,transcriber's ,notes3      ,every     
effort has been made to replicate this  
text as faithfully     as possible1     
including inconsistencies in spelling   
and hyphenation4     ,some corrections  
of spelling and punctuation have been   
made4 ,they     are listed at the end of
 the text4      ,italic text has been   
marked with underscores4     ,greek text
 has been transliterated and marked with
 tildes4          ,,german              
,,philosophical ,,classics   ,,for      
,,english ,,readers ,,and ,,students4   
,,edited ,,by   ,,george ,s4 ,,morris4  
,,leibniz',s ,,new ,,essays ,,concerning
   ,,the ,,human ,,understanding4       
,,leibniz',s   ,,new ,,essays           
,,concerning ,,the   ,,human            
,,understanding4    ,a ,,critical       
,,exposition4    ,by ,,john ,,dewey1    
,ph4,d41    ,,assistant ,,professor ,,of
 ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university   
,,of   ,,michigan1 ,,and ,,professor    
7,,elect7 ,,of ,,mental ,,and   ,,moral 
,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university    

,,of ,,minnesota    ,,chicago3          
,,scott1 ,,foresman ,,and ,,company     
#aijb     ,copyright1 #ahhh1   ,by ,s4  
,c4 ,griggs and ,company4     ,,preface4
   ,the purpose of the series of which  
the present volume is one1 is not1 as   
will be seen by reference to the        
statement in the initial volume1 to sum 
up in toto the system of any            
philosopher1 but to give a critical     
exposition of some one masterpiece4 ,in 
treating the ,nouveaux ,essais of       
,leibniz1 ,i have found myself obliged1 
at times1 to violate the letter of this 
expressed intention1 in order to fulfil 
its spirit4 ,the ,nouveaux ,essais1 in  
spite of its being one of the two most  
extended philosophical writings of      
,leibniz1 is a compendium of comments1  
rather than a connected argument or     
exposition4 ,it has all the             
suggestiveness and richness of a        
note-book1 but with much also of its    
fragmentariness4 ,i have therefore been 
obliged to supplement my account of it  

by constant references to the other     
writings of ,leibniz1 and occasionally  
to take considerable liberty with the   
order of the treatment of topics4 ,upon 
the whole1 this book will be found1 ,i  
hope1 to be a faithful reflex not only  
of ,leibniz's thought1 but also of his  
discussions in the ,nouveaux ,essais4   
,in the main1 the course of philosophic 
thought since the time of ,leibniz has  
been such as to render almost           
self-evident his limitations1 and to    
suggest needed corrections and          
amplifications4 ,indeed1 it is much     
easier for those whose thoughts follow  
the turn that ,kant has given modern    
thinking to appreciate the defects of   
,leibniz than to realize his greatness4 
,i have endeavored1 therefore1 in the   
body of the work1 to identify my thought
 with that of ,leibniz as much as       
possible1 to assume his standpoint and  
method1 and1 for the most part1 to      
confine express criticism upon his      
limitations to the final chapter4 ,in   

particular1 ,i have attempted to bring  
out the relations of philosophy to the  
growing science of his times1 to state  
the doctrine of pre-established harmony 
as he himself meant it1 and to give     
something like consistency and coherency
 to his doctrine of material existence  
and of nature4 ,this last task seemed   
especially to require doing4 ,i have    
also endeavored to keep in mind1        
throughout1 ,leibniz's relations to     
,locke1 and to show the ,nouveaux       
,essais as typical of the distinction   
between characteristic ,british and     
,german thought4      ,,john ,,dewey4   
,may1 #ahhh4     ,,contents4            
,,chapter ,i4    ,the ,man4             
,,page    ,his ,parents                 
#a    ,his ,early ,education            
#b    ,his ,university ,training at     
,leipsic                                
#d    ,at ,jena                         
#h    ,at the ,university of ,altdorf   
#aj    ,his ,removal to ,frankfurt      
#aj    ,his ,mission to ,paris          

#aa    ,discovery of the ,calculus      
#ab    ,librarian at ,hanover           
#ac    ,his ,activities                 
#ad    ,his ,philosophic ,writings      
#ae    ,his ,ecclesiastic and ,academic 
,projects                               
#ag    ,his ,later ,years and ,death    
#ah     ,,chapter ,,ii4    ,sources of  
his ,philosophy4    ,character of the   
,epoch into which ,leibniz was born     
#bj    ,the ,thought of the ,unity of   
the ,world                              
#bc    ,the two ,agencies which formed  
,leibniz's ,philosophy                  
#bd    ,the ,cartesian ,influences      
#bf    ,rationalistic ,method           
#bh    ,mechanical ,explanation of      
,nature                                 
#cj    ,application of ,mathematics     
#cb    ,idea of ,evolution              
#cc    ,interpretation of these ,ideas  
#ce    ,idea of ,activity or ,entelechy 
#ci    ,idea of ,rationality            
#dj    ,idea of ,organism               
#db     ,,chapter ,,iii4    ,the        

,problem and its ,solution4    ,unity of
 ,leibniz's ,thought                    
#dc    ,relation of ,universal and      
,individual                             
#dd    ,descartes' ,treatment of this   
,question                               
#df    ,spinoza's ,treatment of it      
#dh    ,leibniz's ,solution             
#ej    ,all ,unity is ,spiritual        
#ec    ,and ,active                     
#ed    ,is a ,representative ,individual
                                        
#ef    ,contrast of ,monad and ,atom    
#eh    ,pre-established ,harmony        
reconciles ,universal and ,individual   
#ei    ,meaning of this ,doctrine       
#fb     ,,chapter ,,iv4    ,locke and   
,leibniz4--,innate ,ideas4    ,necessity
 of ,preliminary ,account of ,leibniz's 
,philosophy            #ff    ,locke's  
,empiricism                             
#fg    ,leibniz's ,comments upon ,locke 
#fi    ,the ,controversies of ,leibniz  
#gb    ,the ,essay on the ,human        
,understanding                          

#gc    ,locke's ,denial of ,innate      
,ideas                                  
#ge    ,depending upon      7#a7 ,his   
,mechanical ,conception of ,innate      
,ideas                     #gg          
,leibniz undermines this by substituting
 an ,organic ,conception       #hj      
,and upon      7#b7 ,his ,mechanical    
,conception of ,consciousness           
#hd    ,leibniz refutes this by his     
,theory of ,unconscious ,intelligence   
#he     ,,chapter ,v4    ,sensation and 
,experience4    ,importance of ,doctrine
 regarding ,sensation                   
#hg    ,the ,two ,elements of ,locke's  
,notion of ,sensation                   
#hi    ,its ,relation to the ,object    
producing it3 ,primary and ,secondary   
,qualities                              
#ia    ,locke criticized as to his      
,account      7#a7 ,of the ,production  
of ,sensation                           
#ib      7#b7 ,of its ,function in      
,knowledge                              
#ie    ,the ,meaning of ,physical       

,causation                              
#ig    ,bearing of this ,doctrine upon  
,relation of ,soul and ,body            
#ih    ,criticism of ,locke's ,dualism  
#ih    ,leibniz's ,monism               
#aja    ,summary of ,discussion         
#ajc    ,leibniz on the ,relation of    
,sensations to ,objects   occasioning   
them                                    
#aje    ,nature of ,experience          
#ajf    ,distinction of ,empirical from 
,rational ,knowledge                    
#ajg     ,,chapter ,,vi4    ,the        
,impulses and the ,will4    ,the        
,doctrine of ,will depends upon that of 
,intelligence             #aji    ,the  
,character of ,impulse                  
#aaa    ,of ,desire                     
#aab    ,half-,pains and ,pleasures     
#aac    ,the ,outcome of ,desire        
#aae    ,nature of ,moral ,action       
#aag    ,of ,freedom                    
#aah      7#a7 ,freedom as ,contingency 
#aai          ,limitation of this       
,principle                              

#aba      7#b7 ,freedom as ,spontaneity 
#abc          ,this ,principle is too   
,broad to be a ,moral ,principle        
#abe      7#c7 ,true ,freedom is        
,rational ,action                       
#abe    ,our ,lack of ,freedom is due to
 our ,sensuous ,nature                  
#abh    ,innate ,practical ,principles  
#abi    ,moral ,science is              
,demonstrative                          
#acj     ,,chapter ,,vii4    ,matter and
 its ,relation to ,spirit4    ,locke's  
,account of ,matter and ,allied ,ideas  
the ,foundation of the   ,philosophy of 
,nature ,characteristic of ,british     
,empiricism          #acb    ,space and 
,matter wholly ,distinct ,ideas         
#acd    ,leibniz gives ,matter a        
,metaphysical ,basis                    
#acg    ,ordinary ,misunderstanding of  
,leibniz's ,ideas of ,matter            
#ach    ,matter is not composed of      
,monads                                 
#aci    ,matter is the ,passive or      
,conditioned ,side of ,monads           

#adj    ,passivity equals ,confused     
,representations1 i4 e4 ,incomplete     
,development of ,reason                 
#add    ,matter is logically ,necessary 
from ,leibniz's ,principles             
#ade    ,bearing of ,discussion upon    
,doctrine of ,pre-established ,harmony  
#adf    ,summary                        
#adg     ,,chapter ,,viii4    ,material 
,phenomena and their ,reality4    ,what 
is the ,connection between ,matter as   
,metaphysical and as   ,physical8       
#aea    ,the ,latter is the ,image of   
the ,former                             
#aea    ,leibniz's ,reaction from       
,cartesian ,theory                      
#aeb    ,his ,objections are 7#a7       
,physical and 7#b7 ,logical             
#aec    7#a7 ,motion is ,source of      
,physical ,qualities of ,bodies         
#aee    ,hence there are no ,atoms      
#aeh    ,secondary ,qualities as well as
 ,primary depend upon ,motion           
#afj    7#b7 ,what is the ,subject to   
which the ,quality of ,extension        

belongs8                                
#afa    ,it is the ,monad as ,passive   
#afb    ,space and ,time connect the    
,spiritual and the ,sensible            
#afd    ,distinction between ,space and 
,time1 and ,extension and ,duration     
#aff    ,space and ,time are ,relations 
#afg    ,leibniz's ,controversy with    
,clarke                                 
#afh    ,leibniz denies that ,space and 
,time are ,absolute                     
#agj    ,what is the ,reality of        
,sensible ,phenomena8                   
#agc    ,it consists      7#a7 ,in their
 ,regularity                            
#agd      7#b7 ,in their ,dependence    
upon ,intelligence and ,will            
#age    ,leibniz and ,berkeley          
#agg     ,,chapter ,,ix4    ,some       
,fundamental ,conceptions4    ,locke's  
,account of ,substance as ,static       
#agi    ,the ,distinction between       
,reality and ,phenomena                 
#ahj    ,leibniz's ,conception of       
,substance as ,dynamic                  

#aha    ,his ,specific ,criticisms upon 
,locke                                  
#ahb    ,the ,categories of ,identity   
and ,difference ,locke also explains in 
a ,mechanical ,way                      
#ahc    ,leibniz regards them as        
,internal and as ,organic to each other 
#ahd    ,locke gives a ,quantitative    
,notion of ,infinity                    
#ahh    ,and hence makes our ,idea of it
 purely ,negative                       
#ahi    ,leibniz denies that the ,true  
,notion of ,infinity is ,quantitative   
#ahi    ,he also denies ,locke's        
,account of the ,origin of the          
,indefinite     #aib    ,in ,general1   
,locke has a ,mechanical ,idea1 ,leibniz
 a ,spiritual1 of   these ,categories   
#aic     ,,chapter ,x4    ,the ,nature  
and ,extent of ,knowledge4    ,locke's  
,definition and ,classification of      
,knowledge                 #aif         
,leibniz's ,criticism                   
#aig    ,leibniz1 ,berkeley1 and ,kant  
regarding ,knowledge of ,objects        

#aih    ,the ,degrees of                
,knowledge1--,intuitive1 ,demonstrative1
 and   ,sensitive                       
#aii    ,locke's ,contradictory         
,theories regarding the ,origin of      
,knowledge   #bjb    ,locke starts both 
with the ,individual as given to        
,consciousness   and with the ,unrelated
 ,sensation                             
#bjd    ,either ,theory makes ,relations
 or ,universals ,unreal                 
#bje    ,as to the ,extent of           
,knowledge1 that of ,identity is ,wide1 
but   ,trifling                         
#bje    ,that of ,real ,being includes  
,god1 ,soul1 and ,matter1 but only as to
   their ,existence                     
#bjf    ,and even this at the ,expense  
of contradicting his ,definition of     
,knowledge                              
#bjf    ,knowledge of ,co-existence is  
either ,trifling or ,impossible         
#bjg    ,leibniz rests upon ,distinction
 of ,contingent and ,rational ,truth    
#bji    ,the ,former may become the     

,latter1 and is then ,demonstrative     
#baj    ,the ,means of this             
,transformation are ,mathematics and    
,classification                         
#bae    ,there are ,two                 
,principles1--,one of ,contradiction    
#bag    ,the ,other of ,sufficient      
,reason                                 
#bah    ,the ,latter leads us to ,god as
 the ,supreme ,intelligence and the     
,final ,condition of ,contingent ,fact  
#bai    ,the ,four ,stages of ,knowledge
                                        
#bbb     ,,chapter ,,xi4    ,the        
,theology of ,leibniz4    ,leibniz's    
,three ,arguments for the ,existence of 
,god                 #bbd    ,the ,value
 of the ,ontological                    
#bbe    ,the ,cosmological              
#bbf    ,the ,teleological              
#bbf    ,the ,attributes of ,god        
#bbg    ,the ,relation of ,god to the   
,world1 his ,creating ,activity         
#bbh    ,creation involves ,wisdom and  
,goodness as well as ,power             

#bbi    ,the ,relation of ,god to       
,intelligent ,spirits3 they form a      
,moral   ,community                     
#bcj    ,leibniz as the ,founder of     
,modern ,german ,ethical ,systems       
#bca    ,the ,end of ,morality is       
,happiness as ,self-realization         
#bcb    ,the ,three ,stages of ,natural 
,right                                  
#bcd    ,the ,basis of ,both ,leibniz's 
,ethics and ,political ,philosophy is   
,man's ,relation to ,god                
#bcf    ,his sthetics have the ,same    
,basis                                  
#bcg    ,man's ,spirit as ,architectonic
                                        
#bch     ,,chapter ,,xii4    ,criticism 
and ,conclusion4    ,leibniz's          
,fundamental ,contradiction is between  
his ,method and his   ,subject ,matter  
#bdj    ,the ,use which ,leibniz makes  
of the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason
   reveals this ,contradiction          
#bdb    ,the ,contradiction is between  
the ,ideas of ,formal and of ,concrete  

,unity                                  
#bdc    ,from this ,contradiction flow  
7#a7 ,the ,contradiction in the ,notion 
of ,individuality             #bdf      
,which becomes purely ,negative         
#bdg          ,the ,negative he         
interprets as merely ,privative         
#bdi      7#b7 ,the ,contradiction in   
his ,conception of ,god has the ,same   
,source                                 
#bej          ,he really has ,three     
,definitions of ,god                    
#bej          ,one results in ,atomism1 
another in ,pantheism                   
#bea          ,the ,third in a          
,conception of the ,organic ,harmony of 
the         ,infinite and ,finite       
#beb      7#c7 ,the ,contradiction      
between the ,real and the ,ideal in the 
,monads has the ,same ,source           
#bec      7#d7 ,as have also the        
,contradictions in the ,treatment of the
     ,relations of ,matter and ,spirit  
#bed      7#e7 ,and finally1 his        
,original ,contradiction leads to a     

,contradictory ,treatment of ,knowledge 
#beg    ,summary as to the ,positive    
,value of ,leibniz                      
#bei    ,the ,influence of ,leibniz's   
,philosophy                             
#bfa    ,especially upon ,kant          
#bfb    ,kant claims to be the ,true    
,apologist for ,leibniz                 
#bfc      7#a7 ,as to the ,doctrine of  
,sufficient ,reason and ,contradiction  
#bfc          ,which finds its ,kantian 
,analogue in the ,distinction between   
,analytic and ,synthetic ,judgment      
#bff      7#b7 ,as to the ,relation of  
,monads and ,matter                     
#bfh          ,which finds its ,kantian 
,analogue in the ,relation of the       
,sensuous and ,supersensuous            
#bfh      7#c7 ,and finally1 as to the  
,doctrine of ,pre-established ,harmony  
#bfi          ,which ,kant transforms   
into ,harmony between ,understanding    
and ,sense                              
#bfi          ,and between the          
,categories of the ,understanding and   

the         ,ideas of ,reason           
#bgj    ,conclusion                     
#bgb     ,,leibniz',s ,,new ,,essays    
,,concerning ,,the ,,human              
,,understanding4     ,,chapter ,i4      
,,the ,,man4   ,he who knows me only by 
my writings does not know me1 said      
,leibniz4 ,these words--true1 indeed1 of
 every writer1 but true of ,leibniz in a
 way which gives a peculiar interest and
 charm to his life--must be our excuse  
for prefacing what is to be said of his 
,new ,essays concerning the ,human      
,understanding with a brief biographical
 sketch4  ,gottfried ,wilhelm ,leibniz  
was born in ,leipzig ,june #ba1 #afdf4  
,his father1 who died when ,leibniz was 
only six years old1 was a professor in  
the university and a notary of          
considerable practice4 ,from him the    
future philosopher seems to have derived
 his extraordinary industry and love of 
detail4 ,such accounts as we have of him
 show no traces of the wonderful        
intellectual genius of his son1 but only

 a diligent1 plodding1 faithful1 and    
religious man1 a thoroughly             
conscientious husband1 jurist1 and      
professor4 ,nor in the lines of physical
 heredity can we account for the unique 
career of ,leibniz by his mother's      
endowments4 ,the fact1 however1 that she
 was patient in all trial1 living in    
peace with her neighbors1 anxious for   
unity and concord with all people1 even 
with those not well disposed to her1    
throws great light upon the fundamental 
trait of ,leibniz's ethical nature4 ,as 
in so many cases1 it is the inherited   
moral characteristics which form the    
basis of the intellectual nature4 ,the  
love of unity which was a moral trait in
 ,leibniz's mother became in him the    
hunger for a harmonious and unified     
mental world2 the father's devotion to  
detail showed itself as the desire for  
knowledge as minute and comprehensive as
 it was inter-related4  ,left without   
his father1 he was by the advice of a   
discerning friend allowed free access to

 the library4 ,leibniz never ceased to  
count this one of the greatest fortunes 
of his life4 ,writing in after years to 
a friend1 he says3--  ,when ,i lost my  
father1 and was left without any        
direction in my studies1 ,i had the luck
 to get at books in all languages1 of   
all religions1 upon all sciences1 and to
 read them without any regular order1   
just as my own impulse led me4 ,from    
this ,i obtained the great advantage    
that ,i was freed from ordinary         
prejudices1 and introduced to many      
things of which ,i should otherwise     
never have thought4  ,in a philosophical
 essay1 in which he describes himself   
under the name of ,gulielmus ,pacidius1 
he says3--  ,wilhelm ,friedlieb1 a      
,german by birth1 who lost his father in
 his early years1 was led to study      
through the innate tendency of his      
spirit2 and the freedom with which he   
moved about in the sciences was equal to
 this innate impulse4 ,he buried        
himself1 a boy eight years old1 in a    

library1 staying there sometimes whole  
days1 and1 hardly stammering ,latin1 he 
took up every book which pleased his    
eyes4 ,opening and shutting them without
 any choice1 he sipped now here1 now    
there1 lost himself in one1 skipped over
 another1 as the clearness of expression
 or of content attracted him4 ,he seemed
 to be directed by the ,tolle et lege of
 a higher voice4 ,as good fortune would 
have it1 he gave himself up to the      
ancients1 in whom he at first understood
 nothing1 by degrees a little1 finally  
all that was really necessary1 until he 
assumed not only a certain coloring of  
their expression1 but also of their     
thought1--just as those who go about in 
the sun1 even while they are occupied   
with other things1 get sun-browned4     
,and he goes on to tell us that their   
influence always remained with him4     
,their human1 their important1 their    
comprehensive ideas1 grasping the whole 
of life in one image1 together with     
their clear1 natural1 and transparent   

mode of expression1 adapted precisely to
 their thoughts1 seemed to him to be in 
the greatest contrast with the writings 
of moderns1 without definiteness or     
order in expression1 and without        
vitality or purpose in thought1--written
 as if for another world4 ,thus ,leibniz
 learned two of the great lessons of his
 life1--to seek always for clearness of 
diction and for pertinence and purpose  
of ideas4  ,historians and poets first  
occupied him2 but when in his           
school-life1 a lad of twelve or thirteen
 years1 he came to the study of logic1  
he was greatly struck1 he says1 by the  
ordering and analysis of thoughts which 
he found there4 ,he gave himself up to  
making tables of categories and         
predicaments1 analyzing each book that  
he read into suitable topics1 and       
arranging these into classes and        
sub-classes4 ,we can imagine the        
astonishment of his playmates as he     
burst upon them with a demand to        
classify this or that idea1 to find its 

appropriate predicament4 ,thus he was   
led naturally to the philosophic books  
in his father's library1--to ,plato and 
to ,aristotle1 to the ,scholastics4     
,suarez1 in particular1 among the       
latter1 he read2 and traces of his      
influences are to be found in the       
formulation of his own philosophic      
system4 ,at about this same time he took
 great delight in the theological works 
with which his father's library         
abounded1 reading with equal ease and   
pleasure the writings of the ,lutherans 
and of the ,reformed ,church1 of the    
,jesuits and the ,jansenists1 of the    
,thomists and the ,arminians4 ,the      
result was1 he tells us1 that he was    
strengthened in the ,lutheran faith of  
his family1 but1 as we may easily       
imagine from his after life1 made       
tolerant of all forms of faith4  ,in    
#affa the boy ,leibniz1 fifteen years   
old1 entered the ,university of         
,leipzig4 ,if we glance back upon his   
attainments1 we find him thoroughly at  

home in ,latin1 having made good        
progress in ,greek1 acquainted with the 
historians and poets of antiquity1      
acquainted with the contemporary range  
of science1 except in mathematics and   
physics1 deeply read and interested in  
ancient and scholastic philosophy and in
 the current theological discussions4   
,of himself he says3--  ,two things were
 of extraordinary aid to me3 in the     
first place1 ,i was self-taught2 and in 
the second1 as soon as ,i entered upon  
any science ,i sought for something new1
 even though ,i did not as yet          
thoroughly understand the old4 ,i thus  
gained two things3 ,i did not fill my   
mind with things empty and to be        
unlearned afterwards1--things resting   
upon the assertion of the teacher1 and  
not upon reason2 and secondly1 ,i never 
rested till ,i got down to the very     
roots of the science and reached its    
principles4  ,while there is always a   
temptation to force the facts which we  
know of a man's early life1 so as to    

make them seem to account for what      
appears in mature years1 and to find    
symbolisms and analogies which do not   
exist1 we are not going astray1 ,i      
think1 if we see foreshadowed in this   
early education of ,leibniz the two     
leading traits of his later             
thought1--universality and              
individuality4 ,the range of ,leibniz's 
investigations already marks him as one 
who will be content with no fundamental 
principle which does not mirror the     
universe4 ,the freedom with which he    
carried them on is testimony to the fact
 that even at this age the idea of      
self-development1 of individual growth  
from within1 was working upon him4 ,in  
the fact1 also1 that he was self-taught 
we find doubtless the reason that he    
alone of the thinkers of this period did
 not have to retrace his steps1 to take 
a hostile attitude towards the ideas    
into which he was educated1 and to start
 anew upon a foundation then first      
built4 ,the development of the thought  

of ,leibniz is so gradual1 continuous1  
and constant that it may serve as a     
model of the law by which the monad     
acts4 ,is not his early acquaintance    
with ancient literature and medival     
philosophy the reason that he could     
afterwards write that his philosophical 
system connects ,plato with ,democritus1
 ,aristotle with ,descartes1 the        
,scholastics with the moderns1 theology 
and morals with reason8 ,and who can    
fail to see in the impartiality1 the    
comprehensiveness1 of his self-education
 the prophecy of the time when he can   
write of his ideas that there are united
 in them1 as in a centre of perspective1
 the ideas of the ,sceptics in          
attributing to sensible things only a   
slight degree of reality2 of the        
,pythagoreans and ,platonists1 who      
reduce all to harmonies1 numbers1 and   
ideas2 of ,parmenides and ,plotinus1    
with their ,one and ,all2 of the        
,stoics1 with their notion of necessity1
 compatible with the spontaneity of     

other schools2 of the vital philosophy  
of the ,cabalists1 who find feeling     
everywhere2 of the forms and entelechies
 of ,aristotle and the ,schoolmen1      
united with the mechanical explanation  
of phenomena according to ,democritus   
and the moderns8  ,but we must hurry    
along over the succeeding years of his  
life4 ,in the university the study of   
law was his principal occupation1 as he 
had decided to follow in the footsteps  
of his father4 ,it cannot be said that  
the character of the instruction or of  
the instructors at ,leipzig was such as 
to give much nutriment or stimulus to a 
mind like that of ,leibniz4 ,he became  
acquainted there1 however1 with the     
,italian philosophy of the sixteenth    
century1--a philosophy which1 as        
formulated by ,cardanus and ,campanella1
 formed the transition from ,scholastic 
philosophy to the mechanical mode of    
viewing the universe4 ,he had here also 
his first introduction to ,descartes4   
,the consequences of the new vision     

opened to ,leibniz must be told in his  
own words3 ,i was but a child when ,i   
came to know ,aristotle2 even the       
,scholastics did not frighten me2 and ,i
 in no way regret this now4 ,plato and  
,plotinus gave me much delight1 not to  
speak of other philosophers of          
antiquity4 ,then ,i fell in with the    
writings of modern philosophy1 and ,i   
recall the time when1 a boy of fifteen  
years1 ,i went walking in a little wood 
near ,leipzig1 the ,rosenthal1 in order 
to consider whether ,i should hold to   
the doctrine of substantial forms4      
,finally the mechanical theory          
conquered1 and thus ,i was led to the   
study of the mathematical sciences4  ,to
 the study of the mathematical sciences6
 ,surely words of no mean import for    
either the future of ,leibniz or of     
mathematics4 ,but his ,leipzig studies  
did not take him very far in this new   
direction4 ,only the elements of ,euclid
 were taught there1 and these by a      
lecturer of such confused style that    

,leibniz seems alone to have understood 
them4 ,in ,jena1 however1 where he went 
for a semester1 things were somewhat    
better4 ,weigel1 a mathematician of some
 fame1 an astronomer1 a jurist1 and a   
philosopher1 taught there1 and          
introduced ,leibniz into the lower forms
 of analysis4 ,but the ,thirty ,years'  
,war had not left ,germany in a state of
 high culture1 and in after years       
,leibniz lamented the limitations of his
 early mathematical training1 remarking 
that if he had spent his youth in       
,paris1 he would have enriched science  
earlier4 ,by #afff ,leibniz had finished
 his university career1 having in       
previous years attained the degrees of  
bachelor of philosophy and master of    
philosophy4 ,it is significant that for 
the first he wrote a thesis upon the    
principle of individuation1--the        
principle which in later years became   
the basis of his philosophy4 ,this early
 essay1 however1 is rather an exhibition
 of learning and of dexterity in        

handling logical methods than a real    
anticipation of his afterthought4  ,for 
his second degree1 he wrote a thesis    
upon the application of philosophic     
ideas to juridic                        
procedure1--considerations which never  
ceased to occupy him4 ,at about the same
 time appeared his earliest independent 
work1 ,de ,arte ,combinatoria4 ,from his
 study of mathematics1 and especially of
 algebraic methods1 ,leibniz had become 
convinced that the source of all science
 is1--first1 analysis2 second1 symbolic 
representation of the fundamental       
concepts1 the symbolism avoiding the    
ambiguities and vagueness of language2  
and thirdly1 the synthesis and          
interpretation of the symbols4 ,it      
seemed to ,leibniz that it ought to be  
possible to find the simplest notions in
 all the sciences1 to discover general  
rules for calculating all their         
varieties of combination1 and thus to   
attain the same certainty and generality
 of result that characterize            

mathematics4 ,leibniz never gave up this
 thought4 ,indeed1 in spirit his        
philosophy is but its application1 with 
the omission of symbols1 on the side of 
the general notions fundamental to all  
science4 ,it was also the idea of his   
age1--the idea that inspired ,spinoza   
and the ,aufklrung1 the idea that       
inspired philosophical thinking until   
,kant gave it its death-blow by         
demonstrating the distinction between   
the methods of philosophy and of        
mathematical and physical science4  ,in 
#afff ,leibniz should have received his 
double doctorate of philosophy and of   
law2 but petty jealousies and personal  
fears prevented his presenting himself  
for the examination4 ,disgusted with his
 treatment1 feeling that the ties that  
bound him to ,leipzig were severed by   
the recent death of his mother1 anxious 
to study mathematics further1 and1 as he
 confesses1 desiring1 with the natural  
eagerness of youth1 to see more of the  
world1 he left ,leipzig forever1 and    

entered upon his ,wanderjahre4 ,he was  
prepared to be no mean citizen of the   
world4 ,in his education he had gone    
from the historians to the poets1 from  
the poets to the philosophers and the   
,scholastics1 from them to the          
theologians and ,church ,fathers2 then  
to the jurists1 to the mathematicians1  
and then again to philosophy and to law4
  ,he first directed his steps to the   
,university of ,altdorf2 here he        
obtained his doctorate in law1 and was  
offered a professorship1 which he       
declined1--apparently because he felt   
that his time was not yet come1 and that
 when it should come1 it would not be in
 the narrow limits of a country village4
 ,from ,altdorf he went to ,nrnberg2    
here all that need concern us is the    
fact that he joined a society of        
alchemists 7fraternitas rosecrucis71 and
 was made their secretary4 ,hereby he   
gained three things1--a knowledge of    
chemistry2 an acquaintance with a number
 of scientific men of different         

countries1 with whom1 as secretary1 he  
carried on correspondence2 and the      
friendship of ,boineburg1 a diplomat of 
the court of the ,elector and           
,archbishop of ,mainz4 ,this friendship 
was the means of his removing to        
,frankfurt4 ,here1 under the direction  
of the ,elector1 he engaged in          
remodelling ,roman law so as to adapt it
 for ,german use1 in writing diplomatic 
tracts1 letters1 and essays upon        
theological matters1 and in editing an  
edition of ,nizolius1--a now forgotten  
philosophical writer4 ,one of the most  
noteworthy facts in connection with this
 edition is that ,leibniz pointed out   
the fitness of the ,german language for 
philosophical uses1 and urged its       
employment1--a memorable fact in        
connection with the later development of
 ,german thought4 ,another important    
tract which he wrote was one urging the 
alliance of all ,german ,states for the 
purpose of advancing their internal and 
common interests4 ,here1 as so often1   

,leibniz was almost two centuries in    
advance of his times4 ,but the chief    
thing in connection with the stay of    
,leibniz at ,mainz was the cause for    
which he left it4 ,louis ,,xiv4 had     
broken up the ,triple ,alliance1 and    
showed signs of attacking ,holland and  
the ,german ,empire4 ,it was then       
proposed to him that it would be of     
greater glory to himself and of greater 
advantage to ,france that he should move
 against ,turkey and ,egypt4 ,the       
mission of presenting these ideas to the
 great king was intrusted to ,leibniz1  
and in #afgb he went to ,paris4  ,the   
plan failed completely1--so completely  
that we need say no more about it4 ,but 
the journey to ,paris was none the less 
the turning-point in the career of      
,leibniz4 ,it brought him to the centre 
of intellectual civilization1--to a     
centre compared with which the highest  
attainments of disrupted and            
disheartened ,germany were comparative  
barbarism4 ,molire was still alive1 and 

,racine was at the summit of his glory4 
,leibniz became acquainted with ,arnaud1
 a disciple of ,descartes1 who initiated
 him into the motive and spirit of his  
master4 ,cartesianism as a system1 with 
its scientific basis and its speculative
 consequences1 thus first became to him 
an intellectual reality4 ,and1 perhaps  
most important of all1 he met ,huygens1 
who became his teacher and inspirer both
 in the higher forms of mathematics and 
in their application to the             
interpretation and expression of        
physical phenomena4 ,his diplomatic     
mission took him also to ,london1 where 
the growing world of mathematical       
science was opened yet wider to him4    
,the name of ,sir ,isaac ,newton need   
only be given to show what this meant4  
,from this time one of the greatest     
glories of ,leibniz's life dates1--a    
glory1 however1 which during his        
lifetime was embittered by envy and     
unappreciation1 and obscured by         
detraction and malice1--the invention of

 the infinitesimal calculus4 ,it would  
be interesting1 were this the place1 to 
trace the history of its discovery1--the
 gradual steps which led to it1 the     
physical facts as well as mathematical  
theories which made it a necessity2 but 
it must suffice to mention that these   
were such that the discovery of some    
general mode of expressing and          
interpreting the newly discovered facts 
of ,nature was absolutely required for  
the further advance of science1 and that
 steps towards the introduction of the  
fundamental ideas of the calculus had   
already been taken1--notably by         
,keppler1 by ,cavalieri1 and by ,wallis4
 ,it would be interesting to follow also
 the course of the controversy with     
,newton1--a controversy which in its    
method of conduct reflects no credit    
upon the names of either4 ,but this can 
be summed up by saying that it is now   
generally admitted that absolute        
priority belongs to ,newton1 but that   
entire independence and originality     

characterize none the less the work of  
,leibniz1 and that the method of        
approach and statement of the latter are
 the more philosophical and general1    
and1 to use the words of the judicious  
summary of ,merz1 ,newton cared more for
 the results than the principle1 while  
,leibniz was in search of fundamental   
principles1 and anxious to arrive at    
simplifications and generalizations4    
,the death of ,boineburg removed the    
especial reasons for the return of      
,leibniz to ,frankfurt1 and in #afgf he 
accepted the position of librarian and  
private councillor at the court of      
,hanover4 ,it arouses our interest and  
our questionings to know that on his    
journey back he stopped at the ,hague1  
and there met face to face the other    
future great philosopher of the time1   
,spinoza4 ,but our questionings meet no 
answer4 ,at ,hanover1 the industries of 
,leibniz were varied4 ,an extract from  
one of his own letters1 though written  
at a somewhat later date1 will give the 

best outline of his activities4  ,it is 
incredible how scattered and divided are
 my occupations4 ,i burrow through      
archives1 investigate old writings1 and 
collect unprinted manuscripts1 with a   
view to throwing light on the history of
 ,brunswick4 ,i also receive and write a
 countless number of letters4 ,i have so
 much that is new in mathematics1 so    
many thoughts in philosophy1 so many    
literary observations which ,i cannot   
get into shape1 that in the midst of my 
tasks ,i do not know where to begin1 and
 with ,ovid am inclined to cry out3 ',my
 riches make me poor4' ,i should like to
 give a description of my               
calculating-machine2 but time fails4    
,above all else ,i desire to complete my
 ,dynamics1 as ,i think that ,i have    
finally discovered the true laws of     
material ,nature1 by whose means        
problems about bodies which are out of  
reach of rules now known may be solved4 
,friends are urging me to publish my    
,science of the ,infinite1 containing   

the basis of my new analysis4 ,i have   
also on hand a new ,characteristic1 and 
many general considerations about the   
art of discovery4 ,but all these works1 
the historical excepted1 have to be done
 at odd moments4 ,then at the court all 
sorts of things are expected4 ,i have to
 answer questions on points in          
international law2 on points concerning 
the rights of the various princes in the
 ,empire3 so far ,i have managed to keep
 out of questions of private law4 ,with 
all this ,i have had to carry on        
negotiations with the bishops of        
,neustadt and of ,meaux ,bossuet1 and   
with ,pelisson and others upon religious
 matters4  ,it is interesting to note   
how the philosophic spirit1 the instinct
 for unity and generality1 showed itself
 even in the least of ,leibniz's tasks4 
,the ,duke of ,brunswick imposed upon   
,leibniz the task of drawing up a       
genealogical table of his ,house4 ,under
 ,leibniz's hands this expanded into a  
history of the ,house1 and this in turn 

was the centre of an important study of 
the ,german ,empire4 ,it was impossible 
that the philosopher1 according to whom 
every real being reflected the whole of 
the universe from its point of view1    
should have been able to treat even a   
slight phase of local history without   
regarding it in its relations to the    
history of the world4 ,similarly some   
mining operations in the ,harz          
,mountains called the attention of      
,leibniz to geological matters4 ,the    
result was a treatise called ,protoga1  
in which ,leibniz gave a history of the 
development of the earth4 ,not content  
with seeing in a ,brunswick mountain an 
epitome of the world's physical         
formation1 it was his intention to make 
this an introduction to his political   
history as a sort of geographical       
background and foundation4 ,it is       
interesting to note that the historical 
studies of ,leibniz took him on a three 
years' journey1 from #afhg to #afij1    
through the various courts of           

,europe1--a fact which not only had     
considerable influence upon ,leibniz    
himself1 but which enabled him to give  
stimulus to scientific development in   
more ways and places than one4  ,his    
philosophical career as an author begins
 for the most part with his return to   
,hanover in #afij4 ,this lies outside of
 the scope of the present chapter1 but  
here is a convenient place to call      
attention to the fact that for ,leibniz 
the multitude of his other duties was so
 great that his philosophical work was  
the work of odd moments4 ,there is no   
systematic exposition2 there are a vast 
number of letters1 of essays1 of        
abstracts and memoranda published in    
various scientific journals4 ,his       
philosophy bears not only in form1 but  
in substance1 traces of its haphazard   
and desultory origin4 ,another point of 
interest in this connection is the      
degree to which1 in form1 at least1 his 
philosophical writings bear the impress 
of his cosmopolitan life4 ,leibniz had  

seen too much of the world1 too much of 
courts1 for his thoughts to take the    
rigid and unbending form of geometrical 
exposition suited to the lonely student 
of the ,hague4 ,nor was the regular     
progression and elucidation of ideas    
adapted to the later ,germans1 almost   
without exception university professors1
 suited to the man of affairs4 ,there is
 everywhere in ,leibniz the attempt to  
adapt his modes of statement1 not only  
to the terminology1 but even to the     
ideas1 of the one to whom they are      
addressed4 ,there is the desire to      
magnify points of agreement1 to minimize
 disagreements1 characteristic of the   
courtier and the diplomat4 ,his         
comprehensiveness is not only a         
comprehensiveness of thought1 but of    
ways of exposition1 due very largely1 we
 must think1 to his cosmopolitan        
education4 ,the result has been to the  
great detriment of ,leibniz's influence 
as a systematic thinker1 although it may
 be argued that it has aided his        

indirect and suggestive influence1 the  
absorption of his ideas by men of       
literature1 by ,goethe1 above all by    
,lessing1 and his stimulating effect    
upon science and philosophy4 ,it is     
certain that the attempt to systematize 
his thoughts1 as was done by ,wolff1 had
 for its result the disappearance of all
 that was profound and thought-exciting4
  ,if his philosophy thus reflects the  
manner of his daily life1 the           
occupations of the latter were informed 
by the spirit of his philosophy4 ,two of
 the dearest interests of ,leibniz      
remain to be mentioned1--one1 the       
founding of academies2 the other1 the   
reconciling of religious organizations4 
,the former testifies to his desire for 
comprehensiveness1 unity1 and           
organization of knowledge2 the latter to
 his desire for practical unity1 his    
dislike of all that is opposed and      
isolated4 ,his efforts in the religions 
direction were twofold4 ,the first was  
to end the theological and political    

controversies of the time by the reunion
 of the ,protestant and ,roman ,catholic
 ,churches4 ,it was a plan which did the
 greatest honor to the pacific spirit of
 ,leibniz1 but it was predestined to    
failure4 ,both sides made               
concessions1--more concessions than we  
of to-day should believe possible4 ,but 
the one thing the ,roman ,catholic      
,church would not concede was the one   
thing which the ,protestant ,church     
demanded1--the notion of authority and  
hierarchy4 ,indeed1 it may be questioned
 whether the terms on which ,leibniz    
conceived of their reunion do not point 
to the greatest weakness in his         
philosophy1--the tendency to overlook   
oppositions and to resolve all          
contradiction into differences of       
degree4 ,hardly had this plan fallen    
through when ,leibniz turned to the     
project of a union of the ,lutheran and 
,reformed branches of the ,protestant   
,church4 ,this scheme was more hopeful1 
and while unrealized during the life of 

our philosopher1 was afterwards         
accomplished4  ,it is noteworthy that   
even before ,leibniz went to ,paris and 
to ,london he had conceived the idea of 
a society of learned men for the        
investigation1 the systematization1 and 
the publication of scientific truth in  
all its varied forms1--a society which  
should in breadth include the whole     
sphere of sciences1 but should not treat
 them as so many isolated disciplines1  
but as members of one system4 ,this idea
 was quickened when ,leibniz saw the    
degree in which it had already been     
realized in the two great               
world-capitals4 ,he never ceased to try 
to introduce similar academies wherever 
he had influence4 ,in #agjj his labors  
bore their fruit in one instance4 ,the  
,academy at ,berlin was founded1 and    
,leibniz was its first1 and indeed      
life-long1 president4 ,but              
disappointment met him at ,vienna1      
,dresden1 and ,st4 ,petersburg1 where he
 proposed similar societies4  ,any      

sketch of ,leibniz's life1 however      
brief1 would be imperfect which did not 
mention the names at least of two       
remarkable women1--remarkable in        
themselves1 and remarkable in their     
friendship with ,leibniz4 ,these were   
,sophia1 grand-daughter of ,james ,i4 of
 ,england 7and thus the link by which   
the ,house of ,brunswick finally came to
 rule over ,great ,britain7 and wife of 
the ,duke of ,brunswick1 and her        
daughter ,sophia ,charlotte1 wife of the
 first king of ,prussia4 ,the latter1 in
 particular1 gave ,leibniz every        
encouragement4 ,she was personally      
deeply interested in all theological and
 philosophical questions4 ,upon her     
death-bed1 in #agje1 she is said to have
 told those about her that they were not
 to mourn for her1 as she should now be 
able to satisfy her desire to learn     
about things which ,leibniz had never   
sufficiently explained4  ,her death     
marks the beginning of a period in      
,leibniz's life which it is not pleasant

 to dwell upon4 ,new rulers arose that  
knew not ,leibniz4 ,it cannot be said   
that from this time till his death in   
,hanover in #agaf ,leibniz had much joy 
or satisfaction4 ,his best friends were 
dead2 his political ambitions were      
disappointed2 he was suspected of       
coldness and unfriendliness by the      
courts both of ,berlin and ,hanover2    
,paris and ,vienna were closed to him1  
so far as any wide influence was        
concerned1 by his religious faith2 the  
controversy with the friends of ,newton 
still followed him4 ,he was a man of the
 most remarkable intellectual gifts1 of 
an energy which could be satisfied only 
with wide fields of action2 and he found
 himself shut in by narrow intrigue to a
 petty round of courtly officialism4 ,it
 is little wonder that the following    
words fell from his lips3 ,germany is   
the only country in the world that does 
not know how to recognize the fame of   
its children and to make that fame      
immortal4 ,it forgets itself2 it forgets

 its own1 unless foreigners make it     
mindful of its own treasures4 ,a ,scotch
 friend of ,leibniz1 who happened to be 
in ,hanover when he died1 wrote that    
,leibniz was buried more like a robber  
than what he really was1--the ornament  
of his country4 ,such was the mortal end
 of the greatest intellectual genius    
since ,aristotle4 ,but genius is not a  
matter to be bounded in life or in death
 by provincial courts4 ,leibniz remains 
a foremost citizen in that ,kingdom of  
,spirits in whose formation he found the
 meaning of the world4     ,,chapter    
,,ii4  ,,the ,,sources ,,of ,,his       
,,philosophy4   ,what is true of all men
 is true of philosophers1 and of        
,leibniz among them4 ,speaking          
generally1 what they are unconsciously  
and fundamentally1 they are through     
absorption of their antecedents and     
surroundings4 ,what they are consciously
 and reflectively1 they are through     
their reaction upon the influence of    
heredity and environment4 ,but there is 

a spiritual line of descent and a       
spiritual atmosphere2 and in speaking of
 a philosopher1 it is with this         
intellectual heredity and environment1  
rather than with the physical1 that we  
are concerned4 ,leibniz was born into a 
period of intellectual activity the most
 teeming with ideas1 the most fruitful  
in results1 of any1 perhaps1 since the  
age of ,pericles4 ,we pride ourselves   
justly upon the activity of our own     
century1 and in diffusion of            
intellectual action and wide-spread     
application of ideas the age of ,leibniz
 could not compare with it4 ,but ours is
 the age of diffusion and application1  
while his was one of fermentation and   
birth4  ,such a period in its earlier   
days is apt to be turbid and unsettled4 
,there is more heat of friction than    
calm light4 ,and such had been the case 
in the hundred years before ,leibniz4   
,but when he arrived at intellectual    
maturity much of the crudity had        
disappeared4 ,the troubling of the      

waters of thought had ceased2 they were 
becoming clarified4 ,bacon1 ,hobbes1    
,descartes1 each had crystallized       
something out of that seething and      
chaotic mass of new ideas which had     
forced itself into ,european            
consciousness4 ,men had been introduced 
into a new world1 and the natural result
 had been feelings of strangeness1 and  
the vagaries of intellectual wanderings4
 ,but by the day of ,leibniz the        
intellectual bearings had been made out 
anew1 the new mental orientation had    
been secured4  ,the marks of this new   
spiritual picture of the universe are   
everywhere to be seen in ,leibniz4 ,his 
philosophy is the dawning consciousness 
of the modern world4 ,in it we see the  
very conception and birth of the modern 
interpretation of the world4 ,the       
history of thought is one continuous    
testimony to the ease with which we     
become hardened to ideas through custom4
 ,ideas are constantly precipitating    
themselves out of the realm of ideas    

into that of ways of thinking and of    
viewing the universe4 ,the problem of   
one century is the axiom of another4    
,what one generation stakes its activity
 upon investigating is quietly taken for
 granted by the next4 ,and so the       
highest reach of intellectual           
inspiration in the sixteenth century is 
to-day the ordinary food of thought1    
accepted without an inquiry as to its   
source1 and almost without a suspicion  
that it has a recent historic origin4   
,we have to go to ,bacon or to ,leibniz 
to see the genesis and growth of those  
ideas which to-day have become          
materialized into axiomatic points of   
view and into hard-and-fast categories  
of thought4 ,in reading ,leibniz the    
idea comes over us in all its freshness 
that there was a time when it was a     
discovery that the world is a universe1 
made after one plan and of one stuff4   
,the ideas of inter-relation1 of the    
harmony of law1 of mutual dependence and
 correspondence1 were not always the    

assumed starting-points of thought2 they
 were once the crowning discoveries of a
 philosophy aglow and almost intoxicated
 with the splendor of its far-reaching  
generalizations4 ,i take these examples 
of the unity of the world1 the          
continuity and interdependence of all   
within it1 because these are the ideas  
which come to their conscious and       
delighted birth in the philosophy of    
,leibniz4 ,we do not put ourselves into 
the right attitude for understanding his
 thought until we remember that these   
ideas--the commonest tools of our       
thinking--were once new and fresh1 and  
in their novelty and transforming       
strangeness were the products of a      
philosophic interpretation of           
experience4 ,except in that later       
contemporary of ,leibniz1 the young and 
enthusiastic ,irish idealist1 ,berkeley1
 ,i know of no historic thinker in whom 
the birth-throes 7joyous1 however7 of a 
new conception of the world are so      
evident as in ,leibniz4 ,but while in   

