we direct the aims of the understanding1 beyond every given experience1 towards an extension as great as can possibly be attained4 ,if we review our cognitions in their entire extent1 we shall find that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system1 that is to say1 to give them connection according to a principle4 ,this unity presupposes an idea--the idea of the form of a whole 7of cognition71 preceding the determinate cognition of the parts1 and containing the conditions which determine priori to every part its place and relation to the other parts of the whole system4 ,this idea1 accordingly1 demands complete unity in the cognition of the understanding--not the unity of a contingent aggregate1 but that of a system connected according to necessary laws4 ,it cannot be affirmed with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object2 it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of objects1 in so far as this unity is available to the understanding as a rule4 ,such conceptions of reason are not derived from nature2 on the contrary1 we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of nature1 and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not adequate to them4 ,we admit that such a thing as pure earth1 pure water1 or pure air1 is not to be discovered4 ,and yet we require these conceptions 7which have their origin in the reason1 so far as regards their absolute purity and completeness7 for the purpose of determining the share which each of these natural causes has in every phenomenon4 ,thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to earths1 as mere weight2 to salts and inflammable bodies1 as pure force2 and finally1 to water and air1 as the vehicula of the former1 or the machines employed by them in their operations--for the purpose of explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in accordance with the idea of a mechanism4 ,for1 although not actually so expressed1 the influence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the procedure of natural philosophers4 ,if reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general1 and if the general be certain in se and given1 it is only necessary that the judgement should subsume the particular under the general1 the particular being thus necessarily determined4 ,i shall term this the demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason4 ,if1 however1 the general is admitted as problematical only1 and is a mere idea1 the particular case is certain1 but the universality of the rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem4 ,several particular cases1 the certainty of which is beyond doubt1 are then taken and examined1 for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is applicable to them2 and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule1 its universality is inferred1 and at the same time1 all the causes which have not1 or cannot be presented to our observation1 are concluded to be of the same character with those which we have observed4 ,this ,i shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason4 ,the hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive4 ,that is to say1 if we consider the subject strictly1 the truth of the rule1 which has been employed as an hypothesis1 does not follow from the use that is made of it by reason4 ,for how can we know all the possible cases that may arise8 some of which may1 however1 prove exceptions to the universality of the rule4 ,this employment of reason is merely regulative1 and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the aggregate of our particular cognitions1 and thereby the approximating of the rule to universality4 ,the object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the systematic unity of cognitions2 and this unity is the criterion of the truth of a rule4 ,on the other hand1 this systematic unity--as a mere idea--is in fact merely a unity projected1 not to be regarded as given1 but only in the light of a problem--a problem which serves1 however1 as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the understanding in experience1 directs it with regard to those cases which are not presented to our observation1 and introduces harmony and consistency into all its operations4 ,all that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that this systematic unity is a logical principle1 whose aim is to assist the understanding1 where it cannot of itself attain to rules1 by means of ideas1 to bring all these various rules under one principle1 and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be attained4 ,but the assertion that objects and the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to systematic unity1 that this may be postulated priori1 without any reference to the interest of reason1 and that we are justified in declaring all possible cognitions--empirical and others--to possess systematic unity1 and to be subject to general principles from which1 notwithstanding their various character1 they are all derivable1--such an assertion can be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason1 which would render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically--in its character of a method1 but objectively necessary4 ,we shall illustrate this by an example4 ,the conceptions of the understanding make us acquainted1 among many other kinds of unity1 with that of the causality of a substance1 which is termed power4 ,the different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are different effects--as1 in the case of the human mind1 we have feeling1 consciousness1 imagination1 memory1 wit1 analysis1 pleasure1 desire and so on4 ,now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these differences to as small a number as possible1 by comparing them and discovering the hidden identity which exists4 ,we must inquire1 for example1 whether or not imagination 7connected with consciousness71 memory1 wit1 and analysis are not merely different forms of understanding and reason4 ,the idea of a fundamental power1 the existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of1 is the problem to be solved1 for the systematic representation of the existing variety of powers4 ,the logical principle of reason requires us to produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions2 and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be identical1 the more probable does it become1 that they are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power1 which may be called1 relatively speaking1 a fundamental power4 ,and so with other cases4 ,these relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each other1 to discover1 if possible1 the one radical and absolutely fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations4 ,but this unity is purely hypothetical4 ,it is not maintained1 that this unity does really exist1 but that we must1 in the interest of reason1 that is1 for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience1 try to discover and introduce it1 so far as is practicable1 into the sphere of our cognitions4 ,but the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical1 but that it possesses objective reality1 and thus the systematic unity of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle4 ,for1 without having attempted to discover the unity of the various powers existing in nature1 nay1 even after all our attempts have failed1 we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist1 and may be1 sooner or later1 discovered4 ,and this reason does1 not only1 as in the case above adduced1 with regard to the unity of substance1 but where many substances1 although all to a certain extent homogeneous1 are discoverable1 as in the case of matter in general4 ,here also does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various powers--inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general laws2 and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle of reason1 but an essential law of nature4 ,we cannot understand1 in fact1 how a logical principle of unity can of right exist1 unless we presuppose a transcendental principle1 by which such a systematic unit--as a property of objects themselves--is regarded as necessary priori4 ,for with what right can reason1 in its logical exercise1 require us to regard the variety of forces which nature displays1 as in effect a disguised unity1 and to deduce them from one fundamental force or power1 when she is free to admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be different in kind1 and that a systematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature8 ,in this view of the case1 reason would be proceeding in direct opposition to her own destination1 by setting as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and arrangement of nature4 ,neither can we assert that reason has previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of phenomena4 ,for the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law1 inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason1 nor without reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the understanding1 nor1 in the absence of this1 any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth4 ,in relation to this criterion1 therefore1 we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity4 ,we find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms in the principles of philosophers1 although they have neither recognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence4 ,that the diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species1 that the various species must be considered as merely different determinations of a few genera1 and these again as divisions of still higher races1 and so on--that1 accordingly1 a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical conceptions1 in so far as they can be deduced from higher and more general conceptions1 must be sought for1 is a scholastic maxim or logical principle1 without which reason could not be employed by us4 ,for we can infer the particular from the general1 only in so far as general properties of things constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest4 ,that the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim1 which forbids us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles 7entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda74 ,this maxim asserts that nature herself assists in the establishment of this unity of reason1 and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from the expectation of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of fundamental properties1 of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or less determined form4 ,this unity1 although a mere idea1 thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it4 ,it was considered a great step when chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera--acids and alkalis2 and they regard this difference as itself a mere variety1 or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental material4 ,the different kinds of earths 7stones and even metals7 chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three1 and afterwards to two2 but still1 not content with this advance1 they cannot but think that behind these diversities there lurks but one genus--nay1 that even salts and earths have a common principle4 ,it might be conjectured that this is merely an economical plan of reason1 for the purpose of sparing itself trouble1 and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character1 which1 when successful1 gives an appearance of probability to the principle of explanation employed by the reason4 ,but a selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be distinguished from the idea1 according to which every one presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws of nature1 and that reason does not in this case request1 but requires1 although we are quite unable to determine the proper limits of this unity4 ,if the diversity existing in phenomena--a diversity not of form 7for in this they may be similar7 but of content--were so great that the subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the least similarity 7which is not impossible71 in this case the logical law of genera would be without foundation1 the conception of a genus1 nay1 all general conceptions would be impossible1 and the faculty of the understanding1 the exercise of which is restricted to the world of conceptions1 could not exist4 ,the logical principle of genera1 accordingly1 if it is to be applied to nature 7by which ,i mean objects presented to our senses71 presupposes a transcendental principle4 ,in accordance with this principle1 homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the variety of phenomena 7although we are unable to determine priori the degree of this homogeneity71 because without it no empirical conceptions1 and consequently no experience1 would be possible4 ,the logical principle of genera1 which demands identity in phenomena1 is balanced by another principle--that of species1 which requires variety and diversity in things1 notwithstanding their accordance in the same genus1 and directs the understanding to attend to the one no less than to the other4 ,this principle 7of the faculty of distinction7 acts as a check upon the reason and reason exhibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest--on the one hand1 the interest in the extent 7the interest of generality7 in relation to genera2 on the other1 that of the content 7the interest of individuality7 in relation to the variety of species4 ,in the former case1 the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions1 in the latter it cogitates more in them4 ,this distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers1 some of whom--the remarkably speculative heads--may be said to be hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena1 and have their eyes always fixed on the unity of genera1 while others--with a strong empirical tendency--aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena1 and almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character of these according to general principles4 ,the latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle1 the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions4 ,this principle authorizes me1 beginning at the genus1 to descend to the various and diverse contained under it2 and in this way extension1 as in the former case unity1 is assured to the system4 ,for if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus1 we cannot discover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that sphere2 just as it is impossible1 from the consideration of the space occupied by matter1 to determine how far we can proceed in the division of it4 ,hence every genus must contain different species1 and these again different subspecies2 and as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere 7must be of a certain extent1 as a conceptus communis71 reason demands that no species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest possible4 ,for a species or sub-species1 being always a conception1 which contains only what is common to a number of different things1 does not completely determine any individual thing1 or relate immediately to it1 and must consequently contain other conceptions1 that is1 other sub-species under it4 ,this law of specification may be thus expressed3 entium varietates non temere sunt minuendae4 ,but it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without sense or application1 were it not based upon a transcendental law of specification1 which certainly does not require that the differences existing in phenomena should be infinite in number1 for the logical principle1 which merely maintains the indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception1 in relation to its possible division1 does not authorize this statement2 while it does impose upon the understanding the duty of searching for subspecies to every species1 and minor differences in every difference4 ,for1 were there no lower conceptions1 neither could there be any higher4 ,now the understanding cognizes only by means of conceptions2 consequently1 how far soever it may proceed in division1 never by mere intuition1 but always by lower and lower conceptions4 ,the cognition of phenomena in their complete determination 7which is possible only by means of the understanding7 requires an unceasingly continued specification of conceptions1 and a progression to ever smaller differences1 of which abstraction had been made in the conception of the species1 and still more in that of the genus4 ,this law of specification cannot be deduced from experience2 it can never present us with a principle of so universal an application4 ,empirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of diversities1 and requires the guidance of the transcendental law1 as a principle of the reason--a law which imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for differences1 even although these may not present themselves to the senses4 ,that absorbent earths are of different kinds could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason1 which imposes upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences existing between these earths1 and supposes that nature is richer in substances than our senses would indicate4 ,the faculty of the understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of differences in the objects of nature1 as under the condition that these objects are homogeneous1 because we could not possess conceptions1 nor make any use of our understanding1 were not the phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects dissimilar1 as well as similar1 in their character4 ,reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations of this faculty3 #a4 ,by the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse in higher genera2 #b4 ,by the principle of the variety of the homogeneous in lower species2 and1 to complete the systematic unity1 it adds1 #c4 ,a law of the affinity of all conceptions which prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of diversity4 ,we may term these the principles of the homogeneity1 the specification1 and the continuity of forms4 ,the latter results from the union of the two former1 inasmuch as we regard the systematic connection as complete in thought1 in the ascent to higher genera1 as well as in the descent to lower species4 ,for all diversities must be related to each other1 as they all spring from one highest genus1 descending through the different gradations of a more and more extended determination4 ,we may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical principles in the following manner4 ,every conception may be regarded as a point1 which1 as the standpoint of a spectator1 has a certain horizon1 which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be viewed1 so to speak1 from that centre4 ,within this horizon there must be an infinite number of other points1 each of which has its own horizon1 smaller and more circumscribed2 in other words1 every species contains sub-species1 according to the principle of specification1 and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons 7subspecies71 but not of points 7individuals71 which possess no extent4 ,but different horizons or genera1 which include under them so many conceptions1 may have one common horizon1 from which1 as from a mid-point1 they may be surveyed2 and we may proceed thus1 till we arrive at the highest genus1 or universal and true horizon1 which is determined by the highest conception1 and which contains under itself all differences and varieties1 as genera1 species1 and subspecies4 ,to this highest standpoint ,i am conducted by the law of homogeneity1 as to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law of specification4 ,now as in this way there exists no void in the whole extent of all possible conceptions1 and as out of the sphere of these the mind can discover nothing1 there arises from the presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned1 and its complete division1 the principle3 ,non datur vacuum formarum4 ,this principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest genera1 which stand isolated1 so to speak1 from each other1 but all the various genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest and universal genus2 and hence follows immediately the principle3 ,datur continuum formarum4 ,this principle indicates that all differences of species limit each other1 and do not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus1 but only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other4 ,in one word1 there are no species or sub-species which 7in the view of reason7 are the nearest possible to each other2 intermediate species or sub-species being always possible1 the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing between these4 ,the first law1 therefore1 directs us to avoid the notion that there exist different primal genera1 and enounces the fact of perfect homogeneity2 the second imposes a check upon this tendency to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species1 before proceeding to apply our general conceptions to individuals4 ,the third unites both the former1 by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the most various diversity1 by means of the gradual transition from one species to another4 ,thus it indicates a relationship between the different branches or species1 in so far as they all spring from the same stem4 ,but this logical law of the continuum specierum 7formarum logicarum7 presupposes a transcendental principle 7lex continui in natura71 without which the understanding might be led into error1 by following the guidance of the former1 and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to that prescribed by nature4 ,this law must1 consequently1 be based upon pure transcendental1 and not upon empirical1 considerations4 ,for1 in the latter case1 it would come later than the system2 whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of nature4 ,these principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature2 although when any such connection is discovered1 it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere of nature--and thus they are in this respect not without their use4 ,but we go farther1 and maintain that it is manifest that these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes1 variety in effects1 and affinity in phenomena1 are in accordance both with reason and nature1 and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world4 ,but it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea1 to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience4 ,and this for two reasons4 ,first1 because the species in nature are really divided1 and hence form quanta discreta2 and1 if the gradual progression through their affinity were continuous1 the intermediate members lying between two given species must be infinite in number1 which is impossible4 ,secondly1 because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this law1 inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences3 it merely contains a general indication that it is our duty to seek for and1 if possible1 to discover them4 ,when we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order conformable to their employment in experience1 they will stand thus3 ,variety1 ,affinity1 ,unity1 each of them1 as ideas1 being taken in the highest degree of their completeness4 ,reason presupposes the existence of cognitions of the understanding1 which have a direct relation to experience1 and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions--a unity which far transcends all experience or empirical notions4 ,the affinity of the diverse1 notwithstanding the differences existing between its parts1 has a relation to things1 but a still closer one to the mere properties and powers of things4 ,for example1 imperfect experience may represent the orbits of the planets as circular4 ,but we discover variations from this course1 and we proceed to suppose that the planets revolve in a path which1 if not a circle1 is of a character very similar to it4 ,that is to say1 the movements of those planets which do not form a circle will approximate more or less to the properties of a circle1 and probably form an ellipse4 ,the paths of comets exhibit still greater variations1 for1 so far as our observation extends1 they do not return upon their own course in a circle or ellipse4 ,but we proceed to the conjecture that comets describe a parabola1 a figure which is closely allied to the ellipse4 ,in fact1 a parabola is merely an ellipse1 with its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent4 ,thus these principles conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits1 and1 proceeding farther1 to a unity as regards the cause of the motions of the heavenly bodies--that is1 gravitation4 ,but we go on extending our conquests over nature1 and endeavour to explain all seeming deviations from these rules1 and even make additions to our system which no experience can ever substantiate--for example1 the theory1 in affinity with that of ellipses1 of hyperbolic paths of comets1 pursuing which1 these bodies leave our solar system and1 passing from sun to sun1 unite the most distant parts of the infinite universe1 which is held together by the same moving power4 ,the most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is that they seem to be transcendental1 and1 although only containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason1 and although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an asymptotic relation alone 7to use a mathematical term71 that is1 continually approximate1 without ever being able to attain to them1 they possess1 notwithstanding1 as priori synthetical propositions1 objective though undetermined validity1 and are available as rules for possible experience4 ,in the elaboration of our experience1 they may also be employed with great advantage1 as heuristic#gj principles4 ,a transcendental deduction of them cannot be made2 such a deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas1 as has been already shown4 #gj ,from the ,greek1 eurhioko4 ,we distinguished1 in the ,transcendental ,analytic1 the dynamical principles of the understanding1 which are regulative principles of intuition1 from the mathematical1 which are constitutive principles of intuition4 ,these dynamical laws are1 however1 constitutive in relation to experience1 inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which experience could not exist possible priori4 ,but the principles of pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical conceptions1 because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be discovered1 and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto4 ,now1 if ,i grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience1 as constitutive principles1 how shall ,i secure for them employment and objective validity as regulative principles1 and in what way can they be so employed8 ,the understanding is the object of reason1 as sensibility is the object of the understanding4 ,the production of systematic unity in all the empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation of reason2 just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions1 and subject them to empirical laws4 ,but the operations of the understanding are1 without the schemata of sensibility1 undetermined2 and1 in the same manner1 the unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which1 and the extent to which1 the understanding ought to carry the systematic connection of its conceptions4 ,but1 although it is impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding1 there must be some analogon of this schema4 ,this analogon is the idea of the maximum of the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle4 ,for we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely perfect1 all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an indeterminate and various content having been abstracted4 ,thus the idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema1 with this difference1 that the application of the categories to the schema of reason does not present a cognition of any object 7as is the case with the application of the categories to sensuous schemata71 but merely provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the exercise of the understanding4 ,now1 as every principle which imposes upon the exercise of the understanding priori compliance with the rule of systematic unity also relates1 although only in an indirect manner1 to an object of experience1 the principles of pure reason will also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience4 ,but they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any empirical object2 they will merely indicate the procedure1 following which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding may be in complete harmony and connection with itself--a result which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle of systematic unity1 so far as that is possible1 and deduced from it4 ,i term all subjective principles1 which are not derived from observation of the constitution of an object1 but from the interest which ,reason has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition of that object1 maxims of reason4 ,thus there are maxims of speculative reason1 which are based solely upon its speculative interest1 although they appear to be objective principles4 ,when principles which are really regulative are regarded as constitutive1 and employed as objective principles1 contradictions must arise2 but if they are considered as mere maxims1 there is no room for contradictions of any kind1 as they then merely indicate the different interests of reason1 which occasion differences in the mode of thought4 ,in effect1 ,reason has only one single interest1 and the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference in1 and a reciprocal limitation of1 the methods by which this interest is satisfied4 ,this reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity--in accordance with the principle of specification2 another1 the interest of unity--in accordance with the principle of aggregation4 ,each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is examining1 and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two principles1 neither of which are objective1 but originate solely from the interest of reason1 and on this account to be termed maxims rather than principles4 ,when ,i observe intelligent men disputing about the distinctive characteristics of men1 animals1 or plants1 and even of minerals1 those on the one side assuming the existence of certain national characteristics1 certain well-defined and hereditary distinctions of family1 race1 and so on1 while the other side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and dispositions1 and that all differences are but the result of external and accidental circumstances--,i have only to consider for a moment the real nature of the subject of discussion1 to arrive at the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of1 and that there is little probability of either party being able to speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of the subject itself4 ,both have1 in reality1 been struggling for the twofold interest of reason2 the one maintaining the one interest1 the other the other4 ,but this difference between the maxims of diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted2 although1 so long as they are regarded as objective principles1 they must occasion not only contradictions and polemic1 but place hinderances in the way of the advancement of truth1 until some means is discovered of reconciling these conflicting interests1 and bringing reason into union and harmony with itself4 ,the same is the case with the so-called law discovered by ,leibnitz1 and supported with remarkable ability by ,bonnet--the law of the continuous gradation of created beings1 which is nothing more than an inference from the principle of affinity2 for observation and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth4 ,the steps of this ladder1 as they appear in experience1 are too far apart from each other1 and the so-called petty differences between different kinds of animals are in nature commonly so wide separations that no confidence can be placed in such views 7particularly when we reflect on the great variety of things1 and the ease with which we can discover resemblances71 and no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes of nature4 ,on the other hand1 the method of investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle1 and the maxim which requires us to regard this order--it being still undetermined how far it extends--as really existing in nature1 is beyond doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason--a principle which extends farther than any experience or observation of ours and which1 without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience1 guides us to the goal of systematic unity4 ,of the ,ultimate ,end of the ,natural ,dialectic of ,human ,reason4 ,the ideas of pure reason cannot be1 of themselves and in their own nature1 dialectical2 it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise4 ,for they originate in the nature of reason itself1 and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of confidence and promotive of error4 ,it is to be expected1 therefore1 that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim4 ,it is true1 the mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and contradiction1 and affect to despise the government of that faculty1 because they cannot understand its constitution1 while it is to its beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its procedure4 ,we cannot employ an priori conception with certainty1 until we have made a transcendental deduction therefore4 ,the ideas of pure reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories4 ,but if they are to possess the least objective validity1 and to represent anything but mere creations of thought 7entia rationis ratiocinantis71 a deduction of them must be possible4 ,this deduction will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason2 and it is to this part ,of our labours that we now proceed4 ,there is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the mind as an object in an absolute sense1 or merely as an ideal object4 ,in the former case ,i employ my conceptions to determine the object2 in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema1 which does not relate directly to an object1 not even in a hypothetical sense1 but which is useful only for the purpose of representing other objects to the mind1 in a mediate and indirect manner1 by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect4 ,thus ,i say the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea2 