,transcriber's note3        ,the  
letters ,a and ,b with the plus sign at 
the top      are shown as ,a and ,b4    
,a       ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy    
,,in ,,epitome1       ,,by       ,,dr4  
,,albert ,,schwegler4       ,,translated
 ,,from ,,the ,,original ,,german1      
,,by       ,,julius ,h4 ,,seelye4       
,,third ,,edition4       ,,new ,,york3  
,d4 ,,appleton ,,and ,,company1     #ddc
  #dde ,,broadway4     ,,london3 #af    
,,little ,,britain4     #ahfd4          
,,entered1 according to act of          
,congress1 in the year #ahef1    ,,by   
,,julius ,h4 ,,seelye1    ,in the       
,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court
 of the ,united ,states for the         
,northern ,district of ,new ,york4      
,,introductory ,,note    ,,by ,,henry   
,b4 ,,smith1 ,d4 ,d4      ,the ,history 
of ,philosophy1 by ,dr4 ,albert         
,schwegler1 is considered in  ,germany  
as the best concise manual upon the     
subject from the school of  ,hegel4 ,its
 account of the ,greek and of the       

,german systems1 is of  especial value  
and importance4 ,it presents the whole  
history of  speculation in its          
consecutive order4 ,though following the
 method of  ,hegel's more extended      
lectures upon the progress of           
philosophy1 and  though it makes the    
system of ,hegel to be the ripest       
product of  philosophy1 yet it also     
rests upon independent investigations4  
,it will  well reward diligent study1   
and is one of the best works for a      
text-book  in our colleges1 upon this   
neglected branch of scientific          
investigation4  ,the translation is made
 by a competent person1 and gives1 ,i   
doubt not1 a  faithful rendering of the 
original4         ,,henry ,b4 ,,smith4  
,,union ,,theological ,,seminary1 ,,new 
,,york1 ,nov4 #f1 #ahee4                
,,translator',s ,,preface4              
,schwegler's ,history of ,philosophy    
originally appeared in the 8,neue       
,encyklopdie fr ,wissenschaften und     
,knste40 ,its great value soon  awakened

 a call for its separate issue1 in which
 form it has attained a  very wide      
circulation in ,germany4 ,it is found in
 the hands of almost  every student in  
the philosophical department of a       
,german university1  and is highly      
esteemed for its clearness1 conciseness1
 and  comprehensiveness4    ,the present
 translation was commenced in ,germany  
three years ago1 and  has been carefully
 finished4 ,it was undertaken with the  
conviction that  the work would not lose
 its interest or its value in an        
,english dress1  and with the hope that 
it might be of wider service in such a  
form to  students of philosophy here4   
,it was thought especially1 that a      
proper  translation of this manual would
 supply a want for a suitable text-book 
on this branch of study1 long felt by   
both teachers and students in our       
,american colleges4    ,the effort has  
been made to translate1 and not to      
paraphrase the  author's meaning4 ,many 
of his statements might have been       

amplified  without diffuseness1 and made
 more perceptible to the superficial    
reader  without losing their interest to
 the more profound student1 but he has  
so happily seized upon the germs of the 
different systems1 that they  neither   
need1 nor would be improved by any      
farther development1 and has1  moreover1
 presented them so clearly1 that no     
student need have any  difficulty in    
apprehending them as they are4 ,the     
translator has  therefore endeavored to 
represent faithfully and clearly the    
original  history4 ,as such1 he offers  
his work to the ,american public1       
indulging  no hope1 and making no       
efforts for its success beyond that     
which its own  merits shall ensure4     
,j4 ,h4 ,s4       ,,schenectady1 ,n4    
,y41 ,january1 #ahef4      ,,contents4  
,,page       ,,introductory ,,note1 by  
,,henry ,b4 ,,smith1 ,d4 ,d4            
iii       ,,translator',s ,,preface     
v       ,,table ,,of ,,contents         
vii       ,,section ,i4--,,what ,,is    

,,meant ,,by ,,the ,,history ,,of       
,,philosophy               #aa          
,,ii4--,,classification                 
#af             ,,iii4--,,general ,,view
 ,,of ,,the ,,pre-,,socratic            
,,philosophy              #ag           
#a4 ,the ,ionics                        
#ag                  #b4 ,the           
,pythagoreans                           
#ah                  #c4 ,the ,eleatics 
#ah                  #d4 ,heraclitus    
#ah                  #e4 ,the ,atomists 
#ai                  #f4 ,anaxagoras    
#ai                  #g4 ,the ,sophists 
#bj              ,,iv4--,,the ,,ionic   
,,philosophers                          
#ba                  #a4 ,thales        
#ba                  #b4 ,anaximander   
#bb                  #c4 ,anaximenes    
#bc                  #d4 ,retrospect    
#bc               ,v4--,,pythagoreanism 
#bc                  #a4 ,its ,relative 
,position                               
#bc                  #b4 ,historical and
 ,chronological                         

#bc                  #c4 ,the           
,pythagorean ,principle                 
#bd                  #d4 ,carrying out  
of this ,principle                      
#be              ,,vi4--,,the ,,eleatics
                                        
#bg                  #a4 ,the ,relation 
of the ,eleatic ,principle              
to the ,pythagorean                     
#bg                  #b4 ,xenophanes    
#bh                  #c4 ,parmenides    
#bh                  #d4 ,zeno          
#cj             ,,vii4--,,heraclitus    
#ca                  #a4 ,relation of   
the ,heraclitic ,principle              
to the ,eleatic                         
#ca                  #b4 ,historical and
 ,chronological                         
#cb                  #c4 ,the ,principle
 of the ,becoming                       
#cb                  #d4 ,the ,principle
 of ,fire                               
#cc                  #e4 ,transition to 
the ,atomists                           
#cc            ,,viii4--,,empedocles    

#ce                  #a4 ,general ,view 
#ce                  #b4 ,the ,four     
,elements                               
#ce                  #c4 ,the ,two      
,powers                                 
#cf                  #d4 ,relation of   
the ,empedoclean to the ,eleatic        
and ,heraclitic ,philosophy             
#cf              ,,ix4--,,the           
,,atomistic ,,philosophy                
#cg                  #a4 ,its           
,propounders                            
#cg                  #b4 ,the ,atoms    
#cg                  #c4 ,the ,fulness  
and the ,void                           
#ch                  #d4 ,the ,atomistic
 ,necessity                             
#ch                  #e4 ,relative      
,position of the ,atomistic ,philosophy 
#ci               ,x4--,,anaxagoras     
#dj                  #a4 ,his ,personal 
,history                                
#dj                  #b4 ,his ,relation 
to his ,predecessors                    
#da                  #c4 ,the ,principle

 of the                            #da  
#d4 ,anaxagoras as the close of the     
,pre-,socratic                          
,realism                                
#db              ,,xi4--,,the           
,,sophistic ,,philosophy                
#dc                  #a4 ,the ,relation 
of the ,sophistic ,philosophy to        
the ,anaxagorean ,principle             
#dc                  #b4 ,relation of   
the ,sophistic ,philosophy to the       
,universal ,life of that ,age           
#dd                  #c4 ,tendencies of 
the ,sophistic ,philosophy              
#df                  #d4 ,significance  
of the ,sophistic ,philosophy from      
its relation to the ,culture of the ,age
            #dg                  #e4    
,individual ,sophists                   
#dh                  #f4 ,transition to 
,socrates1 and characteristic           
of the following ,period                
#ea             ,,xii4--,,socrates      
#eb                  #a4 ,his ,personal 
,character                              

#eb                  #b4 ,socrates and  
,aristophanes                           
#ee                  #c4 ,the           
,condemnation of ,socrates              
#eg                  #d4 ,the ,genius of
 ,socrates                              
#fj                  #e4 ,sources of the
 ,philosophy of ,socrates               
#fa                  #f4 ,universal     
,character of the ,philosophizing       
of ,socrates                            
#fb                  #g4 ,the ,socratic 
,method                                 
#fd                  #h4 ,the ,socratic 
,doctrine concerning ,virtue            
#ff            ,,xiii4--,,the ,,partial 
,,disciples ,,of ,,socrates             
#fg                  #a4 ,their         
,relation to the ,socratic ,philosophy  
#fg                  #b4 ,antisthenes   
and the ,cynics                         
#fh                  #c4 ,aristippus and
 the ,cyrenians                         
#fi                  #d4 ,euclid and the
 ,megarians                             

#gj                  #e4 ,plato as the  
complete ,socraticist                   
#ga             ,,xiv4--,,plato         
#gb                  ,i4 ,,plato',s     
,,life                                  
#gb                       #a4 ,his      
,youth                                  
#gb                       #b4 ,his      
,years of ,discipline                   
#gc                       #c4 ,his      
,years of ,travel                       
#gc                       #d4 ,his      
,years of ,instruction                  
#gd                   ,,ii4 ,,the       
,,inner ,,development ,,of ,,the        
,,platonic ,,philosophy                 
,,and ,,writings                        
#ge                  ,,iii4             
,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,platonic  
,,system               #hb              
,,iv4 ,,the ,,platonic ,,dialectics     
#hc                       #a4           
,conception of ,dialectics              
#hc                       #b4 ,what is  
,science8                               

#hd                           7#a47 ,as 
opposed to ,sensation                   
#hd                           7#b47 ,the
 ,relation of ,knowing to ,opinion      
#hf                           7#c47 ,the
 ,relation of ,science to ,thinking     
#hf                       #c4 ,the      
,doctrine of ,ideas in its ,genesis     
#hg                       #d4 ,positive 
,exposition of the ,doctrine of ,ideas  
#ia                       #e4 ,the      
,relation of ,ideas to the ,phenomenal  
,world  #ic                       #f4   
,the ,idea of the ,good and the ,deity  
#ie                    ,v4 ,,the        
,,platonic ,,physics                    
#if                       #a4 ,nature   
#if                       #b4 ,the ,soul
                                        
#ih                   ,,vi4 ,,the       
,,platonic ,,ethics                     
#ajj                       #a4 ,good and
 ,pleasure                              
#ajj                       #b4 ,virtue  
#ajb                       #c4 ,the     

,state                                  
#ajb              ,,xv4--,,the ,,old    
,,academy                               
#ajg             ,,xvi4--,,aristotle    
#ajh                  ,i4 ,,life ,,and  
,,writings ,,of ,,aristotle             
#ajh                 ,,ii4 ,,universal  
,,character ,,and ,,division ,,of ,,the 
,,aristotelian ,,philosophy             
#aji                ,,iii4 ,,logic ,,and
 ,,metaphysics                          
#aab                       #a4          
,conception and ,relation of the ,two   
#aab                       #b4 ,logic   
#aac                       #c4          
,metaphysics                            
#aae                           7#a47    
,the ,aristotelian ,criticism of        
the ,platonic ,doctrine of ,ideas       
#aaf                           7#b47    
,the ,four ,aristotelian ,principles1   
or ,causes1 and the ,relation           
of ,form and ,matter                    
#abj                           7#c47    
,potentiality and ,actuality            

#abc                           7#d47    
,the ,absolute ,divine ,spirit          
#abd                 ,,iv4 ,,the        
,,aristotelian ,,physics                
#abg                       #a4 ,motion1 
,matter1 ,space1 and ,time              
#abg                       #b4 ,the     
,collective ,universe                   
#abh                       #c4 ,nature  
#abi                       #d4 ,man     
#abi                  ,v4 ,,the         
,,aristotelian ,,ethics                 
#aca                       #a4 ,relation
 of ,ethics to ,physics                 
#aca                       #b4 ,the     
,highest ,good                          
#acb                       #c4          
,conception of ,virtue                  
#acd                       #d4 ,the     
,state      #ace                 ,,vi4  
,,the ,,peripatetic ,,school            
#acf                ,,vii4 ,,transition 
,,to ,,the ,,post-,,aristotelian        
,,philosophy     #acg                   
,,xvii4--,,stoicism                     

#ach                  #a4 ,logic        
#aci                  #b4 ,physics      
#adj                  #c4 ,ethics       
#adb                       7#a47        
,respecting the ,relation of ,virtue    
to ,pleasure                            
#adb                       7#b47 ,the   
,view of the ,stoics concerning         
,external ,good                         
#adb                       7#c47        
,farther ,verification of this ,view    
#adc                       7#d47        
,impossibility of furnishing a ,system  
of ,concrete ,moral ,duties from this   
,standpoint                             
#adc           ,,xviii4-,,epicureanism  
#ade             ,,xix4--,,scepticism   
,,and ,,the ,,new ,,academy             
#adh                  #a4 ,the ,old     
,scepticism                             
#adi                  #b4 ,the ,new     
,academy                                
#aej                  #c4 ,the ,later   
,scepticism                             
#aea              ,,xx4--,,the ,,romans 

#aeb             ,,xxi4--,,new          
,,platonism                             
#aed                  #a4 ,ecstasy as a 
,subjective ,state                      
#aed                  #b4 ,the ,cosmical
 ,principles                            
#aed                  #c4 ,the          
,emanation ,theory of the ,new          
,platonists         #aee                
,,xxii4--,,christianity ,,and           
,,scholasticism                         
#aeg                  #a4 ,the          
,christian ,idea                        
#aeg                  #b4 ,scholasticism
                                        
#aei                  #c4 ,nominalism   
and ,realism                            
#afj           ,,xxiii4--,,transition   
,,to ,,the ,,modern ,,philosophy        
#afa                  #a4 ,fall of      
,scholasticism                          
#afa                  #b4 ,the ,results 
of ,scholasticism                       
#afb                  #c4 ,the ,revival 
of ,letters                             

#afc                  #d4 ,the ,german  
,reformation                            
#afd                  #e4 ,the          
,advancement of the ,natural ,sciences  
#afe                  #f4 ,bacon of     
,verulam                                
#aff                  #g4 ,the ,italian 
,philosophers of the ,transition ,epoch 
#afg                  #h4 ,jacob ,boehme
                                        
#afi            ,,xxiv4--,,descartes    
#agb                  #a4 ,the          
,beginning of ,philosophy with ,doubt   
#agc                  #b4 ,cogito ergo  
sum                                     
#agc                  #c4 ,the ,nature  
of ,mind deduced from this ,principle   
#agc                  #d4 ,the          
,universal ,rule of all ,certainty      
follows from                       the  
same                                    
#agd                  #e4 ,the          
,existence of ,god                      
#agd                  #f4 ,results of   
this ,fact in ,philosophy               

#agf                  #g4 ,the ,two     
,substances                             
#agg                  #h4 ,the          
,anthropology of ,descartes             
#agg                  #i4 ,results of   
the ,cartesian ,system                  
#agh             ,,xxv4--,,geulincx     
,,and ,,malebranche                     
#ahj                  #a4 ,geulincx     
#ahj                  #b4 ,malebranche  
#ahb                  #c4 ,the ,defects 
of the ,philosophy of ,descartes        
#ahc            ,,xxvi4--,,spinoza      
#ahd                  #a4 ,the ,one     
,infinite ,substance                    
#ahe                  #b4 ,the ,two     
,attributes                             
#ahf                  #c4 ,the ,modes   
#ahh                  #d4 ,his          
,practical ,philosophy                  
#ahi           ,,xxvii4--,,idealism     
,,and ,,realism                         
#aib          ,,xxviii4--,,locke        
#aic            ,,xxix4--,,hume         
#aih             ,,xxx4--,,condillac    

#bja            ,,xxxi4--,,helvetius    
#bjc           ,,xxxii4-,,the ,,french  
,,clearing ,,up ,,and ,,materialism     
#bje                  #a4 ,the ,common  
,character of the ,french ,philosophers 
of this ,age                            
#bje                  #b4 ,voltaire     
#bjf                  #c4 ,diderot      
#bjf                  #d4 ,la ,mettrie's
 ,materialism                           
#bjg                  #e4 ,systme de la 
,nature                                 
#bjh                       7#a47 ,the   
,materiality of ,man                    
#bjh                       7#b47 ,the   
,atheism of this ,system                
#bji                       7#c47 ,its   
,denial of ,freedom and ,immortality    
#baj                       7#d47 ,the   
,practical ,consequences of these       
,principles                             
#baj          ,,xxxiii4--,,leibnitz     
#baa                  #a4 ,the ,doctrine
 of ,monads                             
#bac                  #b4 ,the ,monads  

more accurately determined              
#bad                  #c4 ,the          
,pre-established ,harmony               
#bae                  #d4 ,the ,relation
 of the ,deity to the ,monads           
#baf                  #e4 ,the ,relation
 of ,soul and ,body                     
#bag                  #f4 ,the ,theory  
of ,knowledge                           
#bah                  #g4 ,leibnitz's   
,thodice                                
#bai           ,,xxxiv4--,,berkeley     
#bbj            ,,xxxv4--,,wolff        
#bbb                  #a4 ,ontology     
#bbd                  #b4 ,cosmology    
#bbe                  #c4 ,rational     
,psychology                             
#bbe                  #d4 ,natural      
,theology                               
#bbf           ,,xxxvi4--,,the ,,german 
,,clearing ,,up                         
#bbg          ,,xxxvii4--,,transition   
,,to ,,kant                             
#bbi                  #a4 ,examination  
of the ,faculty of ,knowledge           

#bcj                  #b4 ,three ,chief 
,principles of the ,kantian ,theory     
of ,knowledge                           
#bcb         ,,xxxviii4--,,kant         
#bce                  ,i4 ,,critick ,,of
 ,,pure ,,reason                        
#bch                       #a4 ,the     
,transcendental sthetics                
#bch                            7#a47   
,the ,metaphysical ,discussion          
#bci                            7#b47   
,the ,transcendental ,discussion        
#bci                       #b4 ,the     
,transcendental ,analytic               
#bda                       #c4 ,the     
,transcendental ,dialectics             
#bdf                             7#a47  
,the ,psychological ,ideas              
#bdg                             7#b47  
,the ,antinomies of ,cosmology          
#bdh                             7#c47  
,the ,ideal of the ,pure ,reason        
#bdi                                    
7a47 ,the ,ontological ,proof           
#bdi                                    

7b47 ,the ,cosmological ,proof          
#bej                                    
7c47 ,the ,physico-,theological         
,proof                      #bej        
,,ii4 ,,critick ,,of ,,the ,,practical  
,,reason                    #beb        
7#a47 ,the ,analytic                    
#bed                             7#b47  
,the ,dialectic3 ,what is this ,highest 
,good8                                  
#bef                                    
7a47 ,perfect ,virtue or ,holiness      
#beg                                    
7b47 ,perfect ,happiness            #beh
                                    7c47
 ,kant's ,views of ,religion     #bei   
,,iii4 ,,critick ,,of ,,the ,,faculty   
,,of ,,judgment                 #bfb    
#a4 ,critick of the sthetic ,faculty of 
,judgment   #bfc                        
7#a47 ,analytic                         
#bfc                            7#b47   
,dialectic                              
#bfe                       #b4 ,critick 
of the ,teleological ,faculty           

of ,judgment                            
#bff                            7#a47   
,analytic of the ,teleological ,faculty 
of ,judgment                            
#bfg                            7#b47   
,dialectic                              
#bfg           ,,xxxix4--,,transition   
,,to ,,the ,,post-,,kantian ,,philosophy
               #bfh                     
,,xl4--,,jacobi                         
#bga             ,,xli4--,,fichte       
#bgi                  ,i4 ,,the         
,,fichtian ,,philosophy ,,in ,,its      
,,original ,,form       #bhb            
#a4 ,the ,theoretical ,philosophy of    
,fichte1                            his 
,wissenschaftslehre1 or ,theory         
of ,science                             
#bhb                       #b4 ,fichte's
 ,practical ,philosophy                 
#bie                 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,later
 ,,form ,,of ,,fichte',s ,,philosophy   
#cja            ,,xlii4--,,herbart      
#cjc                  #a4 ,the ,basis   
and ,starting ,point of ,philosophy     

#cjd                  #b4 ,the ,first   
,act of ,philosophy                     
#cjd                  #c4 ,remodelling  
the ,conceptions of ,experience         
#cje                  #d4 ,herbart's    
,reals                                  
#cjf                  #e4 ,psychology   
connected with ,metaphysics             
#caj                  #f4 ,the          
,importance of ,herbart's ,philosophy   
#caa           ,,xliii4--,,schelling    
#cab                  ,i4 ,,first       
,,period3 ,,schelling',s ,,procession   
,,from ,,fichte   #cad                  
,,ii4 ,,second ,,period3 ,,standpoint   
,,of ,,the ,,distinguishing             
,,between ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of       
,,nature ,,and ,,of ,,mind     #cah     
#a4 ,natural ,philosophy                
#cah                            7#a47   
,organic ,nature                        
#cai                            7#b47   
,inorganic ,nature                      
#cba                            7#c47   
,the ,reciprocal ,determination of the  

,organic and ,inorganic ,world          
#cba                       #b4          
,transcendental ,philosophy             
#cbb                            7#a47   
,the ,theoretical ,philosophy           
#cbc                            7#b47   
,the ,practical ,philosophy             
#cbd                            7#c47   
,philosophy of ,art                     
#cbd                ,,iii4 ,,third      
,,period3 ,,period ,,of ,,spinozism1    
,,or ,,the                              
,,indifference ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,,and 
,,the ,,real           #cbf             
,,iv4 ,,fourth ,,period3 ,,the          
,,direction ,,of ,,schelling',s         
,,philosophy ,,as ,,mystical1 ,,and     
,,allied ,,to ,,new                     
,,platonism                             
#ccc                  ,v4 ,,fifth       
,,period3 ,,attempt ,,at ,a ,,theogony  
,,and ,,cosmogony1                      
,,after ,,the ,,manner ,,of ,,jacob     
,,boehme                 #cce           
7#a47 ,the ,progressive ,development of 

,nature                                 
to ,man                                 
#ccg                            7#b47   
,the ,development of ,mind in ,history  
#ccg                 ,,vi4 ,,sixth      
,,period                                
#cch            ,,xliv4--,,transition   
,,to ,,hegel                            
#cci             ,,xlv4--,,hegel        
#cdc                  ,i4 ,,science ,,of
 ,,logic                                
#cdf                       #a4 ,the     
,doctrine of ,being                     
#cdg                            7#a47   
,quality                                
#cdg                            7#b47   
,quantity                               
#cdh                            7#c47   
,measure                                
#cdh                       #b4 ,the     
,doctrine of ,essence                   
#cdi                            7#a47   
,the ,essence as such                   
#cdi                            7#b47   
,essence and ,phenomenon                

#cej                            7#c47   
,actuality                              
#cea                       #c4 ,the     
,doctrine of the ,conception            
#ceb                            7#a47   
,the ,subjective ,conception            
#ceb                            7#b47   
,objectivity                            
#cec                            7#c47   
,the ,idea                              
#cec                 ,,ii4 ,,the        
,,science ,,of ,,nature                 
#cec                       #a4          
,mechanics                              
#ced                       #b4 ,physics 
#cee                       #c4 ,organics
                                        
#cee                            7#a47   
,geological ,organism                   
#cee                            7#b47   
,vegetable ,organism                    
#cee                            7#c47   
,animal ,organism                       
#cef                ,,iii4 ,,philosophy 
,,of ,,mind                             

#cef                       #a4 ,the     
,subjective ,mind                       
#cef                       #b4 ,the     
,objective ,mind                        
#ceh                       #c4 ,the     
,absolute ,mind                         
#cfb                            7#a47   
sthetics                                
#cfc                                    
7a47 ,architecture                  #cfc
                                   7b47 
,sculpture                     #cfc     
7c47 ,painting                      #cfd
                                   7d47 
,music                         #cfd     
7e47 ,poetry                        #cfd
                            7#b47       
,philosophy of ,religion                
#cfd                                    
7a47 ,the ,natural ,religion of the     
,oriental ,world              #cfd      
7b47 ,the ,religion of ,mental          
,individuality               #cfd       
7c47 ,revealed1 or the ,christian       
,religion                    #cfe       

7#c47 ,absolute ,philosophy             
#cfe      ,a    ,,history ,,of          
,,philosophy4          ,,section ,i4    
,,what ,,is ,,meant ,,by ,,the ,,history
 ,,of ,,philosophy4      ,to            
philosophize is to reflect2 to examine  
things1 in thought4    ,yet in this is  
the conception of philosophy not        
sufficiently defined4  ,man1 as         
thinking1 also employs those practical  
activities concerned in  the adaptation 
of means to an end2 the whole body of   
sciences also1 even  those which do not 
in strict sense belong to philosophy1   
still lie in  the realm of thought4 ,in 
what1 then1 is philosophy distinguished 
from  these sciences1 e4 g4 from the    
science of astronomy1 of medicine1 or   
of rights8 ,certainly not in that it has
 a different material to work  upon4    
,its material is precisely the same as  
that of the different  empirical        
sciences4 ,the construction and         
disposition of the universe1  the       
arrangement and functions of the human  

body1 the doctrines of  property1 of    
rights and of the state--all these      
materials belong as truly  to philosophy
 as to their appropriate sciences4 ,that
 which is given in  the world of        
experience1 that which is real1 is the  
content likewise of  philosophy4 ,it is 
not1 therefore1 in its material but in  
its form1 in  its method1 in its mode of
 knowledge1 that philosophy is to be    
distinguished from the empirical        
sciences4 ,these latter derive their    
material directly from experience2 they 
find it at hand and take it up  just as 
they find it4 ,philosophy1 on the other 
hand1 is never satisfied  with receiving
 that which is given simply as it is    
given1 but rather  follows it out to its
 ultimate grounds2 it examines every    
individual  thing in reference to a     
final principle1 and considers it as one
 link in  the whole chain of knowledge4 
,in this way philosophy removes from the
  individual thing given in experience1 
its immediate1 individual1 and          

accidental character2 from the sea of   
empirical individualities1 it  brings   
out that which is common to all2 from   
the infinite and orderless  mass of     
contingencies it finds that which is    
necessary1 and throws over  all a       
universal law4 ,in short1 philosophy    
examines the totality of  experience in 
the form of an organic system in harmony
 with the laws  of thought4 ,from the   
above it is seen1 that philosophy 7in   
the sense we  have given it7 and the    
empirical sciences have a reciprocal    
influence2  the latter conditioning the 
former1 while they at the same time are 
conditioned by it4 ,we shall1 therefore1
 in the history of the world1 no  more  
find an absolute and complete           
philosophy1 than a complete empirical   
science 7,empirik74 ,rather is          
philosophy found only in the form of the
  different philosophical systems1 which
 have successively appeared in the      
course of history1 advancing hand in    
hand with the progress of the  empirical

 sciences and the universal1 social1 and
 civil culture1 and  showing in their   
advance the different steps in the      
development and  improvement of human   
science4 ,the history of philosophy has1
 for its  object1 to represent the      
content1 the succession1 and the inner  
connection of these philosophical       
systems4    ,the relation of these      
different systems to each other is thus 
already  intimated4 ,the historical and 
collective life of the race is bound    
together by the idea of a spiritual and 
intellectual progress1 and  manifests a 
regular order of advancing1 though not  
always continuous1  stages of           
development4 ,in this1 the fact         
harmonizes with what we should  expect  
from antecedent probabilities4 ,since1  
therefore1 every  philosophical system  
is only the philosophical expression of 
the  collective life of its time1 it    
follows that these different systems    
which have appeared in history will     
disclose one organic movement and  form 

together one rational and internally    
connected 7gegliedertes7  system4 ,in   
all their developments1 we shall find   
one constant order1  grounded in the    
striving of the spirit ever to raise    
itself to a higher  point of            
consciousness and knowledge1 and to     
recognize the whole  spiritual and      
natural universe1 more and more1 as its 
outward being1 as  its reality1 as the  
mirror of itself4    ,hegel was the     
first to utter these thoughts and to    
consider the  history of philosophy as a
 united process1 but this view1 which   
is1 in  its principle1 true1 he has     
applied in a way which would destroy the
  freedom of human actions1 and remove  
the very conception of contingency1  i4 
e4 that any thing should be contrary to 
reason4 ,hegel's view is1  that the     
succession of the systems of philosophy 
which have appeared in  history1        
corresponds to the succession of logical
 categories in a system  of logic4      
,according to him1 if1 from the         

fundamental conceptions of  these       
different philosophical systems1 we     
remove that which pertains to  their    
outward form or particular application1 
c41 so do we find the  different steps  
of the logical conceptions 7e4 g4 being1
 becoming1  existence1 being per se     
7frsichseyn7 quantity1 c474 ,and on the 
other hand1 if we take up the logical   
process by itself1 we find also in  it  
the actual historical process4    ,this 
opinion1 however1 can be sustained      
neither in its principle nor in  its    
historical application4 ,it is defective
 in its principle1 because in  history  
freedom and necessity interpenetrate1   
and1 therefore1 while we  find1 if we   
consider it in its general aspects1 a   
rational connection  running through the
 whole1 we also see1 if we look solely  
at its  individual parts1 only a play of
 numberless contingencies1 just as the  
kingdom of nature1 taken as a whole1    
reveals a rational plan in its          
successions1 but viewed only in its     

parts1 mocks at every attempt to  reduce
 them to a preconceived plan4 ,in       
history we have to do with free         
subjectivities1 with individuals capable
 of originating actions1 and  have1     
therefore1 a factor which does not admit
 of a previous  calculation4 ,for       
however accurately we may estimate the  
controlling  conditions which may attach
 to an individual1 from the general     
circumstances in which he may be placed1
 his age1 his associations1 his         
nationality1 c41 a free will can never  
be calculated like a  mathematical      
problem4 ,history is no example for a   
strict arithmetical  calculation4 ,the  
history of philosophy1 therefore1 cannot
 admit of an  apriori construction2 the 
actual occurrences should not be joined 
together as illustrative of a           
preconceived plan2 but the facts1 so far
  as they can be admitted1 after a      
critical sifting1 should be received as 
such1 and their rational connection be  
analytically determined4 ,the           

speculative idea can only supply the law
 for the arrangement and  scientific    
connection of that which may be         
historically furnished4    ,a more      
comprehensive view1 which contradicts   
the above-given ,hegelian  notion1 is   
the following4 ,the actual historical   
development is1 very  generally1        
different from the theoretical4         
,historically e4 g4 the  ,state arose as
 a means of protection against robbers1 
while  theoretically it is derived from 
the idea of rights4 ,so also1 even in   
the actual history of philosophy1 while 
the logical 7theoretical7  process is an
 ascent from the abstract to the        
concrete1 yet does the  historical      
development of philosophy1 quite        
generally1 descend from the  concrete to
 the abstract1 from intuition to        
thought1 and separates the  abstract    
from the concrete in those general forms
 of culture and those  religious and    
social circumstances1 in which the      
philosophizing subject  is placed4 ,a   

system of philosophy proceeds           
synthetically1 while the  history of    
philosophy1 i4 e4 the history of the    
thinking process  proceeds analytically4
 ,we might1 therefore1 with great       
propriety1 adopt  directly the reverse  
of the ,hegelian position1 and say that 
what in  reality is the first1 is for   
us1 in fact1 the last4 ,this is         
illustrated  in the ,ionic philosophy4  
,it began not with being as an abstract 
conception1 but with the most concrete1 
and most apparent1 e4 g4 with  the      
material conception of water1 air1 c4   
,even if we leave the ,ionics  and      
advance to the being of the ,eleatics or
 the becoming of the  ,heraclitics1 we  
find1 that these1 instead of being pure 
thought  determinations1 are only       
unpurified conceptions1 and materially  
colored  intuitions4 ,still farther1 is 
the attempt impracticable to refer every
  philosophy that has appeared in       
history to some logical category as its 
central principle1 because the most of  

these philosophies have taken1  for     
their object1 the idea1 not as an       
abstract conception1 but in its         
realization as nature and mind1 and1    
therefore1 for the most part1 have  to  
do1 not with logical questions1 but with
 those relating to natural  philosophy1 
psychology and ethics4 ,hegel should    
not1 therefore1 limit  his comparison of
 the historical and systematic process  
of development  simply to logic1 but    
should extend it to the whole system of 
philosophical science4 ,granted that the
 ,eleatics1 the ,heraclitics and  the   
,atomists may have made such a category 
as the centre of their  systems1 and we 
may find thus far the ,hegelian logic in
 harmony with the  ,hegelian history of 
philosophy4 ,but if we go farther1 how  
is it8 ,how  with ,anaxagoras1 the      
,sophists1 ,socrates1 ,plato1           
,aristotle8 ,we cannot1  certainly1     
without violence1 press one central     
principle into the  systems of these    
men1 but if we should be able to do it1 

and could  reduce e4 g4 the philosophy  
of ,anaxagoras to the conception of 8the
  end10 that of the ,sophists to the    
conception of 8the appearance10 and  the
 ,socratic ,philosophy to the conception
 of 8the good10--yet even then  we have 
the new difficulty that the historical  
does not correspond to  the logical     
succession of these categories4 ,in     
fact1 ,hegel himself has  not attempted 
a complete application of his principle1
 and indeed gave  it up at the very     
threshold of the ,grecian philosophy4   
,to the ,eleatics1  the ,heraclitics and
 the ,atomists1 the logical categories  
of 8being10  8becoming10 and being per  
se may be successively ascribed1 and so 
far1  as already remarked1 the          
parallelism extends1 but no farther4    
,not only  does ,anaxagoras follow with 
the conception of reason working        
according  to an end1 but if we go back 
before the ,eleatics1 we find in the    
very  beginning of philosophy a total   
diversity between the logical and       

historical order4 ,if ,hegel had carried
 out his principle consistently1  he    
should have thrown away entirely the    
,ionic philosophy1 for matter is  no    
logical category2 he should have placed 
the ,pythagoreans after the  ,eleatics  
and the ,atomists1 for in logical order 
the categories of  quantity follow those
 of quality2 in short1 he would have    
been obliged  to set aside all          
chronology4 ,unless this be done1 we    
must be satisfied  with a theoretical   
reproduction of the course which the    
thinking spirit  has taken in its       
history1 only so far as we can see in   
the grand stages  of history a rational 
progress of thought2 only so far as the 
philosophical historian1 surveying a    
period of development1 actually  finds  
in it a philosophical acquisition1--the 
acquisition of a new idea3  but we must 
guard ourselves against applying to the 
transition and  intermediate steps1 as  
well as to the whole detail of history1 
the  postulate of an immanent conformity

 to law1 or an organism in harmony  with
 our own thoughts4 ,history often winds 
its way like a serpent in  lines which  
appear retrogressive1 and philosophy1   
especially1 has not  seldom withdrawn   
herself from a wide and already fruitful
 field1 in  order to settle down upon a 
narrow strip of land1 the limits even of
  which she has sought still more       
closely to abridge4 ,at one time we find
  thousands of years expended in        
fruitless attempts with only a negative 
result2--at another1 a fulness of       
philosophical ideas are crowded         
together in the experience of a         
lifetime4 ,there is here no sway of an  
immutable and regularly returning law1  
but history1 as the realm of  freedom1  
will first completely manifest itself at
 the end of time as the  work of reason4
          ,,section ,,ii4               
,,classification4      ,a few words will
 suffice to define our problem and      
classify its  elements4 ,where and when 
does philosophy begin8 ,manifestly1     

according to  the analysis made in  ,i41
 where a final philosophical principle1 
a  final ground of being is first sought
 in a philosophical way1--and hence     
with the ,grecian philosophy4 ,the      
,oriental--,chinese and ,hindoo--so     
named  philosophies1--but which are     
rather theologies or mythologies1--and  
the  mythic cosmogonies of ,greece1 in  
its earliest periods1 are1 therefore1   
excluded from our more definite problem4
 ,like ,aristotle1 we shall begin  the  
history of philosophy with ,thales4 ,for
 similar reasons we exclude  also the   
philosophy of the ,christian middle     
ages1 or ,scholasticism4 ,this  is not  
so much a philosophy1 as a              
philosophizing or reflecting within  the
 already prescribed limits of positive  
religion4 ,it is1 therefore1            
essentially theology1 and belongs to the
 science of the history of  ,christian  
doctrines4    ,the material which       
remains after this exclusion1 may be    
naturally  divided into two periods2    

viz3--ancient--,grecian and             
,grco-,romanic--and  modern philosophy4 
,since a preliminary comparison of the  
characteristics  of these two epochs    
could not here be given without a       
subsequent  repetition1 we shall first  
speak of their inner relations1 when we 
come  to treat of the transition from   
the one to the other4    ,the first     
epoch can be still farther divided into 
three periods2 7#a47  ,the pre-,socratic
 philosophy1 i4 e4 from ,thales to the  
,sophists  inclusive2 7#b47 ,socrates1  
,plato1 ,aristotle2 7#c47 ,the          
post-,aristotelian  philosophy1         
including ,new ,platonism4              
,,section ,,iii4    ,,general ,,view    
,,of ,,the ,,pre-,,socratic             
,,philosophy4      #a4 ,the universal   
tendency of the pre-,socratic philosophy
 is to find some  principle for the     
explanation of nature4 ,nature1 the most
 immediate1  that which first met the   
eye and was the most palpable1 was that 
which  first aroused the inquiring mind4

 ,at the basis of its changing          
forms1--beneath its manifold            
appearances1 thought they1 lies a first 
principle which abides the same through 
all change4 ,what then1 they  asked1 is 
this principle8 ,what is the original   
ground of things8 ,or1  more accurately1
 what element of nature is the          
fundamental element8 ,to  solve this    
inquiry was the problem of the ,ionic   
natural philosophers4  ,one proposes as 
a solution1 water1 another1 air1 and a  
third1 an  original chaotic matter4     
#b4 ,the ,pythagoreans attempted a      
higher solution of this problem4 ,the   
proportions and dimensions of matter    
rather than its sensible  concretions1  
seemed to them to furnish the true      
explanation of being4  ,they1           
accordingly1 adopted as the principle of
 their philosophy1 that  which would    
express a determination of proportions1 
i4 e4 numbers4  8,number is the essence 
of all things10 was their position4     
,number is the  mean between the        

immediate sensuous intuition and the    
pure thought4  ,number and measure have1
 to be sure1 nothing to do with matter  
only in  so far as it possesses         
extension1 and is capable of division in
 space  and time1 but yet we should have
 no numbers or measures if there were no
  matter1 or nothing which could meet   
the intuitions of our sense4 ,this      
elevation above matter1 which is at the 
same time a cleaving to matter1         
constitutes the essence and the         
character of ,pythagoreanism4    #c4    
,next come the ,eleatics1 who step      
absolutely beyond that which is  given  
in experience1 and make a complete      
abstraction of every thing  material4   
,this abstraction1 this negation of all 
division in space and  time1 they take  
as their principle1 and call it pure    
being4 ,instead of  the sensuous        
principle of the ,ionics1 or the        
symbolic principle of the               
,pythagoreans1 the ,eleatics1 therefore1
 adopt an intelligible principle4    #d4

 ,herewith closes the analytic1 the     
first course in the development of      
,grecian philosophy1 to make way for the
 second1 or synthetic course4 ,the      
,eleatics had sacrificed to their       
principle of pure being1 the existence  
of the world and every finite existence4
 ,but the denial of nature and  the     
world could not be maintained4 ,the     
reality of both forced itself  upon the 
attention1 and even the ,eleatics had   
affirmed it1 though in  guarded and     
hypothetical terms4 ,but from their     
abstract being there was  no passage    
back to the sensuous and concrete2 their
 principle ought to  have explained the 
being of events1 but it did not4 ,to    
find a principle  for the explanation of
 these1 a principle which would account 
for the  becoming1 the event was still  
the problem4 ,heraclitus solved it1 by  
asserting that1 inasmuch as being has no
 more reality than not being1  therefore
 the unity of the two1 or in other words
 the becoming1 is the  absolute         

principle4 ,he held that it belonged to 
the very essence of  finite being that  
it be conceived in a continual flow1 in 
an endless  stream4 8,every thing       
flows40 ,we have here the conception of 
original  energy1 instead of the ,ionic 
original matter2 the first attempt to   
explain being and its motion from a     
principle analytically attained4  ,from 
the time of ,heraclitus1 this inquiry   
after the cause of the  becoming1       
remained the chief interest and the     
moving spring of  philosophical         
development4    #e4 ,becoming is the    
unity of being and not-being1 and into  
these two  elements is the ,heraclitic  
principle consciously analyzed by the   
,atomists4 ,heraclitus had uttered the  
principle of the becoming1 but  only as 
a fact of experience4 ,he had simply    
expressed it as a law1 but  had not     
explained it4 ,the necessity for this   
universal law yet remained  to be       
proved4 ,,why is every thing in a       
perpetual flow--in an eternal  movement8

 ,from the dynamical combination of     
matter and the moving force1  the next  
step was to a consciously determined    
distinction1 to a  mechanical division  
of the two4 ,thus ,empedocles combining 
the doctrines  of ,heraclitus and       
,parmenides1 considered matter as the   
abiding being1  while force was the     
ground of the movement4 ,but the        
,atomists still  considered the moving  
mythic energies as forces2 ,empedocles  
regarded  them as love and hate2 and    
,democritus as unconscious necessity4   
,the  result was1 therefore1 that the   
becoming was rather limited as a means  
for the mechanical explanation of       
nature1 than itself explained4    #f4   
,despairing of any merely materialistic 
explanation of the becoming1            
,anaxagoras next appears1 and places a  
world-forming ,intelligence by  the side
 of matter4 ,he recognized mind as the  
primal causality1 to which  the         
existence of the world1 together with   
its determined arrangement and  design  

7zweckmssigkeit7 must be referred4 ,in  
this1 philosophy gained  a great        
principle1 viz4--an ideal one4 ,but     
,anaxagoras did not know how to  fully  
carry out his principles4 ,instead of a 
theoretical comprehension  of the       
universe--instead of deriving being from
 the idea1 he grasped  again after some 
mechanical explanation4 ,his            
8world-forming reason0  serves him only 
as a first impulse1 only as a moving    
power4 ,it is to him  a ,deus ex        
machina4 ,notwithstanding1 therefore1   
his glimpse of  something higher than   
matter1 yet was ,anaxagoras only a      
physical  philosopher1 like his         
predecessors4 ,mind had not yet appeared
 to him as  a true force above nature1  
as an organizing soul of the universe4  
#g4 ,it is1 therefore1 a farther        
progress in thought1 to comprehend      
accurately the distinction between mind 
and nature1 and to recognize  mind as   
something higher and                    
contra-distinguished from all natural   

being4 ,this problem fell to the        
,sophists4 ,they entangled in           
contradictions1 the thinking which had  
been confined to the object1 to  that   
which was given1 and gave to the        
objective world which had before  been  
exalted above the subject1 a subordinate
 position in the dawning  and yet       
infantile consciousness of the          
superiority of subjective  thinking4    
,the ,sophists carried their principle  
of subjectivity1 though  at first this  
was only negative1 into the form of the 
universal  religious and political      
changing condition 7,aufklrung74#a ,they
 stood  forth as the destroyers of the  
whole edifice of thought that had been  
thus far built1 until ,socrates         
appeared1 and set up against this       
principle of empirical subjectivity1    
that of the absolute                    
subjectivity1--that of the spirit in the
 form of a free moral will1 and  the    
thought is positively considered as     
something higher than existence1  as the

 truth of all reality4 ,with the        
,sophist closes our first period1  for  
with these the oldest philosophy finds  
its self-destruction  7,selbstauflsung74
          ,,section ,,iv4    ,,the      
,,ionic ,,philosophers4      #a4        
,,thales4--,at the head of the ,ionic   
natural philosophers1 and therefore  at 
the head of philosophy1 the ancients are
 generally agreed in placing  ,thales of
 ,miletus1 a cotemporary of ,crsus and  
,solon2 although this  beginning lies   
more in the region of tradition than of 
history4 ,the  philosophical principle  
to which he owes his place in the       
history of  philosophy is1 that1 8the   
principle 7the primal1 the original     
ground7 of  all things is water2 from   
water every thing arises and into water 
every  thing returns40 ,but simply to   
assume water as the original ground of  
things was not to advance beyond his    
myth-making predecessors and their      
cosmologies4 ,aristotle1 himself1 when  
speaking of ,thales1 refers to the  old 

8theologians10--meaning1 doubtless1     
,homer and ,hesiod1--who had  ascribed  
to ,oceanus and ,thetis1 the origin of  
all things4 ,thales1  however1 merits   
his place as the beginner of philosophy1
 because he made  the first attempt to  
establish his physical principle1       
without resorting  to a mythical        
representation1 and1 therefore1 brought 
into philosophy a  scientific procedure4
 ,he is the first who has placed his    
foot upon the  ground of a logical      
7verstndig7 explanation of nature4 ,we  
cannot now  say with certainty1 how he  
came to adopt his principle1 though he  
might  have been led to it1 by          
perceiving that dampness belonged to the
 seed  and nourishment of things2 that  
warmth is developed from moisture2 and  
that1 generally1 moisture might be the  
plastic1 living and life-giving         
principle4 ,from the condensation and   
expansion of this first principle1  he  
derives1 as it seems1 the changes of    
things1 though the way in which  this is

 done1 he has not accurately determined4
    ,the philosophical significance of  
,thales does not appear to extend any   
farther4 ,he was not a speculative      
philosopher after a later mode4         
,philosophical book-making was not at   
all the order of his day1 and he  does  
not seem to have given any of his       
opinions a written form4 ,on  account of
 his ethico-political wisdom1 he is     
numbered among the  so-named 8seven wise
 men10 and the characteristics which the
 ancients  furnish concerning him only  
testify to his practical understanding4 
,he  is said e4 g4 to have first        
calculated an eclipse of the sun1 to    
have  superintended the turning of the  
course of the ,halys under ,crsus1 c4   
,when subsequent narrators relate that  
he had asserted the unity of the  world1
 had set up the idea of a world-soul1   
and had taught the  immortality of the  
soul and the personality of ,god1 it is 
doubtless an  unhistorical reference of 
later ideas to a standpoint1 which was1 

as  yet1 far from being developed4      
#b4 ,,anaximander4--,anaximander1       
sometimes represented by the ancients as
 a  scholar and sometimes as a companion
 of ,thales1 but who was1 at all        
events1 younger than the latter1 sought 
to carry out still farther his          
principles4 ,the original essence which 
he assumed1 and which he is said  to    
have been the first to have named       
principle 771 he defined as the         
8unlimited1 eternal and unconditioned10 
as that which embraced all  things and  
ruled all things1 and which1 since it   
lay at the basis of all  determinateness
 of the finite and the changeable1 is   
itself infinite and  undeterminate4 ,how
 we are to regard this original essence 
of ,anaximander  is a matter of dispute4
 ,evidently it was not one of the four  
common  elements1 though we must not1   
therefore1 think it was something       
incorporeal and immaterial4 ,anaximander
 probably conceived it as the  original 
matter before it had separated into     

determined elements1--as  that which was
 first in the order of time1 or what is 
in our day called  the chemical         
indifference in the opposition of       
elements4 ,in this respect  his original
 essence is indeed 8unlimited0 and      
8undetermined10 i4 e4  has no           
determination of quality nor limit of   
quantity1 yet it is not1  therefore1 in 
any way1 a pure dynamical principle1 as 
perhaps the  8friendship0 and 8enmity0  
of ,empedocles might have been1 but it  
was only  a more philosophical          
expression for the same thought1 which  
the old  cosmogonies have attempted to  
utter in their representation of chaos4 
,accordingly1 ,anaximander suffers the  
original opposition of cold and  warm1  
of dry and moist 7i4 e4 the basis of the
 four elements7 to be  secreted from his
 original essence1 a clear proof that it
 was only the  undeveloped1 unanalyzed1 
potential being of these elemental      
opposites4    #c4                       
,,anaximenes4--,anaximenes1 who is      

called by some the scholar1 and by      
others the companion of ,anaximander1   
turned back more closely to the  view of
 ,thales1 in that he made air as the    
principle of all things4 ,the           
perception that air surrounds the whole 
world1 and that breath  conditions the  
activity of life1 seems to have led him 
to his position4    #d4                 
,,retrospect4--,the whole philosophy of 
the three ,ionic sages may be  reduced  
to these three points1 viz3--7#a47 ,they
 sought for the universal  essence of   
concrete being2 7#b47 ,they found this  
essence in a material  substance or     
substratum2 7#c47 ,they gave some       
intimation respecting the  derivation of
 the elements from this original matter4
          ,,section ,v4                 
,,pythagoreanism4      #a4 ,,its        
,,relative ,,position4--,the development
 of the ,ionic philosophy  discloses the
 tendency to abstract matter from all   
else2 though they  directed this process
 solely to the determined quality of    

matter4 ,it  is this abstraction carried
 to a higher step1 when we look away    
from the  sensible concretions of       
matter1 and no more regard its          
qualitative  determinateness as water1  
air1 c41 but only direct our attention  
to its  quantitative                    
determinateness1--to its space-filling  
property4 ,but the  determinateness of  
quantity is number1 and this is the     
principle and  standpoint of            
,pythagoreanism4    #b4 ,,historical    
,,and ,,chronological4--,the            
,pythagorean doctrine of numbers is     
referred to ,pythagoras of ,samos1 who  
is said to have flourished between  #edj
 and #ejj ,b4 ,c4 ,he dwelt in the      
latter part of his life at ,crotonia1   
in ,magna ,grecia1 where he founded a   
society1 or1 more properly1 an  order1  
for the moral and political regeneration
 of the lower ,italian  cities4 ,through
 this society1 this new direction of    
philosophy seems to  have been          
introduced1--though more as a mode of   

life than in the form of  a scientific  
theory4 ,what is related concerning the 
life of ,pythagoras1  his journeys1 the 
new order which he founded1 his         
political influence  upon the lower     
,italian cities1 c41 is so thoroughly   
interwoven with  traditions1 legends1   
and palpable fabrications1 that we can  
be certain  at no point that we stand   
upon a historical basis4 ,not only the  
old  ,pythagoreans1 who have spoken of  
him1 delighted in the mysterious and    
esoteric1 but even his new-,platonistic 
biographers1 ,porphyry and  ,jamblichus1
 have treated his life as a             
historico-philosophical romance4  ,we   
have the same uncertainty in reference  
to his doctrines1 i4 e4 in  reference to
 his share in the number-theory4        
,aristotle1 e4 g4 does not  ascribe this
 to ,pythagoras himself1 but only to the
 ,pythagoreans  generally1 i4 e4 to     
their school4 ,the accounts which are   
given  respecting his school have no    
certainty till the time of ,socrates1 a 

hundred years after ,pythagoras4 ,among 
the few sources of light which we  have 
upon this subject1 are the mention made 
in ,plato's ,phdon of the  ,pythagorean 
,philolaus and his doctrines1 and the   
writings of ,archytas1 a  cotemporary of
 ,plato4 ,we possess in fact the        
,pythagorean doctrine only  in the      
manner in which it was taken up by      
,philolaus1 ,eurytas and  ,archytas1    
since its earlier adherents left nothing
 in a written form4    #c4 ,,the        
,,pythagorean ,,principle4--,the        
ancients are united in affirming that   
the principle of the ,pythagorean       
philosophy was number4 ,but in what     
sense was this their principle--in a    
material or a formal sense8 ,did they   
hold number as the material of things1  
i4 e4 did they believe that  things had 
their origin in numbers1 or did they    
regard it as the  archetype of things1  
i4 e4 did they believe that things were 
made as  the copy or the representation 
of numbers8 ,from this very point the   

accounts given by the ancients diverge1 
and even the expressions of  ,aristotle 
seem to contradict each other4 ,at one  
time he speaks of  ,pythagoreanism in   
the former1 and at another in the latter
 sense4 ,from  this circumstance modern 
scholars have concluded that the        
,pythagorean  doctrine of numbers had   
different forms of development2 that    
some of the  ,pythagoreans regarded     
numbers as the substances and others as 
the  archetypes of things4 ,aristotle1  
however1 gives an intimation how the    
two statements may be reconciled with   
each other4 ,originally1 without  doubt1
 the ,pythagoreans regarded number as   
the material1 as the inherent  essence  
of things1 and therefore ,aristotle     
places them together with the  ,hylics  
7the ,ionic natural philosophers71 and  
says of them that 8they  held things for
 numbers0 7,metaph4 ,i41 #e1 #f74 ,but  
as the ,hylics did not  identify their  
matter1 e4 g4 water1 immediately with   
the sensuous  thing1 but only gave it   

out as the fundamental element1 as the  
original  form of the individual thing1 
so1 on the other side1 numbers also     
might  be regarded as similar           
fundamental types1 and therefore        
,aristotle might  say of the            
,pythagoreans1 that 8they held numbers  
to be the corresponding  original forms 
of being1 as water1 air1 c40 ,but if    
there still remains  a degree of        
uncertainty in the expressions of       
,aristotle respecting the  sense of the 
,pythagorean doctrine of numbers1 it can
 only have its  ground in the fact that 
the ,pythagoreans did not make any      
distinction  between a formal and       
material principle1 but contented       
themselves with  the undeveloped view1  
that1 8number is the essence of things1 
every  thing is number40    #d4 ,,the   
,,carrying-,,out ,,of ,,this            
,,principle4--,from the very nature of  
the  8number-principle10 it follows that
 its complete application to the        
province of the real1 can only lead to a

 fruitless and empty symbolism4  ,if we 
take numbers as even and odd1 and still 
farther as finite and  infinite1 and    
apply them as such to astronomy1 music1 
psychology1  ethics1 c41 there arise    
combinations like the following1 viz43  
one is  the point1 two are the line1    
three are the superficies1 four are the 
extension of a body1 five are the       
condition 7beschaffenheit71  c4--still  
farther1 the soul is a musical harmony1 
as is also virtue1 the  soul of the     
world1 c4 ,not only the philosophical1  
but even the  historical interest here  
ceases1 since the ancients              
themselves--as was  unavoidable from the
 arbitrary nature of such               
combinations--have given  the most      
contradictory account1 some affirming   
that the ,pythagoreans  reduced         
righteousness to the number three1      
others1 that they reduced it  to the    
number four1 others again to five1 and  
still others to nine4  ,naturally1 from 
such a vague and arbitrary              

philosophizing1 there would  early      
arise1 in this1 more than in other      
schools1 a great diversity of  views1   
one ascribing this signification to a   
certain mathematical form1  and another 
that4 ,in this mysticism of numbers1    
that which alone has  truth and value1  
is the thought1 which lies at the ground
 of it all1  that there prevails in the 
phenomena of nature a rational order1   
harmony  and conformity to law1 and that
 these laws of nature can be represented
  in measure and number4 ,but this truth
 has the ,pythagorean school hid  under 
extravagant fancies1 as vapid as they   
are unbridled4    ,the physics of the   
,pythagoreans possesses little          
scientific value1 with  the exception of
 the doctrine taught by ,philolaus      
respecting the  circular motion of the  
earth4 ,their ethics is also defective4 
,what we  have remaining of it relates  
more to the ,pythagorean life1 i4 e4 to 
the practice and discipline of their    
order than to their philosophy4 ,the    

whole tendency of ,pythagoreanism was in
 a practical respect ascetic1 and       
directed to a strict culture of the     
character4 ,as showing this1 we need    
only to cite their doctrines concerning 
the transmigration of the soul1  or1 as 
it has been called1 their 8immortality  
doctrine10 their notion in  respect of  
the lower world1 their opposition to    
suicide1 and their view  of the body as 
the prison of the soul--all of which    
ideas are referred to  in ,plato's      
,phdon1 and the last two of which are   
indicated as belonging  to ,philolaus4  
,,section ,,vi    ,,the ,,eleatics4     
#a4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,eleatic     
,,principle ,,to ,,the                  
,,pythagorean4--,while the              
,pythagoreans had made matter1 in so far
 as it is quantity and the  manifold1   
the basis of their philosophizing1 and  
while in this they only  abstracted from
 the determined elemental condition of  
matter1 the  ,eleatics carry the process
 to its ultimate limit1 and make1 as the

  principle of their philosophy1 a total
 abstraction from every finite          
determinateness1 from every change and  
vicissitude which belongs to  concrete  
being4 ,while the ,pythagoreans had held
 fast to the form of  being as having   
existence in space and time1 the        
,eleatics reject this1  and make as     
their fundamental thought the negation  
of all exterior and  posterior4 ,only   
being is1 and there is no not-being1 nor
 becoming4 ,this  being is the purely   
undetermined1 changeless ground of all  
things4 ,it is  not being in becoming1  
but it is being as exclusive of all     
becoming2  in other words1 it is pure   
being4    ,eleaticism is1 therefore1    
,monism1 in so far as it strove to carry
 back  the manifoldness of all being to 
a single ultimate principle2 but on the 
other hand it becomes ,dualism1 in so   
far as it could neither carry out  its  
denial of concrete existence1 i4 e41 the
 phenomenal world1 nor yet  derive the  
latter from its presupposed original    

ground4 ,the phenomenal  world1 though  
it might be explained as only an empty  
appearance1 did yet  exist2 and1 since  
the sensuous perception would not ignore
 this1 there  must be allowed it1       
hypothetically at least1 the right of   
existence4 ,its  origin must be         
explained1 even though with             
reservations4 ,this  contradiction of an
 unreconciled ,dualism between being and
 existence1 is  the point where the     
,eleatic philosophy is at war with      
itself--though1 in  the beginning of the
 school--with ,xenophanes1 it does not  
yet appear4  ,the principle itself1 with
 its results1 is only fully apparent in 
the  lapse of time4 ,it has three       
periods of formation1 which successively
  appear in three successive            
generations4 ,its foundation belongs to 
,xenophanes2 its systematic formation to
 ,parmenides2 its completion  and       
partial dissolution to ,zeno and        
,melissus--the latter of whom we  can   
pass by4    #b4                         

,,xenophanes4--,xenophanes is considered
 as the originator of the ,eleatic      
tendency4 ,he was born at ,colophon2    
emigrated to ,elea1 a ,phocian colony   
in ,lucania1 and was a younger          
cotemporary of ,pythagoras4 ,he appears 
to  have first uttered the              
proposition--8every thing is one10      
without1  however1 giving any more      
explicit determination respecting this  
unity1  whether it be one simply in     
conception or in actuality4 ,turning his
  attention1 says ,aristotle1 upon the  
world as a whole1 he names the unity    
which he finds1 ,god4 ,god is the ,one4 
,the ,eleatic 8,one and ,all0 7   7 had1
 therefore1 with ,xenophanes1 a         
theological and religious  character4   
,the idea of the unity of ,god1 and an  
opposition to the  anthropomorphism of  
the ordinary views of religion1 is his  
starting  point4 ,he declaimed against  
the delusion that the gods were born1   
that  they had a human voice or form1   
and railed at the robbery1 adultery1 and

  deceit of the gods as sung by ,homer  
and ,hesiod4 ,according to him the      
,godhead is wholly seeing1 wholly       
understanding1 wholly hearing1 unmoved1 
undivided1 calmly ruling all things by  
his thought1 like men neither in  form  
nor in understanding4 ,in this way1 with
 his thought turned only  towards       
removing from the ,godhead all finite   
determinations and  predicates1 and     
holding fast to its unity and           
unchangeableness1 he  declared this     
doctrine of its being to be the highest 
philosophical  principle1 without       
however directing this principle        
polemically against  the doctrine of    
finite being1 or carrying it out in its 
negative  application4    #c4           
,,parmenides4--,the proper head of the  
,eleatic school is ,parmenides of       
,elea1 a scholar1 or at least an        
adherent of ,xenophanes4 ,though we     
possess but little reliable information 
respecting the circumstances of  his    
life1 yet we have1 in inverse           

proportion1 the harmonious voice of  all
 antiquity in an expression of reverence
 for the ,eleatic sage1 and of          
admiration for the depth of his mind1 as
 well as for the earnestness and        
elevation of his character4 ,the        
saying--8a life like ,parmenides10      
became  afterwards a proverb among the  
,greeks4    ,parmenides embodied his    
philosophy in an epic poem1 of which we 
have  still important fragments4 ,it is 
divided into two parts4 ,in the first he
  discusses the conception of being4    
,rising far above the yet unmediated    
view of ,xenophanes1 he attains a       
conception of pure single being1 which  
he sets up as absolutely opposed to     
every thing manifold and changeable1  i4
 e41 to that which has no being1 and    
which consequently cannot be  thought4  
,from this conception of being he not   
only excludes all becoming  and         
departing1 but also all relation to     
space and time1 all divisibility  and   
movement4 ,this being he explains as    

something which has not become  and     
which does not depart1 as complete and  
of its own kind1 as  unalterable and    
without limit1 as indivisible and       
present though not in  time1 and since  
all these are only negative1 he ascribes
 to it1 also1 as  a positive            
determination--thought4 ,being and      
thought are therefore  identical with   
,parmenides4 ,this pure thought1        
directed to the pure  being1 he declares
 is the only true and undeceptive       
knowledge1 in  opposition to the        
deceptive notions concerning the        
manifoldness and  mutability of the     
phenomenal4 ,he has no hesitancy in     
holding that to be  only a name which   
mortals regard as truth1 viz41 becoming 
and departing1  being and not-being1    
change of place and vicissitude of      
circumstance4 ,we  must therefore be    
careful not to hold 8the ,one0 of       
,parmenides1 as the  collective unity of
 all concrete being4    ,so much for the
 first part of ,parmenides' poem4 ,after

 the principle that  there is only being
 has been developed according to its    
negative and  positive determinations1  
we might believe that the system was at 
an end4  ,but there follows a second    
part1 which is occupied solely with the 
hypothetical attempt to explain the     
phenomenal world and give it a  physical
 derivation4 ,though firmly convinced   
that1 according to reason  and          
conception1 there is only 8the ,one10   
yet is ,parmenides unable to  withdraw  
himself from the recognition of an      
appearing manifoldness and  change4     
,forced1 therefore1 by his sensuous     
perception to enter upon a  discussion  
of the phenomenal world1 he prefaces    
this second part of his  poem with the  
remark1 that he had now closed what he  
had to say  respecting the truth1 and   
was hereafter to deal only with the     
opinion of  a mortal4 ,unfortunately1   
this second part has been very          
imperfectly  transmitted to us4 ,enough 
however remains to show1 that he        

explained the  phenomena of nature from 
the mingling of two unchangeable        
elements1  which ,aristotle1 though     
apparently only by way of example1      
indicates as  warm and cold1 fire and   
earth4 ,concerning these two elements1  
,aristotle  remarks still farther that  
,parmenides united the warmth with      
being1 and  the other element with      
not-being4    ,it is scarcely necessary 
to remark that between the two parts of 
the  ,parmenidean philosophy--between   
the doctrine concerning being and the   
doctrine concerning appearance--there   
can exist no inner scientific           
connection4 ,what ,parmenides absolutely
 denies in the first part1 and  indeed  
declares to be unutterable1 viz41 the   
not-being1 the many and the  changeable1
 he yet in the second part admits to    
have an existence at  least in the      
representation of men4 ,but it is clear 
that the not-being  cannot once exist in
 the representation1 if it does not     
exist generally  and every where1 and   

that the attempt to explain a not-being 
of the  representation1 is in complete  
contradiction with his exclusive        
recognition of being4 ,this             
contradiction1 this unmediated          
juxtaposition  of being and not-being1  
of the one and the many1 ,zeno1 a       
scholar of  ,parmenides1 sought to      
remove1 by affirming that from the very 
conception  of being1 the sensuous      
representation1 and thus the world of   
the  not-being1 are dialectically       
annihilated4    #d4 ,,zeno4--,the       
,eleatic ,zeno was born about #ejj ,b4  
,c42 was a scholar of  ,parmenides1 and 
the earliest prose writer among the     
,grecian  philosophers4 ,he is said to  
have written in the form of dialogues4  
,he  perfected1 dialectically1 the      
doctrine of his master1 and carried out 
to  the completest extent the           
abstraction of the ,eleatic ,one1 in    
opposition  to the manifoldness and     
determinateness of the finite4 ,he      
justified the  doctrine of a single1    

simple1 and unchangeable being1 in a    
polemical  way1 by showing up the       
contradictions into which the ordinary  
representations of the phenomenal world 
become involved4 ,while  ,parmenides    
affirms that there is only the ,one1    
,zeno shows in his  well-known proofs   
7which unfortunately we cannot here more
 widely  unfold71 that the many1 the    
changing1 that which has relation to    
space1  or that which has relation to   
time1 is not4 ,while ,parmenides        
affirmed  the being1 ,zeno denied the   
appearance4 ,on account of these proofs1
 in  which ,zeno takes up the           
conceptions of extension1 manifoldness  
and  movement1 and shows their inner    
contradictory nature1 ,aristotle names  
him the founder of dialectics4    ,while
 the philosophizing of ,zeno is the     
completion of the ,eleatic  principle1  
so is it at the same time the beginning 
of its dissolution4  ,zeno had embraced 
the opposition of being and existence1  
of the one and  the many1 so abstractly1

 and had carried it so far1 that with   
him the  inner contradiction of the     
,eleatic principle comes forth still    
more  boldly than with ,parmenides2 for 
the more logical he is in the denial of 
the phenomenal world1 so much the more  
striking must be the  contradiction1 of 
turning1 on the one side1 his whole     
philosophical  activity to the          
refutation of the sensuous              
representation1 while1 on the  other    
side1 he sets over against it a doctrine
 which destroys the very  possibility of
 a false representation4                
,,section ,,vii4    ,,heraclitus4       
#a4 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,heraclitic  
,,principle ,,to ,,the                  
,,eleatic4--,being and  existence1 the  
one and the many1 could not be united by
 the principle of  the ,eleatics2 the   
,monism which they had striven for had  
resulted in an  ill-concealed ,dualism4 
,heraclitus reconciled this             
contradiction by  affirming that being  
and not-being1 the one and the many1    

existed at the  same time as the        
becoming4 ,while the ,eleatics could not
 extricate  themselves from the dilemma 
that the world is either being or       
not-being1  ,heraclitus removes the     
difficulty by answering--it is neither  
being nor  not-being1 because it is     
both4    #b4 ,,historical ,,and         
,,chronological4--,heraclitus1 surnamed 
by later writers  the mystic1 was born  
at ,ephesus1 and flourished about #ejj  
,b4 ,c4 ,his  period was subsequent to  
that of ,xenophanes1 though partially   
cotemporary with that of ,parmenides4   
,he laid down his philosophical         
thoughts in a writing 8,concerning      
,nature10 of which we possess only      
fragments4 ,its rapid transitions1 its  
expressions so concise1 and full  of    
meaning1 the general philosophical      
peculiarity of ,heraclitus1 and the     
antique character of the earliest prose 
writings1 all combine to make  this work
 so difficult to be understood that it  
has long been a proverb4  ,socrates said

 concerning it1 that 8what he understood
 of it was  excellent1 and he had no    
doubt that what he did not understand   
was  equally good2 but the book requires
 an expert swimmer40 ,later ,stoics and 
,academicians have written commentaries 
upon it4    #c4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of  
,,the ,,becoming4--,the ancients unite  
in ascribing to  ,heraclitus the        
principle that the totality of things   
should be conceived  in an eternal flow1
 in an uninterrupted movement and       
transformation1 and  that all           
continuance of things is only           
appearance4 8,into the same  stream10 so
 runs a saying of ,heraclitus1 8we      
descend1 and at the same  time we do not
 descend2 we are1 and also we are not4  
,for into the same  stream we cannot    
possibly descend twice1 since it is     
always scattering  and collecting itself
 again1 or rather it at the same time   
flows to us  and from us40 ,there is1   
therefore1 ground for the assertion that
  ,heraclitus had banished all rest and 

continuance from the totality of        
things2 and it is doubtless in this very
 respect that he accuses the eye  and   
the ear of deception1 because they      
reveal to men a continuance where  there
 is only an uninterrupted change4       
,heraclitus has analyzed the principle  
of the becoming still more  closely1 in 
the propositions which he utters1 to    
account for the origin  of things1 where
 he shows that all becoming must be     
conceived as the  product of warring    
opposites1 as the harmonious union of   
opposite  determinations4 ,hence his two
 well-known propositions3 8,strife is   
the  father of things10 and 8,the ,one  
setting itself at variance with itself1 
harmonizes with itself1 like the harmony
 of the bow and the viol40  8,unite10 so
 runs another of his sayings1 8the whole
 and the not-whole1  the coalescing and 
the not-coalescing1 the harmonious and  
the  discordant1 and thus we have the   
one becoming from the all1 and the all  
from the one40    #d4 ,,the ,,principle 

,,of ,,fire4--,in what relation does the
 principle of fire1  which is also      
ascribed to ,heraclitus1 stand to the   
principle of the  becoming8 ,aristotle  
says that he took fire as his principle1
 in the same  way that ,thales took     
water1 and ,anaximenes took air4 ,but it
 is clear we  must not interpret this to
 mean that ,heraclitus regarded fire as 
the  original material or fundamental   
element of things1 after the manner of  
the ,ionics4 ,if he ascribed reality    
only to the becoming1 it is  impossible 
that he should have set by the side of  
this becoming1 yet  another elemental   
matter as a fundamental substance4      
,when1 therefore1  ,heraclitus calls the
 world an ever-living fire1 which in    
certain stages  and certain degrees     
extinguishes and again enkindles itself1
 when he  says that every thing can be  
exchanged for fire1 and fire for every  
thing1 just as we barter things for gold
 and gold for things1 he can  only mean 
thereby that fire represents the abiding

 power of this eternal  transformation  
and transposition1 in other words1 the  
conception of  life1 in the most obvious
 and effective way4 ,we might name fire1
 in the  ,heraclitic sense1 the symbol  
or the manifestation of the becoming1   
but  that it is also with him the       
substratum of movement1 i4 e4 the means 
with which the power of movement1 which 
is antecedent to all matter1  serves it 
self in order to bring out the living   
process of things4 ,in  the same way    
,heraclitus goes on to explain the      
manifoldness of things1  by affirming   
that they arise from certain hindrances 
and a partial  extinction of this fire4 
,the product of its extremest hindrance 
is the  earth1 and the other things lie 
intermediately between4    #e4          
,,transition ,,to ,,the ,,atomists4--,we
 have above regarded the ,heraclitic    
principle as the consequent of the      
,eleatic1 but we might as properly      
consider the two as antitheses4 ,while  
,heraclitus destroys all abiding  being 

in an absolutely flowing becoming1 so1  
on the other hand1  ,parmenides destroys
 all becoming in an absolutely abiding  
being2 and  while the former charges the
 eye and the ear with deception1 in that
  they transform the flowing becoming   
into a quiescent being1 the latter  also
 accuses these same senses of an untrue 
representation1 in that they  draw the  
abiding being into the movement of the  
becoming4 ,we can  therefore say that   
the being and the becoming are equally  
valid  antitheses1 which demand again a 
synthesis and reconciliation4 ,but now  
can we say that ,heraclitus actually and
 satisfactorily solved the  problem of  
,zeno8 ,zeno had shown every thing      
actual to be a  contradiction1 and from 
this had inferred their not-being1 and  
it is  only in this inference that      
,heraclitus deviates from the ,eleatics4
 ,he  also regarded the phenomenal world
 as an existing contradiction1 but he   
clung to this contradiction as to an    
ultimate fact4 ,that which had been  the

 negative result of the ,eleatics1 he   
uttered as his positive  principle4 ,the
 dialectics which ,zeno had subjectively
 used against the  phenomenal1 he       
directed objectively as a proof for the 
becoming4 ,but  this becoming which the 
,eleatics had thought themselves obliged
 to deny  entirely1 ,heraclitus did not 
explain by simply asserting that it was 
the  only true principle4 ,the question 
continually returned--why is all being  
a becoming8 ,why does the one go out    
over into the many8 ,to give an  answer 
to this question1 i4 e4 to explain the  
becoming from the  presupposed principle
 of being1 forms the standpoint and     
problem of the  ,empedoclean and        
,atomistic philosophy4                  
,,section ,,viii4    ,,empedocles4      
#a4 ,,general ,,view4--,empedocles was  
born at ,agrigentum1 and is extolled by 
the ancients as a natural philosopher1  
physician and poet1 and also as a  seer 
and worker of miracles4 ,he flourished  
about #ddj ,b4 ,c41 and was             

consequently younger than ,parmenides   
and ,heraclitus4 ,he wrote a  doctrinal 
poem concerning nature1 which has been  
preserved to us in  tolerably complete  
fragments4 ,his philosophical system may
 be  characterized in brief1 as an      
attempt to combine the ,eleatic being   
and  the ,heraclitic becoming4 ,starting
 with the ,eleatic thought1 that neither
  any thing which had previously been   
could become1 nor any thing which  now  
is could depart1 he sets up as          
unchangeable being1 four eternal        
original materials1 which1 though       
divisible1 were independent1 and        
underived from each other4 ,in this we  
have what in our day are called  the    
four elements4 ,with this ,eleatic      
thought he united also the  ,heraclitic 
view of nature1 and suffered his four   
elements to become  mingled together1   
and to receive a form by the working of 
two moving  powers1 which he names      
unifying friendship and dividing strife4
  ,originally1 these four elements were 

absolutely alike and unmovable1         
dwelling together in a divine sphere    
where friendship united them1 until     
gradually strife pressing from the      
circumference to the centre of the      
sphere 7i4 e4 attaining a separating    
activity71 broke this union1 and  the   
formation of the world immediately began
 as the result4    #b4 ,,the ,,four     
,,elements4--,with his doctrine of the  
four elements1  ,empedocles1 on the one 
side1 may be joined to the series of the
 ,ionic  philosophers1 but1 on the      
other1 he is excluded from this by his  
assuming the original elements to be    
four4 ,he is distinctly said by the     
ancients to have originated the theory  
of the four elements4 ,he is more       
definitely distinguished from the old   
,ionics1 from the fact that he  ascribed
 to his four 8root-elements0 a          
changeless being1 by virtue of  which   
they neither arose from each other nor  
departed into each other1  and were     
capable of no change of essence but only

 of a change of state4  ,every thing    
which is called arising and departing1  
every change rests  therefore only upon 
the mingling and withdrawing of these   
eternal and  fundamental materials2 the 
inexhaustible manifoldness of being     
rests  upon the different proportions in
 which these elements are mingled4      
,every becoming is conceived as such    
only as a change of place4 ,in this  we 
have a mechanical in opposition to a    
dynamic explanation of nature4    #c4   
,,the ,,two ,,powers4--,whence now can  
arise any becoming1 if in matter  itself
 there is found no principle to account 
for the change8 ,since  ,empedocles did 
not1 like the ,eleatics1 deny that there
 was change1 nor  yet1 like ,heraclitus1
 introduce it in his matter1 as an      
indwelling  principle1 so there was no  
other course left him but to place1 by  
the  side of his matter1 a moving power4
 ,the opposition of the one and the     
many which had been set up by his       
predecessors1 and which demanded an     

explanation1 led him to ascribe to this 
moving power1 two originally  diverse   
directions1 viz43 repulsion and         
attraction4 ,the separation of  the one 
into the many1 and the union again of   
the many into the one1 had  indicated an
 opposition of powers which ,heraclitus 
had already  recognized4 ,while now     
,parmenides starting from the one had   
made love as  his principle1 and        
,heraclitus starting from the many had  
made strife as  his1 ,empedocles        
combines the two as the principle of his
 philosophy4 ,the  difficulty is1 he has
 not sufficiently limited in respect to 
one  another1 the sphere of operation of
 these two directions of his power4     
,although1 to friendship belonged       
peculiarly the attractive1 and to       
strife the repelling function1 yet does 
,empedocles1 on the other hand1  suffer 
his strife to have in the formation of  
the world a unifying1 and  his          
friendship a dividing effect4 ,in fact1 
the complete separation of a  dividing  

and unifying power in the movement of   
the becoming1 is an  unmaintainable     
abstraction4    #d4 ,,relation ,,of     
,,the ,,empedoclean ,,to ,,the ,,eleatic
 ,,and ,,heraclitic                     
,,philosophy4--,empedocles1 by placing1 
as the principle of the becoming1 a     
moving power by the side of his matter1 
makes his philosophy a mediation  of the
 ,eleatic and ,heraclitic principles1 or
 more properly a placing of  them side  
by side4 ,he has interwoven these two   
principles in equal  proportions in his 
system4 ,with the ,eleatics he denied   
all arising and  departing1 i4 e4 the   
transition of being into not-being and  
of  not-being into being1 and with      
,heraclitus he shared the interest to   
find  an explanation for change4 ,from  
the former he derived the abiding1      
unchangeable being of his fundamental   
matter1 and from the latter the         
principle of the moving power4 ,with the
 ,eleatics1 in fine1 he considered  the 
true being in an original and           

indistinguishable unity as a sphere1    
and with ,heraclitus1 he regarded the   
present world as a constant product  of 
striving powers and oppositions4 ,he    
has1 therefore1 been properly  called an
 ,eclectic1 who has united the          
fundamental thoughts of his two         
predecessors1 though not always in a    
logical way4          ,,section ,,ix4   
,,the ,,atomistic ,,philosophy4      #a4
 ,,its ,,propounders4--,empedocles had  
sought to effect a combination of the   
,eleatic and ,heraclitic principle--the 
same was attempted1 though in a         
different way1 by the ,atomists1        
,leucippus and ,democritus4 ,democritus1
  the better known of the two1 was the  
son of rich parents1 and was born  about
 #dfj ,b4 ,c4 in ,abdera1 an ,ionian    
colony4 ,he travelled extensively1  and 
no ,greek before the time of ,aristotle 
possessed such varied  attainments4 ,he 
embodied the wealth of his collected    
knowledge in a  series of writings1 of  
which1 however1 only a few fragments    

have come  down to us4 ,for rhythm and  
elegance of language1 ,cicero compared  
him  with ,plato4 ,he died in a good old
 age4    #b4 ,,the ,,atoms4--,empedocles
 derived all determinateness of the     
phenomenal  from a certain number of    
qualitatively determined and            
undistinguishable  original materials1  
while the ,atomists derived the same    
from an  originally unlimited number of 
constituent elements1 or atoms1 which   
were homogeneous in respect of quality1 
but diverse in respect of form4  ,these 
atoms are unchangeable1 material        
particles1 possessing indeed  extension1
 but yet indivisible1 and can only be   
determined in respect of  magnitude4 ,as
 being1 and without quality1 they are   
entirely incapable of  any              
transformation or qualitative change1   
and1 therefore1 all becoming  is1 as    
with ,empedocles1 only a change of      
place4 ,the manifoldness of the         
phenomenal world is only to be explained
 from the different form1  disposition1 

and arrangement of the atoms as they    
become1 in various  ways1 united4    #c4
 ,,the ,,fulness ,,and ,,the            
,,void4--,the atoms1 in order to be     
atoms1 i4 e4  undivided and impenetrable
 unities1--must be mutually limited and 
separated4 ,there must be something set 
over against them which preserves  them 
as atoms1 and which is the original     
cause of their separateness and         
impenetrability4 ,this is the void      
space1 or more strictly the intervals   
which are found between the atoms1 and  
which hinder their mutual  contact4 ,the
 atoms1 as being and absolute fulness1  
and the interval  between them1 as the  
void and the not-being1 are two         
determinations  which only represent in 
a real and objective way1 what are in   
thought1  as logical conceptions1 the   
two elements in the ,heraclitic         
becoming1  viz4 being and the not-being4
 ,but since the void space is one       
determination of being1 it must possess 
objective reality no less than  the     

atoms1 and ,democritus even went so far 
as to expressly affirm in  opposition to
 the ,eleatics1 that being is no more   
than nothing4    #d4 ,,the ,,atomistic  
,,necessity4--,democritus1 like         
,empedocles1 though far more            
extensively than he1 attempted to answer
 the question--whence arise these       
changes and movements which we behold8  
,wherein lies the ground that the  atoms
 should enter into these manifold       
combinations1 and bring forth  such a   
wealth of inorganic and organic forms8  
,democritus attempted to  solve the     
problem by affirming that the ground of 
movement lay in the  gravity or original
 condition of the material particles1   
and1 therefore1  in the matter itself1  
but in this way he only talked about the
 question  without answering it4 ,the   
idea of an infinite series of           
causalities was  thus attained1 but not 
a final ground of all the manifestations
 of the  becoming1 and of change4 ,such 
a final ground was still to be sought1  

and  as ,democritus expressly declared  
that it could not lie in an ultimate    
reason 1 where ,anaxagoras placed it1   
there only remained for him to  find it 
in an absolute necessity1 or a necessary
 pre-determinateness  4 ,this he adopted
 as his 8final ground10 and is said to  
have named  it chance 1 in opposition to
 the inquiry after final causes1 or the 
,anaxagorean teleology4 ,consequent upon
 this1 we find as the prominent         
characteristic of the later ,atomistic  
school 7,diagoras the ,melier71         
polemics against the gods of the people1
 and a constantly more publicly         
affirmed ,atheism and ,materialism4     
#e4 ,,relative ,,position ,,of ,,the    
,,atomistic ,,philosophy4--,hegel       
characterizes  the relative position of 
the ,atomistic ,philosophy as follows1  
viz43--8,in  the ,eleatic ,philosophy   
being and not-being stand as            
antitheses1--being  alone is1 and       
not-being is not2 in the ,heraclitic    
idea1 being and  not-being are the      

same1--both together1 i4 e4 the         
becoming1 are the  predicate of concrete
 being2 but being and not-being1 as     
objectively  determined1 or in other    
words1 as appearing to the sensuous     
intuition1  are precisely the same as   
the antithesis of the fulness and the   
void4  ,parmenides1 ,heraclitus and the 
,atomists all sought for the abstract   
universal2 ,parmenides found it in      
being1 ,heraclitus in the process  of   
being per se1 and the ,atomists in the  
determination of being per  se40 ,so    
much of this as ascribes to the         
,atomists the characteristic  predicate 
of being per se is doubtless            
correct1--but the real thought  of the  
,atomistic system is rather analogous   
with the ,empedoclean1 to  explain the  
possibility of the becoming1 by         
presupposing these  substances as       
possessing being per se1 but without    
quality4 ,to this  end the not-being or 
the void1 i4 e4 the side which is       
opposed to the  ,eleatic principle1 is  

elaborated with no less care than the   
side which  harmonizes with it1 i4 e4   
that the atoms are without quality and  
never  change in their original         
elements4 ,the ,atomistic ,philosophy is
 therefore  a mediation between the     
,eleatic and the ,heraclitic principles4
 ,it is  ,eleatic in affirming the      
undivided being per se of the           
atoms2--,heraclitic1 in declaring their 
multeity and manifoldness4 ,it is       
,eleatic in the declaration of an       
absolute fulness in the atoms1 and      
,heraclitic in the claim of a real      
not-being1 i4 e4 the void space4 ,it  is
 ,eleatic in its denial of the becoming1
 i4 e4 of the arising and               
departing1--and ,heraclitic in its      
affirmation that to the atoms belong    
movement and a capacity for unlimited   
combinations4 ,the ,atomists carried    
out their leading thought more logically
 than ,empedocles1 and we might  even   
say that their system is the perfection 
of a purely mechanical  explanation of  

nature1 since all subsequent ,atomists1 
even to our own  day1 have only repeated
 their fundamental conceptions4 ,but the
 great  defect which cleaves to every   
,atomistic system1 ,aristotle has justly
  recognized1 when he shows that it is a
 contradiction1 on the one hand1  to set
 up something corporeal or space-filling
 as indivisible1 and on  the other1 to  
derive the extended from that which has 
no extension1 and  that the             
consciousless and inconceivable         
necessity of ,democritus is  especially 
defective1 in that it totally banishes  
from nature all  conception of design4  
,this is the point to which ,anaxagoras 
turns his  attention1 and introduces his
 principle of an intelligence working   
with  design4          ,,section ,x4    
,,anaxagoras4      #a4 ,,his ,,personal 
,,history4--,anaxagoras is said to have 
been born at  ,clazamena1 about the year
 #ejj ,b4 ,c42 to have gone to ,athens  
immediately1  or soon after the ,persian
 war1 to have lived and taught there for

 a long  time1 and1 finally1 accused of 
irreverence to the gods1 to have fled1  
and died at ,lampsacus1 at the age of   
#gb4 ,he it was who first planted       
philosophy at ,athens1 which from this  
time on became the centre of            
intellectual life in ,greece4 ,through  
his personal relations to ,pericles1    
,euripides1 and other important         
men1--among whom ,themistocles and      
,thucydides should be named--he exerted 
a decisive influence upon the  culture  
of the age4 ,it was on account of this  
that the charge of  defaming the gods   
was brought against him1 doubtless by   
the political  opponents of ,pericles4  
,anaxagoras wrote a work 8,concerning   
,nature0  which in the time of ,socrates
 was widely circulated4    #b4 ,,his    
,,relation ,,to ,,his                   
,,predecessors4--,the system of         
,anaxagoras starts  from the same point 
with his predecessors1 and is simply    
another attempt  at the solution of the 
same problem4 ,like ,empedocles and the 

,atomists so  did ,anaxagoras most      
vehemently deny the becoming4 8,the     
becoming and  departing10--so runs one  
of his sayings--8the ,greeks hold       
without  foundation1 for nothing can    
ever be said to become or depart2 but1  
since  existing things may be compounded
 together and again divided1 we should  
name the becoming more correctly a      
combination1 and the departing a        
separation40 ,from this view1 that every
 thing arose by the mingling of         
different elements1 and departed by the 
withdrawing of these elements1          
,anaxagoras1 like his predecessors1 was 
obliged to separate matter from  the    
moving power4 ,but though his point of  
starting was the same1 yet was  his     
direction essentially different from    
that of any previous  philosopher4 ,it  
was clear that neither ,empedocles nor  
,democritus had  satisfactorily         
apprehended the moving power4 ,the      
mythical energies of  love and hate of  
the one1 or the unconscious necessity of

 the other1  explained nothing1 and     
least of all1 the design of the becoming
 in  nature4 ,the conception of an      
activity which could thus work          
designedly1  must1 therefore1 be brought
 into the conception of the moving      
power1 and  this ,anaxagoras            
accomplished by setting up the idea of a
 world-forming  intelligence 771        
absolutely separated from all matter and
 working  with design4    #c4 ,,the     
,,principle ,,of ,,the 4--,anaxagoras   
described this intelligence as  free to 
dispose1 unmingled with any thing1 the  
ground of movement1 but  itself unmoved1
 every where active1 and the most       
refined and pure of all  things4        
,although these predicates rest partly  
upon a physical analogy1  and do not    
exhibit purely the conception of        
immateriality1 yet on the  other hand   
does the attribute of thought and of a  
conscious acting with  design admit no  
doubt to remain of the decided          
idealistic character of  the            

,anaxagorean principle4 ,nevertheless1  
,anaxagoras went no farther than  to    
enunciate his fundamental thought       
without attempting its complete         
application4 ,the explanation of this is
 obvious from the reasons which  first  
led him to adopt his principle4 ,it was 
only the need of an  original cause of  
motion1 to which also might be          
attributed the capacity  to work        
designedly1 which had led him to the    
idea of an immaterial  principle4 ,his 1
 therefore1 is almost nothing but a     
mover of matter1  and in this function  
nearly all its activity is expended4    
,hence the  universal complaint of the  
ancients1 especially of ,plato and      
,aristotle1  respecting the mechanical  
character of his doctrine4 ,in ,plato's 
,phdon  ,socrates relates that1 in the  
hope of being directed beyond a simple  
occasioning1 or mediate cause1 he had   
turned to the book of ,anaxagoras1  but 
had found there only a mechanical       
instead of a truly teleological         

explanation of being4 ,and as ,plato so 
also does ,aristotle find fault  with   
,anaxagoras in that1 while he admits    
mind as the ultimate ground of  things1 
he yet resorts to it only as to a ,deus 
ex machina for the  explanation of      
phenomena1 whose necessity he could not 
derive from the  causality in nature4   
,anaxagoras1 therefore1 has rather      
postulated than  proved mind as an      
energy above nature1 and as the truth   
and actuality of  natural being4    ,the
 further extension of his system1 his   
doctrine concerning the  homoiomeria    
7constituent elements of things71 which 
according to him  existed together      
originally in a chaotic condition until 
with their  separation and parting the  
formation of the world began--can here  
only be  mentioned4    #d4 ,,anaxagoras 
,,as ,,the ,,close ,,of ,,the           
,,pre-,,socratic ,,realism4--,with the  
,anaxagorean principle of the 1 i4 e4   
with the acquisition of an  absolutely  
immaterial principle1 closes the        

realistic period of the old  ,grecian   
,philosophy4 ,anaxagoras combined       
together the principles of all  his     
predecessors4 ,the infinite matter of   
the ,hylics is represented in  his      
chaotic original mingling of things2 the
 ,eleatic pure being appears  in the    
idea of the 2 the ,heraclitic power of  
becoming and the  ,empedoclean moving   
energies are both seen in the creating  
and arranging  power of the eternal     
mind1 while the ,democritic atoms come  
to view in  the homoiomeria4 ,anaxagoras
 is the closing point of an old and the 
beginning point of a new course of      
development1--the latter through the    
setting up of his ideal principle1 and  
the former through the defective  and   
completely physical manner in which this
 principle was yet again  applied4      
,,section ,,xi4    ,,the ,,sophistic    
,,philosophy4      #a4 ,,relation ,,of  
,,the ,,sophistic ,,philosophy ,,to     
,,the ,,anaxagorean                     
,,principle4--,anaxagoras had formed the

 conception of mind1 and in this had    
recognized thought as a power above the 
objective world4 ,upon this newly       
conquered field the ,sophistic          
philosophy now began its gambols1 and   
with  childish wantonness delighted     
itself in setting at work this power1   
and  in destroying1 by means of a       
subjective dialectic1 all objective     
determinations4 ,the ,sophistic         
philosophy--though of far more          
significance  from its relation to the  
culture of the age than from its        
philosophy--had  for its starting       
principle the breach which ,anaxagoras  
had commenced  between the subjective   
and the objective1--the ,ego and the    
external  world4 ,the subject1 after    
recognizing himself as something higher 
than  the objective world1 and          
especially as something above the laws  
of the  state1 above custom and         
religious tradition and the popular     
faith1 in  the next place attempted to  
prescribe laws for this objective world1

 and  instead of beholding in it the    
historical manifestation of reason1 he  
looked upon it only as an exanimated    
matter1 upon which he might  exercise   
his will4    ,the ,sophistic philosophy 
should be characterized as the clearing 
up  reflection4 ,it is1 therefore1 no   
philosophical system1 for its doctrines 
and affirmations exhibit often so       
popular and even trivial a character    
that for their own sake they would merit
 no place at all in the history  of     
philosophy4 ,it is also no philosophical
 school in the ordinary sense  of the   
term1--for ,plato cites a vast number of
 persons under the common  name of      
8,sophists10--but it is an intellectual 
and widely spread  direction of the age1
 which had struck its roots into the    
whole moral1  political1 and religious  
character of the ,athenian life of that 
time1  and which may be called the      
,athenian clearing up period4    #b4    
,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,sophistic       
,,philosophy ,,to ,,the ,,universal     

,,life ,,of ,,that  ,,age4--,the        
,sophistic philosophy is1 theoretically1
 what the whole ,athenian  life during  
the ,peloponnesian war was practically4 
,plato justly remarks  in his ,republic 
that the doctrines of the ,sophists only
 expressed the  very principles which   
guided the course of the great mass of  
men of that  time in their civil and    
social relations1 and the hatred with   
which they  were pursued by the         
practical statesmen1 clearly indicates  
the jealousy  with which the latter saw 
in them their rivals and the destroyers 
of  their polity4 ,if the absoluteness  
of the empirical subject--i4 e4 the     
view that the individual ,ego can       
arbitrarily determine what is true1     
right and good1--is in fact the         
theoretical principle of the ,sophistic 
philosophy1 so does this in a practical 
direction1 as an unlimited  ,egoism meet
 us in all the spheres of the public and
 private life of that  age4 ,the public 
life had become an arena of passion and 

selfishness2  those party struggles     
which racked ,athens during the         
,peloponnesian war  had blunted and     
stifled the moral feeling2 every        
individual accustomed  himself to set up
 his own private interest above that of 
the state and  the common weal1 and to  
seek in his own arbitrariness and       
advantage the  measuring rod for all his
 actions4 ,the ,protagorean sentence    
that 8the  man is the measure of all    
things0 became practically carried out  
only  too faithfully1 and the influence 
of the orator in the assemblies of the  
people and the courts1 the              
corruptibility of the great masses and  
their  leaders1 and the weak points     
which showed to the adroit student of   
human  nature the covetousness1 vanity1 
and factiousness of others around him1  
offered only too many opportunities to  
bring this rule into practice4  ,custom 
had lost its weight2 the laws were      
regarded as only an agreement  of the   
majority1 the civil ordinance as an     

arbitrary restriction1 the  moral       
feeling as the effect of the policy of  
the state in education1 the  faith in   
the gods as a human invention to        
intimidate the free power of  action1   
while piety was looked upon as a statute
 which some men have  enacted and which 
every one else is justified in using all
 his eloquence  to change4 ,this        
degradation of a necessity1 which is    
conformable to  nature and reason1 and  
which is of universal validity1--to an  
accidental  human ordinance1 is chiefly 
the point in which the ,sophistic       
philosophy  came in contact with the    
universal consciousness of the educated 
class  of that period1 and we cannot    
with certainty determine what share     
science and what share the life may have
 had in this connection1--whether  the  
,sophistic philosophy found only the    
theoretical formula for the  practical  
life and tendencies of the age1 or      
whether the moral  corruption was rather
 a consequence of that destructive      

influence which  the principles of the  
,sophists exerted upon the whole course 
of  contemporaneous thought4    ,it     
would be1 however1 to mistake the spirit
 of history if we were only  to bewail  
the epoch of the ,sophists instead of   
admitting for it a  relative            
justification4 ,these phenomena were in 
part the necessary  product of the      
collective development of the age4 ,the 
faith in the  popular religion fell so  
suddenly to the ground simply because it
  possessed in itself no inner1 moral   
support4 ,the grossest vices and acts   
of baseness could all be justified and  
excused from the examples of  mythology4
 ,even ,plato himself1 though otherwise 
an advocate of a devout  faith in the   
traditional religion1 accuses the poets 
of his nation with  leading the very    
moral feeling astray1 through the       
unworthy  representations which they had
 spread abroad concerning the gods and  
the  hero world4 ,it was moreover       
unavoidable that the advancing science  

should clash with tradition4 ,the       
physical philosophers had already long  
lived in open hostility to the popular  
religion1 and the more  convincingly    
they demonstrated by analogies and laws 
that many things  which had hitherto    
been regarded as the immediate effect of
 ,divine  omnipotence1 were only the    
results of natural causes1 so much the  
more  easily would it happen that the   
educated classes would become perplexed 
in reference to all their previous      
convictions4 ,it was no wonder then     
that the transformed consciousness of   
the time should penetrate all the       
provinces of art and poesy2 that in     
sculpture1 wholly analogous to the      
rhetoric art of the ,sophistic          
philosophy1 the emotive should occupy   
the  place of the elevated style2 that  
,euripides1 the sophist among           
tragedians1 should bring the whole      
philosophy of the time and its manner   
of moral reflection upon the stage2 and 
that1 instead of like the  earlier      

poets1 bringing forward his actors to   
represent an idea1 he  should use them  
only as means to excite a momentary     
emotion or some  other stage effect4    
#c4 ,,tendencies ,,of ,,the ,,sophistic 
,,philosophy4--,to give a definite      
classification of the ,sophistic        
philosophy1 which should be derived from
  the conception of the general         
phenomena of the age1 is exceedingly    
difficult1 since1 like the ,french      
8clearing up0 of the last century1 it   
entered into every department of        
knowledge4 ,the ,sophists directed the  
universal culture of the time4          
,protagoras was known as a teacher of   
virtue1 ,gorgias as a rhetorician and   
politician1 ,prodicus as a  grammarian  
and teacher of synonyms1 ,hippias as a  
man of various  attainments1 who besides
 astronomical and mathematical studies  
busied  himself with a theory of        
mnemonics2 others took for their problem
 the  art of education1 and others still
 the explanation of the old poets2 the  

brothers ,euthydemus and ,dionysidorus  
gave instruction in the bearing of  arms
 and military tactics2 many among them1 
as ,gorgias1 ,prodicus1 and  ,hippias1  
were intrusted with embassies3 in short 
the ,sophists1 each one  according to   
his individual tendency1 took upon      
themselves every variety  of calling and
 entered into every sphere of science2  
their method is the  only thing common  
to all4 ,moreover the relation of the   
,sophists to the  educated public1 their
 striving after popularity1 fame and    
money1  disclose the fact that their    
studies and occupations were for the    
most  part controlled1 not by a         
subjective scientific interest1 but by  
some  external motive4 ,with that roving
 spirit which was an essential          
peculiarity of the later ,sophists1     
travelling from city to city1 and       
announcing themselves as thinkers by    
profession--and giving their            
instructions with prominent reference to
 a good recompense and the favor  of the

 rich private classes1 it was very      
natural that they should  discourse upon
 the prominent questions of universal   
interest and of  public culture1 with   
occasional reference also to the        
favorite  occupation of this or that    
rich man with whom they might be brought
 in  contact4 ,hence their peculiar     
strength lay far more in a formal       
dexterity1 in an acuteness of thought   
and a capacity of bringing it  readily  
into exercise1 in the art of discourse  
than in any positive  knowledge2 their  
instruction in virtue was given either  
in positive  dogmatism or in empty      
bombast1 and even where the ,sophistic  
philosophy  became really polymathic1   
the art of speech still remained as the 
great  thing4 ,so we find in ,xenophon1 
,hippias boasting that he can speak     
repeatedly upon every subject and say   
something new each time1 while we  hear 
it expressly affirmed of others1 that   
they had no need of positive  knowledge 
in order to discourse satisfactorily    

upon every thing1 and to  answer every  
question extemporaneously2 and when many
 ,sophists make it a  great point to    
hold a well-arranged discourse about    
something of the  least possible        
significance 7e4 g4 salt71 so do we see 
that with them  the thing was only a    
means while the word was the end1 and we
 ought not  to be surprised that in this
 respect the ,sophistic philosophy sunk 
to  that empty technicality which ,plato
 in his ,phdrus1 on account of its  want
 of character1 subjects to so rigid a   
criticism4    #d4 ,,the ,,significance  
,,of ,,the ,,sophistic ,,philosophy     
,,from ,,its ,,relation ,,to ,,the      
,,culture ,,of ,,the ,,age4--,the       
scientific and moral defect of the      
,sophistic  philosophy is at first view 
obvious2 and1 since certain modern      
writers  of history with over-officious 
zeal have painted its dark sides in     
black1 and raised an earnest accusation 
against its frivolity1  immorality1 and 
greediness for pleasure1 its            

conceitedness and  selfishness1 and bare
 appearance of wisdom and art of        
dispute--it needs  here no farther      
elucidation4 ,but the point in it most  
apt to be  overlooked is the merit of   
the ,sophists in their effect upon the  
culture  of the age4 ,to say1 as is     
done1 that they had only the negative   
merit of  calling out the opposition of 
,socrates and ,plato1 is to leave the   
immense influence and the high fame of  
so many among them1 as well as  the     
revolution which they brought about in  
the thinking of a whole  nation1 an     
inexplicable phenomenon4 ,it were       
inexplicable that e4 g4  ,socrates      
should attend the lectures of ,prodicus1
 and direct to him other  students1 if  
he did not acknowledge the worth of his 
grammatical  performances or recognize  
his merit for the soundness of his      
logic4  ,moreover1 it cannot be denied  
that ,protagoras has hit upon many      
correct  principles of rhetoric1 and has
 satisfactorily established certain     

grammatical categories4 ,generally may  
it be said of the ,sophists1 that  they 
threw among the people a fulness in     
every department of knowledge2  that    
they strewed about them a vast number of
 fruitful germs of  development2 that   
they called out investigations in the   
theory of  knowledge1 in logic and in   
language2 that they laid the basis for  
the  methodical treatment of many       
branches of human knowledge1 and that   
they  partly founded and partly called  
forth that wonderful intellectual       
activity which characterized ,athens at 
that time4 ,their greatest merit  is    
their service in the department of      
language4 ,they may even be said to     
have created and formed the ,attic      
prose4 ,they are the first who made     
style as such a separate object of      
attention and study1 and who set  about 
rigid investigations respecting number  
and the art of rhetorical               
representation4 ,with them ,athenian    
eloquence1 which they first incited1    

begins4 ,antiphon as well as            
,isocrates--the latter the founder of   
the most  flourishing school of ,greek  
rhetoric--are offshoots of the          
,sophistic  philosophy4 ,in all this    
there is ground enough to regard this   
whole  phenomenon as not barely a       
symptom of decay4    #e4 ,,individual   
,,sophists4--,the first1 who is said to 
have been called1 in  the received      
sense1 ,sophist1 is ,protagoras of      
,abdera1 who flourished  about #ddj ,b4 
,c4 ,he taught1 and for wages1 in       
,sicily and in ,athens1 but  was driven 
out of the latter place as a reviler of 
the gods1 and his  book concerning the  
gods was burnt by the herald in the     
public  market-place4 ,it began with    
these words3 8,i can know nothing       
concerning  the gods1 whether they exist
 or not2 for we are prevented from      
gaining  such knowledge not only by the 
obscurity of the thing itself1 but by   
the  shortness of the human life10 ,in  
another writing he develops his         

doctrine concerning knowing or          
not-knowing4 ,starting from the         
,heraclitic  position that every thing  
is in a constant flow1 and applying this
  preminently to the thinking subject1  
he taught that the man is the  measure  
of all things1 who determines in respect
 of being that it may  be1 and of       
not-being that it may not be1 i4 e4 that
 is true for the  perceiving subject    
which he1 in the constant movement of   
things and of  himself1 at every moment 
perceives and is sensible of--and hence 
he has  theoretically no other relation 
to the external world than the sensuous 
apprehension1 and practically no other  
than the sensuous desire4 ,but  now1    
since perception and sensation are as   
diverse as the subjects  themselves1 and
 are in the highest degree variable in  
the very same  subject1 there follows   
the farther result that nothing has an  
objective  validity and determination1  
that contradictory affirmations in      
reference  to the same object must be   

received as alike true1 and that error  
and  contradiction cannot be4           
,protagoras does not seem to have made  
any  efforts to give these frivolous    
propositions a practical and logical    
application4 ,according to the testimony
 of the ancients1 a personal  character 
worthy of esteem1 cannot be denied him2 
and even ,plato1 in the  dialogue which 
bears his name1 goes no farther than to 
object to his  complete obscurity       
respecting the nature of morality1      
while1 in his  ,gorgias and ,philebus1  
he charges the later ,sophists with     
affirming the  principles of immorality 
and moral baseness4    ,next to         
,protagoras1 the most famous ,sophist   
was ,gorgias4 ,during the               
,peloponnesian war 7#dbf ,b4 ,c471 he   
came from ,leontium to ,athens in order 
to gain assistance for his native city  
against the encroachments of  ,syracuse1
 ,after the successful accomplishment of
 his errand he still  abode for some    
time in ,athens1 but resided the latter 

part of his life  in ,thessaly1 where he
 died about the same time with          
,socrates4 ,the  pompous ostentation of 
his external appearance is often        
ridiculed by  ,plato1 and the discourses
 through which he was wont to exhibit   
himself  display the same character1    
attempting1 through poetical ornament1  
and  florid metaphors1 and uncommon     
words1 and a mass of hitherto unheard of
  figures of speech1 to dazzle and      
delude the mind4 ,as a philosopher he   
adhered to the ,eleatics1 especially to 
,zeno1 and attempts to prove upon  the  
basis of their dialectic schematism1    
that universally nothing is1 or  if     
there could be a being1 it would not be 
cognizable1 or if cognizable  it would  
not be communicable4 ,hence his writing 
bore characteristically  enough the     
title--8,concerning ,not-being or       
,nature40 ,the proof of the  first      
proposition that universally nothing is1
 since it can be  established neither as
 being nor as not-being1 nor yet as at  

the same  time both being and not-being1
 rests entirely upon the position that  
all  existence is a space-filling       
existence 7has place and body71 and is  
in  fact the final consequence which    
overturns itself1 in other words the    
self-destruction of the hitherto        
physical method of philosophizing4      
,the later ,sophists with reckless      
daring carried their conclusions far    
beyond ,gorgias and ,protagoras4 ,they  
were for the most part free  thinkers1  
who pulled to the ground the religion1  
laws1 and customs of  their birth4      
,among these should be named1           
prominently1 the tyrant  ,critias1      
,polus1 ,callicles1 and ,thrasymachus4  
,the two latter openly  taught the right
 of the stronger as the law of nature1  
the unbridled  satisfaction of desire as
 the natural right of the stronger1 and 
the  setting up of restraining laws as a
 crafty invention of the weaker2 and    
,critias1 the most talented but the most
 abandoned of the thirty tyrants1  wrote

 a poem1 in which he represented the    
faith in the gods as an  invention of   
crafty statesmen4 ,hippias of ,elis1 a  
man of great  knowledge1 bore an        
honorable character1 although he did not
 fall behind  the rest in bombast and   
boasting2 but before all1 was ,prodicus1
 in  reference to whom it became a      
proverb to say--8as wise as ,prodicus10 
and  concerning whom ,plato himself and 
even ,aristophanes never spoke without  
veneration4 ,especially famous among the
 ancients were his parenetical          
7persuasive7 lectures concerning the    
choice of a mode of life  7,xenophon's  
,memorabilia1 ,,ii4 #a71 concerning     
external good and its use1  concerning  
life and death1 c41 discourses in which 
he manifests a  refined moral feeling1  
and his observation of life2 although1  
through  the want of a higher ethical   
and scientific principle1 he must be    
placed  behind ,socrates1 whose         
forerunner he has been called4 ,the     
later  generations of ,sophists1 as they

 are shown in the ,euthydemus of ,plato1
  sink to a common level of buffoonery  
and disgraceful strife for gain1  and   
comprise their whole dialectic art in   
certain formul for entangling           
fallacies4    #f4 ,,transition ,,to     
,,socrates ,,and ,,characteristic ,,of  
,,the ,,following  ,,period4--,that     
which is true in the ,sophistic         
philosophy is the truth of  the         
subjectivity1 of the self-consciousness1
 i4 e4 the demand that  every thing     
which ,i am to admit must be shown as   
rational before my own                  
consciousness--that which is false in it
 is its apprehension of this            
subjectivity as nothing farther than    
finite1 empirical egoistic              
subjectivity1 i4 e4 the demand that my  
accidental will and opinion  should     
determine what is rational2 its truth is
 that it set up the  principle of       
freedom1 of self-certainty2 its untruth 
is that it  established the accidental  
will and notion of the individual upon  

the  throne4 ,to carry out now the      
principle of freedom and                
self-consciousness  to its truth1 to    
gain a true world of objective thought  
with a real and  distinct content1 by   
the same means of reflection which the  
,sophists had  only used to destroy it1 
to establish the objective will1 the    
rational  thinking1 the absolute or     
ideal in the place of the empirical     
subjectivity was the problem of the next
 advent in philosophy1 the  problem     
which ,socrates took up and solved4 ,to 
make the absolute or ideal  subjectivity
 instead of the empirical for a         
principle1 is to affirm that  the true  
measure of all things is not my 7i4 e4  
the individual  person's7 opinion1 fancy
 and will2 that what is true1 right and 
good1  does not depend upon my caprice  
and arbitrary determination1 or upon    
that of any other empirical subject2 but
 while it is my thinking1 it  is my     
thinking1 the rational within me1 which 
has to decide upon all  those points4   