,berkeley what we see is the young man  
carried away and astounded by the       
grandeur and simplicity of a new way of 
ideas which he has discovered1 what we  
see in ,leibniz is the mature man       
penetrated throughout his being with an 
idea which in its unity answers to the  
unity of the world1 and which in its    
complexity answers1 tone to tone1 to the
 complex harmony of the world4  ,the    
familiarity of the ideas which we use   
hides their grandeur from us4 ,the unity
 of the world is a matter of course with
 us2 the dependent order of all within  
it a mere starting-point upon which to  
base our investigations4 ,but if we will
 put ourselves in the position of       
,leibniz1 and behold1 not the new       
planet1 but the new universe1 so one1 so
 linked together1 swimming into our ken1
 we shall feel something of the same    
exultant thrill that ,leibniz felt1--an 
exultation not indeed personal in its   
nature1 but which arises from the       
expansion of the human mind face to face

 with an expanding world4 ,the spirit   
which is at the heart of the philosophy 
of ,leibniz is the spirit which speaks  
in the following words3 ,quin imo qui   
unam partem materi comprehenderet1 idem 
comprehenderet totum universum ob eandem
 perichrsin quam dixi4 ,mea principia   
talia sunt1 ut vix a se invicem develli 
possint4 ,qui unum bene novit1 omnia    
novit4 ,it is a spirit which feels that 
the secret of the universe has been     
rendered up to it1 and which breathes a 
buoyant optimism4 ,and if we of the     
nineteenth century have chosen to bewail
 the complexity of the problem of life1 
and to run hither and thither           
multiplying insights and points of view 
till this enthusiastic confidence in    
reason seems to us the rashness of an   
ignorance which does not comprehend the 
problem1 and the unity in which ,leibniz
 rested appears cold and abstract beside
 the manifold richness of the world1 we 
should not forget that after all we have
 incorporated into our very mental      

structure the fundamental thoughts of   
,leibniz1--the thoughts of the          
rationality of the universe and of the  
reign of law4  ,what was the origin of  
these ideas in the mind of ,leibniz8    
,what influences in the philosophic     
succession of thinkers led him in this  
direction8 ,what agencies acting in the 
intellectual world about him shaped his 
ideal reproduction of reality8 ,two     
causes above all others stand out with  
prominence1--one1 the discoveries and   
principles of modern physical science2  
the other1 that interpretation of       
experience which centuries before had   
been formulated by ,aristotle4 ,leibniz 
has a double interest for those of      
to-day who reverence science and who    
hold to the historical method4 ,his     
philosophy was an attempt to set in     
order the methods and principles of that
 growing science of nature which even   
then was transforming the emotional and 
mental life of ,europe2 and the attempt 
was guided everywhere by a profound and 

wide-reaching knowledge of the history  
of philosophy4 ,on the first point      
,leibniz was certainly not alone4       
,bacon1 ,hobbes1 ,descartes1 ,spinoza1  
each felt in his own way the fructifying
 touch of the new-springing science1 and
 had attempted under its guidance to    
interpret the facts of nature and of    
man4 ,but ,leibniz stood alone in his   
interest in the history of thought4 ,he 
stands alone indeed till he is greeted  
by his compeers of the nineteenth       
century4 ,to ,bacon previous            
philosophy--the ,greek1 the             
scholastic--was an eidol of the theatre4
 ,the human mind must be freed from its 
benumbing influence4 ,to ,descartes it  
was useless rubbish to be cleared away1 
that we might get a tabula rasa upon    
which to make a fresh start4 ,and shall 
,locke and the empirical ,english       
school1 or ,reid and the ,scotch school1
 or even ,kant1 be the first to throw a 
stone at ,bacon and ,descartes8 ,it was 
reserved to ,leibniz1 with a genius     

almost two centuries in advance of his  
times1 to penetrate the meaning of the  
previous development of reflective      
thought4 ,it would be going beyond our  
brief to claim that ,leibniz was        
interested in this as a historical      
movement1 or that he specially concerned
 himself with the genetic lines which   
connected the various schools of        
thought4 ,but we should come short of   
our duty to ,leibniz if we did not      
recognize his conscious and largely     
successful attempt to apprehend the core
 of truth in all systems1 however alien 
to his own1 and to incorporate it into  
his own thinking4  ,nothing could be    
more characteristic of ,leibniz than his
 saying1 ,i find that most systems are  
right in a good share of that which they
 advance1 but not so much in what they  
deny2 or than this other statement of   
his1 ,we must not hastily believe that  
which the mass of men1 or even of       
authorities1 advance1 but each must     
demand for himself the proofs of the    

thesis sustained4 ,yet long research    
generally convinces that the old and    
received opinions are good1 provided    
they be interpreted justly4 ,it is in   
the profound union in ,leibniz of the   
principles which these quotations image 
that his abiding worth lies4 ,leibniz   
was interested in affirmations1 not in  
denials4 ,he was interested in securing 
the union of the modern method1 the     
spirit of original research and         
independent judgment1 with the conserved
 results of previous thought4 ,leibniz  
was a man of his times2 that is to say1 
he was a scientific man1--the           
contemporary1 for example1 of men as    
different as ,bernouilli1 ,swammerdam1  
,huygens1 and ,newton1 and was himself  
actively engaged in the prosecution of  
mathematics1 mechanics1 geology1        
comparative philology1 and              
jurisprudence4 ,but he was also a man of
 ,aristotle's times1--that is to say1 a 
philosopher1 not satisfied until the    
facts1 principles1 and methods of       

science had received an interpretation  
which should explain and unify them4    
,leibniz's acquaintance with the higher 
forms of mathematics was due1 as we have
 seen1 to his acquaintance with         
,huygens4 ,as he made the acquaintance  
of the latter at the same time that he  
made the acquaintance of the followers  
of ,descartes1 it is likely that he     
received his introduction to the higher 
developments of the scientific          
interpretation of nature and of the     
philosophic interpretation of science at
 about the same time4 ,for a while1     
then1 ,leibniz was a ,cartesian2 and he 
never ceased to call the doctrine of    
,descartes the antechamber of truth4    
,what were the ideas which he received  
from ,descartes8 ,fundamentally they    
were two1--one about the method of      
truth1 the other about the substance of 
truth4 ,he received the idea that the   
method of philosophy consists in the    
analysis of any complex group of ideas  
down to simple ideas which shall be     

perfectly clear and distinct2 that all  
such clear and distinct ideas are true1 
and may then be used for the synthetic  
reconstruction of any body of truth4    
,concerning the substance of philosophic
 truth1 he learned that nature is to be 
interpreted mechanically1 and that the  
instrument of this mechanical           
interpretation is mathematics4 ,i have  
used the term received in speaking of   
the relation of ,leibniz to these ideas4
 ,yet long before this time we might see
 him giving himself up to dreams about a
 vast art of combination which should   
reduce all the ideas concerned in any   
science to their simplest elements1 and 
then combine them to any degree of      
complexity4 ,we have already seen him   
giving us a picture of a boy of fifteen 
gravely disputing with himself whether  
he shall accept the doctrine of forms   
and final causes1 or of physical causes1
 and as gravely deciding that he shall  
side with the moderns2 and that boy was 
himself4 ,in these facts we have renewed

 confirmation of the truth that one mind
 never receives from another anything   
excepting the stimulus1 the reflex1 the 
development of ideas which have already 
possessed it4 ,but when ,leibniz1 with  
his isolated and somewhat ill-digested  
thoughts1 came in contact with that     
systematized and connected body of      
doctrines which the ,cartesians         
presented to him in ,paris1 his ideas   
were quickened1 and he felt the         
necessity--that final mark of the       
philosophic mind--of putting them in    
order4  ,about the method of ,descartes1
 which ,leibniz adopted from him1 or    
rather formulated for himself under the 
influence of ,descartes1 not much need  
be said4 ,it was the method of          
,continental thought till the time of   
,kant4 ,it was the mother of the        
philosophic systems of ,descartes1      
,leibniz1 and ,spinoza4 ,it was equally 
the mother of the ,german ,aufklrung and
 the ,french claircissement4 ,its       
fundamental idea is the thought upon    

which ,rationalism everywhere bases     
itself4 ,it says3 ,reduce everything to 
simple notions4 ,get clearness2 get     
distinctness4 ,analyze the complex4     
,shun the obscure4 ,discover axioms2    
employ these axioms in connection with  
the simple notions1 and build up from   
them4 ,whatever can be treated in this  
way is capable of proof1 and only this4 
,leibniz1 ,i repeat1 possessed this     
method in common with ,descartes and    
,spinoza4 ,the certainty and            
demonstrativeness of mathematics stood  
out in the clearest contrast to the     
uncertainty1 the obscurity1 of all other
 knowledge4 ,and to them1 as to all     
before the days of ,kant1 it seemed     
beyond doubt that the method of         
mathematics consists in the analysis of 
notions1 and in their synthesis through 
the medium of axioms1 which are true    
because identical statements2 while the 
notions are true because clear and      
distinct4  ,and yet the method led      
,leibniz in a very different direction4 

,one of the fundamental doctrines1 for  
example1 of ,leibniz is the existence   
everywhere of minute and obscure        
perceptions1--which are of the greatest 
importance1 but of which we1 at least1  
can never have distinct consciousness4  
,how is this factor of his thought1     
which almost approaches mysticism1 to be
 reconciled with the statements just    
made8 ,it is found in the different     
application which is made of the method4
 ,the object of ,descartes is the       
erection of a new structure of truth    
upon a tabula rasa of all former        
doctrines4 ,the object of ,leibniz is   
the interpretation of an old body of    
truth by a method which shall reveal it 
in its clearest light4 ,descartes and   
,spinoza are rationalists both in their 
method and results4 ,leibniz is a       
rationalist in his method2 but his      
application of the method is everywhere 
controlled by historic considerations4  
,it is1 ,i think1 impossible to         
over-emphasize this fact4 ,descartes was

 profoundly convinced that past thought 
had gone wrong1 and that its results    
were worthless4 ,leibniz was as         
profoundly convinced that its instincts 
had been right1 and that the general    
idea of the world which it gave was     
correct4 ,leibniz would have given the  
heartiest assent to ,goethe's saying1   
,das ,wahre war schon lngst gefunden4   
,it was out of the question1 then1 that 
he should use the new method in any     
other than an interpreting way to bring 
out in a connected system and unity the 
true meaning of the subject-matter4  ,so
 much of generality for the method of   
,leibniz4 ,the positive substance of    
doctrine which he developed under       
scientific influence affords matter for 
more discussion4 ,of the three          
influences which meet us here1 two are  
still ,cartesian2 the third is from the 
new science of biology1 although not yet
 answering to that name4 ,these three   
influences are1 in order3 the idea that 
nature is to be explained mechanically2 

that this is to be brought about through
 the application of mathematics2 and1   
from biology1 the idea that all change  
is of the nature of continuous growth or
 unfolding4 ,let us consider each in    
this order4  ,what is meant by the      
mechanical explanation of nature8 ,to   
answer a question thus baldly put1 we   
must recall the kind of explanations    
which had satisfied the scholastic men  
of science4 ,they had been explanations 
which1 however true1 ,leibniz says1 as  
general principles1 do not touch the    
details of the matter4 ,the explanations
 of natural facts had been found in     
general principles1 in substantial      
forces1 in occult essences1 in native   
faculties4 ,now1 the first contention of
 the founders of the modern scientific  
movement was that such general          
considerations are not verifiable1 and  
that if they are1 they are entirely     
aside from the point1--they fail to     
explain any given fact4 ,explanation    
must always consist in discovering an   

immediate connection between some fact  
and some co-existing or preceding fact4 
,explanation does not consist in        
referring a fact to a general power1 it 
consists in referring it to an          
antecedent whose existence is its       
necessary condition4 ,it was not left   
till the times of ,mr4 ,huxley to poke  
fun at those who would explain some     
concrete phenomenon by reference to an  
abstract principle ending in --ity4     
,leibniz has his word to say about those
 who would account for the movements of 
a watch by reference to a principle of  
horologity1 and of mill-stones by a     
fractive principle4  ,mechanical        
explanation consists1 accordingly1 in   
making out an actual connection between 
two existing facts4 ,but this does not  
say very much4 ,a connection of what    
kind8 ,in the first place1 a connection 
of the same order as the facts observed4
 ,if we are explaining corporeal        
phenomena1 we must find a corporeal     
link2 if we are explaining phenomena of 

motion1 we must find a connection of    
motion4 ,in one of his first            
philosophical works ,leibniz1 in taking 
the mechanical position1 states what he 
means by it4 ,in the ,confession of     
,nature against the ,atheists he says   
that it must be confessed to those who  
have revived the corpuscular theory of  
,democritus and ,epicurus1 to ,galileo1 
,bacon1 ,gassendi1 ,hobbes1 and         
,descartes1 that in explaining material 
phenomena recourse is to be had neither 
to ,god nor to any other incorporeal    
thing1 form1 or quality1 but that all   
things are to be explained from the     
nature of matter and its qualities1     
especially from their magnitude1 figure1
 and motion4 ,the physics of ,descartes1
 to which was especially due the spread 
of mechanical notions1 virtually        
postulated the problem3 given a         
homogeneous quantity of matter1 endowed 
only with extension and mobility1 to    
account for all material phenomena4     
,leibniz accepts this mechanical view   

without reserve4  ,what has been said   
suggests the bearing of mathematics in  
this connection4 ,extension and mobility
 may be treated by mathematics4 ,it is  
indeed the business of the geometer to  
give us an analysis of figured space1 to
 set before us all possible combinations
 which can arise1 assuming extension    
only4 ,the higher analysis sets before  
us the results which inevitably follow  
if we suppose a moving point or any     
system of movements4 ,mathematics is    
thus the essential tool for treating    
physical phenomena as just defined4 ,but
 it is more4 ,the mechanical explanation
 of ,nature not only requires such a    
development of mathematics as will make 
it applicable to the interpretation of  
physical facts1 but the employment of   
mathematics is necessary for the very   
discovery of these facts4 ,exact        
observation was the necessity of the    
growing physical science2 and exact     
observation means such as will answer   
the question1 ,how much8 ,knowledge of  

nature depends upon our ability to      
measure her processes1--that is1 to     
reduce distinctions of quality to those 
of quantity4 ,the only assurance that we
 can finally have that two facts are    
connected in such a way as to fulfil the
 requirements of scientific research1 is
 that there is a complete quantitative  
connection between them1 so that one can
 be regarded as the other transformed4  
,the advance of physical science from   
the days of ,copernicus to the present  
has consisted1 therefore1 on one hand1  
in a development of mathematics which   
has made it possible to apply it in     
greater and greater measure to the      
discussion and formulation of the       
results of experiment1 and to deduce    
laws which1 when interpreted physically1
 will give new knowledge of fact2 and1  
on the other1 to multiply1 sharpen1 and 
make precise all sorts of devices by    
which the processes of nature may be    
measured4 ,the explanation of nature by 
natural processes2 the complete         

application of mathematics to           
nature1--these are the two thoughts     
which1 so far1 we have seen to be       
fundamental to the development of the   
philosophy of ,leibniz4  ,the third     
factor1 and that which brings ,leibniz  
nearer1 perhaps1 our own day than either
 of the others1 is the growth of        
physiological science4 ,swammerdam1     
,malpighi1 ,leewenhoek1--these are names
 which occur and recur in the pages of  
,leibniz4 ,indeed1 he appears to be the 
first of that now long line of modern   
philosophers to be profoundly influenced
 by the conception of life and the      
categories of organic growth4 ,descartes
 concerned himself indeed with          
physiological problems1 but it was only 
with a view to applying mechanical      
principles4 ,the idea of the vital unity
 of all organs of the body might seem to
 be attractive to one filled with the   
notion of the unity of all in ,god1 and 
yet ,spinoza shows no traces of the     
influence of the organic conception4    

,not until ,kant's famous definition of 
organism do we see another philosopher  
moved by an attempt to comprehend the   
categories of living structure4  ,but it
 is the idea of organism1 of life1 which
 is radical to the thought of ,leibniz4 
,i do not think1 however1 that it can   
truly be said that he was led to the    
idea simply from the state of           
physiological investigation at that     
time4 ,rather1 he had already learned to
 think of the world as organic through  
and through1 and found in the results of
 biology confirmations1 apt             
illustrations of a truth of which he was
 already thoroughly convinced4 ,his     
writings show that there were two       
aspects of biological science which     
especially interested him4 ,one was the 
simple fact of organism itself1--the    
fact of the various activities of       
different organs occurring in complete  
harmony for one end4 ,this presented    
three notions very dear to the mind of  
,leibniz1 or rather three moments of the

 same idea1--the factors of activity1 of
 unity brought about by co-ordinated    
action1 and of an end which reveals the 
meaning of the activity and is the ideal
 expression of the unity4 ,the          
physiologists of that day were also     
occupied with the problem of growth4    
,the generalization that all is         
developed ab ovo was just receiving     
universal attention4 ,the question which
 thrust itself upon science for solution
 was the mode by which ova1 apparently  
homogeneous in structure1 developed into
 the various forms of the organic       
kingdom4 ,the answer given was          
evolution4 ,but evolution had not the   
meaning which the term has to-day4 ,by  
evolution was meant that the whole      
complex structure of man1 for example1  
was virtually contained in the germ1 and
 that the apparent phenomenon of growth 
was not the addition of anything from   
without1 but simply the unfolding and   
magnifying of that already existing4 ,it
 was the doctrine which afterwards gave 

way to the epigenesis theory of ,wolff1 
according to which growth is not mere   
unfolding or unwrapping1 but progressive
 differentiation4 ,the evolution theory 
was the scientific theory of the times1 
however1 and was warmly espoused by     
,leibniz4 ,to him1 as we shall see      
hereafter1 it seemed to give a key which
 would unlock one of the problems of the
 universe4  ,such1 then1 were the three 
chief generalizations which ,leibniz    
found current1 and which most deeply    
affected him4 ,but what use did he make 
of them8 ,he did not become a           
philosopher by letting them lie dormant 
in his mind1 nor by surrendering himself
 passively to them till he could        
mechanically apply them everywhere4 ,he 
was a philosopher only in virtue of the 
active attitude which his mind took     
towards them4 ,he could not simply      
accept them at their face-value2 he must
 ask after the source of their value1   
the royal stamp of meaning which made   
them a circulatory medium4 ,that is to  

say1 he had to interpret these ideas1 to
 see what they mean1 and what is the    
basis of their validity4  ,not many men 
have been so conscious of just the      
bearings of their own ideas and of their
 source as was he4 ,he often allows us a
 direct glimpse into the method of his  
thinking1 and nowhere more than when he 
says3 ,those who give themselves up to  
the details of science usually despise  
abstract and general researches4 ,those 
who go into universal principles rarely 
care for particular facts4 ,but ,i      
equally esteem both4 ,leibniz1 in other 
words1 was equally interested in the    
application of scientific principles to 
the explanation of the details of       
natural phenomena1 and in the bearing   
and meaning of the principles           
themselves1--a rare combination1 indeed1
 but one1 which existing1 stamps the    
genuine philosopher4 ,leibniz           
substantially repeats this idea when he 
says3 ,particular effects must be       
explained mechanically2 but the general 

principles of physics and mathematics   
depend upon metaphysics4 ,and again3    
,all occurs mechanically2 but the       
mechanical principle is not to be       
explained from material and mathematical
 considerations1 but it flows from a    
higher and a metaphysical source4  ,as a
 man of science1 ,leibniz might have    
stopped short with the ideas of         
mechanical law1 of the application of   
mathematics1 and of the continuity of   
development4 ,as a philosopher he could 
not4 ,there are some scientific men to  
whom it always seems a perversion of    
their principles to attempt to carry    
them any beyond their application to the
 details of the subject4 ,they look on  
in a bewildered and protesting attitude 
when there is suggested the necessity of
 any further inquiry4 ,or perhaps they  
dogmatically deny the possibility of any
 such investigation1 and as dogmatically
 assume the sufficiency of their        
principles for the decision of all      
possible problems4 ,but bewildered fear 

and dogmatic assertion are equally      
impotent to fix arbitrary limits to     
human thought4 ,wherever there is a     
subject that has meaning1 there is a    
field which appeals to mind1 and the    
mind will not cease its endeavors till  
it has made out what that meaning is1   
and has made it out in its entirety4 ,so
 the three principles already spoken of 
were but the starting-points1 the       
stepping-stones of ,leibniz's           
philosophic thought4 ,while to physical 
science they are solutions1 to          
philosophy they are problems2 and as    
such ,leibniz recognized them4 ,what    
solution did he give8  ,so far as the   
principle of mechanical explanation is  
concerned1 the clew is given by         
considering the factor upon which he    
laid most emphasis1 namely1 motion4     
,descartes had said that the essence of 
the physical world is extension4 ,not   
so1 replied ,leibniz2 ,it is motion4    
,these answers mark two typical ways of 
regarding nature4 ,according to one1    

nature is something essentially rigid   
and static2 whatever change in it       
occurs1 is a change of form1 of         
arrangement1 an external modification4  
,according to the other1 nature is      
something essentially dynamic and       
active4 ,change according to law is its 
very essence4 ,form1 arrangement are    
only the results of this internal       
principle4 ,and so to ,leibniz1         
extension and the spatial aspects of    
physical existence were only secondary1 
they were phenomenal4 ,the primary1 the 
real fact was motion4  ,the             
considerations which led him to this    
conclusion are simple enough4 ,it is the
 fact already mentioned1 that           
explanation always consists in reducing 
phenomena to a law of motion which      
connects them4 ,descartes himself had   
not succeeded in writing his physics    
without everywhere using the conception 
of motion4 ,but motion cannot be got out
 of the idea of extension4 ,geometry    
will not give us activity4 ,what is     

this1 except virtually to admit the     
insufficiency of purely statical        
conceptions8 ,leibniz found himself     
confirmed in this position by the fact  
that the more logical of the followers  
of ,descartes had recognized that motion
 is a superfluous intruder1 if extension
 be indeed the essence of matter1 and   
therefore had been obliged to have      
recourse to the immediate activity of   
,god as the cause of all changes4 ,but  
this1 as ,leibniz said1 was simply to   
give up the very idea of mechanical     
explanation1 and to fall back into the  
purely general explanations of          
scholasticism4  ,this is not the place  
for a detailed exposition of the ideas  
of ,leibniz regarding matter1 motion1   
and extension4 ,we need here only       
recognize that he saw in motion the     
final reality of the physical universe4 
,but what about motion8 ,to many1       
perhaps the majority1 of minds to-day it
 seems useless or absurd1 or both1 to   
ask any question about motion4 ,it is   

simply an ultimate fact1 to which all   
other facts are to be reduced4 ,we are  
so familiar with it as a solution of all
 physical problems that we are confused1
 and fail to recognize it when it       
appears in the guise of a problem4 ,but1
 ,i repeat1 philosophy cannot stop with 
facts1 however ultimate4 ,it must also  
know something about the meaning1 the   
significance1 in short the ideal        
bearing1 of facts4 ,from the point of   
view of philosophy1 motion has a certain
 function in the economy of the         
universe2 it is1 as ,aristotle saw1     
something ideal4  ,the name of          
,aristotle suggests the principles which
 guided ,leibniz in his interpretation  
of the fact of motion4 ,the thought of  
,aristotle moves about the two poles of 
potentiality and actuality4             
,potentiality is not mere capacity2 it  
is being in an undeveloped1 imperfect   
stage4 ,actuality is1 as the word       
suggests1 activity4 ,anything is        
potential in so far as it does not      

manifest itself in action2 it is actual 
so far as it does thus show forth its   
being4 ,now1 movement1 or change in its 
most general sense1 is that by which the
 potential comes to the realization of  
its nature1 and functions as an         
activity4 ,motion1 then1 is not an      
ultimate fact1 but is subordinate4 ,it  
exists for an end4 ,it is that by which 
existence realizes its idea2 that is1   
its proper type of action4  ,now        
,leibniz does not formally build upon   
these distinctions2 and yet he is not   
very far removed from ,aristotle4       
,motion1 he is never weary of repeating1
 means force1 means energy1 means       
activity4 ,to say that the essence of   
nature is motion1 is to say that the    
natural world finally introduces us to  
the supremacy of action4 ,reality is    
activity4 ,substance c'est l'action4    
,that is the key-note and the battle-cry
 of the ,leibnizian philosophy4 ,motion 
is that by which being expresses its    
nature1 fulfils its purpose1 reveals its

 idea4 ,in short1 the specific          
scientific conception of motion is by   
,leibniz transformed into the           
philosophic conception of force1 of     
activity4 ,in motion he sees evidence of
 the fact that the universe is radically
 dynamic4  ,in the applicability of     
mathematics to the interpretation of    
nature ,leibniz finds witness to the    
continuity and order of the world4 ,we  
have become so accustomed to the fact   
that mathematics may be directly        
employed for the discussion and         
formulation of physical investigations  
that we forget what is implied in it4   
,it involves the huge assumption that   
the world answers to reason2 so that    
whatever the mind finds to be ideally   
true may be taken for granted to be     
physically true also4 ,but in those     
days1 when the correlation of the laws  
of the world and the laws of            
mathematical reasoning was a fresh      
discovery1 this aspect of the case could
 not be easily lost sight of4  ,in fact 

it was this correlation which filled the
 ,zeitgeist of the sixteenth century    
with the idea that it had a new organ   
for the penetration of nature1 a new    
sense for learning its meaning4         
,descartes gives the following as the   
origin of his philosophy3 ,the long     
chains of simple and easy reasons which 
geometers employ1 even in their most    
complex demonstrations1 made me fancy   
that all things which are the objects of
 human knowledge are similarly          
interdependent4 ,to ,leibniz also       
mathematics seemed to give a clew to the
 order1 the interdependence1 the        
harmonious relations1 of the world4  ,in
 this respect the feeling of ,plato that
 ,god geometrizes found an echoing      
response in ,leibniz4 ,but the latter   
would hardly have expressed it in the   
same way4 ,he would have preferred to   
say that ,god everywhere uses the       
infinitesimal calculus4 ,in the         
applicability of the calculus to the    
discussion of physical facts1 ,leibniz  

saw two truths reflected1--that         
everything that occurs has its reason1  
its dependent connection upon something 
else1 and that all is continuous and    
without breaks4 ,while the formal       
principles of his logic are those of    
identity and contradiction1 his real    
principles are those of sufficient      
reason and of continuity4 ,nature never 
makes leaps2 everything in nature has a 
sufficient reason why it is as it is3   
these are the philosophic               
generalizations which ,leibniz finds    
hidden in the applicability of          
mathematics to physical science4 ,reason
 finds itself everywhere expressed in   
nature2 and the law of reason is unity  
in diversity1 continuity4  ,let us say1 
in a word1 that the correlation between 
the laws of mathematics and of physics  
is the evidence of the rational         
character of nature4 ,nature may be     
reduced to motions2 and motions can be  
understood only as force1 activity4 ,but
 the laws which connect motions are     

fundamentally mathematical laws1--laws  
of reason4 ,hence force1 activity1 can  
be understood only as rational1 as      
spiritual4 ,nature is thus seen to mean 
,activity1 and ,activity is seen to mean
 ,intelligence4 ,furthermore1 as the    
fundamental law of intelligence is the  
production of difference in unity1 the  
primary law of physical change must be  
the manifestation of this unity in      
difference1--or1 as ,leibniz interpreted
 it1 continuity4 ,in nature there are no
 breaks1 neither of quantity nor of     
quality nor of relationship4 ,the full  
force of this law we shall see later4   
,such an idea can hardly be             
distinguished from the idea of growth or
 development2 one passes naturally into 
the other4 ,thus it is equally proper to
 say that the third scientific          
influence1 the conception of organism   
and growth1 is dominant in the          
,leibnizian thought1 or that this is    
swallowed up and absorbed in the grand  
idea of continuity4 ,the law of animal  

and vegetable life and the law of the   
universe are identified4 ,the substance 
of the universe is activity2 the law of 
the universe is interdependence4 ,what  
is this but to say that the universe is 
an organic whole8 ,its activity is the  
manifestation of life1--nay1 it is life4
 ,the laws of its activity reveal that  
continuity of development1 that harmony 
of inter-relation1 which are everywhere 
the marks of life4 ,the final and       
fundamental notion1 therefore1 by which 
,leibniz interprets the laws of physics 
and mathematics is that of ,life4 ,this 
is his regnant category4 ,it is that    
higher and metaphysical source from     
which the very existence and principles 
of mechanism flow4 ,the perpetual and   
ubiquitous presence of motion reveals   
the pulsations of ,life2 the            
correlation1 the rationality1 of these  
motions indicate the guiding presence of
 ,life4 ,this idea is the alpha and     
omega of his philosophy4     ,,chapter  
,,iii4  ,,the ,,problem1 ,,and ,,its    

,,solution4   ,leibniz1 like every great
 man1 absorbed into himself the various 
thoughts of his time1 and in absorbing  
transformed them4 ,he brought into a    
focus of brilliancy the diffused lights 
of truth shining here and there4 ,he    
summed up in a pregnant and             
comprehensive category the scattered    
principles of his age4 ,yet we are not  
to suppose that ,leibniz considered     
these various ideas one by one1 and then
 patched them into an artificial unity  
of thought4 ,philosophies are not       
manufactured piecemeal out of isolated  
and fragmentary thoughts2 they grow from
 a single root1 absorbing from their    
environment whatever of sustenance      
offers itself1 and maturing in one      
splendid fruit of spiritual truth4 ,it  
is convenient1 indeed1 to isolate       
various phases of truth1 and consider   
them as distinct forces working to shape
 one final product1 and as a convenient 
artifice it is legitimate4 ,but it      
answers to no process actually          

occurring4 ,leibniz never surrendered   
his personal unity1 and out of some one 
root-conception grew all his ideas4 ,the
 principles of his times were not       
separate forces acting upon him1 they   
were the foods of which he selected and 
assimilated such as were fitted to      
nourish his one great conception4  ,but 
it is more than a personal unity which  
holds together the thinking of a        
philosopher4 ,there is the unity of the 
problem1 which the philosopher has      
always before him1 and in which all     
particular ideas find their unity4 ,all 
else issues from this and merges into   
it4 ,the various influences which we    
have seen affecting ,leibniz1 therefore1
 got their effectiveness from the       
relation which he saw them bear to the  
final problem of all thought4 ,this is  
the inquiry after the unity of          
experience1 if we look at it from the   
side of the subject2 the unity of       
reality1 if we put it from the objective
 side4 ,yet each age states this problem

 in its own way1 because it sees it in  
the light of some difficulty which has  
recently arisen in consciousness4 ,at   
one time1 the question is as to the     
relation of the one to the many2 at     
another1 of the relation of the sensible
 to the intelligible world2 at another1 
of the relation of the individual to the
 universal4 ,and this last seems to have
 been the way in which it specifically  
presented itself to ,leibniz4 ,this way 
of stating it was developed1 though     
apparently without adequate realization 
of its meaning1 by the philosophy of    
scholasticism4 ,it stated the problem as
 primarily a logical question1--the     
relation of genera1 of species1 of      
individuals to each other4 ,and the     
school-boy1 made after the stamp of     
literary tradition1 knows that there    
were two parties among the              
,schoolmen1--the ,realists1 and the     
,nominalists2 one asserting1 the other  
denying1 the objective reality of       
universals4 ,to regard this discussion  

as useless1 is to utter the condemnation
 of philosophy1 and to relegate the     
foundation of science to the realm of   
things not to be inquired into4 ,to say 
that it is an easy matter to decide1 is 
to assume the decision with equal ease  
of all the problems that have vexed the 
thought of humanity4 ,to us it seems    
easy because we have bodily incorporated
 into our thinking the results of both  
the realistic and the nominalistic      
doctrines1 without attempting to        
reconcile them1 or even being conscious 
of the necessity of reconciliation4 ,we 
assert in one breath that the individual
 is alone real1 and in the next assert  
that only those forms of consciousness  
which represent something in the        
universe are to be termed knowledge4 ,at
 one moment we say that universals are  
creations of the individual mind1 and at
 the next pass on to talk of laws of    
nature1 or even of a reign of law4 ,in  
other words1 we have learned to regard  
both the individual and the universal as

 real1 and thus ignoring the problem1   
think we have solved it4  ,but to       
,leibniz the problem presented itself   
neither as a logical question1 nor yet  
as one whose solution might be taken for
 granted4 ,on the contrary1 it was just 
this question3 ,how shall we conceive   
the individual to be related to the     
universe8 which seemed to him to be the 
nerve of the philosophic problem1 the   
question whose right answer would solve 
the problems of religion1 of morals1 of 
the basis of science1 as well as of the 
nature of reality4 ,the importance of   
just this way of putting the question   
had been rendered evident by the        
predecessors and contemporaries of      
,leibniz1 especially by ,descartes1     
,spinoza1 and ,locke4 ,his more specific
 relations to the last-named will occupy
 us hereafter2 at present we must notice
 how the question stood at the hands of 
,descartes and ,spinoza4  ,descartes had
 separated the individual from the      
universal4 ,his philosophy began and    

ended with a dualism4 ,i have just said 
that the problem of philosophy is the   
unity of experience4 ,yet we find that  
there have been thinkers1 and those of  
the first rank1 who have left the matter
 without discovering any ultimate unity1
 or rather who have made it the burden  
of their contention that we cannot      
explain the world without at least two  
disparate principles4 ,but if we        
continue to look at the matter in this  
historical way1 we shall see that this  
dualism has always been treated by the  
successors of such a philosopher1 not as
 a solution1 but as a deeper statement  
of the problem4 ,it is the function of  
dualistic philosophies to re-state the  
question in a new and more significant  
way4 ,there are times when the accepted 
unity of thought is seen to be          
inadequate and superficial4 ,men are    
thrashing old straw1 and paying         
themselves with ideas which have lost   
their freshness and their timeliness4   
,there then arises a philosopher who    

goes deep1 beyond the superficial unity1
 and who discovers the untouched        
problem4 ,his it is to assert the true  
meaning of the question1 which has been 
unseen or evaded4 ,the attitude of      
dualism is thus always necessary1 but   
never final4 ,its value is not in any   
solution1 but in the generality and     
depth of the problem which it proposes1 
and which incites thought to the        
discovery of a unity of equal depth and 
comprehensiveness4  ,except for         
,descartes1 then1 we should not be      
conscious of the gulf that yawns between
 the individual mind and the universe in
 front of it4 ,he presented the         
opposition as between mind and matter4  
,the essence of the former is thought2  
of the latter1 extension4 ,the          
conceptions are disparate and opposed4  
,no interaction is possible4 ,his       
disciples1 more consistent than their   
master1 called in a deus ex             
machina1--the miraculous intervention of
 ,god1--in order to account for the     

appearance of reciprocal action between 
the universe of matter and the thinking 
individual4 ,thus they in substance     
admitted the relation between them to be
 scientifically inexplicable1 and had   
recourse to the supernatural4 ,the      
individual does not act upon the        
universe to produce1 destroy1 or alter  
the arrangement of anything4 ,but upon  
the occasion of his volition ,god       
produces a corresponding material       
change4 ,the world does not act upon the
 soul of the individual to produce      
thoughts or sensations4 ,god1 upon      
occasion of the external affection1     
brings them into being4 ,with such      
thoroughness ,descartes performed his   
task of separation4 ,yet the            
introduction of the deus ex machina only
 complicated the problem2 it introduced 
a third factor where two were already   
too many4 ,what is the relation of ,god 
to ,mind and to ,matter8 ,is it simply a
 third somewhat1 equally distinct from  
both1 or does it contain both within    

itself8  ,spinoza attempted to solve the
 problem in the latter sense4 ,he       
conceived ,god to be the one substance  
of the universe1 possessing the two     
known attributes of thought and matter4 
,these attributes are one in ,god2      
indeed1 he is their unity4 ,this is the 
sole legitimate outcome of the          
,cartesian problem stated as ,descartes 
would have it stated4 ,it overcomes the 
absoluteness of the dualism by          
discovering a common and fundamental    
unity1 and at the same time takes the   
subject out of the realm of the         
miraculous4 ,for the solution works both
 ways4 ,it affects the nature of ,god1  
as well as of extension and thought4 ,it
 presents him to us1 not as a           
supernatural being1 but as the unity of 
thought and extension4 ,in knowing these
 as they are1 we know ,god as he is4    
,spinoza1 in other words1 uses the      
conception of ,god in a different way   
from the ,cartesians4 ,the latter had   
treated him as the ,god of theology1--a 

being supernatural2 ,spinoza uses the   
conception as a scientific one1 and     
speaks of ,deus sive ,natura4  ,leibniz 
recognized the unphilosophic character  
of the recourse to a deus ex machina as 
clearly as ,spinoza1 and yet did not    
accept his solution4 ,to find out why he
 did not is the problem of the historian
 of thought4 ,the one cause which stands
 out above all others is that in the    
unity of ,spinoza all difference1 all   
distinction1 is lost4 ,all particular   
existences1 whether things or persons1  
are modes of extension and thought4     
,their apparent existence is due to the 
imagination1 which is the source of     
belief in particular things4 ,when      
considered as they really are1--that is1
 by the understanding1--they vanish4    
,the one substance1 with its two        
unchanging attributes of thought and    
extension1 alone remains4 ,if it is a   
philosophic error to give a solution    
which permits of no unity1 is it not    
equally a philosophic error to give one 

which denies difference8 ,so it seemed  
to ,leibniz4 ,the problem is to         
reconcile difference in unity1 not to   
swallow up difference in a blank        
oneness1--to reconcile the individual   
with the universe1 not to absorb him4   
,the unsatisfactoriness of the solution 
appears if we look at it from another   
side4 ,difference implies change1 while 
a unity in which all variety is lost    
implies quiescence4 ,change is as much  
an illusion of imagination to ,spinoza  
as is variety4 ,the ,one ,reality is    
permanent4 ,how repugnant the conception
 of a static universe was to ,leibniz we
 have already learned4 ,spinoza fails to
 satisfy ,leibniz1 therefore1 because he
 does not allow the conceptions of      
individuality and of activity4 ,he      
presents a unity in which all           
distinction of individuals is lost1 and 
in which there is no room for change4   
,but ,spinoza certainly presented the   
problem more clearly to ,leibniz1 and   
revealed more definitely the conditions 

of its solution4 ,the search is         
henceforth for a unity which shall avoid
 the irresolvable dualism of ,descartes1
 and yet shall allow free play to the   
principles of individuality and of      
activity4 ,there must be1 in short1 a   
universe to which the individual bears a
 real yet independent relation4 ,what is
 this unity8 ,the answer1 in the        
phraseology of ,leibniz1 is the monad4  
,spinoza would be right1 said ,leibniz1 
were it not for the existence of monads4
 ,i know there are some who have done   
,leibniz the honor of supposing that    
this is his way of saying1 ,spinoza is  
wrong because ,i am right2 but ,i cannot
 help thinking that the saying has a    
somewhat deeper meaning4 ,what1 then1 is
 the nature of the monad8 ,the answer to
 this question takes us back to the     
point where the discussion of the       
question was left at the end of chapter 
second4 ,the nature of the monad is     
life4 ,the monad is the spiritual       
activity which lives in absolute harmony

 with an infinite number of other       
monads4  ,let us first consider the     
reasons of ,leibniz for conceiving the  
principle of unity as spiritual4        
,primarily it is because it is          
impossible to conceive of a unity which 
is material4 ,in the sensible world     
there is no unity4 ,there are1 indeed1  
aggregations1 collections1 which seem   
like unities2 but the very fact that    
these are aggregations shows that the   
unity is factitious4 ,it is the very    
nature of matter to be infinitely       
divisible3 to say this is to deny the   
existence of any true principle of      
unity4 ,the world of nature is the world
 of space and time2 and where in space  
or time shall we find a unity where we  
may rest8 ,every point in space1 every  
moment in time1 points beyond itself4   
,it refers to a totality of which it is 
but a part1 or1 rather1 a limitation4   
,if we add resistance1 we are not better
 situated4 ,we have to think of         
something which resists2 and to this    

something we must attribute             
extension1--that is to say1 difference1 
plurality4 ,nor can we find any         
resistance which is absolute and final4 
,there may be a body which is undivided1
 and which resists all energy now acting
 upon it2 but we cannot frame an        
intelligible idea of a body which is    
absolutely indivisible4 ,to do so is to 
think of a body out of all relation to  
existing forces1 something absolutely   
isolated2 while the forces of nature are
 always relative to one another4 ,that  
which resists does so in comparison with
 some opposing energy4 ,the absolutely  
indivisible1 on the other hand1 would be
 that which could not be brought into   
comparison with other forces2 it would  
not have any of the attributes of force 
as we know it4 ,in a word1 whatever     
exists in nature is relative in space1  
in time1 and in qualities to all else4  
,it is made what it is by virtue of the 
totality of its relations to the        
universe2 it has no ultimate principle  

of self-subsistent unity in it4  ,nor do
 we fare better if we attempt to find   
unity in the world of nature as a whole4
 ,nature has its existence as a whole in
 space and time4 ,indeed1 it is only a  
way of expressing the totality of       
phenomena of space and time4 ,it is a   
mere aggregate1 a collection4 ,its very 
essence is plurality1 difference4 ,it is
 divisible without limit1 and each of   
its divisions has as good a right to be 
called one as the whole from which it is
 broken off4 ,we shall consider         
hereafter ,leibniz's idea of infinity2  
but it is easy to see that he must deny 
any true infinity to nature4 ,an        
ultimate whole made up of parts is a    
contradictory conception2 and the idea  
of a quantitative infinite is equally   
so4 ,quantity means number1 measure1    
limitation4 ,we may not be able to      
assign number to the totality of        
occurrences in nature1 nor to measure   
her every event4 ,this shows that nature
 is indefinitely greater than any       

assignable quantity2 but it does not    
remove her from the category of         
quantity4 ,as long as the world is      
conceived as that existing in space and 
time1 it is conceived as that which has 
to be measured4 ,as we saw in the last  
chapter1 the heart of the mechanical    
theory of the world is in the           
application of mathematics to it4 ,since
 quantity and mathematics are           
correlative terms1 the natural world    
cannot be conceived as infinite or as an
 ultimate unity4  ,in short1 ,leibniz   
urges and suggests in one form and      
another those objections to the         
mechanical theory of reality which later
 ,german philosophers have made us so   
familiar with4 ,the objections are      
indeed varied in statement1 but they all
 come to the impossibility of finding   
any unity1 any wholeness1 anything      
except plurality and partiality in that 
which is externally conditioned1--as    
everything is in nature4  ,but the      
reasons as thus stated are rather       

negative than positive4 ,they show why  
the ultimate unity cannot be conceived  
as material1 rather than why it must be 
conceived as spiritual4 ,the immediate  
evidence of its spiritual nature        
,leibniz finds in the perception of the 
one unity directly known to us1--the me1
 the conscious principle within1 which  
reveals itself as an active force1 and  
as truly one1 since not a spatial or    
temporal existence4 ,and this evidence  
he finds confirmed by the fact that     
whatever unity material phenomena appear
 to have comes to them through their    
perception by the soul4 ,whatever the   
mind grasps in one act1 is manifested as
 one4  ,but it is not in any immediate  
certainty of fact that ,leibniz finds   
the best or completest demonstration of 
the spiritual nature of the ultimate    
unity4 ,this is found in the use which  
can be made of the hypothesis4 ,the     
truest witness to the spiritual         
character of reality is found in the    
capacity of this principle to comprehend

 and explain the facts of experience4   
,with this conception the reason of     
things can be ascertained1 and light    
introduced into what were otherwise a   
confused obscurity4 ,and1 indeed1 this  
is the only sufficient proof of any     
doctrine4 ,it is not what comes before  
the formulation of a theory which proves
 it2 it is not the facts which suggest  
it1 or the processes which lead up to   
it3 it is what comes after the formation
 of the theory1--the uses that it can be
 put to2 the facts which it will render 
significant4 ,the whole philosophy of   
,leibniz in its simplicity1 width1 and  
depth1 is the real evidence of the truth
 of his philosophical principle4  ,the  
monad1 then1 is a spiritual unity2 it is
 individualized life4 ,unity1 activity1 
individuality are synonymous terms in   
the vocabulary of ,leibniz4 ,every unity
 is a true substance1 containing within 
itself the source and law of its own    
activity4 ,it is that which is          
internally determined to action4 ,it is 

to be conceived after the analogy of the
 soul4 ,it is an indivisible unity1 like
 that particular something in us which  
thinks1 apperceives and wills1 and      
distinguishes us in a way of its own    
from whatever else thinks and wills4    
,against ,descartes1 therefore1 ,leibniz
 stands for the principle of unity2     
against ,spinoza1 he upholds the        
doctrine of individuality1 of diversity1
 of multiplicity4 ,and the latter       
principle is as important in his thought
 as the former4 ,indeed1 they are       
inseparable4 ,the individual is the true
 unity4 ,there is an infinite number of 
these individuals1 each distinct from   
every other4 ,the law of specification1 
of distinction1 runs through the        
universe4 ,two beings cannot be alike4  
,they are not individualized merely by  
their different positions in space or   
time2 duration and extension1 on the    
contrary1 are1 as we have seen1         
principles of relativity1 of connection4
 ,monads are specified by an internal   

principle4 ,their distinct individuality
 is constituted by their distinct law of
 activity4 ,leibniz will not have a     
philosophy of abstract unity1           
representing the universe as simple     
only1 he will have a philosophy equal to
 the diversity1 the manifold wealth of  
variety1 in the universe4 ,this is only 
to say that he will be faithful to his  
fundamental notion1--that of ,life4     
,life does not mean a simple unity like 
a mathematical one1 it means a unity    
which is the harmony of the interplay of
 diverse organs1 each following its own 
law and having its own function4 ,when  
,leibniz says1 ,god willed to have more 
monads rather than fewer1 the expression
 is indeed one of navet1 but the thought
 is one of unexplored depth4 ,it is the 
thought that ,leibniz repeats when he   
says1 ,those who would reduce all things
 to modifications of one universal      
substance do not have sufficient regard 
to the order1 the harmony of reality4   
,leibniz applies here1 as everywhere1   

the principle of continuity1 which is   
unity in and through diversity1 not the 
principle of bare oneness4 ,there is a  
kingdom of monads1 a realm truly        
infinite1 composed of individual unities
 or activities in an absolute           
continuity4 ,leibniz was one of the     
first1 if not the first1 to use just the
 expression uniformity of nature2 but   
even here he explains that it means     
uniform in variety1 one in principle1   
but varied in manifestation4 ,the world 
is to be as rich as possible4 ,this is  
simply to say that distinct             
individuality as well as ultimate unity 
is a law of reality4  ,but has not      
,leibniz fallen into a perilous         
position8 ,in avoiding the monotone of  
unity which characterizes the thought of
 ,spinoza1 has he not fallen into a     
lawless variety of multiplicity1        
infinitely less philosophic than even   
the dualism of ,descartes1 since it has 
an infinity of ultimate principles      
instead of only two8 ,if ,spinoza       

sacrificed the individual to the        
universe1 has not ,leibniz1 in his      
desire to emphasize the individual1 gone
 to the other extreme8 ,apparently we   
are introduced to a universe that is a  
mere aggregate of an infinite           
multiplicity of realities1 each         
independent of every other4 ,such a     
universe would not be a universe4 ,it   
would be a chaos of disorder and        
conflict4 ,we come1 therefore1 to a     
consideration of the relation between   
these individual monads and the         
universe4 ,we have to discover what     
lifts the monads out of their isolation 
and bestows upon them that stamp of     
universality which makes it possible for
 them to enter into the coherent        
structure of reality3 in a word1 what is
 the universal content which the monad  
in its formal individuality bears and   
manifests8  ,the way in which the       
question has just been stated suggests  
the ,leibnizian answer4 ,the monad1     
indeed1 in its form is thoroughly       

individual1 having its own unique mode  
of activity2 but its content1 that which
 this activity manifests1 is not        
peculiar to it as an individual1 but is 
the substance or law of the universe4   
,it is the very nature of the monad to  
be representative4 ,its activity        
consists in picturing or reproducing    
those relations which make up the world 
of reality4 ,in a conscious soul1 the   
ability thus to represent the world is  
called perception1 and thus ,leibniz    
attributes perception to all the monads4
 ,this is not to be understood as a     
conscious representation of reality to  
itself 7for this the term apperception  
is reserved71 but it signifies that the 
very essence of the monad is to produce 
states which are not its own peculiar   
possessions1 but which reflect the facts
 and relations of the universe4 ,leibniz
 never wearies in finding new ways to   
express this purely representative      
character of the monad4 ,the monads are 
little souls2 they are mirrors of the   

world2 they are concentrations of the   
universe1 each expressing it in its own 
way2 borrowing a term from              
scholasticism1 they are substantial     
forms4 ,they are substantial1 for they  
are independent unities2 they are forms1
 because the term form expresses1 in    
,aristotelian phraseology1 the type or  
law of some class of phenomena4 ,the    
monad is an individual1 but its whole   
content1 its objectivity or reality1 is 
the summation of the universe which it  
represents4 ,it is individual1 but      
whatever marks it as actual is some     
reproduction of the world4 ,his         
reconciliation of the principles of     
individuality and universality is       
contained in the following words3 ,each 
monad contains within itself an order   
corresponding to that of the            
universe1--indeed1 the monads represent 
the universe in an infinity of ways1 all
 different1 and all true1 thus          
multiplying the universe as many times  
as is possible1 approaching the divine  

as near as may be1 and giving the world 
all the perfection of which it is       
capable4 ,the monad is individual1 for  
it represents reality in its own way1   
from its own point of view4 ,it is      
universal1 for its whole content is the 
order of the universe4  ,new light is   
thus thrown upon the former statement   
that reality is activity1 that the      
measure of a being is the action which  
it puts forth4 ,that statement is purely
 formal4 ,it leaves the kind of activity
 and its law wholly undetermined4 ,but  
this relation of representativeness     
which we have discovered gives          
definiteness4 ,it is the law of the     
monad's action to mirror1 to reflect1   
the universe2 its changes follow each   
other so as to bring about this         
reflection in the completest degree     
possible4 ,the monad is literally the   
many in the one2 it is the answer to the
 inquiry of ,greek philosophy4 ,the many
 are not present by way of participation
 in some underlying essence1 not yet as 

statically possessed by the one1 as     
attributes are sometimes supposed to    
inhere in a substratum4 ,the many is the
 manifestation of the activity of the   
one4 ,the one and the many are related  
as form and content in an organic unity1
 which is activity4 ,the essence of a   
substance1 says ,leibniz1 consists in   
that regular tendency of action by which
 its phenomena follow one another in a  
certain order2 and that order1 as he    
repeatedly states1 is the order in which
 the universe itself is arranged4  ,the 
activity of a monad may be              
advantageously compared to that of a    
supposed atom1 granting1 for the sake of
 the illustration1 that there is such a 
thing4 ,each is in a state of change3   
the atom changes its place1 the monad   
its representation1 and each in the     
simplest and most uniform way that its  
conditions permit4 ,how1 then1 is there 
such a similarity1 such a monotony1 in  
the change of an atom1 and such variety 
and complexity in the change of a monad8

