,,transcriber',s ,,note3 ,italic text has been marked with underscores 4 ,inconsistencies in hyphenation have not been corrected2 inconsistencies in spelling have been corrected 7both phantasy and fantasy were used in the original text1 phantasy has been changed to fantasy for consistency74 ,a list of all corrections to the text can be found at the end of the document4 ,,human ,,nature ,,and ,,conduct ,an ,introduction to ,social ,psychology ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,new ,,york ,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company #aibb ,,copyright1 #aibb1 ,,by ,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company ,first ,printing1 ,jan41 #aibb ,second ,printing1 ,mar41 #aibb ,third ,printing1 ,june1 #aibb ,fourth ,printing1 ,aug41 #aibb ,fifth ,printing1 ,nov41 #aibb ,sixth ,printing1 ,april1 #aibc ,,printed ,,in ,,the ,u4 ,s4 ,a4 ,,by ,the ,quinn ,boden ,company ,,book ,,manufacturers ,,rahway ,,new ,,jersey ,,preface ,in the spring of #aiah ,i was invited by ,leland ,stanford ,junior ,university to give a series of three lectures upon the ,west ,memorial ,foundation4 ,one of the topics included within the scope of the ,foundation is ,human ,conduct and ,destiny4 ,this volume is the result1 as1 according to the terms of the ,foundation1 the lectures are to be published4 ,the lectures as given have1 however1 been rewritten and considerably expanded4 ,an ,introduction and ,conclusion have been added4 ,the lectures should have been published within two years from delivery4 ,absence from the country rendered strict compliance difficult2 and ,i am indebted to the authorities of the ,university for their indulgence in allowing an extension of time1 as well as for so many courtesies received during the time when the lectures were given4 ,perhaps the sub-title requires a word of explanation4 ,the book does not purport to be a treatment of social psychology4 ,but it seriously sets forth a belief that an understanding of habit and of different types of habit is the key to social psychology1 while the operation of impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized mental activity4 ,but they are secondary to habit so that mind can be understood in the concrete only as a system of beliefs1 desires and purposes which are formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment4 ,j4 ,d4 ,february1 #aiba ,,contents ,,page ,,introduction #a ,contempt for human nature2 pathology of goodness2 freedom2 value of science4 ,,part ,,one ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,habit ,,in ,,conduct ,,section ,i3 ,,habits ,,as ,,social ,,functions #ad ,habits as functions and arts2 social complicity2 subjective factor4 ,,section ,,ii3 ,,habits ,,and ,,will #bd ,active means2 ideas of ends2 means and ends2 nature of character4 ,,section ,,iii3 ,,character ,,and ,,conduct #dc ,good will and consequences2 virtues and natural goods2 objective and subjective morals4 ,,section ,,iv3 ,,custom ,,and ,,habit #eh ,human psychology is social2 habit as conservative2 mind and body4 ,,section ,v3 ,,custom ,,and ,,morality #ge ,customs as standards2 authority of standards2 class conflicts4 ,,section ,,vi3 ,,habit ,,and ,,social ,,psychology #hd ,isolation of individuality2 newer movements4 ,,part ,,two ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,impulse ,,in ,,conduct ,,section ,i3 ,,impulses ,,and ,,change ,,of ,,habits #hi ,present interest in instincts2 impulses as re-organizing4 ,,section ,,ii3 ,,plasticity ,,of ,,impulse #ie ,impulse and education2 uprush of impulse2 fixed codes4 ,,section ,,iii3 ,,changing ,,human ,,nature #ajf ,habits the inert factor2 modification of impulses2 war a social function2 economic regimes as social products2 nature of motives4 ,,section ,,iv3 ,,impulse ,,and ,,conflict ,,of ,,habits #abe ,possibility of social betterment2 conservatism4 ,,section ,v3 ,,classification ,,of ,,instincts #aca ,false simplifications2 self-love2 will to power2 acquisitive and creative4 ,,section ,,vi3 ,,no ,,separate ,,instincts #adi ,uniqueness of acts2 possibilities of operation2 necessity of play and art2 rebelliousness4 ,,section ,,vii3 ,,impulse ,,and ,,thought #afi ,,part ,,three ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,intelligence ,,in ,,conduct ,,section ,i3 ,,habit ,,and ,,intelligence #agb ,habits and intellect2 mind1 habit and impulse4 ,,section ,,ii3 ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,thinking #aha ,the trinity of intellect2 conscience and its alleged separate subject-matter4 ,,section ,,iii3 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,deliberation #ahi ,deliberation as imaginative rehearsal2 preference and choice2 strife of reason and passion2 nature of reason4 ,,section ,,iv3 ,,deliberation ,,and ,,calculation #aii ,error in utilitarian theory2 place of the pleasant2 hedonistic calculus2 deliberation and prediction4 ,,section ,v3 ,,the ,,uniqueness ,,of ,,good #baj ,fallacy of a single good2 applied to utilitarianism2 profit and personality2 means and ends4 ,,section ,,vi3 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,aims #bbc ,theory of final ends2 aims as directive means2 ends as justifying means2 meaning well as an aim2 wishes and aims4 ,,section ,,vii3 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,principles #bch ,desire for certainty2 morals and probabilities2 importance of generalizations4 ,,section ,,viii3 ,,desire ,,and ,,intelligence #bdh ,object and consequence of desire2 desire and quiescence2 self-deception in desire2 desire needs intelligence2 nature of idealism2 living in the ideal4 ,,section ,,ix3 ,,the ,,present ,,and ,,future #bfe ,subordination of activity to result2 control of future2 production and consummation2 idealism and distant goals4 ,,part ,,four ,,conclusion ,,section ,i3 ,,the ,,good ,,of ,,activity #bgh ,better and worse2 morality a process2 evolution and progress2 optimism2 ,epicureanism2 making others happy4 ,,section ,,ii3 ,,morals ,,are ,,human #bie ,humane morals2 natural law and morals2 place of science4 ,,section ,,iii3 ,,what ,,is ,,freedom8 #cjc ,elements in freedom2 capacity in action2 novel possibilities2 force of desire4 ,,section ,,iv3 ,,morality ,,is ,,social #cad ,conscience and responsibility2 social pressure and opportunity2 exaggeration of blame2 importance of social psychology2 category of right2 the community as religious symbol4 ,,introduction ,give a dog a bad name and hang him4 ,human nature has been the dog of professional moralists1 and consequences accord with the proverb4 ,man's nature has been regarded with suspicion1 with fear1 with sour looks1 sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities but only when these were placed in contrast with its actualities4 ,it has appeared to be so evilly disposed that the business of morality was to prune and curb it2 it would be thought better of if it could be replaced by something else4 ,it has been supposed that morality would be quite superfluous were it not for the inherent weakness1 bordering on depravity1 of human nature4 ,some writers with a more genial conception have attributed the current blackening to theologians who have thought to honor the divine by disparaging the human4 ,theologians have doubtless taken a gloomier view of man than have pagans and secularists4 ,but this explanation doesn't take us far4 ,for after all these theologians are themselves human1 and they would have been without influence if the human audience had not somehow responded to them4 ,morality is largely concerned with controlling human nature4 ,when we are attempting to control anything we are acutely aware of what resists us4 ,so moralists were led1 perhaps1 to think of human nature as evil because of its reluctance to yield to control1 its rebelliousness under the yoke4 ,but this explanation only raises another question4 ,why did morality set up rules so foreign to human nature8 ,the ends it insisted upon1 the regulations it imposed1 were after all outgrowths of human nature4 ,why then was human nature so averse to them8 ,moreover rules can be obeyed and ideals realized only as they appeal to something in human nature and awaken in it an active response4 ,moral principles that exalt themselves by degrading human nature are in effect committing suicide4 ,or else they involve human nature in unending civil war1 and treat it as a hopeless mess of contradictory forces4 ,we are forced therefore to consider the nature and origin of that control of human nature with which morals has been occupied4 ,and the fact which is forced upon us when we raise this question is the existence of classes4 ,control has been vested in an oligarchy4 ,indifference to regulation has grown in the gap which separates the ruled from the rulers4 ,parents1 priests1 chiefs1 social censors have supplied aims1 aims which were foreign to those upon whom they were imposed1 to the young1 laymen1 ordinary folk2 a few have given and administered rule1 and the mass have in a passable fashion and with reluctance obeyed4 ,everybody knows that good children are those who make as little trouble as possible for their elders1 and since most of them cause a good deal of annoyance they must be naughty by nature4 ,generally speaking1 good people have been those who did what they were told to do1 and lack of eager compliance is a sign of something wrong in their nature4 ,but no matter how much men in authority have turned moral rules into an agency of class supremacy1 any theory which attributes the origin of rule to deliberate design is false4 ,to take advantage of conditions after they have come into existence is one thing2 to create them for the sake of an advantage to accrue is quite another thing4 ,we must go back to the bare fact of social division into superior and inferior4 ,to say that accident produced social conditions is to perceive they were not produced by intelligence4 ,lack of understanding of human nature is the primary cause of disregard for it4 ,lack of insight always ends in despising or else unreasoned admiration4 ,when men had no scientific knowledge of physical nature they either passively submitted to it or sought to control it magically4 ,what cannot be understood cannot be managed intelligently4 ,it has to be forced into subjection from without4 ,the opaqueness of human nature to reason is equivalent to a belief in its intrinsic irregularity4 ,hence a decline in the authority of social oligarchy was accompanied by a rise of scientific interest in human nature4 ,this means that the make-up and working of human forces afford a basis for moral ideas and ideals4 ,our science of human nature in comparison with physical sciences is rudimentary1 and morals which are concerned with the health1 efficiency and happiness of a development of human nature are correspondingly elementary4 ,these pages are a discussion of some phases of the ethical change involved in positive respect for human nature when the latter is associated with scientific knowledge4 ,we may anticipate the general nature of this change through considering the evils which have resulted from severing morals from the actualities of human physiology and psychology4 ,there is a pathology of goodness as well as of evil2 that is1 of that sort of goodness which is nurtured by this separation4 ,the badness of good people1 for the most part recorded only in fiction1 is the revenge taken by human nature for the injuries heaped upon it in the name of morality4 ,in the first place1 morals cut off from positive roots in man's nature is bound to be mainly negative4 ,practical emphasis falls upon avoidance1 escape of evil1 upon not doing things1 observing prohibitions4 ,negative morals assume as many forms as there are types of temperament subject to it4 ,its commonest form is the protective coloration of a neutral respectability1 an insipidity of character4 ,for one man who thanks ,god that he is not as other men there are a thousand to offer thanks that they are as other men1 sufficiently as others are to escape attention4 ,absence of social blame is the usual mark of goodness for it shows that evil has been avoided4 ,blame is most readily averted by being so much like everybody else that one passes unnoticed4 ,conventional morality is a drab morality1 in which the only fatal thing is to be conspicuous4 ,if there be flavor left in it1 then some natural traits have somehow escaped being subdued4 ,to be so good as to attract notice is to be priggish1 too good for this world4 ,the same psychology that brands the convicted criminal as forever a social outcast makes it the part of a gentleman not to obtrude virtues noticeably upon others4 ,the ,puritan is never popular1 not even in a society of ,puritans4 ,in case of a pinch1 the mass prefer to be good fellows rather than to be good men4 ,polite vice is preferable to eccentricity and ceases to be vice4 ,morals that professedly neglect human nature end by emphasizing those qualities of human nature that are most commonplace and average2 they exaggerate the herd instinct to conformity4 ,professional guardians of morality who have been exacting with respect to themselves have accepted avoidance of conspicuous evil as enough for the masses4 ,one of the most instructive things in all human history is the system of concessions1 tolerances1 mitigations and reprieves which the ,catholic ,church with its official supernatural morality has devised for the multitude4 ,elevation of the spirit above everything natural is tempered by organized leniency for the frailties of flesh4 ,to uphold an aloof realm of strictly ideal realities is admitted to be possible only for a few4 ,protestantism1 except in its most zealous forms1 has accomplished the same result by a sharp separation between religion and morality in which a higher justification by faith disposes at one stroke of daily lapses into the gregarious morals of average conduct4 ,there are always ruder forceful natures who cannot tame themselves to the required level of colorless conformity4 ,to them conventional morality appears as an organized futility2 though they are usually unconscious of their own attitude since they are heartily in favor of morality for the mass as making it easier to manage them4 ,their only standard is success1 putting things over1 getting things done4 ,being good is to them practically synonymous with ineffectuality2 and accomplishment1 achievement is its own justification4 ,they know by experience that much is forgiven to those who succeed1 and they leave goodness to the stupid1 to those whom they qualify as boobs4 ,their gregarious nature finds sufficient outlet in the conspicuous tribute they pay to all established institutions as guardians of ideal interests1 and in their denunciations of all who openly defy conventionalized ideals4 ,or they discover that they are the chosen agents of a higher morality and walk subject to specially ordained laws4 ,hypocrisy in the sense of a deliberate covering up of a will to evil by loud-voiced protestations of virtue is one of the rarest of occurrences4 ,but the combination in the same person of an intensely executive nature with a love of popular approval is bound1 in the face of conventional morality1 to produce what the critical term hypocrisy4 ,another reaction to the separation of morals from human nature is a romantic glorification of natural impulse as something superior to all moral claims4 ,there are those who lack the persistent force of the executive will to break through conventions and to use them for their own purposes1 but who unite sensitiveness with intensity of desire4 ,fastening upon the conventional element in morality1 they hold that all morality is a conventionality hampering to the development of individuality4 ,although appetites are the commonest things in human nature1 the least distinctive or individualized1 they identify unrestraint in satisfaction of appetite with free realization of individuality4 ,they treat subjection to passion as a manifestation of freedom in the degree in which it shocks the bourgeois4 ,the urgent need for a transvaluation of morals is caricatured by the notion that an avoidance of the avoidances of conventional morals constitutes positive achievement4 ,while the executive type keeps its eyes on actual conditions so as to manipulate them1 this school abrogates objective intelligence in behalf of sentiment1 and withdraws into little coteries of emancipated souls4 ,there are others who take seriously the idea of morals separated from the ordinary actualities of humanity and who attempt to live up to it4 ,some become engrossed in spiritual egotism4 ,they are preoccupied with the state of their character1 concerned for the purity of their motives and the goodness of their souls4 ,the exaltation of conceit which sometimes accompanies this absorption can produce a corrosive inhumanity which exceeds the possibilities of any other known form of selfishness4 ,in other cases1 persistent preoccupation with the thought of an ideal realm breeds morbid discontent with surroundings1 or induces a futile withdrawal into an inner world where all facts are fair to the eye4 ,the needs of actual conditions are neglected1 or dealt with in a half-hearted way1 because in the light of the ideal they are so mean and sordid4 ,to speak of evils1 to strive seriously for change1 shows a low mind4 ,or1 again1 the ideal becomes a refuge1 an asylum1 a way of escape from tiresome responsibilities4 ,in varied ways men come to live in two worlds1 one the actual1 the other the ideal4 ,some are tortured by the sense of their irreconcilability4 ,others alternate between the two1 compensating for the strains of renunciation involved in membership in the ideal realm by pleasurable excursions into the delights of the actual4 ,if we turn from concrete effects upon character to theoretical issues1 we single out the discussion regarding freedom of will as typical of the consequences that come from separating morals from human nature4 ,men are wearied with bootless discussion1 and anxious to dismiss it as a metaphysical subtlety4 ,but nevertheless it contains within itself the most practical of all moral questions1 the nature of freedom and the means of its achieving4 ,the separation of morals from human nature leads to a separation of human nature in its moral aspects from the rest of nature1 and from ordinary social habits and endeavors which are found in business1 civic life1 the run of companionships and recreations4 ,these things are thought of at most as places where moral notions need to be applied1 not as places where moral ideas are to be studied and moral energies generated4 ,in short1 the severance of morals from human nature ends by driving morals inwards from the public open out-of-doors air and light of day into the obscurities and privacies of an inner life4 ,the significance of the traditional discussion of free will is that it reflects precisely a separation of moral activity from nature and the public life of men4 ,one has to turn from moral theories to the general human struggle for political1 economic and religious liberty1 for freedom of thought1 speech1 assemblage and creed1 to find significant reality in the conception of freedom of will4 ,then one finds himself out of the stiflingly close atmosphere of an inner consciousness and in the open-air world4 ,the cost of confining moral freedom to an inner region is the almost complete severance of ethics from politics and economics4 ,the former is regarded as summed up in edifying exhortations1 and the latter as connected with arts of expediency separated from larger issues of good4 ,in short1 there are two schools of social reform4 ,one bases itself upon the notion of a morality which springs from an inner freedom1 something mysteriously cooped up within personality4 ,it asserts that the only way to change institutions is for men to purify their own hearts1 and that when this has been accomplished1 change of institutions will follow of itself4 ,the other school denies the existence of any such inner power1 and in so doing conceives that it has denied all moral freedom4 ,it says that men are made what they are by the forces of the environment1 that human nature is purely malleable1 and that till institutions are changed1 nothing can be done4 ,clearly this leaves the outcome as hopeless as does an appeal to an inner rectitude and benevolence4 ,for it provides no leverage for change of environment4 ,it throws us back upon accident1 usually disguised as a necessary law of history or evolution1 and trusts to some violent change1 symbolized by civil war1 to usher in an abrupt millennium4 ,there is an alternative to being penned in between these two theories4 ,we can recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment1 natural and social4 ,then we shall see that progress proceeds in two ways1 and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something4 ,there are in truth forces in man as well as without him4 ,while they are infinitely frail in comparison with exterior forces1 yet they may have the support of a foreseeing and contriving intelligence4 ,when we look at the problem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently attained1 the issue shifts from within personality to an engineering issue1 the establishment of arts of education and social guidance4 ,the idea persists that there is something materialistic about natural science and that morals are degraded by having anything seriously to do with material things4 ,if a sect should arise proclaiming that men ought to purify their lungs completely before they ever drew a breath it ought to win many adherents from professed moralists4 ,for the neglect of sciences that deal specifically with facts of the natural and social environment leads to a side-tracking of moral forces into an unreal privacy of an unreal self4 ,it is impossible to say how much of the remediable suffering of the world is due to the fact that physical science is looked upon as merely physical4 ,it is impossible to say how much of the unnecessary slavery of the world is due to the conception that moral issues can be settled within conscience or human sentiment apart from consistent study of facts and application of specific knowledge in industry1 law and politics4 ,outside of manufacturing and transportation1 science gets its chance in war4 ,these facts perpetuate war and the hardest1 most brutal side of modern industry4 ,each sign of disregard for the moral potentialities of physical science drafts the conscience of mankind away from concern with the interactions of man and nature which must be mastered if freedom is to be a reality4 ,it diverts intelligence to anxious preoccupation with the unrealities of a purely inner life1 or strengthens reliance upon outbursts of sentimental affection4 ,the masses swarm to the occult for assistance4 ,the cultivated smile contemptuously4 ,they might smile1 as the saying goes1 out of the other side of their mouths if they realized how recourse to the occult exhibits the practical logic of their own beliefs4 ,for both rest upon a separation of moral ideas and feelings from knowable facts of life1 man and the world4 ,it is not pretended that a moral theory based upon realities of human nature and a study of the specific connections of these realities with those of physical science would do away with moral struggle and defeat4 ,it would not make the moral life as simple a matter as wending one's way along a well-lighted boulevard4 ,all action is an invasion of the future1 of the unknown4 ,conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits4 ,but morals based upon concern with facts and deriving guidance from knowledge of them would at least locate the points of effective endeavor and would focus available resources upon them4 ,it would put an end to the impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds4 ,it would destroy fixed distinction between the human and the physical1 as well as that between the moral and the industrial and political4 ,a morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics with physics and biology4 ,it would find the nature and activities of one person coterminous with those of other human beings1 and therefore link ethics with the study of history1 sociology1 law and economics4 ,such a morals would not automatically solve moral problems1 nor resolve perplexities4 ,but it would enable us to state problems in such forms that action could be courageously and intelligently directed to their solution4 ,it would not assure us against failure1 but it would render failure a source of instruction4 ,it would not protect us against the future emergence of equally serious moral difficulties1 but it would enable us to approach the always recurring troubles with a fund of growing knowledge which would add significant values to our conduct even when we overtly failed--as we should continue to do4 ,until the integrity of morals with human nature and of both with the environment is recognized1 we shall be deprived of the aid of past experience to cope with the most acute and deep problems of life4 ,accurate and extensive knowledge will continue to operate only in dealing with purely technical problems4 ,the intelligent acknowledgment of the continuity of nature1 man and society will alone secure a growth of morals which will be serious without being fanatical1 aspiring without sentimentality1 adapted to reality without conventionality1 sensible without taking the form of calculation of profits1 idealistic without being romantic4 ,,part ,,one ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,habit ,,in ,,conduct ,i ,habits may be profitably compared to physiological functions1 like breathing1 digesting4 ,the latter are1 to be sure1 involuntary1 while habits are acquired4 ,but important as is this difference for many purposes it should not conceal the fact that habits are like functions in many respects1 and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment4 ,breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs2 digesting an affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach4 ,seeing involves light just as certainly as it does the eye and optic nerve4 ,walking implicates the ground as well as the legs2 speech demands physical air and human companionship and audience as well as vocal organs4 ,we may shift from the biological to the mathematical use of the word function1 and say that natural operations like breathing and digesting1 acquired ones like speech and honesty1 are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person4 ,they are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions4 ,the same air that under certain conditions ruffles the pool or wrecks buildings1 under other conditions purifies the blood and conveys thought4 ,the outcome depends upon what air acts upon4 ,the social environment acts through native impulses and speech and moral habitudes manifest themselves4 ,there are specific good reasons for the usual attribution of acts to the person from whom they immediately proceed4 ,but to convert this special reference into a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading as to suppose that breathing and digesting are complete within the human body4 ,to get a rational basis for moral discussion we must begin with recognizing that functions and habits are ways of using and incorporating the environment in which the latter has its say as surely as the former4 ,we may borrow words from a context less technical than that of biology1 and convey the same idea by saying that habits are arts4 ,they involve skill of sensory and motor organs1 cunning or craft1 and objective materials4 ,they assimilate objective energies1 and eventuate in command of environment4 ,they require order1 discipline1 and manifest technique4 ,they have a beginning1 middle and end4 ,each stage marks progress in dealing with materials and tools1 advance in converting material to active use4 ,we should laugh at any one who said that he was master of stone working1 but that the art was cooped up within himself and in no wise dependent upon support from objects and assistance from tools4 ,in morals we are however quite accustomed to such a fatuity4 ,moral dispositions are thought of as belonging exclusively to a self4 ,the self is thereby isolated from natural and social surroundings4 ,a whole school of morals flourishes upon capital drawn from restricting morals to character and then separating character from conduct1 motives from actual deeds4 ,recognition of the analogy of moral action with functions and arts uproots the causes which have made morals subjective and individualistic4 ,it brings morals to earth1 and if they still aspire to heaven it is to the heavens of the earth1 and not to another world4 ,honesty1 chastity1 malice1 peevishness1 courage1 triviality1 industry1 irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person4 ,they are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces4 ,all virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces4 ,they are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-door world4 ,they can be studied as objectively as physiological functions1 and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements4 ,if an individual were alone in the world1 he would form his habits 7assuming the impossible1 namely1 that he would be able to form them7 in a moral vacuum4 ,they would belong to him alone1 or to him only in reference to physical forces4 ,responsibility and virtue would be his alone4 ,but since habits involve the support of environing conditions1 a society or some specific group of fellow-men1 is always accessory before and after the fact4 ,some activity proceeds from a man2 then it sets up reactions in the surroundings4 ,others approve1 disapprove1 protest1 encourage1 share and resist4 ,even letting a man alone is a definite response4 ,envy1 admiration and imitation are complicities4 ,neutrality is non-existent4 ,conduct is always shared2 this is the difference between it and a physiological process4 ,it is not an ethical ought that conduct should be social4 ,it is social1 whether bad or good4 ,washing one's hands of the guilt of others is a way of sharing guilt so far as it encourages in others a vicious way of action4 ,non-resistance to evil which takes the form of paying no attention to it is a way of promoting it4 ,the desire of an individual to keep his own conscience stainless by standing aloof from badness may be a sure means of causing evil and thus of creating personal responsibility for it4 ,yet there are circumstances in which passive resistance may be the most effective form of nullification of wrong action1 or in which heaping coals of fire on the evil-doer may be the most effective way of transforming conduct4 ,to sentimentalize over a criminal--to forgive because of a glow of feeling--is to incur liability for production of criminals4 ,but to suppose that infliction of retributive suffering suffices1 without reference to concrete consequences1 is to leave untouched old causes of criminality and to create new ones by fostering revenge and brutality4 ,the abstract theory of justice which demands the vindication of law irrespective of instruction and reform of the wrong-doer is as much a refusal to recognize responsibility as is the sentimental gush which makes a suffering victim out of a criminal4 ,courses of action which put the blame exclusively on a person as if his evil will were the sole cause of wrong-doing and those which condone offense on account of the share of social conditions in producing bad disposition1 are equally ways of making an unreal separation of man from his surroundings1 mind from the world4 ,causes for an act always exist1 but causes are not excuses4 ,questions of causation are physical1 not moral except when they concern future consequences4 ,it is as causes of future actions that excuses and accusations alike must be considered4 ,at present we give way to resentful passion1 and then rationalize our surrender by calling it a vindication of justice4 ,our entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends to prevent recognition of social partnership in producing crime2 it falls in with a belief in metaphysical free-will4 ,by killing an evil-doer or shutting him up behind stone walls1 we are enabled to forget both him and our part in creating him4 ,society excuses itself by laying the blame on the criminal2 he retorts by putting the blame on bad early surroundings1 the temptations of others1 lack of opportunities1 and the persecutions of officers of the law4 ,both are right1 except in the wholesale character of their recriminations4 ,but the effect on both sides is to throw the whole matter back into antecedent causation1 a method which refuses to bring the matter to truly moral judgment4 ,for morals has to do with acts still within our control1 acts still to be performed4 ,no amount of guilt on the part of the evil-doer absolves us from responsibility for the consequences upon him and others of our way of treating him1 or from our continuing responsibility for the conditions under which persons develop perverse habits4 ,we need to discriminate between the physical and the moral question4 ,the former concerns what has happened1 and how it happened4 ,to consider this question is indispensable to morals4 ,without an answer to it we cannot tell what forces are at work nor how to direct our actions so as to improve conditions4 ,until we know the conditions which have helped form the characters we approve and disapprove1 our efforts to create the one and do away with the other will be blind and halting4 ,but the moral issue concerns the future4 ,it is prospective4 ,to content ourselves with pronouncing judgments of merit and demerit without reference to the fact that our judgments are themselves facts which have consequences and that their value depends upon their consequences1 is complacently to dodge the moral issue1 perhaps even to indulge ourselves in pleasurable passion just as the person we condemn once indulged himself4 ,the moral problem is that of modifying the factors which now influence future results4 ,to change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits4 ,our own schemes of judgment1 of assigning blame and praise1 of awarding punishment and honor1 are part of these conditions4 ,in practical life1 there are many recognitions of the part played by social factors in generating personal traits4 ,one of them is our habit of making social classifications4 ,we attribute distinctive characteristics to rich and poor1 slum-dweller and captain of industry1 rustic and suburbanite1 officials1 politicians1 professors1 to members of races1 sets and parties4 ,these judgments are usually too coarse to be of much use4 ,but they show our practical awareness that personal traits are functions of social situations4 ,when we generalize this perception and act upon it intelligently we are committed by it to recognize that we change character from worse to better only by changing conditions--among which1 once more1 are our own ways of dealing with the one we judge4 ,we cannot change habit directly3 that notion is magic4 ,but we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions1 by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfilment of desires4 ,a savage can travel after a fashion in a jungle4 ,civilized activity is too complex to be carried on without smoothed roads4 ,it requires signals and junction points2 traffic authorities and means of easy and rapid transportation4 ,it demands a congenial1 antecedently prepared environment4 ,without it1 civilization would relapse into barbarism in spite of the best of subjective intention and internal good disposition4 ,the eternal dignity of labor and art lies in their effecting that permanent reshaping of environment which is the substantial foundation of future security and progress4 ,individuals flourish and wither away like the grass of the fields4 ,but the fruits of their work endure and make possible the development of further activities having fuller significance4 ,it is of grace not of ourselves that we lead civilized lives4 ,there is sound sense in the old pagan notion that gratitude is the root of all virtue4 ,loyalty to whatever in the established environment makes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of all progress4 ,the best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life4 ,our individual habits are links in forming the endless chain of humanity4 ,their significance depends upon the environment inherited from our forerunners1 and it is enhanced as we foresee the fruits of our labors in the world in which our successors live4 ,for however much has been done1 there always remains more to do4 ,we can retain and transmit our own heritage only by constant remaking of our own environment4 ,piety to the past is not for its own sake nor for the sake of the past1 but for the sake of a present so secure and enriched that it will create a yet better future4 ,individuals with their exhortations1 their preachings and scoldings1 their inner aspirations and sentiments have disappeared1 but their habits endure1 because these habits incorporate objective conditions in themselves4 ,so will it be with our activities4 ,we may desire abolition of war1 industrial justice1 greater equality of opportunity for all4 ,but no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results4 ,there must be change in objective arrangements and institutions4 ,we must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of men4 ,to think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle4 ,both things can happen and without a miracle4 ,but only by first changing the jungle and desert4 ,yet the distinctively personal or subjective factors in habit count4 ,taste for flowers may be the initial step in building reservoirs and irrigation canals4 ,the stimulation of desire and effort is one preliminary in the change of surroundings4 ,while personal exhortation1 advice and instruction is a feeble stimulus compared with that which steadily proceeds from the impersonal forces and depersonalized habitudes of the environment1 yet they may start the latter going4 ,taste1 appreciation and effort always spring from some accomplished objective situation4 ,they have objective support2 they represent the liberation of something formerly accomplished so that it is useful in further operation4 ,a genuine appreciation of the beauty of flowers is not generated within a self-enclosed consciousness4 ,it reflects a world in which beautiful flowers have already grown and been enjoyed4 ,taste and desire represent a prior objective fact recurring in action to secure perpetuation and extension4 ,desire for flowers comes after actual enjoyment of flowers4 ,but it comes before the work that makes the desert blossom1 it comes before cultivation of plants4 ,every ideal is preceded by an actuality2 but the ideal is more than a repetition in inner image of the actual4 ,it projects in securer and wider and fuller form some good which has been previously experienced in a precarious1 accidental1 fleeting way4 ,,ii ,it is a significant fact that in order to appreciate the peculiar place of habit in activity we have to betake ourselves to bad habits1 foolish idling1 gambling1 addiction to liquor and drugs4 ,when we think of such habits1 the union of habit with desire and with propulsive power is forced upon us4 ,when we think of habits in terms of walking1 playing a musical instrument1 typewriting1 we are much given to thinking of habits as technical abilities existing apart from our likings and as lacking in urgent impulsion4 ,we think of them as passive tools waiting to be called into action from without4 ,a bad habit suggests an inherent tendency to action and also a hold1 command over us4 ,it makes us do things we are ashamed of1 things which we tell ourselves we prefer not to do4 ,it overrides our formal resolutions1 our conscious decisions4 ,when we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves4 ,it has a hold upon us because we are the habit4 ,our self-love1 our refusal to face facts1 combined perhaps with a sense of a possible better although unrealized self1 leads us to eject the habit from the thought of ourselves and conceive it as an evil power which has somehow overcome us4 ,we feed our conceit by recalling that the habit was not deliberately formed2 we never intended to become idlers or gamblers or rous4 ,and how can anything be deeply ourselves which developed accidentally1 without set intention8 ,these traits of a bad habit are precisely the things which are most instructive about all habits and about ourselves4 ,they teach us that all habits are affections1 that all have projectile power1 and that a predisposition formed by a number of specific acts is an immensely more intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague1 general1 conscious choices4 ,all habits are demands for certain kinds of activity2 and they constitute the self4 ,in any intelligible sense of the word will1 they are will4 ,they form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities4 ,they rule our thoughts1 determining which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from light into obscurity4 ,we may think of habits as means1 waiting1 like tools in a box1 to be used by conscious resolve4 ,but they are something more than that4 ,they are active means1 means that project themselves1 energetic and dominating ways of acting4 ,we need to distinguish between materials1 tools and means proper4 ,nails and boards are not strictly speaking means of a box4 ,they are only materials for making it4 ,even the saw and hammer are means only when they are employed in some actual making4 ,otherwise they are tools1 or potential means4 ,they are actual means only when brought in conjunction with eye1 arm and hand in some specific operation4 ,and eye1 arm and hand are1 correspondingly1 means proper only when they are in active operation4 ,and whenever they are in action they are cooperating with external materials and energies4 ,without support from beyond themselves the eye stares blankly and the hand moves fumblingly4 ,they are means only when they enter into organization with things which independently accomplish definite results4 ,these organizations are habits4 ,this fact cuts two ways4 ,except in a contingent sense1 with an if1 neither external materials nor bodily and mental organs are in themselves means4 ,they have to be employed in coordinated conjunction with one another to be actual means1 or habits4 ,this statement may seem like the formulation in technical language of a common-place4 ,but belief in magic has played a large part in human history4 ,and the essence of all hocus-pocus is the supposition that results can be accomplished without the joint adaptation to each other of human powers and physical conditions4 ,a desire for rain may induce men to wave willow branches and to sprinkle water4 ,the reaction is natural and innocent4 ,but men then go on to believe that their act has immediate power to bring rain without the cooperation of intermediate conditions of nature4 ,this is magic2 while it may be natural or spontaneous1 it is not innocent4 ,it obstructs intelligent study of operative conditions and wastes human desire and effort in futilities4 ,belief in magic did not cease when the coarser forms of superstitious practice ceased4 ,the principle of magic is found whenever it is hoped to get results without intelligent control of means2 and also when it is supposed that means can exist and yet remain inert and inoperative4 ,in morals and politics such expectations still prevail1 and in so far the most important phases of human action are still affected by magic4 ,we think that by feeling strongly enough about something1 by wishing hard enough1 we can get a desirable result1 such as virtuous execution of a good resolve1 or peace among nations1 or good will in industry4 ,we slur over the necessity of the cooperative action of objective conditions1 and the fact that this cooperation is assured only by persistent and close study4 ,or1 on the other hand1 we fancy we can get these results by external machinery1 by tools or potential means1 without a corresponding functioning of human desires and capacities4 ,often times these two false and contradictory beliefs are combined in the same person4 ,the man who feels that his virtues are his own personal accomplishments is likely to be also the one who thinks that by passing laws he can throw the fear of ,god into others and make them virtuous by edict and prohibitory mandate4 ,recently a friend remarked to me that there was one superstition current among even cultivated persons4 ,they suppose that if one is told what to do1 if the right end is pointed to them1 all that is required in order to bring about the right act is will or wish on the part of the one who is to act4 ,he used as an illustration the matter of physical posture2 the assumption is that if a man is told to stand up straight1 all that is further needed is wish and effort on his part1 and the deed is done4 ,he pointed out that this belief is on a par with primitive magic in its neglect of attention to the means which are involved in reaching an end4 ,and he went on to say that the prevalence of this belief1 starting with false notions about the control of the body and extending to control of mind and character1 is the greatest bar to intelligent social progress4 ,it bars the way because it makes us neglect intelligent inquiry to discover the means which will produce a desired result1 and intelligent invention to procure the means4 ,in short1 it leaves out the importance of intelligently controlled habit4 ,we may cite his illustration of the real nature of a physical aim or order and its execution in its contrast with the current false notion4#a ,a man who has a bad habitual posture tells himself1 or is told1 to stand up straight4 ,if he is interested and responds1 he braces himself1 goes through certain movements1 and it is assumed that the desired result is substantially attained2 and that the position is retained at least as long as the man keeps the idea or order in his mind4 ,consider the assumptions which are here made4 ,it is implied that the means or effective conditions of the realization of a purpose exist independently of established habit and even that they may be set in motion in opposition to habit4 ,it is assumed that means are there1 so that the failure to stand erect is wholly a matter of failure of purpose and desire4 ,it needs paralysis or a broken leg or some other equally gross phenomenon to make us appreciate the importance of objective conditions4 #a ,i refer to ,alexander1 ,man's ,supreme ,inheritance4 ,now in fact a man who can stand properly does so1 and only a man who can1 does4 ,in the former case1 fiats of will are unnecessary1 and in the latter useless4 ,a man who does not stand properly forms a habit of standing improperly1 a positive1 forceful habit4 ,the common implication that his mistake is merely negative1 that he is simply failing to do the right thing1 and that the failure can be made good by an order of will is absurd4 ,one might as well suppose that the man who is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one who fails to drink water4 ,conditions have been formed for producing a bad result1 and the bad result will occur as long as those conditions exist4 ,they can no more be dismissed by a direct effort of will than the conditions which create drought can be dispelled by whistling for wind4 ,it is as reasonable to expect a fire to go out when it is ordered to stop burning as to suppose that a man can stand straight in consequence of a direct action of thought and desire4 ,the fire can be put out only by changing objective conditions2 it is the same with rectification of bad posture4 ,of course something happens when a man acts upon his idea of standing straight4 ,for a little while1 he stands differently1 but only a different kind of badly4 ,he then takes the unaccustomed feeling which accompanies his unusual stand as evidence that he is now standing right4 ,but there are many ways of standing badly1 and he has simply shifted his usual way to a compensatory bad way at some opposite extreme4 ,when we realize this fact1 we are likely to suppose that it exists because control of the body is physical and hence is external to mind and will4 ,transfer the command inside character and mind1 and it is fancied that an idea of an end and the desire to realize it will take immediate effect4 ,after we get to the point of recognizing that habits must intervene between wish and execution in the case of bodily acts1 we still cherish the illusions that they can be dispensed with in the case of mental and moral acts4 ,thus the net result is to make us sharpen the distinction between non-moral and moral activities1 and to lead us to confine the latter strictly within a private1 immaterial realm4 ,but in fact1 formation of ideas as well as their execution depends upon habit4 ,if we could form a correct idea without a correct habit1 then possibly we could carry it out irrespective of habit4 ,but a wish gets definite form only in connection with an idea1 and an idea gets shape and consistency only when it has a habit back of it4 ,only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for proper execution4 ,the act must come before the thought1 and a habit before an ability to evoke the thought at will4 ,ordinary psychology reverses the actual state of affairs4 ,ideas1 thoughts of ends1 are not spontaneously generated4 ,there is no immaculate conception of meanings or purposes4 ,reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction4 ,but pure sensations out of which ideas can be framed apart from habit are equally fictitious4 ,the sensations and ideas which are the stuff of thought and purpose are alike affected by habits manifested in the acts which give rise to sensations and meanings4 ,the dependence of thought1 or the more intellectual factor in our conceptions1 upon prior experience is usually admitted4 ,but those who attack the notion of thought pure from the influence of experience1 usually identify experience with sensations impressed upon an empty mind4 ,they therefore replace the theory of unmixed thoughts with that of pure unmixed sensations as the stuff of all conceptions1 purposes and beliefs4 ,but distinct and independent sensory qualities1 far from being original elements1 are the products of a highly skilled analysis which disposes of immense technical scientific resources4 ,to be able to single out a definitive sensory element in any field is evidence of a high degree of previous training1 that is1 of well-formed habits4 ,a moderate amount of observation of a child will suffice to reveal that even such gross discriminations as black1 white1 red1 green1 are the result of some years of active dealings with things in the course of which habits have been set up4 ,it is not such a simple matter to have a clear-cut sensation4 ,the latter is a sign of training1 skill1 habit4 ,admission that the idea of1 say1 standing erect is dependent upon sensory materials is1 therefore equivalent to recognition that it is dependent upon the habitual attitudes which govern concrete sensory materials4 ,the medium of habit filters all the material that reaches our perception and thought4 ,the filter is not1 however1 chemically pure4 ,it is a reagent which adds new qualities and rearranges what is received4 ,our ideas truly depend upon experience1 but so do our sensations4 ,and the experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits--originally of instincts4 ,thus our purposes and commands regarding action 7whether physical or moral7 come to us through the refracting medium of bodily and moral habits4 ,inability to think aright is sufficiently striking to have caught the attention of moralists4 ,but a false psychology has led them to interpret it as due to a necessary conflict of flesh and spirit1 not as an indication that our ideas are as dependent1 to say the least1 upon our habits as are our acts upon our conscious thoughts and purposes4 ,only the man who can maintain a correct posture has the stuff out of which to form that idea of standing erect which can be the starting point of a right act4 ,only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is4 ,immediate1 seemingly instinctive1 feeling of the direction and end of various lines of behavior is in reality the feeling of habits working below direct consciousness4 ,the psychology of illusions of perception is full of illustrations of the distortion introduced by habit into observation of objects4 ,the same fact accounts for the intuitive element in judgments of action1 an element which is valuable or the reverse in accord with the quality of dominant habits4 ,for1 as ,aristotle remarked1 the untutored moral perceptions of a good man are usually trustworthy1 those of a bad character1 not4 7,but he should have added that the influence of social custom as well as personal habit has to be taken into account in estimating who is the good man and the good judge47 ,what is true of the dependence of execution of an idea upon habit is true1 then1 of the formation and quality of the idea4 ,suppose that by a happy chance a right concrete idea or purpose--concrete1 not simply correct in words--has been hit upon3 ,what happens when one with an incorrect habit tries to act in accord with it8 ,clearly the idea can be carried into execution only with a mechanism already there4 ,if this is defective or perverted1 the best intention in the world will yield bad results4 ,in the case of no other engine does one suppose that a defective machine will turn out good goods simply because it is invited to4 ,everywhere else we recognize that the design and structure of the agency employed tell directly upon the work done4 ,given a bad habit and the will or mental direction to get a good result1 and the actual happening is a reverse or looking-glass manifestation of the usual fault--a compensatory twist in the opposite direction4 ,refusal to recognize this fact only leads to a separation of mind from body1 and to supposing that mental or psychical mechanisms are different in kind from those of bodily operations and independent of them4 ,so deep seated is this notion that even so scientific a theory as modern psycho-analysis thinks that mental habits can be straightened out by some kind of purely psychical manipulation without reference to the distortions of sensation and perception which are due to bad bodily sets4 ,the other side of the error is found in the notion of scientific nerve physiologists that it is only necessary to locate a particular diseased cell or local lesion1 independent of the whole complex of organic habits1 in order to rectify conduct4 ,means are means2 they are intermediates1 middle terms4 ,to grasp this fact is to have done with the ordinary dualism of means and ends4 ,the end is merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage2 and a means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one4 ,the distinction of means and end arises in surveying the course of a proposed line of action1 a connected series in time4 ,the end is the last act thought of2 the means are the acts to be performed prior to it in time4 ,to reach an end we must take our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be performed4 ,we must make that the end4 ,the only exception to this statement is in cases where customary habit determines the course of the series4 ,then all that is wanted is a cue to set it off4 ,but when the proposed end involves any deviation from usual action1 or any rectification of it--as in the case of standing straight--then the main thing is to find some act which is different from the usual one4 ,the discovery and performance of this unaccustomed act is the end to which we must devote all attention4 ,otherwise we shall simply do the old thing over again1 no matter what is our conscious command4 ,the only way of accomplishing this discovery is through a flank movement4 ,we must stop even thinking of standing up straight4 ,to think of it is fatal1 for it commits us to the operation of an established habit of standing wrong4 ,we must find an act within our power which is disconnected from any thought about standing4 ,we must start to do another thing which on one side inhibits our falling into the customary bad position and on the other side is the beginning of a series of acts which may lead into the correct posture4#b ,the hard-drinker who keeps thinking of not drinking is doing what he can to initiate the acts which lead to drinking4 ,he is starting with the stimulus to his habit4 ,to succeed he must find some positive interest or line of action which will inhibit the drinking series and which by instituting another course of action will bring him to his desired end4 ,in short1 the man's true aim is to discover some course of action1 having nothing to do with the habit of drink or standing erect1 which will take him where he wants to go4 ,the discovery of this other series is at once his means and his end4 ,until one takes intermediate acts seriously enough to treat them as ends1 one wastes one's time in any effort at change of habits4 ,of the intermediate acts1 the most important is the next one4 ,the first or earliest means is the most important end to discover4 #b,the technique of this process is stated in the book of ,mr4 ,alexander already referred to1 and the theoretical statement given is borrowed from ,mr4 ,alexander's analysis4 ,means and ends are two names for the same reality4 ,the terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgment4 ,without understanding this fact we cannot understand the nature of habits nor can we pass beyond the usual separation of the moral and non-moral in conduct4 ,end is a name for a series of acts taken collectively--like the term army4 ,means is a name for the same series taken distributively--like this soldier1 that officer4 ,to think of the end signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act to be performed4 ,it means to look at the next act in perspective1 not permitting it to occupy the entire field of vision4 ,to bear the end in mind signifies that we should not stop thinking about our next act until we form some reasonably clear idea of the course of action to which it commits us4 ,to attain a remote end means on the other hand to treat the end as a series of means4 ,to say that an end is remote or distant1 to say in fact that it is an end at all1 is equivalent to saying that obstacles intervene between us and it4 ,if1 however1 it remains a distant end1 it becomes a mere end1 that is a dream4 ,as soon as we have projected it1 we must begin to work backward in thought4 ,we must change what is to be done into a how1 the means whereby4 ,the end thus re-appears as a series of what nexts1 and the what next of chief importance is the one nearest the present state of the one acting4 ,only as the end is converted into means is it definitely conceived1 or intellectually defined1 to say nothing of being executable4 ,just as end1 it is vague1 cloudy1 impressionistic4 ,we do not know what we are really after until a course of action is mentally worked out4 ,aladdin with his lamp could dispense with translating ends into means1 but no one else can do so4 ,now the thing which is closest to us1 the means within our power1 is a habit4 ,some habit impeded by circumstances is the source of the projection of the end4 ,it is also the primary means in its realization4 ,the habit is propulsive and moves anyway toward some end1 or result1 whether it is projected as an end-in-view or not4 ,the man who can walk does walk2 the man who can talk does converse--if only with himself4 ,how is this statement to be reconciled with the fact that we are not always walking and talking2 that our habits seem so often to be latent1 inoperative8 ,such inactivity holds only of overt1 visibly obvious operation4 ,in actuality each habit operates all the time of waking life2 though like a member of a crew taking his turn at the wheel1 its operation becomes the dominantly characteristic trait of an act only occasionally or rarely4 ,the habit of walking is expressed in what a man sees when he keeps still1 even in dreams4 ,the recognition of distances and directions of things from his place at rest is the obvious proof of this statement4 ,the habit of locomotion is latent in the sense that it is covered up1 counteracted1 by a habit of seeing which is definitely at the fore4 ,but counteraction is not suppression4 ,locomotion is a potential energy1 not in any metaphysical sense1 but in the physical sense in which potential energy as well as kinetic has to be taken account of in any scientific description4 ,everything that a man who has the habit of locomotion does and thinks he does and thinks differently on that account4 ,this fact is recognized in current psychology1 but is falsified into an association of sensations4 ,were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act1 no such thing as character could exist4 ,there would be simply a bundle1 an untied bundle at that1 of isolated acts4 ,character is the interpenetration of habits4 ,if each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others1 character would not exist4 ,that is1 conduct would lack unity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions to separated situations4 ,but since environments overlap1 since situations are continuous and those remote from one another contain like elements1 a continuous modification of habits by one another is constantly going on4 ,a man may give himself away in a look or a gesture4 ,character can be read through the medium of individual acts4 ,of course interpenetration is never total4 ,it is most marked in what we call strong characters4 ,integration is an achievement rather than a datum4 ,a weak1 unstable1 vacillating character is one in which different habits alternate with one another rather than embody one another4 ,the strength1 solidity of a habit is not its own possession but is due to reinforcement by the force of other habits which it absorbs into itself4 ,routine specialization always works against interpenetration4 ,men with pigeon-hole minds are not infrequent4 ,their diverse standards and methods of judgment for scientific1 religious1 political matters testify to isolated compartmental habits of action4 ,character that is unable to undergo successfully the strain of thought and effort required to bring competing tendencies into a unity1 builds up barriers between different systems of likes and dislikes4 ,the emotional stress incident to conflict is avoided not by readjustment but by effort at confinement4 ,yet the exception proves the rule4 ,such persons are successful in keeping different ways of reacting apart from one another in consciousness rather than in action4 ,their character is marked by stigmata resulting from this division4 ,the mutual modification of habits by one another enables us to define the nature of the moral situation4 ,it is not necessary nor advisable to be always considering the interaction of habits with one another1 that is to say the effect of a particular habit upon character--which is a name for the total interaction4 ,such consideration distracts attention from the problem of building up an effective habit4 ,a man who is learning ,french1 or chess-playing or engineering has his hands full with his particular occupation4 ,he would be confused and hampered by constant inquiry into