,but my thinking1 my reason1 is not     
something specially  belonging to me1   
but something common to every rational  
being2 something  universal1 and in so  
far as ,i am a rational and thinking    
being1 is my  subjectivity a universal  
one4 ,but every thinking individual has 
the  consciousness that what he holds as
 right1 as duty1 as good or evil1  does 
not appear as such to him alone but to  
every rational being1 and  that         
consequently his thinking has the       
character of universality1 of  universal
 validity1 in a word--of objectivity4   
,this then in opposition to  the        
,sophistic philosophy is the standpoint 
of ,socrates1 and therefore  with him   
the philosophy of objective thought     
begins4 ,what ,socrates  could do in    
opposition to the ,sophists was to show 
that reflection led  to the same results
 as faith or obedience1 hitherto without
 reflection1  had done1 and that the    
thinking man guided by his free         
consciousness and  his own conviction1  

would learn to form the same judgments  
and take the  same course to which life 
and custom had already and unconsciously
  induced the ordinary man4 ,the        
position1 that while the man is the     
measure of all things1 it is the man as 
universal1 as thinking1 as  rational1 is
 the fundamental thought of the         
,socratic philosophy1 which  is1 by     
virtue of this thought1 the positive    
complement of the ,sophistic  principle4
    ,with ,socrates begins the second   
period of the ,grecian philosophy4 ,this
  period contains three philosophical   
systems1 whose authors1 standing to     
each other in the personal relation of  
teacher and pupil1 represent  three     
successive generations1--,,socrates1    
,,plato1 ,,aristotle4          ,,section
 ,,xii4    ,,socrates4#b      #a4 ,,his 
,,personal ,,character4--,the new       
philosophical principle appears in  the 
personal character of ,socrates4 ,his   
philosophy is his mode of acting  as an 
individual2 his life and doctrine cannot

 be separated4 ,his  biography1         
therefore1 forms the only complete      
representation of his  philosophy1 and  
what the narrative of ,xenophon presents
 us as the  definite doctrine of        
,socrates1 is consequently nothing but  
an abstract  of his inward character1 as
 it found expression from time to time  
in his  conversation4 ,plato yet more   
regarded his master as such an          
archetypal  personality1 and a luminous 
exhibition of the historical ,socrates  
is the  special object of his later and 
maturer dialogues1 and of these again1  
the ,symposium is the most brilliant    
apotheosis of the ,eros incarnated in   
the person of ,socrates1 of the         
philosophical impulse transformed into  
character4    ,socrates was born in the 
year #dfi ,b4 ,c1 the son of            
,sophroniscus1 a  sculptor1 and         
,phnarete1 a midwife4 ,in his youth he  
was trained by his  father to follow his
 own profession1 and in this he is said 
not to have  been without skill4 ,three 

draped figures of the ,graces1 called   
the work  of ,socrates1 were seen by    
,pausanias1 upon the ,akropolis4 ,little
 farther  is known of his education4 ,he
 may have profited by the instruction of
  ,prodicus and the musician1 ,damon1   
but he stood in no personal connection  
with the proper philosophers1 who       
flourished before1 or cotemporaneously  
with him4 ,he became what he was by     
himself alone1 and just for this  reason
 does he form an era in the old         
philosophy4 ,if the ancients call  him a
 scholar of ,anaxagoras1 or of the      
natural philosopher1 ,archelaus1  the   
first is demonstrably false1 and the    
second1 to say the least1 is  altogether
 improbable4 ,he never sought other     
means of culture than those  afforded in
 his native city4 ,with the exception of
 one journey to a  public festival1 the 
military campaigns which led him as far 
as ,potida1  ,delion1 and ,amphipolis1  
he never left ,athens4    ,the period   
when ,socrates first began to devote    

himself to the education  of youth1 can 
be determined only approximately from   
the time of the  first representation of
 the ,clouds of ,aristophanes1 which was
 in the  year #dbc4 ,the date of the    
,delphic oracle1 which pronounced him   
the  wisest of men1 is not known4 ,but  
in the traditions of his followers1 he  
is almost uniformly represented as an   
old1 or as a gray-headed man4 ,his  mode
 of instruction1 wholly different from  
the pedantry and boastful  ostentation  
of the ,sophists1 was altogether        
unconstrained1  conversational1 popular1
 starting from objects lying nearest at 
hand and  the most insignificant1 and   
deriving the necessary illustrations and
  proofs from the most common matters of
 every day life2 in fact1 he was        
reproached by his cotemporaries for     
speaking ever only of drudges1  smiths1 
cobblers and tanners4 ,so we find him at
 the market1 in the  gymnasia1 in the   
workshops1 busy early and late1 talking 
with youth1  with young men1 and with   

old men1 on the proper aim and business 
of  life1 convincing them of their      
ignorance1 and wakening up in them the  
slumbering desires after knowledge4 ,in 
every human effort1 whether  directed to
 the interests of the commonwealth1 or  
to the private  individual and the gains
 of trade1 to science or to art1 this   
master of  helps to spiritual births    
could find fit points of contact for the
  awakening of a true self-knowledge1   
and a moral and religions               
consciousness4 ,however often his       
attempts failed1 or were rejected with  
bitter scorn1 or requited with hatred   
and unthankfulness1 yet1 led on by  the 
clear conviction that a real improvement
 in the condition of the  state could   
come only from a proper education of its
 youth1 he remained  to the last true to
 his chosen vocation4 ,purely ,greek in 
these relations  to the rising          
generation1 he designated himself1 by   
preference1 as the  most ardent lover2  
,greek too in this1 that with him1      

notwithstanding  these free relations of
 friendship1 his own domestic life fell 
quite  into the background4 ,he nowhere 
shows much regard for his wife and      
children2 the notorious1 though         
altogether too much exaggerated         
ill-nature of ,xantippe1 leads us to    
suspect1 however1 that his domestic     
relations were not the most happy4      
,as a man1 as a practical sage1         
,socrates is pictured in the brightest  
colors by all narrators4 8,he was10 says
 ,xenophon1 8so pious1 that he did      
nothing without the advice of the gods2 
so just1 that he never injured  any one 
even in the least2 so completely master 
of himself1 that he  never chose the    
agreeable instead of the good2 so       
discerning1 that he  never failed in    
distinguishing the better from the      
worse20 in short1 he  was 8just the best
 and happiest man possible40 7,xen4     
,mem4 ,i4 #a1 #aa4  ,,iv4 #h1 #aa47     
,still that which lends to his person   
such a peculiar charm1  is the happy    

blending and harmonious connection of   
all its  characteristic traits1 the     
perfection of a beautiful1 plastic      
nature4 ,in  all this universality of   
his genius1 in this force of character1 
by  which he combined the most          
contradictory and incongruous elements  
into a  harmonious whole1 in this lofty 
elevation above every human             
weakness1--in  a word1 as a perfect     
model1 he is most strikingly depicted in
 the  brilliant eulogy of ,alcibiades1  
in the ,symposium of ,plato4 ,in the    
scantier representation of ,xenophon1   
also1 we find everywhere a classic      
form1 a man possessed of the finest     
social culture1 full of ,athenian       
politeness1 infinitely removed from     
every thing like gloomy asceticism1  a  
man as valiant upon the field of battle 
as in the festive hall1  conducting     
himself with the most unconstrained     
freedom1 and yet with  entire sobriety  
and self-control1 a perfect picture of  
the happiest  ,athenian time1 without   

the acerbity1 the one-sidedness1 and    
contracted  reserve of the later        
moralists1 an ideal representation of   
the genuinely  human virtues4    #b4    
,,socrates ,,and                        
,,aristophanes4--,socrates seems early  
to have attained  universal celebrity   
through the peculiarities attaching to  
his person  and character4 ,nature had  
furnished him with a remarkable external
  physiognomy4 ,his crooked1 turned-up  
nose1 his projecting eye1 his bald      
pate1 his corpulent body1 gave his form 
a striking similarity to the  ,silenic1 
a comparison which is carried out in    
,xenophon's 8,feast10 in  sprightly     
jest1 and in ,plato's ,symposium1 with  
as much ingenuity as  profoundness4 ,to 
this was added his miserable dress1 his 
going barefoot1  his posture1 his often 
standing still1 and rolling his eyes4   
,after all  this1 one will hardly be    
surprised that the ,athenian comedy took
  advantage of such a remarkable        
character4 ,but there was another and   

peculiar motive1 which influenced       
,aristophanes4 ,he was a most ardent    
admirer of the good old times1 an       
enthusiastic eulogist of the manners    
and the constitution1 under which the   
fathers had been reared4 ,as it was  his
 great object to waken up anew in his   
people1 and to stimulate a  longing     
after those good old times1 his         
passionate hatred broke out  against all
 modern efforts in politics1 art and    
philosophy1 of that  increasing         
mock-wisdom1 which went hand in hand    
with a degenerating  democracy4 ,hence  
comes his bitter railing at ,cleon1 the 
,demagogue 7in  the ,knights71 at       
,euripides1 the sentimental play-writer 
7in the  ,frogs7 and at ,socrates1 the  
,sophist 7in the ,clouds74 ,the latter1 
as  the representative of a subtle1     
destructive philosophy1 must have       
appeared to him just as corrupt and     
pernicious1 as the party of progress  in
 politics1 who trampled without         
conscience upon every thing which had   

come down from the past4 ,it is1        
therefore1 the fundamental thought of   
the ,clouds to expose ,socrates to      
public contempt1 as the representative  
of the ,sophistic philosophy1 a mere    
semblance of wisdom1 at once vain1      
profitless1 corrupting in its influence 
upon the youth1 and undermining  all    
true discipline and morality4 ,seen in  
this light1 and from a moral            
standpoint1 the motives of ,aristophanes
 may find some excuse1 but they  cannot 
be justified2 and his representation of 
,socrates1 into whose  character all the
 characteristic features of the         
,sophistic philosophy  are interwoven1  
even the most contemptible and hateful1 
yet so that the  most unmistakable      
likeness is still apparent1 cannot be   
admitted on the  ground that ,socrates  
did really have the greatest formal     
resemblance to  the ,sophists4 ,the     
,clouds can only be designated as a     
culpable  misunderstanding1 and as an   
act of gross injustice brought about by 

blinded passion2 and ,hegel1 when he    
attempts to defend the conduct of       
,aristophanes1 forgets1 that1 while the 
comic writer may caricature1 he  must do
 it without having recourse to public   
calumniation4 ,in fact all  the         
political and social tendencies of      
,aristophanes rest on a gross           
misunderstanding of historical          
development4 ,the good old times1 as he 
fancies them1 are a fiction4 ,it lies   
just as little in the realm of          
possibility1 that a morality without    
reflection1 and a homely  ingenuousness1
 such as mark a nation's childhood1     
should be forced upon  a time in which  
reflection has utterly eaten out all    
immediateness1 and  unconscious moral   
simplicity1 as that a grown up man      
should became a  child again in the     
natural way4 ,aristophanes himself      
attests the  impossibility of such a    
return1 when in a fit of humor1 with    
cynic  raillery1 he gives up all divine 
and human authority to ridicule1 and    

thereby1 however commendable may have   
been the patriotic motive  prompting him
 to this comic extravagance1            
demonstrates1 that he himself  no longer
 stands upon the basis of the old       
morality1 that he too is the  son of his
 time4    #c4 ,,the ,,condemnation ,,of 
,,socrates4--,to this same confounding  
of his efforts  with those of the       
,sophists1 and the same tendency to     
restore by violent  means the old       
discipline and morality1 ,socrates1     
twenty-four years  later1 fell a victim4
 ,after he had lived and labored at     
,athens for many  years in his usual    
manner1 after the storm of the          
,peloponnesian war had  passed by1 and  
this city had experienced the most      
varied political  fortunes1 in his      
seventieth year he was brought to trial 
and accused of  neglecting the gods of  
the state1 of introducing new deities1  
and also  of corrupting the youth4 ,his 
accusers were ,melitus1 a young poet1   
,anytus1 a demagogue1 and ,lycon1 an    

orator1 men in every respect            
insignificant1 and acting1 as it seems1 
without motives of personal  enmity4    
,the trial resulted in his condemnation4
 ,after a fortunate  accident had       
enabled him to spend thirty days more   
with his scholars in  his confinement1  
spurning a flight from prison1 he drank 
the poisoned  cup in the year #cii ,b4  
,c4    ,the first motive to his         
accusation1 as already remarked1 was his
  identification with the ,sophists1 the
 actual belief that his doctrines  and  
activity were marked with the same      
character of hostility to the  interests
 of the state1 as those of the          
,sophists1 which had already  occasioned
 so much mischief4 ,the three points in 
the accusation1 though  evidently       
resting on a misunderstanding1 alike    
indicate this2 they are  precisely those
 by which ,aristophanes had sought to   
characterize the  ,sophist in the person
 of ,socrates4 ,this 8corruption of the 
youth10 this  bringing in of new        

customs1 and a new mode of culture and  
education  generally1 was precisely the 
charge which was brought against the    
,sophists2 moreover1 in ,plato's ,menon1
 ,anytus1 one of the three accusers1  is
 introduced as the bitter enemy of the  
,sophists and of their manner of        
instruction4 ,so too in respect to the  
denial of the national gods3  before    
this1 ,protagoras1 accused of denying   
the gods1 had been obliged  to flee1 and
 ,prodicus1 to drink hemlock1 a victim  
to the same distrust4  ,even five years 
after the death of ,socrates1 ,xenophon1
 who was not  present at the trial1 felt
 himself called upon to write his       
,memorabilia  in defence of his teacher1
 so wide-spread and deep-rooted was the 
prejudice against him4    ,beside this  
there was also a second1 probably a more
 decisive reason4 ,as  the ,sophistic   
philosophy was1 in its very nature1     
eminently  aristocratic1 and ,socrates1 
as a supposed ,sophist1 consequently    
passed  for an aristocrat1 his entire   

mode of life could not fail to make him 
appear like a bad citizen in the eyes of
 the restored democracy4 ,he had  never 
concerned himself in the affairs of the 
state1 had never but once  sustained an 
official character1 and then1 as chief  
of the ,prytanes1 had  disagreed with   
the will of the people and the rulers4  
7,plat4 ,apol4   #cb4 ,xen4 ,mem4 ,i4   
#a1 #ah47 ,in his seventieth year1 he   
mounted the  orator's stand for the     
first time in his life1 on the occasion 
of his  own accusation4 ,his whole      
manner was somewhat cosmopolitan2 he is 
even  said to have remarked1 that he was
 not an ,athenian1 nor a ,greek1 but a  
citizen of the world4 ,we must also take
 into account1 that he found  fault with
 the ,athenian democracy upon every     
occasion1 especially with  the          
democratic institution of choice by lot1
 that he decidedly preferred  the       
,spartan state to the ,athenian1 and    
that he excited the distrust of  the    
democrats by his confidential relations 

with the former leaders of  the         
oligarchic party4 7,xen4 ,mem4 ,i4 #b1  
#i1 sq47 ,among others who were  of the 
oligarchic interest1 and friendly to the
 ,spartans1 ,critias in  particular1 one
 of the thirty tyrants1 had been his    
scholar2 so too  ,alcibiades--two men1  
who had been the cause of much evil to  
the ,athenian  people4 ,if now we accept
 the uniform tradition1 that two of his 
accusers  were men of fair standing in  
the democratic party1 and farther1 that 
his  judges were men who had fled before
 the thirty tyrants1 and later had      
overthrown the power of the oligarchy1  
we find it much more easy to  understand
 how they1 in the case before them1     
should have supposed they  were acting  
wholly in the interest of the democratic
 party1 when they  pronounced           
condemnation upon the accused1          
especially as enough to all  appearance 
could be brought against him4 ,the      
hurried trial presents  nothing very    
remarkable1 in a generation which had   

grown up during the  ,peloponnesian war1
 and in a people that adopted and       
repented of their  passionate resolves  
with the like haste4 ,yea1 more1 if we  
consider that  ,socrates spurned to have
 recourse to the usual means and forms  
adopted  by those accused of capital    
crime1 and to gain the sympathy of the  
people by lamentations1 or their favor  
by flattery1 that he in proud           
consciousness of his innocence defied   
his judges1 it becomes rather a  matter 
of wonder1 that his condemnation was    
carried by a majority of  only three to 
six votes4 ,and even now he might have  
escaped the sentence  to death1 had he  
been willing to bow to the will of the  
sovereign people  for the sake of a     
commutation of his punishment4 ,but as  
he spurned to  set a value upon himself1
 by proposing another punishment1 a     
fine1 for  example1 instead of the one  
moved by his accuser1 because this would
 be  the same as to acknowledge himself 
guilty1 his disdain could not fail to   

exasperate the easily excited           
,athenians1 and no farther explanation  
is  needed to show why eighty of his    
judges who had before voted for his     
innocence1 now voted for his death4     
,such was the most lamentable  result--a
 result1 afterwards most deeply         
regretted by the ,athenians             
themselves--of an accusation1 which at  
the outset was probably only  intended  
to humble the aristocratic philosopher1 
and to force him to an  acknowledgment  
of the power and the majesty of the     
people4    ,hegel's view of the fate of 
,socrates1 that it was the result of the
  collision of equally just powers--the 
,tragedy of ,athens as he calls  it--and
 that guilt and innocence were shared   
alike on both sides1 cannot  be         
maintained on historical grounds1 since 
,socrates can neither be  regarded      
exclusively as the representative of the
 modern spirit1 the  principle of       
freedom1 subjectivity1 the concrete     
personality2 nor his  judges1 as the    

representatives of the old ,athenian    
unreflecting  morality4 ,the first      
cannot be1 since ,socrates1 if his      
principle was at  variance with the old 
,greek morality1 rested nevertheless so 
far on the  basis of tradition1 that the
 accusations brought against him in this
  respect were false and groundless2 and
 the last cannot be1 since at that      
time1 after the close of the            
,peloponnesian war1 the old morality and
  piety had long been wanting to the    
mass of the people1 and given place  to 
the modern culture1 and the whole       
process against ,socrates must be       
regarded rather as an attempt to restore
 by violence1 in connection with  the   
old constitution1 the old defunct       
morality4 ,the fault is not  therefore  
the same on both sides1 and it must be  
held1 that ,socrates  fell a victim to a
 misunderstanding1 and to an            
unjustifiable reaction of  public       
sentiment4    #d4 ,,the 8,,genius0  ,,of
 ,,socrates4--,those traces of the old  

religious  sentiment1 which have been   
handed down to us from so many different
  sources1 and are certainly not to be  
explained from a bare accommodation  to 
the popular belief1 on the part of the  
philosopher1 and which  distinguish him 
so decidedly from the ,sophists1 show   
how little ,socrates  is really to be   
regarded as an innovator in discipline  
and morals4 ,he  commends the art of    
divination1 believes in dreams1         
sacrifices with all  proper care1 speaks
 of the gods1 of their omniscience1     
omnipresence1  goodness1 and complete   
sufficiency in themselves1 even with the
 greatest  reverence1 and1 at the close 
of his defence1 makes the most solemn   
asseveration of his belief in their     
existence4 ,in keeping with his         
attaching himself in this way to the    
popular religion1 his new  principle1   
though in its results hostile to all    
external authority1  nevertheless       
assumed the form of the popular belief  
in 8,demonic0 signs  and symbols4 ,these

 suggestions of the 8,demon0 are a      
knowledge1 which is  at the same time   
connected with unconsciousness4 ,they   
occupy the middle  ground between the   
bare external of the ,greek oracle1 and 
the purely  internal of the spirit4     
,that ,socrates had the conception of a 
particular  subject1 a personal         
8,demon10 or 8,genius10 is altogether   
improbable4 ,just  as little can these  
8,demonic0 signs1 this inward oracle1   
whose voice  ,socrates professed to     
hear1 be regarded after the modern      
acceptation1  simply as the             
personification of the conscience1 or of
 the practical  instinct1 or of the     
individual tact4 ,the first article in  
the form of  accusation1 which evidently
 refers to this very point1 shows that  
,socrates did not speak barely          
metaphorically of this voice1 to which  
he  professed to owe his prophecies4    
,and it was not solely in reference to  
those higher questions of decided       
importance1 that ,socrates had these    

suggestions1 but rather and preeminently
 with respect to matters of mere        
accident and arbitrary choice1 as for   
example1 whether1 and when1 his  friends
 should set out on a journey4 ,it is no 
longer possible to explain  the 8,demon0
 or 8,genius0 of ,socrates on           
psychological grounds2 there may  have  
been something of a magnetic character  
about it4 ,it is possible  that there   
may be some connection between this and 
the many other  ecstatic or cataleptic  
states1 which are related of ,socrates  
in the  ,symposium of ,plato4    #e4    
,,the ,,sources ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy 
,,of ,,socrates4--,well known is the old
  controversy1 whether the picture of   
,socrates1 drawn by ,xenophon or by     
,plato1 is the most complete and true to
 history1 and which of the two  men is  
to be considered as the more reliable   
source for obtaining a  knowledge of his
 philosophy4 ,this question is being    
decided more and  more in favor of      
,xenophon4 ,great pains has been taken  

in former as in  later times1 to bring  
,xenophon's ,memorabilia into disrepute1
 as a  shallow and insufficient source1 
because their plain1 and any thing      
other than speculative contents1 seemed 
to furnish no satisfactory  ground for  
such a revolution in the world of mind  
as is attributed to  ,socrates1 or for  
the splendor which invests his name in  
history1 or for  the character which    
,plato assigns him2 because again the   
,memorabilia of  ,xenophon have         
especially an apologetic aim1 and their 
defence does not  relate so much to the 
philosopher as to the man2 and finally1 
because  they have been supposed to have
 the appearance of carrying the         
philosophical over into the             
unphilosophical style of the common     
understanding4 ,a distinction has       
therefore been made between an exoteric 
and an esoteric ,socrates1 obtaining the
 first from ,xenophon1 the latter  from 
,plato4 ,but the preference of ,plato to
 ,xenophon has in the first  place no   

historical right in its favor1 since    
,xenophon appears as a  proper historian
 and claims historical credibility1     
while ,plato on the  other hand never   
professes to be an historical narrator1 
save in a few  passages1 and will by no 
means have all the rest which he puts in
 the  mouth of ,socrates understood as  
his authentic expressions and discourse4
  ,there is1 therefore1 no historical   
reason for preferring the               
representation of ,socrates which is    
given by ,plato4 ,in the second place1  
the under-valuation of ,xenophon rests1 
for the most part1 on the false  notion1
 that ,socrates had a proper philosophy1
 i4 e4 a speculative  system1 and on an 
unhistorical mistaking of the limits by 
which the  philosophical character of   
,socrates was conditioned and           
restricted4  ,there was no proper       
,socratic doctrine1 but a ,socratic     
life2 and1 just on  this ground1 are the
 different philosophical tendencies of  
his scholars  to be explained4    #f4   

,,the ,,universal ,,character ,,of ,,the
 ,,philosophizing ,,of ,,socrates4--,the
  philosophizing of ,socrates was       
limited and restricted by his           
opposition1  partly to the preceding1   
and partly to the ,sophistic philosophy4
    ,philosophy before the time of      
,socrates had been in its essential     
character investigation of nature4 ,but 
in ,socrates1 the human mind1 for  the  
first time1 turned itself in upon       
itself1 upon its own being1 and  that   
too in the most immediate manner1 by    
conceiving itself as active1  moral     
spirit4 ,the positive philosophizing of 
,socrates1 is exclusively of  an ethical
 character1 exclusively an inquiry into 
the nature of virtue1  so exclusively1  
and so onesidedly1 that1 as is wont to  
be the case upon  the appearance of a   
new principle1 it even expressed a      
contempt for the  striving of the entire
 previous period1 with its natural      
philosophy1 and  its mathematics4       
,setting every thing under the          

standpoint of immediate  moral law1     
,socrates was so far from finding any   
object in 8irrational0  nature worthy of
 study1 that he rather1 in a kind of    
general  teleological manner1 conceived 
it simply in the light of external means
  for the attainment of external ends2  
yea1 he would not even go out to  walk1 
as he says in the ,phdrus of ,plato1    
since one can learn nothing  from trees 
and districts of country4               
,self-knowledge1 the ,delphic           
appeared to him the only object worthy  
of a man1 as the  starting-point of all 
philosophy4 ,knowledge of every other   
kind1 he  pronounced so insignificant   
and worthless1 that he was wont to boast
 of  his ignorance1 and to declare that 
he excelled other men in wisdom only  in
 this1 that he was conscious of his own 
ignorance4 7,plat4 ,ap4 ,s4 #ba1  #bc47 
,the other side of the ,socratic        
philosophizing1 is its opposition to the
  philosophy of the time4 ,his object1  
as is well understood1 could have  been 

only this1 to place himself upon the    
same position as that occupied  by the  
philosophy of the ,sophists1 and        
overcome it on its own ground1  and by  
its own principles4 ,that ,socrates     
shared in the general position  of the  
,sophists1 and even had many features of
 external resemblance to  them--the     
,socratic irony1 for instance--has been 
remarked above4 ,many of  his           
assertions1 particularly these          
propositions1 that no man knowingly     
does wrong1 and if a man were knowingly 
to lie1 or to do some other  wrong act1 
still he would be better than he who    
should do the same  unconsciously1 at   
first sight bear a purely ,sophistic    
stamp4 ,the great  fundamental thought  
of the ,sophistic philosophy1 that all  
moral acting  must be a conscious act1  
was also his4 ,but whilst the ,sophists 
made it  their object1 through          
subjective reflection to confuse and to 
break up  all stable convictions1 to    
make all rules relating to outward      

conduct  impossible1 ,socrates had      
recognized thinking as the activity of  
the  universal principle1 free1         
objective thought as the measure of all 
things1 and1 therefore1 instead of      
referring moral duties1 and all moral   
action to the fancy and caprice of the  
individual1 had rather referred  all to 
true knowledge1 to the essence of       
spirit4 ,it was this idea of  knowledge 
that led him to seek1 by the process of 
thought1 to gain a  conceivable         
objective ground1 something real1       
abiding1 absolute1  independent of the  
arbitrary volitions of the subject1 and 
to hold fast  to unconditioned moral    
laws4 ,hegel expresses the same opinion1
 when he  says that ,socrates put       
morality from ethical grounds1 in the   
place of  the morality of custom and    
habit4 ,hegel distinguishes morality1 as
  conscious right conduct1 resting on   
reflection and moral principles1  from  
the morality of unsophisticated1        
half-unconscious virtue1 which  rests on

 the compliance with prevailing custom4 
,the logical condition of  this ethical 
striving of ,socrates1 was the          
determining of conceptions1  the method 
of their formation4 ,to search out the  
8what0 of every thing  says ,xenophon   
7,mem4 ,,iv4 #f1 #a47 was the           
uninterrupted care of ,socrates1  and   
,aristotle says expressly that a twofold
 merit must be ascribed to  him1 viz43  
the forming of the method of induction  
and the giving of  strictly logical     
definitions1--the two elements which    
constitute the  basis of science4 ,how  
these two elements stand connected with 
the  principle of ,socrates we shall at 
once see4    #g4 ,,the ,,socratic       
,,method4--,we must not regard the      
,socratic method as we are  accustomed  
to speak of method in our day1 i4 e4 as 
something which1 as  such1 was          
distinctly in his consciousness1 and    
which he abstracted from  every concrete
 content1 but it rather had its growth  
in the very mode of  his philosophizing1

 which was not directed to the imparting
 of a system  but to the education of   
the subject in philosophical thinking   
and life4  ,it is only a subjective     
technicality for his mode of            
instruction1 the  peculiar manner of his
 philosophical1 familiar life4    ,the  
,socratic method has a twofold side1 a  
negative and a positive one4  ,the      
negative side is the well known         
,socratic irony4 ,the philosopher  takes
 the attitude of ignorance1 and would   
apparently let himself be  instructed by
 those with whom he converses1 but      
through the questions  which he puts1   
the unexpected consequences which he    
deduces1 and the  contradictions in     
which he involves the opposite party1 he
 soon leads  them to see that their     
supposed knowledge would only entangle  
and  confuse them4 ,in the embarrassment
 in which they now find themselves      
placed1 and seeing that they do not know
 what they supposed1 this  supposed     
knowledge completes its own destruction1

 and the subject who  had pretended to  
wisdom learns to distrust his previous  
opinions and  firmly held notions4      
8,what we knew1 has contradicted        
itself10 is the  refrain of the most of 
these conversations4    ,this result of 
the ,socratic method was only to lead   
the subject to know  that he knew       
nothing1 and a great part of the        
dialogues of ,xenophon and  ,plato go no
 farther than to represent ostensibly   
this negative result4  ,but there is yet
 another element in his method in which 
the irony loses  its negative           
appearance4    ,the positive side of the
 ,socratic method is the so-called      
obstetrics or  art of intellectual      
midwifery4 ,socrates compares himself   
with his mother  ,phnarete1 a midwife1  
because his position was rather to help 
others  bring forth thoughts than to    
produce them himself1 and because he    
took  upon himself to distinguish the   
birth of an empty thought from one rich 
in its content4 7,plato ,thetetus1 p4   

#adi47 ,through this art of  midwifery  
the philosopher1 by his assiduous       
questioning1 by his  interrogatory      
dissection of the notions of him with   
whom he might be  conversing1 knew how  
to elicit from him a thought of which he
 had  previously been unconscious1 and  
how to help him to the birth of a new   
thought4 ,a chief means in this         
operation was the method of induction1  
or the leading of the representation to 
a conception4 ,the philosopher1  thus1  
starting from some individual1 concrete 
case1 and seizing hold of  the most     
common notions concerning it1 and       
finding illustrations in the  most      
ordinary and trivial occurrences1 knew  
how to remove by his  comparisons that  
which was individual1 and by thus       
separating the  accidental and          
contingent from the essential1 could    
bring up to  consciousness a universal  
truth and a universal determination1--in
 other  words1 could form conceptions4  
,in order e4 g4 to find the conception  

of justice or valor1 he would start from
 individual examples of them1  and from 
these deduce the universal character or 
conception of these  virtues4 ,from this
 we see that the direction of the       
,socratic induction  was to gain logical
 definitions4 ,i define a conception    
when ,i develope  what it is1 its       
essence1 its content4 ,i define the     
conception of justice  when ,i set up   
the common property and logical unity of
 all its different  modes of            
manifestation4 ,socrates sought to go no
 farther than this4 8,to  seek for the  
essence of virtue10 says an             
,aristotelian writing 7,eth4 ,i4  #e71  
8,socrates regarded as the problem of   
philosophy1 and hence1 since he         
regarded all virtue as a knowing1 he    
sought to determine in respect of       
justice or valor what they might really 
be1 i4 e4 he investigated  their essence
 or conception40 ,from this it is very  
easy to see the  connection which his   
method of definitions or of forming     

conceptions had  with his practical     
strivings4 ,he went back to the         
conception of every  individual virtue1 
e4 g4 justice1 only because he was      
convinced that  the knowledge of this   
conception1 the knowledge of it for     
every  individual case1 was the surest  
guide for every moral relation4 ,every  
moral action1 he believed1 should start 
as a conscious action from the          
conception4    ,from this we might      
characterize the ,socratic method as the
 skill by  which a certain sum of given1
 homogeneous and individual phenomena   
was  taken1 and their logical unity1 the
 universal principle which lay at  their
 base1 inductively found4 ,this method  
presupposes the recognition  that the   
essence of the objects must be          
comprehended in the thought1  that the  
conception is the true being of the     
thing4 ,hence we see that  the ,platonic
 doctrine of ideas is only the          
objectifying of this method  which in   
,socrates appears no farther than a     

subjective dexterity4 ,the  ,platonic   
ideas are the universal conceptions of  
,socrates posited as real  individual   
beings4 ,hence ,aristotle 7,metaph4     
,,xiii4 #d7 most fittingly              
characterizes the relation between the  
,socratic method and the ,platonic      
doctrine of ideas with the words1       
8,socrates posits the universal         
conceptions not as separate1 individual 
substances1 while ,plato does  this1 and
 names them ideas40    #h4 ,,the        
,,socratic ,,doctrine ,,concerning      
,,virtue4--,the single1 positive        
doctrinal sentence which has been       
transmitted us from ,socrates is1 that  
virtue is a knowing1--that1             
consequently1 nothing is good which     
happens  without discernment1 and       
nothing bad which is done with          
discernment1 or1  what is the same      
thing1 that no man is voluntarily       
vicious1 that the  base are such against
 their will1 aye1 even he who knowingly 
does wrong  is better than he who does  

it ignorantly1 because in the latter    
case1  morality and true knowledge are  
both wanting1 while in the former--if   
such a case could happen--morality alone
 is violated4 ,socrates could not       
conceive how a man should know the good 
and yet not do it2 it was to him  a     
logical contradiction that the man who  
sought his own well being  should at the
 same time knowingly despise it4        
,therefore1 with him the  good action   
followed as necessarily from the        
knowledge of the good as a  logical     
conclusion from its premise4    ,the    
sentence that virtue is a knowing1 has  
for its logical consequence  the unity  
of virtue and for its practical         
consequence the teachableness  of it4   
,with these three propositions1 in which
 every thing is embraced  which we can  
properly term the ,socratic philosophy1 
,socrates has laid  the first foundation
 stone for a scientific treatment of    
ethics1 a  treatment which must be dated
 first from him4 ,but he laid only the  

foundation stone1 for on the one side he
 attempted no carrying out of  his      
principle into details1 nor any setting 
up of a concrete doctrine of  ethics1   
but only1 after the ancient manner1     
referred to the laws of  states and the 
unwritten laws of the universal human   
order1 and on the  other side1 he has   
not seldom served himself with          
utilitarian motives to  establish his   
ethical propositions1 in other words he 
has referred to  the external advantages
 and useful consequences of virtue1 by  
which the  purity of his ethical point  
of view became tarnished4               
,,section ,,xiii4    ,,the ,,partial    
,,disciples ,,of ,,socrates4      #a4   
,,their ,,relation ,,to ,,the ,,socratic
 ,,philosophy4--,the death of ,socrates 
gave  to his life an ideal perfection1  
and this became an animating principle  
which had its working in many           
directions4 ,the apprehension of him as 
an  ideal type forms the common         
character of the immediate ,socratic    

schools4  ,the fundamental thought1 that
 men should have one universal and      
essentially true aim1 they all received 
from ,socrates2 but since their  master 
left no complete and systematic         
doctrine1 but only his many-sided  life 
to determine the nature of this aim1    
every thing would depend upon  the      
subjective apprehension of the personal 
character of ,socrates1 and  of this we 
should at the outset naturally expect to
 find among his  different disciples a  
different estimate4 ,socrates had       
numerous  scholars1 but no school4      
,among these1 three views of his        
character have  found a place in        
history4 ,that of ,antisthenes1 or the  
,cynical1 that of  ,aristippus1 or the  
,cyrenian1 and that of ,euclid1 or the  
,megarian--three modes of apprehending  
him1 each of which contains a true      
element of the ,socratic character1 but 
all of which separate that which  in the
 master was a harmonious unity1 and     
affirm of the isolated  elements that   

which could be truly predicated only of 
the whole4 ,they  are therefore1        
one-sided1 and give of ,socrates a false
 picture4 ,this1  however1 was not      
wholly their fault2 but in that         
,aristippus was forced  to go back to   
the theory of knowledge of ,protagoras1 
and ,euclid to the  metaphysics of the  
,eleatics1 they rather testify to the   
subjective  character and to the want of
 method and system of the ,socratic     
philosophy1 and exhibit in their defects
 and one-sidedness1 in part1  only the  
original weakness which belongs to the  
doctrine of their  master4    #b4       
,,antisthenes ,,and ,,the ,,cynics4--,as
 a strictly literal adherent of the     
doctrine of ,socrates1 and zealously    
though grossly1 and often with          
caricature imitating his method1        
,antisthenes stands nearest his master4 
,in early life a disciple of ,gorgias1  
and himself a teacher of the  ,sophistic
 philosophy1 he subsequently became an  
inseparable attendant of  ,socrates1    

after whose death he founded a school in
 the ,cynosarges1  whence his scholars  
and adherents took the name of ,cynics1 
though  according to others this name   
was derived from their mode of life4    
,the  doctrine of ,antisthenes is only  
an abstract expression for the ,socratic
  ideal of virtue4 ,like ,socrates he   
considered virtue the final cause of    
men1 regarding it also as knowledge or  
science1 and thus as an object of       
instruction2 but the ideal of virtue as 
he had beheld it in the person  of      
,socrates was realized in his estimation
 only in the absence of every  need 7in 
his appearance he imitated a beggar with
 staff and scrip7 and  hence in the     
disregarding of all former intellectual 
interests2 virtue  with him aims only to
 avoid evil1 and therefore has no need  
of  dialectical demonstrations1 but only
 of ,socratic vigor2 the wise man1      
according to him1 is self-sufficient1   
independent of every thing1  indifferent
 in respect of marriage1 family1 and the

 public life of  society1 as also in    
respect of wealth1 honor1 and enjoyment4
 ,in this  ideal of ,antisthenes1 which 
is more negative than positive1 we miss 
entirely the genial humanity and the    
universal susceptibility of his  master1
 and still more a cultivation of those  
fruitful dialectic  elements which the  
,socratic philosophizing contained4     
,with a more  decided contempt for all  
knowledge1 and a still greater scorn of 
all the  customs of society1 the later  
,cynicism became frequently a repulsive 
and  shameful caricature of the         
,socratic spirit4 ,this was especially  
the case  with ,diogenes of ,sinope1 the
 only one of his disciples whom         
,antisthenes  suffered to remain with   
him4 ,in their high estimation of virtue
 and  philosophy these ,cynics1 who have
 been suitably styled the ,capuchins of 
the ,grecian world1 preserved a trace of
 the original ,socratic  philosophy1 but
 they sought virtue 8in the shortest    
way10 in a life  according to nature as 

they themselves expressed it1 that is1  
in  shutting out the outer world1 in    
attaining a complete independence1 and  
absence of every need1 and in renouncing
 art and science as well as  every      
determinate aim4 ,to the wise man said  
they nothing should go  amiss2 he should
 be mighty over every need and desire1  
free from the  restraints of civil law  
and of custom1 and of equal privileges  
with the  gods4 ,an easy life1 said     
,diogenes1 is assigned by the gods to   
that man  who limits himself to his     
necessities1 and this true philosophy   
may be  attained by every one1 through  
perseverance and the power of           
self-denial4 ,philosophy and            
philosophical interest is there none in 
this  school of beggars4 ,all that is   
related of ,diogenes are anecdotes and  
sarcasms4    ,we see here how the ethics
 of the ,cynic school lost itself in    
entirely  negative statements1 a        
consequence naturally resulting from the
 fact  that the original ,socratic      

conception of virtue lacked a concrete  
positive content1 and was not           
systematically carried out4 ,cynicism is
  the negative side of the ,socratic    
doctrine4    #c4 ,,aristippus ,,and     
,,the ,,cyrenians4--,aristippus of      
,cyrene1 numbered till the  death of    
,socrates among his adherents1 is       
represented by ,aristotle as a          
,sophist1 and this with propriety1 since
 he received money for his              
instructions4 ,he appears in ,xenophon  
as a man devoted to pleasure4 ,the      
adroitness with which he adapted himself
 to every circumstance1 and the         
knowledge of human nature by which in   
every condition he knew how to  provide 
means to satisfy his desire for good    
living and luxury1 were  well known     
among the ancients4 ,brought in contact 
with the government1  he kept himself   
aloof from its cares lest he should     
become dependent2 he  spent most of his 
time abroad in order to free himself    
from every  restraint2 he made it his   

rule that circumstances should be       
dependent  upon him1 while he should be 
independent of them4 ,though such a man 
seems little worthy of the name of a    
,socraticist1 yet has he two points  of 
contact with his master which should not
 be overlooked4 ,socrates had  called   
virtue and happiness coordinately the   
highest end of man1 i4  e4 he had indeed
 asserted most decidedly the idea of a  
moral action1  but because he brought   
this forward only in an undeveloped and 
abstract  form1 he was only able in     
concrete cases to establish the         
obligation of  the moral law in a       
utilitarian way1 by appealing to the    
benefit  resulting from the practice of 
virtue4 ,this side of the ,socratic     
principle ,aristippus adopted for his   
own1 affirming that pleasure is the     
ultimate end of life1 and the highest   
good4 ,moreover1 this pleasure1 as      
,aristippus regards it1 is not happiness
 as a condition embracing the  whole    
life1 nor pleasure reduced to a system1 

but is only the individual  sensation of
 pleasure which the body receives1 and  
in this all  determinations of moral    
worth entirely disappear2 but in that   
,aristippus  recommends knowledge1      
self-government1 temperance1 and        
intellectual  culture as means for      
acquiring and preserving enjoyment1 and1
 therefore1  makes a cultivated mind    
necessary to judge respecting a true    
satisfaction1 he shows that the         
,socratic spirit was not yet wholly     
extinguished within him1 and that the   
name of pseudo-,socraticist which       
,schleiermacher gives him1 hardly       
belongs to him4    ,the other leaders of
 the ,cyrenian school1 ,hegesias1       
,theodorus1  ,anniceris1 we can here    
only name4 ,the farther development of  
this  school is wholly occupied in more 
closely defining the nature of          
pleasure1 i4 e4 in determining whether  
it is to be apprehended as a  momentary 
sensation1 or as an enduring condition  
embracing the whole  life2 whether it   

belonged to the mind or the body1       
whether an isolated  individual could   
possess it1 or whether it is found alone
 in the social  relations of life2      
whether we should regard it as positive 
or negative1  7i4 e4 simply the absence 
of pain74    #d4 ,,euclid ,,and ,,the   
,,megarians4--,the union of the         
dialectical and the  ethical is a common
 character in all the partial ,socratic 
schools2 the  difference consists only  
in this1 that in the one the ethical is 
made to  do service to the dialectical1 
and that in the other1 the dialectical  
stands in subjection to the ethical4    
,the former is especially true of  the  
,megarian school1 whose essential       
peculiarity was pointed out by the      
ancients themselves as a combination of 
the ,socratic and ,eleatic  principles4 
,the idea of the good is on the ethical 
side the same as the  idea of being on  
the physical2 it was1 therefore1 only an
 application to  ethics of the ,eleatic 
view and method when ,euclid called the 

good pure  being1 and the not-good1     
not-being4 ,what is farther related of  
,euclid is  obscure1 and may here be    
omitted4 ,the ,megarian school was kept 
up under  different leaders after his   
death1 but without living force1 and    
without  the independent activity of an 
organic development4 ,as hedonism 7the  
philosophical doctrine of the ,cyreneans
 that pleasure is the chief good7  led  
the way to the doctrine of ,epicurus1   
and cynicism was the bridge  toward the 
,stoic1 so the later ,megaric           
development formed the transition  point
 to scepticism4 ,directing its attention
 ever more exclusively  towards the     
culture of the formal and logical method
 of argument1 it  left entirely out of  
view the moral thoughts of ,socrates4   
,its  sophistries and quiddities which  
were1 for the most part1 only plays of  
word and wit1 were widely known and     
noted among the ancients4    #e4        
,,plato1 ,,as ,,the ,,complete          
,,socraticist4--,the attempts thus far  

to build  upon the foundation pillars of
 the ,socratic doctrine1 started without
 a  vigorous germinating principle1 and 
ended fruitlessly4 ,plato was the  only 
one of his scholars who has approached  
and represented the whole  ,socrates4   
,starting from the ,socratic idea of    
knowledge he brought into  one focus the
 scattered elements and rays of truth   
which could be  collected from his      
master or from the philosophers         
preceding him1 and  gave to philosophy a
 systematic completeness4 ,socrates had 
affirmed the  principle that conception 
is the true being and the only actual1  
and had  urged to a knowledge according 
to the conception2 but these positions  
were no farther developed4 ,his         
philosophy is not yet a system1 but is  
only the first impulse toward a         
philosophical development and method4   
,plato is the first who has approached a
 systematic representation and          
development of the ideal world of       
conceptions true in themselves4    ,the 

,platonic system is ,socrates           
objectified1 the blending and           
reconciling of preceding philosophy4    
,,section ,,xiv4    ,,plato4      ,i4   
,,plato',s ,,life4 #a4 ,his             
,,youth4--,plato1 the son of ,aristo1 of
 a noble  ,athenian family1 was born in 
the year #dbi ,b4 ,c4 ,it was the year  
of the  death of ,pericles1 the second  
year of the ,peloponnesian war1 so fatal
 to  ,athens4 ,born in the centre of    
,grecian culture and industry1 and      
descended from an old and noble family1 
he received a corresponding  education1 
although no farther tidings of this have
 been transmitted to  us1 than the      
insignificant names of his teachers4    
,that the youth growing  up under such  
circumstances should choose the         
seclusion of a philosophic  life rather 
than a political career may seem        
strange1 since many and  favorable      
opportunities for the latter course lay 
open before him4  ,critias1 one of the  
thirty tyrants1 was the cousin of his   

mother1 and  ,charmides1 who            
subsequently1 under the oligarchic rule 
at ,athens1 found  his death at         
,thrasybulus on the same day with       
,critias1 was his uncle4                
,notwithstanding this1 he is never known
 to have appeared a single time  as a   
public speaker in the assembly of the   
people4 ,in view of the rising          
degeneracy and increasing political     
corruption of his native land1 he  was  
too proud to court for himself the favor
 of the many-headed ,demos2  and more   
attached to ,doricism than to the       
democracy and practice of the  ,attic   
public life1 he chose to make science   
his chief pursuit1 rather  than as a    
patriot to struggle in vain against     
unavoidable disaster1 and  become a     
martyr to his political opinions4 ,he   
regarded the ,athenian  state as lost1  
and to hinder its inevitable ruin he    
would not bring a  useless offering4    
#b4 ,,his ,,years ,,of ,,discipline4--,a
 youth of twenty1 ,plato came to        

,socrates1  in whose intercourse he     
spent eight years4 ,besides a few       
doubtful  anecdotes1 nothing is known   
more particularly of this portion of his
  history4 ,in ,xenophon's ,memorabilia 
7,,iii4 #f7 ,plato is only once         
cursorily  mentioned1 but this in a way 
that indicates an intimate relation     
between  the scholar and his master4    
,plato himself in his dialogues has     
transmitted nothing concerning his      
personal relations to ,socrates2 only   
once 7,phd4 p4 #ei7 he names himself    
among the intimate friends of           
,socrates4 ,but the influence which     
,socrates exerted upon him1 how he      
recognized in him the complete          
representation of a wise man1 how he    
found not only in his doctrine but also 
in his life and action the most         
fruitful philosophic germs1 the         
significance which the personal         
character of his master as an ideal type
 had for him--all this we learn  with   
sufficient accuracy from his writings1  

where he places his own  incomparably   
more developed philosophical system in  
the mouth of his  master1 whom he makes 
the centre of his dialogues and the     
leader of his  discourses4    #c4 ,,his 
,,years ,,of ,,travel4--,after the death
 of ,socrates #cii ,b4 ,c1 in the       
thirtieth year of his age1 ,plato1      
fearing lest he also should be met by   
the incoming reaction against           
philosophy1 left1 in company with other 
,socraticists1 his native city1 and     
betook himself to ,euclid1 his former   
fellow-scholar1 the founder of the      
,megaric school 7cf4  ,,xiii4 #d7 at    
,megara4 ,up to this time a pure        
,socraticist1 he became greatly animated
  and energized by his intercourse with 
the ,megarians1 among whom a  peculiar  
philosophical direction1 a modification 
of ,socraticism1 was  already asserted4 
,we shall see farther on the influence  
of this  residence at ,megara upon the  
foundation of his philosophy1 and       
especially upon the elaboration and     

confirmation of his doctrine of  ,ideas4
 ,one whole period of his literary      
activity and an entire group of  his    
dialogues1 can only be satisfactorily   
explained by the intellectual  stimulus 
gained at this place4 ,from ,megara1    
,plato visited ,cyrene1 ,egypt1         
,magna-,grecia and ,sicily4 ,in         
,magna-,grecia he became acquainted with
 the  ,pythagorean philosophy1 which was
 then in its highest bloom4 ,his abode  
among the ,pythagoreans had a marked    
effect upon him2 as a man it made  him  
more practical1 and increased his zest  
for life and his interest in  public    
life and social intercourse2 as a       
philosopher it furnished him  with a new
 incitement to science1 and new motives 
to literary labor4 ,the  traces of the  
,pythagorean philosophy may be seen     
through all the last  period of his     
literary life2 especially his aversion  
to public and  political life was       
greatly softened by his intercourse with
 the  ,pythagoreans4 ,while in the      

,theattus1 he affirmed most positively  
the  incompatibility of philosophy with 
public life1 we find in his later       
dialogues1 especially in the ,republic  
and also in the ,statesman--upon  which 
,pythagoreanism seems already to have   
had an influence--a returning  favor for
 the actual world1 and the well-known   
sentence that the ruler  must be a      
philosopher is an expression very       
characteristic of this  change4 ,his    
visit to ,sicily gave him the           
acquaintance of the elder  ,dionysius   
and ,dion his brother-in-law1 but the   
philosopher and the  tyrant had little  
in common4 ,plato is said to have       
incurred his  displeasure to so high a  
degree1 that his life was in danger4    
,after  about ten years spent in travel1
 he returned to ,athens in the fortieth 
year of his age1 7#chi or #chh ,b4 ,c47 
#d4 ,,plato ,,as ,,head ,,of ,,the      
,,academy2 ,,his ,,years ,,of           
,,instruction4--,on his  return1 ,plato 
surrounded himself with a circle of     

pupils4 ,the place  where he taught was 
known as the academy1 a gymnasium       
outside of ,athens  where ,plato had    
inherited a garden from his father4 ,of 
his school and of  his later life1 we   
have only the most meagre accounts4 ,his
 life passed  evenly along1 interrupted 
only by a second and third visit to     
,sicily1  where meanwhile the younger   
,dionysius had come to the throne4 ,this
  second and third residence of ,plato  
at the court of ,syracuse abounds in    
vicissitudes1 and shows us the          
philosopher in a great variety of       
conditions 7cf4 ,plutarch's ,life of    
,dion72 but to us1 in estimating  his   
philosophical character1 it is of       
interest only for the attempt1  which1  
as seems probable from all accounts1 he 
there made to realize his  ideal of a   
moral state1 and by the philosophical   
education of the new  ruler to unite    
philosophy and the reins of government  
in one and the  same hand1 or at least  
in some way by means of philosophy to   

achieve a  healthy change in the        
,sicilian state constitution4 ,his      
efforts were  however fruitless2 the    
circumstances were not propitious1 and  
the  character of the young ,dionysius1 
who was one of those mediocre natures   
who strive after renown and distinction1
 but are capable of nothing  profound   
and earnest1 deceived the expectations  
concerning him which  ,plato1 according 
to ,dion's account1 thought he had      
reason to entertain4    ,when we look at
 ,plato's philosophical labors in the   
academy1 we are  struck with the        
different relations to public life which
 philosophy  already assumes4 ,instead  
of carrying philosophy1 like ,socrates1 
into the  streets and public places and 
making it there a subject of social     
conversation with any one who desired   
it1 he lived and labored entirely       
withdrawn from the movements of the     
public1 satisfied to influence the      
pupils who surrounded him4 ,in precisely
 the measure in which philosophy        

becomes a system and the systematic form
 is seen to be essential1 does  it lose 
its popular character and begin to      
demand a scientific training1  and to   
become a topic for the school1 an       
esoteric affair4 ,yet such was  the     
respect for the name of a philosopher1  
and especially for the name  of ,plato1 
that requests were made to him by       
different states to compose  for them a 
book of laws1 a work which in some      
instances it was said was  actually     
performed4 ,attended by a retinue of    
devoted disciples1 among  whom were even
 women disguised as men1 and receiving  
reiterated  demonstrations of respect1  
he reached the age of eighty-one years1 
with  his powers of mind unweakened to  
the latest moment4    ,the close of his 
life seems to have been clouded by      
disturbances and  divisions which arose 
in his school under the lead of         
,aristotle4 ,engaged  in writing1 or as 
others state it at a marriage feast1    
death came upon  him as a gentle sleep1 

#cdh ,b4 ,c4 ,his remains were buried in
 the  ,ceramicus1 not far from the      
academy4    ,,ii4 ,,the ,,inner         
,,development ,,of ,,the ,,platonic     
,,philosophy ,,and ,,writings4--,that   
the ,platonic philosophy has a real     
development1 that it should not be      
apprehended as a perfectly finished     
system to which the different  writings 
stand related as constituent elements1  
but that these are  rather steps of this
 inner development1 as it were stages   
passed over in  the philosophical       
journeyings of the philosopher--is a    
view of the  highest importance for the 
true estimate of ,plato's literary      
labors4    ,plato's philosophical and   
literary labors may be divided into     
three  periods1 which we can            
characterize in different ways4 ,looking
 at them in  a chronological or         
biographical respect1 we might call them
 respectively  the periods of his years 
of discipline1 of travel1 of            
instruction1 or if  we view them in     

reference to the prevailing external    
influence under  which they were formed1
 they might be termed the ,socratic1    
,heraclitic-,eleatic1 and the           
,pythagorean2 or if we looked at the    
content  alone1 we might term them the  
,anti-,sophistic-,ethic1 the ,dialectic 
or  mediating1 and the systematic or    
constructive periods4    ,,the ,,first  
,,period--the ,socratic--is marked      
externally by the predominance  of the  
dramatic element1 and in reference to   
its philosophical  standpoint1 by an    
adherence to the method and the         
fundamental principles  of the ,socratic
 doctrine4 ,not yet accurately informed 
of the results of  former inquiries1 and
 rather repelled from the study of the  
history of  philosophy than attracted to
 it by the character of the ,socratic   
philosophizing1 ,plato confined himself 
to an analytical treatment of           
conceptions1 particularly of the        
conception of virtue1 and to a          
reproducing of his master1 which1 though

 something more than a mere  recital of 
verbal recollections1 had yet no        
philosophical independence4  ,his       
,socrates exhibits the same view of life
 and the same scientific  standpoint    
which the historical ,socrates of       
,xenophon had had4 ,his  efforts were   
thus1 like those of his contemporary    
fellow disciples1  directed prominently 
toward practical wisdom4 ,his conflicts 
however1  like those of ,socrates1 had  
far more weight against the prevailing  
want  of science and the shallow        
sophisms of the day than for the        
opposite  scientific directions4 ,the   
whole period bears an eclectic and      
hortatory  character4 ,the highest point
 in which the dialogues of this group   
culminate is the attempt which at the   
same time is found in the ,socratic     
doctrine to determine the certainty of  
an absolute content 7of an  objective   
reality7 to the good4    ,the history of
 the development of the ,platonic       
philosophy would assume a  very         

different form if the view of some      
modern scholars respecting the  date of 
the ,phdrus were correct4 ,if1 as they  
claim1 the ,phdrus were  ,plato's       
earliest work1 this circumstance would  
betray from the outset an  entirely     
different course of culture for him than
 we could suppose in a  mere scholar of 
,socrates4 ,the doctrine in this        
dialogue of the  pre-existence of souls1
 and their periodical transmigrations1  
of the  relation of earthly beauty with 
heavenly truth1 of divine inspiration in
  contrast to human wisdom1 the         
conception of love1--these and other    
,pythagorean ingredients are all so     
distinct from the original ,socratic    
doctrine that we must transfer the most 
of that which ,plato has  creatively    
produced during his whole philosophical 
career1 to the  beginning of his        
philosophical development4 ,the         
improbability of this1  and numerous    
other grounds of objection1 claim a far 
later composition  for this dialogue4   

,setting aside for the present the      
,phdrus1 the  ,platonic development     
assumes the following form3    ,among   
the earliest works 7if they are genuine7
 are the small dialogues  which treat of
 ,socratic questions and themes in a    
,socratic way4 ,of these  e4 g4 the     
,charmides discusses temperance1 the    
,lysis friendship1 the  ,laches valor1  
the lesser ,hippias knowing and wilful  
wrong-doing1 the  first ,alcibiades1 the
 moral and intellectual qualifications  
of a  statesman1 c4 ,the immaturity and 
the crudeness of these dialogues1 the   
use of scenic means which have only an  
external relation to the content1  the  
scantiness and want of independence in  
the content1 the indirect  manner of    
investigation which lacks a satisfactory
 and positive result1  the formal and   
analytical treatment of the conceptions 
discussed--all  these features indicate 
the early character of these minor      
dialogues4    ,the ,protagoras may be   
taken as a proper type of the ,socratic 

period4  ,since this dialogue1 though   
directing its whole polemic against the 
,sophistic philosophy1 confined itself  
almost exclusively to the outward       
manifestation of this system1 to its    
influence on its age and its method  of 
instruction in opposition to that of    
,socrates1 without entering into  the   
ground and philosophical character of   
the doctrine itself1 and1  still        
farther1 since1 when it comes in a      
strict sense to philosophize1  it       
confines itself1 in an indirect         
investigation1 to the ,socratic         
conception of virtue according to its   
different sides 7virtue as  knowing1 its
 unity and its teachableness1 cf4       
,,xii4 #h17--;it represents  in the     
clearest manner the tendency1 character 
and want of the first  period of        
,plato's literary life4    ,the         
,gorgias1 written soon after the death  
of ,socrates1 represents the  third and 
highest stage of this period4 ,directed 
against the ,sophistical  identification

 of pleasure and virtue1 of the good and
 of the agreeable1  i4 e4 against the   
affirmation of an absolute moral        
relativity1 this  dialogue maintains the
 proof that the good1 far from owing its
 origin  only to the right of the       
stronger1 and thus to the arbitrariness 
of the  subject1 has in itself an       
independent reality and objective       
validity1  and1 consequently1 alone is  
truly useful1 and thus1 therefore1 the  
measure of pleasure must follow the     
higher measure of the good4 ,in this    
direct and positive polemic against the 
,sophistic doctrine of pleasure1  in its
 tendency to a view of the good as      
something firm and abiding1 and  secure 
against all subjective arbitrariness1   
consists prominently the  advance which 
the ,gorgias makes over the ,protagoras4
    ,in the first ,socratic period the  
,platonic philosophizing became ripe and
  ready for the reception of ,eleatic   
and ,pythagorean categories4 ,to        
grapple by means of these categories    

with the higher questions of            
philosophy1 and so to free the ,socratic
 philosophy from its so close           
connection with practical life1 was the 
task of the second period4    ,,the     
,,second ,,period--the dialectic or the 
,megaric--is marked externally1 by  a   
less prominence of form and poetic      
contemplation1 and not unfrequently     
indeed1 by obscurity and difficulties of
 style1 and internally1 by the  attempt 
to give a satisfactory mediation for the
 ,eleatic doctrine and a  dialectic     
foundation for the doctrine of ideas4   
,by his exile at ,megara1 and his       
journeys to ,italy1 ,plato became       
acquainted with other and opposing      
philosophical directions1 from which  he
 must now separate himself in order to  
elevate the ,socratic doctrine  to its  
true significance4 ,it was now that he  
first learned to know the  philosophic  
theories of the earlier sages1 for whose
 study the necessary  means could not at
 that period1 so wanting in literary    

publicity1 be  found at ,athens4 ,by his
 separation from these varying          
standpoints1 as  his older fellow pupils
 had already striven to do1 he attempted
 striding  over the narrow limits of    
ethical philosophizing1 to reach the    
final  ground of knowing1 and to carry  
out the art of forming conceptions as   
brought forward by ,socrates1 to a      
science of conceptions1 i4 e4 to the    
doctrine of ideas4 ,that all human      
acting depends upon knowing1 and that   
all thinking depends upon the           
conception1 were results to which ,plato
  might already have attained through   
the scientific generalization of the    
,socratic doctrine itself1 but now to   
bring this ,socratic wisdom within  the 
circle of speculative thinking1 to      
establish dialectically that the        
conception in its simple unity is that  
which abides in the change of           
phenomena1 to disclose the fundamental  
principles of knowledge which had  been 
evaded by ,socrates1 to grasp the       

scientific theories of the  opposers    
direct in their scientific grounds1 and 
follow them out in all  their           
ramifications1--this is the problem     
which the ,megaric family of  dialogues 
attempts to solve4    ,the ,theattus    
stands at the head of this group4 ,this 
is chiefly directed  against the        
,protagorean theory of knowledge1       
against the identification  of the      
thinking and the sensible perception1 or
 against the claim of an  objective     
relativity of all knowledge4 ,as the    
,gorgias before it had  sought to       
establish the independent being of the  
ethical1 so does the  ,theattus         
ascending from the ethical to the       
theoretical1 endeavor to  prove an      
independent being and objective reality 
for the logical  conceptions which lie  
at the ground of all representation and 
thinking1  in a word1 to prove the      
objectivity of truth1 the fact that     
there lies a  province of thought       
immanent in the thinking and independent

 of the  perceptions of the senses4     
,these conceptions1 whose objective     
reality is  thus affirmed1 are those of 
a species1 likeness and unlikeness1     
sameness  and difference1 c4    ,the    
,theattus is followed by the trilogy of 
the ,sophist1 the ,statesman1  and the  
,philosopher1 which completes the       
,megaric group of dialogues4 ,the  first
 of these dialogues examines the        
conception of appearance1 that is  of   
the not-being1 the last 7for which the  
,parmenides may be taken7 the           
conception of being4 ,both dialogues are
 especially directed to the  ,eleatic   
doctrine4 ,after ,plato had recognized  
the conception in its  simple unity as  
that which abides in the change of      
phenomena1 his  attention was naturally 
turned towards the ,eleatics1 who in an 
opposite  way had attained the similar  
result that in unity consists all true  
substantiality1 and to multiplicity as  
such no true being belongs4 ,in  order  
more easily on the one side to carry out

 this fundamental thought  of the       
,eleatic to its legitimate result1 in   
which the ,megarians had  already       
preceded him1 he was obliged to give a  
metaphysical substance to  his abstract 
conceptions of species1 i4 e4 ideas4    
,but on the other  side1 he could not   
agree with the inflexibility and        
exclusiveness of the  ,eleatic unity1   
unless he would wholly sacrifice the    
multiplicity of  things2 he was rather  
obliged to attempt to show by a         
dialectic  development of the ,eleatic  
principle that the one must be at the   
same  time a totality1 organically      
connected1 and embracing multiplicity in
  itself4 ,this double relation to the  
,eleatic principle is carried out by    
the ,sophist and the ,parmenides2 by the
 former polemically against the         
,eleatic doctrine1 in that it proves the
 being of the appearance or the         
not-being1 and by the latter            
pacifically1 in that it analyzes the    
,eleatic one by its own logical         

consequences into many4 ,the inner      
progress of the doctrine of ,ideas in   
the ,megaric group of dialogues is      
therefore this1 viz41 that the          
,theattus1 in opposition to the         
,heraclitico-,protagorean theory of the 
absolute becoming1 affirms the          
objective and independent reality of    
ideas1 and the ,sophist shows their     
reciprocal relation and combining       
qualities1 while the ,parmenides in     
fine exhibits their whole dialectic     
completeness with their relation to  the
 phenomenal world4    ,,the ,,third     
,,period begins with the return of the  
philosopher to his native  city4 ,it    
unites the completeness of form         
belonging to the first with the         
profounder characteristical content     
belonging to the second4 ,the  memories 
of his youthful years seem at this time 
to have risen anew  before the soul of  
,plato1 and to have imparted again to   
his literary  activity the long lost    
freshness and fulness of that period1   

while at  the same time his abode in    
foreign lands1 and especially his       
acquaintance with the ,pythagorean      
philosophy1 had greatly enriched his    
mind with a store of images and ideals4 
,this reviving of old memories is  seen 
in the fact that the writings of this   
group return with fondness to  the      
personality of ,socrates1 and represent 
in a certain degree the whole           
philosophy of ,plato as the exaltation  
of the doctrine and the ideal           
embodiment of the historical character  
of his early master4 ,in  opposition to 
both of the first two periods1 the third
 is marked  externally by an excess of  
the mythical form connected with the    
growing  influence of ,pythagoreanism in
 this period1 and internally by the     
application of the doctrine of ideas to 
the concrete spheres of  psychology1    
ethics and natural science4 ,that ideas 
possess objective  reality1 and are the 
foundation of all essentiality and      
truth1 while the  phenomena of the      

sensible world are only copies of these1
 was a theory  whose vindication was no 
longer attempted1 but which was         
presupposed as  already proved1 and as  
forming a dialectical basis for the     
pursuit of  the different branches of   
science4 ,with this was connected a     
tendency to  unite the hitherto separate
 branches of science into a systematic  
whole1  as well as to mould together the
 previous philosophical directions1 and 
show the inner application of the       
,socratic philosophy for ethics1 of the 
,eleatic for dialectics1 and the        
,pythagorean for physics4    ,upon this 
standpoint1 the ,phdrus1 ,plato's       
inaugural to his labors in  the         
,academy1 together with the ,symposium1 
which is closely connected  with it1    
attempts to subject the rhetorical      
theory and practice of their  time to a 
thorough criticism1 in order to show in 
opposition to this  theory and practice1
 that the fixedness and stability of a  
true  scientific principle could only be

 attained by grounding every thing on   
the idea4 ,on the same standpoint the   
,phdon attempts to prove the            
immortality of the soul from the        
doctrine of ideas2 the ,philebus to     
bring out the conception of pleasure and
 of the highest good2 the  ,republic to 
develop the essence of the state1 and   
the ,timus that of  nature4    ,having  
thus sketched the inner development of  
the ,platonic philosophy1  we now turn  
to a systematic statement of its        
principles4    ,,iii4--,,classification 
,,of ,,the ,,platonic ,,system4--,the   
philosophy of ,plato1 as  left by       
himself1 is without a systematic        
statement1 and has no  comprehensive    
principle of classification4 ,he has    
given us only the  history of his       
thinking1 the statement of his          
philosophical development2  we are      
therefore limited in reference to his   
classification of  philosophy to simple 
intimations4 ,accordingly1 some have    
divided the  ,platonic system into      

theoretical and practical science1 and  
others into  a philosophy of the good1  
the beautiful and the true4 ,another    
classification1 which has some support  
in old records1 is more correct4  ,some 
of the ancients say that ,plato was the 
first to unite in one whole  the        
scattered philosophical elements of the 
earlier sages1 and so to  obtain for    
philosophy the three parts1 logic1      
physics1 and ethics4 ,the  more accurate
 statement is given by ,sextus          
,empiricus1 that ,plato has  laid the   
foundation for this threefold division  
of philosophy1 but that  it was first   
expressly recognized and affirmed by his
 scholars1  ,xenocrates and ,aristotle4 
,the ,platonic system may1 however1     
without  difficulty1 be divided into    
these three parts4 ,true1 there are many
  dialogues which mingle together in    
different proportions the logical1  the 
ethical1 and the physical element1 and  
though even where ,plato  treats of some
 special discipline1 the three are      

suffered constantly to  interpenetrate  
each other1 still there are some        
dialogues in which this  fundamental    
scheme can be clearly recognized4 ,it   
cannot be mistaken that  the ,timus has 
predominantly a physical1 and the       
,republic as decidedly  an ethical      
element1 and if the dialectic is        
expressly represented in no  separate   
dialogue1 yet does the whole ,megaric   
group pursue the common  end of bringing
 out the conception of science and its  
true object1  being1 and is1 therefore1 
in its content decidedly dialectical4   
,plato  must have been led to this      
threefold division by even the earlier  
development of philosophy1 and though   
,xenocrates does not clearly see  it1   
yet since ,aristotle presupposes it as  
universally admitted1 we need  not      
scruple to make it the basis on which to
 represent the ,platonic  system4       
,the order which these different parts  
should take1 ,plato himself has not     
declared4 ,manifestly1 however1         

dialectics should have the first place  
as  the ground of all philosophy1 since 
,plato uniformly directs that every     
philosophical investigation should begin
 with accurately determining the  idea  
7,phd4 p4 #ii4 ,phdr4 p4 #bcg71 while he
 subsequently examines  all the concrete
 spheres of science on the standpoint of
 the doctrine of  ideas4 ,the relative  
position of the other two parts is not  
so clear4  ,since1 however1 the physics 
culminates in the ethics1 and the       
ethics1 on  the other hand1 has for its 
basis physical investigations into the  
ensouling power in nature1 we may assign
 to physics the former place of  the    
two4    ,the mathematical sciences      
,plato has expressly excluded from      
philosophy4  ,he considers them as helps
 to philosophical thinking 7,rep4 ,,vii4
 #ebf71  as necessary steps of          
knowledge1 without which no one can come
 to  philosophy 7,ib4 ,,vi4 #eaj72 but  
mathematics with him is not philosophy1 
for it assumes its principles or axioms1

 without at all accounting for  them1 as
 though they were manifest to all1 a    
procedure which is not  permitted to    
pure science2 it also serves itself for 
its demonstrations1  with illustrative  
figures1 although it does not treat of  
these1 but of  that which they represent
 to the understanding 7,ib474 ,plato    
thus  places mathematics midway between 
a correct opinion and science1 clearer  
than the one1 but more obscure than the 
other4 7,ib4 ,,vii4 #ecc47    ,,iv4     
,,the ,,platonic ,,dialectics4 #a4      
,,conception ,,of ,,dialectics4--,the   
conception  of dialectics or of logic1  
is used by the ancients for the most    
part in  a very wide sense1 while ,plato
 employs it in repeated instances       
interchangeably with philosophy1 though 
on the other hand he treats it  also as 
a separate branch of philosophy4 ,he    
divides it from physics as  the science 
of the eternal and unchangeable from the
 science of the  changeable1 which never
 is1 but is only ever becoming2 he      

distinguishes  also between it and      
ethics1 so far as the latter treats of  
the good not  absolutely1 but in its    
concrete exhibition in morals and in the
 state2  so that dialectics may be      
termed philosophy in a higher sense1    
while  physics and ethics follow it as  
two less exact sciences1 or as a not yet
  perfected philosophy4 ,plato himself  
defines dialectics1 according to the    
ordinary signification of the word1 as  
the art of developing knowledge  by way 
of dialogue in questions and answers4   
7,rep4 ,,vii4 #ecd74 ,but  since the art
 of communicating correctly in dialogue 
is according to  ,plato1 at the same    
time the art of thinking correctly1 and 
as thus  thinking and speaking could not
 be separated by the ancients1 but every
  process of thought was a living       
dialogue1 so ,plato would more          
accurately  define dialectics as the    
science which brings speech to a correct
 issue1  and which combines or separates
 the species1 i4 e4 the conceptions of  

things correctly with one another4      
7,soph4 p4 #bec4 ,phdr4 p4 #bff74       
,dialectics with him has two divisions1 
to know what can and what cannot  be    
connected1 and to know how division or  
combination can be4 ,but as  with ,plato
 these conceptions of species or ideas  
are the only actual and  true existence1
 so have we1 in entire conformity with  
this1 a third  definition of dialectics 
7,philebus p4 #eg71 as the science of   
being1  the science of that which is    
true and unchangeable1 the science of   
all  other sciences4 ,we may therefore  
briefly characterize it as the science  
of absolute being or of ideas4    #b4   
,,what ,,is ,,science8 7#a47 ,as opposed
 to sensation and the sensuous          
representation4--,the ,theattus is      
devoted to the discussion of this       
question in opposition to the           
,protagorean sensualism4 ,that all      
knowledge  consists in perception1 and  
that the two are one and the same thing1
 was  the ,protagorean proposition4     

,from this it followed1 as ,protagoras  
himself had inferred1 that things are1  
as they appear to me1 that the          
perception or sensation is infallible4  
,but since perception and  sensation are
 infinitely diversified with different  
individuals1 and  even greatly vary in  
the same individual1 it follows farther1
 that there  are no objective           
determinations and predicates1 that we  
can never affirm  what a thing is in    
itself1 that all conceptions1 great1    
small1 light1  heavy1 to increase1 to   
diminish1 c41 have only a relative      
significance1  and consequently1 also1  
the conceptions of species1 as          
combinations of  the changeful many1 are
 wholly wanting in constancy and        
stability4 ,in  opposition to this      
,protagorean thesis1 ,plato urges the   
following  objections and               
contradictions4 ,first4 ,the            
,protagorean doctrine leads  to the most
 startling consequences4 ,if being and  
appearance1 knowledge  and perception   

are one and the same thing1 then is the 
irrational brute1  which is capable of  
perception1 as fully entitled to be     
called the  measure of all things1 as   
man1 and if the representation is       
infallible1  as the expression of my    
subjective character at a given time1   
then need  there be no more instruction1
 no more scientific conclusion1 no more 
strife1 and no more refutation4 ,second4
 ,the ,protagorean doctrine is a        
logical contradiction2 for according to 
it ,protagoras must yield the  question 
to every one who disputes with him1     
since1 as he himself  affirms1 no one is
 incorrect1 but every one judges only   
according to  truth2 the pretended truth
 of ,protagoras is therefore true for no
 man1  not even for himself4 ,third4    
,protagoras destroys the knowledge of   
future events4 ,that which ,i may regard
 as profitable may not therefore        
certainly prove itself as such in the   
result4 ,to determine that which is     
really profitable implies a calculation 

of the future1 but since the  ability of
 men to form such a calculation is very 
diverse1 it follows  from this that not 
man as such1 but only the wise man can  
be the measure  of things4 ,fourth4 ,the
 theory of ,protagoras destroys         
perception4  ,perception1 according to  
him1 rests upon a distinction of the    
perceived  object and the perceiving    
subject1 and is the common product of   
the two4  ,but in his view the objects  
are in such an uninterrupted flow1 that 
they  can neither become fixed in seeing
 nor in hearing4 ,this condition of     
constant change renders all knowledge   
from sense1 and hence 7the  identity of 
the two being assumed71 all knowledge   
impossible4 ,fifth4  ,protagoras        
overlooks the apriori element in        
knowledge4 ,it is seen in an  analysis  
of the sense-perception itself1 that all
 knowledge cannot be  traced to the     
activity of the senses1 but that there  
must also be  presupposed besides these1
 intellectual functions1 and hence an   

independent province of supersensible   
knowledge4 ,we see with the eyes1  and  
hear with the ears1 but to group        
together the perceptions attained       
through these different organs1 and to  
hold them fast in the unity of          
self-consciousness1 is beyond the power 
of the activity of the senses4  ,again1 
we compare the different                
sense-perceptions with one another1 a   
function which cannot belong to the     
senses1 since each sense can only       
furnish its own distinctive perception4 
,still farther1 we bring forward        
determinations respecting the           
perceptions which we manifestly cannot  
owe  to the senses1 in that we predicate
 of these perceptions1 being and        
not-being1 likeness and unlikeness1 c4  
,these determinations1 to which  also   
belong the beautiful and the odious1    
good and evil1 constitute a  peculiar   
province of knowledge1 which the soul1  
independently of every                  
sense-perception1 brings forward through

 its own independent activity4  ,the    
ethical element of this ,plato exhibits 
in his attack upon  sensualism1 and also
 in other dialogues4 ,he maintains 7in  
the  ,sophist71 that men holding such   
opinions must be improved before they   
can be instructed1 and that when made   
morally better1 they will readily       
recognize the truth of the soul and its 
moral and rational capacities1  and     
affirm that these are real things1      
though objects of neither sight  nor of 
feeling4    7#b47 ,the ,relation of     
,knowing to ,opinion4--,opinion is just 
as little  identical with knowing as is 
the sense-perception4 ,an incorrect     
opinion  is certainly different from    
knowing1 and a correct one is not the   
same1  for it can be engendered by the  
art of speech without therefore         
attaining the validity of true          
knowledge4 ,the correct opinion1 so far 
as  it is true in matter though         
imperfect in form1 stands rather midway 
between knowing and not-knowing1 and    

participates in both4    7#c47 ,the     
,relation of ,science to ,thinking4--,in
 opposition to the  ,protagorean        
sensualism1 we have already referred to 
an energy of the  soul independent of   
the sensuous perception and sensation1  
competent in  itself to examine the     
universal1 and grasp true being in      
thought4 ,there  is1 therefore1 a double
 source of knowledge1 sensation and     
rational  thinking4 ,sensation refers to
 that which is conceived in the constant
  becoming and perpetual change1 to the 
pure momentary1 which is in an          
incessant transition from the was1      
through the now1 into the shall be      
7,parm4 p4 #aeb72 it is1 therefore1 the 
source of dim1 impure1 and  uncertain   
knowledge2 thinking on the other hand   
refers to the abiding1  which neither   
becomes nor departs1 but remains ever   
the same4 7,tim4 p4  #ea47 ,existence1  
says the ,timus 7p4 #bg7 is of two      
kinds1 8that which  ever is but has no  
becoming1 and that which ever becomes   

but never is4  ,the one kind1 which is  
always in the same state1 is            
comprehended through  reflection by the 
reason1 the other1 which becomes and    
departs1 but  never properly is1 may be 
apprehended by the sensuous perception  
without  the reason40 ,true science1    
therefore1 flows alone from that pure   
and  thoroughly internal activity of the
 soul which is free from all  corporeal 
qualities and every sensuous            
disturbance4 7,phd4 p4 #fe47 ,in  this  
state the soul looks upon things purely 
as they are 7,phd4 p4 #ff7  in their    
eternal being and their unchangeable    
condition4 ,hence the true  state of the
 philosopher is announced in the ,phdon 
7p4 #fd7 to be a  willingness to die1 a 
longing to fly from the body1 as from a 
hinderance  to true knowledge1 and      
become pure spirit4 ,according to all   
this1  science is the thinking of true  
being or of ideas2 the means to discover
  and to know these ideas1 or the organ 
for their apprehension is the           

dialectic1 as the art of separating and 
combining conceptions2 the true  objects
 of dialectics are ideas4    #c4 ,,the  
,,doctrine ,,of ,,ideas ,,in ,,its      
,,genesis4--,the ,platonic doctrine of  
ideas  is the common product of the     
,socratic method of forming conceptions1
 the  ,heraclitic doctrine of absolute  
becoming1 and the ,eleatic doctrine of  
absolute being4 ,to the first of these  
,plato owes the idea of a knowing       
through conceptions1 to the second the  
recognition of the becoming in  the     
field of the sensuous1 to the third the 
position of a field of  absolute        
reality4 ,elsewhere 7in the ,philebus7  
,plato connects the  doctrine of ideas  
with the ,pythagorean thought that every
 thing may be  formed from unity and    
multiplicity1 from the limit and the    
unlimited4  ,the aim of the ,theattus1  
the ,sophist1 and the ,parmenides is to 
refute  the principles of the ,eleatics 
and ,heraclitics3 this refutation is    
effected in the ,theattus by combating  

directly the principle of an  absolute  
becoming1 in the ,sophist by combating  
directly the principle of  abstract     
being1 and in the ,parmenides by taking 
up the ,eleatic one and  showing its    
true relations4 ,we have already spoken 
of the ,theattus2 we  will now look for 
the development of the doctrine of ideas
 in the  ,sophist and ,parmenides4      
,the ostensible end of the former of    
these dialogues is to show that the     
,sophist is really but a caricature of  
the philosopher1 but its true end  is to
 fix the reality of the appearance1 i4  
e4 of the not-being1 and  to discuss    
speculatively the relation of being and 
not-being4 ,the  doctrine of the        
,eleatics ended with the rejection of   
all sensuous  knowledge1 declaring that 
what we receive as the perception of a  
multiplicity of things or of a becoming 
is only an appearance4 ,in this  the    
contradiction was clear1 the not-being  
was absolutely denied1 and  yet its     
existence was admitted in the notion of 

men4 ,plato at once draws  attention to 
this contradiction1 showing that a      
delusive opinion1 which  gives rise to a
 false image or representation1 is not  
possible1 since  the whole theory rests 
upon the assumption that the false1 the 
not-true1  i4 e4 not-being cannot even  
be thought4 ,this1 ,plato continues1 is 
the  great difficulty in thinking of    
not-being1 that both he who denies and  
he who affirms its reality is driven to 
contradict himself4 ,for though  it is  
inexpressible and inconceivable either  
as one or as many1 still1  when speaking
 of it1 we must attribute to it both    
being and  multiplicity4 ,if we admit   
that there is such a thing as a false   
opinion1  we assume in this very fact   
the notion of not-being1 for only that  
opinion can be said to be false which   
supposes either the not-being to  be1 or
 makes that1 which is not1 to be4 ,in   
short1 if there actually  exists a false
 notion1 so does there actually and     
truly exist a  not-being4 ,after ,plato 

had thus fixed the reality of not-being1
 he  discusses the relation of being and
 not-being1 i4 e4 the relation of       
conceptions generally in their          
combinations and differences4 ,if       
not-being has no less reality than      
being1 and being no more than           
not-being1 if1 therefore1 e4 g4 the     
not-great is as truly real as the       
great1 then every conception may be     
apprehended according to its  opposite  
sides as being and not-being at the same
 time3 it is a being in  reference to   
itself1 as something identical with     
itself1 but it is  not-being in         
reference to every one of the numberless
 other conceptions  which can be        
referred to it1 and with which1 on      
account of its  difference from them1 it
 can have nothing in common4 ,the       
conception of  the same  and the        
different  represent the general form of
  an antithesis4 ,these are the         
universal formul of combination for all 
conceptions4 ,this reciprocal relation  

of conceptions as at the same time      
being and not-being1 by virtue of which 
they can be arranged among  themselves1 
forms now the basis for the art of      
dialectics1 which has to  judge what    
conceptions can and what cannot be      
joined together4 ,plato  illustrates    
here by taking the conceptions of being1
 motion 7becoming71  and rest           
7existence71 and showing what are the   
results of the  combinations of these   
ideas4 ,the conceptions of motion and   
rest cannot  well be joined together1   
though both of them may be joined with  
that of  being1 since both are2 the     
conception of rest is therefore in      
reference  to itself a being1 but in    
reference to the conception of motion a 
not-being or different4 ,thus the       
,platonic doctrine of ideas1 after      
having in the ,theattus attained its    
general foundation in fixing the        
objective reality of conceptions1       
becomes now still farther developed in  
the ,sophist to a doctrine of the       

agreement and disagreement of           
conceptions4 ,the category which        
conditions these reciprocal relations is
  that of not-being or difference4 ,this
 fundamental thought of the  ,sophist1  
that being is not without not-being and 
not-being is not  without being1 may be 
expressed in modern phraseology thus3   
negation is  not not-being but          
determinateness1 and on the other hand  
all  determinateness and concreteness of
 conceptions1 or every thing            
affirmative can be only through         
negation2 in other words the conception 
of contradiction is the soul of a       
philosophical method4    ,the doctrine  
of ideas appears in the ,parmenides as  
the positive  consequence and           
progressive development of the ,eleatic 
principle4 ,indeed  in this dialogue1 in
 that ,plato makes ,parmenides the chief
 speaker1 he  seems willing to allow    
that his doctrine is in substance that  
of the  ,eleatic sage4 ,true1 the       
fundamental thought of the              

dialogue--that the one  is not          
conceivable in its complete singleness  
without the many1 nor the  many without 
the one1 that each necessarily          
presupposes and reciprocally  conditions
 the other--stands in the most direct   
contradiction to  ,eleaticism4 ,yet     
,parmenides himself1 by dividing his    
poem into two parts1  and treating in   
the first of the one and in the second  
of the many1  postulates an inner       
mediation between these two externally  
so disjointed  parts of his philosophy1 
and in this respect the ,platonic theory
 of  ideas might give itself out as the 
farther elimination1 and the true  sense
 of the ,parmenidean philosophizing4    
,this dialectical mediation  between the
 one and the not-one or the many ,plato 
now attempts in four  antinomies1 which 
have ostensibly only a negative result  
in so far as  they show that            
contradictions arise both whether the   
one be adopted or  rejected4 ,the       
positive sense of these antinomies1     

though it can be  gained only through   
inferences which ,plato himself does not
 expressly  utter1 but leaves to be     
drawn by the reader--is as follows4 ,the
 first  antinomy shows that the one is  
inconceivable as such since it is only  
apprehended in its abstract opposition  
to the many2 the second1 that in  this  
case also the reality of the many is    
inconceivable2 the third1 that  the one 
or the idea cannot be conceived as      
not-being1 since there can be  neither  
conception nor predicate of the absolute
 not-being1 and since1  if not-being is 
excluded from all fellowship with being1
 all becoming  and departing1 all       
similarity and difference1 every        
representation and  explanation         
concerning it must also be denied2 and  
lastly1 the fourth  affirms that the    
not-one or the many cannot be conceived 
without the one  or the idea4 ,what now 
is ,plato's aim in this discussion of   
the dialectic  relations between the    
conceptions of the one and the many8    

,would he use  the conception of the one
 only as an example to explain his      
dialectic  method with conceptions1 or  
is the discussion of this conception    
itself  the very object before him8     
,manifestly the latter1 or the dialogue 
ends  without result and without any    
inner connection of its two parts4 ,but 
how came ,plato to make such a special  
investigation of this conception  of the
 one8 ,if we bear in mind that the      
,eleatics had already perceived  the    
antithesis of the actual and the        
phenomenal world in the antithesis  of  
the one and the many1 and that ,plato   
himself had also regarded his  ideas as 
the unity of the manifold1 as the one   
and the same in the  many--since he     
repeatedly uses 8idea0 and 8the one0 in 
the same sense1  and places 7,rep4      
,,vii4 #ecg7 dialectics in the same rank
 with the  faculty of bringing many to  
unity--then is it clear that the one    
which is  made an object of             
investigation in the ,parmenides is the 

idea in its  general sense1 i4 e4 in its
 logical form1 and that ,plato          
consequently  in the dialectic of the   
one and the many would represent the    
dialectic  of the idea and the          
phenomenal world1 or in other words     
would  dialectically determine and      
establish the correct view of the idea  
as  the unity in the manifoldness of the
 phenomenal4 ,in that it is shown in    
the ,parmenides1 on the one side1 that  
the many cannot be conceived  without   
the one1 and on the other side1 that the
 one must be something  which embraces  
in itself manifoldness1 so have we the  
ready inference on  the one side1 that  
the phenomenal world1 or the many1 has a
 true being  only in so far as it has   
the one or the conception within it1 and
 on the  other side1 that since the     
conception is not an abstract one but   
manifoldness in unity1 it must actually 
have manifoldness in unity in  order to 
be able to be in the phenomenal world4  
,the indirect result of  the ,parmenides

 is that matter as the infinitely       
divisible and  undetermined mass has no 
actuality1 but is in relation to the    
ideal  world a not-being1 and though the
 ideas as the true being gain their     
appearance in it1 yet the idea itself is
 all that is actual in the  appearance  
or phenomenon2 the phenomenal world     
derives its whole  existence from the   
ideal world which appears in it1 and has
 a being only  so far as it has a       
conception or idea for its content4     
#d4 ,,positive ,,exposition ,,of ,,the  
,,doctrine ,,of ,,ideas4--,ideas may be 
defined  according to the different     
sides of their historical connection1 as
 the  common in the manifold1 the       
universal in the particular1 the one in 
the  many1 or the constant and abiding  
in the changing4 ,subjectively they are 
principles of knowing which cannot be   
derived from experience they are  the   
intuitively certain and innate          
regulators of our knowledge4            
,objectively they are the immutable     

principles of being and of the          
phenomenal world1 incorporeal and simple
 unities which have no relation  to     
space1 and which may be predicated of   
every independent thing4 ,the  doctrine 
of ideas grew originally out of the     
desire to give a definite  conception to
 the inner essence of things1 and make  
the real world  conceivable as a        
harmoniously connected intellectual     
world4 ,this desire  of scientific      
knowledge ,aristotle cites expressly as 
the motive to the  ,platonic doctrine of
 ideas4 8,plato10 he says 7,metaph4     
,,xiii4 #d71 8came  to the doctrine of  
ideas because he was convinced of the   
truth of the  ,heraclitic view which    
regarded the sensible world as a        
ceaseless flowing  and changing4 ,his   
conclusion from this was1 that if there 
be a science  of any thing there must   
be1 besides the sensible1 other         
substances which  have a permanence1 for
 there can be no science of the         
fleeting40 ,it is1  therefore1 the idea 

of science which demands the reality of 
ideas1 a  demand which cannot be granted
 unless an idea or conception is also   
the  ground of all being4 ,this is the  
case with ,plato4 ,according to him     
there  can be neither a true knowing nor
 a true being without ideas and         
conceptions which have an independent   
reality4    ,what now does ,plato mean  
by idea8 ,from what has already been    
said it is  clear that he means         
something more than ideal conceptions of
 the  beautiful and the good4 ,an idea  
is found1 as the name itself 77         
indicates1 wherever a universal         
conception of a species or kind is      
found4 ,hence ,plato speaks of the idea 
of a bed1 table1 strength1 health1      
voice1 color1 ideas of simple relations 
and properties1 ideas of  mathematical  
figures1 and even ideas of not-being1   
and of that1 which in  its essence only 
contradicts the idea1 baseness and vice4
 ,in a word1 we  may put an idea        
wherever many things may be             

characterized by a common  name 7,rep4  
,x4 #eif73 or as ,aristotle expresses it
 7,met4 ,,xii4 #c74  ,plato places an   
idea to every class of being4 ,in this  
sense ,plato  himself speaks in the     
beginning of the ,parmenides4           
,parmenides asks the  young ,socrates   
what he calls ideas4 ,socrates answers  
by naming  unconditionally the moral    
ideas1 the ideas of the true1 the       
beautiful1  the good1 and then after a  
little delay he mentions some physical  
ones1  as the ideas of man1 of fire1 of 
water2 he will not allow ideas to be    
predicated of that which is only a      
formless mass1 or which is a part of    
something else1 as hair1 mud and clay1  
but in this he is answered by           
,parmenides1 that if he would be fully  
imbued with philosophy1 he must  not    
consider such things as these to be     
wholly despicable1 but should  look upon
 them as truly though remotely          
participating in the idea4 ,here  at    
least the claim is asserted that no     

province of being is excluded  from the 
idea1 that even that which appears most 
accidental and  irrational is yet a part
 of rational knowledge1 in fact that    
every thing  existing may be brought    
within a rational conception4    #e4    
,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,ideas ,,to ,,the
 ,,phenomenal ,,world4 ,analogous to the
  different definitions of idea are the 
different names which ,plato gives  to  
the sensible and phenomenal world4 ,he  
calls it the many1 the  divisible1 the  
unbounded1 the undetermined and         
measureless1 the  becoming1 the         
relative1 great and small1 not-being4   
,the relation now in  which these two   
worlds of sense and of ideas stand to   
each other is a  question which ,plato  
has answered neither fully nor          
consistently with  himself4 ,his most   
common way is to characterize the       
relation of things  to conceptions as a 
participant1 or to call things the      
copies and  adumbrations1 while ideas   
are the archetypes4 ,yet this is so     

indefinite  that ,aristotle properly    
says that to talk in this way is only to
 use  poetical metaphors4 ,the great    
difficulty of the doctrine of ideas is  
not  solved but only increased by these 
figurative representations4 ,the        
difficulty lies in the contradiction    
which grows out of the fact that  while 
,plato admits the reality of the        
becoming and of the province of  the    
becoming1 he still affirms that ideas   
which are substances ever at  rest and  
ever the same are the only actual4 ,now 
in this ,plato is  formally consistent  
with himself1 while he characterizes the
 matriel  of matter not as a positive   
substratum but as not-being1 and guards 
himself with the express affirmation    
that he does not consider the  sensible 
as being1 but only as something similar 
to being4 7,rep4 ,x4  #eig47 ,the       
position laid down in the ,parmenides is
 also consistent with  this1 that a     
perfect philosophy should look upon the 
idea as the  cognizable in the          

phenomenal world1 and should follow it  
out in the  smallest particulars until  
every part of being should be known and 
all  dualism removed4 ,in fine1 ,plato  
in many of his expressions seems to     
regard the world of sensation only as a 
subjective appearance1 as a  product of 
the subjective notion1 as the result of 
a confused way of  representing ideas4  
,in this sense the phenomena are        
entirely dependent  on ideas2 they are  
nothing but the ideas themselves in the 
form of not  being2 the phenomenal world
 derives its whole existence from the   
ideal  world which appears in it4 ,but  
yet when ,plato calls the sensible a    
mingling of the same with the different 
or the not-being 7,tim4 p4 #ce71  when  
he characterizes the ideas as vowels    
which go through every thing  like a    
chain 7,soph4 p4 #bec71 when he himself 
conceives the possibility  that matter  
might offer opposition to the formative 
energy of ideas  7,tim4 p4 #ef71 when he
 speaks of an evil soul of the world 7de

 ,leg4  ,x4 #hif71 and gives intimations
 of the presence in the world of a      
principle in nature hostile to ,god     
7,polit4 p4 #bfh71 when he in the       
,phdon treats of the relation between   
body and soul as one wholly  discordant 
and malignant1--in all this there is    
evidence enough1 even  after allowing   
for the mythical form of the ,timus1 and
 the rhetorical  composition which      
prevails in the ,phdon1 to substantiate 
the  contradiction mentioned above4     
,this is most clear in the ,timus4      
,plato  in this dialogue makes the      
sensible world to be formed by a        
,creator  after the pattern of an idea1 
but in this he lays down as a condition 
that this ,demi-urge or ,creator should 
find at hand a something which  should  
be apt to receive and exhibit this ideal
 image4 ,this something  ,plato compares
 to the matter which is fashioned by the
 artisan 7whence  the later name hyle74 
,he characterizes it as wholly          
undetermined and  formless1 but         

possessing in itself an aptitude for    
every variety of  forms1 an invisible   
and shapeless thing1 a something which  
it is  difficult to characterize1 and   
which ,plato even does not seem inclined
  very closely to describe4 ,in this the
 actuality of matter is denied2  while  
,plato makes it equivalent to space it  
is only the place1 the  negative        
condition of the sensible while it      
possesses a being only as it  receives  
in itself the ideal form4 ,still matter 
remains the objective  and phenomenal   
form of the idea3 the visible world     
arises only through  the mingling of    
ideas with this substratum1 and if      
matter be  metaphysically expressed as  
8the different10 then does it follow    
with  logical necessity in a dialectical
 discussion that it is just as truly    
being as not-being4 ,plato does not     
conceal from himself this difficulty1   
and therefore attempts to represent with
 comparisons and images this            
presupposition of a hyle which he finds 

it as impossible to do without  as to   
express in a conceivable form4 ,if he   
would do without it he must  rise to the
 conception of an absolute creation1 or 
consider matter as an  ultimate         
emanation from the absolute spirit1 or  
else explain it as  appearance only4    
,thus the ,platonic system is only a    
fruitless struggle  against dualism4    
#f4 ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,and
 ,,the ,,deity4 ,if the true and the    
real is  exhibited in general           
conceptions which are so related to each
 other that  every higher conception    
embraces and combines under it several  
lower1 so  that any one starting from a 
single idea may eventually discover all 
7,meno4 p4 #ha71 then must the sum of   
ideas form a connected organism  and    
succession in which the lower idea      
appears as a stepping-stone and         
presupposition to a higher4 ,this       
succession must have its end in an idea 
which needs no higher idea or           
presupposition to sustain it4 ,this     

highest  idea1 the ultimate limit of all
 knowledge1 and itself the independent  
ground of all other ideas1 ,plato calls 
the idea of the good1 i4 e4 not  of the 
moral but of the metaphysical good4     
7,rep4 ,,vii4 #eag47    ,what this good 
is in itself1 ,plato undertakes to show 
only in images4  8,in the same manner as
 the sun10 he says in the ,republic     
7,,vi4 #ejf71 8is  the cause of sight1  
and the cause not merely that objects   
are visible  but also that they grow and
 are produced1 so the good is of such   
power  and beauty1 that it is not merely
 the cause of science to the soul1 but  
is also the cause of being and reality  
to whatever is the object of  science1  
and as the sun is not itself sight or   
the object of sight but  presides over  
both1 so the good is not science and    
truth but is superior  to both1 they    
being not the good itself but of a      
goodly nature40 ,the  good has          
unconditioned worth1 and gives to every 
other thing all the  value it possesses4

 ,the idea of the good excludes all     
presupposition4 ,it  is the ultimate    
ground at the same time of knowing and  
of being1 of the  perceiver and the     
perceived1 of the subjective and the    
objective1 of the  ideal and the real1  
though exalted itself above such a      
division4 7,rep4  ,,vi4 #ejh-eag47      
,plato1 however1 has not attempted a    
derivation of the  remaining ideas from 
the idea of the good2 his course here is
 wholly an  empirical one2 a certain    
class of objects are taken1 and having  
referred  these to their common essence 
this is given out as their idea4 ,he has
  treated the individual conceptions so 
independently1 and has made each  one so
 complete in itself1 that it is         
impossible to find a proper  division or
 establish an immanent continuation of  
one into another4    ,it is difficult to
 say precisely what relation this idea  
of the good  bore to the ,deity in the  
,platonic view4 ,taking every thing     
together it  seems clear that ,plato    

regarded the two as identical1 but      
whether he  conceived this highest cause
 to be a personal being or not is a     
question  which hardly admits of a      
definite answer4 ,the logical result of 
his  system would exclude the           
personality of ,god4 ,if only the       
universal 7the  idea7 is the true being1
 then can the only absolute idea1 the   
,deity1 be  only the absolute universal2
 but that ,plato was himself conscious  
of  this logical conclusion we can      
hardly affirm1 any more than we can say 
on the other hand that he was clearly a 
theist4 ,for whenever in a  mythical or 
popular statement he speaks of          
innumerable gods1 this only  indicates  
that he is speaking in the language of  
the popular religion1  and when he      
speaks in an accurate philosophical     
sense1 he only makes the  relation of   
the personal deity with the idea a very 
uncertain one4 ,most  probable1         
therefore1 is it that this whole        
question concerning the  personality of 