 ,it is because the atom has merely     
parts1 or external variety1 while the   
monad has an internal variety4          
,multiplicity is organically wrought    
into its very being4 ,it has an         
essential relation to all things in the 
universe2 and to say that this relation 
is essential1 is to say that it is one  
which constitutes its very content1 its 
being4 ,hence the cause of the changes  
of the monad1 of their variety and      
complexity1 is one with the cause of the
 richness1 the profusion1 the regulated 
variety of change in the universe       
itself4 ,while we have employed a       
comparison with atoms1 this very        
comparison may serve to show us the     
impossibility of atoms as they are      
generally defined by the physicist      
turned philosopher4 ,atoms have no      
internal and essential relation to the  
world2 they have no internal connection 
with any one thing in the world3 and    
what is this but to say that they do not
 enter anywhere into the structure of   

the world8 ,by their very conception    
they are forever aliens1 banished from  
any share or lot in the realm of        
reality4 ,the idea which ,leibniz never 
lets go1 the idea which he always       
accentuates1 is1 then1 the idea of an   
individual activity which in its        
continual change manifests as its own   
internal content and reality that       
reality and those laws of connection    
which make up the world itself4  ,we are
 thus introduced naturally to the       
conception which plays so large a part  
in the ,leibnizian philosophy1 that of  
pre-established harmony4 ,this term     
simply names the fact1 which we see to  
be fundamental with ,leibniz1--the fact 
that1 while the form of every monad is  
individuality1 a unique principle of    
action1 its content is universal1 the   
very being and laws of the world4 ,for  
we must now notice more explicitly what 
has been wrapped up in the idea all     
along4 ,there is no direct influence of 
monads upon each other4 ,one cannot     

affect another causally4 ,there is no   
actual interaction of one upon another4 
,expressed in that figurative language  
which was ever natural to ,leibniz1 the 
monads have no windows by which anything
 can get in or out4 ,this follows1 of   
course1 from the mutual independence and
 individuality of the monads4 ,they are 
a true democracy1 in which each citizen 
has sovereignty4 ,to admit external     
influences acting upon them is to       
surrender their independence1 to deny   
their sovereignty4 ,but we must remember
 the other half4 ,this democracy is not 
after the ,platonic conception of       
democracy1 in which each does as it     
pleases1 and in which there is neither  
order nor law1 but the extremest        
assertion of individuality4 ,what each  
sovereign citizen of the realm of       
reality expresses is precisely law4     
,each is an embodiment in its own way of
 the harmony1 the order1 of the whole   
kingdom4 ,each is sovereign because it  
is dynamic law1--law which is no longer 

abstract1 but has realized itself in    
life4 ,thus another way of stating the  
doctrine of pre-established harmony is  
the unity of freedom and necessity4     
,each monad is free because it is       
individual1 because it follows the law  
of its own activity unhindered1         
unretarded1 by others2 it is            
self-determined4 ,but it is             
self-determined to show forth the order1
 the harmony1 of the universe4 ,there is
 nothing of caprice1 of peculiarity1 in 
the content of the monad4 ,it shows     
forth order2 it is organized by law2 it 
reveals the necessary connections which 
constitute the universe4 ,the           
pre-established harmony is the unity of 
the individual and the universe2 it is  
the organic oneness of freedom and      
necessity4  ,we see still further what  
it means when we learn that it is by    
this conception that ,leibniz reconciles
 the conceptions of physical and final  
causation4 ,there is no principle closer
 to the thought of ,leibniz than that of

 the equal presence and efficiency      
everywhere of both physical and final   
causes4 ,every fact which occurs is     
susceptible of a mechanical and of a    
rational explanation4 ,it is necessarily
 connected with preceding states1 and it
 has a necessary end which it is        
fulfilling4 ,the complete meaning of    
this principle will meet us hereafter2  
at present we must notice that it is one
 form of the doctrine of pre-established
 harmony4 ,all things have an end       
because they form parts of one system2  
everything that occurs looks forward to 
something else and prepares the way for 
it1 and yet it is itself mechanically   
conditioned by its antecedents4 ,this is
 only another way of saying that there  
is complete harmony between all beings  
in the universe2 so that each monad in  
fulfilling the law of its own existence 
contributes to the immanent significance
 of the universe4 ,the monads are       
co-ordinated in such a way that they    
express a common idea4 ,there is a plan 

common to all1 in which each has its own
 place4 ,all are making towards one     
goal1 expressing one purpose4 ,the      
universe is an organism2 and ,leibniz   
would have applied to it the words which
 ,milne-,edwards applied to the human   
organism1 as ,i find them quoted by     
,lewes3 ,in the organism everything     
seems to be calculated with one         
determined result in view2 and the      
harmony of the parts does not result    
from the influence which they exert upon
 one another1 but from their            
co-ordination under the rule of a common
 force1 a preconceived plan1 a          
pre-existent force4 ,that is to say1 the
 universe is teleological1 both as a    
whole and in its parts2 for there is a  
common idea animating it and expressed  
by it2 it is mechanical1 for this idea  
is realized and manifested by the       
outworking of forces4  ,it ought to be  
evident even from this imperfect sketch 
that the ,leibnizian theory of          
pre-established harmony is not that     

utterly artificial and grotesque        
doctrine which it is sometimes          
represented to be4 ,the phrase          
pre-established harmony is1 strictly    
speaking1 tautologous4 ,the term        
pre-established is superfluous4 ,it     
means existent4 ,there is no real       
harmony which is not existent or        
pre-established4 ,an accidental harmony 
is a contradiction in terms4 ,it means a
 chaotic cosmos1 an unordered order1 a  
lawless law1 or whatever else is        
nonsensical4  ,harmony1 in short1 means 
relation1 means connection1 means       
subordination and co-ordination1 means  
adjustment1 means a variety1 which yet  
is one4 ,the ,leibnizian doctrine is not
 a factitious product of his            
imagination1 nor is it a mechanical     
scheme for reconciling a problem which  
has no existence outside of the         
bewildered brains of philosophers4 ,it  
is an expression of the fact that the   
universe is one of order1 of continuity1
 of unity2 it is the accentuating of    

this doctrine so that the very essence  
of reality is found in this ordered     
combination2 it is the special          
application of this principle to the    
solution of many of the problems which  
the mind of man is apt to run into1--the
 questions of the relation of the       
individual and the universal1 of freedom
 and necessity1 of the physical and     
material1 of the teleological and       
mechanical4 ,we may not be contented    
with the doctrine as he presents it1 we 
may think it to be rather a summary and 
highly concentrated statement of the    
problem than its solution1 or we may    
object to details in the carrying out of
 the doctrine4 ,but we cannot deny that 
it is a genuine attempt to meet a       
genuine problem1 and that it contains   
some1 if not all1 of the factors        
required for its adequate solution4 ,to 
,leibniz must remain the glory of being 
the thinker to seize upon the perfect   
unity and order of the universe as its  
essential characteristic1 and of        

arranging his thoughts with a view to   
discovering and expressing it4  ,we have
 but to notice one point more1 and our  
task is done so far as it serves to make
 plain the standpoint from which        
,leibniz criticised ,locke4 ,there is1  
we have seen1 the greatest possible     
continuity and complexity in the realm  
of monads4 ,there is no break1          
quantitative nor qualitative4 ,it       
follows that the human soul has no gulf 
set between it and what we call nature4 
,it is only the highest1 that is to say 
the most active and the most            
representative1 of all monads4 ,it      
stands1 indeed1 at the head of the      
scale1 but not outside it4 ,from the    
monad which reveals its presence in that
 stone which with blinded eyes we call  
dead1 through that which acts in the    
plant1 in the animal1 up to that of man1
 there is no chasm1 no interruption4    
,nay1 man himself is but one link in the
 chain of spiritual beings which ends   
only in ,god4 ,all monads are souls2 the

 soul of man is a monad which represents
 the universe more distinctly and       
adequately4 ,the law which is enfolded  
in the lower monads is developed in it  
and forms a part of its conscious       
activity4 ,the universe1 which is       
confusedly mirrored by the perception of
 the lower monad1 is clearly brought out
 in the conscious apperception of man4  
,the stone is representative of the     
whole world4 ,an all-knowing            
intelligence might read in it relations 
to every other fact the world1 might see
 exemplified the past history of the    
world1 and prefigured the events to     
come4 ,for the stone is not an isolated 
existence1 it is an inter-organic member
 of a system4 ,change the slightest fact
 in the world1 and in some way it is    
affected4 ,the law of the universe is   
one of completed reciprocity1 and this  
law must be mirrored in every existence 
of the universe4 ,increase the activity1
 the representative power1 until it     
becomes turned back1 as it were1 upon   

itself1 until the monad not only is a   
mirror1 but knows itself as one1 and you
 have man4 ,the soul of man is the world
 come to consciousness of itself4 ,the  
realm of monads in what we call the     
inorganic world and the lower organic   
realm shows us the monad let and        
hindered in its development4 ,these     
realms attempt to speak forth the law of
 their being1 and reveal the immanent   
presence of the universe2 but they do   
not hear their own voice1 their         
utterance is only for others4 ,in man   
the universe is manifested1 and is      
manifested to man himself4     ,,chapter
 ,,iv4  ,,locke ,,and                   
,,leibniz4--,,innate ,,ideas4   ,the    
reader1 impatient of what may have      
seemed an over-long introduction1 has   
perhaps been asking when he was to be   
brought to the subject under            
consideration1--the relations of        
,leibniz to ,locke4 ,but it has been    
impossible to come to this question     
until we had formed for ourselves an    

outline of the philosophical position of
 ,leibniz4 ,nowhere in the ,nouveaux    
,essais does ,leibniz give a connected  
and detailed exposition of his          
philosophy1 either as to his standpoint1
 his fundamental principles1 or his     
method4  ,some preliminary view of his  
position is therefore a necessity4 ,the 
demand for this preliminary exposition  
becomes more urgent as we recognize that
 ,leibniz's remarks upon ,locke are not 
a critique of ,locke from the standpoint
 of the latter1 but are the application 
of his own philosophical conclusions4   
,criticism from within1 an examination  
of a system of thought with relation to 
the consistency and coherency of its    
results1 the connection between these   
results and the method professedly      
employed1 investigation which depends   
not at all upon the position of the     
critic1 but occupies itself with the    
internal relations of the system under  
discussion1--such criticism is a product
 of the present century4 ,what we find  

in the ,nouveaux ,essais is a comparison
 of the ideas of ,locke with those of   
,leibniz himself1 a testing of the      
former by the latter as a standard1     
their acceptance when they conform1     
their rejection when they are opposed1  
their completion when they are in       
partial harmony4  ,the value of this    
sort of criticism is likely to be small 
and evanescent4 ,if the system used as a
 standard is meagre and narrow1 if it is
 without comprehensiveness and          
flexibility1 it does not repay          
after-examination4 ,the fact that the   
,nouveaux ,essais of ,leibniz have      
escaped the oblivion of the             
philosophical criticism of his day is   
proof1 if proof still be needed1 of the 
reasoned basis1 the width of grasp1 the 
fertility of suggestion which           
characterize the thought of ,leibniz4   
,but the fact that the criticism is1    
after all1 external and not internal has
 made necessary the foregoing extended  
account of his method and general       

results4  ,on the other hand1 what of   
,locke8 ,how about him who is the       
recipient of the criticism8 ,i assume   
that no extended account of his ideas is
 here necessary1 and conceive myself to 
be justified in this assumption by the  
fact that we are already better         
acquainted with ,locke4 ,this           
acquaintance1 indeed1 is not confined to
 those who have expressly studied       
,locke4 ,his thought is an inheritance  
into which every ,english-speaking      
person at least is born4 ,only he who   
does not think escapes this inheritance4
 ,locke did the work which he had to do 
so thoroughly that every ,englishman who
 will philosophize must either build    
upon ,locke's foundations1 or1 with     
conscious purpose1 clear the ground     
before building for himself4 ,and it    
would be difficult to say that the      
acceptance of ,locke's views would      
influence one's thought more than their 
rejection4 ,this must not1 of course1 be
 taken too literally4 ,it may be that   

one who is a lineal descendant of ,locke
 in the spiritual generations of thought
 would not state a single important     
truth as ,locke stated it1 or that those
 who seek their method and results      
elsewhere have not repudiated the       
thought of ,locke as expressly belonging
 to him4  ,but the fundamental          
principles of empiricism3 its conception
 of intelligence as an individual       
possession2 its idea of reality as      
something over against and distinct from
 mind2 its explanation of knowledge as a
 process of action and reaction between 
these separate things2 its account of   
our inability to know things as they    
really are1--these principles are       
congenital with our thinking4 ,they are 
so natural that we either accept them as
 axiomatic1 and accuse those who reject 
them of metaphysical subtlety1 or1      
staggered perchance by some of their    
results1 give them up with an effort4   
,but it is an effort1 and a severe one2 
and there is none of us who can tell    

when some remnant of the conception of  
intelligence as purely particular and   
finite will catch him tripping4 ,on the 
other hand1 we realize much better than 
those who have behind them a ,leibniz   
and a ,kant1 rather than a ,locke and a 
,hume1 the meaning and the              
thorough-going necessity of the         
universality of intelligence4 ,idealism 
must be in some ways arbitrary and      
superficial to him who has not had a    
pretty complete course of empiricism4   
,leibniz seems to have been impressed   
with the ,essay on the ,human           
,understanding at its first appearance4 
,as early as #afif we find him writing a
 few pages of comment upon the book4    
,compared with his later critique1 these
 early reflections seem colorless1 and  
give the impression that ,leibniz       
desired to minimize his differences from
 ,locke rather than to set them forth in
 relief4 ,comparatively slight as were  
his expressions of dissent1 they appear 
to have stung ,locke when they reached  

him4 ,meantime ,locke's book was        
translated into ,french1 and made its   
way to a wider circle of readers4 ,this 
seems to have suggested to ,leibniz the 
advisability of pursuing his comments   
somewhat further2 and in the summer of  
#agjc he produced the work which now    
occupies us4 ,a letter which ,leibniz   
wrote at about this time is worth       
quoting at large for the light which it 
throws upon the man1 as well as for     
suggesting the chief points in which he 
differed from ,locke4 ,leibniz writes3--
  ,i have forgotten to tell you that my 
comments upon the work of ,locke are    
nearly done4 ,as he has spoken in a     
chapter of his second book about        
freedom1 he has given me an opportunity 
to discuss that2 and ,i hope that ,i may
 have done it in such a way as will     
please you4 ,above all1 ,i have laid it 
upon myself to save the immateriality of
 the soul1 which ,locke leaves doubtful4
 ,i justify also the existence of innate
 ideas1 and show that the soul produces 

their perception out of itself4 ,axioms1
 too1 ,i approve1 while ,locke has a low
 opinion of them4 ,in contradiction to  
him1 ,i show that the individuality of  
man1 through which he preserves his     
identity1 consists in the duration of   
the simple or immaterial substance which
 animates him2 that the soul is never   
without representations2 that there is  
neither a vacuum nor atoms2 that matter1
 or the passive principle1 cannot be    
conscious1 excepting as ,god unites with
 it a conscious substance4 ,we disagree1
 indeed1 in numerous other points1 for  
,i find that he rates too low the noble 
philosophy of the ,platonic school 7as  
,descartes did in part71 and substitutes
 opinions which degrade us1 and which   
may become hurtful to morals1 though ,i 
am persuaded that ,locke's intention was
 thoroughly good4 ,i have made these    
comments in leisure hours1 when ,i have 
been journeying or visiting1 and could  
not occupy myself with investigations   
requiring great pains4 ,the work has    

continued to grow under my hands1 for in
 almost every chapter1 and to a greater 
extent than ,i had thought possible1 ,i 
have found matter for remark4 ,you will 
be astonished when ,i tell you that ,i  
have worked upon this as upon something 
which requires no great pains4 ,but the 
fact is1 that ,i long ago established   
the general principles of philosophic   
subjects in my mind in a demonstrative  
way1 or pretty nearly so1 and that they 
do not require much new consideration   
from me4  ,leibniz goes on to add that  
he has put these reflections in the form
 of a dialogue that they may be more    
attractive2 has written them in the     
popular language1 rather than in ,latin1
 that they may reach as wide a circle as
 the work of ,locke2 and that he hopes  
to publish them soon1 as ,locke is      
already an old man1 and he wishes to get
 them before the public while ,locke may
 still reply4  ,but unfortunately this  
last hope was destined to remain        
unrealized4 ,before the work of revision

 was accomplished1 ,locke died4         
,leibniz1 in a letter written in #agad1 
alludes to his controversy with ,locke  
as follows3 ,i do not like the thought  
of publishing refutations of authors who
 are dead4 ,these should appear during  
their life1 and be communicated to them4
 ,then1 referring to his earlier        
comments1 he says3 ,a few remarks       
escaped me1 ,i hardly know how1 and were
 taken to ,england4 ,mr4 ,locke1 having 
seen them1 spoke of them slightingly in 
a letter to ,molineux4 ,i am not        
astonished at it4 ,we were somewhat too 
far apart in principle1 and that which  
,i suggested seemed paradoxical to him4 
,leibniz1 according to his conviction   
here expressed1 never published his     
,nouveaux ,essais sur l',entendement    
,humain4 ,schaarschmidt remarks that    
another reason may have restrained him1 
in that he did not wish to carry on too 
many controversies at once with the     
,english people4 ,he had two on his     
hands then1--one with the ,newtonians   

regarding the infinitesimal calculus2   
the other with ,bishop ,clarke regarding
 the nature of ,god1 of time and space1 
of freedom1 and cognate subjects4       
,however1 in #agfe1 almost fifty years  
after the death of ,leibniz1 his        
critique upon ,locke finally appeared4  
,it is somewhat significant that one    
whose tendency was conciliatory1 who was
 eminently what the ,germans delight to 
call him1 a mediator1 attempting to     
unite the varied truths which he found  
scattered in opposed systems1 should    
have had so much of his work called     
forth by controversy4 ,aside from the   
cases just mentioned1 his other chief   
work1 the ,theodicy1 is1 in form1 a     
reply to ,bayle4 ,many of his minor     
pieces are replies to criticism or are  
developments of his own thought with    
critical reference to ,descartes1       
,malebranche1 and others4 ,but ,leibniz 
has a somewhat different attitude       
towards his ,british and towards his    
,continental opponents4 ,with the latter

 he was always in sympathy1 while they  
in turn gave whatever he uttered a      
respectful hearing4 ,their mutual       
critiques begin and end in compliments4 
,but the ,englishmen found the thought  
of ,leibniz paradoxical and forced4 ,it 
seemed to them wildly speculative1 and  
indeed arbitrary guess-work1 without any
 special reason for its production1 and 
wholly unverifiable in its results4     
,such has been the fate of much of the  
best ,german thought since that time in 
the land of the descendants of ,newton  
and ,locke4 ,but ,leibniz1 on the other 
hand1 felt as if he were dealing1 in    
philosophical matters at least1 with    
foemen hardly worthy of his steel4      
,locke1 he says1 had subtlety and       
address1 and a sort of superficial      
metaphysics2 but he was ignorant of the 
method of mathematics1--that is to say1 
from the standpoint of ,leibniz1 of the 
method of all science4 ,we have already 
seen that he thought the examination of 
a work which had been the result of the 

continued labor of ,locke was a matter  
for the leisure hours of his courtly    
visits4 ,indeed1 he would undoubtedly   
have felt about it what he actually     
expressed regarding his controversy with
 ,clarke1--that he engaged in it        
,ludus et jocus1 quia in philosophia    
,omnia percepi atque animo mecum ante   
peregi4  ,he regarded the ,english as   
superficial and without grasp of        
principles1 as they thought him         
over-deep and over-theoretical4  ,from  
this knowledge of the external          
circumstances of the work of ,leibniz   
and its relation to ,locke1 it is       
necessary that we turn to its internal  
content1 to the thought of ,leibniz as  
related to the ideas of ,locke4 ,the    
,essay on the ,human ,understanding is1 
as the name implies1 an account of the  
nature of knowledge4 ,locke tells us    
that it originated in the fact that     
often1 when he had been engaged in      
discussions with his friends1 they found
 themselves landed in insoluble         

difficulties4 ,this occurred so         
frequently that it seemed probable that 
they had been going at matters from the 
wrong side1 and that before they        
attempted to come to conclusions about  
questions they ought to examine the     
capacity of intelligence1 and see       
whether it is fitted to deal with such  
questions4 ,locke1 in a word1 is another
 evidence of that truth which lies at   
the basis of all forms of philosophical 
thought1 however opposed they may be to 
one another1--the truth that knowledge  
and reality are so organic to each other
 that to come to any conclusion about   
one1 we must know something about the   
other4 ,reality equals objects known or 
knowable1 and knowledge equals reality  
dissolved in ideas1--reality which has  
become translucent through its meaning4 
,locke's ,essay is1 then1 an account of 
the origin1 nature1 extent1 and         
limitations of human knowledge4 ,such is
 its subject-matter4 ,what is its       
method8 ,locke himself tells us that he 

uses the plain historical method4 ,we do
 not have to resort to the forcing of   
language to learn that this word        
historical contains the key to his work4
 ,every page of the ,essay is testimony 
to the fact that ,locke always proceeds 
by inquiring into the way and           
circumstances by which knowledge of the 
subject under consideration came into   
existence and into the conditions by    
which it was developed4 ,origin means   
with ,locke1 not logical dependence1 but
 temporal production2 development means 
temporal succession4 ,in the language of
 our day1 ,locke's ,essay is an attempt 
to settle ontological questions by a    
psychological method4 ,and as we have   
before noticed1 ,leibniz meets him1 not 
by inquiry into the pertinence of the   
method or into the validity of results  
so reached1 but by the more direct way  
of impugning his psychology1 by         
substituting another theory of the      
nature of mind and of the way in which  
it works4  ,the questions with which the

 discussion begins are as to the        
existence of innate ideas1 and as to    
whether the soul always                 
thinks1--questions which upon their face
 will lead the experienced reader of    
to-day to heave a sigh in memory of     
hours wasted in barren dispute1 and     
which will create a desire to turn      
elsewhere for matter more solid and more
 nutritive4 ,but in this case1 under the
 form which the discussion takes at the 
hands of ,leibniz1 the question which   
awaits answer under the meagre and      
worn-out formula of innate ideas is the 
function of intelligence in experience4 
,locke denies1 and denies with great    
vigor1 the existence of innate ideas4   
,his motives in so doing are practical  
and theoretical4 ,he sees almost every  
old idea1 every hereditary prejudice1   
every vested interest of thought1       
defended on the ground that it is an    
innate idea4 ,innate ideas were sacred1 
and everything which could find no      
defence before reason was an innate     

idea4 ,under such circumstances he takes
 as much interest in demolishing them as
 ,bacon took in the destruction of the  
eidols4 ,but this is but a small portion
 of the object of ,locke4 ,he is a      
thorough-going empiricist2 and the      
doctrine of innate ideas appears to     
offer the greatest obstacle to the      
acceptance of the truth that all the    
furnishing of the intellect comes from  
experience4 ,locke's metaphors for the  
mind are that it is a blank tablet1 an  
empty closet1 an unwritten book4 ,the   
innate idea is only a sentence written  
by experience1 but which1 deified by a  
certain school of philosophers1 has come
 to be regarded as eternally imprinted  
upon the soul4  ,such1 indeed1 is       
,locke's understanding of the nature of 
innate ideas4 ,he conceives of them as  
characters stamped1 as it were1 upon the
 mind of man1 which the soul has        
received in its first being and brings  
into the world with it2 or they are     
constant impressions which the souls of 

men receive in their first beings4 ,they
 are truths imprinted upon the soul4    
,having this conception of what is meant
 by innate ideas1 ,locke sets himself   
with great vigor1 and1 it must be       
confessed1 with equal success1 to their 
annihilation4  ,his argument is somewhat
 diffuse and scattered1 but in substance
 it is as follows3 ,whatever is in the  
mind1 the mind must be conscious of4 ,to
 be in the mind and not to be perceived1
 is all one as to say that anything is  
and is not in the mind4 ,if there be    
anything in the mind which is innate1 it
 must be present to the consciousness of
 all1 and1 it would seem1 of all at all 
times1 savages1 infants1 and idiots     
included4 ,and as it requires little    
philosophical penetration to see that   
savages do not ponder upon the principle
 that whatever is1 is2 that infants do  
not dwell in their cradle upon the      
thought of contradiction1 or idiots     
ruminate upon that of excluded          
middle1--it ought to be evident that    

such truths cannot be innate4 ,indeed1  
we must admit1 with ,locke1 that        
probably few men ever come to the       
explicit consciousness of such ideas1   
and that these few are such as direct   
their minds to the matter with some     
pains4 ,locke's argument may be summed  
up in his words3 ,if these are not      
notions naturally imprinted1 how can    
they be innate8 ,and if they are notions
 naturally imprinted1 how can they be   
unknown8  ,but since it may be said that
 these truths are in the mind1 but in   
such a way that it is only when they are
 proposed that men assent to them1      
,locke goes on to clinch his argument4  
,if this be true1 it shows that the     
ideas are not innate2 for the same thing
 is true of a large number of scientific
 truths1 those of mathematics and       
morals1 as well as of purely sensible   
facts1 as that red is not blue1 sweet is
 not sour1 etc41--truths and facts which
 no one calls innate4 ,or if it be said 
that they are in the mind implicitly or 

potentially1 ,locke points out that this
 means either nothing at all1 or else   
that the mind is capable of knowing     
them4 ,if this is what is meant by      
innate ideas1 then all ideas are innate2
 for certainly it cannot be denied that 
the mind is capable of knowing all that 
it ever does know1 or1 as ,locke        
ingenuously remarks1 nobody ever denied 
that the mind was capable of knowing    
several truths4  ,it is evident that the
 force of ,locke's contention against   
innate ideas rests upon a certain theory
 regarding the nature of innate ideas   
and of the relations of consciousness to
 intelligence4 ,besides this1 there runs
 through his whole polemic the assertion
 that1 after all1 innate ideas are      
useless1 as experience1 in the sense of 
impressions received from without1 and  
the formal action of intelligence upon  
them1 is adequate to doing all they are 
supposed to do4 ,it is hardly too much  
to say that the nerve of ,locke's       
argument is rather in this positive     

assertion than in the negations which he
 brings against this existence4 ,leibniz
 takes issue with him on each of these  
three points4 ,he has another conception
 of the very nature of innate ideas2 he 
denies ,locke's opinions about          
consciousness2 he brings forward an     
opposed theory upon the relation of     
experience to reason4 ,this last point  
we shall take up in a chapter by itself1
 as its importance extends far beyond   
the mere question as to the existence of
 ideas which may properly be called     
innate4 ,the other two questions1 as to 
the real character of innate ideas and  
the relation of an idea to              
consciousness1 afford material to occupy
 us for the present4  ,the metaphor     
which ,locke constantly uses is the clew
 to his conception of innate ideas4     
,they are characters stamped or         
imprinted upon the mind1 they exist in  
the mind4 ,the mind would be just what  
it is1 even if they had no existence4   
,it would not have quite so much in it1 

but its own nature would not be changed4
 ,innate ideas he conceives as bearing a
 purely external relation to mind4 ,they
 are not organic to it1 nor necessary   
instruments through which it expresses  
itself2 they are mechanically impressed 
upon it4 ,but what the intellectual     
school had meant by innate ideas was    
precisely that the relation of ideas to 
intelligence is not that of passive     
holding or containing on the side of    
mind1 and of impressions or stamps on   
the side of the ideas4 ,locke reads the 
fundamental category of                 
empiricism--mechanical relation1 or     
external action--into the nature of     
innate ideas1 and hence easily infers   
their absurdity4 ,but the object of the 
upholders of innate ideas had been      
precisely to deny that this category was
 applicable to the whole of             
intelligence4 ,by an innate idea they   
meant an assertion of the dynamic       
relation of intelligence and some of its
 ideas4 ,they meant to assert that      

intelligence has a structure1 which     
necessarily functions in certain ways4  
,while ,locke's highest conception of an
 innate idea was that it must be        
something ready made1 dwelling in the   
mind prior to experience1 ,leibniz      
everywhere asserts that it is a         
connection and relation which forms the 
logical prius and the psychological     
basis of experience4 ,he finds no       
difficulty in admitting all there is of 
positive truth in ,locke's doctrine2    
namely1 that we are not conscious of    
these innate ideas until a period later 
than that in which we are conscious of  
sensible facts1 or1 in many cases1 are  
not conscious of them at all4 ,this     
priority in time of sensible experience 
to rational knowledge1 however1 can     
become a reason for denying the innate  
character of the latter only when we    
suppose that they are two entirely      
different orders of fact1 one knowledge 
due to experience1 the other knowledge  
already formed and existing in the mind 

prior to experience4  ,leibniz's        
conception of the matter is brought out 
when he says that it is indeed true that
 we begin with particular experiences   
rather than with general principles1 but
 that the order of nature is the        
reverse1 for the ground1 the basis of   
the particular truths is in the general2
 the former being in reality only       
instances of the latter4 ,general       
principles1 he says1 enter into all our 
thoughts1 and form their soul and       
interconnection4 ,they are as necessary 
for thought as muscles and tendons are  
for walking1 although we may not be     
conscious of their existence4 ,this side
 of the teaching of ,leibniz consists1  
accordingly1 in the assertion that      
innate knowledge and knowledge derived  
from experience are not two kinds of    
knowledge1 but rather two ways of       
considering it4 ,if we consider it as it
 comes to us1 piecemeal and fragmentary1
 a succession of particular instances1  
to be gathered up at a future time into 

general principles1 and stated in a     
rational form1 it is seen as empirical4 
,but1 after all1 this is only a         
superficial and external way of looking 
at it4 ,if we examine into it we shall  
see that there are contained in these   
transitory and particular experiences   
certain truths more general and         
fundamental1 which condition them1 and  
at the same time constitute their       
meaning4  ,if we inquire into the       
propriety of calling these truths       
innate1 we find it is because they are  
native to intelligence1 and are not     
acquisitions which it makes4 ,indeed1 it
 may be said that they are intelligence1
 so close and organic is their relation1
 just as the muscles1 the tendons1 the  
skeleton1 are the body4 ,thus it is that
 ,leibniz accepts the statement1 ,nihil 
est in intellectu quod non fuerit in    
sensu1 with the addition of the         
statement nisi ipse intellectus4 ,the   
doctrine of the existence of innate     
ideas is thus shown to mean that        

intelligence exists with a real content 
which counts for something in the realm 
of experience4 ,if we take intelligence 
and examine into its structure and      
ascertain its modes of expression1 we   
find organically inherent in its        
activity certain conceptions like unity1
 power1 substance1 identity1 etc41 and  
these we call innate4 ,an idea1 in      
short1 is no longer conceived as        
something existing in the mind or in    
consciousness2 it is an activity of     
intelligence4 ,an innate idea is a      
necessary activity of intelligence2 that
 is1 such an activity as enters into the
 framework of all experience4  ,leibniz 
thus succeeds in avoiding two errors    
into which philosophers whose general   
aims are much like his have fallen4 ,one
 is dividing a priori and a posteriori  
truths from each other by a hard and    
fixed line1 so that we are conceived to 
have some knowledge which comes wholly  
from experience1 while there is another 
which comes wholly from reason4         

,according to ,leibniz1 there is no     
thought so abstract that it does not    
have its connection with a sensible     
experience1 or rather its embodiment in 
it4 ,and1 on the other hand1 there is no
 experience so thoroughly sensuous that 
it does not bear in itself traces of its
 origin in reason4 ,all our thoughts    
come from the depths of the soul1 says  
,leibniz2 there are none that come to us
 from without4 ,the other error is the  
interpretation of the existence of      
innate ideas or intuitions 7as this     
school generally calls them7 in a purely
 formal sense4 ,they are thus considered
 as truths contained in and somehow     
expressed by intelligence1 but yet not  
so connected with it that in knowing    
them we necessarily know intelligence   
itself4 ,they are considered rather as  
arbitrary determinations of truths by a 
power whose own nature is conceivably   
foreign to truth1 than as so many       
special developments of an activity     
which may indifferently be called       

intelligence or truth4 ,leibniz1        
however1 never fails to state that an   
innate truth is1 after all1 but one form
 or aspect of the activity of the mind  
in knowing4  ,in this way1 by bringing  
to light a deeper and richer conception 
of what in reality constitutes an innate
 idea1 ,leibniz answers ,locke4 ,his    
reply is indirect2 it consists rather in
 throwing a flood of new light upon the 
matter discussed1 than in a ponderous   
response and counter-attack4 ,but when  
,leibniz touches upon the conception of 
a tabula rasa1 of a mind which in itself
 is a mere blank1 but has the capacity  
for knowing1 he assumes the offensive4  
,the idea of a bare capacity1 a formal  
faculty1 of power which does not already
 involve some actual content within     
itself1 he repudiates as a relic of     
scholasticism4 ,what is the soul1 which 
has nothing until it gets it from       
without8 ,the doctrine of a vacuum1 an  
emptiness which is real1 is always      
absurd2 and it is doubly so when to this

 vacuum is ascribed powers of feeling   
and thinking1 as ,locke does4 ,accepting
 for the moment the metaphor of a tabula
 rasa1 ,leibniz asks where we shall find
 a tablet which yet does not have some  
quality1 and which is not a co-operating
 cause1 at least1 in whatever effects   
are produced upon it8 ,the notion of a  
soul without thought1 an empty tablet of
 the soul1 he says1 is one of a thousand
 fictions of philosophers4 ,he compares 
it with the idea of space empty of      
matter1 absolute uniformity or          
homogeneity1 perfect spheres of the     
second element produced by primordial   
perfect cubes1 abstractions pure and    
simple1 to which our ignorance and      
inattention give birth1 but of which    
reality does not admit4 ,if ,locke      
admits then 7as he does7 certain        
capacities inherent in the soul1 he     
cannot mean the scholastic fiction of   
bare capacity or mere possibility2 he   
must mean real possibilities1--that is1 
capacities accompanied with some actual 

tendency1 an inclination1 a disposition1
 an aptitude1 a preformation which      
determines our soul in a certain        
direction1 and which makes it necessary 
that the possibility becomes actual4    
,and this tendency1 this actual         
inclination of intelligence in one way  
rather than another1 so that it is not a
 matter of indifference to intelligence 
what it produces1 is precisely what     
constitutes an innate idea4 ,so ,leibniz
 feels certain that at bottom ,locke    
must agree with him in this matter if   
the latter is really in earnest in      
rejecting the faculties of the          
scholastics and in wishing for a real   
explanation of knowledge4  ,but the     
argument of ,locke rests upon yet       
another basis4 ,he founds his denial of 
innate ideas not only upon a static     
conception of their ready made existence
 in the soul1 but also upon an equally  
mechanical conception of consciousness4 
,nothing can be in the mind which is not
 in consciousness4 ,this statement      

appears axiomatic to ,locke1 and by it  
he would settle the whole discussion4   
,regarding it1 ,leibniz remarks that if 
,locke has such a prejudice as this1 it 
is not surprising that he rejects innate
 ideas4 ,but consciousness and mental   
activity are not thus identical4 ,to go 
no farther1 the mere empirical fact of  
memory is sufficient to show the falsity
 of such an idea4 ,memory reveals that  
we have an indefinite amount of         
knowledge of which we are not always    
conscious4 ,rather than that knowledge  
and consciousness are one1 it is true   
that actual consciousness only lays hold
 of an infinitesimal fraction of        
knowledge4 ,but ,leibniz does not rely  
upon the fact of memory alone4 ,we must 
constantly keep in mind that to ,leibniz
 the soul is not a form of being wholly 
separate from nature1 but is the        
culmination of the system of reality4   
,the reality is everywhere the monad1   
and the soul is the monad with the power
 of feeling1 remembering1 and connecting

 its ideas4 ,the activities of the      
monad1 those representative changes     
which sum up and symbolize the universe1
 do not cease when we reach the soul4   
,they are continued4 ,if the soul has   
the power of attention1 they are        
potentially conscious4 ,such as the soul
 actually attends to1 thus giving them  
relief and making them distinct1 are    
actually conscious4 ,but all of them    
exist4  ,thus it is that ,leibniz not   
only denies the equivalence of soul and 
consciousness1 but asserts that the     
fundamental error of the psychology of  
the ,cartesians 7and here1 at least1    
,locke is a ,cartesian7 is in           
identifying them4 ,he asserts that      
unconscious ideas are of as great       
importance in psychology as molecules   
are in physics4 ,they are the link      
between unconscious nature and the      
conscious soul4 ,nothing happens all at 
once2 nature never makes jumps2 these   
facts stated in the law of continuity   
necessitate the existence of activities1

 which may be called ideas1 since they  
belong to the soul and yet are not in   
consciousness4  ,when1 therefore1 ,locke
 asks how an innate idea can exist and  
the soul not be conscious of it1 the    
answer is at hand4 ,the innate idea     
exists as an activity of the soul by    
which it represents--that is1           
expresses--some relation of the         
universe1 although we have not yet      
become conscious of what is contained or
 enveloped in this activity4 ,to become 
conscious of the innate idea is to lift 
it from the sphere of nature to the     
conscious life of spirit4 ,and thus it  
is1 again1 that ,leibniz can assert that
 all ideas whatever proceed from the    
depths of the soul4 ,it is because it is
 the very being of the soul as a monad  
to reflect from its point of view the   
world4 ,in this way ,leibniz brings the 
discussion regarding innate ideas out of
 the plane of examination into a matter 
of psychological fact into a            
consideration of the essential nature of

 spirit4 ,an innate idea is now seen to 
be one of the relations by which the    
soul reproduces some relation which     
constitutes the universe of reality1 and
 at the same time realizes its own      
individual nature4 ,it is one reflection
 from that spiritual mirror1 the soul4  
,with this enlarged and transformed     
conception of an idea apt to be so      
meagre we may well leave the discussion4
 ,there has been one mind at least to   
which the phrase innate ideas meant     
something worth contending for1 because 
it meant something real4     ,,chapter  
,v4  ,,sensation ,,and ,,experience4    
,a careful study of the various theories
 which have been held concerning        
sensation would be of as much interest  
and importance as an investigation of   
any one point in the range of           
philosophy4 ,in the theory of a         
philosopher about sensation we have the 
reflex of his fundamental category and  
the clew to his further doctrine4       
,sensation stands on the border-line    

between the world of nature and the     
realm of soul2 and every advance in     
science1 every development of           
philosophy1 leaves its impress in a     
change in the theory of sensation4      
,apparently one of the simplest and most
 superficial of questions1 in reality it
 is one of the most difficult and       
far-reaching4 ,at first sight it seems  
as if it were a sufficient account of   
sensation to say that an object affects 
the organ of sense1 and thus impresses  
upon the mind the quality which it      
possesses4 ,but this simple statement   
arouses a throng of further questions3  
,how is it possible that one            
substance1--matter1--should affect      
another1--mind8 ,how can a causal       
relation exist between them8 ,is the    
mind passive or active in this          
impression8 ,how can an object convey   
unchanged to the mind a quality which it
 possesses8 ,or is the sensational quale
 itself a product of the mind's         
activity8 ,if so1 what is the nature of 

the object which excites the sensation8 
,as known1 it is only a collection of   
sensuous qualities2 if these are purely 
mental1 what becomes of the object8 ,and
 if there is no object really there1    
what is it that excites the sensation8  
,such questionings might be continued   
almost indefinitely2 but those given are
 enough to show that an examination of  
the nature and origin of sensation      
introduces us to the problems of the    
relation of intelligence and the world2 
to the problem of the ultimate          
constitution of an object which is set  
over against a subject and which affects
 it2 and to the problem of the nature of
 mind1 which as thus affected from      
without must be limited in its nature1  
but which as bearer of the whole known  
universe must be in some sense infinite4
 ,if we consider1 not the mode of       
production of sensation1 but its        
relation to knowledge1 we find          
philosophical schools divided into      
two1--,sensationalists1 and             

,rationalists4 ,if we inquire into its  
functions1 we find that the empiricist  
sees in it convincing evidence of the   
fact that all knowledge originates from 
a source extra mentem2 that the         
intellectual idealist finds in it       
evidence of the gradual transition of   
nature into spirit2 that the ethical    
idealist1 like ,kant and ,fichte1 sees  
in it the material of the phenomenal    
world1 which is necessary in its        
opposition to the rational sphere in    
order that there may occur that conflict
 of pure law and sensuous impulse which 
alone makes morality possible4 ,we thus 
realize that as we look at the various  
aspects of sensation1 we are taken into 
the discussion of ontology1 of the      
theory of knowledge and of ethics4      
,locke virtually recognizes the extreme 
importance of the doctrine of sensation1
 and his second book might almost be    
entitled ,concerning the ,nature and    
,products of ,sensation4 ,on the other  
hand1 one of the most characteristic and

 valuable portions of the reply of      
,leibniz is in his development of a     
theory of sensation which is thoroughly 
new1 except as we seek for its germs in 
its thoughts of ,plato and ,aristotle4  
,according to ,locke1 knowledge         
originates from two sources1--sensation 
and reflection4 ,sensations are the     
impressions made on our senses by       
outward objects that are extrinsic to   
the mind4 ,when the mind comes to       
reflect on its own operations about the 
ideas got by sensation1 and thereby     
stores itself with a new set of ideas1  
it gets ideas of reflection4  ,if we    
leave out of account for the present the
 ideas of reflection1 we find that the  
ideas which come through sensation have 
two main characteristics4 ,first1 in    
having sensations1 the mind is passive2 
its part is purely receptive4 ,the      
objects impress themselves upon the     
mind1 they obtrude into consciousness1  
whether the mind will or not4 ,there is 
a purely external relation existing     

between sensation and the understanding4
 ,the ideas are offered to the mind1 and
 the understanding cannot refuse to have
 them1 cannot change them1 blot them    
out1 nor create them1 any more than a   
mirror can refuse1 alter1 or obliterate 
the images which objects produce in it4 
,sensation1 in short1 is a purely       
passive having of ideas4 ,secondly1     
every sensation is simple4 ,locke would 
say of sensations what ,hume said of all
 ideas1--every distinct sensation is a  
separate existence4 ,every sensation is 
uncompounded1 containing nothing but one
 uniform appearance1 not being          
distinguishable into different ideas4   
,knowledge is henceforth a process of   
compounding1 of repeating1 comparing1   
and uniting sensation4 ,man's           
understanding reaches no further than to
 compound and divide the materials that 
are made to his hand4  ,it hardly need  
be said that ,locke has great difficulty
 in keeping up this thoroughly atomic   
theory of mind4 ,it is a theory which   

makes all relations external2 they are1 
as ,locke afterwards says1 superinduced 
upon the facts4 ,it makes it impossible 
to account for any appearance of unity  
and connection among ideas1 and ,locke  
quietly1 and without any consciousness  
of the contradiction involved1          
introduces certain inherent relations   
into the structure of the ideas when he 
comes to his constructive work4         
,existence and unity are two ideas1 he  
says1 that are suggested to the         
understanding by every object without1  
and every idea within4  ,at other places
 he introduces the idea of quality of a 
substance1 effect of a cause1 continued 
permanence or identity into a sensation1
 as necessary constituents of it2 thus  
making a sensation a unity of complex   
elements instead of an isolated bare    
notion4 ,how far he could have got on in
 his account of knowledge without this  
surreptitious qualifying of a           
professedly simple existence1 may be    
seen by asking what would be the nature 

of a sensation which did not possess    
existence and unity1 and which was not  
conceived as the quality of a thing or  
as the effect of an external reality4   
,this digression has been introduced at 
this point because the next character of
 a sensation which ,locke discusses is  
its objective character1--its relation  
to the object which produces it4 ,to    
discourse of our ideas intelligibly1 he 
says1 it will be convenient to          
distinguish them as they are ideas in   
our minds and as they are modifications 
of matter in the bodies that cause them4
 ,in other words1 he gives up all       
thought of considering ideas as simply  
mental modifications1 and finds it      
necessary to take them in their         
relations to objects4  ,taking them in  
this way1 he finds that they are to be  
divided into two classes1 of which one  
contains those ideas that are copies and
 resemblances of qualities in the       
objects1 ideas which are really in the  
object1 whether we take notice of them  

or no1--in which case we have an idea of
 the thing as it is in itself2 while the
 other class contains those which are in
 no way resemblances of the objects     
which produce them1 having no more      
similitude than the idea of pain and of 
a sword4 ,the former are primary        
qualities1 and are solidity1 extension1 
figure1 motion or rest1 and number2     
while the secondary qualities are       
colors1 smells1 and tastes4 ,the former 
ideas are produced by impulse of the    
bodies themselves1 which simply effect a
 transference of their qualities over   
into the mind2 while the secondary      
qualities are arbitrarily annexed by the
 power of ,god to the objects which     
excite them4  ,it will be noticed that  
there are two elements which make the   
sensation of ,locke what it is4 ,with   
reference to its production1 it is the  
effect which one substance1 matter1 has 
upon another substance1 mind1 which is  
unlike it in nature1 and between which  
whatever relations exist1 are thoroughly

 incomprehensible1 so that1 indeed1     
their connections with each other can be
 understood only by recourse to a       
tertium quid1 an omnipotent power which 
can arbitrarily produce such            
collocations as please it4 ,with        
reference to its function1 it is the    
isolated and simple 7that is1           
non-relational7 element out of which all
 actual forms of knowledge are made by  
composition and re-arrangement4         
,leibniz1 without entering into explicit
 criticism of just these two points1    
develops his own theory with reference  
to them4 ,to ,leibniz1 reality          
constitutes a system2 that is1 it is of 
such a nature that its various portions 
have an essential and not merely        
external relation to one another4       
,sensation is of course no exception4   
,it is not a mere accident1 nor yet a   
supernatural yoking of things naturally 
opposed4 ,it has a meaning in that      
connection of things which constitute   
the universe4 ,it contributes to the    

significance of the world4 ,it is one   
way in which those activities which make
 the real express themselves4 ,it has   
its place or reason in the totality of  
things1 and this whether we consider its
 origin or its position with regard to  
knowledge4 ,in a word1 while the        
characteristic of ,locke's theory is    
that he conceives sensation as in       
external relation both to reality1 as   
mechanically produced by it1 and to     
knowledge1 as being merely one of the   
atomic elements which may enter into a  
compound1 ,leibniz regards reality as   
organic to sensation1 and this in turn  
as organic to knowledge4 ,we have here  
simply an illustration of the statement 
with which we set out2 namely1 that the 
treatment of sensation always reflects  
the fundamental philosophical category  
of the philosopher4  ,all reality exists
 in the form of monads2 monads are      
simple substances whose nature is       
action2 this action consists in         
representing1 according to a certain law

 of succession1 the universe4 ,various  
monads have various degrees of activity2
 that is1 of the power of reflecting the
 world4 ,so much of ,leibniz's general  
philosophical attitude it is necessary  
to recall1 to understand what he means  
by sensation4 ,the generic name which is
 applied to this mirroring activity of  
the monads is perception1 which1 as     
,leibniz often says1 is to be carefully 
distinguished from apperception1 which  
is the representation become conscious4 
,perception may be defined1 therefore1  
as the inclusion of the many or         
multiform 7the world of objects7 in a   
unity 7the simple substance74 ,it was   
the great defect of previous philosophy 
that it considered only spirits or      
self-conscious beings as souls1 and had 
consequently recognized only conscious  
perceptions4 ,it had been obliged1      
therefore1 to make an impassable gulf   
between mind and matter1 and sensations 
were thus rendered inexplicable4 ,but   
,leibniz finds his function as a        

philosopher in showing that these       
problems1 which seem insoluble1 arise   
when we insist upon erecting into actual
 separations or differences of kind what
 really are only stages of development  
or differences of degree4 ,a sensation  
is not an effect which one substance    
impresses upon another because ,god     
pleased that it should1 or because of an
 incomprehensible incident in the       
original constitution of things4 ,it is 
a higher development of that            
representative power which belongs to   
every real being4  ,certain monads reach
 a state of development1 or             
manifestation of activity1 which is     
characterized by the possession of      
distinct organs4 ,such monads may be    
called1 in a pre-eminent sense1 souls1  
and include all the higher animals as   
well as man4 ,this possession of        
differentiated organs finds its analogue
 in the internal condition of the monad4
 ,what appears externally as an organ of
 sense appears ideally as a conscious   