its effect upon character4 ,he would resemble the centipede who by trying to think of the movement of each leg in relation to all the others was rendered unable to travel4 ,at any given time1 certain habits must be taken for granted as a matter of course4 ,their operation is not a matter of moral judgment4 ,they are treated as technical1 recreational1 professional1 hygienic or economic or esthetic rather than moral4 ,to lug in morals1 or ulterior effect on character at every point1 is to cultivate moral valetudinarianism or priggish posing4 ,nevertheless any act1 even that one which passes ordinarily as trivial1 may entail such consequences for habit and character as upon occasion to require judgment from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct4 ,it then comes under moral scrutiny4 ,to know when to leave acts without distinctive moral judgment and when to subject them to it is itself a large factor in morality4 ,the serious matter is that this relative pragmatic1 or intellectual1 distinction between the moral and non-moral1 has been solidified into a fixed and absolute distinction1 so that some acts are popularly regarded as forever within and others forever without the moral domain4 ,from this fatal error recognition of the relations of one habit to others preserves us4 ,for it makes us see that character is the name given to the working interaction of habits1 and that the cumulative effect of insensible modifications worked by a particular habit in the body of preferences may at any moment require attention4 ,the word habit may seem twisted somewhat from its customary use when employed as we have been using it4 ,but we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired2 which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action2 which is projective1 dynamic in quality1 ready for overt manifestation2 and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity4 ,habit even in its ordinary usage comes nearer to denoting these facts than any other word4 ,if the facts are recognized we may also use the words attitude and disposition4 ,but unless we have first made clear to ourselves the facts which have been set forth under the name of habit1 these words are more likely to be misleading than is the word habit4 ,for the latter conveys explicitly the sense of operativeness1 actuality4 ,attitude and1 as ordinarily used1 disposition suggest something latent1 potential1 something which requires a positive stimulus outside themselves to become active4 ,if we perceive that they denote positive forms of action which are released merely through removal of some counteracting inhibitory tendency1 and then become overt1 we may employ them instead of the word habit to denote subdued1 non-patent forms of the latter4 ,in this case1 we must bear in mind that the word disposition means predisposition1 readiness to act overtly in a specific fashion whenever opportunity is presented1 this opportunity consisting in removal of the pressure due to the dominance of some overt habit2 and that attitude means some special case of a predisposition1 the disposition waiting as it were to spring through an opened door4 ,while it is admitted that the word habit has been used in a somewhat broader sense than is usual1 we must protest against the tendency in psychological literature to limit its meaning to repetition4 ,this usage is much less in accord with popular usage than is the wider way in which we have used the word4 ,it assumes from the start the identity of habit with routine4 ,repetition is in no sense the essence of habit4 ,tendency to repeat acts is an incident of many habits but not of all4 ,a man with the habit of giving way to anger may show his habit by a murderous attack upon some one who has offended4 ,his act is nonetheless due to habit because it occurs only once in his life4 ,the essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response1 not to particular acts except as1 under special conditions1 these express a way of behaving4 ,habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli1 standing predilections and aversions1 rather than bare recurrence of specific acts4 ,it means will4 ,,iii ,the dynamic force of habit taken in connection with the continuity of habits with one another explains the unity of character and conduct1 or speaking more concretely of motive and act1 will and deed4 ,moral theories have frequently separated these things from each other4 ,one type of theory1 for example1 has asserted that only will1 disposition1 motive counts morally2 that acts are external1 physical1 accidental2 that moral good is different from goodness in act since the latter is measured by consequences1 while moral good or virtue is intrinsic1 complete in itself1 a jewel shining by its own light--a somewhat dangerous metaphor however4 ,the other type of theory has asserted that such a view is equivalent to saying that all that is necessary to be virtuous is to cultivate states of feeling2 that a premium is put on disregard of the actual consequences of conduct1 and agents are deprived of any objective criterion for the rightness and wrongness of acts1 being thrown back on their own whims1 prejudices and private peculiarities4 ,like most opposite extremes in philosophic theories1 the two theories suffer from a common mistake4 ,both of them ignore the projective force of habit and the implication of habits in one another4 ,hence they separate a unified deed into two disjoined parts1 an inner called motive and an outer called act4 ,the doctrine that the chief good of man is good will easily wins acceptance from honest men4 ,for common-sense employs a juster psychology than either of the theories just mentioned4 ,by will1 common-sense understands something practical and moving4 ,it understands the body of habits1 of active dispositions which makes a man do what he does4 ,will is thus not something opposed to consequences or severed from them4 ,it is a cause of consequences2 it is causation in its personal aspect1 the aspect immediately preceding action4 ,it hardly seems conceivable to practical sense that by will is meant something which can be complete without reference to deeds prompted and results occasioned4 ,even the sophisticated specialist cannot prevent relapses from such an absurdity back into common-sense4 ,kant1 who went the limit in excluding consequences from moral value1 was sane enough to maintain that a society of men of good will would be a society which in fact would maintain social peace1 freedom and cooperation4 ,we take the will for the deed not as a substitute for doing1 or a form of doing nothing1 but in the sense that1 other things being equal1 the right disposition will produce the right deed4 ,for a disposition means a tendency to act1 a potential energy needing only opportunity to become kinetic and overt4 ,apart from such tendency a virtuous disposition is either hypocrisy or self-deceit4 ,common-sense in short never loses sight wholly of the two facts which limit and define a moral situation4 ,one is that consequences fix the moral quality of an act4 ,the other is that upon the whole1 or in the long run but not unqualifiedly1 consequences are what they are because of the nature of desire and disposition4 ,hence there is a natural contempt for the morality of the good man who does not show his goodness in the results of his habitual acts4 ,but there is also an aversion to attributing omnipotence to even the best of good dispositions1 and hence an aversion to applying the criterion of consequences unreservedly4 ,a holiness of character which is celebrated only on holy-days is unreal4 ,a virtue of honesty1 or chastity or benevolence which lives upon itself apart from definite results consumes itself and goes up in smoke4 ,the separation of motive from motive-force in action accounts both for the morbidities and futilities of the professionally good1 and for the more or less subconscious contempt for morality entertained by men of a strong executive habit with their preference for getting things done4 ,yet there is justification for the common assumption that deeds cannot be judged properly without taking their animating disposition as well as their concrete consequences into account4 ,the reason1 however1 lies not in isolation of disposition from consequences1 but in the need for viewing consequences broadly4 ,this act is only one of a multitude of acts4 ,if we confine ourselves to the consequences of this one act we shall come out with a poor reckoning4 ,disposition is habitual1 persistent4 ,it shows itself therefore in many acts and in many consequences4 ,only as we keep a running account1 can we judge disposition1 disentangling its tendency from accidental accompaniments4 ,when once we have got a fair idea of its tendency1 we are able to place the particular consequences of a single act in a wider context of continuing consequences4 ,thus we protect ourselves from taking as trivial a habit which is serious1 and from exaggerating into momentousness an act which1 viewed in the light of aggregate consequences1 is innocent4 ,there is no need to abandon common-sense which tells us in judging acts first to inquire into disposition2 but there is great need that the estimate of disposition be enlightened by a scientific psychology4 ,our legal procedure1 for example1 wobbles between a too tender treatment of criminality and a viciously drastic treatment of it4 ,the vacillation can be remedied only as we can analyze an act in the light of habits1 and analyze habits in the light of education1 environment and prior acts4 ,the dawn of truly scientific criminal law will come when each individual case is approached with something corresponding to the complete clinical record which every competent physician attempts to procure as a matter of course in dealing with his subjects4 ,consequences include effects upon character1 upon confirming and weakening habits1 as well as tangibly obvious results4 ,to keep an eye open to these effects upon character may signify the most reasonable of precautions or one of the most nauseating of practices4 ,it may mean concentration of attention upon personal rectitude in neglect of objective consequences1 a practice which creates a wholly unreal rectitude4 ,but it may mean that the survey of objective consequences is duly extended in time4 ,an act of gambling may be judged1 for example1 by its immediate overt effects1 consumption of time1 energy1 disturbance of ordinary monetary considerations1 etc4 ,it may also be judged by its consequences upon character1 setting up an enduring love of excitement1 a persistent temper of speculation1 and a persistent disregard of sober1 steady work4 ,to take the latter effects into account is equivalent to taking a broad view of future consequences2 for these dispositions affect future companionships1 vocation and avocations1 the whole tenor of domestic and public life4 ,for similar reasons1 while common-sense does not run into that sharp opposition of virtues or moral goods and natural goods which has played such a large part in professed moralities1 it does not insist upon an exact identity of the two4 ,virtues are ends because they are such important means4 ,to be honest1 courageous1 kindly is to be in the way of producing specific natural goods or satisfactory fulfilments4 ,error comes into theories when the moral goods are separated from their consequences and also when the attempt is made to secure an exhaustive and unerring identification of the two4 ,there is a reason1 valid as far as it goes1 for distinguishing virtue as a moral good resident in character alone1 from objective consequences4 ,as matter of fact1 a desirable trait of character does not always produce desirable results while good things often happen with no assistance from good will4 ,luck1 accident1 contingency1 plays its part4 ,the act of a good character is deflected in operation1 while a monomaniacal egotism may employ a desire for glory and power to perform acts which satisfy crying social needs4 ,reflection shows that we must supplement the conviction of the moral connection between character or habit and consequences by two considerations4 ,one is the fact that we are inclined to take the notions of goodness in character and goodness in results in too fixed a way4 ,persistent disparity between virtuous disposition and actual outcome shows that we have misjudged either the nature of virtue or of success4 ,judgments of both motive and consequences are still1 in the absence of methods of scientific analysis and continuous registration and reporting1 rudimentary and conventional4 ,we are inclined to wholesale judgments of character1 dividing men into goats and sheep1 instead of recognizing that all character is speckled1 and that the problem of moral judgment is one of discriminating the complex of acts and habits into tendencies which are to be specifically cultivated and condemned4 ,we need to study consequences more thoroughly and keep track of them more continuously before we shall be in a position where we can pass with reasonable assurance upon the good and evil in either disposition or results4 ,but even when proper allowances are made1 we are forcing the pace when we assume that there is or ever can be an exact equation of disposition and outcome4 ,we have to admit the rle of accident4 ,we cannot get beyond tendencies1 and must perforce content ourselves with judgments of tendency4 ,the honest man1 we are told1 acts upon principle and not from considerations of expediency1 that is1 of particular consequences4 ,the truth in this saying is that it is not safe to judge the worth of a proposed act by its probable consequences in an isolated case4 ,the word principle is a eulogistic cover for the fact of tendency4 ,the word tendency is an attempt to combine two facts1 one that habits have a certain causal efficacy1 the other that their outworking in any particular case is subject to contingencies1 to circumstances which are unforeseeable and which carry an act one side of its usual effect4 ,in cases of doubt1 there is no recourse save to stick to tendency1 that is1 to the probable effect of a habit in the long run1 or as we say upon the whole4 ,otherwise we are on the lookout for exceptions which favor our immediate desire4 ,the trouble is that we are not content with modest probabilities4 ,so when we find that a good disposition may work out badly1 we say1 as ,kant did1 that the working-out1 the consequence1 has nothing to do with the moral quality of an act1 or we strain for the impossible1 and aim at some infallible calculus of consequences by which to measure moral worth in each specific case4 ,human conceit has played a great part4 ,it has demanded that the whole universe be judged from the standpoint of desire and disposition1 or at least from that of the desire and disposition of the good man4 ,the effect of religion has been to cherish this conceit by making men think that the universe invariably conspires to support the good and bring the evil to naught4 ,by a subtle logic1 the effect has been to render morals unreal and transcendental4 ,for since the world of actual experience does not guarantee this identity of character and outcome1 it is inferred that there must be some ulterior truer reality which enforces an equation that is violated in this life4 ,hence the common notion of another world in which vice and virtue of character produce their exact moral meed4 ,the idea is equally found as an actuating force in ,plato4 ,moral realities must be supreme4 ,yet they are flagrantly contradicted in a world where a ,socrates drinks the hemlock of the criminal1 and where the vicious occupy the seats of the mighty4 ,hence there must be a truer ultimate reality in which justice is only and absolutely justice4 ,something of the same idea lurks behind every aspiration for realization of abstract justice or equality or liberty4 ,it is the source of all idealistic utopias and also of all wholesale pessimism and distrust of life4 ,utilitarianism illustrates another way of mistreating the situation4 ,tendency is not good enough for the utilitarians4 ,they want a mathematical equation of act and consequence4 ,hence they make light of the steady and controllable factor1 the factor of disposition1 and fasten upon just the things which are most subject to incalculable accident--pleasures and pains--and embark upon the hopeless enterprise of judging an act apart from character on the basis of definite results4 ,an honestly modest theory will stick to the probabilities of tendency1 and not import mathematics into morals4 ,it will be alive and sensitive to consequences as they actually present themselves1 because it knows that they give the only instruction we can procure as to the meaning of habits and dispositions4 ,but it will never assume that a moral judgment which reaches certainty is possible4 ,we have just to do the best we can with habits1 the forces most under our control2 and we shall have our hands more than full in spelling out their general tendencies without attempting an exact judgment upon each deed4 ,for every habit incorporates within itself some part of the objective environment1 and no habit and no amount of habits can incorporate the entire environment within itself or themselves4 ,there will always be disparity between them and the results actually attained4 ,hence the work of intelligence in observing consequences and in revising and readjusting habits1 even the best of good habits1 can never be foregone4 ,consequences reveal unexpected potentialities in our habits whenever these habits are exercised in a different environment from that in which they were formed4 ,the assumption of a stably uniform environment 7even the hankering for one7 expresses a fiction due to attachment to old habits4 ,the utilitarian theory of equation of acts with consequences is as much a fiction of self-conceit as is the assumption of a fixed transcendental world wherein moral ideals are eternally and immutably real4 ,both of them deny in effect the relevancy of time1 of change1 to morals1 while time is of the essence of the moral struggle4 ,we thus come1 by an unexpected path1 upon the old question of the objectivity or subjectivity of morals4 ,primarily they are objective4 ,for will1 as we have seen1 means1 in the concrete1 habits2 and habits incorporate an environment within themselves4 ,they are adjustments of the environment1 not merely to it4 ,at the same time1 the environment is many1 not one2 hence will1 disposition1 is plural4 ,diversity does not of itself imply conflict1 but it implies the possibility of conflict1 and this possibility is realized in fact4 ,life1 for example1 involves the habit of eating1 which in turn involves a unification of organism and nature4 ,but nevertheless this habit comes into conflict with other habits which are also objective1 or in equilibrium with their environments4 ,because the environment is not all of one piece1 man's house is divided within itself1 against itself4 ,honor or consideration for others or courtesy conflict with hunger4 ,then the notion of the complete objectivity of morals gets a shock4 ,those who wish to maintain the idea unimpaired take the road which leads to transcendentalism4 ,the empirical world1 they say1 is indeed divided1 and hence any natural morality must be in conflict with itself4 ,this self-contradiction however only points to a higher fixed reality with which a true and superior morality is alone concerned4 ,objectivity is saved but at the expense of connection with human affairs4 ,our problem is to see what objectivity signifies upon a naturalistic basis2 how morals are objective and yet secular and social4 ,then we may be able to decide in what crisis of experience morals become legitimately dependent upon character or self--that is1 subjective4 ,prior discussion points the way to the answer4 ,a hungry man could not conceive food as a good unless he had actually experienced1 with the support of environing conditions1 food as good4 ,the objective satisfaction comes first4 ,but he finds himself in a situation where the good is denied in fact4 ,it then lives in imagination4 ,the habit denied overt expression asserts itself in idea4 ,it sets up the thought1 the ideal1 of food4 ,this thought is not what is sometimes called thought1 a pale bloodless abstraction1 but is charged with the motor urgent force of habit4 ,food as a good is now subjective1 personal4 ,but it has its source in objective conditions and it moves forward to new objective conditions4 ,for it works to secure a change of environment so that food will again be present in fact4 ,food is a subjective good during a temporary transitional stage from one object to another4 ,the analogy with morals lies upon the surface4 ,a habit impeded in overt operation continues nonetheless to operate4 ,it manifests itself in desireful thought1 that is in an ideal or imagined object which embodies within itself the force of a frustrated habit4 ,there is therefore demand for a changed environment1 a demand which can be achieved only by some modification and rearrangement of old habits4 ,even ,plato preserves an intimation of the natural function of ideal objects when he insists upon their value as patterns for use in reorganization of the actual scene4 ,the pity is that he could not see that patterns exist only within and for the sake of reorganization1 so that they1 rather than empirical or natural objects1 are the instrumental affairs4 ,not seeing this1 he converted a function of reorganization into a metaphysical reality4 ,if we essay a technical formulation we shall say that morality becomes legitimately subjective or personal when activities which once included objective factors in their operation temporarily lose support from objects1 and yet strive to change existing conditions until they regain a support which has been lost4 ,it is all of a kind with the doings of a man1 who remembering a prior satisfaction of thirst and the conditions under which it occurred1 digs a well4 ,for the time being water in reference to his activity exists in imagination not in fact4 ,but this imagination is not a self-generated1 self-enclosed1 psychical existence4 ,it is the persistent operation of a prior object which has been incorporated in effective habit4 ,there is no miracle in the fact that an object in a new context operates in a new way4 ,of transcendental morals1 it may at least be said that they retain the intimation of the objective character of purposes and goods4 ,purely subjective morals arise when the incidents of the temporary 7though recurrent7 crisis of reorganization are taken as complete and final in themselves4 ,a self having habits and attitudes formed with the cooperation of objects runs ahead of immediately surrounding objects to effect a new equilibration4 ,subjective morals substitutes a self always set over against objects and generating its ideals independently of objects1 and in permanent1 not transitory1 opposition to them4 ,achievement1 any achievement1 is to it a negligible second best1 a cheap and poor substitute for ideals that live only in the mind1 a compromise with actuality made from physical necessity not from moral reasons4 ,in truth1 there is but a temporal episode4 ,for a time1 a self1 a person1 carries in his own habits against the forces of the immediate environment1 a good which the existing environment denies4 ,for this self moving temporarily1 in isolation from objective conditions1 between a good1 a completeness1 that has been and one that it is hoped to restore in some new form1 subjective theories have substituted an erring soul wandering hopelessly between a ,paradise ,lost in the dim past and a ,paradise to be ,regained in a dim future4 ,in reality1 even when a person is in some respects at odds with his environment and so has to act for the time being as the sole agent of a good1 he in many respects is still supported by objective conditions and is in possession of undisturbed goods and virtues4 ,men do die from thirst at times1 but upon the whole in their search for water they are sustained by other fulfilled powers4 ,but subjective morals taken wholesale sets up a solitary self without objective ties and sustenance4 ,in fact1 there exists a shifting mixture of vice and virtue4 ,theories paint a world with a ,god in heaven and a ,devil in hell4 ,moralists in short have failed to recall that a severance of moral desire and purpose from immediate actualities is an inevitable phase of activity when habits persist while the world which they have incorporated alters4 ,back of this failure lies the failure to recognize that in a changing world1 old habits must perforce need modification1 no matter how good they have been4 ,obviously any such change can be only experimental4 ,the lost objective good persists in habit1 but it can recur in objective form only through some condition of affairs which has not been yet experienced1 and which therefore can be anticipated only uncertainly and inexactly4 ,the essential point is that anticipation should at least guide as well as stimulate effort1 that it should be a working hypothesis corrected and developed by events as action proceeds4 ,there was a time when men believed that each object in the external world carried its nature stamped upon it as a form1 and that intelligence consisted in simply inspecting and reading off an intrinsic self-enclosed complete nature4 ,the scientific revolution which began in the seventeenth century came through a surrender of this point of view4 ,it began with recognition that every natural object is in truth an event continuous in space and time with other events2 and is to be known only by experimental inquiries which will exhibit a multitude of complicated1 obscure and minute relationships4 ,any observed form or object is but a challenge4 ,the case is not otherwise with ideals of justice or peace or human brotherhood1 or equality1 or order4 ,they too are not things self-enclosed to be known by introspection1 as objects were once supposed to be known by rational insight4 ,like thunderbolts and tubercular disease and the rainbow they can be known only by extensive and minute observation of consequences incurred in action4 ,a false psychology of an isolated self and a subjective morality shuts out from morals the things important to it1 acts and habits in their objective consequences4 ,at the same time it misses the point characteristic of the personal subjective aspect of morality3 the significance of desire and thought in breaking down old rigidities of habit and preparing the way for acts that re-create an environment4 ,,iv ,we often fancy that institutions1 social custom1 collective habit1 have been formed by the consolidation of individual habits4 ,in the main this supposition is false to fact4 ,to a considerable extent customs1 or wide-spread uniformities of habit1 exist because individuals face the same situation and react in like fashion4 ,but to a larger extent customs persist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior customs4 ,an individual usually acquires the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group4 ,the activities of the group are already there1 and some assimilation of his own acts to their pattern is a prerequisite of a share therein1 and hence of having any part in what is going on4 ,each person is born an infant1 and every infant is subject from the first breath he draws and the first cry he utters to the attentions and demands of others4 ,these others are not just persons in general with minds in general4 ,they are beings with habits1 and beings who upon the whole esteem the habits they have1 if for no other reason than that1 having them1 their imagination is thereby limited4 ,the nature of habit is to be assertive1 insistent1 self-perpetuating4 ,there is no miracle in the fact that if a child learns any language he learns the language that those about him speak and teach1 especially since his ability to speak that language is a pre-condition of his entering into effective connection with them1 making wants known and getting them satisfied4 ,fond parents and relatives frequently pick up a few of the child's spontaneous modes of speech and for a time at least they are portions of the speech of the group4 ,but the ratio which such words bear to the total vocabulary in use gives a fair measure of the part played by purely individual habit in forming custom in comparison with the part played by custom in forming individual habits4 ,few persons have either the energy or the wealth to build private roads to travel upon4 ,they find it convenient1 natural1 to use the roads that are already there2 while unless their private roads connect at some point with the high-way they cannot build them even if they would4 ,these simple facts seem to me to give a simple explanation of matters that are often surrounded with mystery4 ,to talk about the priority of society to the individual is to indulge in nonsensical metaphysics4 ,but to say that some pre-existent association of human beings is prior to every particular human being who is born into the world is to mention a commonplace4 ,these associations are definite modes of interaction of persons with one another2 that is to say they form customs1 institutions4 ,there is no problem in all history so artificial as that of how individuals manage to form society4 ,the problem is due to the pleasure taken in manipulating concepts1 and discussion goes on because concepts are kept from inconvenient contact with facts4 ,the facts of infancy and sex have only to be called to mind to see how manufactured are the conceptions which enter into this particular problem4 ,the problem1 however1 of how those established and more or less deeply grooved systems of interaction which we call social groups1 big and small1 modify the activities of individuals who perforce are caught-up within them1 and how the activities of component individuals remake and redirect previously established customs is a deeply significant one4 ,viewed from the standpoint of custom and its priority to the formation of habits in human beings who are born babies and gradually grow to maturity1 the facts which are now usually assembled under the conceptions of collective minds1 group-minds1 national-minds1 crowd-minds1 etc41 etc41 lose the mysterious air they exhale when mind is thought of 7as orthodox psychology teaches us to think of it7 as something which precedes action4 ,it is difficult to see that collective mind means anything more than a custom brought at some point to explicit1 emphatic consciousness1 emotional or intellectual4#c #c ,mob psychology comes under the same principles1 but in a negative aspect4 ,the crowd and mob express a disintegration of habits which releases impulse and renders persons susceptible to immediate stimuli1 rather than such a functioning of habits as is found in the mind of a club or school of thought or a political party4 ,leaders of an organization1 that is of an interaction having settled habits1 may1 however1 in order to put over some schemes deliberately resort to stimuli which will break through the crust of ordinary custom and release impulses on such a scale as to create a mob psychology4 ,since fear is a normal reaction to the unfamiliar1 dread and suspicion are the forces most played upon to accomplish this result1 together with vast vague contrary hopes4 ,this is an ordinary technique in excited political campaigns1 in starting war1 etc4 ,but an assimilation like that of ,le ,bon of the psychology of democracy to the psychology of a crowd in overriding individual judgment shows lack of psychological insight4 ,a political democracy exhibits an overriding of thought like that seen in any convention or institution4 ,that is1 thought is submerged in habit4 ,in the crowd and mob1 it is submerged in undefined emotion4 ,china and ,japan exhibit crowd psychology more frequently than do western democratic countries4 ,not in my judgment because of any essentially ,oriental psychology but because of a nearer background of rigid and solid customs conjoined with the phenomena of a period of transition4 ,the introduction of many novel stimuli creates occasions where habits afford no ballast4 ,hence great waves of emotion easily sweep through masses4 ,sometimes they are waves of enthusiasm for the new2 sometimes of violent reaction against it--both equally undiscriminating4 ,the war has left behind it a somewhat similar situation in western countries4 ,the family into which one is born is a family in a village or city which interacts with other more or less integrated systems of activity1 and which includes a diversity of groupings within itself1 say1 churches1 political parties1 clubs1 cliques1 partnerships1 trade-unions1 corporations1 etc4 ,if we start with the traditional notion of mind as something complete in itself1 then we may well be perplexed by the problem of how a common mind1 common ways of feeling and believing and purposing1 comes into existence and then forms these groups4 ,the case is quite otherwise if we recognize that in any case we must start with grouped action1 that is1 with some fairly settled system of interaction among individuals4 ,the problem of origin and development of the various groupings1 or definite customs1 in existence at any particular time in any particular place is not solved by reference to psychic causes1 elements1 forces4 ,it is to be solved by reference to facts of action1 demand for food1 for houses1 for a mate1 for some one to talk to and to listen to one talk1 for control of others1 demands which are all intensified by the fact already mentioned that each person begins a helpless1 dependent creature4 ,i do not mean of course that hunger1 fear1 sexual love1 gregariousness1 sympathy1 parental love1 love of bossing and of being ordered about1 imitation1 etc41 play no part4 ,but ,i do mean that these words do not express elements or forces which are psychic or mental in their first intention4 ,they denote ways of behavior4 ,these ways of behaving involve interaction1 that is to say1 and prior groupings4 ,and to understand the existence of organized ways or habits we surely need to go to physics1 chemistry and physiology rather than to psychology4 ,there is doubtless a great mystery as to why any such thing as being conscious should exist at all4 ,but if consciousness exists at all1 there is no mystery in its being connected with what it is connected with4 ,that is to say1 if an activity which is an interaction of various factors1 or a grouped activity1 comes to consciousness it seems natural that it should take the form of an emotion1 belief or purpose that reflects the interaction1 that it should be an our consciousness or a my consciousness4 ,and by this is meant both that it will be shared by those who are implicated in the associative custom1 or more or less alike in them all1 and that it will be felt or thought to concern others as well as one's self4 ,a family-custom or organized habit of action comes into contact and conflict for example with that of some other family4 ,the emotions of ruffled pride1 the belief about superiority or being as good as other people1 the intention to hold one's own are naturally our feeling and idea of our treatment and position4 ,substitute the ,republican party or the ,american nation for the family and the general situation remains the same4 ,the conditions which determine the nature and extent of the particular grouping in question are matters of supreme import4 ,but they are not as such subject-matter of psychology1 but of the history of politics1 law1 religion1 economics1 invention1 the technology of communication and intercourse4 ,psychology comes in as an indispensable tool4 ,but it enters into the matter of understanding these various special topics1 not into the question of what psychic forces form a collective mind and therefore a social group4 ,that way of stating the case puts the cart a long way before the horse1 and naturally gathers obscurities and mysteries to itself4 ,in short1 the primary facts of social psychology center about collective habit1 custom4 ,in addition to the general psychology of habit--which is general not individual in any intelligible sense of that word--we need to find out just how different customs shape the desires1 beliefs1 purposes of those who are affected by them4 ,the problem of social psychology is not how either individual or collective mind forms social groups and customs1 but how different customs1 established interacting arrangements1 form and nurture different minds4 ,from this general statement we return to our special problem1 which is how the rigid character of past custom has unfavorably influenced beliefs1 emotions and purposes having to do with morals4 ,we come back to the fact that individuals begin their career as infants4 ,for the plasticity of the young presents a temptation to those having greater experience and hence greater power which they rarely resist4 ,it seems putty to be molded according to current designs4 ,that plasticity also means power to change prevailing custom is ignored4 ,docility is looked upon not as ability to learn whatever the world has to teach1 but as subjection to those instructions of others which reflect their current habits4 ,to be truly docile is to be eager to learn all the lessons of active1 inquiring1 expanding experience4 ,the inert1 stupid quality of current customs perverts learning into a willingness to follow where others point the way1 into conformity1 constriction1 surrender of scepticism and experiment4 ,when we think of the docility of the young we first think of the stocks of information adults wish to impose and the ways of acting they want to reproduce4 ,then we think of the insolent coercions1 the insinuating briberies1 the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled4 ,education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young2 the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of custom4 ,of course it is not wholly forgotten that habits are abilities1 arts4 ,any striking exhibition of acquired skill in physical matters1 like that of an acrobat or billiard-player1 arouses universal admiration4 ,but we like to have innovating power limited to technical matters and reserve our admiration for those manifestations that display virtuosity rather than virtue4 ,in moral matters it is assumed that it is enough if some ideal has been exemplified in the life of a leader1 so that it is now the part of others to follow and reproduce4 ,for every branch of conduct1 there is a ,jesus or ,buddha1 a ,napoleon or ,marx1 a ,froebel or ,tolstoi1 whose pattern of action1 exceeding our own grasp1 is reduced to a practicable copy-size by passage through rows and rows of lesser leaders4 ,the notion that it suffices if the idea1 the end1 is present in the mind of some authority dominates formal schooling4 ,it permeates the unconscious education derived from ordinary contact and intercourse4 ,where following is taken to be normal1 moral originality is pretty sure to be eccentric4 ,but if independence were the rule1 originality would be subjected to severe1 experimental tests and be saved from cranky eccentricity1 as it now is in say higher mathematics4 ,the regime of custom assumes that the outcome is the same whether an individual understands what he is about or whether he goes through certain motions while mouthing the words of others--repetition of formul being esteemed of greater importance1 upon the whole1 than repetition of deeds4 ,to say what the sect or clique or class says is the way of proving that one also understands and approves what the clique clings to4 ,in theory1 democracy should be a means of stimulating original thought1 and of evoking action deliberately adjusted in advance to cope with new forces4 ,in fact it is still so immature that its main effect is to multiply occasions for imitation4 ,if progress in spite of this fact is more rapid than in other social forms1 it is by accident1 since the diversity of models conflict with one another and thus give individuality a chance in the resulting chaos of opinions4 ,current democracy acclaims success more boisterously than do other social forms1 and surrounds failure with a more reverberating train of echoes4 ,but the prestige thus given excellence is largely adventitious4 ,the achievement of thought attracts others not so much intrinsically as because of an eminence due to multitudinous advertising and a swarm of imitators4 ,even liberal thinkers have treated habit as essentially1 not because of the character of existing customs1 conservative4 ,in fact only in a society dominated by modes of belief and admiration fixed by past custom is habit any more conservative than it is progressive4 ,it all depends upon its quality4 ,habit is an ability1 an art1 formed through past experience4 ,but whether an ability is limited to repetition of past acts adopted to past conditions or is available for new emergencies depends wholly upon what kind of habit exists4 ,the tendency to think that only bad habits are disserviceable and that bad habits are conventionally enumerable1 conduces to make all habits more or less bad4 ,for what makes a habit bad is enslavement to old ruts4 ,the common notion that enslavement to good ends converts mechanical routine into good is a negation of the principle of moral goodness4 ,it identifies morality with what was sometime rational1 possibly in some prior experience of one's own1 but more probably in the experience of some one else who is now blindly set up as a final authority4 ,the genuine heart of reasonableness 7and of goodness in conduct7 lies in effective mastery of the conditions which now enter into action4 ,to be satisfied with repeating1 with traversing the ruts which in other conditions led to good1 is the surest way of creating carelessness about present and actual good4 ,consider what happens to thought when habit is merely power to repeat acts without thought4 ,where does thought exist and operate when it is excluded from habitual activities8 ,is not such thought of necessity shut out from effective power1 from ability to control objects and command events8 ,habits deprived of thought and thought which is futile are two sides of the same fact4 ,to laud habit as conservative while praising thought as the main spring of progress is to take the surest course to making thought abstruse and irrelevant and progress a matter of accident and catastrophe4 ,the concrete fact behind the current separation of body and mind1 practice and theory1 actualities and ideals1 is precisely this separation of habit and thought4 ,thought which does not exist within ordinary habits of action lacks means of execution4 ,in lacking application1 it also lacks test1 criterion4 ,hence it is condemned to a separate realm4 ,if we try to act upon it1 our actions are clumsy1 forced4 ,in fact1 contrary habits 7as we have already seen7 come into operation and betray our purpose4 ,after a few such experiences1 it is subconsciously decided that thought is too precious and high to be exposed to the contingencies of action4 ,it is reserved for separate uses2 thought feeds only thought not action4 ,ideals must not run the risk of contamination and perversion by contact with actual conditions4 ,thought then either resorts to specialized and technical matters influencing action in the library or laboratory alone1 or else it becomes sentimentalized4 ,meantime there are certain practical men who combine thought and habit and who are effectual4 ,their thought is about their own advantage2 and their habits correspond4 ,they dominate the actual situation4 ,they encourage routine in others1 and they also subsidize such thought and learning as are kept remote from affairs4 ,this they call sustaining the standard of the ideal4 ,subjection they praise as team-spirit1 loyalty1 devotion1 obedience1 industry1 law-and-order4 ,but they temper respect for law--by which they mean the order of the existing status--on the part of others with most skilful and thoughtful manipulation of it in behalf of their own ends4 ,while they denounce as subversive anarchy signs of independent thought1 of thinking for themselves1 on the part of others lest such thought disturb the conditions by which they profit1 they think quite literally for themselves1 that is1 of themselves4 ,this is the eternal game of the practical men4 ,hence it is only by accident that the separate and endowed thought of professional thinkers leaks out into action and affects custom4 ,for thinking cannot itself escape the influence of habit1 any more than anything else human4 ,if it is not a part of ordinary habits1 then it is a separate habit1 habit alongside other habits1 apart from them1 as isolated and indurated as human structure permits4 ,theory is a possession of the theorist1 intellect of the intellectualist4 ,the so-called separation of theory and practice means in fact the separation of two kinds of practice1 one taking place in the outdoor world1 the other in the study4 ,the habit of thought commands some materials 7as every habit must do7 but the materials are technical1 books1 words4 ,ideas are objectified in action but speech and writing monopolize their field of action4 ,even then subconscious pains are taken to see that the words used are not too widely understood4 ,intellectual habits like other habits demand an environment1 but the environment is the study1 library1 laboratory and academy4 ,like other habits they produce external results1 possessions4 ,some men acquire ideas and knowledge as other men acquire monetary wealth4 ,while practising thought for their own special ends they deprecate it for the untrained and unstable masses for whom habits1 that is unthinking routines1 are necessities4 ,they favor popular education--up to the point of disseminating as matter of authoritative information for the many what the few have established by thought1 and up to the point of converting an original docility to the new into a docility to repeat and to conform4 ,yet all habit involves mechanization4 ,habit is impossible without setting up a mechanism of action1 physiologically engrained1 which operates spontaneously1 automatically1 whenever the cue is given4 ,but mechanization is not of necessity all there is to habit4 ,consider the conditions under which the first serviceable abilities of life are formed4 ,when a child begins to walk he acutely observes1 he intently and intensely experiments4 ,he looks to see what is going to happen and he keeps curious watch on every incident4 ,what others do1 the assistance they give1 the models they set1 operate not as limitations but as encouragements to his own acts1 reinforcements of personal perception and endeavor4 ,the first toddling is a romantic adventuring into the unknown2 and every gained power is a delightful discovery of one's own powers and of the wonders of the world4 ,we may not be able to retain in adult habits this zest of intelligence and this freshness of satisfaction in newly discovered powers4 ,but there is surely a middle term between a normal exercise of power which includes some excursion into the unknown1 and a mechanical activity hedged within a drab world4 ,even in dealing with inanimate machines we rank that invention higher which adapts its movements to varying conditions4 ,all life operates through a mechanism1 and the higher the form of life the more complex1 sure and flexible the mechanism4 ,this fact alone should save us from opposing life and mechanism1 thereby reducing the latter to unintelligent automatism and the former to an aimless splurge4 ,how delicate1 prompt1 sure and varied are the movements of a violin player or an engraver6 ,how unerringly they phrase every shade of emotion and every turn of idea6 ,mechanism is indispensable4 ,if each act has to be consciously searched for at the moment and intentionally performed1 execution is painful and the product is clumsy and halting4 ,nevertheless the difference between the artist and the mere technician is unmistakeable4 ,the artist is a masterful technician4 ,the technique or mechanism is fused with thought and feeling4 ,the mechanical performer permits the mechanism to dictate the performance4 ,it is absurd to say that the latter exhibits habit and the former not4 ,we are confronted with two kinds of habit1 intelligent and routine4 ,all life has its lan1 but only the prevalence of dead habits deflects life into mere lan4 ,yet the current dualism of mind and body1 thought and action1 is so rooted that we are taught 7and science is said to support the teaching7 that the art1 the habit1 of the artist is acquired by previous mechanical exercises of repetition in which skill apart from thought is the aim1 until suddenly1 magically1 this soulless mechanism is taken possession of by sentiment and imagination and it becomes a flexible instrument of mind4 ,the fact1 the scientific fact1 is that even in his exercises1 his practice for skill1 an artist uses an art he already has4 ,he acquires greater skill because practice of skill is more important to him than practice for skill4 ,otherwise natural endowment would count for nothing1 and sufficient mechanical exercise would make any one an expert in any field4 ,a flexible1 sensitive habit grows more varied1 more adaptable by practice and use4 ,we do not as yet fully understand the physiological factors concerned in mechanical routine on one hand and artistic skill on the other1 but we do know that the latter is just as much habit as is the former4 ,whether it concerns the cook1 musician1 carpenter1 citizen1 or statesman1 the intelligent or artistic habit is the desirable thing1 and the routine the undesirable thing3--or1 at least1 desirable and undesirable from every point of view except one4 ,those who wish a monopoly of social power find desirable the separation of habit and thought1 action and soul1 so characteristic of history4 ,for the dualism enables them to do the thinking and planning1 while others remain the docile1 even if awkward1 instruments of execution4 ,until this scheme is changed1 democracy is bound to be perverted in realization4 ,with our present system of education--by which something much more extensive than schooling is meant--democracy multiplies occasions for imitation not occasions for thought in action4 ,if the visible result is rather a messy confusion than an ordered discipline of habits1 it is because there are so many models of imitation set up that they tend to cancel one another1 so that individuals have the advantage neither of uniform training nor of intelligent adaptation4 ,whence an intellectualist2 the one with whom thinking is itself a segregated habit1 infers that the choice is between muss-and-muddling and a bureaucracy4 ,he prefers the latter1 though under some other name1 usually an aristocracy of talent and intellect1 possibly a dictatorship of the proletariat4 ,it has been repeatedly stated that the current philosophical dualism of mind and body1 of spirit and mere outward doing1 is ultimately but an intellectual reflex of the social divorce of routine habit from thought1 of means from ends1 practice from theory4 ,one hardly knows whether most to admire the acumen with which ,bergson has penetrated through the accumulation of historic technicalities to this essential fact1 or to deplore the artistic skill with which he has recommended the division and the metaphysical subtlety with which he has striven to establish its necessary and unchangeable nature4 ,for the latter tends to confirm and sanction the dualism in all its obnoxiousness4 ,in the end1 however1 detection1 discovery1 is the main thing4 ,to envisage the relation of spirit1 life1 to matter1 body1 as in effect an affair of a force which outruns habit while it leaves a trail of routine habits behind it1 will surely turn out in the end to imply the acknowledgment of the need of a continuous unification of spirit and habit1 rather than to be a sanction of their divorce4 ,and when ,bergson carries the implicit logic to the point of a clear recognition that upon this basis concrete intelligence is concerned with the habits which incorporate and deal with objects1 and that nothing remains to spirit1 pure thought1 except a blind onward push or impetus1 the net conclusion is surely the need of revision of the fundamental premiss of separation of soul and habit4 ,a blind creative force is as likely to turn out to be destructive as creative2 the vital lan may delight in war rather than in the laborious arts of civilization1 and a mystic intuition of an ongoing splurge be a poor substitute for the detailed work of an intelligence embodied in custom and institution1 one which creates by means of flexible continuous contrivances of reorganization4 ,for the eulogistic qualities which ,bergson attributes to the lan vital flow not from its nature but from a reminiscence of the optimism of romanticism1 an optimism which is only the reverse side of pessimism about actualities4 ,a spiritual life which is nothing but a blind urge separated from thought 7which is said to be confined to mechanical manipulation of material objects for personal uses7 is likely to have the attributes of the ,devil in spite of its being ennobled with the name of ,god4 ,v ,for practical purposes morals mean customs1 folkways1 established collective habits4 ,this is a commonplace of the anthropologist1 though the moral theorist generally suffers from an illusion that his own place and day is1 or ought to be1 an exception4 ,but always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities4 ,they are the pattern into which individual activity must weave itself4 ,this is as true today as it ever was4 ,but because of present mobility and interminglings of customs1 an individual is now offered an enormous range of custom-patterns1 and can exercise personal ingenuity in selecting and rearranging their elements4 ,in short he can1 if he will1 intelligently adapt customs to conditions1 and thereby remake them4 ,customs in any case constitute moral standards4 ,for they are active demands for certain ways of acting4 ,every habit creates an unconscious expectation4 ,it forms a certain outlook4 ,what psychologists have laboriously treated under the caption of association of ideas has little to do with ideas and everything to do with the influence of habit upon recollection and perception4 ,a habit1 a routine habit1 when interfered with generates uneasiness1 sets up a protest in favor of restoration and a sense of need of some expiatory act1 or else it goes off in casual reminiscence4 ,it is the essence of routine to insist upon its own continuation4 ,breach of it is violation of right4 ,deviation from it is transgression4 ,all that metaphysics has said about the nisus of ,being to conserve its essence and all that a mythological psychology has said about a special instinct of self-preservation is a cover for the persistent self-assertion of habit4 ,habit is energy organized in certain channels4 ,when interfered with1 it swells as resentment and as an avenging force4 ,to say that it will be obeyed1 that custom makes law1 that nomos is lord of all1 is after all only to say that habit is habit4 ,emotion is a perturbation from clash or failure of habit1 and reflection1 roughly speaking1 is the painful effort of disturbed habits to readjust themselves4 ,it is a pity that ,westermarck in his monumental collection of facts which show the connection of custom with morals#d is still so much under the influence of current subjective psychology that he misstates the point of his data4 ,for although he recognizes the objectivity of custom1 he treats sympathetic resentment and approbation as distinctive inner feelings or conscious states which give rise to acts4 ,in his anxiety to displace an unreal rational source of morals he sets up an equally unreal emotional basis4 ,in truth1 feelings as well as reason spring up within action4 ,breach of custom or habit is the source of sympathetic resentment1 while overt approbation goes out to fidelity to custom maintained under exceptional circumstances4 #d ,the ,origin and ,development of ,moral ,ideas4 ,those who recognize the place of custom in lower social forms generally regard its presence in civilized society as a mere survival4 ,or1 like ,sumner1 they fancy that to recognize its abiding place is equivalent to the denial of all rationality and principle to morality2 equivalent to the assertion of blind1 arbitrary forces in life4 ,in effect1 this point of view has already been dealt with4 ,it overlooks the fact that the real opposition is not between reason and habit but between routine1 unintelligent habit1 and intelligent habit or art4 ,even a savage custom may be reasonable in that it is adapted to social needs and uses4 ,experience may add to such adaptation a conscious recognition of it1 and then the custom of rationality is added to a prior custom4 ,external reasonableness or adaptation to ends precedes reasonableness of mind4 ,this is only to say that in morals as well as in physics things have to be there before we perceive them1 and that rationality of mind is not an original endowment but is the offspring of intercourse with objective adaptations and relations--a view which under the influence of a conception of knowing the like by the like has been distorted into ,platonic and other objective idealisms4 ,reason as observation of an adaptation of acts to valuable results is not however a mere idle mirroring of pre-existent facts4 ,it is an additional event having its own career4 ,it sets up a heightened emotional appreciation and provides a new motive for fidelities previously blind4 ,it sets up an attitude of criticism1 of inquiry1 and makes men sensitive to the brutalities and extravagancies of customs4 ,in short1 it becomes a custom of expectation and outlook1 an active demand for reasonableness in other customs4 ,the reflective disposition is not self-made nor a gift of the gods4 ,it arises in some exceptional circumstance out of social customs1 as we see in the case of the ,greeks4 ,but when it has been generated it establishes a new custom1 which is capable of exercising the most revolutionary influence upon other customs4 ,hence the growing importance of personal rationality or intelligence1 in moral theory if not in practice4 ,that current customs contradict one another1 that many of them are unjust1 and that without criticism none of them is fit to be the guide of life was the discovery with which the ,athenian ,socrates initiated conscious moral theorizing4 ,yet a dilemma soon presented itself1 one which forms the burden of ,plato's ethical writings4 ,how shall thought which is personal arrive at standards which hold good for all1 which1 in modern phrase1 are objective8 ,the solution found by ,plato was that reason is itself objective1 universal1 cosmic and makes the individual soul its vehicle4 ,the result1 however1 was merely to substitute a metaphysical or transcendental ethics for the ethics of custom4 ,if ,plato had been able to see that reflection and criticism express a conflict of customs1 and that their purport and office is to re-organize1 re-adjust customs1 the subsequent course of moral theory would have been very different4 ,custom would have provided needed objective and substantial ballast1 and personal rationality or reflective intelligence been treated as the necessary organ of experimental initiative and creative invention in remaking custom4 ,we have another difficulty to face3 a greater wave rises to overwhelm us4 ,it is said that to derive moral standards from social customs is to evacuate the latter of all authority4 ,morals1 it is said1 imply the subordination of fact to ideal consideration1 while the view presented makes morals secondary to bare fact1 which is equal to depriving them of dignity and jurisdiction4 ,the objection has the force of the custom of moral theorists behind it2 and therefore in its denial of custom avails itself of the assistance of the notion it attacks4 ,the criticism rests upon a false separation4 ,it argues in effect that either ideal standards antecede customs and confer their moral quality upon them1 or that in being subsequent to custom and evolved from them1 they are mere accidental by-products4 ,but how does the case stand with language8 ,men did not intend language2 they did not have social objects consciously in view when they began to talk1 nor did they have grammatical and phonetic principles before them by which to regulate their efforts at communication4 ,these things come after the fact and because of it4 ,language grew out of unintelligent babblings1 instinctive motions called gestures1 and the pressure of circumstance4 ,but nevertheless language once called into existence is language and operates as language4 ,it operates not to perpetuate the forces which produced it but to modify and redirect them4 ,it has such transcendent importance that pains are taken with its use4 ,literatures are produced1 and then a vast apparatus of grammar1 rhetoric1 dictionaries1 literary criticism1 reviews1 essays1 a derived literature ad lib4 ,education1 schooling1 becomes a necessity2 literacy an end4 ,in short language when it is produced meets old needs and opens new possibilities4 ,it creates demands which take effect1 and the effect is not confined to speech and literature1 but extends to the common life in communication1 counsel and instruction4 ,what is said of the institution of language holds good of every institution4 ,family life1 property1 legal forms1 churches and schools1 academies of art and science did not originate to serve conscious ends nor was their generation regulated by consciousness of principles of reason and right4 ,yet each institution has brought with its development demands1 expectations1 rules1 standards4 ,these are not mere embellishments of the forces which produced them1 idle decorations of the scene4 ,they are additional forces4 ,they reconstruct4 ,they open new avenues of endeavor and impose new labors4 ,in short they are civilization1 culture1 morality4 ,still the question recurs3 ,what authority have standards and ideas which have originated in this way8 ,what claim have they upon us8 ,in one sense the question is unanswerable4 ,in the same sense1 however1 the question is unanswerable whatever origin and sanction is ascribed to moral obligations and loyalties4 ,why attend to metaphysical and transcendental ideal realities even if we concede they are the authors of moral standards8 ,why do this act if ,i feel like doing something else8 ,any moral question may reduce itself to this question if we so choose4 ,but in an empirical sense the answer is simple4 ,the authority is that of life4 ,why employ language1 cultivate literature1 acquire and develop science1 sustain industry1 and submit to the refinements of art8 ,to ask these questions is equivalent to asking3 ,why live8 ,and the only answer is that if one is going to live one must live a life of which these things form the substance4 ,the only question having sense which can be asked is how we are going to use and be used by these things1 not whether we are going to use them4 ,reason1 moral principles1 cannot in any case be shoved behind these affairs1 for reason and morality grow out of them4 ,but they have grown into them as well as out of them4 ,they are there as part of them4 ,no one can escape them if he wants to4 ,he cannot escape the problem of how to engage in life1 since in any case he must engage in it in some way or other--or else quit and get out4 ,in