,god was not yet definitely before him1 
that he took up  the religious idea of  
,god and defended it in ethical interest
 against  the anthropomorphism of the   
mythic poets1 that he sought to         
establish it  by arguments drawn from   
the evidences of design in nature1 and  
the  universal prevalence of a belief in
 a ,god1 while as a philosopher he  made
 no use of it4    ,v4 ,,the ,,platonic  
,,physics4 #a4 ,,nature4--,the          
connection between the ,physics  and the
 ,dialectics of ,plato lies principally 
in two points--the  conception of       
becoming1 which forms the chief property
 of nature1 and  that of real being1    
which is at once the all sufficient and 
good1 and  the true end of all becoming4
 ,because nature belongs to the province
 of  irrational sensation we cannot look
 for the same accuracy in the  treatment
 of it1 as is furnished in dialectics4  
,plato therefore applied  himself with  
much less zest to physical              
investigations than to those of  an     

ethical or dialectical character1 and   
indeed only attended to them in  his    
later years4 ,only in one dialogue1 the 
,timus1 do we find any  extended        
evolution of physical doctrines1 and    
even here ,plato seems to  have gone to 
his work with much less independence    
than his wont1 this  dialogue being more
 strongly tinctured with ,pythagoreanism
 than any  other of his writings4 ,the  
difficulty of the ,timus is increased by
 the  mythical form on which the old    
commentators themselves have stumbled4  
,if  we take the first impression that  
it gives us1 we have1 before the        
creation of the world1 a ,creator as a  
moving and a reflecting principle1  with
 on the one side the ideal world        
existing immovable as the eternal       
archetype1 and on the other side1 a     
chaotic1 formless1 irregular1           
fluctuating mass1 which holds in itself 
the germ of the material world1  but has
 no determined character nor substance4 
,with these two elements  the ,creator  

now blends the world-soul which he      
distributes according to  the relation  
of numbers1 and sets it in definite and 
harmonious motion4  ,in this way the    
material world1 which has become actual 
through the  arrangement of the chaotic 
mass into the four elements1 finds its  
external frame1 and the process thus    
begun is completed in its external      
structure by the formation of the       
organic world4    ,it is difficult to   
separate the mythical and the           
philosophical elements  in this         
cosmogony of the ,timus1 especially     
difficult to determine how  far the     
historical construction1 which gives a  
succession in time to the  acts of      
creation1 is only a formal one1 and also
 how far the affirmation  that matter is
 absolutely a not-being can be          
harmonized with the general  tenor of   
,plato's statements4 ,the significance  
of the world-soul is  clearer4 ,since   
the soul in the ,platonic system is the 
mean between  spirit and body1 and as in

 the same way mathematical relations1 in
 their  most universal expression as    
numbers1 are the mean between mere      
sensuous  existence and the pure idea   
7between the one and the many as ,plato 
expresses it71 it would seem clear that 
the world-soul1 construed  according to 
the relation of numbers1 must express   
the relation of the  world of ideas to  
that of sense1 in other words1 that it  
denotes the  sensible world as a thought
 represented in the form of material    
existence4 ,the ,platonic view of       
nature1 in opposition to the mechanical 
attempts to explain it of the earlier   
philosophers1 is entirely  teleological1
 and based upon the conception of the   
good1 or1 on the  moral idea4 ,plato    
conceives the world as the image of the 
good1 as the  work of the divine        
munificence4 ,as it is the image of the 
perfect it is  therefore only one1      
corresponding to the idea of the single 
all-embracing substance1 for an infinite
 number of worlds is not to be          

conceived as actual4 ,for the same      
reason the world is spherical1 after    
the most perfect and uniform structure1 
which embraces in itself all  other     
forms2 its movement is in a circle1     
because this1 by returning  into itself1
 is most like the movement of reason4   
,the particular points  of the ,timus1  
the derivation of the four elements1 the
 separation of  the seven planets       
according to the musical scale1 the     
opinion that the  stars were immortal   
and heavenly substances1 the affirmation
 that the  earth holds an abiding       
position in the middle of the world1 a  
view which  subsequently became         
elaborated to the ,ptolemaic system1 the
 reference of  all material figures to  
the triangle as the simplest plane      
figure1 the  division of inanimate      
nature1 according to the four elements1 
into  creatures of earth1 water1 and    
air1 his discussions respecting organic 
nature1 and especially respecting the   
construction of the human body--all     

these we need here only mention4 ,their 
philosophical worth consists not  so    
much in their material content1 but     
rather in their fundamental idea1  that 
the world should be conceived as the    
image and the work of reason1  as an    
organism of order1 harmony1 and beauty1 
as the good actualizing  itself4    #b4 
,,the ,,soul4--,the doctrine of the     
soul1 considering it simply as the      
basis of a moral action1 and leaving out
 of view all questions of  concrete     
ethics1 forms a constituent element in  
the ,platonic physics4  ,since the soul 
is united to the body1 it participates  
in the motions and  changes of the body1
 and is1 in this respect1 related to the
 perishable4  ,but in so far as it      
participates in the knowledge of the    
eternal1 i4  e4 in so far as it knows   
ideas1 does there live within it a      
divine  principle--reason4 ,accordingly1
 ,plato distinguishes two components of 
the  soul--the divine and the mortal1   
the rational and the irrational4 ,these 

two are united by an intermediate link1 
which ,plato calls  or  spirit1 and     
which1 though allied to reason is not   
reason itself1 since  it is often       
exhibited in children and also in       
brutes1 and since even men  are often   
carried away by it without reflection4  
,this threefoldness1  here exhibited    
psychologically1 is found1 in different 
applications1  through all the last     
general period of ,plato's literary     
life4 ,based upon  the anthropological  
triplicate of reason1 soul and body1 it 
corresponds  also to the division of    
theoretical knowledge into science 7or  
thinking71 correct opinions 7or         
sense-perception71 and ignorance1 to the
  triple ladder of eroticism in the     
,symposium and the mythological         
representation connected with this of   
,poros1 ,eros1 and ,penia2 to the       
metaphysical triplicate of the ideal    
world1 mathematical relations and  the  
sensible world2 and furnishes ground for
 deriving the ethical  division of      

virtue and the political division of    
ranks4    ,so far as the soul is a mean 
between the spiritual and corporeal1 may
 we  connect the ,phdon's proofs of its 
immortality with the psychological  view
 now before us4 ,the common thought of  
these arguments is that the  soul1 in   
its capacity for thinking1 participates 
in the reason1 and  being thus of an    
opposite nature to1 and uncontrolled by 
the corporeal1  it may have an          
independent existence4 ,the arguments   
are wholly  analytical1 and possess no  
valid and universal proof2 they proceed 
entirely upon a petitio principii1 they 
are derived partly from  mythical       
philosophemes1 and manifest not only an 
obscure conception of  the soul1 but of 
its relations to the body and the       
reason1 and1 so far  as the relation of 
the soul to the ideal world is in view1 
they furnish  in the best case only some
 proof for the immortality of him who   
has  raised his soul to a pure spirit1  
i4 e4 the immortality of the            

philosopher4 ,plato was not himself     
deceived as to the theoretical          
insufficiency of his arguments4 ,their  
number would show this1 and1  besides1  
he expressly calls them proofs which    
amount to only human  probability1 and  
furnish practical postulates alone4     
,with this view he  introduces at the   
close of his arguments the myth of the  
lower world1  and the state of departed 
souls1 in order1 by complying with the  
religious notions1 and traditions of his
 countrymen1 to gain a positive  support
 for belief in the soul's immortality4  
,elsewhere ,plato also  speaks of the   
lower world1 and of the future rewards  
and punishments of  the good and the    
evil1 in accordance with the popular    
notions1 as though  he saw the elements 
of a divine revelation therein2 he tells
 of  purifying punishment in ,hades1    
analogous to a purgatory2 he avails     
himself of the common notion to affirm  
that shades still subject to the        
corporeal principle will hover after    

death over their graves1 seeking to     
recover their lifeless bodies1 and at   
times he dilates upon the  migration of 
the soul to various human and brute     
forms4 ,on the whole1 we  find in       
,plato's proofs of immortality1 as in   
his psychology generally1  that dualism1
 which here expresses itself as hatred  
to the corporeal1  and is connected with
 the tendency to seek the ultimate      
ground of evil  in the nature of the    
8different0 and the sensible world4     
,,vi4 ,,the ,,platonic ,,ethics4--,the  
ground idea of the good1 which in       
physics  served only as an inventive    
conception1 finds now1 in the ethics1   
its  true exhibition4 ,plato has        
developed it prominently according to   
three  sides1 as good1 as individual    
virtue1 and as ethical world in the     
state4  ,the conception of duty remains 
in the background with him as with the  
older philosophers4    #a4 ,,good ,,and 
,,pleasure4--,that the highest good can 
be nothing other than  the idea of the  

good itself1 has already been shown in  
the dialectics1  where this idea was    
suffered to appear as the ultimate end  
of all our  striving4 ,but since the    
dialectics represent the supreme good as
  unattainable by human reason1 and only
 cognizable in its different modes  of  
manifestation1 we can1 therefore1 only  
follow these different  manifestations  
of the highest good1 which represent not
 the good itself1  but the good in      
becoming1 where it appears as science1  
truth1 beauty1  virtue1 c4 ,we are thus 
not required to be equal to ,god1 but   
only like  him 7,thet47 ,it is this     
point of view which lies at the basis of
 the  graduated table of good1 given in 
the ,philebus4    ,in seeking the       
highest good1 the conception of pleasure
 must be  investigated4 ,the ,platonic  
standpoint here is the attempt to strike
 a  balance between ,hedonism1 7the     
,cyrenian theory that pleasure is the   
highest good1 cf4  ,,xiii4 #c71 and     
,cynicism4 ,while he will not admit     

with ,aristippus that pleasure is the   
true good1 neither will he find it  as  
the ,cynics maintain1 simply in the     
negation of its contrary1 pain1  and    
thus deny that it belongs to the good   
things of human life4 ,he finds  his    
refutation of ,hedonism in the          
indeterminateness and relativity of  all
 pleasure1 since that which at one time 
may seem as pleasure1 under  other      
circumstances may appear as pain2 and   
since he who chooses  pleasure without  
distinction1 will find impure pleasures 
always combined  in his life with more  
or less of pain2 his refutation of      
,cynicism he  establishes by showing the
 necessary connection between virtue and
 true  pleasure1 showing that there is a
 true and enduring pleasure1 the        
pleasure of reason1 found in the        
possession of truth and of goodness1    
while a rational condition separate from
 all pleasure1 cannot be the  highest   
good of a finite being4 ,it is most     
prominently by this  distinction of a   

true and false1 of a pure and impure    
pleasure1 that  ,plato adjusts the      
controversy of the two ,socratic        
schools4--,a detailed  exhibition of the
 ,philebus we must here omit4--,on the  
whole1 in the  ,platonic apprehension of
 pleasure1 we cannot but notice that    
same  vacillation with which ,plato     
every where treats of the relation      
between  the corporeal and the          
spiritual1 at one time considering the  
former as a  hindrance to the latter1   
and at another as its serving           
instrument2 now1  regarding it as a     
concurring cause to the good1 and then1 
as the ground  of all evil2 here1 as    
something purely negative1 and there1 as
 a  positive substratum which supports  
all the higher intellectual             
developments2 and in conformity with    
this1 pleasure is also considered  at   
one time as something equivalent to a   
moral act1 and to knowledge1  and at    
another as the means and accidental     
consequence of the good4    #b4         

,,virtue4--,in his theory of virtue1    
,plato is wholly ,socratic4 ,he holds   
fast to the opinion that it is science  
7,protagoras71 and therefore1  teachable
 7,meno71 and as to its unity1 it       
follows from the dialectical  principle 
that the one can be manifold1 or the    
manifold one1 that1  therefore1 virtue  
must both be regarded as one1 and also  
in a different  respect1 as many4 ,plato
 thus brings out prominently the union  
and  connection of all virtues1 and is  
fond of painting1 especially in the     
introductory dialogues1 some single     
virtue as comprising in itself the  sum 
of all the rest4 ,plato follows for the 
most part the fourfold  division of     
virtues1 as popularly made2 and first1  
in the ,republic 7,,iv4  #dda71 he      
attempts a scientific derivation of     
them1 by referring to each  of the three
 parts of the soul its appropriate      
virtue4 ,the virtue of the  reason he   
calls prudence or wisdom1 the directing 
or measuring virtue1  without whose     

activity valor would sink to brute      
impulse1 and calm  endurance to stupid  
indifference2 the virtue of spirit is   
valor1 the  help-meet of reason1 or     
spirit 77 penetrated by science1 which  
in  the struggle against pleasure and   
pain1 desire and fear1 preserves the    
rational intelligence against the alarms
 with which sensuous desires1  would    
seek to sway the soul2 the virtue of the
 sensuous desires1 and  which has to    
reduce these within true and proper     
grounds1 is temperance1  and that virtue
 in fine to which belong the due        
regulation and mutual  adjustment of the
 several powers of the soul1 and which1 
therefore1  constitutes the bond and the
 unity of the three other virtues1 is   
justice4    ,in this last conception1   
that of justice1 all the elements of    
moral  culture meet together and centre1
 exhibiting the moral life of the       
individual as a perfect whole1 and then1
 by requiring an application of  the    
same principle to communities1 the moral

 consideration is advanced  beyond the  
narrow circle of individual life4 ,thus 
is established the  whole of the moral  
world--,justice 8in great letters10 the 
moral life in  its complete totality1 is
 the state4 ,in this is first actualized
 the  demand for the complete harmony of
 the human life4 ,in and through the    
state comes the complete formation of   
matter for the reason4    #c4 ,,the     
,,state4--,the ,platonic state is       
generally regarded as an ideal or       
chimera1 which it is impracticable to   
realize among men4 ,this view of  the   
case has even been ascribed to ,plato1  
and it has been said that in  his       
,republic he attempted to sketch only a 
fine ideal of a state  constitution1    
while in the ,laws he traced out a      
practicable philosophy  of the state    
from the standpoint of the common       
consciousness4 ,but in the  first place1
 this was not ,plato's true meaning4    
,although he acknowledges  that the     
state he describes cannot be found on   

earth1 and has its  archetype only in   
heaven1 by which the philosopher ought  
to form himself  7,,ix4 #eib71 still he 
demands that efforts should be made to  
realize it  here1 and he even attempts  
to show the conditions and means under  
which  such a state could be made       
actual1 not overlooking in all this the 
defects arising from the different      
characters and temperaments of men4 ,a  
composition1 dissociated from the idea1 
could only appear untrue to a           
philosopher like ,plato1 who saw the    
actual and the true only in the  idea2  
and the common view which supposes that 
he wrote his ,republic in  the full     
consciousness of its impracticability1  
mistakes entirely the  standpoint of the
 ,platonic philosophy4 ,still farther   
the question  whether such a state as   
the ,platonic is attainable and the     
best1 is  generally perverted4 ,the     
,platonic state is the ,grecian         
state-idea given  in a narrative form4  
,it is no vain and powerless ideal to   

picture the  idea as a rational         
principle in every moment of the world's
 history1  since the idea itself is that
 which is absolutely actual1 that which 
is  essential and necessary in existing 
things4 ,the truly ideal ought not  to  
be actual1 but is actual1 and the only  
actual2 if an idea were too  good for   
existence1 or the empirical actuality   
too bad for it1 then were  this a fault 
of the ideal itself4 ,plato has not     
given himself up merely  to abstract    
theories1 the philosopher cannot leap   
beyond his age1 but  can only see and   
grasp it in its true content4 ,this     
,plato has done4 ,his  standpoint is his
 own age4 ,he looks upon the political  
life of the  ,greeks as then existing1  
and it is this life1 exalted to its     
idea1 which  forms the real content of  
the ,platonic ,republic4 ,plato has here
  represented the ,grecian morality in  
its substantial condition1 ,if the      
,platonic ,republic seems prominently an
 ideal which can never be  realized1    

this is owing much less to its ideality 
than to the defects of  the old         
political life4 ,the most prominent     
characteristic of the  ,hellenic        
conception of the state1 before the     
,greeks began to fall into  unbridled   
licentiousness1 was the constraint      
thrown upon personal  subjective        
freedom1 in the sacrifice of every      
individual interest to the  absolute    
sovereignty of the state4 ,with ,plato  
also1 the state is every  thing4 ,his   
political institutions1 so loudly       
ridiculed by the ancients1  are only the
 undeniable consequences following from 
the very idea of the  ,grecian state1   
which allowed neither to the individual 
citizen nor to a  corporation1 any      
lawful sphere of action independent of  
itself4    ,the grand feature of the    
,platonic state is1 as has been said1   
the  exclusive sacrifice of the         
individual to the state1 the reference  
of  moral to political virtue4 ,since   
man cannot reach his complete           

development in isolation1 but only as a 
member of an organic society  7the      
state71 ,plato therefore concludes that 
the individual purpose  should wholly   
conform to the general aim1 and that the
 state must  represent a perfect and    
harmonious unity1 and be a counterpart  
of the  moral life of the individual4   
,in a perfect state all things1 joy and 
sorrow1 and even eyes1 ears and hands1  
must be common to all1 so that  the     
social life would be as it were the life
 of one man4 ,this perfect  universality
 and unity1 can only be actualized when 
every thing  individual and particular  
falls away1 and hence the difficulty of 
the  ,platonic ,republic4 ,private      
property and domestic life 7in place of 
which  comes a community of goods and of
 wives71 the duty of education1 the     
choice of rank and profession1 the arts 
and sciences1 all these must be         
subjected and placed under the exclusive
 and absolute control of the  state4    
,the individual may lay claim only to   

that happiness which belongs  to him as 
a constituent element of the state4     
,from this point ,plato goes  down into 
the minutest particulars1 and gives the 
closest directions  respecting          
gymnastics and music1 which form the two
 means of culture of  the higher ranks2 
respecting the study of mathematics1 and
 philosophy1  the choice of stringed    
instruments1 and the proper measure of  
verse2  respecting bodily exercise and  
the service of women in war2 respecting 
marriage settlements1 and the age at    
which any one should study  dialectics1 
marry1 and beget children4 ,the state   
with him is only a  great educational   
establishment1 a family in the          
mass4--,lyric poetry he  would allow    
only under the inspection of competent  
judges4 ,epic and  dramatic poetry1 even
 ,homer and ,hesiod1 should be banished 
from the  state1 since they rouse and   
lead astray the passions1 and give      
unworthy  representations of the gods4  
,exhibitions of physical degeneracy or  

weakness should not be tolerated in the 
,platonic state2 deformed and  sickly   
infants should be abandoned1 and food   
and attention should be  denied to the  
sick4--,in all this we find the chief   
antithesis of the  ancient to the modern
 state4 ,plato did not recognize the    
will and choice  of the individual1 and 
yet the individual has a right to demand
 this4  ,the problem of the modern state
 has been to unite these two sides1 to  
bring the universal end and the         
particular end of the individual into   
harmony1 to reconcile the highest       
possible freedom of the conscious       
individual will1 with the highest       
possible supremacy of the state4    ,the
 political institutions of the ,platonic
 state are decidedly  aristocratic4     
,grown up in opposition to the          
extravagances of the  ,athenian         
democracy1 ,plato prefers an absolute   
monarchy to every other  constitution1  
though this should have as its absolute 
ruler only the  perfect philosopher4 ,it

 is a well-known expression of his1 that
 the  state can only attain its end when
 philosophers become its rulers1 or     
when its present rulers have carried    
their studies so far and so  accurately1
 that they can unite philosophy with a  
superintendence of  public affairs 7,v4 
#dgc74 ,his reason for claiming that the
 sovereign  power should be vested only 
in one1 is the fact that very few are   
endowed with political wisdom4 ,this    
ideal of an absolute ruler who  should  
be able to lead the state perfectly1    
,plato abandons in the  ,laws1 in which 
work he shows his preference for a mixed
 constitution1  embracing both a        
monarchical and an aristocratic element4
 ,from the  aristocratic tendency of the
 ,platonic ideal of a state1 follows    
farther  the sharp division of ranks1   
and the total exclusion of the third    
rank  from a proper political life4 ,in 
reality ,plato makes but two classes in 
his state1 the subjects and the         
sovereign1 analogous to his twofold     

psychological division of sensible and  
intellectual1 mortal and  immortal1 but 
as in psychology he had introduced a    
middle step1 spirit1  to stand between  
his two divisions there1 so in the state
 he brings in  the military class       
between the ruler and those intended to 
supply the  bodily wants of the         
community4 ,we have thus three ranks1   
that of the  ruler1 corresponding to the
 reason1 that of the watcher or warrior1
  answering to spirit1 and that of the  
craftsman1 which is made parallel  to   
the appetites or sensuous desires4 ,to  
these three ranks belong three  separate
 functions3 to the first1 that of making
 the law and caring for  the general    
good2 to the second1 that of defending  
the public welfare  from attacks of     
external foes2 and to the third1 the    
care of separate  interests and wants1  
as agriculture1 mechanics1 c4 ,from each
 of these  three ranks and its functions
 the state derives a peculiar           
virtue--wisdom  from the ruler1 bravery 

from the warrior1 and temperance from   
the  craftsman1 so far as he lives in   
obedience to his rulers4 ,in the proper 
union of these three virtues is found   
the justice of the state1 a virtue      
which is thus the sum of all other      
virtues4 ,plato pays little attention   
to the lowest rank1 that of the         
craftsman1 who exists in the state only 
as means4 ,he held that it was not      
necessary to give laws and care for  the
 rights of this portion of the          
community4 ,the separation between the  
ruler and the warrior is not so broad4  
,plato suffers these two ranks to       
interpenetrate each other1 and analogous
 to his original psychological          
division1 as though the reason were but 
spirit in the highest step of  its      
development1 he makes the oldest and the
 best of the warriors rise  to the      
dignity and power of the rulers4 ,the   
education of its warriors  should       
therefore be a chief care of the state1 
in order that their  spirit1 though     

losing none of its peculiar energy1 may 
yet be penetrated  by reason4 ,the best 
endowed by nature and culture among the 
warriors1  may be selected at the age of
 thirty1 and put upon a course of       
careful  training4 ,when he has reached 
the age of fifty and looked upon the    
idea  of the good1 he may be bound to   
actualize this archetype in the state1  
provided always that every one wait his 
turn1 and spend his remaining  time in  
philosophy4 ,only thus can the state be 
raised to the  unconditioned rule of    
reason under the supremacy of the good4 
,,section ,,xv4    ,,the ,,old          
,,academy4      ,in the old ,academy1 we
 lose the presence of inventive genius2 
with few  exceptions we find here no    
movements of progress1 but rather a     
gradual  retrogression of the ,platonic 
philosophizing4 ,after the death of     
,plato1  ,speusippus1 his nephew and    
disciple1 held the chair of his master  
in the  ,academy during eight years4 ,he
 was succeeded by ,xenocrates1 after    

whom  we meet with ,polemo1 ,crates1 and
 ,crantor4 ,it was a time in which      
schools  for high culture were          
established1 and the older teacher      
yielded to his  younger successor the   
post of instruction4 ,the general       
characteristics  of the old ,academy1 so
 far as can be gathered from the scanty 
accounts1  were great attention to      
learning1 the prevalence of ,pythagorean
  elements1 especially the doctrine of  
numbers1 and lastly1 the reception  of  
fantastic and demonological notions1    
among which the worship of the  stars   
played a part4 ,the prevalence of the   
,pythagorean doctrine of  numbers in the
 later instructions of the ,academy1    
gave to mathematical  sciences1         
particularly arithmetic and astronomy1 a
 high place1 and at  the same time      
assigned to the doctrine of ideas a much
 lower position  than ,plato had given  
it4 ,subsequently1 the attempt was made 
to get back  to the unadulterated       
doctrine of ,plato4 ,crantor is said to 

be the first  editor of the ,platonic   
writings4    ,as ,plato was the only    
true ,socraticist1 so was ,aristotle the
 only  genuine disciple of ,plato1      
though often abused by his              
fellow-disciples  as unfaithful to his  
master's principles4    ,we pass on at  
once to him1 without stopping now to    
inquire into his  relation to ,plato1 or
 the advance which he made beyond his   
predecessor1  since these points will   
come up before us in the exhibition of  
the  ,aristotelian philosophy4 7,see    
,,xvi3 ,,iii4 #a47          ,,section   
,,xvi4    ,,aristotle4      ,i4 ,,life  
,,and ,,writings ,,of                   
,,aristotle4--,aristotle was born #chd  
,b4 ,c4 at  ,stagira1 a ,greek colony in
 ,thrace4 ,his father1 ,nicomachus1 was 
a  physician1 and the friend of         
,amyntas1 king of ,macedonia4 ,the      
former fact  may have had its influence 
in determining the scientific direction 
of  the son1 and the latter may have    
procured his subsequent summons to the  

,macedonian court4 ,aristotle at a very 
early age lost both his parents4  ,in   
his seventeenth year he came to ,plato  
at ,athens1 and continued with  him     
twenty years4 ,on account of his        
indomitable zeal for study1 ,plato      
named him 8the ,teacher10 and said1 upon
 comparing him with ,xenocrates1  that  
the latter required the spur1 the former
 the bit4 ,among the many  charges made 
against his character1 most prominent   
are those of jealousy  and ingratitude  
towards his master1 but most of the     
anecdotes in which  these charges are   
embodied merit little credence4 ,it is  
certain that  ,aristotle1 after the     
death of ,plato1 stood in friendly      
relations with  ,xenocrates2 still1 as a
 writer1 he can hardly be absolved from 
a certain  want of friendship and regard
 towards ,plato and his philosophy1     
though  all this can be explained on    
psychological grounds4 ,after ,plato's  
death1  ,aristotle went with ,xenocrates
 to ,hermeas1 tyrant of ,atarneus1 whose

  sister ,pythias he married after      
,hermeas had fallen a prey to ,persian  
violence4 ,after the death of ,pythias  
he is said to have married his          
concubine1 ,herpyllis1 who was the      
mother of his son ,nicomachus4 ,in the  
year #cdc he was called by ,philip of   
,macedon1 to take the charge of the     
education of his son ,alexander1 then   
thirteen years old4 ,both father and    
son honored him highly1 and the latter1 
with royal munificence1  subsequently   
supported him in his studies4 ,when     
,alexander went to  ,persia1 ,aristotle 
betook himself to ,athens1 and taught in
 the ,lyceum1  the only gymnasium then  
vacant1 since ,xenocrates had possession
 of the  ,academy1 and the ,cynics of   
the ,cynosaerges4 ,from the shady walks 
of the ,lyceum1 in which ,aristotle was 
accustomed to walk and  expound his     
philosophy1 his school received the name
 of the ,peripatetic4  ,aristotle is    
said to have spent his mornings with his
 more mature  disciples1 exercising them

 in the profoundest questions of        
philosophy1  while his evenings were    
occupied with a greater number of pupils
 in a  more general and preparatory     
instruction4 ,the former investigations 
were  called acroamatic1 the latter     
exoteric4 ,he abode at ,athens1 and     
taught  thirteen years1 and then1 after 
the death of ,alexander1 whose          
displeasure he had incurred1 he is said 
to have been accused by the  ,athenians 
of impiety towards the gods1 and to have
 fled to ,chalcis1 in  order to escape a
 fate similar to that of ,socrates4 ,he 
died in the year  #cbb at ,chalcis1 in  
,euba4    ,aristotle left a vast number 
of writings1 of which the smaller       
7perhaps  a fourth71 but unquestionably 
the more important portion have come    
down  to us1 though in a form which     
cannot be received without some         
scruples4  ,the story of ,strabo about  
the fate of the ,aristotelian writings1 
and the  injury which they suffered in a
 cellar at ,scepsis1 is confessedly a   

fable1 or at least limited to the       
original manuscripts2 but the           
fragmentary and descriptive form which  
many among them1 and even the  most     
important 7e4 g4 the metaphysics7       
possess1 the fact that  scattered       
portions of one and the same work 7e4 g4
 the ethics7 are  repeatedly found in   
different treatises1 the irregularities 
and striking  contradictions in one and 
the same writing1 the disagreement found
 in  other particulars among different  
works1 and the distinction made by      
,aristotle himself between acroamatic   
and exoterical writings1 all this  gives
 reason to believe that we have1 for the
 most part1 before us only  his oral    
lectures written down1 and subsequently 
edited by his scholars4    ,,ii4        
,,universal ,,character ,,and ,,division
 ,,of ,,the ,,aristotelian              
,,philosophy4--,with ,plato1 philosophy 
had been national in both its form  and 
content1 but with ,aristotle1 it loses  
its ,hellenic peculiarity1 and  becomes 

universal in scope and meaning2 the     
,platonic dialogue changes  into barren 
prose2 a rigid1 artistic language takes 
the place of the  mythical and poetical 
dress2 the thinking which had been with 
,plato  intuitive1 is with ,aristotle   
discursive2 the immediate beholding of  
reason in the former1 becomes reflection
 and conception in the latter4  ,turning
 away from the ,platonic unity of all   
being1 ,aristotle prefers to  direct his
 attention to the manifoldness of the   
phenomenal2 he seeks the  idea only in  
its concrete actualization1 and         
consequently grasps the  particular far 
more prominently in its peculiar        
determinateness and  reciprocal         
differences1 than in its connection with
 the idea4 ,he  embraces with equal     
interest the facts given in nature1 in  
history1 and  in the inner life of man4 
,but he ever tends toward the           
individual1 he  must ever have a fact   
given in order to develope his thought  
upon it2 it  is always the empirical1   

the actual1 which solicits and guides   
his  speculation2 his whole course is a 
description of the facts given1 and     
only merits the name of a philosophy    
because it comprehends the  empirical in
 its totality and synthesis2 because it 
has carried out its  induction to the   
farthest extent4 ,only because he is the
 absolute  empiricist may ,aristotle be 
called the truly philosopher4    ,this  
character of the ,aristotelian          
philosophy explains at the outset its   
encyclopedian tendency1 inasmuch as     
every thing given in experience is      
equally worthy of regard and            
investigation4 ,aristotle is thus the   
founder of many courses of study unknown
 before him2 he is not only the  father 
of logic1 but also of natural history1  
empirical psychology1 and  the science  
of natural rights4    ,this devotion of 
,aristotle to that which is given will  
also explain his  predominant           
inclination towards physics1 for nature 
is the most  immediate and actual4      

,connected also with this is the fact   
that  ,aristotle is the first among     
philosophers who has given to history   
and  its tendencies an accurate         
attention4 ,the first book of the       
,metaphysics is also the first attempt  
at a history of philosophy1 as  his     
politics is the first critical history  
of the different states and             
constitutions4 ,in both these cases he  
brings out his own theory only as  the  
consequence of that which has been      
historically given1 basing it in  the   
former case upon the works of his       
predecessors1 and in the latter  case   
upon the constitutions which lie before 
him4    ,it is clear that according to  
this1 the method of ,aristotle must be a
  different one from that of ,plato4    
,instead of proceeding like the latter1 
synthetically and dialectically1 he     
pursues for the most part an  analytic  
and regressive course1 that is1 going   
backward from the  concrete to its      
ultimate ground and determination4      

,while ,plato would  take his standpoint
 in the idea1 in order to explain from  
this position  and set in a clearer     
light that which is given and empirical1
 ,aristotle  on the other hand1 starts  
with that which is given1 in order to   
find and  exhibit the idea in it4 ,his  
method is1 hence1 induction2 that is1   
the  derivation of certain principles   
and maxims from a sum of given facts    
and phenomena2 his mode of procedure is1
 usually1 argument1 a barren  balancing 
of facts1 phenomena1 circumstances and  
possibilities4 ,he  stands out for the  
most part only as the thoughtful        
observer4 ,renouncing  all claim to     
universality and necessity in his       
results1 he is content to  have brought 
out that which has an approximative     
truth1 and the highest  degree of       
probability4 ,he often affirms that     
science does not simply  relate to the  
changeless and necessary1 but also to   
that which  ordinarily takes place1 that
 being alone excluded from its province1

  which is strictly accidental4         
,philosophy1 consequently1 has with him 
the  character and worth of a reckoning 
of probabilities1 and his mode of       
exhibition assumes not unfrequently only
 the form of a doubtful  deliberation4  
,hence there is no trace of the         
,platonic ideals1 hence1  also1 his     
repugnance to a glowing and poetic style
 in philosophy1 a  repugnance which1    
while indeed it induces in him a fixed1 
philosophical  terminology1 also        
frequently leads him to mistake and     
misrepresent the  opinions of his       
predecessors4 ,hence1 also1 in whatever 
he treated1 his  thorough adherence to  
that which is actually given4           
,connected in fine with the empirical   
character of the ,aristotelian          
philosophizing1 is the fragmentary form 
of his writings1 and their want  of a   
systematic division and arrangement4    
,proceeding always in the line  of that 
which is given1 from individual to      
individual1 he considers  every province

 of the actual by itself1 and makes it  
the subject of a  separate treatise2 but
 he1 for the most part1 fails to        
indicate the  lines by which the        
different parts hang together1 and are  
comprehended  in a systematic whole4    
,thus he holds up a number of           
co-ordinate  sciences1 each one of which
 has an independent basis1 but he fails 
to  give us the highest science which   
embraces them all4 ,the principle is    
sometimes affirmed that all the writings
 follow the idea of a whole2 but  in    
their procedure there is such a want of 
all systematic connection1  and every   
one of his writings is a monograph so   
thoroughly independent  and complete in 
itself1 that we are sometimes puzzled to
 know what  ,aristotle himself received 
as a part of philosophy1 and what he    
excluded4 ,we are never furnished with  
an independent scheme or outline1  we   
rarely find definite results or summary 
explanations1 and even the  different   
divisions of philosophy which he gives1 

vary essentially from  one another4 ,at 
one time he divides science into        
theoretical and  practical1 at another1 
he adds to these two a poetical creative
 science1  while still again he speaks  
of the three parts of science1 ethics1  
physics1 and logic4 ,at one time he     
divides the theoretical philosophy  into
 logic and physics1 and at another into 
theology1 mathematics1 and  physics4    
,but no one of these divisions has he   
expressly given as the  basis on which  
to represent his system2 he himself     
places no value upon  this method of    
division1 and1 indeed1 openly declares  
himself opposed to  it4 ,it is1         
therefore1 only for the sake of         
uniformity that we can give  the        
preference here to the threefold        
division of philosophy as already       
adopted by ,plato4    ,,iii4 ,,logic    
,,and ,,metaphysics4 #a4 ,,conception   
,,and ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,two4--,the
  word metaphysics was first furnished  
by the ,aristotelian commentators4      

,plato had used the term dialectics1 and
 ,aristotle had characterized the  same 
thing as 8first philosophy10 while he   
calls physics the 8second  philosophy40 
,the relation of this first philosophy  
to the other sciences  ,aristotle       
determines in the following way4 ,every 
science1 he says1 must  have for        
investigation a determined province and 
separate form of being1  but none of    
these sciences reaches the conception of
 being itself4 ,hence  there is needed a
 science which should investigate that  
which the other  sciences take up       
hypothetically1 or through experience4  
,this is done by  the first philosophy  
which has to do with being as such1     
while the other  sciences relate only to
 determined and concrete being4 ,the    
metaphysics1  which is this science of  
being and its primitive grounds1 is the 
first  philosophy1 since it is          
presupposed by every other discipline4  
,thus1  says ,aristotle1 if there were  
only a physical substance1 then would   

physics be the first and the only       
philosophy1 but if there be an          
immaterial and unmoved essence which is 
the ground of all being1 then  must     
there also be an antecedent1 and because
 it is antecedent1 a  universal         
philosophy4 ,the first ground of all    
being is ,god1 whence  ,aristotle       
occasionally gives to the first         
philosophy the name of  theology4    ,it
 is difficult to determine the relation 
between this first philosophy  as the   
science of the ultimate ground of       
things1 and that science which  is      
ordinarily termed the logic of          
,aristotle1 and which is exhibited in   
the writings bearing the name of the    
,organon4 ,aristotle himself has  not   
accurately examined the relations of    
these two sciences1 the reason  of which
 is doubtless to be found in the        
incomplete form of the  metaphysics4    
,but since he has embraced them both    
under the same name of  logic1 since the
 investigation of the essence of things 

7,,vii4 #ag71 and  the doctrine of ideas
 7,,xiii4 #e71 are expressly called     
logical1 since he  repeatedly attempts  
in the ,metaphysics 7,book ,,iv471 to   
establish the  logical principle of     
contradiction as an absolute            
presupposition for all  thinking and    
speaking and philosophizing1 and employs
 the method of  argument belonging to   
that science which has to do with the   
essence of  things 7,,iii4 #b4 ,,iv4    
#c71 and since1 in fine1 the categories 
to which he  had already dedicated a    
separate book in the ,organon are also  
discussed  again in the ,metaphysics    
7,book ,v471 it follows that this much  
at least  may be affirmed with          
certainty1 that he would not absolutely 
separate  the investigations of the     
,organon from those of the ,metaphysics1
 and  that he would not counsel the     
ordinary division of formal logic and   
metaphysics1 although he has omitted to 
show more clearly their inner           
connection4    #b4 ,,logic4--,the great 

problem both of the logical faculty and 
also of  logic both as science and art1 
consists in this1 viz41 to form and     
judge  of conclusions1 and through      
conclusions to be able to establish a   
proof4  ,the conclusions1 however1 arise
 from propositions1 and the propositions
  from conceptions4 ,according to this  
natural point of view1 which lies in    
the very nature of the case1 ,aristotle 
has divided the content of the  logical 
and dialectical doctrine contained in   
the different treatises of  the         
,organon4 ,the first treatise in the    
,organon is that containing the         
categories1 a work which treats of the  
universal determinations of  being1 and 
gives the first attempt at an ontology4 
,of these categories  ,aristotle        
enumerates ten2 essence1 magnitude1     
quality1 relation1 the  where1 the when1
 position1 habit1 action1 and passion4  
,the second  treatise 7de               
interpretatione7 investigates speech as 
the expression of  thought1 and         

discusses the doctrine of the parts of  
speech1 propositions  and judgments4    
,the third are the analytic books1 which
 show how  conclusions may be referred  
back to their principles and arranged in
  order of their antecedence4 ,the first
 ,analytic contains in two books the    
universal doctrine of the ,syllogism4   
,conclusions are according to their     
content and end either apodictic1 which 
possess a certain and  incontrovertible 
truth1 or dialectic1 which are directed 
toward that  which may be disputed and  
is probable1 or1 finally1 sophistic1    
which are  announced deceptively as     
correct conclusions while they are not4 
,the  doctrine of apodictic conclusions 
and thus of proofs is given in the two  
books of the second ,analytic1 that of  
dialectic1 is furnished in the  eight   
books of the ,topic1 and that of        
sophistic in the treatise  concerning   
8,sophistical ,convictions40    ,a      
closer statement of the ,aristotelian   
logic would be familiar to every  one1  

since the formal representations of this
 science ordinarily given1  employ for  
the most part only the material         
furnished by ,aristotle4 ,kant  has     
remarked1 that since the time of the    
,grecian sage1 logic has made  neither  
progress nor retrogression4 ,only in two
 points has the formal  logic of our    
time advanced beyond that of ,aristotle2
 first1 in adding to  the categorical   
conclusion which was the only one       
,aristotle had in mind1  the            
hypothetical and disjunctive1 and       
second1 in adding the fourth to  the    
first three figures of conclusion4 ,but 
the incompleteness of the  ,aristotelian
 logic1 which might be pardoned in the  
founder of this  science1 yet abides1   
and its thoroughly empirical method not 
only still  continues1 but has even been
 exalted to a principle by making the   
antithesis1 which ,aristotle did not1   
between the form of a thought and  the  
content4 ,aristotle1 in reality1 only   
attempted to collect the  logical facts 

in reference to the formation of        
propositions1 and the  method of        
conclusions2 he has given in his logic  
only the natural  history of finite     
thinking4 ,however highly now we may    
rate the  correctness of his            
abstraction1 and the clearness with     
which he brings  into consciousness the 
logical operation of the understanding1 
we must  make equally conspicuous with  
this the want of all scientific         
derivation  and foundation4 ,the ten    
categories which he1 as already         
remarked1 has  discussed in a separate  
treatise1 he simply mentions1 without   
furnishing  any ground or principle for 
this enumeration2 that there are this   
number  of categories is only a matter  
of fact to him1 and he even cites them  
differently in different writings4 ,in  
the same way also he takes up the       
figures of the conclusion empirically2  
he considers them only as forms  and    
determinations of relation of the formal
 thinking1 and continues  thus1 although

 he allows the conclusion to stand for  
the only form of  science within the    
province of the logic of the            
understanding4 ,neither  in his         
,metaphysics nor in his ,physics does he
 cite the rules of the  formal methods  
of conclusion which he develops in the  
,organon1 clearly  proving that he has  
nowhere in his system properly          
elaborated either his  categories or his
 analytic2 his logical investigations do
 not influence  generally the           
development of his philosophical        
thought1 but have for the  most part    
only the value of a preliminary         
scrutiny4    #c4 ,,metaphysics4--,among 
all the ,aristotelian writings1 the     
,metaphysics is  least entitled to be   
called a connected whole2 it is only a  
connection  of sketches1 which1 though  
they follow a certain fundamental idea1 
utterly fail of an inner mediation and a
 perfect development4 ,we may           
distinguish in it seven distinct groups4
 7#a7 ,criticism of the previous        

philosophic systems viewed in the light 
of the four ,aristotelian  principles1  
,book ,i4 7#b7 ,positing of the apories 
or the philosophical  preliminary       
questions1 ,,iii4 7#c7 ,the principle of
 contradiction1 ,,iv4 7#d7              
,definitions1 ,v4 7#e7 ,examination of  
the conception of essence 77 and        
conceivable being 7the   7 or the       
conception of matter 771  form 771 and  
that which arises from the connection of
 these two  771 ,,vii4 ,,viii4 7#f7     
,potentiality and actuality1 ,,ix4 7#g7 
,the ,divine  ,spirit moving all1 but   
itself unmoved1 ,,xii4 7#h7 ,to these we
 may add the  polemic against the       
,platonic doctrine of ideas and numbers1
 which runs  through the whole          
,metaphysics1 but is especially carried 
out in ,books  ,,xiii4 and ,,xiv4       
7#a7 ,the ,aristotelian ,criticism of   
the ,platonic ,doctrine of ,ideas4--,in 
,aristotle's antagonism to the ,platonic
 doctrine of ideas1 we must seek  for   
the specific difference between the two 

systems1 a difference of  which         
,aristotle avails himself of every      
opportunity 7especially  ,metaph4 ,i4   
and ,,xiii47 to express4 ,plato had     
beheld every thing actual  in the idea1 
but the idea was to him a rigid truth1  
which had not yet  become interwoven    
with the life and the movement of       
existence4 ,such a  view1 however1 had  
this difficulty1 the idea1 however      
little ,plato would  have it so1 found  
standing over against it in independent 
being the  phenomenal world1 while it   
furnished no principle on which the     
being of  the phenomenal world could be 
affirmed4 ,this ,aristotle recognizes   
and  charges upon ,plato1 that his ideas
 were only 8immortalized things of      
sense10 out of which the being and      
becoming of the sensible could not be   
explained4 ,in order to avoid this      
consequence1 he himself makes out an    
original reference of mind to           
phenomenon1 affirming that the relation 
of  the two is1 that of the actual to   

the possible1 or that of form to        
matter1 and considering also mind as the
 absolute actuality of matter1  and     
matter1 as the potentially mind4 ,his   
argument against the ,platonic  doctrine
 of ideas1 ,aristotle makes out in the  
following way4    ,passing by now the   
fact that ,plato has furnished no       
satisfactory proof  for the objective   
and independent reality of ideas1 and   
that his theory  is without vindication1
 we may affirm in the first place that  
it is  wholly unfruitful1 since it      
possesses no ground of explanation for  
being4 ,the ideas have no proper and    
independent content4 ,to see this we    
need only refer to the manner in which  
,plato introduced them4 ,in order  to   
make science possible he had posited    
certain substances independent  of the  
sensible1 and uninfluenced by its       
changes4 ,but to serve such a  purpose1 
there was offered to him nothing other  
than this individual  thing of sense4   
,hence he gave to this individual a     

universal form1 which  was with him the 
idea4 ,from this it resulted1 that his  
ideas can hardly  be separated from the 
sensible and individual objects which   
participate  in them4 ,the ideal duality
 and the empirical duality is one and   
the same  content4 ,the truth of this we
 can readily see1 whenever we gain from 
the  adherents to the doctrine of ideas 
a definite statement respecting the     
peculiar character of their unchangeable
 substances1 in comparison with  the    
sensible and individual things which    
participate in them4 ,the only          
difference between the two consists in  
appending per se to the names           
expressing the respective ideas2 thus1  
while the individual things are  e4 g4  
man1 horse1 etc41 the ideas are man per 
se1 horse per se1  etc4 ,there is only  
this formal change for the doctrine of  
ideas to rest  upon2 the finite content 
is not removed1 but is only             
characterized as  perpetual4 ,this      
objection1 that in the doctrine of ideas

 we have in  reality only the sensible  
posited as a not-sensible1 and endowed  
with  the predicate of immutability1    
,aristotle urges as above remarked when 
he  calls the ideas 8immortalized things
 of sense10 not as though they were     
actually something sensible and spacial1
 but because in them the  sensible      
individual loses at once its            
individuality1 and becomes a  universal4
 ,he compares them in this respect with 
the gods of the popular  and            
anthropomorphical religion2 as these are
 nothing but deified men1 so  the ideas 
are only things of nature endowed with a
 supernatural potency1  a sensible      
exalted to a not-sensible4 ,this        
identity between the ideas  and their   
respective individual things amounts    
moreover to this1 that  the introduction
 of ideas doubles the objects to be     
known in a  burdensome manner1 and      
without any good results4 ,why set up   
the same  thing over again8 ,why besides
 the sensible twofoldness and           

threefoldness1 affirm a twofoldness and 
threefoldness in the idea8 ,the         
adherents of the doctrine of ideas1 when
 they posit an idea for every  class of 
natural things1 and through this theory 
set up two equivalent  theories of      
sensible and not-sensible substances1   
seem therefore to  ,aristotle like men  
who think they can reckon better with   
many numbers  than with few1 and who    
therefore go to multiplying their       
numbers before  they begin their        
reckoning4 ,therefore again the doctrine
 of ideas is a  tautology1 and wholly   
unfruitful of the explanation of being1 
8,the ideas  give no aid to the         
knowledge of the individual things      
participating in  them1 since the ideas 
are not immanent in these things1 but   
separate  from them40 ,equally          
unfruitful are the ideas when considered
 in  reference to the arising and       
departing of the things of sense4 ,they 
contain no principle of becoming1 of    
movement4 ,there is in them no          

causality which might bring out the     
event1 or explain the event when it  had
 actually happened4 ,themselves without 
motion and process1 if they  had any    
effect1 it could only be that of perfect
 repose4 ,true1 ,plato  affirms in his  
,phdon that the ideas are causes both of
 being and  becoming1 but in spite of   
the ideas1 nothing ever becomes without 
a  moving2 the ideas1 by their          
separation from the becoming1 have no   
such  capacity to move4 ,this           
indifferent relation of ideas to the    
actual  becoming1 ,aristotle brings     
under the categories1 potentiality and  
actuality1 and farther says that the    
ideas are only potential1 they are  only
 bare possibility and essentiality      
because they are wanting in             
actuality4--,the inner contradiction of 
the doctrine of ideas is in brief  this1
 viz41 that it posits an individual     
immediately as a universal1 and  at the 
same time pronounces the universal1 the 
species1 as numerically  an individual1 

and also that the ideas are set up on   
the one side as  separate individual    
substances1 and on the other side as    
participant1  and therefore as          
universal4 ,although the ideas as the   
original  conceptions of species are a  
universal1 which arise when being is    
fixed  in existence1 and the one brought
 out in the many1 and the abiding is    
given a place in the changeable1 yet can
 they not be defined as they  should be 
according to the ,platonic notion1 that 
they are individual  substances1 for    
there can be neither definition nor     
derivation of an  absolute individual1  
since even the word 7and only in words  
is a  definition possible7 is in its    
nature a universal1 and belongs also to 
other objects1 consequently1 every      
predicate in which ,i attempt to        
determine an individual thing cannot    
belong exclusively to that thing4  ,the 
adherents of the doctrine of ideas1 are 
therefore not at all in a  condition to 
give an idea a conceivable termination2 

their ideas are  indefinable4--,in      
general1 ,plato has left the relation of
 the individual  objects to ideas very  
obscure4 ,he calls the ideas archetypes1
 and allows  that the objects may       
participate in them2 yet are these only 
poetical  metaphors4 ,how shall we      
represent to ourselves this             
8participation10  this copying of the   
original archetype8 ,we seek in vain for
 more  accurate explanations of this in 
,plato4 ,it is impossible to conceive   
how  and why matter participates in the 
ideas4 ,in order to explain this1 we    
must add to the ideas a still higher and
 wider principle1 which contains  the   
cause for this 8participation0 of       
objects1 for without a moving  principle
 we find no ground for 8participation40 
,alike above the idea  7e4 g4 the idea  
of man71 and the phenomenon 7e4 g4 the  
individual  man71 there must stand a    
third common to both1 and in which the  
two were  united1 i4 e4 as ,aristotle   
was in the habit of expressing this     

objection1 the doctrine of ideas leads  
to the adoption of a 8third man40  ,the 
result of this ,aristotelian criticism  
is the immanence of the  universal in   
the individual4 ,the method of ,socrates
 in trying to find  the universal as the
 essence of the individual1 and to give 
definitions  according to conception1   
was as correct 7for no science is       
possible  without the universal7 as the 
theory of ,plato in exalting these      
universal conceptions to an independent 
subsistence as real individual          
substances1 was erroneous4 ,nothing     
universal1 nothing which is a kind or  a
 species1 exists besides and separate   
from the individual2 a thing and  its   
conception cannot be separated from each
 other4 ,with these  principles         
,aristotle hardly deviated from ,plato's
 fundamental idea that  the universal is
 the only true being1 and the essence of
 individual  things2 it may rather be   
said that he has freed this idea from   
its  original abstraction1 and given it 

a more profound mediation with the      
phenomenal world4 ,notwithstanding his  
apparent contradiction to ,plato1  the  
fundamental position of ,aristotle is   
the same as that of his master1  viz41  
that the essence of a thing 7  1    7 is
 known  and represented in the          
conception2 ,aristotle however          
recognizes the  universal1 the          
conception to be as little separated    
from the determined  phenomenon as form 
from matter1 and essence or substance 77
 in its  most proper sense is1 according
 to him1 only that which cannot be      
predicated of another1 though of this   
other every remaining thing may be      
predicated2 it is that which is a this 7
 71 the individual thing  and not a     
universal4    7#b47 ,the four           
,aristotelian principles or causes1 and 
the relation of  form and matter4--,from
 the criticism of the ,platonic doctrine
 of ideas  arose directly the groundwork
 of the ,aristotelian system1 the       
determinations of matter 771 and form   

774 ,aristotle enumerates  four         
metaphysical principles or causes3      
matter1 form1 moving cause1 and  end4   
,in a house1 for instance1 the matter is
 the wood1 the form is the  conception  
of the house1 the moving cause is the   
builder1 and the end is  the actual     
house4 ,these four determinations of all
 being resolve  themselves upon a closer
 scrutiny into the fundamental          
antithesis of  matter and form4 ,the    
conception of the moving cause is       
involved with the  two other ideal      
principles of form and of end4 ,the     
moving cause is that  which has secured 
the transition of the incomplete        
actuality or  potentiality to the       
complete actuality1 or induces the      
becoming of  matter to form4 ,but in    
every movement of the incomplete to the 
complete1  the latter antedates in      
conception this movement1 and is its    
motive4 ,the  moving cause of matter is 
therefore form4 ,so is man the moving   
and  producing cause of man2 the form of

 the statue in the understanding of  the
 artist is the cause of the movement by 
which the statue is produced2  health   
must be in the thought of the physician 
before it can become the  moving cause  
of convalescence2 so in a certain degree
 is medicine1  health1 and the art of   
building the form of the house4 ,but in 
the same  way1 the moving or first cause
 is also identical with the final cause 
or  end1 for the end is the motive for  
all becoming and movement4 ,the moving  
cause of the house is the builder1 but  
the moving cause of the builder  is the 
end to be attained1 i4 e4 the house4    
,from such examples as  these it is seen
 that the determinations of form and end
 may be  considered under one1 in so far
 as both are united in the conception of
  actuality 771 for the end of every    
thing is its completed being1  its      
conception or its form1 the bringing out
 into complete actuality  that which was
 potentially contained in it4 ,the end  
of the hand is its  conception1 the end 

of the seed is the tree1 which is at the
 same time  the essence of the seed4    
,the only fundamental determinations1   
therefore1  which cannot be wholly      
resolved into each other1 are matter and
 form4    ,matter when abstracted from  
form in thought1 ,aristotle regarded as 
that  which was entirely without        
predicate1 determination and            
distinction4 ,it  is that abiding thing 
which lies at the basis of all becoming2
 but which  in its own being is         
different from every thing which has    
become4 ,it is  capable of the widest   
diversity of forms1 but is itself       
without  determinate form2 it is every  
thing in possibility1 but nothing in    
actuality4 ,there is a first matter     
which lies at the basis of every        
determinate thing1 precisely as the wood
 is related to the bench and the  marble
 to the statue4 ,with this conception of
 matter ,aristotle prides  himself upon 
having conquered the difficulty so      
frequently urged of  explaining the     

possibility that any thing can become1  
since being can  neither come out of    
being nor out of not-being4 ,for it is  
not out of  not-being absolutely1 but   
only out of that which as to actuality  
is  not-being1 but which potentially is 
being1 that any thing becomes4          
,possible or potential being is no more 
not-being than actuality4 ,every        
existing object of nature is hence but a
 potential thing which has  become      
actualized4 ,matter is thus a far more  
positive substratum with  ,aristotle    
than with ,plato1 who had treated it as 
absolutely not-being4  ,from this is    
clearly seen how ,aristotle could       
apprehend matter in  opposition to form 
as something positively negative and    
antithetic to  the form1 and as its     
positive denial 774    ,as matter       
coalesces with potentiality1 so does    
form coincide with  actuality4 ,it is   
that which makes a distinguishable and  
actual object1 a  this 7 7 out of the   
undistinguished and indeterminate       

matter2 it  is the peculiar virtue1 the 
completed activity1 the soul of every   
thing4  ,that which ,aristotle calls    
form1 therefore1 is not to be confounded
 with  what we perhaps may call shape2 a
 hand severed from the arm1 for         
instance1 has still the outward shape of
 a hand1 but according to the           
,aristotelian apprehension1 it is only a
 hand now as to matter and not as  to   
form3 an actual hand1 a hand as to form1
 is only that which can do  the proper  
work of a hand4 ,pure form is that      
which1 in truth1 is without  matter 7   
72 or1 in other words1 the conception of
 being1  the pure conception4 ,but such 
pure form does not exist in the realm of
  determined being2 every determined    
being1 every individual substance  771  
every thing which is a this1 is rather a
 totality of matter  and form1 a 774 ,it
 is1 therefore1 owing to matter1 that   
being is  not pure form and pure        
conception2 matter is the ground of the 
becoming1  the manifold1 and the        

accidental2 and it is this1 also1 which 
gives to  science its limits4 ,for in   
precisely the measure in which the      
individual  thing bears in itself a     
material element is it uncognizable4    
,from what  has been said1 it follows   
that the opposition between matter and  
form is  a variable one1 that being     
matter in one respect which in another  
is  form2 building-wood1 e4 g4 is matter
 in relation to the completed  house1   
but in relation to the unhewn tree it is
 form2 the soul in  respect to the body 
is form1 but in respect to the reason1  
which is the  form of form 7 7 is it    
matter4 ,on this standpoint the         
totality of all existence may be        
represented as a ladder1 whose lowest   
step is a prime matter 7 71 which is not
 at all form1 and whose  highest step is
 an ultimate form which is not at all   
matter1 but is pure  form 7the absolute1
 divine spirit74 ,that which stands     
between these two  points is in one     
respect matter1 and in another respect  

form1 i4 e4  the former is ever         
translating itself into the latter4     
,this position1  which lies at the basis
 of the ,aristotelian view of nature1 is
 attained  analytically through the     
observation that all nature exhibits the
  perpetual and progressive transition  
of matter into form1 and shows the      
exhaustless and original ground of      
things as it comes to view in ever      
ascending ideal formations4 ,that all   
matter should become form1 and all  that
 is potential should be actual1 and all 
that is should be known1 is  doubtless  
the demand of the reason and the end of 
all becoming2 yet is  this actually     
impracticable1 since ,aristotle         
expressly affirms that  matter as the   
antithesis1 or denial of form1 can never
 become wholly  actualized1 and         
therefore can never be perfectly known4 
,the ,aristotelian  system ends thus    
like its predecessors1 in the unsubdued 
dualism of  matter and form4    7#c47   
,potentiality and ,actuality 7 and      

74--,the relation  of matter to form1   
logically apprehended1 is but the       
relation of  potentiality to actuality4 
,these terms1 which ,aristotle first    
employed  according to their            
philosophical significance1 are very    
characteristic  for his system4 ,we have
 in the movement of potential being to  
actual  being the explicit conception of
 becoming1 and in the four principles we
  have a distribution of this conception
 in its parts4 ,the ,aristotelian       
system is consequently a system of the  
becoming1 in which the ,heraclitic      
principle appears again in a richer and 
profounder apprehension1 as that  of the
 ,eleatics had done with ,plato4        
,aristotle in this has made no          
insignificant step towards the          
subjection of the ,platonic dualism4 ,if
  matter is the possibility of form1 or 
reason becoming1 then is the  opposition
 between the idea and the phenomenal    
world potentially  overcome1 at least in
 principle1 since there is one being    

which appears  both in matter and form  
only in different stages of development4
 ,the  relation of the potential to the 
actual ,aristotle exhibits by the       
relation of the unfinished to the       
finished work1 of the unemployed        
carpenter to the one at work upon his   
building1 of the individual asleep  to  
him awake4 ,potentially the seed-corn is
 the tree1 but the grown up  tree is it 
actually2 the potential philosopher is  
he who is not at this  moment in a      
philosophizing condition2 even before   
the battle the better  general is the   
potential conqueror2 potentially is     
space infinitely  divisible2 in fact    
every thing is potentially which        
possesses a  principle of motion1 of    
development1 or of change1 and which1 if
  unhindered by any thing external1 will
 be of itself4 ,actuality or  entelechy 
on the other hand indicates the perfect 
act1 the end as  gained1 the completely 
actual 7the grown-up tree e4g4 is the   
entelechy  of the seed-corn71 that      

activity in which the act and the       
completeness  of the act fall together1 
e4 g4 to see1 to think where he sees and
 he  has seen1 he thinks and he has     
thought 7the acting and the completeness
  of the act7 are one and the same1     
while in those activities which  involve
 a becoming1 e4 g4 to learn1 to go1 to  
become well1 the two are  separated4 ,in
 this apprehension of form 7or idea7 as 
actuality or  entelechy1 i4 e4 in       
joining it with the movement of the     
becoming1 is  found the chief antagonism
 of the ,aristotelian and ,platonic     
systems4  ,plato considers the idea as  
being at rest1 and consisting for       
itself1 in  opposition to the becoming  
and to motion2 but with ,aristotle the  
idea is  the eternal product of the     
becoming1 it is an eternal energy1 i4 e4
 an  activity in complete actuality1 it 
is not perfect being1 but is being      
produced in every moment and eternally1 
through the movement of the  potential  
to its actual end4    7#d47 ,the        

,absolute1 ,divine ,spirit4--,aristotle 
has sought to establish  from a number  
of sides1 the conception of the absolute
 spirit1 or as he  calls it1 the first  
mover1 and especially by joining it to  
the relation  of potentiality and       
actuality4    7a47 ,the ,cosmological   
,form4--,the actual is ever antecedent  
to the  potential not only in conception
 7for ,i can speak of potentiality only 
in reference to some activity7 but also 
in time1 for the acting becomes  actual 
only through an acting2 the uneducated  
becomes educated through  the educated1 
and this leads to the claim of a first  
mover which shall  be pure activity4    
,or1 again1 it is only possible that    
there should be  motion1 becoming1 or a 
chain of causes1 except as a principle  
of motion1  a mover exists4 ,but this   
principle of motion must be one whose   
essence  is actuality1 since that which 
only exists in possibility cannot alone 
become actual1 and therefore cannot be a
 principle of motion4 ,all  becoming    

postulates with itself that which is    
eternal and which has not  become1 that 
which itself unmoved is a principle of  
motion1 a first  mover4    7b47 ,the    
,ontological ,form4--,in the same way it
 follows from the  conception of        
potentiality1 that the eternal and      
necessary being cannot  be potential4   
,for that which potentially is1 may just
 as well either be  or not be2 but that 
which possibly is not1 is temporal and  
not eternal4  ,nothing therefore which  
is absolutely permanent1 is potential1  
but only  actual4 ,or1 again1 if        
potentiality be the first1 then can     
there be no  possible existence1 but    
this contradicts the conception of the  
absolute  or that which it is impossible
 should not be4    7c47 ,the ,moral     
,form4--,potentiality always involves a 
possibility to  the most opposite4 ,he  
who has the capacity to be well1 has    
also the  capacity to be sick1 but      
actually no man is at the same time both
 sick  and well4 ,therefore actuality is

 better than potentiality1 and only it  
can belong to the eternal4    7d47 ,so  
far as the relation of potentiality and 
actuality is identical  with the        
relation of matter and form1 we may     
apprehend in the following  way these   
arguments for the existence of a being  
which is pure  actuality4 ,the          
supposition of an absolute matter       
without form 7the   7 involves also the 
supposition of an absolute form without 
matter 7a   74 ,and since the conception
 of form resolves itself into the  three
 determinations1 of the moving1 the     
conceivable1 and the final  cause1 so is
 the eternal one the absolute principle 
of motion 7the first  mover  71 the     
absolute conception or pure intelligible
 7the  pure   71 and the absolute end4  
,all the other predicates of the first  
mover or the highest principle of  the  
world1 follow from these premises with  
logical necessity4 ,unity  belongs to   
him1 since the ground of the            
manifoldness of being lies in  the      

matter and he has no participation in   
matter2 he is immovable and  abiding    
ever the same1 since otherwise he could 
not be the absolute  mover and the cause
 of all becoming2 he is life as active  
self-end and  actuality2 he is at the   
same time intelligible and intelligence1
 because  he is absolutely immaterial   
and free from nature2 he is active1 i4  
e4  thinking intelligence1 because his  
essence is pure actuality2 he is        
self-contemplating intelligence1 because
 the divine thought cannot  attain its  
actuality in any thing extrinsic1 and   
because if it were the  thought of any  
thing other than itself1 this would make
 it depend upon  some potential         
existence for its actualization4 ,hence 
the famed  ,aristotelian definition of  
the absolute that it is the thought of  
thought 7 71 the personal unity of the  
thinking and the  thought1 of the       
knowing and the known1 the absolute     
subject-object4 ,in  the ,metaphysics   
7,,xii4 #a47 we have a statement in     

order of these  attributes of the       
,divine ,spirit1 and an almost devout   
sketch of the  eternally blessed ,deity1
 knowing himself in his eternal         
tranquillity as  the absolute truth1    
satisfied with himself1 and wanting     
neither in  activity nor in any virtue4 
,as would appear from this statement1   
,aristotle has never fully developed    
the idea of his absolute spirit1 and    
still less has he harmonized it  with   
the fundamental principles and demands  
of his philosophy1 although  many       
consequences of his system would seem to
 drive him to this1 and  numerous       
principles which he has laid down would 
seem to prepare the way  for it4 ,this  
idea is unexpectedly introduced in the  
twelfth book of the  ,metaphysics simply
 as an assertion1 without being farther 
and  inductively substantiated4 ,it is  
at once attended with important         
difficulties4 ,we do not see why the    
ultimate ground of motion or the        
absolute spirit must be conceived as a  

personal being2 we do not see how  any  
thing can he a moving cause and yet     
itself unmoved2 how it can be  the      
origin of all becoming1 that is of the  
departing and arising1 and  itself      
remain a changeless energy1 a principle 
of motion with no  potentiality to be   
moved1 for the moving thing must stand  
in a relation  of passive and active    
with the thing moved4 ,moreover1        
,aristotle1 as  would follow from these 
contradictory determinations1 has never 
thoroughly and consistently determined  
the relation between ,god and the       
world4 ,he has considered the absolute  
spirit only as contemplative and        
theoretical reason1 from whom all action
 must be excluded because he is  perfect
 end in himself1 but every action       
presupposes an end not yet  perfected2  
we have thus no true motive for his     
activity in reference to  the world4 ,he
 cannot be truly called the first mover 
in his theoretical  relation alone1 and 
since he is in his essence extra-mundane

 and  unmoved1 he cannot once permeate  
the life of the world with his          
activity2 and since also matter on one  
side never rises wholly to form1  we    
have1 therefore1 here again the         
unreconciled dualism between the        
,divine spirit and the unmistakable     
reality of matter4 ,many of the         
arguments which ,aristotle brings       
against the gods of ,anaxagoras may be  
urged against his own theory4    ,,iv4  
,,the ,,aristotelian ,,physics4--,the   
,aristotelian ,physics1 which embraces  
the greater portion of his writings1    
follows the becoming and the  building  
up of matter into form1 the course      
through which nature as a  living being 
progresses in order to become individual
 soul4 ,all becoming  has an end2 but   
end is form1 and the absolute form is   
spirit4 ,with  perfect consistency1     
therefore1 ,aristotle regards the human 
individual  of the male sex as the end  
and the centre of earthly nature in its 
realized form4 ,all else beneath the    

moon is1 as it were1 an unsuccessful    
attempt of nature to produce the male   
human1 a superfluity which arises  from 
the impotence of nature to subdue the   
whole of matter and bring it  into form4
 ,every thing which does not gain the   
universal end of nature  must be        
regarded as incomplete1 and is properly 
an exception or  abortion4 ,for         
instance1 he calls it an abortion when a
 child does not  resemble its father2   
and the female child he looks upon as an
 abortion  in a less degree1 which he   
accounts for by the insufficient energy 
of  the male as the forming principle4  
,in general1 ,aristotle regards the     
female as imperfect in comparison with  
the male1 an imperfection which  belongs
 in a higher degree to all animals      
except man4 ,if nature did her  work    
with perfect consciousness1 then were   
all these mistakes1 these  incomplete   
and improper formations inexplicable1   
but she is an artist  working only after
 an unconscious impulse1 and does not   

complete her  work with a clear and     
rational insight4    #a4 ,the universal 
conditions of all natural existence1    
motion1  matter1 space and time1        
,aristotle investigates in the books of 
,physics4 ,these physical conceptions   
may1 moreover1 be reduced to the        
metaphysical notions of potentiality and
 actuality2 motion is  accordingly      
defined as the activity of being        
potentially1 and is  therefore a mean   
between the merely potential entity and 
the perfectly  realized activity2--space
 is the possibility of motion and       
possesses1  therefore1 potentially1     
though not actively1 the property of    
infinite  divisibility2 time is in the  
same way the infinitely divisible1      
expressing the measure of motion in     
number1 and is the number of motion     
according to before and after4 ,all     
three are infinite1 but the infinite    
which is represented in them is only    
potentially but not actually a  whole3  
it comprehends nothing1 but is itself   

comprehended1--a fact  mistaken by those
 who are accustomed to extol the        
infinite as though it  comprehended and 
held every thing in itself1 because it  
had some  similarity with the whole4    
#b4 ,from his conception of motion      
,aristotle derives his view of the      
collective universe1 as brought out in  
his books ,de ,clo4 ,the most  perfect  
motion is the circular1 because this is 
constant1 uniform1 and  ever returning  
into itself4 ,the world as a whole is   
therefore  conditioned by the circular  
motion1 and being a whole complete in   
itself1 it has a spherical form4 ,but   
because the motion which returns  into  
itself is better than every other1 it   
follows1 from the same  ground1 that in 
this spherical universe the better      
sphere will be in the  circumference    
where the circular motion is most       
perfect1 and the  inferior one will     
arrange itself around the centre of the 
universal  sphere4 ,the former is       
heaven1 the latter is earth1 and between

 the two  stand the planetary spheres4  
,heaven1 as the place of circular       
motion1  and the scene of unchangeable  
order1 stands nearest the first moving  
cause1 and is under its immediate       
influence2 it is the place where the    
ancients1 guided by the correct         
tradition of a lost wisdom1 have1 placed
  the ,divine abode4 ,its parts1 the    
fixed stars1 are passionless and        
eternal essences1 which have attained   
the best end1 which must be  eternally  
conceived in a tireless activity1 and   
which1 though not  clearly cognizable1  
are yet much more divine than man1 ,a   
lower sphere1  next to that of the fixed
 stars1 is the sphere of the planets1   
among  which1 besides the five known to 
the ancients1 he reckons the sun and    
the moon4 ,this sphere stands a little  
removed from the greatest  perfection3  
instead of moving directly from right to
 left1 as do the  fixed stars1 the      
planets move in contrary directions and 
in oblique  orbits2 they serve the fixed

 stars1 and are ruled by their motion4  
,lastly1 the earth is in the centre of  
the universe1 farthest removed  from the
 first mover1 and hence partaking in the
 smallest degree of the  ,divine4 ,there
 are thus three kinds of being1         
exhibiting three stages of  perfection1 
and necessary for the explanation of    
nature2 first1 the  absolute spirit or  
,god1 an immaterial being1 who1 himself 
unmoved1  produces motion2 second1 the  
super-terrestrial region of the heavens1
 a  being which is moved and which      
moves1 and which1 though not without    
matter1 is eternal and unchangeable1 and
 possesses ever a circular  motion2 and1
 lastly1 in the lowest course this      
earth1 a changeful being1  which has    
only to play the passive part of being  
moved4    #c4 ,nature in a strict sense1
 the scene of elemental working1        
represents to us a constant and         
progressive transition of the elementary
  to the vegetative1 and of the         
vegetative to the animal world4 ,the    

lowest  step is occupied by the         
inanimate bodies of nature1 which are   
simple  products of the elements        
mingling themselves together1 and have  
their  entelechy only in the determinate
 combinations of these elements1 but    
whose energy consists only in striving  
after a fitting place in the  universe1 
and in resting there so far as they     
reach it unhindered4 ,but  now such a   
mere external entelechy is not possessed
 by the living  bodies2 within them     
dwells a motion as organizing principle 
by which  they attain to actuality1 and 
which as a preserving activity develops 
in  them towards a perfected            
organization1--in a word they have a    
soul1 for a  soul is the entelechy of an
 organic body4 ,in plants we find the   
soul  working only as persevering and   
nourishing energy3 the plant has no     
other function than to nourish itself   
and to propagate its kind2 among        
animals--where we find a progress       
according to the mode of their          

reproduction--the soul appears as       
sensitive2 animals have sense1 and are  
capable of locomotion2 lastly1 the human
 soul is at the same time  nutritive1   
sensitive1 and cognitive4    #d4 ,man1  
as the end of all nature1 embraces in   
himself the different  steps of         
development in which the life of nature 
is exhibited4 ,the  division of the     
faculties of the soul must therefore be 
necessarily  regulated1 according to the
 division of living creatures4 ,as the  
nutritive faculty is alone the property 
of vegetables1 and sensation1 of        
animals1 while to the more perfect      
animals locomotion also belongs1 so  are
 these three activities also development
 steps of the human soul1 the           
antecedent being the necessary condition
 of1 and presupposed in time by1  the   
subsequent1 while the soul itself is    
nothing other than the union of  these  
different activities of an organic body 
in one common end1 as the  entelechy of 
the organic body4 ,the fourth step1     

thought or reason1  which1 added to the 
three others1 constitutes the           
peculiarity of the  human soul1 forms   
alone an exception from the general law4
 ,it is not a  simple product of the    
lower facilities of the soul1 it does   
not stand  related to them simply as a  
higher stage of development1 nor simply 
as  the soul to the body1 as the end to 
the instrument1 as actuality to         
possibility1 as form to matter4 ,but as 
pure intellectual activity1 it          
completes itself without any mediation  
of a bodily organ2 as the reason  comes 
into the body from without1 so is it    
separable from the body1 and  therefore 
has it no inner connection with the     
bodily functions1 but is  something     
wholly foreign in nature4 ,true1 there  
exists a connection  between thought and
 sensation1 for while the sensations are
 outwardly  divided1 according to the   
different objects of sense1 yet         
internally  they meet in one centre1 as 
a common sense4 ,here they become       

changed  into images and                
representations1 which again become     
transmuted into  thoughts1 and so it    
might seem as if thought were only the  
result of the  sensation1 as if         
intelligence were passively determined2 
7here we might  notice the proposition  
falsely ascribed to ,aristotle3 nihil   
est in  intellectu quod non fuerit in   
sensu1 and also the well-known though   
often misunderstood comparison of the   
soul with an unwritten tablet1  which   
only implies this much1 viz41 that as   
the unwritten tablet is  potentially but
 not actually a book1 so does knowledge 
belong  potentially though not actually 
to the human reason2 fundamentally and  
radically the thought may have in itself
 universal conceptions1 so far  as it   
has the capacity to form them1 but not  
actually1 nor in a  determined or       
developed form74 ,but this passivity    
presupposes rather an  activity2 for if 
the thought in its actuality1 in that it
 appears as  knowledge1 becomes all     

forms and therefore all things1 then    
must the  thought constitute itself that
 which it becomes1 and therefore all    
passively determined human intelligence 
rests on an originally active           
intelligence1 which exists as           
self-actualizing possibility and pure   
actuality1 and which1 as such1 is wholly
 independent of the human body1  and has
 not its entelechy in it but in itself1 
and is not therefore  participant in the
 death of the body1 but lives on as     
universal reason1  eternal and immortal4
 ,the ,aristotelian dualism here again  
appears4  ,manifestly this active       
intelligence stands related to the soul 
as ,god to  nature4 ,the two sides      
possess no essential relation to each   
other4 ,as  the ,divine spirit could not
 enter the life of the world1 so is the 
human  spirit unable to permeate the    
life of sense2 although it is determined
  as something passionless and          
immaterial1 still must it as soul be    
connected with matter1 and although it  

is pure and self-contemplative  form1   
still it should be distinguished from   
the ,divine spirit which is  its        
counterpart2 the want of a satisfactory 
mediation on the side of the  human and 
on that of the ,divine1 is in these     
respects unmistakable4    ,v4 ,,the     
,,aristotelian ,,ethics4 #a4 ,,relation 
,,of ,,ethics ,,to                      
,,physics4--,aristotle1  guided by his  
tendency towards the natural1 has more  
closely connected  ethics and physics   
than either of his predecessors1        
,socrates or ,plato1  had done4 ,while  
,plato found it impossible to speak of  
the good in man's  moral condition1     
disconnected from the idea of the good  
in itself1  ,aristotle's principal      
object is to determine what is good for 
man  solely2 and he supposes that the   
good in itself1 the idea of the good1   
in no way facilitates the knowledge of  
that good1 which alone is  attainable in
 practical life4 ,it is only the latter1
 the moral element  in the life of men1 

and not the good in the great affairs of
 the  universe1 with which ethics has to
 do4 ,aristotle therefore considers the 
good especially in its relation to the  
natural condition of men1 and  affirms  
that it is the end towards which nature 
herself tends4 ,instead  of viewing the 
moral element as something purely       
intellectual1 he rather  apprehends it  
as only the bloom of the physical1 which
 here becomes  spiritualized and        
ethical2 instead of making virtue to be 
knowledge1 he  treats it as the normal  
perfection of the natural instinct4     
,that man is  by nature a political     
animal1 is his fundamental proposition  
for the  doctrine of the state4    ,from
 this connection of the ethical and the 
physical1 arose the  objections which   
,aristotle urged against the ,socratic  
conception of  virtue4 ,socrates had    
looked to the dialectical exclusively   
for the  ground of all morality1 and had
 accordingly made virtue and knowledge  
one4 ,but in this1 said ,aristotle1 the 

pathological element which is           
associated by nature with every moral   
act1 is destroyed4 ,it is not  reason1  
but the circumstances and natural bias  
of the soul which are the  first ground 
of virtue4 ,there is an instinct in the 
soul which at first  strives            
unconsciously after the good1 which is  
only subsequently sought  with the full 
moral insight4 ,moral virtue arises     
first from that which  is natural4 ,it  
is on this ground1 also1 that ,aristotle
 combats the  notion that virtue may be 
learned4 ,it is not through the         
perfection of  knowledge1 but by        
exercise that we become acquainted with 
the good4 ,it  is by a practice of moral
 acts that we become virtuous1 just as  
by a  practice of building and of music 
we become architects and musicians2  for
 the habit which is the ground of moral 
constancy1 is only a fruit of  the      
abundant repetition of a moral action4  
,hence it is that originally  we have   
our virtuous or our vicious dispositions

 in our power1 but as  soon as they are 
formed either to virtue or to vice1 we  
are no longer  able to control them4 ,it
 is by three things1 therefore1 nature1 
habit1  and reason1 that man becomes    
good4 ,the standpoint of ,aristotle is  
in  these respects directly opposed to  
that of ,socrates4 ,while ,socrates     
regarded the moral and the natural as   
two opposites1 and made the moral       
conduct to be the consequent of a       
rational enlightenment1 ,aristotle      
treated both as different steps of      
development1 and reversing the order  of
 ,socrates1 made the rational           
enlightenment in moral things consequent
  upon the moral conduct4    #b4 ,,the  
,,highest ,,good4--,every action has an 
end2 but since every end is  only itself
 a means to some other1 we need         
therefore something after  which we can 
strive for its own sake1 and which is a 
good absolutely1 or  a best4 ,what now  
is this highest good and supreme object 
of human  pursuit8 ,in name1 at least1  

all men are agreed upon it1 and call it 
happiness1 but what happiness is1 is a  
much disputed point4 ,if asked in  what 
human happiness consists1 the first     
characteristic given would be  that it  
belongs alone to the peculiar being of  
man4 ,but sensation is not  peculiar to 
man1 for he shares this with the brute4 
,a sensation of  pleasure1 therefore1   
which arises when some desire is        
gratified1 may be  the happiness of the 
brute1 but certainly does not constitute
 the  essential of human happiness4     
,human happiness must express the       
completeness of intelligent existence1  
and because intelligence is  essentially
 activity1 therefore the happiness of   
man cannot consist in  any merely       
passive condition1 but must express a   
completeness of human  action4          
,happiness therefore is a well-being1   
which is at the same time a  well-doing1
 and it is a well-doing which satisfies 
all the conditions of  nature1 and which
 finds the highest contentment or       

well-being in an  unrestrained energy4  
,activity and pleasure are thus         
inseparably bound  together by a natural
 bond1 and happiness is the result of   
their union  when they are sustained    
through a perfect life4 ,hence the      
,aristotelian  definition of happiness4 
,it is a perfect practical activity in a
 perfect  life4    ,although it might   
seem from this as though ,aristotle     
placed the  happiness of man in the     
natural activity of the soul1 and       
regarded this  as self-sufficient1 still
 he is not blind to the fact that       
perfect  happiness is dependent on other
 kinds of good whose possession is not  
absolutely within our power4 ,it is true
 he expresses an opinion1 that  outward 
things in moderation are sufficient1 and
 that only great success  or signal     
reverses materially influence the       
happens of life2 still he  holds that   
wealth1 the possession of friends and   
children1 noble birth1  beauty of body1 
etc41 are more or less necessary        

conditions of  happiness1 though these  
are partly dependent on accidental      
circumstances4 ,these wavering and      
inconsistent views of ,aristotle        
respecting the nature of happiness1     
naturally rise from his empirical       
method of investigation4 ,careful in    
noting every thing which our limited    
experience seems to utter1 he expressly 
avoids making either virtue or  pleasure
 his principle1 because actual          
experience shows the separation  of the 
two4 ,although therefore he gives       
directions in general to strive  after  
that pleasure in which the good man     
delights1 or which is  connected with a 
virtuous activity1 yet is pleasure with 
him an end for  its own sake1 and not   
merely an accident of virtue1 an        
empiricist1  ,aristotle is here also a  
dualist1 while the ,stoics and          
,epicureans have  respectively taken and
 held fast to each of the two sides4    
#c4 ,,conception ,,of ,,virtue4--,as has
 already been seen in the ,aristotelian 

,polemic against ,socrates1 virtue is   
the product of an oft-repeated moral    
action1 a condition acquired through    
practice1 a moral dexterity of the      
soul4 ,the nature of this dexterity is  
seen in the following way3 every  action
 completes something as its work2 but   
now if a work is imperfect  when it has 
either a want or a superfluity1 so also 
is every action  imperfect in so far as 
there is in it either too little or too 
much2 its  perfection1 therefore1 is    
only found as it contains the right     
degree1  the true mean between the too  
much and too little4 ,accordingly1      
virtue  in general may be explained as  
the observation of the right mean in    
action1 by which is meant not the       
arithmetical or absolute mean1 but the  
one relative to ourselves4 ,for what is 
enough for one individual is            
insufficient for another4 ,the virtue of
 a man1 of a woman1 of a child1  and of 
a slave is respectively different4      
,thus1 virtue depends upon  time1       

circumstance1 and relation4 ,the        
determination of this correct mean  will
 always waver4 ,in the impossibility of 
an active and exhaustive  formula1 we   
can only say respecting it that it is   
the correct mean as  determined by a    
correct practical insight which is seen 
to be such by  the intelligent man4     
,it follows from this general conception
 of virtue1 that there will be as  many 
separate virtues as there are           
circumstances of life1 and as men are   
ever entering into new relations1 in    
which it becomes difficult  practically 
to determine the correct method of      
action1 ,aristotle1 in  opposition to   
,plato1 would limit the field of        
separate virtues by no  definite number4
 ,only certain fundamental virtues can  
be named according  as there are certain
 fixed and fundamental relations among  
men4 ,for  instance1 man has a fixed    
relation to pleasure and pain4 ,in      
relation to  pain1 the true moral mean  
is found in neither fearing nor courting

 it1  and this is valor4 ,in relation to
 pleasure1 the true mean standing       
between greediness and indifference is  
temperance4 ,in social life1 the  moral 
mean is between doing and suffering     
wrong1 which is justice4 ,in a  similar 
way many other virtues might be         
characterized1 each one of them         
standing as a mean between two vices1   
the one of which expresses a want  and  
the other a superfluity4 ,a closer      
exhibition of the ,aristotelian         
doctrine of virtue would have much      
psychological and linguistic  interest1 
though but little philosophical worth4  
,aristotle takes the  conception of his 
virtues more from the use of language   
than from a  thoroughly applied         
principle of classification4 ,his       
classification of  virtues is1          
therefore1 without any stable ground1   
and is differently  given in different  
places4 ,the conception of the correct  
mean which  ,aristotle makes the measure
 of a moral act is obviously unworthy of

 a  systematic representation1 for as it
 cannot be determined how the           
intelligent man would act in every case1
 there could never be given any         
specific directions how others should   
act4 ,in fine1 the criterion of  virtue 
as the correct mean between two vices   
cannot be always applied  for in the    
virtue of wisdom1 e4 g4 which ,aristotle
 describes as the  mean between         
simplicity and cunning1 there is no such
 thing as too much4    #d4 ,,the        
,,state4--,aristotle1 like ,plato1 makes
 the highest condition of  moral virtue 
attainable only through political life4 
,the state exists  before the           
individual1 as the whole is prior to its
 parts4 ,the  rationality and morality  
of the state is thus antecedent to that 
of the  individual4 ,hence in the best  
state1 moral and political virtue1 the  
virtue of the man and the virtue of the 
citizen are one and the same  thing1    
although in states as they are1 the good
 citizen is not  necessarily also the   

good man4 ,but though this principle    
harmonized with  ,plato1 yet ,aristotle1
 at whose time the old aboriginal states
 had  already begun their process of    
dissolution1 cherished a very different 
view concerning the relation of the     
individual and the family to the  state4
 ,he allows to both these an            
incomparably greater consideration1  and
 yields to them a far wider field of    
independent action4 ,hence he  combats  
,plato's community of wives and goods1  
not simply on the ground  of its        
practicability1 but also on the ground  
of its principle1 since  the state      
cannot be conceived as a strict unit1 or
 as possessing any  such centralization 
as would weaken or destroy individual   
activity4 ,with  ,plato the state is but
 the product of the philosophical       
reflection1  while with ,aristotle it   
results from given circumstances1 from  
history  and experience1 and he         
therefore wholly omits to sketch a model
 state or  a normal constitution1 but   

carefully confines his attention to     
those  which actually exist4 ,although  
the ideal of a state constitution in the
  form of a limited monarchy is         
unmistakably in his mind1 still he      
contents himself with portraying the    
different kinds of polities in  their   
peculiarities1 their origin1 and their  
reciprocal transitions4 ,he  does not   
undertake to declare which is the best  
state absolutely1 since  this depends   
upon circumstances1 and one constitution
 is not adapted for  every state4 ,he   
simply attempts to show what form of the
 state is  relatively the best and the  
most advisable under certain historical 
circumstances1 and under given natural1 
climatic1 geographic1 economic1  and    
intellectual conditions4 ,in this he is 
faithful to the character of  his whole 
philosophy4 ,standing on the basis of   
the empirical1 he  advances here as     
elsewhere1 critically and reflectively1 
and in despair  of attaining the        
absolutely true and good1 he seeks for  

these  relatively1 with his eye fixed   
only on the probable and the            
practicable4    ,,vi4--,,the            
,,peripatetic ,,school4--,the school of 
,aristotle1 called the  ,peripatetic1   
can here only be mentioned2 the want of 
independence in its  philosophizing1 and
 the absence of any great and universal 
influence1  rendering it unworthy an    
extended notice4 ,theophrastus1         
,eudemus1 and  ,strato are its most     
famous leaders4 ,like most philosophical
 schools1 it  confines itself chiefly to
 a more thorough elaboration and        
explanation  of the system of its       
master4 ,in some empirical provinces1   
especially the  physical1 the attempt   
was made to carry out still further the 
system1  while at the same time its     
speculative basis was set aside and     
neglected4    ,,vii4--,,transition ,,to 
,,the ,,post-,,aristotelian             
,,philosophy4--,the productive  energy  
of ,grecian philosophy expends itself   
with ,aristotle1  contemporaneously and 

in connection with the universal decay  
of ,grecian  life and spirit4 ,instead  
of the great and universal systems of a 
,plato  and an ,aristotle1 we have now  
systems of a partial and one-sided      
character1 corresponding to that        
universal breach between the subject    
and the objective world which           
characterized the civil1 religious1 and 
social life of this last epoch of       
,greece1 the time succeeding ,alexander 
the ,great4 ,that subjectivity1 which   
had been first propounded by the        
,sophists1 was at length1 after numerous
 struggles1 victorious1 though  its     
triumph was gained upon the ruins of the
 ,grecian civil and artistic  life2 the 
individual has become emancipated1 the  
subject is no longer to  be given up to 
the objective world1 the liberated      
subjectivity must now  be perfected and 
satisfied4 ,this process of development 
is seen in the  post-,aristotelian      
philosophy1 though it finds its         
conditioning cause in  the character of 

the preceding philosophical strivings4  
,the dualism  which formed the chief    
want of the systems both of ,plato and  
,aristotle1  has forced itself upon our 
attention at every step4 ,the attempt   
which  had been made1 with the greatest 
expenditure of which the ,grecian mind  
was capable1 to refer back to one       
ultimate ground both subject and        
object1 mind and matter1 had produced no
 satisfactory result2 and these  two    
oppositions1 around which all previous  
philosophy had struggled in  vain1 still
 remained disconnected4 ,wearied with   
the fruitless attempts  at mediation1   
the subject now breaks with the         
objective world4 ,its  attention is     
directed towards itself in its own      
self-consciousness4 ,the  result of this
 gives us either ,,stoicism1 where the  
moral subject appears  in the           
self-sufficiency of the sage to whom    
every external good and  every objective
 work is indifferent1 and who finds a   
good only in a  moral activity2 or      

,,epicureanism1 where the subject       
delights itself in  the inner feeling of
 pleasure and the calm repose of a      
satisfied heart1  enjoying the present  
and the past1 and never fearing the     
future while it  sees in the objective  
world only a means by which it can utter
 itself2  or1 again1 ,scepticism1 where 
the subject1 doubting and rejecting all 
objective truth and science1 appears in 
the apathy of the ,sceptic1 who  has    
broken both theoretically and           
practically with the objective world4   
,in fine1 ,,new-,,platonism1 the last of
 the ancient philosophical systems1     
bears this same character of            
subjectivity1 for this whole system     
turns  upon the exaltation of the       
subject to the absolute1 and wherever it
  speculates respecting ,god and his    
relation to man1 it is alone in order   
to establish the progressive transition 
from the absolute object to the  human  
personality4 ,the ruling principle in it
 all is the interest of the             

subjectivity1 and the fact that in this 
system there are numerous  objective    
determinations1 is only because the     
subject has become  absolute4           
,,section ,,xvii4    ,,stoicism4        
,zeno1 of ,cittium1 a city of ,cyprus1  
an elder contemporary of ,antigonus     
,gonatas1 king of ,macedon1 is generally
 given as the founder of the  ,stoical  
school4 ,deprived of his property by    
shipwreck1 he took refuge in            
philosophy1 incited also by an inner    
bias to such pursuits4 ,he at first     
became a disciple of the ,cynic         
,crateas1 then of ,stilpo1 one of the   
,megarians1 and lastly he betook himself
 to the ,academy1 where he heard  the   
lessons of ,xenocrates and ,polemo4     
,hence the eclectic character of  his   
teaching4 ,it has in fact been charged  
against him1 that differing  but little 
if at all from the earlier schools1 he  
attempted to form a  school of his own1 
with a system wherein he had changed    
nothing but  names4 ,he opened a school 

at ,athens1 in the 8variegated porch10  
so  called from the paintings of        
,polygnotus1 with which it was adorned1 
whence his adherents received the name  
of 8philosophers of the porch0          
7,stoics74 ,zeno is said to have        
presided over his school for fifty-eight
  years1 and at a very advanced age to  
have put an end to his existence4  ,he  
is praised for the temperance and the   
austerity of his habits1 while  his     
abstemiousness is proverbial4 ,the      
monument in his honor1 erected  after   
his death by the ,athenians1 at the     
instance of ,antigonus1 bore the  high  
but simple eulogium that his life had   
been in unison with his  philosophy4    
,cleanthes was the successor of ,zeno in
 the ,stoic school1  and faithfully     
carried out the method of his master4   
,cleanthes was  succeeded by            
,chrysippus1 who died about #bjh ,b4 ,c4
 ,he has been regarded  as the chief    
prop of this school1 in which respect it
 was said of him1  that without a       

,chrysippus there would never have been 
a ,porch4 ,at all  events1 as           
,chrysippus was an object of the        
greatest veneration1 and of  almost     
undisputed authority with the later     
,stoics1 he ought to be  considered as  
the principal founder of the school4 ,he
 was a writer so  voluminous1 that his  
works have been said to amount to seven 
hundred and  five1 among which1 however1
 were repeated treatises upon the same  
propositions1 and citations without     
measure from poets and historians1      
given to prove and illustrate his       
opinions4 ,not one of all his writings  
has come down to us4 ,chrysippus closes 
the series of the philosophers  who     
founded the ,porch4 ,the later heads of 
the school1 as ,pantius1 the  friend of 
the younger ,scipio 7his famous work ,de
 ,officiis1 ,cicero has  elaborated in  
his treatise of the same name71 and     
,posidonius1 may be  classed with       
,cicero1 ,pompeius1 and others1 and were
 eclectic in their  teachings4 ,the     

,stoics have connected philosophy most  
intimately with the  duties of practical
 life4 ,philosophy is with them the     
practice of  wisdom1 the exercise of    
virtue4 ,virtue and science are with    
them one1 in  so far at least that they 
divide virtue in reference to philosophy
 into  physical1 ethical1 and logical4  
,but though they go on according to this
  threefold division1 and treat of logic
 and physics1 and though they even  rank
 physics higher than either of the other
 sciences1 regarding it as  the mother  
of the ethical and the science of the   
,divine1 yet do we find  their          
characteristic standpoint most          
prominently in their theory of  morals4 
#a4 ,,logic4--,we have already said that
 it is the breach between subject and   
object1 which forms the basis of all    
post-,aristotelian philosophy4 ,the     
beginning of this philosophy of         
subjectivity is found with the ,stoics4 
,the feature most worthy of notice in   
their logic1 is the striving after  a   

subjective criterion of the truth1 by   
which they might distinguish the  true  
representation from the false4 ,since   
they limited all scientific  knowledge  
to the knowledge of the senses1 they    
found this criterion in  that which was 
evident in the sensuous impression4     
,they conceived that  they had answered 
the whole problem1 in affirming that the
 true or  conceivable representation    
reveals not only itself1 but also its   
object3  it1 they said1 is nothing else 
than a representation which is produced 
by a present object in a manner like    
itself4    #b4 ,,physics4--,in their    
physics1 where they follow for the most 
part  ,heraclitus1 the ,stoics are      
distinguished from their predecessors1  
especially from ,plato and ,aristotle1  
by their thoroughly carried out         
proposition that nothing uncorporeal    
exists1 that every thing essential  is  
corporeal 7just as in their logic they  
had sought to derive all  knowledge from
 the sensuous perception74 ,this        

sensualism or materialism  of the       
,stoics which1 as we have seen in their 
logic1 lies at the basis  of their      
theory of knowledge1 might seem foreign 
to all their moral and  idealistic      
tendencies1 but is clearly explained    
from their subjective  standpoint1 for1 
when the thought has become so intensely
 engrossed in  the subject1 the         
objective world can only be regarded as 
a corporeal and  material existence4    
,the most immediate consequence of such 
a view is  their pantheism4 ,aristotle  
before them had separated the ,divine   
,being  from the world1 as the pure and 
eternal form from the eternal matter2   
but so far as this separation implied a 
distinction which was not simply        
logical1 but actual and real1 the       
,stoics would not admit it4 ,it seemed  
to them impossible to dissever ,god from
 matter1 and they therefore  considered 
,god and the world as power and its     
manifestation1 and thus as  one4 ,matter
 is the passive ground of things1 the   

original substratum for  the divine     
activity3 ,god is the active and        
formative energy of matter  dwelling    
within it1 and essentially united to it3
 the world is the body  of ,god1 and    
,god is the soul of the world4 ,the     
,stoics1 therefore1  considered ,god and
 matter as one identical substance1     
which1 on the side  of its passive and  
changeable capacity they call matter1   
and on the side  of its active and      
changeless energy1 ,god4 ,but since     
they1 as already  remarked1 considered  
the world as ensouled by ,god in the    
light of a  living and rational being1  
they were obliged to treat the          
conception of  ,god not only in a       
physical but also in its ethical aspect4
 ,god is not  only in the world as the  
ruling and living energy of this great  
,greek3 zon 7animal71 but he is also the
 universal reason which rules  the whole
 world and penetrates all matter2 he is 
the gracious ,providence  which cares   
for the individual and the whole2 he is 

wise1 and is the  ground of that natural
 law which commands the good and forbids
 the evil2  he punishes and rewards2 he 
possesses a perfect and blessed life4   
,but  accustomed to regard every thing  
spiritual only in a sensuous way1 the   
,stoics were obliged to clothe this     
ideal conception of ,god in a material  
form1 apprehending it as the vital      
warmth or an original fire1 analogous   
to the view of the earlier natural      
philosophers1 who held that the soul1   
and even reason itself1 consisted in the
 vital warmth4 ,the ,stoics  express    
this thought in different ways4 ,at one 
time they call ,god the  rational breath
 which passes through all nature2 at    
another1 the  artistic fire which       
fashions or begets the universe2 and    
still again the  ether2 which1 however1 
they hardly distinguish from the        
artistic fire4  ,from these varying     
views1 we see that it did not belong to 
the ,stoics to  represent the conception
 of ,god in any determinate kind of     

existence4  ,they availed themselves of 
these expressions only to indicate that 
,god1  as the universal animating energy
 in the world1 could not be             
disconnected from a corporeal agency4   
,this identification of ,god and the    
world1 according to which the ,stoics   
regarded the whole formation of the     
universe as but a period in the         
development of ,god1 renders their      
remaining doctrine concerning the world 
very simple4 ,every thing in the  world 
seemed to them to be permeated by the   
divine life1 and was  regarded as but   
the flowing out of this most perfect    
life through  certain channels1 until it
 returned in a necessary circle back    
again to  itself4 ,it is not necessary  
here to speak more closely of the       
physics of  this school4    #c4 ,,the   
,,ethics4--,the ethics of the ,stoics is
 most closely connected with  their     
physics4 ,in the physics we saw the     
rational order of the universe  as it   
existed through the divine thought4 ,in 

the ethics1 the highest law  of human   
action1 and thus the whole moral        
legality of life is dependent  upon this
 rational order and conformity to law in
 universal nature1 and  the highest good
 or the highest end of our strivings is 
to shape our  life according to this    
universal law1 to live in conformity    
with the  harmony of the world or with  
nature4 8,follow nature10 or 8live in   
harmony with nature10 is the moral maxim
 of the ,stoics4 ,more accurately3  live
 in harmony with thy rational nature so 
far as this has not been  distorted nor 
refined by art1 but is held in its      
natural simplicity4    ,from this moral 
principle1 in which we have also the    
,stoic conception of  virtue1 the       
peculiarities of their theory of morals 
follow with logical  necessity4    7#a47
 ,respecting the ,relation of ,virtue to
 ,pleasure4--,when the demand is  made  
that the life should be in conformity   
with nature1 the individual  becomes    
wholly subjected to the universal1 and  

every personal end is  excluded4 ,hence 
pleasure1 which of all ends is the most 
individual1 must  be disregarded4 ,in   
pleasure that activity in which         
blessedness consists  is abated1 and    
this could only appear to the ,stoics as
 a restraint of  life1 and thus as an   
evil4 ,pleasure is not in conformity    
with nature1  and is no end of nature1  
says ,cleanthes2 and though other       
,stoics relax a  little from the        
strictness of this opinion1 and admit   
that pleasure may  be according to      
nature1 and is to be considered in a    
certain degree as a  good1 yet they all 
held fast to the doctrine1 that it has  
no moral worth  and is no end of nature1
 but is only something which is         
accidentally  connected with the free   
and fitting activity of nature1 while   
itself is  not an activity1 but a       
passive condition of the soul4 ,in this 
lies the  whole severity of the ,stoic  
doctrine of morals2 every thing personal
 is  cast aside1 every external end of  

action is foreign to the moral man1  the
 action in wisdom is the only good4     
,from this follows directly3    7#b47   
,the ,view of the ,stoics ,concerning   
,external ,good4--,if virtue1 as  the   
activity in conformity to nature1 is    
exclusively a good1 and if it  alone can
 lead to happiness1 then external good  
of every kind is  something morally     
indifferent1 and can neither be the     
object of our  striving nor the end of  
any moral action4 ,the action itself and
 not that  towards which it tends is    
good4 ,hence such special ends as       
health1  wealth1 c41 are in themselves  
worthless and indifferent4 ,they may    
result either in good or evil1 and when 
deprived of them the happiness  of the  
virtuous man is not destroyed4 ,the     
,stoics yield from the rigor of  their  
fundamental principle only in a single  
instance4 ,they admit that  there may be
 a distinction among indifferent things2
 that while none of  these can be called
 a moral good1 yet some may be          

preferable to others1  and that the     
preferable1 so far as it contributes to 
a life in  conformity to nature1 should 
enter into the account of a moral life4 
,so  the sage will prefer health and    
wealth when these are balanced in the   
choice with sickness and poverty1 but   
though these objects have been          
rationally chosen1 he does not esteem   
them as really good1 for they are  not  
the highest1 they are inferior to the   
virtuous acting1 in comparison  with    
which every thing else sinks to         
insignificance4 ,in making this         
distinction between the good and the    
preferable1 we see how the ,stoics      
exclude from the good every thing       
relative1 and hold fast to it alone in  
its highest significance4    7#c47 ,this
 abstract apprehension of the conception
 of virtue is still  farther verified in
 the rigid antagonism which the ,stoics 
affirmed  between virtue and not-virtue1
 reason and sense4 ,either1 they        
conclude1  reason is awakened in the    

life of man and holds the mastery over  
him1 or  it is not awakened1 and he     
serves his irrational instincts4 ,in the
  former case we have a good and in the 
latter a bad man1 while between  these  
two cases as between virtue and vice1   
there is no mean4 ,and since  virtue    
cannot be partially possessed1 but the  
man must be wholly  virtuous or not at  
all1 it follows that virtue as such is  
without  degree1 just as truth is1 and  
hence also all good acts are equally    
good1  because they spring from the full
 freedom of the reason1 and all vicious 
ones equally bad1 because they are      
impelled by the irrational instinct4    
7#d47 ,but this abstractedness of the   
moral standpoint1 this rigid  opposition
 of reason and irrationality1 of the    
highest good and the  individual good1  
of virtue and pleasure1 has no power to 
furnish a  system of concrete moral     
duties4 ,the universal moral principle  
of the  ,stoics fails in its            
applicability to the individual         

instance4 ,the ,stoic  morals has no    
concrete principle of moral             
self-determination4 ,how must  we act in
 every individual instance1 in every    
moral relation1 so as to  act according 
to nature8 ,to this inquiry ,stoicism   
can give no answer4  ,its system of     
particular duties is thus wholly without
 a scientific  form1 and is only held   
together by some universal conceptions  
which it  contains4 ,for the most part  
they satisfy themselves with describing 
in  general terms the action according  
to nature1 and with portraying their    
ideal of the wise man4 ,the             
characteristics which they give this    
ideal  are partly paradoxical4 ,the wise
 man is free even in chains1 for he acts
  from himself unmoved by fear or       
desire2 the wise man alone is king1 for 
he alone is not bound by laws and owes  
fealty to no one2 he is the true  rich  
man1 the true priest1 prophet1 and poet4
 ,he is exalted above all  law and every
 custom2 even that which is most        

despicable and  base--deception1        
suicide1 murder--he may commit at a     
proper time and in a  virtuous          
character4 ,in a word the ,stoics       
describe their wise man as a  god1 and  
yield it to him to be proud and to boast
 of his life like ,zeus4  ,but where    
shall we find such a sage8 ,certainly   
not among the living4 ,in  the time long
 ago there may have been a perfect sage 
of such a pattern2  but now1 and for a  
long time back1 are men at best only    
fools who strive  after wisdom and      
virtue4 ,the conception of the wise man 
represented1  therefore1 to the ,stoics 
only an ideal1 the actualization of     
which we  should strive after1 though   
without ever hoping to reach it2 and yet
  their system of particular duties is  
almost wholly occupied in  portraying   
this unreal and abstract ideal--a       
contradiction in which it is  seen most 
clearly that their whole standpoint is  
one of abstract  subjectivity4          
,,section ,,xviii4    ,,epicureanism4   

