,transcriber's ,note3 ,on ,p4 #dce1 there are four instances of #b in brackets4 #b indicates a subscript #b4 #b indicates a superscript #b4 in ,footnote #fi indicates a larger than normal plus sign4 ,remaining transcriber's notes are at the end of the text4 ,,essays ,,in ,,experimental ,,logic ,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,chicago ,,press ,,chicago1 ,,illinois ,,copyright #aiaf ,,by ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,chicago ,all ,rights ,reserved ,published ,june #aiaf ,second ,impression ,may #aiah ,third ,impression ,october #aibj ,composed and ,printed ,by ,the ,university of ,chicago ,press ,chicago1 ,illinois1 ,u4,s4,a4 ,,prefatory ,,note ,in #aijc a volume was published by the ,university of ,chicago ,press1 entitled ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 as a part of the ,decennial ,publications of the ,university4 ,the volume contained contributions by ,drs4 ,thompson 7now ,mrs4 ,woolley71 ,mc,lennan1 ,ashley1 ,gore1 ,heidel1 ,stuart1 and ,moore1 in addition to four essays by the present writer who was also general editor of the volume4 ,the edition of the ,studies being recently exhausted1 the ,director of the ,press suggested that my own essays be reprinted1 together with other studies of mine in the same field4 ,the various contributors to the original volume cordially gave assent1 and the present volume is the outcome4 ,chaps4 ii-v1 inclusive1 represent 7with editorial revisions1 mostly omissions7 the essays taken from the old volume4 ,the first and introductory chapter has been especially written for the volume4 ,the other essays are in part reprinted and in part rewritten1 with additions1 from various contributions to philosophical periodicals4 ,i should like to point out that the essay on ,some ,stages of ,logical ,thought antedates the essays taken from the volume of ,studies1 having been published in #aijj2 the other essays have been written since then4 ,i should also like to point out that the essays in their psychological phases are written from the standpoint of what is now termed a behavioristic psychology1 though some of them antedate the use of that term as a descriptive epithet4 ,j4 ,d4 ,,columbia ,,university ,april #c1 #aiaf ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,,page ,i4 ,,introduction #a ,,ii4 ,,the ,,relationship ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,its ,,subject-,,matter #ge ,,iii4 ,,the ,,antecedents ,,and ,,stimuli ,,of ,,thinking #ajc ,,iv4 ,,data ,,and ,,meanings #acf ,v4 ,,the ,,objects ,,of ,,thought #aeg ,,vi4 ,,some ,,stages ,,of ,,logical ,,thought #ahc ,,vii4 ,,the ,,logical ,,character ,,of ,,ideas #bbj ,,viii4 ,,the ,,control ,,of ,,ideas ,,by ,,facts #bcj ,,ix4 ,,na,,ve ,,realism ,,vs4 ,,presentative ,,realism #bej ,x4 ,,epistemological ,,realism3 ,,the ,,alleged ,,ubiquity ,,of ,,the ,,knowledge ,,relation #bfd ,,xi4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,world ,,as ,a ,,logical ,,problem #bha ,,xii4 ,,what ,,pragmatism ,,means ,,by ,,practical #cjc ,,xiii4 ,,an ,,added ,,note ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,practical #ccj ,,xiv4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,judgments ,,of ,,practice #cce ,index #ddc ,i ,,introduction ,the key to understanding the doctrine of the essays which are herewith reprinted lies in the passages regarding the temporal development of experience4 ,setting out from a conviction 7more current at the time when the essays were written than it now is7 that knowledge implies judgment 7and hence1 thinking7 the essays try to show 7#a7 that such terms as thinking1 reflection1 judgment denote inquiries or the results of inquiry1 and 7#b7 that inquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating place in the development of an experience4 ,if this be granted1 it follows at once that a philosophical discussion of the distinctions and relations which figure most largely in logical theories depends upon a proper placing of them in their temporal context2 and that in default of such placing we are prone to transfer the traits of the subject-matter of one phase to that of another--with a confusing outcome4 ,i #a4 ,an intermediary stage for knowledge 7that is1 for knowledge comprising reflection and having a distinctively intellectual quality7 implies a prior stage of a different kind1 a kind variously characterized in the essays as social1 affectional1 technological1 aesthetic1 etc4 ,it may most easily be described from a negative point of view3 it is a type of experience which cannot be called a knowledge experience without doing violence to the term knowledge and to experience4 ,it may contain knowledge resulting from prior inquiries2 it may include thinking within itself2 but not so that they dominate the situation and give it its peculiar flavor4 ,positively1 anyone recognizes the difference between an experience of quenching thirst where the perception of water is a mere incident1 and an experience of water where knowledge of what water is1 is the controlling interest2 or between the enjoyment of social converse among friends and a study deliberately made of the character of one of the participants2 between aesthetic appreciation of a picture and an examination of it by a connoisseur to establish the artist1 or by a dealer who has a commercial interest in determining its probable selling value4 ,the distinction between the two types of experience is evident to anyone who will take the trouble to recall what he does most of the time when not engaged in meditation or inquiry4 ,but since one does not think about knowledge except when he is thinking1 except1 that is1 when the intellectual or cognitional interest is dominant1 the professional philosopher is only too prone to think of all experiences as if they were of the type he is specially engaged in1 and hence unconsciously or intentionally to project its traits into experiences to which they are alien4 ,unless he takes the simple precaution of holding before his mind contrasting experiences like those just mentioned1 he generally forms a habit of supposing that no qualities or things at all are present in experience except as objects of some kind of apprehension or awareness4 ,overlooking1 and afterward denying1 that things and qualities are present to most men most of the time as things and qualities in situations of prizing and aversion1 of seeking and finding1 of converse1 enjoyment and suffering1 of production and employment1 of manipulation and destruction1 he thinks of things as either totally absent from experience or else there as objects of consciousness or knowing4 ,this habit is a tribute to the importance of reflection and of the knowledge which accrues from it4 ,but a discussion of knowledge perverted at the outset by such a misconception is not likely to proceed prosperously4 ,all this is not to deny that some element of reflection or inference may be required in any situation to which the term experience is applicable in any way which contrasts with1 say1 the experience of an oyster or a growing bean vine4 ,men experience illness4 ,what they experience is certainly something very different from an object of apprehension1 yet it is quite possible that what makes an illness into a conscious experience is precisely the intellectual elements which intervene--a certain taking of some things as representative of other things4 ,my thesis about the primary character of non-reflectional experience is not intended to preclude this hypothesis--which appears to me a highly plausible one4 ,but it is indispensable to note that1 even in such cases1 the intellectual element is set in a context which is non-cognitive and which holds within it in suspense a vast complex of other qualities and things that in the experience itself are objects of esteem or aversion1 of decision1 of use1 of suffering1 of endeavor and revolt1 not of knowledge4 ,when1 in a subsequent reflective experience1 we look back and find these things and qualities 7quales would be a better word1 or values1 if the latter word were not so open to misconstruction71 we are only too prone to suppose that they were then what they are now--objects of a cognitive regard1 themes of an intellectual gesture4 ,hence1 the erroneous conclusion that things are either just out of experience1 or else are 7more or less badly7 known objects4 ,in any case the best way to study the character of those cognitional factors which are merely incidental in so many of our experiences is to study them in the type of experience where they are most prominent1 where they dominate2 where knowing1 in short1 is the prime concern4 ,such study will also1 by a reflex reference1 throw into greater relief the contrasted characteristic traits of the non-reflectional types of experience4 ,in such contrast the significant traits of the latter are seen to be internal organization3 7#a7 the factors and qualities hang together2 there is a great variety of them but they are saturated with a pervasive quality4 ,being ill with the grippe is an experience which includes an immense diversity of factors1 but none the less is the one qualitatively unique experience which it is4 ,philosophers in their exclusively intellectual preoccupation with analytic knowing are only too much given to overlooking the primary import of the term thing3 namely1 res1 an affair1 an occupation1 a cause2 something which is similar to having the grippe1 or conducting a political campaign1 or getting rid of an overstock of canned tomatoes1 or going to school1 or paying attention to a young woman3--in short1 just what is meant in non-philosophic discourse by an experience4 ,noting things only as if they were objects--that is1 objects of knowledge--continuity is rendered a mystery2 qualitative1 pervasive unity is too often regarded as a subjective state injected into an object which does not possess it1 as a mental construct1 or else as a trait of being to be attained to only by recourse to some curious organ of knowledge termed intuition4 ,in like fashion1 organization is thought of as the achieved outcome of a highly scientific knowledge1 or as the result of transcendental rational synthesis1 or as a fiction superinduced by association1 upon elements each of which in its own right is a separate existence4 ,one advantage of an excursion by one who philosophizes upon knowledge into primary non-reflectional experience is that the excursion serves to remind him that every empirical situation has its own organization of a direct1 non-logical character4 7#b7 ,another trait of every res is that it has focus and context3 brilliancy and obscurity1 conspicuousness or apparency1 and concealment or reserve1 with a constant movement of redistribution4 ,movement about an axis persists1 but what is in focus constantly changes4 ,consciousness1 in other words1 is only a very small and shifting portion of experience4 ,the scope and content of the focused apparency have immediate dynamic connections with portions of experience not at the time obvious4 ,the word which ,i have just written is momentarily focal2 around it there shade off into vagueness my typewriter1 the desk1 the room1 the building1 the campus1 the town1 and so on4 ,in the experience1 and in it in such a way as to qualify even what is shiningly apparent1 are all the physical features of the environment extending out into space no one can say how far1 and all the habits and interests extending backward and forward in time1 of the organism which uses the typewriter and which notes the written form of the word only as temporary focus in a vast and changing scene4 ,i shall not dwell upon the import of this fact in its critical bearings upon theories of experience which have been current4 ,i shall only point out that when the word experience is employed in the text it means just such an immense and operative world of diverse and interacting elements4 ,it might seem wiser1 in view of the fact that the term experience is so frequently used by philosophers to denote something very different from such a world1 to use an acknowledgedly objective term3 to talk about the typewriter1 for example4 ,but experience in ordinary usage 7as distinct from its technical use in psychology and philosophy7 expressly denotes something which a specific term like typewriter does not designate3 namely1 the indefinite range of context in which the typewriter is actually set1 its spatial and temporal environment1 including the habitudes1 plans1 and activities of its operator4 ,and if we are asked why not then use a general objective term like world1 or environment1 the answer is that the word experience suggests something indispensable which these terms omit3 namely1 an actual focusing of the world at one point in a focus of immediate shining apparency4 ,in other words1 in its ordinary human usage1 the term experience was invented and employed previously because of the necessity of having some way to refer peremptorily to what is indicated in only a roundabout and divided way by such terms as organism and environment1 subject and object1 persons and things1 mind and nature1 and so on4#a ,,ii ,had this background of the essays been more explicitly depicted1 ,i do not know whether they would have met with more acceptance1 