,the ,world ,as ,will ,and ,idea ,by ,arthur ,schopenhauer ,translated ,from ,the ,german ,by ,r4 ,b4 ,haldane1 ,m4,a4 ,and ,j4 ,kemp1 ,m4,a4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,containing ,supplements to ,part of the ,second ,book and to the ,third and ,fourth ,books ,sixth ,edition ,london ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench1 ,trbner ,co4 #aiji ,,contents ,supplements ,to ,the ,second ,book4 ,chapter ,,xxi4 ,retrospect and ,more ,general ,view4 ,chapter ,,xxii4 ,objective ,view of the ,intellect4 ,chapter ,,xxiii4,on ,the ,objectification ,of ,the ,will ,in ,unconscious ,nature4 ,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,on ,matter4 ,chapter ,,xxv4 ,transcendent ,considerations ,concerning ,the ,will ,as ,thing ,in ,itself4 ,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,on ,teleology4 ,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,on ,instinct ,and ,mechanical ,tendency4 ,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,characterisation ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live4 ,supplements to the ,third ,book4 ,chapter ,,xxix4 ,on ,the ,knowledge ,of ,the ,ideas4 ,chapter ,,xxx4 ,on ,the ,pure ,subject ,of ,knowledge4 ,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,on ,genius4 ,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,on ,madness4 ,chapter ,,xxxiii4 ,isolated ,remarks ,on ,natural ,beauty4 ,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,on ,the ,inner ,nature ,of ,art4 ,chapter ,,xxxv4 ,on ,the sthetics ,of ,architecture4 ,chapter ,,xxxvi4 ,isolated ,remarks ,on ,the sthetics ,of ,the ,plastic ,and ,pictorial ,arts4 ,chapter ,,xxxvii4 ,on ,the sthetics ,of ,poetry4 ,chapter ,,xxxviii4 ,on ,history4 ,chapter ,,xxxix4 ,on ,the ,metaphysics ,of ,music4 ,supplements to the ,fourth ,book4 ,chapter ,,xl4 ,preface4 ,chapter ,,xli4 ,on ,death ,and ,its ,relation ,to ,the ,indestructibility ,of ,our ,true ,nature4 ,chapter ,,xlii4 ,the ,life ,of ,the ,species4 ,chapter ,,xliii4 ,on ,heredity4 ,chapter ,,xliv4 ,the ,metaphysics ,of ,the ,love ,of ,the ,sexes4 ,chapter ,,xlv4 ,on ,the ,assertion ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live4 ,chapter ,,xlvi4 ,on ,the ,vanity ,and ,suffering ,of ,life4 ,chapter ,,xlvii4 ,on ,ethics4 ,chapter ,,xlviii4 ,on ,the ,doctrine ,of ,the ,denial ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live4 ,chapter ,,xlix4 ,the ,way ,of ,salvation4 ,chapter ,l4 ,epiphilosophy4 ,appendix4 ,abstract4 ,chapter ,i4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,chapter ,v4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,index4 ,corrigenda ,and ,addenda ,in ,vol4 ,i4 ,footnotes ,cover ,art ,transcriber's ,note3 ,the above cover image was produced by the submitter at ,distributed ,proofreaders1 and is being placed into the public domain4 ,,supplements ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,book4 ,chapter ,,xxi4 ,retrospect and ,more ,general ,view4 ,if the intellect were not of a subordinate nature1 as the two preceding chapters show1 then everything which takes place without it1 i4e41 without intervention of the idea1 such as reproduction1 the development and maintenance of the organism1 the healing of wounds1 the restoration or vicarious supplementing of mutilated parts1 the salutary crisis in diseases1 the works of the mechanical skill of animals1 and the performances of instinct would not be done so infinitely better and more perfectly than what takes place with the assistance of intellect1 all conscious and intentional achievements of men1 which compared with the former are mere bungling4 ,in general nature signifies that which operates1 acts1 performs without the assistance of the intellect4 ,now1 that this is really identical with what we find in ourselves as will is the general theme of this second book1 and also of the essay1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur40 ,the possibility of this fundamental knowledge depends upon the fact that in us the will is directly lighted by the intellect1 which here appears as selfconsciousness2 otherwise we could just as little arrive at a fuller knowledge of it within us as without us1 and must for ever stop at inscrutable forces of nature4 ,we have to abstract from the assistance of the intellect if we wish to comprehend the nature of the will in itself1 and thereby1 as far as is possible1 penetrate to the inner being of nature4 ,on this account1 it may be remarked in passing1 my direct antipode among philosophers is ,anaxagoras2 for he assumed arbitrarily as that which is first and original1 from which everything proceeds1 a 1 an intelligence1 a subject of ideas1 and he is regarded as the first who promulgated such a view4 ,according to him the world existed earlier in the mere idea than in itself2 while according to me it is the unconscious will which constitutes the reality of things1 and its development must have advanced very far before it finally attains1 in the animal consciousness1 to the idea and intelligence2 so that1 according to me1 thought appears as the very last4 ,however1 according to the testimony of ,aristotle 7,metaph41 i4 #d71 ,anaxagoras himself did not know how to begin much with his 1 but merely set it up1 and then left it standing like a painted saint at the entrance1 without making use of it in his development of nature1 except in cases of need1 when he did not know how else to help himself4 ,all physicotheology is a carrying out of the error opposed to the truth expressed at the beginning of this chapter--the error that the most perfect form of the origin of things is that which is brought about by means of an intellect4 ,therefore it draws a bolt against all deep exploration of nature4 ,from the time of ,socrates down to our own time1 we find that the chief subject of the ceaseless disputations of the philosophers has been that ens rationis1 called soul4 ,we see the most of them assert its immortality1 that is to say1 its metaphysical nature2 yet others1 supported by facts which incontrovertibly prove the entire dependence of the intellect upon the bodily organism1 unweariedly maintain the contrary4 ,that soul is by all and before everything taken as absolutely simple2 for precisely from this its metaphysical nature1 its immateriality and immortality were proved1 although these by no means necessarily follow from it4 ,for although we can only conceive the destruction of a formed body through breaking up of it into its parts1 it does not follow from this that the destruction of a simple existence1 of which besides we have no conception1 may not be possible in some other way1 perhaps by gradually vanishing4 ,i1 on the contrary1 start by doing away with the presupposed simplicity of our subjectively conscious nature1 or the ego1 inasmuch as ,i show that the manifestations from which it was deduced have two very different sources1 and that in any case the intellect is physically conditioned1 the function of a material organ1 therefore dependent upon it1 and without it is just as impossible as the grasp without the hand2 that accordingly it belongs to the mere phenomenon1 and thus shares the fate of this1--that the will1 on the contrary1 is bound to no special organ1 but is everywhere present1 is everywhere that which moves and forms1 and therefore is that which conditions the whole organism2 that1 in fact1 it constitutes the metaphysical substratum of the whole phenomenon1 consequently is not1 like the intellect1 a ,posterius of it1 but its ,prius2 and the phenomenon depends upon it1 not it upon the phenomenon4 ,but the body is reduced indeed to a mere idea1 for it is only the manner in which the will exhibits itself in the perception of the intellect or brain4 ,the will1 again1 which in all other systems1 different as they are in other respects1 appears as one of the last results1 is with me the very first4 ,the intellect1 as mere function of the brain1 is involved in the destruction of the body1 but the will is by no means so4 ,from this heterogeneity of the two1 together with the subordinate nature of the intellect1 it becomes conceivable that man1 in the depths of his self consciousness1 feels himself to be eternal and indestructible1 but yet can have no memory1 either a parte ante or a parte post1 beyond the duration of his life4 ,i do not wish to anticipate here the exposition of the true indestructibility of our nature1 which has its place in the fourth book1 but have only sought to indicate the place where it links itself on4 ,but now that1 in an expression which is certainly onesided1 yet from our standpoint true1 the body is called a mere idea depends upon the fact than an existence in space1 as something extended1 and in time1 as something that changes1 and more closely determined in both through the causal nexus1 is only possible in the idea1 for all those determinations rest upon its forms1 thus in a brain1 in which accordingly such an existence appears as something objective1 i4e41 foreign2 therefore even our own body can have this kind of existence only in a brain4 ,for the knowledge which ,i have of my body as extended1 spaceoccupying1 and movable1 is only indirect3 it is a picture in my brain which is brought about by means of the senses and understanding4 ,the body is given to me directly only in muscular action and in pain and pleasure1 both of which primarily and directly belong to the will4 ,but the combination of these two different kinds of knowledge of my own body afterwards affords the further insight that all other things which also have the objective existence described1 which is primarily only in my brain1 are not therefore entirely non existent apart from it1 but must also ultimately in themselves be that which makes itself known in selfconsciousness as will4 ,chapter ,,xxii47#a7 ,objective ,view of the ,intellect4 ,there are two fundamentally different ways of regarding the intellect1 which depend upon the difference of the point of view1 and1 much as they are opposed to each other in consequence of this1 must yet be brought into agreement4 ,one is the subjective1 which1 starting from within and taking the consciousness as the given1 shows us by what mechanism the world exhibits itself in it1 and how1 out of the materials which the senses and the understanding provide1 it constructs itself in it4 ,we must look upon ,locke as the originator of this method of consideration2 ,kant brought it to incomparably higher perfection2 and our first book also1 together with its supplements1 are devoted to it4 ,the method of considering the intellect which is opposed to this is the objective1 which starts from without1 takes as its object not our own consciousness1 but the beings given in outward experience1 conscious of themselves and of the world1 and now investigates the relation of their intellect to their other qualities1 how it has become possible1 how it has become necessary1 and what it accomplishes for them4 ,the standpoint of this method of consideration is the empirical4 ,it takes the world and the animal existences present in it as absolutely given1 in that it starts from them4 ,it is accordingly primarily zoological1 anatomical1 physiological1 and only becomes philosophical by connection with that first method of consideration1 and from the higher point of view thereby attained4 ,the only foundations of this which as yet have been given we owe to zootomists and physiologists1 for the most part ,french4 ,here ,cabanis is specially to be named1 whose excellent work1 8,des rapports du physique au moral10 is initiatory of this method of consideration on the path of physiology4 ,the famous ,bichat was his contemporary1 but his theme was a much more comprehensive one4 ,even ,gall may be named here1 although his chief aim was missed4 ,ignorance and prejudice have raised against this method of consideration the accusation of materialism1 because1 adhering simply to experience1 it does not know the immaterial substance1 soul4 ,the most recent advances in the physiology of the nervous system1 through ,sir ,charles ,bell1 ,magendie1 ,marshall ,hall1 and others1 have also enriched and corrected the material of this method of consideration4 ,a philosophy which1 like the ,kantian1 entirely ignores this point of view for the intellect is onesided1 and consequently inadequate4 ,it leaves an impassable gulf between our philosophical and our physiological knowledge1 with which we can never find satisfaction4 ,although what ,i have said in the two preceding chapters concerning the life and the activity of the brain belongs to this method of consideration1 and in the same way all the discussions to be found under the heading1 8,pflanzenphysiologie10 in the essay1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 and also a portion of those under the heading 8,vergleichende ,anatomie10 are devoted to it1 the following exposition of its results in general will be by no means superfluous4 ,we become most vividly conscious of the glaring contrast between the two methods of considering the intellect opposed to each other above if we carry the matter to the extreme and realise that what the one1 as reflective thought and vivid perception1 directly assumes and makes its material is for the other nothing more than the physiological function of an internal organ1 the brain2 nay1 that we are justified in asserting that the whole objective world1 so boundless in space1 so infinite in time1 so unsearchable in its perfection1 is really only a certain movement or affection of the pulpy matter in the skull4 ,we then ask in astonishment3 what is this brain whose function produces such a phenomenon of all phenomena8 ,what is the matter which can be refined and potentiated to such a pulp that the stimulation of a few of its particles becomes the conditional supporter of the existence of an objective world8 ,the fear of such questions led to the hypothesis of the simple substance of an immaterial soul1 which merely dwelt in the brain4 ,we say boldly3 this pulp also1 like every vegetable or animal part1 is an organic structure1 like all its poorer relations in the inferior accommodation of the heads of our irrational brethren1 down to the lowest1 which scarcely apprehends at all2 yet that organic pulp is the last product of nature1 which presupposes all the rest4 ,but in itself1 and outside the idea1 the brain also1 like everything else1 is will4 ,for existing for another is being perceived2 being in itself is willing3 upon this it depends that on the purely objective path we never attain to the inner nature of things2 but if we attempt to find their inner nature from without and empirically1 this inner always becomes an outer again in our hands1--the pith of the tree1 as well as its bark2 the heart of the animal1 as well as its hide2 the white and the yolk of an egg1 as well as its shell4 ,on the other hand1 upon the subjective path the inner is accessible to us at every moment2 for we find it as the will primarily in ourselves1 and must1 by the clue of the analogy with our own nature1 be able to solve that of others1 in that we attain to the insight that a being in itself independent of being known1 i4e41 of exhibiting itself in an intellect1 is only conceivable as willing4 ,if now1 in the objective comprehension of the intellect1 we go back as far as we possibly can1 we shall find that the necessity or the need of knowledge in general arises from the multiplicity and the separate existence of beings1 thus from individuation4 ,for suppose there only existed a single being1 such a being would have no need of knowledge3 because nothing would exist which was different from it1 and whose existence it would therefore have to take up into itself indirectly through knowledge1 i4e41 image and concept4 ,it would itself already be all in all1 and therefore there would remain nothing for it to know1 i4e41 nothing foreign that could be apprehended as object4 ,in the case of a multiplicity of beings1 on the other hand1 every individual finds itself in a condition of isolation from all the rest1 and hence arises the necessity of knowledge4 ,the nervous system1 by means of which the animal individual primarily becomes conscious of itself1 is bounded by a skin2 yet in the brain that has attained to intellect it passes beyond this limit by means of its form of knowledge1 causality1 and thus there arises for it perception as a consciousness of other things1 as an image of beings in space and time1 which change in accordance with causality4 ,in this sense it would be more correct to say1 8,only the different is known by the different10 than as ,empedocles said1 8,only the like is known by the like10 which was a very indefinite and ambiguous proposition2 although points of view may certainly also be conceived from which it is true2 as1 for instance1 we may observe in passing that of ,helvetius when he says so beautifully and happily3 8,il n'y a que l'esprit qui sente l'esprit3 c'est une corde qui ne frmit qu' l'unison10 which corresponds with ,xenophon's 8 0 7sapientem esse opportet eum1 qui sapientem agniturus sit71 and is a great sorrow4 ,but now1 again1 from the other side we know that multiplicity of similars only becomes possible through time and space2 thus through the forms of our knowledge4 ,space first arises in that the knowing subject sees externally2 it is the manner in which the subject comprehends something as different from itself4 ,but we also saw knowledge in general conditioned by multiplicity and difference4 ,thus knowledge and multiplicity1 or individuation1 stand and fall together1 for they reciprocally condition each other4 ,hence it must be inferred that1 beyond the phenomenon in the true being of all things1 to which time and space1 and consequently also multiplicity1 must be foreign1 there can also be no knowledge4 ,buddhism defines this as ,pratschna ,paramita1 i4e41 that which is beyond all knowledge 7,j4 ,j4 ,schmidt1 8,on the ,maha,jana and ,pratschna ,paramita074 ,a 8knowledge of things in themselves10 in the strictest sense of the word1 would accordingly be already impossible from the fact that where the thing in itself begins knowledge ceases1 and all knowledge is essentially concerned only with phenomena4 ,for it springs from a limitation1 by which it is made necessary1 in order to extend the limits4 ,for the objective consideration the brain is the efflorescence of the organism2 therefore only where the latter has attained its highest perfection and complexity does the brain appear in its greatest development4 ,but in the preceding chapter we have recognised the organism as the objectification of the will2 therefore the brain also1 as a part of it1 must belong to this objectification4 ,further1 from the fact that the organism is only the visibility of the will1 thus in itself is the will1 ,i have deduced that every affection of the organism at once and directly affects the will1 i4e41 is felt as agreeable or painful4 ,yet1 with the heightening of sensibility1 in the higher development of the nervous system1 the possibility arises that in the nobler1 i4e41 the objective1 organs of sense 7sight and hearing7 the exquisitely delicate affections proper to them are perceived without in themselves and directly affecting the will1 that is1 without being either painful or agreeable1 and that therefore they appear in consciousness as indifferent1 merely perceived1 sensations4 ,but in the brain this heightening of sensibility reaches such a high degree that upon received impressions of sense a reaction even takes place1 which does not proceed directly from the will1 but is primarily a spontaneity of the function of understanding1 which makes the transition from the directly perceived sensation of the senses to its cause2 and since the brain then at once produces the form of space1 there thus arises the perception of an external object4 ,we may therefore regard the point at which the understanding makes the transition from the mere sensation upon the retina1 which is still a mere affection of the body and therefore of the will1 to the cause of that sensation1 which it projects by means of its form of space1 as something external and different from its own body1 as the boundary between the world as will and the world as idea1 or as the birthplace of the latter4 ,in man1 however1 the spontaneity of the activity of the brain1 which in the last instance is certainly conferred by the will1 goes further than mere perception and immediate comprehension of causal relations4 ,it extends to the construction of abstract conceptions out of these perceptions1 and to operating with these conceptions1 i4e41 to thinking1 as that in which his reason consists4 ,thoughts are therefore furthest removed from the affections of the body1 which1 since the body is the objectification of the will1 may1 through increased intensity1 pass at once into pain1 even in the organs of sense4 ,accordingly idea and thought may also be regarded as the efflorescence of the will1 because they spring from the highest perfection and development of the organism2 but the organism1 in itself and apart from the idea1 is the will4 ,of course1 in my explanation1 the existence of the body presupposes the world of idea2 inasmuch as it also1 as body or real object1 is only in this world2 and1 on the other hand1 the idea itself just as much presupposes the body1 for it arises only through the function of an organ of the body4 ,that which lies at the foundation of the whole phenomenon1 that in it which alone has being in itself and is original1 is exclusively the will2 for it is the will which through this very process assumes the form of the idea1 i4e41 enters the secondary existence of an objective world1 or the sphere of the knowable4 ,philosophers before ,kant1 with few exceptions1 approached the explanation of the origin of our knowledge from the wrong side4 ,they set out from a socalled soul1 an existence whose inner nature and peculiar function consisted in thinking1 and indeed quite specially in abstract thinking1 with mere conceptions1 which belonged to it the more completely the further they lay from all perception4 7,i beg to refer here to the note at the end of #f of my prize essay on the foundation of morals47 ,this soul has in some inconceivable manner entered the body1 and there it is only disturbed in its pure thinking1 first by impressions of the senses and perceptions1 still more by the desires which these excite1 and finally by the emotions1 nay1 passions1 to which these desires develop2 while the characteristic and original element of this soul is mere abstract thinking1 and given up to this it has only universals1 inborn conceptions1 and tern veritates for its objects1 and leaves everything perceptible lying far below it4 ,hence1 also1 arises the contempt with which even now 8sensibility0 and the sensuous are referred to by professors of philosophy1 nay1 are even made the chief source of immorality1 while it is just the senses which are the genuine and innocent source of all our knowledge1 from which all thinking must first borrow its material1 for in combination with the a priori functions of the intellect they produce the perception4 ,one might really suppose that in speaking of sensibility these gentlemen always think only of the pretended sixth sense of the ,french4 ,thus1 as we have said1 in the process of knowledge1 its ultimate product was made that which is first and original in it1 and accordingly the matter was taken hold of by the wrong end4 ,according to my exposition1 the intellect springs from the organism1 and thereby from the will1 and hence could not be without the latter4 ,thus1 without the will it would also find no material to occupy it2 for everything that is knowable is just the objectification of the will4 ,but not only the perception of the external world1 or the consciousness of other things1 is conditioned by the brain and its functions1 but also selfconsciousness4 ,the will in itself is without consciousness1 and remains so in the greater part of its phenomena4 ,the secondary world of idea must be added1 in order that it may become conscious of itself1 just as light only becomes visible through the bodies which reflect it1 and without them loses itself in darkness without producing any effect4 ,because the will1 with the aim of comprehending its relations to the external world1 produces a brain in the animal individual1 the consciousness of its own self arises in it1 by means of the subject of knowledge1 which comprehends things as existing and the ego as willing4 ,the sensibility1 which reaches its highest degree in the brain1 but is yet dispersed through its different parts1 must first of all collect all the rays of its activity1 concentrate them1 as it were1 in a focus1 which1 however1 does not lie without1 as in the case of the concave mirror1 but within1 as in the convex mirror4 ,with this point now it first describes the line of time1 upon which1 therefore1 all that it presents to itself as idea must exhibit itself1 and which is the first and most essential form of all knowledge1 or the form of inner sense4 ,this focus of the whole activity of the brain is what ,kant called the synthetic unity of apperception 7cf4 vol4 ii4 p4 #dge74 ,only by means of this does the will become conscious of itself1 because this focus of the activity of the brain1 or that which knows1 apprehends itself as identical with its own basis1 from which it springs1 that which wills2 and thus the ego arises4 ,yet this focus of the brain activity remains primarily a mere subject of knowledge1 and as such capable of being the cold and impartial spectator1 the mere guide and counsellor of the will1 and also of comprehending the external world in a purely objective manner1 without reference to the will and its weal or woe4 ,but whenever it turns within1 it recognises the will as the basis of its own phenomenon1 and therefore combines with it in the consciousness of an ego4 ,that focus of the activity of the brain 7or the subject of knowledge7 is indeed1 as an indivisible point1 simple1 but yet is not on this account a substance 7soul71 but a mere condition or state4 ,that of which it is itself a condition or state can only be known by it indirectly1 as it were through reflection4 ,but the ceasing of this state must not be regarded as the annihilation of that of which it is a state4 ,this knowing and conscious ego is related to the will1 which is the basis of its phenomenal appearance1 as the picture in the focus of a concave mirror is related to the mirror itself1 and has1 like that picture1 only a conditioned1 nay1 really a merely apparent1 reality4 ,far from being the absolutely first 7as1 for example1 ,fichte teaches71 it is at bottom tertiary1 for it presupposes the organism1 and the organism presupposes the will4 ,i admit that all that is said here is really only an image and a figure1 and in part also hypothetical2 but we stand at a point to which thought can scarcely reach1 not to speak of proof4 ,i therefore request the reader to compare with this what ,i have adduced at length on this subject in chapter #bj4 ,now1 although the true being of everything that exists consists in its will1 and knowledge together with consciousness are only added at the higher grades of the phenomenon as something secondary1 yet we find that the difference which the presence and the different degree of consciousness places between one being and another is exceedingly great and of important results4 ,the subjective existence of the plant we must think of as a weak analogue1 a mere shadow of comfort and discomfort2 and even in this exceedingly weak degree the plant knows only of itself1 not of anything outside of it4 ,on the other hand1 even the lowest animal standing next to it is forced by increased and more definitely specified wants to extend the sphere of its existence beyond the limits of its own body4 ,this takes place through knowledge4 ,it has a dim apprehension of its immediate surroundings1 out of which the motives for its action with a view to its own maintenance arise4 ,thus accordingly the medium of motives appears1 and this is--the world existing objectively in time and space1 the world as idea1 however weak1 obscure1 and dimly dawning this first and lowest example of it may be4 ,but it imprints itself ever more and more distinctly1 ever wider and deeper1 in proportion as in the ascending scale of animal organisations the brain is ever more perfectly produced4 ,this progress in the development of the brain1 thus of the intellect1 and of the clearness of the idea1 at each of these ever higher grades is1 however1 brought about by the constantly increasing and more complicated wants of this phenomenon of the will4 ,this must always first afford the occasion for it1 for without necessity nature 7i4e41 the will which objectifies itself in it7 produces nothing1 least of all the hardest of its productions--a more perfect brain3 in consequence of its lex parsimoni3 natura nihil agit frustra et nihil facit supervacaneum4 ,it has provided every animal with the organs which are necessary for its sustenance and the weapons necessary for its conflict1 as ,i have shown at length in my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 under the heading1 8,vergleichende ,anatomie40 ,according to this measure1 therefore1 it imparts to each the most important of those organs concerned with what is without1 the brain1 with its function the intellect4 ,the more complicated1 through higher development1 its organisation became1 the more multifarious and specially determined did its wants also become1 and consequently the more difficult and the more dependent upon opportunity was the provision of what would satisfy them4 ,thus there was needed here a wider range of sight1 a more accurate comprehension1 a more correct distinction of things in the external world1 in all their circumstances and relations4 ,accordingly we see the faculty of forming ideas1 and its organs1 brain1 nerves1 and special senses1 appear ever more perfect the higher we advance in the scale of animals2 and in proportion as the cerebral system develops1 the external world appears ever more distinct1 manysided1 and complete in consciousness4 ,the comprehension of it now demands ever more attention1 and ultimately in such a degree that sometimes its relation to the will must momentarily be lost sight of in order that it may take place more purely and correctly4 ,quite definitely this first appears in the case of man4 ,with him alone does a pure separation of knowing and willing take place4 ,this is an important point1 which ,i merely touch on here in order to indicate its position1 and be able to take it up again later4 ,but1 like all the rest1 nature takes this last step also in extending and perfecting the brain1 and thereby in increasing the powers of knowledge1 only in consequence of the increased needs1 thus in the service of the will4 ,what this aims at and attains in man is indeed essentially the same1 and not more than what is also its goal in the brutes--nourishment and propagation4 ,but the requisites for the attainment of this goal became so much increased in number1 and of so much higher quality and greater definiteness through the organisation of man1 that a very much more considerable heightening of the intellect than the previous steps demanded was necessary1 or at least was the easiest means of reaching the end4 ,but since now the intellect1 in accordance with its nature1 is a tool of the most various utility1 and is equally applicable to the most different kinds of ends1 nature1 true to her spirit of parsimony1 could now meet through it alone all the demands of the wants which had now become so manifold4 ,therefore she sent forth man without clothing1 without natural means of protection or weapons of attack1 nay1 with relatively little muscular power1 combined with great frailty and little endurance of adverse influences and wants1 in reliance upon that one great tool1 in addition to which she had only to retain the hands from the next grade below him1 the ape4 ,but through the predominating intellect which here appears not only is the comprehension of motives1 their multiplicity1 and in general the horizon of the aims infinitely increased1 but also the distinctness with which the will is conscious of itself is enhanced in the highest degree in consequence of the clearness of the whole consciousness which has been brought about1 which is supported by the capacity for abstract knowledge1 and now attains to complete reflectiveness4 ,but thereby1 and also through the vehemence of the will1 which is necessarily presupposed as the supporter of such a heightened intellect1 an intensifying of all the emotions appears1 and indeed the possibility of the passions1 which1 properly speaking1 are unknown to the brute4 ,for the vehemence of the will keeps pace with the advance of intelligence1 because this advance really always springs from the increased needs and pressing demands of the will3 besides this1 however1 the two reciprocally support each other4 ,thus the vehemence of the character corresponds to the greater energy of the beating of the heart and the circulation of the blood1 which physically heighten the activity of the brain4 ,on the other hand1 the clearness of the intelligence intensifies the emotions1 which are called forth by the outward circumstances1 by means of the more vivid apprehension of the latter4 ,hence1 for example1 young calves quietly allow themselves to be packed in a cart and carried off2 but young lions1 if they are only separated from their mother1 remain permanently restless1 and roar unceasingly from morning to night2 children in such a position would cry and vex themselves almost to death4 ,the vivaciousness and impetuosity of the ape is in exact proportion to its greatly developed intellect4 ,it depends just on this reciprocal relationship that man is1 in general1 capable of far greater sorrows than the brute1 but also of greater joy in satisfied and pleasing emotions4 ,in the same way his higher intelligence makes him more sensible to ennui than the brute2 but it also becomes1 if he is individually very complete1 an inexhaustible source of entertainment4 ,thus1 as a whole1 the manifestation of the will in man is related to that in the brute of the higher species1 as a note that has been struck to its fifth pitched two or three octaves lower4 ,but between the different kinds of brutes also the differences of intellect1 and thereby of consciousness1 are great and endlessly graduated4 ,the mere analogy of consciousness which we must yet attribute to plants will be related to the still far deader subjective nature of an unorganised body1 very much as the consciousness of the lowest species of animals is related to the quasi consciousness of plants4 ,we may present to our imagination the innumerable gradations in the degree of consciousness under the figure of the different velocity of points which are unequally distant from the centre of a revolving sphere4 ,but the most correct1 and indeed1 as our third book teaches1 the natural figure of that gradation is afforded us by the scale in its whole compass from the lowest audible note to the highest4 ,it is1 however1 the grade of consciousness which determines the grade of existence of a being4 ,for every immediate existence is subjective3 the objective existence is in the consciousness of another1 thus only for this other1 consequently quite indirect4 ,through the grade of consciousness beings are as different as through the will they are alike1 for the will is what is common to them all4 ,but what we have now considered between the plant and the animal1 and then between the different species of animals1 occurs also between man and man4 ,here also that which is secondary1 the intellect1 by means of the clearness of consciousness and distinctness of knowledge which depends upon it1 constitutes a fundamental and immeasurably great difference in the whole manner of the existence1 and thereby in the grade of it4 ,the higher the consciousness has risen1 the more distinct and connected are the thoughts1 the clearer the perceptions the more intense the sensations4 ,through it everything gains more depth3 emotion1 sadness1 joy1 and sorrow4 ,commonplace blockheads are not even capable of real joy3 they live on in dull insensibility4 ,while to one man his consciousness only presents his own existence1 together with the motives which must be apprehended for the purpose of sustaining and enlivening it1 in a bare comprehension of the external world1 it is to another a camera obscura in which the macrocosm exhibits itself3 8,he feels that he holds a little world ,brooding in his brain1 ,that it begins to work and to live1 ,that he fain would give it forth40 ,the difference of the whole manner of existence which the extremes of the gradation of intellectual capacity establish between man and man is so great that that between a king and a day labourer seems small in comparison4 ,and here also1 as in the case of the species of animals1 a connection between the vehemence of the will and the height of the intellect can be shown4 ,genius is conditioned by a passionate temperament1 and a phlegmatic genius is inconceivable3 it seems as if an exceptionally vehement1 thus a violently longing1 will must be present if nature is to give an abnormally heightened intellect1 as corresponding to it2 while the merely physical account of this points to the greater energy with which the arteries of the head move the brain and increase its turgescence4 ,certainly1 however1 the quantity1 quality1 and form of the brain itself is the other and incomparably more rare condition of genius4 ,on the other hand1 phlegmatic persons are as a rule of very moderate mental power2 and thus the northern1 coldblooded1 and phlegmatic nations are in general noticeably inferior in mind to the southern vivacious and passionate peoples2 although1 as ,bacon7#b7 has most pertinently remarked1 if once a man of a northern nation is highly gifted by nature1 he can then reach a grade which no southern ever attains to4 ,it is accordingly as perverse as it is common to take the great minds of different nations as the standard for comparing their mental powers3 for that is just attempting to prove the rule by the exceptions4 ,it is rather the great majority of each nation that one has to consider3 for one swallow does not make a summer4 ,we have further to remark here that that very passionateness which is a condition of genius1 bound up with its vivid apprehension of things1 produces in practical life1 where the will comes into play1 and especially in the case of sudden occurrences1 so great an excitement of the emotions that it disturbs and confuses the intellect2 while the phlegmatic man in such a case still retains the full use of his mental faculties1 though they are much more limited1 and then accomplishes much more with them than the greatest genius can achieve4 ,accordingly a passionate temperament is favourable to the original quality of the intellect1 but a phlegmatic temperament to its use4 ,therefore genius proper is only for theoretical achievements1 for which it can choose and await its time1 which will just be the time at which the will is entirely at rest1 and no waves disturb the clear mirror of the comprehension of the world4 ,on the other hand1 genius is ill adapted and unserviceable for practical life1 and is therefore for the most part unfortunate4 ,goethe's 8,tasso0 is written from this point of view4 ,as now genius proper depends upon the absolute strength of the intellect1 which must be purchased by a correspondingly excessive vehemence of disposition1 so1 on the other hand1 the great pre eminence in practical life that makes generals and statesmen depends upon the relative strength of the intellect1 thus upon the highest degree of it that can be attained without too great excitability of the emotions1 and too great vehemence of character1 and that therefore can hold its own even in the storm4 ,great firmness of will and constancy of mind1 together with a capable and fine understanding1 are here sufficient2 and whatever goes beyond this acts detrimentally1 for too great a development of the intelligence directly impedes firmness of character and resolution of will4 ,hence this kind of eminence is not so abnormal1 and is a hundred times less rare than the former kind2 and accordingly we see great generals and great ministers appear in every age1 whenever the merely external conditions are favourable to their efficiency4 ,great poets and philosophers1 on the other hand1 leave centuries waiting for them2 and yet humanity may be contented even with this rare appearance of them1 for their works remain1 and do not exist only for the present1 like the achievements of those other men4 ,it is also quite in keeping with the law of the parsimony of nature referred to above that it bestows great eminence of mind in general upon very few1 and genius only as the rarest of all exceptions1 while it equips the great mass of the human race with no more mental power than is required for the maintenance of the individual and the species4 ,for the great1 and through their very satisfaction1 constantly increasing needs of the human race make it necessary that the great majority of men should pass their lives in occupations of a coarsely physical and entirely mechanical description4 ,and what would be the use to them of an active mind1 a glowing imagination1 a subtle understanding1 and a profoundly penetrating intellect8 ,these would only make them useless and unhappy4 ,therefore nature has thus gone about the most costly of all her productions in the least extravagant manner4 ,in order not to judge unfairly one ought also to settle definitely one's expectations of the mental achievements of men generally from this point of view1 and to regard1 for example1 even learned men1 since as a rule they have become so only by the force of outward circumstances1 primarily as men whom nature really intended to be tillers of the soil2 indeed even professors of philosophy ought to be estimated according to this standard1 and then their achievements will be found to come up to all fair expectations4 ,it is worth noticing that in the south1 where the necessities of life press less severely upon the human race1 and more leisure is allowed1 the mental faculties even of the multitude also become more active and finer4 ,it is physiologically noteworthy that the preponderance of the mass of the brain over that of the spinal cord and the nerves1 which1 according to ,smmerring's acute discovery1 affords the true and closest measure of the degree of intelligence both of species of brutes and of individual men1 at the same time increases the direct power of moving1 the agility of the limbs2 because1 through the great inequality of the relation1 the dependence of all motor nerves upon the brain becomes more decided2 and besides this the cerebellum1 which is the primary controller of movements1 shares the qualitative perfection of the cerebrum2 thus through both all voluntary movements gain greater facility1 rapidity1 and manageableness1 and by the concentration of the startingpoint of all activity that arises which ,lichtenberg praises in ,garrick3 8that he appeared to be present in all the muscles of his body40 ,hence clumsiness in the movement of the body indicates clumsiness in the movement of the thoughts1 and will be regarded as a sign of stupidity both in individuals and nations1 as much as sleepiness of the countenance and vacancy of the glance4 ,another symptom of the physiological state of the case referred to is the fact that many persons are obliged at once to stand still whenever their conversation with any one who is walking with them begins to gain some connection2 because their brain1 as soon as it has to link together a few thoughts1 has no longer as much power over as is required to keep the limbs in motion by means of the motory nerves1 so closely is everything measured with them4 ,it results from this whole objective consideration of the intellect and its origin1 that it is designed for the comprehension of those ends upon the attainment of which depends the individual life and its propagation1 but by no means for deciphering the inner nature of things and of the world1 which exists independently of the knower4 ,what to the plant is the susceptibility to light1 in consequence of which it guides its growth in the direction of it1 that is1 in kind1 the knowledge of the brute1 nay1 even of man1 although in degree it is increased in proportion as the needs of each of these beings demand4 ,with them all apprehension remains a mere consciousness of their relations to other things1 and is by no means intended to present again in the consciousness of the knower the peculiar1 absolutely real nature of these things4 ,rather1 as springing from the will1 the intellect is also only designed for its service1 thus for the apprehension of motives2 it is adapted for this1 and is therefore of a thoroughly practical tendency4 ,this also holds good if we conceive the significance of life as ethical2 for in this regard too we find man knowing only for the benefit of his conduct4 ,such a faculty of knowledge1 existing exclusively for practical ends1 will from its nature always comprehend only the relations of things to each other1 but not the inner nature of them1 as it is in itself4 ,but to regard the complex of these relations as the absolute nature of the world as it is in itself1 and the manner in which it necessarily exhibits itself in accordance with the laws predisposed in the brain as the eternal laws of the existence of all things1 and then to construct ontology1 cosmology1 and theology in accordance with this view--this was really the old fundamental error1 of which ,kant's teaching has made an end4 ,here1 then1 our objective1 and therefore for the most part physiological consideration of the intellect meets his transcendental consideration of it2 nay1 appears in a certain sense even as an a priori insight into it2 for1 from a point of view which we have taken up outside of it1 our objective view enables us to know in its origin1 and therefore as necessary1 what that transcendental consideration1 starting from facts of consciousness1 presents only as a matter of fact4 ,for it follows from our objective consideration of the intellect1 that the world as idea1 as it exists stretched out in space and time1 and moves on regularly according to the strict law of causality1 is primarily only a physiological phenomenon1 a function of the brain1 which brings it about1 certainly upon the occasion of certain external stimuli1 but yet in conformity with its own laws4 ,accordingly it is beforehand a matter of course1 that what goes on in this function itself1 and therefore through it and for it1 must by no means be regarded as the nature of things in themselves1 which exist independently of it and are entirely different from it1 but primarily exhibits only the mode or manner of this function itself1 which can always receive only a very subordinate modification through that which exists completely independently of it1 and sets it in motion as a stimulus4 ,as1 then1 ,locke claimed for the organs of sense all that comes into our apprehension by means of the sensation1 in order to deny that it belongs to things in themselves1 so ,kant1 with the same intention1 and pursuing the same path further1 has proved all that makes perception proper possible1 thus space1 time1 and causality1 to be functions of the brain2 although he has refrained from using this physiological expression1 to which1 however1 our present method of investigation1 coming from the opposite side1 the side of the real1 necessarily leads us4 ,kant arrived upon his analytical path at the result that what we know are mere phenomena4 ,what this mysterious expression really means becomes clear from our objective and genetic investigation of the intellect4 ,the phenomena are the motives for the aims of individual will as they exhibit themselves in the intellect which the will has produced for this purpose 7which itself appears as a phenomenon objectively1 as the brain71 and which1 when comprehended1 as far as one can follow their concatenation1 afford us in their connection the world which extends itself objectively in time and space1 and which ,i call the world as idea4 ,moreover1 from our point of view1 the objectionable element vanishes which in the ,kantian doctrine arises from the fact that1 because the intellect knows merely phenomena instead of things as they are in themselves1 nay1 in consequence of this is led astray into paralogisms and unfounded hypostases by means of 8sophistications1 not of men but of the reason itself1 from which even the wisest does not free himself1 and if1 perhaps indeed after much trouble1 he avoids error1 can yet never get quit of the illusion which unceasingly torments and mocks him0--because of all this1 ,i say1 the appearance arises that our intellect is intentionally designed to lead us into errors4 ,for the objective view of the intellect given here1 which contains a genesis of it1 makes it conceivable that1 being exclusively intended for practical ends1 it is merely the medium of motives1 and therefore fulfils its end by an accurate presentation of these1 and that if we undertake to discover the nature of things in themselves1 from the manifold phenomena which here exhibit themselves objectively to us1 and their laws1 we do this at our own peril and on our own responsibility4 ,we have recognised that the original inner force of nature1 without knowledge and working in the dark1 which1 if it has worked its way up to selfconsciousness1 reveals itself to this as will1 attains to this grade only by the production of an animal brain and of knowledge1 as its function1 whereupon the phenomenon of the world of perception arises in this brain4 ,but to explain this mere brain phenomenon1 with the conformity to law which is invariably connected with its functions1 as the objective inner nature of the world and the things in it1 which is independent of the brain1 existing before and after it1 is clearly a spring which nothing warrants us in making4 ,from this mundus phnomenon1 however1 from this perception which arises under such a variety of conditions1 all our conceptions are drawn4 ,they have all their content from it1 or even only in relation to it4 ,therefore1 as ,kant says1 they are only for immanent1 not for transcendental1 use2 that is to say1 these conceptions of ours1 this first material of thought1 and consequently still more the judgments which result from their combination1 are unfitted for the task of thinking the nature of things in themselves1 and the true connection of the world and existence2 indeed1 to undertake this is analogous to expressing the stereometrical content of a body in square inches4 ,for our intellect1 originally only intended to present to an individual will its paltry aims1 comprehends accordingly mere relations of things1 and does not penetrate to their inner being1 to their real nature4 ,it is therefore a merely superficial force1 clings to the surface of things1 and apprehends mere species transitivas1 not the true being of things4 ,from this it arises that we cannot understand and comprehend any single thing1 even the simplest and smallest1 through and through1 but something remains entirely inexplicable to us in each of them4 ,just because the intellect is a product of nature1 and is therefore only intended for its ends1 the ,christian mystics have very aptly called it 8the light of nature10 and driven it back within its limits2 for nature is the object to which alone it is the subject4 ,the thought from which the ,critique of ,pure ,reason has sprung really lies already at the foundation of this expression4 ,that we cannot comprehend the world on the direct path1 i4e41 through the uncritical1 direct application of the intellect and its data1 but when we reflect upon it become ever more deeply involved in insoluble mysteries1 points to the fact that the intellect1 thus knowledge itself1 is secondary1 a mere product1 brought about by the development of the inner being of the world1 which consequently till then preceded it1 and it at last appeared as a breaking through to the light out of the obscure depths of the unconscious striving the nature of which exhibits itself as will to the selfconsciousness which now at once arises4 ,that which preceded knowledge as its condition1 whereby it first became possible1 thus its own basis1 cannot be directly comprehended by it2 as the eye cannot see itself4 ,it is rather the relations of one existence to another1 exhibiting themselves upon the surface of things1 which alone are its affair1 and are so only by means of the apparatus of the intellect1 its forms1 space1 time1 and causality4 ,just because the world has made itself without the assistance of knowledge1 its whole being does not enter into knowledge1 but knowledge presupposes the existence of the world2 on which account the origin of the world does not lie within its sphere4 ,it is accordingly limited to the relations between the things which lie before it1 and is thus sufficient for the individual will1 for the service of which alone it appeared4 ,for the intellect is1 as has been shown1 conditioned by nature1 lies in it1 belongs to it1 and cannot therefore place itself over against it as something quite foreign to it1 in order thus to take up into itself its whole nature1 absolutely1 objectively1 and thoroughly4 ,it can1 if fortune favours it1 understand all that is in nature1 but not nature itself1 at least not directly4 ,however discouraging to metaphysics this essential limitation of the intellect may be1 which arises from its nature and origin1 it has yet another side which is very consoling4 ,it deprives the direct utterances of nature of their unconditional validity1 in the assertion of which naturalism proper consists4 ,if1 therefore1 nature presents to us every living thing as appearing out of nothing1 and1 after an ephemeral existence1 returning again for ever to nothing1 and if it seems to take pleasure in the unceasing production of new beings1 in order that it may be able unceasingly to destroy1 and1 on the other hand1 is unable to bring anything permanent to light2 if accordingly we are forced to recognise matter as that which alone is permanent1 which never came into being and never passes away1 but brings forth all things from its womb1 whence its name appears to be derived from mater rerum1 and along with it1 as the father of things1 form1 which1 just as fleeting as matter is permanent1 changes really every moment1 and can only maintain itself so long as it clings as a parasite to matter 7now to one part of it1 now to another71 but when once it entirely loses hold1 disappears1 as is shown by the palotheria and the ichthyosaurians1 we must indeed recognise this as the direct and genuine utterance of nature1 but on account of the origin of the intellect explained above1 and the nature of it which results from this origin1 we cannot ascribe to this utterance an unconditional truth1 but rather only an entirely conditional truth1 which ,kant has appropriately indicated as such by calling it the phenomenon in opposition to the thing in itself4 ,if1 in spite of this essential limitation of the intellect1 it is possible1 by a circuitous route1 to arrive at a certain understanding of the world and the nature of things1 by means of reflection widely pursued1 and the skilful combination of objective knowledge directed towards without1 with the data of selfconsciousness1 this will yet be only a very limited1 entirely indirect1 and relative understanding1 a parabolical translation into the forms of knowledge1 thus a quadam prodire tenus1 which must always leave many problems still unsolved4 ,on the other hand1 the fundamental error of the old dogmatism in all its forms1 which was destroyed by ,kant1 was this1 that it started absolutely from knowledge1 i4e41 the world as idea1 in order to deduce and construct from its laws being in general1 whereby it accepted that world of idea1 together with its laws1 as absolutely existing and absolutely real2 while its whole existence is throughout relative1 and a mere result or phenomenon of the true being which lies at its foundation1--or1 in other words1 that it constructed an ontology when it had only materials for a dianoiology4 ,kant discovered the subjectively conditioned and therefore entirely immanent nature of knowledge1 i4e41 its unsuitableness for transcendental use1 from the constitution of knowledge itself2 and therefore he very appropriately called his doctrine the ,critique of ,reason4 ,he accomplished this partly by showing the important and thoroughly a priori part of all knowledge1 which1 as throughout subjective1 spoils all objectivity1 and partly by professedly proving that if they were followed out to the end the principles of knowledge1 taken as purely objective1 led to contradictions4 ,he had1 however1 hastily assumed that1 apart from objective knowledge1 i4e41 apart from the world as idea1 there is nothing given us except conscience1 out of which he constructed the little that still remained of metaphysics1 his moral theology1 to which1 however1 he attributed absolutely only a practical validity1 and no theoretical validity at all4 ,he had overlooked that although certainly objective knowledge1 or the world as idea1 affords nothing but phenomena1 together with their phenomenal connection and regressus1 yet our own nature necessarily also belongs to the world of things in themselves1 for it must have its root in it4 ,but here1 even if the root itself cannot be brought to light1 it must be possible to gather some data for the explanation of the connection of the world of phenomena with the inner nature of things4 ,thus here lies the path upon which ,i have gone beyond ,kant and the limits which he drew1 yet always restricting myself to the ground of reflection1 and consequently of honesty1 and therefore without the vain pretension of intellectual intuition or absolute thought which characterises the period of pseudophilosophy between ,kant and me4 ,in his proof of the insufficiency of rational knowledge to fathom the nature of the world ,kant started from knowledge as a fact1 which our consciousness affords us1 thus in this sense he proceeded a posteriori4 ,but in this chapter1 and also in my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 ,i have sought to show what knowledge is in its nature and origin1 something secondary1 designed for individual ends2 whence it follows that it must be insufficient to fathom the nature of the world4 ,thus so far ,i have reached the same goal a priori4 ,but one never knows anything wholly and completely until one has gone right round it for that purpose1 and has got back to it from the opposite side from which one started4 ,therefore also1 in the case of the important fundamental knowledge here considered1 one must not merely go from the intellect to the knowledge of the world1 as ,kant has done1 but also from the world1 taken as given1 to the intellect1 as ,i have undertaken here4 ,then this physiological consideration1 in the wider sense1 becomes the supplement of that ideological1 as the ,french say1 or1 more accurately1 transcendental consideration4 ,in the above1 in order not to break the thread of the exposition1 ,i have postponed the explanation of one point which ,i touched upon4 ,it was this1 that in proportion as1 in the ascending series of animals1 the intellect appears ever more developed and complete1 knowledge always separates itself more distinctly from will1 and thereby becomes purer4 ,what is essential upon this point will be found in my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 under the heading1 8,pflanzenphysiologie0 7p4 #fhgb of the second1 and #gdgg of the third edition71 to which ,i refer1 in order to avoid repetition1 and merely add here a few remarks4 ,since the plant possesses neither irritability nor sensibility1 but the will objectifies itself in it only as plastic or reproductive power1 it has neither muscle nor nerve4 ,in the lowest grades of the animal kingdom1 in zoophites1 especially in polyps1 we cannot as yet distinctly recognise the separation of these two constituent parts1 but still we assume their existence1 though in a state of fusion2 because we perceive movements which follow1 not1 as in the case of plants1 upon mere stimuli1 but upon motives1 i4e41 in consequence of a certain apprehension4 ,now in proportion as1 in the ascending series of animals1 the nervous and muscular systems separate ever more distinctly from each other1 till in the vertebrate animals1 and most completely in man1 the former divides into an organic and a cerebral nervous system1 and of these the latter again develops into the excessively complicated apparatus of the cerebrum and cerebellum1 spinal marrow1 cerebral and spinal nerves1 sensory and motor nerve fascicles1 of which only the cerebrum1 together with the sensory nerves depending upon it1 and the posterior spinal nerve fascicles are intended for the apprehension of the motive from the external world1 while all the other parts are intended for the transmission of the motive to the muscles in which the will manifests itself directly2 in the same proportion does the motive separate ever more distinctly in consciousness from the act of will which it calls forth1 thus the idea from the will2 and thereby the objectivity of consciousness constantly increases1 for the ideas exhibit themselves ever more distinctly and purely in it4 ,these two separations are1 however1 really only one and the same1 which we have here considered from two sides1 the objective and the subjective1 or first in the consciousness of other things and then in selfconsciousness4 ,upon the degree of this separation ultimately depends the difference and the gradation of intellectual capacity1 both between different kinds of animals and between individual human beings2 thus it gives the standard for the intellectual completeness of these beings4 ,for the clearness of the consciousness of the external world1 the objectivity of the perception1 depends upon it4 ,in the passage referred to above ,i have shown that the brute only perceives things so far as they are motives for its will1 and that even the most intelligent of the brutes scarcely overstep these limits1 because their intellect is too closely joined to the will from which it has sprung4 ,on the other hand1 even the stupidest man comprehends things in some degree objectively2 for he recognises not merely what they are with reference to him1 but also something of what they are with reference to themselves and to other things4 ,yet in the case of very few does this reach such a degree that they are in a position to examine and judge of anything purely objectively2 but 8that must ,i do1 that must ,i say1 that must ,i believe10 is the goal to which on every occasion their thought hastens in a direct line1 and at which their understanding at once finds welcome rest4 ,for thinking is as unendurable to the weak head as the lifting of a burden to the weak arm2 therefore both hasten to set it down4 ,the objectivity of knowledge1 and primarily of perceptive knowledge1 has innumerable grades1 which depend upon the energy of the intellect and its separation from the will1 and the highest of which is genius1 in which the comprehension of the external world becomes so pure and objective that to it even more reveals itself directly in the individual thing than the individual thing itself1 namely1 the nature of its whole species1 i4e41 its ,platonic ,idea2 which is brought about by the fact that in this case the will entirely vanishes from consciousness4 ,here is the point at which the present investigation1 starting from physiological grounds1 connects itself with the subject of our third book1 the metaphysics of the beautiful1 where sthetic comprehension proper1 which1 in a high degree1 is peculiar to genius alone1 is fully considered as the condition of pure1 i4e41 perfectly willless1 and on that account completely objective knowledge4 ,according to what has been said1 the rise of intelligence1 from the obscurest animal consciousness up to that of man1 is a progressive loosening of the intellect from the will1 which appears complete1 although only as an exception1 in the genius4 ,therefore genius may be defined as the highest grade of the objectivity of knowledge4 ,the condition of this1 which so seldom occurs1 is a decidedly larger measure of intelligence than is required for the service of the will1 which constitutes its basis2 it is accordingly this free surplus which first really properly comes to know the world1 i4e41 comprehends it perfectly objectively1 and now paints pictures1 composes poems1 and thinks in accordance with this comprehension4 ,chapter ,,xxiii47#c7,on ,the ,objectification ,of ,the ,will ,in ,unconscious ,nature4 ,that the will which we find within us does not proceed1 as philosophy has hitherto assumed1 first from knowledge1 and indeed is a mere modification of it1 thus something secondary1 derived1 and1 like knowledge itself1 conditioned by the brain2 but that it is the prius of knowledge1 the kernel of our nature1 and that original force itself which forms and sustains the animal body1 in that it carries out both its unconscious and its conscious functions2--this is the first step in the fundamental knowledge of my metaphysics4 ,paradoxical as it even now seems to many that the will in itself is without knowledge1 yet the scholastics in some way already recognised and confessed it2 for ,jul4 ,cs4 ,vaninus 7that well known sacrifice to fanaticism and priestly fury71 who was thoroughly versed in their philosophy1 says in his 8,amphitheatro10 p4 #aha3 8,voluntas potentia cca est1 ex scholasticorum opinione40 ,that1 further1 it is that same will which in the plant forms the bud in order to develop the leaf and the flower out of it2 nay1 that the regular form of the crystal is only the trace which its momentary effort has left behind1 and that in general1 as the true and only 1 in the proper sense of the word1 it lies at the foundation of all the forces of unorganised nature1 plays1 acts1 in all their multifarious phenomena1 imparts power to their laws1 and even in the crudest mass manifests itself as gravity2--this insight is the second step in that fundamental knowledge1 and is brought about by further reflection4 ,but it would be the grossest misunderstanding to suppose that this is a mere question of a word to denote an unknown quantity4 ,it is rather the most real of all real knowledge which is here expressed in language4 ,for it is the tracing back of that which is quite inaccessible to our immediate knowledge1 and therefore in its essence foreign and unknown to us1 which we denote by the words force of nature1 to that which is known to us most accurately and intimately1 but which is yet only accessible to us in our own being and directly1 and must therefore be carried over from this to other phenomena4 ,it is the insight that what is inward and original in all the changes and movements of bodies1 however various they may be1 is in its nature identical2 that yet we have only one opportunity of getting to know it more closely and directly1 and that is in the movements of our own body4 ,in consequence of this knowledge we must call it will4 ,it is the insight that that which acts and strives in nature1 and exhibits itself in ever more perfect phenomena1 when it has worked itself up so far that the light of knowledge falls directly upon it1 i4e41 when it has attained to the state of self consciousness--exists as that will1 which is what is most intimately known to us1 and therefore cannot be further explained by anything else1 but rather affords the explanation of all other things4 ,it is accordingly the thing in itself so far as this can ever be reached by knowledge4 ,consequently it is that which must express itself in some way in everything in the world1 for it is the inner nature of the world and the kernel of all phenomena4 ,as my essay1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 specially refers to the subject of this chapter1 and also adduces the evidence of unprejudiced empiricists in favour of this important point of my doctrine1 ,i have only to add now to what is said there a few supplementary remarks1 which are therefore strung together in a somewhat fragmentary manner4 ,first1 then1 with reference to plant life1 ,i draw attention to the remarkable first two chapters of ,aristotle's work upon plants4 ,what is most interesting in them1 as is so often the case with ,aristotle1 are the opinions of earlier profound philosophers quoted by him4 ,we see there that ,anaxagoras and ,empedocles quite rightly taught that plants have the motion of their growth by virtue of their indwelling desires 772 nay1 that they also attributed to them pleasure and pain1 therefore sensation4 ,but ,plato only ascribed to them desires1 and that on account of their strong appetite for nutrition 7cf4 ,plato in the 8,timus10 p4 #djc1 ,bip47 ,aristotle1 on the other hand1 true to his customary method1 glides on the surface of things1 confines himself to single characteristics and conceptions fixed by current expressions1 and asserts that without sensation there can be no desires1 and that plants have not sensation4 ,he is1 however1 in considerable embarrassment1 as his confused language shows1 till here also1 8where fails the comprehension1 a word steps promptly in as deputy10 namely1 1 the faculty of nourishing4 ,plants have this1 and thus a part of the socalled soul1 according to his favourite division into anima vegetativa1 sensitiva1 and intellectiva4 ,this1 however1 is just a scholastic ,quidditas1 and signifies plant nutriuntur quia habent facultatem nutritivam4 ,it is therefore a bad substitute for the more profound research of his predecessors1 whom he is criticising4 ,we also see1 in the second chapter1 that ,empedocles even recognised the sexuality of plants2 which ,aristotle then also finds fault with1 and conceals his want of special knowledge behind general propositions1 such as this1 that plants could not have both sexes combined1 for if so they would be more complete than animals4 ,by quite an analogous procedure he displaces the correct astronomical system of the world of the ,pythagoreans1 and by his absurd fundamental principles1 which he specially explains in the books de ,clo1 introduces the system of ,ptolemy1 whereby mankind was again deprived of an already discovered truth of the greatest importance for almost two thousand years4 ,i cannot refrain from giving here the saying of an excellent biologist of our own time who fully agrees with my teaching4 ,it is ,g4 ,r4 ,treviranus1 who1 in his work1 8,ueber die ,erscheinungen und ,gesetze des organischen ,lebens10 #ahcb1 ,bd4 #b1 ,abth4 #a1 #di1 has said what follows3 8,a form of life is1 however1 conceivable in which the effect of the external upon the internal produces merely feelings of desire or dislike4 ,such is the life of plants4 ,in the higher forms of animal life the external is felt as something objective40 ,treviranus speaks here from pure unprejudiced comprehension of nature1 and is as little conscious of the metaphysical importance of his words as of the contradictio in adjecto which lies in the conception of something 8felt as objective10 a conception which indeed he works out at great length4 ,he does not know that all feeling is essentially subjective1 and all that is objective is1 on the other hand1 perception1 and therefore a product of the understanding4 ,yet this does not detract at all from the truth and importance of what he says4 ,in fact1 in the life of plants the truth that will can exist without knowledge is apparent--one might say palpably recognisable4 ,for here we see a decided effort1 determined by wants1 modified in various ways1 and adapting itself to the difference of the circumstances1 yet clearly without knowledge4 ,and just because the plant is without knowledge it bears its organs of generation ostentatiously in view1 in perfect innocence2 it knows nothing about it4 ,as soon1 on the other hand1 as in the series of existences knowledge appears the organs of generation are transferred to a hidden part4 ,man1 however1 with whom this is again less the case1 conceals them intentionally3 he is ashamed of them4 ,primarily1 then1 the vital force is identical with the will1 but so also are all other forces of nature2 though this is less apparent4 ,if1 therefore1 we find the recognition of a desire1 i4e41 of a will1 as the basis of plant life1 expressed at all times1 with more or less distinctness of conception1 on the other hand1 the reference of the forces of unorganised nature to the same foundation is rarer in proportion as their remoteness from our own nature is greater4 ,in fact1 the boundary between the organised and the unorganised is the most sharply drawn in the whole of nature1 and perhaps the only one that admits of no transgressions2 so that natura non facit saltus seems to suffer an exception here4 ,although certain crystallisations display an external form resembling the vegetable1 yet even between the smallest lichen1 the lowest fungus1 and everything unorganised there remains a fundamental and essential difference4 ,in the unorganised body that which is essential and permanent1 thus that upon which its identity and integrity rests1 is the material1 the matter2 what is unessential and changing is1 on the other hand1 the form4 ,with the organised body the case is exactly reversed2 for its life1 i4e41 its existence as an organised being1 simply consists in the constant change of the material1 while the form remains permanent4 ,its being and its identity thus lies in the form alone4 ,therefore the continuance of the unorganised body depends upon repose and exclusion from external influences3 thus alone does it retain its existence2 and if this condition is perfect1 such a body lasts for ever4 ,the continuance of the organised body1 on the contrary1 just depends upon continual movement and the constant reception of external influences4 ,as soon as these are wanting and the movement in it stops it is dead1 and thereby ceases to be organic1 although the trace of the organism that has been still remains for a while4 ,therefore the talk1 which is so much affected in our own day1 of the life of what is unorganised1 indeed of the globe itself1 and that it1 and also the planetary system1 is an organism1 is entirely inadmissible4 ,the predicate life belongs only to what is organised4 ,every organism1 however1 is throughout organised1 is so in all its parts2 and nowhere are these1 even in their smallest particles1 composed by aggregation of what is unorganised4 ,thus if the earth were an organism1 all mountains and rocks1 and the whole interior of their mass1 would necessarily be organised1 and accordingly really nothing unorganised would exist2 and therefore the whole conception of it would be wanting4 ,on the other hand1 that the manifestation of a will is as little bound up with life and organisation as with knowledge1 and that therefore the unorganised has also a will1 the manifestations of which are all its fundamental qualities1 which cannot be further explained1--this is an essential point in my doctrine2 although the trace of such a thought is far seldomer found in writers who have preceded me than that of the will in plants1 where1 however1 it is still unconscious4 ,in the forming of the crystal we see1 as it were1 a tendency towards an attempt at life1 to which1 however1 it does not attain1 because the fluidity of which1 like a living thing1 it is composed at the moment of that movement is not enclosed in a skin1 as is always the case with the latter1 and consequently it has neither vessels in which that movement could go on1 nor does anything separate it from the external world4 ,therefore1 rigidity at once seizes that momentary movement1 of which only the trace remains as the crystal4 ,the thought that the will1 which constitutes the basis of our own nature1 is also the same will which shows itself even in the lowest unorganised phenomena1 on account of which the conformity to law of both phenomena shows a perfect analogy1 lies at the foundation of ,goethe's 8,wahlverwandtschaften10 as the title indeed indicates1 although he himself was unconscious of this4 ,mechanics and astronomy specially show us how this will conducts itself so far as it appears at the lowest grade of its manifestation merely as gravity1 rigidity1 and inertia4 ,hydraulics shows us the same thing where rigidity is wanting and the fluid material is now unrestrainedly surrendered to its predominating passion1 gravity4 ,in this sense hydraulics may be conceived as a characteristic sketch of water1 for it presents to us the manifestations of will to which water is moved by gravity2 these always correspond exactly to the external influences1 for in the case of all nonindividual existences there is no particular character in addition to the general one2 thus they can easily be referred to fixed characteristics1 which are called laws1 and which are learned by experience of water4 ,these laws accurately inform us how water will conduct itself under all different circumstances1 on account of its gravity1 the unconditioned mobility of its parts1 and its want of elasticity4 ,hydrostatics teaches how it is brought to rest through gravity2 hydrodynamics1 how it is set in motion2 and the latter has also to take account of hindrances which adhesion opposes to the will of water3 the two together constitute hydraulics4 ,in the same way ,chemistry teaches us how the will conducts itself when the inner qualities of materials obtain free play by being brought into a fluid state1 and there appears that wonderful attraction and repulsion1 separating and combining1 leaving go of one to seize upon another1 from which every precipitation originates1 and the whole of which is denoted by 8elective affinity0 7an expression which is entirely borrowed from the conscious will74 ,but ,anatomy and ,physiology allow us to see how the will conducts itself in order to bring about the phenomenon of life and sustain it for a while4 ,finally1 the poet shows us how the will conducts itself under the influence of motives and reflection4 ,he exhibits it therefore for the most part in the most perfect of its manifestations1 in rational beings1 whose character is individual1 and whose conduct and suffering he brings before us in the ,drama1 the ,epic1 the ,romance1 c4 ,the more correctly1 the more strictly according to the laws of nature his characters are there presented1 the greater is his fame2 hence ,shakespeare stands at the top4 ,the point of view which is here taken up corresponds at bottom to the spirit in which ,goethe followed and loved the natural sciences1 although he was not conscious of the matter in the abstract4 ,nay more1 this not only appears from his writings1 but is also known to me from his personal utterances4 ,if we consider the will1 where no one denies it1 in conscious beings1 we find everywhere1 as its fundamental effort1 the selfpreservation of every being3 omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui4 ,but all manifestations of this fundamental effort may constantly be traced back to a seeking or pursuit and a shunning or fleeing from1 according to the occasion4 ,now this also may be shown even at the lowest grades of nature1 that is1 of the objectification of the will1 where the bodies still act only as bodies in general1 thus are the subjectmatter of mechanics1 and are considered only with reference to the manifestations of impenetrability1 cohesion1 rigidity1 elasticity1 and gravity4 ,here also the seeking shows itself as gravitation1 and the shunning as the receiving of motion2 and the movableness of bodies by pressure or impact1 which constitutes the basis of mechanics1 is at bottom a manifestation of the effort after selfpreservation1 which dwells in them also4 ,for1 since as bodies they are impenetrable1 this is the sole means of preserving their cohesion1 thus their continuance at any time4 ,the body which is impelled or exposed to pressure would be crushed to pieces by the impelling or pressing body if it did not withdraw itself from its power by flight1 in order to preserve its cohesion2 and when flight is impossible for it this actually happens4 ,indeed1 one may regard elastic bodies as the more courageous1 which seek to repel the enemy1 or at least to prevent him from pursuing further4 ,thus in the one secret which 7besides gravity7 is left by mechanics otherwise so clear1 in the communicability of motion1 we see a manifestation of the fundamental effort of the will in all its phenomena1 the effort after self preservation1 which shows itself even at the lowest grades as that which is essential4 ,in unorganised nature the will objectifies itself primarily in the universal forces1 and only by means of these in the phenomena of the particular things which are called forth by causes4 ,in #bf of the first volume ,i have fully explained the relation between cause1 force of nature1 and will as thing in itself4 ,one sees from that explanation that metaphysics never interrupts the course of physics1 but only takes up the thread where physics leaves it1 at the original forces in which all causal explanation has its limits4 ,only here does the metaphysical explanation from the will as the thing in itself begin4 ,in the case of every physical phenomenon1 of every change of material things1 its cause is primarily to be looked for2 and this cause is just such a particular change which has appeared immediately before it4 ,then1 however1 the original force of nature is to be sought by virtue of which this cause was capable of acting4 ,and first of all the will is to be recognised as the inner nature of this force in opposition to its manifestation4 ,yet the will shows itself just as directly in the fall of a stone as in the action of the man2 the difference is only that its particular manifestation is in the one case called forth by a motive1 in the other by a mechanically acting cause1 for example1 the taking away of what supported the stone2 yet in both cases with equal necessity2 and that in the one case it depends upon an individual character1 in the other upon an universal force of nature4 ,this identity of what is fundamentally essential is even made palpable to the senses4 ,if1 for instance1 we carefully observe a body which has lost its equilibrium1 and on account of its special form rolls back and forward for a long time till it finds its centre of gravity again1 a certain appearance of life forces itself upon us1 and we directly feel that something analogous to the foundation of life is also active here4 ,this is certainly the universal force of nature1 which1 however1 in itself identical with the will1 becomes here1 as it were1 the soul of a very brief quasi life4 ,thus what is identical in the two extremes of the manifestation of the will makes itself faintly known here even to direct perception1 in that this raises a feeling in us that here also something entirely original1 such as we only know in the acts of our own will1 directly succeeded in manifesting itself4 ,we may attain to an intuitive knowledge of the existence and activity of the will in unorganised nature in quite a different and a sublime manner if we study the problem of the three heavenly bodies1 and thus learn more accurately and specially the course of the moon round the earth4 ,by the different combinations which the constant change of the position of these three heavenly bodies towards each other introduces1 the course of the moon is now accelerated2 now retarded1 now it approaches the earth1 and again recedes from it2 and this again takes place differently in the perihelion of the earth from in its aphelion1 all of which together introduces such irregularity into the moon's course that it really obtains a capricious appearance2 for1 indeed1 ,kepler's third law is no longer constantly valid1 but in equal times it describes unequal areas4 ,the consideration of this course is a small and separate chapter of celestial mechanics1 which is distinguished in a sublime manner from terrestrial mechanics by the absence of all impact and pressure1 thus of the vis a tergo which appears to us so intelligible1 and indeed of the actually completed case1 for besides vis inerti it knows no other moving and directing force1 except only gravitation1 that longing for union which proceeds from the very inner nature of bodies4 ,if now we construct for ourselves in imagination the working of this given case in detail1 we recognise distinctly and directly in the moving force here that which is given to us in selfconsciousness as will4 ,for the alterations in the course of the earth and the moon1 according as one of them is by its position more or less exposed to the influence of the sun1 are evidently analogous to the influence of newly appearing motives upon our wills1 and to the modifications of our action which result4 ,the following is an illustrative example of another kind4 ,liebig 7,chemie in ,anwendung auf ,agrikultur1 p4 #eja71 says3 8,if we bring moist copper into air which contains carbonic acid1 the affinity of the metal for the oxygen of the air will be increased by the contact with this acid to such a degree that the two will combine with each other2 its surface will be coated with green carbonic oxide of copper4 ,but now two bodies which have the capacity of combining1 the moment they meet assume opposite electrical conditions4 ,therefore if we touch the copper with iron1 by producing a special electrical state1 the capacity of the copper to enter into combination with the oxygen is destroyed2 even under the above conditions it remains bright40 ,the fact is well known and of technical use4 ,i quote it in order to say that here the will of the copper1 laid claim to and occupied by the electrical opposition to iron1 leaves unused the opportunity which presents itself for its chemical affinity for oxygen and carbonic acid4 ,accordingly it conducts itself exactly as the will in a man who omits an action which he would otherwise feel himself moved to in order to perform another to which a stronger motive urges him4 ,i have shown in the first volume that the forces of nature lie outside the chain of causes and effects1 because they constitute their accompanying condition1 their metaphysical foundation1 and therefore prove themselves to be eternal and omnipresent1 i4e41 independent of time and space4 ,even in the uncontested truth that what is essential to a cause as such consists in this1 that it will produce the same effect at any future time as it does now1 it is already involved that something lies in the cause which is independent of the course of time1 i4e41 is outside of all time2 this is the force of nature which manifests itself in it4 ,one can even convince oneself to a certain extent empirically and as a matter of fact of the ideality of this form of our perception by fixing one's eyes upon the powerlessness of time as opposed to natural forces4 ,if1 for example1 a rotatory motion is imparted to a planet by some external cause1 if no new cause enters to stop it1 this motion will endure for ever4 ,this could not be so if time were something in itself and had an objective1 real existence2 for then it would necessarily also produce some effect4 ,thus we see here1 on the one hand1 the forces of nature1 which manifest themselves in that rotation1 and1 if it is once begun1 carry it on for ever without becoming weary or dying out1 prove themselves to be eternal or timeless1 and consequently absolutely real and existing in themselves2 and1 on the other hand1 time as something which consists only in the manner in which we apprehend that phenomenon1 since it exerts no power and no influence upon the phenomenon itself2 for what does not act is not4 ,we have a natural inclination whenever it is possible to explain every natural phenomenon mechanically2 doubtless because mechanics calls in the assistance of the fewest original1 and hence inexplicable1 forces1 and1 on the other hand1 contains much that can be known a priori1 and therefore depends upon the forms of our own intellect1 which as such carries with it the highest degree of comprehensibility and clearness4 ,however1 in the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science0 ,kant has referred mechanical activity itself to a dynamical activity4 ,on the other hand1 the application of mechanical explanatory hypotheses1 beyond what is demonstrably mechanical1 to which1 for example1 ,acoustics also belongs1 is entirely unjustified1 and ,i will never believe that even the simplest chemical combination or the difference of the three states of aggregation will ever admit of mechanical explanation1 much less the properties of light1 of heat1 and electricity4 ,these will always admit only of a dynamical explanation1 i4e41 one which explains the phenomenon from original forces which are entirely different from those of impact1 pressure1 weight1 c41 and are therefore of a higher kind1 i4e41 are more distinct objectifications of that will which obtains visible form in all things4 ,i am of opinion that light is neither an emanation nor a vibration2 both views are akin to that which explains transparency from pores and the evident falseness of which is proved by the fact that light is subject to no mechanical laws4 ,in order to obtain direct conviction of this one only requires to watch the effects of a storm of wind1 which bends1 upsets1 and scatters everything1 but during which a ray of light shooting down from a break in the clouds is entirely undisturbed and steadier than a rock1 so that with great directness it imparts to us the knowledge that it belongs to another order of things than the mechanical3 it stands there unmoved like a ghost4 ,those constructions of light from molecules and atoms which have originated with the ,french are indeed a revolting absurdity4 ,an article by ,ampre1 who is otherwise so acute1 upon light and heat1 which is to be found in the ,april number of the 8,annales de chimie et physique10 of #ahce1 may be considered as a flagrant expression of this1 and indeed of the whole of atomism in general4 ,there the solid1 the fluid1 and the elastic consist of the same atoms1 and all differences arise solely from their aggregation2 nay1 it is said that space indeed is infinitely divisible1 but not matter2 because1 if the division has been carried as far as the atoms1 the further division must fall in the spaces between the atoms6 ,light and heat1 then1 are here vibrations of the atoms2 and sound1 on the other hand1 is a vibration of the molecules composed of the atoms4 ,in truth1 however1 these atoms are a fixed idea of the ,french savants1 and therefore they just speak of them as if they had seen them4 ,otherwise one would necessarily marvel that such a matteroffact nation as the ,french can hold so firmly to a completely transcendent hypothesis1 which is quite beyond the possibility of experience1 and confidently build upon it up to the sky4 ,this is just a consequence of the backward state of the metaphysics they shun so much1 which is poorly represented by ,m4 ,cousin1 who1 with all good will1 is shallow and very scantily endowed with judgment4 ,at bottom they are still ,lockeians1 owing to the earlier influence of ,condillac4 ,therefore for them the thing in itself is really matter1 from the fundamental properties of which1 such as impenetrability1 form1 hardness1 and the other primary qualities1 everything in the world must be ultimately explicable4 ,they will not let themselves be talked out of this1 and their tacit assumption is that matter can only be moved by mechanical forces4 ,in ,germany ,kant's teaching has prevented the continuance of the absurdities of the atomistic and purely mechanical physics for any length of time2 although at the present moment these views prevail here also1 which is a consequence of the shallowness1 crudeness1 and folly introduced by ,hegel4 ,however1 it cannot be denied that not only the evidently porous nature of natural bodies1 but also two special doctrines of modern physics1 apparently render assistance to the atomic nuisance4 ,these are1 ,hauz's ,crystallography1 which traces every crystal back to its kernel form1 which is an ultimate form1 though only relatively indivisible2 and ,berzelius's doctrine of chemical atoms1 which are yet mere expressions for combining proportions1 thus only arithmetical quantities1 and at bottom nothing more than counters4 ,on the other hand1 ,kant's thesis in the second antinomy in defence of atoms1 which is certainly only set up for dialectical purposes1 is a mere sophism1 as ,i have proved in my criticism of his philosophy1 and our understanding itself by no means leads us necessarily to the assumption of atoms4 ,for just as little as ,i am obliged to think that the slow but constant and uniform motion of a body before my eyes is composed of innumerable motions which are absolutely quick1 but broken and interrupted by just as many absolutely short moments of rest1 but1 on the contrary1 know very well that the stone that has been thrown flies more slowly than the projected bullet1 yet never pauses for an instant on the way1 so little am ,i obliged to think of the mass of a body as consisting of atoms and the spaces between them1 i4e41 of absolute density and absolute vacuity2 but ,i comprehend those two phenomena without difficulty as constant continua1 one of which uniformly fills time and the other space4 ,but just as the one motion may yet be quicker than another1 i4e41 in an equal time can pass through more space1 so also one body may have a greater specific gravity than another1 i4e41 in equal space may contain more matter3 in both cases the difference depends upon the intensity of the acting force2 for ,kant 7following ,priestley7 has quite correctly reduced matter to forces4 ,but even if the analogy here set up should not be admitted as valid1 and it should be insisted upon that the difference of specific gravity can only have its ground in porosity1 even this assumption would always lead1 not to atoms1 but only to a perfectly dense matter1 unequally distributed among different bodies2 a matter which would certainly be no longer compressible1 when no pores ran through it1 but yet1 like the space which it fills1 would always remain infinitely divisible4 ,for the fact that it would have no pores by no means involves that no possible force could do away with the continuity of its spatial parts4 ,for to say that everywhere this is only possible by extending the already existing intervals is a purely arbitrary assertion4 ,the assumption of atoms rests upon the two phenomena which have been touched upon1 the difference of the specific gravity of bodies and that of their compressibility1 for both are conveniently explained by the assumption of atoms4 ,but then both must also always be present in like measure1 which is by no means the case4 ,for1 for example1 water has a far lower specific gravity than all metals properly so called4 ,it must thus have fewer atoms and greater interstices between them1 and consequently be very compressible3 but it is almost entirely incompressible4 ,the defence of atoms might be conducted in this way4 ,one may start from porosity and say something of this sort3 ,all bodies have pores1 and therefore so also have all parts of a body3 now if this were carried out to infinity1 there would ultimately be nothing left of a body but pores4 ,the refutation would be that what remained over would certainly have to be assumed as without pores1 and so far as absolutely dense1 yet not on that account as consisting of absolutely indivisible particles1 atoms2 accordingly it would certainly be absolutely incompressible1 but not absolutely indivisible4 ,it would therefore be necessary that it should be asserted that the division of a body is only possible by penetrating into its pores2 which1 however1 is entirely unproved4 ,if1 however1 this is assumed1 then we certainly have atoms1 i4e41 absolutely indivisible bodies1 thus bodies of such strong cohesion of their spatial parts that no possible power can separate them3 but then one may just as well assume such bodies to be large as small1 and an atom might be as big as an ox1 if it only would resist all possible attacks upon it4 ,imagine two bodies of very different kinds1 entirely freed from all pores by compression1 as by means of hammering1 or by pulverisation2--would their specific gravity then be the same8 ,this would be the criterion of dynamics4 ,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,on ,matter4 ,matter has already been spoken of in the fourth chapter of the supplements to the first book1 when we were considering the part of our knowledge of which we are conscious a priori4 ,but it could only be considered there from a onesided point of view1 because we were then concerned merely with its relation to the forms of our intellect1 and not to the thing in itself1 and therefore we investigated it only from the subjective side1 i4e41 so far as it is an idea1 and not from the objective side1 i4e41 with regard to what it may be in itself4 ,in the first respect1 our conclusion was that it is objective activity in general1 yet conceived without fuller determination2 therefore it takes the place of causality in the table of our a priori knowledge which is given there4 ,for what is material is that which acts 7the actual7 in general1 and regarded apart from the specific nature of its action4 ,hence also matter1 merely as such1 is not an object of perception1 but only of thought1 and thus is really an abstraction4 ,it only comes into perception in connection with form and quality1 as a body1 i4e41 as a fully determined kind of activity4 ,it is only by abstracting from this fuller determination that we think of matter as such1 i4e41 separated from form and quality2 consequently under matter we think of acting absolutely and in general1 thus of activity in the abstract4 ,the more fully determined acting we then conceive as the accident of matter2 but only by means of this does matter become perceptible1 i4e41 present itself as a body and an object of experience4 ,pure matter1 on the other hand1 which1 as ,i have shown in the ,criticism of the ,kantian ,philosophy1 alone constitutes the true and admissible content of the conception of substance1 is causality itself1 thought objectively1 consequently as in space1 and therefore filling it4 ,accordingly the whole being of matter consists in acting4 ,only thus does it occupy space and last in time4 ,it is through and through pure causality4 ,therefore wherever there is action there is matter1 and the material is the active in general4 ,but causality itself is the form of our understanding2 for it is known to us a priori1 as well as time and space4 ,thus matter also1 so far and up to this point1 belongs to the formal part of our knowledge1 and is consequently that form of the understanding1 causality itself1 bound up with space and time1 hence objectified1 i4e41 conceived as that which fills space4 7,the fuller explanation of this doctrine will be found in the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 p4 #gg2 third edition1 p4 #hb47 ,so far1 however1 matter is properly not the object but the condition of experience2 like the pure understanding itself1 whose function it so far is4 ,therefore of pure matter there is also only a conception1 no perception4 ,it enters into all external experience as a necessary constituent part of it2 yet it cannot be given in any experience1 but is only thought1 and thought indeed as that which is absolutely inert1 inactive1 formless1 and without qualities1 and which is yet the supporter of all forms1 qualities1 and effects4 ,accordingly1 of all fleeting phenomena1 thus of all manifestations of natural forces and all living beings1 matter is the permanent substratum which is necessarily produced by the forms of our intellect in which the world as idea exhibits itself4 ,as such1 and as having sprung from the forms of the intellect1 it is entirely indifferent to those phenomena themselves1 i4e41 it is just as ready to be the supporter of this force of nature as of that1 whenever1 under the guidance of causality1 the necessary conditions appear2 while it itself1 just because its existence is really only formal1 i4e41 is founded in the intellect must be thought as that which under all that change is absolutely permanent1 thus with regard to time is without beginning and without end4 ,this is why we cannot give up the thought that anything may be made out of anything1 for example1 gold out of lead2 for this would only require that we should find out and bring about the intermediate states which matter1 in itself indifferent1 would have to pass through upon that path4 ,for a priori we can never see why the same matter which is now the supporter of the quality lead could not some time become the supporter of the quality gold4 ,matter1 as that which is only thought a priori1 is distinguished from the a priori intuitions or perceptions proper by the fact that we can also think it entirely away2 space and time1 on the contrary1 never4 ,but this only shows that we can present to ourselves space and time in imagination without matter4 ,for the matter which has once been placed in them1 and accordingly thought as existing1 we can never again absolutely think away1 i4e41 imagine it as vanished and annihilated1 but are always forced to think of it merely as transferred to another space4 ,so far1 then1 matter is as inseparably connected with our faculty of knowledge as space and time themselves4 ,yet even the difference that it must first be voluntarily thought as existing indicates that it does not belong so entirely and in every regard to the formal part of our knowledge as space and time1 but also contains an element which is only given a posteriori4 ,it is1 in fact1 the point of connection of the empirical part of our knowledge with the pure and a priori part1 consequently the peculiar foundationstone of the world of experience4 ,only where all a priori assertions cease1 therefore in the entirely empirical part of our knowledge of bodies1 in their form1 quality1 and definite manner of acting1 does that will reveal itself which we have already recognised and established as the true inner nature of things4 ,but these forms and qualities always appear only as the properties and manifestations of that very matter the existence and nature of which depends upon the subjective forms of our intellect1 i4e41 they only become visible in it1 and therefore by means of it4 ,for that which always exhibits itself to us is only matter acting in some specially determined manner4 ,out of the inner properties of such matter1 properties which cannot be further explained1 proceeds every definite kind of effect of given bodies2 and yet the matter itself is never perceived1 but only these effects1 and the definite properties which lie at their foundation1 after separating which1 matter1 as that which then remains over1 is necessarily added in thought by us2 for1 according to the exposition given above1 it is objectified causality itself4 ,accordingly matter is that whereby the will1 which constitutes the inner nature of things1 becomes capable of being apprehended1 perceptible1 visible4 ,in this sense1 then1 matter is simply the visibility of the will1 or the bond between the world as will and the world as idea4 ,it belongs to the latter inasmuch as it is the product of the functions of the intellect1 to the former inasmuch as that which manifests itself in all material existences1 i4e41 phenomena is the will4 ,therefore every object is1 as thing in itself1 will1 and as phenomenon1 matter4 ,if we could strip any given matter of all the properties that come to it a priori1 i4e41 of all the forms of our perception and apprehension1 we would have left the thing in itself1 that which1 by means of those forms1 appears as the purely empirical in matter1 but which would then itself no longer appear as something extended and active2 i4e41 we would no longer have matter before us1 but the will4 ,this very thing in itself1 or the will1 in that it becomes a phenomenon1 i4e41 enters the forms of our intellect1 appears as matter1 i4e41 as the invisible but necessarily assumed supporter of the properties which are only visible through it4 ,in this sense1 then1 matter is the visibility of the will4 ,consequently ,plotinus and ,giordano ,bruno were right1 not only in their sense but also in ours1 when they made the paradoxical assertion already referred to in chapter #d3 ,matter itself is not extended1 consequently it is incorporeal4 ,for space1 which is our form of perception1 imparts extension to matter1 and corporeal existence consists in acting1 which depends upon causality1 and consequently upon the form of our understanding4 ,on the other hand1 every definite property1 thus everything empirical in matter1 even gravity1 depends upon that which only becomes visible by means of matter1 the thing in itself1 the will4 ,gravity is yet the lowest of all grades of the objectification of the will2 therefore it appears in all matter without exception1 thus is inseparable from matter in general4 ,yet1 just because it is a manifestation of the will1 it belongs to knowledge a posteriori1 not to knowledge a priori4 ,therefore we can always picture to ourselves matter without weight1 but not without extension1 repulsive force1 and stability1 for then it would be without impenetrability1 and consequently would not occupy space1 i4e41 it would be without the power of acting2 but the nature of matter as such just consists in acting1 i4e41 in causality in general2 and causality depends upon the a priori form of our understanding1 and therefore cannot be thought away4 ,matter is accordingly the will itself1 but no longer in itself1 but so far as it is perceived1 i4e41 assumes the form of the objective idea4 ,thus what objectively is matter is subjectively will4 ,exactly corresponding to this1 as was proved above1 our body is just the visibility1 objectivity of our will1 and so also every body is the objectivity of the will at some one of its grades4 ,whenever the will exhibits itself to objective knowledge it enters into the forms of perception of the intellect1 time1 space1 and causality4 ,but on account of this it exists at once as a material object4 ,we can present to our minds form without matter1 but not the reverse2 because matter deprived of form would be the will itself1 and the will only becomes objective by entering the forms of perception of our intellect1 and therefore only by means of the assumption of form4 ,space is the form of perception of matter because the latter is the substance 7,stoff7 of mere form1 but matter can appear only in form4 ,since the will becomes objective1 i4e41 passes over into the idea1 matter is the universal substratum of this objectification1 or rather it is this objectification itself taken abstractly1 i4e41 regarded apart from all form4 ,matter is accordingly the visibility of the will in general1 while the character of its definite manifestations has its expression in form and quality4 ,hence what in the manifestation1 i4e41 for the idea1 is matter is in itself will4 ,therefore1 under the conditions of experience and perception1 everything holds good of it that holds good of the will in itself1 and it repeats all the relations and properties of the will in temporal images4 ,accordingly it is the substance of the world of perception1 as the will is the inner nature of all things4 ,the forms are innumerable1 the matter is one2 just as the will is one in all its objectifications4 ,as the will never objectifies itself as general1 i4e41 as absolute will1 but always as particular1 i4e41 under special determinations and a given character1 so matter never appears as such1 but always in connection with some particular form and quality4 ,in the manifestation or objectification of the will matter represents its totality1 it itself1 which in all is one1 as matter is one in all bodies4 ,as the will is the inmost kernel of all phenomenal beings1 so matter is the substance which remains after all the accidents have been taken away4 ,as the will is that which is absolutely indestructible in all existence1 so matter is that which is imperishable in time and permanent through all changes4 ,that matter for itself1 thus separated from form1 cannot be perceived or presented in imagination depends upon the fact that in itself1 and as the pure substantiality of bodies1 it is really the will itself4 ,but the will cannot be apprehended objectively1 or perceived in itself1 but only under all the conditions of the idea1 and therefore only as phenomenon4 ,under these conditions1 however1 it exhibits itself at once as body1 i4e41 as matter clothed in form and quality4 ,but form is conditioned by space1 and quality or power of acting by causality2 thus both depend upon the functions of the intellect4 ,matter without them would just be the thing in itself1 i4e41 the will itself4 ,therefore1 as has been said1 ,plotinus and ,giordano ,bruno could only be brought by a completely objective path to the assertion that matter in and for itself is without extension1 consequently without spatial properties1 consequently incorporeal4 ,because1 then1 matter is the visibility of the will1 and every force in itself is will1 no force can appear without a material substratum1 and conversely no body can be without forces dwelling in it which constitute its quality4 ,therefore a body is the union of matter and form which is called substance 7,stoff74 ,force and substance are inseparable because at bottom they are one2 for1 as ,kant has shown1 matter itself is given us only as the union of two forces1 the force of expansion and that of attraction4 ,thus there is no opposition between force and substance1 rather they are precisely one4 ,led by the course of our consideration to this standpoint1 and having attained to this metaphysical view of matter1 we will confess without reluctance that the temporal origin of forms1 shapes1 or species cannot reasonably be sought elsewhere than in matter4 ,some time or other they must have come forth from it1 just because it is the mere visibility of the will which constitutes the inner nature of all phenomena4 ,in that the will manifests itself1 i4e41 presents itself objectively to the intellect1 matter1 as its visibility1 assumes form by means of the functions of the intellect4 ,hence the ,schoolmen said3 8,materia appetit formam40 ,that such was the origin of all forms of life cannot be doubted3 we cannot even conceive it otherwise4 ,whether1 however1 now1 since the paths to the perpetuation of the forms stand open1 and are secured and sustained by nature with boundless care and jealousy1 generatio quivoca still takes place1 can only be decided by experience2 especially since the saying1 ,natura nihil facit frustra1 might1 with reference to the paths of regular propagation1 be used as a valid argument against it4 ,yet in spite of the most recent objections to it1 ,i hold that at very low grades generatio quivoca is very probable1 and primarily indeed in the case of entozoa and epizoa1 particularly such as appear in consequence of special cachexia of the animal organism4 ,for the conditions of their life only appear exceptionally2 consequently their species cannot propagate itself in the regular manner1 and therefore has always to arise anew whenever opportunity offers4 ,therefore as soon as the conditions of life of epizoa have appeared in consequence of certain chronic diseases1 or cachexia1 and in accordance with them1 pediculus capitis or pubis or corporis appears entirely of itself1 and without any egg2 and this notwithstanding the complex structure of these insects1 for the putrefaction of a living animal body affords material for higher productions than that of hay in water1 which only produces infusoria4 ,or is it thought more likely that the eggs of the epizoa are constantly floating about in the air in expectation8 7,fearful to think of67 ,let us rather remember the disease of phthiriasis1 which occurs even now4 ,an analogous case takes place when through special circumstances the conditions of life appear of a species which up till then was foreign to that place4 ,thus ,august ,st4 ,hilaire saw in ,brazil1 after the burning of a primitive forest1 as soon as ever the ashes had cooled1 a number of plants grow up out of them1 the species of which was not to be found far and wide2 and quite recently ,admiral ,petit,thouars informed the ,acadmie des sciences that upon the growing coral islands in ,polynesia a soil gradually deposits itself which is now dry1 now lies in water1 and which vegetation soon takes possession of1 bringing forth trees which are absolutely peculiar to these islands 7,comptes rendus1 #agth ,jan4 #ahei1 p4 #adg74 ,whenever putrefaction takes place mould1 fungi1 and in liquids infusoria appear4 ,the assumption now in favour that spores and eggs of the innumerable species of all those kinds of animal life are everywhere floating in the air1 and wait through long years for a favourable opportunity1 is more paradoxical than that of generatio quivoca4 ,putrefaction is the decomposition of an organised body1 first into its more immediate chemical constituents4 ,since now these are more or less the same in all living beings1 the omnipresent will to live can possess itself of them1 in order1 in accordance with the circumstances1 to produce new existences from them2 and these forming themselves according to design1 i4e41 objectifying the volition of the will at the time1 solidify out of the chemical elements as the chicken out of the fluidity of the egg4 ,when1 however1 this does not take place1 the putrefying matter is resolved into its ultimate constituent parts1 which are the chemical elements1 and now passes over again into the great course of nature4 ,the war which has been waged for the last ten or fifteen years against generatio quivoca1 with its premature shouts of victory1 was the prelude to the denial of the vital force1 and related to it4 ,let no one1 however1 be deceived by dogmatic assertions and brazen assurances that the questions are decided1 settled1 and generally recognised4 ,on the contrary1 the whole mechanical and atomistic view of nature is approaching its bankruptcy1 and its defenders have to learn that something more is concealed behind nature than action and reaction4 ,the reality of generatio quivoca and the folly of the extraordinary assumption that in the atmosphere1 everywhere and always1 billions of seeds of all possible kinds of fungi1 and eggs of all possible kinds of infusoria1 are floating about1 till now one and then another by chance finds its suitable medium1 has quite recently 7#ahei7 been thoroughly and victoriously shown by ,pouchet before the ,french ,academy1 to the great vexation of the other members4 ,our wonder at the origin of forms in matter is at bottom like that of the savage who looks for the first time in a mirror and marvels at his own image which he sees there4 ,for our own inner nature is the will1 whose mere visibility is matter4 ,yet matter never appears otherwise than with the visible1 i4e41 under the outer shell of form and quality1 and therefore is never directly apprehended1 but always merely added in thought as that which is identical in all things1 under all differences of quality and form4 ,on this account it is more a metaphysical than a physical principle of explanation of things1 and to make all existences arise from it is really to explain them from something which is very mysterious2 which all know it to be except those who confound attacking with comprehending4 ,in truth1 the ultimate and exhaustive explanation of things is by no means to be sought in matter1 although certainly the temporal origin both of unorganised forms and of organised beings is to be sought in it4 ,yet it seems that the origination of organised forms1 the production of the species themselves1 is almost as difficult for nature to accomplish as it is for us to comprehend4 ,this is indicated by the entirely extravagant provision which nature always makes for maintaining the species which once exist4 ,yet on the present surface of this planet the will to live has gone through the scale of its objectification three times1 quite independently of each other1 in a different modulation1 and also with great difference of perfection and fulness4 ,the old world1 ,america1 and ,australia have1 it is well known1 each their peculiar independent fauna1 entirely different from that of the other two4 ,upon each of these great continents the species are throughout different1 but yet1 because all three belong to the same planet1 they have a thorough analogy with each other running parallel through them2 therefore the genera are for the most part the same4 ,in ,australia this analogy can only be very imperfectly followed because its fauna is very poor in mammalia1 and contains neither beasts of prey nor apes4 ,on the other hand1 between the old world and ,america it is obvious1 and in the following manner4 ,in mammals ,america always produces the inferior analogue1 but in birds and reptiles the better4 ,thus it has the advantage in the condor1 the macaw1 the hummingbird1 and the largest batrachia and ophidia2 but1 for example1 instead of the elephant it has only the tapir1 instead of the lion the puma1 instead of the tiger the jaguar1 instead of the camel the lama1 and instead of apes proper only monkeys4 ,even from this last defect it may be concluded that in ,america nature was not able to rise to man2 for even from the nearest grade below man1 the chimpanzee and the orang outang or pongo1 the step to man was still an excessively great one4 ,correspondingly we find that the three races of men which1 both upon physiological and linguistic grounds1 are undoubtedly equally original1 the ,caucasian1 the ,mongolian1 and the ,ethiopian1 are only at home in the old world2 while ,america1 on the other hand1 is peopled by a mixed or climatically modified ,mongolian race1 which must have come over from ,asia4 ,on the surface of the earth which immediately preceded the present surface apes were reached here and there1 but not men4 ,from this standpoint of our consideration1 which shows us matter as the direct visibility of the will which manifests itself in all things1 nay1 indeed1 for the merely physical investigation which follows the guidance of time and causality1 lets it pass as the origin of things1 we are easily led to the question whether even in philosophy we could not just as well start from the objective as from the subjective side1 and accordingly set up as the fundamental truth the proposition3 8,there is in general nothing but matter and its indwelling forces40 ,but1 with regard to these 8indwelling forces0 here so easily used1 we must remember that their assumption leads every explanation back to a completely incomprehensible miracle1 and then leaves it beside it1 or rather leaves it to begin from it4 ,for every definite1 inexplicable force of nature which lies at the foundation of the most different kinds of effects of an unorganised body1 not less than the vital force which manifests itself in every organised body1 is such an incomprehensible miracle1 as ,i have fully explained in chap4 #ag1 and have also shown that physics can never be set upon the throne of metaphysics1 just because it leaves quite untouched the assumption referred to and also many others2 whereby from the beginning it renounces all claim to give an ultimate explanation of things4 ,i must further remind the reader here of the proof of the insufficiency of materialism1 which is given towards the end of the first chapter1 because1 as was said there1 it is the philosophy of the subject which forgets itself in its calculation4 ,but all these truths rest upon the fact that everything objective1 everything external1 since it is always only something apprehended1 something known1 remains also always indirect and secondary1 therefore absolutely never can become the ultimate ground of explanation of things or the startingpoint of philosophy4 ,philosophy necessarily requires what is absolutely immediate for its startingpoint4 ,but clearly only that which is given in selfconsciousness fulfils this condition1 that which is within1 the subjective4 ,and hence it is so eminent a merit of ,descartes that he first made philosophy start from selfconsciousness4 ,since then1 upon this path1 the genuine philosophers1 especially ,locke1 ,berkeley1 and ,kant1 have gone even further1 each in his own manner1 and in consequence of their investigations ,i was led to recognise and make use1 not of one1 but of two completely different data of immediate knowledge in selfconsciousness1 the idea and the will1 by the combined application of which one can go further in philosophy1 in the same proportion as in the case of an algebraical problem one can accomplish more if two known quantities are given than if only one is given4 ,in accordance with what has been said1 the ineradicable falseness of materialism primarily consists in the fact that it starts from a petitio principii1 which when more closely considered turns out indeed to be a 4 ,it starts from the assumption that matter is something absolutely and unconditionally given1 something existing independently of the knowledge of the subject1 thus really a thing in itself4 ,it attributes to matter 7and consequently also to its presuppositions time and space7 an absolute existence1 i4e41 an existence independent of the perceiving subject2 this is its fundamental error4 ,then1 if it will go honestly to work1 it must leave the qualities inherent in the given materials1 i4e41 in the substances1 together with the natural forces which manifest themselves in these1 and finally also the vital force1 unexplained1 as unfathomable qualitates occult1 and start from them2 as physics and physiology actually do1 because they make no claim to be the ultimate explanation of things4 ,but just to avoid this1 materialism--at least as it has hitherto appeared--has not proceeded honestly4 ,it denies all those original forces1 for it pretends and seems to reduce them all1 and ultimately also the vital force1 to the mere mechanical activity of matter1 thus to manifestations of impenetrability1 form1 cohesion1 impulsive power1 inertia1 gravity1 c41 qualities which certainly have least that is inexplicable in themselves1 just because they partly depend upon what is known a priori1 consequently on the forms of our own intellect1 which are the principle of all comprehensibility4 ,but the intellect as the condition of all objects1 and consequently of the whole phenomenal world1 is entirely ignored by materialism4 ,its plan is now to refer everything qualitative to something merely quantitative1 for it attributes the former to mere form in opposition to matter proper4 ,to matter it leaves1 of the properly empirical qualities1 only gravity1 because it already appears as something quantitative1 the only measure of the quantity of the matter4 ,this path necessarily leads it to the fiction of atoms1 which now become the material out of which it thinks to construct the mysterious manifestations of all original forces4 ,but here it has really no longer to do with empirically given matter1 but with a matter which is not to be found in rerum natura1 but is rather a mere abstraction of that real matter1 a matter which would absolutely have no other than those mechanical qualities which1 with the exception of gravity1 can be pretty well construed a priori1 just because they depend upon the forms of space1 time1 and causality1 and consequently upon our intellect2 to this poor material1 then1 it finds itself reduced for the construction of its castle in the air4 ,in this way it inevitably becomes atomism2 as happened to it already in its childhood in the hands of ,leucippus and ,democritus1 and happens to it again now that it has come to a second childhood through age2 with the ,french because they have never known the ,kantian philosophy1 and with the ,germans because they have forgotten it4 ,and indeed it carries it further in this its second childhood than in its first4 ,not merely solid bodies are supposed to consist of atoms1 but liquids1 water1 air1 gas1 nay1 even light1 which is supposed to be the undulations of a completely hypothetical and altogether unproved ether1 consisting of atoms1 the difference of the rapidity of these undulations causing colours4 ,this is an hypothesis which1 like the earlier ,newtonian sevencolour theory1 starts from an analogy with music1 entirely arbitrarily assumed1 and then violently carried out4 ,one must really be credulous to an unheardof degree to let oneself be persuaded that the innumerable different ether vibrations proceeding from the infinite multiplicity of coloured surfaces in this varied world could constantly1 and each in its own time1 run through and everywhere cross each other without ever disturbing each other1 but should rather produce through such tumult and confusion the profoundly peaceful aspect of illumined nature and art4 ,credat ,judus ,apella6 ,certainly the nature of light is to us a secret2 but it is better to confess this than to bar the way of future knowledge by bad theories4 ,that light is something quite different from a mere mechanical movement1 undulation1 or vibration and tremor1 indeed that it is material1 is shown by its chemical effects1 a beautiful series of which was recently laid before the ,acadmie des sciences by ,chevreul1 who let sunlight act upon different coloured materials4 ,the most beautiful thing in these experiments is1 that a white roll of paper which has been exposed to the sunlight exhibits the same effects1 nay1 does so even after six months1 if during this time it has been secured in a firmly closed metal tube4 ,has1 then1 the tremulation paused for six months1 and does it now fall into time again8 7,comptes rendus of #bjth ,december #aheh47 ,this whole hypothesis of vibrating ether atoms is not only a chimera1 but equals in awkward crudeness the worst of ,democritus1 and yet is shameless enough1 at the present day1 to profess to be an established fact1 and has thus brought it about that it is orthodoxly repeated by a thousand stupid scribblers of all kinds1 who are devoid of all knowledge of such things1 and is believed in as a gospel4 ,but the doctrine of atoms in general goes still further3 it is soon a case of ,spartam1 quam nactus es1 orna6 ,different perpetual motions are then ascribed to all the atoms1 revolving1 vibrating1 c41 according to the office of each2 in the same way every atom has its atmosphere of ether1 or something else1 and whatever other similar fancies there may be4 ,the fancies of ,schelling's philosophy of nature and its disciples were for the most part ingenious1 lofty1 or at least witty2 but these1 on the contrary1 are clumsy1 insipid1 paltry1 and awkward1 the production of minds which1 in the first place1 are unable to think any other reality than a fabulous1 qualityless matter1 which is also an absolute object1 i4e41 an object without a subject2 and secondly can think of no other activity than motion and impact3 these two alone are comprehensible to them1 and that everything runs back to these is their a priori assumption2 for these are their thing in itself4 ,to attain this end the vital force is reduced to chemical forces 7which are insidiously and unjustifiably called molecular forces71 and all processes of unorganised nature to mechanism1 i4e41 to action and reaction4 ,and thus at last the whole world and everything in it becomes merely a piece of mechanical ingenuity1 like the toys worked by levers1 wheels1 and sand1 which represent a mine or the work on a farm4 ,the source of the evil is1 that through the amount of handwork which