,the ,epicurean school arose at ,athens1
 almost contemporaneously with the      
,porch1 though perhaps a little earlier 
than this4 ,epicurus1 its founder1  was 
born #cdb ,b4,c41 six years after the   
death of ,plato4 ,of his youth and      
education little is known4 ,in his      
thirty-sixth year he opened a           
philosophical school at ,athens1 over   
which he presided till his death1  #bga 
,b4,c4 ,his disciples and adherents     
formed a social league1 in which  they  
were united by the closest band of      
friendship1 illustrating the  general   
condition of things in ,greece after the
 time of ,alexander1 when  the social   
took the place of the decaying poetical 
life4 ,epicurus  himself compared his   
society to the ,pythagorean fraternity1 
although the  community of goods1 which 
forms an element in the latter1         
,epicurus  excludes1 affirming that true
 friends can confide in one another4    
,the  moral conduct of ,epicurus has    
been repeatedly assailed but1 according 

to  the testimony of the most reliable  
witnesses1 his life was blameless in    
every respect1 and his personal         
character was estimable and amiable4    
,moreover1 it cannot be doubted that    
much of that1 which is told by some1  of
 the offensive voluptuousness of the    
,epicurean band1 should be  regarded as 
calumny4 ,epicurus was a voluminous     
writer1 surpassing1 in  this respect1   
even ,aristotle1 and exceeded by        
,chrysippus alone4 ,to the  loss of his 
greater works he has himself            
contributed1 by his practice of         
composing summaries of his system1 which
 he recommended his disciples to  commit
 to memory4 ,these summaries have been  
for the most part preserved4    ,the end
 which ,epicurus proposed to himself in 
science is distinctly  revealed in his  
definition of philosophy4 ,he calls it  
an activity which1  by means of         
conceptions and arguments1 procures the 
happiness of life4  ,its end is1        
therefore1 with him essentially a       

practical one1 and on this  account the 
object of his whole system is to produce
 a scheme of morals  which should teach 
us how we might inevitably attain a     
happy life4 ,it is  true that the       
,epicureans adopted the usual division  
of philosophy into  logic1 which they   
called canonics1 physics1 and ethics2   
but they  confined logic to the doctrine
 of the criterion of truth1 and         
considered  it only as an instrument and
 introduction to physics1 while they    
only  treated of physics as existing    
wholly for ethics1 and being necessary  
in  order to free men from superstitious
 fear1 and deliver them from the  power 
of fables and mythical fancies          
concerning nature1 which might  hinder  
the attainment of happiness4 ,we have   
therefore in ,epicureanism  the three   
old parts of philosophy1 but in a       
reversed order1 since logic  and physics
 here stand as the handmaids of ethics4 
,we shall confine  ourselves in our     
exposition to the latter1 since the     

,epicurean canonics  and physics offer  
little scientific interest1 and since   
the physics  especially is not only very
 incomplete and without any internal    
connection1 but rests entirely upon the 
atomic theory of ,democritus4           
,epicurus1 like ,aristotle and the other
 philosophers of his day1 placed  the   
highest good in happiness1 or a happy   
life4 ,more closely he makes  pleasure  
to be the principal constituent of      
happiness1 and even calls it  the       
highest good4 ,but ,epicurus goes on to 
give a more accurate  determination of  
pleasure1 and in this he differs        
essentially from his  predecessors1 the 
,cyrenians4 7cf4  ,,xiii4 #c47    #a4   
,while with ,aristippus the pleasure of 
the moment is made the end of  human    
efforts1 ,epicurus directs men to strive
 after a system of  pleasures which     
should insure an abiding course of      
happiness for the  whole life4 ,true    
pleasure is thus the object to be       
considered and  weighed4 ,many a        

pleasure should be despised because it  
will result in  pain1 and many a pain   
should be rejoiced in because it would  
lead to a  greater pleasure4    #b4     
,since the sage will seek after the     
highest good1 not simply for the        
present but for his whole life1 he will 
hold the pleasures and pains of  the    
soul1 which like memory and hope stretch
 over the past and the  future1 in      
greater esteem than those of the body1  
which relate only to  the present       
moment4 ,the pleasure of the soul       
consists in the untroubled  tranquillity
 of the sage1 who rests secure in the   
feeling of his inner  worth and his     
exaltation above the strokes of destiny4
 ,thus ,epicurus1  would say that it is 
better to be miserable but rational than
 to be  happy and irrational1 and that  
the wise man might be happy though in   
torture4 ,he would even affirm1 like a  
true follower of ,aristotle1 that       
pleasure and happiness were most closely
 connected with virtue1 that  virtue is 

in fact inseparable from true pleasure1 
and that there can be  no agreeable life
 without virtue1 and no virtue without  
an agreeable  life4    #c4 ,while other 
,hedonists would regard the most        
positive and intense  feeling of        
pleasure as the highest good1 ,epicurus1
 on the other hand1  fixed his eye on a 
happiness which should be abiding and   
for the whole  life4 ,he would not seek 
the most exquisite enjoyments in order  
to attain  to a happy life1 but he      
rather recommends one to be satisfied   
with  little1 and to practise sobriety  
and temperance of life4 ,he guards      
himself against such a false application
 of his doctrine as would imply  that   
the pleasure of the debauchee were the  
highest good1 and boasts  that with a   
little barley-bread and water he would  
rival ,zeus in  happiness4 ,he even     
expresses an aversion for all costly    
pleasures1 not1  however1 in themselves1
 but because of the evil consequences   
which they  entail4 ,true1 the          

,epicurean sage need not therefore live 
as a ,cynic4 ,he  will enjoy himself    
where he can without harm1 and will even
 seek to  acquire means to live with    
dignity and ease4 ,but though all these 
enjoyments of life may properly belong  
to the sage1 yet he can deprive  himself
 of them without misery--though he ought
 not to do so--since he  enjoys the     
truest and most essential pleasure in   
the calmness of his  soul and the       
tranquillity of his heart4 ,in          
opposition to the positive  pleasure of 
some ,hedonists1 the theory of ,epicurus
 expends itself in  negative            
conceptions1 representing that freedom  
from pain is pleasure1  and that hence  
the activity of the sage should be      
prominently directed  to avoid that     
which is disagreeable4 ,all that man    
does1 says ,epicurus1  is that he may   
neither suffer nor apprehend pain1 and  
in another place  he remarks1 that not  
to live is far from being an evil4      
,hence death1 for  which men have the   

greatest terror1 the wise man does not  
fear4 ,for  while we live1 death is not1
 and when death is1 we are not2 when it 
is  present we feel it not1 for it is   
the end of all feeling1 and that1  which
 by its presence cannot affect our      
happiness1 ought not1 when  thought of  
as a future1 to trouble us4 ,here       
,epicurus must bear the  censure urged  
against him by the ancients1 that he    
does not recognize  any positive end of 
life1 and that the object after which   
his sage  should strive is a mere       
passionless state4    ,the crown of     
,epicurus's view of the universe is his 
doctrine of the  gods1 where he has     
carried over his ideal of happiness4 ,to
 the gods  belong a human form1 though  
without any fixed body or human wants4  
,in  the void space they lead an        
undisturbed and changeless life1 whose  
happiness is incapable of increase4     
,from the blessedness of the gods he    
inferred that they had nothing to do    
with the management of our affairs1  for

 blessedness is repose1 and on this     
account the gods neither take  trouble  
to themselves nor cause it to others4   
,it may indeed be said that  these      
inactive gods of ,epicurus1 these       
indestructible and yet not fixed  forms1
 these bodies which are not bodies1 have
 but an ill connection  with his general
 system1 in which there is in fact no   
point to which his  doctrine of the gods
 can be fitly joined--but a strict      
scientific  connection is hardly the    
merit of this whole philosophy4         
,,section ,,xix4    ,,scepticism ,,and  
,,the ,,new ,,academy4      ,this       
subjective direction already noticed was
 carried out to its  farthest extent by 
the ,sceptics1 who broke down completely
 the bridge  between subject and object1
 denying all objective truth1 knowledge 
and  science1 and wholly withdrawing the
 philosopher from every thing but       
himself and his own subjective          
estimates4 ,in this direction we may    
distinguish between the old ,scepticism1

 the new ,academy1 and the later        
,scepticism4    #a4 ,,the ,,old         
,,scepticism4--,pyrrho of ,elis1 who was
 perhaps a cotemporary  of ,aristotle1  
was the head of the old ,sceptics4 ,he  
left no writings  behind him1 and we are
 dependent for a knowledge of his       
opinions upon  his scholar and follower1
 ,timon of ,phlius4 ,the tendency of    
these  sceptical philosophers1 like that
 of the ,stoics and ,epicureans1 was a  
practical one1 for philosophy1 said     
they1 ought to lead us to happiness4    
,but in order to live happily we must   
know how things are1 and1  therefore1 in
 what kind of a relation we stand to    
them4 ,the first of  these questions the
 ,sceptics answered by attempting to    
show that all  things1 without          
exception1 are indifferent as to truth  
and falsehood1  uncertain1 and in nowise
 subject to man's judgment4 ,neither our
 senses  nor our opinions concerning any
 thing teach us any truth2 to every     
precept and to every position a contrary

 may be advanced1 and hence the         
contradictory views of men1 and         
especially of the philosophies of the   
schools respecting one and the same     
thing4 ,all objective knowledge and     
science being thus impossible1 the true 
relation of the philosopher to  things  
consists in the entire suspension of    
judgment1 and the  withholding of every 
positive assertion4 ,in order to avoid  
every thing  like a positive assertion1 
the ,sceptics had recourse to a variety 
of  artifices1 and availed themselves of
 doubtful modes of expression1 such  as 
it is possible2 it may be so2 perhaps2  
,i assert  nothing1--cautiously         
subjoining to this last--not even that  
,i assert  nothing4 ,by this suspension 
of judgment the ,sceptics thought they  
could  attain their practical end1      
happiness2 for the abstinence from all  
positive opinion is followed by a       
freedom from all mental disturbance1  as
 a substance is by a shadow4 ,he who has
 embraced ,scepticism lives             

thenceforward tranquilly1 without       
inquietude1 without agitation1 with an  
equable state of mind1 and1 in fact1    
divested of his humanity4 ,pyrrho is    
said to have originated the doctrine    
which lies at the basis of  sceptical   
apathy1 that no difference exists       
between sickness and health1  or between
 life and death4 ,the ,sceptics1 for the
 most part1 derived the  material for   
their views from the previous           
investigations in the  dogmatic schools4
 ,but the grounds on which they rested  
were far from  being profound1 and were 
for the most part either dialectic      
errors which  could easily be refuted1  
or mere subtleties4 ,the use of the     
following  ten tropes is ascribed to the
 old ,sceptics1 though these were       
perhaps  not definitely brought out by  
either ,pyrrho or ,timon1 but were      
probably  first collected by nesidemus1 
soon after the time of ,cicero4 ,the    
withholding of all decisive judgment may
 rest2 7#a7 upon the distinction        

generally existing between individual   
living objects2 7#b7 upon the           
difference among men2 7#c7 the different
 functions of the organs of  sense2 7#d7
 the circumstances under which objects  
appear2 7#e7 the  relative positions1   
intervals1 and places2 7#f7             
intermixtures2 7#g7 the  quantities and 
modifications of the objects we         
perceive2 7#h7 relations2  7#i7 the     
frequent or rare occurrence2 7#aj7 the  
different ways of life1  the varieties  
of customs and laws1 the mythical       
representations and  dogmatic opinions  
of men4    #b4 ,,the ,,new              
,,academy4--,scepticism1 in its conflict
 with the ,stoics1 as it  appeared in   
the ,platonic school established by     
,arcesilaus 7#caf-bda71  has a far      
greater significance than belongs to the
 performances of the  ,pyrrhonists4 ,in 
this school ,scepticism sought its      
support by its great  respect for the   
writings and its transmission of the    
oral teachings of  ,plato4 ,arcesilaus  

could neither have assumed nor          
maintained the chair of  instruction in 
the ,academy1 had he not carefully      
cherished and imparted  to his disciples
 the impression that his own view1      
respecting the  withholding of a        
decisive judgment1 coincided essentially
 with that of  ,socrates and of ,plato1 
and if he had not also taught that he   
only  restored the genuine and original 
significance of ,platonism1 when he set 
aside the dogmatic method of teaching4  
,an immediate incitement to the  efforts
 of ,arcesilaus is found in his         
opposition to the rigid dogmatic  system
 which had lately arisen in the ,porch1 
and which claimed to be in  every       
respect an improvement upon ,platonism4 
,hence1 as ,cicero remarks1  ,arcesilaus
 directed all his sceptical and polemic 
attacks against ,zeno1  the founder of  
,stoicism4 ,he granted with his opponent
 that no  representation should form a  
part of undoubted knowledge1 if it could
  possibly have arisen through any other

 object than that from which it         
actually sprung1 but he would not admit 
that there might be a notion  which     
expressed so truly and accurately its   
own object1 that it could  not have     
arisen from any other4 ,accordingly1    
,arcesilaus denied the  existence of a  
criterion which could certify to us the 
truth of our  knowledge4 ,if there be   
any truth in our affirmations1 said he1 
we cannot  be certain of it4 ,in this   
sense he taught that one can know       
nothing1 not  even that he does know    
nothing4 ,but in moral matters1 in      
choosing the  good and rejecting the    
evil1 he taught that we should follow   
that which  is probable4    ,of the     
subsequent leaders in the new ,academy1 
,carneades 7#bad-abi7  alone need here  
be mentioned1 whose whole philosophy1   
however1 consists  almost exclusively in
 a polemic against ,stoicism and in the 
attempt to  set up a criterion of truth4
 ,his positive performance is the       
attempt to  bring out a philosophical   

theory of probabilities4 ,the later     
,academicians fell back to an eclectic  
dogmaticism4    #c4 ,,the ,,later       
,,scepticism4--,once more we meet with a
 peculiar ,scepticism at  the time when 
,grecian philosophy had wholly fallen to
 decay4 ,to this  time belong nesidemus1
 who probably--though this cannot be    
affirmed  with certainty--lived but a   
little after ,cicero2 ,agrippa1 whose   
date is  also uncertain1 though         
subsequent to nesidemus1 and ,sextus    
,empiricus--i4 e4 a ,grecian physician  
of the empiric sect1 who probably       
flourished in the first half of the     
third century of the ,christian era4    
,these are the most significant names4  
,of these the last has the greatest     
interest for us1 from two writings which
 he left behind him 7the  hypotyposes of
 ,pyrrho in three books1 and a treatise 
against the  mathematicians in nine     
books71 which are sources of much       
historical  information4 ,in these he   
has profusely collected every thing     

which the  ,scepticism of the ancients  
knew how to advance against the         
certainty of  knowledge4                
,,section ,,xx4    ,,the ,,romans4      
,the ,romans have taken no independent  
part in the progress of philosophy4     
,after ,grecian philosophy and          
literature had begun to gain a foothold 
among them1 and especially after three  
distinguished representatives of  ,attic
 culture and eloquence--,carneades the  
,academician1 ,critolaus the            
,peripatetic1 and ,diogenes the         
,stoic--had appeared in ,rome as envoys 
from  ,athens2 and after ,greece1 a few 
years later1 had become a ,roman        
province1 and thus outwardly in a close 
connection with ,rome1 almost all  the  
more significant systems of ,grecian    
philosophy1 especially the  ,epicurean  
7,lucretius71 and the ,stoic 7,seneca71 
flourished and found  adherents in      
,rome1 though without gaining any real  
philosophical  progress4 ,the ,romish   
philosophizing is wholly eclectic1 as is

 seen in  ,cicero1 the most important   
and influential philosophic writer among
 the  ,romans4 ,but the popular         
philosophy of this man and of the minds 
akin to  him cannot be strongly         
assailed1 for1 notwithstanding its want 
of  originality and logical sequence1 it
 gave philosophy a broad  dissemination1
 and made it a means of universal       
culture4          ,,section ,,xxi4      
,,new ,,platonism4      ,in ,new        
,platonism1 the ancient mind made its   
last and almost despairing  attempt at a
 philosophy which should resolve the    
dualism between the  subjective and the 
objective4 ,the attempt was made by     
taking on the one  side a subjective    
standpoint1 like the other philosophies 
of the  post-,aristotelian time 7cf4    
,,xvi #g72 and on the other with the    
design  to bring out objective          
determinations concerning the highest   
conceptions  of metaphysics1 and        
concerning the absolute2 in other words1
 to sketch a  system of absolute        

philosophy4 ,in this respect the effort 
was made to  copy the ,platonic and     
,aristotelian philosophy1 and the claim 
was set up  by the new system to be a   
revival of the original ,platonism4 ,on 
both  sides the new attempt formed the  
closing period of an ancient            
philosophy4 ,it represents the last     
struggle1 but at the same time the      
exhaustion of the ancient thinking and  
the dissolution of the old  philosophy4 
,the first1 and also the most important1
 representative of ,new ,platonism1  is 
,plotinus4 ,he was a pupil of ,ammonius 
,saccas1 who taught the  ,platonic      
philosophy at ,alexandria in the        
beginning of the third century1  though 
he left no writings behind him4         
,plotinus 7,a4 ,d4 #bje-bgj7 from his   
fortieth year taught philosophy at      
,rome4 ,his opinions are contained in a 
course of hastily written and not       
closely connected treatises1 which1     
after his death1 were collected and     
published in six enneads by  ,porphyry  

7who was born ,a4 ,d4 #bcc1 and taught  
both philosophy and  eloquence at       
,rome71 his most noted disciple4 ,from  
,rome and ,alexandria1  the ,new        
,platonism of ,plotinus passed over in  
the fourth century to  ,athens1 where it
 established itself in the ,academy4 ,in
 the fourth  century1 ,jamblichus1 a    
scholar of ,porphyry1 and in the fifth1 
,proclus1  7#dab-dhe71 were prominently 
distinguished among the ,new            
,platonists4 ,with  the triumph of      
,christianity and the consequent fall of
 heathenism1 in  the course of the sixth
 century1 even this last bloom of       
,grecian  philosophy faded away4    ,the
 common characteristic of all the ,new  
,platonists is a tendency to  mysticism1
 theosophy1 and theurgy4 ,the majority  
of them gave themselves  up to magic and
 sorcery1 and the most distinguished    
boasted that they  were the subjects of 
divine inspiration and illumination1    
able to look  into the future1 and to   
work miracles4 ,they professed to be    

hierophants  as much as philosophers1   
and exhibited the unmistakable tendency 
to  represent a ,pagan copy of          
,christianity1 which should be at the   
same time  a philosophy and a universal 
religion4 ,in the following sketch of   
,new  ,platonism we follow mainly the   
track of ,plotinus4    #a4 ,,ecstasy    
,,as ,a ,,subjective ,,state4--,the     
result of the philosophical  strivings  
antecedent to ,new ,platonism had been  
,scepticism2 which1 seeing  the         
impracticability of both the ,stoic and 
,epicurean wisdom1 had assumed  a       
totally negative relation to every      
positive and theoretical content4  ,but 
the end which ,scepticism had actually  
gained was the opposite of  that for    
which it had striven4 ,it had striven   
for the perfect apathy of  the sage1 but
 it had gained only the necessity of    
incessantly opposing  every positive    
affirmation4 ,instead of the rest which 
they had sought1  they found rather an  
absolute unrest4 ,this absolute unrest  

of the  consciousness striving after an 
absolute rest1 begat immediately a      
longing to be freed from this unrest1 a 
longing after some content which  should
 be absolutely satisfying1 and stripped 
of every sceptical  objection4 ,this    
longing after an absolutely true1 found 
its historical  expression in ,new      
,platonism4 ,the subject sought to      
master and comprehend  the absolute2 and
 this1 neither by objective knowledge   
nor dialectic  mediation1 but           
immediately1 by an inner and mystical   
mounting up of the  subject in the form 
of an immediate beholding1 or ecstasy4  
,the knowledge  of the true1 says       
,plotinus1 is not gained by proof nor by
 any mediation2  it cannot be found when
 the objects known remain separate from 
the  subject knowing1 but only when the 
distinction between knower and known    
disappears2 it is a beholding of the    
reason in itself1 not in the sense  that
 we see the reason1 but the reason      
beholds itself2 in no other way  can    

knowledge come4 ,if any one has attained
 to such a beholding1 to such  a true   
unison with the divine1 he will despise 
the pure thinking which  he otherwise   
loved1 for this thinking was only a     
movement which  presupposed a difference
 between the perceiver and the          
perceived4 ,this  mystical absorption   
into the ,deity1 or1 the ,one1 this     
resolving the self  into the absolute1  
is that which gives to ,new ,platonism a
 character so  peculiarly distinct from 
the genuine ,grecian systems of         
philosophy4    #b4 ,,the ,,cosmical     
,,principles4--,the doctrine of the     
three cosmical  principles is most      
closely connected with the theory just  
named4 ,to the  two cosmical principles 
already received1 viz41 the world-soul  
and the  world-reason1 a third and      
higher one was added by the ,new        
,platonists4  ,for if the reason        
apprehends the true by means of         
thinking1 and not  within itself alone2 
if1 in order to grasp the absolute and  

behold the  divine1 it must lose its own
 self-consciousness1 and go out beyond  
itself1 then reason cannot be the       
highest principle1 but there stands     
above it that primal essence1 with which
 it must be united if it will  behold   
the true4 ,to this primal essence       
,plotinus gives different names1  as    
8the first10 8the one10 8the good10 and 
8that which stands above  being0 7being 
is with him but a conception1 which1    
like the reason1 may  be resolved into a
 higher ground1 and which1 united with  
the reason1  forms but the second step  
in the series of highest conceptions74  
,in all  these names1 ,plotinus does not
 profess to have satisfactorily         
expressed  the essence of this primal   
one1 but only to have given a           
representation  of it4 ,in              
characterizing it still farther1 he     
denies it all thinking and  willing1    
because it needs nothing and can desire 
nothing2 it is not  energy1 but above   
energy2 life does not belong to it2     

neither being nor  essence nor any of   
the most general categories of being can
 be ascribed  to it2 in short1 it is    
that which can neither be expressed nor 
thought4  ,plotinus has thoroughly      
striven to think of this first principle
 not as  first principle1 i4 e4 not in  
its relation to that of which it is the 
ground1 but only in itself1 as being    
wholly without reference either to  us  
or to any thing else4 ,this pure        
abstraction1 however1 he could not      
carry out4 ,he sets himself to show how 
every thing else1 and especially  the   
two other cosmical principles1 could    
emanate from this first2 but in  order  
to have a principle for his emanation   
theory1 he was obliged to  consider the 
first in its relation to the second and 
as its producer4    #c4 ,,the           
,,emanation ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,new   
,,platonists4--,every emanation theory1 
and hence also that of the ,new         
,platonists1 considers the world as the 
effluence of ,god1 and gives to the     

emanation a greater or less degree of   
perfection1 according as it is nearer or
 more remote from its source4  ,they all
 have for their principle the totality  
of being1 and represent a  progressively
 ascending relation in its several      
parts4 ,fire1 says  ,plotinus1 emits    
heat1 snow cold1 fragrant bodies odors1 
and every  organic thing so far as it is
 perfect begets something like itself4  
,in  the same way the all-perfect and   
the eternal1 in the overflowing of his  
perfection sends out from himself that  
which is also eternal1 and after  him1  
the best1 viz41 the reason or           
world-intelligence1 which is the        
immediate reflection and image of the   
primal one4 ,plotinus abounds in        
figures to show how the primal one need 
lose nothing nor become weakened  by    
this emanation of reason4 ,next to the  
original one1 reason is the  most       
perfect4 ,it contains in itself the     
ideal world1 and the whole of  true and 
changeless being4 ,some notion may be   

formed of its exaltation  and glory by  
carefully beholding the sensible world  
in its greatness1  its beauty1 and the  
order of its ceaseless motion1 and then 
by rising to  contemplate its archetype 
in the pure and changeless being of the 
intelligible world1 and then by         
recognizing in intelligence the author  
and finisher of all4 ,in it there is    
neither past nor future1 but only an    
ever abiding present4 ,it is1 moreover1 
as incapable of division in space  as of
 change in time4 ,it is the true        
eternity1 which is only copied by  time4
 ,as reason flows from the primal one1  
so does the world-soul  eternally       
emanate from reason1 though the latter  
incurs no change  thereby4 ,the         
world-soul is the copy of reason1       
permeated by it1 and  actualizing it in 
an outer world4 ,it gives ideas         
externally to sensible  matter1 which is
 the last and lowest step in the series 
of emanations  and in itself is         
undetermined1 and has neither quality   

nor being4 ,in  this way the visible    
universe is but the transcript of the   
world-soul1  which forms it out of      
matter1 permeates and animates it1 and  
carries it  forward in a circle4 ,here  
closes the series of emanations1 and1 as
 was  the aim of the theory1 we have    
been carried in a constant current from 
the highest to the lowest1 from ,god to 
the mere image of true being1 or  the   
sensible world4    ,individual souls1   
like the world-soul1 are linked both to 
the higher and  the lower1 to reason and
 the sensible2 now bound with the latter
 and  sharing its destiny1 and anon     
rising to their source in reason4 ,their
  original and proper home was in the   
rational world1 from whence they  have  
come down1 each one in its proper time1 
into the corporeal2 not1  however1      
wholly forsaking their ideal abode1 but 
as a sunbeam touches at  the same time  
the sun and the earth1 so are they found
 alike in the  world of reason and the  
world of sense4 ,our calling1           

therefore--and here  we come back to the
 point from which we started in our     
exhibition of ,new  ,platonism--can only
 be to direct our senses and aspirations
 towards our  proper home1 in the ideal 
world1 and by asceticism and crucifying 
of the  flesh1 to free our better self  
from its participation with the body4   
,but  when our soul has once mounted up 
to the ideal world1 that image of the   
originally good and beautiful1 it then  
attains the final goal of all its       
longings and efforts1 the immediate     
union with ,god1 through the  enraptured
 beholding of the primal one in which it
 loses its  consciousness and becomes   
buried and absorbed4    ,according to   
all this1 the ,new ,platonic philosophy 
would seem to be a  monism1 and thus the
 most perfect development of ancient    
philosophy1 in  so far as this had      
striven to carry back the sum of all    
being to one  ultimate ground4 ,but as  
it attained its highest principle from  
which all  the rest was derived1 by     

means of ecstasy1 by a mystical         
self-destruction of the individual      
person 7,ichheit71 by asceticism and    
theurgy1 and not by means of            
self-conscious thinking1 nor by any     
natural  or rational way1 it is seen    
that ancient philosophy1 instead of     
becoming  perfected in ,new ,platonism1 
only makes a despairing leap beyond     
itself  to its own self-destruction4    
,,section ,,xxii4    ,,christianity     
,,and ,,scholasticism4      #a4 ,,the   
,,christian ,,idea4--,the ,grecian      
intellectual life at the time of its    
fairest bloom1 was characterized by the 
immediate sacrifice of the  subject to  
the object 7nature1 the state1 c473 the 
full breach between  the two1 between   
spirit and nature1 had not yet arrived2 
the subject had  not yet so far         
reflected upon himself that he could    
apprehend his own  absolute worth4 ,this
 breach came in1 with the decay of      
,grecian life1 in  the time after       
,alexander the ,great4 ,as the objective

 world lost its  influence1 the thinking
 consciousness turned back upon itself2 
but even  in this very process1 the     
bridge between subject and object was   
broken  down4 ,the self-consciousness   
had not yet become sufficiently absorbed
 in  itself to look upon the true1 the  
divine1 in any other light than as      
separate from itself1 and belonging to  
an opposite world2 while a  feeling of  
pain1 of unsatisfied desire1 took the   
place of that fair  unity between spirit
 and nature which had been peculiar to  
the better  periods of the ,grecian     
civil and artistic life4 ,new           
,platonism1 by its  overleaping         
speculation1 and1 practically1 by its   
mortification of the  sense1 made a last
 and despairing attempt to overcome this
 separation1  or to bury itself within  
it1 by bringing the two sides forcibly  
together4 ,the attempt was in vain1 and 
the old philosophy1 totally  exhausted1 
came to its end4 ,dualism is therefore  
the rock on which it  split4 ,this      

problem1 thus left without a solution1  
,christianity took up4  ,it assumed for 
its principle the idea which the ancient
 thinking had not  known how to carry   
out1 affirming that the separation      
between ,god and  man might be overcome1
 and that the human and the divine could
 be united  in one4 ,the speculative    
fundamental idea of ,christianity is1   
that ,god  has become incarnate1 and    
this had its practical exhibition 7for  
,christianity was a practical religion7 
in the idea of the atonement and  the   
demand of the new birth1 i4 e4 the      
positive purifying of the sense  from   
its corruptions1 instead of holding it1 
as asceticism1 in a merely  negative    
relation4    ,from the introduction of  
,christianity1 monism has been the      
character and  the fundamental tendency 
of the whole modern philosophy4 ,in     
fact1 the  new philosophy started from  
the very point at which the old had     
stood  still4 ,the turning of the       
self-consciousness upon itself1 which   

was the  standpoint of the              
post-,aristotelian speculations1 forms  
in ,descartes the  starting-point of the
 new philosophy1 whose whole course has 
been the  reconciling of that opposition
 beyond which the old could not pass4   
#b4 ,,scholasticism4--,it very early    
resulted that ,christianity came in     
contact with the cotemporaneous         
philosophy1 especially with ,platonism4 
,this arose first with the apologists of
 the second century1 and the  fathers of
 the ,alexandrian church4 ,subsequently1
 in the ninth century1  ,scotus ,erigena
 made an attempt to combine             
,christianity with ,new  ,platonism1    
though it was not till the second half  
of the ,middle ,ages1  from the eleventh
 century1 that there was developed any  
thing that might  be properly termed a  
,christian philosophy4 ,this was the    
so-called  ,scholasticism4    ,the      
effort of ,scholasticism was to mediate 
between the dogma of religion  and the  
reflecting self-consciousness2 to       

reconcile faith and knowledge4  ,when   
the dogma passed over into the schools  
from the ,church which had  given it    
utterance1 and theology became a science
 of the universities1  the scientific   
interest asserted its rights1 and       
undertook to bring the  dogma which had 
hitherto stood over against the         
self-consciousness as an  external      
power1 into a closer relation to the    
thinking subject4 ,a series  of attempts
 was now made to bring out the doctrines
 of the ,church in the  form of         
scientific systems 7the first complete  
dogmatic system was given  by ,peter    
,lombard1 who died #aafd1 in his four   
books of sentences1 and  was            
voluminously commented upon by the later
 ,scholastics71 all starting  from the  
indisputable premise 7beyond which      
scholastic thinking never  reached71    
that the faith of the church is absolute
 truth2 but all guided  likewise by the 
interest to make this revealed truth    
intelligible1 and  to show it to be     

rational4 8,credo ut intelligam0--this  
expression of  ,anselm1 the beginner and
 founder of ,scholasticism 7he was born 
about  #ajcd1 and made ,archbishop of   
,canterbury in #ajic71 was the watchword
 of  this whole direction4              
,scholasticism applied to the solution  
of its  problem the most remarkable     
logical acumen1 and brought out systems 
of  doctrine like the ,gothic cathedrals
 in their architecture4 ,the extended   
study of ,aristotle1 called par eminence
 8the philosopher10 whom many  of the   
most distinguished ,scholastics wrote   
commentaries upon1 and who  was greatly 
studied at the same period among the    
,arabians 7,avicenna  and ,averroes71   
furnished their terminology and most of 
their points of  view4 ,at the summit of
 ,scholasticism we must place the two   
incontestably  greatest masters of the  
,scholastic art and method1 ,thomas     
,aquinas  7,dominican1 who died #abgd7  
and ,duns ,scotus 7,franciscan1 who died
  #acjh71 the founders of two schools1  

in which since their time the whole     
,scholastic theology divides itself--the
 former exalting the understanding      
7intellectus71 and the latter the will  
7voluntas71 as their highest  principle1
 both being driven into essentially     
differing directions by  this opposition
 of a theoretical and a practical       
principle4 ,even with  this began the   
downfall of ,scholasticism2 its highest 
point was also the  turning-point to its
 self-destruction4 ,the rationality of  
the dogma1 the  oneness of faith and    
knowledge1 had been constantly their    
fundamental  premise2 but this premise  
fell away1 and the whole basis of their 
metaphysics was given up in principle1  
the moment ,duns ,scotus placed the     
problem of theology in the practical4   
,when the practical and the  theoretical
 became divided1 and still more when    
thought and being were  separated by    
,nominalism 7cf4 #c71 philosophy broke  
loose from theology  and knowledge from 
faith2 knowledge assumed its position   

above faith and  above authority 7modern
 philosophy71 and the religious         
consciousness  broke with the           
traditional dogma 7the ,reformation74   
#c4 ,,nominalism ,,and ,,realism4--,hand
 in hand with the whole development of  
,scholasticism1 there was developed the 
opposition between ,nominalism and      
,realism1 an opposition whose origin is 
to be found in the relation of          
,scholasticism to the ,platonic and     
,aristotelian philosophy4 ,the          
,nominalists were those who held that   
the conceptions of the universal  7the  
universalia7 were simple names1 flatus  
vocis1 representations  without content 
and without reality4 ,according to them 
there are no  universal conceptions1 no 
species1 no class2 every thing which is1
  exists only as separate in its pure   
individuality2 there is1 therefore1  no 
pure thinking1 but only a representation
 and sensuous perception4 ,the          
,realists1 on the other hand1 taking    
pattern from ,plato1 held fast to the   

objective reality of the universals     
7universalia ante rem74 ,these  opposite
 directions appeared first between      
,roscellinus1 who took the  side of     
,nominalism1 and ,anselm1 who advocated 
the ,realistic theory1  and it is seen  
from this time through the whole period 
of ,scholasticism1  though from the age 
of ,abelard 7born #ajgi7 a middle view1 
which was  both ,nominalistic and       
,realistic1 held with some slight       
modifications the  prominent place      
7universalia in re74 ,according to this 
view the  universal is only something   
thought and represented1 though as such 
it  is not simply a product of the      
representing consciousness1 but has also
  its objective reality in objects      
themselves1 from which it was argued we 
could not abstract it if it were not    
essentially contained in them4 ,this    
identity of thought and being1 is the   
fundamental premise on which the  whole 
dialectic course of the ,scholastics    
rests4 ,all their arguments are  founded

 on the claim1 that that which has been 
syllogistically proved is  in reality   
the same as in logical thinking4 ,if    
this premise is  overthrown1 so falls   
with it the whole basis of              
,scholasticism2 and there  remains      
nothing more for the thinker to do1 who 
has gone astray in his  objectivity1 but
 to fall back upon himself4 ,this       
self-dissolution of  ,scholasticism     
actually appears with ,william of ,occam
 7died #acdg71 the  most influential    
reviver of that ,nominalism which had   
been so mighty in  the beginning of     
,scholasticism1 but which now1 more     
victorious against a  decaying than then
 against a rising form of culture1      
plucked away its  foundation from the   
framework of ,scholastic dogmatism1 and 
brought the  whole structure into       
inevitable ruin4          ,,section     
,,xxiii4    ,,transition ,,to ,,the     
,,modern ,,philosophy4      ,the        
emancipation of modern philosophy from  
the bondage of ,scholasticism  was a    

gradual process4 ,it first showed itself
 in a series of preparative  movements  
during the fifteenth century1 and became
 perfected1  negatively1 in the course  
of the sixteenth1 and positively in the 
first  half of the seventeenth century4 
#a4 ,,fall ,,of ,,scholasticism4--,the  
immediate ground of this changed        
direction  of the time1 we have already 
seen in the inner decay of              
,scholasticism  itself4 ,just so soon as
 the fundamental premise on which the   
,scholastic  theology and method rested1
 the rationality of the dogma1 was      
abandoned1  the whole structure1 as     
already remarked1 fell to inevitable    
ruin4 ,the  conviction1 directly opposed
 to the principle of ,scholasticism1    
that  what might be true dogmatically1  
might be false1 or1 at least1 incapable 
of proof in the eye of the reason--a    
point of view from which e4 g4 the      
,aristotelian ,pomponatius 7#adfb-aecj7 
treated the doctrines of the  future    
state1 and in whose light ,vanini       

subsequently went over the  chief       
problems of philosophy--kept gaining    
ground1 notwithstanding the  opposition 
of the ,church1 and even associated with
 itself the opinion  that reason and    
revelation could not be harmonized4 ,the
 feeling became  prevalent that         
philosophy must be freed from its       
previous condition of  minority and     
servitude2 a struggle after a greater   
independence of  philosophic            
investigation was awakened1 and though  
no one yet ventured  to attack directly 
the doctrine of the ,church1 the effort 
was made to  shatter the confidence in  
the chief bulwark of ,scholasticism1 the
  ,aristotelian philosophy1 or what at  
that period was regarded as such2       
7especially in this connection ,peter   
,ramus1 7#aeae-aegb7 should be          
mentioned1 who fell in the massacre of  
,st4 ,bartholomew74 ,the authority  of  
the ,church became more and more        
weakened in the faith of the people1    
and the great principles of             

,scholasticism came to an end4    #b4   
,,the ,,results ,,of                    
,,scholasticism4--,notwithstanding all1 
,scholasticism was  not without its     
positively good results4 ,though        
standing wholly in the  service of the  
,church1 it had1 nevertheless1 grown out
 of a scientific  impulse1 and so       
naturally awakened a free spirit of     
inquiry and a sense  for knowledge4 ,it 
made the objects of faith the objects of
 thought1 it  raised men from the sphere
 of unconditional faith to the sphere of
  doubt1 of investigation and of        
knowledge1 and by its very effort to    
demonstrate the principles of theology  
it established1 though against  its     
knowledge and design1 the authority of  
reason4 ,it thus introduced to  the     
world another principle than that of the
 old ,church1 the principle  of the     
thinking spirit1 the self-consciousness 
of the reason1 or at  least prepared the
 way for the victory of this principle4 
,even the  deformities and unfavorable  

side of ,scholasticism1 the many absurd 
questions upon which the ,scholastics   
divided1 even their thousandfold        
unnecessary and accidental distinctions1
 their inquisitiveness and  subtleties1 
all sprang from a rational principle1   
and grew out of a  spirit of            
investigation1 which could only utter   
itself in this way under  the all       
powerful ecclesiastical spirit of the   
time4 ,only when it was  surpassed by   
the advancing spirit of the age1 did    
,scholasticism1  falsifying its original
 meaning1 make common cause and interest
 with the  old ecclesiasticism1 and     
turned itself as the most violent       
opposer  against the improvements of the
 new period4    #c4 ,,the ,,revival ,,of
 ,,letters4--,the revival of classic    
literature contributed  prominently to  
that change in the spirit of the age    
which marks the  beginning of the new   
epoch of philosophy4 ,the study of the  
ancients1  especially of the ,greeks1   
had almost wholly ceased in the course  

of the  ,middle ,ages2 even the         
philosophy of ,plato and ,aristotle was 
known1 for  the most part1 only through 
,latin translations or secondary        
sources2 no  one realized the spirit of 
classic life1 and all sense for beauty  
of  form and elegant composition had    
passed away4 ,the change was chiefly    
brought about by means of the ,greek    
scholars who fled from  ,constantinople 
to ,italy2 the study of the ancients in 
the original  sources came up again2 the
 newly discovered art of printing       
allowed the  classics to be widely      
circulated2 the ,medicis drew classic   
scholars to  their court2 all this      
working for a far better understanding  
of the  ancient philosophy4 ,besarion   
7died #adgb7 and ,ficinus 7died #adii7  
were prominent in this movement4 ,the   
result was presently seen4 ,the new     
scholars contended against the stiff and
 uncouth manner in which the  sciences  
had hitherto been treated1 new ideas    
began to circulate1 and  there arose    

again the free1 universal1 thinking     
spirit of antiquity4 ,in  ,germany1     
also1 classic studies found a fruitful  
soil4 ,reuchlin 7born  #aded71          
,melancthon and ,erasmus1 labored in    
this sense1 and the  classic movement1  
hostile as it was to the ,scholastic    
impulse1 favored  most decidedly the    
growing tendencies to the ,reformation4 
#d4 ,,the ,,german ,,reformation4--,all 
the elements of the new age1 the        
struggle  against ,scholasticism1 the   
revival of letters and the more enlarged
  culture thus secured1 the striving    
after national independence1 the        
attempts of the state to free itself    
from the ,church and the hierarchy1  and
 above all1 the desire of the thinking  
self-consciousness for  autonomy1 for   
freedom from the fetters of             
authority--all these elements  found    
their focus and point of union in the   
,german ,reformation4 ,though  having   
its root at first in practical1 and     
religious1 and national  interests1 and 

expending itself mainly upon the        
,christian doctrine and  ,church1 yet   
was the ,reformation in principle and in
 its true  consequences a rupture of the
 thinking spirit with authority1 a      
protesting against the fetters of the   
positive1 a return of the mind  from its
 self-estrangement to itself4 ,from that
 which was without1 the  mind now came  
back to that which is within1 and the   
purely human as  such1 the individual   
heart and conscience1 the subjective    
conviction1 in  a word1 the rights of   
the subject now began to be of worth4   
,while  marriage had formerly been      
regarded1 though not immoral1 as yet    
inferior  to continence and celibacy1 it
 appeared now as a divine institution1 a
  natural law ordained of ,god4 ,while  
poverty had formerly been esteemed      
higher than wealth1 and the             
contemplative life of the monk was      
superior  to the manual labor of the    
layman supporting himself by his own    
toil1  yet now poverty ceased to be     

desirable in itself1 and labor was no   
longer despised4 ,ecclesiastical freedom
 took the place of spiritual  bondage2  
monasticism and the priesthood lost     
their power4 ,in the same  way1 on the  
side of knowledge the individual man    
came back to himself1  and threw off the
 restraints of authority4 ,he was       
impressed with the  conviction that the 
whole process of redemption must be     
experienced  within himself1 that his   
reconciliation to ,god and salvation was
 his own  concern1 for which he needed  
no mediation of priests1 and that he    
stood  in an immediate relation to ,god4
 ,he found his whole being in his faith1
  in the depth of his feelings and      
convictions4    ,since thus             
,protestantism sprang from the essence  
of the same spirit in  which modern     
philosophy had its birth1 the two have  
the closest relation  to each other1    
though of course there is a specific    
difference between  the religious and   
the scientific principle4 ,yet in their 

origin1 both  kinds of ,protestantism1  
that of religion and that of thought1   
are one  and the same1 and in their     
progress they have also gone hand in    
hand  together4 ,for religion1 reduced  
to its simple elements1 will be found to
  have its source1 like philosophy1 in  
the self-knowledge of the reason4    #e4
 ,,the ,,advancement ,,of ,,the         
,,natural ,,sciences4--,to all these    
phenomena1  which should be regarded    
both as causes and as symptoms of the   
intellectual revolution of this period1 
we must add yet another1 which          
essentially facilitated and gave a      
positive assistance to the freedom of   
the mind from the fetters of            
authority--the starting up of the       
natural  sciences and the inductive     
method of examining nature4 ,this epoch 
was a  period of the most fruitful and  
influential discoveries in nature4 ,the 
discovery of ,america and the passage to
 the ,east ,indies had already  widened 
the circle of view1 but still greater   

revolutions are connected  with the name
 of a ,copernicus 7died #aedc71 ,kepler 
7died #afcj71 and  ,galileo 7died       
#afdb71 revolutions which could not     
remain1 without an  influence upon the  
whole mode of thinking of that age1 and 
which  contributed prominently to break 
the faith in the prevailing             
ecclesiastical authority4 ,scholasticism
 had turned away from nature and  the   
phenomenal world1 and1 blind towards    
that which lay before the very  eyes1   
had spent itself in a dreamy            
intellectuality2 but now nature rose    
again in honor2 her glory and           
exaltation1 her infinite diversity and  
fulness of life became again the        
immediate objects of observation2 to    
investigate nature became an essential  
object of philosophy1 and  scientific   
empiricism was thus regarded as a       
universal and essential  concern of the 
thinking man4 ,from this time the       
natural sciences date  their historical 
importance1 for only from this time have

 they had an  uninterrupted history4    
,the results of this new intellectual   
movement can  be readily estimated4     
,such a scientific investigation of     
nature not only  destroyed a series of  
traditional errors and prejudices1 but1 
what was  of greater importance1 it     
directed the intellectual interest      
towards  that which is real and actual1 
it nourished and protected the          
self-thinking and feeling of            
self-dependence1 the spirit of inquiry  
and  proof4 ,the standpoint of          
observation and experiment presupposes  
an  independent self-consciousness of   
the individual1 a breaking loose from   
authority--in a word1 scepticism1 with  
which1 in fact1 the founders of  modern 
philosophy1 ,bacon and ,descartes1      
began2 the former by  conditioning the  
knowledge of nature upon the removal of 
all prejudice  and every preconceived   
opinion1 and the latter by demanding    
that  philosophy should be begun with   
universal doubt4 ,no wonder that a      

bitter  struggle should soon break out  
between the natural sciences and        
ecclesiastical orthodoxy1 which could   
only result in breaking the power  of   
the latter4    #f4 ,,bacon ,,of         
,,verulam4--,francis of ,verulam was    
born in #aefa1 and was ,lord  ,high     
,chancellor of ,england and keeper of   
the king's seal under ,james ,i4  ,from 
these offices he was subsequently       
expelled1 and died in #afbf1 with  a    
character which has not been without    
reproach4 ,he took as his  principle the
 inductive method1 which he directed    
expressly against  ,scholasticism and   
the ruling scientific method4 ,on this  
account he is  frequently placed at the 
head of modern philosophy4    ,the      
sciences1 says ,bacon1 have hitherto    
been in a most sad condition4           
,philosophy1 wasted in empty and        
fruitless logomachies1 has failed during
  so many centuries to bring out a      
single work or experiment of actual     
benefit to human life4 ,logic hitherto  

has served more to the  establishment of
 error than to the investigation of     
truth4 ,whence all  this8 ,why this     
penury of the sciences8 ,simply because 
they have broken  away from their root  
in nature and experience4 ,the blame of 
this is  chargeable to many sources2    
first1 the old and rooted prejudice that
 the  human mind loses somewhat of its  
dignity when it busies itself much and  
continuously with experiments and       
material things2 next1 superstition  and
 a blind religious zeal1 which has been 
the most irreconcilable  opposer to     
natural philosophy2 again1 the exclusive
 attention paid to  morals and politics 
by the ,romans1 and since the ,christian
 era to  theology by every acute mind2  
still farther1 the great authority which
  certain philosophers have professed1  
and the great reverence given1 to       
antiquity2 and in fine1 a want of       
courage and a despair of overcoming  the
 many and great difficulties which lie  
in the way of the  investigation of     

nature4 ,all these causes have          
contributed to keep down  the sciences4 
,hence they must now be renewed1 and    
regenerated1 and  reformed in their most
 fundamental principles2 there must now 
be found a  new basis of knowledge and  
new principles of science4 ,this radical
  reformation of the sciences depends   
upon two conditions1 objectively  upon  
the referring of science to experience  
and the philosophy of  nature1 and      
subjectively upon the purifying of the  
sense and the  intellect from all       
abstract theories and traditional       
prejudices4 ,both  conditions furnish   
the correct method of natural science1  
which is  nothing other than the method 
of induction4 ,upon a true induction    
depends all the soundness of the        
sciences4    ,in these propositions the 
,baconian philosophy is contained4 ,the 
historical significance of its founder  
is1 therefore1 in general  this1--that  
he directed the attention and reflection
 of his  contemporaries again upon the  

given actuality1 upon nature2 that he   
affirmed the necessity of experience1   
which had been formerly only a  matter  
of accident1 and made it as in and for  
itself an object of  thought4 ,his merit
 consists in having brought up the      
principle of  scientific empiricism1 and
 only in this4 ,strictly speaking1 we   
can allow  no content to the ,baconian  
philosophy1 although 7in his treatise de
  augmentis scientiarum7 he has         
attempted a systematic encyclopedia of  
the sciences according to a new         
principle of classification1 through    
which he has scattered an abundance of  
fine and fruitful observations1  which  
are still used as apothegms4    #g4     
,,the ,,italian ,,philosophers ,,of     
,,the ,,transition ,,epoch4--,besides   
,bacon1  other phenomena must be noticed
 which have prepared and introduced the 
new age of philosophy4 ,first among     
these is a list of ,italian             
philosophers1 from the second half of   
the sixteenth and the first half  of the

 seventeenth century4 ,these            
philosophers are connected in a  twofold
 manner with the movements already      
sketched of this transition  period1    
first by an enthusiasm for nature which 
among them all partook  in a greater or 
less degree of pantheism 7,vanini e4 g4 
gave to one of  his writings the title  
8concerning the wonderful secrets of    
nature1 the  queen and goddess of       
mortals071 and second1 by their         
connection with the  systems of ancient 
philosophy4 ,the best known of these    
philosophers are  the following3        
,cardanus 7#aeja-aege71 ,campanella     
7#aefh-afci71  ,giordano ,bruno         
7--#afjj71 ,vanini 7#aehf-afai47 ,they  
were all men of a  passionate1          
enthusiastic and impetuous nature1      
unsteady and wild in  character1        
restless and adventurous in life1 men   
who were inspired by an  eager impulse  
towards knowledge1 but who were carried 
away by great  fantasy1 wildness of     
imagination1 and a seeking after secret 

astrological and geomantic knowledge4   
,for these reasons they also passed     
away1 leaving no fruitful result behind4
 ,they were all persecuted by the       
hierarchy1 and two of them 7,bruno and  
,vanini7 ended their lives at the       
stake4 ,in their whole historical       
appearance they are like the eruption   
of a volcano1 and are to be regarded    
more as forerunners and announcers  than
 as beginners and founders of the new   
age of philosophy4 ,the most  important 
among them is ,giordano ,bruno4 ,he     
reviewed the old idea of  the ,stoics1  
that the world is a living being1 and   
that a world-soul  penetrates it all4   
,the content of his general thought is  
the profoundest  enthusiasm for nature1 
and the plastic reason which is present 
in it4  ,the reason is1 according to    
him1 the inner artist who shapes the    
matter  and manifests himself in the    
forms of the universe4 ,from the heart  
of  the root or the germ he sends out   
the lobes1 and from these again he      

evolves the shoots1 and from the shoots 
the branches1 until bud1 and  leaf1 and 
blossom are brought forth4 ,every thing 
is arranged1 adjusted1  and perfected   
within4 ,thus the universal reason calls
 back from within  the sap out of the   
fruits and flowers to the branches      
again1 c4 ,the  universe thus is an     
infinite living thing1 in which every   
thing lives  and moves after the most   
manifold way4    ,the relation of the   
reason to matter1 ,bruno determines     
wholly in the  ,aristotelian manner2    
both stand related to each other as form
 and  matter1 as actuality and          
potentiality1 neither is without the    
other2 the  form is the inner impelling 
might of matter1 and matter1 as the     
unlimited possibility1 as the capability
 for an infinite diversity of  form1 is 
the mother of all forms4 ,the other side
 of ,bruno's  philosophizing1 his       
elaboration of the topics of ,lullus1   
which occupies  the greater part of his 
writings1 has little philosophic        

interest1 and  we therefore pass it by4 
#h4 ,,jacob ,,boehme4--,as ,bacon among 
the ,english and ,bruno among the       
,italians1 so ,jacob ,boehme is the     
index among the ,germans of this        
transition period4 ,each one of these   
three indicates it in a way  peculiar to
 his own nationality2 ,bacon as the     
herald of empiricism1  ,bruno as the    
representative of a poetic pantheism1   
and ,boehme as the  father of the       
theosophic mysticism4 ,if we regarded   
alone the  profoundness of his          
principle1 ,boehme should hold a much   
later place in  the history of          
philosophy1 but if we looked chiefly at 
the imperfect  form of his              
philosophizing1 his rank would be       
assigned to the mystics of  the ,middle 
,ages1 while chronologically we must    
associate him with the  ,german         
,reformation and the protestant elements
 that were nourished at  that time4 ,his
 true position is among the forerunners 
and prophets of  the new age4    ,jacob 

,boehme was born in #aege1 in old       
,seidenburg1 a village of upper         
,lusace1 not far from ,goerlitz4 ,his   
parents were poor peasants4 ,in his     
boyhood be took care of the cattle1 and 
in his youth1 after he had  acquired the
 rudiments of reading and writing in a  
village school1 he  was sent to         
,goerlitz to learn the shoe-maker's art4
 ,he finished his  apprenticeship and   
settled down at ,goerlitz in #aeid as   
master of his  trade4 ,even in his youth
 he had received illuminations or       
mysterious  revealings1 which were      
subsequently repeated when his soul1    
striving for  the truth1 had become     
profoundly agitated by the religious    
conflicts of  the age4 ,besides the     
,bible1 the only books which ,boehme    
read were some  mystical writings of a  
theosophic and alchymistic content1 e4  
g4 those  of ,paracelsus4 ,his entire   
want of culture is seen as soon as he   
undertakes to write down his thoughts1  
or1 as he calls them1 his               

illuminations4 ,hence the imperious     
struggle of the thought with the        
expression1 which1 however1 not         
unfrequently rises to a dialectical     
acuteness and a poetic beauty4 ,his     
first treatise1 ,aurora1 composed in    
the year #afab1 brought ,boehme into    
trouble with the chief pastor in        
,goerlitz1 ,gregorious ,richter1 who    
publicly condemned the book from the    
pulpit1 and even ridiculed the person of
 its author4 ,the writing of  books was 
prohibited him by a magistrate1 a       
prohibition which ,boehme  observed for 
many years1 till at length the command  
of the spirit was  too mighty within    
him1 and he took up again his literary  
labors4 ,boehme  was a plain1 quiet1    
modest and gentle man4 ,he died in      
#afbd4    ,to give an exhibition of his 
theosophy in a few words is very        
difficult1  since ,boehme1 instead of   
clothing his thoughts in a logical form1
  dressed them only in pictures of the  
sense and obscure analogies1 and  often 

availed himself of the most arbitrary   
and singular modes of  expression4 ,a   
twilight reigns in his writings1 as in a
 ,gothic cathedral  where the light     
falls through variegated windows4 ,hence
 the magic effect  which he has made    
upon many hearts4 ,the chief thought of 
his  philosophizing is this1 viz41 that 
the distinguishing of the self from  the
 not-self is the essential determination
 of spirit1 and hence of ,god  so far as
 ,god is to be apprehended as spirit4   
,god1 according to ,boehme1  is living  
spirit only at the time and in the      
degree in which he  conceives the       
distinction within himself from himself1
 and is in this  distinction object and 
consciousness4 ,the distinction of ,god 
in himself  is the only source of his   
and of all actuosity and spontaneity1   
the  spring and fountain of that        
self-active life which produces         
consciousness out of itself4 ,boehme is 
inexhaustible in images by which  this  
negativity in ,god1 his                 

self-distinguishing and                 
self-renunciation to  the world1 may be 
made conceivable4 ,the great expansion  
without end1 he  says1 needs limitation 
and a compass in which it may manifest  
itself1  for in expansion without limit 
there could be no manifestation1 there  
must be a contraction and an enclosing1 
in order that a manifestation  may      
arise4 ,see1 he says in another place1  
if the will were only of one  kind1 then
 would the soul have only one quality1  
and were an immovable  thing1 which     
would always lie still and never do any 
thing farther than  one thing2 in this  
there could be no joy1 as also no art   
nor science of  other things1 and no    
wisdom2 every thing would be a nothing1 
and there  would be neither heart nor   
will for any thing1 for there would be  
only  the single4 ,hence it cannot be   
said that the whole ,god is in one will 
and essence1 there is a distinction4    
,nothing can ever become manifest to    
itself without resistance1 for if it has

 nothing resisting1 it expends  itself  
and never comes to itself again2 but if 
it does not come to  itself again except
 in that from which it has originally   
sprung1 it thus  knows nothing of its   
original condition4 ,the above thought  
,boehme  expresses when he says in his  
,questionibus ,theosophicis2 the reader 
should know that in yea and nay all     
things consist1 whether divine1         
devilish1 earthly1 or whatever may be   
named4 ,the one as the yea1 is  simple  
energy and love1 and is the truth of    
,god and ,god himself4 ,but  this were  
inconceivable1 and there were neither   
delight1 nor importance1  nor           
sensibility1 without the nay4 ,the nay  
is thrown in the way of the  yea1 or of 
truth1 in order that the truth may be   
manifest and something1  in which there 
may be a contrarium1 where eternal love 
may work and  become sensitive and      
willing4 ,there is nothing in the one   
which is an  occasion for willing until 
the one becomes duplicated1 and so there

 can  be no sensation in unity1 but only
 in duality4 ,in brief1 according to    
,boehme1 neither knowledge nor          
consciousness is possible1 without      
distinction1 without opposition1 without
 duplication2 a thing becomes  clear and
 an object of consciousness only through
 something else1  through its own       
opposition identical with its own being4
 ,it was very  natural to connect this  
thought of a unity distinguishing itself
 in  itself1 with the ,christian        
doctrine of the ,trinity1 as ,boehme    
has1 in  fact1 repeatedly done when     
treating of the ,divine life and its    
process  of duplication4 ,schelling     
afterwards took up these ideas of       
,boehme and  philosophically elaborated 
them4    ,if we should assign to the    
theosophy of ,boehme a position in the  
development of later philosophy         
corresponding to the inner content of   
its principle1 it would most properly be
 placed as a complement to the  system  
of ,spinoza4 ,if ,spinoza taught the    

flowing back of all the  finite into the
 eternal one1 ,boehme1 on the other     
hand1 shows the  procession of the      
finite from the eternal one1 and the    
inner necessity  of this procession1    
since the being of this one would be    
rather a  not-being without such a      
self-duplication4 ,compared with        
,descartes1  ,boehme has at least more  
profoundly apprehended the conception of
  self-consciousness and the relation of
 the finite to ,god4 ,but his           
historical position in other respects is
 far too isolated and  exceptional1 and 
his mode of statement far too impure1 to
 warrant us in  incorporating him       
anywhere in a series of systems         
developed continuously  and in a genetic
 connection4          ,,section ,,xxiv4 
,,descartes4      ,the beginner and     
founder of modern philosophy is         
,descartes4 ,while he1  like the men of 
the transition epoch just noticed1 broke
 loose entirely  from the previous      
philosophizing1 and began his work      

wholly de novo1  yet he did not content 
himself1 like ,bacon1 with merely       
bringing out a  new method1 or like     
,boehme and his contemporaries among the
 ,italians1  with affirming             
philosophical views without a methodical
 ground4 ,he went  further than any of  
these1 and making his standpoint one of 
universal  doubt1 he affirms a new1     
positive1 and pregnant philosophical    
principle1  from which he attempted     
logically to deduce the chief points of 
his  system4 ,the character and novelty 
of his principle makes him the          
beginner1 and its inner fruitfulness the
 founder1 of modern philosophy4    ,rene
 ,descartes 7,renatus ,cartesius7 was   
born in #aeif1 at ,la ,haye in          
,torraine4 ,possessing an independent   
property1 he volunteered as a  soldier  
in his twenty-first year1 and served in 
the wars with the ,dutch1  the          
,bavarians1 and the ,imperialists4      
,after this he travelled a good  deal1  
and then abode a considerable time in   

,paris4 ,in #afbi he left his  native   
land1 and betook himself to ,holland1   
that he might there1  undisturbed and   
unknown1 devote himself to philosophy1  
and elaborate his  scientific ideas4 ,he
 spent twenty years in ,holland1        
enduring much  vexatious treatment from 
fanatical theologians1 till in #afdi he 
accepted  an invitation from ,queen     
,christina of ,sweden1 to visit         
,stockholm1 where  he died in the       
following year4    ,the chief content of
 the ,cartesian system may be seen      
condensed in the  following epitome4    
#a4 ,if science would have any thing    
fixed and abiding1 it must begin with   
the primal ground of things2 every      
presupposition which we may have        
cherished from infancy must be          
abandoned2 in a word1 we must doubt at  
every point to which the least          
uncertainty is attached4 ,we must       
therefore doubt not only the existence  
of the objects of sense1 since  the     
senses so frequently deceive1 but also  

the truths of mathematics and           
geometry--for1 however evident the      
proposition may appear that two and     
three make five1 or that the square has 
four sides1 yet we cannot know  but what
 ,god may have designedly formed us for 
erroneous judgments4 ,it  is therefore  
advisable to doubt every thing1 in fact 
to deny every  thing1 to posit every    
thing as false4    #b4 ,but though we   
posit every thing as false to which the 
slightest doubt  may be attached1 yet we
 cannot deny one thing1 viz41 the truth 
that we1  who so think1 do exist4 ,but  
rather from the very fact that ,i posit 
every  thing as false1 that ,i doubt    
every thing1 is it manifest that ,i1 the
  doubter1 exist4 ,hence the            
proposition3 ,i think1 therefore ,i am  
7cogito  ergo sum71 is the first and    
most certain position which offers      
itself  to every one attempting to      
philosophize4 ,upon this the most       
certain of  all propositions1 the       
certainty of all other knowledge        

depends4 ,the  objection of ,gassendi   
that the truth of existence follows from
 any  other activity of man as well as  
from thinking1 that ,i might just as    
well say3 ,i go to walk1 therefore ,i   
exist1--has no weight2 for1 of all my   
actions1 ,i can be absolutely certain   
only of my thinking4    #c4 ,from the   
proposition ,i think1 therefore1 ,i am1 
the whole nature of  the mind may be    
determined4 ,when we examine who we are 
who hold every  thing to be false that  
is distinct from ourselves1 we see      
clearly that  neither extension nor     
figure1 nor any thing which can be      
predicated of  body1 but only thought1  
belongs to our nature4 ,i am therefore  
only a  thinking being1 i4 e4 mind1     
soul1 intelligence1 reason4 ,thought is 
my  substance4 ,mind can therefore be   
apprehended clearly and completely for  
itself alone1 without any of those      
attributes which belong to body4 ,its   
conception contains nothing of that     
which belongs to the conception of      

body4 ,it is therefore impossible to    
apprehend it through any sensuous       
representation1 or to make an image of  
it3 it apprehends itself only  through  
the pure intelligence4    #d4 ,from the 
proposition cogito ergo sum1 follows    
still farther the  universal rule of all
 certainty4 ,i am certain that ,i am a  
thinking  being1 what now is involved in
 the fact that ,i am certain of any     
thing8  ,whence comes this certainty8   
,from no other source than the knowledge
  that this first proposition contains a
 clear conception of that which ,i      
affirm4 ,i know of a certainty that ,i  
am1 and ,i know any thing else only     
when ,i know it as certainly as ,i know 
that ,i am4 ,hence ,i may regard it  as 
a universal rule1 that every thing is   
true which ,i know clearly and          
determinately4    #e4 ,this rule1       
however1 is only a principle of         
certainty1 not of  knowledge and of     
truth4 ,we apply it therefore to our    
thoughts or ideas1  in order to discover

 what is objectively true4 ,but our     
ideas are partly  innate1 partly        
acquired1 and partly self-originated4   
,among those of the  first class we find
 the idea of a ,god4 ,the question      
arises1 whence have  we this idea8      
,manifestly not from ourselves2 this    
idea could only be  implanted within us 
by a being who has the fulness of all   
perfection in  himself1 i4 e4 only by an
 actually existing ,god4 ,if ,i ask now 
the  question1 whence have ,i the       
faculty to conceive of a nature more    
perfect  than my own8 the answer must   
ever come1 that ,i have it only from him
  whose nature is actually more perfect4
 ,all the attributes of ,god1 the  more 
,i contemplate them1 show that their    
idea could not have originated  with    
myself alone4 ,for though there might be
 in me the idea of substance  because ,i
 am a substance1 yet ,i could not of    
myself have the idea of an  infinite    
substance1 since ,i am finite2 such an  
idea could only be given  me through a  

substance actually infinite4 ,moreover1 
we must not think  that the conception  
of the infinite is to be gained through 
abstraction  and negation1 as we might  
gain darkness through the negation of   
light2  but ,i perceive1 rather1 that   
the infinite contains more reality than 
the  finite1 and that1 therefore1 the   
conception of the infinite must be      
correspondingly antecedent in me to that
 of the finite4 ,since then ,i  have a  
clear and determined idea of the        
infinite substance1 and since  this has 
a greater objective reality than every  
other1 so is there no  other which ,i   
have so little reason to doubt4 ,but now
 since ,i am certain  that the idea of  
,god has come to me from ,god himself1  
it only remains  for me to examine the  
way in which ,i have received it from   
,god4 ,i have  never derived it directly
 nor indirectly from the sense1 for     
ideas  through the sense arise only by  
affecting the external organs of sense2 
neither have ,i devised it1 for ,i can  

neither add to it nor diminish it  in   
any respect1--it must1 therefore1 be    
innate as the idea of myself is  innate4
 ,hence the first proof we can assign   
for the being of a ,god is  the fact    
that we find the idea of a ,god within  
us1 and that we must have  a cause for  
its being4 ,again1 the being of a ,god  
may be concluded from  my own           
imperfection1 and especially from the   
knowledge of my  imperfection4 ,for     
since ,i know that there is a perfection
 which is  wanting in me1 it follows    
that there must exist a being who is    
more  perfect than ,i1 on whom ,i depend
 and from whom ,i receive all ,i        
possess4--,but the best and most evident
 proof for the being of a ,god is1  in  
fine1 that which is gained from the     
conception of a ,god4 ,the mind  among  
all its different ideas singles out the 
chiefest of all1 that of  the most      
perfect being1 and perceives that this  
has not only the  possibility of        
existence1 i4 e4 accidental existence   

like all other  ideas1 but that it      
possesses necessary existence in itself4
 ,and as the  mind knows that in every  
triangle its three angles are equal to  
two  right angles1 because this is      
involved in the very idea of a triangle1
  so does the mind necessarily infer    
that necessary existence belongs to  the
 conception of the most perfect being1  
and that1 therefore1 the most  perfect  
being actually exists4 ,no other idea   
which the mind finds within  itself     
contains necessary existence1 but from  
the idea of the highest  being existence
 cannot be separated without            
contradiction4 ,it is only  our         
prejudices which keep us from seeing    
this4 ,since we are accustomed  in every
 thing to separate its conception from  
its existence1 and since  we often make 
ideas arbitrarily1 it readily happens1  
that when we  contemplate the highest   
being we are in doubt whether its idea  
may not  be one also arbitrarily        
devised1 or at least one in whose       

conception  existence does not          
lie4--,this proof is essentially        
different from that of  ,thomas 7,anselm
 of ,canterbury74 ,his argument was as  
follows3 8,if we  understand what is    
indicated by the word ,,god1 it is all  
that can be  conceived of greatness2 but
 now there is actually and in thought   
more  belonging to him than the word    
represents1 and therefore ,god exists   
not  only in word 7or representation71  
but in fact40 ,here the defect in the   
syllogism is manifest1 for from the     
premise it could only be concluded  that
 ,god must therefore be represented as  
existing in fact1 while his  actual     
existence would not follow4 ,my proof on
 the other hand is  this1--we may       
predicate of a thing what we clearly see
 belongs to its  true and changeless    
nature1 or to its essence1 or to its    
form4 ,but now  after we had examined   
what ,god is1 we found existence to     
belong to his  true and changeless      
nature1 and therefore may we properly   

predicate  existence of ,god4 ,necessary
 existence is contained in the idea of  
the  most perfect being1 not by a       
fiction of our understanding but because
  existence belongs to his eternal and  
changeless nature4    #f4 ,the result   
just found--the existence of ,god--is of
 the highest  consequence4 ,before      
attaining this we were obliged to doubt 
every thing1  and give up even every    
certainty1 for we did not know but that 
it  belonged to the nature of the human 
mind to err1 but that ,god had  created 
us for error4 ,but so soon as we look at
 the necessary attributes  of ,god in   
the innate idea of him1 so soon as we   
know that he is true1 it  would be a    
contradiction to suppose that he would  
deceive us1 or that he  could have made 
us to err2 for though an ability to     
deceive might prove  his skill1 a       
willingness to deceive would only       
demonstrate his frailty4  ,our reason1  
therefore1 can never apprehend an object
 which would not be  true so far as the 

reason apprehended it1 i4 e4 so far as  
it is  clearly known4 ,for ,god might   
justly be styled a deceiver if he had   
given  us a reason so perverted as to   
hold the false for the true4 ,and thus  
every absolute doubt with which we began
 is dispelled4 ,from the being of  ,god 
we derive every certainty4 ,for every   
sure knowledge it is only  necessary    
that we have clearly known a thing1 and 
are also certain of  the existence of a 
,god1 who would not deceive4    #g4     
,from the true idea of ,god follow the  
principles of a philosophy of  nature or
 the doctrine of the two substances4    
,substance is that which so  exists that
 it needs nothing else for its          
existence4 ,in this 7highest7  sense    
,god is the only substance4 ,god1 as the
 infinite substance1 has his  ground in 
himself1 is the cause of himself4 ,the  
two created substances1  on the other   
hand1 the thinking and the corporeal    
substance1 mind and  matter1 are        
substances only in a broader sense of   

the word2 they may be  apprehended under
 the common conception that they are    
things which need  only the co-operation
 of ,god for their existence4 ,each of  
these two  substances has an attribute  
which constitutes its nature and its    
essence1 and to which all its other     
determinations may be referred4 ,the    
attribute and essence of matter is      
extension1 that of mind1 thought4 ,for  
every thing else which can be predicated
 of body presupposes extension1  and is 
only a mode of extension1 as every thing
 we can find in mind is  only a         
modification of thought4 ,a substance to
 which thought immediately  belongs is  
called mind1 and a substance1 whose     
immediate substratum is  extension1 is  
called body4 ,since thought and         
extension are distinct from  each other1
 and since mind cannot only be known    
without the attributes  of the body1 but
 is in itself the negation of those     
attributes1 we may  say that the essence
 of these substances is in their        

reciprocal  negation4 ,mind and body are
 wholly distinct1 and have nothing in   
common4    #h4 ,we pass by the physics  
of ,descartes1 which has only a         
subordinate  philosophical interest1 and
 notice next his views of anthropology4 
,from  this dualistic relation between  
mind and matter1 there follows a        
dualistic relation between soul and     
body4 ,if matter is essentially         
extension1 and mind essentially thought1
 and if the two have nothing in  common1
 then the union of soul and body can be 
conceived only as a  mechanical one4    
,the body is to be regarded as an       
artistic automaton1  which ,god has     
made1 as a statue or machine formed by  
,god from the earth4  ,within this body 
the soul dwells1 closely but not        
internally connected  with it4 ,the     
union of the two is only a powerful     
bringing of the two  together1 since    
each is not only an independent factor1 
but is  essentially distinct from and   
even opposed to the other4 ,the body by 

itself is a machine fully prepared1 in  
which nothing is changed by the         
entrance of the thinking soul1 except   
that through it certain motions  are    
secured3 the wheel-work of the machine  
remains as it was4 ,it is only  thought 
which distinguishes this machine from   
every other2 hence1  therefore1 brutes  
which are not self-conscious nor        
thinking1 must be  ranked with all other
 machines4 ,from this standpoint arose  
especially  the question concerning the 
seat of the soul4 ,if body and soul are 
independent substances1 each essentially
 opposed to the other1 they  cannot     
interpenetrate each other1 but can touch
 only at one point when  they are       
powerfully brought together4 ,this point
 where the soul has its  seat1 is1      
according to ,descartes1 not the whole  
brain but the pineal  gland1 a little   
kernel in the middle of the brain4 ,the 
proof for this  claim1 that the pineal  
gland is the only place where the soul  
immediately exhibits its energy1 is     

found in the circumstance that all      
other parts of the brain are twofold1   
which should not be in an organ  where  
the soul has its seat1 else objects     
would appear double4 ,there is1         
therefore1 no other place in the body   
where impressions can be so well  united
 as in this gland4 ,the pineal gland is1
 therefore1 the chief seat  of the soul1
 and the place where all our thoughts   
are formed4    ,we have thus developed  
the fundamental thoughts of the         
,cartesian system1  and will now        
recapitulate in a few words the features
 characteristic of  its standpoint and  
historic position4 ,descartes was the   
founder of a new  epoch in philosophy1  
first1 from his postulate of universal  
freedom  from all preconceptions4 ,his  
protesting against every thing which is 
not  posited by the thought1 against    
taking any thing for granted in respect 
of the truth1 has remained from that    
time onward the fundamental  principle  
of the new age4 ,secondly4 ,descartes   

has brought out the  principle of       
self-consciousness 7the mind or the     
thinking substance is  regarded by him  
as an individual self1 a particular     
,ego7--a new  principle1 unknown in this
 view to the ancients4 ,thirdly4        
,descartes  has shown the opposition    
between being and thought1 existence and
  consciousness1 and the mediation of   
this opposition1 which has been the     
problem of the whole modern philosophy1 
he first affirmed as the true           
philosophical problem4 ,but with these  
ideas1 which make an epoch in the       
history of philosophy1 there are at the 
same time connected the defects  of the 
,cartesian philosophizing4 ,first4      
,descartes gained the content  of his   
system1 namely his three substances1    
empirically4 ,true1 the  system which   
begins with a protestation against all  
existence would seem  to take nothing   
for granted1 but to derive every thing  
from the  thinking4 ,but in fact this   
protesting is not thoroughly carried    

out4  ,that which seems to be cast aside
 is afterwards1 when the principle of   
certainty is gained1 taken up again     
unchanged4 ,and so it happens that      
,descartes finds at hand not only the   
idea of ,god1 but his two substances  as
 something immediately given4 ,true1 in 
order to reach them1 he  abstracts every
 thing which lies immediately before    
him1 but in the end  the two substances 
are seen as that which remains when all 
else is  abstracted4 ,they are received 
empirically4 ,the second defect is1     
that ,descartes separates so wholly from
 each other the two sides of the        
opposition between thought and being4   
,he posits both as 8substances10  i4 e4 
as powers1 which reciprocally exclude   
and negate each other4 ,the  essence of 
matter according to him consists only in
 extension1 i4 e4  in the pure being    
extra se 7,aussersichsein71 and that of 
mind only  in thought1 i4 e4 in the pure
 being in se 7,insichsein47 ,the two    
stand over against each other as        

centrifugal and centripetal4 ,but with  
this apprehension of mind and matter1 an
 inner mediation of the two is  an      
impossibility2 there must be a powerful 
act of creation1 there must  be the     
divine assistance in order that the two 
sides may ever come  together1 and be   
united as they are in man4 ,nevertheless
 ,descartes  demands and attempts such a
 mediation of the two sides4 ,but the   
impossibility of truly overcoming the   
dualism of his standpoint is the  third1
 and the chief defect of his system4 ,in
 the proposition 8,i  think1 therefore  
,i am10 or 8,i am thinking10 the two    
sides1 being and  thought1 are indeed   
connected together1 but only that they  
may become  fixed independently in      
respect of each other4 ,if the question 
is asked1  how does the ,ego stand      
related to the extended8 the answer can 
only be3  by thinking1 i4 e4 negatively1
 by excluding it4 ,the idea of ,god1    
therefore1 is all that remains for the  
mediation of these two sides4 ,the  two 

substances are created by ,god1 and     
through the divine will may be  bound   
together2 through the idea of ,god1 the 
,ego attains the certainty  that the    
extended exists4 ,god is therefore in a 
certain degree a ,deus  ex machina1     
necessary in order to mediate the       
conflict of the ,ego with  the extended4
 ,it is obvious how external such a     
mediation is4    ,this defect of the    
,cartesian system operated as an        
impelling motive to  those which        
succeeded4          ,,section ,,xxv4    
,,geulincx ,,and ,,malebranche4      #a4
 ,mind and matter1 consciousness and    
existence1 ,descartes had fixed in  the 
farthest separation from each other4    
,both1 with him1 are substances1        
independent powers1 reciprocally        
excluding oppositions4 ,mind 7i4 e4 in  
his view the simple self1 the ,ego7 he  
regarded as essentially the  abstraction
 from the sensuous1 the distinguishing  
itself from matter and  the separating  
of matter from itself2 matter was       

essentially the  complete opposition to 
thought4 ,if the relation of these two  
powers be  as has been given1 then the  
question arises1 how can there ever be a
  filiation 7,rapport7 between them8    
,how1 on the one hand1 can the          
affections of the body work upon the    
soul1 and on the other hand1 how  can   
the volition of the soul direct the     
body1 if the two are absolutely         
distinct and opposed to each other8 ,at 
this point1 ,arnold ,geulincx 7a        
disciple of ,descartes1 born at ,antwerp
 #afbe1 and died as professor of        
philosophy at ,leyden #affi7 took up the
 ,cartesian system1 and endeavored  to  
give it a greater logical perfection4   
,according to ,geulincx neither  the    
soul works immediately upon the body1   
nor the body immediately upon  the soul4
 ,certainly not the former3 for though  
,i can determine and  move my body in   
many respects arbitrarily1 yet ,i am not
 the cause of  this movement2 for ,i    
know not how it happens1 ,i know not in 

what manner  motion is communicated from
 my brain to the different parts of my  
body1  and it is impossible that ,i     
should do that in respect of which ,i   
cannot  see how it is done4 ,but if ,i  
cannot produce motion in my body1 much  
less  can ,i do this outside of my body4
 ,i am therefore simply a contemplator  
of the world2 the only act which is     
peculiarly mine is contemplation4  ,but 
even this contemplation arises in a     
singular manner4 ,for if we ask  how we 
obtain our observations of the external 
world1 we find it  impossible that the  
external world should directly give them
 to us4 ,for  however much we may say   
that1 e4 g4 in the act of seeing1 the   
external  objects produce an image in my
 eye or an impression in my brain as in 
wax1 yet this impression or picture is  
after all only something  corporeal or  
material1 and cannot therefore come into
 my mind1 which is  absolutely distinct 
from every thing material4 ,there       
remains1 therefore1  only that we seek  

the mediation of the two sides in ,god4 
,it is ,god alone  who can unite the    
outer with the inner1 and the inner with
 the outer2  who can make the outer     
phenomena to become inner               
representations or  notions of the mind2
 who can thus bring the world within the
 mind's  observation1 and the inner     
determinations of the will outward into 
deed4  ,hence every working1 every act  
which unites the outer and inner1 which 
brings the mind and the world into      
connection1 is neither a working of  the
 mind nor of the world1 but only an     
immediate working of ,god4 ,the         
movement of my limbs does not follow    
from my will1 but only because it  is   
the will of ,god that these movements   
should follow when ,i will4 ,my  will is
 an occasion by which ,god moves my     
body--an affection of my body  is an    
occasion by which ,god brings within me 
a representation of the  external world3
 the one is only the occasional cause of
 the other 7hence  the name             

occasionalism74 ,my will1 however1 does 
not move ,god to move my  limbs1 but he 
who has imparted motion to matter and   
given it its laws1  created also my     
will1 and has so connected together the 
most diverse  things1 the movement of   
matter and the arbitrium of my will1    
that when  my will puts forth a         
volition1 such a motion follows as it   
wills1 and  the motion follows the      
volition without any interaction or     
physical  influence exerted by the one  
upon the other4 ,but just as it is with 
two  clocks which go exactly alike1 the 
one striking precisely as the other1    
their harmony is not the result of any  
reciprocal interacting1 but  follows    
because both have been fashioned and    
directed alike1--so is it  with the     
movements of the body and the will1 they
 harmonize only through  that exalted   
artist who has in this ineffable way    
connected them  together4 ,we see from  
this that ,geulincx has carried to its  
limit the  dualistic basis of           

,descartes4 ,while ,descartes called the
 union of mind  and matter a conjunction
 through power1 ,geulincx named it a    
miracle4  ,there is consequently in this
 view no immanent1 but only a           
transcendent  mediation possible4    #b4
 ,closely connected with this view of   
,geulincx1 and at the same time a  real 
consequence and a wider development of  
the ,cartesian  philosophizing1 is the  
philosophic standpoint of ,nicolas      
,malebranche4  ,he was born at ,paris in
 #afch1 chosen a member of the          
8,congrgation de  l'oratoire0 in his    
twenty-second year1 won over to         
philosophy through  the writings of     
,descartes1 and died1 after numerous    
feuds with  theological opposers1 in    
#agae4    ,malebranche started with the 
,cartesian view of the relation between 
mind  and matter4 ,both are strictly    
distinct from each other1 and in their  
essence opposed4 ,how now does the mind1
 7i4 e4 the ,ego7 gain a  knowledge of  
the external world and have ideas of    

corporeal things8 ,for  it comes to know
 things only by means of ideas1--not    
through itself1 not  immediately4 ,now  
the mind can neither gain these ideas   
from itself1 nor  from the things       
themselves4 ,not from itself1 for it is 
absolutely  opposed to the bodily world1
 and hence has no capacity to idealize1 
to  spiritualize material things1 though
 they must become spiritualized  before 
they can be introduced to the mind2 in a
 word1 the mind1 which in  relation to  
the material world is only an           
opposition1 has no power to  destroy    
this opposition4 ,just as little has the
 mind derived these ideas  from things3 
for matter is not visible through       
itself1 but rather as  antithetic to    
mind is it that which is absolutely     
unintelligible1 and  which cannot be    
idealized1 that which is absolutely     
without light and  clearness4--,it only 
remains1 therefore1 that the mind       
beholds things in a  third that stands  
above the opposition of the two1 viz41  

,god4 ,god1 as  the absolute substance1 
is the absolute ideality1 the infinite  
power to  spiritualize all things4      
,material things have no real opposition
 for  ,god1 to him they are no          
impenetrable darkness1 but an ideal     
existence2  all things are in him       
spiritually and ideally2 the whole      
world1 as  intellectual or ideal1 is    
,god4 ,god is1 therefore1 the higher    
mean  between the ,ego and the external 
world4 ,in him we behold ideas1 we being
  so strictly united with him1 that he  
may properly be called the place of     
minds4    ,the philosophy of            
,malebranche1 whose simple thought is   
this1 that we  know and see all things  
in ,god1--shows itself1 like the        
occasionalism of  ,geulincx1 to be a    
peculiar attempt to stand upon the basis
 of the  ,cartesian philosophy1 and with
 its fundamental thought to overcome its
  dualism4    #c4 ,two defects or inner 
contradictions have manifested          
themselves in the  philosophy of        

,descartes4 ,he had considered mind and 
matter as  substances1 each one of which
 excluded the other from itself1 and had
  sought a mediation of the two4 ,but   
with such conditions no mediation  other
 than an external one is possible4 ,if  
thought and existence are  each one     
substance1 then can they only negate and
 exclude each other4  ,unnatural        
theories1 like those which have been    
mentioned1 are the  inevitable result of
 this4 ,the simplest way out of the     
difficulty is to  give up the principle 
first assumed1 to strip off their       
independence  from the two opposites1   
and instead of regarding them as        
substances1  view them as accidents of  
one substance4 ,this way of escape is   
moreover  indicated by a particular     
circumstance4 ,according to ,descartes1 
,god is  the infinite substance1 the    
peculiar substance in the proper sense  
of  the word4 ,mind and matter are      
indeed substances1 but only in relation 
to  each other2 in relation to ,god they

 are dependent1 and not substances4     
,this is1 strictly taken1 a             
contradiction4 ,the true consequence    
were  rather to say that neither the    
,ego 7i4 e4 the individual thinking7 nor
  the material things are independent1  
but that this can be predicated  only of
 the one substance1 ,god2 this substance
 alone has a real being1  and all the   
being which belongs to individual       
essences these latter  possess not as a 
substantial being1 but only as accidents
 of the one  only true and real         
substance4 ,malebranche approached this 
consequence4  ,with him the bodily world
 is ideally at least resolved and made  
to sink  in ,god1 in whom are the       
eternal archetypes of all things4 ,but  
,spinoza  has most decidedly and        
logically adopted this consequence1 and 
affirmed  the accidence of all          
individual being and the exclusive      
substantiality  of ,god alone4 ,his     
system is the perfection and the truth  
of the  ,cartesian4          ,,section  

,,xxvi4    ,,spinoza4      ,baruch or   
,benedict ,spinoza was born at          
,amsterdam1 ,nov4 #bd1 #afcb4 ,his      
parents were ,jews of ,portuguese       
descent1 and being merchants of         
opulence1 they gave him a finished      
education4 ,he studied with great       
diligence the ,bible and the ,talmud1   
but soon exchanged the pursuit of       
theology for the study of physics and   
the works of ,descartes4 ,he early      
became dissatisfied with ,judaism1 and  
presently came to an open rupture  with 
it1 though without going over formally  
to ,christianity4 ,in order to  escape  
the persecutions of the ,jews1 who had  
excommunicated him1 and who  even went  
so far as to make an attempt upon his   
life1 he left ,amsterdam  and betook    
himself to ,rhynsberg1 near ,leyden4 ,he
 finally settled down at  the ,hague1   
where he spent his life in the greatest 
seclusion1 devoted  wholly to scientific
 pursuits4 ,he supported himself by     
grinding optic  glasses1 which his      

friends sold for him4 ,the ,elector     
,palatine1 ,charles  ,louis1 offered him
 a ,professorship of ,philosophy at     
,heidelberg1 with the  full permission  
to teach as he chose1 but ,spinoza      
declined the post4  ,naturally of a weak
 constitution1 which consumption had for
 many years  been undermining1 ,spinoza 
died at the age of #dd1 on the #bast of 
,february1 #afgg4 ,in his life there was
 mirrored the unclouded clearness  and  
exalted serenity of the perfected sage4 
,abstemious in his habits1  satisfied   
with little1 the master of his passions1
 never intemperately  sad nor joyous1   
gentle and benevolent1 with a character 
of singular  excellence and purity1 he  
faithfully illustrated in his life1 the 
doctrines of his philosophy4 ,his chief 
work1 the ,ethica1 appeared the  year of
 his death4 ,his design was probably to 
have published it during  his life1 but 
the odious report that he was an atheist
 restrained him4  ,the friend he most   
trusted1 ,louis ,mayer1 a physician1    

attended to its  publication after the  
author's death and according to his     
will4    ,the system of ,spinoza rests  
upon three fundamental conceptions1 from
  which all the rest may be derived with
 mathematical necessity4 ,these         
conceptions are that of substance1 of   
attribute1 and of mode4    #a4 ,spinoza 
starts from the ,cartesian conception of
 substance3 substance  is that which    
needs nothing other for its existence4  
,but with such a  conception there can  
exist only one single substance4 ,a     
number of  substances like that of      
,descartes is necessarily a             
contradiction4 ,there  can be nothing   
which has a substantial being besides   
the one substance  of all things4 ,this 
one substance ,spinoza calls ,god4 ,of  
course1 with  such a view1 the          
,christian idea of ,god1 the notion of a
 spiritual and  personal being1 must be 
laid aside4 ,spinoza expressly declares1
 that his  notion of ,god is entirely   
different from that of the ,christian2  

he  denied that understanding and will  
could be predicated of ,god2 he         
ridiculed those who supposed that ,god  
worked for an end1 and even  scorned the
 view which regarded the world as a     
product of the ,divine  willing or      
thinking4 ,god is1 with him1 only       
substance1 and nothing more4  ,the      
propositions that there is only one     
,god1 and that the substance of  all    
things is only one1 are with him        
identical4    ,what now peculiarly is   
this substance8 ,what is positive being8
 ,this  question it is very difficult to
 answer directly from the standpoint of 
,spinoza1 partly because a definition1  
according to him1 must contain  7i4 e4  
must be genetically7 the immediate cause
 of that which is to be  explained1 but 
substance is uncreated and can have no  
cause besides  itself2 but prominently  
because ,spinoza held that every        
determination is  a negation1 since it  
must indicate a want of existence1 a    
relative  not-being4 7,omnis            

determinatio est negatio is an          
expression which1  though he uses it    
only occasionally1 expresses the        
fundamental idea of  his whole system47 
,hence1 by setting up any positive      
determinations of  being1 we only take  
away from substance its infinity and    
make it finite4  ,when we therefore     
affirm any thing concerning it1 we can  
only speak  negatively1 e4 g4 that it   
has no foreign cause1 that it has no    
plurality1 that it cannot be divided1   
etc4 ,it is even reluctantly that       
,spinoza declares concerning it that it 
is one1 for this predicate might        
readily be taken numerically1 as        
implying that others1 the many1 stood   
over against it4 ,thus there can remain 
only such positive affirmations         
respecting it as express its absolute   
reference to itself4 ,in this sense     
,spinoza says that substance is the     
cause of itself1 i4 e4 its being        
concludes existence in itself4 ,when    
,spinoza calls it eternal1 it is only   

another expression for the same thought2
 for by eternity he understands         
existence itself1 so far as it is       
conceived to follow from the  definition
 of the thing1 in a sense similar to    
that in which  geometricians speak of   
the eternal properties of figures4      
,still farther  he calls substance      
infinite1 because the conception of     
infinity  expressed to him the          
conception of true being1 the absolute  
affirmation  of existence4 ,so also the 
expression1 ,god is free1 affirms       
nothing more  than those already        
mentioned1 viz41 negatively1 that every 
foreign  restraint is excluded from him1
 and positively1 that ,god is in harmony
  with himself1 that his being          
corresponds to the laws of his essence4 
,the comprehensive statement for the    
above is1 that there is only one        
infinite substance that excludes from   
itself all determination and  negation1 
and is named ,god1 or nature4    #b4    
,besides the infinite substance or ,god1

 ,descartes had assumed two  other      
substances created by ,god1 viz41 mind  
7thought71 and matter  7extension74     
,these two ,spinoza considers in the    
light of attributes1  though1 like      
,descartes1 he receives them            
empirically4 ,what1 now1 is the         
relation of these attributes to the     
infinite substance8 ,this is the  severe
 question1 the tendon-,achilles of      
,spinoza's system4 ,they cannot be      
essential forms in which the substance  
may manifest itself or appear1  for this
 would make them determine the essence  
of the substance1 which  would          
contradict its conception as already    
given4 ,substance1 as such1 is  neither 
understanding nor extension4 ,if1 then1 
the two attributes do not  flow out of  
the essence of the substance1 and do not
 constitute the  substance1 there       
remains only one other supposition1     
viz41 that they are  externally attached
 to the substance2 and this is1 in fact1
 ,spinoza's  view4 ,attribute1 according

 to him1 is that which the understanding
  perceives in the substance as         
constituting its essence4 ,but          
understanding1 as ,spinoza expressly    
says1 does not belong to substance  as  
such4 ,attributes1 therefore1 are those 
determinations which express  the       
essence of the substance only for the   
perceiving understanding2  since they   
express the essence of the substance in 
a determinate way1  while substance     
itself has no determinate way of being1 
they can only  fall outside the         
substance1 viz41 in the reflective      
understanding4 ,to  the substance itself
 it is indifferent whether the          
understanding  contemplate it under     
these two attributes or not2 the        
substance in  itself has an infinity of 
attributes1 i4 e4 every possible        
attribute  which is not a limitation1   
may be predicated of it2 it is only the 
human  understanding which attaches     
these two attributes to the substance1  
and  it affixes no more than these1     

because1 among all the conceptions it   
can  form1 these alone are actually     
positive1 or express a reality4 ,god1 or
  the substance1 is therefore thinking1 
in so far as the understanding          
contemplates him under the attribute of 
thought1 and is extended in so  far as  
the understanding contemplates him under
 the attribute of  extension4 ,it is1   
says ,spinoza--using a figure to express
 this relation  of substance to         
attribute--it is1 like a surface        
reflecting the light1  which            
7objectively taken7 may be hot1 though1 
in reference to the man  looking upon   
it1 it is white4 ,more accurately       
substance is a surface1  standing       
opposite to a beholder who can see only 
through yellow and blue  glasses2 to    
whom1 therefore1 the surface must appear
 either yellow or  blue1 though it is   
neither the one nor the other4    ,in   
relation to substance1 therefore1 the   
attributes must be apprehended  as      
entirely independent3 they must be      

conceived through themselves3  their    
conception is not dependent upon that of
 substance4 ,this is  necessarily true2 
for since the substance can have no     
determinateness1  then the attribute    
which is its determinate being1 cannot  
be explained  from the substance1 but   
only through itself4 ,only by           
apprehending the  attribute             
independently can the unity of the      
substance be maintained4    ,in relation
 to each other1 the attributes are to be
 taken as opposites  strictly and       
determinately diverse4 ,between the     
bodily and the ideal  world there is no 
reciprocal influence nor interaction3 a 
body can only  spring from a body1 and  
an idea can only have an idea for its   
source4  ,hence1 therefore1 neither the 
mind can work upon the body nor the body
  upon the mind4 ,nevertheless there    
exists between the two worlds a  perfect
 harmony and an entire parallelism4 ,it 
is one and the same  substance which is 
conceived under each of the two         

attributes1 and under  which one of the 
two we may contemplate it is indifferent
 to the  substance itself1 for each mode
 of contemplation is equally correct4   
,from this follows at once the          
proposition of ,spinoza1 that the       
connection of ideas and of things is the
 same4 ,hence the solution to the       
problem of the relation of body and     
soul1 so difficult to find from the     
,cartesian standpoint1 is readily seen  
from that of ,spinoza4 ,body and  soul  
are one and the same thing1 only viewed 
under different attributes4  ,mind is   
nothing but the idea of body1 i4 e4 it  
is the same thing as  body1 only that it
 is viewed under the attribute of       
thought4 ,in the same  way is explained 
the apparent but not real influence of  
the body upon  the mind1 and the mind   
upon the body4 ,that which1 in one point
 of view  is bodily motion1 in another  
is an act of thought4 ,in short1 the    
most  perfect parallelism reigns between
 the world of bodily things and that  of

 ideas4    #c4 ,individual beings1 which
 considered under the attribute of      
thought  are ideas1 and under the       
attribute of extension are bodies1      
,spinoza  comprehends under the         
conception of accidence1 or1 as he calls
 it1 mode4  ,by modes we are therefore  
to understand the changing forms of     
substance4  ,the modes stand related to 
the substance as the rippling waves of  
the  sea to the water of the sea1 as    
forms constantly disappearing and never 
having a real being4 ,in fact this      
example goes too far1 for the waves of  
the sea are at least a part of the water
 of the sea1 while the modes1  instead  
of being parts of the substance1 are    
essentially nothing and  without being4 
,the finite has no existence as finite2 
only the infinite  substance has actual 
existence4 ,substance1 therefore1 could 
not be  regarded more falsely than if it
 should be viewed as made up of modes4  
,that would be1 ,spinoza remarks1 as if 
one should say that the line is  made up

 out of points4 ,it is just as false to 
affirm that ,spinoza  identifies ,god   
and the world4 ,he identifies them so   
little that he would  rather say that   
the world1 as world1 i4 e4 as an        
aggregate of  individuals1 does not at  
all exist2 we might rather say with     
,hegel that  he denies the world 7his   
system is an acosmism71 than with       
,bayle1 that  he makes every thing ,god1
 or that he ascribes divinity to every  
thing4    ,whence do finite things or   
individuals arise1 if they can have no  
existence by the side of substance8     
,they are only the product of our       
deceptive apprehension4 ,there are two  
chief ways of knowledge--the  intuitive1
 through the reason1 and the            
imaginative4 ,to the latter belong  the 
knowledge of experience1 and all that is
 abstract1 superficial1 and  confused2  
to the former1 the collection of all    
fitting 7adequate7 ideas4  ,it is only  
the fault of the imagination that we    
should look upon the  world as a        

manifoldness of individuals2 the        
manifoldness is only a form  of         
representation4 ,the imagination        
isolates and individualizes what the    
reason sees together in its unity4      
,hence it is only as considered  through
 the imagination 7experience or opinion7
 that modes are things2  the reason     
looks upon them as necessary1 or1 what  
is the same thing1 as  eternal4    ,such
 are the fundamental thoughts and       
features of ,spinoza's system4 ,his     
practical philosophy yet remains to be  
characterized and in a few  words4 ,its 
chief propositions follow necessarily   
from the metaphysical  grounds already  
cited4 ,first1 it follows from these1   
that what is called  free will cannot be
 admitted4 ,for since man is only a     
mode1 he1 like  every other mode1 stands
 in an endless series of conditioning   
causes1  and no free will can therefore 
be predicated of him4 ,the will must    
thus1  like the body 7and the resolution
 of the will is only a modification of  

the body71 be determined by something   
other than itself4 ,men regard          
themselves as free only because they are
 conscious of their actions and  not of 
the determining causes4 ,just so the    
notions which one commonly  connects    
with the words good and evil1 rest on an
 error as follows at  once from the     
conception of the absolute divine       
causality4 ,good and evil  are not      
something actually in the things        
themselves1 but only express  relative  
conceptions which we have formed from a 
comparison of things  with one another4 
,thus1 by observing certain things we   
form a certain  universal conception1   
which we thereupon treat as though it   
were the  rule for the being and acting 
of all individuals1 and if any          
individual  varies from this conception 
we fancy that it does not correspond to 
its  nature1 and is incomplete4 ,evil or
 sin is therefore only something        
relative1 for nothing happens against   
,god's will4 ,it is only a simple       

negation or deprivation1 which only     
seems to be a reality in our            
representation4 ,with ,god there is no  
idea of the evil4 ,what is therefore    
good and what evil8 ,that is good which 
is useful to us1 and that evil  which   
hinders us from partaking of a good4    
,that1 moreover1 is useful to  us which 
brings us to a greater reality1 which   
preserves and exalts our  being4 ,but   
our true being is knowledge1 and hence  
that only is useful to  us which aids us
 in knowing2 the highest good is the    
knowledge of ,god2  the highest virtue  
of the mind is to know and love ,god4   
,from the  knowledge of ,god we gain the
 highest gladness and joy of the mind1  
the  highest blessedness4 ,blessedness1 
hence1 is not the reward of virtue1  but
 virtue itself4    ,the grand feature of
 ,spinoza's philosophy is that it buries
 every thing  individual and particular1
 as a finite1 in the abyss of the divine
  substance4 ,with its view unalterably 
fixed upon the eternal one1 it  loses   

sight of every thing which seems actual 
in the ordinary notions of  men4 ,but   
its defect consists in its inability to 
transform this negative  abyss of       
substance into the positive ground of   
all-being and becoming4  ,the substance 
of ,spinoza1 has been justly compared to
 the lair of a  lion1 which many        
footsteps enter1 but from which none    
emerge4 ,the  existence of the          
phenomenal world1 though it be only the 
apparent and  deceptive reality of the  
finite1 ,spinoza does not explain4 ,with
 his  abstract conception of substance  
he cannot explain it4 ,and yet the means
  to help him out of the difficulty lay 
near at hand4 ,he failed to apply       
universally his fundamental principle   
that all determination is  negation2 he 
applied it only to the finite1 but the  
abstract infinite1  in so far as it     
stands over against the finite1 is also 
a determinate2  this infinite must be   
denied by its negation1 which is the    
case when a  finite world is posited4   

,jacob ,boehme rightly apprehended this1
 when he  affirmed1 that without a      
self-duplication1 without an ingress    
into the  limited1 the finite1 the      
original ground of things is an empty   
nothing  7cf4  ,,xxiii4 #h74 ,so the    
original ground of ,spinoza is a        
nothing1 a  purely indeterminate1       
because with him substance was only a   
principle of  unity and not also a      
principle of distinction1 because its   
attributes1  instead of being an        
expression of an actual difference and a
 positive  distinction to itself1 are   
rather wholly indifferent to itself4    
,the  system of ,spinoza is the most    
abstract ,monotheism that can be        
thought4  ,it is not accidental that its
 author1 a ,jew1 should have brought out
  again this view of the world1 this    
view of absolute identity1 for it is  in
 a certain degree with him only a       
consequence of his national             
religion--an echo of the ,orient4       
,,section ,,xxvii4    ,,idealism ,,and  

,,realism4      ,we have now reached a  
point of divergence in the development  
of  philosophy4 ,descartes had affirmed 
and attempted to mediate the            
opposition1 between thought and being1  
mind and matter4 ,this mediation1       
however1 was hardly successful1 for the 
two sides of the opposition he  had     
fixed in their widest separation1 when  
he posited them as two  substances or   
powers1 which reciprocally negated each 
other4 ,the  followers of ,descartes    
sought a more satisfactory mediation1   
but the  theories to which they saw     
themselves driven1 only indicated the   
more  clearly that the whole premise    
from which they started must be given   
up4  ,at length ,spinoza abandoned the  
false notion1 and took away its         
substantiality from each of the two     
opposed principles4 ,mind and matter1   
thought and extension1 are now one in   
the infinite substance4 ,yet they  are  
not one in themselves1 which would be   
the only true unity of the  two4 ,that  

they are one in the substance is of     
little avail1 since they  are           
indifferent to the substance1 and are   
not immanent distinctions in  it4 ,thus 
even with ,spinoza the two remain       
strictly separate4 ,the ground  of this 
isolation we find in the fact that      
,spinoza himself did not  sufficiently  
renounce the ,cartesian notion1 and thus
 could not escape  the ,cartesian       
dualism4 ,with him1 as with ,descartes1 
thought is only  thought1 and extension 
only extension1 and in such an          
apprehension of  the two1 the one       
necessarily excludes the other4 ,if we  
would find an  inner mediation for the  
two1 we must cease to abstract every    
thing  essential from each4 ,the        
opposite sides must be mediated even in 
their  strictest opposition4 ,to do     
this1 two ways alone were possible4 ,a  
position could be taken either on the   
material or on the ideal side1 and  the 
attempt made to explain the ideal under 
the material1 or the  material under the

 ideal1 comprehending one through the   
other4 ,both  these attempts were in    
fact made1 and at about the same time4  
,the two  parallel courses of a         
one-sided idealism1 and a one-sided     
realism  7,empiricism1 ,sensualism1     
,materialism71 now begin their          
development4          ,,section         
,,xxviii4    ,,locke4      ,the founder 
of the realistic course and the father  
of modern ,empiricism  and ,materialism1
 is ,john ,locke1 an ,englishman4       
,thomas ,hobbes  7#aehh-afgi7 was his   
predecessor and countryman1 whose name  
we need here  only mention1 as it has no
 importance except for the history of   
natural  rights4    ,john ,locke was    
born at ,wrington1 #afcb4 ,his student  
years he devoted to  philosophy and     
prominently to medicine1 though his weak
 health prevented  him from practising  
as a physician4 ,few cares of business  
interrupted  his leisure1 and he devoted
 his time mostly to literary pursuits4  
,his  friendly relations with ,lord     