short1 the choice is not between a moral authority outside custom and one within it4 ,it is between adopting more or less intelligent and significant customs4 ,curiously enough1 the chief practical effect of refusing to recognize the connection of custom with moral standards is to deify some special custom and treat it as eternal1 immutable1 outside of criticism and revision4 ,this consequence is especially harmful in times of rapid social flux4 ,for it leads to disparity between nominal standards1 which become ineffectual and hypocritical in exact ratio to their theoretical exaltation1 and actual habits which have to take note of existing conditions4 ,the disparity breeds disorder4 ,irregularity and confusion are however practically intolerable1 and effect the generation of a new rule of some sort or other4 ,only such complete disturbance of the physical bases of life and security as comes from plague and starvation can throw society into utter disorder4 ,no amount of intellectual transition can seriously disturb the main tenor of custom1 or morals4 ,hence the greater danger which attends the attempt in period of social change to maintain the immutability of old standards is not general moral relaxation4 ,it is rather social clash1 an irreconciled conflict of moral standards and purposes1 the most serious form of class warfare4 ,for segregated classes develop their own customs1 which is to say their own working morals4 ,as long as society is mainly immobile these diverse principles and ruling aims do not clash4 ,they exist side by side in different strata4 ,power1 glory1 honor1 magnificence1 mutual faith here2 industry1 obedience1 abstinence1 humility1 and reverence there3 noble and plebeian virtues4 ,vigor1 courage1 energy1 enterprise here2 submission1 patience1 charm1 personal fidelity there3 the masculine and feminine virtues4 ,but mobility invades society4 ,war1 commerce1 travel1 communication1 contact with the thoughts and desires of other classes1 new inventions in productive industry1 disturb the settled distribution of customs4 ,congealed habits thaw out1 and a flood mixes things once separated4 ,each class is rigidly sure of the rightness of its own ends and hence not overscrupulous about the means of attaining them4 ,one side proclaims the ultimacy of order--that of some old order which conduces to its own interest4 ,the other side proclaims its rights to freedom1 and identifies justice with its submerged claims4 ,there is no common ground1 no moral understanding1 no agreed upon standard of appeal4 ,today such a conflict occurs between propertied classes and those who depend upon daily wage2 between men and women2 between old and young4 ,each appeals to its own standard of right1 and each thinks the other the creature of personal desire1 whim or obstinacy4 ,mobility has affected peoples as well4 ,nations and races face one another1 each with its own immutable standards4 ,never before in history have there existed such numerous contacts and minglings4 ,never before have there been such occasions for conflict which are the more significant because each side feels that it is supported by moral principles4 ,customs relating to what has been and emotions referring to what may come to be go their independent ways4 ,the demand of each side treats its opponent as a wilful violator of moral principles1 an expression of self-interest or superior might4 ,intelligence which is the only possible messenger of reconciliation dwells in a far land of abstractions or comes after the event to record accomplished facts4 ,,vi ,the prior discussion has tried to show why the psychology of habit is an objective and social psychology4 ,settled and regular action must contain an adjustment of environing conditions2 it must incorporate them in itself4 ,for human beings1 the environing affairs directly important are those formed by the activities of other human beings4 ,this fact is accentuated and made fundamental by the fact of infancy--the fact that each human being begins life completely dependent upon others4 ,the net outcome accordingly is that what can be called distinctively individual in behavior and mind is not1 contrary to traditional theory1 an original datum4 ,doubtless physical or physiological individuality always colors responsive activity and hence modifies the form which custom assumes in its personal reproductions4 ,in forceful energetic characters this quality is marked4 ,but it is important to note that it is a quality of habit1 not an element or force existing apart from adjustment of the environment and capable of being termed a separate individual mind4 ,orthodox psychology starts however from the assumption of precisely such independent minds4 ,however much different schools may vary in their definitions of mind1 they agree in this premiss of separateness and priority4 ,hence social psychology is confused by the effort to render its facts in the terms characteristic of old psychology1 when the distinctive thing about it is that it implies an abandonment of that psychology4 ,the traditional psychology of the original separate soul1 mind or consciousness is in truth a reflex of conditions which cut human nature off from its natural objective relations4 ,it implies first the severance of man from nature and then of each man from his fellows4 ,the isolation of man from nature is duly manifested in the split between mind and body--since body is clearly a connected part of nature4 ,thus the instrument of action and the means of the continuous modification of action1 of the cumulative carrying forward of old activity into new1 is regarded as a mysterious intruder or as a mysterious parallel accompaniment4 ,it is fair to say that the psychology of a separate and independent consciousness began as an intellectual formulation of those facts of morality which treated the most important kind of action as a private concern1 something to be enacted and concluded within character as a purely personal possession4 ,the religious and metaphysical interests which wanted the ideal to be a separate realm finally coincided with a practical revolt against current customs and institutions to enforce current psychological individualism4 ,but this formulation 7put forth in the name of science7 reacted to confirm the conditions out of which it arose1 and to convert it from a historic episode into an essential truth4 ,its exaggeration of individuality is largely a compensatory reaction against the pressure of institutional rigidities4 ,any moral theory which is seriously influenced by current psychological theory is bound to emphasize states of consciousness1 an inner private life1 at the expense of acts which have public meaning and which incorporate and exact social relationships4 ,a psychology based upon habits 7and instincts which become elements in habits as soon as they are acted upon7 will on the contrary fix its attention upon the objective conditions in which habits are formed and operate4 ,the rise at the present time of a clinical psychology which revolts at traditional and orthodox psychology is a symptom of ethical import4 ,it is a protest against the futility1 as a tool of understanding and dealing with human nature in the concrete1 of the psychology of conscious sensations1 images and ideas4 ,it exhibits a sense for reality in its insistence upon the profound importance of unconscious forces in determining not only overt conduct but desire1 judgment1 belief1 idealization4 ,every moment of reaction and protest1 however1 usually accepts some of the basic ideas of the position against which it rebels4 ,so the most popular forms of the clinical psychology1 those associated with the founders of psycho-analysis1 retain the notion of a separate psychic realm or force4 ,they add a statement pointing to facts of the utmost value1 and which is equivalent to practical recognition of the dependence of mind upon habit and of habit upon social conditions4 ,this is the statement of the existence and operation of the unconscious1 of complexes due to contacts and conflicts with others1 of the social censor4 ,but they still cling to the idea of the separate psychic realm and so in effect talk about unconscious consciousness4 ,they get their truths mixed up in theory with the false psychology of original individual consciousness1 just as the school of social psychologists does upon its side4 ,their elaborate artificial explanations1 like the mystic collective mind1 consciousness1 over-soul1 of social psychology1 are due to failure to begin with the facts of habit and custom4 ,what then is meant by individual mind1 by mind as individual8 ,in effect the reply has already been given4 ,conflict of habits releases impulsive activities which in their manifestation require a modification of habit1 of custom and convention4 ,that which was at first the individualized color or quality of habitual activity is abstracted1 and becomes a center of activity aiming to reconstruct customs in accord with some desire which is rejected by the immediate situation and which therefore is felt to belong to one's self1 to be the mark and possession of an individual in partial and temporary opposition to his environment4 ,these general and necessarily vague statements will be made more definite in the further discussion of impulse and intelligence4 ,for impulse when it asserts itself deliberately against an existing custom is the beginning of individuality in mind4 ,this beginning is developed and consolidated in the observations1 judgments1 inventions which try to transform the environment so that a variant1 deviating impulse may itself in turn become incarnated in objective habit4 ,,part ,,two ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,impulse ,,in ,,conduct ,i ,habits as organized activities are secondary and acquired1 not native and original4 ,they are outgrowths of unlearned activities which are part of man's endowment at birth4 ,the order of topics followed in our discussion may accordingly be questioned4 ,why should what is derived and therefore in some sense artificial in conduct be discussed before what is primitive1 natural and inevitable8 ,why did we not set out with an examination of those instinctive activities upon which the acquisition of habits is conditioned8 ,the query is a natural one1 yet it tempts to flinging forth a paradox4 ,in conduct the acquired is the primitive4 ,impulses although first in time are never primary in fact2 they are secondary and dependent4 ,the seeming paradox in statement covers a familiar fact4 ,in the life of the individual1 instinctive activity comes first4 ,but an individual begins life as a baby1 and babies are dependent beings4 ,their activities could continue at most for only a few hours were it not for the presence and aid of adults with their formed habits4 ,and babies owe to adults more than procreation1 more than the continued food and protection which preserve life4 ,they owe to adults the opportunity to express their native activities in ways which have meaning4 ,even if by some miracle original activity could continue without assistance from the organized skill and art of adults1 it would not amount to anything4 ,it would be mere sound and fury4 ,in short1 the meaning of native activities is not native2 it is acquired4 ,it depends upon interaction with a matured social medium4 ,in the case of a tiger or eagle1 anger may be identified with a serviceable life-activity1 with attack and defense4 ,with a human being it is as meaningless as a gust of wind on a mud puddle apart from a direction given it by the presence of other persons1 apart from the responses they make to it4 ,it is a physical spasm1 a blind dispersive burst of wasteful energy4 ,it gets quality1 significance1 when it becomes a smouldering sullenness1 an annoying interruption1 a peevish irritation1 a murderous revenge1 a blazing indignation4 ,and although these phenomena which have a meaning spring from original native reactions to stimuli1 yet they depend also upon the responsive behavior of others4 ,they and all similar human displays of anger are not pure impulses2 they are habits formed under the influence of association with others who have habits already and who show their habits in the treatment which converts a blind physical discharge into a significant anger4 ,after ignoring impulses for a long time in behalf of sensations1 modern psychology now tends to start out with an inventory and description of instinctive activities4 ,this is an undoubted improvement4 ,but when it tries to explain complicated events in personal and social life by direct reference to these native powers1 the explanation becomes hazy and forced4 ,it is like saying the flea and the elephant1 the lichen and the redwood1 the timid hare and the ravening wolf1 the plant with the most inconspicuous blossom and the plant with the most glaring color are alike products of natural selection4 ,there may be a sense in which the statement is true2 but till we know the specific environing conditions under which selection took place we really know nothing4 ,and so we need to know about the social conditions which have educated original activities into definite and significant dispositions before we can discuss the psychological element in society4 ,this is the true meaning of social psychology4 ,at some place on the globe1 at some time1 every kind of practice seems to have been tolerated or even praised4 ,how is the tremendous diversity of institutions 7including moral codes7 to be accounted for8 ,the native stock of instincts is practically the same everywhere4 ,exaggerate as much as we like the native differences of ,patagonians and ,greeks1 ,sioux ,indians and ,hindoos1 ,bushmen and ,chinese1 their original differences will bear no comparison to the amount of difference found in custom and culture4 ,since such a diversity cannot be attributed to an original identity1 the development of native impulse must be stated in terms of acquired habits1 not the growth of customs in terms of instincts4 ,the wholesale human sacrifices of ,peru and the tenderness of ,st4 ,francis1 the cruelties of pirates and the philanthropies of ,howard1 the practice of ,suttee and the cult of the ,virgin1 the war and peace dances of the ,comanches and the parliamentary institutions of the ,british1 the communism of the ,southsea islander and the proprietary thrift of the ,yankee1 the magic of the medicine man and the experiments of the chemist in his laboratory1 the non-resistance of ,chinese and the aggressive militarism of an imperial ,prussia1 monarchy by divine right and government by the people2 the countless diversity of habits suggested by such a random list springs from practically the same capital-stock of native instincts4 ,it would be pleasant if we could pick and choose those institutions which we like and impute them to human nature1 and the rest to some devil2 or those we like to our kind of human nature1 and those we dislike to the nature of despised foreigners on the ground they are not really native at all4 ,it would appear to be simpler if we could point to certain customs1 saying that they are the unalloyed products of certain instincts1 while those other social arrangements are to be attributed wholly to other impulses4 ,but such methods are not feasible4 ,the same original fears1 angers1 loves and hates are hopelessly entangled in the most opposite institutions4 ,the thing we need to know is how a native stock has been modified by interaction with different environments4 ,yet it goes without saying that original1 unlearned activity has its distinctive place and that an important one in conduct4 ,impulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn1 they are agencies of deviation1 for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality4 ,consequently whenever we are concerned with understanding social transition and flux or with projects for reform1 personal and collective1 our study must go to analysis of native tendencies4 ,interest in progress and reform is1 indeed1 the reason for the present great development of scientific interest in primitive human nature4 ,if we inquire why men were so long blind to the existence of powerful and varied instincts in human beings1 the answer seems to be found in the lack of a conception of orderly progress4 ,it is fast becoming incredible that psychologists disputed as to whether they should choose between innate ideas and an empty1 passive1 wax-like mind4 ,for it seems as if a glance at a child would have revealed that the truth lay in neither doctrine1 so obvious is the surging of specific native activities4 ,but this obtuseness to facts was evidence of lack of interest in what could be done with impulses1 due1 in turn1 to lack of interest in modifying existing institutions4 ,it is no accident that men became interested in the psychology of savages and babies when they became interested in doing away with old institutions4 ,a combination of traditional individualism with the recent interest in progress explains why the discovery of the scope and force of instincts has led many psychologists to think of them as the fountain head of all conduct1 as occupying a place before instead of after that of habits4 ,the orthodox tradition in psychology is built upon isolation of individuals from their surroundings4 ,the soul or mind or consciousness was thought of as self-contained and self-enclosed4 ,now in the career of an individual if it is regarded as complete in itself instincts clearly come before habits4 ,generalize this individualistic view1 and we have an assumption that all customs1 all significant episodes in the life of individuals can be carried directly back to the operation of instincts4 ,but1 as we have already noted1 if an individual be isolated in this fashion1 along with the fact of primacy of instinct we find also the fact of death4 ,the inchoate and scattered impulses of an infant do not coordinate into serviceable powers except through social dependencies and companionships4 ,his impulses are merely starting points for assimilation of the knowledge and skill of the more matured beings upon whom he depends4 ,they are tentacles sent out to gather that nutrition from customs which will in time render the infant capable of independent action4 ,they are agencies for transfer of existing social power into personal ability2 they are means of reconstructive growth4 ,abandon an impossible individualistic psychology1 and we arrive at the fact that native activities are organs of re-organization and re-adjustment4 ,the hen precedes the egg4 ,but nevertheless this particular egg may be so treated as to modify the future type of hen4 ,,ii ,in the case of the young it is patent that impulses are highly flexible starting points for activities which are diversified according to the ways in which they are used4 ,any impulse may become organized into almost any disposition according to the way it interacts with surroundings4 ,fear may become abject cowardice1 prudent caution1 reverence for superiors or respect for equals2 an agency for credulous swallowing of absurd superstitions or for wary scepticism4 ,a man may be chiefly afraid of the spirits of his ancestors1 of officials1 of arousing the disapproval of his associates1 of being deceived1 of fresh air1 or of ,bolshevism4 ,the actual outcome depends upon how the impulse of fear is interwoven with other impulses4 ,this depends in turn upon the outlets and inhibitions supplied by the social environment4 ,in a definite sense1 then1 a human society is always starting afresh4 ,it is always in process of renewing1 and it endures only because of renewal4 ,we speak of the peoples of southern ,europe as ,latin peoples4 ,their existing languages depart widely from one another and from the ,latin mother tongue4 ,yet there never was a day when this alteration of speech was intentional or explicit4 ,persons always meant to reproduce the speech they heard from their elders and supposed they were succeeding4 ,this fact may stand as a kind of symbol of the reconstruction wrought in habits because of the fact that they can be transmitted and be made to endure only through the medium of the crude activities of the young or through contact with persons having different habits4 ,for the most part1 this continuous alteration has been unconscious and unintended4 ,immature1 undeveloped activity has succeeded in modifying adult organized activity accidentally and surreptitiously4 ,but with the dawn of the idea of progressive betterment and an interest in new uses of impulses1 there has grown up some consciousness of the extent to which a future new society of changed purposes and desires may be created by a deliberate humane treatment of the impulses of youth4 ,this is the meaning of education2 for a truly humane education consists in an intelligent direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and necessities of the social situation4 ,but for the most part1 adults have given training rather than education4 ,an impatient1 premature mechanization of impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and affection has been desired4 ,the combined effect of love of power1 timidity in the face of the novel and a self-admiring complacency has been too strong to permit immature impulse to exercise its re-organizing potentialities4 ,the younger generation has hardly even knocked frankly at the door of adult customs1 much less been invited in to rectify through better education the brutalities and inequities established in adult habits4 ,each new generation has crept blindly and furtively through such chance gaps as have happened to be left open4 ,otherwise it has been modeled after the old4 ,we have already noted how original plasticity is warped and docility is taken mean advantage of4 ,it has been used to signify not capacity to learn liberally and generously1 but willingness to learn the customs of adult associates1 ability to learn just those special things which those having power and authority wish to teach4 ,original modifiability has not been given a fair chance to act as a trustee for a better human life4 ,it has been loaded with convention1 biased by adult convenience4 ,it has been practically rendered into an equivalent of non-assertion of originality1 a pliant accommodation to the embodied opinions of others4 ,consequently docility has been identified with imitativeness1 instead of with power to re-make old habits1 to re-create4 ,plasticity and originality have been opposed to each other4 ,that the most precious part of plasticity consists in ability to form habits of independent judgment and of inventive initiation has been ignored4 ,for it demands a more complete and intense docility to form flexible easily re-adjusted habits than it does to acquire those which rigidly copy the ways of others4 ,in short1 among the native activities of the young are some that work towards accommodation1 assimilation1 reproduction1 and others that work toward exploration1 discovery and creation4 ,but the weight of adult custom has been thrown upon retaining and strengthening tendencies toward conformity1 and against those which make for variation and independence4 ,the habits of the growing person are jealously kept within the limit of adult customs4 ,the delightful originality of the child is tamed4 ,worship of institutions and personages themselves lacking in imaginative foresight1 versatile observation and liberal thought1 is enforced4 ,very early in life sets of mind are formed without attentive thought1 and these sets persist and control the mature mind4 ,the child learns to avoid the shock of unpleasant disagreement1 to find the easy way out1 to appear to conform to customs which are wholly mysterious to him in order to get his own way--that is to display some natural impulse without exciting the unfavorable notice of those in authority4 ,adults distrust the intelligence which a child has while making upon him demands for a kind of conduct that requires a high order of intelligence1 if it is to be intelligent at all4 ,the inconsistency is reconciled by instilling in him moral habits which have a maximum of emotional empressment and adamantine hold with a minimum of understanding4 ,these habitudes1 deeply engrained before thought is awake and even before the day of experiences which can later be recalled1 govern conscious later thought4 ,they are usually deepest and most unget-at-able just where critical thought is most needed--in morals1 religion and politics4 ,these infantalisms account for the mass of irrationalities that prevail among men of otherwise rational tastes4 ,these personal hang-overs are the cause of what the student of culture calls survivals4 ,but unfortunately these survivals are much more numerous and pervasive than the anthropologist and historian are wont to admit4 ,to list them would perhaps oust one from respectable society4 ,and yet the intimation never wholly deserts us that there is in the unformed activities of childhood and youth the possibilities of a better life for the community as well as for individuals here and there4 ,this dim sense is the ground of our abiding idealization of childhood4 ,for with all its extravagancies and uncertainties1 its effusions and reticences1 it remains a standing proof of a life wherein growth is normal not an anomaly1 activity a delight not a task1 and where habit-forming is an expansion of power not its shrinkage4 ,habit and impulse may war with each other1 but it is a combat between the habits of adults and the impulses of the young1 and not1 as with the adult1 a civil warfare whereby personality is rent asunder4 ,our usual measure for the goodness of children is the amount of trouble they make for grownups1 which means of course the amount they deviate from adult habits and expectations4 ,yet by way of expiation we envy children their love of new experiences1 their intentness in extracting the last drop of significance from each situation1 their vital seriousness in things that to us are outworn4 ,we compensate for the harshness and monotony of our present insistence upon formed habits by imagining a future heaven in which we too shall respond freshly and generously to each incident of life4 ,in consequence of our divided attitude1 our ideals are self-contradictory4 ,on the one hand1 we dream of an attained perfection1 an ultimate static goal1 in which effort shall cease1 and desire and execution be once and for all in complete equilibrium4 ,we wish for a character which shall be steadfast1 and we then conceive this desired faithfulness as something immutable1 a character exactly the same yesterday1 today and forever4 ,but we also have a sneaking sympathy for the courage of an ,emerson in declaring that consistency should be thrown to the winds when it stands between us and the opportunities of present life4 ,we reach out to the opposite extreme of our ideal of fixity1 and under the guise of a return to nature dream of a romantic freedom1 in which all life is plastic to impulse1 a continual source of improvised spontaneities and novel inspirations4 ,we rebel against all organization and all stability4 ,if modern thought and sentiment is to escape from this division in its ideals1 it must be through utilizing released impulse as an agent of steady reorganization of custom and institutions4 ,while childhood is the conspicuous proof of the renewing of habit rendered possible by impulse1 the latter never wholly ceases to play its refreshing rle in adult life4 ,if it did1 life would petrify1 society stagnate4 ,instinctive reactions are sometimes too intense to be woven into a smooth pattern of habits4 ,under ordinary circumstances they appear to be tamed to obey their master1 custom4 ,but extraordinary crises release them and they show by wild violent energy how superficial is the control of routine4 ,the saying that civilization is only skin deep1 that a savage persists beneath the clothes of a civilized man1 is the common acknowledgment of this fact4 ,at critical moments of unusual stimuli the emotional outbreak and rush of instincts dominating all activity show how superficial is the modification which a rigid habit has been able to effect4 ,when we face this fact in its general significance1 we confront one of the ominous aspects of the history of man4 ,we realize how little the progress of man has been the product of intelligent guidance1 how largely it has been a by-product of accidental upheavals1 even though by an apologetic interest in behalf of some privileged institution we later transmute chance into providence4 ,we have depended upon the clash of war1 the stress of revolution1 the emergence of heroic individuals1 the impact of migrations generated by war and famine1 the incoming of barbarians1 to change established institutions4 ,instead of constantly utilizing unused impulse to effect continuous reconstruction1 we have waited till an accumulation of stresses suddenly breaks through the dikes of custom4 ,it is often supposed that as old persons die1 so must old peoples4 ,there are many facts in history to support the belief4 ,decadence and degeneration seems to be the rule as age increases4 ,an irruption of some uncivilized horde has then provided new blood and fresh life--so much so that history has been defined as a process of rebarbarization4 ,in truth the analogy between a person and a nation with respect to senescence and death is defective4 ,a nation is always renewed by the death of its old constituents and the birth of those who are as young and fresh as ever were any individuals in the hey-day of the nation's glory4 ,not the nation but its customs get old4 ,its institutions petrify into rigidity2 there is social arterial sclerosis4 ,then some people not overburdened with elaborate and stiff habits take up and carry on the moving process of life4 ,the stock of fresh peoples is1 however1 approaching exhaustion4 ,it is not safe to rely upon this expensive method of renewing civilization4 ,we need to discover how to rejuvenate it from within4 ,a normal perpetuation becomes a fact in the degree in which impulse is released and habit is plastic to the transforming touch of impulse4 ,when customs are flexible and youth is educated as youth and not as premature adulthood1 no nation grows old4 ,there always exists a goodly store of non-functioning impulses which may be drawn upon4 ,their manifestation and utilization is called conversion or regeneration when it comes suddenly4 ,but they may be drawn upon continuously and moderately4 ,then we call it learning or educative growth4 ,rigid custom signifies not that there are no such impulses but that they are not organically taken advantage of4 ,as matter of fact1 the stiffer and the more encrusted the customs1 the larger is the number of instinctive activities that find no regular outlet and that accordingly merely await a chance to get an irregular1 uncoordinated manifestation4 ,routine habits never take up all the slack4 ,they apply only where conditions remain the same or recur in uniform ways4 ,they do not fit the unusual and novel4 ,consequently rigid moral codes that attempt to lay down definite injunctions and prohibitions for every occasion in life turn out in fact loose and slack4 ,stretch ten commandments or any other number as far as you will by ingenious exegesis1 yet acts unprovided for by them will occur4 ,no elaboration of statute law can forestall variant cases and the need of interpretation ad hoc4 ,moral and legal schemes that attempt the impossible in the way of definite formulation compensate for explicit strictness in some lines by implicit looseness in others4 ,the only truly severe code is the one which foregoes codification1 throwing responsibility for judging each case upon the agents concerned1 imposing upon them the burden of discovery and adaptation4 ,the relation which actually exists between undirected instinct and over-organized custom is illustrated in the two views that are current about savage life4 ,the popular view looks at the savage as a wild man2 as one who knows no controlling principles or rules of action1 who freely follows his own impulse1 whim or desire whenever it seizes him and wherever it takes him4 ,anthropologists are given to the opposed notion4 ,they view savages as bondsmen to custom4 ,they note the network of regulations that order his risings-up and his sittings-down1 his goings-out and his comings-in4 ,they conclude that in comparison with civilized man the savage is a slave1 governed by many inflexible tribal habitudes in conduct and ideas4 ,the truth about savage life lies in a combination of these two conceptions4 ,where customs exist they are of one pattern and binding on personal sentiment and thought to a degree unknown in civilized life4 ,but since they cannot possibly exist with respect to all the changing detail of daily life1 whatever is left uncovered by custom is free from regulation4 ,it is therefore left to appetite and momentary circumstance4 ,thus enslavement to custom and license of impulse exist side by side4 ,strict conformity and unrestrained wildness intensify each other4 ,this picture of life shows us in an exaggerated form the psychology current in civilized life whenever customs harden and hold individuals enmeshed4 ,within civilization1 the savage still exists4 ,he is known in his degree by oscillation between loose indulgence and stiff habit4 ,impulse in short brings with itself the possibility but not the assurance of a steady reorganization of habits to meet new elements in new situations4 ,the moral problem in child and adult alike as regards impulse and instinct is to utilize them for formation of new habits1 or what is the same thing1 the modification of an old habit so that it may be adequately serviceable under novel conditions4 ,the place of impulse in conduct as a pivot of re-adjustment1 re-organization1 in habits may be defined as follows3 ,on one side1 it is marked off from the territory of arrested and encrusted habits4 ,on the other side1 it is demarcated from the region in which impulse is a law unto itself4#e ,generalizing these distinctions1 a valid moral theory contrasts with all those theories which set up static goals 7even when they are called perfection71 and with those theories which idealize raw impulse and find in its spontaneities an adequate mode of human freedom4 ,impulse is a source1 an indispensable source1 of liberation2 but only as it is employed in giving habits pertinence and freshness does it liberate power4 #e ,the use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional1 even though it may grieve critical readers4 ,the word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted--which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings4 ,the word impulse suggests something primitive1 yet loose1 undirected1 initial4 ,man can progress as beasts cannot1 precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another1 so that most serviceable actions must be learned4 ,in learning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of learning4 ,then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life4 ,,iii ,incidentally we have touched upon a most far-reaching problem3 ,the alterability of human nature4 ,early reformers1 following ,john ,locke1 were inclined to minimize the significance of native activities1 and to emphasize the possibilities inherent in practice and habit-acquisition4 ,there was a political slant to this denial of the native and a priori1 this magnifying of the accomplishments of acquired experience4 ,it held out a prospect of continuous development1 of improvement without end4 ,thus writers like ,helvetius made the idea of the complete malleability of a human nature which originally is wholly empty and passive1 the basis for asserting the omnipotence of education to shape human society1 and the ground of proclaiming the infinite perfectibility of mankind4 ,wary1 experienced men of the world have always been sceptical of schemes of unlimited improvement4 ,they tend to regard plans for social change with an eye of suspicion4 ,they find in them evidences of the proneness of youth to illusion1 or of incapacity on the part of those who have grown old to learn anything from experience4 ,this type of conservative has thought to find in the doctrine of native instincts a scientific support for asserting the practical unalterability of human nature4 ,circumstances may change1 but human nature remains from age to age the same4 ,heredity is more potent than environment1 and human heredity is untouched by human intent4 ,effort for a serious alteration of human institutions is utopian4 ,as things have been so they will be4 ,the more they change the more they remain the same4 ,curiously enough both parties rest their case upon just the factor which when it is analyzed weakens their respective conclusions4 ,that is to say1 the radical reformer rests his contention in behalf of easy and rapid change upon the psychology of habits1 of institutions in shaping raw nature1 and the conservative grounds his counter-assertion upon the psychology of instincts4 ,as matter of fact1 it is precisely custom which has greatest inertia1 which is least susceptible of alteration2 while instincts are most readily modifiable through use1 most subject to educative direction4 ,the conservative who begs scientific support from the psychology of instincts is the victim of an outgrown psychology which derived its notion of instinct from an exaggeration of the fixity and certainty of the operation of instincts among the lower animals4 ,he is a victim of a popular zoology of the bird1 bee and beaver1 which was largely framed to the greater glory of ,god4 ,he is ignorant that instincts in the animals are less infallible and definite than is supposed1 and also that the human being differs from the lower animals in precisely the fact that his native activities lack the complex ready-made organization of the animals' original abilities4 ,but the short-cut revolutionist fails to realize the full force of the things about which he talks most1 namely institutions as embodied habits4 ,any one with knowledge of the stability and force of habit will hesitate to propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social changes4 ,a social revolution may effect abrupt and deep alterations in external customs1 in legal and political institutions4 ,but the habits that are behind these institutions and that have1 willy-nilly1 been shaped by objective conditions1 the habits of thought and feeling1 are not so easily modified4 ,they persist and insensibly assimilate to themselves the outer innovations--much as ,american judges nullify the intended changes of statute law by interpreting legislation in the light of common law4 ,the force of lag in human life is enormous4 ,actual social change is never so great as is apparent change4 ,ways of belief1 of expectation1 of judgment and attendant emotional dispositions of like and dislike1 are not easily modified after they have once taken shape4 ,political and legal institutions may be altered1 even abolished2 but the bulk of popular thought which has been shaped to their pattern persists4 ,this is why glowing predictions of the immediate coming of a social millennium terminate so uniformly in disappointment1 which gives point to the standing suspicion of the cynical conservative about radical changes4 ,habits of thought outlive modifications in habits of overt action4 ,the former are vital1 the latter1 without the sustaining life of the former1 are muscular tricks4 ,consequently as a rule the moral effects of even great political revolutions1 after a few years of outwardly conspicuous alterations1 do not show themselves till after the lapse of years4 ,a new generation must come upon the scene whose habits of mind have been formed under the new conditions4 ,there is pith in the saying that important reforms cannot take real effect until after a number of influential persons have died4 ,where general and enduring moral changes do accompany an external revolution it is because appropriate habits of thought have previously been insensibly matured4 ,the external change merely registers the removal of an external superficial barrier to the operation of existing intellectual tendencies4 ,those who argue that social and moral reform is impossible on the ground that the ,old ,adam of human nature remains forever the same1 attribute however to native activities the permanence and inertia that in truth belong only to acquired customs4 ,to ,aristotle slavery was rooted in aboriginal human nature4 ,native distinctions of quality exist such that some persons are by nature gifted with power to plan1 command and supervise1 and others possess merely capacity to obey and execute4 ,hence slavery is natural and inevitable4 ,there is error in supposing that because domestic and chattel slavery has been legally abolished1 therefore slavery as conceived by ,aristotle has disappeared4 ,but matters have at least progressed to a point where it is clear that slavery is a social state not a psychological necessity4 ,nevertheless the worldlywise ,aristotles of today assert that the institutions of war and the present wage-system are so grounded in immutable human nature that effort to change them is foolish4 ,like ,greek slavery or feudal serfdom1 war and the existing economic regime are social patterns woven out of the stuff of instinctive activities4 ,native human nature supplies the raw materials1 but custom furnishes the machinery and the designs4 ,war would not be possible without anger1 pugnacity1 rivalry1 self-display1 and such like native tendencies4 ,activity inheres in them and will persist under every condition of life4 ,to imagine they can be eradicated is like supposing that society can go on without eating and without union of the sexes4 ,but to fancy that they must eventuate in war is as if a savage were to believe that because he uses fibers having fixed natural properties in order to weave baskets1 therefore his immemorial tribal patterns are also natural necessities and immutable forms4 ,from a humane standpoint our study of history is still all too primitive4 ,it is possible to study a multitude of histories1 and yet permit history1 the record of the transitions and transformations of human activities1 to escape us4 ,taking history in separate doses of this country and that1 we take it as a succession of isolated finalities1 each one in due season giving way to another1 as supernumeraries succeed one another in a march across the stage4 ,we thus miss the fact of history and also its lesson2 the diversity of institutional forms and customs which the same human nature may produce and employ4 ,an infantile logic1 now happily expelled from physical science1 taught that opium put men to sleep because of its dormitive potency4 ,we follow the same logic in social matters when we believe that war exists because of bellicose instincts2 or that a particular economic regime is necessary because of acquisitive and competitive impulses which must find expression4 ,pugnacity and fear are no more native than are pity and sympathy4 ,the important thing morally is the way these native tendencies interact1 for their interaction may give a chemical transformation not a mechanical combination4 ,similarly1 no social institution stands alone as a product of one dominant force4 ,it is a phenomenon or function of a multitude of social factors in their mutual inhibitions and reinforcements4 ,if we follow an infantile logic we shall reduplicate the unity of result in an assumption of unity of force behind it--as men once did with natural events employing teleology as an exhibition of causal efficiency4 ,we thus take the same social custom twice over3 once as an existing fact and then as an original force which produced the fact1 and utter sage platitudes about the unalterable workings of human nature or of race4 ,as we account for war by pugnacity1 for the capitalistic system by the necessity of an incentive of gain to stir ambition and effort1 so we account for ,greece by power of esthetic observation1 ,rome by administrative ability1 the middle ages by interest in religion and so on4 ,we have constructed an elaborate political zoology as mythological and not nearly as poetic as the other zoology of phoenixes1 griffins and unicorns4 ,native racial spirit1 the spirit of the people or of the time1 national destiny are familiar figures in this social zoo4 ,as names for effects1 for existing customs1 they are sometimes useful4 ,as names for explanatory forces they work havoc with intelligence4 ,an immense debt is due ,william ,james for the mere title of his essay3 ,the ,moral ,equivalents of ,war4 ,it reveals with a flash of light the true psychology4 ,clans1 tribes1 races1 cities1 empires1 nations1 states have made war4 ,the argument that this fact proves an ineradicable belligerent instinct which makes war forever inevitable is much more respectable than many arguments about the immutability of this and that social tradition4 ,for it has the weight of a certain empirical generality back of it4 ,yet the suggestion of an equivalent for war calls attention to the medley of impulses which are casually bunched together under the caption of belligerent impulse2 and it calls attention to the fact that the elements of this medley may be woven together into many differing types of activity1 some of which may function the native impulses in much better ways than war has ever done4 ,pugnacity1 rivalry1 vainglory1 love of booty1 fear1 suspicion1 anger1 desire for freedom from the conventions and restrictions of peace1 love of power and hatred of oppression1 opportunity for novel displays1 love of home and soil1 attachment to one's people and to the altar and the hearth1 courage1 loyalty1 opportunity to make a name1 money or a career1 affection1 piety to ancestors and ancestral gods--all of these things and many more make up the war-like force4 ,to suppose there is some one unchanging native force which generates war is as naive as the usual assumption that our enemy is actuated solely by the meaner of the tendencies named and we only by the nobler4 ,in earlier days there was something more than a verbal connection between pugnacity and fighting2 anger and fear moved promptly through the fists4 ,but between a loosely organized pugilism and the highly organized warfare of today there intervenes a long economic1 scientific and political history4 ,social conditions rather than an old and unchangeable ,adam have generated wars2 the ineradicable impulses that are utilized in them are capable of being drafted into many other channels4 ,the century that has witnessed the triumph of the scientific doctrine of the convertibility of natural energies ought not to balk at the lesser miracle of social equivalences and substitutes4 ,it is likely that if ,mr4 ,james had witnessed the world war1 he would have modified his mode of treatment4 ,so many new transformations entered into the war1 that the war seems to prove that though an equivalent has not been found for war1 the psychological forces traditionally associated with it have already undergone profound changes4 ,we may take the ,iliad as a classic expression of war's traditional psychology as well as the source of the literary tradition regarding its motives and glories4 ,but where are ,helen1 ,hector and ,achilles in modern warfare8 ,the activities that evoke and incorporate a war are no longer personal love1 love of glory1 or the soldier's love of his own privately amassed booty1 but are of a collective1 prosaic political and economic nature4 ,universal conscription1 the general mobilization of all agricultural and industrial forces of the folk not engaged in the trenches1 the application of every conceivable scientific and mechanical device1 the mass movements of soldiery regulated from a common center by a depersonalized general staff3 these factors relegate the traditional psychological apparatus of war to a now remote antiquity4 ,the motives once appealed to are out of date2 they do not now induce war4 ,they simply are played upon after war has been brought into existence in order to keep the common soldiers keyed up to their task4 ,the more horrible a depersonalized scientific mass war becomes1 the more necessary it is to find universal ideal motives to justify it4 ,love of ,helen of ,troy has become a burning love for all humanity1 and hatred of the foe symbolizes a hatred of all the unrighteousness and injustice and oppression which he embodies4 ,the more prosaic the actual causes1 the more necessary is it to find glowingly sublime motives4 ,such considerations hardly prove that war is to be abolished at some future date4 ,but they destroy that argument for its necessary continuance which is based on the immutability of specified forces in original human nature4 ,already the forces that once caused wars have found other outlets for themselves2 while new provocations1 based on new economic and political conditions1 have come into being4 ,war is thus seen to be a function of social institutions1 not of what is natively fixed in human constitution4 ,the last great war has not1 it must be confessed1 made the problem of finding social equivalents simpler and easier4 ,it is now naive to attribute war to specific isolable human impulses for which separate channels of expression may be found1 while the rest of life is left to go on about the same4 ,a general social re-organization is needed which will redistribute forces1 immunize1 divert and nullify4 ,hinton was doubtless right when he wrote that the only way to abolish war was to make peace heroic4 ,it now appears that the heroic emotions are not anything which may be specialized in a side-line1 so that the war-impulses may find a sublimation in special practices and occupations4 ,they have to get an outlet in all the tasks of peace4 ,the argument for the abiding necessity of war turns out1 accordingly1 to have this much value4 ,it makes us wisely suspicious of all cheap and easy equivalencies4 ,it convinces us of the folly of striving to eliminate war by agencies which leave other institutions of society pretty much unchanged4 ,history does not prove the inevitability of war1 but it does prove that customs and institutions which organize native powers into certain patterns in politics and economics will also generate the war-pattern4 ,the problem of war is difficult because it is serious4 ,it is none other than the wider problem of the effective moralizing or humanizing of native impulses in times of peace4 ,the case of economic institutions is as suggestive as that of war4 ,the present system is indeed much more recent and more local than is the institution of war4 ,but no system has ever as yet existed which did not in some form involve the exploitation of some human beings for the advantage of others4 ,and it is argued that this trait is unassailable because it flows from the inherent1 immutable qualities of human nature4 ,it is argued1 for example1 that economic inferiorities and disabilities are incidents of an institution of private property which flows from an original proprietary instinct2 it is contended they spring from a competitive struggle for wealth which in turn flows from the absolute need of profit as an inducement to industry4 ,the pleas are worth examination for the light they throw upon the place of impulses in organized conduct4 ,no unprejudiced observer will lightly deny the existence of an original tendency to assimilate objects and events to the self1 to make them part of the me4 ,we may even admit that the me cannot exist without the mine4 ,the self gets solidity and form through an appropriation of things which identifies them with whatever we call myself4 ,even a workman in a modern factory where depersonalization is extreme gets to have his machine and is perturbed at a change4 ,possession shapes and consolidates the ,i of philosophers4 ,i own1 therefore ,i am expresses a truer psychology than the ,cartesian ,i think1 therefore ,i am4 ,a man's deeds are imputed to him as their owner1 not merely as their creator4 ,that he cannot disown them when the moment of their occurrence passes is the root of responsibility1 moral as well as legal4 ,but these same considerations evince the versatility of possessive activity4 ,my worldly goods1 my good name1 my friends1 my honor and shame all depend upon a possessive tendency4 ,the need for appropriation has had to be satisfied2 but only a calloused imagination fancies that the institution of private property as it exists ,a4 ,d4 #aiba is the sole or the indispensable means of its realization4 ,every gallant life is an experiment in different ways of fulfilling it4 ,it expends itself in predatory aggression1 in forming friendships1 in seeking fame1 in literary creation1 in scientific production4 ,in the face of this elasticity1 it requires an arrogant ignorance to take the existing complex system of stocks and bonds1 of wills and inheritance1 a system supported at every point by manifold legal and political arrangements1 and treat it as the sole legitimate and baptized child of an instinct of appropriation4 ,sometimes1 even now1 a man most accentuates the fact of ownership when he gives something away2 use1 consumption1 is the normal end of possession4 ,we can conceive a state of things in which the proprietary impulse would get full satisfaction by holding goods as mine in just the degree in which they were visibly administered for a benefit in which a corporate community shared4 ,does the case stand otherwise with the other psychological principle appealed to1 namely1 the need of an incentive of personal profit to keep men engaged in useful work8 ,we need not content ourselves with pointing out the elasticity of the idea of gain1 and possible equivalences for pecuniary gain1 and the possibility of a state of affairs in which only those things would be counted personal gains which profit a group4 ,it will advance the discussion if we instead subject to analysis the whole conception of incentive and motive4 ,there is doubtless some sense in saying that every conscious act has an incentive or motive4 ,but this sense is as truistic as that of the not dissimilar saying that every event has a cause4 ,neither statement throws any light on any particular occurrence4 ,it is at most a maxim which advises us to search for some other fact with which the one in question may be correlated4 ,those who attempt to defend the necessity of existing economic institutions as manifestations of human nature convert this suggestion of a concrete inquiry into a generalized truth and hence into a definitive falsity4 ,they take the saying to mean that nobody would do anything1 or at least anything of use to others1 without a prospect of some tangible reward4 ,and beneath this false proposition there is another assumption still more monstrous1 namely1 that man exists naturally in a state of rest so that he requires some external force to set him into action4 ,the idea of a thing intrinsically wholly inert in the sense of absolutely passive is expelled from physics and has taken refuge in the psychology of current economics4 ,in truth man acts anyway1 he can't help acting4 ,in every fundamental sense it is false that a man requires a motive to make him do something4 ,to a healthy man inaction is the greatest of woes4 ,any one who observes children knows that while periods of rest are natural1 laziness is an acquired vice--or virtue4 ,while a man is awake he will do something1 if only to build castles in the air4 ,if we like the form of words we may say that a man eats only because he is moved by hunger4 ,the statement is nevertheless mere tautology4 ,for what does hunger mean except that one of the things which man does naturally1 instinctively1 is to search for food--that his activity naturally turns that way8 ,hunger primarily names an act or active process not a motive to an act4 ,it is an act if we take it grossly1 like a babe's blind hunt for the mother's breast2 it is an activity if we take it minutely as a chemico-physiological occurrence4 ,the whole concept of motives is in truth extra-psychological4 ,it is an outcome of the attempt of men to influence human action1 first that of others1 then of a man to influence his own behavior4 ,no sensible person thinks of attributing the acts of an animal or an idiot to a motive4 ,we call a biting dog ugly1 but we don't look for his motive in biting4 ,if however we were able to direct the dog's action by inducing him to reflect upon his acts1 we should at once become interested in the dog's motives for acting as he does1 and should endeavor to get him interested in the same subject4 ,it is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally speaking4 ,he is an active being and that is all there is to be said on that score4 ,but when we want to get him to act in this specific way rather than in that1 when we want to direct his activity that is to say in a specified channel1 then the question of motive is pertinent4 ,a motive is then that element in the total complex of a man's activity which1 if it can be sufficiently stimulated1 will result in an act having specified consequences4 ,and part of the process of intensifying 7or reducing7 certain elements in the total activity and thus regulating actual consequence is to impute these elements to a person as his actuating motives4 ,a child naturally grabs food4 ,but he does it in our presence4 ,his manner is socially displeasing and we attribute to his act1 up to this time wholly innocent1 the motive of greed or selfishness4 ,greediness simply means the quality of his act as socially observed and disapproved4 ,but by attributing it to him as his motive for acting in the disapproved way1 we induce him to refrain4 ,we analyze his total act and call his attention to an obnoxious element in its outcome4 ,a child with equal spontaneity1 or thoughtlessness1 gives way to others4 ,we point out to him with approval that he acted considerately1 generously4 ,and this quality of action when noted and encouraged becomes a reinforcing stimulus of that factor which will induce similar acts in the future4 ,an element in an act viewed as a tendency to produce such and such consequences is a motive4 ,a motive does not exist prior to an act and produce it4 ,it is an act plus a judgment upon some element of it1 the judgment being made in the light of the consequences of the act4 ,at first1 as was said1 others characterize an act with favorable or condign qualities which they impute to an agent's character4 ,they react in this fashion in order to encourage him in future acts of the same sort1 or in order to dissuade him--in short to build or destroy a habit4 ,this characterization is part of the technique of influencing the development of character and conduct4 ,it is a refinement of the ordinary reactions of praise and blame4 ,after a time and to some extent1 a person teaches himself to think of the results of acting in this way or that before he acts4 ,he recalls that if he acts this way or that some observer1 real or imaginary1 will attribute to him noble or mean disposition1 virtuous or vicious motive4 ,thus he learns to influence his own conduct4 ,an inchoate activity taken in this forward-looking reference to results1 especially results of approbation and condemnation1 constitutes a motive4 ,instead then of saying that a man requires a motive in order to induce him to act1 we should say that when a man is going to act he needs to know what he is going to do--what the quality of his act is in terms of consequences to follow4 ,in order to act properly he needs to view his act as others view it2 namely1 as a manifestation of a character or will which is good or bad according as it is bent upon specific things which are desirable or obnoxious4 ,there is no call to furnish a man with incentives to activity in general4 ,but there is every need to induce him to guide his own action by an intelligent perception of its results4 ,for in the long run this is the most effective way of influencing activity to take this desirable direction rather than that objectionable one4 ,a motive in short is simply an impulse viewed as a constituent in a habit1 a factor in a disposition4 ,in general its meaning is simple4 ,but in fact motives are as numerous as are original impulsive activities multiplied by the diversified consequences they produce as they operate under diverse conditions4 ,how then does it come about that current economic psychology has so tremendously oversimplified the situation8 ,why does it recognize but one type of motive1 that which concerns personal gain4 ,of course part of the answer is to be found in the natural tendency in all sciences toward a substitution of artificial conceptual simplifications for the tangles of concrete empirical facts4 ,but the significant part of the answer has to do with the social conditions under which work is done1 conditions which are such as to put an unnatural emphasis upon the prospect of reward4 ,it exemplifies again our leading proposition that social customs are not direct and necessary consequences of specific impulses1 but that social institutions and expectations shape and crystallize impulses into dominant habits4 ,the social peculiarity which explains the emphasis put upon profit as an inducement to productive serviceable work stands out in high relief in the identification of work with labor4 ,for labor means in economic theory something painful1 something so onerously disagreeable or costly that every individual avoids it if he can1 and engages in it only because of the promise of an overbalancing gain4 ,thus the question we are invited to consider is what the social condition is which makes productive work uninteresting and toilsome4 ,why is the psychology of the industrialist so different from that of inventor1 explorer1 artist1 sportsman1 scientific investigator1 physician1 teacher8 ,for the latter we do not assert that activity is such a burdensome sacrifice that it is engaged in only because men are bribed to act by hope of reward or are coerced by fear of loss4 ,the social conditions under which labor is undertaken have become so uncongenial to human nature that it is not undertaken because of intrinsic meaning4 ,it is carried on under conditions which render it immediately irksome4 ,the alleged need of an incentive to stir men out of quiescent inertness is the need of an incentive powerful enough to overcome contrary stimuli which proceed from the social conditions4 ,circumstances of productive service now shear away direct satisfaction from those engaging in it4 ,a real and important fact is thus contained in current economic psychology1 but it is a fact about existing industrial conditions and not a fact about native1 original activity4 ,it is natural for activity to be agreeable4 ,it tends to find fulfilment1 and finding an outlet is itself satisfactory1 for it marks partial accomplishment4 ,if productive activity has become so inherently unsatisfactory that men have to be artificially induced to engage in it1 this fact is ample proof that the conditions under which work is carried on balk the complex of activities instead of promoting them1 irritate and frustrate natural tendencies instead of carrying them forward to fruition4 ,work then becomes labor1 the consequence of some aboriginal curse which forces man to do what he would not do if he could help it1 the outcome of some original sin which excluded man from a paradise in which desire was satisfied without industry1 compelling him to pay for the