experimenting requires the headwork of thinking has been allowed to get out of practice4 ,the crucible and the voltaic pile are supposed to assume its functions2 hence also the profound abhorrence of all philosophy4 ,but the matter might be put in this way4 ,one might say that materialism1 as it has hitherto appeared1 has only failed because it did not adequately know the matter out of which it thought to construct the world1 and therefore was dealing1 not with matter itself1 but with a propertyless substitute for it4 ,if1 on the contrary1 instead of this1 it had taken the actual and empirically given matter 7i4e41 material substance1 or rather substances71 endowed as it is with all physical1 chemical1 electrical properties1 and also with the power of spontaneously producing life out of itself1 thus the true mater rerum1 from the obscurity of whose womb all phenomena and forms come forth1 to fall back into it some time again2 from this1 i4e41 from matter fully comprehended and exhaustively known1 a world might have been constructed of which materialism would not need to be ashamed4 ,quite true3 only the trick would then consist in this1 that the ,qusita had been placed in the ,data1 for professedly what was taken as given1 and made the startingpoint of the deduction1 was mere matter1 but really it included all the mysterious forces of nature which cling to it1 or more correctly1 by means of it become visible to us1 much the same as if under the name of the dish we understand what lies upon it4 ,for in fact1 for our knowledge1 matter is really merely the vehicle of the qualities and natural forces1 which appear as its accidents1 and just because ,i have traced these back to the will ,i call matter the mere visibility of the will4 ,stripped of all these qualities1 matter remains behind as that which is without qualities1 the caput mortuum of nature1 out of which nothing can honestly be made4 ,if1 on the contrary1 in the manner referred to1 one leaves it all these properties1 one is guilty of a concealed petitio principii1 for one has assumed the ,qusita beforehand as ,data4 ,but what is accomplished with this will no longer be a proper materialism1 but merely naturalism1 i4e41 an absolute system of physics1 which1 as was shown in chap4 #ag already referred to1 can never assume and fill the place of metaphysics1 just because it only begins after so many assumptions1 thus never undertakes to explain things from the foundation4 ,mere naturalism is therefore essentially based simply upon qualitates occult1 which one can never get beyond except1 as ,i have done1 by calling in the aid of the subjective source of knowledge1 which then certainly leads to the long and toilsome roundabout path of metaphysics1 for it presupposes the complete analysis of selfconsciousness and of the intellect and will given in it4 ,however1 the starting from what is objective1 at the foundation of which lies external perception1 so distinct and comprehensible1 is a path so natural and which presents itself of its own accord to man1 that naturalism1 and consequently1 because this cannot satisfy as it is not exhaustive1 materialism1 are systems to which the speculative reason must necessarily have come1 nay1 must have come first of all4 ,therefore at the very beginning of the history of philosophy we meet naturalism1 in the systems of the ,ionic philosophers1 and then materialism in the teaching of ,leucippus and ,democritus1 and also later we see them ever appear anew from time to time4 ,chapter ,,xxv4 ,transcendent ,considerations ,concerning ,the ,will ,as ,thing ,in ,itself4 ,even the merely empirical consideration of nature recognises a constant transition from the simplest and most necessary manifestation of a universal force of nature up to the life and consciousness of man himself1 through gentle gradations1 and with only relative1 and for the most part fluctuating1 limits4 ,reflection1 following this view1 and penetrating somewhat more deeply into it1 will soon be led to the conviction that in all these phenomena1 the inner nature1 that which manifests itself1 that which appears1 is one and the same1 which comes forth ever more distinctly2 and accordingly that what exhibits itself in a million forms of infinite diversity1 and so carries on the most varied and the strangest play without beginning or end1 this is one being which is so closely disguised behind all these masks that it does not even recognise itself1 and therefore often treats itself roughly4 ,thus the great doctrine of the early appeared both in the east and in the west1 and1 in spite of all contradiction1 has asserted itself1 or at least constantly revived4 ,we1 however1 have now entered even deeper into the secret1 since by what has already been said we have been led to the insight that when in any phenomenon a knowing consciousness is added to that inner being which lies at the foundation of all phenomena1 a consciousness which when directed inwardly becomes selfconsciousness1 then that inner being presents itself to this selfconsciousness as that which is so familiar and so mysterious1 and is denoted by the word will4 ,accordingly we have called that universal fundamental nature of all phenomena the will1 after that manifestation in which it unveils itself to us most fully2 and by this word nothing is further from our intention than to denote an unknown x2 but1 on the contrary1 we denote that which at least on one side is infinitely better known and more intimate than anything else4 ,let us now call to mind a truth1 the fullest and most thorough proof of which will be found in my prize essay on the freedom of the will--the truth that on account of the absolutely universal validity of the law of causality1 the conduct or the action of all existences in this world is always strictly necessitated by the causes which in each case call it forth4 ,and in this respect it makes no difference whether such an action has been occasioned by causes in the strictest sense of the word1 or by stimuli1 or finally by motives1 for these differences refer only to the grade of the susceptibility of the different kinds of existences4 ,on this point we must entertain no illusion3 the law of causality knows no exception2 but everything1 from the movement of a mote in a sunbeam to the most deeply considered action of man1 is subject to it with equal strictness4 ,therefore1 in the whole course of the world1 neither could a mote in a sunbeam describe any other line in its flight than it has described1 nor a man act any other way than he has acted2 and no truth is more certain than this1 that all that happens1 be it small or great1 happens with absolute necessity4 ,consequently1 at every given moment of time1 the whole condition of all things is firmly and accurately determined by the condition which has just preceded it1 and so is it with the stream of time back to infinity and on to infinity4 ,thus the course of the world is like that of a clock after it has been put together and wound up2 thus from this incontestable point of view it is a mere machine1 the aim of which we cannot see4 ,even if1 quite without justification1 nay1 at bottom1 in spite of all conceivability and its conformity to law1 one should assume a first beginning1 nothing would thereby be essentially changed4 ,for the arbitrarily assumed first condition of things would at its origin have irrevocably determined and fixed1 both as a whole and down to the smallest detail1 the state immediately following it2 this state1 again1 would have determined the one succeeding it1 and so on per secula seculorum1 for the chain of causality1 with its absolute strictness--this brazen bond of necessity and fate--introduces every phenomenon irrevocably and unalterably1 just as it is4 ,the difference merely amounts to this1 that in the case of the one assumption we would have before us a piece of clockwork which had once been wound up1 but in the case of the other a perpetual motion2 the necessity of the course1 on the other hand1 would remain the same4 ,in the prize essay already referred to ,i have irrefutably proved that the action of man can make no exception here1 for ,i showed how it constantly proceeds with strict necessity from two factors--his character and the motives which come to him4 ,the character is inborn and unalterable2 the motives are introduced with necessity under the guidance of causality by the strictly determined course of the world4 ,accordingly then1 from one point of view1 which we certainly cannot abandon1 because it is established by the objective laws of the world1 which are a priori valid1 the world1 with all that is in it1 appears as an aimless1 and therefore incomprehensible1 play of an eternal necessity1 an inscrutable and inexorable 4 ,now1 what is objectionable1 nay1 revolting1 in this inevitable and irrefutable view of the world cannot be thoroughly done away with by any assumption except this1 that as in one aspect every being in the world is a phenomenon1 and necessarily determined by the laws of the phenomenon1 in another aspect it is in itself will1 and indeed absolutely free will1 for necessity only arises through the forms which belong entirely to the phenomenon1 through the principle of sufficient reason in its different modes4 ,such a will1 then1 must be selfdependent1 for1 as free1 i4e41 as a thing in itself1 and therefore not subject to the principle of sufficient reason1 it cannot depend upon another in its being and nature any more than in its conduct and action4 ,by this assumption alone will as much freedom be supposed as is needed to counterbalance the inevitable strict necessity which governs the course of the world4 ,accordingly one has really only the choice either of seeing that the world is a mere machine which runs on of necessity1 or of recognising a free will as its inner being whose manifestation is not directly the action but primarily the existence and nature of things4 ,this freedom is therefore transcendental1 and consists with empirical necessity1 in the same way as the transcendental ideality of phenomena consists with their empirical reality4 ,that only under this assumption the action of a man1 in spite of the necessity with which it proceeds from his character and the motives1 is yet his own ,i have shown in my prize essay on the freedom of the will2 with this1 however1 self dependency is attributed to his nature4 ,the same relation holds good of all things in the world4 ,the strictest necessity1 carried out honestly with rigid consistency1 and the most perfect freedom1 rising to omnipotence1 had to appear at once and together in philosophy2 but1 without doing violence to truth1 this could only take place by placing the whole necessity in the acting and doing 7,operari71 and the whole freedom in the being and nature 7,esse74 ,thereby a riddle is solved which is as old as the world1 simply because it has hitherto always been held upside down and the freedom persistently sought in the ,operari1 the necessity in the ,esse4 ,i1 on the contrary1 say3 ,every being without exception acts with strict necessity1 but it exists and is what it is by virtue of its freedom4 ,thus with me freedom and necessity are to be met with neither more nor less than in any earlier system2 although now one and now the other must be conspicuous according as one takes offence that will is attributed to processes of nature which hitherto were explained from necessity1 or that the same strict necessity is recognised in motivation as in mechanical causality4 ,the two have merely changed places3 freedom has been transferred to the ,esse1 and necessity limited to the ,operari4 ,in short1 ,determinism stands firm4 ,for fifteen hundred years men have wearied themselves in vain to shake it1 influenced by certain crotchets1 which are well known1 but dare scarcely yet be called by their name4 ,yet in accordance with it the world becomes a mere puppetshow1 drawn by wires 7motives71 without it being even possible to understand for whose amusement4 ,if the piece has a plan1 then fate is the director2 if it has none1 then blind necessity4 ,there is no other deliverance from this absurdity than the knowledge that the being and nature of all things is the manifestation of a really free will1 which knows itself in them2 for their doing and acting cannot be delivered from necessity4 ,to save freedom from fate and chance1 it had to be transferred from the action to the existence4 ,as now necessity only affects the phenomenon1 not the thing in itself1 i4e41 the true nature of the world1 so also does multiplicity4 ,this is sufficiently explained in #be of the first volume4 ,i have only to add here one remark in confirmation and illustration of this truth4 ,every one knows only one being quite immediately--his own will in self consciousness4 ,everything else he knows only indirectly1 and then judges it by analogy with this2 a process which he carries further in proportion to the grade of his reflective powers4 ,even this ultimately springs from the fact that there really is only one being2 the illusion of multiplicity 7,maja71 which proceeds from the forms of external1 objective comprehension1 could not penetrate to inner1 simple consciousness2 therefore this always finds before it only one being4 ,if we consider the perfection of the works of nature1 which can never be sufficiently admired1 and which even in the lowest and smallest organisms1 for example1 in the fertilising parts of plants or in the internal construction of insects1 is carried out with as infinite care and unwearied labour as if each work of nature had been its only one1 upon which it was therefore able to expend all its art and power2 if we yet find this repeated an infinite number of times in each one of innumerable individuals of every kind1 and not less carefully worked out in that one whose dwellingplace is the most lonely1 neglected spot1 to which1 till then1 no eye had penetrated2 if we now follow the combination of the parts of every organism as far as we can1 and yet never come upon one part which is quite simple1 and therefore ultimate1 not to speak of one which is inorganic2 if1 finally1 we lose ourselves in calculating the design of all those parts of the organism for the maintenance of the whole by virtue of which every living thing is complete in and for itself2 if we consider at the same time that each of these masterpieces1 itself of short duration1 has already been produced anew an innumerable number of times1 and yet every example of a species1 every insect1 every flower1 every leaf1 still appears just as carefully perfected as was the first of its kind2 thus that nature by no means wearies and begins to bungle1 but1 with equally patient masterhand1 perfects the last like the first3 then we become conscious1 first of all1 that all human art is completely different1 not merely in degree1 but in kind1 from the works of nature2 and1 next1 that the working force1 the natura naturans1 in each of its innumerable works1 in the least as in the greatest1 in the last as in the first1 is immediately present whole and undivided1 from which it follows that1 as such and in itself1 it knows nothing of space and time4 ,if we further reflect that the production of these hyperboles of all works of art costs nature absolutely nothing1 so that1 with inconceivable prodigality1 she creates millions of organisms which never attain to maturity1 and without sparing exposes every living thing to a thousand accidents1 yet1 on the other hand1 if favoured by chance or directed by human purpose1 readily affords millions of examples of a species of which hitherto there was only one1 so that millions cost her no more than one2 this also leads us to see that the multiplicity of things has its root in the nature of the knowledge of the subject1 but is foreign to the thing in itself1 i4e41 to the inner primary force which shows itself in things2 that consequently space and time1 upon which the possibility of all multiplicity depends1 are mere forms of our perception2 nay1 that even that whole inconceivable ingenuity of structure associated with the reckless prodigality of the works upon which it has been expended ultimately springs simply from the way in which things are apprehended by us2 for when the simple and indivisible original effort of the will exhibits itself as object in our cerebral knowledge1 it must appear as an ingenious combination of separate parts1 as means and ends of each other1 accomplished with wonderful completeness4 ,the unity of that will1 here referred to1 which lies beyond the phenomenon1 and in which we have recognised the inner nature of the phenomenal world1 is a metaphysical unity1 and consequently transcends the knowledge of it1 i4e41 does not depend upon the functions of our intellect1 and therefore can not really be comprehended by it4 ,hence it arises that it opens to the consideration an abyss so profound that it admits of no thoroughly clear and systematically connected insight1 but grants us only isolated glances1 which enable us to recognise this unity in this and that relation of things1 now in the subjective1 now in the objective sphere1 whereby1 however1 new problems are again raised1 all of which ,i will not engage to solve1 but rather appeal here to the words est quadam prodire tenus1 more concerned to set up nothing false or arbitrarily invented than to give a thorough account of all2--at the risk of giving here only a fragmentary exposition4 ,if we call up to our minds and distinctly go through in thought the exceedingly acute theory of the origin of the planetary system1 first put forth by ,kant and later by ,laplace1 a theory of which it is scarcely possible to doubt the correctness1 we see the lowest1 crudest1 and blindest forces of nature bound to the most rigid conformity to law1 by means of their conflict for one and the same given matter1 and the accidental results brought about by this produce the framework of the world1 thus of the designedly prepared future dwellingplace of innumerable living beings1 as a system of order and harmony1 at which we are the more astonished the more distinctly and accurately we come to understand it4 ,for example1 if we see that every planet1 with its present velocity1 can only maintain itself exactly where it actually has its place1 because if it were brought nearer to the sun it would necessarily fall into it1 or if placed further from it would necessarily fly away from it2 how1 conversely1 if we take the place as given1 it can only remain there with its present velocity and no other1 because if it went faster it would necessarily fly away from the sun1 and if it went slower it would necessarily fall into it2 that thus only one definite place is suitable to each definite velocity of a planet2 and if we now see this solved by the fact that the same physical1 necessary1 and blindly acting cause which appointed it its place1 at the same time and just by doing so1 imparted to it exactly the only velocity suitable for this place1 in consequence of the law of nature that a revolving body increases its velocity in proportion as its revolution becomes smaller2 and1 moreover1 if finally we understand how endless permanence is assured to the whole system1 by the fact that all the mutual disturbances of the course of the planets which unavoidably enter1 must adjust themselves in time2 how then it is just the irrationality of the periods of revolution of ,jupiter and ,saturn to each other that prevents their respective perturbations from repeating themselves at one place1 whereby they would become dangerous1 and brings it about that1 appearing seldom and always at a different place1 they must sublate themselves again1 like dissonances in music which are again resolved into harmony4 ,by means of such considerations we recognise a design and perfection1 such as could only have been brought about by the freest absolute will directed by the most penetrating understanding and the most acute calculation4 ,and yet1 under the guidance of that cosmogony of ,laplace1 so well thought out and so accurately calculated1 we cannot prevent ourselves from seeing that perfectly blind forces of nature1 acting according to unalterable natural laws1 through their conflict and aimless play among themselves1 could produce nothing else but this very framework of the world1 which is equal to the work of an extraordinarily enhanced power of combination4 ,instead now1 after the manner of ,anaxagoras1 of dragging in the aid of an intelligence known to us only from animal nature1 and adapted only to its aims1 an intelligence which1 coming from without1 cunningly made use of the existing forces of nature and their laws in order to carry out its ends1 which are foreign to these1--we recognise in these lowest forces of nature themselves that same1 one will1 which indeed first manifests itself in them1 and already in this manifestation striving after its goal1 through its original laws themselves works towards its final end1 to which therefore all that happens according to blind laws of nature must minister and correspond4 ,and this indeed cannot be otherwise1 because everything material is nothing but just the phenomenal appearance1 the visibility1 the objectivity of the will to live which is one4 ,thus even the lowest forces of nature themselves are animated by that same will1 which afterwards1 in the individual beings provided with intelligence1 marvels at its own work1 as the somnambulist wonders in the morning at what he has done in his sleep2 or1 more accurately1 which is astonished at its own form which it beholds in the mirror4 ,this unity which is here proved of the accidental with the intentional1 of the necessary with the free1 on account of which the blindest chances1 which1 however1 rest upon universal laws of nature1 are as it were the keys upon which the worldspirit plays its melodies so full of significance1--this unity1 ,i say1 is1 as has already been remarked1 an abyss in the investigation into which even philosophy can throw no full light1 but only a glimmer4 ,but ,i now turn to a subjective consideration belonging to this place1 to which1 however1 ,i am able to give still less distinctness than to the objective consideration which has just been set forth2 for ,i shall only be able to express it by images and similes4 ,why is our consciousness brighter and more distinct the further it extends towards without1 so that its greatest clearness lies in sense perception1 which already half belongs to things outside us1--and1 on the other hand1 grows dimmer as we go in1 and leads1 if followed to its inmost recesses1 to a darkness in which all knowledge ceases8 ,because1 ,i say1 consciousness presupposes individuality2 but this belongs to the mere phenomenon1 for it is conditioned by the forms of the phenomenon1 space and time1 as multiplicity of the similar4 ,our inner nature1 on the other hand1 has its root in that which is no longer phenomenon1 but thing in itself1 to which1 therefore1 the forms of the phenomenon do not extend2 and thus the chief conditions of individuality are wanting1 and with these the distinctness of consciousness falls off4 ,in this root of existence the difference of beings ceases1 like that of the radii of a sphere in the centre2 and as in the sphere the surface is produced by the radii ending and breaking off1 so consciousness is only possible where the true inner being runs out into the phenomenon1 through whose forms the separate individuality becomes possible upon which consciousness depends1 which is just on that account confined to phenomena4 ,therefore all that is distinct and thoroughly comprehensible in our consciousness always lies without upon this surface of the sphere4 ,whenever1 on the contrary1 we withdraw entirely from this1 consciousness forsakes us1--in sleep1 in death1 to a certain extent also in magnetic or magic influences2 for these all lead through the centre4 ,but just because distinct consciousness1 being confined to the surface of the sphere1 is not directed towards the centre1 it recognises other individuals certainly as of the same kind1 but not as identical1 which yet in themselves they are4 ,immortality of the individual might be compared to a point of the surface flying off at a tangent4 ,but immortality1 by virtue of the eternal nature of the inner being of the whole phenomenon1 may be compared to the return of that point1 on the radius1 to the centre1 of which the whole surface is just the extension4 ,the will as the thing in itself is whole and undivided in every being1 as the centre is an integral part of every radius2 while the peripherical end of this radius is in the most rapid revolution1 with the surface1 which represents time and its content1 the other end1 at the centre1 which represents eternity1 remains in the profoundest peace1 because the centre is the point of which the rising half is not different from the sinking4 ,therefore in the ,bhagavad gita it is said3 8,haud distributum animantibus1 et quasi distributum tamen insidens1 animantiumque sustentaculum id cognoscendum1 edax et rursus genitale0 7,lect4 #ac1 #af vers4 ,schlegel74 ,certainly we fall here into mystical and figurative language1 but it is the only language in which anything can be said on this entirely transcendent theme4 ,so this simile also may pass4 ,the human race may be imagined as an animal compositum1 a form of life of which many polypi1 especially those which swim1 such as ,veretillum1 ,funiculina1 and others1 afford examples4 ,as in these the head isolates each individual animal1 and the lower part1 with the common stomach1 combines them all in the unity of one life process1 so the brain with its consciousness isolates the human individual1 while the unconscious part1 the vegetative life with its ganglion system1 into which in sleep the brainconsciousness disappears1 like a lotus which nightly sinks in the flood1 is a common life of all1 by means of which in exceptional cases they can even communicate1 as1 for example1 occurs when dreams communicate themselves directly1 the thoughts of the mesmeriser pass into the somnambulist1 and finally also in the magnetic or generally magical influence proceeding from intentional willing4 ,such an influence1 if it occurs1 is toto genere different from every other on account of the influxus physicus which takes place1 for it is really an actio in distans which the will1 certainly proceeding from the individual1 yet performs in its metaphysical quality as the omnipresent substratum of the whole of nature4 ,one might also say that as in the generatio quivoca there sometimes and as an exception appears a weak residue of the original creative power of the will1 which in the existing forms of nature has already done its work and is extinguished1 so there may be1 exceptionally1 acting in these magical influences1 as it were1 a surplus of its original omnipotence1 which completes its work and spends itself in the construction and maintenance of the organisms4 ,i have spoken fully of this magical property of the will in 8,the ,will in ,nature10 and ,i gladly omit here discussions which have to appeal to uncertain facts1 which yet cannot be altogether ignored or denied4 ,chapter ,,xxvi47#d7 ,on ,teleology4 ,the universal teleology or design of organised nature relative to the continuance of every existing being1 together with the adaptation of organised to unorganised nature1 cannot without violence enter into the connection of any philosophical system except that one which makes a will the basis of the existence of every natural being2 a will which accordingly expresses its nature and tendency not merely in the actions1 but already in the form of the phenomenal organism4 ,in the preceding chapter ,i have merely indicated the account which our system of thought gives of this subject1 since ,i have already expounded it in the passage of the first volume referred to below1 and with special clearness and fulness in 8,the ,will in ,nature10 under the rubric 8,comparative ,anatomy40 ,the astounding amazement which is wont to take possession of us when we consider the endless design displayed in the construction of organised beings ultimately rests upon the certainly natural but yet false assumption that that adaptation of the parts to each other1 to the whole of the organism and to its aims in the external world1 as we comprehend it and judge of it by means of knowledge1 thus upon the path of the idea1 has also come into being upon the same path2 thus that as it exists for the intellect1 it was also brought about by the intellect4 ,we certainly can only bring about something regular and conforming to law1 such1 for example1 as every crystal is1 under the guidance of the law and the rule2 and in the same way1 we can only bring about something designed under the guidance of the conception of the end2 but we are by no means justified in imputing this limitation of ours to nature1 which is itself prior to all intellect1 and whose action is entirely different in kind from ours1 as was said in the preceding chapter4 ,it accomplishes that which appears so designed and planned without reflection and without conception of an end1 because without idea1 which is of quite secondary origin4 ,let us first consider what is merely according to rule1 not yet adapted to ends4 ,the six equal radii of a snowflake1 separating at equal angles1 are measured beforehand by no knowledge2 but it is the simple tendency of the original will1 which so exhibits itself to knowledge when knowledge appears4 ,as now here the will brings about the regular figure without mathematics1 so also without physiology does it bring about the form which is organised and furnished with organs evidently adapted to special ends4 ,the regular form in space only exists for the perception1 the perceptive form of which is space2 so the design of the organism only exists for the knowing reason1 the reflection of which is bound to the conceptions of end and means4 ,if direct insight into the working of nature was possible for us1 we would necessarily recognise that the wonder excited by teleology referred to above is analogous to that which that savage referred to by ,kant in his explanation of the ludicrous felt when he saw the froth irresistibly foaming out of a bottle of beer which had just been opened1 and expressed his wonder not that it should come out1 but that any one had ever been able to get it in2 for we also assume that the teleology of natural productions has been put in the same as it comes out for us4 ,therefore our astonishment at design may likewise be compared to that which the first productions of the art of printing excited in those who considered them under the supposition that they were works of the pen1 and therefore had to resort to the assumption of the assistance of a devil in order to explain them4 ,for1 let it be said again1 it is our intellect which by means of its own forms1 space1 time1 and causality1 apprehends as object the act of will1 in itself metaphysical and indivisible1 which exhibits itself in the phenomenon of an animal1--it is our intellect which first produces the multiplicity and diversity of the parts1 and is then struck with amazement at their perfect agreement and conspiring together1 which proceeds from the original unity2 whereby then1 in a certain sense1 it marvels at its own work4 ,if we give ourselves up to the contemplation of the indescribably and infinitely ingenious construction of any animal1 even if it were only the commonest insect1 lose ourselves in admiration of it1 and it now occurs to us that nature recklessly exposes even this exceedingly ingenious and highly complicated organism daily and by thousands to destruction by accident1 animal rapacity1 and human wantonness1 this wild prodigality fills us with amazement2 but our amazement is based upon an ambiguity of the conceptions1 for we have in our minds the human work of art which is accomplished by the help of the intellect and by overcoming a foreign and resisting material1 and therefore certainly costs much trouble4 ,nature's works1 on the contrary1 however ingenious they may be1 cost her absolutely no trouble2 for here the will to work is already the work itself1 since1 as has already been said1 the organism is merely the visibility of the will which is here present1 brought about in the brain4 ,in consequence of the nature of organised beings which has been set forth1 teleology1 as the assumption of the adaptation of every part to its end1 is a perfectly safe guide in considering the whole of organised nature2 on the other hand1 in a metaphysical regard1 for the explanation of nature beyond the possibility of experience1 it must only be regarded as valid in a secondary and subsidiary manner for the confirmation of principles of explanation which are otherwise established3 for here it belongs to the problems which have to be given account of4 ,accordingly1 if in some animal a part is found of which we do not see any use1 we must never venture the conjecture that nature has produced it aimlessly1 perhaps trifling1 or out of mere caprice4 ,certainly it is possible to conceive something of this kind under the ,anaxagorean assumption that the disposition of nature has been brought about by means of an ordering understanding1 which1 as such1 obeys a foreign will2 but not under the assumption that the true inner being 7i4e41 outside of our idea7 of every organism is simply and solely its own will2 for then the existence of every part is conditioned by the circumstance that in some way it serves the will which here lies at its foundation1 expresses and realises some tendency of it1 and consequently in some way contributes to the maintenance of this organism4 ,for apart from the will which manifests itself in it1 and the conditions of the external world under which this has voluntarily undertaken to live1 for the conflict with which its whole form and disposition is already adapted1 nothing can have influenced it and determined its form and parts1 thus no arbitrary power1 no caprice4 ,on this account everything in it must be designed2 and therefore final causes 7caus finales7 are the clue to the understanding of organised nature1 as efficient causes 7caus efficientes7 are the clue to the understanding of unorganised nature4 ,it depends upon this1 that if in anatomy or zoology1 we cannot find the end or aim of an existing part1 our understanding receives a shock similar to that which it receives in physics from an effect whose cause remains concealed2 and as we assume the latter as necessary1 so also we assume the former1 and therefore go on searching for it1 however long we may already have done so in vain4 ,this is1 for example1 the case with the spleen1 as to the use of which men never cease inventing hypotheses1 till some day one shall have proved itself correct4 ,so is it also with the large spiral formed teeth of the babyroussa1 the hornshaped excrescences of certain caterpillars1 and more of the like4 ,negative cases are also judged by us according to the same rule2 for example1 that in a class which1 as a whole1 is so uniform as that of lizards1 so important a part as the bladder is present in many species1 while it is wanting in others2 similarly that dolphins and certain cetacea related to them are entirely without olfactory nerves1 while the rest of the cetacea and even fishes have them3 there must be a reason which determines this4 ,individual real exceptions to this universal law of design in organised nature have indeed been discovered1 and with great surprise2 but in these cases that exceptio firmat regulam applies1 since they can be accounted for upon other grounds4 ,such1 for example1 is the fact that the tadpoles of the pipa toad have tails and gills1 although1 unlike all other tadpoles1 they do not swim1 but await their metamorphosis on the back of the mother2 that the male kangaroo has the marsupial bones which in the female carry the pouch2 that male mammals have breasts2 that the ,mus typhlus1 a rat1 has eyes1 although very small ones1 without any opening for them in the outer skin1 which thus covers them1 clothed with hair2 and that the moles of the ,apennines1 and also two fishes--,murena ccilia and ,gastrobrauchus ccus--are in the same case2 of like kind is the ,proteus anguinus4 ,these rare and surprising exceptions to the rule of nature1 which is otherwise so rigid1 these contradictions with itself into which it falls1 we must explain from the inner connection which the different kinds of phenomena have with each other1 by virtue of the unity of that which manifests itself in them1 and in consequence of which nature must hint at some thing in one1 simply because another of the same type actually has it4 ,accordingly the male animal has a rudimentary form of an organ which is actually present in the female4 ,as now here the difference of the sex cannot abolish the type of the species1 so also the type of a whole order--for example1 of the batrachia--asserts itself even where in one particular species 7pipa7 one of its determinations is superfluous4 ,still less can nature allow a determination 7eyes7 which belongs to the type of a whole division 7,vertebrata7 to vanish entirely without a trace1 even if it is wanting in some particular species 7,mus typhlus7 as superfluous2 but here also it must at least indicate in a rudimentary manner what it carries out in all the others4 ,even from this point of view it is to some extent possible to see upon what depends that homology in the skeleton primarily of mammals1 and in a wider sense of all vertebrates1 which has been so fully explained1 especially by ,richard ,owen in his 8,ostologie compare10 and on account of which1 for example1 all mammals have seven cervical vertebr1 every bone of the human hand and arm finds its analogue in the fin of the whale1 the skull of the bird in the egg has exactly as many bones as that of the human ftus1 c4 ,all this points to a principle which is independent of teleology1 but which is yet the foundation upon which teleology builds1 or the already given material for its works1 and just that which ,geoffroy ,st4 ,hilaire has explained as the 8anatomical element40 ,it is the unit de plan1 the fundamental type of the higher animal world1 as it were the arbitrarily chosen key upon which nature here plays4 ,aristotle has already correctly defined the difference between the efficient cause 7causa efficiens7 and the final cause 7causa finalis7 in these words3 8 1 1 40 7,duo sunt caus modi3 alter cujus gratia1 et alter e necessitate2 ac potissimum utrumque eruere oportet47 ,de part4 anim41 i4 #a4 ,the efficient cause is that whereby something is1 the final cause that on account of which it is2 the phenomenon to be explained has1 in time1 the former behind it1 and the latter before it4 ,only in the case of the voluntary actions of animal beings do the two directly unite1 for here the final cause1 the end1 appears as the motive2 a motive1 however1 is always the true and proper cause of the action1 is wholly and solely its efficient cause1 the change preceding it which calls it forth1 by virtue of which it necessarily appears1 and without which it could not happen2 as ,i have shown in my prize essay upon freedom4 ,for whatever of a physiological nature one might wish to insert between the act of will and the corporeal movement1 the will always remains here confessedly that which moves1 and what moves it is the motive coming from without1 thus the causa finalis2 which consequently appears here as causa efficiens4 ,besides1 we know from what has gone before that the bodily movement is one with the act of will1 for it is merely its phenomenal appearance in cerebral perception4 ,this union of the causa finalis with the efficient cause in the one phenomenon intimately known to us1 which accordingly remains throughout our typical phenomenon1 is certainly to be firmly retained2 for it leads precisely to the conclusion that at least in organised nature1 the knowledge of which has throughout final causes for its clue1 a will is the forming power4 ,in fact1 we cannot otherwise distinctly think a final cause except as an end in view1 i4e41 a motive4 ,indeed1 if we carefully consider the final causes in nature in order to express their transcendent nature1 we must not shrink from a contradiction1 and boldly say3 the final cause is a motive which acts upon a being1 by which it is not known4 ,for certainly the termite nests are the motive which has produced the toothless muzzle of the antbear1 and also its long extensile1 glutinous tongue3 the hard eggshell which holds the chicken imprisoned is certainly the motive for the horny point with which its beak is provided in order to break through that shell1 after which it throws it off as of no further use4 ,and in the same way the laws of the reflection and refraction of light are the motive for the wonderfully ingenious and complex optical instrument1 the human eye1 which has the transparency of its cornea1 the different density of its three humours1 the form of its lens1 the blackness of its choroid1 the sensitiveness of its retina1 the contracting power of its pupil1 and its muscular system1 accurately calculated according to those laws4 ,but those motives acted before they were apprehended2 it is not otherwise1 however contradictory it may sound4 ,for here is the transition of the physical into the metaphysical4 ,but the latter we have already recognised in the will2 therefore we must see that the will which extends an elephant's trunk towards an object is the same will which has also called it forth and formed it1 anticipating objects4 ,it is in conformity with this that in the investigation of organised nature we are entirely referred to final causes1 everywhere seek for these and explain everything from them4 ,the efficient causes1 on the contrary1 here assume only a quite subordinate position as the mere tools of the final causes1 and1 just as in the case of the voluntary movement of the limbs1 which is confessedly effected by external motives1 they are rather assumed than pointed out4 ,in explaining the physiological functions we certainly look about for the efficient causes1 though for the most part in vain2 but in explaining the origin of the parts we again look for them no more1 but are satisfied with the final causes alone4 ,at the most we have here some such general principle as that the larger the part is to be the stronger must be the artery that conducts blood to it2 but of the actually efficient causes which bring about1 for example1 the eye1 the ear1 the brain1 we know absolutely nothing4 ,indeed1 even in explaining the mere functions the final cause is far more important and more to the point than the efficient2 therefore1 if the former alone is known we are instructed and satisfied with regard to the principal matter1 while1 on the other hand1 the efficient cause alone helps us little4 ,for example1 if we really knew the efficient cause of the circulation of the blood1 as we do not1 but still seek it1 this would help us little unless we knew the final cause1 that the blood must go into the lungs for the purpose of oxidation1 and again flow back for the purpose of nourishing2 but by the knowledge of this1 even without the knowledge of the efficient cause1 we have gained much light4 ,moreover1 ,i am of opinion1 as was said above1 that the circulation of the blood has no properly efficient cause1 but that the will is here as immediately active as in muscular movement where motives determine it by means of nerve conduction1 so that here also the movement is called forth directly by the final cause2 thus by the need of oxidation in the lungs1 which here to a certain extent acts as a motive upon the blood1 yet so that the mediation of knowledge is in this case wanting1 because everything takes place in the interior of the organism4 ,the socalled metamorphosis of plants1 a thought lightly thrown out by ,kaspar ,wolf1 which1 under this hyperbolic title1 ,goethe pompously and with solemn delivery expounds as his own production1 belongs to the class of explanations of organic nature from the efficient cause2 although ultimately he only says that nature does not in the case of every production begin from the beginning and create out of nothing1 but as it were1 writing on in the same style1 adds on to what already exists1 makes use of the earlier forms1 developed1 and raised to higher power1 to carry its work further3 just as it has done in the ascending series of animals entirely in accordance with the law3 ,natura non facit saltus1 et quod commodissimum in omnibus suis operationibus sequitur 7,arist4 de incessu animalium1 c4 #b et #h74 ,indeed1 to explain the blossom by pointing out in all its parts the form of the leaf seems to me almost the same as explaining the structure of a house by showing that all its parts1 storeys1 balconies1 and garrets1 are only composed of bricks and mere repetitions of the original unity of the brick4 ,and not much better1 though much more problematical1 seems to me the explanation of the skull from vertebr1 although even here also it is a matter of course that the covering or case of the brain will not be absolutely different and entirely disparate from that of the spinal cord1 of which it is the continuation and terminal knob1 but will rather be a carrying out of the same kind of thing4 ,this whole method of consideration belongs to the ,homology of ,richard ,owen referred to above4 ,on the other hand1 it seems to me that the following explanation of the nature of the flower from its final cause1 suggested by an ,italian whose name has escaped me1 is a far more satisfactory account to give4 ,the end of the corolla is--7#a47 ,protection of the pistil and the stamina2 7#b47 by means of it the purified saps are prepared1 which are concentrated in the pollen and germs2 7#c47 from the glands of its base the essential oil distils which1 for the most part as a fragrant vapour1 surrounding the anthers and pistil1 protects them to a certain extent from the influence of the damp air4 ,it is also one of the advantages of final causes that every efficient cause always ultimately rests upon something that cannot be fathomed1 a force of nature1 i4e41 a qualitas occulta1 and1 therefore1 it can only give a relative explanation2 while the final cause within its sphere affords a sufficient and perfect explanation4 ,it is true we are only perfectly content when we know both the efficient cause1 also called by ,aristotle 1 and the final cause1 1 at once and yet separately1 as their concurrence1 their wonderful working together1 then surprises us1 and on account of it the best appears as the absolutely necessary1 and the necessary again as if it were merely the best and not necessary2 for then arises in us the dim perception that both causes1 however different may be their origin1 are yet connected in the root1 in the nature of the thing in itself4 ,but such a twofold knowledge is seldom attainable2 in organised nature1 because the efficient cause is seldom known to us2 in unorganised nature1 because the final cause remains problematical4 ,however1 ,i will illustrate this by a couple of examples as good as ,i find within the range of my physiological knowledge1 for which physiologists may be able to substitute clearer and more striking ones4 ,the louse of the negro is black4 ,final cause3 its own safety4 ,efficient cause3 because its nourishment is the black rete ,malpighi of the negro4 ,the multifarious1 brilliant1 and gay colouring of the plumage of tropical birds is explained1 although only very generally1 from the strong effect of the light in the tropics1 as its efficient cause4 ,as the final cause ,i would assign that those brilliant feathers are the gorgeous uniform in which the individuals of the innumerable species there1 often belonging to the same genus1 may recognise each other2 so that each male may find his female4 ,the same holds good of butterflies of different zones and latitudes4 ,it has been observed that consumptive women1 in the last stage of their illness1 readily become pregnant1 that the disease stops during pregnancy1 but after delivery appears again worse than before1 and now generally results in death3 similarly that consumptive men generally beget another child in the last days of their life4 ,the final cause here is that nature1 always so anxiously concerned for the maintenance of the species1 seeks to replace by a new individual the approaching loss of one in the prime of life2 the efficient cause1 on the other hand1 is the unusually excited state of the nervous system which occurs in the last period of consumption4 ,from the same final cause is to be explained the analogous phenomenon that 7according to ,oken1 ,die ,zeugung1 p4 #fe7 flies poisoned with arsenic still couple1 and die in the act of copulation4 ,the final cause of the pubes in both sexes1 and of the ,mons ,veneris in the female1 is that even in the case of very thin subjects the ,ossa pubis shall not be felt1 which might excite antipathy2 the efficient cause1 on the other hand1 is to be sought in the fact that wherever the mucous membrane passes over to the outer skin1 hair grows in the vicinity2 and1 secondly1 also that the head and the genitals are to a certain extent opposite poles of each other1 and therefore have various relations and analogies between them1 among which is that of being covered with hair4 ,the same efficient cause holds good also of the beard of the man2 the final cause of it1 ,i suppose1 lies in the fact that the pathogonomic signs1 thus the rapid alterations of the countenance betraying every movement of the mind1 are principally visible in the mouth and its vicinity2 therefore1 in order to conceal these from the prying eye of the adversary1 as something dangerous in bargaining1 or in sudden emergencies1 nature gave man the beard 7which shows that homo homini lupus74 ,the woman1 on the other hand1 could dispense with this2 for with her dissimulation and command of countenance are inborn4 ,as ,i have said1 there must be far more apt examples to be found to show how the completely blind working of nature unites in the result with the apparently intentional1 or1 as ,kant calls it1 the mechanism of nature with its technic2 which points to the fact that both have their common origin beyond their difference in the will as the thing in itself4 ,much would be achieved for the elucidation of this point of view1 if1 for example1 we could find the efficient cause which carries the driftwood to the treeless polar lands1 or that which has concentrated the dry land of our planet principally in the northern half of it2 while it is to be regarded as the final cause of this that the winter of that half1 because it occurs in the perihelion which accelerates the course of the earth1 is eight days shorter1 and hereby is also milder4 ,yet in considering unorganised nature the final cause is always ambiguous1 and1 especially when the efficient cause is found1 leaves us in doubt whether it is not a merely subjective view1 an aspect conditioned by our point of view4 ,in this respect1 however1 it may be compared to many works of art2 for example1 to coarse mosaics1 theatre decorations1 and to the god ,apennine at ,pratolino1 near ,florence1 composed of large masses of rock1 all of which only produce their effect at a distance1 and vanish when we come near1 because instead of them the efficient cause of their appearance now becomes visible3 but the forms are yet actually existent1 and are no mere imagination4 ,analogous to this1 then1 are the final causes in unorganised nature1 if the efficient causes appear4 ,indeed1 those who take a wide view of things would perhaps allow it to pass if ,i added that something similar is the case with omens4 ,for the rest1 if any one desires to misuse the external design1 which1 as has been said1 always remains ambiguous for physicotheological demonstrations1 which is done even at the present day1 though it is to be hoped only by ,englishmen1 there are in this class enough examples in contrarium1 thus ateleological instances1 to derange his conception4 ,one of the strongest is presented by the unsuitableness of seawater for drinking1 in consequence of which man is never more exposed to the danger of dying of thirst than in the midst of the greatest mass of water on his planet4 8,why1 then1 does the sea need to be salt80 let us ask our ,englishman4 ,that in unorganised nature the final causes entirely withdraw into the background1 so that an explanation from them alone is here no longer valid1 but the efficient causes are rather indispensably required1 depends upon the fact that the will which objectifies itself here also no longer appears in individuals which constitute a whole for themselves1 but in forces of nature and their action1 whereby end and means are too far separated for their relation to be clear and for us to recognise a manifestation of will in it4 ,this already occurs in organised nature1 in a certain degree1 when the design is an external one1 i4e41 the end lies in one individual and the means in another4 ,yet even here it remains unquestionable so long as the two belong to the same species1 indeed it then becomes the more striking4 ,here we have first to count the reciprocally adapted organisation of the genitals of the two sexes1 and then also many circumstances that assist the propagation of the species1 for example1 in the case of the ,lampyris noctiluca 7the glowworm7 the circumstance that only the male1 which does not shine1 has wings to enable it to seek out the female2 the wingless female1 on the other hand1 since it only comes out in the evening1 possesses the phosphorescent light1 so that the male may be able to find it4 ,yet in the case of the ,lampyris ,italica both sexes shine1 which is an instance of the natural luxury of the ,south4 ,but a striking1 because quite special1 example of the kind of design we are speaking of is afforded by the discovery made by ,geoffroy ,st4 ,hilaire1 in his last years1 of the more exact nature of the sucking apparatus of the cetacea4 ,since all sucking requires the action of respiration1 it can only take place in the respirable medium itself1 and not under water1 where1 however1 the sucking young of the whale hangs on to the teats of the mother2 now to meet this the whole mammary apparatus of the cetacea is so modified that it has become an injecting organ1 and placed in the mouth of the young injects the milk into it without it requiring to suck4 ,when1 on the contrary1 the individual that affords essential help to another belongs to an entirely different species1 and even to another kingdom of nature1 we will doubt this external design just as in unorganised nature2 unless it is evident that the maintenance of the species depends upon it4 ,but this is the case with many plants whose fructification only takes place by means of insects1 which either bear the pollen to the stigma or bend the stamina to the pistil4 ,the common barberry1 many kinds of iris1 and ,aristolochia ,clematitis cannot fructify themselves at all without the help of insects 7,chr4 ,cour4 ,sprengel1 ,entdecktes ,geheimniss1 c41 #agic2 ,wildenow1 ,grundriss der ,kruterkunde1 #cec74 ,very many dicia1 moncia1 and polygamia are in the same position4 ,the reciprocal support which the plant and the insect worlds receive from each other will be found admirably described in ,burdach's large ,physiology1 vol4 i4 #bfc4 ,he very beautifully adds3 8,this is no mechanical assistance1 no makeshift1 as if nature had made the plants yesterday1 and had committed an error which she tries to correct today through the insect2 it is rather a deeplying sympathy between the plant and the animal worlds4 ,it ought to reveal the identity of the two4 ,both1 children of one mother1 ought to subsist with each other and through each other40 ,and further on3 8,but the organised world stands in such a sympathy with the unorganised world also10 c4 ,a proof of this consensus natur is also afforded by the observation communicated in the second volume of the 8,introduction into ,entomology0 by ,kirby and ,spence1 that the insect eggs that pass the winter attached to the twigs of the trees1 which serve as nourishment for their larv1 are hatched exactly at the time at which the twig buds2 thus1 for example1 the aphis of the birch a month earlier than that of the ash4 ,similarly1 that the insects of perennial plants pass the winter upon these as eggs2 but those of mere annuals1 since they cannot do this1 in the state of pup4 ,three great men have entirely rejected teleology1 or the explanation from final causes1 and many small men have echoed them4 ,these three are1 ,lucretius1 ,bacon of ,verulam1 and ,spinoza4 ,but in the case of all three we know clearly enough the source of this aversion1 namely1 that they regarded it as inseparable from speculative theology1 of which1 however1 they entertained so great a distrust 7which ,bacon indeed prudently sought to conceal7 that they wanted to give it a wide berth4 ,we find ,leibnitz also entirely involved in this prejudice1 for1 with characteristic navet1 he expresses it as something selfevident in his ,lettre ,m4 ,nicaise 7,spinoz op4 ed ,paulus1 vol4 ii4 p4 #fgb73 8,les causes finales1 ou ce qui est la mme chose1 la consideration de la sagesse divine dans l'ordre des choses40 7,the devil also mme chose67 ,at the same point of view we find1 indeed1 ,englishmen even at the present day4 ,the ,bridgewater ,treatisemen--,lord ,brougham1 c4--nay1 even ,richard ,owen also1 in his 8,ostologie ,compare10 thinks precisely as ,leibnitz1 which ,i have already found fault with in the first volume4 ,to all these teleology is at once also theology1 and at every instance of design recognised in nature1 instead of thinking and learning to understand nature1 they break at once into the childish cry1 8,design6 design60 then strike up the refrain of their old wives' philosophy1 and stop their ears against all rational arguments1 such as1 however1 the great ,hume has already advanced against them47#e7 ,the ignorance of the ,kantian philosophy now1 after seventy years1 which is really a disgrace to ,englishmen of learning1 is principally responsible for this whole outcast position of the ,english2 and this ignorance1 again1 depends1 at least in great measure1 upon the nefarious influence of the detestable ,english clergy1 with whom stultification of every kind is a thing after their own hearts1 so that only they may be able still to hold the ,english nation1 otherwise so intelligent1 involved in the most degrading bigotry2 therefore1 inspired by the basest obscurantism1 they oppose with all their might the education of the people1 the investigation of nature1 nay1 the advancement of all human knowledge in general2 and both by means of their connections and by means of their scandalous1 unwarrantable wealth1 which increases the misery of the people1 they extend their influence even to university teachers and authors1 who accordingly 7for example1 ,th4 ,brown1 8,on ,cause and ,effect07 resort to suppressions and perversions of every kind simply in order to avoid opposing even in a distant manner that 8cold superstition0 7as ,pckler very happily designates their religion1 or the current arguments in its favour74 ,but1 on the other hand1 the three great men of whom we are speaking1 since they lived long before the dawn of the ,kantian philosophy1 are to be pardoned for their distrust of teleology on account of its origin2 yet even ,voltaire regarded the physicotheological proof as irrefutable4 ,in order1 however1 to go into this somewhat more fully3 first of all1 the polemic of ,lucretius 7iv4 #hbdheh7 against teleology is so crude and clumsy that it refutes itself and convinces us of the opposite4 ,but as regards ,bacon 7,de augm4 scient41 iii4 #d71 he makes1 in the first place1 no distinction with reference to the use of final causes between organised and unorganised nature 7which is yet just the principal matter71 for1 in his examples of final causes1 he mixes the two up together4 ,then he banishes final causes from physics to metaphysics2 but the latter is for him1 as it is still for many at the present day1 identical with speculative theology4 ,from this1 then1 he regards final causes as inseparable1 and goes so far in this respect that he blames ,aristotle because he has made great use of final causes1 yet without connecting them with speculative theology 7which ,i shall have occasion immediately especially to praise74 ,finally1 ,spinoza 7,eth4 i4 prop4 #cf1 appendix7 makes it abundantly clear that he identifies teleology so entirely with physicotheology1 against which he expresses himself with bitterness1 that he explains ,natura nihil frustra agere3 hoc est1 quod in usum hominum non sit3 similarly1 ,omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerant1 et credunt aliquem alium esse1 qui illa media paraverit2 and also3 ,hinc statuerunt1 ,deos omnia in usum hominum fecisse et dirigere4 ,upon this1 then1 he bases his assertion3 ,naturam finem nullum sibi prfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil1 nisi humana esse figmenta4 ,his aim merely was to block the path of theism2 and he had quite rightly recognised the physicotheological proof as its strongest weapon4 ,but it was reserved for ,kant really to refute this proof1 and for me to give the correct exposition of its material1 whereby ,i have satisfied the maxim3 ,est enim verum index sui et falsi4 ,but ,spinoza did not know how else to help himself but by the desperate stroke of denying teleology itself1 thus design in the works of nature--an assertion the monstrosity of which is at once evident to every one who has gained any accurate knowledge of organised nature4 ,this limited point of view of ,spinoza1 together with his complete ignorance of nature1 sufficiently prove his entire incompetence in this matter1 and the folly of those who1 upon his authority1 believe they must judge contemptuously of final causes4 ,aristotle1 who just here shows his brilliant side1 contrasts very advantageously with these modern philosophers4 ,he goes unprejudiced to nature1 knows of no physicotheology--such a thing has never entered his mind1--and he has never looked at the world for the purpose of seeing whether it was a bungled piece of work4 ,he is in his heart pure from all this1 for he also sets up hypotheses as to the origin of animals and men 7,de generat4 anim41 iii4 #aa7 without lighting upon the physico theological train of thought4 ,he always says3 8 7natura facit71 never 0 7natura facta est74 ,but after he has truly and diligently studied nature1 he finds that it everywhere proceeds teleologically1 and he says3 8 0 7naturam nihil frustra facere cernimus71 ,de respir41 c4 #aj2 and in the books1 ,de partibus animalium1 which are a comparative anatomy3 8 1 4-- 4-- 1 1 2 1 1 4 2 1 40 7,nihil supervacaneum1 nihil frustra natura facit4--,natura rei alicujus gratia facit omnia4--,rem autem hanc esse illius gratia asserere ubique solemus1 quoties finem intelligimus aliquem1 in quem motus terminetur2 quocirca ejusmodi aliquid esse constat1 quod ,naturam vocamus4 ,est enim corpus instrumentum3 nam membrum unumquodque rei alicujus gratia est1 tum vero totum ipsum47 ,at greater length1 p4 #fcc and #fde of the ,berlin quarto edition1 and also ,de incessu animalium1 c4 #b3 8 1 1 1 40 7,natura nihil frustra facit1 sed semper ex iis1 qu cuique animalium generis essenti contingunt1 id quod optimum est47 ,but he expressly recommends teleology at the end of the books ,de generatione animalium1 and blames ,democritus for having denied it1 which is just what ,bacon1 in his prejudice1 praises in him4 ,especially1 however1 in the 8,physica10 ii4 #h1 p4 #aih1 ,aristotle speaks ex professo of final causes1 and establishes them as the true principle of the investigation of nature4 ,in fact1 every good and regular mind must1 in considering organised nature1 hit upon teleology1 but unless it is determined by the preconceived opinions1 by no means either upon physicotheology or upon the anthropoteleology condemned by ,spinoza4 ,with regard to ,aristotle generally1 ,i wish further to draw attention to the fact here1 that his teaching1 so far as it concerns unorganised nature1 is very defective and unserviceable1 as in the fundamental conceptions of mechanics and physics he accepts the most gross errors1 which is the less pardonable1 since before him the ,pythagoreans and ,empedocles had been upon the right path and had taught much better4 ,empedocles indeed1 as we learn from ,aristotle's second book1 ,de clo 7c4 #a1 p4 #bhd71 had already grasped the conception of a tangential force arising from rotation1 and counteracting gravity1 which ,aristotle again rejects4 ,quite the reverse1 however1 is ,aristotle's relation to the investigation of organised nature4 ,this is his field2 here the wealth of his knowledge1 the keenness of his observation1 nay1 sometimes the depth of his insight1 astonish us4 ,thus1 to give just one example1 he already knew the antagonism in which in the ruminants the horns and the teeth of the upper jaw stand to each other1 on account of which1 therefore1 the latter are wanting where the former are found1 and conversely 7,de partib4 anim41 iii4 #b74 ,hence then1 also his correct estimation of final causes4 ,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,on ,instinct ,and ,mechanical ,tendency4 ,it is as if nature had wished1 in the mechanical tendencies of animals1 to give the investigator an illustrative commentary upon her works1 according to final causes and the admirable design of her organised productions which is thereby introduced4 ,for these mechanical tendencies show most clearly that creatures can work with the greatest decision and definiteness towards an end which they do not know1 nay1 of which they have no idea4 ,such1 for instance1 is the bird's nest1 the spider's web1 the antlion's pitfall1 the ingenious beehive1 the marvellous termite dwelling1 c41 at least for those individual animals that carry them out for the first time2 for neither the form of the perfected work nor the use of it can be known to them4 ,precisely so1 however1 does organising nature work2 and therefore in the preceding chapter ,i gave the paradoxical explanation of the final cause1 that it is a motive which acts without being known4 ,and as in working from mechanical tendency that which is active is evidently and confessedly the will1 so is it also really the will which is active in the working of organising nature4 ,one might say1 the will of animal creatures is set in motion in two different ways3 either by motivation or by instinct2 thus from without1 or from within2 by an external occasion1 or by an internal tendency2 the former is explicable because it lies before us without1 the latter is inexplicable because it is merely internal4 ,but1 more closely considered1 the contrast between the two is not so sharp1 indeed ultimately it runs back into a difference of degree4 ,the motive also only acts under the assumption of an inner tendency1 i4e41 a definite quality of will which is called its character4 ,the motive in each case only gives to this a definite direction--individualises it for the concrete case4 ,so also instinct1 although a definite tendency of the will1 does not act entirely1 like a spring1 from within2 but it also waits for some external circumstance necessarily demanded for its action1 which at least determines the time of its manifestation2 such is1 for the migrating bird1 the season of the year2 for the bird that builds its nest1 the fact of pregnancy and the presence of the material for the nest2 for the bee it is1 for the beginning of the structure1 the basket or the hollow tree1 and for the following work many individually appearing circumstances2 for the spider1 it is a welladapted corner2 for the caterpillar1 the suitable leaf2 for egglaying insects1 the for the most part very specially determined and often rare place1 where the hatched larv will at once find their nourishment1 and so on4 ,it follows from this that in works of mechanical tendency it is primarily the instinct of these animals that is active1 yet subordinated also to their intellect4 ,the instinct gives the universal1 the rule2 the intellect the particular1 the application1 in that it directs the detail of the execution1 in which therefore the work of these animals clearly adapts itself to the circumstances of the existing case4 ,according to all this1 the difference between instinct and mere character is to be fixed thus3 ,instinct is a character which is only set in motion by a quite specially determined motive1 and on this account the action that proceeds from it is always exactly of the same kind2 while the character which is possessed by every species of animal and every individual man is certainly a permanent and unalterable quality of will1 which can yet be set in motion by very different motives1 and adapts itself to these2 and on account of this the action proceeding from it may1 according to its material quality1 be very different1 but yet will always bear the stamp of the same character1 and will therefore express and reveal this2 so that for the knowledge of this character the material quality of the action in which it appears is essentially a matter of indifference4 ,accordingly we might explain instinct as a character which is beyond all measure onesided and strictly determined4 ,it follows from this exposition that being determined by mere motivation presupposes a certain width of the sphere of knowledge1 and consequently a more fully developed intellect3 therefore it is peculiar to the higher animals1 quite preeminently1 however1 to man2 while being determined by instinct only demands as much intellect as is necessary to apprehend the one quite specially determined motive1 which alone and exclusively becomes the occasion for the manifestation of the instinct4 ,therefore it is found in the case of an exceedingly limited sphere of knowledge1 and consequently1 as a rule1 and in the highest degree1 only in animals of the lower classes1 especially insects4 ,since1 accordingly1 the actions of these animals only require an exceedingly simple and small motivation from without1 the medium of this1 thus the intellect or the brain1 is very slightly developed in them1 and their outward actions are for the most part under the same guidance as the inner1 follow upon mere stimuli1 physiological functions1 thus the ganglion system4 ,this is1 then1 in their case excessively developed2 their principal nervestem runs under the belly in the form of two cords1 which at every limb of the body form a ganglion little inferior to the brain in size1 and1 according to ,cuvier1 this nervestem is an analogue not so much of the spinal cord as of the great sympathetic nerve4 ,according to all this1 instinct and action through mere motivation1 stand in a certain antagonism1 in consequence of which the former has its maximum in insects1 and the latter in man1 and the actuation of other animals lies between the two in manifold gradations according as in each the cerebral or the ganglion system is preponderatingly developed4 ,just because the instinctive action and the ingenious contrivances of insects are principally directed from the ganglion system1 if we regard them as proceeding from the brain alone1 and wish to explain them accordingly1 we fall into absurdities1 because we then apply a false key4 ,the same circumstance1 however1 imparts to their action a remarkable likeness to that of somnambulists1 which indeed is also explained as arising from the fact that1 instead of the brain1 the sympathetic nerve has undertaken the conduct of the outward actions also2 insects are accordingly1 to a certain extent1 natural somnambulists4 ,things which we cannot get at directly we must make comprehensible to ourselves by means of an analogy4 ,what has just been referred to will accomplish this in a high degree when assisted by the fact that in ,kieser's 8,tellurismus0 7vol4 ii4 p4 #bej7 a case is mentioned 8in which the command of the mesmerist to the somnambulist to perform a definite action in a waking state was carried out by him when he awoke1 without remembering the command40 ,thus it was as if he must perform that action without rightly knowing why4 ,certainly this has the greatest resemblance to what goes on in the case of mechanical instincts in insects4 ,the young spider feels that it must spin its web1 although it neither knows nor understands the aim of it4 ,we are also reminded here of the dmon of ,socrates1 on account of which he had the feeling that he must leave undone some action expected of him1 or lying near him1 without knowing why--for his prophetic dream about it was forgotten4 ,we have in our own day quite wellauthenticated cases analogous to this2 therefore ,i only briefly call these to mind4 ,one had taken his passage on a ship1 but when it was about to sail he positively would not go on board without being conscious of a reason2--the ship went down4 ,another goes with companions to a powder magazine2 when he has arrived in its vicinity he absolutely will not go any further1 but turns hastily back1 seized with anxiety he knows not why2--the magazine blows up4 ,a third upon the ocean feels moved one night1 without any reason1 not to undress1 but lays himself on the bed in his clothes and boots1 and even with his spectacles on2--in the night the ship goes on fire1 and he is among the few who save themselves in the boat4 ,all this depends upon the dull aftereffect of forgotten fatidical dreams1 and gives us the key to an analogous understanding of instinct and mechanical tendencies4 ,on the other hand1 as has been said1 the mechanical tendencies of insects reflect much light upon the working of the unconscious will in the inner functions of the organism and in its construction4 ,for without any difficulty we can see in the anthill or the beehive the picture of an organism explained and brought to the light of knowledge4 ,in this sense ,burdach says 7,physiologie1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bb73 8,the formation and depositing of the eggs is the part of the queenbee1 and the care for the cultivation of them falls to the workers2 thus in the former the ovary1 and in the latter the uterus1 is individualised40 ,in the insect society1 as in the animal organism1 the vita propria of each part is subordinated to the life of the whole1 and the care for the whole precedes that for particular existence2 indeed the latter is only conditionally willed1 the former unconditionally2 therefore the individuals are even sacrificed occasionally for the whole1 as we allow a limb to be taken off in order to save the whole body4 ,thus1 for example1 if the path is closed by water against the march of the ants1 those in front boldly throw themselves in until their corpses are heaped up into a dam for those that follow4 ,when the drones have become useless they are stung to death4 ,two queens in the hive are surrounded1 and must fight with each other till one of them loses its life4 ,the antmother bites its own wings off after it has been impregnated1 for they would only be a hindrance to it in the work that is before it of tending the new family it is about to found under the earth 7,kirby and ,spence1 vol4 i47 ,as the liver will do nothing more than secrete gall for the service of the digestion1 nay1 will only itself exist for this end--and so with every other part--the working bees also will do nothing more than collect honey1 secrete wax1 and make cells for the brood of the queen2 the drones nothing more than impregnate2 the queen nothing but deposit eggs2 thus all the parts work only for the maintenance of the whole which alone is the unconditional end1 just like the parts of the organism4 ,the difference is merely that in the organism the will acts perfectly blindly in its primary condition2 in the insect society1 on the other hand1 the thing goes on already in the light of knowledge1 to which1 however1 a decided cooperation and individual choice is only left in the accidents of detail1 where it gives assistance and adopts what has to be carried out to the circumstances4 ,but the insects will the end as a whole without knowing it2 just like organised nature working according to final causes2 even the choice of the means is not as a whole left to their knowledge1 but only the more detailed disposition of them4 ,just on this account1 however1 their action is by no means automatic1 which becomes most distinctly visible if one opposes obstacles to their action4 ,for example1 the caterpillar spins itself in leaves without knowing the end2 but if we destroy the web it skilfully repairs it4 ,bees adapt their hive at the first to the existing circumstances1 and subsequent misfortunes1 such as intentional destruction1 they meet in the way most suitable to the special case 7,kirby and ,spence1 ,introduc4 to ,entomol42 ,huber1 ,des abeilles74 ,such things excite our astonishment1 because the apprehension of the circumstances and the adaptation to these is clearly a matter of knowledge2 while we believe them capable once for all of the most ingenious preparation for the coming race and the distant future1 well knowing that in this they are not guided by knowledge1 for a forethought of that kind proceeding from knowledge demands an activity of the brain rising to the level of reason4 ,on the other hand1 the intellect even of the lower animals is sufficient for the modifying and arranging of the particular case according to the existing or appearing circumstances2 because1 guided by instinct1 it has only to fill up the gaps which this leaves4 ,thus we see ants carry off their larv whenever the place is too damp1 and bring them back again when it becomes dry4 ,they do not know the aim of this1 thus are not guided in it by knowledge2 but the choice of the time at which the place is no longer suitable for the larv1 and also of the place to which they now bring them1 is left to their knowledge4 ,i wish here also to mention a fact which some one related to me verbally from his own experience1 though ,i have since found that ,burdach quotes it from ,gleditsch4 ,the latter1 in order to test the buryingbeetle 7,necrophorus vespillo71 had tied a dead frog lying upon the ground to a string1 the upper end of which was fastened to a stick stuck obliquely in the ground4 ,now after several buryingbeetles had1 according to their custom1 undermined the frog1 it could not1 as they expected1 sink into the ground2 after much perplexed running hither and thither they undermined the stick also4 ,to this assistance rendered to instinct1 and that repairing of the works of mechanical tendency1 we find in the organism the healing power of nature analogous1 which not only heals wounds1 replacing even bone and nerve substance1 but1 if through the injury of a vein or nerve branch a connection is interrupted1 opens a new connection by means of enlargement of other veins or nerves1 nay1 perhaps even by producing new branches2 which further makes some other part or function take the place of a diseased part or function2 in the case of the loss of an eye sharpens the other1 or in the case of the loss of one of the senses sharpens all the rest2 which even sometimes closes an intestinal wound1 in itself fatal1 by the adhesion of the mesentery or the peritoneum2 in short1 seeks to meet every injury and every disturbance in the most ingenious manner4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the injury is quite incurable1 it hastens to expedite death1 and indeed the more so the higher is the species of the organism1 thus the greater its sensibility4 ,even this has its analogue in the instinct of insects4 ,the wasps1 for instance1 who through the whole summer have with great care and labour fed their larv on the produce of their plundering1 but now1 in ,october1 see the last generation of them facing starvation1 sting them to death 7,kirby and ,spence1 vol4 i4 p4 #cgd74 ,nay1 still more curious and special analogies may be found2 for example1 this3 if the female humblebee 7,apis terrestris1 bombylius7 lays eggs1 the working humblebees are seized with a desire to devour them1 which lasts from six to eight hours and is satisfied unless the mother keeps them off and carefully guards the eggs4 ,but after this time the working humblebees show absolutely no inclination to eat the eggs even when offered to them2 on the contrary1 they now become the zealous tenders and nourishers of the larv now being hatched out4 ,this may without violence be taken as an analogue of children's complaints1 especially teething1 in which it is just the future nourishers of the organism making an attack upon it which so often costs it its life4 ,the consideration of all these analogies between organised life and the instinct1 together with the mechanical tendencies of the lower animals1 serves ever more to confirm the conviction that the will is the basis of the one as of the other1 for it shows here also the subordinate rle of knowledge in the action of the will1 sometimes more1 sometimes less1 confined1 and sometimes wanting altogether4 ,but in yet another respect instincts and the animal organisation reciprocally illustrate each other3 through the anticipation of the future which appears in both4 ,by means of instincts and mechanical tendencies animals care for the satisfaction of wants which they do not yet feel1 nay1 not only for their own wants1 but even for those of the future brood4 ,thus they work for an end which is as yet unknown to them4 ,this goes so far1 as ,i have illustrated by the example of the ,bombex in 8,the ,will in ,nature0 7second edit4 p4 #de1 third edit4 p4 #dg71 that they pursue and kill in advance the enemies of their future eggs4 ,in the same way we see the future wants of an animal1 its prospective ends1 anticipated in its whole corporisation by the organised implements for their attainment and satisfaction2 from which1 then1 proceeds that perfect adaptation of the structure of every animal to its manner of life1 that equipment of it with the needful weapons to attack its prey and to ward off its enemies1 and that calculation of its whole form with reference to the element and the surroundings in which it has to appear as a pursuer1 which ,i have fully described in my work on the will in nature under the rubric 8,comparative ,anatomy40 ,all these anticipations1 both in the instinct and in the organisation of animals1 we might bring under the conception of a knowledge a priori1 if knowledge lay at their foundation at all4 ,but this is1 as we have shown1 not the case4 ,their source lies deeper than the sphere of knowledge1 in the will as the thing in itself1 which as such remains free even from the forms of knowledge2 therefore with reference to it time has no significance1 consequently the future lies as near it as the present4 ,chapter ,,xxviii47#f7 ,characterisation ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live4 ,our second book closed with the question as to the goal and aim of that will which had shown itself to be the inner nature of all things in the world4 ,the following remarks may serve to supplement the answer to this question given there in general terms1 for they lay down the character of the will as a whole4 ,such a characterisation is possible because we have recognised as the inner nature of the world something thoroughly real and empirically given4 ,on the other hand1 the very name 8worldsoul10 by which many have denoted that inner being1 gives instead of this a mere ens rationis2 for 8soul0 signifies an individual unity of consciousness which clearly does not belong to that nature1 and in general1 since the conception 8soul0 supposes knowing and willing in inseparable connection and yet independent of the animal organism1 it is not to be justified1 and therefore not to be used4 ,the word should never be applied except in a metaphorical sense1 for it is much more insidious than or anima1 which signify breath4 ,much more unsuitable1 however1 is the way in which socalled pantheists express themselves1 whose whole philosophy consists chiefly in this1 that they call the inner nature of the world1 which is unknown to them1 8,god20 by which indeed they imagine they have achieved much4 ,according to this1 then1 the world would be a theophany4 ,but let one only look at it3 this world of constantly needy creatures1 who continue for a time only by devouring one another1 fulfil their existence in anxiety and want1 and often suffer terrible miseries1 till at last they fall into the arms of death2 whoever distinctly looks upon this will allow that ,aristotle was right in saying3 8 1 0 7,natura dmonia est1 non divina71 ,de divinat41 c4 #b1 p4 #dfc2 nay1 he will be obliged to confess that a ,god who could think of changing ,himself into such a world as this must certainly have been tormented by the devil4 ,i know well that the pretended philosophers of this century follow ,spinoza in this1 and think themselves thereby justified4 ,but ,spinoza had special reasons for thus naming his one substance1 in order1 namely1 to preserve at least the word1 although not the thing4 ,the stake of ,giordano ,bruno and of ,vanini was still fresh in the memory2 they also had been sacrificed to that ,god for whose honour incomparably more human sacrifices have bled than on the altars of all heathen gods of both hemispheres together4 ,if1 then1 ,spinoza calls the world ,god1 it is exactly the same thing as when ,rousseau in the 8,contrat social10 constantly and throughout denotes the people by the word le souverain2 we might also compare it with this1 that once a prince who intended to abolish the nobility in his land1 in order to rob no one of his own1 hit upon the idea of ennobling all his subjects4 ,those philosophers of our day have certainly one other ground for the nomenclature we are speaking of1 but it is no more substantial4 ,in their philosophising they all start1 not from the world or our consciousness of it1 but from ,god1 as something given and known2 ,he is not their qusitum1 but their datum4 ,if they were boys ,i would then explain to them that this is a petitio principii1 but they know this as well as ,i do4 ,but since ,kant has shown that the path of the earlier dogmatism1 which proceeded honestly1 the path from the world to a ,god1 does not lead there1 these gentlemen now imagine they have found a fine way of escape and made it cunningly4 ,will the reader of a later age pardon me for detaining him with persons of whom he has never heard4 ,every glance at the world1 to explain which is the task of the philosopher1 confirms and proves that will to live1 far from being an arbitrary hypostasis or an empty word1 is the only true expression of its inmost nature4 ,everything presses and strives towards existence1 if possible organised existence1 i4e41 life1 and after that to the highest possible grade of it4 ,in animal nature it then becomes apparent that will to live is the keynote of its being1 its one unchangeable and unconditioned quality4 ,let any one consider this universal desire for life1 let him see the infinite willingness1 facility1 and exuberance with which the will to live presses impetuously into existence under a million forms everywhere and at every moment1 by means of fructification and of germs1 nay1 when these are wanting1 by means of generatio quivoca1 seizing every opportunity1 eagerly grasping for itself every material capable of life3 and then again let him cast a glance at its fearful alarm and wild rebellion when in any particular phenomenon it must pass out of existence2 especially when this takes place with distinct consciousness4 ,then it is precisely the same as if in this single phenomenon the whole world would be annihilated for ever1 and the whole being of this threatened living thing is at once transformed into the most desperate struggle against death and resistance to it4 ,look1 for example1 at the incredible anxiety of a man in danger of his life1 the rapid and serious participation in this of every witness of it1 and the boundless rejoicing at his deliverance4 ,look at the rigid terror with which a sentence of death is heard1 the profound awe with which we regard the preparations for carrying it out1 and the heartrending compassion which seizes us at the execution itself4 ,we would then suppose there was something quite different in question than a few less years of an empty1 sad existence1 embittered by troubles of every kind1 and always uncertain3 we would rather be amazed that it was a matter of any consequence whether one attained a few years earlier to the place where after an ephemeral existence he has billions of years to be4 ,in such phenomena1 then1 it becomes visible that ,i am right in declaring that the will to live is that which cannot be further explained1 but lies at the foundation of all explanations1 and that this1 far from being an empty word1 like the absolute1 the infinite1 the idea1 and similar expressions1 is the most real thing we know1 nay1 the kernel of reality itself4 ,but if now1 abstracting for a while from this interpretation drawn from our inner being1 we place ourselves as strangers over against nature1 in order to comprehend it objectively1 we find that from the grade of organised life upwards it has only one intention--that of the maintenance of the species4 ,to this end it works1 through the immense superfluity of germs1 through the urgent vehemence of the sexual instinct1 through its willingness to adapt itself to all circumstances and opportunities1 even to the production of bastards1 and through the instinctive maternal affection1 the strength of which is so great that in many kinds of animals it even outweighs selflove1 so that the mother sacrifices her life in order to preserve that of the young4 ,the individual1 on the contrary1 has for nature only an indirect value1 only so far as it is the means of maintaining the species4 ,apart from this its existence is to nature a matter of indifference2 indeed nature even leads it to destruction as soon as it has ceased to be useful for this end4 ,why the individual exists would thus be clear2 but why does the species itself exist8 ,that is a question which nature when considered merely objectively cannot answer4 ,for in vain do we seek by contemplating her for an end of this restless striving1 this ceaseless pressing into existence1 this anxious care for the maintenance of the species4 ,the strength and time of the individuals are consumed in the effort to procure sustenance for themselves and their young1 and are only just sufficient1 sometimes even not sufficient1 for this4 ,even if here and there a surplus of strength1 and therefore of comfort--in the case of the one rational species also of knowledge--remains1 this is much too insignificant to pass for the end of that whole process of nature4 ,the whole thing1 when regarded thus purely objectively1 and indeed as extraneous to us1 looks as if nature was only concerned that of all her 7,platonic7 ,ideas1 i4e41 permanent forms1 none should be lost4 ,accordingly1 as if she had so thoroughly satisfied herself with the fortunate discovery and combination of these ,ideas 7for which the three preceding occasions on which she stocked the earth's surface with animals were only the preparation71 that now her only fear is lest any one of these beautiful fancies should be lost1 i4e41 lest any one of these forms should disappear from time and the causal series4 ,for the individuals are fleeting as the water in the brook2 the ,ideas1 on the contrary1 are permanent1 like its eddies3 but the exhaustion of the water would also do away with the eddies4 ,we would have to stop at this unintelligible view if nature were known to us only from without1 thus were given us merely objectively1 and we accepted it as it is comprehended by knowledge1 and also as sprung from knowledge1 i4e41 in the sphere of the idea1 and were therefore obliged to confine ourselves to this province in solving it4 ,but the case is otherwise1 and a glance at any rate is afforded us into the interior of nature2 inasmuch as this is nothing else than our own inner being1 which is precisely where nature1 arrived at the highest grade to which its striving could work itself up1 is now by the light of knowledge found directly in selfconsciousness4 ,here the will shows itself to us as something toto genere different from the idea1 in which nature appears unfolded in all her 7,platonic7 ,ideas2 and it now gives us1 at one stroke1 the explanation which could never be found upon the objective path of the idea4 ,thus the subjective here gives the key for the exposition of the objective4 ,in order to recognise1 as something original and unconditioned1 that exceedingly strong tendency of all animals and men to retain life and carry it on as long as possible--a tendency which was set forth above as characteristic of the subjective1 or of the will--it is necessary to make clear to ourselves that this is by no means the result of any objective knowledge of the worth of life1 but is independent of all knowledge2 or1 in other words1 that those beings exhibit themselves1 not as drawn from in front1 but as impelled from behind4 ,if with this intention we first of all review the interminable series of animals1 consider the infinite variety of their forms1 as they exhibit themselves always differently modified according to their element and manner of life1 and also ponder the inimitable ingenuity of their structure and mechanism1 which is carried out with equal perfection in every individual2 and finally1 if we take into consideration the incredible expenditure of strength1 dexterity1 prudence1 and activity which every animal has ceaselessly to make through its whole life2 if1 approaching the matter more closely1 we contemplate the untiring diligence of wretched little ants1 the marvellous and ingenious industry of the bees1 or observe how a single buryingbeetle 7,necrophorus vespillo7 buries a mole of forty times its own size in two days in order to deposit its eggs in it and insure nourishment for the future brood 7,gleditsch1 ,physik4 ,bot4 kon4 ,abhandl41 iii4 #bbj71 at the same time calling to mind how the life of most insects is nothing but ceaseless labour to prepare food and an abode for the future brood which will arise from their eggs1 and which then1 after they have consumed the food and passed through the chrysalis state1 enter upon life merely to begin again from the beginning the same labour2 then also how1 like this1 the life of the birds is for the most part taken up with their distant and laborious migrations1 then with the building of their nests and the collecting of food for the brood1 which itself has to play the same rle the following year2 and so all work constantly for the future1 which afterwards makes bankrupt2--then we cannot avoid looking round for the reward of all this skill and trouble1 for the end which these animals have before their eyes1 which strive so ceaselessly--in short1 we are driven to ask3 ,what is the result8 what is attained by the animal existence which demands such infinite preparation8 ,and there is nothing to point to but the satisfaction of hunger and the sexual instinct1 or in any case a little momentary comfort1 as it falls to the lot of each animal individual1 now and then in the intervals of its endless need and struggle4 ,if we place the two together1 the indescribable ingenuity of the preparations1 the enormous abundance of the means1 and the insufficiency of what is thereby aimed at and attained1 the insight presses itself upon us that life is a business1 the proceeds of which are very far from covering the cost of it4 ,this becomes most evident in some animals of a specially simple manner of life4 ,take1 for example1 the mole1 that unwearied worker4 ,to dig with all its might with its enormous shovel claws is the occupation of its whole life2 constant night surrounds it2 its embryo eyes only make it avoid the light4 ,it alone is truly an animal nocturnum2 not cats1 owls1 and bats1 who see by night4 ,but what1 now1 does it attain by this life1 full of trouble and devoid of pleasure8 ,food and the begetting of its kind2 thus only the means of carrying on and beginning anew the same doleful course in new individuals4 ,in such examples it becomes clear that there is no proportion between the cares and troubles of life and the results or gain of it4 ,the consciousness of the world of perception gives a certain appearance of objective worth of existence to the life of those animals which can see1 although in their case this consciousness is entirely subjective and limited to the influence of motives upon them4 ,but the blind mole1 with its perfect organisation and ceaseless activity1 limited to the alternation of insect larv and hunger1 makes the disproportion of the means to the end apparent4 ,in this respect the consideration of the animal world left to itself in lands uninhabited by men is also specially instructive4 ,a beautiful picture of this1 and of the suffering which nature prepares for herself without the interference of man1 is given by ,humboldt in his 8,ansichten der ,natur0 7second edition1 p4 #cj et seq472 nor does he neglect to cast a glance 7p4 #dd7 at the analogous suffering of the human race1 always and everywhere at variance with itself4 ,yet in the simple and easily surveyed life of the brutes the emptiness and vanity of the struggle of the whole phenomenon is more easily grasped4 ,the variety of the organisations1 the ingenuity of the means1 whereby each is adapted to its element and its prey contrasts here distinctly with the want of any lasting final aim2 instead of which there presents itself only momentary comfort1 fleeting pleasure conditioned by wants1 much and long suffering1 constant strife1 bellum omnium1 each one both a hunter and hunted1 pressure1 want1 need1 and anxiety1 shrieking and howling2 and this goes on in secula seculorum1 or till once again the crust of the planet breaks4 ,yunghahn relates that he saw in ,java a plain far as the eye could reach entirely covered with skeletons1 and took it for a battlefield2 they were1 however1 merely the skeletons of large turtles1 five feet long and three feet broad1 and the same height1 which come this way out of the sea in order to lay their eggs1 and are then attacked by wild dogs 7,canis rutilans71 who with their united strength lay them on their backs1 strip off their lower armour1 that is1 the small shell of the stomach1 and so devour them alive4 ,but often then a tiger pounces upon the dogs4 ,now all this misery repeats itself thousands and thousands of times1 year out1 year in4 ,for this1 then1 these turtles are born4 ,for whose guilt must they suffer this torment8 ,wherefore the whole scene of horror8 ,to this the only answer is3 it is thus that the will to live objectifies itself47#g7 ,let one consider it well and comprehend it in all its objectifications2 and then one will arrive at an understanding of its nature and of the world2 but not if one frames general conceptions and builds card houses out of them4 ,the comprehension of the great drama of the objectification of the will to live1 and the characterisation of its nature1 certainly demands somewhat more accurate consideration and greater thoroughness than the dismissal of the world by attributing to it the title of ,god1 or1 with a silliness which only the ,german fatherland offers and knows how to enjoy1 explaining it as the 8,idea in its other being10 in which for twenty years the simpletons of my time have found their unutterable delight4 ,certainly1 according to pantheism or ,spinozism1 of which the systems of our century are mere travesties1 all that sort of thing reels itself off actually without end1 straight on through all eternity4 ,for then the world is a ,god1 ens perfectissimum1 i4e41 nothing better can be or be conceived4 ,thus there is no need of deliverance from it2 and consequently there is none4 ,but why the whole tragicomedy exists cannot in the least be seen2 for it has no spectators1 and the actors themselves undergo infinite trouble1 with little and merely negative pleasure4 ,let us now add the consideration of the human race4 ,the matter indeed becomes more complicated1 and assumes a certain seriousness of aspect2 but the fundamental character remains unaltered4 ,here also life presents itself by no means as a gift for enjoyment1 but as a task1 a drudgery to be performed2 and in accordance with this we see1 in great and small1 universal need1 ceaseless cares1 constant pressure1 endless strife1 compulsory activity1 with extreme exertion of all the powers of body and mind4 ,many millions1 united into nations1 strive for the common good1 each individual on account of his own2 but many thousands fall as a sacrifice for it4 ,now senseless delusions1 now intriguing politics1 incite them to wars with each other2 then the sweat and the blood of the great multitude must flow1 to carry out the ideas of individuals1 or to expiate their faults4 ,in peace industry and trade are active1 inventions work miracles1 seas are navigated1 delicacies are collected from all ends of the world1 the waves engulf thousands4 ,all strive1 some planning1 others acting2 the tumult is indescribable4 ,but the ultimate aim of it all1 what is it8 ,to sustain ephemeral and tormented individuals through a short span of time in the most fortunate case with endurable want and comparative freedom from pain1 which1 however1 is at once attended with ennui2 then the reproduction of this race and its striving4 ,in this evident disproportion between the trouble and the reward1 the will to live appears to us from this point of view1 if taken objectively1 as a fool1 or subjectively1 as a delusion1 seized by which everything living works with the utmost exertion of its strength for something that is of no value4 ,but when we consider it more closely1 we shall find here also that it is rather a blind pressure1 a tendency entirely without ground or motive4 ,the law of motivation1 as was shown in #bi of the first volume1 only extends to the particular actions1 not to willing as a whole and in general4 ,it depends upon this1 that if we conceive of the human race and its action as a whole and universally1 it does not present itself to us1 as when we contemplate the particular actions1 as a play of puppets who are pulled after the ordinary manner by threads outside them2 but from this point of view1 as puppets which are set in motion by internal clockwork4 ,for if1 as we have done above1 one compares the ceaseless1 serious1 and laborious striving of men with what they gain by it1 nay1 even with what they ever can gain1 the disproportion we have pointed out becomes apparent1 for one recognises that that which is to be gained1 taken as the motivepower1 is entirely insufficient for the explanation of that movement and that ceaseless striving4 ,what1 then1 is a short postponement of death1 a slight easing of misery or deferment of pain1 a momentary stilling of desire1 compared with such an abundant and certain victory over them all as death8 ,what could such advantages accomplish taken as actual moving causes of a human race1 innumerable because constantly renewed1 which unceasingly moves1 strives1 struggles1 grieves1 writhes1 and performs the whole tragicomedy of the history of the world1 nay1 what says more than all1 perseveres in such a mockexistence as long as each one possibly can8 ,clearly this is all inexplicable if we seek the moving causes outside the figures and conceive the human race as striving1 in consequence of rational reflection1 or something analogous to this 7as moving threads71 after those good things held out to it1 the attainment of which would be a sufficient reward for its ceaseless cares and troubles4 ,the matter being taken thus1 every one would rather have long ago said1 8,le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle10 and have gone out4 ,but1 on the contrary1 every one guards and defends his life1 like a precious pledge intrusted to him under heavy responsibility1 under infinite cares and abundant misery1 even under which life is tolerable4 ,the wherefore and the why1 the reward for this1 certainly he does not see2 but he has accepted the worth of that pledge without seeing it1 upon trust and faith1 and does not know what it consists in4 ,hence ,i have said that these puppets are not pulled from without1 but each bears in itself the clockwork from which its movements result4 ,this is the will to live1 manifesting itself as an untiring machine1 an irrational tendency1 which has not its sufficient reason in the external world4 ,it holds the individuals firmly upon the scene1 and is the primum mobile of their movements2 while the external objects1 the motives1 only determine their direction in the particular case2 otherwise the cause would not be at all suitable to the effect4 ,for1 as every manifestation of a force of nature has a cause1 but the force of nature itself none1 so every particular act of will has a motive1 but the will in general has none3 indeed at bottom these two are one and the same4 ,the will1 as that which is metaphysical1 is everywhere the boundarystone of every investigation1 beyond which it cannot go4 ,from the original and unconditioned nature of the will1 which has been proved1 it is explicable that man loves beyond everything else an existence full of misery1 trouble1 pain1 and anxiety1 and1 again1 full of ennui1 which1 if he considered and weighed it purely objectively1 he would certainly abhor1 and fears above all things the end of it1 which is yet for him the one thing certain47#h7 ,accordingly we often see a miserable figure1 deformed and shrunk with age1 want1 and disease1 implore our help from the bottom of his heart for the prolongation of an existence1 the end of which would necessarily appear altogether desirable if it were an objective judgment that determined here4 ,thus instead of this it is the blind will1 appearing as the tendency to life1 the love of life1 and the sense of life2 it is the same which makes the plants grow4 ,this sense of life may be compared to a rope which is stretched above the puppetshow of the world of men1 and on which the puppets hang by invisible threads1 while apparently they are supported only by the ground beneath them 7the objective value of life74 ,but if the rope becomes weak the puppet sinks2 if it breaks the puppet must fall1 for the ground beneath it only seemed to support it3 i4e41 the weakening of that love of life shows itself as hypochondria1 spleen1 melancholy3 its entire exhaustion as the inclination to suicide1 which now takes place on the slightest occasion1 nay1 for a merely imaginary reason1 for now1 as it were1 the man seeks a quarrel with himself1 in order to shoot himself dead1 as many do with others for a like purpose2--indeed1 upon necessity1 suicide is resorted to without any special occasion4 7,evidence of this will be found in ,esquirol1 ,des maladies mentales1 #ahch47 ,and as with the persistence in life1 so is it also with its action and movement4 ,this is not something freely chosen2 but while every one would really gladly rest1 want and ennui are the whips that keep the top spinning4 ,therefore the whole and every individual bears the stamp of a forced condition2 and every one1 in that1 inwardly weary1 he longs for rest1 but yet must press forward1 is like his planet1 which does not fall into the sun only because a force driving it forward prevents it4 ,therefore everything is in continual strain and forced movement1 and the course of the world goes on1 to use an expression of ,aristotle's 7,de clo1 ii4 #ac71 8 1 0 7,motu1 non naturali sed violento74 ,men are only apparently drawn from in front2 really they are pushed from behind2 it is not life that tempts them on1 but necessity that drives them forward4 ,the law of motivation is1 like all causality1 merely the form of the phenomenon4 ,we may remark in passing that this is the source of the comical1 the burlesque1 the grotesque1 the ridiculous side of life2 for1 urged forward against his will1 every one bears himself as best he can1 and the straits that thus arise often look comical enough1 serious as is the misery which underlies them4 ,in all these considerations1 then1 it becomes clear to us that the will to live is not a consequence of the knowledge of life1 is in no way a conclusio ex prmissis1 and in general is nothing secondary4 ,rather1 it is that which is first and unconditioned1 the premiss of all premisses1 and just on that account that from which philosophy must start1 for the will to live does not appear in consequence of the world1 but the world in consequence of the will to live4 ,i scarcely need to draw attention to the fact that the considerations with which we now conclude the second book already point forcibly to the serious theme of the fourth book1 indeed would pass over into it directly if it were not that my architectonic symmetry makes it necessary that the third book1 with its fair contents1 should come between1 as a second consideration of the world as idea1 the conclusion of which1 however1 again points in the same direction4 ,,supplements ,,to ,,the ,,third ,,book4 8,et is similis spectatori est1 quad ab omni separatus spectaculum videt40 --,,oupnekhat1 vol4 i4 p4 #cjd4 ,chapter ,,xxix47#i7 ,on ,the ,knowledge ,of ,the ,ideas4 ,the intellect1 which has hitherto only been considered in its original and natural condition of servitude under the will1 appears in the third book in its deliverance from that bondage2 with regard to which1 however1 it must at once be observed that we have not to do here with a lasting emancipation1 but only with a brief hour of rest1 an exceptional and indeed only momentary release from the service of the will4 ,as this subject has been treated with sufficient fulness in the first volume1 ,i have here only to add a few supplementary remarks4 ,as1 then1 was there explained1 the intellect in its activity in the service of the will1 thus in its natural function1 knows only the mere relations of things2 primarily to the will itself1 to which it belongs1 whereby they become motives of the will2 but then also1 just for the sake of the completeness of this knowledge1 the relations of things to each other4 ,this last knowledge first appears in some extent and importance in the human intellect2 in the case of the brutes1 on the other hand1 even where the intellect is considerably developed1 only within very narrow limits4 ,clearly even the apprehension of the relations which things have to each other only takes place1 indirectly1 in the service of the will4 ,it therefore forms the transition to the purely objective knowledge1 which is entirely independent of the will2 it is scientific knowledge1 the latter is artistic knowledge4 ,if many and various relations of an object are immediately apprehended1 from these the peculiar and proper nature of the object appears ever more distinctly1 and gradually constructs itself out of mere relations3 although it itself is entirely different from them4 ,in this mode of apprehension the subjection of the intellect to the will at once becomes ever more indirect and less4 ,if the intellect has strength enough to gain the preponderance1 and let go altogether the relations of things to the will1 in order to apprehend1 instead of them1 the purely objective nature of a phenomenon1 which expresses itself through all relations1 it also forsakes1 along with the service of the will1 the apprehension of mere relations1 and thereby really also that of the individual thing as such4 ,it then moves freely1 no longer belonging to a will4 ,in the individual thing it knows only the essential1 and therefore its whole species2 consequently it now has for its object the ,ideas1 in my sense1 which agrees with the original1 ,platonic meaning of this grossly misused word2 thus the permanent1 unchanging forms1 independent of the temporal existence of the individuals1 the species rerum1 which really constitute what is purely objective in the phenomena4 ,an ,idea so apprehended is not yet indeed the essence of the thing in itself1 just because it has sprung from knowledge of mere relations2 yet1 as the result of the sum of all the relations1 it is the peculiar character of the thing1 and thereby the complete expression of the essence which exhibits itself as an object of perception1 comprehended1 not in relation to an individual will1 but as it expresses itself spontaneously1 whereby indeed it determines all its relations1 which till then alone were known4 ,the ,idea is the root point of all these relations1 and thereby the complete and perfect phenomenon1 or1 as ,i have expressed it in the text1 the adequate objectivity of the will at this grade of its manifestation4 ,form and colour1 indeed1 which in the apprehension of the ,idea by perception are what is immediate1 belong at bottom not to the ,idea itself1 but are merely the medium of its expression2 for1 strictly speaking1 space is as foreign to it as time4 ,in this sense the ,neo,platonist ,olympiodorus already says in his commentary on ,plato's ,alcibiades 7,kreuzer's edition of ,proclus and ,olympiodorus1 vol4 ii4 p4 #hb73 8 30 i4e41 the ,idea1 in itself unextended1 imparted certainly the form to the matter1 but first assumed extension from it4 ,thus1 as was said1 the ,ideas reveal not the thing in itself1 but only the objective character of things1 thus still only the phenomenon2 and we would not even understand this character if the inner nature of things were not otherwise known to us at least obscurely and in feeling4 ,this nature itself cannot be understood from the ,ideas1 nor in general through any merely objective knowledge2 therefore it would remain an eternal secret if we were not able to approach it from an entirely different side4 ,only because every knowing being is also an individual1 and thereby a part of nature1 does the approach to the inner being of nature stand open to him in his own selfconsciousness1 where1 as we have found1 it makes itself known in the most immediate manner as will4 ,now what the ,platonic ,idea is1 regarded as a merely objective image1 mere form1 and thereby lifted out of time and all relations--that1 taken empirically and in time1 is the species or kind4 ,this1 then1 is the empirical correlative of the ,idea4 ,the ,idea is properly eternal1 but the species is of endless duration1 although its appearance upon one planet may become extinct4 ,even the names of the two pass over into each other3 1 1 species1 kind4 ,the ,idea is the species1 but not the genus3 therefore the species are the work of nature1 the genera the work of man2 they are mere conceptions4 ,there are species naturales1 but only genera logica4 ,of manufactured articles there are no ,ideas1 but only conceptions2 thus genera logica1 and their subordinate classes are species logic4 ,to what is said in this reference in vol4 i4 #da1 ,i will add here that ,aristotle also 7,metaph4 i4 #i and xiii4 #e7 says that the ,platonists admitted no ideas of manufactured articles3 8 1 1 0 7,ut domus et annulus1 quorum ideas dari negant74 ,with which compare the ,scholiast1 p4 #efb1 #efc of the ,berlin quarto edition4 ,aristotle further says 7,metaph4 xi4 #c73 8 7,supple41 7 77 1 0 7,si quidem ide sunt1 in iis sunt1 qu natura fiunt3 propter quod non male ,plato dixit1 quod species eorum sunt1 qu natura sunt74 ,on which the ,scholiast remarks1 p4 #hjj3 8 2 1 0 7,hoc etiam ipsis ideas statuentibus placet3 non enim arte factorum ideas dari ajebant1 sed natura procreatorum74 ,for the rest1 the doctrine of ,ideas originated with the ,pythagoreans1 unless we distrust the assertion of ,plutarch in the book1 ,de placitis philosophorum1 ,l4 i4 c4 #c4 ,the individual is rooted in the species1 and time in eternity4 ,and as every individual is so only because it has the nature of its species in itself1 so also it has only temporal existence because it is in eternity4 ,in the following book a special chapter is devoted to the life of the species4 ,in #di of the first volume ,i have sufficiently brought out the difference between the ,idea and the conception4 ,their resemblance1 on the other hand1 rests upon the following ground3 ,the original and essential unity of an ,idea becomes broken up into the multiplicity of individual things through the perception of the knowing individual1 which is subject to sensuous and cerebral conditions4 ,but that unity is then restored through the reflection of the reason1 yet only in abstracto1 as a concept1 universale1 which indeed is equal to the ,idea in extension1 but has assumed quite a different form1 and has thereby lost its perceptible nature1 and with this its thorough determinateness4 ,in this sense 7but in no other7 we might1 in the language of the ,scholastics1 describe the ,ideas as universalia ante rem1 the conceptions as universalia post rem4 ,between the two stand the individual things1 the knowledge of which is possessed also by the brutes4 ,without doubt the realism of the ,scholastics arose from the confusion of the ,platonic ,ideas1 to which1 since they are also the species1 an objective real being can certainly be attributed1 with the mere concepts to which the ,realists now wished to attribute such a being1 and thereby called forth the victorious opposition of ,nominalism4 ,chapter ,,xxx47#aj7 ,on ,the ,pure ,subject ,of ,knowledge4 ,the comprehension of an ,idea1 the entrance of it into our consciousness1 is only possible by means of a change in us1 which might also be regarded as an act of selfdenial2 for it consists in this1 that knowledge turns away altogether from our own will1 thus now leaves out of sight entirely the valuable pledge intrusted to it1 and considers things as if they could never concern the will at all4 ,for thus alone does knowledge become a pure mirror of the objective nature of things4 ,knowledge conditioned in this way must lie at the foundation of every genuine work of art as its origin4 ,the change in the subject which is required for this cannot proceed from the will1 just because it consists in the elimination of all volition2 thus it can be no act of the will1 i4e41 it cannot lie in our choice4 ,on the contrary1 it springs only from a temporary preponderance of the intellect over the will1 or1 physiologically considered1 from a strong excitement of the perceptive faculty of the brain1 without any excitement of the desires or emotions4 ,to explain this somewhat more accurately ,i remind the reader that our consciousness has two sides2 partly1 it is a consciousness of our own selves1 which is the will2 partly a consciousness of other things1 and as such primarily1 knowledge1 through perception1 of the external world1 the apprehension of objects4 ,now the more one side of the whole consciousness comes to the front1 the more the other side withdraws4 ,accordingly1 the consciousness of other things1 thus knowledge of perception1 becomes the more perfect1 i4e41 the more objective1 the less we are conscious of ourselves at the time4 ,here exists an actual antagonism4 ,the more we are conscious of the object1 the less we are conscious of the subject2 the more1 on the other hand1 the latter occupies our consciousness1 the weaker and more imperfect is our perception of the external world4 ,the state which is required for pure objectivity of perception has partly permanent conditions in the perfection of the brain and the general physiological qualities favourable to its activity1 partly temporary conditions1 inasmuch as such a state is favoured by all that increases the attention and heightens the susceptibility of the cerebral nervous system1 yet without exciting any passion4 ,one must not think here of spirituous drinks or opium2 what is rather required is a night of quiet sleep1 a cold bath1 and all that procures for the brain activity an unforced predominance by quieting the circulation and calming the passions4 ,it is especially these natural means of furthering the cerebral nervous activity which bring it about1 certainly so much the better the more developed and energetic in general the brain is1 that the object separates itself ever more from the subject1 and finally introduces the state of pure objectivity of perception1 which of itself eliminates the will from consciousness1 and in which all things stand before us with increased clearness and distinctness1 so that we are conscious almost only of them and scarcely at all of ourselves2 thus our whole consciousness is almost nothing more than the medium through which the perceived object appears in the world as an idea4 ,thus it is necessary for pure1 willless knowledge that the consciousness of ourselves should vanish1 since the consciousness of other things is raised to such a pitch4 ,for we only apprehend the world in a purely objective manner when we no longer know that we belong to it2 and all things appear the more beautiful the more we are conscious merely of them and the less we are conscious of ourselves4 ,since now all suffering proceeds from the will1 which constitutes the real self1 with the withdrawal of this side of consciousness all possibility of suffering is also abolished2 therefore the condition of the pure objectivity of perception is one which throughout gives pleasure2 and hence ,i have shown that in it lies one of the two constituent elements of sthetic satisfaction4 ,as soon1 on the other hand1 as the consciousness of our own self1 thus subjectivity1 i4e41 the will1 again obtains the upper hand1 a proportional degree of discomfort or unrest also enters2 of discomfort1 because our corporealness 7the organism which in itself is the will7 is again felt2 of unrest1 because the will1 on the path of thought1 again fills the consciousness through wishes1 emotions1 passions1 and cares4 ,for the will1 as the principle of subjectivity1 is everywhere the opposite1 nay1 the antagonist of knowledge4 ,the greatest concentration of subjectivity consists in the act of will proper1 in which therefore we have the most distinct consciousness of our own self4 ,all other excitements of the will are only preparations for this2 the act of will itself is for subjectivity what for the electric apparatus is the passing of the spark4 ,every bodily sensation is in itself an excitement of the will1 and indeed oftener of the noluntas than of the voluntas4 ,the excitement of the will on the path of thought is that which occurs by means of motives2 thus here the subjectivity is awakened and set in play by the objectivity itself4 ,this takes place whenever any object is apprehended no longer in a purely objective manner1 thus without participation in it1 but1 directly or indirectly1 excites desire or aversion1 even if it is only by means of a recollection1 for then it acts as a motive in the widest sense of the word4 ,i remark here that abstract thinking and reading1 which are connected with words1 belong indeed in the wider sense to the consciousness of other things1 thus to the objective employment of the mind2 yet only indirectly1 by means of conceptions4 ,but the latter are the artificial product of the reason1 and are therefore already a work of intention4 ,moreover1 the will is the ruler of all abstract exercise of the mind1 for1 according to its aims1 it imparts the direction1 and also fixes the attention2 therefore such mental activity is always accompanied by some effort2 and this presupposes the activity of the will4 ,thus complete objectivity of consciousness does not exist with this kind of mental activity1 as it accompanies the sthetic apprehension1 i4e41 the knowledge of the ,ideas1 as a condition4 ,in accordance with the above1 the pure objectivity of perception1 by virtue of which no longer the individual thing as such1 but the ,idea of its species is known1 is conditioned by the fact that one is no longer conscious of oneself1 but only of the perceived objects1 so that one's own consciousness only remains as the supporter of the objective existence of these objects4 ,what increases the difficulty of this state1 and therefore makes it more rare1 is1 that in it the accident 7the intellect7 overcomes and annuls the substance 7the will71 although only for a short time4 ,here also lies the analogy and1 indeed1 the relationship of this with the denial of the will expounded at the end of the following book4 ,although knowledge1 as was shown in the preceding book1 is sprung from the will and is rooted in the manifestation of the will1 the organism1 yet it is just by the will that its purity is disturbed1 as the flame is by the fuel and its smoke4 ,it depends upon this that we can only apprehend the purely objective nature of things1 the ,ideas which appear in them1 when we have ourselves no interest in them1 because they stand in no relation to our will4 ,from this1 again1 it arises that the ,ideas of anything appeal to us more easily from a work of art than from reality4 ,for what we behold only in a picture or in poetry stands outside all possibility of having any relation to our will2 for in itself it exists only for knowledge and appeals immediately to knowledge alone4 ,on the other hand1 the apprehension of ,ideas from reality assumes some measure of abstraction from our own volition1 arising above its interests which demands a special power of the intellect4 ,in a high degree1 and for some duration1 this belongs only to genius1 which consists indeed in this1 that a greater measure of the power of knowledge exists than is required for the service of an individual will1 and this surplus becomes free1 and now comprehends the world without reference to the will4 ,thus that the work of art facilitates so greatly the apprehension of the ,ideas1 in which sthetic satisfaction consists1 depends not merely upon the fact that art1 by giving prominence to what is essential and eliminating what is unessential1 presents the things more distinctly and characteristically1 but just as much on the fact that the absolute silence of the will1 which is demanded for the purely objective comprehension of the nature of the things1 is attained with the greatest certainty when the perceived object itself lies entirely outside the province of things which are capable of having a relation to the will1 because it is nothing real1 but a mere picture4 ,now this holds good1 not only of the works of plastic and pictorial art1 but also of poetry2 the effect of which is also conditioned by indifferent1 willless1 and thereby purely objective apprehension4 ,it is exactly this which makes a perceived object picturesque1 an event of actual life poetical2 for it is only this that throws over the objects of the real world that magic gleam which in the case of sensibly perceived objects is called the picturesque1 and in the case of those which are only perceived in imagination is called the poetical4 ,if poets sing of the blithe morning1 the beautiful evening1 the still moonlight night1 and many such things1 the real object of their praise is1 unknown to themselves1 the pure subject of knowledge which is called forth by those beauties of nature1 and on the appearance of which the will vanishes from consciousness1 and so that peace of heart enters which1 apart from this1 is unattainable in the world4 ,how otherwise1 for example1 could the verse-- 8,nox erat1 at clo fulgebat luna sereno1 ,inter minora sidera10 affect us so beneficently1 nay1 so magically8 ,further1 that the stranger or the mere passing traveller feels the picturesque or poetical effect of objects which are unable to produce this effect upon those who live among them may be explained from the fact that the novelty and complete strangeness of the objects of such an indifferent1 purely objective apprehension are favourable to it4 ,thus1 for example1 the sight of an entirely strange town often makes a specially agreeable impression upon the traveller1 which it by no means produces in the inhabitant of it2 for it arises from the fact that the former1 being out of all relation to this town and its inhabitants1 perceives it purely objectively4 ,upon this depends partly the pleasure of travelling4 ,this seems also to be the reason why it is sought to increase the effect