,anthony ,ashley1 afterwards ,earl of   
,shaftesbury1 exerted a weighty         
influence upon his course in life4 ,at  
the  house of this distinguished        
statesman and author he always found the
  most cordial reception1 and an        
intercourse with the most important men 
of ,england4 ,in the year #afgj he      
sketched for a number of friends the    
first plan of his famous ,essay on the  
,human ,understanding1 though the       
completed work did not appear till      
#afhi4 ,locke died aged #gb in the year 
#agjd4 ,his writings are characterized  
by clearness and precision1  openness   
and determinateness4 ,more acute than   
profound in his  philosophizing1 he does
 not in this respect belie the          
characteristic of  his nation4 ,the     
fundamental thoughts and results of his 
philosophy have  now become common      
property1 especially among the ,english1
 though it  should not therefore be     
forgotten that he is the first who has  
scientifically established them1 and is1

 on this account1 entitled to a  true   
place in the history of philosophy1 even
 though his principle was  wanting in an
 inner capacity for development4        
,locke's ,philosophy 7i4 e4 his theory  
of knowledge1 for his whole             
philosophizing expends itself in        
investigating the faculty of knowing7   
rests upon two thoughts1 to which he    
never ceases to revert3 first           
7negatively71 there are no innate ideas2
 second 7positively71 all our  knowledge
 arises from experience4    ,many1 says 
,locke1 suppose that there are innate   
ideas which the soul  receives          
coetaneous with its origin1 and brings  
with it into the world4  ,in order to   
prove that these ideas are innate1 it is
 said that they  universally exist1 and 
are universally valid with all men4 ,but
 admitting  that this were so1 such a   
fact would prove nothing if this        
universal  harmony could be explained in
 any other way4 ,but men mistake when   
they  claim such a fact4 ,there is1 in  

reality1 no fundamental proposition1    
theoretical or practical1 which would be
 universally admitted4 ,certainly  there
 is no such practical principle1 for the
 example of different  people as well as
 of different ages shows that there is  
no moral rule  universally admitted as  
valid4 ,neither is there a theoretical  
one1 for  even those propositions which 
might lay the strongest claim to be     
universally valid1 e4 g4 the            
proposition1--8what is1 is10 or--8it is 
impossible that one and the same thing  
should be and not be at the same        
time10--receive by no means a universal 
assent4 ,children and idiots have  no   
notion of these principles1 and even    
uncultivated men know nothing of  these 
abstract propositions4 ,they cannot     
therefore have been imprinted  on all   
men by nature4 ,if ideas were innate1   
then they must be known by  all from    
earliest childhood4 ,for 8to be in the  
understanding10 and 8to  become known10 
is one and the same thing4 ,the         

assertion therefore that  these ideas   
are imprinted on the understanding while
 it does not know  it1 is hence a       
manifest contradiction4 ,just as little 
is gained by the  subterfuge1 that these
 principles come into the consciousness 
so soon  as men use their reason4 ,this 
affirmation is directly false1 for these
  maxims which are called universal come
 into the consciousness much later  than
 a great deal of other knowledge1 and   
children1 e4 g4 give many  proofs of    
their use of reason before they know    
that it is impossible  that a thing     
should be and at the same time not be4  
,it is only correct  to say that no one 
becomes conscious of these propositions 
without  reasoning1--but to say that    
they are all known with the first       
reasoning  is false4 ,moreover1 that    
which is first known is not universal   
propositions1 but relates to individual 
impressions4 ,the child knows  that     
sweet is not bitter long before he      
understands the logical  proposition of 

contradiction4 ,he who carefully        
bethinks himself1 will  hesitate before 
he affirms that particular dicta as     
8sweet is not  bitter10 are derived from
 universal ones4 ,if the universal      
propositions  were innate1 then must    
they be the first in the consciousness  
of the  child2 for that which nature has
 stamped upon the human soul must come  
into consciousness antecedently to any  
thing which she has not written  there4 
,consequently1 if there are no innate   
ideas1 either theoretical or  practical1
 there can be just as truly no innate   
art nor science4 ,the  understanding 7or
 the soul7 is essentially a tabula      
rasa1--a blank and  void space1 a white 
paper on which nothing is written4      
,how now does the understanding become  
possessed of ideas8 ,only through       
experience1 upon which all knowledge    
rests1 and on which as its  principle   
all knowledge depends4 ,experience      
itself is twofold2 either it  arises    
through the perception of external      

objects by means of the sense1  in which
 case we call it sensation2 or it is a  
perception of the  activities of our own
 understanding1 in which case it is     
named the inner  sense1 or1 better1     
reflection4 ,sensation and reflection   
give to the  understanding all its      
ideas2 they are the windows through     
which alone  the light of ideas falls   
upon the naturally dark space of the    
mind2  external objects furnish us with 
the ideas of sensible qualities1 and    
the inner object1 which is the          
understanding itself1 offers us the     
ideas  of its own activities4 ,to show  
the derivation and to give an           
explanation  of all the ideas derived   
from both is the problem of the ,lockian
  philosophy4 ,for this end ,locke      
divides ideas 7representations or       
notions7 into simple and compound4      
,simple ideas1 he names those  which are
 impressed from without upon the        
understanding while it remains  wholly  
passive1 just as the images of certain  

objects are represented in  a mirror4   
,these simple ideas are partly such as  
come to the  understanding through an   
individual sense1 e4 g4 the ideas of    
color1  which are furnished to the mind 
through the eye1 or those of sound1     
which come to it through the ear1 or    
those of solidity or  impenetrability1  
which we receive through the touch2     
partly such as a  number of senses have 
combined to give us1 as those of space  
and of  motion1 of which we become      
conscious by means of the sense both of 
touch  and of sight2 partly such as we  
receive through reflection1 as the  idea
 of thought and of will2 and partly1 in 
fine1 such as arise from  both sensation
 and reflection combined1 e4 g4 power1  
unity1 c4 ,these  simple ideas form the 
material1 as it were the letters of all 
our  knowledge4 ,but now as language    
arises from a manifold combination of   
letters1 syllables and words1 so the    
understanding forms complex ideas  by   
the manifold combination of simple ideas

 with each other4 ,the complex  ideas   
may be referred to three classes1 viz43 
the ideas of mode1 of  substance1 and of
 relation4 ,under the ideas of mode1    
,locke considers the  modifications of  
space 7as distance1 measurement1        
immensity1 surface1  figure1 c471 of    
time 7as succession1 duration1          
eternity71 of thought  7perception1     
memory1 abstraction1 c471 of number1    
power1 c4 ,special  attention is given  
by ,locke to the conception of          
substance4 ,he explains  the origin of  
this conception in this way1 viz43 we   
find both in  sensation and reflection1 
that a certain number of simple ideas   
seem  often to be connected together4   
,but as we cannot divest ourselves of   
the  impression that these simple ideas 
have not been produced through          
themselves1 we are accustomed to furnish
 them with a ground in some  existing   
substratum1 which we indicate with the  
word substance4  ,substance is something
 unknown1 and is conceived of as        

possessing those  qualities which are   
necessary to furnish us with simple     
ideas4 ,but from  the fact that         
substance is a product of our subjective
 thinking1 it does  not follow that it  
has no existence outside of ourselves4  
,on the  contrary1 this is distinguished
 from all other complex ideas in the    
fact  that this is an idea which has its
 archetype distinct from ourselves1  and
 possesses objective reality1 while     
other complex ideas are formed by  the  
mind at pleasure1 and have no reality   
corresponding to them external  to the  
mind4 ,we do not know what is the       
archetype of substance1 and of  the     
substance itself we are acquainted only 
with its attributes4 ,from  considering 
the conception of substance1 ,locke next
 passes over to the  idea of relation4  
,a relation arises when the             
understanding has  connected two things 
with each other1 in such a way1 that in 
considering  them it passes over from   
the one to the other4 ,every thing is   

capable of  being brought by the        
understanding into relation1 or what is 
the same  thing1 to be transformed into 
something relative4 ,it is consequently 
impossible to enumerate the sum of every
 possible relation4 ,hence ,locke       
treats only of some of the more weighty 
conceptions of relation1 among  others1 
that of identity and difference1 but    
especially that of cause  and effect4   
,the idea of cause and effect arises    
when our understanding  perceives that  
any thing whatsoever1 be it substance or
 quality1 begins  to exist through the  
activity of another4 ,so much concerning
 ideas4 ,the  combination of ideas among
 themselves gives the conception of     
knowing4  ,hence knowledge stands in the
 same relation to the simple and complex
  ideas as a proposition does to the    
letters1 syllables and words which      
compose it4 ,from this it follows that  
our knowledge does not pass beyond  the 
compass of our ideas1 and hence that it 
is bounded by experience4    ,these are 

the prominent thoughts in the ,lockian  
philosophy4 ,its  empiricism is clear as
 day4 ,the mind1 according to it1 is in 
itself  bare1 and only a mirror of the  
outer world1--a dark space which        
passively  receives the images of       
external objects2 its whole content is  
made by  the impressions furnished it by
 material things4 ,nihil est in         
intellectu1 quod non fuerit in sensu--is
 the watchword of this  standpoint4     
,while ,locke1 by this proposition1     
expresses the undoubted  preponderance  
of the material over the intellectual1  
he does so still  more decisively when  
he declares that it is possible and even
 probable  that the mind is a material  
essence4 ,he does not admit the reverse 
possibility1 that material things may be
 classed under the intellectual  as a   
special kind4 ,hence with him mind is   
the secondary to matter1 and  hence he  
is seen to take the characteristic      
standpoint of realism 7cf4   ,,xxvii74  
,it is true that ,locke was not always  

logically consistent1 and  in many      
points did not thoroughly carry out his 
empiricism3 but we can  clearly see that
 the road which will be taken in the    
farther development  of this direction1 
will result in a thorough denial of the 
ideal factor4    ,the empiricism of     
,locke1 wholly national as it is1 soon  
became the  ruling philosophy in        
,england4 ,standing on its basis we find
 ,isaac  ,newton1 the great             
mathematician 7#afdb-agbg71 ,samuel     
,clarke1 a  disciple of ,newton1 whose  
chief attention was given to moral      
philosophy  7#afge-agbi71 the ,english  
moralists of this period1 ,william      
,wollaston  7#afei-agbd71 the ,earl of  
,shaftesbury 7#afga-agac71 ,francis     
,hutcheson  7#afid-agdf71 and even some 
opponents of ,locke1 as ,peter ,brown1  
who  died #agce4          ,,section     
,,xxix4    ,,hume4      ,as already     
remarked1 ,locke had not been wholly    
consistent with the  standpoint of      
empiricism4 ,though conceding to        

material objects a decided  superiority 
above the thinking subject1 there was   
yet one point1 viz41  the recognition of
 substance1 where he claimed for the    
thinking a power  above the objective   
world4 ,among all the complex ideas     
which are formed  by the subjective     
thinking1 the idea of substance is1     
according to  ,locke1 the only one which
 has objective reality2 all the rest    
being  purely subjective1 with nothing  
actually corresponding to them in the   
objective world4 ,but in the very fact  
that the subjective thinking  places the
 conception of substance1 which it has  
formed1 in the  objective world1 it     
affirms an objective relation of things1
 an  objective connection of them among 
each other1 and an existing             
rationality4 ,the reason of the subject 
in this respect stands in a  certain    
degree above the objective world1 for   
the relation of substance  is not       
derived immediately from the world of   
sense1 and is no product of  sensation  

nor of perception through the sense4 ,on
 a pure empirical  standpoint--and such 
was ,locke's--it was therefore illogical
 to allow the  conception of substance  
to remain possessed of objective being4 
,if the  understanding is essentially a 
bare and empty space1 a white unwritten 
paper1 if its whole content of objective
 knowledge consists in the  impressions 
made upon it by material things1 then   
must the conception of  substance also  
be explained as a mere subjective       
notion1 a union of  ideas joined        
together at the mind's pleasure1 and the
 subject itself1  thus fully deprived of
 every thing to which it could lay      
claim1 must  become wholly subordinated 
to the material world4 ,this stride to a
  logical empiricism ,hume has made in  
his criticism on the conception of      
causality4    ,david ,hume was born at  
,edinburgh #agaa4 ,devoted in youth to  
the study of  law1 then for some time a 
merchant1 he afterwards gave his        
attention  exclusively to philosophy and

 history4 ,his first literary attempt   
was  hardly noticed4 ,a more favorable  
reception was1 however1 given to his    
8,essays10--of which he published       
different collections from #agdb to     
#ageg1 making in all five volumes4 ,in  
these ,hume has treated  philosophical  
themes as a thoughtful and cultivated   
man of the world1  but without any      
strict systematic connection4 ,in #ageb 
he was elected to  the care of a public 
library in ,edinburgh1 and began in this
 same year  his famous history of       
,england4 ,afterwards he became         
secretary of  legation at ,paris1 where 
he became acquainted with ,rousseau4 ,in
 #agfg he  became under secretary of    
state1 an office1 however1 which he     
filled for  only a brief period4 ,his   
last years were spent in ,edinburgh1 in 
a quiet  and contented seclusion4 ,he   
died #aggf4    ,the centre of ,hume's   
philosophizing is his criticism of the  
conception  of cause4 ,locke had already
 expressed the thought that we attain   

the  conception of substance only by the
 habit of always seeing certain  modes  
together4 ,hume takes up this thought   
with earnestness4 ,whence do  we know1  
he asks1 that two things stand to each  
other in the relation of  cause and     
effect8 ,we do not know it apriori1 for 
since the effect is  something other    
than the cause1 while knowledge apriori 
embraces only  that which is identical1 
the effect cannot thus be discovered in 
the  cause2 neither do we know it       
through experience1 for experience      
reveals  to us only the succession in   
time of two facts4 ,all our conclusions 
from  experience1 therefore1 rest simply
 upon habit4 ,because we are in the     
habit of seeing that one thing is       
followed in time by another1 do we  form
 the notion that the latter must follow 
out of the former3 we make  the relation
 of causality out of the relation of    
succession2 but a  connection in time is
 naturally something other than a causal
  connection4 ,hence1 with the          

conception of causality1 we transcend   
that  which is given in perception and  
form for ourselves1 notions to which we 
are properly not entitled4--,that which 
belongs to causality belongs to  every  
necessary relation4 ,we find within us  
conceptions1 as those of  power and     
expression1 and in general that of      
necessary connection2 but  let us note  
how we attain these3 not through        
sensation1 for though  external objects 
seem to us to have coetaneousness of    
being1 they show  as no necessary       
connection4 ,do they then come through  
reflection8 ,true1  it seems as if we   
might get the idea of power by seeing   
that the organs  of our body move in    
consequence of the dictate of our mind4 
,but since we  do not know the means    
through which the mind works1 and since 
all the  organs of the body cannot be   
moved by the will1 it follows1 that we  
are  indeed pointed to experience in    
reference to this activity2 but since   
experience can show us only a frequent  

conjunction1 but no real  connection1 it
 follows also that we come to the       
conception of power as  of every        
necessary connection1 only because we   
are accustomed to a  transcending       
process in our notions4 ,all conceptions
 which express a  relation of necessity1
 all knowledge presumptive of a real    
objective  connection of things1 rests  
therefore ultimately only upon the      
association of ideas4 ,having denied the
 conception of substance1 ,hume  was led
 also to deny that of the ,ego or self4 
,if the ,ego or self really  exists1 it 
must be a substance possessing inherent 
qualities4 ,but since  our conception of
 substance is purely subjective1 without
 objective  reality1 it follows that    
there is no correspondent reality to our
  conception of the self or the ,ego4   
,the self or the ,ego is1 in fact1      
nothing other than a compound of many   
notions following rapidly upon  each    
other2 and under this compound we lay a 
conceived substratum1 which  we call    

soul1 self1 ,ego 7,i74 ,the self1 or the
 ,ego1 rests wholly on an  illusion4 ,of
 course1 with such premises1 nothing can
 be said of the  immortality of the     
soul4 ,if the soul is only the compound 
of our  notions1 it necessarily ceases  
with the notions--that which is         
compounded  of the movements of the body
 dies with those movements4    ,there   
needs no further proof1 than simply to  
utter these chief thoughts  of ,hume1 to
 show that his scepticism is only a     
logical carrying out of  ,locke's       
empiricism4 ,every determination of     
universality and necessity  must fall   
away1 if we derive our knowledge only   
from perceptions through  the sense2    
these determinations cannot be comprised
 in sensation4          ,,section ,,xxx4
    ,,condillac4      ,the ,french took 
up the problem of carrying out the      
empiricism of ,locke1  to its ultimate  
consequences in sensualism and          
materialism4 ,although  this empiricism 
had sprung up on ,english soil1 and had 

soon become  universally prevalent      
there1 it was reserved for ,france to   
push it to  the last extreme1 and show  
that it overthrew all the foundations of
  moral and religious life4 ,this final 
consequence of empiricism did not       
correspond to the ,english national     
character4 ,but on the contrary1 both   
the empiricism of ,locke1 and the       
scepticism of ,hume1 found themselves   
opposed in the latter half of the       
eighteenth century1 by a reaction in    
the ,scotch philosophy 7,reid           
#agja-agii1 ,beattie1 ,oswald1 ,dugald  
,stewart1 #agec-ahbh74 ,the attempt was 
here made to establish certain          
principles of truth as innate and       
immanent in the subject1 which should   
avail both against the tabula rasa of   
,locke1 and the scepticism of  ,hume4   
,these principles were taken in a       
thoroughly ,english way1 as those  of   
common sense1 as facts of experience1 as
 facts of the moral instinct  and sound 
human understanding2 as something       

empirically given1 and found  in the    
common consciousness by                 
self-contemplation and reflection4 ,but 
in  ,france1 on the other hand1 there   
was such a public and social condition  
of things during the eighteenth century1
 that we can only regard the  systems of
 materialism and egoistic moralism which
 here appeared1 as the  last practical  
consequences of the empirical           
standpoint1--to be the  natural result  
of the universal desolation4 ,the       
expression of a lady  respecting the    
system of ,helvetius is well known1 that
 it uttered only  the secret of all the 
world4    ,most closely connected with  
the empiricism of ,locke1 is the        
sensualism  of the ,abb ,condillac4     
,condillac was born at ,grenoble1 #agae4
 ,in his  first writings he adhered to  
,locke1 but subsequently passed beyond  
him1  and sought to ground a            
philosophical standpoint of his own4 ,he
 was  elected a member of the ,french   
,academy in #agfh1 and died in #aghj4   

,his  writings fill twenty-three        
volumes1 and have their origin in a     
moral and  religious interest4          
,condillac1 like ,locke1 started with   
the proposition that all our  knowledge 
comes from experience4 ,while1 however1 
,locke had indicated two  sources for   
this knowledge1 sensation and           
reflection1 the outer and the  inner    
sense1 ,condillac referred reflection to
 sensation1 and reduced the  two sources
 to one4 ,reflection is1 with him1 only 
sensation2 all  intellectual            
occurrences1 even the combination of    
ideas and volition1  are to be regarded 
only as modified sensations4 ,it is the 
chief problem  and content of           
,condillac's philosophizing to carry out
 this thought1 and  derive the different
 functions of the soul out of the       
sensations of the  outer sense4 ,he     
illustrates this thought by a statue1   
which has been  made with a perfect     
internal organization like a man1 but   
which  possesses no ideas1 and in which 

only gradually one sense after another  
awakens and fills the soul with         
impressions4 ,in such a view man stands 
on the same footing as the brute1 for   
all his knowledge and all his           
incentives to action he receives from   
sensation4 ,condillac consequently      
names men perfect animals1 and brutes   
imperfect men4 ,still he revolts  from  
affirming the materiality of the soul1  
and denying the existence of  ,god4     
,these ultimate consequences of         
sensualism were first drawn by  others  
after him1 as would naturally enough    
follow4 ,as sensualism  affirmed that   
truth or being could only be perceived  
through the sense1  so we have only to  
reverse this proposition1 and have the  
thesis of  materialism1 viz43 the       
sensible alone is1 there is no other    
being but  material being4              
,,section ,,xxxi4    ,,helvetius4       
,helvetius has exhibited the moral      
consequences of the sensualistic        
standpoint4 ,while theoretical          

sensualism affirms that all our         
knowledge  is determined by sensation1  
practical sensualism adds to this the   
analogous proposition that all our      
volition springs from the same  source1 
and is regulated by the sensuous desire4
 ,helvetius adopted it as  the principle
 of morals to satisfy this sensuous     
desire4    ,helvetius was born at ,paris
 in #agae4 ,gaining a position in his   
twenty-third year as farmer-general1 he 
found himself early in the  possession  
of a rich income1 but after a few years 
he found this office  so vexatious that 
he abandoned it4 ,the study of ,locke   
decided his  philosophic direction4     
,helvetius wrote his famed work1 de     
l',esprit1  after he had given up his   
office and withdrawn himself in         
seclusion4 ,it  appeared in #ageh1 and  
attracted a great attention at home and 
abroad1  though it drew upon him a      
violent persecution1 especially from the
  clergy4 ,it was fortunate for him that
 the persecution satisfied itself  with 

suppressing his book4 ,the repose in    
which he spent his later years  was     
interrupted only by two journeys which  
he made to ,germany and  ,england4 ,he  
died in #agga4 ,his personal character  
was wholly estimable1  full of kindness 
and generosity4 ,especially in his place
 as  farmer-general he showed himself   
benevolent towards the poor1 and        
resolute against the encroachments of   
his subalterns4 ,the style of his       
writings is easy and elegant4           
,self-love or interest1 says ,helvetius1
 is the lever of all our mental         
activities4 ,even that activity which is
 purely intellectual1 our  instinct     
towards knowledge1 our forming of ideas1
 rests upon this4 ,since  now all       
self-love refers essentially only to    
bodily pleasure1 it follows  that every 
mental occurrence within us has its     
peculiar source only in  the striving   
after this pleasure2 but in saying this1
 we have only  affirmed where the       
principle of all morality is to be      

sought4 ,it is an  absurdity to require 
a man to do the good simply for its own 
sake4 ,this  is just as impracticable as
 that he should do the evil simply for  
the  sake of the evil4 ,hence if        
morality would not be wholly fruitless1 
it  must return to its empirical basis1 
and venture to adopt the true  principle
 of all acting1 viz41 sensuous pleasure 
and pain1 or1 in other  words1          
selfishness as an actual moral          
principle4 ,hence1 as a correct         
legislation is that which secures       
obedience to its laws through reward    
and punishment1 i4 e4 through           
selfishness1 so will a correct system of
  morals be that which derives the      
duties of men from self-love1 which     
shows that that which is forbidden is   
something which is followed by          
disagreeable consequences4 ,a system of 
ethics which does not involve the       
self-interest of men1 or which wars     
against this1 necessarily remains       
fruitless4          ,,section ,,xxxii4  

,,the ,,french ,,clearing ,,up          
7,aufklaerung7 ,,and ,,materialism4     
#a4 ,it has already been remarked 7     
,,xxx47 that the carrying out of        
empiricism to its extremes1 as was      
attempted in ,france1 was most          
intimately connected with the general   
condition of the ,french people and     
state1 in the period before the         
revolution4 ,the contradictory element  
in  the character of the ,middle ,ages1 
the external and dualistic relation to  
the spiritual world1 had developed      
itself in ,catholic ,france till it had 
corrupted and destroyed every condition4
 ,morality1 mainly through the          
influence of a licentious court1 had    
become wholly corrupted2 the state  had 
sunk to an unbridled despotism1 and the 
church to a hierarchy as  hypocritical  
as it was powerful4 ,thus1 as every     
intellectual edifice was  threatened    
with ruin1 nature1 as matter without    
intellect1 as the object  of sensation  
and desire1 alone remained4 ,yet it is  

not the materialistic  extreme which    
constitutes the peculiar character and  
tendency of the  period now before us4  
,the common character of the            
philosophers of the  eighteenth century 
is rather1 and most prominently1 the    
opposition  against every ruling        
restraint1 and perversion in morals1    
religion1 and  the state4 ,their        
criticism and polemics1 which were much 
more ingenious  and eloquent than       
strictly scientific1 were directed      
against the whole  realm of traditional 
and given and positive notions4 ,they   
sought to show  the contradiction       
between the existing elements in the    
state and the  church1 and the          
incontrovertible demands of the reason4 
,they sought to  overthrow in the faith 
of the world every fixed opinion which  
had not  been established in the eye of 
reason1 and to give the thinking man the
  full consciousness of his pure        
freedom4 ,in order that we may correctly
  estimate the merit of these men1 we   

must bring before us the ,french  world 
of that age against which their attacks 
were directed2 the  dissoluteness of a  
pitiful court1 the slavish obedience    
exacted by a  corrupt priesthood1 a     
church sunken into decay yet seeking    
worldly  honor1 a state constitution1 a 
condition of rights and of society1     
which  must be profoundly revolting to  
every thinking man and every moral      
feeling4 ,it is the immortal merit of   
these men that they gave over to  scorn 
and hatred the abjectness and hypocrisy 
which then reigned2 that  they brought  
the minds of men to look with           
indifference upon the idols  of the     
world1 and awakened within them a       
consciousness of their own  autonomy4   
#b4 ,the most famous and influential    
actor in this period of the ,french     
clearing up1 is ,voltaire 7#afid-aggh74 
,though a writer of great  versatility1 
rather than a philosopher1 there was yet
 no philosopher of  that time who       
exerted so powerful an influence upon   

the whole thinking  of his country and  
his age4 ,voltaire was no atheist4 ,on  
the contrary1 he  regarded the belief in
 a ,supreme ,being to be so necessary1  
that he once  said that if there were no
 ,god we should be under the necessity  
of  inventing one4 ,he was just as      
little disposed to deny the immortality 
of  the soul1 though he often expressed 
his doubts upon it4 ,he regarded the    
atheistic materialism of a ,la ,mettrie 
as nothing but nonsense4 ,in these      
respects1 therefore1 he is far removed  
from the standpoint of the  philosophers
 who followed him4 ,his whole hatred was
 expended against  ,christianity as a   
positive religion4 ,to destroy this     
system he  considered as his peculiar   
mission1 and he left no means untried to
  attain this anxiously longed-for end4 
,his unwearied warfare against  every   
positive religion prepared the way and  
gave weapons for the  attacks against   
spiritualism which followed4    #c4 ,the
 ,encyclopedists had a more decidedly   

sceptical relation to the  principles   
and the basis of spiritualism4 ,the     
philosophical ,encyclopedia  established
 by ,diderot 7#agac-aghd71 and published
 by him in connection  with d',alembert1
 is a memorable monument of the ruling  
spirit in ,france  in the time before   
the revolution4 ,it was the pride of    
,france at that  age1 because it        
expressed in a splendid and universally 
accessible form  the inner consciousness
 of the ,french people4 ,with the       
keenest wit it  reasoned away law from  
the state1 and freedom from morality1   
and spirit  and ,god from nature1 though
 all this was done only in scattered1   
and1  for the most part1 timorous       
intimations4 ,in ,diderot's independent 
writings we find talent of much         
philosophic importance united with great
  earnestness4 ,but it is very difficult
 to fix and accurately to limit his     
philosophic views1 since they were very 
gradually formed1 and ,diderot          
expressed them always with some reserve 

and accommodation4 ,in general1         
however1 it may be remarked1 that in the
 progress of his speculations he        
constantly approached nearer the extreme
 of the philosophical direction  of his 
age4 ,in his earlier writings a ,deist1 
he afterwards avowed the  opinion that  
every thing is ,god4 ,at first defending
 the immateriality  and immortality of  
the soul1 he expressed himself at a     
later period  decidedly against these   
doctrines1 affirming that the species   
alone has  an abiding being while the   
individual passes away1 and that        
immortality  is nothing other than to   
live in the thoughts of coming          
generations4 ,but  ,diderot did not     
venture to the real extreme of logical  
materialism2 his  moral earnestness     
restrained him from this4    #d4 ,the   
last word of materialism was spoken with
 reckless audacity by ,la  ,mettrie     
7#agji-agea71 a contemporary of         
,diderot3 every thing spiritual  is a   
delusion1 and physical enjoyment is the 

highest end of men4 ,faith  in the      
existence of a ,god1 says ,la ,mettrie1 
is just as groundless as it  is         
fruitless4 ,the world will not be happy 
till atheism becomes  universally       
established4 ,then alone will there be  
no more religious  strife1 then alone   
will theologians1 the most odious of    
combatants1  disappear1 and nature1     
poisoned at present by their influence1 
will come  again to its rights4 ,in     
reference to the human soul1 there can  
be no  philosophy but materialism4 ,all 
the observation and experience of the   
greatest philosophers and physicians    
declare this4 ,soul is nothing but a    
mere name1 which has a rational         
signification only when we understand by
  it that part of our body which thinks4
 ,this is the brain1 which has its      
muscles of thought1 just as the limbs   
have their muscles of motion4 ,that     
which gives man his advantage over the  
brutes is1 first1 the  organization of  
his brain1 and second1 its capacity for 

receiving  instruction4 ,otherwise1 is  
man a brute like the beasts around him1 
though in many respects surpassed by    
these4 ,immortality is an absurdity4    
,the soul perishes with the body of     
which it forms a part4 ,with death      
every thing is over1 la farce est joue6 
,the practical and selfish  application 
of all this is--let us enjoy ourselves  
as long as we exist1  and not throw away
 any satisfaction we can attain4    #e4 
,the ,systme de la ,nature afterwards   
attempted to elaborate with  greater    
earnestness and scientific precision1   
that which had been  uttered so         
superficially and so superciliously by  
,la ,mettrie1 viz41 the  doctrine that  
matter alone exists1 while mind is      
nothing other than  matter refined4     
,the ,systme de la ,nature appeared in  
,london under a fictitious name in      
#aggj4 ,it was then published as a      
posthumous work of ,mirabaud1 late      
secretary of the ,academy4 ,it doubtless
 had its origin in the circle  which was

 wont to assemble with ,baron ,holbach1 
and of which ,diderot1  ,grimm1 and     
others formed a part4 ,whether the      
,baron ,holbach himself1 or  his tutor  
,lagrange is the author of this work1 or
 whether it is the  joint production of 
a number1 cannot now be determined4 ,the
 ,systme de  la ,nature is hardly a     
,french book3 the style is too heavy and
 tedious4    ,there is1 in fact1 nothing
 but matter and motion1 says this work4 
,both  are inseparably connected4 ,if   
matter is at rest1 it is only because   
hindered in motion1 for in its essence  
it is not a dead mass4 ,motion is       
twofold1 attraction and repulsion4 ,the 
different motions which we see  are the 
product of these two1 and through these 
different motions arise  the different  
connections and the whole manifoldness  
of things4 ,the laws  which direct in   
all this are eternal and                
unchangeable4--,the most weighty        
consequences of such a doctrine are3    
7#a47 ,the materiality of man4 ,man is  

no twofold being compounded of  mind and
 matter1 as is erroneously believed4 ,if
 the inquiry is closely  made what the  
mind is1 we are answered1 that the most 
accurate  philosophical investigations  
have shown1 that the principle of       
activity  in man is a substance whose   
peculiar nature cannot be known1 but of 
which we can affirm that it is          
indivisible1 unextended1 invisible1 c4  
,but now1 who should conceive any thing 
determinate in a substance which  is    
only the negation of that which gives   
knowledge1 an idea which is  peculiarly 
only the absence of all ideas8 ,still   
farther1 how can it be  explained upon  
such a hypothesis1 that a substance     
which itself is not  material can work  
upon material things2 and how can it set
 these in  motion1 since there is no    
point of contact between the two8 ,in   
fact1  those who distinguish their soul 
from their body1 have only to make a    
distinction between their brain and     
their body4 ,thought is only a          

modification of our brain1 just as      
volition is another modification of  the
 same bodily organ4    7#b47 ,another   
chimera1 the belief in the being of a   
,god1 is connected  with the twofold    
division of man into body and soul4     
,this belief arises  like the hypothesis
 of a soul-substance1 because mind is   
falsely divided  from matter1 and nature
 is thus made twofold4 ,the evil which  
men  experienced1 and whose natural     
cause they could not discover1 they     
assigned to a deity which they imagined 
for the purpose4 ,the first  notions of 
a ,god have their source therefore in   
sorrow1 fear1 and  uncertainty4 ,we     
tremble because our forefathers for     
thousands of years  have done the same4 
,this circumstance awakens no auspicious
  prepossession4 ,but not only the rude1
 but also the theological idea of  ,god 
is worthless1 for it explains no        
phenomenon of nature4 ,it is1  moreover1
 full of absurdities1 for1 since it     
ascribes moral attributes  to ,god1 it  

renders him human2 while on the other   
hand1 by a mass of  negative attributes1
 it seeks to distinguish him absolutely 
from every  other being4 ,the true      
system1 the system of nature1 is hence  
atheistic4  ,but such a doctrine        
requires a culture and a courage which  
neither all  men nor most men possess4  
,if we understand by the word atheist   
one who  considers only dead matter1 or 
who designates the moving power in      
nature with the name ,god1 then is there
 no atheist1 or whoever would be  one is
 a fool4 ,but if the word means one who 
denies the existence of a  spiritual    
being1 a being whose attributes can only
 be a source of  annoyance to men1 then 
are there indeed atheists1 and there    
would be  more of them1 if a correct    
knowledge of nature and a sound reason  
were  more widely diffused4 ,but if     
atheism is true1 then should it be      
diffused4 ,there are1 indeed1 many who  
have cast off the yoke of  religion1 who
 nevertheless think it is necessary for 

the common people  in order to keep them
 within proper limits4 ,but this is just
 as if we  should determine to give a   
man poison lest he should abuse his     
strength4  ,every kind of ,deism leads  
necessarily to superstition1 since it is
 not  possible to continue on the       
standpoint of pure deism4    7#c47 ,with
 such premises the freedom and          
immortality of the soul both  disappear4
 ,man1 like every other substance in    
nature1 is a link in the  chain of      
necessary connection1 a blind instrument
 in the hands of  necessity4 ,if any    
thing should be endowed with            
self-motion1 that is1  with a capacity  
to produce motion without any other     
cause1 then would it  have the power to 
destroy motion in the universe2 but this
 is contrary  to the conception of the  
universe1 which is only an endless      
series of  necessary motions spreading  
out into wider circles continually4 ,the
  claim of an individual immortality is 
absurd4 ,for to affirm that the  soul   

exists after the destruction of the     
body1 is to affirm that a  modification 
of a substance can exist after the      
substance itself has  disappeared4      
,there is no other immortality than to  
live in the  remembrance of posterity4  
7#d47 ,the practical consequences of    
these principles are in the highest     
degree favorable for the system of      
nature1 the utility of any doctrine     
being ever the first criterion of its   
truth4 ,while the ideas of  theologians 
are productive only of disquiet and     
anxiety to man1 the  system of nature   
frees him from all such unrest1 teaches 
him to enjoy  the present moment1 and to
 quietly yield to his destiny1 while it 
gives  him that kind of apathy which    
every one must regard as a blessing4 ,if
  morality would be active1 it can rest 
only upon self-love and  self-interest2 
it must show man whither his            
well-considered interest  would lead    
him4 ,he is a good man who gains his own
 interest in such a  way that others    

will find it for their interest to      
assist him4 ,the  system of             
self-interest1 therefore1 demands the   
union of men among each  other1 and     
hence we have true morality4    ,the    
logical dogmatic materialism of the     
,systme de la ,nature is the  farthest  
limit of an empirical direction in      
philosophy1 and consequently  closes    
that course of the development of a     
one-sided realism which had  begun with 
,locke4 ,the attempt first made by      
,locke to explain and derive  the ideal 
world from the material1 ended in       
materialism with the total  reduction of
 every thing spiritual to the material1 
with the total  denial of the spiritual4
 ,we must now1 before proceeding        
farther1  according to the              
classification made  ,,xxvii41 consider 
the idealistic  course of development   
which ran parallel with the systems of a
 partial  realism4 ,at the head of this 
course stands ,leibnitz4                
,,section ,,xxxiii4    ,,leibnitz4      

,as empiricism sprang from the striving 
to subject the intellectual to  the     
material1 to materialize the spiritual1 
so on the other hand1  idealism had its 
source in the effort to spiritualize the
 material1 or  so to apprehend the      
conception of mind that matter could be 
subsumed  under it4 ,to the             
empiric-sensualistic direction1 mind was
 nothing but  refined matter1 while to  
the idealistic direction matter was only
  degenerated 7vergrbert7 mind 78a      
confused notion10 as ,leibnitz          
expresses it74 ,the former1 in its      
logical development1 was driven to the  
principle that only material things     
exist1 the latter 7as with ,leibnitz    
and ,berkeley7 comes to the opposite    
principle1 that there are only souls    
and their ideas4 ,for the partial       
realistic standpoint1 material things   
were the truly substantial4 ,but for the
 idealistic standpoint1 the  substantial
 belongs alone to the intellectual      
world1 to the ,egos4 ,mind1  to the     

partial realism1 was essentially void1 a
 tabula rasa1 its whole  content came to
 it from the external world4 ,but a     
partial idealism  sought to carry out   
the principle that nothing can come into
 the mind  which had not at least been  
preformed within it1 that all its       
knowledge  is furnished it by itself4   
,according to the former view knowledge 
was a  passive relation1 according to   
the latter was it wholly active4 ,while1
  in fine1 a partial realism had        
attempted to explain the becoming in    
nature for the most part through real1  
i4 e4 through mechanical  motives       
7l'homme machine is the title of one of 
la ,mettrie's  writings71 idealism had  
sought an explanation of the same       
through ideal  motives1 i4 e4           
teleologically4 ,while the former had   
made its prominent  inquiry for moving  
causes1 and had1 indeed1 often ridiculed
 the search  for a final cause2 it is   
final causes toward which the latter    
directs  its chief aim4 ,the mediation  

between mind and matter1 between thought
  and being1 will now be sought in the  
final cause1 in the teleological        
harmony of all things 7pre-established  
harmony74 ,the standpoint of  ,leibnitz 
may thus be characterized in a word4    
,gottfried ,wilhelm ,leibnitz was born  
in #afdf1 at ,leipsic1 where his  father
 was professor4 ,having chosen the law  
as his profession1 he  entered the      
university in #affa1 and in #affc he    
defended for his degree  of doctor in   
philosophy1 his dissertation de         
principio individui1 a  theme well      
characteristic of the direction of his  
later philosophizing4  ,he afterwards   
went to ,jena1 and subsequently to      
,altdorf1 where he became  doctor of    
laws4 ,at ,altdorf he was offered a     
professorship of  jurisprudence1 which  
he refused4 ,the rest of his life was   
unsettled and  desultory1 spent for the 
most part in courts1 where1 as a        
versatile  courtier1 he was employed in 
the most varied duties of diplomacy4 ,in

 the  year #afgb he went to ,paris1 in  
order to induce ,louis ,,xiv4 to        
undertake  the conquest of ,egypt4 ,he  
subsequently visited ,london1 whence he 
was  afterwards called to ,hanover1 as  
councillor of the ,duke of ,brunswick4  
,he  received later a post as librarian 
at ,wolfenbttel1 between which place    
and ,hanover he spent the most of his   
subsequent life1 though interrupted     
with numerous journeys to ,vienna1      
,berlin1 etc4 ,he was intimately        
associated with the ,prussian           
,electress1 ,maria ,charlotte1 a highly 
talented woman1 who surrounded herself  
with a circle of the most  distinguished
 scholars of the time1 and for whom     
,liebnitz wrote1 at her  own request1   
his ,theodice4 ,in #agja1 after ,prussia
 had become a  kingdom1 an academy was  
established at ,berlin1 through1 his    
efforts1 and  he became its first       
president4 ,similar1 but fruitless      
attempts were made  by him to establish 
academies in ,dresden and ,vienna4 ,in  

#agaa the title  of imperial court      
councillor1 and a baronage1 was bestowed
 upon him by  the emperor ,charles ,,vi4
 ,soon after1 he betook himself to      
,vienna1 where  he remained a           
considerable period1 and wrote his      
,monadology1 at the  solicitation of    
,prince ,eugene4 ,he died in #agaf4     
,next to ,aristotle1  ,leibnitz was the 
most highly gifted scholar that had ever
 lived2 with  the richest and most      
extensive learning1 he united the       
highest and most  penetrating powers of 
mind4 ,germany has reason to be proud of
 him1  since1 after ,jacob ,boehme1 he  
is the first philosopher of any note    
among  the ,germans4 ,with him          
philosophy found a home in ,germany4 ,it
 is to be  regretted that the great     
variety of his efforts and literary     
undertakings1 together with his roving  
manner of life1 prevented him  from     
giving any connected exhibition of his  
philosophy4 ,his views are  for the most
 part developed only in brief and       

occasional writings and  letters1       
composed frequently in the ,french      
language4 ,it is hence not  easy to     
state his philosophy in its internal    
connection1 though none of  his views   
are isolated1 but all stand strictly    
connected with each  other4 ,the        
following are the chief points3    #a4  
,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,monads4--,the   
fundamental peculiarity of ,leibnitz's  
theory is its opposition to ,spinozism4 
,substance1 as the indeterminate        
universal1 was with ,spinoza the only   
positive4 ,with ,leibnitz also the      
conception of substance lay at the basis
 of his philosophy1 but his  definition 
of it was entirely different4 ,while    
,spinoza had sought to  exclude from his
 substance every positive determination1
 and especially  all acting1 and had    
apprehended it simply as pure being1    
,leibnitz viewed  it as living activity 
and active energy1 an example for which 
might be  found in a stretched bow1     
which moved and straightened itself     

through  its own energy as soon as the  
external hindrance was removed4 ,that   
this  active energy forms the essence of
 substance is a principle to which      
,leibnitz ever returns1 and from which1 
in fact1 all the other chief  points in 
his philosophy may be derived4 ,from    
this there follow at the  outset two    
determinations of substance directly    
opposed to ,spinozism2  first1 that it  
is a single being1 a monad2 and second1 
that there are a  multiplicity of       
monads4 ,the first follows because      
substance1 in so far  as it exercises an
 activity similar to an elastic body1 is
 essentially  an excluding activity1 or 
repulsion2 the conception of an         
individual or  a monad being that which 
excludes another from itself4 ,the      
second  follows because the existence of
 one monad involves the existence of    
many4 ,the conception of one individual 
postulates other individuals1  which    
stand over against the one as excluded  
from it4 ,hence the  fundamental thesis 

of the ,leibnitz philosophy in          
opposition to ,spinozism  is this1 viz41
 there is a multiplicity of individual  
substances or  monads4    #b4 ,,the     
,,monads ,,more ,,accurately            
,,determined4--,the monads of ,leibnitz 
are  similar to atoms in their general  
features4 ,like these they are          
corpuscular units1 independent of any   
external influence1 and  indestructible 
by any external power4 ,but             
notwithstanding this  similarity1 there 
is an important and characteristic      
difference between  the two4 ,first1 the
 atoms are not distinguished from each  
other1 they  are all qualitatively      
alike2 but each one of the monads is    
different in  quality from every other1 
every one is a peculiar world for       
itself1  every one is different from    
every other4 ,according to ,leibnitz1   
there  are no two things in the world   
which are exactly alike4 ,secondly1     
atoms  can be considered as extended and
 divisible1 but the monads are          

metaphysical points1 and actually       
indivisible4 ,here1 lest we should      
stumble at this proposition 7for an     
aggregate of unextended monads can      
never give an extended world71 we must  
take into consideration  ,leibnitz's    
view of space1 which1 according to him1 
is not something  real1 but only        
confused1 subjective representation4    
,thirdly1 the monad  is a representative
 being4 ,with the atomists such a       
determination would  amount to nothing1 
but with ,leibnitz it has a very        
important part to  play4 ,according to  
him1 in every monad1 every other is     
reflected2 every  monad is a living     
mirror of the universe1 and ideally     
contains the whole  within itself as in 
a germ4 ,in thus mirroring the world1   
however1 the  monad is not passive but  
spontaneously self-active3 it does not  
receive  the images which it mirrors1   
but produces them spontaneously itself1 
as  the soul does a dream4 ,in every    
monad1 therefore1 the all-seeing and    

all-knowing one might read every thing1 
even the future1 since this is          
potentially contained in the present4   
,every monad is a kind of ,god4         
7,parvus in suo genere ,deus47    #c4   
,,the ,,pre-,,established               
,,harmony4--,the universe is thus the   
sum of all the  monads4 ,every thing1   
every composite1 is an aggregate of     
monads4 ,thus  every bodily organism is 
not one substance1 but many1 it is a    
multiplicity of monads1 like a machine  
which is made up of a number of         
distinct pieces of mechanism4 ,leibnitz 
compared bodies to a fish-pond1  which  
might be full of living elements1 though
 dead itself4 ,the ordinary  view of    
things is thus wholly set aside2 the    
truly substantial does not  belong to   
bodies1 i4 e4 to the aggregates1 but to 
their original  elements4 ,matter1 in   
the vulgar sense1 as something conceived
 to be  without mind1 does not at all   
exist4 ,how now must the inner          
connection  of the universe be          

conceived8 ,in the following way4 ,every
 monad is a  representative being1 and  
at the same time1 each one is different 
from  every other4 ,this difference1    
therefore1 depends alone upon the       
difference of representation3 there are 
just as many different degrees  of      
representation as there are monads1 and 
these degrees may be fixed  according to
 some of their prominent stages4 ,the   
representations may be  classified      
according to the distinction between    
confused and distinct  knowledge4 ,hence
 a monad of the lowest rank 7a monad    
toute nue7 will  be one which simply    
represents1 i4 e4 which stands on the   
stage of  most confused knowledge4      
,leibnitz compares this state with a    
swoon1 or  with our condition in a      
dreamy sleep1 in which we are not       
without  representations1 7notions7--for
 otherwise we could have none when      
awaking--but in which the               
representations are so numerous that    
they  neutralize each other and do not  

come into the consciousness4 ,this is   
the stage of inorganic nature4 ,in a    
higher rank are those monads in  which  
the representation is active as a       
formative vital force1 though  still    
without consciousness4 ,this is the     
stage of the vegetable world4  ,still   
higher ascends the life of the monad    
when it attains to sensation  and       
memory1 as is the case in the animal    
kingdom4 ,the lower monads may  be said 
to sleep1 and the brute monads to dream4
 ,when still farther the  soul rises to 
reason or reflection1 we call it mind1  
spirit4--,the  distinction of the monads
 from each other is1 therefore1 this1   
that each  one1 though mirroring the    
whole and the same universe in itself1  
does it  from a different point of view1
 and1 therefore1 differently1 the one   
more1 and the rest less perfectly4 ,each
 one is a different centre of the  world
 which it mirrors4 ,each one contains   
the whole universe1 the whole  infinity 
within itself1 and in this respect is   

like ,god1 the only  difference being   
that ,god knows every thing with perfect
 distinctness1  while the monad         
represents it confusedly1 though one    
monad may represent  it more confusedly 
than another4 ,the limitation of a monad
 does not1  therefore1 consist in its   
containing less than another or than    
,god1 but  only in its containing more  
imperfectly or in its representing less 
distinctly4--,upon this standpoint the  
universe1 in so far as every monad      
mirrors one and the same universe1      
though each in a different way1         
represents a drama of the greatest      
possible difference1 as well as of  the 
greatest possible unity and order1 i4 e4
 of the greatest possible  perfection1  
or the absolute harmony4 ,for           
distinction in unity is  harmony4--,but 
in still another respect the universe is
 a system of  harmony4 ,since the monads
 do not work upon each other1 but each  
one  follows only the law of its own    
being1 there is danger lest the inner   

harmony of the universe may be          
disturbed4 ,how is this danger removed8 
,thus1 viz41 every monad mirrors the    
whole and the same universe4 ,the       
changes of the collected monads1        
therefore1 run parallel with each       
other1 and in this consists the harmony 
of all as pre-established by  ,god4     
#d4 ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,deity 
,,to ,,the ,,monads4--,what part does   
the  conception of ,god play in the     
system of ,leibnitz8 ,an almost idle    
one4  ,following the strict consequences
 of his system1 ,leibnitz should have   
held to no proper theism1 but the       
harmony of the universe should have     
taken the place of the ,deity4          
,ordinarily he considers ,god as the    
sufficient cause of all monads4 ,but he 
was also accustomed to consider  the    
final cause of a thing as its sufficient
 cause4 ,in this respect1  therefore1 he
 almost identifies ,god and the absolute
 final cause4  ,elsewhere he considers  
the ,deity as a simple primitive        

substance1 or as  the individual        
primitive unity4 ,again1 he speaks of   
,god as a pure  immaterial actuality1   
actus purus1 while to the monads belongs
 matter1  i4 e4 restrained actuality1   
striving1 appetitio4 ,once he calls him 
a  monad1 though this is in manifest    
contradiction with the determinations   
otherwise assigned him4 ,it was for     
,leibnitz a very difficult problem to   
bring his monadology and his theism into
 harmony with each other1  without      
giving up the premises of both4 ,if he  
held fast to the  substantiality of the 
monads1 he was in danger of making them 
independent of the ,deity1 and if he did
 not1 he could hardly escape  falling   
back into ,spinozism4    #e4 ,,the      
,,relation ,,of ,,soul ,,and ,,body is  
clearly explained on the standpoint  of 
the pre-established harmony4 ,this      
relation1 taking the premises of  the   
monadology1 might seem enigmatical4 ,if 
no monad can work upon any  other1 how  
can the soul work upon the body to lead 

and move it8 ,the  enigma is solved by  
the pre-established harmony4 ,while the 
body and  soul1 each one independently  
of the other1 follows the laws of its   
being1 the body working mechanically1   
and the soul pursuing ends1 yet  ,god   
has established such a concordant       
harmony of the two activities1  such a  
parallelism of the two functions1 that  
there is in fact a perfect  unity for   
body and soul4 ,there are1 says         
,leibnitz1 three views  respecting the  
relation of body and soul4 ,the first   
and most common  supposes a reciprocal  
influence between the two1 but such a   
view is  untenable1 because there can be
 no interchange between mind and matter4
  ,the second and occasional one 7cf4   
,,xxv4 #a71 brings about this           
interchange through the constant        
assistance of ,god1 which is nothing    
more nor less than to make ,god a ,deus 
ex machina4 ,hence the only  solution   
for the problem is the hypothesis of a  
pre-established harmony4  ,leibnitz     

illustrates these three views in the    
following example4 ,let one  conceive of
 two watches1 whose hands ever          
accurately point to the same  time4     
,this agreement may be explained1 first 
7the common view71 by  supposing an     
actual connection between the hands of  
each1 so that the  hand of the one watch
 might draw the hand of the other after 
it1 or  second 7the occasional view71 by
 conceiving of a watch-maker who        
continually keeps the hands alike1 or in
 fine 7the pre-established  harmony71 by
 ascribing to each a mechanism so       
exquisitely wrought that  each one goes 
in perfect independence of the other1   
and at the same time  in entire         
agreement with it4--,that the soul is   
immortal 7indestructible71  follows at  
once from the doctrine of monads4 ,there
 is no proper death4  ,that which is    
called death is only the soul losing a  
part of the monads  which compose the   
mechanism of its body1 while the living 
element goes  back to a condition       

similar to that in which it was before  
it came upon  the theatre of the world4 
#f4 ,the monadology has very important  
consequences in reference to ,,the      
,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge4 ,as the      
philosophy of ,leibnitz1 by its         
opposition to  ,spinozism1 had to do    
with the doctrine of being1 so by its   
opposition to  the empiricism of ,locke 
must it expound the theory of knowledge4
 ,locke's  ,essay on the ,human         
,understanding had attracted ,leibnitz  
without  satisfying him1 and he         
therefore attempted a new investigation 
in his  ,nouveaux ,essais1 in which he  
defended the doctrine of innate ideas4  
,but this hypothesis of innate ideas    
,leibnitz now freed from that  defective
 view which had justified the objections
 of ,locke4 ,the  innateness of the     
ideas must not be held as though they   
were explicitly  and consciously        
contained in the mind1 but rather the   
mind possesses  them potentially and    
only virtually1 though with the capacity

 to produce  them out of itself4 ,all   
thoughts are properly innate1 i4 e4 they
 do  not come into the mind from        
without1 but are rather produced by it  
from  itself4 ,any external influence   
upon the mind is inconceivable1 it even 
needs nothing external for its          
sensations4 ,while ,locke had compared  
the  mind to an unwritten piece of      
paper1 ,leibnitz likened it to a block  
of  marble1 in which the veins prefigure
 the form of the statue4 ,hence the     
common antithesis between rational and  
empirical knowledge disappears  with    
,leibnitz in the degrees of greater or  
less distinctness4--,among  these       
theoretically innate ideas1 ,leibnitz   
recognizes two of special  prominence1  
which take the first rank as principles 
of all knowledge and  all               
ratiocination1--the principle of        
contradiction 7principium               
contradictionis71 and the principle of  
sufficient cause 7principium  rationis  
sufficientis74 ,to these1 as a principle

 of the second rank1  must be added the 
principium indiscernibilium1 or the     
principle that  there are in nature no  
two things wholly alike4    #g4 ,the    
most elaborate exhibition of ,leibnitz's
 theological views is  given in his     
,thodice4 ,the ,thodice1 is1 however1   
his weakest work1  and has but a loose  
connection with the rest of his         
philosophy4 ,written  at the instigation
 of a woman1 it belies this origin      
neither in its form  nor in its         
content--not in its form1 for in its    
effort to be popular it  becomes diffuse
 and unscientific1 and not in its       
content1 for it  accommodates itself to 
the positive dogmas and the premises of 
theology  farther than the scientific   
basis of the system of ,leibnitz would  
permit4 ,in this work1 ,leibnitz        
investigates the relation of ,god to the
  world in order to show a conformity in
 this relation to a final cause1  and to
 free ,god from the charge of acting    
without or contrary to an aim4  ,why is 

the world as it is8 ,god might have     
created it very differently4  ,true1    
answers ,leibnitz1 ,god saw an infinite 
number of worlds as possible  before    
him1 but out of all these he chose the  
one which actually is as  the best4     
,this is the famous doctrine of the best
 world1 according to  which no more     
perfect world is possible than the one  
which is4--,but how  so8 ,is not the    
existence of evil at variance with this8
 ,leibnitz answers  this objection by   
distinguishing three kinds of evil1 the 
metaphysical1  the physical1 and the    
moral4 ,the metaphysical evil1 i4 e4 the
  finiteness and incompleteness of      
things1 is necessary because            
inseparable from finite existence1 and  
is thus independent of the will  of     
,god4 ,physical evil 7pain1 c471 though 
not independent of the will of  ,god1 is
 often a good conditionally1 i4 e4 as a 
punishment or means of  improvement4    
,moral evil or wickedness can in no way 
be charged to the  will of ,god4        

,leibnitz took various ways to account  
for its existence1  and obviate the     
contradiction lying between it and the  
conception of  ,god4 ,at one time he    
says that wickedness is only permitted  
by ,god as a  conditio sine qua non1    
because without wickedness there were no
  freedom1 and without freedom no       
virtue4 ,again1 he reduces the moral    
evil  to the metaphysical1 and makes    
wickedness nothing but a want of        
perfection1 a negation1 a limitation1   
playing the same part as do the  shadows
 in a painted picture1 or the discords  
in a piece of music1 which  do not      
diminish the beauty1 but only increase  
it through contrast4  ,again1 he        
distinguishes between the material and  
the formal element in a  wicked act4    
,the material of sin1 the power to act1 
is from ,god1 but the  formal element1  
the wickedness of the act1 belongs      
wholly to man1 and is  the result of his
 limitation1 or1 as ,leibnitz here and  
there expresses  it1 of his eternal     

self-predestination4 ,in no case can the
 harmony of  the universe be destroyed  
through such a cause4    ,these are the 
chief points of ,leibnitz's philosophy4 
,the general  characteristic of it as   
given in the beginning of the present   
section1  will be found to have its     
sanction in the specific exhibition that
 has  now been furnished4               
,,section ,,xxxiv4    ,,berkeley4       
,leibnitz had not carried out the       
standpoint of idealism to its extreme4  
,he had indeed1 on the one side1        
explained space and motion and bodily   
things as phenomena which had their     
existence only in a confused            
representation1 but on the other side1  
he had not wholly denied the  existence 
of the bodily world1 but had recognized 
as a reality lying at  its basis1 the   
world of monads4 ,the phenomenal or     
bodily world had its  fixed and         
substantial foundation in the monads4   
,thus ,leibnitz1 though an  idealist1   
did not wholly break with realism4 ,the 

ultimate consequence of  a subjective   
idealism would have been to wholly deny 
the reality of the  objective1 sensible 
world1 and explain corporeal objects as 
simply  phenomena1 as nothing but       
subjective notions without any objective
  reality as a basis4 ,this consequence 
the idealistic counterpart to the       
ultimate realistic result of            
materialism--appears in ,george         
,berkeley1  who was born in ,ireland1   
#afhd1 made bishop of the ,anglican     
,church in  #agcd1 and died in #agec4   
,hence1 though he followed the          
empiricism of  ,locke1 and sustained no 
outward connection with ,leibnitz1 we   
must place  him in immediate succession 
to the latter as the perfecter of a     
subjective idealism4    ,our sensations1
 says ,berkeley1 are entirely           
subjective4 ,we are wholly in  error if 
we believe that we have a sensation of  
external objects or  perceive them4     
,that which we have and perceive is only
 our sensations4  ,it is e4 g4 clear1   

that by the sense of sight we can see   
neither the  distance1 the size1 nor the
 form of objects1 but that we only      
conclude  that these exist1 because our 
experience has taught us that a certain 
sensation of sight is always attended by
 certain sensations of touch4  ,that    
which we see is only colors1 clearness1 
obscurity1 c41 and it is  therefore     
false to say that we see and feel the   
same thing4 ,so also we  never go out of
 ourselves for those sensations to which
 we ascribe most  decidedly an objective
 character4 ,the peculiar objects of our
  understanding are only our own        
affections2 all ideas are hence only our
  own sensations4 ,but just as there can
 be no sensations outside of the        
sensitive subject1 so no idea can have  
existence outside of him who  possesses 
it4 ,the so-called objects exist only in
 our notion1 and have a  being only as  
they are perceived4 ,it is the great    
error of most  philosophers that they   
ascribe to corporeal objects a being    

outside the  conceiving mind1 and do not
 see that they are only mental4 ,it is  
not  possible that material things      
should produce any thing so wholly      
distinct from themselves as sensations  
and notions4 ,there is no such  thing as
 a material external world2 mind alone  
exists as thinking  being1 whose nature 
consists in thinking and willing4 ,but  
whence then  arise all our sensations   
which come to us like the images of     
fancy1  without our agency1 and which   
are thus no products of our will8 ,they 
arise from a spirit superior to         
ourselves--for only a spirit can produce
  within us notions--even from ,god4    
,god gives us ideas2 but as it would be 
contradictory to assert that a being    
could give what it does not  possess1 so
 ideas exist in ,god1 and we derive them
 from him4 ,these  ideas in ,god may be 
called archetypes1 and those in us      
ectypes4--,in  consequence of this view1
 says ,berkeley1 we do not deny an      
independent  reality of things1 we only 

deny that they can exist elsewhere than 
in an  understanding4 ,instead therefore
 of speaking of a nature in which1 e4   
g4 the sun is the cause of warmth1 c41  
the accurate expression would  be this3 
,god announces to us through the sense  
of sight that we should  soon perceive a
 sensation of warmth4 ,hence by nature  
we are only to  understand the          
succession or the connection of ideas1  
and by natural  laws the constant order 
in which they proceed1 i4 e4 the laws of
 the  association of ideas4 ,this       
thorough-going subjective idealism1 this
  complete denial of matter1 ,berkeley  
considered as the surest way to  oppose 
materialism and atheism4                
,,section ,,xxxv4    ,,wolff4      ,the 
idealism of ,berkeley1 as was to be     
expected from the nature of the  case1  
remained without any farther            
development1 but the philosophy of      
,leibnitz was taken up and subjected to 
a farther revision by ,christian        
,wolff4 ,he was born in ,breslau in     

#afgi4 ,he was chosen professor at      
,halle1 where he became obnoxious to the
 charge of teaching a doctrine at       
variance with the ,scriptures1 and drew 
upon himself such a violent  opposition 
from the theologians of the university1 
that a cabinet order  was issued for his
 dismissal on the #hth of ,november1    
#agbc1 and he was  enjoined to leave    
,prussia within forty-eight hours on    
pain of being  hung4 ,he then became    
professor in ,marburg1 but was          
afterwards recalled  to ,prussia by     
,frederic ,,ii4 immediately upon his    
accession to the throne4  ,he was       
subsequently made baron1 and died #aged4
 ,in his chief thoughts he  followed    
,leibnitz1 a connection which he himself
 admitted1 though he  protested against 
the identification of his philosophy    
with that of  ,leibnitz1 and objected to
 the name1 ,philosophia                 
,leibnitio-,wolffiana1  which was taken 
by his disciple ,bilfinger4 ,the        
historical merit of ,wolff  is          

threefold4 ,first1 and most important1  
he laid claim again to the  whole domain
 of knowledge in the name of philosophy1
 and sought again to  build up a        
systematic framework1 and make an       
encyclopedia of philosophy  in the      
highest sense of the word4 ,though he   
did not himself furnish much  new       
material for this purpose1 yet he       
carefully elaborated and arranged  that 
which he found at hand4 ,secondly1 he   
made again the philosophical  method as 
such1 an object of attention4 ,his own  
method is1 indeed1 an  external one as  
to its content1 namely1 the mathematical
 or the  mathematico-syllogistical1     
recommended by ,leibnitz1 and by the    
application of this his whole           
philosophizing sinks to a level         
formalism4  7,for instance1 in his      
principles of architecture1 the eighth  
proposition  is--8a window must be wide 
enough for two persons to recline       
together  conveniently10--a proposition 
which is thus proved3 8we are more      

frequently accustomed to recline and    
look out at a window in company  with   
another person than alone1 and hence1   
since the builder of the  house should  
satisfy the owner in every respect 7    
#a71 he must make a  window wide enough 
for two persons conveniently to recline 
within it at  the same time047 ,still   
this formalism is not without its       
advantage1 for  it subjects the         
philosophical content to a logical      
treatment4 ,thirdly1  ,wolff has taught 
philosophy to speak ,german1 an art     
which it has not  since forgotten4 ,next
 to ,leibnitz1 he is entitled to the    
merit of having  made the ,german       
language for ever the organ of          
philosophy4    ,the following remarks   
will suffice for the content and the    
scientific  classification of ,wolff's  
philosophy4 ,he defines philosophy to be
 the  science of the possible as such4  
,but that is possible which contains no 
contradiction4 ,wolff defends this      
definition against the charge of        

presuming too much4 ,it is not affirmed1
 he says1 with this definition  that    
either he or any other philosopher knows
 every thing which is  possible4 ,the   
definition only claims for philosophy   
the whole province  of human knowledge1 
and it is certainly proper that         
philosophy should be  described         
according to the highest perfection     
which it can attain1 even  though it has
 not yet actually reached it4--,in what 
parts now does this  science of the     
possible consist8 ,resting on the       
perception that there  are within the   
soul two faculties1 one of knowing and  
one of willing1  ,wolff divides         
philosophy into two great parts1        
theoretical philosophy  7an expression1 
however1 which first appears among his  
followers71 or  metaphysics1 and        
practical philosophy4 ,logic precedes   
both as a  preliminary training for     
philosophical study4 ,metaphysics are   
still  farther divided by ,wolff into   
ontology1 cosmology1 psychology1 and    

natural theology2 practical philosophy  
he divides into ethics1 whose  object is
 man as man2 economics1 whose object is 
man as a member of the  family2 and     
politics1 whose object is man as a      
citizen of the state4    #a4 ,,ontology 
is the first part of ,wolff's           
metaphysics4 ,ontology treats of  what  
are now called categories1 or those     
fundamental conceptions which  are      
applied to every object1 and must       
therefore at the outset be              
investigated4 ,aristotle had already    
furnished a table of categories1 but  he
 had derived them wholly empirically4   
,it is not much better with the         
ontology of ,wolff2 it is laid out like 
a philosophical dictionary4 ,at  its    
head he places the principle of         
contradiction1 viz43 it is not  possible
 for any thing to be1 and at the same   
time not to be4 ,the  conception of the 
possible at once follows from this      
principle4 ,that is  possible which     
contains no contradiction4 ,that is     

necessary1 the  opposite of which       
contradicts itself1 and that is         
accidental1 the  opposite of which is   
possible4 ,every thing which is possible
 is a thing1  though only an imaginary  
one2 that which neither is1 nor is      
possible1 is  nothing4 ,when many things
 together compose a thing1 this is a    
whole1 and  the individual things       
comprehended by it are its parts4 ,the  
greatness of  a thing consists in the   
multitude of its parts4 ,if ,a contains 
that by  which we can understand the    
being of ,b1 then that in ,a by which ,b
  becomes understood is the ground of   
,b1 and the whole ,a which contains  the
 ground of ,b is its cause4 ,that which 
contains the ground of its  properties  
is the essence of a thing4 ,space is the
 arrangement of things  which exist     
conjointly4 ,place is the determinate   
way in which a thing  exists in         
conjunction with others4 ,movement is   
change of place4 ,time is  the          
arrangement of that which exists        

successively1 etc4    #b4               
,,cosmology4--,wolff defines the world  
to be a series of changing  objects1    
which exist conjointly and successively1
 but which are so  connected together   
that one ever contains the ground of the
 other4  ,things are connected in space 
and in time4 ,by virtue of this         
universal  connection1 the world is one 
united whole2 the essence of the world  
consists in the manner of its           
connection4 ,but this manner cannot be  
changed4 ,it can neither receive any new
 ingredients nor lose any of  those it  
possesses4 ,from the essence of the     
world spring all its  changes4 ,in this 
respect the world is a machine4 ,events 
in the world are  only hypothetically   
necessary in so far as previous events  
have had a  certain character2 they are 
accidental in so far as the world might 
have  been directed otherwise4 ,in      
respect to the question whether the     
world  had a beginning in time1 ,wolff  
does not express himself explicitly4    

,since ,god is independent of time1 but 
the world has been from eternity  in    
time1 the world therefore is in no case 
eternal in any sense like  ,god4 ,but   
according to ,wolff1 neither space nor  
time has any substantial  being4 ,body  
is a connected thing composed of matter1
 and possessing a  moving power within  
itself4 ,the powers of a body taken     
together are  called its nature1 and the
 comprehension of all being is called   
nature  in general4 ,that which has its 
ground in the essence of the world is   
called natural1 and that which has not1 
is supernatural1 or a wonder4 ,at  the  
close of his cosmology1 ,wolff treats of
 the perfection and  imperfection of the
 world4 ,the perfection of a world      
consists in the  harmony with each other
 of every thing which exists conjointly 
and  successively4 ,but since every     
thing has its separate rules1 the       
individual must give up so much from its
 perfection as is necessary for  the    
symmetry of the whole4    #c4 ,,rational

 ,,psychology4--,the soul is that within
 us which is  self-conscious4 ,in the   
self-consciousness of the soul are      
itself and  other objects4              
,consciousness is either clear or       
indistinct4 ,clear  consciousness is    
thought4 ,the soul is a simple          
incorporeal substance4  ,there dwells   
within it a power to represent to itself
 a world4 ,in this  sense brutes also   
may have a soul1 but a soul which       
possesses  understanding and will is    
mind1 and mind belongs alone to men4    
,the soul  of man is a mind joined to a 
body1 and this is the distinction       
between  men and superior spirits4 ,the 
movements of the soul and of the body   
harmonize with each other by virtue of  
the prestablished harmony4 ,the  freedom
 of the human soul is the power         
according to its own arbitrament1  to   
choose of two possible things that which
 pleases it best4 ,but the  soul does   
not decide without motives1 it ever     
chooses that which it  holds to be the  

best4 ,thus the soul would seem impelled
 to its action by  its representations1 
but the understanding is not constrained
 to its  representations of that which  
is good and bad1 and hence also the will
  is not constrained1 but free4 ,as a   
simple being the soul is indivisible1   
and hence incorruptible2 the souls of   
brutes1 however1 have no  understanding1
 and hence enjoy no conscious existence 
after death4 ,this  belongs alone to the
 human soul1 and hence the human soul   
alone is  immortal4    #d4 ,,natural    
,,theology4--,wolff uses here the       
cosmological argument to  demonstrate   
the existence of a ,god4 ,god might have
 made different  worlds1 but has        
preferred the present one as the best4  
,this world has  been called into being 
by the will of ,god4 ,his aim in its    
creation was  the manifestation of his  
own perfection4 ,evil in the world does 
not  spring from the ,divine will1 but  
from the limited being of human things4 
,god permits it only as a means of good4

    ,this brief aphoristic exposition of
 ,wolff's metaphysics1 shows how        
greatly it is related to the doctrine of
 ,leibnitz4 ,the latter1 however1  loses
 much of its speculative profoundness by
 the abstract and logical  treatment it 
receives in the hands of ,wolff4 ,for   
the most part1 the  specific elements of
 the monadology remain in the           
background2 with  ,wolff1 his simple    
beings are not representative like the  
,monads1 but  more like the ,atoms4     
,hence there is with him much that is   
illogical and  contradictory4 ,his      
peculiar merit in metaphysics is        
ontology1 which he  has elaborated far  
more strictly than his predecessors4 ,a 
multitude of  philosophical terminations
 owe to him their origin1 and their     
introduction into philosophical         
language4    ,the philosophy of ,wolff1 
comprehensible and distinct as it was1  
and by  its composition in the ,german  
language more accessible than that of   
,leibnitz1 soon became the popular      

philosophy1 and gained an extensive     
influence4 ,among the names which       
deserve credit for their scientific     
treatment of it1 we may mention         
,thmming1 #afig-agbh2 ,bilfinger1       
#afic-agej2 ,baumeister1 #agjh-aghe2    
,baumgarten the esthetic1  #agad-agfb2  
and his scholar ,meier1 #agah-aggg4     
,,section ,,xxxvi4    ,,the ,,german    
,,clearing ,,up4      ,under the        
influence of the philosophy of ,leibnitz
 and ,wolff1 though  without any        
immediate connection with it1 there     
arose in ,germany during  the latter    
half of the eighteenth century1 an      
eclectic popular  philosophy1 whose     
different phases may be embraced under  
the name of the  ,german clearing up4   
,it has but little significance for the 
history of  philosophy1 though not      
without importance in other respects4   
,its great  aim was to secure a higher  
culture1 and hence a cultivated and     
polished  style of reasoning is the form
 in which it philosophized4 ,it is the  

,german counterpart of the ,french      
clearing up4 ,as the latter closed  the 
realistic period of development by      
drawing the ultimate consequence  of    
materialism1 so the former closed the   
idealistic series by its  tendency to an
 extreme subjectivism4 ,to the men of   
this direction1 the  empirical1         
individual ,ego becomes the absolute2   
they forget every thing  else for it1 or
 rather every thing else has a value in 
their eyes only  in proportion as it    
refers and ministers to the subject by  
contributing  to its demands and        
satisfying its inner cravings4 ,hence   
the question of  immortality becomes now
 the great problem of philosophy 7in    
which  respect we may mention           
,mendelssohn1 #agbg-aghf1 the most      
important man  in this direction72 the  
eternal duration of the individual soul 
is the  chief point of interest2        
objective ideas or truths of faith1 e4  
g4 the  personality of ,god1 though not 
denied1 cease to have an interest2 it is

  held as a standing article of belief  
that we can know nothing of ,god4 ,in   
another current of this direction1 it is
 moral philosophy and esthetics         
7,garvey1 #agdb-agih2 ,engel1           
#agda-ahjb2 ,abbt1 #agch-agff2 ,sulzer1 
#agbj-aggi7 which find a scientific     
treatment1 because both these  preserve 
a subjective interest4 ,in general1     
every thing is viewed in its  useful    
relations2 the useful becomes the       
peculiar criterion of truth2  that which
 is not useful to the subject1 or which 
does not minister to  his subjective    
ends1 is set aside4 ,in connection with 
this turn of mind  stands the prevailing
 teleological direction which the       
investigations of  nature assumed       
7,reimarus1 #afid-agfe71 and the        
utilitarian character  given to ethics4 
,the happiness of the individual was    
considered as the  highest principle and
 the supreme end 7,basedow1 #agbc-agij74
 ,even  religion is contemplated from   
this point of view4 ,reimarus wrote a   

treatise upon the 8advantages0 of       
religion1 in which he attempted to      
prove that religion was not subversive  
of earthly pleasure1 but rather         
increased it2 and ,steinbart            
7#agch-ahji7 elaborated1 in a number of 
treatises1 the theme that all wisdom    
consists alone in attaining  happiness1 
i4 e4 enduring satisfaction1 and that   
the ,christian  religion1 instead of    
forbidding this1 was rather itself the  
true  doctrine of happiness4 ,in other  
particulars ,christianity received only 
a  temperate respect2 wherever it laid  
claim to any authority disagreeable  to 
the subject 7as in individual doctrines 
like that of future  punishment71 it was
 opposed1 and in general the effort was 
made to  counteract1 as far as possible1
 the positive dogma by natural religion4
  ,reimarus1 for example1 the most      
zealous defender of theism and of the   
teleological investigation of nature1 is
 at the same time the author of  the    
,wolfenbttel fragments4 ,by criticizing 

the ,gospel history1 and every  thing   
positive and transmitted1 and by        
rationalizing the supernatural in       
religion1 the subject displayed its     
new-found independence4 ,in fine1 the   
subjective standpoint of this period    
exhibits itself in the numerous         
autobiographies and self-confessions    
then so prevalent2 the isolated  self is
 the object of admiring contemplation   
7,rousseau1 #agab-aggh1 and  his        
confessions72 it beholds itself mirrored
 in its particular  conditions1         
sensations1 and views--a sort of        
flirtation with itself1  which often    
rises to sickly sentimentality4         
,according to all this1 it is  seen to  
be the extreme consequence of subjective
 idealism which  constitutes the        
character of the ,german clearing up    
period1 which thus  closes the series of
 an idealistic development4             
,,section ,,xxxvii4    ,,transition ,,to
 ,,kant4      ,the idealistic and the   
realistic stage of development to which 

we have  now been attending1 each ended 
with a one-sided result4 ,instead of    
actually and internally reconciling the 
opposition between thought and  being1  
they both issued in denying the one or  
the other of these  factors4 ,realism1  
on its side1 had made matter absolute2  
and idealism1  on its side1 had endowed 
the empirical ,ego with the same        
attribute--extremes in which philosophy 
was threatened with total  destruction4 
,it had1 in fact1 in ,germany as in     
,france1 become merged in  the most     
superficial popular philosophy4 ,then   
,kant arose1 and brought  again into one
 channel the two streams which1 when    
separate from each  other1 threatened to
 lose themselves amid the sands4 ,kant  
is the great  renovator of philosophy1  
who brought back to their point of      
divergence  the one-sided efforts which 
had preceded him1 and embraced them in  
their  unity and totality4 ,he stands in
 some special and fitting relation      
either antagonistic or harmonious to all

 others--to ,locke no less than to      
,hume1 to the ,scottish philosophers no 
less than to the ,english and  ,french  
moralists1 to the philosophy of         
,leibnitz and of ,wolff1 as well as  to 
the materialism of the ,french and the  
utilitarianism of the ,german  clearing 
up period4 ,his relation to the         
development of a partial  idealism and a
 one-sided realism is thus stated3      
,empiricism had made the  ,ego purely   
passive and subordinate to the sensible 
external  world--idealism had made it   
purely active1 and given it a           
sovereignty  over the sensible world2   
,kant attempted to strike a balance     
between  these two claims1 by affirming 
that the ,ego as practical is free and  
autonomic1 an unconditioned lawgiver for
 itself1 while as theoretical it  is    
receptive and conditioned by the        
phenomenal world2 but at the same  time 
the theoretical ,ego contains the two   
sides within itself1 for if1  on the one
 side1 empiricism may be justified upon 

the ground that the  material and only  
field of all our knowledge is furnished 
by experience1  so on the other side1   
rationalism may be justified on the     
ground that  there is an apriori factor 
and basis to our knowledge1 for in      
experience  itself we make use of       
conceptions which are not furnished by  
experience1  but are contained apriori  
in our understanding4    ,in order1 now1
 that we may bring the very elaborate   
framework of the  ,kantian philosophy   
into a clearer outline1 let us briefly  
glance at its  fundamental conceptions1 
and notice its chief principles and     
results4  ,kant subjected the activity  
of the human mind in knowing1 and the   
origin  of our experience1 to his       
critical investigation4 ,hence his      
philosophy  is called critical          
philosophy1 or criticism1 because it    
aims to be  essentially an examination  
of our faculty of knowledge2 it is also 
called transcendental philosophy1 since 
,kant calls the reflection of the       

reason upon its relation to the         
objective world1 a transcendental       
reflection 7transcendental must not be  
confounded with transcendent71  or1 in  
other words1 a transcendental knowledge 
is one 8which does not  relate so much  
to objects of knowledge1 as to our way  
of knowing them1  so far as this is     
apriori possible40 ,the examination of  
the faculty of  knowledge1 which ,kant  
attempts in his 8,critick of ,pure      
,reason10 shows  the following results4 
,all knowledge is a product of two      
factors1 the  knowing subject and the   
external world4 ,of these two factors1  
the latter  furnishes our knowledge with
 experience1 as the matter1 and the     
former  with the conceptions of the     
understanding1 as the form1 through     
which a  connected knowledge1 or a      
synthesis of our perceptions in a whole 
of  experience first becomes possible4  
,if there were no external world1 then  
would there be no phenomena2 if there   
were no understanding1 then these       

phenomena1 or perceptions1 which are    
infinitely manifold1 would never be     
brought into the unity of a notion1 and 
thus no experience were  possible4      
,thus1 while intuitions without         
conceptions are blind1 and  conceptions 
without intuitions are empty1 knowledge 
is a union of the  two1 since it        
requires that the form of conception    
should be filled with  the matter of    
experience1 and that the matter of      
experience should be  apprehended in the
 net of the understanding's conceptions4
 ,nevertheless1  we do not know things  
as they are in themselves4 ,first1      
because the  categories1 or the forms of
 our understanding prevent4 ,by bringing
 that  which is given as the material of
 knowledge into our own conceptions as  
the form1 there is manifestly a change  
in respect of the objects1 which  become
 thought of not as they are1 but only as
 we apprehend them2 they  appear to us  
only as they are transmuted into        
categories4 ,but besides  this          

subjective addition1 there is yet       
another4 ,secondly1 we do not  know     
things as they are in themselves1       
because even the intuitions which  we   
bring within the form of the            
understanding's conceptions1 are not    
pure and uncolored1 but are already     
penetrated by a subjective medium1      
namely1 by the universal form of all    
objects of sense1 space and time4       
,space and time are also subjective     
additions1 forms of sensuous  intuition1
 which are just as originally present in
 our minds as the  fundamental          
conceptions or categories of our        
understanding4 ,that which  we would    
represent intuitively to ourselves we   
must place in space and  time1 for      
without these no intuition is possible4 
,from this it follows  that it is only  
phenomena which we know1 and not things 
in themselves  separate from space and  
time4    ,a superficial apprehension of 
these ,kantian principles might lead one
 to  suppose that ,kant's criticism did 

not essentially go beyond the           
standpoint of ,locke's empiricism4 ,but 
such a supposition disappears upon  a   
careful scrutiny4 ,kant was obliged to  
recognize with ,hume that the           
conceptions1 cause and effect1 substance
 and attribute1 and the other           
conceptions which the human             
understanding sees itself necessitated  
to  think in the phenomena1 and in which
 every one of its thoughts must be      
found1 do not arise from any experience 
of the sense4 ,for instance1 when  we   
become affected through different       
senses1 and perceive a white color1  a  
sweet taste1 a rough surface1 c41 and   
predicate all these of one  thing1 as a 
piece of sugar1 there come from without 
only the plurality  of sensations1 while
 the conception of unity cannot come    
through  sensation1 but is a category or
 conception borne over to the sensations
  from the mind itself4 ,but instead of 
denying1 for this reason1 the  reality  
of these conceptions of the             

understanding1 ,kant took a step in     
advance1 assigning a peculiar province  
to this activity of the  understanding1 
and showing that these forms of thought 
thus furnished to  the matter of        
experience are immanent laws of the     
human faculty of  knowledge1 the        
peculiar laws of the understanding's    
operations1 which  may be obtained by a 
perfect analysis of our thinking        
activity4 7,of  these laws or           
conceptions there are twelve1 viz41     
unity1 plurality1  totality2 reality1   
negation1 limitation2 substantiality1   
causality1  reciprocal action2          
possibility1 actuality1 and necessity47 
,from what has been said we can see the 
three chief principles of the  ,kantian 
theory of knowledge3    #a4 ,,we ,,know 
,,only ,,phenomena ,,and ,,not ,,things 
,,in ,,themselves4--,the experience     
furnished us by the external world      
becomes so adjusted and altered in  its 
relations 7for we apprehend it at first 
in the subjective framework  of space   

and time1 and then in the equally       
subjective forms of our  understanding's
 conceptions71 that it no longer        
represents the thing  itself in its     
original condition1 pure and unmixed4   
#b4 ,,nevertheless ,,experience ,,is    
,,the ,,only ,,province ,,of ,,our      
,,knowledge1 ,,and  ,,there ,,is ,,no   
,,science ,,of ,,the                    
,,unconditioned4--,this follows of      
course1 for  since every knowledge is   
the product of the matter of experience1
 and  the form of the understanding1 and
 depends thus upon the co-working of    
the sensory and the understanding1 then 
no knowledge is possible of  objects for
 which one of these factors1 experience1
 fails us2 a  knowledge alone from the  
understanding's conceptions of the      
unconditioned is illusory since the     
sensory can show no unconditioned       
object corresponding to the conception4 
,hence the questions which ,kant  places
 at the head of his whole ,critick2 how 
are synthetical judgments  apriori      

possible8 i4 e4 can we widen our        
knowledge apriori1 by thought  alone1   
beyond the sensuous experience8 is a    
knowledge of the  supersensible         
possible8 must be answered with an      
unconditional negative4    #c4 ,still1  
if the human knowledge makes no effort  
to stride beyond the  narrow limits of  
experience1 i4 e4 to become             
transcendent1 it involves  itself in the
 greatest contradictions4 ,the three    
ideas of the reason1  the psychological1
 the cosmological1 and the theological1 
viz4 7a7 the  idea of an absolute       
subject1 i4 e4 of the soul1 or of       
immortality1  7b7 the idea of the world 
as a totality of all conditions and     
phenomena1 7c7 the idea of a most       
perfect being--are so wholly without    
application to the empirical actuality1 
are so truly regulative1 and not        
constitutive principles1 which are only 
the pure products of the reason1  and   
are so entirely without a correspondent 
object in experience1 that  whenever    

they are applied to experience1 i4 e4   
become conceived of as  actually        
existing objects1 they lead to pure     
logical errors1 to the most  obvious    
paralogisms and sophisms4 ,these errors1
 which are partly false  conclusions and
 paralogisms1 and partly unavoidable    
contradictions of  the reason with      
itself1 ,kant undertook to show in      
reference to all the  ideas of the      
reason4 ,take1 e4 g4 the cosmological   
idea4 ,whenever the  reason posits any  
transcendental expressions in reference 
to the  universe1 i4 e4 attempts to     
apply the forms of the finite to the    
infinite1 it is at once evident that the
 antithesis of those expressions  can be
 proved just as well as the thesis4 ,the
 affirmation that the world  has a      
beginning in time1 and limits in space1 
can be proved as well as1  and no better
 than its opposite1 that the world has  
no beginning in  time1 and no spacial   
limits4 ,whence it follows that all     
speculative  cosmology is an assumption 

by the reason4 ,so also with the        
theological  idea2 it rests on bare     
logical paralogisms1 and false          
conclusions1 as  ,kant1 with great      
acuteness1 shows in reference to each of
 the proofs for  the being of a ,god1   
which previous dogmatic philosophies had
 attempted4  ,it is therefore impossible
 to prove and to conceive of the        
existence of  a ,god as a ,supreme      
,being1 or of the soul as a real        
subject1 or of a  comprehending         
universe4 ,the peculiar problems of     
metaphysics lie outside  the province of
 philosophical knowledge4    ,such is   
the negative part of the ,kantian       
philosophy2 its positive  complement is 
found in the 8,critick of the ,practical
 ,reason40 ,while  the mind as          
theoretical and cognitive is wholly     
conditioned1 and ruled  by the objective
 and sensible world1 and thus knowledge 
is only possible  through intuition1 yet
 as practical does it go wholly beyond  
the given  7the sense impulse71 and is  

determined only through the categorical 
imperative1 and the moral law1 which is 
itself1 and is therefore free  and      
autonomic2 the ends which it pursues are
 those which itself1 as  moral spirit1  
places before itself2 objects are no    
more its masters and  lawgivers1 to     
which it must yield if it would know the
 truth1 but its  servants1 which it may 
use for its own ends in actualizing its 
moral  law4 ,while the theoretical mind 
is united to a world of sense and       
phenomena1 a world obedient to necessary
 laws1 the practical mind1 by  virtue of
 the freedom essential to it1 by virtue 
of its direction  towards an absolute   
aim1 belongs to a purely intelligible   
and  supersensible world4 ,this is the  
practical idealism of ,kant1 from which 
he derives the three practical          
postulates of the immortality of the    
soul1 moral freedom1 and the being of a 
,god1 which1 as theoretical  truths1 had
 been before denied4    ,with this brief
 sketch for our guidance1 let us now    

pass on to a more  extended exposition  
of the ,kantian ,philosophy4            
,,section ,,xxxviii4    ,,kant4         
,immanuel ,kant was born at ,knigsberg  
in ,prussia1 ,april #bb1 #agbd4 ,his    
father an honest saddlemaker1 and his   
mother a prudent and pious woman1       
exerted a good influence upon him in his
 earliest youth4 ,in the year  #agdj he 
entered the university1 where he        
connected himself with the  theological 
department1 but devoted the most of his 
time to philosophy1  mathematics1 and   
physics4 ,he commenced his literary     
career in his  twenty-third year1 in    
#agdg1 with a treatise entitled         
8,thoughts  concerning the true estimate
 of ,living ,forces40 ,he was obliged by
 his  pecuniary circumstances to spend  
some years as a private tutor in        
different families in the neighborhood  
of ,knigsberg4 ,in #agee he took a      
place in the university as              
8privat-docent10 which position he held 
for  fifteen years1 during which time he

 gave lectures upon logic1  metaphysics1
 physics1 mathematics1 and also1 during 
the latter part of  the time1 upon      
ethics1 anthropology1 and physical      
geography4 ,at this  period he adhered  
for the most part to the school of      
,wolff1 though early  expressing his    
doubts in respect of dogmatism4 ,from   
the publication of  his first treatise  
he applied himself to writing with      
unwearied  activity1 though his great   
work1 the 8,critick of pure ,reason10   
did not  appear till his fifty-seventh  
year1 #agha4 ,his 8,critick of the      
practical  ,reason10 was issued in      
#aghg1 and his 8,religion within the    
bounds of  pure ,reason10 in #agic4 ,in 
#aggj1 in his forty-sixth year1 he was  
chosen  ordinary professor of logic and 
metaphysics1 a chair which he continued 
to fill uninterruptedly till #agid1 when
 the weakness of age obliged him  to    
leave it4 ,invitations to professorships
 at ,jena1 ,erlangen1 and ,halle1  were 
given him and rejected4 ,as soon as he  

became known1 the noblest and  most     
active minds flocked from all parts of  
,germany to ,knigsberg1 to  sit at the  
feet of the sage who was master there4  
,one of his  worshippers1 ,reuss1       
professor of philosophy at ,wrzburg1 who
 abode but a  brief time at ,knigsberg1 
entered his chamber1 declaring that he  
had  come one hundred and sixty miles#c 
in order to see ,kant and to speak  with
 him4--,during the last seventeen years 
of his life he occupied a  little house 
with a garden1 in a quiet quarter of the
 city1 where his  calm and regular mode 
of life might be undisturbed4 ,his      
habits of life  were very simple4 ,he   
never left his native province even to  
go as far as  ,dantzic4 ,his longest    
journeys were to visit some             
country-seats in the  environs of       
,knigsberg4 ,nevertheless1 as his       
lectures upon physical  geography       
testify1 he acquired by reading the most
 accurate knowledge of  the earth4 ,he  
knew all of ,rousseau's works1 of which 

,emile at its  first appearance detained
 him for a number of days from his      
customary  walks4 ,kant died ,february  
#ab1 #ahjd1 in the eightieth year of his
 life4  ,he was of medium stature1      
finely built1 with blue eyes1 and always
  enjoyed sound health till in his      
latter years1 when he became childish4  
,he was never married4 ,his character   
was marked by an earnest love of  truth1
 great candor1 and simple modesty4      
,though ,kant's great work1 the         
8,critick of pure ,reason10 which       
created an  epoch in the history of     
philosophy1 did not appear till #agha2  
yet had he  previously shown an approach
 towards the same standpoint in several 
smaller treatises1 and particularly in  
his inaugural dissertation which        
appeared in #aggj1 8,concerning the form
 and the principles of the              
,sense-,world and that of the           
,understanding40 ,kant himself refers   
the  inner genesis of his critical      
standpoint to ,hume4 8,i freely         

confess10 he  says1 8that it was ,david 
,hume who first roused me from my       
dogmatic  slumber1 and gave a different 
direction to my investigations in the   
field of speculative philosophy40 ,the  
critical view therefore first  became   
developed in ,kant as he left the       
dogmatic metaphysical school1  the      
,wolffian philosophy in which he had    
grown up1 and went over to the  study of
 a sceptical empiricism in ,hume4       
8,hitherto10 says ,kant at the  close of
 his ,critick of pure ,reason1 8men have
 been obliged to choose  either a       
dogmatical direction1 like ,wolff1 or a 
sceptical one1 like  ,hume4 ,the        
critical road alone is yet open4 ,if the
 reader has had  pleasure and patience  
in travelling along this in my company1 
let him  now contribute his aid in      
making this by-path into a highway1 in  
order  that that which many centuries   
could not effect may now be attained    
before the expiration of the present1   
and the reason become perfectly  content

 in respect of that which has hitherto1 
but in vain1 engaged its  curiosity40   
,kant had the clearest consciousness    
respecting the relation  of his         
criticism to the previous philosophy4   
,he compares the revolution  which he   
himself had brought about in philosophy 
with that wrought by  ,copernicus in    
astronomy1 8,hitherto it has been       
assumed that all our  knowledge must    
regulate itself according to the        
objects2 but all  attempts to make any  
thing out of them apriori1 through      
notions whereby  our knowledge might be 
enlarged1 proved1 under this            
supposition1  abortive4 ,let us1 then1  
try for once whether we do not succeed  
better  with the problems of            
metaphysics1 by assuming that the       
objects must  regulate themselves       
according to our knowledge1 a mode of   
viewing the  subject which accords so   
much better with the desired possibility
 of a  knowledge of them apriori1 which 
must decide something concerning        

objects before they are given us4 ,the  
circumstances are in this case          
precisely the same as with the first    
thoughts of ,copernicus1 who1  finding  
that his attempt to explain the motions 
of the heavenly bodies  did not succeed1
 when he assumed the whole starry host  
to revolve around  the spectator1 tried 
whether he should not succeed better1 if
 he left  the spectator himself to turn1
 and the stars on the contrary at rest40
  ,in these words we have the principle 
of a subjective idealism1 most  clearly 
and decidedly expressed4    ,in the     
succeeding exposition of the ,kantian   
philosophy we shall most  suitably      
follow the classification adopted by    
,kant himself4 ,his  principle of       
classification is a psychological one4  
,all the faculties of  the soul1 he     
says1 may be referred to three1 which   
are incapable of any  farther reduction2
 knowing1 feeling1 and desire4 ,the     
first faculty  contains the principles1 
the governing laws for all the three4   

,so far as  the faculty of knowledge    
contains the principles of knowledge    
itself1 is  it theoretical reason1 and  
so far as it contains the principles of 
desire and action1 is it practical      
reason1 while1 so far as it contains    
the principles which regulate the       
feelings of pleasure and pain1 is it a  
faculty of judgment4 ,thus the ,kantian 
philosophy 7on its critical side7       
divides itself into three criticks1 7#a7
 ,critick of pure i4 e4  theoretical    
reason1 7#b7 ,critick of practical      
reason1 7#c7 ,critick of the  judgment4 
,i4 ,,critick ,,of ,,pure               
,,reason4--,the critick of pure reason1 
says ,kant1 is the  inventory in which  
all our possessions through pure reason 
are  systematically arranged4 ,what are 
these possessions8 ,when we have a      
cognition1 what is it that we bring     
thereto8 ,to answer these questions1    
,kant explores the two chief fields of  
our theoretical consciousness1 the  two 
chief factors of all knowledge1 the     

sensory and the understanding4          
,firstly3 what does our sensory or our  
faculty of intuition possess  apriori8  
,secondly3 what is the apriori          
possession of our understanding8  ,the  
first of these questions is discussed in
 the transcendental  sthetics 7a title  
which we must take not in the sense now 
commonly  attached to the word1 but in  
its etymological signification as the   
8science of the apriori principles of   
the sensory072 and the second in  the   
transcendental ,logic or ,analytics4    
,sense and understanding are  thus the  
two factors of all knowledge1 the two   
stalks--as ,kant expresses  it--of our  
knowledge1 which may spring from a      
common root1 though this is  unknown to 
us3 the sensory is the receptivity1 and 
the understanding the  spontaneity of   
our cognitive faculty2 by the sensory1  
which can only  furnish intuitions1     
objects become given to us2 by the      
understanding1  which forms conceptions1
 these objects become thought4          

,conceptions  without intuitions are    
empty2 intuitions without conceptions   
are blind4  ,intuitions and conceptions 
constitute the reciprocally complemental
  elements of our intellectual activity4
 ,what now are the apriori  principles  
respectively of our knowledge1 through  
the sense and through  the thought8 ,the
 first of these questions1 as already   
said1 is answered  by    #a4 ,,the      
,,transcendental ,,sthetics4--,to       
anticipate at once the answer1 we  may  
say that the apriori principles of our  
knowledge through the sense1  the       
original forms of sensuous intuition1   
are space and time4 ,space is  the form 
of the external sense1 by means of which
 objects are given to  us as existing   
outside of ourselves separately and     
conjointly2 time is  the form of the    
inner sense1 by means of which the      
circumstances of our  own soul-life     
become objects to our consciousness4 ,if
 we abstract every  thing belonging to  
the matter of our sensations1 space     

remains as the  universal form in which 
all the materials of the external sense 
must be  arranged4 ,if we abstract every
 thing which belongs to the matter of   
our  inner sense1 time remains as the   
form which the movement of the mind had 
filled4 ,space and time are the highest 
forms of the outer and inner  sense4    
,that these forms lie apriori in the    
human mind1 ,kant proves1  first1       
directly from the nature of these       
conceptions themselves2 and1  secondly1 
indirectly by showing that without      
apriori presupposing these  conceptions1
 it were not possible to have any       
certain science of  undoubted validity4 
,the first of these he calls the        
metaphysical1 and  the second the       
transcendental discussion4    7#a47 ,in 
the metaphysical discussion it is to be 
shown1 7a7 that  space and time are     
apriori given1 7b7 that these notions   
belong to the  sensory 7sthetics7 and   
not to the understanding 7logic71 i4 e4 
that  they are intuitions and not       

conceptions1 7a7 ,that space and time   
are  apriori is clear from the fact that
 every experience1 before it can be1    
must presuppose already a space and     
time4 ,i perceive something as  external
 to me2 but this external presupposes   
space4 ,again1 ,i have two  sensations  
at the same time and successively2 this 
presupposes time1  7b7 ,space and time1 
however1 are by no means conceptions1   
but forms of  intuition1 or intuitions  
themselves4 ,for in every universal     
conception  the individual is           
comprehended under it1 and is not a part
 of it2 but in  space and time1 all     
individual spaces and times are parts of
 and  contained within the universal    
space and the universal time4    7#b47  
,in the transcendental discussion ,kant 
draws his proof indirectly  by showing  
that certain sciences1 universally      
recognized as such1 can  only be        
conceived upon the supposition that     
space and time are apriori4  ,a pure    
mathematics is only possible on the     

ground that space and time  are pure and
 not empirical intuitions4 ,kant        
comprises the whole problem  of the     
,transcendental sthetics in the         
question--how are pure  mathematical    
sciences possible8 ,the ground1 says    
,kant1 upon which pure  mathematics     
moves1 is space and time4 ,but now      
mathematics utters its  principles as   
universal and necessary4 ,universal and 
necessary  principles1 however1 can     
never come from experience2 they must   
have an  apriori ground2 consequently it
 is impossible that space and time1 out 
of which mathematics receives its       
principles1 should be first given       
aposteriori2 they must be given apriori 
as pure intuitions4 ,hence we  have a   
knowledge apriori1 and a science which  
rests upon apriori  grounds2 and the    
matter simply resolves itself into this1
 viz43  whosoever should deny that      
apriori knowledge can be1 must also at  
the  same time deny the possibility of  
mathematics4 ,but if the fundamental    

truths of mathematics are intuitions    
apriori1 we might conclude that  there  
may be also apriori conceptions1 out of 
which1 in connection with  these pure   
intuitions1 a metaphysics could be      
formed4 ,this is the  positive result of
 the ,transcendental sthetics1 though   
with this  positive side the negative is
 closely connected4 ,intuition or       
immediate  knowledge can be attained by 
man only through the sensory1 whose     
universal intuitions are only space and 
time4 ,but since these intuitions  of   
space and time are no objective         
relations1 but only subjective forms1   
there is therefore something subjective 
mingled with all our intuitions1  and we
 can know things not as they are in     
themselves1 but only as they  appear to 
us through this subjective medium of    
space and time4 ,this is  the meaning of
 the ,kantian principle1 that we do not 
know things in  themselves1 but only    
phenomena4 ,but if on this account we   
should affirm  that all things are in   

space and time1 this would be too much2 
they are  in space and time only for    
us1--all phenomena of the external sense
  appearing both in space and in time1  
and all phenomena of the inner  sense   
appearing only in time4 ,notwithstanding
 this1 ,kant would in no  ways have     
admitted that the world of sense is mere
 appearance4 ,he  affirmed1 that while  
he contended for a transcendental       
ideality1 there  was1 nevertheless1 an  
empirical reality of space and time3    
things  external to ourselves exist just
 as certainly as do we and the          
circumstances within us1 only they are  
not represented to us as they are  in   
themselves and in their independence of 
space and of time4 ,as to the  question1
 whether there is any thing in the thing
 itself back of the  phenomena1 ,kant   
intimates in the first edition of his   
,critick1 that it  is not impossible    
that the ,ego and the thing-in-itself   
are one and the  same thinking          
substance4 ,this thought1 which ,kant   

threw out as a mere  conjecture1 was the
 source of all the wider developments of
 the latest  philosophy4 ,it was        
afterwards the fundamental idea of the  
,fichtian  system1 that the ,ego does   
not become affected through a thing     
essentially foreign to it1 but purely   
through itself4 ,in the second  edition 
of his ,critick1 however1 ,kant omitted 
this sentence4    ,the ,transcendental  
sthetics closes with the discussion of  
space and  time1 i4 e4 with finding out 
what is in the sensory apriori4 ,but the
  human mind cannot be satisfied merely 
with the receptive relation of the      
sensory2 it does not simply receive     
objects1 but it applies to these its    
own spontaneity1 and attempts to think  
these through its conceptions1  and     
embrace them in the forms of its        
understanding4 ,it is the object of  the
 ,transcendental ,analytic 7which forms 
the first part of the  ,transcendental  
,logic71 to examine these apriori       
conceptions or forms  of thought which  

lie originally in the understanding1 as 
the forms of  space and time do in the  
intuitive faculty4    #b4 ,,the         
,,transcendental ,,analytic4--,it is the
 first problem of the ,analytic  to     
attain the pure conceptions of the      
understanding4 ,aristotle had  already  
attempted to form a table of these      
conceptions or categories1  but he had  
collected them empirically instead of   
deriving them from a  common principle1 
and had numbered among them space and   
time1 though  these are no pure         
conceptions of the understanding1 but   
only forms of  intuition4 ,but if we    
would have a perfect1 pure1 and         
regularly arranged  table of all the    
conceptions of the understanding1 or all
 the apriori  forms of thought1 we must 
look for a principle out of which we may
  derive them4 ,this principle is the   
judgment4 ,the general fundamental      
conceptions of the understanding may be 
perfectly attained if we look at  all   
the different modes or forms of the     

judgment4 ,for this end ,kant  considers
 the different kinds of judgment as     
ordinarily pointed out to  us by the    
science of logic4 ,now logic shows that 
there are four kinds of  judgment1 viz41
 judgments of       ,quantity4          
,quality4      ,relation4               
,modality4     ,universal1              
,affirmative1    ,categorical1          
,problematical1     ,plurative1         
,negative1       ,hypothetical1         
,assertive1     ,singular4              
,illimitable4    ,disjunctive4          
,apodictic4    ,from these judgments    
result the same number of fundamental   
conceptions  or categories of the       
understanding1 viz43         ,quantity4 
,quality4      ,relation4               
,modality4     ,totality1               
,reality1        ,substance and         
,possibility and                        
inherence1          impossibility1      
,multiplicity1     ,negation1           
,cause and           ,being and         
dependence1         not-being1          