that is to say1 its objective reality does not consist in the fact that it has an immediate relation to an object 7for in this sense we have no means of establishing its objective validity71 it is merely a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the unity of reason--the schema of a thing in general1 which is useful towards the production of the highest degree of systematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason1 in which we deduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea1 as the ground or cause of the said object of experience4 ,in this way1 the idea is properly a heuristic1 and not an ostensive1 conception2 it does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an object1 it merely indicates how1 under the guidance of the idea1 we ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects in the world of experience4 ,now1 if it can be shown that the three kinds of transcendental ideas 7psychological1 cosmological1 and theological71 although not relating directly to any object nor determining it1 do nevertheless1 on the supposition of the existence of an ideal object1 produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical employment of the reason1 and extend our empirical cognition1 without ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it--it must be a necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas4 ,and this forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas1 not as constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience1 but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of empirical cognition1 which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended within its own proper limits1 to an extent unattainable by the operation of the principles of the understanding alone4 ,i shall make this plainer4 ,guided by the principles involved in these ideas1 we must1 in the first place1 so connect all the phenomena1 actions1 and feelings of the mind1 as if it were a simple substance1 which1 endowed with personal identity1 possesses a permanent existence 7in this life at least71 while its states1 among which those of the body are to be included as external conditions1 are in continual change4 ,secondly1 in cosmology1 we must investigate the conditions of all natural phenomena1 internal as well as external1 as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member1 while we do not1 on this account1 deny the existence of intelligible grounds of these phenomena1 although we never employ them to explain phenomena1 for the simple reason that they are not objects of our cognition4 ,thirdly1 in the sphere of theology1 we must regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an absolute1 but dependent and sensuously-conditioned unity1 and at the same time as based upon a sole1 supreme1 and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world itself--a ground which is a self-subsistent1 primeval and creative reason1 in relation to which we so employ our reason in the field of experience1 as if all objects drew their origin from that archetype of all reason4 ,in other words1 we ought not to deduce the internal phenomena of the mind from a simple thinking substance1 but deduce them from each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a simple being2 we ought not to deduce the phenomena1 order1 and unity of the universe from a supreme intelligence1 but merely draw from this idea of a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of causes and effects4 ,now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess an objective and hyperbolic existence1 except the cosmological ideas1 which lead reason into an antinomy3 the psychological and theological ideas are not antinomial4 ,they contain no contradiction2 and how1 then1 can any one dispute their objective reality1 since he who denies it knows as little about their possibility as we who affirm8 ,and yet1 when we wish to admit the existence of a thing1 it is not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the way2 for it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of thought1 which transcend1 though they do not contradict1 all our conceptions1 as real and determinate objects1 solely upon the authority of a speculative reason striving to compass its own aims4 ,they cannot1 therefore1 be admitted to be real in themselves2 they can only possess a comparative reality--that of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition4 ,they are to be regarded not as actual things1 but as in some measure analogous to them4 ,we abstract from the object of the idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our understanding1 but which1 on the other hand1 are the sole conditions of our possessing a determinate conception of any given thing4 ,and thus we cogitate a something1 of the real nature of which we have not the least conception1 but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to the whole system of phenomena1 analogous to that in which phenomena stand to each other4 ,by admitting these ideal beings1 we do not really extend our cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience2 we extend merely the empirical unity of our experience1 by the aid of systematic unity1 the schema of which is furnished by the idea1 which is therefore valid--not as a constitutive1 but as a regulative principle4 ,for although we posit a thing corresponding to the idea--a something1 an actual existence--we do not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions4 ,this existence is purely ideal1 and not objective2 it is the mere expression of the systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of experience4 ,there are no attempts made at deciding what the ground of this unity may be1 or what the real nature of this imaginary being4 ,thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of ,god1 which is presented to us by speculative reason1 is in the strictest sense deistic4 ,in other words1 reason does not assure us of the objective validity of the conception2 it merely gives us the idea of something1 on which the supreme and necessary unity of all experience is based4 ,this something we cannot1 following the analogy of a real substance1 cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all things operating in accordance with rational laws1 if we regard it as an individual object2 although we should rest contented with the idea alone as a regulative principle of reason1 and make no attempt at completing the sum of the conditions imposed by thought4 ,this attempt is1 indeed1 inconsistent with the grand aim of complete systematic unity in the sphere of cognition--a unity to which no bounds are set by reason4 ,hence it happens that1 admitting a divine being1 ,i can have no conception of the internal possibility of its perfection1 or of the necessity of its existence4 ,the only advantage of this admission is that it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the contingent1 and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of experience4 ,but ,i cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis itself2 and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight into the subject1 but its speculative interest alone which induces it to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our cognition1 for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as parts of a systematic whole4 ,here a distinction presents itself1 in regard to the way in which we may cogitate a presupposition--a distinction which is somewhat subtle1 but of great importance in transcendental philosophy4 ,i may have sufficient grounds to admit something1 or the existence of something1 in a relative point of view 7suppositio relativa71 without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense 7suppositio absoluta74 ,this distinction is undoubtedly requisite1 in the case of a regulative principle1 the necessity of which we recognize1 though we are ignorant of the source and cause of that necessity1 and which we assume to be based upon some ultimate ground1 for the purpose of being able to cogitate the universality of the principle in a more determinate way4 ,for example1 ,i cogitate the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental idea4 ,but ,i cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in itself1 because all of the conceptions by which ,i can cogitate an object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of its existence2 nay1 the conditions of the objective validity of my conceptions are excluded by the idea--by the very fact of its being an idea4 ,the conceptions of reality1 substance1 causality1 nay1 even that of necessity in existence1 have no significance out of the sphere of empirical cognition1 and cannot1 beyond that sphere1 determine any object4 ,they may1 accordingly1 be employed to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense1 but they are utterly inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself considered as a whole2 because in this case the ground of explanation must lie out of and beyond the world1 and cannot1 therefore1 be an object of possible experience4 ,now1 ,i may admit the existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature--the object of a mere idea1 relatively to the world of sense2 although ,i have no ground to admit its existence absolutely and in itself4 ,for if an idea 7that of a systematic and complete unity1 of which ,i shall presently speak more particularly7 lies at the foundation of the most extended empirical employment of reason1 and if this idea cannot be adequately represented in concreto1 although it is indispensably necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest possible degree--,i am not only authorized1 but compelled1 to realize this idea1 that is1 to posit a real object corresponding thereto4 ,but ,i cannot profess to know this object2 it is to me merely a something1 to which1 as the ground of systematic unity in cognition1 ,i attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed by the understanding in the sphere of experience4 ,following the analogy of the notions of reality1 substance1 causality1 and necessity1 ,i cogitate a being1 which possesses all these attributes in the highest degree2 and1 as this idea is the offspring of my reason alone1 ,i cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason1 and as the cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest possible harmony and unity4 ,thus ,i abstract all conditions that would limit my idea1 solely for the purpose of rendering systematic unity possible in the world of empirical diversity1 and thus securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in that sphere4 ,this ,i am enabled to do1 by regarding all connections and relations in the world of sense1 as if they were the dispositions of a supreme reason1 of which our reason is but a faint image4 ,i then proceed to cogitate this ,supreme ,being by conceptions which have1 properly1 no meaning or application1 except in the world of sense4 ,but as ,i am authorized to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a being in a relative respect alone1 that is1 as the substratum of the greatest possible unity in experience--,i may attribute to a being which ,i regard as distinct from the world1 such properties as belong solely to the sphere of sense and experience4 ,for ,i do not desire1 and am not justified in desiring1 to cognize this object of my idea1 as it exists in itself2 for ,i possess no conceptions sufficient for this task1 those of reality1 substance1 causality1 nay1 even that of necessity in existence1 losing all significance1 and becoming merely the signs of conceptions1 without content and without applicability1 when ,i attempt to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense4 ,i cogitate merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest possible systematic unity of experience1 solely for the purpose of employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs reason in its empirical exercise4 ,it is evident1 at the first view1 that we cannot presuppose the reality of this transcendental object1 by means of the conceptions of reality1 substance1 causality1 and so on1 because these conceptions cannot be applied to anything that is distinct from the world of sense4 ,thus the supposition of a ,supreme ,being or cause is purely relative2 it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of experience2 such a being is but a something1 of whose existence in itself we have not the least conception4 ,thus1 too1 it becomes sufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being in relation to objects given by sense1 although we can never have the least conception of this being1 or of its absolute necessity4 ,and now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental dialectic1 and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason--which become dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness4 ,pure reason is1 in fact1 occupied with itself1 and not with any object4 ,objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of an empirical conception2 it is only the cognitions of the understanding that are presented to it1 for the purpose of receiving the unity of a rational conception1 that is1 of being connected according to a principle4 ,the unity of reason is the unity of system2 and this systematic unity is not an objective principle1 extending its dominion over objects1 but a subjective maxim1 extending its authority over the empirical cognition of objects4 ,the systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment of the understanding not only advances the extension of that employment1 but ensures its correctness1 and thus the principle of a systematic unity of this nature is also objective1 although only in an indefinite respect 7principium vagum74 ,it is not1 however1 a constitutive principle1 determining an object to which it directly relates2 it is merely a regulative principle or maxim1 advancing and strengthening the empirical exercise of reason1 by the opening up of new paths of which the understanding is ignorant1 while it never conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience4 ,but reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity1 without at the same time cogitating an object of the idea--an object that cannot be presented in any experience1 which contains no concrete example of a complete systematic unity4 ,this being 7ens rationis ratiocinatae7 is therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real absolutely and in itself4 ,on the contrary1 it forms merely the problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces among the phenomena of the sensuous world4 ,we look upon this connection1 in the light of the above-mentioned idea1 as if it drew its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea4 ,and yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure foundation for the systematic unity of experience--a unity indispensable to reason1 advantageous to the understanding1 and promotive of the interests of empirical cognition4 ,we mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an enouncement1 or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of a real thing1 which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a systematic constitution of the universe4 ,on the contrary1 it is left completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this so-called ground may be4 ,the idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view1 from which this unity1 so essential to reason and so beneficial to the understanding1 may be regarded as radiating4 ,in one word1 this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative principle1 by means of which ,reason1 so far as in her lies1 extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of experience4 ,the first object of an idea of this kind is the ego1 considered merely as a thinking nature or soul4 ,if ,i wish to investigate the properties of a thinking being1 ,i must interrogate experience4 ,but ,i find that ,i can apply none of the categories to this object1 the schema of these categories1 which is the condition of their application1 being given only in sensuous intuition4 ,but ,i cannot thus attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena of the internal sense4 ,instead1 therefore1 of an empirical conception of what the soul really is1 reason takes the conception of the empirical unity of all thought1 and1 by cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive1 constructs the rational conception or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable1 possessing personal identity1 and in connection with other real things external to it2 in one word1 it constructs the idea of a simple self-subsistent intelligence4 ,but the real aim of reason in this procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul4 ,that is1 reason desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal sense as existing in one subject1 all powers as deduced from one fundamental power1 all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a being which is permanent and always the same1 and all phenomena in space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of thought4 ,essential simplicity 7with the other attributes predicated of the ego7 is regarded as the mere schema of this regulative principle2 it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the properties of the soul4 ,for these properties may rest upon quite different grounds1 of which we are completely ignorant2 just as the above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it is in itself1 even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it1 inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea1 which cannot be represented in concreto4 ,nothing but good can result from a psychological idea of this kind1 if we only take proper care not to consider it as more than an idea2 that is1 if we regard it as valid merely in relation to the employment of reason1 in the sphere of the phenomena of the soul4 ,under the guidance of this idea1 or principle1 no empirical laws of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that which is a phenomenon of the internal sense alone2 no windy hypotheses of the generation1 annihilation1 and palingenesis of souls are admitted4 ,thus the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure1 and unmixed with heterogeneous elements2 while the investigation of reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in this sphere of knowledge to a single principle4 ,all this is best effected1 nay1 cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a schema1 which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual existence4 ,the psychological idea is1 therefore1 meaningless and inapplicable1 except as the schema of a regulative conception4 ,for1 if ,i ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature--it is a question which has no meaning4 ,from such a conception has been abstracted1 not merely all corporeal nature1 but all nature1 that is1 all the predicates of a possible experience2 and consequently1 all the conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this conception have disappeared4 ,but1 if these conditions are absent1 it is evident that the conception is meaningless4 ,the second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception of the universe4 ,for nature is properly the only object presented to us1 in regard to which reason requires regulative principles4 ,nature is twofold--thinking and corporeal nature4 ,to cogitate the latter in regard to its internal possibility1 that is1 to determine the application of the categories to it1 no idea is required--no representation which transcends experience4 ,in this sphere1 therefore1 an idea is impossible1 sensuous intuition being our only guide2 while1 in the sphere of psychology1 we require the fundamental idea 7,i71 which contains priori a certain form of thought namely1 the unity of the ego4 ,pure reason has1 therefore1 nothing left but nature in general1 and the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance with some principle4 ,the absolute totality of the series of these conditions is an idea1 which can never be fully realized in the empirical exercise of reason1 while it is serviceable as a rule for the procedure of reason in relation to that totality4 ,it requires us1 in the explanation of given phenomena 7in the regress or ascent in the series71 to proceed as if the series were infinite in itself1 that is1 were prolonged in indefinitum2 while on the other hand1 where reason is regarded as itself the determining cause 7in the region of freedom71 we are required to proceed as if we had not before us an object of sense1 but of the pure understanding4 ,in this latter case1 the conditions do not exist in the series of phenomena1 but may be placed quite out of and beyond it1 and the series of conditions may be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible cause4 ,all this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles1 and not constitutive2 and that their aim is not to realize an actual totality in such series4 ,the full discussion of this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason4 ,the third idea of pure reason1 containing the hypothesis of a being which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis1 is that of the one and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series1 in other words1 the idea of ,god4 ,we have not the slightest ground absolutely to admit the existence of an object corresponding to this idea2 for what can empower or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of the highest perfection--a being whose existence is absolutely necessary--merely because we possess the conception of such a being8 ,the answer is3 ,it is the existence of the world which renders this hypothesis necessary4 ,but this answer makes it perfectly evident that the idea of this being1 like all other speculative ideas1 is essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason that it shall regulate the connection which it and its subordinate faculties introduce into the phenomena of the world by principles of systematic unity and1 consequently1 that it shall regard all phenomena as originating from one all-embracing being1 as the supreme and all-sufficient cause4 ,from this it is plain that the only aim of reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal rule for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience2 that it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits of experience2 and that1 consequently1 this idea does not contain any constitutive principle4 ,the highest formal unity1 which is based upon ideas alone1 is the unity of all things--a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose2 and the speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it originated from the intention and design of a supreme reason4 ,this principle unfolds to the view of reason in the sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects1 and invites it to connect the phenomena of the world according to teleological laws1 and in this way to attain to the highest possible degree of systematic unity4 ,the hypothesis of a supreme intelligence1 as the sole cause of the universe--an intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal existence--is accordingly always of the greatest service to reason4 ,thus1 if we presuppose1 in relation to the figure of the earth 7which is round1 but somewhat flattened at the poles71#ga or that of mountains or seas1 wise designs on the part of an author of the universe1 we cannot fail to make1 by the light of this supposition1 a great number of interesting discoveries4 ,if we keep to this hypothesis1 as a principle which is purely regulative1 even error cannot be very detrimental4 ,for1 in this case1 error can have no more serious consequences than that1 where we expected to discover a teleological connection 7nexus finalis71 only a mechanical or physical connection appears4 ,in such a case1 we merely fail to find the additional form of unity we expected1 but we do not lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in experience4 ,but even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the law in its general and teleological relations4 ,for although we may convict an anatomist of an error1 when he connects the limb of some animal with a certain purpose1 it is quite impossible to prove in a single case that any arrangement of nature1 be it what it may1 is entirely without aim or design4 ,and thus medical physiology1 by the aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason1 extends its very limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts of an organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost confidence1 and with the approbation of all reflecting men1 that every organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain design4 ,now1 this is a supposition which1 if regarded as of a constitutive character1 goes much farther than any experience or observation of ours can justify4 ,hence it is evident that it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason1 which aims at the highest degree of systematic unity1 by the aid of the idea of a causality according to design in a supreme cause--a cause which it regards as the highest intelligence4 #ga ,the advantages which a circular form1 in the case of the earth1 has over every other1 are well known4 ,but few are aware that the slight flattening at the poles1 which gives it the figure of a spheroid1 is the only cause which prevents the elevations of continents or even of mountains1 perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion1 from continually altering the position of the axis of the earth--and that to some considerable degree in a short time4 ,the great protuberance of the earth under the ,equator serves to overbalance the impetus of all other masses of earth1 and thus to preserve the axis of the earth1 so far as we can observe1 in its present position4 ,and yet this wise arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass4 ,if1 however1 we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely regulative influence1 reason is betrayed into numerous errors4 ,for it has then left the ground of experience1 in which alone are to be found the criteria of truth1 and has ventured into the region of the incomprehensible and unsearchable1 on the heights of which it loses its power and collectedness1 because it has completely severed its connection with experience4 ,the first error which arises from our employing the idea of a ,supreme ,being as a constitutive 7in repugnance to the very nature of an idea71 and not as a regulative principle1 is the error of inactive reason 7ignava ratio74#gb ,we may so term every principle which requires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete1 and allows reason to cease its inquiries1 as if it had fully executed its task4 ,thus the psychological idea of the ego1 when employed as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul1 and for the extension of our knowledge regarding this subject beyond the limits of experience--even to the condition of the soul after death--is convenient enough for the purposes of pure reason1 but detrimental and even ruinous to its interests in the sphere of nature and experience4 ,the dogmatizing spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality through all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking substance1 the interest which we take in things and events that can happen only after our death1 from a consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject1 and so on4 ,thus he dispenses with all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal phenomena1 and with all possible explanations of them upon purely natural grounds2 while1 at the dictation of a transcendent reason1 he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience1 greatly to his own ease and convenience1 but to the sacrifice of all1 genuine insight and intelligence4 ,these prejudicial consequences become still more evident1 in the case of the dogmatical treatment of our idea of a ,supreme ,intelligence1 and the theological system of nature 7physico-theology7 which is falsely based upon it4 ,for1 in this case1 the aims which we observe in nature1 and often those which we merely fancy to exist1 make the investigation of causes a very easy task1 by directing us to refer such and such phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the ,supreme ,wisdom1 while we ought to investigate their causes in the general laws of the mechanism of matter4 ,we are thus recommended to consider the labour of reason as ended1 when we have merely dispensed with its employment1 which is guided surely and safely only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world--which are arranged according to immanent and general laws4 ,this error may be avoided1 if we do not merely consider from the view-point of final aims certain parts of nature1 such as the division and structure of a continent1 the constitution and direction of certain mountain-chains1 or even the organization existing in the vegetable and animal kingdoms1 but look upon this systematic unity of nature in a perfectly general way1 in relation to the idea of a ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,if we pursue this advice1 we lay as a foundation for all investigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature in accordance with universal laws1 for which no particular arrangement of nature is exempt1 but only cognized by us with more or less difficulty2 and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connection1 which we do not attempt to anticipate or predetermine4 ,all that we do1 and ought to do1 is to follow out the physico-mechanical connection in nature according to general laws1 with the hope of discovering1 sooner or later1 the teleological connection also4 ,thus1 and thus only1 can the principle of final unity aid in the extension of the employment of reason in the sphere of experience1 without being in any case detrimental to its interests4 #gb ,this was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical argument1 which ran thus3 ,if it is your fate to die of this disease1 you will die1 whether you employ a physician or not4 ,cicero says that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation1 because1 if followed1 it puts an end to the employment of reason in the affairs of life4 ,for a similar reason1 ,i have applied this designation to the sophistical argument of pure reason4 ,the second error which arises from the misconception of the principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason 7perversa ratio1 usteron roteron rationis74 ,the idea of systematic unity is available as a regulative principle in the connection of phenomena according to general natural laws2 and1 how far soever we have to travel upon the path of experience to discover some fact or event1 this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the more nearly to the completion of its use in the sphere of nature1 although that completion can never be attained4 ,but this error reverses the procedure of reason4 ,we begin by hypostatizing the principle of systematic unity1 and by giving an anthropomorphic determination to the conception of a ,supreme ,intelligence1 and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature4 ,thus not only does teleology1 which ought to aid in the completion of unity in accordance with general laws1 operate to the destruction of its influence1 but it hinders reason from attaining its proper aim1 that is1 the proof1 upon natural grounds1 of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause4 ,for1 if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in nature priori1 that is1 as essentially belonging to nature1 how can we be directed to endeavour to discover this unity and1 rising gradually through its different degrees1 to approach the supreme perfection of an author of all--a perfection which is absolutely necessary1 and therefore cognizable priori8 ,the regulative principle directs us to presuppose systematic unity absolutely and1 consequently1 as following from the essential nature of things--but only as a unity of nature1 not merely cognized empirically1 but presupposed priori1 although only in an indeterminate manner4 ,but if ,i insist on basing nature upon the foundation of a supreme ordaining ,being1 the unity of nature is in effect lost4 ,for1 in this case1 it is quite foreign and unessential to the nature of things1 and cannot be cognized from the general laws of nature4 ,and thus arises a vicious circular argument1 what ought to have been proved having been presupposed4 ,to take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a constitutive principle1 and to hypostatize and make a cause out of that which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and harmonious exercise of reason1 involves reason in inextricable embarrassments4 ,the investigation of nature pursues its own path under the guidance of the chain of natural causes1 in accordance with the general laws of nature1 and ever follows the light of the idea of an author of the universe--not for the purpose of deducing the finality1 which it constantly pursues1 from this ,supreme ,being1 but to attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which it seeks in the existence of the phenomena of nature1 and1 if possible1 in that of all things to cognize this being1 consequently1 as absolutely necessary4 ,whether this latter purpose succeed or not1 the idea is and must always be a true one1 and its employment1 when merely regulative1 must always be accompanied by truthful and beneficial results4 ,complete unity1 in conformity with aims1 constitutes absolute perfection4 ,but if we do not find this unity in the nature of the things which go to constitute the world of experience1 that is1 of objective cognition1 consequently in the universal and necessary laws of nature1 how can we infer from this unity the idea of the supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being1 which is the origin of all causality8 ,the greatest systematic unity1 and consequently teleological unity1 constitutes the very foundation of the possibility of the most extended employment of human reason4 ,the idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our reason4 ,this idea is a legislative one2 and hence it is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative reason corresponding to it1 from which the systematic unity of nature--the object of the operations of reason--must be derived4 ,in the course of our discussion of the antinomies1 we stated that it is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise2 and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition1 which is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural phenomena1 cannot in this case be admitted1 because the questions raised do not relate to the nature