but it is likely that they would not have met with so many misunderstandings4 ,but the essays1 save for slight incidental references1 took this background for granted in the allusions to the universe of non-reflectional experience of our doings1 sufferings1 enjoyments of the world and of one another4 ,it was their purpose to point out that reflection 7and1 hence1 knowledge having logical properties7 arises because of the appearance of incompatible factors within the empirical situation just pointed at3 incompatible not in a mere structural or static sense1 but in an active and progressive sense4 ,then opposed responses are provoked which cannot be taken simultaneously in overt action1 and which accordingly can be dealt with1 whether simultaneously or successively1 only after they have been brought into a plan of organized action by means of analytic resolution and synthetic imaginative conspectus2 in short1 by means of being taken cognizance of4 ,in other words1 reflection appears as the dominant trait of a situation when there is something seriously the matter1 some trouble1 due to active discordance1 dissentiency1 conflict among the factors of a prior non-intellectual experience2 when1 in the phraseology of the essays1 a situation becomes tensional4#b ,given such a situation1 it is obvious that the meaning of the situation as a whole is uncertain4 ,through calling out two opposed modes of behavior1 it presents itself as meaning two incompatible things4 ,the only way out is through careful inspection of the situation1 involving resolution into elements1 and a going out beyond what is found upon such inspection to be given1 to something else to get a leverage for understanding it4 ,that is1 we have 7a7 to locate the difficulty1 and 7b7 to devise a method of coping with it4 ,any such way of looking at thinking demands moreover that the difficulty be located in the situation in question 7very literally in question74 ,knowing always has a particular purpose1 and its solution must be a function of its conditions in connection with additional ones which are brought to bear4 ,every reflective knowledge1 in other words1 has a specific task which is set by a concrete and empirical situation1 so that it can perform that task only by detecting and remaining faithful to the conditions in the situation in which the difficulty arises1 while its purpose is a reorganization of its factors in order to get unity4 ,so far1 however1 there is no accomplished knowledge1 but only knowledge coming to be--learning1 in the classic ,greek conception4 ,thinking gets no farther1 as thinking1 than a statement of elements constituting the difficulty at hand and a statement--a propounding1 a proposition--of a method for resolving them4 ,in fixing the framework of every reflective situation1 this state of affairs also determines the further step which is needed if there is to be knowledge--knowledge in the eulogistic sense1 as distinct from opinion1 dogma1 and guesswork1 or from what casually passes current as knowledge4 ,overt action is demanded if the worth or validity of the reflective considerations is to be determined4 ,otherwise1 we have1 at most1 only a hypothesis that the conditions of the difficulty are such and such1 and that the way to go at them so as to get over or through them is thus and so4 ,this way must be tried in action2 it must be applied1 physically1 in the situation4 ,by finding out what then happens1 we test our intellectual findings--our logical terms or projected metes and bounds4 ,if the required reorganization is effected1 they are confirmed1 and reflection 7on that topic7 ceases2 if not1 there is frustration1 and inquiry continues4 ,that all knowledge1 as issuing from reflection1 is experimental 7in the literal physical sense of experimental7 is then a constituent proposition of this doctrine4 ,upon this view1 thinking1 or knowledge-getting1 is far from being the armchair thing it is often supposed to be4 ,the reason it is not an armchair thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within the cortex or the cortex and vocal organs4 ,it involves the explorations by which relevant data are procured and the physical analyses by which they are refined and made precise2 it comprises the readings by which information is got hold of1 the words which are experimented with1 and the calculations by which the significance of entertained conceptions or hypotheses is elaborated4 ,hands and feet1 apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain4 ,since these physical operations 7including the cerebral events7 and equipments are a part of thinking1 thinking is mental1 not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it1 but because of what physical acts and appliances do3 the distinctive purpose for which they are employed and the distinctive results which they accomplish4 ,that reflection terminates1 through a definitive overt act1#c in another non-reflectional situation1 within which incompatible responses may again in time be aroused1 and so another problem in reflection be set1 goes without saying4 ,certain things about this situation1 however1 do not at the present time speak for themselves and need to be set forth4 ,let me in the first place call attention to an ambiguity in the term knowledge4 ,the statement that all knowledge involves reflection--or1 more concretely1 that it denotes an inference from evidence--gives offense to many2 it seems a departure from fact as well as a wilful limitation of the word knowledge4 ,i have in this ,introduction endeavored to mitigate the obnoxiousness of the doctrine by referring to knowledge which is intellectual or logical in character4 ,lest this expression be regarded as a futile evasion of a real issue1 ,i shall now be more explicit4 7#a7 ,it may well be admitted that there is a real sense in which knowledge 7as distinct from thinking or inquiring with a guess attached7 does not come into existence till thinking has terminated in the experimental act which fulfils the specifications set forth in thinking4 ,but what is also true is that the object thus determined is an object of knowledge only because of the thinking which has preceded it and to which it sets a happy term4 ,to run against a hard and painful stone is not of itself1 ,i should say1 an act of knowing2 but if running into a hard and painful thing is an outcome predicted after inspection of data and elaboration of a hypothesis1 then the hardness and the painful bruise which define the thing as a stone also constitute it emphatically an object of knowledge4 ,in short1 the object of knowledge in the strict sense is its objective2 and this objective is not constituted till it is reached4 ,now this conclusion--as the word denotes--is thinking brought to a close1 done with4 ,if the reader does not find this statement satisfactory1 he may1 pending further discussion1 at least recognize that the doctrine set forth has no difficulty in connecting knowledge with inference1 and at the same time admitting that knowledge in the emphatic sense does not exist till inference has ceased4 ,seen from this point of view1 so-called immediate knowledge or simple apprehension or acquaintance-knowledge represents a critical skill1 a certainty of response which has accrued in consequence of reflection4 ,a like sureness of footing apart from prior investigations and testings is found in instinct and habit4 ,i do not deny that these may be better than knowing1 but ,i see no reason for complicating an already too confused situation by giving them the name knowledge with its usual intellectual implications4 ,from this point of view1 the subject-matter of knowledge is precisely that which we do not think of1 or mentally refer to in any way1 being that which is taken as matter of course1 but it is nevertheless knowledge in virtue of the inquiry which has led up to it4 7#b7 ,definiteness1 depth1 and variety of meaning attach to the objects of an experience just in the degree in which they have been previously thought about1 even when present in an experience in which they do not evoke inferential procedures at all4 ,such terms as meaning1 significance1 value1 have a double sense4 ,sometimes they mean a function3 the office of one thing representing another1 or pointing to it as implied2 the operation1 in short1 of serving as sign4 ,in the word symbol this meaning is practically exhaustive4 ,but the terms also sometimes mean an inherent quality1 a quality intrinsically characterizing the thing experienced and making it worth while4 ,the word sense1 as in the phrase sense of a thing 7and non-sense7 is devoted to this use as definitely as are the words sign and symbol to the other4 ,in such a pair as import and importance1 the first tends to select the reference to another thing while the second names an intrinsic content4 ,in reflection1 the extrinsic reference is always primary4 ,the height of the mercury means rain2 the color of the flame means sodium2 the form of the curve means factors distributed accidentally4 ,in the situation which follows upon reflection1 meanings are intrinsic2 they have no instrumental or subservient office1 because they have no office at all4 ,they are as much qualities of the objects in the situation as are red and black1 hard and soft1 square and round4 ,and every reflective experience adds new shades of such intrinsic qualifications4 ,in other words1 while reflective knowing is instrumental to gaining control in a troubled situation 7and thus has a practical or utilitarian force71 it is also instrumental to the enrichment of the immediate significance of subsequent experiences4 ,and it may well be that this by-product1 this gift of the gods1 is incomparably more valuable for living a life than is the primary and intended result of control1 essential as is that control to having a life to live4 ,words are treacherous in this field2 there are no accepted criteria for assigning or measuring their meanings2 but if one use the term consciousness to denote immediate values of objects1 then it is certainly true that consciousness is a lyric cry even in the midst of business4 ,but it is equally true that if someone else understands by consciousness the function of effective reflection1 then consciousness is a business--even in the midst of writing or singing lyrics4 ,but the statement remains inadequate until we add that knowing as a business1 inquiry and invention as enterprises1 as practical acts1 become themselves charged with the meaning of what they accomplish as their own immediate quality4 ,there exists no disjunction between aesthetic qualities which are final yet idle1 and acts which are practical or instrumental4 ,the latter have their own delights and sorrows4 ,,iii ,speaking1 then1 from the standpoint of temporal order1 we find reflection1 or thought1 occupying an intermediate and reconstructive position4 ,it comes between a temporally prior situation 7an organized interaction of factors7 of active and appreciative experience1 wherein some of the factors have become discordant and incompatible1 and a later situation1 which has been constituted out of the first situation by means of acting on the findings of reflective inquiry4 ,this final situation therefore has a richness of meaning1 as well as a controlled character lacking to its original4 ,by it is fixed the logical validity or intellectual force of the terms and relations distinguished by reflection4 ,owing to the continuity of experience 7the overlapping and recurrence of like problems71 these logical fixations become of the greatest assistance to subsequent inquiries2 they are its working means4 ,in such further uses1 they get further tested1 defined1 and elaborated1 until the vast and refined systems of the technical objects and formulae of the sciences come into existence--a point to which we shall return later4 ,owing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary to dwell1 the position thus sketched was not developed primarily upon its own independent account1 but rather in the course of a criticism of another type of logic1 the idealistic logic found in ,lotze4 ,it is obvious that the theory in question has critical bearings4 ,according to it1 reflection in its distinctions and processes can be understood only when placed in its intermediate pivotal temporal position--as a process of control1 through reorganization1 of material alogical in character4 ,it intimates that thinking would not exist1 and hence knowledge would not be found1 in a world which presented no troubles or where there are no problems of evil2 and on the other hand that a reflective method is the only sure way of dealing with these troubles4 ,it intimates that while the results of reflection1 because of the continuity of experience1 may be of wider scope than the situation which calls out a particular inquiry and invention1 reflection itself is always specific in origin and aim2 it always has something special to cope with4 ,for troubles are concretely specific4 ,it intimates also that thinking and reflective knowledge are never an end-all1 never their own purpose nor justification1 but that they pass naturally into a more direct and vital type of experience1 whether technological or appreciative or social4 ,this doctrine implies1 