representative state which we call      
sensation4 ,when1 ,leibniz says1 the    
monad has its organs so developed that  
there is relief and differentiation in  
the impressions received1 and           
consequently in the perceptions which   
represent them1 we have feeling or      
sensation2 that is1 a perception        
accompanied by memory1 to which at other
 times he adds attention4 ,life1 he     
says1 is a perceptive principle2 the    
soul is sensitive life2 mind is rational
 soul4 ,and again he says in substance  
that when the soul begins to have       
interests1 and to regard one            
representation as of more value than    
others1 it introduces relief into its   
perceptions1 and those which stand out  
are called sensations4  ,this origin of 
sensations as higher developments of the
 representative activities of a monad   
conditions their relation to further    
processes of knowledge4 ,the sensations 
are confused knowledge2 they are ideas  
in their primitive and most             

undifferentiated form4 ,they constitute1
 as ,leibniz somewhere says1 the vertigo
 of the conscious life4 ,in every       
sentient organism multitudes of         
sensations are constantly thronging in  
and overpowering its distinct           
consciousness4 ,the soul is so flooded  
with ideas of everything in the world   
which has any relation to its body that 
it has distinct ideas of nothing4       
,higher knowledge1 then1 does not       
consist in compounding these sensations2
 that would literally make confusion    
worse confounded4 ,it consists in       
introducing distinctness into the       
previously confused sensations1--in     
finding out what they mean2 that is1 in 
finding out their bearings1 what they   
point to1 and how they are related4     
,knowledge is not an external process   
performed upon the sensations1 it is the
 development of their internal content4 
,it follows1 therefore1 that sensation  
is organic to all forms of knowledge    
whatever4 ,the monad1 which is pure     

activity1 that which culminates the     
scale of reality1 has no confused ideas1
 and to it all knowledge is eternally   
rational1 having no sensible traces     
about it4 ,but every other monad1 having
 its activity limited1 has ideas which  
come to it at first in a confused way1  
and which its activity afterwards       
differentiates4 ,thus it is that        
,leibniz can agree so heartily with the 
motto of the ,sensationalist            
school1--that there is nothing in the   
intellect which was not first in the    
sensory4 ,but ,leibniz uses this phrase 
as ,aristotle would have done1 having in
 mind the distinction between           
potentiality and actuality4 ,in posse1  
sensation is all knowledge2 but only in 
posse4 ,and he1 like ,aristotle1        
interprets the relation between         
potentiality and actuality as one of a  
difference of activity4 ,the potential  
is that which becomes real through a    
dynamic process4 ,the actual is capacity
 plus action4 ,sensation1 in short1 is  

spiritual activity in an undeveloped and
 hence partial and limited condition4   
,it is not1 as ,locke would have it1 the
 real factor in all knowledge4  ,the    
marks of sensation which ,locke lays    
down1--their passivity1 their           
simplicity1 their position as the real  
element in knowledge1--,leibniz either  
denies1 therefore1 or accepts in a sense
 different from that of ,locke4         
,strictly speaking1 sensation is an     
activity of the mind4 ,there are no     
windows through which the soul receives 
impressions4 ,pure passivity of any kind
 is a myth1 a scholastic fiction4       
,sensation is developed from the soul   
within2 it is the activity of reality   
made manifest to itself4 ,it is a higher
 kind of action than anything we find in
 minerals or in plants4 ,if we look at  
sensation ideally1 however1 that is1    
according to the position which it holds
 in the system of knowledge1 it is      
properly regarded as passive4 ,it       
represents the limitation1 the          

unrealized 7that is1 the non-active7    
side of spiritual life4  ,efficient     
causality is a term which has its       
rightful and legitimate use in physical 
science4 ,simply from the scientific    
point of view we are correct in speaking
 of objects as affecting the body1 and  
the body1 through its nervous system1 as
 affecting the soul and producing       
sensations4 ,but philosophy does not    
merely use categories1 it explains them4
 ,and ,leibniz contends that to explain 
the category of causality in a          
mechanical sense1 to understand by it   
physical influence actually transferred 
from one thing to another1 is to make   
the idea inexplicable and irrational4   
,the true meaning of causality is ideal4
 ,it signifies the relative positions   
which the objects concerned have in the 
harmonious system of reality4 ,the body 
that is higher in the scale impresses   
the other2 that is to say1 it dominates 
it or gives its law4 ,there is no energy
 or quality which passes physically from

 one to the other4 ,but one monad1 as   
higher in the stage of development than 
another1 makes an ideal demand upon that
 one4 ,it places before the other its   
own more real condition4 ,the           
less-developed monad1 since its whole   
activity consists in representing the   
universe of reality1 answers to this    
demand by developing the corresponding  
quality in itself4 ,the category of     
harmonious or co-operative action is    
thus substituted for that of external   
and mechanical influence4 ,physical     
causality when given a philosophic      
interpretation means organic            
development4 ,the reality of a higher   
stage is the more active3 the more      
active has a greater content in that it 
mirrors the universe more fully2 it     
manifests accordingly more of the law of
 the universe1 and hence has an ideal   
domination over that which is lower in  
the scale4 ,it is actually 7that is1 in 
activity7 what the other is potentially4
 ,but as the entire existence of the    

latter is in representing or setting    
forth the relations which make the      
world1 its activity is aroused to a     
corresponding production4 ,hence the    
former is called cause1 and the latter  
effect4  ,this introduces us to the     
relation of soul and body1 or1 more     
generally stated1 to the relation of    
mind and matter4 ,it is the theory of   
co-operation1 of harmonious activity1   
which ,leibniz substitutes for the      
theory which ,descartes had formulated1 
according to which there are two opposed
 substances which can affect each other 
only through the medium of a deus ex    
machina4 ,locke1 on the other hand1 took
 the ,cartesian principle for granted1  
and thus enveloped himself in all the   
difficulties which surround the question
 of mind and matter4 ,locke wavers      
between two positions1 one of which is  
that there are two unknown              
substances1--the soul and the object in 
itself1--which1 coming in contact1      
produce sensations2 while the other     

takes the hypothetical attitude that    
there may be but one                    
substance1--matter1--and that ,god1 out 
of the plenitude of his omnipotence1 has
 given matter a capacity which does not 
naturally belong to it1--that of        
producing sensations4 ,in either case1  
however1 the final recourse is to the   
arbitrary power of ,god4 ,there is no   
natural--that is1 intrinsic and         
explicable--connection between the      
sensation and that which produces it4   
,sensation occupied the hard position   
which the mechanical school of to-day   
still allots it4 ,it is that            
inexplicable1 mysterious1 unaccountable 
link between the domains of matter and  
mind of which no rational account can be
 given1 but which is yet the source of  
all that we know about matter1 and the  
basis of all that is real in the mind6  
,leibniz1 recognizing that reality is an
 organic whole1--not two parts with a   
chasm between them1--says that ,god does
 not arbitrarily give substances        

whatever qualities may happen1 or that  
he may arbitrarily determine1 but only  
such as are natural2 that is1 such as   
are related to one another in an        
explicable way as modifications of the  
substance4 ,leibniz feels sure that to  
introduce the idea of the inexplicable1 
the purely supernatural1 into the       
natural is to give up all the advantages
 which the modern mechanical theory had 
introduced1 and to relapse into the     
meaningless features of scholasticism4  
,if the supernatural--that is1 the      
essentially inexplicable--is introduced 
in this one case1 why should it not be  
in others2 why should we not return     
outright to the fanatic philosophy which
 explains all facts by simply           
attributing them to ,god immediately or 
by way of miracle1 or to the barbarian  
philosophy1 which explains phenomena by 
manufacturing1 ad hoc1 occult qualities 
or faculties1 seemingly like little     
demons or spirits capable of performing1
 without ceremony1 whatever is          

required1--as if watches marked time by 
their horodeictic power1 without wheels1
 and mills ground grain1 without        
grindstones1 by their fractive power8   
,in fact1 says ,leibniz1 by introducing 
the inexplicable into our explanations  
we fall into something worse than occult
 qualities1--we give up philosophy and  
reason2 we open asylums for ignorance   
and laziness1 holding not only that     
there are qualities which we do not     
understand 7there are1 indeed1 too many 
such71 but qualities which the greatest 
intelligence1 if ,god gave it all the   
insight possible1 could not             
understand1--that is1 such as are in    
themselves without rhyme or reason4 ,and
 indeed it would be a thing without     
rhyme or reason that ,god should perform
 miracles in the ordinary course of     
nature4 ,and regarding the whole matter 
of introducing the inconceivable and the
 inexplicable into science1 he says that
 while the conception of men is not the 
measure of ,god's power1 their capacity 

of conception is the measure of nature's
 power1 since everything occurring in   
the natural order is capable of being   
understood by the created intelligence4 
,such being the thought of ,leibniz     
regarding the virtual attempt to        
introduce in his day the unknowable into
 philosophy1 it is evident that he must 
reject1 from the root up1 all theories  
of sensation which1 like ,locke's1 make 
it the product of the inexplicable      
intercourse of two substances4  ,for    
this doctrine1 then1 ,leibniz           
substitutes that of an infinite number  
of substances1 all of the same kind1 all
 active1 all developing from within1 all
 conspiring to the same end1 but of     
various stages of activity1 or bearing  
various relations of completeness to the
 one end4  ,indeed1 one and the same    
monad has various degrees of activity in
 itself2 that is1 it represents more or 
less distinctly the universe according  
to its point of view4 ,its point of view
 requires of it1 of course1 primarily1 a

 representation of that which is about  
it4 ,thus an infinity of states arises1 
each corresponding to some one of the   
multitude of objects surrounding the    
monad4 ,the soul has no control1 no     
mastery1 over these states4 ,it has to  
take them as they come2 with regard to  
them1 the soul appears passive4 ,it     
appears so because it does not as yet   
clearly distinguish them4 ,it does not  
react upon them and become conscious of 
their meaning or thoroughly rational    
character4 ,we shall afterwards see that
 matter is1 with ,leibniz1 simply this  
passive or confused side of monads4 ,it 
is the monad so far as it has not       
brought to light the rational activity  
which is immanent in it4 ,at present we 
need only notice that the body is simply
 the part of matter or of passivity     
which limits the complete activity of   
any monad4 ,so ,leibniz says1 in so far 
as the soul has perfection1 it has      
distinct thoughts1 and ,god has         
accommodated the body to the soul4 ,so  

far as it is imperfect and its          
perceptions are confused1 ,god has      
accommodated the soul to the body in    
such a way that the soul lets itself be 
inclined by the passions1 which are born
 from corporeal representations4 ,it is 
by its confused thoughts 7sensations7   
that the soul represents the bodies     
about it1 just as1 we may add1 its      
distinct thoughts represent the monads  
or souls about it1 and1 in the degree of
 their distinctness1 ,god1 the monad    
which is purus actus4  ,following the   
matter into more detail1 we may say that
 since ,god alone is pure energy1       
knowing no limitation1 ,god alone is    
pure spirit4 ,every finite soul is      
joined to an organic body4 ,i do not    
admit1 says ,leibniz1 that there are    
souls entirely separate from matter1 nor
 created spirits detached from body4 4 4
 4 ,it is this body which the monad     
represents most distinctly2 but since   
this body expresses the entire universe 
by the connection of all matter         

throughout it1 the soul represents the  
entire universe in representing the body
 which belongs to it most particularly4 
,but according to the principle of      
continuity there must be in the least   
apparent portion of matter still a      
universe of creatures1 of souls1 of     
entelechies4 ,there is nothing sterile1 
nothing dead in the universe4 ,it is    
evident from these considerations that  
every living body has a dominant        
entelechy1 which is the soul in that    
body1 but that the members of this      
living body are again full of other     
living beings and souls1 which1 however1
 since not of so high a grade1 that is1 
not representing the universe so fully1 
appear to be wholly material and subject
 to the dominant entelechy2 namely1 to  
the one which gives the law to the      
others by expressing more adequately the
 idea at which they only confusedly aim4
 ,owing to the constant change of       
activity1 however1 these particles do   
not remain in constant subordination to 

the same entelechy 7that is1 do not form
 parts of the same body71 but pass on to
 higher or lower degrees of evolution1  
and have their places taken by others   
undergoing similar processes of change4 
,thus all bodies are in a perpetual     
flux1 like rivers1 with parts           
continually leaving and entering in4    
,or1 interpreting this figurative       
language1 each monad is continually1 in 
its process of development1 giving law  
to new and less developed monads1 which 
therefore appear as its body4 ,the      
nature of matter in itself1 and of its  
phenomenal manifestation in the body1   
are1 however1 subjects which find no    
explanation here1 and which will demand 
explanation in another chapter4  ,we may
 sum up ,leibniz's theory of sensation  
by saying that it is a representative   
state developed by the self-activity of 
the soul2 that in itself it is a        
confused or involved grade of activity1 
and in its relation to the world        
represents the confused or passive      

aspects of existence2 that this         
limitation of the monad constitutes     
matter1 and in its necessary connection 
with the monad constitutes the body     
which is always joined to the finite    
soul2 that to this body are joined in   
all cases an immense number of monads1  
whose action is subordinate to that of  
this dominant monad1 and that it is the 
collection of these which constitute the
 visible animal body4 ,thus if we look  
at sensation with regard to the monad   
which possesses it1 it is a product of  
the body of the monad2 if we look at it 
with reference to other monads1 it      
represents or reflects their passive or 
material side4 ,this is evidently one   
aspect again of the pre-established     
harmony1--an aspect in which some of the
 narrower of ,leibniz's critics have    
seen the whole meaning of the doctrine  
exhausted4 ,it is1 however1 simply one  
of the many forms in which the harmony1 
the union of spiritual and mechanical1  
ideal and material1 meets us4 ,in truth1

 while in other systems the fact of     
sensation is a fact demanding some      
artificial mode of reconciling mind and 
matter1 or is else to be accepted as an 
inexplicable fact1 in the system of     
,leibniz it is itself evidence that the 
spiritual and the mechanical are not two
 opposed kinds of existence1 but are    
organically united4 ,it is itself the   
manifestation of the harmony of the     
ideal and the material1 not something   
which requires that a factitious theory 
be invented for explaining their        
appearance of harmony4 ,sensation has   
within itself the ideal element1 for it 
is the manifestation1 in its most       
undeveloped form1 of the spiritual      
meaning of the universe4 ,it has a      
mechanical element1 for it expresses the
 limitation1 the passivity1 of the      
monad4  ,it is from this standpoint that
 ,leibniz criticises what ,locke says   
about the relation of sensations to the 
objects which produce them4 ,leibniz    
holds that all our sensations have a    

definite and natural connection with the
 qualities of objects1--the secondary as
 well as the primary4 ,they all         
represent certain properties of the     
object4 ,even the pain which the thrust 
of a needle gives us1 while it does not 
resemble anything in the needle1 does in
 some way represent or resemble motions 
going on in our body4 ,this resemblance 
is not necessarily one of exact form1   
but just as the ellipse1 hyperbola1 and 
parabola are projections of the circle  
in the sense that there is a natural and
 fixed law of connection between them1  
so that every point of one corresponds  
by a certain relation with every point  
of the other1 so the resemblance between
 the sensation and the quality of the   
object is always in the form of a fixed 
law of order1 which1 however unknown to 
us it may now be1 is capable of being   
found out4 ,if we are to make any       
distinction between secondary and       
primary sensations1 it should be not    
that one presents qualities that are in 

the objects1 and the other affections   
which exist only in us1 but that the    
primary sensations 7of number1 form1    
size1 etc47 represent the qualities in a
 distinct way1 appealing to the rational
 activity of intelligence1 while the    
secondary represent the qualities in a  
confused way1 a way not going beyond the
 effect upon the mind into relations1   
that is1 into distinct knowledge4  ,this
 brings regularly before us the question
 of the relation of sensations to       
knowledge4 ,we have seen enough already 
to know that ,leibniz does not believe  
that knowledge begins with the simple   
7that is1 unrelated71 and then proceeds 
by a process of compounding4 ,the       
sensation is not simple to ,leibniz1 but
 thoroughly complex1 involving          
confusedly within itself all possible   
relations4 ,as relations are brought    
forth into distinct light out of this   
confusion1 knowledge ends rather than   
begins with the simple4 ,and again it is
 evident that ,leibniz cannot believe   

that knowledge begins and ends in       
experience1 in the sense in which both  
himself and ,locke use the word2 namely1
 as meaning the combination and         
succession of impressions4  ,experience1
 as they use the term1 consists in      
sensations and their                    
association1--consecution as ,leibniz   
calls it4 ,experience is the stage of   
knowledge reached by animals1 and in    
which the majority of men remain1--and  
indeed all men in the greater part of   
their knowledge4 ,leibniz takes just the
 same position regarding the larger part
 of our knowledge which ,hume takes     
regarding it all4 ,it consists simply in
 associations of such a nature that when
 one part recurs there is a tendency to 
expect the recurrence of the other      
member4 ,it resembles reason1 but it is 
based on the accidental experience of   
events in a consecutive order1 and not  
on knowledge of their causal connection4
 ,we all expect the sun to rise         
to-morrow2 but with all of us1 excepting

 the astronomer1 such expectation is    
purely empirical1 being based on the    
images of past experiences which recur4 
,the astronomer1 however1 sees into the 
grounds1 that is1 the reasons1 of the   
expectation1 and hence his knowledge is 
rational4  ,thus we have two grades of  
knowledge1--one empirical1 consisting of
 knowledge of facts2 the other rational1
 being of the truths of reason4 ,the    
former is contingent and particular1 the
 latter is necessary and universal4     
,leibniz insists1 with a pertinacity    
which reminds us of ,kant1 that         
experience can give instances or        
examples only1 and that the fact that   
anything has happened in a given way any
 number of times in the past1 can give  
no assurance that it will continue to do
 so in the future4 ,there is nothing in 
the nature of the case which renders its
 exact opposite impossible4 ,but a      
rational truth is necessary1 for its    
opposite is impossible1 being irrational
 or meaningless4 ,this may not always be

 evident in the case of a complex       
rational truth2 but if it be analyzed   
into simpler elements1 as a geometrical 
proposition into definitions1 axioms1   
and postulates1 the absurdity of its    
opposite becomes evident4 ,sensation1 in
 conclusion1 is the having of confused  
ideas1--ideas corresponding to matter4  
,experience is the association of these 
confused ideas1 and their association   
according to their accidental           
juxtaposition in the life of the soul4  
,it therefore is not only thoroughly    
sensible1 but is also phenomenal4 ,its  
content is sensations2 its form is      
contingent and particular consecution4  
,both form and content1 accordingly1    
need to be reconstructed if they are to 
be worthy of the name of science or of  
knowledge4 ,this is the position which  
,leibniz assumes as against the         
empiricist1 ,locke4 ,the details of this
 reconstruction1 its method and result1 
we must leave till we come in the course
 of the argument again to the subject of

 knowledge4     ,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,the  
,,impulses ,,and ,,the ,,will4   ,locke1
 after discussing the subject of innate 
ideas in their relation to knowledge1   
goes on to discuss their practical side1
 or connection with will4 ,we shall     
follow him in this as ,leibniz does2 but
 we shall consider in connection with   
this1 ,leibniz's general theory of will1
 which is developed partially in this   
chapter1 but more completely in his     
critical remarks upon what ,locke has to
 say of the notion of power4 ,since the 
theory of morals is as closely connected
 with will as the theory of knowledge is
 with the intellect1 we shall supplement
 this discussion with what ,leibniz says
 upon the ethical question1 drawing our 
material somewhat freely from his other 
writings4  ,the doctrine of will which  
,leibniz propounds is in closest harmony
 with his conception of intelligence1   
and this not merely in the way of       
empirical juxtaposition1 but as the     
result of his fundamental principles4   

,if we recall what has been said        
concerning the monad1 we shall remember 
that it is an activity1 but an activity 
with a content4 ,it is a force1 but a   
force which mirrors the universe4 ,the  
content1 that portion of reality which  
is reflected in the action1 is          
knowledge1 or the idea2 the activity    
which brings this about is will1 or the 
volition4 ,they are related to each     
other as form and content4 ,there is1   
strictly speaking1 no state of mind2    
there is only a tension1 a pushing      
forward of mind4 ,there is no idea which
 is not a volition4 ,will is thus used1 
in a very broad sense1 as equivalent to 
action4 ,since1 however1 the activity of
 the monad is in no case aimless1 but   
has an end in view1 the will is not mere
 activity in general1 it is action      
towards some definite end4 ,and since   
the end at which the monad aims is      
always the development of an idea1 the  
reflection of some constituent of the   
universe1 the will is always directed   

towards and determined by some idea of  
the intellect4  ,we have seen1 however1 
that there are various stages in the    
reflecting power of the soul1 or in the 
realization of intellect4 ,taking only  
the broadest division1 there are        
perception and apperception2 that is1   
there are the conscious and the         
unconscious mirroring of reality4 ,we   
shall expect1 then1 to find two         
corresponding stages of volition4       
,leibniz calls these stages appetition  
and volition in the narrower sense4 ,the
 constant tendency in every monad to go 
from one perception to another1--that   
is1 the following of the law of         
development1--constitutes appetition4   
,if joined to feeling1 it constitutes   
instinct4 ,since1 again1 there are two  
degrees of apperception1 one of         
empirical1 the other of rational1       
consciousness1 we shall expect to find  
two grades of volition proper1--one     
corresponding to action for conscious   
particular ends2 the other for ends     

which are proposed by reason1 and are   
hence universal4 ,in this chapter we    
shall simply expand and illustrate these
 various propositions4  ,sensations1    
looked at not as to what they represent1
 but in themselves1 are impulses4 ,as   
such they constitute the lowest stage of
 will4 ,impulsive action then includes  
all such as occurs for an end which is  
unknown1 or at best but dimly felt4     
,such action may be called blind1 not in
 the sense that it is without reason1   
but in the sense that reason is not     
consciously present4 ,we are not to     
think of this instinctive action1       
however1 as if it were found simply in  
the animals4 ,much of human action is   
also impulsive2 probably1 indeed1 an    
impulsive factor is contained in our    
most rational willing4 ,we are never    
able to take complete account of the    
agencies which are acting upon us4      
,along with the reasons of which we are 
conscious in choosing1 there are mingled
 faint memories of past experience1     

subconscious solicitations of the       
present1 dim expectations for the       
future4 ,such elements are decisive     
factors far more than we realize4       
,indeed1 it is because of the extent to 
which such unconscious influences bear  
upon us and move us that there arises   
the idea of indifferent or unmotivated  
choice4 ,were both motive and choice    
unconscious1 the question as to whether 
choice were antecedently determined     
would not arise2 and were our motives   
and their results wholly in             
consciousness1 the solution of the      
question would be evident4 ,but when we 
are conscious of our choice1 but are not
 conscious of our impulses and motives1 
we get the impression that our choice is
 unmotived1 and hence come to believe in
 indifferent freedom1--the ability to   
choose as we will4  ,we shall shortly   
take up in more detail the theory of    
,leibniz regarding the freedom of will2 
and it is needful here to remark only   
that the conception which makes it      

consist in ability to choose without    
reason is in direct contradiction to his
 fundamental thought1--namely1 that     
there can be no activity which does not 
aim at some reflection of the universe1 
by which1 therefore1 it is determined4  
,from the psychological point of view1  
it is interesting also to notice how    
,leibniz's theory of unconscious ideas  
enables him to dispose of the strongest 
argument for indifferent choice1--that  
drawn from the immediate testimony of   
consciousness4  ,upon the origin and    
nature of desires ,leibniz has much more
 to say than about the impulses4 ,his   
account of the transition from impulse  
to desire is based upon the conception  
of unconscious ideas4 ,slight and       
imperceptible impulses are working upon 
us all the time4 ,indeed1 they are a    
necessity2 for the actual state of a    
soul or monad at any time is1 of course1
 one of incompleteness4 ,our nature must
 always work to free itself from its    
hindrances and obtain its goal of       

complete development4 ,but it will not  
do this unless there is some stimulus1  
some solicitation to induce it to       
overcome its limitation4 ,there is found
 accordingly in our every condition a   
feeling of dissatisfaction1 or1 using   
,locke's word1 of uneasiness2 and it is 
this which calls forth that activity    
which brings about a nearer approach to 
the soul's real good4 ,but ,leibniz     
differs from ,locke in saying that this 
feeling of uneasiness is not a distinct1
 or even in most cases a conscious1 one4
 ,it is not pain1 although it differs   
from pain only in degree4 ,uneasiness   
and pain are related to each other as   
appetite for food is to hunger1--the    
first suffices to stimulate us to       
satisfaction1 but if the want is not    
met1 results in actual pain2 if met1    
these half pains become tributary to    
pleasure itself4 ,these unconscious     
stimuli to action result in actions     
which meet the want1 and the aggregation
 of these satisfactions results in      

pleasure4 ,in ,leibniz's own words3--   
,if these elements of pain were         
themselves true pains1 we should always 
be in a state of misery1 even in        
pursuing the good4 ,but since there is  
always going on a summation of minute   
successes in overcoming these states of 
uneasiness1 and these put us more and   
more at ease1 there comes about a       
decided pleasure1 which often has       
greater value even than the enjoyment of
 the good4 ,far1 then1 from regarding   
this uneasiness as a thing incompatible 
with happiness1 ,i find that it is an   
essential condition of our happiness4   
,for this does not consist in perfect   
possession1 which would make us         
insensible and stupid1 but in a constant
 progress towards greater results1 which
 must always be accompanied1            
accordingly1 by this element of desire  
or uneasiness4  ,and again he says that 
we enjoy all the advantages of pain     
without any of its inconveniences4 ,if  
the uneasiness should become too        

distinct1 we should be miserable in our 
awaiting the good which relieves it2 but
 as it is1 there is a constant victory  
over these half-pains1 which we always  
find in desire1 and this gives us a     
quantity of half-pleasures1 whose       
continuance and summation 7for they     
acquire force like a moving body as it  
falls7 result in a whole and true       
pleasure4 ,in short1 there is indeed an 
element of pain in all desire which     
stimulates us to action1 and therefore  
to higher development4 ,but ordinarily  
this element of pain is not present as  
such in consciousness1 but is absorbed  
in the pleasure which accompanies the   
realization of the higher good4 ,thus   
,leibniz1 accepting and emphasizing the 
very same fact that served ,schopenhauer
 as a psychological base of pessimism1  
uses it as a foundation-stone of        
optimism4  ,but desire1 or the conscious
 tendency towards something required as 
a good1 accompanied by the dim feeling  
of uneasiness at its absence1 does not  

yet constitute the complete act of      
volition4 ,several impulses and         
inclinations meet in forming the        
complete volition which is the result of
 their conflict4 ,in the concrete act of
 will there are contained impulses which
 push us towards some end whose nature  
is not known2 there is desire both in   
its inchoate stage1 where pleasure and  
pain are not in consciousness1 and in   
its formed state1 where the pain and    
pleasure are definitely presented4      
,mixed with these desires and impulses  
are images of past experiences which    
call up the feelings which were formerly
 attached to them1 and thus there are   
aroused indirectly additional impulses  
and desires4 ,out of this complicated   
mass of impulses1 desires1 and feelings1
 both original and reproduced1 comes the
 dominant effort which constitutes      
complete will4 ,but what governs the    
production of this prevailing or        
dominant effort1 which we may interpret 
as the act of choice8 ,the answer is    

simple3 the result of the conflict of   
these various factors1 the striking of  
the balance1 is the choice4 ,some desire
 emerges from the confused complex1 and 
that desire is the final determination  
of the will4 ,this desire may not in all
 cases be the strongest in itself1--that
 is1 the one whose satisfaction will    
allay the greatest uneasiness1 for the  
others1 taken together1 may outweigh it2
 it may1 so to speak1 have a plurality1 
but not a majority1 of volitional forces
 on its side1--and in this case a fusion
 of opposing factors may defeat it4 ,but
 in any event the result will be the    
algebraic sum of the various desires and
 impulses4  ,it is not at all necessary1
 however1 that the net outcome shall    
make itself apparent as a mechanical    
equivalent of the forces at work4 ,the  
soul1 ,leibniz says1 may use its skill  
in the formation of parties1 so as to   
make this or that side the victor4 ,how 
is this to be done1 and still disallow  
the possibility of arbitrary choice8    

,this problem is solved through action  
becoming deliberate4 ,deliberate action 
is impossible unless the soul has formed
 the habit of looking ahead and of      
arranging for modes of action which do  
not present themselves as immediate     
necessities4 ,only in this way can one  
look at the matter impartially and      
coolly2 at the moment of combat there is
 no time for discussion4 ,everything    
which then occurs throws its full force 
on the balance1 and contributes to an   
outcome made up in the same way as in   
mechanics4 ,the formation of certain    
habits beforehand1 therefore1 is the    
secret of translating impulsive action  
into the deliberate sphere4  ,of these  
habits the simplest consists in thinking
 only occasionally and incidentally of  
certain things4 ,imagination is the     
mother of desire4 ,if we do not allow   
the imagination to dwell upon certain   
lines of thought1 the probability of    
such thoughts acquiring sufficient force
 to become motives of weight is small4  

,a still more effective method of       
regulating action is to accustom        
ourselves to forming a train of thoughts
 of which reason1 and not chance 7that  
is1 association71 is the basis4 ,we must
 get out of the tumult of present       
impressions1 beyond our immediate       
surroundings1 and ask3 ,dic cur hic8    
respice finem6 ,in other words1 we must 
cross-question our impulses and desires1
 we must ask whence they come1 that we  
may see how valid are the credentials   
which they offer4 ,we must ask whither  
they tend1 that we may measure them1 not
 by their immediate interest1 but by    
their relation to an end4 ,the desires  
are not to be taken at their face-value1
 but are to be weighed and compared4    
,such a process will evidently result in
 arresting instantaneous action4 ,there 
will be a pause between the presentation
 of the desires and the overt act4      
,during this pause it may well occur    
that the examination to which the       
desires have been subject has awakened  

contrary desires4 ,the thought of the   
ignoble origin of a desire or of its    
repulsive1 though remote1 result will   
bring into action desires of an opposed 
kind4 ,thus the soul regulates action1  
not as if1 however1 it had any direct   
influence over desires1 but by its      
ability of bringing other desires into  
the field4 ,the will1 in short1 is not  
opposed to desire1 though rational      
desire may be opposed to sensuous       
desire4 ,by various artifices1 then1    
,leibniz concludes1 we become masters of
 ourselves1 and can make ourselves think
 and do that which we ought to will1 and
 which reason ordains4 ,such is the     
summary of ,leibniz's analysis of the   
elements and mechanism of volition4     
,there was not much psychology existing 
at the time which could aid him in such 
an acute and subtle account2 only in    
,aristotle could he have found much     
help4 ,on the other hand1 it has been so
 generally incorporated into current    
psychology that we may seem to have     

wasted space in repeating truisms4  ,of 
moral action1 however1 we have as yet   
heard nothing4 ,we have an account of a 
psychological mechanism2 but for what   
ethical end does this work1 and by what 
method8 ,this question may best be      
answered by turning in more detail to   
the question of the freedom of the will4
 ,freedom in the sense of arbitrary     
choice ,leibniz wholly rejects1 as we   
have seen4 ,it is inconsistent with at  
least two of his fundamental principles2
 those1 namely1 of sufficient reason1   
and of continuity4 ,everything that     
occurs must have a sufficient reason for
 its occurrence4 ,this oft-repeated     
dictum of ,leibniz1 the logical way of  
stating the complete rationality of     
experience1 would be shattered into     
fragments by collision with groundless  
choice4 ,it conflicts equally 7indeed   
for the same reason7 with the principle 
of continuity4 ,the present is pregnant 
with the future4 ,nature never makes    
leaps4 ,an absolute equilibrium is a    

chimera4 ,the soul is never wholly at   
rest4 ,these are only various ways of   
saying that the notion of arbitrary or  
unmotivated choice rests upon the       
assumption that there is a complete     
break in the life of the soul1 so that  
it is possible for something to happen  
which bears no organic relation to      
anything that precedes4 ,the notion of a
 state of the soul without motives1     
followed by the irruption of a certain  
line of conduct1 the notion of an       
equilibrium broken by arbitrary choice1 
is simply the counterpart of the idea of
 a vacuum4 ,all that makes ,leibniz     
reject the latter conception makes it   
impossible for him to accept the former4
  ,this should not be interpreted to    
mean that ,leibniz denied the freedom of
 the will4 ,what he denied is a notion  
of freedom which seemed to him at once  
unverifiable1 useless1 and irrational4  
,there is a conception of freedom which 
,leibniz not only accepts1 but insists  
upon4 ,such a notion of freedom is      

indeed his ethical ideal4 ,its three    
traits are contingency1 spontaneity1 and
 rationality of action4 ,how action can 
be at the same time contingent and      
determined is perhaps difficult to      
understand2 but ,leibniz takes the      
position that it is4 ,his first step is 
to distinguish between physical1        
mathematical1 metaphysical1 and moral   
necessity4 ,there are truths which are  
eternal1 truths which are absolutely    
necessary1 because their opposites      
involve contradiction4 ,they cannot be  
violated without involving us in        
absurdity4 ,there are other truths which
 are positive1 that is1 ordained for    
good reason4 ,these truths may be a     
priori1 or rational1 and not merely     
empirical2 for they have been chosen for
 reasons of advantage4 ,god always      
chooses and ordains the best of a number
 of possibilities2 but he does it1 not  
because the opposite is impossible1 but 
because it is inferior4 ,truths whose   
opposites are impossible have           

metaphysical and mathematical necessity4
 ,positive truths have moral necessity4 
,the principle of causation must be     
true2 the three interior angles of a    
triangle must be equal to two right     
angles4 ,but that ,god shall choose the 
better of two courses is a moral        
necessity only4 ,it invokes no absolute 
logical contradiction to conceive him   
choosing some other way4 ,upon moral    
necessity depends the physical4 ,the    
particular laws of nature are necessary1
 not because their opposites are        
logically absurd1 but because these laws
 are most in accordance with the general
 principles of good and order1 in       
agreement with which ,god chooses4      
,physical and moral action is therefore 
in all cases contingent4 7,contingency  
does not of itself1 of course1          
constitute freedom1 but conjoined with  
the characteristics of rationality and  
spontaneity1 does so47  ,necessity1 in  
short1 is based upon the principle of   
logical contradiction2 contingency upon 

that of sufficient reason4 ,since our   
actions are in no case necessitated in  
such a way that their opposite is       
self-contradictory1 or1 put positively1 
since our actions are always determined 
by the choice of that which seems best1 
our actions are contingent4             
,occasionally ,leibniz puts the matter  
in a much simpler way1 and one which    
brings out the essential element more   
clearly than the foregoing distinction4 
,some facts are determined by the       
principle of physical causation2 others 
by that of final causation4 ,some1 in   
other words1 are necessary as the       
mechanical outcome of their antecedents2
 others are necessary as involved in the
 reaching of a given end4 ,it is simply 
the ,aristotelian distinction between   
efficient and teleological causation4   
,human action is determined1 since it   
always has a motive or reason2 it is    
contingent1 because it springs from this
 reason and not from its temporal       
antecedents4 ,it is1 in short1          

determined1 but it is also free4  ,it   
does not require much analysis1 however1
 to see that this distinction1 in       
whatever way it be put1 really has no   
significance1 except as it points to the
 other marks of freedom1--spontaneity   
and rationality4 ,as we shall see1      
,leibniz makes and can make no absolute 
distinction between truths of reason and
 truths of fact4 ,the contingent and the
 necessary are one at bottom4 ,to us    
with our limited intelligence it does   
indeed often appear as if no            
contradiction were involved in the      
former1--as if1 for example1 a man could
 turn either to right or left without   
there being any logical contradiction in
 either case2 but this is because of our
 defective insight4 ,an intelligence    
cognizant of the whole matter could see 
that one action would contradict some   
truth involved in the constitution of   
the universe4 ,the source of the        
contingent and changing is in the       
necessary and eternal4 ,thus it is that 

although ,leibniz at one time says that 
neither one's self nor any other spirit 
more enlightened could demonstrate that 
the opposite of a given action 7like    
going out in preference to staying in7  
involves contradiction1 at another time 
he says that a perfect knowledge of all 
the circumstances1 internal and         
external1 would enable any one to       
foresee the decision in a given case4   
,if that be so1 any other action must be
 impossible2 that is1 according to      
,leibniz's invariable logic1 imply      
contradiction4  ,we get the same result 
if we consider the relation of final and
 efficient causes4 ,it is only when     
speaking in a very general way that     
,leibniz opposes action as determined by
 precedent activities to that directed  
towards the attainment of an end4 ,he   
does not really mean that some action is
 physical1 while other is teleological4 
,he cannot suppose that some action has 
an antecedent cause1 while other has a  
purpose4 ,the very essence of his       

thought is that action is both          
mechanical and teleological2 that all   
action follows in a law of order from   
precedent action1 and that all fulfils a
 certain spiritual function4 ,the       
distinction is not1 with ,leibniz1 one  
between two kinds of action1 but between
 two ways of looking at every action4   
,the desire to go rather than to stay1  
has its efficient cause2 the movements  
by which the desire is executed1 have   
their final cause4 ,the truth of the    
matter seems to be that ,leibniz in his 
desire to guard against being thought a 
fatalist1 or one denying all freedom1   
uses terms which are compatible only    
with a freedom of indifference4 ,so in  
his statement that man's action is free 
because contingent1 he seems actuated   
rather by a wish to avoid the hateful   
term necessity than by considerations   
strictly in harmony with his own        
principles4  ,had he confined his use of
 the term contingent1 however1 simply to
 re-stating the fact that human action  

is spontaneous1 no such apparent        
contradiction would have presented      
itself4 ,human actions may be called    
contingent1 as physical actions are not1
 because the latter always seem to be   
externally determined1 while the former 
are internally directed4 ,motions act   
from without2 motives from within4 ,the 
cause of the falling of a stone lies    
outside it2 the source of a desire which
 moves to action is from the mind       
itself4 ,we are thus introduced to      
contingency as a synonym of spontaneity4
  ,kuno ,fischer calls attention to the 
fact that ,spinoza and ,leibniz both use
 the same sort of illustration to show  
the non-arbitrary character of human    
action1 but the same illustration with a
 difference2 and in the difference he   
finds the distinction between the two   
philosophies4 ,spinoza says that a stone
 falling to the ground1 if endowed with 
consciousness1 might imagine itself     
following its own will in falling4      
,leibniz says that a magnetic needle    

similarly endowed might imagine that it 
turned towards the north simply because 
it wished4 ,both examples are used to   
illustrate the folly of relying upon the
 immediate testimony of consciousness4  
,but the example of ,spinoza is that of 
an object1 all whose movements are      
absolutely necessitated from without2   
the example of ,leibniz is that of an   
object whose activity1 though following 
law1 and not caprice1 is apparently     
initiated from within4 ,of course in    
reality the movements of the magnetic   
needle are just as much externally      
conditioned as those of the stone2 but  
the appearance of self-action in the    
latter case may serve at least to       
exemplify what is meant by spontaneity  
as attributed to human action4  ,it must
 be noticed at the outset that          
spontaneity belongs to every simple     
substance4 ,we have only to recall the  
doctrine of monads4 ,these suffer       
nothing from without1 all their activity
 is the expression1 is the unfolding1 of

 their own law4 ,by nature1 ,leibniz    
says1 every simple substance has        
perceptions1 and its individuality      
consists in the permanent law which     
forms the succession of its perceptions1
 that are born naturally one of another4
 ,hence it is not necessary for it to   
receive any physical influence from     
without2 and therefore the soul has in  
itself a perfect spontaneity in such a  
way that its actions depend only upon   
,god and itself4 ,or if we put the      
matter in its connection with his       
psychology rather than with his         
metaphysics1 it is true that our actions
 are determined by our motives2 but     
motives are not forces without the soul1
 they are forces of the soul4 ,in acting
 according to motives the soul is simply
 acting according to its own laws4 ,a   
desire is not an impulsion from an      
external cause2 it is the expression of 
an inward tendency4 ,to say that the    
soul acts from the strongest desire is  
simply to say1 from this standpoint1    

that it manifests the most real part of 
itself1 not that it obeys a foreign     
force4 ,impulses1 desires1 motives1 are 
all psychical2 they admit of no         
description or explanation except in    
their relation to the soul itself4 ,thus
 when ,leibniz compares1 as he often    
does1 motives to weights acting upon a  
balance1 we are to remember that the    
balance is not to be conceived as the   
soul1 and the weights as energies       
outside it1 but that this is only a way 
of picturing what is going on within the
 soul itself4 ,the soul may be a        
mechanism1 but it is a self-directing   
and self-executing mechanism4 ,to say   
that human action is free because it is 
spontaneous1 is to say that it follows  
an immanent principle1 that it is       
independent of foreign influences1--in a
 word1 that it is self-determined4  ,but
 here again it seems as if ,leibniz had 
stated a principle altogether too wide  
to throw any light upon the nature of   
moral freedom4 ,spontaneity is no more  

an attribute of human activity than it  
is of all real activity4 ,every monad1  
even the unconscious1 as truly follows  
its own law without interference from   
without as does man himself4 ,if the    
spontaneity of action constitutes its   
morality1 we are not in a condition to  
ascribe morality to man any more than to
 any real thing4 ,we are thus thrown    
back again upon the conception of       
rationality as the final and decisive   
trait of freedom and of ethical conduct4
 ,just as contingency gets a moral      
import only in connection with conscious
 ends of action1 so spontaneity comes   
within the moral realm only when        
conjoined to reason4  ,why is there this
 close connection between reason and    
freedom8 ,the reader has only to recall 
what was said of ,leibniz's theory of   
causality to get a glimpse into their   
unity4 ,causality is not a matter of    
physical influence1 but of affording the
 reason in virtue of which some fact is 
what it is4 ,this applies of course to  

the relation of the soul and the body4  
,so far as the soul is perfect and has  
distinct ideas1 ,god has accommodated   
the body to it2 so far as the soul is   
imperfect and its ideas are confused1   
,god has accommodated the soul to the   
body4 ,in the former case the body      
always responds to the demands of the   
soul2 in the latter the soul is moved by
 the passions which are born of the     
sensuous ideas4 ,each is thought to act 
upon the other in the measure of its    
perfection that is1 degree of activity1 
since ,god has adjusted one thing to    
another according to its perfection or  
imperfection4 ,activity and passivity   
are always reciprocal in created things1
 because a portion of the reasons which 
serve to explain what goes on is in one 
substance1 and another portion in the   
other4 ,this is what makes us call one  
active1 the other passive4  ,if we      
translate these ideas out of their      
somewhat scholastic phraseology1 the    
meaning is that the self-activity of any

 substance is accurately measured by the
 extent to which it contains the reasons
 for its own actions2 and conversely1   
that it is dependent or enslaved just so
 far as it has its reasons beyond       
itself4 ,sensations1 sensuous impulses1 
represent1 as we have seen before1 the  
universe only in a confused and         
inarticulate way4 ,they are knowledge   
which cannot give an account of itself4 
,they represent1 in short1 that side of 
mind which may be regarded as affected1 
or the limitation of mind1--its want of 
activity4 ,so far as the mind acts from 
these sensations and the feelings which 
accompany them1 it is ideally determined
 from without2 it is a captive to its   
own states2 it is in a condition of     
passivity4 ,in all action1 therefore1   
which occurs from a sensuous basis1 the 
soul is rightly regarded as unfree4  ,on
 the other hand1 just in the degree in  
which distinctness is introduced into   
the sensations1 so that they are not    
simply experienced as they come1 but are

 related to one another so that their   
reason for existence1 their spiritual   
meaning1 is ascertained1 just in that   
degree is the soul master of itself4 ,in
 ,leibniz's own words3 ,distinct        
knowledge or intelligence has its place 
in the true use of reason1 while the    
senses furnish confused ideas4 ,hence we
 can say that we are free from slavery  
just in the degree that we act with     
distinct knowledge1 but are subject to  
our passions in just the degree that our
 ideas are confused2 that is1 not really
 representative of things as they are4  
,intelligence is the soul of liberty4   
,this psychological explanation rests1  
of course1 upon the foundation principle
 of the ,leibnizian philosophy4 ,spirit 
is the sole reality1 and spirit is      
activity4 ,but there are various degrees
 of activity1 and each grade lower than 
the purus actus may be rightfully       
regarded as in so far passive4 ,this    
relative passivity or unreality         
constitutes the material and hence the  

sensuous world4 ,one who has not insight
 into truth1 lives and acts in this     
world of comparative unreality2 he is in
 bondage to it4 ,from this condition of 
slavery only reason1 the understanding  
of things as they are1 can lift one4    
,the rational man is free because he    
acts1 in the noble words of ,spinoza1   
sub specie ternitatis4 ,he acts in view 
of the eternal truth of things1--as ,god
 himself would act4  ,god alone1 it     
further follows1 is wholly free4 ,in him
 alone are understanding and will wholly
 one4 ,in him the true and the good are 
one2 while every created intelligence is
 subject in some degree to sensuous     
affection1 to passion4 ,in us1 besides  
the judgment of the understanding1 there
 is always mixed some unreal idea of the
 sensation which gives birth to passions
 and impulses1 and these traverse the   
judgment of the practical understanding4
 ,freedom1 in fine1 is not a ready made 
garment with which all men are clothed  
to do with as they will4 ,it is the     

ethical ideal2 it is something to be    
attained2 it is action in conformity    
with reason1 or insight into the        
spiritual nature of reality and into its
 laws2 it is not the starting-point1 it 
is the goal4 ,only with a great price do
 men purchase such freedom4 ,it will be 
noticed at once that ,leibniz comes very
 close to ,plato in his fundamental     
ethical ideas4 ,the unity of virtue and 
reason1 of virtue and freedom1--these   
are thoroughly ,platonic conceptions4   
,to both ,plato and ,leibniz reason is  
the ethical ideal because it is the     
expression of1 nay1 rather1 is the      
reality of the universe2 while all else 
is1 as ,leibniz says1 imperfect or      
unreal1 since it is not an activity1 or1
 as ,plato says1 a mixture of ,being and
 ,non-,being4 ,again1 to both man bears 
a similar relation to this spiritual    
reality4 ,in ,plato's words1 he         
participates in the ,ideas2 in those of 
,leibniz he reflects1 as a mirror1 the  
universe4 ,to both1 in a word1 the      

reality1 the true-self of the           
individual1 is the spiritual universe of
 which it is an organic member4 ,to     
both1 therefore1 man obtains freedom or 
self-realization only as he realizes his
 larger and more comprehensive identity 
with the ,reason of the universe4 ,with 
both1 knowledge is the good1 ignorance  
is the evil4 ,no man is voluntarily bad1
 but only through lack of knowledge of  
the true ,good4 ,leibniz1 however1 with 
a more developed psychology1 supplements
 ,plato in the point where the latter   
had the most difficulty1--the           
possibility of the feelings or of a love
 of pleasure overcoming knowledge of the
 good4 ,this possibility ,plato was     
compelled to deny1 while ,leibniz1 by   
his subtle identifying of the passions  
with lack of knowledge1 or with confused
 knowledge1 can admit it4 ,it is an     
imperfection of our freedom1 says       
,leibniz1 which causes us to choose evil
 rather than good1--a greater evil      
rather than the less1 the less good     

rather than the greater4 ,this comes    
from the appearances of good and evil   
which deceive us2 but ,god1 who is      
perfect knowledge1 is always led to the 
true and to the best good1 that is1 to  
the true and absolute good4  ,it only   
remains briefly to apply these          
conceptions to some specific questions  
of moral actions4 ,locke asks whether   
there are practical innate ideas1 and   
denies them1 as he denies theoretical4  
,leibniz1 in replying1 recognizes two   
kinds of innate practical principles1   
one of which is to be referred to the   
class of instincts1 the other to that of
 maxims4 ,primarily1 and probably wholly
 in almost all men1 moral truths take   
the rank of instincts alone4 ,all men   
aim at the ,good2 it is impossible to   
think of man wilfully seeking his own   
evil4 ,the methods1 the means of        
reaching this ,good1 are implanted in   
men as instincts4 ,these instincts1 when
 brought to the light of reason and     
examined1 become maxims of action2 they 

lose their particular and impulsive     
character1 and become universal and     
deliberate principles4 ,thus ,leibniz is
 enabled to answer the various          
objections which are always brought     
against any intuitive theory of moral   
actions1--the variability of men's moral
 beliefs and conduct in different       
countries and at different times4       
,common instincts1 but at first         
instincts only1 are present in all men  
whenever and wherever they live4 ,these 
instincts may readily be resisted by    
men's passions1 obscured by prejudice1  
and changed by custom4 ,the moral       
instincts are always the basis of moral 
action1 but custom1 tradition1 education
 become mixed with them4 ,even when so  
confounded1 however1 the instinct will  
generally prevail1 and custom is1 upon  
the whole1 on the side of right rather  
than wrong1 so that ,leibniz thinks     
there is a sense in which all men have  
one common morality4  ,but these moral  
instincts1 even when pure1 are not      

ethical science4 ,this is innate1       
,leibniz says1 only in the sense in     
which arithmetic is innate1--it depends 
upon demonstrations which reason        
furnishes4 ,leibniz does not1 then1     
oppose intuitive and demonstrative1 as  
sometimes happens4 ,morality is         
practically intuitive in the sense that 
all men tend to aim at the ,good1 and   
have an instinctive feeling of what     
makes towards the ,good4 ,it is         
theoretically demonstrative1 since it   
does not become a science until ,reason 
has an insight into the nature of the   
,good1 and ascertains the fixed laws    
which are tributary to it4 ,moral       
principles are not intuitive in the     
sense that they are immediately         
discovered as separate principles by    
some one power of the soul called       
conscience4 ,moral laws are intuitive1  
he says1 as the consequences of our own 
development and our true well-being4    
,here we may well leave the matter4     
,what is to be said in detail of        