of narrative or dramatic works by transferring the scene to distant times or lands3 in ,germany1 to ,italy or ,spain2 in ,italy1 to ,germany1 ,poland1 or even ,holland4 ,if now perfectly objective1 intuitive apprehension1 purified from all volition1 is the condition of the enjoyment of sthetic objects1 so much the more is it the condition of their production4 ,every good picture1 every genuine poem1 bears the stamp of the frame of mind described4 ,for only what has sprung from perception1 and indeed from purely objective perception1 or is directly excited by it1 contains the living germ from which genuine and original achievements can grow up3 not only in plastic and pictorial art1 but also in poetry1 nay1 even in philosophy4 ,the punctum saliens of every beautiful work1 of every great or profound thought1 is a purely objective perception4 ,such perception1 however1 is absolutely conditioned by the complete silence of the will1 which leaves the man simply the pure subject of knowledge4 ,the natural disposition for the predominance of this state is genius4 ,with the disappearance of volition from consciousness1 the individuality also1 and with it its suffering and misery1 is really abolished4 ,therefore ,i have described the pure subject of knowledge which then remains over as the eternal eye of the world1 which1 although with very different degrees of clearness1 looks forth from all living creatures1 untouched by their appearing and passing away1 and thus1 as identical with itself1 as constantly one and the same1 is the supporter of the world of permanent ,ideas1 i4e41 of the adequate objectivity of the will2 while the individual subject1 whose knowledge is clouded by the individuality which springs from the will1 has only particular things as its object1 and is transitory as these themselves4 ,in the sense here indicated a double existence may be attributed to every one4 ,as will1 and therefore as individual1 he is only one1 and this one exclusively1 which gives him enough to do and to suffer4 ,as the purely objective perceiver1 he is the pure subject of knowledge in whose consciousness alone the objective world has its existence2 as such he is all things so far as he perceives them4 and in him is their existence without burden or inconvenience4 ,it is his existence1 so far as it exists in his idea2 but it is there without will4 ,so far1 on the other hand1 as it is will1 it is not in him4 ,it is well with every one when he is in that state in which he is all things2 it is ill with him when in the state in which he is exclusively one4 ,every state1 every man1 every scene of life1 requires only to be purely objectively apprehended and be made the subject of a sketch1 whether with pencil or with words1 in order to appear interesting1 charming1 and enviable2 but if one is in it1 if one is it oneself1 then 7it is often a case of7 may the devil endure it4 ,therefore ,goethe says-- 8,what in life doth only grieve us1 ,that in art we gladly see40 ,there was a period in the years of my youth when ,i was always trying to see myself and my action from without1 and picture it to myself2 probably in order to make it more enjoyable to me4 ,as ,i have never spoken before on the subject ,i have just been considering1 ,i wish to add a psychological illustration of it4 ,in the immediate perception of the world and of life we consider things1 as a rule1 merely in their relations1 consequently according to their relative and not their absolute nature and existence4 ,for example1 we will regard houses1 ships1 machines1 and the like with the thought of their end and their adaptation to it2 men1 with the thought of their relation to us1 if they have any such2 and then with that of their relations to each other1 whether in their present action or with regard to their position and business1 judging perhaps their fitness for it1 c4 ,such a consideration of the relations we can follow more or less far to the most distant links of their chain3 the consideration will thereby gain in accuracy and extent1 but in its quality and nature it remains the same4 ,it is the consideration of things in their relations1 nay1 by means of these1 thus according to the principle of sufficient reason4 ,every one1 for the most part and as a rule1 is given up to this method of consideration2 indeed ,i believe that most men are capable of no other4 ,but if1 as an exception1 it happens that we experience a momentary heightening of the intensity of our intuitive intelligence1 we at once see things with entirely different eyes1 in that we now apprehend them no longer according to their relations1 but according to that which they are in and for themselves1 and suddenly perceive their absolute existence apart from their relative existence4 ,at once every individual represents its species2 and accordingly we now apprehend the universal of every being4 ,now what we thus know are the ,ideas of things2 but out of these there now speaks a higher wisdom than that which knows of mere relations4 ,and we also have then passed out of the relations1 and have thus become the pure subject of knowledge4 ,but what now exceptionally brings about this state must be internal physiological processes1 which purify the activity of the brain1 and heighten it to such a degree that a sudden springtide of activity like this ensues4 ,the external conditions of this are that we remain completely strange to the scene to be considered1 and separated from it1 and are absolutely not actively involved in it4 ,in order to see that a purely objective1 and therefore correct1 comprehension of things is only possible when we consider them without any personal participation in them1 thus when the will is perfectly silent1 let one call to mind how much every emotion or passion disturbs and falsifies our knowledge1 indeed how every inclination and aversion alters1 colours1 and distorts not only the judgment1 but even the original perception of things4 ,let one remember how when we are gladdened by some fortunate occurrence the whole world at once assumes a bright colour and a smiling aspect1 and1 on the contrary1 looks gloomy and sad when we are pressed with cares2 also1 how even a lifeless thing1 if it is to be made use of in doing something which we abhor1 seems to have a hideous physiognomy2 for example1 the scaffold1 the fortress1 to which we have been brought1 the surgeon's cases of instruments2 the travelling carriage of our loved one1 c41 nay1 numbers1 letters1 seals1 may seem to grin upon us horribly and affect us as fearful monstrosities4 ,on the other hand1 the tools for the accomplishment of our wishes at once appear to us agreeable and pleasing2 for example1 the humpbacked old woman with the loveletter1 the ,jew with the louis d'ors1 the ropeladder to escape by1 c4 ,as now here the falsification of the idea through the will in the case of special abhorrence or love is unmistakable1 so is it present in a less degree in every object which has any even distant relation to our will1 that is1 to our desire or aversion4 ,only when the will with its interests has left consciousness1 and the intellect freely follows its own laws1 and as pure subject mirrors the objective world1 yet in doing so1 although spurred on by no volition1 is of its own inclination in the highest state of tension and activity1 do the colours and forms of things appear in their true and full significance4 ,thus it is from such comprehension alone that genuine works of art can proceed whose permanent worth and ever renewed approval arises simply from the fact that they express the purely objective element1 which lies at the foundation of and shines through the different subjective1 and therefore distorted1 perceptions1 as that which is common to them all and alone stands fast2 as it were the common theme of all those subjective variations4 ,for certainly the nature which is displayed before our eyes exhibits itself very differently in different minds2 and as each one sees it so alone can he repeat it1 whether with the pencil or the chisel1 or with words and gestures on the stage4 ,objectivity alone makes one capable of being an artist2 but objectivity is only possible in this way1 that the intellect1 separated from its root the will1 moves freely1 and yet acts with the highest degree of energy4 ,to the youth whose perceptive intellect still acts with fresh energy nature often exhibits itself with complete objectivity1 and therefore with perfect beauty4 ,but the pleasure of such a glance is sometimes disturbed by the saddening reflection that the objects present which exhibit themselves in such beauty do not stand in a personal relation to this will1 by virtue of which they could interest and delight him2 he expects his life in the form of an interesting romance4 8,behind that jutting cliff the wellmounted band of friends should await me1--beside that waterfall my love should rest2 this beautifully lighted building should be her dwelling1 and that vineclad window hers2--but this beautiful world is for me a desert60 and so on4 ,such melancholy youthful reveries really demand something exactly contradictory to themselves2 for the beauty with which those objects present themselves depends just upon the pure objectivity1 i4e41 disinterestedness of their perception1 and would therefore at once be abolished by the relation to his own will which the youth painfully misses1 and thus the whole charm which now affords him pleasure1 even though alloyed with a certain admixture of pain1 would cease to exist4 ,the same holds good1 moreover1 of every age and every relation2 the beauty of the objects of a landscape which now delights us would vanish if we stood in personal relations to them1 of which we remained always conscious4 ,everything is beautiful only so long as it does not concern us4 7,we are not speaking here of sensual passion1 but of sthetic pleasure47 ,life is never beautiful1 but only the pictures of life are so in the transfiguring mirror of art or poetry2 especially in youth1 when we do not yet know it4 ,many a youth would receive great peace of mind if one could assist him to this knowledge4 ,why has the sight of the full moon such a beneficent1 quieting1 and exalting effect8 ,because the moon is an object of perception1 but never of desire3 8,the stars we yearn not after ,delight us with their glory40--,g4 ,further1 it is sublime1 i4e41 it induces a lofty mood in us1 because1 without any relation to us1 it moves along for ever strange to earthly doings1 and sees all while it takes part in nothing4 ,therefore1 at the sight of it the will1 with its constant neediness1 vanishes from consciousness1 and leaves a purely knowing consciousness behind4 ,perhaps there is also mingled here a feeling that we share this sight with millions1 whose individual differences are therein extinguished1 so that in this perception they are one1 which certainly increases the impression of the sublime4 ,finally1 this is also furthered by the fact that the moon lights without heating1 in which certainly lies the reason why it has been called chaste and identified with ,diana4 ,in consequence of this whole beneficent impression upon our feeling1 the moon becomes gradually our bosom friend4 ,the sun1 again1 never does so2 but is like an overplenteous benefactor whom we can never look in the face4 ,the following remark may find room here as an addition to what is said in #ch of the first volume on the sthetic pleasure afforded by light1 reflection1 and colours4 ,the whole immediate1 thoughtless1 but also unspeakable1 pleasure which is excited in us by the impression of colours1 strengthened by the gleam of metal1 and still more by transparency1 as1 for example1 in coloured windows1 and in a greater measure by means of the clouds and their reflection at sunset1--ultimately depends upon the fact that here in the easiest manner1 almost by a physical necessity1 our whole interest is won for knowledge1 without any excitement of our will1 so that we enter the state of pure knowing1 although for the most part this consists here in a mere sensation of the affection of the retina1 which1 however1 as it is in itself perfectly free from pain or pleasure1 and therefore entirely without direct influence on the will1 thus belongs to pure knowledge4 ,chapter ,,xxxi47#aa7 ,on ,genius4 ,what is properly denoted by the name genius is the predominating capacity for that kind of knowledge which has been described in the two preceding chapters1 the knowledge from which all genuine works of art and poetry1 and even of philosophy1 proceed4 ,accordingly1 since this has for its objects the ,platonic ,ideas1 and these are not comprehended in the abstract1 but only perceptibly1 the essence of genius must lie in the perfection and energy of the knowledge of perception4 ,corresponding to this1 the works which we hear most decidedly designated works of genius are those which start immediately from perception and devote themselves to perception2 thus those of plastic and pictorial art1 and then those of poetry1 which gets its perceptions by the assistance of the imagination4 ,the difference between genius and mere talent makes itself noticeable even here4 ,for talent is an excellence which lies rather in the greater versatility and acuteness of discursive than of intuitive knowledge4 ,he who is endowed with talent thinks more quickly and more correctly than others2 but the genius beholds another world from them all1 although only because he has a more profound perception of the world which lies before them also1 in that it presents itself in his mind more objectively1 and consequently in greater purity and distinctness4 ,the intellect is1 according to its destination1 merely the medium of motives2 and in accordance with this it originally comprehends nothing in things but their relations to the will1 the direct1 the indirect1 and the possible4 ,in the case of the brutes1 where it is almost entirely confined to the direct relations1 the matter is just on that account most apparent3 what has no relation to their will does not exist for them4 ,therefore we sometimes see with surprise that even clever animals do not observe at all something conspicuous to them2 for example1 they show no surprise at obvious alterations in our person and surroundings4 ,in the case of normal men the indirect1 and even the possible1 relations to the will are added1 the sum of which make up the total of useful knowledge2 but here also knowledge remains confined to the relations4 ,therefore the normal mind does not attain to an absolutely pure1 objective picture of things1 because its power of perception1 whenever it is not spurred on by the will and set in motion1 at once becomes tired and inactive1 because it has not enough energy of its own elasticity and without an end in view to apprehend the world in a purely objective manner4 ,where1 on the other hand1 this takes place--where the brain has such a surplus of the power of ideation that a pure1 distinct1 objective image of the external world exhibits itself without any aim2 an image which is useless for the intentions of the will1 indeed1 in the higher degrees1 disturbing1 and even injurious to them--there1 the natural disposition1 at least1 is already present for that abnormity which the name genius denotes1 which signifies that here a genius foreign to the will1 i4e41 to the ,i proper1 as it were coming from without1 seems to be active4 ,but to speak without a figure3 genius consists in this1 that the knowing faculty has received a considerably greater development than the service of the will1 for which alone it originally appeared1 demands4 ,therefore1 strictly speaking1 physiology might to a certain extent class such a superfluity of brain activity1 and with it of brain itself1 among the monstra per excessum1 which1 it is well known1 it coordinates with monstra per defectum and those per situm mutatum4 ,thus genius consists in an abnormally large measure of intellect1 which can only find its use by being applied to the universal of existence1 whereby it then devotes itself to the service of the whole human race1 as the normal intellect to that of the individual4 ,in order to make this perfectly comprehensible one might say3 if the normal man consists of twothirds will and onethird intellect1 the genius1 on the contrary1 has twothirds intellect and one third will4 ,this might1 then1 be further illustrated by a chemical simile3 the base and the acid of a neutral salt are distinguished by the fact that in each of the two the radical has the converse relation to oxygen to that which it has in the other4 ,the base or the alkali is so because in it the radical predominates with reference to oxygen1 and the acid is so because in it oxygen predominates4 ,in the same way now the normal man and the genius are related in respect of will and intellect4 ,from this arises a thorough distinction between them1 which is visible even in their whole nature and behaviour1 but comes out most clearly in their achievements4 ,one might add the difference that while that total opposition between the chemical materials forms the strongest affinity and attraction between them1 in the human race the opposite is rather wont to be found4 ,the first manifestation which such a superfluity of the power of knowledge calls forth shows itself for the most part in the most original and fundamental knowledge1 i4e41 in knowledge of perception1 and occasions the repetition of it in an image2 hence arises the painter and the sculptor4 ,in their case1 then1 the path between the apprehension of genius and the artistic production is the shortest2 therefore the form in which genius and its activity here exhibits itself is the simplest and its description the easiest4 ,yet here also the source is shown from which all genuine productions in every art1 in poetry1 and indeed in philosophy1 have their origin1 although in the case of these the process is not so simple4 ,let the result arrived at in the first book be here borne in mind1 that all perception is intellectual and not merely sensuous4 ,if one now adds the exposition given here1 and1 at the same time1 in justice considers that the philosophy of last century denoted the perceptive faculty of knowledge by the name 8lower powers of the soul10 we will not think it so utterly absurd nor so deserving of the bitter scorn with which ,jean ,paul quotes it in his 8,vorschule der sthetik10 that ,adelung1 who had to speak the language of his age1 placed genius in 8a remarkable strength of the lower powers of the soul40 ,the work just referred to of this author1 who is so worthy of our admiration1 has great excellences1 but yet ,i must remark that all through1 whenever a theoretical explanation and1 in general1 instruction is the end in view1 a style of exposition which is constantly indulging in displays of wit and hurrying along in mere similes cannot be well adapted to the purpose4 ,it is1 then1 perception to which primarily the peculiar and true nature of things1 although still in a conditioned manner1 discloses and reveals itself4 ,all conceptions and everything thought are mere abstractions1 consequently partial ideas taken from perception1 and have only arisen by thinking away4 ,all profound knowledge1 even wisdom properly so called1 is rooted in the perceptive apprehension of things1 as we have fully considered in the supplements to the first book4 ,a perceptive apprehension has always been the generative process in which every genuine work of art1 every immortal thought1 received the spark of life4 ,all primary thought takes place in pictures4 ,from conceptions1 on the other hand1 arise the works of mere talent1 the merely rational thoughts1 imitations1 and indeed all that is calculated merely with reference to the present need and contemporary conditions4 ,but if now our perception were constantly bound to the real present of things1 its material would be entirely under the dominion of chance1 which seldom produces things at the right time1 seldom arranges them for an end and for the most part presents them to us in very defective examples4 ,therefore the imagination is required in order to complete1 arrange1 give the finishing touches to1 retain1 and repeat at pleasure all those significant pictures of life1 according as the aims of a profoundly penetrating knowledge and of the significant work whereby they are to be communicated may demand4 ,upon this rests the high value of imagination1 which is an indispensable tool of genius4 ,for only by virtue of imagination can genius ever1 according to the requirements of the connection of its painting or poetry or thinking1 call up to itself each object or event in a lively image1 and thus constantly draw fresh nourishment from the primary source of all knowledge1 perception4 ,the man who is endowed with imagination is able1 as it were1 to call up spirits1 who at the right time reveal to him the truths which the naked reality of things exhibits only weakly1 rarely1 and then for the most part at the wrong time4 ,therefore the man without imagination is related to him1 as the mussel fastened to its rock1 which must wait for what chance may bring it1 is related to the freely moving or even winged animal4 ,for such a man knows nothing but the actual perception of the senses3 till it comes he gnaws at conceptions and abstractions which are yet mere shells and husks1 not the kernel of knowledge4 ,he will never achieve anything great1 unless it be in calculating and mathematics4 ,the works of plastic and pictorial art and of poetry1 as also the achievements of mimicry1 may also be regarded as means by which those who have no imagination may make up for this defect as far as possible1 and those who are gifted with it may facilitate the use of it4 ,thus1 although the kind of knowledge which is peculiar and essential to genius is knowledge of perception1 yet the special object of this knowledge by no means consists of the particular things1 but of the ,platonic ,ideas which manifest themselves in these1 as their apprehension was analysed in chapter #bi4 ,always to see the universal in the particular is just the fundamental characteristic of genius1 while the normal man knows in the particular only the particular as such1 for only as such does it belong to the actual which alone has interests for him1 i4e41 relations to his will4 ,the degree in which every one not merely thinks1 but actually perceives1 in the particular thing1 only the particular1 or a more or less universal up to the most universal of the species1 is the measure of his approach to genius4 ,and corresponding to this1 only the nature of things generally1 the universal in them1 the whole1 is the special object of genius4 ,the investigation of the particular phenomena is the field of the talents1 in the real sciences1 whose special object is always only the relations of things to each other4 ,what was fully shown in the preceding chapter1 that the apprehension of the ,ideas is conditioned by the fact that the knower is the pure subject of knowledge1 i4e41 that the will entirely vanishes from consciousness1 must be borne in mind here4 ,the pleasure which we have in many of ,goethe's songs which bring the landscape before our eyes1 or in ,jean ,paul's sketches of nature1 depends upon the fact that we thereby participate in the objectivity of those minds1 i4e41 the purity with which in them the world as idea separated from the world as will1 and1 as it were1 entirely emancipated itself from it4 ,it also follows from the fact that the kind of knowledge peculiar to genius is essentially that which is purified from all will and its relations1 that the works of genius do not proceed from intention or choice1 but it is guided in them by a kind of instinctive necessity4 ,what is called the awaking of genius1 the hour of initiation1 the moment of inspiration1 is nothing but the attainment of freedom by the intellect1 when1 delivered for a while from its service under the will1 it does not now sink into inactivity or lassitude1 but is active for a short time entirely alone and spontaneously4 ,then it is of the greatest purity1 and becomes the clear mirror of the world2 for1 completely severed from its origin1 the will1 it is now the world as idea itself1 concentrated in one consciousness4 ,in such moments1 as it were1 the souls of immortal works are begotten4 ,on the other hand1 in all intentional reflection the intellect is not free1 for indeed the will guides it and prescribes it its theme4 ,the stamp of commonness1 the expression of vulgarity1 which is impressed on the great majority of countenances consists really in this1 that in them becomes visible the strict subordination of their knowledge to their will1 the firm chain which binds these two together1 and the impossibility following from this of apprehending things otherwise than in their relation to the will and its aims4 ,on the other hand1 the expression of genius which constitutes the evident family likeness of all highly gifted men consists in this1 that in it we distinctly read the liberation1 the manumission of the intellect from the service of the will1 the predominance of knowledge over volition2 and because all anxiety proceeds from the will1 and knowledge1 on the contrary1 is in and for itself painless and serene1 this gives to their lofty brow and clear1 perceiving glance1 which are not subject to the service of the will and its wants1 that look of great1 almost supernatural serenity which at times breaks through1 and consists very well with the melancholy of their other features1 especially the mouth1 and which in this relation may be aptly described by the motto of ,giordano ,bruno3 ,in tristitia hilaris1 in hilaritate tristis4 ,the will1 which is the root of the intellect1 opposes itself to any activity of the latter which is directed to anything else but its own aims4 ,therefore the intellect is only capable of a purely objective and profound comprehension of the external world when it has freed itself at least for a while from this its root4 ,so long as it remains bound to the will1 it is of its own means capable of no activity1 but sleeps in a stupor1 whenever the will 7the interests7 does not awake it1 and set it in motion4 ,if1 however1 this happens1 it is indeed very well fitted to recognise the relations of things according to the interest of the will1 as the prudent mind does1 which1 however1 must always be an awakened mind1 i4e41 a mind actively aroused by volition2 but just on this account it is not capable of comprehending the purely objective nature of things4 ,for the willing and the aims make it so onesided that it sees in things only that which relates to these1 and the rest either disappears or enters consciousness in a falsified form4 ,for example1 the traveller in anxiety and haste will see the ,rhine and its banks only as a line1 and the bridges over it only as lines cutting it4 ,in the mind of the man who is filled with his own aims the world appears as a beautiful landscape appears on the plan of a battlefield4 ,certainly these are extremes1 taken for the sake of distinctness2 but every excitement of the will1 however slight1 will have as its consequence a slight but constantly proportionate falsification of knowledge4 ,the world can only appear in its true colour and form1 in its whole and correct significance1 when the intellect1 devoid of willing1 moves freely over the objects1 and without being driven on by the will is yet energetically active4 ,this is certainly opposed to the nature and determination of the intellect1 thus to a certain extent unnatural1 and just on this account exceedingly rare2 but it is just in this that the essential nature of genius lies1 in which alone that condition takes place in a high degree and is of some duration1 while in others it only appears approximately and exceptionally4 ,i take it to be in the sense expounded here that ,jean ,paul 7,vorschule der sthetik1 #ab7 places the essence of genius in reflectiveness4 ,the normal man is sunk in the whirl and tumult of life1 to which he belongs through his will2 his intellect is filled with the things and events of life2 but he does not know these things nor life itself in their objective significance2 as the merchant on ',change in ,amsterdam apprehends perfectly what his neighbour says1 but does not hear the hum of the whole ,exchange1 like the sound of the sea1 which astonishes the distant observer4 ,from the genius1 on the contrary1 whose intellect is delivered from the will1 and thus from the person1 what concerns these does not conceal the world and things themselves2 but he becomes distinctly conscious of them1 he apprehends them in and for themselves in objective perception2 in this sense he is reflective4 ,it is reflectiveness which enables the painter to repeat the natural objects which he contemplates faithfully upon the canvas1 and the poet accurately to call up again the concrete present1 by means of abstract conceptions1 by giving it utterance and so bringing it to distinct consciousness1 and also to express everything in words which others only feel4 ,the brute lives entirely without reflection4 ,it has consciousness1 i4e41 it knows itself and its good and ill1 also the objects which occasion these4 ,but its knowledge remains always subjective1 never becomes objective2 everything that enters it seems a matter of course1 and therefore can never become for it a theme 7an object of exposition7 nor a problem 7an object of meditation74 ,its consciousness is thus entirely immanent4 ,not certainly the same1 but yet of kindred nature1 is the consciousness of the common type of man1 for his apprehension also of things and the world is predominantly subjective and remains prevalently immanent4 ,it apprehends the things in the world1 but not the world2 its own action and suffering1 but not itself4 ,as now in innumerable gradations the distinctness of consciousness rises1 reflectiveness appears more and more2 and thus it is brought about little by little that sometimes1 though rarely1 and then again in very different degrees of distinctness1 the question passes through the mind like a flash1 8,what is all this80 or again1 8,how is it really fashioned80 ,the first question1 if it attains great distinctness and continued presence1 will make the philosopher1 and the other1 under the same conditions1 the artist or the poet4 ,therefore1 then1 the high calling of both of these has its root in the reflectiveness which primarily springs from the distinctness with which they are conscious of the world and their own selves1 and thereby come to reflect upon them4 ,but the whole process springs from the fact that the intellect through its preponderance frees itself for a time from the will1 to which it is originally subject4 ,the considerations concerning genius here set forth are connected by way of supplement with the exposition contained in chapter #ba1 of the ever wider separation of the will and the intellect1 which can be traced in the whole series of existences4 ,this reaches its highest grade in genius1 where it extends to the entire liberation of the intellect from its root the will1 so that here the intellect becomes perfectly free1 whereby the world as idea first attains to complete objectification4 ,a few remarks now concerning the individuality of genius4 ,aristotle has already said1 according to ,cicero 7,tusc41 i4 #cc71 8,omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse20 which without doubt is connected with the passage of ,aristotle's 8,problemata10 xxx4 #a4 ,goethe also says3 8,my poetic rapture was very small1 so long as ,i only encountered good2 but it burnt with a bright flame when ,i fled from threatening evil4 ,the tender poem1 like the rainbow1 is only drawn on a dark ground2 hence the genius of the poet loves the element of melancholy40 ,this is to be explained from the fact that since the will constantly re establishes its original sway over the intellect1 the latter more easily withdraws from this under unfavourable personal relations2 because it gladly turns from adverse circumstances1 in order to a certain extent to divert itself1 and now directs itself with so much the greater energy to the foreign external world1 thus more easily becomes purely objective4 ,favourable personal relations act conversely4 ,yet as a whole and in general the melancholy which accompanies genius depends upon the fact that the brighter the intellect which enlightens the will to live1 the more distinctly does it perceive the misery of its condition4 ,the melancholy disposition of highly gifted minds which has so often been observed has its emblem in ,mont ,blanc1 the summit of which is for the most part lost in clouds2 but when sometimes1 especially in the early morning1 the veil of clouds is rent and now the mountain looks down on ,chamounix from its height in the heavens above the clouds1 then it is a sight at which the heart of each of us swells from its profoundest depths4 ,so also the genius1 for the most part melancholy1 shows at times that peculiar serenity already described above1 which is possible only for it1 and springs from the most perfect objectivity of the mind4 ,it floats like a ray of light upon his lofty brow3 ,in tristitia hilaris1 in hilaritate tristis4 ,all bunglers are so ultimately because their intellect1 still too firmly bound to the will1 only becomes active when spurred on by it1 and therefore remains entirely in its service4 ,they are accordingly only capable of personal aims4 ,in conformity with these they produce bad pictures1 insipid poems1 shallow1 absurd1 and very often dishonest philosophemes1 when it is to their interest to recommend themselves to high authorities by a pious disingenuousness4 ,thus all their action and thought is personal4 ,therefore they succeed at most in appropriating what is external1 accidental1 and arbitrary in the genuine works of others as mannerisms1 in doing which they take the shell instead of the kernel1 and yet imagine they have attained to everything1 nay1 have surpassed those works4 ,if1 however1 the failure is patent1 yet many hope to attain success in the end through their good intentions4 ,but it is just this good will which makes success impossible2 because this only pursues personal ends1 and with these neither art nor poetry nor philosophy can ever be taken seriously4 ,therefore the saying is peculiarly applicable to such persons3 8,they stand in their own light40 ,they have no idea that it is only the intellect delivered from the government of the will and all its projects1 and therefore freely active1 that makes one capable of genuine productions1 because it alone imparts true seriousness2 and it is well for them that they have not1 otherwise they would leap into the water4 ,the good will is in morality everything2 but in art it is nothing4 ,in art1 as the word itself indicates 7,kunst71 what alone is of consequence is ability 7,knnen74 ,it all amounts ultimately to this1 where the true seriousness of the man lies4 ,in almost all it lies exclusively in their own wellbeing and that of their families2 therefore they are in a position to promote this and nothing else2 for no purpose1 no voluntary and intentional effort1 imparts the true1 profound1 and proper seriousness1 or makes up for it1 or more correctly1 takes its place4 ,for it always remains where nature has placed it2 and without it everything is only half performed4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 persons of genius often manage so badly for their own welfare4 ,as a leaden weight always brings a body back to the position which its centre of gravity thereby determined demands1 so the true seriousness of the man always draws the strength and attention of the intellect back to that in which it lies2 everything else the man does without true seriousness4 ,therefore only the exceedingly rare and abnormal men whose true seriousness does not lie in the personal and practical1 but in the objective and theoretical1 are in a position to apprehend what is essential in the things of the world1 thus the highest truths1 and reproduce them in any way4 ,for such a seriousness of the individual1 falling outside himself in the objective1 is something foreign to the nature of man1 something unnatural1 or really supernatural3 yet on account of this alone is the man great2 and therefore what he achieves is then ascribed to a genius different from himself1 which takes possession of him4 ,to such a man his painting1 poetry1 or thinking is an end2 to others it is a means4 ,the latter thereby seek their own things1 and1 as a rule1 they know how to further them1 for they flatter their contemporaries1 ready to serve their wants and humours2 therefore for the most part they live in happy circumstances2 the former often in very miserable circumstances4 ,for he sacrifices his personal welfare to his objective end2 he cannot indeed do otherwise1 because his seriousness lies there4 ,they act conversely2 therefore they are small1 but he is great4 ,accordingly his work is for all time1 but the recognition of it generally only begins with posterity3 they live and die with their time4 ,in general he only is great who in his work1 whether it is practical or theoretical1 seeks not his own concerns1 but pursues an objective end alone2 he is so1 however1 even when in the practical sphere this end is a misunderstood one1 and even if in consequence of this it should be a crime4 ,that he seeks not himself and his own concerns1 this makes him under all circumstances great4 ,small1 on the other hand1 is all action which is directed to personal ends2 for whoever is thereby set in activity knows and finds himself only in his own transient and insignificant person4 ,he who is great1 again1 finds himself in all1 and therefore in the whole3 he lives not1 like others1 only in the microcosm1 but still more in the macrocosm4 ,hence the whole interests him1 and he seeks to comprehend it in order to represent it1 or to explain it1 or to act practically upon it4 ,for it is not strange to him2 he feels that it concerns him4 ,on account of this extension of his sphere he is called great4 ,therefore that lofty predicate belongs only to the true hero1 in some sense1 and to genius3 it signifies that they1 contrary to human nature1 have not sought their own things1 have not lived for themselves1 but for all4 ,as now clearly the great majority must constantly be small1 and can never become great1 the converse of this1 that one should be great throughout1 that is1 constantly and every moment1 is yet not possible-- 8,for man is made of common clay1 ,and custom is his nurse40 ,every great man must often be only the individual1 have only himself in view1 and that means he must be small4 ,upon this depends the very true remark1 that no man is a hero to his valet1 and not upon the fact that the valet cannot appreciate the hero2 which ,goethe1 in the 8,wahlverwandhschaften0 7vol4 ii4 chap4 #e71 serves up as an idea of ,ottilie's4 ,genius is its own reward3 for the best that one is1 one must necessarily be for oneself4 8,whoever is born with a talent1 to a talent1 finds in this his fairest existence10 says ,goethe4 ,when we look back at a great man of former times1 we do not think1 8,how happy is he to be still admired by all of us60 but1 8,how happy must he have been in the immediate enjoyment of a mind at the surviving traces of which centuries revive themselves60 ,not in the fame1 but in that whereby it is attained1 lies the value1 and in the production of immortal children the pleasure4 ,therefore those who seek to show the vanity of posthumous fame from the fact that he who obtains it knows nothing of it1 may be compared to the wiseacre who very learnedly tried to demonstrate to the man who cast envious glances at a heap of oystershells in his neighbour's yard the absolute uselessness of them4 ,according to the exposition of the nature of genius which has been given1 it is so far contrary to nature1 inasmuch as it consists in this1 that the intellect1 whose real destination is the service of the will1 emancipates itself from this service in order to be active on its own account4 ,accordingly genius is an intellect which has become untrue to its destination4 ,upon this depend the disadvantages connected with it1 for the consideration of which we shall now prepare the way by comparing genius with the less decided predominance of the intellect4 ,the intellect of the normal man1 strictly bound to the service of the will1 and therefore really only occupied with the apprehension of motives1 may be regarded as a complex system of wires1 by means of which each of these puppets is set in motion in the theatre of the world4 ,from this arises the dry1 grave seriousness of most people1 which is only surpassed by that of the brutes1 who never laugh4 ,on the other hand1 we might compare the genius1 with his unfettered intellect1 to a living man playing along with the large puppets of the famous puppetshow at ,milan1 who would be the only one among them who would understand everything1 and would therefore gladly leave the stage for a while to enjoy the play from the boxes2--that is the reflectiveness of genius4 ,but even the man of great understanding and reason1 whom one might almost call wise1 is very different from the genius1 and in this way1 that his intellect retains a practical tendency1 is concerned with the choice of the best ends and means1 therefore remains in the service of the will1 and accordingly is occupied in a manner that is thoroughly in keeping with nature4 ,the firm1 practical seriousness of life which the ,romans denoted gravitas presupposes that the intellect does not forsake the service of the will in order to wander away after that which does not concern the will2 therefore it does not admit of that separation of the will and the intellect which is the condition of genius4 ,the able1 nay1 eminent man1 who is fitted for great achievements in the practical sphere1 is so precisely because objects rouse his will in a lively manner1 and spur him on to the ceaseless investigation of their relations and connections4 ,thus his intellect has grown up closely connected with his will4 ,before the man of genius1 on the contrary1 there floats in his objective comprehension the phenomenon of the world1 as something foreign to him1 an object of contemplation1 which expels his will from consciousness4 ,round this point turns the distinction between the capacity for deeds and for works4 ,the latter demand objectivity and depth of knowledge1 which presupposes entire separation of the intellect from the will2 the former1 on the other hand1 demands the application of knowledge1 presence of mind1 and decision1 which required that the intellect should uninterruptedly attend to the service of the will4 ,where the bond between the intellect and the will is loosened1 the intellect1 turned away from its natural destination1 will neglect the service of the will2 it will1 for example1 even in the need of the moment1 preserve its emancipation1 and perhaps be unable to avoid taking in the picturesque impression of the surroundings1 from which danger threatens the individual4 ,the intellect of the reasonable and understanding man1 on the other hand1 is constantly at its post1 is directed to the circumstances and their requirements4 ,such a man will therefore in all cases determine and carry out what is suitable to the case1 and consequently will by no means fall into those eccentricities1 personal slips1 nay1 follies1 to which the genius is exposed1 because his intellect does not remain exclusively the guide and guardian of his will1 but sometimes more1 sometimes less1 is laid claim to by the purely objective4 ,in the contrast of ,tasso and ,antonio1 ,goethe has illustrated the opposition1 here explained in the abstract1 in which these two entirely different kinds of capacity stand to each other4 ,the kinship of genius and madness1 so often observed1 depends chiefly upon that separation of the intellect from the will which is essential to genius1 but is yet contrary to nature4 ,but this separation itself is by no means to be attributed to the fact that genius is accompanied by less intensity of will2 for it is rather distinguished by a vehement and passionate character2 but it is to be explained from this1 that the practically excellent person1 the man of deeds1 has merely the whole1 full measure of intellect required for an energetic will while most men lack even this2 but genius consists in a completely abnormal1 actual superfluity of intellect1 such as is required for the service of no will4 ,on this account the men of genuine works are a thousand times rarer than the men of deeds4 ,it is just that abnormal superfluity of intellect by virtue of which it obtains the decided preponderance1 sets itself free from the will1 and now1 forgetting its origin1 is freely active from its own strength and elasticity2 and from this the creations of genius proceed4 ,now further1 just this1 that genius in working consists of the free intellect1 i4e41 of the intellect emancipated from the service of the will1 has as a consequence that its productions serve no useful ends4 ,the work of genius is music1 or philosophy1 or paintings1 or poetry2 it is nothing to use4 ,to be of no use belongs to the character of the works of genius2 it is their patent of nobility4 ,all other works of men are for the maintenance or easing of our existence2 only those we are speaking of are not2 they alone exist for their own sake1 and are in this sense to be regarded as the flower or the net profit of existence4 ,therefore our heart swells at the enjoyment of them1 for we rise out of the heavy earthly atmosphere of want4 ,analogous to this1 we see the beautiful1 even apart from these1 rarely combined with the useful4 ,lofty and beautiful trees bear no fruit2 the fruittrees are small1 ugly cripples4 ,the full garden rose is not fruitful1 but the small1 wild1 almost scentless roses are4 ,the most beautiful buildings are not the useful ones2 a temple is no dwelling house4 ,a man of high1 rare mental endowments compelled to apply himself to a merely useful business1 for which the most ordinary man would be fitted1 is like a costly vase decorated with the most beautiful painting which is used as a kitchen pot2 and to compare useful people with men of genius is like comparing buildingstone with diamonds4 ,thus the merely practical man uses his intellect for that for which nature destined it1 the comprehension of the relations of things1 partly to each other1 partly to the will of the knowing individual4 ,the genius1 on the other hand1 uses it1 contrary to its destination1 for the comprehension of the objective nature of things4 ,his mind1 therefore1 belongs not to himself1 but to the world1 to the illumination of which1 in some sense1 it will contribute4 ,from this must spring manifold disadvantages to the individual favoured with genius4 ,for his intellect will in general show those faults which are rarely wanting in any tool which is used for that for which it has not been made4 ,first of all1 it will be1 as it were1 the servant of two masters1 for on every opportunity it frees itself from the service to which it was destined in order to follow its own ends1 whereby it often leaves the will very inopportunely in a fix1 and thus the individual so gifted becomes more or less useless for life1 nay1 in his conduct sometimes reminds us of madness4 ,then1 on account of its highly developed power of knowledge1 it will see in things more the universal than the particular2 while the service of the will principally requires the knowledge of the particular4 ,but1 again1 when1 as opportunity offers1 that whole abnormally heightened power of knowledge directs itself with all its energy to the circumstances and miseries of the will1 it will be apt to apprehend these too vividly1 to behold all in too glaring colours1 in too bright a light1 and in a fearfully exaggerated form1 whereby the individual falls into mere extremes4 ,the following may serve to explain this more accurately4 ,all great theoretical achievements1 in whatever sphere they may be1 are brought about in this way3 ,their author directs all the forces of his mind upon one point1 in which he lets them unite and concentrate so strongly1 firmly1 and exclusively that now the whole of the rest of the world vanishes for him1 and his object fills all reality4 ,now this great and powerful concentration which belongs to the privileges of genius sometimes appears for it also in the case of objects of the real world and the events of daily life1 which then1 brought under such a focus1 are magnified to such a monstrous extent that they appear like the flea1 which under the solar microscope assumes the stature of an elephant4 ,hence it arises that highly gifted individuals sometimes are thrown by trifles into violent emotions of the most various kinds1 which are incomprehensible to others1 who see them transported with grief1 joy1 care1 fear1 anger1 c41 by things which leave the everyday man quite composed4 ,thus1 then1 the genius lacks soberness1 which simply consists in this1 that one sees in things nothing more than actually belongs to them1 especially with reference to our possible ends2 therefore no sober minded man can be a genius4 ,with the disadvantages which have been enumerated there is also associated hypersensibility1 which an abnormally developed nervous and cerebral system brings with it1 and indeed in union with the vehemence and passionateness of will which is certainly characteristic of genius1 and which exhibits itself physically as energy of the pulsation of the heart4 ,from all this very easily arises that extravagance of disposition1 that vehemence of the emotions1 that quick change of mood under prevailing melancholy1 which ,goethe has presented to us in ,tasso4 ,what reasonableness1 quiet composure1 finished surveyal1 certainty and proportionateness of behaviour is shown by the wellendowed normal man in comparison with the now dreamy absentness1 and now passionate excitement of the man of genius1 whose inward pain is the mother's lap of immortal works6 ,to all this must still be added that genius lives essentially alone4 ,it is too rare to find its like with ease1 and too different from the rest of men to be their companion4 ,with them it is the will1 with him it is knowledge1 that predominates2 therefore their pleasures are not his1 and his are not theirs4 ,they are merely moral beings1 and have merely personal relations2 he is at the same time a pure intellect1 and as such belongs to the whole of humanity4 ,the course of thought of the intellect which is detached from its mother soil1 the will1 and only returns to it periodically1 will soon show itself entirely different from that of the normal intellect1 still cleaving to its stem4 ,for this reason1 and also on account of the dissimilarity of the pace1 the former is not adapted for thinking in common1 i4e41 for conversation with the others3 they will have as little pleasure in him and his oppressive superiority as he will in them4 ,they will therefore feel more comfortable with their equals1 and he will prefer the entertainment of his equals1 although1 as a rule1 this is only possible through the works they have left behind them4 ,therefore ,chamfort says very rightly3 8,il y a peu de vices qui empchent un homme d'avoir beaucoup d'amis1 autant que peuvent le faire de trop grandes qualits40 ,the happiest lot that can fall to the genius is release from action1 which is not his element1 and leisure for production4 ,from all this it results that although genius may highly bless him who is gifted with it1 in the hours in which1 abandoned to it1 he revels unhindered in its delight1 yet it is by no means fitted to procure for him a happy course of life2 rather the contrary4 ,this is also confirmed by the experience recorded in biographies4 ,besides this there is also an external incongruity1 for the genius1 in his efforts and achievements themselves1 is for the most part in contradiction and conflict with his age4 ,mere men of talent come always at the right time2 for as they are roused by the spirit of their age1 and called forth by its needs1 they are also capable only of satisfying these4 ,they therefore go hand in hand with the advancing culture of their contemporaries or with the gradual progress of a special science3 for this they reap reward and approval4 ,but to the next generation their works are no longer enjoyable2 they must be replaced by others1 which again are not permanent4 ,the genius1 on the contrary1 comes into his age like a comet into the paths of the planets1 to whose wellregulated and comprehensible order its entirely eccentric course is foreign4 ,accordingly he cannot go hand in hand with the existing1 regular progress of the culture of the age1 but flings his works far out on to the way in front 7as the dying emperor flung his spear among the enemy71 upon which time has first to overtake them4 ,his relation to the culminating men of talent of his time might be expressed in the words of the ,evangelist3 8 2 0 7,john vii4 #f74 ,the man of talent can achieve what is beyond the power of achievement of other men1 but not what is beyond their power of apprehension3 therefore he at once finds those who prize him4 ,but the achievement of the man of genius1 on the contrary1 transcends not only the power of achievement1 but also the power of apprehension of others2 therefore they do not become directly conscious of him4 ,the man of talent is like the marksman who hits a mark the others cannot hit2 the man of genius is like the marksman who hits a mark they cannot even see to2 therefore they only get news of him indirectly1 and thus late2 and even this they only accept upon trust and faith4 ,accordingly ,goethe says in one of his letters1 8,imitation is inborn in us2 what to imitate is not easily recognised4 ,rarely is what is excellent found2 still more rarely is it prized40 ,and ,chamfort says3 8,il en est de la valeur des hommes comme de celle des diamans1 qui une certaine mesure de grosseur1 de puret1 de perfection1 ont un prix fixe et marqu1 mais qui1 pardel cette mesure1 restent sans prix1 et ne trouvent point d'acheteurs40 ,and ,bacon of ,verulam has also expressed it3 8,infimarum virtutum1 apud vulgus1 laus est1 mediarum admiratio1 supremarum sensus nullus0 7,de augm4 sc41 ,l4 vi4 c4 #c74 ,indeed1 one might perhaps reply1 ,apud vulgus6 ,but ,i must then come to his assistance with ,machiavelli's assurance3 8,nel mondo non se non volgo207#ab7 as also ,thilo 7,ueber den ,ruhm7 remarks1 that to the vulgar herd there generally belongs one more than each of us believes4 ,it is a consequence of this late recognition of the works of the man of genius that they are rarely enjoyed by their contemporaries1 and accordingly in the freshness of colour which synchronism and presence imparts1 but1 like figs and dates1 much more in a dry than in a fresh state4 ,if1 finally1 we consider genius from the somatic side1 we find it conditioned by several anatomical and physiological qualities1 which individually are seldom present in perfection1 and still more seldom perfect together1 but which are yet all indispensably required2 so that this explains why genius only appears as a perfectly isolated and almost portentous exception4 ,the fundamental condition is an abnormal predominance of sensibility over irritability and reproductive power2 and what makes the matter more difficult1 this must take place in a male body4 7,women may have great talent1 but no genius1 for they always remain subjective47 ,similarly the cerebral system must be perfectly separated from the ganglion system by complete isolation1 so that it stands in complete opposition to the latter2 and thus the brain pursues its parasitic life on the organism in a very decided1 isolated1 powerful1 and independent manner4 ,certainly it will thereby very easily affect the rest of the organism injuriously1 and through its heightened life and ceaseless activity wear it out prematurely1 unless it is itself possessed of energetic vital force and a good constitution3 thus the latter belong to the conditions of genius4 ,indeed even a good stomach is a condition on account of the special and close agreement of this part with the brain4 ,but chiefly the brain must be of unusual development and magnitude1 especially broad and high4 ,on the other hand1 its depth will be inferior1 and the cerebrum will abnormally preponderate in proportion to the cerebellum4 ,without doubt much depends upon the configuration of the brain as a whole and in its parts2 but our knowledge is not yet sufficient to determine this accurately1 although we easily recognise the form of skull that indicates a noble and lofty intelligence4 ,the texture of the mass of the brain must be of extreme fineness and perfection1 and consist of the purest1 most concentrated1 tenderest1 and most excitable nervesubstance2 certainly the quantitative proportion of the white to the grey matter has a decided influence1 which1 however1 we are also unable as yet to specify4 ,however1 the report of the postmortem on the body of ,byron7#ac7 shows that in his case the white matter was in unusually large proportion to the grey1 and also that his brain weighed six pounds4 ,cuvier's brain weighed five pounds2 the normal weight is three pounds4 ,in contrast to the superior size of the brain1 the spinal cord and nerves must be unusually thin4 ,a beautifully arched1 high and broad skull of thin bone must protect the brain without in any way cramping it4 ,this whole quality of the brain and nervous system is the inheritance from the mother1 to which we shall return in the following book4 ,but it is quite insufficient to produce the phenomenon of genius if the inheritance from the father is not added1 a lively1 passionate temperament1 which exhibits itself somatically as unusual energy of the heart1 and consequently of the circulation of the blood1 especially towards the head4 ,for1 in the first place1 that turgescence peculiar to the brain on account of which it presses against its walls is increased by this2 therefore it forces itself out of any opening in these which has been occasioned by some injury2 and secondly1 from the requisite strength of the heart the brain receives that internal movement different from its constant rising and sinking at every breath1 which consists in a shaking of its whole mass at every pulsation of the four cerebral arteries1 and the energy of which must correspond to the here increased quantity of the brain1 as this movement in general is an indispensable condition of its activity4 ,to this1 therefore1 small stature and especially a short neck is favourable1 because by the shorter path the blood reaches the brain with more energy2 and on this account great minds have seldom large bodies4 ,yet that shortness of the distance is not indispensable2 for example1 ,goethe was of more than middle height4 ,if1 however1 the whole condition connected with the circulation of the blood1 and therefore coming from the father is wanting1 the good quality of the brain coming from the mother1 will at most produce a man of talent1 a fine understanding1 which the phlegmatic temperament thus introduced supports2 but a phlegmatic genius is impossible4 ,this condition coming from the father explains many faults of temperament described above4 ,but1 on the other hand1 if this condition exists without the former1 thus with an ordinarily or even badly constructed brain1 it gives vivacity without mind1 heat without light1 hotheaded persons1 men of unsupportable restlessness and petulance4 ,that of two brothers only one has genius1 and that one generally the elder1 as1 for example1 in ,kant's case1 is primarily to be explained from the fact that the father was at the age of strength and passion only when he was begotten2 although also the other condition originating with the mother may be spoiled by unfavourable circumstances4 ,i have further to add here a special remark on the childlike character of the genius1 i4e41 on a certain resemblance which exists between genius and the age of childhood4 ,in childhood1 as in the case of genius1 the cerebral and nervous system decidedly preponderates1 for its development hurries far in advance of that of the rest of the organism2 so that already at the seventh year the brain has attained its full extension and mass4 ,therefore1 ,bichat says3 8,dans l'enfance le systme nerveux1 compar au musculaire1 est proportionellement plus considrable que dans tous les ges suivans1 tandis que par la suite1 la pluspart des autres systmes prdominent sur celuici4 ,on sait que1 pour bien voir les nerfs1 on choisit toujours les enfans0 7,de la vie et de la mort1 art4 #h1 #f74 ,on the other hand1 the development of the genital system begins latest1 and irritability1 reproduction1 and genital function are in full force only at the age of manhood1 and then1 as a rule1 they predominate over the brain function4 ,hence it is explicable that children1 in general1 are so sensible1 reasonable1 desirous of information1 and teachable1 nay1 on the whole1 are more disposed and fitted for all theoretical occupation than grownup people4 ,they have1 in consequence of that course of development1 more intellect than will1 i4e41 than inclinations1 desire1 and passion4 ,for intellect and brain are one1 and so also is the genital system one with the most vehement of all desires3 therefore ,i have called the latter the focus of the will4 ,just because the fearful activity of this system still slumbers1 while that of the brain has already full play1 childhood is the time of innocence and happiness1 the paradise of life1 the lost ,eden on which we look longingly back through the whole remaining course of our life4 ,but the basis of that happiness is that in childhood our whole existence lies much more in knowing than in willing--a condition which is also supported from without by the novelty of all objects4 ,hence in the morning sunshine of life the world lies before us so fresh1 so magically gleaming1 so attractive4 ,the small desires1 the weak inclinations1 and trifling cares of childhood are only a weak counterpoise to that predominance of intellectual activity4 ,the innocent and clear glance of children1 at which we revive ourselves1 and which sometimes in particular cases reaches the sublime contemplative expression with which ,raphael has glorified his cherubs1 is to be explained from what has been said4 ,accordingly the mental powers develop much earlier than the needs they are destined to serve2 and here1 as everywhere1 nature proceeds very designedly4 ,for in this time of predominating intelligence the man collects a great store of knowledge for future wants which at the time are foreign to him4 ,therefore his intellect1 now unceasingly active1 eagerly apprehends all phenomena1 broods over them and stores them up carefully for the coming time1--like the bees1 who gather a great deal more honey than they can consume1 in anticipation of future need4 ,certainly what a man acquires of insight and knowledge up to the age of puberty is1 taken as a whole1 more than all that he afterwards learns1 however learned he may become2 for it is the foundation of all human knowledge4 ,up till the same time plasticity predominates in the child's body1 and later1 by a metastasis1 its forces throw themselves into the system of generation2 and thus with puberty the sexual passion appears1 and now1 little by little1 the will gains the upper hand4 ,then childhood1 which is prevailingly theoretical and desirous of learning1 is followed by the restless1 now stormy1 now melancholy1 period of youth1 which afterwards passes into the vigorous and earnest age of manhood4 ,just because that impulse pregnant with evil is wanting in the child is its volition so adapted and subordinated to knowledge1 whence arises that character of innocence1 intelligence1 and reasonableness which is peculiar to the age of childhood4 ,on what1 then1 the likeness between childhood and genius depends ,i scarcely need to express further3 upon the surplus of the powers of knowledge over the needs of the will1 and the predominance of the purely intellectual activity which springs from this4 ,really every child is to a certain extent a genius1 and the genius is to a certain extent a child4 ,the relationship of the two shows itself primarily in the navet and sublime simplicity which is characteristic of true genius2 and besides this it appears in several traits1 so that a certain childishness certainly belongs to the character of the genius4 ,in ,riemer's 8,mittheilungen ber ,goethe0 7vol4 i4 p4 #ahd7 it is related that ,herder and others found fault with ,goethe1 saying he was always a big child4 ,certainly they were right in what they said1 but they were not right in finding fault with it4 ,it has also been said of ,mozart that all his life he remained a child 7,nissen's ,biography of ,mozart1 p4 #b and #ebi74 ,schlichtegroll's 8,nekrology0 7for #agia1 vol4 ii4 p4 #aji7 says of him3 8,in his art he early became a man1 but in all other relations he always remained a child40 ,every genius is even for this reason a big child2 he looks out into the world as into something strange1 a play1 and therefore with purely objective interest4 ,accordingly he has just as little as the child that dull gravity of ordinary men1 who1 since they are capable only of subjective interests1 always see in things mere motives for their action4 ,whoever does not to a certain extent remain all his life a big child1 but becomes a grave1 sober1 thoroughly composed1 and reasonable man1 may be a very useful and capable citizen of this world2 but never a genius4 ,in fact1 the genius is so because that predominance of the sensible system and of intellectual activity which is natural to childhood maintains itself in him in an abnormal manner through his whole life1 thus here becomes perennial4 ,a trace of this certainly shows itself in many ordinary men up to the period of their youth2 therefore1 for example1 in many students a purely intellectual tendency and an eccentricity suggestive of genius is unmistakable4 ,but nature returns to her track2 they assume the chrysalis form and reappear at the age of manhood1 as incarnate ,philistines1 at whom we are startled when we meet them again in later years4 ,upon all this that has been expounded here depends ,goethe's beautiful remark3 8,children do not perform what they promise2 young people very seldom2 and if they do keep their word1 the world does not keep its word with them0 7,wahlverwandtschaften1 ,pt4 i4 ch4 #aj7--the world which afterwards bestows the crowns which it holds aloft for merit on those who are the tools of its low aims or know how to deceive it4 ,in accordance with what has been said1 as there is a mere beauty of youth1 which almost every one at some time possesses 7beaut du diable71 so there is a mere intellectuality of youth1 a certain mental nature disposed and adapted for apprehending1 understanding1 and learning1 which every one has in childhood1 and some have still in youth1 but which is afterwards lost1 just like that beauty4 ,only in the case of a very few1 the chosen1 the one1 like the other1 lasts through the whole life2 so that even in old age a trace of it still remains visible3 these are the truly beautiful and the men of true genius4 ,the predominance of the cerebral nervous system and of intelligence in childhood1 which is here under consideration1 together with the decline of it in riper age1 receives important illustration and confirmation from the fact that in the species of animals which stands nearest to man1 the apes1 the same relation is found in a striking degree4 ,it has by degrees become certain that the highly intelligent orangoutang is a young pongo1 which when it has grown up loses the remarkable human look of its countenance1 and also its astonishing intelligence1 because the lower and brutal part of its face increases in size1 the forehead thereby recedes1 large crist1 muscular developments1 give the skull a brutish form1 the activity of the nervous system sinks1 and in its place extraordinary muscular strength develops1 which1 as it is sufficient for its preservation1 makes the great intelligence now superfluous4 ,especially important is what ,frd4 ,cuvier has said in this reference1 and ,flourens has illustrated in a review of the 8,histoire ,naturelle0 of the former1 which appeared in the ,september number of the 8,journal des ,savans0 of #ahci1 and was also separately printed with some additions1 under the title1 8,rsum analytique des observations de ,fr4 ,cuvier sur l'instinct et l'intelligence des animaux10 p4 ,flourens1 #ahda4 ,it is there said1 p4 #ej3 8,l'intelligence de l'orangoutang1 cette intelligence si dveloppe1 et dveloppe de si bonne heure1 dcroit avec l'ge4 ,l'orangoutang1 lorsqu'il est jeune1 nous tonne par sa pntration1 par sa ruse1 par son adresse2 l'orangoutang1 devenu adulte1 n'est plus qu'un animal grossier1 brutal1 intraitable4 ,et il en est de tous les singes comme de l'orang outang4 ,dans tous1 l'intelligence dcroit mesure que les forces s'accroissent4 ,l'animal qui a le plus d'intelligence1 n'a toute cette intelligence que dans le jeune ge40 ,further1 p4 #hg3 8,les singes de tous les genres offrent ce rapport inverse de l'ge et de l'intelligence4 ,ainsi1 par exemple1 l',entelle 7espce de guenon du sousgenre des ,semno pithques et l'un des singes vnrs dans la religion des ,brames7 a1 dans le jeune ge1 le front large1 le museau peu saillant1 le crne lev1 arrondi1 etc4 ,avec l'ge le front disparait1 recule1 le museau promine2 et le moral ne change pas moins que le physique3 l'apathie1 la violence1 le besoin de solitude1 remplacent la pntration1 la docilit1 la confiance4 ,ces diffrences sont si grandes1 dit ,mr4 ,frd4 ,cuvier1 que dans l'habitude o nous sommes de juger des actions des animaux par les ntres1 nous prendrions le jeune animal pour un individu de l'ge1 o toutes les qualits morales de l'espce sont acquises1 et l',entelle adulte pour un individu qui n'aurait encore que ses forces physiques4 ,mais la nature n'en agit pas ainsi avec ces animaux1 qui ne doivent pas sortir de la sphre troite1 qui leur est fixe1 et qui il suffit en quelque sorte de pouvoir veiller leur conservation4 ,pour cela l'intelligence tait ncessaire1 quand la force n'existait pas1 et quand celleci est acquise1 toute autre puissance perd de son utilit4 0 ,and p4 #aah3 8,la conservation des espces ne repose pas moins sur les qualits intellectuelles des animaux1 que sur leurs qualits organiques40 ,this last confirms my principle that the intellect1 like the claws and teeth1 is nothing else than a weapon in the service of the will4 ,chapter ,,xxxii47#ad7 ,on ,madness4 ,the health of the mind properly consists in perfect recollection4 ,of course this is not to be understood as meaning that our memory preserves everything4 ,for the past course of our life shrinks up in time1 as the path of the wanderer looking back shrinks up in space3 sometimes it is difficult for us to distinguish the particular years2 the days have for the most part become unrecognisable4 ,really1 however1 only the exactly similar events1 recurring an innumerable number of times1 so that their images1 as it were1 conceal each other1 ought so to run together in the memory that they are individually unrecognisable2 on the other hand1 every event in any way peculiar or significant we must be able to find again in memory1 if the intellect is normal1 vigorous1 and quite healthy4 ,in the text ,i have explained madness as the broken thread of this memory1 which still runs on regularly1 although in constantly decreasing fulness and distinctness4 ,the following considerations may serve to confirm this4 ,the memory of a healthy man affords a certainty as to an event he has witnessed1 which is regarded as just as firm and sure as his present apprehension of things2 therefore1 if sworn to by him1 this event is thereby established in a court of law4 ,on the other hand1 the mere suspicion of madness will at once weaken the testimony of a witness4 ,here1 then1 lies the criterion between the healthy mind and insanity4 ,whenever ,i doubt whether an event which ,i remember really took place1 ,i throw upon myself the suspicion of madness3 unless it is that ,i am uncertain whether it was not a mere dream4 ,if another doubts the reality of an event1 related by me as an eyewitness1 without mistrusting my honesty1 then he regards me as insane4 ,whoever comes at last1 through constantly recounting an event which originally was fabricated by him1 to believe in it himself is1 in this one point1 really insane4 ,we may ascribe to an insane person flashes of wit1 single clever thoughts1 even correct judgments1 but his testimony as to past events no man will consider valid4 ,in the ,lalita vistara1 well known to be the history of ,buddha ,sakya,muni1 it is related that at the moment of his birth all the sick became well1 all the blind saw1 all the deaf heard1 and all mad people 8recovered their memory40 ,this last is mentioned in two passages47#ae7 ,my own experience of many years has led me to the opinion that madness occurs proportionally most frequently among actors4 ,but what a misuse they make of their memory6 ,daily they have to learn a new part or refresh an old one2 but these parts are entirely without connection1 nay1 are in contradiction and contrast with each other1 and every evening the actor strives to forget himself entirely and be some quite different person4 ,this kind of thing paves the way for madness4 ,the exposition of the origin of madness given in the text will become more comprehensible if it is remembered how unwillingly we think of things which powerfully injure our interests1 wound our pride1 or interfere with our wishes2 with what difficulty do we determine to lay such things before our own intellect for careful and serious investigation2 how easily1 on the other hand1 we unconsciously break away or sneak off from them again2 how1 on the contrary1 agreeable events come into our minds of their own accord1 and1 if driven away1 constantly creep in again1 so that we dwell on them for hours together4 ,in that resistance of the will to allowing what is contrary to it to come under the examination of the intellect lies the place at which madness can break in upon the mind4 ,each new adverse event must be assimilated by the intellect1 i4e41 it must receive a place in the system of the truths connected with our will and its interests1 whatever it may have to displace that is more satisfactory4 ,whenever this has taken place1 it already pains us much less2 but this operation itself is often very painful1 and also1 in general1 only takes place slowly and with resistance4 ,however1 the health of the mind can only continue so long as this is in each case properly carried out4 ,if1 on the contrary1 in some particular case1 the resistance and struggles of the will against the apprehension of some knowledge reaches such a degree that that operation is not performed in its integrity1 then certain events or circumstances become for the intellect completely suppressed1 because the will cannot endure the sight of them1 and then1 for the sake of the necessary connection1 the gaps that thus arise are filled up at pleasure2 thus madness appears4 ,for the intellect has given up its nature to please the will3 the man now imagines what does not exist4 ,yet the madness which has thus arisen is now the lethe of unendurable suffering2 it was the last remedy of harassed nature1 i4e41 of the will4 ,let me mention here in passing a proof of my view which is worth noticing4 ,carlo ,gozzi1 in the 8,monstro turchino10 act i4 scene #b1 presents to us a person who has drunk a magic potion which produces forgetfulness1 and this person appears exactly like a madman4 ,in accordance with the above exposition one may thus regard the origin of madness as a violent 8casting out of the mind0 of anything1 which1 however1 is only possible by 8taking into the head0 something else4 ,the converse process is more rare1 that the 8taking into the head0 comes first1 and the 8casting out of the mind0 second4 ,it takes place1 however1 in those cases in which the occasion of insanity is kept constantly present to the mind and cannot be escaped from2 thus1 for example1 in the case of many who have gone mad from love1 erotomaniacs1 where the occasion of their madness is constantly longed after2 also in the case of madness which has resulted from the fright of some sudden horrible occurrence4 ,such patients cling1 as it were1 convulsively to the thought they have grasped1 so that no other1 or at least none opposed to it1 can arise4 ,in both processes1 however1 what is essential to madness remains the same1 the impossibility of a uniformly connected recollection1 such as is the basis of our healthy and rational reflection4 ,perhaps the contrast of the ways in which they arise1 set forth here1 might1 if applied with judgment1 afford a sharp and profound principle of division of delusions proper4 ,for the rest1 ,i have only considered the physical origin of madness1 thus what is introduced by external1 objective occasions4 ,more frequently1 however1 it depends upon purely physical causes1 upon malformations or partial disorganisation of the brain or its membranes1 also upon the influence which other parts affected with disease exercise upon the brain4 ,principally in the latter kind of madness false senseperceptions1 hallucinations1 may arise4 ,yet the two causes of madness will generally partake of each other1 particularly the psychical of the physical4 ,it is the same as with suicide1 which is rarely brought about by an external occasion alone1 but a certain physical discomfort lies at its foundation2 and according to the degree which this attains to a greater or less external occasion is required2 only in the case of the very highest degree is no external occasion at all required4 ,therefore there is no misfortune so great that it would influence every one to suicide1 and none so small that one like it has not already led to it4 ,i have shown the psychical origin of madness as1 at least according to all appearance1 it is brought about in the healthy mind by a great misfortune4 ,in the case of those who are already strongly disposed to madness physically a very small disappointment will be sufficient to induce it4 ,for example1 ,i remember a man in a madhouse who had been a soldier1 and had gone out of his mind because his officer had addressed him as ,er47#af7 ,in the case of decided physical disposition no occasion at all is required when this has come to maturity4 ,the madness which has sprung from purely psychical causes may1 perhaps1 by the violent perversion of the course of thought which has produced it1 also introduce a kind of paralysis or other depravity of some part of the brain1 which1 if not soon done away with1 becomes permanent4 ,therefore madness is only curable at first1 and not after a longer time4 ,pinel taught that there is a mania sine delirio1 frenzy without insanity4 ,this was controverted by ,esquirol1 and since then much has been said for and against it4 ,the question can only be decided empirically4 ,but if such a state really does occur1 then it is to be explained from the fact that here the will periodically entirely withdraws itself from the government and guidance of the intellect1 and consequently of motives1 and thus it then appears as a blind1 impetuous1 destructive force of nature1 and accordingly manifests itself as the desire to annihilate everything that comes in its way4 ,the will thus let loose is like the stream which has broken through the dam1 the horse that has thrown his rider1 or a clock out of which the regulating screws have been taken4 ,yet only the reason1 thus reflective knowledge1 is included in that suspension1 not intuitive knowledge also2 otherwise the will would remain entirely without guidance1 and consequently the man would be immovable4 ,but1 on the contrary1 the man in a frenzy apprehends objects1 for he breaks out upon them2 thus he has also consciousness of his present action1 and afterwards remembrance of it4 ,but he is entirely without reflection1 thus without any guidance of the reason1 consequently quite incapable of any consideration or regard for the present1 the past1 or the future4 ,when the attack is over1 and the reason has regained its command1 its function is correct1 because here its proper activity has not been perverted or destroyed1 but only the will has found the means to withdraw itself from it entirely for a while4 ,chapter ,,xxxiii47#ag7 ,isolated ,remarks ,on ,natural ,beauty4 ,what contributes among other things to make the sight of a beautiful landscape so exceedingly delightful is the perfect truth and consistency of nature4 ,certainly nature does not follow here the guidance of logic in the connection of the grounds of knowledge1 of antecedents and consequences1 premisses and conclusions2 but still it follows what is for it analogous to the law of causality in the visible connection of causes and effects4 ,every modification1 even the slightest1 which an object receives from its position1 foreshortening1 concealment1 distance1 lighting1 linear and atmospheric perspective1 c41 is1 through its effect upon the eye1 unerringly given and accurately taken account of3 the ,indian proverb1 8,every corn of rice casts its shadow10 finds here its confirmation4 ,therefore here everything shows itself so consistent1 accurately regular1 connected1 and scrupulously right2 here there are no evasions4 ,if now we consider the sight of a beautiful view1 merely as a brainphenomenon1 it is the only one among the complicated brainphenomena which is always absolutely regular1 blameless1 and perfect2 all the rest1 especially our own mental operations1 are1 in form or material1 affected more or less with defects or inaccuracies4 ,from this excellence of the sight of beautiful nature1 is the harmonious and thoroughly satisfying character of its impression to be explained1 and also the favourable effect which it has upon our whole thought1 which in its formal part thereby becomes more correctly disposed1 and to a certain extent purified1 for that brainphenomenon which alone is entirely faultless sets the brain in general in perfectly normal action2 and now the thought seeks to follow that method of nature in the consistency1 connectedness1 regularity1 and harmony of all its processes1 after being brought by it into the right swing4 ,a beautiful view is therefore a cathartic of the mind1 as music1 according to ,aristotle1 is of the feeling1 and in its presence one will think most correctly4 ,that the sight of a mountain chain suddenly rising before us throws us so easily into a serious1 and even sublime mood may partly depend upon the fact that the form of the mountains and the outline of the chain arising from it is the only constantly permanent line of the landscape1 for the mountains alone defy the decay which soon sweeps away everything else1 especially our own ephemeral person4 ,not that at the sight of the mountain chain all this appeared distinctly in our consciousness1 but an obscure feeling of it is the fundamental note of our mood4 ,i would like to know why it is that while for the human form and countenance light from above is altogether the most advantageous1 and light from below the most unfavourable1 with regard to landscape nature exactly the converse holds good4 ,yet how sthetic is nature6 ,every spot that is entirely uncultivated and wild1 i4e41 left free to itself1 however small it may be1 if only the hand of man remains absent1 it decorates at once in the most tasteful manner1 clothes it with plants1 flowers1 and shrubs1 whose unforced nature1 natural grace1 and tasteful grouping bears witness that they have not grown up under the rod of correction of the great egoist1 but that nature has here moved freely4 ,every neglected plant at once becomes beautiful4 ,upon this rests the principle of the ,english garden1 which is as much as possible to conceal art1 so that it may appear as if nature had here moved freely2 for only then is it perfectly beautiful1 i4e41 shows in the greatest distinctness the objectification of the still unconscious will to live1 which here unfolds itself with the greatest navet1 because the forms are not1 as in the animal world1 determined by external ends1 but only immediately by the soil1 climate1 and a mysterious third influence on account of which so many plants which have originally sprung up in the same soil and climate yet show such different forms and characters4 ,the great difference between the ,english1 or more correctly the ,chinese1 garden and the old ,french1 which is now always becoming more rare1 yet still exists in a few magnificent examples1 ultimately rests upon the fact that the former is planned in an objective spirit1 the latter in a subjective4 ,in the former the will of nature1 as it objectifies itself in tree and shrub1 mountain and waterfall1 is brought to the purest possible expression of these its ,ideas1 thus of its own inner being4 ,in the ,french garden1 on the other hand1 only the will of the possessor of it is mirrored1 which has subdued nature so that instead of its ,ideas it bears as tokens of its slavery the forms which correspond to that will1 and which are forcibly imposed upon it--clipped hedges1 trees cut into all kinds of forms1 straight alleys1 arched avenues1 c4 ,chapter ,,xxxiv47#ah7 ,on ,the ,inner ,nature ,of ,art4 ,not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom towards the solution of the problem of existence4 ,for in every mind that once gives itself up to the purely objective contemplation of nature a desire has been excited1 however concealed and unconscious it may be1 to comprehend the true nature of things1 of life and existence4 ,for this alone has interest for the intellect as such1 i4e41 for the pure subject of knowledge which has become free from the aims of the will2 as for the subject which knows as a mere individual the aims of the will alone have interest4 ,on this account the result of the purely objective apprehension of things is an expression more of the nature of life and existence1 more an answer to the question1 8,what is life80 ,every genuine and successful work of art answers this question in its own way with perfect correctness4 ,but all the arts speak only the naive and childish language of perception1 not the abstract and serious language of reflection2 their answer is therefore a fleeting image3 not permanent and general knowledge4 ,thus for perception every work of art answers that question1 every painting1 every statue1 every poem1 every scene upon the stage3 music also answers it2 and indeed more profoundly than all the rest1 for in its language1 which is understood with absolute directness1 but which is yet untranslatable into that of the reason1 the inner nature of all life and existence expresses itself4 ,thus all the other arts hold up to the questioner a perceptible image1 and say1 8,look here1 this is life40 ,their answer1 however correct it may be1 will yet always afford merely a temporary1 not a complete and final1 satisfaction4 ,for they always give merely a fragment1 an example instead of the rule1 not the whole1 which can only be given in the universality of the conception4 ,for this1 therefore1 thus for reflection and in the abstract1 to give an answer which just on that account shall be permanent and suffice for always1 is the task of philosophy4 ,however1 we see here upon what the relationship of philosophy to the fine arts rests1 and can conclude from that to what extent the capacity of both1 although in its direction and in secondary matters very different1 is yet in its root the same4 ,every work of art accordingly really aims at showing us life and things as they are in truth1 but cannot be directly discerned by every one through the mist of objective and subjective contingencies4 ,art takes away this mist4 ,the works of the poets1 sculptors1 and representative artists in general contain an unacknowledged treasure of profound wisdom2 just because out of them the wisdom of the nature of things itself speaks1 whose utterances they merely interpret by illustrations and purer repetitions4 ,on this account1 however1 every one who reads the poem or looks at the picture must certainly contribute out of his own means to bring that wisdom to light2 accordingly he comprehends only so much of it as his capacity and culture admit of2 as in the deep sea each sailor only lets down the lead as far as the length of the line will allow4 ,before a picture1 as before a prince1 every one must stand1 waiting to see whether and what it will speak to him2 and1 as in the case of a prince1 so here he must not himself address it1 for then he would only hear himself4 ,it follows from all this that in the works of the representative arts all truth is certainly contained1 yet only virtualiter or implicite2 philosophy1 on the other hand1 endeavours to supply the same truth actualiter and explicite1 and therefore1 in this sense1 is related to art as wine to grapes4 ,what it promises to supply would be1 as it were1 an already realised and clear gain1 a firm and abiding possession2 while that which proceeds from the achievements and works of art is one which has constantly to be reproduced anew4 ,therefore1 however1 it makes demands1 not only upon those who produce its works1 but also upon those who are to enjoy them which are discouraging and hard to comply with4 ,therefore its public remains small1 while that of art is large4 ,the cooperation of the beholder1 which is referred to above1 as demanded for the enjoyment of a work of art1 depends partly upon the fact that every work of art can only produce its effect through the medium of the fancy2 therefore it must excite this1 and can never allow it to be left out of the play and remain inactive4 ,this is a condition of the sthetic effect1 and therefore a fundamental law of all fine arts4 ,but it follows from this that1 through the work of art1 everything must not be directly given to the senses1 but rather only so much as is demanded to lead the fancy on to the right path2 something1 and indeed the ultimate thing1 must always be left over for the fancy to do4 ,even the author must always leave something over for the reader to think2 for ,voltaire has very rightly said1 8,le secret d'tre ennuyeux1 c'est de tout dire40 ,but besides this1 in art the best of all is too spiritual to be given directly to the senses2 it must be born in the imagination of the beholder1 although begotten by the work of art4 ,it depends upon this that the sketches of great masters often effect more than their finished pictures2 although another advantage certainly contributes to this1 namely1 that they are completed offhand in the moment of conception2 while the perfected painting is only produced through continued effort1 by means of skilful deliberation and persistent intention1 for the inspiration cannot last till it is completed4 ,from the fundamental sthetical law we are speaking of1 it is further to be explained why wax figures never produce an sthetic effect1 and therefore are not properly works of fine art1 although it is just in them that the imitation of nature is able to reach its highest grade4 ,for they leave nothing for the imagination to do4 ,sculpture gives merely the form without the colour2 painting gives the colour1 but the mere appearance of the form2 thus both appeal to the imagination of the beholder4 ,the wax figure1 on the other hand1 gives all1 form and colour at once2 whence arises the appearance of reality1 and the imagination is left out of account4 ,poetry1 on the contrary1 appeals indeed to the imagination alone1 which it sets in action by means of mere words4 ,an arbitrary playing with the means of art without a proper knowledge of the end is1 in every art1 the fundamental characteristic of the dabbler4 ,such a man shows himself in the pillars that support nothing1 aimless volutes1 juttings and projections of bad architecture1 in the meaningless runs and figures1 together with the aimless noise of bad music1 in the jingling of the rhymes of senseless poetry1 c4 ,it follows from the preceding chapter1 and from my whole view of art1 that its aim is the facilitating of the knowledge of the ,ideas of the world 7in the ,platonic sense1 the only one which ,i recognise for the word ,idea74 ,the ,ideas1 however1 are essentially something perceptible1 which1 therefore1 in its fuller determinations1 is inexhaustible4 ,the communication of such an ,idea can therefore only take place on the path of perception1 which is that of art4 ,whoever1 therefore1 is filled with the comprehension of an ,idea is justified if he chooses art as the medium of its communication4 ,the mere conception1 on the other hand1 is something completely determinable1 therefore exhaustible1 and distinctly thought1 the whole content of which can be coldly and dryly expressed in words4 ,now to desire to communicate such a conception by means of a work of art is a very useless circumlocution1 indeed belongs to that playing with the means of art without knowledge of its end which has just been condemned4 ,therefore a work of art which has proceeded from mere distinct conceptions is always ungenuine4 ,if now1 in considering a work of plastic art1 or in reading a poem1 or in hearing a piece of music 7which aims at describing something definite71 we see1 through all the rich materials of art1 the distinct1 limited1 cold1 dry conception shine out1 and at last come to the front1 the conception which was the kernel of this work1 the whole notion of which consequently consisted in the distinct thinking of it1 and accordingly is absolutely exhausted by its communication1 we feel disgusted and indignant1 for we see ourselves deceived and cheated out of our interest and attention4 ,we are only perfectly satisfied by the impression of a work of art when it leaves something which1 with all our thinking about it1 we cannot bring down to the distinctness of a conception4 ,the mark of that hybrid origin from mere conceptions is that the author of a work of art could1 before he set about it1 give in distinct words what he intended to present2 for then it would have been possible to attain his whole end through these words4 ,therefore it is an undertaking as unworthy as it is absurd if1 as has often been tried at the present day1 one seeks to reduce a poem of ,shakspeare's or ,goethe's to the abstract truth which it was its aim to communicate4 ,certainly the artist ought to think in the arranging of his work2 but only that thought which was perceived before it was thought has afterwards1 in its communication1 the power of animating or rousing1 and thereby becomes imperishable4 ,we shall not refrain from observing here that certainly the work which is done at a stroke1 like the sketches of painters already referred to1 the work which is completed in the inspiration of its first conception1 and as it were unconsciously dashed off1 like the melody which comes entirely without reflection1 and quite as if by inspiration1 and finally1 also the lyrical poem proper1 the mere song1 in which the deeply felt mood of the present1 and the impression of the surroundings1 as if involuntarily1 pours itself forth in words1 whose metre and rhyme come about of their own accord--that all these1 ,i say1 have the great advantage of being purely the work of the ecstasy of the moment1 the inspiration1 the free movement of genius1 without any admixture of intention and reflection2 hence they are through and through delightful and enjoyable1 without shell and kernel1 and their effect is much more inevitable than that of the greatest works of art1 of slower and more deliberate execution4 ,in all the latter1 thus in great historical paintings1 in long epic poems1 great operas1 c41 reflection1 intention1 and deliberate selection has had an important part2 understanding1 technical skill1 and routine must here fill up the gaps which the conception and inspiration of genius has left1 and must mix with these all kinds of necessary supplementary work as cement of the only really genuinely brilliant parts4 ,this explains why all such works1 only excepting the perfect masterpieces of the very greatest masters 7as1 for example1 8,hamlet10 8,faust10 the opera of 8,don ,juan071 inevitably contain an admixture of something insipid and wearisome1 which in some measure hinders the enjoyment of them4 ,proofs of this are the 8,messiah10 8,gerusalemme liberata10 even 8,paradise ,lost0 and the 8neid20 and ,horace already makes the bold remark1 8,quandoque dormitat bonus ,homerus40 ,but that this is the case is the consequence of the limitation of human powers in general4 ,the mother of the useful arts is necessity2 that of the fine arts superfluity4 ,as their father1 the former have understanding2 the latter genius1 which is itself a kind of superfluity1 that of the powers of knowledge beyond the measure which is required for the service of the will4 ,chapter ,,xxxv47#ai7 ,on ,the sthetics ,of ,architecture4 ,in accordance with the deduction given in the text of the pure sthetics of architecture from the lowest grades of the objectification of the will or of nature1 the ,ideas of which it seeks to bring to distinct perception1 its one constant theme is support and burden1 and its fundamental law is that no burden shall be without sufficient support1 and no support without a suitable burden2 consequently that the relation of these two shall be exactly the fitting one4 ,the purest example of the carrying out of this theme is the column and entablature4 ,therefore the order or columnar arrangement has become1 as it were1 the thorough bass of the whole of architecture4 ,in column and entablature the support and the burden are completely separated2 whereby the reciprocal action of the two and their relation to each other becomes apparent4 ,for certainly even every plain wall contains support and burden2 but here the two are still fused together4 ,all is here support and all is burden2 hence there is no sthetic effect4 ,this first appears through the separation1 and takes place in proportion to its degree4 ,for between the row of columns and the plain wall there are many intermediate degrees4 ,even in the mere breaking up of the wall of a house by windows and doors one seeks at least to indicate that separation by flat projecting pilasters 7ant7 with capitals1 which are inserted under the mouldings1 nay1 in case of need1 are represented by mere painting1 in order to indicate in some way the entablature and an order4 ,real pillars1 and also consoles and supports of various kinds1 realise more that pure separation of support and burden which is striven after throughout by architecture4 ,in this respect1 next to the column with the entablature1 but as a special construction not imitating it1 stands the vault with the pillar4 ,the latter certainly is far from attaining to the sthetic effect of the former1 because here the support and the burden are not purely separated1 but are fused1 passing over into each other4 ,in the vault itself every stone is at once burden and support1 and even the pillars1 especially in groined vaulting1 are1 at least apparently1 held in position by the pressure of opposite arches2 and also just on account of this lateral pressure not only vaults but even mere arches ought not to rest upon columns1 but require the massive four cornered pillars4 ,in the row of columns alone is the separation complete1 for here the entablature appears as pure burden1 the column as pure support4 ,accordingly the relation of the colonnade to the plain wall may be compared to that which would exist between a scale ascending in regular intervals and a tone ascending little by little from the same depth to the same height without gradation1 which would produce a mere howl4 ,for in the one as in the other the material is the same1 and the important difference proceeds entirely from the pure separation4 ,moreover1 the support is not adapted to the burden when it is only sufficient to bear it1 but when it can do this so conveniently and amply that at the first glance we are quite at ease about it4 ,yet this superfluity of support must not exceed a certain degree2 for otherwise we will perceive support without burden1 which is opposed to the sthetic end4 ,as a rule for determining that degree the ancients devised the line of equilibrium1 which is got by carrying out the diminution of the thickness of the column as it ascends till it runs out into an acute angle1 whereby the column becomes a cone2 now every cross section will leave the lower part so strong that it is sufficient to support the upper part cut off4 ,commonly1 however1 one builds with twentyfold strength1 i4e41 one lays upon every support only #a_/bjth of the maximum it could bear4 ,a glaring example of burden without support is presented to the eye by the balconies at the corners of many houses built in the elegant style of the present day4 ,we do not see what supports them2 they seem to hang suspended1 and disturb the mind4 ,that in ,italy even the simplest and most unornamented buildings make an sthetic impression1 while in ,germany this is not the case1 depends principally upon the fact that in ,italy the roofs are very flat4 ,a high roof is neither support nor burden1 for its two halves mutually support each other1 but the whole has no weight corresponding to its extension4 ,therefore it presents to the eye an extended mass which is entirely foreign to the sthetic end1 serves merely a useful end1 consequently disturbs the former1 of which the theme is always only support and burden4 ,the form of the column has its sole ground in the fact that it affords the simplest and most suitable support4 ,in the twisted column inappropriateness appears as if with intentional perversity1 and therefore shamelessness3 hence good taste condemns it at the first glance4 ,the four cornered pillar1 since the diagonal exceeds the sides1 has unequal dimensions of thickness which have no end as their motive1 but are occasioned by the accident of greater feasibleness2 and just on this account it pleases us so very much less than the column4 ,even the hexagonal or octagonal pillar is more pleasing1 because it approaches more nearly to the round column2 for the form of the latter alone is exclusively determined by the end4 ,it is1 however1 also so determined in all its other proportions1 primarily in the relation of its thickness to its height1 within the limits permitted by the difference of the three columnar orders4 ,therefore its diminution from the first third of its height upwards1 and also a slight increase of its thickness just at this place 7entasis vitr471 depends upon the fact that the pressure of the burden is greatest there4 ,it has hitherto been believed that this increase in thickness was peculiar to the ,ionic and ,corinthian columns alone1 but recent measurements have shown it also in the ,doric columns1 even at ,pstum4 ,thus everything in the column1 its thoroughly determined form1 the proportion of its height to its thickness1 of both to the intervals between the columns1 and that of the whole series to the entablature and the burden resting upon it1 is the exactly calculated result of the relation of the necessary support to the given burden4 ,as the latter is uniformly distributed1 so must also the support be2 therefore groups of columns are tasteless4 ,on the other hand1 in the best ,doric temples the corner column comes somewhat nearer to the next ones1 because the meeting of the entablatures at the corner increases the burden2 and in this the principle of architecture expresses itself distinctly1 that the structural relations1 i4e41 the relations between support and burden1 are the essential ones1 to which the relations of symmetry1 as subordinate1 must at once give way4 ,according to the weight of the whole burden generally will the ,doric or the two lighter orders of columns be chosen1 for the first1 not only by the greater thickness1 but also by the closer position of the columns1 which is essential to it1 is calculated for heavier burdens1 to which end also the almost crude simplicity of its capital is suited4 ,the capitals in general serve the end of showing visibly that the columns bear the entablature1 and are not stuck in like pins2 at the same time they increase by means of their abacus the bearing surface4 ,since1 then1 all the laws of columnar arrangement1 and consequently also the form and proportion of the column1 in all its parts and dimensions down to the smallest details1 follow from the thoroughly understood and consistently carried out conception of the amply adequate support of a given burden1 thus so far are determined a priori1 it comes out clearly how perverse is the thought1 so often repeated1 that the stems of trees1 or even 7which unfortunately even 8,vitruvius10 iv4 #a1 expresses7 the human form has been the prototype of the column4 ,for if the form of the column were for architecture a purely accidental one1 taken from without1 it could never appeal to us so harmoniously and satisfactorily whenever we behold it in its proper symmetry2 nor1 on the other hand1 could every even slight disproportion of it be felt at once by the fine and cultivated sense as disagreeable and disturbing1 like a false note in music4 ,this is rather only possible because1 according to the given end and means1 all the rest is essentially determined a priori1 as in music1 according to the given melody and key1 the whole harmony is essentially so determined4 ,and1 like music1 architecture in general is also not an imitative art1 although both are often falsely taken to be so4 sthetic satisfaction1 as was fully explained in the text1 always depends upon the apprehension of a 7,platonic7 ,idea4 ,for architecture1 considered merely as a fine art1 the ,ideas of the lowest grades of nature1 such as gravity1 rigidity1 and cohesion1 are the peculiar theme2 but not1 as has hitherto been assumed1 merely regular form1 proportion1 and symmetry1 which1 as something purely geometrical1 properties of space1 are not ,ideas1 and therefore cannot be the theme of a fine art4 ,thus in architecture also they are of secondary origin1 and have a subordinate significance1 which ,i shall bring out immediately4 ,if it were the task of architecture as a fine art simply to exhibit these1 then the model would have the same effect as the finished work4 ,but this is distinctly not the case2 on the contrary1 the works of architecture1 in order to act sthetically1 absolutely must have a considerable size2 nay1 they can never be too large1 but may easily be too small4 ,indeed ceteris paribus the sthetic effect is in exact proportion to the size of the building1 because only great masses make the action of gravitation apparent and impressive in a high degree4 ,but this confirms my view that the tendency and antagonism of those fundamental forces of nature constitute the special sthetical material of architecture1 which1 according to its nature1 requires large masses in order to become visible1 and indeed capable of being felt4 ,the forms in architecture1 as was shown above in the case of the column1 are primarily determined by the immediate structural end of each part4 ,but so far as this leaves anything undetermined1 the law of the most perfect clearness to perception1 thus also of the easiest comprehensibility1 comes in2 for architecture has its existence primarily in our spatial perception1 and accordingly appeals to our a priori faculty for this4 ,but these qualities always result from the greatest regularity of the forms and rationality of their relations4 ,therefore beautiful architecture selects only regular figures composed of straight lines or regular curves1 and also the bodies which result from these1 such as cubes1 parallelopipeda1 cylinders1 spheres1 pyramids1 and cones2 but as openings sometimes circles or ellipses1 yet1 as a rule1 quadrates1 and still oftener rectangles1 the latter of thoroughly rational and very easily comprehended relation of their sides 7not1 for instance as #f3g1 but as #a3b1 #b3c71 finally also blind windows or niches of regular and comprehensible proportions4 ,for the same reason it will readily give to the buildings themselves and their large parts a rational and easily comprehended relation of height and breadth2 for example1 it will let the height of a facade be half the breadth1 and place the pillars so that every three or four of them1 with the intervals between them1 will measure a line which is equal to the height1 thus will form a quadrate4 ,the same principle of perceptibility and easy comprehension demands also that a building should be easily surveyed4 ,this introduces symmetry1 which is further necessary to mark out the work as a whole1 and to distinguish its essential from its accidental limitation2 for sometimes1 for example1 it is only under the guidance of symmetry that one knows whether one has before one three buildings standing beside each other or only one4 ,thus only by means of symmetry does a work of architecture at once announce itself as individual unity1 and as the development of a central thought4 ,now although1 as was cursorily shown above1 architecture has by no means to imitate the forms of nature1 such as the stems of trees or even the human figure1 yet it ought to work in the spirit of nature1 for it makes the law its own1 natura nihil agit frustra1 nihilque supervacaneum1 et quod commodissimum in omnibus suis operationibus sequitur1 and accordingly avoids everything which is even only apparently aimless1 and always attains the end in view in each case1 whether this is purely architectonic1 i4e41 structural1 or an end connected with usefulness1 by the shortest and most natural path1 and thus openly exhibits the end through the work itself4 ,thus it attains a certain grace1 analogous to that which in living creatures consists in the ease and suitableness of every movement and position to its end4 ,accordingly we see in the good antique style of architecture every part1 whether pillar1 column1 arch1 entablature1 or door1 window1 stair1 or balcony1 attain its end in the directest and simplest manner1 at the same time displaying it openly and naively2 just as organised nature also does in its works4 ,the tasteless style of architecture1 on the contrary1 seeks in everything useless roundabout ways1 and delights in caprices1 thereby hits upon aimlessly broken and irregular entablatures1 grouped columns1 fragmentary cornices on door arches and gables1 meaningless volutes1 scrolls1 and such like4 ,it plays with the means of the art without understanding its aims1 as children play with the tools of grownup people4 ,this was given above as the character of the bungler4 ,of this kind is every interruption of a straight line1 every alteration in the sweep of a curve1 without apparent end4 ,on the other hand1 it is also just that naive simplicity in the disclosure and attainment of the end1 corresponding to the spirit in which nature works and fashions1 that imparts such beauty and grace of form to antique pottery that it ever anew excites our wonder1 because it contrasts so advantageously in original taste with our modern pottery1 which bears the stamp of vulgarity1 whether it is made of porcelain or common potter's clay4 ,at the sight of the pottery and implements of the ancients we feel that if nature had wished to produce such things it would have done so in these forms4 ,since1 then1 we see that the beauty of architecture arises from the unconcealed exhibition of the ends1 and the attainment of them by the shortest and most natural path1 my theory here appears in direct contradiction with that of ,kant1 which places the nature of all beauty in an apparent design without an end4 ,the sole theme of architecture here set forth--support and burden--is so very simple1 that just on this account this art1 so far as it is a fine art 7but not so far as it serves useful ends71 is perfect and complete in essential matters1 since the best ,greek period1 at least1 is not susceptible of any important enrichment4 ,on the other hand1 the modern architect cannot noticeably depart from the rules and patterns of the ancients without already being on the path of deterioration4 ,therefore there remains nothing for him to do but to apply the art transmitted to him by the ancients1 and carry out the rules so far as is possible under the limitations which are inevitably laid down for him by wants1 climate1 age1 and country4 ,for in this art1 as in sculpture1 the effort after the ideal unites with the imitation of the ancients4 ,i scarcely need to remind the reader that in all these considerations ,i have had in view antique architecture alone1 and not the socalled ,gothic style1 which is of ,saracen origin1 and was introduced by the ,goths in ,spain to the rest of ,europe4 ,perhaps a certain beauty of its own kind is not altogether to be denied to this style1 but yet if it attempts to oppose itself to the former as its equal1 then this is a barbarous presumption which must not be allowed for a moment4 ,how beneficently1 after contemplating such ,gothic magnificence1 does the sight of a building correctly carried out in the antique style act upon our mind6 ,we feel at once that this alone is right and true4 ,if one could bring an ancient ,greek before our most celebrated ,gothic cathedrals1 what would he say to them8--6 ,our pleasure in ,gothic works certainly depends for the most part upon the association of ideas and historical reminiscences1 thus upon a feeling which is foreign to art4 ,all that ,i have said of the true sthetic end1 of the spirit and the theme of architecture1 loses in the case of these works its validity4 ,for the freely lying entablature has vanished1 and with it the columns3 support and burden1 arranged and distributed in order to give visible form to the conflict between rigidity and gravity1 are here no longer the theme4 ,moreover1 that thorough1 pure rationality by virtue of which everything admits of strict account1 nay1 already presents it of its own accord to the thoughtful beholder1 and which belongs to the character of antique architecture1 can here no longer be found2 we soon become conscious that here1 instead of it1 a will guided by other conceptions has moved2 therefore much remains unexplained to us4 ,for only the antique style of architecture is conceived in a purely objective spirit2 the ,gothic style is more in the subjective spirit4 ,yet as we have recognised the peculiar sthetic fundamental thought of antique architecture in the unfolding of the conflict between rigidity and gravity1 if we wish to discover in ,gothic architecture also an analogous fundamental thought1 it will be this1 that here the entire overcoming and conquest of gravity by rigidity is supposed to be exhibited4 ,for in accordance with this the horizontal line which is that of burden has entirely vanished1 and the action of gravity only appears indirectly1 disguised in arches and vaults1 while the vertical line which is that of support1 alone prevails1 and makes palpable to the senses the victorious action of rigidity1 in excessively high buttresses1 towers1 turrets1 and pinnacles without number which rise unencumbered on high4 ,while in antique architecture the tendency and pressure from above downwards is just as well represented and exhibited as that from below upwards1 here the latter decidedly predominates2 whence that analogy often observed with the crystal1 whose crystallisation also takes place with the overcoming of gravity4 ,if now we attribute this spirit and fundamental thought to ,gothic architecture1 and would like thereby to set it up as the equally justified antithesis of antique architecture1 we must remember that the conflict between rigidity and gravity1 which the antique architecture so openly and navely expresses1 is an actual and true conflict founded in nature2 the entire overcoming of gravity by rigidity1 on the contrary1 remains a mere appearance1 a fiction accredited by illusion4 ,every one will easily be able to see clearly how from the fundamental thought given here1 and the peculiarities of ,gothic architecture noticed above1 there arises that mysterious and hyperphysical character which is attributed to it4 ,it principally arises1 as was already mentioned1 from the fact that here the arbitrary has taken the place of the purely rational1 which makes itself known as the thorough adaptation of the means to the end4 ,the many things that are really aimless1 but yet are so carefully perfected1 raise the assumption of unknown1 unfathomed1 and secret ends1 i4e41 give the appearance of mystery4 ,on the other hand1 the brilliant side of ,gothic churches is the interior2 because here the effect of the groined vaulting borne by slender1 crystalline1 aspiring pillars1 raised high aloft1 and1 all burden having disappeared1 promising eternal security1 impresses the mind2 while most of the faults which have been mentioned lie upon the outside4 ,in antique buildings the external side is the most advantageous1 because there we see better the support and the burden2 in the interior1 on the other hand1 the flat roof always retains something depressing and prosaic4 ,for the most part1 also1 in the temples of the ancients1 while the outworks were many and great1 the interior proper was small4 ,an appearance of sublimity is gained from the hemispherical vault of a cupola1 as in the ,pantheon1 of which1 therefore1 the ,italians also1 building in this style1 have made a most extensive use4 ,what determines this is1 that the ancients1 as southern peoples1 lived more in the open air than the northern nations who have produced the ,gothic style of architecture4 ,whoever1 then1 absolutely insists upon ,gothic architecture being accepted as an essential and authorised style may1 if he is also fond of analogies1 regard it as the negative pole of architecture1 or1 again1 as its minor key4 ,in the interest of good taste ,i must wish that great wealth will be devoted to that which is objectively1 i4e41 actually1 good and right1 to what in itself is beautiful1 but not to that whose value depends merely upon the association of ideas4 ,now when ,i see how this unbelieving age so diligently finishes the ,gothic churches left incomplete by the believing ,middle ,ages1 it looks to me as if it were desired to embalm a dead ,christianity4 ,chapter ,,xxxvi47#bj7 ,isolated ,remarks ,on ,the sthetics ,of ,the ,plastic ,and ,pictorial ,arts4 ,in sculpture beauty and grace are the principal things2 but in painting expression1 passion1 and character predominate2 therefore just so much of the claims of beauty must be neglected4 ,for a perfect beauty of all forms1 such as sculpture demands1 would detract from the characteristic and weary by monotony4 ,accordingly painting may also present ugly faces and emaciated figures2 sculpture1 on the other hand1 demands beauty1 although not always perfect1 but1 throughout1 strength and fulness of the figures4 ,consequently a thin ,christ upon the ,cross1 a dying ,st4 ,jerome1 wasted by age and disease1 like the masterpiece of ,domenichino1 is a proper subject for painting2 while1 on the contrary1 the marble figure by ,donatello1 in the gallery at ,florence1 of ,john the ,baptist1 reduced to skin and bone by fasting1 has1 in spite of the masterly execution1 a repulsive effect4 ,from this point of view sculpture seems suitable for the affirmation1 painting for the negation1 of the will to live1 and from this it may be explained why sculpture was the art of the ancients1 while painting has been the art of the ,christian era4 ,in connection with the exposition given in #de of the first volume1 that the discovery1 recognition1 and retention of the type of human beauty depends to a certain extent upon an anticipation of it1 and therefore in part has an a priori foundation1 ,i find that ,i have yet to bring out clearly the fact that this anticipation nevertheless requires experience1 by which it may be stirred up2 analogous to the instinct of the brutes1 which1 although guiding the action a priori1 yet requires determination by motives in the details of it4 ,experience and reality present to the intellect of the artist human forms1 which1 in one part or another1 are more or less true to nature1 as if it were asking for his judgment concerning them1 and thus1 after the ,socratic method1 call forth from that obscure anticipation the distinct and definite knowledge of the ideal4 ,therefore it assisted the ,greek sculptors very much that the climate and customs of their country gave them opportunity the whole day of seeing halfnaked forms1 and in the gymnasium entirely naked forms4 ,in this way every limb presented its plastic significance to criticism1 and to comparison with the ideal which lay undeveloped in their consciousness4 ,thus they constantly exercised their judgment with regard to all forms and limbs1 down to their finest shades of difference2 and thus1 little by little1 their originally dull anticipation of the ideal of human beauty was raised to such distinct consciousness that they became capable of objectifying it in works of art4 ,in an entirely analogous manner some experience is useful and necessary to the poet for the representation of characters4 ,for although he does not work according to experience and empirical data1 but in accordance with the clear consciousness of the nature of humanity1 as he finds it within himself1 yet experience serves this consciousness as a pattern1 incites it and gives it practice4 ,accordingly his knowledge of human nature and its varieties1 although in the main it proceeds a priori and by anticipation1 yet first receives life1 definiteness1 and compass through experience4 ,but1 supporting ourselves upon the preceding book and chapter #dd in the following book1 we can go still deeper into the ground of that marvellous sense of beauty of the ,greeks which made them alone of all nations upon earth capable of discovering the true normal type of the human form1 and accordingly of setting up the pattern of beauty and grace for the imitation of all ages1 and we can say3 ,the same thing which1 if it remains unseparated from the will1 gives sexual instinct with its discriminating selection1 i4e41 sexual love 7which it is well known was subject among the ,greeks to great aberrations71 becomes1 if1 by the presence of an abnormally preponderating intellect1 it separates itself from the will and yet remains active1 the objective sense of beauty of the human form1 which now shows itself primarily as a critical artistic sense1 but can rise to the discovery and representation of the norm of all parts and proportions2 as was the case in ,phidias1 ,praxiteles1 ,scopas1 c4 ,then is fulfilled what ,goethe makes the artist say-- 8,that ,i with mind divine ,and human hand ,may be able to form ,what with my wife1 ,as animal1 ,i can and must40 ,and again1 analogous to this1 that which in the poet1 if it remained unseparated from the will1 would give only worldly prudence1 becomes1 if it frees itself from the will by abnormal preponderance of the intellect1 the capacity for objective1 dramatic representation4 ,modern sculpture1 whatever it may achieve1 is still analogous to modern ,latin poetry1 and1 like this1 is a child of imitation1 sprung from reminiscences4 ,if it presumes to try to be original1 it at once goes astray1 especially upon the bad path of forming according to nature as it lies before it1 instead of according to the proportions of the ancients4 ,canova1 ,thorwaldsen1 and many others may be compared to ,johannes ,secundus and ,owenus4 ,it is the same with architecture1 only there it is founded in the art itself1 the purely sthetic part of which is of small compass1 and was already exhausted by the ancients2 therefore the modern architect can only distinguish himself in the wise application of it2 and he ought to know that he removes himself from good taste just so far as he departs from the style and pattern of the ,greeks4 ,the art of the painter1 considered only so far as it aims at producing the appearance of reality1 may ultimately be referred to the fact that he understands how to separate purely what in seeing is the mere sensation1 thus the affection of the retina1 i4e41 the only directly given effect1 from its cause1 i4e41 the objective external world1 the perception of which first rises in the understanding from this effect2 whereby1 if he has technical skill1 he is in a position to produce the same effect in the eye through an entirely different cause1 the patches of applied colour1 from which then in the understanding of the beholder the same perception again arises through the unavoidable reference of the effect to the ordinary cause4 ,if we consider how there lies something so entirely idiosyncratic1 so thoroughly original1 in every human countenance1 and that it presents a whole which can only belong to a unity consisting entirely of necessary parts by virtue of which we recognise a known individual out of so many thousands1 even after long years1 although the possible variations of human features1 especially of one race1 lie within very narrow limits1 we must doubt whether anything of such essential unity and such great originality could ever proceed from any other source than from the mysterious depths of the inner being of nature2 but from this it would follow that no artist could be capable of really reproducing the original peculiarity of a human countenance1 or even of composing it according to nature from recollection4 ,accordingly what he produced of this kind would always be only a half true1 nay1 perhaps an impossible composition2 for how should he compose an actual physiognomical unity when the principle of this unity is really unknown to him8 ,therefore1 in the case of every face which has merely been imagined by an artist1 we must doubt whether it is in fact a possible face1 and whether nature1 as the master of all masters1 would not show it to be a bungled production by pointing out complete contradictions in it4 ,this would1 of course1 lead to the principle that in historical paintings only portraits ought to figure1 which certainly would then have to be selected with the greatest care and in some degree idealised4 ,it is well known that great artists have always gladly painted from living models and introduced many portraits4 ,although1 as is explained in the text1 the real end of painting1 as of art in general1 is to make the comprehension of the 7,platonic7 ,ideas of the nature of the world easier for us1 whereby we are at once thrown into the state of pure1 i4e41 willless1 knowing1 there yet belongs to it besides this an independent beauty of its own1 which is produced by the mere harmony of the colours1 the pleasingness of the grouping1 the happy distribution of light and shade1 and the tone of the whole picture4 ,this accompanying subordinate kind of beauty furthers the condition of pure knowing1 and is in painting what the diction1 the metre1 and rhyme are in poetry2 both are not what is essential1 but what acts first and immediately4 ,i have some further evidence to give in support of my judgment given in the first volume1 #ej1 on the inadmissibleness of allegory in painting4 ,in the ,borghese palace at ,rome there is the following picture by ,michael ,angelo ,caravaggio3 ,jesus1 as a child of about ten years old1 treads upon the head of a serpent1 but entirely without fear and with great calmness2 and ,his mother1 who accompanies ,him1 remains quite as indifferent4 ,close by stands ,st4 ,elizabeth1 looking solemnly and tragically up to heaven4 ,now what could be thought of this kyriological hieroglyphic by a man who had never heard anything about the seed of the woman that should bruise the head of the serpent8 ,at ,florence1 in the library of the palace ,riccardi1 we find the following allegory upon the ceiling1 painted by ,luca ,giordano1 which is meant to signify that science frees the understanding from the bonds of ignorance3 the understanding is a strong man bound with cords1 which are just falling off2 a