,,the ,,connexion ,,between ,,taste ,,and ,,morals3 ,,two ,,lectures ,,by ,,mark ,,hopkins1 ,d4 ,d4 ,,president ,,of ,,williams ,,college4 ,boston3 ,,published ,,by ,,dutton ,,and ,,wentworth4 #ahda4 ,,lecture ,i4 ,is the prevalence of a cultivated taste1 favorable to morals8 ,is there a connexion1 either in individuals1 or in communities1 between good taste and good morals8 ,when ,i began to reflect upon this point with reference to a public discussion of it1 ,i put the above questions to three educated men1 as ,i happened to meet them4 ,the first said1 he had not thought of it1 but that1 at the first view1 he did not believe there was any such connexion2 the second said he should wish to see it proved before he would believe it2 and the third said1 he thought there was such a connexion4 ,this difference of opinion among educated men1 led me to think that an investigation of the subject might be a matter of interest1 and perhaps of profit4 ,as every thing1 in this country1 depends upon a sound state of morals in the community1 whatever bears upon that1 deserves our most careful scrutiny4 ,to discuss this subject understandingly1 we must know precisely what we are talking about4 ,what then is taste8 ,this term is sometimes used to express mere desire1 as a taste for dress1 or for low pleasures4 ,it can hardly be necessary to say that that is not the meaning now attached to it4 ,taste is defined by ,alison1 to be1 ,that faculty of the human mind by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature or of art4 ,according to this definition1 which is sufficiently correct for our present purpose1 it will be perceived that there is1 first1 a perception of certain qualities in external objects1 and then1 according to the nature of the object1 an emotion of beauty1 or of sublimity in the mind4 ,these emotions are1 of course1 incapable of definition except by stating the occasions on which they arise1 and can be known only by being felt4 ,to talk of an emotion to those who have not felt it1 is like talking of colors to the blind4 ,and here ,i may remark1 that these terms1 beauty and sublimity1 have1 in common with those denoting sensations1 an ambiguity which has often produced confusion4 ,as the term heat is used to denote both the sensation we feel on approaching the fire1 and that quality in the fire which produces the sensation1 so beauty and sublimity are sometimes used to express the emotions in the mind1 and sometimes those qualities in external objects which are fitted to produce them1 though there is1 of course1 in the external object1 no emotion1 nor any thing resembling one4 ,if this account of taste be correct1 it will be perceived that it cannot1 with any propriety1 be compared1 as it often has been1 to a bodily sense4 ,the impression upon a bodily sense1 necessarily follows the presence of the object1 and is uniform in all mankind4 ,a tree clothed in fresh foliage is necessarily seen1 and seen to be green by all who turn their eyes upon it4 ,the same tree1 when seen1 may be pronounced by one individual to be beautiful1 by another1 from some peculiar association1 to be the reverse1 and by a third1 however beautiful in itself1 it may be looked upon without any emotion at all4 ,it is1 therefore1 a great mistake to suppose1 as many do1 that those qualities in objects which awaken the emotions of taste1 act directly and necessarily upon us1 like those which affect the senses4 ,a second preliminary inquiry is1 ,what are the causes which produce these emotions8 ,and here ,i barely remark1 without inquiring after any common principle by which they produce similar results1 that these causes differ widely from each other4 ,the emotions may be awakened by natural objects1 by sound1 by the products of the imagination1 by the combinations of the intellect1 and by certain manifestations of the affections and moral character4 ,a third inquiry is1 how the taste can be cultivated8 ,this obviously can be done only on two conditions4 ,the first is1 that we put ourselves in situations adapted to produce the emotions of taste2 and the second is1 that we preserve a state of mind that will permit those emotions to arise4 ,this last1 a proper state of mind1 though less often considered1 is quite as important as the first4 ,it is1 says the poet1 ,the soul that sees2 the outward eyes ,present the object1 but the mind descries1 ,and thence delight1 disgust1 or cool indifference rise4 ,upon him whose mind is engrossed by care1 or ruffled by passion1 the most beautiful objects make no impression4 ,to perceive and enjoy them1 the mind must be calm4 ,the beauties and sublimities of nature are like the stars1 which the storm shuts out1 but when the heavens are serene1 they come out1 one after another1 to the eye that is watching for them1 till the firmament glows with their light4 ,he1 therefore1 and he only1 who1 in a proper state of mind1 will place himself in the presence of beautiful or sublime objects1 and will compare the effects produced under different circumstances1 will improve his taste1 both in its susceptibility to emotion1 and in its power of discrimination4 ,the question then1 which we are now prepared to discuss1 is1 whether such a cultivation and improvement of the taste1 has a favorable effect upon the moral character8 ,that it has such an effect1 ,i infer1 first1 because we find in the emotions of taste1 to say the least1 an innocent source of enjoyment for our leisure hours1 and the mind that is innocently happy1 is less accessible to temptation4 ,indolence1 mere vacuity1 we all know1 is the porch of vice1 and the great dangers to the young arise from their leisure hours--from the want of some means of innocent mental exhilaration1 in which they can be induced to spend those hours4 ,it was said by ,franklin1 that leisure was a time in which to do something useful2 but all are not ,franklins4 ,if leisure time can be1 as it is by many1 usefully employed1 so much the better2 but he who should provide for our youth the means and the inducements to spend their leisure time innocently1 would be a public benefactor4 ,in our cities1 where the temptations to mere sensual gratification are so numerous and obtrusive1 and where natural objects are very much excluded1 this is a point of great importance1 and of great difficulty4 ,until of late very little of this kind has been attempted1 unless theatres may be called an attempt4 ,but theatres with us are out of the question1 for ,miss ,martineau says that the ,americans have very little dramatic taste2 and that the spirit of puritanism still rises up in such fierce opposition to the stage1 as to forbid the hope that this grand means of intellectual exercise will ever be made the instrument of moral good to society there1 that it might be made4 ,she says1 moreover1 so hopeless is our case1 that those who respect dramatic entertainments the most highly1 will be the most anxious that the ,american theatres should be closed4 ,theatres are indeed out of the question1 and ,i trust it will be a long time before we shall make progress backwards1 to that state of morals which is produced by the instructions even of an ,english theatre4 ,it is in view of the want now under consideration1 that the establishment of ,associations for literary purposes1 and for procuring popular lectures open to all1 is not only a new1 but a most promising feature in the history of our cities4 ,man needs1 and must have1 excitement and mental exhilaration1 and our ,creator1 if we would but see it1 has not been inattentive to this want of our frame4 ,no2 to supply it1 we have the pleasures of rational social converse1 the play of the affections1 the duties of kindness and benevolence--does a man feel depressed1 let him do a good action--and last1 but not least1 the gratifications of taste3 all the pleasure to be derived from the concord of sweet sounds1 from the charms of literature1 from the forms and colors and groupings of nature1 from her sunrisings and sunsettings1 from her landscapes of mountain and valley and lake and river1 from the stars that roll in their courses1 and the flowers that nod to each other by the way-side4--,these are the sources of mental exhilaration which ,god has provided2 and they are1 to the artificial stimulants of theatrical exhibitions and of gambling1 what the cold water that was drank in ,eden is to brandy and gin4 ,may ,i not here venture to say to young men1 ',beware how you spend your leisure hours6 your character and destiny in life will probably turn upon it4' ,among the means1 as ,i have already said1 of spending these hours at least innocently1 the gratifications of taste are conspicuous4 ,they seem for this very purpose to have been had distinctly in view in the fitting up of this world2 and so far as they lure the mind from the lower gratifications of sense1 they must be favorable to morals4 ,the remarks now made respect taste chiefly as a guard against evil2 but ,i cannot dismiss this head without noticing more fully its positive influence1 as a source of innocent enjoyment1 upon morals4 ,a good taste1 and ,i do not hold myself answerable for its perversions1 involves a ready susceptibility to the emotions of beauty and sublimity1 and of course a readiness to receive pleasure from the common appearances of nature1 and from every free and natural expression of good feeling4 ,it is1 in my view1 of the first importance both to character and to happiness1 that the young should cultivate a relish for those simple and natural pleasures1 the sources of which are open to all4 ,it is important to happiness4 ,how much happiness does the young florist secure1 who can look upon the common violet as it opens its eye from under the snows of the early spring1 with much the same pleasure as upon the choice exotic which is resorted to and exclusively admired by those who have unfortunately been taught that it is vulgar to admire what is common6 ,how much happiness does he secure who is touched by a beautiful action wherever he sees it1 who appreciates sympathy wherever he finds it1 and however expressed6 ,a mind rightly constituted in this respect1 drinks in enjoyment from the objects and occurrences of daily life1 as the eye does light4 ,it is also essential to character4 ,how many young men enter life with a false estimate of the advantages which wealth and fashion can confer2 who find their happiness1 not in the contemplation and pursuit of appropriate objects1 but in what others think of them1 and to whom the world becomes insipid unless they make a figure in it6 ,let now misfortune come upon such men1 and the world fails them4 ,their world is gone2 they have no resource2 they become1 generally dishonest1 sometimes inefficient and gloomy1 and commit suicide4 ,these persons come to consider the common and truly great blessings which ,god has given as nothing unless they may possess those artificial and egotistical enjoyments which arise