moreover1 that logical theory in its usual sense is essentially a descriptive study2 that it is an account of the processes and tools which have actually been found effective in inquiry1 comprising in the term inquiry both deliberate discovery and deliberate invention4 ,since the doctrine was propounded in an intellectual environment where such statements were not commonplaces1 where in fact a logic was reigning which challenged these convictions at every point1 it is not surprising that it was put forth with a controversial coloring1 being directed particularly at the dominant idealistic logic4 ,the point of contact and hence the point of conflict between the logic set forth and the idealistic logic are not far to seek4 ,the logic based on idealism had1 as a matter of fact1 treated knowledge from the standpoint of an account of thought--of thought in the sense of conception1 judgment1 and inferential reasoning4 ,but while it had inherited this view from the older rationalism1 it had also learned from ,hume1 via ,kant1 that direct sense or perceptual material must be taken into account4 ,hence it had1 in effect1 formulated the problem of logic as the problem of the connection of logical thought with sense-material1 and had attempted to set forth a metaphysics of reality based upon various ascending stages of the completeness of the rationalization or idealization of given1 brute1 fragmentary sense material by synthetic activity of thought4 ,while considerations of a much less formal kind were chiefly influential in bringing idealism to its modern vogue1 such as the conciliation of a scientific with a religious and moral point of view and the need of rationalizing social and historic institutions so as to explain their cultural effect1 yet this logic constituted the technique of idealism--its strictly intellectual claim for acceptance4 ,the point of contact1 and hence of conflict1 between it and such a doctrine of logic and reflective thought as is set forth above is1 ,i repeat1 fairly obvious4 ,both fix upon thinking as the key to the situation4 ,i still believe 7what ,i believed when ,i wrote the essays7 that under the influence of idealism valuable analyses and formulations of the work of reflective thought1 in its relation to securing knowledge of objects1 were executed4 ,but--and the but is one of exceptional gravity--the idealistic logic started from the distinction between immediate plural data and unifying1 rationalizing meanings as a distinction ready-made in experience1 and it set up as the goal of knowledge 7and hence as the definition of true reality7 a complete1 exhaustive1 comprehensive1 and eternal system in which plural and immediate data are forever woven into a fabric and pattern of self-luminous meaning4 ,in short1 it ignored the temporally intermediate and instrumental place of reflection2 and because it ignored and denied this place1 it overlooked its essential feature3 control of the environment in behalf of human progress and well-being1 the effort at control being stimulated by the needs1 the defects1 the troubles1 which accrue when the environment coerces and suppresses man or when man endeavors in ignorance to override the environment4 ,hence it misconstrued the criterion of the work of intelligence2 it set up as its criterion an ,absolute and ,non-temporal reality at large1 instead of using the criterion of specific temporal achievement of consequences through a control supplied by reflection4 ,and with this outcome1 it proved faithless to the cause which had generated it and given it its reason for being3 the magnification of the work of intelligence in our actual physical and social world4 ,for a theory which ends by declaring that everything is1 really and eternally1 thoroughly ideal and rational1 cuts the nerve of the specific demand and work of intelligence4 ,from this general statement1 let me descend to the technical point upon which turns the criticism of idealistic logic by the essays4 ,grant1 for a moment1 as a hypothesis1 that thinking starts neither from an implicit force of rationality desiring to realize itself completely in and through and against the limitations which are imposed upon it by the conditions of our human experience 7as all idealisms have taught71 nor from the fact that in each human being is a mind whose business it is just to know--to theorize in the ,aristotelian sense2 but1 rather1 that it starts from an effort to get out of some trouble1 actual or menacing4 ,it is quite clear that the human race has tried many another way out besides reflective inquiry4 ,its favorite resort has been a combination of magic and poetry1 the former to get the needed relief and control2 the latter to import into imagination1 and hence into emotional consummation1 the realizations denied in fact4 ,but as far as reflection does emerge and gets a working foothold1 the nature of its job is set for it4 ,on the one hand1 it must discover1 it must find out1 it must detect2 it must inventory what is there4 ,all this1 or else it will never know what the matter is2 the human being will not find out what struck him1 and hence will have no idea of where to seek for a remedy--for the needed control4 ,on the other hand1 it must invent1 it must project1 it must bring to bear upon the given situation what is not1 as it exists1 given as a part of it4 ,this seems to be quite empirical and quite evident4 ,the essays submitted the thesis that this simple dichotomization of the practical situation of power and enjoyment1 when menaced1 into what is there 7whether as obstacle or as resource71 and into suggested inventions--projections of something else to be brought to bear upon it1 ways of dealing with it--is the explanation of the time-honored logical determinations of brute fact1 datum and meaning or ideal quality2 of 7in more psychological terminology7 sense-perception and conception2 of particulars 7parts1 fragments7 and universals-generics2 and also of whatever there is of intrinsic significance in the traditional subject-predicate scheme of logic4 ,it held1 less formally1 that this view explained the eulogistic connotations always attaching to reason and to the work of reason in effecting unity1 harmony1 comprehension1 or synthesis1 and to the traditional combination of a depreciatory attitude toward brute facts with a grudging concession of the necessity which thought is under of accepting them and taking them for its own subject-matter and checks4 ,more specifically1 it is held that this view supplied 7and ,i should venture to say for the first time7 an explanation of the traditional theory of truth as a correspondence or agreement of existence and mind or thought4 ,it showed that the correspondence or agreement was like that between an invention and the conditions which the invention is intended to meet4 ,thereby a lot of epistemological hangers-on to logic were eliminated2 for the distinctions which epistemology had misunderstood were located where they belong3--in the art of inquiry1 considered as a joint process of ascertainment and invention1 projection1 or hypothesizing--of which more below4 ,,iv ,the essays were published in #aijc4 ,at that time 7as has been noted7 idealism was in practical command of the philosophic field in both ,england and this country2 the logics in vogue were profoundly influenced by ,kantian and post-,kantian thought4 ,empirical logics1 those conceived under the influence of ,mill1 still existed1 but their light was dimmed by the radiance of the regnant idealism4 ,moreover1 from the standpoint of the doctrine expounded in the essays1 the empirical logic committed the same logical fault as did the idealistic1 in taking sense-data to be primitive 7instead of being resolutions of the things of prior experiences into elements for the aim of securing evidence72 while it had no recognition of the specific service rendered by intelligence in the development of new meanings and plans of new actions4 ,this state of things may explain the controversial nature of the essays1 and their selection in particular of an idealistic logic for animadversion4 ,since the essays were written1 there has been an impressive revival of realism1 and also a development of a type of logical theory--the so-called ,analytic ,logic--corresponding to the philosophical aspirations of the new realism4 ,this marked alteration of intellectual environment subjects the doctrine of the essays to a test not contemplated when they were written4 ,it is one thing to develop a hypothesis in view of a particular situation2 it is another to test its worth in view of procedures and results having a radically different motivation and direction4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible to discuss the analytic logic in this place4 ,a consideration of how some of its main tenets compare with the conclusions outlined above will1 however1 throw some light upon the meaning and the worth of the latter4 ,although this was formulated with the idealistic and sensationalistic logics in mind1 the hypothesis that knowledge can be rightly understood only in connection with considerations of time and temporal position is a general one4 ,if it is valid1 it should be readily applicable to a critical placing of any theory which ignores and denies such temporal considerations4 ,and while ,i have learned much from the realistic movement about the full force of the position sketched in the essays when adequately developed2 and while later discussions have made it clear that the language employed in the essays was sometimes unnecessarily 7though naturally7 infected by the subjectivism of the positions against which it was directed1 ,i find that the analytic logic is also guilty of the fault of temporal dislocation4 ,in one respect1 idealistic logic takes cognizance of a temporal contrast2 indeed1 it may fairly be said to be based upon it4 ,it seizes upon the contrast in intellectual force1 consistency1 and comprehensiveness between the crude or raw data with which science sets out and the defined1 ordered1 and systematic totality at which it aims--and which in part it achieves4 ,this difference is a genuine empirical difference4 ,idealism noted that the difference may properly be ascribed to the intervention of thinking--that thought is what makes the difference4 ,now since the outcome of science is of higher intellectual rank than its data1 and since the intellectualistic tradition in philosophy has always identified degrees of logical adequacy with degrees of reality1 the conclusion was naturally drawn that the real world--absolute reality--was an ideal or thought-world1 and that the sense-world1 the commonsense-world1 the world of actual and historic experience1 is simply a phenomenal world presenting a fragmentary manifestation of that thought which the process of human thinking makes progressively explicit and articulate4 ,this perception of the intellectual superiority of objects which are constituted at the conclusion of thinking over those which formed its data may fairly be termed the empirical factor in the idealistic logic4 ,the essence of the realistic reaction1 on its logical side1 is exceedingly simple4 ,it starts from those objects with which science1 approved science1 ends4 ,since they are the objects which are known1 which are true1 they are the real objects4 ,that they are also objects for intervening thinking is an interesting enough historical and psychological fact1 but one quite irrelevant to their natures1 which are precisely what knowledge finds them to be4 ,in the biography of human beings it may hold good that apprehension of objects is arrived at only through certain wanderings1 endeavors1 exercises1 experiments2 possibly acts called sensation1 memory1 reflection may be needed by men in reaching a grasp of the objects4 ,but such things denote facts about the history of the knower1 not about the nature of the known object4 ,analysis will show1 moreover1 that any intelligible account of this history1 any verified statement of the psychology of knowing assumes objects which are unaffected by the knowing--otherwise the pretended history is merely pretense and not to be trusted4 ,the history of the process of knowing1 moreover1 implies also the terms and propositions--truths--of logic4 ,that logic must therefore be assumed as a science of objects real and true1 quite apart from any process of thinking them4 ,in short1 the requirement is that we shall think things as they are themselves1 not make them into objects constructed by thinking4 ,this revival of realism coincided also with an important movement in mathematics and logic3 the attempt to treat logical distinctions by mathematical methods2 while at the same time mathematical subject-matter had become so generalized that it was a theory of types and orders of terms and propositions--in short1 a logic4 ,certain minds have always found mathematics the type of knowledge1 because of its definiteness1 order1 and comprehensiveness4 ,the wonderful accomplishments of modern mathematics1 including its development into a type of highly generalized logic1 was not calculated to lessen the tendency4 ,and while prior philosophers have generally played their admiration of mathematics into the hands of idealism 7regarding mathematical