,unity4            ,limitation4         
,reciprocal action4  ,necessity and     
accidence4    ,from these twelve        
categories all the rest may be derived  
by combination4  ,from the fact that    
these categories are shown to belong    
apriori to the  understanding1 it       
follows1 7#a7 that these conceptions are
 apriori1 and  hence have a necessary   
and universal validity1 7#b7 that by    
themselves  they are empty forms1 and   
attain a content only through           
intuitions4 ,but  since our intuition is
 wholly through the sense1 these        
categories have  their validity only in 
their application to the sensuous       
intuition1  which becomes a proper      
experience only when apprehended in the 
conceptions of the understanding4--,here
 we meet a second question2 how  does   
this happen8 ,how do objects become     
subsumed under these forms of  the      
understanding1 which for themselves are 
so empty8    ,there would be no         
difficulty with this subsumption if the 

objects and  the conceptions of the     
understanding were the same in kind4    
,but they are  not4 ,because the objects
 come to the understanding from the     
sensory1  they are of the nature of the 
sense4 ,hence the question arises3 how  
can  these sensible objects be subsumed 
under pure conceptions of the           
understanding1 and fundamental          
principles 7judgments apriori71 be      
formed  from them8 ,this cannot result  
immediately1 but there must come in     
between the two1 a third1 which must    
have some thing in common with  each1 i4
 e4 which is in one respect pure and    
apriori1 and in another  sensible4 ,the 
two pure intuitions of the              
,transcendental sthetics1 space  and    
time1 especially the latter1 are of such
 a nature4 ,a transcendental  time      
determination1 as the determination of  
coetaneousness1 corresponds  on the one 
side to the categories1 because it is   
apriori1 and on the  other side to the  
phenomenal objects1 because every thing 

phenomenal can  be represented only in  
time4 ,the transcendental time          
determination1 ,kant  calls in this     
respect the transcendental schema1 and  
the use which the  understanding makes  
of it1 he calls the transcendental      
schematism of  the pure understanding4  
,the schema is a product of the         
imaginative  faculty1 which             
self-actively determines the inner sense
 to this1 though  the schema is         
something other than a mere image4 ,an  
image is always  merely an individual   
and determinate intuition1 but the      
schema merely  represents the universal 
process of the imagination1 by which it 
furnishes for a conception a proper     
image4 ,hence the schema can only  exist
 in the conception1 and never suffers   
itself to be brought within  the        
sensuous intuition4 ,if1 now1 we        
consider more closely the schematism  of
 the understanding1 and seek the        
transcendental time determination for   
every category1 we find that3    7#a7   

,quantity has for a universal schema the
 series of time or  number1 which       
represents the successive addition of   
one and one of the  same kind4 ,i can   
only represent to myself the pure       
understanding  conception of greatness1 
except as ,i bring into the imagination 
a number  of units one after another4   
,if ,i stop this process at its first   
beginning1 the result is unity2 if ,i   
let it go on farther ,i have  plurality2
 and if ,i suffer it to continue without
 limit1 there is  totality4 ,whenever ,i
 meet with objects in the phenomenal    
world1 which ,i  can only apprehend     
successively1 ,i am directed to apply   
the conception  of greatness1 which     
would not be possible without the schema
 of the  series of time4    7#b7        
,quality has for its schema the content 
of time4 ,if ,i wish to  represent to   
myself the understanding conception of  
reality1 which  belongs to quality1 ,i  
bring before me in thought a time filled
 up1 or a  content of time4 ,that is    

real which fills a time4 ,if also ,i    
would  represent to myself the pure     
understanding conception of negation1 ,i
  bring into thought a void time4       
7#c7 ,the categories of relation take   
their schemata from the order of  time2 
for if ,i would represent to myself a   
determinate relation1 ,i  always bring  
into thought a determinate order of     
things in time4  ,substance appears as  
the persistence of the real in time2    
causality as  regular succession in     
time2 reciprocal action as the regular  
coetaneousness of the determinations in 
the one substance1 with the             
determinations in the other4    7#d7    
,the categories of modality take their  
schema from the whole of  time1 i4 e4   
from whether1 and how1 an object belongs
 to time4 ,the  schema of possibility is
 the general harmony of a representation
 with  the conditions of time2 the      
schema of actuality is the existence of 
an  object in a determined time2 that of
 necessity is the existence of an       

object for all time4    ,we are thus    
furnished with all the means for forming
 metaphysical  fundamental principles   
7judgments apriori72 we have1 firstly1  
conceptions apriori1 and secondly1      
schemata through which we can apply     
these conceptions to objects2 for since 
every object which we can  perceive1    
falls in time1 so must it also fall     
under one of these  schemata1 which have
 been borrowed from time1 and must      
consequently  permit the corresponding  
category to be applied to it4 ,the      
judgments  which we here attain are     
synthetical4 ,they are1 corresponding to
 the  four classes of categories1 the   
following3 7#a7 ,all phenomena are1     
according to intuition1 extensive       
greatness1 since they cannot be         
apprehended otherwise than through space
 and time4 ,on this principle the       
axioms of intuition rely4 7#b7 ,all     
phenomena are1 according to sensation1  
intensive greatness1 since every        
sensation has a determined degree1 and  

is capable of increase and diminution4  
,on this principle the  anticipations of
 perception rest4 7#c7 ,the phenomena   
stand under  necessary                  
time-determinations4 ,they contain the  
substantial1 which  abides1 and the     
accidental1 which changes4 ,in reference
 to the change of  accidence1 they are  
subject to the law of the following     
connection1  through the relation of    
cause and effect3 as substances they    
are1 in  respect of their accidences1 in
 a constant reciprocal action4 ,from    
this  principle spring the analogies of 
experience4 7#d7 ,the postulates of     
empirical thinking are contained in the 
principles3 7a7 that which  coincides   
with the formal conditions of           
experience1 is possible1 and can  become
 phenomenon2 7b7 that which agrees with 
the material conditions  of experience  
is actual1 and is phenomenon2 7c7 that1 
whose connection  with the actual is    
determined according to the universal   
conditions of  experience1 is necessary1

 and must be phenomenon4 ,such are the  
possible  and authorized synthetical    
judgments apriori4 ,but it must not be  
forgotten that we are entitled to make  
only an empirical use of all  these     
conceptions and principles1 and that we 
must ever apply them only  to things as 
objects of a possible experience1 and   
never to things in  themselves2 for the 
conception without an object is an empty
 form1 but  the object cannot be given  
to the conception except in intuition1  
and  the pure intuition of space and    
time needs to be filled by experience4  
,hence1 without reference to human      
experience1 these apriori conceptions   
and principles are nothing but a        
sporting of the imagination and the     
understanding1 with their               
representations4 ,their peculiar        
determination  is only to enable us to  
spell perceptions1 that we may read them
 as  experiences4 ,but here one is apt  
to fall into a delusion1 which can      
hardly be avoided4 ,since the categories

 are not grounded upon the  sensory1 but
 have an apriori origin1 it would seem  
as though their  application would reach
 far beyond the sense2 but such a view  
is a  delusion2 our conceptions are not 
able to lead us to a knowledge of       
things in themselves 7noumena71 since   
our intuition gives us only  phenomena  
for the content of our conceptions1 and 
the thing in itself  can never be given 
in a possible experience2 our knowledge 
remains  limited to the phenomena4 ,the 
source of all the confusions and errors 
and strife in previous metaphysics1 was 
in confounding the phenomenal  with the 
noumenal world4    ,besides the         
categories or conceptions of the        
understanding1 which have  been         
considered1 and which are especially    
important for experience1  though often 
applied erroneously beyond the province 
of experience1  there are other         
conceptions whose peculiar province is  
only to deceive2  conceptions whose     
express determination is to pass beyond 

the province  of experience1 and which  
may consequently be called transcendent4
 ,these  are the fundamental conceptions
 and principles of the previous         
metaphysics4 ,to examine these          
conceptions1 and destroy the appearance 
of  objective science and knowledge1    
which they falsely exhibit1 is the      
problem of the ,transcendental          
,dialectics 7the second part of the     
transcendental logic74    #c4 ,,the     
,,transcendental ,,dialectics4--,in a   
strict sense1 the reason is             
distinguished from the understanding4   
,as the understanding has its           
categories1 the reason has its ideas2 as
 the understanding forms  fundamental   
maxims from conceptions1 the reason     
forms principles from  ideas1 in which  
the maxims of the understanding have    
their highest  confirmation4 ,the       
peculiar work of the reason is1 in      
general1 to find  the unconditioned for 
the conditioned knowledge of the        
understanding1  and to unify it4 ,hence 

the reason is the faculty of the        
unconditioned1  or of principles2 but   
since it has no immediate reference to  
objects1  but only to the understanding 
and its judgments1 its activity must    
remain an immanent one4 ,if it would    
take the highest unity of the reason    
not simply in a transcendental sense1   
but exalt it to an actual object  of    
knowledge1 then it would become         
transcendent in that it applied the     
conceptions of the understanding to the 
knowledge of the unconditioned4  ,from  
this transcending and false use of the  
categories1 arises the  transcendental  
appearance which decoys us beyond       
experience1 by the  delusive pretext of 
widening the domain of the pure         
understanding4 ,it is  the problem of   
the transcendental logic to discover    
this transcendental  appearance4    ,the
 speculative ideas of the reason1       
derived from the three kinds of  logical
 conclusion1 the categorical1 the       
hypothetical1 and the  disjunctive1 are 

threefold4    7#a47 ,the psychological  
idea1 the idea of the soul1 as a        
thinking  substance 7the object hitherto
 of rational psychology74    7#b47 ,the 
cosmological idea1 the idea of the world
 as including all  phenomena 7the object
 hitherto of cosmology74    7#c47 ,the  
theological idea1 the idea of ,god as   
the highest condition of  the           
possibility of all things 7the object   
hitherto of rational  theology74    ,but
 with these ideas1 in which the reason  
attempts to apply the  categories of the
 understanding to the unconditioned1 the
 reason becomes  unavoidably entangled  
in a semblance and an illusion4 ,this   
transcendental semblance1 or this       
optical illusion of the reason1         
exhibits itself differently in each of  
the different ideas4 ,with the          
psychological ideas the reason          
perpetrates a simple paralogism1 while  
with the cosmological it finds itself   
driven to contradictory  affirmations or
 antinomies1 and1 with the theological1 

it wanders about  in an empty ideal4    
7#a47 ,the psychological ideas1 or the  
paralogisms of the pure reason4    ,kant
 has attempted1 under this rubric1 to   
overthrow all rational  psychology as   
this had been previously apprehended4   
,rational psychology  has considered the
 soul as a thing called by that name    
with the  attribute of immateriality1 as
 a simple substance with the attribute  
of  incorruptibility1 as a numerically  
identical1 intellectual substance  with 
the predicate of personality1 as an     
unextended and thinking being  with the 
predicate of immortality4 ,all these    
principles of rational  psychology1 says
 ,kant1 are surreptitious2 they are all 
derived from the  one premise1 8,i      
think20 but this premise is neither     
intuition nor  conception1 but a simple 
consciousness1 an act of the mind which 
attends1 connects1 and bears in itself  
all representations and  conceptions4   
,this thinking is now falsely taken as a
 real thing2 the  being of the ,ego as  

object is connected with the ,ego as    
subject1 and  that which is affirmed    
analytically of the latter is predicated
  synthetically of the former4 ,but in  
order to treat the ,ego also as  object1
 and to be able to apply to it          
categories1 it must be given            
empirically1 in an intuition1 which is  
not the case4 ,from all this it  follows
 that the proofs for immortality rest   
upon false conclusions4 ,i  can1 indeed1
 separate my pure thinking ideally from 
the body2 but  obviously1 it does not   
follow from this that my thinking can   
exist  really when separate from the    
body4 ,the result which ,kant derives   
from  his critick of rational psychology
 is this1 viz41 there is no rational    
psychology as a doctrine which can      
furnish us with any addition to our     
self-knowledge1 but only as a           
discipline1 which places impassable     
limits to the speculative reason in this
 field1 in order that it may  neither   
throw itself into the bosom of a        

soulless materialism1 nor lose  itself  
in the delusion of a groundless         
spiritualism4 ,in this respect  rational
 psychology would rather remind us1 that
 this refusal of our  reason to give a  
satisfactory answer to the questions    
which stretch  beyond this life1 should 
be regarded as an intimation of the     
reason for  us to leave this fruitless  
and superfluous speculation1 and apply  
our  self-knowledge to some fruitful and
 practical use4    7#b47 ,the           
,antinomies of ,cosmology4    ,the      
cosmological ideas cannot be fully      
attained without the aid of the         
categories4 7#a7 ,so far as the quantity
 of the world is concerned1 space  and  
time are the original quanta of all     
intuition4 ,in a quantitative  respect1 
therefore1 the cosmological idea must   
hold fast to something  concerning the  
totality of the times and spaces of the 
world4 7#b7 ,in  respect of quality1 the
 divisibility of matter must be         
regarded4 7#c7 ,in  respect of relation1

 the complete series of causes must be  
sought for  the existing effects in the 
world4 7#d7 ,in respect of modality1 the
  accidental according to its           
conditions1 or the complete dependence  
of  the accidental in the phenomenon    
must be conceived4 ,when1 now1 the      
reason attempts to establish            
determinations respecting these         
problems1  it finds itself at once      
entangled in a contradiction with       
itself4  ,directly contrary affirmations
 can be made with equal validity in     
reference to each of these four points4 
,we can show1 upon grounds  equally     
valid1 7#a7 the thesis1 the world has a 
beginning in time and  limits in space2 
and the antithesis1 the world has       
neither beginning  in time nor limit in 
space4 7#b7 ,the thesis3 every compound 
substance in  the world consists of     
simple parts1 and there exists nothing  
else than  the simple and that which it 
composes2 and the antithesis3 no        
compound  thing consists of simple      

parts1 and there exists nothing simple  
in the  world4 7#c7 ,the thesis3        
causality according to the laws of      
nature1 is not  the only one from which 
the phenomena of the world may be       
deduced1 but  these may be explained    
through a causality in freedom2 and the 
antithesis3 there is no freedom1 but    
every thing in the world happens  only  
according to natural laws4 ,lastly1 7#d7
 the thesis3 something  belongs to the  
world either as its part or its cause1  
which is an  absolutely necessary being2
 and the antithesis3 there exists no    
absolutely necessary being as cause of  
the world1 either in the world or       
without it4 ,from this dialectic        
conflict of the cosmological ideas1     
there follows at once the worthlessness 
of the whole struggle4    7#c47 ,the    
ideal of the pure ,reason or the idea of
 ,god4    ,kant shows at first how the  
reason comes to the idea of a most real 
being1 and then turns himself against   
the efforts of previous  metaphysics to 

prove its valid existence4 ,his critick 
of the arguments  employed to prove the 
existence of a ,god1 is essentially the 
following4    7a47 ,the ,ontological    
proof4--,the argument here is as        
follows3 it is  possible that there is a
 most real being2 now existence is      
implied in  the conception of all       
reality1 and hence1 existence           
necessarily belongs  to the conception  
of the most real being4 ,but1 answers   
,kant1 existence  is not at all a       
reality1 or real predicate which can be 
added to the  conception of a thing1 but
 it is the position of a thing with all 
its  properties4 ,a thing1 however1 may 
lose its existence1 and still be        
deprived of none of its properties4     
,hence if it have any property1 it  does
 not at all follow that it possesses    
existence4 ,being is nothing but  the   
logical copula1 which1 does not in the  
least enlarge the content of  the       
subject4 ,a hundred actual dollars1 e4  
g4 contain no more than a  hundred      

possible ones2 there is only a          
difference between them in  reference to
 my own wealth4 ,thus the most real     
being may with perfect  propriety be    
conceived of as the most real1 while at 
the same time it  should only be        
conceived of as possible1 and not as    
actual4 ,it was  therefore wholly       
unnatural1 and a simple play of school  
wit1 to take an  idea which had been    
arbitrarily formed1 and deduce from it  
the existence  of its corresponding     
object4 ,any effort and toil which might
 be spent  upon this famous proof is    
thus only thrown away1 and a man would  
become  no richer in knowledge out of   
simple ideas than a merchant would      
increase his property by adding a number
 of ciphers to the balance of  his      
accounts4    7b47 ,the ,cosmological    
proof4--,this1 like the ontological1    
infers the  existence of an absolute    
being from the necessity of existence4  
,if any  thing exist there must also    
exist an absolutely necessary being as  

its  cause4 ,but now there exists at    
least ,i myself1 and there must hence   
also  exist an absolutely necessary     
being as my cause4 ,the last            
cosmological  antinomy is here brought  
in to criticise the argument at this    
stage4 ,the  conclusion is erroneous1   
because from the phenomenal and the     
accidental  a necessary being above     
experience is inferred4 ,moreover1 if we
 allow  the conclusion to be valid1 it  
is still no ,god which it gives us4     
,hence  the farther inference is made3  
that being can alone be necessary which 
includes all reality within itself4 ,if 
now this proposition should be          
reversed1 and the affirmation made that 
that being which includes all  reality  
is absolutely necessary1 then have we   
again the ontological  proof1 and the   
cosmological falls with this4 ,in the   
cosmological proof1  the reason uses the
 trick of bringing forth as a new       
argument an old one  with a changed     
dress1 that it might seem to have the   

power of summoning  two witnesses4      
7c47 ,the ,physico-theological          
proof4--,if thus neither conception nor 
experience can furnish a proof for the  
divine existence1 there still  remains a
 third attempt1 viz41 to start from a   
determinate experience1  and endeavor to
 see whether the existence of a supreme 
being can not be  inferred from the     
arrangement and condition of things in  
the world4 ,such  is the                
physico-theological proof1 which starts 
from the evidences of  design in nature1
 and directs its argument as follows3   
there is  evidently design in the       
universe2 this is extraneous to the     
things of  the world1 and adheres to    
them only contingently2 there exists    
therefore  a necessary cause of this    
design which works with wisdom and      
intelligence2 this necessary cause must 
be the most real being2 the most  real  
being has therefore necessary           
existence4--,to this ,kant answers3 ,the
  physico-theological proof is the      

oldest1 clearest1 and most conformable  
to the common reason4 ,but it is not    
demonstration 7apodictic74 ,it  infers1 
from the form of the world1 a           
proportionate and sufficient cause  of  
this form2 but in this way we only      
attain an originator of the form  of the
 world1 and not an originator of its    
matter1 a world-builder1 and  not a     
world-creator4 ,to help out with this   
difficulty the cosmological  proof is   
brought in1 and the originator of the   
form becomes conceived as  the necessary
 being lying at the ground of the       
content4 ,thus we have an  absolute     
being whose perfection corresponds to   
that of the world4 ,but in  the world   
there is no absolute perfection2 we have
 therefore only a very  perfect being2  
to get the most perfect1 we must revert 
again to the  ontological proof4 ,thus  
the teleological proof rests upon the   
cosmological1 while this in turn has its
 basis in the ontological1 and  from    
this circle the metaphysical modes of   

proof cannot escape4    ,from these     
considerations1 it would follow that the
 ideal of a supreme  being is nothing   
other than a regulative principle of the
 reason1 by  which it looks upon every  
connection in the world as if it sprang 
from  an all-sufficient and necessary   
cause2 in order that1 in explaining this
  connection1 it may establish the rule 
of a systematic and necessary  unity1 it
 being also true that in this process   
the reason through a  transcendental    
subreption cannot avoid representing to 
itself this  formal principle as        
constitutive1 and this unity as         
personal4 ,but in  truth this supreme   
being remains for the simply speculative
 use of the  reason1 a mere but         
faultless ideal1 a conception which is  
the summit and  the crown of the whole  
human knowledge1 whose objective        
reality1 though  it cannot be proved    
with apodictic certainty1 can just as   
little be  disproved4    ,with this     
critick of the ideas of the reason there

 is still another  question4 ,if these  
ideas have no objective significance1   
why are they  found within us8 ,since   
they are necessary1 they will doubtless 
have some  good purpose to subserve4    
,what this purpose is1 has already been 
indicated in speaking of the theological
 idea4 ,though not constitutive1  yet   
are they regulative principles4 ,we     
cannot better order the faculties  of   
our soul1 than by acting 8as if0 there  
were a soul4 ,the  cosmological idea    
leads us to consider the world 8as if0  
the series of  causes were infinite1    
without1 however1 excluding an          
intelligent cause4  ,the theological    
idea enables us to look upon the world  
in all its  complexity1 as a regulated  
unity4 ,thus1 while these ideas of the  
reason  are not constitutive principles1
 by means of which our knowledge could  
be widened beyond experience1 they are  
regulative principles1 by means  of     
which our experience may be ordered1 and
 brought under certain  hypothetical    

unities4 ,these three ideas1 therefore1 
the psychological1  the cosmological1   
and the theological1 do not form an     
organon for the  discovery of truth1 but
 only a canon for the simplification and
  systematizing of our experiences4     
,besides their regulative significance1 
these ideas of the reason have  also a  
practical importance4 ,there is a       
sufficient certainty1 not  objective1   
but subjective1 which is especially of a
 practical nature1  and is called belief
 or confidence4 ,if the freedom of the  
will1 the  immortality of the soul1 and 
the existence of a ,god1 are three      
cardinal  principles1 which1 though not 
in any way contributing to our          
knowledge1  are yet pressed continually 
upon us by the reason1 this difficulty  
is  removed in the practical field where
 these ideas have their peculiar        
significance for the moral confidence4  
,this confidence is not logical1  but   
moral certainty4 ,since it rests wholly 
upon subjective grounds1 upon  the moral

 character1 ,i cannot say it is morally 
certain that there is a  ,god1 but only 
,i am morally certain1 c4 ,that is1 the 
belief in a ,god and  in another world  
is so interwoven with my moral          
character1 that ,i am in  just as much  
danger of losing this character as of   
being deprived of  this belief4 ,we are 
thus brought to the basis of the        
,,practical ,,reason4    ,,ii4 ,,critick
 ,,of ,,the ,,practical ,,reason4--,with
 the ,critick of the ,practical         
,reason1 we enter a wholly different    
world1 where the reason richly  recovers
 that of which it was deprived in the   
theoretical province4 ,the  essential   
problem of the ,critick of the          
,practical ,reason is almost            
diametrically different from that of the
 critick of the theoretical  reason4    
,the object of investigation in the     
critick of the speculative  reason1     
was1--how can the pure reason know      
objects apriori2 in the  practical      
reason it is1--how can the pure reason  

determine apriori the  will in respect  
of objects4 ,the critick of the         
speculative reason  inquired after the  
cognizableness of objects apriori3 the  
practical  reason has nothing to do with
 the cognizableness of objects1 but only
  with the determination of the will4   
,hence1 in the latter critick1 we  have 
an order directly the reverse of that   
which we find in the former4  ,as the   
original determinations of our          
theoretical knowledge are  intuitions1  
so the original determinations of our   
will are principles  and conceptions4   
,the critick of the practical reason    
must1 therefore1  start from moral      
principles1 and only after these are    
firmly fixed1 may  we inquire concerning
 the relation in which the practical    
reason stands  to the sensory4          
,freedom1 says ,kant1 is given to us    
apriori as an inner fact1 it is a  fact 
of the inner experience4 ,while1        
therefore1 the reason in the            
theoretical field had only a negative   

result1 because1 when it would  attain  
to a true thing in itself it became     
transcendent1 yet now in the  practical 
province it becomes positive through the
 idea of freedom1  because with the fact
 of freedom we have no need to go out   
beyond  ourselves1 but possess a        
principle immanent to the reason4 ,but  
why then  give a critick of practical   
reason8 ,in order to determine the      
relation  of freedom to the sensory4    
,since the free will works through its  
acts  upon the sensory1 there must be a 
point of contact between the two4 ,this 
is found in the sensuous motives of the 
will1 which exist implanted in  it by   
nature1 in the impulses and inclinations
 which1 as the principle  of the empiric
 in opposition to the free or pure will1
 bear in  themselves the character of a 
want of freedom4 ,since1 then1 freedom  
cannot be touched1 a critick of the     
practical reason can only relate to     
these empirical motives1 in the sense of
 divesting these from the claim  of     

being exclusively the motives by which  
the will is determined4 ,while1         
therefore1 in the theoretical reason the
 empirical element was immanent1  and   
the intelligible transcendent1 the      
reverse is the case in the  practical   
reason1 since here the empirical is     
transcendent1 and the  intelligible     
immanent4 ,it is the object of the      
,analytic to show the  relation of these
 two momenta of the will1 and the       
highest moral  principle which springs  
therefrom1 while it belongs to the      
,dialectic to  solve the antinomies     
which result from the contradiction of  
the pure and  empiric will4    7#a47    
,the ,analytic4--,freedom1 as the one   
constituent element which shows  itself 
in the activity of our will1 is the     
simple form of our actions4  ,the       
universal law binding the will1 is that 
it should determine itself  purely from 
itself1 independently of every external 
incitement4 ,this  capacity of          
self-lawgiving1 or self-determining1    

,kant calls the  autonomy of the will4  
,the free autonomic will says to man3   
thou  oughtest6 and since this moral    
ought commands to an unconditioned      
obedience1 the moral imperative is a    
categorical imperative4 ,what is  it now
 which is categorically commanded by the
 practical reason8 ,to  answer this     
question1 we must first consider the    
empirical will1 i4 e4  the nature-side  
of man4    ,the empirical1 as the other 
constituent element of our will1 first  
produces a definite deed when it has    
filled the empty form of action  with   
the matter of action4 ,the matter of the
 will is furnished by the  sensory in   
the desire of pleasure and the dread of 
pain4 ,since this  second principle of  
our actions does not find its seat in   
the freedom of  the will as the higher  
faculty of desire1 but in the sensory1  
as the  lower faculty of desire1 and a  
foreign law is thus laid upon the       
will1--,kant calls it1 in opposition to 
the autonomy of the reason1 the         

heteronomy of the will4    ,the         
categorical imperative is the necessary 
law of freedom binding upon  all men1   
and is distinguished from material      
motives1 in that the latter  have no    
fixed character4 ,for men are at        
variance in respect of pleasure  and    
pain1 since that which is disagreeable  
to one may seem pleasant to  another1   
and if they ever agree1 this is simply  
accidental4  ,consequently1 these       
material motives can never act the part 
of laws  binding upon every being1 but  
each subject may find his end in a      
different motive4 ,such rules of acting1
 ,kant calls maxims of the will4  ,he   
also censures those moralists who have  
exalted such maxims as  universal       
principles of morality4                 
,nevertheless1 these maxims1 though not 
the highest principles of  morality1 are
 yet necessary to the autonomy of the   
will1 because they  alone furnish for it
 a content4 ,it is only by uniting the  
two sides1  that we gain the true       

principle of morality4 ,to this end the 
maxims of  acting must be freed from    
their limitation1 and widened to the    
form of  universal laws of the reason4  
,only those maxims should be chosen as  
motives of action which are capable of  
becoming universal laws of the  reason4 
,the highest principle of morality will 
therefore be this3 act  so that the     
maxims of thy will can at the same time 
be valid as the  principle of a         
universal lawgiving1 i4e4 that no       
contradiction shall  arise in the       
attempt to conceive the maxims of thy   
acting as a law  universally obeyed4    
,through this formal moral principle all
 material  moral principles which can   
only be of a heteronomic nature1 are    
excluded4    ,the question next         
arises--what impels the will to act     
conformably to this  highest moral law8 
,kant answers3 the moral law itself1    
apprehended and  revered1 must be the   
only moving spring of the human will4   
,if an act  which in itself might be    

conformable to the moral law1 be done   
only  through some impulse to happiness 
arising simply from an inclination of   
the sense1 if it be not done purely for 
the sake of the law1 then have  we      
simply legality and not morality4 ,that 
which is included in every  inclination 
of the sense is self-love and           
self-conceit1 and of these the  former  
is restricted by the moral law1 and the 
latter wholly stricken  down4 ,but that 
which strikes down our self-conceit and 
humbles us must  appear to us in the    
highest degree worthy of esteem4 ,but   
this is done by  the moral law4         
,consequently the positive feeling which
 we shall cherish  in respect of the    
moral law will be reverence4 ,this      
reverence1 though a  feeling1 is neither
 sensuous nor pathological1 for it      
stands opposed to  these2 but is rather 
an intellectual feeling1 since it arises
 from the  notion of the practical law  
of the reason4 ,on the one side as      
subordination to law1 the reverence     

includes pain2 on the other side1  since
 the coercion can only be exercised     
through the proper reason1 it  includes 
pleasure4 ,reverence is the single      
sensation befitting man in  reference to
 the moral law4 ,man1 as creature of    
sense1 cannot rest on  any inner        
inclination to the moral law1 for he has
 ever inclinations  within him which    
resist the law2 love to the law can only
 be considered  as something            
ideal4--,thus the moral purism of ,kant1
 or his effort to  separate every       
impulse of the sense from the motives to
 action1 merges  into rigorism1 or the  
dark view that duty can never be done   
except with  resistance4 ,a similar     
exaggeration belongs to the well-known  
epigram of  ,schiller1 who answers the  
following scruple of conscience--       
,the friends whom ,i love1 ,i gladly    
would serve1       ,but to this         
inclination incites me2     ,and so ,i  
am forced from virtue to swerve         
,since my act1 through affection1       

delights me--    with the following     
decision3       ,the friends whom thou  
lov'st1 thou must first seek to scorn1  
,for to no other way can ,i guide thee3 
',tis alone with disgust thou canst     
rightly perform       ,the acts to which
 duty would lead thee4    7#b47 ,the    
,dialectic4--,the pure reason has always
 its dialectics1 since  it belongs to   
the nature of the reason to demand the  
unconditioned for  the given            
conditioned4 ,hence also the practical  
reason seeks an  unconditioned highest  
good for that conditioned good after    
which man  strives4 ,what is this       
highest good8 ,if we understand by the  
highest good  the fundamental condition 
of all other goods1 then it is virtue4  
,but  virtue is not the perfect good1   
since the finite reason as sensitive    
stands in need also of happiness4 ,hence
 the highest good is only perfect  when 
the highest happiness is joined to the  
highest virtue4 ,the question  now      
arises3 what is the relation of these   

two elements of the highest  good to    
each other8 ,are they analytically or   
synthetically connected  together8 ,the 
former would be affirmed by most of the 
ancients1  especially by the ,greek     
moral philosophers4 ,we might allow with
 the  ,stoics1 that happiness is        
contained as an accidental element in   
virtue1  or1 with the ,epicureans1 that 
virtue is contained as an accidental    
element in happiness4 ,the ,stoics said3
 to be conscious of one's virtue  is    
happiness2 the ,epicureans said3 to be  
conscious of the maxims leading  one to 
happiness is virtue4 ,but1 says ,kant1  
an analytic connection  between these   
two conceptions is not possible1 since  
they are wholly  different in kind4     
,consequently there can be between them 
only a  synthetic unity1 and this unity 
more closely scanned is seen to be a    
causal one1 so that the one element is  
cause1 and the other effect4 ,such  a   
relation must be regarded as its highest
 good by the practical reason1  whose   

thesis must therefore be3 virtue and    
happiness must be bound  together in a  
correspondent degree as cause and       
effect4 ,but this thesis  is all        
thwarted by the actual fact4 ,neither of
 the two is the direct  cause of the    
other4 ,neither is the striving after   
happiness a moving  spring to virtue1   
nor is virtue the efficient cause of    
happiness4 ,hence  the antithesis3      
virtue and happiness do not necessarily 
correspond1 and  are not universally    
connected as cause and effect4 ,the     
critical solution  of this antinomy     
,kant finds in distinguishing between   
the sensible and  the intelligible      
world4 ,in the world of sense1 virtue   
and happiness do  not1 it is true1      
correspond2 but the reason as noumenon  
is also a  citizen of a supersensible   
world1 where the counter-strife between 
virtue and happiness has no place4 ,in  
this supersensible world virtue is      
always adequate to happiness1 and when  
man passes over into this he may  look  

for the actualization of the highest    
good4 ,but the highest good  has1 as    
already remarked1 two elements1 7#a7    
highest virtue1 7#b7 highest  happiness4
 ,the actualization demanded for the    
first of these elements  postulates the 
immortality of the soul1 and for the    
second1 the  existence of ,god4    7a47 
,to the highest good belongs in the     
first place perfect virtue or  holiness4
 ,but no creature of sense can be holy3 
reason united to sense  can only        
approximate holiness as an ideal in an  
endless progression4 ,but  such an      
endless progress is only possible in an 
endless continuance of  personal        
existence4 ,if1 therefore1 the highest  
good shall ever be  actualized1 the     
immortality of the soul must be         
presupposed4    7b47 ,to the highest    
good belongs1 in the second place1      
perfect  happiness4 ,happiness is that  
condition of a rational creature in the 
world1 to whom every thing goes         
according to his desire and will4 ,this 

can only occur when all nature is in    
accord with his ends4 ,but this is  not 
the case2 as acting beings we are not   
the cause of nature1 and there  is not  
the slightest ground in the moral law   
for connecting morality and  happiness4 
,notwithstanding this1 we ought to      
endeavor to secure the  highest good4   
,it must therefore be possible4 ,there  
is thus postulated  the necessary       
connection of these two elements1 i4 e4 
the existence of  a cause of nature     
distinct from nature1 and which contains
 the ground of  this connection4 ,there 
must be a being as the common cause of  
the  natural and moral world1 a being   
who knows our characters of             
intelligence1 and who1 according to this
 intelligence imparts to us  happiness4 
,such a being is ,god4    ,thus from the
 practical reason there issue the ideas 
of immortality and  of ,god1 as we have 
already seen to be the case with the    
idea of freedom4  ,the reality of the   
idea of freedom is derived from the     

possibility of a  moral law2 that of the
 idea of immortality is borrowed from   
the  possibility of a perfect virtue2   
that of the idea of a ,god follows from 
the necessary demand of a perfect       
happiness4 ,these three ideas1          
therefore1 which the speculative reason 
has treated as problems that  could not 
be solved1 gain a firm basis in the     
province of the practical  reason4      
,still they are not yet theoretical     
dogmas1 but as ,kant calls  them        
practical postulates1 necessary premises
 of moral action4 ,my  theoretical      
knowledge is not enlarged by them3 ,i   
only know now that  there are objects   
corresponding to these ideas1 but of    
these objects ,i  can know no more4 ,of 
,god1 for instance1 we possess and know 
no more than  this very conception2 and 
if we should attempt to establish the   
theory  of the supersensible grounded   
upon such categories1 this would be to  
make theology like a magic lantern1 with
 its phantasmagorical  representations4 

,yet has the practical reason acquired  
for us a  certainty respecting the      
objective reality of these ideas1 which 
the  theoretical reason had been obliged
 to leave undecided1 and in this        
respect the practical reason has the    
primacy4 ,this relation of the two      
faculties of knowledge is wisely        
established in relation to the destiny  
of men4 ,since the ideas of ,god and    
immortality are theoretically obscure   
to us1 they do not defile our moral     
motives by fear and hope1 but leave  us 
free space to act through reverence for 
the moral law4    ,thus far ,kant's     
,critick of the ,practical ,reason4 ,in 
connection with this  we may here       
mention his views of religion as they   
appear in his  treatise upon 8,religion 
within the ,bounds of ,pure ,reason40   
,the chief  idea of this treatise is the
 referring of religion to morality4     
,between  morality and religion there   
may be the twofold relation1 that either
  morality is founded upon religion1 or 

else religion upon morality4 ,if  the   
first relation were real1 it would give 
us fear and hope as  principles of moral
 action2 but this cannot be1 and we are 
therefore  left alone to the second4    
,morality leads necessarily to religion1
  because the highest good is a         
necessary ideal of the reason1 and this 
can only be realized through a ,god2 but
 in no way may religion first  incite us
 to virtue1 for the idea of ,god may    
never become a moral  motive4 ,religion1
 according to ,kant1 is the recognition 
of all our  duties as divine commands4  
,it is revealed religion when ,i find in
 it the  divine command1 and thus learn 
my duty2 it is natural religion when ,i 
find in it my duty1 and thus learn the  
divine command4 ,the ,church is an      
ethical community1 which has for its end
 the fulfilment and the most  perfect   
exhibition of moral commands1--a union  
of those who with united  energies      
purpose to resist evil and advance      
morality4 ,the ,church1 in so  far as it

 is no object of a possible experience1 
is called the invisible  ,church1 which1
 as such1 is a simple idea of the union 
of all the  righteous under the divine  
moral government of the world4 ,the     
visible  ,church1 on the other hand1 is 
that which presents the kingdom of ,god 
upon earth1 so far as this can be       
attained through men4 ,the requisites1  
and hence also the characteristics of   
the true visible ,church 7which are     
divided according to the table of the   
categories since this ,church is  given 
in experience7 are the following3 7a7   
,in respect of quantity  the ,church    
must be total or universal2 and though  
it may be divided in  accidental        
opinions1 yet must it be instituted upon
 such principles as  will necessarily   
lead to a universal union in one single 
church4 7b7  ,the quality of the true   
visible ,church is purity1 as a union   
under  no other than moral motives1     
since it is at the same time purified   
from  the stupidness of superstition and

 the madness of fanaticism4 7c7 ,the    
relation of the members of the ,church  
to each other rests upon the  principle 
of freedom4 ,the ,church is1 therefore1 
a free state1 neither  a hierarchy nor a
 democracy1 but a voluntary1 universal1 
and enduring  union of heart4 7d7 ,in   
respect of modality the ,church demands 
that  its constitution should not be    
changed4 ,the laws themselves may not   
change1 though one may reserve to       
himself the privilege of changing some  
accidental arrangements which relate    
simply to the administration4--,that    
alone which can establish a universal   
,church is the moral faith of the       
reason1 for this alone can be shared by 
the convictions of every man4  ,but1    
because of the peculiar weakness of     
human nature1 we can never  reckon      
enough on this pure faith to build a    
,church on it alone1 for men  are not   
easily convinced that the striving after
 virtue and an  irreproachable life is  
every thing which ,god demands3 they    

always  suppose that they must offer to 
,god a special service prescribed by    
tradition1 in which it only comes to    
this--that he is served4    ,to         
establish a ,church1 we must therefore  
have a statutory faith  historically    
grounded upon facts4 ,this is the       
so-called faith of the  ,church1 ,in    
every ,church there are therefore two   
elements--the purely  moral1 or the     
faith of reason1 and the                
historico-statutory1 or the faith  of   
the ,church4 ,it depends now upon the   
relation of the two elements  whether a 
,church shall have any worth or not4    
,the statutory element  should ever be  
only the vehicle of the moral4 ,just so 
soon as this  element becomes in itself 
an independent end1 claiming an         
independent  validity1 will the ,church 
become corrupt and irrational1 and      
whenever  the ,church passes over to the
 pure faith of reason1 does it          
approximate  to the kingdom of ,god4    
,upon this principle we may distinguish 

the true  from the spurious service of  
the kingdom of ,god1 religion from      
priestcraft4 ,a dogma has worth alone in
 so far as it has a moral  content4 ,the
 apostle ,paul himself would with       
difficulty have given  credit to the    
dicta of the faith of the ,church       
without this moral faith4  ,from the    
doctrine of the ,trinity1 e4 g4 taken   
literally1 nothing  actually practical  
can be derived4 ,whether we have to     
reverence in the  ,godhead three persons
 or ten makes no difference1 if in both 
cases we  have the same rules for our   
conduct of life4 ,the ,bible also1 with 
its  interpretation1 must be considered 
in a moral point of view4 ,the records  
of revelation must be interpreted in a  
sense which will harmonize with  the    
universal rules of the religion of      
reason4 ,reason is in religious  things 
the highest interpreter of the ,bible4  
,this interpretation in  reference to   
some texts may seem forced1 yet it must 
be preferred to any  such literal       

interpretation as would contain nothing 
for morality1 or  perhaps go against    
every moral motive4 ,that such a moral  
signification  may always be found      
without ever entirely repudiating the   
literal sense1  results from the fact   
that the foundation for a moral religion
 lay  originally in the human reason4   
,we need only to divest the             
representations of the ,bible of their  
mythical dress 7an attempt which  ,kant 
has himself made1 by moral explanation  
of some of the weightiest  doctrines71  
in order to attain a rational sense     
which shall be  universally valid4 ,the 
historical element of the sacred books  
is in  itself of no account4 ,the       
maturer the reason becomes1 the more it 
can  hold fast for itself the moral     
sense1 so much the more unnecessary will
  be the statutory institutions of the  
faith of the ,church4 ,the transition   
of the faith of the ,church to the pure 
faith of reason is the  approximation to
 the kingdom of ,god1 to which1 however1

 we can only  approach nearer and nearer
 in an infinite progress4 ,the actual   
realization of the kingdom of ,god is   
the end of the world1 the cessation  of 
history4    ,,iii4 ,,critick ,,of ,,the 
,,faculty ,,of ,,judgment4--,the        
conception of this science  ,kant gives 
in the following manner4 ,the two       
faculties of the human mind  hitherto   
considered were the faculty of knowledge
 and that of desire4 ,it  was proved in 
the ,critick of pure ,reason1 that the  
understanding only as  faculty of       
knowledge included constitutive         
principles apriori2 and it  was shown in
 the ,critick of ,practical ,reason1    
that the reason possesses  constitutive 
principles apriori1 simply in reference 
to the faculty of  desire4 ,whether now 
the faculty of judgment1 as the middle  
link  between understanding and reason1 
can take its object--the feeling of     
pleasure and pain as the middle link    
between the faculty of knowledge  and   
that of desire--and furnish it apriori  

with principles which shall be  for     
themselves constitutive and not simply  
regulative3 this is the point  upon     
which the ,critick of the ,faculty of   
,judgment has to turn4    ,the faculty  
of judgment is the middle link between  
the understanding as  the faculty of    
conceptions1 and the reason as the      
faculty of principles4  ,in this        
position it has the following functions3
 ,the speculative reason  had taught us 
to consider the world only according to 
natural laws2 the  practical reason had 
inferred for us a moral world1 in which 
every thing  is determined through      
freedom4 ,there was thus a gulf between 
the kingdom  of nature and that of      
freedom1 which could not be passed      
unless the  faculty of judgment should  
furnish a conception which should unite 
the  two sides4 ,that it is entitled to 
do this lies in the very conception of  
the faculty of judgment4 ,since it is   
the faculty of conceiving the           
particular as contained under the       

universal1 it thus refers the  empirical
 manifoldness of nature to a            
supersensible1 transcendental           
principle1 which embraces in itself the 
ground for the unity of the  manifold4  
,the object of the faculty of judgment  
is1 therefore1 the  conception of design
 in nature2 for the evidence of this    
points to  that supersensible unity     
which contains the ground for the       
actuality of  an object4 ,and since all 
design and every actualization of an end
 is  connected with pleasure1 we may    
farther explain the faculty of judgment 
by saying1 that it contains the laws for
 the feeling of pleasure and  pain4     
,the evidence of design in nature can be
 represented either subjectively  or    
objectively4 ,in the first case ,i      
perceive pleasure and pain1  immediately
 through the representation of an       
object1 before ,i have  formed a        
conception of it2 my delight1 in this   
instance1 can only be  referred to a    
designed harmony of relation1 between   

the form of an  object1 and my faculty  
of beholding4 ,the faculty of judgment  
viewed thus  subjectively1 is called the
 sthetic faculty4 ,in the second case1  
,i  form to myself at the outset1 a     
conception of the object1 and then judge
  whether the form of the object        
corresponds to this conception4 ,in     
order  to find a flower that is         
beautiful to my beholding1 ,i do not    
need to  have a conception of the       
flower2 but1 if ,i would see a design in
 it1  then a conception is necessary4   
,the faculty of judgment1 viewed as     
capacity to judge of these objective    
designs1 is called the  teleological    
faculty4    #a4 ,,critick ,,of ,,the    
,,sthetic ,,faculty ,,of ,,judgment4    
7#a47 ,analytic4--,the  analytic of the 
sthetic faculty of judgment is divided  
into two parts1  the analytic of the    
beautiful1 and the analytic of the      
sublime4    ,in order to discover what  
is required in naming an object         
beautiful1  we must analyze the judgment

 of taste1 as the faculty for deciding  
upon  the beautiful4 7a7 ,in respect of 
quality1 the beautiful is the object  of
 a pure1 uninterested satisfaction4     
,this disinterestedness enables us  to  
distinguish between the satisfaction in 
the beautiful1 and the  satisfaction in 
the agreeable and the good4 ,in the     
agreeable and the  good ,i am           
interested2 my satisfaction in the      
agreeable is connected with  a sensation
 of desire2 my satisfaction in the good 
is1 at the same time1  a motive for my  
will to actualize it4 ,my satisfaction  
in the beautiful  alone is without      
interest4 7b7 ,in respect of quantity1  
the beautiful  is that which universally
 pleases4 ,in respect of the agreeable1 
every  one decides that his satisfaction
 in it is only a personal one2 but if   
any one should affirm of a picture1 that
 it is beautiful1 he would  expect that 
not only he1 but every other one1 would 
also find it so4  ,nevertheless1 this   
judgment of the taste does not arise    

from  conceptions2 its universal        
validity is therefore purely subjective4
 ,i do  not judge that all the objects  
of a species are beautiful1 but only    
that  a certain specific object will    
appear beautiful to every beholder4 ,all
  the judgments of taste are individual 
judgments4 7c7 ,in respect of  relation1
 that is beautiful in which we find the 
form of design1 without  representing to
 ourselves any specific design4 7d7 ,in 
respect of  modality1 that is beautiful 
which is recognized without a           
conception1 as  the object of a         
necessary satisfaction4 ,of every       
representation1 it is  at least         
possible1 that it may awaken pleasure4  
,the representation of  the agreeable   
awakens actual pleasure4 ,the           
representation of the  beautiful1 on the
 other hand1 awakens pleasure           
necessarily4 ,the  necessity which is   
conceived in an sthetic judgment1 is a  
necessity for  determining every thing  
by a judgment1 which can be viewed as an

 example  of a universal rule1 though   
the rule itself cannot be stated4 ,the  
subjective principle which lies at the  
basis of the judgment of taste1  is     
therefore a common sense1 which         
determines what is pleasing1 and what   
displeasing1 only through feeling1 and  
not through conception4    ,the sublime 
is that which is absolutely1 or beyond  
all comparison1  great1 compared with   
which every thing else is small4 ,but   
now in nature  there is nothing which   
has no greater4 ,the absolutely great is
 only the  infinite1 and the infinite is
 only to be met with in ourselves1 as   
idea4  ,the sublime1 therefore1 is not  
properly found in nature1 but is only   
carried over to nature from our own     
minds4 ,we call that sublime in  nature1
 which awakens within us the idea of the
 infinite4 ,as in the  beautiful there  
is prominent reference to quality1 so1  
in the sublime1  the most important     
element of all1 is quantity2 and this   
quantity is  either greatness of        

extension 7the mathematically sublime71 
or greatness  of power 7the dynamically 
sublime74 ,in the sublime there is a    
greater  satisfaction in the formless1  
than in the form4 ,the sublime excites a
  vigorous movement of the heart1 and   
awakens pleasure only through pain1  i4 
e4 through the feeling that the energies
 of life are for the moment  restrained4
 ,the satisfaction in the sublime is    
hence not so much a  positive pleasure1 
but rather an amazement and awe1 which  
may be called  a negative pleasure4 ,the
 elements for an sthetic judgment of the
  sublime are the same as in the feeling
 of the beautiful4 7a7 ,in  respect of  
quantity1 that is sublime which is      
absolutely great1 in  comparison with   
which every thing else is small4 ,the   
sthetic estimate  of greatness does not 
lie1 however1 in numeration1 but in the 
simple  intuition of the subject4 ,the  
greatness of an object of nature1 which 
the imagination attempts in vain to     
comprehend1 leads to a supersensible    

substratum1 which is great beyond all   
the measures of the sense1 and  which   
has reference properly to the feeling of
 the sublime4 ,it is not  the object    
itself1 as the surging sea1 which is    
sublime1 but rather the  subject's frame
 of mind1 in the estimation of this     
object4 7b7 ,in  respect of quality1 the
 sublime does not awaken pure pleasure1 
like the  beautiful1 but first pain1 and
 through this1 pleasure4 ,the feeling of
  the insufficiency of our imagination1 
in the sthetic estimate of  greatness1  
gives rise to pain2 but1 on the other   
side1 the consciousness  of our         
independent reason1 for which the       
faculty of imagination is  inadequate1  
awakens pleasure4 ,in this respect1     
therefore1 that is  sublime which       
immediately pleases us1 through its     
opposition to the  interest of the      
sense4 7c7 ,in respect of relation1 the 
sublime suffers  nature to appear as a  
power1 indeed1 but in reference to      
which1 we have  the consciousness of    

superiority4 7d7 ,in respect of         
modality1 the  judgments concerning the 
sublime are as necessarily valid1 as    
those for  the beautiful2 only with this
 difference1 that our judgment of the   
sublime finds an entrance to some minds1
 with greater difficulty than  our      
judgment of the beautiful1 since to     
perceive the sublime1 culture1  and     
developed moral ideas1 are necessary4   
7#b47 ,dialectic4--,a dialectic of the  
sthetic faculty of judgment1 like  every
 dialectic1 is only possible where we   
can meet with judgments which  lay claim
 to universality apriori4 ,for          
dialectics consists in the  opposition  
of such judgments4 ,the antinomy of the 
principles of taste  rests upon the two 
opposite elements of the judgment of    
taste1 that it  is purely subjective1   
and at the same time1 lays claim to     
universal  validity4 ,hence1 the two    
common-place sayings3 8there is no      
disputing  about taste10 and 8there is a
 contest of taste40 ,from these1 we have

 the  following antinomy4 7a7 ,thesis3  
the judgment of taste cannot be         
grounded on conception1 else might we   
dispute it4 7b7 ,antithesis3 the        
judgment of taste must be grounded on   
conception1 else1 notwithstanding  its  
diversity1 there could be no contest    
respecting it4--,this antinomy1  says   
,kant1 is1 however1 only an apparent    
one1 and disappears as soon as  the two 
propositions are more accurately        
apprehended4 ,the thesis should  be3 the
 judgment of taste is not grounded upon 
a definite conception1  and is not      
strictly demonstrable2 the antithesis   
should be3 this  judgment is grounded   
upon a conception1 though an indefinite 
one1 viz41  upon the conception of a    
supersensible substratum for the        
phenomenal4  ,thus apprehended1 there is
 no longer any contradiction between the
 two  propositions4    ,in the          
conclusion of the sthetic faculty of    
judgment1 we can now answer  the        
question1 whether the fitness of things 

to our faculty of judgment  7their      
beauty and sublimity71 lies in the      
things themselves1 or in us8  ,the      
sthetic realism claims that the supreme 
cause of nature designed to  produce    
things which should affect our          
imagination1 as beautiful and  sublime1 
and the organic forms of nature strongly
 support this view4 ,but  on the other  
band1 nature exhibits even in her merely
 mechanical forms1  such a tendency to  
the beautiful1 that we might believe    
that she could  produce also the most   
beautiful organic forms through         
mechanism alone2  and that thus the     
design would lie not in nature1 but in  
our soul4 ,this  is the standpoint of   
idealism1 upon which it becomes         
explicable how we  can determine any    
thing apriori concerning beauty and     
sublimity4 ,but the  highest view of the
 sthetical1 is to use it as a symbol of 
the moral  good4 ,thus ,kant makes the  
theory of taste1 like religion1 to be a 
corollary of morality4    #b4 ,,critick 

,,of ,,the ,,teleological ,,faculty ,,of
 ,,judgment4--,in the foregoing1 we     
have considered the subjective sthetical
 design in the objects of  nature4 ,but 
the objects of nature have also a       
relation of design to each  other4 ,the 
teleological faculty of judgment has    
also to consider this  faculty of       
design4    7#a47 ,analytic of the       
,teleological ,faculty of               
,judgment4--,the analytic  has to       
determine the kinds of objective design4
 ,objective1 material  design1 is of two
 kinds1 external1 and internal4 ,the    
external design is  only relative1 since
 it simply indicates a usefulness of one
 thing for  another4 ,sand1 for         
instance1 which borders the sea shore1  
is of use in  bearing pine forests4 ,in 
order that animals can live upon the    
earth1 the  earth must produce          
nourishment for them1 etc4 ,these       
examples of external  design1 show that 
here the design never belongs to the    
means in itself1  but only accidentally4

 ,we should never get a conception of   
the sand by  saying that it is a means  
for pine forests2 it is conceivable for 
itself1 without any reference to the    
conception of design4 ,the earth  does  
not produce nourishment1 because it is  
necessary that men should  dwell upon   
it4 ,in brief1 this external or relative
 design may be  conceived from the      
mechanism of nature alone4 ,not so the  
inner design of  nature1 which shows    
itself prominently in the organic       
products of  nature4 ,in an organic     
product of nature1 every one of its     
parts is end1  and every one1 means or  
instrument4 ,in the process of          
generation1 the  natural product appears
 as species1 in growth it appears as    
individual1  and in the process of      
complete formation1 every part of the   
individual  shows itself4 ,this natural 
organism cannot be explained from       
mechanical  causes1 but only through    
final causes1 or teleologically4        
7#b47 ,dialectic4--,the dialectic of the

 teleological faculty of judgment1  has 
to adjust this opposition between this  
mechanism of nature and  teleology4 ,on 
the one side we have the thesis3 every  
production of  material things must be  
judged as possible1 according to simple 
mechanical laws4 ,on the other side we  
have the antithesis3 certain  products  
of material nature cannot be judged as  
possible1 according to  simple          
mechanical laws1 but demand the         
conception of design for their          
explanation4 ,if these two maxims are   
posited as constitutive 7objective7     
principles for the possibility of the   
objects themselves1 then do they        
contradict each other1 but as simply    
regulative 7subjective7 principles  for 
the investigation of nature1 they are   
not contradictory4 ,earlier  systems    
treated the conception of design in     
nature dogmatically1 and  either        
affirmed or denied its essential        
existence in nature4 ,but we1  convinced
 that teleology is only a regulative    

principle1 have nothing to  do with the 
question whether an inner design belongs
 essentially to  nature or not1 but we  
only affirm that our faculty of judgment
 must look  upon nature as designed4 ,we
 envisage the conception of design in   
nature1  but leave it wholly undecided  
whether to another understanding1 which 
does not think discursively like ours1  
nature may not be understood1  without  
at all needing to bring in this         
conception of design4 ,our              
understanding thinks discursively3 it   
proceeds from the parts1 and            
comprehends the whole as the product of 
its parts2 it cannot1 therefore1        
conceive the organic products of nature1
 where the whole is the ground  and the 
prius of the parts1 except from the     
point of view of the  conception of     
design4 ,if there were1 on the other    
hand1 an intuitive  understanding1 which
 could know the particular and the parts
 as  co-determined in the universal and 
the whole2 such an understanding  might 

conceive the whole of nature out of one 
principle1 and would not  need the      
conception of end4    ,if ,kant had     
thoroughly carried out this conception  
of an intuitive  understanding as well  
as the conception of an immanent design 
in nature1  he would have overcome1 in  
principle1 the standpoint of subjective 
idealism1 which he made numerous        
attempts1 in his critick of the faculty 
of judgment1 to break through2 but these
 ideas he only propounded1 and  left    
them to be positively carried out by his
 successors4          ,,section ,,xxxix4
    ,,transition ,,to ,,the             
,,post-,,kantian ,,philosophy4      ,the
 ,kantian philosophy soon gained in     
,germany an almost undisputed rule4     
,the imposing boldness of its           
standpoint1 the novelty of its results1 
the  applicability of its principles1   
the moral severity of its view of the   
world1 and above all1 the spirit of     
freedom and moral autonomy which        
appeared in it1 and which was so        

directly counter to the efforts of that 
age1 gained for it an assent as         
enthusiastic as it was extended4 ,it    
aroused among all cultivated classes a  
wider interest and participation  in    
philosophic pursuits1 than had ever     
appeared in an equal degree among  any  
people4 ,in a short time it had drawn to
 itself a very numerous  school3 there  
were soon few ,german universities in   
which it had not had  its talented      
representatives1 while in every         
department of science and  literature1  
especially in theology 7it is the parent
 of theological  rationalism71 and in   
natural rights1 as also in              
belles-lettres  7,schiller71 it began to
 exert its influence4 ,yet most of the  
writers  who appeared in the ,kantian   
school1 confined themselves to an       
exposition  or popular application of   
the doctrine as ,kant had given it1 and 
even  the most talented and independent 
among the defenders and improvers of    
the critical philosophy 7e4 g4          

,reinhold1 #ageh-ahbc2 ,bardili1        
#agfa-ahjh2 ,schulze1 ,beck1 ,fries1    
,krug1 ,bouterweck71 only  attempted to 
give a firmer basis to the ,kantian     
philosophy as they had  received it1 to 
obviate some of its wants and           
deficiencies1 and to carry  out the     
standpoint of transcendental idealism   
more purely and  consistently4 ,among   
those who carried out the ,kantian      
philosophy1 only  two men1 ,fichte and  
,herbart1 can be named1 who made by     
their actual  advance an epoch in       
philosophy2 and among its opposers 7e4  
g4 ,hamann1  ,herder71 only one1        
,jacobi1 is of philosophic importance4  
,these three  philosophers are hence the
 first objects for us to consider4 ,in  
order to  a more accurate development of
 their principles1 we preface a brief   
and  general characteristic of their    
relation to the ,kantian philosophy4    
#a4 ,dogmatism had been critically      
annihilated by ,kant2 his ,critick of   
pure ,reason had for its result the     

theoretical indemonstrableness of the   
three ideas of the reason1 ,god1        
freedom1 and immortality4 ,true1 these  
ideas which1 from the standpoint of     
theoretical knowledge1 had been  thrust 
out1 ,kant had introduced again as      
postulates of the practical  reason2 but
 as postulates1 as only practical       
premises1 they possess no  theoretic    
certainty1 and remain exposed to doubt4 
,in order to do away  with this         
uncertainty1 and this despairing of     
knowledge which had seemed  to be the   
end of the ,kantian philosophy1 ,jacobi1
 a younger cotemporary  of ,kant1 placed
 himself upon the standpoint of the     
faith philosophy in  opposition to the  
standpoint of criticism4 ,though these  
highest ideas of  the reason1 the       
eternal and the divine1 cannot be       
reached and proved by  means of         
demonstration1 yet is it the very       
essence of the divine that it  is       
indemonstrable and unattainable for the 
understanding4 ,in order to be  certain 

of the highest1 of that which lies      
beyond the understanding1  there is only
 one organ1 viz41 feeling4 ,in feeling1 
therefore1 in  immediate knowledge1 in  
faith1 ,jacobi thought he had found that
  certainty which ,kant had sought in   
vain on the basis of discursive         
thinking4    #b4 ,while ,jacobi stood in
 an antithetic relation to the ,kantian 
philosophy1 ,fichte appears as its      
immediate consequence4 ,fichte  carried 
out to its consequence the ,kantian     
dualism1 according to which  the ,ego1  
as theoretic1 is subjected to the       
external world1 while as  practical1 it 
is its master1 or1 in other words1      
according to which the  ,ego stands     
related to the objective world1 now     
receptively and again  spontaneously4   
,he allowed the reason to be exclusively
 practical1 as  will alone1 and         
spontaneity alone1 and apprehended its  
theoretical and  receptive relation to  
the objective world as only a           
circumscribed  activity1 as a limitation

 prescribed to itself by the reason4    
,but for  the reason1 so far as it is   
practical1 there is nothing objective   
except  as it is produced4 ,the will    
knows no being but only an ought4 ,hence
 the  objective being of truth is       
universally denied1 and the thing which 
is  essentially unknown must fall away  
of itself as an empty shadow4 8,every   
thing which is1 is the ,ego10 is the    
principle of the ,fichtian system1  and 
represents at the same time the         
subjective idealism in its  consequence 
and completion4    #c4 ,while the       
subjective idealism of ,fichte was      
carried out in the  objective idealism  
of ,schelling1 and the absolute idealism
 of ,hegel1  there arose                
cotemporaneously with these systems a   
third offshoot of the  ,kantian         
criticism1 viz41 the philosophy of      
,herbart4 ,it had its  subjective origin
 in the ,kantian philosophy1 but its    
objective and  historic connection with 
,kant is slight4 ,it breaks up all      

historic  continuity1 and holds an      
isolated position in the history of     
philosophy4  ,its general basis is      
,kantian1 in so far as it makes for its 
problem a  critical investigation of the
 subjective experience4 ,we place it    
between  ,fichte and ,schelling4        
,,section ,,xl4    ,,jacobi4            
,friedrich ,heinrich ,jacobi was born at
 ,dsseldorf in #agdc4 ,his father       
destined him for a merchant4 ,after he  
had studied in ,geneva and become       
interested in philosophy1 he entered his
 father's mercantile  establishment1 but
 afterwards abandoned this business1    
having been made  chancellor of the     
exchequer and customs commissioner for  
,cleves and  ,berg1 and also privy      
councillor at ,dsseldorf4 ,in this city1
 or at his  neighboring estate of       
,pempelfort1 he spent a great part of   
his life  devoted to philosophy and his 
friends4 ,in the year #ahjd he was      
called to  the newly-formed ,academy of 
,sciences in ,munich4 ,in #ahjg he was  

chosen  president of this institution1 a
 post which he filled till his death in 
#ahai4 ,jacobi had a rich intellect and 
an amiable character4 ,besides  being a 
philosopher1 he was also a poet and     
citizen of the world2 and  hence we find
 in his philosophizing an absence of    
strict logical  arrangement and precise 
expression of thought4 ,his writings are
 no  systematic whole1 but are          
occasional treatises written            
8rhapsodically  and in grasshopper      
gait10 for the most part in the form of 
letters1  dialogues1 and romances4 8,it 
was never my purpose10 he says himself1 
8to  set up a system for the schools4   
,my writings have sprung from my        
innermost life1 and were the result of  
that which had taken place within  me4  
,in a certain sense ,i did not make them
 voluntarily1 but they were  drawn out  
of me by a higher power irresistible to 
myself40 ,this want of  an inner        
principle of classification and of a    
systematic arrangement1  renders a      

development of ,jacobi's philosophy not 
easy4 ,it may best be  represented under
 the following three points of          
view3--#a4 ,jacobi's  polemic against   
mediate knowledge4 #b4 ,his principle of
 immediate  knowledge4 #c4 ,his relation
 to the cotemporaneous philosophy1      
especially  to the ,kantian criticism4  
#a4 ,spinoza was the negative starting  
point of ,jacobi's philosophizing4  ,in 
his work 8,on the ,doctrine of ,spinoza1
 in letters to ,moses  ,mendelssohn0    
7#aghe71 he directed public attention   
again to the almost  wholly forgotten   
philosophy of ,spinoza4 ,the            
correspondence originated  thus3 ,jacobi
 made the discovery that ,lessing was a 
,spinozist1 and  announces this to      
,mendelssohn4 ,the latter will not      
believe it1 and  thence grew the farther
 historical and philosophical           
examination4 ,the  positive philosophic 
views which ,jacobi exhibits in this    
treatise can be  reduced to the         
following three principles3 7#a7        

,spinozism is fatalism and  atheism4    
7#b7 ,every path of philosophic         
demonstration leads to fatalism  and    
atheism4 7#c7 ,in order that we may not 
fall into these1 we must set a  limit to
 demonstrating1 and recognize faith as  
the element of all  metaphysic          
knowledge4    7#a47 ,spinozism is       
atheism1 because1 according to it1 the  
cause of the  world is no person--is no 
being working for an end1 and endowed   
with  reason and will--and hence is no  
,god4 ,it is fatalism1 for1 according to
  it1 the human will regards itself only
 falsely as free4    7#b47 ,this atheism
 and fatalism is1 however1 only the     
necessary  consequence of all strictly  
demonstrative philosophizing4 ,to       
conceive a  thing1 says ,jacobi1 is to  
refer a thing to its nearest cause2 it  
is to  find a possible for an actual1   
the condition for a conditioned1 the    
mediation for an immediate4 ,we conceive
 only that which we can explain  out of 
another4 ,hence our conceiving moves in 

a chain of conditioned  conditions1 and 
this connection forms a mechanism of    
nature1 in whose  investigation our     
understanding has its immeasurable      
field4 ,however far  we may carry       
conception and demonstration1 we must   
hold1 in reference to  every object1 to 
a still higher one which conditions it2 
where this  chain of the conditioned    
ceases1 there do conception and         
demonstration  also cease2 till we give 
up demonstrating we can reach no        
infinite4 ,if  philosophy determines to 
apprehend the infinite with the finite  
understanding1 then must it bring down  
the divine to the finite2 and  here is  
where every preceding philosophy has    
been entangled1 while it is  obviously  
an absurd undertaking to attempt to     
discover the conditions of  the         
unconditioned1 and make the absolutely  
necessary a possible1 in  order that we 
may be able to construct it4 ,a ,god who
 could be proved is  no ,god1 for the   
ground of proof is ever above that which

 is to be  proved2 the latter has its   
whole reality from the former4 ,if the  
existence of ,god should be proved1 then
 ,god would be derived from a  ground   
which were before and above him4 ,hence 
the paradox of ,jacobi2 it  is for the  
interest of science that there be no    
,god1 no supernatural and  no extra or  
supramundane being4 ,only upon the      
condition that nature  alone is1 and is 
therefore independent and all in all1   
can science hope  to gain its goal of   
perfection1 and become1 like its object 
itself1 all  in all4 ,hence the result  
which ,jacobi derives from the 8,drama  
of the  history of philosophy0 is       
this3--8,there is no other philosophy   
than that  of ,spinoza4 ,he who         
considers all the works and acts of men 
to be the  effect of natural mechanism1 
and who believes that intelligence is   
but  an accompanying consciousness1     
which has only to act the part of a     
looker-on1 cannot be contended with and 
cannot be helped till we set him  free  

from his philosophy4 ,no philosophical  
conclusion can reach him1 for  what he  
denies cannot be philosophically proved1
 and what he proves  cannot be          
philosophically denied40 ,whence then is
 help to come8 8,the  understanding1    
taken by itself1 is materialistic and   
irrational2 it  denies spirit and ,god4 
,the reason taken by itself is          
idealistic1 and has  nothing to do with 
the understanding2 it denies nature and 
makes itself  ,god40    7#c47 ,hence we 
must seek another way of knowing the    
supersensible1 which  is faith4 ,jacobi 
calls this flight from cognition through
 conception to  faith1 the salto mortale
 of the human reason4 ,every certainty  
through  a conception demands another   
certainty1 but in faith we are led to an
  immediate certainty which needs no    
ground nor proof1 and which is in  fact 
absolutely exclusive of all proof4 ,such
 a confidence which does not  arise from
 arguments1 is called faith4 ,we know   
the sensible as well as  the            

supersensible only through faith4 ,all  
human knowledge springs from  revelation
 and faith4    ,these principles which  
,jacobi brought out in his letters      
concerning  ,spinoza1 did not fail to   
arouse a universal opposition in the    
,german  philosophical world4 ,it was   
charged upon him that he was an enemy of
  reason1 a preacher of blind faith1 a  
despiser of science and of  philosophy1 
a fanatic and a papist4 ,to rebut these 
attacks1 and to  justify his standpoint1
 he wrote in #aghg1 a year and a half   
after the  first appearance of the work 
already named1 his dialogue entitled    
8,david ,hume1 or ,faith1 ,idealism1 and
 ,realism10 in which he developes  more 
extensively and definitely his principle
 of faith or immediate  knowledge4      
#b4 ,jacobi distinguished his faith at  
the outset from a blind credence in     
authority4 ,a blind faith is that which 
supports itself on a foreign  view1     
instead of on the grounds of reason4    
,but this is not the case with  his     

faith1 which rather rests upon the      
innermost necessity of the  subject     
itself4 ,still farther3 his faith is not
 an arbitrary  imagination3 we can      
imagine to ourselves every thing        
possible1 but in  order to regard a     
thing as actual1 there must be an       
inexplicable  necessity of our feeling1 
which we cannot otherwise name than     
faith4  ,jacobi was not constant in his 
terminology1 and hence did not always   
express himself alike in respect of the 
relation in which faith stood to  the   
different sides of the human faculty of 
knowledge4 ,in his earlier  terminology 
he placed faith 7or as he also called   
it1 the power of  faith71 on the side of
 the sense or the receptivity1 and let  
it stand  opposed to the understanding  
and the reason1 taking these two terms  
as  equivalent expressions for the      
finite and immediate knowledge of       
previous philosophy2 afterwards he      
followed ,kant1 and1 distinguishing     
between the reason and the              

understanding1 he called that reason    
which he  had previously named sense and
 faith4 ,according to him now1 the faith
 or  intuition of the reason is the     
organ for perceiving the supersensible4 
,as such1 it stands opposed to the      
understanding4 ,there must be a higher  
faculty which can learn1 in a way       
inconceivable to sense and the          
understanding1 that which is true in and
 above the phenomena4 ,over  against the
 explaining understanding stands the    
reason1 or the natural  faith of the    
reason1 which does not explain1 but     
positively reveals and  unconditionally 
decides4 ,as there is an intuition of   
the sense1 so is  there a rational      
intuition through the reason1 and a     
demonstration has  no more validity in  
respect of the latter than in respect of
 the former4  ,jacobi justifies his use 
of the term1 intuition of the reason1   
from the  want of any other suitable    
designation4 ,language has no other     
expression  to indicate the way in which

 that1 which is unattainable to the     
sense1  becomes apprehended in the      
transcendental feeling4 ,if any one     
affirms  that he knows any thing1 he may
 properly be required to state the      
origin  of his knowledge1 and in doing  
this1 he must of necessity go back      
either  to sensation or to feeling2 the 
latter stands above the former as high  
as the human species above the brute4   
,so ,i affirm1 then1 without            
hesitation1 says ,jacobi1 that my       
philosophy starts from pure feeling1    
and declares the authority of this to be
 supreme4 ,the faculty of feeling  is   
the highest in man1 and that alone which
 specifically distinguishes  him from   
the brute4 ,this faculty is one and the 
same with reason2 or1  reason may be    
said to find in it its single and only  
starting point4    ,jacobi had the      
clearest consciousness of the opposition
 in which he  stood1 with this principle
 of immediate knowledge1 to previous    
philosophy4 ,in his introduction to his 

complete works1 he says3 8,there  had   
arisen since the time of ,aristotle an  
increasing effort in  philosophical     
schools1 to subject the immediate       
knowledge to the  mediate1 to make that 
faculty of perception which originally  
establishes  every thing1 dependent on  
the faculty of reflection1 which is     
conditioned through abstraction2 to     
subordinate the archetype to the  copy1 
the essence to the word1 the reason to  
the understanding1 and1 in  fact1 to    
make the former wholly disappear in the 
latter4 ,nothing is  allowed to be true 
which is not capable of a double        
demonstration1 in  the intuition and in 
the conception1 in the thing and in its 
image or  word2 the thing itself1 it is 
said1 must truly lie and actually be    
known  only in the word40 ,but every    
philosophy which allows only the        
reflecting  reason1 must lose itself at 
length in an utter ignorance4 ,its end  
is  nihilism4    #c4 ,from what has been
 already said1 the position of ,jacobi  

with his  principle of faith1 in        
relation to the ,kantian philosophy1    
can1 partly  at least1 be seen4 ,jacobi 
had separated himself from this         
philosophy1  partly in the above-named  
dialogue 8,david ,hume10 7especially in 
an  appendix to this1 in which he       
discussed the transcendental ,idealism71
  and partly in his essay 8,on the      
attempt of criticism to bring the       
reason to the understanding0 7#ahja74   
,his relation to it may be reduced  to  
the following three general points3     
7#a47 ,jacobi does not agree with       
,kant's theory of sensuous knowledge4   
,in  opposition to this theory he       
defends the standpoint of empiricism1   
affirms the truthfulness of the         
sense-perception1 and denies the        
apriority of space and time1 for which  
,kant contends in order to prove  that  
objects as well as their relations are  
simply determinations of our  own self1 
and do not at all exist externally to   
us4 ,for1 however much it  may be       

affirmed that there is something        
corresponding to our notions as  their  
cause1 yet does it remain concealed what
 this something is4  ,according to      
,kant1 the laws of our beholding and    
thinking are without  objective         
validity1 our knowledge has no objective
 significance4 ,but it  is wrong to     
claim that in the phenomena there is    
nothing revealed of the  hidden truth   
which lies behind them4 ,with such a    
claim1 it were far  better to give up   
completely the unknown thing-in-itself1 
and carry out  to its results the       
consequent idealism4 8,logically1 ,kant 
is at fault1  when he presupposes       
objects which make impressions on our   
soul4 ,he is  bound to teach the        
strictest idealism40    7#b47 ,yet      
,jacobi essentially agrees with ,kant's 
critick of the  understanding4 ,jacobi  
affirmed1 as ,kant had done1 that the   
understanding  is insufficient to know  
the supersensible1 and that the highest 
ideas of  the reason could be           

apprehended only in faith4 ,jacobi      
places ,kant's  great merit in having   
cleared away the ideas1 which were      
simply the  products of reflection and  
logical phantasms4 8,it is very easy for
 the  understanding1 when producing one 
notion from another1 and thus  gradually
 mounting up to ideas1 to imagine that1 
by virtue of these1  which1 though they 
carry it beyond the intuitions of the   
sense1 are  nothing but logical         
phantasms1 it has not only the faculty  
but the most  decided determination to  
fly truly above the world of sense1 and 
to gain  by its flight a higher science 
independent of the intuition1 a science 
of the supersensible4 ,kant discovers   
and destroys this error and             
self-deception4 ,thus there is gained1  
at least1 a clear place for a  genuine  
rationalism4 ,this is ,kant's truly     
great deed1 his immortal  merit4 ,but   
the sound sense of our sage did not     
allow him to hide from  himself that    
this clear place must disappear in a    

gulf1 which would  swallow up in itself 
all knowledge of the true1 unless a ,god
 should  interpose to hinder it4 ,here  
,kant's doctrine and mine meet40        
7#c47 ,but ,jacobi does not fully agree 
with ,kant1 in wholly denying to the    
theoretical reason the faculty of       
objective knowledge4 ,he blames ,kant   
for complaining that the human reason   
cannot theoretically prove the  reality 
of its ideas4 ,he affirms that ,kant is 
thus still entangled in  the delusion1  
that the only reason why these ideas    
cannot be proved1 is  found in the      
nature of the ideas themselves1 and not 
in the deficient  nature of our         
knowledge4 ,kant therefore attempts to  
seek1 in a practical  way1 a kind of    
scientific proof2 a roundabout way1     
which1 to every  profound seeker1 must  
seem folly1 since every proof is as     
impossible as  it is unnecessary4       
,jacobi agreed better with ,kant1 than  
with the post-,kantian philosophy4  ,the
 atheistic tendency of the latter was   

especially repulsive to him4  8,to      
,kant1 that profound thinker and upright
 philosopher1 the words ,god1  freedom1 
immortality1 and religion1 signified the
 same as they have ever  done to the    
sound human understanding2 he in no way 
treats them as  nothing but deception4  
,he created offence by irresistibly     
showing the  insufficiency of all proofs
 of speculative philosophy for these    
ideas4  ,that which was wanting in the  
theoretical proof1 he made up by the    
necessary postulates of a pure practical
 reason4 ,with these1 according  to     
,kant's assurance1 philosophy was fully 
helped out of her difficulty1  and the  
goal1 which had been always missed1     
actually reached4 ,but the  first       
daughter of the critical philosophy     
7,fichte's system7 makes the  living and
 working moral order itself to be ,god1 
a ,god expressly  declared to be without
 consciousness and self-existence4      
,these frank  words1 spoken publicly and
 without restraint1 roused some         

attention1 but  the fear soon subsided4 
,presently astonishment ceased wholly1  
for the  second daughter of the critical
 philosophy 7,schelling's system7 gave  
up  entirely the distinction which the  
first had allowed to remain between     
natural and moral philosophy1 necessity 
and freedom1 and without any  further   
ado affirmed that the only existence is 
nature1 and that there  is nothing      
above2 this second daughter is          
,spinozism transfigured and  reversed1  
an ideal materialism40 ,this latter     
allusion to ,schelling1  connected as it
 was with other and harder thrusts in   
the same essay1  called out from this   
philosopher the well-known answer3      
8,schelling's  ,monument to the         
,treatise on ,divine ,things1 #ahab40   
,if we now take a critical survey of the
 philosophical standpoint of  ,jacobi1  
we shall find its peculiarity to consist
 in the abstract  separation of         
understanding and feeling4 ,these two   
,jacobi could not  bring into harmony4  

8,there is light in my heart10 he says1 
8but it goes  out whenever ,i attempt to
 bring it into the understanding4 ,which
 is the  true luminary of these two8    
,that of the understanding1 which1      
though it  reveals fixed forms1 shows   
behind them only a baseless gulf8 ,or   
that of  the heart1 which points its    
light promisingly upwards1 though       
determinate knowledge escapes it8 ,can  
the human spirit grasp the truth  unless
 it possesses these two luminaries      
united in one light8 ,and is  this union
 conceivable except through a miracle80 
,if now1 in order to  escape in a       
certain degree this contradiction       
between understanding and  feeling1     
,jacobi gave to immediate knowledge the 
place of mediate as  finite knowledge1  
this was a self-deception4 ,even that   
knowledge1 which  is supposed to be     
immediate1 and which ,jacobi regards as 
the peculiar  organ for knowing the     
supersensible1 is also mediate1 obliged 
to go  through a course of subjective   

mediations1 and can only give itself out
  as immediate when it wholly forgets   
its own origin4          ,,section      
,,xli4    ,,fichte      ,johann         
,gottlieb ,fichte was born at ,rammenau1
 in ,upper ,lusatia1 #agfb4 ,a  nobleman
 of ,silesia became interested in the   
boy1 and having committed  him first to 
the instruction of a clergyman1 he      
afterwards placed him at  the high      
school at ,schulpforte4 ,in his         
eighteenth year1 at ,michaelmas1  #aghj1
 ,fichte entered the university at ,jena
 to study theology4 ,he soon  found     
himself attracted to philosophy1 and    
became powerfully affected by  the study
 of ,spinoza4 ,his pecuniary            
circumstances were straitened1 but  this
 only served to harden his will and his 
energy4 ,in #aghd he became  employed as
 a teacher in a certain family1 and     
spent some time in this  occupation with
 different families in ,saxony4 ,in     
#aghg he sought a place  as country     
clergyman1 but was refused on account of

 his religious  opinions4 ,he was now   
obliged to leave his fatherland1 to     
which he clung  with his whole soul4 ,he
 repaired to ,zurich1 where1 in #aghh1  
he took a  post as private tutor1 and   
where also he became acquainted with his
  future wife1 a sister's daughter of   
,klopstock4 ,at ,easter1 #agij1 he      
returned to ,saxony and taught privately
 at ,leipsic1 where he became           
acquainted with the ,kantian philosophy1
 by means of lessons which he was       
obliged to give to a student4 ,in the   
spring of #agia we find him as  private 
tutor at ,warsaw1 and soon after in     
,konigsberg1 where he  resorted1 that he
 might become personally acquainted with
 the ,kant he  had learned to revere4   
,instead of a letter of recommendation  
he  presented him his 8,critick of all  
,revelation10 a treatise which ,fichte  
composed in eight days4 ,in this he     
attempted to deduce1 from the  practical
 reason1 the possibility of a           
revelation4 ,this is not seen  purely   

apriori1 but only under an empirical    
condition2 we must consider  humanity to
 be in a moral ruin so complete1 that   
the moral law has lost  all its         
influence upon the will and all morality
 is extinguished4 ,in  such a case we   
may expect that ,god1 as moral governor 
of the world1  would give man1 through  
the sense1 some pure moral impulses1 and
 reveal  himself as lawgiver to them    
through a special manifestation         
determined  for this end1 in the world  
of sense4 ,in such a case a particular  
revelation were a postulate of the      
practical reason4 ,fichte sought also   
to determine apriori the possible       
content of such a revelation4 ,since we 
need to know nothing but ,god1 freedom1 
and immortality1 the revelation  will   
contain naught but these1 and these it  
must contain in a  comprehensible form1 
yet so that the symbolical dress may lay
 no claim  to unlimited veneration4     
,this treatise1 which appeared          
anonymously in  #agib1 at once attracted

 the greatest attention1 and was at     
first  universally regarded as a work of
 ,kant4 ,it procured for its author1    
soon  after1 a call to the chair of     
philosophy at ,jena1 to succeed         
,reinhold1  who then went to ,kiel4     
,fichte received this appointment in    
#agic at  ,zurich1 where he had gone to 
consummate his marriage4 ,at the same   
time  he wrote and published1 also      
anonymously1 his 8,aids to correct views
 of  the ,french ,revolution10 an essay 
which the governments never looked  upon
 with favor4 ,at ,easter1 #agid1 he     
entered upon his new office1 and  soon  
saw his public call confirmed4 ,taking  
now a new standpoint1 which  transcended
 ,kant1 he sought to establish this1 and
 carry it out in a  series of writings  
7the ,wissenschaftslehre appeared in    
#agid1 the  ,naturrecht in #agif1 and   
the ,sittenlehre in #agih71 by which he 
exerted a powerful influence upon the   
scientific movement in ,germany1  aided 
as he was in this by the fact that ,jena

 was then one of the most  flourishing  
of the ,german universities1 and the    
resort of every vigorous  head4 ,with   
,goethe1 ,schiller1 the brothers        
,schlegel1 ,william von  ,humboldt1 and 
,hufeland1 ,fichte was in close         
fellowship1 though this was             
unfortunately broken after a few years4 
,in #agie he became associate  editor of
 the 8,philosophical ,journal10 which   
had been established by  ,niethammer4 ,a
 fellow-laborer1 ,rector ,forberg1 at   
,saalfeld1 offered for  publication in  
this journal an article 8to determine   
the conception of  religion40 ,fichte   
advised the author not to publish it1   
but at length  inserted it in the       
journal1 prefacing it1 however1 with an 
introduction  of his own4 8,on the      
ground of our faith in a divine         
government of the  world10 in which he  
endeavored to remove1 or at least       
soften1 the views  in the article which 
might give offence4 ,both the essays    
raised a great  cry of atheism4 ,the    

elector of ,saxony confiscated the      
journal in his  territory1 and sent a   
requisition to the dukes ,ernest1 who   
held in  common the university of ,jena1
 to summon the author to trial and      
punishment4 ,fichte answered the edict  
of confiscation and attempted to        
justify himself to the public 7#agii71  
by his 8,appeal to the ,public4 ,an     
essay which it is requested may be read 
before it is confiscated20  while he    
defended his course to the government by
 an article entitled  8,the ,publishers 
of the ,philosophical ,journal justified
 from the charge  of ,atheism40 ,the    
government of ,weimar1 being as anxious 
to spare him as  it was to please the   
elector of ,saxony1 delayed its         
decision4 ,but as  ,fichte1 either with 
or without reason1 had privately learned
 that the  whole matter was to be       
settled by reprimanding the accused     
parties for  their want of caution2 and1
 desiring either a civil acquittal or an
 open  and proper satisfaction1 he wrote

 a private letter to a member of the    
government1 in which he desired his     
dismission in case of a reprimand1  and 
which he closed with the intimation that
 many of his friends would  leave the   
university with him1 in order to        
establish together a new one  in        
,germany4 ,the government regarded this 
letter as an application for  his       
discharge1 indirectly declaring that the
 reprimand was unavoidable4  ,fichte1   
now an object of suspicion1 both on     
account of his religious and  political 
views1 looked about him in vain for a   
place of refuge4 ,the  prince of        
,rudolstadt1 to whom he turned1 denied  
him his protection1 and  his arrival in 
,berlin 7#agii7 attracted great notice4 
,in ,berlin1 where he  had much         
intercourse with ,frederick ,schlegel1  
and also with  ,schleiermacher and      
,novalis1 his views became gradually    
modified2 the  catastrophe at ,jena had 
led him from the exclusive moral        
standpoint  which he1 resting upon      

,kant1 had hitherto held1 to the sphere 
of  religion2 he now sought to reconcile
 religion with his standpoint of the    
,wissenshaftslehre1 and turned himself  
to a certain mysticism 7the  second form
 of the ,fichtian theory74 ,after he had
 privately taught a  number of years in 
,berlin1 and had also held philosophical
 lectures for  men of culture1 he was   
recommended 7#ahje7 by ,beyme and       
,altenstein1  chancellor of state of    
,hardenberg1 to a professorship of      
philosophy in  ,erlangen1 an appointment
 which he received together with a      
permit to  return to ,berlin in the     
winter1 and hold there his philosophical
  lectures before the public4 ,thus1 in 
the winter of #ahjg-h1 while a  ,french 
marshal was governor of ,berlin1 and    
while his voice was often  drowned by   
the hostile tumults of the enemy through
 the streets1 he  delivered his famous  
8,addresses to the ,german nation40     
,fichte labored  most assiduously for   
the foundation of the ,berlin           

university1 for only  by wholly         
transforming the common education did he
 believe the  regeneration of ,germany  
could be secured4 ,as the new university
 was  opened #ahji1 he was made in the  
first year dean of the philosophical    
faculty1 and in the second was invested 
with the dignity of rector4 ,in  the    
8war of liberation10 then breaking out1 
,fichte took the liveliest              
participation by word and deed4 ,his    
wife had contracted a nervous fever  by 
her care of the sick and wounded1 and   
though she recovered1 he fell a  victim 
to the same disease4 ,he died ,jan4 #bh1
 #ahad1 not having yet  completed his   
fifty-second year4    ,in the following 
exposition of ,fichte's philosophy1 we  
distinguish  between the two internally 
different periods of his philosophizing1
 that  of ,jena and that of ,berlin4    
,the first division will include two    
parts--,fichte's theory of science and  
his practical philosophy4    ,i4 ,,the  
,,fichtian ,,philosophy ,,in ,,its      

,,original ,,form4 #a4 ,,the            
,,theoretical  ,,philosophy ,,of        
,,fichte1 ,,his ,,wissenschaftslehre1   
,,or ,,theory ,,of ,,science4--,it  has 
already been shown 7 #ci7 that the      
thoroughly-going subjective  idealism of
 ,fichte was only the logical           
consequence of the ,kantian  standpoint4
 ,it was wholly unavoidable that ,fichte
 should entirely reject  the ,kantian   
essentially thing 7thing in itself71    
which ,kant had  himself declared to be 
unrecognizable though real1 and that he 
should  posit as a proper act of the    
mind1 that external influence which     
,kant  had referred to the essentially  
thing4 ,that the ,ego alone is1 and that
  which we regard as a limitation of the
 ,ego by external objects1 is  rather   
the proper self-limitation of the ,ego2 
this is the grand feature  of the       
,fichtian as of every idealism4         
,fichte himself supported the standpoint
 of this ,theory of ,science as         
follows3 ,in every experience there is  

conjointly an ,ego and a thing1 the     
intelligence and its object4 ,which of  
these two sides must now be  reduced to 
the other8 ,if the philosopher abstracts
 the ,ego1 he has  remaining an         
essentially thing1 and must then        
apprehend his  representations or       
sensations as the products of this      
object2 if he  abstracts the object1 he 
has remaining an essentially ,ego 7an   
,ego in  itself74 ,the former is        
dogmatism1 the latter idealism4 ,both   
are  irreconcilable with each other1 and
 there is no third way possible4 ,we    
must therefore choose between the two4  
,in order to decide between the  two    
systems1 we must note the following3    
7#a7 ,that the ,ego appears in          
consciousness1 wherefore the essentially
 thing is a pure invention1  since in   
consciousness we have only that which is
 perceived2 7#b7  ,dogmatism must       
account for the origin of its           
representation through some  essentially
 object1 it must start from something   

which does not lie in  the              
consciousness4 ,but the effect of being 
is only being1 and not  representation4 
,hence idealism alone can be correct    
which does not start  from being1 but   
from intelligence4 ,according to        
idealism1 intelligence  is only active1 
not passive1 because it is a first and  
absolute3 and on  this account there    
belongs to it no being1 but simply an   
acting4 ,the  forms of this acting1 the 
system of the necessary mode in which   
intelligence acts1 must be found from   
the essence of intelligence4 ,if we     
should take the laws of intelligence    
from experience1 as ,kant did his       
categories1 we fail in two respects3    
7#a7 ,we do not see why intelligence    
must so act1 nor whether these laws are 
immanent laws of intelligence2  7#b7 ,we
 do not see how the object itself       
originates4 ,hence the  fundamental     
principles of intelligence1 as well as  
the objective world1  must be derived   
from the ,ego itself4    ,fichte        

supposed that in these results he only  
expressed the true sense  of the        
,kantian philosophy4 8,whatever my      
system may properly be1 whether  the    
genuine criticism thoroughly carried    
out1 as ,i believe it is1 or  howsoever 
it be named1 is of no account40 ,his    
system1 ,fichte affirms1  had the same  
view of the matter as ,kant's1 while the
 numerous followers  of this philosopher
 had wholly mistaken and misunderstood  
their master's  idealism4 ,in the second
 introduction to the ,theory of ,science
 7#agig71  ,fichte grants to these      
expounders of the ,critick of pure      
,reason that it  contains some passages 
where ,kant would affirm that sensations
 must be  given to the subject from     
without as the material conditions of   
objective reality2 but shows that the   
innumerably repeated declarations  of   
the ,critick1 that there could be no    
influence upon us of a real             
transcendental object outside of us1    
cannot at all be reconciled with  these 

passages1 if any thing other than a     
simple thought be understood  as the    
ground of the sensations4 8,so long10   
adds ,fichte1 8as ,kant does  not       
expressly declare that he derives       
sensations from an impression of  some  
essentially thing1 or1 to use his       
terminology1 that sensation must  be    
explained from a transcendental object  
existing externally to us3 so  long will
 ,i not believe what these expounders   
tell us of ,kant4 ,but if he  should    
give such an explanation1 ,i should     
sooner regard the ,critick of  ,pure    
,reason to be a work of chance than of  
design40 ,for such an  explanation the  
aged ,kant did not suffer him long to   
wait4 ,in the  ,intelligenzblatt der    
,allgemeinen ,litteraturzeitung 7#agii71
 he  formally1 and with much emphasis1  
rejects the ,fichtian improvement of    
his system1 and protests against every  
interpretation of his writings          
according to the conceit of any mind1   
while he maintains the literal          

interpretation of his theory as laid    
down in the ,critick of ,reason4        
,reinhold remarks upon all this3 8,since
 the well known and public  explanation 
of ,kant respecting ,fichte's           
philosophy1 there can be no  longer a   
doubt that ,kant himself would represent
 his own system1 and  desire to have it 
represented by his readers1 entirely    
otherwise than  ,fichte had represented 
and interpreted it4 ,but from this it   
irresistibly  follows1 that ,kant       
himself did not regard his system as    
illogical  because it presupposed       
something external to the subjectivity4 
,nevertheless1 it does not at all follow
 that ,fichte erred when he  declared   
that this system1 with such a           
presupposition1 must be  illogical40 ,so
 much for ,reinhold4 ,that ,kant himself
 did not fail to see  this              
inconclusiveness1 is evident from the   
changes he introduced into  the second  
edition of the ,critick of ,pure        
,reason1 where he suffered the          

idealistic side of his system to fall   
back decidedly behind the  empirical4   
,from what has been said1 we can see the
 universal standpoint of the  ,theory of
 ,science2 the ,ego is made a principle1
 and from the ,ego every  thing else is 
sought to be derived4 ,it hardly needs  
to be remarked1 that  by this ,ego we   
are to understand1 not any individual1  
but the universal  ,ego1 the universal  
rationality4 ,the ,ego and the          
individual1 the pure and  the empirical 
,ego1 are wholly different conceptions4 
,we have still the following preface to 
make concerning the form of the  ,theory
 of ,science4 ,a theory of science1     
according to ,fichte1 must posit  some  
supreme principle1 from which every     
other must be derived4 ,this  supreme   
principle must be absolutely1 and       
through itself1 certain4 ,if  our human 
knowledge should be any thing but       
fragmentary1 there must be  such a      
supreme principle4 ,but now1 since such 
a principle does not admit  of proof1   

every thing depends upon giving it a    
trial4 ,its test and  demonstration can 
only be thus gained1 viz41 if we find a 
principle to  which all science may be  
referred1 then is this shown to be a    
fundamental principle4 ,but besides the 
first fundamental principle1  there are 
yet two others to be considered1 the one
 of which is  unconditioned as to its   
content1 but as to its form1 conditioned
 through  and derived from the first    
fundamental principle2 the other the    
reverse4  ,the relation of these three  
principles to each other is1 in fine1   
this1  viz41 that the second stands     
opposed to the first1 while a third is  
the  product of the two4 ,hence1        
according to this plan1 the first       
absolute  principle starts from the     
,ego1 the second opposes to the ,ego a  
thing or  a non-,ego1 and the third     
brings forward the ,ego again in        
reaction  against the thing or the      
non-,ego4 ,this method of ,fichte       
7thesis1--antithesis1--synthesis7 is the

 same as ,hegel subsequently  adopted1  
and applied to the whole system of      
philosophy1 a union of the  synthetical 
and analytical methods4 ,we start with a
 fundamental  synthesis1 which we       
analyze to produce its antitheses1 in   
order to unite  these antitheses again  
through a second synthesis4 ,but in     
making this  second synthesis1 our      
analysis discovers still farther        
antitheses1 which  obliges us therefore 
to find another synthesis1 and so onward
 in the  process1 till we come at length
 to antitheses which can no longer be   
perfectly but only approximately        
connected4    ,we stand now upon the    
threshold of the ,theory of ,science4   
,it is  divided into three parts4 7#a7  
,general principles of a theory of      
science4  7#b7 ,principles of           
theoretical knowledge4 7#c7 ,principles 
of practical  science4    ,as has       
already been said1 there are three      
supreme fundamental  principles1 one    
absolutely unconditioned1 and two       

relatively  unconditioned4    7#a47 ,the
 absolutely first and absolutely        
unconditioned fundamental  principle    
ought to express that act of the mind   
which lies at the basis  of all         
consciousness1 and alone makes          
consciousness possible4 ,such is  the   
principle of identity1 ,a  ,a4 ,this    
principle remains1 and cannot be        
thought away1 though every empirical    
determination be removed4 ,it is a  fact
 of consciousness1 and must1 therefore1 
be universally admitted3 but  at the    
same time it is by no means conditioned1
 like every other  empirical fact1 but  
unconditioned1 because it is a free act4
 ,by  affirming that this principle is  
certain without any farther ground1 we  
ascribe to ourselves the faculty of     
positing something absolutely4 ,we  do  
not1 therefore1 affirm that ,a is1 but  
only that if ,a is1 then it is  equal to
 ,a4 ,it is no matter now about the     
content of the principle1 we  need only 
regard its form4 ,the principle ,a  ,a  

is1 therefore1  conditioned             
7hypothetically7 as to its content1 and 
unconditioned only  as to its form and  
its connection4 ,if we would now have a 
principle  unconditioned in its content 
as well as in its connection1 we put    
,ego in  the place of ,a1 as we are     
fully entitled to do1 since the         
connection of  subject and predicate    
contained in the judgment ,a  ,a is     
posited in the  ,ego and through the    
,ego4 ,hence ,a  ,a becomes transformed 
into ,ego  ,ego4  ,this principle is    
unconditioned not only as to its        
connection1 but also  as to its content4
 ,while we could not1 instead of ,a  ,a1
 say that ,a is1  yet we can instead of 
,ego  ,ego1 say that ,ego is4 ,all the  
facts of the  empirical consciousness   
find their ground of explanation in     
this1 viz41  that before any thing else 
is posited in the ,ego1 the ,ego itself 
is  there4 ,this fact1 that the ,ego is 
absolutely posited and grounded on      
itself1 is the basis of all acting in   

the human mind1 and shows the pure      
character of activity in itself4 ,the   
,ego is1 because it posits itself1  and 
it only is1 because this simple positing
 of itself is wholly by  itself4 ,the   
being of the ,ego is thus seen in the   
positing of the ,ego1  and on the other 
hand1 the ,ego is enabled to posit      
simply by virtue of  its being4 ,it is  
at the same time the acting1 and the    
product of the  action4 ,i am1 is the   
expression of the only possible deed4   
,logically  considered we have1 in the  
first principle of a ,theory of         
,science1 ,a   ,a1 the logical law of   
identity4 ,from the proposition ,a  ,a1 
we arrive at  the proposition ,ego      
,ego4 ,the latter proposition1 however1 
does not  derive its validity from the  
former1 but contrarywise4 ,the prius of 
all  judgments is the ,ego1 which posits
 the connection of subject and          
predicate4 ,the logical law of identity 
arises1 therefore1 from ,ego   ,ego4    
,metaphysically considered1 we have in  

this same first principle of  a ,theory 
of ,science1 the category of reality4   
,we obtain this category  by abstracting
 every thing from the content1 and      
reflecting simply upon  the mode of     
acting of the human mind4 ,from the     
,ego1 as the absolute  subject1 every   
category is derived4    7#b47 ,the      
second fundamental principle1           
conditioned in its content1 and  only   
unconditioned in its form1 which is just
 as incapable as the first  of          
demonstration or derivation1 is also a  
fact of the empirical  consciousness3 it
 is the proposition non-,a is not  ,a4  
,this sentence is  unconditioned in its 
form1 because it is free act like the   
first1 from  which it cannot be derived2
 but in its content1 as to its matter it
 is  conditioned1 because if a non-,a is
 posited1 there must have previously    
been posited an ,a4 ,let us examine this
 principle more closely4 ,in the  first 
principle1 ,a  ,a1 the form of the act  
was a positing1 while in  this second   

principle it is an oppositing4 ,there is
 an absolute  opposition1 and this      
opposition1 in its simple form1 is an   
act  absolutely possible1 standing under
 no condition1 limited by no higher     
ground4 ,but as to its matter1 the      
opposition presupposes a position2 the  
non-,a cannot be posited without the ,a4
 ,what non-,a is1 ,i do not through     
that yet know3 ,i only know concerning  
non-,a that it is the opposite of  ,a3  
hence ,i only know what non-,a is under 
the condition that ,i know ,a4  ,but now
 ,a is posited through the ,ego2 there  
is originally nothing  posited but the  
,ego1 and nothing but this absolutely   
posited4 ,hence  there can be an        
absolute opposition only to the ,ego4   
,that which is  opposed to the ,ego is  
the non-,ego4 ,a non-,ego is absolutely 
opposed to  the ,ego1 and this is the   
second fact of the empirical            
consciousness4 ,in  every thing ascribed
 to the ,ego1 the contrary1 by virtue of
 this simple  opposition1 must be       

ascribed to the non ,ego4--,as we       
obtained from the  first principle ,ego 
,ego1 the logical law of identity1 so   
now we have1  from the second sentence  
,ego is not  non-,ego1 the logical law  
of  contradiction4 ,and                 
metaphysically1--since we wholly        
abstract the definite  act of judgment1 
and1 simply in the form of sequence1    
conclude not-being  from opposite       
being1--we possess from this second     
principle the category  of negation4    
7#c47 ,the third principle1 conditioned 
in its form1 is almost capable  of      
proof1 since it is determined by two    
others4 ,at every step we  approach the 
province where every thing can be       
proved4 ,this third  principle is       
conditioned in its form1 and            
unconditioned only in its  content3 i4  
e4 the problem1 but not the solution of 
the act to be  established through it1  
has been given through the two preceding
  principles4 ,the solution is afforded 
unconditionally and absolutely by a     

decisive word of the reason4 ,the       
problem to be solved by this third      
principle is this1 viz41 to adjust the  
contradiction contained in the  two     
former ones4 ,on the one side1 the ,ego 
is wholly suppressed by the  non-,ego3  
there can be no positing of the ,ego so 
far as the non-,ego is  posited4 ,on the
 other side1 the non-,ego is only an    
,ego posited in the  consciousness1 and 
hence the ,ego is not suppressed by the 
non-,ego4 ,the  ,ego appearing on the   
one side to be suppressed1 is not really
  suppressed4 ,such a result would be   
non-,a  ,a4 ,in order to remove this    
contradiction1 which threatens to       
destroy the identity of our             
consciousness1 and the only absolute    
foundation of our knowledge1 we  must   
find in x that which will justify both  
of the first two  principles1 and leave 
the identity of our consciousness       
undisturbed4 ,the  two opposites1 the   
,ego and the non-,ego1 should be united 
in the  consciousness1 should be alike  

posited without either excluding the    
other2 they should be received in the   
identity of the proper  consciousness4  
,how shall being and not-being1 reality 
and negation1 be  conceived together    
without destroying each other8 ,they    
will reciprocally  limit each other4    
,hence the unknown quantity x1 whose    
terms we are  seeking1 stands for these 
limits3 limitation is the sought-for act
 of  the ,ego1 and as category in the   
thought1 we have thus the category of   
determination or limitation4 ,but in    
limitation1 there is also given  the    
category of quantity1 for when we say   
that any thing is limited1  we mean that
 its reality is through negation1 not   
wholly1 but only  partially suppressed4 
,thus the conception of limit contains  
also the  conception of divisibility1   
besides the conceptions of reality and  
negation4 ,through the act of           
limitation1 the ,ego as well as the     
non-,ego1  is posited as divisible4     
,still farther1 we see how a logical law

 follows  from the third fundamental    
principle as well as from the first two4
 ,if  we abstract the definite content1 
the ,ego and the non-,ego1 and leave    
remaining the simple form of the union  
of opposites through the  conception of 
divisibility1 we have then the logical  
principle of the  ground1 or foundation1
 which may be expressed in the formula3 
,a in part   non-,a1 non-,a in part  ,a4
 ,wherever two opposites are alike in   
one  characteristic1 we consider the    
ground as a ground of relation1 and     
wherever two similar things are opposite
 in one characteristic1 we  consider the
 ground as a ground of                  
distinction4--,with these three         
principles we have now exhausted the    
measure of that which is  unconditioned 
and absolutely certain4 ,we can embrace 
the three in the  following formula3    
,i posit in the ,ego a divisible non    
,ego over against the divisible ,ego4   
,no philosophy can go beyond this       
cognition1 and every fundamental        