nymph holds a mirror in front of him1 another hands him a large detached wing2 above sits science on a globe1 and beside her1 with a globe in her hand1 the naked truth4 ,at ,ludwigsburg1 near ,stuttgart1 there is a picture which shows us time1 as ,saturn1 cutting off with a pair of shears the wings of ,cupid4 ,if this is meant to signify that when we grow old love proves unstable1 this no doubt has its truth4 ,the following may serve to strengthen my solution of the problem as to why ,laocoon does not cry out4 ,one may practically convince oneself of the faulty effect of the representation of shrieking by the works of the plastic and pictorial arts1 which are essentially dumb1 by a picture of the slaughter of the innocents1 by ,guido ,reni1 which is to be found in the ,academy of ,arts at ,bologna1 and in which this great artist has committed the mistake of painting six shrieking wideopen mouths4 ,let any one who wants to have this more distinct think of a pantomimic representation on the stage1 and in one of the scenes an urgent occasion for one of the players to shriek2 if now the dancer who is representing this part should express the shriek by standing for a while with his mouth wide open1 the loud laughter of the whole house would bear witness to the absurdity of the thing4 ,accordingly1 since the shrieking of ,laocoon had to be avoided for reasons which did not lie in the objects to be represented1 but in the nature of the representing art1 the task thus arose for the artist so to present this notshrieking as to make it plausible to us that a man in such a position should not shriek4 ,he solves this problem by representing the bite of the snake1 not as having already taken place1 nor yet as still threatening1 but as just happening now in the side2 for thereby the lower part of the body is contracted1 and shrieking made impossible4 ,this immediate but only subordinate reason was correctly discovered by ,goethe1 and is expounded at the end of the eleventh book of his autobiography1 and also in the paper on ,laocoon in the first part of the ,propyla2 but the ultimate1 primary reason1 which conditions this one1 is that which ,i have set forth4 ,i cannot refrain from remarking that ,i here stand in the same relation to ,goethe as with reference to the theory of colours4 ,in the collection of the ,duke of ,aremberg at ,brussels there is an antique head of ,laocoon which was found later4 ,however1 the head in the worldrenowned group is not a restored one which follows from ,goethe's special table of all the restorations of this group1 which is given at the end of the first volume of the ,propyla1 and is also confirmed by the fact that the head which was found later resembles that of the group very much4 ,thus we must assume that another antique repetition of the group has existed to which the ,aremberg head belonged4 ,in my opinion the latter excels both in beauty and expression that of the group4 ,it has the mouth decidedly wider open than in the group1 yet not really to the extent of shrieking4 ,chapter ,,xxxvii47#ba7 ,on ,the sthetics ,of ,poetry4 ,i might give it as the simplest and most correct definition of poetry1 that it is the art of bringing the imagination into play by means of words4 ,how it brings this to pass ,i have shown in the first volume1 #ea4 ,a special confirmation of what is said there is afforded by the following passage in a letter of ,wieland's to ,merck1 which has since then been published3 8,i have spent two days and a half upon a single stanza1 in which the whole thing ultimately depended upon a single word which ,i wanted and could not find4 ,i revolved and turned about the thing and my brain in all directions1 because naturally1 where a picture was in question1 ,i desired to bring the same definite vision1 which floated before my own mind into the mind of my reader also1 and for this all often depends1 ut nosti1 upon a single touch or suggestion or reflex0 7,briefe an ,merck1 edited by ,wagner1 #ahce1 p4 #aic74 ,from the fact that the imagination of the reader is the material in which poetry exhibits its pictures1 it has the advantage that the fuller development of these pictures and their finer touches1 take place in the imagination of every one just as is most suitable to his individuality1 his sphere of knowledge1 and his humour1 and therefore move him in the most lively manner2 instead of which plastic and pictorial art cannot so adapt itself1 but here one picture1 one form1 must satisfy all4 ,and yet this will always bear in some respect the stamp of the individuality of the artist or of his model1 as a subjective or accidental and inefficient addition2 although always less so the more objective1 i4e41 the more of a genius1 the artist is4 ,this1 to some extent1 explains why works of poetry exercise a much stronger1 deeper1 and more universal effect than pictures and statues2 the latter1 for the most part1 leave the common people quite cold2 and1 in general1 the plastic arts are those which have the weakest effect4 ,a remarkable proof of this is afforded by the frequent discovery and disclosure of pictures by great masters in private houses and all kinds of localities1 where they have been hanging for many generations1 not buried and concealed1 but merely unheeded1 thus without any effect4 ,in my time 7#ahbc7 there was even discovered in ,florence a ,madonna of ,raphael's1 which had hung for a long series of years on the wall of the servants' hall of a palace 7in the ,quartiere di ,s4 ,spirito72 and this happens among ,italians1 the nation which is gifted beyond all others with the sense of the beautiful4 ,it shows how little direct and immediate effect the works of plastic and pictorial art have1 and that it requires more culture and knowledge to prize them than the works of all other arts4 ,how unfailingly1 on the contrary1 a beautiful melody that touches the heart makes its journey round the world1 and an excellent poem wanders from people to people4 ,that the great and rich devote their powerful support just to the plastic and pictorial arts1 and expend considerable sums upon their works only2 nay1 at the present day1 an idolatry1 in the proper sense of the term1 gives the value of a large estate for a picture of a celebrated old master--this depends principally upon the rarity of the masterpieces1 the possession of which therefore gratifies pride2 and then also upon the fact that the enjoyment of them demands very little time and effort1 and is ready at any moment1 for a moment2 while poetry and even music make incomparably harder conditions4 ,corresponding to this1 the plastic and pictorial arts may be dispensed with2 whole nations--for example1 the ,mohammedan peoples--are without them1 but no people is without music and poetry4 ,but the intention with which the poet sets our imagination in motion is to reveal to us the ,ideas1 i4e41 to show us by an example what life and what the world is4 ,the first condition of this is that he himself has known it2 according as his knowledge has been profound or superficial so will his poem be4 ,therefore1 as there are innumerable degrees of profoundness and clearness in the comprehension of the nature of things1 so are there of poets4 ,each of these1 however1 must regard himself as excellent so far as he has correctly represented what he knew1 and his picture answers to his original3 he must make himself equal with the best1 for even in the best picture he does not recognise more than in his own1 that is1 as much as he sees in nature itself2 for his glance cannot now penetrate deeper4 ,but the best himself recognises himself as such in the fact that he sees how superficial was the view of the others1 how much lay beyond it which they were not able to repeat1 because they did not see it1 and how much further his own glance and picture reaches4 ,if he understood the superficial poets as little as they do him1 then he would necessarily despair2 for just because it requires an extraordinary man to do him justice1 but the inferior poets can just as little esteem him as he can them1 he also has long to live upon his own approval before that of the world follows it4 ,meanwhile he is deprived even of his own approval1 for he is expected to be very modest4 ,it is1 however1 as impossible that he who has merit1 and knows what it costs1 should himself be blind to it1 as that a man who is six feet high should not observe that he rises above others4 ,if from the base of the tower to the summit is #cjj feet1 then certainly it is just as much from the summit to the base4 ,horace1 ,lucretius1 ,ovid1 and almost all the ancients have spoken proudly of themselves1 and also ,dante1 ,shakspeare1 ,bacon of ,verulam1 and many more4 ,that one can be a great man without observing anything of it is an absurdity of which only hopeless incapacity can persuade itself1 in order that it may regard the feeling of its own insignificance as modesty4 ,an ,englishman has wittily and correctly observed that merit and modesty have nothing in common except the initial letter47#bb7 ,i have always a suspicion about modest celebrities that they may very well be right2 and ,corneille says directly-- 8,la fausse humilit ne met plus en crdit3 ,je sais ce que je vaux1 et crois ce qu'on m'en dit40 ,finally1 ,goethe has frankly said1 8,only goodfornothings are modest40 ,but the assertion would be still more certain that those who so eagerly demand modesty from others1 urge modesty1 unceasingly cry1 8,only be modest1 for ,god's sake1 only be modest60 are positively goodfornothings1 i4e41 persons entirely without merit1 manufactures of nature1 ordinary members of the great mass of humanity4 ,for he who himself has merit also concedes merit--understands himself truly and really4 ,but he who himself lacks all excellence and merit wishes there was no such thing3 the sight of it in others stretches him upon the rack2 pale1 green1 and yellow envy consumes his heart3 he would like to annihilate and destroy all those who are personally favoured2 but if unfortunately he must let them live1 it must only be under the condition that they conceal1 entirely deny1 nay1 abjure their advantages4 ,this1 then1 is the root of the frequent eulogising of modesty4 ,and if the deliverers of these eulogies have the opportunity of suppressing merit as it arises1 or at least of hindering it from showing itself or being known1 who can doubt that they will do it8 ,for this is the practice of their theory4 ,now1 although the poet1 like every artist1 always brings before us only the particular1 the individual1 what he has known1 and wishes by his work to make us know1 is the 7,platonic7 ,idea1 the whole species2 therefore in his images1 as it were1 the type of human characters and situations will be impressed4 ,the narrative and also the dramatic poet takes the whole particular from life1 and describes it accurately in its individuality1 but yet reveals in this way the whole of human existence2 for although he seems to have to do with the particular1 in truth he is concerned with that which is everywhere and at all times4 ,hence it arises that sentences1 especially of the dramatic poets1 even without being general apophthegms1 find frequent application in actual life4 ,poetry is related to philosophy as experience is related to empirical science4 ,experience makes us acquainted with the phenomenon in the particular and by means of examples1 science embraces the whole of phenomena by means of general conceptions4 ,so poetry seeks to make us acquainted with the 7,platonic7 ,ideas through the particular and by means of examples4 ,philosophy aims at teaching1 as a whole and in general1 the inner nature of things which expresses itself in these4 ,one sees even here that poetry bears more the character of youth1 philosophy that of old age4 ,in fact1 the gift of poetry really only flourishes in youth2 and also the susceptibility for poetry is often passionate in youth3 the youth delights in verses as such1 and is often contented with small ware4 ,this inclination gradually diminishes with years1 and in old age one prefers prose4 ,by that poetical tendency of youth the sense of the real is then easily spoiled4 ,for poetry differs from reality by the fact that in it life flows past us1 interesting and yet painless2 while in reality1 on the contrary1 so long as it is painless it is uninteresting1 and as soon as it becomes interesting1 it does not remain without pain4 ,the youth who has been initiated into poetry earlier than into reality now desires from the latter what only the former can achieve2 this is a principal source of the discomfort which oppresses the most gifted youths4 ,metre and rhyme are a fetter1 but also a veil which the poet throws round him1 and under which he is permitted to speak as he otherwise dared not do2 and that is what gives us pleasure4 ,he is only half responsible for all that he says2 metre and rhyme must answer for the other half4 ,metre1 or measure1 as mere rhythm1 has its existence only in time1 which is a pure perception a priori1 thus1 to use ,kant's language1 belongs merely to pure sensibility2 rhyme1 on the other hand1 is an affair of sensation1 in the organ of hearing1 thus of empirical sensibility4 ,therefore rhythm is a much nobler and more worthy expedient than rhyme1 which the ancients accordingly despised1 and which found its origin in those imperfect languages which arose from the corruption of earlier ones and in barbarous times4 ,the poorness of ,french poetry depends principally upon the fact that it is confined to rhyme alone without metre1 and it is increased by the fact that in order to conceal its want of means it has increased the difficulty of rhyming by a number of pedantic laws1 such as1 for example1 that only syllables which are written the same way rhyme1 as if it were for the eye and not for the ear that the hiatus is forbidden2 that a number of words must not occur2 and many such1 to all of which the new school of ,french poetry seeks to put an end4 ,in no language1 however1 at least on me1 does the rhyme make such a pleasing and powerful impression as in ,latin2 the rhymed ,latin poems of the ,middle ,ages have a peculiar charm4 ,this must be explained from the fact that the ,latin language is incomparably more perfect1 more beautiful and noble1 than any modern language1 and now moves so gracefully in the ornaments and spangles which really belong to the latter1 and which it itself originally despised4 ,to serious consideration it might almost appear as high treason against our reason that even the slightest violence should be done to a thought or its correct and pure expression1 with the childish intention that after some syllables the same sound of word should be heard1 or even that these syllables themselves should present a kind of rhythmical beat4 ,but without such violence very few verses would be made2 for it must be attributed to this that in foreign languages verses are much more difficult to understand than prose4 ,if we could see into the secret workshops of the poets1 we would find that the thought is sought for the rhyme ten times oftener than the rhyme for the thought2 and even when the latter is the case1 it is not easily accomplished without pliability on the part of the thought4 ,but the art of verse bids defiance to these considerations1 and1 moreover1 has all ages and peoples upon its side1 so great is the power which metre and rhyme exercise upon the feeling1 and so effective the mysterious lenocinium which belongs to them4 ,i would explain this from the fact that a happily rhymed verse1 by its indescribably emphatic effect1 raises the feeling as if the thought expressed in it lay already predestined1 nay1 performed in the language1 and the poet has only had to find it out4 ,even trivial thoughts receive from rhythm and rhyme a touch of importance2 cut a figure in this attire1 as among girls plain faces attract the eye by finery4 ,nay1 even distorted and false thoughts gain through versification an appearance of truth4 ,on the other hand1 even famous passages from famous poets shrink together and become insignificant when they are reproduced accurately in prose4 ,if only the true is beautiful1 and the dearest ornament of truth is nakedness1 then a thought which appears true and beautiful in prose will have more true worth than one which affects us in the same way in verse4 ,now it is very striking1 and well worth investigating1 that such trifling1 nay1 apparently childish1 means as metre and rhyme produce so powerful an effect4 ,i explain it to myself in the following manner3 ,that which is given directly to the sense of hearing1 thus the mere sound of the words1 receives from rhythm and rhyme a certain completeness and significance in itself for it thereby becomes a kind of music2 therefore it seems now to exist for its own sake1 and no longer as a mere means1 mere signs of something signified1 the sense of the words4 ,to please the ear with its sound seems to be its whole end1 and therefore with this everything seems to be attained and all claims satisfied4 ,but that it further contains a meaning1 expresses a thought1 presents itself now as an unexpected addition1 like words to music--as an unexpected present which agreeably surprises us--and therefore1 since we made no demands of this kind1 very easily satisfies us2 and if indeed this thought is such that1 in itself1 thus said in prose1 it would also be significant1 then we are enchanted4 ,i can remember1 in my early childhood1 that ,i had delighted myself for a long time with the agreeable sound of verse before ,i made the discovery that it all also contained meaning and thoughts4 ,accordingly there is also1 in all languages1 a mere doggerel poetry almost entirely devoid of meaning4 ,davis1 the ,sinologist1 in the preface to his translation of the 8,laou sangurh10 or 8,an ,heir in ,old ,age0 7,london1 #ahag71 observes that the ,chinese dramas partly consist of verses which are sung1 and adds3 8,the meaning of them is often obscure1 and1 according to the statements of the ,chinese themselves1 the end of these verses is especially to flatter the ear1 and the sense is neglected1 and even entirely sacrificed to the harmony40 ,who is not reminded here of the choruses of many ,greek tragedies which are often so hard to make out8 ,the sign by which one most immediately recognises the genuine poet1 both of the higher and lower species1 is the unforced nature of his rhymes4 ,they have appeared of themselves as if by divine arrangement2 his thoughts come to him already in rhyme4 ,the homely1 prosaic man on the contrary1 seeks the rhyme for the thought2 the bungler seeks the thought for the rhyme4 ,very often one can find out from a couple of rhymed verses which of the two had the thought and which had the rhyme as its father4 ,the art consists in concealing the latter1 so that such lines may not appear almost as mere stuffed out boutsrims4 ,according to my feeling 7proofs cannot here be given7 rhyme is from its nature binary3 its effect is limited to one single recurrence of the same sound1 and is not strengthened by more frequent repetition4 ,thus whenever a final syllable has received the one of the same sound its effect is exhausted2 the third recurrence of the note acts merely as a second rhyme which accidentally hits upon the same sound1 but without heightening the effect2 it links itself on to the existing rhyme1 yet without combining with it to produce a stronger impression4 ,for the first note does not sound through the second on to the third3 therefore this is an sthetic pleonasm1 a double courage which is of no use4 ,least of all1 therefore1 do such accumulations of rhymes merit the heavy sacrifices which they cost in the octave rhyme1 the terza rima1 and the sonnet1 and which are the cause of the mental torture under which we sometimes read such productions1 for poetical pleasure is impossible under the condition of racking our brains4 ,that the great poetical mind sometimes overcomes even these forms1 and moves in them with ease and grace1 does not extend to a recommendation of the forms themselves1 for in themselves they are as ineffectual as they are difficult4 ,and even in good poets1 when they make use of these forms1 we frequently see the conflict between the rhyme and the thought1 in which now one and now the other gains the victory2 thus either the thought is stunted for the sake of the rhyme1 or the rhyme has to be satisfied with a weak peu prs4 ,since this is so1 ,i do not regard it as an evidence of ignorance1 but as a proof of good taste1 that ,shakspeare in his sonnets has given different rhymes to each quatraine4 ,at any rate1 their acoustic effect is not in the least diminished by it1 and the thought obtains its rights far more than it could have done if it had had to be laced up in the customary ,spanish boots4 ,it is a disadvantage for the poetry of a language if it has many words which cannot be used in prose1 and1 on the other hand1 dare not use certain words of prose4 ,the former is mostly the case in ,latin and ,italian poetry1 and the latter in ,french1 where it has recently been very aptly called1 8,la bgeulerie de la langue franaise20 both are to be found less in ,english1 and least in ,german4 ,for such words belonging exclusively to poetry remain foreign to our heart1 do not speak to us directly1 and therefore leave us cold4 ,they are a conventional language of poetry1 and as it were mere painted sensations instead of real ones3 they exclude genuine feeling4 ,the distinction1 so often discussed in our own day1 between classic and romantic poetry seems to me ultimately to depend upon the fact that the former knows no other motives than those which are purely human1 actual1 and natural2 the latter1 on the other hand1 also treats artificial conventional1 and imaginary motives as efficient4 ,to such belong the motives which spring from the ,christian mythus1 also from the chivalrous overstrained fantastical law of honour1 further from the absurd and ludicrous ,germano,christian veneration of women1 and lastly from doting and mooning hyperphysical amorousness4 ,but even in the best poets of the romantic class1 e4g41 in ,calderon1 we can see to what ridiculous distortions of human relations and human nature these motives lead4 ,not to speak of the ,autos1 ,i merely refer to such pieces as 8,no siempre el peor es cierto0 7,the worst is not always certain71 and 8,el postrero duelo en ,espaa0 7,the last duel in ,spain71 and similar comedies en capa y espada3 with the elements mentioned there is here further associated the scholastic subtility so often appearing in the conversation which at that time belonged to the mental culture of the higher classes4 ,how decidedly advantageous1 on the contrary1 is the position of the poetry of the ancients1 which always remains true to nature2 and the result is that classical poetry has an unconditional1 romantic poetry only a conditional1 truth and correctness2 analogous to ,greek and ,gothic architecture4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 we must remark here that all dramatic or narrative poems which transfer their scene to ancient ,greece or ,rome lose by this from the fact that our knowledge of antiquity1 especially in what concerns the details of life1 is insufficient1 fragmentary1 and not drawn from perception4 ,this obliges the poet to avoid much and to content himself with generalities1 whereby he becomes abstract1 and his work loses that concreteness and individualisation which is throughout essential to poetry4 ,it is this which gives all such works the peculiar appearance of emptiness and tediousness4 ,only ,shakspeare's works of this kind are free from it2 because without hesitation he has presented1 under the names of ,greeks and ,romans1 ,englishmen of his own time4 ,it has been objected to many masterpieces of lyrical poetry1 especially some ,odes of ,horace 7see1 for example1 the second of the third book7 and several of ,goethe's songs 7for example1 8,the ,shepherd's ,lament071 that they lack proper connection and are full of gaps in the thought4 ,but here the logical connection is intentionally neglected1 in order that the unity of the fundamental sensation and mood may take its place1 which comes out more clearly just by the fact that it passes like a thread through the separate pearls1 and brings about the quick changes of the objects of contemplation1 in the same way as in music the transition from one key to another is brought about by the chord of the seventh1 through which the still sounding fundamental note becomes the dominant of the new key4 ,most distinctly1 even exaggeratedly1 the quality here described is found in the ,canzone of ,petrarch which begins1 8,mai non vo' pi cantar1 com' io soleva40 ,accordingly1 as in the lyrical poem the subjective element predominates1 so in the drama1 on the contrary1 the objective element is alone and exclusively present4 ,between the two epic poetry in all its forms and modifications1 from the narrative romance to the epos proper1 has a broad middle path4 ,for although in the main it is objective1 yet it contains a subjective element1 appearing now more and now less1 which finds its expression in the tone1 in the form of the delivery1 and also in scattered reflections4 ,we do not so entirely lose sight of the poet as in the drama4 ,the end of the drama in general is to show us in an example what is the nature and existence of man4 ,the sad or the bright side of these can be turned to us in it1 or their transitions into each other4 ,but the expression1 8nature and existence of man10 already contains the germ of the controversy whether the nature1 i4e41 the character1 or the existence1 i4e41 the fate1 the adventures1 the action1 is the principal thing4 ,moreover1 the two have grown so firmly together that although they can certainly be separated in conception1 they cannot be separated in the representation of them4 ,for only the circumstances1 the fate1 the events1 make the character manifest its nature1 and only from the character does the action arise from which the events proceed4 ,certainly1 in the representation1 the one or the other may be made more prominent2 and in this respect the piece which centres in the characters and the piece which centres in the plot are the two extremes4 ,the common end of the drama and the epic1 to exhibit1 in significant characters placed in significant situations1 the extraordinary actions brought about by both1 will be most completely attained by the poet if he first introduces the characters to us in a state of peace1 in which merely their general colour becomes visible1 and allows a motive to enter which produces an action1 out of which a new and stronger motive arises1 which again calls forth a more significant action1 which1 in its turn1 begets new and even stronger motives1 whereby1 then1 in the time suitable to the form of the poem1 the most passionate excitement takes the place of the original peace1 and in this now the important actions occur in which the qualities of the characters which have hitherto slumbered are brought clearly to light1 together with the course of the world4 ,great poets transform themselves into each of the persons to be represented1 and speak out of each of them like ventriloquists2 now out of the hero1 and immediately afterwards out of the young and innocent maiden1 with equal truth and naturalness3 so ,shakspeare and ,goethe4 ,poets of the second rank transform the principal person to be represented into themselves4 ,this is what ,byron does2 and then the other persons often remain lifeless1 as is the case even with the principal persons in the works of mediocre poets4 ,our pleasure in tragedy belongs1 not to the sense of the beautiful1 but to that of the sublime2 nay1 it is the highest grade of this feeling4 ,for1 as at the sight of the sublime in nature we turn away from the interests of the will1 in order to be purely perceptive1 so in the tragic catastrophe we turn away even from the will to live4 ,in tragedy the terrible side of life is presented to us1 the wail of humanity1 the reign of chance and error1 the fall of the just1 the triumph of the wicked2 thus the aspect of the world which directly strives against our will is brought before our eyes4 ,at this sight we feel ourselves challenged to turn away our will from life1 no longer to will it or love it4 ,but just in this way we become conscious that then there still remains something over to us1 which we absolutely cannot know positively1 but only negatively1 as that which does not will life4 ,as the chord of the seventh demands the fundamental chord2 as the colour red demands green1 and even produces it in the eye2 so every tragedy demands an entirely different kind of existence1 another world1 the knowledge of which can only be given us indirectly just as here by such a demand4 ,in the moment of the tragic catastrophe the conviction becomes more distinct to us than ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake4 ,so far the effect of the tragedy is analogous to that of the dynamical sublime1 for like this it lifts us above the will and its interests1 and puts us in such a mood that we find pleasure in the sight of what tends directly against it4 ,what gives to all tragedy1 in whatever form it may appear1 the peculiar tendency towards the sublime is the awakening of the knowledge that the world1 life1 can afford us no true pleasure1 and consequently is not worthy of our attachment4 ,in this consists the tragic spirit3 it therefore leads to resignation4 ,i admit that in ancient tragedy this spirit of resignation seldom appears and is expressed directly4 dipus ,colonus certainly dies resigned and willing2 yet he is comforted by the revenge on his country4 ,iphigenia at ,aulis is very willing to die2 yet it is the thought of the welfare of ,greece that comforts her1 and occasions the change of her mind1 on account of which she willingly accepts the death which at first she sought to avoid by any means4 ,cassandra1 in the ,agamemnon of the great schylus1 dies willingly1 7#acjf72 but she also is comforted by the thought of revenge4 ,hercules1 in the ,trachini1 submits to necessity1 and dies composed1 but not resigned4 ,so also the ,hippolytus of ,euripides1 in whose case it surprises us that ,artemis1 who appears to comfort him1 promises him temples and fame1 but never points him to an existence beyond life1 and leaves him in death1 as all gods forsake the dying3--in ,christianity they come to him2 and so also in ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 although in the latter the gods are really exotic4 ,thus ,hippolytus1 like almost all the tragic heroes of the ancients1 shows submission to inevitable fate and the inflexible will of the gods1 but no surrender of the will to live itself4 ,as the ,stoic equanimity is fundamentally distinguished from ,christian resignation by the fact that it teaches only patient endurance and composed expectation of unalterably necessary evil1 while ,christianity teaches renunciation1 surrender of the will2 so also the tragic heroes of the ancients show resolute subjection under the unavoidable blows of fate1 while ,christian tragedy1 on the contrary1 shows the surrender of the whole will to live1 joyful forsaking of the world in the consciousness of its worthlessness and vanity4 ,but ,i am also entirely of opinion that modern tragedy stands higher than that of the ancients4 ,shakspeare is much greater than ,sophocles2 in comparison with ,goethe's ,iphigenia one might find that of ,euripides almost crude and vulgar4 ,the ,bacch of ,euripides is a revolting composition in favour of the heathen priests4 ,many ancient pieces have no tragic tendency at all1 like the ,alcestis and ,iphigenia in ,tauris of ,euripides2 some have disagreeable1 or even disgusting motives1 like the ,antigone and ,philocteles4 ,almost all show the human race under the fearful rule of chance and error1 but not the resignation which is occasioned by it1 and delivers from it4 ,all because the ancients had not yet attained to the summit and goal of tragedy1 or indeed of the view of life itself4 ,although1 then1 the ancients displayed little of the spirit of resignation1 the turning away of the will from life1 in their tragic heroes themselves1 as their frame of mind1 yet the peculiar tendency and effect of tragedy remains the awakening of that spirit in the beholder1 the calling up of that frame of mind1 even though only temporarily4 ,the horrors upon the stage hold up to him the bitterness and worthlessness of life1 thus the vanity of all its struggle4 ,the effect of this impression must be that he becomes conscious1 if only in obscure feeling1 that it is better to tear his heart free from life1 to turn his will from it1 to love not the world nor life2 whereby then in his deepest soul1 the consciousness is aroused that for another kind of willing there must also be another existence4 ,for if this were not so1 then the tendency of tragedy would not be this rising above all the ends and good things of life1 this turning away from it and its seductions1 and the turning towards another kind of existence1 which already lies in this1 although an existence which is for us quite inconceivable4 ,how would it1 then1 in general1 be possible that the exhibition of the most terrible side of life1 brought before our eyes in the most glaring light1 could act upon us beneficently1 and afford us a lofty satisfaction8 ,fear and sympathy1 in the excitement of which ,aristotle places the ultimate end of tragedy1 certainly do not in themselves belong to the agreeable sensations3 therefore they cannot be the end1 but only the means4 ,thus the summons to turn away the will from life remains the true tendency of tragedy1 the ultimate end of the intentional exhibition of the suffering of humanity1 and is so accordingly even where this resigned exaltation of the mind is not shown in the hero himself1 but is merely excited in the spectator by the sight of great1 unmerited1 nay1 even merited suffering4 ,many of the moderns also are1 like the ancients1 satisfied with throwing the spectator into the mood which has been described1 by the objective representation of human misfortune as a whole2 while others exhibit this through the change of the frame of mind of the hero himself1 effected by suffering4 ,the former give1 as it were1 only the premisses1 and leave the conclusion to the spectator2 while the latter give the conclusion1 or the moral of the fable1 also1 as the change of the frame of mind of the hero1 and even also as reflection1 in the mouth of the chorus1 as1 for example1 ,schiller in 8,the ,bride of ,messina30 8,life is not the highest good40 ,let me remark here that the genuine tragic effect of the catastrophe1 thus the resignation and exaltation of the mind of the hero which is brought about by it1 seldom appears so purely motived and so distinctly expressed as in the opera of 8,norma10 where it comes in in the duet1 8,qual cor tradisti1 qual cor perdesti10 in which the change of the will is distinctly indicated by the quietness which is suddenly introduced into the music4 ,in general1 this piece--regarded apart altogether from its excellent music1 and also from the diction which can only be that of a libretto1 and considered only according to its motives and its inner economy--is a highly perfect tragedy1 a true pattern of tragic disposition of the motives1 tragic progress of the action1 and tragic development1 together with the effect of these upon the frame of mind of the hero1 raising it above the world1 and which is then also communicated to the spectator2 indeed the effect attained here is the less delusive and the more indicative of the true nature of tragedy that no ,christians1 nor even ,christian ideas1 appear in it4 ,the neglect of the unity of time and place with which the moderns are so often reproached is only a fault when it goes so far that it destroys the unity of the action2 for then there only remains the unity of the principal character1 as1 for example1 in ,shakspeare's 8,henry ,,viii40 ,but even the unity of the action does not need to go so far that the same thing is spoken of throughout1 as in the ,french tragedies which in general observe this so strictly that the course of the drama is like a geometrical line without breadth4 ,there it is constantly a case of 8,only get on6 ,pensez votre affaire60 and the thing is expedited and hurried on in a thoroughly business fashion1 and no one detains himself with irrelevances which do not belong to it1 or looks to the right or the left4 ,the ,shakspearian tragedy1 on the other hand1 is like a line which has also breadth3 it takes time1 exspatiatur3 speeches and even whole scenes occur which do not advance the action1 indeed do not properly concern it1 by which1 however1 we get to know the characters or their circumstances more fully1 and then understand the action also more thoroughly4 ,this certainly remains the principal thing1 yet not so exclusively that we forget that in the last instance what is aimed at is the representation of human nature and existence generally4 ,the dramatic or epic poet ought to know that he is fate1 and should therefore be inexorable1 as it is2 also that he is the mirror of the human race1 and should therefore represent very many bad and sometimes profligate characters1 and also many fools1 buffoons1 and eccentric persons2 then also1 now and again1 a reasonable1 a prudent1 an honest1 or a good man1 and only as the rarest exception a truly magnanimous man4 ,in the whole of ,homer there is in my opinion no really magnanimous character presented1 although many good and honest4 ,in the whole of ,shakspeare there may be perhaps a couple of noble1 though by no means transcendently noble1 characters to be found2 perhaps ,cordelia1 ,coriolanus--hardly more2 on the other hand1 his works swarm with the species indicated above4 ,but ,iffland's and ,kotzebue's pieces have many magnanimous characters2 while ,goldoni has done as ,i recommended above1 whereby he shows that he stands higher4 ,on the other hand1 ,schiller's 8,minna von ,barnhelm0 labours under too much and too universal magnanimity2 but so much magnanimity as the one ,marquis ,posa displays is not to be found in the whole of ,goethe's works together4 ,there is1 however1 a small ,german piece called 8,duty for ,duty's ,sake0 7a title which sounds as if it had been taken from the ,critique of ,practical ,reason71 which has only three characters1 and yet all the three are of most transcendent magnanimity4 ,the ,greeks have taken for their heroes only royal persons2 and so also for the most part have the moderns4 ,certainly not because the rank gives more worth to him who is acting or suffering2 and since the whole thing is just to set human passions in play1 the relative value of the objects by which this happens is indifferent1 and peasant huts achieve as much as kingdoms4 ,moreover1 civic tragedy is by no means to be unconditionally rejected4 ,persons of great power and consideration are yet the best adapted for tragedy on this account1 that the misfortune in which we ought to recognise the fate of humanity must have a sufficient magnitude to appear terrible to the spectator1 whoever he may be4 ,euripides himself says1 81 1 1 0 7,stob4 ,flor41 vol4 ii4 p4 #bii74 ,now the circumstances which plunge a citizen family into want and despair are in the eyes of the great or rich1 for the most part1 very insignificant1 and capable of being removed by human assistance1 nay1 sometimes even by a trifle3 such spectators1 therefore1 cannot be tragically affected by them4 ,on the other hand1 the misfortunes of the great and powerful are unconditionally terrible1 and also accessible to no help from without2 for kings must help themselves by their own power1 or fall4 ,to this we have to add that the fall is greatest from a height4 ,accordingly persons of the rank of citizens lack height to fall from4 ,if now we have found the tendency and ultimate intention of tragedy to be a turning to resignation1 to the denial of the will to live1 we shall easily recognise in its opposite1 comedy1 the incitement to the continued assertion of the will4 ,it is true the comedy1 like every representation of human life1 without exception1 must bring before our eyes suffering and adversity2 but it presents it to us as passing1 resolving itself into joy1 in general mingled with success1 victory1 and hopes1 which in the end preponderate2 moreover1 it brings out the inexhaustible material for laughter of which life1 and even its adversities themselves are filled1 and which under all circumstances ought to keep us in a good humour4 ,thus it declares1 in the result1 that life as a whole is thoroughly good1 and especially is always amusing4 ,certainly it must hasten to drop the curtain at the moment of joy1 so that we may not see what comes after2 while the tragedy1 as a rule1 so ends that nothing can come after4 ,and moreover1 if once we contemplate this burlesque side of life somewhat seriously1 as it shows itself in the nave utterances and gestures which trifling embarrassment1 personal fear1 momentary anger1 secret envy1 and many similar emotions force upon the forms of the real life that mirrors itself here1 forms which deviate considerably from the type of beauty1 then from this side also1 thus in an unexpected manner1 the reflective spectator may become convinced that the existence and action of such beings cannot itself be an end2 that1 on the contrary1 they can only have attained to existence by an error1 and that what so exhibits itself is something which had better not be4 ,chapter ,,xxxviii47#bc7 ,on ,history4 ,in the passage of the first volume referred to below ,i have fully shown that more is achieved for our knowledge of mankind by poetry than by history1 and why this is so2 inasmuch as more real instruction was to be expected from the former than from the latter4 ,aristotle has also confessed this1 for he says3 8 0 7et res magis philosophica1 et melior posis est quam historia7#bd771 ,de pot41 c4 #i4 ,yet1 in order to cause no misunderstanding as to the value of history1 ,i wish here to express my thoughts about it4 ,in every class and species of things the facts are innumerable1 the individuals infinite in number1 the variety of their differences unapproachable4 ,at the first glance at them the curious mind becomes giddy2 however much it investigates1 it sees itself condemned to ignorance4 ,but then comes science3 it separates the innumerable multitude1 arranges it under generic conceptions1 these again under conceptions of species1 whereby it opens the path to a knowledge of the general and the particular1 which also comprehends the innumerable individuals1 for it holds good of all without one being obliged to consider each particular for itself4 ,thus it promises satisfaction to the investigating mind4 ,then all sciences place themselves together1 and above the real world of individual things1 as that which they have divided among them4 ,over them all1 however1 moves philosophy1 as the most general1 and therefore important1 rational knowledge1 which promises the conclusions for which the others have only prepared the way4 ,history alone cannot properly enter into that series1 since it cannot boast of the same advantage as the others1 for it lacks the fundamental characteristic of science1 the subordination of what is known1 instead of which it can only present its coordination4 ,therefore there is no system of history1 as there is of every other science4 ,it is therefore certainly rational knowledge1 but it is not a science4 ,for it never knows the particular by means of the general1 but must comprehend the particular directly1 and so1 as it were1 creeps along the ground of experience2 while the true sciences move above it1 because they have obtained comprehensive conceptions by means of which they command the particular1 and1 at least within certain limits1 anticipate the possibility of things within their sphere1 so that they can be at ease even about what may yet have to come4 ,the sciences1 since they are systems of conceptions1 speak always of species2 history speaks of individuals4 ,it would accordingly be a science of individuals1 which is a contradiction4 ,it also follows that the sciences all speak of that which always is as history1 on the other hand1 of that which is once1 and then no more4 ,since1 further1 history has to do with the absolutely particular and individuals1 which from its nature is inexhaustible1 it knows everything only imperfectly and half4 ,besides1 it must also let itself be taught by every new day in its trivial commonplaceness what as yet it did not know at all4 ,if it should be objected that in history also there is subordination of the particular under the general1 because the periods1 the governments1 and other general changes1 or political revolutions1 in short1 all that is given in historical tables1 is the general1 to which the special subordinates itself1 this would rest upon a false comprehension of the conception of the general4 ,for the general in history here referred to is merely subjective1 i4e41 its generality springs merely from the inadequacy of the individual knowledge of the things1 but not objective1 i4e41 a conception in which the things would actually already be thought together4 ,even the most general in history is in itself only a particular and individual1 a long period of time1 or an important event2 therefore the special is related to this as the part to the whole1 but not as the case to the rule2 which1 on the contrary1 takes place in all the sciences proper because they afford conceptions and not mere facts4 ,on this account in these sciences by a correct knowledge of the general we can determine with certainty the particular that arises4 ,if1 for example1 ,i know the laws of the triangle in general1 ,i can then also tell what must be the properties of the triangle laid before me2 and what holds good of all mammals1 for example1 that they have double ventricles of the heart1 exactly seven cervical vertebr1 lungs1 diaphragm1 bladder1 five senses1 c41 ,i can also assert of the strange bat which has just been caught1 before dissecting it4 ,but not so in history1 where the general is no objective general of the conception1 but merely a subjective general of my knowledge1 which can only be called general inasmuch as it is superficial4 ,therefore ,i may always know in general of the ,thirty ,years' ,war that it was a religious war1 waged in the seventeenth century2 but this general knowledge does not make me capable of telling anything more definite about its course4 ,the same opposition is also confirmed by the fact that in the real sciences the special and individual is that which is most certain1 because it rests upon immediate apprehension2 the general truths1 again1 are only abstracted from it2 therefore something false may be more easily assumed in the latter4 ,but in history1 conversely1 the most general is the most certain2 for example1 the periods1 the succession of the kings1 the revolutions1 wars1 and treaties of peace2 the particulars1 again1 of the events and their connection is uncertain1 and becomes always more so the further one goes into details4 ,therefore history is the more interesting the more special it is1 but the less to be trusted1 and approaches then in every respect to the romance4 ,for the rest1 what importance is to be attached to the boasted pragmatic teaching of history he will best be able to judge who remembers that sometimes it was only after twenty years that he understood the events of his own life in their true connection1 although the data for this were fully before him1 so difficult is the combination of the action of the motives under the constant interferences of chance and the concealment of the intentions4 ,since now history really always has for its object only the particular1 the individual fact1 and regards this as the exclusively real1 it is the direct opposite and counterpart of philosophy1 which considers things from the most general point of view1 and has intentionally the general as its object1 which remains identical in every particular2 therefore in the particular philosophy sees only the general1 and recognises the change in its manifestation as unessential3 7generalium amator philosophus74 ,while history teaches us that at every time something else has been1 philosophy tries to assist us to the insight that at all times exactly the same was1 is1 and shall be4 ,in truth1 the essence of human life1 as of nature in general1 is given complete in every present time1 and therefore only requires depth of comprehension in order to be exhaustively known4 ,but history hopes to make up for depth by length and breadth2 for it every present time is only a fragment which must be supplemented by the past1 the length of which is1 however1 infinite1 and to which again an infinite future is joined4 ,upon this rests the opposition between philosophical and historical minds2 the former want to go to the bottom1 the latter want to go through the whole series4 ,history shows on every side only the same under different forms2 but whoever does not come to know this in one or a few will hardly attain to a knowledge of it by going through all the forms4 ,the chapters of the history of nations are at bottom only distinguished by the names and dates2 the really essential content is everywhere the same4 ,now since the material of art is the ,idea1 and the material of science the concept1 we see both occupied with that which always exists and constantly in the same manner1 not something which now is and now is not1 now is thus and now otherwise2 therefore both have to do with that which ,plato set up as the exclusive object of real rational knowledge4 ,the material of history1 on the other hand1 is the particular in its particularity and contingency1 which at one time is1 and then for ever is no more1 the transient complexities of a human world moved like clouds in the wind1 a world which is often entirely transformed by the most trifling accident4 ,from this point of view the material of history appears to us as scarcely a worthy object of the serious and painful consideration of the human mind1 the human mind which1 just because it is so transitory1 ought to choose for its consideration that which passes not away4 ,finally1 as regards the endeavour--specially introduced by the ,hegelian pseudophilosophy1 everywhere so pernicious and stupefying to the mind--to comprehend the history of the world as a planned whole1 or1 as they call it1 8to construe it organically10 a crude and positive realism lies at its foundation1 which takes the phenomenon for the inner being of the world1 and imagines that this phenomenon1 its forms and events1 are the chief concern2 in which it is secretly supported by certain mythological notions which it tacitly assumes3 otherwise one might ask for what spectators such a comedy was really produced4 ,for1 since only the individual1 and not the human race1 has actual1 immediate unity of consciousness1 the unity of the course of life of the race is a mere fiction4 ,besides1 as in nature only the species are real1 and the genera are mere abstractions1 so in the human race only the individuals and their course of life are real1 the peoples and their lives mere abstractions4 ,finally1 constructive histories1 guided by a positive optimism1 always ultimately end in a comfortable1 rich1 fat ,state1 with a wellregulated constitution1 good justice and police1 useful arts and industries1 and1 at the most1 in intellectual perfection2 for this1 in fact1 is alone possible1 since what is moral remains essentially unaltered4 ,but it is the moral element which1 according to the testimony of our inmost consciousness1 is the whole concern3 and this lies only in the individual as the tendency of his will4 ,in truth1 only the life of each individual has unity1 connection1 and true significance3 it is to be regarded as an instruction1 and the meaning of it is moral4 ,only the incidents of our inner life1 since they concern the will1 have true reality1 and are actual events2 because the will alone is the thing in itself4 ,in every microcosm lies the whole macrocosm1 and the latter contains nothing more than the former4 ,multiplicity is phenomenal1 and external events are mere configurations of the phenomenal world1 and have therefore directly neither reality nor significance1 but only indirectly through their relation to the wills of the individuals4 ,the endeavour to explain and interpret them directly is accordingly like the endeavour to see in the forms of the clouds groups of men and animals4 ,what history narrates is in fact only the long1 heavy1 and confused dream of humanity4 ,the ,hegelians1 who regard the philosophy of history as indeed the chief end of all philosophy1 are to be referred to ,plato1 who unweariedly repeats that the object of philosophy is that which is unchangeable and always remains1 not that which now is thus and now otherwise4 ,all those who set up such constructions of the course of the world1 or1 as they call it1 of history1 have failed to grasp the principal truth of all philosophy1 that what is is at all times the same1 all becoming and arising are only seeming2 the ,ideas alone are permanent2 time ideal4 ,this is what ,plato holds1 this is what ,kant holds4 ,one ought therefore to seek to understand what exists1 what really is1 today and always1 i4e41 to know the ,ideas 7in ,plato's sense74 ,fools1 on the contrary1 imagine that something must first become and happen4 ,therefore they concede to history the chief place in their philosophy1 and construct it according to a preconceived plan of the world1 according to which everything is ordered for the best1 which is then supposed finaliter to appear1 and will be a glorious thing4 ,accordingly they take the world as perfectly real1 and place the end of it in the poor earthly happiness1 which1 however much it may be fostered by men and favoured by fate1 is a hollow1 deceptive1 decaying1 and sad thing1 out of which neither constitutions and legal systems nor steamengines and telegraphs can ever make anything that is essentially better4 ,the said philosophers and glorifiers of history are accordingly simple realists1 and also optimists and eudmonists1 consequently dull fellows and incarnate philistines2 and besides are really bad ,christians1 for the true spirit and kernel of ,christianity1 as also of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 is the knowledge of the vanity of earthly happiness1 the complete contempt for it1 and the turning away from it to an existence of another1 nay1 an opposite1 kind4 ,this1 ,i say1 is the spirit and end of ,christianity1 the true 8humour of the matter20 and not1 as they imagine1 monotheism2 therefore even atheistic ,buddhism is far more closely related to ,christianity than optimistic ,judaism or its variety ,islamism4 ,a true philosophy of history ought not therefore to consider1 as all these do1 what 7to use ,plato's language7 always becomes and never is1 and hold this to be the true nature of things2 but it ought to fix its attention upon that which always is and never becomes nor passes away4 ,thus it does not consist in raising the temporal ends of men to eternal and absolute ends1 and then with art and imagination constructing their progress through all complications2 but in the insight that not only in its development1 but in its very nature1 history is mendacious2 for1 speaking of mere individuals and particular events1 it pretends always to relate something different1 while from beginning to end it repeats always the same thing under different names and in a different dress4 ,the true philosophy of history consists in the insight that in all these endless changes and their confusion we have always before us only the same1 even1 unchanging nature1 which today acts in the same way as yesterday and always2 thus it ought to recognise the identical in all events1 of ancient as of modern times1 of the east as of the west2 and1 in spite of all difference of the special circumstances1 of the costume and the customs1 to see everywhere the same humanity4 ,this identical element which is permanent through all change consists in the fundamental qualities of the human heart and head--many bad1 few good4 ,the motto of history in general should run3 ,eadem1 sed aliter4 ,if one has read ,herodotus1 then in a philosophical regard one has already studied history enough4 ,for everything is already there that makes up the subsequent history of the world3 the efforts1 action1 sufferings1 and fate of the human race as it proceeds from the qualities we have referred to1 and the physical earthly lot4 ,if in what has been said we have recognised that history1 regarded as a means for the knowledge of the nature of man1 is inferior to poetry2 then1 that it is not in the proper sense a science2 finally1 that the endeavour to construct it as a whole with beginning1 middle1 and end1 together with a significant connection1 is vain1 and based upon misunderstanding3 it would look as if we wished to deny it all value if we did not show in what its value consists4 ,really1 however1 there remains for it1 after this conquest by art and rejection by science1 a quite special province1 different from both1 in which it exists most honourably4 ,what reason is to the individual that is history to the human race4 ,by virtue of reason1 man is not1 like the brute1 limited to the narrow1 perceptible present1 but also knows the incomparably more extended past1 with which it is linked1 and out of which it has proceeded2 and only thus has he a proper understanding of the present itself1 and can even draw inferences as to the future4 ,the brute1 on the other hand1 whose knowledge1 devoid of reflection1 is on this account limited to the present1 even when it is tamed1 moves about among men ignorant1 dull1 stupid1 helpless1 and dependent4 ,analogous to this is the nation that does not know its own history1 is limited to the present of the now living generation1 and therefore does not understand itself and its own present1 because it cannot connect it with a past1 and explain it from this2 still less can it anticipate the future4 ,only through history does a nation become completely conscious of itself4 ,accordingly history is to be regarded as the rational consciousness of the human race1 and is to the race what the reflected and connected consciousness is to the individual who is conditioned by reason1 a consciousness through the want of which the brute is confined to the narrow1 perceptible present4 ,therefore every gap in history is like a gap in the recollective selfconsciousness of a man2 and in the presence of a monument of ancient times which has outlived the knowledge of itself1 as1 for example1 the ,pyramids1 or temples and palaces in ,yucatan1 we stand as senseless and stupid as the brute in the presence of the action of man1 in which it is implicated in his service2 or as a man before something written in an old cipher of his own1 the key to which he has forgotten2 nay1 like a somnambulist who finds before him in the morning what he has done in his sleep4 ,in this sense1 then1 history is to be regarded as the reason1 or the reflected consciousness1 of the human race1 and takes the place of an immediate selfconsciousness common to the whole race1 so that only by virtue of it does the human race come to be a whole1 come to be a humanity4 ,this is the true value of history1 and accordingly the universal and predominating interest in it depends principally upon the fact that it is a personal concern of the human race4 ,now1 what language is for the reason of individuals1 as an indispensable condition of its use1 writing is for the reason of the whole race here pointed out2 for only with this does its real existence begin1 as that of the individual reason begins first with language4 ,writing serves to restore unity to the consciousness of the human race1 which is constantly interrupted by death1 and therefore fragmentary2 so that the thought which has arisen in the ancestor is thought out by his remote descendant2 it finds a remedy for the breaking up of the human race and its consciousness into an innumerable number of ephemeral individuals1 and so bids defiance to the ever hurrying time1 in whose hand goes forgetfulness4 ,as an attempt to accomplish this we must regard not only written1 but also stone monuments1 which in part are older than the former4 ,for who will believe that those who1 at incalculable cost1 set in action the human powers of many thousands for many years in order to construct the pyramids1 monoliths1 rock tombs1 obelisks1 temples1 and palaces which have already existed for thousands of years1 could have had in view the short span of their own life1 too short to let them see the finishing of the construction1 or even the ostensible end which the ignorance of the many required them to allege8 ,clearly their real end was to speak to their latest descendants1 to put themselves in connection with these1 and so to establish the unity of the consciousness of humanity4 ,the buildings of the ,hindus1 the ,egyptians1 even the ,greeks and ,romans1 were calculated to last several thousand years1 because through higher culture their horizon was a wider one2 while the buildings of the ,middle ,ages and of modern times have only been intended1 at the most1 to last a few centuries2 which1 however1 is also due to the fact that men trusted more to writing after its use had become general1 and still more since from its womb was born the art of printing4 ,yet even in the buildings of more recent times we see the desire to speak to posterity2 and1 therefore1 it is shameful if they are destroyed or disfigured in order to serve low utilitarian ends4 ,written monuments have less to fear from the elements1 but more to fear from barbarians1 than stone ones2 they accomplish far more4 ,the ,egyptians wished to combine the two1 for they covered their stone monuments with hieroglyphics1 nay1 they added paintings in case the hieroglyphics should no longer be understood4 ,chapter ,,xxxix47#be7 ,on ,the ,metaphysics ,of ,music4 ,the outcome1 or result1 of my exposition of the peculiar significance of this wonderful art1 which is given in the passage of the first volume referred to below1 and which will here be present to the mind of the reader1 was1 that there is indeed no resemblance between its productions and the world as idea1 i4e41 the world of nature1 but yet there must be a distinct parallelism1 which was then also proved4 ,i have yet to add some fuller particulars with regard to this parallelism1 which are worthy of attention4 ,the four voices1 or parts1 of all harmony1 the bass1 the tenor1 the alto1 and the soprana1 or the fundamental note1 the third1 the fifth1 and the octave1 correspond to the four grades in the series of existences1 the mineral kingdom1 the vegetable kingdom1 the brute kingdom1 and man4 ,this receives an additional and striking confirmation in the fundamental rule of music1 that the bass must be at a much greater distance below the three upper parts than they have between themselves2 so that it must never approach nearer to them than at the most within an octave of them1 and generally remains still further below them4 ,hence1 then1 the correct triad has its place in the third octave from the fundamental note4 ,accordingly the effect of extended harmony1 in which the bass is widely separated from the other parts1 is much more powerful and beautiful than that of close harmony1 in which it is moved up nearer to them1 and which is only introduced on account of the limited compass of the instruments4 ,this whole rule1 however1 is by no means arbitrary1 but has its root in the natural source of the tonal system2 for the nearest consonant intervals that sound along with the fundamental note by means of its vibrations are the octave and its fifth4 ,now1 in this rule we recognise the analogue of the fundamental characteristic of nature on account of which organised beings are much more nearly related to each other than to the inanimate1 unorganised mass of the mineral kingdom1 between which and them exists the most definite boundary and the widest gulf in the whole of nature4 ,the fact that the high voice which sings the melody is yet also an integral part of the harmony1 and therein accords even with the deepest fundamental bass1 may be regarded as the analogue of the fact that the same matter which in a human organism is the supporter of the ,idea of man must yet also exhibit and support the ,ideas of gravitation and chemical qualities1 that is1 of the lowest grades of the objectification of will4 ,that music acts directly upon the will1 i4e41 the feelings1 passions1 and emotions of the hearer1 so that it quickly raises them or changes them1 may be explained from the fact that1 unlike all the other arts1 it does not express the ,ideas1 or grades of the objectification of the will1 but directly the will itself4 ,as surely as music1 far from being a mere accessory of poetry1 is an independent art1 nay1 the most powerful of all the arts1 and therefore attains its ends entirely with means of its own1 so surely does it not stand in need of the words of the song or the action of an opera4 ,music as such knows the tones or notes alone1 but not the causes which produce these4 ,accordingly1 for it even the human voice is originally and essentially nothing else than a modified tone1 just like that of an instrument2 and1 like every other tone1 it has the special advantages and disadvantages which are a consequence of the instrument that produces it4 ,now1 in this case1 that this same instrument1 as the organ of speech1 also serves to communicate conceptions is an accidental circumstance1 which music can certainly also make use of1 in order to enter into a connection with poetry2 but it must never make this the principal matter1 and concern itself entirely with the expression of what for the most part1 nay 7as ,diderot gives us to understand in ,le ,neveu de ,rameau71 essentially are insipid verses4 ,the words are and remain for the music a foreign addition1 of subordinate value1 for the effect of the tones is incomparably more powerful1 more infallible1 and quicker than that of the words4 ,therefore1 if words become incorporated in music1 they must yet assume an entirely subordinate position1 and adapt themselves completely to it4 ,but the relation appears reversed in the case of the given poetry1 thus the song or the libretto of an opera to which music is adapted4 ,for the art of music at once shows in these its power and higher fitness1 disclosing the most profound ultimate and secret significance of the feeling expressed in the words or the action presented in the opera1 giving utterance to their peculiar and true nature1 and teaching us the inmost soul of the actions and events whose mere clothing and body is set before us on the stage4 ,with regard to this superiority of the music1 and also because it stands to the libretto and the action in the relation of the universal to the particular1 of the rule to the example1 it might perhaps appear more fitting that the libretto should be written for the music than that the music should be composed for the libretto4 ,however1 in the customary method1 the words and actions of the libretto lead the composer to the affections of the will which lie at their foundation1 and call up in him the feelings to be expressed2 they act1 therefore1 as a means of exciting his musical imagination4 ,moreover1 that the addition of poetry to music is so welcome to us1 and a song with intelligible words gives us such deep satisfaction1 depends upon the fact that in this way our most direct and most indirect ways of knowing are called into play at once and in connection4 ,the most direct is that for which music expresses the emotions of the will itself1 and the most indirect that of conceptions denoted by words4 ,when the language of the feelings is in question the reason does not willingly sit entirely idle4 ,music is certainly able with the means at its own disposal to express every movement of the will1 every feeling2 but by the addition of words we receive besides this the objects of these feelings1 the motives which occasion them4 ,the music of an opera1 as it is presented in the score1 has a completely independent1 separate1 and1 as it were1 abstract existence for itself1 to which the incidents and persons of the piece are foreign1 and which follows its own unchanging rules2 therefore it can produce its full effect without the libretto4 ,but this music1 since it was composed with reference to the drama1 is1 as it were1 the soul of the latter2 for1 in its connection with the incidents1 persons1 and words1 it becomes the expression of the inner significance of all those incidents1 and of their ultimate and secret necessity which depends upon this significance4 ,the pleasure of the spectator1 unless he is a mere gaper1 really depends upon an indistinct feeling of this4 ,yet in the opera music also shows its heterogeneous nature and higher reality by its entire indifference to the whole material of the incidents2 in consequence of which it everywhere expresses the storm of the passions and the pathos of the feelings in the same way1 and its tones accompany the piece with the same pomp1 whether ,agamemnon and ,achilles or the dissensions of a bourgeois family form its material4 ,for only the passions1 the movements of the will1 exist for it1 and1 like ,god1 it sees only the hearts4 ,it never assimilates itself to the natural2 and therefore1 even when it accompanies the most ludicrous and extravagant farces of the comic opera1 it still preserves its essential beauty1 purity1 and sublimity2 and its fusion with these incidents is unable to draw it down from its height1 to which all absurdity is really foreign4 ,thus the profound and serious significance of our existence hangs over the farce and the endless miseries of human life1 and never leaves it for a moment4 ,if we now cast a glance at purely instrumental music1 a symphony of ,beethoven presents to us the greatest confusion1 which yet has the most perfect order at its foundation1 the most vehement conflict1 which is transformed the next moment into the most beautiful concord4 ,it is rerum concordia discors1 a true and perfect picture of the nature of the world which rolls on in the boundless maze of innumerable forms1 and through constant destruction supports itself4 ,but in this symphony all human passions and emotions also find utterance2 joy1 sorrow1 love1 hatred1 terror1 hope1 c41 in innumerable degrees1 yet all1 as it were1 only in abstracto1 and without any particularisation2 it is their mere form without the substance1 like a spirit world without matter4 ,certainly we have a tendency to realise them while we listen1 to clothe them in imagination with flesh and bones1 and to see in them scenes of life and nature on every hand4 ,yet1 taken generally1 this is not required for their comprehension or enjoyment1 but rather imparts to them a foreign and arbitrary addition3 therefore it is better to apprehend them in their immediacy and purity4 ,since now1 in the foregoing remarks1 and also in the text1 ,i have considered music only from the metaphysical side1 that is1 with reference to the inner significance of its performances1 it is right that ,i should now also subject to a general consideration the means by which1 acting upon our mind1 it brings these about2 therefore that ,i should show the connection of that metaphysical side of music1 and the physical side1 which has been fully investigated1 and is well known1 ,i start from the theory which is generally known1 and has by no means been shaken by recent objections1 that all harmony of the notes depends upon the coincidence of their vibrations1 which when two notes sound together occurs perhaps at every second1 or at every third1 or at every fourth vibration1 according to which1 then1 they are the octave1 the fifth1 or the fourth of each other1 and so on4 ,so long as the vibrations of two notes have a rational relation to each other1 which can be expressed in small numbers1 they can be connected together in our apprehension through their constantly recurring coincidence3 the notes become blended1 and are thereby in consonance4 ,if1 on the other hand1 that relation is an irrational one1 or one which can only be expressed in larger numbers1 then no coincidence of the vibrations which can be apprehended occurs1 but obstrepunt sibi perpetuo1 whereby they resist being joined together in our apprehension1 and accordingly are called a dissonance4 ,now1 according to this theory1 music is a means of making rational and irrational relations of numbers comprehensible1 not like arithmetic by the help of the concept1 but by bringing them to a knowledge which is perfectly directly and simultaneously sensible4 ,now the connection of the metaphysical significance of music with this its physical and arithmetical basis depends upon the fact that what resists our apprehension1 the irrational relation1 or the dissonance1 becomes the natural type of what resists our will2 and1 conversely1 the consonance1 or the rational relation1 which easily adapts itself to our apprehension1 becomes the type of the satisfaction of the will4 ,and further1 since that rational and irrational element in the numerical relations of the vibrations admits of innumerable degrees1 shades of difference1 sequences1 and variations1 by means of it music becomes the material in which all the movements of the human heart1 i4e41 of the will1 movements whose essential nature is always satisfaction and dissatisfaction1 although in innumerable degrees1 can be faithfully portrayed and rendered in all their finest shades and modifications1 which takes place by means of the invention of the melody4 ,thus we see here the movements of the will transferred to the province of the mere idea1 which is the exclusive scene of the achievements of the fine arts1 for they absolutely demand that the will itself shall not interfere1 and that we shall conduct ourselves as pure knowing subjects4 ,therefore the affections of the will itself1 thus actual pain and actual pleasure1 must not be excited1 but only their substitutes1 that which is agreeable to the intellect1 as a picture of the satisfaction of the will1 and that which is more or less repugnant to it1 as a picture of greater or less pain4 ,only thus does music never cause us actual sorrow1 but even in its most melancholy strains is still pleasing1 and we gladly hear in its language the secret history of our will1 and all its emotions and strivings1 with their manifold protractions1 hindrances1 and griefs1 even in the saddest melodies4 ,when1 on the other hand1 in reality and its terrors1 it is our will itself that is roused and tormented1 we have not then to do with tones and their numerical relations1 but are rather now ourselves the trembling string that is stretched and twanged4 ,but1 further1 because1 in consequence of the physical theory which lies at its foundation1 the musical quality of the notes is in the proportion of the rapidity of their vibrations1 but not in their relative strength1 the musical ear always follows by preference1 in harmony1 the highest note1 not the loudest4 ,therefore1 even in the case of the most powerful orchestral accompaniment1 the soprano comes out clearly1 and thus receives a natural right to deliver the melody4 ,and this is also supported by its great flexibility1 which depends upon the same rapidity of the vibrations1 and shows itself in the ornate passages1 whereby the soprano becomes the suitable representative of the heightened sensibility1 susceptible to the slightest impression1 and determinable by it1 consequently of the most highly developed consciousness standing on the uppermost stage of the scale of being4 ,its opposite1 from converse causes1 is the bass1 inflexible1 rising and falling only in great intervals1 thirds1 fourths1 and fifths1 and also at every step guided by rigid rules4 ,it is therefore the natural representative of the inorganic kingdom of nature1 which is insensible1 insusceptible to fine impressions1 and only determinable according to general laws4 ,it must indeed never rise by one tone1 for example1 from a fourth to a fifth1 for this produces in the upper parts the incorrect consecutive fifths and octaves2 therefore1 originally and in its own nature1 it can never present the melody4 ,if1 however1 the melody is assigned to it1 this happens by means of counterpoint1 i4e41 it is an inverted bass--one of the upper parts is lowered and disguised as a bass2 properly speaking1 it then requires a second fundamental bass as its accompaniment4 ,this unnaturalness of a melody lying in the bass is the reason why bass airs1 with full accompaniment1 never afford us pure1 undisturbed pleasure1 like the soprano air1 which1 in the connection of harmony1 is alone natural4 ,we may remark in passing that such a melodious bass1 forcibly obtained by inversion1 might1 in keeping with our metaphysic of music1 be compared to a block of marble to which the human form has been imparted3 and therefore it is wonderfully suitable to the stone guest in 8,don ,juan40 ,but now we shall try to get somewhat nearer the foundation of the genesis of melody1 which can be accomplished by analysing it into its constituent parts1 and in any case will afford us the pleasure which arises from bringing to abstract and distinct consciousness what every one knows in the concrete1 so that it gains the appearance of novelty4 ,melody consists of two elements1 the one rhythmical1 the other harmonious4 ,the former may also be described as the quantitative1 the latter as the qualitative element1 since the first is concerned with the duration1 and the second with the pitch of the notes4 ,in the writing of music the former depends upon the perpendicular1 and the latter upon the horizontal lines4 ,purely arithmetical relations1 thus relations of time1 lie at the foundation of both2 in the one case the relative duration of the notes1 in the other the relative rapidity of their vibrations4 ,the rhythmical element is the essential2 for it can produce a kind of melody of itself alone1 and without the other1 as1 for example1 on the drum2 yet complete melody requires both elements4 ,it consists in an alternating disunion and reconciliation of them1 as ,i shall show immediately2 but first1 since ,i have already spoken of the harmonious element in what has been said1 ,i wish to consider the rhythmical element somewhat more closely4 ,rhythm is in time what symmetry is in space1 division into equal parts corresponding to each other4 ,first1 into larger parts1 which again fall into smaller parts1 subordinate to the former4 ,in the series of the arts given by me architecture and music are the two extreme ends4 ,moreover1 according to their inner nature1 their power1 the extent of their spheres1 and their significance1 they are the most heterogeneous1 indeed true antipodes4 ,this opposition extends even to the form of their appearance1 for architecture is in space alone1 without any connection with time2 and music is in time alone1 without any connection with space47#bf7 ,now hence springs their one point of analogy1 that as in architecture that which orders and holds together is symmetry1 in music it is rhythm1 and thus here also it holds true that extremes meet4 ,as the ultimate constituent parts of a building are the exactly similar stones1 so the ultimate constituent parts of a musical composition are the exactly similar beats2 yet by being weak or strong1 or in general by the measure1 which denotes the species of time1 these are divided into equal parts1 which may be compared to the dimensions of the stone4 ,the musical period consists of several bars1 and it has also two equal parts1 one rising1 aspiring1 generally going to the dominant1 and one sinking1 quieting1 returning to the fundamental note4 ,two or several periods constitute a part1 which in general is also symmetrically doubled by the sign of repetition2 two parts make a small piece of music1 or only a movement of a larger piece2 and thus a concerto or sonata usually consists of three movements1 a symphony of four1 and a mass of five4 ,thus we see the musical composition bound together and rounded off as a whole1 by symmetrical distribution and repeated division1 down to the beats and their fractions1 with thorough subordination1 superordination1 and coordination of its members1 just as a building is connected and rounded off by its symmetry4 ,only in the latter that is exclusively in space which in the former is exclusively in time4 ,the mere feeling of this analogy has in the last thirty years called forth the oftrepeated1 daring witticism1 that architecture is frozen music4 ,the origin of this can be traced to ,goethe2 for1 according to ,eckermann's 8,conversations10 vol4 ii4 p4 #hh1 he said3 8,i have found among my papers a page on which ,i call architecture a rigidified music2 and really there is something in it2 the mood which is produced by architecture approaches the effect of music40 ,probably he let fall this witticism much earlier in conversation1 and in that case it is well known that there were never wanting persons to pick up what he so let fall that they might afterwards go about decked with it4 ,for the rest1 whatever ,goethe may have said1 the analogy of music and architecture1 which is here referred by me to its sole ground1 the analogy of rhythm with symmetry1 extends accordingly only to the outward form1 and by no means to the inner nature of the two arts1 which is entirely different4 ,indeed it would be absurd to wish to put on the same level in essential respects the most limited and the weakest of all the arts1 and the most farreaching and powerful4 ,as an amplification of the analogy pointed out1 we might add further1 that when music1 as it were in a fit of desire for independence1 seizes the opportunity of a pause to free itself from the control of rhythm1 to launch out into the free imagination of an ornate cadenza1 such a piece of music divested of all rhythm is analogous to the ruin which is divested of symmetry1 and which accordingly may be called1 in the bold language of the witticism1 a frozen cadenza4 ,after this exposition of rhythm1 ,i have now to show how the nature of melody consists in the constantly renewed disunion and reconciliation of the rhythmical1 and the harmonious elements of it4 ,its harmonious element has as its assumption the fundamental note1 as the rhythmical element has the species of time1 and consists in a wandering from it through all the notes of the scale1 until by shorter or longer digressions it reaches a harmonious interval1 generally the dominant or subdominant1 which affords it an incomplete satisfaction2 and then follows1 by a similarly long path1 its return to the fundamental note1 with which complete satisfaction appears4 ,but both must so take place that the attainment of the interval referred to and the return to the fundamental note correspond with certain favourite points of the rhythm1 otherwise it will not work4 ,thus1 as the harmonious succession of sounds requires certain notes1 first of all the tonic1 next to it the dominant1 and so on1 so rhythm1 on its part1 requires certain points of time1 certain numbered bars1 and certain parts of these bars1 which are called strong or good beats1 or the accented parts of the bar1 in opposition to the weak or bad beats1 or unaccented parts of the bar4 ,now the disunion of these two fundamental elements consists in this1 that because the demand of one is satisfied that of the other is not2 and their reconciliation consists in this1 that both are satisfied at once and together4 ,that wandering of the notes until they find a more or less harmonious interval must so take place that this interval is attained only after a definite number of bars1 and also at an accented part of the bar1 and in this way becomes for it a kind of restingpoint2 and similarly the return to the keynote must take place after a like number of bars1 and also at an accented part of the bar1 and thus complete satisfaction is then attained4 ,so long as this required coincidence of the satisfaction of both elements is not attained1 the rhythm1 on the one hand1 may follow its regular course1 and1 on the other hand1 the required notes may occur often enough1 but yet they will remain entirely without that effect through which melody arises4 ,the following very simple example may serve to illustrate this3-- ,illustration3 ,music ,here the harmonious sequence of notes finds the keynote just at the end of the first bar2 but it does not receive any satisfaction from this1 because the rhythm is caught at the least accented part of the bar4 ,immediately afterwards1 in the second bar1 the rhythm has the accented part of the bar1 but the sequence of notes has arrived at the seventh4 ,thus here the two elements of melody are entirely disunited2 and we feel disquieted4 ,in the second half of the period everything is reversed1 and in the last note they are reconciled4 ,this kind of thing can be shown in every melody1 although generally in a much more extended form4 ,now the constant disunion and reconciliation of its two elements which there takes place is1 when metaphysically considered1 the copy of the origination of new wishes1 and then of their satisfaction4 ,thus1 by flattery1 music penetrates into our hearts1 for it presents the image of the complete satisfaction of its wishes4 ,more closely considered1 we see in this procedure of melody a condition which1 to a certain extent1 is inward 7the harmonious7 meet with an outward condition 7the rhythmical71 as if by an accident1--which is certainly brought about by the composer1 and which may1 so far1 be compared to rhyme in poetry4 ,but this is just the copy of the meeting of our wishes with the favourable outward circumstances which are independent of them1 and is thus the picture of happiness4 ,the effect of the suspension also deserves to be considered here4 ,it is a dissonance which delays the final consonance1 which is awaited with certainty2 and thus the longing for it is strengthened1 and its appearance satisfies all the more4 ,clearly an analogue of the heightened satisfaction of the will through delay4 ,the complete cadence requires the preceding chord of the seventh on the dominant2 because the most deeply felt satisfaction and the most entire relief can only follow the most earnest longing4 ,thus1 in general1 music consists of a constant succession of more or less disquieting chords1 i4e41 chords which excite longing1 and more or less quieting and satisfying chords2 just as the life of the heart 7the will7 is a constant succession of greater or less disquietude through desire and aversion1 and just as various degrees of relief4 ,accordingly the harmonious sequence of chords consists of the correct alternation of dissonance and consonance4 ,a succession of merely consonant chords would be satiating1 wearisome1 and empty1 like the languor produced by the satisfaction of all wishes4 ,therefore dissonances must be introduced1 although they disquiet us and affect us almost painfully1 but only in order to be resolved again in consonances with proper preparation4 ,indeed1 in the whole of music there are really only two fundamental chords1 the dissonant chord of the seventh and the consonant triad1 to which all chords that occur can be referred4 ,this just corresponds to the fact1 that for the will there are at bottom only dissatisfaction and satisfaction1 under however many forms they may present themselves4 ,and as there are two general fundamental moods of the mind1 serenity1 or at least healthiness1 and sadness1 or even oppression1 so music has two general keys1 the major and the minor1 which correspond to these1 and it must always be in one of the two4 ,but it is1 in fact1 very wonderful that there is a sign of pain which is neither physically painful nor yet conventional1 but which nevertheless is suitable and unmistakable3 the minor4 ,from this we may measure how deeply music is founded in the nature of things and of man4 ,with northern nations1 whose life is subject to hard conditions1 especially with the ,russians1 the minor prevails1 even in the church music4 ,allegro in the minor is very common in ,french music1 and is characteristic of it2 it is as if one danced while one's shoe pinched4 ,i add further a few subsidiary remarks4 ,when the keynote is changed1 and with it the value of all the intervals1 in consequence of which the same note figures as the second1 the third1 the fourth1 and so on1 the notes of the scale are analogous to actors1 who must assume now one rle1 now another1 while their person remains the same4 ,that the actors are often not precisely suited to these rles may be compared to the unavoidable impurity of every harmonic system 7referred to at the end of #eb of the first volume7 which the equal temperament has introduced4 ,perhaps some may be offended1 that1 according to this metaphysic of it1 music1 which so often exalts our minds1 which seems to us to speak of other and better worlds than ours1 yet really only flatters the will to live1 because it exhibits to it its nature1 deludes it with the image of its success1 and at the end expresses its satisfaction and contentment4 ,the following passage from the 8,vedas0 may serve to quiet such doubts3 8,etanand sroup1 quod forma gaudii est1 pram ,atma ex hoc dicunt1 quod quocunque loco gaudium est1 particula e gaudio ejus est0 7,oupnekhat1 vol4 i4 p4 #dje2 et iterum1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bae74 ,,supplements ,,to ,,the ,,fourth ,,book4 8,tous les hommes dsirent uniquement de se dlivrer de la mort3 ils ne savent pas se dlivrer de la vie40 --,laotsen,taote,king1 ed4 ,,stan4 ,,julien1 p4 #ahd4 ,chapter ,,xl4 ,preface4 ,the supplements to this fourth book would be very considerable if it were not that two of its principal subjects which stand specially in need of being supplemented--the freedom of the will and the foundation of ethics--have1 on the occasion of prize questions being set by two ,scandinavian ,academies1 been fully worked out by me in the form of a monograph1 which was laid before the public in the year #ahda under the title1 8,the ,two ,fundamental ,problems of ,ethics40 ,accordingly ,i assume an acquaintance on the part of my readers with the work which has just been mentioned1 just as unconditionally as in the supplements to the second book ,i have assumed it with regard to the work 8,on the ,will in ,nature40 ,in general ,i make the demand that whoever wishes to make himself acquainted with my philosophy shall read every line of me4 ,for ,i am no voluminous writer1 no fabricator of compendiums1 no earner of pecuniary rewards1 not one whose writings aim at the approbation of a minister2 in a word1 not one whose pen is under the influence of personal ends4 ,i strive after nothing but the truth1 and write as the ancients wrote1 with the sole intention of preserving my thoughts1 so that they may be for the benefit of those who understand how to meditate upon them and prize them4 ,therefore ,i have written little1 but that little with reflection and at long intervals1 and accordingly ,i have also confined within the smallest possible limits those repetitions which in philosophical works are sometimes unavoidable on account of the connection1 and from which no single philosopher is free2 so that by far the most of what ,i have to say is only to be found in one place4 ,on this account1 then1 whoever wishes to learn from me and understand me must leave nothing unread that ,i have written4 ,yet one can judge me and criticise me without this1 as experience has shown2 and to this also ,i further wish much pleasure4 ,meanwhile the space gained by the said elimination of two important subjects will be very welcome to us4 ,for since those explanations1 which every man has more at heart than anything else1 and which therefore in every system1 as ultimate results1 form the apex of its pyramid1 are also crowded together in my last book1 a larger space will gladly be granted to every firmer proof or more accurate account of these4 ,besides this we have been able to discuss here1 as belonging to the doctrine of the 8assertion of the will to live10 a question which in our fourth book itself remained untouched1 as it was also entirely neglected by all philosophers before me3 it is the inner significance and real nature of the sexual love1 which sometimes rises to a vehement passion--a subject which it would not have been paradoxical to take up in the ethical part of philosophy if its importance had been known4 ,chapter ,,xli47#bg7 ,on ,death ,and ,its ,relation ,to ,the ,indestructibility ,of ,our ,true ,nature4 ,death is the true inspiring genius1 or the muse of philosophy1 wherefore ,socrates has defined the latter as 4 ,indeed without death men would scarcely philosophise4 ,therefore it will be quite in order that a special consideration of this should have its place here at the beginning of the last1 most serious1 and most important of our books4 ,the brute lives without a proper knowledge of death2 therefore the individual brute enjoys directly the absolute imperishableness of the species1 for it is only conscious of itself as endless4 ,in the case of men the terrifying certainty of death necessarily entered with reason4 ,but as everywhere in nature with every evil a means of cure1 or at least some compensation1 is given1 the same reflection which introduces the knowledge of death also assists us to metaphysical points of view1 which comfort us concerning it1 and of which the brute has no need and is incapable4 ,all religious and philosophical systems are principally directed to this end1 and are thus primarily the antidote to the certainty of death1 which the reflective reason produces out of its own means4 ,yet the degree in which they attain this end is very different1 and certainly one religion or philosophy will1 far more than the others1 enable men to look death in the face with a quiet glance4 ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 which teach man to regard himself as himself1 the original being1 the ,brahm1 to which all coming into being and passing away is essentially foreign1 will achieve much more in this respect than such as teach that man is made out of nothing1 and actually begins at birth his existence derived from another4 ,answering to this we find in ,india a confidence and a contempt for death of which one has no conception in ,europe4 ,it is1 in fact1 a hazardous thing to force upon a man1 by early imprinting them1 weak and untenable conceptions in this important regard1 and thereby making him for ever incapable of taking up correct and stable ones4 ,for example1 to teach him that he recently came out of nothing1 and consequently through an eternity has been nothing1 but yet for the future will be imperishable1 is just the same as to teach him that although he is through and through the work of another1 yet he will be held responsible through all eternity for his actions4 ,if1 then1 when the mind ripens and reflection appears1 the untenable nature of such doctrines forces itself upon him1 he has nothing better to put in its place1 nay1 is no longer capable of understanding anything better1 and thus loses the comfort which nature had destined for him also1 as a compensation for the certainty of death4 ,in consequence of such a process1 we see even now in ,england 7#ahdd71 among ruined factory hands1 the ,socialists1 and in ,germany1 among ruined students1 the young ,hegelians1 sink to the absolutely physical point of view1 which leads to the result3 edite1 bibite1 post mortem nulla voluptas1 and so far may be defined as bestialism4 ,however1 after all that has been taught concerning death1 it cannot be denied that1 at least in ,europe1 the opinion of men1 nay1 often even of the same individual1 very frequently vacillates between the conception of death as absolute annihilation and the assumption that we are1 as it were1 with skin and hair1 immortal4 ,both are equally false3 but we have not so much to find a correct mean as rather to gain the higher point of view from which such notions disappear of themselves4 ,in these considerations ,i shall first of all start from the purely empirical standpoint4 ,here there primarily lies before us the undeniable fact that1 according to the natural consciousness1 man not only fears death for his own person more than anything else1 but also weeps violently over the death of those that belong to him1 and indeed clearly not egotistically1 for his own loss1 but out of sympathy for the great misfortune that has befallen them4 ,therefore he also censures those who in such a case neither weep nor show sadness as hardhearted and unloving4 ,it is parallel with this that revenge1 in its highest degree1 seeks the death of the adversary as the greatest evil that can be inflicted4 ,opinions change with time and place2 but the voice of nature remains always and everywhere the same1 and is therefore to be heeded before everything else4 ,now here it seems distinctly to say that death is a great evil4 ,in the language of nature death means annihilation4 ,and that death is a serious matter may be concluded from the fact that1 as every one knows1 life is no joke4 ,we must indeed deserve nothing better than these two4 ,in fact1 the fear of death is independent of all knowledge2 for the brute has it1 although it does not know death4 ,everything that is born brings it with it into the world4 ,but this fear of death is a priori only the reverse side of the will to live1 which indeed we all are4 ,therefore in every brute the fear of its destruction is inborn1 like the care for its maintenance4 ,thus it is the fear of death1 and not the mere avoidance of pain1 which shows itself in the anxious carefulness with which the brute seeks to protect itself1 and still more its brood1 from everything that might become dangerous4 ,why does the brute flee1 trembling1 and seek to conceal itself8 ,because it is simply the will to live1 but1 as such1 is forfeited to death1 and wishes to gain time4 ,such also1 by nature1 is man4 ,the greatest evil1 the worst that can anywhere threaten1 is death2 the greatest fear is the fear of death4 ,nothing excites us so irresistibly to the most lively interest as danger to the life of others2 nothing is so shocking as an execution4 ,now the boundless attachment to life which appears here cannot have sprung from knowledge and reflection2 to these it rather appears foolish1 for the objective worth of life is very uncertain1 and at least it remains doubtful whether it is preferable to not being1 nay1 if experience and reflection come to be expressed1 not being must certainly win4 ,if one knocked on the graves1 and asked the dead whether they wished to rise again1 they would shake their heads4 ,such is the opinion of ,socrates in 8,plato's ,apology10 and even the gay and amiable ,voltaire cannot help saying1 8,on aime la vie2 mais le nant ne laisse pas d'avoir du bon20 and again1 8,je ne sais pas ce que c'est que la vie ternelle1 mais celleci est une mauvaise plaisanterie40 ,besides1 life must in any case soon end2 so that the few years which perhaps one has yet to be vanish entirely before the endless time when one will be no more4 ,accordingly it appears to reflection even ludicrous to be so anxious about this span of time1 to tremble so much if our own life or that of another is in danger1 and to compose tragedies the horror of which has its strength in the fear of death4 ,that powerful attachment to life is therefore irrational and blind2 it can only be explained from the fact that our whole inner nature is itself will to live1 to which1 therefore1 life must appear as the highest good1 however embittered1 short1 and uncertain it may always be2 and that that will1 in itself and originally1 is unconscious and blind4 ,knowledge1 on the contrary1 far from being the source of that attachment to life1 even works against it1 for it discloses the worthlessness of life1 and thus combats the fear of death4 ,when it conquers1 and accordingly the man faces death courageously and composedly1 this is honoured as great and noble1 thus we hail then the triumph of knowledge over the blind will to live1 which is yet the kernel of our own being4 ,in the same way we despise him in whom knowledge is defeated in that conflict1 and who therefore clings unconditionally to life1 struggles to the utmost against approaching death1 and receives it with despair27#bh7 and yet in him it is only the most original being of ourselves and of nature that expresses itself4 ,we may here ask1 in passing1 how could this boundless love of life and endeavour to maintain it in every way as long as possible be regarded as base1 contemptible1 and by the adherents of every religion as unworthy of this1 if it were the gift of good gods1 to be recognised with thankfulness8 ,and how could it then seem great and noble to esteem it lightly8 ,meanwhile1 what is confirmed by these considerations is--7#a47 that the will to live is the inmost nature of man2 7#b47 that in itself it is unconscious and blind2 7#c47 that knowledge is an adventitious principle1 which is originally foreign to the will2 7#d47 that knowledge conflicts with the will1 and that our judgment applauds the victory of knowledge over the will4 ,if what makes death seem so terrible to us were the thought of not being1 we would necessarily think with equal horror of the time when as yet we were not4 ,for it is irrefutably certain that not being after death cannot be different from not being before birth1 and consequently is also no more deplorable4 ,a whole eternity has run its course while as yet we were not1 but that by no means disturbs us4 ,on the other hand1 we find it hard1 nay1 unendurable1 that after the momentary intermezzo of an ephemeral existence1 a second eternity should follow in which we shall no longer be4 ,should1 then1 this thirst for existence have arisen because we have now tasted it and have found it so delightful8 ,as was already briefly explained above1 certainly not2 far sooner could the experience gained have awakened an infinite longing for the lost paradise of nonexistence4 ,to the hope1 also1 of the immortality of the soul there is always added that of a 8better world0--a sign that the present world is not much good4 ,notwithstanding all this1 the question as to our state after death has certainly been discussed1 in books and verbally1 ten thousand times oftener than the question as to our state before birth4 ,yet theoretically the one is just as near at hand and as fair a problem as the other2 and besides1 whoever had answered the one would soon see to the bottom of the other4 ,we have fine declamations about how shocking it would be to think that the mind of man1 which embraces the world1 and has so many very excellent thoughts1 should sink with him into the grave2 but we hear nothing about this mind having allowed a whole eternity to pass before it came into being with these its qualities1 and how the world must have had to do without it all that time4 ,yet no question presents itself more naturally to knowledge1 uncorrupted by the will1 than this3 ,an infinite time has passed before my birth2 what was ,i during this time8 ,metaphysically1 it might perhaps be answered1 8,i was always ,i2 that is1 all who during that time said ,i1 were just ,i40 ,but let us look away from this to our present entirely empirical point of view1 and assume that ,i did not exist at all4 ,then ,i can console myself as to the infinite time after my death1 when ,i shall not be1 with the infinite time when ,i already was not1 as a wellaccustomed1 and indeed very comfortable1 state4 ,for the eternity a parte post without me can be just as little fearful as the eternity a parte ante without me1 since the two are distinguished by nothing except by the interposition of an ephemeral dream of life4 ,all proofs1 also1 for continued existence after death may just as well be applied in partem ante1 where they then demonstrate existence before life1 in the assumption of which the ,hindus and ,buddhists therefore show themselves very consistent4 ,kant's ideality of time alone solves all these riddles4 ,but we are not speaking of that now4 ,this1 however1 results from what has been said1 that to mourn for the time when one will be no more is just as absurd as it would be to mourn over the time when as yet one was not2 for it is all the same whether the time which our existence does not fill is related to that which it does fill1 as future or as past4 ,but1 also1 regarded entirely apart from these temporal considerations1 it is in and for itself absurd to look upon not being as an evil2 for every evil1 as every good1 presupposes existence1 nay1 even consciousness3 but the latter ceases with life1 as also in sleep and in a swoon2 therefore the absence of it is well known to us1 and trusted1 as containing no evil at all3 its entrance1 however1 is always an affair of a moment4 ,from this point of view ,epicurus considered death1 and therefore quite rightly said1 8 0 7,death does not concern us72 with the explanation that when we are death is not1 and when death is we are not 7,diog4 ,laert41 x4 #bg74 ,to have lost what cannot be missed is clearly no evil4 ,therefore ceasing to be ought to disturb us as little as not having been4 ,accordingly from the standpoint of knowledge there appears absolutely no reason to fear death4 ,but consciousness consists in knowing2 therefore1 for consciousness death is no evil4 ,moreover1 it is really not this knowing part of our ego that fears death1 but the fuga mortis proceeds entirely and alone from the blind will1 of which everything living is filled4 ,to this1 however1 as was already mentioned above1 it is essential1 just because it is will to live1 whose whole nature consists in the effort after life and existence1 and which is not originally endowed with knowledge1 but only in consequence of its objectification in animal individuals4 ,if now the will1 by means of knowledge1 beholds death as the end of the phenomenon with which it has identified itself1 and to which1 therefore1 it sees itself limited1 its whole nature struggles against it with all its might4 ,whether now it has really something to fear from death we will investigate further on1 and will then remember the real source of the fear of death1 which has been shown here along with the requisite distinction of the willing and the knowing part of our nature4 ,corresponding to this1 then1 what makes death so terrible to us is not so much the end of life--for this can appear to no one specially worthy of regret--but rather the destruction of the organism2 really because this is the will itself exhibiting itself as body4 ,but we only really feel this destruction in the evils of disease or of old age2 death itself1 on the other hand1 consists for the subject only in the moment when consciousness vanishes because the activity of the brain ceases4 ,the extension of the stoppage to all the other parts of the organism which follows this is really already an event after death4 ,thus death1 in a subjective regard1 concerns the consciousness alone4 ,now what the vanishing of this may be every one can to a certain extent judge of from going to sleep2 but it is still better known to whoever has really fainted1 for in this the transition is not so gradual1 nor accompanied by dreams1 but first the power of sight leaves us1 still fully conscious1 and then immediately the most profound unconsciousness enters2 the sensation that accompanies it1 so far as it goes1 is anything but disagreeable2 and without doubt1 as sleep is the brother of death1 so the swoon is its twin brother4 ,even violent death cannot be painful1 for even severe wounds are not felt at all till some time afterwards1 often not till the outward signs of them are observed4 ,if they are rapidly mortal1 consciousness will vanish before this discovery2 if they result in death later1 then it is the same as with other illnesses4 ,all those also who have lost consciousness in water1 or from charcoal fumes1 or through hanging are well known to say that it happened without pain4 ,and now1 finally1 the death which is properly in accordance with nature1 death from old age1 euthanasia1 is a gradual vanishing and sinking out of existence in an imperceptible manner4 ,little by little in old age1 the passions and desires1 with the susceptibility for their objects1 are extinguished2 the emotions no longer find anything to excite them2 for the power of presenting ideas to the mind always becomes weaker1 its images fainter2 the impressions no longer cleave to us1 but pass over without leaving a trace1 the days roll ever faster1 events lose their significance1 everything grows pale4 ,the old man stricken in years totters about or rests in a corner now only a shadow1 a ghost of his former self4 ,what remains there for death to destroy8 ,one day a sleep is his last1 and his dreams are ----4 ,they are the dreams which ,hamlet inquires after in the famous soliloquy4 ,i believe we dream them even now4 ,i have here also to remark that the maintenance of the life process1 although it has a metaphysical basis1 does not go on without resistance1 and consequently not without effort4 ,it is this to which the organism yields every night1 on account of which it then suspends the brain function and diminishes certain secretions1 the respiration1 the pulse1 and the development of heat4 ,from this we may conclude that the entire ceasing of the life process must be a wonderful relief to its motive force2 perhaps this has some share in the expression of sweet contentment on the faces of most dead persons4 ,in general the moment of death may be like the moment of awaking from a heavy dream that has oppressed us like a nightmare4 ,up to this point the result we have arrived at is that death1 however much it may be feared1 can yet really be no evil4 ,but often it even appears as a good thing1 as something wished for1 as a friend4 ,all that have met with insuperable obstacles to their existence or their efforts1 that suffer from incurable diseases or inconsolable griefs1 have as a last refuge1 which generally opens to them of its own accord1 the return into the womb of nature1 from which they arose for a short time1 enticed by the hope of more favourable conditions of existence than have fallen to their lot1 and the same path out of which constantly remains open4 ,that return is the cessio bonorum of life4 ,yet even here it is only entered upon after a physical and moral conflict3 so hard does one struggle against returning to the place from which one came out so lightly and readily1 to an existence which has so much suffering and so little pleasure to offer4 ,the ,hindus give the god of death1 ,yama1 two faces2 one very fearful and terrible1 and one very cheerful and benevolent4 ,this partly explains itself from the reflections we have just made4 ,at the empirical point of view at which we still stand1 the following consideration is one which presents itself of its own accord1 and therefore deserves to be accurately defined by illustration1 and thereby referred to its proper limits4 ,the sight of a dead body shows me that sensibility1 irritability1 circulation of the blood1 reproduction1 c41 have here ceased4 ,i conclude from this with certainty that what actuated these hitherto1 which was yet always something unknown to me1 now actuates them no longer1 thus has departed from them4 ,but if ,i should now wish to add that this must have been just what ,i have known only as consciousness1 consequently as intelligence 7soul71 this would be not only an unjustified but clearly a false conclusion4 ,for consciousness has always showed itself to me not as the cause1 but as the product and result of the organised life1 for it rose and sank in consequence of this in the different periods of life1 in health and sickness1 in sleep1 in a swoon1 in awaking1 c41 thus always appeared as effect1 never as cause of the organised life1 always showed itself as something which arises and passes away1 and again arises1 so long as the conditions of this still exist1 but not apart from them4 ,nay1 ,i may also have seen that the complete derangement of consciousness1 madness1 far from dragging down with it and depressing the other forces1 or indeed endangering life1 heightens these very much1 especially irritability or muscular force1 and rather lengthens than shortens life1 if other causes do not come in4 ,then1 also3 ,i knew individuality as a quality of everything organised1 and therefore1 if this is a selfconscious organism1 also of consciousness4 ,but there exists no occasion now to conclude that individuality was inherent in that vanished principle1 which imparts life1 and is completely unknown to me2 all the less so as ,i see that everywhere in nature each particular phenomenon is the work of a general force which is active in thousands of similar phenomena4 ,but1 on the other hand1 there is just as little occasion to conclude that because the organised life has ceased here that force which hitherto actuated it has also become nothing2 as little as to infer the death of the spinner from the stopping of the spinningwheel4 ,if a pendulum1 by finding its centre of gravity1 at last comes to rest1 and thus its individual apparent life has ceased1 no one will imagine that gravitation is now annihilated2 but every one comprehends that1 after as before1 it is active in innumerable phenomena4 ,certainly it might be urged against this comparison1 that here also1 in this pendulum1 gravitation has not ceased to be active1 but only to manifest its activity palpably2 whoever insists on this may think1 instead1 of an electrical body1 in which1 after its discharge1 electricity has actually ceased to be active4 ,i only wished to show in this that we ourselves recognise in the lowest forces of nature an eternity and ubiquity with regard to which the transitory nature of their fleeting phenomena never makes us err for a moment4 ,so much the less1 then1 should it come into our mind to regard the ceasing of life as the annihilation of the living principle1 and consequently death as the entire destruction of the man4 ,because the strong arm which1 three thousand years ago1 bent the bow of ,ulysses is no more1 no reflective and wellregulated understanding will regard the force which acted so energetically in it as entirely annihilated1 and therefore1 upon further reflection1 will also not assume that the force which bends the bow today first began with this arm4 ,the thought lies far nearer us1 that the force which earlier actuated the life which now has vanished is the same which is active in the life which now flourishes3 nay1 this is almost inevitable4 ,certainly1 however1 we know that1 as was explained in the second book1 only that is perishable which is involved in the causal series2 but only the states and forms are so involved4 ,on the other hand1 untouched by the change of these which is introduced by causes1 there remain on the one side matter1 and on the other side natural forces3 for both are the presupposition of all these changes4 ,but the principle of our life we must1 primarily at least1 conceive as a force of nature1 until perhaps a more profound investigation has brought us to know what it is in itself4 ,thus1 taken simply as a force of nature1 the vital force remains entirely undisturbed by the change of forms and states1 which the bond of cause and effect introduces and carries off again1 and which alone are subject to the process of coming into being and passing away1 as it lies before us in experience4 ,thus so far the imperishable nature of our true being can be proved with certainty4 ,but it is true this will not satisfy the claims which are wont to be made upon proofs of our continued existence after death1 nor insure the consolation which is expected from such proofs4 ,however1 it is always something2 and whoever fears death as an absolute annihilation cannot afford to despise the perfect certainty that the inmost principle of his life remains untouched by it4 ,nay1 the paradox might be set up1 that that second thing also which1 just like the forces of nature1 remains untouched by the continual change under the guidance of causality1 thus matter1 by its absolute permanence1 insures us indestructibility1 by virtue of which whoever was incapable of comprehending any other might yet confidently trust in a certain imperishableness4 8,what60 it will be said1 8the permanence of the mere dust1 of the crude matter1 is to be regarded as a continuance of our being80 ,oh6 do you know this dust1 then8 ,do you know what it is and what it can do8 ,learn to know it before you despise it4 ,this matter which now lies there as dust and ashes will soon1 dissolved in water1 form itself as a crystal1 will shine as metal1 will then emit electric sparks1 will by means of its galvanic intensity manifest a force which1 decomposing the closest combinations1 reduces earths to metals2 nay1 it will1 of its own accord1 form itself into plants and animals1 and from its mysterious womb develop that life for the loss of which you1 in your narrowness1 are so painfully anxious4 ,is it1 then1 absolutely nothing to continue to exist as such matter8 ,nay1 ,i seriously assert that even this permanence of matter affords evidence of the indestructibility of our true nature1 though only as in an image or simile1 or1 rather1 only as in outline4 ,to see this we only need to call to mind the explanation of matter given in chapter #bd1 from which it resulted that mere formless matter--this basis of the world of experience which is never perceived for itself alone1 but assumed as constantly remaining--is the immediate reflection1 the visibility in general1 of the thing in itself1 thus of the will4 ,therefore1 whatever absolutely pertains to the will as such holds good also of matter1 and it reflects the true eternal nature of the will under the image of temporal imperishableness4 ,because1 as has been said1 nature does not lie1 no view which has sprung from a purely objective comprehension of it1 and been logically thought out1 can be absolutely false1 but at the most only very onesided and imperfect4 ,such1 however1 is1 indisputably1 consistent materialism2 for instance1 that of ,epicurus1 just as well as the absolute idealism opposed to it1 like that of ,berkeley1 and in general every philosophical point of view which has proceeded from a correct apperu1 and been honestly carried out4 ,only they are all exceedingly onesided comprehensions1 and therefore1 in spite of their opposition1 they are all true1 each from a definite point of view2 but as soon as one has risen above this point of view1 then they only appear as relatively and conditionally true4 ,the highest standpoint alone1 from which one surveys them all and knows them in their relative truth1 but also beyond this1 in their falseness1 can be that of absolute truth so far as this is in general attainable4 ,accordingly we see1 as was shown above1 that in the very crude1 and therefore very old1 point of view of materialism proper the indestructibility of our true nature in itself is represented1 as by a mere shadow of it1 the imperishableness of matter2 as in the already higher naturalism of an absolute physics it is represented by the ubiquity and eternity of the natural forces1 among which the vital force is at least to be counted4 ,thus even these crude points of view contain the assertion that the living being suffers no absolute annihilation through death1 but continues to exist in and with the whole of nature4 ,the considerations which have brought us to this point1 and to which the further explanations link themselves on1 started from the remarkable fear of death which fills all living beings4 ,but now we will change the standpoint and consider how1 in contrast to the individual beings1 the whole of nature bears itself with reference to death4 ,in doing this1 however1 we still always remain upon the ground of experience4 ,certainly we know no higher game of chance than that for death and life4 ,every decision about this we watch with the utmost excitement1 interest1 and fear2 for in our eyes all in all is at stake4 ,on the other hand1 nature1 which never lies1 but is always straightforward and open1 speaks quite differently upon this theme1 speaks like ,krishna in the ,bhagavadgita4 ,what it says is3 ,the death or the life of the individual is of no significance4 ,it expresses this by the fact that it exposes the life of every brute1 and even of man1 to the most insignificant accidents without coming to the rescue4 ,consider the insect on your path2 a slight1 unconscious turning of your step is decisive as to its life or death4 ,look at the woodsnail1 without any means of flight1 of defence1 of deception1 of concealment1 a ready prey for all4 ,look at the fish carelessly playing in the still open net2 the frog restrained by its laziness from the flight which might save it2 the bird that does not know of the falcon that soars above it2 the sheep which the wolf eyes and examines from the thicket4 ,all these1 provided with little foresight1 go about guilelessly among the dangers that threaten their existence every moment4 ,since now nature exposes its organisms1 constructed with such inimitable skill1 not only to the predatory instincts of the stronger1 but also to the blindest chance1 to the humour of every fool1 the mischievousness of every child without reserve1 it declares that the annihilation of these individuals is indifferent to it1 does it no harm1 has no significance1 and that in these cases the effect is of no more importance than the cause4 ,it says this very distinctly1 and it does not lie2 only it makes no comments on its utterances1 but rather expresses them in the laconic style of an oracle4 ,if now the allmother sends forth her children without protection to a thousand threatening dangers1 this can only be because she knows that if they fall they fall back into her womb1 where they are safe2 therefore their fall is a mere jest4 ,nature does not act otherwise with man than with the brutes4 ,therefore its declaration extends also to man3 the life and death of the individual are indifferent to it4 ,accordingly1 in a certain sense1 they ought also to be indifferent to us1 for we ourselves are indeed nature4 ,certainly1 if only we saw deep enough1 we would agree with nature1 and regard life and death as indifferently as it does4 ,meanwhile1 by means of reflection1 we must attribute that carelessness and indifference of nature towards the life of the individuals to the fact that the destruction of such a phenomenon does not in the least affect its true and proper nature4 ,if we further ponder the fact1 that not only1 as we have just seen1 are life and death dependent upon the most trifling accidents1 but that the existence of the organised being in general is an ephemeral one1 that animal and plant arise today and pass away tomorrow1 and birth and death follow in quick succession1 while to the unorganised things which stand so much lower an incomparably longer duration is assured1 and an infinite duration to the absolutely formless matter alone1 to which1 indeed1 we attribute this a priori1--then1 ,i think1 the thought must follow of its own accord1 even from the purely empirical1 but objective and unprejudiced comprehension of such an order of things1 that this is only a superficial phenomenon1 that such a constant arising and passing away can by no means touch the root of things1 but can only be relative1 nay1 only apparent1 in which the true inner nature of that thing is not included1 the nature which everywhere evades our glance and is thoroughly mysterious1 but rather that this continues to exist undisturbed by it2 although we can neither apprehend nor conceive the manner in which this happens1 and must therefore think of it only generally as a kind of tour de passepasse which took place there4 ,for that1 while what is most imperfect1 the lowest1 the unorganised1 continues to exist unassailed1 it is just the most perfect beings1 the living creatures1 with their infinitely complicated and inconceivably ingenious organisations1 which constantly arise1 new from the very foundation1 and after a brief span of time absolutely pass into nothingness1 to make room for other new ones like them coming into existence out of nothing--this is something so obviously absurd that it can never be the true order of things1 but rather a mere veil which conceals this1 or1 more accurately1 a phenomenon conditioned by the nature of our intellect4 ,nay1 the whole being and not being itself of these individuals1 in relation to which death and life are opposites1 can only be relative4 ,thus the language of nature1 in which it is given us as absolute1 cannot be the true and ultimate expression of the nature of things and of the order of the world1 but indeed only a patois du pays1 i4e41 something merely relatively true1--something to be understood cum grano salis1 or1 to speak properly1 something conditioned by our intellect2 ,i say1 an immediate1 intuitive conviction of the kind which ,i have tried to describe in words will press itself upon every one2 i4e41 certainly only upon every one whose mind is not of an utterly ordinary species1 which is absolutely only capable of knowing the particular simply and solely as such1 which is strictly limited to the knowledge of individuals1 after the manner of the intellect of the brutes4 ,whoever1 on the other hand1 by means of a capacity of an only somewhat higher power1 even just begins to see in the individual beings their universal1 their ,ideas1 will also1 to a certain extent1 participate in that conviction1 and that indeed as an immediate1 and therefore certain1 conviction4 ,in fact1 it is also only small1 limited minds that fear death quite seriously as their annihilation1 and persons of decidedly superior capacity are completely free from such terrors4 ,plato rightly bases the whole of philosophy upon the knowledge of the doctrine of ,ideas1 i4e41 upon the perception of the universal in the particular4 ,but the conviction here described1 which proceeds directly from the comprehension of nature1 must have been exceedingly vivid in those sublime authors of the ,upanishads of the ,vedas1 who can scarcely be thought of as mere men1 for it speaks to us so forcibly out of an innumerable number of their utterances that we must ascribe this immediate illumination of their mind to the fact that these wise men1 standing nearer the origin of our race in time1 comprehended the nature of things more clearly and profoundly than the already deteriorated race1 1 is able to do4 ,but certainly their comprehension is assisted by the natural world of ,india1 which is endowed with life in a very different degree from our northern world4 ,however1 thorough reflection1 as pursued by ,kant's great mind1 leads by another path to the same result1 for it teaches us that our intellect1 in which that phenomenal world which changes so fast exhibits itself1 does not comprehend the true ultimate nature of things1 but merely its phenomenal manifestation1 and indeed1 as ,i add1 because it is originally only destined to present the motives to our will1 i4e41 to be serviceable to it in the pursuit of its paltry ends4 ,let us1 however1 carry our objective and unprejudiced consideration of nature still further4 ,if ,i kill a living creature1 whether a dog1 a bird1 a frog1 or even only an insect1 it is really inconceivable that this being1 or rather the original force by virtue of which such a marvellous phenomenon exhibited itself just the moment before1 in its full energy and love of life1 should have been annihilated by my wicked or thoughtless act4 ,and again1 on the other hand1 the millions of animals of every kind which come into existence every moment1 in infinite variety1 full of force and activity1 can never1 before the act of their generation1 have been nothing at all1 and have attained from