,leibniz's ethics will find its         
congenial home in what we have to say of
 his theology4     ,,chapter ,,vii4     
,,matter ,,and ,,its ,,relation ,,to    
,,spirit4   ,locke's account of innate  
ideas and of sensation is only          
preparatory to a discussion of the ideas
 got by sensation4 ,his explanation of  
the mode of knowledge leads up to an    
explanation of the things known4 ,he    
remains true to his fundamental idea    
that before we come to conclusions about
 any matters we must examine our own    
ability4 ,he deals first with ideas got 
by the senses1 whether by some one or by
 their conjoint action4 ,of these the   
ideas of solidity1 of extension1 and of 
duration are of most concern to us4     
,they form as near an approach to a     
general philosophy of nature as may be  
found anywhere in ,locke4 ,they are1    
too1 the germ from which grew the ideas 
of matter1 of space1 and of time1 which1
 however more comprehensive in scope and
 more amply worked out in detail1       

characterize succeeding ,british        
thought1 and which are reproduced to-day
 by ,mr4 ,spencer4  ,the idea of        
solidity we receive by our touch4 ,the  
ideas we get by more than one sense are 
of space or extension1 figure1 rest1 and
 motion4 ,these sentences contain the   
brief statement of the chief contention 
of the sensational school4 ,locke       
certainly was not conscious when he     
wrote them that they were the expression
 of ideas which should resolve the world
 of matter and of space into a          
dissolving series of accidentally       
associated sensations2 but such was none
 the less the case4 ,when he writes1 ,if
 any one asks me what solidity is1 ,i   
send him to his senses to inform him1 he
 is preparing the way for ,berkeley1 and
 for a denial of all reality beyond the 
feelings of the individual mind4 ,when  
he says that we get the idea of space   
both by sight and touch1 this statement1
 although appearing truistic1 is none   
the less the source of the contention of

 ,hume that even geometry contains no   
necessary or universal elements1 but is 
an account of sensible appearances1     
relative1 as are all matters of         
sensation4  ,locke's ideas may be       
synopsized as follows3 ,it is a         
sufficient account of solidity to say   
that it is got by touch and that it     
arises from the resistance found in     
bodies to the entrance of any other     
body4 ,it is that which hinders the     
approach of two bodies when they are    
moved towards one another4 ,if not      
identical with matter1 it is at all     
events its most essential property4     
,this of all others seems the idea most 
intimately connected with and essential 
to body1 so as nowhere else to be found 
or imagined1 but only in matter4 ,it is1
 moreover1 the source of the other      
properties of matter4 ,upon the solidity
 of bodies depend their mutual impulse1 
resistance1 and protrusion4 ,solidity1  
again1 is so inseparable an idea from   
body that upon that depends its filling 

of space1 its contact1 impulse1 and     
communication of motion upon impulse4   
,it is to be distinguished1 therefore1  
from hardness1 for hardness is relative 
and derived1 various bodies having      
various degrees of it2 while solidity   
consists in utter exclusion of other    
bodies from the space possessed by any  
one1 so that the hardest body has no    
more solidity than the softest4  ,the   
close connection between solidity and   
matter makes it not only possible1 but  
necessary1 to distinguish between matter
 and extension as against the           
,cartesians1 who had identified them4   
,in particular ,locke notes three       
differences between these notions4      
,extension includes neither solidity nor
 resistance2 its parts are inseparable  
from one another both really and        
mentally1 and are immovable2 while      
matter has solidity1 its parts are      
mutually separable1 and may be moved in 
space4 ,from this distinction between   
space and matter it follows1 according  

to ,locke1 that there is such a thing as
 a vacuum1 or that space is not         
necessarily a plenum of matter4 ,matter 
is that which fills space2 but it is    
entirely indifferent to space whether or
 not it is filled4 ,space is occupied by
 matter1 but there is no essential      
relation between them4 ,solidity is the 
essence of matter2 emptiness is the     
characteristic of space4 ,the idea of   
space is as distinct from that of       
solidity as it is from that of scarlet  
color4 ,it is true1 solidity cannot     
exist without extension1 neither can    
scarlet color exist without extension2  
but this hinders not that they are      
distinct ideas4  ,thus there is fixed   
for us the idea of space as well as of  
matter4 ,it is a distinct idea2 that is1
 absolute or independent in itself1     
having no intrinsic connection with     
phenomena in space4 ,yet it is got      
through the senses4 ,how that can be a  
matter of sensation which is not only   
not material1 but has no connection in  

itself with matter1 ,locke does not     
explain4 ,he thinks it sufficient to say
 that we see distance between bodies of 
different color just as plainly as we   
see the colors4 ,space is1 therefore1 a 
purely immediate idea1 containing no    
more organic relation to intelligence   
than it has to objects4 ,we get the     
notion of time as we do that of space1  
excepting that it is the observation of 
internal states and not of external     
objects which furnishes the material of 
the idea4 ,time has two                 
elements1--succession and duration4     
,observing what passes in the mind1 how 
of our ideas there in train some        
constantly vanish1 and others begin to  
appear1 we come by the idea of          
succession1 and by observing a distance 
in the parts of this succession we get  
the idea of duration4 ,whether1 however1
 time is something essentially empty1   
having no relation to the events which  
fill it1 as space is essentially empty1 
without necessary connection with the   

objects which fill it1 is a question    
,locke does not consider4 ,in fact1 the 
gist of his ideas upon this point is as 
follows3 there is actually an objective 
space or pure emptiness2 employing our  
senses1 we get the idea of this space4  
,there is actually an objective time2   
employing reflection1 we perceive it4   
,there is not the slightest attempt to  
form a philosophy of them1 or to show   
their function in the construction of an
 intelligible world1 except in the one  
point of the absolute independence of   
matter and space4  ,it cannot be said   
that ,leibniz criticises the minor      
points of ,locke in such a way as to    
throw much light upon them1 or that he  
very fully expresses his own ideas about
 them4 ,he contents himself with        
declaring that while the senses may give
 instances of space1 time1 and matter1  
and may suggest to intelligence the     
stimuli upon which intelligence realizes
 these notions from itself1 they cannot 
be the source of these notions          

themselves2 finding the evidence of this
 in the sciences of geometry1           
arithmetic1 and pure physics4 ,for these
 sciences deal with the notions of      
space1 time1 and matter1 giving         
necessary and demonstrative ideas       
concerning them1 which the senses can   
never legitimate4 ,he further denies the
 supposed absoluteness or independence  
of space1 matter1 and motion4           
,admitting1 indeed1 the distinction     
between extension and matter1 he denies 
that this distinction suffices to prove 
the existence1 or even the possibility1 
of a vacuum1 and ends with a general    
reference to his doctrine of            
pre-established harmony1 as serving to  
explain these matters more fully and    
more accurately4  ,leibniz has1 however1
 a complete philosophy of nature4 ,in   
his other writing1 he explains the ideas
 of matter and force in their dependence
 upon his metaphysic1 or doctrine of    
spiritual entelechies4 ,the task does   
not at first sight appear an easy one4  

,the reality1 according to ,leibniz1 is 
purely spiritual1 does not exist in     
space nor time1 and is a principle of   
activity following its own law1--that of
 reflecting the universe of spiritual   
relations4 ,how from this world of      
ideal1 unextended1 and non-temporal     
dynamic realities we are to pass over to
 a material world of extension1 with its
 static existence in space1 and         
transitory passage in time1 is a        
question challenging the whole          
,leibnizian system4 ,it is a question1  
however1 for which ,leibniz himself has 
provided an answer4 ,we may not regard  
it as adequate2 we may think that he has
 not truly derived the material world   
from his spiritual principles3 but at   
all events he asked himself the         
question1 and gave an answer4 ,we shall 
investigate this answer by arranging    
what ,leibniz has said under the heads  
of3 matter as a metaphysical principle2 
matter as a physical phenomenon2 and the
 relation of phenomena to absolute      

reality1 or of the physical to the      
metaphysical4 ,in connection with the   
second head1 particularly1 we shall find
 it necessary to discuss what ,leibniz  
has said about space1 time1 and motion4 
,wolff1 who put the ideas of ,leibniz   
into systematic shape1 did it at the    
expense of almost all their             
significance4 ,he took away the air of  
paradox1 of remoteness1 that            
characterized ,leibniz's thought1 and   
gave it a popular form4 ,but its depth  
and suggestiveness vanished in the      
process4 ,unfortunately1 ,wolff's       
presentations of the philosophy of      
,leibniz have been followed by others1  
to whom it seemed a dull task to follow 
out the intricacies of a thought nowhere
 systematically expressed4 ,this has    
been especially the case as concerns the
 ,leibnizian doctrine of matter4 ,a     
superficial interpretation of certain   
passages in ,leibniz has led to an      
almost universal misunderstanding about 
it4 ,leibniz frequently says that since 

matter is composite or complex1 it      
follows that there must be something    
simple as its basis1 and this simple    
something is the monad4 ,the            
misinterpretation just spoken of        
consists in supposing that ,leibniz     
meant that matter as composite is made  
up of monads as simple2 that the monad  
and matter are facts of the same order1 
the latter being only an aggregate1 or  
continued collection of the former4 ,it 
interpreted the conception of ,leibniz  
in strict analogy with the atomic theory
 of ,lucretius1 excepting that it       
granted that the former taught that the 
ultimate atom1 the component of all     
complex forms of matter1 has position   
only1 not extension1 its essence        
consisting in its exercise of force1 not
 in its mere space occupancy4 ,the monad
 was thus considered to be in space1 or 
at least conditioned by space relations1
 as is a mathematical point1 although   
not itself spatial in the sense of being
 extended4 ,monad and matter were thus  

represented as facts of the same kind or
 genus1 having their difference only in 
their relative isolation or aggregation4
  ,but ,leibniz repudiated this idea1   
and that not only by the spirit of his  
teaching1 but in express words4 ,monads 
are not ingredients or constituents of  
matter1 he says1 but only conditions of 
it4 ,monads can no more be said to be   
parts of bodies1 or to come in contact  
with them1 or to compose them1 than can 
souls or mathematical points4 ,monads   
per se have no situation relative to one
 another4 ,an increase in the number of 
created monads1 he says again1 if such a
 thing could be supposed1 would no more 
increase the amount of matter in        
existence1 than mathematical points     
added to a line would increase its      
length4 ,and again3 ,there is no        
nearness or remoteness among monads2 to 
say that they are gathered in a point or
 are scattered in space1 is to employ   
mental fictions1 in trying to imagine   
what can only be thought4 ,the          

italicized words give the clew to the   
whole discussion4 ,to make monads of the
 same order as corporeal phenomena1 is  
to make them sensible1 or capable of    
being imaged1 or conditioned by space   
and time1--three phrases which are      
strictly correlative4 ,but the monads   
can only be thought1--that is1 their    
qualities are ideal1 not sensible2 they 
can be realized only by reason1 not     
projected in forms having spatial       
outline and temporal habitation1 that   
is1 in images4 ,monads and material     
things1 in other words1 are facts of two
 distinct orders2 they are related as   
the rational or spiritual and the       
physical or sensible4 ,matter is no more
 composed of monads than it is of       
thoughts or of logical principles4 ,as  
,leibniz says over and over again3      
,matter1 space1 time1 motion are only   
phenomena1 although phenomena bene      
fundata1--phenomena1 that is1 having    
their rational basis and condition4 ,the
 monads1 on the other hand1 are not     

appearances1 they are realities4        
,having freed our minds from the        
supposition that it is in any way       
possible to form an image or picture of 
the monad2 having realized that it is   
wholly false to suppose that monads     
occupy position in space1 and then by   
their continuity fill it1 and make      
extended matter1--we must attempt to    
frame a correct theory of the nature of 
matter and its relation to the monad4   
,we shall do this only as we realize    
that matter1 so far as it has any       
reality1 or so far as it has any real   
fundamentum1 must be something ideal1   
or1 in ,leibniz's language1             
metaphysical4 ,as he says over and over 
again1 the only realities are the       
substances or spiritual units of        
activity1 to which the name monad is    
given4 ,in the inquiry1 then1 after such
 reality as matter may have1 we must    
betake ourselves to this unit of living 
energy4  ,although every monad is       
active1 it is not entirely active4      

,there is1 as we have already seen1 an  
infinite scale of substances2 and since 
substance is equivalent to activity1    
this is saying that there is an infinite
 scale of activities4 ,god alone is     
purus actus1 absolute energy1 untouched 
by passivity or receptivity4 ,every     
other being has the element of          
incompleteness1 of inadequacy2 it does  
not completely represent the universe4  
,in this passivity consists its         
finitude1 so that ,leibniz says that not
 even ,god himself could deprive monads 
of it1 for this would be to make them   
equal to himself4 ,in this passivity1   
incompleteness1 or finitude1 consists   
what we call matter4 ,leibniz says that 
he can understand what ,plato meant when
 he called matter something essentially 
imperfect and transitory4 ,every finite 
monad is a union of two                 
principles1--those of activity and of   
passivity4 ,i do not admit1 says        
,leibniz1 that there are souls existing 
simply by themselves1 or that there are 

created spirits detached from all body4 
,god alone is above all matter1 since he
 is its author2 creatures freed from    
matter would be at the same time        
detached from the universal connection  
of things1 and1 as it were1 deserters   
from the general order4 ,and again1     
,beings have a nature which is both     
active and passive2 that is1 material   
and immaterial4 ,and again1 he says that
 every created monad requires both an   
entelechy1 or principle of activity1 and
 matter4 ,matter is essential to any    
entelechy1 and can never be separated   
from it1 since matter completes it4 ,in 
short1 the term monad is equivalent to  
the term entelechy only when applied to 
,god4 ,in every other monad1 the        
entelechy1 or energy1 is but one factor4
 ,matter1 or primitive passive power1   
completes the entelechy1 or primitive   
active power1 so that it becomes a      
perfect substance1 or monad4 ,on the    
other hand1 of course1 matter1 as the   
passive principle1 is a mere            

potentiality or abstraction1 considered 
in itself4 ,it is real only in its union
 with the active principle4 ,matter1 he 
says1 cannot exist without immaterial   
substances4 ,to every particular portion
 of matter belongs a particular form2   
that is1 a soul1 a spirit4 ,to this     
element of matter1 considered as an     
abstraction1 in its distinction from    
soul1 ,leibniz1 following the           
scholastics1 and ultimately ,aristotle1 
gives the name1 first or bare matter4   
,the same influence is seen in the fact 
that he opposes this element of matter  
to form1 or the active principle4  ,our 
starting-point1 therefore1 for the      
consideration of matter is the statement
 that it is receptivity1 the capacity   
for being affected1 which always        
constitutes matter4 ,but what is meant  
by receptivity8 ,to answer this question
 we must return to what was said about  
the two activities of the               
monad1--representation1 or perception1  
and appetition1--and to the difference  

between confused and distinct ideas4    
,the monad has appetition so far as it  
determines itself from within to change1
 so far as it follows an internal       
principle of energy4 ,it is             
representative so far as it is          
determined from without1 so far as it   
receives impressions from the universe4 
,yet we have learned to know that in one
 sense everything occurs from the       
spontaneity of the monad itself2 it     
receives no influence or influxus from  
without2 everything comes from its own  
depths1 or is appetition4 ,but1 on the  
other hand1 all that which so comes     
forth is only a mirroring or copying of 
the universe4 ,the whole content of the 
appetition is representation4 ,although 
the monad works spontaneously1 it is    
none the less determined in its         
activities to produce only reflections  
or images of the world4 ,in this way    
appetition and representation appear to 
be identical4 ,the monad is determined  
from within1 indeed1 but it is          

determined to exactly the same results  
as if wholly determined from without4   
,what light1 then1 can be thrown from   
this distinction upon the nature of     
matter8  ,none1 unless we follow        
,leibniz somewhat farther4 ,if we do1 we
 shall see that the soul is regarded as 
appetitive1 or self-active1 so far as it
 has clear and distinct ideas4 ,if the  
monad reaches distinct consciousness1 it
 has knowledge of self1--that is1 of the
 nature of pure spirit1--or1 what again 
is equivalent to this1 of the nature of 
reality as it universally is4 ,such     
knowledge is knowledge of ,god1 of      
substance1 of unity1 of pure activity1  
and of all the innate ideas which       
elevate the confused perceptions of     
sense into science4 ,distinct           
consciousness is therefore equivalent to
 self-activity1 and this to recognition 
of ,god and the universal4 ,but if      
knowledge is confused1 it is not        
possible to see it in its relations to  
self2 it cannot be analyzed2 the        

rational or ideal element in it is      
concealed from view4 ,in confused ideas1
 therefore1 the soul appears to be      
passive2 being passive1 to be determined
 from without4 ,this determination from 
without is equivalent to that which is  
opposed to spirit or reason1 and hence  
appears as matter4 ,such is in outline  
the ,leibnizian philosophy4  ,it thus is
 clear that merely stating that matter  
is passivity in the monad is not the    
ultimate way of stating its nature4 ,for
 passivity means in reality nothing but 
confused                                
representations1--representations1 that 
is1 whose significance is not perceived4
 ,the true significance of every        
representation is found in its relation 
to the ego1 or pure self-activity1      
which1 through its dependent relation   
upon ,god1 the absolute self-activity   
and ego1 produces the representation    
from its own ideal being4 ,so far as the
 soul does not have distinct recognition
 of relation of all representations to  

self1 it feels them as coming from      
without2 as foreign to spirit2 in short1
 as matter4 ,leibniz thus employs       
exactly the same language about confused
 ideas that he does about passivity1 or 
matter4 ,it is not possible that the    
monad should have distinct consciousness
 of itself as a mirror of the whole     
universe1 he says1 for in that case     
every entelechy would be ,god4 ,again1  
the soul would be ,god if it could enter
 at once and with distinctness into     
everything occurring within it4 ,but it 
is necessary that we should have        
passions which consist in confused      
ideas1 in which there is something      
involuntary and unknown1 and which      
represent the body and constitute our   
imperfection4 ,again1 he speaks of      
matter as the mixture 7mlange7 of the   
effects of the infinite environing us4  
,in that expression is summed up his    
whole theory of matter4 ,it is a        
mixture2 it is1 that is to say1         
confused1 aggregated1 irresolvable into 

simple ideas4 ,but it is a mixture of   
effects of the infinite about us2 that  
is1 it takes its rise in the true1 the  
real1 the spiritual4 ,it only fails to  
represent this as it actually is4       
,matter1 in short1 is a phenomenon      
dependent upon inability to realize the 
entire spiritual character of reality4  
,it is spirit apprehended in a confused1
 hesitating1 and passive manner4  ,it is
 none the less a necessary phenomenon1  
for it is involved in the idea of a     
continuous gradation of monads1 in the  
distinction between the infinite and the
 finite1 or1 as ,leibniz often prefers  
to put it1 between the creator and the  
created4 ,there is involved everywhere  
in the idea of ,leibniz the conception  
of subordination2 of a hierarchy of     
forms1 each of which receives the law of
 its action from the next higher1 and   
gives the law to the next lower4 ,we    
have previously considered the element  
of passivity or receptivity as relating 
only to the monad which manifests it4   

,it is evident1 however1 that what is   
passive in one1 implies something active
 in another4 ,what one receives1 is what
 another gives4 ,the reciprocal         
influence of monads upon one another1   
therefore1 as harmonious members of one 
system1 requires matter4 ,more strictly 
speaking1 this reciprocal influence is  
matter4 ,to take away all receptivity1  
all passivity1 from monads would be to  
isolate them from all relations with    
others2 it would be to deprive them of  
all power of affecting or being affected
 by others4 ,that is what ,leibniz meant
 by the expression already quoted1 that 
if monads had not matter as an element  
in them1 they would be1 as it were1     
deserters from the general order4 ,the  
note of unity1 of organic connection1   
which we found to be the essence of the 
,leibnizian philosophy1 absolutely      
requires1 therefore1 matter1 or         
passivity4  ,it must be remembered that 
this reciprocal influence is ideal4 ,as 
,leibniz remarks1 ,when it is said that 

one monad is affected by another1 this  
is to be understood concerning its      
representation of the other4 ,for the   
,author of things has so accommodated   
them to one another that one is said to 
suffer 7or receive from the other7 when 
its relative value gives way to that of 
the other4 ,or again1 the modifications 
of one monad are the ideal causes of the
 modifications of another monad1 so far 
as there appear in one the reasons on   
account of which ,god brought about in  
the beginning certain modifications in  
another4 ,and most definitely of all3 ,a
 creature is called active so far as it 
has perfection2 passive in so far as it 
is imperfect4 ,one creature is more     
perfect than another so far as there is 
found in it that which serves to render 
the reason1 a priori1 for that occurring
 in the other2 and it is in this way    
that it acts upon the other4  ,we are   
thus introduced1 from a new point of    
view and in a more concrete way1 to the 
conception of pre-established harmony4  

,the activity of one1 the energy which  
gives the law to the other and makes it 
subordinate in the hierarchy of monads1 
is conceived necessarily as spirit1 as  
soul2 that which receives1 which is     
rendered subordinate by the activity of 
the other1 is body4 ,the pre-established
 harmony is the fact that they are so   
related that one can receive the law of 
its activity from the other4 ,leibniz is
 without doubt partially responsible for
 the ordinary misconception of his views
 upon this point by reason of the       
illustration which he was accustomed to 
use2 namely1 of two clocks so           
constructed that without any subsequent 
regulation each always kept perfect time
 with the other1--as much so as if there
 were some actual physical connection   
between them4 ,this seems to put soul   
and body1 spirit and matter1 as two     
co-ordinate substances1 on the same     
level1 with such natural opposition     
between them that some external harmony 
must arrange some unity of action4 ,in  

causing this common idea of his theory  
of pre-established harmony1 ,leibniz has
 paid the penalty for attempting to do  
what he often reproves in               
others1--imagining or presenting in     
sensible form what can only be thought4 
,but his other explanations show clearly
 enough that the pre-established harmony
 expresses1 not a relation between two  
parallel substances1 but a condition of 
dependence of lower forms of activity   
upon the higher for the law of their    
existence and activity1--in modern      
terms1 it expresses the fact that       
phenomena are conditioned upon noumena2 
that material facts get their           
significance and share of reality       
through their relation to spirit4  ,we  
may sum up what has been said about     
matter as an element in the monad1 or as
 a metaphysical principle1 as follows3  
,the existence of matter is not only not
 opposed to the fundamental ideas of    
,leibniz1 but is a necessary deduction  
from them4 ,it is a necessity of the    

principle of continuity2 for this       
requires an infinity of monads1 alike   
indeed in the universal law of their    
being1 but unlike1 each to each1 in the 
specific coloring or manifestation of   
this law4 ,the principle of organic     
unity requires that there be as many    
real beings as possible participating in
 and contributing to it4 ,it is         
necessary1 again1 in order that there   
may be reciprocal influence or          
connection among the monads4 ,were it   
not for the material element in the     
monad1 each would be a ,god2 if each    
were thus infinite and absolute1 there  
would be so many principles wholly      
independent and isolated4 ,the principle
 of harmony would be violated4 ,so much 
for the necessity of the material       
factor4 ,as to its nature1 it is a      
principle of passivity2 that is1 of     
ideal receptivity1 of conformity to a   
law apparently not self-imposed1 but    
externally laid down4 ,this makes matter
 equivalent to a phenomenon2 that is to 

say1 to the having of confused1         
imperfect1 inadequate ideas4 ,to say    
that matter is correlative to confused  
ideas is to say that there is no        
recognition of its relation to self or  
to spirit4 ,as ,leibniz sometimes puts  
it1 since there is an infinity of beings
 in the universe1 each one of which     
exercises an ideal influence upon every 
other one of the series1 it is          
impossible that this other one should   
realize their full meaning2 they appear 
only as confused ideas1 or as matter4   
,to use language which ,leibniz indeed  
does not employ1 but which seems to     
convey his thought1 the spirit1 not     
seeing them as they really are1 does not
 find itself in them4 ,but matter is    
thus not only the confused manifestation
 or phenomenon of spirit1 it is also its
 potentiality4 ,passivity is always     
relative4 ,it does not mean complete    
lack of activity2 that1 as ,leibniz     
says1 is nothingness1 and matter is not 
a form of nothingness4 ,leibniz even    

speaks of it as passive power4 ,that is 
to say1 there is an undeveloped or      
incomplete activity in what appears as  
matter1 and this may be1--if we admit an
 infinity of time1--must be developed4  
,when developed it manifests itself as  
it really is1 as spirit4 ,confused      
ideas1 as ,leibniz takes pains to state1
 are not a genus of ideas antithetical  
to distinct2 they differ only in degree 
or grade4 ,they are on their way to     
become distinct1 or else they are       
distinct ideas which have fallen back   
into an involved state of being4        
,matter1 therefore1 is not absolutely   
opposed to spirit1--on the one hand     
because it is the manifestation1 the    
phenomenon1 of spirit2 on the other1    
because it is the potentiality of       
spirit1 capable of sometime realizing   
the whole activity implied in it1 but   
now latent4  ,thus it is that ,leibniz  
says that everything is full of souls or
 monads4 ,what appears to be lifeless is
 in reality like a pond full of fishes1 

like a drop of water full of infusoria4 
,everything is organic down to the last 
element4 ,more truly1 there is no last  
element4 ,there is a true infinity of   
organic beings wrapped up in the        
slightest speck of apparently lifeless  
matter4 ,these illustrations1 like many 
others which ,leibniz uses1 are apt to  
suggest that erroneous conception of the
 relation of monads to spirit which we  
were obliged1 in ,leibniz's name1 to    
correct at the outset1--the idea1       
namely1 that matter is composed1 in a   
spatial or mechanical way1 of monads4   
,but after the foregoing explanations we
 can see that what ,leibniz means when  
he says that every portion of matter is 
full of entelechies or souls1 like a    
garden full of plants1 is that there is 
an absolute continuity of spiritual     
principles1 each having its ideal       
relation with every other4 ,there is no 
point of matter which does not represent
 in a confused way the entire universe4 
,it is therefore as infinite in its     

activities as the universe4 ,in idea    
also it is capable of representing in   
distinct consciousness1 or as a         
development of its own self-activity1   
each of these infinite activities4  ,in 
a word1 every created or finite being   
may be regarded as matter or as spirit1 
according as it is accounted for by its 
external relations1 as the reasons for  
what happen in it are to be found       
elsewhere than in its own explicit      
activity1 or according as it shows      
clearly in itself the reasons for its   
own modifications1 and also accounts for
 changes occurring in other beings4 ,the
 externally conditioned is matter2 the  
internally conditioned1 the             
self-explanatory1 is self-active1 or    
spirit4 ,since all external relations   
are finally dependent on organic2 since 
the ultimate source of all explanation  
must be that which is its own reason2   
since the ultimate source of all        
activity must be that which is          
self-active1--the final reason or source

 of matter is spirit4     ,,chapter     
,,viii4  ,,material ,,phenomena ,,and   
,,their ,,reality4   ,we have seen the  
necessity and nature of matter as       
deductions from the fundamental         
principles of ,leibniz4 ,we have seen   
that matter is a phenomenon or          
manifestation of spirit in an imperfect 
and confused way4 ,but why should it    
appear as moving1 as extended1 as       
resisting1 as having cohesion1 with all 
the concrete qualities which always mark
 it8 ,is there any connection between   
these particular properties of matter as
 physical1 and its metaphysical or ideal
 character8 ,these are the questions    
which now occupy us4 ,stated more       
definitely1 they take the following     
form3 ,is there any essential connection
 between the properties of matter as a  
metaphysical element1 and its properties
 as a sensible fact of experience8      
,leibniz holds that there is4 ,he does  
not1 indeed1 explicitly take the ground 
that we can deduce a priori all the     

characteristics of matter as a fact of  
actual experience from its rational     
notion1 but he thinks we can find a     
certain analogy between the two1 that   
the sensible qualities are images or    
reflexes of the spiritual qualities1    
witnessing1 so far as possible1 to their
 origin in pure energy4  ,his position  
is as follows3 that which in the monad  
is activity or substantial1 is1 in      
sensible matter1 motion4 ,that which in 
the monad is lack of a given activity1  
that which constitutes its subordinate  
position in the hierarchy of monads1 is1
 in the sphere of material things1      
inertia4 ,that which in the spiritual   
world is the individuality of monads1   
making each forever ideally distinct    
from every other1 is1 in the phenomenal 
realm1 resistance or impenetrability4   
,the perfect continuity of monads in the
 mundus intelligibilis has also its     
counterpart in the mundus sensibilis in 
the diffusion or extension of physical  
things4  ,instead of following out this 

analogy directly1 it will rather be     
found convenient to take up ,leibniz's  
thought in its historical connection4   
,we have already alluded to the fact    
that he began as a ,cartesian1 and that 
one of the first ideas which repelled   
him from that system of thought was the 
notion that the essence of matter is    
extension4 ,his earliest philosophical  
writings1 as he was gradually coming to 
the thoughts which thereafter dominated 
him1 are upon this point4 ,in general1  
his conclusions are as follows3 ,if     
matter were extension1 it would be      
incapable of passion or of action4      
,solidity1 too1 is a notion entirely    
opposed to the conception of mere       
extension4 ,the idea of matter as       
extension contradicts some of the known 
laws of motion4 ,it requires that the   
quantity of motion remain unchanged     
whenever two bodies come in contact1    
while as matter of fact it is the       
quantity of energy1 that which the      
motion is capable of effecting1 that    

remains unchanged2 or1 as he more often 
puts the objection1 the ,cartesian      
notion of matter requires that matter be
 wholly indifferent to motion1 that     
there be nothing in it which resists    
motion when imparted4 ,but1 says        
,leibniz1 there is something resisting1 
that to which ,keppler gave the name    
inertia4 ,it is not found to be true if 
one body impacts upon another that the  
second moves without diminishing the    
velocity or changing the direction of   
the first4 ,on the other hand1 just in  
proportion to the size of the second    
body1 it resists and changes the motion 
of the first1 up to the point of causing
 the first to rebound if small in       
comparison4 ,and when it was replied    
that the retardation was due to the fact
 that the force moving the first body   
had now to be divided between two1      
,leibniz answered that this was simply  
to give up the contention1 and besides  
the notion of extension to use that of  
force4 ,if extension were the essence of

 matter1 it should be possible to deduce
 all the properties of matter1 or at    
least to account for them all1 from it4 
,but since1 as just seen1 this does not 
enable us to account for any of them1   
since for any of its concrete qualities 
we have to fall back on force1 it is    
evident where the true essence of matter
 is to be found4  ,leibniz has another  
argument of a logical nature1 as those  
already referred to are of a physical3  
,those who claim that extension is a    
substance1 reverse the order of words as
 well as of thoughts4 ,besides extension
 there must be a subject which is       
extended2 that is to say1 something to  
which it belongs to be repeated or      
continued4 ,for extension is nothing but
 a repetition or continued              
multiplication of that which is spread  
out1--it is a plurality1 a continuity1 a
 co-existence of parts4 ,consequently1  
extension does not suffice to explain   
the nature of the repeated or manifold  
substance1 of which the notion is       

anterior to that of its repetition4     
,extension1 in other words1 is nothing  
substantial1 it is not something which  
can exist by itself2 it is only a       
quality1 a property1 a mode of being4   
,it is always relative to something     
which has extension4 ,as ,leibniz says  
elsewhere3 ,i insist that extension is  
only an abstraction1 and requires       
something which is extended4 ,it        
presupposes some quality1 some          
attribute1 some nature in a subject     
which is extended1 diffused1 or         
continued4 ,extension is a diffusion of 
this quality4 ,for example1 in milk     
there is an extension or diffusion of   
whiteness2 in the diamond an extension  
or diffusion of hardness2 in body in    
general a diffusion of antitypia or     
materiality4 ,there is accordingly in   
body something anterior to extension4   
,from the physical side1 therefore1 we  
find it impossible to account for the   
concrete properties of material         
phenomena from extension2 on the logical

 we find that the idea of extension is  
always relative to that which is        
extended4 ,what is that which is to be  
considered as the bearer of extension   
and the source of physical qualities8   
,we are led back to the point at which  
we left the matter in the last chapter4 
,it is force1 and force both passive and
 active4 ,leibniz uses the term matter  
in at least three senses3 it is the     
metaphysical element of passive force in
 the monad2 it is the monad itself      
considered as1 upon the whole1          
externally conditioned or unconscious2  
and it is the phenomenon resulting from 
the aggregation of the monads in the    
second sense4 ,the first is naked       
matter1 and is a pure abstraction2 the  
second is the monad as material1 as     
opposed to the monad1 as soul2 the third
 is clothed1 or second matter1 or1      
concretely1 body1 corpus4 ,the first is 
unreal by itself2 the second is one     
phase of substance2 the third is not    
substantial1 but is a reality1 though a 

phenomenal one4 ,it is from the         
substantial monad that we are to explain
 the two things now demanding           
explanation1--that element in bodies    
7matter in third sense7 which is the    
source of their physical properties1 and
 that which is the subject1 the carrier1
 so to speak1 of extension4  ,that of   
which we are in search as the source of 
the physical qualities of bodies is     
motion4 ,this is not force1 but its     
image4 ,it is force1 says ,leibniz1 that
 is the real element in motion2 that is 
to say1 it is that element which out of 
the present state induces a change in   
the future state4 ,as force1 in other   
words1 is the causal activity which     
effects the development of one          
representation of a monad out of        
another1 so motion1 in the realm of     
phenomena1 is not only change1 but      
change which is continuous and          
progressive1 each new position being    
dependent upon the foregoing1 and       
following out of it absolutely without  

break4  ,motion1 therefore1 is the      
manifestation of the ideal unity of     
substance1--a unity not of mere static  
inherence1 but of a continuous process  
of activity4 ,it is from this standpoint
 that ,leibniz accounts for the         
so-called transference of motion from   
one body to another upon contact4 ,the  
ordinary view of this1 which looks at it
 as if one body loses the motion which  
another body gains1 ,leibniz ridicules1 
saying that those who hold this view    
seem to think that motion is a kind of  
thing1 resembling1 perchance1 salt      
dissolved in water4 ,the right view1 on 
the other hand1 does away with all      
appearance of mystery in the carrying   
over of motion from one body to another1
 for it recognizes that continuity is   
the very essence of motion1 and that we 
do not have two things and a third      
process1 but that the two bodies are    
phases or elements in one and the same  
system of movement4  ,starting from this
 idea of motion1 then1 ,leibniz is to   

account for the actual qualities of     
matter as found in experience4 ,these   
are the form1 magnitude1 cohesion1      
resistance1 and the purely sensible     
qualities of objects4 ,first matter1    
that is1 abstract matter1 may be        
conceived1 according to ,leibniz1 as    
perfectly homogeneous1 a subtle fluid1  
in his words1 without any distinction of
 parts or of solidity4 ,but this is an  
abstract notion4 ,it is what matter     
would be without motion4 ,motion        
necessarily differentiates this plenum  
of homogeneity1 and thus causes         
distinctions of figure 7that is1        
boundaries of parts7 and varieties of   
cohesion1 or the varying solidity and   
fluidity of bodies4 ,the latter         
difference is indeed the ultimate one4  
,the principle of continuity or         
gradation1 as applied to motion1 makes  
it necessary that motions should not be 
in any two places of exactly the same   
energy4 ,the result is that the original
 fluid matter is everywhere differently 

divided4 ,motion1 entering into the     
uniform plenum1 introduces distinction2 
it causes so much of the matter as is   
affected by a given movement to collect 
together and form in appearance a       
coherent body1 as opposed to surrounding
 bodies which are affected by different 
degrees of energy4 ,but even this is    
only approximate2 the same principle of 
continuity must be applied within any   
apparently coherent body2 its parts1    
while1 in relation to other bodies1 they
 have the same amount of motion1 are in 
relation to one another differently     
affected4 ,there are no two having      
exactly the same motion2 if they had1   
there would be no distinction between   
them2 and thus1 according to the        
principle of ,leibniz1 they would be the
 same4  ,it follows at once from this   
that there is in the universe no body of
 absolute hardness or solidity1 nor of  
entire softness or fluidity4 ,a         
perfectly solid body would be one whose 
system of motions could not be affected 

by any other system1--a body which by   
motion had separated itself from motion1
 or become absolute4 ,this is evidently 
an idea which contradicts itself1 for   
the very essence of motion is continuity
 or relation4 ,a body perfectly fluid1  
on the other hand1 would be one in which
 there was no resistance offered to     
other motions1--a body1 in other words1 
in which there are no movements that1   
entering into connection with one       
another1 form a relative opposition to  
other movements4 ,it would be a body    
isolated or out of relation with the    
general system of motions1 and hence an 
impossibility4 ,there is no last term   
either of solidity or of fluidity4  ,it 
equally follows as matter of course that
 there is no indivisible particle of    
matter1--no atom4 ,the infinity of      
degrees of motion implies a             
corresponding division of matter4 ,as   
already said1 it is only in contrast    
with other relatively constant systems  
of motion that any body is of uniform   

motion2 in reality there is everywhere  
throughout it variety of movement1 and  
hence complete divisibility1 or rather1 
complete division4 ,if ,leibniz were to 
employ the term atom at all1 it could be
 only in the sense of the modern        
dynamical theory 7of which1 indeed1 he  
is one of the originators71 according to
 which the atom is not defined by its   
spatial position and outlines1 but1 by  
the range of its effects1 as the centre 
of energies of infinite circumference4  
,correlative to the non-existence of the
 atom is the non-existence of the       
vacuum4 ,the two imply each other4 ,the 
hard1 limited1 isolated body1 having no 
intrinsic relations with other bodies1  
must have room to come into external    
relations with them4 ,this empty space1 
which is the theatre of such accidental 
contacts as may happen1 is the vacuum4  
,but if bodies are originally in        
connection with one another1 if they are
 in reality but differentiations of     
varying degrees of motion within one    

system of motion1 then there is no      
necessity for the vacuum1--nay1 there is
 no place for it4 ,the vacuum in this   
case could mean only a break1 a chasm1  
in the order of nature4 ,according to   
the theory of ,leibniz1 bodies are but  
the dynamic divisions of the one energy 
that fills the universe2 their          
separateness is not an independent      
possession of any one of them or of all 
together1 but is the result of relations
 to the entire system4 ,their apparent  
isolation is only by reason of their    
actual connections4 ,to admit a vacuum  
anywhere1 would thus be to deny the     
relatedness of the parts separated by   
it4 ,the theory of the atom and the     
vacuum are the two phases of the        
metaphysical assumption of an indefinite
 plurality of independent separate      
realities4 ,the theory of ,leibniz1     
resting as it does on the idea of a     
perfect unity of interrelated members1  
must deny both of these aspects4 ,were  
we making an extended analysis of the   

opposed view1 it would be necessary to  
point out that it denies itself4 ,for it
 is only through the vacuum that the    
atoms are isolated or independent1 and  
the sole function of the vacuum is to   
serve as the background of the atoms4   
,the atoms are separated only in virtue 
of their connection1 and the vacuum is  
what it is--pure emptiness--only on     
account of that which is in it4 ,in     
short1 the theory is only an abstract   
and incomplete way of grasping the      
thought of relation or mediated unity4  
,we have thus discovered that all       
motions conspire together1 or form a    
system4 ,but in their unity they do not 
cease to be motions1 or variously       
differentiated members4 ,through this   
differentiation1 or mutual reaction of  
motions1 there comes about the          
appearance of boundaries1 of separation4
 ,from these boundaries or terminations 
arise the form and size of bodies4 ,from
 motion also proceeds the cohesion of   
bodies1 in the sense that each relative 

system resists dissolution1 or hangs    
together4 ,says ,leibniz1 ,the motions1 
since they are conspiring1 would be     
troubled by separation2 and accordingly 
this can be accomplished only by        
violence and with resistance4 ,not only 
form1 size1 and stability depend upon   
motion1 but also the sensible1 the      
secondary qualities4 ,it must not be    
supposed that color1 pain1 sound1 etc41 
are arbitrary and without relation to   
their causes4 ,it is not ,god's way to  
act with so little reason and order4    
,there is a kind of resemblance1 not    
entire1 but of relation1 of order4 ,we  
say1 for example1 ',light is in the     
fire1' since there are motions in the   
fire which are imperceptible in their   
separation1 but which are sensible in   
their conjunction or confusion2 and this
 is what is made known in the idea of   
light4 ,in other words1 color1 sound1   
etc41 even pain1 are still the          
perception of motion1 but in a confused 
way4 ,we thus see how thoroughly        

,leibniz carries back all the properties
 of bodies to motion4 ,to sum up1 motion
 is the origin of the relative solidity1
 the divisibleness1 the form1 the size1 
the cohesion1 or active resistance of   
bodies1 and of their properties as made 
known to us in immediate sensation4  ,in
 all that has been said it has been     
implied that extension is already in    
existence2 first matter is supposed to  
fill all space1 and motion to determine 
it to take upon itself its actual       
concrete properties4 ,but this first    
matter1 when thus spoken of1 has a      
somewhat mythological sound1 even if it 
be admitted that it is an abstraction4  
,for how can an abstraction be extended 
in space1 and how can it form1 as it    
were1 a background upon which motion    
displays itself8 ,the idea of first     
matter in its relation to extension     
evidently demands explanation4 ,in      
seeking this explanation we shall also  
learn about that subject which ,leibniz 
said was necessarily presupposed in     

extension1 as a concrete thing is       
required for a quality4  ,the clew to   
the view of ,leibniz upon this point may
 be derived1 ,i think1 from the         
following quotations3--  ,if it were    
possible to see what makes extension1   
that kind of extension which falls under
 our eyes at present would vanish1 and  
our minds would perceive nothing else   
than simple realities existing in mutual
 externality to one another4 ,it would  
be as if we could distinguish the minute
 particles of matter variously disposed 
from which a painted image is formed3 if
 we could do it1 the image1 which is    
nothing but a phenomenon1 would vanish4 
4 4 4 ,if we think of two simple        
realities as both existing at the same  
time1 but distinct from one another1 we 
look at them as if they were outside of 
one another1 and hence conceive them as 
extended4  ,the monads are outside of   
one another1 not spatially1 but ideally2
 but this reciprocal distinction from   
one another1 if it is to appear in      

phenomenal mode1 must take the form of  
an image1 and the image is spatial4 ,but
 if the monads were pure activity1 they 
would not take phenomenal form or appear
 in an image4 ,they would always be     
thought just as they are1--unextended   
activities realizing the spiritual      
essence of the universe4 ,but they are  
not pure activity2 they are passive as  
well4 ,it is in virtue of this passive  
element that the ideal externality takes
 upon itself phenomenal or sensible     
form1 and thus appears as spatial       
externality4  ,leibniz1 in a passage    
already quoted1 refers to the diffusion 
of materiality or antitypia4 ,this word1
 which is of frequent occurrence in the 
discussions of ,leibniz1 he translates  
generally as impenetrability1 sometimes 
as passive resistance4 ,it corresponds  
to the solidity or resistance of which  
,locke spoke as forming the essence of  
matter4 ,antitypia is the representation
 by a monad of the passive element in   
other monads4 ,leibniz sometimes speaks 

as if all created monads had in         
themselves antitypia1 and hence         
extension2 but he more accurately       
expresses it by saying that they need   
7exigent7 it4 ,this is a technical term 
which he elsewhere uses to express the  
relation of the possible to the actual4 
,the possible needs the actual1 not in  
the sense that it necessarily requires  
existence1 but in the sense that when   
the actual gives it existence1 it is the
 logical basis of the actual1--the      
actual1 on the other hand1 being its    
real complement4 ,the passivity of the  
monad is therefore at once the logical  
basis and the possibility of the        
impenetrability of matter4 ,it is owing 
to the passivity of the monad that it   
does not adequately reflect 7that it is 
not transparent to1 so to speak7 the    
activities of other monads4 ,in its     
irresponsiveness1 it fails to mirror    
them in itself4 ,it may be said1        
therefore1 to be impenetrable to them4  
,they in turn1 so far as they are       

passive1 are impenetrable to it4 ,now   
the impenetrable is1 ex vi terminis1    
that which excludes1 and that which     
excludes1 not in virtue of its active   
elasticity1 but in virtue of its mere   
inertia1 its dead weight1 as it were1 of
 resistance4 ,but mutual exclusion of   
this passive sort constitutes that which
 is extended4 ,extension is the abstract
 quality of this concrete subject4      
,such1 in effect1 is the deduction which
 ,leibniz gives of body1 or physical    
matter1 from matter as metaphysical2 of 
matter as sensible or phenomenal1 from  
matter as ideal or as intelligible4  ,if
 we put together what has been said1 it 
is clear that material phenomena        
7bodies1 corpora1 in ,leibniz's phrase7 
simply repeat in another sphere the     
properties of the spiritual monad4      
,there is a complete parallelism between
 every property1 each to each1 and this 
necessarily2 for every property of body 
is in logical dependence upon1 and a    
phenomenalization of1 some spiritual or 

ideal quality4 ,motion is the source of 
all the dynamic qualities of body1 and  
motion is the reflection of ,force1 that
 force which is ,life4 ,but this force  
in all finite forms is conditioned by a 
passive1 unreceptive1 unresponsive      
factor2 and this must also have its     
correlate in body4 ,this correlate is   
primarily impenetrability1 and          
secondarily extension4 ,thus it is that 
concrete body always manifests motion1  
indeed1 but upon a background of        
extension1 and against inertia4 ,it     
never has free play2 had it an          
unrestrained field of activity1         
extension would disappear1 and spatial  
motion would vanish into ideal energy4  
,on the other hand1 were the essence of 
matter found in resistance or           
impenetrability1 it would be wholly     
inert2 it would be a monotone of        
extension1 without variety of form or   
cohesion4 ,as ,leibniz puts it with     
reference to ,locke1 body implies       
motion1 or impetuosity1 resistance1 and 

cohesion4 ,motion is the active         
principle1 resistance the passive2 while
 cohesion1 with its various grades of   
completeness1 which produce form1 size1 
and solidity1 is the result of their    
union4  ,leibniz1 like ,plato1 has an   
intermediary between the rational and   
the sensible2 and as ,plato found that  
it was mathematical relations that      
mediate between the permanent and       
unified ,ideas and the changing manifold
 objects1 so ,leibniz found that the    
relations of space and time form the    
natural transition from the sphere of   
monads to the world of bodies4 ,as      
,plato found that it was the possibility
 of applying mathematical considerations
 to the world of images that showed the 
participation of ,ideas in them1 and    
constituted such reality as they had1 so
 ,leibniz found that space and time     
formed the element of order and         
regularity among sense phenomena1 and   
thus brought them into kinship with the 
monads and made them subjects of        

science4 ,it is implied in what is here 
said that ,leibniz distinguished between
 space and time on the one hand1 and    
duration and extension on the other4    
,this distinction1 which ,leibniz draws 
repeatedly and with great care1 has been
 generally overlooked by his            
commentators4 ,but it is evident that   
this leaves ,leibniz in a bad plight4   
,mathematics1 in its various forms1 is  
the science of spatial and temporal     
relations4 ,but if these are identical  
with the forms of duration and          
extension1 they are purely phenomenal   
and sensible4 ,the science of them1     
according to the ,leibnizian distinction
 between the absolutely real and the    
phenomenally real1 would be then a      
science of the confused1 the imperfect1 
and the transitory2 in fact1 no science 
at all4 ,but mathematics1 on the        
contrary1 is to ,leibniz the type of    
demonstrative1 conclusive science4      
,space and time are1 in his own words1  
innate ideas1 and the entire science of 

them is the drawing out of the content  
of these innate--that is1 rational1     
distinct1 and eternal--ideas4 ,but      
extension and duration are sensible     
experiences2 not rational1 but          
phenomenal2 not distinct1 but confused2 
not eternal1 but evanescent4 ,we may be 
sure that this contradiction would not  
escape ,leibniz1 although it has many of
 his critics and historians4  ,it is    
true1 however1 that he occasionally uses
 the terms as synonymous2 but this where
 the distinction between them has no    
bearing on the argument in hand1 and    
where the context determines in what    
sense the term is used4 ,the distinction
 which he actually makes1 and to which  
he keeps when space and time are the    
subject of discussion1 is that extension
 and duration are qualities or          
predicates of objects and events1 while 
space and time are relations1 or orders 
of existence4 ,extension and duration   
are1 as he says1 the immensity1 the     
mass1 the continuation1 the repetition1 