philosophy should go back to this4 ,just
 so far as it does this1 it  becomes    
science 7,wissenschaftslehre74 ,every   
thing which can appear in  a system of  
knowledge1 as well as a farther division
 of the ,theory of  ,science itself1    
must be derived from this4 ,the         
proposition that the ,ego  and the      
non-,ego reciprocally limit each other1 
may be divided into the  following two3 
7#a7 the ,ego posits itself as limited  
through the non-,ego  7i4 e4 the ,ego is
 in a cognitive 7or passive7 relation72 
7#b7 the ,ego  posits the non-,ego as   
limited through the ,ego 7i4 e4 the ,ego
 is in an  active relation74 ,the former
 proposition is the basis of the        
theoretical1 and the latter of the      
practical part of the ,theory of        
,science4 ,the latter part cannot1 at   
the outset1 be brought upon the  stage2 
for the non-,ego1 which should be       
limited by the acting ,ego1 does  not at
 the outset exist1 and we must wait and 
see whether it will find1  in the       

theoretical part1 a reality4    ,the    
groundwork of theoretical knowledge     
advances through an  uninterrupted      
series of antitheses and syntheses4 ,the
 fundamental  synthesis of the          
theoretical ,theory of ,science is the  
proposition3 the  ,ego posits itself as 
determined 7limited7 by the non-,ego4   
,if we  analyze this sentence1 we find  
in it two subordinate sentences which   
are  reciprocally opposite4 7#a7 ,the   
non-,ego as active determines the ,ego1 
which thus far is passive2 but since all
 activity must start from the  ,ego1 so 
7#b7 the ,ego determines itself through 
an absolute activity4  ,herein is a     
contradiction1 that the ,ego should be  
at the same time  active and passive4   
,since this contradiction would destroy 
the above  proposition1 and also        
suppress the unity of consciousness1 we 
are forced  to seek some point1 some new
 synthesis1 in which these given        
antitheses  may be united4 ,this        
synthesis is attained when we find that 

the  conceptions of action and passion1 
which are contained under the           
categories of reality and negation1 find
 their compensation and due  adjustment 
in the conception of divisibility4 ,the 
propositions3 8the ,ego  determines10   
and 8the ,ego is determined10 are       
reconciled in the  proposition3 8the    
,ego determines itself in part1 and is  
determined in  part40 ,both1 however1   
should be considered as one and the     
same4 ,hence  more accurately3 as many  
parts of reality as the ,ego posits in  
itself1  so many parts of negation does 
it posit in the non-,ego2 and as many   
parts of reality as the ,ego posits in  
the non-,ego1 so many parts of  negation
 does it posit in itself4 ,this         
determination is reciprocal             
determination1 or reciprocal action4    
,thus ,fichte deduces the last of  the  
three categories under ,kant's general  
category of relation4 ,in a  similar way
 7viz41 by finding a synthesis for      
apparent contradictions71  he deduces   

the two other categories of this class1 
viz41 that of cause1  and that of       
substance4 ,the process is thus3 ,so far
 as the ,ego is  determined1 and        
therefore passive1 has the non-,ego     
reality4 ,the category  of reciprocal   
determination1 to which we may ascribe  
indifferently  either of the two sides1 
reality or negation1 may1 more strictly 
taken1  imply that the ,ego is passive1 
and the non-,ego active4 ,the notion    
which  expresses this relation is that  
of causality4 ,that1 to which activity  
is ascribed1 is called cause 7primal    
reality71 and that to which  passiveness
 is ascribed1 is called effect2 both1   
conceived in  connection1 may be termed 
a working4 ,on the other side1 the ,ego 
determines itself4 ,herein is a         
contradiction2 7#a7 the ,ego determines 
itself2 it is therefore that which      
determines1 and is thus active2 7#b7  it
 determines itself2 it is therefore that
 which becomes determined1 and  is thus 
passive4 ,thus in one respect and in one

 action both reality and  negation are  
ascribed to it4 ,to resolve this        
contradiction1 we must find  a mode of  
action which is activity and passiveness
 in one2 the ,ego must  determine its   
passiveness through activity1 and its   
activity through  passiveness4 ,this    
solution is attained by aid of the      
conception of  quantity4 ,in the ,ego   
all reality is first of all posited as  
absolute  quantum1 as absolute totality1
 and thus far the ,ego may be compared  
to a  greatest circle which contains all
 the rest4 ,a definite quantum of       
activity1 or a limited sphere within    
this greatest circle of activity1  is   
indeed a reality2 but when compared with
 the totality of activity1  is it also a
 negation of the totality or            
passiveness4 ,here we have  found the   
mediation sought for2 it lies in the    
notion of substance4 ,in  so far as the 
,ego is considered as the whole circle1 
embracing the  totality of all          
realities1 is it substance2 but so far  

as it becomes  posited in a determinate 
sphere of this circle1 is it accidental4
 ,no  accidence is conceivable without  
substance2 for1 in order to know that   
any thing is a definite reality1 it must
 first be referred to reality in        
general1 or to substance4 ,in every     
change we think of substance in the     
universal2 accidence is something       
specific 7determinate71 which changes   
with every changing cause4 ,there is    
originally but one substance1 the  ,ego2
 in this one substance all possible     
accidents1 and therefore all  possible  
realities1 are posited4 ,the ,ego alone 
is the absolutely  infinite4 ,the ,ego1 
as thinking and as acting1 indicates a  
limitation4  ,the ,fichtian theory is   
accordingly ,spinozism1 only 7as ,jacobi
 strikingly  called it7 a reversed and  
idealistic ,spinozism4    ,let us look  
back a moment4 ,the objectivity which   
,kant had allowed to  exist ,fichte has 
destroyed4 ,there is only the ,ego4 ,but
 the ,ego  presupposes a non-,ego1 and  

therefore a kind of object4 ,how the    
,ego comes  to posit such an object1    
must the theoretical ,theory of ,science
 now  proceed to show4    ,there are two
 extreme views respecting the relation  
of the ,ego to the  non-,ego1 according 
as we start from the conception of      
cause1 or that of  substance4 7#a7      
,starting from the conception of cause1 
we have posited  through the passiveness
 of the ,ego an activity of the         
non-,ego4 ,this  passiveness of the ,ego
 must have some ground4 ,this cannot lie
 in the  ,ego1 which in itself posits   
only activity4 ,consequently it lies in 
the  non-,ego4 ,here the distinction    
between action and passion is           
apprehended1  not simply as quantitative
 7i4 e41 viewing the passiveness as a   
diminished activity71 but the passion is
 in quality opposed to the  action2 a   
presupposed activity of the non-,ego is1
 therefore1 a real  ground of the       
passiveness in the ,ego4 7#b7 ,starting 
from the conception  of substance1 we   

have posited a passiveness of the ,ego  
through its own  activity4 ,here the    
passiveness in respect of quality is the
 same as  activity1 it being only a     
diminished activity4 ,while1 therefore1 
according to the first view1 the passive
 ,ego has a ground distinct in  quality 
from the ,ego1 and thus a real ground1  
yet here its ground is  only a          
diminished activity of the ,ego1        
distinct only in quantity from  the     
,ego1 and is thus an ideal ground4 ,the 
former view is dogmatic  realism1 the   
latter is dogmatic idealism4 ,the latter
 affirms3 all  reality of the non-,ego  
is only a reality given it from the     
,ego2 the  former declares3 nothing can 
be given1 unless there be something to  
receive1 unless an independent reality  
of the non-,ego1 as thing in  itself1 be
 presupposed4 ,both views present thus a
 contradiction1 which  can only be      
removed by a new synthesis4 ,fichte     
attempted this synthesis  of idealism   
and realism1 by bringing out a mediating

 system of critical  idealism4 ,for this
 purpose he sought to show that the     
ideal ground and  the real ground are   
one and the same4 ,neither is the simple
 activity of  the ,ego a ground for the 
reality of the non-,ego1 nor is the     
simple  activity of the non-,ego a      
ground for the passiveness in the ,ego4 
,both  must be conceived together in    
this way1 viz41 the activity of the ,ego
  meets a hindrance1 which is set up    
against it1 not without some  assistance
 of the ,ego1 and which circumscribes   
and reflects in itself  this activity of
 the ,ego4 ,the hindrance is found when 
the subjective can  be no farther       
extended1 and the expanding activity of 
the ,ego is driven  back into itself1   
producing as its result self-limitation4
 ,what we call  objects are nothing     
other than the different impinging of   
the activity  of the ,ego on some       
inconceivable hindrance1 and these      
determinations of  the ,ego1 we carry   
over to something external to ourselves1

 and represent  them to ourselves as    
space filling matter4 ,that which       
,fichte calls a  hindrance through the  
non-,ego1 is thus in fact the same as   
,kant calls  thing essentially1 the only
 difference being that with ,fichte it  
is made  subjective4 ,from this point   
,fichte then deduces the subjective     
activities of the ,ego1 which mediate1  
or seek to mediate1 theoretically1  the 
,ego with the non-,ego--as imagination1 
representation 7sensation1  intuition1  
feeling71 understanding1 faculty of     
judgment1 reason2 and in  connection    
with this he brought out the subjective 
projections of the  intuition1 space1   
and time4    ,we have now reached the   
third part of the ,theory of ,science1  
via41 the  foundation of the practical4 
,we have seen that the ,ego represents4 
,but  that it may represent does not    
depend upon the ,ego alone1 but is      
determined by something external to it4 
,we could in no way conceive of a       
representation1 except through the      

presupposition that the ,ego finds  some
 hindrance to its undetermined and      
unlimited activity4 ,accordingly  the   
,ego1 as intelligence1 is universally   
dependent upon an indefinite1  and      
hitherto wholly indefinable non-,ego1   
and only through and by means  of such  
non-,ego1 is it intelligence4 ,a finite 
being is only finite as  intelligence4  
,these limits1 however1 we shall break  
through4 ,the  practical law which      
unites the finite ,ego with the         
infinite1 can depend  upon nothing      
external to ourselves4 ,the ,ego1       
according to all its  determinations1   
should be posited absolutely through    
itself1 and hence  should be wholly     
independent of every possible non-,ego4 
,consequently1  the absolute ,ego and   
the intelligent ,ego1 both of which     
should  constitute but one1 are opposed 
to each other4 ,this contradiction is   
obviated1 when we see that because the  
absolute ,ego is capable of no          
passiveness1 but is absolute activity1  

therefore the ,ego determines1  through 
itself1 that hitherto unknown non-,ego1 
to which the hindrance  has been        
ascribed4 ,the limits which the ,ego1 as
 theoretic1 has set over  against itself
 in the non-,ego1 it must1 as practical1
 seek to destroy1  and absorb again the 
non-,ego in itself 7or conceive it as   
the  self-limitation of the ,ego74 ,the 
,kantian primacy of the practical reason
  is here made a truth4 ,the transition 
of the theoretical part into the        
practical1 the necessity of advancing   
from the one to the other1 ,fichte      
represents more closely thus3--,the     
theoretical ,theory of ,science had to  
do with the mediation of the ,ego1 and  
the non-,ego4 ,for this end it          
introduced one connecting link after    
another1 without ever attaining its     
end4 ,then enters the reason with the   
absolute and decisive word3 8there      
ought to be no non-,ego1 since the      
non-,ego can in no way be united with   
the ,ego20 and with this the knot is    

cut1 though not untied4 ,thus it is  the
 incongruity between the absolute       
7practical7 ,ego1 and the finite        
7intelligent7 ,ego1 which is carried    
over beyond the theoretical province    
into the practical4 ,true1 this         
incongruity does not wholly disappear1  
even in the practical province1 where   
the act is only an infinite  striving to
 surpass the limits of the non-,ego4    
,the ,ego1 so far as it is  practical1  
has1 indeed1 the tendency to pass beyond
 the actual world1  and establish an    
ideal world1 as it would be were every  
reality posited  by the absolute ,ego2  
but this striving is always confined to 
the finite  partly through itself1      
because it goes out towards objects1 and
 objects  are finite1 and partly through
 the resistance of the sensible world4  
,we  ought to seek to reach the         
infinite1 but we cannot do it2 this     
striving  and inability is the impress  
of our destiny for eternity4            
,thus--and in these words ,fichte brings

 together the result of the ,theory  of 
,science--the whole being of finite     
rational natures is comprehended  and   
exhausted3 an original idea of our      
absolute being2 an effort to  reflect   
upon ourselves1 in order to gain this   
idea2 a limitation1 not of  this        
striving1 but of our own existence1     
which first becomes actual  through this
 limitation1 or through an opposite     
principle1 a non-,ego1 or  our          
finiteness2 a self-consciousness1 and   
especially a consciousness of  our      
practical strivings2 a determination    
accordingly of our  representations1 and
 through these of our actions2 a        
constant widening  of our limits into   
the infinite4    #b4 ,,fichte',s        
,,practical ,,philosophy4--,the         
principles which ,fichte had  developed 
in his ,theory of ,science he applied to
 practical life1  especially to the     
theory of rights and morals4 ,he sought 
to deduce here  every thing with        
methodical rigidness1 without admitting 

any thing which  could not be proved    
from experience4 ,thus1 in the theory of
 rights and  of morals1 he will not     
presuppose a plurality of persons1 but  
first  deduces this3 even that the man  
has a body is first demonstrated1       
though1 to be sure1 not stringently4    
,the ,theory of ,rights 7the rights of  
nature7 ,fichte founds upon the         
conception of the individual4 ,first1 he
 deduces the conception of  rights1 and 
as follows3--,a finite rational being   
cannot posit itself  without ascribing  
to itself a free activity4 ,through this
 positing of  its faculties to a free   
activity1 this rational being posits an 
external  world of sense1 for it can    
ascribe to itself no activity till it   
has  posited an object towards which    
this activity may be directed4 ,still   
farther1 this free activity of a        
rational being presupposes other        
rational beings1 for without these it   
would never be conscious that it  was   
free4 ,we have therefore a plurality of 

free individuals1 each one of  whom has 
a sphere of free activity4 ,this        
co-existence of free  individuals is not
 possible without a relation of rights4 
,since no one  with freedom passes      
beyond his sphere1 and each one         
therefore limits  himself1 they         
recognize each other as rational and    
free4 ,this relation  of a reciprocal   
acting through intelligence and freedom 
between rational  beings1 according to  
which each one has his freedom limited  
by the  conception of the possibility of
 the other's freedom1 under the         
condition also that this other limits   
his own freedom also through that  of   
the first1 is called a relation of      
rights4 ,the supreme maxim of a  theory 
of rights is therefore this3 limit thy  
freedom through the  conception of the  
freedom of every other person with whom 
thou canst be  connected4 ,after ,fichte
 has attempted the application of this  
conception  of rights1 and for this end 
has deduced the corporeity1 the         

anthropological side of man1 he passes  
over to a proper theory of  rights4 ,the
 theory of rights may be divided into   
three parts4 7#a7  ,rights which belong 
to the simple conception of person are  
called  original rights4 ,the original  
right is the absolute right of the      
person to be only a cause in the        
sensible world1 though he may be        
absolutely 7in other relations than to  
the sense7 an effect4 ,in this are      
contained1 7a7 the right of personal    
7bodily7 freedom1 and 7b7 the  right of 
property4 ,but every relation of rights 
between individual  persons is          
conditioned through each one's          
recognition of the rights of  the other4
 ,each one must limit the quantum of his
 free acts for the sake  of the freedom 
of the other1 and only so far as the    
other has respect to  my freedom need ,i
 have regard to his4 ,in case1          
therefore1 the other does  not respect  
my original rights1 some mechanical     
necessity must be sought  in order to   

secure the rights of person1 and this   
involves 7#b7 the  ,right of ,coercion4 
,the laws of punishment have their end  
in securing  that the opposite of that  
which is intended shall follow every    
unrighteous aim1 that every vicious     
purpose shall be destroyed1 and the     
right in its integrity be established4  
,to establish such a law of  coercion1  
and to secure a universal coercive      
power1 the free individuals  must enter 
into covenant among themselves4 ,such a 
covenant is only  possible on the ground
 of a common nature4 ,natural right1 i4 
e4 the  rightful relation between man   
and man1 presupposes thus 7#c7 a civil  
right1 viz41 7a7 a free covenant1 a     
compact of citizens by which the  free  
individuals guarantee to each other     
their reciprocal rights2 7b7  positive  
laws1 a civil legislation1 through which
 the common will of all  becomes law2   
7c7 an executive force1 a civil power   
which executes the  common will1 and in 
which1 therefore1 the private will and  

the common  will are synthetically      
united4 ,the particular view of         
,fichte's theory of  rights is this3 on 
the one side there is the state as      
reason demands  7philosophical theory of
 rights71 and on the other side the     
state as it  actually is 7theory of     
positive rights and of the state74 ,but 
now comes  up the problem1 to make the  
actual state ever more and more         
conformable  to the state of reason4    
,the science which has this             
approximation for its  aim1 is polity4  
,we can demand of no actual state a     
perfect conformity to  the idea of a    
state4 ,every state constitution is     
according to right1 if  it only leaves  
possible an advancement to a better     
state1 and the only  constitution wholly
 contrary to right is that whose end is 
to hold every  thing just as it is4     
,the absolute ,ego of the ,theory of    
,science is separated in the ,theory of 
,rights into an infinite number of      
persons with rights3 to bring it out    

again in its unity is the problem of    
,ethics4 ,right and morals are          
essentially different4 ,right is the    
external necessity to omit or to do     
something in order not to infringe upon 
the freedom of another2 the  inner      
necessity to do or omit something wholly
 independent of external  ends1         
constitutes the moral nature of man4    
,and as the theory of rights  arose from
 the conflict of the impulse of freedom 
in one subject with  the impulse of     
freedom in another subject1 so does the 
theory of morals  or ethics arise from  
such a conflict1 which1 in the present  
case1 is not  external but internal1    
between two impulses in one and the same
 person4  7#a7 ,the rational being is   
impelled towards absolute independence1 
and  strives after freedom for the sake 
of freedom4 ,this fundamental impulse   
may be called the pure impulse1 and it  
furnishes the formal principle of       
ethics1 the principle of absolute       
autonomy1 of absolute                   

indeterminableness through anything     
external to the ,ego4 ,but 7#b7 as the  
rational being is actually empirical and
 finite1 as it by nature posits  over   
against itself a non-,ego and posits    
itself as corporeal1 so there  is found 
beside the pure impulse another1 the    
impulse of nature1 which  makes for its 
end not freedom but enjoyment4 ,this    
impulse of nature  furnishes the        
material1 utilitarian 7eudmoniacal7     
principle of striving  after a connected
 enjoyment4 ,both impulses1 which from a
 transcendental  standpoint are one and 
the same original impulse of the human  
being1  strive after unity1 and furnish 
a third impulse which is a mingling of  
the two4 ,the pure impulse gives the    
form1 and the natural impulse the       
content of an action4 ,it is true that  
sensuous objects will be chosen1  but by
 virtue of the pure impulse these are   
modified so as to conform to  the       
absolute ,ego4 ,this mingled impulse is 
now the moral impulse4 ,it  mediates the

 pure and the natural impulse4 ,but     
since these two lie  infinitely apart1  
the approximation of the natural to the 
pure impulse  is an infinite            
progression4 ,the intent in an action is
 directed towards  a complete freeing   
from nature1 and it is only the result  
of our  limitation that the act should  
remain still conformable to the natural 
impulse4 ,since the ,ego can never be   
independent so long as it is ,ego1  the 
final aim of the rational being lies in 
infinity4 ,there must be a  course in   
whose progress the ,ego can conceive    
itself as approximating  towards        
absolute independence4 ,this course is  
determined in infinity in  the idea2    
there is1 therefore1 no possible case in
 which it is not  determined what the   
pure impulse should demand4 ,we might   
name this  course the moral             
determination 7destiny7 of the finite   
rational being4  ,the principle of      
ethics is1 therefore3 ,always fulfil thy
 destiny6 ,that  which is in every      

moment conformable to our moral destiny1
 is at the  same time demanded by our   
natural impulse1 though it does not     
follow  that every thing which the      
latter demands agrees therefore with the
  former4 ,i ought to act only when     
conscious that something is duty1 and ,i
  ought to discharge the duty for its   
own sake4 ,the blind motives of         
sympathy1 love of mankind1 c41 have not1
 as mere impulses of nature1  morality4 
,the moral impulse has causality as     
having none1 for it demands  be free6   
,through the conception of the absolute 
ought1 is the rational  being absolutely
 independent1 and is represented thus   
only when acting  from duty4 ,the formal
 condition of the morality of our       
actions1 is3 act  always according to   
the best conviction of thy duty2 or1 act
 according  to thy conscience4 ,the     
absolute criterion of the correctness of
 our  conviction of duty is a feeling of
 truth and certainty4 ,this immediate   
feeling never deceives1 for it only     

exists with the perfect harmony of  our 
empirical ,ego with that which is pure  
and original4 ,from this point  ,fichte 
developes his particular ethics1 or     
theory of duties1 which1  however1 we   
must here pass by4    ,fichte's theory  
of religion is developed in the above   
mentioned  treatise3 8,on the ground of 
our faith in a divine government of the 
world10 and in the writings which he    
subsequently put forth in its  defence4 
,the moral government of the world1 says
 ,fichte1 we assume to be  the divine4  
,this divine government becomes living  
and actual in us  through right-doing3  
it is presupposed in every one of our   
actions which  are only performed in the
 presupposition that the moral end is   
attainable in the world of sense4 ,the  
faith in such an order of the  world    
comprises the whole of faith1 for this  
living and active moral  order is ,god2 
we need no other ,god1 and can          
comprehend no other4 ,there  is no      
ground in the reason to go out of this  

moral order of the world1  and by       
concluding from design to a designer1   
affirm a separate being as  its cause4  
,is1 then1 this order an accidental one8
 ,it is the absolute  ,first of all     
objective knowledge4 ,but now if you    
should be allowed to  draw the          
conclusion that there is a ,god as a    
separate being1 what have  you gained by
 this8 ,this being should be distinct   
from you and the  world1 it should work 
in the latter according to conceptions2 
it should1  therefore1 be capable of    
conceptions1 and possess personality and
  consciousness4 ,but what do you call  
personality and consciousness8          
,certainly that which you have found in 
yourself1 which you have learned  to    
know in yourself1 and which you have    
characterized with such a name4  ,but   
that you cannot conceive of this without
 limitation and finiteness1  you might  
see by the slightest attention to the   
construction of this  conception4 ,by   
attaching1 therefore1 such a predicate  

to this being1 you  bring it down to a  
finite1 and make it a being like        
yourself2 you have  not conceived ,god  
as you intended to do1 but have only    
multiplied  yourself in thought4 ,the   
conception of ,god1 as a separate       
substance1 is  impossible and           
contradictory4 ,god has essential       
existence only as such a  moral order of
 the world4 ,every belief in a divine   
being1 which contains  any thing more   
than the conception of the moral order  
of the world1 is  an abomination to me1 
and in the highest degree unworthy of a 
rational  being4--,religion and morality
 are1 on this standpoint1 as on that of 
,kant1 naturally one2 both are an       
apprehending of the supersensible1 the  
former through action and the latter    
through faith4 ,this 8,religion of      
joyous right-doing10 ,fichte farther    
carried out in the writings which he    
put forth to rebut the charge of        
atheism4 ,he affirms that nothing but   
the principles of the new philosophy    

could restore the degenerate  religious 
sense among men1 and bring to light the 
inner essence of the  ,christian        
doctrine4 ,especially he seeks to show  
this in his 8,appeal0 to  the public4   
,in this he says3 to furnish an answer  
to the questions3 what  is good8 what is
 true8 is the aim of my philosophical   
system4 ,we must  start with the        
affirmation that there is something     
absolutely true and  good2 that there is
 something which can hold and bind the  
free flight of  thought4 ,there is a    
voice in man which cannot be silenced1  
which affirms  that there is a duty1 and
 that it must be done simply for its own
 sake4  ,resting on this basis1 there is
 opened to us an entirely new world in  
our being2 we attain a higher existence1
 which is independent of all  nature1   
and is grounded simply in ourselves4 ,i 
would call this absolute                
self-satisfaction of the reason1 this   
perfect freedom from all  dependence1   
blessedness4 ,as the single but unerring

 means of  blessedness1 my conscience   
points me to the fulfilment of duty4 ,i 
am1  therefore1 impressed by the        
unshaken conviction1 that there is a    
rule  and fixed order1 according to     
which the purely moral disposition      
necessarily makes blessed4 ,it is       
absolutely necessary1 and it is the     
essential element in religion1 that the 
man who maintains the dignity of  his   
reason1 will repose on the faith in this
 order of a moral world1  will regard   
each one of his duties as an enactment  
of this order1 and  will joyfully submit
 himself to1 and find bliss in1 every   
consequence of  his duty4 ,thou shalt   
know ,god if ,i can only beget in thee a
 dutiful  character1 and though to      
others of us thou mayest seem to be     
still in  the world of sense1 yet for   
thyself art thou already a partaker of  
eternal life4    ,,ii4 ,,the ,,later    
,,form ,,of ,,fichte',s                 
,,philosophy4--,every thing of          
importance  which ,fichte accomplished  

as a speculative philosopher1 is        
contained in  the ,theory of ,science as
 above considered4 ,subsequently1 after 
his  departure from ,jena1 his system   
gradually became modified1 and from     
different causes4 ,partly1 because it   
was difficult to maintain the rigid     
idealism of the ,theory of ,science2    
partly1 because ,schelling's natural    
philosophy1 which now appeared1 was not 
without an influence upon  ,fichte's    
thinking1 though the latter denied this 
and became involved in  a bitter        
controversy with ,schelling2 and1       
partly1 his outward relations1  which   
were far from being happy1 contributed  
to modify his view of the  world4       
,fichte's writings1 in this second      
period1 are for the most part  popular1 
and intended for a mixed class of       
readers4 ,they all bear the  impress of 
his acute mind1 and of his exalted manly
 character1 but lack  the originality   
and the scientific sequence of his      
earlier productions4  ,those of them    

which are scientific do not satisfy the 
demands which he  himself had previously
 laid down with so much strictness1 both
 for  himself and others1 in respect of 
genetic construction and philosophical  
method4 ,his doctrine at this time seems
 rather as a web1 of his old  subjective
 idealistic conceptions and the newly   
added objective  idealism1 so loosely   
connected that ,schelling might call it 
the  completest syncretism and          
eclecticism4 ,his new standpoint is     
chiefly  distinguished from his old by  
his attempt to merge his subjective     
idealism into an objective pantheism 7in
 accordance with the new  ,platonism71  
to transmute the ,ego of his earlier    
philosophy into the  absolute1 or the   
thought of ,god4 ,god1 whose conception 
he had formerly  placed only at the end 
of his system1 in the doubtful form of a
 moral  order of the world1 becomes to  
him now the absolute beginning1 and     
single element of his philosophy4 ,this 
gave to his philosophy an  entirely new 

color4 ,the moral severity gives place  
to a religious  mildness2 instead of the
 ,ego and the ,ought1 life and love are 
now the  chief features of his          
philosophy2 in place of the exact       
dialectic of the  ,theory of ,science1  
he now makes choice of mystical and     
metaphorical  modes of expression4      
,this second period of ,fichte's        
philosophy is especially characterized  
by  its inclination to religion and     
,christianity1 as exhibited most        
prominently in the essay 8,direction to 
a ,blessed ,life40 ,fichte here  affirms
 that his new doctrine is exactly that  
of ,christianity1 and  especially of the
 ,gospel according to ,john4 ,he would  
make this gospel  alone the clear       
foundation of ,christian truth1 since   
the other apostles  remained half ,jews 
after their conversion1 and adhered to  
the  fundamental error of ,judaism1 that
 the world had a creation in time4      
,fichte lays great weight upon the first
 part of ,john's prologue1 where  the   

formation of the world out of nothing is
 confuted1 and a true view  laid down of
 a revelation co-eternal with ,god1 and 
necessarily given  with his being4 ,that
 which this prologue says of the        
incarnation of the  ,logos in the person
 of ,jesus1 has1 according to ,fichte1  
only a historic  validity4 ,the absolute
 and eternally true standpoint is1 that 
at all  times1 and in every one1 without
 exception1 who is vitally sensible of  
his union with ,god1 and who actually   
and in fact yields up his whole         
individual life to the divine life      
within him1--the eternal word becomes   
flesh in the same way as in ,jesus      
,christ and holds a personal1 sensible1 
and human existence4 ,the whole         
communion of believers1 the first-born  
alike with the later born1 coincides in 
the ,godhead1 the common source  of life
 for all4 ,and so then1 ,christianity   
having gained its end1  disappears again
 in the eternal truth1 and affirms that 
every man should  come to a union with  

,god4 ,so long as man desires to be     
himself any thing  whatsoever1 ,god does
 not come to him1 for no man can become 
,god4 ,but  just so soon as he purely1  
wholly1 and radically gives up himself1 
,god  alone remains1 and is all and in  
all4 ,the man himself can beget no ,god1
  but he can give up himself as a proper
 negation1 and thus he disappears  in   
,god4    ,the result of his advanced    
philosophizing1 ,fichte has briefly and 
clearly comprehended in the following   
lines1 which we extract from two        
posthumous sonnets3                     
,the ,eternal ,one     ,lives in my life
 and sees in my beholding4     ,nought  
is but ,god1 and ,god is nought but     
life4     ,clearly the vail of things   
rises before thee2     ,it is thyself1  
what though the mortal die     ,and     
hence there lives but ,god in thine     
endeavors1     ,if thou wilt look       
through that which lives beyond this    
death1     ,the vail of things shall    
seem to thee as vail1     ,and unveiled 

thou shalt look upon the life divine4   
,,section ,,xlii4    ,,herbart4      ,a 
peculiar1 and in many respects          
noticeable1 carrying out of the ,kantian
  philosophy1 was attempted by ,johann  
,friedrich ,herbart1 who was born at    
,oldenburg in #aggf1 chosen professor of
 philosophy in ,gttingen in #ahje2  made
 ,kant's successor at ,knigsberg in     
#ahjh1 and recalled to ,gttingen  in    
#ahcc1 where he died in #ahda4 ,his     
philosophy1 instead of making1 like     
most other systems1 for its principle1  
an idea of the reason1 followed  the    
direction of ,kant1 and expended itself 
mainly in a critical  examination of the
 subjective experience4 ,it is          
essentially a criticism1  but with      
results which are peculiar1 and which   
differ wholly from those  of ,kant4 ,its
 fundamental position in the history of 
philosophy is an  isolated one2 instead 
of regarding antecedent systems as      
elements of a  true philosophy1 it looks
 upon almost all of them as failures4   

,it is  especially hostile to the       
post-,kantian ,german philosophy1 and   
most of  all to ,schelling's philosophy 
of nature1 in which it could only behold
 a  phantom and a delusion2 sooner than 
come in contact with this1 it would     
join ,hegelianism1 of which it is the   
opposite pole4 ,we will give a brief    
exposition of its prominent thoughts4   
#a4 ,,the ,,basis ,,and                 
,,starting-,,point ,,of ,,philosophy is1
 according to ,herbart1  the common view
 of things1 or a knowledge which shall  
accord with  experience4 ,a             
philosophical system is in reality      
nothing but an attempt  by which a      
thinker strives to solve certain        
questions which present  themselves     
before him4 ,every question brought up  
in philosophy should  refer itself      
singly and solely to that which is      
given1 and must arise  from this source 
alone1 because there is no other        
original field of  certainty1 for men1  
than experience alone4 ,every philosophy

 should begin  with it4 ,the thinking   
should yield itself to experience1 which
 should  lead it1 and not be led by it4 
,experience1 therefore1 is the only     
object  and basis of philosophy2 that   
which is not given cannot be an object  
of  thought1 and it is impossible to    
establish any knowledge which           
transcends the limits of experience4    
#b4 ,,the ,,first ,,act ,,of            
,,philosophy4--,though the material     
furnished by  experience is the basis of
 philosophy1 yet1 since it is furnished1
 it  stands outside of philosophy4 ,the 
question arises1 what is the first act  
or beginning of philosophy8 ,the        
thinking should first separate itself   
from experience1 that it may clearly see
 the difficulties of its  undertaking4  
,the beginning of philosophy1 where the 
thinking rises  above that which is     
given1 is accordingly doubt or          
scepticism4  ,scepticism is twofold1 a  
lower and a higher4 ,the lower          
scepticism simply  doubts that things   

are so constituted as they appear to us 
to be2 the  higher scepticism passes    
beyond the form of the phenomenon1 and  
inquires  whether in reality any thing  
there exists4 ,it doubts e4 g4 the      
succession in time2 it asks in reference
 to the forms of the objects of  nature 
which exhibit design1 whether the design
 is perceived1 or only  attached to them
 in the thought1 c4 ,thus the problems  
which form the  content of metaphysics1 
are gradually brought out4 ,the result  
of  scepticism is therefore not         
negative1 but positive4 ,doubt is       
nothing but  the thinking upon those    
conceptions of experience which are the 
material  of philosophy4 ,through this  
reflection1 scepticism leads us to the  
knowledge that these conceptions of     
experience1 though they refer to        
something given1 yet contain no         
conceivable content free from logical   
incongruities4    #c4 ,,remodelling ,,of
 ,,the ,,conceptions ,,of               
,,experience4--,metaphysics1 according  

to ,herbart1 is the science of that     
which is conceivable in experience4     
,our view thus far has been a twofold   
one4 ,on the one side we hold fast  to  
the opinion that the single basis of    
philosophy is experience1 and on  the   
other side1 scepticism has shaken the   
credibility of experience4 ,the  point  
now is to transform this scepticism into
 a definite knowledge of  metaphysical  
problems4 ,conceptions from experience  
crowd upon us1 which  cannot be         
thoughts1 i4 e4 they may indeed be      
thought by the ordinary  understanding1 
but this thinking is obscure and        
confused1 and does not  separate nor    
compare opposing characteristics4 ,but  
an acute process of  thought1 a logical 
analysis1 will find in the conceptions  
of experience  7e4 g4 space1 time1      
becoming1 motion1 c47 contradictions and
  characteristics1 which are totally    
inconsistent with each other4 ,what  now
 is to be done8 ,we may not reject these
 conceptions1 for they are  given1 and  

beyond the given we cannot step2 we     
cannot retain them1 for  they are       
inconceivable and cannot logically be   
established4 ,the only way  of escape   
which remains to us is to remodel them4 
,to remodel the  conceptions of         
experience1 to eliminate their          
contradictions1 is the  proper act of   
speculation4 ,scepticism has brought to 
light the more  definite problems which 
involve a contradiction1 and whose      
solution it  therefore belongs to       
metaphysics to attempt2 the most        
important of these  are the problems of 
inherence1 change1 and the ,ego4    ,the
 relation between ,herbart and ,hegel is
 very clear at this point4 ,both  are   
agreed respecting the contradictory     
nature of the determinations of         
thought1 and the conceptions of         
experience4 ,but from this point they   
separate4 ,it is the nature of these    
conceptions as of every thing1 says     
,hegel1 to be an inner contradiction2   
becoming1 for instance1 is  essentially 

the unity of being1 and not being1 c4   
,this is impossible1  says ,herbart1 on 
the other side1 so long as the principle
 of  contradiction is valid2 if the     
conceptions of experience contain inner 
contradictions1 this is not the fault of
 the objective world1 but of the        
representing subject who must rectify   
his false apprehension by  remodelling  
these conceptions1 and eliminating the  
contradiction4  ,herbart thus charges   
the philosophy of ,hegel with           
empiricism1 because it  receives from   
experience these contradictory          
conceptions unchanged1 and  not only    
regards these as established1 but even  
goes so far as to  metamorphose logic on
 their account1 and this simply because 
they are  given in experience1 though   
their contradictory nature is clearly   
seen4  ,hegel and ,herbart stand related
 to each other as ,heraclitus and       
,parmenides 7cf4   ,,vi4 and ,,vii47    
#d4 ,,herbart',s ,,reals4--,from this   
point ,herbart reaches his 8reals0      

7,realen7 as follows3 ,to discover the  
contradictions1 he says1 in all  our    
conceptions of experience1 might lead us
 to absolute scepticism1 and  to despair
 of the truth4 ,but here we remember    
that if the existence of  every thing   
real be denied1 then the appearance1    
sensation1  representation1 and thought 
itself would be destroyed4 ,we perceive1
  therefore1 just as strong an          
indication of being as of appearance4   
,we  cannot1 indeed1 ascribe to the     
given any true and essential being per  
se1 it is not per se alone1 but only on1
 or in1 or through something  other4    
,the truly being is an absolute being1  
which as such excludes  every thing     
relative and dependent2 it is absolute  
position1 which it  is not for us first 
to posit1 but only to recognize4 ,in so 
far as this  being is attributed to any 
thing1 this latter possesses reality4   
,the  truly being is1 therefore1 ever a 
quale1 a something which is  considered 
as being4 ,in order now that this       

posited may correspond to  the          
conditions which lie in the conception  
of absolute position1 the  what of the  
real must be thought 7a7 as absolutely  
positive or  affirmative1 i4 e4 without 
any negation or limitation1 which might 
destroy again the absoluteness2 7b7 as  
absolutely simple1 i4 e4 in  no way1 as 
a multiplicity or admitting of inner    
antitheses2 7c7 as  indeterminate by any
 conceptions of greatness1 i4 e4 not as 
a quantum  which may be divided and     
extended in time and space2 hence1 also1
 not as  a constant greatness or        
continuity4 ,but we must never forget   
that this  being or this absolute       
reality is not simply something thought1
 but is  something independent and      
resting on itself1 and hence it is      
simply to  be recognized by the         
thinking4 ,the conception of this       
thinking lies at  the basis of all      
,herbart's metaphysics4 ,take an example
 of this4 ,the  first problem to be     
solved in metaphysics is the problem of 

inherence1  or the thing with its       
characteristics4 ,every perceptible     
thing  represents itself to the senses  
as a complex of several characteristics4
  ,but all the attributes of a thing    
which are given in perception are       
relative4 ,we say e4 g4 that sound is a 
property of a certain body4 ,it         
sounds--but it cannot-do this without   
air2 what now becomes of this  property 
in a space without air8 ,again1 we say  
that a body is heavy1 but  it is only so
 on the earth4 ,or again1 that a body is
 colored1 but light  is necessary for   
this2 what now becomes of such a        
property in darkness8  ,still farther1 a
 multiplicity of properties is          
incompatible with the  unity of an      
object4 ,if you ask what is this thing1 
you are answered  with the sum of its   
characteristics2 it is soft1 white1     
full-sounding1  heavy1--but your        
question was of one1 not of many4 ,the  
answer only  affirms what the thing has1
 not what it is4 ,moreover1 the list of 

characteristics is always incomplete4   
,the what of a thing can therefore  lie 
neither in the individual given         
properties1 nor in their unity4 ,in     
determining what a thing is1 we have    
only this answer remaining1 viz41  the  
thing is that unknown1 which we must    
posit before we can posit any  thing as 
lying in the given properties2 in a     
word1 it is the substance4  ,for if1 in 
order to see what the thing purely and  
essentially is1 we  take away the       
characteristics which it may have1 we   
find that nothing  more remains1 and we 
perceive that what we considered as the 
real thing  was only a complex of       
characteristics1 and the union of these 
in one  whole4 ,but since every         
appearance indicates a definite reality1
 and thus  since there must be as much  
reality as there is appearance1 we have 
to  consider the reality1 which lies at 
the basis of the thing1 with its        
characteristics1 as a complex of many   
simple substances or monads1 and  whose 

quality is different in different       
instances4 ,when our experience  has led
 us to a repeated grouping together of  
these monads1 we call the  group a      
thing4 ,let us now briefly look at the  
formation of those  fundamental         
conceptions of metaphysics1 which       
involve the same thoughts  through the  
fundamental conception of being4 ,first1
 there is the  conception of causality1 
which cannot be maintained in its       
ordinary  form4 ,all that we can        
perceive in the act is succession in    
time1 and not  the necessary connection 
of cause with effect4 ,the cause in     
itself can  be neither transcendent nor 
immanent2 it cannot be transcendent1    
because  a real influence of one real   
thing upon another1 contradicts the     
conception of the absolute reality2 nor 
immanent1 for then the substance  must  
be thought as one with its              
characteristics1 which contradicts the  
investigations concerning a thing with  
its characteristics4 ,we can just  as   

little find in the conception of the    
real an answer to the question1  how one
 determinate being can be brought into  
contact with another1 for  the real is  
the absolute unchangeable4 ,we can      
therefore only explain the  conception  
of causality on the ground that the     
different reals which lie  at the basis 
of the characteristics are conceived1   
each one for itself1  as cause of the   
phenomenon1 there being just as many    
causes as there are  phenomena4 ,the    
problem of change1 is intimately        
connected with the  conception of cause4
 ,since1 however1 according to ,herbart1
 there is no  inner change1 no          
self-determination1 no becoming and no  
life2 since the  monads are1 and remain 
in themselves unchangeable1 they do not 
therefore  become different in respect  
of quality1 but they are originally     
different one from another1 and each one
 exhibits its equality without  ever any
 change4 ,the problem of change can thus
 only be solved through  the theory of  

the disturbance and self-preservation of
 these essences4  ,but if that which we 
call not simply an apparent but an      
actual event1 in  the essence of the    
monads1 may be reduced to a             
8self-preservation10 as  the last gleam 
of an activity and life1 still we have  
the question ever  remaining1 how to    
explain the appearance of change4 ,for  
this it is  necessary to bring in two   
auxiliary conceptions2 first1 that of   
accidental views1 and second1 that of   
intellectual spaces4 ,the  accidental   
views1 an expression taken from         
mathematics1 signify1 in  reference to  
the problem before us this much1 viz41  
one and the same  conception may often  
be considered in very different         
relations to some  other essence1       
without the slightest change in its own 
essence1 e4 g4  a straight line may be  
considered as radius or as tangent1 and 
a tone as  harmonious or discordant4 ,by
 help of these accidental views1 we may 
now  regard that which actually results 

in the monad1 when other monads1        
opposite in quality1 come in contact    
with it1 as on the one side an  actual  
occurrence1 though on the other side1 no
 actual change can be  imputed to the   
original condition of the monads 7a gray
 color1 e4 g4  seems comparatively white
 by the side of black1 and comparatively
 black  by the side of white1 without   
changing at all its quality74 ,a further
  auxiliary conception is that of       
intellectual space1 which1 arises when  
we must consider these essences as at   
the same time together and not          
together4 ,by means of this conception  
we can eliminate the  contradictions    
from the conception of movement4        
,lastly1 it can be seen  that the       
conception of matter and that of the    
,ego 7in psychologically  explaining    
which1 the rest of the metaphysics is   
occupied7 are1 like the  preceding ones1
 no less contradictory in themselves    
than they are  irreconcilable with the  
fundamental conception of the real2 for 

neither  can an extended being1 like    
matter1 be formed out of spaceless      
monads--and with matter1 therefore1 fall
 also the ordinary conceptions of  space
 and time--nor can we admit1 without    
transformation1 the conception  of the  
,ego1 since it exhibits the             
contradictory conception of a thing     
with many and changing characteristics  
7conditions1 powers1 faculties1  c47    
,we are reminded by ,herbart's 8reals0  
of the atomic theory of the  atomists   
7cf4  ,,ix4 #b71 of the ,eleatic theory 
of the one being 7cf4   ,,vi471 and of  
,leibnitz's monadology4 ,his reals      
however are  distinguished from the     
atoms by not possessing impenetrability4
 ,the  monads of ,herbart may be just as
 well represented in the same space as a
  mathematical point may be conceived as
 accurately coexisting with  another in 
the same place4 ,in this respect the    
8real0 of ,herbart has a  far greater   
similarity to the 8one0 of the          
,eleatics4 ,both are simple1  and to be 

conceived in intellectual spaces1 but   
the essential difference  is1 that      
,herbart's substances exist in numbers  
distinct from one  another1 and even    
from opposites among themselves4        
,herbart's simple  quantities have      
already been compared to the monads of  
,leibnitz1 but  these latter have       
essentially a power of representation2  
they are  essences with inner           
circumstances1 while1 according to      
,herbart1  representation1 just as      
little as every other circumstance1     
belongs to  the essence itself4    #e4  
,,psychology is connected with          
metaphysics4 ,the ,ego is primarily a   
metaphysical problem1 and comes in this 
respect under the category of  the thing
 with its characteristics4 ,it is a real
 with many properties  changing         
circumstances1 powers1 faculties1       
activities1 c41 and thus is  not without
 contradictions4 ,but then the ,ego is a
 psychological  principle1 and here     
those contradictions may be considered  

which lie in  the ideality of subject   
and object4 ,the subject posits itself  
and is  therefore itself object4 ,but   
this posited object is nothing other    
than  the positing subject4 ,thus the   
,ego is1 as ,fichte says1               
subject-object1  and1 as such1 full of  
the hardest contradictions1 for subject 
and object  will never be affirmed as   
one and the same without contradiction4 
,but  now if the ,ego is given it cannot
 be thrown away1 but must be purified   
from its contradictions4 ,this occurs   
whenever the ,ego is conceived as  that 
which represents1 and the different     
sensations1 thoughts1 c4 are  embraced  
under the common conception of changing 
appearance4 ,the  solution of this      
problem is similar to that of inherence4
 ,as in the  latter problem the thing   
was apprehended as a complex of as many 
reals  as it has characteristics1 just  
so here the ,ego2 but with the ,ego     
inner  circumstances and representations
 correspond to the characteristics4     

,thus that which we are accustomed to   
name ,ego is nothing other than the     
soul4 ,the soul as a monad1 as          
absolutely being1 is therefore simple1  
eternal1 indissoluble1 from which we may
 conclude its eternal existence4  ,from 
this standpoint ,herbart combats the    
ordinary course of psychology  which    
ascribes certain powers and faculties to
 the soul4 ,that which  stands out in   
the soul is nothing other than          
self-preservation1 which  can only be   
manifold and changing in opposition to  
other reals4 ,the  causes of changing   
circumstances are therefore these other 
reals1 which  come variously in conflict
 with the soul-monad1 and thus produce  
that  apparently infinite manifoldness  
of sensations1 representations1 and     
affections4 ,this theory of             
self-preservation lies at the basis of  
all  ,herbart's psychology4 ,that which 
psychology ordinarily calls feeling1    
thinking1 representing1 c41 are only    
specific differences in the             

self-preservation of the soul2 they     
indicate no proper condition of the     
inner real essence itself1 but only     
relations between the reals1  relations1
 which1 coming up together at the same  
time from different  sides1 are partly  
suppressed1 partly forwarded1 and partly
 modified4  ,consciousness is the sum of
 those relations in which the soul      
stands to  other essences4 ,but the     
relations to the objects1 and hence to  
the  representations corresponding to   
these1 are not all equally strong2 one  
presses1 restricts1 and obscures        
another1 a relation of equilibrium      
which can be calculated according to the
 doctrine of statics4 ,but the          
suppressed representations do not wholly
 disappear1 but waiting on the          
threshold of consciousness for the      
favorable moment when they shall be     
permitted again to arise1 they join     
themselves with kindred                 
representations1 and press forward with 
united energies4 ,this movement  of the 

representations 7sketched in a masterly 
manner by ,herbart7 may be  calculated  
according to the rules of mathematics1  
and this is ,herbart's  well known      
application of mathematics to the       
empirical theory of the  soul4 ,the     
representations which were pressed back1
 which wait on the  threshold of        
consciousness and only work in the      
darkness1 and of which  we are only half
 conscious1 are feelings4 ,they express 
themselves as  desires1 according as    
their struggle forward is more or less  
successful4  ,desire becomes will when  
united with the hope of success4 ,the   
will is no  separate faculty of the     
mind1 but consists only in the relation 
of the  dominant representations to the 
others4 ,the power of deciding and the  
character of a man1 prominently depend  
upon the constant presence in the       
consciousness of a certain number of    
representations1 while other            
representations are weakened1 or denied 
an entrance over the threshold  of      

consciousness4    #f4 ,,the ,,importance
 ,,of ,,herbart',s                      
,,philosophy4--,herbart's philosophy is 
important mainly for its metaphysics and
 psychology4 ,in the other  spheres and 
activities of the human mind1 e4 g4     
rights1 morality1 the  state1 art1      
religion1 his philosophy is mostly      
barren of results1 and  though there are
 not wanting here striking observations1
 yet these have  no connection with the 
speculative principles of the system4   
,herbart  fundamentally isolates the    
different philosophical sciences1       
distinguishing especially and in the    
strictest manner between  theoretical   
and practical philosophy4 ,he charges   
the effort after unity  in philosophy1  
with occasioning the greatest errors2   
for logical1  metaphysical1 and sthetic 
forms are entirely diverse4 ,ethics and 
sthetics have to do with objects in     
which an immediate evidence  appears1   
but this is foreign to the whole nature 
of metaphysics1 which  can only gain its

 knowledge as errors have been removed4 
sthetic  judgments on which practical   
philosophy rests1 are independent of the
  reality of any object1 and appear with
 immediate certainty in the midst  of   
the strongest metaphysical doubts4      
,moral elements1 says ,herbart1 are     
pleasing and displeasing relations of   
the will4 ,he thus grounds the  whole   
practical philosophy upon sthetic       
judgments4 ,the sthetic  judgment is an 
involuntary and immediate judgment1     
which attaches to  certain objects1     
without proof1 the predicates of        
goodness and  badness4--,here is seen   
the greatest difference between ,herbart
 and ,kant4    ,we may characterize1 on 
the whole1 the philosophy of ,herbart as
 a  carrying out of the monadology of   
,leibnitz1 full of enduring acuteness1  
but without any inner fruitfulness or   
capacity of development4                
,,section ,,xliii4    ,,schelling4      
,schelling sprang from ,fichte4 ,we may 
pass on to an exposition of his         

philosophy without any farther          
introduction1 since that which it       
contains from ,fichte forms a part of   
its historical development1 and  will   
therefore be treated of as this is      
unfolded4    ,friedrich ,wilhelm ,joseph
 ,schelling was born at ,leonberg1 in   
,wrtemberg1 ,january #bgth1 #agge4 ,with
 a very precocious development1 he      
entered the theological seminary at     
,tbingen in his fifteenth year1 and     
devoted himself partly to philology and 
mythology1 but especially to  ,kant's   
philosophy4 ,during his course as a     
student1 he was in personal  connection 
with ,hlderlin and ,hegel4 ,schelling   
came before the world as  an author very
 early4 ,in #agib appeared his          
graduating treatise on the  third       
chapter of ,genesis1 in which he gave an
 interesting philosophical              
signification to the ,mosaic account of 
the fall4 ,in the following year1       
#agic1 he published in ,paulus'         
,memorabilia an essay of a kindred      

nature  8,on the ,myths and             
,philosophemes of the ,ancient ,world40 
,to the last  year of his abode at      
,tbingen belong the two philosophical   
writings3  8,on the ,possibility of a   
,form for ,philosophy0 and 8,on the ,ego
 as a  ,principle of ,philosophy1 or on 
the ,unconditioned in ,human            
,knowledge40  ,after completing his     
university studies1 ,schelling went to  
,leipsic as  tutor to the ,baron von    
,riedesel1 but soon afterwards repaired 
to ,jena1  where he became the pupil and
 co-laborer of ,fichte4 ,after ,fichte's
  departure from ,jena1 he became       
himself1 #agih1 teacher of philosophy   
there1 and now began1 removing himself  
from ,fichte's standpoint1 to  develope 
more and more his own peculiar views4   
,he published in ,jena the  ,journal of 
,speculative ,physics1 and also in      
company with ,hegel1 the  ,critical     
,journal4 ,in the year #ahjc he went to 
,wrzburg as professor  ordinarius of    
philosophy4 ,in #ahjg he repaired to    

,munich as member  ordinarius of the    
newly established academy of sciences   
there4 ,the  year after he became       
general secretary of the ,academy of the
 plastic  arts1 and subsequently1 when  
the university professorship was        
established at ,munich1 he became its   
incumbent4 ,after the death of  ,jacobi1
 he was chosen president of the ,munich 
,academy4 ,in #ahda he  removed to      
,berlin1 where he has sometimes held    
lectures4 ,for the last  ten years      
,schelling has written nothing of       
importance1 although he has  repeatedly 
promised an exposition of his present   
system4 ,by far the  greater portion of 
his writings belongs to his early life4 
,schelling's  philosophy is no completed
 system of which his separate works are 
the  constituent elements2 but1 like    
,plato's1 it has a historical           
development1 a course of formative steps
 which the philosopher has  passed      
through in his own life4 ,instead of    
systematically elaborating  the separate

 sciences from the standpoint of his    
principle1 ,schelling  has gone back    
repeatedly to the beginning again1      
seeking ever for new  foundations and   
new standpoints1 connecting these for   
the most part  7like ,plato7 with some  
antecedent philosophemes1 7,fichte1     
,spinoza1 ,new  ,platonism1 ,leibnitz1  
,jacob ,bhme1 ,gnosticism17 which in    
their order he  attempted to interweave 
with his system4 ,we must modify        
accordingly our  exposition of          
,schelling's ,philosophy1 and take up   
its different periods1  separated       
according to the different groups of his
 writings4#d    ,i4 ,,first ,,period4   
,,schelling',s ,,procession ,,from      
,,fichte4    ,schelling's starting point
 was ,fichte1 whom he decidedly followed
 in his  earliest writings4 ,in his     
essay1 8,on the ,possibility of a ,form 
of  ,philosophy0 he shows the necessity 
of that supreme principle which  ,fichte
 had first propounded4 ,in his essay1   
8,on the ,ego0 ,schelling  shows that   

the ultimate ground of our knowledge can
 only lie in the ,ego1  and hence that  
every true philosophy must be idealism4 
,if our knowledge  shall possess        
reality1 there must be one point in     
which ideality and  reality1 thought and
 being1 can identically coincide2 and if
 outside of  our knowledge1 there were  
something higher which conditioned it1  
if  itself were not the highest1 then it
 could not be absolute4 ,fichte         
regarded this essay as a commentary on  
his ,theory of ,science2 yet it         
contains already indications of         
,schelling's subsequent standpoint1 in  
its expressly affirming the unity of all
 knowledge1 the necessity that  in the  
end all the different sciences shall    
become merged into one4 ,in  the        
8,letters on ,dogmatism and ,criticism10
 #agie1 ,schelling combatted  the       
notions of those ,kantians who had left 
the critical and idealistic  standpoint 
of their master1 and fallen back again  
into the old  dogmatism4 ,it was also on

 the standpoint of ,fichte that         
,schelling  published in ,niethammer's  
and ,fichte's ,journal1 #agig-ih1 a     
series of  articles1 in which he gave a 
survey of the recent philosophical      
literature4 ,here he begins to turn his 
attention towards a philosophical       
deduction of nature1 though he still    
remains on the standpoint of ,fichte    
when he deduces nature wholly from the  
essence of the ,ego4 ,in the essay      
which was composed soon after1 and      
entitled 8,ideas for a philosophy of    
,nature10 #agig1 and the one 8,on the   
,world-soul10 #agih1 he gradually       
unfolded more clearly his views4 ,the   
chief points which are brought out  in  
the two last named essays are the       
following3 ,the first origin of the     
conception of matter springs from nature
 and the intuition of the human  mind4  
,the mind is the union of an unlimited  
and a limiting energy4 ,if  there were  
no limit to the mind1 consciousness     
would be just as  impossible as if the  

mind were totally and absolutely        
limited4 ,feeling1  perception and      
knowledge are only conceivable1 as the  
energy which  strives for the unlimited 
becomes limited through its opposite1   
and as  this latter becomes itself freed
 from its limitations4 ,the actual mind 
or heart consists only in the antagonism
 of these two energies1 and  hence only 
in their ever approximate or relative   
unity4 ,just so is it in  nature4       
,matter as such is not the first1 for   
the forces of which it is  the unity are
 before it4 ,matter is only to be       
apprehended as the ever  becoming       
product of attraction and repulsion2 it 
is not1 therefore1 a  mere inert        
grossness1 as we are apt to represent   
it1 but these forces  are its original4 
,but force in the material is like      
something  immaterial4 ,force in nature 
is that which we may compare to mind4   
,since  now the mind or heart exhibits  
precisely the same conflict1 as matter1 
of opposite forces1 we must unite the   

two in a higher identity4 ,but the      
organ of the mind for apprehending      
nature is the intuition which takes1  as
 object of the external sense1 the space
 which has been filled and  limited by  
the attracting and repelling forces4    
,thus ,schelling was led  to the        
conclusion that the same absolute       
appears in nature as in mind1  and that 
the harmony of these is something more  
than a thought in  reference to them4   
8,or if you affirm that we only carry   
over such an  idea to nature1 then have 
you utterly failed to apprehend the only
  nature which there can be to us4 ,for 
our view of nature is not that it       
accidentally meets the laws of our      
mind--7perhaps through the mediation  of
 a third7--but that it necessarily and  
originally not only expresses1  but     
itself realizes1 the laws of our mind1  
and that it is nature1 and is  called   
such only in so far as it does this40   
8,nature should be the  visible mind1   
and mind invisible nature4 ,here1       

therefore1 in the  absolute ideality of 
the mind within us1 and nature without  
us1 must  we solve the problem how it is
 possible for a nature outside of us to 
be40 ,this thought1 that nature or      
matter is just as much the actual  unity
 of an attracting and a repelling force1
 as the mind or heart is  the unity of  
an unlimited and a limiting tendency1   
and that the  repelling force in matter 
corresponds to the positive or unlimited
  activity of the mind1 while the       
attracting force corresponds to the     
mind's negative or limiting             
activity--this identical deduction of   
matter  from the essence of the ,ego1 is
 very prominent in all that ,schelling  
wrote upon natural philosophy during    
this period4 ,nature thus appears as  a 
copy 7,doppelbild7 of the mind1 which   
the mind itself produces1 in  order to  
return1 by its means1 to pure           
self-intuition1 to  self-consciousness4 
,hence we have the successive stages of 
nature1 in  which all the stations of   

the mind in its way to                  
self-consciousness are  externally      
established4 ,it is especially in the   
organic world that the  mind can behold 
its own self-production4 ,hence1 in     
every thing organic1  there is something
 symbolical1 every plant bears some     
feature of the  soul4 ,the chief        
characteristics of an organic           
formation1--the  self-forming process   
from within outwards1 the conformity to 
some end1  the change of                
interpenetration of form and matter--are
 equally chief  features of the mind4   
,since now there exists in our mind an  
endless  striving to organize itself1 so
 there must also be manifested in the   
external world a universal tendency to  
organization4 ,the whole universe  may  
thus be called a kind of organization   
which has formed itself from a  centre1 
rising ever from a lower to a higher    
stage4 ,from such a point of  view1 the 
natural philosopher will make it his    
chief effort to bring to  a unity in his

 contemplations that life of nature1    
which by many  researches into physical 
science had been separated into         
numberless  different powers4 8,it is a 
needless trouble which many have given  
themselves1 to show how very different  
is the working of fire and  electricity1
 for every one knows this who has ever  
seen or heard of the  two4 ,but our mind
 strives after unity in the system of   
its knowledge2 it  will not endure that 
there should be pressed upon it a       
separate  principle for every single    
phenomenon1 and it will only believe    
that it  sees nature where it can       
discover the greatest simplicity of laws
 in the  greatest multiplicity of       
phenomena1 and the highest frugality of 
means  in the highest prodigality of    
effects4 ,therefore1 every thought1 even
  that which is now rough and crude1    
merits attention so soon as it tends    
towards the simplifying of principles1  
and if it serves no other end1 it  at   
least strengthens the impulse to        

investigate and trace out the hidden    
process of nature40 ,the special        
tendency of the scientific investigation
  of nature which prevailed at that     
time1 was to make a duality of forces   
the predominant element in the life of  
nature4 ,in mechanics1 the ,kantian     
theory of the opposition of attraction  
and repulsion was adopted2 in           
chemistry1 by apprehending electricity  
as positive and negative1 its           
phenomenon was brought near that of     
magnetism2 in physiology there was  the 
opposition of irritability and          
sensibility1 c4 ,in opposition to  these
 dualities1 ,schelling now insisted upon
 the unity of every thing  opposite1 the
 unity of all dualities1 and this not   
simply as an abstract  unity1 but as a  
concrete identity1 as the harmonious    
co-working of the  heterogeneous4 ,the  
world is the actual unity of a positive 
and a  negative principle1 8and these   
two conflicting forces taken together1  
or  represented in their conflict1 lead 

to the idea of an organizing  principle 
which makes of the world a system1 in   
other words1 to the idea  of a          
world-soul40    ,in his above-cited     
essay on 8the world-soul10 ,schelling   
took the great  step forward of         
apprehending nature as entirely         
autonomic4 ,in the  world-soul nature   
has a peculiar principle which dwells   
within it1 and  works according to      
conception4 ,in this way the objective  
world was  recognized as the independent
 life of nature in a manner which the   
logical idealism of ,fichte would not   
permit4 ,schelling proceeded still      
farther in this direction1 and          
distinguished definitely1 as the two    
sides of philosophy1 the philosophy of  
nature and a transcendental  philosophy4
 ,by placing a philosophy of nature by  
the side of idealism1  ,schelling passed
 decidedly beyond the standpoint of     
science1 and we thus  enter a second    
stadium of his philosophizing1 though   
his method still  remained that of      

,fichte1 and he continued to believe    
that he was  speculating in the spirit  
of the ,theory of ,science4    ,,ii4    
,,second ,,period4 ,,standpoint ,,of    
,,the ,,distinguishing ,,between ,,the  
,,philosophy ,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,of   
,,mind4    ,this standpoint of          
,schelling is chiefly carried out in the
 following  works3--8,first ,draft of a 
,system of ,natural ,philosophy10 #agii2
 an  introduction to this1 #agii2       
articles in the 8,journal of            
,speculative  ,physics10 #ahjj1 #ahja2  
8,system of ,transcendental ,idealism10 
#ahjj4  ,schelling thus distinguishes   
the two sides of philosophy4 ,all       
knowledge  rests upon the harmony of a  
subject with an object4 ,that which is  
simply  objective is natural1 and that  
which is simply subjective is the ,ego  
or  intelligence4 ,there are two        
possible ways of uniting these two      
sides3 we  may either make nature first1
 and inquire how it is that intelligence
 is  associated with it 7natural        

philosophy72 or we may make the subject 
first1 and inquire how do objects       
proceed from the subject                
7transcendental philosophy74 ,the end of
 all philosophy must be to make  either 
an intelligence out of nature1 or a     
nature out of intelligence4  ,as the    
transcendental philosophy has to subject
 the real to the ideal1  so must natural
 philosophy attempt to explain the ideal
 from the real4  ,both1 however1 are    
only the two poles of one and the same  
knowledge  which reciprocally attract   
each other2 hence1 if we start from     
either  pole1 we are necessarily drawn  
towards the other4    #a4 ,,natural     
,,philosophy4--,to philosophize         
concerning nature is1 in a  certain     
sense1 to create nature--to raise it    
from the dead mechanism in  which it had
 seemed confined1 to inspire it with    
freedom1 and transpose  it into a       
properly free development4 ,and what1   
then1 is matter1 other  than mind which 
has become extinct8 ,according to this  

view1 since nature  is only the visible 
organism of our understanding1 it can   
produce  nothing but what is conformable
 to a rule and an end4 ,but you         
radically  destroy every idea of nature 
just so soon as you allow its design to 
have come to it from without1 by passing
 over from the understanding of  any    
being4 ,the complete exhibition of the  
intellectual world in the laws  and     
forms of the phenomenal world1 and1 on  
the other hand1 the complete  conception
 of these laws and forms from the       
intellectual world1 and  therefore the  
exhibition of the ideality of nature    
with the ideal world1  is the work of   
natural philosophy4 ,immediate          
experience is indeed its  starting      
point2 we know originally nothing except
 through experience2  but just as soon  
as ,i gain an insight into the inner    
necessity of a  principle of experience1
 it becomes a principle apriori4        
,natural  philosophy is empiricism      
extended until it becomes absolute4     

,schelling expresses himself as follows1
 concerning the chief principles  of a  
philosophy of nature4 ,nature is a      
suspension 7,schweben7 between          
productivity and product1 which is      
always passing over into definite  forms
 and products1 just as it is always     
productively passing beyond  these4     
,this suspension indicates a duality of 
principles1 through which  nature is    
held in a constant activity1 and        
hindered from exhausting  itself in its 
products4 ,a universal duality is thus  
the principle of  every explanation of  
nature2 it is the first principle of a  
philosophic  theory of nature1 to end in
 all nature with polarity and dualism4  
,on the  other hand1 the final cause of 
all our contemplation of nature is to   
know that absolute unity which          
comprehends the whole1 and which suffers
  only one side of itself to be known in
 nature4 ,nature is1 as it were1  the   
instrument of this absolute unity1      
through which it eternally  executes and

 actualizes that which is prefigured in 
the absolute  understanding4 ,the whole 
absolute is therefore cognizable in     
nature1  though phenomenal nature only  
exhibits in a succession1 and produces  
in  an endless development1 that which  
the true or real nature eternally       
possesses4 ,schelling treats of natural 
philosophy in three sections3 7#a7  the 
proof that nature1 in its original      
products1 is organic2 7#b7 the          
conditions of an inorganic nature2 7#c7 
the reciprocal determination of  organic
 and inorganic nature4    7#a47 ,organic
 nature ,schelling thus deduces3 ,nature
 absolutely  apprehended is nothing     
other than infinite activity1 infinite  
productivity4 ,if this were unhindered  
in expressing itself1 it would at  once1
 with infinite celerity1 produce an     
absolute product1 which would  allow no 
explanation for empirical nature4 ,if   
this latter may be  explained--if there 
may be finite products1 we must consider
 the  productive activity of nature as  

restrained by an opposite1 a retarding  
activity1 which lies in nature itself4  
,thus arises a series of finite         
products4 ,but since the absolute       
productivity of nature tends towards an 
absolute product1 these individual      
products are only apparent ones1  beyond
 each one of which nature herself       
advances1 in order to satisfy  the      
absoluteness of her inner productivity  
through an infinite series of           
individual products4 ,in this eternal   
producing of finite products1  nature   
shows itself as a living antagonism of  
two opposite forces1 a  productive and a
 retarding tendency4 ,and1 indeed1 the  
working of this  latter is infinitely   
manifold2 the original productive       
impulse of nature  has not only to      
combat a simple restraint1 but it must  
struggle with an  infinity of reactions1
 which may be called original qualities4
 ,hence  every organic being is the     
permanent expression for a conflict of  
reciprocally destroying and limiting    

actions of nature4 ,and from this1      
viz41 from the original limitation and  
infinite restraint of the  formative    
impulse of nature1 we see the reason why
 every organization1  instead of        
attaining to an absolute product1 only  
reproduces itself ad  infinitum4 ,upon  
this rests the special significance for 
the organic  world1 of the distinction  
of sex4 ,the distinction of sex fixes   
the  organic products of nature1 it     
restrains them within their own         
processes  of development1 and suffers  
them only to produce the same again4    
,but in  this production nature has no  
regard for the individual1 but only for 
the species4 ,the individual is contrary
 to nature2 nature desires the          
absolute1 and its constant effort is to 
represent this4 ,individual  products1  
therefore1 in which the activity of     
nature is brought to a  stand1 can only 
be regarded as abortive attempts to     
represent the  absolute4 ,hence the     
individual must be the means1 and the   

species the  end of nature4 ,just so    
soon as the species is secured1 nature  
abandons  the individuals and labors for
 their destruction4 ,schelling divides  
the  dynamic scale of organic nature    
according to the three grand functions  
of the organic world3 7a7 ,formative    
impulse 7reproductive energy72  7b7     
,irritability2 7c7 ,sensibility4        
,highest in rank are those  organisms in
 which sensibility has the preponderance
 over irritability2  a lower rank is    
held by those where irritability        
preponderates1 and  lower still are     
those where reproduction first comes out
 in its entire  perfection1 while       
sensibility and irritability are almost 
extinct4 ,yet  these three powers are   
interwoven together in all nature1 and  
hence  there is but one organization1   
descending through all nature from man  
to  the plant4    7#b47 ,inorganic      
nature offers the antithesis to organic4
 ,the existence  and essence of         
inorganic nature are conditioned through

 the existence  and essence of organic  
nature4 ,while the powers of organic    
nature are  productive1 those of        
inorganic nature are not productive4    
,while organic  nature aims only to     
establish the species1 inorganic nature 
regards only  the individual1 and offers
 no reproduction of the species through 
the  individual4 ,it possesses a great  
multitude of materials1 but can only    
use these materials in the way of       
conjoining or separating4 ,in a word1   
inorganic nature is simply a mass held  
together by some external cause  as     
gravity4 ,yet it1 like organic nature1  
has its gradations4 ,the power  of      
reproduction in the latter has its      
counterpart in the chemical  process in 
the former2 that which in the one case  
is irritability1 in  the other is       
electricity2 and sensibility1 which is  
the highest stage of  organic life1     
corresponds to the universal magnetism1 
the highest stage  of the inorganic4    
7#c47 ,the reciprocal determination of  

the organic and inorganic world1  is    
made clear by what has already been     
said4 ,the result to which every        
genuine philosophy of nature must come1 
is that the distinction between  organic
 and inorganic nature is only in nature 
as object1 and that  nature1 as         
originally productive1 waves over both4 
,if the functions of  an organism are   
only possible on the condition that     
there is a definite  external world1 and
 an organic world1 then must the        
external world and  the organic world   
have a common origin4 ,this can only be 
explained on  the ground that inorganic 
nature presupposes in order to its      
existence a  higher dynamical order of  
things1 to which it is subject4 ,there  
must be  a third1 which can unite again 
organic and inorganic nature2 which can 
be a medium1 holding the continuity     
between the two4 ,both must be          
identified in some ultimate cause1      
through which1 as through one common    
soul of nature 7world-soul71 both the   

organic and inorganic1 i4 e4  universal 
nature1 is inspired2 in some common     
principle1 which1  fluctuating between  
inorganic and organic nature1 and       
maintaining the  continuity of the two1 
contains the first cause of all changes 
in the  one1 and the ultimate ground of 
all activity in the other4 ,we have here
  the idea of a universal organism4     
,that it is one and the same            
organization which unites in one the    
organic and inorganic world1 would      
appear from what has already been said  
of the parallel gradations of the  two  
worlds4 ,that which in universal nature 
is the cause of magnetism1 is  in       
organic nature the cause of sensibility1
 and the latter is only a  higher       
potency of the former4 ,just as in the  
organic world through  sensibility1 so  
in universal nature through magnetism1  
there arises a  duality from the        
ideality4 ,in this way organic nature   
appears only as a  higher stage of the  
inorganic2 the very same dualism which  

is seen in  magnetic polarity1          
electrical phenomena1 and chemical      
differences1  displays itself also in   
the organic world4    #b4               
,,transcendental                        
,,philosophy4--,transcendental          
philosophy is the  philosophy of nature 
become subjective4 ,the whole succession
 of objects  thus far described1 becomes
 now repeated as a successive           
development of  the beholding subject4  
,it is the peculiarity of transcendental
 idealism1  that so soon as it is once  
admitted1 it requires that the origin of
 all  knowledge shall be sought for     
anew2 that the truth which has long been
  considered as established1 should be  
subjected to a new examination1 and     
that this examination should proceed    
under at least an entirely new  form4   
,all parts of philosophy must be        
exhibited in one continuity1 and  the   
whole of philosophy must be regarded as 
that which it is1 viz41 the  advancing  
history of consciousness1 which can use 

only as monuments or  documents that    
which is laid down in experience4       
7,schelling's  transcendental idealism  
is1 in this respect1 the forerunner to  
,hegel's  ,phnomenology1 which pursues a
 similar course74 ,the exhibition of    
this  connection is properly a          
succession of intuitions through which  
the ,ego  raises itself to consciousness
 in the highest potency4 ,neither       
transcendental philosophy nor the       
philosophy of nature1 can alone         
represent the parallelism between nature
 and intelligence2 but1 in order  to    
this1 both sciences must be united1 the 
former being considered as a  necessary 
counterpart to the other4 ,the division 
of transcendental  philosophy follows   
from its problem1 to seek anew the      
origin of all  knowledge1 and to subject
 to a new examination every previous    
judgment  which had been held to be     
established truth4 ,the pre-judgments of
 the  common understanding are          
principally two3 7#a7 ,that a world of  

objects  exist independent of1 and      
outside of1 ourselves1 and are          
represented to  us just as they are4 ,to
 explain this pre-judgment1 is the      
problem of the  first part of the       
transcendental philosophy 7theoretical  
philosophy74  7#b7 ,that we can produce 
an effect upon the objective world      
according to  representations which     
arise freely within us4 ,the solution of
 this  problem is practical philosophy4 
,but1 with these two problems we find   
ourselves entangled1 7#c7 in a          
contradiction4 ,how is it possible that 
our  thought should ever rule over the  
world of sense1 if the representation   
is conditional in its origin by the     
objective8 ,the solution of this        
problem1 which is the highest of        
transcendental philosophy1 is the       
answer to the question3 how can the     
representations be conceived as         
directing themselves according to the   
objects1 and at the same time the       
objects be conceived as directing       

themselves according to the             
representations8 ,this is only          
conceivable on the ground that the      
activity through which the objective    
world is produced1 is originally        
identical with that which utters itself 
in the will4 ,to show this  identity of 
conscious and unconscious activity1 is  
the problem of the  third part of       
transcendental philosophy1 or the       
science of ends in  nature and of art4  
,the three parts of the transcendental  
philosophy  correspond thus entirely to 
the three criticks of ,kant4    7#a47   
,the theoretical philosophy starts from 
the highest principle of  knowledge1 the
 self-consciousness1 and from this point
 developes the  history of              
self-consciousness1 according to its    
most prominent epochs  and stations1    
viz41 sensation1 intuition1 productive  
intuition 7which  produces              
matter7--outer and inner intuition 7from
 which space and time1  and all ,kant's 
categories may be derived71 abstraction 

7by which the  intelligence             
distinguishes itself from its           
products7--absolute  abstraction1 or    
absolute act of will4 ,with the act of  
the will there is  spread before us1    
7#b47 ,the ,field of ,practical         
,philosophy4--,in practical philosophy  
the  ,ego is no longer beholding1 i4 e4 
consciousless1 but is consciously       
producing1 i4 e4 realizing4 ,as a whole1
 nature developes itself from  the      
original act of self-consciousness1 so  
from the second act1 or the  act of free
 self-determination1 there is produced a
 second nature1 to  find the origin for 
which is the object of practical        
philosophy4 ,in his  exposition of the  
practical philosophy1 ,schelling follows
 almost wholly  the theory of ,fichte1  
but closes this section with some       
remarkable  expressions respecting the  
philosophy of history4 ,history1 as a   
whole1  is1 according to him1 a gradual 
and self-disclosing revelation of the   
absolute1 a progressing demonstration of

 the existence of a ,god4 ,the  history 
of this revelation may be divided into  
three periods4 ,the first  is that in   
which the overruling power was          
apprehended only as destiny1  i4 e4 as a
 blind power1 cold and consciousless1   
which brings the  greatest and most     
glorious things of earth to ruin2 it is 
marked by the  decay of the magnificence
 and wonders of the ancient world1 and  
the fall  of the noblest manhood that   
has ever bloomed4 ,the second period of 
history is that in which this destiny   
manifests itself as nature1 and  the    
hidden law seems changed into a manifest
 law of nature1 which  compels freedom  
and every choice to submit to and serve 
a plan of  nature4 ,this period seems to
 begin with the spread of the great     
,roman  republic4 ,the third period will
 be that where what has previously been 
regarded as destiny and nature1 will    
develope itself as ,providence4 ,when   
this period shall begin1 we cannot say2 
we can only affirm that if it  be1 then 

,god will be seen also to be4    7#c47  
,philosophy of ,art4--,the problem of   
transcendental philosophy is to         
harmonize the subjective and the        
objective4 ,in history1 with which      
practical philosophy closes1 the        
identity of the two is not exhibited1   
but only approximated in an infinite    
progress4 ,but now the ,ego must  attain
 a position where it can actually look  
upon this identity1 which  constitutes  
its inner essence4 ,if now all conscious
 activity exhibits  design1 then a      
conscious and consciousless activity can
 only coincide in  a product1 which1    
though it exhibits design1 was yet      
produced without  design4 ,such a       
product is nature2 we have here the     
principle of all  teleology1 in which   
alone the solution of the given problem 
can be  sought4 ,the peculiarity of     
nature is this1 viz41 that though it    
exhibits  itself as nothing but a blind 
mechanism1 it yet displays design1 and  
represents an identity of the conscious 

subjective1 and the  consciousless      
objective activity2 in it the ,ego      
beholds its own most  peculiar essence1 
which consists alone in this identity4  
,but in nature  the ,ego beholds this   
identity1 not as something objective1   
which has a  being only outside of it1  
but also as that whose principle lies   
within  the ,ego itself4 ,this beholding
 is the art-intuition4 ,as the          
production  of nature is consciousless1 
though similar to that which is         
conscious1  so the sthetic production of
 the artist is a conscious production1  
similar to that which is consciousless4 
sthetics must therefore be  joined to   
teleology4 ,that contradiction between  
the conscious and the  consciousless1   
which moves forward untiringly in       
history1 and which is  unconsciously    
reconciled in nature1 finds its         
conscious reconciliation  in a work of  
art4 ,in a work of art1 the intelligence
 attains a perfect  intuition of itself4
 ,the feeling which accompanies this    

intuition1 is  the feeling of an endless
 satisfaction2 all contradictions being 
resolved1 and every riddle explained4   
,the unknown1 which unexpectedly        
harmonizes the objective and the        
conscious activity1 is nothing other    
than that absolute and unchangeable     
identity1 to which every existence  must
 be referred4 ,in the artist it lays    
aside the veil1 which elsewhere         
surrounds it1 and irresistibly impels   
him to complete his work4 ,thus  there  
is no other eternal revelation but art1 
and this is also the  miracle which     
should convince us of the reality of    
that supreme1 which  is never itself    
objective1 but is the cause of all      
objective4 ,hence art  holds a higher   
rank than philosophy1 for only in art   
has the  intellectual intuition         
objectivity4 ,there is nothing1         
therefore1 higher  to the philosopher   
than art1 because this opens before him1
 as it were1  the holy of holies1 where 
that which is separate in nature and    

history1  and which in life and action1 
as in thought1 must ever diverge1 burns1
  as it were1 in one flame1 in an       
eternal and original union4 ,from this  
we  see also both the fact and the      
reason for it1 that philosophy1 as      
philosophy1 can never be universally    
valid4 ,art is that alone to which  is  
given1 an absolute objectivity1 and it  
is through this alone that  nature1     
consciously productive1 concludes and   
completes itself within  itself4    ,the
 8,transcendental ,idealism0 is the last
 work which ,schelling wrote  after the 
method of ,fichte4 ,in its principle he 
goes decidedly beyond  the standpoint of
 ,fichte4 ,that which was with ,fichte  
the inconceivable  limit of the ,ego1   
,schelling derives as a necessary       
duality1 from the  simple essence of the
 ,ego4 ,while ,fichte had regarded the  
union of  subject and object1 only as an
 infinite progression towards that which
  ought to be1 ,schelling looked upon it
 as actually accomplished in a work  of 

art4 ,with ,fichte ,god was apprehended 
only as the object of a moral  faith1   
but with ,schelling he was looked upon  
as the immediate object of  the sthetic 
intuition4 ,this difference between the 
two could not long  be concealed from   
,schelling4 ,he was obliged to see that 
he no longer  stood upon the basis of   
subjective idealism1 but that his real  
position  was that of objective         
idealism4 ,if he had already gone beyond
 ,fichte in  setting the philosophy of  
nature and transcendental philosophy    
opposite  to each other1 it was         
perfectly consistent for him now to go  
one step  farther1 and1 placing himself 
on the point of indifference between the
  two1 make the identity of the ideal   
and the real1 of thought and being1  as 
his principle4 ,this principle ,spinoza 
had already possessed before  him4 ,to  
this philosophy of identity ,schelling  
now found himself  peculiarly attracted4
 ,instead of following ,fichte's method1
 he now  availed himself of that of     

,spinoza1 the mathematical1 to which he 
ascribed the greatest evidence of proof4
    ,,iii4 ,,third ,,period3 ,,period   
,,of ,,spinozism1 ,,or ,,the            
,,indifference ,,of ,,the ,,ideal  ,,and
 ,,the ,,real4    ,the principal        
writings of this period                 
are3--8,exposition of my ,system of     
,philosophy0 7,journal for ,speculative 
,physics1 ii4 #b72 the second  edition1 
with additions1 of the 8,ideas for a    
,philosophy of ,nature0  #ahjc2 the     
dialogue1 8,bruno1 or concerning the    
,divine and the ,natural  ,principle of 
,things0 #ahjb2 8,lectures on the       
,method of ,academical  ,study10 #ahjc2 
three numbers of a 8,new ,journal for   
,speculative  ,physics10 #ahjb-c4 ,the  
characteristic of the new standpoint of 
,schelling1 to which we now arrive1 is  
perfectly exhibited in the  definition  
of reason1 which he places at the head  
of the first of the  above-named        
writings2 ,i give to reason the name    
absolute1 or the reason  in so far as it

 is conceived as the total indifference 
of the  subjective and the objective4   
,to think of reason is demanded of every
  man2 to think of it as absolute1 and  
thus to reach the standpoint which  ,i  
require1 every thing must be abstracted 
from the thinking subject4 ,to  him who 
makes this abstraction1 reason          
immediately ceases to be  something     
subjective1 as most men represent it2   
neither can it be  conceived as         
something objective1 since an objective1
 or that which is  thought1 is only     
possible in opposition to that which    
thinks4 ,we thus  rise through this     
abstraction to the reality of things    
7zum wahren  an-sich71 which reality is 
precisely in the indifference point of  
the  subjective and the objective4 ,the 
standpoint of philosophy is the         
standpoint of reason2 its knowledge is a
 knowledge of things as they are  in    
themselves1 i4 e4 as they are in the    
reason4 ,it is the nature of  philosophy
 to destroy every distinction which the 

imagination has  mingled with the       
thinking1 and to see in things only that
 through which  they express the        
absolute reason1 not regarding in them  
that which is  simply an object for that
 reflection which expends itself on the 
laws of  mechanism and in time4 ,besides
 reason there is nothing1 and in it is  
every thing4 ,reason is the absolute4   
,all objections to this principle  can  
only arise from the fact1 that men are  
in the habit of looking at  things not  
as they are in reason1 but as they      
appear4 ,every thing which  is1 is in   
essence like the reason1 and is one with
 it4 ,it is not the  reason which posits
 something external to itself1 but only 
the false use  of reason1 which is      
connected with the incapacity of        
forgetting the  subjective in itself4   
,the reason is absolutely one and like  
itself4  ,the highest law for the being 
of reason1 and since there is nothing   
besides reason1 the highest law for all 
being1 is the law of identity4  ,between

 subject and object therefore--since it 
is one and the same  absolute identity  
which displays itself in both--there can
 be no  difference except a quantitative
 difference 7a difference of more or    
less71 so that nothing is either simple 
object or simple subject1 but in  all   
things subject and object are united1   
this union being in different           
proportions1 so that sometimes the      
subject and sometimes the object has    
the preponderance4 ,but since the       
absolute is pure identity of subject    
and object1 there can be no quantitative
 difference except outside of  the      
identity1 i4 e4 in the finite4 ,as the  
fundamental form of the  ,infinite is ,a
  ,a1 so the scheme of the finite is ,a 
,b 7i4 e4 the  union of a subjective    
with another objective in a different   
proportion74  ,but1 in reality1 nothing 
is finite1 because the identity is the  
only  reality4 ,so far as there is      
difference in individual things1 the    
identity exists in the form of          

indifference4 ,if we could see together 
every thing which is1 we should find in 
all the pure identity1 because  we      
should find in all a perfect            
quantitative equilibrium of subjectivity
  and objectivity4 ,true1 we find1 in   
looking at individual objects1 that     
sometimes the preponderance is on one   
side and sometimes on the other1  but in
 the whole this is compensated4 ,the    
absolute identity is the  absolute      
totality1 the universe itself4 ,there is
 in reality 7an-sich7  no individual    
being or thing4 ,there is in reality    
nothing beyond the  totality2 and if any
 thing beyond this is beheld1 this can  
only happen  by virtue of arbitrary     
separation of the individual from the   
whole1  which is done through           
reflection1 and is the source of every  
error4 ,the  absolute identity is       
essentially the same in every part of   
the universe4  ,hence the universe may  
be conceived under the figure of a line1
 in the  centre of which is the ,a  ,a1 

while at the end on one side is ,a  ,b1 
i4  e4 a transcendence of the           
subjective1 and at the end on the other 
side  is ,a  ,b1 i4 e4 a transcendence  
of the objective1 though this must  be  
conceived so that a relative identity   
may exist even in these  extremes4 ,the 
one side is the real or nature1 the     
other side is the  ideal4 ,the real side
 developes itself according to three    
potences 7a  potence1 or power1         
indicates a definite quantitative       
difference of  subjectivity and         
objectivity74 7#a7 ,the first potence is
 matter and  weight--the greatest       
preponderance of the object4 7#b7 ,the  
second potence  is light 7,a71 an       
inner--as weight is an outer--intuition 
of nature4 ,the  light is a higher      
rising of the subjective4 ,it is the    
absolute identity  itself4 7#c7 ,the    
third potence is organism 7,a71 the     
common product of  light and weight4    
,organism is just as original as matter4
 ,inorganic  nature1 as such1 does not  

exist3 it is actually organized1 and is1
 as it  were1 the universal germ out of 
which organization proceeds4 ,the       
organization of every globe is but the  
inner evolution of the globe  itself2   
the earth itself1 by its own evolving1  
becomes animal and plant4  ,the organic 
world has not formed itself out of the  
inorganic1 but has  been at least       
potentially present in it from the      
beginning4 ,that matter  which lies     
before us1 apparently inorganic1 is the 
residuum of organic  metamorphoses1     
which could not become organic4 ,the    
human brain is the  highest bloom of the
 whole organic metamorphosis of the     
earth4 ,from the  above1 ,schelling     
adds1 it must be perceived that we      
affirm an inner  identity of all things1
 and a potential presence of every thing
 in every  other1 and therefore even the
 so-called dead matter may be viewed    
only  as a sleeping-world of animals and
 plants1 which1 in some period1 the     
absolute identity may animate and raise 

to life4 ,at this point ,schelling      
stops suddenly1 without developing      
further the three potences of the  ideal
 series1 corresponding to those of the  
real4 ,elsewhere he completes  the work 
by setting up the following three       
potences of the ideal series3  7#a7     
,knowledge1 the potence of reflection2  
7#b7 ,action1 the potence of            
subsumption2 7#c7 the ,reason as the    
unity of reflection and subsumption4    
,these three potences represent         
themselves3 7#a7 as the true1 the       
imprinting of the matter in the form2   
7#b7 as the good1 or the imprinting  of 
the form in the matter2 7#c7 as the     
beautiful1 or the work of art1 the      
absolute blending together of form and  
matter4    ,schelling sought also to    
furnish himself with a new method for   
knowing  the absolute identity4 ,neither
 the analytic nor the synthetical method
  seems to him suitable for this1 since 
both are only a finite knowledge4       
,gradually1 also1 he abandoned the      

mathematical method4 ,the logical forms 
of the ordinary method of knowledge1 and
 even the ordinary metaphysical         
categories1 were now insufficient for   
him4 ,schelling now places the          
intellectual intuition as the starting  
point of true knowledge4  ,intuition1 in
 general1 is an equal positing of       
thought and being4 ,when ,i  behold an  
object1 the being of the object and my  
thought of the object  is for me        
absolutely the same4 ,but in the        
ordinary intuition1 some  separate      
sensible being is posited as one with   
the thought4 ,but in the  intellectual  
or rational intuition1 being in general1
 and every being is  made identical with
 the thought1 and the absolute          
subject-object is  beheld4 ,the         
intellectual intuition is absolute      
knowledge1 and as such it  can only be  
conceived as that in which thought and  
being are not opposed  to each other4   
,it is the beginning and the first step 
towards philosophy  to behold1          

immediately and intellectually within   
thyself1 that same  indifference of the 
ideal and the real which thou beholdest 
projected as  it were from thyself in   
space and time4 ,this absolutely        
absolute mode of  knowledge is wholly   
and entirely in the absolute itself4    
,that it can  never become taught is    
clear4 ,it cannot1 moreover1 be seen why
  philosophy is bound to have special   
regard to the unattainable4 ,it seems   
much more fitting to make so complete a 
separation on every side between  the   
entrance to philosophy and the common   
knowledge1 that no road nor  track shall
 lead from the latter to the former4    
,the absolute mode of  knowledge1 like  
the truth which it contains1 has no true
 opposition  outside of itself1 and as  
it cannot be demonstrated by any        
intelligent  being1 so nothing can be   
set up in opposition to it by           
any4--,schelling  has attempted to bring
 the intellectual intuition into a      
method1 and has  named this method      

construction4 ,the possibility and the  
necessity of the  constructive method is
 based upon the fact that the absolute  
is in all1  and that all is the         
absolute4 ,construction is nothing other
 than the  proving that the whole is    
absolutely expressed in every particular
  relation and object4 ,to construe an  
object1 philosophically1 is to prove    
that in this object the whole inner     
structure of the absolute repeats       
itself4    ,in ,schelling's 8,lectures  
on the ,method of ,academical ,study0   
7delivered  in #ahjb1 and published in  
#ahjc71 he sought to treat              
encyclopdiacally1  every philosophical  
discipline from the given standpoint of 
identity or  indifference4 ,they furnish
 a connected and popular exposition of  
the  outlines of his philosophy1 in the 
form of a critical modelling of the     
studies of the university course4 ,the  
most noticeable feature in them is      
,schelling's attempt at a historical    
construction of ,christianity4 ,the     

incarnation of ,god is an incarnation   
from eternity4 ,the eternal ,son of     
,god1 born from the essence of the      
father of all things1 is the finite     
itself1 as it is in the eternal         
intuition of ,god4 ,christ is only the  
historical and phenomenal pinnacle of   
the incarnation2 as an individual1  he  
is a person wholly conceivable from the 
circumstances of the age in  which he   
appeared4 ,since ,god is eternally      
outside of all time1 it is              
inconceivable that he should have       
assumed a human nature at any definite  
moment of time4 ,the temporal form of   
,christianity1 the exoteric             
,christianity does not correspond to its
 idea1 and has its perfection yet  to be
 hoped for4 ,a chief hindrance to the   
perfection of ,christianity1  was1 and  
is the so-called ,bible1 which1         
moreover1 is far inferior to  other     
religious writings1 in a genuine        
religious content4 ,the future  must    
bring a new birth of the esoteric       

,christianity1 or a new and higher  form
 of religion1 in which philosophy1      
religion and poesy shall melt  together 
in unity4--,this latter remark contains 
already an intimation of  the           
8,philosophy of ,revelation10 a work    
subsequently written by  ,schelling1 and
 which exhibited many of the principles 
current in the age  of the apostle      
,john4 ,in the work we are now          
considering1 there are also  many other 
points which correspond to this later   
standpoint of  ,schelling4 ,thus he     
places at the summit of history a kind  
of golden age4  ,it is inconceivable1 he
 says1 that man as he now appears1      
should have  raised himself through     
himself from instinct to consciousness1 
from  animality to rationality4 ,another
 human race1 must1 therefore1 have      
preceded the present1 which the old saga
 have immortalized under the  form of   
gods and heroes4 ,the first origin of   
religion and culture is  only           
conceivable through the instruction of  

higher natures4 ,i hold the  condition  
of culture as the first condition of the
 human race1 and  considere the first   
foundation of states1 sciences1 religion
 and arts as  cotemporary1 or rather as 
one thing3 so that all these were not   
truly  separate1 but in the completest  
interpenetration1 as it will be again in
  the final consummation4 ,schelling is 
no more than consistent when he         
accordingly apprehends the symbols of   
mythology which we meet with at  the    
beginning of history1 as disclosures of 
the highest wisdom4 ,there is  here also
 a step towards his subsequent          
8,philosophy of ,mythology40    ,the    
mystical element revealed in these      
expressions of ,schelling gained        
continually a greater prominence with   
him4 ,its growth was partly  connected  
with his fruitless search after an      
absolute method1 and a  fitting form in 
which he might have satisfactorily      
expressed his  philosophic intuitions4  
,all noble mysticism rests on the       

incapacity of  adequately expressing an 
infinite content in the form of a       
conception4  ,so ,schelling1 after he   
had been restlessly tossed about in     
every method1  soon gave up also his    
method of construction1 and abandoned   
himself  wholly to the unlimited current
 of his fancy4 ,but though this was     
partly  the cause of his mysticism1 it  
is also true that his philosophical     
standpoint was gradually undergoing a   
change4 ,from the speculative  science  
of nature1 he was gradually passing over
 more and more into the  philosophy of  
mind1 by which the determination of the 
absolute in his  conception became      
changed4 ,while he had previously       
determined the  absolute as the         
indifference of the ideal and the real1 
he now gives a  preponderance to the    
ideal over the real1 and makes ideality 
the  fundamental determination of the   
absolute4 ,the first is the ideal2      
secondly1 the ideal determines itself in
 itself to the real1 and the  real as   

such is the third4 ,the earlier harmony 
of mind and matter is  dissolved3 matter
 appears now as the negative of mind4   
,since ,schelling  in this way          
distinguishes the universe from the     
absolute as its  counterpart1 we see    
that he leaves decidedly the basis of   
,spinozism on  which he had previously  
stood1 and places himself on a new      
standpoint4    ,,iv4 ,,fourth ,,period3 
,,the ,,direction ,,of ,,schelling',s   
,,philosophy ,,as ,,mystical  ,,and     
,,allied ,,to ,,new-,,platonism4    ,the
 writings of this period                
are3--8,philosophy and ,religion10      
#ahjd4  8,exposition of the true        
relation of the ,philosophy of ,nature  
to the  improved ,theory of ,fichte10   
#ahjf2 8,medical ,annual0 7published in 
company with ,marcus7 #ahje-ahjh4--;,as 
has already been said1 the absolute  and
 the universe were1 on the standpoint of
 indifference1 identical4  ,nature and  
history were immediate manifestations of
 the absolute4 ,but  now ,schelling lays

 stress upon the difference between the 
two1 and the  independence of the world4
 ,this he expresses in a striking way in
 the  first of the above named writings1
 by placing the origin of the world     
wholly after the manner of              
,new-,platonism1 in a breaking away or a
  falling off from the absolute4 ,from  
the absolute to the actual1 there is  no
 abiding transition2 the origin of the  
sensible world is only  conceivable as a
 complete breaking off per saltum from  
the absolute4  ,the absolute is the only
 real1 finite things are not real2 they 
can1  therefore1 have their ground in no
 reality imparted to them from the      
absolute1 but only in a separation and  
complete falling away from the          
absolute4 ,the reconciliation of this   
fall1 and the manifestation of ,god     
made complete1 is the final cause of    
history4 ,with this idea there are  also
 connected other representations        
borrowed from ,new-,platonism1 which    
,schelling brings out in the same work4 

,he speaks in it of the descent of  the 
soul from intellectuality1 to the world 
of sense1 and like the  ,platonic myth  
he allows this fall of souls to be a    
punishment for their  selfhood 7pride72 
he speaks also in connection with this  
of a  regeneration1 or transmigration of
 souls1 by which they either begin a    
higher life on a better sphere1 or      
intoxicated with matter1 they are       
driven down to a still lower abode1     
according as they have in the  present  
life laid aside more or less of their   
selfhood1 and become  purified in a     
greater or less degree1 to an identity  
with the infinite2  but we are          
especially reminded of ,new-,platonism  
by the high place and  the mystical and 
symbolical significance1 which          
,schelling gives in this  work to the   
,greek mysteries 7as did ,bruno71 and   
the view that if  religion would be held
 in its pure ideality1 it can only exist
 as  exoteric1 or in the form of        
mysteries4--,this notion of a higher    

blending  together of religion and      
philosophy goes through all the writings
 of  this period4 ,all true experience1 
says ,schelling in the 8,medical        
,annual10 is religious4 ,the existence  
of ,god is an empirical truth1 and  the 
ground of all experience4 ,true1        
religion is not philosophy1 but the     
philosophy which does not unite in      
sacred harmony1 religion with  science1 
were unworthy of the name4 ,true1 ,i    
know something higher than  science4    
,and if science has only these two ways 
open before it to  knowledge1 viz41 that
 of analysis or abstraction1 and that of
 synthetic  derivation1 then we deny all
 science of the absolute4 ,speculation  
is  every thing1 i4 e4 a beholding1 a   
contemplation of that which is in  ,god4
 ,science itself has worth only so far  
as it is speculative1 i4 e4  only so far
 as it is a contemplation of ,god as he 
is4 ,but the time will  come when the   
sciences shall more and more cease1 and 
immediate  knowledge take their place4  

,the mortal eye closes only in the      
highest  science1 where it is no longer 
the man who sees1 but the eternal       
beholding which has now become seeing in
 him4    ,with this theosophic view of  
the world1 ,schelling was led to pay    
attention to the earlier mystics4 ,he   
began to study their writings4 ,he      
answered the charge of mysticism in his 
controversy with ,fichte as             
follows3--,among the learned of the last
 century1 there was a tacit  agreement  
never to go beyond a certain height1    
and1 therefore1 the  genuine spirit of  
science was given up to the unlearned4  
,these1 because  they were uneducated   
and had drawn upon themselves the       
jealousy of the  learned1 were called   
fanatics4 ,but many a philosopher by    
profession  might well have exchanged   
all his rhetoric for the fulness of mind
 and  heart which abound in the writings
 of such fanatics4 ,therefore ,i am not 
ashamed of the name of such a fanatic4  
,i will even seek to make this  reproach

 true2 if ,i have not hitherto studied  
the writings of these men  correctly1 it
 has been owing to negligence4          
,schelling did not omit to verify these 
words4 ,there were some special  mental 
affinities between himself and ,jacob   
,boehme1 with whom he now  became more  
and more closely joined4 ,a study of his
 writings is indeed  indicated in       
,schelling's works of the present       
period4 ,one of the most  famous of     
,schelling's writings1 his theory of    
freedom1 which appeared  after this     
78,philosophische ,untersuchungen ber   
das ,wesen der  menschlichen ,freiheit10
 #ahji71 is composed entirely in the    
spirit of  ,jacob ,boehme4 ,we begin    
with it a new period of ,schelling's    
philosophizing1 where the will is       
affirmed as the essence of ,god1 and  we
 have thus a new definition of the      
absolute differing from every  previous 
one4    ,v4 ,,fifth ,,period3--,,attempt
 ,,at ,a ,,theogony ,,and ,,cosmogony   
,,after ,,the ,,manner ,,of  ,,jacob    

,,boehme4    ,schelling had much in     
common with ,jacob ,boehme4 ,both       
considered the  speculative cognition as
 a kind of immediate intuition4 ,both   
made use of  forms which mingled the    
abstract and the sensuous1 and          
interpenetrated  the definiteness of    
logic with the coloring of fancy4 ,both1
 in fine1  were speculatively in close  
contact4 ,the self-duplication of the   
absolute was a fundamental thought of   
,boehme4 ,he started with the           
principle1 that the divine essence was  
the indeterminable1 infinite1 and       
inconceivable1 the absence of ground    
7,ungrund74 ,this absence of ground  now
 projects itself in a proper feeling of 
its abstract and infinite  essence1 into
 the finite1 i4 e4 into a ground1 or the
 centre of  nature1 in the dark womb of 
which qualities are produced1 from whose
  harsh collision the lightning streams 
forth1 which1 as mind or principle  of  
light1 is destined to rule and explain  
the struggling powers of  nature1 so    

that the ,god who has been raised from  
the absence of ground  through a ground 
to the light of the mind1 may henceforth
 move in an  eternal kingdom of joy4    
,this theogony of ,jacob ,boehme is in  
striking  accord with the present       
standpoint of ,schelling4 ,as ,boehme   
had  apprehended the absolute as the    
indeterminable absence of ground1 so had
  ,schelling in his earlier writings    
apprehended it as indifference4 ,as     
,boehme had distinguished this absence  
of ground from a ground1 or from  nature
 and from ,god1 as the light of minds1  
so had ,schelling1 in the  writings of  
the last period1 apprehended the        
absolute as a  self-renunciation1 and a 
return back from this renunciation into 
a  higher unity with itself4 ,we have   
here the three chief elements of that   
history of ,god1 around which           
,schelling's essay on freedom turns3    
7#a7 ,god  as indifference1 or the      
absence of ground2 7#b7 ,god as         
duplication into  ground and existence1 

real and ideal2 7#c7 ,reconciliation of 
this  duplication1 and elevation of the 
original indifference to identity4 ,the 
first element of the divine life is that
 of pure indifference1 or               
indistinguishableness4 ,this1 which     
precedes every thing existing1 may be   
called the original ground1 or the      
absence of ground4 ,the absence of      
ground is not a product of opposites1   
nor are they contained implicite  in it1
 but it is a proper essence separate    
from every opposite1 and  having no     
predicate but that of predicatelessness4
 ,real and ideal1  darkness and light1  
can never be predicated of the absence  
of ground as  opposites2 they can only  
be affirmed of it as not-opposites in a 
neither-nor4 ,from this indifference now
 rises the duality3 the absence  of     
ground separates into two co-eternal    
beginnings1 so that ground and          
existence may become one through love1  
and the indeterminable and  lifeless    
indifference may rise to a determinate  

and living identity4  ,since nothing is 
before or external to ,god1 he must have
 the ground of  his existence in        
himself4 ,but this ground is not simply 
logical1 as  conception1 but real1 as   
something which is actually to be       
distinguished  in ,god from existence2  
it is nature in ,god1 an essence        
inseparable  indeed from him1 but yet   
distinct4 ,hence we cannot assign to    
this ground  understanding and will1 but
 only desire after this2 it is the      
longing to  produce itself4 ,but in that
 this ground moves in its longing       
according  to obscure and uncertain laws
 like a swelling sea1 there is1         
self-begotten in ,god1 another and      
reflexive motion1 an inner              
representation by which he beholds      
himself in his image4 ,this             
representation is the eternal word in   
,god1 which rises as light in the       
darkness of the ground1 and endows its  
blind longing with understanding4  ,this
 understanding1 united with the ground1 

becomes pre-creating will4  ,its work is
 to give order to nature1 and to        
regulate the hitherto  unregulated      
ground2 and from this explanation of the
 real through the  ideal1 comes the     
creation of the world4 ,the development 
of the world has  two stadia3 7#a7 the  
travail of light1 or the progressive    
development of  nature to man2 7#b7 the 
travail of mind1 or the development of  
mind in  history4    7#a47 ,the         
progressive development of nature       
proceeds from a conflict of  the ground 
with the understanding4 ,the ground     
originally sought to  produce every     
thing solely from itself1 but its       
products had no  consistence without the
 understanding1 and went again to the   
ground1 a  creation which we see        
exhibited in the extinct classes of     
animals and  plants of the pre-,adamite 
world4 ,but consecutively and gradually1
 the  ground admitted the work of the   
understanding1 and every such step      
towards light is indicated by a new     

class of nature's beings4 ,in every     
creature of nature we must1 therefore1  
distinguish two principles3  first1 the 
obscure principle through which the     
creatures of nature are  separate from  
,god1 and have a particular will2       
second1 the divine  principle of the    
understanding1 of the universal will4   
,with irrational  creatures of nature1  
however1 these two principles are not   
yet brought  to unity2 but the          
particular will is simple seeking and   
desire1 while  the universal will1      
without the individual will1 reigns as  
an external  power of nature1 as        
controlling instinct4    7#b47 ,the two 
principles1 the particular and the      
universal will1 are  first united in man
 as they are in the absolute3 but in    
,god they are  united inseparably1 and  
in man separably1 for otherwise ,god    
could not  reveal himself in man4 ,it is
 even this separableness of the         
universal  will1 and the particular     
will1 which makes good and evil         

possible4 ,the  good is the subjection  
of the particular will to the universal 
will1 and  the reverse of this right    
relation is evil4 ,human freedom        
consists in  this possibility of good   
and evil4 ,the empirical man1 however1  
is not  free1 but his whole empirical   
condition is posited by a previous act  
of  intelligence4 ,the man must act just
 as he does1 but is nevertheless  free1 
because he has from eternity freely made
 himself that which he now  necessarily 
is4 ,the history of the human race is   
founded for the most  part on the       
struggle of the individual will with the
 universal will1 as  the history of     
nature is founded on the struggle of the
 ground with the  understanding4 ,the   
different stages through which evil1 as 
a historical  power1 takes its way in   
conflict with love1 constitute the      
periods of  the world's history4        
,christianity is the centre of history3 
in ,christ1  the principle of love came 
in personal contact with incarnate evil3

