,,the ,,rise ,,of ,,rail-,,power ,,in ,,war ,,and ,,conquest #ahcc-aiad ,,the ,,rise ,,of ,,rail-,,power ,,in ,,war ,,and ,,conquest #ahcc-aiad ,,with ,a ,,bibliography ,,by ,,edwin ,a4 ,,pratt ,author of ,a ,history of ,inland ,transport1 ,railways and their ,rates1 etc4 ,,london ,p4 ,s4 ,,king ,,son1 ,,ltd4 ,,orchard ,,house ,,westminster #aiae ,,contents4 ,,chap4 ,,page ,i ,a ,,new ,,factor #a ,,ii ,,railways ,,in ,,the ,,civil ,,war #ad ,,iii ,,railway ,,destruction ,,in ,,war #bf ,,iv ,,control ,,of ,,railways ,,in ,,war #dj ,v ,,protection ,,of ,,railways ,,in ,,war #ed ,,vi ,,troops ,,and ,,supplies #fb ,,vii ,,armoured ,,trains #fg ,,viii ,,railway ,,ambulance ,,transport #ha ,,ix ,,preparation ,,in ,,peace ,,for ,,war #ih ,x ,,organisation ,,in ,,germany #ajc ,,xi ,,railway ,,troops ,,in ,,germany #abb ,,xii ,,france ,,and ,,the ,,war ,,of #ahgj-ga #ach ,,xiii ,,organisation ,,in ,,france #adi ,,xiv ,,organisation ,,in ,,england #age ,,xv ,,military ,,railways #bje ,,xvi ,,railways ,,in ,,the ,,boer ,,war #bcb ,,xvii ,,the ,,russo-,,japanese ,,war #bfj ,,xviii ,,strategical ,,railways3 ,,germany #bgg ,,xix ,a ,,german-,,african ,,empire #bif ,,xx ,,designs ,,on ,,asiatic ,,turkey #cca ,,xxi ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusions #cde ,,appendix ,,indian ,,frontier ,,railways #ceg ,,the ,,defence ,,of ,,australia #cfh ,,bibliography #cgf ,,index #cih ,,prefatory ,,note4 ,the extent to which railways are being used in the present ,war of the ,nations has taken quite by surprise a world whose military historians1 in their accounts of what armies have done or have failed to do on the battle-field in the past1 have too often disregarded such matters of detail as to how the armies got there and the possible effect of good or defective transport conditions1 including the maintenance of supplies and communications1 on the whole course of a campaign4 ,in the gigantic struggle now proceeding1 these matters of detail are found to be of transcendant importance4 ,the part which railways are playing in the struggle has1 indeed--in keeping with the magnitude of the struggle itself--assumed proportions unexampled in history4 ,whilst this is so it is1 nevertheless1 a remarkable fact that although much has been said as to the conditions of military unpreparedness in which the outbreak of hostilities in ,august1 #aiad1 found the ,allies1 there has1 so far as ,i am aware1 been no suggestion of any inability on the part of the railways to meet1 at once1 from the very moment war was declared1 all the requirements of military transport4 ,in this respect1 indeed1 the organisation1 the preparedness1 and the efficiency throughout alike of the ,british and of the ,french railways have been fully equal to those of the ,german railways themselves4 ,as regards ,british conditions1 especially1 much interest attaches to some remarks made by ,sir ,charles ,owens1 formerly ,general ,manager of the ,london and ,south ,western ,railway ,company1 in the course of an address delivered by him to students of the ,london ,school of ,economics on ,october #ab1 #aiad4 ,he told how1 some five or six years ago1 he had met at a social function the ,secretary of ,state for ,war1 who1 after dinner1 took him aside and asked1 ,do you think in any emergency which might arise in this country the railways would be able to cope with it adequately8 ,to this question ,sir ,charles replied1 ,i will stake my reputation as a railway man that the country could not concentrate men and materials half so fast as the railways could deal with them2 but the management of the railways must be left in the hands of railway men4 ,we have here an affirmation and a proviso4 ,that the affirmation was warranted has been abundantly proved by what the ,british railways have accomplished in the emergency that has arisen4 ,the special significance of the proviso will be understood in the light of what ,i record in the present work concerning the control of railways in war4 ,taking the railways of all the countries1 whether friends or foes1 concerned in the present ,world-,war1 and assuming1 for the sake of argument1 that all1 without exception1 have accomplished marvels in the way of military transport1 one must1 nevertheless1 bear in mind two important considerations3-- 7#a7 ,that1 apart from the huge proportions of the scale upon which1 in the aggregate1 the railways are being required to serve military purposes1 the present conflict1 in spite of its magnitude1 has thus far produced no absolutely new factor in the employment of railways for war except as regards the use of air-craft for their destruction4 7#b7 ,that when hostilities were declared in ,august1 #aiad1 the subject of the employment of railways for the purposes of war had already been under the consideration of railway and military experts in different countries for no fewer than eighty years1 during which period1 and as the result of vast study1 much experience1 and many blunders in or between wars in various parts of the world1 there had been slowly evolved certain fixed principles and1 also1 subject to constant amendments1 a recognised and comprehensive organisation which1 accepted more or less completely by the leading nations1 with modifications to suit their national circumstances and conditions1 was designed to meet all contingencies1 to provide1 as far as human foresight could suggest1 for all possible difficulties1 and be capable of application instantly the need for it might arise4 ,the time has not yet come for telling all that the railways have thus far done during the war which has still to be fought out4 ,that story1 in the words of a railway man concerned therein1 is at present a sealed book4 ,meanwhile1 however1 it is desirable that the position as defined in the second of the two considerations given above should be fully realised1 in order that what the railways and1 so far as they have been aided by them1 the combatants1 have accomplished or are likely to accomplish may be better understood when the sealed book becomes an open one4 ,if1 as suggested at the outset1 the world has already been taken by surprise even by what the railways are known to have done1 it may be still more surprised to learn 7as the present work will show7 that the construction of railways for strategical purposes was advocated in ,germany as early as #ahcc2 that in #ahdb a scheme was elaborated for covering ,germany with a network of strategical railways which1 while serving the entire country1 would more especially allow of war being conducted on two fronts--,france and ,russia--at the same time2 and that in the same year 7#ahdb7 attention was already being called in the ,french ,chamber to the aggressive lines which ,germany was building in the direction of ,france1 while predictions were also being made that any new invasion of ,france by ,germany would be between ,metz and ,strasburg4 ,if1 again1 it is found that a good deal of space is devoted in the present work to the ,war of ,secession1 criticism may1 perhaps1 be disarmed by the explanation that the ,american ,civil ,war was practically the beginning of things as regards the scientific use of railways for war1 and that many of the problems connected therewith were either started in the ,united ,states or were actually worked out there1 precedents being established and examples being set which the rest of the world had simply to follow1 adapt or perfect4 ,the possibility of carrying on warfare at a great distance from the base of supplies by means of even a single line of single-track railway2 the creation of an organised corps for the restoration1 operation or destruction of railways2 the control of railways in war by the railway or the military interests independently or jointly2 the question as to when the railway could be used to advantage and when it would be better for the troops to march2 the use of armoured trains2 the evolution of the ambulance or the hospital train--all these1 and many other matters besides1 are to be traced back to the ,american ,civil ,war of #ahfa-fe1 and are dealt with herein at what1 it is hoped1 will be found not undue length4 ,as for the building up of the subsequent organisation in ,europe--,germany1 ,france and ,england being the countries selected for special treatment in relation thereto--this1 also1 has had to be described with some regard for detail2 and1 incidentally1 it is shown 7#a7 that the alleged perfection of ,germany's arrangements when she went to war with ,france in #ahgj-ga is merely one of the fictions of history1 so far as her military rail-transport was concerned2 7#b7 that ,france learned the bitter lesson taught her by the deplorable and undeniable imperfections of her own transport system--or no-system--on that occasion1 and at once set about the creation of what was to become an organisation of the most complete and comprehensive character2 and 7#c7 that the beginning of things in ,england1 in the way of employing railways for the purposes of war1 was the direct outcome of the conditions of semi-panic created here in #ahei by what was regarded as the prospect of an early invasion of this country by ,france1 coupled with the then recognised deficiencies of our means of national defence4 ,military railways1 as employed in the ,crimean ,war1 the ,abyssinian ,campaign1 the ,franco-,german ,war1 the ,russo-,turkish ,war and the ,sudan are described2 a detailed account is given of the use of railways in the ,boer ,war and the ,russo-,japanese ,war2 and this is followed by a description of the strategical railways constructed in ,germany for the purpose of facilitating war on the possessions of her neighbours4 ,chapters ,,xix and ,,xx deal with the building of railways which1 whether avowedly strategical or what ,i have described as economic-political-strategical1 are intended to effect the purposes of conquest1 with or without the accompaniment of war4 ,the former of these two chapters1 which shows how1 with the help of railways1 ,germany proposed to transform the ,african continent into an ,african ,empire of her own1 should be found deserving of notice1 and especially so in view of the statements quoted 7p4 #caa7 as having been made by ,german officers in what was then ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 to the effect that the main objective of ,germany in going to war would be the conquest of ,africa1 the smashing up of ,france and ,great ,britain being regarded only as incidents which1 followed by seizure of the possessions of the smaller ,powers1 would make ,germany the supreme ,power in ,africa1 and lead to the whole ,african continent becoming a ,german possession4 ,from ,chapter ,,xx the reader will learn how ,germany proposed to employ railways for the furthering of her aims against1 not only ,asiatic ,turkey1 but ,egypt and ,india1 as well4 ,the subsidiary articles on ,indian ,frontier ,railways and ,the ,defence of ,australia have no direct bearing on that evolution of rail-power in warfare with which it is the special purpose of the present volume to deal2 but in the belief that they are of interest and importance in themselves1 from the point of view of the general question1 they have been given in an ,appendix4 ,the difficulties and other conditions under which the ,sind-,pishin ,state ,railway1 designed to serve strategical purposes1 was built to the frontiers of ,afghanistan are unexampled in the history either of railways or of war4 ,as regards ,australia1 the gravity of the position there was well indicated by ,lord ,kitchener when he wrote of the lines running inland that they were of little use for defence1 although possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have temporary command of the sea4 ,at the end of the volume there is a ,bibliography of books1 pamphlets and review or other articles relating to the use of railways for the purposes of war4 ,in the first instance this compilation was based on a ,list of ,references prepared by the ,american ,bureau of ,railway ,economics2 but1 while many items on that list have here been omitted1 a considerable number of others have been inserted from other sources4 ,the ,bibliography is not offered as being in any way complete1 but it may1 nevertheless1 be of advantage to students desirous of making further researches into the matters of history here specially treated4 ,the assistance rendered in other ways by the ,american ,bureau of ,railway ,economics in the preparation of the present work has been most helpful4 ,in the writing of the chapters concerning ,german designs on ,africa1 ,asia ,minor1 etc41 the resources of the well-arranged and admirably-indexed library of the ,royal ,colonial ,institute have been of great service4 ,i have1 also1 to express cordial acknowledgments to the ,general ,managers and other officers of various leading railway companies for information given respecting the organisation of railways in this country for military purposes4 ,,edwin ,a4 ,,pratt4 ,november1 #aiae4 ,the ,rise of ,rail-,power in ,war and ,conquest ,,chapter ,i ,a ,,new ,,factor ,while the original purpose of railways was to promote the arts of peace1 the wide scope of their possibilities in the direction1 also1 of furthering the arts of war began to be realised at a very early date after their success in the former capacity had been assured in ,great ,britain4 ,already the canal system had introduced an innovation which greatly impressed the ,british public4 ,in ,december1 #ahjf1 a considerable body of troops went by barge on the ,paddington ,canal from ,london to ,liverpool1 en route for ,dublin1 relays of fresh horses for the canal boats being provided at all the stages in order to facilitate the transport2 and in referring to this event ,the ,times of ,december #ai1 #ahjf1 remarked3--,by this mode of conveyance the men will be only seven days in reaching ,liverpool1 and with comparatively little fatigue1 as it would take them above fourteen days to march that distance4 ,but when1 on the opening of the ,liverpool and ,manchester ,railway1 in #ahcj1 a ,british regiment was conveyed thereon1 in two hours1 a journey of thirty-four miles1 which they would have required two days to accomplish on foot1 far-seeing men became still more impressed1 and began to realise that there had1 indeed1 been introduced a new factor destined to exercise a powerful influence on the future conduct of war4 ,the geographical position of the ,united ,kingdom led1 in those early days1 to greater importance being attached to the conveniences of railways as a means of transport than to their actual strategical and tactical advantages2 and the issue by the ,war ,office1 in #ahdf1 of a ,regulation ,relative to the ,conveyance of ,her ,majesty's ,forces1 their ,baggage and ,stores1 by ,rail1 may have appeared to meet the requirements of the immediate situation1 so far as this country was concerned4 ,on the ,continent of ,europe1 however1 the rivalry of nations divided from one another only by a more or less uncertain or varying frontier1 and still powerfully influenced by the recollection of recent conflicts1 resulted in much greater attention being paid to the possibilities of the new development4 ,the first definite proposals for the use of railways for strategical purposes were advanced1 as early as #ahcc1 by ,friedrich ,wilhelm ,harkort1 a ,westphalian worthy who came to be better known in his native land as ,der alte ,harkort4 ,a participant in the ,napoleonic wars1 he had subsequently shown great energy and enterprise in the development of steam engines1 hydraulic presses1 iron-making1 and other important industries in ,germany2 he had been the first writer in that country to give an account--as he did in #ahbe--of the progress ,england was making in respect to railways and steamships2 and he had1 in #ahbf1 placed a working model of a railway in the garden of the ,elberfeld ,museum4 ,these various efforts he followed up1 in #ahcc1 by bringing forward in the ,westphalian ,landtag a scheme for the building of a railway to connect the ,weser and the ,lippe4 ,later in the same year he published ,die ,eisenbahn von ,minden nach ,kln1 in which he laid special stress on the value to ,germany of the proposed line from a military point of view4 ,with the help of such a railway1 he argued1 it would be possible to concentrate large bodies of troops at a given point much more speedily than if they marched by road2 he made calculations as to what the actual saving in time1 as well as in physical strain1 would be in transporting ,prussian troops from various specified centres to others2 and he proceeded3-- ,let us suppose that we had a railway and a telegraph line on the right bank of the ,rhine1 from ,mainz to ,wesel4 ,any crossing of the ,rhine by the ,french would then scarcely be possible1 since we should be able to bring a strong defensive force on the spot before the attempt could be developed4 ,these things may appear very strange to-day2 yet in the womb of the future there slumbers the seed of great developments in railways1 the results of which it is1 as yet1 quite beyond our powers to foresee4 ,harkort's proposals gave rise to much vigorous controversy in ,germany4 ,the official classes condemned as nonsensical fancies his ideas1 not only as to the usefulness of railways for the conveyance of troops1 but1 also1 as to the utility of railways for any practical purposes whatever2 and contemporary newspapers and periodicals1 in turn1 made him the butt of their ridicule4 ,the pros and cons of the use of railways for military purposes were1 none the less1 actively discussed in numerous pamphlets and treatises4 ,just as1 in ,france1 ,general ,rumigny1 adjutant to ,louis-,philippe1 had already foreshadowed the possibility of a sudden invasion by a ,german army reaching the frontier by rail1 so1 also1 in ,germany1 in the words of one writer at this period1 anxious spirits shudder at the thought that1 some fine spring morning1 a hundred thousand ,frenchmen1 thirsting for war1 will suddenly invade our peaceful valleys at bird-like speed1 thanks to the new means of locomotion1 and begin their old game 7das alte ,spiel7 over again4 ,on the other hand there were military sceptics--such as the author of a pamphlet ,uber die ,militrische ,benutzung der ,eisenbahnen 7,berlin1 #ahcf7--who1 basing their calculations on locomotive performances up to that date1 asserted that1 although the railway might be of service in the conveyance of supplies1 guns and ammunition1 it would be of no advantage in the transport of troops4 ,these1 they declared1 would get to their destination sooner if they marched4#a ,the most noticeable of the various publications issued in ,germany at this period was a book by ,carl ,eduard ,pnitz 7,pz471 which appeared at ,adorf1 ,saxony1 in #ahdb1 under the title of ,die ,eisenbahnen als militrische ,operationslinien betrachtet1 und durch ,beispiele erlatert4 ,the writer of this remarkable book 7of which a second edition was issued in #ahec7 gave a comprehensive survey of the whole situation in regard to railways and war1 so far as the subject could be dealt with in the light of railway developments and of actual experiences of troop movements by rail down to that time2 and he argued strongly in favour of the advantages to be derived from the employment of railways for military purposes4 ,he even suggested that1 in the event of an inadequate supply of locomotives1 or of operations having to be conducted in a mountainous country where locomotives could not be used for heavy traffic1 the troops might still use their own horses to draw the coaches and wagons along the railway lines1 so that the men would arrive fresh and fit for immediate fighting at the end of their journey4 ,describing railways as the most powerful vehicle for the advancement of ,kultur since the invention of printing1 ,pnitz showed how ,belgium and ,saxony were the two countries which had taken the initiative in railway construction on the ,continent of ,europe2 and his references to the former country are especially deserving of being recalled1 in view of recent events4 ,he pointed to the good example which had been set by the far-sighted and energetic ,king of the ,belgians1 and continued3-- ,although1 in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions1 many wounds were still bleeding2 and although the newly-created kingdom was threatened by foes within and without and could organise means of resistance only with great difficulty1 there was1 nevertheless1 taken in hand a scheme for the construction of a network of railways designed to extend over the entire country1 while at the present moment the greater part of that scheme has1 in fact1 been carried out4 ,in this way ,king ,leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full value and significance of which may1 perhaps1 be appreciated only by generations yet to come4 ,while ,belgium was thus shown to have been setting a good example1 the only railways which ,prussia then had in actual operation 7apart from the ,berlin-,stettin and the ,berlin-,breslau lines1 which had been begun1 and others which had been projected7 were the ,berlin-,potsdam and the ,berlin-,magdeburg-,leipzig lines2 though ,saxony had the ,leipzig-,dresden line1 and ,bavaria the ,nremberg-,frth and the ,munich-,augsburg lines4 ,pnitz1 however1 excused the backwardness of ,prussia on the ground that if her ,government had refused1 for a long time1 to sanction various projected railways1 or had imposed heavy obligations in regard to them1 such action was due1 not to prejudice1 but to a wise foresight--meaning1 presumably1 that ,prussia was waiting to profit by the experience that other countries were gaining at their own cost4 ,having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in favour of the general principle of employing railways for military purposes1 ,pnitz proceeded to elaborate a scheme for the construction of a network of strategical lines serving the whole of ,germany1 though intended1 more especially1 to protect her frontiers against attack by either ,france or ,russia4 ,without1 he said1 being in the secrets of international politics1 he thought he might safely presume that ,germany's only fear of attack was from one of these two directions2 and1 although the relations of the ,great ,powers of ,europe were then peaceful1 a continuance of those conditions could not1 of course1 be guaranteed4 ,so1 he proceeded-- ,we have to look to these two fronts2 and1 if we want to avoid the risk of heavy losses at the outset1 we needs must--also at the outset--be prepared to meet the enemy there with an overwhelming force4 ,every one knows that the strength of an army is multiplied by movements which are rapid in themselves and allow of the troops arriving at the end of their journey without fatigue4 ,in a powerful appeal--based on motives alike of patriotism1 of national defence and of economic advantage--that his fellow-countrymen should support the scheme he thus put forward1 ,pnitz once more pointed to ,belgium1 saying3-- ,the youngest of all the ,european ,states has given us an example of what can be done by intelligence and good will4 ,the network of ,belgian railways will be of as much advantage in advancing the industries of that country as it will be in facilitating the defence of the land against attack by ,france4 ,it will increase alike ,belgium's prosperity and ,belgium's security4 ,and we ,germans1 who place so high a value on our intelligence1 and are scarcely yet inclined to recognise the political independence of the ,belgian people1 shall we remain so blind as not to see what is needed for our own safety8 ,pnitz could not1 of course1 anticipate in #ahdb that the time would come when his country1 acting to the full on the advice he was then giving1 would have her strategic railways1 not only to the ,french and the ,russian1 but1 also1 to the ,belgian frontier1 and would use those in the last-mentioned direction to crush remorselessly the little nation concerning which he himself was using words of such generous sympathy and approbation4 ,the ideas and proposals put forward by ,pnitz 7of whose work a ,french translation1 under the title of ,essai sur les ,chemins de ,fer1 considrs commes lignes d'oprations militaires1 was published by ,l4 ,a4 ,unger in ,paris1 in #ahdd7 did much to stimulate the discussion of the general question1 while the military authorities of ,germany were moved to make investigations into it on their own account1 there being issued in ,berlin1 about #ahdh or #ahej1 a ,survey of the ,traffic and ,equipment of ,german and of neighbouring foreign ,railways for military purposes1 based on information collected by the ,great ,general ,staff4#b ,in ,france1 also1 there were those who1 quite early in the days of the new means of transport1 predicted the important service it was likely to render for the purposes of war no less than for those of peace4 ,general ,lamarque declared in the ,french ,chamber of ,deputies in #ahcb1 or #ahcc1 that the strategical use of railways would lead to a revolution in military science as great as that which had been brought about by the use of gunpowder4 ,at the sitting of the ,chamber on ,may #be1 #ahcc1 ,m4 de ,brigny1 in urging the incontestable importance of railways1 said3-- ,from the point of view of national defence1 what advantages do they not present6 ,an army1 with all its material1 could1 in a few days1 be transported from the north to the south1 from the east to the west1 of ,france4 ,if a country could thus speedily carry considerable masses of troops to any given point on its frontiers1 would it not become invincible1 and would it not1 also1 be in a position to effect great economies in its military expenditure8 ,in a further debate on ,june #h1 #ahcg1 ,m4 ,dufaure declared that railways had a greater mission to fulfil than that of offering facilities to industry or than that of conferring benefits on private interests4 ,was it a matter of no account1 he asked1 that they should be able in one night to send troops to all the frontiers of ,france1 from ,paris to the banks of the ,rhine1 from ,lyons to the foot of the ,alps1 with an assurance of their arriving fresh and ready for combat8 ,then1 in #ahdb1 ,m4 ,marschall1 advocating the construction of a line from ,paris to ,strasburg1 predicted that any new invasion of ,france by ,germany would most probably be attempted between ,metz and ,strasburg4 ,he further said3-- ,it is there that the ,german ,confederation is converging a formidable system of railways from ,cologne1 ,mayence and ,mannheim4444 ,twenty-four hours will suffice for our neighbours to concentrate on the ,rhine the forces of ,prussia1 ,austria and the ,confederation1 and on the morrow an army of #djj1jjj men could invade our territory by that breach of forty leagues between ,thionville and ,lauterburg1 which are the outposts of ,strasburg and ,metz4 ,three months later1 the reserve system organised in ,prussia and in some of the other ,german ,states would allow of a second ,army being sent of equal force to the other4 ,the title of aggressive lines given by our neighbours to these railways leave us with no room for doubt as to their intentions4 ,studies for an expedition against ,paris by way of ,lorraine and ,champagne can hardly be regarded as indicative of a sentiment of fraternity4 ,france1 however1 had no inclination at that time to build railways designed to serve military purposes1 whether from the point of view of aggression or even from that of national defence2 so that in a letter to his brother ,ludwig1 written ,april #ac1 #ahdd1 von ,moltke1 then a member of the ,general ,staff of the ,fourth ,army ,corps of the ,prussian ,army1 declared that whilst ,germany was building railways1 the ,french ,chamber was only discussing them4 ,this was so far the case that when1 later on1 ,germany had nearly #c1cjj miles of railway ,france was operating only a little over #a1jjj miles4 ,apart from the experiences1 on quite a small scale1 which had been obtained on the ,liverpool and ,manchester ,railway1 the earliest example of what railways could do in the transport of large bodies of troops was afforded in #ahdf1 when ,prussia's ,sixth ,army ,corps--consisting of over #ab1jjj men1 together with horses1 guns1 road vehicles and ammunition--was moved by rail1 upon two lines1 to ,cracow4 ,in #ahdi a ,russian corps of #cj1jjj men1 with all its equipment1 was taken by rail from its cantonments in ,poland to ,gding1 ,moravia1 whence it effected a junction with the ,austrian army4 ,there was1 also1 a certain movement of ,german troops by rail to ,schleswig-,holstein in the troubles of #ahdh-ej2 but of greater importance than these other instances was the transport of an ,austrian army of #ge1jjj men1 #h1jjj horses and #a1jjj vehicles from ,vienna and ,hungary to the ,silesian frontier in the early winter of #ahej4 ,it is true that1 owing to the combined disadvantages of single-line railways1 inadequate staff and rolling stock1 unfavourable weather1 lack of previous preparations and of transport regulations1 and delays from various unforeseen causes1 no fewer than twenty-six days were occupied in the transport1 although the journey was one of only about #aej miles4 ,it was1 also1 admitted that the troops could have marched the distance in the same time4 ,all the same1 as told by ,regierungsrat ,wernekke1#c the movement of so large a body of troops by rail at all was regarded as especially instructive4 ,it was the cause of greater attention being paid to the use of railways for military purposes1 while it further led 7#a7 to the drawing up1 in ,may1 #ahea1 of a scheme for the construction throughout the ,austrian monarchy of railways from the special point of view of strategical requirements2 and 7#b7 to a reorganisation of the methods hitherto adopted for the transport of troops by rail1 the result being that the next considerable movement in ,austria--in the year #ahec--was conducted with unprecedented regularity and efficiency1 and this1 also1 without any cessation of the ordinary traffic of the lines concerned4 ,in #ahea a further striking object lesson of the usefulness of railways was afforded by the moving of a division of #ad1ejj men1 with nearly #b1jjj horses1 #dh guns and #dfd vehicles1 from ,cracow to ,hradish1 a distance of #ahg miles1 in two days4 ,reckoning that a large column of troops1 with all its impedimenta1 would march twelve miles per day1 and allowing for one day's rest in seven1 the movement would1 in this instance1 have occupied fifteen days by road instead of two days by rail4 ,it was in the ,italian campaign of #ahei that railways first played a conspicuous part in actual warfare1 both strategically and tactically4 ,in this campaign1 said ,major ,millar1 ,r4,a41 ,v4,c41 of the ,topographical ,staff1 in two lectures delivered by him at the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution in #ahfad-- ,railways assisted the ordinary means of locomotion hitherto employed by armies4 ,by them thousands of men were carried daily through ,france to ,toulon1 ,marseilles1 or the foot of ,mont ,cenis2 by them troops were hastened up to the very fields of battle2 and by them injured men were brought swiftly back to the hospitals1 still groaning in the first agony of their wounds4 ,moreover1 the railway cuttings1 embankments and bridges presented features of importance equal or superior to the ordinary accidents of the ground1 and the possession of which was hotly contested4 ,if you go to ,magenta you will see1 close to the railway platform on which you alight1 an excavation full of rough mounds and simple black crosses1 erected to mark the resting-places of many hundred men who fell in the great fight4 ,this first employment of railways in close connection with vast military operations would alone be enough to give a distinction to this campaign in military history4 ,the ,french railways1 especially1 attained a remarkable degree of success4 ,in eighty-six days--from ,april #ai to ,july #ae--they transported an aggregate of #fjd1jjj men and over #abi1jjj horses1 including nearly #bbh1jjj men and #cg1jjj horses sent to ,culox1 ,marseilles1 ,toulon1 ,grenoble and ,aix by lines in the south-east4 ,the greatest movements took place during the ten days from ,april #bj to ,april #cj1 when the ,paris-,lyons ,company1 without interrupting the ordinary traffic1 conveyed an average per day of #h1dba men and #eab horses4 ,on ,april #be1 a maximum of #ab1ach men and #fee horses was attained4 ,during the eighty-six days there were run on the lines of the same company a total of #b1fcf trains1 including #bec military specials4 ,it was estimated that the #ge1iff men and #d1dfi horses transported by rail from ,paris to the ,mediterranean or to the frontiers of the ,kingdom of ,sardinia between ,april #bj and ,april #cj would have taken sixty days to make the journey by road4 ,in effect1 the rate of transit by rail was six times greater than the rate of progress by marching would have been1 and this1 again1 was about double as fast as the best achievement recorded up to that time on the ,german railways4 ,the ,chasseurs de ,vincennes are described as leaving the station at ,turin full of vigour and activity1 and with none of the fatigue or the reduction in numbers which would have occurred had they made the journey by road4 ,as against1 however1 the advantage thus gained by the quicker transport of the ,french troops to the seat of war1 due to the successful manner in which the railways were operated1 there had to be set some serious defects in administrative organisation4 ,when the men got to the end of their rail journey there was a more or less prolonged waiting for the food and other necessaries which were to follow4 ,there were grave deficiencies1 also1 in the dispatch of the subsequent supplies4 ,on ,june #be1 the day after the defeat of the ,austrians1 the ,french troops had no provisions at all for twenty-four hours1 except some biscuits which were so mouldy that no one could eat them4 ,their horses1 also1 were without fodder4 ,in these circumstances it was impossible to follow up the ,austrians in their retreat beyond the ,mincio4 ,thus the efficiency of the ,french railways was to a large extent negatived by the inefficiency of the military administration2 and in these respects ,france had a foretaste1 in #ahei1 of experiences to be repeated on a much graver scale in the ,franco-,german ,war of #ahgj-ga4 ,as regards the ,austrians1 they improved but little on their admittedly poor performance in #ahej1 in spite of the lessons they appeared to have learned as the result of their experiences on that occasion4 ,government and railways were alike unprepared4 ,little or no real attempt at organisation in time of peace had been made1 and1 in the result1 trains were delayed or blocked1 and stations got choked with masses of supplies which could not be forwarded4 ,at ,vienna there was such a deficiency of rolling stock--accelerated by great delays in the return of empties--that many of the troop trains for the ,south could not be made up until the last moment4 ,even then the average number of men they conveyed did not exceed about #cfj4 ,at ,laibach there was much congestion because troops had to wait there for instructions as to their actual destination4 ,other delays occurred because1 owing to the heavy gradients of the ,semmering ,pass1 each train had to be divided into three sections before it could proceed4 ,between1 again1 ,innsbruck and ,bozen the railway was still incomplete1 and the ,first ,corps 7about #dj1jjj men and #aj1jjj horses7 had to march between these two points on their journey from ,prague to ,verona4 ,notwithstanding this fact1 it was estimated that they covered in fourteen days a journey which would have taken sixty-four days if they had marched all the way4 ,from ,vienna to ,lombardy the ,third ,army ,corps 7#bj1jjj men1 #e1ejj horses1 with guns1 ammunition and #cjj wagons7 was carried by rail in fourteen days1 the rate of progress attained being four and a half times greater than by road marching1 though still inferior by one and a half times to what the ,french troop-trains had accomplished4 ,on both sides important reinforcements were brought up at critical periods during the progress of the war4 ,referring to the attacks by the allies on ,casteggio and ,montebello1 ,count ,gyulai1 the ,austrian ,general1 wrote3--,the enemy soon displayed a superior force1 which was continually increased by arrivals from the railway2 and the special correspondent of ,the ,times1 writing from ,pavia on ,may #ba1 #ahei1 said3-- ,from the heights of ,montebello the ,austrians beheld a novelty in the art of war4 ,train after train arrived by railway from ,voghera1 each train disgorging its hundreds of armed men and immediately hastening back for more4 ,in vain ,count ,stadion endeavoured to crush the force behind him before it could be increased enough to overpower him4 ,then1 also1 the good use made of the railways by the allies in carrying out their important flanking movement against the ,austrians at ,vercelli gave further evidence of the fact that rail-power was a new force which could be employed1 not alone for the earlier concentration of troops at the seat of war1 but1 also1 in support of strategic developments on the battle-field itself4 ,commenting on this fact the ,spectateur ,militaire said1 in its issue for ,september1 #ahfi3-- ,les chemins de fer ont jou un rle immense dans cette concentration4 ,c'est la premire fois que1 dans l'histoire militaire1 ils servent d'une manire aussi merveilleuse et entrent dans les combinaisons stratgiques4 ,while these observations were fully warranted by the results accomplished in regard to concentration1 reinforcements and tactical movements by rail1 the campaign also brought out more clearly than ever before the need1 if railways were to fulfil their greatest possible measure of utility in time of war1 of working out in advance all important details likely to arise in connection with the movement of troops1 instead--as in the case of the ,austrians1 at least--of neglecting any serious attempt at organisation until the need arose for immediate action4 ,from all these various points of view the ,italian campaign of #ahei marked a further important stage in the early development of that new factor which the employment of railways for the purposes of warfare represented2 though far greater results in the same direction were to be brought about1 shortly afterwards1 by the ,american ,civil ,war of #ahfa-fe4 ,not only does the real development of rail-power as a new arm in war date therefrom1 but the ,war of ,secession was to establish in a pre-eminent degree 7#a7 the possibility1 through the use of railways1 of carrying on operations at a considerable distance from the base of supplies2 7#b7 the need of a special organisation to deal alike with restoration of railway lines destroyed by the enemy and with the interruption1 in turn1 of the enemy's own communications2 and 7#c7 the difficulties that may arise as between the military element and the technical 7railway7 element in regard to the control and operation of railways during war4 ,to each of these subjects it is proposed to devote a separate chapter4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,in #ahdg one of the leading military writers in ,germany published a pamphlet in which he sought to prove that the best-organised railway could not carry #aj1jjj ,infantry a distance equal to sixty ,english miles in twenty-four hours4 ,as for the conveyance of ,cavalry and ,artillery by train1 he declared that this would be a sheer impossibility4 #b ,uebersicht des ,verkehrs und der ,betriebsmittel auf den inlndischen und den benachbarten auslndischen ,eisenbahnen fr militrischen ,zwecke2 nach dem beim grossen ,generalstabe vorhanden ,materialen zusammen gestellt4 #c ,die ,mitwirkung der ,eisenbahn an den ,kriegen in ,mitteleuropa4 ,archiv fr ,eisenbahnwesen1 ,juli und ,august1 #aiab4 #d ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 vol4 v1 pp4 #bfi-cjh4 ,london1 #ahfa4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,railways ,,in ,,the ,,civil ,,war ,such were the conditions under which the ,war of ,secession in the ,united ,states was fought that without the help of railways it could hardly have been fought at all4 ,the area of the military operations1 from first to last1 was equal in extent almost to the whole of ,europe4 ,the line of separation between the rival forces of ,north and ,south was fully #b1jjj miles4 ,large portions of this region were then unexplored4 ,everywhere1 except in the towns1 it was but thinly populated4 ,civilisation had not yet progressed so far that an advancing army could always depend on being able to live on the country4 ,there were occasions when local supplies of food and forage were so difficult of attainment that an army might be wholly dependent on a base hundreds of miles distant from the scene of its operations4 ,of roads and tracks throughout this vast area there were but few1 and these were mostly either indifferent or bad1 even if they did not become positively execrable in wet weather or after a considerable force of troops had passed along them4 ,in the low-lying districts1 especially1 the alluvial undrained soil was speedily converted by the winter floods into swamps and lakes4 ,further difficulties in the movement of troops were offered by pathless forests as large as an ,english county2 and still others by the broad rivers or the mountain ranges it might be necessary to cross4 ,apart from the deficient and defective roads and tracks1 the transport facilities available for the combatants were those afforded by coastal services1 navigable rivers1 canals and railways4 ,of these it was the railways that played the most important rle4 ,the ,american railway lines of those days had1 generally speaking1 been constructed as cheaply as possible by the private enterprise which--though with liberal grants of land and other advantages--alone undertook their provision1 the main idea being to supply a railway of some sort to satisfy immediate wants and to improve it later on1 when population and traffic increased and more funds were available4 ,the lines themselves were mostly single track2 the ballasting was too often imperfect2 iron rails of inadequate weight soon wore down and got out of shape2 sleepers 7otherwise ties71 which consisted of logs of wood brought straight from the forests1 speedily became rotten1 especially in low-lying districts2 while1 in the early ',sixties lumber1 used either in the rough or smoothed on two sides1 was still the customary material for the building of bridges and viaducts carrying the railways across narrow streams1 broad rivers or widespread valleys4 ,all the same1 these railways1 while awaiting their later betterment1 extended for long distances1 served as a connecting link of inestimable advantage between the various centres of population and production1 and offered in many instances the only practicable means by which troops and supplies could be moved4 ,they fulfilled1 in fact1 purposes of such vital importance from a strategical point of view that many battles were fought primarily for the control of particular railways1 for the safeguarding of lines of communication1 or for the possession1 more especially1 of important junctions1 some of which themselves became the base for more or less distant operations4 ,the ,north1 bent not simply on invasion but on reconquest of the ,states which had seceded1 necessarily took the offensive2 the ,south stood mostly on the defensive4 ,yet while the population in the ,north was far in excess of that in the ,south1 the initial advantages from a transport point of view were in favour of the ,south1 which found its principal ally in the railways4 ,generals in the ,north are1 indeed1 said to have been exceedingly chary1 at first1 in getting far away from the magazines they depended on for their supplies2 though this uneasiness wore off in proportion as organised effort showed how successfully the lines of rail communication could be defended4 ,in these and other circumstances1 and especially in view of the paramount importance the railway system was to assume in the conduct of the war1 the ,federal ,government took possession of the ,philadelphia1 ,wilmington and ,baltimore ,railway on ,march #ca1 #ahfa4 ,this preliminary measure was followed by the passing1 in ,january1 #ahfb1 by the ,united ,states ,house of ,representatives1 of ,an ,act to authorise the ,president of the ,united ,states in certain cases to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines1 and for other purposes4 ,the ,president1 when in his judgment the public safety may require it1 was to take possession of any or all the telegraph lines in the ,united ,states2 444 to take possession of any or all the railroad lines in the ,united ,states1 their rolling stock1 their offices1 shops1 buildings and all their appendages and appurtenances2 to prescribe rules and regulations for the holding1 using1 and maintaining of the aforesaid telegraph and railroad lines1 and to extend1 repair and complete the same in the manner most conducive to the safety and interest of the ,government2 to place under military control all the officers1 agents and employs belonging to the telegraph and railroad lines thus taken possession of by the ,president1 so that they shall be considered as a post road and a part of the military establishment of the ,united ,states1 subject to all the restrictions imposed by the ,rules and ,articles of ,war4 ,commissioners were to be appointed to assess and determine the damages suffered1 or the compensation to which any railroad or telegraph company might be entitled by reason of such seizure of their property2 and it was further enacted that the transportation of troops1 munitions of war1 equipments1 military property and stores1 throughout the ,united ,states1 should be under the immediate control and supervision of the ,secretary of ,war and such agents as he might appoint4 ,thus the ,act in question established a precedent for a ,government taking formal possession of1 and exercising complete authority and control over1 the whole of such railways as it might require to employ for the purposes of war2 although1 in point of fact1 only such lines1 or portions of lines1 were so taken over by the ,war ,department as were actually required4 ,in each instance1 also1 the line or portion of line in question was given back to the owning company as soon as it was no longer required for military purposes2 while at the conclusion of the war all the lines taken possession of by the ,government were formally restored to their original owners by an ,executive ,order dated ,august #h1 #ahfe4 ,under the authority of the ,act of ,january #ca1 #ahfb1 the following order was sent to ,mr4 ,daniel ,craig ,mc,callum1 a native of ,johnstone1 ,renfrewshire1 ,scotland1 who had been taken to ,america by his parents when a youth1 had joined the railway service1 had held for many years the position of general superintendent of the ,erie ,railroad1 and was one of the ablest and most experienced railway men then in the ,united ,states3-- ,,war ,,department4 ,washington ,city1 ,d4,c41 ,february #aa1 #ahfb4 ,ordered1 ,that ,d4 ,c4 ,mc,callum be1 and he is hereby1 appointed ,military ,director and ,superintendent of ,railroads in the ,united ,states1 with authority to enter upon1 take possession of1 hold and use all railroads1 engines1 cars1 locomotives1 equipments1 appendages and appurtenances that may be required for the transport of troops1 arms1 ammunition and military supplies of the ,united ,states1 and to do and perform all acts and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid4 ,by order of the ,president1 ,commander-in-,chief of the ,army and ,navy of the ,united ,states4 ,,edwin ,m4 ,,stanton1 ,secretary of ,war4 ,mc,callum commenced his duties with the staff rank of ,colonel1 afterwards attaining to that of ,brev4-,brig4-,general4 ,the scope of the authority conferred on him1 under the ,war ,department order of ,february #aa1 #ahfb1 was widened a year later1 when he was further appointed general manager of all railways in possession of the ,federal ,government1 or that might from time to time be taken possession of by military authority1 in the departments of the ,cumberland1 the ,ohio1 the ,tennessee1 and of ,arkansas1 forming the ,military ,division of the ,mississippi4 ,the total mileage of the lines taken over by the ,federal ,government during the course of the war was #b1aje1 namely1 in ,virginia1 #faa miles2 in the military division of the ,mississippi1 #a1bja2 and in ,north ,carolina1 #bic4 ,much more was involved1 however1 for the ,federal ,government than a mere transfer to themselves of the ownership and operation of these lines for the duration of the war4 ,one of the greatest disadvantages of the ,american railways at the time of the ,civil ,war lay in their differences of gauge4 ,the various companies had built their lines with gauges chosen either to suit local conditions or according to the views of their own engineers1 with little or no consideration for the running of through traffic on or from other lines4 ,there were1 in fact1 at that time gauges of #f ft41 #e ft4 #f in41 #e ft41 #d ft4 #aj in41 #d ft4 #i in41 #d ft4 #h in4 7the standard ,english gauge71 and various narrower gauges besides4 ,these conditions prevailed until #ahff1 when the companies adopted a uniform gauge of #d ft4 #h in4 ,during the ,civil ,war the lack of uniformity was in full force1 and military transport by rail was greatly complicated in consequence4 ,more than one-half of the lines taken over and operated had a gauge of #e ft41 and the remainder had a gauge of #d ft4 #h in41 except in the case of one short line1 which was #e ft4 #f in4 ,as locomotives and rolling stock adapted to one gauge were unsuited to any other1 the obligations falling upon the ,director and ,general ,manager of the ,federal ,military ,railways included that of taking up the lines of certain companies which had adopted the #e ft4 gauge1 and relaying them with the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge1 so that the same rolling stock could be used as on lines connecting with them4 ,incidentally1 therefore1 the ,civil ,war in ,america taught the lesson that the actual value of rail-power as influencing warfare in one and the same country1 or on one and the same continent1 may vary materially according to whether there is uniformity or diversity of railway gauge4 ,in certain instances the lines taken possession of were in so defective a condition that it was imperatively necessary to relay them1 apart altogether from any question of gauge4 ,when ,mc,callum was appointed ,general ,manager of ,military ,railways for the ,division of the ,mississippi1 the main army was at ,chattanooga1 ,tennessee1 and its supplies were being received from ,nashville1 #aea miles distant1 over the ,nashville and ,chattanooga ,railroad4 ,this was necessarily the main line of supply during the subsequent campaigns from ,chattanooga towards ,atlanta1 and from ,knoxville towards ,south-western ,virginia2 yet ,mc,callum says of it1 in the ,final ,report he presented to the ,secretary of ,war in #ahff3-- ,the track was laid originally in a very imperfect manner1 with a light ,u-rail on wooden stringers which were badly decayed and caused almost daily accidents by spreading apart and letting the engines and cars drop through them4 ,in still other instances1 lines which1 though begun1 were not finished1 had to be completed2 in others new lines had to be constructed throughout1 or extensive sidings provided2 so that once more we see that it was not then simply a question of the ,federal ,government taking possession of and operating an existing complete and efficient system of railways4 ,whatever1 again1 the condition of the lines when taken over1 the railways of both combatants were subjected to constant attack by the other side with a view to the interruption of communications1 the destruction of railway track1 railway bridges1 rolling stock and other railway property being enormous4 ,reviewing the general situation at this time1 ,mc,callum says in his report3-- ,in the beginning of the war military railroads were an experiment2 and though some light as to their management had been gleaned by the operations of #ahfb and #ahfc1 yet so little progress had been made that the attempt to supply the army of ,general ,sherman in the field1 construct and reconstruct the railroad in its rear1 and keep pace with its march1 was regarded by those who had the largest experience1 and who had become most familiar with the subject1 as the greatest experiment of all4 ,the attempt to furnish an army of #ajj1jjj men and #fj1jjj animals with supplies from a base #cfj miles distant by one line of single-track railroad1 located almost the entire distance through the country of an active and vindictive enemy1 is without precedent in the history of warfare2 and to make it successful required an enormous outlay for labour and a vast consumption of material1 together with all the forethought1 energy1 patience and watchfulness of which men are capable4 ,to meet the various conditions which had thus arisen1 ,mc,callum was authorised by the ,federal ,government to create two distinct departments1 destined to bring about a still further development in the application of rail-power to war by establishing precedents which the leading countries of the world were afterwards to follow more or less completely1 according to their own circumstances and requirements4 ,the departments were known respectively as the ,transportation ,department1 embracing the operation and maintenance of all the lines brought under use by the army of the ,north2 and the ,construction ,corps1 which was to repair the damage done by wrecking parties of the enemy1 maintain lines of communication1 and reconstruct1 when necessary1 railways captured from the enemy as the ,federals advanced4 ,concerning the ,construction ,corps1 and the great work accomplished by it in keeping the lines open1 details will be given in the chapter which follows4 ,in regard to the ,transportation ,department1 it may be of interest to state that this was placed by ,mc,callum in charge of a ,general ,superintendent of ,transportation on ,united ,states ,railroads in the ,military ,division of the ,mississippi4 ,for each of the principal lines there was appointed a ,superintendent of ,transportation who1 acting under the control of the ,general ,superintendent1 was held responsible for the movement of all trains and locomotives2 and these superintendents1 in turn1 had under their direction one or more ,masters of ,transportation1 whose business it was to be constantly moving about over the sections of line placed under their charge1 and see that the railway employs were attending properly to their duties4 ,at each of the principal stations there was an ,engine ,dispatcher who was required to see that the locomotives were kept in good order and ready for immediate use whenever required1 to exercise control over the drivers and firemen1 and to assign the requisite crew to each engine sent out4 ,maintenance of road and structures for each line 7as distinct from the reconstruction work left to the ,construction ,department7 was in charge of a ,superintendent of ,repairs1 assisted by such supervisors1 road-masters and foremen as he needed to control and direct his working staff2 and maintenance of rolling stock was delegated to 7#a7 a ,master ,machinist1 responsible for repairs to locomotives1 and 7#b7 a ,master of ,car ,repairs4 ,these various officers were independent of each other1 and all of them reported direct to the ,general ,superintendent4 ,the maximum force employed at any one time in the ,transportation ,department of the ,military ,division of the ,mississippi 7as distinct from the military lines in ,virginia and elsewhere7 was about #ab1jjj men4 ,a sufficient staff of competent railwaymen for the operation of the ,military ,railways was difficult to get1 partly because of the inadequate supply of such men in the ,united ,states at that period1 and partly because those still at work on railways not taken over for military purposes were unwilling to give up what they found to be exceptionally good posts2 but of the men whose services he was able to secure ,mc,callum speaks in terms of the highest commendation4 ,having got his ,department and ,construction ,corps into working order1 ,mc,callum had next to turn his attention to ensuring an adequate supply of locomotives and cars1 with the necessary shops1 tools and materials for keeping them in working order4 ,here the ,secretary of ,war again came to his help1 issuing1 on ,march #bc1 #ahfd1 an ,order addressed to locomotive manufacturers in which he stated that ,colonel ,mc,callum had been authorised by the ,war ,department to procure locomotives without delay for the railways under his charge1 and proceeded3-- ,in order to meet the wants of the ,military ,department of the ,government1 you will deliver to his order such engines as he may direct1 whether building under orders for other parties or otherwise1 the ,government being accountable to you for the same4 ,the urgent necessity of the ,government for the immediate supply of our armies operating in ,tennessee renders the engines indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication1 and it is hoped that this necessity will be recognised by you as a military necessity1 paramount to all other considerations4--,by order of the ,president4 ,in ,january1 #ahfd1 ,mc,callum had estimated that he would require #bjj locomotives and #c1jjj cars for the lines to be operated from ,nashville1 and towards this number he then had only #dg locomotives and #dcg cars available4 ,there was thus a substantial shortage which had to be made good2 but the manufacturers1 inspired by a spirit of zealous patriotism1 responded heartily to the appeal made to them1 putting their full force on to the completion of further supplies4 ,these were furnished with a speed that surpassed all previous records4 ,then1 to maintain the locomotives and cars in good condition--more especially in view of the constant attempts made by the enemy to destroy them--extensive machine and car shops were built at ,nashville and ,chattanooga4 ,those at ,nashville--the terminal station for #ejj miles of railway running south1 east or west--had1 at times1 as many as #ajj engines and #a1jjj cars awaiting repair4 ,next to that insufficiency of engines and rolling stock which hampered the movements of both combatants came the difficulty in the way of obtaining further supplies of rails1 whether for new lines or to take the place of those which had either worn out or been so bent and twisted by the enemy that they could not be used again without re-rolling4 ,for the ,confederates1 cut off by the advance of ,general ,grant to the south and west from their sources of supply1 the want of iron for new rails was declared to be a worse evil than was the lack of gold for the ,federals4 ,one expedient resorted to by the ,federal ,government1 on finding they could not procure from the manufacturers all the rails they wanted1 was to pull up the railway lines that were not wanted for military purposes and use their rails for relaying those that were4 ,altogether the rails on over #aef miles of track in ,virginia and the ,military ,division of the ,mississippi were thus taken up and utilised elsewhere4 ,later on the ,federal ,construction ,corps erected at ,chattanooga some very superior rolling mills1 equipped with all the latest improvements in the way of machinery and mechanical appliances2 though these mills did not actually get to work until ,april #a1 #ahfe4 ,their production of new rails during the course of six months from that date was #c1hah tons1 this supply being in addition to nearly #bb1jjj tons which the ,federal ,government obtained by purchase4 ,these details may convey some idea of all that was involved in the utilisation of rail-power in the ,american ,civil ,war under such development of railway construction as had then been brought about4 ,great1 however1 as was the outlay1 the forethought1 the energy1 the patience and the watchfulness spoken of by ,mc,callum1 the results were no less valuable from the point of view of the ,federals1 who could hardly have hoped to achieve the aim they set before themselves--that of saving the ,union--but for the material advantages they derived from the use of the railways for the purposes of the campaign4 ,some of the achievements accomplished in the movement of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another would have been creditable even in the most favourable of circumstances2 but they were especially so in view alike of the physical conditions of many of the lines1 the inadequate supply of rolling stock1 and the risks and difficulties to be met or overcome4 ,one of these achievements1 carried out in ,september1 #ahfc1 is thus narrated in an article on ,recollections of ,secretary ,stanton1 published in the ,century ,magazine for ,march1 #ahhg3-- ,the defeat of ,rosecrans1 at ,chickamauga1 was believed at ,washington to imperil ,east ,tennessee1 and the ,secretary of ,war was urged to send a strong reinforcement there from the ,army of the ,potomac4 ,general ,halleck 7,general-in-,chief of the ,army of the ,united ,states7 contended that it was impossible to get an effective reinforcement there in time2 and the ,president1 after hearing both sides1 accepted the judgment of ,halleck4 ,mr4 ,stanton put off the decision till evening1 when he and ,halleck were to be ready with details to support their conclusions4 ,the ,secretary then sent for ,colonel ,mc,callum1 who was neither a lawyer nor a strategist1 but a master of railway science4 ,he showed ,mc,callum how many officers1 men1 horses1 and pieces of artillery1 and how much baggage1 it was proposed to move from the ,rapidan to the ,tennessee1 and asked him to name the shortest time he would undertake to do it in if his life depended on it4 ,mc,callum made some rapid calculations1 jotted down some projects connected with the move1 and named a time within that which ,halleck had admitted would be soon enough if it were only possible2 this time being conditioned on his being able to control everything that he could reach4 ,the ,secretary was delighted1 told him that he would make him a ,brigadier-,general the day that the last train was safely unloaded2 put him on his mettle by telling him of ,halleck's assertion that the thing was beyond human power2 told him to go and work out final calculations and projects and to begin preliminary measures1 using his name and authority everywhere2 and finally instructed him what to do and say when he should send for him by and by to come over to the department4 ,when the conference was resumed and ,mc,callum was introduced1 his apparently spontaneous demonstration of how easily and surely the impossible thing could be done convinced the two sceptics1 and the movement was ordered1 and made1 and figures now in military science as a grand piece of strategy4 ,the feat thus accomplished was that of conveying by rail #bc1jjj men1 together with artillery1 road vehicles1 etc41 a distance of about #a1bjj miles in seven days4 ,it was estimated that if the troops had had to march this distance1 with all their impedimenta1 along such roads as were then available1 the journey would have taken them three months4 ,by doing it in one week they saved the situation in ,east ,tennessee1 and they gave an especially convincing proof of the success with which a grand piece of strategy could be carried out through the employment of rail transport4 ,in ,december1 #ahfd1 ,general ,schofield's corps of #ae1jjj men1 after fighting at ,nashville in the midst of ice and snow1 was1 on the conclusion of the campaign in the west1 transferred from the valley of the ,tennessee to the banks of the ,potomac1 moving by river and rail down the ,tennessee1 up the ,ohio and across the snow-covered ,alleghanies1 a distance of #a1djj miles1 accomplished in the short space of eleven days4 ,in #ahfe the moving of the ,fourth ,army ,corps of the ,federals from ,carter's ,station1 ,east ,tennessee1 to ,nashville1 a distance of #cgc miles1 involved the employment of #a1dih cars4 ,what1 in effect1 the ,civil ,war in ,america did in furthering the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was to show that1 by the use of railways1 7#a7 the fighting power of armies is increased2 7#b7 strategical advantages unattainable but for the early arrival of reinforcements at threatened points may be assured2 and 7#c7 expeditions may be undertaken at distances from the base of supplies which would be prohibitive but for the control of lines of railway communication2 though as against these advantages were to be put those considerations which also arose as to destruction and restoration1 and as to the control of railways in their operation for military purposes4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,railway ,,destruction ,,in ,,war ,one of the earliest and most obvious criticisms advanced against the use of railways in war was based on the vulnerability of the iron road4 ,the destruction of a bridge1 the tearing up of a few rails or the blocking of a tunnel would1 it was argued1 suffice to cause an interruption in the transport of troops or supplies which might be of serious consequence to the combatants prejudiced thereby1 though of corresponding advantage to the other side4 ,by means of such interruption the concentration of troops on the frontier might be delayed2 an army might be divided into two or more parts1 and exposed to the risk of defeat in detail2 the arrival of reinforcements urgently wanted to meet a critical situation might be prevented until it was too late for them to afford the desired relief2 a force advancing into an enemy's country might have its rail connection severed and be left to starve or to surrender at discretion2 invaders would find that the force they were driving before them had taken the precaution to destroy their own railways as they retreated2 or1 alternatively1 lines of railway constructed to the frontier1 and depended upon to facilitate invasion of neighbouring territory1 might--unless destroyed--be of material service to the enemy1 should the latter become the invaders instead of the invaded4 ,while these and other possibilities--foreshadowed more especially in the controversies which the whole subject aroused in ,germany in the ',forties--were frankly admitted1 it was argued that1 however vulnerable railways might be as a line of communication1 it should be quite possible either to defend them successfully or to carry out on them such speedy repairs or reconstruction as would1 generally speaking1 permit of an early resumption of traffic2 though experience was to show that these safeguards could only be assured through a well-planned and thoroughly efficient organisation prepared to meet1 with the utmost dispatch and the highest degree of efficiency1 all the requirements in the way of railway repairs or railway rebuilding that were likely to arise4 ,the earliest instance of an attempt to delay the advance of an enemy by interrupting his rail communications was recorded in #ahdh1 when the ,venetians1 threatened with bombardment by the ,austrians1 destroyed some of the arches in the railway viaduct connecting their island city with the mainland4 ,then in the ,italian campaign of #ahei the allies and the ,austrians both resorted to the expedient of destroying railway bridges or tearing up the railway lines2 although the allies were able1 in various instances1 to repair so speedily the damage done by the ,austrians that the lines were ready for use again by the time they were wanted4 ,it was the ,american ,civil ,war that was to elevate railway destruction and restoration into a science and to see the establishment1 in the interests of such science1 of an organisation which was to become a model for ,european countries and influence the whole subsequent course of modern warfare4 ,the destruction of railways likely to be used by the ,north for its projected invasion of the ,confederate ,states was1 from the first1 a leading feature in the strategy of the ,south4 ,expeditions were undertaken and raids were made with no other object than that of burning down bridges1 tearing up and bending rails1 making bonfires of sleepers1 wrecking stations1 rendering engines1 trucks and carriages unserviceable1 cutting off the water supply for locomotives1 or in various other ways seeking to check the advance of the ,northerners4 ,later on the ,federals1 in turn1 became no less energetic in resorting to similar tactics in order either to prevent pursuit by the ,confederates or to interrupt their communications4 ,for the carrying out of these destructive tactics use was generally made either of cavalry1 accompanied by civilians1 or of bodies of civilians only2 but in some instances1 when it was considered desirable to destroy lengths of track extending to twenty or thirty miles1 or more1 the ,confederates put the whole of their available forces on to the work4 ,at the outset the methods of destruction were somewhat primitive2 but they were improved upon as the result of practice and experiment4 ,thus1 in the first instance1 timber bridges or viaducts were destroyed by collecting brushwood1 placing this around the arches1 pouring tar or petroleum upon the pile1 and then setting fire to the whole4 ,afterwards the ,federals made use of a torpedo1 eight inches long1 and charged with gunpowder1 which was inserted in a hole bored in the main timbers of the bridge and exploded with a fuse4 ,it was claimed that with two or three men working at each span the largest timber bridge could be thrown down in a few minutes4 ,then the method generally adopted at first for destroying a railway track was to tear up sleepers and rails1 place the sleepers in a heap1 put the rails cross-ways over them1 set fire to the sleepers1 and heat the rails until they either fell out of shape or could be twisted around a tree with the help of chains and horses4 ,but this process was found to require too much time and labour1 while the results were not always satisfactory1 since rails only slightly bent could be restored to their original shape1 and made ready for use again1 in much less time than it had taken for the fire to heat and bend them4 ,a ,federal expert accordingly invented an ingenious contrivance1 in the form of iron ,u-shaped claws1 which1 being turned up and over at each extremity1 were inserted underneath each end of a rail1 on opposite sides1 and operated1 with the help of a long wooden lever and rope1 by half a dozen men4 ,in this way a rail could be torn from the sleepers and not only bent but given such a spiral or corkscrew twist1 while still in the cold state1 that it could not be used again until it had gone through the rolling mills4 ,by the adoption of this method1 #ddj men could destroy one mile of track in an hour1 or #b1bjj men could1 in the same time1 destroy five miles4 ,the most effective method for rendering a locomotive unfit for service was found to be the firing of a cannon ball through the boiler4 ,carriages and wagons which might otherwise be used by the enemy1 and could not be conveniently carried off1 were easily destroyed by fire4 ,in one period of six months the ,federals disposed of #djj in this way4 ,stations1 water-tanks1 sleepers1 fuel and telegraph poles were also destroyed or rendered useless by fire or otherwise4 ,in the first year of the war--#ahfa--the ,confederates gave the ,federals a foretaste of much that was to come by destroying forty-eight locomotives on the ,baltimore and ,ohio ,railroad1 and making a complete wreck of #ajj miles of the ,north ,missouri ,railroad track and everything thereon4 ,much more serious than this1 however1 from a strategical point of view1 was the wholesale destruction carried out by the ,confederates1 in ,april1 #ahfb1 on the ,fredericksburg ,railway1 connecting ,richmond and ,washington1 the immediate result of the mischief done being to prevent an impending combination between the ,federal armies of the ,potomac and the ,rappahannock1 neither of which could act without the other1 while neither could join the other unless it could make use of rail communication4 ,there was much that required to be done1 for the ,confederates had carried out their work in a most thorough-going fashion4 ,several indispensable railway bridges had been destroyed2 three miles of track had been torn up1 the rails being carried south and the sleepers burned2 and wharves and buildings had been burned or wrecked4 ,the whole transportation service1 in fact1 had been reduced to a state of chaos4 ,at the urgent request of the ,secretary of ,war1 the work of restoration was undertaken by ,mr4 ,herman ,haupt1 a railway engineer who had already distinguished himself more especially as a builder of bridges1 and was now to establish a further record as the pioneer of those ,construction ,corps of which so much was to be heard later on in connection with railways and war4 ,in carrying out the necessary repairs the only help which ,haupt could obtain1 at first1 was that of soldiers detailed from the ,federal ranks4 ,many of these men were entirely unaccustomed to physical labour2 others were sickly1 inefficient1 or unwilling to undertake what they did not regard as a soldier's duties1 while the ,army officers sent in a fresh lot daily until ,haupt's remonstrances led to their allotting certain men to form a ,construction ,corps4 ,other difficulties which presented themselves included an insufficient supply of tools1 occasional scarcity of food1 and several days of wet weather2 yet the work advanced so rapidly that the ,akakeek bridge1 a single span of #abj ft41 at an elevation of #cj ft41 was rebuilt in about fifteen working hours2 the ,potomac ,creek bridge1 #dad ft4 long with an elevation of #hb ft4 above the water1 and requiring the use of as much roughly-hewn timber as would have extended a total length of six and a half miles1 if put end to end1 was completed in nine days2#e and the three miles of track were relaid in three days1 included in the work done in that time being the preparation of more than #c1jjj sleepers from lumber cut down for the purpose in woods a mile and a half distant from the track4 ,general ,mc,dowell subsequently said1 concerning the ,potomac bridge3-- ,when it is considered that in the campaigns of ,napoleon trestle bridges of more than one story1 even of moderate height1 were regarded as impracticable1 and that1 too1 for common military roads1 it is not difficult to understand why distinguished ,europeans should express surprise at so bold a specimen of ,american military engineering4 ,it is a structure which ignores all rules and precedents of military science as laid down in the books4 ,it is constructed chiefly of round sticks cut from the woods1 and not even divested of bark2 the legs of the trestles are braced with round poles4 ,it is in four stories--three of trestle and one of crib work4 ,while constructed in so apparently primitive a fashion1 the bridge was1 ,general ,mc,dowell further said1 carrying every day from ten to twenty heavy railway trains in both directions1 and had withstood several severe freshets and storms without injury4 ,thus early1 therefore1 in the more active phases of the ,civil ,war1 evidence was being afforded that1 although the railways on which so much depended might be readily destroyed1 they could1 also1 be rapidly restored2 and subsequent experience was to offer proofs still more remarkable in support of this fact4 ,on ,may #bh1 #ahfb1 ,haupt was appointed ,chief of ,construction and ,transportation in the ,department of the ,rappahannock1 with the rank of ,colonel4 ,he was raised to the rank of ,brigadier-,general in the following year1 and did much excellent construction and other work for the ,government1 though mainly in ,virginia1 down to ,september1 #ahfc4 ,in his ,reminiscences he relates that the supplies of repair or reconstruction materials1 as kept on hand by the ,federals1 included the interchangeable parts of bridge trusses1 in spans of #fj ft41 and so prepared that1 taken on flat cars1 by ox-teams or otherwise1 to the place where they were wanted1 and hoisted into position by machinery arranged for the purpose1 they could1 without previous fitting1 be put together with such rapidity that one of his foremen claimed to be able to build a bridge about as fast as a dog could trot4 ,when the ,massaponix bridge1 six miles from ,fredericksburg1 was burned down one ,monday morning1 a new one was put up in its place in half a day--a feat which1 he says1 led some of the onlookers to exclaim1 ,the ,yankees can build bridges quicker than the ,rebs can burn them down4 ,in ,may1 #ahfb1 five bridges over ,goose ,creek which the ,rebs had destroyed were reconstructed in a day and a half4 ,in the following month five other bridges1 each with a span of from #fj ft4 to #abj ft41 were renewed in one day4 ,at the ,battle of ,gettysburg ,lee's troops destroyed nineteen bridges on the ,northern ,central ,railroad and did much havoc on the branch lines leading to ,gettysburg2 but the ,construction ,corps was hard at work on the repairs whilst the battle was still being waged1 and rail communication with both ,washington and ,baltimore had been re-established by noon of the day after ,lee's retreat4 ,in some instances railway bridges underwent repeated destruction and reconstruction4 ,by ,june1 #ahfc1 the bridge over ,bull ,run1 for instance1 had been burned down and built up again no fewer than seven times4 ,many of the bridges1 also1 were swept away by floods1 and this even for a second or a third time after they had been rebuilt4 ,precautions thus had to be taken against the destructive forces of ,nature no less than against those of man4 ,haupt's pioneer ,construction ,corps in ,virginia was succeeded by the one set up on much broader lines by ,mc,callum when1 in ,february1 #ahfd1 he became ,general ,manager of railways in the ,military ,division of the ,mississippi4 ,this corps eventually reached a total of #aj1jjj men4 ,the design of the corps1 wrote ,mc,callum1 in his final report1 was to combine a body of skilled workmen in each department of railroad construction and repairs1 under competent engineers1 supplied with abundant materials1 tools and mechanical appliances4 ,the corps was formed into divisions the number of which varied from time to time1 in different districts1 according to requirements4 ,in the military division of the ,mississippi the corps comprised six divisions1 under the general charge of the chief engineer of the ,united ,states military railroads for that military division1 and consisted at its maximum strength of nearly #e1jjj men4 ,in order to give the corps entire mobility1 and to enable it to move independently and undertake work at widely different points1 each of the six divisions was made a complete unit1 under the command of a divisional engineer1 and was1 in turn1 divided into sub-divisions or sections1 with a supervisor in charge of each4 ,the two largest and most important sub-divisions in any one division were those of the track-layers and the bridge-builders4 ,a sub-division was1 again1 composed of gangs1 each with a foreman1 while the gangs were divided into squads1 each with a sub-foreman4#f ,under this method of organisation it was possible to move either the entire division or any section thereof1 with its tools1 camp requirements and field transport1 in any direction1 wherever and whenever needed1 and by any mode of conveyance--rail1 road1 with teams and wagons1 or on foot4 ,to facilitate the operations of the corps1 supplies of materials were kept at points along or within a short distance of the railway lines1 where they would be comparatively safe and speedily procurable in case of necessity4 ,at places where there was special need for taking precautionary measures1 detachments of the corps were stationed in readiness for immediate action1 while on important lines of railway ,federals and ,confederates alike had1 at each end thereof1 construction trains loaded with every possible requisite1 the locomotives attached to them keeping their steam up in order that the trains could be started off instantly on the receipt of a telegram announcing a further interruption of traffic4 ,at ,nashville and ,chattanooga the ,federals built extensive storehouses where they kept on hand supplies of materials for the prompt carrying out of railway repairs of every kind to any extent and in whatever direction4 ,on the ,nashville and ,chattanooga ,railway itself the ,construction ,corps1 from ,february1 #ahfd1 to the close of the war1 relaid #aae miles of track1 put in nineteen miles of new sidings1 eight miles apart and each capable of holding from five to eight long freight trains1 and erected forty-five new water tanks4 ,the reconstruction of this particular line was more especially needed in connection with ,general ,sherman's campaign in ,georgia and the ,carolinas--a campaign which afforded the greatest and most direct evidence up to that time alike of the possibilities of rail-power in warfare1 of the risks by which its use was attended1 and of the success with which those risks could be overcome by means of efficient organisation4 ,in that struggle for ,atlanta which preceded his still more famous march to the sea1 ,sherman had with him a force of #ajj1jjj men1 together with #bc1jjj animals4 ,his base of supplies1 when he approached ,atlanta1 was #cfj miles distant1 and the continuance of his communications with that base1 not only for the procuring of food1 clothing1 fodder1 ammunition and every other requisite1 but for the transport to the rear of sick and wounded1 refugees1 freedmen and prisoners1 depended on what he afterwards described as a poorly-constructed single-track railroad passing for #abj miles of its length through the country of an extremely active enemy4 ,yet ,sherman is said to have made his advance in perfect confidence that1 although subject to interruptions1 the railway in his rear would be all right2 and this confidence was fully warranted by the results accomplished4 ,early in ,september1 #ahfd1 the ,confederate ,general1 ,wheeler1 destroyed seven miles of road between ,nashville and ,murfreesboro'1 on the ,nashville and ,chattanooga ,railway1 and in the following ,december ,hood destroyed eight miles of track and #ecj ft4 of bridges between the same stations2 yet the arrangements of the ,federal ,construction ,corps allowed of the repairs being carried out with such promptness that in each instance the trains were running again in a few days4 ,the ,confederate attacks on the ,western and ,atlantic ,railway1 running from ,chattanooga at ,atlanta1 a distance of #acf miles1 were more continuous and more severe than on any other line of railway during the war2 but1 thanks again to the speed with which the repair and reconstruction work was done1 the delays occasioned were1 as a rule1 of only a few hours1 or1 at the most1 a few days' duration4 ,one especially remarkable feat accomplished on this line was the rebuilding1 in four and a half days1 of the ,chattahochee bridge1 near ,atlanta--a structure #ghj ft4 long1 and #ib ft4 high4 ,hood1 the ,confederate ,general1 thought still further to check ,sherman's communications by passing round the ,federal army and falling upon the railway in its rear4 ,he succeeded in tearing up two lengths of track1 one of ten miles1 and another of twenty-five miles1 in extent1 and destroying #bej ft4 of bridges2 but once more the work of restoration was speedily carried out1 ,mc,callum saying in reference to it3-- ,fortunately the detachments of the ,construction ,corps which escaped were so distributed that even before ,hood had left the road two strong working parties were at work1 one at each end of the break at ,big ,shanty1 and this gap of ten miles was closed1 and the force ready to move to the great break of twenty-five miles in length1 north of ,resaca1 as soon as the enemy had left it4 ,the destruction by ,hood's army of our depts of supplies compelled us to cut nearly all the cross-ties required to relay this track and to send a distance for rails4 ,the cross-ties were cut near the line of the road and many of them carried by hand to the track1 as the teams to be furnished for hauling them did not get to the work until it was nearly complete4 ,the rails used on the southern end of the break had to be taken up and brought from the railroads south of ,atlanta1 and those for the northern end were mostly brought from ,nashville1 nearly #bjj miles distant4 ,notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labour was performed1 this twenty-five miles of track was laid1 and the trains were running over it in seven and a half days from the time the work was commenced4 ,concluding1 however1 that it would be unwise to depend on the railway during his further march to the sea1 ,sherman collected at ,atlanta1 by means of the restored lines1 the supplies he wanted for #fjj1jjj men1 sent to the rear all the men and material no longer required1 and then1 before starting for ,savannah1 destroyed sixty miles of track behind him in so effectual a manner that it would be impossible for the ,confederates--especially in view of their own great lack1 at this time1 of rails1 locomotives and rolling stock--to repair and utilise the lines again in any attempted pursuit4 ,it was1 in fact1 as much to his advantage now to destroy the railways in his rear as it had previously been to repair and rebuild them4 ,all through ,georgia1 for the #cjj miles from ,atlanta to ,savannah 7where he was able to establish communications with the ,federal fleet71 ,sherman continued the same tactics of railway destruction2 and he resumed them when his army1 now divided into three columns1 turned northward to effect a junction with ,grant at ,richmond4 ,on this northward march1 also1 there was no need for ,sherman to make a direct attack on ,charleston4 ,by destroying about sixty miles of track in and around ,branchville--a village on the ,south ,carolina ,railroad which formed a junction where the line from ,charleston branched off in the directions of ,columbia and ,augusta respectively--one of ,sherman's columns severed ,charleston from all its sources of supply in the interior1 and left the garrison with no alternative but to surrender4 ,commenting on this event1 ,vigo-,rouissillon remarks1 in his ,puissance ,militaire des tats-,unis d',amrique3-- ,ainsi il avait suffi de la destruction ou de la possession de quelques kilomtres de chemin de fer pour amener la chute de ce boulevard de l'insurrection1 qui avait si longtemps rsist aux plus puissantes flottes du ,nord4 ,exemple frappant du rle reserv dans nos guerres modernes ce precieux et fragile moyen de communication4 ,in the aggregate1 ,sherman's troops destroyed hundreds of miles of railway track in their progress through what had previously been regarded as a veritable stronghold of the enemy's country2 though meanwhile the ,construction ,corps had repaired and reopened nearly #cjj miles of railway in ,north ,carolina and had built a wharf1 covering an area of #ed1jjj square feet1 at the ocean terminus of the ,atlantic and ,north ,carolina ,railroad in order both to facilitate ,sherman's progress northwards1 by the time of his reaching the lines in question1 and to enable him to obtain supplies from the fleet4 ,the railways1 in fact1 contributed greatly to the brilliant success of ,sherman's campaign1 and hence1 also1 to the final triumph of the ,federal cause4 ,the total length of track laid or relaid by the ,federal ,construction ,corps during the continuance of the war was #fda miles1 and the lineal feet of bridges built or rebuilt was equal to twenty-six miles4 ,the net expenditure1 in respect alike to construction and transportation1 incurred by the department in charge of the railways during their control by the ,government for military purposes was close on #cj1jjj1jjj4 ,from this time the interruption of railway communication became a recognised phase of warfare all the world over2 and1 not only have numerous treatises been written on the subject in various languages1 but the creation of special forces to deal alike with the destruction and the restoration of railways has become an important and indispensable feature of military organisation4 ,these matters will be dealt with more fully in subsequent chapters2 but it may be of interest if reference is made here to the experiences of ,mexico1 as further illustrating the universality of practices with which1 in her case1 at least1 no effective measures had been taken to deal4 ,how ,mexican ,rebels ,destroy ,railways and ,bridges was told by ,mr4 ,g4 ,e4 ,weekes in the ,scientific ,american for ,september #ac1 #aiac1 and the subject was further dealt with by ,major ,charles ,hine in a paper on ,war ,time ,railroading in ,mexico1 read by him before the ,st4 ,louis ,railway ,club1 on ,october #aj1 #aiac4 ,the term rebels applies1 of course1 in ,mexico to the party that is against the particular ,president who is in office for the time being2 and in the revolutionary period lasting from #aiaj to #aiac the rebels of the moment found plenty to do in the way of destroying railways not only1 as in other countries1 in order to retard the advance of their pursuers1 but1 also1 to spite the national ,government1 who control about two-thirds of the stock in the railways of the ,republic4 ,altogether1 the mischief done by one party or the other during the period in question included the destruction of many hundreds of miles of track2 the burning or the dynamiting of hundreds of bridges1 according as these had been built of timber or of steel2 and the wrecking of many stations and over #ej per cent4 of the rolling stock on the national lines4 ,concerning the methods adopted in the carrying out of this work1 ,mr4 ,weekes1 who had the opportunity of seeing track and bridge destruction in full progress1 says3-- ,up to the past six months track destruction had been accompanied either by the use of a wrecking crane1 which lifted sections of rails and ties 7sleepers7 bodily and piled them up ready for burning1 or by the slower process of the claw-bar1 wrench and pick4 ,but a ,constitutionalist expert devised a new system4 ,a trench is dug between two ties1 through which a heavy chain is passed around two opposite rails and made fast in the centre of the track4 ,to this one end of a heavy steel cable is hooked1 the other end being made fast to the coupling on the engine pilot4 ,at the signal the engineman starts his locomotive slowly backward1 and as they are huge #bbj-ton consolidations1 with #bb-;inch by #cj-;inch cylinders1 one can easily imagine that something has to give4 ,and it does6 ,the rails are torn loose from the spikes that hold them to the ties and are dragged closely together in the centre of the road bed4 ,the ties are loosened from the ballast and dragged into piles1 while in many cases the rails are badly bent and twisted by the force applied4 ,a gang of men follows the engine1 piling ties on top of the line and leaving others beneath them4 ,these are then saturated with oil and a match applied4 ,in a short time the ties are consumed and the rails left lying on the ground twisted and contorted into all sorts of shapes and of no further use until after they have been re-rolled4 ,as for the bridges1 those of timber were saturated with oil and burned1 while in the case of steel bridges rows of holes were bored horizontally in the lower part of the piers and charged with dynamite1 which was then exploded by means of fuses connected with batteries of the type used in ,mexican coal mines4 ,another favourite method adopted for interfering with transportation by rail was that of attacking a train1 compelling it to stop1 taking possession of the locomotive1 and burning the cars4 ,there is no suggestion by either of the authorities mentioned above of any well-organised ,construction ,corps in ,mexico repairing damage done on the railway almost as quickly as it could be effected by the destroyers4 ,mr4 ,weekes believed1 rather1 that it would take years to restore the roads to the condition they were in before the rebellion against ,president ,diaz1 and he further declared that it would cost the national lines of ,mexico many millions of dollars to replace the destroyed rolling stock1 bridges1 stations1 etc4 ,,footnotes3 #e ,in ,may1 #ahfd1 when this bridge had been again destroyed1 it was rebuilt1 ready for trains to pass over1 in forty working hours4 #f ,a division1 completely organised1 consisted of #ggg officers and men1 as follows3--,division engineer1 assistant engineer1 rodman1 clerk1 and #b messengers 7#f74 ,sub-division ,i3 ,supervisor of bridges and carpenters' work1 clerk and time-keeper1 commissionary 7taking charge of transport and issue of rations71 quartermaster 7in charge of tools1 camp equipment1 etc471 surgeon1 hospital steward1 #f foremen 7#a for each #ej men71 #cj sub-foremen 7#a for each #aj men71 #cjj mechanics and labourers1 blacksmith and helper1 and #ab cooks 7#cef74 ,sub-division ,,ii3 ,supervisor of track1 and remainder of staff as in ,sub-division ,i 7#cef74 ,sub-division ,,iii3 ,supervisor of water stations1 foreman1 #ab mechanics and labourers1 and cook 7#ae74 ,sub-division ,,iv3 ,supervisor of masonry1 foreman1 #aj masons and helpers1 and cook 7#ac74 ,sub-division ,v3 ,foreman of ox-brigade1 #ah ox-drivers1 and cook 7#bj74 ,train crew3 #b conductors1 #d brakesmen1 #b locomotive engineers1 #b firemen1 and cook 7#aa74 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,control ,,of ,,railways ,,in ,,war ,curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war may be due to friend no less than to foe2 and there have been occasions when1 of the two1 it is the friend who has caused the greater degree of trouble1 hindrance and interruption4 ,these conditions have arisen mainly from three causes--7#a7 questions of control2 7#b7 irregularities in the employment of railway material2 and 7#c7 absence or inadequacy of organisation for military rail-transport purposes4 ,when the use of railways becomes an essential factor in the conduct of war1 it may appear only natural that the military authority charged with the duty of furthering or defending national interests should1 through the ,government concerned1 have power to command the transport facilities of all railway lines the use of which may be necessary for the movement of troops or other military purposes4 ,yet1 while the soundness of the principle here involved is beyond dispute1 there is much to be said as to the circumstances and conditions under which a military control of railways should be exercised4 ,it is1 in the first place1 especially necessary to bear in mind that the railway1 as a means of transport1 must needs be regarded from a point of view wholly different from that which would apply to ordinary roads4 ,on the latter any sort of vehicle can be used1 and there are1 generally1 alternative roads along which traffic can pass1 in case of need4 ,railroads are not only available exclusively for vehicles constructed to run upon them1 but the degree of their usefulness is limited by such considerations as the number of separate routes to a given destination2 the important matters of detail as to whether the lines are single track or double track and whether they are on the level or have heavy gradients2 the number of locomotives and the amount of rolling stock available2 the extent of the station and siding accommodation2 the provision or non-provision of adequate facilities for loading and unloading2 and1 in war time1 the damage or destruction of a particular line or lines by the enemy4 ,the amount of traffic it is possible to convey between certain points in a given time may thus be wholly controlled by the physical conditions of the railway concerned1 and such conditions may be incapable of modification by the railway staffs1 in case of a sudden emergency1 however great their desire to do everything that is in their power4 ,in the next place1 all these physical conditions may vary on different railway systems1 and even on different sections of the same system4 ,it does not1 therefore1 necessarily follow that military requirements which can be complied with on one line or in one district can be responded to as readily1 if at all1 under another and totally different set of conditions elsewhere2 though it is conceivable that a military commander or officer who fails to realise this fact may1 if he is left to deal direct with the railway people1 become very angry indeed at non-compliance with his demands1 and resent protests that what he asks for cannot be done at one place although it may have been done at another4 ,then a railway must be regarded as a delicate piece of transportation machinery which can easily be thrown out of order1 and is capable of being worked only by railwaymen as skilled in the knowledge of its mechanism1 and as experienced in the details of its complicated operation1 as military officers themselves are assumed to be in the technicalities of their own particular duties4 ,the ,chief ,goods ,manager of a leading line of railway who offered to take the place of a ,general at the seat of war would arouse much mirth in the ,army at his own expense4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 quite conceivable that the ,general would himself not be a complete success as a ,chief ,goods ,manager4 ,in the earliest days of railways it was assumed that the men best qualified both to manage them and to control the large staffs to be employed would be retired ,army officers4 ,this policy was1 in fact1 adopted for a time1 though it was abandoned1 after a fair trial1 in favour of appointing as responsible railway officers men who had undergone training in the railway service1 and were practically acquainted alike with its fundamental principles and its technical details4 ,in the operation of this delicate and complicated piece of machinery dislocation of traffic may result from a variety of causes1 even when such operation is conducted by men of the greatest experience in railway working2 but the risk1 alike of blocks and interruptions and of accidents involving loss of life or destruction of valuable property must needs be materially increased if military commanders1 or officers1 themselves having no practical knowledge of railway working1 and influenced only by an otherwise praiseworthy zeal for the interests of their own service1 should have power either to force a responsible railwayman to do something which he1 with his greater technical knowledge1 knows to be impracticable1 or to hamper and interfere with the working of the line at a time of exceptional strain on its resources4 ,under1 again1 a misapprehension of the exact bearing of the principle of military control of railways for military operations in time of war1 there was developed in various campaigns a tendency on the part of commanders and subordinate officers 7#a7 to look upon railways and railwaymen as subject to their personal command1 if not1 even1 to their own will1 pleasure and convenience1 so long as the war lasted2 7#b7 to consider that every order they themselves gave should be at once carried out1 regardless either of orders from other directions or of any question as to the possibility of complying therewith2 and 7#c7 to indulge in merciless denunciations1 even if not in measures still more vigorous1 when their orders have not been obeyed4 ,apart from other considerations1 all these things have a direct bearing on the efficiency of the railway itself as an instrument in the carrying on of warfare2 and it is1 therefore1 a matter of essential importance to our present study to see how the difficulties in question had their rise1 the development they have undergone1 and the steps that have been taken to overcome or to guard against them4 ,it was once more in the ,american ,civil ,war that the control problem first arose in a really acute degree4 ,the fundamental principle adopted for the operation of the railways taken possession of by the ,federal ,government for military purposes was that they should be conducted under orders issued by the ,secretary of ,war or by ,army commanders in or out of the field4 ,it was for the ,quartermaster's department to load all material upon the cars1 to direct where such material should be taken1 and to arrange for unloading and delivery2 but because the ,government had taken possession of the railways2 because the ,quartermaster's department was to discharge the duties mentioned2 and because the railways were to be used during the war for the transport of troops and of ,army supplies1 therefore certain of the officers came to the conclusion that the whole operation of the particular lines in which they were concerned should be left either to themselves individually or to the ,quartermaster's department4 ,among those holding this view was ,general ,pope1 who1 on taking over the command of the ,rappahannock ,division1 on ,june #bf1 #ahfb1 disregarded the position held by ,herman ,haupt as ,chief of ,construction and ,transportation in that ,division1 gave him no instructions1 and left him to conclude that the ,army could get on very well without his assistance as a mere railwayman4 ,thereupon ,haupt went home4 ,ten days afterwards he received from the ,assistant-,secretary of ,war a telegram which said3--,come back immediately4 ,cannot get on without you4 ,not a wheel moving4 ,haupt went back1 and he found that1 what with mismanagement of the lines and the attacks made on them by ,confederates1 not a wheel was1 indeed1 moving in the ,division4 ,his own position strengthened by his now being put in exclusive charge of all the railways within the limits of the ,army of ,virginia1 he was soon able to set the wheels running again2 and from that time ,general ,pope exercised a wise discretion in leaving the details of railway transportation to men who understood them4 ,then there was a ,general ,sturgis who1 when ,haupt called on him one day1 received him with the intimation1 ,i have just sent a guard to your office to put you under arrest for disobedience of my orders in failing to transport my command4 ,it was quite true4 ,haupt had failed to obey his orders4 ,sturgis wanted some special trains to convey #aj1jjj men1 with horses and baggage1 the short distance of eighteen miles4 ,the railway was a single-track line2 it had only a limited equipment of engines and cars2 there was the prospect of further immediate requirements in other directions1 and ,haupt took the liberty of thinking that he had better keep his transportation for more pressing needs than a journey to a prospective battle-field only eighteen miles away--the more so as if the men were attacked whilst they were in the train they would be comparatively helpless1 whereas if they were attacked when on the road--doing what amounted to no more than a single day's march--they would be ready for immediate defence4 ,these considerations suggest that1 of the two1 the railwayman was a better strategist than the ,general4 ,sturgis followed up his intimation to ,haupt by taking military possession of the railway and issuing some orders which any one possessing the most elementary knowledge of railway operation would have known to be impracticable4 ,meanwhile ,haupt appealed by telegraph to the ,commander-in-,chief1 who replied3--,no military officer has any authority to interfere with your control over railroad4 ,show this to ,general ,sturgis1 and1 if he attempts to interfere1 ,i will arrest him4 ,told what the ,commander-in-,chief said in his message1 ,sturgis exclaimed1 ,he does1 does he8 ,well1 then1 take your damned railroad6 ,haupt found it possible to put at the disposal of ,sturgis1 early the following morning1 the transportation asked for2 but at two o'clock in the afternoon the cars were still unoccupied4 ,on the attention of ,sturgis being called to this fact he replied that he had given his orders but they had been disobeyed4 ,thereupon the cars were withdrawn for service elsewhere--the more so since no other traffic could pass until they had been cleared out of the way4 ,the net results of the ,general's interference was that traffic on the lines was deranged for twenty-four hours1 and #aj1jjj men were prevented from taking part in an engagement1 as they might have done had they gone by road4 ,of the varied and almost unending irregularities which occurred in the working of the lines as military railways during the progress of the same war a few other examples may be given4 ,one prolific source of trouble was the detention or appropriation of trains by officers who did not think it necessary to communicate first with the ,superintendent of the ,line4 ,a certain ,general who did inform the ,superintendent when he wanted a train was1 nevertheless1 in the habit of keeping it waiting for several hours before he made his appearance1 traffic being meanwhile suspended1 in consequence4 ,special consideration was even claimed for officers' wives1 as well as for the officers themselves4 ,on one occasion ,haupt was much disturbed by the non-arrival of a train bringing supplies which were urgently wanted for a body of troops starting on a march1 and he went along the line to see what had happened4 ,coming at last to the train1 which had pulled up1 he made inquiries of the engine-driver1 who told him that he had received instructions to stop at a certain point so that an officer's wife1 who was coming in the train to see her husband on the eve of an engagement1 could go to a neighbouring town to look out for rooms for herself4 ,at that moment the lady put in an appearance4 ,she took her seat again and the train then proceeded2 but her side-trip in search of rooms meant a delay of three hours alike for this one train and for three others following behind4 ,the impression seems to have prevailed1 also1 that officers were at liberty to make any use of the trains they pleased for the conveyance of their own belongings4 ,to check the abuses thus developed1 ,haupt was compelled to issue1 on ,june #be1 #ahfb1 the following notice3-- ,assistant ,quartermasters and ,commissaries are positively forbidden to load on to cars on any of the ,military ,railroads of the ,department of the ,rappahannock any freights which are not strictly and properly included in ,quarter and ,commissary stores4 ,they shall not load or permit to be loaded any articles for the private use of officers1 or other persons1 whatever their rank or position4 ,officers1 again1 there were who1 regardless of all traffic considerations1 would order a train to pull up at any point they thought fit along the main line in order that they could examine the passes and permits of the passengers1 instead of doing this at a terminal or other station4 ,in still another instance a paymaster adopted as his office a box car standing on a main line4 ,he placed in it a table1 some chairs1 a money-chest and his papers--finding it either more comfortable or more convenient than a house alongside--and proceeded with the transaction of all his ,army business in the car4 ,invited to withdraw1 on the ground that he was holding up the traffic1 he refused to leave1 and he persisted in his refusal until troops were called up to remove his things for him4 ,defective arrangements in regard to the forwarding of supplies were another cause of traffic disorganisation4 ,the railwayman made from time to time the most strenuous efforts in getting to the extreme front large consignments of articles either in excess of requirements or not wanted there at all4 ,after blocking the line for some days1 the still-loaded cars might be sent back again1 no fewer than #adb of such cars being returned on the ,orange and ,alexandria ,railroad in the course of a single day4 ,if the excessive supplies so sent were unloaded at the front1 they might have to be loaded into the cars again when the ,army moved2 or1 as was frequently the case in exposed positions1 they might be seized or destroyed by the enemy4 ,under a well-organised system an adequate stock of supplies would1 of course1 have been kept in stores or on sidings at some point in the rear1 only such quantities being forwarded to the advanced front as were really needed4 ,at the railway stations there were frequent disputes between the responsible officers as to which should have the first use of such troop trains as were available1 and ,haupt found it necessary to ask the ,commander-in-,chief to delegate some one who would decide in what order the troops should be forwarded4 ,much trouble arose because1 in their anxiety to send off as many wounded as they could1 medical officers detained their trains for such periods as dislocated the service1 instead of despatching at schedule time the men they had ready1 and then asking for an extra train for the remainder4 ,in other respects1 also1 the arrangements for the transport of the sick and wounded were defective4 ,telegraphing on this subject to the ,assistant ,secretary of ,war on ,august #bb1 #ahfb1 ,haupt said3-- ,i fear that ,i may be compelled to-night to do what may appear inhuman--turn out the sick in the street4 ,doctors will persist in sending sick1 often without papers1 to get them off their hands1 and we cannot send forward the troops if we must run our trains to ,washington with sick to stand for hours unloaded4 ,my first care is to send forward troops1 next forage and subsistence4 ,still more serious were the irregularities due to delays in the unloading of trucks and the return of empties4 ,the amount of rolling stock available was already inadequate to meet requirements2 but the effect of the shortage was rendered still worse by reason of these delays1 due1 in part1 to the too frequent insufficiency of the force available for unloading a train of supplies with the expedition that should have been shown1 and in part to the retention of the cars for weeks together as storehouses2 though the main cause1 perhaps1 was the inability of military men1 inexperienced in railway working1 to appreciate1 as railwaymen would do1 the need of getting the greatest possible use out of rolling stock in times of emergency1 and not allowing it to stand idle longer than absolutely necessary4 ,how such delays interfered with the efficiency of the railways was indicated in one of ,haupt's oft-repeated protests1 in which he wrote3-- ,if all cars on their arrival at a dept are immediately loaded or unloaded and returned1 and trains are run to schedule1 a single-track road1 in good order and properly equipped1 may supply an army of #bjj1jjj men when1 if these conditions are not complied with1 the same road will not supply #cj1jjj4 ,on ,july #i1 #ahfc1 he telegraphed to ,general ,m4 ,c4 ,meigs3-- ,i am on my way to ,gettysburg again4 ,find things in great confusion4 ,road blocked2 cars not unloaded2 stores ordered to ,gettysburg--where they stand for a long time1 completely preventing all movement there--ordered back without unloading2 wounded lying for hours without ability to carry them off4 ,all because the simple rule of promptly unloading and returning cars is violated4 ,as for the effect of all these conditions on the military situation as a whole1 this is well shown in the following ,notice1 which1 replying to complaints that railwaymen had not treated the military officers with proper respect1 ,haupt addressed ,to agents and other employs of the ,united ,states ,military ,railroad ,department3-- ,while conscious of no disposition to shield the employs or agents of the ,military ,railroads from any censure or punishment that is really merited1 justice to them requires me to state that1 so far1 examination has shown that complaints against them have been generally without proper foundation1 and1 when demands were not promptly complied with1 the cause has been inability1 arising from want of proper notice1 and not indisposition4 ,officers at posts entrusted with the performance of certain local duties1 and anxious1 as they generally are1 to discharge them efficiently1 are not always able1 or disposed1 to look beyond their own particular spheres4 ,they expect demands on railway agents to be promptly complied with1 