subject-matter as the embodiment or manifestation of pure thought71 the new philosophy insisted that the terms and types of order constituting mathematical and logical subject-matter were real in their own right1 and 7at most7 merely led up to and discovered by thinking--an operation1 moreover1 itself subjected 7as has been pointed out7 to the entities and relationships set forth by logic4 ,the inadequacy of this summary account may be pardoned in view of the fact that no adequate exposition is intended2 all that is wanted is such a statement of the general relationship of idealism to realism as may serve as the point of departure for a comparison with the instrumentalism of the essays4 ,in bare outline1 it is obvious that the two latter agree in regarding thinking as instrumental1 not as constitutive4 ,but this agreement turns out to be a formal matter in contrast with a disagreement concerning that to which thinking is instrumental4 ,the new realism finds that it is instrumental simply to knowledge of objects4 ,from this it infers 7with perfect correctness and inevitableness7 that thinking 7including all the operations of discovery and testing as they might be set forth in an inductive logic7 is a mere psychological preliminary1 utterly irrelevant to any conclusions regarding the nature of objects known4 ,the thesis of the essays is that thinking is instrumental to a control of the environment1 a control effected through acts which would not be undertaken without the prior resolution of a complex situation into assured elements and an accompanying projection of possibilities--without1 that is to say1 thinking4 ,such an instrumentalism seems to analytic realism but a variant of idealism4 ,for it asserts that processes of reflective inquiry play a part in shaping the objects--namely1 terms and propositions--which constitute the bodies of scientific knowledge4 ,now it must not only be admitted but proclaimed that the doctrine of the essays holds that intelligence is not an otiose affair1 nor yet a mere preliminary to a spectator-like apprehension of terms and propositions4 ,in so far as it is idealistic to hold that objects of knowledge in their capacity of distinctive objects of knowledge are determined by intelligence1 it is idealistic4 ,it believes that faith in the constructive1 the creative1 competency of intelligence was the redeeming element in historic idealisms4 ,lest1 however1 we be misled by general terms1 the scope and limits of this idealism must be formulated4 7#a7 ,its distinguishing trait is that it defines thought or intelligence by function1 by work done1 by consequences effected4 ,it does not start with a power1 an entity or substance or activity which is ready-made thought or reason and which as such constitutes the world4 ,thought1 intelligence1 is to it just a name for the events and acts which make up the processes of analytic inspection and projected invention and testing which have been described4 ,these events1 these acts1 are wholly natural2 they are realistic2 they comprise the sticks and stones1 the bread and butter1 the trees and horses1 the eyes and ears1 the lovers and haters1 the sighs and delights of ordinary experience4 ,thinking is what some of the actual existences do4 ,they are in no sense constituted by thinking2 on the contrary1 the problems of thought are set by their difficulties and its resources are furnished by their efficacies2 its acts are their doings adapted to a distinctive end4 7#b7 ,the reorganization1 the modification1 effected by thinking is1 by this hypothesis1 a physical one4 ,thinking ends in experiment and experiment is an actual alteration of a physically antecedent situation in those details or respects which called for thought in order to do away with some evil4 ,to suffer a disease and to try to do something for it is a primal experience2 to look into the disease1 to try and find out just what makes it a disease1 to invent--or hypothecate--remedies is a reflective experience2 to try the suggested remedy and see whether the disease is helped is the act which transforms the data and the intended remedy into knowledge objects4 ,and this transformation into knowledge objects is also effected by changing physical things by physical means4 ,speaking from this point of view1 the decisive consideration as between instrumentalism and analytic realism is whether the operation of experimentation is or is not necessary to knowledge4 ,the instrumental theory holds that it is2 analytic realism holds that even though it were essential in getting knowledge 7or in learning71 it has nothing to do with knowledge itself1 and hence nothing to do with the known object3 that it makes a change only in the knower1 not in what is to be known4 ,and for precisely the same reason1 instrumentalism holds that an object as a knowledge-object is never a whole2 that it is surrounded with and inclosed by things which are quite other than objects of knowledge1 so that knowledge cannot be understood in isolation or when taken as mere beholding or grasping of objects4 ,that is to say1 while it is making the sick man better or worse 7or leaving him just the same7 which determines the knowledge-value of certain findings of fact and certain conceptions as to mode of treatment 7so that by the treatment they become definitely knowledge-objects71 yet improvement or deterioration of the patient is other than an object of cognitive apprehension4 ,its knowledge-object phase is a selection in reference to prior reflections4 ,so the laboratory experiment of a chemist which brings to a head a long reflective inquiry and settles the intellectual status of its findings and theorizings 7thereby making them into cognitive concerns or terms and propositions7 is itself much more than a knowledge of terms and propositions1 and only by virtue of this surplusage is it even contemplative knowledge4 ,he knows1 say1 tin1 when he has made tin into an outcome of his investigating procedures1 but tin is much more than a term of knowledge4 ,putting the matter in a slightly different way1 logical 7as distinct from nave7 realism confuses means of knowledge with objects of knowledge4 ,the means are twofold3 they are 7a7 the data of a particular inquiry so far as they are significant because of prior experimental inquiries2 and 7b7 they are the meanings which have been settled in consequence of prior intellectual undertakings3 on the one hand1 particular things or qualities as signs2 on the other1 general meanings as possibilities of what is signified by given data4 ,our physician has in advance a technique for telling that certain particular traits1 if he finds them1 are symptoms1 signs2 and he has a store of diseases and remedies in mind which may possibly be meant in any given case4 ,from prior reflective experiments he has learned to look for temperature1 for rate of heartbeats1 for sore spots in certain places2 to take specimens of blood1 sputum1 of membrane1 and subject them to cultures1 microscopic examination1 etc4 ,he has acquired certain habits1 in other words1 in virtue of which certain physical qualities and events are more than physical1 in virtue of which they are signs or indications of something else4 ,on the other hand1 this something else is a somewhat not physically present at the time3 it is a series of events still to happen4 ,it is suggested by what is given1 but is no part of the given4 ,now1 in the degree in which the physician comes to the examination of what is there with a large and comprehensive stock of such possibilities or meanings in mind1 he will be intellectually resourceful in dealing with a particular case4 ,they 7the concepts or universals of the situation7 are 7together with the sign-capacity of the data7 the means of knowing the case in hand2 they are the agencies of transforming it1 through the actions which they call for1 into an object--an object of knowledge1 a truth to be stated in propositions4 ,but since the professional 7as distinct from the human7 knower is particularly concerned with the elaboration of these tools1 the professional knower--of which the class philosopher presents of course one case--ungenerously drops from sight the situation in its integrity and treats these instrumentalities of knowledge as objects of knowledge4 ,each of these aspects--signs and things signified--is sufficiently important to deserve a section on its own account4 ,v ,the position taken in the essays is frankly realistic in acknowledging that certain brute existences1 detected or laid bare by thinking but in no way constituted out of thought or any mental process1 set every problem for reflection and hence serve to test its otherwise merely speculative results4 ,it is simply insisted that as a matter of fact these brute existences are equivalent neither to the objective content of the situations1 technological or artistic or social1 in which thinking originates1 nor to the things to be known--to the objects of knowledge4 ,let us take the sequence of mineral rock in place1 pig iron and the manufactured article1 comparing the raw material in its undisturbed place in nature to the original res of experience1 compare the manufactured article to the objective and object of knowledge1 and the brute datum to the metal undergoing extraction from raw ore for the sake of being wrought into a useful thing4 ,and we should add that just as the manufacturer always has a lot of already extracted ore on hand for use in machine processes as it is wanted1 so every person of any maturity1 especially if he lives in an environment affected by previous scientific work1 has a lot of extracted data--or1 what comes to the same thing1 of ready-made tools of extraction--for use in inference as they are required4 ,we go about with a disposition to identify certain shapes as tables1 certain sounds as words of the ,french language1 certain cries as evidences of distress1 certain massed colors as woods in the distance1 certain empty spaces as buttonholes1 and so on indefinitely4 ,the examples are trivial enough4 ,but if more complicated matters were taken1 it would be seen that a large part of the technique of science 7all of science which is specifically inductive in character7 consists of methods of finding out just what qualities are unambiguous1 economical1 and dependable signs of those other things which cannot be got at as directly as can the sign-bearing elements4 ,and if we started from the more obscure and complex difficulties of identification and diagnosis with which the sciences of physiology1 botany1 astronomy1 chemistry1 etc41 deal1 we should be forced to recognize that the identifications of everyday life--our perceptions of chairs1 tables1 trees1 friends--differ only in presenting questions much easier of solution4 ,in every case1 it is a matter of fixing some given physical existence as a sign of some other existences not given in the same way as is that which serves as a sign4 ,these words of ,mill might well be made the motto of every logic3 ,to draw inferences has been said to be the great business of life4 ,everyone has daily1 hourly1 and momentary need of ascertaining facts which he has not directly observed4444 ,it is the only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged4 ,such being the case1 the indispensable condition of doing the business well is the careful determination of the sign-force of specific things in experience4 ,and this condition can never be fulfilled as long as a thing is presented to us1 so to say1 in bulk4 ,the complex organizations which are the subject-matter of our direct activities and enjoyments are grossly unfit to serve as intellectual indications or evidence4 ,their testimony is almost worthless1 they speak so many languages4 ,in their complexity1 they point equally in all directions2 in their unity1 they run in a groove and point to whatever is most customary4 ,to break up the complexity1 to resolve it into a number of independent variables each as irreducible as it is possible to make it1 is the only way of getting secure pointers as to what is indicated by the occurrence of the situation in question4 ,the objects of ordinary life1 stones1 plants1 cats1 rocks1 moon1 etc41 are neither the data of science nor the objects at which science arrives4 ,we are here face to face with a crucial point in analytic realism4 ,realism argues that we have no alternative except either to regard analysis as falsifying 7 la ,bergson71 and thus commit ourselves to distrust of science as an organ of knowledge1 or else to admit that something eulogistically termed ,reality 7especially as ,existence1 ,being as subject to space and time determinations7 is but a complex made up of fixed1 mutually independent simples3 viz41 that ,reality is truly conceived only under the caption of whole and parts1 where the parts are independent of each other and consequently of the whole4 ,for instrumentalism1 however1 the alleged dilemma simply does not exist4 ,the results of abstraction and analysis are perfectly real2 but they are real1 like everything else1 where they are real3 that is to say1 in some particular coexistence in the situation where they originate and operate4 ,the remark is perhaps more cryptic than enlightening4 ,its intent is that reflection is an actual