means of livelihood with the sweat of his brow4 ,from which it follows naturally that ,paradise ,regained means the accumulation of investments such that a man can live upon their return without labor4 ,there is1 we repeat1 too much truth in this picture4 ,but it is not a truth concerning original human nature and activity4 ,it concerns the form human impulses have taken under the influence of a specific social environment4 ,if there are difficulties in the way of social alteration--as there certainly are--they do not lie in an original aversion of human nature to serviceable action1 but in the historic conditions which have differentiated the work of the laborer for wage from that of the artist1 adventurer1 sportsman1 soldier1 administrator and speculator4 ,,iv ,war and the existing economic regime have not been discussed primarily on their own account4 ,they are crucial cases of the relation existing between original impulse and acquired habit4 ,they are so fraught with evil consequences that any one who is disposed can heap up criticisms without end4 ,nevertheless they persist4 ,this persistence constitutes the case for the conservative who argues that such institutions are rooted in an unalterable human nature4 ,a truer psychology locates the difficulty elsewhere4 ,it shows that the trouble lies in the inertness of established habit4 ,no matter how accidental and irrational the circumstances of its origin1 no matter how different the conditions which now exist to those under which the habit was formed1 the latter persists until the environment obstinately rejects it4 ,habits once formed perpetuate themselves1 by acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities4 ,they stimulate1 inhibit1 intensify1 weaken1 select1 concentrate and organize the latter into their own likeness4 ,they create out of the formless void of impulses a world made in their own image4 ,man is a creature of habit1 not of reason nor yet of instinct4 ,recognition of the correct psychology locates the problem but does not guarantee its solution4 ,indeed1 at first sight it seems to indicate that every attempt to solve the problem and secure fundamental reorganizations is caught in a vicious circle4 ,for the direction of native activity depends upon acquired habits1 and yet acquired habits can be modified only by redirection of impulses4 ,existing institutions impose their stamp1 their superscription1 upon impulse and instinct4 ,they embody the modifications the latter have undergone4 ,how then can we get leverage for changing institutions8 ,how shall impulse exercise that re-adjusting office which has been claimed for it8 ,shall we not have to depend in the future as in the past upon upheaval and accident to dislocate customs so as to release impulses to serve as points of departure for new habits8 ,the existing psychology of the industrial worker for example is slack1 irresponsible1 combining a maximum of mechanical routine with a maximum of explosive1 unregulated impulsiveness4 ,these things have been bred by the existing economic system4 ,but they exist1 and are formidable obstacles to social change4 ,we cannot breed in men the desire to get something for as nearly nothing as possible and in the end not pay the price4 ,we satisfy ourselves cheaply by preaching the charm of productivity and by blaming the inherent selfishness of human nature1 and urging some great moral and religious revival4 ,the evils point in reality to the necessity of a change in economic institutions1 but meantime they offer serious obstacles to the change4 ,at the same time1 the existing economic system has enlisted in behalf of its own perpetuity the managerial and the technological abilities which must serve the cause of the laborer if he is to be emancipated4 ,in the face of these difficulties other persons seek an equally cheap satisfaction in the thought of universal civil war and revolution4 ,is there any way out of the vicious circle8 ,in the first place1 there are possibilities resident in the education of the young which have never yet been taken advantage of4 ,the idea of universal education is as yet hardly a century old1 and it is still much more of an idea than a fact1 when we take into account the early age at which it terminates for the mass4 ,also1 thus far schooling has been largely utilized as a convenient tool of the existing nationalistic and economic regimes4 ,hence it is easy to point out defects and perversions in every existing school system4 ,it is easy for a critic to ridicule the religious devotion to education which has characterized for example the ,american republic4 ,it is easy to represent it as zeal without knowledge1 fanatical faith apart from understanding4 ,and yet the cold fact of the situation is that the chief means of continuous1 graded1 economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and desire4 ,the young are not as yet as subject to the full impact of established customs4 ,their life of impulsive activity is vivid1 flexible1 experimenting1 curious4 ,adults have their habits formed1 fixed1 at least comparatively4 ,they are the subjects1 not to say victims1 of an environment which they can directly change only by a maximum of effort and disturbance4 ,they may not be able to perceive clearly the needed changes1 or be willing to pay the price of effecting them4 ,yet they wish a different life for the generation to come4 ,in order to realize that wish they may create a special environment whose main function is education4 ,in order that education of the young be efficacious in inducing an improved society1 it is not necessary for adults to have a formulated definite ideal of some better state4 ,an educational enterprise conducted in this spirit would probably end merely in substituting one rigidity for another4 ,what is necessary is that habits be formed which are more intelligent1 more sensitively percipient1 more informed with foresight1 more aware of what they are about1 more direct and sincere1 more flexibly responsive than those now current4 ,then they will meet their own problems and propose their own improvements4 ,educative development of the young is not the only way in which the life of impulse may be employed to effect social ameliorations1 though it is the least expensive and most orderly4 ,no adult environment is all of one piece4 ,the more complex a culture is1 the more certain it is to include habits formed on differing1 even conflicting patterns4 ,each custom may be rigid1 unintelligent in itself1 and yet this rigidity may cause it to wear upon others4 ,the resulting attrition may release impulse for new adventures4 ,the present time is conspicuously a time of such internal frictions and liberations4 ,social life seems chaotic1 unorganized1 rather than too fixedly regimented4 ,political and legal institutions are now inconsistent with the habits that dominate friendly intercourse1 science and art4 ,different institutions foster antagonistic impulses and form contrary dispositions4 ,if we had to wait upon exhortations and unembodied ideals to effect social alterations1 we should indeed wait long4 ,but the conflict of patterns involved in institutions which are inharmonious with one another is already producing great changes4 ,the significant point is not whether modifications shall continue to occur1 but whether they shall be characterized chiefly by uneasiness1 discontent and blind antagonistic struggles1 or whether intelligent direction may modulate the harshness of conflict1 and turn the elements of disintegration into a constructive synthesis4 ,at all events1 the social situation in advanced countries is such as to impart an air of absurdity to our insistence upon the rigidity of customs4 ,there are plenty of persons to tell us that the real trouble lies in lack of fixity of habit and principle2 in departure from immutable standards and structures constituted once for all4 ,we are told that we are suffering from an excess of instinct1 and from laxity of habit due to surrender to impulse as a law of life4 ,the remedy is said to be to return from contemporary fluidity to the stable and spacious patterns of a classic antiquity that observed law and proportion3 for somehow antiquity is always classic4 ,when instability1 uncertainty1 erratic change are diffused throughout the situation1 why dwell upon the evils of fixed habit and the need of release of impulse as an initiator of reorganizations8 ,why not rather condemn impulse and exalt habits of reverencing order and fixed truth8 ,the question is natural1 but the remedy suggested is futile4 ,it is not easy to exaggerate the extent to which we now pass from one kind of nurture to another as we go from business to church1 from science to the newspaper1 from business to art1 from companionship to politics1 from home to school4 ,an individual is now subjected to many conflicting schemes of education4 ,hence habits are divided against one another1 personality is disrupted1 the scheme of conduct is confused and disintegrated4 ,but the remedy lies in the development of a new morale which can be attained only as released impulses are intelligently employed to form harmonious habits adapted to one another in a new situation4 ,a laxity due to decadence of old habits cannot be corrected by exhortations to restore old habits in their former rigidity4 ,even though it were abstractly desirable it is impossible4 ,and it is not desirable because the inflexibility of old habits is precisely the chief cause of their decay and disintegration4 ,plaintive lamentations at the prevalence of change and abstract appeals for restoration of senile authority are signs of personal feebleness1 of inability to cope with change4 ,it is a defense reaction4 ,v ,we may sum up the discussion in a few generalized statements4 ,in the first place1 it is unscientific to try to restrict original activities to a definite number of sharply demarcated classes of instincts4 ,and the practical result of this attempt is injurious4 ,to classify is1 indeed1 as useful as it is natural4 ,the indefinite multitude of particular and changing events is met by the mind with acts of defining1 inventorying and listing1 reducing to common heads and tying up in bunches4 ,but these acts like other intelligent acts are performed for a purpose1 and the accomplishment of purpose is their only justification4 ,speaking generally1 the purpose is to facilitate our dealings with unique individuals and changing events4 ,when we assume that our clefts and bunches represent fixed separations and collections in rerum natura1 we obstruct rather than aid our transactions with things4 ,we are guilty of a presumption which nature promptly punishes4 ,we are rendered incompetent to deal effectively with the delicacies and novelties of nature and life4 ,our thought is hard where facts are mobile2 bunched and chunky where events are fluid1 dissolving4 ,the tendency to forget the office of distinctions and classifications1 and to take them as marking things in themselves1 is the current fallacy of scientific specialism4 ,it is one of the conspicuous traits of highbrowism1 the essence of false abstractionism4 ,this attitude which once flourished in physical science now governs theorizing about human nature4 ,man has been resolved into a definite collection of primary instincts which may be numbered1 catalogued and exhaustively described one by one4 ,theorists differ only or chiefly as to their number and ranking4 ,some say one1 self-love2 some two1 egoism and altruism2 some three1 greed1 fear and glory2 while today writers of a more empirical turn run the number up to fifty and sixty4 ,but in fact there are as many specific reactions to differing stimulating conditions as there is time for1 and our lists are only classifications for a purpose4 ,one of the great evils of this artificial simplification is its influence upon social science4 ,complicated provinces of life have been assigned to the jurisdiction of some special instinct or group of instincts1 which has reigned despotically with the usual consequences of despotism4 ,politics has replaced religion as the set of phenomena based upon fear2 or after having been the fruit of a special ,aristotelian political faculty1 has become the necessary condition of restraining man's self-seeking impulse4 ,all sociological facts are disposed of in a few fat volumes as products of imitation and invention1 or of cooperation and conflict4 ,ethics rest upon sympathy1 pity1 benevolence4 ,economics is the science of phenomena due to one love and one aversion--gain and labor4 ,it is surprising that men can engage in these enterprises without being reminded of their exact similarity to natural science before scientific method was discovered in the seventeenth century4 ,just now another simplification is current4 ,all instincts go back to the sexual1 so that cherchez la femme 7under multitudinous symbolic disguises7 is the last word of science with respect to the analysis of conduct4 ,some sophisticated simplifications which once had great influence are now chiefly matters of historic moment4 ,even so they are instructive4 ,they show how social conditions put a heavy load on certain tendencies1 so that in the end an acquired disposition is treated as if it were an original1 and almost the only original activity4 ,consider1 for example1 the burden of causal power placed by ,hobbes upon the reaction of fear4 ,to a man living with reasonable security and comfort today1 ,hobbes' pervasive consciousness of fear seems like the idiosyncrasy of an abnormally timid temperament4 ,but a survey of the conditions of his own time1 of the disorders which bred general distrust and antagonism1 which led to brutal swashbuckling and disintegrating intrigue1 puts the matter on a different footing4 ,the social situation conduced to fearfulness4 ,as an account of the psychology of the natural man his theory is unsound4 ,as a report of contemporary social conditions there is much to be said for it4 ,something of the same sort may be said regarding the emphasis of eighteenth century moralists upon benevolence as the inclusive moral spring to action1 an emphasis represented in the nineteenth century by ,comte's exaltation of altruism4 ,the load was excessive4 ,but it testifies to the growth of a new philanthropic spirit4 ,with the breaking down of feudal barriers and a consequent mingling of persons previously divided1 a sense of responsibility for the happiness of others1 for the mitigation of misery1 grew up4 ,conditions were not ripe for its translation into political action4 ,hence the importance attached to the private disposition of voluntary benevolence4 ,if we venture into more ancient history1 ,plato's threefold division of the human soul into a rational element1 a spirited active one1 and an appetitive one1 aiming at increase or gain1 is immensely illuminating4 ,as is well known1 ,plato said that society is the human soul writ large4 ,in society he found three classes3 the philosophic and scientific1 the soldier-citizenry1 and the traders and artisans4 ,hence the generalization as to the three dominating forces in human nature4 ,read the other way around1 we perceive that trade in his days appealed especially to concupiscence1 citizenship to a generous lan of self-forgetting loyalty1 and scientific study to a disinterested love of wisdom that seemed to be monopolized by a small isolated group4 ,the distinctions were not in truth projected from the breast of the natural individual into society1 but they were cultivated in classes of individuals by force of social custom and expectation4 ,now the prestige that once attached to the instinct of self-love has not wholly vanished4 ,the case is still worth examination4 ,in its scientific form1 start was taken from an alleged instinct of self-preservation1 characteristic of man as well as of other animals4 ,from this seemingly innocuous assumption1 a mythological psychology burgeoned4 ,animals1 including man1 certainly perform many acts whose consequence is to protect and preserve life4 ,if their acts did not upon the whole have this tendency1 neither the individual or the species would long endure4 ,the acts that spring from life also in the main conserve life4 ,such is the undoubted fact4 ,what does the statement amount to8 ,simply the truism that life is life1 that life is a continuing activity as long as it is life at all4 ,but the self-love school converted the fact that life tends to maintain life into a separate and special force which somehow lies back of life and accounts for its various acts4 ,an animal exhibits in its life-activity a multitude of acts of breathing1 digesting1 secreting1 excreting1 attack1 defense1 search for food1 etc41 a multitude of specific responses to specific stimulations of the environment4 ,but mythology comes in and attributes them all to a nisus for self-preservation4 ,thence it is but a step to the idea that all conscious acts are prompted by self-love4 ,this premiss is then elaborated in ingenious schemes1 often amusing when animated by a cynical knowledge of the world1 tedious when of a would-be logical nature1 to prove that every act of man including his apparent generosities is a variation played on the theme of self-interest4 ,the fallacy is obvious4 ,because an animal cannot live except as it is alive1 except that is as its acts have the result of sustaining life1 it is concluded that all its acts are instigated by an impulse to self-preservation4 ,since all acts affect the well-being of their agent in one way or another1 and since when a person becomes reflective he prefers consequences in the way of weal to those of woe1 therefore all his acts are due to self-love4 ,in actual substance1 one statement says that life is life2 and the other says that a self is a self4 ,one says that special acts are acts of a living creature and the other that they are acts of a self4 ,in the biological statement the concrete diversity between the acts of say a clam and of a dog are covered up by pointing out that the acts of each tend to self-preservation1 ignoring the somewhat important fact that in one case it is the life of a clam and in the other the life of a dog which is continued4 ,in morals1 the concrete differences between a ,jesus1 a ,peter1 a ,john and a ,judas are covered up by the wise remark that after all they are all selves and all act as selves4 ,in every case1 a result or end is treated as an actuating cause4 ,the fallacy consists in transforming the 7truistic7 fact of acting as a self into the fiction of acting always for self4 ,every act1 truistically again1 tends to a certain fulfilment or satisfaction of some habit which is an undoubted element in the structure of character4 ,each satisfaction is qualitatively what it is because of the disposition fulfilled in the object attained1 treachery or loyalty1 mercy or cruelty4 ,but theory comes in and blankets the tremendous diversity in the quality of the satisfactions which are experienced by pointing out that they are all satisfactions4 ,the harm done is then completed by transforming this artificial unity of result into an original love of satisfaction as the force that generates all acts alike4 ,because a ,nero and a ,peabody both get satisfaction in acting as they do it is inferred that the satisfaction of each is the same in quality1 and that both were actuated by love of the same objective4 ,in reality the more we concretely dwell upon the common fact of fulfilment1 the more we realize the difference in the kinds of selves fulfilled4 ,in pointing out that both the north and the south poles are poles we do not abolish the difference of north from south2 we accentuate it4 ,the explanation of the fallacy is however too easy to be convincing4 ,there must have been some material1 empirical reason why intelligent men were so easily entrapped by a fairly obvious fallacy4 ,that material error was a belief in the fixity and simplicity of the self1 a belief which had been fostered by a school far removed from the one in question1 the theologians with their dogma of the unity and ready-made completeness of the soul4 ,we arrive at true conceptions of motivation and interest only by the recognition that selfhood 7except as it has encased itself in a shell of routine7 is in process of making1 and that any self is capable of including within itself a number of inconsistent selves1 of unharmonized dispositions4 ,even a ,nero may be capable upon occasion of acts of kindness4 ,it is even conceivable that under certain circumstances he may be appalled by the consequences of cruelty1 and turn to the fostering of kindlier impulses4 ,a sympathetic person is not immune to harsh arrogances1 and he may find himself involved in so much trouble as a consequence of a kindly act1 that he allows his generous impulses to shrivel and henceforth governs his conduct by the dictates of the strictest worldly prudence4 ,inconsistencies and shiftings in character are the commonest things in experience4 ,only the hold of a traditional conception of the singleness and simplicity of soul and self blinds us to perceiving what they mean3 the relative fluidity and diversity of the constituents of selfhood4 ,there is no one ready-made self behind activities4 ,there are complex1 unstable1 opposing attitudes1 habits1 impulses which gradually come to terms with one another1 and assume a certain consistency of configuration1 even though only by means of a distribution of inconsistencies which keeps them in water-tight compartments1 giving them separate turns or tricks in action4 ,many good words get spoiled when the word self is prefixed to them3 ,words like pity1 confidence1 sacrifice1 control1 love4 ,the reason is not far to seek4 ,the word self infects them with a fixed introversion and isolation4 ,it implies that the act of love or trust or control is turned back upon a self which already is in full existence and in whose behalf the act operates4 ,pity fulfils and creates a self when it is directed outward1 opening the mind to new contacts and receptions4 ,pity for self withdraws the mind back into itself1 rendering its subject unable to learn from the buffetings of fortune4 ,sacrifice may enlarge a self by bringing about surrender of acquired possessions to requirements of new growth4 ,self-sacrifice means a self-maiming which asks for compensatory pay in some later possession or indulgence4 ,confidence as an outgoing act is directness and courage in meeting the facts of life1 trusting them to bring instruction and support to a developing self4 ,confidence which terminates in the self means a smug complacency that renders a person obtuse to instruction by events4 ,control means a command of resources that enlarges the self2 self-control denotes a self which is contracting1 concentrating itself upon its own achievements1 hugging them tight1 and thereby estopping the growth that comes when the self is generously released2 a self-conscious moral athleticism that ends in a disproportionate enlargement of some organ4 ,what makes the difference in each of these cases is the difference between a self taken as something already made and a self still making through action4 ,in the former case1 action has to contribute profit or security or consolation to a self4 ,in the latter1 impulsive action becomes an adventure in discovery of a self which is possible but as yet unrealized1 an experiment in creating a self which shall be more inclusive than the one which exists4 ,the idea that only those impulses have moral validity which aim at the welfare of others1 or are altruistic1 is almost as one-sided a doctrine as the dogma of self-love4 ,yet altruism has one marked superiority2 it at least suggests a generosity of outgoing action1 a liberation of power as against the close1 pent in1 protected atmosphere of a ready-made ego4 ,the reduction of all impulses to forms of self-love is worth investigation because it gives an opportunity to say something about self as an ongoing process4 ,the doctrine itself is faded1 its advocates are belated4 ,the notion is too tame to appeal to a generation that has experienced romanticism and has been intoxicated by imbibing from the streams of power released by the industrial revolution4 ,the fashionable unification of today goes by the name of the will to power4 ,in the beginning1 this is hardly more than a name for a quality of all activity4 ,every fulfilled activity terminates in added control of conditions1 in an art of administering objects4 ,execution1 satisfaction1 realization1 fulfilment are all names for the fact that an activity implies an accomplishment which is possible only by subduing circumstance to serve as an accomplice of achievement4 ,each impulse or habit is thus a will to its own power4 ,to say this is to clothe a truism in a figure4 ,it says that anger or fear or love or hate is successful when it effects some change outside the organism which measures its force and registers its efficiency4 ,the achieved outcome marks the difference between action and a cooped-up sentiment which is expended upon itself4 ,the eye hungers for light1 the ear for sound1 the hand for surfaces1 the arm for things to reach1 throw and lift1 the leg for distance1 anger for an enemy to destroy1 curiosity for something to shiver and cower before1 love for a mate4 ,each impulse is a demand for an object which will enable it to function4 ,denied an object in reality it tends to create one in fancy1 as pathology shows4 ,so far we have no generalized will to power1 but only the inherent pressure of every activity for an adequate manifestation4 ,it is not so much a demand for power as search for an opportunity to use a power already existing4 ,if opportunities corresponded to the need1 a desire for power would hardly arise3 power would be used and satisfaction would accrue4 ,but impulse is balked4 ,if conditions are right for an educative growth1 the snubbed impulse will be sublimated4 ,that is1 it will become a contributory factor in some more inclusive and complex activity1 in which it is reduced to a subordinate yet effectual place4 ,sometimes however frustration dams activity up1 and intensifies it4 ,a longing for satisfaction at any cost is engendered4 ,and when social conditions are such that the path of least resistance lies through subjugation of the energies of others1 the will to power bursts into flower4 ,this explains why we attribute a will to power to others but not to ourselves1 except in the complimentary sense that being strong we naturally wish to exercise our strength4 ,otherwise for ourselves we only want what we want when we want it1 not being overscrupulous about the means we take to get it4 ,this psychology is naive but it is truer to facts than the supposition that there exists by itself as a separate and original thing a will to power4 ,for it indicates that the real fact is some existing power which demands outlet1 and which becomes self-conscious only when it is too weak to overcome obstacles4 ,conventionally the will to power is imputed only to a comparatively small number of ambitious and ruthless men4 ,they are probably upon the whole quite unconscious of any such will1 being mastered by specific intense impulses that find their realization most readily by bending others to serve as tools of their aims4 ,self-conscious will to power is found mainly in those who have a so-called inferiority complex1 and who would compensate for a sense of personal disadvantage 7acquired early in childhood7 by making a striking impression upon others1 in the reflex of which they feel their strength appreciated4 ,the literateur who has to take his action out in imagination is much more likely to evince a will to power than a ,napoleon who sees definite objects with extraordinary clearness and who makes directly for them4 ,explosive irritations1 naggings1 the obstinacy of weak persons1 dreams of grandeur1 the violence of those usually submissive are the ordinary marks of a will to power4 ,discussion of the false simplification involved in this doctrine suggests another unduly fixed and limited classification4 ,critics of the existing economic regime have divided instincts into the creative and the acquisitive1 and have condemned the present order because it embodies the latter at the expense of the former4 ,the division is convenient1 yet mistaken4 ,convenient because it sums up certain facts of the present system1 mistaken because it takes social products for psychological originals4 ,speaking roughly we may say that native activity is both creative and acquisitive1 creative as a process1 acquisitive in that it terminates as a rule in some tangible product which brings the process to consciousness of itself4 ,activity is creative in so far as it moves to its own enrichment as activity1 that is1 bringing along with itself a release of further activities4 ,scientific inquiry1 artistic production1 social companionship possess this trait to a marked degree2 some amount of it is a normal accompaniment of all successfully coordinated action4 ,while from the standpoint of what precedes it is a fulfilment1 it is a liberative expansion with respect to what comes after4 ,there is here no antagonism between creative expression and the production of results which endure and which give a sense of accomplishment4 ,architecture at its best1 for example1 would probably appear to most persons to be more creative1 not less1 than dancing at its best4 ,there is nothing in industrial production which of necessity excludes creative activity4 ,the fact that it terminates in tangible utilities no more lowers its status than the uses of a bridge exclude creative art from a share in its design and construction4 ,what requires explanation is why process is so definitely subservient to product in so much of modern industry3--that is1 why later use rather than present achieving is the emphatic thing4 ,the answer seems to be twofold4 ,an increasingly large portion of economic work is done with machines4 ,as a rule1 these machines are not under the personal control of those who operate them4 ,the machines are operated for ends which the worker has no share in forming and in which as such1 or apart from his wage1 he has no interest4 ,he neither understands the machines nor cares for their purpose4 ,he is engaged in an activity in which means are cut off from ends1 instruments from what they achieve4 ,highly mechanized activity tends as ,emerson said to turn men into spiders and needles4 ,but if men understand what they are about1 if they see the whole process of which their special work is a necessary part1 and if they have concern1 care1 for the whole1 then the mechanizing effect is counteracted4 ,but when a man is only the tender of a machine1 he can have no insight and no affection2 creative activity is out of the question4 ,what remains to the workman is however not so much acquisitive desires as love of security and a wish for a good time4 ,an excessive premium on security springs from the precarious conditions of the workman2 desire for a good time1 so far as it needs any explanation1 from demand for relief from drudgery1 due to the absence of culturing factors in the work done4 ,instead of acquisition being a primary end1 the net effect of the process is rather to destroy sober care for materials and products2 to induce careless wastefulness1 so far as that can be indulged in without lessening the weekly wage4 ,from the standpoint of orthodox economic theory1 the most surprising thing about modern industry is the small number of persons who have any effective interest in acquisition of wealth4 ,this disregard for acquisition makes it easier for a few who do want to have things their own way1 and who monopolize what is amassed4 ,if an acquisitive impulse were only more evenly developed1 more of a real fact1 than it is1 it is quite possible that things would be better than they are4 ,even with respect to men who succeed in accumulating wealth it is a mistake to suppose that acquisitiveness plays with most of them a large rle1 beyond getting control of the tools of the game4 ,acquisition is necessary as an outcome1 but it arises not from love of accumulation but from the fact that without a large stock of possessions one cannot engage effectively in modern business4 ,it is an incident of love of power1 of desire to impress fellows1 to obtain prestige1 to secure influence1 to manifest ability1 to succeed in short under the conditions of the given regime4 ,and if we are to shove a mythological psychology of instincts behind modern economics1 we should do better to invent instincts for security1 a good time1 power and success than to rely upon an acquisitive instinct4 ,we should have also to give much weight to a peculiar sporting instinct4 ,not acquiring dollars1 but chasing them1 hunting them is the important thing4 ,acquisition has its part in the big game1 for even the most devoted sportsman prefers1 other things being equal1 to bring home the fox's brush4 ,a tangible result is the mark to one's self and to others of success in sport4 ,instead of dividing sharply an acquisitive impulse manifested in business and a creative instinct displayed in science1 art and social fellowship1 we should rather first inquire why it is that so much of creative activity is in our day diverted into business1 and then ask why it is that opportunity for exercise of the creative capacity in business is now restricted to such a small class1 those who have to do with banking1 finding a market1 and manipulating investments2 and finally ask why creative activity is perverted into an over-specialized and frequently inhumane operation4 ,for after all it is not the bare fact of creation but its quality which counts4 ,that captains of industry are creative artists of a sort1 and that industry absorbs an undue share of the creative activity of the present time cannot be denied4 ,to impute to the leaders of industry and commerce simply an acquisitive motive is not merely to lack insight into their conduct1 but it is to lose the clew to bettering conditions4 ,for a more proportionate distribution of creative power between business and other occupations1 and a more humane1 wider use of it in business depend upon grasping aright the forces actually at work4 ,industrial leaders combine interest in making far-reaching plans1 large syntheses of conditions based upon study1 mastery of refined and complex technical skill1 control over natural forces and events1 with love of adventure1 excitement and mastery of fellow-men4 ,when these interests are reinforced with actual command of all the means of luxury1 of display and procuring admiration from the less fortunate1 it is not surprising that creative force is drafted largely into business channels1 and that competition for an opportunity to display power becomes brutal4 ,the strategic question1 as was said1 is to understand how and why political1 legal1 scientific and educational conditions of society for the last centuries have stimulated and nourished such a one-sided development of creative activities4 ,to approach the problem from this point of view is much more hopeful1 though infinitely more complex intellectually1 than the approach which sets out with a fixed dualism between acquisitive and creative impulses4 ,the latter assumes a complete split of higher and lower in the original constitution of man4 ,were this the case1 there would be no organic remedy4 ,the sole appeal would be to sentimental exhortation to men to wean themselves from devotion to the things which are beloved by their lower and material nature4 ,and if the appeal were moderately successful the social result would be a fixed class division4 ,there would remain a lower class1 superciliously looked down upon by the higher1 consisting of those in whom the acquisitive instinct remains stronger and who do the necessary work of life1 while the higher creative class devotes itself to social intercourse1 science and art4 ,since the underlying psychology is wrong1 the problem and its solution assumes in fact a radically different form4 ,there are an indefinite number of original or instinctive activities1 which are organized into interests and dispositions according to the situations to which they respond4 ,to increase the creative phase and the humane quality of these activities is an affair of modifying the social conditions which stimulate1 select1 intensify1 weaken and coordinate native activities4 ,the first step in dealing with it is to increase our detailed scientific knowledge4 ,we need to know exactly the selective and directive force of each social situation2 exactly how each tendency is promoted and retarded4 ,command of the physical environment on a large and deliberate scale did not begin until belief in gross forces and entities was abandoned4 ,control of physical energies is due to inquiry which establishes specific correlations between minute elements4 ,it will not be otherwise with social control and adjustment4 ,having the knowledge we may set hopefully at work upon a course of social invention and experimental engineering4 ,a study of the educative effect1 the influence upon habit1 of each definite form of human intercourse1 is prerequisite to effective reform4 ,,vi ,in spite of what has been said1 it will be asserted that there are definite1 independent1 original instincts which manifest themselves in specific acts in a one-to-one correspondence4 ,fear1 it will be said1 is a reality1 and so is anger1 and rivalry1 and love of mastery of others1 and self-abasement1 maternal love1 sexual desire1 gregariousness and envy1 and each has its own appropriate deed as a result4 ,of course they are realities4 ,so are suction1 rusting of metals1 thunder and lightning and lighter-than-air flying machines4 ,but science and invention did not get on as long as men indulged in the notion of special forces to account for such phenomena4 ,men tried that road1 and it only led them into learned ignorance4 ,they spoke of nature's abhorrence of a vacuum2 of a force of combustion2 of intrinsic nisus toward this and that2 of heaviness and levity as forces4 ,it turned out that these forces were only the phenomena over again1 translated from a specific and concrete form 7in which they were at least actual7 into a generalized form in which they were verbal4 ,they converted a problem into a solution which afforded a simulated satisfaction4 ,advance in insight and control came only when the mind turned squarely around4 ,after it had dawned upon inquirers that their alleged causal forces were only names which condensed into a duplicate form a variety of complex occurrences1 they set about breaking up phenomena into minute detail and searching for correlations1 that is1 for elements in other gross phenomena which also varied4 ,correspondence of variations of elements took the place of large and imposing forces4 ,the psychology of behavior is only beginning to undergo similar treatment4 ,it is probable that the vogue of sensation-psychology was due to the fact that it seemed to promise a similar detailed treatment of personal phenomena4 ,but as yet we tend to regard sex1 hunger1 fear1 and even much more complex active interests as if they were lump forces1 like the combustion or gravity of old-fashioned physical science4 ,it is not hard to see how the notion of a single and separate tendency grew up in the case of simpler acts like hunger and sex4 ,the paths of motor outlet or discharge are comparatively few and are fairly well defined4 ,specific bodily organs are conspicuously involved4 ,hence there is suggested the notion of a correspondingly separate psychic force or impulse4 ,there are two fallacies in this assumption4 ,the first consists in ignoring the fact that no activity 7even one that is limited by routine habit7 is confined to the channel which is most flagrantly involved in its execution4 ,the whole organism is concerned in every act to some extent and in some fashion1 internal organs as well as muscular1 those of circulation1 secretion1 etc4 ,since the total state of the organism is never exactly twice alike1 in so far the phenomena of hunger and sex are never twice the same in fact4 ,the difference may be negligible for some purposes1 and yet give the key for the purposes of a psychological analysis which shall terminate in a correct judgment of value4 ,even physiologically the context of organic changes accompanying an act of hunger or sex makes the difference between a normal and a morbid phenomenon4 ,in the second place1 the environment in which the act takes place is never twice alike4 ,even when the overt organic discharge is substantially the same1 the acts impinge upon a different environment and thus have different consequences4 ,it is impossible to regard these differences of objective result as indifferent to the quality of the acts4 ,they are immediately sensed if not clearly perceived2 and they are the only components of the meaning of the act4 ,when feelings1 dwelling antecedently in the soul1 were supposed to be the causes of acts1 it was natural to suppose that each psychic element had its own inherent quality which might be directly read off by introspection4 ,but when we surrender this notion1 it becomes evident that the only way of telling what an organic act is like is by the sensed or perceptible changes which it occasions4 ,some of these will be intra-organic1 and 7as just indicated7 they will vary with every act4 ,others will be external to the organism1 and these consequences are more important than the intra-organic ones for determining the quality of the act4 ,for they are consequences in which others are concerned and which evoke reactions of favor and disfavor as well as cooperative and resisting activities of a more indirect sort4 ,most so-called self-deception is due to employing immediate organic states as criteria of the value of an act4 ,to say that it feels good or yields direct satisfaction is to say that it gives rise to a comfortable internal state4 ,the judgment based upon this experience may be entirely different from the judgment passed by others upon the basis of its objective or social consequences4 ,as a matter of even the most rudimentary precaution1 therefore1 every person learns to recognize to some extent the quality of an act on the basis of its consequences in the acts of others4 ,but even without this judgment1 the exterior changes produced by an act are immediately sensed1 and being associated with the act become a part of its quality4 ,even a young child sees the smash of things occasionally by his anger1 and the smash may compete with his satisfied feeling of discharged energy as an index of value4 ,a child gives way to what1 grossly speaking1 we call anger4 ,its felt or appreciated quality depends in the first place upon the condition of his organism at the time1 and this is never twice alike4 ,in the second place1 the act is at once modified by the environment upon which it impinges so that different consequences are immediately reflected back to the doer4 ,in one case1 anger is directed say at older and stronger playmates who immediately avenge themselves upon the offender1 perhaps cruelly4 ,in another case1 it takes effect upon weaker and impotent children1 and the reflected appreciated consequence is one of achievement1 victory1 power and a knowledge of the means of having one's own way4 ,the notion that anger still remains a single force is a lazy mythology4 ,even in the cases of hunger and sex1 where the channels of action are fairly demarcated by antecedent conditions 7or nature71 the actual content and feel of hunger and sex1 are indefinitely varied according to their social contexts4 ,only when a man is starving1 is hunger an unqualified natural impulse2 as it approaches this limit1 it tends to lose1 moreover1 its psychological distinctiveness and to become a raven of the entire organism4 ,the treatment of sex by psycho-analysts is most instructive1 for it flagrantly exhibits both the consequences of artificial simplification and the transformation of social results into psychic causes4 ,writers1 usually male1 hold forth on the psychology of woman1 as if they were dealing with a ,platonic universal entity1 although they habitually treat men as individuals1 varying with structure and environment4 ,they treat phenomena which are peculiarly symptoms of the civilization of the ,west at the present time as if they were the necessary effects of fixed native impulses of human nature4 ,romantic love as it exists today1 with all the varying perturbations it occasions1 is as definitely a sign of specific historic conditions as are big battle ships with turbines1 internal-combustion engines1 and electrically driven machines4 ,it would be as sensible to treat the latter as effects of a single psychic cause as to attribute the phenomena of disturbance and conflict which accompany present sexual relations as manifestations of an original single psychic force or ,libido4 ,upon this point at least a ,marxian simplification is nearer the truth than that of ,jung4 ,again it is customary to suppose that there is a single instinct of fear1 or at most a few well-defined sub-species of it4 ,in reality1 when one is afraid the whole being reacts1 and this entire responding organism is never twice the same4 ,in fact1 also1 every reaction takes place in a different environment1 and its meaning is never twice alike1 since the difference in environment makes a difference in consequences4 ,it is only mythology which sets up a single1 identical psychic force which causes all the reactions of fear1 a force beginning and ending in itself4 ,it is true enough that in all cases we are able to identify certain more or less separable characteristic acts--muscular contractions1 withdrawals1 evasions1 concealments4 ,but in the latter words we have already brought in an environment4 ,such terms as withdrawal and concealment have no meaning except as attitudes toward objects4 ,there is no such thing as an environment in general2 there are specific changing objects and events4 ,hence the kind of evasion or running away or shrinking up which takes place is directly correlated with specific surrounding conditions4 ,there is no one fear having diverse manifestations2 there are as many qualitatively different fears as there are objects responded to and different consequences sensed and observed4 ,fear of the dark is different from fear of publicity1 fear of the dentist from fear of ghosts1 fear of conspicuous success from fear of humiliation1 fear of a bat from fear of a bear4 ,cowardice1 embarrassment1 caution and reverence may all be regarded as forms of fear4 ,they all have certain physical organic acts in common--those of organic shrinkage1 gestures of hesitation and retreat4 ,but each is qualitatively unique4 ,each is what it is in virtue of its total interactions or correlations with other acts and with the environing medium1 with consequences4 ,high explosives and the aeroplane have brought into being something new in conduct4 ,there is no error in calling it fear4 ,but there is error1 even from a limited clinical standpoint1 in permitting the classifying name to blot from view the difference between fear of bombs dropped from the sky and the fears which previously existed4 ,the new fear is just as much and just as little original and native as a child's fear of a stranger4 ,for any activity is original when it first occurs4 ,as conditions are continually changing1 new and primitive activities are continually occurring4 ,the traditional psychology of instincts obscures recognition of this fact4 ,it sets up a hard-and-fast preordained class under which specific acts are subsumed1 so that their own quality and originality are lost from view4 ,this is why the novelist and dramatist are so much more illuminating as well as more interesting commentators on conduct than the schematizing psychologist4 ,the artist makes perceptible individual responses and thus displays a new phase of human nature evoked in new situations4 ,in putting the case visibly and dramatically he reveals vital actualities4 ,the scientific systematizer treats each act as merely another sample of some old principle1 or as a mechanical combination of elements drawn from a ready-made inventory4 ,when we recognize the diversity of native activities and the varied ways in which they are modified through interactions with one another in response to different conditions1 we are able to understand moral phenomena otherwise baffling4 ,in the career of any impulse activity there are speaking generally three possibilities4 ,it may find a surging1 explosive discharge--blind1 unintelligent4 ,it may be sublimated--that is1 become a factor coordinated intelligently with others in a continuing course of action4 ,thus a gust of anger may1 because of its dynamic incorporation into disposition1 be converted into an abiding conviction of social injustice to be remedied1 and furnish the dynamic to carry the conviction into execution4 ,or an excitation of sexual attraction may reappear in art or in tranquil domestic attachments and services4 ,such an outcome represents the normal or desirable functioning of impulse2 in which1 to use our previous language1 the impulse operates as a pivot1 or reorganization of habit4 ,or again a released impulsive activity may be neither immediately expressed in isolated spasmodic action1 nor indirectly employed in an enduring interest4 ,it may be suppressed4 ,suppression is not annihilation4 ,psychic energy is no more capable of being abolished than the forms we recognize as physical4 ,if it is neither exploded nor converted1 it is turned inwards1 to lead a surreptitious1 subterranean life4 ,an isolated or spasmodic manifestation is a sign of immaturity1 crudity1 savagery2 a suppressed activity is the cause of all kinds of intellectual and moral pathology4 ,one form of the resulting pathology constitutes reaction in the sense in which the historian speaks of reactions4 ,a conventionally familiar instance is ,stuart license after ,puritan restraint4 ,a striking modern instance is the orgy of extravagance following upon the enforced economies and hardships of war1 the moral let-down after its highstrung exalted idealisms1 the deliberate carelessness after an attention too intense and too narrow4 ,outward manifestation of many normal activities had been suppressed4 ,but activities were not suppressed4 ,they were merely dammed up awaiting their chance4 ,now such reactions are simultaneous as well as successive4 ,resort to artificial stimulation1 to alcoholic excess1 sexual debauchery1 opium and narcotics are examples4 ,impulses and interests that are not manifested in the regular course of serviceable activity or in recreation demand and secure a special manifestation4 ,and it is interesting to note that there are two opposite forms4 ,some phenomena are characteristic of persons engaged in a routine monotonous life of toil attended with fatigue and hardship4 ,and others are found in persons who are intellectual and executive1 men whose activities are anything but monotonous1 but are narrowed through over-specialization4 ,such men think too much1 that is1 too much along a particular line4 ,they carry too heavy responsibilities2 that is1 their offices of service are not adequately shared with others4 ,they seek relief by escape into a more sociable and easy-going world4 ,the imperative demand for companionship not satisfied in ordinary activity is met by convivial indulgence4 ,the other class has recourse to excess because its members have in ordinary occupations next to no opportunity for imagination4 ,they make a foray into a more highly colored world as a substitute for a normal exercise of invention1 planning and judgment4 ,having no regular responsibilities1 they seek to recover an illusion of potency and of social recognition by an artificial exaltation of their submerged and humiliated selves4 ,hence the love of pleasure against which moralists issue so many warnings4 ,not that love of pleasures is in itself in any way demoralizing4 ,love of the pleasures of cheerfulness1 of companionship is one of the steadying influences in conduct4 ,but pleasure has often become identified with special thrills1 excitations1 ticklings of sense1 stirrings of appetite for the express purpose of enjoying the immediate stimulation irrespective of results4 ,such pleasures are signs of dissipation1 dissoluteness1 in the literal sense4 ,an activity which is deprived of regular stimulation and normal function is piqued into isolated activity1 and the result is division1 disassociation4 ,a life of routine and of over-specialization in non-routine lines seek occasions in which to arouse by abnormal means a feeling of satisfaction without any accompanying objective fulfilment4 ,hence1 as moralists have pointed out1 the insatiable character of such appetites4 ,activities are not really satisfied1 that is fulfilled in objects4 ,they continue to seek for gratification in more intensified stimulations4 ,orgies of pleasure-seeking1 varying from saturnalia to mild sprees1 result4 ,it does not follow however that the sole alternative is satisfaction by means of objectively serviceable action1 that is by action which effects useful changes in the environment4 ,there is an optimistic theory of nature according to which wherever there is natural law there is also natural harmony4 ,since man as well as the world is included in the scope of natural law1 it is inferred that there is natural harmony between human activities and surroundings1 a harmony which is disturbed only when man indulges in artificial departures from nature4 ,according to this view1 all man has to do is to keep his occupations in balance with the energies of the environment and he will be both happy and efficient4 ,rest1 recuperation1 relief can be found in a proper alternation of forms of useful work4 ,do the things which surroundings indicate need doing1 and success1 content1 restoration of powers will take care of themselves4 ,this benevolent view of nature falls in with a ,puritanic devotion to work for its own sake and creates distrust of amusement1 play and recreation4 ,they are felt to be unnecessary1 and worse1 dangerous diversions from the path of useful action which is also the path of duty4 ,social conditions certainly impart to occupations as they are now carried on an undue element of fatigue1 strain and drudgery4 ,consequently useful occupations which are so ordered socially as to engage thought1 feed imagination and equalize the impact of stress would surely introduce a tranquillity and recreation which are now lacking4 ,but there is good reason to think that even in the best conditions there is enough maladjustment between the necessities of the environment and the activities natural to man1 so that constraint and fatigue would always accompany activity1 and special forms of action be needed--forms that are significantly called re-creation4 ,hence the immense moral importance of play and of fine1 or make-believe1 art--of activity1 that is1 which is make-believe from the standpoint of the useful arts enforced by the demands of the environment4 ,when moralists have not regarded play and art with a censorious eye1 they often have thought themselves carrying matters to the pitch of generosity by conceding that they may be morally indifferent or innocent4 ,but in truth they are moral necessities4 ,they are required to take care of the margin that exists between the total stock of impulses that demand outlet and the amount expended in regular action4 ,they keep the balance which work cannot indefinitely maintain4 ,they are required to introduce variety1 flexibility and sensitiveness into disposition4 ,yet upon the whole the humanizing capabilities of sport in its varied forms1 drama1 fiction1 music1 poetry1 newspapers have been neglected4 ,they have been left in a kind of a moral no-man's territory4 ,they have accomplished part of their function but they have not done what they are capable of doing4 ,in many cases they have operated merely as reactions like those artificial and isolated stimulations already mentioned4 ,the suggestion that play and art have an indispensable moral function which should receive an attention now denied1 calls out an immediate and vehement protest4 ,we omit reference to that which proceeds from professional moralists to whom art1 fun and sport are habitually under suspicion4 ,for those interested in art1 professional estheticians1 will protest even more strenuously4 ,they at once imagine that some kind of organized supervision if not censorship of play1 drama and fiction is contemplated which will convert them into means of moral edification4 ,if they do not think of ,comstockian interference in the alleged interest of public morals1 they at least think that what is intended is the elimination by persons of a ,puritanic1 unartistic temperament of everything not found sufficiently earnest and elevating1 a fostering of art not for its own sake but as a means of doing good by something to somebody4 ,there is a natural fear of injecting into art a spirit of earnest uplift1 of surrendering art to the reformers4 ,but something quite other than this is meant4 ,relief from continuous moral activity--in the conventional sense of moral--is itself a moral necessity4 ,the service of art and play is to engage and release impulses in ways quite different from those in which they are occupied and employed in ordinary activities4 ,their function is to forestall and remedy the usual exaggerations and deficits of activity1 even of moral activity and to prevent a stereotyping of attention4 ,to say that society is altogether too careless about the moral worth of art is not to say that carelessness about useful occupations is not a necessity for art4 ,on the contrary1 whatever deprives play and art of their own careless rapture thereby deprives them of their moral function4 ,art then becomes poorer as art as a matter of course1 but it also becomes in the same measure less effectual in its pertinent moral office4 ,it tries to do what other things can do better1 and it fails to do what nothing but itself can do for human nature1 softening rigidities1 relaxing strains1 allaying bitterness1 dispelling moroseness1 and breaking down the narrowness consequent upon specialized tasks4 ,even if the matter be put in this negative way1 the moral value of art cannot be depreciated4 ,but there is a more positive function4 ,play and art add fresh and deeper meanings to the usual activities of life4 ,in contrast with a ,philistine relegation of the arts to a trivial by-play from serious concerns1 it is truer to say that most of the significance now found in serious occupations originated in activities not immediately useful1 and gradually found its way from them into objectively serviceable employments4 ,for their spontaneity and liberation from external necessities permits to them an enhancement and vitality of meaning not possible in preoccupation with immediate needs4 ,later this meaning is transferred to useful activities and becomes a part of their ordinary working4 ,in saying then that art and play have a moral office not adequately taken advantage of it is asserted that they are responsible to life1 to the enriching and freeing of its meanings1 not that they are responsible to a moral code1 commandment or special task4 ,to a coarse view--and professed moral refinement is often given to taking coarse views--there is something vulgar not only in recourse to abnormal artificial exigents and stimulations but also in interest in useless games and arts4 ,negatively the two things have features which are alike4 ,they both spring from failure of regular occupations to engage the full scope of impulses and instincts in an elastically balanced way4 ,they both evince a surplusage of imagination over fact2 a demand in imaginative activity for an outlet which is denied in overt activity4 ,they both aim at reducing the domination of the prosaic2 both are protests against the lowering of meanings attendant upon ordinary vocations4 ,as a consequence no rule can be laid down for discriminating by direct inspection between unwholesome stimulations and invaluable excursions into appreciative enhancements of life4 ,their difference lies in the way they work1 the careers to which they commit us4 ,art releases energy and focuses and tranquilizes it4 ,it releases energy in constructive forms4 ,castles in the air like art have their source in a turning of impulse away from useful production4 ,both are due to the failure in some part of man's constitution to secure fulfilment in ordinary ways4 ,but in one case the conversion of direct energy into imagination is the starting point of an activity which shapes material2 fancy is fed upon a stuff of life which assumes under its influence a rejuvenated1 composed and enhanced form4 ,in the other case1 fancy remains an end in itself4 ,it becomes an indulging in fantasies which bring about withdrawal from all realities1 while wishes impotent in action build a world which yields temporary excitement4 ,any imagination is a sign that impulse is impeded and is groping for utterance4 ,sometimes the outcome is a refreshed useful habit2 sometimes it is an articulation in creative art2 and sometimes it is a futile romancing which for some natures does what self-pity does for others4 ,the amount of potential energy of reconstruction that is dissipated in unexpressed fantasy supplies us with a fair measure of the extent to which the current organization of occupation balks and twists impulse1 and1 by the same sign1 with a measure of the function of art which is not yet utilized4 ,the development of mental pathologies to the point where they need clinical attention has of late enforced a widespread consciousness of some of the evils of suppression of impulse4 ,the studies of psychiatrists have made clear that impulses driven into pockets distil poison and produce festering sores4 ,an organization of impulse into a working habit forms an interest4 ,a surreptitious furtive organization which does not articulate in avowed expression forms a complex4 ,current clinical psychology has undoubtedly overworked the influence of sexual impulse in this connection1 refusing at the hands of some writers to recognize the operation of any other modes of disturbance4 ,there are explanations of this onesidedness4 ,the intensity of the sexual instinct and its organic ramifications produce many of the cases that are so noticeable as to demand the attention of physicians4 ,and social taboos and the tradition of secrecy have put this impulse under greater strain than has been imposed upon others4 ,if a society existed in which the existence of impulse toward food were socially disavowed until it was compelled to live an illicit1 covert life1 alienists would have plenty of cases of mental and moral disturbance to relate in connection with hunger4 ,the significant thing is that the pathology arising from the sex instinct affords a striking case of a universal principle4 ,every impulse is1 as far as it goes1 force1 urgency4 ,it must either be used in some function1 direct or sublimated1 or be driven into a concealed1 hidden activity4 ,it has long been asserted on empirical grounds that expression and enslavement result in corruption and perversion4 ,we have at last discovered the reason for this fact4 ,the wholesome and saving force of intellectual freedom1 open confrontation1 publicity1 now has the stamp of scientific sanction4 ,the evil of checking impulses is not that they are checked4 ,without inhibition