of things1 but are necessarily originated by the nature of reason itself1 and relate to its own internal constitution4 ,we can now establish this assertion1 which at first sight appeared so rash1 in relation to the two questions in which reason takes the greatest interest1 and thus complete our discussion of the dialectic of pure reason4 ,if1 then1 the question is asked1 in relation to transcendental theology1#gc first1 whether there is anything distinct from the world1 which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according to general laws8 ,the answer is3 ,certainly4 ,for the world is a sum of phenomena2 there must1 therefore1 be some transcendental basis of these phenomena1 that is1 a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone4 ,if1 secondly1 the question is asked whether this being is substance1 whether it is of the greatest reality1 whether it is necessary1 and so forth8 ,i answer that this question is utterly without meaning4 ,for all the categories which aid me in forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the world of sense1 and are without meaning when not applied to objects of actual or possible experience4 ,out of this sphere1 they are not properly conceptions1 but the mere marks or indices of conceptions1 which we may admit1 although they cannot1 without the help of experience1 help us to understand any subject or thing4 ,if1 thirdly1 the question is whether we may not cogitate this being1 which is distinct from the world1 in analogy with the objects of experience8 ,the answer is3 ,undoubtedly1 but only as an ideal1 and not as a real object4 ,that is1 we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum of the systematic unity1 order1 and finality of the world--a unity which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature4 ,nay1 more1 we may admit into the idea certain anthropomorphic elements1 which are promotive of the interests of this regulative principle4 ,for it is no more than an idea1 which does not relate directly to a being distinct from the world1 but to the regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world1 by means1 however1 of a schema of this unity--the schema of a ,supreme ,intelligence1 who is the wisely-designing author of the universe4 ,what this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself1 we know not--we cannot discover from the idea2 we merely know how we ought to employ the idea of this unity1 in relation to the systematic operation of reason in the sphere of experience4 #gc ,after what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of reason1 ,i need not enter into details regarding the transcendental illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of the internal sense is hypostatized4 ,the procedure is in this case very similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the theological ideal4 ,but1 it will be asked again1 can we on these grounds1 admit the existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world8 ,without doubt2 and not only so1 but we must assume the existence of such a being4 ,but do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience8 ,by no means4 ,for we have merely presupposed a something1 of which we have no conception1 which we do not know as it is in itself2 but1 in relation to the systematic disposition of the universe1 which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature1 we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent existence 7an empirical conception71 that is to say1 we have endowed it with those attributes1 which1 judging from the nature of our own reason1 may contain the ground of such a systematic unity4 ,this idea is therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience of our reason4 ,but if we attribute to it absolute and objective validity1 we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that we cogitate2 and1 by setting out from a basis which is not determinable by considerations drawn from experience1 we place ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from applying this principle to the empirical employment of reason4 ,but1 it will be asked further1 can ,i make any use of this conception and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature8 ,yes1 for this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a fundamental basis4 ,but may ,i regard certain arrangements1 which seemed to have been made in conformity with some fixed aim1 as the arrangements of design1 and look upon them as proceeding from the divine will1 with the intervention1 however1 of certain other particular arrangements disposed to that end8 ,yes1 you may do so2 but at the same time you must regard it as indifferent1 whether it is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in conformity with his highest aims1 or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature1 and at the same time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to general laws1 even in those cases where we are unable to discover that unity4 ,in other words1 it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether you say1 when you have discovered this unity3 ,god has wisely willed it so2 or3 ,nature has wisely arranged this4 ,for it was nothing but the systematic unity1 which reason requires as a basis for the investigation of nature1 that justified you in accepting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative principle2 and1 the farther you advance in the discovery of design and finality1 the more certain the validity of your idea4 ,but1 as the whole aim of this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and systematic unity in nature1 we have1 in so far as we attain this1 to attribute our success to the idea of a ,supreme ,being2 while1 at the same time1 we cannot1 without involving ourselves in contradictions1 overlook the general laws of nature1 as it was in reference to them alone that this idea was employed4 ,we cannot1 ,i say1 overlook the general laws of nature1 and regard this conformity to aims observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin2 inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature4 ,all that we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed as a principle1 and that the properties of the being which is assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena4 ,for the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements 7for without these we could not predicate anything of it72 we may regard it as allowable to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding1 the feelings of pleasure and displeasure1 and faculties of desire and will corresponding to these4 ,at the same time1 we may attribute to this being infinite perfection--a perfection which necessarily transcends that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world authorize us to predicate of it4 ,for the regulative law of systematic unity requires us to study nature on the supposition that systematic and final unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable1 even in the highest diversity4 ,for1 although we may discover little of this cosmical perfection1 it belongs to the legislative prerogative of reason to require us always to seek for and to expect it2 while it must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in accordance with this principle4 ,but it is evident that1 by this idea of a supreme author of all1 which ,i place as the foundation of all inquiries into nature1 ,i do not mean to assert the existence of such a being1 or that ,i have any knowledge of its existence2 and1 consequently1 ,i do not really deduce anything from the existence of this being1 but merely from its idea1 that is to say1 from the nature of things in this world1 in accordance with this idea4 ,a certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used by them regarding the cause of the world4 ,we find them employing the expressions wisdom and care of nature1 and divine wisdom1 as synonymous--nay1 in purely speculative discussions1 preferring the former1 because it does not carry the appearance of greater pretensions than such as we are entitled to make1 and at the same time directs reason to its proper field of action--nature and her phenomena4 ,thus1 pure reason1 which at first seemed to promise us nothing less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience1 is found1 when thoroughly examined1 to contain nothing but regulative principles1 the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of itself4 ,these principles1 by placing the goal of all our struggles at so great a distance1 realize for us the most thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition1 and the highest degree of systematic unity4 ,but1 on the other hand1 if misunderstood and employed as constitutive principles of transcendent cognition1 they become the parents of illusions and contradictions1 while pretending to introduce us to new regions of knowledge4 ,thus all human cognition begins with intuitions1 proceeds from thence to conceptions1 and ends with ideas4 ,although it possesses1 in relation to all three elements1 priori sources of cognition1 which seemed to transcend the limits of all experience1 a thoroughgoing criticism demonstrates that speculative reason can never1 by the aid of these elements1 pass the bounds of possible experience1 and that the proper destination of this highest faculty of cognition is to employ all methods1 and all the principles of these methods1 for the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets of nature1 by the aid of the principles of unity 7among all kinds of which teleological unity is the highest71 while it ought not to attempt to soar above the sphere of experience1 beyond which there lies nought for us but the void inane4 ,the critical examination1 in our ,transcendental ,analytic1 of all the propositions which professed to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience1 completely demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience4 ,if we were not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems1 if we were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape from the constraining power of their evidence1 we might spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical arguments which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its pretensions2 for we should know with the most complete certainty that1 however honest such professions might be1 they are null and valueless1 because they relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility attain4 ,but1 as there is no end to discussion1 if we cannot discover the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are deceived1 and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study1 while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher--it was found necessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its primary sources4 ,and as the inferences of which this dialectic is the parent are not only deceitful1 but naturally possess a profound interest for humanity1 it was advisable at the same time1 to give a full account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure1 and to deposit it in the archives of human reason1 as a warning to all future metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error4 ,,ii4 ,transcendental ,doctrine of ,method ,if we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an edifice1 the idea of which1 at least1 exists in the human mind1 it may be said that we have in the ,transcendental ,doctrine of ,elements examined the materials and determined to what edifice these belong1 and what its height and stability4 ,we have found1 indeed1 that1 although we had purposed to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to ,heaven1 the supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation1 which was spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes1 and high enough to enable us to survey the level plain of experience1 but that the bold undertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materials--not to mention the confusion of tongues1 which gave rise to endless disputes among the labourers on the plan of the edifice1 and at last scattered them over all the world1 each to erect a separate building for himself1 according to his own plans and his own inclinations4 ,our present task relates not to the materials1 but to the plan of an edifice2 and1 as we have had sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which may be found to transcend our natural powers1 while1 at the same time1 we cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the mind1 we must proportion our design to the material which is presented to us1 and which is1 at the same time1 sufficient for all our wants4 ,i understand1 then1 by the transcendental doctrine of method1 the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason4 ,we shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline1 the canon1 the architectonic1 and1 finally1 the history of pure reason4 ,this part of our ,critique will accomplish1 from the transcendental point of view1 what has been usually attempted1 but miserably executed1 under the name of practical logic4 ,it has been badly executed1 ,i say1 because general logic1 not being limited to any particular kind of cognition 7not even to the pure cognition of the understanding7 nor to any particular objects1 it cannot1 without borrowing from other sciences1 do more than present merely the titles or signs of possible methods and the technical expressions1 which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences2 and thus the pupil is made acquainted with names1 the meaning and application of which he is to learn only at some future time4 ,chapter ,i4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason ,negative judgements--those which are so not merely as regards their logical form1 but in respect of their content--are not commonly held in especial respect4 ,they are1 on the contrary1 regarded as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge2 and it almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate1 much less to prize and to respect them4 ,all propositions1 indeed1 may be logically expressed in a negative form2 but1 in relation to the content of our cognition1 the peculiar province of negative judgements is solely to prevent error4 ,for this reason1 too1 negative propositions1 which are framed for the purpose of correcting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible1 are undoubtedly true1 but inane and senseless2 that is1 they are in reality purposeless and1 for this reason1 often very ridiculous4 ,such is the proposition of the schoolman that ,alexander could not have subdued any countries without an army4 ,but where the limits of our possible cognition are very much contracted1 the attraction to new fields of knowledge great1 the illusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive character1 and the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable magnitude--the negative element in knowledge1 which is useful only to guard us against error1 is of far more importance than much of that positive instruction which makes additions to the sum of our knowledge4 ,the restraint which is employed to repress1 and finally to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain rules1 is termed discipline4 ,it is distinguished from culture1 which aims at the formation of a certain degree of skill1 without attempting to repress or to destroy any other mental power1 already existing4 ,in the cultivation of a talent1 which has given evidence of an impulse towards self-development1 discipline takes a negative1#gd culture and doctrine a positive1 part4 #gd ,i am well aware that1 in the language of the schools1 the term discipline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction4 ,but there are so many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the notion of the former1 as a course of corrective training1 from that of the latter1 as the communication of knowledge1 and the nature of things itself demands the appropriation of the most suitable expressions for this distinction1 that it is my desire that the former terms should never be employed in any other than a negative signification4 ,that natural dispositions and talents 7such as imagination and wit71 which ask a free and unlimited development1 require in many respects the corrective influence of discipline1 every one will readily grant4 ,but it may well appear strange that reason1 whose proper duty it is to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind1 should itself require this corrective4 ,it has1 in fact1 hitherto escaped this humiliation1 only because1 in presence of its magnificent pretensions and high position1 no one could readily suspect it to be capable of substituting fancies for conceptions1 and words for things4 ,reason1 when employed in the field of experience1 does not stand in need of criticism1 because its principles are subjected to the continual test of empirical observations4 ,nor is criticism requisite in the sphere of mathematics1 where the conceptions of reason must always be presented in concreto in pure intuition1 and baseless or arbitrary assertions are discovered without difficulty4 ,but where reason is not held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or of pure intuition1 that is1 when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of pure conceptions1 it stands in great need of discipline1 to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience and to keep it from wandering into error4 ,in fact1 the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character4 ,particular errors may be corrected by particular animadversions1 and the causes of these errors may be eradicated by criticism4 ,but where we find1 as in the case of pure reason1 a complete system of illusions and fallacies1 closely connected with each other and depending upon grand general principles1 there seems to be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation1 which1 under the denomination of a discipline1 and founded upon the nature of reason and the objects of its exercise1 shall constitute a system of thorough examination and testing1 which no fallacy will be able to withstand or escape from1 under whatever disguise or concealment it may lurk4 ,but the reader must remark that1 in this the second division of our transcendental ,critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed to the content1 but to the method of the cognition of pure reason4 ,the former task has been completed in the doctrine of elements4 ,but there is so much similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason1 whatever be the object to which it is applied1 while1 at the same time1 its employment in the transcendental sphere is so essentially different in kind from every other1 that1 without the warning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to that end1 the errors are unavoidable which spring from the unskillful employment of the methods which are originated by reason but which are out of place in this sphere4 ,section ,i4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in the ,sphere of ,dogmatism ,the science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience4 ,examples are always contagious2 and they exert an especial influence on the same faculty1 which naturally flatters itself that it will have the same good fortune in other case as fell to its lot in one fortunate instance4 ,hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in the transcendental sphere with equal success and security1 especially when it applies the same method which was attended with such brilliant results in the science of mathematics4 ,it is1 therefore1 of the highest importance for us to know whether the method of arriving at demonstrative certainty1 which is termed mathematical1 be identical with that by which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty in philosophy1 and which is termed in that science dogmatical4 ,philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of conceptions2 mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions4 ,the construction of a conception is the presentation priori of the intuition which corresponds to the conception4 ,for this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite1 which1 as an intuition1 is an individual object2 while1 as the construction of a conception 7a general representation71 it must be seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under that conception4 ,thus ,i construct a triangle1 by the presentation of the object which corresponds to this conception1 either by mere imagination1 in pure intuition1 or upon paper1 in empirical intuition1 in both cases completely priori1 without borrowing the type of that figure from any experience4 ,the individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical2 but it serves1 notwithstanding1 to indicate the conception1 even in its universality1 because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely on the act of the construction of the conception1 and pay no attention to the various modes of determining it1 for example1 its size1 the length of its sides1 the size of its angles1 these not in the least affecting the essential character of the conception4 ,philosophical cognition1 accordingly1 regards the particular only in the general2 mathematical the general in the particular1 nay1 in the individual4 ,this is done1 however1 entirely priori and by means of pure reason1 so that1 as this individual figure is determined under certain universal conditions of construction1 the object of the conception1 to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema1 must be cogitated as universally determined4 ,the essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists1 therefore1 in this formal quality2 it does not regard the difference of the matter or objects of both4 ,those thinkers who aim at distinguishing philosophy from mathematics by asserting that the former has to do with quality merely1 and the latter with quantity1 have mistaken the effect for the cause4 ,the reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to quantity is to be found in its form alone4 ,for it is the conception of quantities only that is capable of being constructed1 that is1 presented priori in intuition2 while qualities cannot be given in any other than an empirical intuition4 ,hence the cognition of qualities by reason is possible only through conceptions4 ,no one can find an intuition which shall correspond to the conception of reality1 except in experience2 it cannot be presented to the mind priori and antecedently to the empirical consciousness of a reality4 ,we can form an intuition1 by means of the mere conception of it1 of a cone1 without the aid of experience2 but the colour of the cone we cannot know except from experience4 ,i cannot present an intuition of a cause1 except in an example which experience offers to me4 ,besides1 philosophy1 as well as mathematics1 treats of quantities2 as1 for example1 of totality1 infinity1 and so on4 ,mathematics1 too1 treats of the difference of lines and surfaces--as spaces of different quality1 of the continuity of extension--as a quality thereof4 ,but1 although in such cases they have a common object1 the mode in which reason considers that object is very different in philosophy from what it is in mathematics4 ,the former confines itself to the general conceptions2 the latter can do nothing with a mere conception1 it hastens to intuition4 ,in this intuition it regards the conception in concreto1 not empirically1 but in an priori intuition1 which it has constructed2 and in which1 all the results which follow from the general conditions of the construction of the conception are in all cases valid for the object of the constructed conception4 ,suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a philosopher and that he is required to discover1 by the philosophical method1 what relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle4 ,he has nothing before him but the conception of a figure enclosed within three right lines1 and1 consequently1 with the same number of angles4 ,he may analyse the conception of a right line1 of an angle1 or of the number three as long as he pleases1 but he will not discover any properties not contained in these conceptions4 ,but1 if this question is proposed to a geometrician1 he at once begins by constructing a triangle4 ,he knows that two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles which proceed from one point in a straight line2 and he goes on to produce one side of his triangle1 thus forming two adjacent angles which are together equal to two right angles4 ,he then divides the exterior of these angles1 by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of the triangle1 and immediately perceives that he has thus got an exterior adjacent angle which is equal to the interior4 ,proceeding in this way1 through a chain of inferences1 and always on the ground of intuition1 he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the question4 ,but mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of quantities 7quanta71 as in the case of geometry2 it occupies itself with pure quantity also 7quantitas71 as in the case of algebra1 where complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated by the conception of quantity4 ,in algebra1 a certain method of notation by signs is adopted1 and these indicate the different possible constructions of quantities1 the extraction of roots1 and so on4 ,after having thus denoted the general conception of quantities1 according to their different relations1 the different operations by which quantity or number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in accordance with general rules4 ,thus1 when one quantity is to be divided by another1 the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar to the operation of division2 and thus algebra1 by means of a symbolical construction of quantity1 just as geometry1 with its ostensive or geometrical construction 7a construction of the objects themselves71 arrives at results which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by the aid of mere conceptions4 ,now1 what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the philosopher and the mathematician1 the former of whom follows the path of conceptions1 while the latter pursues that of intuitions1 which he represents1 priori1 in correspondence with his conceptions8 ,the cause is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction to this ,critique4 ,we do not1 in the present case1 want to discover analytical propositions1 which may be produced merely by analysing our conceptions--for in this the philosopher would have the advantage over his rival2 we aim at the discovery of synthetical propositions--such synthetical propositions1 moreover1 as can be cognized priori4 ,i must not confine myself to that which ,i actually cogitate in my conception of a triangle1 for this is nothing more than the mere definition2 ,i must try to go beyond that1 and to arrive at properties which are not contained in1 although they belong to1 the conception4 ,now1 this is impossible1 unless ,i determine the object present to my mind according to the conditions1 either of empirical1 or of pure1 intuition4 ,in the former case1 ,i should have an empirical proposition 7arrived at by actual measurement of the angles of the triangle71 which would possess neither universality nor necessity2 but that would be of no value4 ,in the latter1 ,i proceed by geometrical construction1 by means of which ,i collect1 in a pure intuition1 just as ,i would in an empirical intuition1 all the various properties which belong to the schema of a triangle in general1 and consequently to its conception1 and thus construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of universality4 ,it would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle1 that is1 to reflect on it discursively2 ,i should get no further than the definition with which ,i had been obliged to set out4 ,there are certainly transcendental synthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions1 and which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy2 but these do not relate to any particular thing1 but to a thing in general1 and enounce the conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of possible experience4 ,but the science of mathematics has nothing to do with such questions1 nor with the question of existence in any fashion2 it is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves1 only in so far as these are connected with the conception of the objects4 ,in the above example1 we merely attempted to show the great difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere of conceptions1 and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction of conceptions4 ,the question naturally arises3 ,what is the cause which necessitates this twofold exercise of reason1 and how are we to discover whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method which reason is pursuing in an argument8 ,all our knowledge relates1 finally1 to possible intuitions1 for it is these alone that present objects to the mind4 ,an priori or non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition--and in this case it can be constructed2 or it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions1 which are not given priori4 ,in this latter case1 it may help us to form synthetical priori judgements1 but only in the discursive method1 by conceptions1 not in the intuitive1 by means of the construction of conceptions4 ,the only priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena--space and time4 ,a conception of space and time as quanta may be presented priori in intuition1 that is1 constructed1 either alone with their quality 7figure71 or as pure quantity 7the mere synthesis of the homogeneous71 by means of number4 ,but the matter of phenomena1 by which things are given in space and time1 can be presented only in perception1 posteriori4 ,the only conception which represents priori this empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a thing in general2 and the priori synthetical cognition of this conception can give us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may be contained in the corresponding posteriori perception2 it is utterly inadequate to present an priori intuition of the real object1 which must necessarily be empirical4 ,synthetical propositions1 which relate to things in general1 an priori intuition of which is impossible1 are transcendental4 ,for this reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the construction of conceptions2 they are priori1 and based entirely on conceptions themselves4 ,they contain merely the rule1 by which we are to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity of that which cannot be intuited priori4 ,but they are incompetent to present any of the conceptions which appear in them in an priori intuition2 these can be given only posteriori1 in experience1 which1 however1 is itself possible only through these synthetical principles4 ,if we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception1 we must go beyond it1 to the intuition in which it is given4 ,if we keep to what is contained in the conception1 the judgement is merely analytical--it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in the conception4 ,but ,i can pass from the conception to the pure or empirical intuition which corresponds to it4 ,i can proceed to examine my conception in concreto1 and to cognize1 either priori or posteriori1 what ,i find in the object of the conception4 ,the former-- priori cognition--is rational-mathematical cognition by means of the construction of the conception2 the latter-- posteriori cognition--is purely empirical cognition1 which does not possess the attributes of necessity and universality4 ,thus ,i may analyse the conception ,i have of gold2 but ,i gain no new information from this analysis1 ,i merely enumerate the different properties which ,i had connected with the notion indicated by the word4 ,my knowledge has gained in logical clearness and arrangement1 but no addition has been made to it4 ,but if ,i take the matter which is indicated by this name1 and submit it to the examination of my senses1 ,i am enabled to form several synthetical--although still empirical--propositions4 ,the mathematical conception of a triangle ,i should construct1 that is1 present priori in intuition1 and in this way attain to rational-synthetical cognition4 ,but when the transcendental conception of reality1 or substance1 or power is presented to my mind1 ,i find that it does not relate to or indicate either an empirical or pure intuition1 but that it indicates merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions1 which cannot of course be given priori4 ,the synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed priori--without the aid of experience--to the intuition which corresponds to the conception2 and1 for this reason1 none of these conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition1 they can never present more than a principle of the synthesis#ge of possible empirical intuitions4 ,a transcendental proposition is1 therefore1 a synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive method1 and it renders possible all synthetical unity in empirical cognition1 though it cannot present us with any intuition priori4 #ge ,in the case of the conception of cause1 ,i do really go beyond the empirical conception of an event--but not to the intuition which presents this conception in concreto1 but only to the time-conditions1 which may be found in experience to correspond to the conception4 ,my procedure is1 therefore1 strictly according to conceptions2 ,i cannot in a case of this kind employ the construction of conceptions1 because the conception is merely a rule for the synthesis of perceptions1 which are not pure intuitions1 and which1 therefore1 cannot be given priori4 ,there is thus a twofold exercise of reason4 ,both modes have the properties of universality and an priori origin in common1 but are1 in their procedure1 of widely different character4 ,the reason of this is that in the world of phenomena1 in which alone objects are presented to our minds1 there are two main elements--the form of intuition 7space and time71 which can be cognized and determined completely priori1 and the matter or content--that which is presented in space and time1 and which1 consequently1 contains a something--an existence corresponding to our powers of sensation4 ,as regards the latter1 which can never be given in a determinate mode except by experience1 there are no priori notions which relate to it1 except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis of possible sensations1 in so far as these belong 7in a possible experience7 to the unity of consciousness4 ,as regards the former1 we can determine our conceptions priori in intuition1 inasmuch as we are ourselves the creators of