without considering that similar demands1 at the same time1 in addition to the regular train service and routine duties1 may come from ,quartermasters1 ,commissaries1 medical directors1 surgeons1 ordnance officers1 the ,commanding ,general1 the ,war ,department and from other sources4 ,the ,military ,railroads have utterly failed to furnish transportation to even one-fifth of their capacity when managed without a strict conformity to schedule and established rules4 ,punctuality and discipline are even more important to the operation of a railroad than to the movement of an army2 and they are vital in both4 ,it is doubtful if even the ,confederate raiders and wreckers had1 by their destructive tactics1 diminished the efficiency of the ,union railways to the extent of the four-fifths here attributed to the irregularities and shortcomings of the ,federals themselves4 ,the clearest proof was thus afforded that1 if the new arm in warfare which rail-power represented was to accomplish all it was capable of doing1 it would have to be saved from friends quite as much as from foes4 ,haupt1 as we have seen1 suffered much from officers during the time he was connected with the ,military ,railroads in ,virginia4 ,he had the sympathetic support of the ,commander-in-,chief1 who telegraphed to him on one occasion 7,august #bc1 #ahfb71 ,no military officer will give any orders to your subordinates except through you1 nor will any of them attempt to interfere with the running of trains2 and1 also1 of the ,assistant ,secretary of ,war1 who sought to soothe him in a message which said3--,be patient as possible with the ,generals4 ,some of them will trouble you more than they will the enemy4 ,but the abuses which arose were so serious that1 in the interest of the military position itself1 they called for a drastic remedy2 and this was provided for by the issue of the following ,order3-- ,war ,department1 ,adjutant-,general's ,office1 ,washington1 ,november #aj1 #ahfb4 ,,special ,,order4 ,commanding officers of troops along the ,united ,states ,military ,railroads will give all facilities to the officers of the road and the ,quartermasters for loading and unloading cars so as to prevent any delay4 ,on arrival at depts1 whether in the day or night1 the cars will be instantly unloaded1 and working parties will always be in readiness for that duty1 and sufficient to unload the whole train at once4 ,commanding officers will be charged with guarding the track1 sidings1 wood1 water tanks1 etc41 within their several commands1 and will be held responsible for the result4 ,any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this respect will be reported by the ,quartermasters and officers of the railroad1 and his name will be stricken from the rolls of the ,army4 ,depts will be established at suitable points under the direction of the ,commanding ,general of the ,army of the ,potomac1 and properly guarded4 ,no officer1 whatever may be his rank1 will interfere with the running of the cars1 as directed by the superintendent of the road4 ,any one who so interferes will be dismissed from the service for disobedience of orders4 ,by order of the ,secretary of ,war4 ,j4 ,c4 ,,kelton4 ,commenting on this ,order1 ,general ,mc,callum says in his report that it was issued in consequence of several attempts having been made to operate railroads by ,army or departmental commanders which had1 without exception1 proved signal failures1 disorganising in tendency and destructive of all discipline2 and he proceeds3-- ,having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience1 both before and since the rebellion1 ,i consider this ,order of the ,secretary of ,war to have been the very foundation of success2 without it the whole railroad system1 which had proved an important element in conducting military movements1 would have been1 not only a costly but ludicrous failure4 ,the fact should be understood that the management of railroads is just as much a distinct profession as is that of the art of war1 and should be so regarded4 ,in ,europe1 ,germany and ,austria-,hungary were the first countries to attempt to solve problems that seemed to go to the very foundations of the practical usefulness of rail-transport in war4 ,various exhaustive studies thereon were written by railway or military authorities1 and it may be of interest here to refer1 more especially1 to the views expressed by an eminent ,german authority1 ,baron ,m4 ,m4 von ,weber1 in ,die ,schulung der ,eisenbahnen1 published in #ahgj4g ,railway irregularities peculiar to war service were stated by this writer to be mainly of three kinds3--7i7 ,delays from unsatisfactory arrangements of the service and from the misemployment of rolling stock2 7ii7 temporary interruption of traffic owing to the crowding of transport masses at the stations or sidings2 7iii7 unsuitableness of the stations and conveyances for the required military services4 ,the special reasons for the first of these causes he defined as 7a7 the absence of sufficient mutual comprehension between the military and the railway officials2 7b7 the strict limitation of the efficiency of individual railway authorities to their own lines only2 7c7 the ignorance of the entire staff of each line with regard to the details and service regulations of the neighbouring lines2 and 7d7 the impracticability of employing certain modes of carrying on business beyond the circuit to which they belong4 ,it should1 however1 be borne in mind that these criticisms of authorities and their staffs relate to the conditions of the ,german railway system in #ahgj1 at which time1 as told by ,h4 ,budde1 in ,die franzsischen ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege #ahgj-ga1 there were in ,germany fifteen separate ,directions for ,state railways2 five ,directions of private railways operated by the ,state2 and thirty-one ,directions of private railways operated by companies--a total of fifty-one controlling bodies which1 on an average1 operated only #baj miles of line each4 ,on the general question von ,weber observed3-- ,the value in practice of mutual intelligence between military and railway officials has hitherto been far too slightly regarded4 ,demands for services from military authorities1 impracticable from the very nature of railways in general or the nature of the existing lines in particular1 have occasioned confusion and ill-will on the part of the railway authorities and conductors4 ,on the other hand the latter have frequently declared services to be impracticable which were really not so4 ,all this has arisen because the two parties in the transaction have too little insight into the nature and mechanism of their respective callings1 and regard their powers more as contradictory than co-operative1 so that they do not1 and cannot1 work together4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the nature of the railway service1 with its modifications due to differences in the nature of the ground1 the locality1 and the organisation of transport requirements1 is apparent to the military officer1 even in a general way2 if he appreciates the fact that the same amount of transport must be differently performed when he passes from a level line to a mountain line1 from a double line to a single line1 from one where the signal and telegraph system are in use to one in which these organs of safety and intelligence are destroyed2 if he can judge of the capability of stations1 the length of track1 and arrangements for the loading1 ordering and passing of trains1 etc41 he will1 with this knowledge1 and his orders being framed in accordance with it1 come much sooner and with greater facility to an understanding with the railway executives than if his commands had to be rectified by contradiction and assertion1 frequently carried on under the influence of excited passions1 or attempted to be enforced by violence4 ,the railway official1 also1 who has some acquaintance with military science1 who understands from practical experience and inspection1 not confined to his own line1 the capabilities of lines and stations in a military point of view1 will1 at his first transaction with the military authorities1 enter sooner into an understanding with them than if he were deficient in this knowledge1 and will find himself in a position to co-operate1 and not be coerced4 ,here the suggestion seems to be that the individual ,army officer and the individual railway executive1 or railway official1 should each become sufficiently acquainted with the technicalities of the other's business to be able to conduct their relations with mutual understanding4 ,it would1 however1 be too much to expect that this plan could be carried out as regards either the military element in general or the railway element in general4 ,the real need of the situation was1 rather1 for some intermediary organisation which1 including both elements1 would provide the machinery for close co-operation between the ,army on the one side and the railway on the other1 guiding the ,army as to the possibilities and limitations of the railway1 and constituting the recognised and sole medium through which orders from the ,army would be conveyed to the railway1 no individual commander or officer having the right to give any direct order to the railway executives or staffs on his own responsibility1 or to interfere in any way with the working of the railways1 except in some such case of extreme emergency as an attack by the enemy on a railway station4 ,all these problems were to form the subject of much more controversy1 together with much further practical experience1 in various other countries--and notably in ,france during the war of #ahgj-ga--;before1 as will be told in due course1 they were solved by the adoption of elaborate systems of organisation designed to provide1 as far as possible1 for all contingencies4 ,,footnote3 #g ,see ,bibliography4 ,,chapter ,v ,,protection ,,of ,,railways ,,in ,,war ,the liability of railway lines to interruption or destruction--whether by bodies of cavalry sent across the frontier for that purpose1 and aiming at damage on a large scale2 by smaller raiding parties operating in the rear of an advancing army2 or by individuals acting on their own account in a hostile country--rendered necessary from an early date in the railway era the adoption of protective measures of a type and character varying according to circumstances2 while these1 in turn1 introduced some further new features into modern warfare4 ,under the orders given by ,general ,mc,dowell for the guarding of railways in the ,department of the ,rappahannock1 in the ,american ,civil ,war1 twelve sentinels were posted along each mile of track2 block-houses were constructed at each bridge1 at cross-roads1 and at intervals along the track2 pickets were thrown forward at various points2 bushes and trees were cleared away from alongside the line1 and the men at each post had flags and lanterns for signalling4 ,general ,sherman took similar measures to guard his rail communications between ,nashville and ,atlanta4 ,precautions such as these were directed mainly against the enemy in the field2 but an early example was to be afforded of how a civil population may either concern themselves or be concerned against their will in the maintenance of rail communication for military purposes4 ,this position is well shown in the following proclamation1 issued ,july #cj1 #ahfc1 by ,major-,general ,g4 ,g4 ,meade from the head-quarters of the ,army of the ,potomac at a time when attempts to throw troop trains off the railway lines were a matter of daily occurrence3-- ,the numerous depredations committed by citizens or rebel soldiers in disguise1 harboured and concealed by citizens1 along the ,orange and ,alexandria ,railroad1 and within our lines1 call for prompt and exemplary punishment4 ,under the instructions of the ,government1 therefore1 every citizen against whom there is sufficient evidence of his having engaged in these practices will be arrested and confined for punishment1 or put beyond the lines4 ,the people within ten miles of the railroad are notified that they will be held responsible1 in their persons and property1 for any injury done to the road1 trains1 depts or stations by citizens1 guerillas or persons in disguise2 and in case of such injury they will be impressed as labourers to repair all damages4 ,if these measures should not stop such depredations1 it will become the unpleasant duty of the undersigned1 in the execution of his instructions1 to direct that the entire inhabitants of the district of country along the railroad be put across the lines1 and their property taken for ,government uses4 ,on the ,manassas ,gap ,railway ,general ,auger further sought to protect ,federal army trains against guerilla attacks by placing in a conspicuous position in each of such trains some of the leading ,confederates residing within ,union lines1 so that1 should any accident happen to the train1 they would run the risk of being among the victims4 ,in the ,austro-,prussian ,war of #ahff the principle of punishing the civil population for attacks on the railway lines underwent a further development4 ,captain ,webber says in reference to the line through ,turnau1 ,prague and ,pardubitz to ,brnn#h3 ,the ,prussians were fortunate in being able to preserve the line intact from injury by the inhabitants1 partly by the number and strength of the guards posted along it1 and partly from the terror of reprisals which they had inspired4 ,captain ,webber suggests that1 in the face of an active enemy1 and in a country where the population was hostile1 it would have been impossible to depend on the railway as a principal line of communication2 but the significance of his expression1 the terror of reprisals1 as denoting the policy adopted by ,prussia so far back as #ahff1 will not be lost on those who are only too well acquainted with more recent developments of the same policy by the same country4 ,the number of men per mile required for guarding a line of rail communication is declared by ,captain ,john ,bigelow1 in his ,principles of ,strategy 7,philadelphia1 #ahid71 to be exceedingly variable1 depending as it does upon the tactical features of the country and the temper of the inhabitants4 ,according1 he says1 to the estimate of the ,germans for the conditions of ,european warfare1 the number will average about #a1jjj men for every stretch of fifteen miles4 ,at this rate an army sixty miles from its base requires about #d1jjj men for the protection of each line of communication4 ,with the help of figures such as these one may1 perhaps1 understand the more readily how it is that a ,commander-in-,chief1 of merciless disposition1 and wanting to retain the active services of every soldier he possibly can in the interests of an early and successful advance will1 by spreading a feeling of terror among the civil population1 seek to reduce to as low a figure as circumstances will permit the number of men he must leave behind to guard his lines of rail communication4 ,these considerations will be found to apply with the greater force when it is remembered that in the ,franco-,prussian ,war of #ahgj-ga the ,prussians had to adopt an especially elaborate system for safeguarding their lines of communication with ,germany during the time they occupied ,french territory4 ,at each railway station they placed a guard formed of detachments of the ,landwehr1 while small detachments were stationed in towns and villages in the neighbourhood4 ,in each signal-box a detachment of troops was stationed1 and the whole line of railway was patrolled from posts established along it at distances of every three or four miles4 ,altogether1 the ,germans are said to have employed1 on over #b1jjj miles of ,french railway lines controlled by them1 as many as #ajj1jjj troops for protective purposes only2 and even then the franc-tireurs were able to cause many interruptions4 ,under a ,prussian regulation dated ,may #b1 #ahfg1 it was laid down that after the restoration of any lines taken possession of in an enemy's territory1 notice should be given that in the event of any further damage being done to the railway1 the locality would be subject to a fine of at least #ejj thalers1 the belongings of the inhabitants would be liable to seizure1 and the local authorities might be arrested4 ,as a further precautionary measure in the war of #ahgj-ga1 the ,germans took a hint from the example of the ,union ,generals in the ,american ,civil ,war by compelling a leading citizen of the district passed through to ride on the engine of each train run by them on ,french soil4 ,in defence of this practice1 the ,german ,general ,staff say in their handbook on ,the ,usages of ,war#i3-- ,since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were1 without any fault on their part1 thereby exposed to grave danger1 every writer outside ,germany has stigmatised this measure as contrary to the law of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants of the country4 ,as against this unfavourable criticism it must be pointed out that this measure1 which was also recognised on the ,german side as harsh and cruel1 was only resorted to after declarations and instructions of the occupying authorities had proved ineffective1 and that in the particular circumstances it was the only method which promised to be effective against the doubtless unauthorised1 indeed the criminal1 behaviour of a fanatical population4 ,herein lies its justification under the laws of war1 but still more in the fact that it proved completely successful1 and that wherever citizens were thus carried on the trains 444 the security of traffic was assured4 ,writing under date ,december #af1 #ahgj1 ,busch offered the following justification for the course adopted3-- ,they were taken1 not to serve as a hindrance to ,french heroism1 but as a precaution against treacherous crime4 ,the railway does not carry merely soldiers1 ammunition and other war material against which it may be allowable to use violent measures2 it also conveys a great number of wounded1 doctors1 hospital attendants1 and other perfectly harmless persons4 ,is a peasant or franc-tireur to be allowed to endanger hundreds of those lives by removing a rail or laying a stone upon the line8 ,let the ,french see that the security of the railway trains is no longer threatened and the journeys made by those hostages will be merely outings1 or our people may even be able to forgo such precautionary measures4 ,in the ,south ,african ,war1 ,field-,marshal ,earl ,roberts issued at ,pretoria1 on ,june #ai1 #aijj1 a proclamation one section of which authorised the placing of leading men among the ,boers on the locomotives of the trains run by the ,british on the occupied territory2 but this particular section was withdrawn eight days afterwards4 ,the ,english view of the practice in question is thus defined in the official ,manual of ,military ,law 7,chap4 ,,xiv1 ,the ,laws and ,usages of ,war1 par4 #dfc73-- ,such measures expose the lives of inhabitants1 not only to the illegitimate acts of train wrecking by private enemy individuals1 but also to the lawful operations of raiding parties of the armed forces of the belligerent1 and cannot1 therefore1 be considered a commendable practice4 ,to guard against the attacks made on the railway lines in the ,orange ,free ,state and the ,transvaal during the ,british occupation1 entrenched posts were placed at every bridge exceeding a #cj-;feet span2 constant patrolling was maintained between these posts2 and the block-houses introduced 7in #aija7 by ,lord ,kitchener were erected along all the railway lines1 at distances of about #b1jjj yards4 ,each block-house1 also1 was garrisoned by about ten men1 and each was surrounded by wire entanglements which1 together with various kinds of alarm fences1 were also placed between the block-houses themselves in order both to impede the approach of the enemy and to warn the garrison thereof4 ,block-houses are to-day regarded as one of the chief means of protecting railways against attacks4 ,their construction and equipment are dealt with by ,major ,w4 ,d4 ,connor1 of the ,corps of ,engineers1 ,u4,s4,a41 in ,military ,railways 7,professional ,papers1 ,no4 #cb1 ,corps of ,engineers1 ,u4,s4 ,army1 ,washington1 #aiaj74 ,supplementary to the adoption of this block-house system1 in time of war1 is the practice followed in various ,continental countries1 in time of peace1 of building permanent fortresses1 in solid masonry1 alongside railway bridges crossing important rivers4 ,in some instances the fortress is so constructed that the railway lines pass through the centre of it4 ,not only1 as a rule1 are these fortresses extremely solid and substantial1 but they may be provided with bomb-proof covers and be stocked with a sufficient supply of provisions to be able to stand1 if necessary1 a fairly prolonged siege4 ,one can assume1 also1 that the garrison would have under its control facilities arranged in advance for the destruction of the bridge1 as a last resort1 in case of need4 ,the theory is that such fortresses and their garrisons should be of especial advantage1 on the outbreak of war1 in checking any sudden invasion and allowing time for the completion of defensive measures4 ,their construction in connection with all the principal railway bridges crossing the ,rhine was especially favoured in ,prussia after the war of #ahgj-a4 ,similar fortresses1 or interrupting forts1 as the ,germans call them1 are also built for the protection of important tunnels1 junctions1 locomotive and carriage works1 etc4 ,another method adopted for the safeguarding of railway lines in war is the use of armoured trains2 though in practice these are also employed for the purposes of independent attacks on the enemy1 apart altogether from any question of ensuring the safety of rail communication4#aj ,for the protection of locomotives and rolling stock1 and to prevent not only their capture but their use by the enemy1 the most efficacious method to adopt is1 of course1 that of removing them to some locality where the enemy is not likely to come4 ,when1 in #ahff1 ,austria saw that she could not hold back the ,prussian invader1 she took off into ,hungary no fewer than #a1jjj locomotives and #af1jjj wagons from the railways in ,bohemia and ,saxony4 ,similar tactics were adopted by the ,boers as against ourselves in the war in ,south ,africa4 ,on the ,british troops crossing into the ,orange ,free ,state1 from ,cape ,colony1 they found that the retreating enemy had withdrawn all their rolling stock1 as well as all their staffs from the railway stations1 leaving behind only a more or less damaged line of railway4 ,subsequently1 when the forces occupied ,pretoria1 they certainly did find there sixteen locomotives and #djj trucks2 but the station books showed that in the previous forty-eight hours no fewer than seventy trains1 many of them drawn by two engines1 had been sent east in the direction of ,delagoa ,bay4 ,when it is not practicable to withdraw locomotives and rolling stock which it is desired the enemy shall not be able to use1 the obvious alternative is that measures should be taken either to remove vital parts or to ensure their destruction4 ,certain of the methods adopted during the ,civil ,war in ,america were especially efficacious in attaining the latter result4 ,in some instances trains were started running and then--driver and fireman leaping off the engine--were left to go into a river1 or to fall through a broken viaduct4 ,in other instances two trains1 after having had a good supply of explosives put in them1 would be allowed to dash into one another at full speed4 ,many locomotives had their boilers burst1 and wagons were set on fire after having been filled up with combustibles4 ,still another method which has been adopted with a view to preventing an enemy from using the railways he might succeed in capturing is that of constructing them with a different gauge4 ,the standard gauge of the main-line railways in ,france1 ,germany1 ,holland1 ,belgium1 ,denmark1 ,austria-,hungary1 ,italy1 ,switzerland1 ,roumania and ,turkey 7like that1 also1 of railways in ,great ,britain1 ,canada and the ,united ,states71 is #d;ft4 #h;in41 allowing trains to pass readily from one country to the other with the same rolling stock2 but the gauge of the ,russian railways is #e;ft41 necessitating a transshipment from one train to another when the frontier is reached4 ,similar conditions are found in ,spain and ,portugal1 where the standard gauge is #e;ft4 #f;in4#aa ,russia adopted her broader gauge so that1 in case of invasion1 the invader should not be able to run his rolling-stock over her lines1 as ,germany1 for instance1 would be able to do in the case of the railways of ,belgium and ,france4 ,thus far1 therefore1 ,russia strengthened her position from the point of view of defence2 but she weakened it as regards attack1 since if she should herself want1 either to become the invader or to send troop trains over neighbouring territory to some point beyond1 she would be at a disadvantage4 ,in the ,russo-,turkish ,war of #ahgg-gh1 when the ,russian forces passed through ,roumania on their way to ,turkey1 the difference in gauge between the ,russian and the ,roumanian railways caused great delay and inconvenience by reason of the necessary transfer of troops1 stores1 guns1 ammunition1 torpedo boats1 etc41 at the frontier4 ,it should1 also1 be remembered that the reduction of a broad gauge to a narrow one is a much simpler matter1 from an engineering point of view1 than the widening of a narrower gauge into a broad one4 ,in the former case the existing sleepers1 bridges1 tunnels1 platforms1 etc41 would still serve their purpose4 ,in the latter case fresh sleepers might have to be laid1 bridges and tunnels widened or enlarged1 and platforms and stations altered1 use of the broader-gauge rolling stock thus involving an almost complete reconstruction of the railway lines4 ,to this extent1 therefore1 the balance of advantage would seem to be against the country having the broader gauge4 ,the conclusion may1 at least1 be formed that such a country is far more bent on protecting her own territory than on invading that of her neighbours4 ,the course adopted by ,germany for overcoming the difficulty which1 in the event of her seeking to invade ,russia1 the difference of railway gauge in that country would present1 will be told in ,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,footnotes3 #h ,notes on the ,campaign in ,bohemia in #ahff4 ,by ,capt4 ,webber1 ,r4,e4 ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,n4,s41 vol4 xvi4 ,woolwich1 #ahfh4 #i ,the ,german ,war ,book4 ,being the ,usages of ,war on ,land2 issued by the ,great ,general ,staff of the ,german ,army4 ,london1 #aiae4 #aj ,the subject of armoured trains will be dealt with more fully in ,chapters ,,vii and ,,xvi4 #aa ,see ,field ,service ,pocket ,book1 #aiad1 pp4 #aea-b4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,troops ,,and ,,supplies ,in the earlier controversies as to the use of railways in war1 attention was almost entirely concentrated on questions relating to the movement of large masses of troops1 the saving of time to be effected1 and the strategic advantages to be gained4 ,these considerations quickly passed from the theoretical to the practical1 and when the results attained were put against such facts as1 for instance1 the one that in #ahje ,napoleon's ,grand ,army of #bjj1jjj men took forty-two days to march the #gjj kilometres 7#dce miles7 between ,ulm on the ,danube and the ,french camp at ,boulogne1 there was no longer any possibility of doubt as to the services that railways might render from these particular points of view4 ,quicker transport was1 however1 only one consideration4 ,there was the further important detail that the movement of troops by rail would bring them to their point of concentration1 not only sooner1 but in more complete numbers1 than if they had to endure the fatigues of prolonged marches by road4 ,according to ,german authorities1 the falling-out of infantry and cavalry when marching along good roads under conditions of well-maintained discipline and adequate food supplies averages three per cent4 in cool and dry weather1 and six per cent4 in hot or wet weather2 while in unfavourable conditions as regards roads1 weather and supplies1 the diminution may be enormous4 ,when1 in the autumn of #agii1 ,suvroff made his famous march over the ,st4 ,gothard1 he lost1 in eleven days1 no fewer than #aj1jjj men owing to the hardships of the journey4 ,in his invasion of ,russia1 in #ahab1 ,napoleon's losses in men who succumbed to the fatigues and trials they experienced on the road were out of all proportion to the casualties due to actual fighting4 ,it was1 too1 a saying of ,blcher's that he feared night marches worse than the enemy4 ,an ,english authority1 ,lieut4-,col4 ,r4 ,home1 ,c4,b41 ,r4,e41 wrote in a paper on ,the ,organisation of the ,communications1 including ,railways1 published in ,vol ,,xix4 of the ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution 7#ahge73-- ,if an army of moderate size1 say #ej1jjj men1 simply marches one hundred miles without firing one shot or seeing an enemy the number of sick to be got rid of is very great4 ,experience has shown that in a good climate1 with abundant food1 easy marches1 and fair weather1 the waste from ordinary causes in a ten days' march of such a force would be between #b1jjj and #b1ejj men1 while the number of galled1 footsore or worn-out horses would also be very large4 ,a few wet days or a sharp engagement would raise the number of both very considerably4 ,an inefficient man or horse at the front is a positive disadvantage4 ,another equally important detail relates to the provision of supplies for the troops and animals thus transported by rail both more quickly and with less fatigue4 ,in all ages the feeding of his troops in an enemy's country has been one of the gravest problems a military commander has had to solve2 and though1 in some instances1 vast armies have succeeded in drawing sufficient support from the land they have invaded1 there have been others in which an army intending to live upon the country has failed to get the food it needed1 and has had its numbers depleted to the extent of thousands as the result of sheer starvation4 ,this was the experience of ,darius1 ,king of ,persia1 who1 in #eac ,b4,c41 crossed the ,bosporus1 on a bridge of boats1 with an army of #gjj1jjj1 followed the retreating ,scythians1 and lost #hj1jjj of his men in wild steppes where no means existed for feeding them4 ,when1 also1 ,alexander the ,great was withdrawing from ,india1 in #cbe ,b4,c41 two-thirds of his force died on the desert plains of ,beluchistan from thirst or hunger4 ,lack of the supplies from which he found himself entirely cut off was1 again1 a main cause of the disaster that overtook ,napoleon in his ,russian campaign4 ,even fertile or comparatively fertile lands1 satisfying the needs of their inhabitants in time of peace1 may fail to afford provisions for an invading army1 either because of the great number of the latter or because the retreating population have destroyed the food supplies they could not take with them into the interior whether for their own sustenance or with a view to starving the invaders4 ,should the invading army succeed in living on the country1 the effect of leaving the troops to their own resources1 in the way of collecting food1 may still be not only subversive of discipline but of strategic disadvantage through their being scattered on marauding expeditions at a time when1 possibly1 it would be preferable to keep them concentrated4 ,general ,friron1 chief of the staff of ,marshal ,massna1 wrote concerning ,napoleon's campaign in ,portugal3-- ,the day the soldier became convinced that1 for the future1 he would have to depend on himself1 discipline disappeared from the ranks of the army4 ,the officer became powerless in the presence of want2 he was no longer disposed to reprimand the soldier who brought him the nourishment essential to his existence1 and who shared with him1 in brotherly goodwill1 a prey which may have cost him incalculable dangers and fatigues4 ,the extent to which a combination of physical fatigue and shortness of supplies in an inhospitable country may interfere with the efficiency of an army is well shown by ,thiers 7,histoire du ,consulat et de l',empire7 in regard to the conditions at the very outset of ,napoleon's ,russian campaign4 ,the ,french troops arriving on the ,niemen--at which point they were merely on the frontiers of ,russia--were already overcome by the long marches they had made4 ,they had no bread1 no salt1 and no spirits2 their craving for food could no longer be satisfied by meat without salt and meal mixed with water4 ,the horses1 too1 were out of condition for want of proper food4 ,behind the army a great number of soldiers dropped out of the ranks and had lost their way1 while the few people they met in a scantily-populated district could speak nothing but ,polish1 which the wearied and famished men were unable to understand4 ,yet1 under the conditions of former days1 it was by troops thus exhausted by marches of hundreds of miles1 done on1 possibly1 a starvation diet1 that battles involving the severest strain on human energy were fought4 ,when living on the country is no longer practicable1 the only alternative for an army is1 of course1 that of sending supplies after it for the feeding of the troops2 but when1 or where1 this has had to be done by means of ordinary road services1 it has involved--together with the transport of artillery1 ammunition and stores--7#a7 the employment of an enormous number of vehicles and animals1 greatly complicating the movements of the army2 and 7#b7 a limitation of the distance within which a campaign can be waged by an army depending entirely on its own resources4 ,the latter of these conditions was the direct consequence of the former2 and the reason for this was shown by ,general ,w4 ,t4 ,sherman in an article contributed by him to the ,century ,magazine for ,february1 #ahhh 7pp4 #eie-f71 in the course of which he says3-- ,according to the ,duke of ,wellington1 an army moves upon its belly1 not upon its legs2 and no army dependent on wagons can operate more than a hundred miles from its base because the teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons1 leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of men and animals at the front who are fully employed in fighting4 ,there was1 again1 the risk when food supplies followed the army by road either of perishables going bad en route1 owing to the time taken in their transport by wagon1 or of their suffering deterioration as the result of exposure to weather1 the consequence in either case being a diminution in the amount of provisions available for feeding the army4 ,all these various conditions have been changed by the railway1 the use of which for the purposes of war has1 in regard to the forwarding of supplies1 introduced innovations which are quite as important as those relating to the movement of troops--if1 indeed1 the former advantages are not of even greater importance than the latter4 ,thanks to the railway1 an army can now draw its supplies from the whole of the interior of the home country--provided that the lines of communication can be kept open2 and1 with the help not only of regular rail services but of stores and magazines en route those supplies can be forwarded to railhead in just such quantities as they may be wanted4 ,under these conditions the feeding of an army in the field should be assured regardless alike of the possible scanty resources of the country in which it is engaged and of its own distance from the base of supplies4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,armoured ,,trains ,in the issue of the now defunct ,london periodical1 ,once a ,week1 for ,august #ac1 #ahei1 there was published an article on ,english ,railway ,artillery3 ,a ,cheap ,defence against ,invasion1 in which it was said1 among other things3-- ,we have hitherto regarded the rail merely as a vehicle of transport1 to carry materials which are not to be set in work till off the rails4 ,if we look at the rail as part of an instrument of warfare1 we shall be startled at the enormous means we have at hand1 instantly available1 from mercantile purposes1 to convert to engines of war4 ,the writer was ,william ,bridges ,adams 7#agig-ahgb71 an authority on railways who had grown up with them1 had introduced into their operation many inventions and improvements 7including the fish-joint still used for connecting rails71 and was the author of various books and papers on railways1 transport1 and other subjects4 ,his new idea1 as set forth in the article in question1 was specially directed to the utilisation of railways for defending the shores of ,great ,britain against an invader2 and in developing this idea he was1 also1 as far as can be traced1 the first to suggest the employment of armoured trains4 ,the immediate reason alike for the writing of the article and for the making of the suggestion was that in #ahei ,great ,britain appeared to be faced by the prospect of invasion by ,france1--a prospect which1 in view of the then admittedly defective condition of the national defences1 led to the creation of the ,volunteer ,corps1 to the appointment of a ,royal ,commission to inquire into the question of coast defence1 and to suggestions being put forward by many different authorities as to what should be done4 ,among those suggestions was one by the writer in question for supplementing any system of coast defence that might be adopted by the mounting of guns on railway trucks protected by armour1 such trucks being moved from point to point along the coast railways to meet1 as far as possible1 the needs of the military situation4 ,heavy artillery1 wrote ,adams1 though the most formidable implement of modern warfare1 had the disadvantage of requiring many horses to draw it4 ,so the problem arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with4 ,this could best be done1 he thought1 by putting artillery on our true line of defence1--our rails1 and having it drawn1 or propelled1 by a locomotive4 ,mount1 he said1 a gun of twenty tons weight on a railway truck1 with a circular traversing platform1 and capable of throwing a shot or shell weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of five miles4 ,a truck on eight wheels would carry this very easily1 and there would be no recoil4 ,such a battery would be practically a moving fortress1 and1 used on the coast railways1 which he regarded as constituting lines of defence1 would be the cheapest of all possible fortresses--absolutely a continuous fortress along the whole coast4 ,communication with coast railways at all strategical points should1 however1 be facilitated by the placing of rails along the ordinary highways4 ,after giving some technical details as to the construction alike of coast railways and road tramways1 he proceeded3-- ,with these roads communicating with the railroads1 the whole railway system becomes applicable to military purposes4 ,the railway system is so especially adapted for defence1 and so little adapted to invaders1 that it should become at once a matter of experiment how best to adapt ,armstrong or other guns to its uses4 ,the process of fitting the engines with shot-proof walls to protect the drivers against riflemen would be very easy4444 ,nothing but artillery could damage the engines or moving batteries1 and artillery could not get near them if it were desirable to keep out of the way4 ,one gun transportable would do the work of ten which are fixtures in forts1 and there would be no men to take prisoners1 for no forts would be captured4 ,the more this system is thought of the more the conviction will grow that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country impenetrable to invaders at a comparatively trifling cost4 ,it will be seen that the scheme here proposed included three separate propositions--7#a7 the use of railways1 as engines of war1 for coast defence2 7#b7 the mounting of ,armstrong or other guns on railway trucks from which they could be discharged for the purposes of such defence2 and 7#c7 the providing of the engines with shot-proof walls for the protection of the drivers4 ,a similar protection for the men operating the guns on the trucks was not then1 apparently1 considered necessary2 but we have here what was clearly the germ of the armoured train4 ,among the other suggestions advanced on the same occasion were some for the employment of railways in general for strategical purposes1 and more especially for the defence of ,london2 and here1 again1 the employment of armoured trains was advocated4 ,a ,staff ,officer1 writing in ,the ,times of ,july #af1 #ahfj1 declared that the most efficacious and the most economical line of defence which ,london could have would be a circular railway forming a complete cordon around the ,metropolis at a distance of fifteen miles from the centre1 and having for its interior lines of operation the numerous railways already existing within that radius4 ,on this circular railway there should be ,armstrong and ,whitworth ordnance mounted on large iron-plated trucks fitted with traversing platforms in the way already recommended by ,w4 ,bridges ,adams1 the trucks themselves1 however1 and not only the locomotives1 being protected by shot-proof shields4 ,the circular railway was to be constructed primarily for strategical purposes2 but during peace the line would be available for ordinary traffic1 and in this way it could be made to yield at least some return on the capital expenditure4 ,the writer of this letter1 ,lieut4 ,arthur ,walker1 then an officer of the #gith ,highlanders and the holder of a staff appointment at the ,school of ,musketry1 ,fleetwood1 followed up the subject by reading a paper on ,coast ,railways and ,railway ,artillery at a meeting of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution on ,january #cj1 #ahfe4ab ,on this occasion he specially advocated the use of moveable batteries for coast defence in conjunction with railways constructed more or less within a short parallel distance of the entire coast line4 ,field artillery1 he recommended1 should be mounted on a truck the sides of which would be encased in a cuirass of sufficient thickness1 while the engine and tender would also be protected by an iron cuirass1 and placed between two cupolas for further protection4 ,he considered that to attempt to land in face of such an engine of war as this would be simply impossible4 ,moving batteries of this kind would be the cheapest of all possible fortresses4444 ,we have nothing to do but to improvise well-adapted gun-carriages for our rails4 ,at the same meeting ,mr4 ,t4 ,wright1 ,c4,e41 gave details of a proposed railway train battery for coast1 frontier and inland defence which was designed to carry ten1 twenty or forty guns or mortars4 ,another early advocate of the use of railways as an actual instrument of warfare was ,colonel ,e4 ,r4 ,wethered1 who1 in #ahgb1 wrote to the ,war ,office suggesting that heavy ordnance should be mounted on wheeled carriages so constructed that they could be moved along any of the railways1 from point to point4 ,in this way the three-fold advantage would be gained of 7#a7 utilising the railway system for purposes of national defence2 7#b7 rendering possible a concentration of artillery with overwhelming force at any given spot1 and1 7#c7 by the use of these moveable carriages for the conveyance of the guns1 exposing the men to less risk4 ,colonel ,wethered further communicated to ,the ,times of ,may #be1 #ahgg1 a letter on ,portable ,batteries in which he declared that if1 before an enemy could effect a landing1 we were to provide the means of concentrating1 with unerring certainty1 on any given points of the coast1 a crushing force of artillery1 with guns of heavier calibre than even the warships of the invader could command1 it would be impossible for the vessels of an invading force to approach near enough to effect the landing of their men4 ,he continued3-- ,my proposal is to take the full advantage which our railway system1 in connection with our insular position1 affords1 and provide powerful moveable batteries which can be sent fully equipped in fighting order direct by railway to any required point2 and the recent experimental trials of the #ha-ton gun have proved that the heaviest ordnance can be moved and fought on railway metals with considerable advantage4444 ,in connection with our present main lines of railway1 which probably would require strengthening at certain points1 ,i would construct branch lines or sidings leading to every strategical point of our coast and into every fort1 as far as possible1 with requisite platforms4444 ,these branch lines during peace would1 doubtless1 be of some small commercial value4444 ,i would mount as many of our heaviest guns as practicable on railway gun carriages so that they could be moved by rail from one face of a front to another1 and from one place to another4 ,he also recommended that guns thus mounted1 fully equipped1 and ready for use1 should be kept at three large central depts which might be utilised for the defence of ,london4 ,at each of them he would station 7#a7 ,militia and ,volunteer ,artillery able not only to work the guns but to construct1 repair or destroy railway lines1 and 7#b7 a locomotive corps specially trained in the working of traffic under war conditions4 ,by reading a paper at the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution on ,april #bd1 #ahia1 on ,the ,use of ,railways for ,coast and ,harbour ,defence1#ac ,lieut4 ,e4 ,p4 ,girouard1 ,r4,e4 7now ,major-,general ,sir ,e4 ,percy ,c4 ,girouard1 ,k4,c4,m4,g471 made what was1 at that time1 an important contribution to a subject on which there was then still much to be learned4 ,sketching a detailed scheme comprising the employment of all the coastal railways for the purposes of national defence1 he emphasised the value of ,britain's enormous railway power as the strong point of her defensive position1 whether regarded from the point of view of 7#a7 railway mileage open as compared with the square mile of coastal area to be defended1 or 7#b7 the length of coast line compared with the railway mileage at or near that coast line1 and1 therefore1 locally available for its defence4 ,why1 he asked1 should we not turn to account the enormous advantage which our great railway power gives us to concentrate every available gun at a threatened point in the right and the proper time1 which the proper utilisation of our railways can and will do1 thereby practically doubling or quadrupling our available gun power8 ,whilst the subject had thus been under discussion in the ,united ,kingdom1 ,america1 in her ,civil ,war of #ahfa-fe1 had set the rest of the world an example by actually introducing armoured-protected gun-carrying trucks into modern warfare4 ,writing from ,washington1 under date ,august #bi1 #ahfb1 to ,colonel ,herman ,haupt1 then ,chief of ,construction and ,transportation in the ,department of ,rappahannock1 ,mr4 ,p4 ,h4 ,watson1 ,assistant-,secretary of ,war1 said3--,an armour-clad car1 bullet proof1 and mounting a cannon1 has arrived here and will be sent down to ,alexandria4 ,a later message1 on the same date added3--,after you see the bullet-proof car1 let me know what you think of it4 ,i think you ought at once to have a locomotive protected by armour4 ,can you have the work done expeditiously and well at ,alexandria1 or shall ,i get it done at ,philadelphia or ,wilmington8 ,the car was duly received2 but ,haupt's comments in respect to it1 as recorded in his ,reminiscences1 show that he was not greatly impressed by the innovation4 ,p4 ,h4 ,watson1 ,assistant-,secretary of ,war1 sent me1 he says1 an armour-clad1 bullet-proof car1 mounting a cannon4 ,the kindness was appreciated1 but the present was an elephant4 ,i could not use it1 and1 being in the way1 it was finally side-tracked on an old siding in ,alexandria4 ,it would seem1 however1 that other armour-clad cars were brought into actual use during the course of the ,civil ,war4 ,in the ,railway ,age ,gazette 7,chicago7 for ,january #bb1 #aiae1 ,mr4 ,frederick ,hobart1 associated editor of the ,new ,york ,engineer and ,mining ,journal1 writes1 from personal knowledge1 of two armoured cars which were in use in the ,civil ,war4 ,one of these1 formed by heavy timbers built up on a flat car1 was put together in the shops of the ,atlantic and ,north ,carolina ,railroad ,company at ,newberne1 ,n4,c41 in #ahfb1 about two months after the city had been captured by the ,burnside expedition4 ,the armour consisted of old rails spiked on the outside of the planking composing the sides and front of the car4 ,along the sides there were slits for musketry fire1 and at the front end there was a port hole covered with a shutter behind which a gun from one of the field batteries was mounted4 ,the second car was similarly constructed1 but was armed with a naval howitzer4 ,the cars were run ahead of the engine1 and were used in reconnoitring along the railroad line west of ,newberne4 ,mr4 ,hobart adds that he was quite familiar with the cars1 having assisted in the design and construction of both4 ,in the ,century ,magazine for ,september1 #ahhg 7page #ggd71 there is given an illustration 7from a photograph7 of an armour-clad car described as the ,union ,railroad ,battery which was1 apparently1 used in connection with the springing of the mine in front of ,petersburg on ,july #cj1 #ahfd4 ,the car is shown to have consisted of a low truck with1 at one end1 a sloping armour plate coming down almost to the rails1 and having a hole through which the gun placed behind it on the truck could be fired4 ,the sides of the truck were protected from the top of the sloping armour downwards1 but the back was open4 ,the car was1 of course1 designed to be pushed in front of the locomotive4 ,mr4 ,l4 ,lodian1 also1 contributed to the issue of the ,american periodical1 ,railway and ,locomotive ,engineering1 for ,may1 #aiae1 a communication1 under the title of ,the ,origin of ,armoured ,railroad ,cars ,unquestionably the ,product of the ,american ,civil ,war1 in which1 claiming that our own ,civil ,war originated those cars1 he said3-- ,attached is a picture of one in use on the old ,philadelphia-,baltimore ,railroad4 ,the illustration appeared in ,frank ,leslie's illustrated periodical on ,may #ah1 #ahfd4 ,no better proof could be furnished of the authenticity of the fact that such a car was in use at that time4444 ,there appears to be no great variation even to-day in armoured car design from the initial effort of half a century ago4 ,pictures are appearing in numerous periodicals1 at the period of writing1 of those in use by the ,european belligerents1 and in general appearance and outline they are about the same as the original1 the chief variation in their use being that the war-going locomotive is also sheathed in armour1 whereas that in use in the sixties was entirely unprotected1 except in front1 and then only by reason of the mailclad car being placed in front to do the fighting4 ,as against this suggestion1 there is the undoubted fact that in the ,american ,civil ,war the plan was adopted of having the locomotives of ordinary troop or supply trains protected by armour-plating as a precaution against attack when there was no armoured car in front of them4 ,writing to the ,director of ,military ,railroads on ,october #h1 #ahfb1 ,haupt said3-- ,i have been thinking over the subject of locomotives4 ,it is one which1 at the present time1 and in view of the future requirements of the service1 demands especial attention4 ,experience has shown that on engines men are targets for the enemy2 the cabs where they are usually seated have been riddled by bullets1 and they have only escaped by lying on the footboard4 ,it will be necessary to inspire confidence in our men by placing iron cabins 7bullet proof7 upon all or nearly all our engines1 and the necessity will increase as we penetrate further into the enemy's country4 ,again1 it is desirable that the smaller and more delicate portions of the apparatus should be better protected than at present1 and ,i would be pleased if you would give to the plans1 of which ,i spoke to you recently1 a careful consideration4 ,it seems to me that they are peculiarly well adapted to military service4 ,haupt adds that protected locomotives and bullet-proof cabs were soon after provided1 as recommended2 and elsewhere in his ,reminiscences he says1 on the same subject3-- ,the bullet-proof cabs on locomotives were very useful--in fact1 indispensable4 ,i had a number of them made and put on engines1 and they afforded protection to engineers and firemen against the fire from guerillas from the bushes that lined the road4 ,in the ,franco-,prussian ,war of #ahgj-ga guns mounted on four armour-plated trucks1 fitted up in the workshops of the ,orlans ,company1 under the supervision of ,m4 ,dupuy de ,lorme1 ,engineer-in-,chief for ,naval ,construction1 were taken into action on four occasions during the siege of ,paris1 namely1 at ,choisy-le-,roi1 for the sortie preceding the one from ,champigny2 near ,brie-sur-,marne1 to support the ,champigny sortie2 at ,le ,bourget1 for one of the attempts to recapture that position2 and at ,la ,malmaison1 to support the ,montretout sortie4 ,the wagons were protected by a covering which consisted of five plates of wrought iron1 each two-fifths of an inch thick1 and giving1 therefore1 a total thickness of two inches4 ,the two engines used were also protected by armour-plating4 ,one or two of the wagons were struck by field-gun shells without1 however1 sustaining further damage than the denting of their plates4 ,the engines escaped damage altogether4 ,on going into action the armoured wagons were followed by another bullet-proof engine conveying a party of men with tools and materials to repair any interruption of the lines that might interfere with the return of the trains2 but the only damage done was so slight that it was remedied in about a quarter of an hour4#ad ,further use was made of armoured trains in the ,egyptian ,campaign of #ahhb4 ,one that was put together to assist in the defensive works at ,alexandria is declared in the official history of the campaign#ae to have proved most serviceable4 ,two of the trucks1 fitted with iron plating and sand bags as a protecting cover1 carried one ,nordenfelt and two ,gatling guns4 ,a #i-pr4 was also placed on one of the trucks1 together with a crane by means of which it could be lowered out immediately4 ,other trucks1 rendered bullet proof by sand bags and boiler-plating1 and carrying a force of #bjj bluejackets1 with small arms1 completed the fighting force4 ,on ,july #bh1 the train took part in a reconnaissance sent out to ascertain the extent of the damage which had been done to the railway lines near ,arabi's outpost4 ,shots were fired at the train by the enemy1 but without effect4 ,the reconnaissance was a complete success inasmuch as it enabled such repairs to be done to the railway as gave the use of a second line between ,ramleh and ,alexandria4 ,so useful had the train been found that it was now further improved by adding to it a #dj-pr4 on a truck protected by an iron mantlet4 ,the locomotive was put in the middle of the train and was itself protected by sand bags and railway iron4 ,thus strengthened1 the train went into action in the reconnaissance in force carried out from ,alexandria on ,august #e1 and the most interesting incident of the engagement1 according to the official account1 was the good service done by the #dj-pr4 from the armoured train4 ,early in the morning of ,september #ac the train1 consisting of five wagons1 and having1 on this occasion1 one ,krupp gun and one ,gatling in addition to the #dj-pr41 was sent to support the attack on ,tel el-,kebir4 ,it was followed by another train having #cej yards of permanent-way materials1 with all the necessary tools and appliances for the prompt carrying out of any repairs that might be necessary4 ,owing1 however1 to the hazy and uncertain light and to the ever-increasing clouds of smoke that hung over the battle-field1 it was impossible to fire the #dj-pr4 ,in the futile attempt made in #ahhe to construct a railway from ,suakin to ,berber1 in support of the ,nile ,expedition of #ahhd-he1 resort was had to an armoured train for the purpose of protecting the line from the constant attacks to which it was subjected by the enemy4 ,the train carried a #bj-pr4 ,b4,l41 which could be fired only either in prolongation of the line or at a slight angle from it4 ,at the ,camp of ,exercise in ,delhi in ,january1 #ahhf1 some important experiments were carried out with a view to testing the practicability of firing guns at right angles to an ordinary line of railway1 the result being to establish the fact that a #dj-pr4 ,r4,b4,l4 could be fired with perfect safety broadside from 7a7 small empty wagons mounted on four wheels2 7b7 small empty wagons weighted up to four tons2 and 7c7 empty eight-wheel bogies4 ,these experiments were especially successful when account is taken of the fact that no attempt was made to reduce in any way the energy of recoil4 ,other experiments1 begun in #ahhe1 were successfully conducted during a succession of years both by the ,french ,government and by private firms in ,france in the transport and the firing of guns from railway trucks with a view to obtaining definite data on the subject1 more especially in relation to firing at right angles to the line4 ,in ,italy a distinguished officer raised the question in the ,italian ,parliament1 in #ahia1 as to whether ,sicily should not be defended by means of a coast railway and armoured trains4 ,some experiments carried out at ,newhaven1 ,sussex1 in #ahid1 were the more interesting because the results attained were due to the combined efforts of ,artillery ,volunteers and of the ,london1 ,brighton and ,south ,coast ,railway ,company4 ,under the ,volunteer mobilization scheme of #ahia there were some #cjj members of the #ast ,sussex ,artillery ,volunteers to whom no special duties had been allotted1 and there happened to be1 at ,shoreham1 a #dj-pr4 ,armstrong ,b4,l4 gun which was then serving no particular purpose4 ,inspired by these two facts1 the ,secretary of the ,committee for ,national ,defence suggested1 in ,november1 #ahia1 that negotiations should be opened with the ,london1 ,brighton and ,south ,coast ,railway ,company with a view to their mounting the #dj-pr4 on a specially prepared truck1 designed to form part of an armoured train1 experiments in firing the gun from the truck--in order to test the efficiency of this expedient for the purposes of coast defence--being afterwards carried out by the ,artillery ,volunteers whose services were available for the purpose4 ,on being approached1 the directors of the railway company readily consented to the fitting up of the truck being carried out at their engineering and carriage works2 they contributed towards the expenses1 and members of their staff entered with great cordiality into the scheme1 ,mr4 ,r4 ,j4 ,billington1 the locomotive superintendent1 being the first to suggest the mounting of the gun on a turntable to be fixed on the truck1--a bold departure1 as it was regarded at the time1 and one expected to produce excellent results4 ,the railway staff were the more interested1 also1 in the proposed experiments because a large proportion of the members of the #ast ,sussex ,artillery ,volunteers consisted of men employed at the ,brighton ,company's works4 ,in commenting upon these facts1 ,col4 ,charles ,gervaise ,boxall1 the commanding officer1 said in a paper on ,the ,armoured ,train for ,coast ,defence1 read by him at a meeting of officers and ,n4,c4,o4's of the ,brigade1 held at ,newhaven ,fort1 ,sussex1 on ,may #ad1 #ahid3-- ,when one considers that a railway company is neither a philanthropic institution nor a patriotic society1 the generous support given to this experiment by so powerful a body as the directors of the ,london1 ,brighton and ,south ,coast ,railway ,company is in itself some considerable evidence of the importance they themselves ascribe to this effort in the direction of the maintenance of coast defence and protection from invasion4 ,preliminary experiments with the gun were conducted on ,may #e1 #ahid1 and they conclusively showed1 ,col4 ,boxall said1 that the gun will require no traversing to correct variation caused by the recoil1 while the muzzle of the gun can be directed to any part of its circumference by handspike traversing within half a minute4 ,he was evidently proud of the results even of these preliminary trials4 ,they were the first occasion on which a heavy gun had been fired broadside on the permanent way of an ,english railway1 and the truck was the first armour-plated one on which a turntable1 a recoil cylinder1 and other inventions introduced had been employed4 ,so1 he further declared3-- ,we do confidently submit that1 having proved that such a gun as this can be mounted so as to be transportable to any part of our railway system at a moment's notice1 brought into action1 and fired with accuracy either end on1 broadside1 or in any other direction1 without danger of capsizing1 and without injury to the permanent way1 we have become pioneers of a new departure in artillery which must lead to results of the highest importance4 ,this was written prior to the full trials1 which took place at ,newhaven on ,may #ai1 #ahid1 in the presence of a distinguished company of military men and others4 ,an account of the event will be found in ,the ,times of ,may #ba1 #ahid4 ,the gun and its carriage are described as standing on a turntable platform pivoted on the centre of the truck1 and revolving on a central racer4 ,the gun detachments were protected by a plating six feet high round three sides of the turntable1 and the gun was fired through an aperture in the plating4 ,drawn by an ordinary locomotive1 the truck on which the gun was mounted was accompanied by two carriages conveying the ,volunteer ,artillerymen who were to serve the gun4 ,several rounds were fired at a target some #b1ejj yards distant1 and the armoured train passed through the searching and severe ordeal most successfully1 the jar caused being so slight that a stone placed on the rails remained unmoved by the firing4 ,the truck1 it is further stated1 had been provided with some cross girders which could be run out and supported on blocks in order to secure a broad base when the gun was fired at right angles to the line1 and there was a further arrangement for connecting the truck to the rails by strong clips2 but the truck remained sufficiently steady without any need for making use of these appliances4 ,finally1 as will be told more fully in ,chapter ,,xvi1 the ,south ,african ,campaign of #ahii-aijb definitely established the usefulness of armoured trains as an instrument of war1 and led both to the creation of an efficient organisation for their employment on the most scientific and most practical lines and to the establishment of certain principles in regard to such important matters of detail as uses and purposes1 administration1 staff1 armament1 tactics1 etc4 ,published in the ,detailed ,history of the ,railways in the ,south ,african ,war which was issued by the ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,chatham1 in #aije1 these principles were adopted in the ,united ,states with modifications to suit ,american conditions1 and1 so modified1 are reproduced in ,major ,william ,d4 ,connor's handbook on ,military ,railways1 forming ,no4 #cb of the ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,engineers1 ,u4,s4 ,army4 ,an excellent treatment of the subject1 from a technical point of view1 will be found in a paper1 by ,capt4 ,h4 ,o4 ,nance1 on ,armoured ,trains1 published1 with photographs and drawings1 in ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,fourth ,series1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,paper #d 7,chatham1 #aijf74 ,,footnotes3 #ab ,see the ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,vol4 ,,ix41 pp4 #bba-ca1 #ahfe4 #ac ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,vol4 ,,xxxv41 #ahia4 #ad ,for detailed description1 with diagrams1 of the trains here in question1 see ,armour-plated ,railway ,wagons used during the late ,sieges of ,paris1 by ,lieut4 ,fraser1 ,r4,e4 ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,n4,s41 ,vol4 ,,xx1 #ahgb4 #ae ,military ,history of the ,campaign of #ahhb in ,egypt4 ,prepared by the ,intelligence ,branch of the ,war ,office4 ,revised edition4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,railway ,,ambulance ,,transport ,according to statistics which have been compiled in relation to wars alike in ancient and in modern times1 for every ten men among the armies in the field who have died from wounds received in battle there have been from thirty-five to forty who died from sickness or disease4 ,writing in the ,journal des ,sciences ,militaires1 ,dr4 ,morache1 a surgeon in the ,french ,army1 has said that while the total number of deaths among combatants taking part in the ,crimean ,war was #ie1jjj1 no fewer than #gj1jjj were due to typhus1 scurvy1 cholera or other diseases4 ,in the ,italian campaign of #ahei the ,french lost #e1dih men1 of whom #b1ejj died from sickness4 ,on the conclusion of the ,russo-,turkish ,war the ,russians had #ea1jjj of their troops sick1 the ravages of typhus having been especially severe4 ,these conditions have been materially aggravated by the gathering together of great numbers of sick and wounded into overcrowded hospitals situate on or near to the theatre of war and destined inevitably to become hot-beds of disease and pestilence far more dangerous to human life1 under these conditions1 than even the most deadly weapons which the art of war had invented for use on the battle-field itself4 ,nor was it the armies alone that suffered4 ,returning troops spread the seeds of disease among the civil population1 causing epidemics that lingered1 in some instances1 for several years and carried off many thousands of non-combatants1 in addition to the great number of victims among the combatants themselves4 ,in a volume of #hff pages1 published by ,dr4 ,e4 ,gurlt1 under the title of ,zur ,geschichte der ,internationellen und ,freiwilligen ,krankenpflege im ,kriege 7,leipzig1 #ahgc71 will be found many terrible details concerning the ravages in ,france1 ,germany and ,austria of the typhus which ,napoleon's troops brought back with them on the occasion of their disastrous retreat from ,russia4 ,the most practicable means of mitigating1 if not of avoiding1 these various evils is to be found in the prompt removal of the sick and wounded from the theatre of war1 and their distribution in smaller units1 not simply among a group of neighbouring towns1 but over an area extending to considerable distances inland4 ,the adoption of this remedy only became possible1 however1 with a provision of adequate rail facilities1 and even then many years were to elapse before an efficient system of railway ambulance transport was finally evolved4 ,the objects which the use of the railway in these directions was to attain were alike humanitarian and strategical4 ,to the sick and wounded among the troops1 prompt removal and widespread distribution among hospitals in the interior meant 7#a7 that they avoided the risks to which they would have been subjected in the aforesaid overcrowded and pestilential hospitals near the fighting line1 where slight injuries might readily develop dangerous symptoms1 and contagious disease complete the conditions leading to a fatal issue2 7#b7 that1 apart from these considerations1 it would be possible to give them a greater degree of individual attention if they were distributed among a large number of hospitals away from the scene of the fighting2 7#c7 that more conservative methods of surgery became practicable when operations of a kind not to be attempted either on the battle-field or in temporary hospitals 7from which the inmates might have to be suddenly removed1 owing to some change in the strategical position7 could be delayed until the sufferer's arrival at some hospital in the interior1 where better appliances and better facilities would be available1 and where1 after the operation1 the patient would be able to remain undisturbed until he was cured2 7#d7 that these improved conditions might more especially permit of the avoidance of amputations otherwise imperatively necessary2 and 7#e7 that1 on the whole1 the wounded soldier was afforded a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and of saving both life and limb than would be possible if railways were not available4 ,to the army in the field the innovation meant that with the speedy removal of the sick and wounded it would be relieved of the great source of embarrassment caused by the presence and dependence upon it of so many inefficients2#af dept and intermediate hospitals could be reduced to the smallest proportions1 and would thus occasion less inconvenience if1 owing to a retreat or a change in the strategical position1 they were brought within the sphere of military operations2 with the delegation of so many of the sick and wounded to the care of civil practitioners in the interior1 fewer of the divisional1 brigade and regimental medical officers would require to be detached from the marching column2 a smaller supplementary medical staff would suffice2 a considerable reduction could be effected in the stocks of ambulance supplies kept on hand at the front2 while important strategical advantages would be gained through 7#a7 the greater freedom of movement which the army would secure2 7#b7 the decreased risk of the number of efficients being reduced through the outbreak of epidemics2 and 7#c7 the prospect of a large proportion of the sick and wounded being enabled to rejoin the fighting force on their making a speedy recovery from their illness or their wounds4 ,the earliest occasion on which the railway was made use of for the conveyance of sick and wounded from a scene of actual hostilities to the rear was on the occasion of the ,crimean ,war1 when the little military line between ,balaklava and the camp before ,sebastopol1 of which an account will be given in ,chapter ,,xv1 was so employed4 ,the facilities afforded were1 however1 of the most primitive character4 ,only the wagons used for the transport of supplies to the front--wagons1 that is to say1 little better than those known as contractors' trucks--were available1 and there were no means of adapting them to the conveyance of sufferers who could not be moved otherwise than in a recumbent position4 ,sitting-up cases could1 therefore1 alone be carried2 but what was to develop into a revolution in the conditions of warfare was thus introduced1 all the same4 ,in the ,italian war of #ahei both the ,french and the ,austrians made use of the railways for the withdrawal of their sick and wounded1 and1 in his ,souvenir de ,solferino1 ,jean ,henri ,dumant1 the ,father of the ,red ,cross ,movement1 speaks of the transportation of wounded from ,brescia to ,milan by train to the extent of about #a1jjj a night4 ,no arrangements for their comfort on the journey had been made in advance1 and the changes in the military situation were so rapid1 when hostilities broke out1 that no special facilities could be provided then4 ,all that was done was to lay down straw on the floor of the goods or cattle trucks used for the conveyance of some of the more serious cases4 ,the remainder travelled in ordinary third-class carriages1 and their sufferings on the journey1 before they reached the long and narrow sheds put up along the railway lines at ,milan or elsewhere to serve as temporary hospitals1 must often have been very great4 ,they may1 nevertheless1 have escaped the fate of those who died1 not from their wounds1 but from the fevers quickly generated in the overcrowded hospitals at the front1 where there was1 besides1 a general deficiency of ambulance requirements of all kinds4 ,the good resulting from the removal by train is1 indeed1 said to have been immense4 ,these experiences in the campaign of #ahei led to a recommendation being made in the following year by a ,german medical authority1 ,dr4 ,e4 ,gurlt1#ag that railway vehicles should be specially prepared for the conveyance of the sick and wounded in time of war4 ,the plan which he himself suggested for adoption was the placing of the sufferers in hammocks suspended from hooks driven into the roof of the goods van or carriage employed1 mattresses being first put on the hammocks1 when necessary4 ,by this means1 he suggested1 the sufferers would travel much more comfortably than when seated in the ordinary passenger carriages1 or when lying on straw in the goods wagons or cattle trucks4 ,dr4 ,gurlt's pamphlet served the good purpose of drawing much attention to the subject1 and his proposals were duly subjected to the test of experiment4 ,they failed1 however1 on two grounds1--7#a7 because the roofs of the goods vans1 designed for shelter only1 were not sufficiently strong to bear the weight of a number of men carried in the way suggested2 and 7#b7 because the motion of the train caused the hammocks to come into frequent contact with the sides of the wagon1 to the serious discomfort of the occupants4 ,in ,november of the same year 7#ahfj7 the ,prussian ,war ,minister1 von ,roon1 appointed a ,commission to enquire into the whole subject of the care of the sick and wounded in time of war1 and the question of transport by rail was among the various matters considered4 ,as a result of these investigations1 the ,minister issued1 on ,july #a1 #ahfa1 an order to the effect that in future the less seriously wounded should travel in ordinary first1 second or third-class carriages1 according to the degree of comfort they required1 care being taken to let them have corner seats2 while for those who were seriously ill1 or badly wounded1 there were to be provided sacks of straw having three canvas loops on each side for the insertion of poles by means of which the sacks and the sufferers lying upon them could be readily lifted in or out of the goods wagons set apart for their conveyance4 ,in these wagons they were to be placed on the floor in such a way that each wagon would accommodate either seven or eight4 ,in the event of a deficiency of sacks1 loose straw was to be used instead4 ,the door on one side of the truck was to be left open for ventilation4 ,a doctor and attendants were to accompany each train1 and they were to have a supply of bandages1 medicines and appliances4 ,of the last-mentioned a list of five articles was appended as obligatory4 ,the medical officer was to visit the wagons during the stoppages1 and the attendants on duty in the wagons were to carry flags so that1 when necessary1 they could signal both for the train to pull up and for the doctor to come to the sufferers4 ,this was as far as ,prussia had got by #ahfa1 when the arrangements stated were regarded as quite sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation4 ,real progress was to come1 rather1 from the other side of the ,atlantic4 ,in the early days of the ,war of ,secession 7#ahfa-fe7 the arrangements for the conveyance by rail of the sick and wounded from the battle-fields of the ,eastern ,states to the hospitals in the large cities were still distinctly primitive4 ,those who could sit up in the ordinary cars were conveyed in them4 ,those who could not sit up1 or would be injured by so doing1 were carried to the railway1 by hand1 on the mattresses or stretchers they had occupied in the hospitals to which they had first been taken4 ,at the station the mattresses were placed on thick layers of straw or hay strewn over the floors of the freight cars in which supplies had been brought to the front4 ,large window spaces were cut in the sides or ends of the cars to provide for ventilation4 ,on some occasions1 when hay or straw was not available1 pine boughs or leaves were used instead4 ,as only the floor space was occupied no more than about ten patients could be carried comfortably in each car1 though as many as twenty were occasionally crowded in4 ,the wide doors of the box cars readily permitted of the beds being lifted in or out4 ,medical officers1 with supplies1 accompanied each train4 ,on arrival at ,new ,york1 ,washington1 ,philadelphia1 ,harrisburg1 or other destination1 the sufferers were taken out and carried1 still on the same mattresses or stretchers1 to the hospitals there4 ,large numbers of sick or wounded were conveyed by rail under one or other of these conditions1 and the work was done with great expedition4 ,between the morning of ,june #ab and the evening of ,june #ad1 #ahfc1 over #i1jjj wounded1 victims of the ,federal disaster at ,chancellorsville1 were taken by the single-track ,aquia ,creek railroad from ,aquia ,creek to ,washington4 ,many even of the severely wounded declared they had suffered no inconvenience from the journey4 ,after the battle of ,gettysburg1 ,july #a-c1 #ahfc1 more than #ae1jjj wounded had been sent by rail from the field hospitals to ,baltimore1 ,new ,york1 ,harrisburg or ,philadelphia by ,july #bb4 ,an even more rapid distribution was effected after the battles of the ,wilderness and ,spottsylvania when1 with a few exceptions1 the transfer to the hospitals in the cities mentioned was effected in the course of a few days4 ,following on the battle of ,olustree 7,february #bj1 #ahfd71 the serious cases were removed on the ,mobile ,railway by freight cars bedded with pine boughs1 palmetto leaves and a small quantity of straw1 each patient having a blanket1 in addition4 ,as an improvement on these methods of transport1 the plan was adopted of fixing rows of upright wooden posts1 connecting floor and ceiling1 on each side of a car as supports for two or three tiers of rough wooden bunks1 a central gangway through the car being left4 ,in this way the available space in the car was much better utilised than with the straw-on-floor system4 ,next1 in place of the bunks1 came an arrangement by which the stretchers whereon the patients lay could be securely lashed to the uprights2 while this was followed1 in turn1 by the insertion of wooden pegs into the uprights and the placing on them of large and strong india-rubber rings into which the handles of the stretchers could readily be slipped1 and so suspended4 ,the first car so arranged came into use in ,march1 #ahfc4 ,meanwhile the ,philadelphia ,railroad ,company had1 at the end of #ahfb1 fitted up an ambulance car on the principle of a sleeping car1 but so planned that the stretchers on which the sufferers lay could be made to slide in or out of the wooden supports4 ,this particular car was capable of accommodating fifty-one patients1 in addition to a seat at each end for an attendant4 ,other innovations introduced on the car were 7#a7 a stove at which soups could be warmed or tea made2 7#b7 a water tank1 and 7#c7 a locker4 ,what the introducers of these improvements mainly prided themselves upon was the fact that the patient could remain1 throughout the entire journey from field hospital to destination1 on the stretcher he had been placed on at the start4 ,the adoption of this principle necessitated1 however1 uniformity in the dimensions of the stretchers in order that these could always be accommodated on the ambulance-car fittings4 ,the next important development was reached when the ambulance car1 run in connection with ordinary trains1 and used for exceptionally severe cases1 was succeeded by the ambulance train4 ,here came further innovations1 the nine or ten ward-cars1 of which such a train mainly consisted in the ,eastern ,states1 being supplemented by others fitted up as dispensary and store-room1 kitchen1 and quarters for surgeon1 attendants1 and staff of train1 besides carrying all necessary appliances and provisions for the journey4 ,what was now specially aimed at was to make the train as close an approach to an actual hospital on wheels as circumstances would permit4 ,at present1 wrote the ,medical ,director of the ,department of ,washington1 the sick and wounded are transferred in cars ill-adapted for the purpose and with difficulty spared from the other pressing demands2 and lives are lost on the route not infrequently which1 in all probability1 might be saved by a more comfortable and easy method of transportation4 ,the train he caused to be constructed consisted of ten ward-cars1 one car for the surgeon and attendants1 one as a dispensary and store-room1 and one as a kitchen1 etc4 ,the ward-cars1 arranged on an improved principle1 each accommodated thirty recumbent and twenty or thirty seated patients4 ,the train was to run regularly on the ,orange and ,alexandria ,railroad between the theatre of war and the base hospitals at ,alexandria and ,washington4 ,it was either to supplement or to supersede the freight cars with their bedding of straw1 hay or leaves4 ,if only from the point of view of the inadequate supply of rolling stock1 a car fitted up to accommodate fifty or sixty patients offered an obvious advantage1 in the speedy removal and distribution of sick and wounded1 over a car1 without fittings1 in which the floor space alone could be utilised4 ,several complete trains of the type stated were soon running on the ,orange and ,alexandria ,railroad1 within the ,union lines1 and the hospital train thus became an established institution in modern warfare4 ,it was1 however1 in connection with the chief army in the ,west1 the ,army of the ,cumberland1 operating under ,general ,george ,h4 ,thomas1 that the useful purposes which could be served by hospital trains became most conspicuous4 ,the need for them in the ,west was even greater than in the ,east1 because the distances to be covered were greater and lay1 also1 to a considerable extent1 in enemy country4 ,in the fall of #ahfc and the winter of #ahfd1 as narrated in the ,medical and ,surgical ,history of the ,war of the ,rebellion1 the chief army of the ,west was concentrated principally along the line of railroads leading from ,nashville1 ,tennessee1 to the ,south-west1 vi ,chattanooga1 ,tenn41 and onwards towards ,atlanta1 ,georgia4 ,at the outset the sick and wounded who could travel in ordinary passenger cars to points in the ,north were so taken4 ,severe cases had to remain in the nearest available hospital dept4 ,in addition to the discomfort suffered by the former in having to travel in cars not suited to invalids1 they were liable to frequent and prolonged delays on the single-track lines by reason of the constant passing of supply trains proceeding to the front2 and not unfrequently the detentions were at points where nothing could be obtained for feeding the sufferers or making them comfortable1 while even if rations could be drawn the train afforded no means of cooking them4 ,so it was resolved to have a train which would be the equivalent of an ambulating1 self-contained hospital1 capable of carrying both recumbent and sitting-up patients and supplying all their wants on the journey4 ,on ,august #aa1 #ahfc1 instructions were sent from the ,assistant-,surgeon-,general's ,office to the ,medical ,officer of the ,army of the ,cumberland directing him to take immediate measures to fit up a special train for hospital purposes1 with every possible comfort1 to run between ,nashville1 ,ten41 and ,louisville1 ,ken4 ,general ,thomas1 in turn1 accorded the fullest authority to the ,medical ,officer to select for the purpose the best locomotives and the best cars to be found among the railway rolling stock1 and to have new cars fitted up whenever necessary4 ,he further directed that the most experienced drivers1 conductors and other necessary railway employs should be selected for the conduct of the hospital-train service4 ,three of these trains were ready by the spring of #ahfd1 and they ran regularly--each taking a section of the journey--between ,atlanta and ,louisville1 a distance of #dgb miles4 ,they consisted1 apparently1 in part of specially-built and in part of adapted rolling stock1 the large open ,american passenger cars1 with their greater freedom from internal fittings than ordinary ,european railway carriages1 lending themselves specially to the purpose4 ,in the converted passenger cars the carrying of the stretchers through the end doors was avoided by removing two windows and the panelling underneath them from the side of the car1 and making an opening #f ft4 in width which could be closed by a sliding door4 ,each train provided five ward-cars 7converted passenger cars7 for lying-down patients2 a surgeon's car 7a passenger car from which the seats had been removed1 with partitions and fittings for the accommodation of the doctor and his helpers72 a dispensary car 7in which an ample supply of medicines1 instruments and appliances was carried72 an ordinary passenger car for sitting-up patients or convalescents2 a kitchen car 7divided into kitchen1 dining-room and store-room72 and a conductor's car4 ,the kitchen car was supplied with a small cooking range1 boilers1 and other requisites for the feeding of from #age to #bjj patients4 ,the cars were warmed and lighted in winter1 and special attention was paid to ventilation1 so that ,dr4 ,f4 ,l4 ,town1 of the ,united ,states ,army1 was able to report of them3--,in visiting these hospital trains1 the air is found sweet and pure1 the wards are neat and inviting2 and it may unhesitatingly be said that men on hospital trains are often as comfortable and better fed and attended than in many permanent hospitals4 ,the trains had distinguishing signals which were recognised by the ,confederates1 and none of them were ever fired on or molested in any way4 ,one1 at least1 of the trains was despatched daily from the vicinity of the field hospitals4 ,the services rendered by them during the last eighteen months of the war were of the greatest value4 ,it has been said1 indeed1 that the combined effect of all the provision made for the care of the sick and wounded and their speedy recovery--including therein1 as one of the most important items1 their prompt removal and distribution by rail--was to ensure for the ,federals the retention of a force equal in itself to an army of #ajj1jjj men4 ,no single fact could show more conclusively the strategical as well as the humanitarian value of railway ambulance transport4 ,these details as to what was accomplished in the ,american ,civil ,war are the more deserving of record because they show that the evolution of the hospital on wheels1 from the initial conditions of a bedding of straw on the floor of a railway goods wagon1 was really carried out1 step by step1 in all its essential details1 in the ,united ,states4 ,the hospital train was thus not an ,english invention1 as is widely assumed to be the case2 though much was to be done here to improve its construction1 equipment and organisation4 ,whilst ,america had been gaining all this very practical experience1 the ,danish ,war of #ahfd had given ,prussia the opportunity of testing the system approved by her in #ahfa for the conveyance of the less severely wounded in ordinary passenger carriages and of the seriously wounded on sacks of straw laid on the floor of goods wagons4 ,the results were found so unsatisfactory that on the conclusion of hostilities a fresh series of investigations and experiments was begun1 and matters were still at this stage when war broke out between ,prussia and ,austria4 ,the conditions in regard to the care of the sick and wounded in the campaign of #ahff were deplorably defective4 ,not only1 according to ,dr4 ,t4 ,w4 ,evans#ah--;an ,american medical man1 settled in ,paris1 who visited the battle-field and assisted in the work of relief--was there no advance on what had been done in the ,united ,states1 but the ,american example was in no way followed1 the combatants having made no attempt whatever to profit from her experience4 ,after the battle of ,sadowa1 thousands of wounded were left on the battle-field1 and many remained there three days and three nights before they could be removed in the carts and wagons which were alone available for the purpose4 ,within five days every village in a radius of four leagues was crowded with wounded4 ,those taken to ,dresden and ,prague in ordinary passenger carriages or goods vans were detained for days on the journey owing to the congestion of traffic on the lines4 ,some of them1 also1 were in the trains for two days before their wounds were dressed4 ,then the use of straw1 depended on by the ,austrians1 was found to be unsatisfactory4 ,it failed to afford the sufferers a sufficient protection against the jolting of the wagons1 especially when they worked through it to the bare boards2 and even then there was not always sufficient straw available to meet requirements4 ,altogether1 it is declared1 the wounded suffered unheard-of tortures4 ,shortly after the conclusion of the war there was appointed in ,prussia a further ,commission of medical and military authorities to renew the investigation into the care and transport of sick and wounded4 ,the ,commission sat from ,march #ah to ,may #e1 #ahfg4 ,in the result it still favoured the use of sacks of straw1 with canvas loops1 as the simplest and most comfortable method to adopt for the rail transport of recumbent sufferers1 though it recommended that the sacks should be made with side pieces1 giving them the form of paillasses1 as this would afford a greater degree of support to those lying on them4 ,the ,american system of suspending stretchers in tiers by means of india-rubber rings depending from pegs let into wooden uprights was disapproved of1 partly because of the continuous swinging of the stretchers so carried1 and partly because of the assumed discomfort to one set of patients of having others just above them4 ,the report also recommended the adoption of the following principles3--7#a7 ,through communication between all the carriages employed in one and the same train for the conveyance of sick and wounded2 7#b7 provision1 for the severely wounded1 either of beds with springs or of litters suspended from the roof or the sides of the carriages2 and 7#c7 extra carriages for the accommodation of doctor1 nurses1 surgical appliances1 medical stores1 cooking utensils1 etc4 ,these principles were subjected to various tests1 and it was found that in ,germany the existing carriages which could best be adapted to the desired purpose were those belonging to the fourth-class1 inasmuch as they had no internal divisions or fittings1 travellers by them being expected either to stand during the journey or to sit on their luggage4 ,the only structural alteration necessary was the placing of the doors at the end of the carriages instead of at the sides1 so that1 on opening these end doors1 and letting down a small bridge to be provided for the purpose1 access could readily be obtained from one carriage to another4 ,instructions were accordingly given that all fourth-class carriages on the ,prussian railways should thenceforward have end doors--an arrangement which had1 in fact1 already been adopted in ,south ,germany4 ,steps were also taken in ,prussia to adapt goods vans and horse boxes for the conveyance of sick and wounded in the event of the number of fourth-class carriages not being sufficient to meet requirements4 ,the widespread interest which was being attracted throughout ,europe to the subject of the care of the sick and wounded in war led to a series of experimental trials being carried out at the ,paris ,international ,exhibition of #ahfg1 when1 with the help of a short line of railway laid down in the exhibition grounds and of a goods wagon supplied by the ,western of ,france ,railway ,company1 a number of different systems were tested4 ,on this occasion1 also1 a model of an ,american car fitted up with india-rubber rings for the handles of stretchers was shown4 ,at this time1 and for many years afterwards1 the ideal arrangement was considered1 on the ,continent of ,europe1 to be one under which railway vehicles sent to the front with troops1 supplies or munitions could be readily adapted for bringing back the sick and wounded on the return journey2 and alike in ,germany1 ,russia1 ,france1 ,austria and ,italy the respective merits of a great variety of internal fittings designed to adapt existing rolling stock1 whether passenger coaches1 luggage vans1 ,post ,office vans or goods wagons1 to the serving of these dual purposes formed the subject of much experiment and controversy4 ,rope cables across the roof of a goods wagon1 with dependent loops of rope for the reception of the stretcher handles 7as in the ,zavodovski method72 stretchers laid on springs on the floor1 suspended from the roof either by strong springs or by rope1 resting on brackets attached to the sides1 or partly resting and partly suspended2 and collapsible frames of various kinds1 each had their respective advocates4#ai ,the use and equipment of ambulance or hospital trains constituted1 also1 a regular subject of discussion at all the international congresses of ,red ,cross ,societies which have been held since #ahfi4 ,the experimental trials at the ,paris ,exhibition of #ahfg were followed by the appointment in ,prussia of still another ,commission of inquiry1 and1 acting on the recommendations of this body1 the ,prussian ,government adopted the ,grund system1 under which the stretchers whereon the recumbent sufferers lay in the goods wagons or fourth-class carriages were placed on poles resting in slots over the convexity of laminated springs having one end screwed into the floor while the other1 and free1 end was provided with a roller designed to respond to the varying conditions of weight by sliding to and fro4 ,this was the system mainly used in the sanitary trains of the ,germans in the ,franco-,prussian ,war of #ahgj-ga4 ,it was criticised on the ground 7#a7 that the sick and wounded were still subject to the same jolts and concussions as ordinary seated passengers2 7#b7 that the number who could be carried per carriage or wagon was very small1 since it was still the case that only the floor space was utilised2 and 7#c7 that it was inconvenient for the doctor and the attendants to have to kneel down in order to attend to the patients4#bj ,apart from these disadvantages1 the ambulance service of the ,germans was well organised during the war4 ,of ambulance trains1 fitted up more or less as complete travelling hospitals1 twenty-one were run1 and the total number of sufferers removed by rail is said to have been over #hi1jjj4 ,owing to traffic congestions1 the transport to ,berlin of wounded from the army engaged in the investment of ,paris occupied no less a period than six days2 but these journeys were made in the special ambulance trains which1 provided in the later stages of the war1 ensured full provision for the feeding1 nursing and general comfort of the sufferers4 ,the fact that such journeys could be undertaken at all showed the great advance which had been made since the battle of ,sadowa1 when most of the wounded could be conveyed no further than to cottages and farm-houses in neighbouring villages4 ,in the ,south-,african ,war of #ahii-aijb the system favoured was that of having hospital trains either expressly built for the purpose or adapted from ordinary rolling stock and devoted exclusively1 for the duration of the war1 to the conveyance of the sick and wounded4 ,the ,princess ,christian hospital train1 specially constructed for the ,british ,central ,red ,cross ,committee by the ,birmingham ,railway ,carriage and ,wagon ,company ,ltd41 according to the plans of ,sir ,john ,furley and ,mr4 ,w4 ,j4 ,fieldhouse1 and sent out to ,south ,africa early in #aijj1 consisted of seven carriages1 each about #cf ft4 in length1 and #h ft4 in width1 for running on the ,cape standard gauge of #c;ft4 #f;in4 ,the carriages were arranged as follows3--,i41 divided into three compartments for 7a7 linen and other stores1 7b7 two nurses and 7c7 two invalid officers2 ,,ii41 also divided into three compartments1 for 7a7 two medical officers2 7b7 dining-room and 7c7 dispensary2 ,,iii41 ,,iv41 ,v41 and ,,vi41 ward-cars for invalids1 carried on beds arranged in three tiers2 ,,vii41 kitchen1 pantry1 and a compartment for the guard4 ,the train carried everything that was necessary for patients and staff even though they might be cut off from other sources of supply for a period of two or three weeks4 ,seven other hospital trains1 all adapted from existing rolling stock in ,cape ,colony or ,natal1 were made available for the transport of sick and wounded in the same war4 ,one of these1 ,no4 #d1 was arranged and equipped at the cost of the ,british ,central ,red ,cross ,committee1 under the direction of ,sir ,john ,furley1 then acting as the ,society's ,chief ,commissioner in ,south ,africa4 ,the arrangement of the other converted trains was carried out by the ,army ,medical ,service in ,south ,africa1 with the co-operation of the ,government ,railway officials in ,cape ,town and ,natal4 ,a number of specially-fitted carriages1 placed at convenient distances on the railways occupied by the ,british1 were made use of to pick up small parties of sick from the various posts along the lines1 such carriages being attached to passing trains for the conveyance of the sufferers to the nearest hospital4 ,many of them had a regular service up and down a particular stretch of railway4 ,some were provided with iron frames for the support of service stretchers1 and others were fitted up similarly to the ward-carriages of the converted hospital trains4 ,convalescents and sitting-up patients for whom no special accommodation was necessary travelled in such ordinary trains as might be available4 ,in effect1 there are four classes of trains by which1 under the conditions of to-day1 the sick and wounded may be despatched from the seat of war3--7#a7 ,permanent hospital trains1 specially constructed for the purpose2 7#b7 temporary hospital trains1 made up either entirely of converted ordinary vehicles or partly of converted and partly of specially-constructed rolling stock1 their use for this purpose continuing for the duration of the war2 7#c7 ambulance trains improvised at railhead out of rolling stock bringing troops1 supplies and stores to the front1 the internal fittings for lying-down cases being of such a kind that they can be readily fixed or dismantled2 and 7#d7 ordinary passenger carriages for slightly wounded or convalescents4 ,the advantages conferred on armies from a strategical point of view1 under all these improved conditions1 are no less beyond dispute than the benefits conferred on the individual soldiers1 and if railways had done no more in regard to the conduct of warfare than ensure these dual results1 they would still have rendered a service of incalculable value4 ,while1 also1 their provision of an efficient ambulance transport system1 with its speedy removal of non-effectives1 has served the purposes of war1 it has1 in addition1 by its regard for the sick and wounded themselves1 further served to relieve warfare of some1 at least1 of its horrors4 ,,footnotes3 #af ,a saying attributed to ,napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier to a wounded one4 #ag ,ueber den ,transport ,schwerverwundeter und ,kranker im ,kriege1 nebst ,vorschlgen ber die ,benutzung der ,eisenbahnen dabei4 #cc pp4 ,berlin1 #ahfj4 #ah ,les ,institutions ,sanitaires pendant le ,conflit ,austro-,prussien-,italien4 ,par ,thomas ,w4 ,evans4 ,paris1 #ahfg4 #ai ,for ,a short consideration and comparison of the regulations for the transport of sick and wounded by rail1 as laid down in four of the leading ,continental armies 7the ,german1 ,french1 ,austrian and ,italian71 see a paper on ,continental ,regulations for the ,transport of ,sick and ,wounded by ,rail1 by ,surg4-,capt4 ,c4 ,h4 ,melville1 ,a4,m4,s41 ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,journal1 vol4 #db 7#ahih71 pp4 #efj-eid4 #bj ,in an article on ,military ,hospital ,trains2 their ,origin and ,progress1 in ,the ,railway ,gazette of ,december #d1 #aiad1 it is said3 ,the comparatively small loss of the ,germans by death from wounds in #ahgj was due solely to the fact that they entered upon the war with what were then considered wonderfully elaborate arrangements for removing the wounded4444 ,the trains were composed partly of first-class carriages1 for the less badly wounded1 and partly of covered goods wagons4444 ,in these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs4 ,each van would hold four or five men1 and a sister rode in the van4 ,one would not1 however1 consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five sufferers were accommodated in each goods van4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,preparation ,,in ,,peace ,,for ,,war ,the greater the experience gained of the application of rail-power in practice1 and the closer the study devoted to its possibilities1 in theory1 the more obvious it became that the fullest degree of advantage to be derived therefrom could only be assured as the result of preparation and organisation in peace2 and this conclusion appeared specially to apply to countries whose geographical and political conditions led them to regard it as expedient that they should always be ready to meet some great national emergency4 ,the ,federal ,government of the ,united ,states certainly did succeed1 in the early sixties1 in creating an excellent military rail-transport organisation after hostilities had broken out2 but the conditions of warfare to-day make it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use of railways for military purposes should1 as far as possible1 be planned1 perfected or provided for long in advance of any possible outbreak of hostilities4 ,among other considerations which strengthen this view are the following3-- ,i4 ,the increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to 7a7 the vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former days2 7b7 the supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling a ,commander-in-,chief to effect1 possibly1 an earlier concentration than the enemy1 and so obtain the power of initiative2 and 7c7 the magnitude of the supplies1 munitions and other necessaries wanted to meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field1 and only to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a more or less distant base4 ,,ii4 ,the complications1 confusion and possible chaos which may result if1 without prior preparation1 railway lines designed to serve ordinary transport purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing their resources to the utmost extreme4 ,,iii4 ,the further troubles that will assuredly arise if1 in the absence of efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible intermediaries1 railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities are left to deal with the possibly conflicting and impracticable orders of individual military officers themselves unfamiliar with the technicalities and limitations of railway working4 ,,iv4 ,the imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated system of forwarding military supplies1 etc41 in order both to avoid congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of those supplies in the right quantities1 at the right spot1 and at the right time4 ,v4 ,the need1 in view of the vital importance of the part that railways may play in war1 of having organised forces of railway troops and railway workers available1 together with stores of materials and appliances1 to carry out1 speedily and thoroughly1 all the work that may be necessary for the repair1 construction or destruction of railway lines4 ,in making the necessary preparations1 in time of peace1 to ensure the successful realisation of these and other purposes1 there is a vast amount of work that requires to be done4 ,in readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing1 on the order being given for mobilisation1 the military authorities and the railway authorities must needs have at their command the fullest information as to the physical conditions1 the resources and the transport capabilities of every line of railway in the country which1 directly or indirectly1 may be able to render useful service4 ,details as to double or single track2 gradients2 number of locomotives1 carriages1 wagons1 horse-boxes and other vehicles available2 and facilities afforded by stations in important centres as regards number and length of platforms and sidings1 water supply1 loading1 unloading or storage accommodation1 etc41 are all carefully compiled and kept up to date4 ,as regards rolling stock1 lines not likely to be called upon to carry any military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the supply of carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other railways4 ,by including all lines of railway in the collected data1 it will be known exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained if wanted4 ,the carrying capacity of the different types of carriages1 trucks1 etc41 is also noted4 ,if necessary1 arrangements will be made for the reduction of gradients1 the improvement of curves1 the construction of connecting links between different main lines1 the lengthening of station platforms1 or the provision of increased loading or unloading facilities4 ,on the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are made in regard to such matters as 7#a7 the number of vehicles required for a given number of men1 with horses1 guns1 munitions1 stores1 road vehicles1 etc41 so that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage and according as to whether the troops carried belong to the ,infantry1 ,cavalry or the ,artillery2 7#b7 the number of vehicles that can be made up into a train going by any one route2 7#c7 the length of time likely to be taken for the entraining and detraining respectively of a given unit2 7#d7 the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can follow one another on the same line2 7#e7 the speed of troop trains2 and 7#f7 the further intervals to be allowed in the arrival at one and the same station1 or centre1 of a number of trains starting from different points1 so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of consequent delays4 ,military time-tables1 corresponding to those in everyday use1 have next to be prepared1 showing exactly what trains must run from given stations1 at fixed hours1 by clearly defined routes1 to specified destinations as soon as the occasion arises4 ,the great aim kept in view in the compilation of these time-tables is1 not alone preparation in advance1 but the most complete utilisation possible of the available transport facilities of the country as a whole4 ,a selection must also be made in advance of the stations at which troops on long journeys can obtain food1 as well as of the stations to be used as depts for stores and supplies1 all the necessary arrangements being provided for4 ,after the initial great strain on the railway resources involved in mobilisation and concentration1 there will still be an enormous amount of transport to be done during the campaign4 ,in the one direction there will be a constant despatch of reinforcements1 provisions1 clothing1 munitions and supplies or stores to the front2 in the other direction there will be a steady flow of sick and wounded1 of prisoners of war1 and of materiel not wanted at the front1 followed by the final return home of the troops at the end of the campaign4 ,at each important point along the lines of communication where special services in connection with the rail transport1 in either direction1 are to be rendered1 there must be organisation of such kind as will ensure that whatever is necessary shall be done promptly and efficiently under the control of persons of recognised authority and responsibility1 and without any of the friction that would1 inevitably1 lead to delays1 traffic blocks and other complications4 ,nor can the same system of organisation apply to the whole line of communication1 from the base to the limit of the rail service at the front4 ,a point will be reached therein where the control1 if not the actual operation1 of the railway lines must needs be transferred from the civil to the military authorities1 rendering necessary a scheme of supervision and working different from that which can be followed on the sections not within the actual theatre of war4 ,then1 if the army should be compelled to retreat before the enemy1 there should be available a sufficiency of forces skilled in the art of rapidly and effectively destroying lines1 bridges1 viaducts1 tunnels1 or other railway property1 with a view to retarding the enemy's movements until1 it may be1 reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient number to check his further progress4 ,if1 alternatively1 the army should advance into the enemy's country1 there must again be a provision of ,railway ,troops fully qualified by previous training and experience both to repair quickly the demolitions or the damage which the enemy will have carried out on his own lines and to construct hastily such new lines--light railways or otherwise--as the circumstances of the moment require4 ,these things done1 and still further advance being made into the invaded territory1 the need will also arise for a staff capable of operating1 under war conditions1 the lines of which possession has been taken1 in order that communications with the advanced front and the forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be maintained4 ,all these and many other things1 besides1 must needs be thought out and prepared for in time of peace1 long in advance of any probable or even any possible war4 ,they are1 in fact1 made the subject of exhaustive and continuous study alike by military officers specially entrusted with the task and by railway managers commanding all the technical knowledge requisite for making arrangements calculated to ensure the prompt and efficient satisfaction of all such demands for military rail-transport as may1 with whatever urgency1 and under whatever conditions1 some day be put forward4 ,still more practical do the preparations in peace for war become when they include the construction of a network of strategical railways expressly designed to facilitate the mobilisation of troops1 their speedy concentration on the frontier1 or their movement from one point of attack to another at the theatre of war4 ,,chapter ,x ,,organisation ,,in ,,germany ,in no country in the world was the desirability of preparing in time of peace for military rail-transport in time of war recognised earlier than in ,germany4 ,in none has the practice of such preparation in peace been followed up with greater study and persistence4 ,as shown in ,chapter ,i1 the military use of railways led to the proposal and discussion in ,germany of definite schemes for such use as early as #ahcc2 and it is not too much to say that1 from that date down to the outbreak of the ,world-,war in #aiad1 the whole subject had received there an ever-increasing degree of attention from the military authorities1 and1 also1 from a large body of writers as a question of the day in its relation more especially to ,german expansion4 ,one great mistake1 however1 made alike by historians1 by writers in the ,press1 and by popular tradition1 has been the attributing to ,germany of a far higher degree of credit in regard to the alleged perfection of her preparations for the ,franco-,prussian ,war of #ahgj-ga than she was really entitled to claim4 ,nor1 indeed1 has the fact been sufficiently recognised that the organisation eventually elaborated by ,germany for the efficient conduct of her rail-transport in war had been evolved from studies1 investigations1 trials1 experiments and tests 7in actual warfare or otherwise7 extending over a period of half a century or more1 during which time1 also1 there was issued a bewildering mass of laws1 rules and regulations1 each more or less modifying those that had gone before and adding still further to the elaborate1 if not the extremely complicated1 machinery