there is no instigation of imagination1 no redirection into more discriminated and comprehensive activities4 ,the evil resides in a refusal of direct attention which forces the impulse into disguise and concealment1 until it enacts its own unavowed uneasy private life subject to no inspection and no control4 ,a rebellious disposition is also a form of romanticism4 ,at least rebels set out as romantics1 or1 in popular parlance1 as idealists4 ,there is no bitterness like that of conscious impotency1 the sense of suffocatingly complete suppression4 ,the world is hopeless to one without hope4 ,the rage of total despair is a vain effort at blind destructiveness4 ,partial suppression induces in some natures a picture of complete freedom1 while it arouses a destructive protest against existing institutions as enemies that stand in the way of freedom4 ,rebellion has at least one advantage over recourse to artificial stimulation and to subconscious nursings of festering sore spots4 ,it engages in action and thereby comes in contact with realities4 ,it contains the possibility of learning something4 ,yet learning by this method is immensely expensive4 ,the costs are incalculable4 ,as ,napoleon said1 every revolution moves in a vicious circle4 ,it begins and ends in excess4 ,to view institutions as enemies of freedom1 and all conventions as slaveries1 is to deny the only means by which positive freedom in action can be secured4 ,a general liberation of impulses may set things going when they have been stagnant1 but if the released forces are on their way to anything they do not know the way nor where they are going4 ,indeed1 they are bound to be mutually contradictory and hence destructive--destructive not only of the habits they wish to destroy but of themselves1 of their own efficacy4 ,convention and custom are necessary to carrying forward impulse to any happy conclusion4 ,a romantic return to nature and a freedom sought within the individual without regard to the existing environment finds its terminus in chaos4 ,every belief to the contrary combines pessimism regarding the actual with an even more optimistic faith in some natural harmony or other--a faith which is a survival of some of the traditional metaphysics and theologies which professedly are to be swept away4 ,not convention but stupid and rigid convention is the foe4 ,and1 as we have noted1 a convention can be reorganized and made mobile only by using some other custom for giving leverage to an impulse4 ,yet it is too easy to utter commonplaces about the superiority of constructive action to destructive4 ,at all events the professed conservative and classicist of tradition seeks too cheap a victory over the rebel4 ,for the rebel is not self-generated4 ,in the beginning no one is a revolutionist simply for the fun of it1 however it may be after the furor of destructive power gets under way4 ,the rebel is the product of extreme fixation and unintelligent immobilities4 ,life is perpetuated only by renewal4 ,if conditions do not permit renewal to take place continuously it will take place explosively4 ,the cost of revolutions must be charged up to those who have taken for their aim arrest of custom instead of its readjustment4 ,the only ones who have the right to criticize radicals--adopting for the moment that perversion of language which identifies the radical with the destructive rebel--are those who put as much effort into reconstruction as the rebels are putting into destruction4 ,the primary accusation against the revolutionary must be directed against those who having power refuse to use it for ameliorations4 ,they are the ones who accumulate the wrath that sweeps away customs and institutions in an undiscriminating avalanche4 ,too often the man who should be criticizing institutions expends his energy in criticizing those who would re-form them4 ,what he really objects to is any disturbance of his own vested securities1 comforts and privileged powers4 ,,vii ,we return to the original proposition4 ,the position of impulse in conduct is intermediary4 ,morality is an endeavor to find for the manifestation of impulse in special situations an office of refreshment and renewal4 ,the endeavor is not easy of accomplishment4 ,it is easier to surrender the main and public channels of action and belief to the sluggishness of custom1 and idealize tradition by emotional attachment to its ease1 comforts and privileges instead of idealizing it in practice by making it more equably balanced with present needs4 ,again1 impulses not used for the work of rejuvenation and vital recovery are sidetracked to find their own lawless barbarities or their own sentimental refinements4 ,or they are perverted to pathological careers--some of which have been mentioned4 ,in the course of time custom becomes intolerable because of what it suppresses and some accident of war or inner catastrophe releases impulses for unrestrained expression4 ,at such times we have philosophies which identify progress with motion1 blind spontaneity with freedom1 and which under the name of the sacredness of individuality or a return to the norms of nature make impulse a law unto itself4 ,the oscillation between impulse arrested and frozen in rigid custom and impulse isolated and undirected is seen most conspicuously when epochs of conservatism and revolutionary ardor alternate4 ,but the same phenomenon is repeated on a smaller scale in individuals4 ,and in society the two tendencies and philosophies exist simultaneously2 they waste in controversial strife the energy that is needed for specific criticism and specific reconstruction4 ,the release of some portion of the stock of impulses is an opportunity1 not an end4 ,in its origin it is the product of chance2 but it affords imagination and invention their chance4 ,the moral correlate of liberated impulse is not immediate activity1 but reflection upon the way in which to use impulse to renew disposition and reorganize habit4 ,escape from the clutch of custom gives an opportunity to do old things in new ways1 and thus to construct new ends and means4 ,breach in the crust of the cake of custom releases impulses2 but it is the work of intelligence to find the ways of using them4 ,there is an alternative between anchoring a boat in the harbor till it becomes a rotting hulk and letting it loose to be the sport of every contrary gust4 ,to discover and define this alternative is the business of mind1 of observant1 remembering1 contriving disposition4 ,habit as a vital art depends upon the animation of habit by impulse2 only this inspiriting stands between habit and stagnation4 ,but art1 little as well as great1 anonymous as well as that distinguished by titles of dignity1 cannot be improvised4 ,it is impossible without spontaneity1 but it is not spontaneity4 ,impulse is needed to arouse thought1 incite reflection and enliven belief4 ,but only thought notes obstructions1 invents tools1 conceives aims1 directs technique1 and thus converts impulse into an art which lives in objects4 ,thought is born as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded habit4 ,but unless it is nurtured1 it speedily dies1 and habit and instinct continue their civil warfare4 ,there is instinctive wisdom in the tendency of the young to ignore the limitations of the environment4 ,only thus can they discover their own power and learn the differences in different kinds of environing limitations4 ,but this discovery when once made marks the birth of intelligence2 and with its birth comes the responsibility of the mature to observe1 to recall1 to forecast4 ,every moral life has its radicalism2 but this radical factor does not find its full expression in direct action but in the courage of intelligence to go deeper than either tradition or immediate impulse goes4 ,to the study of intelligence in action we now turn our attention4 ,,part ,,three ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,intelligence ,,in ,,conduct ,i ,in discussing habit and impulse we have repeatedly met topics where reference to the work of thought was imperative4 ,explicit consideration of the place and office of intelligence in conduct can hardly begin otherwise than by gathering together these incidental references and reaffirming their significance4 ,the stimulation of reflective imagination by impulse1 its dependence upon established habits1 and its effect in transforming habit and regulating impulse forms1 accordingly1 our first theme4 ,habits are conditions of intellectual efficiency4 ,they operate in two ways upon intellect4 ,obviously1 they restrict its reach1 they fix its boundaries4 ,they are blinders that confine the eyes of mind to the road ahead4 ,they prevent thought from straying away from its imminent occupation to a landscape more varied and picturesque but irrelevant to practice4 ,outside the scope of habits1 thought works gropingly1 fumbling in confused uncertainty2 and yet habit made complete in routine shuts in thought so effectually that it is no longer needed or possible4 ,the routineer's road is a ditch out of which he cannot get1 whose sides enclose him1 directing his course so thoroughly that he no longer thinks of his path or his destination4 ,all habit-forming involves the beginning of an intellectual specialization which if unchecked ends in thoughtless action4 ,significantly enough this fullblown result is called absentmindedness4 ,stimulus and response are mechanically linked together in an unbroken chain4 ,each successive act facilely evoked by its predecessor pushes us automatically into the next act of a predetermined series4 ,only a signal flag of distress recalls consciousness to the task of carrying on4 ,fortunately nature which beckons us to this path of least resistance also puts obstacles in the way of our complete acceptance of its invitation4 ,success in achieving a ruthless and dull efficiency of action is thwarted by untoward circumstance4 ,the most skilful aptitude bumps at times into the unexpected1 and so gets into trouble from which only observation and invention extricate it4 ,efficiency in following a beaten path has then to be converted into breaking a new road through strange lands4 ,nevertheless what in effect is love of ease has masqueraded morally as love of perfection4 ,a goal of finished accomplishment has been set up which if it were attained would mean only mindless action4 ,it has been called complete and free activity when in truth it is only a treadmill activity or marching in one place4 ,the practical impossibility of reaching1 in an all around way and all at once such a perfection has been recognized4 ,but such a goal has nevertheless been conceived as the ideal1 and progress has been defined as approximation to it4 ,under diverse intellectual skies the ideal has assumed diverse forms and colors4 ,but all of them have involved the conception of a completed activity1 a static perfection4 ,desire and need have been treated as signs of deficiency1 and endeavor as proof not of power but of incompletion4 ,in ,aristotle this conception of an end which exhausts all realization and excludes all potentiality appears as a definition of the highest excellence4 ,it of necessity excludes all want and struggle and all dependencies4 ,it is neither practical nor social4 ,nothing is left but a self-revolving1 self-sufficing thought engaged in contemplating its own sufficiency4 ,some forms of ,oriental morals have united this logic with a profounder psychology1 and have seen that the final terminus on this road is ,nirvana1 an obliteration of all thought and desire4 ,in medieval science1 the ideal reappeared as a definition of heavenly bliss accessible only to a redeemed immortal soul4 ,herbert ,spencer is far enough away from ,aristotle1 medieval ,christianity and ,buddhism2 but the idea re-emerges in his conception of a goal of evolution in which adaptation of organism to environment is complete and final4 ,in popular thought1 the conception lives in the vague thought of a remote state of attainment in which we shall be beyond temptation1 and in which virtue by its own inertia will persist as a triumphant consummation4 ,even ,kant who begins with a complete scorn for happiness ends with an ideal of the eternal and undisturbed union of virtue and joy1 though in his case nothing but a symbolic approximation is admitted to be feasible4 ,the fallacy in these versions of the same idea is perhaps the most pervasive of all fallacies in philosophy4 ,so common is it that one questions whether it might not be called the philosophical fallacy4 ,it consists in the supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions4 ,because a thirsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water1 bliss consists in being drowned4 ,because the success of any particular struggle is measured by reaching a point of frictionless action1 therefore there is such a thing as an all-inclusive end of effortless smooth activity endlessly maintained4 ,it is forgotten that success is success of a specific effort1 and satisfaction the fulfilment of a specific demand1 so that success and satisfaction become meaningless when severed from the wants and struggles whose consummations they are1 or when taken universally4 ,the philosophy of ,nirvana comes the closest to admission of this fact1 but even it holds ,nirvana to be desirable4 ,habit is however more than a restriction of thought4 ,habits become negative limits because they are first positive agencies4 ,the more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible observation and foretelling4 ,the more flexible they are1 the more refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by imagination4 ,the sailor is intellectually at home on the sea1 the hunter in the forest1 the painter in his studio1 the man of science in his laboratory4 ,these commonplaces are universally recognized in the concrete2 but their significance is obscured and their truth denied in the current general theory of mind4 ,for they mean nothing more or less than that habits formed in process of exercising biological aptitudes are the sole agents of observation1 recollection1 foresight and judgment3 a mind or consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth4 ,the doctrine of a single1 simple and indissoluble soul was the cause and the effect of failure to recognize that concrete habits are the means of knowledge and thought4 ,many who think themselves scientifically emancipated and who freely advertise the soul for a superstition1 perpetuate a false notion of what knows1 that is1 of a separate knower4 ,nowadays they usually fix upon consciousness in general1 as a stream or process or entity2 or else1 more specifically upon sensations and images as the tools of intellect4 ,or sometimes they think they have scaled the last heights of realism by adverting grandiosely to a formal knower in general who serves as one term in the knowing relation2 by dismissing psychology as irrelevant to knowledge and logic1 they think to conceal the psychological monster they have conjured up4 ,now it is dogmatically stated that no such conceptions of the seat1 agent or vehicle will go psychologically at the present time4 ,concrete habits do all the perceiving1 recognizing1 imagining1 recalling1 judging1 conceiving and reasoning that is done4 ,consciousness1 whether as a stream or as special sensations and images1 expresses functions of habits1 phenomena of their formation1 operation1 their interruption and reorganization4 ,yet habit does not1 of itself1 know1 for it does not of itself stop to think1 observe or remember4 ,neither does impulse of itself engage in reflection or contemplation4 ,it just lets go4 ,habits by themselves are too organized1 too insistent and determinate to need to indulge in inquiry or imagination4 ,and impulses are too chaotic1 tumultuous and confused to be able to know even if they wanted to4 ,habit as such is too definitely adapted to an environment to survey or analyze it1 and impulse is too indeterminately related to the environment to be capable of reporting anything about it4 ,habit incorporates1 enacts or overrides objects1 but it doesn't know them4 ,impulse scatters and obliterates them with its restless stir4 ,a certain delicate combination of habit and impulse is requisite for observation1 memory and judgment4 ,knowledge which is not projected against the black unknown lives in the muscles1 not in consciousness4 ,we may1 indeed1 be said to know how by means of our habits4 ,and a sensible intimation of the practical function of knowledge has led men to identify all acquired practical skill1 or even the instinct of animals1 with knowledge4 ,we walk and read aloud1 we get off and on street cars1 we dress and undress1 and do a thousand useful acts without thinking of them4 ,we know something1 namely1 how to do them4 ,bergson's philosophy of intuition is hardly more than an elaborately documented commentary on the popular conception that by instinct a bird knows how to build a nest and a spider to weave a web4 ,but after all1 this practical work done by habit and instinct in securing prompt and exact adjustment to the environment is not knowledge1 except by courtesy4 ,or1 if we choose to call it knowledge--and no one has the right to issue an ukase to the contrary--then other things also called knowledge1 knowledge of and about things1 knowledge that things are thus and so1 knowledge that involves reflection and conscious appreciation1 remains of a different sort1 unaccounted for and undescribed4 ,for it is a commonplace that the more suavely efficient a habit the more unconsciously it operates4 ,only a hitch in its workings occasions emotion and provokes thought4 ,carlyle and ,rousseau1 hostile in temperament and outlook1 yet agree in looking at consciousness as a kind of disease1 since we have no consciousness of bodily or mental organs as long as they work at ease in perfect health4 ,the idea of disease is1 however1 aside from the point1 unless we are pessimistic enough to regard every slip in total adjustment of a person to its surroundings as something abnormal--a point of view which once more would identify well-being with perfect automatism4 ,the truth is that in every waking moment1 the complete balance of the organism and its environment is constantly interfered with and as constantly restored4 ,hence the stream of consciousness in general1 and in particular that phase of it celebrated by ,william ,james as alternation of flights and perchings4 ,life is interruptions and recoveries4 ,continuous interruption is not possible in the activities of an individual4 ,absence of perfect equilibrium is not equivalent to a complete crushing of organized activity4 ,when the disturbance amounts to such a pitch as that1 the self goes to pieces4 ,it is like shell-shock4 ,normally1 the environment remains sufficiently in harmony with the body of organized activities to sustain most of them in active function4 ,but a novel factor in the surroundings releases some impulse which tends to initiate a different and incompatible activity1 to bring about a redistribution of the elements of organized activity between those have been respectively central and subsidiary4 ,thus the hand guided by the eye moves toward a surface4 ,visual quality is the dominant element4 ,the hand comes in contact with an object4 ,the eye does not cease to operate but some unexpected quality of touch1 a voluptuous smoothness or annoying heat1 compels a readjustment in which the touching1 handling activity strives to dominate the action4 ,now at these moments of a shifting in activity conscious feeling and thought arise and are accentuated4 ,the disturbed adjustment of organism and environment is reflected in a temporary strife which concludes in a coming to terms of the old habit and the new impulse4 ,in this period of redistribution impulse determines the direction of movement4 ,it furnishes the focus about which reorganization swirls4 ,our attention in short is always directed forward to bring to notice something which is imminent but which as yet escapes us4 ,impulse defines the peering1 the search1 the inquiry4 ,it is1 in logical language1 the movement into the unknown1 not into the immense inane of the unknown at large1 but into that special unknown which when it is hit upon restores an ordered1 unified action4 ,during this search1 old habit supplies content1 filling1 definite1 recognizable1 subject-matter4 ,it begins as vague presentiment of what we are going towards4 ,as organized habits are definitely deployed and focused1 the confused situation takes on form1 it is cleared up--the essential function of intelligence4 ,processes become objects4 ,without habit there is only irritation and confused hesitation4 ,with habit alone there is a machine-like repetition1 a duplicating recurrence of old acts4 ,with conflict of habits and release of impulse there is conscious search4 ,,ii ,we are going far afield from any direct moral issue4 ,but the problem of the place of knowledge and judgment in conduct depends upon getting the fundamental psychology of thought straightened out4 ,so the excursion must be continued4 ,we compare life to a traveler faring forth4 ,we may consider him first at a moment where his activity is confident1 straightforward1 organized4 ,he marches on giving no direct attention to his path1 nor thinking of his destination4 ,abruptly he is pulled up1 arrested4 ,something is going wrong in his activity4 ,from the standpoint of an onlooker1 he has met an obstacle which must be overcome before his behavior can be unified into a successful ongoing4 ,from his own standpoint1 there is shock1 confusion1 perturbation1 uncertainty4 ,for the moment he doesn't know what hit him1 as we say1 nor where he is going4 ,but a new impulse is stirred which becomes the starting point of an investigation1 a looking into things1 a trying to see them1 to find out what is going on4 ,habits which were interfered with begin to get a new direction as they cluster about the impulse to look and see4 ,the blocked habits of locomotion give him a sense of where he was going1 of what he had set out to do1 and of the ground already traversed4 ,as he looks1 he sees definite things which are not just things at large but which are related to his course of action4 ,the momentum of the activity entered upon persists as a sense of direction1 of aim2 it is an anticipatory project4 ,in short1 he recollects1 observes and plans4 ,the trinity of these forecasts1 perceptions and remembrances form a subject-matter of discriminated and identified objects4 ,these objects represent habits turned inside out4 ,they exhibit both the onward tendency of habit and the objective conditions which have been incorporated within it4 ,sensations in immediate consciousness are elements of action dislocated through the shock of interruption4 ,they never1 however1 completely monopolize the scene2 for there is a body of residual undisturbed habits which is reflected in remembered and perceived objects having a meaning4 ,thus out of shock and puzzlement there gradually emerges a figured framework of objects1 past1 present1 future4 ,these shade off variously into a vast penumbra of vague1 unfigured things1 a setting which is taken for granted and not at all explicitly presented4 ,the complexity of the figured scene in its scope and refinement of contents depends wholly upon prior habits and their organization4 ,the reason a baby can know little and an experienced adult know much when confronting the same things is not because the latter has a mind which the former has not1 but because one has already formed habits which the other has still to acquire4 ,the scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter1 the physician and politician know with their habits not with their consciousness4 ,the latter is eventual1 not a source4 ,its occurrence marks a peculiarly delicate connection between highly organized habits and unorganized impulses4 ,its contents or objects1 observed1 recollected1 projected and generalized into principles1 represent the incorporated material of habits coming to the surface1 because habits are disintegrating at the touch of conflicting impulses4 ,but they also gather themselves together to comprehend impulse and make it effective4 ,this account is more or less strange as psychology but certain aspects of it are commonplaces in a static logical formulation4 ,it is1 for example1 almost a truism that knowledge is both synthetic and analytic2 a set of discriminated elements connected by relations4 ,this combination of opposite factors of unity and difference1 elements and relations1 has been a standing paradox and mystery of the theory of knowledge4 ,it will remain so until we connect the theory of knowledge with an empirically verifiable theory of behavior4 ,the steps of this connection have been sketched and we may enumerate them4 ,we know at such times as habits are impeded1 when a conflict is set up in which impulse is released4 ,so far as this impulse sets up a definite forward tendency it constitutes the forward1 prospective character of knowledge4 ,in this phase unity or synthesis is found4 ,we are striving to unify our responses1 to achieve a consistent environment which will restore unity of conduct4 ,unity1 relations1 are prospective2 they mark out lines converging to a focus4 ,they are ideal4 ,but what we know1 the objects that present themselves with definiteness and assurance1 are retrospective2 they are the conditions which have been mastered1 incorporated in the past4 ,they are elements1 discriminated1 analytic just because old habits so far as they are checked are also broken into objects which define the obstruction of ongoing activity4 ,they are real1 not ideal4 ,unity is something sought2 split1 division is something given1 at hand4 ,were we to carry the same psychology into detail we should come upon the explanation of perceived particulars and conceived universals1 of the relation of discovery and proof1 induction and deduction1 the discrete and the continuous4 ,anything approaching an adequate discussion is too technical to be here in place4 ,but the main point1 however technical and abstract it may be in statement1 is of far reaching importance for everything concerned with moral beliefs1 conscience and judgments of right and wrong4 ,the most general1 if vaguest issue1 concerns the nature of the organ of moral knowledge4 ,as long as knowledge in general is thought to be the work of a special agent1 whether soul1 consciousness1 intellect or a knower in general1 there is a logical propulsion towards postulating a special agent for knowledge of moral distinctions4 ,consciousness and conscience have more than a verbal connection4 ,if the former is something in itself1 a seat or power which antecedes intellectual functions1 why should not the latter be also a unique faculty with its own separate jurisdiction8 ,if reason in general is independent of empirically verifiable realities of human nature1 such as instincts and organized habits1 why should there not also exist a moral or practical reason independent of natural operations8 ,on the other hand if it is recognized that knowing is carried on through the medium of natural factors1 the assumption of special agencies for moral knowing becomes outlawed and incredible4 ,now the matter of the existence or non-existence of such special agencies is no technically remote matter4 ,the belief in a separate organ involves belief in a separate and independent subject-matter4 ,the question fundamentally at issue is nothing more or less than whether moral values1 regulations1 principles and objects form a separate and independent domain or whether they are part and parcel of a normal development of a life process4 ,these considerations explain why the denial of a separate organ of knowledge1 of a separate instinct or impulse toward knowing1 is not the wilful philistinism it is sometimes alleged to be4 ,there is of course a sense in which there is a distinctive impulse1 or rather habitual disposition1 to know4 ,but in the same sense there is an impulse to aviate1 to run a typewriter or write stories for magazines4 ,some activities result in knowledge1 as others result in these other things4 ,the result may be so important as to induce distinctive attention to the activities in order to foster them4 ,from an incident1 almost a by-product1 attainment of truth1 physical1 social1 moral1 may become the leading characteristic of some activities4 ,under such circumstances1 they become transformed4 ,knowing is then a distinctive activity1 with its own ends and its peculiarly adapted processes4 ,all this is a matter of course4 ,having hit upon knowledge accidentally1 as it were1 and the product being liked and its importance noted1 knowledge-getting becomes1 upon occasion1 a definite occupation4 ,and education confirms the disposition1 as it may confirm that of a musician or carpenter or tennis-player4 ,but there is no more an original separate impulse or power in one case than in the other4 ,every habit is impulsive1 that is projective1 urgent1 and the habit of knowing is no exception4 ,the reason for insisting on this fact is not failure to appreciate the distinctive value of knowledge when once it comes into existence4 ,this value is so immense it may be called unique4 ,the aim of the discussion is not to subordinate knowing to some hard1 prosaic utilitarian end4 ,the reason for insistence upon the derivative position of knowing in activity1 roots in a sense for fact1 and in a realization that the doctrine of a separate original power and impulse of knowledge cuts knowledge off from other phases of human nature1 and results in its non-natural treatment4 ,the isolation of intellectual disposition from concrete empirical facts of biological impulse and habit-formation entails a denial of the continuity of mind with nature4 ,aristotle asserted that the faculty of pure knowing enters a man from without as through a door4 ,many since his day have asserted that knowing and doing have no intrinsic connection with each other4 ,reason is asserted to have no responsibility to experience2 conscience is said to be a sublime oracle independent of education and social influences4 ,all of these views follow naturally from a failure to recognize that all knowing1 judgment1 belief represent an acquired result of the workings of natural impulses in connection with environment4 ,upon the ethical side1 as has been intimated1 the matter at issue concerns the nature of conscience4 ,conscience has been asserted by orthodox moralists to be unique in origin and subject-matter4 ,the same view is embodied by implication in all those popular methods of moral training which attempt to fix rigid authoritative notions of right and wrong by disconnecting moral judgments from the aids and tests which are used in other forms of knowledge4 ,thus it has been asserted that conscience is an original faculty of illumination which 7if it has not been dimmed by indulgence in sin7 shines upon moral truths and objects and reveals them without effort for precisely what they are4 ,those who hold this view differ enormously among themselves as to the nature of the objects of conscience4 ,some hold them to be general principles1 others individual acts1 others the order of worth among motives1 others the sense of duty in general1 others the unqualified authority of right4 ,still others carry the implied logic of authority to conclusion1 and identify knowledge of moral truths with a divine supernatural revelation of a code of commandments4 ,but among these diversities there is agreement about one fundamental4 ,there must be a separate non-natural faculty of moral knowledge because the things to be known1 the matters of right and wrong1 good and evil1 obligation and responsibility1 form a separate domain1 separate that is from that of ordinary action in its usual human and social significance4 ,the latter activities may be prudential1 political1 scientific1 economic4 ,but1 from the standpoint of these theories1 they have no moral meaning until they are brought under the purview of this separate unique department of our nature4 ,it thus turns out that the so-called intuitional theories of moral knowledge concentrate in themselves all the ideas which are subject to criticism in these pages3 ,namely1 the assertion that morality is distinct in origin1 working and destiny from the natural structure and career of human nature4 ,this fact is the excuse1 if excuse be desired1 for a seemingly technical excursion that links intellectual activity with the conjoint operation of habit and impulse4 ,,iii ,so far the discussion has ignored the fact that there is an influential school of moralists 7best represented in contemporary thought by the utilitarians7 which also insists upon the natural1 empirical character of moral judgments and beliefs4 ,but unfortunately this school has followed a false psychology2 and has tended1 by calling out a reaction1 actually to strengthen the hands of those who persist in assigning to morals a separate domain of action and in demanding a separate agent of moral knowledge4 ,the essentials of this false psychology consist in two traits4 ,the first1 that knowledge originates from sensations 7instead of from habits and impulses72 and the second1 that judgment about good and evil in action consists in calculation of agreeable and disagreeable consequences1 of profit and loss4 ,it is not surprising that this view seems to many to degrade morals1 as well as to be false to facts4 ,if the logical outcome of an empirical view of moral knowledge is that all morality is concerned with calculating what is expedient1 politic1 prudent1 measured by consequences in the ways of pleasurable and painful sensations1 then1 say moralists of the orthodox school1 we will have naught to do with such a sordid view3 ,it is a reduction to the absurd of its premisses4 ,we will have a separate department for morals and a separate organ of moral knowledge4 ,our first problem is then to investigate the nature of ordinary judgments upon what it is best or wise to do1 or1 in ordinary language1 the nature of deliberation4 ,we begin with a summary assertion that deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal 7in imagination7 of various competing possible lines of action4 ,it starts from the blocking of efficient overt action1 due to that conflict of prior habit and newly released impulse to which reference has been made4 ,then each habit1 each impulse1 involved in the temporary suspense of overt action takes its turn in being tried out4 ,deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like4 ,it is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses1 to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon4 ,but the trial is in imagination1 not in overt fact4 ,the experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical facts outside the body4 ,thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes1 and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster4 ,an act overtly tried out is irrevocable1 its consequences cannot be blotted out4 ,an act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal4 ,it is retrievable4 ,each conflicting habit and impulse takes its turn in projecting itself upon the screen of imagination4 ,it unrolls a picture of its future history1 of the career it would have if it were given head4 ,although overt exhibition is checked by the pressure of contrary propulsive tendencies1 this very inhibition gives habit a chance at manifestation in thought4 ,deliberation means precisely that activity is disintegrated1 and that its various elements hold one another up4 ,while none has force enough to become the center of a re-directed activity1 or to dominate a course of action1 each has enough power to check others from exercising mastery4 ,activity does not cease in order to give way to reflection2 activity is turned from execution into intra-organic channels1 resulting in dramatic rehearsal4 ,if activity were directly exhibited it would result in certain experiences1 contacts with the environment4 ,it would succeed by making environing objects1 things and persons1 co-partners in its forward movement2 or else it would run against obstacles and be troubled1 possibly defeated4 ,these experiences of contact with objects and their qualities give meaning1 character1 to an otherwise fluid1 unconscious activity4 ,we find out what seeing means by the objects which are seen4 ,they constitute the significance of visual activity which would otherwise remain a blank4 ,pure activity is for consciousness pure emptiness4 ,it acquires a content or filling of meanings only in static termini1 what it comes to rest in1 or in the obstacles which check its onward movement and deflect it4 ,as has been remarked1 the object is that which objects4 ,there is no difference in this respect between a visible course of conduct and one proposed in deliberation4 ,we have no direct consciousness of what we purpose to do4 ,we can judge its nature1 assign its meaning1 only by following it into the situations whither it leads1 noting the objects against which it runs and seeing how they rebuff or unexpectedly encourage it4 ,in imagination as in fact we know a road only by what we see as we travel on it4 ,moreover the objects which prick out the course of a proposed act until we can see its design also serve to direct eventual overt activity4 ,every object hit upon as the habit traverses its imaginary path has a direct effect upon existing activities4 ,it reinforces1 inhibits1 redirects habits already working or stirs up others which had not previously actively entered in4 ,in thought as well as in overt action1 the objects experienced in following out a course of action attract1 repel1 satisfy1 annoy1 promote and retard4 ,thus deliberation proceeds4 ,to say that at last it ceases is to say that choice1 decision1 takes place4 ,what then is choice8 ,simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action4 ,choice is made as soon as some habit1 or some combination of elements of habits and impulse1 finds a way fully open4 ,then energy is released4 ,the mind is made up1 composed1 unified4 ,as long as deliberation pictures shoals or rocks or troublesome gales as marking the route of a contemplated voyage1 deliberation goes on4 ,but when the various factors in action fit harmoniously together1 when imagination finds no annoying hindrance1 when there is a picture of open seas1 filled sails and favoring winds1 the voyage is definitely entered upon4 ,this decisive direction of action constitutes choice4 ,it is a great error to suppose that we have no preferences until there is a choice4 ,we are always biased beings1 tending in one direction rather than another4 ,the occasion of deliberation is an excess of preferences1 not natural apathy or an absence of likings4 ,we want things that are incompatible with one another2 therefore we have to make a choice of what we really want1 of the course of action1 that is1 which most fully releases activities4 ,choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference4 ,it is the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences4 ,biases that had held one another in check now1 temporarily at least1 reinforce one another1 and constitute a unified attitude4 ,the moment arrives when imagination pictures an objective consequence of action which supplies an adequate stimulus and releases definitive action4 ,all deliberation is a search for a way to act1 not for a final terminus4 ,its office is to facilitate stimulation4 ,hence there is reasonable and unreasonable choice4 ,the object thought of may simply stimulate some impulse or habit to a pitch of intensity where it is temporarily irresistible4 ,it then overrides all competitors and secures for itself the sole right of way4 ,the object looms large in imagination2 it swells to fill the field4 ,it allows no room for alternatives2 it absorbs us1 enraptures us1 carries us away1 sweeps us off our feet by its own attractive force4 ,then choice is arbitrary1 unreasonable4 ,but the object thought of may be one which stimulates by unifying1 harmonizing1 different competing tendencies4 ,it may release an activity in which all are fulfilled1 not indeed1 in their original form1 but in a sublimated fashion1 that is in a way which modifies the original direction of each by reducing it to a component along with others in an action of transformed quality4 ,nothing is more extraordinary than the delicacy1 promptness and ingenuity with which deliberation is capable of making eliminations and recombinations in projecting the course of a possible activity4 ,to every shade of imagined circumstance there is a vibrating response2 and to every complex situation a sensitiveness as to its integrity1 a feeling of whether it does justice to all facts1 or overrides some to the advantage of others4 ,decision is reasonable when deliberation is so conducted4 ,there may be error in the result1 but it comes from lack of data not from ineptitude in handling them4 ,these facts give us the key to the old controversy as to the respective places of desire and reason in conduct4 ,it is notorious that some moralists have deplored the influence of desire2 they have found the heart of strife between good and evil in the conflict of desire with reason1 in which the former has force on its side and the latter authority4 ,but reasonableness is in fact a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire4 ,it signifies the order1 perspective1 proportion which is achieved1 during deliberation1 out of a diversity of earlier incompatible preferences4 ,choice is reasonable when it induces us to act reasonably2 that is1 with regard to the claims of each of the competing habits and impulses4 ,this implies1 of course1 the presence of a comprehensive object1 one which coordinates1 organizes and functions each factor of the situation which gave rise to conflict1 suspense and deliberation4 ,this is as true when some bad impulses and habits enter in as when approved ones require unification4 ,we have already seen the effects of choking them off1 of efforts at direct suppression4 ,bad habits can be subdued only by being utilized as elements in a new1 more generous and comprehensive scheme of action1 and good ones be preserved from rot only by similar use4 ,the nature of the strife of reason and passion is well stated by ,william ,james4 ,the cue of passion1 he says in effect1 is to keep imagination dwelling upon those objects which are congenial to it1 which feed it1 and which by feeding it intensify its force1 until it crowds out all thought of other objects4 ,an impulse or habit which is strongly emotional magnifies all objects that are congruous with it and smothers those which are opposed whenever they present themselves4 ,a passionate activity learns to work itself up artificially--as ,oliver ,cromwell indulged in fits of anger when he wanted to do things that his conscience would not justify4 ,a presentiment is felt that if the thought of contrary objects is allowed to get a lodgment in imagination1 these objects will work and work to chill and freeze out the ardent passion of the moment4 ,the conclusion is not that the emotional1 passionate phase of action can be or should be eliminated in behalf of a bloodless reason4 ,more passions1 not fewer1 is the answer4 ,to check the influence of hate there must be sympathy1 while to rationalize sympathy there are needed emotions of curiosity1 caution1 respect for the freedom of others--dispositions which evoke objects which balance those called up by sympathy1 and prevent its degeneration into maudlin sentiment and meddling interference4 ,rationality1 once more1 is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit4 ,it is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires4 ,reason as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions1 such as sympathy1 curiosity1 exploration1 experimentation1 frankness1 pursuit--to follow things through--circumspection1 to look about at the context1 etc41 etc4 ,the elaborate systems of science are born not of reason but of impulses at first slight and flickering2 impulses to handle1 move about1 to hunt1 to uncover1 to mix things separated and divide things combined1 to talk and to listen4 ,method is their effectual organization into continuous dispositions of inquiry1 development and testing4 ,it occurs after these acts and because of their consequences4 ,reason1 the rational attitude1 is the resulting disposition1 not a ready-made antecedent which can be invoked at will and set into movement4 ,the man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen1 not narrow1 his life of strong impulses while aiming at their happy coincidence in operation4 ,the clew of impulse is1 as we say1 to start something4 ,it is in a hurry4 ,it rushes us off our feet4 ,it leaves no time for examination1 memory and foresight4 ,but the clew of reason is1 as the phrase also goes1 to stop and think4 ,force1 however1 is required to stop the ongoing of a habit or impulse4 ,this is supplied by another habit4 ,the resulting period of delay1 of suspended and postponed overt action1 is the period in which activities that are refused direct outlet project imaginative counterparts4 ,it signifies1 in technical phrase1 the mediation of impulse4 ,for an isolated impulse is immediate1 narrowing the world down to the directly present4 ,variety of competing tendencies enlarges the world4 ,it brings a diversity of considerations before the mind1 and enables action to take place finally in view of an object generously conceived and delicately refined1 composed by a long process of selections and combinations4 ,in popular phrase1 to be deliberate is to be slow1 unhurried4 ,it takes time to put objects in order4 ,there are however vices of reflection as well as of impulse4 ,we may not look far enough ahead because we are hurried into action by stress of impulse2 but we may also become overinterested in the delights of reflection2 we become afraid of assuming the responsibilities of decisive choice and action1 and in general be sicklied over by a pale cast of thought4 ,we may become so curious about remote and abstract matters that we give only a begrudged1 impatient attention to the things right about us4 ,we may fancy we are glorifying the love of truth for its own sake when we are only indulging a pet occupation and slighting demands of the immediate situation4 ,men who devote themselves to thinking are likely to be unusually unthinking in some respects1 as for example in immediate personal relationships4 ,a man to whom exact scholarship is an absorbing pursuit may be more than ordinarily vague in ordinary matters4 ,humility and impartiality may be shown in a specialized field1 and pettiness and arrogance in dealing with other persons4 ,reason is not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea4 ,it is a laborious achievement of habit needing to be continually worked over4 ,a balanced arrangement of propulsive activities manifested in deliberation--namely1 reason--depends upon a sensitive and proportionate emotional sensitiveness4 ,only a one-sided1 over-specialized emotion leads to thinking of it as separate from emotion4 ,the traditional association of justice and reason has good psychology back of it4 ,both imply a balanced distribution of thought and energy4 ,deliberation is irrational in the degree in which an end is so fixed1 a passion or interest so absorbing1 that the foresight of consequences is warped to include only what furthers execution of its predetermined bias4 ,deliberation is rational in the degree in which forethought flexibly remakes old aims and habits1 institutes perception and love of new ends and acts4 ,,iv ,we now return to a consideration of the utilitarian theory according to which deliberation consists in calculation of courses of action on the basis of the profit and loss to which they lead4 ,the contrast of this notion with fact is obvious4 ,the office of deliberation is not to supply an inducement to act by figuring out where the most advantage is to be procured4 ,it is to resolve entanglements in existing activity1 restore continuity1 recover harmony1 utilize loose impulse and redirect habit4 ,to this end observation of present conditions1 recollection of previous situations are devoted4 ,deliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and its conclusion in choice of a course of action which straightens it out4 ,it no more resembles the casting-up of accounts of profit and loss1 pleasures and pains1 than an actor engaged in drama resembles a clerk recording debit and credit items in his ledger4 ,the primary fact is that man is a being who responds in action to the stimuli of the environment4 ,this fact is complicated in deliberation1 but it certainly is not abolished4 ,we continue to react to an object presented in imagination as we react to objects presented in observation4 ,the baby does not move to the mother's breast because of calculation of the advantages of warmth and food over against the pains of effort4 ,nor does the miser seek gold1 nor the architect strive to make plans1 nor the physician to heal1 because of reckonings of comparative advantage and disadvantage4 ,habit1 occupation1 furnishes the necessity of forward action in one case as instinct does in the other4 ,we do not act from reasoning2 but reasoning puts before us objects which are not directly or sensibly present1 so that we then may react directly to these objects1 with aversion1 attraction1 indifference or attachment1 precisely as we would to the same objects if they were physically present4 ,in the end it results in a case of direct stimulus and response4 ,in one case the stimulus is presented at once through sense2 in the other case1 it is indirectly reached through memory and constructive imagination4 ,but the matter of directness and indirectness concerns the way the stimulus is reached1 not the way in which it operates4 ,joy and suffering1 pain and pleasure1 the agreeable and disagreeable1 play their considerable rle in deliberation4 ,not1 however1 by way of a calculated estimate of future delights and miseries1 but by way of experiencing present ones4 ,the reaction of joy and sorrow1 elation and depression1 is as natural a response to objects presented in imagination as to those presented in sense4 ,complacency and annoyance follow hard at the heels of any object presented in image as they do upon its sensuous experience4 ,some objects when thought of are congruent to our existing state of activity4 ,they fit in1 they are welcome4 ,they agree1 or are agreeable1 not as matter of calculation but as matter of experienced fact4 ,other objects rasp2 they cut across activity2 they are tiresome1 hateful1 unwelcome4 ,they disagree with the existing trend of activity1 that is1 they are disagreeable1 and in no other way than as a bore who prolongs his visit1 a dun we can't pay1 or a pestiferous mosquito who goes on buzzing4 ,we do not think of future losses and expansions4 ,we think1 through imagination1 of objects into which in the future some course of action will run1 and we are now delighted or depressed1 pleased or pained at what is presented4 ,this running commentary of likes and dislikes1 attractions and disdains1 joys and sorrows1 reveals to any man who is intelligent enough to note them and to study their occasions his own character4 ,it instructs him as to the composition and direction of the activities that make him what he is4 ,to know what jars an activity and what agrees with it is to know something important about that activity and about ourselves4 ,some one may ask what practical difference it makes whether we are influenced by calculation of future joys and annoyances or by experience of present ones4 ,to such a question one can hardly reply except in the words ,all the difference in the world4 ,in the first place1 no difference can be more important than that which concerns the nature of the subject-matter of deliberation4 ,the calculative theory would have it that this subject-matter is future feelings1 sensations1 and that actions and thought are external means to get and avoid these sensations4 ,if such a theory has any practical influence1 it is to advise a person to concentrate upon his own most subjective and private feelings4 ,it gives him no choice except between a sickly introspection and an intricate calculus of remote1 inaccessible and indeterminate results4 ,in fact1 deliberation1 as a tentative trying-out of various courses of action1 is outlooking4 ,it flies toward and settles upon objective situations not upon feelings4 ,no doubt we sometimes fall to deliberating upon the effect of action upon our future feelings1 thinking of a situation mainly with reference to the comforts and discomforts it will excite in us4 ,but these moments are precisely our sentimental moments of self-pity or self-glorification4 ,they conduce to morbidity1 sophistication1 isolation from others2 while facing our acts in terms of their objective consequences leads to enlightenment and to consideration of others4 ,the first objection therefore to deliberation as a calculation of future feelings is that1 if it is consistently adhered to1 it makes an abnormal case the standard one4 ,if however an objective estimate is attempted1 thought gets speedily lost in a task impossible of achievement4 ,future pleasures and pains are influenced by two factors which are independent of present choice and effort4 ,they depend upon our own state at some future moment and upon the surrounding circumstances of that moment4 ,both of these are variables which change independently of present resolve and action4 ,they are much more important determinants of future sensations than is anything which can now be calculated4 ,things sweet in anticipation are bitter in actual taste1 things we now turn from in aversion are welcome at another moment in our career4 ,independently of deep changes in character1 such as from mercifulness to callousness1 from fretfulness to cheerfulness1 there are unavoidable changes in the waxing and waning of activity4 ,a child pictures a future of unlimited toys and unrestricted sweetmeats4 ,an adult pictures an object as giving pleasure while he is empty while the thing arrives in a moment of repletion4 ,a sympathetic person reckons upon the utilitarian basis the pains of others as a debit item in his calculations4 ,but why not harden himself so that others' sufferings won't count8 ,why not foster an arrogant cruelty so that the suffering of others which will follow from one's own action will fall on the credit side of the reckoning1 be pleasurable1 all to the good8 ,future pleasures and pains1 even of one's own1 are among the things most elusive of calculation4 ,of all things they lend themselves least readily to anything approaching a mathematical calculus4 ,and the further into the future we extend our view1 and the more the pleasures of others enter into the account1 the more hopeless does the problem of estimating future consequences become4 ,all of the elements become more and more indeterminate4 ,even if one could form a fairly accurate picture of the things that give pleasure to most people at the present moment--an exceedingly difficult task--he cannot foresee the detailed circumstances which will give a decisive turn to enjoyment at future times and remote places4 ,do pleasures due to defective education or unrefined disposition1 to say nothing of the pleasures of sensuality and brutality1 rank the same as those of cultivated persons having acute social sensitiveness8 ,the only reason the impossibility of the hedonistic calculus is not self-evident is that theorists in considering it unconsciously substitute for calculation of future pleasures an appreciation of present ones1 a present realization in imagination of future objective situations4 ,for1 in truth1 a man's judgment of future joys and sorrows is but a projection of what now satisfies and annoys him4 ,a man of considerate disposition now feels hurt at the thought of an act bringing harm to others1 and so he is on the lookout for consequences of that sort1 ranking them as of high importance4 ,he may even be so abnormally sensitive to such consequences that he is held back from needed vigorous action4 ,he fears to do the things which are for the real welfare of others because he shrinks from the thought of the pain to be inflicted upon them by needed measures4 ,a man of an executive type1 engrossed in carrying through a scheme1 will react in present emotion to everything concerned with its external success2 the pain its execution brings to others will not occur to him1 or if it does1 his mind will easily glide over it4 ,this sort of consequence will seem to him of slight importance in comparison with the commercial or political changes which bulk in his plans4 ,what a man foresees and fails to foresee1 what he appraises highly and at a low rate1 what he deems important and trivial1 what he dwells upon and what he slurs over1 what he easily recalls and what he naturally forgets--all of these things depend upon his character4 ,his estimate of future consequences of the agreeable and annoying is consequently of much greater value as an index of what he now is than as a prediction of future results4 ,one has only to read between the lines to see the enormous difference that marks off modern utilitarianism from epicureanism1 in spite of similarities in professed psychologies4 ,epicureanism is too worldly-wise to indulge in attempts to base present action upon precarious estimates of future and universal pleasures and pains4 ,on the contrary it says let the future go1 for life is uncertain4 ,who knows when it will end1 or what fortune the morrow will bring8 ,foster1 then1 with jealous care every gift of pleasure now allotted to you1 dwell upon it with lingering love1 prolong it as best you may4 ,utilitarianism on the contrary was a part of a philanthropic and reform movement of the nineteenth century4 ,its commendation of an elaborate and impossible calculus was in reality part of a movement to develop a type of character which should have a wide social outlook1 sympathy with the experiences of all sentient creatures1 one zealous about the social effects of all proposed acts1 especially those of collective legislation and administration4 ,it was concerned not with extracting the honey of the passing moment but with breeding improved bees and constructing hives4 ,after all1 the object of foresight of consequences is not to predict the future4 ,it is to ascertain the meaning of present activities and to secure1 so far as possible1 a present activity with a unified meaning4 ,we are not the creators of heaven and earth2 we have no responsibility for their operations save as their motions are altered by our movements4 ,our concern is with the significance of that slight fraction of total activity which starts from ourselves4 ,the best laid plans of men as well of mice gang aglee2 and for the same reason3 inability to dominate the future4 ,the power of man and mouse is infinitely constricted in comparison with the power of events4 ,men always build better or worse than they know1 for their acts are taken up into the broad sweep of events4 ,hence the problem of deliberation is not to calculate future happenings but to appraise present proposed actions4 ,we judge present desires and habits by their tendency to produce certain consequences4 ,it is our business to watch the course of our action so as to see what is the significance1 the import of our habits and dispositions4 ,the future outcome is not certain4 ,but neither is it certain what the present fire will do in the future4 ,it may be unexpectedly fed or extinguished4 ,but its tendency is a knowable matter1 what it will do under certain circumstances4 ,and so we know what is the tendency of malice1 charity1 conceit1 patience4 ,we know by observing their consequences1 by recollecting what we have observed1 by using that recollection in constructive imaginative forecasts of the future1 by using the thought of future consequence to tell the quality of the act now proposed4 ,deliberation is not calculation of indeterminate future results4 ,the present1 not the future1 is ours4 ,no shrewdness1 no store of information will make it ours4 ,but by constant watchfulness concerning the tendency of acts1 by noting disparities between former judgments and actual outcomes1 and tracing that part of the disparity that was due to deficiency and excess in disposition1 we come to know the meaning of present acts1 and to guide them in the light of that meaning4 ,the moral is to develop conscientiousness1 ability to judge the significance of what we are doing and to use that judgment in directing what we do1 not by means of direct cultivation of something called conscience1 or reason1 or a faculty of moral knowledge1 but by fostering those impulses and habits which experience has shown to make us sensitive1 generous1 imaginative1 impartial in perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning activities4 ,every attempt to forecast the future is subject in the end to the auditing of present concrete impulse and habit4 ,therefore the important thing is the fostering of those habits and impulses which lead to a broad1 just1 sympathetic survey of situations4 ,the occasion of deliberation1 that is of the attempt to find a stimulus to complete overt action in thought of some future object1 is confusion and uncertainty in present activities4 ,a similar devision in activities and need of a like deliberative activity for the sake of recovery of unity is sure to recur1 to recur again and again1 no matter how wise the decision4 ,even the most comprehensive deliberation leading to the most momentous choice only fixes a disposition which has to be continuously applied in new and unforeseen conditions1 re-adapted by future deliberations4 ,always our old habits and dispositions carry us into new fields4 ,we have to be always learning and relearning the meaning of our active tendencies4 ,does not this reduce moral life to the futile toil of a ,sisyphus who is forever rolling a stone uphill only to have it roll back so that he has to repeat his old task8 ,yes1 judged from progress made in a control of conditions which shall stay put and which excludes the necessity of future deliberations and reconsiderations4 ,no1 because continual search and experimentation to discover the meaning of changing activity1 keeps activity alive1 growing in significance4 ,the future situation involved in deliberation is of necessity marked by contingency4 ,what it will be in fact remains dependent upon conditions that escape our foresight and power of regulation4 ,but foresight which draws liberally upon the lessons of past experience reveals the tendency1 the meaning1 of present action2 and1 once more1 it is this present meaning rather than the future outcome which counts4 ,imaginative forethought of the probable consequences of a proposed act keeps that act from sinking below consciousness into routine habit or whimsical brutality4 ,it preserves the meaning of that act alive1 and keeps it growing in depth and refinement of meaning4 ,there is no limit to the amount of meaning which reflective and meditative habit is capable of importing into even simple acts1 just as the most splendid successes of the skilful executive who manipulates events may be accompanied by an incredibly meager and superficial consciousness4 ,v ,the reason for dividing conduct into two distinct regions1 one of expediency and the