from conventional society4 ,they see not the splendid ornaments and rich provisions which1 to adopt1 with a slight accommodation1 the beautiful language of another1 are gathered round the earth for them2--its ocean of air above1 its ocean of water beneath1 its zodiac of lights1 its tent of dropping clouds1 its striped coat of climates1 its fourfold year4 ,it is nothing to them1 if they have not man for their servant1 that all the parts of nature incessantly work into each other's hands for their profit2 that the wind sows the seed1 the sun evaporates the sea1 the wind blows the vapor to the field1 the ice on the other side of the planet condenses the rain on this1 and thus the endless circulations of the divine charity nourish man4 ,what a change when such a person is brought back to a true relish of the simple pleasures of nature6 ,even sickness1 depriving him for a time of what he had undervalued1 if it bring him back to this1 is a blessing2 and then the result may be stated in the words of ,gray3-- ,see the wretch who long has tost ,on the thorny bed of pain1 ,at length regain his vigor lost1 ,and breathe and walk again4 ,then1 ,the meanest flow'ret of the vale1 ,the simplest note that swells the gale1 ,the common sun1 the air1 the skies1 ,to him are opening paradise6 ,then1 though he may hold little property by that title which the law gives1 he yet feels that the universe is his for those nobler purposes for which it was intended to act on the spirit3 ,his are the mountains1 and the valleys his1 ,and the resplendent rivers2 and he looks back upon his former discontent as the petulance of a child4 ,the simple beauties and the glad voices of nature have made him a man again4 ,but again1 ,i infer that there is a connexion between good taste and good morals1 because there is an analogy between those qualities in matter which excite the emotions of taste1 and those relations on which morals depend4 ,so much is this the case1 that some philosophers found morality upon a theory of the beautiful1 considering it a sublime harmony4 ,in all beautiful objects in nature1 or in art1 there is an order1 a propriety1 a fitness1 a proportion2 and the impression which these make upon us is so analogous to that which is made by virtuous conduct1 that we use the same terms to express both4 ,to me1 indeed1 it seems that beauty in matter is to moral beauty what instinct is to reason1 or what the light of the moon is to that of the sun2 containing some of the same elements1 but destitute of the highest4 ,hence1 as we should naturally expect1 morals furnish that region in the province of taste in which she gathers those flowers that are richest in beauty and sweetest in perfume4 ,is aught so fair1 ,in all the dewy landscape of the spring1 ,in the bright eye of ,hesper1 or the morn1 ,in nature's fairest forms1 is aught so fair ,as virtuous friendship8 ,but ,i observe again1 that as there is the analogy just pointed out between their causes1 so there is an affinity between the emotions themselves of taste and correct moral feeling1 and the transition from one to the other is obvious4 ,this point requires illustration4 ,that our emotions are associated in groups1 is practically known to every body4 ,even the child does not ask his father for a sixpence when he is in an ill temper1 because he knows the transition is not easy from ill temper to generosity4 ,deep grief cannot pass at once to sudden joy4 ,it must be by a gradual transition1 first to a tender melancholy1 and then to cheerfulness1 and then to joy4 ,the garment of sorrow1 as ,coleridge expresses it1 must be drawn off so gradually1 and that to be put in its stead so gradually slipt on and feel so like the former1 that the sufferer shall be sensible of the change only by the refreshment4 ,it is by understanding well these affinities of the feelings that the orator can continue to control them as they pass over their widest range4 ,the necessity of a suitable state of mind in order that the emotions of taste may arise1 has already been noticed1 and what ,i now observe is1 that a state of correct moral feeling is more favorable to these emotions than any other4 ,there is between them such an affinity that they readily associate with each other2 while there is1 between the emotions of taste and a vicious state of mind1 no such affinity1 but they are to a great extent incompatible4 ,the external world often gives back to us but the image of our own thoughts1 and hence may seem almost as variable as the dim forms of twilight to which the imagination gives its own shape4 ,this tendency of the mind to cast its own hue over nature1 or rather to receive different emotions from external objects1 according to its own state1 is well illustrated by ,crabbe1 in his tale called ,the ,lover's ,journey4 ,in this tale1 ,orlando1 the lover1 starts on a pleasant morning with the expectation of finding the object of his affections at a village1 where she had agreed to meet him4 ,the first part of his journey lay across a heath covered with furze4 ,but hear him3-- ,men may say ,a heath is barren2 nothing is so gay2 ,barren or bare to call this charming scene ,argues a mind possessed by care or spleen4 ,and thus he went on1 admiring the wholesome wormwood and the vigorous brier1 till he reached the village1 and then disappointment came4 ,the lady had gone to a village some miles further on1 under circumstances that vexed him1 and led him to doubt her affection4 ,he doubted even whether he should proceed1 but at length determined to see and upbraid her4 ,now hear him again1 as he passes along by the side of a beautiful river3-- ,i hate these scenes1 ,orlando angry cried2 ,and these proud farmers1 yes1 ,i hate their pride2 ,see that sleek fellow1 how he stalks along1 ,strong as an ox1 and ignorant as strong4 ,these deep1 fat meadows ,i detest2 it shocks ,one's feelings there to see the grazing ox2-- ,for slaughter fatted--as a lady's smile ,rejoices man1 and means his death the while4 ,and if mere disappointment1 without a consciousness of guilt and remorse1 could produce such effects1 what must we expect when the mind is not at peace with itself8 ,tendencies are shown by extreme cases1 and it is in perfect consistency with the nature of things that ,milton makes ,satan exclaim1 on seeing ,eden in its united innocence and beauty1 ,o hell6 what do mine eyes with grief behold6 ,who can imagine a miser1 even1 to say nothing of a thief1 or a drunkard1 lifting his eyes from his buried heaps1 and enjoying the scene before him1 however beautiful8 ,while he who performs a deed of charity at the end of his walk1 will find nature wearing a richer dress on his return4 ,the mind conscious of rectitude is at peace with itself1 and is in that calm state which permits it to enjoy whatever is pleasing4 ,but not only1 as in the cases now mentioned1 is a right state of moral feeling favorable to taste1 but the emotions of taste also tend to introduce moral ideas and emotions4 ,it is1 as ,i conceive1 chiefly from this fact that nature has a tendency to lead the mind up to nature's ,god2 for we must all be conscious that when we view nature as beautiful or sublime1 this tendency is strongest4 ,no one can have stood by ,niagara1 or upon the ,white ,mountains1 without feeling this4 ,hence the groves and the high hills were the first places of worship4 ,hence the ,indian sacrifices to the ,great ,spirit when he passes through the wild rapids4 ,and as we associate the beauties of nature with the wisdom and goodness of ,god1 so do we1 in many cases1 instinctively infer from the displays of taste in man1 something of his moral character4 ,who1 for example1 in travelling through a solitary forest1 if he should come1 as there are many such1 to a neat log-house1 with a trellised woodbine at the door1 and with every thing orderly and clean about it1 would not expect to pass by unmolested1 or1 if he should call1 to be civilly and kindly treated8--whereas1 if every thing bore the appearance of filth and dilapidation1 and the only signs of taste were those which indicated a taste for rum1 he might well quicken his pace for fear he should be waylaid4 ,no one expects to find indications of taste about the dwelling of a drunkard1 or of one abandoned to any low vice4 ,i appeal to any one who hears me1 whether he has not felt that it was an indication of a good moral character1 and an encouragement to charity1 when he has entered some poor dwelling and found that there was still kept alive1 in the midst of poverty1 a susceptibility to the emotions1 and a regard to the requisitions of taste4 ,i have just observed1 that there is an affinity between correct moral feeling and the emotions of taste4 ,i now observe1 that the highest pleasures of taste cannot be enjoyed without correct views on great moral subjects1 and especially respecting the being and attributes of ,god4 ,whatever may be said of the power of material objects1 in themselves considered1 to produce the emotions of taste1 it is certain that their chief power depends on the conceptions of the mind which they awaken as signs4 ,a single instance will illustrate this4 ,most of us have probably felt the emotion of sublimity on hearing what we supposed to be distant thunder1 which vanished1 and perhaps seemed ridiculous1 the moment we ascertained that the sound was produced by the rumbling of a cart4 ,in this case1 it is obvious that the emotion depended1 not on the sound itself1 but on the conception of the mind awakened by it4 ,now this is pre-eminently the case in the works of nature4 ,how different must be the emotions awakened by a view of the evening firmament in the mind of him who should suppose the stars to be mere points of light1 set at no great distance above him1 and moving around the earth solely for the convenience of man1 from those awakened in the mind of him to whom those points of light indicate the existence of an infinite space2 and of suns1 and worlds1 and systems without number1 and at distances which cause the wing of the strongest imagination to flag6 ,how different the emotions produced by the comet now1 as it returns at its predicted period1 from those excited as it fired the length of ,ophiucus huge ,in the ,arctic sky1 and1 from his horrid hair1 was supposed to shake pestilence and war6 ,as1 therefore1 he who cannot see beyond the stars as they appear to the sense1 must lose by far the highest pleasure which they are adapted as objects of taste to give2 so he who knows the physical structure of the universe1 and who yet does not see in it1 and behind it1 an infinite and beneficent ,intelligence1 cannot have connected with his view those conceptions which awaken the highest emotions of beauty and sublimity4 ,the relations of man to nature are much less intimate than those of ,god1 and yet our emotions in view of nature are greatly modified by the view which we take of ,his dignity and moral character4 ,it was when ,hamlet supposed there was foul corruption and a general want of principle in society1 that this goodly frame1 the earth1 seemed to him but a steril promontory2 this most excellent canopy1 the air1 look you1 this brave o'erhanging firmament1 why1 it appeared no other thing to him than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors4 ,it was when her inhabitants were oppressed and degraded1 that the natural beauty1 which is still as bright as ever on the shores of ,greece1 seemed in the eye of the poet but as ,the loveliness in death ,that parts not quite with parting breath1 ,but beauty with that fearful bloom1 ,that hue which haunts it to the tomb1 ,so coldly sweet1 so deadly fair1 ,we start1 for life is wanting there4 ',twas ,greece1 but living ,greece no more4 ,we must all have felt that a shade of sadness was cast over the face of nature when we have thought of the passions1 and wars1 and lust1 and rapine of man1 in connexion with her quiet scenes4 ,on the other hand1 were the moral state of the world what we trust it shall one day be1--did universal purity1 and goodness1 and love reign1--would not the sun seem to shine with a more benignant radiance2 instead of the thorn1 would there not come up the fir-tree3 would not the mountains and hills break forth into singing1 and all the trees of the field clap their hands8 ,and if the emotions of taste are thus modified by our views of man1 how much more must they be by those respecting ,god6 ,how must a blank atheism hang the heavens in sackcloth1 and cover the earth with a pall1 and turn the mute promisings of nature into a mockery1 and make of her mighty fabric one great charnel-house of death1 without the hope of a resurrection6 ,on the other hand1 how must the beauty and sublimity of nature and of the universe be heightened1 the moment we perceive them in their connexion with ,god6 ,nothing is more common than to hear those1 who emerge from that practical atheism in which most men live1 speak of the new perceptions of beauty and sublimity with which they look upon the works of nature3-- ,in that blest moment1 ,nature1 throwing wide ,her veil opaque1 discloses1 with a smile1 ,the ,author of her beauties1 who1 retired ,behind his own creation1 works unseen ,by the impure1 and hears his power denied4 ,all our investigations into nature show that man has no faculties to which there are not corresponding and adequate objects4 ,as infinite as he is in reason1 yet the works of ,god are not exhausted by the operations of that reason4 ,no intellectual ,alexander ever sat down and wept for the want of more worlds to conquer4 ,as vast as is his imagination1 the revelations of astronomy1 as sober facts1 go beyond any thing that the imagination had conceived4 ,and is it so1 that1 in the region of taste alone1 the faculties of man have no adequate object8 ,but it is only when nature1 like the ,bible1 is seen to be full of ,god1 that she is clothed with her true sublimity4 ,it is only when the heavens declare the glory of ,god and the firmament showeth his handy work1 that they correspond to the highest conceptions either of the taste or of the intellect4 ,man rests in the ,infinite alone1 and the universe without a ,god is not in harmony with his constitution1 even when he is considered as endowed with taste only4 ,but if our views on moral subjects thus modify the emotions of taste1 it cannot be doubted that those emotions react upon our moral views1 tending to elevate and purify them4 ,i remark again1 that the emotions of taste are favorable to morals1 because they are disinterested4 ,as admiration becomes intense1 men forget themselves1 and1 in proportion as they thus find enjoyment1 they are prepared for that higher enjoyment which a disinterested performance of duty brings with it4 ,whenever we see excellence in another1 we are bound to admire it without reference to sect or party2 and admiration1 thus bestowed1 is almost always connected with a high moral character4 ,the beauty who can truly forget herself in her admiration for another1 deserves admiration for qualities far higher and nobler than beauty4 ,i only observe further1 that a cultivated taste is favorable to morals1 because the cultivation of one of our powers has a tendency to strengthen the rest4--,this1 ,i know1 is disputed1 and it is even supposed that the union of certain powers in any high degree is impossible4 ,thus1 it is often supposed that a remarkable memory and a sound judgment do not go together2 and it must be confessed that the memory may be so cultivated as not to strengthen the judgment4 ,but when ,i speak of cultivating a faculty1 ,i mean cultivating it on correct principles and with reference to the end for which it was given4 ,those who remember events as isolated1 or only as they are connected by the relations of time and place1 and who do not see and remember them as connected by the relations of cause and effect1 means and end1 premises and conclusion1 do not1 by such an exercise of the memory1 strengthen the judgment1 though they certainly show that it has great need of being strengthened4 ,of what possible use can it be1 to the forming of a correct judgment on any point1 for a good woman to remember the precise age of every child in the neighborhood8 ,it is these walking chronicles1 these living almanacs1 who will tell you the weather for all time past1 if not for all time to come1 who get the credit of having great memories and little judgment4 ,but such a memory is1 to one cultivated on correct principles1 only what a room full of minerals and birds and fish and insects and rubbish1 promiscuously tumbled together1 is to a well-arranged museum4 ,who does not know that experience is the best enlightener of the judgment8--,and where does experience garner her stores but in the memory8 ,it is obvious that he who has the best memory of past events1 in their true connexions1 will have the best possible materials for forming a judgment of the future4 ,the same opposition is generally supposed to exist between the imagination and the judgment4 ,but it occasionally happens that an individual1 like ,edmund ,burke1 unites the most gorgeous imagination with the profoundest judgment2 and then it is seen that the analogies which the imagination suggests yield important lights to the judgment instead of misleading it4 ,i know that the imagination1 striking its roots into the hotbed of novel-reading1 may overtop the judgment2 but1 judiciously cultivated1 ,i contend that it is not unfavorable to the judgment4 ,and if1 in these cases1 a judicious cultivation of one power tends to strengthen the other1 much more will the cultivation of taste have a favorable tendency upon the moral nature1 since these departments of the mind have never been supposed to be in opposition1 but are1 as we have seen1 closely allied to each other4 ,but all this time it has probably been objected that1 however plausible the reasoning may be on this subject1 it is yet contrary to experience4 ,if it were so1 it might perhaps be said of it1 as was said by ,euler of a demonstrated property of the arch1 this is contrary to all experience1 but is nevertheless true3--it is so in the nature of things1 but the materials are refractory4 ,but let us see how far it is contrary to experience2 or rather1 whether we cannot1 so far as it is thus contrary1 satisfactorily account for it4 ,in order to this1 we must make1 as it seems to me1 three important distinctions4 ,and1 first1 we must distinguish between taste considered as a power of judging1 and as a susceptibility to emotion4 ,this distinction is often overlooked4 ,mr4 ,blair1 for instance1 defines taste to be1 the power of receiving pleasure or pain from the beauties or deformities of nature and of art2 in which1 regard is had to the susceptibility only4 ,but afterwards1 when contrasting taste with genius1 he says--,taste is the power of judging1 genius is the power of executing2 in which the susceptibility to emotion is left out of sight4 ,can ,i make this distinction obvious8 ,when an unpractised person sees for the first time a grand historical picture1 or reads a beautiful poem1 he gives himself up to the emotion2 he is absorbed2 he takes no note of time2 he forgets where he is1 and neither knows nor cares why he is pleased4 ,the eye drinks in beauty as the thirsty man the cold water1 and it refreshes the soul4 ,he sees the picture1 or reads the poem1 again and again1 and at length sits down to give an account to a friend of that which had pleased him4 ,now1 he wishes to state the reasons why he was pleased1 and he begins to inquire what those qualities were which produced the effect4 ,here is the rudiment of philosophical criticism1 and he goes on perhaps investigating1 till he discovers those general principles of taste according to which the work was executed4 ,as long1 however1 as his mind is thus occupied in analyzing1 he feels no emotion of beauty or sublimity4 ,but as this is an enticing species of logic1 he may follow it till a work of art shall give him pleasure only by its conformity to certain principles1 true or false1 which he may have established for himself1 and till he becomes a cold critic1 or perhaps a reviewer by trade4 ,he may become a mere teller in the bank of taste1 to pronounce on what is genuine1 and hand it over to others to be used and enjoyed4 ,now1 a man who writes a skilful review of a work of genius1 and tells us why we are or ought to be pleased1 is supposed to be a man of taste2 and the writing of the review is considered as an exercise of taste4 ,this is true of taste considered as a power of judging1 but not as a power of feeling4 ,if it were so1 the mass of men would be in a pitiable condition4 ,god no more intended that the uninitiated should wait to be pleased with the beauty which they see1 until its principles are analyzed1 and they are told when and why they ought to be pleased1 than ,he intended they should wait to be cheered and warmed by the rays of the sun1 till they should see light decomposed into the seven colors of the prismatic image4 ,but it is by cherishing and keeping alive these universal emotions1 which belong to the race1 and which find excitement everywhere1 that ,i suppose there is a healthful effect produced on the moral character4 ,the power of genuine philosophical criticism2 the power of going back1 if ,i may so express it1 into the workshop of nature1 and seeing how she mixes her colors1 is a rare1 a valuable and a dignified power2 but it is still an exercise of the intellect1 and ,i am not aware that it has any peculiarly favorable effect upon the moral character4 ,indeed1 when literature and the fine arts become fashionable1 and much the subject of conversation1 there is a vast deal of this kind of criticism1 which is fallen into from imitation and vanity1 and which can have no good effect upon morals except as it supplies the place of scandal4 ,it is not1 then1 in