the objects of the conceptions in space and time--these objects being regarded simply as quanta4 ,in the one case1 reason proceeds according to conceptions and can do nothing more than subject phenomena to these--which can only be determined empirically1 that is1 posteriori--in conformity1 however1 with those conceptions as the rules of all empirical synthesis4 ,in the other case1 reason proceeds by the construction of conceptions2 and1 as these conceptions relate to an priori intuition1 they may be given and determined in pure intuition priori1 and without the aid of empirical data4 ,the examination and consideration of everything that exists in space or time--whether it is a quantum or not1 in how far the particular something 7which fills space or time7 is a primary substratum1 or a mere determination of some other existence1 whether it relates to anything else--either as cause or effect1 whether its existence is isolated or in reciprocal connection with and dependence upon others1 the possibility of this existence1 its reality and necessity or opposites--all these form part of the cognition of reason on the ground of conceptions1 and this cognition is termed philosophical4 ,but to determine priori an intuition in space 7its figure71 to divide time into periods1 or merely to cognize the quantity of an intuition in space and time1 and to determine it by number--all this is an operation of reason by means of the construction of conceptions1 and is called mathematical4 ,the success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good fortune will be its lot1 if it applies the mathematical method in other regions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities4 ,its success is thus great1 because it can support all its conceptions by priori intuitions and1 in this way1 make itself a master1 as it were1 over nature2 while pure philosophy1 with its priori discursive conceptions1 bungles about in the world of nature1 and cannot accredit or show any priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions4 ,masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success of this method2 indeed1 it is a common persuasion that it is capable of being applied to any subject of human thought4 ,they have hardly ever reflected or philosophized on their favourite science--a task of great difficulty2 and the specific difference between the two modes of employing the faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts4 ,rules current in the field of common experience1 and which common sense stamps everywhere with its approval1 are regarded by them as axiomatic4 ,from what source the conceptions of space and time1 with which 7as the only primitive quanta7 they have to deal1 enter their minds1 is a question which they do not trouble themselves to answer2 and they think it just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of the pure conceptions of the understanding and the extent of their validity4 ,all they have to do with them is to employ them4 ,in all this they are perfectly right1 if they do not overstep the limits of the sphere of nature4 ,but they pass1 unconsciously1 from the world of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions 7instabilis tellus1 innabilis unda71 where they can neither stand nor swim1 and where the tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by time2 while the march of mathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent highway1 which the latest posterity shall frequent without fear of danger or impediment4 ,as we have taken upon us the task of determining1 clearly and certainly1 the limits of pure reason in the sphere of transcendentalism1 and as the efforts of reason in this direction are persisted in1 even after the plainest and most expressive warnings1 hope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into the splendours of the intellectual world--it becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope4 ,we shall1 accordingly1 show that the mathematical method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by the least advantage--except1 perhaps1 that it more plainly exhibits its own inadequacy--that geometry and philosophy are two quite different things1 although they go hand in hand in the field of natural science1 and1 consequently1 that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other4 ,the evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions1 axioms1 and demonstrations4 ,i shall be satisfied with showing that none of these forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which they are understood by mathematicians2 and that the geometrician1 if he employs his method in philosophy1 will succeed only in building card-castles1 while the employment of the philosophical method in mathematics can result in nothing but mere verbiage4 ,the essential business of philosophy1 indeed1 is to mark out the limits of the science2 and even the mathematician1 unless his talent is naturally circumscribed and limited to this particular department of knowledge1 cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy1 or set himself above its direction4 ,i4 ,of ,definitions4 ,a definition is1 as the term itself indicates1 the representation1 upon primary grounds1 of the complete conception of a thing within its own limits4#gf ,accordingly1 an empirical conception cannot be defined1 it can only be explained4 ,for1 as there are in such a conception only a certain number of marks or signs1 which denote a certain class of sensuous objects1 we can never be sure that we do not cogitate under the word which indicates the same object1 at one time a greater1 at another a smaller number of signs4 ,thus1 one person may cogitate in his conception of gold1 in addition to its properties of weight1 colour1 malleability1 that of resisting rust1 while another person may be ignorant of this quality4 ,we employ certain signs only so long as we require them for the sake of distinction2 new observations abstract some and add new ones1 so that an empirical conception never remains within permanent limits4 ,it is1 in fact1 useless to define a conception of this kind4 ,if1 for example1 we are speaking of water and its properties1 we do not stop at what we actually think by the word water1 but proceed to observation and experiment2 and the word1 with the few signs attached to it1 is more properly a designation than a conception of the thing4 ,a definition in this case would evidently be nothing more than a determination of the word4 ,in the second place1 no priori conception1 such as those of substance1 cause1 right1 fitness1 and so on1 can be defined4 ,for ,i can never be sure1 that the clear representation of a given conception 7which is given in a confused state7 has been fully developed1 until ,i know that the representation is adequate with its object4 ,but1 inasmuch as the conception1 as it is presented to the mind1 may contain a number of obscure representations1 which we do not observe in our analysis1 although we employ them in our application of the conception1 ,i can never be sure that my analysis is complete1 while examples may make this probable1 although they can never demonstrate the fact4 ,instead of the word definition1 ,i should rather employ the term exposition--a more modest expression1 which the critic may accept without surrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the analysis of any such conception4 ,as1 therefore1 neither empirical nor priori conceptions are capable of definition1 we have to see whether the only other kind of conceptions--arbitrary conceptions--can be subjected to this mental operation4 ,such a conception can always be defined2 for ,i must know thoroughly what ,i wished to cogitate in it1 as it was ,i who created it1 and it was not given to my mind either by the nature of my understanding or by experience4 ,at the same time1 ,i cannot say that1 by such a definition1 ,i have defined a real object4 ,if the conception is based upon empirical conditions1 if1 for example1 ,i have a conception of a clock for a ship1 this arbitrary conception does not assure me of the existence or even of the possibility of the object4 ,my definition of such a conception would with more propriety be termed a declaration of a project than a definition of an object4 ,there are no other conceptions which can bear definition1 except those which contain an arbitrary synthesis1 which can be constructed priori4 ,consequently1 the science of mathematics alone possesses definitions4 ,for the object here thought is presented priori in intuition2 and thus it can never contain more or less than the conception1 because the conception of the object has been given by the definition--and primarily1 that is1 without deriving the definition from any other source4 ,philosophical definitions are1 therefore1 merely expositions of given conceptions1 while mathematical definitions are constructions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself2 the former are produced by analysis1 the completeness of which is never demonstratively certain1 the latter by a synthesis4 ,in a mathematical definition the conception is formed1 in a philosophical definition it is only explained4 ,from this it follows3 #gf ,the definition must describe the conception completely that is1 omit none of the marks or signs of which it composed2 within its own limits1 that is1 it must be precise1 and enumerate no more signs than belong to the conception2 and on primary grounds1 that is to say1 the limitations of the bounds of the conception must not be deduced from other conceptions1 as in this case a proof would be necessary1 and the so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place at the head of all the judgements we have to form regarding an object4 7a7 ,that we must not imitate1 in philosophy1 the mathematical usage of commencing with definitions--except by way of hypothesis or experiment4 ,for1 as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely analyses of given conceptions1 these conceptions1 although only in a confused form1 must precede the analysis2 and the incomplete exposition must precede the complete1 so that we may be able to draw certain inferences from the characteristics which an incomplete analysis has enabled us to discover1 before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of the conception4 ,in one word1 a full and clear definition ought1 in philosophy1 rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our labours4#gg ,in mathematics1 on the contrary1 we cannot have a conception prior to the definition2 it is the definition which gives us the conception1 and it must for this reason form the commencement of every chain of mathematical reasoning4 #gg ,philosophy abounds in faulty definitions1 especially such as contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete definition4 ,if a conception could not be employed in reasoning before it had been defined1 it would fare ill with all philosophical thought4 ,but1 as incompletely defined conceptions may always be employed without detriment to truth1 so far as our analysis of the elements contained in them proceeds1 imperfect definitions1 that is1 propositions which are properly not definitions1 but merely approximations thereto1 may be used with great advantage4 ,in mathematics1 definition belongs ad esse1 in philosophy ad melius esse4 ,it is a difficult task to construct a proper definition4 ,jurists are still without a complete definition of the idea of right4 7b7 ,mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous4 ,for the conception is given only in and through the definition1 and thus it contains only what has been cogitated in the definition4 ,but although a definition cannot be incorrect1 as regards its content1 an error may sometimes1 although seldom1 creep into the form4 ,this error consists in a want of precision4 ,thus the common definition of a circle--that it is a curved line1 every point in which is equally distant from another point called the centre--is faulty1 from the fact that the determination indicated by the word curved is superfluous4 ,for there ought to be a particular theorem1 which may be easily proved from the definition1 to the effect that every line1 which has all its points at equal distances from another point1 must be a curved line--that is1 that not even the smallest part of it can be straight4 ,analytical definitions1 on the other hand1 may be erroneous in many respects1 either by the introduction of signs which do not actually exist in the conception1 or by wanting in that completeness which forms the essential of a definition4 ,in the latter case1 the definition is necessarily defective1 because we can never be fully certain of the completeness of our analysis4 ,for these reasons1 the method of definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy4 #b4 ,of ,axioms4 ,these1 in so far as they are immediately certain1 are priori synthetical principles4 ,now1 one conception cannot be connected synthetically and yet immediately with another2 because1 if we wish to proceed out of and beyond a conception1 a third mediating cognition is necessary4 ,and1 as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of conceptions alone1 there is to be found in it no principle which deserves to be called an axiom4 ,mathematics1 on the other hand1 may possess axioms1 because it can always connect the predicates of an object priori1 and without any mediating term1 by means of the construction of conceptions in intuition4 ,such is the case with the proposition3 ,three points can always lie in a plane4 ,on the other hand1 no synthetical principle which is based upon conceptions1 can ever be immediately certain 7for example1 the proposition3 ,everything that happens has a cause71 because ,i require a mediating term to connect the two conceptions of event and cause--namely1 the condition of time-determination in an experience1 and ,i cannot cognize any such principle immediately and from conceptions alone4 ,discursive principles are1 accordingly1 very different from intuitive principles or axioms4 ,the former always require deduction1 which in the case of the latter may be altogether dispensed with4 ,axioms are1 for this reason1 always self-evident1 while philosophical principles1 whatever may be the degree of certainty they possess1 cannot lay any claim to such a distinction4 ,no synthetical proposition of pure transcendental reason can be so evident1 as is often rashly enough declared1 as the statement1 twice two are four4 ,it is true that in the ,analytic ,i introduced into the list of principles of the pure understanding1 certain axioms of intuition2 but the principle there discussed was not itself an axiom1 but served merely to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in general1 while it was really nothing more than a principle based upon conceptions4 ,for it is one part of the duty of transcendental philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself4 ,philosophy possesses1 then1 no axioms1 and has no right to impose its priori principles upon thought1 until it has established their authority and validity by a thoroughgoing deduction4 #c4 ,of ,demonstrations4 ,only an apodeictic proof1 based upon intuition1 can be termed a demonstration4 ,experience teaches us what is1 but it cannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise4 ,hence a proof upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic4 priori conceptions1 in discursive cognition1 can never produce intuitive certainty or evidence1 however certain the judgement they present may be4 ,mathematics alone1 therefore1 contains demonstrations1 because it does not deduce its cognition from conceptions1 but from the construction of conceptions1 that is1 from intuition1 which can be given priori in accordance with conceptions4 ,the method of algebra1 in equations1 from which the correct answer is deduced by reduction1 is a kind of construction--not geometrical1 but by symbols--in which all conceptions1 especially those of the relations of quantities1 are represented in intuition by signs2 and thus the conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the fact that every proof is submitted to ocular evidence4 ,philosophical cognition does not possess this advantage1 it being required to consider the general always in abstracto 7by means of conceptions71 while mathematics can always consider it in concreto 7in an individual intuition71 and at the same time by means of priori representation1 whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the senses4 ,the former--discursive proofs--ought to be termed acroamatic proofs1 rather than demonstrations1 as only words are employed in them1 while demonstrations proper1 as the term itself indicates1 always require a reference to the intuition of the object4 ,it follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant with the nature of philosophy1 especially in the sphere of pure reason1 to employ the dogmatical method1 and to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of mathematical science4 ,it does not belong to that order1 and can only hope for a fraternal union with that science4 ,its attempts at mathematical evidence are vain pretensions1 which can only keep it back from its true aim1 which is to detect the illusory procedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits1 and by fully explaining and analysing our conceptions1 to conduct us from the dim regions of speculation to the clear region of modest self-knowledge4 ,reason must not1 therefore1 in its transcendental endeavours1 look forward with such confidence1 as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim1 nor reckon with such security upon its premisses1 as to consider it unnecessary to take a step back1 or to keep a strict watch for errors1 which1 overlooked in the principles1 may be detected in the arguments themselves--in which case it may be requisite either to determine these principles with greater strictness1 or to change them entirely4 ,i divide all apodeictic propositions1 whether demonstrable or immediately certain1 into dogmata and mathemata4 ,a direct synthetical proposition1 based on conceptions1 is a dogma2 a proposition of the same kind1 based on the construction of conceptions1 is a mathema4 ,analytical judgements do not teach us any more about an object than what was contained in the conception we had of it2 because they do not extend our cognition beyond our conception of an object1 they merely elucidate the conception4 ,they cannot therefore be with propriety termed dogmas4 ,of the two kinds of priori synthetical propositions above mentioned1 only those which are employed in philosophy can1 according to the general mode of speech1 bear this name2 those of arithmetic or geometry would not be rightly so denominated4 ,thus the customary mode of speaking confirms the explanation given above1 and the conclusion arrived at1 that only those judgements which are based upon conceptions1 not on the construction of conceptions1 can be termed dogmatical4 ,thus1 pure reason1 in the sphere of speculation1 does not contain a single direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions4 ,by means of ideas1 it is1 as we have shown1 incapable of producing synthetical judgements1 which are objectively valid2 by means of the conceptions of the understanding1 it establishes certain indubitable principles1 not1 however1 directly on the basis of conceptions1 but only indirectly by means of the relation of these conceptions to something of a purely contingent nature1 namely1 possible experience4 ,when experience is presupposed1 these principles are apodeictically certain1 but in themselves1 and directly1 they cannot even be cognized priori4 ,thus the given conceptions of cause and event will not be sufficient for the demonstration of the proposition3 ,every event has a cause4 ,for this reason1 it is not a dogma2 although from another point of view1 that of experience1 it is capable of being proved to demonstration4 ,the proper term for such a proposition is principle1 and not theorem 7although it does require to be proved71 because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground of proof1 that is1 experience1 and of forming a necessary presupposition in all empirical observation4 ,if then1 in the speculative sphere of pure reason1 no dogmata are to be found2 all dogmatical methods1 whether borrowed from mathematics1 or invented by philosophical thinkers1 are alike inappropriate and inefficient4 ,they only serve to conceal errors and fallacies1 and to deceive philosophy1 whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe and straight path4 ,a philosophical method may1 however1 be systematical4 ,for our reason is1 subjectively considered1 itself a system1 and1 in the sphere of mere conceptions1 a system of investigation according to principles of unity1 the material being supplied by experience alone4 ,but this is not the proper place for discussing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy1 as our present task is simply to examine whether our faculties are capable of erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason1 and how far they may proceed with the materials at their command4 ,section ,,ii4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in ,polemics ,reason must be subject1 in all its operations1 to criticism1 which must always be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint2 otherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence obnoxious to suspicion4 ,there is nothing1 however useful1 however sacred it may be1 that can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme tribunal1 which has no respect of persons4 ,the very existence of reason depends upon this freedom2 for the voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power1 it is rather like the vote of the citizens of a free state1 every member of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts1 and possess even the right of veto4 ,but while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of criticism1 it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this court4 ,pure reason1 however1 when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism1 is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest laws1 as to appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect confidence4 ,on the contrary1 it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in philosophy4 ,very different is the case when it has to defend itself1 not before a judge1 but against an equal4 ,if dogmatical assertions are advanced on the negative side1 in opposition to those made by reason on the positive side1 its justification kat authrhopon is complete1 although the proof of its propositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory4 ,by the polemic of pure reason ,i mean the defence of its propositions made by reason1 in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions advanced by other parties4 ,the question here is not whether its own statements may not also be false2 it merely regards the fact that reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with demonstrative certainty1 nor even asserted with a higher degree of probability4 ,reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance2 for1 although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them1 no one can prove that she is not the rightful possessor4 ,it is a melancholy reflection that reason1 in its highest exercise1 falls into an antithetic2 and that the supreme tribunal for the settlement of differences should not be at union with itself4 ,it is true that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic1 but we found that it was based upon a misconception4 ,in conformity with the common prejudice1 phenomena were regarded as things in themselves1 and thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the one mode or in the other 7it was shown to be impossible in both72 a demand entirely out of place in regard to phenomena4 ,there was1 then1 no real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions3 ,the series of phenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning2 and3 ,this series is absolutely and in itself without beginning4 ,the two propositions are perfectly consistent with each other1 because phenomena as phenomena are in themselves nothing1 and consequently the hypothesis that they are things in themselves must lead to self-contradictory inferences4 ,but there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be provided against1 and the dispute must remain unsettled4 ,take1 for example1 the theistic proposition3 ,there is a ,supreme ,being2 and on the other hand1 the atheistic counter-statement3 ,there exists no ,supreme ,being2 or1 in psychology3 ,everything that thinks possesses the attribute of absolute and permanent unity1 which is utterly different from the transitory unity of material phenomena2 and the counter-proposition3 ,the soul is not an immaterial unity1 and its nature is transitory1 like that of phenomena4 ,the objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements1 for they relate to things in themselves1 and not to phenomena4 ,there would arise1 indeed1 a real contradiction1 if reason came forward with a statement on the negative side of these questions alone4 ,as regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be subjected1 it may be freely admitted1 without necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions1 which have1 at least1 the interest of reason in their favour--an advantage which the opposite party cannot lay claim to4 ,i cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers--,sulzer among the rest--that1 in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use1 we may hope1 one day1 to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason--the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 and the immortality of the soul4 ,i am certain1 on the contrary1 that this will never be the case4 ,for on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions1 which do not relate to the objects of experience and their internal possibility8 ,but it is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability4 ,for1 as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason1 he is bound to prove that a ,supreme ,being1 and a thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence1 are impossible4 ,but where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which transcend the region of experience8 ,we may1 therefore1 rest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated4 ,we need not1 then1 have recourse to scholastic arguments2 we may always admit the truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests of reason in the sphere of experience1 and form1 moreover1 the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest4 ,our opponent1 who must not be considered here as a critic solely1 we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert him2 while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort1 as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason1 and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm indifference4 ,from this point of view1 there is properly no antithetic of pure reason4 ,for the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and psychology2 but on this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to fear4 ,ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons2 and these may be laughed at1 as mere child's play4 ,this consideration restores to ,reason her courage2 for what source of confidence could be found1 if she1 whose vocation it is to destroy error1 were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose8 ,everything in nature is good for some purpose4 ,even poisons are serviceable2 they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated in our system1 and must always find a place in every complete pharmacopoeia4 ,the objections raised against the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason1 are objections given by the nature of this reason itself1 and must therefore have a destination and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity4 ,for what purpose has ,providence raised many objects1 in which we have the deepest interest1 so far above us1 that we vainly try to cognize them with certainty1 and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize8 ,it is very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity2 perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best interests4 ,but it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investigating1 as well as the critical reason1 in perfect freedom1 and permit it to take charge of its own interests1 which are advanced as much by its limitation1 as by its extension of its views1 and which always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing it1 against its natural tendencies1 to bend to certain preconceived designs4 ,allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable1 and combat him only with the weapons of reason4 ,have no anxiety for the practical interests of humanity--these are never imperilled in a purely speculative dispute4 ,such a dispute serves merely to disclose the antinomy of reason1 which1 as it has its source in the nature of reason1 ought to be thoroughly investigated4 ,reason is benefited by the examination of a subject on both sides1 and its judgements are corrected by being limited4 ,it is not the matter that may give occasion to dispute1 but the manner4 ,for it is perfectly permissible to employ1 in the presence of reason1 the language of a firmly rooted faith1 even after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge4 ,if we were to ask the dispassionate ,david ,hume--a philosopher endowed1 in a degree that few are1 with a well-balanced judgement3 ,what motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is capable of assuring us of the existence1 and presenting us with a determinate conception of a ,supreme ,being8--his answer would be3 ,nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own powers better1 and1 at the same time1 a dislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions1 and prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examination4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we were to ask ,priestley--a philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation1 but was entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism--what his motives were for overturning those two main pillars of religion--the doctrines of the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul 7in his view the hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection7--this philosopher1 himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion1 could give no other answer than this3 ,i acted in the interest of reason1 which always suffers1 when certain objects are explained and judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material nature--the only laws which we know in a determinate manner4 ,it would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher1 who endeavoured to harmonize his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion1 and to undervalue an honest and reflecting man1 because he finds himself at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science4 ,the same grace must be accorded to ,hume1 a man not less well-disposed1 and quite as blameless in his moral character1 and who pushed his abstract speculations to an extreme length1 because1 as he rightly believed1 the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science1 and within the sphere of pure ideas4 ,what is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the present case to menace the best interests of humanity8 ,the course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural one4 ,let each thinker pursue his own path2 if he shows talent1 if he gives evidence of profound thought1 in one word1 if he shows that he possesses the power of reasoning--reason is always the gainer4 ,if you have recourse to other means1 if you attempt to coerce reason1 if you raise the cry of treason to humanity1 if you excite the feelings of the crowd1 which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle speculations--you will only make yourselves ridiculous4 ,for the question does not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries2 the question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of speculation1 apart from all kinds of interest1 and whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason1 or must renounce all reliance on it4 ,instead of joining the combatants1 it is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle--a laborious struggle for the parties engaged1 but attended1 in its progress as well as in its result1 with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of thought and knowledge4 ,it is absurd to expect to be enlightened by ,reason1 and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt4 ,moreover1 reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power1 the limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient2 it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional guards1 as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual state4 ,in the dialectic of reason there is no victory gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility4 ,the strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason1 and we cannot but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom which ought to be its essential condition4 ,in this case1 we should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism1 which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes1 by exposing the illusions and prejudices in which they originated4 ,there is in human nature an unworthy propensity--a propensity which1 like everything that springs from nature1 must in its final purpose be conducive to the good of humanity--to conceal our real sentiments1 and to give expression only to certain received opinions1 which are regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good4 ,it is true1 this tendency1 not only to conceal our real sentiments1 but to profess those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society1 has not only civilized1 but1 in a certain measure1 moralized us2 as no one can break through the outward covering of respectability1 honour1 and morality1 and thus the seemingly-good examples which we see around us form an excellent school for moral improvement1 so long as our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken4 ,but this disposition to represent ourselves as better than we are1 and to utter opinions which are not our own1 can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state1 and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good we see4 ,but when true principles have been developed1 and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of thought1 this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour1 otherwise it corrupts the heart1 and checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of