other of morality1 disappears when the psychology that identifies ordinary deliberation with calculation is disposed of4 ,there is seen to be but one issue involved in all reflection upon conduct3 ,the rectifying of present troubles1 the harmonizing of present incompatibilities by projecting a course of action which gathers into itself the meaning of them all4 ,the recognition of the true psychology also reveals to us the nature of good or satisfaction4 ,good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action4 ,this human good1 being a fulfilment conditioned upon thought1 differs from the pleasures which an animal nature--of course we also remain animals so far as we do not think--hits upon accidentally4 ,moreover there is a genuine difference between a false good1 a spurious satisfaction1 and a true good1 and there is an empirical test for discovering the difference4 ,the unification which ends thought in act may be only a superficial compromise1 not a real decision but a postponement of the issue4 ,many of our so-called decisions are of this nature4 ,or it may present1 as we have seen1 a victory of a temporarily intense impulse over its rivals1 a unity by oppression and suppression1 not by coordination4 ,these seeming unifications which are not unifications of fact are revealed by the event1 by subsequent occurrences4 ,it is one of the penalties of evil choice1 perhaps the chief penalty1 that the wrong-doer becomes more and more incapable of detecting these objective revelations of himself4 ,in quality1 the good is never twice alike4 ,it never copies itself4 ,it is new every morning1 fresh every evening4 ,it is unique in its every presentation4 ,for it marks the resolution of a distinctive complication of competing habits and impulses which can never repeat itself4 ,only with a habit rigid to the point of immobility could exactly the same good recur twice4 ,and with such rigid routines the same good does not after all recur1 for it does not even occur4 ,there is no consciousness at all1 either of good or bad4 ,rigid habits sink below the level of any meaning at all4 ,and since we live in a moving world1 they plunge us finally against conditions to which they are not adapted and so terminate in disaster4 ,to utilitarianism with all its defects belongs the distinction of enforcing in an unforgettable way the fact that moral good1 like every good1 consists in a satisfaction of the forces of human nature1 in welfare1 happiness4 ,to ,bentham remains1 in spite of all crudities and eccentricities1 the imperishable renown of forcing home to the popular consciousness that conscience1 intelligence applied to in moral matters1 is too often not intelligence but is veiled caprice1 dogmatic ipse dixitism1 vested class interest4 ,it is truly conscience only as it contributes to relief of misery and promotion of happiness4 ,an examination of utilitarianism brings out however the catastrophe involved in thinking of the good to which intelligence is pertinent as consisting in future pleasures and pains1 and moral reflection as their algebraic calculus4 ,it emphasizes the contrast between such conceptions of good and of intelligence1 and the facts of human nature according to which good1 happiness1 is found in the present meaning of activity1 depending upon the proportion1 order and freedom introduced into it by thought as it discovers objects which release and unify otherwise contending elements4 ,an adequate discussion of why utilitarianism with its just insight into the central place of good1 and its ardent devotion to rendering morals more intelligent and more equitably human took its onesided course 7and thereby provoked an intensified reaction to transcendental and dogmatic morals7 would take us far afield into social conditions and the antecedent history of thought4 ,we can deal with only one factor1 the domination of intellectual interest by economic considerations4 ,the industrial revolution was bound in any case to give a new direction to thought4 ,it enforced liberation from other-worldly concerns by fixing attention upon the possibility of the betterment of this world through control and utilization of natural forces2 it opened up marvelous possibilities in industry and commerce1 and new social conditions conducive to invention1 ingenuity1 enterprise1 constructive energy and an impersonal habit of mind dealing with mechanisms rather than appearances4 ,but new movements do not start in a new and clear field4 ,the context of old institutions and corresponding habits of thought persisted4 ,the new movement was perverted in theory because prior established conditions deflected it in practice4 ,thus the new industrialism was largely the old feudalism1 living in a bank instead of a castle and brandishing the check of credit instead of the sword4 ,an old theological doctrine of total depravity was continued and carried over in the idea of an inherent laziness of human nature which rendered it averse to useful work1 unless bribed by expectations of pleasure1 or driven by fears of pains4 ,this being the incentive to action1 it followed that the office of reason is only to enlighten the search for good or gain by instituting a more exact calculus of profit and loss4 ,happiness was thus identified with a maximum net gain of pleasures on the basis of analogy with business conducted for pecuniary profit1 and directed by means of a science of accounting dealing with quantities of receipts and expenses expressed in definite monetary units4#f ,for business was conducted as matter of fact with primary reference to procuring gain and averting loss4 ,gain and loss were reckoned in terms of units of money1 assumed to be fixed and equal1 exactly comparable whether loss or gain occurred1 while business foresight reduced future prospects to definitely measured forms1 to dollars and cents4 ,a dollar is a dollar1 past1 present or future2 and every business transaction1 every expenditure and consumption of time1 energy1 goods1 is1 in theory1 capable of exact statement in terms of dollars4 ,generalize this point of view into the notion that gain is the object of all action2 that gain takes the form of pleasure2 that there are definite1 commensurable units of pleasure1 which are exactly offset by units of pain 7loss71 and the working psychology of the ,benthamite school is at hand4 #f ,i owe the suggestion of this mode of interpreting the hedonistic calculus of utilitarianism to ,dr4 ,wesley ,mitchell4 ,see his articles in ,journal of ,political ,economy1 vol4 #ah4 ,compare also his article in ,political ,science ,quarterly1 vol4 #cc4 ,now admitting that the device of money accounting makes possible more exact estimates of the consequences of many acts than is otherwise possible1 and that accordingly the use of money and accounting may work a triumph for the application of intelligence in daily affairs1 yet there exists a difference in kind between business calculation of profit and loss and deliberation upon what purposes to form4 ,some of these differences are inherent and insuperable4 ,others of them are due to the nature of present business conducted for pecuniary profit1 and would disappear if business were conducted primarily for service of needs4 ,but it is important to see how in the latter case the assimilation of business accounting and normal deliberation would occur4 ,for it would not consist in making deliberation identical with calculation of loss and gain2 it would proceed in the opposite direction4 ,it would make accounting and auditing a subordinate factor in discovering the meaning of present activity4 ,calculation would be a means of stating future results more exactly and objectively and thus of making action more humane4 ,its function would be that of statistics in all social science4 ,but first as to the inherent difference between deliberation regarding business profit and loss and deliberation about ordinary conduct4 ,the distinction between wide and narrow use of reason has already been noted4 ,the latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates only upon means of reaching it4 ,the former regards the end-in-view in deliberation as tentative and permits1 nay encourages the coming into view of consequences which will transform it and create a new purpose and plan4 ,now business calculation is obviously of the kind where the end is taken for granted and does not enter into deliberation4 ,it resembles the case in which a man has already made his final decision1 say to take a walk1 and deliberates only upon what walk to take4 ,his end-in-view already exists2 it is not questioned4 ,the question is as to comparative advantages of this tramp or that4 ,deliberation is not free but occurs within the limits of a decision reached by some prior deliberation or else fixed by unthinking routine4 ,suppose1 however1 that a man's question is not which path to walk upon1 but whether to walk or to stay with a friend whom continued confinement has rendered peevish and uninteresting as a companion4 ,the utilitarian theory demands that in the latter case the two alternatives still be of the same kind1 alike in quality1 that their only difference be a quantitative one1 of plus or minus in pleasure4 ,this assumption that all desires and dispositions1 all habits and impulses1 are the same in quality is equivalent to the assertion that no real or significant conflict among them is possible2 and hence there is no need of discovering an object and an activity which will bring them into unity4 ,it asserts by implication that there is no genuine doubt or suspense as to the meaning of any impulse or habit4 ,their meaning is ready-made1 fixed3 pleasure4 ,the only problem or doubt is as to the amount of pleasure 7or pain7 that is involved4 ,this assumption does violence to fact4 ,the poignancy of situations that evoke reflection lies in the fact that we really do not know the meaning of the tendencies that are pressing for action4 ,we have to search1 to experiment4 ,deliberation is a work of discovery4 ,conflict is acute2 one impulse carries us one way into one situation1 and another impulse takes us another way to a radically different objective result4 ,deliberation is not an attempt to do away with this opposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount4 ,it is an attempt to uncover the conflict in its full scope and bearing4 ,what we want to find out is what difference each impulse and habit imports1 to reveal qualitative incompatibilities by detecting the different courses to which they commit us1 the different dispositions they form and foster1 the different situations into which they plunge us4 ,in short1 the thing actually at stake in any serious deliberation is not a difference of quantity1 but what kind of person one is to become1 what sort of self is in the making1 what kind of a world is making4 ,this is plain enough in those crucial decisions where the course of life is thrown into widely different channels1 where the pattern of life is rendered different and diversely dyed according as this alternative or that is chosen4 ,deliberation as to whether to be a merchant or a school teacher1 a physician or a politician is not a choice of quantities4 ,it is just what it appears to be1 a choice of careers which are incompatible with one another1 within each of which definitive inclusions and rejections are involved4 ,with the difference in career belongs a difference in the constitution of the self1 of habits of thought and feeling as well as of outward action4 ,with it comes profound differences in all future objective relationships4 ,our minor decisions differ in acuteness and range1 but not in principle4 ,our world does not so obviously hang upon any one of them2 but put together they make the world what it is in meaning for each one of us4 ,crucial decisions can hardly be more than a disclosure of the cumulative force of trivial choices4 ,a radical distinction thus exists between deliberation where the only question is whether to invest money in this bond or that stock1 and deliberation where the primary decision is as to the kind of activity which is to be engaged in4 ,definite quantitative calculation is possible in the former case because a decision as to kind or direction of action does not have to be made4 ,it has been decided already1 whether by persistence of habit1 or prior deliberation1 that the man is to be an investor4 ,the significant thing in decisions proper1 the course of action1 the kind of a self simply1 doesn't enter in2 it isn't in question4 ,to reduce all cases of judgment of action to this simplified and comparatively unimportant case of calculation of quantities1 is to miss the whole point of deliberation4#g #g ,so far as ,i am aware ,dr4 ,h4 ,w4 ,stuart was the first to point out this difference between economic and moral valuations in his essay in ,studies in ,logical ,theory4 ,it is another way of saying the same thing to note that business calculations about pecuniary gain never concern direct use in experience4 ,they are1 as such1 not deliberations about good or satisfaction at all4 ,the man who decides to put business activity before all other claims whatsoever1 before that of family or country or art or science1 does make a choice about satisfaction or good4 ,but he makes it as a man1 not as a business man4 ,on the other hand1 what is to be done with business profit when it accrues 7except to invest it in similar undertakings7 does not enter at all into a strictly business deliberation4 ,its use1 in which alone good or satisfaction is found1 is left indeterminate1 contingent upon further deliberation1 or else is left matter of routine habit4 ,we do not eat money1 or wear it1 or marry it1 or listen for musical strains to issue from it4 ,if by any chance a man prefers a less amount of money to a greater amount1 it is not for economic reasons4 ,pecuniary profit in itself1 in other words1 is always strictly instrumental1 and it is of the nature of this instrument to be effective in proportion to size4 ,in choosing with respect to it1 we are not making a significant choice1 a choice of ends4 ,we have already seen1 however1 there is something abnormal and in the strict sense impossible in mere means1 in1 that is1 instruments totally dissevered from ends4 ,we may view economic activity in abstraction1 but it does not exist by itself4 ,business takes for granted non-business uses to which its results are to be put4 ,the stimuli for economic activity 7in the sense in which business means activity subject to monetary reckoning7 are found in non-pecuniary1 non-economic activities4 ,taken by itself then economic action throws no light upon the nature of satisfaction and the relation of intelligence to it1 because the whole question of satisfaction is either taken for granted or else is ignored by it4 ,only when money-making is itself taken as a good does it exhibit anything pertinent to the question4 ,and when it is so taken1 then the question is not one of future gain but of present activity and its meaning4 ,business then becomes an activity carried on for its own sake4 ,it is then a career1 a continuous occupation in which are developed daring1 adventure1 power1 rivalry1 overcoming of competitors1 conspicuous achievement which attracts admiration1 play of imagination1 technical knowledge1 skill in foresight and making combinations1 management of men and goods and so on4 ,in this case1 it exemplifies what has been said about good or happiness as incorporating in itself at present the foreseen future consequences that result from intelligent action4 ,the problem concerns the quality of such a good4 ,in short the attempt to assimilate other activities to the model of economic activity 7defined as a calculated pursuit of gain7 reverses the state of the facts4 ,the economic man defined as a creature devoted to an enlightened or calculating pursuit of gain is morally objectionable because the conception of such a being empirically falsifies empirical facts4 ,love of pecuniary gain is an undoubted and powerful fact4 ,but it and its importance are affairs of social not of psychological nature4 ,it is not a primary fact which can be used to account for other phenomena4 ,it depends upon other impulses and habits4 ,it expresses and organizes the use to which they are put4 ,it cannot be used to define the nature of desire1 effort and satisfaction1 because it embodies a socially selected type of desire and satisfaction4 ,it affords1 like steeple-chasing1 or collecting postage stamps1 seeking political office1 astronomical observation of the heavens1 a special case of desire1 effort1 and happiness4 ,and like them it is subject to examination1 criticism and valuation in the light of the place it occupies in the system of developing activities4 ,the reason that it is so easy and for specific purposes so useful to select economic activities and subject them to separate scientific treatment is because the men who engage in it are men who are also more than business men1 whose usual habits may be more or less safely guessed at4 ,as human beings they have desires and occupations which are affected by social custom1 expectation and admiration4 ,the uses to which gains will be put1 that is the current scheme of activities into which they enter as factors1 are passed over only because they are so inevitably present4 ,support of family1 of church1 philanthropic benefactions1 political influence1 automobiling1 command of luxuries1 freedom of movement1 respect from others1 are in general terms some of the obvious activities into which economic activity fits4 ,this context of activities enters into the real make-up and meaning of economic activity4 ,calculated pursuit of gain is in fact never what it is made out to be when economic action is separated from the rest of life1 for in fact it is what it is because of a complex social environment involving scientific1 legal1 political and domestic conditions4 ,a certain tragic fate seems to attend all intellectual movements4 ,that of utilitarianism is suggested in the not infrequent criticism that it exaggerated the rle of rational thought in human conduct1 that it assumed that everybody is moved by conscious considerations and that all that is really necessary is to make the process of consideration sufficiently enlightened4 ,then it is objected that a better psychology reveals that men are not moved by thought but rather by instinct and habit4 ,thus a partially sound criticism is employed to conceal the one factor in utilitarianism from which we ought to learn something2 is used to foster an obscurantist doctrine of trusting to impulse1 instinct or intuition4 ,neither the utilitarians nor any one else can exaggerate the proper office of reflection1 of intelligence1 in conduct4 ,the mistake lay not here but in a false conception of what constitutes reflection1 deliberation4 ,the truth that men are not moved by consideration of self-interest1 that men are not good judges of where their interests lie and are not moved to act by these judgments1 cannot properly be converted into the belief that consideration of consequences is a negligible factor in conduct4 ,so far as it is negligible in fact it evinces the rudimentary character of civilization4 ,we may indeed safely start from the assumption that impulse and habit1 not thought1 are the primary determinants of conduct4 ,but the conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the need is therefore the greater for cultivation of thought4 ,the error of utilitarianism is not at this point4 ,it is found in its wrong conception of what thought1 deliberation1 is and does4 ,,vi ,our problem now concerns the nature of ends1 that is ends-in-view or aims4 ,the essential elements in the problem have already been stated4 ,it has been pointed out that the ends1 objectives1 of conduct are those foreseen consequences which influence present deliberation and which finally bring it to rest by furnishing an adequate stimulus to overt action4 ,consequently ends arise and function within action4 ,they are not1 as current theories too often imply1 things lying beyond activity at which the latter is directed4 ,they are not strictly speaking ends or termini of action at all4 ,they are terminals of deliberation1 and so turning points in activity4 ,many opposed moral theories agree however in placing ends beyond action1 although they differ in their notions of what the ends are4 ,the utilitarian sets up pleasure as such an outside-and-beyond1 as something necessary to induce action and in which it terminates4 ,many harsh critics of utilitarianism have however agreed that there is some end in which action terminates1 a final goal4 ,they have denied that pleasure is such an outside aim1 and put perfection or self-realization in its place4 ,the entire popular notion of ideals is infected with this conception of some fixed end beyond activity at which we should aim4 ,according to this view ends-in-themselves come before aims4 ,we have a moral aim only as our purpose coincides with some end-in-itself4 ,we ought to aim at the latter whether we actually do or not4 ,when men believed that fixed ends existed for all normal changes in nature1 the conception of similar ends for men was but a special case of a general belief4 ,if the changes in a tree from acorn to full-grown oak were regulated by an end which was somehow immanent or potential in all the less perfect forms1 and if change was simply the effort to realize a perfect or complete form1 then the acceptance of a like view for human conduct was consonant with the rest of what passed for science4 ,such a view1 consistent and systematic1 was foisted by ,aristotle upon western culture and endured for two thousand years4 ,when the notion was expelled from natural science by the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century1 logically it should also have disappeared from the theory of human action4 ,but man is not logical and his intellectual history is a record of mental reserves and compromises4 ,he hangs on to what he can in his old beliefs even when he is compelled to surrender their logical basis4 ,so the doctrine of fixed ends-in-themselves at which human acts are--or should be--directed and by which they are regulated if they are regulated at all persisted in morals1 and was made the cornerstone of orthodox moral theory4 ,the immediate effect was to dislocate moral from natural science1 to divide man's world as it never had been divided in prior culture4 ,one point of view1 one method and spirit animated inquiry into natural occurrences2 a radically opposite set of ideas prevailed about man's affairs4 ,completion of the scientific change begun in the seventeenth century thus depends upon a revision of the current notion of ends of action as fixed limits and conclusions4 ,in fact1 ends are ends-in-view or aims4 ,they arise out of natural effects or consequences which in the beginning are hit upon1 stumbled upon so far as any purpose is concerned4 ,men like some of the consequences and dislike others4 ,henceforth 7or till attraction and repulsion alter7 attaining or averting similar consequences are aims or ends4 ,these consequences constitute the meaning and value of an activity as it comes under deliberation4 ,meantime of course imagination is busy4 ,old consequences are enhanced1 recombined1 modified in imagination4 ,invention operates4 ,actual consequences1 that is effects which have happened in the past1 become possible future consequences of acts still to be performed4 ,this operation of imaginative thought complicates the relation of ends to activity1 but it does not alter the substantial fact3 ,ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course4 ,they are in no sense ends of action4 ,in being ends of deliberation they are redirecting pivots in action4 ,men shoot and throw4 ,at first this is done as an instinctive or natural reaction to some situation4 ,the result when it is observed gives a new meaning to the activity4 ,henceforth men in throwing and shooting think of it in terms of its outcome2 they act intelligently or have an end4 ,liking the activity in its acquired meaning1 they not only take aim when they throw instead of throwing at random1 but they find or make targets at which to aim4 ,this is the origin and nature of goals of action4 ,they are ways of defining and deepening the meaning of activity4 ,having an end or aim is thus a characteristic of present activity4 ,it is the means by which an activity becomes adapted when otherwise it would be blind and disorderly1 or by which it gets meaning when otherwise it would be mechanical4 ,in a strict sense an end-in-view is a means in present action2 present action is not a means to a remote end4 ,men do not shoot because targets exist1 but they set up targets in order that throwing and shooting may be more effective and significant4 ,a mariner does not sail towards the stars1 but by noting the stars he is aided in conducting his present activity of sailing4 ,a port or harbor is his objective1 but only in the sense of reaching it not of taking possession of it4 ,the harbor stands in his thought as a significant point at which his activity will need re-direction4 ,activity will not cease when the port is attained1 but merely the present direction of activity4 ,the port is as truly the beginning of another mode of activity as it is the termination of the present one4 ,the only reason we ignore this fact is because it is empirically taken for granted4 ,we know without thinking that our ends are perforce beginnings4 ,but theories of ends and ideals have converted a theoretical ignoring which is equivalent to practical acknowledgment into an intellectual denial1 and have thereby confused and perverted the nature of ends4 ,even the most important among all the consequences of an act is not necessarily its aim4 ,results which are objectively most important may not even be thought of at all2 ordinarily a man does not think in connection with exercise of his profession that it will sustain him and his family in existence4 ,the end-thought-of is uniquely important1 but it is indispensable to state the respect in which it is important4 ,it gives the decisive clew to the act to be performed under the existing circumstances4 ,it is that particular foreseen object that will stimulate the act which relieves existing troubles1 straightens out existing entanglements4 ,in a temporary annoyance1 even if only that caused by the singing of a mosquito1 the thought of that which gives relief may engross the mind in spite of consequences much more important1 objectively speaking4 ,moralists have deplored such facts as evidence of levity4 ,but the remedy1 if a remedy be needed1 is not found in insisting upon the importance of ends in general4 ,it is found in a change of the dispositions which make things either immediately troublesome or tolerable or agreeable4 ,when ends are regarded as literally ends to action rather than as directive stimuli to present choice they are frozen and isolated4 ,it makes no difference whether the end is natural good like health or a moral good like honesty4 ,set up as complete and exclusive1 as demanding and justifying action as a means to itself1 it leads to narrowness2 in extreme cases fanaticism1 inconsiderateness1 arrogance and hypocrisy4 ,joshua's reputed success in getting the sun to stand still to serve his desire is recognized to have involved a miracle4 ,but moral theorists constantly assume that the continuous course of events can be arrested at the point of a particular object2 that men can plunge with their own desires into the unceasing flow of changes1 and seize upon some object as their end irrespective of everything else4 ,the use of intelligence to discover the object that will best operate as a releasing and unifying stimulus in the existing situation is discounted4 ,one reminds one's self that one's end is justice or charity or professional achievement or putting over a deal for a needed public improvement1 and further questionings and qualms are stilled4 ,it is customary to suppose that such methods merely ignore the question of the morality of the means which are used to secure the end desired4 ,common sense revolts against the maxim1 conveniently laid off upon ,jesuits or other far-away people1 that the end justifies the means4 ,there is no incorrectness in saying that the question of means employed is overlooked in such cases4 ,but analysis would go further if it were also pointed out that overlooking means is only a device for failing to note those ends1 or consequences1 which1 if they were noted would be seen to be so evil that action would be estopped4 ,certainly nothing can justify or condemn means except ends1 results4 ,but we have to include consequences impartially4 ,even admitting that lying will save a man's soul1 whatever that may mean1 it would still be true that lying will have other consequences1 namely1 the usual consequences that follow from tampering with good faith and that lead lying to be condemned4 ,it is wilful folly to fasten upon some single end or consequence which is liked1 and permit the view of that to blot from perception all other undesired and undesirable consequences4 ,it is like supposing that when a finger held close to the eye covers up a distant mountain the finger is really larger than the mountain4 ,not the end--in the singular--justifies the means2 for there is no such thing as the single all-important end4 ,to suppose that there is such an end is like working over again1 in behalf of our private wishes1 the miracle of ,joshua in arresting the course of nature4 ,it is not possible adequately to characterize the presumption1 the falsity and the deliberate perversion of intelligence involved in refusal to note the plural effects that flow from any act1 a refusal adopted in order that we may justify an act by picking out that one consequence which will enable us to do what we wish to do and for which we feel the need of justification4 ,yet this assumption is continually made4 ,it is made by implication in the current view of purposes or ends-in-view as objects in themselves1 instead of means to unification and liberation of present conflicting1 confused habits and impulses4 ,there is something almost sinister in the desire to label the doctrine that the end justifies the means with the name of some one obnoxious school4 ,politicians1 especially if they have to do with the foreign affairs of a nation and are called statesmen1 almost uniformly act upon the doctrine that the welfare of their own country justifies any measure irrespective of all the demoralization it works4 ,captains of industry1 great executives in all lines1 usually work upon this plan4 ,but they are not the original offenders by any means4 ,every man works upon it so far as he permits himself to become so absorbed in one aspect of what he is doing that he loses a view of its varied consequences1 hypnotizing his attention by consideration of just those consequences which in the abstract are desirable and slurring over other consequences equally real4 ,every man works upon this principle who becomes over-interested in any cause or project1 and who uses its desirability in the abstract to justify himself in employing any means that will assist him in arriving1 ignoring all the collateral ends of his behavior4 ,it is frequently pointed out that there is a type of executive-man whose conduct seems to be as non-moral as the action of the forces of nature4 ,we all tend to relapse into this non-moral condition whenever we want any one thing intensely4 ,in general1 the identification of the end prominent in conscious desire and effort with the end is part of the technique of avoiding a reasonable survey of consequences4 ,the survey is avoided because of a subconscious recognition that it would reveal desire in its true worth and thus preclude action to satisfy it--or at all events give us an uneasy conscience in striving to realize it4 ,thus the doctrine of the isolated1 complete or fixed end limits intelligent examination1 encourages insincerity1 and puts a pseudo-stamp of moral justification upon success at any price4 ,moralistic persons are given to escaping this evil by falling into another pit4 ,they deny that consequences have anything at all to do with the morality of acts4 ,not ends but motives they say justify or condemn acts4 ,the thing to do1 accordingly1 is to cultivate certain motives or dispositions1 benevolence1 purity1 love of perfection1 loyalty4 ,the denial of consequences thus turns out formal1 verbal4 ,in reality a consequence is set up at which to aim1 only it is a subjective consequence4 ,meaning well is selected as the consequence or end to be cultivated at all hazards1 an end which is all-justifying and to which everything else is offered up in sacrifice4 ,the result is a sentimental futile complacency rather than the brutal efficiency of the executive4 ,but the root of both evils is the same4 ,one man selects some external consequence1 the other man a state of internal feeling1 to serve as the end4 ,the doctrine of meaning well as the end is if anything the more contemptible of the two1 for it shrinks from accepting any responsibility for actual results4 ,it is negative1 self-protective and sloppy4 ,it lends itself to complete self-deception4 ,why have men become so attached to fixed1 external ends8 ,why is it not universally recognized that an end is a device of intelligence in guiding action1 instrumental to freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided tendencies8 ,the answer is virtually contained in what was earlier said about rigid habits and their effect upon intelligence4 ,ends are1 in fact1 literally endless1 forever coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences4 ,endless ends is a way of saying that there are no ends--that is no fixed self-enclosed finalities4 ,while however we cannot actually prevent change from occurring we can and do regard it as evil4 ,we strive to retain action in ditches already dug4 ,we regard novelties as dangerous1 experiments as illicit and deviations as forbidden4 ,fixed and separate ends reflect a projection of our own fixed and non-interacting compartmental habits4 ,we see only consequences which correspond to our habitual courses4 ,as we have said1 men did not begin to shoot because there were ready-made targets to aim at4 ,they made things into targets by shooting at them1 and then made special targets to make shooting more significantly interesting4 ,but if generation after generation were shown targets they had had no part in constructing1 if bows and arrows were thrust into their hands1 and pressure were brought to bear upon them to keep them shooting in season and out1 some wearied soul would soon propound to willing listeners the theory that shooting was unnatural1 that man was naturally wholly at rest1 and that targets existed in order that men might be forced to be active2 that the duty of shooting and the virtue of hitting are externally imposed and fostered1 and that otherwise there would be no such thing as a shooting-activity--that is1 morality4 ,the doctrine of fixed ends not only diverts attention from examination of consequences and the intelligent creation of purpose1 but1 since means and ends are two ways of regarding the same actuality1 it also renders men careless in their inspection of existing conditions4 ,an aim not framed on the basis of a survey of those present conditions which are to be employed as means of its realization simply throws us back upon past habits4 ,we then do not do what we intended to do but what we have got used to doing1 or else we thrash about in a blind ineffectual way4 ,the result is failure4 ,discouragement follows1 assuaged perhaps by the thought that in any case the end is too ideal1 too noble and remote1 to be capable of realization4 ,we fall back on the consoling thought that our moral ideals are too good for this world and that we must accustom ourselves to a gap between aim and execution4 ,actual life is then thought of as a compromise with the best1 an enforced second or third best1 a dreary exile from our true home in the ideal1 or a temporary period of troubled probation to be followed by a period of unending attainment and peace4 ,at the same time1 as has been repeatedly pointed out1 persons of a more practical turn of mind accept the world as it is1 that is as past customs have made it to be1 and consider what advantages for themselves may be extracted from it4 ,they form aims on the basis of existing habits of life which may be turned to their own private account4 ,they employ intelligence in framing ends and selecting and arranging means4 ,but intelligence is confined to manipulation2 it does not extend to construction4 ,it is the intelligence of the politician1 administrator and professional executive--the kind of intelligence which has given a bad meaning to a word that ought to have a fine meaning1 opportunism4 ,for the highest task of intelligence is to grasp and realize genuine opportunity1 possibility4 ,roughly speaking1 the course of forming aims is as follows4 ,the beginning is with a wish1 an emotional reaction against the present state of things and a hope for something different4 ,action fails to connect satisfactorily with surrounding conditions4 ,thrown back upon itself1 it projects itself in an imagination of a scene which if it were present would afford satisfaction4 ,this picture is often called an aim1 more often an ideal4 ,but in itself it is a fancy which may be only a fantasy1 a dream1 a castle in the air4 ,in itself it is a romantic embellishment of the present2 at its best it is material for poetry or the novel4 ,its natural home is not in the future but in the dim past or in some distant and supposedly better part of the present world4 ,every such idealized object is suggested by something actually experienced1 as the flight of birds suggests the liberation of human beings from the restrictions of slow locomotion on dull earth4 ,it becomes an aim or end only when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization1 that is in terms of means4 ,this transformation depends upon study of the conditions which generate or make possible the fact observed to exist already4 ,the fancy of the delight of moving at will through the air became an actuality only after men carefully studied the way in which a bird although heavier than air actually sustains itself in air4 ,a fancy becomes an aim1 in short1 when some past sequence of known cause-and-effect is projected into the future1 and when by assembling its causal conditions we strive to generate a like result4 ,we have to fall back upon what has already happened naturally without design1 and study it to see how it happened1 which is what is meant by causation4 ,this knowledge joined to wish creates a purpose4 ,many men have doubtless dreamed of ability to have light in darkness without the trouble of oil1 lamps and friction4 ,glow-worms1 lightning1 the sparks of cut electric conductors suggest such a possibility4 ,but the picture remained a dream until an ,edison studied all that could be found out about such casual phenomena of light1 and then set to work to search out and gather together the means for reproducing their operation4 ,the great trouble with what passes for moral ends and ideals is that they do not get beyond the stage of fancy of something agreeable and desirable based upon an emotional wish2 very often1 at that1 not even an original wish1 but the wish of some leader which has been conventionalized and transmitted through channels of authority4 ,every gain in natural science makes possible new aims4 ,that is1 the discovery of how things do occur makes it possible to conceive of their happening at will1 and gives us a start on selecting and combining the conditions1 the means1 to command their happening4 ,in technical matters1 this lesson has been fairly well learned4 ,but in moral matters1 men still largely neglect the need of studying the way in which results similar to those which we desire actually happen4 ,mechanism is despised as of importance only in low material things4 ,the consequent divorce of moral ends from scientific study of natural events renders the former impotent wishes1 compensatory dreams in consciousness4 ,in fact ends or consequences are still determined by fixed habit and the force of circumstance4 ,the evils of idle dreaming and of routine are experienced in conjunction4 ,idealism must indeed come first--the imagination of some better state generated by desire4 ,but unless ideals are to be dreams and idealism a synonym for romanticism and fantasy-building1 there must be a most realistic study of actual conditions and of the mode or law of natural events1 in order to give the imagined or ideal object definite form and solid substance--to give it1 in short1 practicality and constitute it a working end4 ,the acceptance of fixed ends in themselves is an aspect of man's devotion to an ideal of certainty4 ,this affection was inevitably cherished as long as men believed that the highest things in physical nature are at rest1 and that science is possible only by grasping immutable forms and species3 in other words1 for much the greater part of the intellectual history of mankind4 ,only reckless sceptics would have dared entertain any idea of ends except as fixed in themselves as long as the whole structure of science was erected upon the immobile4 ,behind however the conception of fixity whether in science or morals lay adherence to certainty of truth1 a clinging to something fixed1 born of fear of the new and of attachment to possessions4 ,when the classicist condemns concession to impulse and holds up to admiration the patterns tested in tradition1 he little suspects how much he is himself affected by unavowed impulses--timidity which makes him cling to authority1 conceit which moves him to be himself the authority who speaks in the name of authority1 possessive impulse which fears to risk acquisition in new adventures4 ,love of certainty is a demand for guarantees in advance of action4 ,ignoring the fact that truth can be bought only by the adventure of experiment1 dogmatism turns truth into an insurance company4 ,fixed ends upon one side and fixed principles--that is authoritative rules--on the other1 are props for a feeling of safety1 the refuge of the timid and the means by which the bold prey upon the timid4 ,,vii ,intelligence is concerned with foreseeing the future so that action may have order and direction4 ,it is also concerned with principles and criteria of judgment4 ,the diffused or wide applicability of habits is reflected in the general character of principles3 a principle is intellectually what a habit is for direct action4 ,as habits set in grooves dominate activity and swerve it from conditions instead of increasing its adaptability1 so principles treated as fixed rules instead of as helpful methods take men away from experience4 ,the more complicated the situation1 and the less we really know about it1 the more insistent is the orthodox type of moral theory upon the prior existence of some fixed and universal principle or law which is to be directly applied and followed4 ,ready-made rules available at a moment's notice for settling any kind of moral difficulty and resolving every species of moral doubt have been the chief object of the ambition of moralists4 ,in the much less complicated and less changing matters of bodily health such pretensions are known as quackery4 ,but in morals a hankering for certainty1 born of timidity and nourished by love of authoritative prestige1 has led to the idea that absence of immutably fixed and universally applicable ready-made principles is equivalent to moral chaos4 ,in fact1 situations into which change and the unexpected enter are a challenge to intelligence to create new principles4 ,morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all1 not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man1 but because life is a moving affair in which old moral truth ceases to apply4 ,principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification by the event2 and the time honored effort to assimilate morals to mathematics is only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic authority1 or putting a new one upon the throne of the old4 ,but the experimental character of moral judgments does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity4 ,principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment4 ,human history is long4 ,there is a long record of past experimentation in conduct1 and there are cumulative verifications which give many principles a well earned prestige4 ,lightly to disregard them is the height of foolishness4 ,but social situations alter2 and it is also foolish not to observe how old principles actually work under new conditions1 and not to modify them so that they will be more effectual instruments in judging new cases4 ,many men are now aware of the harm done in legal matters by assuming the antecedent existence of fixed principles under which every new case may be brought4 ,they recognize that this assumption merely puts an artificial premium on ideas developed under bygone conditions1 and that their perpetuation in the present works inequity4 ,yet the choice is not between throwing away rules previously developed and sticking obstinately by them4 ,the intelligent alternative is to revise1 adapt1 expand and alter them4 ,the problem is one of continuous1 vital readaptation4 ,the popular objection to casuistry is similar to the popular objection to the maxim that the end justifies the means4 ,it is creditable to practical moral sense1 but not to popular logical consistency4 ,for recourse to casuistry is the only conclusion which can be drawn from belief in fixed universal principles1 just as the ,jesuit maxim is the only conclusion proper to be drawn from belief in fixed ends4 ,every act1 every deed is individual4 ,what is the sense in having fixed general rules1 commandments1 laws1 unless they are such as to confer upon individual cases of action 7where alone instruction is finally needed7 something of their own infallible certainty8 ,casuistry1 so-called1 is simply the systematic effort to secure for particular instances of conduct the advantage of general rules which are asserted and believed in4 ,by those who accept the notion of immutable regulating principles1 casuistry ought to be lauded for sincerity and helpfulness1 not dispraised as it usually is4 ,or else men ought to carry back their aversion to manipulation of particular cases1 until they will fit into the procrustean beds of fixed rules1 to the point where it is clear that all principles are empirical generalizations from the ways in which previous judgments of conduct have practically worked out4 ,when this fact is apparent1 these generalizations will be seen to be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases1 but instrumentalities for their investigation1 methods by which the net value of past experience is rendered available for present scrutiny of new perplexities4 ,then it will also follow that they are hypotheses to be tested and revised by their further working4#h #h ,among contemporary moralists1 ,mr4 ,g4 ,e4 ,moore may be cited as almost alone in having the courage of the convictions shared by many4 ,he insists that it is the true business of moral theory to enable men to arrive at precise and sure judgments in concrete cases of moral perplexity4 ,every such statement meets with prompt objection4 ,we are told that in deliberation rival goods present themselves4 ,we are faced by competing desires and ends which are incompatible with one another4 ,they are all attractive1 seductive4 ,how then shall we choose among them8 ,we can choose rationally among values1 the argument continues1 only if we have some fixed measure of values1 just as we decide the respective lengths of physical things by recourse to the fixed foot-rule4 ,one might reply that after all there is no fixed foot-rule1 no fixed foot in itself and that the standard length or weight of measure is only another special portion of matter1 subject to change from heat1 moisture and gravitational position1 defined only by conditions1 relations4 ,one might reply that the foot-rule is a tool which has been worked out in actual prior comparisons of concrete things for use in facilitating further comparisons4 ,but we content ourselves with remarking that we find in this conception of a fixed antecedent standard another manifestation of the desire to escape the strain of the actual moral situation1 its genuine uncertainty of possibilities and consequences4 ,we are confronted with another case of the all too human love of certainty1 a case of the wish for an intellectual patent issued by authority4 ,the issue after all is one of fact4 ,the critic is not entitled to enforce against the facts his private wish for a ready-made standard which will relieve him from the burden of examination1 observation and continuing generalization and test4 ,the worth of this private wish is moreover open to question in the light of the history of the development of natural science4 ,there was a time when in astronomy1 chemistry and biology men claimed that judgment of individual phenomena was possible only because the mind was already in possession of fixed truths1 universal principles1 pre-ordained axioms4 ,only by their means could contingent1 varying particular events be truly known4 ,there was1 it was argued1 no way to judge the truth of any particular statement about a particular plant1 heavenly body1 or case of combustion unless there was a general truth already in hand with which to compare a particular empirical occurrence4 ,the contention was successful1 that is for a long time it maintained its hold upon men's minds4 ,but its effect was merely to encourage intellectual laziness1 reliance upon authority and blind acceptance of conceptions that had somehow become traditional4 ,the actual advance of science did not begin till men broke away from this method4 ,when men insisted upon judging astronomical phenomena by bringing them directly under established truths1 those of geometry1 they had no astronomy1 but only a private esthetic construction4 ,astronomy began when men trusted themselves to embarking upon the uncertain sea of events and were willing to be instructed by changes in the concrete4 ,then antecedent principles were tentatively employed as methods for conducting observations and experiments1 and for organizing special facts3 as hypotheses4 ,in morals now1 as in physical science then1 the work of intelligence in reaching such relative certainty1 or tested probability1 as is open to man is retarded by the false notion of fixed antecedent truths4 ,prejudice is confirmed4 ,rules formed accidentally or under the pressure of conditions long past1 are protected from criticism and thus perpetuated4 ,every group and person vested with authority strengthens possessed power by harping upon the sacredness of immutable principle4 ,moral facts1 that is the concrete careers of special courses of action1 are not studied4 ,there is no counterpart to clinical medicine4 ,rigid classifications forced upon facts are relied upon4 ,and all is done1 as it used to be done in natural science1 in praise of ,reason and in fear of the variety and fluctuation of actual happenings4 ,the hypothesis that each moral situation is unique and that consequently general moral principles are instrumental to developing the individualized meaning of situations is declared to be anarchic4 ,it is said to be ethical atomism1 pulverizing the order and dignity of morals4 ,the question1 again is not what our inherited habits lead us to prefer1 but where the facts take us4 ,but in this instance the facts do not take us into atomism and anarchy4 ,these things are specters seen by the critic when he is suddenly confused by the loss of customary spectacles4 ,he takes his own confusion due to loss of artificial aids for an objective situation4 ,because situations in which deliberation is evoked are new1 and therefore unique1 general principles are needed4 ,only an uncritical vagueness will assume that the sole alternative to fixed generality is absence of continuity4 ,rigid habits insist upon duplication1 repetition1 recurrence2 in their case there is accordingly fixed principles4 ,only there is no principle at all1 that is1 no conscious intellectual rule1 for thought is not needed4 ,but all habit has continuity1 and while a flexible habit does not secure in its operation bare recurrence nor absolute assurance neither does it plunge us into the hopeless confusion of the absolutely different4 ,to insist upon change and the new is to insist upon alteration of the old4 ,in denying that the meaning of any genuine case of deliberation can be exhausted by treating it as a mere case of an established classification the value of classification is not denied4 ,it is shown where its value lies1 namely1 in directing attention to resemblances and differences in the new case1 in economizing effort in foresight4 ,to call a generalization a tool is not to say it is useless2 the contrary is patently the case4 ,a tool is something to use4 ,hence it is also something to be improved by noting how it works4 ,the need of such noting and improving is indispensable if1 as is the case with moral principles1 the tool has to be used in unwonted circumstances4 ,continuity of growth not atomism is thus the alternative to fixity of principles and aims4 ,this is no ,bergsonian plea for dividing the universe into two portions1 one all of fixed1 recurrent habits1 and the other all spontaneity of flux4 ,only in such a universe would reason in morals have to take its choice between absolute fixity and absolute looseness4 ,nothing is more instructive about the genuine value of generalization in conduct than the errors of ,kant4 ,he took the doctrine that the essence of reason is complete universality 7and hence necessity and immutability71 with the seriousness becoming the professor of logic4 ,applying the doctrine to morality he saw that this conception severed morals from connection with experience4 ,other moralists had gone that far before his day4 ,but none of them had done what ,kant proceeded to do3 carry this separation of moral principles and ideals from experience to its logical conclusion4 ,he saw that to exclude from principles all connection with empirical details meant to exclude all reference of any kind to consequences4 ,he then saw with a clearness which does his logic credit that with such exclusion1 reason becomes entirely empty3 nothing is left except the universality of the universal4 ,he was then confronted by the seemingly insoluble problem of getting moral instruction regarding special cases out of a principle that having forsworn intercourse with experience was barren and empty4 ,his ingenious method was as follows4 ,formal universality means at least logical identity2 it means self-consistency or absence of contradiction4 ,hence follows the method by which a would-be truly moral agent will proceed in judging the rightness of any proposed act4 ,he will ask3 ,can its motive be made universal for all cases8 ,how would one like it if by one's act one's motive in that act were to be erected into a universal law of actual nature8 ,would one then be willing to make the same choice8 ,surely a man would hesitate to steal if by his choice to make stealing the motive of his act he were also to erect it into such a fixed law of nature that henceforth he and everybody else would always steal whenever property was in question4 ,no stealing without property1 and with universal stealing also no property2 a clear self-contradiction4 ,looked at in the light of reason every mean1 insincere1 inconsiderate motive of action shrivels into a private exception which a person wants to take advantage of in his own favor1 and which he would be horrified to have others act upon4 ,it violates the great principle of logic that ,a is ,a4 ,kindly1 decent acts1 on the contrary1 extend and multiply themselves in a continuing harmony4 ,this treatment by ,kant evinces deep insight into the office of intelligence and principle in conduct4 ,but it involves flat contradiction of ,kant's own original intention to exclude consideration of concrete consequences4 ,it turns out to be a method of recommending a broad impartial view of consequences4 ,our forecast of consequences is always subject1 as we have noted1 to the bias of impulse and habit4 ,we see what we want to see1 we obscure what is unfavorable to a cherished1 probably unavowed1 wish4 ,we dwell upon favoring circumstances till they become weighted with reinforcing considerations4 ,we don't give opposing consequences half a chance to develop in thought4 ,deliberation needs every possible help it can get against the twisting1 exaggerating and slighting tendency of passion and habit4 ,to form the habit of asking how we should be willing to be treated in a similar case--which is what ,kant's maxim amounts to--is to gain an ally for impartial and sincere deliberation and judgment4 ,it is a safeguard against our tendency to regard our own case as exceptional in comparison with the case of others4 ,just this once1 a plea for isolation2 secrecy--a plea for non-inspection1 are forces which operate in every passionate desire4 ,demand for consistency1 for universality1 far from implying a rejection of all consequences1 is a demand to survey consequences broadly1 to link effect to effect in a chain of continuity4 ,whatever force works to this end is reason4 ,for reason1 let it be repeated is an outcome1 a function1 not a primitive force4 ,what we need are those habits1 dispositions which lead to impartial and consistent foresight of consequences4 ,then our judgments are reasonable2 we are then reasonable creatures4 ,,viii ,certain critics in sympathy with at least the negative contention1 the critical side1 of such a theory as has been advanced1 regard it as placing too much emphasis upon intelligence4 ,they find it intellectualistic1 cold-blooded4 ,they say we must change desire1 love1 aspiration1 admiration1 and then action will be transformed4 ,a new affection1 a changed appreciation1 brings with it a revaluation of life and insists upon its realization4 ,a refinement of intellect at most only figures out better ways of reaching old and accustomed ends4 ,in fact we are lucky if intellect does not freeze the ardor of generous desire and paralyze creative endeavor4 ,intellect is critical1 unproductive while desire is generative4 ,in its dispassionateness intellect is aloof from humanity and its needs4 ,it fosters detachment where sympathy is needed4 ,it cultivates contemplation when salvation lies in liberating desire4 ,intellect is analytic1 taking things to pieces2 its devices are the scalpel and test-tube4 ,affection is synthetic1 unifying4 ,this argument affords an opportunity for making more explicit those respective offices of wish and thought in forming ends which have already been touched upon4 ,first we must undertake an independent analysis of desire4 ,it is customary to describe desires in terms of their objects1 meaning by objects the things which figure as in imagination their goals4 ,as the object is noble or base1 so1 it is thought1 is desire4 ,in any case1 emotions rise and cluster about the object4 ,this stands out so conspicuously in immediate experience that it monopolizes the central position in the traditional psychological theory of desire4 ,barring gross self-deception or the frustration of external circumstance1 the outcome1 or end-result1 of desire is regarded by this theory as similar to the end-in-view or object consciously desired4 ,such1 however1 is not the case1 as readily appears from the analysis of deliberation4 ,in saying that the actual outcome of desire is different in kind from the object upon which desire consciously fastens1 ,i do not mean to repeat the old complaint about the fallibility and feebleness of mortals in virtue of which man's hopes are frustrated and twisted in realization4 ,the difference is one of diverse dimensions1 not of degree or amount4 ,the object desired and the attainment of desire are no more alike than a signboard on the road is like the garage to which it points and which it recommends to the traveler4 ,desire is the forward urge of living creatures4 ,when the push and drive of life meets no obstacle1 there is nothing which we call desire4 ,there is just life-activity4 ,but obstructions present themselves1 and activity is dispersed and divided4 ,desire is the outcome4 ,it is activity surging forward to break through what dams it up4 ,the object which then presents itself in thought as the goal of desire is the object of the environment which1 if it were present1 would secure a re-unification of activity and the restoration of its ongoing unity4 ,the end-in-view of desire is that object which were it present would link into an organized whole activities which are now partial and competing4 ,it is no more like the actual end of desire1 or the resulting state attained1 than the coupling of cars which have been separated is like an ongoing single train4 ,yet the train cannot go on without the coupling4 ,such statements may seem contrary to common sense4 ,the pertinency of the illustration used will be denied4 ,no man desires the signboard which he sees1 he desires the garage1 the objective1 the ulterior thing4 ,but does he8 ,or is the garage simply a means by which a divided body of activities is redintegrated or coordinated8 ,is it desired in any sense for itself1 or only because it is the means of effective adjustment of a whole set of underlying habits8 ,while common sense responds to the ordinary statement of the end of desire1 it also responds to a statement that no one desires the object for its own sake1 but only for what can be got out of it4 ,here is just the point at which the theory that pleasure is the real objective of desire makes its appeal4 ,it points out that not the physical object nor even its possession is really wanted2 that they are only means to something personal and experiential4 ,and hence it is argued that they are means to pleasure4 ,the present hypothesis offers an alternative3 it says that they are means of removal of obstructions to an ongoing1 unified system of activities4 ,it is easy to see why an objective looms so large and why emotional surge and stress gather about it and lift it high above the floor of consciousness4 ,the objective is 7or is taken to be7 the key to the situation4 ,if we can attain it1 lay hold of it1 the trick is turned4 ,it is like the piece of paper which carries the reprieve a condemned man waits for4 ,issues of life hang upon it4 ,the desired object is in no sense the end or goal of desire1 but it is the sine qua non of that end4 ,a practical man will fix his attention upon it1 and not dream about eventualities which are only dreams if the objective is not attained1 but which will follow in their own natural course if it is reached4 ,for then it becomes a factor in the system of activities4 ,hence the truth in the various so-called paradoxes of desire4 ,if pleasure or perfection were the true end of desire1 it would still be true that the way to attainment is not to think of them4 ,for object thought of and object achieved exist in different dimensions4 ,in addition to the popular notions that either the object in view or else pleasure is the end of desire1 there is a less popular theory that quiescence is the actual outcome or