an egotistical and vain community1 who read works of genius1 and look at pictures1 not to admire and enjoy them1 but that they may themselves talk about them and be admired1 that any good effect upon the moral character is to be expected from the prevalence of what they are pleased to call taste4 ,how far this comes to be the case with communities in which taste is said to be prevalent1 and morals are corrupt1 ,i leave others to judge4 ,the second distinction which ,i would make1 is that between the cultivation of a taste for the fine arts and for natural objects4 ,this ,i consider a distinction of much importance on this subject2 and ,i propose to give some reasons why the cultivation of the fine arts--as painting1 sculpture1 architecture1 poetry--has less tendency than a taste for natural objects to improve the character4 ,this ,i am bound to do2 because it is well known that certain nations1 as the ,spartans and ancient ,romans1 considered a taste for the fine arts as having a tendency to corrupt morals2 and some of the sterner moralists of modern times1 especially religious moralists1 have objected to it on the same ground4 ,it must also be conceded that those nations1 as the ,greeks and ,italians1 among whom these arts have flourished most1 have been exceedingly corrupt1 and that that corruption has co-existed with an advanced state of the arts in question4 ,and1 first1 ,i remark1 that a taste for the fine arts cannot be general in a community of any considerable extent4 ,if we suppose such a taste1 when formed1 to have a tendency to improve the morals1 yet how few1 in a country like ours1 have an opportunity to form it6 ,the products of the arts are to be found1 for the most part1 only in cities2 and of the inhabitants of cities1 it is only those who have leisure and wealth1 who are affected by them4 ,it ought also to be observed that1 as these arts do not come to perfection in the early stages of society1 they cannot produce their effect till wealth and luxury have had time to work general corruption4 ,but ,i observe again that1 as the power either of executing or of judging in these arts is confined to comparatively a few1 it becomes a mark of distinction and a ground of ostentation1 and thus there comes to be the appearance of more taste than there really is4 ,the artist finds himself a candidate for fame and wealth through his skill1 and hence his passions are aroused and his interests are involved4 ,if successful1 he is flattered1 perhaps almost deified2 if unsuccessful1 he becomes irritable and sinks back on the proud consciousness of neglected merit4 ,this peculiar position will account for the bad character of many artists4 ,those also who patronize the arts1 as it is significantly termed1 often do it from ostentation4 ,what better resource has an ordinary person who has money1 and who wishes to be distinguished in the fashionable world1 than to become a patron of the fine arts8 ,i knew a person who spent several thousand dollars for pictures1 and who1 to my certain knowledge1 knew and cared nothing about them except as they affected her standing in the fashionable world4 ,but of those who have a good degree of taste1 there are few whose motives are not mixed4 ,and then it is to be remembered1 that a product of art may be viewed in many different aspects4 ,it may be regarded as costing so much1 as requiring such a frame1 or to be placed in such a light1 or as an ornamental piece of furniture1 while there is but a single point of view in which it can be regarded as gratifying taste4 ,the moment a picture comes to be considered as an ornament1 or an article of furniture1 you might as well have a looking-glass or a pier-table4 ,it not unfrequently happens1 that the owner of fine pictures thinks so much of them as ornamental or valuable1 so much of their framing1 or light1 or preservation1 that he becomes indifferent to them in the only point of view in which they are truly valuable4 ,but again1 in order to see this point in its true light we must consider the peculiar rank which is held by the pleasures connected with the fine arts4 ,these pleasures are addressed to the eye and to the ear1 and hold a middle rank between the lower pleasures of sense on the one hand1 and the higher enjoyments of the intellect and of the affections on the other2 and may readily associate with1 and promote either4 ,this point is well stated by ,lord ,kames4 ,it is observed by him1 that in touching1 tasting1 and smelling1 we are sensible of the impression made upon the organ1 and are led to place there the pleasant or painful feeling caused by that impression2 but that with respect to hearing and seeing1 we are insensible to the organic impression1 and hence conceive the pleasures derived from these senses to be more refined and spiritual than those which seem to exist externally at the organ of sense1 and which are conceived to be merely corporeal4 ,these pleasures1 says he1 being sweet and moderately exhilarating1 are1 in their tone1 equally distant from the turbulence of passion and the languor of indolence1 and by that tone are perfectly well qualified not only to revive the spirits when sunk by sensual gratification1 but also to relax them when overstrained in any violent pursuit4 ,organic pleasures1 he observes again1 have naturally a short duration2 when prolonged1 they lose their relish2 when indulged to excess1 they beget satiety and disgust2 and to restore a proper tone of mind1 nothing can be more happily contrived than the exhilarating pleasures of the eye and ear4 ,now this is precisely the use1 and all the use that many make of the fine arts1 and ,i may add1 to some extent of the beauties of nature too4 ,how many wealthy sensualists are there in our cities who give an appearance of elevation and refinement to their low and selfish mode of life1 by collecting about them specimens of the arts6 ,these men may be best compared to that amphibious animal1 the frog4 ,they come up occasionally from that lower element in which they live1 into a region of light and beauty1 but no sooner are they a little refreshed than they plunge again into the mud of sensual gratification4 ,it is men like these1 who1 when their capacity for the lower pleasures is exhausted1 drive in their carriages about the cities of the old world 7perhaps we are not yet sufficiently corrupt17 and set up to be virtuosi4 ,it is easy to see how such a taste must bear upon morals4 ,but ,i remark once more1 that the fine arts may be made to pander directly to vice4 ,from the middle rank which the pleasures derived from them hold1 they readily associate1 as has been said1 both with the higher and the lower4 ,thus1 music may quicken the devotions of a seraph1 and lend its strains to cheer the carousals of the bacchanal2 and poetry1 painting and sculpture1 while they have power to elevate1 and charm1 and purify the mind1 may be made direct stimulants to the vilest and lowest passions4 ,it is indeed from this quarter that we are to look for danger from the prevalence of these arts4 ,it was thus that they corrupted the ancient cities2 and those who have seen the abominable statuary dug from the ruins of ,herculaneum and ,pompeii1 do not wonder that they were buried under a sea of fire4 ,the same process of corruption through these arts has gone to a fearful extent on the eastern continent1 and has commenced in this country4 ,clothed in this garment of light1 vice finds access where it otherwise could not4 ,under the pretence of promoting the fine arts1 modesty is cast aside1 and indecent pictures are exhibited1 and respectable people go to see them4 ,if ,i might utter a word of warning to the young1 it would be to beware of vice dressed in the garments of taste4 ,the beauties of nature are capable of no such perversion4 ,all the associations connected with them tend to elevate and to purify the mind4 ,no case can be adduced in which a taste for gardening or for natural objects has corrupted a people4 ,while1 therefore1 ,i believe that the cultivation of the arts1 in their genuine spirit of beauty and of purity1 has a tendency to improve the character1 it would appear that they are greatly liable to abuse1 and that they have been extensively abused4 ,but though ,i may thus dispose of the general objection from the co-existence in many cases of refinement in the arts and corrupt morals1 yet this1 ,i think1 will not fully meet the objection which first arose in the minds of some1 from those numerous individual instances in which men have been eminent for taste and genius1 and at the same time corrupt4 ,what1 you have been ready to say1 do you make of such a case as that of ,byron8 ,now ,i would here make an inquiry1 how far1 and in what sense1 those productions of genius which have a corrupt tendency are really consistent with good taste4 ,take the ,don ,juan of ,byron for instance4 ,to say nothing of principle1 such a work certainly is not compatible with a correct moral taste4 ,that it is in some sense1 however1 a work of taste1 cannot be denied2 but it seems to me to be only as a splendid palace1 built in a low and fetid morass1 is a work of taste4 ,the palace may be beautiful1 but it was in bad taste to set it there4 ,particular rooms may be elegantly furnished1 but still there comes up from the surrounding marsh a pestilential miasm1 and it may be said of the atmosphere around it1 as was said of that around ,new ,orleans a few autumns since1 that all is beauty and all is death4 ,so far therefore as these works have a corrupt tendency1 they cannot be said to be in the highest sense consistent with good taste4 ,but still it is said that corrupt men have produced works of the highest genius and of the best taste that have had no such tendency4 ,this is granted1 but it is to be accounted for from the fact that men of genius are often men of strong passions and of wayward and unbalanced minds1 and from the peculiar temptations in which1 as ,i have already said1 they are placed4 ,taste seems to me to be1 to such men1 what the music of ,david was to ,saul1--it charms away the evil spirit1 but it is only for a time4 ,but we now pass to the third distinction which was to be made1 and that is1 between a true taste for natural objects and the fine arts1 and what is called taste in the world of fashion4 ,the point of distinction to which ,i would draw your attention is well stated by ,stewart4 ,it is obvious1 says he1 that the circumstances which please in the objects of taste are of two kinds3 first1 those which are fitted to please by nature1 or by associations which all mankind are led to form by their common condition2 and secondly1 those which please in consequence of associations arising from local and accidental circumstances4 ,hence there are two kinds of taste2 the one enabling us to judge of those beauties which have a foundation in the human constitution2 the other1 of such objects as derive their principal recommendation