fair appearances4 ,i am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion1 where there is less temptation to restrain the free expression of thought4 ,for what can be more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our real sentiments1 to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our statements1 or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we well know to be insufficient8 ,so long as mere personal vanity is the source of these unworthy artifices--and this is generally the case in speculative discussions1 which are mostly destitute of practical interest1 and are incapable of complete demonstration--the vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side2 and thus the result is the same1 although it is not brought about so soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit4 ,but where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very foundations of public welfare and morality--it seems not only prudent1 but even praise worthy1 to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments1 rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical conviction1 and of compelling us to confess our inability to attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative subjects4 ,but we ought to reflect that there is nothing1 in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause than deceit1 misrepresentation1 and falsehood4 ,that the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least requirement that can be made4 ,if we could reckon with security even upon so little1 the conflict of speculative reason regarding the important questions of ,god1 immortality1 and freedom1 would have been either decided long ago1 or would very soon be brought to a conclusion4 ,but1 in general1 the uprightness of the defence stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause2 and perhaps more honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who uphold these doctrines4 ,i shall persuade myself1 then1 that ,i have readers who do not wish to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments4 ,such will now recognize the fact that1 according to the principles of this ,critique1 if we consider not what is1 but what ought to be the case1 there can be really no polemic of pure reason4 ,for how can two persons dispute about a thing1 the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in possible experience8 ,each adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea1 if he can1 what is more than the idea1 that is1 the reality of the object which it indicates4 ,how shall they settle the dispute1 since neither is able to make his assertions directly comprehensible and certain1 but must restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent8 ,all statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience1 beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth1 while they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the understanding1 which are applicable only to experience2 and thus it is the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent1 he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses4 ,the critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for all speculative disputes2 for it is not involved in these disputes1 which have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws of the mind1 but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason4 ,without the control of criticism1 reason is1 as it were1 in a state of nature1 and can only establish its claims and assertions by war4 ,criticism1 on the contrary1 deciding all questions according to the fundamental laws of its own institution1 secures to us the peace of law and order1 and enables us to discuss all differences in the more tranquil manner of a legal process4 ,in the former case1 disputes are ended by victory1 which both sides may claim and which is followed by a hollow armistice2 in the latter1 by a sentence1 which1 as it strikes at the root of all speculative differences1 ensures to all concerned a lasting peace4 ,the endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical investigation of reason itself2 just as ,hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence1 and that we must leave it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law1 which indeed limits individual freedom1 but only that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the common good of all4 ,this freedom will1 among other things1 permit of our openly stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve1 without being decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens4 ,this privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason1 which recognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity2 and as this reason is the source of all progress and improvement1 such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable4 ,it is unwise1 moreover1 to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions against1 or rash attacks upon1 an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of the community2 for that would be giving them an importance which they do not deserve4 ,when ,i hear that the freedom of the will1 the hope of a future life1 and the existence of ,god have been overthrown by the arguments of some able writer1 ,i feel a strong desire to read his book2 for ,i expect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown in his writings4 ,but ,i am perfectly certain1 even before ,i have opened the book1 that he has not succeeded in a single point1 not because ,i believe ,i am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these important propositions1 but because this transcendental critique1 which has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason1 has fully convinced me that1 as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative1 it is as powerless1 and even more so1 to assure us of the truth of the negative answer to these questions4 ,from what source does this free-thinker derive his knowledge that there is1 for example1 no ,supreme ,being8 ,this proposition lies out of the field of possible experience1 and1 therefore1 beyond the limits of human cognition4 ,but ,i would not read at1 all the answer which the dogmatical maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent1 because ,i know well beforehand1 that he will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary1 without being able to establish his own assertions4 ,besides1 a new illusory argument1 in the construction of which talent and acuteness are shown1 is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning1 and in this respect the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless4 ,again1 the dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism1 and enables us to test and correct its principles1 while there is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his reasoning4 ,but1 it will be said1 must we not warn the youth entrusted to academical care against such writings1 must we not preserve them from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions1 until their judgement is ripened1 or rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas1 from whatever quarter they may come8 ,if we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the sphere of pure reason1 and find ourselves unable to settle such disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them1 and setting counter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents1 there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment1 but1 at the same time1 none more absurd and inefficient for the future1 than this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time1 and thus preserving it--for so long at least--from seduction into error4 ,but when1 at a later period1 either curiosity1 or the prevalent fashion of thought places such writings in their hands1 will the so-called convictions of their youth stand firm8 ,the young thinker1 who has in his armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of his opponent1 and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party1 sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which have the advantage of novelty1 against as illusory grounds of proof destitute of this advantage1 and which1 perhaps1 excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has been abused by his instructors4 ,he thinks he can find no better means of showing that he has out grown the discipline of his minority than by despising those well-meant warnings1 and1 knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism1 he drinks deep draughts of the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years were trained4 ,exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued in academical instruction4 ,this can only be effected1 however1 by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason4 ,for1 in order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise as soon as possible1 and to demonstrate their perfect even in the presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion1 the student ought to examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by step1 and to test them by these principles4 ,it cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies inherent in these propositions1 and thus he begins early to feel his own power of securing himself against the influence of such sophistical arguments1 which must finally lose1 for him1 all their illusory power4 ,and1 although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures1 if such he has wished to rear2 he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune1 as he has now before him a fair prospect into the practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure foundation for a rational system4 ,there is1 accordingly1 no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason4 ,both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows1 as they pass beyond the limits of nature1 and can find no tangible point of attack--no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict4 ,fight as vigorously as they may1 the shadows which they hew down1 immediately start up again1 like the heroes in ,walhalla1 and renew the bloodless and unceasing contest4 ,but neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment of pure reason1 such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality in all speculative disputes4 ,to excite reason against itself1 to place weapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those of the other1 and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the fierce struggle that ensues1 seems1 from the dogmatical point of view1 to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition4 ,but1 when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness1 and a pride which no criticism can moderate1 there is no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and pretensions on the other side1 equally well or ill founded1 so that reason1 staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it1 finds it necessary to moderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen to the advice of criticism4 ,but we cannot stop at these doubts1 much less regard the conviction of our ignorance1 not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism1 but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with itself4 ,on the contrary1 scepticism is merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting it to a more careful investigation into its own powers and pretensions4 ,but1 as scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace in the domain of philosophy1 and as it is the track pursued by the many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous dislike of all inquiries of this kind1 ,i think it necessary to present to my readers this mode of thought in its true light4 ,scepticism not a ,permanent ,state for ,human ,reason4 ,the consciousness of ignorance--unless this ignorance is recognized to be absolutely necessary ought1 instead of forming the conclusion of my inquiries1 to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them4 ,all ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge4 ,if my ignorance is accidental and not necessary1 it must incite me1 in the first case1 to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which ,i am ignorant2 in the second1 to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge4 ,but that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable1 and that it consequently absolves from the duty of all further investigation1 is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical grounds--from observation--but upon critical grounds alone1 that is1 by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of cognition4 ,it follows that the determination of the bounds of reason can be made only on priori grounds2 while the empirical limitation of reason1 which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be completely removed1 can take place only posteriori4 ,in other words1 our empirical knowledge is limited by that which yet remains for us to know4 ,the former cognition of our ignorance1 which is possible only on a rational basis1 is a science2 the latter is merely a perception1 and we cannot say how far the inferences drawn from it may extend4 ,if ,i regard the earth1 as it really appears to my senses1 as a flat surface1 ,i am ignorant how far this surface extends4 ,but experience teaches me that1 how far soever ,i go1 ,i always see before me a space in which ,i can proceed farther2 and thus ,i know the limits--merely visual--of my actual knowledge of the earth1 although ,i am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself4 ,but if ,i have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere1 and that its surface is spherical1 ,i can cognize priori and determine upon principles1 from my knowledge of a small part of this surface--say to the extent of a degree--the diameter and circumference of the earth2 and although ,i am ignorant of the objects which this surface contains1 ,i have a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent4 ,the sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level surface1 with an apparent horizon--that which forms the limit of its extent1 and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality4 ,to reach this limit by empirical means is impossible1 and all attempts to determine it priori according to a principle1 are alike in vain4 ,but all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon1 or1 at least1 in its boundary line4 ,the celebrated ,david ,hume was one of those geographers of human reason who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all such questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our knowledge--a horizon which1 however1 ,hume was unable to determine4 ,his attention especially was directed to the principle of causality2 and he remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle1 and even the objective validity of the conception of a cause1 was not commonly based upon clear insight1 that is1 upon priori cognition4 ,hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its universality and necessity1 but merely from its general applicability in the course of experience1 and a kind of subjective necessity thence arising1 which he termed habit4 ,from the inability of reason to establish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all experience1 he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical4 ,this procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination1 and1 if necessary1 to disapproval1 may be termed the censura of reason4 ,this censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles4 ,but this is only the second step in our inquiry4 ,the first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason1 and which marks the infancy of that faculty1 is that of dogmatism4 ,the second1 which we have just mentioned1 is that of scepticism1 and it gives evidence that our judgement has been improved by experience4 ,but a third step is necessary--indicative of the maturity and manhood of the judgement1 which now lays a firm foundation upon universal and necessary principles4 ,this is the period of criticism1 in which we do not examine the facta of reason1 but reason itself1 in the whole extent of its powers1 and in regard to its capability of priori cognition2 and thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge1 but its necessary and eternal limits4 ,we demonstrate from indubitable principles1 not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject1 but in regard to all possible questions of a certain class4 ,thus scepticism is a resting place for reason1 in which it may reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be1 that it may pursue its way with greater certainty2 but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place4 ,it must take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude1 whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves1 or to the limits which bound all our cognition4 ,reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane1 of the bounds of which we have only a general knowledge2 it ought rather to be compared to a sphere1 the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its surface--that is1 the nature of priori synthetical propositions--and1 consequently1 its circumference and extent4 ,beyond the sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize2 nay1 even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the subjective principles of a complete determination of the relations which exist between the understanding-conceptions which lie within this sphere4 ,we are actually in possession of priori synthetical cognitions1 as is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding1 which anticipate experience4 ,if any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles1 he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really priori2 but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible1 and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance4 ,he can only say3 ,if we perceived their origin and their authenticity1 we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason2 but1 till we can do this1 all propositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions4 ,in this view1 the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy1 which proceeds without the guidance of criticism1 is well grounded2 but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy1 when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation4 ,all the conceptions produced1 and all the questions raised1 by pure reason1 do not lie in the sphere of experience1 but in that of reason itself1 and hence they must be solved1 and shown to be either valid or inadmissible1 by that faculty4 ,we have no right to decline the solution of such problems1 on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things1 and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties1 for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas1 and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature4 ,the polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist1 who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is based1 for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs1 and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers4 ,but1 in itself1 scepticism does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge4 ,all unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia1 which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic4 ,but this cannot help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours2 the investigations of scepticism cannot1 therefore1 settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason4 ,hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical philosophers1 and his writings have1 undoubtedly1 exerted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into its own powers4 ,it will1 therefore1 well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors into which he strayed1 although setting out on the path of truth and certitude4 ,hume was probably aware1 although he never clearly developed the notion1 that we proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our conception of the object4 ,i have termed this kind of judgement synthetical4 ,as regard the manner in which ,i pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience1 no doubts can be entertained4 ,experience is itself a synthesis of perceptions2 and it employs perceptions to increment the conception1 which ,i obtain by means of another perception4 ,but we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a conception1 and to extend our cognition priori4 ,we attempt this in two ways--either1 through the pure understanding1 in relation to that which may become an object of experience1 or1 through pure reason1 in relation to such properties of things1 or of the existence of things1 as can never be presented in any experience4 ,this sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements1 as he ought to have done1 but regarded this augmentation of conceptions1 and1 if we may so express ourselves1 the spontaneous generation of understanding and reason1 independently of the impregnation of experience1 as altogether impossible4 ,the so-called priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary1 and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in experience1 and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules1 to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality4 ,in support of this strange assertion1 he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect4 ,no faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else2 and hence he believed he could infer that1 without experience1 we possess no source from which we can augment a conception1 and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to extend our cognition priori4 ,that the light of the sun1 which shines upon a piece of wax1 at the same time melts it1 while it hardens clay1 no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances2 much less is there any priori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion1 which experience alone can certify4 ,on the other hand1 we have seen in our discussion of transcendental logic1 that1 although we can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which is given us1 we can always cognize completely priori--in relation1 however1 to a third term1 namely1 possible experience--the law of its connection with other things4 ,for example1 if ,i observe that a piece of wax melts1 ,i can cognize priori that there must have been something 7the sun's heat7 preceding1 which this law2 although1 without the aid of experience1 ,i could not cognize priori and in a determinate manner either the cause from the effect1 or the effect from the cause4 ,hume was1 therefore1 wrong in inferring1 from the contingency of the determination according to law1 the contingency of the law itself2 and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience 7which is an priori proceeding1 constituting the objective reality of the conception71 he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience1 which is always1 of course1 empirical4 ,thus1 too1 he regarded the principle of affinity1 which has its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection1 as a mere rule of association1 lying in the imitative faculty of imagination1 which can present only contingent1 and not objective connections4 ,the sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally from a defect1 which was common to him with the dogmatists1 namely1 that he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of priori synthesis performed by the understanding4 ,had he done so1 he would have found1 to take one example among many1 that the principle of permanence was of this character1 and that it1 as well as the principle of causality1 anticipates experience4 ,in this way he might have been able to describe the determinate limits of the priori operations of understanding and reason4 ,but he merely declared the understanding to be limited1 instead of showing what its limits were2 he created a general mistrust in the power of our faculties1 without giving us any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ignorance2 he examined and condemned some of the principles of the understanding1 without investigating all its powers with the completeness necessary to criticism4 ,he denies1 with truth1 certain powers to the understanding1 but he goes further1 and declares it to be utterly inadequate to the priori extension of knowledge1 although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty2 and thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too4 ,that is to say1 his own declarations are doubted1 for his objections were based upon facta1 which are contingent1 and not upon principles1 which can alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions4 ,as ,hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason1 against which1 however1 his attacks are mainly directed1 reason does not feel itself shut out from all attempts at the extension of priori cognition1 and hence it refuses1 in spite of a few checks in this or that quarter1 to relinquish such efforts4 ,for one naturally arms oneself to resist an attack1 and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the claims he has advanced4 ,but a complete review of the powers of reason1 and the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a limited field of action1 while we must admit the vanity of higher claims1 puts an end to all doubt and dispute1 and induces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain4 ,to the uncritical dogmatist1 who has not surveyed the sphere of his understanding1 nor determined1 in accordance with principles1 the limits of possible cognition1 who1 consequently1 is ignorant of his own powers1 and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field of cognition1 these attacks of scepticism are not only dangerous1 but destructive4 ,for if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which he cannot prove1 or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle1 suspicion falls on all his statements1 however plausible they may appear4 ,and thus scepticism1 the bane of dogmatical philosophy1 conducts us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason4 ,when we are thus far advanced1 we need fear no further attacks2 for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out1 and we can make no claims nor become involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these limits4 ,thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason1 but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers1 awakening its circumspection1 and indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate possessions4 ,section ,,iii4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in ,hypothesis ,this critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend the bounds of knowledge1 by means of pure speculation1 are utterly fruitless4 ,so much the wider field1 it may appear1 lies open to hypothesis2 as1 where we cannot know with certainty1 we are at liberty to make guesses and to form suppositions4 ,imagination may be allowed1 under the strict surveillance of reason1 to invent suppositions2 but1 these must be based on something that is perfectly certain--and that is the possibility of the object4 ,if we are well assured upon this point1 it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to the reality of the object2 but this supposition must1 unless it is utterly groundless1 be connected1 as its ground of explanation1 with that which is really given and absolutely certain4 ,such a supposition is termed a hypothesis4 ,it is beyond our power to form the least conception priori of the possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena2 and the category of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such connection1 but merely helps us to understand it1 when we meet with it in experience4 ,for this reason we cannot1 in accordance with the categories1 imagine or invent any object or any property of an object not given1 or that may not be given in experience1 and employ it in a hypothesis2 otherwise1 we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon mere chimerical fancies1 and not upon conceptions of things4 ,thus1 we have no right to assume the existence of new powers1 not existing in nature--for example1 an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition1 a force of attraction without contact1 or some new kind of substances occupying space1 and yet without the property of impenetrability--and1 consequently1 we cannot assume that there is any other kind of community among substances than that observable in experience1 any kind of presence than that in space1 or any kind of duration than that in time4 ,in one word1 the conditions of possible experience are for reason the only conditions of the possibility of things2 reason cannot venture to form1 independently of these conditions1 any conceptions of things1 because such conceptions1 although not self-contradictory1 are without object and without application4 ,the conceptions of reason are1 as we have already shown1 mere ideas1 and do not relate to any object in any kind of experience4 ,at the same time1 they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects4 ,they are purely problematical in their nature and1 as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties1 form the basis of the regulative principles for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience4 ,if we leave this ground of experience1 they become mere fictions of thought1 the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable2 and they cannot1 consequently1 be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of real phenomena4 ,it is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple1 for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect and necessary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle of all our inquiries into its internal phenomena1 although we cannot cognize this unity in concreto4 ,but to assume that the soul is a simple substance 7a transcendental conception7 would be enouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable--as many physical hypotheses are--but a proposition which is purely arbitrary1 and in the highest degree rash4 ,the simple is never presented in experience2 and1 if by substance is here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition1 the possibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable4 ,reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings1 or of intelligible properties of sensuous things1 although--as we have no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility--it will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist4 ,in the explanation of given phenomena1 no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known laws of experience4 ,a transcendental hypothesis1 in which a mere idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena of nature1 would not give us any better insight into a phenomenon1 as we should be trying to explain what we do not sufficiently understand from known empirical principles1 by what we do not understand at all4 ,the principles of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of reason1 but it would not assist the understanding in its application to objects4 ,order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to natural laws2 and the wildest hypotheses1 if they are only physical1 are here more admissible than a hyperphysical hypothesis1 such as that of a divine author4 ,for such a hypothesis would introduce the principle of ignava ratio1 which requires us to give up the search for causes that might be discovered in the course of experience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea4 ,as regards the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes1 this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena2 because1 as they are to us nothing more than phenomena1 we have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the series of their conditions4 ,transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible2 and we cannot use the liberty of employing1 in the absence of physical1 hyperphysical grounds of explanation4 ,and this for two reasons2 first1 because such hypothesis do not advance reason1 but rather stop it in its progress2 secondly1 because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere1 which is that of experience4 ,for1 when the explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult1 we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation1 which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature2 and our inquiries are brought to a close1 not because we have obtained all the requisite knowledge1 but because we abut upon a principle which is incomprehensible and which1 indeed1 is so far back in the track of thought as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being4 ,the next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its sufficiency4 ,that is1 it must determine priori the consequences which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from the hypothesis itself4 ,if we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses1 the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions2 because the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the case of the original hypothesis1 and thus their testimony is invalid4 ,if we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause1 we possess sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims1 the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe2 but we find ourselves obliged1 when we observe the evil in the world and the exceptions to these laws1 to employ new hypothesis in support of the original one4 ,we employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena2 but when we meet with difficulties in our way1 when we observe in the soul phenomena similar to the changes which take place in matter1 we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses4 ,these may1 indeed1 not be false1 but we do not know them to be true1 because the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to explain4 ,we are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a ,supreme ,being as dogmata1 which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate priori1 but purely as hypotheses4 ,in the former case1 the dogmatist must take care that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration4 ,for the assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry4 ,pure abstract reason1 apart from all experience1 can either cognize nothing at all2 and hence the judgements it enounces are never mere opinions1 they are either apodeictic certainties1 or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject4 ,opinions and probable judgements on the nature of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena1 