laboriously built up as the result of the universally recognised genius of the ,german people for organisation4 ,the final great test of all this machinery was to be applied in #aiad4 ,here1 however1 it must suffice1 for present purposes1 to show how the machinery itself was created and the form it finally assumed4 ,down to #ahfa ,prussia had done no more1 in the way of organising military transport by rail1 than issue a series of ,ordinances dealing with the movement of large bodies of troops1 such ,ordinances being akin to those which all the leading countries of ,europe had either compiled or were engaged in compiling4 ,directly influenced by the developments of the ,civil ,war in ,america1 ,prussia took the further step1 in #ahfd1 of forming a ,railway ,section of her ,general ,staff4 ,this new body was actively employed in the furtherance of ,prussia's interests in the ,danish ,war of the same year1 when confirmatory evidence was given of the advantages to be derived from the use of rail transport for military movements1 journeys that would have taken the troops sixteen days by road being done within six days by rail4 ,the organisation thus applied on a comparatively small scale in #ahfd was further developed by ,prussia in the campaign of #ahff4 ,on that occasion mobilisation and concentration of the ,prussian troops were both carried out mainly by rail1 under the direction of an ,executive ,commission consisting of an officer of the ,general ,staff and a representative of the ,ministry of ,commerce4 ,this ,executive ,commission sat in ,berlin1 and was assisted by ,line ,commissions operating on the different railways utilised for military purposes4 ,movements of troops by rail were certainly effected in one-third of the time they would have taken by road1 while the ,prussians1 gaining a great advantage1 by the rapidity of such movements1 over ,austria1 routed her combined forces within seven days of crossing the frontier1 and dictated terms of peace to her within a month4 ,some serious faults were nevertheless developed1 even in the course of this very short campaign1 in ,prussia's rail-transport arrangements1 such being especially the case in regard to the forwarding of supplies4 ,these were rushed to the front in excess of immediate requirements1 the only concern of contractors or of officers at the base being to get them away1 while the railway companies--bound to accept goods for transport and delivery as ordered--dispatched them without regard for any possible deficiency in the unloading and storage arrangements at the other end4 ,the supplies1 forwarded in bulk1 followed as close up behind the troops as they could be taken2 but the provision made for unloading was inadequate1 the railway staffs disclaimed responsibility for the work1 and1 before long1 stations and sidings at the front were hopelessly blocked1 although elsewhere the shortage of wagons was so great that everything was at a standstill4 ,even when wagons had been unloaded1 they were too often left on the lines1 in long trains of empties1 instead of being sent where they were most needed4 ,each railway company disposed of its own rolling stock independently of the other companies1 adopting the view that it had no concern with what was happening elsewhere4 ,in some instances special trains were dispatched for the conveyance of a few hundred men or a few hundredweights of stores4 ,orders which should have gone direct from one responsible person to another went through a variety of channels with the result that serious delays and no less serious blunders occurred4 ,one ,east ,prussian ,battalion1 for instance1 was sent off by train in a direction exactly opposite to that which it should have taken4 ,all these and other troubles experienced were directly due to the absence of a central controlling body formed on such a basis that it could 7#a7 govern the rail-transport arrangements as a whole2 7#b7 supervise the forwarding of supplies2 7#c7 provide for a proper distribution1 and better utilisation1 of rolling stock2 7#d7 secure the prompt unloading and return of wagons1 and 7#e7 form a direct link between the military authorities and the railway managements and staffs4 ,immediately on the close of the war a mixed committee of ,staff officers and railway authorities was appointed1 under the supervision of von ,moltke1 to inquire what steps should be taken to organise the ,prussian military transport services on such a basis as would avoid a repetition of the faults already experienced1 and give a greater guarantee of efficiency on the occasion of the next war in which ,prussia might be engaged4 ,the desirability of making such preparations in time of peace doubtless appeared the greater in proportion as it became more and more evident that the trial of strength between ,prussia and ,austria would inevitably be followed by one between ,prussia and ,france4 ,the scheme elaborated by the committee in question took the form of a ,route ,service ,regulation which was approved by the ,king on ,may #b1 #ahfg1 and was1 also1 adopted by most of the other ,german ,states1 but was kept secret until the time came for applying it in practice1 as was done in the war of #ahgj-ga4 ,the basis of the scheme was the creation of a system of ,route ,inspection 7,etappen ,inspektion7 constituting a department of the ,general ,staff1 and designed-- ,i4 ,to watch over the replenishing of the operating army with men1 horses1 provisions1 ammunition1 and other military stores4 ,,ii4 ,to see to the removal into the interior of the country of the sick and wounded1 prisoners and trophies of war4 ,,iii4 ,with the assistance of the troops appointed for the purpose and the ,railway ,field ,corps1 to maintain the line of communication1 viz41 railway1 roads1 bridges1 telegraphs1 and postal arrangements2 to undertake the government of the hostile conquered provinces1 and other duties4 ,the preparation of the necessary plans for the attainment of these objects was entrusted to a ,central ,commission composed1 partly of officers connected with the ,general ,staff and the ,ministry of ,war1 and partly of prominent functionaries on the staffs of the ,ministry of ,commerce1 ,industry and ,public ,works 7then in supreme control over the railways71 and of the ,minister of the ,interior4 ,two of its members--a ,staff ,officer and a railway expert from the ,ministry of ,commerce--formed an ,executive ,commission and exercised a general supervision over the arrangements for military transports2 though on the removal of the ,great ,head-quarters from ,berlin1 the ,executive ,commission was to be succeeded by an ,auxiliary ,executive ,commission1 which would supervise the railways in the interior to be made use of for supplying the needs of the army4 ,in time of war the ,central ,commission was to be supplemented by ,line ,commissions formed by military officers and railway officers in combination1 and operating each in a leading centre of railway traffic4 ,their function it would be--with the assistance of ,district ,line ,commissions--not only to communicate to the line or lines of railway in their district such orders as might be necessary for the transport of troops1 guns1 ammunition1 horses1 and supplies1 but1 also1 to draw up or make the final arrangements in connection with the time-tables for the running of military trains2 to fix the direction in which the trains would go2 to decide at what stations the troops should stop for their meals or for their coffee2 and1 in fact1 to arrange everything connected with the said transport down to--as it appeared at the time--the smallest details4 ,in the forwarding of supplies1 each ,army ,corps was to have its own line of communication1 separate and distinct from that of the other ,army ,corps1 the object aimed at being that of avoiding the confusion and disorder which might result from the fact of several ,army ,corps using the same railway4 ,each of such lines of communication would start from some large railway station forming a ,point of ,concentration 7,etappenanfangsort7 for the collection and the dispatch therefrom of supplies for the ,army ,corps it would serve1 or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior of persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war4 ,along the line of railway1 at distances of about #ajj or #abe miles1 stations were to be selected which would serve as halting-places for the feeding of troops1 for the watering of horses1 for the reception of sick and wounded unable to continue their journey1 for the repair of rolling stock1 or for other such purposes4 ,the furthest point to be reached by rail from day to day would constitute ,railhead 7,etappenhauptort71 whence communication with the fighting line would be carried on by road1 being further facilitated by ,halting ,places 7,etappenrter7 en route4 ,the whole of this elaborate organisation--and here we come to the weakest point in the system--was to be under the supreme direction and control of an ,inspector-,general of ,communications--a sort of ,universal ,provider of every requirement the ,army could possibly need1 and responsible for the fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list of obligations among which the conduct of military rail-transport became simply one of many items4 ,the special merit of his position was assumed to be that of a superior authority who1 having the rank of ,commandant of a ,division1 and being in constant touch both with the ,commander-in-,chief of the ,army and with the ,war ,minister1 would be able to establish harmony in the operations of the different services and corps4 ,the principle itself was sound2 but1 in practice1 such a multiplicity of duties fell upon him1 or1 through him1 on his department1 that the break-down which actually occurred in the campaign of #ahgj-ga should have been foreseen in advance4 ,on the declaration of war the ,inspector-,general was to organise the stations for the feeding of the troops and horses proceeding to the front1 and was then himself to go to some station one or two marches from the fighting-line1 and fix1 each day1 the ,railhead ,station for the time being1 moving his own head-quarters as occasion might require4 ,from these head-quarters he was to exercise control and direction over a staff among whose duties--apart from those relating to railways or rail-transport--were the following3--,a centralisation of all the services through a ,chief of the ,staff giving a common impulse to them according to the instructions of the ,inspector-,general2 the forwarding of all troops to the front1 special precautions having to be taken that none were left behind2 distribution of the troops on arrival at their destination2 the forwarding of all supplies2 decision of all personal questions that might arise in connection with the troops2 the keeping of journals and registers1 the drawing up of reports1 and the carrying on of correspondence with the ,war ,minister and the ,chiefs of the army2 everything concerned with horses for the troops1 transport and distribution of prisoners of war1 and maintenance of good order among the troops2 assurance of an ample supply of ammunition for the artillery2 construction or provision of barracks1 huts1 or temporary hospitals2 maintenance of roads and telegraphs2 control of telegraphs and postal services at the seat of war2 supervision of road communications2 responsibility for the safe and regular delivery to the troops of all supplies and necessaries ordered to meet their requirements1 and establishment of hospitals1 infirmaries and convalescent homes1 with the arrangements for the removal thereto of the sick and wounded4 ,in regard to railway matters1 the ,inspector-,general was assisted by a ,director of ,field ,railways who1 in turn1 had many duties to perform4 ,acting in the name and with the authority of the ,inspector-,general1 he gave directions to the ,line ,commissions concerning the succession in which supplies were to be forwarded1 and1 in conjunction with the military and railway authorities1 drew up the time-tables for military transports1 submitting them1 however1 for the approval of his chief before they were put into operation4 ,the actual transport of troops and material--on the basis of principles the details of which would have been worked out in advance--was also to be conducted under the supervision of the ,director of ,railways4 ,in the event of any of the lines being destroyed by the enemy1 he was to undertake their reconstruction1 obtaining through the ,inspector-,general such helpers--whether soldiers or civilians--as he might require to supplement his own working staff in the accomplishment of the necessary work4 ,on the lines being restored1 the ,director was further to take control of their operation by means of troops and1 also1 of railway employs to be furnished by the ,minister of ,commerce on the requisition of the ,inspector-,general of ,communications4 ,such was the elaborate machinery which1 constructed alike in peace and in secret by the ,great ,general ,staff1 under the direct supervision of von ,moltke himself1 was to be tested in the inevitable war with ,france for which it had been designed4 ,according to popular belief1 ,germany's preparations for that war were so complete that she had only1 as it were1 to press a button1 or pull a lever1 in order to ensure the immediate and perfect working of all the plans she had made in advance4 ,whether or not this was really so in regard to her transport arrangements1 at least1 is a point to which attention may now be directed4 ,at the beginning of the war a ,route ,inspection1 organised on the basis already detailed1 and having its own ,inspector-,general of ,communications in charge of1 and responsible for1 the efficient working of the entire network of duties and obligations1 was called into being for each of the three ,german armies4 ,subsequently a fourth1 under the ,crown ,prince of ,saxony1 was added4 ,so far as the mobilisation of the ,german troops and their concentration on the frontier were concerned the plans worked1 on the whole1 remarkably well2 though even in this respect complete success was not attained4 ,there were1 in #ahgj1 nine lines of concentration available1 namely1 six for the ,northern and three for the ,southern ,army2 and between ,july #bd and ,august #c1 there were dispatched by these different routes #a1bjj trains1 conveying #cej1jjj men1 #hg1jjj horses1 and #h1djj guns or road vehicles4 ,yet the delays which occurred to some of these trains were alone sufficient to show that the machinery which had been elaborated was not working with perfect smoothness4 ,on1 for example1 the route known as line ,c1 the troops sent to ,giessen were--as told by ,balck1 in his ,taktik--eleven hours late in their arrival4 ,they then had their first warm food after a journey which had lasted twenty-one hours4 ,for the transport to ,homburg-in-der-,pfalz and ,neunkirchen forty hours had been allowed4 ,the first train did the journey in the time1 but the next one took ninety hours4 ,it was1 however1 in the forwarding of supplies and in the provisioning of the troops that the greatest difficulties were experienced2 and here there certainly appeared to be little real advance on the shortcomings of the campaign of #ahff1 notwithstanding all the preparations which had been made in the meantime4 ,comprehensive as it undoubtedly was1 the scheme prepared in time of peace included no adequate organisation for regulating the transport of supplies to the front and for ensuring alike their dispatch and their arrival in just such quantities1 and under just such conditions1 as would provide for the needs of the troops from day to day4 ,magazines had certainly been set up1 but not in sufficient number or always in the right place4 ,the system1 too1 of operating them was defective4 ,just as in #ahff1 so in #ahgj1 army officers1 contractors and railway companies1 all inspired by zeal for the welfare of the troops1 rushed off train-load after train-load of supplies to stations provided with an inadequate supply alike of sidings where the wagons could be accommodated and of labour for the work of unloading4 ,stores were handed to the railway staffs under the same conditions as in peace time1 the idea being1 apparently1 that if they were only dispatched as soon as possible they would be sure to get to the troops in want of them4 ,as for the conditions at the other end1 it not unfrequently happened that even though the supply-trains might go to stations where the facilities for unloading them were ample1 the ,commissariat or other officers in charge would follow the example already being set in ,france by regarding loaded railway trucks as convenient movable magazines which should not be unloaded until their contents were really wanted4 ,this was done regardless of the fact alike that the trucks thus kept standing on the lines impeded the traffic and that they were urgently wanted to meet the shortage of trucks elsewhere4 ,but for the stringent action taken to check it1 the evil due to this use of railway trucks for storage purposes would have assumed even graver proportions than was actually the case4 ,defective1 also1 as the ,german arrangements in this respect undoubtedly were1 they still did not attain to the same degree of inefficiency as was the case in ,france4 ,all the same1 the general result of these various conditions was that serious difficulties were experienced on the ,german no less than on the ,french railways4 ,no sooner had the concentration of the ,prussian troops been completed than provisions and stores were sent after them in such volume that a hopeless block1 extending to ,cologne in one direction and ,frankfort in the other1 was speedily produced on the lines along the left bank of the ,rhine1 while the feeding of the troops was brought to a temporary standstill4 ,the combined efforts of the ,prussian ,executive ,commission1 of the ,minister of ,commerce and of the ,line ,commissions failed for a time to overcome the conditions of chaos and confusion thus brought about1 and on ,august #aa1 #ahgj1 instructions had to be given that thenceforward supplies were to be forwarded only on the express order of the ,intendant-,general or of an ,inspector-,general of ,communications4 ,yet on ,september #e there were standing1 on five different lines1 a total of no fewer than #b1cbb loaded wagons1 containing #af1hcj tons of provisions for the ,second ,army1 or sufficient to keep it supplied for a period of twenty-six days4 ,such blocks on the ,german lines--though not always on so great a scale--were of frequent occurrence throughout the war4 ,trouble arose1 also1 in getting provisions from the railway to the troops by reason either of the inadequate number of road vehicles or because of the use of these for the conveyance of ammunition or for other purposes1 instead4 ,thus the ,inspector-,general of the ,first ,army started with #b1jjj road vehicles2 but on ,october #ag the total number still at his disposal was only twenty4 ,the position became still worse as the retreating ,french destroyed the lines behind them1 increasing the difficulties of the invaders in maintaining their communications with the ,fatherland4 ,while the food supplies for the ,german troops were thus blocking the railway lines--or1 alternatively1 were going bad on account either of the heated conditions of the closed wagons or of exposure to the weather after unloading--many of the ,german troops were suffering severe privations from lack of adequate nourishment2 and they would have suffered still more but for the provision-trains or stores of supplies seized from the ,french at ,metz1 ,forbach1 ,verdun1 ,dle1 ,le ,hans1 and elsewhere4 ,if1 indeed1 the ,french had only refrained from rushing their own supplies to the extreme front in excessive quantities1 or if they had destroyed those they could not remove in time1 the invaders would1 on various occasions1 have found themselves in a condition bordering on starvation4 ,even as it was1 they were often reduced to the necessity of dependence on their iron rations4 ,difficulty was especially experienced in feeding the army of occupation during the investment of ,paris4 ,the supplies received by train from ,germany were equal to scarcely one half of the actual requirements2 a resort to requisitions on the ,french territory occupied yielded inadequate results2 and the making of a regular daily money-allowance to officers and men1 so that they could purchase their own supplies in the open market or otherwise1 was1 at first1 far from satisfactory4 ,it was1 in fact1 only owing to the most strenuous effort on the part of the responsible officers1 both during the investment of ,paris and in earlier phases of the war1 that the ,german troops were often saved from actual want4#ba ,the main reasons for the defects and shortcomings thus developed in a scheme on which so much care and preparation had been bestowed were 7#a7 that1 while based on fundamentally sound principles1 the scheme in its actual application threw too great a strain on the department of the ,inspector-,general of ,communications1 which1 as we have seen1 was expected to look after1 not only rail transport1 but route marching1 telegraphs1 postal arrangements1 and a great variety of other things besides2 7#b7 that1 owing to the larger number of ,army ,corps1 it was no longer possible1 as had been done in #ahff1 to place a separate line of railway at the disposal of each1 so as to allow the said department to superintend the traffic on the basis of its own organisation2 and 7#c7 the absence of a central administration specially designed 7a7 to act as an intermediary and to ensure co-operation and mutual working between the various ,line ,commissions and1 also1 between the individuals and administrations1 both military and civil1 engaged in the conduct of rail-transport2 and 7b7 to control the traffic as a whole1 avoiding difficulties1 blocks and delays assuring a prompt and efficient distribution of supplies1 and guaranteeing the utilisation of rolling stock to the best advantage4 ,with a view to overcoming1 as far as possible1 the trouble due to the wide extent and the great variety of duties falling on the department of the ,inspector-,general of ,communications1 it was arranged1 during the latter part of the war1 to relieve that department of all responsibility for the railway services and to transfer the control and direction of these to the ,executive ,commission established at the ,royal ,head-quarters4 ,in this way it was hoped to utilise the rail-transport facilities to greater advantage1 to decrease the risk of collisions and delays1 and1 through a central organisation1 to distribute the transport demands more equally among the various railways concerned4 ,by means of these provisional modifications in the original scheme a better system of operation was obtained during the remainder of the war4 ,but the complete reorganisation that was really necessary was then impracticable1 and much friction in the working of the railway services was still experienced1 partly because this needful reorganisation could not be carried out1 and partly because of the conflicting orders coming from different authorities1 each of whom1 under the conditions then existing1 was perfectly within his right in giving them4#bb ,the difficulties due to the attempts to rush supplies in excessive quantities direct to the fighting-line1 or as near thereto as possible1 were also met1 to a certain extent1 during the course of the war1 by the setting up of additional railway magazines or depts where the forwarding of necessaries could be better controlled2 but it was not until the end of #ahgj that any approach to regularity in supplying the wants of the ,german forces was finally secured4 ,no sooner had the war come to an end than the work of remedying the defects which had been developed was taken in hand by the ,minister of ,war and the ,great ,general ,staff4 ,following the creation1 on ,october #a1 #ahga1 of a ,railway ,battalion on a permanent basis came1 on ,july #bj1 #ahgb1 a new ,regulation cancelling the one of ,may #b1 #ahfg1 which had been in operation during the war1 and substituting a new basis of organisation in its place4 ,while retaining the principle of a ,central ,commission in ,berlin1 the scheme of #ahgb relieved the route authorities of all responsibility for rail transport as well as for railway restoration and operation at the theatre of war1 transferring to a new military department all the duties falling under these heads1 with the further advantage that such department would be able to control the railways in time of war independently of the civil authorities1 and without the disadvantages hitherto resulting from the need to deal1 in regard to railway questions1 with nine separate ,ministries of ,commerce and about fifty different railway companies4 ,at the same time the principle of co-ordination was to be maintained by the appointment of an ,inspector-,general of ,railways and ,lines of ,communication who1 in each of these departments1 would control a far more efficient organisation than had previously existed1 and1 also1 as director-in-chief1 would constitute a central authority and an intermediary between the services concerned and the head of the ,great ,general ,staff1 under whose direction he would himself act4 ,another important feature of the new ,regulation was that a distinction was now drawn between 7#a7 railways on or near to the theatre of war which could not be worked by their ordinary staffs1 and must needs pass under military operation1 with a paramount military control2 and 7#b7 home or other railways1 in the rear of the fighting1 which might carry ordinary traffic--except so far as the lines were wanted for military purposes--and might still be worked by their own staffs1 but in the operation of which there should be a military element in time of war in order to facilitate the transport of troops and military necessaries4 ,various other ,regulations1 and notably a series in #ahgh and #ahhh1 followed that of #ahgb1 and eventually the whole scheme of organisation1 with its additions and modifications1 seeking to provide for every possible contingency1 became extremely complicated4 ,of the multifarious instructions1 provisions and orders which had been compiled1 some applied to peace only1 some to war only1 and some to both peace and war2 some to home railways and some to railways at the seat of war2 some to military men and some to railway men1 and so on4 ,as an elaborate piece of machinery the organisation was more comprehensive and more complete than ever2 but the fear arose that there had again been a failure to take the human element sufficiently into account4 ,of those in the military and the railway service who should have applied themselves in time of peace to a study of the elaborate and extremely involved provisions which would apply in time of war1 comparatively few1 it was found1 were disposed to devote themselves to so uninviting a task4 ,so there was issued1 on ,january #ah1 #ahii1 still another new ,regulation which repealed some of the earlier ones and aimed at amplifying1 condensing1 rearranging and facilitating reference to the provisions remaining in force1 in order that the whole scheme should be made clearer1 simpler and easier to grasp4 ,these results were fully attained1 and1 though still subject to the final test of a great war1 such as that which broke out in #aiad1 the ,german ,regulation of #ahii might certainly be considered a masterpiece of organisation as prepared in time of peace4 ,one especially useful purpose it served was that of defining clearly the duties1 responsibilities1 and spheres of action of all the authorities1 civil or military1 concerned in the control and operation of railways for military purposes4 ,the various ,regulations here in question have been supplemented from time to time by ,field ,service ,regulations1 the first series of which1 issued under date ,may #bc1 #ahhg1 was designed to take the place of the ,ordinances of #ahfa relating to the movement by rail of great bodies of troops4 ,these ,field ,service ,regulations of #ahhg constituted an epoch in the military history of ,germany4 ,they were regarded at the time as offering a resum of the most advanced ideas of ,moltke1 if not1 also1 as the crowning glory of military organisation in the reign of ,william ,i2 and they certainly exercised a powerful influence on ,german military literature4 ,they were1 further1 the starting-point of a prolonged series of similar ,regulations1 all amending1 modifying1 adding to1 or abbreviating their predecessors4 ,these changes led to the issue1 on ,january #a1 #aijj1 of a new edition1 based on the exhaustive studies of a ,commission of fourteen members2 and still later revisions resulted in the publication of a further series on ,march #bb1 #aijh4bc ,here1 then1 we get still further evidence of the keenness with which ,germany has followed up1 in times of peace1 her preparations for war1 while the ,field ,service ,regulations1 no less than the other ,regulations already detailed1 show the important place that military rail-transport holds in the view of those responsible in ,germany for the making of these arrangements4 ,railways1 it is declared in the ,regulations of #aijh1 exercise a decisive influence on the whole conduct of a war4 ,they are of the greatest importance for mobilising and concentrating the army1 and for maintaining it in a state of efficiency1 and they enable portions of it to be transported from one place to another during the operations4 ,what the ,field ,service ,regulations do is to present in concentrated and compact form the working details1 in respect to field service requirements1 of those other and fuller ,regulations which cover the whole ground of military transport in general4 ,taking these various sources of information1 the nature of the organisation that ,germany has thus effected as the result of so many years of study and experience may be summarised as follows3-- ,in time of peace the authorities entrusted with the task of ensuring1 by their preparations in advance1 the success of the whole system of military rail-transport include 7#a7 the ,minister of ,war2 the ,prussian ,chief of the ,general ,staff of the ,army2 the members of the ,railway ,section of the ,great ,general ,staff1 the ,line ,commissions and the ,station ,commissions2 authorities concerned in the forwarding1 transport and receiving of supplies1 and representatives of the ,commissariat department2 and 7#b7 the ,imperial ,chancellor1 the ,imperial ,railway ,bureau1 the ,imperial ,administration of ,posts and ,telegraphs1 and the various railway administrations4 ,the ,prussian ,minister of ,war is the chief representative of the interests of the ,army in all questions relating to the military use of the railways4 ,the ,prussian ,chief of the ,general ,staff of the ,army has under his orders1 in time of peace1 the military authorities concerned in rail-transport1 and gives them the necessary instructions4 ,he keeps in close relations with the ,imperial ,railway ,bureau1 and serves as intermediary between that ,bureau and the ,prussian ,minister of ,war4 ,it is he who gives the directions according to which the use of the railways in war-time is regulated1 and he prescribes all the preparations that are to be made in advance for the facilitating of such use4 ,on mobilisation1 he discharges all the duties appertaining to the office of the ,inspector-,general of ,railways and ,lines of ,communication until that officer has himself taken them in hand4 ,from that time he issues instructions according to circumstances4 ,the ,railway ,section of the ,great ,general ,staff is required1 among other duties1 to collect1 and have always available1 the fullest and most complete information as to the powers and facilities of the railways for the transport of troops1 etc4 ,to this end it keeps in constant communication with the railway administrations1 and1 also1 with the ,imperial ,railway ,bureau 7which centralises all questions affecting railway administration71 completing1 if necessary1 through investigations made by its own officers1 the information furnished annually by the ,bureau4 ,the ,railway ,section further takes charge of a wide range of details and preparations concerning military rail-transport in war-time4 ,on the outbreak of hostilities there is appointed for each theatre of war an ,inspector-,general of ,railways and ,lines of ,communication who1 receiving his orders from the ,chief of the ,general ,staff1 co-ordinates the two groups of services1 and ensures harmony in their joint working4 ,for the operation of the railways1 as applied to military purposes1 there is a ,director of ,field ,railways who1 acting under the ,inspector-,general1 controls the whole railway service4 ,through the ,line ,commissions or ,commandants subordinate to him he conveys to the railway authorities the necessary demands or instructions in respect to military transport1 and1 in concert with his superior officers1 he fixes the boundary between the lines to be operated on a peace footing and those that are to be subject to military working4 ,in the discharge of these and other duties he is assisted by a staff composed partly of military men and partly of railwaymen4 ,each officer concerned in the transport arrangements has a recognised deputy who can act for him in case of need4 ,of ,line ,commissions1 placed in charge1 for military purposes1 over the lines of railway in certain districts1 and becoming ,line ,commandants on the outbreak of war1 there were twenty under the revised ,regulation of #ahii1 the number being increased in #aijd to twenty-one4 ,the headquarters of these ,commissions are at such centres of traffic as ,berlin1 ,hanover1 ,erfurt1 ,dresden1 ,cologne1 ,altona1 ,breslau1 etc4 ,they serve as intermediaries between the higher military authorities and the railway administrations with which they are associated4 ,each ,line ,commission consists1 normally1 of a staff officer of the active army and a prominent railway functionary1 the former having a non-commissioned officer1 and the latter a railway official1 as secretary1 with such further assistance as may be needed4 ,subordinate1 in turn1 to the ,line ,commissions are the ,station ,commissions1 which1 receiving instructions from the former1 see to the carrying out of the necessary transport requirements either at their particular station or on the section of line of which they are placed in charge4 ,while full provision is thus made for the representation of the military element in the conduct of rail-transport in time of war1 with a view to ensuring its efficiency1 precautions are no less taken to avoid repetitions of earlier troubles due to questions of responsibility and control1 and1 more especially1 to the interference of military officers in the technical operation of the railway lines4 ,on this subject the ,field ,service ,regulations of #aijj stated 7paragraph #dif73-- ,railways can only fully accomplish their important and difficult task during war if no serious hindrances to their management are created by the conduct of the troops4 ,in the later ,regulations of #aijh it was said 7paragraph #ebg73-- ,the important rle which railways have to fulfil renders it incumbent on every commander to do all in his power to prevent any interference with the traffic due to delay1 etc41 on the part of the troops4 ,the railway staff and conducting officers are bound by the transport arrangements made by the railway authorities4 ,the conducting officer is responsible for the administration of the detachment of troops or consignment of stores under his charge4 ,it is his duty1 as regards himself and his charge1 to obey the instructions of the railway officials4 ,any interference with the service of the railways is forbidden4 ,at important stations ,railway ,staff ,officers are appointed who act as intermediaries between the conducting officers and the railway officials4 ,concerning ,lines of ,communication the ,field ,service ,regulations of #aijh say3-- ,a railway station1 to serve as a ,home ,base 7,etappenanfangsort7 will be assigned to every ,army ,corps4 ,from these home bases supplies are sent forward to ,collecting ,depts 7,sammelstationen71 which will be established at not too great a distance from the theatre of war4 ,in the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each ,army1 the situation of which will change according to the progress of the operations4 ,the ,army ,corps are connected with the ,field ,base by lines of communication roads 7,etappenstrassen71 and on these roads posts are formed about #ac miles apart4 ,as for the mass of working details also included in the various ,regulations1 these may well appear to provide in advance for every possible requirement in regard to military transport by rail1 from the movement of entire armies down to the supply of drinking water at stations and the taking of carrier pigeons in the troop trains4 ,,footnotes3 #ba ,in ,der ,kriegs-,train des deutschen ,heeres1 by ,e4 ,schffer1 7,berlin1 #ahhc71 the author1 dealing with the subject of transport in the war of #ahgj-ga1 and its effect on the feeding of the ,german ,army1 says of the situation in ,august-,september1 #ahgj3 ,immerhin wurden den ,truppen damals nicht unerhebliche ,entbehrungen auferlegt2 while concerning the position of the army of occupation in ,france he writes3 ,immerhin erforderte es umfassender ,massregeln seitens der ,intendantur1 die ,truppen vor wirklichem ,mangel zu schtzen1 namentlich da die ,requisitionen wenig ergiebig ausfielen1 und anfnglich auch der freihndige ,ankauf keinen rechten ,erfolg hatte4 #bb ,revue militaire de l'tranger1 #bg ,novembre1 #ahgb4 #bc ,field ,service ,regulations 7,felddienst ,ordnung1 #aijh7 of the ,german ,army4 ,translated by the ,general ,staff1 ,war ,office4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,railway ,,troops ,,in ,,germany ,the innovation introduced into modern warfare by the ,federal ,government of the ,united ,states1 in the organisation on a comprehensive scale of a ,construction ,corps for the combined purposes of repairing1 destroying and operating the railways on which so much might depend in the conduct of war1 attracted great attention in ,europe1 and more especially so in ,germany1 which was the first country on this side of the ,atlantic to follow the ,american precedent1 since adopted more or less completely by all nations possessed alike of railways and a standing army4 ,down to the time of the ,war of ,secession the need for such a corps had not been realised in ,europe2 but the advantages which might be gained therefrom had been shown in so unmistakable a form that when1 in #ahff1 there was the certainty of an early conflict between ,prussia and ,austria1 one of the first steps taken by the former country was to provide1 under a decree of ,may #f1 #ahff1 for a ,field ,railway ,section1 7,feldeisenbahnabteilung17 to be formed1 and designed to operate1 on a basis closely approximating to that which had applied to the corresponding ,american corps4 ,the special purposes to be served were defined as those of rapidly repairing lines of railway destroyed by the enemy and of destroying railways it might be thought expedient to prevent the enemy from using4 ,the section was to be under the orders of the ,general ,staff either of the ,army or of an ,army ,corps4 ,it was1 however1 not to come into being until its services were really required1 and it was then to act for the duration of the war only4 ,on the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corps were mobilised1 under ,cabinet ,orders of ,may #be and ,june #a1 one division being allotted to each of the three ,prussian armies operating in different parts of the theatre of war4 ,the composition of the corps was partly military and partly civil4 ,the military element was supplied by officers of the ,engineers 7one of whom acted as chief71 non-commissioned officers1 and a detachment of ,pioneers1 the last-mentioned being either carpenters or smiths4 ,the civil element comprised railway engineers1 thoroughly acquainted with the construction and repair of permanent way1 bridges1 etc42 assistant railway engineers1 performing the duties of clerks of the works2 head platelayers1 foremen1 locomotive drivers1 machinists 7for the repair of engines1 rolling-stock1 water pumps and water tanks71 and others4 ,the members of the civil section were chosen from the staff of the ,prussian ,state railways by the ,minister of ,commerce1 their services being placed by him at the disposal of the ,war ,minister4 ,each of the three divisions constituted a complete unit4 ,on the side of the ,austrians there was at that time no similar force available4 ,three years before there had been published in ,vienna a book1 by ,oberst4 von ,panz1 entitled ,das ,eisenbahnwesen1 vom militrischen ,standpuncte1 in which the author expressed the view that details on the following points1 among others1 concerning railways should be collected in time of peace and classified for reference in case of need3--,permanent way3 system and construction2 gauge and number of lines2 whether lines single or double4 ,stations3 size and construction2 which of them best fitted to serve as depts4 ,bridges3 underground works1 etc42 which of these could be the most easily destroyed1 or soonest repaired if destroyed1 and if prepared beforehand for destruction4 ,embankments3 size2 how made2 slope2 if provided with culverts and size of these4 ,cuttings3 length and depth2 slopes2 nature of ground2 whether much or little water1 and whether danger of landslips4 ,tunnels3 dimensions and construction2 if lined or cut in rock2 nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked4 ,large bridges and viaducts3 system of construction2 span of arches2 whether or not the piers are mined4#bd ,where men1 tools1 stores and materials can be obtained1 and to what extent4 ,these recommendations attracted much attention at the time4 ,they were quoted by ,h4 ,l4 ,westphalen in his book on ,die ,kriegfhrung unter ,benutzung der ,eisenbahnen 7,leipzig1 #ahfh71 of which a ,french translation was published under the title of ,de l',emploi des ,chemins de ,fer en ,temps de ,guerre 7,paris1 #ahfi72 yet when1 just before the outbreak of war with ,prussia1 the ,commander-in-,chief of the ,austrian ,northern ,army recommended that a ,construction ,corps should be formed1 the ,minister of ,war replied that the repair of railways was work which should be done by the railway companies concerned4 ,all the same1 the retarding of the ,prussian advance by interrupting the rail communications became an important phase of ,austrian tactics and was followed up with great activity4 ,bridges and viaducts were destroyed1 rails torn up1 sleepers burned1 points and turntables carried away1 tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless4 ,at one place 7between ,libenau and ,sichrau71 where the railway passed through a deep cutting1 the explosion of mines along the top of each bank detached great masses of rock which1 falling on the lines1 filled up the cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about #bej ft41 and could not be removed until1 by means of blasting1 they had been broken up into pieces sufficiently small to be carried away in ballast trucks4 ,the arrangements made by the ,prussians were1 however1 so complete as to permit1 in most instances1 of a speedy restoration4 ,even in the instance just mentioned1 fifty ,pioneers1 aided by twenty labourers1 had the line clear for traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was caused4 ,each division of the ,construction ,corps had at its disposal two locomotives and thirty closed wagons or open trucks1 provision thus being made for the transport of1 among other things1 six light covered carts 7for use on the roads in the country to be invaded1 horses being requisitioned therein as necessary72 tools2 supplies of blasting powder or gun-cotton2 and rails1 sleepers1 bolts1 etc41 for #bej yards of railway1 reserve materials for a further quarter of a mile of track being left at intermediate depts1 supplemented by an unlimited supply at the base of operations4 ,the construction trains also carried timber1 ropes1 nails1 scaffolding1 clamps1 etc41 for the prompt repair of small bridges4 ,materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored at convenient centres4 ,how the reconnaissance of a line which might have been subjected to the enemy's destructive tactics was carried out is thus told by ,captain ,c4 ,e4 ,webber1 ,r4,e41 in his ,notes on the ,campaign in ,bohemia in #ahff3-- ,the reconnaissance starts with1 and1 until interrupted1 keeps up with1 the advance guard1 the movement being covered by cavalry scouts on each side of the line4 ,the greater portion of the train in charge of the department1 with one engine in front and another behind1 advances slowly1 preceded at a distance of about #ejj paces by a trolley carrying one of the officers1 four men to work it1 and a bugler4 ,on arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in advancing towards it4 ,if in presence of the enemy1 the scouts give warning to the officer in the trolley1 who returns to the train and the whole retires4 ,the second engine can be detached from the rear to send messages or bring up fresh supplies4 ,but for the successes already gained in the same direction by the ,federals in the ,united ,states1 the speed with which repairs were carried out by the ,prussian ,construction ,corps--then so recently organised--would have been regarded as remarkable4 ,in various instances communication was restored within from one and a half to three days after the destruction even of important bridges4 ,as it happened1 however1 whilst the ,austrians had shown an excess of zeal in some directions by destroying bridges when the tearing up of the rails would have answered the same purpose1 the hesitation of the responsible ,austrian officer to fire the mines which had already been laid to the bridge over the ,elbe at ,lobkowitz was of great advantage to the ,prussians1 leaving them the use of the line from ,turnau to ,prague1 ,pardubitz and ,brnn between ,july #ah and ,july #bg1 on which latter date the bridge was at last destroyed by order of the governor of ,theresienstadt4 ,this particular bridge was one of exceptional strategical importance1 and1 according to ,captain ,webber1 the construction even of a temporary substitute--had the ,austrians blown up the bridge before the ,prussians could cross it--would have taken no less than six weeks4 ,the omission1 also1 of the ,austrians to remove or to destroy the railway rolling stock they left behind at ,prague1 on their retirement from that city1 conferred a further benefit on the ,prussians4 ,these examples would seem to show that promptness in carrying out destruction at a critical moment may be no less important on the one side than efficient organisation on the other for accomplishing the work of restoration in the shortest possible time4 ,while the ,construction ,corps had thus fully justified its existence1 the sudden creation of such a corps for the purposes of a particular war1 and for the period of the war only1 was considered inadequate for a country where a large standing ,army had to be maintained in readiness for action at any moment1 in case of need4 ,hence it was thought desirable that ,prussia should have a ,field ,railway ,section established on a permanent and well-organised footing4 ,there was the further reason for adopting this course because the ,pioneers1 composed almost exclusively of reservists1 had received no special training in railway work1 while the railway men themselves1 accustomed to building lines in a solid way for public use1 were at a disadvantage when called on to carry out1 with great rapidity1 and in a rough and ready manner1 work that was wanted only to serve the temporary purposes of the ,army with which they were associated4 ,it was found1 also1 that the corps1 comprising so large a civil element1 had escaped the supervision and control of the ,executive ,commission at ,berlin which had for its function the regulation of all matters concerning military rail-transport4 ,nor did the ,construction and ,destruction ,corps constitute1 as well1 an ,operation ,corps1 providing for the working of railways at the theatre of war1 and especially of railways taken from the enemy4 ,the ,prussians had1 indeed1 been able to command the services of ,austrian railwaymen in working the railways seized in that country2 but there was no certainty that the adoption of a like expedient would be possible in any future war4 ,by this time the whole subject of the destruction and restoration of railway lines as an important element in modern warfare was attracting attention among military authorities and writers in ,germany4 ,a translation of ,mc,callum's report was published1 and the issue was begun of what was to develop into a long series of technical papers1 pamphlets or books--such as1 for example1 ,wilhelm ,basson's ,die ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege1 nach den ,erfahrungen des letzten ,feldzuges 7,ratibor1 #ahfg7--;dealing with the art of rapidly destroying and restoring railways in time of war and the most effective measures to be adopted in the attainment of either end4 ,these various considerations and developments were1 no doubt1 the reason for the issuing1 on ,august #aj1 #ahfi1 of a ,prussian ,royal ,decree which created a permanent cadre of ,railway ,troops to be constituted of ,pioneers who were to undergo regular instruction in everything relating to the construction1 destruction and operation of railways4 ,a new ,battalion of ,pioneers was to be raised for the purpose1 and the whole scheme was to be carried into effect in the course of #ahga4 ,when1 in #ahgj1 the war with ,france broke out1 the preparations for the creation of this permanent corps were still proceeding2 but the ,prussians were1 nevertheless1 able to enter on the campaign with four sections of ,railway ,troops1 subsequently increased to six1 including one ,bavarian section4 ,each section comprised ,engineers1 ,pioneers1 railwaymen and auxiliary helpers1 all of whom wore a uniform having the letter ,e 7,eisenbahntruppen7 on the shoulder1 and carried rifles4 ,prussia1 in fact1 once more started1 as in #ahff1 with such advantage over her enemy as might result from her control of a ,railway ,construction ,corps4 ,at the outset ,france had no similar body1 and though1 during the progress of the war1 she hurriedly set about the creation of a ,construction ,corps of her own1 that corps did not do very much beyond collecting at ,metz and ,strasburg a great store of railway materials which was afterwards to fall into the hands of the ,prussians1 and assist them in their own operations4 ,notwithstanding the advantage thus gained1 the practical benefits secured by the ,germans1 although important in their effect on the final issue1 were far from being as great as the ,army leaders may have anticipated or desired4 ,the destruction work carried out by the ,french on their own railways1 on their retirement1 was much more serious than anything experienced in the ,prussian campaign in ,austria4 ,thus the works for the re-establishment of the ,paris-,strasburg line 7of primary importance to the ,germans for the siege of ,paris7 extended from ,september #ag to ,november #bb4 ,the ,french had blocked the tunnel of ,nanteuil by the explosion therein of six mines which brought down the walls and filled the western end of the tunnel with about #d1jjj square yards of sand4 ,attempts to clear away the obstruction were a failure1 owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the wet weather1 and eventually the ,construction ,corps built a loop line which avoided the tunnel1 and so restored communication4 ,the defence of some of the principal lines by fortresses also contributed to the difficulties of the invaders2 though1 on the other hand1 these difficulties would have been greater still if the ,french had always adopted the best and most scientific methods of interrupting rail communications1 as1 presumably1 they would have done if they had had the advantage of a well-organised corps prepared in advance for the work that required to be done4 ,at ,fontenoy-sur-,moselle1 between ,nancy and ,toul1 there was1 for example1 a bridge of seven arches1 effective destruction of which would have made a very serious check in the communications along the principal line between ,germany and ,paris2 but1 instead of blowing up the bridge in the middle1 the men entrusted with the work 7in ,january1 #ahga7 brought down two arches at the side of the bridge1 causing a break which the ,germans were able to fill in with stones and earth1 restoring communication in about seventeen days4 ,then1 although several of the tunnels in the ,vosges mountains were mined1 the mines had not been charged1 and before instructions to blow up the tunnels had been received by those awaiting them1 the ,germans were on the spot and took possession4 ,on the other hand the absence on the side of the ,french of an organised corps for destruction as well as construction did not prevent the carrying out of some very bold and highly successful work by parties of franc tireurs1 who showed alike their appreciation of the importance of rail communications and their skill in impeding them4 ,one especially striking feat in this direction was accomplished by a company known as the ,franc ,tireurs of the ,meuse4 ,learning that a ,prussian troop train was to pass through ,lanois 7on the line between ,reims and ,mons7 on ,october #bf1 #ahgj1 they resolved to effect its destruction4 ,how they operated is told by ,lieutenant ,fraser1 ,r4 ,e41#be who arrived on the spot shortly afterwards1 and heard the story from some of the men engaged on the work4 ,any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen4 ,hence a different course had to be adopted4 ,selecting a spot where the line ran along a #ab-;ft4 high embankment1 to which a well-wooded slope came down on one side1 the franc tireurs took up a pair of rails1 removed the sleepers1 cut a deep trench across the line1 laid some pieces of iron at the bottom of the trench1 placed on the iron a box containing thirty kilos 7#b qrs4 #aj lbs47 of powder1 and fixed into the lid of the box a ,french field shell in such a way that1 when the rail was replaced over the box1 the head of the fuse would be just below the lower flange of the rail4 ,in restoring the line again in order that there should be nothing to attract attention1 the franc tireurs omitted one sleeper so that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press the rail down on to the head of the fuse4 ,the party--some seventy-five strong--then withdrew to the shelter of the woods to await developments4 ,in due time the train of forty coaches approached at the ordinary speed1 the driver not suspecting any danger4 ,when the engine reached the spot where the torpedo had been placed1 an explosion occurred which tore up a mass of earth1 rails and sleepers1 threw the engine and several carriages down the embankment1 and wrecked the train4 ,those of the ,prussian troops who got clear from the wreckage were shot down by the franc tireurs under the protection of their cover4 ,the number of the enemy thus disposed of was said to be about #djj4 ,altogether the ,french1 in their efforts to impede the rail movements of the invader1 destroyed many miles of line1 together with no fewer than seventy-eight large bridges and tunnels1 apart from minor interruptions4 ,the repairs and reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great amount of labour on the ,prussian ,railway ,troops1 and much trouble arose from time to time on account1 not only of the inadequate supply of materials even for temporary constructions1 but1 also1 by reason of the shortcomings of the workers themselves4 ,the sections of ,railway ,troops had been so recently formed that the men were still without adequate training4 ,in #ahgj-ga1 as in #ahff1 military members and civilian members of the ,construction ,corps were alike unfamiliar with the special class of work called for in the repair or the rebuilding of railways under the emergency conditions of actual warfare4 ,this instruction had1 in fact1 to be completed at the theatre of war at a time when the ,corps should have been prepared to show the greatest efficiency4 ,difficulties arose1 also1 on the side of the ,germans in operating the #b1ejj miles of ,french railway lines of which they took possession4 ,there was1 in the first place1 a deficiency both of locomotives and of rolling stock4 ,so far as circumstances would permit1 the ,french1 as they retreated1 either took their railway rolling stock with them or destroyed it1 in order that it should not be used by the enemy4 ,attempts were made to meet the difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements of engines and wagons from ,germany2 but even then the organisation for controlling the use of rolling stock1 among other transport details1 was still so defective that commanders who wanted to ensure the movement of their own troops by rail did not hesitate to take possession of engines and carriages set aside for the regular services of the line4 ,there were1 in fact1 occasions when1 for this reason1 the regular services had to be stopped altogether4 ,in the next place troubles with the personnel were no less acute than those with the matriel4 ,in proportion as the ,germans advanced towards ,paris the bulk of the ,french population retired1 while threats and offers of liberal pay alike failed to secure from those who remained assistance either in repairing or in operating the lines of which the invaders had taken possession4 ,in these circumstances not only engines1 carriages and wagons1 but no fewer than #c1ejj railwaymen--in addition to the ,german ,railway ,troops already in ,france--had to be brought from ,germany4 ,yet even the resort to this expedient started a fresh lot of troubles4 ,the railwaymen so imported had been in the service of different ,german railway companies whose equipment and methods of operation varied considerably2 so that when the men were required to work together--and that1 also1 on the lines of a foreign country1 with the accompaniment of much laxity in discipline as well as of much mutual misunderstanding--a vast amount of friction arose4 ,all these experiences emphasised and strengthened the conclusion arrived at even before the campaign of #ahgj-ga--that the real efficiency of ,railway ,troops can only be obtained by organising them in time of peace in readiness for times of war4 ,such conclusion being now beyond all possible dispute1 action was taken by ,prussia with characteristic promptness4 ,in accordance with a ,royal ,order of ,may #ai1 #ahga1 there was added to the ,prussian ,army1 on ,october #a of the same year1 a ,railway ,battalion 7,eisenbahnbataillon71 the special purposes of which were 7#a7 to afford to those constituting it the means of obtaining1 in time of peace1 such technical training as would enable them to construct any railway works necessary in time of war1 to repair promptly any damage done to railways1 and to undertake the entire railway traffic along lines of communication2 7#b7 to procure1 or prepare1 in time of peace1 all plant1 materials1 tools1 etc41 likely to be required in time of war2 and 7#c7 to constitute the nucleus of all necessary railway formations in war4 ,the ,battalion was formed of non-commissioned officers and men of the now disbanded sections of ,railway ,troops who were still liable to military service1 supplemented by three-year volunteers and recruits from all parts of the territory subject to the ,prussian ,minister of ,war1 only those being accepted1 however1 whose previous occupations fitted them for one or other of the various grades of railway work4 ,the officers were obtained mainly1 though not exclusively1 from the ,engineers4 ,members of that corps1 together with others who were mechanical engineers by profession1 were accepted as one-year volunteers4 ,on a peace footing the ,battalion was composed of a ,staff and four ,companies1 each of #ajj or #abe men1 with a dept1 and provided with its own means of transport4 ,one of the ,companies consisted exclusively of platelayers and watchmen4 ,on mobilisation each ,company was to be enlarged into two ,construction ,companies and one ,traffic ,company1 giving a total1 on a war footing1 of eight ,construction and four ,traffic ,companies4 ,the ,corps also had a reserve division consisting of a ,staff1 two ,companies and a section of railway employs4 ,all officers having railway experience who had served in the war of #ahgj-ga were included in the reserve4 ,the training of the ,battalion was under the direction of the ,inspector-,general of the ,engineers ,corps4 ,it comprised 7#a7 theoretical and scientific instruction of the officers in all branches of railway construction1 repair and destruction1 coupled with the study of every branch of railway science likely to be of advantage in military transport1 while special importance was attached to a close and constant intercourse with the staffs of the various railways1 and 7#b7 practical experience of railway construction and operation4 ,this experience was afforded 7a7 on the ,battalion's practice grounds1 where instruction was more especially given in the art of rapidly destroying railway track2 7b7 through the employment of the men--subject to the continued maintenance among them of the principle of a military organisation--on many of the private as well as on the ,state railways in ,germany1 such employment including the repair of bridges1 the laying of track1 the enlargement of stations1 etc41 and 7c7 by the construction1 operation and management of a short line of railway which1 on completion1 was devoted to the public service4 ,the period of training was for either one or three years and the ,battalion was kept up to a normal standard of about #ejj men by a succession of recruits4 ,these recruits were generally men of a good type1 admission to the ,battalion being regarded with the greater favour inasmuch as the experience gained was found to be of advantage to the men in obtaining railway employment on their return to civil life4 ,in the giving of this practical instruction the purpose specially kept in view was that of anticipating as far as possible actual war conditions1 and providing for them accordingly4 ,thus in the laying of rails for any new line built by the ,railway ,troops great importance was attached to the speed with which the work could be done1 the records of the time taken being very closely watched4 ,to one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying all developments in railway science and operation at home or abroad and conveying information thereon to those under instruction4 ,a further important feature of the scheme included the publication of a series of textbooks on railway subjects regarded from a military standpoint4 ,a beginning was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails1 bridge materials1 etc41 for use as required4 ,in ,december1 #ahgb1 ,bavaria created a similar ,battalion1 comprising a single ,company attached to the #ast ,bavarian ,corps4 ,the constitution and the operations of this ,battalion followed closely the precedents established by ,prussia4 ,such was the importance attached by the highest military authorities in ,germany to the formation of these ,railway ,troops that the ,chief of the ,great ,general ,staff was their ,inspector-,general from the time of the first ,prussian ,battalion being created down to the year #ahii4 ,in ,december #cj1 #ahge1 came the conversion of the ,railway ,battalion into a ,railway ,regiment4 ,it was felt that the cadres of the former did not respond sufficiently to the needs of the military rail-transport situation1 and they were accordingly enlarged into a ,regiment of two ,battalions1 with a regimental ,staff of forty-eight1 and #ejb men in each ,battalion4 ,in #ahhg the ,prussian ,regiment was increased from two ,battalions to four1 and the ,bavarian ,battalion expanded to the extent of two companies in place of one4 ,in #ahij the ,prussian ,regiment further became a ,brigade of two ,regiments1 each of two ,battalions1 the number of units thus remaining the same as before2 though in #ahic the ,prussian ,brigade was augmented by two more ,battalions1 increasing its force to three ,regiments1 each of two ,battalions with four ,companies in each ,battalion1 or a total of twenty-four ,companies1 of which one was a ,wrtemberg ,company and two were ,saxon ,companies1 while the ,bavarian ,battalion acquired three ,companies in the place of two4 ,in #ahii ,prussia took a further new departure by grouping together1 as ,communication ,troops 7,verkerstrppen71 all the technical units concerned in the railway1 the telegraphic and the air-craft services4 ,this new arm was put under the control of an officer holding the rank of a ,general of ,division and receiving his orders direct from the ,emperor4 ,a change was also effected in regard to the ,berlin-,juterbog railway--a single-track line1 #gj km4 7#dd miles7 in length1 which1 originally constructed mainly by the ,railway ,troops1 was operated by them as a means of acquiring experience in railway working4 ,prior to the passing of the law of ,march #be1 #ahii1 troops for the working staff were supplied by the ,brigade1 and the frequent changes were a cause of some inconvenience4 ,under the new law a section constituted of three ,prussian ,companies and a ,saxon detachment1 with a ,lieutenant-,colonel as director1 was specially created for the operation of the line4 ,altogether the ,railway ,troops comprised a total of thirty-one ,companies1 having #ahj officers and #d1ejj non-commissioned officers and men2 but these figures were irrespective of carefully-compiled lists 7subjected to frequent revision7 of all reservists possessing railway experience and still liable for military service4 ,brigade1 ,battalions and ,companies thus formed only the cadres of a small army of men considered qualified to undertake railway work of one kind or another in time of war4 ,even in ,germany itself the need for having so large a body of ,railway ,troops was called into question some years ago1 on the ground1 partly1 that it was desirable to keep to the lowest practicable minimum the number of non-combatants closely associated with the ,army2 and1 partly1 because of the view--favoured by ,von der ,goltz1 in his ,kriegfhrung--that much of the construction work which the ,railway ,troops would carry out might be left to contractors1 without hampering the ,army with further bodies of new troops for special purposes4 ,to these suggestions it was replied1 in effect1 7#a7 that in any future war the movement of large bodies of troops would be directly associated with the provision and the maintenance of adequate railway facilities2 7#b7 that ,railway ,troops1 constituted in time of peace1 would alone be capable of ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines1 or the construction of new ones1 in time of war2 7#c7 that works of this kind1 done under great pressure1 and serving temporary purposes only1 would differ essentially from railway works undertaken in peace by ordinary contractors2 and 7#d7 that ,germany required a large body of ,railway ,troops on account of her geographical position1 inasmuch as she might have to face an enemy on either1 or both1 of two fronts--,france and ,russia2 while if1 in the event of a war with ,russia1 she should want to send her forces into that country by rail1 she would require to have a large body of ,railway ,troops available either for the conversion of the ,russian #e ft4 gauge into the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge of the ,german lines 7in order that the engines and rolling stock of the latter could be utilised on ,russian territory71 or for the construction of special military railways as substitutes for the ,russian lines4 ,whatever the merits of these respective arguments1 the fact remains that the ,railway ,troops of ,germany1 created under the circumstances and conditions here detailed1 have been maintained in steadily increasing numbers1 and1 also1 in constantly expanding efficiency thanks to what is1 in effect1 their ,school of ,railway ,instruction and to the great amount of practical work they have been called upon to do1 whether in the building of strategical lines or in other departments of railway construction1 destruction or working in which they could gain experience likely to be of advantage in time of war4 ,there was1 also1 according to ,m4 ,paul ,lanoir1 as related by him in his book on ,the ,german ,spy ,system1 a still further purpose that these ,army railwaymen might be called on to serve4 ,he tells how in #ahhj1 the chief of the system1 the notorious ,stieber1 conceived the idea of securing the appointment in every portion of the national railway system of ,france 7and more especially at important junctions or strategical centres7 of ,german spies who1 competent to act as railway workers1 would1 in the event of any future war between ,germany and ,france1 and on receiving the necessary instructions1 destroy or block the railway lines at those points in such a manner--as planned1 of course1 in advance--that great delay would occur in the mobilisation of the ,french troops owing to the traffic being paralysed for the time being2 the ,germans1 in the meantime1 rushing their own forces to the frontier4 ,the extremely important rle which would devolve on our railwaymen1 adds ,m4 ,lanoir1 at the moment of the declaration of war1 in fulfilling their functions as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant army1 was already thoroughly appreciated at this period4 ,submitted to ,prince ,bismarck1 ,stieber's scheme was approved by him1 and1 so far as the obtaining of appointments on the ,french railways by ,stieber's agents was concerned1 the plan had been quietly carried into effect by the end of #ahhc2 but a casual incident then led to the discovery of the conspiracy by ,m4 ,lanoir himself4 ,within a week1 as the result of his communications with ,general ,campenau1 ,minister of ,war1 the railway companies received a confidential circular requiring that they should call upon every foreigner employed by them in any capacity whatever to become naturalised without delay4 ,those who would not adopt this course were to be immediately dismissed4 ,the number of foreigners then in the employ of the railway companies was #a1fda1 and1 although #a1dei of them agreed to become naturalised1 there were #ahb ,germans who refused so to do4 ,these #ahb were at once discharged--the assumption being that they were the spies1 qualified to act as railway workers1 by whom the dislocation of traffic was to have been ensured whenever they might receive word to that effect4 ,,footnotes3 #bd ,captain ,a4 de ,formanoir states in his book1 ,des ,chemins de ,fer en ,temps de ,guerre 7,confrences militaires belges4 ,bruxelles1 #ahgj71 that in ,france and ,austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that they can be readily destroyed when the occasion arises4 #be ,account of a ,torpedo used for the ,destruction of a ,railway ,train on the #bfth of ,october1 #ahgj4 ,by ,lieut4 ,fraser1 ,r4,e4 ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,n4,s41 ,vol4 ,,xx4 ,woolwich1 #ahgb4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,france ,,and ,,the ,,war ,,of #ahgj-ga ,when ,france went to war with ,germany in #ahgj-ga1 her military rail-transport was still governed by regulations which1 adopted as far back as #ahea and #ahee1 related only to such matters of detail as the financial arrangements between the ,army and the railway companies1 the length of troop trains1 etc41 without making any provision for an organisation controlling the transport of large bodies of men in time of war4 ,it certainly had been under these regulations that the ,french troops were conveyed to ,italy when they took part in the campaign of #ahei2 but the defects then developed1 coupled with the further lessons taught by the ,austro-,prussian ,war of #ahff1 had shown the need for bringing these early ,french regulations into harmony with the conditions and requirements of modern warfare4 ,impressed by these considerations1 and realising the disadvantages and dangers of the position into which his country had drifted1 the ,french ,minister of ,war1 ,marshal ,niel1 appointed in ,march1 #ahfi1 a ,commission ,centrale des ,chemins de ,fer1 composed of representatives of the ,army1 the ,ministry of ,public ,works1 and the principal railway companies1 for the purpose not only of revising the existing regulations on military transports but of preparing a new one to take their place4 ,the ,commission held twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme on lines closely following those already adopted in ,germany and ,austria and based1 especially1 on the same principle of a co-ordination of the military with the railway technical element4 ,this provisional scheme was subjected to various tests and trials with a view to perfecting it before it was placed on a permanent basis4 ,but ,marshal ,niel died2 no new regulation was adopted2 the projected scheme was more or less forgotten2 time was against the early completion of the proposed experiments1 while political and military developments succeeded one another with such rapidity that1 on the outbreak of war in #ahgj1 it was no longer possible to carry out the proposed plans4 ,so the studies of the ,commission came to naught1 and ,france embarked on her tremendous conflict with no organisation for military transport apart from the out-of-date and wholly defective regulations under which her troops had already suffered in the ,italian war of #ahei4 ,there was an impression that the talent of the ,french soldier would enable him to se dbrouiller--to pull1 if not 7in the ,english sense7 to muddle1 through4 ,but the conditions were hopeless1 and the results speedily brought about were little short of chaos4 ,so far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned1 the railway companies themselves did marvels4 ,the numerical superiority of ,germany1 as ,von der ,goltz says in his ,nation in ,arms1 was known in ,paris1 and it was thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness and rapidity4 ,the idea was a good one 444 but 444 it was needful that the ,germans should be outdone in the rapidity with which the armies were massed4 ,that the railway managements and staffs did their best to secure this result is beyond any possibility of doubt4 ,on ,july #ae1 #ahgj1 the ,minister of ,public ,works directed the ,est1 ,nord and ,paris-,lyon ,companies to place all their means of transport at the disposal of the ,war ,minister1 suspending as far as necessary their ordinary passenger and goods services2 and the ,ouest and ,orlans ,companies were asked to put their rolling stock at the disposal of the three other companies4 ,the ,est1 to which the heaviest part in the work involved was to fall1 had already taken various measures in anticipation of an outbreak of war2 and such was the energy shown by the companies1 as a whole1 that the first troop train was started from ,paris at #e4de p4m4 on ,july #af1 within1 that is to say1 twenty-four hours of the receipt of the notice from the ,minister of ,public ,works4 ,between ,july #af and ,july #bf there were despatched #eid troop trains1 conveying #ahf1fbj men1 #cb1daj horses1 #c1afb guns and road vehicles1 and #iie wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies4 ,in the nineteen days of the whole concentration period 7,july #af-;,august #d7 the companies carried #cjj1jjj men1 #fd1gjj horses1 #f1fjj guns and road vehicles1 and #d1djj wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies4 ,all this activity on the part of the railway companies was1 however1 neutralised more or less by the absence of any adequate organisation for regulating and otherwise dealing with the traffic1 so far as concerned the military authorities themselves4 ,the first regiment to leave ,paris1 on ,july #af1 arrived at the station at #b p4m4 for the train due to start at #e4de p4m4 ,the men had been accompanied through the streets by an immense crowd shouting ,berlin6 and1 with so much time to spare1 they either blocked up the station or were taken off by their friends to the neighbouring taverns1 where the consumption of liquor was such that1 by the time the train started1 most of the men were excessively drunk4 ,in addition to this1 many had been relieved of their ammunition--taken from them1 perhaps1 as souvenirs of an historic occasion1 though destined to reappear and to be put to bad use in the days of the ,commune1 later on4 ,if1 however1 at the beginning1 the troops got to the station three hours before there was any need1 other occasions were to arise when they kept trains waiting three or four hours before they themselves were ready to start4 ,then1 in ,germany the concentration of the troops at some safe point in the interior1 and their transport thence by rail to the frontier in complete units1 took place as separate and distinct operations4 ,in ,france the two movements were conducted simultaneously2 and this1 in itself1 was a prolific source of confusion and disorganisation on the railways4 ,the troops came to the stations on a peace footing and in various strengths4 ,one regiment might have only one-third the strength of another despatched earlier the same day or on the previous day1 although the railway company would have provided the same number of vehicles for both4 ,there was thus a choice of evils as between removing two-thirds of the carriages 7a procedure which time or the station arrangements did not always permit72 sending the train away only partially loaded2 or filling up the available space either with men belonging to other corps or with such supplies as might be available at the moment4 ,some trains did leave nearly empty1 but it was the last mentioned of the three courses that was generally adopted4 ,men of different arms--,infantry1 ,cavalry and ,artillery2 mobilised troops1 reservists1 and individuals1 separated1 it might be1 from their own officers and not willing to show themselves amenable to the discipline of other officers--were thus transported at the same time as1 possibly1 a miscellaneous collection of horses1 material and commissariat supplies4 ,other trains1 again1 went away so overcrowded that they could not accommodate all the men who should have gone by them1 many being left behind in consequence4 ,confusion and delays at the railway stations during the entraining of the troops were rendered the more complete because the railway staffs failed to get an adequate degree of support from the military authorities4 ,according to one of the articles in those regulations of #ahee which were still in force1 officers were responsible for the prescribed movements in connection with the entraining1 and should personally co-operate in ensuring observance of the regulations referring thereto2 but1 according to ,baron ,ernouf1 7,histoire des ,chemins de ,fer ,franais pendant la ,guerre ,franco-,prussienne17 there were officers who refused absolutely to concern themselves with the entraining of their men at the ,est station in ,paris1 declaring that this was a matter to be looked after by the railway officials with the help of subordinate officers1 if they wanted it4 ,under such conditions as these1 officers in charge of troops got hopelessly separated from their men1 who themselves might have been sent off with no knowledge of their proper destination4 ,one ,general telegraphed to ,paris on ,july #ba3--;,have arrived at ,belfort4 ,not found my ,brigade4 ,not found ,general of ,division4 ,what should ,i do8 ,don't know where my ,regiments are4 ,as for the men1 it was not many days before the stations en route to the front were occupied by a floating mass of lost soldiers1 who pretended to be looking for their corps but too often found it much pleasanter to remain in the station buffets1 and there enjoy the hospitality of local patriots4 ,such proportions did this evil assume that in ,august1 #ahgj1 the railway station at ,reims had to be protected against a mob of from #d1jjj to #e1jjj lost ones1 who wanted to plunder the wagons containing supplies for the front4 ,confusion1 again1 was made still worse confounded by the multiplicity of orders--too often contradictory or impossible to carry out--which bombarded the railway officials1 and must have driven them at times almost to distraction4 ,orders came direct from anybody and everybody possessed of the slightest degree of military authority4 ,they came from the ,ministry of ,war1 the ,general ,staff1 and the ,administrative ,staff2 from the ,quartermaster-,general's ,department and the ,commissariat2 from officers and non-commissioned officers of ,infantry1 ,artillery and ,engineers2 while each individual invariably gave his orders based on the range of his own particular sphere1 or the convenience of his own particular troops1 without any regard for the situation as a whole1 for what might be wanted in other spheres1 or for whether or not it was physically possible for the railway staffs to do at all what was asked of them1 even if they were not being overwhelmed with those other orders1 besides4 ,commanding officers of different corps especially distinguished themselves by presenting to the railway managements claims for priority in the despatch of ,infantry1 ,artillery or supplies1 as the case might be1 threatening them with grave consequences if1 in each instance1 they did not yield such priority at once1 though leaving them to meet an obviously impracticable position as best they could4 ,then it might happen that when all the necessary arrangements--involving much interference with other traffic--had been made1 another order would come countermanding the first one1 or postponing the execution of it until a later occasion4 ,as though1 again1 the orders from all these independent military authorities were not sufficient1 the railways were further worried by local authorities who wanted special trains for some such service as the conveyance of detachments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve miles to an instruction camp so that the men would not have to march by road4 ,there were even demands from certain of the local authorities that they should be allowed to use railway wagons as barracks for troops4 ,m4 ,jacqmin1 general manager of the ,chemin de ,fer de l',est1 relates in his book1 ,les ,chemins de ,fer ,pendant la ,guerre de #ahgj-ga1 that at the moment when the ,compagnie de l',est was providing for the transport of ,bourbacki's forces1 and preparing for the revictualling of ,paris1 the prfet of the ,rhone demanded the use of railway wagons in which to house the garde nationale mobilised on the plain of ,vnissieux1 on the left bank of the ,rhone1 there having been a delay in the delivery of the material for barracks4 ,the company refused the request1 and they had with the departmental authorities a lively controversy which was only settled by the decision of the ,bordeaux ,government that those authorities were in the wrong4 ,typical of the general conditions1 as they prevailed not only in ,paris but elsewhere in ,france1 were the circumstances under which the ,nineteenth ,army ,corps1 of #cb1jjj men1 #c1jjj horses and #cjj guns1 was sent from ,cherbourg to ,alenon4 ,the troops were late in arriving at the station2 the officers neglected to look after the men2 the men refused to travel in goods trucks2 orders and counter-orders succeeded one another in rapid succession2 two or three hours were required for the despatch of each train1 and delays occurred which must have disorganised the traffic all along the line4 ,great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch1 it was far surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains were sent regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they could be unloaded there with such despatch as to avoid congestion4 ,no transfer stations--constituting the points beyond which only the supplies wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme front should be taken1 the remainder being forwarded as wanted--had been arranged1 and the consignors1 military or civil1 had assumed that all supplies should be sent in bulk to places as near to the troops as possible4 ,there were1 consequently1 many stations close to the frontier where the rails leading to them were occupied for miles together by loaded wagons1 the number of which was being constantly added to by fresh arrivals4 ,many of these wagons were1 in fact1 used as magazines or storehouses on wheels4 ,the same was1 also1 being done to a certain extent on the ,german lines1 though with this difference--that whereas in ,germany there were at the railway stations route commandants whose duty it was to enforce the prompt unloading of wagons1 in ,france there was no corresponding authority4 ,it suited the officers or the military department concerned to keep the supplies in the wagons until they were wanted2 and this arrangement may have appeared an especially desirable one from their point of view because if the army moved forward--or backward--the supplies could be more readily moved with it if they were still in the wagons4 ,for these various reasons1 there were officers who gave the most stringent orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their contents were actually required4 ,it was evidently a matter of no concern to them that the wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere1 and that1 for lack of them1 other troops might be experiencing a shortage in their own supplies4 ,when the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded1 it might still be impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no military in attendance to do the work4 ,as for the picking out1 from among the large number in waiting1 of some one wagon the contents of which were specially wanted1 the trouble involved in this operation must often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the supplies stored in the first instance4 ,even the stations themselves got congested1 under like conditions4 ,the ,commissariat wanted to convert them into depts1 and the ,artillery sought to change them into arsenals4 ,there were stations at which no platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further train had to descend some distance away1 several days elapsing before their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up4 ,at stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving1 or they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made for receiving a battalion of infantry4 ,in one instance a ,general refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival at their destination at night1 saying they would be more comfortable in the carriages than in the snow4 ,this was1 indeed1 the case2 but so long as the train remained where it was standing no other traffic could pass4 ,sometimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines for hours because no camp had been assigned to the men1 and there was at least one occasion when a ,colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it was his troops were to go4 ,most of the traffic had been directed to ,metz and ,strasburg1 and the state of chaos speedily developed at the former station has become historic4 ,the station at ,metz was a large one2 it had eight good depts and four miles of sidings1 and it was equal to the unloading of #icj wagons in twenty-four hours under well-organised conditions4 ,but when the first infantry trains arrived the men were kept at the station four or five hours owing to the absence of orders as to their further destination4 ,the men detrained1 and the wagons containing road vehicles1 officers' luggage1 etc41 were left unloaded and sent into the sidings4 ,other trains followed in rapid succession1 bringing troops and supplies1 and the block began to assume serious proportions4 ,the railway officials appealed to the local ,commissariat force to unload the wagons so that they could be got out of the way4 ,they were told that this could not be done because no orders had been received4 ,the ,commissariat force for the division also declined to unload the wagons1 saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were intended would remain at ,metz or go further on4 ,any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by the higher military authorities4 ,they asked the railway officers to prepare for the transport of an army corps of #cj1jjj men4 ,this was done1 and forty trains were located at various points along the line4 ,an order was then given that the trains should be brought to ,metz1 to allow of the troops leaving at once4 ,within four hours every train was ready1 and its locomotive was standing with the steam up2 but no troops appeared4 ,the order was countermanded4 ,then it was repeated1 and then it was countermanded over again4 ,all this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been arriving at ,metz1 adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which1 having filled up all the sidings began to overflow and block up1 first the lines leading to the locomotive sheds and next the main lines themselves4 ,everything was in inextricable confusion4 ,nobody knew where any particular commodity was to be found or1 if they did1 how to get the truck containing it from the consolidated mass of some thousands of vehicles4 ,in ,metz1 telegraphed the ,commissary-,general to ,paris1 there is neither coffee1 nor sugar2 no rice1 no brandy1 no salt1 only a little bacon and biscuit4 ,send me at least a million rations to ,thionville4 ,yet it was quite possible that the articles specified were already in some or other of the trucks on hand1 had the ,commissary-,general only known where they were and how to get them4 ,the railway people did what they could4 ,they unloaded some of the consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road--only to have them sent back again to ,metz station for re-loading and conveyance elsewhere4 ,hay unloaded at the station was sent into ,metz to some magazines which1 in turn1 and at the same time1 were sending hay to the railway for another destination4 ,finally1 as a last resource1 and in order both to reduce the block and to get further use out of the wagons1 the railway officials began to unload them and put their contents on the ground alongside4 ,a big capture alike of wagons and of supplies was made by the enemy on his occupation of ,metz4 ,analogous conditions prevailed in many other places4 ,at ,dle 7,dep4 ,jura7 an accumulated stock of loaded wagons not only filled up all the sidings but blocked up a large portion of the main line4 ,when the evacuation was decided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the wagons to be moved4 ,orders given one hour were countermanded the next2 trains which had been made up were moved forward and backward1 instead of being got out of the way at once2 and1 eventually1 a considerable quantity of rolling stock1 which might and should have been removed1 had to be left behind4 ,on the ,paris-,lyon railway a collection of #g1ejj loaded trucks had accumulated at a time when a great truck shortage began to be felt1 and the whole of these1 together with the provisions and the materials they contained1 fell into the hands of the ,germans1 whose total haul of wagons1 including those captured at ,metz and other places1 numbered no fewer than #af1jjj4 ,the wagons thus taken were first used by them for their own military transport during the remainder of the war2 were then utilised for ordinary traffic on lines in ,germany1 and were eventually returned to ,france4 ,not only1 therefore1 had the ,french failed to get from these #af1jjj railway wagons the benefit they should have derived from their use but1 in blocking their lines with them under such conditions that it was impossible to save them from capture1 they conferred a material advantage on the enemy1 providing him with supplies1 and increasing his own means both of transport and of attack on themselves4 ,the proportions of the ,german haul of wagons would1 probably1 have been larger still had not some of the ,french railway companies1 on seeing the advance the enemy was making1 assumed the responsibility of stopping traffic on certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock to a place of safety4 ,in taking this action they adopted a course based alike on precedent and prudence1 and one fully warranted by the principle of keeping railway rolling stock designed for purposes of defence from being utilised by the enemy for his own purposes of attack4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,organisation ,,in ,,france ,while1 on the conclusion of the ,franco-,prussian war1 ,germany began1 as we have seen in ,chapter ,x41 to improve her own system of military rail-transport1 with a view to remedying the faults developed therein1 ,france applied herself with equal1 if not with even greater1 determination and perseverance to the task of creating for herself a system which1 in her case1 had been entirely lacking4 ,recognising alike her own shortcomings1 the imperative need to prepare for future contingencies1 and the still more important part that railways would inevitably play in the next great war in which she might be engaged1 ,france resolved to create1 in time of peace1 and as an indispensable factor in her scheme of national defence1 a system of military transport comprehensive in its scope1 complete in its working details1 and leaving nothing to chance4 ,everything was to be foreseen1 provided for1 and1 as far as circumstances would permit1 tested in advance4 ,the ,prussian organisation of #ahgj-ga was1 admittedly1 and as recommended by ,jacqmin1 taken as a starting point for what was to be done4 ,from that time1 also1 every new regulation adopted by ,prussia in regard to military transport1 and every important alteration made in the ,prussian system1 was promptly recorded and commended or criticised in the ably-conducted ,french military papers2 though in the actual creation of her own system there was no mere following by ,france of ,prussian examples4 ,what was considered worth adopting certainly was adopted2 but the organisation eventually built up1 as the result of many years of pertinacious efforts1 was1 in reality1 based on ,french conditions1 ,french requirements1 and the most progressive ideas of ,french military science4 ,the ,french were1 also1 to show that1 when they applied themselves to the task1 they had a genius for organisation in no way inferior to that of the ,germans themselves4 ,in his review of the events of #ahgj-ga1 ,jacqmin declared that1 while the education of ,france in the use of railways in time of war had still to be completed1 the basis for such education had already been laid down by ,marshal ,niel's ,commission ,centrale of #ahfi4 ,the two essential conditions were 7#a7 unification of control in the use of railways for military purposes1 whether for the transport of men or of supplies2 and 7#b7 association of the military element and the technical element1--an association which should be permanent in its nature and apply to every phase of the railway service1 so that before any order was given there should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achievement1 and this1 also1 without prejudice to other transport orders already given or likely to become necessary4 ,it was these essential conditions that formed the basis of the organisation which ,france created4 ,as early as ,november1 #ahgb1 there was called into existence a ,commission ,militaire ,superieure des ,chemins de ,fer consisting of twelve members1 who represented the ,ministry of ,public ,works1 the ,army1 the ,navy1 and the great railway companies4 ,attached to the ,ministry of ,war1 and charged with the task of studying all questions relating to the use of railways by the ,army1 the ,commission had for its first duty a revision of the proposals made by ,marshal ,niel's ,commission of #ahfi4 ,following on this came a succession of laws1 decrees and instructions dealing with various aspects of the situation in regard to military transport and the military organization of the railways1 the number issued between #ahgb and #ahhc being no fewer than seventeen4 ,these1 however1 represented more or less tentative or sectional efforts made in combination with the railway companies1 who gave to the ,chambers and to the administrative authorities their most earnest support and the full benefit of all their technical knowledge and experience in regard to the many problems which had to be solved4 ,in #ahhd there were issued two decrees 7,july #g and ,october #bi7 which codified1 modified or further developed the various legislative or administrative measures already taken1 and laid down both the fundamental principles and the leading details of a comprehensive scheme which1 after additional modifications or amendments1 based on later experiences1 was to develop into the system of organised military rail-transport as it exists in ,france to-day4 ,these later modifications were more especially effected by three decrees which1 based on the law of ,december #bh1 #ahhh1 dealt with 7#a7 the composition and powers of the ,commission ,militaire ,superieure des ,chemins de ,fer2 7#b7 the creation of ,field ,railway ,sections and ,railway ,troops2 and 7#c7 the organisation of the military service of railways4 ,since its original formation in #ahgb1 the ,superior ,military ,commission had already undergone reconstruction in #ahhf1 and still further changes1 in addition to those made by the decree of ,february #e1 #ahhi1 were to follow4 ,in its final form the ,commission still retains the principle of representation thereon alike of the military and the technical 7railway7 element4 ,presided over by the ,chief of the ,general ,staff--who1 with the help of a special department of that ,staff1 exercises the supreme direction of the military transport services1 subject to the authority of the ,war ,minister--the ,commission is composed of six ,generals or other military officers of high rank1 three representatives of the ,ministry of ,public ,works1 and the members of the ,line ,commission appointed for each of the great railway systems and1 also1 for the ,chemin de ,fer d'tat4 ,all the members of the ,commission are nominated by the ,minister of ,war4 ,the function they discharge is a purely consultative one4 ,their business it is to give to the ,minister their views on all such questions as he may submit to them for consideration in regard to the use of the railways by the ,army1 and more especially in regard to-- #a4 ,preparations for military transports4 #b4 ,examination of all projects for new lines or junctions and alterations of existing lines1 as well as all projects which concern railway facilities 7stations1 platforms1 water supply1 locomotive sheds1 etc47 #c4 ,the fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway rolling stock in view of military requirements1 and the alterations which may be necessary to adapt it thereto4 #d4 ,special instructions to be given to troops of all arms as to their travelling by rail4 #e4 ,agreements to be made between railway companies and the ,war ,department in respect to transport of troops1 provisions1 etc4 #f4 ,organisation1 instruction and employment of special corps of railwaymen 7for repairs1 etc474 #g4 ,measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and protection of railways and their approaches4 #h4 ,the means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines of railway4 ,heads of the different services at the ,ministry of ,war can attend meetings of the ,commission1 in a consultative capacity1 in respect to matters coming within their jurisdiction1 and the ,commission can1 in turn1 apply to the ,minister for the attendance of any person it may desire to hear4 ,as far as possible1 all plans and arrangements concerning the transport of troops and supplies in time of war1 from the moment of mobilisation onward1 are thus prepared1 examined or provided for in advance4 ,in article #h of the ,regulation of ,december #h1 #aiac1 on ,military ,transports by ,railway 7,rglement sur les transports stratgiques par chemin de fer7 it is1 in fact1 stated that-- ,all the arrangements relating to the organisation and carrying out of transport for mobilisation1 concentration1 revictualling and evacuation are studied and prepared in time of peace4 ,the ,minister gives1 to this effect1 all the necessary instructions to the ,general ,staff1 to the commanders of ,army ,corps1 and to the different services4 ,a like course is adopted1 in time of peace1 with regard to the study of the conditions under which the railways will be operated on the lines of communication4 ,the creation1 under the law of ,march #ac1 #ahge1 of ,field ,railway ,sections and ,railway ,troops was the outcome of the obvious need of having an organised force able to take up the duties of constructing1 repairing1 destroying or operating railways at the theatre of war1 such force being established in time of peace and assured all the experience needed to qualify them for the discharge of those various duties4 ,france1 in fact1 was now1 in this respect1 to follow the example of ,germany1 just as ,germany had already been inspired by the example of the ,united ,states4 ,under a decree of ,february #e1 #ahhi1 ,field ,railway ,sections 7,sections de chemins de fer de campagne7 were defined as permanent military corps charged1 in time of war1 and concurrently with the ,railway ,troops1 with the construction1 renovation and operation of those railways of which the working could not be assured by the national companies4 ,their personnel was to be recruited from among the engineers1 officials and men employed by the railway companies and by the ,state ,railways ,administration1 such recruiting being carried out either voluntarily or by reason of liability to render military service2 and they were to form a distinct corps1 having its own governing body with1 as its head1 a commandant exercising the functions of a ,chef de ,corps4 ,in time of peace there were to be nine sections1 each designated by a distinctive number according to the particular railway system or systems from which it was formed2 though authority was given to the ,minister of ,war to call further sections into being in case of war4 ,the number in peace was increased1 in #aijf1 by the formation of a tenth section from among the staffs of railways in the secondary group1 including local lines and tramways1 in order to assure1 or to assist in1 the operation of these railways or tramways for military transport in time of war4 ,in time of peace the sections were to be subject to inspections1 musters1 reviews and assemblies1 as ordered by the ,minister of ,war4 ,a further provision in the decree of #ahhi says3--,all the arrangements relative to the mobilisation of each section shall be studied and planned in time of peace4 ,each section should always be ready1 in the most complete manner1 to render its services to the ,minister of ,war4 ,subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of the sections a complete unit on the following basis3 7#a7 ,a central body2 7#b7 three distinct divisions1 namely1 7a7 movement1 7b7 voie1 and 7c7 traction2 7#c7 a central dept common to the three divisions and the central body2 and 7#d7 complementary territorial subdivisions in the same three classes1 and attached to the central dept of the section4 ,the territorial subdivisions are designed to provide a reserve force of men who can complete or strengthen the existing sections1 or1 alternatively1 be constituted into additional sections1 if so desired by the ,minister of ,war4 ,the total strength of each section 7including #ada allotted to the central dept7 was fixed as #a1dff4 ,the administration of a section rests with an ,administrative ,council formed by the president and the heads of the several departments1 and meeting at least once in every three months in time of peace1 and once a week in time of war4 ,authority is exercised over the sections by the ,field ,railway ,commissions to which they are attached4#bf ,men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable to military service are excused from taking part in the ordinary military exercises1 but may be assembled for inspections1 etc41 or to undergo courses of instruction in railway work4 ,men in the territorial subdivisions can be summoned by the ,minister of ,war for a period of exercises in railway work in time of peace2 and the fact may be recalled that advantage of this power was taken during the ,french railway troubles of #aiaj1 when the strikers were required to assume the rle of soldiers doing railway work under military authority and control4 ,the ,railway ,troops 7,troupes de chemin de fer7 now constitute a ,railway ,regiment 7#e;e rgiment du gnie7 organised under the decree of ,july #aa1 #ahii1 and comprising on a peace footing1 three ,battalions1 each of four ,companies4 ,recruits for the ,railway ,regiment come from one or other of the following classes3 7#a7 ,young soldiers who were in the railway service before they joined the ,army2 7#b7 an annual contingent of railway employs selected by the ,minister of ,war from lists supplied for this purpose by the administrations of the five great railway companies and of the ,state railways1 the number so selected not to exceed #bdj1 distributed as follows3 ,compagnie du ,nord1 #db2 ,est1 #ah2 ,p4 ,l4 ,m41 #ed2 ,orlans1 #db2 ,midi1 #ae2 tat1 #fi2 and 7#c7 soldiers belonging to ,infantry ,regiments who1 after one year of training therein1 are sent to the ,railway ,regiment1 those chosen for this purpose being1 by preference1 men whose previous occupation in life has adapted them for railway work4 ,the railway administrations are also required to provide from among their officials a certain number of officers and non-commissioned officers to form a reserve for the ,regiment4 ,a most complete and systematic course of instruction is arranged4#bg ,it is divided into 7#a7 military instruction and 7#b7 technical instruction1 the purpose of the latter being defined as that of qualifying the ,railway ,troops to undertake at the theatre of war1 subject to the authority of the ,director-,general of ,railways and ,communications1 works of repair or destruction of railway lines1 or1 in case of need1 the provisional working of the railways4 ,in time of peace it is the duty of the ,superior ,military ,commission for ,railways to advise on all questions concerning the organisation1 instruction and employment of the special troops for railway work4 ,to enable it to discharge this function the ,commission receives1 through the ,chief of the ,general ,staff1 all programmes1 proposals or reports that may be issued in regard to the technical instruction of the troops1 giving its views thereon1 and making such recommendations as it may consider desirable4 ,such technical instruction comprises 7a7 that which is given to the whole of the troops2 7b7 instruction in particular branches of railway work given to a limited number of individuals2 7c7 instruction to groups of men operating in companies or otherwise1 and 7d7 instruction obtained on the ordinary railways4 ,it is further divided into 7i7 theoretical and 7ii7 practical4 ,among the measures adopted for ensuring the success of the general scheme1 mention might be made of the issuing of special series of textbooks2 the regular working by the ,regiment of about forty miles of railway--including an important junction--between ,chartres and ,orlans1 on the ,state ,railway system2 and arrangements made with the railway administrations under which 7#a7 a certain number of ,companies belonging to the ,regiment are attached to the ordinary railway systems every year1 for periods of two or three months2 and 7#b7 power is given to the railway administrations to engage the services of the ,railway ,troops in carrying out repairs or construction works on their lines1 a mutual advantage thus being obtained4 ,finally there is a ,railway ,school 7cole de chemins de fer7 which has charge of all the materials1 tools1 etc41 used in the technical instruction of the troops2 draws up1 under the orders of the ,colonel1 programmes of practical work and instruction2 and provides 7#a7 a library which is supplied with books and periodicals dealing with military1 railway1 scientific and historical subjects1 together with maps1 plans1 decrees1 regulations1 etc41 relating to the military operation of railways2 7#b7 a collection of tools1 instruments and models2 7#c7 photographic and lithographic departments2 7#d7 stores of railway construction material for instruction purposes2 7#e7 other stores of like material for use in case of war2 7#f7 workshops for practical instruction in railway repairs1 etc42 and 7#g7 practice grounds reserved exclusively for the ,railway ,troops4 ,the fact of these two bodies of ,field ,railway ,sections and ,railway ,troops being organised on so practical and comprehensive a basis secured to ,france the control of forces certain to be of the greatest service to her in the next war in which she might be engaged4 ,it would1 also1 even suffice by itself to prove the earnestness1 the vigour and the thoroughness with which1 after #ahgj-ga1 ,france entered upon the improvement of her system of military rail-transport for national defence4 ,there was1 however1 much more to be done1 besides1 before that system could be considered complete2 and here1 again1 a vast amount of study1 foresight and energy was shown4 ,following1 indeed1 the laws1 decrees1 regulations1 orders1 and instructions issued down to #ahhi came so many others--dealing1 in some instances1 with even the minutest detail concerning some particular phase of the organisation in course of being perfected--that a collected series of those still in force in #aijb formed a volume of over #gjj pages4#bh ,since the issue of this somewhat formidable collection1 still further changes have been introduced1 the general conditions being finally modified by decrees passed on ,december #h1 #aiac4 ,without attempting to indicate all the successive stages in this prolonged series of legislative and administrative efforts1 it may suffice to offer a general sketch of the ,french organisation of military rail-transport on the basis of the laws1 regulations and practices in operation on the outbreak of war in #aiad4 ,connected with each of the great railway systems there is a permanent ,line ,commission 7,commission de rseau7 which consists of 7#a7 a technical member who1 in practice1 is the general manager of the line2 and 7#b7 a military member1 who is a member of the ,general ,staff of the ,army4 ,the former is chosen by the railway administration1 subject to the approval of the ,war ,minister1 and the latter by the ,war ,minister himself4 ,each ,line ,commission controls the services of a combined technical and military staff1 and each ,commissioner has a deputy who can take his place and exercise his powers in case of need4 ,while the ,military ,commissioner is specially responsible for measures adopted from a military point of view1 the ,railway ,commissioner is specially responsible for putting at the command of the ,army1 as far as may be necessary or practicable1 all the resources of the particular railway system he represents4 ,the authority of a ,line ,commission on any one of the great railway systems extends to the smaller1 or secondary1 lines situate within the same territory2 but the smaller companies may themselves claim to be represented on the ,commission by a duly credited agent4 ,among the duties to be discharged by a ,line ,commission in time of peace are the following3-- #a4 ,investigation of all matters to which military transport on the line or the system can give rise4 #b4 ,study of all the available resources of the system1 in material and men1 from the point of view of military requirements4 #c4 ,preparation of plans1 estimates1 and other data in connection