from the influence of fashion4 ,these two kinds of taste are not always united in the same person2 indeed1 ,i am inclined to think that they are united but rarely4 ,the perfection of the one depends much on the degree in which we are able to free the mind from the influence of casual associations2 that of the other1 on the contrary1 depends on a faculty of association which enables us to fall in at once with all the turns of the fashion1 and1 as ,shakspeare expresses it1 to catch the tune of the times4 ,association is the sole foundation of the value which we put upon some articles1 and of the beauty which we find in others4 ,thus1 a lock of hair1 valueless in itself1 may1 from associations connected with it1 have a value which money cannot measure2 and articles of dress1 which would otherwise be to us indifferent1 or odious1 become beautiful by their association with those persons whom we have been accustomed to consider as models of elegance4 ,it is indeed astonishing what an effect this principle will have upon our feelings2 and from looking too exclusively at facts connected with it1 some have been led to doubt whether there is any such thing as a permanent principle of taste4 ,it would really seem1 that1 within the bounds of comfort and decency1 both of which are often outraged by fashion1 one mode of dress may come to be as becoming as another4 ,the wigs1 the knee-buckles1 the small-clothes1 the long-skirts and cocked-hats of our grandfathers1 were as becoming then1 as is now the dress of the present day4 ,says ,sir ,joshua ,reynolds1 ,if an ,european1 when he has cut off his beard1 and put false hair on his head1 or bound up his own natural hair in regular hard knots1 as unlike nature as he can possibly make it1 and after having rendered them immovable by the help of the fat of hogs1 has covered the whole with flour1 laid on by a machine with the utmost regularity2 if1 when thus attired1 he issues forth and meets a ,cherokee ,indian1 who has bestowed as much time at his toilet1 and laid on1 with equal care and attention1 his yellow and red ochre on particular parts of his forehead or cheeks1 as he judges most becoming2 whoever of these two despises the other for his attention to the fashion of his country2 whichever feels himself provoked to laugh1 is the barbarian4 ,good taste with respect to the fashions1 then1 would seem to consist1 not in following them1 or in paying them attention1 except so far as to avoid attracting notice in any way by dress2 for it is a strong indication1 when a person seeks notice from that1 that there is about him little else that is worthy of notice4 ,the foundation of taste in the fashions1 however1 being what ,i have now stated1 it is obvious that a quick perception of their ever-varying changes and a ready and careful accommodation to them1 can belong1 whether in man or woman1 only to a mind essentially frivolous2 and that such a taste1 if not absolutely incompatible with a perception of all that is permanently grand and beautiful in the works of ,god1 is yet seldom connected with it4 ,such a taste must1 of course1 rather injure than promote good morals4 ,i have now considered taste as exercised indifferently upon any objects within its appropriate province4 ,it still remains that ,i should say something1 which ,i propose to do in another ,lecture1 on ,moral ,taste1 or on taste having moral actions for its object4 ,,lecture ,,ii4 ,it was observed on a former occasion1 that material objects produce their effect upon taste chiefly as signs2 but it is the opinion of ,mr4 ,alison1 of ,mr4 ,jeffries1 and others of high authority on this point1 that it is solely as signs--solely as suggesting intellectual and moral qualities--that they have an effect4 ,it is quite evident that mere matter in a chaotic state1 or in any state which is not either produced by mind or such as mind would produce1 cannot be beautiful2 and hence it is said that it can be beautiful only as a means of indicating qualities that do not belong to itself4 ,the great difficulty which this theory has to encounter arises from the apparent instantaneousness with which the emotion seems to arise when a beautiful object is presented4 ,but this is not a conclusive objection1 because emotions which can arise only from association seem to come in the same way4 ,how instantaneous1 for instance1 are the emotions that throng up when he who has been long on a foreign shore sees1 for the first time1 the stars and stripes of his country's flag as it enters the port where he is2--and yet1 these emotions can be awakened by it only as a link of association with scenes that are past1 or as a sign of his country's presence and protection4 ,i have heard the rainbow adduced as an instance of an object which produces the emotion of beauty without a reference to any thing beyond itself4 ,but what was the impression made by it more than two thousand years ago1 upon the mind of one who had no theory to maintain8--,look upon the rainbow1 says he1 and praise ,him that made it3 very beautiful it is in the brightness thereof4 ,it compasseth the heavens about with a glorious circle1 and the hands of the ,most ,high have bended it4 ,how apparently instantaneous1 yet how different1 are our emotions when looking at the cheek flushed by the bloom of health1 or suffused by the blush of shame1 or reddened by anger1 or wearing that hectic flush which is the flag of distress held out by nature when she is sinking in consumption6--,and yet no one can doubt1 if these indications were reversed1 that the emotions would be reversed also4 ,it is conceded by all1 that it is the expression1 the indication of mental and moral qualities1 that gives its highest beauty to the human countenance4 ,there are no features which may not be so lighted up with noble or tender emotion as to be beautiful4 ,but is there1 it will be asked1 no beauty in any combination of features1 or of matter1 except as connected with expression8 ,i am inclined to think there is what may be called an instinctive beauty on the perception of certain colors and forms2 but it is of little value compared with that of which a rational and reflective being can give an account to himself4 ,even this1 however1 presupposes the action of mind upon matter1 though that action is not recognized by us as the cause of our emotion4 ,it is therefore still true that1 as the beauty of the early morning is produced solely by a reflexion from the sun while he is still below the horizon1 so the beauty of matter is wholly a reflexion from that great central orb of mind which has never yet beamed upon the eye of man in its direct effulgence--that1 to him who views it aright1 the beauty of this world is but the morning twilight of heaven4 ,but1 however this question may be decided1 the fact that it can be made a question at all1 shows how largely moral ideas and emotions enter into the province of taste1 and the intimate connexion there is between taste and morals4 ,what is called moral taste is1 in fact1 discriminated from taste in general1 only as it has the moral actions of free and intelligent agents for its object4 ,when we look at a moral action1 there is a plain difference between our perception of it as right1 and our perception of it as beautiful4 ,in one case there arises the feeling of approbation1 in the other of admiration1 which are entirely distinct1 and may exist in very different proportions4 ,it is1 indeed1 not always easy to distinguish the point at which approbation and admiration run into each other2 and in treating of this subject1 ,i shall first say a few words of that border-ground between taste and morals where the dividing line seems to be unsettled4 ,where1 for example1 shall we place that feeling which we have in view of the manner of doing a thing1 in distinction from the thing done8 ,is that feeling merely the result of taste1 or are there mingled with it some elements of moral approbation or disapprobation8 ,where will you place a mean action in distinction from a dishonest one8 ,i have heard it disputed whether neatness is a virtue1 a matter of moral obligation1 or merely a requisition of taste4 ,is a man under moral obligation to be neat in his person8 ,it is along this dividing line that all those actions lie which relate to the proprieties and courtesies of life--all those smaller attentions to the convenience and comfort of others1 and that delicate regard to their feelings1 which have been designated by the ,french as the smaller morals4 ,in regard to this very extensive1 and therefore important department of human conduct1 there seem to be two common mistakes4 ,the first consists in disregarding it altogether4 ,there are many men whose characters1 in their sketching and outline1 are fine1 and which1 seen at a distance1 appear well2 but on approaching them1 they seem coarse and very imperfect4 ,in all the great duties of life they appear to advantage2 but through negligence1 or some greater failing1 the minor duties1 and especially the department of manners1 is entirely neglected4 ,they seem like stately trees1 in the trunk and main branches of which the sap circulates vigorously1 but does not reach and animate the smaller twigs1 and give to the leaves their perfect green4 ,a second1 and more common mistake1 is the giving up of this department to the control of taste under the guidance of selfishness4 ,the manners are polished1 and all the forms of politeness adopted1 not for the purpose of making others happy1 but of securing to ourselves their esteem1 and of effecting our own ends in life4 ,this is the school of manners recommended by ,chesterfield1 and young persons are often exhorted to pay attention to their manners on this ground4 ,in this case the sap does not circulate at all1 and the leaves are painted4 ,but to me it seems1 that this whole class of actions falls within the province of morality4 ,wherever human happiness is concerned1 there is room for principle to operate1 and the constitution of society will never be sound1 and its beauty will never be perfect1 till the sap of principle circulates to the extremities of human action4 ,the true polish and beauty of society can result only from the principle of benevolence showing itself in a graceful and practical attention to the minor wants and to the feelings of others4 ,but whatever we may decide in regard to their respective limits in this department1 it is obvious that taste1 so far as it goes1 must be favorable to morals4 ,we now pass to what is indisputably the province of morals4 ,and here our first inquiry will be1 what are the circumstances under which the emotions of taste are awakened by moral actions8 ,in reply to this inquiry ,i observe1 that the emotion of beauty1 leaving sublimity for the present out of the question1 is awakened by a moral action chiefly1 and perhaps solely1 when it springs from the principle of duty acting in coincidence with the desires1 