nothing to an absolute beginning4 ,if now in this way ,i see one of these withdraw itself from my sight1 without me knowing where it goes1 and another appear without me knowing whence it comes2 if1 moreover1 both have the same form1 the same nature1 the same character1 and only not the same matter1 which yet during their existence they continually throw off and renew2 then certainly the assumption1 that that which vanishes and that which appears in its place are one and the same1 which has only experienced a slight alteration1 a renewal of the form of its existence1 and that consequently death is for the species what sleep is for the individual2 this assumption1 ,i say1 lies so close at hand that it is impossible not to light upon it1 unless the mind1 perverted in early youth by the imprinting of false views1 hurries it out of the way1 even from a distance1 with superstitious fear4 ,but the opposite assumption that the birth of an animal is an arising out of nothing1 and accordingly that its death is its absolute annihilation1 and this with the further addition that man1 who has also originated out of nothing1 has yet an individual1 endless existence1 and indeed a conscious existence1 while the dog1 the ape1 the elephant1 are annihilated by death1 is really something against which the healthy mind revolts and which it must regard as absurd4 ,if1 as is sufficiently often repeated1 the comparison of the results of a system with the utterances of the healthy mind is supposed to be a touchstone of its truth1 ,i wish the adherents of the system which was handed down from ,descartes to the pre,kantian eclectics1 nay1 which even now is still the prevailing view of the great majority of cultured people in ,europe1 would apply this touchstone here4 ,throughout and everywhere the true symbol of nature is the circle1 because it is the schema or type of recurrence4 ,this is1 in fact1 the most universal form in nature1 which it carries out in everything1 from the course of the stars down to the death and the genesis of organised beings1 and by which alone1 in the ceaseless stream of time1 and its content1 a permanent existence1 i4e41 a nature1 becomes possible4 ,if in autumn we consider the little world of insects1 and see how one prepares its bed to sleep the long1 rigid wintersleep2 another spins its cocoon to pass the winter as a chrysalis1 and awake in spring rejuvenated and perfected2 and1 finally1 how most of them1 intending themselves to rest in the arms of death1 merely arrange with care the suitable place for their egg1 in order to issue forth again from it some day renewed2--this is nature's great doctrine of immortality1 which seeks to teach us that there is no radical difference between sleep and death1 but the one endangers existence just as little as the other4 ,the care with which the insect prepares a cell1 or hole1 or nest1 deposits its egg in it1 together with food for the larva that will come out of it in the following spring1 and then quietly dies1 is just like the care with which in the evening a man lays ready his clothes and his breakfast for the next morning1 and then quietly goes to sleep2 and at bottom it could not take place at all if it were not that the insect which dies in autumn is in itself1 and according to its true nature1 just as much identical with the one which is hatched out in the spring as the man who lies down to sleep is identical with the man who rises from it4 ,if now1 after these considerations1 we return to ourselves and our own species1 then cast our glance forward far into the future1 and seek to present to our minds the future generations1 with the millions of their individuals in the strange form of their customs and pursuits1 and then interpose with the question3 ,whence will all these come8 ,where are they now8 ,where is the fertile womb of that nothing1 pregnant with worlds1 which still conceals the coming races8 ,would not the smiling and true answer to this be1 ,where else should they be than there where alone the real always was and will be1 in the present and its content8--thus with thee1 the foolish questioner1 who in this mistaking of his own nature is like the leaf upon the tree1 which1 fading in autumn and about to fall1 complains at its destruction1 and will not be consoled by looking forward to the fresh green which will clothe the tree in spring1 but says lamenting1 8,i am not these6 ,these are quite different leaves60 ,oh1 foolish leaf6 ,whither wilt thou8 ,and whence should others come8 ,where is the nothing whose abyss thou fearest8 ,know thine own nature1 that which is so filled with thirst for existence2 recognise it in the inner1 mysterious1 germinating force of the tree1 which1 constantly one and the same in all generations of leaves1 remains untouched by all arising and passing away4 ,and now1 1 7,qualis foliorum generatio1 talis et hominum74 ,whether the fly which now buzzes round me goes to sleep in the evening1 and buzzes again tomorrow1 or dies in the evening1 and in spring another fly buzzes which has sprung from its egg3 that is in itself the same thing2 but therefore the knowledge which exhibits this as two fundamentally different things is not unconditioned1 but relative1 a knowledge of the phenomenon1 not of the thing in itself4 ,in the morning the fly exists again2 it also exists again in the spring4 ,what distinguishes for it the winter from the night8 ,in ,burdach's 8,physiology10 vol4 i4 #bge1 we read1 8,till ten o'clock in the morning no ,cercaria ephemera 7one of the infusoria7 is to be seen 7in the infusion71 and at twelve the whole water swarms with them4 ,in the evening they die1 and the next morning they again appear anew40 ,so it was observed by ,nitzsch six days running4 ,so everything lingers but a moment1 and hastens on to death4 ,the plant and the insect die at the end of the summer1 the brute and the man after a few years3 death reaps unweariedly4 ,yet notwithstanding this1 nay1 as if this were not so at all1 everything is always there and in its place1 just as if everything were imperishable4 ,the plant always thrives and blooms1 the insect hums1 the brute and the man exist in unwasted youth1 and the cherries that have already been enjoyed a thousand times we have again before us every summer4 ,the nations also exist as immortal individuals1 although sometimes their names change2 even their action1 what they do and suffer1 is always the same2 although history always pretends to relate something different3 for it is like the kaleidoscope1 which at every turn shows a new figure1 while we really always have the same thing before our eyes4 ,what then presses itself more irresistibly upon us than the thought that that arising and passing away does not concern the real nature of things1 but this remains untouched by it1 thus is imperishable1 and therefore all and each that wills to exist actually exists continuously and without end4 ,accordingly at every given point of time all species of animals1 from the gnat to the elephant1 exist together complete4 ,they have already renewed themselves many thousand times1 and withal have remained the same4 ,they know nothing of others like them1 who have lived before them1 or will live after them2 it is the species which always lives1 and in the consciousness of the imperishable nature of the species and their identity with it the individuals cheerfully exist4 ,the will to live manifests itself in an endless present1 because this is the form of the life of the species1 which1 therefore1 never grows old1 but remains always young4 ,death is for it what sleep is for the individual1 or what winking is for the eye1 by the absence of which the ,indian gods are known1 if they appear in human form4 ,as through the entrance of night the world vanishes1 but yet does not for a moment cease to exist1 so man and brute apparently pass away through death1 and yet their true nature continues1 just as undisturbed by it4 ,let us now think of that alternation of death and birth as infinitely rapid vibrations1 and we have before us the enduring objectification of the will1 the permanent ,ideas of being1 fixed like the rainbow on the waterfall4 ,this is temporal immortality4 ,in consequence of this1 notwithstanding thousands of years of death and decay1 nothing has been lost1 not an atom of the matter1 still less anything of the inner being1 that exhibits itself as nature4 ,therefore every moment we can cheerfully cry1 8,in spite of time1 death1 and decay1 we are still all together60 ,perhaps we would have to except whoever had once said from the bottom of his heart1 with regard to this game1 8,i want no more40 ,but this is not yet the place to speak of this4 ,but we have certainly to draw attention to the fact that the pain of birth and the bitterness of death are the two constant conditions under which the will to live maintains itself in its objectification1 i4e41 our inner nature1 untouched by the course of time and the death of races1 exists in an everlasting present1 and enjoys the fruit of the assertion of the will to live4 ,this is analogous to the fact that we can only be awake during the day on condition that we sleep during the night2 indeed the latter is the commentary which nature offers us for the understanding of that difficult passage47#bi7 ,for the substratum1 or the content1 1 or the material of the present1 is through all time really the same4 ,the impossibility of knowing this identity directly is just time1 a form and limitation of our intellect4 ,that on account of it1 for example1 the future event is not yet1 depends upon an illusion of which we become conscious when that event has come4 ,that the essential form of our intellect introduces such an illusion explains and justifies itself from the fact that the intellect has come forth from the hands of nature by no means for the apprehension of the nature of things1 but merely for the apprehension of motives1 thus for the service of an individual and temporal phenomenon of will47#cj7 ,whoever comprehends the reflections which here occupy us will also understand the true meaning of the paradoxical doctrine of the ,eleatics1 that there is no arising and passing away1 but the whole remains immovable3 8 1 0 7,parmenides et ,melissus ortum et interitum tollebant1 quoniam nihil moveri putabant71 ,stob4 ,ecl41 i4 #ba4 ,light is also thrown here upon the beautiful passage of ,empedocles which ,plutarch has preserved for us in the book1 8,adversus ,coloten10 c4 #ab3-- 82 1 1 4 1 7 71 1 1 1 40 7,stulta1 et prolixas non admittentia curas ,pectora3 qui sperant1 existere posse1 quod ante ,non fuit1 aut ullam rem pessum protinus ire2-- ,non animo prudens homo quod prsentiat ullus1 ,dum vivunt 7namque hoc vita nomine signant71 ,sunt1 et fortuna tum conflictantur utraque3 ,ante ortum nihil est homo1 nec post funera quidquam47 ,the very remarkable and1 in its place1 astonishing passage in ,diderot's 8,jacques le fataliste10 deserves not less to be mentioned here3 8,un chteau immense1 au frontispice duquel on lisait3 ,je n'appartiens personne1 et j'appartiens tout le monde3 vous y tiez avant que d'y entrer1 vous y serez encore1 quand vous en sortirez 40 ,certainly in the sense in which1 when he is begotten1 the man arises out of nothing1 he becomes nothing through death4 ,but really to learn to know this 8nothing0 would be very interesting2 for it only requires moderate acuteness to see that this empirical nothing is by no means absolute1 i4e41 such as would in every sense be nothing4 ,we are already led to this insight by the observation that all qualities of the parents recur in the children1 thus have overcome death4 ,of this1 however1 ,i will speak in a special chapter4 ,there is no greater contrast than that between the ceaseless flight of time1 which carries its whole content with it1 and the rigid immobility of what is actually present1 which at all times is one and the same4 ,and if from this point of view we watch in a purely objective manner the immediate events of life1 the ,nunc stans becomes clear and visible to us in the centre of the wheel of time4 ,to the eye of a being of incomparably longer life1 which at one glance comprehended the human race in its whole duration1 the constant alternation of birth and death would present itself as a continuous vibration1 and accordingly it would not occur to it at all to see in this an ever new arising out of nothing and passing into nothing2 but just as to our sight the quickly revolving spark appears as a continuous circle1 the rapidly vibrating spring as a permanent triangle1 the vibrating cord as a spindle1 so to this eye the species would appear as that which has being and permanence1 death and life as vibrations4 ,we will have false conceptions of the indestructibility of our true nature by death1 so long as we do not make up our minds to study it primarily in the brutes1 but claim for ourselves alone a class apart from them1 under the boastful name of immortality4 ,but it is this pretension alone1 and the narrowness of view from which it proceeds1 on account of which most men struggle so obstinately against the recognition of the obvious truth that we are essentially1 and in the chief respect1 the same as the brutes2 nay1 that they recoil at every hint of our relationship with these4 ,but it is this denial of the truth which more than anything else closes against them the path to real knowledge of the indestructibility of our nature4 ,for if we seek anything upon a wrong path1 we have just on that account forsaken the right path1 and upon the path we follow we will never attain to anything in the end but late disillusion4 ,up1 then1 follow the truth1 not according to preconceived notions1 but as nature leads6 ,first of all1 learn to recognise in the aspect of every young animal the existence of the species that never grows old1 which1 as a reflection of its eternal youth1 imparts to every individual a temporary youth1 and lets it come forth as new and fresh as if the world were of today4 ,let one ask himself honestly whether the swallow of this year's spring is absolutely a different one from the swallow of the first spring1 and whether really between the two the miracle of the creation out of nothing has repeated itself millions of times1 in order to work just as often into the hands of absolute annihilation4 ,i know well that if ,i seriously assured any one that the cat which now plays in the yard is still the same one which made the same springs and played the same tricks there three hundred years ago1 he would think ,i was mad2 but ,i also know that it is much madder to believe that the cat of today is through and through and in its whole nature quite a different one from the cat of three hundred years ago4 ,one only requires truly and seriously to sink oneself in the contemplation of one of these higher vertebrates in order to become distinctly conscious that this unfathomable nature1 taken as a whole1 as it exists there1 cannot possibly become nothing2 and yet1 on the other hand1 one knows its transitoriness4 ,this depends upon the fact that in this animal the infinite nature of its ,idea 7species7 is imprinted in the finiteness of the individual4 ,for in a certain sense it is of course true that in the individual we always have before us another being--in the sense which depends upon the principle of sufficient reason1 in which are also included time and space1 which constitute the principium individuationis4 ,but in another sense it is not true--in the sense in which reality belongs to the permanent forms of things1 the ,ideas alone1 and which was so clearly evident to ,plato that it became his fundamental thought1 the centre of his philosophy2 and he made the comprehension of it the criterion of capacity for philosophising in general4 ,as the scattered drops of the roaring waterfall change with lightning rapidity1 while the rainbow1 whose supporter they are1 remains immovably at rest1 quite untouched by that ceaseless change1 so every ,idea1 i4e41 every species of living creature remains quite untouched by the continual change of its individuals4 ,but it is the ,idea1 or the species in which the will to live is really rooted1 and manifests itself2 and therefore also the will is only truly concerned in the continuance of the species4 ,for example1 the lions which are born and die are like the drops of the waterfall2 but the leonitas1 the ,idea or form of the lion1 is like the unshaken rainbow upon it4 ,therefore ,plato attributed true being to the ,ideas alone1 i4e41 to the species2 to the individuals only a ceaseless arising and passing away4 ,from the profound consciousness of his imperishable nature really springs also the confidence and peace of mind with which every brute1 and even human individual1 moves unconcernedly along amid a host of chances1 which may annihilate it any moment1 and1 moreover1 moves straight on to death3 out of its eyes1 however1 there shines the peace of the species1 which that death does not affect1 and does not concern4 ,even to man this peace could not be imparted by uncertain and changing dogmas4 ,but1 as was said1 the contemplation of every animal teaches that death is no obstacle to the kernel of life1 to the will in its manifestation4 ,what an unfathomable mystery lies1 then1 in every animal6 ,look at the nearest one2 look at your dog1 how cheerfully and peacefully he lives6 ,many thousands of dogs have had to die before it came to this one's turn to live4 ,but the death of these thousands has not affected the ,idea of the dog2 it has not been in the least disturbed by all that dying4 ,therefore the dog exists as fresh and endowed with primitive force as if this were its first day and none could ever be its last2 and out of its eyes there shines the indestructible principle in it1 the archus4 ,what1 then1 has died during those thousands of years8 ,not the dog--it stands unscathed before us2 merely its shadow1 its image in our form of knowledge1 which is bound to time4 ,yet how can one even believe that that passes away which for ever and ever exists and fills all time8 ,certainly the matter can be explained empirically2 in proportion as death destroyed the individuals1 generation produced new ones4 ,but this empirical explanation is only an apparent explanation3 it puts one riddle in the place of the other4 ,the metaphysical understanding of the matter1 although not to be got so cheaply1 is yet the only true and satisfying one4 ,kant1 in his subjective procedure1 brought to light the truth that time cannot belong to the thing in itself1 because it lies preformed in our apprehension4 ,now death is the temporal end of the temporal phenomenon2 but as soon as we abstract time1 there is no longer any end1 and this word has lost all significance4 ,but ,i1 here upon the objective path1 am trying to show the positive side of the matter1 that the thing in itself remains untouched by time1 and by that which is only possible through time1 arising and passing away1 and that the phenomena in time could not have even that ceaselessly fleeting existence which stands next to nothingness1 if there were not in them a kernel of the infinite4 ,eternity is certainly a conception which has no perception as its foundation2 accordingly it has also a merely negative content2 it signifies a timeless existence4 ,time is yet merely an image of eternity1 1 as ,plotinus has it2 and in the same way our temporal existence is a mere image of our true nature4 ,this must lie in eternity1 just because time is only the form of our knowledge2 but on account of this alone do we know our own existence1 and that of all things as transitory1 finite1 and subject to annihilation4 ,in the second book ,i have shown that the adequate objectivity of the will as the thing in itself1 at each of its grades1 is the 7,platonic7 ,idea2 similarly in the third book that the ,ideas of things have the pure subject of knowledge as their correlative2 consequently the knowledge of them only appears exceptionally and temporarily under specially favourable conditions4 ,for individual knowledge1 on the other hand1 thus in time1 the ,idea presents itself under the form of the species1 which is the ,idea broken up through its entrance into time4 ,therefore the species is the most immediate objectification of the thing in itself1 i4e41 of the will to live4 ,the inmost nature of every brute1 and also of man1 accordingly lies in the species2 thus the will to live1 which is so powerfully active1 is rooted in this1 not really in the individual4 ,on the other hand1 in the individual alone lies the immediate consciousness3 accordingly it imagines itself different from the species1 and therefore fears death4 ,the will to live manifests itself in relation to the individual as hunger and the fear of death3 in relation to the species as sexual instinct and passionate care for the offspring4 ,in agreement with this we find nature1 which is free from that delusion of the individual1 as careful for the maintenance of the species as it is indifferent to the destruction of the individuals3 the latter are always only means1 the former is the end4 ,therefore a glaring contrast appears between its niggardliness in the endowment of the individuals and its prodigality when the species is concerned4 ,in the latter case from one individual are often annually obtained a hundred thousand germs1 and more2 for example1 from trees1 fishes1 crabs1 termites1 and many others4 ,in the former case1 on the contrary1 only barely enough in the way of powers and organs is given to each to enable it with ceaseless effort to maintain its life4 ,and1 therefore1 if an animal is injured or weakened it must1 as a rule1 starve4 ,and where an incidental saving was possible1 through the circumstance that one part could upon necessity be dispensed with1 it has been withheld1 even out of order4 ,hence1 for example1 many caterpillars are without eyes2 the poor creatures grope in the dark from leaf to leaf1 which1 since they lack feelers1 they do by moving threefourths of their body back and forward in the air1 till they find some object4 ,hence they often miss their food which is to be found close by4 ,but this happens in consequence of the lex parsimoni natur1 to the expression of which natura nihil facit supervacaneum one may add et nihil largitur4 ,the same tendency of nature shows itself also in the fact that the more fit the individual is1 on account of his age1 for the propagation of the species1 the more powerfully does the vis natur medicatrix manifest itself in him1 and therefore his wounds heal easily1 and he easily recovers from diseases4 ,this diminishes along with the power of generation1 and sinks low after it is extinct2 for now in the eyes of nature the individual has become worthless4 ,if now we cast another glance at the scale of existences1 with the whole of their accompanying gradations of consciousness1 from the polyp up to man1 we see this wonderful pyramid1 kept in ceaseless oscillation certainly by the constant death of the individuals1 yet by means of the bond of generation1 enduring in the species through the infinite course of time4 ,while1 then1 as was explained above1 the objective1 the species1 presents itself as indestructible1 the subjective1 which consists merely in the selfconsciousness of these beings1 seems to be of the shortest duration1 and to be unceasingly destroyed1 in order1 just as often1 to come forth again from nothing in an incomprehensible manner4 ,but1 indeed1 one must be very shortsighted to let oneself be deceived by this appearance1 and not to comprehend that1 although the form of temporal permanence only belongs to the objective1 the subjective1 i4e41 the will1 which lives and manifests itself in all1 and with it the subject of the knowledge in which all exhibits itself1 must be not less indestructible2 because the permanence of the objective1 or external1 can yet only be the phenomenal appearance of the indestructibility of the subjective or internal2 for the former can possess nothing which it has not received on loan from the latter2 and cannot be essentially and originally an objective1 a phenomenon1 and then secondarily and accidentally a subjective1 a thing in itself1 a selfconsciousness4 ,for clearly the former as a manifestation presupposes something which manifests itself1 as being for other presupposes a being for self1 and as object presupposes a subject2 and not conversely3 because everywhere the root of things must lie in that which they are for themselves1 thus in the subjective1 not in the objective1 i4e41 in that which they are only for others1 in a foreign consciousness4 ,accordingly we found in the first book that the right startingpoint for philosophy is essentially and necessarily the subjective1 i4e41 the idealistic startingpoint2 and also that the opposite startingpoint1 that which proceeds from the objective1 leads to materialism4 ,at bottom1 however1 we are far more one with the world than we commonly suppose3 its inner nature is our will1 its phenomenal appearance is our idea4 ,for any one who could bring this unity of being to distinct consciousness1 the difference between the continuance of the external world after his death and his own continuance after death would vanish4 ,the two would present themselves to him as one and the same2 nay1 he would laugh at the delusion that could separate them4 ,for the understanding of the indestructibility of our nature coincides with that of the identity of the macrocosm and the microcosm4 ,meanwhile one may obtain light upon what is said here by a peculiar experiment1 performed by means of the imagination1 an experiment which might be called metaphysical4 ,let any one try to present vividly to his mind the time1 in any case not far distant1 when he will be dead4 ,then he thinks himself away and lets the world go on existing2 but soon1 to his own astonishment1 he will discover that he was nevertheless still there4 ,for he intended to present the world to his mind without himself2 but the ego is the immediate element in consciousness1 through which alone the world is brought about1 and for which alone it exists4 ,this centre of all existence1 this kernel of all reality1 is to be abolished1 and yet the world is to go on existing2 it is a thought which can be conceived in the abstract1 but not realised4 ,the endeavour to accomplish this1 the attempt to think the secondary without the primary1 the conditioned without the condition1 that which is supported without the supporter1 always fails1 much in the same way as the attempt to think an equilateral1 rightangled triangle1 or a destruction or origination of matter1 and similar impossibilities4 ,instead of what was intended1 the feeling here presses upon us that the world is not less in us than we in it1 and that the source of all reality lies within us4 ,the result is really this3 the time when ,i shall not be will objectively come2 but subjectively it can never come4 ,it might therefore1 indeed1 be asked1 how far every one1 in his heart1 actually believes in a thing which he really cannot conceive at all2 or whether1 since the profound consciousness of the indestructibleness of our true nature associates itself with that merely intellectual experiment1 which1 however1 has already been made more or less distinctly by every one1 whether1 ,i say1 our own death is not perhaps for us at bottom the most incredible thing in the world4 ,the deep conviction of the indestructibleness of our nature through death1 which1 as is also shown by the inevitable qualms of conscience at its approach1 every one carries at the bottom of his heart1 depends altogether upon the consciousness of the original and eternal nature of our being3 therefore ,spinoza expresses it thus3 8,sentimus1 experimurque1 nos ternos esse40 ,for a reasonable man can only think of himself as imperishable1 because he thinks of himself as without beginning1 as eternal1 in fact as timeless4 ,whoever1 on the other hand1 regards himself as having become out of nothing must also think that he will again become nothing2 for that an eternity had passed before he was1 and then a second eternity had begun1 through which he will never cease to be1 is a monstrous thought4 ,really the most solid ground for our immortality is the old principle3 8,ex nihilo nihil fit1 et in nihilum nihil potest reverti40 ,theophrastus ,paracelsus very happily says 7,works1 ,strasburg1 #afjc1 vol4 ii4 p4 #f73 8,the soul in me has arisen out of something2 therefore it does not come to nothing2 for it comes out of something40 ,he gives the true reason4 ,but whoever regards the birth of the man as his absolute beginning must regard death as his absolute end4 ,for both are what they are in the same sense2 consequently every one can only think of himself as immortal so far as he also thinks of himself as unborn1 and in the same sense4 ,what birth is1 that also is death1 according to its nature and significance3 it is the same line drawn in two directions4 ,if the former is an actual arising out of nothing1 then the latter is also an actual annihilation4 ,but in truth it is only by means of the eternity of our real being that we can conceive it as imperishable1 and consequently this imperishableness is not temporal4 ,the assumption that man is made out of nothing leads necessarily to the assumption that death is his absolute end4 ,thus in this the ,old ,testament is perfectly consistent2 for no doctrine of immortality is suitable to a creation out of nothing4 ,new ,testament ,christianity has such a doctrine because it is ,indian in spirit1 and therefore more than probably also of ,indian origin1 although only indirectly1 through ,egypt4 ,but to the ,jewish stem1 upon which that ,indian wisdom had to be grafted in the ,holy ,land1 such a doctrine is as little suited as the freedom of the will to its determinism1 or as 8,humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam ,jungere si velit40 ,it is always bad if one cannot be thoroughly original1 and dare not carve out of the whole wood4 ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 on the other hand1 have quite consistently1 besides the continued existence after death1 an existence before birth to expiate the guilt of which we have this life4 ,moreover1 how distinctly conscious they were of the necessary consistency in this is shown by the following passage from ,colebrooke's 8,history of the ,indian ,philosophy0 in the 8,transac4 of the ,asiatic ,london ,society10 vol4 i4 p4 #egg3 8,against the system of the ,bhagavatas which is but partially heretical1 the objection upon which the chief stress is laid by ,vyaso is1 that the soul would not be eternal if it were a production1 and consequently had a beginning40 ,further1 in ,upham's 8,doctrine of ,buddhism10 p4 #aaj1 it is said3 8,the lot in hell of impious persons called ,deitty is the most severe3 these are they who1 discrediting the evidence of ,buddha1 adhere to the heretical doctrine that all living beings had their beginning in the mother's womb1 and will have their end in death40 ,whoever conceives his existence as merely accidental must certainly fear that he will lose it by death4 ,on the other hand1 whoever sees1 even only in general1 that his existence rests upon some kind of original necessity will not believe that this which has produced so wonderful a thing is limited to such a brief span of time1 but that it is active in every one4 ,but he will recognise his existence as necessary who reflects that up till now1 when he exists1 already an infinite time1 thus also an infinity of changes1 has run its course1 but in spite of this he yet exists2 thus the ,whole range of all possible states has already exhausted itself without being able to destroy his existence4 ,if he could ever not be1 he would already not be now4 ,for the infinity of the time that has already elapsed1 with the exhausted possibility of the events in it1 guarantees that what exists1 exists necessarily4 ,therefore every one must conceive himself as a necessary being1 i4e41 as a being whose existence would follow from its true and exhaustive definition if one only had it4 ,in this line of thought1 then1 really lies the only immanent proof of the imperishableness of our nature1 i4e41 the only proof of this that holds good within the sphere of empirical data4 ,in this nature existence must inhere1 because it shows itself as independent of all states which can possibly be introduced through the chain of causes2 for these states have already done what they could1 and yet our existence has remained unshaken by it1 as the ray of light by the storm wind which it cuts through4 ,if time1 of its own resources1 could bring us to a happy state1 then we would already have been there long ago2 for an infinite time lies behind us4 ,but also3 if it could lead us to destruction1 we would already have long been no more4 ,from the fact that we now exist1 it follows1 if well considered1 that we must at all times exist4 ,for we are ourselves the nature which time has taken up into itself in order to fill its void2 consequently it fills the whole of time1 present1 past1 and future1 in the same way1 and it is just as impossible for us to fall out of existence as to fall out of space4 ,carefully considered1 it is inconceivable that what once exists in all the strength of reality should ever become nothing1 and then not be1 through an infinite time4 ,hence has arisen the ,christian doctrine of the restoration of all things1 that of the ,hindus of the constantly repeated creation of the world by ,brahma1 together with similar dogmas of the ,greek philosophers4 ,the great mystery of our being and not being1 to explain which these and all kindred dogmas have been devised1 ultimately rests upon the fact that the same thing which objectively constitutes an infinite course of time is subjectively an indivisible1 ever present present3 but who comprehends it8 ,it has been most distinctly set forth by ,kant in his immortal doctrine of the ideality of time and the sole reality of the thing in itself4 ,for it results from this that the really essential part of things1 of man1 of the world1 lies permanently and enduringly in the ,nunc stans1 firm and immovable2 and that the change of the phenomena and events is a mere consequence of our apprehension of them by means of our form of perception1 which is time4 ,accordingly1 instead of saying to men1 8,ye have arisen through birth1 but are immortal10 one ought to say to them1 8,ye are not nothing10 and teach them to understand this in the sense of the saying attributed to ,hermes ,trismegistus1 8 0 7,quod enim est1 erit semper71 ,stob4 ,ecl41 i4 #dc1 #f4 ,if1 however1 this does not succeed1 but the anxious heart raises its old lament1 8,i see all beings arise through birth out of nothing1 and after a brief term again return to this2 my existence also1 now in the present1 will soon lie in the distant past1 and ,i will be nothing60--the right answer is1 8,dost thou not exist8 ,hast thou not within thee the valuable present1 after which ye children of time so eagerly strive1 now within1 actually within8 ,and dost thou understand how thou hast attained to it8 ,knowest thou the paths which have led thee to it1 that thou canst know they will be shut against thee by death8 ,an existence of thyself after the destruction of thy body is not conceivable by thee as possible2 but can it be more inconceivable to thee than thy present existence1 and how thou hast attained to it8 ,why shouldst thou doubt but that the secret paths to this present1 which stood open to thee1 will also stand open to every future present80 ,if1 then1 considerations of this kind are at any rate adapted to awaken the conviction that there is something in us which death cannot destroy1 this yet only takes place by raising us to a point of view from which birth is not the beginning of our existence4 ,but from this it follows that what is proved to be indestructible by death is not properly the individual1 which1 moreover1 as having arisen through generation1 and having in itself the qualities of the father and mother1 presents itself as a mere difference of the species1 but as such can only be finite4 ,as1 in accordance with this1 the individual has no recollection of its existence before its birth1 so it can have no remembrance of its present existence after death4 ,but every one places his ego in consciousness2 this seems to him therefore to be bound to individuality1 with which1 besides1 everything disappears which is peculiar to him1 as to this1 and distinguishes him from others4 ,his continued existence without individuality becomes to him therefore indistinguishable from the continuance of other beings1 and he sees his ego sink4 ,but whoever thus links his existence to the identity of consciousness1 and therefore desires an endless existence after death for this1 ought to reflect that he can certainly only attain this at the price of just as endless a past before birth4 ,for since he has no remembrance of an existence before birth1 thus his consciousness begins with birth1 he must accept his birth as an origination of his existence out of nothing4 ,but then he purchases the endless time of his existence after death for just as long a time before birth2 thus the account balances without any profit for him4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the existence which death leaves untouched is different from that of the individual consciousness1 then it must be independent of birth1 just as of death2 and therefore1 with regard to it1 it must be equally true to say1 8,i will always be10 and 8,i have always been20 which then gives two infinities for one4 ,but the great equivocation really lies in the word 8,i10 as any one will see at once who remembers the contents of our second book1 and the separation which is made there of the willing from the knowing part of our nature4 ,according as ,i understand this word ,i can say1 8,death is my complete end20 or1 8,this my personal phenomenal existence is just as infinitely small a part of my true nature as ,i am of the world40 ,but the 8,i0 is the dark point in consciousness1 as on the retina the exact point at which the nerve of sight enters is blind1 as the brain itself is entirely without sensation1 the body of the sun is dark1 and the eye sees all except itself4 ,our faculty of knowledge is directed entirely towards without1 in accordance with the fact that it is the product of a brain function1 which has arisen for the purpose of mere selfmaintenance1 thus of the search for nourishment and the capture of prey4 ,therefore every one knows himself only as this individual as it presents itself in external perception4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he could bring to consciousness what he is besides and beyond this1 then he would willingly give up his individuality1 smile at the tenacity of his attachment to it1 and say1 8,what is the loss of this individuality to me1 who bear in myself the possibility of innumerable individualities80 ,he would see that even if a continued existence of his individuality does not lie before him1 it is yet quite as good as if he had such an existence1 because he carries in himself complete compensation for it4 ,besides1 however1 it may further be taken into consideration that the individuality of most men is so miserable and worthless that with it they truly lose nothing1 and that that in them which may still have some worth is the universal human element2 but to this imperishableness can be promised4 ,indeed1 even the rigid unalterableness and essential limitation of every individual would1 in the case of an endless duration of it1 necessarily at last produce such great weariness by its monotony that only to be relieved of this one would prefer to become nothing4 ,to desire that the individuality should be immortal really means to wish to perpetuate an error infinitely4 ,for at bottom every individuality is really only a special error1 a false step1 something that had better not be2 nay1 something which it is the real end of life to bring us back from4 ,this also finds confirmation in the fact that the great majority1 indeed really all men1 are so constituted that they could not be happy in whatever kind of world they might be placed4 ,in proportion as such a world excluded want and hardship1 they would become a prey to ennui1 and in proportion as this was prevented1 they would fall into want1 misery1 and suffering4 ,thus for a blessed condition of man it would be by no means sufficient that he should be transferred to a 8better world10 but it would also be necessary that a complete change should take place in himself2 that thus he should no longer be what he is1 and1 on the contrary1 should become what he is not4 ,but for this he must first of all cease to be what he is3 this desideratum is1 as a preliminary1 supplied by death1 the moral necessity of which can already be seen from this point of view4 ,to be transferred to another world and to have his whole nature changed are1 at bottom1 one and the same4 ,upon this also ultimately rests that dependence of the objective upon the subjective which the idealism of our first book shows4 ,accordingly here lies the point at which the transcendent philosophy links itself on to ethics4 ,if one considers this one will find that the awaking from the dream of life is only possible through the disappearance along with it of its whole groundwarp also1 ,but this is its organ itself1 the intellect together with its forms1 with which the dream would spin itself out without end1 so firmly is it incorporated with it4 ,that which really dreamt this dream is yet different from it1 and alone remains over4 ,on the other hand1 the fear that with death all will be over may be compared to the case of one who imagines in a dream that there are only dreams without a dreamer4 ,but now1 after an individual consciousness has once been ended by death1 would it even be desirable that it should be kindled again in order to continue for ever8 ,the greater part of its content1 nay1 generally its whole content1 is nothing but a stream of small1 earthly1 paltry thoughts and endless cares4 ,let them1 then1 at last be stilled6 ,therefore with a true instinct1 the ancients inscribed upon their gravestones3 ,securitati perpetu2--or ,bon quieti4 ,but if here1 as so often has happened1 a continued existence of the individual consciousness should be desired1 in order to connect with it a future reward or punishment1 what would really be aimed at in this would simply be the compatibility of virtue and egoism4 ,but these two will never embrace3 they are fundamentally opposed4 ,on the other hand1 the conviction is well founded1 which the sight of noble conduct calls forth1 that the spirit of love1 which enjoins one man to spare his enemy1 and another to protect at the risk of his life some one whom he has never seen before1 can never pass away and become nothing4 ,the most thorough answer to the question as to the continued existence of the individual after death lies in ,kant's great doctrine of the ideality of time1 which just here shows itself specially fruitful and rich in consequences1 for it substitutes a purely theoretical but wellproved insight for dogmas which upon one path as upon the other lead to the absurd1 and thus settles at once the most exciting of all metaphysical questions4 ,beginning1 ending1 and continuing are conceptions which derive their significance simply and solely from time1 and are therefore valid only under the presupposition of this4 ,but time has no absolute existence2 it is not the manner of being of the thing in itself1 but merely the form of our knowledge of our existence and nature1 and that of all things1 which is just on this account very imperfect1 and is limited to mere phenomena4 ,thus with reference to this knowledge alone do the conceptions of ceasing and continuing find application1 not with reference to that which exhibits itself in these1 the inner being of things in relation to which these conceptions have therefore no longer any meaning4 ,for this shows itself also in the fact that an answer to the question which arises from those timeconceptions is impossible1 and every assertion of such an answer1 whether upon one side or the other1 is open to convincing objections4 ,one might indeed assert that our true being continues after death because it is false that it is destroyed2 but one might just as well assert that it is destroyed because it is false that it continues3 at bottom the one is as true as the other4 ,accordingly something like an antinomy might certainly be set up here4 ,but it would rest upon mere negations4 ,in it one would deny two contradictorily opposite predicates of the subject of the judgment1 but only because the whole category of these predicates would be inapplicable to that subject4 ,but if now one denies these two predicates1 not together1 but separately1 it appears as if the contradictory opposite of the predicate which in each case is denied were proved of the subject of the judgment4 ,this1 however1 depends upon the fact that here incommensurable quantities are compared1 for the problem removes us to a scene where time is abolished1 and yet asks about temporal properties which it is consequently equally false to attribute to1 or to deny of the subject4 ,this just means3 the problem is transcendent4 ,in this sense death remains a mystery4 ,on the other hand1 adhering to that distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself1 we can make the assertion that1 as phenomenon1 man is certainly perishable1 but yet his true being will not be involved in this4 ,thus this true being is indestructible1 although1 on account of the elimination of timeconceptions which is connected with it1 we cannot attribute to it continuance4 ,accordingly we would be led here to the conception of an indestructibility which would yet be no continuance4 ,now this is a conception which1 having been obtained on the path of abstraction1 can certainly also be thought in the abstract1 but yet cannot be supported by any perception1 and consequently cannot really become distinct2 yet1 on the other hand1 we must here keep in mind that we have not1 like ,kant1 absolutely given up the knowledge of the thing in itself1 but know that it is to be sought for in the will4 ,it is true that we have never asserted an absolute and exhaustive knowledge of the thing in itself1 but rather have seen very well that it is impossible to know anything as it is absolutely and in itself4 ,for as soon as ,i know1 ,i have an idea2 but this idea1 just because it is my idea1 cannot be identical with what is known1 but repeats it in an entirely different form1 for it makes a being for other out of a being for self1 and is thus always to be regarded as a phenomenal appearance of the thing in itself4 ,therefore for a knowing consciousness1 however it may be constituted1 there can be always only phenomena4 ,this is not entirely obviated even by the fact that it is my own nature which is known2 for1 since it falls within my knowing consciousness1 it is already a reflex of my nature1 something different from this itself1 thus already in a certain degree phenomenon4 ,so far1 then1 as ,i am a knowing being1 ,i have even in my own nature really only a phenomenon2 so far1 on the other hand1 as ,i am directly this nature itself1 ,i am not a knowing being4 ,for it is sufficiently proved in the second book that knowledge is only a secondary property of our being1 and introduced by its animal nature4 ,strictly speaking1 then1 we know even our own will always merely as phenomenon1 and not as it may be absolutely in and for itself4 ,but in that second book1 and also in my work upon the will in nature1 it is fully explained and proved that if1 in order to penetrate into the inner nature of things1 leaving what is given merely indirectly and from without1 we stick to the only phenomenon into the nature of which an immediate insight from within is attainable1 we find in this quite definitely1 as the ultimate kernel of reality1 the will1 in which therefore we recognise the thing in itself in so far as it has here no longer space1 although it still has time1 for its form consequently really only in its most immediate manifestation1 and with the reservation that this knowledge of it is still not exhaustive and entirely adequate4 ,thus in this sense we retain here also the conception of will as that of the thing in itself4 ,the conception of ceasing to be is certainly applicable to man as a phenomenon in time1 and empirical knowledge plainly presents death as the end of this temporal existence4 ,the end of the person is just as real as was its beginning1 and in the same sense as before birth we were not1 after death we shall be no more4 ,yet no more can be destroyed by death than was produced by birth2 thus not that through which birth first became possible4 ,in this sense natus et denatus is a beautiful expression4 ,but now the whole of empirical knowledge affords us merely phenomena2 therefore only phenomena are involved in the temporal processes of coming into being and passing away1 and not that which manifests itself in the phenomena1 the thing in itself4 ,for this the opposition of coming into being and passing away conditioned by the brain1 does not exist at all1 but has here lost meaning and significance4 ,it thus remains untouched by the temporal end of a temporal phenomenon1 and constantly retains that existence to which the conceptions of beginning1 end1 and continuance are not applicable4 ,but the thing in itself1 so far as we can follow it1 is in every phenomenal being the will of this being3 so also in man4 ,consciousness1 on the other hand1 consists in knowledge4 ,but knowledge1 as activity of the brain1 and consequently as function of the organism1 belongs1 as has been sufficiently proved1 to the mere phenomenon1 and therefore ends with this4 ,the will alone1 whose work1 or rather whose image was the body1 is that which is indestructible4 ,the sharp distinction of will from knowledge1 together with the primacy of the former1 which constitutes the fundamental characteristic of my philosophy1 is therefore the only key to the contradiction which presents itself in so many ways1 and arises ever anew in every consciousness1 even the most crude1 that death is our end1 and that yet we must be eternal and indestructible1 thus the sentimus1 experimurque nos ternos esse of ,spinoza4 ,all philosophers have erred in this3 they place the metaphysical1 the indestructible1 the eternal element in man in the intellect4 ,it lies exclusively in the will1 which is entirely different from the intellect1 and alone is original4 ,the intellect1 as was most fully shown in the second book1 is a secondary phenomenon1 and conditioned by the brain1 therefore beginning and ending with this4 ,the will alone is that which conditions1 the kernel of the whole phenomenon1 consequently free from the forms of the phenomenon to which time belongs1 thus also indestructible4 ,accordingly with death consciousness is certainly lost1 but not that which produced and sustained consciousness2 life is extinguished1 but not the principle of life also1 which manifested itself in it4 ,therefore a sure feeling informs every one that there is something in him which is absolutely imperishable and indestructible4 ,indeed the freshness and vividness of memories of the most distant time1 of earliest childhood1 bears witness to the fact that something in us does not pass away with time1 does not grow old1 but endures unchanged4 ,but what this imperishable element is one could not make clear to oneself4 ,it is not consciousness any more than it is the body upon which clearly consciousness depends4 ,but it is just that which1 when it appears in consciousness1 presents itself as will4 ,beyond this immediate manifestation of it we certainly cannot go2 because we cannot go beyond consciousness2 therefore the question what that may be when it does not come within consciousness1 i4e41 what it is absolutely in itself1 remains unanswerable4 ,in the phenomenon1 and by means of its forms1 time and space1 as principium individuationis1 what presents itself is that the human individual perishes1 while the human race1 on the contrary1 always remains and lives4 ,but in the true being of things1 which is free from these forms1 this whole distinction between the individual and the race also disappears1 and the two are immediately one4 ,the whole will to live is in the individual1 as it is in the race1 and therefore the continuance of the species is merely the image of the indestructibility of the individual4 ,since1 then1 the infinitely important understanding of the indestructibility of our true nature by death depends entirely upon the distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself1 ,i wish now to bring this difference into the clearest light by explaining it in the opposite of death1 thus in the origin of the animal existence1 i4e41 generation4 ,for this process1 which is just as mysterious as death1 presents to us most directly the fundamental opposition between the phenomenal appearance and the true being of things1 i4e41 between the world as idea and the world as will1 and also the entire heterogeneity of the laws of these two4 ,the act of procreation presents itself to us in a twofold manner3 first1 for selfconsciousness1 whose only object1 as ,i have often shown1 is the will1 with all its affections2 and then for the consciousness of other things1 i4e41 the world of idea1 or the empirical reality of things4 ,now1 from the side of the will1 thus inwardly1 subjectively1 for self consciousness1 that act presents itself as the most immediate and complete satisfaction of the will1 i4e41 as sensual pleasure4 ,from the side of the idea1 on the other hand1 thus externally1 objectively1 for the consciousness of other things1 this act is just the woof of the most cunning of webs1 the foundation of the inexpressibly complicated animal organism1 which then only requires to be developed to become visible to our astonished eyes4 ,this organism1 whose infinite complication and perfection is only known to him who has studied anatomy1 cannot1 from the side of the idea1 be otherwise conceived and thought of than as a system devised with the most ingenious forethought and carried out with the most consummate skill and exactness1 as the most arduous work of profound reflection4 ,but from the side of the will we know1 through self consciousness1 the production of this organism as the work of an act which is exactly the opposite of all reflection1 an impetuous1 blind impulse1 an exceedingly pleasurable sensation4 ,this opposition is closely related to the infinite contrast1 which is shown above1 between the absolute facility with which nature produces its works1 together with the correspondingly boundless carelessness with which it abandons them to destruction1 and the incalculably ingenious and studied construction of these very works1 judging from which they must have been infinitely difficult to make1 and their maintenance should have been provided for with all conceivable care2 while we have the opposite before our eyes4 ,if now by this certainly very unusual consideration1 we have brought together in the boldest manner the two heterogeneous sides of the world1 and1 as it were1 grasped them with one hand1 we must now hold them fast in order to convince ourselves of the entire invalidity of the laws of the phenomenon1 or the world as idea1 for that of will1 or the thing in itself4 ,then it will become more comprehensible to us that while on the side of the idea1 that is1 in the phenomenal world1 there exhibits itself to us now an arising out of nothing1 and now an entire annihilation of what has arisen1 from that other side1 or in itself1 a nature lies before us with reference to which the conceptions of arising and passing away have no significance4 ,for1 by going back to the root1 where1 by means of selfconsciousness1 the phenomenon and the thing in itself meet1 we have just1 as it were1 palpably apprehended that the two are absolutely incommensurable1 and the whole manner of being of the one1 together with all the fundamental laws of its being1 signify nothing1 and less than nothing1 in the other4 ,i believe that this last consideration will only be rightly understood by a few1 and that it will be displeasing and even offensive to all who do not understand it1 but ,i shall never on this account omit anything that can serve to illustrate my fundamental thought4 ,at the beginning of this chapter ,i have explained that the great clinging to life1 or rather fear of death1 by no means springs from knowledge1 in which case it would be the result of the known value of life2 but that that fear of death has its root directly in the will1 out of the original nature of which it proceeds1 in which it is entirely without knowledge1 and therefore blind will to live4 ,as we are allured into life by the wholly illusory inclination to sensual pleasure1 so we are retained in it by the fear of death1 which is certainly just as illusory4 ,both spring directly from the will1 which in itself is unconscious4 ,if1 on the contrary1 man were merely a knowing being1 then death would necessarily be to him not only indifferent1 but even welcome4 ,the reflection to which we have here attained now teaches that what is affected by death is merely the knowing consciousness1 and the will1 on the other hand1 because it is the thing in itself1 which lies at the foundation of every phenomenon1 is free from all that depends upon temporal determinations1 thus is also imperishable4 ,its striving towards existence and manifestation1 from which the world results1 is constantly satisfied1 for this accompanies it as the shadow accompanies the body1 for it is merely the visibility of its nature4 ,that yet in us it fears death results from the fact that here knowledge presents its existence to it as merely in the individual phenomenon1 whence the illusion arises that it will perish with this1 as my image in a mirror seems to be destroyed along with it if the mirror is broken2 this then1 as contrary to its original nature1 which is a blind striving towards existence1 fills it with horror4 ,from this now it follows that that in us which alone is capable of fearing death1 and also alone fears it1 the will1 is not affected by it2 and that1 on the other hand1 what is affected by it and really perishes is that which from its nature is capable of no fear1 and in general of no desire or emotion1 and is therefore indifferent to being and not being1 the mere subject of knowledge1 the intellect1 whose existence consists in its relation to the world of idea1 i4e41 the objective world1 whose correlative it is1 and with whose existence its own is ultimately one4 ,thus1 although the individual consciousness does not survive death1 yet that survives it which alone struggles against it--the will4 ,this also explains the contradiction that from the standpoint of knowledge philosophers have always proved with cogent reasons that death is no evil2 yet the fear of death remains inevitable for all1 because it is rooted1 not in knowledge1 but in the will4 ,it is also a result of the fact that only the will1 and not the intellect1 is indestructible1 that all religions and philosophies promise a reward in eternity only to the virtues of the will1 or heart1 not to those of the intellect1 or head4 ,the following may also serve to illustrate this consideration4 ,the will1 which constitutes our true being1 is of a simple nature2 it merely wills1 and does not know4 ,the subject of knowledge1 on the other hand1 is a secondary phenomenon1 arising from the objectification of the will2 it is the point of unity of the sensibility of the nervous system1 as it were the focus in which the rays of the activity of all the parts of the brain unite4 ,with this1 then1 it must perish4 ,in selfconsciousness1 as that which alone knows1 it stands over against the will as its spectator1 and1 although sprung from it1 knows it as something different from itself1 something foreign to it1 and consequently also only empirically1 in time1 by degrees1 in its successive excitements and acts1 and also learns its decisions only a posteriori1 and often very indirectly4 ,this explains the fact that our own nature is a riddle to us1 i4e41 to our intellect1 and that the individual regards itself as having newly arisen and as perishable2 although its true nature is independent of time1 thus is eternal4 ,as now the will does not know1 so conversely the intellect1 or the subject of knowledge1 is simply and solely knowing1 without ever willing4 ,this can be proved even physically in the fact that1 as was already mentioned in the second book1 according to ,bichat1 the various emotions directly affect all parts of the organism and disturb their functions1 with the exception of the brain1 which can only be affected by them very indirectly1 i4e41 just in consequence of those disturbances 7,de la vie et de la mort1 art4 #f1 #b74 ,but from this it follows that the subject of knowledge1 for itself and as such1 cannot take part or interest in anything1 but for it the being or not being of everything1 nay1 even of its own self1 is a matter of indifference4 ,now why should this purely neutral being be immortal8 ,it ends with the temporal manifestation of the will1 i4e41 the individual1 as it arose with it4 ,it is the lantern which is extinguished when it has served its end4 ,the intellect1 like the perceptible world which exists only in it1 is a mere phenomenon2 but the finiteness of both does not affect that of which they are the phenomenal appearance4 ,the intellect is the function of the cerebral nervous system2 but the latter1 like the rest of the body1 is the objectivity of the will4 ,therefore the intellect depends upon the somatic life of the organism2 but this itself depends upon the will4 ,the organised body may thus1 in a certain sense1 be regarded as the link between the will and the intellect2 although really it is only the will itself exhibiting itself spatially in the perception of the intellect4 ,death and birth are the constant renewal of the consciousness of the will1 in itself without end and without beginning1 which alone is1 as it were1 the substance of existence 7but each such renewal brings a new possibility of the denial of the will to live74 ,consciousness is the life of the subject of knowledge1 or the brain1 and death is its end4 ,and therefore1 finally1 consciousness is always new1 in each case beginning at the beginning4 ,the will alone is permanent2 and1 moreover1 it is it alone that permanence concerns2 for it is the will to live4 ,the knowing subject for itself is not concerned about anything4 ,in the ego1 however1 the two are bound up together4 ,in every animal existence the will has achieved an intellect which is the light by which it here pursues its ends4 ,it may be remarked by the way that the fear of death may also partly depend upon the fact that the individual will is so loath to separate from the intellect which has fallen to its lot through the course of nature1 its guide and guard1 without which it knows that it is helpless and blind4 ,finally1 this explanation also agrees with the commonplace moral experience which teaches us that the will alone is real1 while its objects1 on the other hand1 as conditioned by knowledge1 are only phenomena1 are only froth and vapour1 like the wine which ,mephistopheles provided in ,auerbach's cellar3 after every sensuous pleasure we also say1 8,and yet it seemed as ,i were drinking wine40 ,the terrors of death depend for the most part upon the false illusion that now the ego vanishes and the world remains4 ,but rather is the opposite the case2 the world vanishes1 but the inmost kernel of the ego1 the supporter and producer of that subject1 in whose idea alone the world has its existence1 remains4 ,with the brain the intellect perishes1 and with the intellect the objective world1 its mere idea4 ,that in other brains1 afterwards as before1 a similar world lives and moves is1 with reference to the intellect which perishes1 a matter of indifference4 ,if1 therefore1 reality proper did not lie in the will1 and if the moral existence were not that which extends beyond death1 then1 since the intellect1 and with it its world1 is extinguished1 the true nature of things in general would be no more than an endless succession of short and troubled dreams1 without connection among themselves2 for the permanence of unconscious nature consists merely in the idea of time of conscious nature4 ,thus a worldspirit dreaming without end or aim1 dreams which for the most part are very troubled and heavy1 would then be all in all4 ,when1 now1 an individual experiences the fear of death1 we have really before us the extraordinary1 nay1 absurd1 spectacle of the lord of the worlds1 who fills all with his being1 and through whom alone everything that is has its existence1 desponding and afraid of perishing1 of sinking into the abyss of eternal nothingness2--while1 in truth1 all is full of him1 and there is no place where he is not1 no being in which he does not live2 for it is not existence that supports him1 but he that supports existence4 ,yet it is he who desponds in the individual who suffers from the fear of death1 for he is exposed to the illusion produced by the principium individuationis that his existence is limited to the nature which is now dying4 ,this illusion belongs to the heavy dream into which1 as the will to live1 he has fallen4 ,but one might say to the dying individual3 8,thou ceasest to be something which thou hadst done better never to become40 ,so long as no denial of the will takes place1 what death leaves untouched is the germ and kernel of quite another existence1 in which a new individual finds itself again1 so fresh and original that it broods over itself in astonishment4 ,what sleep is for the individual1 death is for the will as thing in itself4 ,it would not endure to continue the same actions and sufferings throughout an eternity without true gain1 if memory and individuality remained to it4 ,it flings them off1 and this is lethe2 and through this sleep of death it reappears refreshed and fitted out with another intellect1 as a new being--8a new day tempts to new shores40 ,as the selfasserting will to live man has the root of his existence in the species4 ,accordingly death is the loss of one individuality and the assumption of another1 consequently a change of individuality under the exclusive guidance of one's own will4 ,for in this alone lies the eternal power which could produce its existence with its ego1 yet1 on account of its nature1 was not able to maintain it in existence4 ,for death is the dmenti which the essence 7essentia7 of every one receives in its claim to existence 7existentia71 the appearance of a contradiction which lies in every individual existence3 8,for all that arises ,is worthy of being destroyed40 ,but an infinite number of such existences1 each with its ego1 stands within reach of this power1 thus of the will1 which1 however1 will again prove just as transitory and perishable4 ,since now every ego has its separate consciousness1 that infinite number of them is1 with reference to such an ego1 not different from a single one4 ,from this point of view it appears to me not accidental that vum1 1 signifies both the individual term of life and infinite time4 ,indeed from this point of view it may be seen1 although indistinctly1 that ultimately and in themselves both are the same2 and according to this there would really be no difference whether ,i existed only through my term of life or for an infinite time4 ,certainly1 however1 we cannot obtain an idea of all that is said above entirely without timeconcepts2 yet when we are dealing with the thing in itself these ought to be excluded4 ,but it belongs to the unalterable limitations of our intellect that it can never entirely cast off this first and most immediate form of all its ideas1 in order to operate without it4 ,therefore we certainly come here upon a kind of metempsychosis1 although with the important difference that it does not concern the whole 1 not the knowing being1 but the will alone2 and thus1 with the consciousness that the form of time only enters here as an unavoidable concession to the limitation of our intellect1 so many absurdities which accompany the doctrine of metempsychosis disappear4 ,if1 indeed1 we now call in the assistance of the fact1 to be explained in chapter #dc1 that the character1 i4e41 the will1 is inherited from the father1 and the intellect1 on the other hand1 from the mother1 it agrees very well with our view that the will of a man1 in itself individual1 separated itself in death from the intellect received from the mother in generation1 and in accordance with its now modified nature1 under the guidance of the absolutely necessary course of the world harmonising with this1 received through a new generation a new intellect1 with which it became a new being1 which had no recollection of an earlier existence2 for the intellect1 which alone has the faculty of memory1 is the mortal part or the form1 while the will is the eternal part1 the substance4 ,in accordance with this1 this doctrine is more correctly denoted by the word palingenesis than by metempsychosis4 ,these constant new births1 then1 constitute the succession of the lifedreams of a will which in itself is indestructible1 until1 instructed and improved by so much and such various successive knowledge in a constantly new form1 it abolishes or abrogates itself4 ,the true and1 so to speak1 esoteric doctrine of ,buddhism1 as we have come to know it through the latest investigations1 also agrees with this view1 for it teaches not metempsychosis1 but a peculiar palingenesis1 resting upon a moral basis which it works out and explains with great profundity4 ,this may be seen from the exposition of the subject1 well worth reading and pondering1 which is given in ,spence ,hardy's 8,manual of ,buddhism10 pp4 #cidif 7with which compare pp4 #dbi1 #ddj1 and #dde of the same book71 the confirmation of which is to be found in ,taylor's 8,prabodh ,chandro ,daya10 ,london1 #ahab1 p4 #ce2 also in ,sangermano's 8,burmese ,empire10 p4 #f1 and in the 8,asiatic ,researches10 vol4 vi4 p4 #agi1 and vol4 ix4 p4 #bef4 ,the very useful ,german compendium of ,buddhism by ,kppen is also right upon this point4 ,yet for the great mass of ,buddhists this doctrine is too subtle2 therefore to them simple metempsychosis is preached as a comprehensible substitute4 ,besides1 it must not be neglected that even empirical grounds support a palingenesis of this kind4 ,as a matter of fact there does exist a connection between the birth of the newly appearing beings and the death of those that are worn out4 ,it shows itself in the great fruitfulness of the human race which appears as a consequence of devastating diseases4 ,when in the fourteenth century the black death had for the most part depopulated the old world1 a quite abnormal fruitfulness appeared among the human race1 and twinbirths were very frequent4 ,the circumstance was also very remarkable that none of the children born at this time obtained their full number of teeth2 thus nature1 exerting itself to the utmost1 was niggardly in details4 ,this is related by ,f4 ,schnurrer1 8,chronik der ,seuchen10 #ahbe4 ,casper also1 8,ueber die wahrscheinliche ,lebensdauer des ,menschen10 #ahce1 confirms the principle that the number of births in a given population has the most decided influence upon the length of life and mortality in it1 as this always keeps pace with the mortality3 so that always and everywhere the deaths and the births increase and decrease in like proportion2 which he places beyond doubt by an accumulation of evidence collected from many lands and their various provinces4 ,and yet it is impossible that there can be a physical causal connection between my early death and the fruitfulness of a marriage with which ,i have nothing to do1 or conversely4 ,thus here the metaphysical appears undeniably and in a stupendous manner as the immediate ground of explanation of the physical4 ,every newborn being indeed comes fresh and blithe into the new existence1 and enjoys it as a free gift3 but there is1 and can be1 nothing freely given4 ,its fresh existence is paid for by the old age and death of a wornout existence which has perished1 but which contained the indestructible seed out of which this new existence has arisen3 they are one being4 ,to show the bridge between the two would certainly be the solution of a great riddle4 ,the great truth which is expressed here has never been entirely unacknowledged1 although it could not be reduced to its exact and correct meaning1 which is only possible through the doctrine of the primacy and metaphysical nature of the will and the secondary1 merely organic nature of the intellect4 ,we find the doctrine of metempsychosis1 springing from the earliest and noblest ages of the human race1 always spread abroad in the earth as the belief of the great majority of mankind1 nay1 really as the teaching of all religions1 with the exception of that of the ,jews and the two which have proceeded from it3 in the most subtle form1 however1 and coming nearest to the truth1 as has already been mentioned1 in ,buddhism4 ,accordingly1 while ,christians console themselves with the thought of meeting again in another world1 in which one regains one's complete personality and knows oneself at once1 in those other religions the meeting again is already going on now1 only incognito4 ,in the succession of births1 and by virtue of metempsychosis or palingenesis1 the persons who now stand in close connection or contact with us will also be born along with us at the next birth1 and will have the same or analogous relations and sentiments towards us as now1 whether these are of a friendly or a hostile description4 7,cf41 for example1 ,spence ,hardy's 8,manual of ,buddhism10 p4 #afb47 ,recognition is certainly here limited to an obscure intimation1 a reminiscence which cannot be brought to distinct consciousness1 and refers to an infinitely distant time2--with the exception1 however1 of ,buddha himself1 who has the prerogative of distinctly knowing his own earlier births and those of others2--as this is described in the 8,jtaka40 ,but1 in fact1 if at favourable moment one contemplates1 in a purely objective manner1 the action of men in reality2 the intuitive conviction is forced upon one that it not only is and remains constantly the same1 according to the 7,platonic7 ,idea1 but also that the present generation1 in its true inner nature1 is precisely and substantially identical with every generation that has been before it4 ,the question simply is in what this true being consists4 ,the answer which my doctrine gives to this question is well known4 ,the intuitive conviction referred to may be conceived as arising from the fact that the multiplyingglasses1 time and space1 lose for a moment their effect4 ,with reference to the universality of the belief in metempsychosis1 ,obry says rightly1 in his excellent book1 8,du ,nirvana ,indien10 p4 #ac3 8,cette vieille croyance a fait le tour du monde1 et tait tellement rpandue dans la haute antiquit1 qu'un docte ,anglican l'avait juge sans pre1 sans mre1 et sans gnalogie0 7,ths4 ,burnet1 dans ,beausobre1 ,hist4 du ,manichisme1 ii4 p4 #cia74 ,taught already in the ,vedas1 as in all the sacred books of ,india1 metempsychosis is well known to be the kernel of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism4 ,it accordingly prevails at the present day in the whole of non,mohammedan ,asia1 thus among more than half of the whole human race1 as the firmest conviction1 and with an incredibly strong practical influence4 ,it was also the belief of the ,egyptians 7,herod41 ii4 #abc71 from whom it was received with enthusiasm by ,orpheus4 ,pythagoras1 and ,plato3 the ,pythagoreans1 however1 specially retained it4 ,that it was also taught in the mysteries of the ,greeks undeniably follows from the ninth book of ,plato's 8,laws0 7pp4 #ch and #db1 ed4 ,bip47 ,nemesius indeed 7,de nat4 hom41 c4 #b7 says3 8 1 1 40 7,communiter igitur omnes ,grci1 qui animam immortalem statuerunt1 eam de uno corpore in aliud transferri censuerunt47 ,the 8,edda0 also1 especially in the 8,vlusp10 teaches metempsychosis4 ,not less was it the foundation of the religion of the ,druids 7,cs4 de bello ,gall41 vi42 ,a4 ,pictet1 ,le mystre des ,bardes de l'ile de ,bretagne1 #ahef74 ,even a ,mohammedan sect in ,hindostan1 the ,bohrahs1 of which ,colebrooke gives a full account in the 8,asiatic ,researches10 vol4 vii4 p4 #ccf sqq41 believes in metempsychosis1 and accordingly refrains from all animal food4 ,also among ,american ,indians and negro tribes1 nay1 even among the natives of ,australia1 traces of this belief are found1 as appears from a minute description given in the ,times of #bith ,january #ahda of the execution of two ,australian savages for arson and murder4 ,it is said there3 8,the younger of the two prisoners met his end with a dogged and a determined spirit1 as it appeared1 of revenge2 the only intelligible expressions made use of conveyed an impression that he would rise up a #8white fellow1' which it was considered strengthened his resolution40 ,also in a book by ,ungewitter1 8,der ,welttheil ,australien10 it is related that the ,papuas in ,australia regarded the whites as their own relations who had returned to the world4 ,according to all this1 the belief in metempsychosis presents itself as the natural conviction of man1 whenever he reflects at all in an unprejudiced manner4 ,it would really be that which ,kant falsely asserts of his three pretended ,ideas of the reason1 a philosopheme natural to human reason1 which proceeds from its forms2 and when it is not found it must have been displaced by positive religious doctrines coming from a different source4 ,i have also remarked that it is at once obvious to every one who hears of it for the first time4 ,let any one only observe how earnestly ,lessing defends it in the last seven paragraphs of his 8,erziehung des ,menschengeschlechts40 ,lichtenberg also says in his 8,selbstcharacteristik30 8,i cannot get rid of the thought that ,i died before ,i was born40 ,even the excessively empirical ,hume says in his sceptical essay on immortality1 p4 #bc3 8,the metempsychosis is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to407#ca7 ,what resists this belief1 which is spread over the whole human race and commends itself alike to the wise and to the vulgar1 is ,judaism1 together with the two religions which have sprung from it1 because they teach the creation of man out of nothing1 and he has then the hard task of linking on to this the belief in an endless existence a parte post4 ,they certainly have succeeded1 with fire and sword1 in driving out of ,europe and part of ,asia that consoling primitive belief of mankind2 it is still doubtful for how long4 ,yet how difficult this was is shown by the oldest ,church histories4 ,most of the heretics were attached to this primitive belief2 for example1 ,simonists1 ,basilidians1 ,valentinians1 ,marcionists1 ,gnostics1 and ,manichans4 ,the ,jews themselves have in part fallen into it1 as ,tertullian and ,justinus 7in his dialogues7 inform us4 ,in the ,talmud it is related that ,abel's soul passed into the body of ,seth1 and then into that of ,moses4 ,even the passage of the ,bible1 ,matt4 xvi4 #acae1 only obtains a rational meaning if we understand it as spoken under the assumption of the dogma of metempsychosis4 ,luke1 it is true1 who also has the passage 7ix4 #ahbj71 adds the words 1 and thus attributes to the ,jews the assumption that such an ancient prophet can rise again body and all1 which1 since they know that he has already lain between six and seven hundred years in his grave1 and consequently has long since turned to dust1 would be a palpable absurdity4 ,in ,christianity1 however1 the doctrine of original sin1 i4e41 the doctrine of punishment for the sins of another individual1 has taken the place of the transmigration of souls and the expiation in this way of all the sins committed in an earlier life4 ,both identify1 and that with a moral tendency1 the existing man with one who has existed before2 the transmigration of souls does so directly1 original sin indirectly4 ,death is the great reprimand which the will to live1 or more especially the egoism1 which is essential to this1 receives through the course of nature2 and it may be conceived as a punishment for our existence47#cb7 ,it is the painful loosing of the knot which the act of generation had tied with sensual pleasure1 the violent destruction coming from without of the fundamental error of our nature3 the great disillusion4 ,we are at bottom something that ought not to be3 therefore we cease to be4 ,egoism consists really in the fact that man limits all reality to his own person1 in that he imagines that he lives in this alone and not in others4 ,death teaches him better1 for it destroys this person1 so that the true nature of man1 which is his will1 will henceforth live only in other individuals2 while his intellect1 which itself belonged only to the phenomenon1 i4e41 to the world as idea1 and was merely the form of the external world1 also continues to exist in the condition of being idea1 i4e41 in the objective being of things as such1 thus also only in the existence of what was hitherto the external world4 ,his whole ego thus lives from this time forth only in that which he had hitherto regarded as nonego3 for the difference between external and internal ceases4 ,we call to mind here that the better man is he who makes the least difference between himself and others1 does not regard them as absolute nonego1 while for the bad man this difference is great1 nay1 absolute4 ,i have worked this out in my prize essay on the foundation of morals4 ,according to what was said above1 the degree in which death can be regarded as the annihilation of the man is in proportion to this difference4 ,but if we start from the fact that the distinction of outside me and in me1 as a spatial distinction1 is only founded in the phenomenon1 not in the thing in itself1 thus is no absolutely real distinction1 then we shall see in the losing of our own individuality only the loss of a phenomenon1 thus only an apparent loss4 ,however much reality that distinction has in the empirical consciousness1 yet from the metaphysical standpoint the propositions1 8,i perish1 but the world endures10 and 8,the world perishes but ,i endure10 are at bottom not really different4 ,but1 besides all this1 death is the great opportunity no longer to be ,i2--to him who uses it4 ,during life the will of man is without freedom3 his action takes place with necessity upon the basis of his unalterable character in the chain of motives4 ,but every one remembers much that he has done1 and on account of which he is by no means satisfied with himself4 ,if now he were to go on living1 he would go on acting in the same way1 on account of the unalterable nature of his character4 ,accordingly he must cease to be what he is in order to be able to arise out of the germ of his nature as a new and different being4 ,therefore death looses these bonds2 the will again becomes free2 for freedom lies in the ,esse1 not in the ,operari4 8,finditur nodus cordis1 dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes1 ejusque opera evanescunt10 is a very celebrated saying of the ,vedas1 which all ,vedantic writers frequently repeat47#cc7 ,death is the moment of that deliverance from the onesidedness of an individuality which does not constitute the inmost kernel of our being1 but is rather to be thought of as a kind of aberration of it4 ,the true original freedom reenters at this moment1 which1 in the sense indicated1 may be regarded as a restitutio in integrum4 ,the peace and quietness upon the countenance of most dead persons seems to have its origin in this4 ,quiet and easy is1 as a rule1 the death of every good man3 but to die willingly1 to die gladly1 to die joyfully1 is the prerogative of the resigned1 of him who surrenders and denies the will to live4 ,for only he wills to die really1 and not merely apparently1 and consequently he needs and desires no continuance of his person4 ,the existence which we know he willingly gives up3 what he gets instead of it is in our eyes nothing1 because our existence is1 with reference to that1 nothing4 ,the ,buddhist faith calls it ,nirvana17#cd7 i4e41 extinction4 ,chapter ,,xlii4 ,the ,life ,of ,the ,species4 ,in the preceding chapter it was called to mind that the 7,platonic7 ,ideas of the different grades of beings1 which are the adequate objectification of the will to live1 exhibit themselves in the knowledge of the individual1 which is bound to the form of time1 as the species1 i4e41 as the successive individuals of one kind connected by the bond of generation1 and that therefore the species is the ,idea 71 species7 broken up in time4 ,accordingly the true nature of every living thing lies primarily in its species3 yet the species again has its existence only in the individuals4 ,now1 although the will only attains to selfconsciousness in the individual1 thus knows itself immediately only as the individual1 yet the deepseated consciousness that it is really the species in which his true nature objectifies itself appears in the fact that for the individual the concerns of the species as such1 thus the relations of the sexes1 the production and nourishment of the offspring1 are of incomparably greater importance and consequence than everything else4 ,hence1 then1 arises in the case of the brutes1 heat or rut 7an excellent description of the vehemence of which will be found in ,burdach's 8,physiology10 vol4 i4 #bdg1 #beg71 and1 in the case of man1 the careful and capricious selection of the other individual for the satisfaction of the sexual impulse1 which can rise to the height of passionate love1 to the fuller investigation of which ,i shall devote a special chapter3 hence also1 finally the excessive love of parents for their offspring4 ,in the supplements to the second book the will was compared to the root and the intellect to the crown of the tree2 and this is the case inwardly or psychologically4 ,but outwardly or physiologically the genitals are the root and the head the crown4 ,the nourishing part is certainly not the genitals1 but the villi of the intestines3 yet not the latter but the former are the root2 because through them the individual is connected with the species in which it is rooted4 ,for physically the individual is a production of the species1 metaphysically a more or less perfect picture of the ,idea1 which1 in the form of time1 exhibits itself as species4 ,in agreement with the relation expressed here1 the greatest vitality1 and also the decrepitude of the brain and the genital organs1 is simultaneous and stands in connection4 ,the sexual impulse is to be regarded as the inner life of the tree 7the species7 upon which the life of the individual grows1 like a leaf that is nourished by the tree1 and assists in nourishing the tree2 this is why that impulse is so strong1 and springs from the depths of our nature4 ,to castrate an individual means to cut him off from the tree of the species upon which he grows1 and thus severed1 leave him to wither3 hence the degradation of his mental and physical powers4 ,that the service of the species1 i4e41 fecundation1 is followed in the case of every animal individual by momentary exhaustion and debility of all the powers1 and in the case of most insects indeed by speedy death1 on account of which ,celsus said1 8,seminis emissio est partis anim jactura20 that in the case of man the extinction of the generative power shows that the individual approaches death2 that excessive use of this power at every age shortens life1 while1 on the other hand1 temperance in this respect increases all the powers1 and especially the muscular powers1 on which account it was part of the training of the ,greek athletes2 that the same restraint lengthens the life of the insect even to the following spring2 all this points to the fact that the life of the individual is at bottom only borrowed from the species1 and that all vital force is1 as it were1 force of the species restricted by being dammed up4 ,but this is to be explained from the fact that the metaphysical substratum of life reveals itself directly in the species and only by means of this in the individual4 ,accordingly the ,lingam with the ,yoni1 as the symbol of the species and its immortality1 is worshipped in ,india1 and1 as the counterpoise of death1 is ascribed as an attribute to the very divinity who presides over death1 ,siva4 ,but without myth or symbol1 the vehemence of the sexual impulse1 the keen intentness and profound seriousness with which every animal1 including man1 pursues its concerns1 shows that it is through the function which serves it that the animal belongs to that in which really and principally its true being lies1 the species2 while all other functions and organs directly serve only the individual1 whose existence is at bottom merely secondary4 ,in the vehemence of that impulse1 which is the concentration of the whole animal nature1 the consciousness further expresses itself that the individual does not endure1 and therefore all must be staked on the maintenance of the species1 in which its true existence lies4 ,to illustrate what has been said1 let us now imagine a brute in rut1 and in the act of generation4 ,we see a seriousness and intentness never known in it at any other time4 ,now what goes on in it8 ,does it know that it must die1 and that through its present occupation a new individual1 which yet entirely resembles itself1 will arise in order to take its place8 ,of all this it knows nothing1 for it does not think4 ,but it is as intently careful for the continuance of the species in time as if it knew all that4 ,for it is conscious that it desires to live and exist1 and it expresses the highest degree of this volition in the act of generation2 this is all that then takes place in its consciousness4 ,this is also quite sufficient for the permanence of the kind2 just because the will is the radical and knowledge the adventitious4 ,on this account the will does not require to be guided by knowledge throughout2 but whenever in its primitive originality it has resolved1 this volition will objectify itself of its own accord in the world of the idea4 ,if now in this way it is that definite animal form which we have thought of that wills life and existence1 it does not will life and existence in general1 but in this particular form4 ,therefore it is the sight of its form in the female of its species that stimulates the will of the brute to the act of generation4 ,this volition of the brute1 when regarded from without and under the form of time1 presents itself as such an animal form maintained through an infinite time by the constantly repeated replacement of one individual by another1 thus by the alternation of death and reproduction1 which so regarded appear only as the pulsebeats of that form 71 1 species7 which endures through all time4 ,they may be compared to the forces of attraction and repulsion in which matter consists4 ,that which is shown here in the brute holds good also of man2 for although in him the act of generation is accompanied by complete knowledge of its final cause1 yet it is not guided by this knowledge1 but proceeds directly from the will to live as its concentration4 ,it is accordingly to be reckoned among instinctive actions4 ,for in reproduction the brute is just as little guided by knowledge of the end as in mechanical instincts2 in these also the will manifests itself1 in the main1 without the mediation of knowledge1 which here1 as there1 is only concerned with details4 ,reproduction is1 to a certain extent1 the most marvellous of all instincts1 and its work the most astonishing4 ,these considerations explain why the sexual desire has a very different character from every other2 it is not only the strongest1 but even specifically of a more powerful kind than any other4 ,it is everywhere tacitly assumed as necessary and inevitable1 and is not1 like other desires1 a matter of taste and disposition4 ,for it is the desire which even constitutes the nature of man4 ,in conflict with it no motive is so strong that it would be certain of victory4 ,it is so preeminently the chief concern that no other pleasures make up for the deprivation of its satisfaction2 and1 moreover1 for its sake both brute and man undertake every danger and every conflict4 ,a very nave expression of this disposition is the wellknown inscription on the door of the fornix at ,pompeii1 decorated with the phallus3 8,heic habitat felicitas30 this was for those going in nave1 for those coming out ironical1 and in itself humorous4 ,on the other hand1 the excessive power of the sexual passion is seriously and worthily expressed in the inscription which 7according to ,theon of ,smyrna1 ,de ,musica1 c4 #dg71 ,osiris had placed upon the column he erected to the eternal gods3 8,to ,eros1 the spirit1 the heaven1 the sun1 the moon1 the earth1 the night1 the day1 and the father of all that is and that shall be20 also in the beautiful apostrophe with which ,lucretius begins his work3 8neadum genetrix1 hominum divomque voluptas1 ,alma ,venus cet40 ,to all this corresponds the important rle which the relation of the sexes plays in the world of men1 where it is really the invisible central point of all action and conduct1 and peeps out everywhere in spite of all veils thrown over it4 ,it is the cause of war and the end of peace1 the basis of what is serious1 and the aim of the jest1 the inexhaustible source of wit1 the key to all allusions1 and the meaning of all mysterious hints1 of all unspoken offers and all stolen glances1 the daily meditation of the young1 and often also of the old1 the hourly thought of the unchaste1 and even against their will the constantly recurring imagination of the chaste1 the ever ready material of a joke1 just because the profoundest seriousness lies at its foundation4 ,it is1 however1 the piquant element and the joke of life that the chief concern of all men is secretly pursued and ostensibly ignored as much as possible4 ,but1 in fact1 we see it every moment seat itself1 as the true and hereditary lord of the world1 out of the fulness of its own strength1 upon the ancestral throne1 and looking down from thence with scornful glances1 laugh at the preparations which have been made to bind it1 imprison it1 or at least to limit it and wherever it is possible to keep it concealed1 or even so to master it that it shall only appear as a subordinate1 secondary concern of life4 ,but all this agrees with the fact that the sexual passion is the kernel of the will to live1 and consequently the concentration of all desire2 therefore in the text ,i have called the genital organs the focus of the will4 ,indeed1 one may say man is concrete sexual desire2 for his origin is an act of copulation and his wish of wishes is an act of copulation1 and this tendency alone perpetuates and holds together his whole phenomenal existence4 ,the will to live manifests itself indeed primarily as an effort to sustain the individual2 yet this is only a step to the effort to sustain the species1 and the latter endeavour must be more powerful in proportion as the life of the species surpasses that of the individual in duration1 extension1 and value4 ,therefore sexual passion is the most perfect manifestation of the will to live1 its most distinctly expressed type2 and the origin of the individual in it1 and its primacy over all other desires of the natural man1 are both in complete agreement with this4 ,one other remark of a physiological nature is in place here1 a remark which throws light upon my fundamental doctrine expounded in the second book4 ,as the sexual impulse is the most vehement of desires1 the wish of wishes1 the concentration of all our volition1 and accordingly the satisfaction of it which exactly corresponds to the individual wish of any one1 that is1 the desire fixed upon a definite individual1 is the summit and crown of his happiness1 the ultimate goal of his natural endeavours1 with the attainment of which everything seems to him to have been attained1 and with the frustrating of which everything seems to him to have been lost3--so we find1 as its physiological correlative1 in the objectified will1 thus in the human organism1 the sperm or semen as the secretion of secretions1 the quintessence of all animal fluids1 the last result of all organic functions1 and have in it a new proof of the fact that the body is only the objectivity of the will1 i4e41 is the will itself under the form of the idea4 ,with reproduction is connected the maintenance of the offspring1 and with the sexual impulse1 parental love2 and thus through these the life of the species is carried on4 ,accordingly the love of the brute for its young has1 like the sexual impulse1 a strength which far surpasses that of the efforts which merely concerns itself as an individual4 ,this shows itself in the fact that even the mildest animals are ready to undertake for the sake of their young even the most unequal battle for life and death1 and with almost all species of animals the mother encounters any danger for the protection of her young1 nay1 in many cases even faces certain death4 ,in the case of man this instinctive parental love is guided and directed by reason1 i4e41 by reflection4 ,sometimes1 however1 it is also in this way restricted1 and with bad characters this may extend to the complete repudiation of it4 ,therefore we can observe its effects most purely in the lower animals4 ,in itself1 however1 it is not less strong in man2 here also1 in particular cases1 we see it entirely overcome selflove1 and even extend to the sacrifice of life4 ,thus1 for example1 the ,french newspapers have just announced that at ,cahors1 in the department of ,lot1 a father has taken his own life in order that his son1 who had been drawn for military service1 should be the eldest son of a widow1 and therefore exempt 7,galignani's ,messenger of #bb;d ,june #ahdc74 ,yet in the case of the lower animals1 since they are capable of no reflection1 the instinctive maternal affection 7the male is generally ignorant of his paternity7 shows itself directly and unsophisticated1 and therefore with perfect distinctness and in its whole strength4 ,at bottom it is the expression of the consciousness in the brute that its true being lies more immediately in the species than in the individual1 and therefore1 when necessary1 it sacrifices its life that the species may be maintained in the young4 ,thus here1 as also in the sexual impulse1 the will to live becomes to a certain extent transcendent1 for its consciousness extends beyond the individual1 in which it is inherent1 to the species4 ,in order to avoid expressing this second manifestation of the life of the species in a merely abstract manner1 and to present it to the reader in its magnitude and reality1 ,i will give a few examples of the extraordinary strength of instinctive maternal affection4 ,the seaotter1 when pursued1 seizes its young one and dives with it2 when it comes up again to take breath1 it covers the young one with its body1 and receives the harpoon of the hunter while the young one is escaping4 ,a young whale is killed merely to attract the mother1 who hurries to it and seldom forsakes it so long as it still lives1 even although she is struck with several harpoons 7,scoresby's 8,journal of a ,whaling ,voyage20 from the ,english of ,kreis1 p4 #aif74 ,at ,three ,kings ,island1 near ,new ,zealand1 there are colossal seals called seaelephants 7phoca proboscidea74 ,they swim round the island in regular herds and feed upon fishes1 but yet have certain terrible enemies below water unknown to us1 by whom they are often severely wounded2 hence their swimming together requires special tactics4 ,the females bring forth their young upon the shore2 while they are suckling them1 which lasts from seven to eight weeks1 all the males form a circle round them in order to prevent them1 driven by hunger1 from entering the sea1 and if this is attempted they prevent it by biting4 ,thus they all fast together for between seven and eight weeks1 and all become very thin1 simply in order that the young may not enter the sea before they are able to swim well and observe the necessary tactics which are then taught them with blows and bites 7,freycinet1 ,voy4 aux terres ,australes1 #ahbf74 ,we also see here how parental affection1 like every strong exertion of the will 7cf4 chap4 xix4 #f71 heightens the intelligence4 ,wild ducks1 whitethroats1 and many other birds1 when the sportsman comes near their nest1 fly in front of him with loud cries and flap about as if their wings were injured1 in order to attract his attention from their young to themselves4 ,the lark tries to entice the dog away from its nest by exposing itself4 ,in the same way hinds and does induce the hunter to pursue them in order that their young may not be attacked4 ,swallows have flown into burning houses to rescue their young or perish with them4 ,at ,delft1 in a great fire1 a stork allowed itself to be burnt in its nest rather than forsake its tender young1 which could not yet fly 7,hadr4 ,junius1 ,descriptio ,hollandi74 ,mountaincocks and woodcocks allow themselves to be taken upon the nest when brooding4 ,muscicapa tyrannus protects its nest with remarkable courage1 and defends itself against eagles4 ,an ant has been cut in two1 and the fore half been seen to bring the pup to a place of safety4 ,a bitch whose litter had been cut out of her belly crept up to them dying1 caressed them1 and began to whine violently only when they were taken from her 7,burdach1 ,physiologie als ,erfahrungswissenschaft1 vol4 ii4 and iii474 ,chapter ,,xliii4 ,on ,heredity4 ,the most ordinary experience teaches that in generation the combined seed of the parents not only propagates the peculiarities of the species1 but also those of the individual1 as far as bodily 7objective1 external7 qualities are concerned1 and this has also always been recognised-- 8,natur sequitur semina quisque su40 --,,catull4 ,now whether this also holds good of mental 7subjective1 internal7 qualities1 so that these also are transmitted by the parents to the children1 is a question which has already often been raised1 and almost always answered in the affirmative4 ,more difficult1 however1 is the problem whether it is possible to distinguish what belongs to the father and what to the mother1 thus what is the mental inheritance which we receive from each of our parents4 ,if now we cast upon this problem the light of our fundamental knowledge that the will is the true being1 the kernel1 the radical element in man1 and the intellect1 on the other hand1 is what is secondary1 adventitious1 the accident of that substance2 before questioning experience we will assume it as at least probable that the father1 as sexus potior and the procreative principle1 imparts the basis1 the radical element1 of the new life1 thus the will1 and the mother1 as sexus sequior and merely conceiving principle1 imparts the secondary element1 the intellect2 that thus the man inherits his moral nature1 his character1 his inclinations1 his heart1 from the father1 and1 on the other hand1 the grade1 quality1 and tendency of his intelligence from the mother4 ,now this assumption actually finds its confirmation in experience2 only this cannot be decided by a physical experiment upon the table1 but results partly from the careful and acute observation of many years1 and partly from history4 ,one's own experience has the advantage of complete certainty and the greatest speciality1 and this outweighs the disadvantage that arises from it1 that its sphere is limited and its examples not generally known4 ,therefore1 primarily1 ,i refer every one to his own experience4 ,first of all let him consider himself1 confess to himself his inclinations and passions1 his characteristic errors and weaknesses1 his vices1 and also his excellences and virtues1 if he has any4 ,then let him think of his father1 and he cannot fail to recognise all these characteristic traits in him also4 ,on the other hand1 he will often find his mother of an entirely different character1 and a moral agreement with her will very seldom occur1 indeed only through the exceptional accident of a similarity of the character of the two parents4 ,let him make this examination1 for example1 with reference to quick temper or patience1 avarice or prodigality1 inclination to sensuality1 or to intemperance1 or to gambling1 hard heartedness or kindliness1 honesty or hypocrisy1 pride or condescension1 courage or cowardice1 peaceableness or quarrelsomeness1 placability or resentfulness1 c4 ,then let him make the same investigation with regard to all those whose characters and whose parents he has accurately known4 ,if he proceeds attentively1 with correct judgment1 and candidly1 the confirmation of our principle will not be lacking4 ,thus1 for example1 he will find the special tendency to lie1 which belongs to many men1 equally present in two brothers1 because they have inherited it from the father2 on this account also the comedy1 8,the ,liar and his ,son10 is psychologically correct4 ,however1 two inevitable limitations must here be borne in mind1 which only open injustice could interpret as evasions4 ,first1 pater semper incertus4 ,only a decided physical resemblance to the father removes this limitation2 a superficial resemblance1 on the other hand1 is not sufficient to do so2 for there is an aftereffect of earlier impregnation by virtue of which the children of the second marriage have sometimes still a slight resemblance to the first husband1 and children begotten in adultery to the legitimate father4 ,such an aftereffect has been still more distinctly observed in the case of brutes4 ,the second limitation is1 that in the son the moral character of the father certainly appears1 yet under the modification which it has received through another and often very different intellect 7the inheritance from the mother71 and thus a correction of the observation becomes necessary4 ,this modification may be important or trifling in proportion to that difference1 but it can never be so great that the fundamental traits of the paternal character do not always appear under it recognisably enough1 like a man who has disguised himself by an entirely different kind of dress1 wig1 and beard4 ,for example1 if by inheritance from the mother a man is preeminently endowed with reason1 thus with the power of reflection and deliberation1 the passions inherited from his father are partly bridled by this1 partly concealed1 and accordingly only attain to a methodical1 systematic1 or secret manifestation1 and thus a very different phenomenon from that of the father1 who perhaps had only a very limited mind1 will then result2 and in the same way the converse case may occur4 ,the inclinations and passions of the mother1 on the other hand1 do not reappear at all in the children1 often indeed their opposite4 ,historical examples have the advantage over those of private life of being universally known2 but1 on the other hand1 they are of course impaired by the uncertainty and frequent falsification of all tradition1 and especially also by the fact that as a rule they only contain the public1 not the private life1 and consequently only the political actions1 not the finer manifestations of character4 ,however1 ,i wish to support the truth we are speaking of by a few historical examples1 to which those who have made a special study of history can no doubt add a far larger number of equally pertinent cases4 ,it is well known that ,p4 ,decius ,mus sacrificed his life for his country with heroic nobleness2 for1 solemnly committing himself and the enemy to the infernal deities1 with covered face he plunged into the army of the ,latins4 ,about forty years later his son1 of the same name1 did exactly the same thing in the war against the ,gauls 7,liv4 viii4 #f2 x4 #bh74 ,thus a thorough proof of the ,horatian fortes creantur fortibus et bonis3 the converse of which is thus given by ,shakspeare-- 8,cowards father cowards1 and base things sire base40 --,,cymbeline1 iv4 #b4 ,early ,roman history presents to us whole families whose members in long succession distinguished themselves by devoted patriotism and courage2 such were the gens ,fabia and the gens ,fabricia4 ,again1 ,alexander the ,great was fond of power and conquest1 like his father ,philip4 ,the pedigree of ,nero which1 with a moral intention1 ,suetonius 7c4 #d et #e7 gives at the beginning of his sketch of this monster is very well worth considering4 ,it is the gens ,claudia he describes1 which flourished in ,rome through six centuries1 and produced not only capable1 but arrogant and cruel men4 ,from it sprang ,tiberius1 ,caligula1 and finally ,nero4 ,in his grandfather1 and still more strongly in his father1 all those atrocious qualities show themselves1 which could only attain their perfect development in ,nero1 partly because his higher position afforded them freer scope1 partly because he had for his mother the irrational ,bacchante1 ,agrippina1 who could impart to him no intellect to bridle his passions4 ,quite in our sense1 therefore1 ,suetonius relates that at his birth prsagio fuit etiam ,domitii1 patris1 vox1 inter gratulationes amicorum1 negantis1 quidquam ex se et ,agrippina1 nisi detestabile et malo publico nasci potuisse4 ,on the other hand1 ,cimon was the son of ,miltiades1 and ,hannibal of ,hamilcar1 and the ,scipios make up a whole family of heroes and noble defenders of their country4 ,but the son of ,pope ,alexander ,,vi4 was his hideous image1 ,csar ,borgia4 ,the son of the notorious ,duke of ,alba was just as cruel and wicked a man as his father4 ,the malicious and unjust ,philip ,,iv4 of ,france1 who is specially known by his cruel torture and execution of the knights templars1 had for his daughter ,isabella1 wife of ,edward ,,ii4 of ,england1 who rebelled against her husband1 took him prisoner1 and after he had signed his abdication1 since the attempt to kill him by illusage was unsuccessful1 caused him to be put to death in prison in a manner which is too horrible for me to care to relate4 ,the bloodthirsty tyrant and defensor fidei1 ,henry ,,viii4 of ,england had a daughter by his first marriage1 ,queen ,mary1 equally distinguished for bigotry and cruelty1 who from her numerous burnings of heretics has won the name of ,bloody ,mary4 ,his daughter by his second marriage1 ,elizabeth1 received an excellent understanding from her mother1 ,anne ,boleyn1 which prevented bigotry and curbed the parental character in her1 yet did not do away with it2 so that it still always shone through on occasions1 and distinctly appeared in her cruel treatment of ,mary of ,scotland4 ,van ,geuns7#ce7 tells a story1 after ,marcus ,donatus1 of a ,scotch girl whose father had been burnt as a highway robber and a cannibal when she was only one year old4 ,although she was brought up among quite different people1 there developed in her the same craving for human flesh1 and being caught in the act of satisfying it1 she was buried alive4 ,in the ,freimthigen of the #acth ,july #ahba we read that in the department of ,aube the police pursued a girl because she had murdered two children1 whom she ought to have taken to the foundling hospital1 in order to keep the little money given to the children4 ,at last the police found the girl on the road to ,paris1 near ,romilly1 drowned1 and her own father gave himself up as her murderer4 ,finally1 let me mention a couple of cases which have occurred recently1 and have therefore only the newspapers as their vouchers4 ,in ,october #ahcf a ,count ,belecznai was condemned to death in ,hungary because he had murdered an official and severely wounded his own relations4 ,his elder brother was executed earlier as a patricide1 and his father also had been a murderer 7,frankfurter ,postzeitung of the #bfth ,october #ahcf74 ,a year later the youngest brother of this ,count1 in the same street where the latter had murdered the official1 fired a pistol at the steward of his estates1 but missed him 7,frankfurter ,journal1 #afth ,september #ahcg74 ,in the ,frankfurter ,postzeitung of the #aith ,november #aheg a correspondent in ,paris announces the condemnation to death of a very dangerous highway robber1 ,lemaire1 and his companions1 and adds3 8,the criminal tendency seems hereditary in his family and in those of his confederates1 as several of their race have died on the scaffold40 ,it follows from a passage in the ,laws of ,plato that similar cases were already known in ,greece 7,stob4 ,flor41 vol4 ii4 p4 #bac74 ,the annals of crime will certainly have many similar pedigrees to show4 ,the tendency to suicide is specially hereditary4 ,on the other hand1 when we see the excellent ,marcus ,aurelius have the wicked ,commodus for a son1 this does not not lead us astray2 for we know that the ,diva ,faustina was a uxor infamis4 ,on the contrary1 we mark this case in order in analogous cases to presume an analogous reason2 for example1 that ,domitian was the full brother of ,titus ,i can never believe1 but that ,vespasian also was a deceived husband4 ,now1 as regards the second part of the principle set up thus the inheritance of the intellect from the mother1 this enjoys a far more general acceptance than the first part1 which in itself appeals to the liberum arbitrium indifferenti1 while its separate apprehension is opposed by the doctrine of the simplicity and indivisibility of the soul4 ,even the old and popular expression 8motherwit0 shows the early recognition of this second truth1 which depends upon the experience both with regard to small and great intellectual endowments1 that they are the possession of those whose mothers proportionately distinguished themselves by their intelligence4 ,that1 on the other hand1 the intellectual qualities of the father are not transmitted to the son is proved both by the fathers and the sons of men distinguished by the most eminent faculties1 for1 as a rule1 they are quite ordinary men1 without a trace of the paternal mental gifts4 ,but if now an isolated exception to this experience1 so often confirmed1 should appear2 such1 for example1 as is presented by ,pitt and his father1 ,lord ,chatham1 we are warranted in ascribing it to accident1 nay1 obliged to do so1 although1 on account of the exceptional rarity of great talents1 it is certainly an accident of a most extraordinary kind4 ,here1 however1 the rule holds good3 it is improbable that the improbable never happens4 ,besides1 great statesmen 7as was already mentioned in chapter #bb7 are so just as much through the qualities of their character1 thus through what is inherited from the father1 as through the superiority of their mind4 ,on the other hand1 among artists1 poets1 and philosophers1 to whose works alone genius is properly ascribed1 ,i know of no case analogous to that4 ,raphael's father was certainly a painter1 but not a great one2 ,mozart's father1 and also his son1 were musicians1 but not great ones4 ,however1 it is indeed wonderful that the fate which had destined a very short life to both of these men1 each the greatest in his own sphere1 as it were by way of compensation1 took care1 by letting them be born already in their workshop1 that1 without suffering the loss of time in youth which for the most part occurs in the case of other men of genius1 they received even from childhood1 through paternal example and instruction1 the necessary introduction into the art to which they were exclusively destined4 ,this secret and mysterious power which seems to guide the individual life ,i have made the subject of special investigations1 which ,i have communicated in the essay1 8,ueber die scheinbare ,absichtlichkeit im ,schicksale des ,einzelnen0 7,parerga1 vol4 i474 ,it is further to be observed here that there are certain scientific occupations which certainly presuppose good native faculties1 yet not those which are really rare and extraordinary2 while the principal requirements are zealous efforts1 diligence1 patience1 early instruction1 sustained study1 and much practice4 ,from this1 and not from the inheritance of the intellect of the father1 the fact is to be explained that1 since the son always willingly follows the path that has been opened up by the father1 and almost all businesses are hereditary in certain families1 in some sciences also1 which before everything demand diligence and persistence1 individual families can show a succession of men of merit2 such are the ,scaligers1 the ,bernouillis1 the ,cassinis1 the ,herschels4 ,the number of proofs of the actual inheritance of the intellect of the mother would be much greater than it appears if it were not that the character and disposition of the female sex is such that women rarely give public proof of their mental faculties2 and therefore these do not become historical1 and thus known to posterity4 ,besides1 on account of the weaker nature in general of the female sex1 these faculties themselves can never reach the grade in them to which they may afterwards rise in the son2 thus1 with reference to themselves1 we have to estimate their achievements higher in this proportion4 ,accordingly1 in the first instance1 only the following examples present themselves as proofs of our truth4 ,joseph ,,ii4 was the son of ,maria ,theresia4 ,cardanus says in the third chapter1 8,de vita propria30 8,mater mea fuit memoria et ingenio pollens40 ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau says in the first book of the 8,confessions30 8,la beaut de ma mre1 son esprit1 ses talents1--elle en avait de trop brillans pour son tat10 c41 and then quotes some delightful lines of hers4 ,d',alembert was the illegitimate son of ,claudine de ,tencin1 a woman of superior mind1 and the author of several romances and similar works1 which met with great approbation in her day1 and should even still be enjoyable 7see her biography in the 8,bltter fr litterarische ,unterhaltung10 ,march #ahde1 ,nos4 #gagc74 ,that ,buffon's mother was a remarkable woman is shown by the following passage from the 8,voyage ,montbar1 par ,hrault de ,sechelles10 which ,flourens quotes in his 8,histoire des travaux de ,buffon10 p4 #bhh3 8,buffon avait ce principe qu'en gnral les enfants tenaient de leur mre leurs qualits intellectuelles et morales3 et lorsqu'il l'avait dvelopp dans la conversation1 il en faisait surlechamp l'application luimme1 en faisant un loge pompeux de sa mre1 qui avait en effet1 beaucoup d'esprit1 des connaissances tandues1 et une tte trs bien organise40 ,that he includes the moral qualities is an error which is either committed by the reporter1 or depends upon the fact that his mother had accidentally the same character as himself and his father4 ,the contrary of this is shown in innumerable cases in which the mother and the son have opposite characters4 ,hence the greatest dramatists could present1 in ,orestes and ,hamlet1 mother and son in hostile conflict1 in which the son appears as the moral representative and avenger of his father4 ,on the other hand1 the converse case1 that the son should appear as the moral representative and avenger of the mother against the father1 would be revolting and1 at the same time1 almost absurd4 ,this depends upon the fact that between father and son there is actual identity of nature1 which is the will1 but between mother and son there is merely identity of intellect1 and even this only in a conditioned manner4 ,between mother and son the greatest moral opposition can exist1 between father and son only an intellectual opposition4 ,from this point of view1 also1 one should recognise the necessity of the ,salic law3 the woman cannot carry on the race4 ,hume says in his short autobiography3 8,our mother was a woman of singular merit40 ,it is said of ,kant's mother in the most recent biography by ,f4 ,w4 ,schubert3 8,according to the judgment of her son himself1 she was a woman of great natural understanding4 ,for that time1 when there was so little opportunity for the education of girls1 she was exceptionally well instructed1 and she also continued later to care for her further education by herself4 ,in the course of walks she drew the attention of her son to all kinds of natural phenomena1 and tried to explain to him through them the power of ,god40 ,what a remarkably able1 clever1 and superior woman ,goethe's mother was is now universally known4 ,how much she has been spoken of in literature6 while his father has not been spoken of at all2 ,goethe himself describes him as a man of subordinate faculties4 ,schiller's mother was susceptible to poetry1 and made verses herself1 a fragment of which will be found in his biography by ,schwab4 ,brger1 that genuine poetic genius1 to whom perhaps the first place after ,goethe among ,german poets belongs--for compared with his ballads those of ,schiller seem cold and laboured--has given an account of his parents which for us is significant1 and which his friend and physician1 ,althof repeats in his biography which appeared in #agih1 in these words3 8,brger's father was certainly provided with a variety of knowledge after the manner of study prevalent at the time1 and was also a good1 honourable man2 but he loved his quiet comfort and his pipe of tobacco so much1 that1 as my friend used to say1 he had always first to pull himself together if he was going to apply himself for a quarter of an hour or so to the instruction of his son4 ,his wife was a woman of extraordinary mental endowments1 which1 however1 were so little cultivated that she had scarcely learnt to write legibly4 ,brger thought that with proper culture his mother would have been the most famous of her sex1 although he several times expressed a strong disapproval of different traits of her moral character4 ,however1 he believed that he inherited from his mother some mental gifts1 and from his father an agreement with his moral character40 ,walter ,scott's mother was a poetess1 and was in communication with the wits of her time1 as we learn from the obituary notice of ,walter ,scott in the ,globe of #bdth ,september #ahcb4 ,that poems of hers appeared in print in #aghi ,i find from an article entitled 8,mother wit10 in the ,bltter fr litterarische ,unterhaltung of #dth ,october #ahda1 published by ,brockhaus1 which gives a long list of clever mothers of distinguished men1 from which ,i shall only take two3 8,bacon's mother was a distinguished linguist1 wrote and translated several works1 and in all of them showed learning1 acuteness1 and taste4 ,boerhave's mother distinguished herself through medical knowledge40 ,on the other hand1 ,haller has preserved for us a strong proof of the inheritance of the mental weakness of the mother1 for he says3 8,e duabus patriciis sororibus1 ob divitias maritos nactis1 quum tamen fatuis essent proxim1 novimus in nobilissimas gentes nunc a seculo retro ejus morbi manasse semina1 ut etiam in quarta generatione1 quintave1 omnium posterorum aliqui fatui supersint0 7,elementa physiol41 ,lib4 xxix4 #h74 ,also1 according to ,esquirol1 madness is more frequently inherited from the mother than the father4 ,if1 however1 it is inherited from the father1 ,i attribute this to the disposition of the character whose influence occasions it4 ,it seems to follow from our principle that sons of the same mother have equal mental capacity1 and if one should be highly gifted the other must be so also4 ,sometimes it is so4 ,examples of this are the ,carracci1 ,joseph and ,michael ,haydn1 ,bernard and ,andreas ,romberg1 ,george and ,frederic ,cuvier4 ,i would also add the brothers ,schlegel1 if it were not that the younger1 ,friedrich1 made himself unworthy of the honour of being named along with his excellent1 blameless1 and highly distinguished brother1 ,august ,wilhelm1 by the disgraceful obscurantism which in the last quarter of his life he pursued along with ,adam ,mller4 ,for obscurantism is a sin1 possibly not against the ,holy ,spirit1 but yet against the human spirit1 which one ought therefore never to forgive1 but always and everywhere implacably to remember against whoever has been guilty of it1 and take every opportunity of showing contempt for him so long as he lives1 nay1 after he is dead4 ,but just as often the above result does not take place2 for example1 ,kant's brother was quite an ordinary man4 ,to explain this ,i must remind the reader of what is said in the thirtyfirst chapter on the physiological conditions of genius4 ,not only an extraordinarily developed and absolutely correctly formed brain 7the share of the mother7 is required1 but also a very energetic action of the heart to animate it1 i4e41 subjectively a passionate will1 a lively temperament3 this is the inheritance from the father4 ,but this quality is at its height only during the father's strongest years2 and the mother ages still more quickly4 ,accordingly the highly gifted sons will1 as a rule1 be the eldest1 begotten in the full strength of both parents2 thus ,kant's brother was eleven years younger than him4 ,even in the case of two distinguished brothers1 as a rule1 the elder will be the superior4 ,but not only the age1 but every temporary ebb of the vital force or other disturbance of health in the parents at the time when the child is begotten may interfere with the part of one or other1 and prevent the appearance of a man of eminent talent1 which is therefore so exceedingly rare a phenomenon4 ,it may be said1 in passing1 that in the case of twins the absence of all the differences just mentioned is the cause of the quasiidentity of their nature4 ,if single cases should be found in which a highly gifted son had a mother who was not mentally distinguished at all1 this may be explained from the fact that this mother herself had a phlegmatic father1 and on this account her more than ordinarily developed brain was not adequately excited by a corresponding energy of the circulation--a necessary condition1 as ,i have explained above in chapter #ca4 ,nevertheless1 her highly perfected nervous and cerebral system was transmitted to the son1 in whose case a father with a lively and passionate disposition and an energetic action of the heart was added1 and thus the other physical condition of great mental power first appeared here4 ,perhaps this was ,byron's case1 since we nowhere find the mental advantages of his mother mentioned4 ,the same explanation is also to be applied to the case in which the mother of a son of genius who was herself distinguished for mental gifts had a mother who was by no means clever1 for the father of the latter has been a man of a phlegmatic disposition4 ,the inharmonious1 disproportionate1 ambiguous element in the character of most men might perhaps be referred to the fact that the individual has not a simple origin1 but derives the will from the father and the intellect from the mother4 ,the more heterogeneous and illadapted to each other the two parents were1 the greater will that want of harmony1 that inner variance1 be4 ,while some excel through their heart and others through their head1 there are still others whose excellence lies in a certain harmony and unity of the whole nature1 which arises from the fact that in them heart and head are so thoroughly adapted that they mutually support and advance each other2 which leads us to assume that the parents were peculiarly suited to each other1 and agreed in an exceptional measure4 ,with reference to the physiological side of the theory set forth1 ,i wish now to mention that ,burdach1 who erroneously assumes that the same psychical qualities may be inherited now from the father1 now from the mother1 yet adds 7,physiologie als ,erfahrungswissenschaft1 vol4 i4 #cjf73 8,as a whole1 the male element has more influence in determining the irritable life1 and the female element1 on the other hand1 has more influence on the sensibility40 ,what ,linn says in the 8,systema natur10 ,tom4 i4 p4 #h1 is also in point here3 8,mater prolifera promit1 ante generationem1 vivum compendium medullare novi animalis suique simillimi1 carinam ,malpighianam dictum1 tanquam plumulam vegetabilium3 hoc ex genitura ,cor adsociat ramificandum in corpus4 ,punctum emin saliens ovi incubantis avis ostendit primum cor micans1 cerebrumque cum medulla3 corculum hoc1 cessans a frigore1 excitatur calido halitu1 premitque bulla area1 sensim dilatata1 liquores1 secundum canales fluxiles4 ,punctum vitalitatis itaque in viventibus est tanquam a prima creatione continuata medullaris vit ramificatio1 cum ovum sit gemma medullaris matris a primordio viva1 licet non sua ante proprium cor paternum40 ,if we now connect the conviction we have gained here of the inheritance of the character from the father and the intellect from the mother with our earlier investigation of the wide gulf which nature has placed between man and man in a moral as in an intellectual regard1 and also with our knowledge of the absolute unalterableness both of the character and of the mental faculties1 we shall be led to the view that a real and thorough improvement of the human race might be attained to not so much from without as from within1 thus not so much by instruction and culture as rather upon the path of generation4 ,plato had already something of the kind in his mind when in the fifth book of his ,republic he set forth his wonderful plan for increasing and improving his class of warriors4 ,if we could castrate all scoundrels1 and shut up all stupid geese in monasteries1 and give persons of noble character a whole harem1 and provide men1 and indeed complete men1 for all maidens of mind and understanding1 a generation would soon arise which would produce a better age than that of ,pericles4 ,but1 without entering into such utopian plans1 it might be taken into consideration that if1 as1 if ,i am not mistaken1 was actually the case among certain ancient nations1 castration was the severest punishment after death1 the world would be delivered from whole races of scoundrels1 all the more certainly as it is well known that most crimes are committed between the age of twenty and thirty47#cf7 ,in the same way1 it might be considered whether1 as regards results1 it would not be more advantageous to give the public dowries which upon certain occasions have to be distributed1 not1 as is now customary1 to the girls who are supposed to be the most virtuous1 but to those who have most understanding and are the cleverest2 especially as it is very difficult to judge as to virtue1 for1 as it is said1 only ,god sees the heart4 ,the opportunities for displaying a noble character are rare1 and a matter of chance2 besides1 many a girl has a powerful support to her virtue in her plainness2 on the other hand1 as regards understanding1 those who themselves are gifted with it can judge with great certainty after some examination4 ,the following is another practical application4 ,in many countries1 among others in ,south ,germany1 the bad custom prevails of women carrying burdens1 often very considerable1 upon the head4 ,this must act disadvantageously upon the brain1 which must thereby gradually deteriorate in the female sex of the nation2 and since from that sex the male sex receives its brain1 the whole nation becomes ever more stupid2 which in many cases is by no means necessary4 ,accordingly by the abolition of this custom the quantum of intelligence in the whole nation would be increased1 which would positively be the greatest increase of the national wealth4 ,but if now1 leaving such practical applications to others1 we return to our special point of view1 the ethicometaphysical standpoint--since we connect the content of chapter #da with that of the present chapter--the following result will present itself to us1 which1 with all its transcendence1 has yet a direct empirical support4 ,it is the same character1 thus the same individually determined will1 that lives in all the descendants of one stock1 from the remote ancestor to the present representative of the family4 ,but in each of these a different intellect is given with it1 thus a different degree and a different kind of knowledge4 ,thus in each of these life presents itself to it from another side and in a different light3 it receives a new fundamental view of it1 a new instruction4 ,it is true that1 since the intellect is extinguished with the individual1 that will cannot supplement the insight of one course of life with that of another4 ,but in consequence of each fundamentally new view of life1 such as only a renewed personality can impart to it1 its willing itself receives a different tendency1 thus experiences a modification from it1 and what is the chief concern1 the will1 has1 in this new direction1 either to assert life anew or deny it4 ,in this way does the arrangement of nature of an everchanging connection of a will with an intellect1 which arises from the necessity of two sexes for reproduction1 become the basis of a method of salvation4 ,for by virtue of this arrangement life unceasingly presents new sides to the will 7whose image and mirror it is71 turns itself about1 as it were1 without intermission before its sight1 allows different and ever different modes of perception to try their effect upon it1 so that upon each of these it must decide for assertion or denial1 both of which constantly stand open to it1 only that1 if once denial is chosen1 the whole phenomenon ceases for it with death4 ,now because1 according to this1 it is just the constant renewal and complete alteration of the intellect for the same will which1 as imparting a new view of the world1 holds open the path of salvation1 and because the intellect comes from the mother1 the profound reason may lie here on account of which all nations 7with very few and doubtful exceptions7 abominate and forbid the marriage of brothers and sisters1 nay1 even on account of which sexual love does not arise at all between brothers and sisters1 unless in very rare exceptions1 which depend upon an unnatural perversity of the instinct1 if not upon the fact that one of the two is illegitimate4 ,for from a marriage of brothers and sisters nothing could proceed but constantly ever the same will with the same intellect1 as both already exist united in both the parents1 thus the hopeless repetition of the phenomenon which has already been4 ,but if now1 in the particular case and close at hand1 we contemplate the incredibly great and yet manifest difference of characters--find one so good and philanthropic1 another so wicked1 nay1 ferocious2 again1 behold one just1 honest1 and upright1 and another completely false1 as a sneak1 a swindler1 a traitor1 an incorrigible scoundrel--there discloses itself to us a chasm in our investigation1 for in vain we ponder1 reflecting on the origin of such a difference4 ,hindus and ,buddhists solve the problem by saying1 8,it is the consequence of the deeds of the preceding courses of life40 ,this solution is certainly the oldest1 also the most comprehensible1 and has come from the wisest of mankind2 but it only pushes the question further back4 ,yet a more satisfactory answer will hardly be found4 ,from the point of view of my whole teaching1 it remains for me to say that here1 where we are speaking of the will as thing in itself1 the principle of sufficient reason1 as merely the form of the phenomenon1 is no longer applicable2 with it1 however1 all why and whence disappear4 ,absolute freedom just consists in this1 that something is not subject at all to the principle of sufficient reason1 as the principle of all necessity4 ,such freedom1 therefore1 only belongs to the thing in itself4 ,and this is just the will4 ,accordingly1 in its phenomenal manifestation1 consequently in the ,operari1 it is subject to necessity2 but in the ,esse1 where it has determined itself as thing in itself1 it is free4 ,whenever1 therefore1 we come to this1 as happens here1 all explanation by means of reasons and consequents ceases1 and nothing remains for us but to say that here manifests itself the true freedom of the will1 which belongs to it because it is the thing in itself1 which1 however1 just as such1 is groundless1 i4e41 knows no why4 ,but on this account all understanding ceases for us here1 because all our understanding depends upon the principle of sufficient reason1 for it consists in the mere application of that principle4 ,chapter ,,xliv4 ,the ,metaphysics ,of ,the ,love ,of ,the ,sexes4 8,ye wise men1 highly1 deeply learned1 ,who think it out and know1 ,how1 when1 and where do all things pair8 ,why do they kiss and love8 ,ye men of lofty wisdom1 say ,what happened to me then2 ,search out and tell me where1 how1 when1 ,and why it happened thus40 --,b,,rger4 ,this chapter is the last of four whose various reciprocal relations1 by virtue of which1 to a certain extent1 they constitute a subordinate whole1 the attentive reader will recognise without it being needful for me to interrupt my exposition by recalling them or referring to them4 ,we are accustomed to see poets principally occupied with describing the love of the sexes4 ,this is as a rule the chief theme of all dramatic works1 tragical as well as comical1 romantic as well as classical1 ,indian as well as ,european4 ,not less is it the material of by far the largest part of lyrical and also of epic poetry1 especially if we class with the latter the enormous piles of romances which for centuries every year has produced in all the civilised countries of ,europe as regularly as the fruits of the earth4 ,as regards their main contents1 all these works are nothing else than manysided brief or lengthy descriptions of the passion we are speaking of4 ,moreover1 the most successful pictures of it--such1 for example1 as ,romeo and ,juliet1 ,la ,nouvelle ,hlise1 and ,werther--have gained immortal fame4 ,yet1 when ,rochefoucauld imagines that it is the same with passionate love as with ghosts1 of which every one speaks1 but which no one has seen2 and ,lichtenberg also in his essay1 8,ueber die ,macht der ,liebe10 disputes and denies the reality and naturalness of that passion1 they are greatly in error4 ,for it is impossible that something which is foreign and contrary to human nature1 thus a mere imaginary caricature1 could be unweariedly represented by poetic genius in all ages1 and received by mankind with unaltered interest2 for nothing that is artistically beautiful can be without truth3-- 8,rien n'est beau que le vrai2 le vrai seul est aimable40 --,,boil4 ,certainly1 however1 it is also confirmed by experience1 although not by the experience of every day1 that that which as a rule only appears as a strong yet still controllable inclination may rise under certain circumstances to a passion which exceeds all others in vehemence1 and which then sets aside all considerations1 overcomes all obstacles with incredible strength and perseverance1 so that for its satisfaction life is risked without hesitation1 nay1 if that satisfaction is still withheld1 is given as the price of it4 ,werthers and ,jacopo ,ortis exist not only in romance1 but every year can show at least half a dozen of them in ,europe3 ,sed ignotis perierunt mortibus illi2 for their sorrows find no other chroniclers than the writers of official registers or the reporters of the newspapers4 ,yet the readers of the police news in ,english and ,french journals will attest the correctness of my assertion4 ,still greater1 however1 is the number of those whom the same passion brings to the madhouse4 ,finally1 every year can show cases of the double suicide of a pair of lovers who are opposed by outward circumstances4 ,in such cases1 however1 it is inexplicable to me how those who1 certain of mutual love1 expect to find the supremest bliss in the enjoyment of this1 do not withdraw themselves from all connections by taking the extremest steps1 and endure all hardships1 rather than give up with life a pleasure which is greater than any other they can conceive4 ,as regards the lower grades of that passion1 and the mere approaches to it1 every one has them daily before his eyes1 and1 as long as he is not old1 for the most part also in his heart4 ,so then1 after what has here been called to mind1 no one can doubt either the reality or the importance of the matter2 and therefore1 instead of wondering that a philosophy should also for once make its own this constant theme of all poets1 one ought rather to be surprised that a thing which plays throughout so important a part in human life has hitherto practically been disregarded by philosophers altogether1 and lies before us as raw material4 ,the one who has most concerned himself with it is ,plato1 especially in the 8,symposium0 and the 8,phdrus40 ,yet what he says on the subject is confined to the sphere of myths1 fables1 and jokes1 and also for the most part concerns only the ,greek love of youths4 ,the little that ,rousseau says upon our theme in the 8,discours sur l'ingalit0 7p4 #if1 ed4 ,bip47 is false and insufficient4 ,kant's explanation of the subject in the third part of the essay1 8,ueber das ,gefhl des ,schnen und ,erhabenen0 7p4 #dce seq4 of ,rosenkranz's edition71 is very superficial and without practical knowledge1 therefore it is also partly incorrect4 ,lastly1 ,platner's treatment of the matter in his 8,anthropology0 7 #acdg seq47 every one will find dull and shallow4 ,on the other hand1 ,spinoza's definition1 on account of its excessive navet1 deserves to be quoted for the sake of amusement3 8,amor est titillatio1 concomitante idea caus extern0 7,eth4 iv41 prop4 #dd1 dem47 ,accordingly ,i have no predecessors either to make use of or to refute4 ,the subject has pressed itself upon me objectively1 and has entered of its own accord into the connection of my consideration of the world4 ,moreover1 least of all can ,i hope for approbation from those who are themselves under the power of this passion1 and who accordingly seek to express the excess of their feelings in the sublimest and most ethereal images4 ,to them my view will appear too physical1 too material1 however metaphysical and even transcendent it may be at bottom4 ,meanwhile let them reflect that if the object which today inspires them to write madrigals and sonnets had been born eighteen years earlier it would scarcely have won a glance from them4 ,for all love1 however ethereally it may bear itself1 is rooted in the sexual impulse alone1 nay1 it absolutely is only a more definitely determined1 specialised1 and indeed in the strictest sense individualised sexual impulse4 ,if now1 keeping this in view1 one considers the important part which the sexual impulse in all its degrees and nuances plays not only on the stage and in novels1 but also in the real world1 where1 next to the love of life1 it shows itself the strongest and most powerful of motives1 constantly lays claim to half the powers and thoughts of the younger portion of mankind1 is the ultimate goal of almost all human effort1 exerts an adverse influence on the most important events1 interrupts the most serious occupations every hour1 sometimes embarrasses for a while even the greatest minds1 does not hesitate to intrude with its trash interfering with the negotiations of statesmen and the investigations of men of learning1 knows how to slip its love letters and locks of hair even into ministerial portfolios and philosophical manuscripts1 and no less devises daily the most entangled and the worst actions1 destroys the most valuable relationships1 breaks the firmest bonds1 demands the sacrifice sometimes of life or health1 sometimes of wealth1 rank1 and happiness1 nay1 robs those who are otherwise honest of all conscience1 makes those who have hitherto been faithful1 traitors2 accordingly1 on the whole1 appears as a malevolent demon that strives to pervert1 confuse1 and overthrow everything2--then one will be forced to cry1 ,wherefore all this noise8 ,wherefore the straining and storming1 the anxiety and want8 ,it is merely a question of every ,hans finding his ,grethe47#cg7 ,why should such a trifle play so important a part1 and constantly introduce disturbance and confusion into the wellregulated life of man8 ,but to the earnest investigator the spirit of truth gradually reveals the answer4 ,it is no trifle that is in question here2 on the contrary1 the importance of the matter is quite proportionate to the seriousness and ardour of the effort4 ,the ultimate end of all love affairs1 whether they are played in sock or cothurnus1 is really more important than all other ends of human life1 and is therefore quite worthy of the profound seriousness with which every one pursues it4 ,that which is decided by it is nothing less than the composition of the next generation4 ,the dramatis person who shall appear when we are withdrawn are here determined1 both as regards their existence and their nature1 by these frivolous love affairs4 ,as the being1 the existentia1 of these future persons is absolutely conditioned by our sexual impulse generally1 so their nature1 essentia1 is determined by the individual selection in its satisfaction1 i4e41 by sexual love1 and is in every respect irrevocably fixed by this4 ,this is the key of the problem3 we shall arrive at a more accurate knowledge of it in its application if we go through the degrees of love1 from the passing inclination to the vehement passion1 when we shall also recognise that the difference of these grades arises from the degree of the individualisation of the choice4 ,the collective love affairs of the present generation taken together are accordingly1 of the whole human race1 the serious meditatio compositionis generationis futur1 e qua iterum pendent innumer generationes4 ,this high importance of the matter1 in which it is not a question of individual weal or woe1 as in all other matters1 but of the existence and special nature of the human race in future times1 and therefore the will of the individual appears at a higher power as the will of the species2--this it is on which the pathetic and sublime elements in affairs of love depend1 which for thousands of years poets have never wearied of representing in innumerable examples2 because no theme can equal in interest this one1 which stands to all others which only concern the welfare of individuals as the solid body to the surface1 because it concerns the weal and woe of the species4 ,just on this account1 then1 is it so difficult to impart interest to a drama without the element of love1 and1 on the other hand1 this theme is never worn out even by daily use4 ,that which presents itself in the individual consciousness as sexual impulse in general1 without being directed towards a definite individual of the other sex1 is in itself1 and apart from the phenomenon1 simply the will to live4 ,but what appears in consciousness as a sexual impulse directed to a definite individual is in itself the will to live as a definitely determined individual4 ,now in this case the sexual impulse1 although in itself a subjective need1 knows how to assume very skilfully the mask of an objective admiration1 and thus to deceive our consciousness2 for nature requires this stratagem to attain its ends4 ,but yet that in every case of falling in love1 however objective and sublime this admiration may appear1 what alone is looked to is the production of an individual of a definite nature is primarily confirmed by the fact that the essential matter is not the reciprocation of love1 but possession1 i4e41 the physical enjoyment4 ,the certainty of the former can therefore by no means console us for the want of the latter2 on the contrary1 in such a situation many a man has shot himself4 ,on the other hand1 persons who are deeply in love1 and can obtain no return of it1 are contented with possession1 i4e41 with the physical enjoyment4 ,this is proved by all forced marriages1 and also by the frequent purchase of the favour of a woman1 in spite of her dislike1 by large presents or other sacrifices1 nay1 even by cases of rape4 ,that this particular child shall be begotten is1 although unknown to the parties concerned1 the true end of the whole love story2 the manner in which it is attained is a secondary consideration4 ,now1 however loudly persons of lofty and sentimental soul1 and especially those who are in love1 may cry out here about the gross realism of my view1 they are yet in error4 ,for is not the definite determination of the individualities of the next generation a much higher and more worthy end than those exuberant feelings and supersensible soap bubbles of theirs8 ,nay1 among earthly aims1 can there be one which is greater or more important8 ,it alone corresponds to the profoundness with which passionate love is felt1 to the seriousness with which it appears1 and the importance which it attributes even to the trifling details of its sphere and occasion4 ,only so far as this end is assumed as the true one do the difficulties encountered1 the infinite exertions and annoyances made and endured for the attainment of the loved object1 appear proportionate to the matter4 ,for it is the future generation1 in its whole individual determinateness1 that presses into existence by means of those efforts and toils4 ,nay1 it is itself already active in that careful1 definite1 and arbitrary choice for the satisfaction of the sexual impulse which we call love4 ,the growing inclination of two lovers is really already the will to live of the new individual which they can and desire to produce2 nay1 even in the meeting of their longing glances its new life breaks out1 and announces itself as a future individuality harmoniously and well composed4 ,they feel the longing for an actual union and fusing together into a single being1 in order to live on only as this2 and this longing receives its fulfilment in the child which is produced by them1 as that in which the qualities transmitted by them both1 fused and united in one being1 live on4 ,conversely1 the mutual1 decided and persistent aversion between a man and a maid is a sign that what they could produce would only be a badly organised1 in itself inharmonious and unhappy being4 ,hence there lies a deeper meaning in the fact that ,calderon1 though he calls the atrocious ,semiramis the daughter of the air1 yet introduces her as the daughter of rape followed by the murder of the husband4 ,but1 finally1 what draws two individuals of different sex exclusively to each other with such power is the will to live1 which exhibits itself in the whole species1 and which here anticipates in the individual which these two can produce an objectification of its nature answering to its aims4 ,this individual will have the will1 or character1 from the father1 the intellect from the mother1 and the corporisation from both2 yet1 for the most part1 the figure will take more after the father1 the size after the mother1--according to the law which comes out in the breeding of hybrids among the brutes1 and principally depends upon the fact that the size of the ftus must conform to the size of the uterus4 ,just as inexplicable as the quite special individuality of any man1 which is exclusively peculiar to him1 is also the quite special and individual passion of two lovers2 indeed at bottom the two are one and the same3 the former is explicite what the latter was implicite4 ,the moment at which the parents begin to love each other--to fancy each other1 as the very happy ,english expression has it--is really to be regarded as the first appearance of a new individual and the true punctum saliens of its life1 and1 as has been said1 in the meeting and fixing of their longing glances there appears the first germ of the new being1 which certainly1 like all germs1 is generally crushed out4 ,this new individual is to a certain extent a new 7,platonic7 ,idea2 and now1 as all ,ideas strive with the greatest vehemence to enter the phenomenal world1 eagerly seizing for this end upon the matter which the law of causality divides among them all1 so also does this particular ,idea of a human individuality strive with the greatest eagerness and vehemence towards its realisation in the phenomenon4 ,this eagerness and vehemence is just the passion of the two future parents for each other4 ,it has innumerable degrees1 the two extremes of which may at any rate be described as and 2 in its nature1 however1 it is everywhere the same4 ,on the other hand1 it will be in degree so much the more powerful the more individualised it is2 that is1 the more the loved individual is exclusively suited1 by virtue of all his or her parts and qualities1 to satisfy the desire of the lover and the need established by his or her own individuality4 ,what is really in question here will become clear in the further course of our exposition4 ,primarily and essentially the inclination of love is directed to health1 strength1 and beauty1 consequently also to youth2 because the will first of all seeks to exhibit the specific character of the human species as the basis of all individuality3 ordinary amorousness 7 7 does not go much further4 ,to these1 then1 more special claims link themselves on1 which we shall investigate in detail further on1 and with which1 when they see satisfaction before them1 the passion increases4 ,but the highest degrees of this passion spring from that suitableness of two individualities to each other on account of which the will1 i4e41 the character1 of the father and the intellect of the mother1 in their connection1 make up precisely that individual towards which the will to live in general which exhibits itself in the whole species feels a longing proportionate to this its magnitude1 and which therefore exceeds the measure of a mortal heart1 and the motives of which1 in the same way1 lie beyond the sphere of the individual intellect4 ,this is thus the soul of a true and great passion4 ,now the more perfect is the mutual adaptation of two individuals to each other in each of the many respects which have further to be considered1 the stronger will be their mutual passion4 ,since there do not exist two individuals exactly alike1 there must be for each particular man a particular woman--always with reference to what is to be produced--who corresponds most perfectly4 ,a really passionate love is as rare as the accident of these two meeting4 ,since1 however1 the possibility of such a love is present in every one1 the representations of it in the works of the poets are comprehensible to us4 ,just because the passion of love really turns about that which is to be produced1 and its qualities1 and because its kernel lies here1 a friendship without any admixture of sexual love can exist between two young and goodlooking persons of different sex1 on account of the agreement of their disposition1 character1 and mental tendencies2 nay1 as regards sexual love there may even be a certain aversion between them4 ,the reason of this is to be sought in the fact that a child produced by them would have physical or mental qualities which were inharmonious2 in short1 its existence and nature would not answer the ends of the will to live as it exhibits itself in the species4 ,on the other hand1 in the case of difference of disposition1 character1 and mental tendency1 and the dislike1 nay1 enmity1 proceeding from this1 sexual love may yet arise and exist2 when it then blinds us to all that2 and if it here leads to marriage it will be a very unhappy one4 ,let us now set about the more thorough investigation of the matter4 ,egoism is so deeply rooted a quality of all individuals in general1 that in order to rouse the activity of an individual being egoistical ends are the only ones upon which we can count with certainty4 ,certainly the species has an earlier1 closer1 and greater claim upon the individual than the perishable individuality itself4 ,yet when the individual has to act1 and even make sacrifices for the continuance and quality of the species1 the importance of the matter cannot be made so comprehensible to his intellect1 which is calculated merely with regard to individual ends1 as to have its proportionate effect4 ,therefore in such a case nature can only attain its ends by implanting a certain illusion in the individual1 on account of which that which is only a good for the species appears to him as a good for himself1 so that when he serves the species he imagines he is serving himself2 in which process a mere chimera1 which vanishes immediately afterwards1 floats before him1 and takes the place of a real thing as a motive4 ,this illusion is instinct4 ,in the great majority of cases this is to be regarded as the sense of the species1 which presents what is of benefit to it to the will4 ,since1 however1 the will has here become individual1 it must be so deluded that it apprehends through the sense of the individual what the sense of the species presents to it1 thus imagines it is following individual ends while in truth it is pursuing ends which are merely general 7taking this word in its strictest sense74 ,the external phenomenon of instinct we can best observe in the brutes where its rle is most important2 but it is in ourselves alone that we arrive at a knowledge of its internal process1 as of everything internal4 ,now it is certainly supposed that man has almost no instinct2 at any rate only this1 that the newborn babe seeks for and seizes the breast of its mother4 ,but1 in fact1 we have a very definite1 distinct1 and complicated instinct1 that of the selection of another individual for the satisfaction of the sexual impulse1 a selection which is so fine1 so serious1 and so arbitrary4 ,with this satisfaction in itself1 i4e41 so far as it is a sensual pleasure resting upon a pressing want of the individual1 the beauty or ugliness of the other individual has nothing to do4 ,thus the regard for this which is yet pursued with such ardour1 together with the careful selection which springs from it1 is evidently connected1 not with the chooser himself--although he imagines it is so--but with the true end1 that which is to be produced1 which is to receive the type of the species as purely and correctly as possible4 ,through a thousand physical accidents and moral aberrations there arise a great variety of deteriorations of the human form2 yet its true type1 in all its parts1 is always again established3 and this takes place under the guidance of the sense of beauty1 which always directs the sexual impulse1 and without which this sinks to the level of a disgusting necessity4 ,accordingly1 in the first place1 every one will decidedly prefer and eagerly desire the most beautiful individuals1 i4e41 those in whom the character of the species is most purely impressed2 but1 secondly1 each one will specially regard as beautiful in another individual those perfections which he himself lacks1 nay1 even those imperfections which are the opposite of his own4 ,hence1 for example1 little men love big women1 fair persons like dark1 c4 c4 ,the delusive ecstasy which seizes a man at the sight of a woman whose beauty is suited to him1 and pictures to him a union with her as the highest good1 is just the sense of the species1 which1 recognising the distinctly expressed stamp of the same1 desires to perpetuate it with this individual4 ,upon this decided inclination to beauty depends the maintenance of the type of the species3 hence it acts with such great power4 ,we shall examine specially further on the considerations which it follows4 ,thus what guides man here is really an instinct which is directed to doing the best for the species1 while the man himself imagines that he only seeks the heightening of his own pleasure4 ,in fact1 we have in this an instructive lesson concerning the inner nature of all instinct1 which1 as here1 almost always sets the individual in motion for the good of the species4 ,for clearly the pains with which an insect seeks out a particular flower1 or fruit1 or dung1 or flesh1 or1 as in the case of the ichneumonid1 the larva of another insect1 in order to deposit its eggs there only1 and to attain this end shrinks neither from trouble nor danger1 is thoroughly analogous to the pains with which for his sexual satisfaction a man carefully chooses a woman with definite qualities which appeal to him individually1 and strives so eagerly after her that in order to attain this end he often sacrifices his own happiness in life1 contrary to all reason1 by a foolish marriage1 by love affairs which cost him wealth1 honour1 and life1 even by crimes such as adultery or rape1 all merely in order to serve the species in the most efficient way1 although at the cost of the individual1 in accordance with the will of nature which is everywhere sovereign4 ,instinct1 in fact1 is always an act which seems to be in accordance with the conception of an end1 and yet is entirely without such a conception4 ,nature implants it wherever the acting individual is incapable of understanding the end1 or would be unwilling to pursue it4 ,therefore1 as a rule1 it is given only to the brutes1 and indeed especially to the lowest of them which have least understanding2 but almost only in the case we are here considering it is also given to man1 who certainly could understand the end1 but would not pursue it with the necessary ardour1 that is1 even at the expense of his individual welfare4 ,thus here1 as in the case of all instinct1 the truth assumes the form of an illusion1 in order to act upon the will4 ,it is a voluptuous illusion which leads the man to believe he will find a greater pleasure in the arms of a woman whose beauty appeals to him than in those of any other2 or which indeed1 exclusively directed to a single individual1 firmly convinces him that the possession of her will ensure him excessive happiness4 ,therefore he imagines he is taking trouble and making sacrifices for his own pleasure1 while he does so merely for the maintenance of the regular type of the species1 or else a quite special individuality1 which can only come from these parents1 is to attain to existence4 ,the character of instinct is here so perfectly present1 thus an action which seems to be in accordance with the conception of an end1 and yet is entirely without such a conception1 that he who is drawn by that illusion often abhors the end which alone guides it1 procreation1 and would like to hinder it2 thus it is in the case of almost all illicit love affairs4 ,in accordance with the character of the matter which has been explained1 every lover will experience a marvellous disillusion after the pleasure he has at last attained1 and will wonder that what was so longingly desired accomplishes nothing more than every other sexual satisfaction2 so that he does not see himself much benefited by it4 ,that wish was related to all his other wishes as the species is related to the individual1 thus as the infinite to the finite4 ,the satisfaction1 on the other hand1 is really only for the benefit of the species1 and thus does not come within the consciousness of the individual1 who1 inspired by the will of the species1 here served an end with every kind of sacrifice1 which was not his own end at all4 ,hence1 then1 every lover1 after the ultimate consummation of the great work1 finds himself cheated2 for the illusion has vanished by means of which the individual was here the dupe of the species1 ,accordingly ,plato very happily says3 8 0 7voluptas ommlum maxime vaniloqua71 ,phileb4 #cai4 ,but all this reflects light on the instincts and mechanical tendencies of the brutes4 ,they also are1 without doubt1 involved in a kind of illusion1 which deceives them with the prospect of their own pleasure1 while they work so laboriously and with so much selfdenial for the species1 the bird builds its nest1 the insect seeks the only suitable place for its eggs1 or even hunts for prey which1 unsuited for its own enjoyment1 must be laid beside the eggs as food for the future larv1 the bees1 the wasps1 the ants apply themselves to their skilful dwellings and highly complicated economy4 ,they are all guided with certainty by an illusion1 which conceals the service of the species under the mask of an egotistical end4 ,this is probably the only way to comprehend the inner or subjective process that lies at the foundation of the manifestations of instinct4 ,outwardly1 however1 or objectively1 we find in those creatures which are to a large extent governed by instinct1 especially in insects1 a preponderance of the ganglion system1 i4e41 the subjective nervous system1 over the objective or cerebral system2 from which we must conclude that they are moved1 not so much by objective1 proper apprehension as by subjective ideas exciting desire1 which arise from the influence of the ganglion system upon the brain1 and accordingly by a kind of illusion2 and this will be the physiological process in the case of all instinct4 ,for the sake of illustration ,i will mention as another example of instinct in the human species1 although a weak one1 the capricious appetite of women who are pregnant4 ,it seems to arise from the fact that the nourishment of the embryo sometimes requires a special or definite modification of the blood which flows to it1 upon which the food which produces such a modification at once presents itself to the pregnant woman as an object of ardent longing1 thus here also an illusion arises4 ,accordingly woman has one instinct more than man2 and the ganglion system is also much more developed in the woman4 ,that man has fewer instincts than the brutes and that even these few can be easily led astray1 may be explained from the great preponderance of the brain in his case4 ,the sense of beauty which instinctively guides the selection for the satisfaction of sexual passion is led astray when it degenerates into the tendency to pederasty2 analogous to the fact that the bluebottle 7,musca vomitoria71 instead of depositing its eggs1 according to instinct1 in putrefying flesh1 lays them in the blossom of the ,arum dracunculus1 deceived by the cadaverous smell of this plant4 ,now that an instinct entirely directed to that which is to be produced lies at the foundation of all sexual love will receive complete confirmation from the fuller analysis of it1 which we cannot therefore avoid4 ,first of all we have to remark here that by nature man is inclined to inconstancy in love1 woman to constancy4 ,the love of the man sinks perceptibly from the moment it has obtained satisfaction2 almost every other woman charms him more than the one he already possesses2 he longs for variety4 ,the love of the woman1 on the other hand1 increases just from that moment4 ,this is a consequence of the aim of nature which is directed to the maintenance1 and therefore to the greatest possible increase1 of the species4 ,the man can easily beget over a hundred children a year2 the woman1 on the contrary1 with however many men1 can yet only bring one child a year into the world 7leaving twin births out of account74 ,therefore the man always looks about after other women2 the woman1 again1 sticks firmly to the one man2 for nature moves her1 instinctively and without reflection1 to retain the nourisher and protector of the future offspring4 ,accordingly faithfulness in marriage is with the man artificial1 with the woman it is natural1 and thus adultery on the part of the woman is much less pardonable than on the part of the man1 both objectively on account of the consequences and also subjectively on account of its unnaturalness4 ,but in order to be thorough and gain full conviction that the pleasure in the other sex1 however objective it may seem to us1 is yet merely disguised instinct1 i4e41 sense of the species1 which strives to maintain its type1 we must investigate more fully the considerations which guide us in this pleasure1 and enter into the details of this1 rarely as these details which will have to be mentioned here may have figured in a philosophical work before4 ,these considerations divide themselves into those which directly concern the type of the species1 i4e41 beauty1 those which are concerned with physical qualities1 and lastly1 those which are merely relative1 which arise from the requisite correction or neutralisation of the onesided qualities and abnormities of the two individuals by each other4 ,we shall go through them one by one4 ,the first consideration which guides our choice and inclination is age4 ,in general we accept the age from the years when menstruation begins to those when it ceases1 yet we give the decided preference to the period from the eighteenth to the twentyeighth year4 ,outside of those years1 on the other hand1 no woman can attract us3 an old woman1 i4e41 one who no longer menstruates1 excites our aversion4 ,youth without beauty has still always attraction2 beauty without youth has none4 ,clearly the unconscious end which guides us here is the possibility of reproduction in general3 therefore every individual loses attraction for the opposite sex in proportion as he or she is removed from the fittest period for begetting or conceiving4 ,the second consideration is that of health4 ,acute diseases only temporarily disturb us1 chronic diseases or cachexia repel us1 because they are transmitted to the child4 ,the third consideration is the skeleton1 because it is the basis of the type of the species4 ,next to age and disease nothing repels us so much as a deformed figure2 even the most beautiful face cannot atone for it2 on the contrary1 even the ugliest face when accompanied by a straight figure is unquestionably preferred4 ,further1 we feel every disproportion of the skeleton most strongly2 for example1 a stunted1 dumpy1 shortboned figure1 and many such2 also a halting gait1 where it is not the result of an extraneous accident4 ,on the other hand1 a strikingly beautiful figure can make up for all defects3 it enchants us4 ,here also comes in the great value which all attach to the smallness of the feet3 it depends upon the fact that they are an essential characteristic of the species1 for no animal has the tarsus and the metatarsus taken together so small as man1 which accords with his upright walk2 he is a plantigrade4 ,accordingly ,jesus ,sirach also says 7xxvi4 #bc1 according to the revised translation by ,kraus73 8,a woman with a straight figure and beautiful feet is like columns of gold in sockets of silver40 ,the teeth also are important2 because they are essential for nourishment and quite specially hereditary4 ,the fourth consideration is a certain fulness of flesh2 thus a predominance of the vegetative function1 of plasticity2 because this promises abundant nourishment for the ftus2 hence great leanness repels us in a striking degree4 ,a full female bosom exerts an exceptional charm upon the male sex2 because1 standing in direct connection with the female functions of propagation1 it promises abundant nourishment to the newborn child4 ,on the other hand1 excessively fat women excite our disgust3 the cause is that this indicates atrophy of the uterus1 thus barrenness2 which is not known by the head1 but by instinct4 ,the last consideration of all is the beauty of the face4 ,here also before everything else the bones are considered2 therefore we look principally for a beautiful nose1 and a short turnedup nose spoils everything4 ,a slight inclination of the nose downwards or upwards has decided the happiness in life of innumerable maidens1 and rightly so1 for it concerns the type of the species4 ,a small mouth1 by means of small maxill1 is very essential as specifically characteristic of the human countenance1 as distinguished from the muzzle of the brutes4 ,a receding or1 as it were1 cutaway chin is especially disagreeable1 because mentum prominulum is an exclusive characteristic of our species4 ,finally comes the regard for beautiful eyes and forehead2 it is connected with the psychical qualities1 especially the intellectual which are inherited from the mother4 ,the unconscious considerations which1 on the other hand1 the inclination of women follows naturally cannot be so exactly assigned4 ,in general the following may be asserted3 ,they give the preference to the age from thirty to thirtyfive years1 especially over that of youths who yet really present the height of human beauty4 ,the reason is that they are not guided by taste but by instinct1 which recognises in the age named the acme of reproductive power4 ,in general they look less to beauty1 especially of the face4 ,it is as if they took it upon themselves alone to impart this to the child4 ,they are principally won by the strength of the man1 and the courage which is connected with this2 for these promise the production of stronger children1 and also a brave protector for them4 ,every physical defect of the man1 every divergence from the type1 may with regard to the child be removed by the woman in reproduction1 through the fact that she herself is blameless in these respects1 or even exceeds in the opposite direction4 ,only those qualities of the man have to be excepted which are peculiar to his sex1 and which therefore the mother cannot give to the child3 such are the manly structure of the skeleton1 broad shoulders1 slender hips1 straight bones1 muscular power1 courage1 beard1 c4 ,hence it arises that women often love ugly men1 but never an unmanly man1 because they cannot neutralise his defects4 ,the second class of the considerations which lie at the foundation of sexual love are those which regard psychical qualities4 ,here we shall find that the woman is throughout attracted by the qualities of the heart or character in the man1 as those which are inherited from the father4 ,the woman is won especially by firmness of will1 decision1 and courage1 and perhaps also by honesty and goodheartedness4 ,on the other hand1 intellectual gifts exercise no direct and instinctive power over her1 just because they are not inherited from the father4 ,want of understanding does a man no harm with women2 indeed extraordinary mental endowment1 or even genius1 might sooner influence them unfavourably as an abnormity4 ,hence one often sees an ugly1 stupid1 and coarse fellow get the better of a cultured1 able1 and amiable man with women4 ,also marriages from love are sometimes consummated between natures which are mentally very different3 for example1 the man is rough1 powerful1 and stupid2 the woman tenderly sensitive1 delicately thoughtful1 cultured1 sthetic1 c42 or the man is a genius and learned1 the woman a goose3 8,sic visum ,veneri2 cui placet impares ,formas atque animos sub juga anea ,svo mittere cum joco40 ,the reason is1 that here quite other considerations than the intellectual predominate1--those of instinct4 ,in marriage what is looked to is not intellectual entertainment1 but the production of children3 it is a bond of the heart1 not of the head4 ,it is a vain and absurd pretence when women assert that they have fallen in love with the mind of a man1 or else it is the overstraining of a degenerate nature4 ,men1 on the other hand1 are not determined in their instinctive love by the qualities of character of the woman2 hence so many ,socrateses have found their ,xantippes2 for example1 ,shakspeare1 ,albrecht ,drer1 ,byron1 c4 ,the intellectual qualities1 however1 certainly influence here1 because they are inherited from the mother4 ,yet their influence is easily outweighed by that of physical beauty1 which acts directly1 as concerning a more essential point4 ,however1 it happens1 either from the feeling or the experience of that influence1 that mothers have their daughters taught the fine arts1 languages1 and so forth in order to make them attractive to men1 whereby they wish to assist the intellect by artificial means1 just as1 in case of need1 they assist the hips and the bosom4 ,observe that here we are speaking throughout only of that entirely immediate instinctive attraction from which alone love properly so called grows4 ,that a woman of culture and understanding prizes understanding and intellect in a man1 that a man from rational reflection should test and have regard to the character of his bride1 has nothing to do with the matter with which we are dealing here4 ,such things lie at the bottom of a rational choice in marriage1 but not of the passionate love1 which is our theme4 ,hitherto ,i have only taken account of the absolute considerations1 i4e41 those which hold good for every one3 ,i come now to the relative considerations1 which are individual1 because in their case what is looked to is the rectification of the type of the species1 which is already defectively presented1 the correction of the divergences from it which the chooser's own person already bears in itself1 and thus the return to the pure presentation of the type4 ,here1 then1 each one loves what he lacks4 ,starting from the individual constitution1 and directed to the individual constitution1 the choice which rests upon such relative considerations is much more definite1 decided1 and exclusive than that which proceeds merely from the absolute considerations2 therefore the source of really passionate love will lie1 as a rule1 in these relative considerations1 and only that of the ordinary and slighter inclination in the absolute considerations4 ,accordingly it is not generally precisely correct and perfect beauties that kindle great passions4 ,for such a truly passionate inclination to arise something is required which can only be expressed by a chemical metaphor3 two persons must neutralise each other1 like acid and alkali1 to a neutral salt4 ,the essential conditions demanded for this are the following4 ,first3 all sex is onesided4 ,this onesidedness is more distinctly expressed in one individual than in another2 therefore in every individual it can be better supplemented and neutralised by one than by another individual of the opposite sex1 for each one requires a one sidedness which is the opposite of his own to complete the type of humanity in the new individual that is to be produced1 the constitution of which is always the goal towards which all tends4 ,physiologists know that manhood and womanhood admit of innumerable degrees1 through which the former sinks to the repulsive gynander and hypospadus1 and the latter rises to the graceful androgyne2 from both sides complete hermaphrodism can be reached1 at which point stand those individuals who1 holding the exact mean between the two sexes1 can be attributed to neither1 and consequently are unfit to propagate the species4 ,accordingly1 the neutralisation of two individualities by each other1 of which we are speaking1 demands that the definite degree of his manhood shall exactly correspond to the definite degree of her womanhood2 so that the one sidedness of each exactly annuls that of the other4 ,accordingly1 the most manly man will seek the most womanly woman1 and vice vers1 and in the same way every individual will seek another corresponding to him or her in degree of sex4 ,now how far the required relation exists between two individuals is instinctively felt by them1 and1 together with the other relative considerations1 lies at the foundation of the higher degrees of love4 ,while1 therefore1 the lovers speak pathetically of the harmony of their souls1 the heart of the matter is for the most part the agreement or suitableness pointed out here with reference to the being which is to be produced and its perfection1 and which is also clearly of much more importance than the harmony of their souls1 which often1 not long after the marriage1 resolves itself into a howling discord4 ,now1 here come in the further relative considerations1 which depend upon the fact that every one endeavours to neutralise by means of the other his weaknesses1 defects1 and deviations from the type1 so that they will not perpetuate themselves1 or even develop into complete abnormities in the child which is to be produced4 ,the weaker a man is as regards muscular power the more will he seek for strong women2 and the woman on her side will do the same4 ,but since now a less degree of muscular power is natural and regular in the woman1 women as a rule will give the preference to strong men4 ,further1 the size is an important consideration4 ,little men have a decided inclination for big women1 and vice vers2 and indeed in a little man the preference for big women will be so much the more passionate if he himself was begotten by a big father1 and only remains little through the influence of his mother2 because he has inherited from his father the vascular system and its energy1 which was able to supply a large body with blood4 ,if1 on the other hand1 his father and grandfather were both little1 that inclination will make itself less felt4 ,at the foundation of the aversion of a big woman to big men lies the intention of nature to avoid too big a race1 if with the strength which this woman could impart to them they would be too weak to live long4 ,if1 however1 such a woman selects a big husband1 perhaps for the sake of being more presentable in society1 then1 as a rule1 her offspring will have to atone for her folly4 ,further1 the consideration as to the complexion is very decided4 ,blondes prefer dark persons1 or brunettes2 but the latter seldom prefer the former4 ,the reason is1 that fair hair and blue eyes are in themselves a variation from the type1 almost an abnormity1 analogous to white mice1 or at least to grey horses4 ,in no part of the world1 not even in the vicinity of the pole1 are they indigenous1 except in ,europe1 and are clearly of ,scandinavian origin4 ,i may here express my opinion in passing that the white colour of the skin is not natural to man1 but that by nature he has a black or brown skin1 like our forefathers the ,hindus2 that consequently a white man has never originally sprung from the womb of nature1 and that thus there is no such thing as a white race1 much as this is talked of1 but every white man is a faded or bleached one4 ,forced into the strange world1 where he only exists like an exotic plant1 and like this requires in winter the hothouse1 in the course of thousands of years man became white4 ,the gipsies1 an ,indian race which immigrated only about four centuries ago1 show the transition from the complexion of the ,hindu to our own47#ch7 ,therefore in sexual love nature strives to return to dark hair and brown eyes as the primitive type2 but the white colour of the skin has become a second nature1 though not so that the brown of the ,hindu repels us4 ,finally1 each one also seeks in the particular parts of the body the corrective of his own defects and aberrations1 and does so the more decidedly the more important the part is4 ,therefore snubnosed individuals have an inexpressible liking for hooknoses1 parrotfaces2 and it is the same with regard to all other parts4 ,men with excessively slim1 long bodies and limbs can find beauty in a body which is even beyond measure stumpy and short4 ,the considerations with regard to temperament act in an analogous manner4 ,each will prefer the temperament opposed to his own2 yet only in proportion as his one is decided4 ,whoever is himself in some respect very perfect does not indeed seek and love imperfection in this respect1 but is yet more easily reconciled to it than others2 because he himself insures the children against great imperfection of this part4 ,for example1 whoever is himself very white will not object to a yellow complexion2 but whoever has the latter will find dazzling whiteness divinely beautiful4 ,the rare case in which a man falls in love with a decidedly ugly woman occurs when1 besides the exact harmony of the degree of sex explained above1 the whole of her abnormities are precisely the opposite1 and thus the corrective1 of his4 ,the love is then wont to reach a high degree4 ,the profound seriousness with which we consider and ponder each bodily part of the woman1 and she on her part does the same1 the critical scrupulosity with which we inspect a woman who begins to please us1 the capriciousness of our choice1 the keen attention with which the bridegroom observes his betrothed1 his carefulness not to be deceived in any part1 and the great value which he attaches to every excess or defect in the essential parts1 all this is quite in keeping with the importance of the end4 ,for the new being to be produced will have to bear through its whole life a similar part4 ,for example1 if the woman is only a little crooked1 this may easily impart to her son a hump1 and so in all the rest4 ,consciousness of all this certainly does not exist4 ,on the contrary1 every one imagines that he makes that careful selection in the interest of his own pleasure 7which at bottom cannot be interested in it at all72 but he makes it precisely as1 under the presupposition of his own corporisation1 is most in keeping with the interest of the species1 to maintain the type of which as pure as possible is the secret task4 ,the individual acts here1 without knowing it1 by order of something higher than itself1 the species2 hence the importance which it attaches to things which may and indeed must be1 indifferent to itself as such4 ,there is something quite peculiar in the profound unconscious seriousness with which two young persons of opposite sex who see each other for the first time regard each other1 in the searching and penetrating glance they cast at one another1 in the careful review which all the features and parts of their respective persons have to endure4 ,this investigating and examining is the meditation of the genius of the species on the individual which is possible through these two and the combination of its qualities4 ,according to the result of this meditation is the degree of their pleasure in each other and their yearning for each other4 ,this yearning1 even after it has attained a considerable degree1 may be suddenly extinguished again by the discovery of something that had previously remained unobserved4 ,in this way1 then1 the genius of the species meditates concerning the coming race in all who are capable of reproduction4 ,the nature of this race is the great work with which ,cupid is occupied1 unceasingly active1 speculating1 and pondering4 ,in comparison with the importance of his great affair1 which concerns the species and all coming races1 the affairs of individuals in their whole ephemeral totality are very trifling2 therefore he is always ready to sacrifice these regardlessly4 ,for he is related to them as an immortal to mortals1 and his interests to theirs as infinite to finite4 ,thus1 in the consciousness of managing affairs of a higher kind than all those which only concern individual weal or woe1 he carries them on sublimely1 undisturbed in the midst of the tumult of war1 or in the bustle of business life1 or during the raging of a plague1 and pursues them even into the seclusion of the cloister4 ,we have seen in the above that the intensity of love increases with its individualisation1 because we have shown that the physical qualities of two individuals can be such that1 for the purpose of restoring as far as possible the type of the species1 the one is quite specially and perfectly the completion or supplement of the other1 which therefore desires it exclusively4 ,already in this case a considerable passion arises1 which at once gains a nobler and more sublime appearance from the fact that it is directed to an individual object1 and to it alone2 thus1 as it were1 arises at the special order of the species4 ,for the opposite reason1 the mere sexual impulse is ignoble1 because without individualisation it is directed to all1 and strives to maintain the species only as regards quantity1 with little respect to quality4 ,but the individualising1 and with it the intensity of the love1 can reach so high a degree that without its satisfaction all the good things in the world1 and even life itself1 lose their value4 ,it is then a wish which attains a vehemence that no other wish ever reaches1 and therefore makes one ready for any sacrifice1 and in case its fulfilment remains unalterably denied1 may lead to madness or suicide4 ,at the foundation of such an excessive passion there must lie1 besides the considerations we have shown above1 still others which we have not thus before our eyes4 ,we must therefore assume that here not only the corporisation1 but the will of the man and the intellect of the woman are specially suitable to each other1 in consequence of which a perfectly definite individual can be produced by them alone1 whose existence the genius of the species has here in view1 for reasons which are inaccessible to us1 since they lie in the nature of the thing in itself4 ,or1 to speak more exactly1 the will to live desires here to objectify itself in a perfectly definite individual1 which can only be produced by this father with this mother4 ,this metaphysical desire of the will in itself has primarily no other sphere of action in the series of existences than the hearts of the future parents1 which accordingly are seized with this ardent longing1 and now imagine themselves to desire on their own account what really for the present has only a purely metaphysical end1 i4e41 an end which lies outside the series of actually existing things4 ,thus it is the ardent longing to enter existence of the future individual which has first become possible here1 a longing which proceeds from the primary source of all being1 and exhibits itself in the phenomenal world as the lofty passion of the future parents for each other1 paying little regard to all that is outside itself2 in fact1 as an unparalleled illusion1 on account of which such a lover would give up all the good things of this world to enjoy the possession of this woman1 who yet can really give him nothing more than any other4 ,that yet it is just this possession that is kept in view here is seen from the fact that even this lofty passion1 like all others1 is extinguished in its enjoyment--to the great astonishment of those who are possessed by it4 ,it also becomes extinct when1 through the woman turning out barren 7which1 according to ,hufeland1 may arise from nineteen accidental constitutional defects71 the real metaphysical end is frustrated2 just as daily happens in millions of germs trampled under foot1 in which yet the same metaphysical life principle strives for existence2 for which there is no other consolation than that an infinity of space1 time1 and matter1 and consequently inexhaustible opportunity for return1 stands open to the will to live4 ,the view which is here expounded must once have been present to the mind of ,theophrastus ,paracelsus1 even if only in a fleeting form1 though he has not handled this subject1 and my whole system of thought was foreign to him2 for1 in quite a different context and in his desultory manner1 he wrote the following remarkable words3 8,hi sunt1 quos ,deus copulavit1 ut eam1 qu fuit ,uri et ,david2 quamvis ex diametro 7sic enim sibi humana mens persuadebat7 cum justo et legitimo matrimonio pugnaret hoc4444 sed propter ,salomonem1 ,,qui ,,aliunde ,,nasci ,,non ,,potuit1 nisi ex ,bathseba1 conjuncto ,david semine1 quamvis meretrice1 conjunxit eos ,deus0 7,de vita longa1 i4 #e74 ,the longing of love1 the 1 which the poets of all ages are unceasingly occupied with expressing in innumerable forms1 and do not exhaust the subject1 nay1 cannot do it justice1 this longing1 which attaches the idea of endless happiness to the possession of a particular woman1 and unutterable pain to the thought that this possession cannot be attained1--this longing and this pain cannot obtain their material from the wants of an ephemeral individual2 but they are the sighs of the spirit of the species1 which sees here1 to be won or lost1 a means for the attainment of its ends which cannot be replaced1 and therefore groans deeply4 ,the species alone has infinite life1 and therefore is capable of infinite desires1 infinite satisfaction1 and infinite pain4 ,but these are here imprisoned in the narrow breast of a mortal4 ,no wonder1 then1 if such a breast seems like to burst1 and can find no expression for the intimations of infinite rapture or infinite misery with which it is filled4 ,this1 then1 affords the materials for all erotic poetry of a sublime kind1 which accordingly rises into transcendent metaphors1 soaring above all that is earthly4 ,this is the theme of ,petrarch1 the material for the ,st4 ,preuxs1 ,werthers1 and ,jacopo ,ortis1 who apart from it could not be understood nor explained4 ,for that infinite esteem for the loved one cannot rest upon some spiritual excellences1 or in general upon any objective1 real qualities of hers2 for one thing1 because she is often not sufficiently well known to the lover1 as was the case with ,petrarch4 ,the spirit of the species alone can see at one glance what worth she has for it1 for its ends4 ,and great passions also arise1 as a rule1 at the first glance3 8,who ever loved that loved not at first sight80 --,,shakspeare1 8,as ,you ,like it10 iii4 #e4 ,in this regard a passage in the romance of 8,guzman de ,alfarache10 by ,mateo ,aleman1 which has been famous for #bej years1 is remarkable3 8,no es necessario1 para que uno ame1 que pase distancia de tiempo1 que siga discurso1 ni haga eleccion1 sino que con aquella primera y sola vista1 concurran juntamente cierta correspondencia consonancia1 lo que ac solemos vulgarmente decir1 una confrontacion de sangre1 a que por particular influxo suelen mover las estrellas40 7,for one to love it is not necessary that much time should pass1 that he should set about reflecting and make a choice2 but only that at that first and only glance a certain correspondence and consonance should be encountered on both sides1 or that which in common life we are wont to call a sympathy of the blood1 and to which a special influence of the stars generally impels71 ,p4 ii4 lib4 iii4 c4 #e4 ,accordingly the loss of the loved one1 through a rival1 or through death1 is also for the passionate lover a pain that surpasses all others1 just because it is of a transcendental kind1 since it affects him not merely as an individual1 but attacks him in his essentia terna1 in the life of the species into whose special will and service he was here called4 ,hence jealousy is such torment and so grim1 and the surrender of the loved one is the greatest of all sacrifices4 ,a hero is ashamed of all lamentations except the lamentation of love1 because in this it is not he but the species that laments4 ,in ,calderon's 8,zenobia the ,great0 there is in the first act a scene between ,zenobia and ,decius in which the latter says3 8,cielos1 luego tu me quieres8 ,perdiera cien mil victorias1 ,volvirame10 c4 7,heaven6 then thou lovest me8 ,for this ,i would lose a thousand victories1 would turn about1 c47 ,here1 honour1 which hitherto outweighed every interest1 is beaten out of the field as soon as sexual love1 i4e41 the interest of the species1 comes into play1 and sees before it a decided advantage2 for this is infinitely superior to every interest of mere individuals1 however important it may be4 ,therefore to this alone honour1 duty1 and fidelity yield after they have withstood every other temptation1 including the threat of death4 ,in the same way we find in private life that conscientiousness is in no point so rare as in this3 it is here sometimes set aside even by persons who are otherwise honest and just1 and adultery is recklessly committed when passionate love1 i4e41 the interest of the species1 has mastered them4 ,it even seems as if in this they believed themselves to be conscious of a higher right than the interests of individuals can ever confer2 just because they act in the interest of the species4 ,in this reference ,chamfort's remark is worth noticing3 8,quand un homme et une femme ont l'un pour l'autre une passion violente1 il me semble toujours que quelque soient les obstacles qui les sparent1 un mari1 des parens1 etc41 les deux amans sont l'un a l'autre1 de par la ,nature1 qu'ils s'appartiennent de droit divin1 malgr les lois et les conventions humaines40 ,whoever is inclined to be incensed at this should be referred to the remarkable indulgence which the ,saviour shows in the ,gospel to the woman taken in adultery1 in that ,he also assumes the same guilt in the case of all present4 ,from this point of view the greater part of the 8,decameron0 appears as mere mocking and jeering of the genius of the species at the rights and interests of individuals which it tramples under foot4 ,differences of rank and all similar circumstances1 when they oppose the union of passionate lovers1 are set aside with the same ease and treated as nothing by the genius of the species1 which1 pursuing its ends that concern innumerable generations1 blows off as spray such human laws and scruples4 ,from the same deeplying grounds1 when the ends of passionate love are concerned1 every danger is willingly encountered1 and those who are otherwise timorous here become courageous4 ,in plays and novels also we see1 with ready sympathy1 the young persons who are fighting the battle of their love1 i4e41 the interest of the species1 gain the victory over their elders1 who are thinking only of the welfare of the individuals4 ,for the efforts of the lovers appear to us as much more important1 sublime1 and therefore right1 than anything that can be opposed to them1 as the species is more important than the individual4 ,accordingly the fundamental theme of almost all comedies is the appearance of the genius of the species with its aims1 which are opposed to the personal interest of the individuals presented1 and therefore threaten to undermine their happiness4 ,as a rule it attains its end1 which1 as in accordance with poetical justice1 satisfies the spectator1 because he feels that the aims of the species are much to be preferred to those of the individual4 ,therefore at the conclusion he leaves the victorious lovers quite confidently1 because he shares with them the illusion that they have founded their own happiness1 while they have rather sacrificed it to the choice of the species1 against the will and foresight of their elders4 ,it has been attempted in single1 abnormal comedies to reverse the matter and bring about the happiness of the individuals at the cost of the aims of the species2 but then the spectator feels the pain which the genius of the species suffers1 and is not consoled by the advantages which are thereby assured to the individuals4 ,as examples of this kind two very wellknown little pieces occur to me3 8,la reine de #af ans10 and 8,le marriage de raison40 ,in tragedies containing love affairs1 since the aims of the species are frustrated1 the lovers who were its tools1 generally perish also2 for example1 in 8,romeo and ,juliet10 8,tancred10 8,don ,carlos10 8,wallenstein10 8,the ,bride of ,messina10 and many others4 ,the love of a man often affords comical1 and sometimes also tragical phenomena2 both because1 taken possession of by the spirit of the species1 he is now ruled by this1 and no longer belongs to himself3 his conduct thereby becomes unsuited to the individual4 ,that which in the higher grades of love imparts such a tinge of poetry and sublimeness to his thoughts1 which gives them even a transcendental and hyperphysical tendency1 on account of which he seems to lose sight altogether of his real1 very physical aim1 is at bottom this1 that he is now inspired by the spirit of the species whose affairs are infinitely more important than all those which concern mere individuals1 in order to find under the special directions of this spirit the whole existence of an indefinitely long posterity with this individual and exactly determined nature1 which it can receive only from him as father and the woman he loves as mother1 and which otherwise could never1 as such1 attain to existence1 while the objectification of the will to live expressly demands this existence4 ,it is the feeling that he is acting in affairs of such transcendent importance which raises the lover so high above everything earthly1 nay1 even above himself1 and gives such a hyperphysical clothing to his very physical desires1 that love becomes a poetical episode even in the life of the most prosaic man2 in which last case the matter sometimes assumes a comical aspect4 ,that mandate of the will which objectifies itself in the species exhibits itself in the consciousness of the lover under the mask of the anticipation of an infinite blessedness which is to be found for him in the union with this female individual4 ,now1 in the highest grades of love this chimera becomes so radiant that if it cannot be attained life itself loses all charm1 and now appears so joyless1 hollow1 and insupportable that the disgust at it even overcomes the fear of death1 so that it is then sometimes voluntarily cut short4 ,the will of such a man has been caught in the vortex of the will of the species1 or this has obtained such a great predominance over the individual will that if such a man cannot be effective in the first capacity1 he disdains to be so in the last4 ,the individual is here too weak a vessel to be capable of enduring the infinite longing of the will of the species concentrated upon a definite object4 ,in this case1 therefore1 the issue is suicide1 sometimes the double suicide of the two lovers2 unless1 to save life1 nature allows madness to intervene1 which then covers with its veil the consciousness of that hopeless state4 ,no year passes without proving the reality of what has been expounded by several cases of all these kinds4 ,not only1 however1 has the unsatisfied passion of love sometimes a tragic issue1 but the satisfied passion also leads oftener to unhappiness than to happiness4 ,for its demands often conflict so much with the personal welfare of him who is concerned that they undermine it1 because they are incompatible with his other circumstances1 and disturb the plan of life built upon them4 ,nay1 not only with external circumstances is love often in contradiction1 but even with the lover's own individuality1 for it flings itself upon persons who1 apart from the sexual relation1 would be hateful1 contemptible1 and even abhorrent to the lover4 ,but so much more powerful is the will of the species than that of the individual that the lover shuts his eyes to all those qualities which are repellent to him1 overlooks all1 ignores all1 and binds himself for ever to the object of his passion--so entirely is he blinded by that illusion1 which vanishes as soon as the will of the species is satisfied1 and leaves behind a detested companion for life4 ,only from this can it be explained that we often see very reasonable and excellent men bound to termagants and shedevils1 and cannot conceive how they could have made such a choice4 ,on this account the ancients represented love as blind4 ,indeed1 a lover may even know distinctly and feel bitterly the faults of temperament and character of his bride1 which promise him a miserable life1 and yet not be frightened away3-- 8,i ask not1 ,i care not1 ,if guilt's in thy heart1 ,i know that ,i love thee ,whatever thou art40 ,for ultimately he seeks not his own things1 but those of a third person1 who has yet to come into being1 although he is involved in the illusion that what he seeks is his own affair4 ,but it is just this not seeking of one's own things which is everywhere the stamp of greatness1 that gives to passionate love also a touch of sublimity1 and makes it a worthy subject of poetry4 ,finally1 sexual love is compatible even with the extremest hatred towards its object3 therefore ,plato has compared it to the love of the wolf for the sheep4 ,this case appears when a passionate lover1 in spite of all efforts and entreaties1 cannot obtain a favourable hearing on any condition3-- 8,i love and hate her40 --,,shakspeare1 ,cymb41 iii4 #e4 ,the hatred of the loved one which then is kindled sometimes goes so far that the lover murders her1 and then himself4 ,one or two examples of this generally happen every year2 they will be found in the newspapers4 ,therefore ,goethe's lines are quite correct3-- 8,by all despised love6 ,by hellish element6 ,would that ,i knew a worse1 that ,i might swear by60 ,it is really no hyperbole if a lover describes the coldness of his beloved and the delight of her vanity1 which feeds on his sufferings1 as cruelty2 for he is under the influence of an impulse which1 akin to the instinct of insects1 compels him1 in spite of all grounds of reason1 to pursue his end unconditionally1 and to undervalue everything else3 he cannot give it up4 ,not one but many a ,petrarch has there been who was compelled to drag through life the unsatisfied ardour of love1 like a fetter1 an iron weight at his foot1 and breathe his sighs in lonely woods2 but only in the one ,petrarch dwelt also the gift of poetry2 so that ,goethe's beautiful lines hold good of him3-- 8,and when in misery the man was dumb ,a god gave me the power to tell my sorrow40 ,in fact1 the genius of the species wages war throughout with the guardian geniuses of individuals1 is their pursuer and enemy1 always ready relentlessly to destroy personal happiness in order to carry out its ends2 nay1 the welfare of whole nations has sometimes been sacrificed to its humours4 ,an example of this is given us by ,shakspeare in 8,henry ,,vi410 pt4 iii41 act #c1 sc4 #b and #c4 ,all this depends upon the fact that the species1 as that in which the root of our being lies1 has a closer and earlier right to us than the individual2 hence its affairs take precedence4 ,from the feeling of this the ancients personified the genius of the species in ,cupid1 a malevolent1 cruel1 and therefore illreputed god1 in spite of his childish appearance2 a capricious1 despotic demon1 but yet lord of gods and men3 8 1 60 7,tu1 deorum hominumque tyranne1 ,amor67 ,a deadly shot1 blindness1 and wings are his attributes4 ,the latter signify inconstancy2 and this appears1 as a rule1 only with the disillusion which is the consequence of satisfaction4 ,because the passion depended upon an illusion1 which represented that which has only value for the species as valuable for the individual1 the deception must vanish after the attainment of the end of the species4 ,the spirit of the species which took possession of the individual sets it free again4 ,forsaken by this spirit1 the individual falls back into its original limitation and narrowness1 and sees with wonder that after such a high1 heroic1 and infinite effort nothing has resulted for its pleasure but what every sexual gratification affords4 ,contrary to expectation1 it finds itself no happier than before4 ,it observes that it has been the dupe of the will of the species4 ,therefore1 as a rule1 a ,theseus who has been made happy will forsake his ,ariadne4 ,if ,petrarch's passion had been satisfied1 his song would have been silenced from that time forth1 like that of the bird as soon as the eggs are laid4 ,here let me remark in passing that however much my metaphysics of love will displease the very persons who are entangled in this passion1 yet if rational considerations in general could avail anything against it1 the fundamental truth disclosed by me would necessarily fit one more than anything else to subdue it4 ,but the saying of the old comedian will1 no doubt1 remain true3 8,qu res in se neque consilium1 neque modum habet ullum1 eam consilio regere non potes40 ,marriages from love are made in the interest of the species1 not of the individuals4 ,certainly the persons concerned imagine they are advancing their own happiness2 but their real end is one which is foreign to themselves1 for it lies in the production of an individual which is only possible through them4 ,brought together by this aim1 they ought henceforth to try to get on together as well as possible4 ,but very often the pair brought together by that instinctive illusion1 which is the essence of passionate love1 will1 in other respects1 be of very different natures4 ,this comes to light when the illusion vanishes1 as it necessarily must4 ,accordingly love marriages1 as a rule1 turn out unhappy2 for through them the coming generation is cared for at the expense of the present4 8,quien se casa por amores1 ha de vivir con dolores0 7,who marries from love must live in sorrow71 says the ,spanish proverb4 ,the opposite is the case with marriages contracted for purposes of convenience1 generally in accordance with the choice of the parents4 ,the considerations prevailing here1 of whatever kind they may be1 are at least real1 and cannot vanish of themselves4 ,through them1 however1 the happiness of the present generation is certainly cared for1 to the disadvantage of the coming generation1 and notwithstanding this it remains problematical4 ,the man who in his marriage looks to money more than to the satisfaction of his inclination lives more in the individual than in the species2 which is directly opposed to the truth2 hence it appears unnatural1 and excites a certain contempt4 ,a girl who1 against the advice of her parents1 rejects the offer of a rich and not yet old man1 in order1 setting aside all considerations of convenience1 to choose according to her instinctive inclination alone1 sacrifices her individual welfare to the species4 ,but just on this account one cannot withhold from her a certain approbation2 for she has preferred what is of most importance1 and has acted in the spirit of nature 7more exactly1 of the species71 while the parents advised in the spirit of individual egoism4 ,in accordance with all this1 it appears as if in making a marriage either the individual or the interests of the species must come off a loser4 ,and this is generally the case2 for that convenience and passionate love should go hand in hand is the rarest of lucky accidents4 ,the physical1 moral1 or intellectual deficiency of the nature of most men may to some extent have its ground in the fact that marriages are ordinarily entered into not from pure choice and inclination1 but from all kinds of external considerations1 and on account of accidental circumstances4 ,if1 however1 besides convenience1 inclination is also to a certain extent regarded1 this is1 as it were1 an agreement with the genius of the species4 ,happy marriages are well known to be rare2 just because it lies in the nature of marriage that its chief end is not the present but the coming generation4 ,however1 let me add1 for the consolation of tender1 loving natures1 that sometimes passionate sexual love associates itself with a feeling of an entirely different origin--real friendship based upon agreement of disposition1 which yet for the most part only appears when sexual love proper is extinguished in its satisfaction4 ,this friendship will then generally spring from the fact that the supplementing and corresponding physical1 moral1 and intellectual qualities of the two individuals1 from which sexual love arose1 with reference to the child to be produced1 are1 with reference also to the individuals themselves1 related to each other in a supplementary manner as opposite qualities of temperament and mental gifts1 and thereby form the basis of a harmony of disposition4 ,the whole metaphysics of love here dealt with stands in close connection with my metaphysics in general1 and the light which it throws upon this may be summed up as follows4 ,we have seen that the careful selection for the satisfaction of the sexual impulse1 a selection which rises through innumerable degrees up to that of passionate love1 depends upon the highly serious interest which man takes in the special personal constitution of the next generation4 ,now this exceedingly remarkable interest confirms two truths which have been set forth in the preceding chapters4 7#a47 ,the indestructibility of the true nature of man1 which lives on in that coming generation4 ,for that interest which is so lively and eager1 and does not spring from reflection and intention1 but from the inmost characteristics and tendencies of our nature1 could not be so indelibly present and exercise such great power over man if he were absolutely perishable1 and were merely followed in time by a race actually and entirely different from him4 7#b47 ,that his true nature lies more in the species than in the individual4 ,for that interest in the special nature of the species1 which is the root of all love1 from the passing inclination to the serious passion1 is for every one really the highest concern1 the success or failure of which touches him most sensibly2 therefore it is called par excellence the affair of the heart4 ,moreover1 when this interest has expressed itself strongly and decidedly1 everything which merely concerns one's own person is postponed and necessarily sacrificed to it4 ,through this1 then1 man shows that the species lies closer to him than the individual1 and he lives more immediately in the former than in the latter4 ,why does the lover hang with complete abandonment on the eyes of his chosen one1 and is ready to make every sacrifice for her8 ,because it is his immortal part that longs after her2 while it is only his mortal part that desires everything else4 ,that vehement or intense longing directed to a particular woman is accordingly an immediate pledge of the indestructibility of the kernel of our being1 and of its continued existence in the species4 ,but to regard this continued existence as something trifling and insufficient is an error which arises from the fact that under the conception of the continued life of the species one thinks nothing more than the future existence of beings similar to us1 but in no regard identical with us2 and this again because1 starting from knowledge directed towards without1 one takes into consideration only the external form of the species as we apprehend it in perception1 and not its inner nature4 ,but it is just this inner nature which lies at the foundation of our own consciousness as its kernel1 and hence indeed is more immediate than this itself1 and1 as thing in itself1 free from the principium individuationis1 is really the same and identical in all individuals1 whether they exist together or after each other4 ,now this is the will to live1 thus just that which desires life and continuance so vehemently4 ,this accordingly is spared and unaffected by death4 ,it can attain to no better state than its present one2 and consequently for it1 with life1 the constant suffering and striving of the individuals is certain4 ,to free it from this is reserved for the denial of the will to live1 as the means by which the individual will breaks away from the stem of the species1 and surrenders that existence in it4 ,we lack conceptions for that which it now is2 indeed all data for such conceptions are wanting4 ,we can only describe it as that which is free to be will to live or not4 ,buddhism denotes the latter case by the word ,nirvana1 the etymology of which was given in the note at the end of chapter #da4 ,it is the point which remains for ever unattainable to all human knowledge1 just as such4 ,if now1 from the standpoint of this last consideration1 we contemplate the turmoil of life1 we behold all occupied with its want and misery1 straining all their powers to satisfy its infinite needs and to ward off its multifarious sorrows1 yet without daring to hope anything else than simply the preservation of this tormented existence for a short span of time4 ,in between1 however1 in the midst of the tumult1 we see the glances of two lovers meet longingly3 yet why so secretly1 fearfully1 and stealthily8 ,because these lovers are the traitors who seek to perpetuate the whole want and drudgery1 which would otherwise speedily reach an end2 this they wish to frustrate1 as others like them have frustrated it before4 ,this consideration already passes over into the subject of the following chapter47#ci7 ,chapter ,,xlv47#dj7 ,on ,the ,assertion ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live4 ,if the will to live exhibited itself merely as an impulse to self preservation1 this would only be an assertion of the individual phenomenon for the span of time of its natural duration4 ,the cares and troubles of such a life would not be great1 and consequently existence would be easy and serene4 ,since1 on the contrary1 the will wills life absolutely and for all time1 it exhibits itself also as sexual impulse1 which has in view an endless series of generations4 ,this impulse does away with that carelessness1 serenity1 and innocence which would accompany a merely individual existence1 for it brings unrest and melancholy into the consciousness2 misfortunes1 cares1 and misery into the course of life4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is voluntarily suppressed1 as we see in rare exceptions1 then this is the turning of the will1 which changes its course4 ,the will does not then transcend the individual1 but is abolished in it4 ,yet this can only take place by means of the individual doing painful violence to itself4 ,if1 however1 it does take place1 then the freedom from care and the serenity of the purely individual existence is restored to the consciousness1 and indeed in a higher degree4 ,on the other hand1 to the satisfaction of that most vehement of all impulses and desires is linked the origin of a new existence1 thus the carrying out of life anew1 with all its burdens1 cares1 wants1 and pains2 certainly in another individual2 yet if the two who are different in the phenomenon were so absolutely and in themselves1 where would then be eternal justice8 ,life presents itself as a problem1 a task to be worked out1 and therefore1 as a rule1 as a constant conflict with necessity4 ,accordingly every one tries to get through with it and come off as well as he can4 ,he performs life as a compulsory service which he owes4 ,but who has contracted the debt8--,his begetter1 in the enjoyment of sensual pleasure4 ,thus1 because the one has enjoyed this1 the other must live1 suffer1 and die4 ,however1 we know and look back here to the fact that the difference of the similar is conditioned by space and time1 which in this sense ,i have called the principium individuationis4 ,otherwise eternal justice could not be vindicated4 ,paternal love1 on account of which the father is ready to do1 to suffer1 and to risk more for his child than for himself1 and at the same time knows that he owes this1 depends simply upon the fact that the begetter recognises himself in the begotten4 ,the life of a man1 with its endless care1 want1 and suffering1 is to be regarded as the explanation and paraphrase of the act of procreation1 i4e41 the decided assertion of the will to live2 and further1 it is also due to this that he owes to nature the debt of death1 and thinks with anxiety of this debt4 ,is this not evidence of the fact that our existence involves guilt8 ,at any rate1 we always exist1 subject to the periodical payment of the toll1 birth and death1 and successively partake of all the sorrows and joys of life1 so that none can escape us3 this is just the fruit of the assertion of the will to live4 ,thus the fear of death1 which in spite of all the miseries of life holds us firmly to it1 is really illusory2 but just as illusory is the impulse which has enticed us into it4 ,this enticement itself may be seen objectively in the reciprocal longing glances of two lovers2 they are the purest expression of the will to live1 in its assertion4 ,how soft and tender it is here6 ,it wills well being1 and quiet pleasure1 and mild joys for itself1 for others1 for all4 ,it is the theme of ,anacreon4 ,thus by allurements and flattery it makes its way into life4 ,but when once it is there1 misery introduces crime1 and crime misery2 horror and desolation fill the scene4 ,it is the theme of schylus4 ,but now the act through which the will asserts itself and man arises is one of which all are1 in their inmost being1 ashamed1 which they therefore carefully conceal2 nay1 if they are caught in it1 are terrified as if they had been taken in a crime4 ,it is an action of which in cold reflection one generally thinks with dislike1 and in a lofty mood with loathing4 ,reflections which in this regard approach the matter more closely are offered by ,montaigne in the fifth chapter of the third book1 under the marginal heading3 8,ce que c'est que l'amour40 ,a peculiar sadness and repentance follows close upon it1 is yet most perceptible after the first performance of the act1 and in general is the more distinct the nobler is the character4 ,hence even ,pliny1 the pagan1 says3 8,homini tantum primi coitus pnitentia1 augurium scilicet vit1 a pnitenda origine0 7,hist4 ,nat41 x4 #hc74 ,and1 on the other hand1 in ,goethe's 8,faust10 what do devil and witches practise and sing of on their ,sabbath8 ,lewdness and obscenity4 ,and in the same work 7in the admirable 8,paralipomena0 to 8,faust07 what does incarnate ,satan preach before the assembled multitude8 ,lewdness and obscenity4 ,but simply and solely by means of the continual practice of such an act as this does the human race subsist4 ,if now optimism were right1 if our existence were to be thankfully recognised as the gift of the highest goodness guided by wisdom1 and accordingly in itself praiseworthy1 commendable1 and agreeable1 then certainly the act which perpetuates it would necessarily have borne quite another physiognomy4 ,if1 on the other hand1 this existence is a kind of false step or error2 if it is the work of an originally blind will1 whose most fortunate development is that it comes to itself in order to abolish itself2 then the act which perpetuates that existence must appear precisely as it does appear4 ,with reference to the first fundamental truth of my doctrine1 the remark deserves a place here that the shame mentioned above which attaches to the act of generation extends even to the parts which are concerned in this1 although1 like all other parts1 they are given us by nature4 ,this is again a striking proof that not only the actions but even the body of man is to be regarded as the manifestation1 the objectification1 of his will1 and as its work4 ,for he could not be ashamed of a thing which existed without his will4 ,the act of generation is further related to the world1 as the answer is related to the riddle4 ,the world is wide in space and old in time1 and of an inexhaustible multiplicity of forms4 ,yet all this is only the manifestation of the will to live2 and the concentration1 the focus of this will is the act of generation4 ,thus in this act the inner nature of the world expresses itself most distinctly4 ,in this regard it is indeed worth noticing that this act itself is also distinctly called 8the will0 in the very significant ,german phrase1 8,er verlangte von ihr1 sie sollte ihm zu ,willen sein0 7,he desired her to comply with his wishes74 ,as the most distinct expression of the will1 then1 this act is the kernel1 the compendium1 the quintessence of the world4 ,therefore from it we obtain light as to the nature and tendency of the world3 it is the answer to the riddle4 ,accordingly it is understood under 8the tree of knowledge10 for after acquaintance with it the eyes of every one are opened as to life1 as ,byron also says3 8,the tree of knowledge has been plucked1--all's known40 --,don ,juan1 i4 #abh4 ,it is not less in keeping with this quality that it is the great 1 the open secret1 which must never and nowhere be distinctly mentioned1 but always and everywhere is understood as the principal matter1 and is therefore constantly present to the thoughts of all1 wherefore also the slightest allusion to it is instantly understood4 ,the leading part which that act1 and what is connected with it1 plays in the world1 because love intrigues are everywhere1 on the one hand1 pursued1 and1 on the other hand1 assumed1 is quite in keeping with the importance of this punctum saliens of the egg of the world4 ,the source of the amusing is simply the constant concealment of the chief concern4 ,but see now how the young1 innocent1 human intellect1 when that great secret of the world first becomes known to it1 is startled at the enormity6 ,the reason of this is that in the long course which the originally unconscious will had to traverse before it rose to intellect1 especially to human1 rational intellect1 it became so strange to itself that it no longer knows its origin1 that pnitenda origo1 and now1 from the standpoint of pure1 and therefore innocent1 knowing1 is horrified at it4 ,since now the focus of the will1 i4e41 its concentration and highest expression1 is the sexual impulse and its satisfaction1 this is very significantly and navely expressed in the symbolical language of nature through the fact that the individualised will1 that is1 the man and the brute1 makes its entrance into the world through the door of the sexual organs4 ,the assertion of the will to live1 which accordingly has its centre in the act of generation1 is in the case of the brute infallible4 ,for the will1 which is the natura naturans1 first arrives at reflection in man4 ,to arrive at reflection means1 not merely to know the momentary necessity of the individual will1 how to serve it in the pressing present--as is the case with the brute1 in proportion to its completeness and its necessities1 which go hand in hand--but to have attained a greater breadth of knowledge1 by virtue of a distinct remembrance of the past1 an approximate anticipation of the future1 and thereby a general survey of the individual life1 both one's own life and that of others1 nay1 of existence in general4 ,really the life of every species of brute1 through the thousands of years of its existence1 is to a certain extent like a single moment2 for it is mere consciousness of the present1 without that of the past and the future1 and consequently without that of death4 ,in this sense it is to be regarded as a permanent moment1 a ,nunc stans4 ,here we see1 in passing1 most distinctly that in general the form of life1 or the manifestation of the will with consciousness1 is primarily and immediately merely the present4 ,past and future are added only in the case of man1 and indeed merely in conception1 are known in abstracto1 and perhaps illustrated by pictures of the imagination4 ,thus after the will to live1 i4e41 the inner being of nature1 in the ceaseless striving towards complete objectification and complete enjoyment1 has run through the whole series of the brutes1--which often occurs in the various periods of successive animal series each arising anew on the same planet1--it arrives at last at reflection in the being who is endowed with reason1 man4 ,here now to him the thing begins to be doubtful1 the question forces itself upon him whence and wherefore all this is1 and chiefly whether the care and misery of his life and effort is really repaid by the gain8 8,le jeu vautil bien la chandelle80 ,accordingly here is the point at which1 in the light of distinct knowledge1 he decides for the assertion or denial of the will to live2 although as a rule he can only bring the latter to consciousness in a mythical form4 ,we have consequently no ground for assuming that a still more highly developed objectification of the will is ever reached1 anywhere2 for it has already reached its turningpoint here4 ,chapter ,,xlvi47#da7 ,on ,the ,vanity ,and ,suffering ,of ,life4 ,awakened to life out of the night of unconsciousness1 the will finds itself an individual1 in an endless and boundless world1 among innumerable individuals1 all striving1 suffering1 erring2 and as if through a troubled dream it hurries back to its old unconsciousness4 ,yet till then its desires are limitless1 its claims inexhaustible1 and every satisfied desire gives rise to a new one4 ,no possible satisfaction in the world could suffice to still its longings1 set a goal to its infinite cravings1 and fill the bottomless abyss of its heart4 ,then let one consider what as a rule are the satisfactions of any kind that a man obtains4 ,for the most part nothing more than the bare maintenance of this existence itself1 extorted day by day with unceasing trouble and constant care in the conflict with want1 and with death in prospect4 ,everything in life shows that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated or recognised as an illusion4 ,the grounds of this lie deep in the nature of things4 ,accordingly the life of most men is troubled and short4 ,those who are comparatively happy are so1 for the most part1 only apparently1 or else1 like men of long life1 they are the rare exceptions1 a possibility of which there had to be1--as decoybirds4 ,life presents itself as a continual deception in small things as in great4 ,if it has promised1 it does not keep its word1 unless to show how little worth desiring were the things desired3 thus we are deluded now by hope1 now by what was hoped for4 ,if it has given1 it did so in order to take4 ,the enchantment of distance shows us paradises which vanish like optical illusions when we have allowed ourselves to be mocked by them4 ,happiness accordingly always lies in the future1 or else in the past1 and the present may be compared to a small dark cloud which the wind drives over the sunny plain3 before and behind it all is bright1 only it itself always casts a shadow4 ,the present is therefore always insufficient2 but the future is uncertain1 and the past irrevocable4 ,life with its hourly1 daily1 weekly1 yearly1 little1 greater1 and great misfortunes1 with its deluded hopes and its accidents destroying all our calculations1 bears so distinctly the impression of something with which we must become disgusted1 that it is hard to conceive how one has been able to mistake this and allow oneself to be persuaded that life is there in order to be thankfully enjoyed1 and that man exists in order to be happy4 ,rather that continual illusion and disillusion1 and also the nature of life throughout1 presents itself to us as intended and calculated to awaken the conviction that nothing at all is worth our striving1 our efforts and struggles1 that all good things are vanity1 the world in all its ends bankrupt1 and life a business which does not cover its expenses2--so that our will may turn away from it4 ,the way in which this vanity of all objects of the will makes itself known and comprehensible to the intellect which is rooted in the individual1 is primarily time4 ,it is the form by means of which that vanity of things appears as their perishableness2 for on account of this all our pleasures and joys disappear in our hands1 and we afterwards ask astonished where they have remained4 ,that nothingness itself is therefore the only objective element in time1 i4e41 that which corresponds to it in the inner nature of things1 thus that of which it is the expression4 ,just on this account time is the a priori necessary form of all our perceptions2 in it everything must present itself1 even we ourselves4 ,accordingly1 first of all1 our life is like a payment which one receives in nothing but copper pence1 and yet must then give a discharge for3 the copper pence are the days2 the discharge is death4 ,for at last time makes known the judgment of nature concerning the work of all the beings which appear in it1 in that it destroys them3-- 8,and rightly so1 for all that arises ,is worthy only of being destroyed4 ,hence were it better that nothing arose40 ,thus old age and death1 to which every life necessarily hurries on1 are the sentence of condemnation on the will to live1 coming from the hands of nature itself1 and which declares that this will is an effort which frustrates itself4 8,what thou hast wished10 it says1 8ends thus3 desire something better40 ,hence the instruction which his life affords to every one consists1 as a whole1 in this1 that the objects of his desires continually delude1 waver1 and fall1 and accordingly bring more misery than joy1 till at last the whole foundation upon which they all stand gives way1 in that his life itself is destroyed and so he receives the last proof that all his striving and wishing was a perversity1 a false path3-- 8,then old age and experience1 hand in hand1 ,lead him to death1 and make him understand1 ,after a search so painful and so long1 ,that all his life he has been in the wrong40 ,we shall1 however1 enter into the details of the matter1 for it is in these views that ,i have met with most contradiction4 ,first of all1 ,i have to confirm by the following remarks the proof given in the text of the negative nature of all satisfaction1 thus of all pleasure and all happiness1 in opposition to the positive nature of pain4 ,we feel pain1 but not painlessness2 we feel care1 but not the absence of care2 fear1 but not security4 ,we feel the wish as we feel hunger and thirst2 but as soon as it has been fulfilled1 it is like the mouthful that has been taken1 which ceases to exist for our feeling the moment it is swallowed4 ,pleasures and joys we miss painfully whenever they are wanting2 but pains1 even when they cease after having long been present1 are not directly missed1 but at the most are intentionally thought of by means of reflection4 ,for only pain and want can be felt positively1 and therefore announce themselves2 wellbeing1 on the other hand1 is merely negative4 ,therefore we do not become conscious of the three greatest blessings of life1 health1 youth1 and freedom1 so long as we possess them1 but only after we have lost them2 for they also are negations4 ,we only observe that days of our life were happy after they have given place to unhappy ones4 ,in proportion as pleasures increase1 the susceptibility for them decreases3 what is customary is no longer felt as a pleasure4 ,just in this way1 however1 is the susceptibility for suffering increased1 for the loss of what we are accustomed to is painfully felt4 ,thus the measure of what is necessary increases through possession1 and thereby the capacity for feeling pain4 ,the hours pass the quicker the more agreeably they are spent1 and the slower the more painfully they are spent2 because pain1 not pleasure1 is the positive1 the presence of which makes itself felt4 ,in the same way we become conscious of time when we are bored1 not when we are diverted4 ,both these cases prove that our existence is most happy when we perceive it least1 from which it follows that it would be better not to have it4 ,great and lively joy can only be conceived as the consequence of great misery1 which has preceded it2 for nothing can be added to a state of permanent satisfaction but some amusement1 or the satisfaction of vanity4 ,hence all poets are obliged to bring their heroes into anxious and painful situations1 so that they may be able to free them from them4 ,dramas and ,epics accordingly always describe only fighting1 suffering1 tormented men2 and every romance is a rareeshow in which we observe the spasms and convulsions of the agonised human heart4 ,walter ,scott has navely expressed this sthetic necessity in the conclusion to his novel1 8,old ,mortality40 ,voltaire1 who was so highly favoured both by nature and fortune1 says1 in entire agreement with the truth proved by me3 8,le bonheur n'est qu'un rve1 et la douleur est relle40 ,and he adds3 8,il y a quatrevingts ans que je l'prouve4 ,je n'y sais autre chose que me rsigner1 et me dire que les mouches sont nes pour tre manges par les araignes1 et les hommes pour tre dvors par les chagrins40 ,before so confidently affirming that life is a blessing worth desiring or giving thanks for1 let one compare calmly the sum of the possible pleasures which a man can enjoy in his life with the sum of the possible sorrows which may come to him in his life4 ,i believe the balance will not be hard to strike4 ,at bottom1 however1 it is quite superfluous to dispute whether there is more good or evil in the world3 for the mere existence of evil decides the matter4 ,for the evil can never be annulled1 and consequently can never be balanced by the good which may exist along with it or after it4 8,mille piacer' non vagliono un tormento40--,petr4 7,a thousand pleasures are not worth one torment47 ,for that a thousand had lived in happiness and pleasure would never do away with the anguish and deathagony of a single one2 and just as little does my present wellbeing undo my past suffering4 ,if1 therefore1 the evils in the world were a hundred times less than is the case1 yet their mere existence would be sufficient to establish a truth which may be expressed in different ways1 though always somewhat indirectly1 the truth that we have not to rejoice but rather to mourn at the existence of the world2--that its nonexistence would be preferable to its existence2--that it is something which at bottom ought not to be1 c41 c4 ,very beautiful is ,byron's expression of this truth3-- 8,our life is a false nature1--'tis not in ,the harmony of things1 this hard decree1 ,this uneradicable taint of sin1 ,this boundless ,upas1 this allblasting tree ,whose root is earth1 whose leaves and branches be ,the skies1 which rain their plagues on men like dew-- ,disease1 death1 bondage--all the woes we see-- ,and worse1 the woes we see not--which throb through ,the immedicable soul1 with heartaches ever new40 ,if the world and life were an end in themselves1 and accordingly required theoretically no justification and practically no indemnification or compensation1 but existed1 for instance1 as ,spinoza and the ,spinozists of the present day represent it1 as the single manifestation of a ,god1 who1 animi causa1 or else in order to mirror himself1 undertook such an evolution of himself2 and hence its existence neither required to be justified by reasons nor redeemed by results2--then the sufferings and miseries of life would not indeed have to be fully equalled by the pleasures and wellbeing in it2 for this1 as has been said1 is impossible1 because my present pain is never abolished by future joys1 for the latter fill their time as the former fills its time3 but there would have to be absolutely no suffering1 and death also would either have not to be1 or else to have no terrors for us4 ,only thus would life pay for itself4 ,but since now our state is rather something which had better not be1 everything about us bears the trace of this1--just as in hell everything smells of sulphur--for everything is always imperfect and illusory1 everything agreeable is displaced by something disagreeable1 every enjoyment is only a half one1 every pleasure introduces its own disturbance1 every relief new difficulties1 every aid of our daily and hourly need leaves us each moment in the lurch and denies its service1 the step upon which we place our foot so often gives way under us1 nay1 misfortunes great and small are the element of our life2 and1 in a word1 we are like ,phineus1 whose food was all tainted and made uneatable by the harpies47#db7 ,two remedies for this are tried3 first1 1 i4e41 prudence1 foresight1 cunning2 it does not fully instruct us1 is insufficient1 and leads to defeat4 ,secondly1 the stoical equanimity which seeks to arm us against all misfortunes by preparedness for everything and contempt of all3 practically it becomes cynical renunciation1 which prefers once for all to reject all means of relief and all alleviations--it reduces us to the position of dogs1 like ,diogenes in his tub4 ,the truth is1 we ought to be wretched1 and we are so4 ,the chief source of the serious evils which affect men is man himself3 homo homini lupus4 ,whoever keeps this last fact clearly in view beholds the world as a hell1 which surpasses that of ,dante in this respect1 that one man must be the devil of another4 ,for this1 one is certainly more fitted than another2 an archfiend1 indeed1 more fitted than all others1 appearing in the form of a conqueror1 who places several hundred thousand men opposite each other1 and says to them3 8,to suffer and die is your destiny2 now shoot each other with guns and cannons10 and they do so4 ,in general1 however1 the conduct of men towards each other is characterised as a rule by injustice1 extreme unfairness1 hardness1 nay1 cruelty3 an opposite course of conduct appears only as an exception4 ,upon this depends the necessity of the ,state and legislation1 and upon none of your false pretences4 ,but in all cases which do not lie within the reach of the law1 that regardlessness of his like1 peculiar to man1 shows itself at once2 a regardlessness which springs from his boundless egoism1 and sometimes also from wickedness4 ,how man deals with man is shown1 for example1 by negro slavery1 the final end of which is sugar and coffee4 ,but we do not need to go so far3 at the age of five years to enter a cotton spinning or other factory1 and from that time forth to sit there daily1 first ten1 then twelve1 and ultimately fourteen hours1 performing the same mechanical labour1 is to purchase dearly the satisfaction of drawing breath4 ,but this is the fate of millions1 and that of millions more is analogous to it4 ,we others1 however1 can be made perfectly miserable by trifling misfortunes2 perfectly happy1 not by the world4 ,whatever one may say1 the happiest moment of the happy man is the moment of his falling asleep1 and the unhappiest moment of the unhappy that of his awaking4 ,an indirect but certain proof of the fact that men feel themselves unhappy1 and consequently are so1 is also abundantly afforded by the fearful envy which dwells in us all1 and which in all relations of life1 on the occasion of any superiority1 of whatever kind it may be1 is excited1 and cannot contain its poison4 ,because they feel themselves unhappy1 men cannot endure the sight of one whom they imagine happy2 he who for the moment feels himself happy would like to make all around him happy also1 and says3 8,que tout le monde ici soit heureux de ma joie40 ,if life were in itself a blessing to be prized1 and decidedly to be preferred to nonexistence1 the exit from it would not need to be guarded by such fearful sentinels as death and its terrors4 ,but who would continue in life as it is if death were less terrible8 ,and again1 who could even endure the thought of death if life were a pleasure6 ,but thus the former has still always this good1 that it is the end of life1 and we console ourselves with regard to the suffering of life with death1 and with regard to death with the suffering of life4 ,the truth is1 that the two inseparably belong to each other1 for together they constitute a deviation from the right path1 to return to which is as difficult as it is desirable4 ,if the world were not something which1 expressed practically1 ought not to be1 it would also not be theoretically a problem2 but its existence would either require no explanation1 inasmuch as it would be so entirely selfevident that wonder concerning it or a question about it could arise in no mind1 or its end would present itself unmistakably4 ,instead of this1 however1 it is indeed an insoluble problem2 for even the most perfect philosophy will yet always contain an unexplained element1 like an insoluble deposit or the remainder which the irrational relation of two quantities always leaves over4 ,therefore if one ventures to raise the question why there is not rather nothing than this world1 the world cannot be justified from itself1 no ground1 no final cause of its existence can be found in itself1 it cannot be shown that it exists for its own sake1 i4e41 for its own advantage4 ,in accordance with my teaching1 this can certainly be explained from the fact that the principle of its existence is expressly one which is without ground1 a blind will to live1 which as thing in itself cannot be made subject to the principle of sufficient reason1 which is merely the form of the phenomenon1 and through which alone every why is justified4 ,but this also agrees with the nature of the world1 for only a blind will1 no seeing will1 could place itself in the position in which we behold ourselves4 ,a seeing will would rather have soon made the calculation that the business did not cover the cost1 for such a mighty effort and struggle with the straining of all the powers1 under constant care1 anxiety1 and want1 and with the inevitable destruction of every individual life1 finds no compensation in the ephemeral existence itself1 which is so obtained1 and which passes into nothing in our hands4 ,hence1 then1 the explanation of the world from the ,anaxagorean 1 i4e41 from a will accompanied by knowledge1 necessarily demands optimism to excuse it1 which accordingly is set up and maintained in spite of the loudly crying evidence of a whole world full of misery4 ,life is there given out to be a gift1 while it is evident that every one would have declined such a gift if he could have seen it and tested it beforehand2 just as ,lessing admired the understanding of his son1 who1 because he had absolutely declined to enter life1 had to be forcibly brought into it with the forceps1 but was scarcely there when he hurried away from it again4 ,on the other hand1 it is then well said that life should be1 from one end to the other1 only a lesson2 to which1 however1 any one might reply3 8,for this very reason ,i wish ,i had been left in the peace of the allsufficient nothing1 where ,i would have had no need of lessons or of anything else40 ,if indeed it should now be added that he must one day give an account of every hour of his life1 he would be more justified in himself demanding an account of why he had been transferred from that rest into such a questionable1 dark1 anxious1 and painful situation4 ,to this1 then1 we are led by false views4 ,for human existence1 far from bearing the character of a gift1 has entirely the character of a debt that has been contracted4 ,the calling in of this debt appears in the form of the pressing wants1 tormenting desires1 and endless misery established through this existence4 ,as a rule1 the whole lifetime is devoted to the paying off of this debt2 but this only meets the interest4 ,the payment of the capital takes place through death4 ,and when was this debt contracted8 ,at the begetting4 ,accordingly1 if we regard man as a being whose existence is a punishment and an expiation1 we then view him in a right light4 ,the myth of the fall 7although probably1 like the whole of ,judaism1 borrowed from the ,zend ,avesta3 ,bundahish1 #ae71 is the only point in the ,old ,testament to which ,i can ascribe metaphysical1 although only allegorical1 truth2 indeed it is this alone that reconciles me to the ,old ,testament4 ,our existence resembles nothing so much as the consequence of a false step and a guilty desire4 ,new ,testament ,christianity1 the ethical spirit of which is that of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 and is therefore very foreign to the otherwise optimistic spirit of the ,old ,testament1 has also1 very wisely1 linked itself on precisely to that myth3 indeed1 without this it would have found no point of connection with ,judaism at all4 ,if any one desires to measure the degree of guilt with which our existence is tainted1 then let him look at the suffering that is connected with it4 ,every great pain1 whether bodily or mental1 declares what we deserve3 for it could not come to us if we did not deserve it4 ,that ,christianity also regards our existence in this light is shown by a passage in ,luther's ,commentary on ,galatians1 chap4 #c1 which ,i only have beside me in ,latin3 8,sumus autem nos omnes corporibus et rebus subjecti ,diabolo1 et hospites sumus in mundo1 cujus ipse princeps et ,deus est4 ,ideo panis1 quem edimus1 potus1 quem bibimus1 vestes1 quibus utimur1 imo ar et totum quo vivimus in carne1 sub ipsius imperio est40 ,an outcry has been made about the melancholy and disconsolate nature of my philosophy2 yet it lies merely in the fact that instead of inventing a future hell as the equivalent of sin1 ,i show that where guilt lies in the world there is also already something akin to hell2 but whoever is inclined to deny this can easily experience it4 ,and to this world1 to this scene of tormented and agonised beings1 who only continue to exist by devouring each other1 in which1 therefore1 every ravenous beast is the living grave of thousands of others1 and its self maintenance is a chain of painful deaths2 and in which the capacity for feeling pain increases with knowledge1 and therefore reaches its highest degree in man1 a degree which is the higher the more intelligent the man is2 to this world it has been sought to apply the system of optimism1 and demonstrate to us that it is the best of all possible worlds4 ,the absurdity is glaring4 ,but an optimist bids me open my eyes and look at the world1 how beautiful it is in the sunshine1 with its mountains and valleys1 streams1 plants1 animals1 c4 c4 ,is the world1 then1 a rareeshow8 ,these things are certainly beautiful to look at1 but to be them is something quite different4 ,then comes a teleologist1 and praises to me the wise arrangement by virtue of which it is taken care that the planets do not run their heads together1 that land and sea do not get mixed into a pulp1 but are held so beautifully apart1 also that everything is neither rigid with continual frost nor roasted with heat2 in the same way1 that in consequence of the obliquity of the ecliptic there is no eternal spring1 in which nothing could attain to ripeness1 c4 c4 ,but this and all like it are mere conditiones sine quibus non4 ,if in general there is to be a world at all1 if its planets are to exist at least as long as the light of a distant fixed star requires to reach them1 and are not1 like ,lessing's son1 to depart again immediately after birth1 then certainly it must not be so clumsily constructed that its very framework threatens to fall to pieces4 ,but if one goes on to the results of this applauded work1 considers the players who act upon the stage which is so durably constructed1 and now sees how with sensibility pain appears1 and increases in proportion as the sensibility develops to intelligence1 and then how1 keeping pace with this1 desire and suffering come out ever more strongly1 and increase till at last human life affords no other material than this for tragedies and comedies1 then whoever is honest will scarcely be disposed to set up hallelujahs4 ,david ,hume1 in his 8,natural ,history of ,religion10 #f1 #g1 #h1 and #ac1 has also exposed1 mercilessly but with convincing truth1 the real though concealed source of these last4 ,he also explains clearly in the tenth and eleventh books of his 8,dialogues on ,natural ,religion10 with very pertinent arguments1 which are yet of quite a different kind from mine1 the miserable nature of this world and the untenableness of all optimism2 in doing which he attacks this in its origin4 ,both works of ,hume's are as well worth reading as they are unknown at the present day in ,germany1 where1 on the other hand1 incredible pleasure is found1 patriotically1 in the most disgusting nonsense of home bred boastful mediocrities1 who are proclaimed great men4 ,hamann1 however1 translated these dialogues2 ,kant went through the translation1 and late in life wished to induce ,hamann's son to publish them because the translation of ,platner did not satisfy him 7see ,kant's biography by ,f4 ,w4 ,schubert1 pp4 #ha and #afe74 ,from every page of ,david ,hume there is more to be learned than from the collected philosophical works of ,hegel1 ,herbart1 and ,schleiermacher together4 ,the founder of systematic optimism1 again1 is ,leibnitz whose philosophical merit ,i have no intention of denying although ,i have never succeeded in thinking myself into the monadology1 preestablished harmony1 and identitas indiscernibilium4 ,his 8,nouveaux essays sur l'entendement0 are1 however1 merely an excerpt1 with a full yet weak criticism1 with a view to correction1 of ,locke's work which is justly of worldwide reputation4 ,he here opposes ,locke with just as little success as he opposes ,newton in the 8,tentamen de motuum clestium causis10 directed against the system of gravitation4 ,the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 is specially directed against this ,leibnitz,wolfian philosophy1 and has a polemical1 nay1 a destructive relation to it1 just as it is related to ,locke and ,hume as a continuation and further construction4 ,that at the present day the professors of philosophy are on all sides engaged in setting ,leibnitz1 with his juggling1 upon his legs again1 nay1 in glorifying him1 and1 on the other hand1 in depreciating and setting aside ,kant as much as possible1 has its sufficient reason in the primum vivere2 the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 does not admit of one giving out ,judaistic mythology as philosophy1 nor of one speaking1 without ceremony1 of the 8soul0 as a given reality1 a wellknown and wellaccredited person1 without giving account of how one arrived at this conception1 and what justification one has for using it scientifically4 ,but primum vivere1 deinde philosophari6 ,down with ,kant1 vivat our ,leibnitz6 ,to return1 then1 to ,leibnitz1 ,i cannot ascribe to the ,thodice1 as a methodical and broad unfolding of optimism1 any other merit than this1 that it gave occasion later for the immortal 8,candide0 of the great ,voltaire2 whereby certainly ,leibnitz's oftenrepeated and lame excuse for the evil of the world1 that the bad sometimes brings about the good1 received a confirmation which was unexpected by him4 ,even by the name of his hero ,voltaire indicates that it only requires sincerity to recognise the opposite of optimism4 ,really upon this scene of sin1 suffering1 and death optimism makes such an extraordinary figure that one would be forced to regard it as irony if one had not a sufficient explanation of its origin in the secret source of it 7insincere flattery1 with insulting confidence in its success71 which1 as was mentioned above1 is so delightfully disclosed by ,hume4 ,but indeed to the palpably sophistical proofs of ,leibnitz that this is the best of all possible worlds1 we may seriously and honestly oppose the proof that it is the worst of all possible worlds4 ,for possible means1 not what one may construct in imagination1 but what can actually exist and continue4 ,now this world is so arranged as to be able to maintain itself with great difficulty2 but if it were a little worse1 it could no longer maintain itself4 ,consequently a worse world1 since it could not continue to exist1 is absolutely impossible3 thus this world itself is the worst of all possible worlds4 ,for not only if the planets were to run their heads together1 but even if any one of the actually appearing perturbations of their course1 instead of being gradually balanced by others1 continued to increase1 the world would soon reach its end4 ,astronomers know upon what accidental circumstances--principally the irrational relation to each other of the periods of revolution--this depends1 and have carefully calculated that it will always go on well2 consequently the world also can continue and go on4 ,we will hope that1 although ,newton was of an opposite opinion1 they have not miscalculated1 and consequently that the mechanical perpetual motion realised in such a planetary system will not also1 like the rest1 ultimately come to a standstill4 ,again1 under the firm crust of the planet dwell the powerful forces of nature which1 as soon as some accident affords them free play1 must necessarily destroy that crust1 with everything living upon it1 as has already taken place at least three times upon our planet1 and will probably take place oftener still4 ,the earthquake of ,lisbon1 the earthquake of ,haiti1 the destruction of ,pompeii1 are only small1 playful hints of what is possible4 ,a small alteration of the atmosphere1 which cannot even be chemically proved1 causes cholera1 yellow fever1 black death1 c41 which carry off millions of men2 a somewhat greater alteration would extinguish all life4 ,a very moderate increase of heat would dry up all the rivers and springs4 ,the brutes have received just barely so much in the way of organs and powers as enables them to procure with the greatest exertion sustenance for their own lives and food for their offspring2 therefore if a brute loses a limb1 or even the full use of one1 it must generally perish4 ,even of the human race1 powerful as are the weapons it possesses in understanding and reason1 ninetenths live