with the movement of troops1 etc4 #d4 ,verification of reports concerning extent of lines1 rolling stock1 and station or traffic facilities4 #e4 ,special instruction of the railway staff4 #f4 ,inspection of lines1 bridges1 etc4 #g4 ,the carrying out of experiments of all kinds with a view to ameliorating or accelerating the facilities offered by the system in respect to military transports4 ,should several ,line ,commissions be interested in some particular question concerning military movements by rail1 the ,chief of the ,general ,staff can summon them to a joint conference as often as may be necessary4 ,the fact1 also1 that the members of the ,line ,commissions are members of the ,superior ,commission assures co-ordination in the studies carried on as regards the railways in general1 and provides a ready means by which the central body can obtain the information it desires concerning any one system or group of systems4 ,as their district executives1 the ,line ,commissions have such number of ,sub-,line ,commissions as may be found necessary4 ,each of these is1 in turn1 composed of a military member1 nominated by the ,minister1 and a technical member1 chosen by the ,line ,commission4 ,then1 also1 to discharge the function of local executive1 there is at every important centre of traffic a ,station ,commission 7,commission de gare7 which consists of a military officer and the stationmaster4 ,it receives from the ,line or ,sub-,line ,commission all orders or instructions concerning military transport to1 from1 or passing through1 such station1 and is the recognised intermediary for carrying them into effect and seeing that efficiency is ensured and good order maintained4 ,a staff1 formed of military men and railwaymen acting in combination1 is allotted to each ,line1 ,sub-,line or ,station ,commission4 ,concerning the representation of these two elements1 military and civil1 on the one body1 article #aj of the decree of ,december #h1 #aiac1 on ,military ,transports says3-- ,the special function of each of the agents1 military or technical1 on the ,commissions or ,sub-,commissions must1 in the operation of the service1 be maintained in the most absolute manner4 ,at the same time these agents should not lose from their view the fact that their association is designed to effect harmony between the exigencies alike of military requirements and of rail transport1 subordinating those of the one to those of the other1 according to circumstances4 ,from the time that mobilisation begins--or even earlier1 on the order of the ,war ,minister--the members of the ,superior ,commission take up their posts en permanence at the ,war ,office1 and those of the ,line1 ,sub-,line and ,station ,commissions locate themselves at the stations which will have been allotted to them in time of peace4 ,thenceforward each ,station ,commission is in constant communication by telegraph with the ,line or ,sub-,line ,commission under which it acts1 supplementing such communication by daily written reports4 ,among the duties to be discharged by the ,station ,commissions are those of superintending the entrainment or detrainment of troops and the loading or unloading of material2 seeing that the trains required for transport purposes are provided2 preventing congestion of the lines or of the station approaches2 and ensuring the security of the station and of the lines within a certain radius thereof4 ,on the outbreak of war the railway companies must place at the service of the ,state either the whole or such of their lines1 rolling stock1 and other means of transport as may be needed for the conveyance of troops1 stores1 etc41 to any points served by them4 ,thenceforward the lines so required for strategic transports--including therein mobilisation1 concentration1 reinforcements1 supplies and evacuations from the theatre of war--can be used for ordinary passengers and goods only to such extent as the ,minister may approve4 ,following on the order for mobilisation the ,minister1 after consultation with the ,commander-in-,chief1 divides the railways of the country into two zones--the ,zone of the ,interior1 and the ,zone of the ,armies4 ,of these the former passes under the supreme control of the ,war ,minister1 and the latter under that of the ,commander-in-,chief4 ,the location of the ,stations of ,transition1 dividing the one zone from the other1 can be varied from time to time by the ,minister1 in consultation with the ,commander-in-,chief1 according to the developments of the military situation4 ,the ,zone of the ,interior is that part of the railway system which1 though not situated at the theatre of war1 is subject to military control by reason of the services required of it in the forwarding of troops1 supplies1 guns1 ammunition and other necessaries4 ,operation by the ordinary staffs of the railway systems is continued1 but the transports ordered by the ,war ,minister are regulated by the ,chief of the ,general ,staff4 ,the execution of the orders given is entrusted from the day of mobilisation to the ,line ,commissions1 each of which1 acting under the authority of the ,war ,minister1 takes charge over the whole of the services on the lines comprised in its particular territory4 ,the ,zone of the ,armies is1 in turn1 divided into two sections 7#a7 the ,zone de l'avant1 in which military operation of the railways is necessary on account of their nearness to the fighting-line2 and 7#b7 the ,zone de l',arrire1 in which the railways can still be operated by the ordinary railway staffs1 under the direction of ,line and ,station ,commissions1 as in the adjoining ,zone of the ,interior4 ,orders given by the ,commander-in-,chief in respect to transport in the ,zone of the ,armies are carried out under the supreme control of an officer now known as the ,directeur de l',arrire4 ,the history of this important functionary affords an excellent example of the way in which the whole scheme of operations has been evolved4 ,the ,rglement gnral of ,july #a1 #ahgd1--one of the earliest attempts to meet the difficulties which had arisen in #ahgj-ga in respect to military rail-transport--was found to be defective inasmuch as it did not apply1 also1 to those road and rear services 7,services de l',arrire7 which are necessarily associated with the rail services and themselves constitute so important a phase of military transport as a whole4 ,in #ahgh an attempt was made to meet this defect by the inauguration of a system of ,services des tapes2 but here1 again1 the existence of separate organisations for rail service and road service1 without any connecting and controlling link1 was found to be unsatisfactory4 ,in #ahhc a ,commission1 presided over by ,general ,fay1 was appointed to consider what would be the best course to adopt1 and1 in the result1 there was issued1 on ,july #g1 #ahhd1 a ,decree creating a ,directeur ,gnral des ,chemins de ,fer et des tapes1 whose duties were more clearly defined under a ,decree of ,february #ba1 #aijj4 ,in #aijh the title of this officer was changed to that of ,directeur de l',arrire1 and1 after further revisions1 the scope of his authority and responsibility was eventually fixed by the ,regulation of ,december #h1 #aiac4 ,taking up his position at the head-quarters of the ,commander-in-,chief1 and keeping in close touch1 also1 with the ,minister of ,war through the ,chief of the ,general ,staff1 the ,directeur de l',arrire has for his special function that of securing complete co-ordination alike between rail services and road services and between the services in the ,zone of the ,interior and those in the ,zone of the ,armies4 ,both from the ,minister and from the ,commander-in-,chief he receives information as to operations projected or in progress1 and as to the needs of the armies in personnel and matriel4 ,his business it is to see that these needs1 according to their order of urgency--as further communicated to him--are supplied under conditions which shall provide for all contingencies and guard against all possible confusion or delays4 ,he fixes1 among other things1 the lines of communication2 he keeps in close touch with the road services1 and--having1 within the limit of his instructions1 complete control over the railways in the ,zone of the ,armies--he decides on the conditions to be adopted in respect to all transport alike from the interior to the armies and from the armies to the interior4 ,as between1 also1 the ,minister of ,war and the ,commander-in-,chief1 he maintains a constant exchange of information concerning time-tables for military trains and other such matters4 ,in the discharge of these duties the ,directeur de l',arrire is aided by a staff which comprises both the technical and the military elements2 but he is not himself responsible for the actual working of either the rail or the road services4 ,railway services in the ,zone of the ,armies are--subject to the supreme authority of the ,directeur de l',arrire--under the control of a ,director of ,railways who is assisted by 7#a7 a combined military and technical staff2 7#b7 a ,line ,commission for that section of the zone where the railways can still be worked by their ordinary staffs2 and 7#c7 one or more ,field ,line ,commissions 7,commissions de chemins de fer de campagne71 together with ,railway ,troops1 for the section where military operation is necessary4 ,in the interests of that co-ordination to which so much importance is rightly attached1 the ,director of ,railways refers to the ,directeur de l',arrire all demands for transport that concern the railways of both the ,zone of the ,interior and the ,zone of the ,armies or involve conveyance by road as well as by rail4 ,he also passes on to the ,commissions in charge of either section of the railways included in the ,zone of the ,armies the orders he himself receives from the ,directeur de l',arrire in respect to such transport requirements as may concern them4 ,time-tables drawn up1 and other arrangements made1 by these ,commissions are subject to his approval4 ,he further decides as to the distribution1 within the ,zone of the ,armies1 of the rolling stock and the railway personnel placed at his disposal by the ,commander-in-,chief4 ,the ,field ,line ,commissions are the executive agents of the ,director of ,railways in the discharge of the various duties assigned to him4 ,the number of these ,commissions is decided by the ,directeur de l',arrire1 and the date of their entering on their functions is fixed by the ,director of ,railways4 ,each ,commission consists of a staff officer and a railway engineer4 ,of these the former is military president of the ,commission and has the controlling voice4 ,when he considers it necessary that he should accept1 in addition to his own responsibility1 that of the technical commissioner1 the latter must defer to his views and to the orders he gives4 ,the president has an assistant--also a staff officer--who can replace him when necessary1 while the ,commission has a staff of secretaries and orderlies as approved by the ,minister of ,war4 ,the personnel of the ,commissions includes ,railway ,troops 7,sapeurs de chemins de fer and ,sections de chemins de fer de campagne72 a telegraphy staff2 ,station ,commissions2 and gendarmerie to undertake police duties in the stations and on the trains4 ,in addition to making traffic arrangements and undertaking the operation of those lines at the theatre of war that may pass under full military control1 the ,field ,line ,commissions are required to carry out such construction1 repair1 maintenance or destruction work on the railways as should be found necessary4 ,on the ,lines of ,communication passing through the two zones and ensuring direct communication between the interior and such accessible points on the railway as may1 from time to time1 be nearest to the armies in the field1 the leading stations en route are required to serve a variety of military purposes2 though in each and every such instance the system of organisation is such that the duties to be discharged or the responsibilities to be fulfilled are undertaken by1 or are under the control of1 a ,commission formed on the now established basis of representation thereon of both the military and the technical elements4 ,for the conveyance of troops1 there are1 in the first place1 ,mobilisation ,stations and ,junction ,stations1 whence the men within a certain district are sent to the ,embarkation ,stations1 at which complete units for the front are made up4 ,these are followed by ,stations for ,meals 7,stations haltes-repas71 for men and horses2 though in this case the stations may really be goods or locomotive sheds1 able to accommodate a large number of men4 ,at the end of the railway line1 so far as it is available for troops1 come the ,detraining ,stations4 ,in regard to supplies and stores1 the first link in the chain of organisation is constituted by the ,base ,supply ,stations 7gares de rassemblement74 ,here the supplies going from a certain district outside the theatre of operations to any one ,army ,corps must be delivered2 and here they are checked1 made up into full train loads1 or otherwise dealt with in such a way as to simplify and facilitate their further transport4 ,in certain cases full train-loads arriving at these assembling stations pass through to destination1 after being checked2 but the general practice is for the consignments forwarded from base supply stations to go to the ,supply ,depts 7,stations-magasins71 serving the purposes of storehouses from which supplies1 whether received from the base or collected locally1 can be despatched in just such quantities1 and at just such intervals1 as circumstances may require4 ,these depts are organised on a different basis according to the particular service or purpose for which they are designed1--,cavalry1 ,engineers1 ,artillery1 ,medical1 ,telegraph ,corps2 provisions1 live stock1 clothing1 camp equipment1 etc4 ,their number1 character1 and location are decided by the ,minister of ,war in time of peace4 ,on the outbreak of war those in the ,zone of the ,armies pass under the control of the ,commander-in-,chief together with the railway lines within that zone4 ,the situation of the depts may be changed1 or additional depts may be opened1 by the ,directeur de l',arrire1 with the consent of the ,commander-in-,chief4 ,each station dept is under the charge of the military member of the ,station ,commission4 ,his special function it is to supply therefrom the wants of the ,army in accordance with the demands he receives4 ,these demands he distributes among the different departments of the dept1 giving instructions as to the time by which the railway wagons must be loaded4 ,he also takes1 with the stationmaster1 all the necessary measures for ensuring the making up1 the loading1 and the departure of the trains2 but he must not interfere with the internal administration of the station or with the technical direction and execution of the railway services4 ,provision is also made for the immediate unloading of trains bringing supplies to the station depts for storage there1 the military commissioner being expressly instructed to guard against any block on the lines in or near to the station4 ,wagons need not be unloaded if they are to be sent on after only a brief detention1 or if they contain ammunition forming part of the current needs of the ,army4 ,from the supply depts the supplies and stores pass on to the ,regulating ,station 7gare rgulatrice74 ,this is located at such point on each line of communication as1 while allowing of a final regulation of supplies going to the front1 does not--owing to its nearness to the fighting line--permit of any guarantee of a fixed train service beyond that point4 ,the locality of the regulating station is changed from day to day1 or from time to time1 according to developments in the military situation4 ,the regulating station is in charge of a ,regulating ,commission 7,commission rgulatrice71 constituted on the same basis as a ,sub-,line ,commission4 ,receiving orders or instructions as to the nature and quantities of the supplies and stores required by the troops at the front1 and drawing these from the supply depts1 the ,commission must always have on hand a sufficiency to meet requirements4 ,it is1 also1 left to the ,commission to arrange for the further despatch of the supplies from the regulating station by means of such trains as1 in the circumstances of the moment1 may be found practicable4 ,as a matter of daily routine1 and without further instructions1 the supply depts send one train of provisions each day to the regulating station1 and the latter sends on one train daily to the front1 always1 however1 keeping a further day's supply on hand1 at or near the regulating station1 to meet further possible requirements4 ,additional trains1 whether from the supply depts or from the regulating station 7where rolling stock is kept available7 are made up as needed4 ,supplementing these arrangements1 the ,regulating ,commission may1 at the request of the ,director of ,road ,services1 further keep permanently within its zone of action a certain number of wagons of provisions in readiness to meet contingencies1 the wagons so utilised as ,stores on wheels being known as en-cas mobiles4 ,should the ,directeur de l',arrire so desire1 railway wagons with ammunition can1 in the same way1 be kept loaded at any station within the ,zone of the ,armies1 or1 by arrangement with the ,minister of ,war1 in the ,zone of the ,interior4 ,it is1 however1 stipulated that the number of these wagons should be reduced to a minimum1 in order to avoid congestion either of the stations or of the railway lines4 ,beyond the regulating station comes ,railhead1 which constitutes the furthest limit of possible rail-transport for the time being1 and the final point of connection between rail and road services1 the latter being left with the responsibility of continuing the line of communication thence to the armies on the field of battle4 ,it is the duty of the ,regulating ,commission1 as soon as it enters on the discharge of its functions and as often afterwards as may be necessary1 to advise both the ,general in command of the ,army served by the line of communication and the ,director of ,road ,services as to the station which can be used as railhead and the facilities offered there for the accommodation1 unloading1 and loading of wagons4 ,on the basis of the information so given the ,general-in-,command decides each day1 or as the occasion requires1 on the particular station which shall be regarded as railhead for the purposes of transport4 ,he advises the ,regulating ,commission and the ,director of ,road ,services accordingly1 and he further notifies to them his wishes in regard to the forwarding of supplies to the point thus fixed4 ,these elaborate arrangements for ensuring a maintenance of efficiency along the whole line of communication from the interior to the front equally apply to transport of all kinds from the theatre of war to the interior4 ,in principle1 evacuations from the army of sick and wounded1 prisoners1 surplus stores1 and so on1 are effected from railhead by means of the daily supply-trains returning thence to the regulating station1 where the ,regulating ,commission takes them in charge1 and passes them on by the trains going back to the ,dept ,stations1 or beyond4 ,should special trains be necessary for the removal of a large number of wounded1 or otherwise1 the ,director of ,road ,services communicates with the ,regulating ,commission1 which either makes up the desired specials from the rolling stock it has on hand or1 if it cannot do this1 itself applies1 in turn1 to the ,director of ,railways4 ,for dealing with the sick and wounded1 every possible provision is made under the authority of the ,minister of ,war and the ,director-,general1 the arrangements in advance1 as detailed in the decrees relating to this branch of the subject1 being on the most comprehensive scale4 ,among other measures provided for is the setting up of ,evacuation ,hospitals 7hpitaux d'vacuation7 in the immediate neighbourhood of the ,regulating ,stations1 if not1 also1 at railhead4 ,elsewhere along the line certain stations become ,infirmary ,stations1 7infirmaries de gare7 where1 in urgent cases1 and under conditions laid down by the ,war ,minister1 the sick and wounded en route to the interior can receive prompt medical attention in case of need4 ,from the ,distribution ,stations 7gares de rpartition71 the sick and wounded are sent to the hospitals in the interior to which they may be assigned4 ,it will be seen that this comprehensive scheme of organisation aims at preventing the recurrence of any of those defects or deficiencies which characterised the military rail-transport movements of ,france in the war of #ahgj-ga4 ,the presence1 at every important link in the chain of rail communication1 of a ,commission designed to secure regularity and efficiency in the traffic arrangements should avoid confusion1 congestion and delay4 ,the association1 on each of these ,commissions1 of the military and technical elements1 with a strict definition of their respective powers1 duties and responsibilities1 should ensure the best use of the available transport facilities under conditions in themselves practicable1 and without the risk either of friction between the representatives of the two interests or1 alternatively1 of any interference with the railway services owing to contradictory or impossible orders being given by individual officers acting on their own responsibility4 ,the setting up of the supply depts and regulating stations along the line of communication should prevent 7i7 the rushing through of supplies in excessive quantities to the extreme front2 7ii7 the congestion of railway lines and stations2 7iii7 the undue accumulation of provisions at one point1 with a corresponding deficiency elsewhere1 and 7iv7 the possibility of large stocks being eventually seized by the enemy and made use of by him to his own advantage4 ,the measures adopted both to prevent any excessive employment of railway wagons as storehouses on wheels and to secure their prompt unloading should afford a greater guarantee of the best utilisation of rolling stock under conditions of1 possibly1 extreme urgency4 ,finally1 the unification of control1 the co-ordination of the many different services involved1 and the harmony of working established between all the various sections on the line of communication linking up the interior of the country with the troops in the fighting line should assure1 not only the nearest possible approach to complete efficiency in the transport conditions1 but the conferring of great advantages on the armies concerned1 with a proportionate increase of their strength in the field4 ,the effect of all these things on the military position of ,france must needs be great4 ,had ,france controlled a rail-transport organisation such as this--instead of none at all--in #ahgj-ga2 and had ,germany controlled a system no better than what we have seen to be the admittedly imperfect one she put into operation on that occasion1 the results of the ,franco-,german war and the subsequent course of events in ,europe might alike have been wholly different4 ,tests of what were being planned or projected in ,france as precautionary measures1 for application in war1 could not1 of course1 be carried out exhaustively in peace2 but many parts of the machinery designed came into daily use as a matter of ordinary routine4 ,full advantage was taken1 also1 of whatever opportunities did present themselves--in the form of exercises in partial mobilisation1 reviews1 and other occasions involving the movement by rail of large bodies of troops--to effect such trials as were possible of regulations and instructions already based on exhaustive studies by the military and railway authorities4 ,in #ahib the results attained were so satisfactory that a ,german authority1 ,lieutenant ,becker1 writing in his book on ,der nchste ,krieg und die deutschen ,bahnverwaltungen1 7,hanover1 #ahic17 concerning the trials in ,france1 in that year1 of the new conditions introduced by the law of ,december #bh1 #ahhh1 was not only greatly impressed thereby but even appeared disposed to think that the ,french were becoming superior to the ,germans in that very organisation which the latter had regarded as their own particular province4 ,the following passages from his book may be worth recalling3-- ,towards the middle of ,september1 #ahib1 from a military railway station improvised for the occasion1 there were sent off in less than eight hours forty-two trains conveying a complete ,army ,corps of #be1jjj men4 ,in their famous mobilisation test of #ahhg the ,french despatched from the ,toulouse station #aej military trains without interrupting the ordinary traffic1 and without any accident4 ,such figures speak a significant language4 ,they show what enormous masses of troops the railway can carry in the course of a few hours to a given point4444 ,if ,i have referred to the results obtained by our neighbours on their railway systems1 it is not because ,i have the least fear as to the final issue of the next war4 ,quite the contrary2 but the fact does not prevent me from asking why the ,german ,army cannot base on the railways of that country the same hopes which neighbouring countries are able to entertain in regard to theirs4 ,the favourable impression thus given1 even to a ,german critic1 by the progress ,france was making in her creation1 not so much de novo as ab ovo1 of a system of organised military rail-transport1 were confirmed by many subsequent trials1 experiments and experiences1 all1 in turn1 leading to further improvements in matters of detail2 but it was1 indeed1 the nchste ,krieg concerning which ,lieutenant ,becker wrote that was to be the real test of the organisation which1 during more than forty years of peace1 ,france followed up with a zeal1 a pertinacity and a thoroughness fully equal to those of ,germany herself4 ,in any case it would seem that ,france1 though having to make up for the headway gained by ,germany1 finally created a system of military rail-transport which would be able to stand the fullest comparison with even the now greatly-improved system of her traditional foe2 while the organisation she thus elaborated1 not for the purposes of aggression but as an arm of her national defence1 illustrates in a striking degree the ever-increasing importance of the problem of rail-power1 and the comprehensive nature of the measures for its effective exercise which a great ,continental nation regards as indispensable under the conditions of modern warfare4 ,,defensive ,,railways ,the measures adopted included1 also1 the improvement of the ,french railway system1 since this was no less in need of amendment and additions in order to adapt it to the needs of the military situation4 ,whilst1 as we have seen in ,chapter ,i1 the important part that railways were likely to play in war was recognised in ,france as early as #ahcc1 and whilst1 in #ahdb1 attention was called in that country to the aggressive lines which ,germany was then already building in the direction of the ,french frontiers1 the ,french railway system itself was1 prior to the war of #ahgj-ga1 developed on principles which practically ignored strategical considerations1 were based mainly on economic1 political and local interests1 and not only refrained from becoming aggressive in turn1 but even failed to provide adequately1 as they should have done1 for the legitimate purposes of national defence4 ,apart from the absence of any designs on the part of ,france against her neighbours' territory1 during this period of her history1 one of the main reasons for the conditions just mentioned is to be found in the predominant position of ,paris as the capital and centre-point of ,french life and ,french movement4 ,germany at this time consisted of a collection of ,states each of which had its own chief city and built its railways to serve its own particular interests1 without much regard for the interests of its sister ,states1 even if it escaped the risk of cherishing more or less jealousy towards them4 ,in ,france there was but one ,state and one capital1 and ,paris was regarded as the common centre from which the main lines were to radiate in all directions4 ,communication was thus established as between the capital and the principal inland towns or important points on the frontiers or on the coasts of ,france2 but the inadequate number of lateral or transverse lines linking up and connecting these main lines placed great difficulty in the way of communication between the provincial centres themselves otherwise than vi ,paris4 ,some of these disadvantages were to have been overcome under a law passed in #ahfh which approved the construction of seventeen new lines having a total length of #a1hdj km4 7#a1adc miles74 ,when1 however1 war broke out in #ahgj1 comparatively little had been done towards the achievement of this programme1 and ,france entered upon the conflict with a railway system which had been even less developed towards her eastern frontiers than towards the north1 the west and the south1 while for the purposes of concentrating her troops in the first-mentioned direction she had available only three lines1 and of these three one alone was provided with double-track throughout4 ,such were the inadequacies of the system at this time that the important line between ,verdun and ,metz had not yet been completed4 ,no sooner had the war come to an end than the ,french ,government started on the improvement of the railway system in order to adapt it to the possible if not prospective military requirements of the future1 so that they should never again be taken at a disadvantage2 and in carrying on this work--in addition to the reorganisation of their military-transport system in general--they showed an unexampled energy and thoroughness4 ,within five years of the restoration of peace the ,french railway system had already undergone an extension which1 according to ,captain ,a4 ,pernot1 as told in his ,aperu historique sur le service des transports militaires1 would have been possible in but few countries in so short a period2 while of the situation at the time he wrote 7#ahid7 the same authority declared3--,one can say that everything is ready in a vast organisation which only awaits the word of command in order to prove the strength of its capacity4 ,without attempting to give exhaustive details of all that was done1 it may suffice to indicate generally the principles adopted4 ,one of the most important of these related to an improvement of the conditions in and around ,paris4 ,here the purposes specially aimed at were 7#a7 to establish further connecting links between the various trunk lines radiating from the capital1 and 7#b7 to obviate the necessity for traffic from1 for example1 the south or the west having to pass through ,paris en route to the east or the north4 ,these aims it was sought to effect by means of a series of circular railways1 or rings of railways1 joining up the existing lines1 and allowing of the transfer of military transport from one to the other without coming into ,paris at all4 ,an inner circular railway 7,chemin de ,fer de ,petite ,ceinture7 had already been constructed within the fortifications prior to #ahgj1 and this was followed in #ahgi by an outer line1 7,chemin de ,fer de ,grande ,ceinture71 which provided a wider circle at an average distance of about #bj km4 7#ab miles7 and established direct rail connection1 not only between a large number of the more remote suburbs1 together with the different trunk lines at a greater distance from the city1 but1 also1 between the various forts constructed for the defence of ,paris4 ,these circular railways were1 in turn1 succeeded by a series of connecting links which ensured the provision of a complete ring of rail communication at a still greater distance around ,paris1 the towns comprised therein including ,rouen1 ,amiens1 ,la ,fre1 ,laon1 ,reims1 ,chalons-sur-,marne1 ,troyes1 ,sens1 ,montargis1 ,orlans1 ,dreux1 and so on back to ,rouen4 ,within1 again1 this outermost ring there was provided a further series of lines which1 by linking up ,orlans1 ,malesherbes1 ,montereau1 ,nogent1 ,epernay1 ,soissons1 ,beauvais and ,dreux1 established additional connections between all the lines from ,paris to the north and the east of ,france1 and gave increased facilities for the distribution in those directions of troops arriving at ,orlans from the south-west1 this being once more done without any need for their entering ,paris or even approaching it at a closer distance than about forty miles4 ,orlans itself was recognised as a point of great strategical importance in regard to the movement of troops1 and it was1 accordingly1 provided with a number of new lines radiating therefrom1 and establishing better connections with other lines4 ,tours and other centres of military significance1 from the same point of view1 were strengthened in a like manner4 ,at important junctions1 and notably so in the case of ,troyes 7,champagne71 loop lines were built in order that troop trains could be transferred direct from one line to another without stopping1 and with no need for shunting or for changing the position of the engine4 ,in the direction of the eastern frontier the line from ,verdun to ,metz was completed1 and by #ahii the three routes which could alone be made use of in #ahgj-ga had been increased to ten4 ,most of them were provided with double-track throughout1 and all of them were independent of one another1 though having intercommunication by means of cross lines4 ,other new railways established connection with or between the forts on both the eastern and the northern frontiers4 ,others1 again1 provided direct communication between different harbours or between each of them and strategical points in the interior1 thus contributing to the possibilities of their defence in case of attack from the sea4 ,still others were designed for the defence of the ,french ,alps4 ,apart from the provision of all these new lines1 much was done in the doubling or even the quadrupling of existing track wherever the question of military transport came into consideration at all4 ,then at railway stations near to arsenals1 and at important strategical centres1 specially long platforms were provided to allow of the rapid entraining of men or material in case of need4 ,while1 also1 so much was being done for the improvement of the ,french railway system from an avowedly strategical point of view1 there were many additional lines constructed or improvements made which1 although designed to further the interests of trade and travel1 also added to the sum total of available facilities for military transport4 ,the advantages specially aimed at were 7#a7 the ensuring of a more rapid mobilisation of troops through the betterment of cross-country connections2 7#b7 the avoidance of congestion of traffic in ,paris2 7#c7 the securing of a more rapid concentration on the frontiers1 especially when each ,army ,corps could be assured the independent use of a double-track line of rails for its own use2 and 7#d7 the more effective defence of all vital points4 ,national defence1 rather than the building of strategical lines designed to serve aggressive purposes1 was the fundamental principle on which the policy thus followed since #ahgj-ga was based2 and if1 as ,captain ,pernot wrote in #ahid1 everything was even then ready for all emergencies1 the continuous additions and improvements made since that time1 bringing the railway system of the country more and more into harmony with the perfectionnement aimed at by ,france in the organisation of her military transport1 must have made the conditions of preparedness still more complete by #aiad4 ,,footnotes3 #bf ,for details concerning the functions and duties of the various divisions1 subdivisions1 etc41 see ,mouvements et ,transports4 ,sections de chemins de fer de campagne4 ,volume arrt la date du #a;er septembre1 #aiad4 ,paris3 ,henri ,charles-,lavauzelle4 #bg ,bulletin ,officiel du ,ministre de la ,guerre4 ,gnie4 ,troupes de chemins de fer4 ,volume arrt la date du #a;er dcembre1 #aiab4 #bh ,transports militaires par chemin de fer4 7,guerre et ,marine47 dition mise jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en octobre1 #aijb4 ,for later publications1 dealing1 in separate issues1 with particular departments of the military rail-transport organisation1 see ,bibliography4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,organisation ,,in ,,england ,the difference between the geographical conditions of the ,british ,isles and those of the principal countries on the ,continent of ,europe led to the systematic organisation of rail transport for military purposes being taken in hand at a later date in the ,united ,kingdom than was1 more especially1 the case in ,germany4 ,here there was no question of building lines of invasion or lines to facilitate the massing of troops on a neighbour's frontiers4 ,the questions that alone seemed to arise in ,england were--7#a7 the relations between the ,state and the companies in regard to the use of the railways for the transport of troops and military necessaries under conditions either of peace or of war2 7#b7 the employment of railways both for resisting invasion and for the conveyance of expeditionary forces to the port of embarkation2 7#c7 the adoption of such means as would ensure the efficient working of the railways under war conditions2 and 7#d7 the creation of an ,army engineering force providing for the construction1 repair1 operation or destruction of railways either at home1 in case of invasion1 or to facilitate operations in overseas expeditions through the building and working of military railways4 ,with these various considerations it may be convenient to deal in the order as here given4 ,,the ,,state ,,and ,,the ,,railways ,in the ,railway ,regulation ,act1 #ahdb1 7#e and #f ,vict41 c4 #ee17 entitled ,an ,act for the better ,regulation of ,railways and for the ,conveyance of ,troops1 it was provided1 by section #bj3-- ,whenever it shall be necessary to move any of the officers or soldiers of her ,majesty's forces of the line 444 by any railway1 the directors shall permit them1 with baggage1 stores1 arms1 ammunition and other necessaries and things1 to be conveyed1 at the usual hours of starting1 at such prices or upon such conditions as may be contracted for between the ,secretary at ,war and such railway companies on the production of a route or order signed by the proper authorities4 ,this was the first provision made in the ,united ,kingdom in respect to the conveyance of troops by rail4 ,it was succeeded in #ahdd by another ,act 7#g and #h ,vict41 c4 #he17 by which 7sec4 #ab7 railway companies were required to provide conveyances for the transport of troops at fares not exceeding a scale given in the ,act1 and maximum fares were also prescribed in regard to public baggage1 stores1 ammunition1 7with certain exceptions1 applying to gunpowder and explosives17 and other military necessaries4 ,in #ahfg these provisions were extended to the ,army ,reserve4 ,further revision of the fares and charges took place under the ,cheap ,trains ,act1 #ahhc1 7#df and #dg ,vict41 c4 #cd17 entitled ,an ,act to amend the ,law ,relating to ,railway ,passenger ,duty and to amend and consolidate the law relating to the conveyance of the ,queen's forces by railway4 ,state control of the railways in case of war was provided for under the ,regulation of the ,forces ,act1 #ahga1 7#cd and #ce ,vict41 c4 #hf17 ,an ,act for the ,regulation of the ,regular and ,auxiliary ,forces of the ,crown1 and for other purposes relating thereto4 ,section #af laid down that-- ,when her ,majesty1 by ,order in ,council1 declares that an emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public service that her ,majesty's ,government should have control over the railroads of the ,united ,kingdom1 or any of them1 the ,secretary of ,state may1 by warrant under his hand1 empower any person or persons named in such warrant to take possession in the name or on behalf of her ,majesty of any railroad in the ,united ,kingdom1 and of the plant belonging thereto1 or of any part thereof1 and may take possession of any plant without taking possession of the railroad itself1 and to use the same for her ,majesty's service at such times and in such manner as the ,secretary of ,state may direct2 and the directors1 officers and servants of any such railroad shall obey the directions of the ,secretary of ,state as to the user of such railroad or plant as aforesaid for her ,majesty's service4 ,any warrant granted by the said ,secretary of ,state in pursuance of this section shall remain in force for one week only1 but may be renewed from week to week so long as1 in the opinion of the said ,secretary of ,state1 the emergency continues4 ,provision was also made for the payment of full compensation to the interests concerned4 ,the powers of control thus acquired by the ,government followed1 in effect1 closely upon the precedent already established in the ,united ,states1 7see p4 #af17 even although they were not defined with the same elaborate detail4 ,on the other hand greater emphasis is laid in the ,english ,act on the provision that the ,government may take possession of any plant without taking possession of the railroad itself4 ,this gives them the right to take over the locomotives and rolling stock of any railway in any part of the ,united ,kingdom1 even though the lines in question may not themselves be wanted for the purposes of military transport4 ,under the provisions of the ,national ,defence ,act1 #ahhh1 7#ea and #eb ,vict41 c4 #ca17 traffic for naval and military purposes is to have precedence over other traffic on the railways of the ,united ,kingdom whenever an ,order for the embodiment of the ,militia is in force4 ,it was by virtue of the above section of the ,act of #ahga that the ,government took control over the railways of ,great ,britain on the outbreak of war in #aiad4 ,as regards the earlier ,acts of #ahdb and #ahdd1 these were mainly domestic measures relating to the conveyance of troops in time of peace rather than war4 ,the beginnings of organisation of military rail-transport for the purposes of war followed1 rather1 on a realisation both of the possibilities of invasion and of the weakness of the position in which ,england at one time stood from the point of view of national defence4 ,,invasion ,,prospects ,,and ,,home ,,defence ,in #ahdg the ,duke of ,wellington1 7then ,commander-in-,chief17 addressed to ,sir ,john ,burgoyne a letter in which he said he had endeavoured to awaken the attention of different ,administrations to the defenceless state of the country4 ,we had1 he declared1 no defence1 or hope of chance of defence1 except in our ,fleet1 and he was especially sensible both of the certainty of failure if we did not1 at an early moment1 attend to the measures necessary to be taken for our defence and of the disgrace1 the indelible disgrace1 of such failure4 ,then1 in words that greatly impressed the country1 he added3-- ,i am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age1 passed in honour2 ,i hope that the ,almighty may protect me from being the witness of the tragedy which ,i cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert4 ,as the result alike of this pathetic warning2 of a ,letter on the ,defence of ,england by ,volunteer ,corps and ,militia issued in pamphlet form by ,sir ,charles ,napier in #aheb2 and of the ,indian ,mutiny in #aheg1 which event called attention to the defenceless condition of the ,empire as a whole1 continuous efforts were made to secure the creation of ,volunteer ,corps for the purposes of defence4 ,for a period of twelve years these efforts met with persistent discouragement1 the ,government refusing official recognition to certain corps of riflemen tentatively formed2 but in #ahei the prospect of an early invasion of this country by ,france aroused public feeling to such an extent that on ,may #ab the then ,secretary of ,state for ,war1 ,general ,peel1 addressed a circular to the ,lord-,lieutenants of counties in ,great ,britain announcing that ,volunteer ,corps might be formed under an ,act passed in #ahjd1 when a like course had been adopted as a precautionary measure against the threatened invasion of ,england by ,napoleon4 ,the formation of ,volunteer ,corps was thereupon taken up with the greatest zeal1 and by the end of #ahfj the number of ,volunteers enrolled throughout ,great ,britain was no fewer than #abj1jjj4 ,other results of the national awakening in #ahei were the public discussion of the questions of coast defence and armoured trains1 7of which mention has been made in ,chapter ,,vii17 and the appropriation1 in #ahfj1 of a loan of seven and a half millions for the improvement of our coast defences and notably the fortifications of ,portsmouth and ,plymouth4 ,,engineer ,,and ,,railway ,,staff ,,corps ,already in ,december1 #ahei1 the necessity for some definite engineering instruction for ,volunteers was being pointed out1 and in ,january1 #ahfj1 the first corps of ,volunteer ,engineers was created1 under the title of the #ast ,middlesex ,volunteer ,engineers4 ,similar corps were formed in various parts of the country1 and by #ahfg the number of ,volunteer ,engineers enrolled was #f1ehj4 ,at the beginning of #ahfj a further proposal was made for the formation of a body which1 composed of eminent civil engineers1 the general managers of leading lines of railway1 and the principal railway contractors or other employers of labour1 would undertake a variety of duties considered no less essential in the interests of national defence4 ,there was1 in the first place1 the question of the transport by rail alike of ,volunteers and of the regular forces1 either on the occasion of reviews or for the protection of our coasts against an invader4 ,while it was evident that the railways could be efficiently worked only by their own officers1 it was no less obvious that plans for the movement of large bodies of men1 and especially of troops1 with horses1 guns1 ammunition and stores1 should be well considered and prepared long beforehand1 and not left for the occasion or the emergency when the need for them would arise4 ,in the next place it was suggested that the engineering talent of the country should be made available for the purpose of supplementing the services of the ,royal ,engineers in carrying out various defensive works1 such as the destruction of railway lines1 bridges and roads1 the throwing up of earthworks1 or the flooding of the lowland districts1 with a view to resisting the advance of a possible invader4 ,finally the great contractors were to be brought into the combination so that they could provide the labour necessary for the execution of these defensive works under the direction of the civil engineers1 who themselves would act under the direction of the military commanders4 ,each of the three groups was to discharge the function for which it was specially adapted1 while the co-ordination of the three1 for the purpose of strengthening the country's powers of resisting invasion1 was expected to add greatly to the value of the proposed organisation4 ,the author of this scheme was ,mr4 ,charles ,manby1 ,f4,r4,s41 7#ahjd-ahhd17 a distinguished civil engineer who for nearly half a century was secretary of the ,institution of ,civil ,engineers and was closely associated with the leading civil engineers1 contractors and railway interests of the country4 ,he submitted his ideas to several members of the ,council of his ,institution1 and though1 at first1 the scheme was not well received1 he was subsequently so far encouraged that in ,august1 #ahfj1 he laid his plan before ,mr4 ,sidney ,herbert1 then ,minister at ,war in ,lord ,palmerston's second administration4 ,mr4 ,herbert expressed cordial approval of the project1 giving the assurance1 on behalf of the ,war ,office1 that an organisation on the basis suggested could not fail to be of public benefit2 but ,mr4 ,manby still met with difficulties alike from several members of the ,council1 who either offered direct opposition to the scheme or else gave unwilling consent to join1 and1 also1 from the railway companies1 who thought that arrangements for rail-transport might very well be left to themselves1 and that there was no necessity for the suggested system so far as they1 at least1 were concerned4 ,in these circumstances ,mr4 ,manby made1 at first1 very little progress2 but he was unremitting in his efforts to demonstrate alike to civil engineers and to the railway companies the practical benefits from the point of view of public interests that would result from the organisation he advocated1 and in #ahfd he felt sufficiently encouraged to lay his views once more before the ,war ,office4 ,earl de ,grey1 then in charge of that ,department1 thereupon instructed the ,inspector-,general of ,volunteers1 ,colonel ,mc,murdo1 7afterwards ,general ,sir ,w4 ,m4 ,mc,murdo1 ,c4,b417 to inquire into and report to him on the subject4 ,in the result there was created1 in ,january1 #ahfe1 a body known as the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps1 constituted1 according to its rules1 for the purpose of directing the application of skilled labour and of railway transport to the purposes of national defence1 and for preparing1 in time of peace1 a system on which such duties should be conducted4 ,the ,corps was to consist of officers only1 and its members were to be civil engineers and contractors1 officers of railway and dock companies1 and1 under special circumstances1 ,board of ,trade ,inspectors of ,railways4 ,civil engineers of standing and experience who had directed the construction of the chief railways and other important works1 general managers of railways and commercial docks1 and ,board of ,trade ,inspectors of ,railways1 were alone eligible for the rank of ,lieutenant-,colonel4 ,other civil engineers and contractors connected chiefly with railway works1 and1 also1 railway officers other than general managers1 take the rank of ,major4 ,col4 ,mc,murdo was appointed ,honorary ,colonel of the ,corps on ,february #i1 #ahfe4bi ,as ultimately constituted1 the corps consisted of an ,honorary ,colonel 7now ,maj4-,gen4 ,d4 ,a4 ,scott1 ,c4,v4,o41 ,c4,b41 ,d4,s4,c471 thirty ,lieutenant-,colonels including a ,commandant1 7now ,lieut4-,col4 ,sir ,william ,forbes1 general manager of the ,london1 ,brighton and ,south ,coast ,railway7 and twenty ,majors4#cj ,,functions ,,and ,,purposes ,that the ,corps thus created was the direct outcome1 first1 of the ,volunteer movement1 and1 through that movement1 of the state of semi-panic into which the country had drifted in #ahei1 as the result both of the anticipations of invasion and the admitted weakness1 at that time1 of our national defences1 has thus been clearly established4 ,writing in #ahfi1 ,major-,general ,mc,murdo1 who had been raised to that rank in #ahfh1 said in a pamphlet he issued under the title of ,rifle ,volunteers for ,field ,service that the ,corps was prepared to work1 not for ,volunteers alone1 but for the entire defensive forces of the country4 ,in this same publication ,major-,general ,mc,murdo gave an account of the functions and purposes the ,corps had been designed to serve4 ,alluding first to the ,volunteer movement1 he showed how the railway carriage must both carry and shelter the ,volunteer when moving from one part of the country to another2 and he proceeded3-- ,i will ask you to look attentively for a moment at a ,bradshaw's railway map1 and you will see that throughout the network of rails that overspreads the land none of the meshes1 so to speak1 in any vital parts of the country1 exceed fifteen miles across1 from rail to rail2 but as the eye approaches the ,metropolis1 or any of the commercial centres1 these meshes are diminished to about one-half the area of the others4 ,he then dealt with the operations which the movement of troops along these lines of railway would involve1 and continued3-- ,the railway schemes for the accomplishment of such delicate operations would emanate from the ,council of the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps4444 ,during peace the railway branch of this body is employed in working out hypothetical plans of campaign1 in the development of which they manipulate in theory the entire rolling-stock and railway resources of the country1 elaborated by special time-tables and technical reports4 ,the share taken by the civil engineers is not confined to providing merely for the class of railway works contingent on war1 whether of construction1 demolition1 or of reconstruction1 but in supplying the military engineers with information1 advice and labour4 ,no one1 for example1 can be more familiar with the features and character of a district than the engineer who has constructed a line of railway through it4 ,no one is so well able to point out the results of letting in that which he had been so often employed in keeping out1 viz41 the inundations of the sea4 ,none better acquainted with the existing distribution of labour power throughout the country1 and of the means by which it could be concentrated upon given points1 for the construction of works of defence4 ,all these elements1 in short1 by which the gigantic resources of our country may be safely wielded for her defence1 are now being silently considered and woven into strategical schemes of operations by these eminent and patriotic men1 the value of whose voluntary services will not be fully comprehended or appreciated till the day comes when the discomfiture of the invader shall be accomplished through their instrumentality4 ,the same distinguished authority wrote concerning the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps in an article on ,volunteers which he contributed to the ,encyclopdia ,britannica 7ninth edition73-- ,the ready labour power of this useful ,corps is estimated at from #ab1jjj to #bj1jjj navvies1 with tools1 barrows and commissariat complete4 ,it has already performed important service in tabulating1 and printing at great private cost1 complete time-tables and special reports for six general concentrations against possible invasion4 ,a special return was also prepared by the ,corps 7the first of its kind7 of the entire rolling stock of all the railways in ,great ,britain4 ,this important work--which is corrected and republished annually--shows where the requisite number of carriages of every description can be obtained for the composition of troop trains4 ,in the official catalogue of books in the ,war ,office ,library there is an item which reads3--,time ,tables for ,special ,troop ,trains1 etc4 ,compiled by the ,railway ,companies4 #caa pp4 #hvo4 ,london1 #ahff4 ,this1 presumably1 refers to the first of the complete time tables mentioned in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica article as having been compiled by the ,corps4 ,it is evident1 from the date given1 that the ,corps must have got quickly to work after its formation in #ahfe4 ,at one time there was an expectation that the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps would develop into a body exercising still wider and more responsible duties than those already mentioned4 ,on this point we have the testimony of the late ,sir ,george ,findlay1 formerly general manager of the ,london and ,north-,western ,railway ,company1 and himself a ,lieutenant-,colonel in the ,corps4 ,col4 ,j4 ,s4 ,rothwell had written some articles#ca in which1 while admitting their practically unlimited resources1 he questioned the ability of the ,british railways1 at a few hours notice1 to transport to any part of our coasts which might be the scene of a hostile invasion a sufficient body of troops to dispute the advance of an army upon ,london1 and he further suggested that the whole question was one which had not yet received the mature consideration it deserved4 ,col4 ,rothwell said1 in the course of what he wrote3-- ,though the actual working of our railways must be left in the hands of the proper railway officials1 it does not follow that the planning of the arrangements for the military traffic should also be entrusted to them exclusively4 ,this1 however1 appears to be contemplated1 as1 under existing circumstances1 such arrangements would rest with the members of a body called the ,volunteer ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps4444 ,though the efficiency of these gentlemen in their own sphere is undeniable1 it appears open to question whether they are likely to have sufficient leisure personally to work out the details of a large concentration of troops by rail1 and whether the special requirements of military transport will be fully appreciated by them1 or by the subordinates whom they presumably will employ4 ,much1 he argued1 required to be done before the country could be considered ready to meet a possible invader2 and he concluded3-- ,if the invasion of ,england is to be regarded as an event which is within the bounds of possibility1 it is surely not unreasonable to ask that those precautionary measures which require time for their elaboration shall be thoroughly worked out before there is any risk of our wanting to employ them4 ,the organisation for the conveyance of our troops by railway is such a measure4 ,to these criticisms ,sir ,george ,findlay replied in an article ,on the ,use of ,railways in the ,united ,kingdom for the ,conveyance of ,troops1 published in the ,united ,service ,magazine for ,april1 #ahib4 ,the complete network of railways covering these islands1 admirably equipped and efficiently worked as they were1 would1 he declared1 be found equal to any part they might be called upon to play in a scheme of national defence4 ,as regarded the attention already paid to the question he said3-- ,the ,war ,office1 so far from having in any way neglected the subject1 have devoted considerable attention to it1 and a complete scheme for the working of our railways for transport purposes in time of war has been elaborated1 and would at once be put in operation1 if ever the emergency arose4 ,passing on to describe the composition and duties of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps1 he spoke of its members as meeting in council at their headquarters to discuss from time to time details of railway organisation and other matters delegated to their consideration1 afterwards reporting their conclusions to the ,war ,office2 and he went on to say that for the operation of the railways1 under ,state control1 on any occasion of national energy or danger-- ,a draft scheme has been prepared1 has been worked out in detail1 and would1 in all probability1 be adopted and put in operation if1 unhappily1 the necessity should ever arise4 ,this scheme in its main features provides that1 at such time as we are contemplating1 the principal railway officials in ,great ,britain and ,ireland would at once become1 for the time being1 the officers of the ,state1 and in addition to the general managers of the leading railways1 who are officers of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps1 military rank of some kind would be conferred upon the engineers1 locomotive superintendents1 chief passenger superintendents and goods managers of the principal railway companies1 as well as on the managers of the principal ,irish railways4 ,the railways of the country would be divided into sections1 and for each section there would be a committee composed of the general managers of the railways included in the section1 together with the principal engineers1 locomotive superintendents and other chief officers4 ,the railways would be worked and controlled for military purposes by these committees of sections1 each committee having as its president a ,lieutenant-,colonel of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps1 who would be directly responsible for providing transport for troops and stores over the section of which his committee had charge1 while if the operation to be carried out required the co-operation of one or more sections of the railways1 the committees of those sections would act in unison4 ,in such a case the ,quartermaster-,general's requisition for the service to be performed would be made upon the president of the section embracing the point of departure1 that officer and his committee taking the initiative and arranging with the other committees for the performance of the service4 ,for each section1 or group1 of railways1 a military officer of rank would be appointed1 with full power to arrange for food1 forage and water for the troops and horses en route1 and having at his disposal a sufficient number of soldiers or labourers to assist in loading and unloading baggage1 stores1 etc41 at the points of entrainment and detrainment within his section4 ,he would also be able to command the services of the ,royal or ,volunteer ,engineers to assist in the erection of temporary platforms or landings1 or the laying down of temporary rails1 and would be instructed to co-operate with1 and assist in every way1 the committee of section having charge of his district1 but not in any way to attempt to interfere with the working of the line or the movement of the trains or traffic4 ,the number of sections into which the railways were to be divided for the purposes of this scheme was nine4 ,after defining the various areas1 ,sir ,george continued3-- ,it is contemplated that during any such period of crisis as we are now discussing1 the ,council of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps would be sitting en permanence at its headquarters1 and1 with a full knowledge of the nature and extent of the operations to be carried out1 would have power to regulate the supply and distribution of rolling stock throughout the area affected1 all the vehicles in the country being1 for the time being1 treated as a common stock4 ,this is a mere outline of the scheme1 with the further details of which it is not necessary to trouble the reader1 though probably enough has been said to show that the subject1 far from having been neglected1 as ,colonel ,rothwell appears to assume1 has been carefully studied and thought out4 ,had the scheme in question been matured and adopted on the lines here stated1 a still greater degree of importance would have been attached to the position and proceedings of a ,corps then--and still--almost unknown to the world at large1 since its chief function was to carry out investigations at the request of the authorities1 and prepare reports1 statements and statistics which have invariably got no further than the ,war ,office and the ,horse ,guards1 where1 alone1 the value of the services rendered has been fully understood and appreciated4 ,the scheme was1 however1 allowed to drop1 the policy eventually adopted being based1 preferably1 7#a7 on the railways of ,great ,britain being operated in war time as one group instead of in a series of groups or sections2 and 7#b7 on such operation being entrusted to a body specially created for the purpose2 though prior to the adoption of the latter course there was to be a fresh development in another direction4 ,,the ,,war ,,railway ,,council ,while the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps remained1 down to #ahif1 the only organised body which 7apart from the individual railway companies7 ,government departments could consult as to the technical working and traffic facilities of the railways1 from the point of view of military transport1 it was thought desirable1 in the year mentioned1 to supplement that ,corps by a smaller body known at first as the ,army ,railway ,council and afterwards as the ,war ,railway ,council4 ,designed to act in a purely advisory capacity1 without assuming any administrative or executive functions1 this ,council was eventually constituted as follows3--,the ,deputy ,quartermaster-,general 7president72 six railway managers1 who represented the ,british railway companies and might or might not already be members of the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps2 one ,board of ,trade ,inspector of ,railways2 two members 7not being railway managers7 of the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps2 the ,deputy-,assistant ,quartermaster-,general2 one mobilisation officer2 two ,naval officers2 and one officer of the ,royal ,engineers1 with a representative of the ,quartermaster-,general's ,department as secretary4 ,the ,council approximated closely to the ,commission ,militaire ,superieure des ,chemins de ,fer in ,france1 of which an account has been given in ,chapter ,,ix4 ,it also undertook many of the duties which in the case of the ,german ,army would be performed by a special section of the ,general ,staff2 though some of these duties it took over from the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps1 reducing the functions and the importance of that body proportionately4 ,in time of peace the ,council was 7#a7 generally to advise the ,secretary of ,state for ,war on matters relating to military rail-transport2 7#b7 to draw up1 in conjunction with the different railway companies concerned1 and on the basis of data to be supplied to them by the ,war ,office1 a detailed scheme for the movement of troops on mobilisation2 7#c7 to arrange in advance as to the composition of the trains which would be required for any such movement2 7#d7 to determine the nature of the data to be asked for from the railway companies1#cb and to prepare the necessary regulations and instructions in regard to the said troop movements2 7#e7 to draw up rules for the organisation of a body of ,railway ,staff ,officers who1 located at railway stations to be selected by the ,council1 would act there as intermediaries between the railway officials and the troops2 and 7#f7 to confer with the different railway companies as to the provision of such extra sidings1 loading platforms1 ramps1 barriers1 etc41 as might be necessary to facilitate military transport1 and to decide on the best means by which the provision thereof could be arranged4 ,information on these subjects was to be carefully compiled1 elaborated1 and1 with explanatory maps1 placed on record for use as required4 ,in the event of mobilisation1 or of some national emergency1 the ,council was1 also1 to advise the ,secretary of ,state for ,war in regard to matters relating to the movement of troops by rail2 to act as a medium of communication between the ,war ,office and the railway companies1 and to make all the necessary arrangements in connection with such movements4 ,other questions likely to arise1 and requiring consideration in time of peace1 included the guarding of the railways against possible attack2 the prompt repair of any damage that might be done to them2 the equipment of armoured trains1 and the provision of ambulance trains on lines where they might be required4 ,all these and various other matters were dealt with at the periodical meetings held by the ,council1 which1 within the range of its limitations as an advisory body1 rendered good service to the ,war ,office2 though that ,department was still left to deal with the individual railway companies in regard to all arrangements and matters of detail directly concerning them4 ,,railway ,,transport ,,officers ,in the foregoing statement as to the functions to be discharged by the ,war ,railway ,council it is mentioned that these were to include the drawing up of rules for the organisation of a body of ,railway ,staff ,officers who were to act as intermediaries between the troops and the railway station staffs in the conduct of military rail-transport4 ,we touch here upon those questions of control and organisation of military traffic which had been a fruitful source of trouble in earlier wars1 and more especially so on the ,french railways in the war of #ahgj-ga4 ,there was1 indeed1 much wisdom in the attempt now being made1 as a precautionary measure1 to provide well in advance against the risk of similar experiences in regard to movements of ,british troops by rail1 while the course adopted led to the creation of a system which was to ensure excellent results later on4 ,in the first instance the officers appointed under the system here in question were known as ,railway ,control ,officers1 7,r4,c4,o4's17 their chief as the ,director of ,railways1 7,d4,r417 and the organisation itself as the ,railway ,control ,establishment2 but the titles of ,railway ,transport ,officers 7,r4,t4,o4's71 ,director of ,railway ,transport 7,d4,r4,t47 and ,transport ,establishments were afterwards substituted4 ,the functions of the ,director of ,railway ,transport are thus defined in ,field ,service ,regulations1 ,part ,,ii1 section #bc 7#aiac73-- ,provision of railway transport and administration of railway transport personnel4 ,control1 construction1 working and maintenance of all railways4 ,provision of telegraph operators for railway circuits4 ,control and working of telephones and telegraphs allotted to the railway service4 ,for the erection and maintenance of all telegraph circuits on railways which are worked by the troops1 a representative of the ,director of ,army ,signals will be attached to his headquarters and the necessary signal troops allotted to him as may be ordered by the ,i4,g4,c4 7,inspector-,general of ,communications74 ,as regards the ,railway ,transport ,establishments1 the ,regulations say 7section #fb73-- ,in railway matters1 the authority of each member of a railway transport establishment will be paramount on that portion of a railway system where he is posted for duty4 ,railway technical officials will always receive the demands of the troops for railway transport through the railway transport establishment4 ,except when fighting is imminent or in progress1 a member of the railway transport establishment will receive orders from the ,director of ,railway ,transport only1 or his representative4 ,an officer1 or officers1 of the railway transport establishment1 recognized by a badge worn on the left arm marked ,r4,t4,o41 will be posted for duty at each place where troops are constantly entraining1 detraining1 or halting en route4 ,their chief duties will be3-- #a4 ,to facilitate the transport of troops1 animals and material4 #b4 ,to act as a channel of communication between the military authorities and the technical railway personnel4 #c4 ,to advise the local military authorities as to the capacity and possibilities of the railway4 #d4 ,to bring to the notice of the ,director of ,railway ,transport any means by which the carrying power of the railway may1 for military purposes1 be increased4 ,all details as to the entraining and detraining of troops and the loading and unloading of stores will be arranged in conjunction with the technical officials by the railway transport establishment1 who will meet all troops arriving to entrain1 inform commanders of the times and places of entrainment1 and allot trucks and carriages to units in bulk4 ,they will see that the necessary rolling stock is provided by the railway officials1 that only the prescribed amount of baggage is loaded1 and that no unauthorised person travels by rail4 ,they will meet all troop trains1 and see that troops and stores are detrained with the utmost despatch4 ,it will be observed from these regulations that1 whatever his own rank may be1 the ,r4,t4,o41 subject to the instructions he has received from his superior ,transport ,officer1 exercises at the railway station to which he is delegated an authority that not even a ,general may question or seek to set aside by giving orders direct to the station staff4 ,the ,r4,t4,o4 alone is the channel of communication between the military and the railway elements4 ,he it is who1 acting in conjunction with the railway people1 must see that all the details in connection with entraining and detraining are properly arranged and efficiently carried out1 while the operations of the station staff are1 in turn1 greatly facilitated alike by his co-operation and by the fact that there is now only one military authority to be dealt with at a station instead1 possibly1 of several acting more or less independently of one another4 ,,volunteer ,,reviews ,while all these developments had been proceeding1 the railway companies had1 since the formation of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps1 given repeated evidence of their capacity to move large bodies of ,volunteers with complete efficiency4 ,they specially distinguished themselves in this respect on the occasion of the great ,volunteer reviews held from time to time4 ,in a book entitled ,england's ,naval and ,military ,weakness1 7,london1 #ahhb17 ,major ,james ,walter1 of the #dth ,lancashire ,artillery ,volunteers1 was highly eulogistic of what was done by the railways on the occasion of the reviews in ,edinburgh and ,windsor in #ahha4 ,in regard to the ,windsor review he wrote3-- ,the broad result has been1 so far as the railway part of the business goes1 to prove that it is perfectly feasible to concentrate fifty thousand men from all parts of the kingdom in twenty-four hours4444 ,the two lines most concerned in the ,windsor review--the ,great ,western and the ,south ,western--carried out this great experiment with 444 the regularity and dispatch of the ,scotch mail4 ,major ,walter seems to have had the idea1 rightly or wrongly1 that the success of this performance was mainly due to the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps4 ,he says concerning that body3-- ,not the least valued result of the ,windsor and ,edinburgh reviews of #ahha is the having introduced with becoming prominence to public knowledge the necessary and indispensable services of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps4 ,until these reviews bore testimony to the national importance of this ,corps1 few knew anything of its duties1 or even existence1 beyond a list of officers recorded in the ,army ,list4444 ,since the embodiment of the ,volunteers the ,engineer and ,railway ,transport ,corps has done much service1 invariably thorough and without a hitch4444 ,these several officers of the ,railway ,staff ,corps set about their transport work of the #ahha reviews in a manner worthy of their vocation4 ,they proved to the country that their ,corps was a reality and necessity4 ,in #ahic the authors of the ,army ,book for the ,british ,empire wrote 7p4 #eca73-- ,there is every reason to believe that1 in case of the military forces in the ,united ,kingdom being mobilised for the purposes of home defence1 and being concentrated in any part or parts of the country for the purpose of guarding against or confronting an invasion1 the railway arrangements would work satisfactorily4 ,the remarkable success which has attended the concentration of large bodies of ,volunteers gathered from all quarters of the ,kingdom for military functions and reviews1 on more than one occasion1 has shown the extraordinary capabilities of the ,british railway system for military transport on a great scale4 ,rolling stock is abundant4 ,the more important lines in ,england have a double line of rails2 some have four or more rails4 ,gradients1 moreover1 as a rule are easy1 an important point1 since troop trains are very heavy4 ,,the ,,south ,,african ,,war ,while no one was likely to dispute these conclusions1 it had to be remembered that the transport by rail even of exceptionally large bodies of ,volunteers1 carrying their rifles only1 was a very different matter from the conveyance1 under conditions of great pressure1 of large forces of troops accompanied by horses1 guns1 ammunition1 road wagons1 stores and other necessaries for prospective actual warfare4 ,so the accepted capacity of the ,british railways had still to stand the test of actual war conditions1 with or without the accompaniment of invasion2 and this test was applied1 to a certain extent1 by the ,south ,african ,war4 ,the bulk of the military traffic on that occasion passed over the lines of the ,london and ,south ,western ,railway ,company1 troops from all parts of the country being conveyed by different routes and different lines of railway to ,southampton1 whence they and their stores1 etc41 were shipped to the ,cape4 ,such was the magnitude of this traffic that between the outbreak of the war1 in #ahii1 and the end of #aijj there were carried on the ,london and ,south ,western1 and despatched from ,southampton1 #f1afj officers2 #bbi1jig men2 #bi1ejj horses2 and #a1jhe wheeled vehicles4 ,the conveyance of this traffic involved the running of #a1aed special trains1 in addition to a large number of others carrying baggage1 stores1 etc4 ,at times the pressure was very great4 ,on ,october #bj1 #ahii1 five transports sailed from ,southampton with #afg officers and #d1gef men1 besides guns horses and wagons4 ,yet the whole of the operations were conducted with perfect smoothness1 there being no overtaxing either of the railway facilities or of the dock accommodation4#cc ,much of this smoothness of working was due to the fact that the ,war ,office had1 in accordance with the principle adopted on the appointment of the ,war ,railway ,council1 stationed at ,southampton a ,railway ,transport ,officer who was to act as a connecting link1 or intermediary1 between the railway1 the docks1 the military and the ,admiralty authorities1 co-ordinating their requirements1 superintending the arrivals by train1 arranging for and directing the embarkation of the troops and their equipment in the transports allotted to them1 and preventing any of that confusion which otherwise might well have arisen4 ,similar officers had also been stationed by the ,war ,office at leading railway stations throughout the country to ensure co-operation between the military and the railway staffs and1 while avoiding the possibility of friction or complications1 facilitate the handling of the military traffic4 ,in the account to be given in ,chapter ,,xvi4 of ,railways in the ,boer ,war1 it will be shown that a like course was pursued in ,south ,africa for the duration of the campaign4 ,,army ,,manoeuvres ,,of #aiab ,further evidence as to what the ,british railways were capable of accomplishing was afforded by the ,army ,manoeuvres in ,east ,anglia in #aiab4 ,this event also constituted a much more severe test than the ,volunteer reviews of former days1 since it meant not only the assembling1 in the manoeuvre area1 of four divisions of the ,army and some thousands of ,territorials1 but the transport1 at short notice1 and within a limited period1 of many horses1 guns1 transport wagons1 etc41 together with considerable quantities of stores4 ,certain sections of the traffic were dealt with by the ,great ,northern and the ,london and ,north-,western ,companies2 but the bulk of it was handled by the ,great ,eastern and was carried in nearly #bjj troop trains1 consisting in all of about #d1jjj vehicles4 ,of these trains #ej per cent4 started before or exactly to time1 while the others were only a few minutes late in leaving the station4 ,such was the regularity and general efficiency with which the work of transportation was carried out that in the course of an address to the ,generals1 at ,cambridge1 his ,majesty the ,king referred to the rapid concentration of troops by rail1 without dislocating the ordinary civilian traffic1 as one of the special features of the manoeuvres4 ,the dispersal of the forces on the conclusion of the manoeuvres was effected in a little over two days1 and constituted another smart piece of work4#cd ,a ,,railways ,,executive ,,committee ,in view of all such testimony and of all such actual achievements1 there was no reason to doubt that the railway companies1 with their great resources in material and personnel1 and with the excellence of their own organisation1 would themselves be able to respond promptly and effectively to such demands as might be made upon them in a time of national emergency4 ,there still remained1 however1 the singular fact that although1 so far back as #ahga1 the ,government had acquired power of control over the railways1 in the event of an emergency arising1 a period of forty years had elapsed without any action being taken to create1 even as a precautionary measure1 the administrative machinery by which that control would be exercised by the ,state4 ,such machinery had been perfected in ,germany1 ,france1 and other countries1 but in ,england it had still to be provided4 ,not only had section #af of the ,act of #ahga remained practically a dead letter1 but even the fact that it existed did not seem to be known to so prominent a railway manager as ,sir ,george ,findlay when he wrote ,working and ,management of an ,english ,railway and the article he contributed to the ,united ,service ,magazine of ,april1 #ahib1 his assumption that the ,state would control the railways in time of war being based1 not on the ,act of #ahga--which he failed to mention--but on the ,act of #ahhh1 which simply gives a right of priority to military traffic1 under certain conditions4 ,notwithstanding1 too1 the draft scheme spoken of by ,sir ,george ,findlay1 under which the operation of the railways was to be entrusted1 in case of emergency1 to the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps1 that body and1 also1 the ,war ,railway ,council1 continued to occupy a purely advisory position4 ,so it was clearly desirable to supplement the recognized efficiency of the railways themselves by the creation of a central executive body which1 whenever the ,state assumed control of the railways1 under the ,act of #ahga1 would 7#a7 secure the necessary co-operation between ,government departments and the railway managements2 7#b7 ensure the working of the various railway systems on a national basis2 and 7#c7 co-ordinate such various needs as naval and military movements to or from all parts of the ,kingdom2 coal supply for the ,fleet2 transport of munitions2 the requirements of the civil population1 etc4 ,the necessity for this machinery--which could not possibly be created at a moment's notice--became still more apparent in the autumn of #aiaa1 and steps were taken to provide what was so obviously a missing link in the existing organisation4 ,thus it was that in #aiab the ,war ,railway ,council was succeeded by a ,railways ,executive ,committee which1 constituted of the general managers of leading railway companies1 was to prepare plans with a view to facilitate the working of the provisions of the ,act of #ahga1 and would1 also1 in the event of the ,government assuming control over the railways of ,great ,britain1 under the provisions of that ,act1 constitute the executive body for working them on behalf of the ,state1 becoming the recognised intermediary 7#a7 for receiving the instructions of ,government departments in respect to military and naval requirements2 and 7#b7 for taking the necessary measures in order to give effect to them through the individual companies1 each of which1 subject to the instructions it received from the ,committee1 would retain the management of its own line4 ,in accordance with the principle thus adopted1 it was through the ,railways ,executive ,committee that the ,government1 subject to certain financial arrangements which need not be dealt with here1 established their control over the railways of ,great ,britain on the outbreak of war in #aiad1 the announcement to this effect issued from the ,war ,office1 under date ,august #d1 stating3-- ,an ,order in ,council has been made under ,section #af of the ,regulation of the ,forces ,act1 #ahga1 declaring that it is expedient that the ,government should have control over the railroads in ,great ,britain4 ,this control will be exercised through an ,executive ,committee composed of general managers of railways which has been formed for some time1 and has prepared plans with a view to facilitating the working of this ,act4 ,in a notification issued by the ,executive ,committee1 of which the official chairman was the ,president of the ,board of ,trade and the acting chairman was ,mr4 7now ,sir ,herbert ,a47 ,walker1 general manager of the ,london and ,south ,western ,railway1 it was further stated3-- ,the control of the railways has been taken over by the ,government for the purpose of ensuring that the railways1 locomotives1 rolling stock and staff shall be used as one complete unit in the best interests of the ,state for the movement of troops1 stores and food supplies4444 ,the staff on each railway will remain under the same control as heretofore1 and will receive their instructions through the same channels as in the past4 ,as eventually constituted1 the ,committee consisted of the following general managers3--,mr4 ,d4 ,a4 ,matheson1 ,caledonian ,railway2 ,sir ,sam ,fay1 ,great ,central ,railway2 ,mr4 ,c4 ,h4 ,dent1 ,great ,northern ,railway2 ,mr4 ,f4 ,potter1 ,great ,western ,railway2 ,mr4 ,guy ,calthrop1 ,london and ,north ,western ,railway2 ,mr4 ,j4 ,a4 ,f4 ,aspinall1 ,lancashire and ,yorkshire ,railway2 ,sir ,herbert ,a4 ,walker1 ,london and ,south ,western ,railway2 ,sir ,william ,forbes1 ,london1 ,brighton and ,south ,coast ,railway2 ,sir ,guy ,granet1 ,midland ,railway2 ,sir ,a4 ,k4 ,butterworth1 ,north ,eastern ,railway1 and ,mr4 ,f4 ,h4 ,dent1 ,south ,eastern and ,chatham ,railway1 with ,mr4 ,gilbert ,s4 ,szlumper as secretary4 #ahfj ,,and #aiad ,such1 then1 was the final outcome of a movement which1 started in #ahfj1 by individual effort1 as the result of an expected invasion of ,england by ,france1 was1 in #aiad1 and after undergoing gradual though continuous development1 to play an important part on behalf of the nation in helping ,france herself1 now ,england's cherished ,ally1 to resist the invader of her own fair territory4 ,with what smoothness the transport of our troops was conducted cannot yet be told in detail2 but the facts here narrated will show that the success attained was mainly due to three all-important factors1--7#a7 the efficiency of the railway organisation2 7#b7 the willingness of the ,government1 on assuming control of the railways under the ,act of #ahga1 to leave their management in the hands of railway men2 and 7#c7 the ready adoption1 alike by the railway interests and by ,state departments1 of the fundamental principle enforced by a succession of wars from the ,american ,civil ,war of #ahfa-fe downwards1--that in the conduct of military rail transport there should be1 in each of its various stages1 intermediaries between the military and the railway technical elements1 co-ordinating their mutual requirements1 constituting the recognised and only channel for orders and instructions1 and ensuring1 as far as prudence1 foresight and human skill can devise1 the perfect working of so delicate and complicated an instrument as the railway machine4 ,,railway ,,troops ,while ,germany1 inspired by the ,american example1 had begun the creation of special bodies of ,railway ,troops in #ahff1 it was not until #ahhb that a like course was adopted in ,england4 ,prior to the last-mentioned year it was1 possibly1 thought that the labour branch of the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps would suffice to meet requirements in regard to the destruction or the re-establishment of railways at home in the event of invasion2 but the arrangements of the ,corps did not provide for the supply of men to take up railway construction and operation on the occasion of military expeditions to other countries4 ,it was this particular need that led1 in the summer of #ahhb1 to the conversion of the #hth ,company of ,royal ,engineers into the #hth 7,railway7 ,company1 ,r4,e41 the occasion therefore being the dispatch of an expeditionary force under ,sir ,garnet 7afterwards ,lord7 ,wolseley to ,egypt1 where the necessity for railway work of various kinds was likely to arise4 ,this pioneer corps of ,british ,railway ,troops was formed of seven officers1 one warrant officer1 two buglers1 and ninety-seven ,n4,c4,o4's and sappers4 ,so constituted1 it was thought better adapted for railway work under conditions of active service than a body of civilian railwaymen would be4 ,there certainly was the disadvantage that those constituting the #hth were not then proficient in railway matters2 but1 before they left1 both officers and men were given the run of the ,london1 ,chatham and ,dover ,railway lines1 and were there enabled to pick up what they could of railway working in the locomotive and traffic departments1 while on the ,london and ,south ,western and the ,south ,eastern ,railways they were initiated1 as far as could be done in the time1 into the art of platelaying4 ,the ,corps took out to ,egypt four small tank locomotives2 two first-class1 two second-class and six third-class carriages2 forty cattle trucks2 four brake vans2 two travelling cranes2 two breakdown vans1 and five miles of permanent way1 complete1 with accessories1 tools1 etc4 ,excellent work was done in carrying on regular train services1 repairing damaged track1 etc41 running an armoured train1 constructing supplementary short lines1 and conveying troops1 sick and wounded1 and stores1 the practical utility of such an addition to the engineering forces of the ,army being thus fully assured4 ,in ,january1 #ahhe1 the #ajth ,company1 ,royal ,engineers1 was converted into the #ajth 7,railway7 ,company1 and sent to ,egypt to assist in the construction of the then contemplated ,suakin-,berber line1 to which further reference will be made in ,chapter ,,xv4 ,both companies also rendered good service in the ,south ,african ,war4 ,according to the ,manual of ,military ,railways1 issued with ,army ,orders dated ,march #ast1 #ahhi1 the duties likely to be required from the ,royal ,engineers with regard to railways are as follows3-- 7#a7 ,laying1 working1 and maintaining a military line of railway between two places2 7#b7 restoring an existing line which has been damaged or destroyed by an enemy2 7#c7 destroying an existing line as much as possible with a given number of men and in a specified time1 and 7#d7 working and maintaining an existing line4 ,the ,manual itself gave much technical information as to the construction1 maintenance1 destruction and working of railways4 ,it was re-issued by the ,war ,office in #ahih as ,part ,,vi of ,instruction in ,military ,engineering1 and was stated to embody a portion of the course of instruction in railways at the school of ,military ,engineering1 ,chatham4 ,in the ,manual of ,military ,engineering1 issued by the ,general ,staff of the ,war ,office in #aije1 instructions are given 7,chap4 ,,xvii1 pars4 #bch-bdd7 on the hasty demolition1 without explosives1 of railways1 stations1 buildings1 rolling stock1 permanent way1 water supply1 etc42 and in ,chapter ,,xxiii1 ,railways and ,telegraphs1 the statement is made that-- ,the duties likely to be required of troops in the field with regard to railways 7apart from large railway schemes1 for which special arrangements would be necessary17 may be considered as either temporary repairs or the laying of short lengths of line to join up breaks1 the construction of additional works1 such as platforms1 etc41 to adapt the line for military use1 or the demolition of an existing line4 ,detailed information is given1 for the benefit of ,r4,e4 officers1 concerning railway construction1 repair and reconstruction1 and the main principles on which such work should be carried out for military purposes are explained4 ,the best system to adopt for the effecting of rapid repairs is said to be that of establishing construction trains4 ,the reconstruction staff live in these trains1 which rapidly advance along the line as it is being repaired1 conveying1 also1 the necessary material4 ,the peace training#ce of the ,companies includes3 reconnaissance1 survey and final location of a railway2 laying out station yards2 laying out deviations2 rapid laying of narrow-gauge military lines2 construction of all kinds of railway bridges2 signal installation2 water supply2 repairs to telegraphs and telephones necessary for working construction lines2 working of electric block instruments2 fitting up armoured trains2 construction of temporary platforms1 and working and maintenance of construction trains4 ,instruction in reconnaissance and survey work is given to officers while at head-quarters1 and a certain number of ,n4,c4,o4's and men are also instructed in railway survey work4 ,parties1 each commanded by an officer1 are sent to carry out a reconnaissance and final location of a railway between two points about forty miles apart on the assumption that it is an unmapped country1 and complete maps and sections are prepared4 ,the ,companies have also undertaken the construction and maintenance of the ,woolmer ,instructional ,military ,railway1--a #d ft4 #h in4 gauge military line1 about six miles in length1 connecting ,bordon 7,london and ,south ,western ,railway7 with ,longmore ,camp4 ,all the plant necessary for railway work and workshops for the repair of rolling stock are provided at ,longmore4 ,in time of war the chief duties of a ,railway ,company1 ,r4,e41 would be to survey1 construct1 repair and demolish railways and to work construction and armoured trains4 ,in the ,south ,african campaign1 when the military had to operate the railways of which they took possession in the enemy's country1 some difficulty was experienced in obtaining from the ranks of the ,army a sufficient number of men capable of working the lines4 ,as the result of these conditions1 it was arranged1 in #aijc1 between the ,war ,office and certain of the ,british railway companies that the latter should afford facilities in their locomotive departments and workshops for the training of a number of non-commissioned officers and men as drivers1 firemen and mechanics1 7capable of carrying out repairs17 in order to qualify them better for railway work in the field1 in case of need4 ,this arrangement was carried out down to the outbreak of war in #aiad4 ,the period of training lasted either six or nine months4 ,in order to avoid the raising of any labour difficulties1 no wages were given during this period to ,army men who were already receiving ,army pay as soldiers1 but a bonus was granted to them by the railway companies1 when they left1 on their obtaining from the head of the department to which they had been attached a certificate of their efficiency4 ,,strategical ,,railways ,the subject of strategical railways will be dealt with1 both generally and in special reference to their construction in ,germany1 in ,chapter ,,xviii4 ,in regard to ,great ,britain it may be said that the position as explained by ,sir ,george ,findlay in his article in the ,united ,service ,magazine for ,april1 #ahib1 is that whilst ,continental countries have been spending large sums of money on the building of strategical lines for the defence of their frontiers1 7or1 he might have added1 for the invasion1 in some instances1 of their neighbours' territory17 ,great ,britain1 more fortunate1 possesses already a system of railways which1 though constructed entirely by private enterprise1 could not1 even if they had been laid out with a view to national defence1 have been better adapted for the purpose1 since there are duplicated lines directed from the great centres of population and of military activity upon every point of the coast1 while there are lines skirting the coast in every direction1 north1 east1 south and west4 ,some years ago there were certain critics who recommended the building of lines1 for strategical purposes1 along sections of our coast which the ordinary railways did not directly serve2 but the real necessity for such lines was questioned1 the more so because the transport of troops by rail on such short-distance journeys as those that would have been here in question might1 with the marching to and from the railway and the time occupied in entraining and detraining1 take longer than if the troops either marched all the way1 or 7in the event of there being only a small force7 if they went by motor vehicles to the coast4 ,one point that was1 indeed1 likely to arise in connection with the movement of troops was the provision of facilities for their ready transfer from one railway system to another1 without change of carriage1 when making cross-country journeys or travelling1 for instance1 from the ,north or the ,midlands to ports in the ,south4 ,we have seen that in ,france many such links were established1 subsequent to the war of #ahgj-ga1 expressly for strategical reasons2 but in ,great ,britain a like result has been attained1 apart from military considerations1 from the fact that some years ago the different railway companies established physical connections between their different systems with a view to the ready transfer of ordinary traffic4 ,when1 therefore1 the necessity arose for a speedy mobilisation1 or for the transport of troops from any part of ,great ,britain to any particular port for an overseas destination1 the necessary facilities for through journeys by rail1 in the shortest possible time1 already existed4 ,in effect1 the nearest approach to purely strategical lines in ,great ,britain is to be found1 perhaps1 in those which connect military camps with the ordinary railways2 yet1 while these particular lines may have been built to serve a military purpose1 they approximate less to strategical railways proper1 as understood in ,germany1 than to branch lines and sidings constructed to meet the special needs of some large industrial concern4 ,generally speaking1 the attitude of ,parliament and of ,british authorities in general has not been sympathetic to suggestions of strategical railways1 even when proposals put forward have had the support of the ,war ,office itself4 ,this tendency was well shown in connection with the ,northern ,junction ,railway scheme which was inquired into by a ,select ,committee of the ,house of ,commons in #aiac4 ,under the scheme in question1 a railway was to be constructed from ,brentford1 on the west of ,london1 to ,wood ,green1 on the north1 passing through ,acton1 ,ealing1 ,wembley ,park1 ,hampstead and ,finchley1 and establishing connections with and between several of the existing main-line systems4 ,in this respect it compared with those outer circle railway systems which1 as a further result of the war of #ahgj-ga1 were expressly designed by the ,french ,government for the better defence of ,paris4 ,the ,northern ,junction scheme was introduced to the ,select ,committee as one which1 among other considerations1 would be important from a military point of view for moving troops from one point to another without taking them through ,london4 ,lieut4-,general ,sir ,j4 ,s4 ,cowans1 ,quartermaster-,general1 a member of the ,army ,council responsible for the movement of troops1 and deputed by the ,secretary for ,war to give evidence1 said3 ,the proposed line would be a great advantage in time of emergency if it was constructed in its entirety4 ,the ,army ,council felt that it would provide important routes between the ,south of ,england and ,east ,anglia and the ,north4 ,at present trains had to come from ,aldershot to ,clapham ,junction by the ,south-,western line1 and be there broken up and sent over congested ,city lines on to the ,great ,northern4 ,by the proposed line military trains could be handled without dividing them and be transferred to the ,great ,northern or ,great ,eastern without being sent over the congested ,city lines4 ,strong opposition was offered1 however1 on the ground that the construction of the line would do irreparable damage to the amenities of the ,hampstead ,garden ,suburb2 and1 after a sitting which extended over several days1 the ,committee threw out the ,bill1 the ,chairman subsequently admitting that they had been influenced very largely by the objection of the ,hampstead ,garden ,suburb4 ,in #aiad the scheme was introduced afresh into the ,house of ,commons1 with certain modifications1 the proposed line of route no longer passing through the ,hampstead ,garden ,suburb1 though near to it4 ,one member of the ,house said he had collaborated in promoting the ,bill because he most earnestly believed this railway was of vital import to the mobilisation of our troops in time of emergency2 but another declared that the alleged military necessity for the railway was all fudge1 while much was now said as to the pernicious effect the line would have on the highly-desirable residential district of ,finchley4 ,in the result strategical considerations were again set aside1 and the ,house rejected the ,bill by a majority of seventy-seven4 ,,footnotes3 #bi ,colonel ,mc,murdo had special qualifications for the post4 ,becoming a ,lieutenant-,colonel in the ,army in ,october1 #ahec1 he was ,assistant-,adjutant-,general at ,dublin from ,may1 #ahed1 to ,january1 #ahee4 ,on ,february #b1 #ahee1 he was entrusted with the duties of ,director-,general of the new ,land-,transport ,corps1 and was sent out to the ,crimea1 with the local rank of ,colonel1 to reorganize the transport service1 then in a deplorably defective condition4 ,he is said to have accomplished this task with great energy and success4 ,before the close of the campaign his corps numbered #ag1jjj men1 with #bh1jjj horses1 mules1 etc4 ,he also took over the working of the pioneer military railway in the ,crimea4 ,in #aheg the ,land-,transport ,corps was converted into the ,military ,train1 with ,colonel ,mc,murdo as ,colonel-,commandant4 ,early in #ahfj1 when the ,volunteer movement was assuming a permanent character1 ,colonel ,mc,murdo was appointed ,inspector of ,volunteers1 and in ,june of the same year he became ,inspector-,general1 a post he retained until ,january1 #ahfe4 ,he was chosen as ,colonel of the ,inns of ,court ,volunteers on ,january #bc1 #ahfe1 and his further appointment to the post of ,colonel of the newly-formed ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps followed1 as stated above1 in ,february1 #ahfe4 ,he was created ,k4,c4,b4 in #ahha and ,g4,c4,b4 in #ahic4 ,he died in #ahid4 #cj ,the names of present members of the ,corps will be found in ,hart's ,army ,list4 ,under the ,territorial and ,reserve ,forces ,act of #aijg the ,corps became part of the ,territorial ,force1 and the designation ,volunteer was dropped from its title1 which since that date has been ,the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps4 #ca ,the ,conveyance of ,troops by ,railway4 ,by ,col4 ,j4 ,s4 ,rothwell1 ,r4,a41 ,professor of ,military ,administration1 ,staff ,college1 ,united ,service ,magazine1 ,dec41 #ahia1 and ,jan41 #ahib4 #cb ,detailed information as to the capacity of ,british rolling stock2 composition of trains required for units at war strength2 truck space taken up by ,army vehicles2 standard forms of reports on existing railways1 and other matters1 is published in the official publication known as ,railway ,manual 7,war74 #cc ,the ,railway ,magazine1 ,may1 #aija4 #cd ,for details as to the nature of the organisation by which these results were effected1 see an article on ,the ,great ,eastern ,railway and the ,army ,manoeuvres in ,east ,anglia--#aiab1 by ,h4 ,j4 ,prytherch1 in the ,great ,eastern ,railway ,magazine for ,november1 #aiab4 ,in the ,great ,western ,railway ,magazine for ,november1 #aiji1 there are given1 under the heading1 ,the ,transport of an ,army1 some details concerning the military transport on the ,great ,western system during the ,army manoeuvres of that year4 ,the traffic conveyed was1 approximately1 #ead officers1 #ad1eeb men1 #bjh officers' horses1 #b1dgd troop horses1 #be guns1 #cd limbers1 and #eha wagons and carts4 ,the military authorities and the ,army contractors1 it is said1 expressed their pleasure at the manner in which the work was performed by the ,company's staff4 #ce ,general ,principles1 ,organisation and ,equipment of ,royal ,engineers1 ,royal ,engineers ,journal1 ,february1 #aiaj4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,military ,,railways ,by the expression military railways is meant lines of railways which1 as distinct from commercial lines serving public purposes1 have been designed expressly for military use4 ,the fact that any line forming part of the ordinary railway system of the country is employed for the conveyance of troops either direct to the theatre of war or to some port for embarkation therefrom does not constitute that line a military railway1 in the strict sense of the term1 whatever the extent of its use for military transport for the time being4 ,such line remains a commercial railway1 all the same1 and the application to it of the designation military is erroneous4 ,military railways proper fall mainly into two groups--7#a7 field or siege railways1 constructed on the theatre of war for moving heavy guns1 platform materials1 etc41 to their position2 conveying ammunition and supplies to siege batteries1 magazines1 advanced trenches or bombproofs2 bringing up reinforcements rapidly in case of a sortie2 conveying working-parties to and from their work2 removing sick and wounded to the rear1 and other kindred purposes1 the loads being generally hauled by animals1 by gasoline motor or by men2 and 7#b7 supply railways1 specially constructed to convey troops1 stores1 etc41 from the base to the front1 in time of war1 or from an ordinary main-line railway to a military camp or dept in time of peace1 where local lines of railway are not available for the purpose4 ,these two main groups include various types of railways coming under one or the other designation1 and ranging from a very light portable tramway1 put down at express speed to serve an emergency1 and worked by small engines1 mules or horses1 to substantially built lines1 of standard gauge1 designed both to be worked by locomotives and to carry the largest possible number of troops or amount of freight4 ,in any case1 the details of construction1 equipment and operation of a military railway vary from those of a commercial railway since the one would be intended to serve only a specific and possibly temporary purpose1 in the attainment of which the question of speed would be a secondary consideration1 whereas the other would require to assume a permanent form1 be capable of higher speeds1 and afford adequate guarantee of safety for the public1 by whom it would be used4 ,the building1 also1 of a military railway may be1 and generally is1 carried out by a corps of ,railway ,troops to which are specially delegated the duties of laying1 working1 maintaining1 repairing1 restoring or destroying railways2 and1 provided the desired lines were built with sufficient dispatch1 and answered the desired purpose1 the military commanders who would alone be concerned might well be satisfied4 ,in many different ways the resort to military railways1 whatever their particular type1 has greatly extended the range of advantages to be gained from the application of rail-power to war4 ,a full record of all that has been accomplished in this direction could hardly be attempted here2 but a few typical examples of what has been done in this direction--though not always with conspicuous success--may be offered4 ,,the ,,crimean ,,war ,the earliest instance of a purely military railway being constructed to serve the purpose of a campaign occurred in the ,crimean ,war2 and1 although the line then made would to-day be regarded as little more than an especially inefficient apology for a railway1 it was looked upon at the time as a remarkable innovation in warfare4 ,it further established a precedent destined to be widely followed in later years4 ,between the camp of the allies at ,sebastopol and their base of supplies at ,balaklava the distance was only seven or eight miles2 yet in the winter of #ahed-ee the fatigue parties sent for rations1 clothing1 fuel1 huts1 ammunition and other necessaries were frequently no less than twelve hours in doing the return journey4 ,the reason was that during the greater part of that time they were floundering in a sea of mud4 ,the soil of the ,crimea is clay impregnated with salt1 and1 under the combined influence of climatic conditions and heavy traffic1 the route between camp and base had been converted into a perfect quagmire4 ,horses1 mules and carts were1 at first1 alone available for transport purposes2 but1 although plenty of animals were to be obtained in the surrounding country1 only a limited number could be employed by reason of the lack of forage1 a totally inadequate supply having been sent out from ,england4 ,as for the animals that were used1 their sufferings1 as the result of those terrible journeys1 their own shortage of food1 and the effect of the intense cold on their half-starved bodies1 were terrible4 ,in the rear of each ,division1 says ,general ,sir ,edward ,hamley1 in ,the ,war in the ,crimea1 a scanty group of miserable ponies and mules1 whose backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle1 shivered1 and starved1 and daily died4 ,they died1 also1 on every journey to or from the base4 ,the toil of going through the quagmire even for their own forage1 or of bringing it back when they had got it1 was too great for them1 and the whole line of route was marked by their remains4 ,as for the troops1 they experienced great hardships owing to the inadequate supplies of provisions and fuel at the camp1 although there might be plenty of both at the base4 ,apart from the physical conditions of the roads1 or apologies for roads1 between the two points1 the campaign was begun without transport arrangements of any kind whatever4 ,a transport corps formed for the ,british ,army in #agii1 under the title of the ,royal ,wagon ,train1 had been disbanded in #ahcc1 and1 whether from motives of economy or because the need for war preparations in time of peace was not sufficiently appreciated1 no other corps had been created to take its place4 ,hence the troops sent to the ,crimea were required1 at the outset1 to look after the transport themselves1 and in many instances they even had to do the work of mules and horses4 ,it was not until ,january #bd1 #ahee1 that a ,land ,transport ,corps1 composed of volunteers from various arms of the service1 was raised by ,royal ,warrant and began to provide for a defect in the military organisation which had1 in the meantime1 involved the allies1 and especially the ,british1 in severe privations owing to the frequent shortage of supplies4 ,the original intention to establish a dept at head-quarters before ,sebastopol had had to be abandoned because of the hopelessness of any attempt to get a sufficient surplus of provisions to form a store4 ,such were the conditions that the pioneer military railway was designed to remedy4 ,built1 at a very slow rate1 by ,english contractors1 who arrived at the ,crimea with their men and material during the month of ,january1 #ahee1 the line was a single-track one1 with a #d feet #h inch gauge4 ,for the first two miles from ,balaklava it was worked by a locomotive4 ,then the trucks were drawn up an incline1 eight at a time1 by a stationary engine4 ,six horses next drew two trucks at a time up another incline4 ,after this came a fairly level piece of road1 followed by two gullies where each wagon was detached in succession and made to run down one side of the gully and up the other by its own momentum4 ,then horses were again attached to the trucks and so drew them1 finally1 to the end of the line on the ,upland4 ,five locomotives1 of from #ab to #ah tons weight1 were provided1 and there were about forty ordinary side-tip ballast wagons--all entirely unsuitable for use on a military railway4 ,at first the men belonging to the contractors' staff--navvies and others--were entrusted with the working of the line4 ,the question had been raised as to whether their services should not be made use of in other directions1 as well4 ,on their being sent out from ,england the idea was entertained that they might construct trenches and batteries1 in addition to building the railway1 and there was a suggestion that they should1 also1 join the siege parties in the attack on ,sebastopol4 ,in order to test the question 7as recorded by ,major-,general ,whitworth ,porter1 in his ,history of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers71 ,sir ,john ,burgoyne wrote to ,mr4 ,beattie1 principal engineer of the ,railway ,department1 asking if he would approve