the affections1 or some other natural and inferior principle of action4 ,this point is of practical importance1 and requires illustration4 ,man1 as we all know1 has various principles of action1--such as instincts1 desires1 affections1 passions4 ,these may impel him to a course of action directly opposed to that indicated by a sense of duty1 and they may also lead him to perform the same actions as are dictated by it2 and the position is1 that moral beauty arises when there is a partial or entire coincidence between the principle of duty and these inferior powers4 ,that this is so is evident1 because there are many actions which are right1 which are imperatively required by duty1 which yet do not awaken in the mind of the impartial spectator any admiration--for we must here keep in mind the distinction already made between admiration and approbation4 ,the simple payment of a debt1 for example1 does not awaken any admiration1 though we approve the act and should strongly condemn him who should not do it when it was in his power4 ,in this case1 there can be mingled with the performance of duty no play of the generous emotions4 ,he who performs all his actions solely from a sense of duty1 has our approbation1 our respect2 but he who1 in addition to this1 is possessed of warm affections1 which always coincide in their promptings with what is right1 has also our admiration and love4 ,duty is to the affections1 in the conduct of life1 what logic is to rhetoric in a discourse4 ,logic forms an excellent body for a discourse2 we assent to it1 we approve it1 it is good1 all good1 but it awakens no admiration4 ,it is not till rhetoric sends its warm life-blood to mantle on the cold cheek of logic1 and clothes its angular form in the garments of taste1 that we begin to admire the discourse4 ,and so it is with duty4 ,it is an excellent body to the course of our conduct in life2 nothing else will do1 but it may be so performed as to appear unamiable and even repulsive4 ,in order to be beautiful1 there must be connected with it some manifestation of natural affection or graceful emotion4 ,and here ,i may remark1 that though we have a right to expect of every man that he will do his duty1 yet the display of this beauty is not equally within the power of all1 since the existence and manifestation of emotion depend1 to some extent1 upon the temperament4 ,as there are some who have naturally a meagre intellect1 so there are others whose minds seem to be barren of those finer sympathies and affections of our nature which are the verdure of the soul1 and upon which the eye always rests with pleasure4 ,the characters of some good men are dry and unattractive4 ,they are harsh1 and hard-visaged1 and seem too much like wooden men1 moved by rule and calculation4 ,such persons often seem better1 and worse1 than they really are4 ,their freedom from extravagancies on the one hand1 and on the other1 that want of feeling which is wrongly termed by many hardness of heart1 is equally the result of temperament4 ,that the doctrine which ,i now advocate is correct1 appears also from the effect produced upon our feelings when we observe habit taking the place of sentiment in the performance of duty4 ,we have all seen persons enter upon a course of virtuous activity1 and continue it for a time from a sense of duty1 sustained by ardent feeling2 but after a time the feeling has died away1 and there has come in its stead habit1 or a regard to consistency1 to sustain the sense of duty in keeping up the same course of external action4 ,when this change has taken place1 we are all conscious that the beauty of the conduct is greatly diminished2--its spirit has vanished2 the dew of its youth is exhaled4 ,i said that this was a practical point1 and ,i now wish to show1 in connexion with it1 precisely how it is that mischief arises from the perversion of moral taste2 as was shown1 in the former ,lecture1 how it arises from its perversion in other things4 ,in opposition to the hard and dry characters mentioned above1 there are those whose susceptibilities are acute1 whose sympathies are quick1 whose feelings are generous1 whose affections are ardent1 who do every thing so promptly and so heartily that impulse seems almost to supply the place of principle4 ,there is something very attractive in a character of this kind2 there is an ease and freedom about it which seems to put aside all labor of calculation1 and it moreover exhibits our nature in the pleasing garb of natural goodness4 ,it is for this reason that novelists1 who draw men as they wish to have them1 and not as they are1 have almost universally made these fine instincts of humanity the guide of their hero1 and the basis of his character4 ,this is1 indeed1 if ,i understand it1 the basis of this kind of literature1 and one chief source of the injury it produces4 ,the exhibition of these instincts1 and affections1 and emotions1 springing up at random and acting without the control of principle1 holds out no stimulus to exertion2 and their possession and exercise is often in fact1 and often too in books1 connected with great corruption of moral character4 ,taking1 therefore1 as the main ingredient in the character of those who are to make the chief figure in this kind of writing1 what ,miss ,martineau calls spontaneousness1 and which she and a certain wise friend of hers in ,boston thought should by all means be encouraged and reverenced1 we may mix the other materials somewhat to our taste4 ,an excellent and much-approved receipt for the hero of a novel is the following3--#ast4 ,make him handsome1 for beauty is to the body what spontaneousness is to the mind1 a sort of physical spontaneousness4 ,or1 if you do not make him handsome1 do what amounts to much the same thing1 give him an air2 let him have something about him that is peculiar1 so that those who scan him closely may observe1 under those apparently indifferent features1 a certain something1 a sign of the fire that is slumbering within4 #b;d4 ,if you find it necessary1 for fashion's sake1 to put him at school1 or at any place for study1 make him idle1 generous1 somewhat mischievous1 a great hater of mathematics1 7for1 so far as my knowledge extends1 no hero of a novel ever yet knew any thing about mathematics17 give him some whimsical pursuit for the hours when he chooses to do any thing1 and then make him speak1 as he has occasion1 ,italian1 ,french and ,spanish1 which he learned by instinct4 #c;d4 ,make him act from impulse1 and not from principle1 and get him into difficulty through the influence of these same generous impulses4 ,it is on difficulties thus created that the plot must turn4 #dth4 ,get him in love4 #eth4 ,make him run a gauntlet of difficulties a volume and a half long1 furnishing a new illustration of that old adage1 the course of true love never did run smooth4 #fth4 ,marry him1 and let him live many years in perfect felicity4 ,we commonly hear it said1 that the chief mischief of novel-reading arises from the false pictures of life which novels present4 ,this is doubtless a source of no small mischief2 but in my view1 a much greater evil arises from their holding up1 directly or indirectly1 false principles of action1 and casting contempt upon the true2 from their leading young persons to admire that which they esteem graceful rather than that which is respectable and right in the conduct of life4 ,there is in those works an unnatural separation made between the principle of virtue and that which gives to virtue its beauty2 and principle is represented as formal and cold1 and perhaps ridiculous4 ,prudence1 especially1 is a virtue which no heroine of a novel must ever be guilty of4 ,in a recent work1 which deserves great credit for avoiding the general fault just mentioned1 we are yet told that prudence was a virtue for which the heroine was never famous1 and a slight odium is cast upon the virtue itself by making it appear1 in the rival of the heroine1 somewhat stiff and pragmatical4 ,it is thus that these works awaken extensively1 in the minds of the young1 associations unfavorable to the sterner and sterling virtues2 and in many cases1 these amiable qualities are so associated with vice as to render it attractive4 ,it is thus that we are presented by popular novelists--and in such a manner as ,i know carries along the sympathies of many young men1 while their imaginations are rendered familiar with the haunts of vice--with gentlemen robbers who rob in style2 who are so generous that they never rob the poor2 who never shed human blood if people will give up their money without it2 and if they are occasionally obliged to blow out the brains of some agent of the law1 they are really sorry for it1 though they do not see how such impertinent fellows could expect any thing better4 ,it is thus that the impression is received1 that a certain class of impulses is sufficient to secure success in life1 and even to excuse the want of principle2 and young men with their heads full of pictures1 not perhaps so bad as this1 yet fundamentally the same1 rush eagerly into life without fixed principles and fixed aims4 ,to him who is without experience1 there is no sight more beautiful than that of a young man of an ingenuous nature entering upon life1 and resting upon his own good impulses to keep him from evil4 ,but such a sight1 even when there has been no corruption like that just spoken of1 now causes apprehension in me2 for ,i have seen him who had every thing1 in his person and in his sensibilities1 to excite admiration and love1 tarrying long at the wine1 and seeking mixed wine2 ,i have seen him going to that house which is the way to hell2 and therefore it is that ,i would utter a solemn protest against any thing which would divorce the beauty of virtue from the principle of virtue1 or which would give an impression that there is security without fixed principle4 ,even genius1 with all these amiable qualities-- ,yet may lack the aid ,implored by humble minds and hearts afraid1 ,may leave to timid souls the shield and sword ,of the tried faith and the resistless word2 ,amid a world of dangers venturing forth1 ,frail but yet fearless1 proud in conscious worth1 ,till strong temptation1 in some fatal time1 ,assails the heart and wins the soul to crime4 ,then1 ,all that honor brings against the force ,of headlong passion1 aids its rapid course2 ,its slight resistance but provokes the fire1 ,as wood-work stops the flame1 and then conveys it higher4 ,with such a basis to the characters presented1 it will follow of course1 that the emotions and the sensibilities will be chiefly addressed in these works1 and thus they become the principal means of promoting that false and selfish sensibility which is so often cultivated in refined society4 ,this is a more refined species of intemperance1 and is to the mind what intemperance in strong drink is to the body4 ,it causes excitement for the mere selfish