of some underlying subject4 ,but space  
and time are the measure of the mass1   
the rule or law of the continuation1 the
 order or mode of the repetition4 ,thus 
immediately after the passage already   
quoted1 in which he says that extension 
in body is the diffusion of materiality1
 just as whiteness is the diffusion of a
 property of milk1 he goes on to say    
that extension is to space as duration  
to time4 ,duration and extension are    
attributes of things2 but space and time
 are to be considered1 as it were1      
outside of things1 and as serving to    
measure them4 ,still more definitely he 
says3 ,many confound the immensity or   
extent of things with the space by means
 of which this extent is defined4 ,space
 is not the extension of body1 any more 
than duration is its time4 ,things keep 
their extension1 not always their space4
 ,everything has its own extent and     
duration2 but it does not have a time of
 its own1 nor keep for its own a space4 
,or1 as he expresses the latter idea    

elsewhere1 space is like number1 in the 
sense that it is indifferent to spatial 
things1 just as number is indifferent to
 res numerata4 ,just as the number five 
is not a quality or possession of any   
object1 or group of objects1 but        
expresses an order or relation among    
them1 so a given space is not the       
property of a thing1 but expresses the  
order of its parts to one another4 ,but 
extension1 on the other hand1 is a      
property of the given objects4 ,while   
extension1 therefore1 must always belong
 to some actual thing1 space1 as a      
relation1 is as applicable to possible  
things as to actual existences2 so that 
,leibniz sometimes says that time and   
space express possibilities4 ,they are  
that which makes it possible for a      
definite and coherent order of          
experiences to exist4 ,they determine   
existence in some of its relations1 and 
as such are logically prior to any given
 forms of existence2 while extent and   
duration are always qualities of some   

given form of existence1 and hence      
logically derivative4 ,since time and   
space characterize possibilities as well
 as actualities1 it follows as a matter 
of course that they are of the nature of
 eternal truths1 which relate equally to
 the possible and to the existing4      
,being an eternal truth1 space must have
 its place in that which is simply the  
active unity of all eternal truths1--the
 mind of ,god4 ,its truth and reality   
are based upon ,god4 ,it is an order    
whose source is ,god4 ,since ,god is    
purus actus1 he is the immediate1 the   
efficient source only of that which     
partakes in some degree of his own      
nature1 or is rational2 and here is     
another clear point of distinction      
between space and extension1 between    
time and duration4  ,but we must ask    
more in detail regarding their nature4  
,admitting that they are relations1     
ideal and prior to particular           
experiences1 the question must be asked1
 ,what sort of relations are they2 how  

are they connected with the purely      
spiritual on one hand1 and with the     
phenomenal on the other8 ,leibniz's most
 extended answers to these questions are
 given in his controversy with ,clarke4 
,the latter took much the same position 
regarding the nature of space 7though   
not1 indeed1 concerning the origin of   
its idea7 as ,locke1 and the arguments  
which ,leibniz uses against him he might
 also have used1 for the most part1     
against ,locke4 ,locke and ,clarke both 
conceived of space and time as wholly   
without intrinsic relation to objects   
and events4 ,it is especially against   
this position that ,leibniz argues1     
holding that space and time are simply  
orders or relations of objects and      
events1 that space exists only where    
objects are existing1 and that it is the
 order of their co-existence1 or of     
their possible co-existence2 while time 
exists only as events are occurring1 and
 is the relation of their succession4   
,clarke1 on the other hand1 speaks of   

the universe of objects as bounded by   
and moving about in an empty space1 and 
says that time existed before ,god      
created the finite world1 so that the   
world came into a time already there to 
receive its on-goings1 just as it fell  
into a space already there to receive   
its co-existences4  ,to get at the ideas
 of ,leibniz1 therefore1 we cannot do   
better than follow the course of this   
discussion4 ,he begins by saying that   
both space and time are purely relative1
 one being the order of co-existences1  
the other of successions4 ,space        
characterizes in terms of possibility an
 order of things existing at the same   
time1 so far as they exist in mutual    
relations 7ensemble71 without regard to 
their special modes of existence4 ,as to
 the alternate doctrine that space is a 
substance1 or something absolute1 it    
contradicts the principle of sufficient 
reason4 ,were space something absolutely
 uniform1 without things placed in it1  
there would be no difference between one

 part and another1 and it would be a    
matter of utter indifference to ,god why
 he gave bodies certain positions in    
space rather than others2 similarly it  
would be a matter of indifference why he
 created the world when he did1 if time 
were something independent of events4   
,in other words1 the supposed           
absoluteness of space and time would    
render the action of ,god wholly without
 reason1 capricious1 and at haphazard4  
,similarly1 it contradicts the principle
 of indiscernibles1 by which ,leibniz   
means the principle of specification1 or
 distinction4 ,according to him1 to     
suppose two things exactly alike1 is    
simply to imagine the same thing twice4 
,absolute uniformity1 wholly            
undifferentiated1 is a fiction          
impossible to realize in thought4 ,space
 considered without objects has nothing 
in it to determine it2 it is accordingly
 nothing actual4 ,the parts of space    
must be determined and distinguished by 
the objects which are in them4 ,finally1

 were space and time absolutely real    
things in themselves1 they would be     
independent of ,god1 and even           
limitations upon him4 ,they would be    
more substantial than substances4 ,god  
would not be able to change or destroy  
them4 ,they would be immutable and      
eternal in every part4 ,thus there would
 be an infinity of eternal things 7these
 parts7 independent of ,god4 ,they would
 limit ,god because he would be obliged 
to exist in them4 ,only by existing     
through this independent time would he  
be eternal2 only by extending through   
this independent space would he be      
omnipresent4 ,space and time thus become
 gods themselves4  ,when ,clarke        
declares that by the absoluteness of    
space and time he does not mean that    
they are themselves substances1 but only
 properties1 attributes of substance1   
,leibniz advances the same arguments in 
different form4 ,if space were the      
property of the things that are in      
space1 it would belong now to one       

substance1 now to another1 and when     
empty of all material substance1 even to
 an immaterial substance1 perhaps to    
,god4 ,truly a strange attribute which  
is handed about from one thing to       
another4 ,substances thus leave their   
accidents as if they were old clothes1  
and other substances put them on4 ,since
 these finite spaces are in infinite    
space1 and the latter is an attribute of
 ,god1 it must be that an attribute of  
,god is composed of parts1 some of them 
empty1 some full1 some round1 some      
square4 ,so1 too1 whatever is in time   
would help make one of the attributes of
 ,god4 ,truly a strange ,god1 says      
,leibniz1 this ,deity of parts 7ce ,dieu
  parties74 ,clarke's reply to this was 
that space and time are attributes of   
,god and of ,god alone1 not of things in
 space and time1--that1 indeed1 strictly
 speaking1 there are no parts in space  
or in time2 they are absolutely one4    
,this was virtually to give up the whole
 matter4 ,it was to deny the existence  

of finite spaces and times1 and to      
resolve them into an indefinite         
attribute of ,god4 ,such a view1 as     
,leibniz points out1 not only is        
contrary to experience1 but affords no  
aid in determining the actual concrete  
forms and situations of bodies1 and     
durations and successions of events4    
,the absolute space and time1 having no 
parts1 are wholly out of relations to   
these concrete existences4 ,the latter  
require1 therefore1 a space and a time  
that are relations or orders4 ,clarke's 
hypothesis is1 as ,leibniz says1 wholly 
without use or function1 and requires a 
theory like that of ,leibniz to account 
for the actually determinate forms of   
experience4 ,in his last reply ,clarke  
shifts his ground again1 and says that  
space and time are effects of ,god's    
existence2 they are the necessary       
results of his existence4 ,his existence
 is the cause of space and time4 ,the   
death of ,leibniz prevented any further 
reply4 ,it is not hard to imagine1      

however1 that in a general way his reply
 would have been to ask how space and   
time are at once attributes essential   
and necessary to ,god1 as constituting  
his immensity and eternity1 and effects 
dependent upon his existence4 ,to take  
this latter position1 indeed1 seems to  
abandon the position that they are      
absolute1 and to admit that1 like the   
rest of ,god's creation1 they are       
relative and finite4  ,so much for      
,leibniz's polemic4 ,its meaning is that
 space and time have significance only  
with reference to things and events1    
that they are the intellectual1 the     
ideal side of these objects and         
occurrences1 being the relations which  
give them order and unity4 ,a space     
which is not the space of objects1 which
 is not space in and through objects1 is
 an inanity2 it is not spirit1 it is not
 matter2 it is not a relation of either4
 ,it is nothingness magnified to        
infinity1 and then erected into         
existence4 ,and all for nothing2 for it 

does not enable us to account for a     
single concrete fact of experience4 ,for
 this we must have recourse to relations
 and orders of existence4 ,space is     
therefore to be defined as the order    
which makes it possible for objects to  
have situation2 time as that which makes
 it possible for events to have         
dating1--not as if they were actually   
prior to them1 and although nothings in 
themselves1 yet capable of giving       
concrete determination to things1 but as
 actually the relations themselves1 and 
as ideally necessary for the coherent   
experience of co-existent objects and of
 connected events4 ,as ,leibniz puts it 
epigrammatically3 ,space is the order of
 possible constants2 time the order of  
inconstant possibilities4  ,we have     
finished the exposition of the views of 
,leibniz about matter and material      
facts4 ,one question1 however1 remains  
to be discussed1--a question which      
,leibniz's contemporary critics would   
not allow him to pass over in silence1  

even had he been so disposed4 ,what is  
the reality of matter1 of motion1 of    
space1 and of time8 ,since they are1 as 
,leibniz says1 only phenomena1 not      
absolute realities1 what distinguishes  
them from dreams1 from illusions8 ,what 
distinguishes sensible phenomena from   
capricious fantasies1 and gives them    
reality8  ,leibniz begins his answer by 
pointing out that the mere fact that    
bodies are phenomena does not make them 
unreal4 ,to say that anything is        
phenomenal is to say that it is         
sensible2 but the senses make no        
declaration regarding metaphysical      
matters such as truth and reality4 ,the 
senses1 in a word1 only inform us that  
the experiences are there for the       
senses1 that they are sensible4 ,what is
 the ultimate nature of the sensible or 
the phenomenal1 what is their reality1  
is a question wholly outside the        
province of sense4 ,the questions of    
ultimate nature1 of reality1 are        
questions of metaphysics1 and hence are 

to be decided by the reason1 not by the 
senses4 ,and ,leibniz goes on to say    
that the truthfulness of the senses1    
since it concerns only the sensible1    
consists in the reciprocal agreement of 
sensible facts1 and in that we are not  
deceived in reasoning from one to       
another4 ,an isolated sense-experience  
could not be said to be either true or  
false1 real or illusory4 ,it would be   
true that it was experienced1 and that  
is all that could be said about it4 ,but
 since our experiences are not thus     
separated1 but have a certain order1    
there arises what we may call sensible  
reality and illusion4 ,when the order   
between two facts remains the same in   
different times and places and in the   
experience of different men1 we call    
these facts real4 ,if1 however1 our     
experience cannot be repeated by        
ourselves or by other men when the same 
conditions 7that is1 connections7 are   
present1 it is unreal1 or false4 ,it is 
thus the relation of phenomena which    

guarantees truth of fact regarding      
sensible objects4 ,constancy1           
regularity1 justify us in ascribing     
reality2 chaotic change and lack of     
orderly connection are a sign of        
unreality4 ,even our dreams have a      
reality2 for they have their connections
 and place in experience4 ,if we        
understood their connections we should  
even be able to explain their apparent  
lack of connection with the rest of     
experience4 ,leibniz thinks that both   
the ,academicians and ,sceptics and     
their opponents erred in attempting to  
find greater reality in sensible things 
than that of regular phenomena4 ,since  
our observations and judgments upon     
sensible phenomena are of such a nature 
that we can predict future phenomena and
 prepare for them1 we have all the      
reality in them that can be had or asked
 for4 ,even if it be granted possible   
7as it must be on this basis7 that1     
metaphysically speaking1                
sense-experience is only a connected    

dream1 it yet has a sufficient reality2 
for we are not deceived in the measures 
taken with reference to phenomena1      
provided that we act on the ground of   
their observed harmonies and relations4 
,thus while we are obliged to admit that
 our senses inform us that there are    
hard1 passive1 extended1 indivisible    
things1 not perfectly continuous and not
 intellectual in their nature1 and we   
know on metaphysical grounds that this  
information is not correct1 we cannot   
say that our senses deceive us1 for     
sense makes no statements regarding such
 matters4 ,it is our reason that errs if
 it takes the information that the      
senses give as if it were a declaration 
of reason itself4 ,sensible things have 
all the reality necessary for this range
 of experience1--practical1--such       
regularity of co-existence and sequence 
as allows us to act without being led   
astray4  ,but if we regard              
sense-phenomena not merely in their     
connection with one another1 but in     

their dependence upon the absolute      
realities1 we have still better         
justification for their comparative     
reality4 ,these phenomena are           
consequences of necessary and eternal   
truths4 ,one endowed with a perfect     
knowledge of such truths would be able  
to deduce1 a priori1 the phenomena from 
them4 ,the reality of sensible phenomena
 thus consists not merely in their      
connection with one another1 but in the 
fact that they are connected as the laws
 of the intelligible world require4     
,they follow not only rules of          
co-existence and sequence2 but these    
rules may be brought under general laws 
of motion1 which in turn may be deduced 
from geometrical principles4 ,these     
latter1 however1 are a priori2 they are 
truths which are grounded in the very   
intelligence of ,god4 ,the sensible has 
its basis in the ideal4 ,to state the   
same fact in another way1 all sensible  
phenomena occur in time and space2 or   
rather1 time and space are the orders1  

the relations1 of phenomena occurring   
and existing4 ,but1 as we have just     
seen1 time and space are ideal4 ,a      
relation1 as ,leibniz points out1 being 
neither attribute nor accident1 cannot  
be in the things which it relates1 as   
their possession4 ,in his own words1 it 
cannot be conceived as if it had one leg
 in one object1 the other leg in the    
other4 ,a relation is not a material    
bond1 running through or cementing      
objects2 it is ideal1 existing in the   
mind4 ,and while it is true that space  
and time are the relations of objects   
and events1 it is also true that if all 
objects and events were annihilated1    
space and time would continue to have   
their ideal existence in the            
intelligence of ,god as the eternal     
conditions of phenomena4 ,they thus form
 the links between absolute reality and 
the reality of sensible existence4 ,the 
principle of sufficient reason forms    
another link4 ,it may be recalled that  
in discussing ,leibniz's theory of      

volition we found that the will of ,god 
in relation to the sensible world is    
always determined by the choice of the  
better2 that in this consists the       
controlling reason and regulative       
principle of all that occurs and exists4
 ,thus for every fact in the sensible   
world there is connection with          
metaphysical1 or absolute1 reality1 not 
only through the medium of the          
intellectual relations of time and      
space1 but through the dynamic          
intermediary of the divine will acting  
in accordance with the divine reason4   
,sensible facts have1 then1 a reality1  
but a dependent one4 ,there would be no 
contradiction involved if they were not 
what they actually are4  ,we may sum up 
the matter by saying that the reality of
 sensible phenomena consists in the     
constancy of the mutual order in which  
they exist1 and in the dependence of    
this order upon the divine ,intelligence
 and ,will4 ,in this respect1 at least1 
,leibniz resembles the young ,irish     

idealist1 ,berkeley1 who only seven     
years after ,leibniz wrote the ,new     
,essays composed his ,principles of     
,human ,knowledge1 urging that the      
immediate reality of sense-phenomena    
consists in their steadiness1 order1 and
 coherence1 in a constant uniform       
working1 and that this gives us a       
foresight which enables us to regulate  
our actions for the benefit of life4 ,it
 was ,berkeley also who wrote that their
 ultimate reality consists in their     
being ideas of a ,divine ,spirit4 ,this 
was six years before the death of       
,leibniz4 ,yet it does not appear that  
,berkeley knew of ,leibniz1 and the only
 allusion to ,berkeley which ,i have    
found in the writings of ,leibniz shows 
that ,leibniz knew only of that         
caricature of his views which has always
 been current1--that ,berkeley was one  
who denied the existence of any external
 world4 ,what he writes is as follows3  
,as for him in ,ireland who questions   
the reality of 'bodies1' he seems       

neither to offer what is rational1 nor  
sufficiently to explain his own ideas4  
,i suspect that he is one of those men  
who are desirous of making themselves   
known through paradoxes4     ,,chapter  
,,ix4  ,,some ,,fundamental             
,,conceptions4   ,the fundamental       
category of ,locke1 as of all who take  
simply a mechanical view of experience1 
is that of substance4 ,he had good      
reason to be surprised when the ,bishop 
of ,worcester objected that ,locke      
wished to discard substance out of the  
world4 ,how can that be so1 ,locke asks1
 when ,i say that our idea of body is an
 extended solid substance1 and our idea 
of soul is of a substance that thinks4  
,and he adds1 ,nay1 as long as there is 
any simple idea or sensible quality     
left1 according to my way of arguing1   
substance cannot be discarded4          
,everything that really exists1 is1     
according to ,locke1 substance4 ,but    
substance to ,locke1 as again to all who
 interpret the universe after sensible  

categories1 is unknowable4 ,for such    
categories allow only of external       
relations2 they admit only of static    
existence4 ,substance1 in this way of   
looking at it1 must be distinct from its
 qualities1 and must be simply the      
existing substratum in which they       
inhere4  ,locke's account of the way in 
which we get the idea1 and of its       
nature1 is as follows3 ,all the ideas of
 all the sensible qualities of a cherry 
come into my mind by sensation4 ,the    
ideas of these qualities and actions1 or
 powers1 are perceived by the mind to be
 by themselves inconsistent with        
existence4 ,they cannot subsist of      
themselves4 ,hence the mind perceives   
their necessary connection with         
inherence1 or with being supported4     
,correlative to the idea of being       
supported is1 of course1 the idea of the
 support4 ,but this idea is not         
represented to the mind by any clear and
 distinct idea2 the obscure and vague1  
indistinct idea of thing or something1  

is all that is left4 ,or yet more       
simply1 ,taking notice that a certain   
number of simple ideas go together1 and 
not imagining how these simple ideas can
 subsist by themselves1 we accustom     
ourselves to suppose some substratum    
wherein they do subsist1 and from which 
they do result4 ,hence the only idea we 
have of it is of something which        
underlies known qualities4 ,it is their 
supposed1 but unknown1 support4  ,if we 
translate these expressions into the    
ideas of to-day1 we see that they are   
equivalent to the view of the world     
which is given us by scientific         
categories when these categories are    
regarded not merely as scientific1 but  
also as philosophic2 that is1 capable of
 interpreting and expressing the        
ultimate nature of experience4 ,this    
modern view uses the words              
things-in-themselves 7or absolute       
realities7 and phenomena4 ,it says that 
we know nothing of existence as it is in
 itself1 but only of its phenomena4     

,mind1 matter1 objects1 are all         
substances1 all equally substances1 and 
all have their unknown essence and their
 phenomenal appearance4 ,such a         
distinction between the known and the   
unknown can rest1 it is evident1 only   
upon a separation between reality and   
phenomena similar to that which ,locke  
makes between substance and qualities4  
,in knowing the latter1 we know nothing 
of the former4 ,although the latter are 
called phenomena1 they do not really    
manifest the substantial reality2 they  
conceal it4 ,this absolute distinction  
between substance and quality1 between  
reality and phenomenon1 rests1 in turn1 
upon the hypothesis that reality is mere
 existence2 that is1 it is something    
which is1 and that is all4 ,it is a     
substratum2 it lies under1 in a passive 
way1 qualities2 it is 7literally7       
substance2 it simply stands1 inactively1
 under phenomena4 ,it may1 by           
possibility1 have actions2 but it has   
them4 ,activities are qualities which1  

like all qualities1 are in external     
relation to the substance4 ,being1 in   
other words1 is the primary notion1 and 
being means something essentially       
passive and merely enduring1            
accidentally and secondarily something  
acting4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 ,locke is  
the father of the mechanical philosophy 
of to-day4  ,we have already learned how
 completely ,leibniz reverses this way  
of regarding reality4 ,according to     
,locke1 reality essentially is2 and in  
its being there is no ground of         
revelation of itself4 ,it then acts2 but
 these actions1 powers1 or qualities1   
since not flowing from the very being of
 substance1 give no glimpse into its    
true nature4 ,according to ,leibniz1    
reality acts1 and therefore is4 ,its    
being is conditioned upon its activity4 
,it is not first there1 and secondly    
acts2 but its being there is its        
activity4 ,since its very substance is  
activity1 it is impossible that it      
should not manifest its true nature4    

,its every activity is a revelation of  
itself4 ,it cannot hide itself as a     
passive subsistence behind qualities or 
phenomena4 ,it must break forth into    
them4 ,on the other hand1 since the     
qualities are not something which merely
 inhere in an underlying support1 but   
are the various forms or modes of the   
activity which constitutes reality1 they
 necessarily reveal it4 ,they are its   
revelations4 ,there is here no need to  
dwell further on the original dynamic   
nature of substance2 what was said in   
the way of general exposition suffices4 
,it is only in its relations to ,locke's
 view as just laid down that it now     
concerns us4  ,in the first place1      
,leibniz points out that qualities are  
abstract1 while substance is concrete4  
,the qualities1 from the very fact that 
they have no self-subsistence1 are only 
relations1 while the substance1 as that 
of which they are qualities1 or from    
which they are abstractions1 is         
concrete4 ,it is1 ,leibniz says1 to     

invert the true order to take qualities 
or abstract terms as the best known and 
most easily comprehended1 and concretes 
as unknown1 and as having the most      
difficulty about them4 ,it is           
abstractions which give birth to almost 
all our difficulties1 and ,locke's error
 here is that he begins with            
abstractions1 and takes them to be most 
open to intelligence4 ,locke's second   
error is separating so completely       
substance and attribute4 ,after having  
distinguished1 says ,leibniz1 two things
 in substance1 the attributes or        
predicates1 and the common subject of   
these predicates1 it is not to be       
wondered at that we cannot conceive     
anything in particular in the subject4  
,this result is necessary1 since we have
 separated all the attributes in which  
there is anything definite to be        
conceived4 ,hence to demand anything    
more than a mere unknown somewhat in the
 subject1 is to contradict the          
supposition which was made in making the

 abstraction and in conceiving          
separately the subject and its qualities
 or accidents4 ,we are indeed ignorant  
of a subject from which abstraction has 
been made of all defining and           
characteristic qualities2 but this      
ignorance results from our demanding a  
sort of knowledge of which the object   
does not permit4 ,in short1 it is a     
credit to our knowledge1 not an         
aspersion upon it1 that we cannot know  
that which is thoroughly unreal1--a     
substance deprived of all attributes4   
,this is1 indeed1 a remark which is     
applicable to the supposed              
unknowableness of pure ,being1 or       
,absolute ,being1 when it is defined as 
the absence of all relations 7as is     
done1 for example1 by ,mr4 ,spencer     
to-day74  ,closely connected with the   
notion of substance are the categories  
of identity and diversity4 ,these       
relations are of course to ,locke       
thoroughly external4 ,it is relation of 
time and place which always determines  

identity4 ,that that had one beginning  
is the same thing2 and that which had a 
different beginning in time and place   
from that1 is not the same1 but diverse4
 ,it is therefore easy to discover the  
principle of individuation4 ,it is      
existence itself1 which determines a    
being of any sort to a particular time  
and place1 incommunicable to two beings 
of the same kind4 ,he applies this      
notion to organic being1 including man1 
and to the personal identity of man4    
,the identity of an organism1 vegetable1
 brute1 or human1 is its continuous     
organization2 it is the participation of
 the same continued life1 by constantly 
fleeting particles of matter in         
succession vitally united to the same   
organized body4 ,personal identity is   
constituted by a similar continuity of  
consciousness4 ,it being the same       
consciousness that makes a man be       
himself to himself1 personal identity   
depends on that only4 ,it consists not  
in the identity of substance1 but in the

 identity of consciousness4 ,it will be 
noticed that ,locke uses the notion of  
identity which he has already           
established to explain organic and      
personal unity4 ,it is the same         
continued life1 identity of             
consciousness1 that constitute them4 ,we
 are1 hence1 introduced to no new       
principle4 ,identity is even in         
personality a matter of temporal and    
spatial relations4  ,in the general     
account of the system of ,leibniz it was
 pointed out that it is characteristic  
of his thought to regard identity and   
distinction as internal principles1 and 
as necessarily implied in each other4   
,we need not go over that ground again1 
but simply see how he states his        
position with reference to what is      
quoted from ,locke4 ,these are his      
words3 ,besides the difference of place 
and time there is always necessary an   
internal principle or law of            
distinction1 so that while there may be 
several things of the same species1     

there are no two things exactly alike4  
,thus1 although time and place 7that is1
 relations to the external7 aid us in   
distinguishing things1 things do not    
cease to be distinguished in themselves4
 ,the essence of identity and diversity 
does not consist in time and place1     
although it is true that diversity of   
things is accompanied with that of time 
and place1 since they carry along with  
them different impressions upon the     
thing2 that is1 they expose the thing to
 different surroundings4 ,but in reality
 it is things which diversify times and 
places from one another1 for in         
themselves these are perfectly similar1 
not being substances or complete        
realities4  ,the principle of           
individuation follows1 of course1 from  
this4 ,if two individuals were perfectly
 similar and equal1 that is1            
indistinguishable in themselves1 there  
would be no principle of individuation2 
there would not be two individuals4     
,thus ,leibniz states his important     

principle of the identity of            
indiscernibles1 the principle that where
 there is not some internal             
differentiating principle which         
specifies the existence in this or that 
definite way1 there is no individual4   
,leibniz here states1 in effect1 the    
principle of organic unity1 the notion  
that concrete unity is a unity of       
differences1 not from them4 ,it is the  
principle which allows him at once to   
accept and transform the thought of     
,spinoza that all qualification or      
determination is negation4 ,spinoza1 in 
spite of his intellectual greatness1    
conceived of distinction or             
determination as external1 and hence as 
external negation4 ,but since ultimate  
reality admits of no external negation1 
it must be without distinction1 an      
all-inclusive one4 ,but to ,leibniz the 
negation is internal2 it is             
determination of its own being into the 
greatest possible riches4 ,things that  
are conceived as absolutely uniform and 

containing no variety are pure          
abstractions4 ,things indistinguishable 
in themselves1 and capable of being     
distinguished only by external          
characteristics without internal        
foundation1 are contrary to the most    
important principles of reason4 ,the    
truth is that every being is capable of 
change or differentiation1 and is itself
 actually changed in such a way that in 
itself it differs from every other4  ,as
 to organic bodies1 so far as they are  
bodies1 or corporeal1 they are one and  
identical only in appearance4 ,they are 
not the same an instant4 4 4 4 ,bodies  
are in constant flux4 ,they are like a  
river which is always changing its      
water1 or like the ship of ,theseus     
which the ,athenians are constantly     
repairing4 ,such unity as they really   
possess is like all unity1--ideal or    
spiritual4 ,they remain the same        
individual by virtue of that same soul  
or spirit which constitutes the ',ego'  
in those individuals who think4 ,except 

for the soul1 there is neither the same 
life nor any vital union4 ,as to        
personal identity1 ,leibniz             
distinguishes between physical or real  
identity and moral4 ,in neither case1   
however1 is it a unity which excludes   
plurality1 an identity which does not   
comprehend diversity4 ,every spirit has1
 he says1 traces of all the impressions 
which it has ever experienced1 and even 
presentiments of all that ever will     
happen4 ,but these feelings are         
generally too minute to be distinguished
 and brought into consciousness1 though 
they may be sometime developed4 ,this   
continuity and connection of perceptions
 makes up the real identity of the      
individual1 while apperceptions 7that   
which is consciously apprehended of past
 experiences7 constitute the moral      
identity and make manifest the real     
identity4 ,we have had occasion before  
to allude to the part played in the     
,leibnizian philosophy by minute        
perceptions or unconscious ideas4 ,of   

them he says1 relative to the present   
point1 that insensible perceptions mark 
and even constitute the sameness of the 
individual1 which is characterized by   
the residua preserved from its preceding
 states1 as they form its connection    
with its present state4 ,if these       
connections are apperceived or brought  
into distinct consciousness1 there is   
moral identity as well4 ,as he expresses
 it in one place3 ,the self 7soi7 is    
real and physical identity2 the         
appearance of self1 accompanied with    
truth1 is personal identity4 ,but the   
essential point in either case is that  
the identity is not that of a substance 
underlying modifications1 nor of a      
consciousness which merely accompanies  
all mental states1 but is the           
connection1 the active continuity1      
or--in ,kant's word--the synthesis1 of  
all particular forms of the mental life4
 ,the self is not the most abstract     
unity of experience1 it is the most     
organic4 ,what ,leibniz says of his     

monads generally is especially true of  
the higher monads1--human souls4 ,they  
vary1 up to infinity itself1 with the   
greatest abundance1 order1 and beauty   
imaginable4 ,not a mathematical point1  
but life1 is the type of ,leibniz's     
conception of identity4  ,in the order  
in which ,locke takes up his topics 7and
 in which ,leibniz follows him7 we have 
omitted one subject1 which1 however1 may
 find its natural place in the present  
connection1--the subject of infinity4   
,in ,locke's conception1 the infinite is
 only a ceaseless extension or          
multiplication of the finite4 ,he       
considers the topic immediately after   
the discussions of space1 time1 and     
number1 and with good logic from his    
standpoint2 for finite and infinite1 he 
says1 are looked upon by the mind as the
 modes of quantity1 and are attributed1 
in their first designation1 only to     
those things which have parts and are   
capable of increase and diminution4     
,this is true even of the application of

 the term infinite to ,god1 so far as   
concerns the attributes of duration and 
ubiquity2 and as applied to his other   
attributes the term is figurative1      
signifying that they are                
incomprehensible and inexhaustible4     
,such being the idea of the infinite1 it
 is attained as follows3 ,there is no   
difficulty1 says ,locke1 as to the way  
in which we come by the idea of the     
finite4 ,every obvious portion of       
extension and period of succession which
 affects us is bounded4 ,if we take one 
of these periods or portions1 we find   
that we can double it1 or otherwise     
multiply it1 as often as we wish1 and   
that there is no reason to stop1 nor are
 we one jot nearer the end at any point 
of the multiplication than when we set  
out4 ,by repeating as often as we will  
any idea of space1 we get the idea of   
infinity2 by being able to repeat the   
idea of any length of duration1 we come 
by the idea of eternity4 ,there is a    
difference1 then1 between the ideas of  

the infinity of space1 time1 and number1
 and of an infinite space1 time1 and    
number4 ,the former idea we have2 it is 
the idea that we can continue without   
end the process of multiplication or    
progression4 ,the latter we have not2 it
 would be the idea of having completed  
the infinite multiplication1 it would be
 the result of the never-ending         
progression4 ,and this is evidently a   
contradiction in terms4 ,to sum the     
matter up1 the term infinite always     
relates to the notion of quantity4      
,quantity is that which is essentially  
capable of increase or decrease4 ,there 
is then an infinity of quantity2 there  
is no quantity which is the absolute    
limit to quantity4 ,such a quantity     
would be incapable of increase1 and     
hence contradictory to quantity4 ,but an
 actual infinite quantity 7whether of   
space1 time1 or number7 would be one    
than which there could be no greater2   
and hence the impossibility of our      
having a positive idea of an actual or  

completed infinite4  ,leibniz's reply   
consists simply in carrying out this    
same thought somewhat further4 ,it is   
granted that the idea of an infinite    
quantity of any kind is absurd and      
self-contradictory4 ,but what does this 
prove1 except that the notions of       
quantity and infinity are incompatible  
with each other1 that they contradict   
each other8 ,hence1 instead of the      
infinite being a mode of quantity1 it   
must be conceived as essentially        
distinct from and even opposed to       
quantity4 ,locke's argument is virtually
 a reductio ad absurdum of the notion   
that the infinite is capable of parts4  
,in the few pages of comment which      
,leibniz in #afif wrote upon ,locke1    
this topic of the infinite is one of the
 few touched upon4 ,his words upon that 
occasion were as follows3 ,i agree with 
,mr4 ,locke that1 properly speaking1    
there is no space1 time1 nor number     
which is infinite2 and that it is only  
true that however great be a space1 a   

time1 or a number1 there is always      
another which is still greater1 and this
 without end2 and that1 therefore1 the  
infinite is not to be found in a whole  
made up of parts4 ,but it does not cease
 to exist3 it is found in the absolute1 
which is without parts1 and of which    
compound things phenomena in space and  
time1 or facts which may be numbered are
 only limitations4 ,the positive        
infinite being nothing else than the    
absolute1 it may be said that there is1 
in this sense1 a positive idea of the   
infinite1 and that it is anterior to the
 idea of the finite4 ,in other words1   
while the infinite is to ,locke an      
indefinite extension of the finite1     
which alone is positively given1 to     
,leibniz the infinite is the positive   
and real1 and the finite is only in and 
by it4 ,the finite is the negative4     
,leibniz amplifies this thought upon    
other occasions1 as in his present more 
extended examination4 ,there is no      
infinite number1 line1 or quantity1 if  

they are taken as true wholes4 ,we      
deceive ourselves in trying to imagine  
an absolute space which should be an    
infinite whole1 composed of parts4      
,there is none such4 ,it is an idea     
which implies contradiction2 and all    
these 'infinites' and 'infinitesimals'  
are of use only in geometry1 as         
imaginary roots are in algebra4 ,that   
which is ordinarily called the infinite1
 that is1 the quantitative infinite1 is 
in reality only the indefinite4 ,we     
involve ourselves in difficulty when we 
talk about a series of numbers extending
 to infinity2 we imagine a last term1 an
 infinite number1 or one infinitely     
little4 ,but these are only fictions4   
,all number is finite and assignable1   
that is1 of a certain definite quantity2
 every line is the same4 ',infinites'   
and 'infinitesimals' signify only       
quantities which can be taken as large  
or as small as one wishes1 simply for   
the purpose of showing that there is no 
error which can be assigned4 ,or we are 

to understand by the infinitely little1 
the state of vanishing or commencing of 
a quantum after the analogy of a quantum
 already formed4 ,on the other hand1 the
 true infinite is not an aggregate1 nor 
a whole of parts2 it is not clothed with
 magnitude1 nor does it consist in      
number4 4 4 4 ,the ,absolute alone1 the 
indivisible infinite1 has true          
unity1--,i mean ,god4 ,and as he sums up
 the matter3 ,the infinite1 consisting  
of parts1 is neither one nor a whole2 it
 cannot be brought under any notion of  
the mind except that of quantity4 ,only 
the infinite without parts is one1 and  
this is not a whole of parts3 this      
infinite is ,god4  ,it cannot be        
admitted1 however1 that ,locke has given
 a correct account of the origin of the 
notion of the quantitative infinite1    
or--to speak philosophically1 and not   
after the use of terms convenient in    
mathematics--the indefinite4 ,according 
to him1 its origin is the mere empirical
 repeating of a sensuous datum of time  

and space4 ,according to ,leibniz1 this 
repetition1 however long continued1 can 
give no idea beyond itself2 it can never
 generate the idea that the process of  
repetition may be continued without a   
limit4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 he objects  
that experience cannot guarantee notions
 beyond the limits of experience4       
,locke's process of repetition could    
tell us that a number had been extended 
up to a given point2 not that it could  
be extended without limit4 ,the source  
of this latter idea must be found1      
therefore1 where we find the origin of  
all extra-empirical notions1--in reason4
 ,its origin is the same as that of     
universal and necessary truths4 ,it is  
not the empirical process of            
multiplying1 but the fact that the same 
reason for multiplying always exists1   
that originates and guarantees the idea4
 ,take a straight line and prolong it in
 such a way that it is double the first4
 ,it is evident that the second1 being  
perfectly similar to the first1 can be  

itself doubled2 and we have a third1    
which in turn is similar to the         
preceding4 ,the same reason always being
 present1 it is not possible that the   
process should ever be brought to a     
stop4 ,thus the line can be prolonged   
'to infinity4' ,therefore the idea of   
'infinity' comes from the consideration 
of the identity of relation or of       
reason4  ,the considerations which we   
have grouped together in this chapter   
serve to show the fundamental           
philosophical difference between ,locke 
and ,leibniz4 ,although1 taken in       
detail1 they are self-explanatory1 a few
 words may be permitted upon their unity
 and ultimate bearing4 ,it is           
characteristic of ,locke that he uses   
the same principle of explanation with  
reference to the conceptions of         
substance1 identity and diversity1 and  
infinity1 and that this principle is    
that of spatial and temporal relation4  
,infinity is conceived as quantitative1 
as the successive addition of times and 

spaces2 identity and diversity are      
oneness and difference of existence as  
determined by space and time2 substance 
is the underlying static substratum of  
qualities1 and1 as such1 is considered  
after the analogy of things existing in 
space and through time4 ,it must not be 
forgotten that ,locke believed as       
thoroughly as ,leibniz in the           
substantial existence of the world1 of  
the human soul1 and of ,god2 in the     
objective continuity of the world1 and  
the personal identity of man1 and in the
 true infinity of ,god4 ,whatever       
negative or sceptical inferences may    
have afterwards been drawn from ,locke's
 premises were neither drawn nor dreamed
 of by him4 ,his purpose was in essence 
one with that of ,leibniz4  ,but the    
contention of ,leibniz is that when     
substance1 identity1 and infinity are   
conceived of by mechanical categories1  
or measured by the sensible standard of 
space and time1 they lose their meaning 
and their validity4 ,according to him   

such notions are spiritual in their     
nature1 and to be spiritually conceived 
of4 ,spiritual1 however1 does not mean  
opposed to the sensible2 it does not    
mean something to be known by a peculiar
 kind of intuition unlike our knowledge 
of anything else4 ,it means the active  
and organic basis of the sensible1 its  
significance and ideal purpose4 ,it is  
known by knowing the sensible or        
mechanical as it really is2 that is1 as 
it is completely1 as a concretum1 in    
,leibniz's phrase4 ,leibniz saw clearly 
that to make the infinite something at  
one end of the finite1 as its mere      
external limit1 or something            
miraculously intercalated into the      
finite1 was to deprive it of meaning1   
and1 by making it unknowable1 to open   
the way for its denial4 ,to make        
identity consist in the removal of all  
diversity 7as must be done if it be     
thought after the manner of external    
relations71 is to reduce it to          
nothing1--as ,hume1 indeed1 afterwards  

showed4 ,substance1 which is merely a   
support behind qualities1 is unknowable1
 and hence unverifiable4 ,while1 then1  
the aim of both ,locke and ,leibniz as  
regards these categories was the same1  
,leibniz saw what ,locke did not1--that 
to interpret them after the manner of   
existence in space and time1 to regard  
them 7in ,leibniz's terminology7 as     
mathematical1 and not as metaphysical1  
is to defeat that aim4 ,the sole way to 
justify them1 and in justifying them to 
give relative validity to the sensible  
and phenomenal1 is to demonstrate their 
spiritual and dynamic nature1 to show   
them as conditioning space and time1 and
 not as conditioned by them4            
,,chapter ,x4  ,,the ,,nature ,,and     
,,extent ,,of ,,knowledge4   ,the third 
book of ,locke's ,essay is upon words   
and language2 and in the order of       
treatment this would be the next topic  
for discussion4 ,but much of what is    
said in this connection both by ,locke  
and by ,leibniz is philological1        

rhetorical1 and grammatical in          
character1 and although not without     
interest in itself1 is yet without any  
especial bearing upon the philosophical 
points in controversy4 ,the only topics 
in this book demanding our attention are
 general and particular terms2 but these
 fall most naturally into the discussion
 of general and particular knowledge4   
,in fact1 it is not the terms which     
,locke actually discusses1 but the ideas
 for which the terms stand4 ,we pass on 
accordingly1 without further ceremony1  
to the fourth book1 which is concerning 
knowledge in general4 ,locke defines    
knowledge as nothing but the perception 
of the connection and agreement1 or     
disagreement and repugnancy1 of any of  
our ideas4 ,these agreements or         
disagreements may be reduced to four    
sorts1--,identity1 or diversity2        
,relation2 ,co-existence1 or necessary  
connection2 ,real existence4 ,the       
statement of identity and diversity is  
implied in all knowledge whatsoever4 ,by

 them the mind clearly and infallibly   
perceives each idea to agree with itself
 and be what it is1 and all distinct    
ideas to disagree2 i4 e41 the one not to
 be the other4 ,the agreement of        
relation is such knowledge as the mind  
derives from the comparison of its      
ideas4 ,it includes mathematical        
knowledge4 ,the connection of           
co-existence belongs particularly to    
substances4 ,locke's example is that    
gold is fixed1--by which we understand  
that the idea of fixedness goes along   
with that group of ideas which we call  
gold4 ,all statements of fact coming    
under the natural sciences would fall   
into this class4 ,the fourth sort is    
that of actual and real existence       
agreeing to any idea4  ,leibniz's       
criticism upon these statements of      
,locke is brief and to the point4 ,he   
admits ,locke's definition of knowledge1
 qualifying it1 however1 by the         
statement that in much of our knowledge1
 perhaps in all that is merely          

empirical1 we do not know the reason and
 connection of things and hence cannot  
be said to perceive the agreement or    
disagreement of ideas1 but only to feel 
it confusedly4 ,his most important      
remark1 however1 is to the effect that  
relation is not a special kind of       
knowledge1 but that all ,locke's four   
kinds are varieties of relation4        
,locke's connection of ideas which makes
 knowledge is nothing but relation4 ,and
 there are two kinds of relation1--those
 of comparison and of concourse4 ,that  
of comparison states the identity or    
distinction of ideas1 either in whole or
 in part4 ,that of concourse contains   
,locke's two classes of co-existence and
 existence4 ,when we say that a thing   
really exists1 this existence is the    
predicate1--that is to say1 a notion    
connected with the idea which is the    
subject2 and there is connection between
 these two notions4 ,the existence of an
 object of an idea may be considered as 
the concourse of this object with me4   

,hence comparison1 which marks identity 
or diversity1 and concourse of an object
 with me 7or with the ego7 are the only 
forms of knowledge4  ,leibniz leaves the
 matter here2 but he only needed to     
develop what is contained in this       
statement to anticipate ,berkeley and   
,kant in some of the most important of  
their discoveries4 ,the contradiction   
which lies concealed in ,locke's account
 is between his definition of knowledge 
in general1 and knowledge of real       
existence in particular4 ,one is the    
agreement or disagreement of ideas2 the 
other is the agreement of an idea with  
an object4 ,berkeley's work1 in its     
simplest form1 was to remove this       
inconsistency4 ,he saw clearly that the 
object was an intruder here4 ,if        
knowledge lies in the connection of     
ideas1 it is impossible to get outside  
the ideas to find an object with which  
they agree4 ,either that object is      
entirely unknown1 or it is an idea4 ,it 
is impossible1 therefore1 to find the   

knowledge of reality in the comparison  
of an idea with an object4 ,it must be  
in some property of the ideas           
themselves4  ,kant developed more fully 
the nature of this property1 which      
constitutes the objectivity of our      
ideas4 ,it is their connection with one 
another according to certain necessary  
forms of perception and rules of        
conception4 ,in other words1 the reality
 of ideas lies in their being connected 
by the necessary and hence universal    
relations of synthetic intelligence1 or1
 as ,kant often states it1 in their     
agreement with the conditions of        
self-consciousness4 ,it is not1 ,i      
believe1 unduly stretching either the   
letter or the spirit of ,leibniz to find
 in that concourse of the object with   
the ego which makes its reality1 the    
analogue of this doctrine of ,kant2 it  
is at all events the recognition of the 
fact that reality is not to be found in 
the relating of ideas to unknown things1
 but in their relation to self-conscious

 intelligence4 ,the points of similarity
 between ,kant and ,leibniz do not end  
here4 ,leibniz's two relations of       
comparison and concourse are certainly  
the congeners of ,kant's analytic and   
synthetic judgments4 ,but ,leibniz1 as  
we shall see hereafter1 trusts too      
thoroughly to the merely formal         
relations of identity and contradiction 
to permit him such a development of     
these two kinds of relation as renders  
,kant's treatment of them epoch-making4 
,the discussion then advances to the    
subject of degrees of knowledge1 of     
which ,locke recognizes                 
three1--intuitive1 demonstrative1 and   
sensitive4 ,intuitive knowledge is      
immediate knowledge1--recognition of    
likeness or difference without the      
intervention of a third idea2 it is the 
most certain and clear of all knowledge4
 ,in demonstrative knowledge the        
agreement or disagreement cannot be     
perceived directly1 because the ideas   
cannot be put together so as to show it4

 ,hence the mind has recourse to        
intermediaries4 ,and this is what we    
call reasoning4 ,demonstrative rests on 
intuitive knowledge1 because each       
intermediate idea used must be          
immediately perceived to be like or     
unlike its neighboring idea1 or it would
 itself need intermediates for its      
proof4 ,besides these two degrees of    
knowledge there is another perception of
 the mind employed about the particular 
existence of finite things without us1  
which1 going beyond bare probability1   
and yet not reaching perfectly to either
 of the foregoing degrees of certainty1 
passes under the name of knowledge4     
,leibniz's comments are again brief4    
,the primitive truths which are known by
 intuition are to be divided into two   
classes1--truths of reason and of fact4 
,the primitive truths of reason are     
necessary1 and may be called identical1 
because they seem only to repeat the    
same thing1 without teaching us         
anything4 ,a is ,a4 ,a is not non-,a4   