of an invitation being given to the men to undergo such training as would qualify them to defend any position in which they might happen to be4 ,in his answer ,mr4 ,beattie wrote3-- ,the subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously discussed in ,london before ,i left1 and it was determined not to arm the men4 ,they were considered too valuable to be used as soldiers1 and were distinctly told that they would not be called upon to fight4 ,their value1 however1 did not stand the test it underwent when they were called on to work the railway they had built4 ,they were found to be lacking in any sense of discipline2 they repeatedly struck work when their services were most urgently needed1 and they had to be got rid of accordingly4 ,they were replaced by men from the ,army ,works ,corps and the ,land ,transport ,corps1 then in operation in the ,crimea1 and the members of the new staff--constituting a disciplined force--worked admirably4 ,major ,powell1 who became traffic manager of the line in ,march1 #ahee1 and chief superintendent in the following ,july1 has said concerning them#cf3-- ,many lost their lives in the execution of their duty4 ,when ,i required them to work night and day to throw forward supplies for the great struggle--the capture of ,sebastopol--several of them remained seventy-two hours continuously at work4 ,the quantities of ammunition and stores which could be carried were below the requirements of the troops engaged in the siege operations2 but during the last bombardment of ,sebastopol--when the line was worked continuously1 night and day1 by a staff increased to about #a1jjj men1 of whom #djj were ,turks--the transport effected rose from #bjj tons a day1 the limit attained under operation by the undisciplined navvies1 to #gjj tons4 ,the line also did excellent work on the re-embarkment of the troops at the end of the campaign4 ,,american ,,civil ,,war ,in the ,american ,war of ,succession1 the existing lines of railway were supplemented in various instances by surface railroads1 which consisted of rails and sleepers laid on the ordinary ground without any preparation of a proper road bed1 yet serving a useful purpose1 notwithstanding the rough and ready way in which they were put together4 ,,the ,,abyssinian ,,campaign ,how a railway specially constructed for the purpose may assist a military expedition in the prosecution of a little war in an uncivilised country1 practically devoid of roads1 and offering great physical difficulties1 was shown on the occasion of the ,british ,campaign in ,abyssinia in #ahfg-fh2 though the circumstances under which the line in question was built were not in themselves creditable to the authorities concerned4 ,sent to effect the release of the ,british prisoners whom ,king ,theodore was keeping in captivity at ,magdala1 the expedition under ,sir ,robert ,napier 7afterwards ,lord ,napier of ,magdala7 entered upon what was to be quite as much an engineering as a military exploit4 ,not only was ,magdala #cjj miles from ,annesley ,bay1 the base of operations on the ,red ,sea1 but it stood1 as a hill fortress1 on a plateau more than #i1jjj feet above the sea-level4 ,to reach it meant the construction of roads in three sections4 ,the first1 which1 in parts1 had to be cut in the mountain side1 rose to a height of #g1djj feet in #fc miles2 the second allowed of no more than a cart road1 and the third and final stage was a mere mountain track where the only transport possible was that of mules or elephants4 ,when1 in ,october1 #ahfg1 the advance ,brigade landed at ,zoulla1 the port in ,annesley ,bay from which the advance inland was to be made1 they took with them the materials for some tramway lines intended to connect two landing piers with the depts it was proposed to establish a mile inland4 ,in ,november these plans were altered in favour of a line of railway1 twelve miles in length1 from the landing-place to ,koomayleh1 at the entrance of the ,soroo ,pass1 the route to be taken by the expedition on its journey to the ,abyssinian highlands4 ,all the necessary plant was to be supplied by the ,government of ,bombay1 who also undertook to provide the labour2 but it was the middle of ,january1 #ahfh1 before a real start could be made with the work4 ,even then1 as told by ,lieut4 ,willans1 ,r4,e41#cg who took part in the expedition1 the progress made was extremely slow4 ,the rails obtained from different railway companies in ,india were of five different patterns1 of odd lengths1 and varying in weight from #cj lb4 to #fe lb4 a yard4 ,some of them had been in use many years on the harbour works at ,karachi1 had been taken up and laid down several times1 and had1 also1 been bent to fit sharp curves or cut to suit the original line4 ,some single-flanged rails had been fitted in the ,government workshops at ,bombay with fish-plates and bolts2 but the holes in the plates and rails were not at uniform distances1 and the bolts fitted the holes so tightly as to allow of no play4 ,then1 when the rails arrived1 no spikes came with them1 and without spikes they could not be laid4 ,when the spikes followed1 it was found that the augurs for boring holes in the sleepers had been left at ,bombay1 to come on by another ship2 though this particular difficulty was met by the artisans of the #bcrd ,punjab ,pioneer ,regiment making augurs for themselves4 ,if the rails gave much trouble--and even when they had been laid it was no unusual thing for them to break between two sleepers and throw the engine off the line--the locomotives and rolling stock caused still more4 ,six locomotives were shipped from ,bombay2 but1 owing to the great difficulty in landing and the labour involved in putting them together1 only four were used4 ,of these1 one was a tank engine which1 although just turned out from the railway workshops at ,bombay1 required new driving wheels after it had been running a fortnight4 ,another came with worn-out boiler tubes1 and these had to be replaced at ,zoulla4 ,the two others1 tank engines with only four wheels each1 had previously seen many years' service at ,karachi4 ,all the engines were very light1 weighing with coal and water from #af to #bj tons each4 ,the best of them could do no more than draw fifteen small loaded trucks up an incline of one in sixty4 ,the sixty wagons sent were ordinary trolleys having no springs1 no spring buffers and no grease boxes4 ,their axle-boxes were of cast iron1 and wore out within a fortnight1 owing to the driving sand4 ,as the railway came into use1 every truck was loaded to its fullest capacity1 and the combination of this weight with the jarring and oscillation on a very rough line led either to the breaking of the coupling chains or to the coupling bars being pulled from the wagons at starting4 ,when fresh coupling chains were asked for it was found that the boxes containing them had either been left behind at ,bombay or were buried beneath several hundred tons of other supplies on board ship4 ,at least forty per cent4 of the trucks were either constantly under repair or had to be put aside as unfit for use4 ,in ,may a number of open wagons with springs and spring buffers arrived from ,bombay4 ,some of these were converted into passenger carriages4 ,difficulties arose in other directions1 besides4 ,the plant forwarded was adapted to the ,indian standard gauge of #e feet #f inches1 and was heavy and difficult to handle1 especially under the troublesome conditions of landing4 ,to-day1 of course1 a narrow-gauge railway1 easily dealt with1 would be employed in circumstances such as those of the ,abyssinian expedition4 ,the ,indian natives who had been sent in the first instance to construct the line were found unsuitable1 and had to be replaced by gangs of ,chinese picked up in ,bombay4 ,the latter worked well and gave no trouble4 ,the country through which the line was laid was timberless1 if not1 also1 practically waterless4 ,wells had to be sunk for the water wanted for the locomotives and the working-parties4 ,the heat was excessive4 ,the temperature at times was #ahj degrees ,fahr4 in the sun4 ,english navvies could not have made the line at all4 ,the two piers where the incoming vessels could alone be unloaded got so congested with traffic that it was only with the greatest trouble railway material could be landed4 ,use began to be made of the line as soon as any of it was ready1 and the traffic at the shore end at once became so heavy that it was difficult to get materials and supplies through to the construction parties at the other end4 ,officers1 also1 who should have been superintending the construction had to devote a good deal of time1 instead1 to details of operation1 or to looking after the repairs of rolling stock4 ,in all these circumstances one cannot be surprised at the slow rate of progress made4 ,one may1 rather1 wonder that the line got built at all4 ,as it was1 four months were spent on eleven miles of railway1 or a total of twelve miles including sidings4 ,there remained still another mile or so to be built when1 at the end of ,april1 news arrived that the object of the expedition had been attained1 and that ,magdala had fallen4 ,it was then decided not to complete the line1 but to devote all energies to preparing for the heavy traffic to be dealt with in the conveyance of troops1 baggage and stores on the return journey4 ,from the middle of ,may to the middle of ,june the resources of the line were severely taxed2 but a great improvement had been made in the working arrangements1 and a railway which had involved so much trouble in the making was eventually found to be of great practical service4 ,lieutenant ,willans says of it3-- ,the ,abyssinian railway was a great success1 if one may gauge it by the amount of assistance it gave to the expedition1 by the celerity and dispatch with which1 by its aid1 stores were landed and brought up to the store sheds1 and by the rapidity and ease with which the troops and their baggage were brought back and re-embarked at once4444 ,as an auxiliary to the expedition1 and as an additional means of transport1 no one who had anything to do in connection with it can have doubted its extreme utility4 ,faulty1 therefore1 as had been the conditions under which the line was constructed1 the results nevertheless established definitely the principle that1 in such campaigns as the one in ,abyssinia1 military railways might serve an extremely useful purpose in facilitating the transport of troops and supplies4 ,the ,abyssinian experiences did1 however1 further show the desirability of any country likely to find itself in a position requiring the construction of military railways--as an aid to wars small or great--creating in advance an organisation designed to enable it1 as far as possible1 to meet promptly whatever emergency might arise1 without the risk of having to deal with defective material1 unsatisfactory labour1 and administrative mismanagement4 ,the same lesson was to be enforced by other expeditions in which ,england has taken part1 and1 down to the period when improvements in our system--or lack of system--began to be effected1 there was much scope for criticism as to the way in which military railways1 designed to facilitate operations undertaken in countries having a lack of communications1 had been either constructed or worked4 ,writing1 in #ahhb1 in the ,professional ,papers of the ,royal ,engineers 7,chatham7 on ,railways for ,military ,communication in the ,field1 ,col4 ,j4 ,p4 ,maquay1 ,r4,e41 observed in regard to what had been the experiences to that date3-- ,in most of the wars that ,england has undertaken during the past thirty years1 attempts have been made to construct railways for the transport of stores and materials from the base of operations4 ,this base must necessarily be on the sea coast for a country situated as ,england is4 ,these railways have not been successful chiefly because1 when war had broken out1 such material was hastily got together as seemed most suitable to the occasion2 and1 further1 the construction of these lines was not carried out on any system4 ,it is not surprising1 therefore1 that our military railways were never completed in time to be of much use to the troops they were intended to serve4 ,,franco-,,german ,,war ,in the ,franco-,german ,war of #ahgj-ga the ,germans constructed two military railways--7#a7 a line1 twenty-two miles in length1 connecting ,remilly1 on the ,saarbrck ,railway1 with ,pont ,mousson1 on the ,metz-,frouard line2 and 7#b7 a loop line1 three miles long1 passing round the tunnel at ,nanteuil1 blown up by the ,french4 ,special interest attached to these two lines inasmuch as they were the result of construction work done1 not in anticipation of a war1 or even immediately preceding hostilities1 but during the course of an active campaign4 ,in addition to this1 they afforded an opportunity for showing what ,prussia could do1 under pressure1 with the ,construction ,corps she had formed in order1 among other things1 to meet just such contingencies as those that now arose4 ,at the beginning of the war the ,prussian ,general ,staff had 7according to ,rstow7 assumed that ,metz would offer a prolonged resistance1 and that the defenders would be certain to make an attempt to interrupt the rail communication between ,germany and her troops in the field4 ,to meet the position which might thus be created1 it was decided to build from ,pont ,mousson to ,remilly a field railway which1 avoiding ,metz1 would link up at ,remilly with the line proceeding thence to ,saarbrck1 and so ensure the maintenance of direct rail communication to and from ,germany4 ,on ,august #ad1 #ahgj1 the day of the rearguard action at ,borny1 the survey and the levelling of the ground were begun1 and three days later a start was made with the construction4 ,altogether some #d1bjj men were employed on the work1 namely1 #djj belonging to two ,field ,railway ,companies2 #hjj forming four ,fortress ,pioneer ,companies1 and about #c1jjj miners from the colliery districts of ,saarbrck who had been thrown out of work owing to the war and accepted employment on the railway4 ,the building corps had at their disposal a park of #ccj wagons and other vehicles1 and patrol and requisition duties were performed for them by a squadron of ,cavalry4 ,notwithstanding that so considerable a force was available for the purpose1 the work of building the twenty-two miles of railway took forty-eight days1 the line not being ready for operation until ,october #d4 ,this was in no way a great achievement1 and it did not compare favourably with much that was done by the ,federal ,construction ,corps employed in the ,american ,war of ,secession4 ,it is true that the irregularities of the ground were such as to render necessary numerous cuttings and embankments1 and that two bridges and two viaducts had to be provided2 but the cuttings were only about #c feet deep1 and the embankments were only #e feet high1 except near one of the viaducts1 where they were #aj feet high4 ,the viaducts and bridges were of timber1 with spans of about #af feet4 ,the building of the line was1 therefore1 in no way a formidable undertaking1 from an engineering point of view4 ,not only1 however1 did it take over #d1jjj men nearly fifty days to make twenty-two miles of line1 but the work had been done in such a way that when the autumn rains came on the track settled in many places2 traffic on the lines became very dangerous2 one of the bridges was washed away by the floods1 and almost as many men had to be put on to do repairs as had previously been employed for the construction4 ,traffic of a very moderate description--each locomotive drawing only four wagons at a time--was carried on for just twenty-six days1 and then1 happily for the engineers concerned1 the developments in and around ,metz rendered the line no longer necessary4 ,how the restoration of the traffic interrupted through the explosion of ,french mines in the tunnel at ,nanteuil occupied from ,september #ag to ,november #bb has already been told on page #abh4 ,,russo-,,turkish ,,war ,in the opinion of one ,english military critic1 what short lines were made in the ,franco-,german ,war were neither so speedily constructed nor so successful in result as to encourage the idea that lines of any length could be made during a campaign2 but a different impression is to be derived from the story of what was accomplished in the same direction in the ,russo-,turkish ,war of #ahgg-gh4 ,russia planned her campaign against ,turkey in the hope and expectation that it would be short1 sharp and decisive4 ,she started her mobilisation in good time1 that is to say1 in ,november1 #ahgf1 although she did not declare war until ,april #bd1 #ahgg4 ,making the mistake1 however1 of despising her foe1 she anticipated no serious opposition from the ,turks1 but expected1 rather1 to paralyse them by a rapid advance1 have a triumphal march to ,constantinople1 secure the desired safeguards for the ,christians in ,turkey1 and see the war over before the end of the summer4 ,one reason why ,russia specially desired to bring the campaign to so early a conclusion lay in the deficient and precarious nature of the rail communication4 ,under a convention which had been agreed to with ,rumania on ,april #af1 #ahgg1 ,russia was to have a free passage for her troops through that country4 ,she was1 also1 to have the use of the ,rumanian railways and of all their transport facilities4 ,but the only line then running through ,rumania was one that went from ,galatz1 on the ,russo-,rumanian frontier1 to ,bucharest1 and thence 7with a branch to ,slatina7 to ,giurgevo1 on the ,danube1 where it connected with a ,bulgarian line from ,rustchuk1 on the south of the river1 to ,varna1 the ,turkish base of supplies on the ,black ,sea4 ,not only was the ,rumanian railway system thus limited in extent1 but the lines had been indifferently constructed1 they were badly maintained1 and they had an inadequate personnel together with an insufficiency both of rolling stock and of terminal facilities4 ,still further1 the fact that the ,russian railways had a broader gauge than the railways of ,rumania 7among other ,european countries7 caused great delay in the transfer1 at the frontier1 from the one system to the other1 not alone of #bjj1jjj men1 but of the #hej field and #djj siege guns1 of the ammunition1 and of much other material the troops required to take with them4 ,the alternative to dependence on the railway was a resort to roads impassable in wet weather4 ,what really caused the ,russian plans to miscarry1 however1 was the obstinate defence of ,plevna by ,osman ,pasha1 who took up his position there on ,july #ai1 subjected the ,russians to successive repulses1 and did not capitulate until ,december #aj1 the siege costing the ,russians #ee1jjj men and the ,rumanians #aj1jjj4 ,when it was realised that the check at ,plevna rendered certain a prolongation of the campaign1 ,russia set about the construction of a series of new lines of railway during the course of the war4 ,the principal lines thus taken in hand were3-- #a4 ,a line in ,russia1 from ,bender1 on the ,dniester1 to ,galatz1 establishing direct communication between the ,odessa railways and the ,rumanian frontier1 and affording improved facilities for the sending of reinforcements to the seat of war4 #b4 ,a line from ,fratesti1 on the ,bucharest-,giurgevo ,railway1 to ,simnitza1 the point on the north bank of the ,danube where1 on the night of ,june #bf-g1 the ,russians built the bridge which enabled them to cross the river4 #c4 ,a line from ,sistova1 on the south side of the ,danube1 to ,tirnova 7,bulgaria71 situate about thirty miles south-east of ,plevna1 and about twenty-five north of the ,shipka ,pass4 ,of these three lines the construction of the first1 #ahi miles in length1 was begun at the end of ,july1 #ahgg4 ,the original intention was to build a railway to serve the purposes of the war only2 but the conclusion that ulterior strategical and commercial purposes would alike be served by linking up ,odessa with the ,rumanian frontier led to the building of a railway likely to be of permanent usefulness4 ,the line was a single-track one1 with a sufficient number of stations and passing places to allow of the running of seven trains in each direction in the twenty-four hours4 ,the construction1 carried out by contract1 involved the building of a number of timber bridges and the provision of several embankments1 one of which was over three miles in length4 ,great difficulties were experienced in regard to labour1 and especially by reason of the refusal of the men to work either on ,sundays or on their numerous saints' days4 ,trains were1 nevertheless1 running on the line within #ajj days of the construction being started1 and this notwithstanding the fact that the number of actual working days had been only fifty-eight4 ,whereas1 therefore1 the ,germans had1 in #ahgj1 with the help of a ,construction ,corps over #d1jjj strong1 taken forty-eight days to build twenty-two miles of railway between ,pont ,mousson and ,remilly1 the ,russians in #ahgg built1 by contract1 #ahi miles of railway in just over double the same period4 ,a railway from ,fratesti to ,simnitza had become indispensable inasmuch as the main line of communication for the ,russian ,army could not be continued for an indefinite period along the forty miles of defective roads--speedily worn out by the heavy traffic--which separated the ,bucharest-,giurgevo line from the bridge built across the ,danube4 ,the only important earthwork necessary was an embankment a mile and a half long and fourteen feet high4 ,the bridges to be provided included one of #dbj feet and two of #baj feet each4 ,in this instance the troubles experienced were due to the difficulty in getting the necessary materials for the work of construction owing partly to the existing ,rumanian lines being blocked with military traffic1 and partly to the state of the roads and to the use of all available draught horses for ,army transport purposes4 ,there could thus be no great celerity shown in construction1 and the forty miles of railway1 begun in the middle of ,september1 were1 in fact1 not ready for working until the beginning of ,december4 ,like difficulties were experienced1 though to a still more acute degree1 in regard to the ,sistova-,tirnova line1 the length of which was to be seventy-five miles2 and here only the earthworks could be finished before the end of the campaign4 ,what1 however1 had been accomplished during the time the war was in progress was 7#a7 the completion of #bbi miles of new railway1 and the making of the road-bed for another seventy-five miles1 together with the carrying out of a number of minor railway works2 7#b7 the acquisition1 by purchase in different countries1 of #abj locomotives and #b1aej wagons and trucks1 all new1 and 7#c7 the provision of a steam railway ferry across the ,danube4#ch ,so the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was carried still further by this construction1 during the course of the ,russo-,turkish conflict1 of a greater length of railways1 designed for military use1 than had ever been built under like conditions before4 ,the world gained a fresh lesson as to the importance of the rle played by railways in war1 and it was offered1 also1 a striking example of what could be done in the way of rapidly providing them in a time of emergency4 ,on the other hand it had to be remembered that1 of the three railways in question1 the one which included #ahi miles out of the total #bbi miles built was constructed on ,russian territory where there was no danger of interruption by the enemy1 while the delays which occurred with the two other lines1 owing to the congestion of traffic1 under war conditions1 on existing railways depended upon for the supply of materials1 seemed to point 7#a7 to the risk that might1 from this cause1 be run if the building of lines necessary or desirable in the interests of some prospective campaign were left until the outbreak of hostilities1 and 7#b7 to the wisdom of constructing all such lines1 as far as necessary and practicable1 in time of peace4 ,,the ,,sudan ,if we turn now to the ,sudan1 we gain examples of military railways which1 designed for the purposes of war1 and constructed1 in part1 during the progress of active hostilities1 first rendered great services in facilitating the conquest of a vast area1 and then developed into a system of ,government railways operated1 in turn1 for the purposes of peace1 and accomplishing results as conspicuously successful in the latter direction as they had previously done in the former4 ,during the time that ,sad ,pasha was ,viceroy of ,egypt 7#ahed-fc7 there was brought forward a scheme for the linking up of ,egypt and the ,sudan by means of a single line of railway from ,cairo to ,khartoum1 with a branch to ,massowa1 on the ,red ,sea4 ,it was an ambitious proposal1 and1 if it could have been carried into effect1 the opening up of the ,sudan to civilisation1 by means of an iron road1 might have altered the whole subsequent history of that much-suffering land4 ,but the cost was regarded as prohibitive1 and the scheme was abandoned for a time1 to be revived1 however1 in a modified form in #ahga1 when ,ismail ,pasha was ,khedive4 ,it was then proposed that the line should start at ,wady ,halfa and be continued to ,matemmeh 7,shendy71 situate about #ajj miles north of ,khartoum--a total distance of #eeh miles4 ,in #ahge a beginning was made with the building of this railway1 which was to consist of a single line1 with a gauge of #c feet #f inches1 and was to be made with #ej-lb4 rails and #g-;ft4 sleepers2 but when1 in #ahgg1 after an expenditure of about #djj1jjj1 the railway had been carried no farther than ,sarras1 thirty-three and a half miles from the starting-point1 it was stopped for lack of funds4 ,in the autumn of #ahhd the ,british expedition to ,khartoum1 where ,general ,gordon was endeavouring to maintain his position against the ,mahdi's followers1 was resolved upon1 and it was then decided to extend the ,sudan ,railway beyond the point already reached1 at ,sarras1 in order to facilitate still further the journey of the troops along the valley of the ,nile1 which had been selected as the route of the expedition4 ,platelaying for the extension was begun in ,september by a party of ,english and ,egyptian infantry and native labourers1 afterwards joined by the #dth ,battalion ,egyptian ,army and the #hth 7,railway7 ,company of the ,royal ,engineers4 ,while1 however1 materials previously stored at ,sarras were found to be still available1 the trucks containing rails1 etc41 for the extension work had to be pushed by hand from ,sarras to railhead owing to the absence of engines2 sleepers were carried on the backs of camels1 of which #cjj were employed for the purpose1 and the coolie work was entrusted to #gjj native labourers1 mainly old men and boys1 most of whom had deserted by the end of ,october1 when further platelaying was discontinued4 ,by that time the extension works had reached the thirty-ninth mile1 and the line from ,sarras to this point was opened on ,december #d4 ,following on the fall of ,khartoum and the death of ,gordon in ,january1 #ahhe1 came the decision to extend the line to ,firket 7#ajc miles71 in view of a then projected further campaign in the autumn of that year4 ,the extension was sanctioned towards the end of ,february2 fifty-two miles of permanent way were ordered from ,england2 #cjj platelayers and railway mechanics were obtained from ,india1 to supplement the construction forces already available2 and on ,august #g the extension was completed as far as ,akasha 7#hg miles74 ,meanwhile1 however1 there had been a change of policy which affected the whole situation4 ,on the return of the expeditionary force to ,korti 7situate at the southern extremity of the great ,nile bend71 the whole of the country to the south thereof passed under the control of the ,dervishes2 and the ,british ,government1 reluctant at that time to enter on the formidable task of reconquest1 decided that no further military operations should be taken in hand1 and that the ,sudan must be definitely abandoned4 ,orders were accordingly given by ,lord ,wolseley in ,may1 #ahhe1 for the withdrawal of the troops from all stations south of ,dongola1 which itself was abandoned on ,june #ae1 the retreat continuing as far as ,akasha4 ,beyond this point1 therefore1 platelaying for the proposed railway extension was not carried1 although the formation levels had been completed to ,firket4 ,subsequently the ,british retreat was continued to ,wady ,halfa1 which then became the southern frontier of ,egypt1 the railway extension thence to ,akasha1 together with all posts to the south of ,wady ,halfa1 being also abandoned4 ,excellent service had1 nevertheless1 been rendered by the railway1 as far as it was carried4 ,operation of the line had been taken over by the #hth 7,railway7 ,company1 ,r4,e41 who1 at the outset1 had at their disposal only five more or less decrepit locomotives1 fifty open trucks1 five covered goods vans1 and six brake vans4 ,the troops were conveyed in the open trucks1 and by the end of #ahhd all the stores for the opening of the campaign had been passed up4 ,during the course of #ahhe additional locomotives and rolling stock were obtained from the ,cape4 ,summing up the work done on the ,sudan ,military ,railway for the ,nile ,expedition of #ahhd-e1 ,lieut4 ,m4 ,nathan1 ,r4,e41#ci says that it included 7#a7 the repair and maintenance of thirty-three and a half miles of existing railway2 7#b7 the construction of fifty-three and a half miles of new line through a nearly waterless desert1 with no means of distributing material except the line itself2 7#c7 the transport1 for the most part with limited and indifferent stock1 of about #i1jjj troops round the worst part of the second cataract when going up the river1 and round nearly the whole of it when coming down2 and 7#d7 the carriage of #dj1jjj tons for an average distance of thirty-six and a half miles4 ,as against what had thus been achieved in the ,nile ,valley must be set a failure on the ,red ,sea4 ,when1 on the fall of ,khartoum in ,january1 #ahhe1 the ,british ,government first decided on an extension of the ,nile ,valley ,railway1 they further resolved on the building of a military railway from ,suakin to ,berber1 on the ,nile1 in order to have a second line of communication available for ,lord ,wolseley's ,army2 and an ,anglo-,indian force was sent to ,suakin1 under the command of ,general ,sir ,gerald ,graham1 in order1 first1 to defeat the ,dervishes in the ,eastern ,sudan1 and then to protect the construction of the proposed railway4 ,such a line would obviously have been of great strategical value to a ,nile expeditionary force2 but the attempt to build it broke down owing1 in part1 to the defective nature of the organisation resorted to1 though still more to the active opposition of the enemy4 ,sir ,andrew ,clarke1 ,inspector-,general of ,fortifications1 had from the first advocated that the line should be supplied and laid by the military engineering strength then available2 but he was over-ruled1 and the work was given to an ,english firm of contractors in the expectation1 as ,major-,general ,whitworth ,porter tells1 in volume two of the ,history of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 that the necessary material would be supplied more readily1 and in shorter time1 through civilian agency4 ,it was1 however1 decided to send the #ajth 7,railway7 ,company of ,royal ,engineers both to carry out some local works in the neighbourhood of ,suakin and to assist the contractors in the longer undertaking2 and this military element was strengthened1 not only by a force of ,indian coolies1 but1 also1 by the addition of thirty-nine members of ,engineer ,volunteer ,corps in ,england who had enlisted for the campaign1 all having had experience in trades qualifying them for railway work4#dj ,there was thus practically a dual system1 workable1 in the opinion of ,sir ,andrew ,clarke1 only by a species of compromise which was both unscientific and uneconomical4 ,as for interruptions by the ,dervishes1 these took the form of constant attacks both on the line under construction and on the workers4 ,several actions were fought1 and at ,tofrik1 near ,suakin1 the ,british sustained a serious loss of life4 ,posts were erected as the work slowly progressed1 and the bullet-proof train mentioned on page #gf was used for patrolling the line at night2 but in face of all the difficulties experienced the work was definitely abandoned when only twenty miles of the intended railway had been completed4 ,the troops were recalled in ,june1 #ahhe1 the railway material not used was brought back to ,england1 and a line linking up ,suakin 7and ,port ,sudan7 with ,berber1 via ,atbara ,junction1 was not finally opened until #aijf4 ,reverting to the ,nile ,valley ,railway1 it is gratifying to be able to say that the success already spoken of as having been attained in this direction was but a prelude to still more important developments that were to follow4 ,to prevent the carrying out of schemes which the ,dervishes were known to be preparing for an invasion of ,egypt1 the ,british ,government decided1 early in #ahif1 to allow ,egypt to resume occupation of the country along the ,nile ,valley abandoned at the time of the withdrawal in #ahhe1 and on ,march #ab1 #ahif1 ,sir ,herbert 7now ,earl7 ,kitchener1 who had succeeded to the command of the ,egyptian army in #ahib1 received instructions to advance to the south from ,wady ,halfa4 ,akasha1 the point to which the ,nile ,valley ,railway had been built1 was occupied on ,march #bj1 the ,dervishes retreating to ,firket4 ,as a means towards realising the objects of the expedition1 ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener resolved to continue the railway along the ,nile ,valley to ,kerma2 but this meant the construction of practically a new railway1 since the ,dervishes had torn up over fifty of the eighty-seven miles of the original line between ,wady ,halfa and ,akasha1 burning the sleepers and twisting the rails1 while the remainder of the line was in such a condition that it required relaying4 ,the work of construction was entrusted to a staff of ,royal ,engineers operating under ,lieut4 7now ,major-,general ,sir ,e4 ,percy ,c47 ,girouard1 and it was pushed forward with great energy1 the line being urgently required for the forwarding of stores to the front1 and especially so on account of the impediments to navigation along the ,nile due to the cataracts4 ,with the help of the railway1 so far as it had then been restored1 ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener concentrated a force of #i1jjj men at ,akasha1 and early in ,june he made a successful advance on ,firket4 ,the ,dervishes retired to ,dongola2 but it was thought prudent1 before following them up1 to await a further extension of the railway4 ,this was completed as far as ,kosha1 #aaf miles from ,wady ,halfa1 by ,august #d1 #ahif4 ,three weeks later some heavy rains1 lasting three days1 were the cause of floods which1 in a few hours1 destroyed twelve miles of the newly-constructed line4 ,the repairs were completed in about a week1 but in the same month there was an outbreak of cholera which carried off a large number of the working staff4 ,utilising the railway as far as ,kosha1 ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener concentrated the whole of his force at ,fereig1 on the north of the ,kaibar cataract1 and from thence a further advance was made to ,dongola1 which place the ,dervishes made no attempt to defend4 ,the immediate purpose of the expedition had thus been attained2 but1 in the meantime1 a further campaign had been resolved upon for the purpose of breaking down the power of the ,khalifa and effecting the conquest of ,khartoum4 ,to this end the railway was continued another hundred miles1 from ,kosha to ,kerma1 which point was reached in ,may1 #ahig4 ,some #baf miles of railway had thus been completed in about thirteen months1 notwithstanding interruptions which had led to very little progress being made during five months of this period1 and notwithstanding1 also1 the fact that construction work had to be carried on simultaneously with the transport of troops and stores so far as the line had been completed4 ,before1 however1 ,kerma was reached1 ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener instructed the staff of the ,royal ,engineers to make a survey of the ,nubian ,desert with a view to seeing whether or not it would be practicable to build an alternative line of railway across it from ,wady ,halfa direct to ,abu ,hamed 7a distance of #bcb miles71 thus giving a direct route to ,khartoum4 ,a survey carried out at the end of #ahif showed that the work was not likely to present any unsurmountable engineering difficulties1 and that the absence of water could be overcome by the sinking of wells4 ,the only doubtful point was whether construction could be carried through without interruption by a still active enemy4 ,it was seen that the proposed desert line was likely to be of far greater importance1 both strategically and politically1 than a continuation of the ,wady ,halfa-,kerma line round the remainder of the ,nile bend4 ,the cutting off of this bend altogether would confer a great advantage on the ,expeditionary ,force4 ,it was thus resolved to build the line1 to run the risk of attacks by the enemy1 and to push construction forward with the greatest energy4 ,a start was made with the work on ,may #ae1 #ahig1 the staff which had been engaged on the ,nile ,valley line to ,kerma returning to ,wady ,halfa in order to take the desert line in hand4 ,by the end of ,july1 #aae of the #bcb miles of line had been completed1 and ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener1 utilising the railway which had already been constructed to ,kerma1 then sent a force along the ,nile ,valley to effect the capture of ,abu ,hamed4 ,this was accomplished on ,august #g1 and the constructors of the desert line were thus enabled to resume their work with greater security and even accelerated speed4 ,abu ,hamed was reached on ,october #ca1 #ahig1 the two extreme points of the great ,nile bend being thus brought into communication by a direct line of railway4 ,the construction of the #bcb miles of track had been accomplished in five and a half months1 notwithstanding the fact that the work was carried on during the hottest time of the year4 ,an average length of a mile and a quarter of line was laid per day1 while on one day in ,october a maximum of three and a quarter miles was attained4 ,so well1 too1 had the work been done that trains carrying #bjj tons of stores1 drawn by engines weighing1 without tender1 fifty tons1 were taken safely across the desert at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour4 ,from ,abu ,hamed the line was at once pushed on in the direction of ,berber1 and its value from a military point of view was speedily to be proved4 ,receiving information1 towards the end of #ahig1 that the ,dervishes were planning an attack on ,berber1 ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener sent to ,cairo for a ,brigade of ,british troops to join with the ,egyptian forces then at ,berber in opposing this advance1 and the ,brigade arrived in ,january1 #ahih1 having travelled by the desert railway not only to ,abu ,hamed1 but to a point twenty miles farther south1 which then constituted railhead4 ,early in ,march the ,anglo-,egyptian ,army was concentrated between ,berber and the ,atbara river1 and the battle of ,atbara1 fought in the following month1 led to the complete annihilation of the forces sent by the ,khalifa to drive the ,egyptians out of ,berber4 ,there was known to be still an army of #ej1jjj men in ,omdurman1 at the command of the ,khalifa2 but it was considered desirable1 before any further advance was made by the ,anglo-,egyptian forces1 to await not only the completion of the railway to the ,atbara but the rise1 also1 of the ,nile1 so that the river would be available for the bringing up of steamers and gunboats to take part in the attack on ,omdurman4 ,once more1 therefore1 ,lieut4 ,girouard and his staff had to make the most strenuous efforts1 and these were again so successful that the line was carried to the ,atbara early in ,july4 ,it was of the greatest service in facilitating the concentration of an ,anglo-,egyptian ,army1 #bb1jjj strong1 at ,wad ,hamed1 and the victory of ,omdurman1 on ,september #b1 #ahih--when #bj1jjj of the enemy were killed or wounded--followed by the occupation of ,khartoum1 meant the overthrow of the ,mahdi1 the final reconquest of the ,sudan1 and the gaining of a further great triumph in the cause of civilisation4 ,in the account of these events which he gives in volume three of the ,history of the ,corps of the ,royal ,engineers1 ,colonel ,sir ,charles ,m4 ,watson says concerning this ultimate outcome of a rebellion which had lasted1 altogether1 for a period of eighteen years3-- ,lord ,kitchener1 of course1 by the skill and determination with which he conducted the operations to a successful termination1 deserves the principal credit for the happy conclusion of the campaign4 ,but it must not be forgotten that a large part of the work was carried out by the officers of the ,royal ,engineers1 especially those who had charge of the construction and maintenance of that railway without which1 it is fair to say1 the campaign could not have been conducted at all4 ,the final triumph was the more gratifying because1 although the desert railway had contributed so materially thereto1 dependence upon it had not been without an element of serious risk which cannot be told better than in the words of ,lord ,cromer1 in his book on ,modern ,egypt3-- ,the interval which elapsed between the occupation of ,abu ,hamed and the final advance on ,khartoum was a period of much anxiety4 ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener's force depended entirely on the desert railway for its supplies4 ,i was rather haunted with the idea that some ,european adventurer1 of the type familiar in ,india a century and more ago1 might turn up at ,khartoum and advise the ,dervishes to make frequent raids across the ,nile below ,abu ,hamed with a view to cutting the communication of the ,anglo-,egyptian force with ,wady ,halfa4 ,this was unquestionably the right military operation to have undertaken2 neither1 ,i think1 would it have been very difficult of accomplishment4 ,fortunately the ,dervishes 444 failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented to them4 ,to myself it was a great relief when the period of suspense was over4 ,i do not think that the somewhat perilous position in which ,sir ,herbert ,kitchener's army was undoubtedly placed for some time was at all realised by the public in general4 ,within about two months of the battle of ,omdurman the plans were made for a further extension of the railway from ,atbara to ,khartoum1 and ,khartoum ,north was reached on the last day of #ahii4 ,the construction of a bridge over the ,blue ,nile subsequently allowed of trains running direct into ,khartoum4 ,to-day this same railway has been carried a distance of #dcj miles south of ,khartoum4 ,it continues along the ,blue ,nile to ,sennah1 where it turns to the westward1 crosses the ,white ,nile at ,kosti1 and has its terminus at ,el ,obeid1 the capital of ,kordofan ,province4 ,what this means is that an enormous expanse of territory has been opened up both to civilisation and to commercial development4 ,apart from the important gum trade of which ,el ,obeid is the centre1 the ,sudan is pre-eminently a pastoral country4 ,the number of its cattle1 sheep and goats is estimated at several millions2 it has thousands of square miles available for cotton-growing1 already carried on there for centuries1 and it has wide possibilities in other directions1 besides2 though stock-raising and cotton cultivation should alone suffice to ensure for the ,sudan a future of great wealth and commercial importance4 ,beyond the districts immediately served by the extension there are others which are to be brought into touch with the railway1 either direct or via the ,nile1 by means of a roads system linking up towns and villages with a number of highways extending to all the frontiers of the ,sudan4 ,on these roads and highways motor traction will1 it is hoped1 be gradually substituted for transport animals1 the troubles caused by the tsetse fly and other pests being thus avoided4 ,the scheme here in question is certainly an ambitious one1 considering that the ,sudan covers an area of #a1jjj1jjj square miles1 and is equal in extent to the whole of ,british ,india2 but already the outlook is most promising4 ,for twelve years before its rescue from heathenism by the ,british and ,egyptian forces in #ahih1 ,khartoum1 which formerly had a population of #ej1jjj1 was represented by the mass of ruins to which it had been reduced by order of the ,khalifa4 ,to-day it is a large1 beautiful1 and well-built city1 possessed of a ,governor-,general's palace1 cathedrals1 a mosque1 schools1 hospitals1 hotels1 broad streets1 public gardens1 boulevards1 imposing business premises1 a good water supply1 electric light1 tramways1 ferries1 and other essentials of a capital city of the most progressive type4 ,khartoum itself has now about #cj1jjj inhabitants2 in ,khartoum ,north1 on the other side of the ,blue ,nile1 there are #bj1jjj1 and in ,omdurman #gj1jjj1 a total of #abj1jjj for the three sister cities4 ,not only1 also1 have the natives1 once living under the terror of their oppressors1 settled down to peaceful pursuits1 but many thousands of immigrants have come into the ,sudan from ,west ,africa 7a striking testimony of the confidence felt by native tribes in the justice and security of ,british rule71 while great expansion has taken place in the commercial interests of the ,sudan and more especially in the export of cattle and sheep4 ,in the bringing about of these developments1 affecting the peace and prosperity of so huge a country and of so many millions of people1 the ,sudan ,military ,railways have played a leading part4 ,they rendered possible1 in the first instance1 the conquest of the ,sudan1 and then 7save for the now abandoned line from ,wady ,halfa to ,kerma7 they became1 with their extensions and improvements1 the system of ,sudan ,government ,railways1 having their branches to-day both from ,atbara to ,port ,sudan and ,suakin1 on the ,red ,sea1 and from ,abu ,hamed to ,kareima1 on the south side of the great ,nile bend1 whence there is free communication by water to the third cataract at ,kerma4 ,concurrently1 also1 with the carrying out of the railway extension schemes1 and in order to make greater provision for the prospective increase of traffic1 #dfj miles of the line north of ,khartoum were relaid with #ge-lb4 rails1 in place of the #ej-lb4 rails originally used1 and the whole of the track from ,khartoum to ,el ,obeid was also laid with the heavier rails4 ,so we are enabled to regard military railways from still another point of view--that1 namely1 in which they may develop into lines of permanent communication and promote the blessings of peace and security no less than afford unquestionable advantages in the prosecution of war4 ,other examples of a similar kind might be offered from the history of ,british rule in ,africa2 but the record of what has been accomplished in the ,sudan may suffice to establish the further claim here presented as to the varied purposes that military railways may serve4 ,,footnotes3 #cf ,see lecture by ,capt4 ,c4 ,e4 ,luard1 ,r4,e41 on ,field ,railways and their general application in war4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 vol4 xvii1 #ahgc4 #cg ,the ,abyssinian ,railway4 ,by ,lieut4 ,willans1 ,r4,e4 ,papers on ,subjects ,connected with the ,duties of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers4 ,new ,series4 ,vol4 xviii4 #ahgj4 #ch ,the ,construction of ,military ,railways during the ,russo-,turkish ,war of #ahgg-h4 ,by ,captain ,m4 ,t4 ,sale1 ,r4,e4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 vol4 xxiv1 #ahha4 ,de la ,construction des ,chemins de ,fer en temps de guerre4 ,lignes construites par l'arme russe pendant la campagne #ahgg-gh4 ,par ,m4 ,p4 ,lessar1 ,ingnieur du ,gouvernement russe4 ,traduit du russe par ,m4 ,l4 ,avril4 ,paris1 #ahgi4 #ci ,the ,sudan ,military ,railway4 ,by ,lieut4 ,m4 ,nathan1 ,r4,e4 ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,occasional ,papers1 vol4 xi1 #ahhe4 #dj ,in his dispatch of ,may #cj1 #ahhe1 ,sir ,gerald ,graham said concerning these ,volunteers3 ,their services would have been of great value had the campaign lasted longer4 ,as it was the ,volunteers worked well with their comrades of the ,royal ,engineers4444 ,it may be considered the first experiment in associating the ,volunteer force with a combatant branch of the ,regular ,army on active service4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,railways ,,in ,,the ,,boer ,,war ,the ,south ,african campaign of #ahii-aijb afforded to ,great ,britain and to ,british ,imperial interests their greatest1 most instructive1 and1 also1 their most anxious experiences1 down to that time1 not only of the services railways can render in the conduct of war1 but of the difficulties and complications which may result from their employment1 and especially from dependence on them for the purposes of military transport2 though1 in the result1 the services so rendered were a material factor in the success by which the military operations carried out by the ,british forces were crowned4 ,when the ,boers declared war in ,october1 #ahii1 the various railway systems1 working in direct communication with one another1 in ,south ,africa1 had a total length of #d1bfh miles1 namely1 ,british ,south ,africa1 #c1bfg2 the ,transvaal1 #iah2 the ,orange ,free ,state1 #chh2 and in ,portuguese territory1 #ee4 ,these railways consisted of single-track1 narrow-gauge lines 7#c feet #f inches71 never designed for such heavy traffic as the transport of an army and all its impedimenta would involve2 but it was obvious from the first that they must needs play a part of paramount importance in the campaign4 ,independently of all that was involved in the conveyance of troops1 munitions1 supplies1 etc41 from ,england to the ,cape1 there was the consideration that from ,cape ,town1 the principal base of our forces1 to ,pretoria1 their eventual objective1 the distance was #a1jdj miles4 ,from ,port ,elizabeth it was #gdj miles1 and from ,durban #eaa miles4 ,journeys such as these could be made only by rail1 and there was seen to be an imperative need1 not only for the railways themselves1 but for an organisation which would1 among other things1 superintend military rail-transport in order to ensure efficiency in the movement of troops1 stores1 etc41 and1 also1 provide for the speedy repair or rebuilding of damaged lines as well as for the operation of lines taken possession of in the captured territory4 ,in view of the uncertainty of events in the ,transvaal1 and as a precautionary measure1 the #hth 7,railway7 ,company1 ,royal ,engineers1 was sent out to the ,cape in ,july1 #ahii2 and when1 subsequently1 the dispatch of an ,army ,corps was being arranged by the ,british ,government1 it was decided to create a ,department of ,military ,railways1 of which ,major ,girouard1 ,r4,e4 7now ,major-,general ,sir ,e4 ,percy ,c4 ,girouard1 ,k4,c4,m4,g471 who had rendered such valuable services in connection with military railways in the ,sudan1 and was then ,president of the ,egyptian ,railway ,administration1 was put in charge as ,director of ,railways for the ,south ,african ,field ,force4 ,a number of other ,royal ,engineer officers who had had experience of railway work in ,india and other parts of the ,british ,empire were selected to serve as ,assistant ,directors or staff officers in various capacities1 and the #ajth 7,railway7 ,company1 ,royal ,engineers1 with the #fth1 #bjth1 #cast and #dbnd ,fortress ,companies1 were sent to join the #hth 7,railway7 ,company in the carrying out of railway work4 ,,organisation ,,and ,,control ,the creation of this ,department of ,military ,railways for ,south ,africa carried still further the development of those questions of organisation and control which1 as we have seen1 had already raised important issues in the ,united ,states1 in ,germany1 and in ,france4 ,according to the official ,history of the ,war in ,south ,africa1 #ahii-aijb1 the ,director and his staff were 7#a7 to be the intermediaries between the ,army and the technical working administration of the railway2 7#b7 to see that the ordinary working of the railway was carried on in such a manner as to ensure the greatest military efficiency2 and 7#c7 to satisfy the demands of the ,army on the railway without disorganising the working of the railway system as a whole4 ,in war1 the official ,history further declares1 these services are essential1 for the officers of a civil railway administration cannot discriminate between the demands of the various branches and departments of the ,army1 or class them in the order of urgency4 ,this is perfectly true of the civil railway administration1 and it is only what could be expected of railwaymen who1 while competent to discharge their ordinary railway duties1 might not be well versed in military matters1 and ought not to be left with the responsibility of deciding between the possibly conflicting orders of different military commanders4 ,all the same1 there was another side to the question2 and this is dealt with by ,sir ,percy ,girouard in his ,history of the ,railways during the ,war in ,south ,africa1 wherein he says1 in regard to rail transport conditions in time of war3-- ,military commanders who have not previously studied the working of a railway attempt to seize and work the portion of line nearest to them1 regardless of the remainder of the system4 ,they often look upon trucks as another form of commissariat wagon which may be kept loaded for an indefinite period4 ,they expect trains to stop and off-load1 or load1 on the main line4 ,they like to have a number of trains ready1 either loaded or unloaded1 in case they should be required4 ,they are apt to give orders for large entrainments and detrainments to be carried out at any part of the line1 regardless of the railway facilities at that point1 although perhaps a suitable place is within reasonable distance4 ,frequently they have been known to countermand their orders for entrainments1 heedless of the fact that1 once arrangements have been made to concentrate rolling stock on a certain place1 it takes time to alter these arrangements1 and is sure to cause confusion4 ,many of them expect railway accommodation for troops to be on a liberal scale1 and consider that there is no necessity1 when close to a railway1 to make any effort to cut down baggage and stores4444 ,commandants of posts on the line1 which are very often placed at railway stations1 are inclined to think that1 because they are called station commandants1 it means that they are in charge of the railway station1 and can give orders to railway officials as to traffic and other matters4444 ,civil railway officials have been heard to say that attacks by the enemy are not nearly so disturbing to traffic as the arrival of a friendly ,general with his force4 ,it was under these circumstances that ,sir ,percy ,girouard saw from the first the necessity for having in ,south ,africa1 for the duration of the war1 a staff of officers whose business it would be1 as he himself defines their duties1 7a7 to keep the military commanders fully informed of the capacity and possibilities of the railway1 and to convey their orders and requests to the civil railway staff2 and 7b7 to protect the civil railway administration from interference by military commanders and commandants of posts2 in fact1 to act as intermediaries between the army and the civil railway officials4 ,in arriving at this conclusion ,sir ,percy was especially impressed by the rail transport experiences of ,france in her war with ,prussia in #ahgj-a2 and in his ,report he gives a digest of ,jacqmin's facts and recommendations by way of further justifying the step that he himself took4 ,he thought it absolutely necessary that the staff of the ,director of ,railways should be paramount on the railway1 and that no officer should be able to give any orders to railway staff officers or other railway officials unless fighting was actually proceeding at that spot4 ,this1 he adds1 was the system adopted with great success by the ,germans1 the want of which caused such chaos on the ,french railways1 and the correctness of which has been entirely established by the experience of this war4 ,it is not too much to say that1 unless it had been adopted in ,south ,africa1 the chaos would have been past belief4 ,the ,military ,railway ,controlling-,staff created1 in accordance with these principles and policy1 to co-operate with the technical working staff under the ,director of ,railways1 was constituted as follows3-- ,i4 ,an ,assistant-,director of ,railways for ,cape ,colony1 who was on the staff both of the ,director of ,railways and on that of the ,general ,officer ,commanding ,lines of ,communication1 ,cape ,colony4 ,his business it was to co-operate with the ,general ,traffic ,manager of the ,cape ,government ,railway1 in whose office he was given accommodation4 ,in this dual capacity it was his duty to inform both the ,general ,officer ,commanding and the ,director as to the traffic capacities of the railways2 to take the orders of the ,g4,o4,c4 while advising him as to the best method of carrying them out2 to inform the railway officials what was required1 and1 ,sir ,percy adds1 in giving these details1 to protect them from interference by unauthorised military officers4 ,it was the duty1 also1 of the ,assistant-,director to see that proper regulations were issued to the ,army for 7a7 the efficient conduct of entrainments and detrainments2 7b7 the forwarding of stores1 and 7c7 the keeping of financial accounts in respect to the use made of the lines for military purposes4 ,as between the ,general ,officer ,commanding and the ,chief ,traffic ,manager1 the ,assistant-,director of ,railways was the sole channel of communication4 ,,ii4 ,four ,deputy-,assistant-,directors1 undertaking similar duties over particular sections of the railway system4 ,,iii4 ,railway ,staff ,officers1 located at leading stations to superintend all important movements1 and constituting the only means of communication between the ,army and the stationmasters4 ,the latter were to take orders in respect to military requirements from no one else1 and were1 in turn1 to be protected by the railway staff officers from interference with by other officers having no authority to give them direct orders4 ,the defective step in the scheme1 as originally planned1 was in respect to the railway staff officers1 who1 of all those constituting the ,military ,railway ,controlling ,staff1 were1 under ,army ,regulations1 on the staff of officers commanding lines of communication and thus not controlled by the ,director of ,railways4 ,the officers in question1 though charged with the duty of looking after entrainments1 detrainments1 etc41 were in no way to interfere with the railway staff in the shunting or marshalling of trains or in regard to the traffic arrangements generally4 ,for this reason the framers of the ,army ,regulations had assumed that there was no need for the railway staff officers to have any knowledge of railway operation1 or to be under the control of others who did possess such knowledge4 ,after the annexation of the ,orange ,free ,state railways1 the ,chief of the ,staff agreed that the railway staff officers in that ,state should be under the orders of the ,director of ,railways through his ,deputy-,assistant-,directors2 and a like course was adopted shortly afterwards in respect to the railway staff officers in ,cape ,colony4 ,in this way an undivided chain of responsibility was secured1 affording a much greater guarantee of efficiency alike in control and in actual operation4 ,concerning the ,deputy-,assistant-,directors1 ,sir ,percy ,girouard says they were found to be of great benefit to the railway officials1 who appreciated their work and laboured in hearty co-operation with them2 though they experienced difficulty in establishing their position with the ,generals and ,staff officers1 to whom the arrangement was an entire novelty1 and one they did not at first understand4 ,in the first instance the principle of military control applied specially to the lines in ,cape ,colony1 those in ,natal being still operated by the ,natal ,government ,railway ,department1 with certain assistance in the matter of repairs2 though after eighteen months of war1 the military transport system first established in ,cape ,colony became uniform throughout ,british ,south ,africa4 ,,transport ,,conditions ,the need for the elaborate organisation thus brought into existence was all the greater because of the difficulties by which those responsible for the conduct of military transport were faced4 ,in ,november1 #ahii1 considerable portions of the lines both in ,cape ,colony and in ,natal were in the possession of the ,boers1 so that1 beyond a certain distance1 the ,british would have to fight for every mile of railway before they could make use of it4 ,after1 also1 regaining possession of the lines on ,british territory controlled by the ,boers1 they would require first to capture and then to operate those on the enemy's territory2 and in each case they would have to be prepared to repair the damage the enemy would be certain to do to the lines in order to prevent their use by the advancing forces4 ,meanwhile the traffic must be kept open1 as far as possible1 for the conveyance of troops and stores to the theatre of war and for the carrying out of such strategic movements as the requirements of the military situation might render necessary1 adequate protection of the lines being meanwhile assured4 ,there were1 in fact1 occasions when the whole issue of the campaign seemed to turn upon the question as to whether or not the ,british could either secure possession of the railways or1 alternatively1 repair them as fast1 more or less1 as the enemy could demolish them4 ,although1 again1 so elaborate a system of organisation had been arranged1 there was much that required to be done to adapt it to the conditions of ,african warfare4 ,initial mistakes had to be remedied2 old evils reappeared in new forms2 regulations had to be made or modified according to experiences gained2 and1 while there was at no time any general failure of transport1 there certainly were partial failures4 ,not only was there an inadequate supply of trucks1 partly because of the considerable number in the ,boer ,states at the time of the declaration of war and partly because of the number locked up in ,kimberley and ,mafeking1 but trucks were kept loaded when they should have been promptly unloaded and released for service elsewhere2 lines were seriously blocked at critical moments by these loaded trucks1 while chaos in certain large troop movements was only avoided owing to the control of ,cape ,town facilities by the ,director's staff and to the fact that the ,deputy-,assistant-,directors of ,railways were enabled to have special officers at all important points4 ,,how ,,the ,,system ,,worked ,as regards the operation of the railways during the war ,sir ,percy ,girouard says3-- ,although not1 perhaps1 so much a matter of railway as of general staff administration1 a word should be said as to the methods whereby the very limited resources of the single line of railway communication were allotted to ensure an equal attention to the requirements of the ,army as a whole4 ,the allocation of railway facilities was reserved strictly to the ,chief of ,staff1 without whose order1 in each case1 nothing could pass by rail towards the front4 ,the number of trains1 or1 more accurately1 the number of trucks which could be hauled daily in the up direction1 being communicated by the railway authorities to ,lord ,kitchener1 he placed a number1 liable to vary from day to day1 at the disposal of the supply and remount departments1 either generally for the maintenance of their depts or for specific traffic4 ,the number reserved for hospital1 ordnance1 engineer and special stores was even more closely calculated1 and the demands of these departments had to be submitted for approval in the utmost detail4 ,all authorisations were passed to the railway representatives at ,headquarters1 whose business it was to notify when the total of such orders outstanding for dispatch from the advanced base was exceeding the accommodation which could be provided within a reasonable time under the scheme of proportion in force for the time being4 ,in such case the issue of permits fell temporarily into abeyance1 or the outstanding list was revised to accord with the necessities of the moment4 ,no truck could be loaded and no troops dispatched by rail without such authority1 with the single exception of details and small parties1 who were invariably made to travel upon the loaded supply trucks4 ,proposed troop movements by rail requiring separate accommodation had to be carefully considered in view of the supply traffic they would displace1 and1 when time permitted1 were generally made by road4 ,it was this system alone which co-ordinated the railway requirements of the various departments and did so much to falsify previously accepted figures as to the limits of the fighting force which could be maintained by a single line of railway4 ,,the ,,imperial ,,military ,,railways ,following the questions which arose as to the working of railways on ,british territory within the sphere of the military operations came those concerning the railways taken from the enemy in the ,boer ,states1 and converted into a system of ,imperial ,military ,railways for which the ,department also became responsible4 ,the occupation of ,bloemfontein led to that place becoming the base of supplies for an army of #ce1jjj men1 likely to increase to #ajj1jjj1 while eventually the ,imperial ,military ,railways included #a1acj miles of line4 ,efficient operation thus became a matter of grave importance1 and the task to be accomplished was one of considerable magnitude1 especially considering that a staff for the working of the system had to be created4 ,in the traffic and locomotive departments alone no fewer than #c1jjj white workers were needed4 ,many of the employs of the ,netherlands ,railway ,company were kept on1 even at the risk of their showing hostility to the ,british2 but the number who thus made themselves available was quite inadequate1 even if they could all have been trusted4 ,the ,cape ,government ,railways were drawn on to the fullest possible extent for workers2 the ,railway and the ,fortress ,companies of the ,royal ,engineers in ,south ,africa were employed in operating the lines2 railwaymen in the ,special ,railway ,reserve in ,england were sent for1 and1 of the remaining posts1 from #hjj to #a1jjj were filled--the approval of the ,commander-in-,chief being first obtained--by inviting soldiers and reservists serving in the ,army who had had experience of railway work in civil life to join the staff of the ,imperial ,military ,railways1 pay at ,royal ,engineer rates being guaranteed to them4 ,positions of the least importance were filled by men who had had no previous railway experience at all4 ,railway staff officers were also obtained mainly from among the troops2 though many even of these1 being unfamiliar with the details of railway operation1 had to be taught their special duties before they could attempt to discharge them4 ,on ,september #cj1 #aijj1 the staff employed on the ,imperial ,military ,railways comprised close on #ah1jjj officers and men4 ,from the time these railways were brought under the control of the ,british forces to ,august #ca1 #aijj1 they carried #agg1jjj passengers1 #hf1jjj animals1 and #ebj1jjj tons of goods4 ,as the moral to be drawn from his experiences in having to create1 under circumstances of exceptional difficulty1 a staff for the operation of railways captured from the enemy1 ,sir ,percy ,girouard says3-- ,the ,south ,african campaign has fully shown the necessity of having a number of traffic employs registered in peace time1 who are paid a small retaining fee which will render them liable to be called out in case of war at home or abroad4 ,the want of this system forced the ,director of ,railways in ,south ,africa to employ a large number of men who had been employed by the enemy1 and who could not be relied on1 and also to withdraw from the fighting-line a large number of soldiers with railway experience prior to enlistment2 and he was compelled to work the railways with this heterogeneous mass of individuals whose qualifications were unknown4 ,the amount of correspondence entailed over conditions of service1 pay1 transfer1 etc41 of all these men1 coming from different parts of ,south ,africa and from different units1 was tremendous4 ,the registration system would also arrange for the men on the railways being subject to ,military ,law1 the necessity for which has been clearly proved4 ,,repair ,,of ,,railways ,whilst all these arrangements in regard to operation and transport were thus being perfected1 the need had arisen for an equally complete organisation in another direction1 that1 namely1 of providing for the repair or restoration of railway lines damaged or destroyed by the enemy4 ,since the ,american ,civil ,war the art of railway demolition had made considerable advance by reason of the use for this purpose of dynamite--an agency which was now to be employed very freely by the ,boers4 ,with dynamite they easily blew up the bridges1 or material portions thereof2 they destroyed the track for considerable distances by the simple process of exploding dynamite cartridges under alternate rail-joints2 they wrecked culverts1 pumps and water tanks1 and they effectively damaged locomotives which they had not time or opportunity to remove4 ,then1 among other things1 they derailed engines and trucks by means of mines2 they caused obstructions by throwing down into the railway cuttings boulders of up to two or three tons in weight2 they cut telegraph lines2 they removed or smashed up instruments and batteries at railway stations2 they wrecked the stations2 they burned many railway trucks1 or otherwise rendered them useless2 they set fire to stacks of fuel1 and1 when dynamite cartridges were not available1 they deprived the locomotives of their vital parts and tore up considerable lengths of rails4 ,by ,december1 #ahii1 it had become evident that the ,railway ,companies and the ,fortress ,companies of the ,royal ,engineers1 sent out to the ,cape and brought up to their fullest strength1 would be unequal to the requirements of the prospective situation4 ,the ,railway ,corps thus formed was1 accordingly1 augmented by a ,railway ,pioneer ,regiment1 composed of miners1 artisans and labourers who had been employed at ,cape ,town or ,johannesburg1 volunteers from the ranks of the ,army 7preference being given to those already possessed of experience in railway work71 and employs of the ,orange ,free ,state ,railway4 ,some ,field ,railway ,sections1 created to form the nucleus of a staff to take over the working of railways in the enemy's country became construction parties1 doing repairs only1 and having no control of traffic except at railhead4 ,in addition to all these1 a large number of natives were engaged through ,native ,labour ,depts opened at ,de ,aar1 ,bloemfontein and ,johannesburg1 the number so employed at any one time attaining a maximum of about #bj1jjj4 ,it was in the ,orange ,free ,state and the ,transvaal that the ,boers displayed their greatest activity in the way of railway destruction4 ,at ,norval's ,pont and ,bethulie they broke down the bridges crossing the ,orange ,river1 which divided ,cape ,colony from the ,orange ,free ,state4 ,before leaving ,bloemfontein 7occupied by the ,british ,march #ac1 #aijj71 they destroyed all the bridges and all the culverts on the railway in their rear2 they blew up miles of the permanent way1 and they left the railway itself an almost complete wreck4 ,north of ,bloemfontein they pursued similar tactics along #ahj miles of track1 on which they wrecked more or less completely no fewer than fifty bridges1 including the one over the ,vaal ,river--a high structure with seven spans each of #acj feet4 ,no sooner1 too1 had the line been reopened as far as ,johannesburg than ,commandant ,de ,wet made a raid on it and undid all that the repairing parties had done over a length of thirty miles4 ,speedily following the re-establishing of rail communication with ,pretoria1 the ,boers began a fresh series of guerilla attacks on the lines both in the ,transvaal and in the ,orange ,free ,state2 and they continued these attacks for months--until1 in fact1 their power for doing further mischief had been finally checked4 ,in carrying out repairs and reconstruction work of such vital importance to the advance and security of the ,british forces1 the policy adopted by the ,director of ,railways was that of employing ,royal ,engineers to do rapid temporary repairs--with a view to having a line of some sort made available with the least possible delay--and leaving permanent or even semi-permanent repairs to the ,railway ,pioneer ,regiment4 ,at convenient sidings on the railways throughout the theatre of war construction trains were stationed in charge of permanent-way inspectors and sections of ,royal ,engineers who had at their disposal1 at each of such sidings1 a gang of men--whites and natives--varying in number from #cjj to #a1jjj1 according to circumstances4 ,infantry working-parties were also obtained wherever possible4 ,gangers began a patrol of the lines at dawn4 ,information as to any break or alarm was communicated to the nearest military post and telegraphed to the ,deputy-,superintendent of ,works1 who thereupon ordered the dispatch of a construction train to the scene of any reported or prospective break without waiting for confirmation of the news received or of the suspicions aroused4 ,this well-organised system operated to great advantage4 ,at #b4cj a4m4 on ,january #a1 #aija1 for instance1 information reached the ,deputy-,superintendent of ,works at ,bloemfontein that a break of the line had occurred at ,wolvehoek1 sixty-three miles distant4 ,the construction train was instantly dispatched1 and the repairs were completed by #h a4m4 ,rail communication with ,johannesburg1 notwithstanding the great amount of destruction done by the ,boers1 was restored within eleven days of the arrival of ,lord ,roberts at that place4 ,it was restored to ,pretoria within sixteen days of the occupation thereof by our troops4 ,on the western side1 where the enemy had been no less active than in the ,orange ,free ,state1 rail communication was reopened within thirteen days of the relief of ,mafeking4 ,in the official report on ,field ,transport in the ,south ,african ,war1 it is said in regard to the ,railways ,department3-- ,all temporary repairs in the ,cape ,colony1 ,transvaal1 and ,orange ,river ,colony were carried out1 with a few exceptions1 by the military railway staff4 ,up to #ca ,october1 #aijj1 these temporary repairs included the restoration of seventy-five bridges1 ninety-four culverts1 and #cg miles of line4 ,a detail of the general advance from ,bloemfontein to ,johannesburg1 a distance of #bfe miles1 will give some idea of the expedition with which repairs were affected4 ,the period during which the advance was being made was from #c ,may to #aa ,june1 #aijj1 in which space of time the following temporary repairs were executed3 ,twenty-seven bridges1 forty-one culverts1 #aj miles of line1 including seven deviations1 varying in length from #bjj yards to #b miles4 ,from #f ,june to #ae ,november1 #aijj1 the ,imperial ,military ,railways were more or less seriously damaged by the enemy on #aae occasions1 but all such damages were promptly repaired1 and did not materially affect the working of the railways1 except that the running of trains after dark had to be suspended4 ,during the same period fully #fj per cent4 of damaged bridges and culverts were permanently or semi-permanently repaired4 ,of bridges1 over #bjj1 with spans ranging from nine feet to #acj feet1 were destroyed wholly or in part during the progress of the war2 but even here the speedy restoration of traffic did not1 as a rule1 present any very grave difficulty4 ,the course generally adopted1 as one suited to ,south ,african conditions1 was1 not to start at once on the repair of the damaged bridge1 but1 in order to meet the exigencies of the moment1 to construct a diversion or deviation line alongside1 with small low-level bridges on piers1 built of sleepers and rails4#da ,these deviation lines offered great disadvantages by reason of their sharp curves1 their steep approaches and their liability to be washed away in wet weather4 ,the building even of temporary bridges across deep rivers having a considerable volume of water also caused inevitable delays4 ,but the lines in question served their purpose until the reconstruction of the damaged bridges--taken in hand as speedily as possible--could be effected4 ,anticipating the needs for this more permanent work1 the ,director of ,railways had arranged before leaving ,england for a supply of girders1 similar to those in use in ,south ,africa1 to be sent out1 together with sufficient timber1 of useful dimensions1 to rebuild the whole of the railway bridges in the ,orange ,free ,state1 should it become necessary so to do--as1 in point of fact1 it did4 ,of new rails he had available1 at one time1 a total length of #cjj miles4 ,by ,october1 #aijj1 the makeshift repairs completed on all the lines taken from the enemy were being gradually converted into permanent or semi-permanent reconstruction by the ,works ,department of the ,imperial ,military ,railways2 but the continuous guerilla raids of the enemy still made it impossible to run trains by night4 ,these conditions led to a resort to the system of blockhouses which1 first constructed for the defence of railway bridges in ,natal during the advance for the relief of ,ladysmith1 and used extensively when ,lord ,roberts marched from ,bloemfontein into the ,transvaal1 leaving a long track of railway lines behind him1 were subsequently so far extended that the whole of the railway lines in the ,transvaal and the ,orange ,river ,colony were provided with them4#db ,so well did they answer the purpose that by ,april1 #aija1 the worst of the trouble involved in maintaining railway communications was over1 although another year was to elapse before peace was restored4 ,,military ,,traffic ,an especially remarkable achievement with which1 under the various conditions here narrated1 the ,department of ,military ,railways is to be credited was in connection with the concentration of the force with which ,lord ,roberts marched from the ,modder ,river to ,bloemfontein4 ,the movement began on ,january #ba1 #aijj1 by which time the repairs of the lines had been completed1 and within three weeks no fewer than #bj1jjj men1 #ac1eij horses and over #bd1jjj tons of stores had been conveyed over a single line of railway4 ,taking the sum total of the military traffic carried on the ,cape ,government and the ,natal ,government ,railways respectively during the war period1 we get the following substantial figures3-- ,cape ,government ,railways1 from ,october #a1 #ahii1 to ,march #ca1 #aija3--,officers1 men1 and other passengers1 #a1bdg1jjj2 supplies1 etc41 #a1jeh1jjj tons2 horses and other live stock1 #edj1cba1 besides many wagons and guns4 ,natal ,government ,railways3--,officers1 men1 prisoners of war1 sick and wounded1 women and children 7including ,boer refugees71 natives and ,indians1 #ebb1ahf2 baggage and stores1 supplies1 hay1 forage1 etc41 #hfa1jjj tons2 ammunition1 #i1ghd boxes2 guns1 #ded2 vehicles1 #f1dcj2 pontoons1 #dh2 traction engines1 #hd2 horses and other live stock1 #cii1jjj4 ,,miscellaneous ,,services ,the figures here given as to the military traffic carried do not represent the full extent of the work that was done by the ,south ,african railways during the course of the war4 ,one must also take into account the wide variety of subsidiary services rendered1 and these are the more deserving of attention because they show1 more than had1 perhaps1 been the case in any previous war1 that railways can afford valuable aid in the conduct of a campaign apart from the achievement of their fundamental purpose in the transport of men and matriel4 ,if we look atthe list of services rendered by the ,natal ,government ,railways we find that the ,railway ,department--in addition to the transport work represented by the above figures--adapted six armoured trains2 prepared special carriages for the #f in4 and #dg in4 guns2 adapted and equipped three hospital trains1 withdrawing for this purpose fully a quarter of the most serviceable carriage stock from the ordinary traffic2 wired and lamped the hospitals at four different centres1 supplying them1 also1 with electric current2 mounted the electric search-light apparatus with engine1 dynamo1 etc42 supplied #cj1jjj troops at ,colenso with water2 found the plant and fuel at ,ladysmith for condensing water from the ,klip ,river for #bj1jjj persons during the four months' siege2 allotted and arranged a portion of the goods-shed as the ,base ,medical ,stores at ,durban1 and fitted up vans to follow the army with reserve medical supplies4 ,the ,department's ,engineering ,staff speedily restored1 or temporarily provided--either on the ,natal system or along #ajj miles of the ,transvaal railways1 when these passed under control of the ,british forces--#gb bridges and culverts1 varying in length from #aj to #fjj feet2 #cb different portions of permanent way2 and many water tanks1 etc4 ,the ,engineering ,staff also effected in seven days a clearance through the ,lang's ,nek ,tunnel1 blown in by the ,boers1 and constructed several miles of new lines1 sidings and deviations4 ,the ,natal ,railway ,pioneer ,staff advanced with ,general ,buller and worked the ,netherlands ,railway as far as ,greylingstad1 #ajj miles beyond ,charlestown 7the point of traffic exchange with the ,transvaal system71 until the line was taken over by the ,imperial authorities on ,august #ae1 #aijj4 ,for nearly six months1 up to the relief of ,ladysmith1 says ,mr4 ,c4 ,w4 ,francis ,harrison1 from whose official work on ,natal#dc these details are mainly taken1 the ,natal lines were robbed of about #dj per cent4 of their total mileage and a quantity of their stock4 ,on the clearance of the enemy from ,natal and the south-eastern portion of the ,transvaal1 large supply depts were formed at ,newcastle1 ,volksrust1 ,standerton and intermediate points2 and on the joining of the two main portions of the ,british army at ,heidelberg1 the greater portion of the stores for the forces was conveyed via ,natal2 and this continued unceasingly until the termination of hostilities4 ,,armoured ,,trains ,it was1 again1 in the ,south ,african war that armoured trains underwent their greatest development--down to that time--for the purposes alike of line protection and of attack on the enemy1 although their real usefulness and the conditions necessary to their efficient operation were not established until after certain early experiences which had tended to throw doubts upon their efficiency1 and had even led to their being regarded as of little or no account for the purposes of war4 ,in view of prospective requirements1 five armoured trains had been constructed in advance in the locomotive shops at ,cape ,town and another at ,natal4 ,others were put together shortly afterwards2 but one of the ,cape trains was wrecked by the ,boers the first night of the war1 and two of the ,natal trains were locked up in ,ladysmith4 ,the remainder were employed on scouting expeditions during the earlier phases of the war4 ,their use not being then rightly understood1 they were often sent considerable distances without any support1 with the result that one of the ,natal trains was destroyed by the ,boers at ,chieveley1 on ,november #ae1 #ahii1 and the ,cape trains had several narrow escapes of sharing the same fate4 ,on the occupation of ,bloemfontein by the ,british1 more armoured trains were constructed at the railway workshops there1 and eventually the number available was increased to a fleet of twenty4 ,under an improved system of control and operation1 and converted1 by the addition of guns1 into what were virtually batteries on wheels1 the trains came to be regarded as offering possibilities of much practical usefulness4 ,in a lecture on ,railways in ,war1 delivered by him at the ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,chatham1 and reported in the ,royal ,engineers ,journal for ,july1 #aije1 ,sir ,percy ,girouard1 said3-- ,the ,south ,african ,war at one time threatened to produce a siege1 that of ,pretoria1 where fairly modern forts with modern armaments were known to exist4 ,at the same time the enemy at ,modder ,river were giving us some trouble with their heavy artillery4 ,the ,navy came to our rescue with heavy ,b4,l4 guns mounted on wheels4 ,with a view to trying the use of the railway itself1 it was pointed out that the railway department had both the shops and the goodwill to mount heavy guns1 if required4 ,this offer was approved1 and in a few weeks the two heaviest siege guns ever seen in the field were made ready4 ,the carriages1 designed by the combined wit of the machinery officers and the ,chief ,locomotive ,superintendent of the ,cape ,government ,railway1 were most creditable achievements1 old engine and tender frames being used as a foundation4 ,the guns mounted were a #f-;inch ,b4,l41 and no less a monster than a #ib inch ,b4,l4 ,the #f-;inch went into action at ,modder ,river4 ,it was deemed unsafe to fix it at an angle of more than sixteen degrees to either side of the centre line of the railway2 but by placing it on a so-called firing curve a wider field of fire was secured4 ,the gun behaved exceedingly well in every way2 and later on it was fired at right angles to the railway1 without any damage either to itself or to the line4 ,the #ib-;inch gun gave good results in its trials1 but1 although it was run up to ,pretoria on its truck1 there was no opportunity of firing it on the enemy4 ,sir ,percy says in his ,history that-- ,the experiments demonstrated the possibility of big guns being used in siege operations without any difficulty1 the only limit to the size of the gun being the weight which the railway bridges will stand4 ,apart from the powers of usefulness offered by these batteries on wheels1 there arose1 in the early days of the war1 the further question whether the usefulness of armoured trains proper might not be marred as the result of a defective system of control4 ,at the outset the trains were placed entirely under the orders of officers commanding sections of the line2 but the arrangement was found unsatisfactory as the trains were constantly being rushed out regardless of ,traffic ,department regulations1 and sometimes without even a line clear message4 ,having1 also1 the trains at their disposal1 as they considered officers commanding sections of the line often made use of them to inspect posts between stations1 other traffic being stopped while the inspections were being made4 ,on one occasion1 when a large mob of cattle was being sent to ,pretoria and there were no mounted troops available to convoy them1 the expedient was resorted to of employing an armoured train for the purpose4 ,the train had to adapt its speed to the rate of progress of the cattle alongside1 and such was the interference with other traffic that the entire length of railway on the ,delagoa main line was blocked until the cattle had reached their destination4 ,in fact1 instead of assisting traffic by preventing the enemy from interrupting it1 the armoured trains caused1 ,sir ,percy ,girouard declares1 more interruptions than the enemy themselves4 ,with a view both to meet these particular difficulties and to ensure a better use of the trains1 there was appointed an ,assistant-,director of ,armoured ,trains who was placed on the staff both of the ,commander-in-,chief and of the ,director of ,railways and had under his control all the armoured trains in ,south ,africa4 ,captain ,h4 ,c4 ,nanton1 ,r4,e41 the officer so appointed1 had practical acquaintance alike with railway requirements and regulations and with armoured trains4 ,in touch with ,headquarters1 and kept informed as to which portions of the line were most threatened by the enemy1 it became his duty to order where the trains should be sent4 ,once despatched to a particular section of the line1 an armoured train was to be under the control of the ,general or other officer commanding that section4 ,the ,assistant-,director had power to remove it1 however1 if he thought it was more urgently required elsewhere4 ,it was his duty1 also1 to work in harmony with the officers in question2 but they1 in turn1 were not to use as a private conveyance the train sent to them1 and they were not to alter its garrison or equipment1 or to give orders to the officer in charge which were contrary to the spirit of the general instructions4 ,the ,assistant-,director was himself required to instruct officers in command of the trains as to the proper tactics to adopt1 the best methods of patrolling1 etc41 and to see that they worked in harmony with the railway officials1 and were an assistance and not a hindrance to traffic4 ,these improved conditions led to a recognised system for the employment of armoured trains1 the purposes and duties of which were eventually defined as follows#dd3-- #a4 ,in conjunction with columns in the field1 to intercept the enemy whom the columns were driving on to the line4 #b4 ,to act on the flank of a column or line of columns1 the train being well advanced so as to prevent the enemy breaking to that flank4 #c4 ,to reinforce stations and camps on the railway which were threatened by the enemy4 #d4 ,to escort ordinary traffic trains4 #e4 ,to reconnoitre4 #f4 ,to patrol by day and night4 #g4 ,to protect traffic routes generally4 ,the garrison of an armoured train consisted of an ,infantry escort and ,royal ,artillery and ,royal ,engineer detachments4 ,the ,r4,e4 detachment consisted of one ,n4,c4,o4 and six sappers skilled in railway repairing work and in re-setting derailed engines and trucks2 two telegraph linesmen2 one telegraph clerk2 two engine-drivers and two firemen4 ,when the train was engaged1 all counted as effective rifles with the exception of the driver and firemen on the footplate1 and even they carried rifles in their engine cab for use against an enemy endeavouring to gain possession of the engine4 ,responsibility for the efficiency of the garrisons was placed upon the ,assistant-,director of ,armoured ,trains4 ,whenever1 also1 a concentration of the trains had been decided upon1 he was to attach himself to one of them1 and take charge of the concerted action of the whole4 ,in reference to the operation of the trains ,captain ,m4 ,h4 ,grant writes#de3-- ,it was important that the officer commanding the train should be a man of judgment and strong nerve4 ,he was often called upon to act on his own responsibility4 ,his strong armament and defences enabled him to attack superior forces4 ,yet his vulnerable points were many4 ,he had ever to be alert that the enemy did not cut the line behind him4 ,in addition to his visible foes and the constant risks of traffic in war time1 he had to contend with skilfully-used automatic and observation mines1 and had to keep his head even amid the roar which followed the passage of his leading truck over a charge of dynamite1 and then to deal with the attack which almost certainly ensued4 ,officers1 therefore1 had to be chosen from men of no common stamp4 ,the danger from contact mines was to a certain extent obviated by a standing order that each train should propel a heavily-loaded bogie truck4 ,such trucks had low sides and ends2 they in no way obstructed the view1 or fire1 from the trains2 and they performed the double purpose of exploding contact mines and carrying the railway and telegraph materials4 ,the necessity for this propelled unoccupied bogie was exemplified on several occasions4 ,as regards their protection of the railway lines1 the armoured trains rendered an invaluable service1 and this was especially the case when the blockhouse system had been fully developed1 and when1 concurrently therewith1 the enemy's artillery became scarce4 ,in recording this opinion1 ,sir ,percy ,girouard further observes3--,there is no doubt1 also1 that the enemy disliked them intensely1 and the presence of an armoured train had a great moral effect4 ,in addition to the organisation and running of these armoured trains1 there was included in every ordinary train1 as far as possible1 a special gun-truck on which was a pedestal-mounted ,q4 ,f4 gun1 under the charge of an escort4 ,the trains also carried a machine gun at each end1 arranged with a lateral sweep1 to allow the fires to cross on either side of the train at a distance of from fifty to eighty yards4 ,in addition to this1 armour plates were hung on each side of the driver's cab1 and the first train run each morning had two or three trucks in front of the engine as a precaution against any mine that might have been laid over-night4 ,,ambulance ,,and ,,hospital ,,trains ,supplementing the references already made on pp4 #ie-f to the employment of ambulance and hospital trains in the ,south ,african ,war1 it may here be stated that three out of the seven adapted from rolling stock already in use on the ,cape or the ,natal ,government lines had been prepared in advance of the outbreak of hostilities1 namely1 two at the ,cape and one in ,natal1 and these three were1 consequently1 available for immediate use4 ,in ,cape ,colony1 as stated in ,the ,times ,history of the ,war in ,south ,africa1 the two hospital trains that had been prepared in ,september were manned by a complete personnel from ,england1 and were kept in constant touch with ,lord ,methuen's advance4 ,in most cases they were run up almost into the firing line1 and during the actions at ,belmont1 ,graspan1 ,modder ,river and ,magersfontein1 they relieved the force of its sick and wounded in an incredibly short time1 conveying some to ,de ,aar and ,orange ,river1 and others to the general hospitals at ,cape ,town4 ,the services thus rendered by the hospital trains were greatly facilitated by the fact that during the first three months of the war the fighting was almost entirely on or alongside the railways4 ,it was1 therefore1 possible to arrange for a speedy evacuation of wounded from the field hospitals4 ,the same two trains1 after working along the line of communication in ,cape ,colony1 reached ,bloemfontein early in ,april1 #aijj2 and here they were of great use in helping to remove the sufferers from the enteric fever which was filling up1 not only all the hospitals1 but every other available building1 as well1 and finally attained1 by the end of ,may1 a maximum of #d1jjj cases4 ,unable to meet all requirements arising under these exceptional conditions1 the two hospital trains were supplemented by a number of locally-prepared or ordinary trains1 made available for the transport either of sick or of convalescents4 ,in regard to ,natal1 ,the ,times ,history says that of all the medical arrangements made in connection with the war1 those during ,sir ,redvers ,buller's operations in ,natal presented the most satisfactory features4 ,the line of communication with the base was short1 and it was amply supplied with hospital trains4 ,in addition to the one that had been formed before the outbreak of hostilities1 a second and similar train was prepared in ,november1 #ahhi4 ,the hospital train1 ,princess ,christian1 constructed in ,england at a cost of #ad1jjj1 mainly raised by ,her ,royal ,highness--with a handsome contribution from the town of ,windsor--reached ,cape ,town early in ,february1 #aijj4 ,it was sent on in sections to ,durban1 where it was put together in the ,natal ,government ,railway workshops4 ,under the charge of ,sir ,john ,furley1 who had also supervised its reconstruction1 the train was the first to cross the temporary trestle bridge provided to take the place of the one across the ,tugela1 at ,colenso1 which had been destroyed by the ,boers1 and it was1 also1 the first train to enter ,ladysmith 7,march #ah1 #aijj7 after the siege4 ,between this time and ,september #e1 #aija1 it made #ajh journeys1 mainly on the ,natal side and on the ,pretoria-,koomati ,poort line2 it ran a total of #db1jjj miles1 and it carried 7in addition to the medical and nursing staff7 #cba officers and #g1bjh non-commissioned officers and men1 a total of #g1ebi sick and wounded1 of whom only three died en route4 ,in ,june1 #aija1 the train was formally presented by the ,central ,red ,cross ,committee to the ,secretary of ,state for ,war as a complete hospital train unit for the use of the military forces in ,south ,africa2 but1 on the assumption1 apparently1 that no further use for its services as a hospital train was likely to arise1 it was subsequently dismantled4 ,as showing the extent of the work done by the other hospital trains during the course of the war1 it may be added that ,no4 #b ran #aad1eci miles1 in #bbf trips1 between ,november #bb1 #ahih1 and the end of ,august1 #aijb1 conveying #dga officers and #aj1cbe non-commissioned officers and men1 a total of #aj1gif1 of whom only seven died en route4 ,,transvaal ,,railways ,,and ,,the ,,war ,to the foregoing account of the ,british use of railways for military purposes during the course of the ,south ,african ,war it may be of interest to add a few notes giving the experiences of the ,boers1 as detailed in a statement on ,the ,netherlands ,south ,african ,railway ,company and the ,transvaal ,war1 drawn up at ,pretoria1 in ,april1 #aijj1 by the ,secretary of the ,company1 ,mr4 ,th4 ,steinnetz1 and published in ,de ,ingenieur of ,july #ad and #ba1 #aijj4df ,under the terms of the concession granted to the ,netherlands ,south ,african ,railway ,company 7otherwise the ,nederland ,zuid ,afrikaansche ,spoorweg ,maatschappij7 by the ,government of the ,transvaal ,republic1 the latter were1 in the event either of war or of danger of war1 to have complete control alike over the railway and over everything--and everybody--necessary for its use1 subject to certain undertakings as to the payment of compensation to concessionaires4 ,by virtue of these powers the ,executive ,raad issued a decree on ,september #ac1 #ahii1 establishing ,government control over the lines1 and stating further3--,with the view of ensuring that proper use can be made of the railway1 the whole of the personnel of the company are 444 commandeered to do duty on the railways in the functions they now occupy1 and they are placed under the orders of the ,commandant-,general and the war officers indicated by him1 or of other officials4 ,the ,government1 in effect1 took possession of all the lines1 rolling stock1 workshops and other properties of the railway company for the purposes of military transport1 and they assumed control over the staff in order to ensure the working1 not only of the company's own lines1 but1 also1 of the lines in such portions of ,british territory as might be occupied by the forces of the ,republic4 ,against the possibility of an immediate invasion of the ,transvaal--about which1 says the statement1 there was much anxiety on account of the armoured trains1 which the ,english advertised so loudly--precautions were taken by preparing for demolition some of the bridges on the south-eastern section of the company's lines4 ,guards were1 also1 stationed at bridges and other important points throughout the ,transvaal in order to protect them against attack or interference by the great number of ,anglophiles assumed to be still in the ,republic2 but the statement seems to suggest that1 as shown by the small number of attempts made in this direction1 the ,british rather neglected their opportunities4 ,in regard to the transport of ,transvaal troops1 difficulties arose at the outset owing to the absence of data1 even of the vaguest character1 as to the numbers of burghers1 horses and wagons it would be necessary to convey by train4 ,consequently1 no military time-tables could be drawn up1 and the traffic demands were met as best they could be when they were made4 ,no more1 however1 than eleven trains a day1 in each direction1 could be run on the south-eastern branch--a single-track line1 with stations and crossing places about one hour's journey apart4 ,concerning the amount of traffic carried1 ,mr4 ,steinnetz says3-- ,the total military traffic to the frontier was not so great as one would expect1 in spite of only a portion of the burghers having taken up arms4 ,from various districts the commandos marched mounted1 with ox-wagons1 to the place of assembly1 as had been the custom in the past1 although the use of the railway would have saved time and trouble to both horses and men4 ,yet it was not the first time that the ,transvaalers had had the opportunity of learning the use of railways in warfare4 ,at the time of the ,jameson ,raid and the ,magato ,campaign full use had been made of them4 ,among the railway bridges which the ,boers had prepared for destruction1 in case of need1 was an iron one of #aaf ft4 span1 the blowing up of which would have checked the anticipated ,british invasion of the ,transvaal via ,lang's ,nek2 but the concentration of the ,british forces at ,dundee and ,ladysmith allowed the ,boers to enter ,natal without resistance2 and they took over1 in sections1 the working of the ,natal railway in proportion as they advanced4 ,at various stations in northern ,natal long platforms had been specially constructed by the ,british1 and other arrangements made1 to permit of large movements of troops and especially the detraining of cavalry4 ,these improvements1 says ,mr4 ,steinnetz1 came in very handy for the ,federal ,army4 ,the personnel of the lines had retired in a great hurry1 without attempting any demolitions or doing any damage to the lines beyond what could be easily repaired4 ,the ,lang's ,nek tunnel was wholly untouched4 ,mr4 ,steinnetz continues3-- ,the ,boers themselves1 however1 through fear of being surprised by armoured trains1 and for other reasons1 gave the breakdown gangs more work to do4 ,the telegraph line was destroyed by them for long distances1 the track was broken up and two bridges were damaged4 ,in order to obstruct the retreat of ,general ,yule from ,dundee a bridge of two #cj-;foot spans on the ,dundee branch line was blown up by the ,irish ,brigade with a dynamite charge in the central pier4 ,the damage done was not very great and was easily repaired4 ,the same ineffective measure was applied with greater success to a similar bridge over a small spruit near ,waschbank4 ,but even here the repair was not difficult4 ,these admissions as to the ease with which the work of destruction could1 as a rule1 readily be put right again are in full accord with ,sir ,percy ,girouard's report1 in dealing with the same subject4 ,it is only fair to accept1 in turn1 the assertion made by ,mr4 ,steinnetz that the damage which the ,british did to certain of the railway bridges was speedily repaired4 ,some of the later destruction work carried out by the ,boers was of a more serious character4 ,the blowing up of the ,tugela bridge at ,colenso--a structure consisting of five iron lattice girder spans of #ajj ft4 each on masonry piles--was entrusted by the ,boer military authorities to an inspector of the railway company who had served in the ,dutch engineers4 ,it was accomplished by the simultaneous detonation of forty dynamite charges all connected by leads to a ,siemens and ,halske exploder1 the bridge being thoroughly demolished4 ,in the destruction of the three-span bridge over the ,orange ,river at ,norval's ,pont the charge employed consisted of about three and a half chests of dynamite1 or #aih lbs4 ,concerning the general destruction of bridges by which the ,boers sought to check pursuit after their abandonment of the siege of ,ladysmith1 ,mr4 ,steinnitz says3--,there was no lack of explosives1 and no need to spare them4 ,the central workshops of the ,netherlands ,company were made use of by the ,government for the repair of guns1 rifles1 wagons1 etc41 and for the manufacture of war material4 ,four complete ambulance trains were also fitted up there for the use of wounded burghers4 ,all the traffic on the lines was done on ,government orders1 and all expenses were charged to them4 ,no private traffic at all was carried4 ,there were1 consequently1 no railway receipts1 and the railway company had no responsibility4 ,,development ,,of ,,rail ,,power ,in one way or another the ,south ,african ,war of #ahii-aijb was concerned in many of the most complicated of the problems that arise in connection with the use of railways for military purposes4#dg ,in various ways1 also1 it advanced to a still further stage the whole question of the nature and possibilities of rail-power in war4 ,it confirmed under especially remarkable conditions a fact which the ,american ,war of ,secession had already established1 namely1 that even single lines of railway1 passing through country occupied by or belonging to the enemy1 may allow of campaigns being conducted at such distances from the base of supplies as1 but for this means of communication1 would render war impracticable4 ,it offered further evidence as to the possibility1 in favourable circumstances1 of employing railways for the carrying out of important tactical movements4 ,it re-established the essential need of organisation for the attainment of efficiency in military transport and especially in so far as such organisation deals with questions of control and co-ordination of the military and the technical elements4 ,it placed on a recognised and clearly defined basis the uses of armoured trains and the best methods to be adopted for their construction and operation4 ,it showed still more clearly1 perhaps1 than any previous war had done1 the useful and beneficent purposes served by ambulance and hospital trains1 whether constructed for the purpose or adapted from existing railway stock4 ,it proved that1 however apparently insecure a line of rail communication may be1 and however active and destructive the attacks made on it by a pertinacious enemy1 yet1 with a strong and well-organised force of ,railway ,troops following close on the advancing army1 and supplemented by an efficient system of line-protection1 repairs and reconstruction can be carried out with such speed that comparatively little material delay will be caused1 the final result of the campaign will not necessarily be affected1 and the value of rail-power as an instrument of war will suffer no actual reduction4 ,,footnotes3 #da ,in ,vol4 ,,ii of the ,detailed ,history of the ,railways in the ,south ,african ,war 7,chatham3 ,royal ,engineers ,institute1 #aijd71 there is a series of #de full-page photographs of damaged bridges and of the low-level deviations constructed to take their place4 #db ,for a description of these blockhouses1 see vol4 iii1 pp4 #abe-f1 of the ,history of the ,corps of the ,royal ,engineers1 by ,col4 ,sir ,chas4 ,m4 ,watson4 ,royal ,engineers ,institute1 ,chatham1 #aiae4 #dc ,natal3 ,an ,illustrated ,official ,railway ,guide and ,handbook4 ,compiled and edited by ,c4 ,w4 ,francis ,harrison4 ,published by ,authority4 ,london1 #aijc4 #dd ,history of the ,war in ,south ,africa1 #ahii-aijb4 ,compiled by ,direction of ,his ,majesty's ,government4 ,vol4 ,,iv1 ,appendix #aj3 ,notes on the ,military ,railway ,system in ,south ,africa4 ,london1 #aiaj4 #de ,official ,history1 ,vol4 ,,iv1 ,appendix #aj4 #df ,for ,english translation1 see ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,january1 #aijb4 #dg ,in the preface of his standard work on ,military ,railways1 ,major ,w4 ,d4 ,connor1 of the ,corps of ,engineers1 ,united ,states ,army1 says3 ,on the military side ,i refer to the reports of ,colonel ,sir ,e4 ,p4 ,c4 ,girouard1 ,k4,c4,m4,g41 ,r4,e41 of the ,british ,army1 whose work in ,egypt and ,south ,africa has set a high standard for any engineer who in future may be required to meet and solve railway problems in the theatre of war4 ,these reports give the solution of many points as worked out in the field1 and confirm the main lessons to be learned from the history of the military railways in our ,civil ,war4 7,see ,bibliography47 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,the ,,russo-,,japanese ,,war ,the ,russo-,japanese war of #aijd-e was a test not so much of the military strength of the two combatants as of their respective means of communication and concentration4 ,from ,moscow to ,port ,arthur the distance is #e1cjj miles1 and1 save for the sea journey via the ,baltic1 the ,north ,sea1 the ,atlantic and the ,indian ,ocean1 the ,russians were dependent for the transport of their troops and stores to ,manchuria on such very inadequate railways as they then controlled4 ,japan1 on the other hand1 was able to rely on her fleet and her considerably developed mercantile marine2 and1 as soon as she had paralysed the ,russian fleet and established her own command of the sea--as she did within two days of the outbreak of hostilities--she could land her forces whenever she chose at almost any convenient point on the sea-board of the theatre of war4 ,the situation recalled1 somewhat1 the still worse position in which ,russia had found herself at the time of the ,crimean ,war when1 in the absence of any rail facilities at all1 her troops had to march1 and their supplies and munitions had to be conveyed1 hundreds of miles over dreary steppes--huge columns that had quitted the far north and east of the interior dwindling to a few broken-down ,battalions before they came in sight of ,sebastopol--whereas the allies could send their troops all the way to the ,crimea by sea4 ,while there are many other causes which1 rightly or wrongly1 have been regarded as contributing to the defeat of ,russia by ,japan--included therein being personal shortcomings of the ,russian officers2 mistakes made by them in strategy and tactics2 defects in the ,russian military system1 and the half-hearted interest of the ,russian nation in the struggle--the really decisive factors in the situation were the transport deficiencies of the ,siberian and ,manchurian railways4 ,the construction of a ,trans-,siberian ,railway as a great strategic line stretching across ,asia1 facilitating the development of a vast territory1 and1 above all1 calculated to foster the realisation of ,russia's aims in the ,far ,east1 first came under discussion about the year #ahfj4 ,it was made the subject of an exhaustive study by a ,committee of ,ministers in #ahge1 but it was not until #ahia that the first sod was turned4 ,military and political considerations being paramount1 such energy was shown in the work of construction that by #ahif the western section had been carried through ,irkutsk to ,lake ,baikal and from the eastern shores thereof to ,strietensk1 while the eastern section--known as the ,usuri ,railway--had been made through ,russia's ,maritime ,province from ,vladivostok to ,khabarovsk4 ,the original design was that the line should be constructed on ,russian territory all the way to ,vladivostok2 but this meant that from ,strietensk it would have to follow the great bend made to the north by the ,amur1 the southern boundary of ,russia1 and the ,russian ,government thought it desirable to secure a more direct route4 ,towards the end of #ahif1 in return for the great services which she considered she had rendered to ,china in the war between that country and ,japan1 ,russia obtained the concession for a railway which1 starting from ,chita1 ,trans-,baikalia1 about #bjj