occurrence as much so as a thunderstorm or a growing plant1 and as an actual existence it is characterized by specific existential traits uniquely belonging to it3 the entities of simple data as such4 ,it is in control of the evidential function that irreducible and independent simples or elements exist4 ,they certainly are found there2 as we have seen they are common-sense objects broken up into expeditious and unambiguous signs of conclusions to be drawn1 conclusions about other things with which they--the elements--are continuous in some respects1 although discrete#d with respect to their sensory conditions4 ,but there is no more reason for supposing that they exist elsewhere in the same manner than there is for supposing that centaurs coexist along with domestic horses and cows because they coexist with the material of folk-tales or rites1 or for supposing that pigs of iron pre-existed as pigs in the mine4 ,there is no falsifying in analysis because the analysis is carried on within a situation which controls it4 ,the fallacy and falsifying is on the part of the philosopher who ignores the contextual situation and who transfers the properties which things have as dependable evidential signs over to things in other modes of behavior4 ,it is no reply to this position to say that the elements or simples were there prior to inquiry and to analysis and abstraction4 ,of course their subject-matter was in some sense there2 and1 being there1 was found1 discovered1 or detected--hit upon4 ,i am not questioning this statement2 rather1 ,i have been asserting it4 ,but ,i am asking for patience and industry to consider the matter somewhat further4 ,i would ask the man who takes the terms of logical analysis 7physical resolution for the sake of getting assured evidential indications of objects as yet unknown7 to be things which coexist with the things of a non-inferential situation1 to inquire in what way his independent given ultimates were there prior to analysis4 ,i would point out that in any case they did not pre-exist as signs4 7a7 ,consequently1 whatever traits or properties they possess as signs must at least be referred exclusively to the reflective situation4 ,and they must possess some distinguishing traits as signs2 otherwise they would be indistinguishable from anything else which happens to be thought of1 and could not be employed as evidence3 could not be1 in short1 what they are4 ,if the reader will seriously ask just what traits data do possess as signs1 or evidence1 ,i shall be quite content to leave the issue to the results of his own inquiries4 7b7 ,any inquiry as to how the data antecedently exist will1 ,i am confident1 show that they do not exist in the same purity1 the same external exclusiveness and internal homogeneity1 which they present within the situation of inference1 any more than the iron which pre-existed in the rocks in the mountains was just the same as the fluxed and extracted ore4 ,hence they did not exist in the same isolated simplicity4 ,i have not the slightest interest in exaggerating the scope of this difference4 ,the important matter is not its extent or range1 but what such a change--however small--indicates3 namely1 that the material is entering into a new environment1 and has been subjected to the changes which will make it useful and effective in that environment4 ,it is trivial to suppose that the sole or even the primary difficulty which an analytic realism has to face is the occurrence of error and illusions1 of secondary qualities1 etc4 ,the difficulty resides in the contrast of the world of a nave1 say ,aristotelian1 realism with that of a highly intellectualized and analytic disintegration of the everyday world of things4 ,if realism is generous enough to have a place within its world 7as a res having social and temporal qualities as well as spatial ones7 for data in process of construction of new objects1 the outlook is radically different from the case where1 in the interests of a theory1 a realism insists that analytic determinations are the sole real things4#e ,if it be not only conceded but asserted that the subject-matter generating the data of scientific procedure antedates the procedure1 it may be asked3 what is the point of insisting so much upon the fact that data exist only within the procedure8 ,is not the statement either a trivial tautology or else an attempt to inject1 sub rosa1 a certain idealistic dependence upon thought into even brute facts8 ,the question is a fair one4 ,and the clew to the reply may be found in the consideration that it was not historically an easy matter to reduce the iron of the rocks to the iron which could freely and effectively be used in the manufacture of articles4 ,it involved hitting upon a highly complicated art1 but an art1 nevertheless1 which anyone with the necessary capital and education can command today as a matter of course1 giving no thought to the fact that one is using an art constructed originally with vast pains4 ,similarly it is by art1 by a carefully determined technique1 that the things of our primary experience are resolved into unquestioned and irreducible data1 lacking in inner complexity and hence unambiguous4 ,there is no call for the scientific man in the pursuit of his calling to take account of this fact1 any more than the manufacturer need reckon with the arts which are required to deliver him his material4 ,but a logician1 a philosopher1 is supposed to take a somewhat broader survey2 and for his purposes the fact which the scientific inquirer can leave out of account1 because it is no part of his business1 may be the important fact4 ,for the logician1 it would seem1 is concerned not with the significance of these or those data1 but with the significance of there being such things as data1 with their traits of irreducibleness1 bruteness1 simplicity1 etc4 ,now1 as the special scientific inquirer answers the question as to the significance of his special brute facts by discovering other facts with which they are connected1 so it would seem that the logician can find out the significance of the existence of data 7the fact which concerns him7 only by finding out the other facts with which they coexist--their significance being their factual continuities4 ,and the first step in the search for these other facts which supply significance is the recognition that they have been extracted for a purpose--for the purpose of guiding inference4 ,it is this purposeful situation of inquiry which supplies the other facts which give the existence of brute data their significance4 ,and unless there is such a discovery 7or some better one71 the logician will inevitably fail in conceiving the import of the existence of brute data4 ,and this misconception is1 ,i repeat1 just the defect from which an analytic presentative realism suffers4 ,to perceive that the brute data laid bare in scientific proceedings are always traits of an extensive situation1 and of that situation as one which needs control and which is to undergo modification in some respects1 is to be protected from any temptation to turn logical specification into metaphysical atomism4 ,the need for the protection is sufficiently great to justify spending some energy in pointing out that the brute objective facts of scientific discovery are discovered facts1 discovered by physical manipulations which detach them from their ordinary setting4 ,we have stated that1 strictly speaking1 data 7as the immediate considerations from which controlled inference proceeds7 are not objects but means1 instrumentalities1 of knowledge3 things by which we know rather than things known4 ,it is by the color stain that we know a cellular structure2 it is by marks on a page that we know what some man believes2 it is by the height of the barometer that we know the probability of rain2 it is by the scratches on the rock that we know that ice was once there2 it is by qualities detected in chemical and microscopic examination that we know that a thing is human blood and not paint4 ,just what the realist asserts about so-called mental states of sensations1 images1 and ideas1 namely1 that they are not the subject-matter of knowledge but its agencies1 holds of the chairs and tables to which he appeals in support of his doctrine of an immediate cognitive presentation1 apart from any problem and any reflection4 ,and there is very solid ground for instituting the comparison3 the sensations1 images1 etc41 of the idealist are nothing but the chairs1 tables1 etc41 of the realist in their ultimate irreducible qualities4#f ,the problem in which the realist appeals to the immediate apprehension of the table is the epistemological problem1 and he appeals to the table not as an object of knowledge 7as he thinks he does71 but as evidence1 as a means of knowing his conclusion--his real object of knowledge4 ,he has only to examine his own evidence to see that it is evidence1 and hence a term in a reflective inquiry1 while the nature of knowledge is the object of his knowledge4 ,again1 the question may be asked3 ,since instrumentalism admits that the table is really there1 why make such a fuss about whether it is there as a means or as an object of knowledge8 ,is not the distinction mere hair-splitting unless it is a way of smuggling in a quasi-idealistic dependence upon thought8 ,the reply will1 ,i hope1 clinch the significance of the distinction1 whether or no it makes it acceptable4 ,respect for knowledge and its object is the ground for insisting upon the distinction4 ,the object of knowledge is1 so to speak1 a more dignified1 a more complete1 sufficient1 and self-sufficing thing than any datum can be4 ,to transfer the traits of the object as known to the datum of reaching it1 is a material1 not a merely verbal1 affair4 ,it is precisely this shift which leads the presentative realist to substitute for irreducibility and unambiguity of logical function 7use in inference7 physical and metaphysical isolation and elementariness4 ,it is this shift which generates the need of reconciling the deliverances of science with the structure and qualities of the world in which we directly live1 since it sets up a rivalry between the claims of the data1 of common-sense objects1 and of scientific objects 7the results of adequate inquiry74 ,above all it commits us to a view that change is in some sense unreal1 since ultimate and primary entities1 being simple1 do not permit of change4 ,no2 whatever is to be said about the validity of the distinction contended for1 it cannot be said to be insignificant4 ,a theory which commits us to the conception of a world of ,eleatic fixities as primary and which regards alteration and organization as secondary has such profound consequences for thought and conduct that a detection of its motivating fallacy makes a substantial difference4 ,no more fundamental question can be raised than the range and force of the applicability to nature1 life1 and society of the whole-and-part conception4 ,and if we confuse our premises by taking the existential instrumentalities of knowledge for its real objects1 all distinctions and relations in nature1 life1 and society are thereby requisitioned to be really only cases of the whole-and-part nature of things4 ,,vi ,the instrumental theory acknowledges the objectivity of meanings as well as of data4 ,they are referred to and employed in reflective inquiry with the confidence attached to the hard facts of sense4 ,pragmatic1 as distinct from sensational1 empiricism may claim to have antedated neo-realism in criticism of resolution of meanings into states or acts of consciousness4 ,as previously noted1 meanings are indispensable instrumentalities of reflection1 strictly coincident with and correlative to what is analytically detected to be given1 or irremovably there4 ,data in their fragmentary character pose a problem2 they also define it4 ,they suggest possible meanings4 ,whether they indicate them as well as suggest them is a question to be resolved4 ,but the meanings suggested are genuinely and existentially suggested1 and the problem described by the data cannot be solved without their acknowledgment and use4 ,that this instrumental necessity has led to a metaphysical hypostatizing of meanings into essences or subsistences having some sort of mysterious being apart from qualitative things and changes is a source of regret2 it is hardly an occasion for surprise4 ,to be sure of our footing1 let us return to empirical ground4 ,it is as certain an empirical fact that one thing suggests another as that fire alters the thing burned4 ,the suggesting thing has to be there or given2 something has to be there to do the suggesting4 ,the suggested thing is obviously not there in the same way as that which suggests2 if it were1 it would not have to be suggested4 ,a suggestion tends1 in the natural man1 to excite action1 to operate as a stimulus4 ,i may respond more readily and energetically to a suggested fire than to the thing from which the suggestion sprang3 that is1 the thing by itself may leave me cold1 the thing as suggesting something else may move me vigorously4 ,the response if effected has all the force of a belief or conviction4 ,it is as if we believed1 on intellectual grounds1 that the thing is a fire4 ,but it is discovered