  ,christ was the mediator to reconcile 
on the highest stage the creation  with 
,god2 for that which is personal can    
alone redeem the personal4 ,the  end of 
history is the reconciliation of the    
particular will and love1  the          
prevalence of the universal will1 so    
that ,god shall be all in all4  ,the    
original indifference is thus elevated  
to identity4    ,schelling has given a  
farther justification of this his idea  
of ,god1 in  his controversial pamphlet 
against ,jacobi1 7#ahab74 ,the charge of
  naturalism which ,jacobi made against 
him1 he sought to refute by showing  how
 the true idea of ,god was a union of   
naturalism and theism4  ,naturalism     
seeks to conceive of ,god as ground of  
the world 7immanent71  while theism     
would view him as the world's cause     
7transcendent73 the  true course is to  
unite both determinations4 ,god is at   
the same time  ground and cause4 ,it no 
way contradicts the conception of ,god  
to affirm  that1 so far as he reveals   

himself1 he developes himself from      
himself1  advancing from the imperfect  
to the perfect3 the imperfect is in fact
  the perfect itself1 only in a state of
 becoming4 ,it is necessary that  this  
becoming should be by stages1 in order  
that the fulness of the  perfect may    
appear on all sides4 ,if there were no  
obscure ground1 no  nature1 no negative 
principle in ,god1 we could not speak of
 a  consciousness of ,god4 ,so long as  
the ,god of modern theism remains the   
simple essence which ought to be purely 
essential1 but which in fact is  without
 essence1 so long as an actual          
twofoldness is not recognized in  ,god1 
and a limiting and denying energy 7a    
nature1 a negative principle7  is not   
placed in opposition to the extending   
and affirming energy in  ,god1 so long  
will science be entitled to make its    
denial of a personal  ,god4 ,it is      
universally and essentially impossible  
to conceive of a being  with            
consciousness1 which has not been       

brought into limit by some  denying     
energy within himself--as universally   
and essentially impossible  as to       
conceive of a circle without a centre4  
,,vi4 ,since the essay against ,jacobi1 
which in its philosophical content      
accords mainly with his theory of       
freedom1 ,schelling has not made public 
any thing of importance4 ,he has often  
announced a work entitled 8,die         
,weltalter10 which should contain a     
complete and elaborate exposition of    
his philosophy1 but has always withdrawn
 it before its appearance4  ,paulus has 
surreptitiously brought his later       
,berlin lectures before  the public in a
 manner for which he has been greatly   
blamed3 but since  this publication is  
not recognized by ,schelling himself1 it
 cannot be  used as an authentic source 
of knowledge of his philosophy4 ,during 
this  long period1 ,schelling has       
published only two articles of a        
philosophical content3 8,on the ,deities
 of ,samothracos10 #ahae1 and a         

8,critical ,preface0 to ,becker's       
translation of a preface of ,cousin1    
#ahcd4 ,both articles are very          
characteristic of the present standpoint
 of  ,schelling's philosophizing--he    
himself calls his present philosophy    
,positive ,philosophy1 or the           
,philosophy of ,mythology and           
,revelation1--but as they give only     
intimations of this1 and do not reach  a
 complete exposition1 they do not admit 
of being used for our purpose4          
,,section ,,xliv4    ,,transition ,,to  
,,hegel4      ,the great want of        
,schelling's philosophizing1 was its    
inability to  furnish a suitable form   
for the philosophic content4 ,schelling 
went  through the list of all methods1  
and at last abandoned all4 ,but this    
absence of method into which he         
ultimately sank1 contradicted the very  
principle of his philosophizing4 ,if    
thought and being are identical1 yet    
form and content cannot be indifferent  
in respect to each other4 ,on the       

standpoint of absolute knowledge1 there 
must be found for the absolute  content 
an absolute form1 which shall be        
identical with the content4  ,this is   
the position assumed by ,hegel4 ,hegel  
has fused the content of  ,schelling's  
philosophy by means of the absolute     
method4 ,hegel sprang  as truly from    
,fichte as from ,schelling2 the origin  
of his system is  found in both4 ,his   
method is essentially that of ,fichte1  
but his general  philosophical          
standpoint is ,schelling's4 ,he has     
combined both ,fichte and  ,schelling4  
,hegel has himself1 in his              
8,phenomenology10 the first work in     
which he  appeared as a philosopher on  
his own hook1 having previously been    
considered as an adherent of            
,schelling--clearly expressed his       
difference  from ,schelling1 which he   
comprehensively affirms in the following
 three  hits 7,schlagworte73--,in       
,schelling's philosophy1 the absolute   
is1 as it  were1 shot out of a pistol2  

it is only the night in which every cow 
looks black2 when it is widened to a    
system1 it is like the course of a      
painter1 who has on his palette but two 
colors1 red and green1 and who  would   
cover a surface with the former when a  
historical piece was  demanded1 and with
 the latter when a landscape was        
required4 ,the first  of these charges  
refers to the mode of attaining the idea
 of the  absolute1 viz41 immediately1   
through intellectual intuition2 this    
leap  ,hegel changes1 in his            
,phenomenology1 to a regular transit1   
proceeding  step by step4 ,the second   
charge relates to the way in which the  
absolute  thus gained is conceived and  
expressed1 viz41 simply as the absence  
of  all finite distinctions1 and not as 
the immanent positing of a system of    
distinctions within itself4 ,hegel      
declares that every thing depends upon  
apprehending and expressing the true not
 as substance 7i4 e4 as  negation of    
determinateness71 but as subject 7as a  

positing and  producing of finite       
distinction74 ,the third charge has to  
do with  ,schelling's manner of carrying
 out his principle through the concrete 
content of the facts given in the       
natural and intellectual worlds1 viz41  
by the application of a ready-made      
schema 7the opposition of the ideal  and
 the real7 to the objects1 instead of   
suffering them to unfold and  separate  
themselves from themselves4 ,the school 
of ,schelling was  especially given to  
this schematizing formalism1 and that   
which ,hegel  remarks1 in the           
introduction to his ,phenomenology1 may 
very well be  applied to it3 8,if the   
formalism of a philosophy of nature     
should happen  to teach that the        
understanding is electricity1 or that   
the animate is  nitrogen1 the           
inexperienced might look upon such      
instructions with deep  amazement1 and  
perhaps revere them as displaying the   
marks of profound  genius4 ,but the     
trick of such a wisdom is as readily    

learned as it is  easily practised2 its 
repetition is as insufferable as the    
repetition of  a discovered feat of     
legerdemain4 ,this method of affixing to
 every thing  heavenly and earthly1 to  
all natural and intellectual forms1 the 
two  determinations of the universal    
scheme1 makes the universe like a       
grocer's shop1 in which a row of closed 
jars stand with their labels  pasted on 
them40    ,the point1 therefore1 of     
greatest difference between ,schelling  
and ,hegel  is their philosophical      
method1 and this at the same time forms 
the bond  of close connection which     
unites ,hegel with ,fichte4 ,thesis1    
antithesis1  synthesis--this was the    
method by which ,fichte had sought to   
deduce all  being from the ,ego1 and in 
precisely the same way ,hegel deduces   
all  being--the intellectual and natural
 universe--from the thought1 only with  
this difference1 that with him that     
which was idealistically deduced had  at
 the same time an objective reality4    

,while the practical idealism of        
,fichte stood related to the objective  
world as a producer1 and the  ordinary  
empiricism as a beholder1 yet with      
,hegel the speculative  7conceiving7    
reason is at the same time productive   
and beholding4 ,i  produce 7for myself7 
that which is 7in itself7 without my    
producing4 ,the  result of philosophy1  
says ,hegel1 is the thought which is by 
itself1 and  which comprehends in itself
 the universe1 and changes it into an   
intelligent world4 ,to raise all being  
to being in the consciousness1 to       
knowledge1 is the problem and the goal  
of philozophizing1 and this goal  is    
reached when the mind has become able to
 beget the whole objective  world from  
itself4    ,in his first great work1 the
 8,phenomenology of the ,mind10 ,hegel  
sought  to establish the standpoint of  
absolute knowledge or absolute idealism4
  ,he furnishes in this work a history  
of the phenomenal consciousness  7whence
 its title71 a development of the       

formative epochs of the  consciousness  
in its progress to philosophical        
knowledge4 ,the inner  development of   
consciousness consists in this1 viz41   
that the peculiar  condition in which it
 finds itself becomes objectified 7or   
conscious71  and through this knowledge 
of its own being the consciousness rises
 ever  a new step to a higher condition4
 ,the 8,phenomenology0 seeks to show    
how1 and out of what necessity the      
consciousness advances from step to     
step1 from reality to being per se 7vom 
,ansich zum ,frsich71 from  being to    
knowledge4 ,the author begins with the  
immediate consciousness  as the lowest  
step4 ,he entitled this section3 8,the  
,sensuous ,certainty1  or the ,this and 
the ,mine40 ,at this stage the question 
is asked the ,ego3  what is this1 or    
what is here8 and it answers1 e4 g4 the 
tree2 and  to the question1 what is now8
 it answers now is the night4 ,but if we
  turn ourselves around1 here is not a  
tree but a house2 and if we write  down 

the second answer1 and look at it again 
after a little time1 we  find that now  
is no longer night but mid-day4 ,the    
this becomes1  therefore1 a not-this1 i4
 e4 a universal4 ,and very naturally2   
for if ,i  say3 this piece of paper1 yet
 each and every paper is a this piece of
  paper1 and ,i have only said the      
universal4 ,by such inner dialectics the
  whole field of the immediate certainty
 of the sense in perception is  gone    
over4 ,in this way--since every         
formative step 7every form7 of the      
consciousness of the philosophizing     
subject is involved in  contradictions1 
and is carried by this immanent         
dialectics to a higher  form of         
consciousness--this process of          
development goes on till the            
contradiction is destroyed1 i4 e4 till  
all strangeness between subject  and    
object disappears1 and the mind rises to
 a perfect self-knowledge  and          
self-certainty4 ,to characterize briefly
 the different steps of this  process1  

we might say that the consciousness is  
first found as a  certainty of the      
sense1 or as the this and the mine2 next
 as  perception1 which apprehends the   
objective as a thing with its           
properties2 and then as understanding1  
i4 e4 apprehending the objects  as being
 reflected in itself1 or distinguishing 
between power and  expression1 being and
 manifestation1 outer and inner4 ,from  
this point  the consciousness1 which has
 only recognized itself1 its own pure   
being  in its objects and their         
determinations1 and for which therefore 
every  other thing than itself has1 as  
such1 no significance1 becomes the      
self-like ,ego1 and rises to the truth  
and certainty of itself to              
self-consciousness4 ,the                
self-consciousness become universal1 or 
as  reason1 now traverses also a series 
of development-steps1 until it          
manifests itself as spirit1 as the      
reason which1 in accord with all        
rationality1 and satisfied with the     

rational world without1 extends  itself 
over the natural and intellectual       
universe as its kingdom1 in  which it   
finds itself at home4 ,mind now passes  
through its stages of  unconstrained    
morality1 culture and refinement1 ethics
 and the ethical  view of the world to  
religion2 and religion itself in its    
perfection1 as  revealed religion       
becomes absolute knowledge4 ,at this    
last stage being  and thought are no    
more separate1 being is no longer an    
object for the  thought1 but the thought
 itself is the object of the thought4   
,science is  nothing other than the true
 knowledge of the mind concerning       
itself4 ,in  the conclusion of the      
8,phenomenology10 ,hegel casts the      
following  retrospect on the course     
which he has laid down3 8,the goal which
 is to  be reached1 viz41 absolute      
knowledge1 or the mind knowing itself as
  mind1 requires us to take notice of   
minds as they are in themselves1 and    
the organization of their kingdom4      

,these elements are preserved1 and      
furnished to us either by history1 where
 we look at the side of the  mind's free
 existence as it accidentally appears1  
or by the science of  phenomenal        
knowledge1 where we look at the side of 
the mind's ideal  organization4 ,these  
two sources taken together1 as the ideal
 history1  give us the real history and 
the true being of the absolute spirit1  
the  actuality1 truth1 and certainty of 
his throne1 without which he were       
lifeless and alone2 only #8from the cup 
of this kingdom of minds does  there    
stream forth for him his infinity4'0    
,,section ,,xlv4    ,,hegel4            
,george ,wilhelm ,friedrich ,hegel was  
born at ,stuttgart1 the #bgth of        
,august1 #aggj4 ,in his eighteenth year 
he entered the university of  ,tbingen1 
in order to devote himself to the study 
of theology4 ,during  his course of     
study here1 he attracted no marked      
attention2 ,schelling1  who was his     
junior in years1 shone far beyond all   

his contemporaries4  ,after leaving     
,tbingen1 he took a situation as private
 tutor1 first in  ,switzerland1 and     
afterwards in ,frankfort-on-the-,main   
till #ahja1 when he  settled down at    
,jena4 ,at first he was regarded as a   
disciple1 and  defender of ,schelling's 
philosophy1 and as such he wrote in     
#ahja his  first minor treatise on the  
8,difference between ,fichte and        
,schelling40  ,soon afterwards he became
 associated with ,schelling in          
publishing the  8,critical ,journal of  
,philosophy10 #ahjb-c1 for which he     
furnished a  number of important        
articles4 ,his labors as an academical  
teacher met at  first with but little   
encouragement2 he gave his first lecture
 to only  four hearers4 ,yet in #ahjf he
 became professor in the university1    
though  the political catastrophe in    
which the country was soon afterwards   
involved1 deprived him again of the     
place4 ,amid the cannon's thunder of    
the battle of ,jena he finished 8the    

,phenomenology of the ,mind10 his  first
 great and independent work1 the crown  
of his ,jena labors4 ,he was            
subsequently in the habit of calling    
this book which appeared in #ahjg1  his 
8voyage of discovery40 ,from ,jena1     
,hegel for want of the means of         
subsistence went to ,bamberg1 where for 
two years he was editor of a  political 
journal published there4 ,in the fall of
 #ahjh1 he became rector  of the        
gymnasium at ,nuremberg4 ,in this       
situation he wrote his ,logic1          
#ahab-af4 ,all his works were produced  
slowly1 and he first properly began  his
 literary activity as ,schelling        
finished his4 ,in #ahaf1 he received a  
call to a professorship of philosophy at
 ,heidelberg1 where in #ahag he         
published his 8,encyclopdia of the      
philosophical sciences10 in which  for  
the first time he showed the whole      
circuit of his system4 ,but his         
peculiar fame1 and his far-reaching     
activity1 dates first from his call  to 

,berlin in #ahah4 ,it was at ,berlin    
that he surrounded himself with an      
extensive and very actively scientific  
school1 and where through his           
connection with the ,prussian government
 he gained a political influence  and   
acquired a reputation for his           
philosophy1 as the philosophy of the    
,state1 though this neither speaks      
favorably for its inner purity1 nor  its
 moral credit4 ,yet in his 8,philosophy 
of ,rights10 which appeared in  #ahba 7a
 time1 to be sure1 when the ,prussian   
,state had not yet shown any  decidedly 
anti-constitutional tendency71 ,hegel   
does not deny the  political demands of 
the present age2 he declares in favor of
 popular  representation1 freedom of the
 press1 and publicity of judicial       
proceedings1 trial by jury1 and an      
administrative independence of          
corporations4    ,in ,berlin1 ,hegel    
gave lectures upon almost every branch  
of philosophy1  and these have been     
published by his disciples and friends  

after his  death4 ,his manner as a      
lecturer was stammering1 clumsy1 and    
unadorned1  but was still not without a 
peculiar attraction as the immediate    
expression of profound thoughtfulness4  
,his social intercourse was more  with  
the uncultivated than with the learned2 
he was not fond of shining  as a genius 
in social circles4 ,in #ahbi he became  
rector of the  university1 an office    
which he administered in a more         
practical manner  than ,fichte had done4
 ,hegel died with the cholera1 ,nov4    
#adth1 #ahca1 the  day also of          
,leibnitz's death4 ,he rests in the same
 churchyard with  ,solger and ,fichte1  
near by the latter1 and not far from the
 former4 ,his  writings and lectures    
form seventeen volumes which have       
appeared since  #ahhb3 ,vol4 ,i4 ,minor 
,articles2 ,,ii4 ,phenomenology2        
,,iii-,v4 ,logic2 ,,vi4-,,vii4          
,encyclopdia2 ,,viii4 ,philosophy of    
,rights2 ,,ix4 ,philosophy of ,history2 
,x4  sthetics2 ,,xi4-,,xii4 ,philosophy 

of ,religion2 ,,xiii4-,,xv4 ,history of 
,philosophy2 ,,xvi4-,,xvii4             
,miscellanies4 ,his life has been       
written by  ,rosenkranz4    ,hegel's    
system may be divided in a number of    
ways4 ,the best mode is by  connecting  
it with ,schelling4 ,schellings's       
absolute was the identity or  the       
indifference point of the ideal and the 
real4 ,from this ,hegel's  threefold    
division immediately follows4 7#a7 ,the 
exposition of the  indifference point1  
the development of the pure conceptions 
or  determinations in thought1 which lie
 at the basis of all natural and        
intellectual life2 in other words1 the  
logical unfolding of the  absolute1--the
 science of logic4 7#b7 ,the development
 of the real world  or of               
nature--natural philosophy4 7#c7 ,the   
development of the ideal  world1 or of  
mind as it shows itself concretely in   
right1 morals1 the  state1 art1         
religion1 and science4--,philosophy of  
,mind4 ,these three  parts of the system

 represent the three elements of the    
absolute method1  thesis1 antithesis1   
synthesis4 ,the absolute is at first    
pure1 and  immaterial thought2 secondly1
 it is differentiation 7,andersseyn7 of 
the pure thought or its diremption      
7,verzerrung7 in space and              
time--nature2 thirdly1 it returns from  
this self-estrangement to itself1       
destroys the differentiation of nature1 
and thus becomes actual  self-knowing   
thought or mind4    ,i4 ,,science ,,of  
,,logic4--,the ,hegelian logic is the   
scientific exposition and  development  
of the pure conceptions of reason1 those
 conceptions or  categories which lie at
 the basis of all thought and being1 and
 which  determine the subjective        
knowledge as truly as they form the     
indwelling  soul of the objective       
reality2 in a word1 those ideas in which
 the ideal  and the real have their     
point of coincidence4 ,the domain of    
logic1 says  ,hegel1 is the truth1 as it
 is per se in its native character4 ,it 

is as  ,hegel himself figuratively      
expresses it1 the representation of ,god
 as he  is in his eternal being1 before 
the creation of the world or a finite   
mind4 ,in this respect it is1 to be     
sure1 a domain of shadows2 but these    
shadows are1 on the other hand1 those   
simple essences freed from all  sensuous
 matters1 in whose diamond net the whole
 universe is  constructed4    ,different
 philosophers had already made a        
thankworthy beginning towards           
collecting and examining the pure       
conceptions of the reason1 as           
,aristotle in his categories1 ,wolff in 
his ontology1 and ,kant in his          
transcendental analytics4 ,but they had 
neither completely collected1 nor       
critically sifted1 nor 7,kant excepted7 
derived them from one principle1  but   
had only taken them up empirically1 and 
treated them  lexicologically4 ,but in  
opposition to this course1 ,hegel       
attempted1 7#a7  to completely collect  
the pure art-conceptions2 7#b7 to       

critically sift  them 7i4 e4 to exclude 
every thing but pure thought72 and      
7#c7--which is  the most characteristic 
peculiarity of the ,hegelian logic--to  
derive  these dialectically from one    
another1 and carry them out to an       
internally connected system of pure     
reason4 ,hegel starts with the view1    
that in every conception of the reason1 
every other is contained  implicite1 and
 may be dialectically developed from it4
 ,fichte had  already claimed that the  
reason must deduce the whole system of  
knowledge purely from itself1 without   
any thing taken for granted2 that  some 
principle must be sought which should be
 of itself certain1 and  need no farther
 proof1 and from which every thing else 
could be derived4  ,hegel holds fast to 
this thought4 ,starting from the        
simplest conception  of reason1 that of 
pure being1 which needs no farther      
establishing1 he  seeks from this1 by   
advancing from one conception ever to   
another and a  richer one1 to deduce the

 whole system of the pure knowledge of  
reason4  ,the lever of this development 
is the dialectical method4    ,hegel's  
dialectical method is partly taken from 
,plato1 and partly from  ,fichte4 ,the  
conception of negation is ,platonic4    
,all negation1 says  ,hegel1 is         
position1 affirmation4 ,if a conception 
is negated1 the result  is not the pure 
nothing--a pure negative1 but a concrete
 positive2 there  results a new         
conception which extends around the     
negation of the  preceding one4 ,the    
negation of the one e4 g4 is the        
conception of the  many4 ,in this way   
,hegel makes negation a vehicle for     
dialectical  progress4 ,every           
presupposed conception is denied1 and   
from its negation  a higher and richer  
conception is gained4 ,this is connected
 with the  method of ,fichte1 which     
posits a fundamental synthesis2 and by  
analyzing  this1 seeks its antitheses1  
and then unites again these antitheses  
through a second synthesis1--e4 g4      

being1 nothing1 becoming1 quality1      
quantity1 measure1 c4 ,this method1     
which is at the same time analytical    
and synthetical1 ,hegel has carried     
through the whole system of science4    
,we now proceed to a brief survey of the
 ,hegelian ,logic4 ,it is divided  into 
three parts2 the doctrine of being1 the 
doctrine of essence1  and the doctrine  
of conception4    #a4 ,,the ,,doctrine  
,,of ,,being4 7#a47 ,quality4--,science 
begins with the  immediate and          
indeterminate conception of being4      
,this1 in its want of  content and      
emptiness1 is nothing more than a pure  
negation1 a  nothing4 ,these two        
conceptions are thus as absolutely      
identical as  they are absolutely       
opposed2 each of the two disappears     
immediately in  its contrary4 ,this     
oscillation of the two is the pure      
becoming1 which1  if it be a transition 
from nothing to being1 we call arising1 
or1 in  the reverse case1 we call it a  
departing4 ,the still and simple        

precipitate of this process of arising  
and departing1 is existence  7,daseyn74 
,existence is being with a              
determinateness1 or it is  quality2 more
 closely1 it is reality or limited      
existence4 ,limited  existence excludes 
every other from itself4 ,this reference
 to itself1  which is seen through its  
negative relation to every other1 we    
call  being per se 7,frsichseyn74 ,being
 per se which refers itself only  to    
itself1 and repels every other from     
itself1 is the one4 ,but1 by  means of  
this repelling1 the one posits          
immediately many ones4 ,but the  many   
ones are not distinguished from each    
other4 ,one is what the other  is4 ,the 
many are therefore one4 ,but the one is 
just as truly the  manifold4 ,for its   
exclusion is the positing of its        
contrary1 or it  posits itself thereby  
as manifold4 ,by this dialectic of      
attraction and  repulsion1 quality      
passes over into quantity3 for          
indifference in  respect of distinction 

or qualitative determinateness is       
quantity4    7#b47 ,quantity4--,quantity
 is determination of greatness1 which1  
as such1  is indifferent in respect of  
quality4 ,in so far as the greatness    
contains many ones distinguishably      
within itself1 it is a discrete1 or  has
 the element of discretion2 but on the  
other hand1 in so far as the  many ones 
are similar1 and the greatness is thus  
indistinguishable1 it  is continuous1 or
 has the element of continuity4 ,each of
 these two  determinations is at the    
same time identical with the other2     
discretion  cannot be conceived without 
continuity1 nor continuity without      
discretion4 ,the existence of quantity1 
or the limited quantity1 is the         
quantum4 ,the quantum has also          
manifoldness and unity in itself2 it is 
the enumeration of the unities1 i4 e4   
number4 ,corresponding to the  quantum  
or the extensive greatness1 is the      
intensive greatness or the  degree4     
,with the conception of degree1 so far  

as degree is simple  determinateness1   
quantity approaches quality again4 ,the 
unity of  quantity and quality is the   
measure4    7#c47 ,the measure is a     
qualitative quantum1 a quantum on which 
the  quality is dependent4 ,an example  
of quantity determining the quality of  
a definite object is found in the       
temperature of water1 which decides     
whether the water shall remain water or 
turn to ice or steam4 ,here the  quantum
 of heat actually constitutes the       
quality of the water4 ,quality  and     
quantity are1 therefore1 ideal          
determinations1 perpetually turning     
around on one being1 on a third1 which1 
is distinguished from the  immediate    
what and how much 7quality and quantity7
 of a thing4 ,this  third is the        
essence1 which is the negation of every 
thing immediate1  or quality independent
 of the immediate being4 ,essence is    
being in se1  being divided in itself1 a
 self-separation of being4 ,hence the   
twofoldness of all determinations of    

essence4    #b4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of   
,,essence4 7#a47 ,the ,essence as such4 
,the essence as  reflected being is the 
reference to itself only as it is a     
reference to  something other4 ,we apply
 to this being the term reflected       
analogously  with the reflection of     
light1 which1 when it falls on a mirror1
 is  thrown back by it4 ,as now the     
reflected light is1 through its         
reference  to another object1 something 
mediated or posited1 so the reflected   
being  is that which is shown to be     
mediated or grounded through another4   
,from  the fact that philosophy makes   
its problem to know the essence of      
things1 the immediate being of things is
 represented as a covering or  curtain  
behind which the essence is concealed4  
,if1 therefore1 we speak  of the essence
 of an object1 the immediate being      
standing over against  the essence 7for 
without this the essence cannot be      
conceived71 is set  down to a mere      
negative1 to an appearance4 ,the being  

appears in the  essence4 ,the essence   
is1 therefore1 the being as appearance  
in itself4  ,the essence when conceived 
in distinction from the appearance1     
gives the  conception of the essential1 
and that which only appears in the      
essence1 is the essenceless1 or the     
unessential4 ,but since the  essential  
has a being only in distinction from the
 unessential1 it  follows that the      
latter is essential to the former1 which
 needs its  unessential just as much as 
the unessential needs it4 ,each of the  
two1  therefore1 appears in the other1  
or there takes place between them a     
reciprocal reference which we call      
reflection4 ,we have1 therefore1 to  do 
in this whole sphere with determinations
 of reflection1 with  determinations1   
each one of which refers to the other1  
and cannot be  conceived without it 7e4 
g4 positive and negative1 ground and    
sequence1 thing and properties1 content 
and form1 power and expression74  ,we   
have1 therefore1 in the development of  

the essence1 those same  determinations 
which we found in the development of    
being1 only no  longer in an immediate1 
but in a reflected form4 ,instead of    
being and  nothing1 we have now the     
forms of the positive and negative2     
instead of  the there-existent          
7,daseyn71 we now have existence4       
,essence is reflected being1 a reference
 to itself1 which1 however1 is  mediated
 through a reference to something other 
which appears in it4  ,this reflected   
reference to itself we call identity    
7which is  unsatisfactorily and         
abstractly expressed in the so-called   
first  principle of thought1 that ,a    
,a74 ,this identity1 as a negativity    
referring itself to itself1 as a        
repulsion of its own from itself1       
contains essentially the determination  
of distinction4 ,the immediate  and     
external distinction is the difference4 
,the essential distinction1  the        
distinction in itself1 is the antithesis
 7positive and  negative74 ,the         

self-opposition of the essence is the   
contradiction4  ,the antithesis of      
identity and distinction is put in      
agreement in the  conception of the     
ground4 ,since now the essence          
distinguishes itself  from itself1 there
 is the essence as identical with itself
 or the  ground1 and the essence as     
distinguished from itself or the        
sequence4 ,in the category of ground and
 sequence the same thing1 i4  e4 the    
essence1 is twice posited2 the grounded 
and the ground are one  and the same    
content1 which makes it difficult to    
define the ground  except through the   
sequence1 or the sequence except through
 the ground4  ,the two can1 therefore1  
be divided only by a powerful           
abstraction2 but  because the two are   
identical1 it is peculiarly a formalism 
to apply  this category4 ,if reflection 
would inquire after a ground1 it is     
because  it would see the thing as it   
were in a twofold relation1 once in its 
immediateness1 and then as posited      

through a ground4    7#b47 ,essence and 
,phenomenon4--,the phenomenon is the    
appearance which  the essence fills1 and
 which is hence no longer essenceless4  
,there is no  appearance without        
essence1 and no essence which may not   
enter into  phenomenon4 ,it is one and  
the same content which at one time is   
taken as  essence1 and at another as    
phenomenon4 ,in the phenomenal essence  
we  recognize the positive element which
 has hitherto been called ground1  but  
which we now name content1 and the      
negative element which we call  the     
form4 ,every essence is a unity of      
content and form1 i4 e4 it  exists4 ,in 
distinction from immediate being1 we    
call that being which  has proceeded    
from some ground1 existence1 i4 e4      
grounded being4  ,when we view the      
essence as existing1 we call it thing4  
,in the  relation of a thing to its     
properties we have a repetition of the  
relation of form and content4 ,the      
properties show us the thing in  respect

 of its form1 but it is thing in respect
 of its content4 ,the  relation between 
the thing and its properties is commonly
 indicated by  the verb to have 7e4 g4  
the thing has properties71 in order to  
distinguish between the two4 ,the       
essence as a negative reference to      
itself1 and as repelling itself from    
itself in order to a reflection in  an  
alterum1 is power and expression4 ,in   
this category1 like all  the other      
categories of essence1 one and the same 
content is posited  twice4 ,the power   
can only be explained from the          
expression1 and the  expression only    
from the power2 consequently every      
explanation of which  this category     
avails itself1 is tautological4 ,to     
regard power as  uncognizable1 is only a
 self-deception of the understanding    
respecting  its own doing4--,a higher   
expression for the category of power and
  expression is the category of inner   
and outer4 ,the latter category  stands 
higher than the former1 because power   

needs some solicitation to  express     
itself1 but the inner is the essence    
spontaneously manifesting  itself4 ,both
 of these1 the inner and the outer1 are 
also identical2  neither is without the 
other4 ,that1 e4 g4 which the man is    
internally  in respect of his character1
 is he also externally in his action4   
,the  truth of this relation will be1   
therefore1 the identity of inner and    
outer1 of essence and phenomenon1 viz43 
7#c47 ,actuality4--,actuality must be   
added as a third to being and           
existence4 ,in the actuality1 the       
phenomenon is a complete and adequate   
manifestation of the essence4 ,the true 
actuality is1 therefore 7in  opposition 
to possibility and contingency71 a      
necessary being1 a  rational necessity4 
,the well-known ,hegelian sentence that 
every thing  is rational1 and every     
thing rational is actual1 is seen in    
this  apprehension of 8actuality0 to be 
a simple tautology4 ,the necessary1     
when posited as its own ground1         

identical with itself1 is substance4    
,the phenomenal side1 the unessential in
 the substance1 and the  contingent in  
the necessary1 are accidences4 ,these   
are no longer  related to the substance1
 as the phenomenon to the essence1 or   
the outer  to the inner1 i4 e4 as an    
adequate manifestation2 they are only   
transitory affections of the substance1 
accidentally changing phenomenal  forms1
 like sea waves on the water of the sea4
 ,they are not produced by  the         
substance1 but are rather destroyed in  
it4 ,the relation of substance  leads to
 the relation of cause4 ,in the relation
 of cause there is one  and the same    
thing posited on the one side as cause1 
and on the other  side as effect4 ,the  
cause of warmth is warmth1 and its      
effect is again  warmth4 ,the effect is 
a higher conception than the accidence1 
since it  actually stands over against  
the cause1 and the cause itself passes  
over  into effect4 ,so far1 however1 as 
each side in the relation of cause      

presupposes the other1 we shall find the
 true relation one in which each  side  
is at the same time cause and effect1 i4
 e4 reciprocal action4  ,reciprocal     
action is a higher relation than        
causality1 because there is  no pure    
causality4 ,there is no effect without  
counteraction4 ,we leave  the province  
of essence with the category of         
reciprocal action4 ,all the  categories 
of essence had shown themselves as a    
duplex of two sides1 but  when we come  
to the category of reciprocal action1   
the opposition  between cause and effect
 is destroyed1 and they meet together2  
unity  thus takes again the place of    
duplicity4 ,we have1 therefore1 again a 
being which coincides with mediate      
being4 ,this unity of being and         
essence1 this inner or realized         
necessity1 is the conception4    #c4    
,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the             
,,conception4--,a conception is a       
rational necessity4  ,we can only have a
 conception of that whose true necessity

 we have  recognized4 ,the conception   
is1 therefore1 the truly actual1 the    
peculiar  essence2 because it states as 
well that which is actual as that which 
should be4    7#a47 ,the subjective     
conception contains the elements of     
universality  7the conception of        
species71 particularity 7ground of      
classification1  logical difference71   
and individuality 7species--logical     
difference74  ,the conception is        
therefore a unity of that which is      
distinct4 ,the  self-separation of the  
conception is the judgment4 ,in the     
judgment1  the conception appears as    
self-excluding duality4 ,the twofoldness
 is  seen in the difference between     
subject and predicate1 and the unity in 
the copula4 ,progress in the different  
forms of judgment1 consists in  this1   
viz41 that the copula fills itself more 
and more with the  conception4 ,but thus
 the judgment passes over into the      
conclusion or  inference1 i4 e4 to the  
conception which is identical with      

itself  through the conception4 ,in the 
inference one conception is concluded   
with a third through a second4 ,the     
different figures of the conclusion  are
 the different steps in the             
self-mediation of the conception4 ,the  
conception is when it mediates itself   
with itself and the conclusion is  no   
longer subjective2 it is no longer my   
act1 but an objective relation  is      
fulfilled in it4    7#b47 ,objectivity  
is a reality only of the conception4    
,the objective  conception has three    
steps1--,mechanism1 or the indifferent  
relation of  objects to each other2     
,chemism1 or the interpenetration of    
objects and  their neutralization2      
,teleology1 or the inner design of      
objects4 ,the  end accomplishing itself 
or the self-end is1    7#c47 ,the       
idea4--,the idea is the highest logical 
definition of the  absolute4 ,the       
immediate existence of the idea1 we call
 life1 or  process of life4 ,every thing
 living is self-end immanent-end4 ,the  

idea  posited in its difference as a    
relation of objective and subjective1 is
  the true and good4 ,the true is the   
objective rationality  subjectively     
posited2 the good is the subjective     
rationality carried  into the           
objectivity4 ,both conceptions together 
constitute the absolute  idea1 which is 
just as truly as it should be1 i4 e4 the
 good is  just as truly actualized as   
the true is living and self-realizing4  
,the absolute and full idea is in space1
 because it discharges itself  from     
itself1 as its reflection2 this its     
being in space is ,nature4    ,,ii4     
,,the ,,science ,,of ,,nature4--,nature 
is the idea in the form of              
differentiation4 ,it is the idea        
externalizing itself2 it is the mind    
estranged from itself4 ,the unity of the
 conception is therefore  concealed in  
nature1 and since philosophy makes it   
its problem to seek  out the            
intelligence which is hidden in nature1 
and to pursue the  process by which     

nature loses its own character and      
becomes mind1 it  should not forget that
 the essence of nature consists in being
 which has  externalized itself1 and    
that the products of nature neither have
 a  reference to themselves1 nor        
correspond to the conception1 but grow  
up  in unrestrained and unbridled       
contingency4 ,nature is a bacchanalian  
god  who neither bridles nor checks     
himself4 ,it therefore represents no    
ideal  succession1 rising ever in       
regular order1 but1 on the contrary1 it 
every  where obliterates all essential  
limits by its doubtful structures1 which
  always defy every fixed               
classification4 ,because it is          
impossible to  throw the determinations 
of the conception over nature1 natural  
philosophy is forced at every point1 as 
it were1 to capitulate between  the     
world of concrete individual structures1
 and the regulative of the  speculative 
idea4    ,natural philosophy has its    
beginning1 its course1 and its end4 ,it 

begins  with the first or immediate     
determination of nature1 with the       
abstract  universality of its being     
extra se1 space and matter2 its end is  
the  dissevering of the mind from nature
 in the form of a rational and          
self-conscious individuality--man2 the  
problem which it has to solve is1  to   
show the intermediate link between these
 two extremes1 and to follow  out       
successively the increasingly successful
 struggles of nature to  raise itself to
 self-consciousness1 to man4 ,in this   
process1 nature  passes through three   
principal stages4    #a4 ,,mechanics1 or
 matter and an ideal system of matter4  
,matter is the  being extra se          
7,aussersichseyn7 of nature1 in its most
 universal  form4 ,yet it shows at the  
outset that tendency to being per se    
which  forms the guiding thread of      
natural philosophy--gravity4 ,gravity is
 the  being in se 7,insichseyn7 of      
matter2 it is the desire of matter to   
come to itself1 and shows the first     

trace of subjectivity4 ,the centre of   
gravity of a body is the one which it   
seeks4 ,this same tendency of  bringing 
all the manifold unto being per se lies 
at the basis of the  solar system and of
 universal gravitation4 ,the centrality 
which is the  fundamental conception of 
gravity1 becomes here a system1 which is
 in  fact a rational system so far as   
the form of the orbit1 the rapidity of  
motion1 or the time of revolution may be
 referred to mathematical laws4    #b4  
,,physics4--,but matter possesses no    
individuality4 ,even in astronomy it  is
 not the bodies themselves1 but only    
their geometrical relations which       
interest us4 ,we have here at the outset
 to treat of quantitative and not  yet  
of qualitative determinations4 ,yet in  
the solar system1 matter has  found its 
centre1 itself4 ,its abstract and hollow
 being in se has  resolved itself into  
form4 ,matter now1 as possessing a      
quality1 is an  object of physics4 ,in  
physics we have to do with matter which 

has  particularized itself in a body1 in
 an individuality4 ,to this province    
belongs inorganic nature1 its forms and 
reciprocal references4    #c4           
,,organics4--,inorganic nature1 which   
was the object of physics1 destroys     
itself in the chemical process4 ,in the 
chemical process1 the inorganic  body   
loses all its properties 7cohesion1     
color1 shining1 sound1  transparency1   
c471 and thus shows the evanescence of  
its existence and  that relativity which
 is its being4 ,this chemical process is
 overcome by  the organic1 the living   
process of nature4 ,true1 the living    
body is ever  on the point of passing   
over to the chemical process2 oxygen1   
hydrogen  and salt1 are always entering 
into a living organism1 but their       
chemical  action is always overcome2 the
 living body resists the chemical       
process  till it dies4 ,life is         
self-preservation1 self-end4 ,while     
therefore  nature in physics had risen  
to individuality1 in organics1 it       

progresses  to subjectivity4 ,the idea1 
as life1 represents itself in three     
stages4    7#a47 ,the general image of  
life in geological organism1 or the     
mineral  kingdom4 ,yet the mineral      
kingdom is the result1 and the residuum 
of a  process of life and formation     
already passed4 ,the primitive rock is  
the  stiffened crystal of life1 and the 
geological earth is a giant corpse4     
,the present life which produces itself 
eternally anew1 breaks forth as  the    
first moving of subjectivity1    7#b47  
,in the organism of plants or the       
vegetable kingdom4 ,the plant  rises    
indeed to a formative process1 to a     
process of assimilation1 and  to a      
process of species4 ,but it is not yet a
 totality perfectly  organized in       
itself4 ,each part of the plant is the  
whole individual1  each twig is the     
whole tree4 ,the parts are related      
indifferently to each  other2 the crown 
can become a root1 and the root a crown4
 ,the plant1  therefore1 does not yet   

attain a true being in se of            
individuality2  for1 in order that this 
may be attained1 an absolute unity of   
the  individual is necessary4 ,this     
unity1 which constitutes an individual  
and  concrete subjectivity1 is first    
seen in    7#c47 ,the animal organism1  
the animal kingdom4 ,an uninterrupted   
intus-susception1 free motion and       
sensation1 are first found in the       
animal organism4 ,in its higher forms we
 find an inner warmth and a  voice4 ,in 
its highest form1 man1 nature1 or rather
 the spirit1 which  works through       
nature1 apprehends itself as conscious  
individuality1 as  ,ego4 ,the spirit    
thus become a free and rational self1   
has now completed  its self-emancipation
 from nature4    ,,iii4 ,,philosophy    
,,of ,,mind4--#a4 ,,the ,,subjective    
,,mind4--,the mind is the truth  of     
nature2 it is being removed from its    
estrangement1 and become  identical with
 itself4 ,its formal essence1 therefore1
 is freedom1 the  possibility of        

abstracting itself from every thing     
else2 its material  essence is the      
capacity of manifesting itself as mind1 
as a conscious  rationality1--of        
positing the intellectual universe as   
its kingdom1 and  of building a         
structure of objective rationality4 ,in 
order1 however1 to  know itself1 and    
every thing rational1--in order to posit
 nature more and  more negatively1 the  
mind1 like nature1 must pass through a  
series of  stages or emancipative acts4 
,as it comes from nature and rises from 
its  externality to being1 per se1 it is
 at first soul or spirit of nature1  and
 as such1 it is an object of            
anthropology in a strict sense4 ,as     
this spirit of nature1 it sympathizes   
with the general planetary life of  the 
earth1 and is in this respect subject to
 diversity of climate1 and  change of   
seasons and days2 it sympathizes with   
the geographical portion  of the world  
which it occupies1 i4 e41 it is related 
to a diversity of  race2 still farther1 

it bears a national type1 and is        
moreover  determined by mode of life1   
formation of the body1 c41 while these  
natural conditions work also upon its   
intelligent and moral character4        
,lastly1 we must here take notice of the
 way in which nature has  determined the
 individual subject1 i4 e4 his natural  
temperament1  character1 idiosyncrasy1  
c4 ,to this belong the natural changes  
of life1  age1 sexual relation1 sleep1  
and waking4 ,in all this the mind is    
still  buried in nature1 and this middle
 condition between being per se and  the
 sleep of nature1 is sensation1 the     
hollow forming of the mind in its       
unconscious and unenlightened           
7verstandlos7 individuality4 ,a higher  
stage of sensation is feeling1 i4 e4    
sensation in se1 where being  per se    
appears2 feeling in its completed form  
is self-feeling4 ,since  the subject1 in
 self-feeling1 is buried in the         
peculiarity of his  sensations1 but at  
the same time concludes himself with    

himself1 as a  subjective one1 the      
self-feeling is seen to be the          
preliminary step to  consciousness4 ,the
 ,ego now appears as the shaft in which 
all these  sensations1 representations1 
cognitions and thoughts are preserved1  
which is with them all1 and constitutes 
the centre in which they all  come      
together4 ,the mind as conscious1 as a  
conscious being per se1 as  ,ego1 is the
 object of the phenomenology of         
consciousness4    ,the mind was         
individual1 so long as it was interwoven
 with nature2 it  is consciousness or   
,ego when it has divested itself of     
nature4 ,when  distinguishing itself    
from nature1 the mind withdraws itself  
into  itself1 and that with which it was
 formerly interwoven1 and which gave  it
 a peculiar 7earthly1 national1 c47     
determination1 stands now  distinct from
 it1 as its external world 7earth1      
people1 c74 ,the awaking  of the ,ego is
 thus the act by which the objective    
world1 as such1 is  created2 while on   

the other hand1 the ,ego awakens to a   
conscious  subjectivity only in the     
objective world1 and in distinction from
 it4  ,the ,ego1 over against the       
objective world1 is consciousness in the
  strict sense of the word4             
,consciousness becomes                  
self-consciousness by  passing through  
the stages of immediate sensuous        
consciousness1  perception1 and         
understanding1 and convincing itself in 
this its  formative history1 that it has
 only to do with itself1 while it       
believed  that it had to do with        
something objective4 ,again1            
self-consciousness  becomes universal or
 rational self-consciousness1 as        
follows3 ,in its  strivings to stamp the
 impress of the ,ego upon the objective1
 and thus  make the objective           
subjective1 it falls in conflict with   
other  self-consciousnesses1 and begins 
a war of extermination against them1    
but rises from this bellum omnium contra
 omnes1 as common  consciousness1 as the

 finding of the proper mean between     
command and  obedience1 i4 e4 as truly  
universal1 i4 e4 rational               
self-consciousness4 ,the rational       
self-consciousness is actually free1    
because1 when related to another1 it is 
really related to itself1 and in  all is
 still with itself2 it has emancipated  
itself from nature4 ,we have  now mind  
as mind1 divested of its naturalness and
 subjectivity1 and as  such1 it is an   
object of ,pneumatology4    ,mind is at 
first theoretical mind1 or intelligence1
 and then practical  mind1 or will4 ,it 
is theoretical in that it has to do with
 the rational  as something given1 and  
now posits it as its own2 it is         
practical in  that it immediately wills 
the subjective content 7truth71 which it
 has  as its own1 to be freed from its  
one-sided subjective form1 and          
transformed into an objective4 ,the     
practical mind is1 so far1 the truth  of
 the theoretical4 ,the theoretical mind1
 in its way to the practical1  passes   

through the stages of intuition1        
representation1 and thought2 and  the   
will on its side forms itself into a    
free will through impulse1  desire1 and 
inclination4 ,the free will1 as having a
 being in space  7,daseyn71 is the      
objective mind1 right1 and the state4   
,in right1  morals and the state1 the   
freedom and rationality1 which are      
chosen by  the will1 take on an         
objective form4 ,every natural          
determination and  impulse now becomes  
moralized1 and comes up to view again as
 ethical  institute1 as right and duty  
7the sexual impulse now appears as      
marriage1 and the impulse of revenge as 
civil punishment1 c47    #b4 ,,the      
,,objective ,,mind4--7#a47 ,the         
immediate objective being 7,daseyn7 of  
the free will is the right4 ,the        
individual1 so far as he is capable of  
rights1 so far as he has rights and     
exercises them1 is a person4 ,the  maxim
 of right is1 therefore1 be a person and
 have respect to other  persons4 ,the   

person allows himself an external sphere
 for his freedom1 a  substratum in which
 he can exercise his will3 as property1 
possession4  ,as person ,i have the     
right of possession1 the absolute right 
of  appropriation1 the right to cast my 
will over every thing1 which thereby    
becomes mine4 ,but there exist other    
persons besides myself4 ,my right is1   
therefore1 limited through the right of 
others4 ,there thus arises a  conflict  
between will and will1 which is settled 
in a compact1 in a  common will4 ,the   
relation of compact is the first step   
towards the  state1 but only the first  
step1 for if we should define the state 
as a  compact of all with all1 this     
would sink it in the category of private
  rights and private property4 ,it does 
not depend upon the will of the         
individual whether he will live in the  
state or not4 ,the relation of  compact 
refers to private property4 ,in a       
compact1 therefore1 two wills  merge    
themselves in a common will1 which as   

such becomes a right4 ,but  just here   
lies also the possibility of a conflict 
between the individual  will and the    
right or the universal will4 ,the       
separation of the two is a  wrong 7civil
 wrong1 fraud1 crime74 ,this separation 
demands a  reconciliation1 a restoration
 of the right or the universal will from
  its momentary suppression or negation1
 by the particular will4 ,the right     
restoring itself in respect of the      
particular will1 and establishing a     
negation of the wrong1 is punishment4   
,those theories1 which found the  right 
of punishment in some end of warning or 
improvement1 mistake the  essence of    
punishment4 ,threatening1 warning1 c41  
are finite ends1 i4  e4 means1 and      
moreover uncertain means3 but an act of 
righteousness  should not be made a     
means2 righteousness is not exercised in
 order that  any thing other than itself
 shall be gained4 ,the fulfilment and   
self-manifestation of righteousness is  
absolute end1 self-end4 ,the  particular

 views we have mentioned1 can only be   
considered in reference  to the mode of 
punishment4 ,the punishment which is    
inflicted on a  criminal1 is his right1 
his rationality1 his law1 beneath which 
he  should be subsumed4 ,his act comes  
back upon himself4 ,hegel also defends  
capital punishment whose abolition      
seemed to him as an untimely            
sentimentalism4    7#b47 ,the removal of
 the opposition of the universal and    
particular will  in the subject         
constitutes morality4 ,in morality the  
freedom of the  will is carried forward 
to a self-determination of the          
subjectivity1 and  the abstract right   
becomes duty and virtue4 ,the moral     
standpoint is the  standpoint of        
conscience1 it is the right of the      
subjective will1 the  right of a free   
ethical decision4 ,in the consideration 
of strict right1  it is no inquiry what 
my principle or my view might be1 but in
 morality  the question is at once      
directed towards the purpose and moving 

spring  of the will4 ,hegel calls this  
standpoint of moral reflection and      
dutiful  action for a reason--morality1 
in distinction from a substantial1      
unconditioned and unreflecting ethics4  
,this standpoint has three  elements2   
7#a7 the element of resolution          
7vorsatz71 where we consider  the inner 
determination of the acting subject1    
that which allows an act  to be ascribed
 only to me1 and the blame of it to rest
 only on my will  7imputation72 7#b7 the
 element of purpose1 where the completed
 act is  regarded not according to its  
consequences1 but according to its      
relative worth in reference to myself4  
,the resolution was still  internal2 but
 now the act is completed1 and ,i must  
suffer myself to  judge according to the
 constituents of the act1 because ,i    
must have  known the circumstances under
 which ,i acted2 7#c7 the element of the
  good1 where the act is judged         
according to its universal worth4 ,the  
good  is peculiarly the reconciliation  

of the particular subjective will with  
the universal will1 or with the         
conception of the will2 in other words1 
to will the rational is good4 ,opposed  
to this is evil1 or the elevation  of   
the subjective will against the         
universal1 the attempt to set up the    
peculiar and individual choice as       
absolute2 in other words1 to will the   
irrational is evil4    7#c47 ,in        
morality we had conscience and the      
abstract good 7the good which  ought to 
be7 standing over against each other4   
,the concrete identity of  the two1 the 
union of subjective and objective good1 
is ethics4 ,in the  ethical the good has
 become actualized in an existing world1
 and a  nature of self-consciousness4   
,the ethical mind is seen at first      
immediately1 or in a natural form1 as   
marriage and the family4 ,three elements
 meet together in marriage1  which      
should not be separated1 and which are  
so often and so wrongly  isolated4      
,marriage is 7#a7 a sexual relation1 and

 is founded upon a  difference of sex2  
it is1 therefore1 something other than  
,platonic love  or monkish asceticism2  
7#b7 it is a civil contract2 7#c7 it is 
love4 ,yet  ,hegel lays no great stress 
upon this subjective element in         
concluding  upon marriage1 for a        
reciprocal affection will spring up in  
the married  life4 ,it is more ethical  
when a determination to marry is first1 
and a  definite personal affection      
follows afterwards1 for marriage is most
  prominently duty4 ,hegel would1       
therefore1 place the greatest obstacles 
in the way of a dissolution of marriage4
 ,he has also developed and  described  
in other respects the family state with 
a profound ethical  feeling4    ,since  
the family becomes separated into a     
multitude of families1 it is a  civil   
society1 in which the members1 though   
still independent  individuals1 are     
bound in unity by their wants1 by the   
constitution of  rights as a means of   
security for person and property1 and by

 an outward  administrative arrangement4
 ,hegel distinguished the civil society 
from  the state in opposition to most   
modern theorists upon the subject1 who1 
regarding it as the great end of the    
state to give security of property  and 
of personal freedom1 reduced the state  
to a civil society4 ,but on  such a     
standpoint which would make the state   
wholly of wants and of  rights1 it is   
impossible1 e4 g4 to conceive of war4   
,on the ground of  civil society each   
one stands for himself1 is independent1 
and makes  himself as end1 while every  
thing else is a means for him4 ,but the 
state1 on the contrary1 knows no        
independent individuals1 each one of    
whom may regard and pursue only his own 
well-being2 but in the state1  the whole
 is the end1 and the individual is the  
means4--,for the  administration of     
justice1 ,hegel1 in opposition to those 
of our time who  deny the right of      
legislation1 would have written and     
intelligible laws1  which should be     

within reach of every one2 still        
farther1 justice should  be administered
 by a public trial by jury4--,in respect
 of the  organization of civil society1 
,hegel expresses a great preference for 
a  corporation4 ,sanctity of marriage1  
he says1 and honor in corporations1  are
 the two elements around which the      
disorganization of civil society  turns4
    ,civil society passes over into the 
state since the interest of the         
individual loses itself in the idea of  
an ethical whole4 ,the state is  the    
ethical idea actualized1 it is the      
ethical mind as it rules over the       
action and knowledge of the individuals 
conceived in it4 ,finally the  states   
themselves1 since they appear as        
individuals in an attracting or         
repelling relation to each other1       
represent1 in their destiny1 in their   
rise and fall1 the process of the       
world's history4    ,in his apprehension
 of the state1 ,hegel approached very   
near the ancient  notion1 which merged  

the individual and the right of         
individuality1  wholly in the will of   
the state4 ,he held fast to the         
omnipotence of the  state in the ancient
 sense4 ,hence his resistance to modern 
liberalism1  which would allow          
individuals to postulate1 to criticize1 
and to will  according to their improved
 knowledge4 ,the state is with ,hegel   
the  rational and ethical substance in  
which the individual has to live1 it  is
 the existing reason to which the       
individual has to submit himself  with a
 free view4 ,he regarded a limited      
monarchy as the best form of            
government1 after the manner of the     
,english constitution1 to which ,hegel  
was especially inclined1 and in         
reference to which he uttered his       
well-known saying that the king was but 
the dot upon the i4 ,there must  be an  
individual1 ,hegel supposes1 who can    
affirm for the state1 who  can prefix an
 8,i will0 to the resolves of the state1
 and who can be  the head of a formal   

decision4 ,the personality of a state1  
he says1 8is  only actual as a person1  
as monarch40 ,hence ,hegel defends      
hereditary  monarchy1 but he places the 
nobility by its side as a mediating     
element  between people and prince--not 
indeed to control or limit the          
government1  nor to maintain the rights 
of the people1 but only that the people 
may  experience that there is a good    
rule1 that1 the consciousness of the    
people may be with the government and   
that the state may enter into the       
subjective consciousness of the people4 
,states and the minds of individual     
races pour their currents into the      
stream of the world's history4 ,the     
strife1 the victory1 and the  subjection
 of the spirits of individual races1 and
 the passing over of  the world spirit  
from one people to another1 is the      
content of the  world's history4 ,the   
development of the world's history is   
generally  connected with some ruling   
race1 which carries in itself the world 

spirit in its present stage of          
development1 and in distinction from    
which the spirits of other races have no
 rights4 ,thus these race-spirits  stand
 around the throne of the absolute      
spirit1 as the executors of its         
actualization1 as the witnesses and     
adornment of its glory4    #c4 ,,the    
,,absolute ,,mind4--7#a47 sthetics4 ,the
 absolute mind is immediately  present  
to the sensuous intuition as the        
beautiful or as art4 ,the  beautiful is 
the appearance of the idea through a    
sensible medium 7a  crystal1 color1     
tone1 poetry72 it is the idea actualized
 in the form of  a limited phenomenon4  
,to the beautiful 7and to its           
subordinate kinds1  the simply          
beautiful1 the sublime1 and the comical7
 two factors always  belong1 thought and
 matter2 but both these are inseparable 
from each  other2 the matter is the     
outer phenomenon of the thought1 and    
should  express nothing but the thought 
which inspires it and shines through it4

  ,the different ways in which matter   
and form are connected1 furnish the     
different forms of art4 ,in the symbolic
 form of art the matter  preponderates2 
the thought presses through it1 and     
brings out the ideal  only with         
difficulty4 ,in the classic form of art1
 the ideal has attained  its adequate   
existence in the matter2 content and    
form are absolutely  befitting each     
other4 ,lastly1 in romantic art1 the    
mind preponderates1  and the matter is a
 mere appearance and sign through which 
the mind  every where breaks out1 and   
struggles up above the material4 ,the   
system  of particular arts is connected 
with the different forms of art2 but the
  distinction of one particular art from
 another1 depends especially upon  the  
difference of the material4    7a47 ,the
 beginning of art is ,architecture4 ,it 
belongs essentially to  the symbolic    
form of art1 since in it the sensible   
matter far  preponderates1 and it first 
seeks the true conformity between       

content  and form4 ,its material is     
stone1 which it fashions according to   
the laws  of gravity4 ,hence it has the 
character of magnitude1 of silent       
earnestness1 of oriental sublimity4     
7b47 ,sculpture4--,the material of this 
art is also stone1 but it  advances from
 the inorganic to the organic4 ,it gives
 the stone a bodily  form1 and makes it 
only a serving vehicle of the thought4  
,in sculpture1  the material1 the stone1
 since it represents the body1 that     
building of  the soul1 in its clearness 
and beauty1 disappears wholly in the    
ideal2  there is nothing left of the    
material which does not serve the idea4 
7c47 ,painting4--,this is preeminently a
 romantic art4 ,it represents1  as      
sculpture cannot do1 the life of the    
soul1 the look1 the disposition1  the   
heart4 ,its medium is no longer a coarse
 material substratum1 but the  colored  
surface1 and the soul-like play of      
light2 it gives the  appearance only of 
complete spacial dimension4 ,hence it is

 able to  represent in a complete       
dramatic movement the whole scale of    
feelings1  conditions of heart1 and     
actions4    7d47 ,music4--,this leaves  
out all relation of space4 ,its material
 is  sound1 the vibration of a sonorous 
body4 ,it leaves1 therefore1 the field  
of sensuous intuition1 and works        
exclusively upon the sensation4 ,its    
basis is the breast of the sensitive    
soul4 ,music is the most subjective     
art4    7e47 ,lastly in ,poetry1 or the 
speaking art1 is the tongue of art      
loosed2 poetry can represent every      
thing4 ,its material is not the mere    
sound1 but the sound as word1 as the    
sign of a representation1 as the        
expression of reason4 ,but this material
 cannot be formed at random1 but  only  
in verse according to certain rhythmical
 and musical laws4 ,in  poetry1 all     
other arts return again2 as epic1       
representing in a pleasing  and extended
 narrative the figurative history of    
races1 it corresponds  to the plastic   

arts2 as lyric1 expressing some inner   
condition of soul1  it corresponds to   
music2 as dramatic poetry1 exhibiting   
the struggles  between characters acting
 out of directly opposite interests1 it 
is the  union of both these arts4       
7#b47 ,philosophy of ,religion4--,poetry
 forms the transition from art to       
religion4 ,in art the idea was present  
for the intuition1 in religion it  is   
present for the representation4 ,the    
content of every religion is the        
reconciliation of the finite with the   
infinite1 of the subject with ,god4     
,all religions seek a union of the      
divine and the human4 ,this was done in 
the crudest form by    7a47 ,the natural
 religions of the oriental world4 ,god  
is1 with them1  but a power of nature1 a
 substance of nature1 in comparison with
 which  the finite and the individual   
disappear as nothing4    7b47 ,a higher 
idea of ,god is attained by the         
religions of spiritual  individuality1  
in which the divine is looked upon as   

subject1--as an  exalted subjectivity1  
full of power and wisdom in ,judaism1   
the religion  of sublimity2 as a circle 
of plastic divine forms in the ,grecian 
religion1 the religion of beauty2 as an 
absolute end of the state in the  ,roman
 religion1 the religion of the          
understanding or of design4    7c47 ,the
 revealed or ,christian religion first  
establishes a positive  reconciliation  
between ,god and the world1 by beholding
 the actual unity  of the divine and the
 human in the person of ,christ1 the    
,god-man1 and  apprehending ,god as     
triune1 i4 e4 as ,himself1 as incarnate1
 and as  returning from this incarnation
 to ,himself4 ,the intellectual content 
of  revealed religion1 or of            
,christianity1 is thus the same as that 
of  speculative philosophy2 the only    
difference being1 that in the one case  
the content is represented in the form  
of the representation1 in the  form of a
 history2 while1 in the other1 it       
appears in the form of the  conception4 

,stripped of its form of religious      
representation1 we have  now the        
standpoint of    7#c47 ,the ,absolute   
,philosophy1 or the thought knowing     
itself as all  truth1 and reproducing   
the whole natural and intellectual      
universe from  itself1 having the system
 of philosophy for its development--a   
closed  circle of circles4    tb        
,with ,hegel closes the history of      
philosophy4 ,the philosophical          
developments which have succeeded him1  
and which are partly a carrying  out of 
his system1 and partly the attempt to   
lay a new basis for  philosophy1 belong 
to the present1 and not yet to history4 
,,the ,,end4      ,,footnotes3          
,footnote #a3 ,this word literally means
 clearing up1 but has a  philosophical  
sense for which no precise equivalent is
 found in the  ,english language4 ,when 
used physically1 it denotes that every  
obstruction which prevented the clear   
sight of the bodily eye is  removed1 and
 when used psychologically it implies   

the same fact in  reference to our      
mental vision4 ,the ,aufklrung in       
philosophy is hence  the clearing up of 
difficulties which have hindered a true 
philosophical  insight4 ,to express     
this1 ,i know of no better word than the
 literal  rendering1 8up-clearing0 or   
8clearing up0 which the reader will find
  adopted in the following              
pages4--,,translator4    ,footnote #b3  
,the article on ,socrates1 from page #eb
 to page #fd1 was  translated by ,prof4 
,n4 ,g4 ,clark1 of the ,university of   
,vermont4    ,footnote #c3 ,a ,german   
mile is about four and a half ,english  
miles4--,,tr4    ,footnote #d3          
,schelling died ,august #bjth1 #ahed1 at
 ,ragaz1 ,switzerland1  whither he had  
gone for the benefit of his health1     
which had long been                     
declining4--,,translator4      ,d4      
,,appleton  ,,co4',s ,,publications4    
,,the     ,,two ,,great ,,answers       
,,to ,,the     ,,recent ,,attack ,,on   
,,the ,,bible4      ,i4--,,replies ,,to 

8,,essays ,,and ,,reviews40    ,with a  
,preface by the ,lord ,bishop of        
,oxford4 #a ,vol41 #abmo1 ,cloth1       
#a4ej4    ,,contents4         ,i4--,,the
 ,,education ,,of ,,the ,,world4 ,by the
 ,rev4 ,e4 ,m4 ,,goulburn4              
,,ii4--,,bunsen1 the ,,critical         
,,school1 and ,dr4 ,,williams4 ,by the  
,rev4            ,j4 ,h4 ,,rose4        
,,iii4--,,miracles4 ,by the ,rev4 ,c4   
,a4 ,,heurtley1 ,d4,d4                  
,,iv4--,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the          
,,national ,,church4 ,by the ,rev4 ,w4  
,j4 ,,irons1            ,d4,d4          
,v4--,,the ,,creative ,,week4 ,by the   
,rev4 ,g4 ,,robinson1 ,m4,a4            
,,vi4--,,rationalism4 ,by the ,rev4 ,a4 
,w4 ,,haddan4       ,,vii4--,,on ,,the  
,,interpretation ,,of ,,scripture4 ,by  
the ,rev4 ,,chr4                        
,,wordsworth1 ,d4,d4      ,,appendix3   
,i4--,,letter ,,from ,,the ,,rev4       
,,robert ,,main1 ,m4,a41 ,pembroke      
,college1           ,radcliffe          
,observer4       ,,ii4--,,letter ,,from 

,,john ,,phillips1 ,m4,a41 ,magdalen    
,college1 ,reader           in ,geology 
in the ,university of ,oxford4          
,,ii4--,,aids ,,to ,,faith4    ,a       
,series of ,theological ,essays by      
,various ,writers1 #a ,volume1 #abmo1   
#ech  pages1 #a4ej4    ,,contents4      
,i4--,,on ,,miracles ,,as ,,evidences   
,,of ,,christianity4 ,by ,h4 ,l4        
,,mansel1             ,b4,d4            
,,ii4--,,on ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,the    
,,evidences ,,of ,,christianity4 ,by    
,,william             ,,fitzgerald1     
,d4,d4        ,,iii4--,,prophecy4 ,by   
,a4 ,,mccaul1 ,d4,d4                    
,,iv4--,,ideology ,,and ,,subscription4 
,by ,f4 ,c4 ,,crooke1 ,m4,a4            
,v4--,,the ,,mosaic ,,record ,,of       
,,creation4 ,by ,a4 ,,mccaul1 ,d4,d4    
,,vi4--,,on ,,the ,,genuineness ,,and   
,,authenticity ,,of ,,the ,,pentateuch4 
,by             ,,geo4 ,,rawlinson1     
,m4,a4        ,,vii4--,,inspiration4 ,by
 ,,edward ,,harold ,,browne1 ,b4,d4     
,,viii4--,,the ,,death ,,of ,,christ4   

,by ,,wm4 ,,thomson1 ,bishop of         
,gloucester and ,bristol4               
,,ix4--,,scripture ,,and ,,its          
,,interpretation4 ,by ,,chas4 ,,john    
,,ellicott1             ,b4,d4          
,,on       ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,species
       by       ,means of ,natural      
,selection2       ,,or1       ,,the     
,,preservation ,,of ,,favored ,,races   
,,in ,,the       ,,struggle ,,for       
,,life4       ,,by       ,,charles      
,,darwin1 ,a4 ,m4       ,one ,volume4   
#abmo4 ,cloth1 #a4ej4         8,his     
first point is to show that species are 
in many cases not     well defined1 and 
that the whole order of natural history 
seems to be in a state of mutation1 by  
reason of constant     variations4 ,thus
 even under domestication1 important    
changes     may be introduced by        
intercrossing1 by selection of the best 
individuals for propagation1 by crossing
 parents marked by     however slight1  
but favorable peculiarities4       8,his
 second point is what he terms the      

universal and necessary     struggle for
 existence4 ,this follows from the high 
geometrical     ratio of increase common
 to all beings4 ,if there were no       
catastrophes1 any one of the existing   
species would be     sufficiently       
numerous in a few thousand years to     
cover the     whole earth1 to the       
exclusion of everything else4           
8,his third point is to prove that this 
struggle is directed by     the law of  
natural selection4 ,even the races of   
domestic     animals may be constantly  
improved and modified by choosing       
the best individuals for propagation4   
,nature brings the same     discipline  
to bear upon the whole domain of animal 
and     vegetable life4 ,she seizes at  
once upon any slight variation     that 
is favorable1 and perpetuates it2 in the
 universal     pressure1 any variation  
that is injurious is immediately        
extinguished40    ,any of the above sent
 free by mail on receipt of price4      
,,new ,,publications       ,,of         

,d4 ,,appleton  ,,co41       #ddc and   
#dde ,broadway1 ,new ,york4             
,evidence as to ,man's ,place in        
,nature4       ,by ,,thomas ,h4         
,,huxley1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s41 ,f4 ,l4 ,s4 #a   
,vol4 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,illustrated1      
#a4be4       ,,contents3         ,i4 ,on
 the ,natural ,history of ,man-like     
,apes4      ,,ii4 ,on the ,relation of  
,man to the ,lower ,animals4     ,,iii4 
,on some ,fossil ,remains of ,man4      
,money4       ,by ,,chas4 ,,moran4 #a   
,vol4 #abmo4 ,cloth1 #a4be4       8,the 
constantly increasing division of labor 
daily increases     the exchange of     
commodities and services1 in which money
 plays     so important a part4 ,the    
subject of money is1 therefore1         
supposed by the writer to be of         
sufficient general interest to          
warrant the publication of the present  
work4 ,if it shall aid     in           
dissipating any of the numerous errors  
and prejudices so     long connected    
with money1 and thus increase the power 

of this     instrument to further the   
well-being and progress of humanity1    
the object of the writer will be        
attained and his labors amply           
compensated40         ,the ,gentle      
,skeptic2    ,or1 ,essays and           
,conversations of a ,country ,justice on
 the ,authenticity  and ,truthfulness of
 the ,old ,testament ,records4 ,edited  
by the ,rev4 ,c4  ,,walworth4 #a ,vol4  
#abmo4 ,cloth1 #a4be4       8,this is   
one of those books that require not only
 reading but     studying1 and yet it   
can be read with interest even by those 
who never study4 ,it is a book rich in  
scholarly research1     masterly in     
argument1 admirable in methodical       
arrangement40--,the ,tablet4      ,the  
,american ,annual ,encyclopdia1         
,and ,register of ,important ,events of 
the year #ahfb4 ,embracing              
,political1 ,civil1 ,military1 and      
,social ,affairs2 ,public               
,documents2 ,biography1 ,statistics1    
,commerce1 ,finance1     ,literature1   

,science1 ,agriculture1 and ,mechanical 
,industry4 #a     ,vol4 #hvo4 ,cloth1   
#d4jj2 ,library ,leather1 #d4ge2 ,half  
,mor41     #e4ej2 ,half ,russia1 #f4jj4 
,the favorable reception given to the   
volume for the preceding     year1 has  
induced us to make special efforts in   
the     preparation of this one4 ,its   
contents embrace the material and       
intellectual progress of the year1      
particularly in this     country2 the   
important civil and political measures  
of the     ,federal and ,state          
,governments2 an accurate and minute    
history     of the struggles of the     
great armies and their battles1         
illustrated with maps and plans of      
actions taken from official     copies2 
the debates of the ,federal and         
,confederate ,congresses2     financial 
measures of the ,government1 commerce1  
c41 c42 the     proceedings in the      
,confederate ,states to maintain the war
 and     establish their government2    
also1 the progress of foreign           

nations2 the developments in the        
physical sciences2 the     progress of  
literature2 mechanical inventions and   
improvements1 embracing the results of  
the ,british ,industrial                
,exhibition2 the principles involved1   
and the developments in     plating     
ships with iron2 descriptions of the    
most useful     patents2 the present    
statistics of the religious             
denominations2 and biographical sketches
 of the eminent     persons deceased in 
#ahfb1 c4      ,the ,united ,states     
,bank ,law3       ,an ,act to ,provide a
 ,national ,currency1 secured by a      
pledge of     ,united ,states ,stocks1  
and to provide for the circulation and  
,redemption thereof4 ,paper covers1 #be 
cents4    ,the ,pentateuch and ,book of 
,joshua1       ,critically examined4 ,by
 the ,right ,rev4 ,,john ,,wm4          
,,colenso1     ,bishop of ,natal4 #b    
,vols41 #abmo4 #a4be each4              
8,bishop ,colenso's books1 in which the 
genuineness and     authenticity of the 

earlier portions of the ,old ,testament 
are     doubted1 or1 as he expresses it1
 his #8arguments to prove the           
non-,mosaic and unhistorical character  
of the ,pentateuch1' have     created   
intense interest in ,england40--,chicago
 ,post4      ,man's ,cry1 and ,god's    
,gracious ,answer1       ,a             
,contribution ,toward the ,defence of   
the ,faith4 ,by ,rev4 ,b4               
,,franklin4 ,cloth1 crimped1 #ej cents4 
8,a thoughtful discussion of theism--or 
man's need of a ,god1 and     what kind 
of a ,god2 and of ,christianity--or     
,god's gracious     answer to that need1
 and how it is an                       
answer40--,congregationalist4           
,prof4 ,huxley's ,lectures 8,on the     
,origin of ,species40       #a ,vol4    
#abmo4 #a4       #a4 ,the ,present      
,condition of ,organic ,nature4--#b4    
,the ,past     ,condition of ,organic   
,nature4--#c4 ,the ,method by which the 
,causes     of the ,present and ,past   
,conditions of ,organic ,nature are to  

be     discovered4 ,the ,origination of 
,living ,beings4--#d4 ,the              
,perpetuation of ,living ,beings1       
,hereditary ,transmission and           
,variation4--#e4 ,the ,condition of     
,existence as affecting the             
,perpetuation of ,living ,beings4--#f4  
,a ,critical ,examination of     the    
,position of ,mr4 ,darwin's ,work 8,on  
the ,origin of ,species10     in        
relation to the complete ,theory of the 
,causes of the     ,phenomena of        
,organic ,nature4         8,readers who 
cannot accept ,mr4 ,darwin's doctrines  
and     conclusions will still be       
delighted with these lectures1 since    
they embody so much curious information 
and so many important     principles of 
biological science1 expressed so clearly
 as to     render the book1 even to     
readers possessing scarcely any         
previous knowledge of the subject1 not  
only intelligible but     more          
interesting than any                    
romance40--,weldon's ,register4         

,lectures on the ,symbolic ,character of
 the ,scriptures4       ,by ,rev4       
,,ariel ,,silver1 ,minister of the ,new 
,jerusalem ,church4 #a     ,vol41 #abmo4
 #bhf pages4 #a4be4         ,these      
lectures1 delivered to a mixed          
congregation during the     past winter1
 are now given to the public4           
8,the author assures the reader1 who has
 not looked into the     spiritual sense
 of the ,holy ,word1 that if he has a   
desire to     do so1 and will study the 
science of correspondences1 and read    
these simple illustrations of the sacred
 ,scriptures1 with a     sincere desire 
to become acquainted with the ,word of  
,god that     he may the better know his
 ,heavenly ,father1 his own soul1 and   
the true way of life1 that he may walk  
in it1 the ,lord will     open to his   
mind a new field of thought and lead him
 to a     fountain of heavenly wisdom   
which he will prize as more     valuable
 than all things else2 for he will find 
therein the     true life of            

,heaven40--,extract from ,preface4      
,the ,new and ,complete ,taxpayer's     
,manual1       ,containing the ,direct  
and ,excise ,taxes2 with the ,recent    
,amendments of ,congress1 and the       
,decisions of the ,commissioner4        
,also1 complete ,marginal ,references1  
and an analytical index1     showing all
 the ,items of ,taxation1 the ,mode of  
,proceeding1 and     the ,duties of the 
,officers1 with an ,explanatory         
,preface4 #a     ,vol4 #hvo1 #ahd pages4
 ,paper covers1 #ej cents2 cloth1 #ge   
cents4       ,an indispensable book for 
every citizen4      ,the ,crisis4       
#a ,vol41 #hvo4 ,paper covers1 #ie      
pages1 #ej cents4    ,madge2       ,or1 
,night and ,morning4 ,by ,h4 ,g4 ,b4 #a 
,vol41 #abmo4 #a4be4       ,from the    
,congregationalist4         8,it        
contains the story of a young girl      
#8bound out1' as the     custom is in   
the ,new ,england villages4 ,her        
,northern mistress     was a harsh1     
selfish and unfeeling woman1 and the    

#8bound     girl's' character is        
pleasantly and interestingly portrayed1 
as it becomes moulded and hewn out by   
the hard circumstances     of her lot1  
till she becomes #8purified by          
suffering1' a     perfect woman40       
,the ,new ,american ,cyclopdia4         
,edited by ,,george ,,ripley and        
,,charles ,a4 ,,dana4 ,now complete1 in 
#af vols4 #hvo1 double columns1 #gej    
pages each4 ,cloth1 #d2     ,sheep1     
#d4ge2 ,half ,mor41 #e4ej2 ,half        
,russia1 #f per volume4       ,the      
leading claims to public consideration  
which the ,new     ,american ,cyclopdia 
possesses may be thus briefly stated3   
8#a4 ,it surpasses all other similar    
works in the fulness and     ability of 
the articles relating to the ,united    
,states4       8#b4 ,no other work      
contains so many reliable biographies of
 the     leading men of this and other  
nations4 ,in this respect it is     far 
superior even to the more bulky         
,encyclopdia ,britannica4       8#c4    

,the best minds of this country have    
been employed in     enriching its pages
 with the latest data1 and the most     
recent     discoveries in every branch  
of manufactures1 mechanics1 and         
general science4       8#d4 ,it is a    
library in itself1 where every topic is 
treated1     and where information can  
be gleaned which will enable a          
student1 if he is so disposed1 to       
consult other authorities1     thus     
affording him an invaluable key to      
knowledge4       8#e4 ,it is neatly     
printed with readable type on good      
paper1 and     contains a most copious  
index4       8#f4 ,it is the only work  
which gives anything approaching        
correct descriptions of cities and towns
 of ,america1 or     embraces reliable  
statistics showing the wonderful growth 
of     all sections40      ,two         
,pictures2       ,or1 ,what ,we ,think  
of ,ourselves1 and ,what the ,world     
,thinks of     ,us4 ,by ,,maria ,j4     
,,mcintosh1 author of 8,two ,lives10    

8,charms and     ,countercharms10 etc4  
#a vol41 #abmo41 #dgf pages4 #a4ej4     
8,the previous works of ,miss ,mc,intosh
 have been popular in the     best sense
 of the word4 ,the simple beauty of her 
narratives1     combining pure sentiment
 with high principle1 and noble views   
of life and its duties1 ought to win for
 them a hearing at     every fireside in
 our land4 ,the lapse of time since we  
have     had any work of fiction from   
her pen1 has only served to     increase
 her power40      ,a ,glimpse of the    
,world4       ,by ,miss ,,sewell1 author
 of 8,amy ,herbert10 etc4 #a vol41      
#abmo4     ,cloth1 #a4be4       8,of the
 authoress's style and language it would
 be superfluous     to speak4 ,the      
simplicity of a refined nature1 the ease
 of a     skilled writer1 and the       
correctness of an industrious one1 are  
conspicuous in every page4 ,there is no 
straining at effect1 no     distortion  
of ,english palmed off as originality1  
no distrust     of native vigor evinced 

by a recourse to artificial40--,the     
,press4      ,the ,history of           
,civilization in ,england4       ,by    
,,henry ,,thomas ,,buckle4--#b vols4    
#hvo4 ,cloth1 #f4       ,whoever misses 
reading this book1 will miss reading    
what is1     in various respects1 to the
 best of our judgment and               
experience1 the most remarkable book of 
the day--one1 indeed1     that no       
thoughtful1 inquiring mind would miss   
reading for a     good deal4 ,let the   
reader be as adverse as he may to the   
writer's philosophy1 let him be as      
devoted to the obstructive     as ,mr4  
,buckle is to the progress party1 let   
him be as orthodox     in church creed  
as the other is heterodox1 as dogmatic  
as his     author is skeptical--let him1
 in short1 find his prejudices          
shocked at every turn of the argument1  
and all his     prepossessions whistled 
down the wind--still there is so much   
in this extraordinary volume to         
stimulate reflection1 and     excite to 

inquiry1 and provoke to earnest         
investigation1     perhaps 7to this or  
that reader7 on a track hitherto        
untrodden1 and across the virgin soil of
 untilled fields1     fresh woods and   
pastures new--that we may fairly defy   
the most     hostile spirit1 the most   
mistrustful and least sympathetic1 to   
read it through without being glad of   
having done so1 or1     having begun it1
 or even glanced at almost any one of   
its #hed     pages1 to pass it away     
unread4--,new ,monthly 7,london7        
,magazine4      ,history of the ,romans 
under the ,empire4       ,by ,,charles  
,,merivale1 ,b4,d41 late ,fellow of ,st4
 ,john's ,college4     #g ,vols4 small  
#hvo4 ,handsomely printed on tinted     
paper4 ,price1     #b per ,vol4 7,nearly
 ready47       ,,contents3       ,vols4 
,i and ,,ii4--,comprising the ,history  
to the ,fall of ,julius     ,csar4      
,vol4 ,,iii4--,to the ,establishment of 
the ,monarchy by ,augustus4       ,vols4
 ,,iv4 and ,v4--,from ,augustus to      

,claudius1 ,b4,c4 #bg to ,a4,d4     #ed4
       ,vol4 ,,vi4--,from the ,reign of 
,nero1 ,a4,d4 #ed1 to the ,fall of      
,jerusalem1 ,a4,d4 #gj4       ,vol4     
,,vii4--,from the ,destruction of       
,jerusalem1 ,a4,d4 #gj1 to the          
,death of ,m4 ,aurelius4       ,this    
valuable work terminates at the point   
where the narrative     of ,gibbon      
commences4       444 8,when we enter on 
a more searching criticism of the two   
writers1 it must be admitted that       
,merivale has as firm a grasp     of his
 subject as ,gibbon1 and that his work  
is characterized     by a greater       
freedom from prejudice1 and a sounder   
philosophy4       444 8,this history    
must always stand as a splendid monument
 of     his learning1 his candor1 and   
his vigorous grasp of intellect4        
,though he is in some respects inferior 
to ,macaulay and ,grote1     he must    
still be classed with them as one of the
 second great     triumvirate of        
,english historians40--,north ,american 

,review4     ,april1 #ahfc4             
,,new ,,views ,,of ,,heat ,,and ,,of    
,,the ,,forces4       ,,heat1           
,,considered ,,as ,a ,,mode ,,of        
,,motion1       ,being a ,course of     
,twelve ,lectures delivered before the  
,royal     ,institution of ,great       
,britain4       ,,by ,,john ,,tyndall1  
,f4 ,r4 ,s4       ,,professor ,,of      
,,natural ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the       
,,royal     ,,institution--,,author ,,of
 ,,the 8,,glaciers ,,of ,,the ,,alps40  
,with ,one ,hundred ,illustrations4     
#hvo41 #dhj pages4 ,price1 #b4jj4       
,this volume is by the gifted successor 
of ,faraday1 the young     ,professor of
 ,natural ,philosophy in the ,royal     
,institution of     ,england4 ,the      
author1 himself celebrated as a         
discoverer1 an     ingenious and fertile
 experimenter1 a bold but disciplined   
thinker1 a vivid and imaginative        
speaker1 and dealing with the     most  
splendid generalizations and the        
grandest phenomena of     nature1 was   

listened to with the profoundest        
attention4 ,the     new views of the    
nature of heat1 its connections with the
     other forms of force1 and the      
sublime part it plays in the     scheme 
of ,nature--views which have but        
recently been adopted in     the        
scientific world--are here for the first
 time brought     forward1 and          
illustrated with a resource of          
experiment1 a     brilliancy of         
illustration1 and a clearness and       
eloquence of     style for which        
,professor ,tyndall is unequalled4      
b,from the ,american ,journal of        
,science4_/b--,with all the skill which 
has made ,faraday the master of         
experimental science in ,great          
,britain1 ,professor ,tyndall enjoys the
 advantage of a superior     general    
culture1 and is thus enabled to set     
forth his     philosophy with all the   
graces of eloquence and the finish of   
superior diction4 ,with a simplicity1   
and absence of     technicalities which 

render his explanations lucid to        
unscientific minds1 and at the same time
 a thoroughness and     originality by  
which he instructs the most learned1 he 
unfolds     all the modern philosophy of
 heat4       b,new ,york                
,times4_/b--,professor ,tyndall's course
 of lectures on heat     is one of the  
most beautiful illustrations of a mode  
of     handling scientific subjects1    
which is comparatively new1 and         
which promises the best results1 both to
 science and to     literature          
generally2 we mean the treatment of     
subjects in a     style at once profound
 and popular4 ,the title of ,professor  
,tyndall's work indicates the theory of 
heat held by him1 and     indeed the    
only one now held by scientific men--it 
is a mode     of motion4       b,boston 
,journal4_/b--,he exhibits the curious  
and beautiful workings     of nature in 
a most delightful manner4 ,before the   
reader     particles of water lock      
themselves or fly asunder with a        

movement regulated like a dance4 ,they  
form themselves into     liquid flowers 
with fine serrated petals1 or into      
rosettes of     frozen gauze1 they bound
 upward in boiling fountains1 or creep  
slowly onward in stupendous glaciers4   
,flames burst into music     and sing1  
or cease to sing1 as the experimenter   
pleases1 and     metals paint themselves
 upon a screen in dazzling hues as the  
painter touches his canvas4       b,new 
,york ,tribune4_/b--,the most original  
and important contribution     that has 
yet been made to the theory and         
literature of     thermotics4           
b,scientific ,american4_/b--,the work is
 written in a charming style1     and is
 the most valuable contribution to      
scientific literature     that has been 
published in many years4 ,it is the most
 popular     exposition of the dynamical
 theory of heat that has yet            
appeared4 ,the old material theory of   
heat may be said to be     defunct4     
b,louisville ,democrat4_/b--,this is one

 of the most delightful     scientific  
works we have ever met4 ,the lectures   
are so full of     life and spirit that 
we can almost imagine the lecturer      
before     us1 and see his brilliant    
experiments in every stage of their     
progress4 ,the theory is so carefully   
and thoroughly explained     that no one
 can fail to understand it4 ,such books 
as these     create a love for science4 
b,troy ,whig4_/b--,no one can take up   
these lectures and pursue the           
general train and scope of thought which
 they compel1 without     having        
attained already to a love of practical 
science which     will inevitably       
impress itself on his mental habits     
hereafter4                              
b,independent4_/b--,professor ,tyndall's
 expositions and experiments     are    
remarkably thoughtful1 ingenious1 clear 
and convincing2     portions of the book
 have almost the interest of a romance1 
so     startling are the descriptions   
and elucidations4      ,any of these    

,books sent free by mail to any address 
on receipt of  ,price4       ,,recent   
,,publications       ,,of       ,d4     
,,appleton  ,,co41       #ddc  #dde     
,,broadway1 ,,new ,,york4       ,the    
,life and ,correspondence of ,,theodore 
,,parker1 ,minister of     the          
,twenty-eighth ,congregational ,society1
 ,boston4 ,by ,,john     ,,weiss4 ,with 
two ,portraits on ,steel1 fac-simile of 
,handwriting1     and nineteen ,wood    
,engravings4 #b vols41 #hvo4 #a1jjh     
pages4     ,price1 #f4       8,these    
volumes contain an account of ,mr4      
,parker's childhood     and             
self-education2 of the development of   
his theological     ideas2 of his       
scholarly and philosophical pursuits2   
and of his     relation to the          
,anti-,slavery cause1 and to the epoch  
in     ,america which preceded the civil
 war4 ,his two visits to ,europe     are
 described in letters and extracts from 
his journal4 ,an     autobiographical   
fragment is introduced in relation to   

,mr4     ,parker's early life1 and his  
letters of friendship on     literary1  
speculative1 and political topics are   
freely     interspersed4 ,the           
illustrations represent scenes connected
     with various periods of ,mr4       
,parker's life1 the houses he dwelt     
in1 his country haunts1 the meeting     
house1 his library1 and     the ,music  
,hall in which he preached40            
,catechism of the ,steam ,engine1       
,in its various ,applications to ,mines1
 ,mills1 ,steam ,navigation1            
,railways1 and ,agriculture4 ,with      
,practical ,instructions for the        
,manufacture and ,management of ,engines
 of every ,class4 ,by ,,john            
,,bourne1 ,c4 ,e4 ,new and ,revised     
,edition4 #a vol41 #abmo4               
,illustrated4 ,cloth4 #b4       8,in    
offering to the ,american public a      
reprint of a work on the     ,steam     
,engine so deservedly successful1 and so
 long considered     standard1 the      
,publishers have not thought it         

necessary that it     should be an exact
 copy of the ,english edition4 ,there   
were     some details in which they     
thought it could be improved and        
better adapted to the use of ,american  
,engineers4 ,on this     account the    
size of the page has been increased to a
 full     #abmo1 to admit of larger     
illustrations1 which1 in the ,english   
edition1 are often on too small a scale1
 and some of the     illustrations      
themselves have been supplied by others 
equally     applicable1 more recent1 and
 to us more familiar examples4 ,the     
first part of ,chapter ,,xi41 devoted in
 the ,english edition to     ,english   
portable and fixed agricultural engines1
 in this     edition gives place        
entirely to illustrations from ,american
     practice1 of steam engines as      
applied to different purposes1     and  
of appliances and machines necessary to 
them4 ,but with the     exception of    
some of the illustrations and the       
description of     them1 and the        

correction of a few typographical       
errors1 this     edition is a faithful  
transcript of the latest ,english       
edition40         ,d4 ,,appleton        
,,co4',s ,,publications4       ,history 
of the ,romans under the ,empire4 ,by   
,,charles ,,merivale1     ,b4 ,d41 late 
,fellow of ,st4 ,john's ,college4 #g    
vols41 small #hvo4     ,handsomely      
printed on tinted paper4 ,price1 in     
cloth1 #b per     vol4 ,half ,morocco   
extra1 #c #ej4       ,,contents3        
,vols4 ,i4 and ,,ii4--,comprising the   
,history to the ,fall of ,julius        
,csar4       ,vol4 ,,iii4--,to the      
,establishment of the ,monarchy by      
,augustus4       ,vols4 ,,iv4 and       
,v4--,from ,augustus to ,claudius1 ,b4  
,c4 #bg to ,a4 ,d4     #ed4       ,vol4 
,,vi4--,from the ,reign of ,nero1 ,a4   
,d4 #ed1 to the ,fall of     ,jerusalem1
 ,a4 ,d4 #gj4       ,vol4 ,,vii4--,from 
the ,destruction of ,jerusalem1 ,a4 ,d4 
#gj1 to the     ,death of ,m4 ,aurelius4
       ,this valuable work terminates at

 the point where the narrative     of   
,gibbon commences4       444 8,when we  
enter on a more searching criticism of  
the two     writers1 it must be admitted
 that ,merivale has as firm a grasp     
of his subject as ,gibbon1 and that his 
work is characterized     by a greater  
freedom from prejudice1 and a sounder   
philosophy4       444 8,this history    
must always stand as a splendid monument
 of     his learning1 his candor1 and   
his vigorous grasp of intellect4        
,though he is in some respects inferior 
to ,macaulay and ,grote1     he must    
still be classed with them1 as one of   
the second great     triumvirate of     
,english historians40--,north ,american 
,review1     ,april1 #ahfc4             
,practice in the ,executive ,department 
of the ,government1 under     the       
,pension1 ,bounty1 and ,prize ,laws of  
the ,united ,states1 with     ,forms and
 ,instructions for ,collecting ,arrears 
of ,pay1 ,bounty1     and ,prize ,money1
 and for ,obtaining ,pensions4 ,by      

,,robert ,,sewell1     ,counsellor at   
,law4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,sheep4 ,price1 #c 
#ej4       8,i offer this little book   
with confidence to the profession1      
as certain to save lawyers1 in one case1
 if they never have     any more1 more  
time and trouble than its cost4 ,to the 
public     generally1 the book is       
offered as containing a large amount of 
useful information on a subject now1    
unfortunately1 brought     home to half 
the families in the land4 ,to the       
officers and     soldiers of the ,army  
it will also be found a useful          
companion2     and it is hoped that by  
it an amount of information of great    
value to the soldiers1 and to their     
families at home1 will be               
disseminated1 and the prevailing        
ignorance respecting the     subject    
treated of in a great degree            
removed40--,extract from     ,preface4  
,hints to ,riflemen4       ,by ,h4 ,w4  
,s4 ,,cleveland4 #a vol41 #abmo4        
,illustrated1 with     numerous ,designs

 of ,rifles and ,rifle ,practice4       
,cloth4 ,price1     #a #ej4       8,i   
offer these hints as the contribution of
 an old sportsman1     and if ,i succeed
 in any degree in exciting an interest  
in the     subject1 my end will be      
accomplished1 even if the future        
investigations of those who are thus    
attracted should prove     any of my    
opinions to be erroneous40--,extract    
from ,preface4         ,laws and        
,principles of ,whist1 ,stated and      
,explained1 and its     ,practice       
,illustrated on an ,original ,system1 by
 means of hands     played completely   
through4 ,by ,,cavendish4 ,from the     
fifth ,london     edition4 #a vol41     
square #afmo4 ,gilt edge4 #a #be4       
8,an excellent and very clearly written 
treatise2 the rules of     the game     
thoroughly explained2 its practice      
illustrated by     means of hands played
 completely through1 and much of the    
minuti and finesse of the game given    
that we have never seen     in any other

 volume of the kind4 ,whist players will
 recognize     it as an authority2 and  
that it is a success is proved by its   
having already gone through five        
editions4 ,it is got out very           
neatly1 in blue and gold1 by the        
publishers40--,com4 ,bulletin4          
,roba di ,roma4       ,by ,w4 ,w4       
,,story4 #b vols41 #abmo4 ,cloth1 #c4   
8,till ,rome shall fall1 the ,city of   
the ,seven ,hills will be               
inexhaustible as a subject of interest4 
#8,roba di ,roma'     contains the      
gatherings of an honest observer and a  
real     artist4444 ,it has permanent   
value to entitle it to a place of       
honor on the shelf which contains every 
lover of ,italy's                       
,rome-books40--,athenum4         ,heat  
considered as a ,mode of ,motion4 ,being
 a ,course of ,twelve     ,lectures     
delivered at the ,royal ,institution of 
,great ,britain4     ,by ,,john         
,,tyndall1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,author of 8,the   
,glaciers of the ,alps40     #a vol41   

#abmo4 ,with #aja illustrations4 ,cloth4
 #b4       8,no one can rend ,dr4       
,tyndall's book without being impressed 
with the intensity of the author's      
conviction of the truth of     the      
theory which it is his object to        
illustrate1 or with the     boldness    
with which he confronts the difficulties
 which lie     encounters4444 ,dr4      
,tyndall's is the first work in which   
the     undulatory or mechanical theory 
of heat has been placed in a     popular
 light2 but we are sure that no one1    
however profound     his knowledge upon 
the subject of which it treats1 will    
rise     from its perusal without a     
feeling that he has been both           
gratified and instructed in a high      
degree while reading its                
pages40--,london ,reader4         ,life 
of ,edward ,livingston1 ,mayor of the   
,city of ,new ,york2     ,member of     
,congress2 ,senator of the ,united      
,states2 ,secretary of     ,state2      
,minister to ,france2 ,author of a      

,system of ,penal ,law for              
,louisiana2 ,member of the ,institute of
 ,france1 etc4 ,by ,,charles     ,h4    
,,hunt1 with an ,introduction by        
,,george ,,bancroft4 #a vol41 #hvo4     
,cloth1 #c4ej4       8,one of the purest
 of statesmen and the most genial of    
men1     was ,edward ,livingston1 whose 
career is presented in this             
volume4444       8,the author of this   
volume has done the country a service4  
,he     has given us in a becoming form 
an appropriate memorial of one     whom 
succeeding generations will be proud to 
name as an     ,american jurist and     
statesman40--,evangelist4         ,round
 the ,block4 ,an ,american ,novel4 ,with
 ,illustrations4 #a     vol41 #abmo4    
,cloth4 ,price1 #a #ej4       8,the     
story is remarkably clever4 ,it presents
 the most vivid     and various pictures
 of men and manners in the great        
,metropolis4 ,unlike most novels that   
now appear1 it has no     #8mission1'   
the author being neither a politician   

nor a     reformer1 but a story teller1 
according to the old pattern1     and a 
capital story he has produced1 written  
in the happiest     style1 and full of  
wit and action4 ,he evidently knows his 
ground1 and moves over it with the foot 
of a master4 ,it is a     work that will
 be read and admired1 unless all love   
for good     novels has departed from   
us2 and we know that such is not the    
case40--,boston ,traveler4         ,the 
,history of ,civilization in ,england4  
,by ,,henry ,,thomas     ,,buckle4 #b   
vols41 #hvo4 ,cloth4 #f4       8,whoever
 misses reading this book1 will miss    
reading what is1     in various         
respects1 to the best of our judgment   
and     experience1 the most remarkable 
book of the day--one1 indeed1     that  
no thoughtful1 inquiring mind would miss
 reading for a     good deal4 ,let the  
reader be as averse as he may to the    
writer's philosophy1 let him be as      
devoted to the obstructive     as ,mr4  
,buckle is to the progress party1 let   

him be as orthodox     in church creed  
as the other is heterodox1 as dogmatic  
as his     author is skeptical--let him1
 in short1 find his prejudices          
shocked at every turn of the argument1  
and all his     prepossessions whistled 
down the wind--still there is so much   
in this extraordinary volume to         
stimulate reflection1 and     excite to 
inquiry1 and provoke to earnest         
investigation1     perhaps 7to this or  
that reader7 on a track hitherto        
untrodden1 and across the virgin soil of
 untilled fields1     fresh woods and   
pastures new--that we may fairly defy   
the most     hostile spirit1 the most   
mistrustful and least sympathetic1 to   
read it through without being glad of   
having done so1 or     having begun it1 
or even glanced at almost any one of its
     pages1 to pass it away             
unread40--,new ,monthly 7,london7       
,magazine4         ,illustrations of    
,universal ,progress4       ,a ,series  
of ,essays4 ,by ,,herbert ,,spencer1    

,author of 8,the     ,principles of     
,psychology20 8,social ,statics20       
8,education40 #a     vol41 #abmo4       
,cloth1 #a #ge4       8,the readers who 
have made the acquaintance of ,mr4      
,herbert     ,spencer through his work  
on ,education1 and are interested in    
his views upon a larger range of        
subjects1 will welcome this     new     
volume of #8,essays4' ,passing by the   
more scientific and     philosophical   
speculations1 we may call attention to a
 group     of articles upon moral and   
political subjects1 which are very      
pertinent to the present condition of   
affairs40--,tribune4         ,thirty    
,poems4       ,,by ,,wm4 ,,cullen       
,,bryant4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth1 #a4be2
 cloth gilt1     #a4ge2 mor41 #c4ej4    
8,no ,english poet surpasses him in     
knowledge of nature1 and but     few are
 his equals4 ,he is better than ,cowper 
and ,thomson in     their special walks 
of poetry1 and the equal of ,wordsworth1
     that great high priest of          

nature40--,the ,world4         ,an      
,introduction to ,municipal ,law1       
designed for ,general     ,readers1 and 
for ,students in ,colleges and ,high    
,schools4 ,by     ,,john ,,norton       
,,pomeroy4 #a vol41 #hvo4 #edd pages4   
,cloth1 #c4       8,i have spent nearly 
four days in reading your book1 and am  
willing to say1 in reference to it1     
that1 when considered in     reference  
to its scope and the design had in view 
in entering     upon it1 it is a work of
 great merit4 ,the topics are presented 
clearly1 discussed with ability1 and in 
the main satisfactory     results       
arrived at4 ,parts ,i4 and ,,ii41 ,i    
think1 may prove very     useful to     
students at law and young lawyers1 as   
there is a     great deal in the history
 of the law1 and especially in its      
sources1 both common and civil1 that is 
very clearly1 briefly1     and logically
 stated1 and more available in the      
manner     presented in your work than  
in any other that ,i am acquainted      

with40--,from ,,amos ,,dean1 ,esq41     
,albany ,law ,school4                   
,thackeray2 ,the ,humorist and ,man of  
,letters1 the ,story of his     ,life1  
with particulars of his early career    
never before made     public4 ,by       
,,theodore ,,taylor1 ,esq4 ,illustrated 
with a ,portrait1     one of the latest 
taken from life2 ,view of ,thackeray's  
,house2     ,facsimile of his           
,handwriting2 ,humorous ,illustrations  
by ,george     ,cruikshank2 and other   
,pictures and ,sketches4 ,one vol41     
#abmo4     ,cloth4 ,price1 #a #be4      
8,the author1 ,mr4 ,t4 ,taylor1 long    
resident in ,paris1 has been            
collecting information for many years1  
and has much to say of     ,mr4         
,thackeray's artist life in that city4  
,the book is     illustrated with a     
portrait and some curious original      
sketches40--,from the ,guardian4        
,the ,iron ,manufacture of ,great       
,britain4 ,theoretically and            
,practically considered3 ,including     

,descriptive ,details of the     ,ores1 
,fuels1 and ,fluxes employed2 the       
,preliminary ,operation of              
,calcination2 the ,blast1 ,refining1 and
 ,puddling ,furnaces2     ,engines and  
,machinery2 and the ,various ,processes 
in ,union1     etc41 etc4 ,by ,w4       
,,truran1 ,c4 ,e41 formerly ,engineer at
 the     ,dowlais ,iron ,works1 under   
the late ,sir ,john ,guest1 ,bart4      
,second ,edition1 revised from the      
manuscripts of the late ,mr4            
,truran1 by ,j4 ,,arthur ,,phillips1    
,author of 8,a ,manual of               
,metallurgy10 8,records of ,mining10    
etc41 and ,,wm4 ,h4 ,,dorman4 ,one      
vol41 imperial #hvo4 ,containing #hd    
,plates4 ,price1 #aj4