miles west of ,strietensk1 would pass through ,manchuria to ,vladivostok1 avoiding the great bend of the ,amur1 though still offering the disadvantage that one important section of the through route would not be on ,russian territory4 ,under a contract made between the ,chinese ,government and the ,russo-,chinese ,bank1 a ,chinese ,eastern ,railway ,company was formed to build and operate the line thus conceded2 but the arrangements made were carried out through the ,russian ,minister of ,finance1 and the line was directly dependent on the ,russian ,state4 ,russia's occupation of ,port ,arthur in ,march1 #ahih1 led1 in the spring of the following year1 to the further construction being begun of a southern branch of the ,chinese ,eastern ,railway from ,harbin1 a station on the ,chita-,vladivostok line1 to the extremity of the ,liao-tung peninsula4 ,it was these two railways1 the ,trans-,siberian and the ,chinese ,eastern1 terminating at ,vladivostok in the one direction and at ,port ,arthur in the other1 which came into special consideration in the war of #aijd-e4 ,it was on the ,trans-,siberian line1 more especially1 that ,russia was mainly dependent 7as the ,german official report on the war points out7 not only for the concentration and maintenance of her army but even for the raising and organisation of most of its units4 ,when the ,trans-,siberian was first built1 the desire to avoid undue expenditure on a line which must necessarily involve a huge expenditure1 with little or no prospect of yielding a return sufficient for the payment of interest thereon1 led to the adoption of an economy which was to hamper very materially the transport capacity of the railway4 ,only a single line of rails was allowed for2 a limit was placed on the breadth of the embankments2 the curves were greater than considerations of speed and safety should have permitted2 the gradients were either dangerously varied or so excessive that divisions of the trains were necessary2 the rails used were of no greater weight than from #db lbs4 to #dg lbs4 per yard1 and they were badly laid1 even then2 the bridges across the smaller streams were made of wood only2 the crossing-places and the railway stations were few and far between1 while all the secondary constructions were provided on what was almost the cheapest possible scale4 ,these conditions necessitated the limitation of the traffic1 when the line was first opened1 to the running of three trains a day in each direction4 ,the length of the trains was restricted to sixty axles4 ,it was thus impossible to meet the demands even of the ordinary traffic in peace time1 apart altogether from any question as to military requirements in time of war4 ,no sooner1 therefore1 were the main portions of the line ready1 in #ahih1 than there was set aside1 for a railway which was already to cost over #cej1jjj1jjj1 a further sum of #i1acj1jjj for relaying those portions of the line with a better quality of rails and sleepers1 the reconstruction of sections dangerous to traffic1 the provision of more stations and more rolling stock1 and other improvements4 ,it was expected that this additional work would be completed by #aijd1 by which time the line was to be equal to the running of thirteen pairs of trains daily4 ,reporting on the condition of the ,russian railways in #aijj 7at which date the ,eastern ,chinese line was still unfinished71 ,general ,kuropatkin1 then ,war ,minister1 afterwards ,commander-in-,chief in ,manchuria1 did not hesitate to declare that it was still impossible for them to cope with heavy traffic4 ,relations between ,russia and ,japan became strained towards the end of #aijc1 though the ,government of the former country were desirous that any outbreak of hostilities should be avoided until they were better able to undertake them4 ,in his account of ,the ,russian ,army and the ,japanese ,war ,general ,kuropatkin says concerning the position at this period3-- ,our unreadiness was only too plain1 and it seemed at that time that we should be able1 with two or three years' steady work1 so to strengthen our position in the ,far ,east1 and improve the railway1 the fleet1 the land forces1 and the fortresses of ,port ,arthur and ,vladivostok that ,japan would have small chance of success against us4 ,regarding war as inevitable1 and disinclined to give ,russia an opportunity of first strengthening her position in the directions here suggested1 ,japan broke off diplomatic relations with ,russia on ,february #f1 #aijd1 this being the immediate prelude to the hostilities that followed4 ,in anticipation of a possible rupture1 ,russia had already despatched reinforcements and stores to the ,far ,east by sea2 but the rupture1 when it did come1 found her quite unprepared to send further large reinforcements by land1 while her forces in the ,far ,east were scattered over the vast area extending from ,lake ,baikal to ,vladivostok1 and from ,port ,arthur to ,nikolaievsk4 ,no orders for mobilisation had been issued2 the army was in the midst of rearmament and reorganisation1 and the unreadiness of the railways had prevented the drawing up of time-tables for the concentration of the troops4 ,ten days after the outbreak of war the ,russian ,government issued a statement in which they said3-- ,the distance of the territory now attacked and the desire of the ,tsar to maintain peace were the causes of the impossibility of preparations for war being made a long time in advance4 ,not only1 too1 was the seat of war #e1jjj miles away1 and not only was a single-track ill-equipped line of railway the only practicable means of sending troops and war material there by land1 but an exceptionally great obstacle to traffic had to be met owing to the interruption of rail communication by ,lake ,baikal4 ,having a length of #chj miles1 a breadth ranging from eighteen miles to fifty-six miles1 a mean depth of #hej feet 7with a maximum1 in parts1 of no less than #d1ejj ft471 and a total area of over #ac1jjj square miles1 ,lake ,baikal ranks1 next to the great lakes of the ,united ,states and ,central ,africa1 as the largest fresh-water lake in the world2 though it should1 in reality1 be regarded less as a lake than as a great inland sea4 ,as it happened1 also1 this vast expanse of water stood in the direct line of route of the ,trans-,siberian railway1 and the crossing of it by the ,russian reinforcements going to the ,far ,east constituted a seriously defective link in the chain of communication4 ,at an elevation of #a1cfj feet above sea level1 the lake is subject alike to severe gales1 to heavy fogs1 and to frosts so intense that in mid-winter the water may be frozen to a depth of ten feet4 ,from the end of ,april to the end of ,december troops and travellers arriving by rail at one side of the lake crossed to the other by passenger steamers4 ,goods wagons were taken over by ferry-boats which1 also1 acted as ice-breakers early and late in the winter season1 so long as the passage could be kept open4 ,when1 in the winter1 the ice was strong enough to bear1 traffic was conducted by transport sledges2 but when there was sufficient ice to stop the ferry-boats1 though not sufficient to permit of the sledges being used--conditions which generally prevailed for about six weeks in the year--the traffic had to be discontinued altogether4 ,the question will naturally be asked1--,why had not the constructors of the line avoided these disadvantages by carrying it round the lake8 ,the reply is that this had not been done1 prior to the outbreak of war1 owing to the formidable nature of the work involved from an engineering point of view4 ,lake ,baikal is bordered1 on the south--the route a ,circum-,baikal line would have to take--by mountains which rise sheer up from the water's edge to a height of1 in places1 no less than #d1fjj ft4 ,across the mountains1 along the rocky shores1 and over the intervening valleys the railway would require to be carried for a distance of #afj miles in order to link up the two sections then divided by the lake4 ,the difficulties of the work were likely to be as great as the cost would certainly be enormous1 compared with that of the remainder of the ,trans-,siberian railway4 ,so it was that when the war broke out there were still #aab miles of the ,circum-,baikal line to be constructed4 ,so it was1 also1 that1 pending the completion of this line round the lake1 ,russia's reinforcements from ,europe for the ,far ,east had to cross the lake itself2 and the outbreak of hostilities in the month of ,february placed ,russia at an especially great disadvantage in regard to transport4 ,the combined ferry-steamers and ice-breakers had made their final journey for the winter on ,january #bg1 and at first the only way in which the troops could cross the ice was by marching or by sledge4 ,after a day's rest at ,irkutsk1 they were brought by train to ,baikal station1 at the lake side1 arriving there at about four o'clock in the morning in order that they could complete the journey to ,tanchoi station1 on the other side of the lake--a distance of about twenty-five miles--in the day4 ,the track was marked out by posts1 supplemented by lanterns at night1 and it was kept in order by gangs of labourers4 ,small bridges were placed over cracks in the ice4 ,shelters1 in telephonic communication with one another1 were provided at four-mile distances alike for the purpose of rest and for the distribution of food prepared by regimental field kitchens2 but the principal meal of the day was taken at a more substantial half-way house1 where the cooking arrangements were on a more elaborate scale and better accommodation was provided4 ,around the half-way house at night petroleum flares were burned1 so that it could be seen a long way off4 ,in foggy weather1 or during snow storms1 bells were rung at all the shelters4 ,inasmuch as the temperature fell1 at times1 to #bb deg41 ,fahr41 below zero1 the provision of these rest-houses must have been greatly appreciated4 ,baggage was taken across in sledges1 the normal supply of which had been increased by an additional #c1jjj4 ,some of the troops also made the journey by this form of conveyance1 four men being seated in each sledge4 ,the batteries crossed with their own horses4 ,as soon as the ice attained a thickness of about #d ft41 the expedient was adopted of laying a pair of rails along it in order1 more especially1 that the additional engines and railway wagons urgently needed on the lines east of the lake could be taken across4 ,the rails were laid on sleepers of exceptional length1 the weight being thus distributed over a greater surface of ice2 but1 even with this precaution1 it was no easy matter to keep the line in working order owing to the extreme cold1 to storms1 to the occasional ice movements and cracks1 or to the effect of earthquake shocks in destroying lengths of line1 sections of which sometimes required to be relaid almost as soon as they had been put down4 ,the line was begun on ,february #aj and completed by the #bith of the same month4 ,between ,march #a and ,march #bf there were taken across the lake1 by this means1 sixty-five dismantled locomotives 7rebuilt on arrival on the eastern side71 twenty-five railway carriages1 and #b1cac goods wagons4 ,transport was provided by horses1 the number so used being about #a1jjj4 ,constructed to serve an exclusively military purpose1 this twenty-five-mile line across ,lake ,baikal may certainly be regarded as a military railway1 while as a military ice-railway it holds a unique position in the history of warfare4 ,when1 owing to the advancing season1 the ice on the lake could no longer be trusted to bear either railway trucks or sledges1 and when navigation was again open1 dependence had to be placed on the ferry services4 ,there were1 however1 only two vessels available for the transfer of railway trucks across the lake1 and each of these1 accommodating twenty-seven trucks at a time1 could make no more than three return crossings in the twenty-four hours4 ,only in one way could an improvement be effected in these obviously inadequate facilities for getting an army to ,manchuria1 and that was in carrying the railway round the southern end of the lake1 thus avoiding the delay caused by the hitherto unavoidable transshipment and crossing1 and ensuring a continuous rail journey4 ,the need for this ,circum-,baikal link had1 in fact1 become urgent1 and the work was pushed on with the greatest vigour4 ,mention has already been made of the engineering difficulties which the construction of the line involved4 ,these will be better understood if it is added that the #afj-mile link passes through thirty-four tunnels1 having an aggregate length of over six miles2 that it is carried across valleys1 or open spaces1 on two hundred bridges1 and that numerous cuttings and many large culverts had also to be provided4 ,the total cost worked out at no less than #eb1jjj per mile--probably the largest sum per mile ever spent on a railway designed1 in the first instance1 to serve a distinctly military purpose1 and exceeding by #ce1jjj the average cost per mile1 down to that date1 of the entire system of ,russian railways4 ,delays occurred1 also1 through strikes and other causes1 and1 in the result1 it was not until ,september #be1 #aijd--more than seven months after the outbreak of war--that the line was ready for use1 and that an interruption of the rail journey by the crossing of ,lake ,baikal became no longer necessary4 ,meanwhile1 an inadequate supply of engines and rolling stock had been a serious hindrance to traffic alike on the ,trans-,baikal section of the ,siberian line and on the ,eastern ,chinese lines4 ,the locomotives and wagons taken across ,lake ,baikal either on the ice-railway or on the ferry boats had served a useful purpose1 but six months elapsed before the ,eastern ,chinese lines could be worked to their full efficiency4 ,there were other directions1 as well1 in which traffic hindrances arose4 ,the freezing1 down to the very bottom1 of the rivers between the eastern side of ,lake ,baikal and ,harbin 7,manchuria7 was a cause of serious difficulty in the early part of the year in getting water even for such locomotives as were available4 ,in the western ,siberian section the supply of water was impaired by the great percentage of salt in the streams4 ,in ,manchuria the fuel reserve was inadequate2 soldiers were the only reliable portion of the subordinate railway staff2 the railway workshops were poorly equipped2 there were not nearly enough engine depts2 large supplies of rails1 fish-plates1 sleepers and ballast were needed1 and much work had to be done in the construction of additional sidings1 etc4 ,all these shortcomings required to be made good whilst the war was in actual progress1 though for the transport of most of the necessary materials and appliances there was only a single-track line of railway already overtaxed for the conveyance of troops1 munitions and supplies4 ,the number of trains that could be run was extremely limited4 ,the capacity of the line of communication as a whole was fixed by that of the ,eastern ,chinese ,railway between ,chita and ,harbin2 and after three months of war it was still possible to run from west to east in each twenty-four hours no more than three military trains 7conveying troops1 supplies1 stores and remounts71 one light mail train1 and1 when necessary1 one ambulance train2 though these conditions were improved later on4 ,the speed at which the trains ran--allowing for necessary stops in stations or at crossing places on the line--ranged from five to eleven miles an hour1 with seven miles an hour as a good average4 ,for the journey from ,warsaw to ,mukden the military trains took forty days1 including one day's rest for the troops at the end of every #fjj or #gjj miles4 ,in ,april and ,may the journey from ,wirballen1 on the frontier of ,russia and ,germany1 to ,liao-yang1 situate between ,mukden and ,port ,arthur1 took fifty days--an average speed of five and a quarter miles per hour4 ,what with the transport and other difficulties that arose1 it was not for three months after the outbreak of hostilities that the ,russian troops in the ,ear ,east received reinforcements4 ,it was not until after seven months of war that the three ,army ,corps sent from ,european ,russia to join the field army were all concentrated in ,manchuria4 ,under these conditions the ,japanese1 free to send their own armies by sea to the theatre of war1 and able to concentrate them with far greater speed1 had all the initial advantage4 ,the ,russian reinforcements arrived in driblets1 and they were either cut off as they came or1 as regards1 at least1 the fighting from ,may #ad to ,october #ad1 provided only #ba1jjj men to replace #ajj1jjj killed1 wounded or sick2 whereas the ,japanese were able to maintain a continuous flow of reinforcements to make good their own casualties4 ,general ,kuropatkin is of opinion that if the ,russians had been able to command better transport from the outset the whole course of the campaign would have been changed4 ,he thinks that even a single extra through troop train per day would have made a material difference1 while the running1 from the start1 of six trains a day would1 he believes1 have secured for ,russia alike the initiative and the victory4 ,referring to the ,siberian and ,eastern ,chinese ,railways he says3-- ,if these lines had been more efficient1 we could have brought up our troops more rapidly1 and1 as things turned out1 #aej1jjj men concentrated at first would have been of far more value to us than the #cjj1jjj who were gradually assembled during nine months1 only to be sacrificed in detail4444 ,if we had had a better railway and had been able to mass at ,liao-yang the number specified1 we should undoubtedly have won the day in spite of our mistakes4 ,kuropatkin himself certainly did all he could to improve the transport conditions4 ,in a statement he submitted to the ,tsar on ,march #g1 #aijd1 he declared that of all urgently pressing questions that of bettering the railway communication between ,russia and ,siberia was the most important2 and he added3--,it must1 therefore1 be taken up at once1 in spite of the enormous cost4 ,the money expended will not be wasted2 it will1 on the contrary1 be in the highest sense productive inasmuch as it will shorten the duration of the war4 ,on the ,trans-,baikal section six new stations were added1 and additional crossing places to facilitate the passing of trains were provided elsewhere1 so that by ,may some additional trains per day could be run4 ,in ,june orders were given by the ,government for the execution of extensive works designed to increase the capacity of the ,siberian and ,eastern ,chinese main lines to seven trains per day in each direction1 and that of the southern branch to twelve per day4 ,the cost of these improvements was estimated at #d1djj1jjj4 ,in ,november1 #aijd1 ,kuropatkin submitted to the ,tsar a recommendation that the lines should be at once doubled throughout their whole length4 ,the reinforcements1 he declared1 were even then still coming in driblets4 ,supplies despatched in the spring are still on the ,siberian side4 ,waterproofs sent for the summer will arrive when we want fur coats2 fur coats will come to hand when waterproofs are wanted4 ,there was need1 also1 to provide stores of provisions for the troops4 ,so long as the army was a comparatively small one it could depend mainly on local resources4 ,in proportion as it increased in size it became more and more dependent on supplies from ,european ,russia2 but the collection of a sufficiency for a single month meant the running of five extra trains a day for a like period4 ,even when ample supplies were available at one point1 weakness and inefficiency in the transport arrangements might lead to the troops elsewhere suffering privations which should be avoided4 ,whether for financial or other reasons1 the ,russian ,government did not adopt the idea of converting the single track of the railway system into double track2 but the improvements made in the traffic facilities 7including the provision of sixty-nine additional places for the passing of trains7 were such that by the time peace was concluded1 on ,september #e1 #aije1 the ,russians had ten1 or even twelve pairs of full-length trains running in the twenty-four hours1 as compared with the two per day which could alone be run six months before the outbreak of war and the three per day which were running nine months later4 ,the capacity of the lines had been increased practically fourfold2 though the general situation remained such as to evoke the following comment from the writer of the official ,german account of the war#dh3-- ,in spite of the efforts made to improve the line1 the connection of the ,russian forces in ,east ,asia with their home country was1 and remained1 an unreliable and uncertain factor in the calculations of ,army ,headquarters4 ,no measures1 were they ever so energetic1 could be designed to remove this uncertainty1 and it was only gradually1 as the ,manchurian ,army itself increased and concentrated1 and as the railway works advanced1 that greater freedom of action was assured to the ,commander-in-,chief2 but even then the army as a whole1 with all its wants and supplies1 remained dependent on the ,siberian and ,eastern ,chinese ,railways4 ,what the railways did was to enable the ,russians to collect at the theatre of war1 by the time the war itself came to an end1 an army of #a1jjj1jjj men--of whom two-thirds had not yet been under fire--together with machine-guns1 howitzers1 shells1 small-arm ammunition1 field railways1 wireless telegraphy1 supplies1 and technical stores of all kinds4 ,kuropatkin says of this achievement3-- ,the ,war ,department had1 with the co-operation of other departments1 successfully accomplished a most colossal task4 ,what single authority would have admitted a few years ago the possibility of concentrating an army of a million men #e1djj miles away from its base of supply and equipment by means of a poorly-constructed single-line railway8 ,wonders were effected2 but it was too late4 ,affairs in the interior of ,russia for which the ,war ,department could not be held responsible were the cause of the war being brought to an end at a time when decisive military operations should really have only just been beginning4 ,russia1 in fact1 agreed to make peace at a time when the prospect of her being able to secure a victory was greater than it had been at any time during the earlier phases of the war2 but the ,japanese failed to attain all they had hoped for1 the primary causes of such failure1 in spite of their repeated victories1 being1 as told in the ,british ,official ,history of the war1 that ,port ,arthur held out longer than had been expected1 and the ,trans-,siberian ,railway enabled ,russia to place more men in the field than had been thought possible4#di ,thus1 in respect to rail-power1 at least1 ,russia still achieved a remarkable feat in her transport of an army so great a distance by a single-track line of railway4 ,such an achievement was unexampled1 while1 although ,fate was against the ultimate success of her efforts1 ,russia provided the world with a fresh object lesson as to what might have been done1 in a campaign waged more than #e1jjj miles from the base of supplies1 if only the line of rail communication had been equal from the first to the demands it was called upon to meet4 ,apart from this main consideration1 there were some other phases of the ,russo-,japanese ,war which are of interest from the point of view of the present study4 ,the ,field railways1 mentioned on the previous page1 constituted a network of1 altogether1 #bej miles of narrow-gauge railways built and operated by the ,russian troops--either alone or with the help of ,chinese labourers--and designed to act as subsidiary arteries of the broad-gauge ,eastern ,chinese ,railway by 7#a7 providing for the transport therefrom of troops and supplies to the front2 7#b7 conveying guns and munitions to the siege batteries1 and 7#c7 bringing back the sick and wounded4 ,horses1 ponies and mules were employed for traction purposes4 ,each of the three ,russian armies in the field had its own group of narrow-gauge lines1 and the lines themselves served a most useful purpose in a country of primitive roads and inadequate local means of transport4 ,in one instance a broad-gauge branch line was built inland1 during the course of the war1 from the ,eastern ,chinese ,railway for a distance of twenty-five miles4 ,a dept was set up at its terminus1 and thence the supplies were conveyed to the troops by a series of narrow-gauge lines extending to every part of that particular section of the theatre of war4 ,construction of the narrow-gauge line serving the ,second ,army1 and extending nineteen miles from a point on the ,eastern ,chinese ,railway near to ,port ,arthur1 necessitated the provision of six bridges and three embankments4 ,three lines1 the building of which was begun in ,january1 #aije1 were siege lines specially designed to serve the positions taken up at ,liao-yang2 but all three were abandoned on the evacuation of ,mukden1 early in ,march4 ,it was1 however1 subsequent to the retreat from ,mukden that the greatest degree of energy in constructing narrow-gauge lines was shown by the ,russians4 ,in addition to the #bej miles brought into use1 there was still another #ajj miles completed2 but these could not be operated owing to the inadequate supply of wagons--a supply reduced still further through seizures made by the ,japanese4 ,during the course of the war the traffic carried on these military narrow-gauge lines included over #eh1jjj tons of provisions1 stores1 etc41 #ge1acb sick and wounded1 and #bd1ghf other troops4#ej ,for the carrying out of all this construction work1 and1 also1 for the operation of the ,manchurian and ,ussuri railways1 ,russia had twenty-four companies of ,railway ,troops1 the total force of which was estimated at #aa1dca4 ,in the first part of the war she relied upon her six ,east ,siberian ,railway ,battalions4 ,as the work increased other ,battalions were brought from ,european ,russia4 ,the ,japanese were not well provided with ,railway ,troops2 but they were none the less active in endeavouring to destroy the ,russian lines of communication1 on which so much depended4 ,for instance1 the railway to ,port ,arthur was cut by them near ,wa-fang-tien at #aa p4m4 on ,may #f4 ,the ,russians repaired the line1 and by ,may #aj a further train-load of ammunition was sent over it into ,port ,arthur4 ,three days later the ,japanese cut the line at another point1 and from that time ,port ,arthur was isolated4 ,as regards the operation of the ,siberian and ,eastern ,chinese ,railways1 ,colonel ,w4 ,h4 ,h4 ,waters says3--#ea ,taking the railway as a whole1 from ,chelyabinsk1 which is the western terminus of the ,siberian portion1 to ,mukden1 a distance of close upon #d1jjj miles1 it has worked better than ,i expected2 but the one great fault connected with it has been1 and is1 the incapacity of ,russian railwaymen1 civil or military1 to handle heavy station traffic properly4 ,if ,russia were to pay a ,british or ,american goods-yard foreman1 say from ,nine ,elms station1 a salary1 no matter how high1 and let him import his own staff of assistants1 the improvement of the ,asiatic lines in question would be remarkable4 ,then1 again1 ,captain ,c4 ,e4 ,vickers1 ,r4,e41 writing on ,the ,siberian ,railway in ,war1 in the issue of ,the ,royal ,engineers ,journal 7,chatham7 for ,august1 #aije1 points to the need which was developed for the control of the railway during war by a separate staff1 as distinct from the staffs concerned in arranging operations1 distributing supplies and munitions1 and other military duties4 ,whether due to the personal incapacity spoken of by the one authority here quoted1 or to the lack of a separate organisation alluded to by the other1 the fact remains that the operation of the ,siberian and ,eastern ,chinese lines did give rise to a degree of confusion that must have greatly increased the difficulties of the position in which the ,russians were placed4 ,when1 for example1 in ,september1 #aijd1 reservists were urgently wanted at ,mukden after the retreat from ,liao-yang1 the traffic was so mismanaged that it took the troops seven days to do the #ccg miles from ,harbin--an average speed of two miles per hour4 ,on ,december #e1 ,harbin ,junction was so blocked in all directions by trains which could neither move in nor go out that traffic had to be suspended for twelve hours until the entanglement was set right4 ,still further1 after the fall of ,port ,arthur1 on ,january #b1 #aije1 and the augmentation of the ,japanese forces by ,nogi's army1 the arrival of reinforcements then so greatly needed by the ,russians was delayed for over one month to allow of the forwarding of a quantity of stores which had accumulated on the line4 ,some1 at least1 of the difficulties and delays experienced in operation were undoubtedly due to developments of that interference by individual officers with the working of the railways of which we have already had striking examples in the case of the ,american ,war of ,secession and the ,franco-,german ,war of #ahgj-ga4 ,colonel ,waters writes on this subject3-- ,it is interesting to note how the working of the line was interfered with by those who should have been the first to see that no extraneous calls were made upon it when the organisation of the army and the strengthening of ,port ,arthur were of vital importance4 ,the chief of the ,viceroy's ,staff was the intermediary between ,admiral ,alexeiev and ,general ,kuropatkin1 the former being at ,mukden and the latter at ,liao-yang1 thirty-seven miles distant4 ,frequent conferences took place between ,kuropatkin and this officer1 who always used to come in a special train to ,liao-yang4 ,this necessitated the line being kept clear for indefinite periods of time and dislocated all the other traffic arrangements1 as the then chief of the railways himself declared4 ,in the first days of ,may1 #aijd1 the ,viceroy and the ,grand ,duke ,boris were at ,port ,arthur1 and wished to leave it before they should be cut off4 ,i heard that they actually took three special trains to quit ,port ,arthur1 namely1 one for each of them1 and one for their baggage and stores4 ,this entirely upset the troop train1 supply and ammunition services1 at a time1 too1 when the scarcity of heavy gun munition in the fortress was such that1 within a week1 ,kuropatkin called for volunteers to run a train-load through1 which was done a few hours only before the place was definitely invested4 ,there were1 throughout #aijd1 plenty of other instances of special trains being run for1 and siding accommodation occupied by1 various individuals1 so that the organisation and maintenance of the army was considerably hampered thereby4 ,these experiences simply confirm the wisdom of the action which other countries had already taken 7#a7 to ensure the efficient operation of railways in time of war by staffs comprising the military and the technical elements in combination1 and 7#b7 to prevent the interference of the former in the details of the actual working by the latter4 ,russia was1 in fact1 distinctly behind ,western nations in these respects in #aijd-e1 and the need for placing her military transport system on a sounder basis was among the many lessons she learnt--and acted upon--as the result of her experiences in the war with ,japan4 ,,footnotes3 #dh ,the ,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,the ,ya-,lu4 ,prepared in the ,historical ,section of the ,german ,general ,staff4 ,authorized ,translation by ,karl von ,donat4 ,london1 #aijh4 #di ,official ,history of the ,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,prepared by the ,historical ,section of the ,committee of ,imperial ,defence4 ,london1 #aiaj4 #ej ,construction et exploitation des chemins de fer traction animale sur le thtre de la guerre de #aijd-e en ,mandchourie4 ,revue du ,genie ,militaire1 ,avril1 ,mai1 ,juin1 #aiji4 ,paris4 #ea ,the ,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,reports from ,british ,officers attached to the ,japanese and ,russians ,forces in the ,field4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,general ,report dated ,march1 #aije by ,col4 ,w4 ,h4 ,h4 ,waters4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,strategical ,,railways3 ,,germany ,between strategical and military railways there are certain fundamental differences1 just as there are1 also1 between both of them and ordinary commercial railways4 ,while designed partly1 mainly1 or1 it may be1 exclusively1 to serve military purposes1 strategical railways1 unlike military railways proper1 form part of the ordinary railway system of the country in which they are built4 ,they approximate to commercial lines in construction1 equipment and operation1 and they are worked in connection with them for the ordinary purposes of trade and travel2 though in their case any considerations as to whether the traffic they carry is remunerative does not arise1 provided only that they are capable of fulfilling their real purpose--that1 namely1 of ensuring such military transports as may1 sooner or later1 be required of them4 ,it is possible that in times of peace the amount of actual traffic passing over them will be comparatively small1 if not even practically nil1 and that many years may elapse before the special facilities they must necessarily offer1--such as extensive siding accommodation and long platforms for the loading and unloading of troop trains--are likely to be employed to the fullest extent2 but they nevertheless form an integral part both of the railway system and of the military system of the country1 and1 having been constructed1 they are1 at least1 available for military purposes whenever wanted4 ,one must1 however1 again bear in mind that a railway built to meet the ordinary requirements of trade and travel does not become a strategical any more than a military railway simply because1 in time of war1 it is used1 to whatever extent1 for the conveyance of troops1 supplies or war material4 ,the essential factor in each instance is1 not the use that is made of the line1 but the particular1 or1 at least1 the main object it has been built to serve4 ,just1 also1 as a commercial line remains a commercial line notwithstanding its use for military traffic1 so1 in turn1 a strategical line remains a strategical line whatever the amount of civilian traffic it may carry in time of peace4 ,yet while the distinction thus drawn between general railways and strategical railways is abundantly warranted1 the increase of the former may still have an important bearing on the operation of the latter because of the improvement of transport facilities in the interior1 and because of the greater amount of rolling stock which will be made available for war purposes4 ,from a military point of view1 said von ,moltke in the ,prussian ,herrenhaus on ,march #bf1 #ahgf1 every railway is welcome1 and two are still more welcome than one2 and he developed this idea in a further speech on ,december #ag1 #ahgi1 when1 in declaring that the ownership and operation of the leading ,prussian railways was desirable from a military standpoint1 he said3--#eb ,railways have become1 in our time1 one of the most essential instruments for the conduct of war4 ,the transport of large bodies of troops to a given point is an extremely complicated and comprehensive piece of work1 to which continuous attention must be paid4 ,every fresh railway junction makes a difference1 while1 although we may not want to make use of every railway line that has been constructed1 we may still want to make use of the whole of the rolling stock that is available4 ,another important distinction between military and strategical railways is that whereas the building of the former will be governed primarily by military requirements1 that of the latter may be fundamentally due to considerations of ,state policy4 ,strategical railways are wanted to serve the purposes of national defence or1 alternatively1 of national expansion4 ,they are especially provided to ensure the speedy concentration of troops on the frontier1 whether to resist invasion by a neighbouring country or to facilitate the invasion either of that country or1 it may be1 of territory on the other side thereof4 ,the fact that they have been built may1 in some cases1 even further the interests of peace1 should the increased means they offer for military transports render the country concerned a more formidable antagonist than it might otherwise be1 and influence the policy of other ,states or lands accordingly4 ,in tropical dependencies the building of railways as a practical proof of effective occupation is often regarded as preferable to military conquest1 being likely1 in most cases1 to answer the same purpose while offering many other advantages1 besides4 ,in ,west ,africa there are not only railways of this class but others that have1 in addition1 been designed as a precautionary measure against a not impossible invasion1 at some future date1 by ,mohammedan tribes from ,north ,central ,africa4 ,all such lines as these belong to the strategical type1 though they may1 also1 serve an important part in furthering the economic development of the territories concerned4 ,strategical railways1 whether designed for defensive or aggressive purposes1 may1 in turn1 be divided into two main groups1 7#a7 those that constitute a network of lines2 and 7#b7 single or individual lines for short or long distances4 ,a network of strategical railways is generally found in direct association with frontiers4 ,single or individual strategical lines fall into various groups including 7#a7 short lines or branches running out to some point on or near to a frontier2 7#b7 single lines carried for long distances1 and1 possibly1 crossing entire continents2 7#c7 circular or short lines1 connecting different railway systems with one another1 in order to facilitate the movement of troops during mobilisation or concentration or for defensive purposes in the event of invasion2 7#d7 lines passing round cities or large towns in order to avoid delay of troop trains2 and 7#e7 lines for coast defence4 ,the ideal conditions for a network of strategical railways was already a subject of discussion in ,germany in #ahdb1 when ,pnitz brought forward his proposal that that country should provide herself with such a system4 ,there were1 he said1 theorists who designed1 on paper1 strategical railways which1 starting from a common centre1 radiated in straight lines to different points on the frontier and were connected with one another by parallel or intersecting lines of railway on the principle of a geometrical design1 or1 he might have added1 of a spider's web4 ,pnitz admitted the excellence of the idea1 suggesting that if there were1 indeed1 a group of lines to the frontier connected by cross lines allowing of a complete interchange of traffic1 the enemy would never know at what point a sudden advance in force might not be made1 while the linking up of the entire system would greatly facilitate working4 ,in practice1 however1 as he proceeded to point out1 this ideal system could not be fully adopted1 partly because the planning of railways is influenced by the configuration of the country1 which may not permit of geometrical designs for iron roads2 and partly because the trunk lines of national systems of rail communication had already been laid by private enterprise on the principle of catering for the social and economic needs of the community and of returning interest on capital expenditure1 rather than of serving military or political purposes4 ,in the proposals which ,pnitz himself advanced for providing ,germany with a complete network of strategical lines he sought to combine1 as far as possible1 the commercial and the military principle2 though the subsequent predominance1 in most countries1 of the economic element in regard to railways in general strengthened the force of his contention that an ideal system was not necessarily a practicable one4 ,the suggested geometrical design was1 nevertheless1 not lost sight of1 and it continued to be regarded as the plan that should1 at least1 be followed in respect to strategical railways1 as far as circumstances would permit4 ,dealing with this particular subject in his ,geschichte und ,system der ,eisenbahnbenutzung im ,kriege 7,leipzig1 #ahif71 ,dr4 ,josef ,joesten included the following among the conditions which1 theoretically and practically1 should enable a railway system to respond to the necessities of war3-- #a4 ,to each of the strategical fronts of the national territory there should be the largest possible number of railway lines1 all independent the one of the other4 #b4 ,the converging lines terminating at the bases of concentration1 and more especially those leading to the coast or to great navigable rivers1 should be crossed by numerous transverse lines in order to allow of the rapid passing of troops from any one of the lines of concentration to any other4 #c4 ,positions or localities having a recognised strategical value should be selected as the places where the two types of lines should cross1 and these intersection points1 when they are near to the frontier1 should themselves be protected by fortifications serving as points d'appui for movements of advance or retirement4 ,it is possible that1 if the building of railways in ,germany had been left entirely to the ,state from the outset1 these principles would have been generally followed there2 but in ,prussia the private lines taken over as the result of the policy of nationalisation adopted by that country--the total length of those acquired since #ahgb being now nearly #aj1jjj miles--had been originally constructed to serve1 not strategic1 but economic purposes1 and1 more especially1 the industrial interests of ,westphalia and the ,rhineland1 the ,government having been left by private enterprise to provide1 not alone the strategical lines1 but1 also1 the lines that were wanted to serve the less promising economic requirements1 of ,eastern ,prussia4 ,to say1 therefore1 as some writers have done1 that the ,prussian--if not the ,german--railways as a whole have been designed to serve military purposes is erroneous4 ,it is none the less true that the adoption of the principle of ,state ownership conferred alike on ,prussia and on other ,german ,states a great advantage in enabling them both to build strategical lines as1 ostensibly1 part of the ordinary railway system and to adapt existing lines to military purposes so far as conditions allowed and occasion might require4 ,in these circumstances any close adherence to ideal systems has1 indeed1 not been practicable2 yet the activity shown in ,germany in providing either new or adapted strategical lines of railway has been beyond all question4 ,such activity has been especially manifest since the ,franco-,german war of #ahgj-a4 ,it is1 indeed1 the case that during the last twenty-five years there have been constant representations by ,prussian trading interests that the railways in ,westphalia and ,rhineland1 numerous as they might appear to be1 were unequal to the industrial needs of those districts4 ,the reasons for these conditions were that the ,administration1 eager to secure railway profits1 had neglected to provide adequately for improvements1 widenings and extensions of line1 and for additions to rolling stock4 ,no one1 however1 is likely to suggest that ,prussia has shown any lack of enterprise in the construction of strategical lines which would enable her to concentrate great masses of troops on her frontiers with the utmost dispatch4 ,the rivalry between neighbouring ,states1 writes von der ,goltz in ,the ,conduct of ,war1 has had the effect of causing perfectly new lines to be constructed solely for military reasons4 ,strategical railways constitute a special feature of our time2 and in no country has this fact been recognised more clearly1 and acted upon more thoroughly1 than in ,germany4 ,it would1 nevertheless1 be a mistake to attempt to form a reliable estimate of the situation1 from a strategical point of view1 on the basis of the ordinary ,german railway maps1 and certain reproductions thereof recently offered in the ,english ,press have been wholly misleading4 ,not only may these maps be hopelessly out of date--one1 for instance1 that was published in a military journal in the autumn of #aiad contained none of the strategical lines built by ,prussia since #aijj for troop movements in the direction of ,belgium--but they invariably draw no distinction between ,state-owned lines which do come into consideration in regard to military transports and agricultural or other lines--including many narrow-gauge ones--which serve local purposes only and are still owned by private companies1 the ,state not having thought it necessary in the general interest to take them over4 ,a more accurate idea of the real bearings of ,german railways on the military and strategical situation can be gathered from the large map 7,kartenbeilage ,i7 which accompanies the ,bericht presented to the ,kaiser1 in #aiaa1 by the ,prussian ,minister of ,public ,works under the title of ,die ,verwaltung der ffentlichen ,arbeiten in ,preussen1 #aijj bis #aiaj4 ,on this map a clear distinction is drawn between ,state-owned and company-owned lines1 while difference in colouring shows the additions made to the ,state system during the decade either by construction of new lines or by ,state acquisition of existing lines4 ,one especially noticeable feature brought out by this map is the fact that1 in addition to the innumerable railway lines built either to the frontiers or establishing intercommunication and exchange of traffic between those lines themselves1 there is an almost unbroken series running parallel to the coasts of ,pomerania and ,east ,prussia1 and thence southward all along and close to the frontiers of ,russia and ,russian ,poland4 ,in this way troops can be moved1 not only by different routes to many points along the ,baltic coast or the ,russian frontier1 but1 also1 from one of these coastal or frontier points direct to another1 as may be desired4 ,the strategical significance of this arrangement is sufficiently obvious2 but any possible doubt as to the purpose aimed at is removed by some observations thereon made by ,joesten1 who further says in his ,geschichte und ,system der ,eisenbahnbenutzung im ,kriege3-- ,if it is true that1 generally speaking1 the best railways for general purposes constitute excellent lines of communication for armies1 it is no less true that good1 or very good1 strategical lines cannot1 and ought not to1 in all cases constitute good commercial lines4 ,in support of this assertion one can refer to the immense extent of railway lines on the coasts of ,pomerania4 ,these lines1 which are of the first importance from a strategical point of view1 have only a moderate value from a commercial standpoint1 considering that they do not connect the interior of the country with any district providing goods or passenger traffic on a material scale1 and only provide means of communication between localities having identical needs4 ,what is thus admitted in regard to the coastal railways of ,pomerania applies no less to many1 if not to most1 of the frontier lines in ,east ,prussia1 ,west ,prussia and ,silesia4 ,not only1 again1 is the number of ,german lines going to the frontiers1 and no farther1 out of all proportion to the number of those providing for international communication1 but the map on which these observations are based shows that between #aijj and #aiaj there were added to the ,prussian ,state system many lines which 7#a7 established additional transverse links between those already going to the ,russian frontier1 7#b7 provided alternative routes thereto1 or 7#c7 supplemented the lines which skirt the frontier1 a few miles inland1 by branches going therefrom to strategic points actually on the frontier itself4 ,as against this construction of an elaborate network of strategical lines towards and along the ,russian frontier1 there must be put the fact that although1 by this means1 ,germany acquired the power to effect a great and speedy concentration of troops on the frontier itself1 her locomotives and rolling stock would not be able to cross into ,russia and run on the railways there because of the difference in gauge4 ,on the eastern frontier the question as to how an invasion in large force could be effected was1 consequently1 quite different from that which would present itself on the western frontiers1 where the railway gauges of ,belgium1 ,luxemburg and ,france were the same as those of ,germany4 ,it was certain that whenever1 in the event of war1 ,german troops were able to enter ,russian territory1 ,russia would withdraw into the interior or else destroy such of her locomotives and rolling stock as the enemy might otherwise utilise for his own purpose4 ,if1 therefore1 the ,germans wanted to use the existing ,russian lines1 they would either have to build1 in advance1 locomotives and rolling stock capable of running thereon1 or they would have to convert the ,russian gauge of #e feet to the ,german gauge of #d feet #h inches1 so that ,german trains could run on the other side of the frontier4 ,as already remarked on page #fa1 the reduction of the broader gauge into a narrower one would involve fewer engineering difficulties than an expansion of the ,german gauge into the ,russian gauge2 yet even the former procedure1 if carried out over any considerable length of line1 would take up a good deal of time1 and this would be still more the case if the ,russians1 when they retreated1 destroyed the railway track and bridges behind them1 as they might confidently be expected to do4 ,dependence1 again1 on the existing lines across the frontier would1 apart from questions of conversion and reconstruction1 still give ,germany only a very small number of railway routes into ,russia1 and these1 also1 at points where the opposition offered might be especially active4 ,what1 in these circumstances1 ,germany evidently planned to do as soon as her troops crossed the frontier1 in the event of a war with ,russia1 was to supplement the strategical lines on her own side of that frontier by military light railways which1 laid on the ordinary roads1 or on clearances to be effected1 on ,russian territory1 would render her independent of the ordinary railways there1 while offering the further advantage 7#a7 that the laying of these narrow-gauge military lines--in rough and ready fashion1 yet in a way that would answer the purposes of the moment--could be effected in shorter time than the gauge-conversion and the reconstruction of the ,russian trunk lines would take2 and 7#b7 that these military railways could be built from any points along the frontier which were capable of being reached direct from the ,german strategical lines1 and offered either an existing road or the opportunity of making one for the purpose4 ,in the light of this assumption1 one can understand more clearly the reason for those short lines which1 branching out from the ,german strategical railways that run parallel to the ,russian frontier though some miles from it1 are carried to the frontier and there suddenly stop4 ,it was1 presumably1 from such terminal points as these that the laying of the military railways on ,russian territory would begin4 ,as regards the type of railways to be employed and the preparations made in advance for supplying and constructing them1 we have the testimony of ,mr4 ,roy ,norton1 an ,american writer1 who says in ,the ,man of ,peace--one of the ,oxford ,pamphlets1 #aiad-ae1 published by the ,oxford ,university ,press3-- ,on ,february #ad of this year 7#aiad7 ,i was in ,cologne1 and blundered1 where ,i had no business1 into what ,i learned was a military-stores yard4 ,among other curious things were tiny locomotives loaded on flats which could be run off those cars by an ingenious contrivance of metals1 or1 as we call them in ,america1 rails4 ,also there were other flats loaded with sections of tracks fastened on cup ties 7sleepers that can be laid on the surface of the earth7 and sections of miniature bridges on other flats4 ,i saw how it was possible to lay a line of temporary railway1 including bridges1 almost anywhere in an incredibly short space of time1 if one had the men4444 ,before ,i could conclude my examination ,i discovered that ,i was on verboten ground2 but the official who directed me out told me that what ,i had seen were construction outfits4 ,mr4 ,norton further quotes the following from a letter he had just received from a ,hollander who was a refugee in ,germany at the outbreak of the war1 and reached home on ,august #cj1 #aiad3-- ,never1 ,i believe1 did a country so thoroughly get ready for war4 ,i saw the oddest spectacle1 the building of a railway behind a battle-field4 ,they had diminutive little engines and rails in sections1 so that they could be bolted together1 and even bridges that could be put across ravines in a twinkling4 ,flat cars that could be carried by hand and dropped on the rails1 great strings of them4 ,up to the nearest point of battle came1 on the regular railway1 this small one4444 ,it seemed to me that hundreds of men had been trained for this task1 for in but a few minutes that small portable train was buzzing backward and forward on its own small portable rails1 distributing food and supplies4444 ,i've an idea that in time of battle it would be possible for those sturdy little trains to shift troops to critical or endangered points at the rate of perhaps twenty miles an hour4444 ,a portable railway for a battle-field struck me as coming about as close to making war by machinery as anything ,i have ever heard of4 ,one may thus reasonably conclude1 in regard to the ,russo-,german frontier1 7#a7 that the broader gauge of the ,russian railways would itself offer no real obstacle to the ,german troops whenever the time came for their invading ,russian territory2 7#b7 that in this eventuality the ,germans would be able1 by reason of the preparations made by them in advance1 to lay down along the ordinary ,russian roads lines of military light railways already put together in complete sections of combined rails and sleepers1 which sections would only require to be fastened the one to the other to be at once ready for use2 and 7#c7 that these portable military railways1 to be built on ,russian territory1 were designed both to supplement and to render still more efficient ,germany's network of strategical railways along her eastern frontier4 ,in southern ,silesia many improvements in the rail communication with ,austria were made in #aijj-aj4 ,new connections were established with the frontier railways1 offering alternative routes from interior points1 while various lines which stopped short of the frontier were extended to it and linked up with ,austrian lines on the other side4 ,in her relations with ,france1 ,germany's efforts to improve still further her rail communications to the eastern and north-eastern frontiers of that country have been continuous since the war of #ahgj-a1 on which campaign she started with a great advantage over the ,french since she was able to concentrate her troops on those frontiers by nine different routes1 namely1 six in ,north ,germany1 and three in ,south ,germany1 whereas ,france herself had then only three available4 ,the course adopted by ,germany has been 7#a7 to secure a larger number of routes to the ,french frontier1 ,south ,germany's three lines1 for instance1 being increased to six2 7#b7 to provide double track1 or to substitute double for single track1 for lines leading to the frontier and having a strategical importance2 7#c7 to construct lines which cross transversely those proceeding direct to the ,french frontiers1 thus allowing of intercommunication and transfer of traffic from one to another2 and 7#d7 improvement of the interior network of lines1 with a view to facilitating military transport services in time of war4 ,altogether1 says ,joesten1 we have nineteen points at which our railways cross the ,rhine1 and sixteen double-track lines for the transport of our troops from east to west1 as against the nine which were alone available for concentration in #ahgj4 ,while showing all this activity on the immediate frontiers of ,france1 ,germany was no less zealous in providing alternative routes for a fresh invasion of ,french territory1 the adoption of this further policy being obviously inspired by the energy that ,france was herself showing in the strengthening of her north-east frontier against invasion4 ,one such alternative route was represented by ,luxemburg4 ,not only did ,germany have lines of her own on the north1 south1 and east of ,luxemburg1 but the lines within the ,grand ,duchy itself had passed under ,german control2 and if ,germany thought fit to disregard her treaty obligations1 and use the lines for strategical purposes1 ,luxemburg was powerless to prevent her from so doing4 ,another alternative route was by way of ,belgium2 and the various developments of ,germany's railway policy on the ,belgian frontier since #aijh point in an unmistakable manner to deliberate preparation on her part for an invasion of that country1 whether for the purpose of passing through it1 as a means of reaching a more vulnerable part of ,french territory than the strongly fortified north-east corner1 or in pursuance of designs against ,belgium itself4 ,the full story of ,germany's activity in this direction will be found in a series of articles from the ,fortnightly ,review reproduced by the author1 ,mr4 ,demetrius ,c4 ,boulger1 in ,england's ,arch-,enemy3 ,a ,collection of ,essays forming an ,indictment of ,german ,policy during the last sixteen years 7,london1 #aiad74ec ,the story opens with the establishment by ,germany1 about the year #ahif1 of a camp at ,elsenborn1 ten miles north-east of ,malmdy1 a town situate close to the ,belgian frontier and four miles from the ,belgian town of ,stavelot4 ,the camp was begun on a small scale1 and at the outset the establishment of it on the site in question was declared by the ,prussian authorities to have no strategical significance4 ,it steadily developed1 however1 in size and importance1 and its position1 character and surroundings all suggested that it was designed for aggressive rather than defensive purposes4 ,at first the camp was reached from ,hellenthal1 a station1 fourteen miles away1 on a light railway connected with the lines in the ,eifel district1 between ,cologne and ,treves 7,trier71 on the ,moselle2 but in #ahif a light railway was constructed from ,aix-la-,chapelle parallel with the ,belgian frontier as far as ,st4 ,vith1 a distance of fifty miles1 the main purpose of this line being stated to be the securing of a better connection1 from ,sourbrodt1 for the camp at ,elsenborn4 ,the line was1 nevertheless1 extended to ,trois ,virges 7,ger4 ,uflingen71 where it connected both with the railway system of the ,grand ,duchy of ,luxemburg and with the main lines of the ,belgian ,system from ,pepinster1 via ,spa1 ,stavelot1 ,trois ,ponts and ,gouvy1 to ,trois ,virges4 ,from ,trois ,ponts there is a direct route to ,lige1 while ,gouvy1 situate only a few miles from ,trois ,virges1 is the junction both for ,libramont1 on the main line from ,brussels to ,metz and ,alsace1 and for the further junction of ,beatrix1 the central point of a ,belgian line running parallel with the ,french frontier from ,dinant to ,luxemburg4 ,the single-track line from ,aix-la-,chapelle along the ,belgian frontier1 supplemented by a light-railway branch from ,weismes to ,malmdy1 met all the traffic requirements of a scantily-populated and primitive district1 devoid alike of industries and of local resources1 and offering very little traffic2 but in #aijh the ,prussian ,government suddenly decided to double the line1 first as far as ,weismes1 and then to ,st4 ,vith1 notwithstanding that there was no apparent justification for such a procedure4 ,the widening involved1 also1 the reconstruction of a high embankment originally designed for one set of metals1 a fact which showed that only a few years previously--since when the local traffic had not materially increased--there was no idea that a double-track line would ever be wanted4 ,still more significant was the fact that1 in addition to the second set of metals1 sidings were provided on such a scale at the stations en route1 in localities possessing only a dozen or so of cottages1 that1 in the aggregate1 trains containing a complete ,army ,corps could have been accommodated on them4 ,at one station three sidings1 each about #ejj yards long1 were supplied1 and at another a perfect network of sidings was constructed1 including two which were at least half a mile long and were1 also1 equipped with turntables4#ed ,the provision1 more especially1 of sidings such as these at local stations where the trains were few and far between and the ordinary merchandise was represented by some occasional coal trucks1 could have but one purpose4 ,they were obviously designed--in conjunction with the substitution of double for single track--to permit of a large body of troops1 whether from ,aix-la-,chapelle 7an important point of concentration for the ,prussian ,army1 on mobilisation71 or elsewhere1 being assembled in the immediate neighbourhood of ,weismes1 the junction of the branch line to ,malmdy1 for an invasion of ,belgium4 ,the doubling of the rails as far as ,weismes was completed by ,may1 #aiji4 ,it was afterwards continued to ,st4 ,vith1 and so on to ,trois ,virges4 ,we have thus far1 however1 got only the first chapter of the story4 ,the second opens with the further attempt of the ,prussian ,government to secure an extension of the ,weismes-,malmdy line as a light railway across the frontier to ,stavelot1 three miles east of ,trois ,ponts1 thus giving a shorter route from ,aix-la-,chapelle and the camp at ,elsenborn to ,lige1 ,namur1 ,louvain and ,brussels1 and a second route to ,gouvy for ,libramont1 ,bertrix and the north of ,france4 ,as the result of the influence they were able to bring to bear on them1 the ,germans succeeded in persuading the ,belgian ,government1 not only to agree to the ,weismes-,malmdy branch being continued to ,stavelot1 but themselves to build the greater part of this connecting link1 and even to cut1 on the north of ,stavelot1 a tunnel without which that town would have remained inaccessible by rail4 ,once more there could be no suggestion that this connecting link1 opened in ,october1 #aiac1 was wanted in the interests of the ordinary traffic1 the needs of which were adequately met by the diligence running twice a day between ,malmdy and ,stavelot4 ,what was really aimed at was a rail connection with the ,belgian system by means of which the troops concentrated in those extensive sidings on the ,aix-la-,chapelle-,st4 ,vith line could be poured into ,belgium in a continuous stream for the achievement of designs on ,belgium or--operating from either the ,belgian or the ,luxemburg frontier--on ,france4 ,in helping to provide this connection1 ,belgium1 as subsequent events were to show1 was in a position akin to that of a man forced to dig the grave in which he is to be buried after being shot2 but ,belgium1 we are told1 yielded in this and other matters because she could not resist without support1 and no support was forthcoming4 ,there certainly was an attempt to lull possible suspicions by the designation of the ,malmdy-,stavelot link as a light railway4 ,it was1 also1 evident that the physical conditions of the ,weismes-,malmdy branch1 with which it was to connect1 would not permit of any heavy traffic along it4 ,but the so-called light railway was built with the same gauge as the main-line systems on each side of the frontier2 the powers obtained in respect to it allowed of trains being run at a speed of forty miles an hour1 as against the recognised speed of sixteen miles an hour on light railways proper2 while no sooner had the link been established than ,germany discarded the defective ,weismes-,malmdy branch for the purposes of military transport1 and built a new line from ,malmdy to ,weywertz1 a station to the north or north-east of ,weismes4 ,this ,malmdy-,weywertz branch would1 it was understood1 be used exclusively for military traffic1 and the station at ,weywertz was1 in due course1 provided with its own extensive platforms and network of sidings for the accommodation of troop trains4 ,we now come to the third chapter of the story2 and here we learn that what was happening in the immediate proximity of the ,german-,belgian frontier was but part of a much wider scheme1 though one still designed to serve the same purpose--that1 namely1 of ensuring the invasion of ,belgium by ,german troops with the greatest facility and in the least possible time4 ,from ,weywertz1 the new junction for ,stavelot and the ,belgian railways in general1 the ,germans built a line to ,jnkerath1 a station north of ,gerolstein1 on the line from ,cologne to ,treves4 ,then from ,blankenheim1 immediately north of ,jnkerath1 and from ,lissendorf1 on the south of the same station1 there were opened for traffic1 in ,july1 #aiab1 new double-track lines which1 meeting at ,dmpelfeld1 on the existing ,remagen-,adenau line1 gave a through route for troops from the ,rhine1 across the ,eifel district to ,weywertz1 and so on to ,stavelot for destinations 7in war-time7 throughout ,belgium1 ,luxemburg1 or along the northern frontier of ,france4 ,this direct route to ,belgium offered the further advantage that it avoided any necessity for troops from the ,rhine to pass through ,cologne1 where much congestion might otherwise occur4 ,it also left the ,aix-la-,chapelle-,weywertz route free for troops from ,cologne and ,westphalia1 while a further improvement of the facilities for crossing the ,rhine made ,remagen still more accessible for troops from all parts of ,central ,germany destined for ,belgium--and beyond4 ,reference to the ,prussian ,state ,railways official map shows1 also1 7#a7 a new line from ,coblenz which joins1 at ,mayen1 the existing railway from ,andernach1 on the ,rhine1 to ,gerolstein1 in the ,eifel1 whence the ,belgian border can be reached either via ,jnkerath and ,weywertz or via ,lammersweiler and the ,luxemburg station of ,trois-,virges2 7#b7 the extension to ,daun1 also on the ,andernach-,gerolstein route1 of a short branch on the ,coblenz-,treves ,railway which previously terminated at ,wittlich2 and 7#c7 several other small lines in the ,eifel district1 offering additional facilities for the concentration of troops on the ,belgian frontier4 ,so the ,malmdy-,stavelot light railway--especially in view of this series of new ,german lines all leading thereto--had become a railway of the greatest strategical importance2 and the fourth chapter of the story 7though one upon which it is not proposed to enter here7 would show how this network of strategical lines1 developed with so much energy and thoroughness1 was brought into operation in #aiad immediately on the outbreak of war1 and1 from that time1 constituted one of the main arteries for the passage of ,german troops to and from ,belgium and ,northern ,france4 ,in regard to ,holland1 one finds a new line of railway from ,jlich--a station reached from ,dren1 on the main line between ,cologne and ,aix-la-,chapelle--to ,dalheim1 the ,german frontier station on the direct line from ,cologne via ,rheydt to ,roermond1 a ,dutch station on the right bank of the ,meuse 7which is here crossed by two bridges71 and thence through the ,belgian stations of ,moll and ,herenthals and across the flat expanse of the ,campine to ,antwerp4 ,this line obviously offers an alternative route for the transport of troops from ,cologne and ,aix-la-,chapelle to ,dalheim2 but of still greater significance is the information given by the writer of the ,fortnightly ,review articles as to the changes carried out at ,dalheim itself1 transforming that place from an unimportant halting-place into a point of concentration of great strategical importance on the frontiers of ,holland4 ,inasmuch as the line from ,dalheim to ,roermond and on to ,antwerp was already a double one1 the alterations made at ,dalheim were confined to a liberal provision of railway sidings in order that1 as we have seen was done on the ,belgian frontier1 a large body of troops could be concentrated for a possible invasion1 in this instance1 either of ,holland itself1 or of ,belgium by the alternative route across the south-eastern corner of ,dutch territory4 ,one of the ,dalheim sidings1 about a quarter of a mile in length1 situate on a high embankment2 and1 in order that it could be reached without interfering with other traffic1 a bridge over which the main line runs east of ,dalheim station was widened to allow of the laying across it of a third pair of rails4 ,other sidings adjoining ,dalheim station have no fewer than ten pairs of parallel rails1 and there are still others on the west of the same station1 towards the ,dutch frontier4 ,at ,wegberg and ,rheydt1 east of ,dalheim1 further sidings were provided which1 like those at ,dalheim1 would not possibly be required for other than military reasons4 ,summing up the situation in regard alike to the ,belgian and the ,dutch frontiers1 ,mr4 ,boulger remarks1 in his article of ,february1 #aiad3-- ,thus on an arc extending from ,treves to ,nijmegen 7excluding from our purview what is called the main concentration on the ,saar1 behind ,metz71 the ,german ,war ,department has arranged for a simultaneous advance by fourteen separate routes across ,holland1 ,belgium and the ,grand ,duchy4 ,in view of all these facts1 there is no possible room for doubt as to the prolonged and extensive nature of the preparations made by ,germany for the war she instigated in #aiad2 but the particular consideration with which we are here concerned is that of seeing to what extent those preparations related either to the construction of strategical lines of railway or to the adaptation of existing lines to strategical purposes4 ,leaving ,belgium and ,holland1 and looking at the ,prussian ,state lines in ,schleswig-,holstein1 one finds on the official map the indication of a new line 7partly built and partly under construction in #aiaj7 which1 starting from ,holtenau1 at the mouth of the ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,canal in the ,baltic1 continues the short distance to ,kiel1 then turns to the west1 connects with the ,neumnster-,vandrup main line to ,denmark1 crosses the canal1 and so on to ,husum1 a junction on the ,altona-,esbjerg west-coast route4 ,this new line would evidently be of strategical advantage in moving troops from ,kiel either for the defence of the ,kaiser ,wilhelm ,canal or to resist invasion by sea on the north of the waterway4 ,then the existing line from ,kiel through ,eckernfrde to ,flensburg1 on the ,neumnster-,vandrup route to ,denmark1 and giving through connection from ,kiel to ,tondern and ,hoyer on the west coast--has been nationalised1 and so added to the ,prussian ,state system2 while from two stations just to the north of ,flensburg there are short new lines which1 meeting at ,torsbll1 continue to the ,alsener ,sund1 on the west of the ,little ,belt1 and may--or may not--be of value in improving ,prussia's strategical position in this corner of the ,baltic1 and in immediate proximity to the ,danish island of ,fnen4 ,finally a large number of additions have been made in recent years to the ,state ,railway systems in the interior of ,germany2 and1 although a good proportion of these may have been provided to meet the increased economic and social needs of the ,german people1 many of them must be regarded as strategical lines designed to facilitate 7#a7 the mobilisation of troops on the outbreak of war2 7#b7 their concentration1 by routes covering all parts of the ,empire1 as arranged long in advance2 and 7#c7 their speedy transfer across country from one frontier to another1 should several campaigns be fought at the same time4 ,the resort by ,germany to strategical railways in ,africa and elsewhere1 as a means of furthering her ,weltpolitik1 will be dealt with in the two chapters that follow4 ,,footnotes3 #eb ,gesammelte ,schriften4 ,berlin1 #ahia1 etc4 #ec ,the articles which here specially come into question are--,the ,menace of ,elsenborn 7published in the ,fortnightly1 ,july1 #aijh72 ,an ,object ,lesson in ,german ,plans 7,february1 #aiaj72 and ,a ,further ,object ,lesson in ,german ,plans 7,february1 #aiad74 #ed ,they were hydraulic turntables1 according to ,major ,stuart-,stephens4 ,see ,the ,english ,review for ,june1 #aiae4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,a ,,german-,,african ,,empire ,strategical railways in ,south-,west ,africa were built by ,germany as a means towards the achievement of her designs on ,british ,south ,africa2 but these1 in turn1 were only part of a still greater plan having for its purpose the transformation of ,africa as a whole into a ,german-,african ,empire which should compare in value1 if not in glory1 with that of the ,indian ,empire itself4 ,colonisation societies began to be formed in ,germany as early as #ahdi2 though in the first instance the aims of their promoters were directed mainly to such parts of the world as ,brazil1 ,texas1 the ,mosquito ,shore1 ,chili and ,morocco4 ,all such places as these1 however1 offered the disadvantage that ,germans going there could only become foreign settlers under the more or less civilised ,powers already in possession4#ee ,in the #fj's and #gj's of the nineteenth century attention in ,germany began to be diverted1 rather1 to ,africa as a land where vast expanses1 possessing great prospects and possibilities1 and not yet controlled by any civilised ,power1 were still available not only for colonisation but for acquisition4 ,so it was that successive ,german travellers explored many different parts of ,africa and published accounts of their journeys designed1 not merely as contributions to geographical science1 but1 also1 to impress a then somewhat apathetic ,german public with the importance of their acquiring a footing on the ,african continent4 ,in #ahgc a ,german ,society for the ,exploration of ,equatorial ,africa was founded4 ,this was followed in #ahgf by the ,german ,african ,society1 and subsequently these two bodies were combined under the name of the ,berlin ,african ,society4 ,not long after this1 evidence was forthcoming that something far more than the settling of ,german colonists in ,africa and the securing of a footing on ,african soil by ,germany was really being kept in view4 ,in #ahhj ,sir ,bartle ,frere1 at that time ,governor of the ,cape and ,high ,commissioner for ,south ,africa1 forwarded to ,lord ,kimberley a translation of an article which had just been contributed to the ,geographische ,nachrichten by ,ernst von ,weber2 and1 in doing so he informed the ,colonial ,secretary that the article contained a clear and well-argued statement in favour of the plan for a ,german colony in ,south ,africa which was much discussed in ,german commercial and political circles even before the ,franco-,german ,war1 and is said to have been one of the immediate motives of the ,german mission of scientific inquiry which visited southern and eastern ,africa in #ahgj-ga4 ,von ,weber's proposals#ef pointed1 however1 to the creation1 not simply of a ,german colony in ,south ,africa1 but of a ,german ,empire in ,africa4 ,a new ,empire1 he wrote1 possibly more valuable and more brilliant than even the ,indian ,empire1 awaits in the newly-discovered ,central ,africa that ,power which shall possess sufficient courage1 strength and intelligence to acquire it2 and he proceeded to show 7#a7 why ,germany should be this ,power1 and 7#b7 the means by which she might eventually secure control of the whole country4 ,the establishment of trading settlements was to ensure for the ,germans a footing in the districts north of the ,transvaal1 and this was to be followed by the flooding of ,south ,africa generally with ,german immigrants4 ,the ,boers spread throughout ,south ,africa were already allied to the ,germans by speech and habits1 and they would1 he thought1 be sure to emigrate to the north and place themselves under the protection of the ,german colonies there1 rather than remain subject to the hated ,british4 ,in any case1 a constant mass-immigration of ,germans would gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of ,germans over the ,dutch population1 and of itself would effect the ,germanisation of the country in a peaceful manner4 ,it was1 he continued1 this free1 unlimited room for annexation in the north1 this open access to the heart of ,africa1 which principally inspired me with the idea1 now more than four years ago1 that ,germany should try1 by the acquisition of ,delagoa ,bay and the subsequent continued influx of ,german immigrants into the ,transvaal1 to secure future dominion over the country1 and so pave the way for the foundation of a ,german-,african ,empire of the future4 ,the procedure to be followed was 7#a7 the acquiring of territory in ,africa by ,germany wherever she could get it1 whether in the central or in the coastal districts2 7#b7 co-operation with the ,boers as a step towards bringing them and their ,republics under ,german suzerainty2 and 7#c7 the overthrow of ,british influence1 with the substitution for it of ,german supremacy4 ,these ideas gained wide acceptance in ,germany2 they became a leading factor in the colonial policy of the ,imperial ,government1 and they reconciled the ,german people1 more or less1 to the heavy burdens which the developments of that policy were to involve4 ,,german ,,south-,,west ,,africa ,the first steps towards the attainment of the aspirations entertained were taken by ,herr ,adolf ,lderitz1 a ,bremen merchant who1 acting under the auspices of the ,german ,colonial ,society1 and having received from the ,imperial ,foreign ,office assurances of its protection1 established a trading settlement1 in ,april1 #ahhc1 in the bay of ,angra ,pequea1 situate between ,namaqualand and ,damaraland on the west coast of ,africa1 and about #aej miles north of ,orange ,river1 the northern boundary of ,cape ,colony4 ,acquiring from a ,hottentot chief a stretch of territory #bae miles in extent in the ,hinterland of ,angra ,pequea1 ,lderitz raised the ,german flag in the settlement1 which thus became ,germany's first colony4 ,further concessions of territory were obtained1 and in ,september1 #ahhd1 ,germany announced that the west coast of ,africa1 from #bf degrees ,s4 latitude to ,cape ,frio1 excepting ,walfisch ,bay 7declared ,british in #ahgh71 had been placed under the protection of the ,german ,emperor4 ,a treaty made between ,england and ,germany in #ahij defined the limits of the ,german ,south-,west ,african ,protectorate as bounded on the south by the ,orange ,river and ,cape ,colony1 on the north by ,portuguese ,angola1 on the west by the ,atlantic1 and on the east by ,british ,bechuanaland1 with the so-called ,caprivi ,strip1 giving ,germany access from the north-east corner of her ,protectorate to a point on the ,zambezi ,river north of ,victoria ,falls4#eg ,the total area comprised within these boundaries was about #cbb1bjj square miles4 ,at the outset1 the new ,protectorate aroused little enthusiasm in ,germany as a colony where her surplus population could hope to settle and prosper under the ,german flag instead of going to foreign countries1 as so many thousands of ,germans were then doing4 ,on a coast-line of #ijj miles there was no good natural harbour except the one at ,walfisch ,bay1 owned by the ,british4 ,swakopmund and ,lderitzbucht1 on which the ,german colonists would have to rely1 were then little better than open roadsteads4 ,considerable expanses of the territory itself consist of drought-stricken desert4 ,the rainfall in ,damaraland and ,namaqualand averages only about three inches a year4 ,in certain districts a period of five or six years has been known to pass without any rain at all4 ,a record of rainfall on some parts of the coast has shown a total of one-fifth of an inch in the course of twelve months4 ,at ,walfisch ,bay the ,british settlement imports its fresh water from ,capetown4 ,on the higher of the series of plateaux rising gradually to the ,kalahari desert the climatic conditions are more favourable1 and the better rainfall in the north-east allows of good crops being grown1 while various sections are favourable for stock-raising4 ,in later years1 also1 various deposits of copper were found in the district of ,otavi1 some #djj miles from ,swakopmund1 and diamond fields1 which yielded nearly #a1jjj1jjj worth of stones in the first year1 were discovered east of ,lderitzbucht in #aijh4 ,but in ,germany the ,protectorate was regarded as a desirable acquisition mainly1 if not exclusively1 because of the advantages it was expected to afford as a base for the eventual creation of a ,german-,african ,empire4 ,,the ,,herero ,,rising ,the attainment of this higher purpose seemed likely to be furthered as the result of the steps taken to suppress the risings of the ,hereros and the ,hottentots between the years #aijc and #aijg4 ,not only did the reinforcements sent out from ,germany assume such proportions that at one time the ,germans are said to have had no fewer than #ai1jjj men under arms in the ,protectorate1 but the troops took with them a plentiful supply of pom-poms1 mountain guns1 field guns and ,maxims of various kinds1 the ,revue ,militaire des ,armes trangres being led to remark thereon that the ,german columns had an unusually large proportion of artillery1 roughly two batteries to three companies of mounted infantry2 and it is difficult to believe that so many guns were necessary1 especially as the ,hereros had no artillery at all4#eh ,probably1 the ,revue continued1 the artillery could have been dispensed with altogether2 and had this been done1 the columns would have been rendered more mobile4 ,the military measures taken appeared to be in excess of requirements even when allowance was made for the fact that the campaign was fought in difficult country and that the ,germans themselves lost about #e1jjj men2 but the real significance of the policy adopted lay in the keeping of a considerable proportion of the ,german expeditionary force in the colony after the rising had1 with ,german thoroughness1 been effectively crushed4 ,this procedure attracted attention and adverse comment even in ,germany1 where doubts were already being entertained as to whether good value was being received for the #cj1jjj1jjj which the suppression of the troubles had cost4 ,it was1 however1 made clear that the still considerable body of ,german troops left in the colony was being kept on hand there in case of the opportunity arising for its employment in another direction--that1 namely1 of achieving ,germany's aspirations in regard to the conquest of ,british ,south ,africa1 and the final elimination of ,british influence from ,africa in general4 ,evidence both as to the nature of these continued aspirations and as to the further purpose it was hoped the troops on the spot might effect was forthcoming in various directions4 ,in a book of #daf pages1 published in #aije1 under the title of ,das neue ,sdafrika1 ,dr4 ,paul ,samassa emphasised the part which the ,german people had taken in the settlement of ,south ,africa2 pointed to the close relationship and affinity of feeling between ,germans and ,boers2 encouraged the idea of their mutually looking forward to the opening up of ,south ,africa as a land of settlement for the ,german race1 and said1 further3-- ,german ,south-,west ,africa is1 to-day1 a strong tramp card in our hands1 from the point of view of ,weltpolitik4 ,in ,england much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would be for that country if our fleet were annihilated before it became dangerous4444 ,on our side we might cool these hot-heads1 and strengthen the peace party in ,england1 if we reminded them that1 whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that country1 ,england would run a greater risk--that of losing ,south ,africa4 ,we have in ,german ,south-,west ,africa to-day about #ab1jjj troops1 of whom one-half will remain there for a considerable time4 ,in the event of a war between ,germany and ,england the ,south ,african coast would naturally be blockaded by ,england2 and there would then be nothing left for our troops to do but to go on to ,cape ,colony--for their food supplies4 ,in so doing they could1 he argued1 count upon the support of the ,boers1 of whom there were #ad1jjj opposed to the ,english at the end of the ,south ,african war4 ,as against this possible concentration of ,german troops and ,boers there was the fact that the ,english garrison in ,south ,africa did not exceed #bj1jjj4 ,so1 he added1 the people in ,england could consider what an incalculable adventure a war with ,germany might be1 notwithstanding the superiority of the ,english fleet4 ,speaking in the ,reichstag in ,february1 #aijf1 ,herr ,ledebour called attention to the fact that ,major von ,franois1 who at one time was in command of ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 had declared1 in his book1 ,nama und ,damara1 issued three months previously1 that fewer than one thousand troops would suffice to maintain order in the colony2 and ,herr ,ledebour added3--,for two years imaginative ,pan-,german politicians have been disseminating the idea that a large force must be maintained in ,south-,west ,africa for the purpose of exercising in the sphere of ,weltpolitik pressure upon ,england1 with the eventual object of invading ,cape ,colony4 ,there is the testimony1 also1 of ,an ,anglo-,german1 who1 in the course of an article on ,german ,clerks in ,british ,offices1 published in ,the ,london ,magazine for ,november1 #aiaj1 tells the following story3-- ,during a recent stay in ,germany ,i was introduced by a man ,i know to be one of the chief functionaries of the ,commerce ,defence ,league#ei to a friend of his who had just returned from ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,on a subsequent meeting ,i entered into conversation with this gentleman1 and made inquiries about ,german progress in that part of the world4 ,he answered my questions without reserve4 ,little headway was being made1 and little was looked for4 ,men and money were being freely expended1 without present return4 ,the only good harbour 7,walfisch ,bay7 is a ,british possession1 as likewise are all the islands of any value which are dotted along the coast4 ,why then1 was my inevitable query1 do the ,germans persist in their occupation of the country8 ,he smiled craftily4 ,we ,germans look far ahead1 my friend1 he replied4 ,we foresee a ,british dbcle in ,south ,africa1 and we are on the spot4 ,thanks to the pioneers of our excellent ,league1 our plans are all matured4 ,the ,league finances the scheme and the ,imperial ,government supplies the military forces4 ,by cession--or otherwise--,walfisch ,bay will before long be ,german territory2 but in the meantime ,british ,free ,trade opposes no obstacle to us1 and we can pursue our purpose unmolested4 ,but what is that purpose8 ,i asked1 with the object of leading him on4 ,surely you are not so blind as to need enlightenment6 was his reply4 ,germany has long regarded ,south ,africa as a future possession of her own4 ,when the inevitable happens1 and ,great ,britain finds her hands full elsewhere1 we are ready to strike the moment the signal is given1 and ,cape ,colony1 ,bechuanaland1 ,rhodesia--all frontier ,states--will fall like ripe apples into our grasp4 ,in order1 however1 that ,germany might be prepared thus to take action at a moment's notice1 two things were essential1 in addition to having troops on the spot1 namely1 7#a7 that the colony should possess railways within striking distance alike of the ,cape1 of ,bechuanaland and of ,rhodesia2 and 7#b7 that the military preparations as a whole should be so complete as to be ready for any emergency4 ,,railways ,,in ,g4,s4,w4 ,,africa ,railways were indispensable on account1 not only of the considerable distances to be covered1 but1 also1 of the sand-belts and stretches of desert across which the transport of troops and stores would be a matter of great difficulty without the help of railways4 ,they were1 in fact1 a vital part of the whole scheme4 ,following on ,germany's annexation of ,damaraland and ,great ,namaqualand1 and her conversion of them into the ,protectorate of ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 a party of ,german engineers and surveyors landed at ,swakopmund with the design of planning a line of railway to be constructed from that point to ,windhoek1 and thence across the ,kalahari desert to the ,transvaal4 ,about the same time1 also1 ,germans and ,boers were alike working to secure as much of ,bechuanaland as they could1 without attracting too much attention to their proceedings4 ,a realisation of these further aims might have been of great value to ,germany in facilitating the attainment of her full programme in respect to ,africa2 but the scheme was frustrated by ,great ,britain's annexation of ,bechuanaland in ,september1 #ahhe1 the result of the step thus taken being to drive a wedge of ,british territory between ,german ,south-,west ,africa and the ,boer ,republics4 ,so the railway in question got no further east than ,windhoek1 the capital of the colony1 a distance inland of #bcg miles4 ,having failed in one direction1 ,germany tried another4 ,under a concession granted to them in #ahhg by the ,government of the ,transvaal ,republic1 a group of ,dutch1 ,german and other capitalists1 constituting the ,netherlands ,south ,african ,railway ,company1 built a railway from ,delagoa ,bay to ,pretoria2 and the new aim of ,germany was1 apparently1 to make use of this line1 and so get access to the ,transvaal--and beyond--from the east coast instead of from the west4 ,confirmation of this fact is to be found in ,a ,brief ,history of the ,transvaal ,secret ,service ,system1 from its ,inception to the ,present ,time1 written by ,mr4 ,a4 ,e4 ,heyer1 and published at ,cape ,town in #ahii4 ,the writer had held a position in the ,transvaal which enabled him to learn many interesting facts concerning the working of the system in question4 ,among other things he tells how1 at ,lisbon1 every effort was made to obtain a port in ,delagoa ,bay1 and how1 aided by ,germany1 ,dr4 ,leyds approached ,lisbon over and over again with a view to get ,delagoa ,bay ceded to the ,transvaal2 though the ,doctor got no more from the ,portuguese authorities than a reminder that1 under the ,london ,convention of #ahhd1 the ,south ,african ,republic could conclude no treaty or engagement with any foreign ,state or nation 7except the ,orange ,free ,state7 until such treaty or engagement had been submitted to the ,queen of ,england for her approval4 ,that ,germany1 in giving her aid in these matters to the ,transvaal ,republic1 was inspired by a regard for the furthering of her own particular schemes is beyond all reasonable doubt2 but ,mr4 ,heyer shows1 also1 that when the negotiations with ,portugal were unsuccessful1 there was elaborated a scheme under which ,germany and the ,transvaal were to get what they wanted by means of a coup de main4 ,mr4 ,heyer says on this subject3-- ,i have before me a copy of a document1 dated ,pretoria1 ,august #bd1 #ahib 7the original of which is still in a certain ,government office in ,pretoria71 wherein a ,pretoria-,berlin scheme is detailed1 namely1 ,how a few regiments of ,prussian ,infantry could be landed at ,delagoa ,bay and force their way into ,transvaal territory1 and1 'once in1' defy ,british suzerainty1 and for all time 'hang the annoying question of her paramountcy on the nail4' ,the name of ,herr von ,herff1 then ,german ,consul at ,pretoria1 appears on the document4 ,any one reading this cleverly-planned ,descent on ,delagoa would be readily convinced as to how very easily a ,german raid on ,delagoa territory could be successfully accomplished4 ,this project1 also1 proved abortive1 and1 in default of ,delagoa ,bay1 ,germany had still to regard her ,south-,west ,african ,protectorate1 with its railways and its armed forces1 as the base from which ,british interests were to be wiped out--sooner or later--from the ,cape to ,cairo4 ,at the time of the outbreak of war in #aiad1 the principal railways in ,german ,south-,west ,africa--apart from some minor lines which do not come into consideration--were as follows3-- ---------------------------------------- ----------- #b ft4 ,,gauge4 #c ft4 #f in4 ,,gauge4 ,,railway4 ,miles4 ,miles4 ---------------------------------------- ----------- ,northern #aba #aai ,otavi #dbe -- ,southern -- #cdj ,north-to-,south -- #cag ---------------------------------------- ----------- ,total #edf #ggg ---------------------------------------- ----------- ,granting that the ,northern ,railway was needed to afford a means of communication between ,swakopmund and the capital of the colony1 and that the original purpose of the ,otavi line was to provide an outlet for the copper obtained from the mines in that district1 it is1 nevertheless1 the fact that the ,southern and the ,north-to-,south lines were designed to serve what were mainly or exclusively strategical purposes4 ,when the building of the first section of the ,southern line--from ,lderitzbucht to ,aus--was under consideration in the ,reichstag1 one of the members of that body1 ,herr ,lattmann1 recommended that the vote should be passed without being referred to a committee2 and in support of his recommendation he said3-- ,this way of passing the vote would be of particular importance for the whole nation1 since the railway would not then have to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning our troops1 or with regard to the financially remunerative character of the colony1 but because a much more serious question lies behind it1 namely1 what significance has the railway in the event of complications between ,germany and other nations8 ,yes1 this railway can be employed for other purposes than for transport from the coast to the interior2 our troops can be easily conveyed by it from the interior to the coast and thence to other places4 ,if1 for example1 a war had broken out with ,england we could send them into ,cape ,colony4 ,from ,aus the line was extended in #aijh to ,keetmanshoop1 a distance inland of #bcj miles from ,lderitzbucht4 ,situate in the ,bezirk 7district7 of ,south-,west ,africa nearest to ,cape ,province1 ,keetmanshoop1 with the railway as a source of supply from the chief harbour of the colony1 developed into the leading military station of ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,at ,keetmanshoop all the chief military authorities were stationed4 ,it became the headquarters of the ,medical ,corps1 the ,ordnance ,department1 the ,engineer and ,railway ,corps1 and the ,intelligence ,corps of the ,southern ,command4 ,it was the point of mobilisation for all the troops in that ,command4 ,it had a considerable garrison1 and it had1 also1 an arsenal which a correspondent of the ,transvaal ,chronicle1 who visited the town about two years before the outbreak of war in #aiad and gathered much information concerning the military preparations which had then already been made1#fj described as four times as large1 and1 in regard to its contents1 four times as important1 as the arsenal at ,windhoek4 ,those contents included--#dg gun carriages2 fourteen #af-pounders2 eighteen ambulances2 #hb covered convoy vehicles2 #c1bhg wheels1 mostly for trek ox-wagons2 three large transportable marquees used as magazines and containing #bh1jjj military rifles2 huge quantities of bandoliers1 kits1 etc42 three further magazines for ammunition1 and large stores of fodder2 while further military supplies were constantly arriving by train from ,lderitzbucht1 whither they were brought from ,germany by ,german ships4 ,in the arsenal workshops was a staff of men actively engaged on the making of1 among other military requirements1 #a1jjj saddles and water bags for the ,camel ,corps kept available for crossing the desert between the furthest limit of the railway and the ,cape ,province border4 ,it was1 also1 in this south-eastern district1 and in immediate proximity1 therefore1 to ,cape ,province and ,bechuanaland1 that the military forces kept in the colony had all their principal manoeuvres4 ,of still greater importance1 from a strategical standpoint1 was the branch of this ,southern ,railway which1 starting from ,seeheim1 forty miles west of ,keetmanshoop1 continued in a south-easterly direction to ,kalkfontein1 eighty miles north of ,raman's ,drift1 on the ,orange ,river1 and less than ninety miles from ,ukamas1 where the ,germans had established a military post within five miles of ,nakob1 situate on the ,bechuanaland border1 only forty miles from ,upington1 in ,cape ,province4 ,from ,kalkfontein the branch was to be continued another thirty miles to ,warmbad1 and so on to ,raman's ,drift--a convenient point for the passage of the ,orange ,river into ,cape ,province territory by an attacking force4 ,at ,seeheim1 the junction of this branch line1 a ,service ,corps was stationed2 ,kalkfontein was the headquarters of the ,camel ,corps of #ejj men and animals2 and at ,warmbad there was a military post and a military hospital4 ,the ,north-to-,south line allowed of an easy movement of troops between the military headquarters at ,keetmanshoop and ,windhoek1 or vice vers4 ,according to the original estimates this line was not to be completed before #aiac4 ,special reasons for urgency--as to the nature of which it would be easy to speculate--led1 however1 to the line being opened for traffic on ,march #h1 #aiab4 ,from ,windhoek1 also1 troops were supplied to ,gobabis1 situate #ajj miles east of the capital and about forty miles west of the ,bechuanaland frontier4 ,gobabis became a ,german military station in #ahie4 ,provided with a well-equipped fort1 it became the chief strategical position on the eastern border of ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,a railway connecting ,gobabis with ,windhoek was to have been commenced in #aiae4 ,from ,windhoek1 as already told1 there is rail communication with ,swakopmund4 ,grootfontein1 the terminus1 on the east1 of the ,swakopmund-,otavi line1 had been a military station since #ahii4 ,its special significance lay in the fact that it was the nearest point of approach by rail to the ,caprivi ,strip1 along which the ,german troops1 conveyed as far as ,grootfontein by rail1 were to make their invasion of the adjoining ,british territory of ,rhodesia4 ,troop movements in this direction would have been further facilitated by a link at ,karibib connecting the ,swakopmund-,otavi-,grootfontein line with the one to ,windhoek and thence to the military headquarters at ,keetmanshoop4 ,karibib was itself a military base1 in addition to having large railway offices and workshops4 ,with1 therefore1 the minor exceptions1 the system of railways in ,german ,south-,west ,africa had been designed or developed in accordance with plans which had for their basis an eventual attack on ,british territory in three separate directions--7#a7 ,cape ,province1 7#b7 ,bechuanaland and 7#c7 ,rhodesia4 ,the ,southern and the ,north-to-,south lines had1 also1 been built exclusively with the standard ,cape gauge of #c ft4 #f in41 so that1 when der ,tag arrived1 and ,german succeeded ,british supremacy in ,south ,africa1 these particular lines could be continued in order to link up with those which the ,germans would then expect to take over from ,cape ,province4 ,keetmanshoop was eventually to be converted from a terminus to a stopping-place on a through line of ,german railway from ,lderitzbucht to ,kimberley1 the effect of which1 it was pointed out1 would be to shorten the distance from ,europe to ,bulawayo by #a1cjj miles as compared with the journey via the ,cape4 ,surveys had been made for extensions 7#a7 from ,keetmanshoop1 via ,hasuur1 to the ,union frontier near ,rietfontein1 and 7#b7 from ,kalkfontein1 on the southern branch1 to ,ukamas1 also on the frontier and in the direction of ,upington1 in ,union territory4 ,each of these additions would have carried the original scheme a stage further1 though it was not1 apparently1 thought wise to make them before der ,tag actually arrived4 ,on these various railways the ,government of ,german ,south-,west ,africa had expended1 so far as the available figures show1 a total of1 approximately1 #h1djj1jjj1 defrayed in part from ,imperial funds and in part from the revenue of the ,protectorate4 ,this total includes the amount paid by the ,government to the ,south-,west ,africa ,company for their line from ,swakopmund to the ,company's mines at ,otavi and ,tsumeb1 but it does not include the cost of the original narrow-gauge ,government line from ,swakopmund to ,windhoek1 of which the section between ,swakopmund and ,karibib was abandoned when the ,swakopmund-,otavi line1 via ,karibib1 was taken over1 the remaining section from ,karibib to ,windhoek being then converted into the ,cape #c ft4 #f in4 gauge4 ,on most of the open lines no more than two or three trains a week were run1 and on some of the branches there was only one train in the week4#fa ,,military ,,preparations ,further details as to the elaborate nature of the preparations made for the realisation of ,germany's dreams of conquest in ,africa are supplied by ,mr4 ,j4 ,k4 ,o',connor in a pamphlet published at ,capetown1 towards the end of #aiad1 under the title of ,the ,hun in our ,hinterland2 or the ,menace of ,g4,s4,w4,a4 ,mr4 ,o',connor made a tour through ,german ,south-,west ,africa a few months before the outbreak of the war1 assuming the rle of a journalist in search of data concerning the agricultural resources of the territory4 ,he obtained much information which had other than an agricultural interest4 ,he ascertained1 for instance1 that the ,german troops then in the territory consisted of ,mounted ,infantry1 ,field ,artillery1 ,machine ,gun ,divisions1 ,intelligence ,divisions1 an ,engineer and ,railway ,corps1 ,field ,railway ,divisions1 an ,etappen-,formation1 a ,camel ,corps1 a ,police ,force and a ,reserve1 representing altogether--apart from natives--a trained ,european force of approximately #aj1jjj men1 whose duties and location in the event of war had all been assigned to them in advance4 ,he found that the railways had been supplemented by a strong transport service of natives1 who had an abundant supply of oxen and mules for their wagons4 ,he tells how 7in addition to the military stations already mentioned7 the ,germans had established throughout the territory a network of block-houses1 strengthened by forts at intervals and supplemented by magazines and storehouses at central points2 while #a1fjj miles of telegraph and telephone wires1 together with the ,funken-telegraph1 placed all these stations and outposts in touch with one another as well as with the military headquarters and the various towns4#fb ,he says concerning ,keetmanshoop that its conversion into the chief military station in the territory was the first move in the ,german game4 ,he points to the fact that ,das ,koloniale ,jahrbuch1 published by authority1 laid it down that the ,boers in ,british ,south ,africa must be constantly reminded of their ,low-,german origin2 that ,german ideas must be spread among them by means of ,german schools and ,german churches1 and he declares3--,for thirty years ,teuton ideas have been foisted upon the ,boer population of ,british ,south ,africa4 ,for thirty years1 under the guise of friendship1 ,germany has plotted and planned for the elimination of the ,anglo-,saxon element from ,south ,africa4 ,mr4 ,o',connor further writes3-- ,from what ,i was able to gather it was evident that the military plans of the ,germans were completed for an invasion of the ,union territory1 and that they were only awaiting the day when ,peace would spread her wings and soar from the embassies of ,europe4 ,it was not anticipated1 however1 that that would be in ,august1 #aiad4 ,they were confident of success1 and from the conversations that took place between officers and myself it was evident that the possession of the ,african continent was the greatest desire of the ,teutons4 ,the smashing up of ,france and ,great ,britain were only incidents that would lead to the whole continent of ,africa becoming a ,german possession2 and it was considered that as ,germany would accomplish this1 despite her late entrance upon the stage as a ,colonial ,power1 she would have more to show for her thirty years as such a ,power than could either ,england or ,france1 who had started colonising centuries before her4 ,the great aim became to break ,france and ,england1 for the purpose of acquiring their ,african possessions2 and1 having broken these ,powers1 ,germany would have turned her attention to the ,african possessions of smaller ,powers who1 having neither ,england nor ,france to rely upon1 would have been compelled to relinquish their possessions1 and1 by so doing1 would have made ,germany the supreme ,power in ,africa4 ,summing up the conclusions at which he arrived1 as the result of all that he saw for himself and all that he had heard from responsible ,german officers during the course of his tour1 ,mr4 ,o',connor says3-- ,from the day the ,germans set their feet upon ,south-,west ,african soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into ,british territory4 ,for years the ,reichstag has voted two million pounds per annum for the purpose4 ,had these millions been spent on the development of ,south-,west ,africa it would1 to-day1 be a colony of which any country might be proud4 ,but what can they show for this expenditure8 ,nothing but a military camp4 ,it is evident1 then1 that this territory has not been regarded by the ,berliners as a colony1 but as a jumping-off ground for an invasion of ,british ,south ,africa4 ,here we have simply an amplification of ideas which1 as we have seen1 had long been entertained in ,germany2 though they were ideas it was now being sought to reduce to practice by a resort1 in advance1 to every step that could possibly be taken for ensuring their realisation4 ,any suggestion that the system of strategical railways which had been built1 and the elaborate military preparations which had been effected1 were merely precautions against a further possible rising of the natives would have been absurd4 ,,rail ,,connection ,,with ,,angola ,what ,mr4 ,o',connor says in regard to ,germany's attitude towards the ,african possessions of the smaller ,powers gives additional significance to a report published in the ,leipziger ,neueste ,nachrichten of ,may #ca1 #aiad1 concerning a project for building a line of railway along the coast of ,german ,south-,west ,africa to connect with ,portuguese ,angola4 ,this was to be the first of a series of lines which after lengthy discussions with the ,imperial ,government1 were to be carried out in ,german ,south-,west ,africa by a syndicate of prominent shipping and banking houses in ,germany1 controlling an initial capital of #ej1jjj1jjj marks 7#b1ejj1jjj74 ,it was further reported that in the early part of #aiad the ,governor of ,german ,south-,west ,africa made a tour through the northern part of the ,protectorate1 going as far as ,tiger ,bay1 in ,angola1 in connection with possible railway construction in the near future4 ,angola was certainly an item on the ,german list of desirable acquisitions in ,africa4 ,it has been in the occupation of ,portugal since the middle of the fifteenth century2 but the point of view from which it was regarded by advocates of ,german expansion may be judged from some remarks made in the ,klnische ,zeitung by a traveller who returned to ,germany from ,angola in ,june1 #aiad3-- ,the game is worth the candle4 ,an enormous market for industrial products1 rich and virgin mineral treasures1 a fruitful and healthy country equally suitable for agriculture1 cattle-breeding and immigration1 and the finest harbours on the west coast--that is the prize that awaits us4 ,a territory offering these advantages1 having an area estimated at #dhd1jjj square miles1 and extending inland for a distance of #a1ejj miles1 might be coveted for its own sake2 but its possession would have been of still greater value to ,germany 7#a7 as a continuation1 northwards1 of ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 and 7#b7 as the starting point for a chain of communications1 under ,german control1 extending right across the ,african continent1 from west to east4 ,the coast-railway spoken of by the ,leipziger ,neueste ,nachrichten was to link up ,german ,south-,west ,africa with ,angola1 in which country1 also1 the ,germans hoped to obtain extensive mining and agricultural concessions1 thus forwarding their established policy of peaceful penetration by means of commerce and railways1 and establishing economic interests which might be expected to lead to political developments in due course1 and so prepare the way for an eventual seizure of the prize that awaits us4 ,the ,germans had also sought to finance the completion eastwards of the ,lobito ,bay or ,benguela ,railway1 to which reference will be made later on in connection with the development of the ,katanga district of the ,belgian ,congo2 but the condition they advanced1 namely that the control of the line should be left in their hands1 coupled with their adoption of suspicious lines of policy in other directions1#fc led to their railway proposals being declined by the ,portuguese1 with thanks4 ,,german ,,east ,,africa ,then1 in order to understand the full scope of the aspirations ,germany was cherishing towards the ,african ,continent1 one must take into account her railways on the east coast no less than those on the west coast1 since these1 also1 formed an essential part of the general scheme4 ,the line which stretches right across ,german ,east ,africa1 from ,dar-es-,salaam1 the capital of the ,protectorate1 to ,kigoma1 on ,lake ,tanganyika1 and north of ,ujiji1 has a total length of #a1dci miles2 and if the economic development of a territory estimated as having a total area of #chd1jjj square miles had been the sole aim in view1 the ,tanganyikabahn would have well deserved to rank as a notable enterprise in ,german colonial expansion1 and one calling for commendation rather than criticism4 ,the question arises1 however1 whether1 in addition to the development of ,german ,east ,africa itself1 the railway in question was not intended1 also1 to facilitate the realisation of ,germany's designs against ,central ,africa as part of her aforesaid scheme for the eventual conquest of the ,african continent4 ,the feverish haste with which the second and third sections of the railway were built sufficed1 in itself1 to give rise to suspicions of ulterior designs4 ,the first section1 from ,dar-es-,salaam to ,morogo 7#acf miles71 was constructed by a syndicate of ,german bankers acting under a ,state guarantee of interest1 and the work1 begun in ,february1 #aije1 was completed in ,september1 #aijg4 ,the second section1 from ,morogo to ,tabora 7#ebf miles71 was to have been completed by ,july #a1 #aiad2 but in #aiaj1 the ,reichstag voted a special credit both for the earlier completion of this second section--which was thus finished by ,february #bf1 #aiab--;and for surveys for the third section1 from ,tabora to ,kigoma 7#ggf miles74 ,such1 again1 was the celerity with which the work on this third section was pushed forward that1 although the date fixed for the completion of the line was ,april #a1 #aiae1 through rail communication from the ,indian ,ocean to ,lake ,tanganyika was established by ,february #a1 #aiad--that is to say1 one year and two months in advance of time4 ,we here come to the two-fold question 7#a7 ,why was the railway extended at all for the #ggf miles from ,tabora to ,lake ,tanganyika1 considering that this portion of the ,german ,protectorate offered1 in itself1 the prospect of no traffic at all for