true terminal of desire4 ,the theory finds its most complete practical statement in ,buddhism4 ,it is nearer the psychological truth than either of the other notions4 ,but it views the attained outcome simply in its negative aspect4 ,the end reached quiets the clash and removes the discomfort attendant upon divided and obstructed activity4 ,the uneasiness1 unrest1 characteristic of desire is put to sleep4 ,for this reason1 some persons resort to intoxicants and anodynes4 ,if quiescence were the end and it could be perpetuated1 this way of removing disagreeable uneasiness would be as satisfactory a way out as the way of objective effort4 ,but in fact desire satisfied does not bring quiescence unqualifiedly1 but that kind of quiescence which marks the recovery of unified activity3 the absence of internal strife among habits and instincts4 ,equilibration of activities rather than quiescence is the actual result of satisfied desire4 ,this names the outcome positively1 rather than comparatively and negatively4 ,this disparity of dimensions in desire between the object thought of and the outcome reached is the explanation of those self-deceptions which psycho-analysis has brought home to us so forcibly1 but of which it gives elaborately cumbrous accounts4 ,the object thought of and the outcome never agree4 ,there is no self-deceit in this fact4 ,what1 then1 really happens when the actual outcome of satisfied revenge figures in thought as virtuous eagerness for justice8 ,or when the tickled vanity of social admiration is masked as pure love of learning8 ,the trouble lies in the refusal of a person to note the quality of the outcome1 not in the unavoidable disparity of desire's object and the outcome4 ,the honest or integral mind attends to the result1 and sees what it really is4 ,for no terminal condition is exclusively terminal4 ,since it exists in time it has consequences as well as antecedents4 ,in being a consummation it is also a force having causal potentialities4 ,it is initial as well as terminal4 ,self-deception originates in looking at an outcome in one direction only--as a satisfaction of what has gone before1 ignoring the fact that what is attained is a state of habits which will continue in action and which will determine future results4 ,outcomes of desire are also beginnings of new acts and hence are portentous4 ,satisfied revenge may feel like justice vindicated2 the prestige of learning may feel like an enlargement and rectification of an objective outlook4 ,but since different instincts and habits have entered into them1 they are actually1 that is dynamically1 unlike4 ,the function of moral judgment is to detect this unlikeness4 ,here1 again1 the belief that we can know ourselves immediately is as disastrous to moral science as the corresponding idea regarding knowledge of nature was to physical science4 ,obnoxious subjectivity of moral judgment is due to the fact that the immediate or esthetic quality swells and swells and displaces the thought of the active potency which gives activity its moral quality4 ,we are all natural ,jack ,horners4 ,if the plum comes when we put in and pull out our thumb we attribute the satisfactory result to personal virtue4 ,the plum is obtained1 and it is not easy to distinguish obtaining from attaining1 acquisition from achieving4 ,jack ,horner1 ,esq41 put forth some effort2 and results and efforts are always more or less incommensurate4 ,for the result is always dependent to some extent upon the favor or disfavor of circumstance4 ,why then should not the satisfactory plum shed its halo retrospectively upon what precedes and be taken as a sign of virtue8 ,in this way heroes and leaders are constructed4 ,such is the worship of success4 ,and the evil of success-worship is precisely the evil with which we have been dealing4 ,success is never merely final or terminal4 ,something else succeeds it1 and its successors are influenced by its nature1 that is by the persisting habits and impulses that enter into it4 ,the world does not stop when the successful person pulls out his plum2 nor does he stop1 and the kind of success he obtains1 and his attitude toward it1 is a factor in what comes afterwards4 ,by a strange turn of the wheel1 the success of the ultra-practical man is psychologically like the refined enjoyment of the ultra-esthetic person4 ,both ignore the eventualities with which every state of experience is charged4 ,there is no reason for not enjoying the present1 but there is every reason for examination of the objective factors of what is enjoyed before we translate enjoyment into a belief in excellence4 ,there is every reason in other words for cultivating another enjoyment1 that of the habit of examining the productive potentialities of the objects enjoyed4 ,analysis of desire thus reveals the falsity of theories which magnify it at the expense of intelligence4 ,impulse is primary and intelligence is secondary and in some sense derivative4 ,there should be no blinking of this fact4 ,but recognition of it as a fact exalts intelligence4 ,for thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding4 ,impulse does not know what it is after2 it cannot give orders1 not even if it wants to4 ,it rushes blindly into any opening it chances to find4 ,anything that expends it1 satisfies it4 ,one outlet is like another to it4 ,it is indiscriminate4 ,its vagaries and excesses are the stock theme of classical moralists2 and while they point the wrong moral in urging the abdication of impulse in favor of reason1 their characterization of impulse is not wholly wrong4 ,what intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator4 ,and this can be accomplished only by a study of the conditions and causes1 the workings and consequences of the greatest possible variety of desires and combinations of desire4 ,intelligence converts desire into plans1 systematic plans based on assembling facts1 reporting events as they happen1 keeping tab on them and analyzing them4 ,nothing is so easy to fool as impulse and no one is deceived so readily as a person under strong emotion4 ,hence the idealism of man is easily brought to naught4 ,generous impulses are aroused2 there is a vague anticipation1 a burning hope1 of a marvelous future4 ,old things are to pass speedily away and a new heavens and earth are to come into existence4 ,but impulse burns itself up4 ,emotion cannot be kept at its full tide4 ,obstacles are encountered upon which action dashes itself into ineffectual spray4 ,or if it achieves1 by luck1 a transitory success1 it is intoxicated1 and plumes itself on victory while it is on the road to sudden defeat4 ,meantime1 other men1 not carried away by impulse1 use established habits and a shrewd cold intellect that manipulates them4 ,the outcome is the victory of baser desire directed by insight and cunning over generous desire which does not know its way4 ,the realistic man of the world has evolved a regular technique for dealing with idealistic outbursts that threaten his supremacy4 ,his aims are low1 but he knows the means by which they are to be executed4 ,his knowledge of conditions is narrow but it is effective within its confines4 ,his foresight is limited to results that concern personal success1 but is sharp1 clearcut4 ,he has no great difficulty in drafting the idealistic desire of others with its vague enthusiasms and its cloudy perceptions into canals where it will serve his own purposes4 ,the energies excited by emotional idealism run into the materialistic reservoirs provided by the contriving thought of those who have not surrendered their minds to their sentiment4 ,the glorification of affection and aspiration at the expense of thought is a survival of romantic optimism4 ,it assumes a pre-established harmony between natural impulse and natural objects4 ,only such a harmony justifies the belief that generous feeling will find its way illuminated by the sheer nobility of its own quality4 ,persons of a literary turn of mind are as subject to this fallacy as intellectual specialists are apt to the contrary fallacy that theorizing apart from force of impulse and habit will get affairs forward4 ,they tend to fancy that things are as pliant to imagination as are words1 that an emotion can compose affairs as if they were materials for a lyric poem4 ,but if the objects of the environment were only as plastic as the materials of poetic art1 men would never have been obliged to have recourse to creation in the medium of words4 ,we idealize in fancy because our idealizations in fact are balked4 ,and while the latter must start with imaginative idealizations instigated by release of generous impulse1 they can be carried through only when the hard labor of observation1 memory and foresight weds the vision of imagination to the organized efficiencies of habit4 ,sometimes desire means not bare impulse but impulse which has sense of an objective4 ,in this case desire and thought cannot be opposed1 for desire includes thought within itself4 ,the question is now how far the work of thought has been done1 how adequate is its perception of its directing object4 ,for the moving force may be a shadowy presentiment constructed by wishful hope rather than by study of conditions2 it may be an emotional indulgence rather than a solid plan built upon the rocks of actuality discovered by accurate inquiries4 ,there is no thought without the impeding of impulse4 ,but the obstruction may merely intensify its blind surge forward2 or it may divert the force of forward impulse into observation of existing conditions and forecast of their future consequences4 ,this long way around is the short way home for desire4 ,no issue of morals is more far-reaching than the one herewith sketched4 ,historically speaking1 there is point in the attacks of those who speak slightingly of science and intellect1 and who would limit their moral significance to supplying incidental help to execution of purposes born of affection4 ,thought too often is specialized in a remote and separate pursuit1 or employed in a hard way to contrive the instrumentalities of success4 ,intellect is too often made a tool for a systematized apology for things as they are1 that is for customs that benefit the class in power1 or else a road to an interesting occupation which accumulates facts and ideas as other men gather dollars1 while priding itself on its ideal quality4 ,no wonder that at times catastrophes that affect men in common are welcomed4 ,for the moment they turn science away from its abstract technicalities into a servant of some human aspiration2 the hard1 chilly calculations of intellect are swept away by floods of sympathy and common loyalties4 ,but1 alas1 emotion without thought is unstable4 ,it rises like the tide and subsides like the tide irrespective of what it has accomplished4 ,it is easily diverted into any side channel dug by old habits or provided by cool cunning1 or it disperses itself aimlessly4 ,then comes the reaction of disillusionment1 and men turn all the more fiercely to the pursuit of narrow ends where they are habituated to use observation and planning and where they have acquired some control of conditions4 ,the separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy4 ,this division is perpetuated by those who deprecate science and foresight in behalf of affection as it is by those who in the name of an idol labeled reason would quench passion4 ,the intellect is always inspired by some impulse4 ,even the most case-hardened scientific specialist1 the most abstract philosopher1 is moved by some passion4 ,but an actuating impulse easily hardens into isolated habit4 ,it is unavowed and disconnected4 ,the remedy is not lapse of thought1 but its quickening and extension to contemplate the continuities of existence1 and restore the connection of the isolated desire to the companionship of its fellows4 ,the glorification of will apart from thought turns out either a commitment to blind action which serves the purpose of those who guide their deeds by narrow plans1 or else a sentimental1 romantic faith in the harmonies of nature leading straight to disaster4 ,in words at least1 the association of idealism with emotion and impulse has been repeatedly implied in the foregoing4 ,the connection is more than verbal4 ,every end that man holds up1 every project he entertains is ideal4 ,it marks something wanted1 rather than something existing4 ,it is wanted because existence as it now is does not furnish it4 ,it carries with itself1 then1 a sense of contrast to the achieved1 to the existent4 ,it outruns the seen and touched4 ,it is the work of faith and hope even when it is the plan of the most hard-headed practical man4 ,but though ideal in this sense it is not an ideal4 ,common sense revolts at calling every project1 every design1 every contrivance of cunning1 ideal1 because common sense includes above all in its conception of the ideal the quality of the plan proposed4 ,idealistic revolt is blind and like every blind reaction sweeps us away4 ,the quality of the ideal is exalted till it is something beyond all possibility of definite plan and execution4 ,its sublimity renders it inaccessibly remote4 ,an ideal becomes a synonym for whatever is inspiring--and impossible4 ,then1 since intelligence cannot be wholly suppressed1 the ideal is hardened by thought into some high1 far-away object4 ,it is so elevated and so distant that it does not belong to this world or to experience4 ,it is in technical language1 transcendental2 in common speech1 supernatural1 of heaven not of earth4 ,the ideal is then a goal of final exhaustive1 comprehensive perfection which can be defined only by complete contrast with the actual4 ,although impossible of realization and of conception1 it is still regarded as the source of all generous discontent with actualities and of all inspiration to progress4 ,this notion of the nature and office of ideals combines in one contradictory whole all that is vicious in the separation of desire and thought4 ,it strives while retaining the vagueness of emotion to simulate the objective definiteness of thought4 ,it follows the natural course of intelligence in demanding an object which will unify and fulfil desire1 and then cancels the work of thought by treating the object as ineffable and unrelated to present action and experience4 ,it converts the surge of present impulse into a future end only to swamp the endeavor to clarify this end in a gush of unconsidered feeling4 ,it is supposed that the thought of the ideal is necessary to arouse dissatisfaction with the present and to arouse effort to change it4 ,but in reality the ideal is itself the product of discontent with conditions4 ,instead however of serving to organize and direct effort1 it operates as a compensatory dream4 ,it becomes another ready-made world4 ,instead of promoting effort at concrete transformations of what exists1 it constitutes another kind of existence already somewhere in being4 ,it is a refuge1 an asylum from effort4 ,thus the energy that might be spent in transforming present ills goes into oscillating flights into a far away perfect world and the tedium of enforced returns into the necessities of the present evil world4 ,we can recover the genuine import of ideals and idealism only by disentangling this unreal mixture of thought and emotion4 ,the action of deliberation1 as we have seen1 consists in selecting some foreseen consequence to serve as a stimulus to present action4 ,it brings future possibilities into the present scene and thereby frees and expands present tendencies4 ,but the selected consequence is set in an indefinite context of other consequences just as real as it is1 and many of them much more certain in fact4 ,the ends that are foreseen and utilized mark out a little island in an infinite sea4 ,this limitation would be fatal were the proper function of ends anything else than to liberate and guide present action out of its perplexities and confusions4 ,but this service constitutes the sole meaning of aims and purposes4 ,hence their slight extent in comparison with ignored and unforeseen consequences is of no import in itself4 ,the ideal as it stands in popular thought1 the notion of a complete and exhaustive realization1 is remote from the true functions of ends1 and would only embarrass us if it could be embraced in thought instead of being1 as it is1 a comment by the emotions4 ,for the sense of an indefinite context of consequences from among which the aim is selected enters into the present meaning of activity4 ,the end is the figured pattern at the center of the field through which runs the axis of conduct4 ,about this central figuration extends infinitely a supporting background in a vague whole1 undefined and undiscriminated4 ,at most intelligence but throws a spotlight on that little part of the whole which marks out the axis of movement4 ,even if the light is flickering and the illuminated portion stands forth only dimly from the shadowy background1 it suffices if we are shown the way to move4 ,to the rest of the consequences1 collateral and remote1 corresponds a background of feeling1 of diffused emotion4 ,this forms the stuff of the ideal4 ,from the standpoint of its definite aim any act is petty in comparison with the totality of natural events4 ,what is accomplished directly as the outcome of a turn which our action gives the course of events is infinitesimal in comparison with their total sweep4 ,only an illusion of conceit persuades us that cosmic difference hangs upon even our wisest and most strenuous effort4 ,yet discontent with this limitation is as unreasonable as relying upon an illusion of external importance to keep ourselves going4 ,in a genuine sense every act is already possessed of infinite import4 ,the little part of the scheme of affairs which is modifiable by our efforts is continuous with the rest of the world4 ,the boundaries of our garden plot join it to the world of our neighbors and our neighbors' neighbors4 ,that small effort which we can put forth is in turn connected with an infinity of events that sustain and support it4 ,the consciousness of this encompassing infinity of connections is ideal4 ,when a sense of the infinite reach of an act physically occurring in a small point of space and occupying a petty instant of times comes home to us1 the meaning of a present act is seen to be vast1 immeasurable1 unthinkable4 ,this ideal is not a goal to be attained4 ,it is a significance to be felt1 appreciated4 ,though consciousness of it cannot become intellectualized 7identified in objects of a distinct character7 yet emotional appreciation of it is won only by those willing to think4 ,it is the office of art and religion to evoke such appreciations and intimations2 to enhance and steady them till they are wrought into the texture of our lives4 ,some philosophers define religious consciousness as beginning where moral and intellectual consciousness leave off4 ,in the sense that definite purposes and methods shade off of necessity into a vast whole which is incapable of objective presentation this view is correct4 ,but they have falsified the conception by treating the religious consciousness as something that comes after an experience in which striving1 resolution and foresight are found4 ,to them morality and science are a striving2 when striving ceases a moral holiday begins1 an excursion beyond the utmost flight of legitimate thought and endeavor4 ,but there is a point in every intelligent activity where effort ceases2 where thought and doing fall back upon a course of events which effort and reflection cannot touch4 ,there is a point in deliberate action where definite thought fades into the ineffable and undefinable--into emotion4 ,if the sense of this effortless and unfathomable whole comes only in alternation with the sense of strain in action and labor in thought1 then we spend our lives in oscillating between what is cramped and enforced and a brief transitory escape4 ,the function of religion is then caricatured rather than realized4 ,morals1 like war1 is thought of as hell1 and religion1 like peace1 as a respite4 ,the religious experience is a reality in so far as in the midst of effort to foresee and regulate future objects we are sustained and expanded in feebleness and failure by the sense of an enveloping whole4 ,peace in action not after it is the contribution of the ideal to conduct4 ,,ix ,over and over again1 one point has recurred for criticism2--the subordination of activity to a result outside itself4 ,whether that goal be thought of as pleasure1 as virtue1 as perfection1 as final enjoyment of salvation1 is secondary to the fact that the moralists who have asserted fixed ends have in all their differences from one another agreed in the basic idea that present activity is but a means4 ,we have insisted that happiness1 reasonableness1 virtue1 perfecting1 are on the contrary parts of the present significance of present action4 ,memory of the past1 observation of the present1 foresight of the future are indispensable4 ,but they are indispensable to a present liberation1 an enriching growth of action4 ,happiness is fundamental in morals only because happiness is not something to be sought for1 but is something now attained1 even in the midst of pain and trouble1 whenever recognition of our ties with nature and with fellow-men releases and informs our action4 ,reasonableness is a necessity because it is the perception of the continuities that take action out of its immediateness and isolation into connection with the past and future4 ,perhaps the criticism and insistence have been too incessant4 ,they may have provoked the reader to reaction4 ,he may readily concede that orthodox theories have been onesided in sacrificing the present to future good1 making of the present but an onerous obligation or a sacrifice endured for future gain4 ,but why1 he may protest1 go to an opposite extreme and make the future but a means to the significance of the present8 ,why should the power of foresight and effort to shape the future1 to regulate what is to happen1 be slighted8 ,is not the effect of such a doctrine to weaken putting forth of endeavor in order to make the future better than the present8 ,control of the future may be limited in extent1 but it is correspondingly precious2 we should jealously cherish whatever encourages and sustains effort to that end4 ,to make little of this possibility1 in effect1 it will be argued1 is to decrease the care and endeavor upon which progress depends4 ,control of the future is indeed precious in exact proportion to its difficulty1 its moderate degree of attainability4 ,anything that actually tends to make that control less than it now is would be a movement backward into sloth and triviality4 ,but there is a difference between future improvement as a result and as a direct aim4 ,to make it an aim is to throw away the surest means of attaining it1 namely attention to the full use of present resources in the present situation4 ,forecast of future conditions1 scientific study of past and present in order that the forecast may be intelligent1 are indeed necessities4 ,concentration of intellectual concern upon the future1 solicitude for scope and precision of estimate characteristic of any well conducted affair1 naturally give the impression that their animating purpose is control of the future4 ,but thought about future happenings is the only way we can judge the present2 it is the only way to appraise its significance4 ,without such projection1 there can be no projects1 no plans for administering present energies1 overcoming present obstacles4 ,deliberately to subordinate the present to the future is to subject the comparatively secure to the precarious1 exchange resources for liabilities1 surrender what is under control to what is1 relatively1 incapable of control4 ,the amount of control which will come into existence in the future is not within control4 ,but such an amount as turns out to be practicable accrues only in consequence of the best possible management of present means and obstacles4 ,dominating intellectual pre-occupation with the future is the way by which efficiency in dealing with the present is attained4 ,it is a way1 not a goal4 ,and1 upon the very most hopeful outlook1 study and planning are more important in the meaning1 the enrichment of content1 which they add to present activity than is the increase of external control they effect4 ,nor is this doctrine passivistic in tendency4 ,what sense is there in increased external control except to increase the intrinsic significance of living8 ,the future that is foreseen is a future that is sometime to be a present4 ,is the value of that present also to be postponed to a future date1 and so on indefinitely8 ,or1 if the good we are struggling to attain in the future is one to be actually realized when that future becomes present1 why should not the good of this present be equally precious8 ,and is there1 again1 any intelligent way of modifying the future except to attend to the full possibilities of the present8 ,scamping the present in behalf of the future leads only to rendering the future less manageable4 ,it increases the probability of molestation by future events4 ,remarks cast in this form probably seem too much like a logical manipulation of the concepts of present and future to be convincing4 ,building a house is a typical instance of an intelligent activity4 ,it is an activity directed by a plan1 a design4 ,the plan is itself based upon a foresight of future uses4 ,this foresight is in turn dependent upon an organized survey of past experiences and of present conditions1 a recollection of former experiences of living in houses and an acquaintance with present materials1 prices1 resources1 etc4 ,now if a legitimate case of subordination of present to regulation of the future may anywhere be found1 it is in such a case as this4 ,for a man usually builds a house for the sake of the comfort and security1 the control1 thereby afforded to future living rather than just for the fun--or the trouble--of building4 ,if in such a case inspection shows that1 after all1 intellectual concern with the past and future is for the sake of directing present activity and giving it meaning1 the conclusion may be accepted for other cases4 ,note that the present activity is the only one really under control4 ,the man may die before the house is built1 or his financial conditions may change1 or he may need to remove to another place4 ,if he attempts to provide for all contingencies1 he will never do anything2 if he allows his attention to be much distracted by them1 he won't do well his present planning and execution4 ,the more he considers the future uses to which the house will probably be put the better he will do his present job which is the activity of building4 ,control of future living1 such as it may turn out to be1 is wholly dependent upon taking his present activity1 seriously and devotedly1 as an end1 not a means4 ,and a man has his hands full in doing well what now needs to be done4 ,until men have formed the habit of using intelligence fully as a guide to present action they will never find out how much control of future contingencies is possible4 ,as things are1 men so habitually scamp present action in behalf of future ends that the facts for estimating the extent of the possibility of reduction of future contingencies have not been disclosed4 ,what a man is doing limits both his direct control and his responsibility4 ,we must not confuse the act of building with the house when built4 ,the latter is a means1 not a fulfilment4 ,but it is such only because it enters into a new activity which is present not future4 ,life is continuous4 ,the act of building in time gives way to the acts connected with a domicile4 ,but everywhere the good1 the fulfilment1 the meaning of activity1 resides in a present made possible by judging existing conditions in their connections4 ,if we seek for an illustration on a larger scale1 education furnishes us with a poignant example4 ,as traditionally conducted1 it strikingly exhibits a subordination of the living present to a remote and precarious future4 ,to prepare1 to get ready1 is its key-note4 ,the actual outcome is lack of adequate preparation1 of intelligent adaptation4 ,the professed exaltation of the future turns out in practice a blind following of tradition1 a rule of thumb muddling along from day to day2 or1 as in some of the projects called industrial education1 a determined effort on the part of one class of the community to secure its future at the expense of another class4 ,if education were conducted as a process of fullest utilization of present resources1 liberating and guiding capacities that are now urgent1 it goes without saying that the lives of the young would be much richer in meaning than they are now4 ,it also follows that intelligence would be kept busy in studying all indications of power1 all obstacles and perversions1 all products of the past that throw light upon present capacity1 and in forecasting the future career of impulse and habit now active--not for the sake of subordinating the latter but in order to treat them intelligently4 ,as a consequence whatever fortification and expansion of the future that is possible will be achieved--as it is now dismally unattained4 ,a more complicated instance is found in the dominant quality of our industrial activity4 ,it may be dogmatically declared that the roots of its evils are found in the separation of production from consumption--that is1 actual consummation1 fulfilment4 ,a normal case of their relationship is found in the taking of food4 ,food is consumed and vigor is produced4 ,the difference between the two is one of directions or dimensions distinguished by intellect4 ,in reality there is simply conversion of energy from one form to another wherein it is more available--of greater significance4 ,the activity of the artist1 the sportsman1 the scientific inquirer exemplifies the same balance4 ,activity should be productive4 ,this is to say it should have a bearing on the future1 should effect control of it4 ,but so far as a productive action is intrinsically creative1 it has its own intrinsic value4 ,reference to future products and future enjoyments is but a way of enhancing perception of an immanent meaning4 ,a skilled artisan who enjoys his work is aware that what he is making is made for future use4 ,externally his action is one technically labeled production4 ,it seems to illustrate the subjection of present activity to remote ends4 ,but actually1 morally1 psychologically1 the sense of the utility of the article produced is a factor in the present significance of action due to the present utilization of abilities1 giving play to taste and skill1 accomplishing something now4 ,the moment production is severed from immediate satisfaction1 it becomes labor1 drudgery1 a task reluctantly performed4 ,yet the whole tendency of modern economic life has been to assume that consumption will take care of itself provided only production is grossly and intensely attended to4 ,making things is frantically accelerated2 and every mechanical device used to swell the senseless bulk4 ,as a result most workers find no replenishment1 no renewal and growth of mind1 no fulfilment in work4 ,they labor to get mere means of later satisfaction4 ,this when procured is isolated in turn from production and is reduced to a barren physical affair or a sensuous compensation for normal goods denied4 ,meantime the fatuity of severing production from consumption1 from present enriching of life1 is made evident by economic crises1 by periods of unemployment alternating with periods of exercise1 work or over-production4 ,production apart from fulfilment becomes purely a matter of quantity2 for distinction1 quality1 is a matter of present meaning4 ,esthetic elements being excluded1 the mechanical reign4 ,production lacks criteria2 one thing is better than another if it can be made faster or in greater mass4 ,leisure is not the nourishment of mind in work1 nor a recreation2 it is a feverish hurry for diversion1 excitement1 display1 otherwise there is no leisure except a sodden torpor4 ,fatigue due for some to monotony and for others to overstrain in maintaining the pace is inevitable4 ,socially1 the separation of production and consumption1 means and ends1 is the root of the most profound division of classes4 ,those who fix the ends for production are in control1 those who engage in isolated productive activity are the subject-class4 ,but if the latter are oppressed the former are not truly free4 ,their consumptions are accidental ostentation and extravagance1 not a normal consummation or fulfilment of activity4 ,the remainder of their lives is spent in enslavement to keeping the machinery going at an increasingly rapid rate4 ,meantime class struggle grows between those whose productive labor is enforced by necessity and those who are privileged consumers4 ,and the exaggeration of production due to its isolation from ignored consumption so hypnotizes attention that even would-be reformers1 like ,marxian socialists1 assert that the entire social problem focuses at the point of production4 ,since this separation of means from ends signifies an erection of means into ends1 it is no wonder that a materialistic conception of history emerges4 ,it is not an invention of ,marx2 it is a record of fact so far as the separation in question obtains4 ,for practicable idealism is found only in a fulfilment1 a consumption which is a replenishing1 growth1 renewal of mind and body4 ,harmony of social interests is found in the wide-spread sharing of activities significant in themselves1 that is to say1 at the point of consumption4#i ,but the forcing of production apart from consumption leads to the monstrous belief that class-struggle civil war is a means of social progress1 instead of a register of the barriers to its attainment4 ,yet here too the ,marxian reads aright the character of most current economic activity4 #i ,acknowledgment is due ,the ,social ,interpretation of ,history by ,maurice ,williams4 ,the history of economic activity thus exemplifies the moral consequences of the separation of present activity and future ends from each other4 ,it also embodies the difficulty of the problem--the tax placed by it upon thought and good will4 ,for the professed idealist and the hard-headed materialist or practical man1 have conspired together to sustain this situation4 ,the idealist sets up as the ideal not fullness of meaning of the present but a remote goal4 ,hence the present is evacuated of meaning4 ,it is reduced to being a mere external instrument1 an evil necessity due to the distance between us and significant valid satisfaction4 ,appreciation1 joy1 peace in present activity are suspect4 ,they are regarded as diversions1 temptations1 unworthy relaxations4 ,then since human nature must have present realization1 a sentimental1 romantic enjoyment of the ideal becomes a substitute for intelligent and rewarding activity4 ,the utopia cannot be realized in fact but it may be appropriated in fantasy and serve as an anodyne to blunt the sense of a misery which after all endures4 ,some private key to a present entering upon remote and superior bliss is sought1 just as the evangelical enjoys a complacent and superior sense of a salvation unobtained by fellow mortals4 ,thus the normal demand for realization1 for satisfaction in the present1 is abnormally met4 ,meantime the practical man wants something definite1 tangible and presumably obtainable for which to work4 ,he is looking after a good thing as the average man is looking after a good time1 that natural caricature of an intrinsically significant activity4 ,yet his activity is impractical4 ,he is looking for satisfaction somewhere else than where it can be found4 ,in his utopian search for a future good he neglects the only place where good can be found4 ,he empties present activity of meaning by making it a mere instrumentality4 ,when the future arrives it is only after all another despised present4 ,by habit as well as by definition it is still a means to something which has yet to come4 ,again human nature must have its claims satisfied1 and sensuality is the inevitable recourse4 ,usually a compromise is worked out1 by which a man for his working-hours accepts the philosophy of activity for some future result1 while at odd leisure times he enters by conventionally recognized channels upon an enjoyment of spiritual blessings and ideal refinements4 ,the problem of serving ,god and ,mammon is thus solved4 ,the situation exemplifies the concrete meaning of the separation of means from ends which is the intellectual reflex of the divorce of theory and practice1 intelligence and habit1 foresight and present impulse4 ,moralists have spent time and energy in showing what happens when appetite1 impulse1 is indulged without reference to consequences and reason4 ,but they have mostly ignored the counterpart evils of an intelligence that conceives ideals and goods which do not enter into present impulse and habit4 ,the life of reason has been specialized1 romanticized1 or made a heavy burden4 ,this situation embodies the import of the problem of actualizing the place of intelligence in conduct4 ,our whole account of the place of intelligence in conduct is exposed however to the charge of being itself romantic1 a compensatory idealization4 ,the history of mind is a record of intellect which registers1 with more or less inaccuracy1 what has happened after it has happened4 ,the crisis in which the intervention of foreseeing and directing mind is needed passes unnoted1 with attention directed toward incidentals and irrelevancies4 ,the work of intellect is post mortem4 ,the rise of social science1 it will be pointed out1 has increased the amount of registering that occurs4 ,social post mortems occur much more frequently than they used to4 ,but one of the things which the unbiased mind will register is the impotency of discussion1 analysis and reporting in modifying the course of events4 ,the latter goes its way unheeding4 ,the reply that this condition of matters shows not the impotency of intelligence but that what passes for science is not science is too easy a retort to be satisfactory4 ,we must have recourse to some concrete facts or surrender our doctrine just at the moment when we have formulated it4 ,technical affairs give evidence that the work of inquiry1 reporting and analysis is not always ineffectual4 ,the development of a chain of nation-wide tobacco shops1 of a well managed national telephone system1 of the extension of the service of an electric-light plant testify to the fact that study1 reflection and the formation of plans do in some instances determine a course of events4 ,the effect is seen in both engineering management and in national commercial expansion4 ,such potency however1 it must be admitted1 is limited to just those matters that are called technical in contrast with the larger affairs of humanity4 ,but if we seek1 as we should1 for a definition of technical1 we can hardly find any save one that goes in a circle3 ,affairs are technical in which observation1 analysis and intellectual organization are determining factors4 ,is the conclusion to be drawn a conviction that our wider social interests are so different from those in which intelligence is a directing factor that in the former science must always remain a belated visitor coming upon the scene after matters are settled8 ,no1 the logical conclusion is that as yet we have no technique in important economic1 political and international affairs4 ,complexity of conditions render the difficulties in the way of the development of a technique enormous4 ,it is imaginable they will never be overcome4 ,but our choice is between the development of a technique by which intelligence will become an intervening partner and a continuation of a regime of accident1 waste and distress4 ,,part ,,four ,,conclusion ,conduct when distributed under heads like habit1 impulse and intelligence gets artificially shredded4 ,in discussing each of these topics we have run into the others4 ,we conclude1 then1 with an attempt to gather together some outstanding considerations about conduct as a whole4 ,i ,the foremost conclusion is that morals has to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter4 ,for wherever they enter a difference between better and worse arises4 ,reflection upon action means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which course is better4 ,the better is the good2 the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good4 ,comparative and superlative degrees are only paths to the positive degree of action4 ,the worse or evil is a rejected good4 ,in deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil4 ,until it is rejected1 it is a competing good4 ,after rejection1 it figures not as a lesser good1 but as the bad of that situation4 ,actually then only deliberate action1 conduct into which reflective choice enters1 is distinctively moral1 for only then does there enter the question of better and worse4 ,yet it is a perilous error to draw a hard and fast line between action into which deliberation and choice enter and activity due to impulse and matter-of-fact habit4 ,one of the consequences of action is to involve us in predicaments where we have to reflect upon things formerly done as matter of course4 ,one of the chief problems of our dealings with others is to induce them to reflect upon affairs which they usually perform from unreflective habit4 ,on the other hand1 every reflective choice tends to relegate some conscious issue into a deed or habit henceforth taken for granted and not thought upon4 ,potentially therefore every and any act is within the scope of morals1 being a candidate for possible judgment with respect to its better-or-worse quality4 ,it thus becomes one of the most perplexing problems of reflection to discover just how far to carry it1 what to bring under examination and what to leave to unscrutinized habit4 ,because there is no final recipe by which to decide this question all moral judgment is experimental and subject to revision by its issue4 ,the recognition that conduct covers every act that is judged with reference to better and worse and that the need of this judgment is potentially coextensive with all portions of conduct1 saves us from the mistake which makes morality a separate department of life4 ,potentially conduct is one hundred per cent of our acts4 ,hence we must decline to admit theories which identify morals with the purification of motives1 edifying character1 pursuing remote and elusive perfection1 obeying supernatural command1 acknowledging the authority of duty4 ,such notions have a dual bad effect4 ,first they get in the way of observation of conditions and consequences4 ,they divert thought into side issues4 ,secondly1 while they confer a morbid exaggerated quality upon things which are viewed under the aspect of morality1 they release the larger part of the acts of life from serious1 that is moral1 survey4 ,anxious solicitude for the few acts which are deemed moral is accompanied by edicts of exemption and baths of immunity for most acts4 ,a moral moratorium prevails for everyday affairs4 ,when we observe that morals is at home wherever considerations of the worse and better are involved1 we are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement4 ,morals means growth of conduct in meaning2 at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct4 ,it is all one with growing4 ,growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought4 ,in the largest sense of the word1 morals is education4 ,it is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action4 ,the good1 satisfaction1 end1 of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control1 and the only one1 accordingly1 for which responsibility exists4 ,the rest is luck1 fortune4 ,and the tragedy of the moral notions most insisted upon by the morally self-conscious is the relegation of the only good which can fully engage thought1 namely present meaning of action1 to the rank of an incident of a remote good1 whether that future good be defined as pleasure1 or perfection1 or salvation1 or attainment of virtuous character4 ,present activity is not a sharp narrow knife-blade in time4 ,the present is complex1 containing within itself a multitude of habits and impulses4 ,it is enduring1 a course of action1 a process including memory1 observation and foresight1 a pressure forward1 a glance backward and a look outward4 ,it is of moral moment because it marks a transition in the direction of breadth and clarity of action or in that of triviality and confusion4 ,progress is present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning1 and retrogression is a present slipping away of significance1 determinations1 grasp4 ,those who hold that progress can be perceived and measured only by reference to a remote goal1 first confuse meaning with space1 and then treat spatial position as absolute1 as limiting movement instead of being bounded in and by movement4 ,there are plenty of negative elements1 due to conflict1 entanglement and obscurity1 in most of the situations of life1 and we do not require a revelation of some supreme perfection to inform us whether or no we are making headway in present rectification4 ,we move on from the worse and into1 not just towards1 the better1 which is authenticated not by comparison with the foreign but in what is indigenous4 ,unless progress is a present reconstructing1 it is nothing2 if it cannot be told by qualities belonging to the movement of transition it can never be judged4 ,men have constructed a strange dream-world when they have supposed that without a fixed ideal of a remote good to inspire them1 they have no inducement to get relief from present troubles1 no desires for liberation from what oppresses and for clearing-up what confuses present action4 ,the world in which we could get enlightenment and instruction about the direction in which we are moving only from a vague conception of an unattainable perfection would be totally unlike our present world4 ,sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof4 ,sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action1 to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony1 monotony into a variegated scene1 and limitation into expansion4 ,the converting is progress1 the only progress conceivable or attainable by man4 ,hence every situation has its own measure and quality of progress1 and the need for progress is recurrent1 constant4 ,if it is better to travel than to arrive1 it is because traveling is a constant arriving1 while arrival that precludes further traveling is most easily attained by going to sleep or dying4 ,we find our clews to direction in the projected recollections of definite experienced goods not in vague anticipations1 even when we label the vagueness perfection1 the ,ideal1 and proceed to manipulate its definition with dry dialectic logic4 ,progress means increase of present meaning1 which involves multiplication of sensed distinctions as well as harmony1 unification4 ,this statement may1 perhaps1 be made generally1 in application to the experience of humanity4 ,if history shows progress it can hardly be found elsewhere than in this complication and extension of the significance found within experience4 ,it is clear that such progress brings no surcease1 no immunity from perplexity and trouble4 ,if we wished to transmute this generalization into a categorical imperative we should say3 ,so act as to increase the meaning of present experience4 ,but even then in order to get instruction about the concrete quality of such increased meaning we should have to run away from the law and study the needs and alternative possibilities lying within a unique and localized situation4 ,the imperative1 like everything absolute1 is sterile4 ,till men give up the search for a general formula of progress they will not know where to look to find it4 ,a business man proceeds by comparing today's liabilities and assets with yesterday's1 and projects plans for tomorrow by a study of the movement thus indicated in conjunction with study of the conditions of the environment now existing4 ,it is not otherwise with the business of living4 ,the future is a projection of the subject-matter of the present1 a projection which is not arbitrary in the extent in which it divines the movement of the moving present4 ,the physician is lost who would guide his activities of healing by building up a picture of perfect health1 the same for all and in its nature complete and self-enclosed once for all4 ,he employs what he has discovered about actual cases of good health and ill health and their causes to investigate the present ailing individual1 so as to further his recovering2 recovering1 an intrinsic and living process rather than recovery1 which is comparative and static4 ,moral theories1 which however have not remained mere theories but which have found their way into the opinions of the common man1 have reversed the situation and made the present subservient to a rigid yet abstract future4 ,the ethical import of the doctrine of evolution is enormous4 ,but its import has been misconstrued because the doctrine has been appropriated by the very traditional notions which in truth it subverts4 ,it has been thought that the doctrine of evolution means the complete subordination of present change to a future goal4 ,it has been constrained to teach a futile dogma of approximation1 instead of a gospel of present growth4 ,the usufruct of the new science has been seized upon by the old tradition of fixed and external ends4 ,in fact evolution means continuity of change2 and the fact that change may take the form of present growth of complexity and interaction4 ,significant stages in change are found not in access of fixity of attainment but in those crises in which a seeming fixity of habits gives way to a release of capacities that have not previously functioned3 in times that is of readjustment and redirection4 ,no matter what the present success in straightening out difficulties and harmonizing conflicts1 it is certain that problems will recur in the future in a new form or on a different plane4 ,indeed every genuine accomplishment instead of winding up an affair and enclosing it as a jewel in a casket for future contemplation1 complicates the practical situation4 ,it effects a new distribution of energies which have henceforth to be employed in ways for which past experience gives no exact instruction4 ,every important satisfaction of an old want creates a new one2 and this new one has to enter upon an experimental adventure to find its satisfaction4 ,from the side of what has gone before achievement settles something4 ,from the side of what comes after1 it complicates1 introducing new problems1 unsettling factors4 ,there is something pitifully juvenile in the idea that evolution1 progress1 means a definite sum of accomplishment which will forever stay done1 and which by an exact amount lessens the amount still to be done1 disposing once and for all of just so many perplexities and advancing us just so far on our road to a final stable and unperplexed goal4 ,yet the typical nineteenth century1 mid-victorian conception of evolution was precisely a formulation of such a consummate juvenilism4 ,if the true ideal is that of a stable condition free from conflict and disturbance1 then there are a number of theories whose claims are superior to those of the popular doctrine of evolution4 ,logic points rather in the direction of ,rousseau and ,tolstoi who would recur to some primitive simplicity1 who would return from complicated and troubled civilization to a state of nature4 ,for certainly progress in civilization has not only meant increase in the scope and intricacy of problems to be dealt with1 but it entails increasing instability4 ,for in multiplying wants1 instruments and possibilities1 it increases the variety of forces which enter into relations with one another and which have to be intelligently directed4 ,or again1 ,stoic indifference or ,buddhist calm have greater claims4 ,for1 it may be argued1 since all objective achievement only complicates the situation1 the victory of a final stability can be secured only by renunciation of desire4 ,since every satisfaction of desire increases force1 and this in turn creates new desires1 withdrawal into an inner passionless state1 indifference to action and attainment1 is the sole road to possession of the eternal1 stable and final reality4 ,again1 from the standpoint of definite approximation to an ultimate goal1 the balance falls heavily on the side of pessimism4 ,the more striving the more attainments1 perhaps2 but also assuredly the more needs and the more disappointments4 ,the more we do and the more we accomplish1 the more the end is vanity and vexation4 ,from the standpoint of attainment of good that stays put1 that constitutes a definite sum performed which lessens the amount of effort required in order to reach the ultimate goal of final good1 progress is an illusion4 ,but we are looking for it in the wrong place4 ,the world war is a bitter commentary on the nineteenth century misconception of moral achievement--a misconception however which it only inherited from the traditional theory of fixed ends1 attempting to bolster up that doctrine with aid from the scientific theory of evolution4 ,the doctrine of progress is not yet bankrupt4 ,the bankruptcy of the notion of fixed goods to be attained and stably possessed may possibly be the means of turning the mind of man to a tenable theory of progress--to attention to present troubles and possibilities4 ,adherents of the idea that betterment1 growth in goodness1 consists in approximation to an exhaustive1 stable1 immutable end or good1 have been compelled to recognize the truth that in fact we envisage the good in specific terms that are relative to existing needs1 and that the attainment of every specific good merges insensibly into a new condition of maladjustment with its need of a new end and a renewed effort4 ,but they have elaborated an ingenious dialectical theory to account for the facts while maintaining their theory intact4 ,the goal1 the ideal1 is infinite2 man is finite1 subject to conditions imposed by space and time4 ,the specific character of the ends which man entertains and of the satisfaction he achieves is due therefore precisely to his empirical and finite nature in its contrast with the infinite and complete character of the true reality1 the end4 ,consequently when man reaches what he had taken to be the destination of his journey he finds that he has only gone a piece on the road4 ,infinite vistas still stretch before him4 ,again he sets his mark a little way further ahead1 and again when he reaches the station set1 he finds the road opening before him in unexpected ways1 and sees new distant objects beckoning him forward4 ,such is the popular doctrine4 ,by some strange perversion this theory passes for moral idealism4 ,an office of inspiration and guidance is attributed to the thought of the goal of ultimate completeness or perfection4 ,as matter of fact1 the idea sincerely held brings discouragement and despair not inspiration or hopefulness4 ,there is something either ludicrous or tragic in the notion that inspiration to continued progress is had in telling man that no matter what he does or what he achieves1 the outcome is negligible in comparison with what he set out to achieve1 that every endeavor he makes is bound to turn out a failure compared with what should be done1 that every attained satisfaction is only forever bound to be only a disappointment4 ,the honest conclusion is pessimism4 ,all is vexation1 and the greater the effort the greater the vexation4 ,but the fact is that it is not the negative aspect of an outcome1 its failure to reach infinity1 which renews courage and hope4 ,positive attainment1 actual enrichment of meaning and powers opens new vistas and sets new tasks1 creates new aims and stimulates new efforts4 ,the facts are not such as to yield unthinking optimism and consolation2 for they render it impossible to rest upon attained goods4 ,new struggles and failures are inevitable4 ,the total scene of action remains as before1 only for us more complex1 and more subtly unstable4 ,but this very situation is a consequence of expansion1 not of failures of power1 and when grasped and admitted it is a challenge to intelligence4 ,instruction in what to do next can never come from an infinite goal1 which for us is bound to be empty4 ,it can be derived only from study of the deficiencies1 irregularities and possibilities of the actual situation4 ,in any case1 however1 arguments about pessimism and optimism based upon considerations regarding fixed attainment of good and evil are mainly literary in quality4 ,man continues to live because he is a living creature not because reason convinces him of the certainty or probability of future satisfactions and achievements4 ,he is instinct with activities that carry him on4 ,individuals here and there cave in1 and most individuals sag1 withdraw and seek refuge at this and that point4 ,but man as man still has the dumb pluck of the animal4 ,he has endurance1 hope1 curiosity1 eagerness1 love of action4 ,these traits belong to him by structure1 not by taking thought4 ,memory of past and foresight of future convert dumbness to some degree of articulateness4 ,they illumine curiosity and steady courage4 ,then when the future arrives with its inevitable disappointments as well as fulfilments1 and with new sources of trouble1 failure loses something of its fatality1 and suffering yields fruit of instruction not of bitterness4 ,humility is more demanded at our moments of triumph than at those of failure4 ,for humility is not a caddish self-depreciation4 ,it is the sense of our slight inability even with our best intelligence and effort to command events2 a sense of our dependence upon forces that go their way without our wish and plan4 ,its purport is not to relax effort but to make us prize every opportunity of present growth4 ,in morals1 the infinitive and the imperative develop from the participle1 present tense4 ,perfection means perfecting1 fulfilment1 fulfilling1 and the good is now or never4 ,idealistic philosophies1 those of ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,spinoza1 like the hypothesis now offered1 have found the good in meanings belonging to a conscious life1 a life of reason1 not in external achievement4 ,like it1 they have exalted the place of intelligence in securing fulfilment of conscious life4 ,these theories have at least not subordinated conscious life to external obedience1 not thought of virtue as something different from excellence of life4 ,but they set up a transcendental meaning and reason1 remote from present experience and opposed to it2 or they insist upon a special form of meaning and consciousness to be attained by peculiar modes of knowledge inaccessible to the common man1 involving not continuous reconstruction of ordinary experience1 but its wholesale reversal4 ,they have treated regeneration1 change of heart1 as wholesale and self-enclosed1 not as continuous4 ,the utilitarians also made good and evil1 right and wrong1 matters of conscious experience4 ,in addition they brought them down to earth1 to everyday experience4 ,they strove to humanize other-worldly goods4 ,but they retained the notion that the good is future1 and hence outside the meaning of present activity4 ,in so far it is sporadic1 exceptional1 subject to accident1 passive1 an enjoyment not a joy1 something hit upon1 not a fulfilling4 ,the future end is for them not so remote from present action as the ,platonic realm of ideals1 or as the ,aristotelian rational thought1 or the ,christian heaven1 or ,spinoza's conception of the universal whole4 ,but still it is separate in principle and in fact from present activity4 ,the next step is to identify the sought for good with the meaning of our impulses and our habits1 and the specific moral good or virtue with learning this meaning1 a learning that takes us back not into an isolated self but out into the open-air world of objects and social ties1 terminating in an increment of present significance4 ,doubtless there are those who will think that we thus escape from remote and external ends only to fall into an ,epicureanism which teaches us to subordinate everything else to present satisfactions4 ,the hypothesis preferred may seem to some to advise a subjective1 self-centered life of intensified consciousness1 an esthetically dilettante type of egoism4 ,for is not its lesson that we should concentrate attention1 each upon the consciousness accompanying his action so as to refine and develop it8 ,is not this1 like all subjective morals1 an anti-social doctrine1 instructing us to subordinate the objective consequences of our acts1 those which promote the welfare of others1 to an enrichment of our private conscious lives8 ,it can hardly be denied that as compared with the dogmas against which it reacted there is an element of truth in ,epicureanism4 ,it strove to center attention upon what is actually within control and to find the good in the present instead of in a contingent uncertain future4 ,the trouble with it lies in its account of present good4 ,it failed to connect this good with the full reach of activities4 ,it contemplated good of withdrawal rather than of active participation4 ,that is to say1 the objection to ,epicureanism lies in its conception of what constitutes present good1 not in its emphasis upon satisfaction as at present4 ,the same remark may be made about every theory which recognizes the individual self4 ,if any such theory is objectionable1 the objection is against the character or quality assigned to the self4 ,of course an individual is the bearer or carrier of experience4 ,what of that8 ,everything depends upon the kind of experience that centers in him4 ,not the residence of experience counts1 but its contents1 what's in the house4 ,the center is not in the abstract amenable to our control1 but what gathers about it is our affair4 ,we can't help being individual selves1 each one of us4 ,if selfhood as such is a bad thing1 the blame lies not with the self but with the universe1 with providence4 ,but in fact the distinction between a selfishness with which we find fault and an unselfishness which we esteem is found in the quality of the activities which proceed from and enter into the self1 according as they are contractive1 exclusive1 or expansive1 outreaching4 ,meaning exists for some self1 but this truistic fact doesn't fix the quality of any particular meaning4 ,it may be such as to make the self small1 or such as to exalt and dignify the self4 ,it is as impertinent to decry the worth of experience because it is connected with a self as it is fantastic to idealize personality just as personality aside from the question what sort of a person one is4 ,other persons are selves too4 ,if one's own present experience is to be depreciated in its meaning because it centers in a self1 why act for the welfare of others8 ,selfishness for selfishness1 one is as good as another2 our own is worth as much as another's4 ,but the recognition that good is always found in a present growth of significance in activity protects us from thinking that welfare can consist in a soup-kitchen happiness1 in pleasures we can confer upon others from without4 ,it