enjoyment produced by it1 without leading to any exertion4 ,and as the grosser species of intemperance is more common among one sex1 so it is to be feared1 that this more refined species is more common among the other2 and that for both1 circulating libraries1 and other libraries1 instead of furnishing wholesome entertainment1 are too often converted into mere intellectual dram-shops4 ,there are many who seek chiefly for excitement1 who have a constant craving for it1 whose emotions and mental sensibilities have become accustomed to a set of artificial stimulants till they are sensible to no other1 and they become as remorselessly selfish as the drunkard himself4 ,i would sooner apply for an act of genuine kindness1 one which should reach actual want1 to a woman in a log-house1 upon the side of a mountain1 surrounded by hungry children1 than to the daintiest young lady whose sensibilities have spindled up and wilted in the artificial heat of novel-reading4 ,in order to perform the duties of benevolence and philanthropy1 it is indispensable that the sensibilities should be kept alive to the impressions of misery as it actually presents itself in all its squalid accompaniments4 ,sweet are the tears that from a ,howard's eye ,drop on the cheek of one he lifts from earth2 ,and he who works me good with unmoved face1 ,does it but half2 he chills me while he aids1 ,my benefactor1 not my fellow-man4 ,but even this1 this cold benevolence1 ,seems worth1 seems manhood1 when there rise before me ,the sluggard ,pity's vision-weaving tribe1 ,who sigh for wretchedness1 yet shun the wretched1 ,nursing1 in some delicious solitude1 ,their slothful loves and dainty sympathies6 ,it was this esteem in which mankind hold the sensibilities and impulses1 this preference of spontaneousness without its connexion with principle1 which gave its popularity to what has been called the sentimental school--the results of which ought to teach society a lesson not soon to be forgotten4 ,concerning this school1 it is justly remarked by ,coleridge1 that all the mischief achieved by ,hobbes1 and the whole school of materialists1 will appear inconsiderable if it be compared with the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy of ,sterne and his numerous imitators4 ,the vilest appetites1 and the most remorseless inconstancy towards their objects1 acquired the title of the heart--the irresistible feelings--the too tender sensibility3 and if the frosts of prudence1 the icy chains of human law1 thawed and vanished at the genial warmth of human nature1 who could help it8 ,it was an amiable weakness4 ,i would here remark1 that ,i have no objection to fictitious writings as such4 ,there are those to which ,i do not object4 ,let them cease1 first1 to present false pictures of life3 secondly1 to array the sensibilities and associations of the mind against principle3 and1 thirdly1 let them cease to create and feed a morbid craving for excitement1 and to destroy the balance between the feelings and the judgment3 and ,i shall not object to them4 ,the mass of these writings1 however1 do produce each and all of these effects1 and are1 so far1 indisputably pernicious4 ,i have been thus particular in pointing out the evils which arise from arraying what is beautiful and graceful in morals and in conduct against that which is right1 because ,i do not believe that the community are sufficiently warned against the mischief it is working1 and in many cases are not perhaps aware of the manner in which it is wrought4 ,evil gains advantage over man by dividing him against himself1 by bringing into collision faculties that were intended to work harmoniously together2 and we may regard it as settled1 that whoever or whatever would set up mere impulses1 or sensibilities1 or emotions1 in the place of the reason and conscience of man1 is thus dividing him against himself4 ,it is with the conscience of man as it is with a king4 ,he may have his prime minister1 who is his chief favorite1 and next to himself1 but he must never abandon his power1 or suffer the highest subject to depose him from the throne4 ,the desires and affections are then only truly beautiful1 when they are in ready attendance at the court of their rightful sovereign4 ,having now spoken of the manner in which evil is done by those who care to please rather than to improve mankind1 ,i cannot leave this part of the subject without suggesting1 to the friends of principle and of religion1 how much1 if what has been said is correct1 they may do to counteract this evil by a free1 a hearty1 a joyful1 and therefore an attractive1 mode of doing that which is right4 ,whence have arisen those associations of coldness and formality and gloom1 as connected with duty1 which haunt the imaginations of many young persons1 and which have just as little existence in reality as other spectres of the night8 ,is it not in part from an unnatural austerity1 or from a cowardly and faltering step1 a want of freedom and power and beauty in the exhibitions of virtue and principle on the part of those who profess to adhere to them8 ,it is not as it should be1 when the glad and the graceful emotions readily spring up by the side of every path that we walk in except the path of duty4 ,he who marches under the banner of principle is not only to feel that he is engaged in a good cause1 but is also to see in that cause a beauty which shall be to him what music is to the soldier1 giving cheerfulness to his countenance and alacrity to his step4 ,his is not indeed to be the unchastened1 and reckless1 and merely animal joy that is unconscious of the evil that exists1 and that is to be met2 but it is to be the joy of him who1 though he is travelling in a difficult and obscure path1 yet sees before him the bright and steady light of his own happy home4 ,the more those who act from principle are able to combine1 with the most perfect rectitude and uncompromising faithfulness1 the cultivation and play of all the graceful and tender emotions1 the more will they do to promote the cause in which they labor4 ,i know1 and here is the difficulty1 that most virtue is too feeble for this2 and ,i would not that there should be put on any affectation of freedom or ease4 ,virtue should move easily and gracefully only as it is strong1 but it should become strong that it may move easily and gracefully1 and thus become to all men as beautiful as it is obligatory4 ,it is not a little that the ,christian religion has suffered from the mistakes of its adherents on this point4 ,it had been better if they had more regarded the spirit of its ,founder when ,he commanded his disciples1 even when they fasted1 not to be of a sad countenance1 as the hypocrites were4 ,the impression we get of ,paul1 notwithstanding his labors and sufferings1 is that he was a happy man4 ,if he was sometimes sorrowful1 he was yet always rejoicing4 ,the movements of his spirit were so ready and free1 in view of the great subjects that filled his mind1 that he reminds us more than any other man of the rapt seraph that adores and burns4 ,what is it1 indeed1 that gives its perfect beauty to our conception of the worship of heaven8 ,is it not1 that the most perfect law is there fully obeyed1 and is yet no restraint upon the highest and freest expansion of feeling8 ,it is when this is so1 and then only1 that moral beauty is perfect4 ,we have thus far considered moral beauty only4 ,we now pass to another branch of our subject1 the moral sublime4 ,when speaking on taste in general1 it was not necessary1 for any purposes ,i then had in view1 that ,i should make a distinction between beauty and sublimity1 either as they exist in themselves1 or as they are occasioned by outward objects4 ,indeed1 it is the opinion of many writers1 that there is no radical distinction between them1 but that sublimity is merely the feeling of beauty heightened4 ,this seems to me doubtful1 even in material beauty2 but in our present department1 the occasions on which they arise are so different1 that they must be distinguished4 ,it was for this reason that ,i treated of beauty by itself4 ,it has been observed1 that the emotion of moral beauty arises when there is a coincidence between the sense of duty and certain inferior principles of action4 ,i now observe1 that the emotion of moral sublimity is awakened1 when the sense of duty is opposed by inclination1 or affection1 or by any or all the inferior principles of action1 and triumphs over them4 ,its principle consists in a power of self-control and of self-sacrifice1 in those cases in which they are difficult4 ,the illustration of this point will lead to a further confirmation of what was said in reference to moral beauty4 ,no sight1 for example1 can be more beautiful than that of a family in which there is mutual attachment1 and in which the performance of every duty is sweetened by affection4 ,how beautiful is the assiduity of a child1 who bears with every infirmity1 and soothes every care1 and anticipates every want1 of a parent in sickness or in age6 ,it is beautiful1 but not sublime4 ,the conduct of that young man1 who labors hard and denies himself the ordinary pleasures of the young that he may support an aged mother1 or add to her comfort1 is highly beautiful2 but natural affection coperates with a sense of duty1 and therefore it is not sublime4 ,no one has ever considered as sublime the conduct of neas1 when he bore his aged father upon his shoulders from the flames of ,troy4 ,but when the ancient ,brutus1 with a power that was supreme1 sat in judgment on his own son who was accused of being a traitor1 and when he gave the sign to the lictor to take him to execution1 then there was a struggle1 then inflexible justice triumphed over natural affection1 and it was--not beautiful1 it was too awful for that--but it was sublime4 ,that act of our ,saviour1 7if ,i may be permitted to refer to such a scene in this connexion17 by which he remembered his mother upon the cross and provided for her wants1 was beautiful--how beautiful6 ,his prayer for his murderers was sublime4 ,it is1 in general1 acts of tenderness1 gentleness1 condescension1 pity1 gratitude1 humanity1 that are beautiful2 while it is1 on the other hand1 acts of magnanimity1 of fortitude1 of inflexible justice1 of high patriotism1 and1 on proper occasions1 of contempt of danger and of death1 that are sublime4 ,in all these latter cases it will be seen that the principle is the same1 and that the sublime emotion is awakened by virtuous self-control1 in union with high resolve4 ,we hence see why it is that periods of difficulty1 and oppression1 and persecution1 are favorable to the exhibition of the moral sublime4 ,they test the amount of attachment to principle which there is among men1 and the sacrifices which they are willing to make for it4 ,accordingly1 it has been in such emergencies that men have arisen1 who1 under the inspiration of the great principles of civil