,such propositions are not frivolous or 
useless1 because the conclusions of     
logic are demonstrated by means of      
identical propositions1 and many of     
those of geometry by the principle of   
contradiction4 ,all the intuitive truths
 of reason may be said to be made known 
through the immediation of ideas4 ,the  
intuitive truths of fact1 on the other  
hand1 are contingent and are made known 
through the immediation of feeling4 ,in 
this latter class come such truths as   
the ,cartesian1 ,i think1 therefore ,i  
am4 ,neither class can be proved by     
anything more certain4  ,demonstration  
is defined by ,leibniz as by ,locke4    
,the former recognizes1 however1 two    
sorts1--analytic and synthetic4         
,synthesis goes from the simple to the  
complex4 ,there are many cases1 however1
 where this is not applicable2 where it 
would be a task equal to drinking up the
 sea to attempt to make all the         
necessary combinations4 ,here the method
 of exclusions should be employed1      

cutting off many of the useless         
combinations4 ,if this cannot be done1  
then it is analysis which gives the clew
 into the labyrinth4 ,he is also of the 
opinion that besides demonstration1     
giving certainty1 there should be       
admitted an art of calculating          
probabilities1--the lack of which is1 he
 says1 a great defect in our present    
logic1 and which would be more useful   
than a large part of our demonstrative  
sciences4 ,as to sensitive knowledge1 he
 agrees with ,locke that there is such a
 thing as real knowledge of objects     
without us1 and that this variety does  
not have the same metaphysical certainty
 as the other two2 but he disagrees     
regarding its criterion4 ,according to  
,locke1 the criterion is simply the     
greater degree of vividness and force   
that sensations have as compared with   
imaginations1 and the actual pleasures  
or pains which accompany them4 ,leibniz 
points out that this criterion1 which in
 reality is purely emotional1 is of no  

great value1 and states the principle of
 the reality of sensible phenomena which
 we have already given1 repeating that  
it is found in the connection of        
phenomena1 and that this connection is  
verified by means of the truths of      
reason1 just as the phenomena of optics 
are explained by geometry4  ,the        
discussion regarding primitive truths1  
axioms1 and maxims1 as well as the      
distinction between truths of fact and  
of reason1 has its most important       
bearing in ,locke's next chapter4 ,this 
chapter has for its title the ,extent of
 ,human ,knowledge1 and in connection   
with the sixth chapter1 upon universal  
propositions1 and with the seventh1 upon
 axioms1 really contains the gist of the
 treatment of knowledge4 ,it is here    
also that are to be considered chapters 
three and six of book third1 having     
respectively as their titles1 ,of       
,general ,terms1 and ,of the ,names of  
,substances4  ,to understand ,locke's   
views upon the extent and limitations of

 our knowledge1 it is necessary to recur
 to his theory of its origin4 ,if we    
compare what he says about the origin of
 ideas from sensations with what he says
 about the development of general       
knowledge from particular1 we shall find
 that ,locke unconsciously puts side by 
side two different1 and even            
contradictory1 theories upon this point4
 ,in the view already given when        
treating of sensation1 knowledge        
originates from the combination1 the    
addition1 of the simple ideas furnished 
us by our senses4 ,it begins with the   
simple1 the unrelated1 and advances to  
the complex4 ,but according to the      
doctrine which he propounds in treating 
of general terms1 knowledge begins with 
the individual1 which is already        
qualified by definite relations1 and    
hence complex1 and proceeds1 by         
abstracting some of these qualities1    
towards the simple4 ,or1 in ,locke's own
 language1 ideas become general by      
separating from them the circumstances  

of time and place and any other ideas   
that may determine them to this and that
 particular existence4 ,and1 still more 
definitely1 he says that general ideas  
are framed by leaving out of the complex
 idea of individuals that which is      
peculiar to each1 and retaining only    
what is common to them all4 ,from this  
it follows that general and universal   
belong not to the real existence of     
things1 but are the inventions and      
creatures of the understanding4 ,when we
 quit particulars1 the generals that    
rest are only creatures of our own      
making4 4 4 4 ,the signification they   
have is nothing but a relation that by  
the mind of man is added to them4 ,and  
in language which reminds us of ,kant1  
but with very different bearing1 he says
 that relations are the workmanship of  
the understanding4 ,the abstract idea of
 what is common to all the members of   
the class constitutes nominal essence4  
,this nominal essence1 not being a      
particular existence in nature1 but the 

workmanship of the understanding1 is to 
be carefully distinguished from the real
 essence1 which is the being of anything
 whereby it is what it is4 ,this real   
essence is evidently equivalent to the  
unknown substance of which we have heard
 before4 ,it is the real1 internal1 and 
unknown constitution of things4 ,in     
simple or unrelated ideas and in modes  
the real and the nominal essence is the 
same2 and hence whatever is demonstrated
 of one is demonstrated of the other4   
,but as to substance it is different1   
the one being natural1 the other        
artificial4 ,the nominal essence always 
relates to sorts1 or classes1 and is a  
pattern or standard by which we classify
 objects4 ,in the individual there is   
nothing essential1 in this sense4       
,particular beings1 considered barely in
 themselves1 will be found to have all  
their qualities equally essential to    
them1 or1 which is more1 nothing at all4
 ,as for the real essence which things  
have1 we only suppose its being without 

precisely knowing what it is4  ,locke   
here presents us with the confusion     
which1 in one form or another1 is always
 found in empiricism1 and which indeed  
is essential to it4 ,locke1 like the    
ordinary empiricist1 has no doubt of the
 existence of real things4 ,his         
starting-point is the existence of two  
substances1 mind and matter2 while1     
further1 there is a great number of     
substances of each kind4 ,each mind and 
every separate portion of matter is a   
distinct substance4 ,this supposed      
deliverance of common sense ,locke never
 called into question4 ,working on this 
line1 all knowledge will consist in     
abstraction from the ready-made things  
presented to us in perception1 in       
leaving out from the complex idea of    
individuals something belonging to them4
 ,but on the other hand1 ,locke never   
doubts that knowledge begins with       
sensation1 and that1 therefore1 the     
process of knowledge is one of adding   
simple1 unrelated elements4 ,the two    

theories are absolutely opposed to each 
other1 and yet one and the same         
philosophical inference may be drawn    
from each2 namely1 that only the        
particular is real1 and that the        
universal 7or relations7 is an          
artificial product1 manufactured in one 
case by abstraction from the real       
individual1 in the other by compounding 
the real sensation4  ,the result is1    
that when he comes to a discussion of   
the extent of knowledge1 he admits      
knowledge of self1 of ,god1 and of      
things1 only by a denial of his very    
definition of knowledge1 while knowledge
 of other conceptions1 like those of    
mathematics1 is not knowledge of        
reality1 but only of ideas which we     
ourselves frame4 ,all knowledge1 that is
 to say1 is obtained only either by     
contradicting his own fundamental       
notion1 or by placing it in relations   
which are confessedly artificial and    
superinduced4 ,it is to this point that 
we come4  ,the proposition which is     

fundamental to the discussion is that we
 have knowledge only where we perceive  
the agreement or disagreement of ideas4 
,locke then takes up each of his four   
classes of connection1 in order to      
ascertain the extent of knowledge in it4
 ,our knowledge of identity and         
diversity extends as far as our ideas1  
because we intuitively perceive every   
idea to be what it is1 and different    
from any other4 ,locke afterwards       
states1 however1 that all purely        
identical propositions are trifling1    
that is1 they contain no instruction2   
they teach us nothing4 ,thus the first  
class of relations cannot be said to be 
of much avail4 ,if we consider the      
fourth kind of knowledge1 that of real  
existence1 we have an intuitive         
knowledge of self1 a demonstrative      
knowledge of ,god1 and a sensitive      
knowledge of other things4 ,but         
sensitive knowledge1 it must be noted1  
does not extend beyond the objects      
actually present to our senses4 ,it can 

hardly be said1 therefore1 to assure us 
of the existence of objects at all4 ,it 
only tells us what experiences are being
 at the time undergone4 ,furthermore1   
knowledge of all three 7,god1 self1 and 
matter71 since of real being1 and not of
 relations between ideas1 contradicts   
his definition of knowledge4 ,but       
perhaps we shall find knowledge more    
extended in the other classes4 ,and     
indeed ,locke tells us that knowledge of
 relations is the largest field of our  
knowledge4 ,it includes morals and      
mathematics2 but it is to be noticed    
that1 according to ,locke1 in both of   
these branches our demonstrations are   
not regarding facts1 but regarding      
either modes framed by ourselves1 or    
relations that are the creatures of our 
minds1--extraneous and superinduced upon
 the facts1 as he says4 ,he thus        
anticipates in substance1 though not in 
phraseology1 ,hume's distinction between
 matters of fact and connections of     
ideas1 in the latter of which we may    

have knowledge1 but not going beyond the
 combinations that we ourselves make4   
,this leaves one class1 that of         
co-existence1 to be examined4 ,here1 if 
anywhere1 must knowledge1 worthy of     
being termed scientific1 be found4 ,this
 class1 it will be remembered1          
comprehends our knowledge concerning    
substances4 ,but this extends1 according
 to ,locke1 a very little way4 ,the idea
 of a substance is a complex of various 
simple ideas united in one subject and  
co-existing together4 ,when we would    
know anything further concerning a      
substance1 we only inquire what other   
simple ideas1 besides those already     
united1 co-exist with them4 ,since there
 is no necessary connection1 however1   
among these simple ideas1 since each is1
 by its very simplicity1 essentially    
distinct from every other1 or1 as we    
have already learned1 since nothing is  
essential to an individual1 we can never
 be sure that any idea really co-exists 
with others4 ,or1 as ,locke says1 in    

physical matters we can go no further   
than particular experience informs us   
of4 4 4 4 ,we can have no certain       
knowledge of universal truths concerning
 natural bodies4 ,and again1 universal  
propositions of whose truth and         
falsehood we have certain knowledge     
concern not existence2 while1 on the    
other hand1 particular affirmations are 
only concerning existence1 declaring    
only the accidental union or separation 
of ideas in things existing4 ,this      
particular knowledge1 it must be        
recalled1 is1 in turn1 only sensitive1  
and thus extends not beyond the time    
when the sensation is had4  ,we are not 
surprised then at learning from ,locke  
that regarding bodies we are not capable
 of scientific knowledge4 ,natural      
philosophy is not capable of being made 
a science2 or1 as ,locke elsewhere      
states it1 knowledge regarding the      
nominal essence is trifling 7,kant's    
analytic judgment72 regarding the real  
essence is impossible4 ,for example1    

when we say that all gold is fusible1   
this means either simply that fusibility
 is one of the ideas which we combine to
 get the general idea of gold1 so that  
in making the given judgment we only    
expand our own notion2 or it means that 
the real substance gold is always       
fusible4 ,but this is a statement we    
have no right to make1 and for two      
reasons3 we do not know what the real   
substance gold is2 and even if we did1  
we should not know that fusibility      
always co-exists with it4 ,the summary  
of the whole matter is that general     
certainty is to be found only in our    
ideas4 ,whenever we go to seek it       
elsewhere1 in experiment or observations
 without us1 our knowledge goes not     
beyond particulars4  ,it has been       
necessary to give an account of ,locke's
 views at this length because it is in  
his discussion of the limitations and   
extent of knowledge that his theory     
culminates4 ,while not working out his  
sensationalism as consistently as did   

,hume1 he yet reduces knowledge to that 
of the existence of ,god and ourselves  
7whose natures1 however1 are unknown71  
and to a knowledge of mathematical and  
moral relations1 which1 however1        
concerns only the habitudes and         
relations of abstract ideas4 ,we have   
now to see by what means ,leibniz finds 
a wider sphere for certain and general  
knowledge by his theory of              
intellectualism than ,locke can by his  
sensationalism4  ,leibniz's theory of   
knowledge rests upon a distinction      
between truths of fact1 which are a     
posteriori and contingent1 and truths of
 reason1 which are a priori and         
necessary4 ,in discussing his views     
regarding experience1 we learned that1  
according to him1 all judgments which   
are empirical are also particular1 not  
allowing any inference beyond the given 
cases experienced4 ,experience gives    
only instances1 not principles4 ,if we  
postpone for the present the discussions
 of truths of reason1 by admitting that 

they may properly be said to be at once 
certain and universal1 the question     
arises how in matters of fact there can 
be any knowledge beyond that which      
,locke admits2 and the answer is1 that  
so far as the mere existence and        
occurrence of these facts is concerned1 
there is neither demonstrative nor      
general knowledge4 ,but the intelligence
 of man does not stop with the isolated 
fact2 it proceeds to inquire into its   
cause1 to ascertain its conditions1 and 
thus to see into1 not merely its actual 
existence1 but its possibility4 ,in     
,leibniz's language3 ,the real existence
 of things that are not necessary is a  
point of fact or history2 but the       
knowledge of possibilities or           
necessities 7the necessary being that   
whose opposite is not possible7         
constitutes demonstrative science4 ,in  
other words1 it is the principle of     
causality1 which makes us see a fact not
 as a mere fact1 but as a dependent     
consequence2 which elevates knowledge1  

otherwise contingent and particular1    
into the realm of the universal and     
apodictic4 ,underlying all accidental   
union is the real synthesis of          
causation4  ,if we follow the discussion
 as it centres about the terms nominal  
and real1 it stands as follows3 ,leibniz
 objects to the use of the term essence 
in this connection1 but is willing to   
accept that of definition2 for1 as he   
says1 a substance can have but one      
essence1 while there may be several     
definitions1 which1 however1 all express
 the same essence4 ,the essence is the  
possibility of that which is under      
consideration2 the definition is the    
statement of that which is supposed to  
be possible4 ,the nominal definition1   
however1 while it implies this          
possibility1 does not expressly affirm  
it1--that is to say1 it may always be   
doubted whether the nominal definition  
has any possibility 7or reality7        
corresponding to it until experience    
comes to our aid and makes us know it a 

posteriori4 ,a real definition1 on the  
other hand1 makes us know a priori the  
reality of the thing defined by showing 
us the mode of its production1 by       
exhibiting its cause or generation4     
,even our knowledge of facts of         
experience cannot be said1 therefore1 to
 be arbitrary1 for we do not combine    
ideas just as we please1 but our        
combinations may be justified by reason 
which shows them to be possible1 or by  
experience which shows them to be       
actual1 and consequently also possible4 
,to take ,locke's example about gold1   
the essence of gold is that which       
constitutes it and gives it its sensible
 qualities1 and these qualities1 so far 
as they enable us to recognize it1      
constitute its nominal essence1 while a 
real and causal definition would enable 
us to explain the contexture or internal
 disposition4 ,the nominal definition1  
however1 is also real in one sense1--not
 in itself1 indeed1 since it does not   
enable us to know a priori the          

possibility or production of the body1  
but empirically real4  ,it is evident   
from these quotations that what ,leibniz
 understands by possibility is the      
condition or cause of a given fact2 and 
that1 while ,locke distinguishes between
 particular1 accidental and             
demonstrative1 general knowledge as two 
opposed kinds1 concerned with two       
distinct and mutually exclusive spheres1
 with ,leibniz they are distinctions in 
the aspect of the same sphere of fact4  
,in reality there is no combination of  
qualities accidental1 as ,locke thought 
that by far the greater part were2 in   
every empirical fact there is a cause or
 condition involved that is invariable1 
and that constitutes the reason of the  
fact4 ,the accidental is only in the    
relation of our ideas to objects1 not in
 the objects themselves4 ,there may be  
accidental mental associations2 there   
are no accidental relations4 ,in        
empirical1 or a posteriori1 knowledge1  
so-called1 the reason is there1 but is  

not known4 ,a priori knowledge1 the real
 definition1 discovers and explicitly   
states this reason4 ,contingent         
knowledge is therefore potentially      
rational2 demonstrative knowledge is the
 actual development of the reasons      
implicitly contained in experience4  ,we
 may with advantage connect this        
discussion with the fundamental doctrine
 of ,locke and ,leibniz regarding       
intelligence and reality4 ,to ,locke1 as
 we have seen1 knowledge is essentially 
a matter of relations or connections2   
but relations are superinduced and      
extraneous as regards the facts4 ,every 
act of knowledge constitutes1 therefore1
 in some way a departure from the       
reality to be known4 ,knowledge and fact
 are1 by their very definition1 opposed 
to one another4 ,but in ,leibniz's view 
intelligence1 or reason1 enters into the
 constitution of reality2 indeed1 it is 
reality4 ,the relations which are the   
creatures of the understanding are1     
therefore1 not foreign to the material  

to be known1 but are organic to it1     
forming its content4 ,the process1 then1
 in which the mind perceives the        
connections or relations of ideas or    
objects1 is simply the process by which 
the mind comes to the consciousness of  
the real nature of these objects1 not a 
process of superinducing unreal ideas   
upon them4 ,the difficulty of ,locke is 
the difficulty of every theory of       
knowledge that does not admit an organic
 unity of the knowing mind and the known
 universe4 ,the theory is obliged to    
admit that all knowledge is in the form 
of relations which have their source in 
intelligence4 ,but being tied to the    
view that reality is distinct from      
intelligence1 it is obliged to draw the 
conclusion that these relations are not 
to be found in actual existence1 and    
hence that all knowledge1 whatever else 
it may be1 is unreal in the sense that  
it does not and cannot conform to actual
 fact4 ,but1 in the theory of ,leibniz1 
the process of relating which is the    

essence of knowledge is only the        
realization on the part of the          
individual mind of the relations or     
reasons that eternally constitute       
reality4 ,since reality is1 and is what 
it is1 through intelligence1 whatever   
relations intelligence rightly perceives
 are not extraneous to reality1 but are 
its essence4 ,as ,leibniz says1 ,truth  
consists in the relations between the   
objects of our ideas4 ,this does not    
depend upon language1 but is common to  
us with ,god1 so that when ,god         
manifests a truth to us1 we acquire what
 is already in his understanding4 ,for  
although there is an infinite difference
 between his ideas and ours as to their 
perfection and extent1 yet it is always 
true that as to the same relation they  
are identical4 ,and it is in this       
relation that truth exists4 ,to this may
 be added another statement1 which      
throws still further light on this      
point3 ,ideas are eternally in ,god1 and
 are in us before we perceive them4  ,we

 have now to consider somewhat more in  
detail the means by which the           
transformation of empirical into        
rational knowledge is carried on4       
,leibniz points out that the difficulty 
concerning scientific knowledge of      
sensible facts is not lack of data1 but1
 in a certain sense1 superfluity of     
data4 ,it is not that we perceive no    
connections among objects1 but that we  
perceive many which we cannot reduce to 
one another4 ,our experiences1 says     
,leibniz1 are simple only in appearance1
 for they are always accompanied by     
circumstances connected with them1      
although these relations are not        
understood by us4 ,these circumstances  
furnish material capable of explanation 
and analysis4 ,there is thus a sort of  
pleonasm in our perceptions of sensible 
objects and qualities1 since we have    
more than one idea of the same object4  
,gold can be nominally defined in many  
ways4 ,such definitions are only        
provisional4 ,this is to say1 empirical 

knowledge will become rational when it  
is possible to view any subject-matter  
as a unity1 instead of a multiplicity of
 varied aspects4 ,and on this same      
subject he says1 in another connection3 
,a great number of experiences can      
furnish us data more than sufficient for
 scientific knowledge1 provided only we 
have the art of using these data4 ,the  
aim of science is therefore1 to discover
 the dynamic unity which makes a whole  
of what appears to be a mere mass of    
accidentally connected circumstances4   
,this unity of relations is the         
individual4  ,it is thus evident that to
 ,leibniz the individual is not the     
beginning of knowledge1 but its goal4   
,the individual is the organic1 the     
dynamic unity of the variety of phases  
or notions presented us in              
sense-experience4 ,individuality is not 
simplicity in the sense of ,locke2 that 
is1 separation from all relations4 ,it  
is complete connection of all relations4
 ,it is impossible for us to have       

complete knowledge of individuals1 and  
to find the means of determining exactly
 the individuality of anything2 for in  
individuality all circumstances are     
combined4 ,individuality envelops the   
infinite4 ,only so far as we know the   
infinite do we know the individual1 on  
account of the influence 7if this word  
be correctly understood7 that all things
 in the universe exercise upon one      
another4 ,leibniz1 in short1 remains    
true to his conception of the monad as  
the ultimate reality2 for the monad1    
though an individual1 yet has the       
universe as its content4 ,we shall be   
able1 therefore1 to render our sensible 
experiences rational just in the degree 
in which we can discover the underlying 
relations and dependencies which make   
them members of one individual4  ,for   
the process of transformation ,leibniz  
relies especially upon two              
methods1--those of mathematics and of   
classification4 ,of the former he here  
says but little2 but the entire progress

 of physical science since the time of  
,leibniz has been the justification of  
that little4 ,in the passage already    
quoted regarding the need of method for 
using our sensible data1 he goes on to  
say that the infinitesimal analysis has 
given us the means of allying physics   
and geometry1 and that dynamics has     
furnished us with the key to the general
 laws of nature4 ,it is certainly       
competent testimony to the truth of     
,leibniz's fundamental principles that  
he foresaw also the course which the    
development of biological science would 
take4 ,no classification based upon     
resemblances1 says ,leibniz in effect1  
can be regarded as wholly arbitrary1    
since resemblances are found in nature  
also4 ,the only question is whether our 
classification is based upon superficial
 or fundamental identities2 the         
superficial resemblances being such as  
are external1 or the effects of some    
common cause1 while the fundamental     
resemblances are such as are the cause  

of whatever other similarities are      
found4 ,it can be said that whatever we 
compare or distinguish with truth1      
nature differentiates1 or makes agree1  
also2 but that nature has differences   
and identities which are better than    
ours1 which we do not know4 4 4 4 ,the  
more we discover the generation of      
species1 and the more we follow in our  
classifications the conditions that are 
required for their production1 the      
nearer we approach the natural order4   
,our classifications1 then1 so far as   
they depend upon what is conditioned1   
are imperfect and provisional1 although 
they cannot be said to be false 7since  
while nature may give us those more     
complete and convenient1 it will not    
give the lie to those we have already72 
while so far as they rest upon what is  
causal and conditioning1 they are true1 
general1 and necessary4 ,in thus        
insisting that classification should be 
genetic1 ,leibniz anticipated the great 
service which the theory of evolution   

has done for biological science in      
enabling science to form classes which  
are natural2 that is1 based on identity 
of origin4  ,leibniz culminates his     
discussion of classification as a method
 of translating the empirical into the  
rational1 by pointing out that it rests 
upon the law of continuity2 and that    
this law contains two factors1--one     
equivalent to the axiom of the          
,realists1 that nature is nowhere empty2
 the other1 to that of the ,nominalists1
 that nature does nothing uselessly4    
,one of these principles seems to make  
nature a prodigal1 the other a miser2   
and yet both are true if properly       
understood1 says ,leibniz4 ,nature is   
like a good manager1 sparing where it is
 necessary1 in order to be magnificent4 
,it is magnificent in its effects1 and  
economical in the causes used to produce
 them4 ,in other words1 classification  
becomes science when it presents us with
 both unity and difference4 ,the        
principle of unity is that of nature as 

a miser and economical2 that of         
differentiation is the principle of     
nature as prodigal and magnificent4 ,the
 thoroughly differentiated unity is     
nature as self-specifying1 or as an     
organic1 not an abstract1 unity4  ,the  
gist of the whole matter is1 then1 that 
experience presents us with an infinity 
of ideas1 which may appear at first     
sight arbitrary and accidental in their 
connections4 ,this appearance1 however1 
is not the fact4 ,these ideas are the   
effects of certain causes2 and in       
ascertaining these conditions1 we reduce
 the apparently unrelated variety of    
experiences to underlying unities1 and  
these unities1 like all real unities or 
simple beings1 are spiritual and        
rational in nature4 ,leibniz's ordinary 
way of stating this is that the         
principle of truths of fact is that of  
sufficient reason4 ,this principle      
,leibniz always treats as distinguished 
from that of identity 7and              
contradiction7 as the ruling category of

 truths of reason4 ,and we shall follow 
him in discussing the two together4     
,our reasonings are based on two leading
 principles1--that of contradiction1 in 
virtue of which we judge false all which
 contains contradiction1 and true that  
which is opposed or contradictory to    
that which is false2 and that of        
sufficient reason1 in virtue of which we
 judge that no fact is true or actual1  
no proposition veritable1 unless there  
is a sufficient reason why it is as it  
is1 and not otherwise1 although these   
reasons are generally unknown to us4    
,thus there are two sorts of            
truths1--those of reason1 and those of  
fact4 ,the truths of reason are         
necessary1 and their opposites          
impossible2 while those of fact are     
contingent1 and their opposites         
possible4 ,when a truth is necessary1   
its reason can be discovered by         
analysis1 resolving it into ideas and   
truths that are simpler1 until the      
primitive truths are arrived at4 ,it is 

thus that the mathematicians proceed in 
reducing by analysis the theorems of    
speculation and the canons of practice  
into definitions1 axioms1 and           
postulates4 ,thus they come to simple   
ideas whose definition cannot be given2 
primitive truths that cannot be proved1 
and which do not need it1 since they are
 identical propositions1 whose opposite 
contains a manifest contradiction4  ,but
 in contingent truths--those of         
fact--the sufficient reason must be     
found2 namely1 in the succession of     
things which fill the created           
universe1--for otherwise the analysis   
into particular reasons would go into   
detail without limit1 by reason of the  
immense variety of natural things1 and  
of the infinite divisibility of bodies4 
,there are an infinity of figures and of
 past and present movements which enter 
into the efficient cause of my present  
writing1 and there are an infinity of   
minute inclinations and dispositions of 
my soul which enter into its final      

cause4 ,and since all this detail       
contains only other contingent and      
particular antecedents1 each of which   
has need of a similar analysis to       
account for it1 we really make no       
progress by this analysis2 and it is    
necessary that the final or sufficient  
reason be outside the endless succession
 or series of contingent particulars1   
that it consist in a necessary being1 in
 which this series of changes is        
contained only eminenter1 as in its     
source4 ,this necessary being and source
 is what we call ,god4  ,in other words1
 the tracing of empirical facts to their
 causes and conditions does not1 after  
all1 render them wholly rational4 ,the  
series of causes is endless4 ,every     
condition is in turn conditioned4 ,we   
are not so much solving the problem of  
the reason of a given fact1 as we are   
stating the problem in other terms as we
 go on in this series4 ,every solution  
offers itself again as a problem1 and   
this endlessly4 ,if these truths of     

fact1 then1 are to be rendered wholly   
rational1 it must be in something which 
lies outside of the series considered as
 a series2 that is1 something which is  
not an antecedent of any one of the     
series1 but is equally related to each  
and to all as their ground and source4  
,this1 considered as an argument for the
 existence of ,god1 we shall deal with  
hereafter2 now we are concerned only    
with its bearing upon the relation of   
experience to the universality and      
necessity of knowledge4 ,according to   
this1 the ultimate meaning of facts is  
found in their relation to the divine   
intelligence2 for ,leibniz is emphatic  
in insisting that the relation of ,god  
to experience is not one of bare will to
 creatures produced by this will 7as    
,descartes had supposed71 but of a will 
governed wholly by ,intelligence4 ,as   
,leibniz states it in another           
connection1 not only matters of fact1   
but mathematical truths1 have the same  
final basis in the divine understanding4

  ,such truths1 strictly speaking1 are  
only conditional1 and say that in case  
their subject existed they would be     
found such and such4 ,but if it is again
 asked in what consists this conditional
 connection in which there is necessary 
reality1 the reply is that it is in the 
relation of ideas4 ,and by the further  
question1 ,where would be the ideas if  
no spirit existed2 and what would then  
become of the foundation of the         
certainty of such truths8--we are       
brought to the final foundation of      
truths2 namely1 that supreme and        
universal spirit1 which must exist1 and 
whose understanding is1 in reality1 the 
region of the eternal truths4 ,and in   
order that it may not be thought that it
 is not necessary to have recourse to   
this region1 we must consider that these
 necessary truths contain the           
determining reason and regulative       
principle of existence1 and1 in a word1 
of the laws of the universe4 ,thus these
 necessary truths1 being anterior to the

 existences of contingent beings1 must  
in turn be based upon the existence of a
 necessary substance4  ,it is because   
facts are not mere facts1 in short1 but 
are the manifestation of a determining  
reason and regulative principle which   
finds its home in universal             
intelligence1 that knowledge of them can
 become necessary and general4  ,the    
general nature of truths of reason and  
of their ruling principle1 identity and 
contradiction1 has already been given in
 the quotation regarding the principle  
of sufficient reason4 ,it is ,leibniz's 
contention that only in truths whose    
opposite is seen to involve             
self-contradiction can we have absolute 
certainty1 and that it is through       
connection with such eternal truths that
 the certainty of our other knowledge   
rests4 ,it is thus evident why ,leibniz 
insists1 as against ,locke1 upon the    
great importance of axioms and maxims4  
,they are important1 not merely in      
themselves1 but as the sole and         

indispensable bases of scientific truth 
regarding all matters4 ,leibniz at      
times1 it is true1 speaks as if         
demonstrative and contingent truths were
 of themselves1 in principle1 distinct1 
and even opposed4 ,but he also corrects 
himself by showing that contingency is  
rather a subjective limitation than an  
objective quality4 ,we1 indeed1 do not  
see that the truth ,i exist1 for        
example1 is necessary1 because we cannot
 see how its opposite involves          
contradiction4 ,but ,god sees how the   
two terms ',i' and 'exist' are          
connected2 that is1 why ,i exist4 ,so   
far as we can see facts1 then1 from the 
standpoint of the divine intelligence1  
so far1 it would appear1 our knowledge  
is necessary4  ,since these axioms1     
maxims1 or first truths are innate1 we  
are in a condition to complete 7for the 
first time7 the discussion of innate    
ideas4 ,these ideas constitute1 as we   
have learned1 the essential content of  
the divine intelligence1 and of ours so 

far as we have realized our identity    
with ,god's understanding4 ,the highest 
form of knowledge1 therefore1 is        
self-consciousness4 ,this bears the same
 relation to necessary truths that the  
latter bear to experience4 ,knowledge of
 necessary and eternal truths1 says     
,leibniz1 distinguishes us from simple  
animals1 and makes us have reason and   
science1 elevating us to the knowledge  
of ourselves4 ,we are thus developed to 
self-consciousness2 and in being        
conscious of ourselves we are conscious 
of being1 of substance1 of the simple1  
of the spiritual1 of ,god4 ,and again he
 says that those that know necessary    
truths are rational spirits1 capable of 
self-consciousness1 of recognizing what 
is termed ,ego1 substance1 and monad4   
,thus they are rendered capable of      
demonstrative knowledge4 ,we are innate 
to ourselves2 and since we are beings1  
being is innate to us1 for knowledge of 
it is implicit in that which we have of 
ourselves4  ,knowledge1 in fine1 may be 

regarded as an ascending series of four 
terms4 ,the first is constituted by     
sensations associated together in such a
 way that a relation of antecedence and 
consequence exists between them4 ,this  
is experience4 ,the second stage comes  
into existence when we connect these    
experiences1 not by mere relations of   
consecution1 but by their conditions1 by
 the principle of causality1 and        
especially by that of sufficient reason1
 which connects them with the supreme   
intelligence1 ,god4 ,this stage is      
science4 ,the third is knowledge of the 
axioms and necessary truths in and of   
themselves1 not merely as involved in   
science4 ,the fourth is                 
self-consciousness1 the knowledge of    
intelligence1 in its intimate and       
universal nature1 by which we know ,god1
 the mind1 and all real substance4 ,in  
the order of time the stage of          
experience is first1 and that of        
self-consciousness last4 ,but in the    
lowest stage there are involved the     

others4 ,the progress of knowledge      
consists in the development or unfolding
 of this implicit content1 till         
intelligence1 spirit1 activity1 is      
clearly revealed as the source and      
condition of all4     ,,chapter ,,xi4   
,,the ,,theology ,,of ,,leibniz4   ,one 
of the chapters concerning knowledge is 
entitled1 ,the ,knowledge that we have  
of ,god4 ,this introduces us to the     
theology of ,leibniz and indirectly to  
the completion of those ethical         
doctrines already outlined in the       
chapter on will4 ,leibniz employs three 
arguments to prove the existence of     
,god3 that of ,god as the sufficient    
reason of the world 7substantially the  
cosmological proof72 of ,god as the     
source of the pre-established harmony   
7an extension of the teleological       
proof72 and the ontological4 ,the latter
 he accepts as it came from the hands of
 ,descartes1 but insists that it        
requires an added argument before it    
ranks as anything more than presumptive 

proof4 ,the ,anselmic-,cartesian        
argument1 as stated by ,leibniz1 is as  
follows3 ,god is defined as the         
greatest1 or most perfect1 of beings1 or
 as a being of supreme grandeur and     
perfection4 ,but in the notion of a     
perfect being1 existence must be        
included1 since it is something more to 
exist than not to exist4 ,or existence  
is a perfection1 and hence must belong  
to the most perfect being2 otherwise    
some perfection would be lacking1 which 
is contrary to the definition4 ,or as   
,descartes sometimes puts it1 in the    
notion of anything like a tree1 a       
mountain1 a triangle1 contingency is    
contained4 ,we may conceive such an     
object to exist or not1 as we like4     
,there is no necessity involved in our  
thought4 ,but we cannot think of a      
perfect being except as existing4 ,it   
does not rest with the decision of our  
thinking whether or not to include      
existence in this notion4 ,we must      
necessarily think existence as soon as  

we think such a being4  ,leibniz takes a
 middle position1 he says1 between those
 who consider this a demonstrative      
argument1 and those who regard it as a  
mere paralogism4 ,it is pre-supposed by 
this argument that the notion of a      
,supreme ,being is possible1 or that it 
does not involve contradiction4 ,this   
pre-supposition is to be proved4 ,first1
 it is well to simplify the argument    
itself4 ,the ,cartesian definition may  
be reduced to this3 ,god is a being in  
whom existence and essence are one4     
,from this definition it follows as a   
corollary that such a being1 if         
possible1 exists4 ,for the essence of a 
thing being just that which constitutes 
its possibility1 it is evident that to  
exist by its essence is the same as to  
exist by its possibility4 ,being in     
itself1 then1 or ,god1 may be most      
simply defined as the ,being who must   
exist if he is possible4  ,there are two
 ways of proving this last clause       
7namely1 that he is possible7 the direct

 and the indirect4 ,the indirect is     
employed against those who assert that  
from mere notions1 ideas1 definitions or
 possible essences1 it is not possible  
to infer actual existence4 ,such persons
 simply deny the possibility of being in
 itself4 ,but if being-in-itself1 or    
absolute being1 is impossible1          
being-by-another1 or relative1 is also  
impossible2 for there is no other upon  
which it may depend4 ,nothing1 in this  
case1 could exist4 ,or if necessary     
being is not possible1 there is no being
 possible4 ,put in another way1 ,god is 
as necessary for possibility as for     
actual existence4 ,if there is          
possibility of anything1 there is ,god4 
,this leads up to the direct proof2 for 
it follows that1 if there be a          
possibility of ,god1--the ,being in whom
 existence and essence are one1--he     
exists4 ,god alone has such a position  
that existence is necessary1 if         
possible4 ,but since there can be       
nothing opposed to the possibility of a 

being without limit1--a being therefore 
without negations and without           
contradiction1--this is sufficient to   
prove a priori the existence of ,god4   
,in short1 ,god being pure affirmation1 
pure self-identity1 the idea of his     
,being cannot include contradiction1 and
 hence is possible1--and since possible1
 necessary4 ,of this conception of ,god 
as the purely self-identical1 without   
negation1 we shall have something to say
 in the next chapter4  ,the cosmological
 proof is1 as we have already seen1 that
 every cause in the world being at the  
same time an effect1 it cannot be the   
sufficient reason of anything4 ,the     
whole series is contingent1 and requires
 a ground not prior to1 but beyond1 the 
series4 ,the only sufficient reason of  
anything is that which is also the      
sufficient reason of itself1--absolute  
being4 ,the teleological argument       
,leibniz invariably1 ,i believe1        
presents in connection with the idea of 
pre-established harmony4 ,if the        

substances of experience1 runs the      
argument1 had not received their being1 
both active and passive1 from one       
universal supreme cause1 they would be  
independent of one another1 and hence   
would not exhibit that order1 harmony1  
and beauty which we notice in nature4   
,this argument possesses only moral     
certainty which becomes demonstrative by
 the new kind of harmony which ,i have  
introduced1--pre-established harmony4   
,since each substance expresses in its  
own way that which occurs beyond it1 and
 can have no influence on other         
particular beings1 it is necessary that 
each substance1 before developing these 
phenomena from the depth of its own     
being1 must have received this nature   
7this internal ground of external       
phenomena7 from a universal cause from  
whom all beings depend1 and which       
effects that one be perfectly in accord 
with and corresponding to every other4  
,this cannot occur except through a     
being of infinite knowledge and power4  

,having determined the existence of     
,god1 ,leibniz states his attributes4   
,these may be reduced to three4 ,he is  
perfect in power1 in wisdom1 and in     
goodness4 ,perfection is nothing other  
than the whole of positive reality      
separated from the limits and bounds of 
things4 ,where there are no limits1 as  
in ,god1 perfection is absolutely       
infinite4 ,in ,god exists power1 which  
is the source of all knowledge1--which  
comprehends the realm of ideas1 down to 
its minutest detail1--and will1 which   
directs all creations and changes       
according to the principle of the best4 
,or as he expands it at another time3   
,the supreme cause must be intelligent1 
for the existing world being contingent1
 and an infinity of other worlds being  
equally possible1 it is necessary that  
the cause of the world take into        
consideration all these possible worlds 
in order to decide upon one4 ,now this  
relation of a substance to simple ideas 
must be the relation of understanding to

 its ideas1 while deciding upon one is  
the act of will in choosing4 ,finally it
 is the power of this substance which   
executes the volition4 ,power has its   
end in being2 wisdom1 or understanding1 
in truth2 and will in good4 ,thus the   
cause must be absolutely perfect in     
power1 wisdom1 and goodness4 ,his       
understanding is the source of essences1
 and his will the origin of existences4 
,this brings us to the relation of ,god 
to the world1 or to an account of the   
creating activity of ,god4 ,this may be 
considered to be metaphysically1        
logically1 or morally necessary4 ,to say
 that it is metaphysically necessary is 
to say that it is the result of the     
divine essence1 that it would imply a   
contradiction of the very being of ,god 
for the world not to be and not to be as
 it is4 ,in short1 the world becomes a  
mere emanation of power1 since1 as we   
have just learned1 power and being are  
correlative4 ,but this leaves out of    
account the divine understanding4 ,not  

all possible worlds emanate from ,god's 
being1 but there is recognition of them 
and of their relations to one another4  
,were the world to proceed from the     
divine understanding alone1 however1 it 
would be logically necessary1--that is1 
it would bear the same relation to his  
understanding that necessary truths do4 
,its opposite would imply contradiction1
 not indeed of the being of ,god1 but of
 his understanding4 ,but the will of    
,god plays the all-important part of    
choosing among the alternative worlds   
presented by reason1 each of which is   
logically possible4 ,one of these       
worlds1 although standing on the same   
intellectual plane as the others1 is    
morally better1--that is1 it involves   
greater happiness and perfection to the 
creatures constituting it4 ,god is      
guided then by the idea of the better   
7and this is the best possible7 world4  
,his will is not arbitrary in creating3 
it does not work by a fiat of brute     
power4 ,but neither is it fatalistic3 it

 does not work by compulsory necessity4 
,it is both free and necessary2 free1   
for it is guided by naught excepting    
,god's own recognition of an end2       
necessary1 for ,god1 being ,god1 cannot 
morally act otherwise than by the       
principle of the better1--and this in   
contingent matters is the best4 ,hence  
the optimism of ,leibniz1 to which here 
no further allusion can be made4  ,since
 the best is precisely ,god himself1 it 
is evident that the created world will  
have1 as far as possible1 his           
perfections4 ,it would thus be possible 
to deduce from this conception of ,god  
and his relation to the world all those 
characteristics of the ,leibnizian      
monadology which we formerly arrived at 
analytically4 ,god is individual1 but   
with an infinite comprehensiveness4     
,each substance repeats these properties
 of the supreme substance4 ,there is an 
infinity of such substances1 in order   
that the world may as perfectly as      
possible mirror the infinity of ,god4   

,each1 so far as in it lies1 reflects   
the activity of ,god2 for activity is   
the very essence of perfection4 ,and    
thus we might go through with the entire
 list of the properties of the monad4   
,to complete the present discussion1    
however1 it is enough to notice that    
intelligence and will must be found in  
every creature1 and that thus we account
 for the appetition and the perception  
that characterize even the lowest monad4
 ,the scale of monads1 however1 would   
not be as complete as possible unless   
there were beings in whom appetition    
became volition1 and perception1        
self-conscious intelligence4 ,such      
monads will stand in quite other        
relation to ,god than the blind         
impulse-governed substances4 ,spirits1  
says ,leibniz1 are capable of entering  
into community with ,god1 and ,god is   
related to them not only as an inventor 
to his machine 7as he is to other       
creatures7 but as a prince to his       
subjects1 or1 better1 as a father to his

 children4 ,this society of spirits     
constitutes the city of ,god1--the most 
perfect state under the most perfect    
monarch4 ,this city of ,god1 this truly 
cosmopolitan monarchy1 is a moral world 
within the natural4 ,among all the works
 of ,god it is the most sublime and     
divine4 ,in it consists the true glory  
of ,god1 for there would be no glory of 
,god unless his greatness and goodness  
were known and admired by spirits2 and  
in his relation to this society1 ,god   
for the first time reveals his goodness1
 while he manifests everywhere his power
 and wisdom4 ,and as previously we      
demonstrated a perfect harmony between  
the two realms of nature1--those of     
efficient and final causes1--so must we 
here declare harmony between the        
physical realm of nature and the moral  
realm of grace1--that is1 between ,god  
as the architect of the mechanical      
world-structure1 and ,god as the monarch
 of the world of spirits4 ,god fulfils  
his creation1 in other words1 in a realm

 of spirits1 and fulfils it because here
 there are beings who do not merely     
reflect him but who enter into relations
 of companionship with him1 forming a   
community4 ,this community of spirits   
with one another and with ,god is the   
moral world1 and we are thus brought    
again to the ethics of ,leibniz4  ,it   
has been frequently pointed out that    
,leibniz was the first to give ethics   
the form which it has since kept in     
,german philosophy1--the division into  
,natur-recht and ,natur-moral4 ,these   
terms are difficult to give in ,english1
 but the latter corresponds to what is  
ordinarily called moral philosophy1     
while the former is political philosophy
 so far as that has an ethical bearing4 
,or the latter may be said to treat of  
the moral ideal and of the moral motive 
and of duty in themselves1 while the    
former deals with the social1 the       
public1 and in a certain sense the      
external1 aspects of morality4          
,puffendorf undoubtedly suggested this  

division to ,leibniz by his             
classification of duties as external and
 internal1--the first comprehending     
natural and civil law1 the second moral 
theology4 ,but ,puffendorf confined the 
former to purely external acts1         
excluding motives and intentions1 and   
the latter to divine revelation4 ,both  
are positive1 and in some sort          
arbitrary1--one resting merely on the   
fact that certain institutions obtain1  
the other on the fact that ,god has made
 certain declarations4 ,to ,leibniz1 on 
the other hand1 the will of ,god is in  
no sense the source of moral truths4    
,the will of ,god does not create truth1
 but carries into effect the eternal    
truths of the divine understanding4     
,moral truths are like those of         
mathematics4 ,and again1 there is no    
such thing as purely external morality3 
it always contains an inner content1 of 
which the external act is only the      
manifestation4 ,leibniz may thus be said
 to have made two discoveries1 or rather

 re-discoveries3 one1 that there is a   
science of morals1 independent of law1  
custom1 and positive right2 the other1  
that the basis of both natural and      
positive morals is not the mere will of 
,god1 but is reason with its content of 
eternal truths4  ,in morals the end is  
happiness1 the means wisdom4 ,happiness 
is defined1 not as an occurrence1 but as
 a condition1 or state of being4 ,it is 
the condition of permanent joy4 ,this   
does not mean that the joy is actually  
felt every moment1 but that one is in   
the condition to enjoy whenever he      
thinks of it1 and that1 in the interval1
 joyfulness arises from his activity and
 being4 ,pleasure1 however1 is not a    
state1 but a feeling4 ,it is the feeling
 of perfection1 whether in ourselves or 
in anything else4 ,it does not follow   
that we perceive intellectually either  
in what the perfection of the pleasant  
thing consists or in what way it        
develops perfection within us4 ,it is   
enough that it be realized in feeling1  

so as to give us pleasure4 ,perfection  
is defined as increase of being4 ,as    
sickness is1 as it were1 a lowering and 
a falling off from health1 so perfection
 is something which mounts above health4
 ,it manifests itself in power to act2  
for all substance consists in a certain 
power1 and the greater the power the    
higher and freer the substance4 ,but    
power increases in the degree that the  
many manifests itself from one and in   
one1 while the one rules many from      
itself and transforms them into self4   
,but unity in plurality is nothing else 
than harmony2 and from this comes order 
or proportion1 from which proceeds      
beauty1 and beauty awakens love4 ,thus  
it becomes evident how happiness1       
pleasure1 love1 perfection1 substance1  
power1 freedom1 harmony1 proportion1 and
 beauty are bound up in one another4    
,from this condensed sketch1 taken from 
,leibniz himself1 the main features of  
his ethical doctrine clearly appear4    
,when we were studying freedom we saw   

that it was not so much a starting-point
 of the will as its goal and ideal4 ,we 
saw also that true freedom is dependent 
upon knowledge1 upon recognition of the 
eternal and universal4 ,what we have    
here is a statement of that doctrine in 
terms of feeling and of will instead of 
knowledge4 ,the end of man is stated to 
be happiness1 but the notion of         
happiness is developed in such a way    
that it is seen to be equivalent to the 
,aristotelian notion of                 
self-realization2 it is development of  
substance1 and substance is activity4   
,it is the union of one and the many2   
and the one1 according to the invariable
 doctrine of ,leibniz1 is the spiritual 
element1 and the many is the real       
content which gives meaning to this     
rational unity4 ,happiness thus means   
perfection1 and perfection a completely 
universalized individual4 ,the motive   
toward the moral life is elsewhere      
stated to be love2 and love is defined  
as interest in perfection1 and hence    

culminates in love of ,god1 the only    
absolute perfection4 ,it also has its   
source in ,god1 as the origin of        
perfection2 so that ,leibniz says1      
,whoso loves ,god1 loves all4  ,natural 
right1 as distinguished from morals1 is 
based upon the notion of justice1 this  
being the outward manifestation of      
wisdom1 or knowledge1--appreciation of  
the relation of actions to happiness4   
,the definitions given by ,leibniz are  
as follows3 ,just and unjust are what   
are useful or harmful to the            
public1--that is1 to the community of   
spirits4 ,this community includes first 
,god1 then humanity1 then the state4    
,these are so subordinated that1 in     
cases of collision of duty1 ,god1 the   
universe of relations1 comes before the 
profit of humanity1 and this before the 
state4 ,at another time ,leibniz defines
 justice as social virtue1 and says that
 there are as many kinds of right as    
there are kinds of natural communities  
in which happiness is an end of action4 

,a natural community is defined as one  
which rests upon desire and the power of
 satisfying it1 and includes three      
varieties1--domestic1 civil1 and        
ecclesiastic4 ,right is defined as that 
which sustains and develops any natural 
community4 ,it is1 in other words1 the  
will for happiness united with insight  
into what makes happiness4              
,corresponding to the three forms of the
 social organism 7as we should now call 
the natural community71 are the three   
kinds of jus1--jus strictum1 equity1 and
 piety4 ,each of these has its          
corresponding prescript4 ,that of jus   
strictum is to injure no one2 of equity1
 to render to each his own2 and of      
piety1 to make the ethical law the law  
of conduct4 ,jus strictum includes the  
right of war and peace4 ,the right of   
peace exists between individuals till   
one breaks it4 ,the right of war exists 
between men and things4 ,the victory of 
person over thing is property4 ,things  
thus come to possess the right of the   

person to whom they belong as against   
every other person2 that is1 in the     
right of the person to himself as       
against the attacks of another 7the     
right to peace7 is included a right to  
his property4 ,jus strictum is1 of      
course1 in all cases1 enforceable by    
civil law and the compulsory force which
 accompanies it4 ,equity1 however1      
reaches beyond this to obligation in    
cases where there is no right of        
compulsion4 ,its law is1 ,be of aid to  
all1 but to each according to his merits
 and his claims4 ,finally comes piety4  
,the other two stages are limited4 ,the 
lowest is negative1 it wards off harm2  
the second aims after happiness1 but    
only within the limits of earthly       
existence4 ,that we should ourselves    
bear misery1 even the greatest1 for the 
sake of others1 and should subject the  
whole of this existence to something    
higher1 cannot be proved excepting as we
 regard the society1 or community1 of   
our spirits with ,god4 ,justice with    

relation to ,god comprehends all        
virtues4 ,everything that is1 is from   
,god2 and hence the law of all conduct  
is to use everything according to its   
place in the idea of ,god1 according to 
its function in the universal harmony4  
,it thus not only complements the other 
two kinds of justice but is the source  
of their inner ethical worth4 ,strict   
justice may conflict with equity4 ,but  
,god effects that what is of use to the 
public well-being--that is1 to the      
universe and to humanity--shall be of   
use also to the individual4 ,thus from  
the standpoint of ,god the moral is     
advantageous1 and the immoral hurtful4  
,kant's indebtedness to ,leibniz will at
 once appear to one initiated into the  
philosophy of the former4  ,leibniz     
never worked out either his ethics or   
his political philosophy in detail2 but 
it is evident that they both take their 
origin and find their scope in the fact 
of man's relationship to ,god1 that they
 are both1 in fact1 accounts of the     

methods of realizing a universal but not
 a merely formal harmony4 ,for harmony  
is not1 with ,leibniz1 an external      
arrangement1 but is the very soul of    
being4 ,perfect harmony1 or adaptation  
to the universe of relations1 is the end
 of the individual1 and man is informed 
of his progress toward this end by an   
inner sentiment of pleasure4  ,it may be
 added that ,leibniz's sthetic theory1  
so far as developed1 rests upon the same
 basis as his ethical1--namely1 upon    
membership in the city of ,god1 or      
community of spiritual beings4 ,this is 
implied1 indeed1 in a passage already   
quoted1 where he states the close       
connection of beauty with harmony and   
perfection4 ,the feeling of beauty is   
the recognition in feeling of an order1 
proportion1 and harmony which are not   
yet intellectually descried4 ,leibniz   
illustrates by music1 the dance1 and    
architecture4 ,this feeling of the      
harmonious also becomes an impulse to   
produce4 ,as perception of beauty may be

 regarded as unexplained1 or confused1  
perception of truth1 so creation of     
beauty may be considered as undeveloped 
will4 ,it is action on its way to       
perfect freedom1 for freedom is simply  
activity with explicit recognition of   
harmony4  ,we cannot do better than     
quote the conclusion of the matter from 
,leibniz's ,principles of ,nature and of
 ,grace1 although1 in part1 it repeats  
what we have already learned4 ,there is 
something more in the rational soul1 or 
spirit1 than there is in the monad or   
even in the simple soul4 ,spirit is not 
only a mirror of the universe of        
creatures1 but is also an image of the  
divine being4 ,spirit not only has a    
perception of the works of ,god1 but is 
also capable of producing something     
which resembles them1 though on a small 
scale4 ,to say nothing of dreams1 in    
which we invent without trouble and     
without volition things upon which we   
must reflect a long time in order to    
discover in our waking state1--to say   

nothing of this1 our soul is            
architectonic in voluntary actions2 and1
 in discovering the sciences in         
accordance with which ,god has regulated
 all things 7pondere1 mensura1 numero71 
it imitates in its department and in its
 own world of activity that which ,god  
does in the macrocosm4 ,this is the     
reason why spirits1 entering through    
reason and eternal truths into a kind of
 society with ,god1 are members of the  
city of ,god1--that is1 of the most     
perfect state1 formed and governed by   
the best of monarchs1 in which there is 
no crime without punishment1 and no good
 action without reward1 and where there 
is as much of virtue and of happiness as
 may possibly exist4 ,and this occurs   
not through a disturbance of nature1 as 
if ,god's dealing with souls were in    
violation of mechanical laws1 but by the
 very order of natural things1 on       
account of the eternal1 pre-established 
harmony between the kingdoms of nature  
and grace1 between ,god as monarch and  