or they may relate to the effect1 in accordance with empirical laws1 of an actually existing cause4 ,in other words1 we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature4 ,beyond this region opinion is mere invention2 unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known1 and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance4 ,but1 although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions of pure speculative reason1 they may be employed in the defence of these answers4 ,that is to say1 hypotheses are admissible in polemic1 but not in the sphere of dogmatism4 ,by the defence of statements of this character1 ,i do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their support1 but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents4 ,all priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity that1 although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition is not in possession of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his statements1 his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the opposite4 ,this equality of fortune does not allow the one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative cognition2 and it is this sphere1 accordingly1 that is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts4 ,but we shall afterwards show that1 in relation to its practical exercise1 ,reason has the right of admitting what1 in the field of pure speculation1 she would not be justified in supposing1 except upon perfectly sufficient grounds2 because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of speculation--a condition which the practical reason1 however1 does not consider to be requisite4 ,in this sphere1 therefore1 ,reason is mistress of a possession1 her title to which she does not require to prove--which1 in fact1 she could not do4 ,the burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent4 ,but as he has just as little knowledge regarding the subject discussed1 and is as little able to prove the non-existence of the object of an idea1 as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate its reality1 it is evident that there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition as a practically necessary supposition 7melior est conditio possidentis74 ,for he is at liberty to employ1 in self-defence1 the same weapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him2 that is1 he has a right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of supporting the arguments in favour of his own propositions1 but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself regarding the subject under discussion and cannot boast of any speculative advantage4 ,hypotheses are1 therefore1 admissible in the sphere of pure reason only as weapons for self-defence1 and not as supports to dogmatical assertions4 ,but the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves4 ,for speculative reason is1 in the sphere of transcendentalism1 dialectical in its own nature4 ,the difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves4 ,they are like old but never superannuated claims2 and we must seek them out1 and settle them once and for ever1 if we are to expect a permanent peace4 ,external tranquility is hollow and unreal4 ,the root of these contradictions1 which lies in the nature of human reason1 must be destroyed2 and this can only be done by giving it1 in the first instance1 freedom to grow1 nay1 by nourishing it1 that it may send out shoots1 and thus betray its own existence4 ,it is our duty1 therefore1 to try to discover new objections1 to put weapons in the bands of our opponent1 and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish4 ,we have nothing to fear from these concessions2 on the contrary1 we may rather hope that we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute4 ,the thinker requires1 to be fully equipped1 the hypotheses of pure reason1 which1 although but leaden weapons 7for they have not been steeled in the armoury of experience71 are as useful as any that can be employed by his opponents4 ,if1 accordingly1 we have assumed1 from a non-speculative point of view1 the immaterial nature of the soul1 and are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous organism--we can weaken the force of this objection by the assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon1 to which1 as a necessary condition1 all sensibility1 and consequently all thought1 relates in the present state of our existence2 and that the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the intellectual4 ,the body would1 in this view of the question1 be regarded1 not as the cause of thought1 but merely as its restrictive condition1 as promotive of the sensuous and animal1 but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life2 and the dependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body1 would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism4 ,we might go still farther1 and discover new objections1 or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced4 ,generation1 in the human race as well as among the irrational animals1 depends on so many accidents--of occasion1 of proper sustenance1 of the laws enacted by the government of a country of vice even1 that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being whose life has begun under circumstances so mean and trivial1 and so entirely dependent upon our own control4 ,as regards the continuance of the existence of the whole race1 we need have no difficulties1 for accident in single cases is subject to general laws2 but1 in the case of each individual1 it would seem as if we could hardly expect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant4 ,but1 in answer to these objections1 we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is properly intelligible1 and not subject to changes of time1 and that it neither began in birth1 nor will end in death4 ,we may assume that this life is nothing more than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life2 that the whole world of sense is but an image1 hovering before the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere1 and with no more objective reality than a dream2 and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they really are1 we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures1 our connection with which did not begin at our birth and will not cease with the destruction of the body4 ,and so on4 ,we cannot be said to know what has been above asserted1 nor do we seriously maintain the truth of these assertions2 and the notions therein indicated are not even ideas of reason1 they are purely fictitious conceptions4 ,but this hypothetical procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason4 ,our opponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all that we have asserted2 and we have to show him that he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature1 as we can lay a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience4 ,such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as declarations of opinion4 ,the philosopher abandons them1 so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit4 ,to maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an insecure foundation1 well befits the moderation of a true philosopher2 but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject4 ,it is evident1 therefore1 that hypotheses1 in the speculative sphere1 are valid1 not as independent propositions1 but only relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions4 ,for1 to make the principles of possible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be applied to no objects except such as lie without the limits of possible experience4 ,the judgements enounced by pure reason must be necessary1 or they must not be enounced at all4 ,reason cannot trouble herself with opinions4 ,but the hypotheses we have been discussing are merely problematical judgements1 which can neither be confuted nor proved2 while1 therefore1 they are not personal opinions1 they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to be raised4 ,but we must take care to confine them to this function1 and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute validity1 a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and contradictions4 ,section ,,iv4 ,the ,discipline of ,pure ,reason in ,relation to ,proofs ,it is a peculiarity1 which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental synthetical propositions from those of all other priori synthetical cognitions1 that reason1 in the case of the former1 does not apply its conceptions directly to an object1 but is first obliged to prove1 priori1 the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses4 ,this is not merely a prudential rule1 it is essential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental proposition4 ,if ,i am required to pass1 priori1 beyond the conception of an object1 ,i find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance of something which is not contained in the conception4 ,in mathematics1 it is priori intuition that guides my synthesis2 and1 in this case1 all our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition4 ,in transcendental cognition1 so long as we are dealing only with conceptions of the understanding1 we are guided by possible experience4 ,that is to say1 a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does not show that the given conception 7that of an event1 for example7 leads directly to another conception 7that of a cause7--for this would be a saltus which nothing can justify2 but it shows that experience itself1 and consequently the object of experience1 is impossible without the connection indicated by these conceptions4 ,it follows that such a proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving1 synthetically and priori1 at a certain knowledge of things1 which was not contained in our conceptions of these things4 ,unless we pay particular attention to this requirement1 our proofs1 instead of pursuing the straight path indicated by reason1 follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association4 ,the illusory conviction1 which rests upon subjective causes of association1 and which is considered as resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity1 is always open to doubt and suspicion4 ,for this reason1 all the attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient reason1 have1 according to the universal admission of philosophers1 been quite unsuccessful2 and1 before the appearance of transcendental criticism1 it was considered better1 as this principle could not be abandoned1 to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind 7a proceeding which always proves that the problem1 which reason ought to solve1 is one in which philosophers find great difficulties71 rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs4 ,but1 if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason1 and if ,i aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of mere ideas1 it is necessary that the proof should first show that such a step in synthesis is possible 7which it is not71 before it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself4 ,the so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception1 is a very plausible one4 ,but it contains no answer to the objection1 that1 as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly applicable to a perception1 but is an idea which must be inferred--if at all--from observation1 it is by no means evident how the mere fact of consciousness1 which is contained in all thought1 although in so far a simple representation1 can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance4 ,when ,i represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion1 my body in this thought is so far absolute unity1 and my representation of it is a simple one2 and hence ,i can indicate this representation by the motion of a point1 because ,i have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body4 ,but ,i cannot hence infer that1 given merely the moving power of a body1 the body may be cogitated as simple substance1 merely because the representation in my mind takes no account of its content in space1 and is consequently simple4 ,the simple1 in abstraction1 is very different from the objectively simple2 and hence the ,ego1 which is simple in the first sense1 may1 in the second sense1 as indicating the soul itself1 be a very complex conception1 with a very various content4 ,thus it is evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism4 ,we guess 7for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited in reference to a proof of this character7 at the presence of the paralogism1 by keeping ever before us a criterion of the possibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience can teach us4 ,this criterion is obtained from the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate1 but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition priori by means of ideas4 ,we must1 accordingly1 always use the greatest caution2 we require1 before attempting any proof1 to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason1 and from what source we are to derive knowledge1 which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions1 nor relates1 by anticipation1 to possible experience4 ,we shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour1 by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power1 or rather by subjecting it to discipline1 and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition4 ,the first rule for our guidance is1 therefore1 not to attempt a transcendental proof1 before we have considered from what source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based1 and what right we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will be veracious4 ,if they are principles of the understanding1 it is vain to expect that we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason2 for these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible experience4 ,if they are principles of pure reason1 our labour is alike in vain4 ,for the principles of reason1 if employed as objective1 are without exception dialectical and possess no validity or truth1 except as regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason in experience4 ,but when such delusive proof are presented to us1 it is our duty to meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgement2 and1 although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based1 we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles employed in it2 and1 if these principles have their origin in pure reason alone1 such a deduction is absolutely impossible4 ,and thus it is unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and confutation of every sophistical illusion2 we may1 at once1 bring all dialectic1 which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies1 before the bar of critical reason1 which tests the principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based4 ,the second peculiarity of transcendental proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest upon more than a single proof4 ,if ,i am drawing conclusions1 not from conceptions1 but from intuition corresponding to a conception1 be it pure intuition1 as in mathematics1 or empirical1 as in natural science1 the intuition which forms the basis of my inferences presents me with materials for many synthetical propositions1 which ,i can connect in various modes1 while1 as it is allowable to proceed from different points in the intention1 ,i can arrive by different paths at the same proposition4 ,but every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception1 and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object according to this conception4 ,there must1 therefore1 be but one ground of proof1 because it is the conception alone which determines the object2 and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the determination of the object according to the conception4 ,in our ,transcendental ,analytic1 for example1 we inferred the principle3 ,every event has a cause1 from the only condition of the objective possibility of our conception of an event4 ,this is that an event cannot be determined in time1 and consequently cannot form a part of experience1 unless it stands under this dynamical law4 ,this is the only possible ground of proof2 for our conception of an event possesses objective validity1 that is1 is a true conception1 only because the law of causality determines an object to which it can refer4 ,other arguments in support of this principle have been attempted--such as that from the contingent nature of a phenomenon2 but when this argument is considered1 we can discover no criterion of contingency1 except the fact of an event--of something happening1 that is to say1 the existence which is preceded by the non-existence of an object1 and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved4 ,if the proposition3 8,every thinking being is simple10 is to be proved1 we keep to the conception of the ego1 which is simple1 and to which all thought has a relation4 ,the same is the case with the transcendental proof of the existence of a ,deity1 which is based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ens realissimum and a necessary being1 and cannot be attempted in any other manner4 ,this caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of reason4 ,when reason employs conceptions alone1 only one proof of its thesis is possible1 if any4 ,when1 therefore1 the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition1 we may be sure that not one of them is conclusive4 ,for if he possessed one which proved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration--as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason--what need is there for any more8 ,his intention can only be similar to that of the advocate who had different arguments for different judges2 this availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments1 who1 without going into any profound investigation1 adopt the view of the case which seems most probable at first sight and decide according to it4 ,the third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect1 but always ostensive or direct4 ,the direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved1 but exposes the grounds of its truth2 the apagogic1 on the other hand1 may assure us of the truth of the proposition1 but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility4 ,the latter is1 accordingly1 rather an auxiliary to an argument1 than a strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure4 ,in one respect1 however1 they have an advantage over direct proofs1 from the fact that the mode of arguing by contradiction1 which they employ1 renders our understanding of the question more clear1 and approximates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstration4 ,the true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences is this4 ,when the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are too various or too profound1 we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cognition from its consequences4 ,the modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a proposition would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn from it are known to be true2 for in this case there can be only one possible ground for these inferences1 and that is the true one4 ,but this is a quite impracticable procedure1 as it surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition4 ,but this mode of reasoning is employed1 under favour1 when we wish to prove the truth of an hypothesis2 in which case we admit the truth of the conclusion--which is supported by analogy--that1 if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed1 all other possible inferences will also agree with it4 ,but1 in this way1 an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth4 ,the modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition1 is not only a rigorous1 but a very easy mode of proof4 ,for1 if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false1 then the proposition must itself be false4 ,instead1 then1 of examining1 in an ostensive argument1 the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests1 we need only take the opposite of this proposition1 and if one inference from it be false1 then must the opposite be itself false2 and1 consequently1 the proposition which we wished to prove must be true4 ,the apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an objective cognition4 ,where this is possible1 it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought1 and not the objective cognition2 or it may happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition1 which is incorrectly considered to be objective1 and1 as the condition is itself false1 both propositions may be false1 and it will1 consequently1 be impossible to conclude the truth of the one from the falseness of the other4 ,in mathematics such subreptions are impossible2 and it is in this science1 accordingly1 that the indirect mode of proof has its true place4 ,in the science of nature1 where all assertion is based upon empirical intuition1 such subreptions may be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observations2 but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge4 ,but the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective1 which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion2 and thus reason endeavours1 in its premisses1 to impose upon us subjective representations for objective cognitions4 ,in the transcendental sphere of pure reason1 then1 and in the case of synthetical propositions1 it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counter-statement4 ,for only two cases are possible2 either1 the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of reason1 which does not affect the real case 7for example1 we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being1 and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds1 while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied72 or1 both propositions1 being dialectical in their nature1 are based upon an impossible conception4 ,in this latter case the rule applies3 non entis nulla sunt predicata2 that is to say1 what we affirm and what we deny1 respecting such an object1 are equally untrue1 and the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impossible4 ,if1 for example1 we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality1 it is false1 either that it is infinite1 or that it is finite and limited in space4 ,both are false1 because the hypothesis is false4 ,for the notion of phenomena 7as mere representations7 which are given in themselves 7as objects7 is self-contradictory2 and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would1 indeed1 be unconditioned1 but would be inconsistent 7as everything in the phenomenal world is conditioned7 with the unconditioned determination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception4 ,the apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy4 ,it may be compared to a champion who maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour2 while nothing can be proved in this way1 except the respective strength of the combatants1 and the advantage1 in this respect1 is always on the side of the attacking party4 ,spectators1 observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered1 are led to regard the subject of dispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon4 ,but such an opinion cannot be justified2 and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark3 ,non defensoribus istis ,tempus eget4 ,each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument1 and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported4 ,if an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds1 he may be refuted with ease2 not1 however to the advantage of the dogmatist1 who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent4 ,but1 if parties employ the direct method of procedure1 they will soon discover the difficulty1 nay1 the impossibility of proving their assertions1 and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence2 or they will1 by the help of criticism1 discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked1 and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its proper sphere--that of practical principles4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,canon of ,pure ,reason ,it is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation1 but1 on the contrary1 stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path and to expose the illusions which it originates4 ,but1 on the other hand1 this consideration ought to elevate and to give it confidence1 for this discipline is exercised by itself alone1 and it is subject to the censure of no other power4 ,the bounds1 moreover1 which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise1 form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents2 and thus what remains of its possessions1 after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed1 is secure from attack or usurpation4 ,the greatest1 and perhaps the only1 use of all philosophy of pure reason is1 accordingly1 of a purely negative character4 ,it is not an organon for the extension1 but a discipline for the determination1 of the limits of its exercise2 and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth1 it has the modest merit of guarding against error4 ,at the same time1 there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the causes of error only from our mistaking their true character1 while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives4 ,how else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experience8 ,it hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest4 ,it enters upon the path of pure speculation2 but in vain4 ,we have some reason1 however1 to expect that1 in the only other way that lies open to it--the path of practical reason--it may meet with better success4 ,i understand by a canon a list of the priori principles of the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition4 ,thus general logic1 in its analytical department1 is a formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason4 ,in the same way1 ,transcendental ,analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding2 for it alone is competent to enounce true priori synthetical cognitions4 ,but1 when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is possible1 no canon can exist4 ,but the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is1 as has been shown1 completely impossible4 ,there cannot1 therefore1 exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty--for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical2 and1 consequently1 transcendental logic1 in this respect1 is merely a discipline1 and not a canon4 ,if1 then1 there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason--in which case there must be a canon for this faculty--this canon will relate1 not to the speculative1 but to the practical use of reason4 ,this canon we now proceed to investigate4 ,section ,i4 ,of the ,ultimate ,end of the ,pure ,use of ,reason ,there exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience1 to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone1 and not to rest satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole4 ,is the motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative1 or in its practical interests alone8 ,setting aside1 at present1 the results of the labours of pure reason in its speculative exercise1 ,i shall merely inquire regarding the problems the solution of which forms its ultimate aim1 whether reached or not1 and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate4 ,these highest aims must1 from the nature of reason1 possess complete unity2 otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be successfully promoted4 ,the transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things3 the freedom of the will1 the immortality of the soul1 and the existence of ,god4 ,the speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small2 and1 for its sake alone1 we should not undertake the labour of transcendental investigation--a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle4 ,we should be loth to undertake this labour1 because the discoveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation4 ,we may find out that the will is free1 but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our volition4 ,as regards the phenomena or expressions of this will1 that is1 our actions1 we are bound1 in obedience to an inviolable maxim1 without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience1 to explain these in the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature1 that is to say1 according to its unchangeable laws4 ,we may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul1 but we cannot employ this knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life1 nor the peculiar nature of the future1 because our conception of an incorporeal nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge1 and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious4 ,if1 again1 we prove the existence of a supreme intelligence1 we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims existing in the arrangement of the world comprehensible2 but we should not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or disposition1 or inferring any where it is not perceived4 ,for it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not overlook natural causes1 or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience1 for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge4 ,in one word1 these three propositions are1 for the speculative reason1 always transcendent1 and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience2 they are1 consequently1 of no use to us in this sphere1 being but the valueless results of the severe but unprofitable efforts of reason4 ,if1 then1 the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is perfectly useless1 while ,reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us to admit them1 it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical1 and not to our speculative interest4 ,i term all that is possible through free will1 practical4 ,but if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical1 reason can have only a regulative1 and not a constitutive1 influence upon it1 and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws4 ,in the moral philosophy of prudence1 for example1 the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends1 which are aimed at by our inclinations1 into one ultimate end--that of happiness--and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end4 ,in this sphere1 accordingly1 reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action1 for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses1 and is incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely priori4 ,on the other hand1 pure practical laws1 the ends of which have been given by reason entirely priori1 and which are not empirically conditioned1 but are1 on the contrary1 absolutely imperative in their nature1 would be products of pure reason4 ,such are the moral laws2 and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason1 and admit of a canon4 ,all the powers of reason1 in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy1 are1 in fact1 directed to the three above-mentioned problems alone4 ,these again have a still higher end--the answer to the question1 what we ought to do1 if the will is free1 if there is a ,god and a future world4 ,now1 as this problem relates to our in reference to the highest aim of humanity1 it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature1 in the constitution of our reason1 has been directed to the moral alone4 ,we must take care1 however1 in turning our attention to an object which is foreign#gh to the sphere of transcendental philosophy1 not to injure the unity of our system by digressions1 nor1 on the other hand1 to fail in clearness1 by saying too little on the new subject of discussion4 ,i hope to avoid both extremes1 by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental1 and excluding all psychological1 that is1 empirical1 elements4 #gh ,all practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain1 and consequently--in an indirect manner1 at least--to objects of feeling4 ,but as feeling is not a faculty of representation1 but lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition1 the elements of our judgements1 in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain1 that is1 the elements of our practical judgements1 do not belong to transcendental philosophy1 which has to do with pure priori cognitions alone4 ,i have to remark1 in the first place1 that at present ,i treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only1 and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception1 which cannot be employed as a ground of explanation in the phenomenal world1 but is itself a problem for pure reason4 ,a will is purely animal 7arbitrium brutum7 when it is determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only1 that is1 when it is determined in a pathological manner4 ,a will1 which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses1 consequently by motives presented by reason alone1 is called a free will 7arbitrium liberum72 and everything which is connected with this free will1 either as principle or consequence1 is termed practical4 ,the existence of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone4 ,for the human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects the senses2 on the contrary1 we have the power1 by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation1 of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire4 ,but these considerations of what is desirable in relation to our whole state1 that is1 is in the end good and useful1 are based entirely upon reason4 ,this faculty1 accordingly1 enounces laws1 which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and which tell us what ought to take place1 thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature1 which relate to that which does take place4 ,the laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws4 ,whether reason is not itself1 in the actual delivery of these laws1 determined in its turn by other influences1 and whether the action which1 in relation to sensuous impulses1 we call free1 may not1 in relation to higher and more remote operative causes1 really form a part of nature--these are questions which do not here concern us4 ,they are purely speculative questions2 and all we have to do1 in the practical sphere1 is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to present4 ,experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature1 that