that not all suggestions are indications1 or signifiers4 ,the whale suggested by the cloud form does not stand on the same level as the fire suggested by smoke1 and the suggested fire does not always turn out fire in fact4 ,we are led to examine the original point of departure and we find out that it was not really smoke4 ,in a world where skim-milk and cream suggestions1 acted upon1 have respectively different consequences1 and where a thing suggests one as readily as the other 7or skim-milk masquerades as cream71 the importance of examination of the thing exercising the suggestive force prior to acting upon what it suggests is obvious4 ,hence the act of response naturally stimulated is turned into channels of inspection and experimental 7physical7 analysis4 ,we move our body to get a better hold on it1 and we pick it to pieces to see what it is4 ,this is the operation which we have been discussing in the last section4 ,but experience also testifies that the thing suggested is worth attention on its own account4 ,perhaps we cannot get very readily at the thing which1 suggesting flame1 suggests fire4 ,it may be that reflection upon the meaning 7or conception71 fire1 will help us4 ,fire--here1 there1 or anywhere1 the essence fire--means thus and so2 if this thing really means fire1 it will have certain traits1 certain attributes4 ,are they there8 ,there are flames on the stage as part of the scenery4 ,do they really indicate fire8 ,fire would mean danger2 but it is not possible that such a risk would be taken with an audience 7other meanings1 risk1 audience1 danger1 being brought in74 ,it must be something else4 ,well1 it is probably colored tissue-paper in strips rapidly blown about4 ,this meaning leads us to closer inspection2 it directs our observations to hunt for corroborations or negations4 ,if conditions permitted1 it would lead us to walk up and get at the thing in close quarters4 ,in short1 devotion to a suggestion1 prior to accepting it as stimulus1 leads first to other suggestions which may be more applicable2 and1 secondly1 it affords the standpoint and the procedure of a physical experimentation to detect those elements which are the more reliable signs1 indicators 7evidence74 ,suggestions thus treated are precisely what constitute meanings1 subsistences1 essences1 etc4 ,without such development and handling of what is suggested1 the process of analyzing the situation to get at its hard facts1 and especially to get at just those which have a right to determine inference1 is haphazard--ineffectively done4 ,in the actual stress of any such needed determination it is of the greatest importance to have a large stock of possible meanings to draw on1 and to have them ordered in such a way that we can develop each promptly and accurately1 and move quickly from one to another4 ,it is not to be wondered at then that we not only conserve such suggestions as have been previously converted successfully into meanings1 but also that we 7or some men at least7 turn professional inquirers and thinkers2 that meanings are elaborated and ordered in related systems quite apart from any immediately urgent situation2 or that a realm of essences is built up apart from that of existences4 ,that suggestion occurs is doubtless a mystery1 but so is it a mystery that hydrogen and oxygen make water4 ,it is one of the hard1 brute facts that we have to take account of4 ,we can investigate the conditions under which the happening takes place1 we can trace the consequences which flow from the happening4 ,by these means we can so control the happening that it will take place in a more secure and fruitful manner4 ,but all this depends upon the hearty acceptance of the happening as fact4 ,suggestion does not of itself yield meanings2 it yields only suggested things4 ,but the moment we take a suggested thing and develop it in connection with other meanings and employ it as a guide of investigation 7a method of inquiry71 that moment we have a full-fledged meaning on our hands1 possessing all the verifiable features which have been imported at any time to ideas1 forms1 species1 essences1 subsistences4 ,this empirical identification of meaning by means of the specific fact of suggestion cuts deep--if ,occam's razor still cuts4 ,a suggestion lies between adequate stimulation and logical indication4 ,a cry of fire may start us running without reflection2 we may have learned1 as children are taught in school1 to react without questioning4 ,there is overt stimulation1 but no suggesting4 ,but if the response is held off or postponed1 it may persist as suggestion3 the cry suggests fire and suggests the advisability of flight4 ,we may1 in a sense we must1 call suggestion mental4 ,but it is important to note what is meant by this term4 ,fire1 running1 getting burned1 are not mental2 they are physical4 ,but in their status of being suggested they may be called mental when we recognize this distinctive status4 ,this means no more than that they are implicated in a specific way in a reflective situation1 in virtue of which they are susceptible of certain modes of treatment4 ,their status as suggested by certain features of the actual situation 7and possibly meant or indicated as well as suggested7 may be definitely fixed2 then we get meanings1 logical terms--determinations4#g ,words are of course the agencies of fixation chiefly employed1 though any kind of physical existence--a gesture1 a muscular contraction in the finger or leg or chest--under ready command may be used4 ,what is essential is that there be a specific physical existence at hand which may be used to concrete and hold on to the suggestion1 so that the latter may be handled on its own account4 ,until thus detached and refixed there are things suggested1 but hardly a suggestion2 things meant1 but hardly a meaning2 things ideated1 but hardly an idea4 ,and the suggested thing until detached is still too literal1 too tied up with other things1 to be further developed or to be successfully used as a method of experimentation in new directions so as to bring to light new traits4 ,as data are signs which indicate other existences1 so meanings are signs which imply other meanings4#h ,i am doubtful1 for example1 whether this is a man or not2 that is1 ,i am doubtful as to some given traits when they are taken as signs or evidences1 but ,i am inclined to the hypothesis of a man4 ,having such a tentative or conceptual object in mind1 ,i am enabled to explore economically and effectively1 instead of at random1 what is present1 provided ,i can elaborate the implications of the term man4 ,to develop its implications is all one with telling its meaning in connection with other meanings4 ,being a man means1 for example1 speaking when spoken to--another meaning which need have been no part of man as originally suggested4 ,this meaning of answering questions will then suggest a procedure which the term man in its first meaning did not possess2 it is an implication or implied meaning which puts me in a new and possibly more fruitful relation to the thing4 7,the process of developing implications is usually termed discourse or ratiocination47 ,now1 be it noted1 replying to questions is no part of the definition of man2 it would not be now an implication of ,plato or of the ,russian ,czar for me4 ,in other words1 there is something in the actual situation which suggests inquiring as well as man2 and it is the interaction between these two suggestions which is fruitful4 ,there is consequently no mystery about the fruitfulness of deduction--though this fruitfulness has been urged as though it offered an insuperable objection to instrumentalism4 ,on the contrary1 instrumentalism is the only theory to which deduction is not a mystery4 ,if a variety of wheels and cams and rods which have been invented with reference to doing a given task are put together1 one expects from the assembled parts a result which could not have been got from any one of them separately or from all of them together in a heap4 ,because they are independent and unlike structures1 working on one another1 something new happens4 ,the same is true of terms in relation to one another4 ,when these are brought to bear upon one another1 something new1 something quite unexpected happens1 quite as when one tries an acid with which he is not familiar upon a rock with which he is unfamiliar--that is1 unfamiliar in such a conjunction1 in spite of intimate acquaintance elsewhere4 ,a definition may fix a certain modicum of meaning in the abstract1 as we say2 it is a specification of a minimum which gives the point of departure in every interaction of a term with other terms4 ,but nothing follows from the definition by itself or in isolation4 ,it is explicit 7boringly so7 and has no implications4 ,but bring it in connection with another term with which it has not previously interacted and it may behave in the most delightful or in the most disgustingly disappointing way4 ,the necessity for independent terms is made obvious in the modern theory of axioms4 ,it escapes attention in much of the contemporary logic of transitive and non-transitive1 symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations1 because the terms are so loaded that there are no propositions at all1 but only discriminations of orders of terms4 ,the terms which figure in the discussions1 in other words1 are correlatives--brother1 parent1 up1 to the right of1 like1 greater1 after4 ,such terms are not logical terms2 they are halves of such terms as brother-other-offspring-of-the-same-pare nts2 parent-child2 up-down2 right-left2 thing-similar-to-another-thing2 greater-less2 after-before4 ,they express positions in a determined situation2 they are relatives1 not relations4 ,they lack implications1 being explicit4 ,but a man who is a brother and also a rival in love1 and a poorer man than his rival brother1 expresses an interaction of different terms from which something might happen3 terms with implications1 terms constituting a proposition1 which a correlative term never does--till brought into conjunction with a term of which it is not a relative4 ,to have called a thing up or brother is to have already solved its import in some situation4 ,it is dead till set to work in some other situation4 ,experience shows1 moreover1 that certain qualities of things are much more fruitful and much more controllable than others when taken as meanings to be used in drawing conclusions4 ,the term must be of a nature to develop a method of behavior by which to test whether it is the meaning of the situation4 ,since it is desirable to have a stock of meanings on hand which are so connected that we can move readily from one to another in any direction1 the stock is effective in just the degree in which it has been worked into a system--a comprehensive and orderly arrangement4 ,hence1 while all meanings are derived from things which antedate suggestion--or thinking or consciousness--not all qualities are equally fitted to be meanings of a wide efficiency1 and it is a work of art to select the proper qualities for doing the work4 ,this corresponds to the working over of raw material into an effective tool4 ,a spade or a watchspring is made out of antecedent material1 but does not pre-exist as a ready-made tool2 and1 the more delicate and complicated the work which it has to do1 the more art intervenes4 ,these summary remarks will have to pass muster as indicating what a more extensive treatment of a mathematical system of terms would show4 ,man began by working such qualities as hate and love and fear and beauty into the meanings by which to interpret and control the perplexities of life4 ,when they demonstrated their inefficacy1 he had recourse to such qualities as heavy and light1 wet and dry1 making them into natural essences or explanatory and regulatory meanings4 ,that ,greek mediaeval science did not get very far on these lines is a commonplace4 ,scientific progress and practical control as systematic and deliberate matters date from the century of ,galileo1 when qualities which lend themselves to mathematical treatment were seized upon4 ,the most promising of these ideal systems at first were of course the richer ones1 the sentimental ones4 ,the baldest and least promising ones were the mathematical ones2 but the history of the latter's application is a history of steadily advancing successes1 while that of the sentimentally richer ones is one of relative sterility and failure4#i ,there is no problem of why and how the plow fits1 or applies to1 the garden1 or the watchspring to time-keeping4 ,they were made for those respective purposes2 the question is how well they do their work1 and how they can be reshaped to do it better4 ,yet they were made out of physical material2 men used ready limbs or roots of trees with which to plow before they used metal4 ,we do not measure the worth or reality of the tool by its closeness to its natural prototype1 but by its efficiency in doing its work--which connotes a great deal of intervening art4 ,the theory proposed for mathematical distinctions and relations is precisely analogous4 ,they are not the creations of mind except in the sense in which a telephone is a creation of mind4 ,they fit nature because they are derived from natural