the line#fd2 and 7#b7 why was it necessary that such haste should be shown in the completion of the undertaking8 ,,the ,,other ,,side ,,of ,,tanganyika ,to the first of these questions the reply is 7#a7 that the traffic on which the western section of the ,tanganyikabahn was mainly to rely for its receipts was traffic originating in or destined for the ,belgian ,congo2 7#b7 that the control it was hoped to secure over ,belgian trade was1 in combination with the strategical advantages offered by the railway1 to be the preliminary to an eventual annexation by ,germany of the ,belgian ,congo itself2 and 7#c7 that like conditions were to lead1 if possible1 to the final realisation of von ,weber's dream of #ahhj4 ,that we are directing our gaze to the other side of ,tanganyika1 said the ,kolonial ,zeitung of ,april #d1 #aiad1 in referring to the completion of the railway to ,kigoma--an event which occasioned a great outburst of enthusiasm in ,germany--goes1 of course1 without saying4 ,there certainly is much on the other side of ,tanganyika to which ,germany might look with feelings of envy4 ,in regard to mineral wealth1 alone1 the resources of the ,south-eastern section of the ,belgian ,congo could not fail to make a strong appeal to her4 ,the great copper belt in the ,katanga district1#fe commences about #ajj miles north-west of the ,british ,south ,african post1 ,ndola 7situate twelve miles south of the ,congo border71 and extends thence1 in a north-westerly direction1 for a distance of #ahj miles1 with an average breadth of twenty-five miles4 ,in the not far distant future1 when the many problems of development are solved1 the ,katanga copper belt1 says ,mr4 ,j4 ,b4 ,thornhill1#ff will be one of the controlling factors in the copper supply of the world4 ,in the report of the ,british ,south ,africa ,company for the year ending ,march #ca1 #aiad1 it was stated that the copper-mining industry in ,katanga had attained to considerable dimensions2 that furnaces with a capacity of #a1jjj tons of copper per month were at work1 and that further large additions to the plant were being made4 ,katanga has1 also1 a tin belt1 and coal1 gold1 iron and other minerals are found there1 besides4 ,in the ,german territory on the eastern side of ,lake ,tanganyika there are1 indeed1 minerals2 but they are found in no such abundance as in the ,belgian territory on the western side of the lake4 ,german ,east ,africa can1 however1 produce in great abundance the wheat1 the rice and the other food supplies necessary for the workers in ,katanga mines1 and the ,german view has been that the eastern and the western sides of the lake should be regarded as complementary the one to the other1 and that the ,tanganyikabahn should convey these food supplies to the lake1 for transfer to the other side by steamer1 and bring back the products of the mines for distribution1 via the ,german east coast route and the ,indian ,ocean1 among the markets of the world4 ,in the same way it was hoped that all goods and necessaries likely to be imported into the ,katanga and ,mweru districts from ,europe would reach their destination via this ,german ,east ,africa ,central ,railway2 and ,german business houses were strongly advised to establish branches in those districts1#fg so that1 apparently1 ,germany would eventually control the trade as well as the transport of the other side of ,tanganyika4 ,the development of the south-western section of ,germany's east-coast ,protectorate had1 in itself1 become a matter of vital importance 7eine ,lebensfrage#fh72 but the ,belgian ,congo was the only quarter to which that section could look for markets for its produce4 ,the possibility of securing sufficient traffic for the ,central ,railway to ensure its financial success may have been a secondary consideration2 but the railway itself was to serve a most important purpose1 economically1 by helping ,germany to capture the ,tanganyika and trans-,tanganyika trade1 and by making her ,east ,africa colony more prosperous2 politically1 by strengthening her hold on the ,belgian ,congo through the increase of her commercial interests there2 and strategically1 by affording her the means of effecting a speedy concentration of troops in ,central ,africa1 should the occasion for so doing arise4 ,this last-mentioned purpose was to be further attained by the projected construction of what would have been a purely strategical line from ,tabora1 on the ,tanganyikabahn1 to ,mwanza1 on the southern shores of the ,victoria ,nyanza1 whence ,german troops would--in case of need--be in a position to make a rear attack on ,british ,east ,africa4 ,,central ,,africa ,germany's hopes of thus strengthening her position in ,central ,africa by means of the ,tanganyikabahn received1 however1 a serious set-back through the activity and enterprise of ,belgian and ,british interests in providing1 opening up or projecting alternative transport routes which threatened 7#a7 to divert a large proportion of the traffic she had expected to secure for the ,east ,africa ,central line2 7#b7 to diminish greatly the prospect of her achieving the commercial and political aims she cherished in regard to the ,belgian ,congo2 7#c7 to make it still more difficult for ,german ,east ,africa to emerge from a position of comparative isolation1 and 7#d7 to impede greatly the realisation of ,germany's aspirations in regard alike to ,central ,africa and the ,african ,continent4 ,it is the more necessary that the bearing of all these facts on the general situation should be understood because they tend to indicate the critical nature of the position into which the said aspirations had drifted1 and the imperative necessity by which ,germany may1 by #aiad1 have considered she was faced for adopting some bold course of action if she were still to look forward to the possibility of those aspirations being realised4 ,the principle originally adopted by ,king ,leopold in his efforts to develop the ,congo ,state was that of supplementing navigation on the ,congo by railways wherever these were necessary either to overcome the difficulties presented by rapids or to supply missing links in the chain of communication to or from the west coast4 ,the same policy was followed by the ,belgian ,government when they assumed control1 and the last of these links--the line1 #afe miles long1 from ,kabalo to ,albertville1 connecting the ,congo with the ,tanganyika--was opened in ,march1 #aiae4 ,one reason1 in fact1 given in ,germany for the express speed at which the ,tanganyikabahn was completed to ,kigoma was an alleged fear that the ,belgians might capture the trade and transport of the territory in question by getting to the lake first4 ,this combined river and rail transport still left it necessary for traffic from the ,congo basin to the west coast to follow the winding course of that river1 with a number of transhipments2 and if the route in question had been the only competitor of the ,tanganyikabahn1 ,germany would have had less cause for uneasiness4 ,meanwhile1 however1 the ,compagnie du ,chemin de ,fer du ,bas-,congo had built a line--forming a continuation of the ,rhodesian ,railways--from the boundary of ,northern ,rhodesia1 at ,elizabethville1 to ,kambove 7,katanga72 and a continuation of this line to ,bukama1 on the ,lualaba1 a navigable tributary of the ,congo1 was 7#a7 to give shorter and better access to the ,congo for products from ,katanga1 and 7#b7 to establish combined rail and water transport between the entire railway system of ,south ,africa and the mouth of the ,congo4 ,already the minerals from ,katanga were finding their outlet to the sea on the east coast via the ,rhodesian ,railways and the ,portuguese port of ,beira1 instead of via the ,tanganyikabahn and the ,german port of ,dar-es-,salaam4 ,the former had1 indeed1 become the recognised route for this important traffic in preference to the latter4 ,the line between ,kambove and ,bukama had not been completed when war broke out in #aiad2 but the provision of this through route1 and the various facilities it would offer1 rendered still more uncertain the prospect of ,germany getting control of the trans-,tanganyika traffic for her own lines4 ,there were other important railway schemes1 besides4 ,from ,bukama rail communication is to be continued right across ,central ,africa to ,matadi1 to which point the ,congo is navigable for large vessels from its mouth1 less than a hundred miles distant4 ,this line1 in addition to avoiding the great bend of the ,congo1 will open up and develop the vast and promising territory in the northern districts of the ,belgian ,congo1 south of that river4 ,another scheme which is to be carried out is a line from ,kambove1 in the ,southern ,katanga1 to the south-western boundary of the ,belgian ,congo1 and thence across ,portuguese territory to the present eastern terminus of the ,lobito ,bay ,railway4 ,this will give to the mining interests of ,katanga direct rail communication1 by the shortest possible route1 with a port on the west coast1 while the connection at ,kambove with the ,rhodesian and ,south ,african systems will make the line a still more important addition to the railways of ,africa for the purposes alike of development in the central districts and as a shorter route to and from ,europe4 ,german financiers were at one time desirous of undertaking the extension eastward of the ,lobito ,bay ,railway--mainly1 as it seemed1 with a view to furthering ,german interests in ,portuguese territory 7see page #cad72 but the ,kambove-,lobito ,bay line is now to be constructed with ,british capital4 ,finally there is the ,cape-to-,cairo ,railway which1 passing through the ,katanga mining districts1 is likely to divert still more of the traffic ,germany had counted upon alike for her ,tanganyikabahn and as a means towards the attainment of her political aspirations in ,central ,africa4 ,whilst these various developments were proceeding1 there were still others1 in the ,cameroons1 to which attention may now be directed4 ,,the ,,cameroons1 ,,lake ,,chad ,,and ,,the ,,sudan ,anticipations of the great results for ,germany which would follow from the building of railways in the ,cameroons began to be entertained about the year #ahig4 ,the main objective of the schemes brought forward seems to have been1 however1 not simply the internal economic development of an already vast area1 but the carrying of lines of communication to the furthest limits of that area in order1 apparently1 to extend ,german interests and influence to territories beyond4 ,one of these schemes was for the building of a line of railway from ,duala1 the chief port of the ,cameroons1 to ,lake ,chad 7otherwise ,tsd71 a sheet of water some #g1jjj square miles in extent which1 situate on the western borders of the ,sudan1 constitutes the extreme northern limits of ,german territory in this direction1 while the shores of the lake are occupied jointly by ,germany1 ,england and ,france4 ,the proposed line was to have an estimated total length of about #a1jjj kilometres 7#fba miles74 ,in ,september1 #aijb1 the ,german ,imperial ,government granted to a ,kamerun-,eisenbahn-,syndikat a concession for building the line2 an expedition sent out by the syndicate made a survey of the route in #aijb-c2 and a ,kamerun-,eisenbahn-,gesellschaft1 with a capital of #ag1jjj1jjj marks 7#hej1jjj71 was formed by a group of bankers and others in ,germany to build the first section4 ,in ,december1 #aijc1 the ,german ,emperor1 at his reception of the ,president of the ,reichstag1 gave his blessing to all such enterprises by declaring that an essential condition 7eine ,lebensbedingung7 for the welfare of ,germany's colonies in ,africa was that the building of railways should be taken earnestly in hand4 ,in #aije the prospects of the proposed line seemed so hopeful that the early commencement of construction was announced as probable2 but various difficulties arose1 including much trouble in regard to labour1 and the line did not get beyond the end of its first stage1 a distance of only #afj km4 7#ajj miles7 from the coast4 ,although the scheme was thus not fully carried out1 there was no doubt as to the nature of the purposes it had been designed to serve4 ,in his official and detailed account of the proposed undertaking#fi--;a book of exceptional merit from the point of view of the clearness and of the exhaustive data with which the case for the line is presented--the director of the syndicate says3-- ,my opinion is that only a great railway--one that unites the ,sudan with the ,atlantic1 and that extends from ,lake ,chad to the west coast of ,africa--will be in a position both to develop fully the economic interests of the ,cameroons and to assure to ,germany a means of access to the richest territory that ,central ,africa possesses4 ,had the line been completed as far as ,lake ,chad1 it would have been a powerful competitor of ,british railways via the ,nile or the ,red ,sea for the traffic of the ,sudan1 with its vast commercial possibilities2 and1 had it been found the better route1 it might have established ,german commercial supremacy in this part of ,central ,africa1 with the inevitable political developments to follow4 ,the ,german ,tsdsee-,eisenbahn1 the director of the syndicate further wrote1 will1 especially when it has been completed1 be for the whole of ,central ,africa a ,kulturwerk of the first importance4 ,the ,germanisation of ,lake ,chad1 combined with an eventual acquiring by ,germany of ,french interests in the ,sahara and ,north ,africa1 would further have permitted the continuation of the ,tsdsee-,eisenbahn from that lake to ,algeria along the route already projected in ,france for a ,trans-,african line linking up the ,mediterranean alike with the ,congo and with the ,rhodesian and other ,british railways in ,south ,africa1 via ,lake ,chad--a line which1 it is said1 would offer no great technical difficulty in construction4#gj ,,the ,,cameroons ,,and ,,the ,,congo ,another ambitious scheme was for the building of a ,mittellandbahn which1 crossing the ,njong1 would eventually link up the chief port of the ,cameroons with a navigable tributary of the ,congo4 ,here1 again1 the line as actually constructed has not been carried a greater distance than about #cjj km4 7#ahf miles74 ,at one time1 in fact1 the original project seemed to have been abandoned2 but quite recently it has been brought forward again under conditions which have a distinct bearing on what has already been said concerning ,germany and ,central ,africa4 ,from the views expressed by ,emil ,zimmermann in his ,neu-,kamerun1#ga one gathers that in #aiac ,germany was regarding with some degree of concern alike the outlook for her ,tanganyikabahn1 on which over #g1jjj1jjj had been spent1 and the prospective set-back to her aspirations in regard to the ,belgian ,congo2 and ,herr ,zimmermann1 in giving an account of the additions made to her ,cameroons possessions at the expense of ,france1 under the agreement of ,november #d1 #aiaa1 following on the ,agadir crisis1 makes certain overtures to ,belgium1 and follows them up with a distinct threat1 should she refrain from responding to them4 ,belgium and ,germany1 he says1 in effect1 are the two dominant ,powers in ,central ,africa2 and he is of opinion that it will be to their mutual interest to co-operate in the development of that great territory4 ,belgium1 however1 he finds to be faced by the need for a great outlay of money 7#a7 on account of necessary improvements of her ,congo rail and river communication1 to meet expanding traffic requirements1 and 7#b7 in order to develop her ,katanga territory4 ,she cannot herself command the necessary capital1 but ,germany could assist her to raise it1 and would do so--provided ,belgium undertook that traffic from her ,tanganyika and ,mweru districts1 and1 also1 from points east of the ,middle ,congo1 should reach the sea by its natural outlet1 that is to say1 by the ,german ,east ,african ,central ,railway4 ,should ,belgium refuse to agree to these proposals1 and should she1 by her high tariffs1 continue to impede the flow of traffic to ,german territory1 then it would be open to ,germany to construct lines of railway from the west coast either to navigable tributaries of the ,congo or to the ,congo itself1 and so divert the traffic from the ,belgian ,congo at certain important points1 to the serious prejudice of ,belgian interests4 ,apart from what might be done in the way of extending the ,duala-,njong line to the said navigable tributaries of the ,congo1 as originally projected1 ,herr ,zimmermann says that1 under the treaty of ,november #d1 #aiaa1 ,germany has the right to continue her ,cameroons railways across ,french territory 7,france having reciprocal rights as regards ,german territory72 and he points out how she could exercise this power1 to the detriment of ,belgium1 should that country not accept her proposals in regard to the ,congo basin and ,central ,africa4 ,he specially mentions the fact that when the boundaries of the #ajj1jjj square miles of territory added1 at the expense of ,france1 to the ,german ,cameroons 7then already #aia1jjj square miles in extent71 were fixed by virtue of the treaty of #aiaa1 the wedge-like strip on the south of ,spanish ,muni was so defined as to leave at the eastern point thereof a gap between the ,spanish territory and the ,french ,cameroons wide enough for either a road or a railway2 and he emphasises the fact that1 by taking advantage of the facilities thus open to her1 ,germany could1 under the treaty of #aiaa1 construct a railway #a1jjj km4 7#fba miles7 long from ,muni ,bay through the said gap and cross ,french territory to the junction of the ,sangha with the ,congo4 ,alternatively1 and by arrangement with ,france1 the line could start from ,libreville4 ,what such a railway1 tapping the ,congo-,sangha-,ubangi traffic at its most favourable point1 would mean1 can1 ,herr ,zimmermann remarks1 be left to the ,belgians themselves to say4 ,he does not suggest that such schemes as these would in themselves be of great value to ,germany2 but he thinks they might have a powerful influence1 both politically and economically1 on the solution of the ,tanganyika problem in ,germany's favour4 ,in fact1 he considers that since the #aiaa treaty ,germany has practically controlled the situation in ,central ,africa2 and from all he says it is a reasonable assumption that the ,agadir crisis1 the concession of territory exacted from ,france1 and the undertaking as to the carrying of ,german ,cameroon railways across ,french territory1 had far more to do with ,german designs on the ,belgian ,congo and ,central ,africa than is generally supposed4 ,in another work1 published a year later1#gb the same writer1 adopting now a distinctly different tone1 endeavoured to appease an ,anti-,central ,africa agitation which1 he tells us1 had developed in ,germany and was protesting alike against the danger of acquiring any more ,congo-swamps and against the boundless ,german plans in ,africa4 ,he further sought to soothe the suspicions which1 he found1 had been excited in ,belgium and elsewhere as to the nature of ,germany's plans in ,africa4 ,germany1 he declared1 had no annexation projects in view4 ,her aspirations were purely economic4 ,kamerun1 thanks to the ,german-,french treaty of #aiaa 7which1 he reiterated1 had changed the whole situation71 could now take a considerable share in the development of ,central ,africa1 and was the more entitled so to do since she had1 in ,duala1 one of the best harbours on the west coast of ,africa4 ,,official ,,admissions ,as against1 however1 affirmations such as these1 there is the undisputable evidence of no less an authority than the ,german ,foreign ,minister himself as to the real nature of ,germany's designs on the ,belgian ,congo4 ,in the second ,belgian ,grey ,book1 published in ,august1 #aiae1 under the title of ,correspondance ,diplomatique relative la ,guerre de #aiad-ae1 there is given 7pp4 #b-c7 a letter from the ,belgian ,minister in ,berlin1 ,baron ,beyens1 to his ,government1 recording1 under date ,april #b1 #aiad1 a conversation which the ,french ,ambassador in ,berlin informed him he had had quite recently 7and1 therefore1 only about four months before the outbreak of war7 with the ,german ,foreign ,minister4 ,herr von ,jagow suggested to him that ,germany1 ,france and ,england should arrive at an agreement on the construction and linking up of railways in ,africa4 ,m4 ,gambon replied that in this case ,belgium ought to be invited to confer with them1 as she was constructing some new railways on the ,congo4 ,he also expressed the view that any conference held on the subject should meet at ,brussels4 ,to this ,herr von ,jagow responded1 ,oh no2 for it is at the expense of ,belgium that our agreement should be made4 ,do you not think1 he added1 that ,king ,leopold placed too heavy a burden on the shoulders of ,belgium8 ,belgium is not rich enough to develop that vast possession4 ,it is an enterprise beyond her financial resources and her means of expansion4 ,the ,french ,ambassador dissented1 but ,herr von ,jagow went on to affirm that the great ,powers were alone in a position to colonise1 and that the small ,powers were destined to disappear or to gravitate towards the orbit of the large ones4 ,in the words of the ,belgian ,minister3-- ,il dveloppa l'opinion que seules les grandes ,puissances sont en situation de coloniser4 ,il dvoila mme le fond de sa pense en soutenant que les petits tats ne pourraient plus mener1 dans la transformation qui s'oprait en ,europe au profit des nationalits les plus fortes1 par suite du dveloppement des forces conomiques et des moyens de communication1 l'existence indpendante dont ils avaient joui jusqu' prsent4 ,ils taient destins disparatre ou graviter dans l'orbite des grandes ,puissances4 ,,der ,,tag ,,and ,,its ,,programme ,the story here presented of ,germany's aims in ,africa has taken us over almost the entire ,african ,continent4 ,it now only remains to be seen how those aims were to be realised1 not merely as the outcome of ,pan-,german dreams and advocacy1 but as the result of many years of scheming1 plotting and actual preparation1 all directed to the wiping out of the influence in ,africa of other ,powers1 great as well as small1 and the final realisation of ,germany's long-cherished purpose4 ,according to conversations ,mr4 ,o',connor had with military officers in ,german ,south-,west ,africa just before the outbreak of war in #aiad1 the programme under which ,germany hoped to become the supreme power in ,africa when der ,tag so long looked forward to should arrive was1 in effect1 as follows3-- ,belgium was to be disposed of at one gulp4 ,this would make it an easy matter for ,germany to take over the ,belgian ,congo4 ,france would be paralysed2 and1 being paralysed1 she would not be able to prevent ,germany from succeeding to the whole of her possessions in ,africa4 ,the ,dervishes would stir up a rebellion in ,egypt1#gc and other rebellions were anticipated in ,ireland and ,india4 ,while ,england was fully occupied in these directions the ,afrikanders were to rise en masse and declare ,british ,south ,africa an ,afrikander ,republic4 ,the forces in ,german ,east ,africa would make a sudden raid into ,british ,east ,africa4 ,having annexed that territory and got possession of the railway1 they would next invade ,rhodesia from the east1 in co-operation with troops from ,german ,south-,west ,africa advancing to the ,zambezi1 via the ,caprivi ,strip1 from the railway terminus at ,grootfontein4 ,meanwhile ,german columns would have moved 7#a7 from the military station at ,gobabis into ,bechuanaland1 crossing the desert of ,kalahari1 to effect the capture of ,vryburg2 and 7#b7 from ,keetmanshoop1 and other points served by the ,seeheim branch1 into northern ,cape ,province1 via ,raman's ,drift1 ,schuit ,drift and the south-east corner of the territory4 ,rhodesia having been seized1 more troops would be available to proceed to the assistance of the ,afrikander forces operating in the ,cape ,province1 the ,transvaal and the ,orange ,free ,state--a rising on the part of the ,afrikanders as soon as they saw a good opportunity for one being taken for granted4 ,in return for the services thus rendered by her to the ,afrikanders in establishing their ,republic1 ,germany would take a portion of the ,transvaal1 as well as part of the ,zululand coast4 ,with ,belgium and ,france effectively crushed1 and the power of ,great ,britain in ,south ,africa broken down1 those countries would no longer be in a position to prevent ,germany from annexing ,portuguese ,angola2 and this she was to do next4 ,she would allow the ,afrikander ,republic to take ,delagoa ,bay2 but the ,republic itself was to come under the guardianship of ,germany4 ,the word suzerainty1 ,mr4 ,o',connor says1 was not mentioned1 guardianship being preferred2 but1 with the exception of ,italian ,somaliland--about which nothing was said--practically the whole of ,africa was either to belong to ,germany or to be brought directly or indirectly under her control4 ,,the ,,objective ,,of ,,the ,,world-,,war ,since the outbreak of the ,world-,war in #aiad there has been much speculation as to the real objective and purpose of ,germany in bringing it about4 ,do the facts stated in the present chapter afford any help towards a solution of this problem8 ,we have seen the nature of the aims cherished by ,germany towards ,africa1 the practical and persistent efforts she made during a long series of years for their attainment1 and the substantial expenditure she incurred in the hope of at last securing the prize she considered was awaiting her4 ,we have seen how the purpose of ,germany in ,africa was less to develop colonies for their own sake than to regard them as points from which to absorb or to control neighbouring territories4 ,we have seen how the development of rival railways in ,central ,africa had recently threatened the supremacy ,germany hoped to gain and may1 indeed1 have suggested to her the need for early vigorous effort1 if she wished still to secure the realisation of her aims4 ,we have seen what1 in the view of the ,german ,foreign ,minister1 should be the fate of small ,powers which stand in the way of the aggrandisement of great ones4 ,we have seen1 also1 how1 in the opinion of officers serving in ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 the real purpose of the war to which they were looking forward1 and for which they were preparing1 was the ,german annexation of ,africa1 and how the smashing up of ,france and ,great ,britain1 the overthrow of ,belgium1 the seizure of ,portuguese possessions1 and the virtual absorption of the proposed new ,boer ,republics were to be the preliminaries to a final transformation of the whole ,african ,continent into a ,german possession--the new ,empire which1 in the words of von ,weber1 was to be possibly more valuable and more brilliant than even the ,indian ,empire4 ,may one not conclude1 in face of these and of all the other facts which have here been narrated1 that one1 at least1 of the main objectives of ,germany 7apart from minor ones7 in provoking the ,great ,war was no less a prize than the ,african ,continent2#gd and that when she invaded ,belgium and ,france she did so less with the object of annexing the former country1 and of creating another ,alsace-,lorraine in the latter than of having something in her hand with which to bargain--in the interests of her projects in ,africa--when the time came for discussing the terms of peace1 assuming that she had not already attained her purpose at the outset by the sheer force of what she thought would be her irresistible strength8 ,if this conclusion should seem to be warranted1 on the basis of what has already been told1 it may certainly be regarded as confirmed by the fact that1 down to the moment when these lines are being written1 any suggestions coming from ,german sources as to possible terms of peace have invariably included proposals for the concession to ,germany of territory in ,africa as compensation for the surrender of territory she has herself occupied in ,belgium and ,france4 ,thus1 in a despatch published in ,the ,times of ,september #d1 #aiae1 a statement was reproduced from the ,chicago ,tribune giving1 on the authority of a writer in close touch with the ,german ,embassy1 the terms on which ,germany would be prepared to agree to peace4 ,these terms included the following3-- ,the cession of the ,belgian ,congo to ,germany1 as compensation for the evacuation of ,belgium4 ,the cession of ,african colonial territory to ,germany by ,france1 as compensation for the evacuation of ,northern ,france4 ,then1 also1 on ,october #bd1 #aiae1 the ,new ,york ,american published a long interview with ,professor ,hans ,delbrck on the terms of peace which ,germany hoped to secure if ,president ,wilson and the ,pope would consent to act as mediators4 ,the interview 7which had been approved by the ,german censor7 included the following passage3-- ,it is quite possible that peace could be secured by ceding to ,germany such colonies as ,uganda by ,england and the ,french and ,belgian ,congos as a ransom for the evacuation by ,germany of ,northern ,france and ,belgium4 ,such concessions1 if one can conceive the possibility of their being made--would still leave ,germany far from the attainment of her full ,african programme2 but the fact of these proposals being put forward at all as terms of peace is quite in keeping with the whole course of ,germany's policy in ,africa1 and points clearly to what may1 in fact1 have been her chief objective in the war itself4 ,any moral reflections either on the said policy or on the programme by means of which it was to have been carried out would be beyond the scope of the present work4 ,what we are here concerned in is the fact that ,germany's dreams of an ,african ,empire1 given expression to by von ,weber in #ahhj1 and the subject of such continuous effort ever since1 were1 in the possibilities of their realisation1 based primarily on the extension and utilisation of such facilities for rail-transport as she might be able either to create or to acquire4 ,,footnotes3 #ee ,see ,vol4 ,,iii4 of ,the ,story of ,africa1 by ,robert ,brown4 ,london1 #ahid4 #ef ,the ,germans and ,africa1 by ,evans ,lewin1 ,librarian of the ,royal ,colonial ,institute4 ,london1 #aiae4 #eg ,under the terms of the treaty of ,july #a1 #aijj1 ,germany was to have free access from her ,south-,west ,africa ,protectorate to the ,zambezi ,river by a strip which shall at no point be less than twenty ,english miles in width4 #eh ,the ,hereros 7,damaras7 are not a warlike people1 and although1 at the time of the rising1 many of them were armed with ,mausers and ,lee-,enfields1 it has been said of them that they were not of much account with the rifle1 their natural weapon being the assegai4 ,a ,german ,white ,book on the rebellion stated that the cause of the outbreak was the spirit of independence which characterised the ,hereros1 to whom the increasing domination of the ,germans had become insupportable1 and who believed themselves stronger than the whites4 ,according to ,mr4 ,h4 ,a4 ,bryden 7,the ,conquest of ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,july1 #aiae7 the real causes were the abuses of the white trader1 the brutal methods of certain officials1 and the seizure and occupation of tribal lands4 ,the war developed into one of practical extermination for the natives concerned4 ,of the ,hereros between #bj1jjj and #cj1jjj were either killed outright or driven into the ,kalahari desert to die of starvation4 ,the ,hottentots also lost heavily4 #ei ,the ,commerce ,defence ,league1 as explained by the writer of the article1 is an organisation of ,german traders which gives subsidies to ,german clerks so that they can take up appointments at nominal salaries in foreign countries1 on the understanding that they are to report to the ,league as to the business methods1 etc41 of those countries and on openings for ,german trade or industry therein1 the ,league acting on such information and dividing among its subscribers the profits derived from the agencies opened or the competitive businesses started4 #fj ,see ,south ,africa1 ,november #ad1 #aiad4 #fa ,memorandum on the ,country known as ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,compiled from such information as is at present available to the ,government of the ,union of ,south ,africa4 ,pretoria1 #aiae4 #fb ,the colony was also in wireless-telegraphic communication1 via ,togoland1 with ,berlin4 #fc ,for details of so-called invasions of ,portuguese territory by ,german political agents1 posing as engineers and prospectors1 see an article on ,the ,invasion of ,angola1 by ,mr4 ,george ,bailey1 in the issue of ,united ,empire3 ,the ,royal ,colonial ,institute ,journal1 for ,october1 #aiae4 #fd ,le ,chemin de ,fer du ,tanganyika et les progrs de l',afrique orientale allemande4 ,par ,camille ,martin4 ,renseignements coloniaux1 ,no4 #c4 ,supplment de l',afrique franaise1 ,mars1 #aiad4 ,paris4 #fe ,a region on the ,belgian ,congo about #aae1jjj square miles in extent and one of the best watered districts in ,africa1 lying nearly in the centre of the ,african continent1 and equidistant1 therefore1 from the ,atlantic and ,indian ,oceans4 #ff ,adventures in ,africa under the ,british1 ,belgian and ,portuguese ,flags4 ,london1 #aiae4 #fg ,welches ,interesse hat ,deutschland an der ,erschliessung des ,congo8 ,von ,emil ,zimmermann4 ,koloniale ,rundschau1 ,mai1 #aiaa4 ,berlin4 #fh ,die ,eroberung des ,tanganyika-,verkehrs4 ,von ,emil ,zimmermann4 ,koloniale ,rundschau1 ,jan41 #aiaa4 ,berlin4 #fi ,kamerun und die ,deutsche ,tsdsee-,eisenbahn4 ,von ,carl ,ren1 ,director des ,kamerun-,eisenbahn-,syndikats4 #bea pp4 ,mit #cg ,textbildern und #bb ,tafeln nach ,original-,aufnahmen der ,kamerun-,eisenbahn-,expediton1 #aijb-c4 ,berlin1 #aije4 #gj ,bulletin de la ,socit de ,geographie et d',etudes coloniales de ,marseilles4 ,tome ,,xxxvi1 ,no4 #a4 ,ie ,trimestre1 #aiab4 #ga ,neu-,kamerun2 ,reiseerlebnisse und wirtschaftspolitische ,untersuchungen4 ,von ,emil ,zimmermann4 #ace pp4 ,map4 ,berlin1 #aiac4 #gb ,was ist uns ,zentralafrika8 ,von ,emil ,zimmermann4 #eg pp4 ,berlin1 #aiad4 #gc ,how ,egypt was to be invaded and captured by the ,germans and ,turks1 in combination1 with the help of the railways in ,asia ,minor1 will be told in the following ,chapter4 #gd ,should there still be any doubt on this point1 it will be removed by the frank admission of ,die ,neue ,zeit1 even whilst the ,great ,war is still in progress1 that ,germany undertook the war with the main object of extending her colonial possessions4 ,as quoted in the ,daily ,express of ,october #h1 #aiae1 ,die ,neue ,zeit further said3--,herr ,paul ,rohrbach favours the acquisition of the whole of ,central ,africa1 but opines that this territory1 vast as it is1 will not be adequate to furnish ,germany with all the elbow room she may require within the next half-century4 ,professor ,delbrck1 while agreeing with ,herr ,rohrbach1 as to the importance of ,central ,africa1 as well as of ,angola and the whole of ,british ,east ,africa1 further emphasises the necessity for the acquisition of the ,sudan and the southern part of the ,sahara1 now in the possession of ,france4 ,we are quite in agreement with these eminent leaders that we must found an ,india of our own1 and that the greater part of the ,african continent must furnish the requisite territory4 ,once well established in this new empire1 we shall link ourselves with ,asiatic ,turkey1 and also with ,china1 reconstructing the political and economic foundations of both on a scientific ,german basis4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,designs ,,on ,,asiatic ,,turkey ,just as avowedly strategical lines in ,africa were to lead the way to the creation of a ,german ,african ,empire1 so1 in turn1 was that system of economic-political-strategical lines comprised within the scheme of what is known as the ,baghdad ,railway designed to ensure the establishment of a ,german ,middle-,asian ,empire1 bringing under ,german control the entire region from the ,mediterranean to the ,persian ,gulf1 and providing convenient stepping-off places from which an advance might be made on ,egypt in the one direction and ,india in the other4 ,the conception of this further programme was spread over 7#a7 the period during which ,germany's aspirations were limited to the inheritance of ,turkey's possessions in ,asia2 and 7#b7 the period when such inheritance began to be regarded as a means to the realisation of still greater aims in the domain of ,weltpolitik4 ,for more than half a century ,asiatic ,turkey has been looked upon as ,germany's ,land of ,promise4 ,anatolia was thought a most desirable territory for her surplus population4 ,the development1 under ,german influence1 of that territory as a whole--especially with a revival of the ,babylonian system of irrigation--was considered to offer vast possibilities of commercial prosperity4 ,wheat1 cotton and tobacco1 especially1 might be raised in prodigious quantities1 and there was the prospect1 also1 of a petroleum industry rivalling that of ,baku itself4 ,turkey was a decadent nation1 and as soon as the ,sick ,man succumbed to his apparently inevitable fate--or even before1 should circumstances permit--,germany was ready to step into his shoes4 ,that these aspirations had1 indeed1 long been cherished is a fact capable of ready proof4 ,in #ahdh ,wilhelm ,roscher1 the leading expounder of the historical school of political economy in ,germany1 selected ,asia ,minor as ,germany's share in the ,turkish spoils1 whenever the division thereof should take place2 and ,johann ,karl ,robertus 7#ahje-ahge71 the founder of the so-called scientific socialism in ,germany1 expressed the hope that he would live long enough to see ,turkey fall into the hands of ,germany1 and1 also1 to see ,german soldiers on the shores of the ,bosporus4 ,coming to a more recent period1 we find that ,dr4 ,aloys ,sprenger1 the ,german orientalist1 published1 in #ahhf1 a pamphlet on ,babylonia1 the richest land in the past1 and the most promising field for colonisation in the present1#ge in which1 after dealing with the history1 physical conditions and resources of ,babylonia1 he predicted that1 before the end of the century1 not only ,babylonia but ,assyria1 which was inseparable from it1 would1 if not formally annexed1 at least come under the control of some ,european ,power4 ,assyria and ,syria1 he declared1 were even better adapted for colonisation than ,babylonia4 ,he continued3-- ,the ,orient is the only territory on earth which has not yet been taken possession of by some aspiring nation4 ,it offers the finest opportunities for colonisation1 and if ,germany1 taking care not to let the opportunity slip1 should act before the ,cossacks come along1 she would1 in the division of the world1 get the best share4444 ,the ,german ,kaiser1 as soon as a few hundred thousand armed ,german colonists bring these promising fields into cultivation1 will have in his hand the fate of ,asia ,minor1 and he can--and will--then become the ,protector of ,peace for the whole of ,asia4 ,dr4 ,karl ,kaerger1 traveller and economist1 lamented1 in his ,kleinasien2 ein deutsches ,kolonisationsfeld 7,berlin1 #ahib71 the enormous loss sustained by ,germany in the migration of so many of her people and of so much capital to ,anglo-,saxon lands2 but there were1 he affirmed1 only two countries to which ,german settlers could go with any hope of retaining alike their nationality and their commercial relations with the ,mutterland4 ,those countries were--,africa and ,asia ,minor4 ,he had been especially impressed1 during the course of his travels1 by the prospects and possibilities of ,anatolia1 and he recommended the establishment there of large ,german companies which would organise schemes of colonisation and land cultivation on a large scale4 ,the colonies so established should be self-governing1 free from all taxation for ten years1 have the right of duty-free importation of necessaries1 and enjoy various other privileges1 while ,turkey1 in return for the concessions she thus made to the settlers1 would be assured the protection of ,germany against attack4 ,not only hundreds of thousands1 but millions1 of colonists could find a second home on those wide expanses4 ,germany herself would gain a dual advantage--an economical one1 and a political one4 ,concerning the latter1 ,dr4 ,kaerger observed3-- ,if the ,german ,empire1 while maintaining her friendship with ,austria and ,italy--which1 under all circumstances1 the political situation in ,europe undoubtedly requires--can direct the stream of her emigration to the fertile territories of ,turkey1 and if she can conclude with that country a closer customs convention1 then the entire economic1 and with it1 also1 the political future of ,germany will rest on a broader and a firmer basis than if the present streams of hundreds of thousands of her people1 and millions of capital1 continue to pass in increasing proportions1 year by year1 to countries which are economically hostile to us4 ,dr4 ,kaerger was especially concerned lest ,germany might be anticipated by ,russia or ,england in the realisation of her own designs on ,asia ,minor4 ,should1 he declared1 either of those countries acquire any further territory from ,turkey1 or increase in any way ,turkey's dependence upon them1 the result would be the most serious disturbance of the prevailing situation in ,europe that had occurred since #ahgj4 ,the development of all these ideas went so far that in #ahie the ,alldeutscher ,bltter recommended that ,germany should establish a ,protectorate over the ,turkish possessions in ,asia ,minor2 and in the following year the ,alldeutscher ,verband published a manifesto on ,german claims to the ,inheritance of ,turkey 7,deutschlands ,anspruch an das trkische ,erbe71 making a formal statement of ,germany's alleged rights to the ,turkish succession4 ,germany had by this time already secured a footing on the soil of ,asiatic ,turkey by virtue of the ,anatolian ,railway4 ,the first section--a length of about seventy miles1 extending from ,haidar ,pacha 7situate on the north-eastern coast of the ,sea of ,marmara1 and opposite ,constantinople7 to ,ismidt--was built in #ahge by ,german engineers to the order of the ,turkish ,government4 ,it was transferred in #ahhh to a ,german syndicate1 nominees of the ,deutsche ,bank4 ,under the powers then conferred upon them1 the syndicate opened an extension1 on the east1 to ,angora1 in #ahib1 and another1 on the south1 to ,konia1 in #ahif1 the total length of line being thus increased to #fcc miles4 ,as the result of the visit of the ,german ,emperor to ,constantinople in #ahih1 followed by negotiations between the ,porte and the director of the ,deutsche ,bank1 authority was given to a new ,german ,company--the ,imperial ,ottoman ,baghdad ,railway ,company--under conventions of #ahhi1 #aijb and #aijc1 to continue the existing ,anatolian ,railway from ,konia to the ,persian ,gulf1 via ,adana1 ,nisibin1 ,mosul and ,baghdad4 ,this extension was to constitute the main line of the ,baghdad ,railway proper2 but the ,company also acquired control over most of the branch railways already in operation4 ,one of these was the ,french ,smyrna--,afium ,karahissar line1 which constitutes the direct trade route between ,smyrna and places served by the ,anatolian railway1 and has1 also1 a branch to ,panderma1 on the southern shores of the ,sea of ,marmara4 ,another was the short line from ,adana to ,mersina1 giving access to the ,mediterranean4 ,this meant the substitution of ,german for ,french interests1 while the course taken by the ,anatolia-,baghdad ,railway from the ,bosporus to ,adana shut off the possibility of an extension of the ,british line from ,smyrna via ,aidin to ,egerdir 7west of ,konia7 into the interior4 ,then in #aiaa the ,company acquired the right to build a new port at ,alexandretta1 with quays1 docks1 bonded warehouses1 etc41 and to construct thence a short line of railway connecting with the ,baghdad main line at ,osmanieh1 east of ,adana4 ,by these means the ,germans acquired the control over1 if not an actual monopoly of1 the traffic between one of the most important ports on the eastern sea-board of the ,mediterranean--a port where a trade valued at three and a half million sterling is already being done--and the vast extent of territory in ,asia ,minor designed to be served by the ,baghdad ,railway4 ,from ,muslimiyeh1 a little town on the north of ,aleppo1 there is a short branch connecting the ,baghdad ,railway with the ,hedjaz line from ,damascus to ,medina1 which is eventually to be carried on to ,mecca2 while from ,rayak1 north of ,damascus1 a branch built in a south-westerly direction was to be carried to within a short distance of the ,egyptian frontier4 ,from the junction for the ,aleppo branch1 the main line was to continue across the ,mesopotamian plain to ,baghdad 7whence a branch to ,khanikin1 on the ,persian frontier was projected7 and so on to ,basra1 for the ,persian ,gulf4 ,thus the scheme for what passes under the title of the ,baghdad ,railway embraces three separate and distinct regions of ,asiatic ,turkey--7#a7 ,anatolia1 7#b7 ,syria and 7#c7 ,mesopotamia4 ,in other words1 whereas in their first phase1 ,german aspirations for ,turkish territory were based on the economic advantages of settlement in ,anatolia--a region in itself large enough to accommodate all the ,germans who were likely to want to settle there--in the second phase those aspirations were based on an extension of the ,baghdad ,railway towards ,egypt in the one direction and the ,persian ,gulf in the other4 ,this dual extension became the more noticeable1 also1 inasmuch as for the passage of the ,taurus range of mountains a total of nearly #ajj miles of blasting and tunnelling would have to be carried out1 the cost of construction on certain sections of the line rising to between #ce1jjj and #dj1jjj a mile4 ,the extension1 therefore1 was likely to be a costly business1 the total length of the ,baghdad ,railway proper1 apart from the ,anatolian system1 being1 as projected1 about #a1cej miles1 of which1 however1 only about #fjj miles were1 in ,june1 #aiae1 available for traffic4#gf ,admitting the desirability of opening up ,mesopotamia to commercial and agricultural development1 it may1 nevertheless1 be asked1 were there other motives--and motives to which still greater weight might have been attached--for this expansion of the earlier designs8 ,abdul ,hamid's reason for granting the concession is said to have been that the extension of the line to the ,persian ,gulf would greatly strengthen the military position of ,turkey1 since it would enable her to effect a speedy transfer of troops between the ,bosporus and the ,gulf1 or intermediate places1 as against the many months that might be occupied by marching on foot across plains and mountains4 ,germany's reasons for seeking to construct the ,baghdad ,railway1 its branches and connections1 to the full extent of the programme laid down1 were1 not simply the development of new trade routes1 as certain inspired representations have sought to make the world believe1 and not simply the gain of various other economic advantages1 but 7#a7 a desire to increase ,german influence over ,turkey2 to strengthen her military and other resources with a view to employing them eventually in the advancement of ,germany's own interests2 and to ensure the realisation of that eventual ,protectorate over ,turkey which would convert the country into practically a ,german province2 and 7#b7 the furthering of ,germany's aims against ,great ,britain in the belief that she1 too1 was a decadent country whose possessions1 when we could no longer defend them effectively1 ,germany would be the more likely to secure for herself if1 with a concentration of ,turkish forces to assist her1 she were established within striking distance of some of the most vulnerable points of the ,british ,empire1 ready to take instant advantage of any favourable opportunity that might present itself1 whether in a prospective break-up of that ,empire or otherwise4 ,of evidence concerning ,germany's efforts to obtain increasing influence over ,turkey there is no lack4 ,we have1 in the first place1 the fact that in #ahhb a ,german military mission1 of which ,general the ,baron ,colmar von der ,goltz was the principal member1 undertook the training of the ,turkish ,army according to the principles of ,german military science1 with the result that the ,turkish ,army became a more efficient instrument for the attainment1 not only of her own aims or purposes1 but those1 also1 of ,germany herself4 ,the ,kaiser1 although the supreme head of the ,lutheran ,church1 and although having no ,mohammedan subjects of his own1 sought to pose as the champion of ,mohammedans in general and the ,defender of their ,faith4 ,during his visit to ,damascus in ,november1 #ahih1 he declared--,may the ,sultan1 may the three hundred million ,mohammedans living who1 scattered throughout the earth1 honour in his person their ,caliph1 rest assured that at all times the ,german ,kaiser will be their friend4#gg ,whenever political trouble threatened to fall upon ,turkey1 as the result of such occurrences as the ,armenian and ,macedonian atrocities or the insurrection in ,crete1 it was ,germany who became her champion as against the other ,powers of ,europe4 ,everything possible was done to push ,german trade in ,turkey and to establish closer commercial relations with her4 ,there came a time when every city of importance in the ,turkish ,empire was declared to be overrun with ,german bankers1 ,german clerks and ,german bagmen4 ,not only1 too1 were ,german engineers active in seeking to get concessions for new railways1 and not only were ,german financiers equally active in endeavouring to control existing ones1 but1 as ,dr4 ,charles ,sarolea points out1 in his book on ,the ,anglo-,german ,problem1 there are1 in the agreements between the ,baghdad ,railway ,company and the ,porte1 financial clauses which must ultimately place ,turkey entirely at the mercy of her professed champion4 ,in ,turkey ,germany alone would rule supreme2 and the aspirations for a ,german ,protectorate over ,turkey1 with the ,sultan as a vassal of ,germany1 would then be realised4 ,writing on the position as he found it in #aijc1 ,m4 ,andr ,chradame said in ,la ,question d',orient3-- ,more and more the ,germans seem to regard the land of the ,turks as their personal property4 ,all the recent ,german literature relating to ,turkey affords proof of the tendency4 ,an ordinary book of travels is entitled1 ,in ,asia ,minor1 by ,german ,railways4 ,in his ,pan-,germanic ,atlas ,paul ,langhams gives a map of ,german ,railways in ,asia ,minor4 ,so it is1 indeed1 a matter of the organised conquest of ,turkey4 ,everywhere and in everything1 ,turkey is being encircled by the tentacles of the ,german octopus4 ,coming1 next1 to the nature of ,germany's aims against ,england and the part which the ,baghdad ,railway was to play in their attainment1 we have the frank confessions of ,dr4 ,paul ,rohrbach1 an authority on the subject of ,germany's ,weltpolitik1 and a traveller who has paid four visits to ,asia ,minor4 ,in ,die ,baghdadbahn 7#bnd4 edition1 #aiaa7 he tells us that ,ludwig ,ross1 a professor at ,halle who was well acquainted with ,anatolia1 was the first to point to ,asia ,minor as a desirable place for ,german settlement4 ,at the outset economic considerations were alone concerned1 and in ,bismarck's day ,germany's relations to ,england played only a minor rle in her foreign politics2 but in proportion as ,germany's interests were developed and her soil no longer provided sufficient food for her people or sufficient raw products for her manufactures1 she had to look abroad for the supply of her surplus needs4 ,in so doing1 however1 her interests abroad might be endangered by the ,british ,fleet4 ,hence the necessity for a ,german ,fleet2 and1 although the ,german sea-power might not be strong enough1 by itself1 to attack and conquer ,england1 it could bring certain considerations home to ,english policy4 ,dr4 ,rohrbach continues3-- ,if it came to a matter of war with ,england1 it would be for ,germany simply a question of life and death4 ,the possibility of a successful issue for ,germany depends exclusively on one consideration1 namely1 on whether or not we can succeed in bringing ,england herself into a dangerous position4 ,that end can in no way be obtained by means of a direct attack across the ,north ,sea2 any idea of a ,german invasion of ,england being possible is a mere phantasy4 ,one must seek1 therefore1 another combination in order to assail ,england at some vulnerable spot2 and here we come to the point where the relations of ,germany to ,turkey1 and the conditions prevailing in ,turkey1 are found to be of decisive importance for ,german foreign policy4 ,there is1 in fact1 only one means possible by which ,germany can resist a war of aggression by ,england1 and that is the strengthening of ,turkey4 ,england can1 from ,europe1 be attacked by land and mortally wounded only in one place--,egypt4 ,if ,england were to lose ,egypt she would lose1 not only her control over the ,suez ,canal and her connexions with ,india and the ,far ,east1 but1 presumably1 also1 her possessions in ,central and ,east ,africa4 ,the conquest of ,egypt by a ,mohammedan ,power1 such as ,turkey1 might1 in addition1 have a dangerous effect on her #fj1jjj1jjj ,mohammedan subjects in ,india1 besides being to her prejudice in ,afghanistan and ,persia4 ,turkey1 however1 can never dream of recovering ,egypt until she controls a fully-developed railway system in ,asia ,minor and ,syria2 until1 by the extension of the ,anatolian ,railway to ,baghdad1 she can resist an attack by ,england on ,mesopotamia2 until her army has been increased and improved2 and until progress has been made in her general economic and financial conditions4444 ,the stronger ,turkey becomes1 the greater will be the danger for ,england if1 in a ,german-,english conflict1 ,turkey should be on the side of ,germany2 and1 with ,egypt for a prize1 it certainly would be worth the while of ,turkey to run the risk of fighting with ,germany against ,england4 ,on the other hand the mere fact that ,turkey had increased in military strength1 had improved her economic position1 and had an adequate railway system1 would make ,england hesitate to attack ,germany2 and this is the point at which ,germany must aim4 ,the policy of supporting ,turkey which is now being followed by ,germany has no other purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the danger of war with ,england4 ,from other directions1 besides1 similar testimony was forthcoming4 ,the ,socialist ,liepziger ,volkszeitung declared in ,march1 #aiaa1 that the new situation shortly to be created in ,asia ,minor would hasten the break-up of the ,british ,empire1 which was already beginning to totter 7schwanken74 ,in ,die ,neue ,zeit for ,june #b1 #aiaa1 ,herr ,karl ,radek said3-- ,the strengthening of ,german ,imperialism1 the first success of which1 attained with so much effort1 is the ,baghdad ,railway2 the victory of the revolutionary party in ,turkey2 the prospect of a modern revolutionary movement in ,india1 which1 of course1 must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier scattered risings of individual tribes2 the movement towards nationalisation in ,egypt2 the beginning of reform in ,egypt--all this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political significance of the ,baghdad ,railway question4 ,the ,baghdad ,railway being a blow at the interests of ,english ,imperialism1 ,turkey could only entrust its construction to the ,german ,company because she knew that ,germany's army and navy stood behind her1 which fact makes it appear to ,england and ,russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon ,turkey4 ,in the ,akademische ,bltter of ,june #a1 #aiaa1 ,professor ,r4 ,mangelsdorf1 another recognised authority on ,german policy and politics1 wrote3-- ,the political and military power an organised railway system will confer upon ,turkey is altogether in the interest of ,germany1 which can only obtain a share in actual economic developments if ,turkey is independent2 and1 besides1 any attempt to increase the power and ambition of ,england1 in any case oppressively great1 is thereby effectively thwarted4 ,to some extent1 indeed1 ,turkey's construction of a railway system is a threat to ,england1 for it means that an attack on the most vulnerable part of the body of ,england's world-empire1 namely ,egypt1 comes well within the bounds of possibility4 ,these declarations and admissions render perfectly clear the reasons for ,germany's professions of friendship for ,turkey and for her desire that that country should become stronger and more powerful4 ,they also leave no doubt as to the real purpose the south-western branch of the ,baghdad ,railway was designed to effect4 ,the conquest of ,egypt by a combined ,german and ,turkish force was the first object to be accomplished with the help of the railway extension to the ,egyptian frontier in one direction and to ,mecca in another2 but ,dr4 ,rohrbach's suggestion that the loss of ,egypt by ,england would entail the loss1 also1 of her possessions in ,central and ,east ,africa has a further bearing on what has been told in the previous chapter concerning ,germany's designs on ,africa as a whole4 ,the strategical railways in ,german ,south-,west ,africa2 the projected extensions thereof--when circumstances permitted2 the ,german ,east ,african lines1 and the south-western branch of the ,baghdad ,railway in the direction of ,egypt were all to play their part in the eventual creation of a ,cape-to-,cairo ,german-,african ,empire4 ,if we now direct our attention to the south-eastern branch of the ,baghdad ,railway1 we are met by the repeated protests made by ,germany that in desiring the construction of a railway to the ,persian ,gulf she was influenced solely by commercial considerations4 ,against these protests1 however1 there are to be put various material facts which leave no room for doubt that ,germany's aims in this direction were otherwise than exclusively economic1 while even the economic purposes which the ,baghdad ,railway would1 undoubtedly1 have served must have eventually led to a strengthening of ,germany's political position1 this1 in turn1 helping her military and strategical purposes4 ,as originally planned1 the port of ,basra 7the commercial centre of trade in ,mesopotamia1 situate1 sixty miles from the sea1 on the ,shat-el-,arab--the great river formed by the junction of the ,tigris and the ,euphrates--and open to the shipping of the world7 was to have been the terminus of the ,baghdad ,railway2 and if commercial considerations had1 indeed1 been exclusively aimed at1 this terminus would have answered all requirements4 ,no objection was1 or could be1 raised by the ,british ,government to the construction of the ,baghdad ,railway1 on ,turkish territory1 as far as ,basra4 ,in the later developments of the scheme1 however1 ,germany and her ,turkish partner sought to ensure the continuation of the line from its natural commercial terminus1 at ,basra1 to a political and strategical terminus1 at ,koweit1 on the shores of the ,persian ,gulf4 ,the ,abendpost 7,berlin7 voiced the ,german view when it spoke of ,koweit as the only possible outlet to the ,baghdad ,railway4 ,but the extension of an avowedly ,german line of railway to ,koweit would have been a direct challenge to the paramountcy which ,great ,britain claimed over the ,persian ,gulf4 ,it would have come into collision with ,british policy1 interests and prestige in the ,east4 ,it would have given the ,german and ,turkish allies an excuse for creating at ,koweit a harbour1 with wharves1 docks1 warehouses1 etc41 which might be converted into a naval and military base capable of serving far different purposes than those of trade and commerce--those1 namely1 of a new line of advance on ,india4 ,it would1 in combination with the control already exercised by the ,deutsche ,bank over the railways in ,european ,turkey1 have assured to ,germany the means of sending her ,naval forces or her troops1 together with supplies and ammunition1 direct to the ,persian ,gulf1 either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further designs she might cherish in the domain of ,weltpolitik as affecting the ,far ,east4 ,it would have meant that1 as far as the head of the ,persian ,gulf1 at least1 rail-power would have rendered her less dependent on the exercise of sea-power1 on her own account1 and would have enabled her to neutralise1 also1 as far as the said ,gulf1 the sea-power of ,england4 ,what so fundamental a change in the strategical position might imply was well expressed by so eminent and impartial an authority as ,a4 ,t4 ,mahan1 when he said1 in his ,retrospect and ,prospect 7#aijb73-- ,the control of the ,persian ,gulf by a foreign ,state of considerable naval potentiality1 a fleet in being there1 based upon a strong military port1 would reproduce the relations of ,cadiz1 ,gibraltar and ,malta to the ,mediterranean4 ,it would flank all the routes to the ,farther ,east1 to ,india and to ,australia1 the last two actually internal to the ,empire1 regarded as a political system2 and1 although at present ,great ,britain unquestionably could check such a fleet1 it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position4444 ,concession in the ,persian ,gulf1 whether by positive formal arrangement1 or by simple neglect of the local commercial interests which now underlie political and military control1 will imperil ,great ,britain's naval situation in the ,farther ,east1 her political position in ,india1 her commercial interests in both1 and the ,imperial tie between herself and ,australia4 ,one is thus led to the conclusion that ,koweit1 as the terminus of the south-eastern branch of the ,baghdad ,railway1 and within four days of ,bombay1 would have been as vital a point for ,british interests as the terminus of the south-western branch within about twelve hours of ,egypt2 while the possession of this further advantage by ,germany would have been in full accord with the proposition laid down by ,rohrbach and others as to the line of policy ,germany should adopt for bringing ,england herself into a dangerous position4 ,with a view to safeguarding ,british interests from any possible drifting into this position1 as regards the ,persian ,gulf1 the claim was raised1 some years ago1 that ,england should have entire control of the railway from ,baghdad to ,koweit4 ,germany did not see her way to assent to this proposal2 but in #aiaa she announced that she would forgo her right to construct the section from ,baghdad to ,basra on the understanding that this final section would be completed by ,turkey4 ,by way of compensation for the concession thus made by her to ,british views1 she secured certain financial advantages and the right both to build the ,alexandretta extension and to convert ,alexandretta itself into practically a ,german port on the shores of the ,mediterranean4 ,the precise value of the concession thus made by ,germany was1 however1 open to considerable doubt4 ,if she could succeed in her long-cherished aim of establishing a virtual protectorate over ,turkey1 then the fact that the final section of the ,baghdad ,railway had been built by ,turkey1 and not by ,germany1 would have become a matter of detail not likely to affect the reality of ,germany's control4 ,the line to ,basra might have been nominally ,turkish but the directing policy would have been ,german2 and like conditions would have arisen had ,great ,britain agreed to allow ,turkey--though not ,germany--to continue the railway from ,basra to ,koweit4 ,in the wide scope of their aggressive purpose1 the ,baghdad ,railway and its associated lines can best be compared with those roads which the ,romans1 in the days of their pride--the pride that came before their fall--built for the better achievement of their own aims as world-conquerors4 ,apart from the fact that the roads now in question are iron roads1 and that the locomotive has superseded the chariot1 the main difference between ,roman and ,german is to be found in the fact that the world which the former sought to conquer was far smaller than the one coveted by the latter4 ,the programme of ,weltpolitik comprised in the ,german schemes embraced not only countries but continents4 ,in addition to the aspirations cherished as regards ,europe1 that programme aimed at the eventual annexation to the ,german ,empire of three other ,empires--the ,turkish1 the ,indian1 and a new one to be known as the ,german-,african4 ,it was further to secure the means of sending troops direct from ,germany via ,constantinople and the ,baghdad ,railway to the frontiers of ,persia for possible operations against that country in combination with the ,turkish military forces1 these having first been brought under ,german control4 ,the ,baghdad ,railway itself was1 in the same way1 and with like support1 to afford to ,germany the means of threatening ,russian interests both in ,persia and in ,trans-,caucasia4 ,it was to nullify ,england's sea power in the ,mediterranean1 if not1 to a certain extent--through the establishment of a new ,power at the gate of ,india--in the ,far ,east1 as well4 ,it would1 as ,mahan showed1 have flanked our communications with ,australia1 giving ,germany an advantage in this direction1 also1 had ,asia and ,africa failed to satisfy her aspirations4 ,regarded from the point of view of its designed effect on the destinies of nations1 on the balance of political power1 and on the reconstruction of the world's forces--all for the aggrandisement of a single people--the full programme must be looked upon as the most ambitious and the most unscrupulous project of world-conquest that has yet been placed on record in the history of mankind4 ,for its attainment1 however1 it clearly depended no less upon rail-transport than upon force of arms2 and in this respect it represented ,germany's greatest attempt to apply1 in practice1 that principle of rail-power to which she had devoted eight decades of inquiry1 trial and organisation4 ,,footnotes3 #ge ,babylonien1 das reichste ,land in der ,vorzeit und das lohnendste ,kolonisationsfeld fr die ,gegenwart4 #abh pp4 ,heidelberg1 #ahhf4 #gf ,important extensions have been carried out since4 #gg ,dr4 ,dillon1 in ,the ,contemporary ,review1 ,april1 #aijf4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusions ,as will have been gathered from the preceding chapters1 a prolonged period of consideration1 preparation and application in many different countries throughout the world1 prior to the outbreak of the ,great ,war in #aiad1 had established certain definite facts and fundamental principles in regard to the relations of railways to warfare in general4 ,these may now be brought together and summarised in four groups or divisions1 namely1 7,a7 ,advantages2 7,b7 ,conditions ,essential to ,efficiency2 7,c7 ,limitations in ,usefulness2 and 7,d7 ,drawbacks and ,disadvantages4 ,a4--,,advantages ,assuming 7#a7 the provision1 in advance1 of a system or systems of railways capable of meeting all the requirements of the military situation on the outbreak of war1 or 7#b7 the possibility of constructing military railways during the progress of hostilities1 such railways should permit of-- ,a mobilisation of troops and their concentration at the frontier1 or at the seat of war1 with a speed that was impossible under earlier conditions4 ,simultaneous use of different routes across the national territory for concentration either on the frontier or at a point some distance therefrom where the concentration can be completed without fear of interruption by the enemy4 ,sudden invasion of neighbouring territory by troops sent in a succession of rapidly-following trains direct from various points in the interior of the country where they might have been concentrated without the knowledge of the enemy1 this procedure being adopted in preference to collecting at the frontier in advance a force on such a scale as would disclose prematurely the intentions entertained4 ,the possibility of using promptly1 for these purposes1 the full strength of the country's available resources--the railway lines in the interior having already been adapted thereto1 as well as those on or directly connecting with the frontier--with a proportionate increase of the offensive and defensive power of the ,state4 ,the supplementing of increased mobility and celerity by decreased strain on the physical powers of the troops and the avoidance of such inevitable reduction in their numbers as would result from the trials and fatigues of prolonged marches by road 7in combination with the carrying of kits1 etc471 should railway lines not be available4 ,a further consequent increase in the fighting strength of the army4 ,the possible attainment of the power of initiative through an early concentration of large forces at points of strategic importance either on national or on enemy's territory4#gh ,the carrying out of strategical combinations on a scale or of a character which would formerly have been impracticable4 ,employment of railways for tactical purposes during the progress of a war1 including therein 7a7 movement of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another1 whether with a view to effecting big changes of front or otherwise2 7b7 employment of the same ,army ,corps on different fronts in succession1 their transfer being effected in the briefest possible interval of time2 7c7 the rapid bringing up of reinforcements at a critical moment to some position exposed to overpowering attack which might otherwise be lost2 7d7 surprise attacks on the enemy2 7e7 the throwing of great masses of troops on distant points2 7f7 strengthening weak places in the fighting line2 7g7 strengthening threatened forts by means of troops1 guns1 munitions or supplies2 7h7 relief of invested fortresses1 and 7i7 retirement by rail--when circumstances permit--of troops after defeat4 ,control of a line of rail communication between the base and the strategic centre of operations1 facilitating the enormous amount of transport in both directions which must be kept up in the rear of the army1 and for which the elements of speed1 safety and regularity may be of vital importance4 ,the possibility1 thanks to railways1 of regarding the whole interior of the national territory as a base for the supply of requirements at the front1 dependence having no longer to be placed on a base established in one particular district with its restricted range of possible supplies and its collection of magazines1 stores1 workshops1 transport parks1 etc41 protected by fortresses1 entrenched camps1 or other means of defence4 ,the establishment of supplementary1 sectional or advanced bases along the line of communication1 with railway services so arranged that supplies can be dispatched daily in such regulated quantities1 and to such points1 as will serve the immediate needs of the army in the field1 without risk either of shortage or of excess4 ,avoidance1 under these conditions1 of congestion of the railway lines in the immediate rear of the army by trains or loaded wagons containing a redundancy of supplies which 7a7 cannot be unloaded1 7b7 restrict the use of the lines for other purposes1 and 7c7 might have to be abandoned to the enemy in the event of a sudden retreat4 ,material benefits from the substitution of rail for road transport of food1 etc41 by reason of 7a7 greater speed and regularity2 7b7 less risk of deterioration from exposure to weather1 and other causes2 7c7 decreased cost of transport as compared with earlier conditions involving the employment of a greater number of drivers1 escort1 guards1 horses and road vehicles2 and 7d7 the arrival at destination of the full quantities dispatched1 the need for the consumption of an appreciable proportion en route by men and animals in a convoying wagon train1 carrying supplies for long distances by road1 being non-existent4 ,reduction in the need for field ovens and other paraphernalia of the army cook1 since much of the food required--bread1 for example--can be prepared in cities or elsewhere at a distant base and forwarded regularly by rail4 ,freedom1 more or less complete1 from the once prevalent obligation on the part of an advancing army that it should live upon the country--a condition which the enormous increase in the size of armies to-day would render impossible of fulfilment1 even assuming that the people of the country invaded had not withdrawn live stock1 vehicles and food supplies on their retirement before the invader4 ,in addition to this provision for the wants of an army in its advance into hostile country1 the safeguarding of the troops against the risk of their becoming a band of demoralized marauders1 wandering over a wide area to seek and appropriate food whenever they can find it--as was the case1 for instance1 in the ,napoleonic wars--the maintenance of discipline and the continued usefulness of the troops as a concentrated body for the military purposes in view being further assured when both men and leaders are relieved of anxiety as to the continuance of their supplies4 ,the conduct of war at a great distance from the base by reason of the facilities offered for the forwarding alike of troops1 reinforcements1 supplies and military materials1 the value of even a single line of railway in the achievement of this purpose having been incontestably established4 ,defence of frontiers by strategical railways which may1 also1 become available for general use4 ,investment of cities or fortresses in occupied territory when1 owing to the lack or the deficiency of food supplies in the surrounding country1 the troops engaged are mainly if not entirely dependent on those brought to them by rail from their own base4#gi ,victualling of cities before1 and their revictualling after1 investment4#hj ,extension of lines of communication by means of quickly-constructed narrow-gauge siege railways to be operated by motor traction1 animal power1 or otherwise1 including therein trench tramways for 7a7 removal of wounded men from the trenches2 7b7 transport of siege guns to trenches2 and 7c7 supplying ammunition to battery4 ,transport of heavy siege guns1 mortars1 ammunition and other materials of a size or weight that would render impracticable their conveyance1 whether singly or in the aggregate1 along ordinary roads1 the railway offering1 in this respect1 facilities for ponderous transport comparable to those of the steamship1 with the further advantage of being able1 in most instances1 to take the guns1 etc41 to the spot or to the locality where they are wanted4 ,material aid given to expeditions to countries otherwise devoid of means of communication1 by the construction of military railways4 ,employment of armoured trains which1 apart from their usefulness in defending railways against attack1 may1 as movable fortresses1 render important service in the operations against the enemy4 ,removal of sick and wounded from the theatre of war1 and the ensuring of their distribution among hospitals in the rear or throughout the interior1 thus 7a7 avoiding alike the embarrassment to the army and the many dangers and evils that would result from their remaining in overcrowded hospitals on or near the battle-field2 7b7 giving the men a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and returning soon to the ranks2 and 7c7 adding to the fighting strength of the army by the combination of these two advantages4 ,facilities for giving a short leave to officers and men who1 though neither sick nor wounded1 have been so far affected by their strenuous exertions that they stand in need of a rest1 or change1 for which they will fight all the better subsequently4 ,dispatch of prisoners of war into the interior by trains which have brought reinforcements or supplies1 the army thus being speedily relieved of what might otherwise be a hindrance to its operations4 ,return of material no longer wanted at the front and constituting impedimenta of which it is desirable to get rid as soon as possible4 ,conveyance into the interior of trophies of war--including plunder--taken from captured towns or cities4 ,retirement of troops from occupied territory on the declaration of peace4 ,b4--,,conditions ,,essential ,,to ,,efficiency ,in the matter of railway construction there should be-- i4 ,uniformity of gauge1 together with physical connections between the different systems or sections1 in order 7a7 that the locomotives and rolling stock on any one line can be used for military transport on any other2 7b7 that mobilisation1 concentration and the forwarding of supplies and military material can be facilitated by the running of through trains from any probable or possible point of dispatch2 and 7c7 that troops can readily be transferred from one front1 or from one part of the coast1 to another for the purpose either of attack or of defence4 ii4 ,lines linking up the interior of the country with the frontier1 with the coast1 or with principal ports by different routes1 transverse lines connecting them1 in turn1 one with another4 iii4 ,double track for all lines leading direct to the frontier4 iv4 ,in the case of single-track lines crossing continents or otherwise1 a liberal provision of passing places each capable of accommodating the longest troop train likely to be run4 v4 ,on all lines1 and at all important stations1 a sufficiency of sidings1 with provision of1 or the possibility of providing speedily1 all such facilities as may be needed for the prompt and efficient handling of military transports whenever the occasion should arise4 ,preparations in advance should include-- i4 ,the carrying out of a scheme of organisation based on recognition of the following principles3--7a7 ,that1 while the railway is an instrument capable of rendering great and even incalculable services in the conduct of war1 the working of it is a highly-skilled business only to be entrusted to those possessed of the necessary experience2 7b7 that interference with such working on the part of military officers not possessing the requisite technical knowledge of the details and limitations of railway operation may result in chaos and disaster2 7c7 that railwaymen1 in turn1 are not likely to be fully acquainted with the technicalities of military conditions and requirements1 and should not1 in any case1 be left with the responsibility of having to decide between the possibly conflicting demands of various military authorities2 7d7 that1 for these reasons1 there should be co-ordination of the military and the technical railway elements1 operating throughout the whole scheme of organisation in its manifold details1 avoiding conflict of authority1 ensuring harmony of working1 and offering the fullest guarantee that all military requirements will be met so far as the capacity of the railway1 together with a due regard for safe and efficient operation1 will allow2 and 7e7 that effect can best be given to these various conditions by the appointment of intermediary bodies which1 representing the dual elements1 shall alone have power to give directions1 or to make demands1 in respect to military rail-transport during the continuance of war4 ii4 ,collection of data concerning the physical character1 resources and transport capabilities of the railways both in the national territory and in any other country to which the war operations may extend4 iii4 ,study of all movements of troops1 etc41 likely to be necessary on the outbreak of war2 the preparation of special time-tables for the running of troop trains1 etc41 and the working out of all essential details respecting military transport in general4 iv4 ,creation and training of bodies of ,railway ,troops qualified to undertake the construction1 destruction1 repair and operation of railways in time of war4 ,c4--,,limitations ,,in ,,usefulness ,the usefulness of railways in war is limited by the following considerations1 among others3-- ,railways are inferior to ships in power of simultaneously transporting heavy loads 7,von der ,goltz74 ,for this reason an overland route to ,india could never compete1 in respect to military transport1 with the sea route via the ,suez ,canal4 ,such overland route1 also1 passing through foreign countries1 would be especially liable to attack and interruption4 ,where1 however1 the overland route goes entirely through national territory 7as in the case of the ,trans-,siberian ,railway71 and when the questions of time and safety1 in regard to an alternative sea route1 suggest possible disadvantages1 railways will be preferred to ships in spite of the said inferiority4 ,railways are inferior to roads in so far as1 like rivers and canals1 they are on fixed spots4 ,troops depending on them are thus able to move only in the direction in which lines have been or can quickly be laid1 whereas if they went by road they might have a greater choice of alternative routes4 ,for these reasons the choice of the zone of concentration or of the decisive points may depend less to-day on political1 military or geographical reasons 7as in the ,napoleonic wars7 than on the direction1 extent and capacity of the available railways4 ,great masses of troops can be entrained only at stations where facilities for their so doing have been prepared in advance4 ,the provision of these facilities is even more necessary in the case of ,cavalry or ,artillery than in that of ,infantry4 ,hence the movement of considerable bodies of troops may be restricted to certain lines1 and their entrainment or detrainment even to certain large stations4 ,in the case of road marching these restrictions would not apply4 ,vehicles specially constructed for the purpose can alone be used on railways4 ,any deficiency in their supply must needs cause delay4 ,during the time the troops are travelling by railway their power of resisting attack is much more restricted than it would be if they were marching by road1 they can do little or nothing to protect the railway lines1 while if the enemy can only get to the railway he may be in a position to prevent the train from continuing its journey1 and take the troops in it at a disadvantage4 ,for these reasons1 among others1 troop movements by rail at the theatre of war1 and especially in the enemy's country1 are attended by a degree of risk which may render it desirable to abandon the use of the railway for the time being4 ,railways are especially liable to destruction by the enemy1 and1 although the arrangements made in advance may permit of speedy repairs or reconstruction1 the interruption of traffic for even a day or half a day may be a matter of grave importance during the concentration of the army or at some critical moment4 ,destructions of line carried out by a retreating force1 in order to delay pursuit by the enemy1 will be to the disadvantage of that force when1 after having driven back the enemy1 it would itself make use of the line it had rendered unserviceable4 ,dependence on the railway for the transport of considerable bodies of troops on short journeys--say for twenty1 twenty-five or thirty miles--is rendered inexpedient by the fact that1 when allowance is made for the time likely to be taken1 not only on the journey1 but in the assembling at the station1 in the entraining and detraining 7perhaps at some place devoid of adequate platform or siding accommodation71 and in the march from the arrival station to destination1 it may well be found that the troops could cover the distance in less time by road1 apart from the consideration1 suggested above1 as to their being in a better position1 when marching1 to resist attack4 ,experts in all countries have studied this question with a view to deciding1 on the basis of their national conditions1 within what limit it would be better for troops to march by road in preference to going by rail4 ,for reasons akin to those here stated1 supplemented by the recent great expansion of motor transport1 less has been heard of late concerning the proposed construction in this country of strategical railways along a coast-line remarkable for its sinuosities1 and presenting1 therefore1 an exceptional position from the point of view of coast railways for purely defensive purposes4 ,as regards long-distance journeys1 whilst armies marching by road have often been materially reduced in proportions by the number of men falling out owing to lameness1 exhaustion1 or other causes1 those who reached the theatre of war1 representing the survival of the fittest1 were better able to endure the trials and fatigues of the subsequent campaign than if they could have made the journey by rail under conditions involving no strain1 but affording them no such exercise and strengthening of their physical powers4#ha ,experience has further shown that exceptionally long railway journeys may have a prejudicial effect upon troops from the point of view1 also1 of maintenance of discipline4#hb ,the services rendered by railways in war relate much more to strategy than to tactics4 ,great masses of troops and munitions1 brought from all parts of the interior1 may be conveyed readily and safely by rail to particular points in the theatre of war2 but the possibility of effecting their transport by rail from one point to another on the battle-field when the opposing forces are in actual contact is subject to many restrictions and constitutes a much more difficult undertaking4 ,the imperative need for guarding a long line of railway communications1 more especially in occupied territory1 may lead to the withdrawal of a considerable number of men from the main army1 weakening the strength of the available fighting force proportionately4 ,d4--,,drawbacks ,,and ,,disadvantages ,while1 notwithstanding the conditions to be observed and the limitations to be experienced1 the balance of advantage conferred by railways on the conduct of war may appear so pronounced1 from a military and a political point of view1 there is a darker side to the story1 as regards the world at large1 which must also be taken into account4 ,if railways have increased the power of defending a country against invasion they have1 also1 increased enormously the power of aggression at the command of an invader4 ,they offer vastly greater facilities to military ,powers for the making of sudden attacks on neighbouring countries--themselves1 it may be1 in a state of more or less unpreparedness4 ,they afford the opportunity for overwhelming weaker ,powers by means of armies mobilised and concentrated in the interior and poured on to or across the frontier in an endless succession of trains following one another with such rapidity that the initial movement may1 in some instances1 be carried out within the short space of twenty-four hours4 ,they permit of the prosecution of war at distances which1 but for the means offered for military transport by rail1 would render war impracticable4 ,they allow of war being carried on between a number of nations at one and the same time1 thus spreading the area over which the conflicts of to-day may extend4 ,they encourage the cherishing of designs of world-power and dreams of universal conquest4 ,they have added to the horrors of war by facilitating the transport and the employment of the most terrible engines of war4 ,they have rendered possible the carrying off of plunder from an occupied territory to an extent which would be impossible if the invaders had to depend on ordinary road vehicles for their means of transport4 ,they have brought fresh risks and dangers upon civil populations1 the maintenance of lines of rail communication being a matter of such paramount importance to an invader that the severest measures may be adopted by him towards the community in general as a means of terrorising them and ensuring the security of the railway lines4 ,what1 in effect1 count as advantages in one direction may be the gravest of disadvantages in another4 99 99 99 99 99 ,such1 for attack or for defence1 for good or for evil1 is the nature1 and such are the possibilities1 of that rail-power in warfare which1 after eighty years of continuous evolution1 was1 in the ,war of the ,nations imposed on mankind in #aiad1 to undergo a development and an application on a wider1 more impressive1 and more terrible scale than the world had ever seen before4 ,,footnotes3 #gh ,von ,moltke is reported to have said on one occasion in the ,reichstag3 ,our ,great ,general ,staff is so much persuaded of the advantages to be derived from obtaining the initiative at the outset of a war that it prefers to construct railways rather than forts4 ,an additional railway1 crossing the whole country1 makes a difference of two days in the assembling of the army1 and advances the operations proportionately4 ,in the concentration of armies1 says von der ,goltz in ,the ,conduct of ,war1 we reckon almost by hours4 #gi ,without railroads1 it is said1 the siege of ,paris would have been impossible 7,bigelow's ,principles of ,strategy74 ,during the siege of ,paris one railway for some time fed the ,german army of1 in round numbers1 #bjj1jjj men1 brought up the siege materials and reinforcements averaging #b1jjj to #c1jjj men a day1 and even1 at one time1 fed ,prince ,frederick ,charles' army1 as well1 with very slight assistance from the exhausted theatre of war 7,hamley's ,operations of ,war74 #hj ,during the thirty-five days preceding the investment1 ,paris received by the ,western ,railway1 alone1 #gb1ddb tons of provisions and #fg1gaf head of cattle4 ,but for these supplies she could not have endured so long a siege4 ,in the revictualling of ,paris1 after the siege1 the railways1 though much restricted by the ,germans1 brought into the city1 in the course of twenty days1 #aee1iee tons of provisions and #db1ehj head of cattle4 #ha ,the railways spare the troops fatigue1 remarks ,lieut4-,col4 ,tovey1 ,r4,e41 in ,the ,elements of ,strategy2 but it may be that when they have to use their legs afterwards there will be more falling out and lagging behind1 in consequence4 ,balck1 in his ,taktik1 says3 ,it is only in respect to the important consideration as to speed that the rail-transport of troops is to be preferred to road-marching4 ,the real advantages of marching on foot--which was formerly the rule1 and had the effect of 'separating the chaff from the wheat' and of preparing the men for the toils of fighting--are not counterbalanced by the fact that the troops arrive at the theatre of war in their full numbers4 ,when time permits1 marching on foot is preferable because it accustoms the men both to their new equipment and to marching in large bodies4 ,after a long railway journey--on which the feet will have swollen and the new boots will have been especially troublesome--marching becomes particularly irksome1 and the falling out of footsore men is very considerable4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 the almost invariable rule that the troops shall begin their marching immediately they get to the end of the rail journey1 since it may be a matter of great importance that the station at which they detrain should be cleared again as soon as possible4 #hb ,in alluding to the conditions under which ,russian reinforcements were sent to ,manchuria during the ,russo-,japanese ,war1 ,general ,kuropatkin writes 7,the ,russian ,army and the ,japanese ,war73 ,in former days troops had to make long marches in full service order before they reached the battle-field4 ,if properly conducted these marches hardened the men1 and enabled units to settle down2 all superfluous luggage was discarded2 the weaker men were left behind2 the officers and men got to know one another4 ,but1 nowadays1 with railway transport1 the results are very different4 ,going to the ,far ,east1 our men were crowded in railway carriages for as long as forty days at a time1 out of the control of their officers1 who were in different compartments4 ,in the old and well-disciplined units in particular no harm was done2 but in the case of newly-formed units 444 it was most harmful4 ,appendix ,,indian ,,frontier ,,railways ,on the north-west frontier of ,india the plains of the ,punjab are separated from the great central valley of ,afghanistan1 from the deserts of ,baluchistan1 and from the ,russian ,empire on the north thereof1 by ranges of mountains1 otherwise a gridiron of stupendous ridges and furrows1 intersected by passes which have always been regarded as the most vulnerable points of the ,indian ,empire4 ,through these passes from the earliest days of recorded history there has come a long succession of invasions instigated by that incalculable wealth of ,india which may well have inspired the envy of dwellers in less favoured lands4#hc ,these considerations would alone suffice to establish the need for an effective control of the more important of the said passes by the ,power which exercises supremacy in ,india2 but the obligation thus devolving upon the ,british people as the present holders of that supremacy has been increased in recent times by two further factors--7#a7 troubles with frontier tribes2 and 7#b7 the development of that ,central ,asian ,question which1 though now no longer acute1 was1 not so many years ago1 a source of great anxiety in ,england and ,india4 ,frontier troubles gave rise to a number of expeditions to ,afghanistan from time to time1 while the gravity of the general situation was increased by the once steady advance of ,russia towards ,india--whether for the purposes of actual conquest thereof or1 alternatively1 for the attainment of the aim cherished by ,russia during three centuries for an outlet to a southern sea1 such outlet being sought via the ,persian ,gulf on her disappointment in regard to the ,dardanelles2 though ,british interests were concerned in either case4 ,this combination of circumstances1 with the possibility1 at one time1 that ,afghanistan might become the theatre of war in a conflict between two great ,european ,powers1 invested with special interest and importance the provision on the north-west frontier of ,india of railway lines which1 whether constructed to the more important passes or going actually through them1 would form a ready means of concentrating ,anglo-,indian troops at such places on the frontier1 or beyond1 as occasion might require4 ,from this point of view the ,bolan and ,khyber passes--the former leading to ,quetta and ,kandahar and the latter to ,kabul--have more especially had importance attached to them as the two gates of ,india4 ,proposals for constructing railways through them were advanced as early as #aheg1 when ,mr4 7afterwards ,sir7 ,w4 ,p4 ,andrew1 chairman of the ,sind1 ,punjab and ,delhi ,railway1 acted as spokesman of a deputation which waited on ,lord ,palmerston in order to urge the construction of 7#a7 a railway down the valley of the ,euphrates1 improving our communications with ,india by connecting the ,mediterranean and the ,persian ,gulf2 and 7#b7 railways through the ,bolan and ,khyber passes1 not only1 as he urged1 facilitating the movement of troops to the frontier1 but offering alternative routes by means of which the flank or the rear of an enemy operating beyond or between the limits of the two lines might be threatened4 ,mr4 ,andrew followed up with great earnestness and perseverance for many years his advocacy of these views1 publishing a succession of books and pamphlets1 and writing many letters to the ,press on the subject4 ,such advocacy had1 however1 no practical issue1 and1 though the arguments originally advanced in favour of the ,euphrates railway lost most of their force on the opening of the ,suez ,canal1 the consequences of the neglect to provide better means of communication with the north-west frontier were well manifested in the troubles of #ahgh-gi-hj4 ,the refusal of the ,ameer of ,afghanistan--who had already accorded an ostentatious welcome to a ,russian ,embassy at ,kabul--to receive a ,british mission led1 in #ahgh1 to an order being given for the advance of three columns of ,british forces upon ,afghan territory1 the routes selected for this purpose being 7#a7 the ,khyber ,pass1 7#b7 the ,kuram ,pass1 and 7#c7 the ,bolan ,pass4 ,at this time1 however1 the system of frontier railways which had been advocated so long scarcely existed except on paper4 ,the nearest point of railway communication with ,afghanistan was then at ,sukkur1 on the ,indus4 ,an extension across the ,sind desert to the entrance to the ,bolan ,pass had been surveyed1 and a very short section had been laid2 but in their advance on ,kandahar ,sir ,donald ,stewart and his force had to march all the way from the ,indus1 experiencing great trials in crossing the intervening desert1 where many of the men lost their lives4 ,the work of constructing this desert railway--which presented no engineering difficulty--was now taken actively in hand1 and the line was available for the troops on their return4 ,success attended the expedition of #ahgh so far as it led to the flight of ,shere ,ali1 the occupation of ,kandahar by ,sir ,donald ,stewart1 the control by the ,british of the three main highways between ,india and ,afghanistan1 and the signing of the treaty of ,gandamak2 but the murder of ,sir ,louis ,cavagnari and his staff at ,kabul1 in ,september1 #ahgi1 rendered necessary the sending of a further expedition1 ,general ,sir ,frederick 7afterwards ,lord7 ,roberts being directed to proceed with a ,british force by the ,kuram route to ,kabul4 ,thereupon the whole question of transport facilities was revived afresh1 and1 although the expedition itself was a conspicuous success1 delays and commissariat difficulties arose which might have been avoided had better railway facilities been available4#hd ,the terminus1 at that time1 of the ,punjab ,state ,railway was at ,jhelum1 seventy miles from ,rawal ,pindi1 #ahj from ,peshawar1 and #bfj from ,thal1 the frontier post of the ,kuram pass2 and in spite of the vigorous efforts made1 between #ahgh and #ahhj1 to extend the line1 ,jhelum remained the actual railway base throughout1 no material assistance being gained from the twenty miles of extension which1 owing to the great engineering difficulties presented by innumerable ravines1 could alone be carried out during that period4 ,commenting on the painfully slow progress being made by the ,khyber column1 ,the ,times of ,october #ac1 #ahgi1 remarked3-- ,it is now upwards of a quarter of a century since the chairman of the ,sind railway commenced to broach the idea of connecting the ,khyber and ,bolan passes with the railway system of ,india4 ,for more than a quarter of a century he has unsparingly advocated these views4444 ,had the views so persistently advocated by ,mr4 ,andrew1 and so repeatedly brought forward by us1 been adopted at the commencement of the struggle last ,october1 as we then ventured to insist upon1 vast sums would have been spared in the hire of transport1 and we should have been spared the ignominy of feeling that a ,british army1 nominally on active service1 has occupied five weeks in covering less than seventy miles4 ,rawal ,pindi--one of the most important strategical points in ,india--was not reached by the railway until ,october1 #ahhj1 by which time the ,afghan ,war of #ahgh-hj had been brought to a close2 and the further extension of the ,indian railway system to ,peshawar1--another position of the utmost strategic importance1 situate ten miles from the entrance to the ,khyber ,pass1 and #aij from ,kabul--was effected by ,may1 #ahhc4 ,from a military point of view1 however1 still greater importance was attached1 at that time1 to the securing of rail communication through the ,bolan ,pass to ,quetta and ,pishin in the direction of ,kandahar1 this being the route by which1 it was thought1 the ,russians would be certain to attempt their invasion of ,india1--if they should undertake one at all4 ,surveys for an extension of the ,sukkur-,sibi desert line to ,pishin were made whilst that line was under construction1 and early in #ahhj the ,government gave directions that the extension was to be proceeded with2 though they decided that the route to be taken from ,sibi should be through the ,hurnai ,pass in preference to the ,bolan route1 the former being regarded as preferable for the broad-gauge line 7#e ft4 #f in47 with which the ,kandahar ,state ,railway1 as it was to be called1 would be provided4 ,arrangements were at once made for collecting the necessary materials and for carrying through the work with the least possible delay2 but further progress was checked1 in ,july1 #ahhj1 by the disaster at ,maiwand4 ,in the following ,october the ,gladstone ,government1 who had succeeded the ,beaconsfield ,administration and had1 apparently1 resolved upon a complete reversal of the ,indian policy of their predecessors1 followed up an earlier announcement of their intention to withdraw from ,kandahar by giving orders for the cessation of the work on the ,sind-,pishin railway4 ,maiwand having been avenged1 and some refractory tribes subdued1 ,afghanistan was completely evacuated by the ,british at the end of ,april1 #ahha1 and the construction of frontier railways in ,india was dropped1 for the time being4 ,in the middle of #ahhc came a reconsideration of the position4 ,russia was then showing increased activity in the direction of ,merv1 and the ,british ,government concluded1 apparently1 that they had been too hasty in ordering the abandonment of the ,kandahar ,state ,railway scheme nearly three years before4 ,so they gave orders that the work should be resumed2 though1 in order to render this volte face on their part less conspicuous1 they directed that the undertaking should now be known only as the ,hurnai ,road ,improvement ,scheme2 that it should be proceeded with quietly1 in order that it might not attract too much attention1 and that the suggestion of a road improvement scheme1 instead of a railway1 should be kept up by the engineers not being allowed to have even a temporary line of rails for conveying stores1 materials for bridges1 etc41 from the base to the passes4 ,this last-mentioned stipulation meant that the stores and materials had to be either transported on the backs of camels or dragged on wheels up stream2 and it was estimated that1 in addition to the great loss of time1 a sum of not less than #a1jjj1jjj was wasted in this way before the order prohibiting the use of temporary rails was rescinded4 ,a start was made with the work in ,october1 #ahhc1 and the fact that the ,russians were then actually approaching ,merv1 and that a sudden advance by them in force was regarded as probable1 led to the laying of great emphasis on the need for construction being pushed on with the utmost vigour4 ,when1 in ,february1 #ahhd1 the ,russians did occupy ,merv1 the pressure brought to bear on the ,engineer-in-chief became still more acute4 ,then1 in ,may1 the ,british ,government formally announced that1 owing to the encroachments of ,russia1 the line would be built4 ,the fiction of a ,hurnai ,road ,improvement ,scheme was now abandoned4 ,henceforth the line under construction was to be known as ,the ,sind-,pishin ,state ,railway4 ,from the very outset1 however1 the difficulties which crowded upon ,colonel 7afterwards ,sir ,james7 ,browne1 ,r4,e41 an officer well experienced in railway and engineering work who was entrusted with the carrying out of the scheme1 were unfavourable to the prospects of speed in construction4 ,the surveys which had already been made were found not only worthless but misleading4 ,the first members of his staff were unacquainted with railway work and had to be succeeded by men brought from ,england4 ,the plant and materials previously collected1 but disposed of at scrap-iron prices when the line was abandoned in #ahhj1 had now to be replaced at an almost fabulous cost1 owing to the urgency of the need for them4 ,all these were1 nevertheless1 minor troubles as compared with the physical conditions to be overcome4 ,starting from an elevation1 at ,sibi1 of #cjj ft41 the line was to rise #f1bjj ft4 in the #abj miles between ,sibi and the summit level at ,kach4 ,then1 for the greater part of the #bbd miles to which the line was to extend1 the country was a wilderness of rocks and stones--a land of barrenness and desolation1 where there was no timber1 no fuel1 scarcely a blade of grass1 and1 in places1 for stretches of several miles1 no water4 ,it was a land1 too1 almost devoid of inhabitants1 while those who did dwell there were described as a savage and blood-thirsty race of robbers1 continually engaged in plunder and inter-tribal warfare1 and not growing sufficient food even for their own consumption4 ,almost everything that was wanted--including supplies for from #ae1jjj to #cj1jjj workers and materials for the line--had to be imported from a distance4 ,still less inviting was this inhospitable region by reason of its range of climatic conditions4 ,the lowlands have the reputation of being one of the hottest corners of the earth's surface4 ,a temperature of #abd deg4 ,fahr4 has been registered in the ,nari valley4 ,the highlands1 in turn1 offer the alternative of ,arctic cold1 the temperature there falling in winter to #ah deg4 below zero4 ,between the lowlands and the highlands there is a temperate zone2 but here the constant pestilence was dreaded no less than the extremes of heat and cold elsewhere4 ,as the result of these conditions1 the work of construction could be carried on in certain districts for part of the year only1 and the workers had to be transferred from one section of the line to another according to the season4 ,such a movement of front involved the transport of everything1--stores1 tools1 offices and some thousands of men4 ,the management of this vast exodus1 says ,captain ,scott-,moncrieff1 ,r4,e41 in his paper on ,the ,frontier ,railways of ,india1#he was a work of considerable anxiety and difficulty4 ,a sudden influx of people1 such as this1 into a desolate and barren land naturally caused a famine4 ,everything was eaten up1 and for some days the question of supplies was the burning question of the hour4444 ,nine hundred camel loads of food were consumed daily on the works4 ,the customary load for a camel was #djj lbs41 but some of the camels carried loads of #hjj lbs4 up the pass4 ,the engineering difficulties fell into four principal groups1--7#a7 the ,nari ,gorge2 7#b7 the ,gundakin ,defile2 7#c7 the ,chuppur ,rift1 and 7#d7 the ,mud ,gorge4#hf ,the ,nari ,gorge1 about fourteen miles in length1 beginning just beyond ,sibi1 has been described as one of the most weird tracks through which a railway has ever been carried4 ,the hills1 absolutely bare1 rise above the valley for many thousands of feet in fantastic pinnacles and cliffs4 ,it is a scene of the wildest desolation4 ,the ,nari river1 running through the gorge1 is formed by a combination of three streams having but little water on ordinary occasions1 but becoming1 in time of flood1 a raging torrent which fills up the whole gorge for miles1 attains a depth of ten feet1 and has a velocity of five feet per second4 ,over this river the railway had to be carried in five different places4 ,not alone bridges1 but heavy embankments1 cuttings and tunnels were needed4 ,at one point there was an especially dangerous tunnel in which so many accidents occurred1 owing to roof or sides falling in1 that at last no workmen would enter it except at a wage five-fold that of the high rate already being paid4 ,the whole work was liable to be stopped for months together1 owing to the washing away of half-completed embankments or bridges2 though until this portion of the line had been completed no materials could be sent to the sections beyond4 ,in the ,gundakin ,defile1 eight miles long1 two tunnels had to be made through some most treacherous material1 and four bridges had to be provided4 ,the ,chuppur ,rift is a chasm three miles long in the spurs of a rocky mountain forming an apparently insuperable barrier4 ,in time of floods the river attains a height of from #cj to #dj ft4 ,the running of the railway on a ledge along the side of the mountain being impracticable1 owing to the nature of the rock1 the engineers cut a line of continuous tunnels partly on one side of the rift and partly on the other1 connecting the two series by an iron girder bridge2 but1 instead of constructing the tunnels in the usual way1 from each end--a procedure which would have taken much time--they adopted the expedient of driving openings 7adits7 into the side of the cliff at various points1 and then cutting the tunnel right and left of each of these openings until the various sections met4 ,the only way in which the openings could be made was by lowering men down by ropes several hundred feet from the top of the cliff until they reached the point where the work for an opening was to be started4 ,they then drove crowbars into the perpendicular sides of the cliff in order to gain the necessary support for a platform from which the blasting operations could be carried on4 ,six of these openings were made on one side of the cliff and six on the other4 ,as a separate gang of men could operate at each it was possible to complete the whole work in the course of a few months4 ,altogether there is a collective length of #f1djj ft4 of tunnels in the rift1 in addition to a viaduct #ge ft4 high1 with seven spans of #dj ft4 each1 and a bridge having an elevation over the river of #bej ft41 and consisting of a central span of #aej ft4 and eight spans of #dj ft4 ,on the summit level1 twenty-five miles in length1 came the five-mile long ,mud ,gorge1--a narrow valley1 between precipitous mountains1 filled with a soil little better than dried mud1 and of such a character that several bad slips of road-bed1 carrying away the whole of the line1 occurred4 ,one would think that with all these difficulties--physical1 climatic and engineering--to face1 the constructors of the railway might have been excused any more2 but there were others besides4 ,in ,august and ,september1 #ahhd1 the troops and native labourers employed on the work on the lower part of the line were visited by an outbreak of fever and scurvy of a virulence almost unprecedented in ,indian experience4 ,large numbers of the men died4 ,in one gang of #bjj the average number of deaths was ten a day4 ,of those who survived the majority were so prostrated as to be scarcely capable of doing anything4 ,sixty per cent4 of the ,sappers were in hospital4 ,fresh troops1 to the extent of three ,battalions of ,pioneers1 were brought on to the work2 but they had scarcely arrived before--in ,november--there was a severe outbreak of cholera4 ,the ,afghans thereupon bolted to a man2 and they were followed by many skilled artisans who had been collected from various parts of ,india4 ,additional labour had to be obtained from the ,eastern ,punjab1 but much time was lost4 ,whilst the engineers were struggling to overcome these manifold difficulties1 the political situation was steadily becoming still more acute4 ,the climax seemed to be reached by the ,penj-deh incident of ,march #cj1 #ahhe1 when a ,russian force under ,general ,komaroff seized this important strategical position1 situate near the junction of the ,khushk and ,murghab rivers4 ,on ,april #bg1 #ahhe1 ,mr4 ,gladstone proposed in the ,house of ,commons a vote of #aa1jjj1jjj for the purposes of what then seemed to be an inevitable war with ,russia4 ,the money was voted the same night4 ,so the urgency for completing the line which would now1 probably1 have been available for use had it not been stopped in #ahhj1 was greater than ever4 ,orders were sent to ,india that the work must be continued along all parts of the line regardless of seasons4 ,within a week or two1 however1 of the war vote at ,westminster1 cholera broke out afresh among the construction party in ,india4 ,by the end of ,may it was spreading among them like a raging fire2 while to the cholera itself there was added a heat so intense that even the most willing of workers found it almost unendurable4 ,under this combination