in constant conflict with want1 always balancing themselves with difficulty and effort upon the brink of destruction4 ,thus throughout1 as for the continuance of the whole1 so also for that of each individual being the conditions are barely and scantily given1 but nothing over4 ,the individual life is a ceaseless battle for existence itself2 while at every step destruction threatens it4 ,just because this threat is so often fulfilled provision had to be made1 by means of the enormous excess of the germs1 that the destruction of the individuals should not involve that of the species1 for which alone nature really cares4 ,the world is therefore as bad as it possibly can be if it is to continue to be at all4 ,q4 ,e4 ,d4 ,the fossils of the entirely different kinds of animal species which formerly inhabited the planet afford us1 as a proof of our calculation1 the records of worlds the continuance of which was no longer possible1 and which consequently were somewhat worse than the worst of possible worlds4 ,optimism is at bottom the unmerited selfpraise of the real originator of the world1 the will to live1 which views itself complacently in its works2 and accordingly it is not only a false1 but also a pernicious doctrine4 ,for it presents life to us as a desirable condition1 and the happiness of man as the end of it4 ,starting from this1 every one then believes that he has the most just claim to happiness and pleasure2 and if1 as is wont to happen1 these do not fall to his lot1 then he believes that he is wronged1 nay1 that he loses the end of his existence2 while it is far more correct to regard work1 privation1 misery1 and suffering1 crowned by death1 as the end of our life 7as ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 and also genuine ,christianity do72 for it is these which lead to the denial of the will to live4 ,in the ,new ,testament the world is represented as a valley of tears1 life as a process of purifying or refining1 and the symbol of ,christianity is an instrument of torture4 ,therefore1 when ,leibnitz1 ,shaftesbury1 ,bolingbroke1 and ,pope brought forward optimism1 the general offence which it gave depended principally upon the fact that optimism is irreconcilable with ,christianity2 as ,voltaire states and explains in the preface to his excellent poem1 8,le dsastre de ,lisbonne10 which is also expressly directed against optimism4 ,this great man1 whom ,i so gladly praise1 in opposition to the abuse of venal ,german inkslingers1 is placed decidedly higher than ,rousseau by the insight to which he attained in three respects1 and which prove the greater depth of his thinking3 7#a7 the recognition of the preponderating magnitude of the evil and misery of existence with which he is deeply penetrated2 7#b7 that of the strict necessity of the acts of will2 7#c7 that of the truth of ,locke's principle1 that what thinks may also be material3 while ,rousseau opposes all this with declamations in his 8,profession de foi du vicaire ,savoyard10 a superficial ,protestant pastor's philosophy2 as he also in the same spirit attacks the beautiful poem of ,voltaire which has just been referred to with illfounded1 shallow1 and logically false reasoning1 in the interests of optimism1 in his long letter to ,voltaire of #ahth ,august #agef1 which is devoted simply to this purpose4 ,indeed1 the fundamental characteristic and the of ,rousseau's whole philosophy is this1 that in the place of the ,christian doctrine of original sin1 and the original depravity of the human race1 he puts an original goodness and unlimited perfectibility of it1 which has only been led astray by civilisation and its consequences1 and then founds upon this his optimism and humanism4 ,as in 8,candide0 ,voltaire wages war in his facetious manner against optimism1 ,byron has also done so in his serious and tragic style1 in his immortal masterpiece1 8,cain10 on account of which he also has been honoured with the invectives of the obscurantist1 ,friedrich ,schlegel4 ,if now1 in conclusion1 to confirm my view1 ,i were to give what has been said by great men of all ages in this antioptimistic spirit1 there would be no end to the quotations1 for almost every one of them has expressed in strong language his knowledge of the misery of this world4 ,thus1 not to confirm1 but merely to embellish this chapter1 a few quotations of this kind may be given at the end of it4 ,first of all1 let me mention here that the ,greeks1 far as they were from the ,christian and lofty ,asiatic conception of the world1 and although they decidedly stood at the point of view of the assertion of the will1 were yet deeply affected by the wretchedness of existence4 ,this is shown even by the invention of tragedy1 which belongs to them4 ,another proof of it is afforded us by the custom of the ,thracians1 which is first mentioned by ,herodotus1 though often referred to afterwards--the custom of welcoming the newborn child with lamentations1 and recounting all the evils which now lie before it2 and1 on the other hand1 burying the dead with mirth and jesting1 because they are no longer exposed to so many and great sufferings4 ,in a beautiful poem preserved for us by ,plutarch 7,de audiend4 pot4 in fine7 this runs thus3-- 8 1 40 7,lugere genitum1 tanta qui intrarit mala3 ,at morte si quis finiisset miserias1 ,hunc laude amicos atque ltitia exsequi47 ,it is not to be attributed to historical relationship1 but to the moral identity of the matter1 that the ,mexicans welcomed the newborn child with the words1 8,my child1 thou art born to endure2 therefore endure1 suffer1 and keep silence40 ,and1 following the same feeling1 ,swift 7as ,walter ,scott relates in his ,life of ,swift7 early adopted the custom of keeping his birthday not as a time of joy but of sadness1 and of reading on that day the passage of the ,bible in which ,job laments and curses the day on which it was said in the house of his father a manchild is born4 ,well known and too long for quotation is the passage in the 8,apology of ,socrates10 in which ,plato makes this wisest of mortals say that death1 even if it deprives us of consciousness for ever1 would be a wonderful gain1 for a deep1 dreamless sleep every day is to be preferred even to the happiest life4 ,a saying of ,heraclitus runs3 8 1 40 7,vit nomen quidem est vita1 opus autem mors4 ,etymologicum magnum1 voce 2 also ,eustath4 ad ,iliad41 i4 p4 #ca47 ,the beautiful lines of the 8,theogony0 are famous3-- 8 1 2 1 40 7,optima sors homini natum non esse1 nec unquam4 ,adspexisse diem1 flammiferumque jubar4 ,altera jam genitum demitti protinus ,orco1 ,et pressum multa mergere corpus humo47 ,sophocles1 in 8dipus ,colonus0 7#abbe71 has the following abbreviation of the same3-- 8 2 1 1 1 1 40 7,natum non esse sortes vincit alias omnes3 proxima autem est1 ubi quis in lucem editus fuerit1 eodem redire1 unde venit1 quam ocissime47 ,euripides says3-- 8 1 40 7,omnis hominum vita est plena dolore1 ,nec datur laborum remissio47 --,,hippol1 #ahi4 ,and ,homer already said3-- 8 1 40 7,non enim quidquam alicubi est calamitosius homine ,omnium1 quotquot super terram spirantque et moventur47 --,,ii4 xvii4 #ddf4 ,even ,pliny says3 8,quapropter hoc primum quisque in remediis animi sui habeat1 ex omnibus bonis1 qu homini natura tribuit1 nullum melius esse tempestiva morte0 7,hist4 ,nat4 #bh1 #b74 ,shakspeare puts the words in the mouth of the old king ,henry ,,iv43-- 8,o heaven6 that one might read the book of fate1 ,and see the revolution of the times1 444 how chances mock1 ,and changes fill the cup of alteration ,with divers liquors6 ,o1 if this were seen1 ,the happiest youth1--viewing his progress through1 ,what perils past1 what crosses to ensue1-- ,would shut the book1 and sit him down and die40 ,finally1 ,byron3-- 8,count o'er the joys thine hours have seen1 ,count o'er thy days from anguish free1 ,and know1 whatever thou hast been1 ',tis something better not to be40 ,baltazar ,gracian also brings the misery of our existence before our eyes in the darkest colours in the 8,criticon10 ,parte i41 ,crisi #e1 just at the beginning1 and ,crisi #g at the end1 where he explicitly represents life as a tragic farce4 ,yet no one has so thoroughly and exhaustively handled this subject as1 in our own day1 ,leopardi4 ,he is entirely filled and penetrated by it3 his theme is everywhere the mockery and wretchedness of this existence2 he presents it upon every page of his works1 yet in such a multiplicity of forms and applications1 with such wealth of imagery that he never wearies us1 but1 on the contrary1 is throughout entertaining and exciting4 ,chapter ,,xlvii47#dc7 ,on ,ethics4 ,here is the great gap which occurs in these supplements1 on account of the circumstance that ,i have already dealt with moral philosophy in the narrower sense in the two prize essays published under the title1 8,die ,grundprobleme der ,ethik10 an acquaintance with which is assumed1 as ,i have said1 in order to avoid useless repetition4 ,therefore there only remains for me here a small gleaning of isolated reflections which could not be discussed in that work1 the contents of which were1 in the main1 prescribed by the ,academies2 least of all those reflections which demand a higher point of view than that which is common to all1 and which ,i was there obliged to adhere to4 ,accordingly it will not surprise the reader to find these reflections here in a very fragmentary collection4 ,this collection again has been continued in the eighth and ninth chapters of the second volume of the ,parerga4 ,that moral investigations are incomparably more difficult than physical1 and in general than any others1 results from the fact that they are almost immediately concerned with the thing in itself1 namely1 with that manifestation of it in which1 directly discovered by the light of knowledge1 it reveals its nature as will4 ,physical truths1 on the other hand1 remain entirely in the province of the idea1 i4e41 of the phenomenon1 and merely show how the lowest manifestations of the will present themselves in the idea in conformity to law4 ,further1 the consideration of the world from the physical side1 however far and successfully it may be pursued1 is in its results without any consolation for us3 on the moral side alone is consolation to be found2 for here the depths of our own inner nature disclose themselves to the consideration4 ,but my philosophy is the only one which confers upon ethics its complete and whole rights2 for only if the true nature of man is his own will1 and consequently he is1 in the strictest sense1 his own work1 are his deeds really entirely his and to be ascribed to him4 ,on the other hand1 whenever he has another origin1 or is the work of a being different from himself1 all his guilt falls back upon this origin1 or originator4 ,for operari sequitur esse4 ,to connect the force which produces the phenomenon of the world1 and consequently determines its nature1 with the morality of the disposition or character1 and thus to establish a moral order of the world as the foundation of the physical1--this has been since ,socrates the problem of philosophy4 ,theism solved it in a childish manner1 which could not satisfy mature humanity4 ,therefore pantheism opposed itself to it whenever it ventured to do so1 and showed that nature bears in itself the power by virtue of which it appears4 ,with this1 however1 ethics had necessarily to be given up4 ,spinoza1 indeed1 attempts here and there to preserve it by means of sophistry1 but for the most part gives it up altogether1 and1 with a boldness which excites astonishment and repugnance1 explains the distinction between right and wrong1 and in general between good and evil1 as merely conventional1 thus in itself empty 7for example1 ,eth4 iv41 prop4 #cg1 schol4 #b74 ,after having met with unmerited neglect for more than a hundred years1 ,spinoza has1 in general1 become too much esteemed in this century through the reaction caused by the swing of the pendulum of opinion4 ,all pantheism must ultimately be overthrown by the inevitable demands of ethics1 and then by the evil and suffering of the world4 ,if the world is a theophany1 then all that man1 or even the brute1 does is equally divine and excellent2 nothing can be censurable1 and nothing more praiseworthy than the rest3 thus there is no ethics4 ,hence1 in consequence of the revived ,spinozism of our own day1 thus of pantheism1 the treatment of ethics has sunk so low and become so shallow that it has been made a mere instruction as to the proper life of a citizen and a member of a family1 in which the ultimate end of human existence is supposed to consist3 thus in methodical1 complete1 smug1 and comfortable philistinism4 ,pantheism1 indeed1 has only led to such shallow vulgarisms through the fact that 7by a shameful misuse of the e quovis ligno fit ,mercurius7 a common mind1 ,hegel1 has1 by the wellknown means1 been falsely stamped as a great philosopher1 and a herd of his disciples1 at first suborned1 afterwards only stupid1 received his weighty words4 ,such outrages on the human mind do not remain unpunished3 the seed has sprouted4 ,in the same spirit it was then asserted that ethics should have for its material not the conduct of individuals1 but that of nations1 that this alone was a theme worthy of it4 ,nothing can be more perverse than this view1 which rests on the most vulgar realism4 ,for in every individual appears the whole undivided will to live1 the thing in itself1 and the microcosm is like the macrocosm4 ,the masses have no more content than each individual4 ,ethics is concerned not with actions and their results1 but with willing1 and willing itself takes place only in the individual4 ,not the fate of nations1 which exists only in the phenomenon1 but that of the individual is decided morally4 ,nations are really mere abstractions2 individuals alone actually exist4 ,thus1 then1 is pantheism related to ethics4 ,but the evil and misery of the world are not in accord even with theism2 hence it sought assistance from all kinds of evasions1 theodicies1 which yet were irretrievably overthrown by the arguments of ,hume and ,voltaire4 ,pantheism1 however1 is completely untenable in the presence of that bad side of the world4 ,only when the world is regarded entirely from without and from the physical side alone1 and nothing else is kept in view but the constant restorative order1 and the comparative imperishableness of the whole which is thereby introduced1 is it perhaps possible to explain it as a god1 yet always only symbolically4 ,but if one enters within1 thus considers also the subjective and moral side1 with its preponderance of want1 suffering1 and misery1 of dissension1 wickedness1 madness1 and perversity1 then one soon becomes conscious with horror that the last thing imaginable one has before one is a theophany4 ,i1 however1 have shown1 and especially in my work 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur0 have proved1 that the force which works and acts in nature is identical with the will in us4 ,thereby the moral order of the world is brought into direct connection with the force which produces the phenomenon of the world4 ,for the phenomenon of the will must exactly correspond to its nature4 ,upon this depends the exposition of eternal justice given in #fc and #fd of the first volume1 and the world1 although subsisting by its own power1 receives throughout a moral tendency4 ,accordingly the problem which has been discussed from the time of ,socrates is now for the first time really solved1 and the demand of thinking reason directed to morality is satisfied4 ,yet ,i have never professed to propound a philosophy which leaves no questions unanswered4 ,in this sense philosophy is really impossible3 it would be the science of omniscience4 ,but est quadam prodire tenus1 si non datur ultra3 there is a limit to which reflection can penetrate and can so far lighten the night of our existence1 although the horizon always remains dark4 ,my doctrine reaches this limit in the will to live1 which in its own manifestation asserts or denies itself4 ,to wish1 however1 to go beyond this is1 in my eyes1 like wishing to fly beyond the atmosphere4 ,we must stop there2 even although new problems arise out of those which have been solved4 ,besides this1 however1 we must refer to the fact that the validity of the principle of sufficient reason is limited to the phenomenon2 this was the theme of my first essay on that principle1 which was published as early as #ahac4 ,i now go on to supplement particular points1 and shall begin by supporting1 with two passages from classical poetry1 my explanation of weeping given in #fg of the first volume1 that it springs from sympathy the object of which is one's own self4 ,at the end of the eighth book of the 8,odyssey10 ,ulysses1 who in all his many sorrows is never represented as weeping1 bursts into tears1 when1 still unknown1 he hears his early heroic life and deeds sung by the bard ,demodocus in the palace of the ,phacian king1 for this remembrance of the brilliant period of his life contrasts with his present wretchedness4 ,thus not this itself directly1 but the objective consideration of it1 the picture of his present summoned up by his past1 calls forth his tears2 he feels sympathy with himself4 ,euripides makes the innocently condemned ,hypolytus1 bemoaning his own fate1 express the same feeling3 8 1 1 0 7#ajhd74 7,heu1 si liceret mihi1 me ipsum extrinsecus spectare1 quantopere deflerem mala1 qu patior47 ,finally1 as a proof of my explanation1 an anecdote may be given here which ,i take from the ,english journal ,the ,herald of the #afth ,july #ahcf4 ,a client1 when he had heard his case set forth by his counsel in court1 burst into a flood of tears1 and cried1 8,i never knew ,i had suffered half so much till ,i heard it here today40 ,i have shown in #ee of the first volume how1 notwithstanding the unalterable nature of the character1 i4e41 of the special fundamental will of a man1 a real moral repentance is yet possible4 ,i wish1 however1 to add the following explanation1 which ,i must preface by a few definitions4 ,inclination is every strong susceptibility of the will for motives of a certain kind4 ,passion is an inclination so strong that the motives which excite it exercise a power over the will1 which is stronger than that of every possible motive that can oppose them2 thus its mastery over the will becomes absolute1 and consequently with reference to it the will is passive or suffering4 ,it must1 however1 be remarked here that passions seldom reach the degree at which they fully answer to the definition1 but rather bear their name as mere approximations to it3 therefore there are then still countermotives which are able at least to restrict their effect1 if only they appear distinctly in consciousness4 ,the emotion is just as irresistible1 but yet only a passing excitement of the will1 by a motive which receives its power1 not from a deeply rooted inclination1 but merely from the fact that1 appearing suddenly1 it excludes for the moment the countereffect of all other motives1 for it consists of an idea1 which completely obscures all others by its excessive vividness1 or1 as it were1 conceals them entirely by its too close proximity1 so that they cannot enter consciousness and act on the will1 whereby1 therefore1 the capacity for reflection1 and with it intellectual freedom1 is to a certain extent abolished4 ,accordingly the emotion is related to the passion as delirium to madness4 ,moral repentance is now conditioned by the fact that before the act the inclination to it did not leave the intellect free scope1 because it did not allow it to contemplate clearly and fully the countermotives1 but rather turned it ever anew to the motives in its own favour4 ,but now1 after the act has been performed1 these motives are1 by this itself1 neutralised1 and consequently have become ineffective4 ,now reality brings before the intellect the countermotives as the consequences of the act which have already appeared2 and the intellect now knows that they would have been the stronger if it had only adequately contemplated and weighed them4 ,thus the man becomes conscious that he has done what was really not in accordance with his will4 ,this knowledge is repentance1 for he has not acted with full intellectual freedom2 for all the motives did not attain to efficiency4 ,what excluded the motives opposed to the action was in the case of the hasty action the emotion1 and in the case of the deliberate action the passion4 ,it has also often depended upon the circumstance that his reason certainly presented to him the countermotives in the abstract1 but was not supported by a sufficiently strong imagination to present to him their whole content and true significance in images4 ,examples of what has been said are the cases in which revenge1 jealousy1 or avarice have led to murder4 ,after it is committed they are extinguished1 and now justice1 sympathy1 the remembrance of former friendship1 raise their voices and say all that they would have said before if they had been allowed to speak4 ,then enters the bitter repentance1 which says1 8,if it were not done it would never happen40 ,an incomparable representation of this is afforded by the old ,scottish ballad1 which has also been translated by ,herder1 8,edward1 ,edward40 ,in an analogous manner1 the neglect of one's own good may occasion an egotistical repentance4 ,for example1 when an otherwise unadvisable marriage is concluded in consequence of passionate love1 which now is extinguished just by the marriage1 and for the first time the countermotives of personal interest1 lost independence1 c41 c41 come into consciousness1 and speak as they would have spoken before if they had been allowed utterance4 ,all such actions accordingly spring from a relative weakness of intellect1 because it lets itself be mastered by the will1 just where its function as the presenter of motives ought to have been inexorably fulfilled1 without allowing itself to be disturbed by the will4 ,the vehemence of the will is here only indirectly the cause1 in that it interferes with the intellect1 and thereby prepares for itself repentance4 ,the reasonableness of the character 1 which is opposed to passionateness1 really consists in this1 that the will never overpowers the intellect to such an extent as to prevent it from correctly exercising its function of the distinct1 full1 and clear exposition of the motives in the abstract for the reason1 in the concrete for the imagination4 ,now this may just as well depend upon the moderation and mildness of the will as upon the strength of the intellect4 ,all that is required is that the latter should be relatively strong enough for the will that is present1 thus that the two should stand in a suitable relation to each other4 ,the following explanations have still to be added to the fundamental characteristics of the philosophy of law expounded in #fb of the first volume1 and also in my prize essay on the foundation of morals1 #ag4 ,those who1 with ,spinoza1 deny that there is a right apart from the ,state1 confound the means for enforcing the right with the right itself4 ,certainly the right is insured protection only in the ,state4 ,but it itself exists independently of the ,state4 ,for by force it can only be suppressed1 never abolished4 ,accordingly the ,state is nothing more than an institution for protection1 which has become necessary through the manifold attacks to which man is exposed1 and which he would not be able to ward off alone1 but only in union with others4 ,so1 then1 the aims of the ,state are-- 7#a47 ,first of all1 outward protection1 which may just as well become needful against lifeless forces of nature or wild beasts as against men1 consequently against other nations2 although this case is the most frequent and important1 for the worst enemy of man is man3 homo homini lupus4 ,since1 in consequence of this aim1 nations always set up the principle1 in words if not with deeds1 that they wish to stand to each other in a purely defensive1 never in an aggressive relation1 they recognise the law of nations4 ,this is at bottom nothing but natural law1 in the only sphere of its practical activity that remains to it1 between nation and nation1 where it alone must reign1 because its stronger son1 positive law1 cannot assert itself1 since it requires a judge and an executive4 ,accordingly the law of nations consists of a certain degree of morality in the dealings of nations with each other1 the maintenance of which is a question of honour for mankind4 ,the bar at which cases based on this law are tried is that of public opinion4 7#b47 ,protection within1 thus protection of the members of a ,state against each other1 consequently security of private right1 by means of the maintenance of an honest state of things1 which consists in this1 that the concentrated forces of all protect each individual1 from which arises an appearance as if all were honest1 i4e41 just1 thus as if no one wished to injure the others4 ,but1 as is always the way in human affairs1 the removal of one evil generally opens the way for a new one2 thus the granting of that double protection introduces the need of a third1 namely3 7#c47 ,protection against the protector1 i4e41 against him or those to whom the society has transferred the management of the protection1 thus the guarantee of public right4 ,this appears most completely attainable by dividing and separating from each other the threefold unity of the protective power1 thus the legislature1 the judicature1 and the executive1 so that each is managed by others1 and independently of the rest4 ,the great value1 indeed the fundamental idea of the monarchy appears to me to lie in the fact that because men remain men one must be placed so high1 and so much power1 wealth1 security1 and absolute inviolability given him that there remains nothing for him to desire1 to hope1 and to fear for himself2 whereby the egoism which dwells in him1 as in every one1 is annihilated1 as it were1 by neutralisation1 and he is now able1 as if he were no longer a man1 to practise justice1 and to keep in view no longer his own but only the public good4 ,this is the source of the seemingly superhuman nature that everywhere accompanies royalty1 and distinguishes it so infinitely from the mere presidency4 ,therefore it must also be hereditary1 not elective2 partly in order that no one may see his equal in the king2 partly that the king himself may only be able to provide for his successors by caring for the welfare of the ,state1 which is absolutely one with that of his family4 ,if other ends besides that of protection1 here explained1 are ascribed to the ,state1 this may easily endanger the true end4 ,according to my explanation1 the right of property arises only through the expenditure of labour upon things4 ,this truth1 which has already often been expressed1 finds a noteworthy confirmation in the fact that it is asserted1 even in a practical regard1 in a declaration of the ,american ex president1 ,quincey ,adams1 which is to be found in the ,quarterly ,review of #ahdj1 ,no4 #acj2 and also in ,french1 in the 8,bibliothque universelle de ,genve10 ,july #ahdj1 ,no4 #ee4 ,i will give it here in ,german 7,english of ,quarterly ,review73 8,there are moralists who have questioned the right of the ,europeans to intrude upon the possessions of the aboriginals in any case1 and under any limitations whatsoever2 but have they maturely considered the whole subject8 ,the ,indian right of possession itself stands1 with regard to the greatest part of the country1 upon a questionable foundation4 ,their cultivated fields1 their constructed habitations1 a space of ample sufficiency for their subsistence1 and whatever they had annexed of themselves by personal labour1 was undoubtedly by the laws of nature theirs4 ,but what is the right of a huntsman to the forest of a thousand miles over which he has accidentally ranged in quest of prey80 c4 ,in the same way1 those who in our own day have seen occasion to combat communism with reasons 7for example1 the ,archbishop of ,paris1 in his pastoral of ,june #ahea7 have always brought forward the argument that property is the result of work1 as it were only embodied work4 ,this is further evidence that the right of property can only be established by the application of work to things1 for only in this respect does it find free recognition and make itself morally valid4 ,an entirely different kind of proof of the same truth is afforded by the moral fact that while the law punishes poaching just as severely as theft1 and in many countries more severely1 yet civil honour1 which is irrevocably lost by the latter1 is really not affected by the former2 but the poacher1 if he has been guilty of nothing else1 is certainly tainted with a fault1 but yet is not regarded1 like the thief1 as dishonourable and shunned by all4 ,for the principles of civil honour rest upon moral and not upon mere positive law2 but game is not an object upon which labour is bestowed1 and thus also is not an object of a morally valid possession3 the right to it is therefore entirely a positive one1 and is not morally recognised4 ,according to my view1 the principle ought to lie at the basis of criminal law that it is not really the man but only the deed which is punished1 in order that it may not recur4 ,the criminal is merely the subject in whom the deed is punished1 in order that the law in consequence of which the punishment is inflicted may retain its deterrent power4 ,this is the meaning of the expression1 8,he is forfeited to the law40 ,according to ,kant's explanation1 which amounts to a jus talionis1 it is not the deed but the man that is punished4 ,the penitentiary system also seeks not so much to punish the deed as the man1 in order to reform him4 ,it thereby sets aside the real aim of punishment1 determent from the deed1 in order to attain the very problematic end of reformation4 ,but it is always a doubtful thing to attempt to attain two different ends by one means3 how much more so if the two are in any sense opposite ends4 ,education is a benefit1 punishment ought to be an evil2 the penitentiary prison is supposed to accomplish both at once4 ,moreover1 however large a share untutored ignorance1 combined with outward distress1 may have in many crimes1 yet we dare not regard these as their principal cause1 for innumerable persons living in the same ignorance and under absolutely similar circumstances commit no crimes4 ,thus the substance of the matter falls back upon the personal1 moral character2 but this1 as ,i have shown in my prize essay on the freedom of the will1 is absolutely unalterable4 ,therefore moral reformation is really not possible1 but only determent from the deed through fear4 ,at the same time1 the correction of knowledge and the awakening of the desire to work can certainly be attained2 it will appear what effect this can produce4 ,besides this1 it appears to me1 from the aim of punishment set forth in the text1 that1 when possible1 the apparent severity of the punishment should exceed the actual3 but solitary confinement achieves the reverse4 ,its great severity has no witnesses1 and is by no means anticipated by any one who has not experienced it2 thus it does not deter4 ,it threatens him who is tempted to crime by want and misery with the opposite pole of human suffering1 ennui3 but1 as ,goethe rightly observes-- 8,when real affliction is our lot1 ,then do we long for ennui40 ,the contemplation of it will deter him just as little as the sight of the palatial prisons which are built by honest men for rogues4 ,if1 however1 it is desired that these penitentiary prisons should be regarded as educational institutions1 then it is to be regretted that the entrance to them is only obtained by crimes1 instead of which it ought to have preceded them4 ,that punishment1 as ,beccaria has taught1 ought to bear a proper proportion to the crime does not depend upon the fact that it would be an expiation of it1 but rather on the fact that the pledge ought to be proportionate to the value of that for which it answers4 ,therefore every one is justified in demanding the pledge of the life of another as a guarantee for the security of his own life1 but not for the security of his property1 for which the freedom1 and so forth1 of another is sufficient pledge4 ,for the security of the life of the citizens capital punishment is therefore absolutely necessary4 ,those who wish to abolish it should be answered1 8,first remove murder from the world1 and then capital punishment ought to follow40 ,it ought also to be inflicted for the clear attempt to murder just as for murder itself2 for the law desires to punish the deed1 not to revenge its consequences4 ,in general the injury to be guarded against affords the right measure for the punishment which is to be threatened1 but it does not give the moral baseness of the forbidden action4 ,therefore the law may rightly impose the punishment of imprisonment for allowing a flowerpot to fall from a window1 or impose hard labour for smoking in the woods during the summer1 and yet permit it in the winter4 ,but to impose the punishment of death1 as in ,poland1 for shooting an ureox is too much1 for the maintenance of the species of ureoxen may not be purchased with human life4 ,in determining the measure of the punishment1 along with the magnitude of the injury to be guarded against1 we have to consider the strength of the motives which impel to the forbidden action4 ,quite a different standard of punishment would be established if expiation1 retribution1 jus talionis1 were its true ground4 ,but the criminal code ought to be nothing but a register of countermotives for possible criminal actions3 therefore each of these motives must decidedly outweigh the motives which lead to these actions1 and indeed so much the more the greater the evil is which would arise from the action to be guarded against1 the stronger the temptation to it1 and the more difficult the conviction of the criminal2--always under the correct assumption that the will is not free1 but determinable by motives2--apart from this it could not be got at at all4 ,so much for the philosophy of law4 ,in my prize essay on the freedom of the will 7p4 #ej seq47 ,i have proved the originality and unalterableness of the inborn character1 from which the moral content of the course of life proceeds4 ,it is established as a fact4 ,but in order to understand problems in their full extent it is sometimes necessary to oppose opposites sharply to each other4 ,in this case1 then1 let one recall how incredibly great is the inborn difference between man and man1 in a moral and in an intellectual regard4 ,here nobleness and wisdom2 there wickedness and stupidity4 ,in one the goodness of the heart shines out of the eyes1 or the stamp of genius is enthroned in his countenance4 ,the base physiognomy of another is the impression of moral worthlessness and intellectual dulness1 imprinted by the hands of nature itself1 unmistakable and ineradicable2 he looks as if he must be ashamed of existence4 ,but to this outward appearance the inner being really corresponds4 ,we cannot possibly assume that such differences1 which transform the whole being of the man1 and which nothing can abolish1 which1 further1 in conflict with his circumstances1 determine his course of life1 could exist without guilt or merit on the part of those affected by them1 and be merely the work of chance4 ,even from this it is evident that the man must be in a certain sense his own work4 ,but now1 on the other hand1 we can show the source of these differences empirically in the nature of the parents2 and besides this1 the meeting and connection of these parents has clearly been the work of the most accidental circumstances4 ,by such considerations1 then1 we are forcibly directed to the distinction between the phenomenon and the true being of things1 which alone can contain the solution of that problem4 ,the thing in itself only reveals itself by means of the forms of the phenomenon2 therefore what proceeds from the thing in itself must yet appear in those forms1 thus also in the bonds of causality4 ,accordingly it will present itself to us here as a mysterious and incomprehensible guidance of things1 of which the external empirical connection would be the mere tool4 ,yet all that happens appears in this empirical connection introduced by causes1 thus necessarily and determined from without1 while its true ground lies in the inner nature of what thus manifests itself4 ,certainly we can here see the solution of the problem only from afar1 and when we reflect upon it we fall into an abyss of thought--as ,hamlet very truly says1 8thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls40 ,in my essay in the first volume of the ,parerga 8,on the ,appearance of ,intention in the ,fate of ,individuals0 ,i have set forth my thoughts upon this mysterious guidance of things1 a guidance which indeed can only be conceived symbolically4 ,in #ad of my prize essay on the foundation of morals there will be found an exposition of egoism1 as regards its nature2 and the following attempt to discover its root may be looked upon as supplementary to that paragraph4 ,nature itself contradicts itself directly1 according as it speaks from the individual or the universal1 from within or from without1 from the centre or the periphery4 ,it has its centre in every individual2 for each individual is the whole will to live4 ,therefore1 even if this individual is only an insect or a worm1 nature itself speaks out of it thus3 8,i alone am all in all3 in my maintenance everything is involved2 the rest may perish1 it is really nothing40 ,so speaks nature from the particular standpoint1 thus from the point of view of self consciousness1 and upon this depends the egoism of every living thing4 ,on the other hand1 from the universal point of view1--which is that of the consciousness of other things1 that of objective knowledge1 which for the moment looks away from the individual with whom the knowledge is connected1--from without then1 from the periphery nature speaks thus3 8,the individual is nothing1 and less than nothing4 ,i destroy millions of individuals every day1 for sport and pastime3 ,i abandon their fate to the most capricious and wilful of my children1 chance1 who harasses them at pleasure4 ,i produce millions of new individuals every day1 without any diminution of my productive power2 just as little as the power of a mirror is exhausted by the number of reflections of the sun1 which it casts on the wall one after another4 ,the individual is nothing40 ,only he who knows how to really reconcile and eliminate this patent contradiction of nature has a true answer to the question as to the perishableness and imperishableness of his own self4 ,i believe ,i have given1 in the first four chapters of this fourth book of the supplements1 an adequate introduction to such knowledge4 ,what is said above may further be illustrated in the following manner4 ,every individual1 when he looks within1 recognises in his nature1 which is his will1 the thing in itself1 therefore that which everywhere alone is real4 ,accordingly he conceives himself as the kernel and centre of the world1 and regards himself as of infinite importance4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he looks without1 then he is in the province of the idea the mere phenomenon1 where he sees himself as an individual among an infinite number of other individuals1 accordingly as something very insignificant1 nay1 vanishing altogether4 ,consequently every individual1 even the most insignificant1 every ,i1 when regarded from within1 is all in all2 regarded from without1 on the other hand1 he is nothing1 or at least as good as nothing4 ,hence upon this depends the great difference between what each one necessarily is in his own eyes and what he is in the eyes of others1 consequently the egoism with which every one reproaches every one else4 ,in consequence of this egoism our fundamental error of all is this1 that with reference to each other we are reciprocally not ,i4 ,on the other hand1 to be just1 noble1 and benevolent is nothing else than to translate my metaphysics into actions4 ,to say that time and space are mere forms of our knowledge1 not conditions of things in themselves1 is the same as to say that the doctrine of metempsychosis1 8,thou shalt one day be born as him whom thou now injurest1 and in thy turn shalt suffer like injury10 is identical with the formula of the ,brahmans1 which has frequently been mentioned1 ,tat twam asi1 8,this thou art40 ,all true virtue proceeds from the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the metaphysical identity of all beings1 which ,i have frequently shown1 especially in #bb of my prize essay on the foundation of morals4 ,but just on this account it is not the result of a special preeminence of intellect2 on the contrary1 even the weakest intellect is sufficient to see through the principium individuationis1 which is what is required in this matter4 ,accordingly we may find the most excellent character even in the case of a very weak understanding4 ,and further1 the excitement of our sympathy is accompanied by no exertion of our intellect4 ,it rather appears that the requisite penetration of the principium individuationis would be present in every one if it were not that the will opposes this1 and by virtue of its immediate mysterious and despotic influence upon the intellect generally prevents it from arising2 so that ultimately all guilt falls back upon the will1 as indeed is in conformity with the fact4 ,the doctrine of metempsychosis1 touched on above1 deviates from the truth merely through the circumstance that it transfers to the future what already is now4 ,it makes my true inner nature exist in others only after my death1 while1 according to the truth1 it already lives in them now1 and death merely removes the illusion on account of which ,i am not aware of this2 just as an innumerable host of stars constantly shine above our heads1 but only become visible to us when the one sun near the earth has set4 ,from this point of view my individual existence1 however much1 like that sun1 it may outshine everything1 appears ultimately only as a hindrance which stands between me and the knowledge of the true extent of my being4 ,and because every individual1 in his knowledge1 is subject to this hindrance1 it is just individuation that keeps the will to live in error as to its own nature2 it is the ,my of ,brahmanism4 ,death is a refutation of this error1 and abolishes it4 ,i believe that at the moment of death we become conscious that it is a mere illusion that has limited our existence to our person4 ,indeed empirical traces of this may be found in several states which are related to death by the abolition of the concentration of consciousness in the brain1 among which the magnetic sleep is the most prominent2 for in it1 if it reaches a high degree1 our existence shows itself through various symptoms1 beyond our persons and in other beings1 most strikingly by direct participation in the thoughts of another individual1 and ultimately even by the power of knowing the absent1 the distant1 and even the future1 thus by a kind of omnipresence4 ,upon this metaphysical identity of the will1 as the thing in itself1 in the infinite multiplicity of its phenomena1 three principal phenomena depend1 which may be included under the common name of sympathies3 7#a7 sympathy proper1 which1 as ,i have shown1 is the basis of justice and benevolence1 caritas2 7#b7 sexual love1 with capricious selection1 amor1 which is the life of the species1 that asserts its precedence over that of the individual2 7#c7 magic1 to which animal magnetism and sympathetic cures also belong4 ,accordingly sympathy may be defined as the empirical appearance of the metaphysical identity of the will1 through the physical multiplicity of its phenomena1 whereby a connection shows itself which is entirely different from that brought about by means of the forms of the phenomenon which we comprehend under the principle of sufficient reason4 ,chapter ,,xlviii47#dd7 ,on ,the ,doctrine ,of ,the ,denial ,of ,the ,will ,to ,live4 ,man has his existence and being either with his will1 i4e41 his consent1 or without this2 in the latter case an existence so embittered by manifold and insupportable sufferings would be a flagrant injustice4 ,the ancients1 especially the ,stoics1 also the ,peripatetics and ,academics1 strove in vain to prove that virtue sufficed to make life happy4 ,experience cried out loudly against it4 ,what really lay at the foundation of the efforts of these philosophers1 although they were not distinctly conscious of it1 was the assumed justice of the thing2 whoever was without guilt ought to be free from suffering1 thus happy4 ,but the serious and profound solution of the problem lies in the ,christian doctrine that works do not justify4 ,accordingly a man1 even if he has practised all justice and benevolence1 consequently the 1 honestum1 is yet not1 as ,cicero imagines1 culpa omni carens 7,tusc41 v4 i472 but el delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido 7the greatest guilt of man is that he was born71 as ,calderon1 illuminated by ,christianity1 has expressed it with far profounder knowledge than these wise men4 ,therefore that man comes into the world already tainted with guilt can appear absurd only to him who regards him as just then having arisen out of nothing and as the work of another4 ,in consequence of this guilt1 then1 which must therefore have proceeded from his will1 man remains rightly exposed to physical and mental suffering1 even if he has practised all those virtues1 thus is not happy4 ,this follows from the eternal justice of which ,i have spoken in #fc of the first volume4 ,that1 however1 as ,st4 ,paul 7,rom4 iii4 #ba71 ,augustine1 and ,luther teach1 works cannot justify1 inasmuch as we all are and remain essentially sinners1 ultimately rests upon the fact that1 because operari sequitur esse1 if we acted as we ought1 we would necessarily be as we ought4 ,but then we would require no salvation from our present condition1 which not only ,christianity but also ,brahmanism and ,buddhism 7under the name which is expressed in ,english by final emancipation7 present as the highest goal1 i4e41 we would not need to become something quite different from1 nay1 the very opposite of what we are4 ,since1 however1 we are what we ought not to be1 we also necessarily do what we ought not to do4 ,therefore we need a complete transformation of our mind and nature2 i4e41 the new birth1 as the result of which salvation appears4 ,although the guilt lies in action1 operari1 yet the root of the guilt lies in our essentia et existentia1 for out of these the operari necessarily proceeds1 as ,i have shown in the prize essay on the freedom of the will4 ,accordingly our one true sin is really original sin4 ,now the ,christian myth makes original sin first arise after man came into existence1 and for this purpose ascribes to him1 per impossibile1 a free will4 ,it does this1 however1 simply as myth4 ,the inmost kernel and spirit of ,christianity is identical with that of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism2 they all teach a great guilt of the human race through its existence itself1 only that ,christianity does not proceed directly and frankly like these more ancient religions3 thus does not make the guilt simply the result of existence itself1 but makes it arise through the act of the first human pair4 ,this was only possible under the fiction of a liberum arbitrium indifferenti1 and only necessary on account of the ,jewish fundamental dogma1 in which that doctrine had here to be implanted4 ,because1 according to the truth1 the coming into existence of man himself is the act of his free will1 and accordingly one with the fall1 and therefore the original sin1 of which all other sins are the result1 appeared already with the essentia and existentia of man2 but the fundamental dogma of ,judaism did not admit of such an explanation4 ,thus ,augustine taught1 in his books ,de libero arbitrio1 that only as ,adam before the fall was man guiltless and possessed of a free will1 but for ever after is involved in the necessity of sin4 ,the law1 1 in the ,biblical sense1 always demands that we shall change our doing1 while our being remains unchanged4 ,but because this is impossible1 ,paul says that no man is justified by the law2 only the new birth in ,jesus ,christ1 in consequence of the work of grace1 on account of which a new man arises and the old man is abolished 7i4e41 a fundamental change of mind or conversion71 can transfer us from the state of sinfulness into that of freedom and salvation4 ,this is the ,christian myth with reference to ethics4 ,but certainly the ,jewish theism1 upon which it was grafted1 must have received wonderful additions to adapt itself to that myth4 ,in it the fable of the fall presented the only place for the graft of the old ,indian stem4 ,it is to be attributed just to that forcibly surmounted difficulty that the ,christian mysteries have received such an extraordinary appearance1 conflicting with the ordinary understanding1 which makes proselytising more difficult1 and on account of which1 from incapacity to comprehend their profound meaning1 ,pelagianism1 or at the present day ,rationalism1 rises against them1 and seeks to explain them away1 but thereby reduces ,christianity to ,judaism4 ,but to speak without myth3 so long as our will is the same1 our world can be no other than it is4 ,it is true all wish to be delivered from the state of suffering and death2 they would like1 as it is expressed1 to attain to eternal blessedness1 to enter the kingdom of heaven1 only not upon their own feet2 they would like to be carried there by the course of nature4 ,that1 however1 is impossible4 ,therefore nature will never let us fall and become nothing2 but yet it can lead us nowhere but always again into nature4 ,yet how questionable a thing it is to exist as a part of nature every one experiences in his own life and death4 ,accordingly existence is certainly to be regarded as an erring1 to return from which is salvation3 it also bears this character throughout4 ,it is therefore conceived in this manner by the ancient ,samana religions1 and also1 although indirectly1 by real and original ,christianity4 ,even ,judaism itself contains at least in the fall 7this its redeeming feature7 the germ of such a view4 ,only ,greek paganism and ,islamism are entirely optimistic3 therefore in the former the opposite tendency had to find expression at least in tragedy2 but in ,islamism1 which is the worst1 as it is the most modern1 of all religions1 it appeared as ,sufism1 that very beautiful phenomenon1 which is completely of ,indian spirit and origin1 and has now continued for upwards of a thousand years4 ,nothing can1 in fact1 be given as the end of our existence but the knowledge that we had better not be4 ,this1 however1 is the most important of all truths1 which must therefore be expressed1 however great the contrast in which it stands with the ,european manner of thought of the present day4 ,on the other hand1 in the whole of non,mohammedan ,asia it is the most universally recognised fundamental truth1 today as much as three thousand years ago4 ,if now we consider the will to live as a whole and objectively1 we have1 in accordance with what has been said1 to think of it as involved in an illusion1 to escape from which1 thus to deny its whole existing endeavour1 is what all religions denote by selfrenunciation1 abnegatio sui ipsius2 for the true self is the will to live4 ,the moral virtues1 thus justice and benevolence1 since if they are pure they spring1 as ,i have shown1 from the fact that the will to live1 seeing through the principium individuationis1 recognises itself in all its manifestations1 are accordingly primarily a sign1 a symptom1 that the selfmanifesting will is no longer firmly held in that illusion1 but the disillusion already begins to take place2 so that one might metaphorically say it already flaps its wings to fly away from it4 ,conversely1 injustice1 wickedness1 cruelty are signs of the opposite1 thus of the deep entanglement in that illusion4 ,secondly1 however1 these virtues are a means of advancing self renunciation1 and accordingly the denial of the will to live4 ,for true integrity1 inviolable justice1 this first and most important of cardinal virtues1 is so hard a task that whoever professes it unconditionally and from the bottom of his heart has to make sacrifices that soon deprive life of the sweetness which is demanded to make it enjoyable1 and thereby turn away the will from it1 thus lead to resignation4 ,yet just what makes integrity honourable is the sacrifices which it costs2 in trifles it is not admired4 ,its nature really consists in this1 that the just man does not throw upon others1 by craft or force1 the burdens and sorrows which life brings with it1 as the unjust man does1 but bears himself what falls to his lot2 and thus he has to bear the full burden of the evil imposed upon human life1 undiminished4 ,justice thereby becomes a means of advancing the denial of the will to live1 for want and suffering1 those true conditions of human life1 are its consequence1 and these lead to resignation4 ,still more quickly does the virtue of benevolence1 caritas1 which goes further1 lead to the same result2 for on account of it one takes over even the sufferings which originally fell to the lot of others1 therefore appropriates to oneself a larger share of these than in the course of things would come to the particular individual4 ,he who is inspired with this virtue has recognised his own being in all others4 ,and thereby he identifies his own lot with that of humanity in general2 but this is a hard lot1 that of care1 suffering1 and death4 ,whoever1 then1 by renouncing every accidental advantage1 desires for himself no other lot than that of humanity in general cannot desire even this long4 ,the clinging to life and its pleasures must now soon yield1 and give place to a universal renunciation2 consequently the denial of the will will take place4 ,since now1 in accordance with this1 poverty1 privation1 and special sufferings of many kinds are introduced simply by the perfect exercise of the moral virtues1 asceticism in the narrowest sense1 thus the surrender of all possessions1 the intentional seeking out of what is disagreeable and repulsive1 selfmortification1 fasts1 the hair shirt1 and the scourge--all this is rejected by many1 and perhaps rightly1 as superfluous4 ,justice itself is the hair shirt that constantly harasses its owner and the charity that gives away what is needed1 provides constant fasts47#de7 ,just on this account ,buddhism is free from all strict and excessive asceticism1 which plays a large part in ,brahmanism1 thus from intentional selfmortification4 ,it rests satisfied with the celibacy1 voluntary poverty1 humility1 and obedience of the monks1 with abstention from animal food1 as also from all worldliness4 ,since1 further1 the goal to which the moral virtues lead is that which is here pointed out1 the ,vedanta philosophy7#df7 rightly says that after the entrance of true knowledge1 with entire resignation in its train1 thus the new birth1 then the morality or immorality of the past life is a matter of indifference1 and uses here also the saying so often quoted by the ,brahmans3 8,finditur nodus cordis1 dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes1 ejusque opera evanescunt1 viso supremo illo0 7,sancara1 sloca #cb74 ,now1 however objectionable this view may be to many1 to whom a reward in heaven or a punishment in hell is a much more satisfactory explanation of the ethical significance of human action1 just as the good ,windischmann rejects that doctrine1 while he expounds it1 yet whoever is able to go to the bottom of the matter will find that in the end it agrees with that ,christian doctrine especially urged by ,luther1 that it is not works but only the faith which enters through the work of grace1 that saves us1 and that therefore we can never be justified by our deeds1 but can only obtain the forgiveness of our sins through the merits of the ,mediator4 ,it is indeed easy to see that without such assumptions ,christianity would have to teach infinite punishment for all1 and ,brahmanism endless rebirths for all1 thus no salvation would be reached by either4 ,the sinful works and their consequences must be annulled and annihilated1 whether by extraneous pardon or by the entrance of a better knowledge2 otherwise the world could hope for no salvation2 afterwards1 however1 they become a matter of indifference4 ,this is also the 1 the announcement of which the risen ,christ exclusively imposes upon ,his ,apostles as the sum of their mission 7,luke xxiv4 #dg74 ,the moral virtues are really not the ultimate end1 but only a step towards it4 ,this step is signified in the ,christian myth by the eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil1 with which moral responsibility enters1 together with original sin4 ,the latter itself is in truth the assertion of the will to live3 the denial of the will to live1 in consequence of the appearance of a better knowledge1 is1 on the other hand1 salvation4 ,between these two1 then1 lies the sphere of morality2 it accompanies man as a light upon his path from the assertion to the denial of the will1 or1 mythically1 from original sin to salvation through faith in the mediation of the incarnate ,god 7,avatar72 or1 according to the teaching of the ,vedas1 through all re births1 which are the consequence of the works in each case1 until right knowledge appears1 and with it salvation 7final emancipation71 ,mokscha1 i4e41 reunion with ,brahma4 ,the ,buddhists1 however1 with perfect honesty1 only indicate the matter negatively1 by ,nirvana1 which is the negation of this world1 or of ,sansara4 ,if ,nirvana is defined as nothing1 this only means that the ,sansara contains no single element which could assist the definition or construction of ,nirvana4 ,just on this account the ,jainas1 who differ from the ,buddhists only in name1 call the ,brahmans who believe in the ,vedas ,sabdapramans1 a nickname which is meant to signify that they believe upon hearsay what cannot be known or proved 78,asiat4 ,researches10 vol4 vi4 ,p4 #dgd74 ,when certain ancient philosophers1 such as ,orpheus1 the ,pythagoreans1 and ,plato 7e4g41 in the 8,phdo10 pp4 #aea1 #ahc seq41 ,bip42 and see ,clem4 ,alex4 strom41 iii4 p4 #djj seq471 just like the ,apostle ,paul1 lament the union of soul and body1 and desire to be freed from it1 we understand the real and true meaning of this complaint1 since we have recognised1 in the second book1 that the body is the will itself1 objectively perceived as a phenomenon in space4 ,in the hour of death it is decided whether the man returns into the womb of nature or belongs no more to nature at all1 but ---- ---- ----3 for this opposite we lack image1 conception1 and word1 just because these are all taken from the objectification of the will1 therefore belong to this1 and consequently can in no way express the absolute opposite of it1 which accordingly remains for us a mere negation4 ,however1 the death of the individual is in each case the unweariedly repeated question of nature to the will to live1 8,hast thou enough8 ,wilt thou escape from me80 ,in order that it may occur often enough1 the individual life is so short4 ,in this spirit are conceived the ceremonies1 prayers1 and exhortations of the ,brahmans at the time of death1 as we find them preserved in the ,upanischad in several places2 and so also are the ,christian provisions for the suitable employment of the hour of death by means of exhortation1 confession1 communion1 and extreme unction3 hence also the ,christian prayers for deliverance from sudden death4 ,that at the present day it is just this that many desire only proves that they no longer stand at the ,christian point of view1 which is that of the denial of the will to live1 but at that of its assertion1 which is the heathen point of view4 ,but he will fear least to become nothing in death who has recognised that he is already nothing now1 and who consequently no longer takes any share in his individual phenomenon1 because in him knowledge has1 as it were1 burnt up and consumed the will1 so that no will1 thus no desire for individual existence1 remains in him any more4 ,individuality inheres indeed primarily in the intellect2 and the intellect1 reflecting the phenomenon1 belongs to the phenomenon1 which has the principium individuationis as its form4 ,but it inheres also in the will1 inasmuch as the character is individual3 yet the character itself is abolished in the denial of the will4 ,thus individuality inheres in the will only in its assertion1 not in its denial4 ,even the holiness which is connected with every purely moral action depends upon the fact that such an action ultimately springs from the immediate knowledge of the numerical identity of the inner nature of all living things47#dg7 ,but this identity only really exists in the condition of the denial of the will 7,nirvana71 for the assertion of the will 7,sansara7 has for its form the phenomenal appearance of it in multiplicity4 ,assertion of the will to live1 the phenomenal world1 the diversity of all beings1 individuality1 egoism1 hatred1 wickedness1 all spring from one root2 and so also1 on the other hand1 do the world as thing in itself1 the identity of all beings1 justice1 benevolence1 the denial of the will to live4 ,if now1 as ,i have sufficiently proved1 even the moral virtues spring from the consciousness of that identity of all beings1 but this lies1 not in the phenomenon1 but only in the thing in itself1 in the root of all beings1 the moral action is a momentary passing through the point1 the permanent return to which is the denial of the will to live4 ,it follows1 as a deduction from what has been said1 that we have no ground to assume that there are more perfect intelligences than that of human beings4 ,for we see that even this degree of intelligence is sufficient to impart to the will that knowledge in consequence of which it denies and abolishes itself1 upon which the individuality1 and consequently the intelligence1 which is merely a tool of individual1 and therefore animal nature1 perish4 ,this will appear to us less open to objection if we consider that we cannot conceive even the most perfect intelligences possible1 which for this end we may experimentally assume1 existing through an endless time1 which would be much too poor to afford them constantly new objects worthy of them4 ,because the nature of all things is at bottom one1 all knowledge of them is necessarily tautological4 ,if now this nature once becomes comprehended1 as by those most perfect intelligences it soon would be comprehended1 what would then remain but the wearisomeness of mere repetition through an infinite time8 ,thus from this side also we are pointed to the fact that the end of all intelligence can only be reaction upon the will2 since1 however1 all willing is an error1 it remains the last work of intelligence to abolish the willing1 whose ends it had hitherto served4 ,accordingly even the most perfect intelligence possible can only be a transition step to that to which no knowledge can ever extend3 indeed such an intelligence can1 in the nature of things1 only assume the position of the moment of the attainment of perfect insight4 ,in agreement with all these considerations1 and also with what is proved in the second book as to the origin of knowledge in the will1 the assertion of which it reflects in fulfilling the sole function of knowledge1 that of being serviceable to the ends of the will1 while true salvation lies in its denial1 we see all religions at their highest point pass over into mysticism and mysteries1 i4e41 into darkness and veiled obscurity1 which for knowledge signify merely an empty spot1 the point where knowledge necessarily ceases2 therefore for thought this can only be expressed by negations1 but for sense perception it is indicated by symbolical signs2 in temples by dim light and silence2 in ,brahmanism indeed by the required suspension of all thought and perception for the sake of sinking oneself profoundly in the grounds of one's own being1 mentally pronouncing the mysterious ,oum47#dh7 ,mysticism in the widest sense is every guidance to the immediate consciousness of that to which neither perception nor conception1 thus in general no knowledge extends4 ,the mystic is thus opposed to the philosopher by the fact that he begins from within1 while the philosopher begins from without4 ,the mystic starts from his inner1 positive1 individual experience1 in which he finds himself to be the eternal and only being1 c4 ,but nothing of this is communicable except the assertions which one has to accept upon his word2 consequently he cannot convince4 ,the philosopher1 on the other hand1 starts from what is common to all1 from the objective phenomenon which lies before all1 and from the facts of consciousness as they are present in all4 ,his method is therefore reflection upon all this1 and combination of the data given in it3 accordingly he can convince4 ,he ought therefore to beware of falling into the way of the mystics1 and1 for example1 by the assertion of intellectual intuitions or pretended immediate apprehensions of the reason1 to seek to make a vain show of positive knowledge of that which is for ever inaccessible to all knowledge1 or at the most can be indicated by means of a negation4 ,the value and worth of philosophy lies in the fact that it rejects all assumptions which cannot be established1 and takes as its data only what can be certainly proved in the world given in external perception1 in the forms of apprehension of this world1 which are constitutive of our intellect1 and in the consciousness of one's own self which is common to all4 ,therefore it must remain cosmology1 and cannot become theology4 ,its theme must limit itself to the world2 to express in all aspects what this is1 what it is in its inmost nature1 is all that it can honestly achieve4 ,now it answers to this that my system when it reaches its highest point assumes a negative character1 thus ends with a negation4 ,it can here speak only of what is denied1 given up3 but what is thereby won1 what is laid hold of1 it is obliged 7at the conclusion of the fourth book7 to denote as nothing1 and can only add the consolation that it is merely a relative1 not an absolute nothing4 ,for if something is none of all the things which we know1 it is certainly for us1 speaking generally1 nothing4 ,but it does not yet follow from this that it is absolutely nothing1 that from every possible point of view and in every possible sense it must be nothing1 but only that we are limited to a completely negative knowledge of it1 which may very well lie in the limitation of our point of view4 ,now it is just here that the mystic proceeds positively1 and therefore it is just from this point that nothing but mysticism remains4 ,however1 any one who wishes this kind of supplement to the negative knowledge to which alone philosophy can guide him will find it in its most beautiful and richest form in the ,oupnekhat1 then also in the ,enneads of ,plotinus1 in ,scotus ,erigena1 in passages of ,jakob ,bhm1 but especially in the marvellous work of ,madame de ,guion1 ,les ,torrens1 and in ,angelus ,silesius2 finally also in the poems of the ,sufis1 of which ,tholuk has given us a collection translated into ,latin1 and another translated into ,german1 and in many other works4 ,the ,sufis are the ,gnostics of ,islam4 ,hence ,sadi denotes them by a word which may be translated 8full of insight40 ,theism1 calculated with reference to the capacity of the multitude1 places the source of existence without us1 as an object4 ,all mysticism1 and so also ,sufism1 according to the various degrees of its initiation1 draws it gradually back within us1 as the subject1 and the adept recognises at last with wonder and delight that he is it himself4 ,this procedure1 common to all mysticism1 we find not only expressed by ,meister ,eckhard1 the father of ,german mysticism1 in the form of a precept for the perfect ascetic1 8that he seek not ,god outside himself0 7,eckhard's works1 edited by ,pfeiffer1 vol4 i4 p4 #fbf71 but also very navely exhibited by ,eckhard's spiritual daughter1 who sought him out1 when she had experienced that conversion in herself1 to cry out joyfully to him1 8,sir1 rejoice with me1 ,i have become ,god0 7loc4 cit41 p4 #dfe74 ,the mysticism of the ,sufis also expresses itself throughout precisely in accordance with this spirit1 principally as a revelling in the consciousness that one is oneself the kernel of the world and the source of all existence1 to which all returns4 ,certainly there also often appears the call to surrender all volition as the only way in which deliverance from individual existence and its suffering is possible1 yet subordinated and required as something easy4 ,in the mysticism of the ,hindus1 on the other hand1 the latter side comes out much more strongly1 and in ,christian mysticism it is quite predominant1 so that pantheistic consciousness1 which is essential to all mysticism1 here only appears in a secondary manner1 in consequence of the surrender of all volition1 as union with ,god4 ,corresponding to this difference of the conception1 ,mohammedan mysticism has a very serene character1 ,christian mysticism a gloomy and melancholy character1 while that of the ,hindus1 standing above both1 in this respect also holds the mean4 ,quietism1 i4e41 surrender of all volition1 asceticism1 i4e41 intentional mortification of one's own will1 and mysticism1 i4e41 consciousness of the identity of one's own nature with that of all things or with the kernel of the world1 stand in the closest connection2 so that whoever professes one of them is gradually led to accept the others1 even against his intention4 ,nothing can be more surprising than the agreement with each other of the writers who present these doctrines1 notwithstanding the greatest difference of their age1 country1 and religion1 accompanied by the firm certainty and inward confidence with which they set forth the permanence of their inner experience4 ,they do not constitute a sect1 which adheres to1 defends1 and propagates a favourite dogma once laid hold of2 indeed the ,indian1 ,christian1 and ,mohammedan mystics1 quietists1 and ascetics are different in every respect1 except the inner significance and spirit of their teaching4 ,a very striking example of this is afforded by the comparison of the ,torrens of ,madame de ,guion with the teaching of the ,vedas1 especially with the passage in the ,oupnekhat1 vol4 i4 p4 #fc1 which contains the content of that ,french work in the briefest form1 but accurately and even with the same images1 and yet could not possibly have been known to ,madame de ,guion in #afhj4 ,in the 8,deutschen ,theologie0 7the only unmutilated edition1 ,stuttgart1 #ahea7 it is said in chapters #b and #c that both the fall of the devil and that of ,adam consisted in the fact that the one as the other ascribed to himself the ,i and me1 the mine and to me1 and on p4 #hi it is said3 8,in true love there remains neither ,i nor me1 mine1 to me1 thou1 thine1 and the like40 ,now1 corresponding to this1 it is said in the 8,kural10 from the ,tamilian by ,graul1 p4 #h3 8,the passion of the mine directed outwardly1 and that of the ,i directed inwardly1 cease0 7cf4 ver4 #cdf74 ,and in the 8,manual of ,buddhism0 by ,spence ,hardy1 p4 #beh1 ,buddha says3 8,my disciples reject the thoughts ,i am this1 or this is mine40 ,in general1 if we look away from the forms which are introduced by external circumstances and go to the bottom of the matter1 we will find that ,sakya ,muni and ,meister ,eckhard teach the same2 only that the former dared to express his thoughts directly1 while the latter is obliged to clothe them in the garments of the ,christian myth and adapt his expressions to this4 ,he carries this1 however1 so far that with him the ,christian myth has become little more than a symbolical language1 just as the ,hellenic myth became for the ,neo ,platonists3 he takes it throughout allegorically4 ,in the same respect it is worth noticing that the transition of ,st4 ,francis from prosperity to the mendicant life is similar to the still greater step of ,buddha ,sakya ,muni from prince to beggar1 and that1 corresponding to this1 the life of ,st4 ,francis1 and also the order he founded1 was just a kind of ,sannyasiism4 ,indeed it deserves to be mentioned that his relationship with the ,indian spirit appears also in his great love for the brutes and frequent intercourse with them1 when he always calls them his sisters and brothers2 and his beautiful ,cantico also bears witness to his inborn ,indian spirit by the praise of the sun1 the moon1 the stars1 the wind1 the water1 the fire1 and the earth47#di7 ,even the ,christian quietists must often have had little or no knowledge of each other2 for example1 ,molinos and ,madame de ,guion of ,tauler and the 8,deutsche ,theologie10 or ,gichtel of the former4 ,in any case1 the great difference of their culture1 in that some of them1 like ,molinos1 were learned1 others1 like ,gichtel and many more1 were the reverse1 has no essential influence upon their teaching4 ,their great internal agreement1 along with the firmness and certainty of their utterances1 proves all the more that they speak from real inward experience1 from an experience which certainly is not accessible to all1 but is possessed only by a few favoured individuals1 and therefore has received the name of the work of grace1 the reality of which1 however1 for the above reasons1 is not to be doubted4 ,but in order to understand all this one must read the mystics themselves1 and not be contented with secondhand reports of them2 for every one must himself be comprehended before one judges concerning him4 ,thus to become acquainted with quietism ,i specially recommend ,meister ,eckhard1 the 8,deutsche ,theologie10 ,tauler1 ,madame de ,guion1 ,antoinette ,bourignon1 the ,english ,bunyan1 ,molinos7#ej7 and ,gichtel4 ,in the same way1 as practical proofs and examples of the profound seriousness of asceticism1 the life of ,pascal1 edited by ,reuchlin1 together with his history of the ,port,royal1 and also the ,histoire de ,sainte ,elisabeth1 par le comte de ,montalembert1 and ,la vie de ,ranc1 par ,chateaubriand1 are very well worth reading1 but yet by no means exhaust all that is important in this class4 ,whoever has read such writings1 and compared their spirit with that of ascetism and quietism as it runs through all works of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 and speaks in every page1 will admit that every philosophy1 which must in consistency reject that whole mode of thought1 which it can only do by explaining the representatives of it to be either impostors or madmen1 must just on this account necessarily be false4 ,but all ,european systems1 with the exception of mine1 find themselves in this position4 ,truly it must be an extraordinary madness which1 under the most widely different circumstances and persons possible1 spoke with such agreement1 and1 moreover1 was raised to the position of a chief doctrine of their religion1 by the most ancient and numerous peoples of the earth1 something like threefourths of all the inhabitants of ,asia4 ,but no philosophy can leave the theme of quietism and asceticism undecided if the question is proposed to it2 because this theme is1 in its matter1 identical with that of all metaphysics and ethics4 ,here then is a point upon which ,i expect and desire that every philosophy1 with its optimism1 should declare itself4 ,and if1 in the judgment of contemporaries1 the paradoxical and unexampled agreement of my philosophy with quietism and asceticism appears as an open stumblingblock1 ,i1 on the contrary1 see just in that agreement a proof of its sole correctness and truth1 and also a ground of explanation of why it is ignored and kept secret by the ,protestant universities4 ,for not only the religions of the ,east1 but also true ,christianity1 has throughout that ascetic fundamental character which my philosophy explains as the denial of the will to live2 although ,protestantism1 especially in its present form1 seeks to conceal this4 ,yet even the open enemies of ,christianity who have appeared in the most recent times have ascribed to it the doctrines of renunciation1 selfdenial1 perfect chastity1 and1 in general1 mortification of the will1 which they quite correctly denote by the name of the 8anticosmic tendency10 and have fully proved that such doctrines are essentially proper to original and genuine ,christianity4 ,in this they are undeniably right4 ,but that they set up this as an evident and patent reproach to ,christianity1 while just here lies its profoundest truth1 its high value1 and its sublime character1--this shows an obscuring of the mind1 which can only be explained by the fact that these men's minds1 unfortunately like thousands more at the present day in ,germany1 are completely spoiled and distorted by the miserable ,hegelism1 that school of dulness1 that centre of misunderstanding and ignorance1 that minddestroying1 spurious wisdom1 which now at last begins to be recognised as such1 and the veneration of which will soon be left to the ,danish ,academy1 in whose eyes even that gross charlatan is a summus philosophus1 for whom it takes the field3-- 8,car ils suivront la crance et estude1 ,de l'ignorante et sotte multitude1 ,dont le plus lourd sera rea pour juge40 --,,rabelais4 ,in any case1 the ascetic tendency is unmistakable in the genuine and original ,christianity as it developed in the writings of the ,church ,fathers from its kernel in the ,new ,testament2 it is the summit towards which all strives upwards4 ,as its chief doctrine we find the recommendation of genuine and pure celibacy 7this first and most important step in the denial of the will to live71 which is already expressed in the ,new ,testament47#ea7 ,strauss also1 in his 8,life of ,jesus0 7vol i4 p4 #fah of the first edition71 says1 with reference to the recommendation of celibacy given in ,matt4 xix4 #aa seq41 8,that the doctrine of ,jesus may not run counter to the ideas of the present day1 men have hastened to introduce surreptitiously the thought that ,jesus only praised celibacy with reference to the circumstances of the time1 and in order to leave the activity of the ,apostles unfettered2 but there is even less indication of this in the context than in the kindred passage1 #a ,cor4 vii4 #be seq42 but we have here again one of the places where ascetic principles1 such as prevailed among the ,essenes1 and probably still more widely among the ,jews1 appear in the teaching of ,jesus also40 ,this ascetic tendency appears more decidedly later than at the beginning1 when ,christianity1 still seeking adherents1 dared not pitch its demands too high2 and by the beginning of the third century it is expressly urged4 ,marriage1 in genuine ,christianity1 is merely a compromise with the sinful nature of man1 as a concession1 something allowed to those who lack strength to aspire to the highest1 an expedient to avoid greater evil3 in this sense it receives the sanction of the ,church in order that the bond may be indissoluble4 ,but celibacy and virginity are set up as the higher consecration of ,christianity through which one enters the ranks of the elect4 ,through these alone does one attain the victor's crown1 which even at the present day is signified by the wreath upon the coffin of the unmarried1 and also by that which the bride lays aside on the day of her marriage4 ,a piece of evidence upon this point1 which certainly comes to us from the primitive times of ,christianity1 is the pregnant answer of the ,lord1 quoted by ,clemens ,alexandrinus 7,strom4 iii4 #f et #i7 from the ,gospel of the ,egyptians3 8 1 2 1 1 1 0 7,salom interroganti quousque vigebit mors8 ,dominus guoadlusque inguit vos1 mulieres1 paritis74 8 1 0 7,hoc est1 quamdiu operabuntur cupiditates71 adds ,clement1 c4 #i1 with which he at once connects the famous passage1 ,rom4 v4 #ab4 ,further on1 c4 #ac1 he quotes the words of ,cassianus3 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7,cum interrogaret ,salome1 quando cognoscentur ea1 de quibus interrogabat1 ait ,dominus3 quando pudoris indumentum conculcaveritis1 et quando duo facto fuerint unum1 et masculum cum fmina nec masculum1 nec fminium71 i4e41 when she no longer needs the veil of modesty1 since all distinction of sex will have disappeared4 ,with regard to this point the heretics have certainly gone furthest3 even in the second century the ,tatianites or ,encratites1 the ,gnostics1 the ,marcionites1 the ,montanists1 ,valentinians1 and ,cassians2 yet only because with reckless consistency they gave honour to the truth1 and therefore1 in accordance with the spirit of ,christianity1 they taught perfect continence2 while the ,church prudently declared to be heresy all that ran counter to its farseeing policy4 ,augustine says of the ,tatianites3 8,nuptias damnant1 atque omnino pares eas fornicationibus aliisque corruptionibus faciunt3 nec recipiunt in suum numerum conjugio utentem1 sive marem1 sive fminam4 ,non vescunlur carnibus1 easque abominantur40 7,de hresi ad quod vult ,deum4 hr41 #be47 ,but even the orthodox ,fathers look upon marriage in the light indicated above1 and zealously preach entire continence1 the 4 ,athanasius gives as the cause of marriage3 8 444 1 2 40 7,quia subjacemus condemnationi propatoris nostri2 444 nam finis1 a ,deo prlatus1 erat1 nos non per nuptias et corruptionem fieri3 sed transgressio mandati nuptias introduxit1 propter legis violationem ,ad4--,exposit4 in psalm4 #ej74 ,tertullian calls marriage genus mali inferioris1 ex indulgentia ortum 7,de pudicitia1 c4 #af7 and says3 8,matrimonium et stuprum est commixtio carnis2 scilicet cujus concupiscentiam dominus stupro adquavit4 ,ergo1 inguis1 jam et primas1 id est unas nuptias destruis8 ,nec immerito3 quoniam et ips ex eo constant1 quod est stuprum0 7,de exhort4 castit41 c4 #i74 ,indeed1 ,augustine himself commits himself entirely to this doctrine and all its results1 for he says3 8,novi quosdam1 qui murmurent3 quid1 si1 inquiunt1 omnes velint ab omni concubitu abstinere1 unde subsistet genus humanum8 ,utinam omnes hoc vellent6 dumtaxat in caritate1 de corde puro et conscientia bona1 et fide non ficta3 multo citius ,dei civitas compleretur1 ut acceleraretur terminus mundi0 7,de bono conjugali1 c4 #aj74 ,and again3 8,non vos ab hoc studio1 quo multos ad imitandum vos excitatis1 frangat querela vanorum1 qui dicunt3 quomodo subsistet genus humanum1 si omnes fuerint continentes8 ,quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc seculum1 nisi ut impleatur prdestinatus numerus ille sanctorum1 quo citius impleto1 profecto nec terminus seculi differetur0 7,de bono individuitatis1 c4 #bc74 ,one sees at once that he identifies salvation with the end of the world4 ,the other passages in the works of ,augustine which bear on this point will be found collected in the 8,confessio ,augustiniana e ,d4 ,augustini operibus compilata a ,hieronymo ,torrense10 #afaj1 under the headings ,de matrimonio1 ,de clibatu1 c41 and any one may convince himself from these that in ancient1 genuine ,christianity marriage was only a concession1 which besides this was supposed to have only the begetting of children as its end1 that1 on the other hand1 perfect continence was the true virtue far to be preferred to this4 ,to those1 however1 who do not wish to go back to the authorities themselves ,i recommend two works for the purpose of removing any kind of doubt as to the tendency of ,christianity we are speaking about3 ,carov1 8,ueber das ,clibatgesetz10 #ahcb1 and ,lind1 8,de clibatu ,christianorum per tria priora secula10 ,havni1 #ahci4 ,it is1 however1 by no means the views of these writers themselves to which ,i refer1 for these are opposed to mine1 but solely to their carefully collected accounts and quotations1 which deserve full acceptance as quite trustworthy1 just because both these writers are opponents of celibacy1 the former a rationalistic ,catholic1 and the other a ,protestant candidate in theology1 who speaks exactly like one4 ,in the firstnamed work we find1 vol4 i4 p4 #aff1 in that reference1 the following result expressed3 8,in accordance with the ,church view1 as it may be read in canonical ,church ,fathers1 in the ,synodal and ,papal instructions1 and in innumerable writings of orthodox ,catholics1 perpetual chastity is called a divine1 heavenly1 angelic virtue1 and the obtaining of the assistance of divine grace for this end is made dependent upon earnest prayer4 ,we have already shown that this ,augustinian doctrine is by ,canisius and in the decrees of the ,council of ,trent expressed as an unchanging belief of the ,church4 ,that1 however1 it has been retained as a dogma till the present day is sufficiently established by the ,june number1 #ahca1 of the magazine #8,der ,katholik4' ,it is said there1 p4 #bfc3 #8,in ,catholicism the observance of a perpetual chastity1 for the sake of ,god1 appears as in itself the highest merit of man4 ,the view that the observance of continual chastity as an end in itself sanctifies and exalts the man is1 as every instructed ,catholic is convinced1 deeply rooted in ,christianity1 both as regards its spirit and its express precepts4 ,the decrees of the ,council of ,trent have abolished all possible doubt on this point4444' ,it must at any rate be confessed by every unprejudiced person1 not only that the doctrine expressed by #8,der ,katholik' is really ,catholic1 but also that the proofs adduced may be quite irrefutable for a ,catholic reason1 because they are drawn so directly from the ecclesiastical view1 taken by the ,church1 of life and its destiny40 ,it is further said in the same work1 p4 #bgj3 8,although both ,paul calls the forbidding to marry a false doctrine1 and the still ,judaistic author of the ,epistle to the ,hebrews enjoins that marriage shall be held in honour by all1 and the bed kept undefiled 7,heb4 xiii #d71 yet the main tendency of these two sacred writers is not on that account to be mistaken4 ,virginity is for both the perfect state1 marriage only a makeshift for the weak1 and only as such to be held inviolable4 ,the highest effort1 on the other hand1 was directed to complete1 material putting off of self4 ,the self must turn and refrain from all that tends only to its own pleasure1 and that only temporarily40 ,lastly1 p4 #bhh3 8,we agree with the ,abb ,zaccaria1 who asserts that celibacy 7not the law of celibacy7 is before everything to be deduced from the teaching of ,christ and the ,apostle ,paul40 ,what is opposed to this specially ,christian view is everywhere and always merely the ,old ,testament1 with its 4 ,this appears with peculiar distinctness from that important third book of the ,stromata of ,clement1 where1 arguing against the encratistic heretics mentioned above1 he constantly opposes to them only ,judaism1 with its optimistic history of creation1 with which the worlddenying tendency of the ,new ,testament is certainly in contradiction4 ,but the connection of the ,new ,testament with the ,old is at bottom only external1 accidental1 and forced2 and the one point at which ,christian doctrine can link itself on to the latter is only to be found1 as has been said1 in the story of the fall1 which1 moreover1 stands quite isolated in the ,old ,testament1 and is made no further use of4 ,but1 in accordance with the account in the ,gospels1 it is just the orthodox adherents of the ,old ,testament who bring about the crucifixion of the founder of ,christianity1 because they find his teaching in conflict with their own4 ,in the said third book of the ,stromata of ,clement the antagonism between optimism with theism on the one hand1 and pessimism with ascetic morality on the other1 comes out with surprising distinctness4 ,this book is directed against the ,gnostics1 who just taught pessimism and asceticism1 that is1 7abstinence of every kind1 but especially from all sexual satisfaction72 on account of which ,clement censures them vigorously4 ,but1 at the same time1 it becomes apparent that even the spirit of the ,old ,testament stands in this antagonism with that of the ,new ,testament4 ,for1 apart from the fall1 which appears in the ,old ,testament like a hors d'uvre1 the spirit of the ,old ,testament is diametrically opposed to that of the ,new ,testament--the former optimistic1 the latter pessimistic4 ,clement himself brings this contradiction out prominently at the end of the eleventh chapter 7 44471 although he will not allow that it is a real contradiction1 but explains it as only apparent1--like a good ,jew1 as he is4 ,in general it is interesting to see how with ,clement the ,new and the ,old ,testament get mixed up together2 and he strives to reconcile them1 yet for the most part drives out the ,new ,testament with the ,old4 ,just at the beginning of the third chapter he objects to the ,marcionites that they find fault with the creation1 after the example of ,plato and ,pythagoras2 for ,marcion teaches that nature is bad1 made out of bad materials 7 1 72 therefore one ought not to people this world1 but to abstain from marriage 7 1 74 ,now ,clement1 to whom in general the ,old ,testament is much more congenial and convincing than the ,new1 takes this very much amiss4 ,he sees in it their flagrant ingratitude to and enmity and rebellion against him who has made the world1 the just demiurgus1 whose work they themselves are1 and yet despise the use of his creatures1 in impious rebellion 8forsaking the natural opinion0 7 1 444 1 1 444 74 ,at the same time1 in his holy zeal1 he will not allow the ,marcionites even the honour of originality1 but1 armed with his wellknown erudition1 he brings it against them1 and supports his case with the most beautiful quotations1 that even the ancient philosophers1 that ,heraclitus and ,empedocles1 ,pythagoras and ,plato1 ,orpheus and ,pindar1 ,herodotus and ,euripides1 and also the ,sibyls1 lamented deeply the wretched nature of the world1 thus taught pessimism4 ,now in this learned enthusiasm he does not observe that in this way he is just giving the ,marcionites water for their mill1 for he shows that 8,all the wisest of all the ages0 have taught and sung what they do1 but confidently and boldly he quotes the most decided and energetic utterances of the ancients in this sense4 ,certainly they cannot lead him astray4 ,wise men may mourn the sadness of existence1 poets may pour out the most affecting lamentations about it1 nature and experience may cry out as loudly as they will against optimism1--all this does not touch our ,church ,father3 he holds his ,jewish revelation in his hand1 and remains confident4 ,the demiurgus made the world4 ,from this it is a priori certain that it is excellent1 and it may look as it likes4 ,the same thing then takes place with regard to the second point1 the 1 through which1 according to his view1 the ,marcionites show their ingratitude towards the demiurgus 7 7 and the perversity with which they put from them all his gifts 7 1 74 ,here now the tragic poets have preceded the ,encratites 7to the prejudice of their originality7 and have said the same things4 ,for since they also lament the infinite misery of existence1 they have added that it is better to bring no children into such a world2 which he now again supports with the most beautiful passages1 and1 at the same time1 accuses the ,pythagoreans of having renounced sexual pleasure on this ground4 ,but all this touches him not2 he sticks to his principle that all these sin against the demiurgus1 in that they teach that one ought not to marry1 ought not to beget children1 ought not to bring new miserable beings into the world1 ought not to provide new food for death 7 1 1 1 1 1 --c4 #f74 ,since the learned ,church ,father thus denounces 1 he seems to have had no presentiment that just after his time the celibacy of the ,christian priesthood would be more and more introduced1 and finally1 in the eleventh century1 raised to the position of a law1 because it is in keeping with the spirit of the ,new ,testament4 ,it is just this spirit which the ,gnostics have grasped more profoundly and understood better than our ,church ,father1 who is more ,jew than ,christian4 ,the conception of the ,gnostics comes out very clearly at the beginning of the ninth chapter1 where the following passage is quoted from the ,gospel of the ,egyptians3 1 8 20 1 2 1 7,ajunt enim dixisse ,servatorem3 veni ad dissolvendum opera femin2 femin quidem1 cupiditatis2 opera autem1 generationem et interitum72 but quite specially at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth chapter4 ,the ,church certainly was obliged to consider how to set a religion upon its legs that could also walk and stand in the world as it is1 and among men2 therefore it declared these persons to be heretics4 ,at the conclusion of the seventh chapter our ,church ,father opposes ,indian asceticism1 as bad1 to ,christian ,judaism2 whereby the fundamental difference of the spirit of the two religions is clearly brought out4 ,in ,judaism and ,christianity everything runs back to obedience or disobedience to the command of ,god3 2 as befits us creatures1 1 7nobis1 qui ,omnipotentis voluntate efficti sumus71 chap4 #ad4 ,then comes1 as a second duty1 1 to serve ,god1 extol ,his works1 and overflow with thankfulness4 ,certainly the matter has a very different aspect in ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 for in the latter all improvement and conversion1 and the only deliverance we can hope for from this world of suffering1 this ,sansara1 proceeds from the knowledge of the four fundamental truths3 7#a7 dolor2 7#b7 doloris ortus2 7#c7 doloris interitus2 7#d7 octopartita via ad doloris sedationem 7,dammapadam1 ed4 ,fausbll1 p4 #ce et #cdg74 ,the explanation of these four truths will be found in ,bournouf1 8,introduct4 l'hist4 du ,buddhisme10 p4 #fbi1 and in all expositions of ,buddhism4 ,in truth1 ,judaism1 with its 1 is not related to ,christianity as regards its spirit and ethical tendency1 but ,brahmanism and ,buddhism are4 ,but the spirit and ethical tendency are what is essential in a religion1 not the myths in which these are clothed4 ,i therefore cannot give up the belief that the doctrines of ,christianity can in some way be derived from these primitive religions4 ,i have pointed out some traces of this in the second volume of the ,parerga1 #agi 7second edition1 #ahj74 ,i have to add to these that ,epiphanias 7,hretic4 xviii47 relates that the first ,jewish ,christians of ,jerusalem1 who called themselves ,nazarenes1 refrained from all animal food4 ,on account of this origin 7or1 at least1 this agreement7 ,christianity belongs to the ancient1 true and sublime faith of mankind1 which is opposed to the false1 shallow1 and injurious optimism which exhibits itself in ,greek paganism1 ,judaism1 and ,islamism4 ,the ,zend religion holds to a certain extent the mean1 because it has opposed to ,ormuzd a pessimistic counterpoise in ,ahriman4 ,from this ,zend religion the ,jewish religion proceeded1 as ,j4,g4 ,rhode has thoroughly proved in his book1 8,die heilige ,sage des ,zendvolks20 from ,ormuzd has come ,jehovah1 and from ,ahriman1 ,satan1 who1 however1 plays only a very subordinate rle in ,judaism1 indeed almost entirely disappears1 whereby then optimism gains the upper hand1 and there only remains the myth of the fall as a pessimistic element1 which certainly 7as the fable of ,meschia and ,meschiane7 is derived from the ,zend,avesta4 ,yet even this falls into oblivion1 till it is again taken up by ,christianity along with ,satan4 ,ormuzd himself1 however1 is derived from ,brahmanism1 although from a lower region of it2 he is no other than ,indra1 that subordinate god of the firmament and the atmosphere1 who is represented as frequently in rivalry with men4 ,this has been very clearly shown by ,j4,j4 ,schmidt in his work on the relation of the ,gnostictheosophic doctrines to the religions of the ,east4 ,this ,indra,ormuzd,jehovah had afterwards to pass over into ,christianity1 because this religion arose in ,juda4 ,but on account of the cosmopolitan character of ,christianity he laid aside his own name to be denoted in the language of each converted nation by the appellation of the superhuman beings he supplanted1 as1 1 ,deus1 which comes from the ,sanscrit ,deva 7from which also devil comes71 or among the ,gothico ,germanic peoples by the word ,god1 ,gott1 which comes from ,odin1 ,wodan1 ,guodan1 ,godan4 ,in the same way he assumed in ,islamism1 which also sprang from ,judaism1 the name of ,allah1 which also existed earlier in ,arabia4 ,analogous to this1 the gods of the ,greek ,olympus1 when in prehistoric times they were transplanted to ,italy1 also assumed the names of the previously reigning gods3 hence among the ,romans ,zeus is called ,jupiter1 ,hera ,juno1 ,hermes ,mercury1 c4 ,in ,china the first difficulty of the missionaries arose from the fact that the ,chinese language has no appellation of the kind and also no word for creating2 for the three religions of ,china know no gods either in the plural or in the singular47#eb7 ,however the rest may be1 that of the ,old ,testament is really foreign to true ,christianity2 for in the ,new ,testament the world is always spoken of as something to which one does not belong1 which one does not love1 nay1 whose lord is the devil47#ec7 ,this agrees with the ascetic spirit of the denial of one's self and the overcoming of the world which1 just like the boundless love of one's neighbour1 even of one's enemy1 is the fundamental characteristic which ,christianity has in common with ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 and which proves their relationship4 ,there is nothing in which one has to distinguish the kernel so carefully from the shell as in ,christianity4 ,just because ,i prize this kernel highly ,i sometimes treat the shell with little ceremony2 it is1 however1 thicker than is generally supposed4 ,protestantism1 since it has eliminated asceticism and its central point1 the meritoriousness of celibacy1 has already given up the inmost kernel of ,christianity1 and so far is to be regarded as a falling away from it4 ,this has become apparent in our own day by the gradual transition of ,protestantism into shallow rationalism1 this modern ,pelagianism1 which ultimately degenerates into the doctrine of a loving father1 who has made the world1 in order that things may go on very pleasantly in it 7in which case1 then1 he must certainly have failed71 and who1 if one only conforms to his will in certain respects1 will also afterwards provide a still more beautiful world 7with regard to which it is only a pity that it has such a fatal entrance74 ,that may be a good religion for comfortable1 married1 and enlightened ,protestant pastors2 but it is no ,christianity4 ,christianity is the doctrine of the deep guilt of the human race through its existence alone1 and the longing of the heart for deliverance from it1 which1 however1 can only be attained by the greatest sacrifices and by the denial of one's own self1 thus by an entire reversal of human nature4 ,luther may have been perfectly right from the practical point of view1 i4e41 with reference to the ,church scandal of his time1 which he wished to remove1 but not so from the theoretical point of view4 ,the more sublime a doctrine is1 the more it is exposed to abuse at the hands of human nature1 which1 on the whole1 is of a low and evil disposition3 hence the abuses of ,catholicism are so much more numerous and so much greater than those of ,protestantism4 ,thus1 for example1 monasticism1 that methodical denial of the will practised in common for the sake of mutual encouragement1 is an institution of a sublime description1 which1 however1 for this very reason is for the most part untrue to its spirit4 ,the shocking abuses of the ,church excited in the honest mind of ,luther a lofty indignation4 ,but in consequence of this he was led to desire to limit as much as possible the claims of ,christianity itself1 and for this end he first confined it to the words of the ,bible2 but then1 in his wellmeant zeal1 he went too far1 for he attacked the very heart of ,christianity in the ascetic principle4 ,for after the withdrawal of the ascetic principle1 the optimistic principle soon necessarily took its place4 ,but in religions1 as in philosophy1 optimism is a fundamental error which obstructs the path of all truth4 ,from all this it seems to me that ,catholicism is a shamefully abused1 but ,protestantism a degenerate ,christianity2 thus1 that ,christianity in general has met the fate which befalls all that is noble1 sublime1 and great whenever it has to dwell among men4 ,however1 even in the very lap of ,protestantism1 the essentially ascetic and encratistic spirit of ,christianity has made way for itself2 and in this case it has appeared in a phenomenon which perhaps has never before been equalled in magnitude and definiteness1 the highly remarkable sect of the ,shakers1 in ,north ,america1 founded by an ,englishwoman1 ,anne ,lee1 in #aggd4 ,the adherents of this sect have already increased to #fjjj1 who are divided into fifteen communities1 and inhabit a number of villages in the states of ,new ,york and ,kentucky1 especially in the district of ,new ,lebanon1 near ,nassau village4 ,the fundamental characteristic of their religious rule of life is celibacy and entire abstention from all sexual satisfaction4 ,it is unanimously admitted1 even by the ,english and ,americans who visit them1 and who laugh and jeer at them in every other respect1 that this rule is strictly and with perfect honesty observed2 although brothers and sisters sometimes even occupy the same house1 eat at the same table1 nay1 dance together in the religious services in church4 ,for whoever has made that hardest of all sacrifices may dance before the ,lord2 he is a victor1 he has overcome4 ,their singing in church consists in general of cheerful1 and partly even of merry1 songs4 ,the churchdance1 also1 which follows the sermon is accompanied by the singing of the rest4 ,it is a lively dance1 performed in measured time1 and concludes with a galop1 which is carried on till the dancers are exhausted4 ,between each dance one of their teachers cries aloud1 8,think1 that ye rejoice before the ,lord for having slain your flesh2 for this is here the only use we make of our refractory limbs40 ,to celibacy most of the other conditions link themselves on of themselves4 ,there are no families1 and therefore there is no private property1 but community of goods4 ,all are clothed alike1 in ,quaker fashion1 and with great neatness4 ,they are industrious and diligent3 idleness is not endured4 ,they have also the enviable rule that they are to avoid all unnecessary noise1 such as shouting1 door slamming1 whipcracking1 loud knocking1 c4 ,their rule of life has been thus expressed by one of them3 8,lead a life of innocence and purity1 love your neighbours as yourself1 live at peace with all men1 and refrain from war1 bloodshed1 and all violence against others1 as well as from all striving after worldly honour and distinction4 ,give to each his own1 and follow after holiness1 without which no man can see the ,lord4 ,do good to all so far as your opportunity and your power extends40 ,they persuade no one to join them1 but test those who present themselves by a novitiate of several years4 ,moreover1 every one is free to leave them2 very rarely is any one expelled for misconduct4 ,adopted children are carefully educated1 and only when they are grown up do they voluntarily join the sect4 ,it is said that in the controversies of their ministers with ,anglican clergy the latter generally come off the worse1 for the arguments consist of passages from the ,new ,testament4 ,fuller accounts of them will be found particularly in ,maxwell's 8,run through the ,united ,states10 #ahda2 also in ,benedict's 8,history of all ,religions10 #ahcj2 also in the ,times1 ,november #d1 #ahcg1 and in the ,german magazine ,columbus1 ,may number1 #ahca4 ,a ,german sect in ,america1 very similar to them1 who also live in strict celibacy and continence1 are the ,rappists4 ,an account of them is given in ,f4 ,loher's 8,geschichte und ,zustande der ,deutschen in ,amerika10 #ahec4 ,in ,russia also the ,raskolniks are a similar sect4 ,the ,gichtelians live also in strict chastity4 ,but among the ancient ,jews we already find a prototype of all these sects1 the ,essenes1 of whom even ,pliny gives an account 7,hist4 ,nat41 v4 #ae71 and who resembled the ,shakers very much1 not only in celibacy1 but also in other respects2 for example1 in dancing during divine service1 which leads to the opinion that the founder of the ,shakers took the ,essenes as a pattern4 ,in the presence of such facts as these how does ,luther's assertion look3 8,ubi natura1 quemadmodum a ,deo nobis insita est1 fertur ac rapitur1 ,,fieri ,,nullo ,,modo ,,potest1 ut extra matrimonium caste vivatur08 7,catech4 maj47 ,although ,christianity1 in essential respects1 taught only what all ,asia knew long before1 and even better1 yet for ,europe it was a new and great revelation1 in consequence of which the spiritual tendency of the ,european nations was therefore entirely transformed4 ,for it disclosed to them the metaphysical significance of existence1 and therefore taught them to look away from the narrow1 paltry1 ephemeral life of earth1 and to regard it no longer as an end in itself1 but as a condition of suffering1 guilt1 trial1 conflict1 and purification1 out of which1 by means of moral achievements1 difficult renunciation1 and denial of oneself1 one may rise to a better existence1 which is inconceivable by us4 ,it taught the great truth of the assertion and denial of the will to live in the clothing of allegory by saying that through ,adam's fall the curse has come upon all1 sin has come into the world1 and guilt is inherited by all2 but that1 on the other hand1 through the sacrificial death of ,jesus all are reconciled1 the world saved1 guilt abolished1 and justice satisfied4 ,in order1 however1 to understand the truth itself that is contained in this myth one must not regard men simply in time1 as beings independent of each other1 but must comprehend the 7,platonic7 ,idea of man1 which is related to the series of men1 as eternity in itself is related to eternity drawn out as time2 hence the eternal ,idea man extended in time to the series of men through the connecting bond of generation appears again in time as a whole4 ,if now we keep the ,idea of man in view1 we see that ,adam's fall represents the finite1 animal1 sinful nature of man1 in respect of which he is a finite being1 exposed to sin1 suffering1 and death4 ,on the other hand1 the life1 teaching1 and death of ,jesus ,christ represent the eternal1 supernatural side1 the freedom1 the salvation of man4 ,now every man1 as such and potenti1 is both ,adam and ,jesus1 according as he comprehends himself1 and his will thereupon determines him2 in consequence of which he is then condemned and given over to death1 or saved and attains to eternal life4 ,now these truths1 both in their allegorical and in their real acceptation1 were completely new as far as ,greeks and ,romans were concerned1 who were still entirely absorbed in life1 and did not seriously look beyond it4 ,let whoever doubts this see how ,cicero 7,pro ,cluentio1 c4 #fa7 and ,sallust 7,catil41 c4 #dg7 speak of the state after death4 ,the ancients1 although far advanced in almost everything else1 remained children with regard to the chief concern1 and were surpassed in this even by the ,druids1 who at least taught metempsychosis4 ,that one or two philosophers1 like ,pythagoras and ,plato1 thought otherwise alters nothing as regards the whole4 ,that great fundamental truth1 then1 which is contained in ,christianity1 as in ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 the need of deliverance from an existence which is given up to suffering and death1 and the attainableness of this by the denial of the will1 thus by a decided opposition to nature1 is beyond all comparison the most important truth there can be2 but1 at the same time1 it is entirely opposed to the natural tendency of the human race1 and in its true grounds it is difficult to comprehend2 as indeed all that can only be thought generally and in the abstract is inaccessible to the great majority of men4 ,therefore for these men there was everywhere required1 in order to bring that great truth within the sphere of its practical application1 a mythical vehicle for it1 as it were a receptacle1 without which it would be lost and dissipated4 ,the truth had therefore everywhere to borrow the garb of the fable1 and also constantly to endeavour to connect itself with what in each case was historically given1 already familiar1 and already revered4 ,what sensu proprio remained inaccessible to the great mass of mankind of all ages and lands1 with their low tone of mind1 their intellectual stupidity and general brutality1 had1 for practical purposes1 to be brought home to them sensu allegorico1 in order to become their guiding star4 ,so1 then1 the religions mentioned above are to be regarded as the sacred vessels in which the great truth1 known and expressed for several thousand years1 indeed perhaps since the beginning of the human race1 which yet in itself1 for the great mass of mankind always remains a mystery1 is1 according to the measure of their powers1 made accessible to them1 preserved and transmitted through the centuries4 ,yet1 because all that does not through and through consist of the imperishable material of pure truth is subject to destruction1 whenever this fate befalls such a vessel1 through contact with a heterogeneous age1 its sacred content must in some way be saved and preserved for mankind by another4 ,but it is the task of philosophy1 since it is one with pure truth1 to present that content pure and unmixed1 thus merely in abstract conceptions1 and consequently without that vehicle1 for those who are capable of thinking1 who are always an exceedingly small number4 ,it is therefore related to religions as a straight line to several curves running near it3 for it expresses sensu proprio1 thus reaches directly1 what they show in veiled forms and reach by circuitous routes4 ,if now1 in order to illustrate what has just been said by an example1 and also to follow a philosophical fashion of my time1 ,i should wish perhaps to attempt to solve the profoundest mystery of ,christianity1 that of the ,trinity1 in the fundamental conception of my philosophy1 this could be done1 with the licence permitted in such interpretations1 in the following manner4 ,the ,holy ,ghost is the distinct denial of the will to live3 the man in whom this exhibits itself in concreto is the ,son2 ,he is identical with the will which asserts life1 and thereby produces the phenomenon of this perceptible world1 i4e41 with the ,father1 because the assertion and denial are opposite acts of the same will whose capability for both is the only true freedom4 ,however1 this is to be regarded as a mere lusus ingenii4 ,before ,i close this chapter ,i wish to adduce a few proofs in support of what in #fh of the first volume ,i denoted by the expression 1 the bringing about of the denial of the will by one's own deeply felt suffering1 thus not merely by the appropriation of the suffering of others1 and the knowledge of the vanity and wretchedness of our existence introduced by this4 ,we can arrive at a comprehension of what goes on in the heart of a man1 in the case of an elevation of this kind and the accompanying purifying process1 by considering what every emotional man experiences on beholding a tragedy1 which is of kindred nature to this4 ,in the third and fourth acts perhaps such a man is distressed and disturbed by the ever more clouded and threatened happiness of the hero2 but when1 in the fifth act1 this happiness is entirely wrecked and shattered1 he experiences a certain elevation of the soul1 which affords him an infinitely higher kind of pleasure than the sight of the happiness of the hero1 however great it might be1 could ever have given4 ,now this is the same thing1 in the weak watercolours of sympathy which is able to raise a wellknown illusion1 as that which takes place with the energy of reality in the feeling of our own fate when it is heavy misfortune that drives the man at last into the haven of entire resignation4 ,upon this occurrence depend all those conversions which completely transform men such as are described in the text4 ,i may give here in a few words the story of the conversion of the ,abb ,ranc1 as it is strikingly similar to that of ,raymond ,lully1 which is told in the text1 and besides this is memorable on account of its result4 ,his youth was devoted to enjoyment and pleasure2 finally1 he lived in a relation of passion with a ,madame de ,montbazon4 ,one evening1 when he visited her1 he found her room empty1 in disorder and darkness4 ,he struck something with his foot2 it was her head1 which had been severed from the trunk1 because after her sudden death her corpse could not otherwise be got into the lead coffin that stood beside it4 ,after overcoming an immense sorrow1 ,ranc now became1 in #affc1 the reformer of the order of the ,trappists1 which at that time had entirely relaxed the strictness of its rules4 ,he joined this order1 and through him it was led back to that terrible degree of renunciation which is still maintained at the present day at ,la ,trappe1 and1 as the methodically carried out denial of the will1 aided by the severest renunciation and an incredibly hard and painful manner of life1 fills the visitor with sacred awe1 after he has been touched at his reception by the humility of these genuine monks1 who1 emaciated by fasting1 by cold1 by night watches1 prayers and penances1 kneel before him1 the worldling and the sinner1 to implore his blessing4 ,of all orders of monks1 this one alone has maintained itself in perfection in ,france1 through all changes2 which is to be attributed to the profound earnestness which in it is unmistakable1 and excludes all secondary ends4 ,it has remained untouched even by the decline of religion1 because its root lies deeper in human nature than any positive system of belief4 ,i have mentioned in the text that this great and rapid change of the inmost being of man which we are here considering1 and which has hitherto been entirely neglected by philosophers1 appears most frequently when1 with full consciousness1 he stands in the presence of a violent and certain death1 thus in the case of executions4 ,but1 in order to bring this process much more distinctly before our eyes1 ,i regard it as by no means unbecoming to the dignity of philosophy to quote what has been said by some criminals before their execution1 even at the risk of incurring the sneer that ,i encourage gallows' sermons4 ,i certainly rather believe that the gallows is a place of quite peculiar revelations1 and a watchtower from which the man who even then retains his presence of mind obtains a wider1 clearer outlook into eternity than most philosophers over the paragraphs of their rational psychology and theology4 ,the following speech on the gallows was made on the #aeth ,april1 #ahcg1 at ,gloucester1 by a man called ,bartlett1 who had murdered his motherinlaw3 8,englishmen and fellow countrymen1--,i have a few words to say to you1 and they shall be but very few4 ,yet let me entreat you1 one and all1 that these few words that ,i shall utter may strike deep into your hearts4 ,bear them in your mind1 not only now while you are witnessing this sad scene1 but take them to your homes1 take them1 and repeat them to your children and friends4 ,i implore you as a dying man--one for whom the instrument of death is even now prepared--and these words are that you may loose yourselves from the love of this dying world and its vain pleasures4 ,think less of it and more of your ,god4 ,do this3 repent1 repent1 for be assured that without deep and true repentance1 without turning to your heavenly ,father1 you will never attain1 nor can hold the slightest hope of ever reaching those bowers of bliss to which ,i trust ,i am now fast advancing0 7,times1 #ahth ,april #ahcg74 ,still more remarkable are the last words of the wellknown murderer1 ,greenacre1 who was executed in ,london on the #ast of ,may #ahcg4 ,the ,english newspaper the ,post gives the following account1 which is also reprinted in ,galignani's ,messenger of the #fth of ,may #ahcg3 8,on the morning of his execution a gentleman advised him to put his trust in ,god1 and pray for forgiveness through the mediation of ,jesus ,christ4 ,greenacre replied that forgiveness through the mediation of ,christ was a matter of opinion2 for his part1 he believed that in the sight of the highest ,being1 a ,mohammedan was as good as a ,christian and had just as much claim to salvation4 ,since his imprisonment he had had his attention directed to theological subjects1 and he had become convinced that the gallows is a passport to heaven40 ,the indifference displayed here towards positive religions is just what gives this utterance greater weight1 for it shows that it is no fanatical delusion1 but individual immediate knowledge that lies at its foundation4 ,the following incident may also be mentioned which is given by ,galignani's ,messenger of the #aeth ,august #ahcg1 from the ,limerick ,chronicle3 8,last ,monday ,maria ,cooney was executed for the revolting murder of ,mrs4 ,anderson4 ,so deeply was this wretched woman impressed with the greatness of her crime that she kissed the rope which was put round her neck1 while she humbly implored the mercy of ,god40 ,lastly this3 the ,times1 of the #bith ,april #ahde gives several letters which ,hocker1 who was condemned for the murder of ,delarue1 wrote the day before his execution4 ,in one of these he says3 8,i am persuaded that unless the natural heart be broken1 and renewed by divine mercy1 however noble and amiable it may be deemed by the world1 it can never think of eternity without inwardly shuddering40 ,these are the outlooks into eternity referred to above which are obtained from that watchtower2 and ,i have had the less hesitation in giving them here since ,shakspeare also says-- 8,out of these convertites ,there is much matter to be heard and learned40 --,as ,you ,like it1 last scene4 ,strauss1 in his 8,life of ,jesus10 has proved that ,christianity also ascribes to suffering as such the purifying and sanctifying power here set forth 7,leben ,jesu1 vol4 i4 ch4 #f1 #gb and #gd74 ,he says that the beatitudes in the ,sermon on the ,mount have a different sense in ,luke 7vi4 #ba7 from that which they have in ,matt4 7v4 #c71 for only the latter adds to 1 and to 4 ,thus by him alone are the simpleminded1 the humble1 c41 meant1 while by ,luke are meant the literally poor2 so that here the contrast is that between present suffering and future happiness4 ,with the ,ebionites it is a capital principle that whoever takes his portion in this age gets nothing in the future1 and conversely4 ,accordingly in ,luke the blessings are followed by as many 1 woes1 which are addressed to the rich1 1 the full1 1 and to them that laugh1 1 in the ,ebionite spirit4 ,in the same spirit1 he says1 p4 #fjd1 is the parable 7,luke xvi4 #ai7 of the rich man and ,lazarus given1 which nowhere mentions any fault of the former or any merit of the latter1 and takes as the standard of the future recompense1 not the good done or the wickedness practised1 but the evil suffered here and the good things enjoyed1 in the ,ebionite spirit4 8,a like estimation of outward poverty10 ,strauss goes on1 8is also attributed to ,jesus by the other synoptists 7,matt4 xix4 #af2 ,mark x4 #ag2 ,luke xviii4 #ah71 in the story of the rich young man and the saying about the camel and the eye of a needle40 ,if we go to the bottom of the matter we will recognise that even in the most famous passages of the ,sermon on the ,mount there is contained an indirect injunction to voluntary poverty1 and thereby to the denial of the will to live4 ,for the precept 7,matt4 v4 #dj seq47 to consent unconditionally to all demands made upon us1 to give our cloak also to him who will take away our coat1 c41 similarly 7,matt4 vi4 #becd7 the precept to cast aside all care for the future1 even for the morrow1 and so to live simply in the present1 are rules of life the observance of which inevitably leads to absolute poverty1 and which therefore just say in an indirect manner what ,buddha directly commands his disciples and has confirmed by his own example3 throw everything away and become bhikkhu1 i4e41 beggars4 ,this appears still more decidedly in the passage ,matt4 x4 #iae1 where all possessions1 even shoes and a staff1 are forbidden to the ,apostles1 and they are directed to beg4 ,these commands afterwards became the foundation of the mendicant order of ,st4 ,francis 7,bonaventur vita ,s4 ,francisci1 c4 #c74 ,hence1 then1 ,i say that the spirit of ,christian ethics is identical with that of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism4 ,in conformity with the whole view expounded here ,meister ,eckhard also says 7,works1 vol4 i4 p4 #dib73 8,the swiftest animal that bears thee to perfection is suffering40 ,chapter ,,xlix4 ,the ,way ,of ,salvation4 ,there is only one inborn error1 and that is1 that we exist in order to be happy4 ,it is inborn in us because it is one with our existence itself1 and our whole being is only a paraphrase of it1 nay1 our body is its monogram4 ,we are nothing more than will to live and the successive satisfaction of all our volitions is what we think in the conception of happiness4 ,as long as we persist in this inborn error1 indeed even become rigidly fixed in it through optimistic dogmas1 the world appears to us full of contradictions4 ,for at every step1 in great things as in small1 we must experience that the world and life are by no means arranged with a view to containing a happy existence4 ,while now by this the thoughtless man only finds himself tormented in reality1 in the case of him who thinks there is added to his real pain the theoretical perplexity why a world and a life which exist in order that one may be happy in them answer their end so badly4 ,first of all it finds expression in pious ejaculations1 such as1 8,ah6 why are the tears on earth so many80 c4 c4 ,but in their train come disquieting doubts about the assumptions of those preconceived optimistic dogmas4 ,one may try if one will to throw the blame of one's individual unhappiness now upon the circumstances1 now upon other men1 now upon one's own bad luck1 or even upon one's own awkwardness1 and may know well how all these have worked together to produce it2 but this in no way alters the result that one has missed the real end of life1 which consists indeed in being happy4 ,the consideration of this is1 then1 often very depressing1 especially if life is already on the wane2 hence the countenances of almost all elderly persons wear the expression of that which in ,english is called disappointment4 ,besides this1 however1 hitherto every day of our life has taught us that joys and pleasures1 even if attained1 are in themselves delusive1 do not perform what they promise1 do not satisfy the heart1 and finally their possession is at least embittered by the disagreeables that accompany them or spring from them2 while1 on the contrary1 the pains and sorrows prove themselves very real1 and often exceed all expectation4 ,thus certainly everything in life is calculated to recall us from that original error1 and to convince us that the end of our existence is not to be happy4 ,indeed1 if we regard it more closely and without prejudice1 life rather presents itself as specially intended to be such that we shall not feel ourselves happy in it1 for through its whole nature it bears the character of something for which we have no taste1 which must be endured by us1 and from which we have to return as from an error that our heart may be cured of the passionate desire of enjoyment1 nay1 of life1 and turned away from the world4 ,in this sense1 it would be more correct to place the end of life in our woe than in our welfare4 ,for the considerations at the conclusion of the preceding chapter have shown that the more one suffers the sooner one attains to the true end of life1 and that the more happily one lives the longer this is delayed4 ,the conclusion of the last letter of ,seneca corresponds with this3 bonum tunc habebis tuum1 quum intelliges infelicissimos esse felices2 which certainly seems to show the influence of ,christianity4 ,the peculiar effect of the tragic drama also ultimately depends upon the fact that it shakes that inborn error by vividly presenting in a great and striking example the vanity of human effort and the nothingness of this whole existence1 and thus discloses the profound significance of life2 hence it is recognised as the sublimest form of poetry4 ,whoever now has returned by one or other path from that error which dwells in us a priori1 that of our existence1 will soon see all in another light1 and will now find the world in harmony with his insight1 although not with his wishes4 ,misfortunes of every kind and magnitude1 although they pain him1 will no longer surprise him1 for he has come to see that it is just pain and trouble that tend towards the true end of life1 the turning away of the will from it4 ,this will give him indeed a wonderful composedness in all that may happen1 similar to that with which a sick person who undergoes a long and painful cure bears the pain of it as a sign of its efficacy4 ,in the whole of human existence suffering expresses itself clearly enough as its true destiny4 ,life is deeply sunk in suffering1 and cannot escape from it2 our entrance into it takes place amid tears1 its course is at bottom always tragic1 and its end still more so4 ,there is an unmistakable appearance of intention in this4 ,as a rule man's destiny passes through his mind in a striking manner1 at the very summit of his desires and efforts1 and thus his life receives a tragic tendency by virtue of which it is fitted to free him from the passionate desire of which every individual existence is an example1 and bring him into such a condition that he parts with life without retaining a single desire for it and its pleasures4 ,suffering is1 in fact1 the purifying process through which alone1 in most cases1 the man is sanctified1 i4e41 is led back from the path of error of the will to live4 ,in accordance with this1 the salutary nature of the cross and of suffering is so often explained in ,christian books of edification1 and in general the cross1 an instrument of suffering1 not of doing1 is very suitably the symbol of the ,christian religion4 ,nay1 even the ,preacher1 who is still ,jewish1 but so very philosophical1 rightly says3 8,sorrow is better than laughter3 for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better0 7,eccles4 vii4 #c74 ,under the name of the ,i have presented suffering as to a certain extent a substitute for virtue and holiness2 but here ,i must make the bold assertion that1 taking everything into consideration1 we have more to hope for our salvation and deliverance from what we suffer than from what we do4 ,precisely in this spirit ,lamartine very beautifully says in his 8,hymne la douleur10 apostrophising pain3-- 8,tu me traites sans doute en favori des cieux1 ,car tu n'pargnes pas les larmes mes yeux4 ,eh bien6 je les reois comme tu les envoies1 ,tes maux seront mes biens1 et tes soupirs mes joies4 ,je sens qu'il est en toi1 sans avoir combattu1 ,une vertu divine au lieu de ma vertu1 ,que tu n'es pas la mort l'me1 mais sa vie1 ,que ton bras1 en frappant1 gurit et vivifie40 ,if1 