conditions4 ,things naturally bulge1 so to speak1 and naturally alter4 ,to seize upon these qualities1 to develop them into keys for discovering the meanings of brute1 isolated events1 and to accomplish this effectively1 to develop and order them till they become economical tools 7and tools upon tools7 for making an unknown and uncertain situation into a known and certain one1 is the recorded triumph of human intelligence4 ,the terms and propositions of mathematics are not fictions2 they are not called into being by that particular act of mind in which they are used4 ,no more is a self-binding reaper a figment1 nor is it called momentarily into being by the man who wants to harvest his grain4 ,but both alike are works of art1 constructed for a purpose in doing the things which have to be done4 ,we may say of terms what ,santayana so happily said of expression3 ,expression is a misleading term which suggests that something previously known is imitated or rendered2 whereas the expression is itself an original fact1 the values of which are then referred to the thing expressed1 much as the honors of a ,chinese mandarin are attributed retroactively to his parents4 ,the natural history of imputation of virtue should prove to the philosopher a profitable theme4 ,even in its most superstitious forms 7perhaps more obviously in them than elsewhere7 it testifies to the sense of a service to be performed and to a demand for application4 ,the superstition lies in making the application to antecedents and to ancestors1 where it is but a shroud1 instead of to descendants1 where it is a generating factor4 ,every reflection leaves behind it a double effect4 ,its immediate outcome is 7as ,i tried to show earlier7 the direct reorganization of a situation1 a reorganization which confers upon its contents new increments of intrinsic meaning4 ,its indirect and intellectual product is the defining of a meaning which 7when fixed by a suitable existence7 is a resource in subsequent investigations4 ,i would not despise the assistance lent by the words term and proposition4 ,as slang has it1 a pitched baseball is to the batter a proposition2 it states1 or makes explicit1 what he has to deal with next amid all the surrounding and momentarily irrelevant circumstance4 ,every statement extracts and sets forth the net result of reflection up to date as a condition of subsequent reflection4 ,this extraction of the kernel of past reflections makes possible a throwing to one side of all the consequences of prior false and futile steps2 it enables one to dispense with the experiences themselves and to deal only with their net profit4 ,in a favorite phrase of realism1 it gives an object as if there were no experience4 ,it is unnecessary to descant upon the economy of this procedure4 ,it eliminates everything which in spite of its immediate urgency1 or vividness1 or weight of past authority1 is rubbish for the purpose in hand4 ,it enables one to get down to business with just that which 7presumably7 is of importance in subsequent procedure4 ,it is no wonder that these logical kernels have been elevated into metaphysical essences4 ,the word term suggests the limiting condition of every process of reflection4 ,it sets a fence beyond which it is1 presumably1 a waste to wander--an error4 ,it sets forth that which must be taken into account--a limit which is inescapable1 something which is to ratiocination what the brute datum is to observation4 ,in classic phrase1 it is a notion1 that is1 a noting1 of the distinctions which have been fixed for the purposes of the kind of inquiry now engaged in4 ,one has only to compare the terms of present scientific discourse with those of1 say1 ,aristotle1 to see that the importance of terms as instruments of a proper survey of and attack upon existential situations is such that the terms resulting naturally and spontaneously from reflection have been dropped and more effective ones substituted4 ,in one sense1 they are all equally objective2 aquosity is as genuine1 as well as more obvious1 a notion as the present chemical conception4 ,but the latter is able to enter a much wider scope of inquiries and to figure in them more prosperously4 ,as a special class of scientific inquirers develops1 terms that were originally by-products of reflection become primary objects for the intellectual class4 ,the troubles which occasion reflection are then intellectual troubles1 discrepancies within some current scheme of propositions and terms4 ,the situation which undergoes reorganization and increase of comprised significance is that of the subject-matter of specialized investigation4 ,nevertheless the same general method recurs within it1 and the resulting objects--the terms and propositions--are for all1 except those who produce them1 instruments1 not terminal objects4 ,the objection to analytic realism as a metaphysics of existence is not so much an undue formalism as its affront to the commonsense-world of action1 appreciation1 and affection4 ,the affront1 due to hypostatizing terms into objects1 is as great as that of idealism4 ,a nave realism withstands both affronts4 ,my interest1 however1 is not to animadvert upon analytic realism4 ,it is to show how the main tenets of instrumental logic stand in relation to considerations which1 although ignored by the idealism which was current when the theory received its first formulation1 demand attention3 the objective status of data and terms with respect to states of mind or acts of awareness4 ,i have tried to show that the theory1 without mutilation or torturing1 makes provision for these considerations4 ,they are not objections to it2 they are considerations which are involved in it4 ,there are questions at issue1 but they concern not matters of logic but matters of fact4 ,they are questions of the existential setting of certain logical distinctions and relations4 ,as to the comparative merits of the two schemes1 ,i have nothing to say beyond what has been said1 save that the tendency of the analytic realism is inevitably to treat a difference between the logic of inquiry and of dialectic as if it were itself a matter to be settled by the logic of dialectic4 ,i confess to some fear that a philosophy which fails to identify science with terms and propositions about things which are not terms and propositions1 will first exaggerate and then misconstrue the function of dialectics1 and land philosophy in a formalism like unto the scholasticism from which the older empiricism with all its defects emancipated those who took it to heart4 ,,vii ,return with me1 if you please1 to fundamentals4 ,the word experience is used freely in the essays and without much explanation4 ,in view of the currency of subjectivistic interpretations of that term1 the chief wonder is probably that the doctrine of the essays was not more misunderstood than was actually the case4 ,i have already said something designed to clarify the sense in which the term was used4 ,i now come back to the matter4 ,what is the reason for using the term at all in philosophy8 ,the history of philosophy supplies1 ,i think1 the answer4 ,no matter how subjective a turn was given to the word by ,hume and ,kant1 we have only to go to an earlier period to see that the appeal to experience in philosophy was coincident with the emancipation of science from occult essences and causes1 and with the substitution of methods of observation1 controlled by experimentation and employing mathematical considerations1 for methods of mere dialectic definition and classification4 ,the appeal to experience was the cry of the man from ,missouri--the demand to be shown4 ,it sprang from the desire to command nature by observing her1 instead of anticipating her in order to deck her with aesthetic garlands and hold her with theological chains4 ,the significance of experience was not that sun and moon1 stick and stone1 are creatures of the senses1 but that men would not put their trust any longer in things which are said1 however authoritatively1 to exist1 unless these things are capable of entering into specifiable connections with the organism and the organism with them4 ,it was an emphatic assertion that until men could see how things got into belief1 and what they did when they got there1 intellectual acceptance would be withheld4 ,has not the lesson1 however1 been so well learned that we can drop reference to experience8 ,would that such were the case4 ,but the time does not seem to have come4 ,some things enter by way of the imagination1 stimulated by emotional preferences and biases4 ,for certain purposes1 they are not the worse for having entered by that gate1 instead of through sensory-motor adjustments4 ,or they may have entered because of the love of man for logical form and symmetry and system1 and because of the emotional satisfaction which harmony awakens in a sensitive soul4 ,they too need not be any worse for all that4 ,but surely it is among the businesses of philosophy to discriminate between the kinds of goodness possessed by different kinds of things4 ,and how can it discriminate unless by telling by what road they got into our experience and what they do after they get there8 ,assuredly the difference is not in intrinsic content4 ,it is not because of self-obvious and self-contained traits of the immediate terms that ,dante's world belongs to poetry and ,newton's to scientific astronomy4 ,no amount of pure inspection and excogitation could decide which belongs to which world4 ,the difference in status and claim is made by what we call experience3 by the place of the two systems in experience with respect to their generation and consequences4 ,and assuredly any philosophy which takes science to be not an account of the world 7which it is71 but a literal and exhaustive apprehension of it in its full reality1 a philosophy which therefore has no place for poetry or possibilities1 still needs a theory of experience4 ,if a scientific man be asked what is truth1 he will reply--if he frame his reply in terms of his practice and not of some convention--that which is accepted upon adequate evidence4 ,and if he is asked for a description of adequacy of evidence1 he certainly will refer to matters of observation and experiment4 ,it is not the self-inclosed character of the terms and propositions nor their systematic ordering which settles the case for him2 it is the way they were obtained and what he can do with them in getting other things4 ,and when a mathematician or logician asks philosophy to abandon this method1 then is just the time to be most vigorous in insisting upon the necessity of reference to experience in order to fix the import of mathematical and logical pretensions4 ,when students influenced by the symmetry and system of mathematics cease building up their philosophies in terms of traits of mathematical subject-matter in isolation1 then empirical philosophers will have less call to mention experience4 ,meantime1 ,i know of no way of fixing the scope and claims of mathematics in philosophy save to try to point out just at what juncture it enters experience and what work it does after it has got entrance4 ,i have made such an attempt in my account of the fixation and handling of suggestions as meanings4 ,it is defective enough1 but the defects are to be remedied by a better empirical account and not by setting up against experience the claims of a logic aloof from experience4 ,the objection then to a logic which rules out knowledge getting1 and which bases logic exclusively upon the traits of known objects1 is that it is self-contradictory4 ,there is no way to know what are the traits of known objects1 as distinct from imaginary objects1 or objects of opinion1 or objects of unanalytic common-sense1 save by referring to the operations of getting1 using1 and testing evidence--the processes of knowledge getting4 ,i am making no appeal for skepticism at large2 ,i am not questioning the right of the physicist1 the mathematician1 or the symbolic logicist to go ahead with accepted objects and do what he can with them4 ,i am pointing out that anyone who professes to be concerned with finding out what knowledge is1 has for his primary work the job of finding out why it is so much safer to proceed with just these objects1 than with those1 say1 of ,aristotelian science4 ,aristotle was not lacking in acuteness nor in learning4 ,to him it was clear that objects of knowledge are the things of ordinary perception1 so far as they are referred to a form which comparison of perceived things1 in the light of a final cause1 makes evident4 ,if this view of the objects of knowledge has gone into the discard1 if quite other objects of knowledge are now received and employed1 it is because the methods of getting knowledge have been transformed1 till1 for the working scientist1 objects of knowledge mean precisely the objects which have been obtained by approved processes of inquiry4 ,to exclude consideration of these processes is thus to throw away the key to understanding knowledge and its objects4 ,there is a certain ironical humor in taking advantage of all the improved methods of experimental inquiry with respect to all objects of knowledge--save one1 knowledge itself2 in denying their relevancy to knowing knowledge1 and falling