of cholera and excessive heat1 work on the lower sections of the line was stopped altogether for a time--,government orders and ,russians notwithstanding4 ,all possible measures were taken to mitigate the severity of the epidemic2 but the death-rate increased with frightful rapidity4 ,some of the best workers1 ,european and ,asiatic--men who could least be spared1 on account of the responsible positions they held--were carried off4 ,during the month of ,june no fewer than #b1jjj died out of #aj1jjj4 ,of the remainder large numbers sought safety in flight4 ,many of the minor ,government officials1 such as telegraph and ,post ,office clerks1 went off in a body4 ,whilst sickness and disease had thus been afflicting the camps1 fresh troubles had arisen in another direction4 ,early in #ahhe the district was visited by a succession of floods exceeding in severity anything known there for sixty years4 ,in the course of three months the rainfall amounted to #ai4bg inches1--a total six times in excess of the average4 ,several bridges and many miles of temporary roads were washed away2 numerous accidents were caused2 camping grounds were destroyed2 communications were interrupted2 food supplies became scarcely obtainable1 and great delay resulted in the prosecution of a work for which urgency was being so persistently demanded4 ,the floods did not finally subside until the end of ,may4 ,nature having done so much to impede the progress of the undertaking1 it only remained for politicians and officials to do what they could to follow her example4 ,mention has already been made of the initial prohibition of temporary lines of rails for the conveyance of stores and materials1 and the loss of time and waste of money involved in the use of camels instead2 but to this one fact may be added another1 namely1 that after the ,engineer-in-,chief had made his arrangements to obtain sleepers from the juniper forests on the north of the line--this being the only timber available in the whole district--the ,government vetoed the arrangement on the ground that it might1 possibly1 lead to quarrels among the ,afghan tribes4 ,the timber had to be procured from ,india1 instead4 ,hence more delay4 ,then the original arrangement with the ,engineer-in-,chief1 that the work was to be carried out under the ,military ,department of the ,indian ,government1 and that1 in the interests of urgency1 he should have a free hand1 was changed into one which required that the work should be controlled by a new member of the ,public ,works ,department1 who1 it is alleged1 interfered with many of the working details which should have been left to an ,engineer-in-,chief1 and1 by his unskilled and unqualified control1 caused still further delay1 together with much expense and confusion4 ,a good deal of time was lost1 for instance1 before ,col4 ,browne could get even some indispensable instruments and survey appliances4 ,especially persistent1 also1 was ,col4 ,browne's immediate superior in demanding from him detailed estimates which1 on account of the uncertainties of the engineering work and of the other factors in the situation1 it was impossible to prepare whilst the construction of the line was in progress4 ,such1 however1 was the energy which had been shown1 in spite of all these difficulties and drawbacks1 that the work was completed within the two years and a half fixed by the ,engineer-in-,chief at the start as the period in which--with money freely granted--it could be done4 ,on ,march #bg1 #ahhg1 an engine ran over the line all the way from ,sibi to ,quetta1 and the ,hurnai ,railway was formally declared open for traffic4 ,in the meantime the apparent certainty of war with ,russia1 following1 especially1 on her seizure of ,penj-deh1 had led1 in ,april1 #ahhe1 to an order being given for the construction of a light railway from ,sibi through the ,bolan ,pass to ,quetta1 as an alternative1 more direct and more quickly constructed route1 of which use could be made for a movement of troops to the frontier on the anticipated partial mobilisation of the ,indian ,army4 ,the laying of this light railway constituted another notable engineering achievement4 ,running through the heart of what has been described as some of the boldest mountain scenery in ,india1 the ,bolan ,pass has a length of about sixty miles and a breadth ranging from one mile to a space1 in places1 of only about twenty yards between the rugged mountain walls which here convert the pass into a mere defile4 ,the pass is1 in fact1 practically the bed of the ,bolan ,river1 and is dry for the greater part of the year1 but liable to floods4 ,the temporary narrow-gauge line was to be laid along the river bed without interfering with the military road constructed in #ahhb-hd as far as ,quetta4 ,for the first forty miles there was a fairly good gradient2 but beyond that came a very heavy rise to the top of the pass2 and here1 at least1 anything more than a metre-gauge line would have been impracticable4 ,the possibility of constructing a line of railway through the pass at all had long been the despair of engineers1 and this was the reason why the ,hurnai route had been decided on in preference to the ,bolan for the broad-gauge line to ,quetta4 ,unfortunately1 too1 the climatic were even greater than the engineering difficulties4 ,the heat in the lower parts of the pass was beyond all description1 and cholera or other diseases carried off thousands of the workers4 ,with these two lines at their disposal1 the ,government were1 in the spring of #ahhg1 quite prepared for a concentration of ,british and ,indian forces in ,afghanistan1 had the political condition rendered such a course necessary2 but the situation had by then greatly improved1 thanks to the negotiations which had been proceeding with ,russia for the demarcation of frontiers4 ,in ,april1 #ahgg1 the ,british and ,russian commissioners met at ,st4 ,petersburg1 and1 as the result of still further negotiations1 the questions at issue were settled without the appeal to arms which had at one time appeared inevitable4 ,in #ahib some fifty miles of the ,bolan light railway were abandoned in favour of another route which1 avoiding the first part of the pass1 allowed of a broad-gauge line being laid from ,sibi through ,quetta to ,bostan ,junction1 where it connects with what is now known as the ,hurnai-,pishin ,loop4 ,a branch ninety miles in length1 from ,quetta to ,mushki1 on the ,seistan trade route1 was opened in #aije4 ,to-day the ,sind-,pishin railway1 with its two sections1 via the ,bolan and the ,hurnai respectively1 has its terminus at ,new ,chaman1 on the actual frontier of ,afghanistan1 and within seventy miles of ,kandahar4 ,a broad-gauge line throughout1 it forms part of the railway system of ,india1 linking up at ,ruk junction with the line running thence along the north bank of the ,indus to ,karachi1 and1 by means of a bridge across the ,indus1 with a line on the south of the river which1 in one direction provides an alternative route to ,karachi1 and in the other connects with ,calcutta and other leading cities4 ,the ,sind-,pishin line affords1 in fact1 a most valuable means for concentrating on the ,afghan frontier1 within a short distance of ,kandahar1 and in the shortest possible time a considerable body of troops collected from all parts of ,india1 together with reinforcements from ,europe1 landed at ,karachi4 ,as a strategical line1 therefore1 the railway is of exceptional importance to ,india and to ,british interests in general2 though there can be no suggestion that it would be used otherwise than for purely defensive purposes4 ,then1 in what1 since #aija1 has constituted the ,north-,west ,frontier ,province of ,india1 there has been a considerable extension of frontier railways in recent years1--all serving important strategical purposes4 ,from ,peshawar--#a1ebj miles from ,calcutta--there is a broad-gauge extension1 twelve miles in length1 to ,fort ,jamrud1 at the mouth of the ,khyber ,pass2 from ,naushahra1 a cantonment twenty-seven miles due east of ,peshawar1 there is a narrow-gauge line to ,dargai1 at the foot of the ,malakand ,pass2 while among other lines is one to ,thal1 a military outpost on the extreme limit of ,british territory which serves also as a dept for the trade with ,northern ,afghanistan passing through the ,kurram valley2 and one to ,banu1 a garrison town1 seventy-nine miles south of ,kohat1 built on a site chosen for political reasons by ,sir ,herbert ,edwards in #ahdh4 ,a number of other railways on the north-west frontiers of ,india have been proposed4 ,whatever may or may not be ultimately done in regard to these further schemes1 it is obvious that those already constructed have made an enormous difference in our strategical position in regard to ,afghanistan and the lands beyond as compared with the military transport conditions of #ahgh4 ,,the ,,defence ,,of ,,australia ,with a total area of #b1idh1jjj square miles1 a population of less than four and a half million1 and a coast line of #aa1cjj miles1 the continent of ,australia is peculiarly open to attack1 and the possibilities of invasion1 or of attempts at invasion1 have not only been much discussed there of late years1 but they have given rise to schemes of land defence in which the building of strategical railways and the adapting of existing lines to strategical purposes form important factors4 ,under present conditions ,western ,australia and the ,northern ,territory are isolated from the remaining ,states of the ,commonwealth so far as regards rail communication1 and are at the mercy of any invader who might be able to land a force there unchallenged by the ,british ,fleet4 ,since the autumn of #aiab1 however1 there has been under construction a railway which1 starting from ,kalgoorlie1 the eastern terminus of the ,western ,australian system1 will proceed in a direct line for #a1jfc miles to ,port ,augusta1 on the ,south ,australian system1 thus establishing through rail connection between ,perth 7,western ,australia7 and the farthest limit of the ,queensland railway system1 a total distance1 that is1 of about #d1jjj miles4 ,when this1 the first of ,australia's proposed trans-continental lines1 is completed1 it will be possible to send troops from the ,central or the ,eastern ,states to ,western ,australia1 not only by rail1 but by a railway laid so far inland that they will be safe from attack from the sea4 ,there would thus be a reasonable certainty of the troops arriving at their destination2 whereas if they had to go by water there might be the risk of the vessels in which they were making the journey being captured by the enemy4 ,while1 therefore1 the ,kalgoorlie-,port ,augusta line is expected to serve other than purely strategical purposes1 it is1 in effect1 the latter which claim first consideration4 ,referring to the ,northern ,territory1 in an article contributed by him to ,the ,empire ,review for ,may1 #aiaj1 ,mr4 ,f4 ,a4 ,w4 ,gisborne1 an authority on ,australian questions1 wrote3-- ,this vast region embraces #ebc1fbj square miles of land1 and lies close to ,asia1 the most populous of the continents4 ,at present it contains1 exclusive of the aborigines1 barely one thousand white people and about twice as many ,chinese4 ,it lacks railway communication with the settled parts of ,australia1 and is completely isolated from them4 ,its magnificent harbour1 accessible to the largest vessels afloat1 and constituting the natural gateway to tropical ,australia1 lies1 save for the ,british ,fleet1 absolutely defenceless4 ,behind it extend millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled1 and never likely to be cultivated by white hands4 ,practically no industry flourishes in a region which could support myriads of agriculturists and operatives4 ,that some of the peoples of crowded ,asia may1 sooner or later1 seek a settlement for their surplus millions on what1 for them1 would be so desirable a land as the ,northern ,territory1 with its magnificent opportunities for those capable of working in a tropical climate1 is a contingency that has been fully realised in ,australia1 and the questions have arisen 7#a7 as to whether the presence of a thousand whites in a region half a million square miles in extent constitutes such effective occupation thereof as gives them a right to its exclusive possession2 and 7#b7 whether it would be possible either to prevent ,asiatics from invading the ,northern ,territory1 if they sought so to do1 or to eject them therefrom if they did4 ,the latter question raises in an especially interesting form the problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power and rail-power4 ,sea-power would1 assuredly1 have to be relied upon for safeguarding the ,northern ,territory against invasion1 since it would be impossible for the ,commonwealth ,government to station troops at every prospective landing point along #a1bjj miles of a tropical coast-line in sufficient force to keep off any invader who might appear there at some unexpected moment4 ,for the checking1 therefore1 of such invasion1 dependence would have to be placed on the power of the ,british ,fleet 7#a7 to stop the invader1 7#b7 to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing1 or 7#c7 to carry war into the invader's own country4 ,nor1 if any large ,asiatic settlement--as distinct from an invasion in the ordinary acceptation of that term--did take place in the ,northern ,territory under conditions that might not call for the intervention of the ,british ,fleet1 is it certain that the ejection of the settlers could be ensured with the help even of a trans-continental line of railway4 ,here the question is not that of the carrying power of a single line of railway4 ,the examples offered by the ,war of ,secession1 the ,south ,african ,war and the ,russo-,japanese ,war have well established the great advantages that even single lines1 extending for great distances1 can confer in the effecting of military transport4 ,the considerations that would arise in ,australia are1 rather1 7#a7 the fact that troops arriving at ,pine ,creek or ,port ,darwin from the south might have to make some very long and very trying marches across the #ebc1jjj square miles comprising the ,northern ,territory before they reached the settlement of the ,asiatics whom they were to eject1 while they would be dependent for their supplies on a far-distant railway base2 and 7#b7 the doubt as to whether ,australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to undertake such an expedition1 having regard to the defence requirements of her south-eastern ,states1 the integrity of which would count as of more vital importance than an ,asiatic settlement in her ,far ,north4 ,so there are those who think that if such a settlement were eventually effected in the ,northern ,territory1 under conditions not constituting a casus belli1 ,australia would simply have to accept the situation1 and reconcile herself to it as best she could4 ,all these things may seem to reflect on the precise value1 from the rail-power point of view1 of that direct communication which1 more especially for strategical reasons1 ,australia has hoped eventually to obtain between north and south as well as between west and east4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 desirable to see what has already been done in this direction4 ,the construction of a north-to-south trans-continental line1 passing through the very centre of the ,australian mainland1 and linking up the ,northern ,territory with the southern and eastern ,states1 has been under discussion for a period of about forty years4 ,progress seemed to be assured by the ,acceptance ,act of #aiaj1 under which the ,government of the ,commonwealth1 in taking over the ,northern ,territory from ,south ,australia1 agreed to build a trans-continental line connecting ,oodnadatta1 the northern terminus of the ,south ,australian railway system1 and #fhh miles from ,adelaide1 with ,pine ,creek1 the southern terminus of the ,northern ,territory system1 and #ade miles distant from ,port ,darwin4 ,this connecting link would have a length of #a1jfc miles1--the same1 by a singular coincidence1 as that of the ,kalgoorlie-,port ,augusta line4 ,since this bargain between the ,south ,australia and the ,commonwealth ,governments was made1 there have been many advocates of an alternative1 or1 otherwise1 a supplementary route which1 instead of going direct from ,south ,australia to the ,northern ,territory1 7passing through the central ,australian desert17 would link up--on their west--with the railway systems of ,victoria1 ,new ,south ,wales and ,queensland1 connections with the new line being made by these ,states where necessary4 ,this eastern deviation route would1 it is argued1 offer a greater strategical advantage1 as compared with the other route1 because if troops had to be despatched to the north1 they could more readily be supplied from ,melbourne and ,sydney--which1 between them1 contain over one-fourth of the entire population of ,australia--than from ,adelaide2 while to send troops from ,queensland1 ,new ,south ,wales and ,victoria to ,south ,australia in order that they might start on their journey to the ,northern ,territory from ,oodnadatta1 would involve a material delay under1 possibly1 urgent conditions4 ,thus it is estimated that if the eastern route were adopted1 troops and travellers from ,brisbane to ,port ,darwin would only travel about #b1bcd miles as against #c1fia miles via ,sydney1 ,melbourne1 ,adelaide and the central ,australian route from ,oodnadatta4 ,how these rival claims and contentions will be eventually settled remains to be seen2 but there has now been added to them a project for the building of other avowedly strategical lines1 establishing a more direct connection between the ,kalgoorlie-,port ,augusta trans-continental line1 when it is finished1 and the capitals of ,victoria1 ,new ,south ,wales and ,queensland respectively1 facilitating the mutual defence of the eastern1 southern and western ,states in a time of crisis4 ,this further scheme is1 however1 designed only to supplement the trans-continental lines already mentioned4 ,as regards the eastern ,states and the central ,state of ,south ,australia1 the question of an ,asiatic invasion may be assumed not to arise4 ,it has1 however1 long been regarded as possible that if ,great ,britain were at war with some non-,asiatic ,power able to challenge her supremacy on the seas1 the enemy might make an attack1 not on the admittedly vulnerable ,northern ,territory--which he would not want either as a colony for ,europeans or as a jumping-off place from which to conquer the remainder of ,australia--but on some point along the coast-line of nearly #b1jjj miles which1 stretching from ,rockhampton1 in ,queensland1 to ,adelaide1 in ,south ,australia1 comprises 7with a ,hinterland of some #bjj miles7 the most populous1 the most wealthy and 7for non-,asiatics7 the most desirable section of the whole ,australian continent4 ,it is true that ,germany--the ,power which claims first attention from this point of view--has shown far greater desire to convert ,africa into a ,german ,empire than she has to effect the annexation of ,australia4 ,yet that she has recognized the weakness of the ,australian situation is suggested by the fact that1 in dealing with the defensive power of the ,commonwealth1 ,dr4 ,rohrbach1 one of the exponents of ,german ,world-,policy1 and author of ,deutschland unter den ,weltvlkern1 among other works1 has declared that ,australia could not resist if her four chief towns1 all of them near the coast1 were occupied by an invader4#hg ,which of these four towns1 or which particular point along the said #b1jjj miles of coast-line1 an invader would select for his main attack--apart from feints elsewhere--must needs be uncertain2 but this very fact only adds to the imperative importance of those responsible for the defence of ,australia being able to move troops freely1 and within the shortest possible period1 either from one ,state to another or from any place to another within one and the same ,state1 as the defence conditions might require4 ,when we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use of existing lines of railway in ,australia for strategical purposes1 we find that the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this branch of the subject is contained in the following extract from the ,memorandum which ,lord ,kitchener wrote in #aiaj1 as the result of an investigation made by him1 at the request of the ,commonwealth ,government1 into the ,defence of ,australia3-- ,railway construction has1 while developing the country1 resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an enemy invading ,australia than to the defence of the country4 ,different gauges in most of the ,states isolate each system1 and the want of systematic interior connection makes the present lines running inland of little use for defence1 although possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have temporary command of the sea4 ,the different gauges undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious shortcomings of the existing railways in ,australia in regard to those military movements with which we are here alone concerned4 ,strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require1 not only that troops shall be readily conveyed1 when necessary1 from one part of a country or one part of a continent to another1 but that a mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a mobilisation of railway rolling stock4 ,locomotives1 carriages and trucks on lines which are not themselves likely to be wanted for military transport should be available for use on the lines that will be so wanted1 in order that all the rolling stock of all the railways in all parts of the country or of the ,states concerned can1 at a time of possibly the gravest emergency1 be concentrated or employed on whatever lines1 or in whatever direction1 additional transport facilities may be needed4 ,the importance of this principle was first recognised by von ,moltke2 but when the railways of ,australia were originally planned1 each ,state took a more or less parochial view of its own requirements1 its own geographical conditions1 or its own resources1 and adopted the gauge which accorded best therewith1 regardless of any future need for a co-ordinated system of rail-transport serving the requirements of the ,australian continent as a whole4 ,so we find that the #c ft4 #f in4 gauge has been adopted in ,queensland1 ,south ,australia 7with a further #fjj miles of #e ft4 #c in4 gauge71 ,western ,australia1 and the ,northern ,territory2 the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge 7the standard gauge in ,great ,britain and1 also1 of over #fe per cent4 of the world's railway mileage17 in ,new ,south ,wales2 and the #e ft4 #c in4 gauge in ,victoria4 ,this means1 in most cases1 that when the frontier of a ,state is reached1 passengers1 mails1 baggage and merchandise must change or be transferred from the trains on the one system to those of the other4 ,assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway 7which is being built with the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge7 were now available for use1 a traveller by it from ,perth1 ,western ,australia1 through ,south ,australia1 ,victoria1 ,new ,south ,wales1 and ,queensland would require1 on account of the differences in gauge1 to change trains at least five times4 ,this may be regarded as an extreme case2 but the evils of the existing conditions are presented to us in a concrete form by an estimate which the ,defence ,department of the ,commonwealth recently made as to the time it would take to move a force of #cj1jjj mounted troops from ,melbourne to ,brisbane4 ,it was shown that1 with the present break of gauge1 this operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days2 whereas if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would suffice4 ,thus the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty days in effecting transfers at the frontier4 ,in this time much might happen if the enemy had obtained temporary control of the sea4 ,under these conditions1 in fact1 he would be able to move his own forces by sea for the still longer distance from ,adelaide to ,brisbane in five days4 ,brisbane might thus be captured by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were still changing trains at the ,state boundaries4 ,it may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time there were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in the ,united ,states2 that in #ahhe the ,american railway companies resolved upon establishing uniformity as a means of overcoming the great inconveniences due to these conditions2 and that in #ahhf1 after adequate preparation1 the conversion of practically the entire system of railways in the ,united ,states to the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge was effected in two days4 ,strategically1 therefore1 the ,united ,states ,federal ,government could now1 not only send troops by rail from any one part of their vast territory to another1 but utilise almost the whole of the available rolling stock for military purposes4#hh ,unification of gauge forms1 however1 a serious proposition for ,australia on account of the prodigious outlay which1 owing to the short-sighted policy of the past1 it would now involve4#hi ,the estimated cost of converting all the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge in ,new ,south ,wales and all the #c ft4 #f in4 gauge in ,queensland1 ,south ,australia1 ,western ,australia and the ,northern ,territory to the #e ft4 #c in4 gauge of ,victoria is no less than #ea1fei1jjj4 ,to convert all the #c ft4 #f in4 and #e ft4 #c in4 railways to the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge of the ,new ,south ,wales lines would cost #cg1afd1jjj4 ,to convert to the #d ft4 #h in4 gauge all the trunk lines connecting the capitals--and this without shortening the present circuitous routes or modifying the heavy grades--would alone cost about #ab1jjj1jjj4 ,in addition to this still undecided battle of the gauges there are in ,australia other disadvantages1 from a strategical standpoint1 in the existing railway system1 included therein being 7#a7 an undue preponderance of single over double track1 so that any exceptional amount of traffic causes a congestion which is likely only to be aggravated by new lines constructed1 or extensions made1 before the carrying capacity of the trunk lines has been increased2 and 7#b7 the building of lines which either lead nowhere or have been expressly stopped short of the boundaries of a ,state in order to retain1 for the railways of that ,state1 traffic from outlying districts which would pass1 by a much shorter journey1 to the port of a neighbouring ,state if1 by means of through railway connexion1 the residents in the districts concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical advantage in respect to their nearness to such port4 ,in addition to the efforts she has already made1 or is proposing to make1 to effect such improvement both in her railway system and in her military transport facilities as may be practicable1 ,australia has sought to provide for that effective organisation without which1 as experience elsewhere has fully shown1 great and even disastrous confusion may arise at a critical moment owing to conflicts of authority and other troubles or difficulties in the working of such railways as may be utilised for military movements4 ,the action taken in this direction is based on a further recommendation made by ,lord ,kitchener1 who1 in the course of his ,memorandum to the ,commonwealth ,government in #aiaj said 7paragraph #he73-- ,preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of the ,general ,staff1 who recommend the lines to be followed and advise where1 and in what quantities1 the munitions of war of the various units should be stored4 ,concentration can only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military authorities are in the closest touch1 and work in absolute harmony4 ,to secure this co-operation1 ,i advise that a ,war ,railway ,council be formed1 as is the case in the ,united ,kingdom1 composed of the ,chief ,railway ,commissioner from each ,state1 under the presidency of the ,quartermaster-,general of the ,citizen ,forces1 and with an officer of the ,headquarters ,staff as secretary4 ,a ,war ,railway ,council for the ,commonwealth was duly constituted in #aiaa4 ,the ,council1 which forms an adjunct of the ,commonwealth ,defence ,department1 consists of the ,quartermaster-,general1 7president17 the senior officer of the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps also created for the railway system alike of the ,commonwealth and of each ,state 7such senior officer being the ,chief or the ,deputy ,commissioner of ,railways72 the ,consulting ,military ,engineer of the ,commonwealth1 and two representatives of the naval and military forces1 with a military officer as secretary4 ,the duties of the ,council in time of peace are1 generally1 to furnish advice to the ,minister of ,defence on railway matters1 and1 particularly 7a7 to determine the method of supplying information to1 and obtaining it from1 the different railway departments2 7b7 to suggest regulations and instructions for carrying out movement of troops2 7c7 to suggest the method of organising railway staff officers in time of war to act as intermediaries between the various railway authorities and the troops2 7d7 to consider the question of extra sidings1 loading platforms1 etc42 and proposals for unification of gauges2 and 7e7 to suggest the organisation and system of training of railway troops4 ,in time of war the ,council further advises the ,minister of defence on questions of mobilisation4 ,the organisation for military rail-transport in the several ,states follows on the lines of the system already adopted in the ,united ,kingdom1 as laid down in the ,field ,service ,regulations4 ,,footnotes3 #hc ,altogether there have been twenty-six invasions of ,india1 dating back to about #b1jjj years ,b4,c41 and of this number no fewer than twenty-one have ended in conquest4 #hd ,it has been stated that the number of camels employed during the expeditions of #ahgh-hj for transport purposes1 in default of better rail communication1 was so great as almost to exhaust the supply of the frontier provinces of ,sind and ,punjab1 while from #cj1jjj to #dj1jjj of them died owing to the excessive toils and trials of the work they were required to perform1 the financial loss resulting therefrom to the ,treasury being estimated at #bjj1jjj4 #he ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,vol xi1 #ahhe4 #hf ,life and ,times of ,general ,sir ,james ,browne1 ,r4,e41 ,k4,c4,b41 ,k4,c4,s4,i4 by ,general ,j4 ,j4 ,mc,leod ,innes1 ,london1 #aije4 #hg ,see ,the ,origins of the ,war2 by ,j4 ,holland ,rose1 ,litt4,d4 ,cambridge1 #aiad4 #hh ,in the ,new ,york ,sun of ,june #ah1 #aiaa1 there was published an article which had for its heading1 ,if ,troops had to be ,rushed1 the ,railroads in this ,country could move #bej1jjj ,men a ,day4 #hi ,the mileage of lines open1 under construction1 or authorised1 in the three gauges1 is as follows3--#e ft4 #c in4 gauge1 #d1igi miles2 #d ft4 #h in4 gauge1 #f1afj miles2 #c ft4 #f in4 gauge1 #aa1gbg miles4 ,,bibliography ,the following list of books1 pamphlets and articles bearing on the evolution and the development of rail-power down to the outbreak of the ,great ,war in #aiad--this alone being the purpose and the scope of the present work--was originally based on selections from a ,list of ,references on the ,use of ,railroads in ,war prepared by the ,bureau of ,railway ,economics1 ,washington1 ,d4,c41 ,u4,s4,a41 and including items from all the leading libraries of the ,united ,states 7,library of ,congress2 the libraries of the principal ,universities1 ,colleges and learned or technical societies2 ,state libraries1 public libraries1 private railway-libraries1 and the library of the ,bureau itself71 together with various foreign libraries1 such as those of the ,minister of ,public ,works in ,berlin1 the ,international ,railway ,congress at ,berne1 and others besides4 ,much valuable help has been derived from the ,american list2 but a large number of its references1 and especially those relating to the ,world-,war itself1 have not here been reproduced1 while so many additions have been gathered in from other sources among which might be mentioned the published catalogue of the ,war ,office ,library2 the libraries of the ,british ,museum1 the ,royal ,colonial ,institute1 and the ,patent ,office2 the ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 the publications of the ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 and official or other publications in ,great ,britain1 ,france1 etc41 that the ,bibliography here presented may1 perhaps1 be regarded as practically a new compilation1 supplementing the excellent purpose which the list of the ,american ,bureau of ,railway ,economics will undoubtedly serve4 ,,earliest ,,references 7#ahcc-ej74 ,,harkort1 ,,friedrich ,,wilhelm4 ,die ,eisenbahn von ,minden nach ,kln4 ,hagen1 #ahcc4 ,the earliest published work in which the importance and the possibilities of railways from a military standpoint were advocated4 ,ueber die militrische ,benutzung der ,eisenbahnen4 ,berlin1 #ahcf4 ,darlegung der technischen und ,verkehrs-,verhltnisse der ,eisenbahnen1 nebst darauf gegrndeter ,errterung ber die militrische ,benutzung derselben4 ,berlin1 #ahda4 ,pz4 7,,carl ,,eduard ,,poenitz74 ,die ,eisenbahn als militrische ,operationslinien betrachtet und durch ,beispiele erlutet4 ,nebst ,entwurf zu einem militrischen ,eisenbahnsystem fr ,deutschland4 ,adorf ,saxony1 #ahdb4 ---- ,,ii4 ,aufl4 ,adorf1 #ahec4 ,essai sur les ,chemins de ,fer1 considrs comme lignes d'oprations militaires4 ,traduit de l'allemand par ,l4 ,a4 ,unger4 ,paris1 #ahdd4 ,a ,french translation of the above-mentioned work by ,poenitz1 with an introduction by the translator and a map of ,germany and ,austria showing railways existing in #ahdb and the system projected by the ,german writer4 ,uebersicht des ,verkehrs und der ,betriebsmittel auf den inlndischen und den benachbarten auslndischen ,eisenbahnen fr militrische ,zwecke2 nach den beim grossen ,generalstabe vorhandenen ,materialen zusammengestellt4 ,berlin1 #ahdh-ej4 ,,hoffmann1 ,c4 ,amtlich erlassene ,vorschriften ber ,anlage und ,betrieb der ,eisenbahnen in ,preussen4 ,berlin1 #ahdi4 ,,wars ,,and ,,expeditions ,,crimean ,,war 7#ahed-ee7 ,,hamley1 ,,gen4 ,,sir ,,edward4 ,the ,war in the ,crimea4 ,london1 #ahia4 ,,luard1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,c4 ,e4 ,field ,railways and their general application in war4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,vol4 ,,xvii1 #ahgc4 ,refers to military railway built for use in the ,crimea4 ,,italian ,,war 7#ahei7 ,,bartholony1 ,f4 ,notice sur les ,transports par les ,chemins de ,fer franais vers le thtre de la guerre d',italie4 #ga pp4 ,paris1 #ahei4 ,,millar1 ,r4,a41 ,,major1 ,topographical ,staff4 ,the ,italian ,campaign of #ahei4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,vol4 ,v1 pp4 #bfi-cjh4 ,london1 #ahfa4 ,introductory reference to use of railways4 ,,american ,,civil ,,war 7#ahfa-fe7 ,abhandlung ber die ,thtigkeit der amerikanischen ,feldeisenbahn-,abtheilungen der ,nordstaaten2 bei den ,directionen der ,staatseisenbahnen4 ,durch das ,knigl4 ,ministerium in ,circulation gesetzt4 ,berlin4 ,,bacon1 ,e4 ,l4 ,how railroads helped save the ,union4 ,railroadman's ,magazine1 ,july1 #aiji4 ,,haupt1 ,,herman4 ,reminiscences of ,general ,herman ,haupt1 ,chief of the ,bureau of ,united ,states ,military ,railroads in the ,civil ,war4 #cba pp4 ,illustrations4 ,milwaukee1 ,wis41 #aija4 ,,henderson1 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,g4 ,f4 ,r4 ,stonewall ,jackson and the ,american ,civil ,war4 ,second edition4 ,two vols4 ,london1 #ahii4 ,,porter1 ,w4 ,e4 ,keeping the ,baltimore and ,ohio in ,repair in ,war ,time was a ,task for ,hercules4 ,book of the ,royal ,blue1 ,june1 #aijg4 ,united ,states ,military ,railroads4 ,report of ,brev4-,brig4-,gen4 ,d4 ,c4 ,mc,callum1 ,director and ,general ,manager1 from #ahfa to #ahff4 ,executive ,documents1 #cith ,congress1 #ast ,session4 ,house4 ,serial number1 #abea4 ,washington1 #ahff4 ,,vigo-,,rouissillon1 ,f4 ,p4 ,puissance ,militaire des tats-,unis d',amrique1 d'aprs la ,guerre de la ,scession1 #ahfa-fe4 ,i,i,ie ,partie2 chap4 viii1 ,transports gnraux4 ,paris1 #ahff4 ,,austro-,,prussian ,,campaign 7#ahff7 ,,cooke1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,a4 ,c4 ,c4 ,short ,sketch of the ,campaign in ,austria of #ahff4 #gj pp4 ,map4 ,london1 #ahfg4 ,,webber1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,notes on the ,campaign in ,bohemia in #ahhf4 ,papers of the ,corps of the ,royal ,engineers1 ,n4,s41 ,vol4 ,,xvi4 ,woolwich1 #ahfh4 ,,abyssinian ,,expedition 7#ahfg-fh7 ,,willans1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4 ,the ,abyssinian ,railway4 ,papers on ,subjects ,connected with the ,duties of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers4 ,n4,s4 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,woolwich1 #ahgj4 ,,franco-,,prussian ,,war 7#ahgj-ga7 ,,budde1 ,,lieut4 ,h4 ,die ,franzsischen ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege #ahgj-ga und ihre seitherige ,entwicklung in militrischer ,hinsicht4 ,mit zwei ,karten und zehn ,skizzen im ,texte4 #ii pp4 ,berlin1 #ahgg4 ,gives maps of the ,french railway system in #ahgj and #ahgg respectively4 ---- ,die franzsischen ,eisenbahnen im deutschen ,kriegsbetriebe1 #ahgj-ga4 #dhg pp4 ,berlin1 #aijd4 ,,ernouf1 ,,le ,,baron4 ,histoire des ,chemins de ,fer franais pendant la ,guerre ,franco-,prussienne4 ,paris1 #ahgd4 ,,jacqmin1 ,f41 ,ingnieur en ,chef des ,ponts et ,chausses4 ,les ,chemins de ,fer pendant la ,guerre de #ahgj-ga4 #cea pp4 ,paris1 #ahgb4 ---- #b;e edition4 #cfc pp4 #ahgd4 ,m,,ller-,,breslau1 ,f4 ,die ,ttigkeit unserer ,feldeisenbahn-,abteilung im ,kriege #ahgj-ga4 ,berlin1 #ahif4 ,railway ,organisation in the late ,war4 ,edinburgh ,review1 ,january1 #ahgb4 ,,russo-,,turkish ,,war 7#ahgg-gh7 ,,lessar1 ,p4 ,de la construction des ,chemins de ,fer en temps de guerre4 ,lignes construites par l'arme russe pendant la campagne #ahgg-gh4 ,traduit du russe par ,l4 ,avril4 #adb pp4 #aj ,planches4 ,paris1 #ahgi4 ,,sale1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,m4 ,t4 ,the ,construction of ,military ,railways during the ,russo-,turkish ,war of #ahgg-gh4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,vol4 ,,xxiv4 #ahhj4 ,,egypt ,,and ,,the ,,sudan 7#ahhb-ii7 ,history of the ,corps of the ,royal ,engineers4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,by ,maj4-,gen4 ,whitworth ,porter1 ,r4,e4 ,the ,war in ,egypt1 #ahhb-he1 pp4 #fd-hg4 ,london1 #ahhi4 ---- ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,by ,col4 ,sir ,chas4 ,m4 ,watson4 ,the ,sudan ,campaigns1 #ahhe-ii1 pp4 #ec-gf4 ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,chatham1 #aiae4 ,military ,history of the ,campaign of #ahhb in ,egypt4 ,prepared in the ,intelligence ,branch of the ,war ,office4 ,revised edition4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,,nathan1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4 ,m4 ,the ,sudan ,military ,railway4 ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers4 ,occasional ,papers1 ,vol4 ,,xi4 #ahhe4 ,,wallace1 ,r4,e41 ,,maj4 ,w4 ,a4 ,j4 ,railway ,operations in ,egypt during ,august and ,september1 #ahhb4 ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,chatham4 ,occasional ,papers1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 ,,philippine ,,war 7#ahih7 ,,colson1 ,l4 ,w4 ,railroading in the ,philippine ,war4 ,baltimore and ,ohio ,employs' ,magazine1 ,feb41 #aiac4 ,soldiers ,running a ,railroad4 ,railroad ,telegrapher1 ,sept41 #ahii4 ,tells how the #bjth ,kansas ,regiment ran four miles of the ,manila and ,dagupan ,railroad during the ,philippine insurrection4 ,,south ,,african ,,war 7#ahii-aijb7 ,detailed ,history of the ,railways in the ,south ,african ,war1 #ahii-aijb4 ,two vols4 ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,chatham1 #aije4 ,vol4 ,i4--,organisation1 ,military ,control1 ,working and ,repair of ,cape and ,natal ,government ,railways2 ,management1 ,engineering and other ,departments of ,imperial ,military ,railways2 ,railway ,pioneer ,regiment2 ,organisation1 ,equipment and ,use of ,armoured ,trains2 ,army ,labour ,depts4 ,vol4 ,,ii4--#fa ,photographs and #ic ,drawings4 ,,girouard1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,e4 ,p4 ,c41 ,director of ,railways1 ,south ,african ,field ,force4 ,history of the ,railways during the ,war in ,south ,africa1 #ahii-aijb4 #adi pp4 ,maps4 ,london1 #aijc4 ,,harrison1 ,c4 ,w4 ,,francis4 ,natal3 an ,illustrated ,official ,railway ,guide and ,handbook4 ,published by ,authority4 ,london1 #aijc4 ,gives a statement1 on pp4 #bhg-bij1 as to services rendered by ,natal ,government ,railways during ,south ,african ,war4 ,history of the ,war in ,south ,africa1 #ahii-aijb4 ,compiled by the ,direction of ,his ,majesty's ,government4 ,vol4 ,,iv1 ,appendix #aj1 ,notes on the ,military ,railway ,system in ,south ,africa4 ,london1 #aiaj4 ,netherlands ,south ,african ,railway ,company and the ,transvaal ,war4 ,account by the ,secretary1 ,th4 ,steinnetz1 dated ,pretoria1 ,april1 #aijj4 ,de ,ingenieur1 ,july #ad and #ba1 #aijj4 ,english translation in ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,jan41 #aijb4 ,the ,times4 ,history of the ,war in ,south ,africa1 #ahii-aijb4 ,vol4 ,,vi1 ,part ,,ii1 chap4 iii1 ,the ,railway ,work in the ,war1 pp4 #big-cca4 ,london1 #aiji4 ,,watson1 ,,col4 ,,sir ,,chas4 ,m4 ,history of the ,corps of the ,royal ,engineers4 ,vol4 ,,iii1 chap4 iv1 ,the ,south ,african ,war1 #ahii-aijb4 ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,chatham1 #aiae4 ,working of ,railways3 ,duties of ,staff ,officers4 ,pamphlet4 ,published by authority4 ,pretoria1 #aijj4 ,,russo-,,japanese ,,war 7#aijd-e7 ,,kuropatkin1 ,,general ,a4 ,n4 ,the ,russian ,army and the ,japanese ,war4 ,translated by ,captain ,a4 ,b4 ,lindsay4 ,two vols4 ,maps1 ,illustrations4 ,london1 #aiji4 ,m,,tin1 ,,albert4 ,le ,transsibrien et la ,guerre4 ,revue conomique ,internationale1 ,oct41 #aijd4 ,official ,history of the ,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,prepared by the ,historical ,section of the ,committee of ,imperial ,defence4 ,london1 #aiaj4 ,p41 ,a4 ,construction et ,exploitation de ,chemins de ,fer ,traction animale sur le ,thtre de la ,guerre de #aijd-e en ,mandchourie4 ,revue du ,gnie ,militaire1 ,avril1 ,mai1 ,juin1 #aiji4 ,paris4 ,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,reports from ,british ,officers attached to the ,japanese and ,russian ,forces in the ,field4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,general ,report 7dated ,march1 #aije7 by ,col4 ,w4 ,h4 ,h4 ,waters3 ,section ,,xxxviii1 ,railways1 pp4 #ahd-i4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,russo-,japanese ,war4 ,the ,ya-,lu4 ,prepared in the ,historical ,section of the ,german ,general ,staff4 ,authorised ,translation by ,karl von ,donat4 ,chaps4 ii and iii4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,,vickers1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,c4 ,e4 ,the ,siberian ,railway in ,war4 ,royal ,engineers' ,journal1 ,aug41 #aije4 ,chatham4 ,,mexican ,,war 7#aiaj-ac7 ,,hine1 ,,maj4 ,,charles4 ,war ,time ,railroading in ,mexico4 ,paper read before the ,st4 ,louis ,railway ,club1 ,oct4 #aj1 #aiac4 ,the ,railway ,library1 #aiac4 ,chicago4 ,,weeks1 ,g4 ,e4 ,how ,mexican ,rebels ,destroy ,railways and ,bridges4 ,scientific ,american1 ,sept4 #ac1 #aiac4 ,,countries ,,australia ,,ellison1 ,h4 ,k4 ,australia's ,trans-,continental ,railway4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,june1 #aiab4 ,,kitchener ,,of ,,khartoum1 ,,field ,,marshal ,,viscount4 ,memorandum on the ,defence of ,australia4 ,government of the ,commonwealth of ,australia1 #aiaj4 ,proceedings of the ,war ,railway ,council4 7#a7 ,first and ,second ,meetings1 ,feb4 #ad-af1 #aiaa1 and ,may #ai1 #aiaa4 7#b7 ,fifth ,meeting1 ,nov4 #ah and #ai1 #aiad4 ,government of the ,commonwealth of ,australia4 ,,austria-,,hungary ,geschichte der ,eisenbahnen der sterreichisch-ungarischen ,monarchie4 ,unsere ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege4 ,eisenbahnbureau des ,k4 u4 ,k4 ,general-,stabes4 ,wien1 #ahih-aijh4 ,,hare1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,w4 ,a4 ,organisation of the ,austrian ,railway and ,telegraph ,corps4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution4 ,vol4 ,,xxix1 pp4 #beg-gi4 ,london1 #ahhe-f4 ,,jessep1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4 ,h4 ,l4 ,railway ,works in ,connection with an ,army in the ,field2 forming the ,second ,division of the ,austrian ,guide to ,railways4 ,vienna1 #ahgb 7,translation74 ,professional ,papers of the ,royal ,engineers4 ,chatham4 ,vol4 ,o4,,ii4 ,,joesten1 ,,josef4 ,studien ber die heutigen ,eisenbahnen im ,kriegsfalle4 ,wien1 #ahib4 ,leitfaden des ,eisenbahnwesens1 mit besonderer ,rcksicht auf den ,dienst der ,feldeisenbahn-,abteilungen4 #b ,bnde4 ,wien1 #ahgb4 ,,nosinich1 ,,maj4 ,das sterreichisch-ungarische ,eisenbahn- und brige ,communications-,system4 ,politisch-militrisch beleuchtet4 #gg pp4 ,wien1 #ahga4 ,,obauer1 ,h41 ,,und ,e4 ,r4 ,,von ,,guttenberg4 ,das ,train-,communications und ,verpflegungswesen1 vom operativen ,standpunkte4 ,wien1 #ahga4 ,,panz1 ,,oberst ,v4 ,v4 ,das ,eisenbahnwesen1 vom militrischen ,standpunkte4 ,two vols4 ,plates4 ,wien1 #ahfc4 ---- ,les ,chemins de ,fer au point de vue militaire4 ,traduit de l',allemand par ,costa de ,serda4 ,paris1 #ahfh4 ,technischer ,unterricht fr die ,k4 u4 ,k4 ,eisenbahn-,truppe4 ,theil #c3 ,strassen1 ,eisenbahn- und ,wasserbau4 ,theil #g3 ,feldmssige ,zerstrung von ,brcken und ,viaducten4 ,wien1 #ahih4 ,,tlaskal1 ,,maj4 ,l4 ,uebersichtliche ,zusammenstellung der ,grundstze und der wesentlichen ,details aus dem ,strassen- u4 ,eisenbahn-,baue1 mit ,bercksichtigung der ,zerstrung und der feldmssigen ,wiederherstellung von ,eisenbahnen4 #ij pp4 ,plates4 ,wien1 #ahgg4 ,,zanantoni1 ,,oberstlt4 ,e4 ,die ,eisenbahnen im ,dienste des ,krieges1 und moderne ,gesichtspunkte fr deren ,ausntzung4 #cc pp4 ,wien1 #aijd4 ,see ,railways in ,war and ,modern ,views as to their ,employment4 ,royal ,engineers' ,journal1 ,march1 #aijg4 ,,belgium ,,body1 ,m4 ,aide-mmoire portatif de campagne pour l'emploi des ,chemins de ,fer en temps de guerre4 #bec pp4 ,plates4 ,lige1 #ahgg4 ---- ,les ,chemins de ,fer dans leurs ,applications militaires4 ,lige1 #ahfg4 ---- ,notice sur l'attaque et la dfense des ,chemins de ,fer en temps de guerre4 ,lige1 #ahfh4 ,,formanoir1 ,a4 ,,de1 ,capitaine d'tat-,major4 ,des ,chemins de ,fer en temps de guerre4 ,confrences ,militaires ,belges4 ,bruxelles1 #ahgj4 ,,grandvallet1 ,,antonin4 ,la neutralit de la ,belgique et les ,chemins de ,fer franais1 belges et allemands4 #aa pp4 ,paris1 #ahhi4 ,,france ,,allix1 ,g4 ,la ,mobilisation des ,chemins de ,fer franais4 ,le ,journal des ,transports1 ,jan4 #cj1 #aiae4 ,paris4 ,,berg,,re1 ,,capitaine ,c4 ,les ,chemins de ,fer et le ,service des tapes1 d'aprs les nouveaux rglements4 ,journal des ,sciences ,militaires4 ,neuvime srie4 ,tome vingt-quatrime4 ,paris1 #ahhf4 ,,bresson1 ,l4 ,rorganisation militaire4444 ,chemins de ,fer4 #ej pp4 ,paris1 #ahha4 ,,dany1 ,,jean4 ,le ,rle des ,chemins de ,fer la ,guerre4 ,revue de ,paris1 ,sept4 #ae1 #aiaa4 ,de l',utilisation des ,chemins de ,fer dans la prochaine ,guerre4 ,paris1 #ahii4 ,,eug,,ne1 ,j4 ,b41 ,capitaine du ,gnie4 tudes sur les ,chemins de ,fer et les ,tlgraphes lectriques1 considrs au point de vue de la dfense du territoire4 #b;e4 dition4 ,two vols4 ,paris1 #ahgi4 ,g41 ,a4 ,a propos des ,rseaux ferrs de la ,france et de l',allemagne4 #cj pp4 ,paris1 #ahhd4 ,,grandvallet1 ,,antonin4 ,les ,chemins de ,fer franais au point de vue de la ,guerre4 #he pp4 ,map4 ,paris1 #ahhi4 ,,jacqmin1 ,f4 tude sur l'exploitation des ,chemins de ,fer par l'tat4 #ajd pp4 ,paris1 #ahgh4 ,,lanoir1 ,,paul4 ,les ,chemins de ,fer et la ,mobilisation4 #agj pp4 ,paris1 #ahid4 ,,lanty ----4 ,exploitation militaire des ,chemins de ,fer1 ,oprations excutes par le #e;e ,rgiment du ,gnie l'occasion des grandes manoeuvres de ,bance4 ,revue de ,gnie ,militaire4 ,vol4 ,,xx1 pp4 #cde-hc4 ,paris1 #aijj4 ,,laplaice1 ,a4 ,notions sur les ,chemins de ,fer1 l'usage des officiers et sous-officiers de toutes armes4 ,paris1 #ahhg4 ,,leroy1 ,a4 ,cours ,pratique de ,chemins de ,fer1 l'usage de ,,mm4 les officiers et sous-officiers de toutes armes1 des sections techniques1 des ouvriers du gnie et des coles spciales4 #dgh pp4 ,plates and ,illustrations4 ,dijon1 #ahha4 ,,marcille1 ,,capt4 ,e4 tude sur l'emploi des ,chemins de ,fer avant et pendant la guerre4 #if pp4 ,paris1 #ahgd4 ,,partiot1 ,l4 ,transport d'un ,torpilleur effectu de ,toulon ,cherbourg par les ,chemins de ,fer4 ,paris1 #ahia4 ,,permezel1 ,h4 ,du ,rgime des ,chemins de ,fer en temps de guerre4 ,paris1 #aijd4 ,,pernot1 ,,capt4 ,a4 ,aperu historique sur le service des transports militaires4 ,pp4 #dib4 ,paris1 #ahid4 ,,picard1 ,,alfred4 ,trait des ,chemins de ,fer4 ,vol4 ,,iv1 ,part ,,iv1 chap4 iv1 ,transports militaires par chemins de fer4 ,paris1 #ahhg4 ,,pierron1 ,g,n4 ,les ,mthodes de ,guerre1 etc4 ,tome ,i1 ,part ,,iii 7,chemins de ,fer74 ,maps and plans4 ,paris1 #ahic4 ,,rovel1 ,,chef ,d',,escad4 ,j4 ,j4 ,manuel des ,chemins de ,fer1 l'usage des officiers4 #abb pp4 ,plates4 ,paris1 #ahhb4 ,,wibrotte1 ,,lieut4 ,construction et destruction des ,chemins de ,fer en campagne4 #b;e4 edition4 #dj pp4 ,plates1 ,paris1 #ahgd4 ,,vigo-,,rouissillon1 ,f4 ,p4 ,des ,principes de l',administration des ,armes4 ,paris1 #ahga4 ,official ,publications ,instruction ,speciale pour le ,transport des ,troupes d',infanterie et du ,gnie par des voies ferres4 #f;e dition4 ,paris1 #ahii4 ,organisation ,gnrale aux ,armes4 ,i4 ,services de l'arrire aux armes4 ,volume arrt la date du #h ,dcembre1 #aiac4 #aga pp4 ---- ,,ii4 ,transports stratgiques4 ,tirage ,novembre1 #aiad4 #bia pp4 ,organisation ,gnrale du ,service ,militaire des ,chemins de ,fer4 ,volume arrt au #ae ,juillet1 #aijd4 #bj pp4 ---- ,supplment1 #ca ,dcembre1 #aiab4 #h pp4 ,rglements et instructions sur le transport des troupes4 dition annote 444 jusqu'en ,aot1 #aiac4 #cfb pp4 ,rglement ,gnral de #are ,juillet1 #ahgd1 pour les transports militaires par chemins de fer4 ,paris1 #ahgd4 ,sections de ,chemin de ,fer de campagne4 ,volume arrt la date du ,sept41 #aiad4 #ib pp4 ,transports militaires par ,chemin de ,fer 7,guerre et ,marine74 dition mise jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en ,octobre1 #aijb4 #gab pp4 ,paris4 ,transports ordinaires du matriel de la guerre4 #ae ,juin1 #aiab4 #bgj pp4 ,troupes des ,chemins de ,fer4 ,volume arrt la date du #a;er4 ,dcembre1 #aiab4 #ajf pp4 ,,germany ,a41 ,h4 ,,von4 ,ueber die militrischen und technischen ,grundlagen der ,truppentransports auf ,eisenbahnen4 ,darmstadt und ,leipzig1 #ahfa4 ,,albert ----4 ,die ,anstellungen im ,eisenbahn-,dienst4 ,handbuch fr ,unteroffiziere1 welche sich dem ,eisenbahnfach zu widmen beabsichtigen4 #ei pp4 ,berlin1 #ahhd4 ,,allix1 ,g4 ,l',organisation ,militaire des ,chemins de ,fer allemands4 ,journal des ,transports1 #ac ,mars41 #aiae4 ,paris4 ,,bauer1 ,,haupt4 ,fuhrkolonne 444 und ,feldbahn4 #ca pp4 ,plates4 ,berlin1 #aijj4 ,,beck1 ,c4 ,h4 ,studien ber das ,etappenwesen4 ,nordlingen1 #ahgb4 ,a detailed account of the rail and road services organised under the ,prussian ,regulation of ,may #b1 #ahfg4 ,le ,service des tapes in guerre4 ,revue ,militaire de l'tranger4 #a;er4 ,mai1 #ahgb4 ,a digest of the facts recorded by ,c4 ,h4 ,beck4 ,,becker1 ,,lieut4 ,der nchste ,krieg und die deutschen ,bahnverwaltungen4 #fb pp4 ,hannover1 #ahic4 ,bedeutung der ,eisenbahnen fr den ,krieg4 ,jahrbuch fr die deutsche ,armee und ,marine4 ,berlin1 #ahih4 ,die ,thtigkeit der deutschen ,eisenbahntruppen in ,china1 #aijj-a4 ,annalen fr ,gewerbe und ,bauwesen1 ,april #ae1 #aijb4 ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege1 ,die4 ,zeitung des ,vereins1 ,oct4 #ah1 #ahii4 ,erste ,benutzung der ,eisenbahn fr ,kriegszwecke4 ,zeitung des ,vereins1 ,sept4 #b1 #aiad4 ,ferrarius1 ,miles 7,dr4 jur4 ,joesten74 ,die ,eisenbahn und die ,kriegfhrung3 ,eine politisch-militrische ,studie4 ,deutsche ,zeit- und ,streit ,fragen4 ,heft #ff4 #cj pp4 ,hamburg1 #ahij4 ,,giese1 ,,oberst ,o4 ,v4 ,provisorische ,befestigungen und ,festungs-,eisenbahnen4 #if pp4 ,plans4 ,berlin1 #ahhb4 ,,joesten1 ,,josef4 ,geschichte und ,system der ,eisenbahnbenutzung im ,kriege4 ,leipzig1 #ahif4 ---- ,histoire et ,organisation militaires des ,chemins de ,fer4 ,traduit de l'allemand par le ,lieut4-,colonel ,b4 444 #bbf pp4 ,paris1 #aije4 ,,lanoir1 ,,paul4 ,the ,german ,spy ,system in ,france4 ,translated from the ,french by an ,english ,officer4 ,pp4 viii1 #bfd4 ,london1 #aiaj4 ,chapters on ,designs on ,french ,railways and ,german ,strategic ,railways4 ,,schaeffer1 ,,eduard4 ,der ,kriegs-,train des deutschen ,heeres4 ,berlin1 #ahhc4 ,,schmiedecke1 ,,oberst4 ,die ,verkehrsmittel im ,kriege4 7,die ,eisenbahnen3 die ,feld- und ,frderbahnen47 ,maps and plates4 #bdb pp4 ,berlin1 #aijf4 ---- #bte4 ,auflage4 #aiaa4 ,,stavenhagen1 ,,haupt4 ,w4 ,verkehrs- und ,nachrichten-,mittel in militrischer ,beleuchtung4 7,eisenbahnen47 ,berlin1 #ahif4 ---- #bte4 ,auflage1 #aije4 ,w4 ,,westphalen1 ,,haupt4 ,h4 ,l4 ,die ,kriegfhrung1 unter ,benutzung der ,eisenbahnen1 und der ,kampf um ,eisenbahnen4 ,nach den ,erfahrungen des letzen ,jahrzents4 #bij pp4 ,leipzig1 #ahfh4 ---- ,,ii ,auflage4 ,neu bearbeitet von einem deutschen ,stabsoffizier4 ,leipzig1 #ahhb4 ,de l'emploi des chemins de fer en temps de guerre4 ,traduit de l'allemand4 #bda pp4 ,paris1 #ahfi4 ,a ,french translation of the #ast edition of ,westphalen's work4 ,,weber1 ,,baron ,m4 ,m4 ,,von4 ,die ,schulung der ,eisenbahnen fr den ,krieg im ,frieden4 7#ahgj47 ,translated into ,english1 under the title of ,our ,railway ,system viewed in ,reference to ,invasion1 with ,introduction and ,notes1 by ,robert ,mallet1 ,m4,i4,c4,e41 ,f4,r4,s4 ,london1 #ahga4 ,,wehberg1 ,h4 ,die rechtliche ,stellung der ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege1 nach den ,beschlssen der zweiten ,haager ,friedens-,konferenz4 ,archiv fr ,eisenbahnwesen1 ,mai-,juni1 #aiaj4 ,berlin4 ,,wernekke1 ,,regierungsrat4 ,die ,mitwirkung der ,eisenbahnen an den ,kriegen in ,mitteleuropa4 ,archiv fr ,eisenbahnwesen1 ,juli und ,august1 #aiab4 ,designs on ,africa ,,boulger1 ,,demetrius ,c4 ,german ,designs on the ,congo4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,sept41 #aiad4 ,republished in ,england's ,arch-,enemy3 ,a ,collection of ,essays forming an ,indictment of ,german ,policy during the last ,sixteen ,years1 by ,d4 ,c4 ,boulger4 ,london1 #aiad4 ,,bryden1 ,h4 ,a4 ,the ,conquest of ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,july1 #aiae4 ,london4 ,,crabtree1 ,,the ,,rev4 ,w4 ,a4 ,german ,colonies in ,africa4 ,journal of the ,african ,society1 ,oct41 #aiad4 ,london4 ,,lewin1 ,,evans4 ,the ,germans and ,africa4 #cag pp4 ,map4 ,london1 #aiae4 ,,martin1 ,,camille4 ,le ,chemin de ,fer du ,tanganyika et les progrs de l',afrique orientale allemande4 ,renseignments coloniaux1 ,no4 #c4 ,supplment ,l',afrique ,franaise de ,mars1 #aiad4 ,paris4 ,memorandum on the ,country known as ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,section on ,railways1 pp4 #hc-hh4 ,pretoria1 ,government ,printing ,office1 #aiae4 ,o',,connor1 ,j4 ,k4 ,the ,hun in our ,hinterland2 or the ,menace of ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 #dc pp4 ,map4 ,cape ,town1 #aiad4 ,gives details concerning strategical railways in ,german ,south-,west ,africa4 ,,ren1 ,,carl1 ,director des ,kamerun-,eisenbahn ,syndikats4 ,kamerun und die ,deutsche ,tsdsee-,eisenbahn4 #bea pp4 ,mit #cg ,textbildern und #bb ,tafeln4 ,berlin1 #aije4 ,south-,west ,african ,notes4 ,republished from the ,transvaal ,chronicle4 ,south ,africa1 ,nov4 #ad and ,dec4 #e1 #aiad4 ,london4 ,,zimmermann1 ,,emil4 ,neu-,kamerun4 ,zweiter ,teil3 ,neu ,kamerun und das ,kongosystem4 ,deutschland und ,zentralafrika4 #ace pp4 ,map4 ,berlin1 #aiac4 ---- ,was ist uns ,zentralafrika8 ,wirtschafts- und verkehrspolitische ,untersuchungen4 #eg pp4 ,maps4 ,berlin1 #aiad4 ,destruction and ,restoration of ,railways ,anleitung zur ,unterbrechung von ,eisenbahnverbindungen1 resp4 ,zerstrung1 etc41 sowie zur ,wiederherstellung4 ,berlin1 #ahfa4 ,,basson1 ,,wilhelm4 ,die ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege1 nach den ,erfahrungen des letzten ,feldzuges4 #gb pp4 ,ratibor1 #ahfg4 ,a work dealing with the technicalities of railway destruction1 restoration and operation on 7a7 national and 7b7 occupied territory4 ,,taubert ----4 ,zerstrung1 ,wiederherstellung und ,neubau von ,vollbahnen und deren ,kunstbauten in ,feindesland4 ,leipzig1 #ahif4 ,verhandlungen des ,kriegs- und ,handelsministeriums ber ,zerstrungen von ,eisenbahnen und die ,entstehung der ,allerhchsten ,instructionen vom ,jahre #ahei und vom #ca ,juli1 #ahfa4 ,ungedrucktes ,actenstck4 ,berlin4 ,germany and the ,baghdad ,railway ,,ch,,radame1 ,,andr4 ,la ,question d',orient4 ,le ,chemin de ,fer de ,bagdad4 ,cartes4 #cig pp4 ,paris1 #aijc4 ,,hamilton1 ,,angus4 ,problems of the ,middle ,east1 ,great ,britain1 ,germany and the ,baghdad ,railway4 ,pp4 #aef-hf4 ,london1 #aiji4 ,,lynch1 ,h4 ,f4 ,b4 ,railways in the ,middle ,east4 ,asiatic ,quarterly ,review1 ,april1 #aiaa4 ---- ,the ,baghdad ,railway4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,march1 #aiaa4 ---- ,the ,baghdad ,railway3 ,four ,new ,conventions4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,may1 #aiaa4 ,,mahan1 ,,capt4 ,a4 ,t4 ,retrospect and ,prospect4 ,,vi3 ,the ,persian ,gulf and ,international ,relations4 ,pp4 #bji-ea4 ,london1 #aijb4 ,,rohrbach1 ,,dr4 ,,paul4 ,die ,bagdadbahn4 #b4 ,auflage4 #hf pp4 ,map4 ,berlin1 #aiaa4 ,,sarolea1 ,,charles4 ,the ,anglo-,german ,problem4 ,the ,baghdad ,railway and ,german ,expansion in the ,near ,east4 ,pp4 #bdg-hj4 ,london1 #aiab4 ,,schneider1 ,,siegmund4 ,die ,deutsche ,bagdadbahn und die projectirte ,ueberbrckung des ,bosporus1 in ihrer ,bedeutung fr ,weltwirthschaft und ,weltverkehr4 ,wien und ,leipzig1 #aijj4 ,,sprenger1 ,,dr4 ,a4 ,babylonien1 das reichste ,land in der ,vorzeit und das lohnendste ,kolonisationfeld fr die ,gegenwart4 ,ein ,vorschlag zur ,kolonisation des ,orients4 #abh pp4 ,map4 ,heidelberg1 #ahhf4 ,the ,times4 ,maps of the ,baghdad ,railway1 showing lines open1 under construction and projected4 ,dec4 #a1 #aiad1 and ,nov4 #a1 #aiae4 ,x4 ,the ,focus of ,asiatic ,policy4 ,national ,review1 ,june1 #aija4 ,official ,publications ,die ,verwaltung der ffentlichen ,arbeiten in ,preussen1 #aijj bis #aiaj4 ,kartenbeilage ,i3 ,die ,preussisch-,hessischen ,staatseisenbahnen am #a ,april1 #aijj1 und ,ende ,mrz1 #aiaj4 ,berlin1 #aiaa4 ,organisation des ,transports grosser ,truppenmassen auf ,eisenbahnen4 ,berlin1 #ahfa4 ,field ,service ,regulations 7,felddienst ,ordnung1 #aijh7 of the ,german ,army4 ,translated by the ,general ,staff1 ,war ,office4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,railway ,troops ,arme allemande4 ,les troupes de ,chemin de ,fer4 ,revue ,militaire de l'tranger4 ,mai1 #ahih4 ,paris4 ,,hille1 ,,maj41 ,,und ,,meurin1 ,,maj4 ,geschichte der preussischen ,eisenbahntruppen4 ,teil ,i4 ,von #ahei bis zur ,beendigung des deutsch-franzsischen ,krieges4 ,maps1 plans1 plates and illustrations4 ,two vols4 ,berlin1 #aiaj4 ,,hille1 ,,maj4 ,geschichte der preussischen ,eisenbahntruppen4 ,teil ,,ii1 #ahga-aiaa4 ,portraits1 maps1 plans1 plates and illustrations4 ,berlin1 #aiac4 ,les troupes allemandes de communications4 ,revue ,militaire1 ,avril1 #aijj4 ,,rawson1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4 ,h4 ,e4 ,the ,german ,railway ,regiment4 ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,journal1 ,vol4 ,,xx1 #ahgg4 ,,webber1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,the ,field ,army ,department of the ,prussian ,army4 ,see ,notes on the ,campaign in ,bohemia in #ahff1 ,papers of the ,corps of the ,royal ,engineers1 ,n4,s41 ,vol4 ,,xvi1 ,woolwich1 #ahfh4 ,strategical ,railways ,,littlefield1 ,,walter4 ,hitherto ,unpublished ,pages in ,war's ,prelude4 ,railway ,cartography reveals ,germany's elaborate ,preparations4 ,new ,york ,times1 ,nov4 #ae1 #aiad4 ,,norton1 ,,roy4 ,the ,man of ,peace4 ,oxford ,pamphlets1 #aiad-ae4 #bb pp4 ,oxford ,university ,press4 ,,stuart-,,stephens1 ,,major4 ,how ,i ,discovered the ,date of the ,world ,war4 ,,the ,,english ,,review1 ,june1 #aiae4 ,deals with the ,german strategical railways on the ,belgian frontier4 ,y4 ,object ,lesson in ,german ,plans4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,feb41 #aiaj4 ,london4 ---- ,a ,further ,object ,lesson in ,german ,plans4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,feb41 #aiad4 ,these two articles were republished in ,england's ,arch-,enemy3 ,a ,collection of ,essays forming an ,indictment of ,german ,policy during the last ,sixteen ,years ,by ,demetrius ,c4 ,boulger4 ,london1 #aiad4 ,,yoxall1 ,m4,p41 ,,sir ,,james4 ,the ,kaiser's ,iron ,web4 ,the ,daily ,graphic1 ,march #i1 #aiae4 ,tactics and ,strategy ,,balck1 ,,oberst4 ,taktik1 ,band #d4 ,eisenbahnen1 etc4 ,berlin1 #aija4 ---- #dte4 ,auflage1 #aiji4 tude sur le ,rseau ferr allemand au point de vue de la concentration4 #cb pp4 ,avec une carte des chemins de fer allemands4 ,paris1 #ahij4 ,,ferrarius1 ,,miles 7,,dr4 ,,jur4 ,,joesten74 ,die ,anforderungen der ,strategie und ,taktik an die ,eisenbahnen4 #dh pp4 ,berlin1 #ahie4 ,,goltz1 ,,baron ,,colmar ,,von ,,der4 ,das ,volk im ,waffen4 ,ein ,buch ber ,heereswesen und ,kriegfhrung unserer ,zeit4 ,berlin1 #ahhc4 ---- ,the ,nation in ,arms4 ,translated by ,phillip ,a4 ,ashworth4 ,new edition4 ,revised in accordance with the fifth ,german edition4 ,london1 #aijf4 ---- ,kriegfhrung4 ,kurze ,lehre ihrer wichtigsten ,grundstze und ,formen4 ,berlin1 #ahie4 ---- ,the ,conduct of ,war4 ,a ,short ,treatise on its most important ,branches and ,guiding ,rules4 ,translated by ,major ,g4 ,f4 ,leverson4 ,vol4 ,,iv of the ,wolseley ,series4 ,london1 #ahii4 ,,lassmann1 ,,lieut4 ,j4 ,c4 ,der ,eisenbahnkrieg4 ,taktische ,studie4 #aab pp4 ,berlin1 #ahfg4 ,,verdy ,,du ,,vernois1 ,,gen4 ,j4 ,v4 ,studien ber den ,krieg4 ,theil ,,iii4 ,strategie4 ,heft #e4 7,einfluss der ,eisenbahnen operativer ,linien auf die ,kriegfhrung74 ,maps and plans4 ,berlin1 #aijf4 ,,great ,,britain ,,burgoyne1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,,sir ,j4 ,railways in ,war4 ,a paper read before the ,british ,association at ,birmingham4 ,the ,engineer1 ,sept4 #bb1 #ahfe4 p4 #ahb4 ,london4 ,,burnaby1 ,,capt4 ,f4 ,g4 ,the ,practical ,instruction of ,staff ,officers in ,foreign ,armies4 ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,journal1 ,vol4 ,,xvi1 pp4 #fcc-dd4 #ahgc4 ,,collinson1 ,,gen4 ,t4 ,b4 ,use of ,railways in ,war4 ,extracted from three ,royal ,engineer ,prize ,essays for #ahgh by ,captains ,d4 ,o',brien and ,t4 ,j4 ,willans and ,lieut4 ,w4 ,h4 ,turton4 #hb pp4 ,chatham4 ,,findlay1 ,,sir ,,george1 ,assoc4 ,inst4 ,c4,e41 ,lieut4-,colonel ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps4 ,paper on ,the ,transport of ,troops by ,rail within the ,united ,kingdom1 read before the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,june #bj1 #ahij1 and forming chapter xxiii of ,working and ,management of an ,english ,railway4 ,london1 #eth edition1 #ahid4 ---- ,the ,use of ,railways in the ,united ,kingdom for the ,conveyance of ,troops4 ,united ,service ,magazine1 ,april1 #ahib4 ,,girouard1 #b,,nd ,,lieut4 ,e4 ,p4 ,c4 ,the ,use of ,railways for ,coast and ,harbour ,defence4 ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,journal1 ,vol4 ,,xxxv1 #ahia4 ,,girouard1 ,r4,e41 ,,brev-,,lieut4-,,colonel ,,sir ,e4 ,,percy ,c4 ,railways in ,war4 ,a lecture delivered at the ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,march #bc1 #aije4 ,royal ,engineers' ,journal1 ,july1 #aije4 ,chatham4 ,,home1 ,c4 ,b41 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,r4 ,on the ,organisation of the ,communications of an ,army1 including ,railways4 ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,journal1 ,vol4 ,,xix1 #ahge4 ,,hopkins1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,l4 ,e4 ,army ,railway ,organisation4 ,the ,royal ,engineers' ,journal1 ,august1 #aije4 ,chatham4 ,,luard1 ,r4,e41 ,,captain ,c4 ,e4 ,field ,railways and their ,general ,application in ,war4 ,royal ,united ,service ,institution ,journal1 ,vol4 ,,xvii1 #ahgc4 ,,mallet1 ,,robert1 ,m4,i4,c4,e41 ,f4,r4,s4 ,see under ,,germany3 ,weber1 ,baron ,m4 ,m4 ,,maquay1 ,r4,e41 ,,col4 ,j4 ,p4 ,railways for ,military ,communication in the ,field4 ,professional ,papers of the ,royal ,engineers1 ,chatham1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 #ahhb4 ,,phelp1 ,s4 ,m4 ,the ,use of our ,railways in the ,event of ,invasion or of a ,european ,war4 ,the ,railway ,magazine1 ,may1 #aija4 ,,porter1 ,r4,e41 ,,maj4-,,gen4 ,,whitworth4 ,history of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers4 ,two vols4 ,london1 #ahhi4 ,vol4 ,,iii1 by ,col4 ,sir ,chas4 ,m4 ,watson1 was issued by the ,royal ,engineers' ,institute1 ,chatham1 in #aiae4 ,,prytherch1 ,h4 ,j4 ,the ,great ,eastern ,railway and the ,army ,manoeuvres in ,east ,anglia1 #aiab4 ,great ,eastern ,railway ,magazine1 ,nov41 #aiab4 ,,rothwell1 ,r4,a41 ,,col4 ,j4 ,s41 ,the ,conveyance of ,troops by ,railway4 ,united ,service ,magazine1 ,dec41 #ahia1 and ,jan41 #ahib4 ---- ,the ,reconnaissance of a ,railway4 ,its ,utilisation and ,destruction in ,time of ,war4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution4 ,vol4 ,,xxxvi1 pp4 #cfi-hi4 ,london1 #ahib4 ,strategical ,importance of ,railways1 ,the4 ,the ,engineer1 ,feb4 #af1 #aijj4 ,the ,part ,played by ,railways in ,modern ,warfare4 ,by ,a4,m4,i4,c4,e4 ,land and ,water1 ,jan4 #cj and ,feb4 #f1 #aiae4 ,london4 ,the ,transport of an ,army4 ,great ,western ,railway ,magazine1 ,nov41 #aiji4 ,an account of the work done by the ,great ,western ,railway on the occasion of the ,army ,manoeuvres of #aiji4 ,,tovey1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,the ,elements of ,strategy4 #ahhg4 ,section on ,railways1 pp4 #db-di4 #bnd edition1 edited by ,t4 ,miller ,maguire4 ,london1 #aijf4 ,,tyler1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,h4 ,w41 ,railway ,inspector1 ,board of ,trade4 ,railways ,strategically ,considered4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution4 ,vol4 ,,viii1 pp4 #cba-da4 ,maps4 ,london1 #ahfe4 ,,williams1 ,j4 ,a4 ,our ,railway in ,time of ,war4 ,north-,eastern ,railway ,magazine1 ,march1 #aiab4 ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps ,army ,book for the ,british ,empire1 ,the4 ,london1 #ahic4 ,references to ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps on pp4 #chb and #eca4 ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps4 ,the ,railway ,news1 ,aug4 #h1 #aiad4 ,,jeune1 ,c4 ,h4 ,the ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps4 ,great ,eastern ,railway ,magazine1 ,july1 #aiaa4 ,london4 ,,mcmurdo1 ,c4,b41 ,,maj4-,,gen41 ,hon4 ,colonel1 ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps4 ,rifle ,volunteers for ,field ,service2 a ,letter to ,commanding ,officers of ,rifle ,corps4 #bg pp4 ,london1 #ahfi4 ,,mcmurdo1 ,,gen4 ,,sir ,w4 ,m4 ,article on ,volunteers1 ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 #ith edition4 ,for references to the ,engineer and ,railway ,transport ,corps1 see p4 #bie4 ,,walter1 ,,maj4 ,,james1 #dth ,lancashire ,artillery ,volunteers4 ,england's ,naval and ,military ,weakness4 ,the ,volunteer ,force4 ,london1 #ahhb4 ,references to services rendered by the ,engineer and ,railway ,volunteer ,staff ,corps in the ,volunteer ,reviews of #ahha4 ,see p4 #cje4 ,official ,publications ,army ,service ,corps ,training4 ,part ,,iii1 ,transport4 ,section ,,vi1 ,conveyance of ,war ,department ,stores4 #a--,rail4 ,appendix ,,iii1 ,acts of ,parliament relating to ,transport ,services4 #aiaa4 ,field ,service ,pocket ,book4 ,section #cj1 ,transport by ,rail4 ,general ,staff1 ,war ,office4 #aiad4 ,field ,service ,regulations4 ,part ,i1 ,operations4 #aiji4 7,reprinted1 with amendments1 #aiad47 ,chap4 iii1 ,movements by ,rail1 pp4 #fb-f4 ,part ,,ii1 ,organisation and ,administration4 #aiji4 7,reprinted1 with amendments1 #aiac47 ,chap4 viii1 ,railway ,transport1 pp4 #ia-if4 ,general ,staff1 ,war ,office4 ,instruction in ,military ,engineering4 ,part ,,vi1 ,military ,railways4 ,war ,office1 #ahih4 ,embodies a portion of the course of instruction in railways at the ,school of ,military ,engineering1 ,chatham4 ,was first issued with ,army ,orders1 dated ,march #a1 #ahhi1 as a ,manual of ,military ,railways1 #ie pp4 ,manual of ,military ,engineering4 ,chap4 xvii3 ,hasty ,demolition of ,railways 444 without ,explosives4 ,chap4 xxiii3 ,railways4 7,technical details concerning construction1 repairs and reconstruction47 #add pp4 ,general ,staff1 ,war ,office1 #aije4 ,manual of ,military ,law4 ,war ,office1 #aiad4 ,includes a brief account of the relations of the ,state to the railways in regard to the conveyance of troops 7see pp4 #ahd-e71 and gives text of various ,parliamentary enactments relating thereto4 ,notes on ,reconnaissance and ,survey of ,military ,railways for ,officers of ,r4,e4 ,railway ,companies4 ,compiled in the ,quartermaster-,general's ,department of the ,war ,office4 #aiaj4 ,railway ,manual 7,war74 #fd pp4 #aiaa4 ,reprinted1 with ,amendments1 #aiad4 ,regulations for the ,transport of ,troops by ,railway ,quartermaster-,general's ,office1 ,horse ,guards1 ,feb4 #bh1 #ahfg4 ,,holland ,,wijnpersse1 ,,kapt4 ,w4 ,j4 ,m4 ,v4 ,d4 ,de voorbereiding van het militair gebruik der spoorwegen in oorlogstijd4 #gf pp4 ,plans and plates4 s',gravenhage1 #aije4 ,,india ,,andrew1 ,w4 ,p4 ,our ,scientific ,frontier4 ,london1 #ahhj4 ,,innes1 ,r4,e41 ,,gen4 ,j4 ,j4 ,,mcleod4 ,life and ,times of ,gen4 ,sir ,james ,browne1 ,r4,e41 ,k4,c4,b41 ,k4,c4,s4,i4 #cga pp4 ,london1 #aije4 ,gives an account of the construction of the ,sind-,pishin ,railway1 of which ,sir ,j4 ,browne was ,chief ,engineer4 ,,lyons1 ,,capt4 ,,gervais4 ,afghanistan1 the ,buffer ,state4 ,great ,britain and ,russia in ,central ,asia4 #bcb pp4 ,maps4 ,madras and ,london1 #aiaj4 ,gives1 in summarised form1 much information concerning ,british ,indian frontier and ,russian ,central ,asian ,railways4 ,military ,railways in ,india4 ,prcis of ,report of the ,railway ,transport ,committee1 ,india1 #ahgf4 ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers4 ,occasional ,papers1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,chatham1 #ahgh4 ,,ross1 ,c4,i4,e41 ,,david4 ,military ,transport by ,indian ,railways4 #aji pp4 ,maps and plates4 ,lahore1 #ahhc4 ---- ,transport by ,rail of ,troops1 ,horses1 ,guns1 and ,war ,material in ,india4 ,a lecture4 #bd pp4 ,london1 #ahgi4 ,,scott-,,moncrieff1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,g4 ,k4 ,the ,frontier ,railways of ,india4 ,professional ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers4 ,occasional ,papers1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 #ahhe4 ,chatham4 ,,italy ,,allix1 ,g4 ,la ,mobilisation des ,chemins de ,fer ,italiens4 ,journal des ,transports1 #c ,juillet1 #aiae4 ,paris4 ,,aymonino1 ,c4 ,considrations ,militaires et ,stratgiques sur les chemins de fer italiens4 ,traduit de l',italien par ,g4 ,malifaud4 #c;e4 d4 #fh pp4 ,paris1 #ahhi4 ,le ,ferrovie dello ,stato e le grandi manovre del #aiaa4,rivista ,tecnica della ,ferrovie ,italiane1 ,nov41 #aiab4 ,,zanotti1 ,,mag4 ,b4 ,impiego dei ferrovieri in guerra4 #fg pp4 #aijb4 ,,russia ,,fendrikh1 ,,col4 ,a4 ,,von4 ,the ,organisation of a ,staff for ,military ,railway ,work and of a ,central ,management for the ,control of ,rolling ,stock in ,war ,time4 ,translated from ,the ,russian ,military ,magazine1 by ,capt4 ,j4 ,wolfe ,murray1 ,r4,a41 ,d4,a4,a4,g4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,vol4 ,,xxxii1 #ahhi4 ,,igel1 ,,gen4 ,,von4 ,russlands ,eisenbahnbau an der ,westgrenze4 ,deutsche ,revue1 ,dec41 #aijb4 ,stuttgart4 ,k41 ,h4 ,das russische ,eisenbahn-,netz zur deutschen ,grenze in seiner ,bedeutung fr einen ,krieg ,russlands mit ,deutschland4 #bi pp4 ,map4 ,hannover1 #ahhe4 ,,nienst,,dt1 ,,oberstlt4 ,das russische ,eisenbahnnetz zur deutschen-sterreichischen ,grenze in seiner ,bedeutung fr einen ,krieg4 #dc pp4 ,map4 ,leipzig1 #ahie4 ,strategical ,railways4 ,translated from the ,vonnyi ,sbrnik4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,oct41 #ahii4 ,,spain ,,taylor1 ,,ten4 ,t4 ,l4 ,los ferrocarriles en la guerra4 #bhh pp4 ,plates4 ,barcelona1 #ahhe4 ,,switzerland ,,blaser1 ,,haupt4 ,e4 ,die ,zerstrungs- und ,wiederherstellungs-,arbeiten von ,eisenbahnen4 #bb pp4 ,plates4 ,basel1 #ahga4 ,,hoffmann-,,merian1 ,t4 ,die ,eisenbahnen zum ,truppen-,transport und fr den ,krieg im ,hinblick auf die ,schweiz4 #b;e4 ,ausg4 ,basel1 #ahga4 ,,nowacki1 ,,karl4 ,die ,eisenbahnen im ,kriege4 #afj pp4 ,zurich1 #aijf4 ,,united ,,states ,are ,railroads ,neutralising ,sea ,power8 ,american ,review of ,reviews1 ,june1 #aiac4 ,,bigelow1 ,,john1 ,captain #ajth ,cavalry1 ,u4,s4 ,army4 ,the ,principles of ,strategy1 illustrated mainly from ,american ,campaigns4 #bnd edition4 ,philadelphia1 #ahid4 ,commerce of the ,ohio and ,western ,rivers4 ,importance of ,railroads in a ,military point of view4 ,de,bow's ,commercial ,review1 ,june1 #aheg4 ,,connor1 ,,maj4 ,w4 ,d4 ,military ,railways4 #aib pp4 ,illustrations4 ,professional ,papers1 ,no4 #cb1 ,corps of ,engineers1 ,u4,s4 ,army4 ,washington1 #aiaj4 ---- ,operation and ,maintenance of the ,railroad in a ,theatre of ,war4 ,journal of the ,military ,service ,institute4 ,new ,york1 #aije4 ,,derr1 ,w4 ,l4 ,the working of railways in ,military ,operations4 ,engineering ,magazine1 ,oct41 #ahih4 ,great ,railroad ,feats during ,war and ,flood4 ,washington1 ,d4,c41 ,post1 ,april #be1 #aiac4 ,,grimshaw1 ,,robert4 ,war ,capacity of ,united ,states ,railways4 ,scientific ,american1 ,may #a1 #aiae4 ,,haines1 ,,charles ,o4 ,our ,railroads and ,national ,defence4 ,the ,north ,american ,review1 ,sept41 #aiae4 ,,haupt1 ,,herman4 ,military ,bridges 444 including designs for trestle and truss bridges for military railroads1 adapted specially to the wants of the service in the ,united ,states4 #caj pp4 #fi plates4 ,new ,york1 #ahfd4 ,use of ,railroads in ,war4 ,journal of the ,military ,service ,institution4 ,vol4 ,,xxi4 ,new ,york1 #ahig4 ,,palmer1 ,,capt4 ,,john ,,mcauley4 ,railroad ,building as a ,mode of ,warfare4 ,north ,american ,review1 ,dec41 #aijb4 ,railroads1 and not ,bullets1 will feature the next ,war4 ,washington1 ,d4,c41 ,star1 ,feb4 #aa1 #aiab4 ,,wilson1 ,w4 ,b4 ,history of the ,pennsylvania ,railroad ,company4 ,two vols4 ,the ,railroad in ,war ,times1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #daa-ah4 ,philadelphia1 #ahii4 ,,ambulance ,,and ,,hospital ,,trains ,,furse1 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,g4 ,a4 ,military ,transport4 ,chap4 vii1 ,railway ,ambulance ,trains1 pp4 #ahe-ii4 ,diagrams and illustrations4 ,london1 #ahhb4 ,,gurlt1 ,,dr4 ,e4 ,ueber den ,transport ,schwerverwundeter und ,kranker im ,kriege1 nebst ,vorschlgen ber die ,benutzung der ,eisenbahnen dabei4 #cc pp4 ,berlin1 #ahfj4 ,contains1 so far as can be traced1 the earliest recommendations as to the special fitting up of railway rolling stock for the transport of the sick and wounded in war4 ,,loeffler1 ,,dr4 ,f4 ,das ,preussische ,militr-,sanittswesen und seine ,reform nach der ,kriegserfahrung von #ahff4 ,two parts4 ,berlin1 #ahfi4 ,in the appendix of ,part ,,ii of this work will be found an ,anleitung zur ,ausfhrung der ,befrderung verwundeter und kranker ,militairs auf ,eisenbahnen1 issued ,july #a1 #ahfa4 ,,longmore1 ,,surg4-,,gen4 ,,sir ,t4 ,a ,manual of ,ambulance ,transport4 #bnd edition4 ,edited by ,surg4-,capt4 ,w4 ,a4 ,morris4 ,chap4 vi1 ,class ,v1 ,railway ,ambulance ,transport1 pp4 #cdg-hi4 ,illustrations4 ,london1 #ahic4 ,the #ast edition was published in #ahfi under the title of ,a ,treatise on the ,transport of ,sick and ,wounded ,troops4 ,medical and ,surgical ,history of the ,war of the ,rebellion4 ,part ,,iii1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,surgical ,history4 ,railway ,transportation1 pp4 #ieg-ga4 ,diagrams and illustrations of hospital cars1 fittings1 etc4 ,u4,s4,a4 ,dept4 of ,war4 ,surgeon-,general's ,office4 ,washington1 #ahhc4 ,gives a detailed account of the evolution1 in the ,civil ,war1 of the hospital train in vogue to-day4 ,a copy of the work will be found in the ,british ,museum ,library4 ,pressmark3 #gfhf i4 #d4 ,,melville1 ,a4,m4,s41 ,,surg4-,,capt4 ,continental ,regulations for the ,transport of ,sick and ,wounded by ,rail4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution4 ,vol4 ,,xlii1 pp4 #efj-ib4 ,london1 #ahih4 ,military ,hospital ,trains3 ,their ,origin and ,progress4 ,the ,railway ,gazette1 ,dec4 #d1 #aiad4 ,london4 ,,nieden1 ,j4 ,der ,eisenbahn-,transport verwundeter und erkrankter ,krieger4 #b ,aufl4 #bga pp4 ,berlin1 #ahhc4 ,,otis1 ,,george ,a4 ,a ,report on a ,plan for ,transporting ,wounded ,soldiers by ,railway in ,time of ,war4 ,surgeon-,general's ,office1 ,war ,department1 ,washington1 #ahge4 ,the material parts of this work are reproduced in the ,medical and ,surgical ,history of the ,war of the ,rebellion4 ,report by the ,central ,british ,red ,cross ,committee on ,voluntary ,organisations in aid of the ,sick and ,wounded during the ,south ,african ,war4 ,part ,,vii1 ,hospital ,trains1 pp4 #cb-e4 ,london1 #aijb4 ,report on the ,medical ,arrangements in the ,south ,african ,war4 ,by ,surg4-,gen4 ,sir ,w4 ,d4 ,wilson1 ,k4,c4,m4,g41 late ,principal ,medical ,officer1 ,south ,african ,field ,force4 ,part ,,ix1 ,hospital ,trains1 pp4 #bac-i4 ,london1 #aijd4 ,,riddell1 ,j4 ,,scott4 ,a ,manual of ,ambulance4 ,section on ,railway ,ambulance ,wagons and ,ambulance ,trains1 pp4 #afh-gf4 #fth edition4 ,london1 #aiac4 ,,armoured ,,trains ,,adams1 ,w4 ,,bridges4 ,english ,railway ,artillery3 ,a ,cheap ,defence against ,invasion4 ,once a ,week1 ,aug4 #ac1 #ahei4 ,london4 ,armoured ,truck 7,union ,railroad ,battery1 ,petersburg7 used in the ,american ,civil ,war1 #ahfa-fe4 ,see illustration1 ,century ,magazine1 ,sept41 #ahhg1 p4 #ggd4 ,,boxall1 ,,charles ,,gervaise1 ,col4 ,commanding #ast ,sussex ,artillery ,volunteers4 ,armoured ,train for ,coast ,defence in ,great ,britain1 ,the4 ,paper read at a meeting of ,officers and ,n4,c4,o4's of the ,brigade at ,newhaven ,fort1 ,sussex1 ,may #ad1 #ahid4 #aa pp4 ---- ,railway ,batteries and ,armoured ,trains4 ,fortnightly ,review1 ,aug41 #ahie4 ,,connor1 ,,maj4 ,w4 ,d4 ,military ,railways4 ,section on ,armoured ,trains1 pp4 #ada-ej4 ,professional ,papers1 ,no4 #cb1 ,corps of ,engineers1 ,u4,s4 ,army4 ,washington1 #aiaj4 ,detailed ,history of the ,railways in the ,south ,african ,war1 #ahii-aijb4 ,vol4 ,i1 ,section on ,organisation1 ,equipment and ,use of ,armoured ,trains4 ,chatham1 #aije4 ,field ,service ,regulations4 ,part ,i1 ,operations4 #aiji4 7,reprinted1 with amendments1 #aiad47 ,section #dj1 ,defence of ,railways4 ,general ,staff1 ,war ,office1 ,london4 ,,fitzgerald1 ,w4 ,c4 ,the ,armoured ,train4 ,the ,four-track ,news1 ,march1 #aijf4 ,new ,york4 ,,forbin1 ,v4 ,les trains blinds4 ,nature1 ,dec4 #ab1 #aiad4 ,paris4 ,,fraser1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4 ,t4 ,armour-plated ,railway ,wagons used during the late ,sieges of ,paris in #ahgj-ga4 ,papers of the ,corps of ,royal ,engineers1 ,n4,s41 ,vol4 ,,xx4 ,woolwich1 #ahgb4 ,,girouard1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,e4 ,p4 ,c4 ,history of the ,railways during the ,war in ,south ,africa1 #ahii-aijb4 ,section ,v1 ,the ,organisation and ,use of ,armoured ,trains4 ,london1 #aijc4 ,,hobart1 ,,frederick4 ,the first ,armoured ,train4 ,railway ,age ,gazette1 ,jan4 #bb1 #aiae4 ,chicago1 ,u4,s4,a4 ,,lodian1 ,l4 ,the ,origin of ,armoured ,railroad ,cars unquestionably the ,product of the ,american ,civil ,war4 ,railroad and ,locomotive ,engineering1 ,may1 #aiae4 ,new ,york4 ,reproduces from ,leslie's ,weekly for ,may #ah1 #ahfd1 an illustration of a ,railroad ,battery on the ,philadelphia and ,baltimore ,railway1 showing a box car completely covered with armour plating1 with loop-holes at end and side for guns1 and placed on the line in front of the locomotive1 itself otherwise unprotected4 ,military ,history of the ,campaign of #ahhb in ,egypt4 ,prepared in the ,intelligence ,branch of the ,war ,office4 ,revised edition4 ,london1 #aijh4 ,references to use of armoured train4 ,,nance1 ,,capt4 ,h4 ,o4 ,armoured ,trains4 ,lecture delivered at the ,royal ,engineers' ,institute4 #eb pp4 ,photographs and drawings4 ,professional ,papers1 fourth series1 ,vol4 ,i1 ,paper #d4 ,chatham1 #aijf4 ,the subject is dealt with in three sections3 7#a7 ,uses of ,armoured ,trains2 7#b7 ,construction1 equipment and garrison2 7#c7 ,organisation and administration4 ,railway ,manual 7,war74 ,chapter ,,vi1 ,section #ae1 ,armoured ,trains4 ,london1 #aiaa4 ,,walker1 ,,lieut4 ,,arthur4 ,coast ,railways and ,railway ,artillery4 ,journal of the ,royal ,united ,service ,institution1 ,vol4 ,,ix1 pp4 #bba-bc4 ,plates4 ,london1 #ahff4 ,,index ,,abyssinian ,,campaign3 ,construction and working of military railway1 #baj-ad4 ,,adams1 ,,william ,,bridges3 #fg-i4 ,,advantages ,,from ,,use ,,of ,,railways3 #cde-ej4 ,,africa1 ,,german ,,designs ,,on3 ,proposals of von ,weber1 #big2 ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 #bih-cjj2 the ,herero rising1 #cjj-a2 railways1 #cjd-aj2 military preparations1 #cjg1 #caj-ab2 rail connection with ,angola1 #cab-ad2 ,german ,east ,africa ,central ,railway1 #cad-g2 ,katanga district1 #caf2 ,central ,africa1 #cah2 rival railway schemes1 #cai-bj2 railway schemes in the ,cameroons1 #cbj-e2 official admissions1 #cbe-f2 der ,tag and its programme1 #cbf-cj4 ,,agadir ,,crisis1 ,,the3 #cbd4 ,,aggression1 ,,use ,,of ,,railways ,,for3 #cee-f4 ,,alexander ,,the ,,great3 #fc4 ,,alexandretta1 ,,germany ,,and3 #ccd1 #cdc4 ,,alexeiev1 ,,admiral3 #bge4 ,,ambulance ,,trains3 see ,,railway ,,ambulance ,,transport4 ,,american ,,civil ,,war3 ,what it established1 #ac2 railway lines1 #ae2 ,federal ,government and railways1 #af2 mileage taken over1 #ah2 gauge of lines1 #ah2 condition of lines1 #ai2 ,transportation ,department1 #bj-a2 locomotives1 #ba-b2 rolling mills1 #bc2 movement of troops1 #bc-e2 destruction of railways1 #bg-h2 ,construction ,corps1 #bi-cg2 control of railways1 #dc-ej2 protection of1 #ed-e2 armoured cars1 #gb-d2 removal of sick and wounded1 #hf-ia2 ,american precedents followed in ,europe1 #ajd1 #abb1 #aec1 #agg2 surface railroads1 #baj2 the ,civil ,war and the ,south ,african campaign1 #beh 7n474 ,,anatolia3 #cca1 #cce4 ,,anatolian ,,railway1 ,,the3 #ccd4 ,,angola3 #bii1 #cab-d1 #cbj4 ,,armoured ,,trains3 ,protection of railway lines1 #ei2 first suggested1 #fg-i2 proposals of ,lieut4 ,a4 ,walker1 #fi-gj2 of ,col4 ,wethered1 #gj-ga2 of ,lieut4 ,e4 ,p4 ,c4 ,girouard1 #ga-b2 ,civil ,war1 #gb-d2 ,franco-,prussian ,war1 #ge2 ,egyptian ,campaign1 #ge-f1 #bbd2 ,delhi1 #gf2 experiments in ,france1 #gg2 at ,newhaven1 ,sussex1 #gg-i2 ,south ,african ,war1 #gi1 #bdh-eb4 ,,asia ,,minor3 ,germany's share in the ,turkish spoils1 #ccb2 ,germany's colonisation field1 #ccb-c2 proposed ,german protectorate1 #ccc4 ,,aspinall1 ,,mr4 ,j4 ,a4 ,f43 #aig4 ,,atlantic ,,and ,,north ,,carolina ,,railroad3 #cf1 #gc4 ,,australia ,,and ,,the ,,baghdad ,,railway3 #cdb1 #cdd4 ,,austria-,,hungary3 ,early troop movements by rail1 #h-i2 scheme for strategical railways1 #i2 ,italian campaign of #ahei1 #aa-ab2 ,railway ,troops1 #abc2 ,german rail communications1 #bhg4 ,,austro-,,prussian ,,campaign3 ,protection of railways1 #ee1 #ei2 removal of sick and wounded1 #ia-b2 ,prussian mobilisation1 #ajd2 defective transport arrangements1 #ajd-e2 destruction and restoration of railway lines1 #abd-f4 ,,babylonia1 ,,germany ,,and3 #ccb4 ,,baghdad ,,railway1 ,,the3 ,concession1 #ccd2 branches1 #ccd-e2 ,germany's aims1 #ccf2 the conquest of ,egypt1 #cch-dj2 the ,persian ,gulf1 #cda2 ,india1 #cdb2 ,capt4 ,mahan's views1 #cdb2 the desired extension to ,koweit1 #cdc2 what the railway was to accomplish1 #cdd4 ,,balck3 #aaj4 ,,baltimore ,,and ,,ohio ,,railroad3 #bi4 ,,basson1 ,,wilhelm3 #abg4 ,,becker1 ,,lieut43 #afi-gj4 ,,belgium3 ,early ,railways in1 #d-e2 ,german strategical lines on ,belgian frontier1 #bhh-bid2 ,german designs1 #cbc-d1 #cbe-f1 #cbg1 #cbi4 ,b,,rigny1 ,m4 ,,de3 #g4 ,,beyens1 ,,baron3 #cbe4 ,,bigelow1 ,,capt4 ,j43 #ef1 #cdh 7n474 ,,billington1 ,,mr4 ,r4 ,j43 #gh4 ,,bismarck1 ,,prince3 #acf1 #cch4 ,,blockhouses ,,for ,,protection ,,of ,,railways3 #ed1 #eh1 #bde4 ,,boulger1 ,,mr4 ,d4 ,c43 #bhh1 #bid4 ,,boxall1 ,,col4 ,c4 ,g43 #gh4 ,,british ,,central ,,red ,,cross ,,committee3 #ie1 #bed4 ,,british ,,east ,,africa3 #cag1 #cbg4 ,,british ,,south ,,africa3 ,german designs on1 #cja1 #cjb1 #cjc1 #cjh1 #cab1 #cbg4 ,,bryden1 ,,mr4 ,h4 ,a43 #cjj 7n474 ,,budde1 ,h43 #ea4 ,,buller1 ,,sir ,,redvers3 #bed4 ,,burgoyne1 ,,sir ,,john3 #agh1 #bji4 ,,butterworth1 ,,sir ,a4 ,k43 #aig4 ,,caledonian ,,rly43 #aig4 ,,calthrop1 ,,mr4 ,,guy3 #aig4 ,,cameroons1 ,,the3 #cbj-e4 ,,campenau1 ,,gen43 #acg4 ,,canals ,,and ,,troops3 #a4 ,,cape ,,government ,,railways3 #bcg1 #bdj1 #bdf1 #bec4 ,,cape-,,to-,,cairo ,,railway3 #cbj4 ,,central ,,africa3 #cah-bj4 ,,ch,,radame1 ,m4 ,,andr3 #cch4 ,,christian1 ,,princess3 #bed4 ,,clarke1 ,,sir ,,andrew3 #bbd4 ,,coast ,,defence3 #fg1 #agi4 ,,commerce ,,defence ,,league1 ,,the ,,german3 #cjc 7n474 ,,congo1 ,,the ,,belgian3 #cae-cbj1 #cbb-f4 ,,conditions ,,essential ,,to ,,efficiency3 #cej-b4 ,,connor1 ,,maj4 ,w4 ,d43 #eh1 #hj1 #beh 7n474 ,,construction ,,corps3 ,u4,s4,a41 #bj1 #ba1 #bc1 #bi-cg2 ,prussia1 #abb-c1 #abd-h1 #acb-f1 #bae-f1 #bai2 ,austria1 #abc-d2 ,bavaria1 #abg-acc2 ,france1 #abh1 #aeb-d2 ,england1 #aih-bjb2 ,south ,african ,war1 #bdb-e2 ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #bgc-d4 ,,construction ,,of ,,railways3 ,military requirements1 #cej-a4 ,,control ,,of ,,railways ,,in ,,war3 ,conditions of operation1 #dj-c2 ,american ,civil ,war1 #dc-ej2 views of ,baron ,m4 ,m4 von ,weber1 #ej-b2 need for intermediaries1 #eb2 organisation in peace1 #ii2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #ajd-e2 ,german system in #ahgj-ga1 #ajf-aae2 new regulations1 #aae-g2 present system1 #aah-aba2 inefficient military control in ,france in #ahgj-ga1 #aci-adg2 creation of new organisation1 #adi-agj2 ,state control in ,england1 #agf-g2 draft scheme for ,state operation1 #ahe-g2 ,railway ,transport ,officers1 #ahi-aia2 ,south ,african ,war1 #bcc-g1 #bch-i1 #bdi-eb2 ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #bgd-e2 general1 #cea4 ,,cowans1 ,,lieut4-,,gen4 ,,sir ,j4 ,s43 #bjd4 ,,crimean ,,war3 ,deaths from sickness and disease1 #ha2 removal of sick and wounded by railway1 #hc2 transport conditions1 #bjg-h2 construction of military railway1 #bjh2 operation1 #bjh-aj2 recalled by ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #bfj4 ,,cromer1 ,,lord3 #bbi4 ,,danish ,,war 7#ahfd73 #ia1 #ajd4 ,,delagoa ,,bay3 #cjd-e1 #cbg4 ,,delbr,,ck1 ,,prof4 ,,hans3 #ccj4 ,,dent1 ,,mr4 ,c4 ,h43 #aig4 ,,dent1 ,,mr4 ,f4 ,h43 #aig4 ,,destruction ,,of ,,railways3 ,vulnerability1 #bf-g2 early instances1 #bg2 ,american ,civil ,war1 #bg-cg2 ,mexican ,war1 #cg-i2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #abd1 #abe-f2 ,franco-,german ,war1 #abh-cj2 ,south ,african ,war1 #bda-e1 #bef-h2 ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #bgd4 ,,disadvantages ,,of ,,railways3 #cee-f4 ,,dufaure1 ,m43 #g4 ,,dumant1 ,,jean ,,henri3 #hd4 ,,east ,,prussia1 ,,strategical ,,railways ,,in3 #bhc4 ,,egypt3 ,german anticipations of rebellion1 #cbf2 aims against ,egypt1 #cch-i2 conquest to be facilitated by railways1 #cdj4 ,,egyptian ,,campaigns3 ,armoured cars1 #ge-f2 ,railway ,companies1 ,royal ,engineers1 #aii4 ,,eifel ,,district3 ,german strategical railways1 #bhi-bib4 ,,elsenborn1 ,,german ,,camp ,,at3 #bhh-i4 ,,engineer ,,and ,,railway ,,staff ,,corps3 ,formation1 #agi-ahb2 constitution1 #aha-b2 functions and work done1 #ahb-g1 #aib2 supplemented by ,war ,railway ,council1 #ahg4 ,,england1 ,,organisation ,,in3 ,early regulation for troop movements1 #b2 legislative enactments1 #age-g2 invasion prospects and formation of ,volunteer ,corps1 #agh2 ,engineer and ,railway ,staff ,corps1 #agi-ahg2 attitude of ,war ,office1 #ahj2 ,war ,office and defence scheme1 #ahe-g2 ,war ,railway ,council1 #ahg-i2 ,railway ,transport ,officers1 #ahi-aia2 ,railways ,executive ,committee1 #aie-g2 ,railway ,companies1 ,royal ,engineers1 #bjj-b4 ,,ernouf1 ,,baron3 #ada4 ,,evans1 ,,dr4 ,t4 ,w43 #ia4 ,,fay1 ,,sir ,,sam3 #aig4 ,,fieldhouse1 ,,mr4 ,w4 ,j43 #ie4 ,,findlay1 ,,sir ,,george3 #ahd-g1 #aie1 #aif1 #bjb4 ,,forbes1 ,,sir ,,william3 #ahb1 #aig4 ,,formanoir1 ,,captain ,a4 ,,de3 #abd 7n474 ,,fortresses ,,for ,,protection ,,of ,,railways3 #ei4 ,,france3 ,early references in ,french ,chamber1 #f-g2 complaints in #ahdb of ,german aggressive lines1 #g2 early railways1 #g2 railways and the ,italian campaign of #ahei1 #i-aa2 early regulations1 #ach2 ,marshal ,niel's ,commission1 #ach-i2 experiences in ,franco-,german ,war1 #aci-adh2 ,german railway lines on ,french frontiers1 #bhg-h2 ,germany's alternative routes1 via ,luxemburg1 #bhh2 via ,belgium1 #bhh-ic2 ,french possessions in ,africa to be seized by ,germany1 #cbf2 to be demanded as ransom1 #cbi4 ,,france1 ,,organisation ,,in3 ,early regulations1 #ach2 action taken after the ,franco-,german ,war1 #adi-ej2 ,superior ,military ,commission1 #aej1 #aea-b2 ,field ,railway ,sections1 #aec-d2 ,railway ,troops1 #aed-f2 existing organisation1 #aeg-afh2 tests1 #afi2 views of ,german authority1 #afi2 defensive railways1 #agj-d4 ,,franco-,,german ,,war3 ,,france3 ,armoured wagons1 #ge2 rail-transport regulations1 #ach2 the ,niel ,commission1 #ach-i2 despatches by rail1 #aci-dj2 absence of military organisation1 #adj2 confusion and chaos1 #adj-b2 conflicting orders1 #adb2 local authorities1 #adc2 unloading1 #adc-d2 congestion at stations1 #ade-g2 seizure of rolling stock by enemy1 #adg4 ,,franco-,,german ,,war3 ,,germany3 ,safeguarding of railway lines1 #ef-h2 removal of sick and wounded1 #id-e2 rail transport conditions1 #ajf-aae2 ,railway ,troops1 #abg-h2 destruction of lines1 etc41 #abh-cj2 operation of ,french lines by ,germans1 #acj-a2 construction of military lines1 #bae-f4 ,,franc-,,tireurs ,,and ,,railways3 #eg1 #abi-cj4 ,,fraser1 ,r4 ,e41 ,,lieut43 #abi4 ,,fredericksburg ,,railroad3 #bi4 ,,french ,,trans-,,african ,,railway ,,scheme3 #cbb4 ,,frere1 ,,sir ,,bartle3 #big4 ,,friron1 ,,gen43 #fd4 ,,furley1 ,,sir ,,john3 #ie1 #if1 #bed4 ,,gambon1 ,m43 #cbe4 ,,gauge1 ,,railway3 ,various countries1 #fj2 ,russian policy in respect to1 #fa2 experiences in ,russo-,turkish ,war1 #fa1 #bag2 ,germany and ,russian lines1 #bhd-f4 ,,german ,,east ,,africa3 #cad-e1 #caf-g4 ,,german ,,emperor1 ,,the3 ,african railways1 #cba2 visit to ,constantinople1 #ccd2 to ,damascus1 #ccg4 ,,german ,,south-,,west ,,africa3 #bih-cab4 ,,germany ,,and ,,egypt3 #cch-dj4 ,,germany3 ,early proposals for strategical railways1 #b-c2 early railways constructed1 #e2 possible attacks on two fronts1 #e2 aggressive lines1 #g2 early troop transports1 #h2 control of railways in war1 #ej-eb2 railway ambulance transport1 #hd-f1 #ia-c1 #id2 see also ,,germany1 ,,organisation ,,in4 ,,germany1 ,,organisation ,,in3 ,influence of ,american ,civil ,war1 #ajd1 #abb2 ,railway ,section of ,general ,staff formed1 #ajd2 ,danish ,war 7#ahfd71 #ajd2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #ajd-f2 ,route ,service ,regulation1 #ajf-i2 ,franco-,prussian ,war1 #aaj-ae2 further ,regulations1 #aae-f2 ,field ,service ,regulations1 #aag2 present basis of organisation1 #aah-aba2 ,railway ,troops1 #abb-cg4 ,,girouard1 ,,sir ,e4 ,,percy ,c43 #ga1 #bbe1 #bbh1 #bcc-g1 #bch-i1 #bdj-a1 #bdh-i1 #beb1 #beg1 #beh 7n474 ,,goltz1 ,,von ,,der3 #ace1 #aci1 #bhb1 #cdf 7n471 #ceb4 ,,gordon1 ,,gen43 #bba1 #bbb4 ,,graham1 ,,gen4 ,,sir ,g43 #bbc1 #bbd 7n474 ,,granet1 ,,sir ,,guy3 #aig4 ,,grant1 ,,capt4 ,m4 ,h43 #bea4 ,,grant1 ,,gen43 #bb4 ,,great ,,central ,,railway1 #aig4 ,,great ,,eastern ,,rly43 #aid1 #bjd4 ,,great ,,northern ,,rly43 #aid1 #aig1 #bjd4 ,,great ,,western ,,railway3 #aib1 #aie 7n471 #aig4 ,,grey1 ,,earl ,,de3 #ahj4 ,,grund ,,system ,,of ,,railway ,,fittings3 #id4 ,,gurlt1 ,,dr4 ,e43 #ha1 #hd1 #he4 ,,gyulia1 ,,count3 #ab4 ,,halleck1 ,,gen43 #bc-d4 ,,hamley1 ,,gen4 ,,sir ,e43 #bjg1 #cdi 7n474 ,,harkort1 ,f4 ,w43 #b-c4 ,,harrison1 ,,mr4 ,c4 ,w4 ,f43 #bdg4 ,,haupt1 ,,herman3 ,pioneer of ,construction ,corps1 ,u4,s4,a41 #bi-cj2 rebuilding of bridges1 #ca-b2 control questions1 #dc-i2 armoured car1 #gb4 ,,hedjaz ,,railway3 #cce4 ,,herbert1 ,,mr4 ,,sidney3 #ahj4 ,,herff1 ,,herr ,,von3 #cje4 ,,heyer1 ,,mr4 ,a4 ,e43 #cje4 ,,hine1 ,,maj4 ,,charles3 #cg4 ,,hobart1 ,,mr4 ,f43 #gc4 ,,holland3 ,german strategical lines on ,dutch frontier1 #bic-d4 ,,home1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col4 ,r43 #fc4 ,,hood1 ,,gen43 #ce4 ,,hospital ,,trains2 see ,,railway ,,ambulance ,,transport4 ,,india3 ,german anticipations of rebellion1 #cbf2 the ,baghdad railway and ,india1 #cdb1 #cdd4 ,,invasion ,,of ,,england3 ,fears of1 #fg1 #agg-h1 #ahb4 ,,italian ,,campaign 7#ahei73 ,conveyance of troops by rail1 #i-ac2 destruction of railway lines1 #bg2 removal of sick and wounded by rail1 #hd4 ,,jacqmin1 ,m43 #adc1 #adh1 #bce4 ,,jagow1 ,,herr ,,von3 #cbe-f4 ,,joesten1 ,,dr4 ,,josef3 #bha1 #bhc4 ,,kaerger1 ,,dr4 ,,karl3 #ccb-c4 ,,katanga ,,district 7,central ,africa73 #caf-bj4 ,,kelton1 ,j4 ,c43 #ej4 ,,kitchener1 ,,lord3 #eh1 #bbe1 #bbf1 #bbg1 #bbh1 #bbi1 #bci4 ,,kuropatkin1 ,,gen43 #bfc1 #bfi-gj1 #bga1 #bge1 #cee 7n474 ,,lamarque1 ,,gen43 #f4 ,,lancashire ,,and ,,yorkshire ,,rly43 #aig4 ,,land ,,transport ,,corps 7,crimea73 #aha 7n471 #bjh1 #bji4 ,,langhams1 ,,paul3 #cch4 ,,lanoir1 ,m4 ,,paul3 #acf-g4 ,,lattmann1 ,,herr3 #cjf4 ,,ledebour1 ,,herr3 #cjb4 ,,leopold1 ,,king3 #cah1 #cbe4 ,,limitations ,,in ,,usefulness ,,of ,,railways3 #ceb-e4 ,,liverpool ,,and ,,manchester ,,rly43 #a1 #h4 ,,lobito ,,bay ,,rly43 #cad1 #cai-bj4 ,,lodian1 ,,mr4 ,l43 #gc4 ,,london ,,and ,,north ,,western ,,rly43 #aid1 #aig4 ,,london ,,and ,,south ,,western ,,rly43 #aib1 #aic1 #aig1 #aii1 #bja4 ,,london1 ,,brighton ,,and ,,south ,,coast ,,rly43 #gg-h1 #aig4 ,,london1 ,,chatham ,,and ,,dover ,,rly43 #aii4 ,,london1 ,,defence ,,of3 #ga4 ,,lorme1 ,m4 ,,dupuy ,,de3 #ge4 ,,luard1 ,r4 ,e41 ,,capt4 ,c4 ,e43 #bji4 ,l,,deritz1 ,,adolf3 #bih4 ,,luxemburg ,,railways3 #bhh1 #bhi1 #bib4 ,,mccallum1 ,d4 ,g43 ,appointed ,military ,director1 etc41 ,u4 ,s4 railroads1 #ag-ah2 views on situation1 #ai2 creation of ,transportation ,department and ,construction ,corps1 #bj1 #cb-cg2 movement of troops1 #bc-d2 question of control1 #ej2 ,german translation of report1 #abg4 ,,mcdowell1 ,,gen43 #cj1 #ed4 ,,mcmurdo1 ,,gen4 ,,sir ,w4 ,m43 #ahj1 #aha1 #ahb-c4 ,,mahan1 ,,capt4 ,a4 ,t43 #cdb1 #cdd4 ,,manassas ,,gap ,,railway3 #ee4 ,,manby1 ,f4,r4,s41 ,,mr4 ,c43 #ahj4 ,,mangelsdorf1 ,,prof4 ,r43 #cdj4 ,,maquay1 ,r4 ,e41 ,,col4 ,j4 ,p43 #bad4 ,,marschall1 ,m41 #g4 ,,mass,,na1 ,,marshal3 #fd4 ,,matheson1 ,,mr4 ,d4 ,a43 #aig4 ,,meade1 ,,maj4-,,gen4 ,g4 ,g43 #ed4 ,,meigs1 ,,gen43 #dh4 ,,mexico1 ,,railway ,,destruction ,,in3 #cg-i4 ,,midland ,,railway3 #aig4 ,,military ,,operation ,,of ,,railways3 ,civil ,war1 #bj-a2 ,franco-,german ,war1 #acj-a2 ,british organisation1 #age2 ,south ,african ,war1 #bci-da2 ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #cgd4 ,,military ,,railways3 ,description of1 #bje-f2 pioneer military line in ,crimean ,war1 #bjf-aj2 ,american ,civil ,war1 #baj2 ,abyssinian ,campaign1 #baj-ad2 ,franco-,german ,war1 #bae-f2 ,russo-,turkish ,war1 #baf-bj2 the ,sudan1 #bbj-bca2 ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #bgb-c2 general1 #cdi4 ,,millar1 ,r4 ,a41 ,,maj43 #i4 ,,moltke1 ,,von3 #h1 #ajf1 #aji1 #bgh1 #cdf 7n474 ,,morache1 ,,dr43 #ha4 ,,muni 7,spanish73 #cbd4 ,,nance1 ,,capt4 ,h4 ,o43 #hj4 ,,nanton1 ,r4 ,e41 ,,capt4 ,h4 ,c43 #bej4 ,,napier ,,of ,,magdala1 ,,lord3 #baj4 ,,napier1 ,,sir ,,charles3 #agh4 ,,napoleon3 #fb1 #fc1 #fd4 ,,nashville ,,and ,,chattanooga ,,rly43 #cc1 #cd4 ,,natal ,,government ,,railways3 #bcg1 #bdf-h1 #bec4 ,,natal ,,railway ,,pioneer ,,staff3 #bdg4 ,,nathan1 ,r4 ,e41 ,,lieut4 ,m43 #bbc4 ,,national ,,defence ,,act1 #ahhh3 #agg1 #aie4 ,,netherlands ,,south ,,african ,,rly43 #bdj1 #bed-h4 ,,niel1 ,,marshal3 #ach1 #aci4 ,,norton1 ,mr4 ,,roy3 #bhf4 ,,north ,,eastern ,,rly43 #aig4 ,,north ,,missouri ,,railroad3 #bi4 ,o',,connor1 ,,mr4 ,j4 ,k43 #caj-ab1 #cbf-g4 ,,orange ,,and ,,alexandria ,,railroad3 #df1 #ee1 #hh4 ,,osman ,,pasha3 #bah4 ,,panz1 ,,oberst4 ,,von3 #abc4 ,,peel1 ,,gen43 #agf4 ,,pernot1 ,,capt4 ,a43 #agb1 #agd4 ,,philadelphia-,,baltimore ,,railroad3 #gc4 ,,philadelphia ,,railroad3 #hg4 ,,pomerania1 ,,strategical ,,railways ,,in3 #bhc4 ,p,,nitz1 ,c4 ,e43 #d-f1 #bhj4 ,,pope1 ,,gen43 #dc4 ,,porter1 ,,maj4-,,gen4 ,,whitworth3 #bji1 #bbd4 ,,potter1 ,,mr4 ,f43 #aig4 ,,powell1 ,,maj43 #bji4 ,,preparations ,,in ,,peace3 ,need for1 #ih-ajb2 #ajf1 #abc1 #ach1 #adi1 #agh-ahj1 #ahd1 #cea-b4 ,,protection ,,of ,,railways ,,in ,,war3 ,american ,civil ,war1 #ed-e2 blockhouses1 #ed1 #eh2 placing of civilians on engines or trains1 #ee1 #eg-h2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #ee-f2 ,franco-,prussian ,war1 #ef-h2 ,south ,african ,war1 #eh2 permanent fortresses1 #ei2 use of armoured trains1 #ei2 removal of rolling stock1 #ei2 destruction of1 #fj2 different gauge1 #fj-a2 terrorising of civil population1 #cef4 ,,prussian ,,railway ,,troops3 ,formation of ,field ,railway ,section1 #abb2 operations in ,austro-,prussian campaign1 #abc1 #abd-f2 permanent cadre1 #abg2 ,franco-,prussian ,war1 #abg-h1 #acj-a2 ,railway ,battalion1 #acb-d2 ,railway ,regiment1 #acd2 ,communication ,troops1 #acd2 need for ,railway ,troops1 #ace-f2 railwaymen as spies1 #acf-g2 construction of military lines1 #bae-f4 ,,radek1 ,,herr ,,karl3 #cci-dj4 ,,railway ,,ambulance ,,transport3 ,deaths from disease and sickness1 #ha2 importance of prompt removal of sick and wounded1 #hb-c2 ,crimean ,war1 #hc2 ,italian ,war1 #hd2 recommendations by ,dr4 ,gurlt1 #hd-e2 first ,prussian ,commission1 #he2 ,american ,civil ,war1 #hf-ia2 ,danish ,war1 #ia2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #ia-b2 second ,prussian ,commission1 #ib-c2 ,paris ,international ,exhibition 7#ahfg71 #ic2 third ,prussian ,commission1 #id2 ,franco-,prussian ,war1 #id-e2 ,south ,african ,war1 #ie-f1 #bec-d2 methods now in vogue1 #if-g4 ,,railway ,,companies1 ,,royal ,,engineers3 ,formation1 #aii2 services in ,egypt1 #aii2 duties1 #bjj2 training1 #bjj-b2 services in the ,sudan1 #bba-i2 ,south ,african ,war1 #bcc1 #bdj1 #bdb1 #bdc1 #bea4 ,,railway ,,pioneer ,,regiment3 #bdb1 #bdc4 ,,railways ,,executive ,,committee3 #aie-f4 ,,railway ,,transport ,,officers3 #ahi-aia1 #aic-d4 ,,railway ,,wagons1 ,,unloading ,,of3 ,american ,civil ,war1 #df1 #dg-h2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #aje2 ,franco-,german ,war1 #aaa-b1 #add1 #ade2 ,south ,african ,war1 #bcd1 #bch1 #bci4 ,,regulation ,,of ,,the ,,forces ,,act1 #ahga3 #agf1 #agg1 #aie1 #aif1 #aig4 ,,ren1 ,,carl3 #cba-b4 ,,reprisals1 ,,prussia ,,and3 #ee-f4 ,,rhodesia3 #cbj1 #cbb1 #cbg4 ,,roberts1 ,,lord3 #eh1 #bde4 ,,robertus1 ,j4 ,k43 #ccb4 ,,rohrbach1 ,,dr4 ,,paul3 #cch-i1 #cdj4 ,,roon1 ,,von3 #he4 ,,roscher1 ,,wilhelm3 #ccb4 ,,ross1 ,,prof4 ,,ludwig3 #cch4 ,,rothwell1 ,r4 ,a41 ,,col4 ,j4 ,s43 #ahd4 ,,rumigny1 ,,gen43 #c ,,russia3 ,early troop movements by rail1 #h2 policy in respect to railway gauge1 #fa1 #ace-f1 #bag2 military lines built in campaign against ,turkey1 #baf-bbj2 ,german strategical lines on ,russian frontier1 #bhd-g4 ,see also ,,russo-,,japanese ,,war4 ,,russo-,,japanese ,,war3 ,distances from theatre of war1 #bfj2 the ,trans-,siberian ,railway1 #bfa1 #bfb-c2 ,chinese ,eastern ,railway1 #bfa1 #bfb2 unreadiness of ,russia1 #bfc2 ,lake ,baikal1 #bfc1 #bfd-g2 ice railway across the lake1 #bff-g2 circum-,baikal line1 #bfg2 traffic hindrances1 #bfh2 number of trains1 #bfh2 speed1 #bfh2 ,russian reinforcements in driblets1 #bfi2 rail improvements1 #bgj-a2 dependence on railway1 #bga2 results accomplished1 #bga-b2 field railways1 #bgb-c2 ,railway ,troops1 #bgc-d2 operation1 #bgd2 control1 #bgd-f1 #cee 7n474 ,,russo-,,turkish ,,war3 ,railway gauge1 #fa2 construction of military railways1 #baf-bj4 ,,sa,d ,,pasha3 #bba4 ,,samassa1 ,,dr4 ,,paul3 #cja-b4 ,,sarolea1 ,,dr4 ,,charles3 #ccg4 ,,sch,,ffer1 ,e43 #aac 7n474 ,,schleswig-,,holstein3 ,german strategical lines1 #bid4 ,,schofield1 ,,gen43 #bd4 ,,scott1 ,,maj4-,,gen4 ,d4 ,a43 #aha4 ,,sherman1 ,,gen4 ,w4 ,t43 #ai1 #cd-f1 #ed1 #fe4 ,,sick ,,and ,,wounded ,,in ,,war3 ,evacuation hospitals1 #afg2 infirmary stations1 #afg2 distribution stations1 #afg2 general1 #cdi-ej4 ,see also1 ,,railway ,,ambulance ,,transport4 ,,south ,,african ,,war3 ,removal of locomotives and rolling stock1 #ei-fj2 hospital trains1 #ie-f1 #bec-d2 transport of troops for embarkation1 #aic2 ,south ,african railways1 #bcb-c2 creation of ,department of ,military ,railways1 #bcc2 control questions1 #bcc-e2 basis of organisation1 #bce-g2 transport conditions1 #bcg-h2 how the system worked1 #bch-i2 ,imperial ,military ,railways1 #bci-dj2 need for operating staff organised in time of peace1 #bdj-a2 destruction and repair of lines1 etc41 #bda-e2 ,railway ,pioneer ,regiment1 #bdb2 blockhouses1 #bde2 military traffic1 #bde-f2 miscellaneous services1 #bdf-h2 armoured trains1 #bdh-eb2 operation of ,netherlands ,south ,african ,railway by ,boers1 #bed-i2 the war and rail-power1 #beh-i4 ,,south ,,carolina ,,railroad3 #cf4 ,,south ,,eastern ,,and ,,chatham ,,rly43 #aig4 ,,south ,,eastern ,,rly43 #aii4 ,,sprenger1 ,,dr4 ,a43 #ccb4 ,,stanton1 ,,mr43 #bc1 #bi4 ,,stavelot-,,malm,,dy ,,line3 #bhh-bib4 ,,steinnetz1 ,,mr4 ,t43 #bee-h4 ,,strategical ,,movements ,,by ,,rail3 #ab1 #be1 #bde-f1 #cdf4 ,,strategical ,,railways3 ,early proposals in ,germany1 #b1 #e-f1 #g2 ,france1 #g2 ,austria1 #i2 defensive lines in ,france1 #agj-d2 position in ,great ,britain1 #bjb2 connecting links1 #bjc2 attitude of ,parliament1 #bjc2 ,northern ,junction line1 #bjc-d2 nature of strategical railways1 #bgg-hj2 ideal conditions1 #bgi-ha2 position in ,germany1 #bha-d2 ,pomerania and ,east ,prussia1 #bhc-d2 ,russian frontier1 #bhd-g2 southern ,silesia1 #bhg2 ,french frontier1 #bhg-h2 ,belgian frontier1 #bhh-ic2 ,dutch frontier1 #bic-d2 ,schleswig-,holstein1 #bid2 ,german ,south-,west ,africa1 #cjd-i2 ,angola1 #cab-d2 ,german ,east ,africa1 #cad-e2 ,cameroons1 #cbj-d2 ,baghdad ,railway1 #ccd-cdd4 ,,stuart-,,stephens1 ,,maj43 #bij 7n474 ,,sturgis1 ,,gen43 #dd4 ,,suakin-,,berber ,,line3 #aii1 #bbc-e4 ,,supplies ,,for ,,troops3 ,war of ,secession1 #ae-af1 #df2 living on the country1 #fc1 #fd1 #fe2 conditions in pre-railway days1 #fc-d2 discipline1 #fd2 road transport1 #fe2 advantages of rail transport1 #fe-f2 defective organisation1 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #aje2 new system for ,germany1 #ajg2 ,franco-,german ,war1 #aaj-aac1 #adc-f2 present ,french system1 #afd-f2 general1 #cdg-h4 ,,surface ,,railroads ,,in ,,the ,,american ,,civil ,,war3 #baj4 ,,sudan1 ,,the3 ,early railway schemes1 #bba2 ,wady ,halfa-,sarras line1 #bba2 extension for expedition of #ahhd1 #bba-b2 abandonment1 #bbb2 results attained1 #bbc2 ,suakin-,berber line1 #bbc-e2 ,nile ,valley line1 reconstructed and extended1 #bbe-f2 ,nubian ,desert line1 #bbf-g2 extension to ,atbara1 #bbh2 ,khartoum1 #bbi2 ,el ,obeid1 #bbi2 military results1 #bbh2 services to civilisation1 #bcj-a2 ,germany and the ,sudan1 #cba-b4 ,,suv,,roff3 #fb4 ,,szlumper1 ,,mr4 ,g4 ,s43 #aig4 ,,tactical ,,movements ,,by ,,rail3 #cdf4 ,,thiers1 ,m43 #fd4 ,,thornhill1 ,,mr4 ,j4 ,b43 #caf4 ,,thomas1 ,,gen4 ,g4 ,h43 #hi4 ,,tovey1 ,r4 ,e41 ,,lieut4-,,col43 #ced 7n474 ,,town1 ,,dr4 ,f4 ,l43 #ij4 ,,trans-,,siberian ,,rly4 ,see ,,russo-,,japanese ,,war4 ,,transvaal1 ,,germany ,,and ,,the3 #cjd1 #cje1 #caa1 #cbg4 ,,troop ,,movements ,,by ,,rail3 ,early1 #h2 ,italian campaign of #ahei1 #i-ab2 ,civil ,war1 #bc-e2 quicker transport1 #fb2 more complete numbers1 #fb-c2 ,danish ,war of #ahfd1 #ajd2 ,austro-,prussian ,war1 #ajd2 ,franco-,prussian ,war1 #aaj1 #aci-adj2 ,volunteer reviews and army manoeuvres1 #aib1 #aid2 ,south ,african ,war1 #aic1 #bde-f2 ,russo-,japanese ,war1 #bfi1 #bga2 general1 #cde-f1 #ceb-d4 ,,turkey1 ,,asiatic3 ,germany's ,land of ,promise1 #cca4 ,,turkey3 ,germany's designs against1 #cca1 #ccf-dj4 ,,unger1 ,l4 ,a43 #f4 ,,vickers1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,c4 ,e43 #bgd4 ,,vigo-,,rouissillon1 ,m43 #cf4 ,,volunteer ,,corps ,,in ,,great ,,britain3 #fg1 #agh-i1 #ahb1 #aia-b4 ,,walker1 ,,lieut4 ,,arthur3 #fi4 ,,walker1 ,,sir ,,herbert ,a43 #aig4 ,,walter1 ,,maj4 ,j43 #aia-b4 ,,war ,,railway ,,council1 ,,the3 #ahg-i1 #aic1 #aif4 ,,waters1 ,,col4 ,w4 ,h4 ,h43 #bgd1 #bge4 ,,watson1 ,,col4 ,,sir ,,charles3 #bbh4 ,,watson1 ,,mr4 ,p4 ,h43 #gb4 ,,webber1 ,r4,e41 ,,capt4 ,c4 ,e43 #ee1 #abe1 #abf4 ,,weber1 ,,baron1 ,m4 ,m4 ,,von3 #ej-b4 ,,weber1 ,,ernst ,,von3 #big1 #ccj4 ,,weeks1 ,g4 ,e43 #cg-h4 ,,wellington1 ,,duke ,,of3 #fe1 #agg4 ,,weltpolitik3 #cca1 #cdb1 #cdd1 #cef4 ,,wernekke1 ,,regierungsrat3 #h4 ,,western ,,and ,,atlantic ,,rly43 #cd4 ,,westphalen1 ,h4 ,l43 #abd4 ,,wethered1 ,,col4 ,e4 ,r43 #gj4 ,,wheeler1 ,,gen43 #cd4 ,,willans1 ,r4,e41 ,,lieut43 #baa1 #bac4 ,,wilson1 ,,president3 #ccj4 ,,wolseley1 ,,lord3 #aii1 #bbb1 #bbc4 ,,wright1 ,c4,e41 ,mr4 ,t43 #gj4 ,,zavodovski ,,system ,,of ,,railway ,,fittings3 #id4 ,,zimmermann1 ,,emil3 #cbb-e4 ,p4 ,s4 ,,king ,,son1 ,,ltd41 ,orchard ,house1 ,westminster1 ,london1 ,s4,w4 ,,works ,,by ,,edwin ,a4 ,,pratt4 ,a ,,history ,,of ,,inland ,,transport ,,and ,,communication ,,in ,,england4 ,,contents4 ,,chap4 ,i ,,introductory ,,ii ,,britain',s ,,earliest ,,roads ,,iii ,,roads ,,and ,,the ,,church ,,iv ,,early ,,trading ,,conditions ,v ,,early ,,road ,,legislation ,,vi ,,early ,,carriages ,,vii ,,loads1 ,,wheels ,,and ,,roads ,,viii ,,the ,,coaching ,,era ,,ix ,,the ,,age ,,of ,,bad ,,roads ,x ,,the ,,turnpike ,,system ,,xi ,,trade ,,and ,,transport ,,in ,,the ,,turnpike ,,era ,,xii ,,scientific ,,road-,,making ,,xiii ,,rivers ,,and ,,river ,,transport ,,xiv ,,river ,,improvement ,,and ,,industrial ,,expansion ,,xv ,,disadvantages ,,of ,,river ,,navigation ,,xvi ,,the ,,canal ,,era ,,xvii ,,the ,,industrial ,,revolution ,,xviii ,,evolution ,,of ,,the ,,railway ,,xix ,,the ,,railway ,,era ,,xx ,,railway ,,expansion ,,xxi ,,railways ,,and ,,the ,,state ,,xxii ,,decline ,,of ,,canals ,,xxiii ,,decline ,,of ,,turnpikes ,,xxiv ,,end ,,of ,,the ,,coaching ,,era ,,xxv ,,railway ,,rates ,,and ,,charges ,,xxvi ,,the ,,railway ,,system ,,to-,,day ,,xxvii ,,what ,,the ,,railways ,,have ,,done ,,xxviii ,,railways ,a ,,national ,,industry ,,xxix ,,tramways1 ,,motor-,,buses ,,and ,,rail-,,less ,,electric ,,traction ,,xxx ,,cycles1 ,,motor-,,vehicles ,,and ,,tubes ,,xxxi ,,the ,,outlook ,,authorities ,,index xii4 #ecb pp4 #fs4 net4 ,by post1 #fs4 #d;d4 ,,railways ,,in ,,america4 ,,american ,,railways4 #caj pp4 #bs4 #f;d4 net4 ,by post1 #bs4 #aj;d4 ,a reprint1 with additions1 of a series of articles contributed to ,the ,times4 ,,railways ,,in ,,germany4 ,,german v4 ,,british ,,railways3 ,with special reference to ,owner's ,risk and ,traders' ,claims4 #fd pp4 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #b;d4 ,,german ,,railways ,,and ,,traders4 #df pp4 #f;d4 net4 ,by post1 #g;d4 ,a digest of the ,board of ,trade ,railway ,conference report on ,german ,railways4 ,,railways ,,and ,,the ,,state4 ,,the ,,case ,,against ,,railway ,,nationalisation4 #bfd pp4 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #c;d4 ,published in ,the ,nation's ,library4 ,,railways ,,and ,,nationalisation4 #def pp4 #bs4 #f;d4 net4 ,by post1 #bs4 #aj;d4 ,,irish ,,railways ,,and ,,their ,,nationalisation4 #dd pp4 #f;d4 net4 ,by post1 #g;d4 ,a detailed criticism of the report of the ,vice-,regal ,commission4 ,,state ,,railways4 #ajh pp4 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #b;d4 ,includes a translation of ,m4 ,marcel ,peschaud's articles on ,les ,chemins de ,fer de l'tat ,belge4 ,,railways ,,and ,,traders4 ,,railways ,,and ,,their ,,rates4 #cfb pp4 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #c;d4 ,,canals4 ,,canals ,,and ,,traders4 #abd pp4 ,nine maps and diagrams1 #dc photographs4 ,cloth1 #bs4 #f;d4 net4 ,by post1 #bs4 #aj;d4 ,paper covers1 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #c;d4 ,the ,argument ,pictorial1 as applied to the ,report of the ,royal ,commission on ,canals and ,waterways4 ,,agriculture4 ,,the ,,organisation ,,of ,,agriculture4 #dgd pp4 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #c;d4 ,,agricultural ,,organisation3 ,its ,rise1 ,principles and ,practice ,abroad and at ,home4 #bgj pp4 #cs4 #f;d4 net4 ,by post1 #cs4 #aj;d4 ,cheap edition1 #afc pp41 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #b;d4 ,,small ,,holders3 ,,what ,,they ,,must ,,do ,,to ,,succeed4 #bdh pp4 #as4 net4 ,by post1 #as4 #b;d4 ,any of the above works will be forwarded by post1 at the prices mentioned1 by ,p4 ,s4 ,,king ,,son1 ,ltd41 ,orchard ,house1 ,westminster1 ,london1 ,s4,w4 ,transcriber's ,notes ,obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics repaired4 ,note3 ,lige was the correct spelling at that time for what is now written ,lige4 ,hyphen removed3 break-down 7p4 #ajh71 earth-work 7p4 #bai71 inter-communication 7p4 #agc71 plate-laying 7pp4 #bba1 #bbb71 rail-head 7pp4 #ff1 #ig1 #ajh71 re-built 7p4 #bff71 re-organisation 7p4 #bfd71 ,south-,african 7p4 #djb71 station-master 7p4 #ade71 store-houses 7pp4 #add1 #afd71 text-books 7p4 #acc71 turn-tables 7p4 #abd71 wide-spread 7pp4 #ae1 #hb74 ,the following variants appear frequently and have not been changed3 block-house _/ blockhouse1 head-quarter7s7 _/ headquarter7s71 sub-division7s7 _/ subdivision7s74 ,p4 #e3 ,leipsig changed to ,leibzig 7,leipzig-,dresden line74 ,p4 #ae3 seceeded changed to seceded 7the ,states which had seceded74 ,p4 #ag3 ,ctiy changed to ,city 7,washington ,city1 ,d4,c474 ,p4 #ca3 ,goose ,greek changed to ,goose ,creek4 ,p4 #aje3 7#c7 changed to 7#d7 77#d7 secure the prompt unloading74 ,p4 #ahe3 ,mazagine changed to ,magazine 7,united ,service ,magazine74 ,p4 #aie3 ,raliway changed to ,railway 7,great ,western ,railway ,magazine74 ,p4 #bah3 dependance changed to dependence 7to dependence on the railway74 ,p4 #bdf3 in4 added 7#dg in4 guns74 ,p4 #bgc3 de changed to des 7des chemins de fer74 ,p4 #bgc3 ,juni changed to ,juin4 ,p4 #bhd3 added 7#d feet #h inches74 ,p4 #bij3 moblisation changed to mobilisation 7on mobilisation1 or elsewhere74 ,p4 #bij3 pursuading changed to persuading 7persuading the ,belgian ,government74 ,p4 #bif3 promotor changed to promotors 7the aims of their promoters74 ,p4 #cjc3 enlightment changed to enlightenment 7not so blind as to need enlightenment74 ,p4 #cjf3 between changed to between 7communication between ,swakopmund and the capital74 ,p4 #cae3 ,renseignments changed to ,renseignements 7,renseignements coloniaux74 ,p4 #cba3 ,expediton changed to ,expedition 7,kamerun-,eisenbahn-,expedition74 ,p4 #cbh3 possesssion changed to possession 7into a ,german possession74 ,p4 #cej3 tranverse changed to transverse 7transverse lines connecting them74 ,p4 #cee3 diciplined changed to disciplined 7old and well-disciplined units74 ,p4 #cee1 footnote #hb3 added no 7no harm was done74 ,p4 #cgc3 ,railway gauges changed to be consistently #c ft4 #f in41 #e ft4 #c in41 #d ft4 #h-a_/b in4 ,p4 #cgg3 ,erterung changed to ,errterung 7gegrndeter ,errterung ber die militrische ,benutzung74 ,p4 #cgg3 militrischen changed to militrische 7,eisenbahnen fr militrische ,zwecke74 ,p4 #cgh3 militrische changed to militrischer 7in militrische ,hinsicht74 ,p4 #chg3 ,heidelburg changed to ,heidelberg4 ,p4 #chh3 ,fielddienst changed to ,felddienst 7,felddienst ,ordnung74 ,p4 #chi3 ,lehrer changed to ,lehre 7,kurze ,lehre ihrer wichtigsten ,grundstze74 ,p4 #cic3 ,revista ,technica changed to ,rivista ,tecnica4 ,p4 #dja3 ,index entry for ,germany1 ,organisation in1 present basis of organisation changed from #ahh-aba to #aah-aba4