and religious liberty1 have been ready to go in the face of every danger1 wherever their duty should call them2 as ,luther was determined to go to the diet of ,worms1 though he should find as many devils in that city as there were tiles upon the houses4 ,these are the men1 who1 though they have been opposed1 and vilified1 and persecuted in their day1 have yet received the homage of after ages2 who have stood as the beacon-lights of the world1 and whose names have been the watchword of those who have rallied and struck for the united reign of liberty and law4 ,such men have almost always been in advance of their age1 and the people of that age have not comprehended them4 ,they have reverenced the great men of former times2 they have built the sepulchres of the prophets1 but have persecuted those who were sent unto them4 ,it is not therefore surprising that ,seneca has spoken so largely of the benefits of adversity1 as alone giving an opportunity for the display of the heroic virtues1 and has said that a good man1 struggling with adversity1 was a spectacle worthy of the gods4 ,but it is not necessary to the existence1 though it may be to the exhibition1 of moral heroism1 that we should be placed in circumstances of external adversity4 ,wherever there is moral combat1 there may be moral sublimity1 and this combat is necessary for the accomplishment of that triumph which every man is called to gain over himself4 ,the force and grandeur of virtue are then seen when we sacrifice to it our appetites1 our avarice1 our pride1 our vanity1 our ambition1 our resentments1 till every evil passion is brought into subjection to reason and conscience4 ,such being the nature of the moral sublime1 it is obvious that there is much less danger to morals from its perversion than from the perversion of the beautiful4 ,there is here no natural passion to come in as an ally of principle2 and which may take the place of it1 but it is duty struggling single-handed1 and triumphing over all the might of external nature1 and all the force of human propensity4 ,virtue may indeed exist in perfect serenity1 and be exercised without an obstacle2 but in this world1 and it is that which makes it a place of probation1 there is little virtue except on the condition of struggling against and overcoming inclination or passion4 ,if we succeed in this struggle1 we feel in our own breasts a peace which is not only present happiness1 but the promise of future reward2 and we awaken in the breasts of others the emotions of moral sympathy1 of approbation1 of sublimity in its highest forms1 till they are ready to welcome us with acclaim1 and we find that virtue is not only happiness1 but is also glory1 and honor1 and immortality4 ,but though moral beauty and sublimity are so different in their nature and in the occasions on which they arise1 it must not be supposed that they do not often blend with each other in actual life4 ,the general course of ,howard1 for instance1 being in accordance with the dictates of humanity1 had great moral beauty1 and yet the sacrifices which he made were often so great as to cause that course to partake of the moral sublime4 ,if the account of moral taste1 now given1 be correct1 the analysis of the subject is the only argument needed4 ,its cultivation must1 of course1 be favorable to morals1 since it would lead1 in its perfect state1 to the same course of conduct as would be required by principle4 ,there is1 indeed1 a whole school of philosophers1 that of ,shaftesbury1 who have looked upon virtue1 and have recommended it1 as beautiful rather than as obligatory2 who have regarded it as a sentiment rather than a principle2 and whose writings have been calculated to awaken enthusiasm in the cause of virtue1 but not to give it its proper sanctions4 ,so far1 however1 as this class of feelings would lead us1 it is in the direct path of virtue1 and they may1 no doubt1 be so cultivated1 and especially by the young1 as to furnish efficient aid to the principle of duty4 ,perhaps few persons1 rightly educated1 are aware how many wrong actions they avoid with the greater care because they are also mean2 how many right actions they perform with the greater readiness because they are in accordance with the requisitions of a cultivated moral taste4 ,considered as a principle of action1 such a taste provides an effectual security against the grossness connected with many vices1 and cherishes a temper of mind friendly to all that is amiable1 or generous1 or elevated in our nature4 ,while1 therefore1 we regard taste as an important ally to the sense of duty1 we are not to rely chiefly upon it4 ,it would need stability1 and would be constantly liable to be led astray by the influence of fashion1 or of casual association4 ,we may however do more1 we should do more to combine them2 to unite taste and principle in the conduct of life2 to do1 ourselves1 and to lead others to do1 what is becoming1 as well as what is right4 ,man is capable of forming to himself an ideal model1 of embodying a conception of excellence such as he has never seen1 and of acting with reference to it4 ,it is this which renders him capable of progression2 and one great reason why men are stationary1 is1 that they have in their minds no fixed and definite standard of excellence after which they are reaching4 ,young men1 to whom ,i speak1 here is the point at which many of you doubtless fail4 ,you are borne on by the current1 and form to yourselves no worthy object of pursuit1 after which you bring yourselves1 by self-discipline1 steadily to labor4 ,but without doing this1 no man ever yet exerted a high and worthy influence2 no man ever can4 ,permit me then to propose to you1 in your capacity as social beings1 an object after which you may thus strive4 ,it is the combination of perfect moral principle with perfect simplicity and refinement of manners--the union1 in the conduct of life1 of ,morals and ,taste4 ,there remains but a single consideration which ,i shall adduce1 to show that there is the connexion between taste and morals for which ,i contend4 ,it is1 that we naturally associate with goodness1 beauty of form2 and that in a perfect state1 we conceive of goodness as surrounded by objects that are pleasing to the taste4 ,perhaps this may not have been noticed by all1 but a little attention to what passes in our own minds will convince us that it is so4 ,this natural association of beauty and goodness perhaps arises from the fact1 that every indication of goodness as expressed in the countenance is pleasing1 and may be heightened into beauty4 ,it is surprising how soon we come to regard as pleasing1 the most ordinary features1 when we have associated with them a fund of good qualities2 or rather1 the features soon become like the letters of a book1 which we regard only for the meaning they convey4 ,as ,i have said before1 no features are so ordinary that they may not come to appear to us beautiful by the expression of good qualities2 and if ,i may suppose1 which ,i would by no means assert1 that there are any homely persons present1 ,i would congratulate them on the inducements they have to cultivate the only beauty that is permanent1 or that can be the foundation of lasting attachment4 ,not only however may homely features become beautiful by their expression1 but we have1 ,i think1 a natural association of positive beauty as connected with the goodness which we have not seen1 and of positive deformity as connected with vice4 ,when we read of good men even1 we regard them as having something in their appearance corresponding with their character1 and no man1 ,i am sure1 can suppose that ,benedict ,arnold had a countenance that was pleasant to look upon4 ,but what is conclusive on this point is1 that no man ever conceived of ,satan in his proper form1 as beautiful1 or ever conceived of an angel1 except as clothed in light and beauty4 ,it is this natural supposition of the connexion of beauty of mind with beauty of form1 that gives its plausibility and point to a dream of ,sir ,isaac ,bickerstaff1 as related in one of the ,tattlers4 ,he seemed to himself to be in an open plain1 surrounded by an immense assembly of females1 in the midst of whom the goddess of justice sat enthroned1 and holding in her hand a mirror of such peculiar properties as to reflect the faces of those who looked into it in exact correspondence with their characters4 ,this mirror was held up and turned before the assembly1 and the effect may well be imagined4 ,some beautiful women had the satisfaction of seeing their faces become still more beautiful1 while many more were shocked to see themselves converted into perfect frights4 ,some who were homely before1 became still more so2 while many unassuming and modest persons1 who had never dreamed of being handsome1 and so had sought the approbation of their own consciences1 were surprised to see how their faces were brightened up4 ,there was however one face1 which seemed to beam with a celestial radiance1 and was so surprisingly beautiful that ,sir ,isaac determined at once on making proposals to the lady1 if he could but ascertain to whom it belonged4 ,this1 by careful attention1 he was soon enabled to do1 and found that it was a little1 grey-headed1 wrinkled old woman who stood by his side4 ,there is something ludicrous in the manner in which this is set forth1 but it involves a most serious and pleasing truth4 ,it is as much a part of the disorders of the present state of things1 that goodness is ever connected with any thing but beauty1 as it is that virtue is depressed while vice triumphs4 ,in a perfect organization and state of things1 matter would be entirely flexible to the action of spirit1 and1 of course1 intellectual and moral beauty1 as well as their opposites1 must stamp their impress perfectly on the features4 ,this we believe will be the case when the physical nature of man shall be reorganized1 and the good shall not only be beautiful1 but1 as ,i have already remarked that we are naturally led to expect1 shall be surrounded with all those objects that are pleasing to the taste4 ,that these expectations are natural may be shown from the writings of all the heathen poets1 and it is pleasing to observe how perfectly they coincide with the representations of the ,scriptures on this point4 ,we are there taught1 not only that the righteous shall shine forth as the sun1 but their dwelling-place is described as a city whose foundations are garnished with all manner of precious stones1 whose streets are of pure gold1 and whose gates are of pearl4 ,thus1 as we associate with royalty its regalia1 so do we associate with goodness1 beauty1 which seems to be its natural appendage2 and not only in the ,scriptures1 but also in our own constitution1 do we find a promise1 that ,goodness and ,beauty shall be finally and forever united4 ,,transcriber',s ,,notes3 ,text in italics is surrounded with underscores3 italics4