is1 it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of the will4 ,the idea of transcendental freedom1 on the contrary1 requires that reason--in relation to its causal power of commencing a series of phenomena--should be independent of all sensuous determining causes2 and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience4 ,it therefore remains a problem for the human mind4 ,but this problem does not concern reason in its practical use2 and we have1 therefore1 in a canon of pure reason1 to do with only two questions1 which relate to the practical interest of pure reason3 ,is there a ,god8 and1 ,is there a future life8 ,the question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative1 and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of practical reason4 ,besides1 we have already discussed this subject in the antinomy of pure reason4 ,section ,,ii4 ,of the ,ideal of the ,summum ,bonum as a ,determining ,ground of the ,ultimate ,end of ,pure ,reason ,reason conducted us1 in its speculative use1 through the field of experience and1 as it can never find complete satisfaction in that sphere1 from thence to speculative ideas--which1 however1 in the end brought us back again to experience1 and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason1 in a manner which1 though useful1 was not at all in accordance with our expectations4 ,it now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere1 and whether it will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason1 as we have just stated them4 ,we shall thus ascertain whether1 from the point of view of its practical interest1 reason may not be able to supply us with that which1 on the speculative side1 it wholly denies us4 ,the whole interest of reason1 speculative as well as practical1 is centred in the three following questions3 #a4 ,,what ,,can ,i ,,know8 #b4 ,,what ,,ought ,i ,,to ,,do8 #c4 ,,what ,,may ,i ,,hope8 ,the first question is purely speculative4 ,we have1 as ,i flatter myself1 exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible1 and have at last found the reply with which reason must content itself1 and with which it ought to be content1 so long as it pays no regard to the practical4 ,but from the two great ends to the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed1 we remain just as far removed as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task at the outset4 ,so far1 then1 as knowledge is concerned1 thus much1 at least1 is established1 that1 in regard to those two problems1 it lies beyond our reach4 ,the second question is purely practical4 ,as such it may indeed fall within the province of pure reason1 but still it is not transcendental1 but moral1 and consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our criticism4 ,the third question3 ,if ,i act as ,i ought to do1 what may ,i then hope8--is at once practical and theoretical4 ,the practical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical1 and--in its highest form--speculative question4 ,for all hoping has happiness for its object and stands in precisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature4 ,the former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is 7which determines the ultimate end71 because something ought to take place2 the latter1 that something is 7which operates as the highest cause71 because something does take place4 ,happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires2 extensive1 in regard to their multiplicity2 intensive1 in regard to their degree2 and protensive1 in regard to their duration4 ,the practical law based on the motive of happiness ,i term a pragmatical law 7or prudential rule72 but that law1 assuming such to exist1 which has no other motive than the worthiness of being happy1 ,i term a moral or ethical law4 ,the first tells us what we have to do1 if we wish to become possessed of happiness2 the second dictates how we ought to act1 in order to deserve happiness4 ,the first is based upon empirical principles2 for it is only by experience that ,i can learn either what inclinations exist which desire satisfaction1 or what are the natural means of satisfying them4 ,the second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them1 and regards only the freedom of a rational being1 and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with the distribution of happiness according to principles4 ,this second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason1 and may be cognized priori4 ,i assume that there are pure moral laws which determine1 entirely priori 7without regard to empirical motives1 that is1 to happiness71 the conduct of a rational being1 or in other words1 to use which it makes of its freedom1 and that these laws are absolutely imperative 7not merely hypothetically1 on the supposition of other empirical ends71 and therefore in all respects necessary4 ,i am warranted in assuming this1 not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists1 but by the moral judgement of every man who will make the attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law4 ,pure reason1 then1 contains1 not indeed in its speculative1 but in its practical1 or1 more strictly1 its moral use1 principles of the possibility of experience1 of such actions1 namely1 as1 in accordance with ethical precepts1 might be met with in the history of man4 ,for since reason commands that such actions should take place1 it must be possible for them to take place2 and hence a particular kind of systematic unity--the moral--must be possible4 ,we have found1 it is true1 that the systematic unity of nature could not be established according to speculative principles of reason1 because1 while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom1 it has none in relation to the whole sphere of nature2 and1 while moral principles of reason can produce free actions1 they cannot produce natural laws4 ,it is1 then1 in its practical1 but especially in its moral use1 that the principles of pure reason possess objective reality4 ,i call the world a moral world1 in so far as it may be in accordance with all the ethical laws--which1 by virtue of the freedom of reasonable beings1 it can be1 and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be4 ,but this world must be conceived only as an intelligible world1 inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions 7ends71 and even of all impediments to morality 7the weakness or pravity of human nature74 ,so far1 then1 it is a mere idea--though still a practical idea--which may have1 and ought to have1 an influence on the world of sense1 so as to bring it as far as possible into conformity with itself4 ,the idea of a moral world has1 therefore1 objective reality1 not as referring to an object of intelligible intuition--for of such an object we can form no conception whatever--but to the world of sense--conceived1 however1 as an object of pure reason in its practical use--and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it1 in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed1 under and by virtue of moral laws1 in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the freedom of all others4 ,that is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which relate to its practical interest3 ,do that which will render thee worthy of happiness4 ,the second question is this3 ,if ,i conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness1 may ,i hope thereby to obtain happiness8 ,in order to arrive at the solution of this question1 we must inquire whether the principles of pure reason1 which prescribe priori the law1 necessarily also connect this hope with it4 ,i say1 then1 that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its practical use1 so it is equally necessary according to reason in its theoretical use to assume that every one has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct1 and that therefore the system of morality is inseparably 7though only in the idea of pure reason7 connected with that of happiness4 ,now in an intelligible1 that is1 in the moral world1 in the conception of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to morality 7sensuous desires71 such a system of happiness1 connected with and proportioned to morality1 may be conceived as necessary1 because freedom of volition--partly incited1 and partly restrained by moral laws--would be itself the cause of general happiness2 and thus rational beings1 under the guidance of such principles1 would be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and that of others4 ,but such a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea1 the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that every one acts as he ought2 in other words1 that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a ,supreme ,will1 comprehending in1 or under1 itself all particular wills4 ,but since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of his freedom of volition1 even if others should not act in conformity with this law1 neither the nature of things1 nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality1 determine how the consequences of these actions will be related to happiness2 and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness1 cannot be cognized by reason1 if we take nature alone for our guide4 ,this connection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason1 which governs according to moral laws4 ,i term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will1 united with supreme blessedness1 is the cause of all happiness in the world1 so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality 7as the worthiness of being happy71 the ideal of the supreme ,good4 ,it is only1 then1 in the ideal of the supreme original good1 that pure reason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative good1 and accordingly of an intelligible1 that is1 moral world4 ,now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world1 while the senses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena1 we must assume the former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense 7since the world of sense gives us no hint of it71 and therefore as future in relation to us4 ,thus ,god and a future life are two hypotheses which1 according to the principles of pure reason1 are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us4 ,morality per se constitutes a system4 ,but we can form no system of happiness1 except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to morality4 ,but this is only possible in the intelligible world1 under a wise author and ruler4 ,such a ruler1 together with life in such a world1 which we must look upon as future1 reason finds itself compelled to assume2 or it must regard the moral laws as idle dreams1 since the necessary consequence which this same reason connects with them must1 without this hypothesis1 fall to the ground4 ,hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as commands1 which they could not be did they not connect priori adequate consequences with their dictates1 and thus carry with them promises and threats4 ,but this1 again1 they could not do1 did they not reside in a necessary being1 as the ,supreme ,good1 which alone can render such a teleological unity possible4 ,leibnitz termed the world1 when viewed in relation to the rational beings which it contains1 and the moral relations in which they stand to each other1 under the government of the ,supreme ,good1 the kingdom of ,grace1 and distinguished it from the kingdom of ,nature1 in which these rational beings live1 under moral laws1 indeed1 but expect no other consequences from their actions than such as follow according to the course of nature in the world of sense4 ,to view ourselves1 therefore1 as in the kingdom of grace1 in which all happiness awaits us1 except in so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of happiness1 is a practically necessary idea of reason4 ,practical laws1 in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions1 that is1 subjective principles1 are termed maxims4 ,the judgements of moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed according ideas2 the observance of its laws1 according to maxims4 ,the whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims2 but this is impossible1 unless with the moral law1 which is a mere idea1 reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which is in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another life1 which is in exact conformity with our highest aims4 ,thus1 without a ,god and without a world1 invisible to us now1 but hoped for1 the glorious ideas of morality are1 indeed1 objects of approbation and of admiration1 but cannot be the springs of purpose and action4 ,for they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being1 and which are determined priori by pure reason itself1 and necessary4 ,happiness alone is1 in the view of reason1 far from being the complete good4 ,reason does not approve of it 7however much inclination may desire it71 except as united with desert4 ,on the other hand1 morality alone1 and with it1 mere desert1 is likewise far from being the complete good4 ,to make it complete1 he who conducts himself in a manner not unworthy of happiness1 must be able to hope for the possession of happiness4 ,even reason1 unbiased by private ends1 or interested considerations1 cannot judge otherwise1 if it puts itself in the place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others4 ,for in the practical idea both points are essentially combined1 though in such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral disposition1 as its condition1 and not conversely1 the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness4 ,for a disposition which should require the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition would not be moral1 and hence also would not be worthy of complete happiness--a happiness which1 in the view of reason1 recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own immoral conduct4 ,happiness1 therefore1 in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings 7whereby they are made worthy of happiness71 constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason4 ,this world is1 it is true1 only an intelligible world2 for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires1 the world of sense gives us no hint4 ,its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good4 ,in it independent reason1 equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause1 founds1 maintains1 and fulfils the universal order of things1 with the most perfect teleological harmony1 however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense4 ,this moral theology has the peculiar advantage1 in contrast with speculative theology1 of leading inevitably to the conception of a sole1 perfect1 and rational ,first ,cause1 whereof speculative theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds1 far less any convincing evidence4 ,for we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology1 however far reason may lead us in these1 any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only ,being1 which stands at the head of all natural causes1 and on which these are entirely dependent4 ,on the other hand1 if we take our stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe1 and from this point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate efficiency and1 for us1 obligatory force1 we must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will1 which comprehends all these laws in itself4 ,for how1 under different wills1 should we find complete unity of ends8 ,this will must be omnipotent1 that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it2 omniscient1 that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and their moral worth2 omnipresent1 that it may be at hand to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise2 eternal1 that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail2 and so on4 ,but this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences--which1 as mere nature1 is only a world of sense1 but1 as a system of freedom of volition1 may be termed an intelligible1 that is1 moral world 7regnum gratiae7--leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole1 according to universal natural laws--just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws--and unites the practical with the speculative reason4 ,the world must be represented as having originated from an idea1 if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason--namely1 the moral use1 which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good4 ,hence the investigation of nature receives a teleological direction1 and becomes1 in its widest extension1 physico-theology4 ,but this1 taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom1 and not accidentally instituted by external commands1 establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things4 ,this gives rise to a transcendental theology1 which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity2 and this principle connects all things according to universal and necessary natural laws1 because all things have their origin in the absolute necessity of the one only ,primal ,being4 ,what use can we make of our understanding1 even in respect of experience1 if we do not propose ends to ourselves8 ,but the highest ends are those of morality1 and it is only pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these4 ,though supplied with these1 and putting ourselves under their guidance1 we can make no teleological use of the knowledge of nature1 as regards cognition1 unless nature itself has established teleological unity4 ,for without this unity we should not even possess reason1 because we should have no school for reason1 and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its conceptions4 ,but teleological unity is a necessary unity1 and founded on the essence of the individual will itself4 ,hence this will1 which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto1 must be so likewise4 ,in this way the transcendental enlargement of our rational cognition would be1 not the cause1 but merely the effect of the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us4 ,hence1 also1 we find in the history of human reason that1 before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined1 and before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles1 the knowledge of nature1 and even a considerable amount of intellectual culture in many other sciences1 could produce only rude and vague conceptions of the ,deity1 sometimes even admitting of an astonishing indifference with regard to this question altogether4 ,but the more enlarged treatment of moral ideas1 which was rendered necessary by the extreme pure moral law of our religion1 awakened the interest1 and thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this object4 ,in this way1 and without the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature1 or of a reliable transcendental insight 7for these have been wanting in all ages71 a conception of the ,divine ,being was arrived at1 which we now hold to be the correct one1 not because speculative reason convinces us of its correctness1 but because it accords with the moral principles of reason4 ,thus it is to pure reason1 but only in its practical use1 that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with our highest interest a cognition1 of which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture1 but the validity of which it was unable to establish--and of having thereby rendered it1 not indeed a demonstrated dogma1 but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason4 ,but if practical reason has reached this elevation1 and has attained to the conception of a sole ,primal ,being as the supreme good1 it must not1 therefore1 imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of its application1 and risen to the immediate cognition of new objects2 it must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained1 and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves4 ,for it was these very laws1 the internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an independent cause1 or of a wise ruler of the universe1 who should give them effect4 ,hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler1 especially as we have no conception of such a will1 except as formed in accordance with these laws4 ,so far1 then1 as practical reason has the right to conduct us1 we shall not look upon actions as binding on us1 because they are the commands of ,god1 but we shall regard them as divine commands1 because we are internally bound by them4 ,we shall study freedom under the teleological unity which accords with principles of reason2 we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves1 and we shall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others4 ,moral theology is1 therefore1 only of immanent use4 ,it teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world1 by placing ourselves in harmony with the general system of ends1 and warns us against the fanaticism1 nay1 the crime of depriving reason of its legislative authority in the moral conduct of life1 for the purpose of directly connecting this authority with the idea of the ,supreme ,being4 ,for this would be1 not an immanent1 but a transcendent use of moral theology1 and1 like the transcendent use of mere speculation1 would inevitably pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason4 ,section ,,iii4 ,of ,opinion1 ,knowledge1 and ,belief ,the holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding which may rest on objective grounds1 but requires1 also1 subjective causes in the mind of the person judging4 ,if a judgement is valid for every rational being1 then its ground is objectively sufficient1 and it is termed a conviction4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it has its ground in the particular character of the subject1 it is termed a persuasion4 ,persuasion is a mere illusion1 the ground of the judgement1 which lies solely in the subject1 being regarded as objective4 ,hence a judgement of this kind has only private validity--is only valid for the individual who judges1 and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated4 ,but truth depends upon agreement with the object1 and consequently the judgements of all understandings1 if true1 must be in agreement with each other 7consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter se74 ,conviction may1 therefore1 be distinguished1 from an external point of view1 from persuasion1 by the possibility of communicating it and by showing its validity for the reason of every man2 for in this case the presumption1 at least1 arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other1 in spite of the different characters of individuals1 rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object1 and thus the correctness of the judgement is established4 ,persuasion1 accordingly1 cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction1 that is1 so long as the subject views its judgement simply as a phenomenon of its own mind4 ,but if we inquire whether the grounds of our judgement1 which are valid for us1 produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own1 we have then the means1 though only subjective means1 not1 indeed1 of producing conviction1 but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgement2 in other words1 of discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion4 ,if we can1 in addition to this1 develop the subjective causes of the judgement1 which we have taken for its objective grounds1 and thus explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind1 apart altogether from the objective character of the object1 we can then expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it1 although1 if its subjective cause lies in our nature1 we cannot hope altogether to escape its influence4 ,i can only maintain1 that is1 affirm as necessarily valid for every one1 that which produces conviction4 ,persuasion ,i may keep for myself1 if it is agreeable to me2 but ,i cannot1 and ought not1 to attempt to impose it as binding upon others4 ,holding for true1 or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation to conviction 7which is1 at the same time1 objectively valid71 has the three following degrees3 opinion1 belief1 and knowledge4 ,opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement1 subjectively as well as objectively4 ,belief is subjectively sufficient1 but is recognized as being objectively insufficient4 ,knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient4 ,subjective sufficiency is termed conviction 7for myself72 objective sufficiency is termed certainty 7for all74 ,i need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions4 ,i must never venture to be of opinion1 without knowing something1 at least1 by which my judgement1 in itself merely problematical1 is brought into connection with the truth--which connection1 although not perfect1 is still something more than an arbitrary fiction4 ,moreover1 the law of such a connection must be certain4 ,for if1 in relation to this law1 ,i have nothing more than opinion1 my judgement is but a play of the imagination1 without the least relation to truth4 ,in the judgements of pure reason1 opinion has no place4 ,for1 as they do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth and priori cognition1 the principle of connection in it requires universality and necessity1 and consequently perfect certainty--otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all4 ,hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics2 we must know1 or abstain from forming a judgement altogether4 ,the case is the same with the maxims of morality4 ,for we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed1 but we must know it to be so4 ,in the transcendental sphere of reason1 on the other hand1 the term opinion is too weak1 while the word knowledge is too strong4 ,from the merely speculative point of view1 therefore1 we cannot form a judgement at all4 ,for the subjective grounds of a judgement1 such as produce belief1 cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries1 inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure4 ,but it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically insufficient judgement can be termed belief4 ,now the practical reference is either to skill or to morality2 to the former1 when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental1 to the latter1 when it is absolutely necessary4 ,if we propose to ourselves any end whatever1 the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary4 ,the necessity is subjectively1 but still only comparatively1 sufficient1 if ,i am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained4 ,on the other hand1 it is sufficient1 absolutely and for every one1 if ,i know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end would be possible4 ,in the former case my supposition--my judgement with regard to certain conditions--is a merely accidental belief2 in the latter it is a necessary belief4 ,the physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger1 but is ignorant of the nature of the disease4 ,he observes the symptoms1 and concludes1 according to the best of his judgement1 that it is a case of phthisis4 ,his belief is1 even in his own judgement1 only contingent3 another man might1 perhaps come nearer the truth4 ,such a belief1 contingent indeed1 but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends1 ,i term ,pragmatical belief4 ,the usual test1 whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion1 or his subjective conviction at least1 that is1 his firm belief1 is a bet4 ,it frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance1 that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error4 ,the offer of a bet startles him1 and makes him pause4 ,sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat1 but not at ten4 ,for he does not hesitate1 perhaps1 to venture a ducat1 but if it is proposed to stake ten1 he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken--a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation4 ,if we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition1 our judgement drops its air of triumph1 we take the alarm1 and discover the actual strength of our belief4 ,thus pragmatical belief has degrees1 varying in proportion to the interests at stake4 ,now1 in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object1 and where1 accordingly1 our judgement is purely theoretical1 we can still represent to ourselves1 in thought1 the possibility of a course of action1 for which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds1 if any means existed of ascertaining the truth of the matter4 ,thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an analogon of practical judgements1 to which the word belief may properly be applied1 and which we may term doctrinal belief4 ,i should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition--if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience--that1 at least1 some one of the planets1 which we see1 is inhabited4 ,hence ,i say that ,i have not merely the opinion1 but the strong belief1 on the correctness of which ,i would stake even many of the advantages of life1 that there are inhabitants in other worlds4 ,now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of ,god belongs to doctrinal belief4 ,for1 although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe ,i do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea1 as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents1 but1 on the contrary1 am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature1 still teleological unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to nature1 that it is impossible for me to ignore it--especially since1 in addition to these considerations1 abundant examples of it are supplied by experience4 ,but the sole condition1 so far as my knowledge extends1 under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature1 is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends4 ,consequently1 the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature--is the condition under which alone ,i can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed1 but by no means unimportant4 ,moreover1 since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption1 and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it1 it follows that it would be saying far too little to term my judgement1 in this case1 a mere opinion1 and that1 even in this theoretical connection1 ,i may assert that ,i firmly believe in ,god4 ,still1 if we use words strictly1 this must not be called a practical1 but a doctrinal belief1 which the theology of nature 7physico-theology7 must also produce in my mind4 ,in the wisdom of a ,supreme ,being1 and in the shortness of life1 so inadequate to the development of the glorious powers of human nature1 we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul4 ,the expression of belief is1 in such cases1 an expression of modesty from the objective point of view1 but1 at the same time1 of firm confidence1 from the subjective4 ,if ,i should venture to term this merely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which ,i am entitled to assume2 a more complete conception1 with regard to another world and to the cause of the world1 might then be justly required of me than ,i am1 in reality1 able to give4 ,for1 if ,i assume anything1 even as a mere hypothesis1 ,i must1 at least1 know so much of the properties of such a being as will enable me1 not to form the conception1 but to imagine the existence of it4 ,but the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me1 and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason1 which forces me to hold it fast1 though ,i may not be in a position to give a speculative account of it4 ,but mere doctrinal belief is1 to some extent1 wanting in stability4 ,we often quit our hold of it1 in consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation1 though in the end we inevitably return to it again4 ,it is quite otherwise with moral belief4 ,for in this sphere action is absolutely necessary1 that is1 ,i must act in obedience to the moral law in all points4 ,the end is here incontrovertibly established1 and there is only one condition possible1 according to the best of my perception1 under which this end can harmonize with all other ends1 and so have practical validity--namely1 the existence of a ,god and of a future world4 ,i know also1 to a certainty1 that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law4 ,but since the moral precept is1 at the same time1 my maxim 7as reason requires that it should be71 ,i am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of ,god and in a future life2 and ,i am sure that nothing can make me waver in this belief1 since ,i should thereby overthrow my moral maxims1 the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes4 ,thus1 while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment1 there is still enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view4 ,no one1 it is true1 will be able to boast that he knows that there is a ,god and a future life2 for1 if he knows this1 he is just the man whom ,i have long wished to find4 ,all knowledge1 regarding an object of mere reason1 can be communicated2 and ,i should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension1 through the instrumentality of his instruction4 ,no1 my conviction is not logical1 but moral certainty2 and since it rests on subjective grounds 7of the moral sentiment71 ,i must not even say3 ,it is morally certain that there is a ,god1 etc41 but3 ,i am morally certain1 that is1 my belief in ,god and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature that ,i am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter4 ,the only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments4 ,if we give up this assumption1 and take a man who is entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws1 the question which reason proposes1 becomes then merely a problem for speculation and may1 indeed1 be supported by strong grounds from analogy1 but not by such as will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way4#gi ,but in these questions no man is free from all interest4 ,for though the want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests1 still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of ,god and a future life4 ,for he cannot pretend to any certainty of the non-existence of ,god and of a future life1 unless--since it could only be proved by mere reason1 and therefore apodeictically--he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both1 which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do4 ,this would be a negative belief1 which could not1 indeed1 produce morality and good sentiments1 but still could produce an analogon of these1 by operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil dispositions4 #gi ,the human mind 7as1 ,i believe1 every rational being must of necessity do7 takes a natural interest in morality1 although this interest is not undivided1 and may not be practically in preponderance4 ,if you strengthen and increase it1 you will find the reason become docile1 more enlightened1 and more capable of uniting the speculative interest with the practical4 ,but if you do not take care at the outset1 or at least midway1 to make men good1 you will never force them into an honest belief4 ,but1 it will be said1 is this all that pure reason can effect1 in opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience8 ,nothing more than two articles of belief8 ,common sense could have done as much as this1 without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter6 ,i shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason--even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only negative--for on this point something more will be said in the next section4 ,but1 ,i ask1 do you require that that knowledge which concerns all men1 should transcend the common understanding1 and should only be revealed to you by philosophers8 ,the very circumstance which has called forth your censure1 is the best confirmation of the correctness of our previous assertions1 since it discloses1 what could not have been foreseen1 that ,nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction and that1 in respect to the essential ends of human nature1 we cannot advance further with the help of the highest philosophy1 than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,architectonic of ,pure ,reason ,by the term architectonic ,i mean the art of constructing a system4 ,without systematic unity1 our knowledge cannot become science2 it will be an aggregate1 and not a system4 ,thus architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition1 and therefore necessarily forms part of our methodology4 ,reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and rhapsodistic state1 but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a system4 ,it is thus alone that they can advance the ends of reason4 ,by a system ,i mean the unity of various cognitions under one idea4 ,this idea is the conception--given by reason--of the form of a whole1 in so far as the conception determines priori not only the limits of its content1 but the place which each of its parts is to occupy4 ,the scientific idea contains1 therefore1 the end and the form of the whole which is in accordance with that end4 ,the unity of the end1 to which all the parts of the system relate1 and through which all have a relation to each other1 communicates unity to the whole system1 so that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our knowledge of the rest2 and it determines priori the limits of the system1 thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions4 ,the whole is thus an organism 7articulatio71 and not an aggregate 7coacervatio72 it may grow from within 7per intussusceptionem71 but it cannot increase by external additions 7per appositionem74 ,it is1 thus1 like an animal body1 the growth of which does not add any limb1 but1 without changing their proportions1 makes each in its sphere stronger and more active4 ,we require1 for the execution of the idea of a system1 a schema1 that is1 a content and an arrangement of parts determined priori by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes4 ,a schema which is not projected in accordance with an idea1 that is1 from the standpoint of the highest aim of reason1 but merely empirically1 in accordance with accidental aims and purposes 7the number of which cannot be predetermined71 can give us nothing more than technical unity4 ,but the schema which is originated from an idea 7in which case reason presents us with aims priori1 and does not look for them to experience71 forms the basis of architectonical unity4 ,a science1 in the proper acceptation of that term1 cannot be formed technically1 that is1 from observation of the similarity existing between different objects1 and the purely contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims2 its constitution must be framed on architectonical principles1 that is1 its parts must be shown to possess an essential affinity1 and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and internal aim or end1 which forms the condition of the possibility of the scientific whole4 ,the schema of a science must give priori the plan of it 7monogramma71 and the division of the whole into parts1 in conformity with the idea of the science2 and it must also distinguish this whole from all others1 according to certain understood principles4 ,no one will attempt to construct a science1 unless he have some idea to rest on as a proper basis4 ,but1 in the elaboration of the science1 he finds that the schema1 nay1 even the definition which he at first gave of the science1 rarely corresponds with his idea2 for this idea lies1 like a germ1 in our reason1 its parts undeveloped and hid even from microscopical observation4 ,for this reason1 we ought to explain and define sciences1 not according to the description which the originator gives of them1 but according to the idea which we find based in reason itself1 and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the science already accumulated4 ,for it will often be found that the originator of a science and even his latest successors remain attached to an erroneous idea1 which they cannot render clear to themselves1 and that they thus fail in determining the true content1 the articulation or systematic unity1 and the limits of their science4 ,it is unfortunate that1 only after having occupied ourselves for a long time in the collection of materials1 under the guidance of an idea which lies undeveloped in the mind1 but not according to any definite plan of arrangement--nay1 only after we have spent much time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials1 does it become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light1 and to project1 according to architectonical principles1 a plan of the whole1 in accordance with the aims of reason4 ,systems seem1 like certain worms1 to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca--by the mere confluence of conceptions1 and to gain completeness only with the progress of time4 ,but the schema or germ of all lies in reason2 and thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea1 but all are united into one grand system of human knowledge1 of which they form members4 ,for this reason1 it is possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition1 the formation of which1 at the present time1 considering the immense materials collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems1 would not indeed be very difficult4 ,our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason2 and we begin from the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two1 one of which is reason4 ,by reason ,i understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition1 the rational being placed in contradistinction to the empirical4 ,if ,i make complete abstraction of the content of cognition1 objectively considered1 all cognition is1 from a subjective point of view1 either historical or rational4 ,historical cognition is cognitio ex datis1 rational1 cognitio ex principiis4 ,whatever may be the original source of a cognition1 it is1 in relation to the person who possesses it1 merely historical1 if he knows only what has been given him from another quarter1 whether that knowledge was communicated by direct experience or by instruction4 ,thus the person who has learned a system of philosophy--say the ,wolfian--although he has a perfect knowledge of all the principles1 definitions1 and arguments in that philosophy1 as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system1 possesses really no more than an historical knowledge of the ,wolfian system2 he knows only what has been told him1 his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers4 ,dispute the validity of a definition1 and he is completely at a loss to find another4 ,he has formed his mind on another's2 but the imitative faculty is not the productive4 ,his knowledge has not been drawn from reason2 and although1 objectively considered1 it is rational knowledge1 subjectively1 it is merely historical4 ,he has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a living man4 ,rational cognitions which are objective1 that is1 which have their source in reason1 can be so termed from a subjective point of view1 only when they have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources of reason1 that is1 from principles2 and it is in this way alone that criticism1 or even the rejection of what has been already learned1 can spring up in the mind4 ,all rational cognition is1 again1 based either on conceptions1 or on the construction of conceptions4 ,the former is termed philosophical1 the latter mathematical4 ,i have already shown the essential difference of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter4 ,a cognition may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical--as is the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system1 and who remain in a state of pupilage all their lives4 ,but it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge1 when committed to memory1 is valid1 from the subjective point of view1 as rational knowledge also1 and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophical cognition4 ,the reason is that the only way of arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of reason1 and thus it is always certain and indisputable2 because reason is employed in concreto--but at the same time priori--that is1 in pure and1 therefore1 infallible intuition2 and thus all causes of illusion and error are excluded4 ,of all the priori sciences of reason1 therefore1 mathematics alone can be learned4 ,philosophy--unless it be in an historical manner--cannot be learned2 we can at most learn to philosophize4 ,philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition4 ,we must use this term in an objective sense1 if we understand by it the archetype of all attempts at philosophizing1 and the standard by which all subjective philosophies are to be judged4 ,in this sense1 philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science1 which does not exist in concreto1 but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate1 until we have discovered the right path to pursue--a path overgrown by the errors and illusions of sense--and the image we have hitherto tried in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype4 ,until that time1 we cannot learn philosophy--it does not exist2 if it does1 where is it1 who possesses it1 and how shall we know it8 ,we can only learn to philosophize2 in other words1 we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles1 retaining at the same time1 the right of investigating the sources of these principles1 of testing1 and even of rejecting them4 ,until then1 our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic conception--a conception1 that is1 of a system of cognition which we are trying to elaborate into a science2 all that we at present know being the systematic unity of this cognition1 and consequently the logical completeness of the cognition for the desired end4 ,but there is also a cosmical conception 7conceptus cosmicus7 of philosophy1 which has always formed the true basis of this term1 especially when philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher4 ,in this view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason 7teleologia rationis humanae71 and the philosopher is not merely an artist--who occupies himself with conceptions--but a lawgiver1 legislating for human reason4 ,in this sense of the word1 it would be in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher1 and to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone4 ,the mathematician1 the natural philosopher1 and the logician--how far soever the first may have advanced in rational1 and the two latter in philosophical knowledge--are merely artists1 engaged in the arrangement and formation of conceptions2 they cannot be termed philosophers4 ,above them all1 there is the ideal teacher1 who employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason4 ,him alone can we call philosopher2 but he nowhere exists4 ,but the idea of his legislative power resides in the mind of every man1 and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason4 ,this idea is1 therefore1 a cosmical conception4#hj #hj ,by a cosmical conception1 ,i mean one in which all men necessarily take an interest2 the aim of a science must accordingly be determined according to scholastic conceptions1 if it is regarded merely as a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends4 ,in view of the complete systematic unity of reason1 there can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind4 ,to this all other aims are subordinate1 and nothing more than means for its attainment4 ,this ultimate end is the destination of man1 and the philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy4 ,the superior position occupied by moral philosophy1 above all other spheres for the operations of reason1 sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always included the idea--and in an especial manner--of moralist in that of philosopher4 ,even at the present day1 we call a man who appears to have the power of self-government1 even although his knowledge may be very limited1 by the name of philosopher4 ,the legislation of human reason1 or philosophy1 has two objects--nature and freedom--and thus contains not only the laws of nature1 but also those of ethics1 at first in two separate systems1 which1 finally1 merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition4 ,the philosophy of nature relates to that which is1 that of ethics to that which ought to be4 ,but all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason1 or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles4 ,the former is termed pure1 the latter empirical philosophy4 ,the philosophy of pure reason is either propdeutic1 that is1 an inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure priori cognition1 and is termed critical philosophy2 or it is1 secondly1 the system of pure reason--a science containing the systematic presentation of the whole body of philosophical knowledge1 true as well as illusory1 given by pure reason--and is called metaphysic4 ,this name may1 however1 be also given to the whole system of pure philosophy1 critical philosophy included1 and may designate the investigation into the sources or possibility of priori cognition1 as well as the presentation of the priori cognitions which form a system of pure philosophy--excluding1 at the same time1 all empirical and mathematical elements4 ,metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason1 and is1 accordingly1 either the metaphysic of nature1 or the metaphysic of ethics4 ,the former contains all the pure rational principles--based upon conceptions alone 7and thus excluding mathematics7--of all theoretical cognition2 the latter1 the principles which determine and necessitate priori all action4 ,now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws--for the regulation of our actions--which are deduced from principles entirely priori4 ,hence the metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy1 as it is not based upon anthropological or other empirical considerations4 ,the metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense4 ,but as pure moral philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition1 we must allow it to retain the name of metaphysic1 although it is not requisite that we should insist on so terming it in our present discussion4 ,it is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which differ from others both in kind and in origin1 and to take great care that they are not confounded with those with which they are generally found connected4 ,what the chemist does in the analysis of substances1 what the mathematician in pure mathematics1 is1 in a still higher degree1 the duty of the philosopher1 that the value of each different kind of cognition1 and the part it takes in the operations of the mind1 may be clearly defined4 ,human reason has never wanted a metaphysic of some kind1 since it attained the power of thought1 or rather of reflection2 but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements4 ,the idea of a science of this kind is as old as speculation itself2 and what mind does not speculate--either in the scholastic or in the popular fashion8 ,at the same time1 it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition--the one completely priori1 the other posteriori2 and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition1 and with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply engaged the attention of the human mind1 has never been established4 ,when it was said3 8,metaphysic is the science of the first principles of human cognition10 this definition did not signalize a peculiarity in kind1 but only a difference in degree2 these first principles were thus declared to be more general than others1 but no criterion of distinction from empirical principles was given4 ,of these some are more general1 and therefore higher1 than others2 and--as we cannot distinguish what is completely priori from that which is known to be posteriori--where shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher and so-called first principles1 from the lower and subordinate principles of cognition8 ,what would be said if we were asked to be satisfied with a division of the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those following them8 8,does the fifth1 or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries80 it would be asked4 ,in the same way ,i ask3 ,does the conception of extension belong to metaphysics8 ,you answer1 8,yes40 ,well1 that of body too8 8,yes40 ,and that of a fluid body8 ,you stop1 you are unprepared to admit this2 for if you do1 everything will belong to metaphysics4 ,from this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination--of the particular to the general--cannot determine the limits of a science2 and that1 in the present case1 we must expect to find a difference in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin4 ,the fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side by the fact that this kind of priori cognition showed a certain similarity in character with the science of mathematics4 ,both have the property in common of possessing an priori origin2 but1 in the one1 our knowledge is based upon conceptions1 in the other1 on the construction of conceptions4 ,thus a decided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematical cognition comes out--a dissimilarity which was always felt1 but which could not be made distinct for want of an insight into the criteria of the difference4 ,and thus it happened that1 as philosophers themselves failed in the proper development of the idea of their science1 the elaboration of the science could not proceed with a definite aim1 or under trustworthy guidance4 ,thus1 too1 philosophers1 ignorant of the path they ought to pursue and always disputing with each other regarding the discoveries which each asserted he had made1 brought their science into disrepute with the rest of the world1 and finally1 even among themselves4 ,all pure priori cognition forms1 therefore1 in view of the peculiar faculty which originates it1 a peculiar and distinct unity2 and metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to represent that cognition in this systematic unity4 ,the speculative part of metaphysic1 which has especially appropriated this appellation--that which we have called the metaphysic of nature--and which considers everything1 as it is 7not as it ought to be71 by means of priori conceptions1 is divided in the following manner4 ,metaphysic1 in the more limited acceptation of the term1 consists of two parts--transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason4 ,the former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles belonging to the understanding and the reason1 and which relate to objects in general1 but not to any particular given objects 7,ontologia72 the latter has nature for its subject-matter1 that is1 the sum of given objects--whether given to the senses1 or1 if we will1 to some other kind of intuition--and is accordingly physiology1 although only rationalis4 ,but the use of the faculty of reason in this rational mode of regarding nature is either physical or hyperphysical1 or1 more properly speaking1 immanent or transcendent4 ,the former relates to nature1 in so far as our knowledge regarding it may be applied in experience 7in concreto72 the latter to that connection of the objects of experience1 which transcends all experience4 ,transcendent physiology has1 again1 an internal and an external connection with its object1 both1 however1 transcending possible experience2 the former is the physiology of nature as a whole1 or transcendental cognition of the world1 the latter of the connection of the whole of nature with a being above nature1 or transcendental cognition of ,god4 ,immanent physiology1 on the contrary1 considers nature as the sum of all sensuous objects1 consequently1 as it is presented to us--but still according to priori conditions1 for it is under these alone that nature can be presented to our minds at all4 ,the objects of immanent physiology are of two kinds3 #a4 ,those of the external senses1 or corporeal nature2 #b4 ,the object of the internal sense1 the soul1 or1 in accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it1 thinking nature4 ,the metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics2 but1 as it must contain only the principles of an priori cognition of nature1 we must term it rational physics4 ,the metaphysics of thinking nature is called psychology1 and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the rational cognition of the soul4 ,thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts3 #a4 ,ontology2 #b4 ,rational ,physiology2 #c4 ,rational cosmology2 and #d4 ,rational theology4 ,the second part--that of the rational doctrine of nature--may be subdivided into two1 physica rationalis#ha and psychologia rationalis4 #ha ,it must not be supposed that ,i mean by this appellation what is generally called physica general is1 and which is rather mathematics than a philosophy of nature4 ,for the metaphysic of nature is completely different from mathematics1 nor is it so rich in results1 although it is of great importance as a critical test of the application of pure understanding--cognition to nature4 ,for want of its guidance1 even mathematicians1 adopting certain common notions--which are1 in fact1 metaphysical--have unconsciously crowded their theories of nature with hypotheses1 the fallacy of which becomes evident upon the application of the principles of this metaphysic1 without detriment1 however1 to the employment of mathematics in this sphere of cognition4 ,the fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity dictates this division2 it is1 therefore1 architectonical--in accordance with the highest aims of reason1 and not merely technical1 or according to certain accidentally-observed similarities existing between the different parts of the whole science4 ,for this reason1 also1 is the division immutable and of legislative authority4 ,but the reader may observe in it a few points to which he ought to demur1 and which may weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy4 ,in the first place1 how can ,i desire an priori cognition or metaphysic of objects1 in so far as they are given posteriori8 and how is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to priori principles1 and to attain to a rational physiology8 ,the answer is this4 ,we take from experience nothing more than is requisite to present us with an object 7in general7 of the external or of the internal sense2 in the former case1 by the mere conception of matter 7impenetrable and inanimate extension71 in the latter1 by the conception of a thinking being--given in the internal empirical representation1 ,i think4 ,as to the rest1 we must not employ in our metaphysic of these objects any empirical principles 7which add to the content of our conceptions by means of experience71 for the purpose of forming by their help any judgements respecting these objects4 ,secondly1 what place shall we assign to empirical psychology1 which has always been considered a part of metaphysics1 and from which in our time such important philosophical results have been expected1 after the hope of constructing an priori system of knowledge had been abandoned8 ,i answer3 ,it must be placed by the side of empirical physics or physics proper2 that is1 must be regarded as forming a part of applied philosophy1 the priori principles of which are contained in pure philosophy1 which is therefore connected1 although it must not be confounded1 with psychology4 ,empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics1 and is indeed excluded by the very idea of that science4 ,in conformity1 however1 with scholastic usage1 we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics--but only as an appendix to it4 ,we adopt this course from motives of economy2 as psychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as an independent study1 while it is1 at the same time1 of too great importance to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less affinity than it has with the subject of metaphysics4 ,it is a stranger who has been long a guest2 and we make it welcome to stay1 until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology--the pendant to empirical physics4 ,the above is the general idea of metaphysics1 which1 as more was expected from it than could be looked for with justice1 and as these pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized1 fell into general disrepute4 ,our ,critique must have fully convinced the reader that1 although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion1 it must always be one of its most important bulwarks1 and that human reason1 which naturally pursues a dialectical course1 cannot do without this science1 which checks its tendencies towards dialectic and1 by elevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge1 prevents the ravages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in the sphere of morals as well as in that of religion4 ,we may be sure1 therefore1 whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those who judge a science not by its own nature1 but according to the accidental effects it may have produced1 that it can never be completely abandoned1 that we must always return to it as to a beloved one who has been for a time estranged1 because the questions with which it is engaged relate to the highest aims of humanity1 and reason must always labour either to attain to settled views in regard to these1 or to destroy those which others have already established4 ,metaphysic1 therefore--that of nature1 as well as that of ethics1 but in an especial manner the criticism which forms the propdeutic to all the operations of reason--forms properly that department of knowledge which may be termed1 in the truest sense of the word1 philosophy4 ,the path which it pursues is that of science1 which1 when it has once been discovered1 is never lost1 and never misleads4 ,mathematics1 natural science1 the common experience of men1 have a high value as means1 for the most part1 to accidental ends--but at last also1 to those which are necessary and essential to the existence of humanity4 ,but to guide them to this high goal1 they require the aid of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions1 which1 be it termed as it may1 is properly nothing but metaphysics4 ,for the same reason1 metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the culture of human reason4 ,in this respect1 it is indispensable1 setting aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science4 ,for its subject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason1 which form the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all4 ,that1 as a purely speculative science1 it is more useful in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge1 does not detract from its value2 on the contrary1 the supreme office of censor which it occupies assures to it the highest authority and importance4 ,this office it administers for the purpose of securing order1 harmony1 and well-being to science1 and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible aim--the happiness of all mankind4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,the ,history of ,pure ,reason ,this title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a division of the system of pure reason of which ,i do not intend to treat at present4 ,i shall content myself with casting a cursory glance1 from a purely transcendental point of view--that of the nature of pure reason--on the labours of philosophers up to the present time4 ,they have aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy2 but to my eye this edifice appears to be in a very ruinous condition4 ,it is very remarkable1 although naturally it could not have been otherwise1 that1 in the infancy of philosophy1 the study of the nature of ,god and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement1 rather than the conclusion1 as we should have it1 of the speculative efforts of the human mind4 ,however rude the religious conceptions generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less cultivated time1 the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature of ,god2 and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of pleasing the invisible ruler of the world1 and of attaining to happiness in another world at least1 than a good and honest course of life in this4 ,thus theology and morals formed the two chief motives1 or rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries4 ,but it was the former that especially occupied the attention of speculative reason1 and which afterwards became so celebrated under the name of metaphysics4 ,i shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the greatest changes in metaphysics took place1 but shall merely give a hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most important revolutions in this sphere of thought4 ,there are three different ends in relation to which these revolutions have taken place4 #a4 ,in relation to the object of the cognition of reason1 philosophers may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists4 ,epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former1 ,plato of the latter4 ,the distinction here signalized1 subtle as it is1 dates from the earliest times1 and was long maintained4 ,the former asserted that reality resides in sensuous objects alone1 and that everything else is merely imaginary2 the latter1 that the senses are the parents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding alone4 ,the former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding a certain kind of reality2 but with them it was merely logical1 with the others it was mystical4 ,the former admitted intellectual conceptions1 but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real existence4 ,the latter maintained that all real objects were intelligible1 and believed that the pure understanding possessed a faculty of intuition apart from sense1 which1 in their opinion1 served only to confuse the ideas of the understanding4 #b4 ,in relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason1 we find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience1 and another that they have their origin in reason alone4 ,aristotle may be regarded as the head of the empiricists1 and ,plato of the noologists4 ,locke1 the follower of ,aristotle in modern times1 and ,leibnitz of ,plato 7although he cannot be said to have imitated him in his mysticism71 have not been able to bring this question to a settled conclusion4 ,the procedure of ,epicurus in his sensual system1 in which he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience1 was much more consequent than that of ,aristotle and ,locke4 ,the latter especially1 after having derived all the conceptions and principles of the mind from experience1 goes so far1 in the employment of these conceptions and principles1 as to maintain that we can prove the existence of ,god and the immortality of the soul--both of them objects lying beyond the limits of possible experience--with the same force of demonstration1 as any mathematical proposition4 #c4 ,in relation to method4 ,method is procedure according to principles4 ,we may divide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific4 ,the naturalist of pure reason lays it down as his principle that common reason1 without the aid of science--which he calls sound reason1 or common sense--can give a more satisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do4 ,he must maintain1 therefore1 that we can determine the content and circumference of the moon more certainly by the naked eye1 than by the aid of mathematical reasoning4 ,but this system is mere misology reduced to principles2 and1 what is the most absurd thing in this doctrine1 the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition4 ,as regards those who are naturalists because they know no better1 they are certainly not to be blamed4 ,they follow common sense1 without parading their ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret1 how we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of ,democritus4 ,quod sapio satis est mihi1 non ego curo ,esse quod ,arcesilas aerumnosique ,solones4 ,,persius --,satirae1 iii4 #gh-gi4 is their motto1 under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy life1 without troubling themselves with science or troubling science with them4 ,as regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method1 they have now the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical1 while they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure4 ,when ,i mention1 in relation to the former1 the celebrated ,wolf1 and as regards the latter1 ,david ,hume1 ,i may leave1 in accordance with my present intention1 all others unnamed4 ,the critical path alone is still open4 ,if my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany me on this hitherto untravelled route1 he can now judge whether1 if he and others will contribute their exertions towards making this narrow footpath a high road of thought1 that which many centuries have failed to accomplish may not be executed before the close of the present--namely1 to bring ,reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which has always1 but without permanent results1 occupied her powers and engaged her ardent desire for knowledge4