then1 suffering itself has such a sanctifying power1 this will belong in an even higher degree to death1 which is more feared than any suffering4 ,answering to this1 a certain awe1 kindred to that which great suffering occasions us1 is felt in the presence of every dead person1 indeed every case of death presents itself to a certain extent as a kind of apotheosis or canonisation2 therefore we cannot look upon the dead body of even the most insignificant man without awe1 and indeed1 extraordinary as the remark may sound in this place1 in the presence of every corpse the watch goes under arms4 ,dying is certainly to be regarded as the real aim of life3 in the moment of death all that is decided for which the whole course of life was only the preparation and introduction4 ,death is the result1 the ,rsum of life1 or the added up sum which expresses at once the instruction which life gave in detail1 and bit by bit2 this1 that the whole striving whose manifestation is life was a vain1 idle1 and self contradictory effort1 to have returned from which is a deliverance4 ,as the whole1 slow vegetation of the plant is related to the fruit1 which now at a stroke achieves a hundredfold what the plant achieved gradually and bit by bit1 so life1 with its obstacles1 deluded hopes1 frustrated plans1 and constant suffering1 is related to death1 which at one stroke destroys all1 all that the man has willed1 and so crowns the instruction which life gave him4 ,the completed course of life upon which the dying man looks back has an effect upon the whole will that objectifies itself in this perishing individuality1 analogous to that which a motive exercises upon the conduct of the man4 ,it gives it a new direction1 which accordingly is the moral and essential result of the life4 ,just because a sudden death makes this retrospect impossible1 the ,church regards such a death as a misfortune1 and prays that it should be averted4 ,since this retrospect1 like the distinct foreknowledge of death1 as conditioned by the reason1 is possible only in man1 not in the brute1 and accordingly man alone really drinks the cup of death1 humanity is the only material in which the will can deny itself and entirely turn away from life4 ,to the will that does not deny itself every birth imparts a new and different intellect1--till it has learned the true nature of life1 and in consequence of this wills it no more4 ,in the natural course1 in age the decay of the body coincides with that of the will4 ,the desire for pleasures soon vanishes with the capacity to enjoy them4 ,the occasion of the most vehement willing1 the focus of the will1 the sexual impulse1 is first extinguished1 whereby the man is placed in a position which resembles the state of innocence which existed before the development of the genital system4 ,the illusions1 which set up chimeras as exceedingly desirable benefits1 vanish1 and the knowledge of the vanity of all earthly blessings takes their place4 ,selfishness is repressed by the love of one's children1 by means of which the man already begins to live more in the ego of others than in his own1 which now will soon be no more4 ,this course of life is at least the desirable one2 it is the euthanasia of the will4 ,in hope of this the ,brahman is ordered1 after he has passed the best years of his life1 to forsake possessions and family1 and lead the life of a hermit 7,menu1 ,b4 #f71 ,but if1 conversely1 the desire outlives the capacity for enjoyment1 and we now regret particular pleasures in life which we miss1 instead of seeing the emptiness and vanity of all2 and if then gold1 the abstract representative of the objects of desire for which the sense is dead1 takes the place of all these objects themselves1 and now excites the same vehement passions which were formerly more pardonably awakened by the objects of actual pleasure1 and thus now with deadened senses a lifeless but indestructible object is desired with equally indestructible eagerness2 or1 also1 if1 in the same way1 existence in the opinion of others takes the place of existence and action in the real world1 and now kindles the same passions2--then the will has become sublimated and etherealised into avarice or ambition2 but has thereby thrown itself into the last fortress1 in which it can only now be besieged by death4 ,the end of existence has been missed4 ,all these considerations afford us a fuller explanation of that purification1 conversion of the will and deliverance1 denoted in the preceding chapter by the expression which is brought about by the suffering of life1 and without doubt is the most frequent4 ,for it is the way of sinners such as we all are4 ,the other way1 which leads to the same goal1 by means of mere knowledge and the consequent appropriation of the suffering of a whole world1 is the narrow path of the elect1 the saints1 and therefore to be regarded as a rare exception4 ,therefore without that first way for most of us there would be no salvation to hope for4 ,however1 we struggle against entering upon it1 and strive rather to procure for ourselves a safe and agreeable existence1 whereby we chain our will ever more firmly to life4 ,the conduct of the ascetics is the opposite of this4 ,they make their life intentionally as poor1 hard1 and empty of pleasure as possible1 because they have their true and ultimate welfare in view4 ,but fate and the course of things care for us better than we ourselves1 for they frustrate on all sides our arrangements for an utopian life1 the folly of which is evident enough from its brevity1 uncertainty1 and emptiness1 and its conclusion by bitter death2 they strew thorns upon thorns in our path1 and meet us everywhere with healing sorrow1 the panacea of our misery4 ,what really gives its wonderful and ambiguous character to our life is this1 that two diametrically opposite aims constantly cross each other in it2 that of the individual will directed to chimerical happiness in an ephemeral1 dreamlike1 and delusive existence1 in which1 with reference to the past1 happiness and unhappiness are a matter of indifference1 and the present is every moment becoming the past2 and that of fate visibly enough directed to the destruction of our happiness1 and thereby to the mortification of our will and the abolition of the illusion that holds us chained in the bonds of this world4 ,the prevalent and peculiarly ,protestant view that the end of life lies solely and immediately in the moral virtues1 thus in the practice of justice and benevolence1 betrays its insufficiency even in the fact that so miserably little real and pure morality is found among men4 ,i am not speaking at all of lofty virtue1 nobleness1 magnanimity1 and self sacrifice1 which one hardly finds anywhere but in plays and novels1 but only of those virtues which are the duty of every one4 ,let whoever is old think of all those with whom he has had to do2 how many persons will he have met who were merely really and truly honest8 ,were not by far the greater number1 in spite of their shameless indignation at the slightest suspicion of dishonesty or even untruthfulness1 in plain words1 the precise opposite8 ,were not abject selfishness1 boundless avarice1 well concealed knavery1 and also poisonous envy and fiendish delight in the misfortunes of others so universally prevalent that the slightest exception was met with surprise8 ,and benevolence1 how very rarely it extends beyond a gift of what is so superfluous that one never misses it4 ,and is the whole end of existence to lie in such exceedingly rare and weak traces of morality8 ,if we place it1 on the contrary1 in the entire reversal of this nature of ours 7which bears the evil fruits just mentioned7 brought about by suffering1 the matter gains an appearance of probability and is brought into agreement with what actually lies before us4 ,life presents itself then as a purifying process1 of which the purifying lye is pain4 ,if the process is carried out1 it leaves behind it the previous immorality and wickedness as refuse1 and there appears what the ,veda says3 8,finditur nodus cordis1 dissolvuntur omnes dubitationes1 ejusque opera evanescunt40 ,as agreeing with this view the fifteenth sermon of ,meister ,eckhard will be found very well worth reading4 ,chapter ,l4 ,epiphilosophy4 ,at the conclusion of my exposition a few reflections concerning my philosophy itself may find their place4 ,my philosophy does not pretend to explain the existence of the world in its ultimate grounds3 it rather sticks to the facts of external and internal experience as they are accessible to every one1 and shows the true and deepest connection of them without really going beyond them to any extramundane things and their relations to the world4 ,it therefore arrives at no conclusions as to what lies beyond all possible experience1 but affords merely an exposition of what is given in the external world and in selfconsciousness1 thus contents itself with comprehending the nature of the world in its inner connection with itself4 ,it is consequently immanent1 in the ,kantian sense of the word4 ,but just on this account it leaves many questions untouched2 for example1 why what is proved as a fact is as it is and not otherwise1 c4 ,all such questions1 however1 or rather the answers to them1 are really transcendent1 i4e41 they cannot be thought by the forms and functions of our intellect1 do not enter into these2 it is therefore related to them as our sensibility is related to the possible properties of bodies for which we have no senses4 ,after all my explanations one may still ask1 for example1 whence has sprung this will that is free to assert itself1 the manifestation of which is the world1 or to deny itself1 the manifestation of which we do not know4 ,what is the fatality lying beyond all experience which has placed it in the very doubtful dilemma of either appearing as a world in which suffering and death reign1 or else denying its very being8--or again1 what can have prevailed upon it to forsake the infinitely preferable peace of blessed nothingness8 ,an individual will1 one may add1 can only turn to its own destruction through error in the choice1 thus through the fault of knowledge2 but the will in itself1 before all manifestation1 consequently still without knowledge1 how could it go astray and fall into the ruin of its present condition8 ,whence in general is the great discord that permeates this world8 ,it may1 further1 be asked how deep into the true being of the world the roots of individuality go2 to which it may certainly be answered3 they go as deep as the assertion of the will to live2 where the denial of the will appears they cease1 for they have arisen with the assertion4 ,but one might indeed even put the question1 8,what would ,i be if ,i were not will to live80 and more of the same kind4 ,to all such questions we would first have to reply that the expression of the most universal and general form of our intellect is the principle of sufficient reason2 but that just on this account that principle finds application only to the phenomenon1 not to the being in itself of things4 ,yet all whence and why depend upon that principle alone4 ,as a result of the ,kantian philosophy it is no longer an terna veritas1 but merely the form1 i4e41 the function1 of our intellect1 which is essentially cerebral1 and originally a mere tool in the service of the will1 which it therefore presupposes together with all its objectifications4 ,but our whole knowing and conceiving is bound to its forms2 accordingly we must conceive everything in time1 consequently as a before and after1 then as cause and effect1 and also as above and below1 whole and part1 c41 and cannot by any means escape from this sphere in which all possibility of our knowledge lies4 ,now these forms are utterly unsuited to the problems raised here1 nor are they fit or able to comprehend their solution even if it were given4 ,therefore with our intellect1 this mere tool of the will1 we are everywhere striking upon insoluble problems1 as against the walls of our prison4 ,but1 besides this1 it may at least be assumed as probable that not only for us is knowledge of all that has been asked about impossible1 but no such knowledge is possible in general1 thus never and in no way2 that these relations are not only relatively but absolutely insusceptible of investigation2 that not only does no one know them1 but that they are in themselves unknowable1 because they do not enter into the form of knowledge in general4 7,this corresponds to what ,scotus ,erigena says1 de mirabili divina ignorantia1 qua ,deus non intelligit quid ipse sit4 ,lib4 ii47 ,for knowableness in general1 with its most essential1 and therefore constantly necessary form of subject and object1 belongs merely to the phenomenal appearance1 not to the being in itself of things4 ,where knowledge1 and consequently idea1 is1 there is also only phenomenon1 and we stand there already in the province of the phenomenal2 nay1 knowledge in general is known to us only as a phenomenon of brain1 and we are not only unjustified in conceiving it otherwise1 but also incapable of doing so4 ,what the world is as world may be understood3 it is phenomenal manifestation2 and we can know that which manifests itself in it1 directly from ourselves1 by means of a thorough analysis of selfconsciousness4 ,then1 however1 by means of this key to the nature of the world1 the whole phenomenal manifestation can be deciphered1 as ,i believe ,i have succeeded in doing4 ,but if we leave the world in order to answer the questions indicated above1 we have also left the whole sphere in which1 not only connection according to reason and consequent1 but even knowledge itself is possible2 then all is instabilis tellus1 innabilis unda4 ,the nature of things before or beyond the world1 and consequently beyond the will1 is open to no investigation2 because knowledge in general is itself only a phenomenon1 and therefore exists only in the world as the world exists only in it4 ,the inner being in itself of things is nothing that knows1 no intellect1 but an unconscious2 knowledge is only added as an accident1 a means of assistance to the phenomenon of that inner being1 and can therefore apprehend that being itself only in proportion to its own nature1 which is designed with reference to quite different ends 7those of the individual will71 consequently very imperfectly4 ,here lies the reason why a perfect understanding of the existence1 nature1 and origin of the world1 extending to its ultimate ground and satisfying all demands1 is impossible4 ,so much as to the limits of my philosophy1 and indeed of all philosophy4 ,the 1 i4e41 that the inner nature in all things is absolutely one and the same1 my age had already grasped and understood1 after the ,eleatics1 ,scotus ,erigena1 ,giordano ,bruno1 and ,spinoza had thoroughly taught1 and ,schelling had revived this doctrine4 ,but what this one is1 and how it is able to exhibit itself as the many1 is a problem the solution of which is first found in my philosophy4 ,certainly from the most ancient times man had been called the microcosm4 ,i have reversed the proposition1 and shown the world as the macranthropos3 because will and idea exhaust its nature as they do that of man4 ,but it is clearly more correct to learn to understand the world from man than man from the world2 for one has to explain what is indirectly given1 thus external perception from what is directly given1 thus selfconsciousness--not conversely4 ,with the ,pantheists1 then1 ,i have certainly that in common1 but not the 2 because ,i do not go beyond experience 7taken in its widest sense71 and still less do ,i put myself in contradiction with the data which lie before me4 ,scotus ,erigena1 quite consistently with the spirit of ,pantheism1 explains every phenomenon as a theophany2 but then this conception must also be applied to the most terrible and abominable phenomena4 ,fine theophanies6 ,what further distinguishes me from ,pantheism is principally the following4 7#a74 ,that their is an x1 an unknown quantity2 the will1 on the other hand1 is of all possible things the one that is known to us most exactly1 the only thing given immediately1 and therefore exclusively fitted for the explanation of the rest4 ,for what is unknown must always be explained by what is better known2 not conversely4 7#b74 ,that their manifests himself animi causa1 to unfold his glory1 or1 indeed1 to let himself be admired4 ,apart from the vanity here attributed to him1 they are placed in the position of being obliged to sophisticate away the colossal evil of the world2 but the world remains in glaring and terrible contradiction with that imagined excellence4 ,with me1 on the contrary1 the will arrives through its objectification however this may occur1 at selfknowledge1 whereby its abolition1 conversion1 salvation becomes possible4 ,and accordingly1 with me alone ethics has a sure foundation and is completely worked out in agreement with the sublime and profound religions1 ,brahmanism1 ,buddhism1 and ,christianity1 not merely with ,judaism and ,mohammedanism4 ,the metaphysic of the beautiful also is first fully cleared up as a result of my fundamental truth1 and no longer requires to take refuge behind empty words4 ,with me alone is the evil of the world honestly confessed in its whole magnitude3 this is rendered possible by the fact that the answer to the question as to its origin coincides with the answer to the question as to the origin of the world4 ,on the other hand1 in all other systems1 since they are all optimistic1 the question as to the origin of evil is the incurable disease1 ever breaking out anew1 with which they are affected1 and in consequence of which they struggle along with palliatives and quack remedies4 7#c47 ,that ,i start from experience and the natural selfconsciousness given to every one1 and lead to the will as that which alone is metaphysical2 thus ,i adopt the ascending1 analytical method4 ,the ,pantheists1 again1 adopt the opposite method1 the descending or synthetical4 ,they start from their 1 which they beg or take by force1 although sometimes under the name substantia1 or absolute1 and this unknown is then supposed to explain everything that is better known4 7#d47 ,that with me the world does not fill the whole possibility of all being1 but in this there still remains much room for that which we denote only negatively as the denial of the will to live4 ,pantheism1 on the other hand1 is essentially optimism3 but if the world is what is best1 then the matter may rest there4 7#e47 ,that to the ,pantheists the perceptible world1 thus the world of idea1 is just the intentional manifestation of the ,god indwelling in it1 which contains no real explanation of its appearance1 but rather requires to be explained itself4 ,with me1 on the other hand1 the world as idea appears merely per accidens1 because the intellect1 with its external perception1 is primarily only the medium of motives for the more perfect phenomena of will1 which gradually rises to that objectivity of perceptibility1 in which the world exists4 ,in this sense its origin1 as an object of perception1 is really accounted for1 and not1 as with the ,pantheists1 by means of untenable fictions4 ,since1 in consequence of the ,kantian criticism of all speculative theology1 the philosophisers of ,germany almost all threw themselves back upon ,spinoza1 so that the whole series of futile attempts known by the name of the post,kantian philosophy are simply ,spinozism tastelessly dressed up1 veiled in all kinds of unintelligible language1 and otherwise distorted1 ,i wish1 now that ,i have explained the relation of my philosophy to ,pantheism in general1 to point out its relation to ,spinozism in particular4 ,it stands1 then1 to ,spinozism as the ,new ,testament stands to the ,old4 ,what the ,old ,testament has in common with the ,new is the same ,god,creator4 ,analogous to this1 the world exists1 with me as with ,spinoza1 by its inner power and through itself4 ,but with ,spinoza his substantia terna1 the inner nature of the world1 which he himself calls ,god1 is also1 as regards its moral character and worth1 ,jehovah1 the ,god,creator1 who applauds ,his own creation1 and finds that all is very good1 4 ,spinoza has deprived ,him of nothing but personality4 ,thus1 according to him also1 the world and all in it is wholly excellent and as it ought to be3 therefore man has nothing more to do than vivere1 agere1 suum ,esse conservare ex fundamento proprium utile qurendi 7,eth41 iv4 pr4 #fg72 he is even to rejoice in his life as long as it lasts2 entirely in accordance with ,ecclesiastes ix4 #gaj4 ,in short1 it is optimism3 therefore its ethical side is weak1 as in the ,old ,testament2 nay1 it is even false1 and in part revolting47#ed7 ,with me1 on the other hand1 the will1 or the inner nature of the world1 is by no means ,jehovah1 it is rather1 as it were1 the crucified ,saviour1 or the crucified thief1 according as it resolves4 ,therefore my ethical teaching agrees with that of ,christianity1 completely and in its highest tendencies1 and not less with that of ,brahmanism and ,buddhism4 ,spinoza could not get rid of the ,jews2 quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem4 ,his contempt for the brutes1 which1 as mere things for our use1 he also declares to be without rights1 is thoroughly ,jewish1 and1 in union with ,pantheism1 is at the same time absurd and detestable 7,eth41 iv41 appendix1 c4 #bg74 ,with all this ,spinoza remains a very great man4 ,but in order to estimate his work correctly we must keep in view his relation to ,descartes4 ,the latter had sharply divided nature into mind and matter1 i4e41 thinking and extended substance1 and had also placed ,god and the world in complete opposition to each other2 ,spinoza also1 so long as he was a ,cartesian1 taught all that in his 8,cogitatis ,metaphysicis10 c4 #ab1 i4 ,i41 #affe4 ,only in his later years did he see the fundamental falseness of that double dualism2 and accordingly his own philosophy principally consists of the indirect abolition of these two antitheses4 ,yet partly to avoid injuring his teacher1 partly in order to be less offensive1 he gave it a positive appearance by means of a strictly dogmatic form1 although its content is chiefly negative4 ,his identification of the world with ,god has also this negative significance alone4 ,for to call the world ,god is not to explain it3 it remains a riddle under the one name as under the other4 ,but these two negative truths had value for their age1 as for every age in which there still are conscious or unconscious ,cartesians4 ,he makes the mistake1 common to all philosophers before ,locke1 of starting from conceptions1 without having previously investigated their origin1 such1 for example1 as substance1 cause1 c41 and in such a method of procedure these conceptions then receive a much too extensive validity4 ,those who in the most recent times refused to acknowledge the ,neo,spinozism which had appeared1 for example1 ,jacobi1 were principally deterred from doing so by the bugbear of fatalism4 ,by this is to be understood every doctrine which refers the existence of the world1 together with the critical position of mankind in it1 to any absolute necessity1 i4e41 to a necessity that cannot be further explained4 ,those who feared fatalism1 again1 believed that all that was of importance was to deduce the world from the free act of will of a being existing outside it2 as if it were antecedently certain which of the two was more correct1 or even better merely in relation to us4 ,what is1 however1 especially assumed here is the non datur tertium1 and accordingly hitherto every philosophy has represented one or the other4 ,i am the first to depart from this2 for ,i have actually established the ,tertium3 the act of will from which the world arises is our own4 ,it is free2 for the principle of sufficient reason1 from which alone all necessity derives its significance1 is merely the form of its phenomenon4 ,just on this account this phenomenon1 if it once exists1 is absolutely necessary in its course2 in consequence of this alone we can recognise in it the nature of the act of will1 and accordingly eventualiter will otherwise4 ,,appendix4 ,abstract4 ,,schopenhauer',s ,,essay ,,on ,,the ,,fourfold ,,root ,,of ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,sufficient ,,reason 7,fourth ,edition1 ,edited by ,,frauenst,,dt4 ,the ,first ,edition appeared in #ahac74 ,this essay is divided into eight chapters4 ,the first is introductory4 ,the second contains an historical review of previous philosophical doctrines on the subject4 ,the third deals with the insufficiency of the previous treatment of the principle1 and prescribes the lines of the new departure4 ,the fourth1 fifth1 sixth1 and seventh treat of the four classes of objects for the subject1 and the forms of the principle of sufficient reason which respectively characterise these classes4 ,the eighth contains general remarks and results4 ,it will be convenient to summarise these chapters severally4 ,chapter ,i4 ,schopenhauer points out that ,plato and ,kant agree in recommending1 as the method of all knowledge1 obedience to two laws3--that of ,homogeneity1 and that of ,specification4 ,the former bids us1 by attention to the points of resemblance and agreement in things1 get at their kinds1 and combine them into species1 and these species again into genera1 until we have arrived at the highest concept of all1 that which embraces everything4 ,this law being transcendental1 or an essential in our faculty of reason1 assumes that nature is in harmony with it1 an assumption which is expressed in the old rule3 ,entia prter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda4 ,the law of ,specification1 on the other hand1 is stated by ,kant in these words3 ,entium varietates non temere esse minuendas4 ,that is to say1 we must carefully distinguish the species which are united under a genus1 and the lower kinds which in their turn are united under these species2 taking care not to make a leap1 and subsume the lower kinds and individuals under the concept of the genus1 since this is always capable of division1 but never descends to the object of pure perception4 ,plato and ,kant agree that these laws are transcendental1 and that they presuppose that things are in harmony with them4 ,the previous treatment of the principle of sufficient reason1 even by ,kant1 has been a failure1 owing to the neglect of the second of these laws4 ,it may well be that we shall find that this principle is the common expression of more than one fundamental principle of knowledge1 and that the necessity1 to which it refers1 is therefore of different kinds4 ,it may be stated in these words3 ,nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit1 quam non sit4 ,this is the general expression for the different forms of the assumption which everywhere justifies that question 8,why80 which is the mother of all science4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,schopenhauer in this chapter traces historically the forms in which the principle had been stated by his predecessors1 and their influence4 ,he points out that in ,greek philosophy it appeared in two aspects--that of the necessity of a ground for a logical judgment1 and that of a cause for every physical change--and that these two aspects were systematically confounded4 ,the ,aristotelian division1 not of the forms of the principle itself1 but of one of its aspects1 the causal1 exemplified a confusion which continued throughout the ,scholastic period4 ,descartes succeeds no better4 ,his proof of the existence of ,god that the immensity of ,his nature is a cause or reason beyond which no cause is needed for ,his existence1 simply illustrates the gross confusion between cause and ground of knowledge which underlies every form of this ontological proof4 8,that a miserable fellow like ,hegel1 whose entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof1 should dare to defend this proof against ,kant's criticism of it is an alliance of which the ontological proof itself1 little as it knows of shame1 might well feel ashamed4 ,it is not to be expected ,i should speak respectfully of people who have brought philosophy into disrespect40 ,spinoza made the same confusion when he laid it down that the cause of existence was either contained in the nature and definition of the thing as it existed1 or was to be found outside that thing4 ,it was through this confusion of the ground of knowledge with the efficient cause that he succeeded in identifying ,god with the world4 ,the true picture of ,spinoza's 8,causa sui0 is ,baron ,munchhausen encircling his horse with his legs1 and raising himself and the horse upwards by means of his pigtail1 with the inscription 8,causa sui0 written below4 ,leibnitz was the first to place the principle of sufficient reason in the position of a first principle1 and to indicate the difference between its two meanings4 ,but it was ,wolff who first completely distinguished them1 and divided the doctrine into three kinds3 principium fiendi 7cause71 principium essendi 7possibility71 and principium cognoscendi4 ,baumgarten1 ,reimarus1 ,lambert1 and ,platner added nothing to the work of ,wolff1 and the next great step was ,hume's question as to the validity of the principle4 ,kant's distinction of the logical or formal principle of knowledge--,every proposition must have its ground2 from the transcendental or material principle1 ,every thing must have its ground--was followed out by his immediate successors4 ,but when we come to ,schelling we find the proposition that gravitation is the reason and light the cause of things1 a proposition which is quoted simply as a curiosity1 for such a piece of nonsense deserves no place among the opinions of earnest and honest inquirers4 ,the chapter concludes by pointing out the futility of the attempts to prove the principle4 ,every proof is the exhibition of the ground of a judgment which has been expressed1 and of which1 just because that ground is exhibited1 we predicate truth4 ,the principle of sufficient reason is just this expression of the demand for such a ground1 and he who seeks a proof1 i4e41 the exhibition of a ground for this principle itself1 presupposes it as true1 and so falls into the circle of seeking a proof of the justification of the demand for proof4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,in the third chapter ,schopenhauer points out that the two applications of the principle of sufficient reason distinguished by his predecessors1 to judgments1 which must have a ground1 and to the changes of real objects1 which must have a cause1 are not exhaustive4 ,the reason why the three sides of a certain triangle are equal is that the angles are equal1 and this is neither a logical deduction nor a case of causation4 ,with a view to stating exhaustively the various kinds into which the application of the principle falls it is necessary to determine the nature of the principle itself4 ,all our ideas are objects of the subject1 and all objects of the subject are our ideas4 ,but our ideas stand to one another as a matter of fact in an orderly connection1 which is always determinable a priori in point of form1 and on account of which nothing that is in itself separate and wholly independent of other things can be the object of our consciousness4 ,it is this connection which the principle of sufficient reason in its generality expresses4 ,the relations which constitute it are what ,schopenhauer calls its root1 and they fall into four classes1 which are discussed in the four following chapters4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,in the fourth chapter ,schopenhauer deals with the first class of objects for the subject and the form of the principle of sufficient reason which obtains in it4 ,this first class is that of those complete ideas of perception which form part of our experience1 and which are referable to some sensation of our bodies4 ,these ideas are capable of being perceived only under the forms of ,space and ,time4 ,if time were the only form there would be no coexistence1 and therefore no persistence4 ,if space were their only form there would be no succession1 and therefore no change4 ,time may therefore be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing4 ,but the union of these two forms of existence is the essential condition of reality1 and this union is the work of the understanding 7see 8,world as ,will and ,idea10 vol4 i4 #d1 and the table of predicables annexed to vol4 ii41 chap4 #d74 ,in this class of objects for the subject the principle of sufficient reason appears as the law of causality or the principle of sufficient reason of becoming1 and it is through it that all objects which present themselves in perception are bound together through the changes of their states4 ,when a new state of one or more objects makes its appearance it must have been preceded by another on which it regularly follows4 ,this is causal sequence1 and the first state is the cause1 the second the effect4 ,the law has thus to do exclusively with the changes of objects of external experience1 and not with things themselves1 a circumstance which is fatal to the validity of the cosmological proof of the existence of ,god4 ,it follows also from the essential connection of causality with succession that the notion of reciprocity1 with its contemporaneous existence of cause and effect1 is a delusion4 ,the chain of causes and effects does not affect either matter1 which is that in which all changes take place1 or the original forces of nature1 through which causation becomes possible1 and which exist apart from all change1 and in this sense out of time1 but which yet are everywhere present 7e4g41 chemical forces1 see supra1 vol4 i41 #bf74 ,in nature causation assumes three different forms2 that of cause in the narrow sense1 of stimulus1 and of motive1 on which differences depend the true distinctions between inorganic bodies1 plants1 and animals4 ,it is only of cause properly so called that ,newton's third law of the equality of action and reaction is true1 and only here do we find the degree of the effect proportionate to that of the cause4 ,the absence of this feature characterises stimulation4 ,motive demands knowledge as its condition1 and intelligence is therefore the true characteristic of the animal4 ,the three forms are in principle identical1 the difference being due to the degrees of receptivity in existence4 ,what is called freedom of the will is therefore an absurdity1 as is also ,kant's 8,practical ,reason40 ,these results are followed by an examination of the nature of vision1 which ,schopenhauer sums up in these words3 8,i have examined all these visual processes in detail in order to show that the understanding is active in all of them1 the understanding which1 by apprehending every change as an effect and referring it to its cause1 creates on the basis of the a priori and fundamental intuitions or perceptions of space and time1 the objective world1 that phenomenon of the brain1 for which the sensations of the senses afford only certain data4 ,and this task the understanding accomplishes only through its proper form1 the law of causality1 and accomplishes it directly without the aid of reflection1 that is1 of abstract knowledge through concepts and words1 which are the material of secondary knowledge1 of thought1 thus of the ,reason40 8,what understanding knows aright is reality2 what reason knows aright is truth1 i4e41 a judgment which has a ground2 the opposite of the former being illusion 7what is falsely perceived71 of the latter error 7what is falsely thought740 ,all understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation1 and this is the sole function of understanding1 and not the complicated working of the twelve ,kantian ,categories1 the theory of which is a mistaken one4 ,a consequence of this conclusion is1 that arithmetical processes do not belong to the understanding1 concerned as they are with abstract conceptions4 ,but it must not be forgotten that between volition and the apparently consequential action of the body there is no causal relation1 for they are the same thing perceived in two different ways4 ,section #bc contains a detailed refutation of ,kant's proof of the a priori nature of the causal relation in the 8,second ,analogy of ,experience0 of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 the gist of the objection being that the socalled subjective succession is as much objective in reality as what is called objective by ,kant3 8,phenomena may well follow one another1 without following from one another40 ,chapter ,v4 ,the fifth chapter commences with an examination of the distinction between man and the brutes4 ,man possesses reason1 that is to say1 he has a class of ideas of which the brutes are not capable1 abstract ideas as distinguished from those ideas of perception from which the former kind are yet derived4 ,the consequence is1 that the brute neither speaks nor laughs1 and lacks all those qualities which make human life great4 ,the nature of motives1 too1 is different where abstract ideas are possible4 ,no doubt the actions of men follow of necessity from their causes1 not less than is the case with the brutes1 but the kind of sequence through thought which renders choice1 i4e41 the conscious conflict of motives1 possible is different4 ,our abstract ideas1 being incapable of being objects of perception1 would be outside consciousness1 and the operations of thought would be impossible1 were it not that they are fixed for sense by arbitrary signs called words1 which therefore always indicate general conceptions4 ,it is just because the brutes are incapable of general conceptions that they have no faculty of speech4 ,but thought does not consist in the mere presence of abstract ideas in consciousness1 but in the union and separation of two or more of them1 subject to the manifold restrictions and modifications which logic deals with4 ,such a clearly expressed conceptual relation is a judgment4 ,in relation to judgments the principle of sufficient reason is valid in a new form3 that of the ground of knowing4 ,in this form it asserts that if a judgment is to express knowledge it must have a ground2 and it is just because it has a ground that it has ascribed to it the predicate true4 ,the grounds on which a judgment may depend are divisible into four kinds4 ,a judgment may have another judgment as its ground1 in which case its truth is formal or logical4 ,there is no truth except in the relation of a judgment to something outside it1 and intrinsic truth1 which is sometimes distinguished from extrinsic logical truth1 is therefore an absurdity4 ,a judgment may also have its ground in senseperception1 and its truth is then material truth4 ,again1 those forms of knowledge which lie in the understanding and in pure sensibility1 as the conditions of the possibility of experience1 may be the ground of a judgment which is then synthetical a priori4 ,finally1 those formal conditions of all thinking which lie in the reason may be the ground of a judgment1 which may in that case be called metalogically true4 ,of these metalogical judgments there are four1 and they were long ago discovered and called laws of thought4 7#a47 ,a subject is equal to the sum of its predicates4 7#b47 ,a subject cannot at once have a given predicate affirmed and denied of it4 7#c47 ,of two contradictorily opposed predicates one must belong to every subject4 7#d47 ,truth is the relation of a judgment to something outside it as its sufficient reason4 ,reason1 it may be remarked1 has no material but only formal truth4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,the third class of objects for the subject is constituted by the formal element in perception1 the forms of outer and inner sense1 space and time4 ,this class of ideas1 in which time and space appear as pure intuitions1 is distinguished from that other class in which they are objects of perception by the presence of matter which has been shown to be the perceptibility of time and space in one aspect1 and causality which has become objective1 in another4 ,space and time have this property1 that all their parts stand to one another in a relation in which each is determined and conditioned by another4 ,this relation is peculiar1 and is intelligible to us neither through understanding nor through reason1 but solely through pure intuition or perception a priori4 ,and the law according to which the parts of space and time thus determine one another is called the law of sufficient reason of being4 ,in space every position is determined with reference to every other position1 so that the first stands to the second in the relation of a consequence to its ground4 ,in time every moment is conditioned by that which precedes it4 ,the ground of being1 in the form of the law of sequence1 is here very simple owing to the circumstance that time has only one dimension4 ,on the nexus of the position of the parts of space depends the entire science of geometry4 ,ground of knowledge produces conviction only1 as distinguished from insight into the ground of being4 ,thus it is that the attempt1 which even ,euclid at times makes1 to produce conviction1 as distinguished from insight into the ground of being1 in geometry1 is a mistake1 and induces aversions to mathematics in many an admirable mind4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,the remaining class of objects for the subject is a very peculiar and important one4 ,it comprehends only one object1 the immediate object of inner sense1 the subject in volition which becomes an object of knowledge1 but only in inner sense1 and therefore always in time and never in space2 and in time only under limitations4 ,there can be no knowledge of knowledge1 for that would imply that the subject had separated itself from knowledge1 and yet knew knowledge1 which is impossible4 ,the subject is the condition of the existence of ideas1 and can never itself become idea or object4 ,it knows itself therefore never as knowing1 but only as willing4 ,thus what we know in ourselves is never what knows1 but what wills1 the will4 ,the identity of the subject of volition with the subject of knowledge1 through which the word 8,i0 includes both1 is the insoluble problem4 ,the identity of the knowing with the known is inexplicable1 and yet is immediately present4 ,the operation of a motive is not1 like that of all other causes1 known only from without1 and therefore indirectly1 but also from within4 ,motivation is1 in fact1 causality viewed from within4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,in this1 the concluding chapter1 ,schopenhauer sums up his results4 ,necessity has no meaning other than that of the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given4 ,all necessity is thus conditioned1 and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms4 ,and there is a fourfold necessity corresponding to the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason3--7#a47 ,the logical form1 according to the principle of the ground of knowledge2 on account of which1 if the premisses are given1 the conclusion follows4 7#b47 ,the physical form1 according to the law of causality2 on account of which1 if the cause is given1 the effect must follow4 7#c47 ,the mathematical form1 according to the law of being2 on account of which every relation expressed by a true geometrical proposition is what it is affirmed to be1 and every correct calculation is irrefutable4 7#d47 ,the moral form1 on account of which every human being and every brute must1 when the motive appears1 perform the only act which accords with the inborn and unalterable character4 ,a consequence of this is1 that every department of science has one or other of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason as its basis4 ,in conclusion1 ,schopenhauer points out that just because the principle of sufficient reason belongs to the a priori element in intelligence1 it cannot be applied to the entirety of things1 to the universe as inclusive of intelligence4 ,such a universe is mere phenomenon1 and what is only true because it belongs to the form of intelligence can have no application to intelligence itself4 ,thus it is that it cannot be said that the universe and all things in it exist because of something else4 ,in other words1 the cosmological proof of the existence of ,god is inadmissible4 ,,index47#ee7 ,aboriginals1 interference with1 iii4 #daa4 ,absolute1 conception of1 has reality only in matter1 ii4 #id2 how not to be conceived1 ii4 #id2 misuse of1 ii4 #id1 #bae1 #baf1 #cic4 ,abstract1 idea1 knowledge1 dependent on idea of perception1 i4 #de1 #eb1 #ec1 ii4 #beh2 insufficiency of1 i4 #gb1 ii4 #bdhbea2 opposite of idea of perception1 i4 #g2 philosophy must not start from1 ii4 #bfa seq42 relation to intuitive knowledge1 ii4 #ed1 #ee1 #ia2 use of1 ii4 #bce1 #bch4 ,absurd1 sphere of1 ii4 #bdb2 supremacy of1 i4 #dah4 ,academies1 relation of1 to great men1 ii4 #dif4 ,accident4 ,see ,substance4 ,actors1 why madness common among1 iii4 #afh4 ,adultery1 iii4 #cea1 #cfd1 #cfe4 schylus1 iii4 #bac1 #cgh4 sthetic mode of contemplation1 i4 #bec seq41 iii4 #abg seq4 ,agamemnon1 i4 #aii1 iii4 #bac4 ,alemann1 ,matteo1 iii4 #cfc4 ,alfieri1 i4 #bdg4 ,allegory1 nature of1 use and abuse in art1 i4 #cjecac4 ,america1 compared with ,old ,world in physical regard1 iii4 #eg1 #eh4 ,ampere1 iii4 #dd4 ,anacreon1 iii4 #cgg4 ,analytical method1 ii4 #cji4 ,anatomy1 what it teaches1 iii4 #ch2 value of comparative anatomy1 i4 #ahg1 iii4 #hd4 ,anaxagoras1 iii4 #b1 #cd1 #gc1 #cij4 ,ancients1 the1 their architecture1 iii4 #ahe1 #ahh1 #aij2 defects in religion1 iii4 #deb2 freedom of thought1 ii4 #cid2 inferiority of tragedy1 iii4 #bac1 #bad2 historians1 i4 #cag1 #cah2 philosophy1 ii4 #djj2 sculpture1 i4 #bfi1 #bia4 ,angelus ,silesius1 i4 #afg1 #dib1 iii4 #dcb4 ,anger1 evidence of primacy of will1 ii4 #ddb2 psychological effect of1 ii4 #dbi4 ,animals1 lower1 distinctive characteristics of animal life1 i4 #be1 ii4 #bbh1 #bcb2 essential identity with man1 i4 #aib2 difference from man1 i4 #de1 #dg1 #aab1 see ,man2 do not laugh1 ii4 #bhj2 nor weep1 i4 #dhf2 navet of1 i4 #bjd2 no passions proper1 iii4 #af2 no knowledge of death1 iii4 #bdi2 yet fear death1 iii4 #bea2 right of man over1 i4 #dha n4 ,animal magnetism1 iii4 #gf1 #dah1 #dai4 ,anselm of ,canterbury1 ii4 #abe1 #abf4 ,anticipation in art1 i4 #bhg1 #bhh2 in nature1 iii4 #ajc1 #ajd4 ,antinomies1 criticism of ,kantian1 i1 #ci1 ii4 #ajg seq42 the two of natural science1 i4 #cg seq4 ,antisthenes1 i4 #aae1 ii4 #ceg4 ,anwari ,soheili1 ii4 #bhc4 and 1 ii4 #bij4 ,apollo ,belvedere1 i4 #bcj4 ,apperception1 transcendental unity of1 ii4 #ccc4 ,a priori knowledge1 meaning and explanation of1 ii4 #cc2 directness1 necessity1 and universality of1 i4 #hh2 table of prdicabilia a priori1 ii4 #bba2 the basis of ontology1 ii4 #bbj4 ,apuleius1 ii4 #ceb4 ,architecture1 its problem as a fine art1 i4 #bgf2 solution of problem1 i4 #bgg seq41 iii4 #ahb seq42 beauty and grace in1 i4 #bgg1 iii4 #ahh1 #ahi2 combines beauty with usefulness1 i4 #bhj2 its relation to light1 i4 #bgi1 #bhj2 to music1 iii4 #bci seq42 to plastic arts and poetry1 i4 #bhj2 its effects dynamical as well as mathematical1 i4 #bgi2 comparison of antique and ,gothic1 iii4 #ahiaib4 ,aristippus1 ii4 #cai1 #cfc4 ,aristo of ,chios1 ii4 #cai4 ,aristocracy of intellect1 ii4 #cdb4 ,aristotle1 his logic1 i4 #fb2 on scientific knowledge1 i4 #ie2 his forma substantialis1 i4 #ahf2 on essential conflict in nature1 i4 #aib2 his method1 i4 #bci2 on ,platonic ,ideas1 i4 #bgc1 iii4 #abd2 on derivation of 1 i4 #cgh2 his style1 ii4 #ba2 denies reciprocity1 ii4 #ff2 on the necessary and contingent1 ii4 #gj2 contented with abstract conceptions1 ii4 #ga2 on quality and quantity1 ii4 #gf2 his categories1 ii4 #he2 on existence as subject1 ii4 #aja2 on infinity of world in space1 ii4 #aaj2 atomism not necessary1 ii4 #aaa2 infinity potentia not actu1 ii4 #aae2 refutation of ontological proof1 ii4 #abi2 of1 ii4 #acc2 the seat of the virtues1 ii4 #acg2 treatment of art1 ii4 #aec2 an infinitely large body immovable1 ii4 #bjc2 relation of number and time1 ii4 #bje2 ,topi of1 ii4 #bab2 division of causes1 ii4 #bag2 on pure matter1 ii4 #bai2 on origin of things1 ii4 #bbj2 real things and conceptions1 ii4 #bdd2 meaning of his nihil est in intellectu nisi quod ante fuerit in sensu1 ii4 #beh2 eight spheres of1 ii4 #bfe2 rhetorics of1 ii4 #bhe2 his and 1 ii4 #bij2 his syllogistic figures1 ii4 #big2 analysis of syllogisms1 ii4 #cjc2 on the prudent man1 ii4 #cdg2 his ethics eudmonistic1 ii4 #cdi2 wonder the origin of philosophy1 ii4 #cfj2 view of the ,sophists1 ii4 #cfb2 necessity of metaphysics1 ii4 #cgi2 on invertebrate animals1 ii4 #dha2 on plants1 iii4 #cd2 difference between efficient and final cause1 iii4 #hb2 his freedom from physicotheology1 iii4 #id2 merits of his teaching as to organised and unorganised nature1 iii4 #ie2 nature a demon1 iii4 #ajf2 music a cathartic of the feelings1 iii4 #agd2 poetry better than history1 iii4 #bbj4 ,arithmetic1 depends on a priori intuition of time1 i4 #ii1 ii4 #bjd4 ,arrian1 ii4 #cee seq4 ,art1 source and aim of1 i4 #bch1 #bci1 #bhf seq41 iii4 #abf1 #agi2 object of1 see ,idea2 subject of1 see ,genius2 relation to and difference from philosophy1 iii4 #agf1 #agg1 #agh2 contrasted with history1 i4 #bih1 #cae1 iii4 #bbd2 inborn and acquired1 i4 #beb2 the two extremes in series of1 i4 #bgd seq41 #bhj2 value and importance of1 i4 #cde1 #cdf1 iii4 #acb2 opposition between useful and fine1 iii4 #aha4 ,art1 works of1 tendency of1 iii4 #agg2 relation of conception to execution of1 iii4 #ahj2 the abstract concept barren in1 i4 #cjc1 #cjd1 iii4 #agi1 #ahj2 why ,idea more easily comprehended in than in nature1 i4 #beb1 iii4 #acb2 cooperation of the beholder required for enjoyment of1 iii4 #agg2 why they do not give all to the senses1 iii4 #agh seq42 superiority of those dashed off in moment of conception1 iii4 #agh1 #ahj4 ,asceticism1 its source1 i1 #dij seq42 its way of manifesting itself1 i4 #dib1 #dic1 #ejf1 iii4 #dbe2 identity of its spirit in different countries and religions1 i4 #ejb1 #ejc1 iii4 #dcc2 difference of spirit of cynicism1 ii4 #ceb1 #cec4 ,assertion1 definition of1 ii4 #cjh4 ,association of ideas1 its root1 ii4 #cbd2 kinds of1 ii4 #cbd2 apparent exceptions to law of1 ii4 #cbg2 the will secretly controls the law of1 ii4 #cbh4 ,astronomy1 what it teaches1 iii4 #cg2 source of its certainty and comprehensibility1 i4 #hf2 its method1 i4 #hg2 ,ptolemaic1 i4 #fd4 ,athanasius1 iii4 #dci4 ,atheism1 what strengthens the reproach of1 ii4 #cgi2 not necessarily materialism1 ii4 #aca1 #acb4 ,atom1 assumption of1 not necessary1 iii4 #dd seq42 has no reality1 ii4 #bbc2 defence of1 from porosity refuted1 iii4 #dg4 ,attraction and repulsion1 forces of1 constitute spaceoccupation1 ii4 #bbd4 ,augustine1 recognises identity of all things with will1 i4 #afe2 cause of beauty of vegetable world1 i4 #bfj n42 on original sin1 i4 #ebd2 the will not free1 i4 #ebe2 dogmatics of1 i4 #ebe n42 beginner of ,scholasticism1 ii4 #ab2 on moral systems of ancients1 ii4 #cdi2 spirit of his anti,pelagianism1 ii4 #cfh1 iii4 #dba2 on affections of will1 ii4 #dab n42 his de civit4 ,dei1 iii4 #aag n4 ,autobiography4 ,see ,biography4 ,avarice1 the vice of old age1 iii4 #dfe ,avatar1 iii4 #dbf4 ,axiom1 definition1 ii4 #cjh4 ,bacon1 his conception of philosophy1 i4 #aji2 all movement preceded by perception1 i4 #acg n42 on atheism1 ii4 #aca2 his philosophical method1 ii4 #bab2 on the intellect1 ii4 #dcc2 his moral character1 ii4 #ddg2 influence of climate upon intellect1 iii4 #ah2 rejected teleology1 iii4 #ia2 on final causes1 iii4 #ic2 on ,democritus1 iii4 #ie2 on rarity of genius1 iii4 #aeh4 ,basilidians1 iii4 #cje4 ,bass4 ,see ,music4 ,baumgarten1 his sthetics1 ii4 #aec4 ,beard1 its efficient and final cause in man1 iii4 #hh4 ,beauty1 the beautiful1 two elements of1 i4 #bgj2 source of pleasure in1 i4 #bec seq42 everything beautiful1 i4 #bga2 why one thing more beautiful than another1 i4 #bgb2 distinguished from grace1 i4 #bhi2 distinguished from the sublime1 i4 #bgj2 effect of natural beauty1 i4 #bee1 iii4 #agc1 #agd2 beauty in art4 ,see ,painting1 ,sculpture1 c4 ,beccaria1 iii4 #dac4 ,being1 as the most general conception1 ii4 #bcf2 in the professorial philosophy1 ii4 #bhh2 relation of thought to4 ,see ,thing in itself2 limitation of individual being the cause of philosophy1 i4 #ace2 contrast of seeing and being1 iii4 #cib4 ,bell1 ,sir ,ch41 i4 #acc1 iii4 #f4 ,benedict1 iii4 #dej4 ,berkeley1 on rareness of thought1 i4 #ej2 his idealism1 ii4 #ae1 #bi1 #da1 #afc1 #afe1 #age1 iii4 #ei1 #bfa4 ,bhagavadgita1 i4 #cff1 iii4 #ge1 #bfb4 ,bible1 one metaphysical truth in ,old ,testament1 iii4 #dbc2 ascetic spirit of ,new ,testament1 iii4 #dcg1 #deh seq42 opposition of ,old and ,new ,testaments1 i4 #dbj1 iii4 #bha1 #dda1 #dde2 its historical material unsuited for paintings1 i4 #cjj4 ,bichat1 8,sur la vie et la mort10 ii4 #dgj1 #dhh2 on circulation of blood1 ii4 #dgh2 on organic and animal life1 ii4 #dhi2 only animal life can be educated1 ii4 #dia2 ,flourens' attack on1 ii4 #did seq42 nervous and muscular systems in children1 iii4 #afa2 effect of emotions on organism1 iii4 #bif4 ,bio1 on relation of science and philosophy1 ii4 #cai4 ,biography1 superiority to history1 i4 #cai seq42 difficulty of dissimulating in autobiographies1 i4 #cbj4 ,biot1 on colour rings1 ii4 #cch4 ,blood1 the primitive fluid of organism1 ii4 #dghdha4 ,body1 the1 an object among objects1 i4 #e1 #ad1 #bc1 #be1 #abi1 ii4 #afg2 its identity with will1 i4 #abi seq42 #acgadb1 ii4 #dbh1 #dfh1 #dgadic2 relation of physiological and metaphysical explanations of1 i4 #aci seq41 ii4 #dib1 #dic2 its design1 i4 #adj seq42 knowledge of1 key to nature of things1 i4 #acf1 #ada seq42 criticism of antithesis of body and soul as two substances1 ii4 #ajaajd1 #cgh1 iii4 #aa4 ,bhm1 ,jakob1 everything half dead1 i4 #aia2 8,de signatura rerum10 i4 #bhd n41 iii4 #dcb4 ,bolingbroke1 iii4 #cig4 ,books1 not so instructive as reality1 ii4 #bdd1 #bde2 why they cannot take the place of experience1 ii4 #bdh1 #bdi4 ,boswell1 his ,life of ,johnson1 ii4 #ddf4 ,boureguon1 ,antoinette1 iii4 #dce4 ,brahmanism1 recognises no beginning of world1 ii4 #id1 #ie1 #ajh1 #aji2 teaches metempsychosis1 iii4 #cjc4 ,brain1 metaphysically considered1 ii4 #dfh1 #dhe1 #dhf2 physiologically considered1 its origin and function1 ii4 #daa1 #dfb1 #dfc1 #dgj1 iii4 #i2 its share in perception1 ii4 #ahe2 its relation to the ganglia1 ii4 #dhc2 the seat of motives1 ii4 #dgc2 develops with organism1 ii4 #daf1 iii4 #ac1 #ad2 as necessary for thought as stomach for digestion1 ii4 #bcg2 the regulator of the will1 ii4 #dgj2 the condition of selfconsciousness1 iii4 #ab seq42 influence of its development upon intellect at different periods of life1 ii4 #dbe1 #ded seq42 necessity of sleep for1 ii4 #dfd2 effect of overwork on1 ii4 #bee1 #bef2 its variation in man the cause of individual character1 i4 #aga2 its activity in dreams1 ii4 #dfd2 the brain of genius1 iii4 #aei1 #afj2 influence on agility of limbs1 iii4 #ba2 influence of noise on1 ii4 #aif1 #aig4 ,brandis1 ,ch4 ,a41 ii4 #bfd4 ,brandis1 ,j4 ,d41 ii4 #dhh4 ,bridgewater ,treatise ,men1 iii4 #ia4 ,brougham1 ,lord1 iii4 #ia4 ,brown1 ,thomas1 8,on ,cause and ,effect10 ii4 #bjg1 iii4 #ib4 ,bruno1 ,giordano1 started from real in his philosophy1 i4 #cc2 his view of life1 i4 #cff2 lonely position in his age1 ii4 #ac n42 on finiteness of world1 ii4 #aaj2 infinitely large body immovable1 ii4 #bjc2 matter incorporeal1 ii4 #bjh1 iii4 #ea1 #ed2 no space beyond the world1 ii4 #bfe2 his death1 iii4 #ajf2 his motto1 iii4 #add4 ,buddhism1 its preeminence over all religions1 ii4 #cga2 superiority to ,brahmanism1 i4 #dfj1 iii4 #dcj2 compared with ,christianity1 iii4 #dde seq42 its pessimism1 i4 #cgb1 iii4 #cig2 its mysticism1 iii4 #dce2 teaches that nature expects salvation from man1 i4 #dib2 its doctrine of metempsychosis1 iii4 #cjb2 doctrine of ,nirvana1 iii4 #cjh1 #dbg4 ,buffon1 on intelligence of animals1 i4 #bi2 on style1 ii4 #bdg4 ,bunyan1 ,john1 iii4 #dce4 ,bundahish1 iii4 #cia4 ,burdach1 sleep the original state1 ii4 #dfc2 formation of muscles from blood1 ii4 #dgh2 heart independent of nervous system and sensibility1 ii4 #dgi2 reciprocal support of vegetable and insect world1 iii4 #ij2 on bees1 iii4 #ajj2 on the burrying beetle1 iii4 #ajb2 on cercaria ephemera1 iii4 #bfi2 on maternal affection of animals1 iii4 #cag4 ,brger1 his place in ,german poetry1 iii4 #cbg2 his parents1 iii4 #cbg2 on love1 iii4 #ccf4 ,burke1 on the beautiful1 ii4 #aec2 on the apprehension of words1 ii4 #bci4 ,byron1 an instance of connection of genius and madness1 i4 #bdg2 brain weighed #f lbs41 iii4 #afj2 quoted1 i4 #bcd1 #cbd1 #beh1 #cdb1 #dcb1 #deh1 iii4 #cgi1 #cih1 #djj4 ,cabanis1 on arterial and venous systems1 ii4 #beg2 his materialism1 ii4 #cgh2 on passions of children1 ii4 #dbd2 8,des rapports du physique au moral10 iii4 #f4 ,csar1 ,jul41 on ,druids1 iii4 #cjd4 ,calderon1 life a dream1 i4 #bb2 steadfast prince1 i4 #cbg2 a crime to be born1 i4 #cbh1 #deh1 iii4 #dbj2 his ,semiramis1 iii4 #cdc2 8,zenobia the ,great10 iii4 #cfd4 ,camerarius1 ,j41 collection of emblems1 i4 #cji4 ,cannibalism1 most palpable example of wrong1 i4 #dca2 hereditary1 iii4 #cbb4 ,canisius1 iii4 #ddj4 ,canova1 iii4 #aie4 ,caravaggio1 iii4 #aig4 ,caricature1 character of species annulled by that of individual1 i4 #bia4 ,carov1 iii4 #ddj4 ,carracci1 ,hannibal1 his allegorical paintings1 i4 #cjf1 #cjh4 ,casper1 on length of human life1 iii4 #cja4 ,castration1 its significance1 iii4 #caj2 its use as a punishment1 iii4 #cca4 ,categories1 criticism of the ,kantian1 ii4 #dhea4 ,catholicism1 compared with ,protestantism in an ethical regard1 iii4 #ddh1 #ddi4 ,catullus1 iii4 #cah4 ,caucasian1 an original race1 iii4 #eh4 ,cause1 ,causality1 law of1 ii4 #bad2 a priori nature of law of1 i4 #aed seq41 ii4 #bjf seq42 corollary from it the permanence of substance1 ii4 #gi2 difference of cause and force1 i4 #add1 #ade2 mysteriousness of connection between cause and effect1 i4 #agd2 temporal relation between cause and effect1 ii4 #bji1 #baj2 three kinds of causes1 i4 #adi1 #aej2 truth of doctrine of occasional causes1 i4 #agh seq42 falseness of proposition 8the effect cannot contain more than the cause10 ii4 #bac2 a 8first cause0 inconceivable1 ii4 #bad2 to determine the cause of an effect1 ii4 #aed4 ,celibacy1 from ,christian and ethical point of view1 iii4 #dbe1 #dcg1 #dch1 #ddi1 #dej1 #dea4 ,cellini1 ,benvenuto1 his conversion1 i4 #eaj4 ,celsus1 on generation1 iii4 #caj4 ,certainty1 distinguished from scientific completeness of knowledge1 i4 #hc2 superiority of immediate to indirect1 i4 #hi1 #ij4 ,cervantes1 i4 #caa2 ii4 #bdf4 ,chamfort1 iii41 #aeg1 #aeh1 #cfe4 ,champollion1 i4 #cac4 ,change1 nature of1 i4 #aa2 always conditioned by a cause1 i4 #agj1 ii4 #baa seq4 ,character1 as a force of nature1 i4 #cgj2 difference between that of man and brutes1 i4 #agj1 #chf1 #chg2 that of man individual1 i4 #bij2 empirical1 ii4 #djg2 constant1 i4 #cgh1 ii4 #dda1 #dia2 inherited from father1 iii4 #cbj seq42 relation of intelligible to empirical1 i4 #bjc1 #bjg1 #cgc seq42 a false inference from unalterableness of1 i4 #chi2 the acquired1 i4 #ciacig2 explanation of inharmonious nature of1 iii4 #ccj2 abolition of1 i4 #ebj seq4 ,chatham1 ,lord1 iii4 #cbd4 ,chateaubriand1 iii4 #dce4 ,chemistry1 what it teaches1 iii4 #ch2 antinomy of1 i4 #cg seq4 ,chevreul1 experiments on light1 iii4 #fb4 ,childhood1 character of1 iii4 #afa seq4 ,chiliasts1 ii4 #bdc4 ,chinese1 philosophy1 i4 #ahg1 #ahh1 #cdc2 garden1 iii4 #aeg4 ,chladni1 i4 #cdd4 ,choice1 man larger sphere of1 than brutes1 i4 #chh2 not freedom of individual volition1 loc4 cit4 ,christianity1 different constituent parts of1 i4 #ejj1 #eja1 iii4 #dbb2 its connection with ,brahmanism and ,buddhism1 iii4 #cia1 #dba1 #dei2 pessimistic spirit of1 ii4 #cgb1 iii4 #cig1 #dcf2 kernel of1 i4 #dbd1 #ebcebd1 ii4 #adi1 iii4 #dba1 #deb2 symbol of1 iii4 #dfb4 ,chrysippus1 i4 #aaf1 #aah1 #chi1 ii4 #gb1 #cdi4 ,cicero1 i4 #aaf n41 #aag1 #bdg1 #chi1 ii4 #gb1 #acg1 #ach1 #adj1 #ada1 #bgj1 #bgb1 #cdh1 #cef1 #ceh1 #ddd1 iii4 #adg1 #bec n41 #deb4 ,circle1 the symbol of nature1 iii4 #bfg4 ,classics1 advantage of studying1 ii4 #bci4 ,classical poetry1 distinguished from romantic1 iii4 #bji4 ,cleanthes1 i4 #aah1 ii4 #abh4 ,clemens ,alexandrinus1 8,stromata0 referred to1 i4 #dbe1 ii4 #ih1 iii4 #dbg1 #dch1 #ddb1 #ddc4 ,clouds1 illustration of opposition between ,idea and phenomenon1 i4 #bce4 ,colebrooke1 i4 #dia1 #did n41 #bha1 #cjd1 #cjg1 #cjh n4 ,comedy1 distinguished from tragedy1 iii4 #bah4 ,composer1 musical1 i4 #ccf4 ,concept1 conception1 see ,abstract2 their construction the function of reason1 i4 #g1 #ej1 ii4 #bce seq42 content and extent of1 ii4 #bcf2 spheres1 i4 #ee1 #fd2 representatives of1 i4 #ea2 relation to word1 i4 #ea2 ii4 #bcd1 #bch2 relation to ,idea1 i4 #cja1 #cjb2 simple1 ii4 #bcf2 distinct1 ii4 #bcg2 abstract and concrete1 i4 #ec2 pure1 ii4 #che2 advantages and disadvantages of1 i4 #de1 #dg seq41 #fhge1 ii4 #bcdbdc1 #cde seq4 ,concrete1 union of form and matter1 ii4 #bae4 ,condillac1 his materialism1 ii4 #age1 #ahg4 iii4 #de4 ,condorcet1 ii4 #ahg4 ,connections among men1 foundation of1 ii4 #dej4 ,conscience1 presupposes intelligible character1 i4 #dgd2 is only affected by deeds1 i4 #chg2 anguish of1 i4 #dga seq42 the good1 i4 #dhb4 ,consciousness1 only a property of animal beings1 ii4 #ccf1 #ccg1 #dad2 origin1 aim1 and seat of1 ii4 #dge2 what common to all1 and what distinguishes one from another1 ii4 #dad1 iii4 #ag seq42 selfconsciousness and that of other things1 ii4 #bei1 #dab1 #dfh1 iii4 #abf2 limited to phenomena1 i4 #ceh n41 iii4 #gd1 #bhe seq42 as opposed to unconsciousness1 ii4 #cbh2 fragmentary nature of1 ii4 #ccj seq42 what gives it unity and connection1 iii4 #ccc2 extinguished in death1 iii4 #bee seq4 ,considering things1 ways of1 i4 #bci2 #aba seq4 ,contingent1 contingency1 conception of1 ii4 #fg2 misuse of word by pre,kantian dogmatists1 ii4 #gj4 ,conversation1 ii4 #cdc4 ,copula1 ii4 #bhg1 #bhh4 ,coriolanus1 ii4 #acf4 ,corneille1 iii4 #bjc4 ,correct1 distinguished from true1 real1 c41 ii4 #bjh4 ,correggio1 i4 #cjj1 #cjf1 #cjg1 #eca4 ,cosmogony1 of ,laplace1 iii4 #ga1 #gb4 ,cosmological proof1 ,kant's refutation of1 ii4 #acj4 ,cousin1 ,m41 iii4 #de4 ,cramp1 ii4 #dhd4 ,crime1 chief cause of1 iii4 #dab4 ,see ,punishment4 ,criticism1 the ,kantian1 ii4 #faa4 ,crystal1 its one manifestation of life1 i4 #bjb2 its individuality1 i4 #aga2 becomes rigid in the moment of movement1 iii4 #cg4 ,culture1 cannot make up for want of understanding1 ii4 #bec seq41 #cdc ,cuvier1 ii4 #bjd1 #cah1 #dgi1 iii4 #ih1 #afj1 #afe4 ,cynicism1 spirit and fundamental thought of1 ii4 #cej seq41 iii4 #chh4 ,da ,capo1 i4 #cdb4 ,daemon1 i4 #cdi1 iii4 #ii4 ,dante1 i4 #beh1 #dai1 ii4 #cae4 ,davis1 iii4 #bjg4 ,death1 i4 #cef seq41 #ejfeji1 iii4 #bdicjh1 #cab1 #chi1 #dfc2 sudden death1 why prayed against1 iii1 #dbh4 ,decameron1 iii4 #cfe4 ,deductive method1 ii4 #caj4 ,delamark1 ii4 #cah1 #cgh4 ,delirium1 distinguished from madness1 i4 #bdh4 ,democritus1 i4 #cc1 #aei1 #afj1 ii4 #aca #adj1 #agg1 #cgh1 iii4 #fa1 #fb1 #fd1 #ie4 ,denial4 ,see ,will4 ,descartes1 vortex of1 i4 #aei2 identifies will with judgment1 #cgg1 #che2 his thought not free1 ii4 #ac2 on repetition1 ii4 #ba1 #be2 ontological proof1 ii4 #abf2 made philosophy start from selfconsciousness1 ii4 #afd1 #afe1 #bja1 #djj1 iii4 #ei2 the quantity of a motion1 ii4 #bbf2 opinion of mathematics1 ii4 #cbc2 slept a great deal1 ii4 #dfe2 criticism of his doctrines1 ii4 #diddif2 relation to ,spinoza1 iii4 #dge4 ,desire1 the universal nature of things1 i4 #afe1 iii4 #cd2 in a psychological regard1 ii4 #dbi4 ,determinism1 iii4 #fgfi4 1 the second way of the denial of the will1 i4 #ejf1 iii4 #ded1 #dfe4 ,dialectic1 definition of1 ii4 #bhe4 ,diderot1 ii4 #cda1 iii4 #bcc1 #bgb4 ,diodorus the ,megaric1 ii4 #gb4 ,diogenes the ,cynic1 i4 #aea1 ii4 #cea1 #ceb1 iii4 #chh4 ,diogenes1 ,laertius1 i4 #aah1 #aea1 #afi1 ii4 #cai1 #cea1 #cee1 #cfc1 iii4 #bee4 ,dionysius the ,areopagite1 ii4 #bfd4 ,discovery1 the work of understanding1 i4 #bf1 #bg4 ,disease1 its nature1 ii4 #dhg4 ,disgusting1 the1 i4 #bfi4 ,dissimulation1 i4 #dg1 iii4 #bca4 ,divisibility1 infinite1 of time1 i4 #ac1 ii4 #bba2 of matter1 iii4 #df4 ,dog1 intelligence of1 ii4 #bcjbcb2 wags its tail1 ii4 #bhj4 ,dogmas1 their relation to virtue and morality1 i4 #dge seq4 ,dogmatism1 philosophical1 opposed to criticism1 ii4 #aj1 #aa2 its fundamental error1 iii4 #bg4 ,domenichino1 iii4 #aic4 ,donatello1 iii4 #aic4 ,don ,quixote1 i4 #caa4 ,drama1 the1 i4 #cbaccj1 iii4 #baabai4 ,drapery in sculpture1 i4 #bif4 ,dreams1 distinguished from real life1 i4 #bj seq4 ,duns ,scotus1 i4 #aaa1 ii4 #bcg4 ,dutch paintings1 i4 #bfi4 ,ebionites1 iii4 #deh4 ,eckermann1 8,conversations of ,goethe10 i4 #cfb1 iii4 #bdj4 ,eckhard1 ,meister1 i4 #dib1 #ejj1 iii4 #dcb1 #dce1 #dfg4 ,edda1 the1 iii4 #cjd4 ,ego1 conception of1 i4 #acb1 #cbd1 ii4 #dac1 #dhg1 iii4 #c1 #ac1 #bhd1 #bhe2 the logical ego1 ii4 #ccc4 ,egoism1 origin1 nature1 and scope of1 i4 #dbg1 iii4 #daf1 #dag2 theoretical egoism1 i4 #ace4 ,egyptians1 gospel of1 iii4 #dcf1 #ddd4 ,eleatics1 i4 #cc1 #fa1 #ic1 ii4 #he1 #aac1 iii4 #bga4 ,election1 doctrine of1 i4 #cgh1 ii4 #adi4 ,elephant1 intelligence of1 i4 #bi1 ii4 #bcb1 #bcc4 ,eloquence1 ii4 #cje1 #cjf4 ,emblems1 i4 #cab1 #cac4 ,emotion1 its origin and effect1 ii4 #cdf1 iii4 #djg1 #djh4 ,empedocles1 i4 #aib1 #bhh1 #ecj1 iii4 #h1 #cd1 #ie1 #bga4 ,encratites1 iii4 #dch4 ,english1 the1 their faults1 ii4 #aca1 iii4 #ib4 1 iii4 #fe1 #dga4 ,ennui1 i4 #djb1 #djd1 iii4 #dac4 ,ens realissimum1 ii4 #abeabg4 ,envy1 iii1 #chi4 and 1 ii4 #bij4 ,epic poetry1 i4 #cbd1 #dac1 iii4 #baa4 ,epicurus1 ,epicureans1 i4 #cc1 #cg1 ii4 #aha1 #ade1 #agg1 #cgh1 iii4 #bee1 #bfa4 ,epictetus1 i4 #aae1 #aaf n41 #chf1 ii4 #ced1 #cef4 ,epiphanias1 iii4 #ddf4 ,equivocation1 i4 #gi4 ,erigena1 ,scotus1 ii4 #cai1 iii4 #dcb1 #dgj1 #dga4 ,error1 definition of1 i4 #cj1 #ajcaje2 difference between man and brutes with regard to1 ii4 #bdc1 seq42 pernicious nature of1 i4 #de1 ii4 #bda seq42 tragic and comic side of1 ii4 #bdc2 how perpetuated1 ii4 #bdc1 #cda4 ,esquirol1 iii4 #aag1 #cbh4 ,essenes1 iii4 #dcg1 #dea4 ,essentia and existentia1 their relation1 ii4 #abi1 #acj2 their union in pure matter1 ii4 #bah4 ,eternity1 conception of1 i4 #bbh1 #cfj seq41 iii4 #bgf4 ,ethics1 i4 #ddaddc1 #dgd seq41 iii4 #djbdji2 criticism of ,kantian1 ii4 #acc seq42 of ancients1 ii4 #cdh1 iii4 #bac1 #bad1 #deb4 ,ethiopian1 an original race1 iii4 #eh4 ,etiology1 subject and scope of1 i4 #abd seq42 its relation to the philosophy of nature1 i4 #ahb seq4 ,euchel1 ,isaak1 his 8,prayers of the ,jews10 ii4 #ih4 ,euclid1 criticism of his method1 i4 #ijajj1 ii4 #cc1 #afd1 #cbacbc4 ,eudmonism1 ii4 #cdh seq4 and 1 i4 #djg4 ,euler1 i4 #ee1 #afe1 ii4 #agb n41 #ahgahi1 #aib1 #cda4 ,euripides1 i4 #cbh1 #dec1 iii4 #bad1 #bah1 #djj1 #djf1 #ddc4 ,evidence1 distinction between empirical and a priori1 i4 #he2 the predicate 8evident0 defined1 ii4 #cjh4 ,evil1 meaning of word1 i4 #dbf2 the punctum pruriens of metaphysics1 ii4 #cge4 ,see ,pessimism4 ,existence1 vanity of1 iii4 #chb seq42 the end of1 ii4 #fie4 ,experience1 ii4 #bcd seq41 #chh seq4 ,experiment1 ii4 #bfh4 ,explanation1 i4 #aje seq41 #abe4 ,extension4 ,see ,matter4 ,eye1 i4 #cja1 ii4 #aid1 iii4 #afb4 ,fame1 i4 #cje1 iii4 #aea4 ,fanaticism1 i4 #dff n4 ,fate1 ,fatalism1 i4 #chi1 #cij1 iii4 #dge4 ,fear1 effect of1 ii4 #dbi seq42 origin of belief in ,god1 ii4 #acj4 ,feeling1 as sense of touch1 ii4 #aie2 as opposite of knowing1 i4 #fffh4 ,fnlon1 i4 #dii4 ,fernow1 i4 #bic4 ,fichte1 i4 #af1 #cc1 #djdc1 ii4 #bb1 #ca1 #agf1 iii4 #ac4 ,fit ,arari1 ii4 #ddd4 ,flagellants1 ii4 #bdc4 ,flourens1 ii4 #acc1 #daf1 #dag1 #dgi1 #diddif1 iii4 #afe1 #cbf4 ,folly1 a species of the ludicrous1 i4 #gg seq41 ii4 #bgg2 a characteristic of genius1 iii4 #aec4 ,force1 distinguished from cause1 i4 #add1 #ade1 #agdagh1 ii4 #bag2 inseparable from matter1 iii4 #ed seq4 ,form and matter4 i4 #afb1 #afh1 ii4 #bae1 iii4 #bf1 #eceg4 ,forms of thought1 #hf seq42 their relation to parts of speech1 ii4 #he1 #hf4 ,francis1 ,st41 i4 #dif1 iii4 #dcd1 #dei4 ,frauenstdt1 ii4 #bbe4 ,frederick the ,great1 ii4 #acc4 ,freedom1 as a metaphysical quality1 i4 #cfi seq42 intellectual1 iii4 #djg2 of the will1 i4 #cgf seq41 #chh1 #chi1 #ebj seq42 criticism of ,kant's doctrine1 ii4 #aag seq4 ,french1 national character of1 i4 #eaj2 philosophy of1 ii4 #ah1 iii4 #dd1 #de2 poetry1 iii4 #bji2 music1 iii4 #bdd4 ,friendship1 i4 #dhe4 ,fright1 effect of1 ii4 #dbi4 ,froriep1 ii4 #bji4 ,future4 ,see ,present4 ,gall1 ii4 #dfi1 #did1 #die4 ,galenus1 ii4 #big4 ,gallows1 iii4 #def1 #deg4 ,ganglia1 their function in organism1 ii4 #dhd seq4 ,gardening1 landscape1 i4 #bhb2 difference between ,english and old ,french1 iii4 #age4 ,garrick1 ii4 #bgi1 iii4 #ba4 ,gemth1 distinguished from mind1 ii4 #deh1 #dei4 ,generatio quivoca1 i4 #ahd seq42 iii4 #edef4 ,generation1 and death essential moments in life of species1 i4 #cfe1 iii4 #bgjbgc2 instinctive nature of act1 iii4 #cji2 act viewed subjectively and objectively1 iii4 #bib1 #bic2 inner significance of act1 i4 #dbc seq41 iii4 #cgi2 reason of shame connected with1 i4 #dbc1 #cgh2 existence a paraphrase of1 iii4 #cgg4 ,genius1 i4 #bchbdg1 #beabec1 ii4 #bdebdi1 iii4 #achaff4 ,genital organs1 the opposite pole of the brain1 i4 #dbe1 iii4 #hg1 #caj2 independence of knowledge1 i4 #aej1 #dbf2 difference of plants1 animals1 and man in respect of1 i4 #bjd1 iii4 #ce2 shame connected with1 iii4 #cgi2 symbolical language of1 iii4 #chj4 ,genus1 distinguished from species1 iii4 #abc seq42 construction of logical genus1 ii4 #ajc1 #ajd4 ,geometry1 content of1 i4 #i2 method of1 i4 #ij seq42 ii4 #cba seq4 ,genre painting1 i4 #bih4 ,gichtel1 iii4 #dcd1 #dce4 ,gilbert1 ii4 #aif4 ,giordano1 ,luca1 iii4 #aih4 ,given1 the1 ii4 #bc1 #hd4 ,gnostics1 iii4 #cje1 #dcb1 #dch1 #ddb1 1 ii4 #dbc4 ,god1 origin of the word1 iii4 #ddf2 egotistical origin of belief in1 ii4 #acj2 an asserted 8consciousness of ,god10 ii4 #abi1 #ada1 #adb2 criticism of proofs for existence of1 ii4 #abhacc4 ,goethe1 his theory of colours1 i4 #bf1 #afj1 #bde1 ii4 #dcc2 on genius1 i4 #bdg1 iii4 #ai1 #adg1 #aea1 #aec1 #aef2 on effect of human beauty1 i4 #bhe2 on ,laocoon1 i4 #bic2 on painting of music1 i4 #bie2 on fable of ,proserpine and pomegranate1 i4 #caa1 #dbd2 his songs1 i4 #cbc1 #baj2 on indestructibility of human spirit1 i4 #cfb n42 8,confessions of beautiful soul10 i4 #dig2 power of sight of suffering1 i4 #eab2 on persistency of error1 ii4 #d1 #h2 unknown to ,kant1 ii4 #aeb2 sensitive to noise1 ii4 #aih2 metamorphosis of plants1 ii4 #bbe1 iii4 #he2 on skeletons of rodents1 ii4 #cah2 on ,kant1 ii4 #cdj2 never overworked1 ii1 #dbg2 example of folly of childhood1 ii4 #def2 on sleep1 ii4 #dff2 8,wahlverwandtschaften10 iii4 #cg1 #aea1 #afd2 his love of natural sciences1 iii4 #ci2 his height1 iii4 #afj2 his childishness1 iii4 #afc2 his mother1 iii4 #cbg2 quoted1 i4 #cad1 #cff1 ii4 #ad1 #bb1 #bid1 iii4 #acb1 #acf1 #cfi4 ,good1 the conception1 i4 #dfd seq42 nature of the good man1 #dfe1 #dhj1 iii4 #cjf1 #cjg4 ,gorgias1 ii4 #bha1 #bhf4 ,gothic architecture compared with antique1 iii4 #ahiaib4 ,gozzi1 ,carlo1 i4 #bcg1 ii4 #bgf1 iii4 #afi4 ,grace1 distinguished from beauty1 i4 #bhi2 ,christian doctrine of1 i4 #ebb seq41 #ebh1 ii4 #adi4 ,gracian1 ,balthasar1 i4 #caa1 ii4 #bej1 iii4 #dja4 ,grammar1 relation to ,logic1 ii4 #hehg1 #hi4 ,gravitas1 iii4 #aeb4 ,gravitation1 i4 #ac1 #bf1 #aie1 #bab1 #bac1 #cih1 ii4 #bbe1 #bbf1 iii4 #eb1 #cid4 ,greatness in spiritual sense1 iii4 #aej4 ,guicciardini1 ii4 #ddg4 ,guido ,reni1 iii4 #aia4 ,guilt1 i4 #bjd1 #ded1 iii4 #cij1 #dae1 #dah1 #dbj seq41 #ddh4 ,guion1 ,mme4 de1 i4 #dig1 #eje1 iii4 #dcb1 #dcd1 #dce4 ,hall1 ,marshall1 i4 #aea1 ii4 #acc1 #dcc1 #dhd1 iii4 #f4 ,haller1 ii4 #dgi1 #dhh1 iii4 #cbh4 ,hamilton1 ,sir ,w41 ii4 #cbc4 ,happiness1 is negative1 i4 #daadac2 from standpoint of higher knowledge1 i4 #def2 impossible in an existence like ours1 iii4 #chb1 #chc2 and virtue1 i4 #dff1 iii4 #dbj seq4 ,hardy1 ,spence1 i4 #dig1 iii4 #cja1 #cjc1 #cjh n41 #dcd4 ,hauz1 iii4 #de4 ,haydn1 i4 #cjd4 ,head1 relation of1 to trunk in brutes and man1 i4 #bcj2 opposite pole of genitals1 i4 #dbe1 iii4 #hg1 #caj2 and heart1 ii4 #dej seq4 ,health1 i4 #aij seq41 iii4 #che4 ,hearing1 sense of1 ii4 #aieaii4 ,heart1 the centre and primum mobile of life1 ii4 #dbh1 #dgidha2 opposition between head and heart1 ii4 #dej seq42 why love affairs are called affairs of the heart1 iii4 #cgc4 ,heathen1 ii4 #ig4 ,heavens1 sublime effect of1 i4 #bff1 #bfg4 ,hegel1 ii4 #h1 #bb1 #ca1 #aga1 #bdc1 #bfa1 #bff1 iii4 #de1 #bbd1 #bbe1 #cid1 #djd1 #dcf4 ,heine1 ,heinrich1 ii4 #bhc4 ,hell1 i4 #dai1 iii4 #chg1 #chh1 #cib4 ,helvetius1 i4 #bhh n41 ii4 #bef1 #ddd #ddf1 iii4 #h4 ,heraclitus1 i4 #h1 ii4 #bef1 iii4 #cii4 ,herder1 i4 #eb1 ii4 #aec1 iii4 #afc4 ,heredity1 iii4 #cahcce4 ,hermaphrodism1 iii4 #cef4 ,herodotus1 ii4 #cdg1 iii4 #cjc1 #cih4 ,hesiod1 i4 #dbe4 ,history and science1 i4 #hb1 iii4 #bbj1 #bba2 and philosophy1 iii4 #bbc2 and poetry1 i4 #cae seq41 iii4 #bbd2 and biography1 i4 #cai2 the philosophy of1 i4 #bcf1 #bcg1 iii4 #bbdbbf2 true value of1 iii4 #bbg seq4 untrustworthiness of1 i4 #bch1 #caf1 #cag1 iii4 #bbc2 history of world and history of the saints1 i4 #dig1 #dih4 ,hobbes1 i4 #ba1 #cfa n41 #dda1 #ddf1 #dea ii4 #bfc1 #dec4 ,holberg1 ii4 #cgi4 ,holiness1 inner nature of1 i4 #did1 #die2 its independence of dogmas1 i4 #die1 #eji4 ,hollbach1 ii4 #agf4 ,home1 ii4 #aec1 #bgj4 ,homer1 i4 #bcf1 #bie1 #caa1 #cad1 #cbd1 iii4 #djj4 ,hooke1 i4 #bf1 ii4 #bbe1 #bbf4 ,hope1 ii4 #dca4 ,horace1 ii4 #aci1 #adj1 #bgd1 iii4 #aha4 ,horizon1 mental1 ii4 #cch4 ,huber1 iii4 #aja4 ,human race4 ,see ,man4 ,humboldt1 ,alex4 von1 ii4 #fd1 iii4 #aab4 ,hume1 ,david1 i4 #ae1 #eb1 #hi1 ii4 #h1 #abi1 #acj1 #aef1 #aeg1 #agc1 #bjg1 #bji iii4 #ib1 #ib n41 #cje1 #cbg1 #cic1 #cid1 #cie4 ,humour1 ii4 #bhbbhd4 ,hutcheson1 ii4 #bgj4 ,hydraulics1 science1 of iii4 #ch2 as a fine art1 i4 #bha1 #bhb4 ,hypothesis1 correct1 ii4 #cji2 effect of1 on mind1 ii4 #dcb4 ,i4 ,see ,ego4 ,idea 7,vorstellung71 what it is1 ii4 #djj2 common form of all classes of1 i4 #c2 form of combination of all classes of1 i4 #e2 chief distinction among1 i4 #g2 idea of perception1 i4 #gde1 ii4 #afcbbg2 abstract1 i4 #deabj1 ii4 #bbhcie2 subjective correlative of1 i4 #ac 7,cf4 ,object and ,world72 the ,platonic ,idea 7,idee7 defined1 i4 #afh1 iii4 #abb2 distinguished from thing in itself1 i4 #bji1 #bbf seq41 #bcb1 iii4 #abb seq42 empirical correlative of1 iii4 #abc42 relation to individual things1 i4 #bbg1 #bcc1 iii4 #bge2 knowledge of1 i4 #bbjbbh1 #bga1 ii4 #cceccf1 iii4 #abb1 #abf seq42 grades of1 in nature1 i4 #aieaii1 #bjb2 the object of art1 see ,art2 misuse of word1 i4 #afh1 ii4 #ii1 #ajj2 association of1 see ,association2 ,kant's ,ideas of reason1 ii4 #bc seq4 ,ideal1 in art1 i4 #bhg1 #bhh2 opposition between ideal and real1 ii4 #djj seq4 ,idealism1 as opposed to realism1 i4 #c seq41 ii4 #bh seq41 #afc1 #afg2 difference between empirical and transcendental1 ii4 #agj1 #ahd2 absolute1 i4 #acd1 #ace4 ,identity1 law of1 ii4 #hfhh2 philosophy of1 i4 #cb1 ii4 #h1 #djj4 ,idyll1 the1 why it must be short1 i4 #dac4 ,iffland1 ii4 #dbf4 ,illusion distinguished from error1 i4 #bh1 #ajc1 #ajd4 ,imagination1 an instrument of thought1 ii4 #bdj1 #bde2 an essential element of genius1 i4 #bda seq41 iii4 #ada1 #adb4 ,imitation1 in art1 i4 #cjd2 of idiosyncrasies of others1 i4 #cie4 ,immanent knowledge1 opposed to transcendent and transcendental1 i4 #bbd1 ii4 #chg1 iii4 #dcj n41 #dfh4 ,immortality1 iii4 #ge4 ,see ,indestructibility4 ,impenetrability of matter1 i1 #ac1 ii4 #ajc1 #bbc seq41 iii4 #eb4 ,inclination1 definition1 iii4 #djf4 ,indestructibility1 of our true nature by death1 ,ch4 #da passim1 iii4 #bdicjh4 ,indian1 mysticism1 #dcb2 sculpture1 i4 #cji2 philosophy1 iii4 #bha1 #bhb2 caste i4 #dei1 #dfj 7,cf4 ,buddhism and ,brahmanism74 ,individuality1 as phenomenon rooted in the thing in itself1 i4 #adg1 #bai1 #ced1 #ceg1 #ceh1 iii4 #gd1 #dbh1 #dfi2 at the different grades of nature1 i4 #agjagb2 language of nature with reference to1 i4 #cee1 #cef1 iii4 #ajh seq41 #daf1 #dag2 destruction of1 by death1 iii4 #bhf1 #bih seq4 ,induction1 ii4 #caj4 ,infinite1 true conception of1 ii4 #aae4 ,inquisition1 i4 #dff n4 ,innocence1 of plants1 i4 #bjd4 ,insects1 fertilisation of plants by1 iii4 #ij2 life of severed parts of1 ii4 #dhc2 ephemeral nature of1 iii4 #bfg4 ,see ,instinct4 ,instinct1 an act directed to an unknown end1 i4 #adh1 #aej1 #aig1 iii4 #if1 #cdf seq42 relation of1 to guidance by motives1 iii4 #if seq42 relation to somnambulism1 iii4 #ih2 throws light on organising work of nature1 iii4 #ifajj1 #ajc2 in man1 iii4 #cdf seq4 ,intellect1 pure1 ii4 #agi1 #ahj2 empirical1 secondary nature of1 ii4 #daadfg1 iii4 #c seq41 #bia2 end of1 i4 #aii1 #bbh1 ii4 #ccf1 #dhe1 iii4 #ba seq42 degrees of1 in series of animals and in man1 iii4 #bi1 #cj2 parsimony of nature in imparting1 iii4 #bj2 limitation of1 to phenomena1 iii4 #babi2 imperfections of1 ii4 #ccjcdd4 ,interesting1 distinguished from beautiful1 i4 #bbi4 ,ionic school1 i4 #cc4 ,irritability as objectification of will1 ii4 #dgb seq42 its connection with blood1 ii4 #dgh4 ,isaiah ii4 #dcg4 ,islamism1 iii4 #dbc1 #ddf4 ,jacobi1 i4 #bbe n41 ii4 #afi4 ,jealousy1 iii4 #cfd4 ,johnson1 ,dr4 ,samuel1 i4 #cbh4 ,jones1 ,sir ,w41 i4 #h1 #eja n4 ,joy1 i4 #daj1 ii4 #dbi seq4 ,judaism1 i4 #cjj1 iii4 #cje1 #ddf4 ,judgment1 faculty of1 i4 #cj1 #hd seq41 ii4 #aeb seq41 #bff seq4 ,julian1 ,emperor1 ii4 #cej4 ,jung ,stilling1 ii4 #bdc4 ,justinius1 #cje4 ,justice1 as a virtue1 i4 #dgh1 #dgi1 iii4 #dbd2 retributive1 i4 #deb2 eternal1 i4 #dbg1 #debdeh1 #dfa1 iii4 #dje1 #dba2 poetical1 i4 #cbh4 ,kant1 abstract and perceptible knowledge1 ii4 #be1 #cb1 #hj1 #bac2 sthetic1 ii4 #cb1 #cc1 #ahi2 amphiboly1 ii4 #ch2 analytic1 ii4 #cchi2 antinomy1 i4 #ci1 ii4 #ajdabe1 iii4 #de2 a priori nature of space and time1 i4 #f1 #h1 #aed1 #aee1 ii4 #afi1 #bja1 #bjb1 iii4 #bgf seq42 on the beautiful1 iii4 #ahi2 categories1 i4 #eg1 ii4 #dcdg1 #djc2 causality1 i4 #af1 ii4 #eh seq41 #agc1 #bjh1 #bji1 #bag1 #che1 #chf1 iii4 #dfi2 character1 empirical and intelligible1 i4 #ach1 #bjc1 #cdi1 #cgc2 chief result of ,kantian philosophy1 ii4 #dje2 childish in old age1 ii4 #dbg2 conceptions1 philosophy a science of1 ii4 #bei1 #chd2 cosmological proof1 ii4 #acj2 cosmology1 i4 #aid1 ii4 #bbe1 #gb2 critical philosophy1 ii4 #faa2 criticism of functions of the brain1 ii4 #agd1 #ahe2 critique of judgment1 ii4 #aebaei2 critique of practical reason1 ii4 #accaej2 critique of pure reason1 ii4 #cacc 7fundamental thought of1 ii4 #ahbj71 #bcg1 #cgg2 dialectic1 #hiacc2 8,die ,falsche ,spitzfindigkeit10 ii4 #cjj2 dreams distinguished from reality1 i4 #bj1 #ba2 editions of ,critique1 ii4 #bi2 error1 source of1 i4 #ajc2 ethics1 i4 #gi1 #aaj1 #adj1 ii4 #ab1 #accaej2 freedom and necessity1 ii4 #cgg2 ,god1 ii4 #abi1 #acj2 laws of homogeneity and specification1 i4 #hc2 idealism of1 ii4 #bi1 #afc1 #afd1 #djj seq42 infinity1 ii4 #aae2 judgment1 reflective and subsuming1 i4 #he2 judgments1 table of1 ii4 #efgh2 philosophy of law1 i4 #dcc1 ii4 #aejaeb2 logic1 transcendental1 ii4 #ccacc2 on love1 #cch2 theory of ludicrous1 ii4 #bgj2 influence of ,kantian doctrine on mathematics1 i4 #id1 #che2 explanation of matter1 i4 #ab n41 iii4 #ed2 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science10 i4 #hh1 ii4 #aaa1 #bai1 #bbd1 #bbe2 metaphysics1 impossibility of1 ii4 #chf seq42 method of1 ii4 #ecee1 iii4 #e2 ,kant's mother1 iii4 #cbg2 negative result of philosophy1 ii4 #ag2 nihil privativum1 i4 #ebh2 sensitive to noise1 ii4 #aih2 ontological proof1 ii4 #abi1 #acj2 object of perception1 ii4 #ccdc2 permanence of substance1 ii4 #ghha2 phenomenon and thing in itself1 i4 #i1 #da1 #aee1 #bbj1 #fab1 #bh1 #aha1 #cgi1 #chi1 #cii1 #dhf2 physicotheological proof1 ii4 #acj2 relation to ,plato1 i4 #bbc seq42 psychology1 refutation of rational1 ii4 #ajjajd2 reason1 conception of1 i4 #di2 ideas of1 i4 #afi1 ii4 #ifajj2 ideal of1 ii4 #abeacc2 principle of1 ii4 #ijif2 reciprocity1 category of1 ii4 #fa seq42 schematism of categories1 #dhea2 ,scholastic dogmatism overthrown by1 ii4 #abaf1 iii4 #bg2 ,schopenhauer gone further than1 iii4 #bh1 #ei2 his sleep1 ii4 #dfe2 speculative theology1 refutation of1 ii4 #abhacc1 #dgc2 spiritualism1 refutation of1 ii4 #agg2 style of1 ii4 #bj1 #ba1 #cdj2 subject1 system starts from1 i4 #db2 theory of1 sublime1 i4 #bfe2 love of symmetry1 ii4 #bb1 #dg1 #fi1 #gf1 #gh1 #ajf1 #acc2 synthetic unity of apperception1 ii4 #ea1 #eb1 #ccc1 #dgf1 iii4 #ab2 thing in itself1 ii4 #c1 #ca1 #afi1 #cha1 #djg2 transcendent1 transcendental and immanent1 i4 #abd1 ii4 #c1 #hg1 iii4 #bd2 das ,vernnfteln ii4 #bfc2 weight an a priori quality of matter1 i4 #ac4 ,kemble1 i4 #bie4 ,kepler1 i4 #hg1 #id1 #acg n41 iii4 #da4 ,kerner1 ,justinus1 ii4 #dha4 ,kielmayer1 #cah4 ,kicser1 ii4 #cbf1 iii4 #ii4 ,kirby1 iii4 #ia1 #aja1 #ajc4 ,kleist1 i4 #caa4 ,klettenberg1 ,fr4 von1 i4 #dig4 ,knowledge1 whence the need of1 iii4 #g1 #h2 physiological and metaphysical view of1 ii4 #dhf1 iii4 #bij1 #bia1 #dgj2 aim of1 ii4 #dge2 kinds of1 i4 #aii1 #bcj2 degrees of1 iii4 #bi1 #cj2 why no knowledge of knowing1 ii4 #dhg2 influence of will upon1 iii4 #acd2 influence of1 on degree of sensibility and suffering1 i4 #djj1 iii4 #af4 ,kppen1 iii4 #cja4 ,koran1 ii4 #cfa4 ,krsi1 ,csoma1 ii4 #cga4 ,kosack1 i4 #if4 ,krishna1 iii4 #bfb4 ,lactantius1 ii4 #ih4 ,lalita,vistara1 iii4 #afh4 ,lamarck1 i4 #ahe4 ,lambert1 i4 #ee1 ii4 #cjc4 ,landscape painting1 i4 #bhb4 ,language1 the first production and tool of reason1 i4 #dg1 #dh1 #ea2 connection of conception with word1 ii4 #bch2 capacity for1 depends on association of ideas1 ii4 #cbe2 the acquisition of several an important mental culture1 ii4 #bch1 #bci2 against the modern habit of curtailing words1 ii4 #caj seq4 ,laocoon1 i4 #bib1 iii4 #aih4 ,laplace1 i4 #aid1 ii4 #bbe1 iii4 #gb1 #gc4 ,latin1 as universal language of scientific literature1 ii4 #caj seq4 ,la ,trappe1 i4 #eaj1 iii4 #dee4 ,laughter1 as a psychical act1 i4 #gf seq41 ii4 #bgj2 peculiar to man1 ii4 #bhj2 why pleasant1 ii4 #bgi2 insulting and bitter1 ii4 #bha2 a test of moral worth1 ii4 #bha4 ,lavater1 i4 #cab4 ,law1 philosophy of1 i4 #ddb1 #deb1 ii4 #aejaeb1 iii4 #djidad4 ,learning1 on the subordinate value of1 ii4 #bec seq4 ,lee1 ,anne1 iii4 #ddi4 ,legislation1 i4 #ddf1 #ddg4 ,leibnitz1 i4 #di1 #aaa1 #cdb1 ii4 #aa1 #ha seq41 #ada1 #bcg1 #cia1 iii4 #ia1 #cid seq4 ,leibnitz,wolfian philosophy1 i4 #fd1 ii4 #h1 #abg1 #abi1 #ada1 iii4 #cid4 ,leopardi1 iii4 #dja4 ,lessing1 i4 #bib1 ii4 #af1 #aec1 #afi1 iii4 #cje4 ,leszczynski1 iii4 #bjc n4 ,leucippus1 ii4 #agg1 #cgh1 iii4 #fa1 #fd4 ,lichtenberg1 ii4 #aac1 #agb n41 #aih1 #dde4 iii4 #ba1 #bjc n41 #cje1 #ccb n4 ,lie1 the1 origin and end of1 i4 #dcd seq4 ,liebig1 iii4 #db4 ,life1 nature of1 iii4 #cf2 conflict with mechanical and chemical forces1 i4 #aij2 opposition between organic and animal1 ii4 #dhidib2 blind striving1 iii4 #ajeaah2 relation to dreams1 i4 #bj1 #dae2 tragic and comic side of1 i4 #dae1 #daf2 misery of1 i4 #djadjg1 #dag1 iii4 #aad1 #chbdja2 aim of1 iii4 #cgf1 #chdcia4 ,light1 mechanical explanations of1 iii4 #dd seq42 relation to heat1 i4 #bfb1 #bfc2 explanation of pleasure given by1 i4 #beh1 iii4 #acg2 connection with architecture1 i4 #bgi1 #bhj4 ,locke1 i4 #di1 ii4 #f1 #g1 #de1 #ha seq41 #ada1 #agc seq41 #ahe seq41 #bab1 #bac1 #beh1 #bei1 #djb1 iii4 #e1 #bc1 #ei1 #cid4 ,logic1 definition of1 i4 #eh1 ii4 #bhe2 value of1 i4 #egei1 ii4 #bhf2 on what its certainty depends1 ii4 #bfh4 ,love1 nature of all true and pure1 i4 #dhd seq42 root and significance of sexual love1 iii1 #dai1 #ccicdc1 #cfj2 degrees of it1 iii4 #cddcfa2 the rle of instinct in it1 iii4 #cdecdi1 #cejcfj2 independence of friendship1 iii4 #cde2 sublime and comic sides of1 iii4 #cff seq4 ,lucretius1 i4 #djc1 #daa1 #dab1 iii4 #ia1 #ic1 #cac4 ,lully1 ,raymond1 i4 #eaj1 iii4 #dee4 ,lupus1 ,rutilius1 ii4 #bhf4 ,luther1 i4 #ejj1 #ebe1 ii4 #ade1 #cfh1 iii4 #cib1 #dba1 #ddhdea4 ,lyric1 subjectivity of1 i4 #cba2 nature of the song1 i4 #cbbcbd4 ,machiavelli1 ii4 #ace1 iii4 #aeh4 ,macrocosm1 i4 #bab1 iii4 #djd4 ,madness1 nature of1 i4 #cj1 #bdh seq41 iii4 #afg2 criterion of1 iii4 #afg seq42 relation of knowledge of madman to that of the brutes1 i4 #bdi1 ii4 #bdc2 relation of1 to genius1 i4 #bdf1 #bdg2 prevalence among actors1 iii4 #afh2 origin of1 i4 #bdi seq41 iii4 #afi1 #agj2 mania sine delirio1 iii4 #aga1 #agb4 ,magnetism1 animal1 ii4 #dff1 #dfg1 iii4 #gf1 #dai4 ,maine de ,biran1 ii4 #bjf1 #ejg1 #bag4 ,malebranche1 i4 #agh1 #agi1 #ebb1 ii4 #ae4 ,man1 the human race1 connection with rest of nature1 i4 #bjj seq41 #djc1 ii4 #cgg2 identity of essence of man and the brutes1 i4 #aib2 difference between man and brutes1 i4 #dfdh1 #aajaab1 #agj1 #aga1 #bcj1 #chd1 #che1 ii4 #bbhbcc1 #ceh1 iii4 #adag1 #chj1 #cha2 transcendent unity of human race1 iii4 #ge1 #gf2 turningpoint of will to live1 i4 #dia seq41 iii4 #cha1 #dbf2 origin of1 iii4 #ceh2 gradual degradation of1 ii4 #cfb4 ,manichans1 iii4 #cje4 ,mannerists1 i4 #cjd1 #cje4 ,manzoni1 ii4 #ceb4 ,marcionists1 iii4 #cje1 #dch1 #ddb1 #ddc4 ,marcus ,aurelius1 ii4 #cef1 iii4 #cbc4 ,marriage1 iii4 #ccc1 #ccd1 #ccfcge4 ,materialism1 i4 #cd seq41 ii4 #age seq41 iii4 #fjfd1 #bfa1 #bfb4 ,mathematics1 scientific nature of1 i4 #ha1 #hb2 ground of certainty of1 i4 #aeg1 ii4 #bfh2 and genius1 i4 #bdf1 #bdg2 method of1 i4 #ie seq42 and logic1 ii4 #bjb2 value of1 ii4 #cbc4 ,matter1 i4 #ajac1 #age1 #bge1 #bgf1 ii4 #gi1 #ajc1 #ajd1 #bahbbd1 iii4 #dhed4 ,maupertius1 ii4 #bbe4 ,maximus of ,tyre1 ii4 #bfd4 ,maxwell1 iii4 #dej4 ,my1 i4 #i1 #ba1 #dbe1 #ded1 #dee1 #dga1 #dgh1 #dha1 #dhb1 #dhi1 #dij1 #ead1 #eae1 ii4 #h1 #aj1 #ajh n41 iii4 #fi1 #dah4 ,mechanics1 iii4 #cg1 #ci1 #dc seq4 ,medwin1 iii4 #afj n4 ,meister1 ,j4 ,c4 ,f41 ii4 #aeb4 ,melancholy1 i4 #eab4 ,melissus1 ii4 #bfd4 ,memnon1 ii4 #aih4 ,memory1 as a function of intellect1 ii4 #cce1 iii4 #cjj2 difference between that of men and brutes1 ii4 #bbi1 #bcj2 the influences acting upon1 i4 #cj1 #bdhbea1 ii4 #bjj1 #ccd1 #dch seq4 ,menenius ,agrippa1 i4 #caa4 ,mens as opposed to animus1 ii4 #deh4 ,menu1 laws of1 i4 #dcc1 #eja n41 iii4 #dfe4 ,merck1 ii4 #ddf1 iii4 #bjj4 ,metaphysics1 i4 #ajg1 ii4 #bj1 #ceicie iii4 #dj4 ,metempsychosis1 doctrine of1 i4 #dehdfj1 iii4 #cjjcjf1 #dag1 #dah4 ,method1 i4 #ajj1 #ajh1 ii4 #ec1 #baj1 #bei1 #cji1 #caj1 #cic4 ,metre1 i4 #cad1 ii4 #bjebjg4 ,mind1 presence of1 ii4 #dcj4 ,minor key1 i4 #ccg1 iii4 #bdc1 #bdd4 ,missionaries1 i4 #dfj4 ,mnemonics1 ii4 #cbe4 ,modality1 categories of1 ii4 #ffge4 ,modesty1 i4 #cjc1 iii4 #bjb1 #bjc4 ,mohammedanism1 ii4 #cfa1 #cfb1 iii4 #dbc1 #dcc1 #dgb4 ,molinos1 iii4 #dcd1 #dce1 #dce n4 ,molock1 ii4 #bdc4 ,monarchy1 i4 #ddc1 iii4 #daj4 ,monasticism1 i4 #dii1 iii4 #ddh4 ,mongolian race1 iii4 #eh4 ,montaigne1 i4 #dfc n41 ii4 #cae1 #dfe1 iii4 #cgh4 ,montalembert1 iii4 #dce4 ,montanists1 iii4 #dch4 ,monuments1 value of historical1 iii4 #bbi4 ,moon1 sthetic effect of1 iii4 #acf4 ,morality1 i4 #cdc1 #dgg1 iii4 #dje1 #dae1 #dbcdbh 7,cf4 ,ethics74 ,morphology1 i4 #abd1 #abe1 #ahc4 ,mortality1 iii4 #cjacjb4 ,motives1 ,motivation1 what they determine1 i4 #ach1 #bab1 #bac1 iii4 #aae2 what imparts power to1 iii4 #ig2 intellectual condition of action of1 i4 #chj1 #cha2 influence of nearness upon strength of1 ii4 #cdf2 influence upon intellect1 ii4 #dcf2 distinguished from instinct1 iii4 #ig2 intellect as medium of1 i4 #aii1 ii4 #ccf1 #dhe1 iii4 #ba seq4 ,movement1 i4 #aid1 ii4 #bbf1 #bbg1 #dhc1 #dhd1 iii4 #ci4 ,mozart1 iii4 #afc4 ,mller1 ii4 #dgi4 ,multiplicity1 i4 #ade1 #adf1 #aff1 #afg1 iii4 #fi seq41 #bgd1 #bge4 ,mnchhausen1 ,baron1 i4 #cd1 ii4 #bgh4 ,murder1 i4 #dcb1 iii4 #dac1 #dad4 ,music1 metaphysics of1 i4 #ccjcdf1 iii4 #bcabdh4 ,mysteries essential to religion1 ii4 #cfg1 #cfh1 iii4 #dcj4 ,mysticism1 ,mystics1 i4 #dii1 #ejj1 iii4 #dcj n41 #dcjdcd4 ,nakedness1 i4 #bif4 ,nature1 what it means1 iii4 #a2 works of nature and works of art1 iii4 #a1 #fi1 #gj1 #gi2 inner nature of1 i4 #adj seq41 #adh1 #aeb seq41 iii4 #cb1 #cc1 #ci2 perfection of works of1 iii4 #fi1 #gj2 the circle of1 iii4 #bfg2 grades of1 i4 #aie seq41 #bjbbjf2 continuity of1 ii4 #bcb1 iii4 #cf1 #he2 the conflict in1 i4 #aia1 #baj1 #baa2 design of1 i4 #bjabaa1 #gg seq41 #ie2 relation to species and individual1 i4 #cef1 #dbe1 #dbf1 iii4 #aid1 #bgg1 #bgh1 #cif2 sthetic effect of1 i4 #bee1 iii4 #agc1 #agd2 navet of1 i4 #bjc1 #bjd1 #cef1 #cfb1 #dbc1 #dia1 iii4 #chj2 moral quality of1 i4 #eah1 iii4 #ajf2 laws of1 i4 #abf1 #agb1 #age seq441 #ahc2 forces of1 i4 #abf1 #afb1 #afiahb1 #bjb1 ii4 #bag1 #bah1 iii4 #gc1 #bei2 investigator of1 ii4 #cah1 #cai1 #chc4 ,necessity1 origin and meaning of conception1 i4 #ig2 relation to the actual and possible1 ii4 #gb seq42 relation to contingent1 ii4 #fg1 #fh2 as opposed to freedom1 iii4 #fg1 #fi2 absolute necessity1 #gj4 ,nerves1 i4 #aca1 ii4 #agc1 #ahe1 #dhadhe4 ,newton1 ,isaac1 i4 #bf1 #fd1 #afj1 #afe1 #bde1 ii4 #bbf1 #bfh1 #cch4 ,nirvana1 i4 #dfj1 iii4 #cjh n41 #cgd1 #dbg1 #dbh4 ,nitzsch1 iii4 #bfi4 ,noise1 ii4 #aih1 #aii1 iii4 #dej4 ,nominalism1 ii4 #he1 iii4 #abe4 and 1 i4 #ic1 ii4 #he4 ,nothing1 relativity of conception1 i4 #ebh1 iii4 #bgb4 ,nourishment1 i4 #ceg4 ,numenius1 ii4 #ih4 1 ii4 #dei1 iii4 #cij4 ,nunc stans1 the1 i4 #bbg1 #cfa n41 iii4 #cha4 ,object1 conditioned by subject1 i4 #c1 #f1 #af1 seq41 #abc1 #abd1 ii4 #affafi1 #agj1 #agc1 #agi1 #cha4 ,objectification1 i4 #acj1 #affafc1 ii4 #dfh4 ,objectivity1 of genius and in art1 i4 #bdj1 #cba1 #cbd1 ii4 #dag1 iii4 #add1 #baj4 ,obscurantism1 iii4 #cbh1 #cbi4 ,obry1 iii4 #cjc1 #cjh n4 ,ocelius ,lucanus1 #aac4 ,opera1 iii4 #ib1 #bcc1 #bcd4 ,optimism1 i4 #dbj1 ii4 #cia1 iii4 #cijcig1 #dcf1 #ddc1 #ddi1 #dga seq4 ,organism1 ii4 #dfh1 iii4 #gg seq4 ,original sin1 iii4 #cjf1 #dba seq41 #dbf4 ,orpheus1 iii4 #cjc1 #dbg1 #dcc1 #ddc4 ,osiander1 i4 #aea4 ,ossian1 i4 #cbd4 ,ought1 the absolute1 i4 #cej1 ii4 #add4 ,oum1 iii4 #dcj1 #dcj n4 ,oupnekhat1 i4 #dei1 #eja1 iii4 #dbe n4 #dcb1 #dcc4 ,ovid1 #a4 #cif1 #daj4 ,owen1 ,r41 ii4 #aca1 #bjc n41 iii4 #hb1 #hf1 #ia4 ,pstum1 iii4 #ahe4 ,pain1 i4 #chf1 #daj1 #dab1 #dac1 iii4 #chd1 #che4 ,paine1 ,t41 i4 #bca4 ,painting1 i4 #bhbbib1 #bigcja1 #cjfcaj1 iii4 #aic1 #aifaih4 ,palingenesis1 iii4 #cjj1 #cja4 ,pander1 ii4 #cah4 ,pantheism1 iii4 #ajf1 #aad1 #djc1 #djd1 #dgadge4 ,paracelsus1 ,theophrastus1 iii4 #bhj1 #cfb4 ,parmenides1 i4 #ada1 #dbe4 ,parody1 ii4 #bge1 #bgf4 ,particles1 logical1 ii4 #bhh1 #cae4 ,pascal1 i4 #dgf1 iii4 #dce4 ,passions1 ii4 #baf1 iii4 #djf1 #djg4 ,past1 the1 i4 #cei1 #cfj4 ,pedantry1 i4 #gh1 ii4 #bej seq4 ,pelagianism1 i4 #ebe1 ii4 #cfh1 #cfi1 iii4 #dbb1 #ddh4 ,penitentiary system1 i4 #djd1 iii4 #dab4 ,perception1 intellectuality of1 i4 #adaf1 ii4 #dj1 #agd1 #ahe1 #aib2 share of senses and brain in1 ii4 #ahe2 object of1 i4 #g1 ii4 #dj2 relation to thing in itself1 ii4 #agd1 #dja2 significance for knowledge1 science1 art1 philosophy1 and virtue1 ii4 #bddbfi1 iii4 #aca1 #ada seq4 ,perfection1 ii4 #ae4 ,peripatetics1 ii4 #acg1 #ade4 ,permanence of substance1 ii4 #gh4 ,perpetual motion1 ii4 #fe1 iii4 #cie4 ,pessimism1 can be demonstrated1 iii4 #cie2 the ground of distinction among religions1 ii4 #cgb seq42 of the most significant religions1 i4 #dbj1 iii4 #dbc2 of great men of all ages1 iii4 #cih seq4 ,petitio principii1 definition of1 ii4 #cjh4 ,petit,thouars1 ,admiral1 iii4 #ee4 ,petrarch1 i4 #dhg1 #eab1 ii4 #cac1 iii4 #baj1 #cfc1 #cfi1 #cgj1 #chf4 ,petronius1 ii4 #acj4 ,pettigrew1 i4 #agh n4 ,phidias1 iii4 #aie4 ,philosopher1 the1 nature of1 i4 #ba1 #aji1 ii4 #cai1 #cei1 #cfj1 iii4 #adf1 #adg2 distinguished from poet1 iii4 #adf1 #adg2 distinguished from sophist1 ii4 #cfb1 #cfc4 ,philosophy1 source of1 #a4 #ace1 ii4 #ceicfa1 #cgd2 task of1 i4 #ajg1 #afh1 #cej1 #ceb1 #die2 distinguished from science1 i4 #ajg1 ii4 #cag2 as opposed to theology1 ii4 #cfg1 #cie1 iii4 #dca1 #dec2 relation to art1 iii4 #agf1 #agg2 relation to history1 iii4 #bbc2 method of1 ii4 #ec1 #baj1 #bei1 #cic2 division of1 i4 #cdi2 cause of small progress of1 ii4 #cie2 limits of1 ii4 #cfb1 #cfc1 #bg1 #dje2 professors of1 ii4 #cfb1 #cfc4 ,phlegmatic temperament1 iii4 #ah1 #afa4 ,physics1 subject of1 ii4 #cge2 relation to metaphysics1 ii4 #cgfchd1 iii4 #dj4 ,physiognomy1 i4 #gd1 #gd n4 ,physiology1 i4 #abe1 ii4 #cag1 iii4 #ch4 ,pico de ,mirandula1 ii4 #bdj4 ,pictet1 iii4 #cjd4 ,picturesque1 iii4 #acj4 ,pindar1 i4 #ba4 ,pitt1 iii4 #cbd4 ,plagiarism1 ii4 #bbe1 #bbf4 ,plants1 chief characteristics of1 i4 #ceg1 ii4 #bi2 inner nature of1 i4 #aeb1 iii4 #cdcf2 distinguished from animals1 i4 #be1 #aej1 iii4 #ac2 form and physiognomy of1 i4 #bjc1 #bjd2 metamorphosis of1 iii4 #he2 sthetic effect of1 i4 #bfj1 #bhh1 #bhi4 ,platner1 ii4 #bgj4 ,plato1 on a priori knowledge1 ii4 #bja2 on being and becoming1 i4 #i2 relation to ,giordano ,bruno1 ii4 #aad n42 figure of the cave1 i4 #caa1 ii4 #h2 improper use of conceptions1 ii4 #baa1 #bfa1 #bfd2 his ,dmon1 i4 #cdi2 his dialectic1 ii4 #cji2 source of error1 i4 #ajc2 errors in syllogistic reasoning1 i4 #ic2 his ethics1 i4 #aad1 ii4 #ade1 #adi1 #cdh2 and 1 i4 #djg2 hope the dream of waking1 ii4 #dca2 his ,ideas1 i4 #afh1 #bbj1 #bgc1 ii4 #he1 #ii1 #cbb1 iii4 #abc1 #bgd1 #bge2 on love1 iii4 #cch2 on materialism1 ii4 #agf2 on mathematics1 #cbc2 on metempsychosis1 #cjc2 his method1 i4 #bci2 on music1 i4 #ccf2 on nature of nothing1 i4 #ebi2 on the nature of the philosopher1 i4 #ba1 #da1 #aji1 #adc2 ii4 #cfi1 #cgd2 on plants1 iii4 #cd2 on punishment1 i4 #dea2 on reason1 ii4 #ada2 on science1 i4 #hc2 on sensual pleasure1 iii4 #cdi1 #cfi2 his world of shadows1 ii4 #aj2 on existence of soul1 ii4 #ajb2 his theism1 ii4 #ih4 ,pliny1 iii4 #cgh1 #djj1 #dea4 ,plotinus1 ii4 #bah1 iii4 #ea1 #ed1 #dcb4 ,plouquet1 i4 #ee4 ,plutarch1 ii4 #ih1 #cai1 iii4 #abd1 #bga #cii4 ,poaching1 a positive1 not a moral fault1 iii4 #daa1 #dab4 ,poet1 the1 grade2 of1 iii4 #bjb2 marks of genuine1 iii4 #bjg2 bad influence of mediocre1 i4 #cag n42 distinguished from philosopher1 iii4 #adf1 #adg4 ,poetical justice1 i4 #cbh ,poetry1 i4 #cacccj1 iii4 #ch1 #bjjbai4 ,point1 extensionless1 ii4 #bbc2 immovable1 ii4 #bai4 ,polarity1 i4 #ahg4 ,polier1 ,mme4 de1 i4 #dib1 #eja n41 ii #aji4 ,position1 i4 #i4 ,possibility1 ii4 #fi1 #gb4 ,pouchet1 iii4 #ef4 ,poussin1 i4 #cjf4 ,praxiteles1 iii4 #aie4 ,predestination1 i4 #cgh1 ii4 #adi4 ,preexistence1 iii4 #bec1 #bed4 ,prejudice1 ii4 #bfh4 ,preller1 ii4 #ceg4 ,present1 the1 i4 #cehcfj1 iii4 #bga1 #bga n4 ,priestley1 i4 #cgc1 ii4 #aaa1 #bbd1 #bbe1 iii4 #df4 ,priests1 i4 #dff n41 ii4 #cfb4 ,principium individuationis1 i4 #ade1 #adf1 #aff1 #ded seq41 #dha1 iii4 #bgd1 #dag1 #dah4 ,principle of sufficient reason1 is a priori1 i4 preface xi41 #f1 iii4 #dfi2 sphere of validity of1 i4 #g1 #af1 #ag1 #da1 #ajf1 iii4 #dje1 #dfi2 importance of1 i4 #if1 #ajg1 ii4 #caf2 indemonstrable nature of1 i4 #if1 #ajf2 fourfold root of1 i4 #g 7,cf4 ,appendix to vol4 iii47 ,property1 right of1 i4 #dcb1 #dcc n41 iii4 #daa4 ,prose1 as distinguished from poetry1 i1 #cac1 iii4 #bjdbjf4 ,protestantism4 ,see ,catholicism4 ,prudence1 i4 #bg1 #bde1 #def4 ,psychology1 ii4 #dabdfg4 ,punishment1 distinguished from revenge1 i4 #ddi2 end of1 i4 #ddhdej1 iii4 #dab1 #dac2 measure of1 iii4 #dac1 #dad4 ,pyramids1 i4 #bfg1 iii4 #bbi4 ,pythagoras1 iii4 #cjc4 ,pythagoreans1 i4 #cc1 #hf1 #ib1 #ie1 #ahh1 #cdc1 ii4 #cai1 iii4 #ie1 #abd1 #dbg1 #ddb1 #deb4 ,quality1 of judgments ii4 #eg1 #hg2 as determination of matter1 iii4 #ed2 natural forces as qualitates occult1 i4 #abf1 #afb1 #agj1 #ahb1 ii4 #cgf4 ,quid pro quo1 i4 #gi4 ,quieter of will1 i4 #cja1 #cbf1 #cbg1 #cfg1 #cif1 #dhi1 #dij4 ,quietism1 iii4 #dccdce1 ,rabelais1 iii4 #dcg4 ,radius1 ,justus1 ii4 #aia4 ,rameau1 i4 #eh4 ,ranc1 ,abb1 i4 #eaj1 iii4 #dee4 ,raphael1 i4 #bie1 #cjj1 #eca1 iii4 #afb4 ,rationalism in theology1 ii4 #cfi4 ,reading1 disadvantage of much1 ii4 #becbee4 ,realism1 ii4 #he1 iii4 #abe4 ,reality1 definition1 i4 #cj2 the present is the form of1 i4 #cei1 #cfj1 iii4 #bga n42 of external world1 i4 #bb1 #bc1 ii4 #afi1 #ahd4 ,reason1 the word1 i4 #dh1 ii4 #ada1 #bda2 function of1 i4 #ej1 ii4 #acg2 theoretical and practical1 i4 #cj1 #aac1 ii4 #ach1 #aci1 #cde2 iii4 #djh2 prerogative of man1 i4 #dfdh1 #aajaab1 #chd1 #che1 ii4 #bbhbcc1 iii4 #chj1 #cha2 relation of language to1 i4 #dgea1 ii4 #bch2 advantages and disadvantages1 i4 #de1 #dg1 #fhge1 ii4 #bcdbdc1 #cde seq42 compatible with want of understanding and with moral badness1 ii4 #acf2 opposed to revelation1 ii4 #adb2 ,kant's ,ideas of1 i4 #afi1 ii4 #ifajj2 ideal of1 ii4 #abeacc2 principle of1 ii4 #ijif4 ,reflection1 definition1 i4 #df2 relation to perceptive knowledge1 ii4 #ed seq4 ,reflex movements1 ii4 #dhcdhd4 ,reid1 ,dr4 ,thomas1 ii4 #ahi1 #aia1 #bjg1 #bdj4 ,reil1 i4 #adj1 #aei4 ,religion1 significance of1 ii4 #cfg seq42 value of1 ii4 #cgj2 fundamental distinction between1 ii4 #cgb seq42 mysteries essential to1 ii4 #cfg2 demoralising influence of1 i4 #dff n42 conflict with culture and science1 ii4 #cgj2 philosophy of1 ii4 #cgj 7,cf4 ,buddhism1 ,brahmanism1 ,christianity1 ,judaism1 and ,mohammedanism74 ,repentance1 i4 #chb1 iii4 #djf1 #djg4 ,reproduction4 ,see ,generation4 ,republics tend to anarchy1 i4 #ddc4 ,resignation4 ,see ,will1 denial of4 ,resolve1 i4 #chg4 ,revenge1 distinguished from punishment1 i4 #ddi2 relation to wickedness1 i4 #dgj2 a characteristic of human nature which is not to be confounded with revenge1 i4 #dfb4 ,rhetoric1 i4 #fc1 ii4 #bhe1 #bhf1 #cje1 #cjf4 ,rhyme4 ,see ,poetry4 ,rhythm1 in music1 i4 #cci seq4 ,see ,poetry4 ,richter1 ,jean ,paul1 ii4 #bb1 #aih1 #bgj1 #bhc1 iii4 #ada1 #adc1 #ade4 ,right1 negative nature of conception1 i4 #dcg1 #ddd2 independent of ,state1 i4 #dci1 iii4 #dji2 positive i4 #ddd1 #ddf2 of property1 i4 #dcb #dcc n41 iii4 #daa4 ,ritter1 ii4 #ceg4 ,romantic1 distinguished from classical1 iii4 #bji4 ,rsch1 ii4 #dgh1 #dhj4 ,rosenkranz1 i4 #bjc n41 ii4 #bi1 #cf1 #aag1 #abj1 #aba1 #adfadh1 #bjd n41 #bab1 #bag1 #bbe1 #cgg4 ,rosini1 ii4 #ddg4 ,rousseau1 i4 #bdg1 #cdc1 ii4 #acf1 #cec1 iii4 #ajf1 #cbe1 #cch1 #cig4 ,ruins1 sublime effect of1 i4 #bfg2 analogous to cadenza in music1 iii4 #bda4 ,ruisdael1 i4 #bee4 ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,august1 iii4 #ee4 ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,geoffroi1 ii4 #cah1 iii4 #hb4 ,sakya ,muni1 iii4 #afh1 #dcd4 ,salvation1 the way of1 iii4 #dfjdfg4 ,sangermano1 iii4 #cja1 #cjh n4 ,sannyasis1 i4 #dif1 ii4 #ceb4 ,saphir1 ii4 #bgd4 ,sceptics1 i4 #abc1 #abd4 ,schelling1 i4 #ahg1 ii4 #bb1 #ca1 #aaf1 #afi1 #agf1 #bcf1 #bfa1 iii4 #fb1 #dga4 ,schiller1 i4 #gi1 #cah1 ii4 #adh1 #bgf1 #cba1 iii4 #bae1 #bag4 ,schleiermacher1 i4 #fg1 #bfb1 iii4 #cid4 ,schlegel1 iii4 #ge4 ,schmidt1 ,j4 ,j41 ii4 #cga1 iii4 #cjh n4 ,schnrrer1 iii4 #cja4 ,scholastics1 ,scholasticism1 i4 #hb1 #adf1 #afb1 #aih n41 ii4 #ab1 #ac1 #ce1 #ajj1 #abe1 #abf1 iii4 #abe4 ,scholiast1 ii4 #cai4 ,schultz1 ii4 #dhj4 ,schulze1 ii4 #cab4 ,science1 nature of1 i4 #cf1 #eh1 #hjij1 #aje1 #ajf1 #bbi1 #bch1 ii4 #ec1 #beb1 #bfg4 ,scott1 ,sir ,walter1 ii4 #dbg1 #deg1 iii4 #cbh1 #chf1 #cii4 ,scopas1 iii4 #aie4 ,sculpture1 as opposed to painting1 i4 #bib1 iii4 #aic2 sthetic effect of1 iii4 #bjj1 #bja2 significance of drapery in1 i4 #bif2 antique1 i4 #cji1 iii4 #aid1 #aie2 modern1 iii4 #aie4 ,secundus1 ,johannes1 iii4 #aie4 ,selfishness4 ,see ,egoism4 ,selfknowledge1 ii4 #dbc4 ,selfrenunciation1 meaning of1 iii4 #dbc2 the appearance of freedom in the phenomenon1 i4 #chh1 #chi4 ,seneca1 i4 #ge1 #bdf1 #cgi1 ii4 #adi1 #bcd1 #cdg1 #cej1 #ceeceh1 #deh4 ,sensation1 ii4 #ahfaia4 ,senses1 ii4 #aicbjj4 ,sensibility1 i4 #ac4 ,sentimentality1 i4 #eab1 #eac4 ,serenity1 i4 #dbb1 iii4 #cgf4 ,seriousness1 as the opposite of laughter1 ii4 #bhj2 as determining the tendency of life1 iii4 #adi4 ,sex1 degree of1 iii4 #cef4 ,sextus ,empiricus1 i4 #fb1 #ic1 #cdc1 ii4 #abg4 ,sexual impulse1 difference between man and brute with reference to1 i4 #aga1 iii4 #cji2 significance and power of1 i4 #dbc1 #dbe1 #caj1 #cabcad1 #cgf2 physiological correlative of1 iii4 #cad2 its relation to happiness of life1 iii4 #cgf2 voluntary renunciation of satisfaction of1 i4 #dcj1 iii4 #cgf4 ,shaftesbury1 iii4 #cig4 ,shakers1 iii4 #ddi4 ,shakspeare1 i4 #ba1 #bfh1 #eaa1 ii4 #bci1 #bed1 #cjf1 #cae1 iii4 #baj1 #bad1 #baf1 #cba1 #cfc1 #cfi1 #djj1 #deg4 ,shame1 i4 #dbd1 iii4 #cgi4 ,shenstone1 ii4 #bge4 ,sicle1 iii4 #aab n4 ,sight1 sense of1 ii4 #aic seq4 ,simonists1 iii4 #cje4 ,simplicius1 ii4 #aeg4 ,sirach1 ,jesus1 iii4 #ceb4 ,sketches1 value of1 iii4 #agh4 ,skull1 explained from vertebr iii4 #he4 ,slavery1 as a wrong1 i4 #dcb4 ,sleep1 necessity of1 ii4 #ccg1 #dbh1 #dfb1 #dfc1 #dff2 action of vital force in1 ii4 #dfc1 #dff2 positive character of1 ii4 #dfd2 relation to brain life1 ii4 #dfe2 relation to death1 i4 #ceh1 iii4 #bfg seq4 ,socialists1 iii4 #bej4 ,socrates1 i4 #bhh1 #cdc1 ii4 #ajg1 #bha1 #cfc1 iii4 #bii1 #bdi1 #beb1 #dje4 ,somnambulism1 ii4 #dfg1 iii4 #ih seq4 ,smmering1 iii4 #ba4 ,sophist1 distinguished from philosopher1 ii4 #cfb1 #cfc4 ,sophistry1 i4 #fc1 ii4 #bfc1 #bfd4 ,sophocles1 i4 #ba1 #bie1 #cbh1 iii4 #bad4 ,soul1 historical1 iii4 #b1 #c1 #ac2 opposition between soul and body1 ii4 #ajbajd1 #cgh2 in what sense the word should be used1 iii4 #aje2 a motive which has led to the assumption of1 ii4 #dji2 theoretical and practical results of assumption1 ii4 #gg1 #dji1 #did4 ,southey1 ii4 #dbg4 ,space1 ideality of1 ii4 #bjabjd1 #bba2 opposition between space and time with reference to abstract knowledge1 i4 #fi1 #gj2 union of space and time the condition of duration and matter1 i4 #ajac1 ii4 #gh2 the framework of the phenomenal world1 i4 #ahg1 #ahh2 whether the world is limited in space1 ii4 #aji 7,cf4 ,principium individuationis74 ,spallanzani1 ii4 #dfi4 ,species1 iii4 #abc4 ,spectator1 ii4 #bcc4 ,spinal cord1 ii4 #dhcdhd4 ,spinoza1 on benevolence1 i4 #dhf2 biography of1 i4 #dig2 explanation and use of concepts1 i4 #aaa1 ii4 #bda1 #bff2 ethical teaching of1 i4 #aad1 #cfg1 iii4 #djc2 ,god of1 iii4 #ajf2 on knowledge of ,ideas1 i4 #bca1 #bcb n42 on immortality1 iii4 #bhj1 #bia2 on love1 iii4 #cch2 method of1 i4 #ajj n41 #ajh1 ii4 #bab2 his place in western philosophy1 ii4 #ac n42 rejection of spiritualism1 ii4 #agg2 conception of substance1 i4 #cc1 ii4 #cgc1 #cia2 rejection of teleology1 iii4 #ia1 #ic1 #id2 on will1 i4 #afd1 #cgg1 #che1 ii4 #abj4 ,spiritualism1 ii1 #agg4 ,stahl1 i4 #fd4 ,state1 the1 i4 #ddbddh1 #dea1 iii4 #djidaa4 ,statics1 ii4 #bbf4 ,stewart1 ,dugald1 ii4 #bbf1 #bdj4 ,stobus1 i4 #aad1 #aag1 #aah1 #cgh1 #ejf n41 ii4 #acg1 #cai1 #cej4 ,stoics1 ,stoicism1 i4 #aacabj1 ii4 #dec4 ,strauss1 ,d4 ,f41 iii4 #dcg1 #deg4 ,stupidity1 i4 #cj4 ,style1 ii4 #dd1 #bdf1 #bdg4 ,suarez1 i4 #adf1 #afb1 #aih n41 ii4 #ac1 #hi1 #ajj4 ,subject1 the1 has two parts1 i4 #acb2 of will1 iii4 #abf2 of knowing1 i4 #c1 #f1 #af1 #abc1 #abd1 ii4 #affafi1 #agj seq42 pure1 willless subject of knowing1 i4 #bec seq41 iii4 #abh seq4 ,sublime1 the1 i4 #beibfh4 ,substance1 origin and content of concept1 ii4 #ajc1 #ajd2 principle of permanence of1 ii4 #gh seq42 and accident1 i4 #ab seq41 ii4 #gi1 #hj4 ,succession1 i4 #i4 ,suetonius1 iii4 #cba4 ,suffering1 universality of1 i4 #cii seq42 sanctifying power of1 i4 #eaa2 of life1 i4 #djadjg1 #dag1 iii4 #aad4 ,sufism1 iii4 #dbc1 #dcb4 ,suicide1 i4 #djh1 #eadebj1 iii4 #aag4 ,suidas1 ii4 #ih4 ,sulzer1 ii4 #ada4 ,supernaturalism1 ii4 #cfi ,swift1 iii4 #cii4 ,swoon1 the twinbrother of death1 iii4 #bef4 ,sybarites1 ii4 #aii4 ,syllogism1 ii4 #bibcjd4 ,symbolism1 i4 #cjh seq4 ,symmetry1 analogy with rhythm iii4 #bdj1 #bda4 ,sympathy1 definition and division1 iii4 #dai4 ,systems1 philosophical1 ground of interest in1 ii4 #cfj1 #cfa2 contrast between ,schopenhauer's and others1 i4 #cb1 ii4 #ahj1 #cic2 division of those starting from object1 i4 #cc2 error of those which proceed historically1 i4 #ceb2 criteria of truth of1 ii4 #cia4 ,tatianites1 iii4 #dci4 ,tauler1 iii4 #dcd1 #dce4 ,teleology1 i4 #bjabaj1 iii4 #ggie4 ,tennemann1 i4 #fg1 ii4 #ab4 ,termini technici1 iii4 #cab4 ,tersteegen1 i4 #dif4 ,tertullian1 ii4 #cfh1 iii4 #cje1 #dci4 ,thales1 i4 #cc4 ,theodicy1 iii4 #cid1 #djd4 ,theon of ,smyrna1 iii4 #cac4 ,thilo1 iii4 #aeh4 ,thing in itself1 as opposed to phenomenon1 i4 #dj1 #dd1 #abh1 #adb #ade1 #aeg1 #aff1 ii4 #ca1 #afh1 #afi1 #djb1 #djc1 iii4 #bib2 how knowledge of it can be attained1 i4 #da1 #abh1 ii4 #ca1 #agd1 #age1 #djd1 #dje2 in what sense it is the will1 i4 #adb1 ii4 #djg2 why our knowledge of it is not exhaustive1 i4 #aeg1 ii4 #djf1 iii4 #i1 #bd1 #be1 #bg1 #bhf seq42 in history of philosophy1 i4 #bbj1 ii4 #cj1 #aag1 #agd1 #ahe1 #chj1 #cij1 iii4 #de4 ,tholuk1 iii4 #dcb4 ,thorwaldsen1 iii4 #aie4 ,thracians1 iii4 #cih4 ,tiedemann1 ii4 #dgj4 ,tien1 ii4 #ig4 ,time1 nature of1 i4 #i1 #dd1 ii4 #bje1 iii4 #ab2 ideality of1 ii4 #bja1 #bjd2 prdicabilia a priori of1 #aba seq4 7,cf4 ,space74 ,times1 the1 i4 #agh n41 ii4 #dei1 iii4 #cjd1 #dej4 ,tourtual1 ii4 #ahg4 ,tragedy1 i41 #cbfccj1 iii4 #babbaf4 #ded4 ,transcendent1 ii4 #chg4 ,transcendental knowledge1 i4 #bbd2 philosophy1 ii4 #aa4 ,travelling1 sthetic effect of1 iii4 #aca4 ,trent1 decrees of ,council of1 iii4 #dda4 ,treviranus1 ii4 #dgj1 iii4 #ce4 ,truth1 definition1 i4 #cj1 ii4 #cjh2 foundation of1 i4 #ajjajc2 difference between conceivability and truth1 ii4 #bgh2 relation to proof1 i4 #hc1 #hd2 power of1 i4 #de1 #agi4 ,understanding1 function of1 i4 #ac1 #ad2 identity of nature at different grades1 i4 #bf1 #bh1 #bi2 why sensibility is everywhere accompanied by1 i4 #cj1 #ca1 #bbh2 misuse of word1 ii4 #bda2 defects and advantages of knowledge of1 ii4 #bec2 keenness of1 i4 #bg1 #bde4 ,ungewitter1 iii4 #cjd4 ,universal1 two kinds of1 i4 #cjacjc1 iii4 #abd1 #abe2 knowledge of1 ii4 #cce1 #ccf2 universal truths1 ii4 #cjh4 ,upham1 iii4 #bhb4 ,utopias1 i4 #dea1 iii4 #cca4 ,valentinians1 iii4 #cje1 #dch4 ,vaninus1 ,jul4 ,csar1 iii4 #cb1 #ajf4 ,vauvenarque1 ii4 #bea4 ,vedas1 #i1 #ba1 #aad1 #bcd1 #bff1 #cfd n41 #deh1 #eja1 ii4 #ajh n41 #cfb1 iii4 #cjc1 #cjg1 #dbf1 #dbg1 #dcc1 #dfg4 ,velocity1 ii4 #bbf1 #bbg4 ,virgil1 i4 #bic1 #bie4 ,virtue1 source of genuine1 i4 #dge1 #dgg1 ii4 #adi1 #beb2 cannot be taught1 i4 #dge1 ii4 #adi2 relation to happiness1 i4 #dff1 iii4 #dbj2 distinguished from reasonableness1 ii4 #acd2 transition to asceticism1 iii4 #dbd1 #dbe4 ,voltaire1 i4 #cbg1 #cbi1 ii4 #aeg1 #bgg1 #dbh1 #dfi1 iii4 #agh1 #beb1 #cfh1 #cie4 #cih1 #djd4 ,vyaso1 iii4 #bhb4 ,weeping1 i4 #dhfdhh1 iii4 #djf4 ,weighing1 two ways of1 ii4 #bbg4 ,whewell1 ii4 #cbc4 ,wieland1 i4 #bdf1 ii4 #dbg1 iii4 #bjj4 ,will1 subject of1 iii4 #abf2 identity of subject of will and knowledge1 #acb2 as the thing in itself1 i4 #adb1 ii4 #djg2 contrast between will and its phenomenal appearance1 i4 #ade1 #aff1 #bacbae1 iii4 #figa2 objectification of1 i4 #acj1 #affafh1 ii4 #dfh2 assertion of1 i4 #dbadbg1 iii4 #cgfcha2 denial of1 i4 #dhhead1 iii4 #dbjdei4 ,windischmann1 iii4 #cjg1 #dbe n4 ,winkelmann1 i4 #bhi1 #bij1 #bib1 #bie1 #cji1 #cah1 ii4 #aec4 ,winkelried1 ,arnold von1 ii4 #acd4 ,wirklichkeit1 i4 #aj4 ,wit1 i4 #gg1 ii4 #bfh1 #bgg4 ,wolf1 i4 #aaa1 ii4 #gj n41 #ij1 #ig1 #ajb1 #abg1 #bbe1 #dgi1 iii4 #he4 ,wordsworth1 ii4 #dbg4 ,wrong1 conception of1 i4 #dcadcg4 ,xenophanes1 ii4 #bbj1 iii4 #h4 ,xenophon1 i4 #bhh4 ,yama1 iii4 #beh4 ,yang1 i4 #ahg4 ,yin1 i4 #ahg4 ,y,king1 i4 #ahh1 #cdc4 ,youth1 i4 #cbd1 iii4 #cjd4 ,yunghahn1 iii4 #aab4 ,zaccaria1 ,abb1 iii4 #dda4 ,zend ,avesta1 #aaa4 #cia1 #ddf4 ,zeno1 i4 #aag #aah4 ,,corrigenda ,,and ,,addenda ,,in ,,vol4 ,i4 ,page xxxii4 insert ,preface to the ,third ,edition4 ,what is true and genuine would more easily gain room in the world if it were not that those who are incapable of producing it are also sworn to prevent it from succeeding4 ,this fact has already hindered and retarded1 when indeed it has not choked1 many a work that should have been of benefit to the world4 ,for me the consequence of this has been1 that although ,i was only thirty years old when the first edition of this work appeared1 ,i live to see this third edition not earlier than my seventy second year4 ,yet for this ,i find comfort in the words of ,petrarch3 ,si quis tota die currens1 pervenit ad vesperam satis est 7de vera ,sapientia1 p4 #adj74 ,if ,i also have at last arrived1 and have the satisfaction at the end of my course of seeing the beginning of my influence1 it is with the hope that1 according to an old rule it will endure long in proportion to the lateness of its beginning4 ,in this third edition the reader will miss nothing that was contained in the second1 but will receive considerably more1 for1 on account of the additions that have been made in it1 it has1 with the same type1 #acf pages more than the second4 ,seven years after the appearance of the second edition ,i published two volumes of 8,parerga and ,paralipomena40 ,what is included under the latter name consists of additions to the systematic exposition of my philosophy1 and would have found its right place in these volumes1 but ,i was obliged to find a place for it then where ,i could1 as it was very doubtful whether ,i would live to see this third edition4 ,it will be found in the second volume of the said 8,parerga10 and will be easily recognised from the headings of the chapters4 ,,frankfort,,on,,the,,maine1 ,september #ahei4 ,page xiv4 line #i1 for 8pancorum0 read 8paucorum40 xix4 #ag1 for 8alchemists0 read 8adepts40 xx4 #aj1 after 8there0 insert 8unanimous40 xxi4 #c1 for 8will appeal to any thinking mind no matter when it comprehends it0 read 8will also some time be comprehended by another thinking mind40 xxii4 last line1 after 8not0 insert 8in this case40 xxiii4 line #bf1 for 8conceptions0 read 8conception40 #cb1 for 8origin0 read 8stem40 xxiv4 #bj1 for 8a chromatic0 read 8an achromatic40 #f1 line #ae1 for 8universality0 read 8common or reciprocal nature40 #ba1 #ca1 for 80 read 840 #ca1 #g1 for 8micrometre0 read 8micrometer40 #da1 #aa1 for 80 read 840 #de1 #bb1 after 8its0 insert 8iron40 #de1 #bc1 for 8extend to0 read 8quench40 #dh1 #ca1 for 80 read 840 #di1 #bb1 after 8to0 insert 8abstract04 #ej1 #ad1 after 8function0 insert 8the construction of the concept40 #fb1 #bf1 for 8,kallisthenes0 read 8,callisthenes40 #ge1 #a1 for 8fictum0 read 8fictam40 #ia1 #ah1 for 8latter0 read 8former40 #ic1 lines #h and #cc1 for 80 read 840 #ii1 line #ag1 for 8#db0 read 8#cb40 #aad1 #g1 for 8 0 read 840 #aaf note1 for 80 read 840 #aag1 line1 #cj1 for 80 read 840 #aah1 lines #aj1 #ab1 for 8,kleanthes0 read 8,cleanthes40 #aai1 line #g1 for 8philospher0 read 8philosopher40 #ada1 #ah1 for 80 read 840 #adf1 #bc1 for 8became0 read 8become40 #aeg1 line #d1 for 8casuality0 read 8causality40 #aff1 #c1 insert #be4 #afi1 #e1 for 8,laertes0 read 8,laertius40 #agb1 #cb1 for 8casuality0 read 8causality40 #ahb1 #h1 for 8quidities0 read 8quiddities40 #ahd1 #cj1 for 8this0 read 8thus40 #bje1 #ce1 for 8casuality0 read 8causality40 #bbj1 #cb1 for 80 read 840 #bbb1 #bd1 for 8casuality0 read 8causality40 #bbc1 lines #d and #cc1 for 8casuality0 read 8causality40 #bbd1 line #h1 for 8casuality0 read 8causality40 #bcj1 #ai1 for 8,apollo of ,belvedere0 read 8,apollo ,belvedere40 #bca1 last line1 for 8,meus0 read 8,mens40 ,page #bdg1 line #ag1 for 8,great wits to madness sure are near allied0 read 8,great wits are sure to madness near allied40 ,the lines are not from ,pope1 as ,schopenhauer says1 but from ,dryden's 8,absalom and ,achitophel10 ,pt4 i41 l4 #afc4 #bea1 #ae1 for 8appear0 read 8appears40 #beh1 #ah1 for 8,ahrimines0 read 8,ahriman40 #bgf1 lines #i and #aa1 for 8casuality0 and 8casual0 read 8causality0 and 8causal20 line #bc1 for 8,timaus0 read 8,timus40 #chb1 line #cb1 for 8as0 read 8but40 #cif1 #e1 for 80 read 840 #dbc1 #ce1 for 8principiu mindividuationis0 read 8principium individuationis40 #dbe1 #g1 no comma after 840 #dbi1 #be1 after 8chapter0 insert 8of his40 #dde1 last line1 for 80 read 840 #dec1 lines #d and #e1 for 80 read 840 #dee1 line #aj1 for 8prineipium0 read 8principium40 #dfc1 #bg1 for 8ever0 read 8every40 #dfg1 #e1 for 80 read 840 #dif1 #be1 for 8,wiedergeborennen0 read 8,wiedergeborenen40 #ebj1 #i1 for 8though this is hard to find out0 read 8which is certainly hard to explain40 #eca1 #af1 for 8wish to fruition0 read 8desire to aversion40 ,,footnotes #a ,this chapter is connected with the last half of #bg of the first volume4 #b ,de ,augm4 ,scient41 ,l4 vi4 c4 #c4 #c ,this chapter is connected with #bc of the first volume4 #d ,this chapter and the following one are connected with #bh of the first volume4 #e ,let me here remark in passing that1 judging from the ,german literature since ,kant1 one would necessarily believe that ,hume's whole wisdom had consisted in his obviously false scepticism with regard to the law of causality1 for this alone is everywhere referred to4 ,in order to know ,hume one must read his 8,natural ,history of ,religion0 and his 8,dialogues on ,natural ,religion40 ,there one sees him in his greatness1 and these1 together with ,essay #ba 8,of ,national ,characters10 are the writings on account of which--,i know of nothing that says more for his fame--even to the present day1 he is everywhere hated by the ,english clergy4 #f ,this chapter is connected with #bi of the first volume4 #g ,in the ,sicle1 #ajth ,april #ahei1 there appears1 very beautifully written1 the story of a squirrel that was magically drawn by a serpent into its very jaws3 8,un voyageur qui vient de parcourir plusieurs provinces de l'ile de ,java cite un exemple remarqueable du pouvoir facinateur des serpens4 ,le voyageur dont il est question commenait gravir ,junjind1 un des monts appels par les ,hollandais ,pepergebergte4 ,aprs avoir pntr dans une paisse fort1 il aperut sur les branches d'un kijatile un cureuil de ,java tte blanche1 foltrant avec la grce et l'agilit qui distinguent cette charmante espce de rongeurs4 ,un nid sphrique1 form de brins flexible et de mousse1 plac dans les parties les plus leves de l'arbre1 a l'enfourchure de deux branches1 et une cavit dans le tronc1 semblaient les points de mire de ses jeux4 ,a peine s'en taitil loign qu'il y revenait avec une ardeur extrme4 ,on tait dans le mois de ,juillet1 et probablement l'cureuil avait en haut ses petits1 et dans le bas le magasin fruits4 ,bientt il fut comme saisi d'effroi1 ces mouvemens devinrent dsordonns1 on eut dit qu'il cherchait toujours mettre un obstacle entre lui et certaines parties de l'arbre3 puis il se tapit et resta immobile entre deux branches4 ,le voyageur eut le sentiment d'un danger pour l'innocente bte1 mais il ne pouvait deviner lequel4 ,il approcha1 et un examen attentif lui fit dcouvrir dans un creux du tronc une couleuvre lieu1 dardant ses yeux fixes dans la direction de l'cureuil4 ,notre voyageur trembla pour le pauvre cureuil4 ,la couleuvre tait si attentive sa proie qu'elle ne semblait nullement remarquer la prsence d'un homme4 ,notre voyageur1 qui tait arm1 aurait donc prevenir en aide l'infortun rongeur en tuant le serpent4 ,mais la science l'emporta sur la piti1 et il voulut voir quelle issue aurait le drame4 ,le dnoment fut tragique4 ,l'cureuil ne tarda point pousser un cri plaintif qui1 pour tous ceux qui le connaissent1 dnote le voisinage d'un serpent4 ,il avana un peu1 essaya de reculer1 revint encore en avant1 tche de retourner en arrire4 ,mais s'approcha toujours plus du reptile4 ,la couleuvre1 roule en spirale1 la tte au dessus des anneaux1 et immobile comme un morceau de bois1 ne le quittait pas du regard4 ,l'cureuil1 de branche en branche1 et descendant toujours plus bas1 arriva jusqu' la partie nue du tronc4 ,alors le pauvre animal ne tenta mme plus de fuir le danger4 ,attir par une puissance invincible1 et comme pouss par le vertige1 il se prcipita dans la gueule du serpent1 qui s'ouvrit tout coup dmesurment pour le recevoir4 ,autant la couleuvre avait t inerte jusque l autant elle devint active ds qu'elle fut en possession de sa proie4 ,droulant ses anneaux et prenant sa course de bas en haut avec une agilit inconcevable1 sa reptation la porta en un clin d'il au sommet de l'arbre1 o elle alla sans doute digrer et dormir40 ,in this example we see what spirit animates nature1 for it reveals itself in it1 and how very true is the saying of ,aristotle quoted above 7p4 #ajf74 ,this story is not only important with regard to fascination1 but also as an argument for pessimism4 ,that an animal is surprised and attacked by another is bad2 still we can console ourselves for that2 but that such a poor innocent squirrel sitting beside its nest with its young is compelled1 step by step1 reluctantly1 battling with itself and lamenting1 to approach the wide1 open jaws of the serpent and consciously throw itself into them is revolting and atrocious4 ,what monstrous kind of nature is this to which we belong6 #h 8,augustini de civit4 ,dei10 ,l4 xi4 c4 #bg1 deserves to be compared as an interesting commentary on what is said here4 #i ,this chapter is connected with #cjcb of the first volume4 #aj ,this chapter is connected with #cccd of the first volume4 #aa ,this chapter is connected with #cf of the first volume4 #ab ,there is nothing else in the world but the vulgar4 #ac ,in ,medwin's 8,conversations of ,lord ,byron10 p4 #ccc4 #ad ,this chapter is connected with the second half of #cf of the first volume4 #ae ,rgya ,tcher ,rol ,pa1 ,hist4 de ,bouddha ,chakya ,mouni1 trad4 du ,tibtain1 p4 ,foucaux1 #ahdh1 p4 #ia et #ii4 #af ,in ,german inferiors are sometimes addressed as ,er instead of ,sie4--,trs4 #ag ,this chapter is connected with #ch of the first volume4 #ah ,this chapter is connected with #di of the first volume4 #ai ,this chapter is connected with #dc of the first volume4 #bj ,this chapter is connected with #ddej of the first volume4 #ba ,this chapter is connected with #ea of the first volume4 #bb ,lichtenberg 78,vermischte ,schriften10 new edition1 ,gttingen1 #ahhd1 vol4 iii4 p4 #ai7 quotes ,stanislaus ,leszczynski as having said1 8,la modestie devroit tre la vertu de ceux1 a qui les autres manquent40 #bc ,this chapter is connected with #ea of the first volume4 #bd ,let me remark in passing that from this opposition of and the origin1 and also the peculiar significance1 of the first word comes out with more than ordinary distinctness2 it signifies that which is made1 invented1 in opposition to what is discovered4 #be ,this chapter is connected with #eb of the first volume4 #bf ,it would be a false objection that sculpture and painting are also merely in space2 for their works are connected1 not directly1 but yet indirectly1 with time1 for they represent life1 movement1 action4 ,and it would be just as false to say that poetry1 as speech1 belongs to time alone3 this is also true only indirectly of the words2 its matter is all existent1 thus spatial4 #bg ,this chapter is connected with #ed of the first volume4 #bh ,in gladiatoriis pugnis timidos et supplices1 et1 ut vivere liceat1 obsecrantes etiam odisse solemus2 fortes et animosos1 et se acriter ipsos morti offerentes servare cupimus 7,cic4 pro ,milone1 c4 #cd74 #bi ,the suspension of the animal functions is sleep1 that of the organic functions is death4 #cj ,there is only one present1 and this is always3 for it is the sole form of actual existence4 ,one must attain to the insight that the past is not in itself different from the present1 but only in our apprehension1 which has time as its form1 on account of which alone the present exhibits itself as different from the past4 ,to assist this insight1 imagine all the events and scenes of human life1 bad and good1 fortunate and unfortunate1 pleasing and terrible1 as they successively present themselves in the course of time and difference of places1 in the most checkered multifariousness and variety1 as at once and together1 and always present in the ,nunc stans1 while it is only apparently that now this and now that is2 then what the objectification of the will to live really means will be understood4 ,our pleasure also in genre painting depends principally upon the fact that it fixes the fleeting scenes of life4 ,the dogma of metempsychosis has proceeded from the feeling of the truth which has just been expressed4 #ca ,this posthumous essay is to be found in the 8,essays on ,suicide and the ,immortality of the ,soul0 by the late ,david ,hume1 ,basil1 #agii1 sold by ,james ,decker4 ,by this reprint at ,ble these two works of one of the greatest thinkers and writers of ,england were rescued from destruction1 when in their own land1 in consequence of the stupid and utterly contemptible bigotry which prevailed1 they had been suppressed through the influence of a powerful and insolent priesthood1 to the lasting shame of ,england4 ,they are entirely passionless1 coldly rational investigations of the two subjects named4 #cb ,death says3 ,thou art the product of an act which should not have been2 therefore to expiate it thou must die4 #cc ,sancara1 s4 de theologumenis ,vedanticorum1 ed4 ,f4 ,h4 ,h4 ,windischmann1 p4 #cg2 8,oupnekhat10 vol4 i4 p4 #chg et p4 #gh2 ,colebrooke's 8,miscellaneous ,essays10 vol4 i4 p4 #cfc4 #cd ,the etymology of the word ,nirvana is variously given4 ,according to ,colebrooke 78,transact4 of the ,royal ,asiat4 ,soc410 vol4 i4 p4 #eff7 it comes from va1 8to blow10 like the wind1 and the prefixed negative nir1 and thus signifies a calm1 but as an adjective 8extinguished40 ,obry1 also1 ,du ,nirvana ,indien1 p4 #c1 says3 8,nirvanam en sanscrit signifie la lettre extinction1 telle que celle d'un feu40 ,according to the 8,asiatic ,journal10 vol4 xxiv4 p4 #gce1 the word is really ,neravana1 from nera1 8without10 and vana1 8life10 and the meaning would be annihilatio4 ,in 8,eastern ,monachism10 by ,spence ,hardy1 p4 #bie1 ,nirvana is derived from vana1 8sinful desires10 with the negative nir4 ,j4 ,j4 ,schmidt1 in his translation of the history of the ,eastern ,mongolians1 says that the ,sanscrit word ,nirvana is translated into ,mongolian by a phrase which signifies 8departed from misery10 8escaped from misery40 ,according to the learned lectures of the same in the ,st4 ,petersburg ,academy1 ,nirvana is the opposite of ,sanfara1 which is the world of constant rebirth1 of longings and desires1 of illusion of the senses and changing forms1 of being born1 growing old1 becoming sick1 and dying4 ,in the ,burmese language the word ,nirvana1 according to the analogy of other ,sanscrit words1 becomes transformed into ,nieban1 and is translated by 8complete vanishing40 ,see ,sangermano's 8,description of the ,burmese ,empire10 translated by ,tandy1 ,rome1 #ahcc1 #bg4 ,in the first edition of #ahai ,i also wrote ,nieban1 because we then knew ,buddhism only from meagre accounts of the ,burmese4 #ce 8,disputatio de corporum habitudine1 anim1 hujusque virium indice40 ,harderov41 #aghi1 #i4 #cf ,lichtenberg says in his miscellaneous writings 7,gttingen1 #ahja1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ddg73 8,in ,england it was proposed to castrate thieves4 ,the proposal is not bad3 the punishment is very severe2 it makes persons contemptible1 and yet leaves them still fit for trades2 and if stealing is hereditary1 in this way it is not propagated4 ,moreover1 the courage ceases1 and since the sexual passion so frequently leads to thefts1 this cause would also disappear4 ,the remark that women would so much the more eagerly restrain their husbands from stealing is roguish1 for as things are at present they risk losing them altogether40 #cg ,i have not ventured to express myself distinctly here3 the courteous reader must therefore translate the phrase into ,aristophanic language4 #ch ,the fuller discussion of this subject will be found in the 8,parerga10 vol4 ii4 #ib of the first edition 7second edition1 pp4 #afgagj74 #ci ,the appendix to this chapter was added only in the third edition of the ,german1 and is meant to explain1 in consistency with ,schopenhauer's general principles1 the wide prevalence of the practice of pederasty1 among different nations and in different ages4 ,it is omitted4--,trs4 #dj ,this chapter is connected with #fj of the first volume4 #da ,this chapter is connected with #efei of the first volume4 ,also chapters #aa and #ab of the second volume of the 8,parerga and ,paralipomena0 should be compared with it4 #db ,all that we lay hold of resists us because it has its own will1 which must be overcome4 #dc ,this chapter is connected with #ee1 #fb1 #fg of the first volume4 #dd ,this chapter is connected with #fh of the first volume4 ,chapter #ad of the second volume of the ,parerga should also be compared with it4 #de ,if1 on the contrary1 asceticism is admitted1 the list of the ultimate motives of human action1 given in my prize essay on the foundation of morals1 namely3 7#a7 our own good1 7#b7 the ill of others1 and 7#c7 the good of others1 must be supplemented by a fourth1 our own ill2 which ,i merely mention here in passing in the interests of systematic consistency4 ,in the essay referred to this fourth motive had to be passed over in silence1 for the question asked was stated in the spirit of the philosophical ethics prevailing in ,protestant ,europe4 #df ,cf4 ,f4 ,h4 ,h4 ,windischmann's ,sancara1 sive de theologumenis ,vedanticorum1 pp4 #aaf1 #aag1 #aba2 and also ,oupnekhat1 vol4 i4 pp4 #cdj1 #cef1 #cfj4 #dg ,cf4 ,die beiden ,grundprobleme der ,ethik1 p4 #bgd 7second edition1 p4 #bga74 #dh ,if we keep in view the essential immanence of our knowledge and of all knowledge1 which arises from the fact that it is a secondary thing which has only appeared for the ends of the will1 it then becomes explicable to us that all mystics of all religions ultimately attain to a kind of ecstasy1 in which all and every knowledge1 with its whole fundamental form1 object and subject1 entirely ceases1 and only in this sphere1 which lies beyond all knowledge1 do they claim to have reached their highest goal1 for they have then attained to the sphere in which there is no longer any subject and object1 and consequently no more knowledge1 just because there is no more will1 the service of which is the sole destiny of knowledge4 ,now1 whoever has comprehended this will no longer regard it as beyond all measure extravagant that ,fakirs should sit down1 and1 contemplating the tip of their nose1 seek to banish all thought and perception1 and that in many passages of the ,upanischads instructions are given to sink oneself1 silently and inwardly pronouncing the mysterious ,oum1 in the depths of one's own being1 where subject and object and all knowledge disappear4 #di ,s4 ,bonaventur vita ,s4 ,francisci1 ch4 #h4 ,k4 ,hase1 8,franz von ,assisi10 ch4 #aj4 8,i cantici di ,s4 ,francesco10 editi da ,schlosser e ,steinle41 ,francoforto1 s4,m41 #ahdb4 #ej ,michlis de ,molinos manuductio spiritualis2 hispanice #afge1 italice #afhj1 latine #afhg1 gallice in libro non adeo raro1 cui titulus3 ,recueil de diverses pices concernant le quitisme1 ou ,molinos et ses disciples4 ,amstd41 #afhh4 #ea ,matt4 xix4 #aa seq42 ,luke xx4 7#a ,thess4 iv4 #c2 #a ,john iii4 #c72 ,rev4 #cecg2 #a ,cor4 vii4 #aaa and #bedj1 xiv4 #d4 #eb ,cf4 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 second edition1 p4 #abd2 third edition1 p4 #ace4 #ec ,for example1 ,john xii4 #be1 #ca1 xiv4 #cj1 xv4 #ah1 #ai1 xvi4 #cc2 ,col4 ii4 #bj2 ,eph4 ii4 #ac2 ,i ,john ii4 #aeag1 iv4 #d1 #e4 ,on this opportunity one may see how certain ,protestant theologians1 in their efforts to misinterpret the text of the ,new ,testament in conformity with their rationalistic1 optimistic1 and unutterably shallow view of life1 go so far that they actually falsify this text in their translations4 ,thus ,h4 ,a4 ,schott1 in his new version given with the ,griesbach text of #ahje1 has translated the word 1 ,john xv4 #ah1 #ai1 by ,judi1 #a ,john iv4 #d1 by profani homines2 and ,col4 ii4 #bj1 by elementa ,judaica2 while ,luther everywhere renders the word honestly and correctly by 8,welt0 7world74 #ed ,unusquisque tantum juris habet1 quantum potenti valet 7,tract4 pol41 c4 #b #h74 ,fides alicui data tamdiu rata manet1 quamdiu ejus1 qui fidem dedit1 non mutatur voluntas 7,ibid41 #ab74 ,uniuscujusque jus potenti ejus definetur 7,eth4 iv41 pr4 #cg1 schol4 #a47 ,especially chap4 #af of the ,tractatus theologico politicus is the true compendium of the immorality of ,spinoza's philosophy4 #ee ,in preparing this ,index ,frauenstdt's ,schopenhauer,lexikon has been freely used4--,trs4