shows that good is the same in quality wherever it is found1 whether in some other self or in one's own4 ,an activity has meaning in the degree in which it establishes and acknowledges variety and intimacy of connections4 ,as long as any social impulse endures1 so long an activity that shuts itself off will bring inward dissatisfaction and entail a struggle for compensatory goods1 no matter what pleasures or external successes acclaim its course4 ,to say that the welfare of others1 like our own1 consists in a widening and deepening of the perceptions that give activity its meaning1 in an educative growth1 is to set forth a proposition of political import4 ,to make others happy except through liberating their powers and engaging them in activities that enlarge the meaning of life is to harm them and to indulge ourselves under cover of exercising a special virtue4 ,our moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement or any proposed reform is its effect upon impulse and habits4 ,does it liberate or suppress1 ossify or render flexible1 divide or unify interest8 ,is perception quickened or dulled8 ,is memory made apt and extensive or narrow and diffusely irrelevant8 ,is imagination diverted to fantasy and compensatory dreams1 or does it add fertility to life8 ,is thought creative or pushed one side into pedantic specialisms8 ,there is a sense in which to set up social welfare as an end of action only promotes an offensive condescension1 a harsh interference1 or an oleaginous display of complacent kindliness4 ,it always tends in this direction when it is aimed at giving happiness to others directly1 that is1 as we can hand a physical thing to another4 ,to foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own powers1 so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion1 is the way of social action4 ,otherwise the prayer of a freeman would be to be left alone1 and to be delivered1 above all1 from reformers and kind people4 ,,ii ,since morals is concerned with conduct1 it grows out of specific empirical facts4 ,almost all influential moral theories1 with the exception of the utilitarian1 have refused to admit this idea4 ,for ,christendom as a whole1 morality has been connected with supernatural commands1 rewards and penalties4 ,those who have escaped this superstition have contented themselves with converting the difference between this world and the next into a distinction between the actual and the ideal1 what is and what should be4 ,the actual world has not been surrendered to the devil in name1 but it is treated as a display of physical forces incapable of generating moral values4 ,consequently1 moral considerations must be introduced from above4 ,human nature may not be officially declared to be infected because of some aboriginal sin1 but it is said to be sensuous1 impulsive1 subjected to necessity1 while natural intelligence is such that it cannot rise above a reckoning of private expediency4 ,but in fact morals is the most humane of all subjects4 ,it is that which is closest to human nature2 it is ineradicably empirical1 not theological nor metaphysical nor mathematical4 ,since it directly concerns human nature1 everything that can be known of the human mind and body in physiology1 medicine1 anthropology1 and psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry4 ,human nature exists and operates in an environment4 ,and it is not in that environment as coins are in a box1 but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil4 ,it is of them1 continuous with their energies1 dependent upon their support1 capable of increase only as it utilizes them1 and as it gradually rebuilds from their crude indifference an environment genially civilized4 ,hence physics1 chemistry1 history1 statistics1 engineering science1 are a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as they enable us to understand the conditions and agencies through which man lives1 and on account of which he forms and executes his plans4 ,moral science is not something with a separate province4 ,it is physical1 biological and historic knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men4 ,the path of truth is narrow and straitened4 ,it is only too easy to wander beyond the course from this side to that4 ,in a reaction from that error which has made morals fanatic or fantastic1 sentimental or authoritative by severing them from actual facts and forces1 theorists have gone to the other extreme4 ,they have insisted that natural laws are themselves moral laws1 so that it remains1 after noting them1 only to conform to them4 ,this doctrine of accord with nature has usually marked a transition period4 ,when mythology is dying in its open forms1 and when social life is so disturbed that custom and tradition fail to supply their wonted control1 men resort to ,nature as a norm4 ,they apply to ,nature all the eulogistic predicates previously associated with divine law2 or natural law is conceived of as the only true divine law4 ,this happened in one form in ,stoicism4 ,it happened in another form in the deism of the eighteenth century with its notion of a benevolent1 harmonious1 wholly rational order of ,nature4 ,in our time this notion has been perpetuated in connection with a laissez-faire social philosophy and the theory of evolution4 ,human intelligence is thought to mark an artificial interference if it does more than register fixed natural laws as rules of human action4 ,the process of natural evolution is conceived as the exact model of human endeavor4 ,the two ideas met in ,spencer4 ,to the enlightened of a former generation1 ,spencer's evolutionary philosophy seemed to afford a scientific sanction for the necessity of moral progress1 while it also proved1 up to the hilt1 the futility of deliberate interference with the benevolent operations of nature4 ,the idea of justice was identified with the law of cause and effect4 ,transgression of natural law wrought in the struggle for existence its own penalty of elimination1 and conformity with it brought the reward of increased vitality and happiness4 ,by this process egoistic desire is gradually coming into harmony with the necessity of the environment1 till at last the individual automatically finds happiness in doing what the natural and social environment demands1 and serves himself in serving others4 ,from this point of view1 earlier scientific philosophers made a mistake1 but only the mistake of anticipating the date of complete natural harmony4 ,all that reason can do is to acknowledge the evolutionary forces1 and thereby refrain from retarding the arrival of the happy day of perfect harmony4 ,meantime justice demands that the weak and ignorant suffer the effect of violation of natural law1 while the wise and able reap the rewards of their superiority4 ,the fundamental defect of such views is that they fail to see the difference made in conditions and energies by perception of them4 ,it is the first business of mind to be realistic1 to see things as they are4 ,if1 for example1 biology can give us knowledge of the causes of competency and incompetency1 strength and weakness1 that knowledge is all to the good4 ,a non-sentimental morals will seek for all the instruction natural science can give concerning the biological conditions and consequences of inferiority and superiority4 ,but knowledge of facts does not entail conformity and acquiescence4 ,the contrary is the case4 ,perception of things as they are is but a stage in the process of making them different4 ,they have already begun to be different in being known1 for by that fact they enter into a different context1 a context of foresight and judgment of better and worse4 ,a false psychology of a separate realm of consciousness is the only reason this fact is not generally acknowledged4 ,morality resides not in perception of fact1 but in the use made of its perception4 ,it is a monstrous assumption that its sole use is to utter benedictions upon fact and its offspring4 ,it is the part of intelligence to tell when to use the fact to conform and perpetuate1 and when to use it to vary conditions and consequences4 ,it is absurd to suppose that knowledge about the connection between inferiority and its consequences prescribes adherence to that connection4 ,it is like supposing that knowledge of the connection between malaria and mosquitoes enjoins breeding mosquitoes4 ,the fact when it is known enters into a new environment4 ,without ceasing to belong to the physical environment it enters also into a medium of human activities1 of desires and aversions1 habits and instincts4 ,it thereby gains new potencies1 new capacities4 ,gunpowder in water does not act the same as gunpowder next a flame4 ,a fact known does not operate the same as a fact unperceived4 ,when it is known it comes into contact with the flame of desire and the cold bath of antipathy4 ,knowledge of the conditions that breed incapacity may fit into some desire to maintain others in that state while averting it for one's self4 ,or it may fall in with a character which finds itself blocked by such facts1 and therefore strives to use knowledge of causes to make a change in effects4 ,morality begins at this point of use of knowledge of natural law1 a use varying with the active system of dispositions and desires4 ,intelligent action is not concerned with the bare consequences of the thing known1 but with consequences to be brought into existence by action conditioned on the knowledge4 ,men may use their knowledge to induce conformity or exaggeration1 or to effect change and abolition of conditions4 ,the quality of these consequences determines the question of better or worse4 ,the exaggeration of the harmony attributed to ,nature aroused men to note its disharmonies4 ,an optimistic view of natural benevolence was followed by a more honest1 less romantic view of struggle and conflict in nature4 ,after ,helvetius and ,bentham came ,malthus and ,darwin4 ,the problem of morals is the problem of desire and intelligence4 ,what is to be done with these facts of disharmony and conflict8 ,after we have discovered the place and consequences of conflict in nature1 we have still to discover its place and working in human need and thought4 ,what is its office1 its function1 its possibility1 or use8 ,in general1 the answer is simple4 ,conflict is the gadfly of thought4 ,it stirs us to observation and memory4 ,it instigates to invention4 ,it shocks us out of sheep-like passivity1 and sets us at noting and contriving4 ,not that it always effects this result2 but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity4 ,when this possibility of making use of conflict has once been noted1 it is possible to utilize it systematically to substitute the arbitration of mind for that of brutal attack and brute collapse4 ,but the tendency to take natural law for a norm of action which the supposedly scientific have inherited from eighteenth century rationalism leads to an idealization of the principle of conflict itself4 ,its office in promoting progress through arousing intelligence is overlooked1 and it is erected into the generator of progress4 ,karl ,marx borrowed from the dialectic of ,hegel the idea of the necessity of a negative element1 of opposition1 for advance4 ,he projected it into social affairs and reached the conclusion that all social development comes from conflict between classes1 and that therefore class-warfare is to be cultivated4 ,hence a supposedly scientific form of the doctrine of social evolution preaches social hostility as the road to social harmony4 ,it would be difficult to find a more striking instance of what happens when natural events are given a social and practical sanctification4 ,darwinism has been similarly used to justify war and the brutalities of competition for wealth and power4 ,the excuse1 the provocation1 though not the justification for such a doctrine is found in the actions of those who say peace1 peace1 when there is no peace1 who refuse to recognize facts as they are1 who proclaim a natural harmony of wealth and merit1 of capital and labor1 and the natural justice1 in the main1 of existing conditions4 ,there is something horrible1 something that makes one fear for civilization1 in denunciations of class-differences and class struggles which proceed from a class in power1 one that is seizing every means1 even to a monopoly of moral ideals1 to carry on its struggle for class-power4 ,this class adds hypocrisy to conflict and brings all idealism into disrepute4 ,it does everything which ingenuity and prestige can do to give color to the assertions of those who say that all moral considerations are irrelevant1 and that the issue is one of brute trial of forces between this side and that4 ,the alternative1 here as elsewhere1 is not between denying facts in behalf of something termed moral ideals and accepting facts as final4 ,there remains the possibility of recognizing facts and using them as a challenge to intelligence to modify the environment and change habits4 ,,iii ,the place of natural fact and law in morals brings us to the problem of freedom4 ,we are told that seriously to import empirical facts into morals is equivalent to an abrogation of freedom4 ,facts and laws mean necessity we are told4 ,the way to freedom is to turn our back upon them and take flight to a separate ideal realm4 ,even if the flight could be successfully accomplished1 the efficacy of the prescription may be doubted4 ,for we need freedom in and among actual events1 not apart from them4 ,it is to be hoped therefore that there remains an alternative2 that the road to freedom may be found in that knowledge of facts which enables us to employ them in connection with desires and aims4 ,a physician or engineer is free in his thought and his action in the degree in which he knows what he deals with4 ,possibly we find here the key to any freedom4 ,what men have esteemed and fought for in the name of liberty is varied and complex--but certainly it has never been a metaphysical freedom of will4 ,it seems to contain three elements of importance1 though on their face not all of them are directly compatible with one another4 7i7 ,it includes efficiency in action1 ability to carry out plans1 the absence of cramping and thwarting obstacles4 7ii7 ,it also includes capacity to vary plans1 to change the course of action1 to experience novelties4 ,and again 7iii7 it signifies the power of desire and choice to be factors in events4 ,few men would purchase even a high amount of efficient action along definite lines at the price of monotony1 or if success in action were bought by all abandonment of personal preference4 ,they would probably feel that a more precious freedom was possessed in a life of ill-assured objective achievement that contained undertaking of risks1 adventuring in new fields1 a pitting of personal choice against the odds of events1 and a mixture of success and failures1 provided choice had a career4 ,the slave is a man who executes the wish of others1 one doomed to act along lines predetermined to regularity4 ,those who have defined freedom as ability to act have unconsciously assumed that this ability is exercised in accord with desire1 and that its operation introduces the agent into fields previously unexplored4 ,hence the conception of freedom as involving three factors4 ,yet efficiency in execution cannot be ignored4 ,to say that a man is free to choose to walk while the only walk he can take will lead him over a precipice is to strain words as well as facts4 ,intelligence is the key to freedom in act4 ,we are likely to be able to go ahead prosperously in the degree in which we have consulted conditions and formed a plan which enlists their consenting cooperation4 ,the gratuitous help of unforeseen circumstance we cannot afford to despise4 ,luck1 bad if not good1 will always be with us4 ,but it has a way of favoring the intelligent and showing its back to the stupid4 ,and the gifts of fortune when they come are fleeting except when they are made taut by intelligent adaptation of conditions4 ,in neutral and adverse circumstances1 study and foresight are the only roads to unimpeded action4 ,insistence upon a metaphysical freedom of will is generally at its most strident pitch with those who despise knowledge of matters-of-fact4 ,they pay for their contempt by halting and confined action4 ,glorification of freedom in general at the expense of positive abilities in particular has often characterized the official creed of historic liberalism4 ,its outward sign is the separation of politics and law from economics4 ,much of what is called the individualism of the early nineteenth century has in truth little to do with the nature of individuals4 ,it goes back to a metaphysics which held that harmony between man and nature can be taken for granted1 if once certain artificial restrictions upon man are removed4 ,hence it neglected the necessity of studying and regulating industrial conditions so that a nominal freedom can be made an actuality4 ,find a man who believes that all men need is freedom from oppressive legal and political measures1 and you have found a man who1 unless he is merely obstinately maintaining his own private privileges1 carries at the back of his head some heritage of the metaphysical doctrine of free-will1 plus an optimistic confidence in natural harmony4 ,he needs a philosophy that recognizes the objective character of freedom and its dependence upon a congruity of environment with human wants1 an agreement which can be obtained only by profound thought and unremitting application4 ,for freedom as a fact depends upon conditions of work which are socially and scientifically buttressed4 ,since industry covers the most pervasive relations of man with his environment1 freedom is unreal which does not have as its basis an economic command of environment4 ,i have no desire to add another to the cheap and easy solutions which exist of the seeming conflict between freedom and organization4 ,it is reasonably obvious that organization may become a hindrance to freedom2 it does not take us far to say that the trouble lies not in organization but in over-organization4 ,at the same time1 it must be admitted that there is no effective or objective freedom without organization4 ,it is easy to criticize the contract theory of the state which states that individuals surrender some at least of their natural liberties in order to make secure as civil liberties what they retain4 ,nevertheless there is some truth in the idea of surrender and exchange4 ,a certain natural freedom is possessed by man4 ,that is to say1 in some respects harmony exists between a man's energies and his surroundings such that the latter support and execute his purposes4 ,in so far he is free2 without such a basic natural support1 conscious contrivances of legislation1 administration and deliberate human institution of social arrangements cannot take place4 ,in this sense natural freedom is prior to political freedom and is its condition4 ,but we cannot trust wholly to a freedom thus procured4 ,it is at the mercy of accident4 ,conscious agreements among men must supplement and in some degree supplant freedom of action which is the gift of nature4 ,in order to arrive at these agreements1 individuals have to make concessions4 ,they must consent to curtailment of some natural liberties in order that any of them may be rendered secure and enduring4 ,they must1 in short1 enter into an organization with other human beings so that the activities of others may be permanently counted upon to assure regularity of action and far-reaching scope of plans and courses of action4 ,the procedure is not1 in so far1 unlike surrendering a portion of one's income in order to buy insurance against future contingencies1 and thus to render the future course of life more equably secure4 ,it would be folly to maintain that there is no sacrifice2 we can however contend that the sacrifice is a reasonable one1 justified by results4 ,viewed in this light1 the relation of individual freedom to organization is seen to be an experimental affair4 ,it is not capable of being settled by abstract theory4 ,take the question of labor unions and the closed or open shop4 ,it is folly to fancy that no restrictions and surrenders of prior freedoms and possibilities of future freedoms are involved in the extension of this particular form of organization4 ,but to condemn such organization on the theoretical ground that a restriction of liberty is entailed is to adopt a position which would have been fatal to every advance step in civilization1 and to every net gain in effective freedom4 ,every such question is to be judged not on the basis of antecedent theory but on the basis of concrete consequences4 ,the question is to the balance of freedom and security achieved1 as compared with practicable alternatives4 ,even the question of the point where membership in an organization ceases to be a voluntary matter and becomes coercive or required1 is also an experimental matter1 a thing to be decided by scientifically conducted study of consequences1 of pros and cons4 ,it is definitely an affair of specific detail1 not of wholesale theory4 ,it is equally amusing to see one man denouncing on grounds of pure theory the coercion of workers by a labor union while he avails himself of the increased power due to corporate action in business and praises the coercion of the political state2 and to see another man denouncing the latter as pure tyranny1 while lauding the power of industrial labor organizations4 ,the position of one or the other may be justified in particular cases1 but justification is due to results in practice not to general theory4 ,organization tends1 however1 to become rigid and to limit freedom4 ,in addition to security and energy in action1 novelty1 risk1 change are ingredients of the freedom which men desire4 ,variety is more than the spice of life2 it is largely of its essence1 making a difference between the free and the enslaved4 ,invariant virtue appears to be as mechanical as uninterrupted vice1 for true excellence changes with conditions4 ,unless character rises to overcome some new difficulty or conquer some temptation from an unexpected quarter we suspect its grain is only a veneer4 ,choice is an element in freedom and there can be no choice without unrealized and precarious possibilities4 ,it is this demand for genuine contingency which is caricatured in the orthodox doctrine of a freedom of indifference1 a power to choose this way or that apart from any habit or impulse1 without even a desire on the part of will to show off4 ,such an indetermination of choice is not desired by the lover of either reason or excitement4 ,the theory of arbitrary free choice represents indeterminateness of conditions grasped in a vague and lazy fashion and hardened into a desirable attribute of will4 ,under the title of freedom men prize such uncertainty of conditions as give deliberation and choice an opportunity4 ,but uncertainty of volition which is more than a reflection of uncertainty of conditions is the mark of a person who has acquired imbecility of character through permanent weakening of his springs of action4 ,whether or not indeterminateness1 uncertainty1 actually exists in the world is a difficult question4 ,it is easier to think of the world as fixed1 settled once for all1 and man as accumulating all the uncertainty there is in his will and all the doubt there is in his intellect4 ,the rise of natural science has facilitated this dualistic partitioning1 making nature wholly fixed and mind wholly open and empty4 ,fortunately for us we do not have to settle the question4 ,a hypothetical answer is enough4 ,if the world is already done and done for1 if its character is entirely achieved so that its behavior is like that of a man lost in routine1 then the only freedom for which man can hope is one of efficiency in overt action4 ,but if change is genuine1 if accounts are still in process of making1 and if objective uncertainty is the stimulus to reflection1 then variation in action1 novelty and experiment1 have a true meaning4 ,in any case the question is an objective one4 ,it concerns not man in isolation from the world but man in his connection with it4 ,a world that is at points and times indeterminate enough to call out deliberation and to give play to choice to shape its future is a world in which will is free1 not because it is inherently vacillating and unstable1 but because deliberation and choice are determining and stabilizing factors4 ,upon an empirical view1 uncertainty1 doubt1 hesitation1 contingency and novelty1 genuine change which is not mere disguised repetition1 are facts4 ,only deductive reasoning from certain fixed premisses creates a bias in favor of complete determination and finality4 ,to say that these things exist only in human experience not in the world1 and exist there only because of our finitude is dangerously like paying ourselves with words4 ,empirically the life of man seems in these respects as in others to express a culmination of facts in nature4 ,to admit ignorance and uncertainty in man while denying them to nature involves a curious dualism4 ,variability1 initiative1 innovation1 departure from routine1 experimentation are empirically the manifestation of a genuine nisus in things4 ,at all events it is these things that are precious to us under the name of freedom4 ,it is their elimination from the life of a slave which makes his life servile1 intolerable to the freeman who has once been on his own1 no matter what his animal comfort and security4 ,a free man would rather take his chance in an open world than be guaranteed in a closed world4 ,these considerations give point to the third factor in love of freedom3 the desire to have desire count as a factor1 a force4 ,even if will chooses unaccountably1 even if it be a capricious impulse1 it does not follow that there are real alternatives1 genuine possibilities1 open in the future4 ,what we want is possibilities open in the world not in the will1 except as will or deliberate activity reflects the world4 ,to foresee future objective alternatives and to be able by deliberation to choose one of them and thereby weight its chances in the struggle for future existence1 measures our freedom4 ,it is assumed sometimes that if it can be shown that deliberation determines choice and deliberation is determined by character and conditions1 there is no freedom4 ,this is like saying that because a flower comes from root and stem it cannot bear fruit4 ,the question is not what are the antecedents of deliberation and choice1 but what are their consequences4 ,what do they do that is distinctive8 ,the answer is that they give us all the control of future possibilities which is open to us4 ,and this control is the crux of our freedom4 ,without it1 we are pushed from behind4 ,with it we walk in the light4 ,the doctrine that knowledge1 intelligence rather than will1 constitutes freedom is not new4 ,it has been preached by moralists of many a school4 ,all rationalists have identified freedom with action emancipated by insight into truth4 ,but insight into necessity has by them been substituted for foresight of possibilities4 ,tolstoi for example expressed the idea of ,spinoza and ,hegel when he said that the ox is a slave as long as he refuses to recognize the yoke and chafes under it1 while if he identifies himself with its necessity and draws willingly instead of rebelliously1 he is free4 ,but as long as the yoke is a yoke it is impossible that voluntary identification with it should occur4 ,conscious submission is then either fatalistic submissiveness or cowardice4 ,the ox accepts in fact not the yoke but the stall and the hay to which the yoke is a necessary incident4 ,but if the ox foresees the consequences of the use of the yoke1 if he anticipates the possibility of harvest1 and identifies himself not with the yoke but with the realization of its possibilities1 he acts freely1 voluntarily4 ,he hasn't accepted a necessity as unavoidable2 he has welcomed a possibility as a desirability4 ,perception of necessary law plays1 indeed1 a part4 ,but no amount of insight into necessity brings with it1 as such1 anything but a consciousness of necessity4 ,freedom is the truth of necessity only when we use one necessity to alter another4 ,when we use the law to foresee consequences and to consider how they may be averted or secured1 then freedom begins4 ,employing knowledge of law to enforce desire in execution gives power to the engineer4 ,employing knowledge of law in order to submit to it without further action constitutes fatalism1 no matter how it be dressed up4 ,thus we recur to our main contention4 ,morality depends upon events1 not upon commands and ideals alien to nature4 ,but intelligence treats events as moving1 as fraught with possibilities1 not as ended1 final4 ,in forecasting their possibilities1 the distinction between better and worse arises4 ,human desire and ability cooperates with this or that natural force according as this or that eventuality is judged better4 ,we do not use the present to control the future4 ,we use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activity4 ,in this use of desire1 deliberation and choice1 freedom is actualized4 ,,iv ,intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we use it and accept responsibility for consequences4 ,it is not ours originally or by production4 ,it thinks is a truer psychological statement than ,i think4 ,thoughts sprout and vegetate2 ideas proliferate4 ,they come from deep unconscious sources4 ,i think is a statement about voluntary action4 ,some suggestion surges from the unknown4 ,our active body of habits appropriates it4 ,the suggestion then becomes an assertion4 ,it no longer merely comes to us4 ,it is accepted and uttered by us4 ,we act upon it and thereby assume1 by implication1 its consequences4 ,the stuff of belief and proposition is not originated by us4 ,it comes to us from others1 by education1 tradition and the suggestion of the environment4 ,our intelligence is bound up1 so far as its materials are concerned1 with the community life of which we are a part4 ,we know what it communicates to us1 and know according to the habits it forms in us4 ,science is an affair of civilization not of individual intellect4 ,so with conscience4 ,when a child acts1 those about him re-act4 ,they shower encouragement upon him1 visit him with approval1 or they bestow frowns and rebuke4 ,what others do to us when we act is as natural a consequence of our action as what the fire does to us when we plunge our hands in it4 ,the social environment may be as artificial as you please4 ,but its action in response to ours is natural not artificial4 ,in language and imagination we rehearse the responses of others just as we dramatically enact other consequences4 ,we foreknow how others will act1 and the foreknowledge is the beginning of judgment passed on action4 ,we know with them2 there is conscience4 ,an assembly is formed within our breast which discusses and appraises proposed and performed acts4 ,the community without becomes a forum and tribunal within1 a judgment-seat of charges1 assessments and exculpations4 ,our thoughts of our own actions are saturated with the ideas that others entertain about them1 ideas which have been expressed not only in explicit instruction but still more effectively in reaction to our acts4 ,liability is the beginning of responsibility4 ,we are held accountable by others for the consequences of our acts4 ,they visit their like and dislike of these consequences upon us4 ,in vain do we claim that these are not ours2 that they are products of ignorance not design1 or are incidents in the execution of a most laudable scheme4 ,their authorship is imputed to us4 ,we are disapproved1 and disapproval is not an inner state of mind but a most definite act4 ,others say to us by their deeds we do not care a fig whether you did this deliberately or not4 ,we intend that you shall deliberate before you do it again1 and that if possible your deliberation shall prevent a repetition of this act we object to4 ,the reference in blame and every unfavorable judgment is prospective1 not retrospective4 ,theories about responsibility may become confused1 but in practice no one is stupid enough to try to change the past4 ,approbation and disapprobation are ways of influencing the formation of habits and aims2 that is1 of influencing future acts4 ,the individual is held accountable for what he has done in order that he may be responsive in what he is going to do4 ,gradually persons learn by dramatic imitation to hold themselves accountable1 and liability becomes a voluntary deliberate acknowledgment that deeds are our own1 that their consequences come from us4 ,these two facts1 that moral judgment and moral responsibility are the work wrought in us by the social environment1 signify that all morality is social2 not because we ought to take into account the effect of our acts upon the welfare of others1 but because of facts4 ,others do take account of what we do1 and they respond accordingly to our acts4 ,their responses actually do affect the meaning of what we do4 ,the significance thus contributed is as inevitable as is the effect of interaction with the physical environment4 ,in fact as civilization advances the physical environment gets itself more and more humanized1 for the meaning of physical energies and events becomes involved with the part they play in human activities4 ,our conduct is socially conditioned whether we perceive the fact or not4 ,the effect of custom on habit1 and of habit upon thought is enough to prove this statement4 ,when we begin to forecast consequences1 the consequences that most stand out are those which will proceed from other people4 ,the resistance and the cooperation of others is the central fact in the furtherance or failure of our schemes4 ,connections with our fellows furnish both the opportunities for action and the instrumentalities by which we take advantage of opportunity4 ,all of the actions of an individual bear the stamp of his community as assuredly as does the language he speaks4 ,difficulty in reading the stamp is due to variety of impressions in consequence of membership in many groups4 ,this social saturation is1 ,i repeat1 a matter of fact1 not of what should be1 not of what is desirable or undesirable4 ,it does not guarantee the rightness of goodness of an act2 there is no excuse for thinking of evil action as individualistic and right action as social4 ,deliberate unscrupulous pursuit of self-interest is as much conditioned upon social opportunities1 training and assistance as is the course of action prompted by a beaming benevolence4 ,the difference lies in the quality and degree of the perception of ties and interdependencies2 in the use to which they are put4 ,consider the form commonly assumed today by self-seeking2 namely command of money and economic power4 ,money is a social institution2 property is a legal custom2 economic opportunities are dependent upon the state of society2 the objects aimed at1 the rewards sought for1 are what they are because of social admiration1 prestige1 competition and power4 ,if money-making is morally obnoxious it is because of the way these social facts are handled1 not because a money-making man has withdrawn from society into an isolated selfhood or turned his back upon society4 ,his individualism is not found in his original nature but in his habits acquired under social influences4 ,it is found in his concrete aims1 and these are reflexes of social conditions4 ,well-grounded moral objection to a mode of conduct rests upon the kind of social connections that figure1 not upon lack of social aim4 ,a man may attempt to utilize social relationships for his own advantage in an inequitable way2 he may intentionally or unconsciously try to make them feed one of his own appetites4 ,then he is denounced as egoistic4 ,but both his course of action and the disapproval he is subject to are facts within society4 ,they are social phenomena4 ,he pursues his unjust advantage as a social asset4 ,explicit recognition of this fact is a prerequisite of improvement in moral education and of an intelligent understanding of the chief ideas or categories of morals4 ,morals is as much a matter of interaction of a person with his social environment as walking is an interaction of legs with a physical environment4 ,the character of walking depends upon the strength and competency of legs4 ,but it also depends upon whether a man is walking in a bog or on a paved street1 upon whether there is a safeguarded path set aside or whether he has to walk amid dangerous vehicles4 ,if the standard of morals is low it is because the education given by the interaction of the individual with his social environment is defective4 ,of what avail is it to preach unassuming simplicity and contentment of life when communal admiration goes to the man who succeeds--who makes himself conspicuous and envied because of command of money and other forms of power8 ,if a child gets on by peevishness or intrigue1 then others are his accomplices who assist in the habits which are built up4 ,the notion that an abstract ready-made conscience exists in individuals and that it is only necessary to make an occasional appeal to it and to indulge in occasional crude rebukes and punishments1 is associated with the causes of lack of definitive and orderly moral advance4 ,for it is associated with lack of attention to social forces4 ,there is a peculiar inconsistency in the current idea that morals ought to be social4 ,the introduction of the moral ought into the idea contains an implicit assertion that morals depend upon something apart from social relations4 ,morals are social4 ,the question of ought1 should be1 is a question of better and worse in social affairs4 ,the extent to which the weight of theories has been thrown against the perception of the place of social ties and connections in moral activity is a fair measure of the extent to which social forces work blindly and develop an accidental morality4 ,the chief obstacle for example to recognizing the truth of a proposition frequently set forth in these pages to the effect that all conduct is potential1 if not actual1 matter of moral judgment is the habit of identifying moral judgment with praise and blame4 ,so great is the influence of this habit that it is safe to say that every professed moralist when he leaves the pages of theory and faces some actual item of his own or others' behavior1 first or instinctively thinks of acts as moral or non-moral in the degree in which they are exposed to condemnation or approval4 ,now this kind of judgment is certainly not one which could profitably be dispensed with4 ,its influence is much needed4 ,but the tendency to equate it with all moral judgment is largely responsible for the current idea that there is a sharp line between moral conduct and a larger region of non-moral conduct which is a matter of expediency1 shrewdness1 success or manners4 ,moreover this tendency is a chief reason why the social forces effective in shaping actual morality work blindly and unsatisfactorily4 ,judgment in which the emphasis falls upon blame and approbation has more heat than light4 ,it is more emotional than intellectual4 ,it is guided by custom1 personal convenience and resentment rather than by insight into causes and consequences4 ,it makes toward reducing moral instruction1 the educative influence of social opinion1 to an immediate personal matter1 that is to say1 to an adjustment of personal likes and dislikes4 ,fault-finding creates resentment in the one blamed1 and approval1 complacency1 rather than a habit of scrutinizing conduct objectively4 ,it puts those who are sensitive to the judgments of others in a standing defensive attitude1 creating an apologetic1 self-accusing and self-exculpating habit of mind when what is needed is an impersonal impartial habit of observation4 ,moral persons get so occupied with defending their conduct from real and imagined criticism that they have little time left to see what their acts really amount to1 and the habit of self-blame inevitably extends to include others since it is a habit4 ,now it is a wholesome thing for any one to be made aware that thoughtless1 self-centered action on his part exposes him to the indignation and dislike of others4 ,there is no one who can be safely trusted to be exempt from immediate reactions of criticism1 and there are few who do not need to be braced by occasional expressions of approval4 ,but these influences are immensely overdone in comparison with the assistance that might be given by the influence of social judgments which operate without accompaniments of praise and blame2 which enable an individual to see for himself what he is doing1 and which put him in command of a method of analyzing the obscure and usually unavowed forces which move him to act4 ,we need a permeation of judgments on conduct by the method and materials of a science of human nature4 ,without such enlightenment even the best-intentioned attempts at the moral guidance and improvement of others often eventuate in tragedies of misunderstanding and division1 as is so often seen in the relations of parents and children4 ,the development therefore of a more adequate science of human nature is a matter of first-rate importance4 ,the present revolt against the notion that psychology is a science of consciousness may well turn out in the future to be the beginning of a definitive turn in thought and action4 ,historically there are good reasons for the isolation and exaggeration of the conscious phase of human action1 an isolation which forgot that conscious is an adjective of some acts and which erected the resulting abstraction1 consciousness1 into a noun1 an existence separate and complete4 ,these reasons are interesting not only to the student of technical philosophy but also to the student of the history of culture and even of politics4 ,they have to do with the attempt to drag realities out of occult essences and hidden forces and get them into the light of day4 ,they were part of the general movement called phenomenalism1 and of the growing importance of individual life and private voluntary concerns4 ,but the effect was to isolate the individual from his connections both with his fellows and with nature1 and thus to create an artificial human nature1 one not capable of being understood and effectively directed on the basis of analytic understanding4 ,it shut out from view1 not to say from scientific examination1 the forces which really move human nature4 ,it took a few surface phenomena for the whole story of significant human motive-forces and acts4 ,as a consequence physical science and its technological applications were highly developed while the science of man1 moral science1 is backward4 ,i believe that it is not possible to estimate how much of the difficulties of the present world situation are due to the disproportion and unbalance thus introduced into affairs4 ,it would have seemed absurd to say in the seventeenth century that in the end the alteration in methods of physical investigation which was then beginning would prove more important than the religious wars of that century4 ,yet the wars marked the end of one era2 the dawn of physical science the beginning of a new one4 ,and a trained imagination may discover that the nationalistic and economic wars which are the chief outward mark of the present are in the end to be less significant than the development of a science of human nature now inchoate4 ,it sounds academic to say that substantial bettering of social relations waits upon the growth of a scientific social psychology4 ,for the term suggests something specialized and remote4 ,but the formation of habits of belief1 desire and judgment is going on at every instant under the influence of the conditions set by men's contact1 intercourse and associations with one another4 ,this is the fundamental fact in social life and in personal character4 ,it is the fact about which traditional human science gives no enlightenment--a fact which this traditional science blurs and virtually denies4 ,the enormous rle played in popular morals by appeal to the supernatural and quasi-magical is in effect a desperate admission of the futility of our science4 ,consequently the whole matter of the formation of the predispositions which effectively control human relationships is left to accident1 to custom and immediate personal likings1 resentments and ambitions4 ,it is a commonplace that modern industry and commerce are conditioned upon a control of physical energies due to proper methods of physical inquiry and analysis4 ,we have no social arts which are comparable because we have so nearly nothing in the way of psychological science4 ,yet through the development of physical science1 and especially of chemistry1 biology1 physiology1 medicine and anthropology we now have the basis for the development of such a science of man4 ,signs of its coming into existence are present in the movements in clinical1 behavioristic and social 7in its narrower sense7 psychology4 ,at present we not only have no assured means of forming character except crude devices of blame1 praise1 exhortation and punishment1 but the very meaning of the general notions of moral inquiry is matter of doubt and dispute4 ,the reason is that these notions are discussed in isolation from the concrete facts of the interactions of human beings with one another--an abstraction as fatal as was the old discussion of phlogiston1 gravity and vital force apart from concrete correlations of changing events with one another4 ,take for example such a basic conception as that of ,right involving the nature of authority in conduct4 ,there is no need here to rehearse the multitude of contending views which give evidence that discussion of this matter is still in the realm of opinion4 ,we content ourselves with pointing out that this notion is the last resort of the anti-empirical school in morals and that it proves the effect of neglect of social conditions4 ,in effect its adherents argue as follows3 ,let us concede that concrete ideas about right and wrong and particular notions of what is obligatory have grown up within experience4 ,but we cannot admit this about the idea of ,right1 of ,obligation itself4 ,why does moral authority exist at all8 ,why is the claim of the ,right recognized in conscience even by those who violate it in deed8 ,our opponents say that such and such a course is wise1 expedient1 better4 ,but why act for the wise1 or good1 or better8 ,why not follow our own immediate devices if we are so inclined8 ,there is only one answer3 ,we have a moral nature1 a conscience1 call it what you will4 ,and this nature responds directly in acknowledgment of the supreme authority of the ,right over all claims of inclination and habit4 ,we may not act in accordance with this acknowledgment1 but we still know that the authority of the moral law1 although not its power1 is unquestionable4 ,men may differ indefinitely according to what their experience has been as to just what is ,right1 what its contents are4 ,but they all spontaneously agree in recognizing the supremacy of the claims of whatever is thought of as ,right4 ,otherwise there would be no such thing as morality1 but merely calculations of how to satisfy desire4 ,grant the foregoing argument1 and all the apparatus of abstract moralism follows in its wake4 ,a remote goal of perfection1 ideals that are contrary in a wholesale way to what is actual1 a free will of arbitrary choice2 all of these conceptions band themselves together with that of a non-empirical authority of ,right and a non-empirical conscience which acknowledges it4 ,they constitute its ceremonial or formal train4 ,why1 indeed1 acknowledge the authority of ,right8 ,that many persons do not acknowledge it in fact1 in action1 and that all persons ignore it at times1 is assumed by the argument4 ,just what is the significance of an alleged recognition of a supremacy which is continually denied in fact8 ,how much would be lost if it were dropped out1 and we were left face to face with actual facts8 ,if a man lived alone in the world there might be some sense in the question ,why be moral8 were it not for one thing3 ,no such question would then arise4 ,as it is1 we live in a world where other persons live too4 ,our acts affect them4 ,they perceive these effects1 and react upon us in consequence4 ,because they are living beings they make demands upon us for certain things from us4 ,they approve and condemn--not in abstract theory but in what they do to us4 ,the answer to the question ,why not put your hand in the fire8 is the answer of fact4 ,if you do your hand will be burnt4 ,the answer to the question why acknowledge the right is of the same sort4 ,for ,right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us1 and of which we are obliged1 if we would live1 to take some account4 ,its authority is the exigency of their demands1 the efficacy of their insistencies4 ,there may be good ground for the contention that in theory the idea of the right is subordinate to that of the good1 being a statement of the course proper to attain good4 ,but in fact it signifies the totality of social pressures exercised upon us to induce us to think and desire in certain ways4 ,hence the right can in fact become the road to the good only as the elements that compose this unremitting pressure are enlightened1 only as social relationships become themselves reasonable4 ,it will be retorted that all pressure is a non-moral affair partaking of force1 not of right2 that right must be ideal4 ,thus we are invited to enter again the circle in which the ideal has no force and social actualities no ideal quality4 ,we refuse the invitation because social pressure is involved in our own lives1 as much so as the air we breathe and the ground we walk upon4 ,if we had desires1 judgments1 plans1 in short a mind1 apart from social connections1 then the latter would be external and their action might be regarded as that of a non-moral force4 ,but we live mentally as physically only in and because of our environment4 ,social pressure is but a name for the interactions which are always going on and in which we participate1 living so far as we partake and dying so far as we do not4 ,the pressure is not ideal but empirical1 yet empirical here means only actual4 ,it calls attention to the fact that considerations of right are claims originating not outside of life1 but within it4 ,they are ideal in precisely the degree in which we intelligently recognize and act upon them1 just as colors and canvas become ideal when used in ways that give an added meaning to life4 ,accordingly failure to recognize the authority of right means defect in effective apprehension of the realities of human association1 not an arbitrary exercise of free will4 ,this deficiency and perversion in apprehension indicates a defect in education--that is to say1 in the operation of actual conditions1 in the consequences upon desire and thought of existing interactions and interdependencies4 ,it is false that every person has a consciousness of the supreme authority of right and then misconceives it or ignores it in action4 ,one has such a sense of the claims of social relationships as those relationships enforce in one's desires and observations4 ,the belief in a separate1 ideal or transcendental1 practically ineffectual ,right is a reflex of the inadequacy with which existing institutions perform their educative office--their office in generating observation of social continuities4 ,it is an endeavor to rationalize this defect4 ,like all rationalizations1 it operates to divert attention from the real state of affairs4 ,thus it helps maintain the conditions which created it1 standing in the way of effort to make our institutions more humane and equitable4 ,a theoretical acknowledgment of the supreme authority of ,right1 of moral law1 gets twisted into an effectual substitute for acts which would better the customs which now produce vague1 dull1 halting and evasive observation of actual social ties4 ,we are not caught in a circle2 we traverse a spiral in which social customs generate some consciousness of interdependencies1 and this consciousness is embodied in acts which in improving the environment generate new perceptions of social ties1 and so on forever4 ,the relationships1 the interactions are forever there as fact1 but they acquire meaning only in the desires1 judgments and purposes they awaken4 ,we recur to our fundamental propositions4 ,morals is connected with actualities of existence1 not with ideals1 ends and obligations independent of concrete actualities4 ,the facts upon which it depends are those which arise out of active connections of human beings with one another1 the consequences of their mutually intertwined activities in the life of desire1 belief1 judgment1 satisfaction and dissatisfaction4 ,in this sense conduct and hence morals are social3 they are not just things which ought to be social and which fail to come up to the scratch4 ,but there are enormous differences of better and worse in the quality of what is social4 ,ideal morals begin with the perception of these differences4 ,human interaction and ties are there1 are operative in any case4 ,but they can be regulated1 employed in an orderly way for good only as we know how to observe them4 ,and they cannot be observed aright1 they cannot be understood and utilized1 when the mind is left to itself to work without the aid of science4 ,for the natural unaided mind means precisely the habits of belief1 thought and desire which have been accidentally generated and confirmed by social institutions or customs4 ,but with all their admixture of accident and reasonableness we have at last reached a point where social conditions create a mind capable of scientific outlook and inquiry4 ,to foster and develop this spirit is the social obligation of the present because it is its urgent need4 ,yet the last word is not with obligation nor with the future4 ,infinite relationships of man with his fellows and with nature already exist4 ,the ideal means1 as we have seen1 a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach4 ,this meaning even now attaches to present activities because they are set in a whole to which they belong and which belongs to them4 ,even in the midst of conflict1 struggle and defeat a consciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending whole4 ,to be grasped and held this consciousness needs1 like every form of consciousness1 objects1 symbols4 ,in the past men have sought many symbols which no longer serve1 especially since men have been idolators worshiping symbols as things4 ,yet within these symbols which have so often claimed to be realities and which have imposed themselves as dogmas and intolerances1 there has rarely been absent some trace of a vital and enduring reality1 that of a community of life in which continuities of existence are consummated4 ,consciousness of the whole has been connected with reverences1 affections1 and loyalties which are communal4 ,but special ways of expressing the communal sense have been established4 ,they have been limited to a select social group2 they have hardened into obligatory rites and been imposed as conditions of salvation4 ,religion has lost itself in cults1 dogmas and myths4 ,consequently the office of religion as sense of community and one's place in it has been lost4 ,in effect religion has been distorted into a possession--or burden--of a limited part of human nature1 of a limited portion of humanity which finds no way to universalize religion except by imposing its own dogmas and ceremonies upon others2 of a limited class within a partial group2 priests1 saints1 a church4 ,thus other gods have been set up before the one ,god4 ,religion as a sense of the whole is the most individualized of all things1 the most spontaneous1 undefinable and varied4 ,for individuality signifies unique connections in the whole4 ,yet it has been perverted into something uniform and immutable4 ,it has been formulated into fixed and defined beliefs expressed in required acts and ceremonies4 ,instead of marking the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole1 it has been petrified into a slavery of thought and sentiment1 an intolerant superiority on the part of the few and an intolerable burden on the part of the many4 ,yet every act may carry within itself a consoling and supporting consciousness of the whole to which it belongs and which in some sense belongs to it4 ,with responsibility for the intelligent determination of particular acts may go a joyful emancipation from the burden for responsibility for the whole which sustains them1 giving them their final outcome and quality4 ,there is a conceit fostered by perversion of religion which assimilates the universe to our personal desires2 but there is also a conceit of carrying the load of the universe from which religion liberates us4 ,within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them4 ,in its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal4 ,the life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship4 ,the acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies4 ,,index ,absentmindedness1 #agc ,accidents1 in history1 #aja2 in consequences1 #di1 #ea1 #bjf-bjh1 #bda1 #bec1 #cjd1 #cji ,acquisition1 #aaf-aah1 #adc-adh ,activity is natural1 #aah-abc1 #afj1 #bbf1 #bic ,aims1 see ,consequences1 ,ends ,alexander ,m41 #bh1 #cf ,altruism1 #acc1 #bic ,analysis1 #ahc ,anger1 #ij1 #aeb ,appetite1 #g1 #bge2 see ,impulse ,aristotle1 #cc1 #aji1 #agd1 #bbd1 #bij ,arts1 #ae1 #bc1 #ga1 #aei-afd1 #bfc ,atomism moral1 #bdc ,attitude1 #da2 see ,habit ,authority1 #b1 #fe1 #gb1 #gi1 #ahg1 #cbd ,benevolence1 #acc ,bergson1 #gc1 #agh1 #bde ,blame1 #ah1 #aba1 #cbj ,causation1 #ah1 #dd ,calculation1 #ahi1 #aii-bji2 see ,deliberation ,casuistry1 #bdj ,certainty1 love of1 #bcf ,character1 defined1 #ch2 and consequences1 #dg ,childhood1 #b1 #fd1 #hi1 #if1 #ii ,choice1 #aib1 #cjd1 #caa ,classes1 #b1 #hb1 #bgj ,classification1 #aca1 #bdd ,codes1 #ajc ,compensatory1 #h1 #cj1 #cc1 #beg1 #bge ,conduct1 see ,character1 ,habit1 ,impulse1 ,intelligence ,confidence1 #aci ,conflict1 #ab1 #ci1 #ff1 #hb1 #aid1 #bjh1 #bag1 #cjj ,conscience1 #ahd-ahh1 #cad ,consciousness1 #fb1 #agi1 #ahd1 #bjh ,consequences1 and motives1 #de-dg2 and aims1 #bbe-bbi1 #bde-bdg ,conservatism1 #ff1 #ajf1 #afh ,continuity1 #ab1 #bcb1 #bci1 #bdd1 #bei ,control1 #ba1 #bc1 #cg1 #aja1 #aci1 #adh1 #bff-bgj2 see ,accident ,conventions1 #f1 #ig1 #aff ,crowd psychology1 #fj ,creative and acquisitive1 #adc-adh ,customs and habits1 #eh-fi2 and standards1 #ge-hc2 rigidity1 #ajc-aje ,deliberation1 #ahi-bji2 as discovery1 #baf ,democracy1 #fan1 #ff1 #gb ,desire1 #bd1 #cc1 #aid1 #bcd1 #bii1 #cjd2 and intelligence1 #bdh-bfd2 object of1 #bdi-beb ,disposition1 #da2 see ,habit ,docility1 #fd1 #ig ,dualism1 #h1 #ab1 #dj1 #ee1 #fg1 #ga1 #adg1 #bge1 #cji ,economic man1 #bbj ,economics1 #i1 #ab1 #abj-abd1 #acb1 #adc-adh1 #bab-bba1 #bgj-bgc1 #cje ,education1 #fd1 #gb1 #ia1 #ajg1 #bgj1 #cbj ,egotism1 #g ,emerson1 #ajj1 #add ,emotion1 #ge1 #hc1 #bee1 #bfd ,end1 #bh1 #cd-cg2 knowledge as1 #ahg1 #bae2 nature of1 #bbc-bcg2 of desire1 #bej1 #bfa2 and means1 #bfi-bgb2 see ,consequences1 ,means ,environments1 #b1 #aj1 #ae1 #ah1 #ba1 #ea1 #aea1 #aei1 #agi1 #caf ,epicureanism1 #bje1 #bia ,equilibration1 #agi1 #beb ,evolution1 #bhd-bhg1 #big ,execution1 of desires1 #cc-ce ,expediency1 #di1 #ahi1 #baj2 see ,deliberation ,experience1 #ca1 #bde ,experimentation1 moral1 #ef1 #cjg ,fallacy1 philosophic1 #age ,fanaticism1 #bbh ,fantasies1 #aeh1 #afd1 #bcf ,fear1 #aaa1 #acb-acc1 #aed-aee1 #bcg ,fiat of will1 #bi ,foresight1 #bjd-bjf1 #bch1 #bfe-bgj2 see ,deliberation1 ,ends ,freedom1 #h1 #afe2 three phases of1 #cjc-cac2 see ,will ,functions1 #ah ,gain1 #aag ,goal1 #bfj1 #bfe1 #bgd1 #bha1 #bhg-bhi2 see ,evolution1 ,perfection ,good1 #b1 #dd1 #baj-bbb1 #bgd1 #bgh ,goodness1 #d-h1 #af1 #dc-de1 #dh1 #fg1 #bbg ,good-will1 #dd ,habits1 place in conduct1 #ad-hh2 and desire1 #bd2 as functions1 #ad2 as arts or abilities1 #ae1 #fd1 #ff1 #ga1 #agj2 and thought1 #ca-cc1 #ff-fi1 #agb-ahj1 #ahb2 definition1 #da2 and impulses1 #ij-ih1 #ajg-aaa2 and principles1 #bch ,harmony1 natural1 #aei1 #afg1 #bih ,hedonistic calculus1 #bjd ,hegel1 #cab ,helvetius1 #ajf1 #cjj ,herd-instinct1 #d ,history1 #aja1 #aaj ,hobbes1 #acc ,human nature1 #a2 and morals1 #a-ac1 #bie2 alterability1 #ajf-abd ,humility1 #bhi ,hypocrisy1 #f ,hypothesis1 moral1 #bci1 #bdc ,ideas1 see ,ends1 ,thought ,ideals and ,idealism1 #b1 #h1 #ej1 #fh1 #gg1 #ha1 #ii1 #aeg1 #aff1 #ahd1 #bcc1 #bcf1 #bee1 #bei-bfd1 #bgd1 #bhb-bhh1 #cja1 #cca ,imagination1 #eb1 #afc1 #aij-aib1 #bjd1 #bbe1 #bcd ,imitation1 #ff1 #ig1 #acb ,impulse1 place in conduct1 #hi-aga2 secondary1 #hi2 intermediary1 #afi-agj2 as means of reorganization1 #ic1 #ajb1 #ajd1 #agi2 plastic1 #ie2 same as human instincts1 #ajen2 and habit1 #ajg-aaa2 false simplification1 #aca-adi2 and reason1 #aif1 #bed ,individualism1 #g1 #he1 #ic ,industry1 #aa ,infantilisms1 #ih ,instinct1 not fixed1 #adi-afh2 and knowledge1 #agh2 see ,impulse ,institutions1 #i1 #hj1 #ajb1 #aaa1 #aff ,intelligence1 #aj1 #ac1 #ea1 #bii1 #cab2 place of1 in conduct1 #agb-bgg2 relation to habits1 #agb-ahj1 #bbh2 and desire1 #bdh-bfd1 #bgf ,interpenetration of habits1 #cg-ci ,intuitions1 #cc1 #ahh ,james1 ,wm41 #aab1 #agi1 #aie ,justice1 #ah1 #eb1 #aih ,kant1 #dd1 #di1 #ee1 #bde ,knowledge1 moral1 #aha-ahh2 see ,conscience1 ,intelligence ,labor1 #aba1 #add ,language1 #eh1 #gi1 #ie ,le ,bon1 #fa ,liberalism1 #cje ,locke1 #ajf ,marx1 #aed1 #bgc1 #cjj ,magic1 #bj1 #bf ,meaning1 #cg1 #ij1 #aea1 #bjg1 #bfb1 #bga1 #bhj ,means1 #bj2 relation to ends1 #be-cf1 #bah-bbj1 #bea2 see ,habit ,mechanization1 #bh1 #gj1 #if1 #add ,mediation1 #aig ,mind1 #fa1 #ie2 and habit1 #age-ahj ,mind and body1 #cj1 #fg1 #ga ,mitchell1 ,w4 ,c41 #bac ,moore1 ,g4 ,e41 #bdan ,morals1 introduction1 #dj2 conclusion1 as objective1 #eb2 of art1 #afg2 scope1 #bgh-bha ,motives1 #dc-de1 #aah-abb1 #bac1 #bca1 #cbi ,natural law and morals1 #bif-cjj ,necessity1 #cab ,nirvana1 #age1 #bhf ,non-moral1 #h1 #bg1 #dj1 #ahh1 #bcj ,occult1 #aa ,oligarchy1 #b-c ,optimism1 #bhf-bhh ,organization1 #cjf ,passion1 #i1 #aic-aif ,pathology1 #d1 #ej ,perfection1 #agc-age1 #bbc1 #bhb ,pessimism1 #bhf ,plato1 #ej1 #gh1 #acd1 #bij ,play1 #aei-afd ,pleasure1 #aeh1 #bjj-bje1 #bej ,posture1 #cb ,potentiality1 #cg ,power1 will to1 #adj-adb ,pragmatic knowing1 #aha-ahh ,principles1 #b2 and tendencies1 #di2 nature of1 #bch-bdg ,private1 #i1 #af1 #dc1 #he ,process and product1 #adb-adc1 #bhj ,progress1 #aj1 #ba1 #ic1 #if1 #aja1 #ajen2 in science1 #adi2 nature of1 #bha-bhh ,property1 #aaf-aah2 see ,economics ,psycho-analysis1 #cd1 #hf1 #acc1 #aec1 #beb ,psychology and moral theory1 #ab1 #df1 #ia2 social1 #fj-fc1 #hd-hh2 current1 #aah1 #ace1 #adg1 #aee2 and scientific method1 #aej1 #cbb-cbd ,punishment1 #ah ,puritanism1 #e1 #aeg ,purpose1 see ,ends ,radicalism1 #afh ,reactions1 #aeg ,realism1 #agf1 #bef1 #bih ,reason1 pure1 #ca2 reasonableness1 #fg1 #gg1 #aic-aih1 #bae ,rebellion1 #aff ,reconstruction1 #afd ,religion1 #e1 #bfc1 #ccj-ccb ,responsibility1 #cae ,revolution1 #aj1 #ajh ,right1 #cbd-cbh ,romanticism1 #f1 #ajj1 #aff1 #bef ,routine1 #db1 #ff1 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analysis reporting and analysis #cbe how to satisfy desire4 how to satisfy desire4 #ccd ,phantasies1 #aeh1 ,fantasies1 #aeh1