,god as architect1 since nature leads up
 to grace1 and grace makes nature       
perfect in making use of it4  ,no better
 sentences could be found with which to 
conclude this analysis of ,leibniz4     
,they resound not only with the grandeur
 and wide scope characteristic of his   
thought1 but they contain his essential 
idea1 his pre-eminent note1--that of the
 harmony of the natural and the         
supernatural1 the mechanical and the    
organic4 ,the mechanical is to ,leibniz 
what the word signifies2 it is the      
instrumental1 and this in the full      
meaning of the term4 ,nature is         
instrumental in that it performs a      
function1 realizes a purpose1 and       
instrumental in the sense that without  
it spirit1 the organic1 is an empty     
dream4 ,the spiritual1 on the other     
hand1 is the meaning1 the idea of       
nature4 ,it perfects it1 in that it     
makes it instrumental to itself1 and    
thus renders it not the passive panorama
 of mere material force1 but the        

manifestation of living spirit4         
,,chapter ,,xii4  ,,criticism ,,and     
,,conclusion4   ,in the exposition now  
completed we have in general taken for  
granted the truth and coherency of      
,leibniz's fundamental ideas1 and have  
contented ourselves with an account of  
the principles and notions that flow    
from these ideas4 ,the time has come for
 retracing our steps1 and for inquiring 
whether the assumed premises can be thus
 unquestioningly adopted4 ,this final   
chapter1 therefore1 we shall devote to  
criticism of the basis of ,leibniz's    
philosophy1 not attempting to test it by
 a comparison with other systems1 but by
 inquiring into its internal coherency1 
and by a brief account of the ways in   
which his successors1 or at least one of
 them1 endeavored to make right the     
points in which he appeared to fail4    
,the fundamental contradiction in       
,leibniz is to be found1 ,i believe1    
between the method which he             
adopted--without inquiry into its       

validity and scope--and the             
subject-matter1 or perhaps better the   
attitude1 to which he attempted to apply
 this method2 between1 that is to say1  
the scholastic formal logic on the one  
hand and the idea of inter-relation     
derived from the development of         
scientific thought1 on the other4       
,leibniz never thought of investigating 
the formal logic bequeathed by          
scholasticism1 with a view to           
determining its adequacy as philosophic 
method4 ,he adopted1 as we have seen1   
the principles of identity and          
contradiction as sole principles of the 
only perfect knowledge4 ,the type of    
knowledge is that which can be reduced  
to a series of identical propositions1  
whose opposite is seen to be impossible1
 because self-contradictory4 ,only      
knowledge in this form can be said to be
 demonstrative and necessary4 ,as       
against ,locke he justified the         
syllogistic method of the schoolmen as  
the typical method of all rational      

truth4  ,on the other hand1 ,leibniz1 as
 we saw in the earlier chapters1 had    
learned positively from the growth of   
science1 negatively from the failures of
 ,descartes and ,spinoza1 to look upon  
the universe as a unity of inter-related
 members1--as an organic unity1 not a   
mere self-identical oneness4 ,failing to
 see the cause of the failures of       
,descartes and ,spinoza in precisely    
their adoption of the logic of identity 
and contradiction as ultimate1 he       
attempted to reconcile this method with 
the conception of organic activity4 ,the
 result is constant conflict between the
 method and content of his philosophy1  
between its letter and its spirit4 ,the 
contradiction is a twofold one4 ,the    
unity of the content of his philosophy1 
the conception of organism or harmony1  
is a unity which essentially involves   
difference4 ,the unity of his method is 
a formal identity which excludes it4    
,the unity1 whose discovery constitutes 
,leibniz's great glory as a philosopher1

 is a unity of activity1 a dynamic      
process4 ,the unity of formal logic is  
exclusive of any mediation or process1  
and is essentially rigid and lifeless4  
,the result is that ,leibniz is         
constantly wavering 7in logical result1 
not of course in spirit7 between two    
opposed errors1 one of which is1 in     
reality1 not different from ,spinozism1 
in that it regards all distinction as   
only phenomenal and unreal1 while the   
other is akin to atomism1 in that       
attempting to avoid the doctrine of the 
all-inclusive one1 it does so only by   
supposing a multitude of unrelated      
units1 termed monads4 ,and thus the     
harmony1 which in ,leibniz's intention  
is the very content of reality1 comes to
 be1 in effect1 an external arrangement 
between the one and the many1 the unity 
and the distinction1 in themselves      
incapable of real relations4 ,such were 
the results of ,leibniz's failure1 in   
,kantian language1 to criticise his     
categories1 in ,hegelian language1 to   

develop a logic1--the results of his    
assuming1 without examination1 the      
validity of formal logic as a method of 
truth4  ,so thoroughly is ,leibniz      
imbued with the belief in its validity1 
that the very conception1 that of       
sufficient reason1 which should have    
been the means of saving him from his   
contradictions1 is used in such a way as
 to plunge him deeper into them4 ,the   
principle of sufficient reason may      
indeed be used as purely formal and     
external1--as equivalent to the notion  
that everything1 no matter what1 has    
some explanation4 ,thus employed1 it    
simply declares that everything has a   
reason1 without in the least determining
 the what of that reason1--its content4 
,this is what we mean by calling it     
formal4 ,but this is not the way in     
which ,leibniz conceives of it4         
,according to him1 it is not a principle
 of the external connection of one      
finite1 or phenomenal1 fact with        
another4 ,it is a principle in the light

 of which the whole phenomenal world is 
to be viewed1 declaring that its ground 
and meaning are to be found in reason1  
in self-conscious intelligence4 ,as we  
have seen1 it is equivalent1 in         
,leibniz's case1 to the notion that we  
have no complete nor necessary knowledge
 of the world of scientific fact until  
we have referred it to a conditioning   
,supreme ,spirit4  ,looked at in this   
way1 we see that the unity which        
,leibniz is positively employing is an  
organic unity1 a unity of intelligence  
involving organic reference to the known
 world4 ,but such a conception of       
sufficient reason leaves no place for   
the final validity of identity and      
non-contradiction2 and therefore        
,leibniz1 when dealing with his method1 
and not1 as in the passages referred to1
 with his subject-matter1 cannot leave  
the matter thus4 ,to do so indeed would 
have involved a complete reconstruction 
of his philosophy1 necessitating a      
derivation of all the categories        

employed from intelligence itself 7that 
is1 from the sufficient or conditioning 
reason74 ,but the bondage to scholastic 
method is so great that ,leibniz can see
 no way but to measure intelligence by  
the ready-made principle of identity1   
and thus virtually 7though not in       
purpose7 to explain away the very       
principle of sufficient reason4 ,in     
,leibniz's words3 ,contingent truths    
require an infinite analysis which only 
,god can carry out4 ,whence by him alone
 are they known a priori and            
demonstratively4 ,for although the      
reason can always be found for some     
occurring state in a prior state1 this  
reason again requires a reason1 and we  
never arrive in the series to the       
ultimate reason4 ,but this progressus ad
 infinitum takes 7in us7 the place of a 
sufficient reason1 which can be found   
only outside the series in ,god1 on whom
 all its members1 prior and posterior   
depend1 rather than upon one another4   
,whatever truth1 therefore1 is incapable

 of analysis1 and cannot be demonstrated
 from its own reasons1 but has its      
ultimate reason and certainty only from 
the divine mind1 is not necessary4      
,everything that we call truths of fact 
come under this head1 and this is the   
root of their contingency4  ,the        
sentences before the one italicized     
repeat what we have learned before1 and 
seem to convey the idea that the        
phenomenal world is that which does not 
account for itself1 because not itself a
 self-determining reason1 and which gets
 its ultimate explanation and ground in 
a self-sufficient reason1--,god4 ,but   
notice the turn given to the thought    
with the word therefore4 ,therefore all 
truth incapable of analysis1--that is1  
of reduction to identical propositions1 
whose opposite is impossible because    
self-contradictory1--all truth whose    
meaning depends upon not its bare       
identity1 but upon its relation to the  
very content of all intelligence1 is not
 necessary1 but contingent4 ,leibniz    

here distinctly opposes identical truths
 as necessary1 to truth connected with  
reason as contingent4 ,synthetic        
reference to the very structure of      
intelligence is thus made1 not the      
ground of truth1 but a blot upon its    
completeness and necessity4 ,perfect    
truth1 it is implied in the argument1 is
 self-identical1 known by mere analysis 
of itself1 and needs no reference to an 
organism of reason4 ,the reference1     
therefore1 to a principle of sufficient 
reason is simply a concession to the    
fragmentary and imperfect condition of  
all knowledge4 ,truth in itself is      
self-identical2 but appearing to us only
 confusedly1 we employ the idea of      
sufficient reason as a makeshift1 by    
which we refer1 in a mass1 all that we  
cannot thus reduce to identical         
propositions1 to an intelligence1 or to 
a ,deus ex machina which can so reduce  
it4 ,this is the lame and impotent      
conclusion4  ,leibniz's fundamental     
meaning is1 no doubt1 a correct one4 ,he

 means that contingency of fact is not  
real1 but apparent2 that it exists only 
because of our inability to penetrate   
the reason which would enable us        
completely to account for the facts     
under consideration4 ,he means that if  
we could understand1 sub specie         
aeternitatis1 from the standpoint of    
universal intelligence1 we should see   
every fact as necessary1 as resulting   
from an intrinsic reason4 ,but so       
thoroughly is he fettered by the        
scholastic method--that is1 the method  
of formal logic--that he can conceive of
 this immanent and intrinsic reason     
which makes every fact a truth--that is1
 self-evident in its necessity--only as 
an analytic1 self-contained identity4   
,and herein lies his contradiction3 his 
method obliges him to conceive of       
ultimate intelligence as purely formal1 
simply as that which does not contradict
 itself1 while the attitude of his      
thought and its concrete subject-matter 
compel him to think of intelligence as  

possessing a content1 as the organic    
unity of a system of relations4  ,from  
this contradiction flow the other       
contradictions of ,leibniz1 which we are
 now prepared to examine in more detail4
 ,for his ideas are so much greater than
 his method that in almost every point  
there seems to be contradiction4 ,his   
ideas per se mean one thing1 and his    
ideas as interpreted by his method      
another4 ,take his doctrine of          
individuality1 for instance4 ,to some it
 has appeared that the great defect of  
the ,leibnizian philosophy is its       
individualism4 ,such conceive him simply
 to have carried out in his monadism the
 doctrine of the individual isolated    
from the universe to its logical        
conclusions1 and thereby to have        
rendered it absurd4 ,in a certain sense1
 the charge is true4 ,the monad1        
according to the oft-repeated statement1
 has no intercourse with the rest of the
 universe4 ,it really excludes all else4
 ,it acts as if nothing but itself and  

,god were in existence4 ,that is to say1
 the monad1 being the self-identical1   
must shut out all intrinsic or real     
relations with other substances4 ,such  
relations would involve a               
differentiating principle for which     
,leibniz's logic has no place4 ,each    
monad is1 therefore1 an isolated        
universe4 ,but such a result has no     
value for ,leibniz4 ,he endeavors to    
correct it by the thought that each     
monad ideally includes the whole        
universe by mirroring it4 ,and then to  
reconcile the real exclusion and the    
ideal inclusion1 he falls back on a     
,deus ex machina who arranges a harmony 
between them1 foreign to the intrinsic  
nature of each4 ,leibniz's              
individualism1 it is claimed1 thus makes
 of his philosophy a synthesis1 or      
rather a juxtaposition1 of mutually     
contradictory positions1 each of which  
appears true only as long as we do not  
attempt to think it together with the   
other4  ,there is1 no doubt1 truth in   

this representation4 ,but a more        
significant way of stating the matter   
is1 ,i think1 that ,leibniz's defect is 
not in his individualism1 but in the    
defect of his conception of the         
individual4 ,his individualism is more  
apparent than real4 ,it is a negative   
principle1 and negative in the sense of 
privative4 ,the individuality of the    
monad is due to its incompleteness1 to  
its imperfections4 ,it is really matter 
which makes monads mutually impenetrable
 or exclusive2 it is matter which       
distinguishes them from ,god1 and thus  
from one another4 ,without the material 
element they would be lost in an        
undistinguished identity with ,god1 the 
supreme substance4 ,but matter1 it must 
be remembered1 is passivity2 and since  
activity is reality1 or substance1      
matter is unsubstantial and unreal4 ,the
 same results from a consideration of   
knowledge4 ,matter is always correlative
 to confused ideas4 ,with the clearing  
up of knowledge1 with making it         

rational1 matter must disappear1 so that
 to ,god1 who is wholly reason1 it must 
entirely vanish4 ,but this view varies  
only in words from that of ,spinoza1 to 
whom it is the imagination1 as          
distinguished from the intellect1 that  
is the source of particular and finite  
objects4  ,it is perhaps in his         
,theodice1 in the treatment of the      
problem of evil1 that his implicit      
,spinozism1 or denial of individuality1 
comes out most clearly4 ,that evil is   
negative1 or privative1 and consists in 
the finitude of the creature1 is the    
result of the discussion4 ,what is this 
except to assert the unreality1 the     
merely privative character1 of the      
finite1 and to resolve all into ,god8   
,to take one instance out of many3 he   
compares inertia to the original        
limitation of creatures1 and says that  
as inertia is the obstacle to the       
complete mobility of bodies1 so         
privation1 or lack1 constitutes the     
essence of the imperfection1 or evil1 of

 creatures4 ,his metaphor is of boats in
 the current of a river1 where the      
heavier one goes more slowly1 owing to  
inertia4 ,the force of the current1     
which is the same to all1 and which is  
positive1 suffering no diminution1 is   
comparable to the activity of ,god1     
which also is perfect and positive4 ,as 
the current is the positive source of   
all the movements of the bodies1 and is 
in no way responsible for the           
retardation of some boats1 so ,god is   
the source only of activities1--the     
perfections of his creatures4 ,as the   
inertia of the boat is the cause of its 
slowness1 so the limitations of its     
receptivity are the cause of the defects
 found in the action of creatures4      
,individuality is thus reduced to mere  
limitation2 and the unlimited1 the real 
which includes all reality1 is ,god4 ,we
 are thus placed in a double difficulty4
 ,this notion of an all-inclusive one   
contradicts the reality of mutually     
exclusive monads2 and we have besides   

the characteristic difficulty of        
,spinoza1--how1 on the basis of this    
unlimited1 self-identical substance1 to 
account for even the appearance of      
finitude1 plurality and individuality4  
,leibniz's fundamental defect may thus  
be said to be that1 while he realized1  
as no one before him had done1 the      
importance of the conception of the     
negative1 he was yet unable to grasp the
 significance of the negative1 was led  
to interpret it as merely privative or  
defective1 and thus1 finally1 to        
surrender the very idea4 ,had not his   
method1 his presupposition regarding    
analytic identity1 bound him so         
completely in its toils1 his clear      
perception that it was the negative     
element that differentiated ,god from   
the universe1 intelligence from matter1 
might have brought him to a general     
anticipation not only of ,kant1 but of  
,hegel4 ,but instead of transforming his
 method by this conception of negation1 
he allowed his assumed 7i4 e41 dogmatic7

 method to evacuate his conception of   
its significance4 ,it was ,hegel who was
 really sufficiently in earnest with the
 idea to read it into the very notion of
 intelligence as a constituent organic  
element1 not as a mere outward and      
formal limitation4  ,we have already    
referred to the saying of ,leibniz that 
the monad acts as if nothing existed but
 ,god and itself4 ,the same idea is     
sometimes expressed by saying that ,god 
alone is the immediate or direct object 
of the monad4 ,both expressions mean    
that1 while the monad excludes all other
 monads1 such is not the case in its    
relation to ,god1 but that it has an    
organic relation with him4 ,we cannot   
keep from asking whether there is not   
another aspect of the contradiction     
here4 ,how is it possible for the monad 
so to escape from its isolation that it 
can have communication with ,god more   
than with other substances8 ,or if it   
can have communication with ,god1 why   
cannot it equally bear real relations of

 community with other monads8 ,and the  
answer is found in ,leibniz's           
contradictory conceptions of ,god4 ,of  
these conceptions there are at least    
three4 ,when ,leibniz is emphasizing his
 monadic theory1 with its aspects of    
individuality and exclusion1 ,god is    
conceived as the highest monad1 as one  
in the series of monads1 differing from 
the others only in the degree of its    
activity4 ,he is the monad of monads2   
the most complete1 active1 and          
individualized of all4 ,but it is       
evident that in this sense there can be 
no more intercourse between ,god and a  
monad than there is between one monad   
and another4 ,indeed1 since ,god is     
purus actus without any passivity1 it   
may be said that there is1 if possible1 
less communication in this case than in 
the others4 ,he is1 as ,leibniz says1   
what a monad without matter would be1 a 
deserter from the general order4 ,he is 
the acme of isolation4 ,this1 of course1
 is the extreme development of the      

individual side of ,leibniz's doctrine1 
resulting in a most pronounced atomism4 
,leibniz seems dimly conscious of this  
difficulty1 and thus by the side of this
 notion of ,god he puts another4        
,according to it1 ,god is the source of 
all monads4 ,the monads are not created 
by a choice of the best of all possible 
worlds1 as his official theology        
teaches1 but are the radiations of his  
divinity4 ,writing to ,bayle1 ,leibniz  
expresses himself as follows3 ,the      
nature of substance consists in an      
active force of definite character1 from
 which phenomena proceed in orderly     
succession4 ,this force was originally  
received by1 and is indeed preserved to1
 every substance by the creator of all  
things1 from whom all actual forces or  
perfections emanate by a sort of        
continual creation4 ,and in his         
,monadology he says3 ,all the created or
 derived monads are the productions of  
,god1 and are born1 as it were1 by the  
continual fulgurations of the divinity  

from instant to instant1 bounded by the 
receptivity of the creature to which it 
is essential to be limited4 ,what has   
become of the doctrine of monads        
7although the word is retained7 it would
 be difficult to say4 ,there is         
certainly no individual distinction now 
between the created monads and ,god1 and
 it is impossible to see why there      
should be individual distinctions       
between the various created monads4     
,they appear to be all alike1 as modes  
of the one comprehensive substance4     
,here we have the universal1 or         
identity1 side of ,leibniz's philosophy 
pushed to its logical outcome1--the     
doctrine of pantheism4  ,his third      
doctrine of ,god is really a unity of   
the two previous4 ,it is the doctrine   
that ,god is the harmony of the         
monads1--neither one among them nor one 
made up of them1 but their organic      
unity4 ,this doctrine is nowhere        
expressly stated in words 7unless it be 
when he says that ,god alone constitutes

 the relation and community of          
substances71 but it runs through his    
whole system4 ,according to this1 ,god  
is the pre-established harmony4 ,this   
conception1 like that of harmony1 may   
have either a mechanical interpretation 
7according to which ,god is the         
artificial1 external point of contact of
 intelligence and reality1 in themselves
 opposed7 or an organic meaning1        
according to which ,god is the unity of 
intelligence and reality4 ,on this      
interpretation alone does the saying    
that ,god is the only immediate object  
of the monads have sense4 ,it simply    
states that the apparent dualism between
 intelligence and its object which is   
found in the world is overcome in ,god2 
that the distinction between them is not
 the ultimate fact1 but exists in and   
for the sake of a unity which transcends
 the difference4 ,according to this     
view1 the opposition between ideal      
inclusion and real exclusion vanishes4  
,god is the harmony of the real and     

ideal1 not a mere arrangement for       
bringing them to an understanding with  
one another4 ,individuality and         
universality are no longer opposed      
conceptions1 needing a tertium quid to  
relate them1 but are organic factors of 
reality1 and this1 at the same time1 is 
intelligence4  ,but admitting this      
conception as stating the implicit      
intention of ,leibniz1 the relation of  
monads to one another is wholly         
different from that which ,leibniz      
gives4 ,and to this point we now come4  
,if in ,god1 the absolute1 the real and 
the ideal are one1 it is impossible that
 in substances1 which have their being  
and significance only in relation to    
,god1 or this unity1 the real and the   
ideal should be so wholly separated as  
,leibniz conceives4  ,leibniz's         
conception relative to this is1 as we   
have seen1 that there is no physical    
influxus1 or commercium1 of monads1 but 
ideal consensus4 ,really each shuts out 
every other2 ideally1 or                

representatively1 it includes every     
other4 ,his positive thought in the     
matter is that a complete knowledge of  
any portion of the universe would       
involve a perfect knowledge of the      
whole1 so organic is the structure of   
the universe4 ,each monad sums up the   
past history of the world1 and is big   
with its future4 ,this is the conception
 of inter-relation2 the conception of   
all in one1 and one as a member1 not a  
part of a whole4 ,it is the conception  
which ,leibniz brought to birth1 the    
conception of the thorough unity of the 
world4 ,in this notion there is no      
denial of community of relation2 it is  
rather the culmination of relation4     
,there is no isolation4 ,but according  
to his presupposed logic1 individuality 
can mean only identity excluding        
distinction1--identity without intrinsic
 relation1 and1 as ,leibniz is bound at 
all hazards to save the notion of       
individuality1 he is obliged to think of
 this inter-relation as only ideal1 as  

the result of a predetermined tendency  
given at its creation to the            
self-identical monad by ,god4 ,but of   
course ,leibniz does not escape the     
contradiction between identity and      
distinction1 between individuality and  
universality1 by this means4 ,he only   
transfers it to another realm4 ,in the  
relation of the monad to ,god the       
diversity of its content1 the real or   
universal element1 is harmonized with   
the identity of its law1 its ideal or   
individual factor4 ,but if these        
elements do not conflict here1 why      
should they in the relation of the      
monads to one another8 ,either there is 
already an immanent harmony between the 
individual and universal1 and no        
external arrangement is needed to bring 
it about1 or there is no such harmony1  
and therefore no relation possible      
between ,god and the individual monad4  
,one side of the ,leibnizian philosophy 
renders the other side impossible4      
,another consequence of ,leibniz's      

treatment of the negative as merely     
limitative is that he can find no       
distinction1 excepting of degree1       
between nature and spirit4 ,such a      
conception is undoubtedly in advance of 
the ,cartesian dualism1 which regards   
them as opposed realms without any      
relation2 but it may be questioned      
whether it is as adequate a view as that
 which regards them as distinct realms  
on account of relation4 ,at all events1 
it leads to confusion in ,leibniz's     
treatment of both material objects and  
self-conscious personalities4 ,in the   
former case his method of escape is a   
metaphor1--that objects apparently      
material are full of souls1 or spirits4 
,this may mean that the material is     
merely material only when considered in 
implicit abstraction from the           
intelligence which conditions it1 that  
the material1 in truth1 is constituted  
by some of the relations which in their 
completeness make up intelligence4 ,this
 at least bears a consistent meaning4   

,but it is not monadism2 it is not the  
doctrine that matter differs from spirit
 only in degree3 it is the doctrine that
 they differ in kind1 as the conditioned
 from the conditioning4 ,at times1      
however1 ,leibniz attempts to carry out 
his monadism literally1 and the result  
is that he conceives matter as being    
itself endowed1 in some unexplained way1
 with souls1 or since this implies a    
dualism between matter and soul1 of     
being made up1 composed1 of souls4 ,but 
as he is obliged to explain that this   
composition is not spatial1 or physical1
 but only ideal1 this doctrine tends to 
resolve itself into the former4 ,and    
thus we end where we began1--with a     
metaphor4  ,on the other hand there is a
 wavering treatment of the nature of    
spirit4 ,at times it is treated as      
precisely on a level in kind with the   
monads that compose matter1 differing   
only in the greater degree of its       
activity4 ,but at other times it is     
certainly represented as standing on    

another plane4 ,the difference between  
those monads which express the world    
with consciousness and those which      
express it unintelligently is as great  
as the difference between a mirror and  
one who sees4 ,if ,leibniz means what he
 seems to imply by these words1 it is   
plainly asserted that only the spiritual
 being is worthy of being called a      
monad1 or individual1 at all1 and that  
material being is simply a dependent    
manifestation of spirit4 ,again he says3
 ,not all entelechies are1 like our     
soul1 images of ,god1--being made as    
members of a society or state of which  
he is chief1--but all are images of the 
universe4 ,in this distinction between  
self-conscious beings as images of ,god 
and unconscious monads as images of the 
universe there is again implied a       
difference of kind4 ,that something is  
the image of the universe need mean only
 that it cannot be explained without its
 relations to the universe4 ,to say that
 something is the image of ,god1 must   

mean that it is itself spiritual and    
self-conscious4 ,god alone is reason and
 activity4 ,he alone has his reality in 
himself4 ,self-conscious beings1 since  
members of a community with him1 must   
participate in this reality in a way    
different in kind from those things     
which1 at most1 are only substances or  
objects1 not subjects4  ,nor do the     
difficulties cease here4 ,if matter be  
conceived1 not as implied in the        
relations by which reason is realized in
 constituting the universe1 but as      
itself differing from reason only in    
degree1 it is impossible to account for 
its existence4 ,why should a less degree
 of perfection exist than is necessary8 
,why should not the perfect activity1   
,god1 complete the universe in himself8 
,leibniz's answer that an infinity of   
monads multiplies his existence so far  
as possible1 may hold indeed of other   
spirits1 who mirror him and live in one 
divine society1 but is utterly          
inapplicable to those which fail to     

image him4 ,their existence1 as         
material1 is merely privative2 it is    
merely the absence of the activity found
 in conscious spirit4 ,how can this     
deprivation1 this limitation1 increase  
in any way the harmony and perfection of
 the universe8 ,leibniz's theory of the 
negative1 in fine1 compels him to put   
nature and spirit on the same level1 as 
differing only in degree4 ,this1 so far 
from giving nature a reality1 results in
 its being swallowed up in spirit1 not  
as necessarily distinct from it and yet 
one with it1 but as absorbed in it1     
since the apparent difference is only   
privative4 ,nor does the theory insure  
the reality of spirit4 ,this1 since one 
in kind with matter1 is swallowed up    
along with it in the one substance1     
which is positive and                   
self-identical1--in effect1 the ,deus   
sive ,natura of ,spinoza4  ,we have to  
see that this contradiction on the side 
of existence has its correlate on the   
side of knowledge1 and our examination  

of this fundamental deficiency in       
,leibniz is ended4 ,sensation is on the 
side of intelligence what matter is on  
the side of reality4 ,it is confused    
knowledge1 as matter is imperfect       
activity or reality4 ,knowledge is      
perfect only when it is seen to be      
necessary1 and by necessary is meant    
that whose opposite is impossible1 or   
involves contradiction4 ,in spite1      
therefore1 of ,leibniz's thorough       
conviction that matters of fact--the    
subject-matter of physical science--are 
not arbitrary1 he is yet obliged finally
 to agree with ,locke that there is no  
certainty to be found in such knowledge1
 either as a whole or in any of its     
details4 ,the element of sensation1 of  
confused knowledge1 cannot be           
eliminated4 ,hence it must always be    
open to any one to object that it is    
only on account of this imperfect factor
 of our knowledge that there appears to 
be a physical world at all1 that the    
external world is an illusion produced  

by our sensations4 ,and ,leibniz        
himself1 while claiming that the world  
of fact1 as opposed to the realm of     
relations1 possesses practical reality1 
is obliged to admit that metaphysically 
it may be only an orderly dream4 ,the   
fact is that ,leibniz unconsciously     
moves in the same circle1 with relation 
to sensation and the material world1    
that confines ,spinoza with regard to   
imagination and particular multiple     
existences4 ,spinoza explains the latter
 from that imperfection of our          
intelligence which leads us to imagine  
rather than to think4 ,but he accounts  
for the existence of imagination1 when  
he comes to treat that1 as due to the   
plurality of particular things4 ,so     
,leibniz1 when an account of the        
existence of matter is demanded of him1 
refers to confused knowledge as its     
source1 while in turn he explains the   
latter1 or sensation1 from the material 
element which sets bounds to the        
activity of spirit4 ,leibniz seems      

indeed1 to advance upon ,spinoza in     
admitting the reality of the negative   
factor in differentiating the purely    
self-identical1 but he gives up what he 
has thus gained by interpreting the     
negation as passivity1 or mere          
deprivation4  ,to sum up1 it may be     
doubted whether we have more to learn   
from ,leibniz's successes or from his   
failures4 ,leibniz's positive           
significance for us is in his clear     
recognition of the problems of modern   
philosophy1 and in his perception of the
 isolated elements of their solution4   
,his negative significance is in his    
clinging to a method which allowed him  
only to juxtapose these elements without
 forming of them a true synthesis4      
,there are a number of sides from which 
we may state ,leibniz's realization of  
the problem4 ,perhaps that which        
distinguishes ,leibniz most clearly from
 ,locke is their respective treatments  
of the relation of the physical to the  
spiritual1 or1 as the question presented

 itself mainly to them1 of the natural  
to the supernatural4 ,to ,locke the     
supernatural was strictly miraculous2 it
 was1 from our standpoint1 mere power1  
or will4 ,it might indeed be rational1  
but this reason was incapable of being  
apprehended by us4 ,its distinction from
 the finite was so great that it could  
be conceived only as something preceding
 and succeeding the finite in time1 and 
meanwhile as intercalating itself       
arbitrarily here and there into the     
finite2 as1 for example1 in the relation
 of soul and body1 in the production of 
sensation1 etc4 ,in a word1 ,locke      
thought that the ends of philosophy1 and
 with it of religion and morals1 could  
be attained only by a complete          
separation of the natural and the       
supernatural4 ,leibniz1 on the other    
hand1 conceived the aim of philosophy to
 be the demonstration of their harmony4 
,this is evidenced by his treatment of  
the relations of the infinite and       
finite1 of matter and spirit1 of        

mechanical and final causation4 ,and he 
found the sought-for harmony in the fact
 that the spiritual is the reason1      
purpose1 and function of the natural4   
,the oft-quoted words of ,lotze express 
the thought of ,leibniz3 ,the mechanical
 is unbounded in range1 but is          
subordinate in value4 ,we cannot find   
some things that occur physically1 and  
others that occur supernaturally2       
everything that occurs has its          
sufficient mechanical antecedents1 but  
all that occurs has its significance1   
its purpose1 in something that does not 
occur1 but that eternally is--,reason4  
,the mechanical and the spiritual are   
not realms which here and there come    
into outward contact4 ,they are related 
as the conditioned and the conditioning4
 ,that1 and not the idea of an          
artificial modus vivendi1 is the true   
meaning of the pre-established harmony4 
,in other words1 ,leibniz's great       
significance for us is the fact that1   
although he accepted in good faith1 and 

indeed as himself a master in its       
methods1 the results and principles of  
physical science1 he remained a         
teleological idealist of the type of    
,aristotle4 ,but ,i have not used the   
right words4 ,it was not in spite of his
 acceptance of the scientific view of   
the world that he retained his faith in 
the primacy of purpose and reason4 ,on  
the contrary1 he was an idealist because
 of his science1 because only by the    
idea of an all-conditioning spiritual   
activity could he account for and make  
valid scientific conceptions2 he was a  
teleologist1 because natural processes1 
with their summing up in the notion of  
causality1 were meaningless except as   
manifesting an immanent purpose4  ,there
 are other more technical ways of       
stating the bearing of ,leibniz's work4 
,we may say that he realized that the   
problem of philosophy consisted in      
giving due value to the notions of      
individuality and universality1 of      
identity and difference1 or of the real 

and the ideal4 ,in developing these     
ideas1 however1 we should only be       
repeating what has already been said1   
and so we may leave the matter here4 ,on
 the negative side we need only recall  
what was said a few pages back regarding
 the incompatibility of ,leibniz's      
method--the scholastic formal           
logic--with the content of his          
philosophy4 ,the attempt to find a      
formal criterion of truth was hopeless2 
it was worse than fruitless1 for it led 
to such an interpretation of concrete   
truths as to deprive them of their      
significance and as to land ,leibniz in 
involved contradictions4  ,to write a   
complete account of the influence of    
,leibniz's philosophy would be too large
 a task for these pages4 ,if we were to 
include under this head all the         
ramifications of thought to which       
,leibniz stimulated1 directly and       
indirectly1 either by stating truths    
which some one worked out or by stating 
errors which incited some one to new    

points of view1 we should have to sketch
 ,german philosophy since his time1--and
 not only the professional philosophy1  
but those wide aspects of thought which 
were reflected in ,herder1 ,lessing1 and
 ,goethe4 ,it is enough to consider him 
as the forerunner of ,kant4 ,it has     
become so customary to represent ,kant  
as working wholly on the problem which  
,hume presented1 that his great         
indebtedness to ,leibniz is overlooked4 
,because ,hume aroused ,kant from his   
dogmatic slumbers1 it is supposed that  
,kant threw off the entire influence of 
the ,leibnizian thought as vain dreams  
of his sleep4 ,such a representation is 
one-sided4 ,it is truer to state that   
,hume challenged ,kant to discover the  
method by which he could justify the    
results of ,leibniz4 ,in this process1  
the results1 no doubt1 took on a new    
form3 results are always relative to    
method2 but ,kant never lost sight of   
the results4 ,in the main1 he accepted  
the larger features of the ,leibnizian  

conclusions1 and1 taught by ,hume of the
 insufficiency of the method that       
,leibniz followed1 searched for a method
 which should guarantee them4  ,this    
aspect of ,kant appears more fully in   
his lesser and somewhat controversial   
writings than in his classic works3 and 
this1 no doubt1 is one reason that his  
indebtedness is so often overlooked4    
,his close relation to ,leibniz appears 
most definitely in his brochure entitled
 ,concerning a ,discovery which renders 
,unnecessary all ,critique of ,pure     
,reason4 ,a ,wolffian1 ,eberhard by     
name1 had made the discovery 7to use    
,kant's words7 that the ,leibnizian     
philosophy contained a critique of      
reason just as well as the modern1 and  
accordingly contained everything that is
 true in the latter1 and much else in   
addition4 ,in his reply to this writing1
 ,kant takes the position that those who
 claimed to be ,leibnizians simply      
repeated the words of ,leibniz without  
penetrating into his spirit1 and that   

consequently they misrepresented him on 
every important point4 ,he1 ,kant1 on   
the other hand1 making no claim to use  
the terminology of ,leibniz1 was his    
true continuator1 since he had only     
changed the doctrine of the latter so as
 to make it conform to the true intent  
of ,leibniz1 by removing its            
self-contradictions4 ,he closes3 ',the  
,critique of ,pure ,reason' may be      
regarded as the real apology for        
,leibniz1 even against his own professed
 followers4  ,kant1 in particular1 names
 three points in which he is the true   
follower of ,leibniz4 ,the professed    
disciples of the latter insisted that   
the law of sufficient reason was an     
objective law1 a law of nature4 ,but1   
says ,kant1 it is so notorious1 so      
self-evident1 that no one can make a new
 discovery through this principle1 that 
,leibniz can have meant it only as      
subjective4 ,for what does it mean to   
say that over and above the principle of
 contradiction another principle must be

 employed8 ,it means this3 that1        
according to the principle of           
contradiction1 only that can be known   
which is already contained in the notion
 of the object2 if anything more is to  
be known1 it must be sought through the 
use of a special principle1 distinct    
from that of contradiction4 ,since this 
last kind of knowledge is that of       
synthetic principles1 ,leibniz means    
just this3 besides the principle of     
contradiction1 or that of analytic      
judgments1 there must be another1 that  
of sufficient reason1 for synthetic     
judgments4 ,he thus pointed out1 in a   
new and remarkable manner1 that certain 
investigations in metaphysics were still
 to be made4 ,in other words1 ,kant1 by 
his distinction of analytic and         
synthetic judgments1 with their         
respective principles and spheres1      
carried out the idea of ,leibniz        
regarding the principles of             
contradiction and sufficient reason4    
,the second point concerns the relation 

of monads to material bodies4 ,eberhard1
 like the other professed ,leibnizians1 
interpreted ,leibniz as saying that     
corporeal bodies1 as composite1 are     
actually made up out of monads1 as      
simple4 ,kant1 on the other hand1 saw   
clearly that ,leibniz was not thinking  
of a relation of composition1 but of    
condition4 ,he did not mean the material
 world1 but the substrate1 the          
intellectual world which lies in the    
idea of reason1 and in which everything 
must be thought as consisting of simple 
substances4 ,eberhard's process1 he     
says1 is to begin with sense-phenomena1 
to find a simple element as a part of   
the sense-perceptions1 and then to      
present this simple element as if it    
were spiritual and equivalent to the    
monad of ,leibniz4 ,kant claims to      
follow the thought of ,leibniz in       
regarding the simple not as an element  
in the sensuous1 but as something       
super-sensuous1 the ground of the       
sensuous4 ,leibniz's mistake was that1  

not having worked out clearly the       
respective limits of the principles of  
identity and of sufficient reason1 he   
supposed that we had a direct           
intellectual intuition of this          
super-sensuous1 when in reality it is   
unknowable4  ,the third group of        
statements concerns the principle of    
pre-established harmony4 ,is it         
possible1 asks ,kant1 that ,leibniz     
meant by this doctrine to assert the    
mere coincidence of two substances      
wholly independent of each other by     
nature1 and incapable through their own 
force of being brought into community8  
,and his answer is that what ,leibniz   
really implied was not a harmony between
 independent things1 but a harmony      
between modes of knowing1 between sense 
on the one hand and understanding on the
 other4 ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason 
carried the discussion farther by       
pointing out its grounds2 namely1 that1 
without the unity of sense and          
understanding1 no experience would be   

possible4 ,why there should be this     
harmony1 why we should have experience1 
this question it is impossible to       
answer1 says ,kant1--adding that        
,leibniz confessed as much when he      
called it a pre-established harmony1    
thus not explaining it1 but only        
referring it to a highest cause4 ,that  
,leibniz really means a harmony within  
intelligence1 not a harmony of things by
 themselves1 is made more clear1        
according to ,kant1 from the fact that  
it is applied also to the relation      
between the kingdom of nature and of    
grace1 of final and of efficient causes4
 ,here the harmony is clearly not       
between two independently existing      
external things1 but between what flows 
from our notions of nature              
7,naturbegriffe7 and of freedom         
7,freiheitsbegriffe72 that is1 between  
two distinct powers and principles      
within us1--an agreement which can be   
explained only through the idea of an   
intelligent cause of the world4  ,if we 

review these points in succession1 the  
influence of ,leibniz upon ,kant becomes
 more marked4 ,as to the first one1 it  
is well known that ,kant's philosophy is
 based upon1 and revolves within1 the   
distinction of analytic and synthetic   
judgments2 and this distinction ,kant   
clearly refers to the ,leibnizian       
distinction between the principles of   
contradiction and of sufficient reason1 
or of identity and differentiation4 ,it 
is not meant that ,kant came to this    
thought through the definitions of      
,leibniz2 on the contrary1 ,kant himself
 refers it to ,hume's distinction       
between matters of fact and relations of
 ideas4 ,but when ,kant had once        
generalized the thought of ,hume1 it    
fell at once1 as into ready prepared    
moulds1 into the categories of ,leibniz4
 ,he never escapes from the ,leibnizian 
distinction4 ,in his working of it out  
consists his greatness as the founder of
 modern thought2 from his acceptance of 
it as ultimate result his               

contradictions4 ,that is to say1 ,kant  
did not merely receive the vague idea of
 sufficient reason3 he so connected it  
with what he learned from ,hume that he 
transformed it into the idea of         
synthesis1 and proceeded to work out the
 conception of synthesis in the various 
notions of the understanding1 or        
categories1 as applicable to the        
material of sense4 ,what ,leibniz       
bequeathed him was the undefined idea   
that knowledge of matters of fact rests 
upon the principle of sufficient reason4
 ,what ,kant did with this inheritance  
was to identify the wholly vague idea of
 sufficient reason with the notion that 
every fact of experience rests upon     
necessary synthetic connection1--that   
is1 connection according to notions of  
understanding with other facts1--and to 
determine1 so far as he could1 the      
various forms of synthesis1 or of       
sufficient reason4 ,with ,leibniz the   
principle remained essentially          
infertile1 because it was the mere      

notion of the ultimate reference of     
experience to understanding4 ,in the    
hands of ,kant1 it became the instrument
 of revolutionizing philosophy1 because 
,kant showed the articulate members of  
understanding by which experience is    
constituted1 and described them in the  
act of constituting4  ,so much for his  
working out of the thought4 ,but on the 
other hand1 ,kant never transcended the 
absoluteness of the distinction between 
the principles of synthesis and         
analysis1 of sufficient reason and      
contradiction4 ,the result was that he  
regarded the synthetic principle as the 
principle only of our knowledge1 while  
perfect knowledge he still considered to
 follow the law of identity1 of mere    
analysis4 ,he worked out the factor of  
negation1 of differentiation1 contained 
in the notion of synthesis1 but limited 
it to synthesis upon material of sense1 
presupposing that there is another kind 
of knowledge1 not limited to sense1 not 
depending upon the synthetic principle1 

but resting upon the principle of       
contradiction1 or analysis1 and that    
this kind is the type1 the norm1 of the 
only perfect knowledge4 ,in other words1
 while admitting the synthetic principle
 of differentiation as a necessary      
element within our knowledge1 he held   
that on account of this element our     
knowledge is limited to the phenomenal  
realm4 ,leibniz's error was in supposing
 that the pure principles of the logical
 understanding1 resting on              
contradiction1 could give us knowledge  
of the noumenal world2 his truth was in 
supposing that only by such principles  
could they be known4 ,thus1 in          
substance1 ,kant4 ,like ,leibniz1 in    
short1 he failed to transcend the       
absoluteness of the value of the        
scholastic method2 but he so worked out 
another and synthetic method1--the      
development of the idea of sufficient   
reason1--that he made it necessary for  
his successors to transcend it4  ,the   
second point concerns the relations of  

the sensuous and the super-sensuous4    
,here1 besides setting right the        
ordinary misconception of ,leibniz1     
,kant did nothing but render him        
consistent with himself4 ,leibniz       
attempted to prove the existence of     
,god1 as we have seen1 by the principles
 both of sufficient reason and          
contradiction4 ,kant denies the validity
 of the proof by either method4 ,god is 
the sufficient cause1 or reason1 of the 
contingent sense world4 ,but since      
,leibniz admits that this contingent    
world may1 after all1 be but a dream1   
how shall we rise from it to the notion 
of ,god8 ,it is not our dreams that     
demonstrate to us the existence of      
reality4 ,or1 again1 sense-knowledge is 
confused knowledge4 ,how shall this     
knowledge1 by hypothesis imperfect1     
guarantee to us the existence of a      
perfect being8 ,on the other hand1 since
 the synthetic principle1 or that of    
sufficient reason1 is necessary to give 
us knowledge of matters of fact1 the    

principle of contradiction1 while it may
 give us a consistent and even necessary
 notion of a supreme being1 cannot give 
this notion reality4 ,leibniz1 while    
admitting1 with regard to all other     
matters of fact1 that the principles of 
formal logic can give no unconditional  
knowledge1 yet supposes that1 with      
regard to the one unconditional reality1
 they are amply sufficient4 ,kant but   
renders him self-consistent on this     
point4  ,it is1 however1 with regard to 
the doctrine of pre-established harmony 
that ,kant's large measure of           
indebtedness to ,leibniz is most apt to 
be overlooked4 ,kant's claim that       
,leibniz himself meant the doctrine in a
 subjective sense 7that is1 of a harmony
 between powers in our own intelligence7
 rather than objective 7or between      
things out of relation to intelligence7 
seems1 at first sight1 to go far beyond 
the mark4 ,however1 when we recall that 
to ,leibniz the sense world is only the 
confused side of rational thought1 there

 is more truth in ,kant's saying than   
appears at this first sight4 ,the       
harmony is between sense and reason4    
,but it may at least be said without    
qualification that ,kant only translated
 into subjective terms1 terms of        
intelligence1 what appears in ,leibniz  
as objective4 ,this is not the place to 
go into the details of ,kant's          
conception of the relation of the       
material to the psychical1 of the body  
and the soul4 ,we may state1 however1 in
 his own words1 that the question is no 
longer as to the possibility of the     
association of the soul with other known
 and foreign substances outside it1 but 
as to the connection of the             
presentations of inner sense with the   
modifications of our external           
sensibility4 ,it is a question1 in      
short1 of the harmony of two modes of   
our own presentation1 not of the harmony
 of two independent things4 ,and ,kant  
not only thus deals with the fact of    
harmony1 but he admits1 as its possible 

source1 just what ,leibniz claims to be 
its actual source2 namely1 some one     
underlying reality1 which ,leibniz calls
 the monad1 but to which ,kant gives no 
name4 ,i can well suppose1 says ,kant1  
that the substance to which through     
external sense extension is attributed1 
is also the subject of the presentations
 given to us by its inner sense3 thus   
that which in one respect is called     
material being would be in another      
respect thinking being4  ,kant treats   
similarly the problem of the relations  
of physical and final causes1 of        
necessity and freedom4 ,here1 as in the 
case just mentioned1 his main problem is
 to discover their harmony4 ,his        
solution1 again1 is in the union1 in our
 intelligence1 of the understanding--as 
the source of the notions which make    
nature--with the ideas of that reason   
which gives a categorical imperative4   
,the cause of the possibility of this   
harmony between nature and freedom1     
between the sense world and the         

rational1 he finds in a being1 ,god1    
whose sole function in the ,kantian     
philosophy may be said to be to         
pre-establish it4 ,i cannot believe that
 ,kant1 in postulating the problems of  
philosophy as the harmony of sense and  
understanding1 of nature and freedom1   
and in finding this harmony where he    
did1 was not profoundly influenced1     
consciously as well as unconsciously1 by
 ,leibniz4 ,in fact1 ,i do not think    
that we can understand the nature either
 of ,kant's immense contributions to    
modern thought or of his                
inconsistencies1 until we have traced   
them to their source in the ,leibnizian 
philosophy1--admitting1 on the other    
hand1 that we cannot understand why     
,kant should have found necessary a new 
way of approach to the results of       
,leibniz1 until we recognize to the full
 his indebtedness to ,hume4 ,it was1    
indeed1 ,hume that awoke him to his     
endeavors1 but it was ,leibniz who set  
before him the goal of these endeavors4 

,that the goal should appear somewhat   
transformed1 when approached from a new 
point of view1 was to be expected4 ,but 
alas6 the challenge from ,hume did not  
wholly awaken ,kant4 ,he still accepted 
without question the validity of the    
scholastic method1--the analytic        
principle of identity as the type of    
perfect knowledge1--although denying its
 sufficiency for human intelligence4    
,leibniz suggested1 and suggested       
richly1 the synthetic1 the negative     
aspect of thought2 ,kant worked it out  
as a necessary law of our knowledge2 it 
was left to his successors to work it   
out as a factor in the law of all       
knowledge4  ,it would be a grievous     
blunder to suppose that this final      
chapter annihilates the earlier ones2   
that the failure of ,leibniz as to      
method1 though a failure in a           
fundamental point1 cancelled his        
splendid achievements4 ,such thoughts as
 that substance is activity2 that its   
process is measured by its end1 its     

idea2 that the universe is an           
inter-related unit2 the thoughts of     
organism1 of continuity1 of uniformity  
of law1--introduced and treated as      
,leibniz treated them1--are             
imperishable4 ,they are members of the  
growing consciousness1 on the part of   
intelligence1 of its own nature4 ,there 
are but three or four names in the      
history of thought which can be placed  
by the side of ,leibniz's in respect to 
the open largeness1 the unexhausted     
fertility1 of such thoughts4 ,but it is 
not enough for intelligence to have     
great thoughts nor even true thoughts4  
,it is testimony to the sincerity and   
earnestness of intelligence that it     
cannot take even such thoughts as those 
of ,leibniz on trust4 ,it must know     
them2 it must have a method adequate to 
their demonstration4 ,and in a broad    
sense1 the work of ,kant and of his     
successors was the discovery of a method
 which should justify the objective     
idealism of ,leibniz1 and which in its  

history has more than fulfilled this    
task4        ,transcriber's ,note3      
,the following is a list of corrections 
made to the original4     ,the first    
line is the original line1 the second   
the corrected one4      ,by ,s4 ,c      
,griggs and ,company4     ,by ,s4 ,c4   
,griggs and ,company4    passivity of   
any kind is a myth1 as scholastic       
fiction4 ,sensation is   passivity of   
any kind is a myth1 a scholastic        
fiction4 ,sensation is    the vacuum is 
to serve as the background of the atoms4
 ,the atoms1 are   the vacuum is to     
serve as the background of the atoms4   
,the atoms are