back upon the method everywhere else disavowed--the method of relying upon isolated1 self-contained properties of subject-matter4 ,one of the points which gave much offense in the essays was the reference to genetic method--to a natural history of knowledge4 ,i hope what has now been said makes clearer the nature of that reference4 ,i was to blame for not making the point more explicit2 but ,i cannot altogether blame myself for my navet in supposing that others understood by a natural history of knowledge what ,i understood by it4 ,it had not occurred to me that anyone would think that the history by which human ignorance1 error1 dogma1 and superstition had been transformed1 even in its present degree of transformation1 into knowledge was something which had gone on exclusively inside of men's heads1 or in an inner consciousness4 ,i thought of it as something going on in the world1 in the observatory and the laboratory1 and in the application of laboratory results to the control of human health1 well-being1 and progress4 ,when a biologist says that the way to understand an organ1 or the sociologist that the way to know an institution1 resides in its genesis and history1 he is understood to mean its history4 ,i took the same liberty for knowledge1 that is1 for science4 ,the accusation of subjectivisim taken in this light appears as a depressing revelation of what the current opinion about the processes of knowledge is4 ,to stumble on a stone need not be a process of knowledge2 to hit it with a hammer1 to pour acid upon it1 to put pieces in the crucible1 to subject things to heat and pressure to see if one can make a similar stone1 are processes of knowledge4 ,so is fixing suggestions by attaching names1 and so is devising ways of putting these terms together so that new suggestions will arise1 or so that suggestions may be transferred from one situation to another4 ,but not one of these processes is subjective in any sense which puts subjectivity in opposition to the public out-of-doors world of nature and human companionship4 ,to set genesis in opposition to analysis is merely to overlook the fact that the sciences of existence have found that considerations of genesis afford their most effective methods of analysis4#aj ,the same kind of consideration applies to the favorable view taken of psychology4 ,if reference to modes and ways of experience--to experiencing--is important for understanding the things with which philosophy deals1 then psychology is useful as a matter of course4 ,for what is meant by psychology is precisely a discrimination of the acts and attitudes of the organism which have a bearing upon respective subject-matters and which have accordingly to be taken account of before the subject-matters can be properly discriminated4 ,the matter was especially striking in the case of ,lotze4 ,he protested constantly against the use of psychology1 and yet his own data and procedures were infected at every turn by psychology1 and1 if ,i am at all correct1 by a false psychology4 ,the particular separation which he made between psychology and logic rested indeed upon a particular psychological assumption4 ,the question is worth asking3 ,is not the marked aversion on the part of some philosophers to any reference to psychology a ,freudian symptom8 ,a word more upon the place assigned by the essays to need and purpose and the humanistic factor generally4 ,to save time ,i may quote a sentence from an early review which attributes to the essays the following doctrine3 ,if the plan turns out to be useful for our need1 it is correct--the judgment is true4 ,the real-ideal distinction is that between stimulus of environment and plan of action or tentative response4 ,both real and ideal are equally experiences of the individual man4 ,these words can be interpreted either so as to convey the position fairly1 or so as radically to misconceive it2 the latter course is a little easier1 as the words stand4 ,that real and ideal are experiences of the individual man in the sense that they actually present themselves as specifications which can be studied by any man who desires to study them is true enough4 ,that such a study is as much required for determining their characters as it is for determining those of carbon dioxide or of the constitution of ,great ,britain is also the contention of the paper4 ,but if the words quoted suggest to anyone that the real or even the ideal are somehow possessions of an individual man1 things secreted somewhere about him and then ejected1 ,i can only say that ,i cannot understand the doctrine4 ,i know of no ready-made and antecedent conception of the individual man4 ,instead of telling about the nature of experience by means of a prior conception of individual man1 ,i find it necessary to go to experience to find out what is meant by individual and by man2 and also by the4 ,consequently even in such an expression as my experience1 ,i should wish not to contradict this idea of method by using the term my to swallow up the term experience1 any more than if ,i said my house1 or my country4 ,on the contrary1 ,i should expect that any intelligible and definite use of such phrases would throw much more light upon me than upon house or country--or experience4 ,the possible misunderstanding is1 ,i think1 actual in the reference to our needs as a criterion of the correctness of truth of an idea or plan4 ,according to the essays1 it is the needs of a situation which are determinative4 ,they evoke thought and the need of knowing1 and it is only within the situation that the identification of the needs with a self occurs2 and it is only by reflection upon the place of the agent in the encompassing situation that the nature of his needs can be determined4 ,in fact1 the actual occurrence of a disturbed1 incomplete1 and needy situation indicates that my present need is precisely to investigate1 to explore1 to hunt1 to pull apart things now tied together1 to project1 to plan1 to invent1 and then to test the outcome by seeing how it works as a method of dealing with hard facts4 ,one source of the demand1 in short1 for reference to experience as the encompassing universe of discourse is to keep us from taking such terms as self1 my1 need1 satisfaction1 etc41 as terms whose meanings can be accepted and proved either by themselves or by even the most extensive dialectic reference to other terms4 ,terms like real and ideal1 individual1 man1 my1 certainly allow of profitable dialectic 7or purely prepositional7 clarification and elaboration4 ,but nothing is settled until these discursive findings have been applied1 through action1 to things1 and an experience has been effected1 which either meets or evades the specification conceptually laid down4 ,to suppose1 for example1 that the import of the term ideal can be settled apart from exhibiting in experience some specific affair1 is to maintain in philosophy that belief in the occult essence and hidden cause which science had to get rid of before it got on the right track4 ,the idealistic misconception of experience is no reason for throwing away its significant point of contact with modern science and for having recourse then to objects distinguished from old-fashioned ,dinge an ,sich only because they involve just that reference to those experiences by which they were established and to which they are applied that propositional or analytic realism professedly and elaborately ignores4 ,in revenge1 this ignoring leaves on our hands the me1 or knowing self1 as a separate thing within which experience falls 7instead of its falling in a specifiable place within experience71 and generates the insoluble problem of how a subjective experience can beget objective knowledge4 ,in concluding1 let me say that reference to experience seems at present to be the easiest way of realizing the continuities among subject-matters that are always getting split up into dualisms4 ,a creation of a world of subsistences or essences which are quite other than the world of natural existences 7which are other than natural existences adapted to the successful performance of inference7 is in itself a technical matter1 though a discouraging one to a philosopher expertly acquainted with all the difficulties which that view has generated from the time of ,plato down4 ,but the assistance which such a philosophy lends to the practical and current divorce of the ideal from the natural world makes it a thing to be dreaded for other than professional reasons4 ,god only knows how many of the sufferings of life are due to a belief that the natural scene and operations of our life are lacking in ideal import1 and to the consequent tendency to flee for the lacking ideal factors to some other world inhabited exclusively by ideals4 ,that such a cut-off1 ideal world is impotent for direction and control and change of the natural world follows as a matter of course4 ,it is a luxury2 it belongs to the genteel tradition of life1 the persistence of an upper class given to a detached and parasitic life4 ,moreover1 it places the scientific inquirer within that irresponsible class4 ,if philosophers could aid in making it clear to a troubled humanity that ideals are continuous with natural events1 that they but represent their possibilities1 and that recognized possibilities form methods for a conduct which may realize them in fact1 philosophers would enforce the sense of a social calling and responsibility4 ,i do not say that pointing out the continuity and interaction of various attitudes and interests in experience is the only way of effecting this consummation4 ,but for a large number of persons today it is the readiest way4 ,much may be said about that other great rupture of continuity which analytic realism would maintain3 that between the world and the knower as something outside of it1 engaged in an otiose contemplative survey of it4 ,i can understand the social conditions which generated this conception of an aloof knower4 ,i can see how it protected the growth of responsible inquiry which takes effect in change of the environment1 by cultivating a sense of the innocuousness of knowing1 and thus lulling to sleep the animosity of those who1 being in control1 had no desire to permit reflection which had practical import4 ,i can see how specialists at any time1 professional knowers1 so to speak1 find in this doctrine a salve for conscience--a solace which all thinkers need as long as an effective share in the conduct of affairs is not permitted them4 ,above all1 ,i can see how seclusion and the absence of the pressure of immediate action developed a more varied curiosity1 greater impartiality1 and a more generous outlook4 ,but all this is no reason for continuing the idealization of a remote and separate mind or knower now that the method of intelligence is perfected1 and changed social conditions not only permit but demand that intelligence be placed within the procession of events4 ,an intellectual integrity1 an impartiality and detachment1 which is maintained only in seclusion is unpleasantly reminiscent of other identifications of virtue with the innocence of ignorance4 ,to place knowledge where it arises and operates in experience is to know that1 as it arose because of the troubles of man1 it is confirmed in reconstructing the conditions which occasioned those troubles4 ,genuine intellectual integrity is found in experimental knowing4 ,until this lesson is fully learned1 it is not safe to dissociate knowledge from experiment nor experiment from experience4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,i am indebted to an unpublished manuscript of ,mr4 ,s4 ,klyce of ,winchester1 ,massachusetts1 for the significance of the fact that our words divide into terms 7of which more in the sequel7 and into names which are not 7strictly speaking7 terms at all1 but which serve to remind us of the vast and vague continuum1 select portions of which only are designated by words as terms4 ,he calls such words infinity and zero words4 ,the word experience is a typical instance of an infinity word4 ,mr4 ,klyce has brought out very clearly that a direct situation of experience 7situation as ,i employ it is another such word7 has no need of any word for itself1 the thing to which the word would point being so egregiously there on its own behalf4 ,but when communication about it takes place 7as it does1 not only in converse with others1 but when a man attempts a mutual reference of different periods of his own life7 a word is needed to remind both parties of this taken-for-granted whole 7another infinity term71 while confusion arises if explicit attention is not called to the fact that it is a very different sort of word from the definite terms of discourse which denote distinctions and their relations to one another4 ,in the text1 attention is called to the fact that the business man wrestling with a difficulty or a scientific man engaged in an inquiry finds his checks and control specifically in the situation in which he is employed1 while the theorizer at large leaves out these checks and limits1 and so loses his clews4 ,well1 the words experience1 situation1 etc41 are used to remind the thinker of the need of reversion to precisely something which never can be one of the terms of his reflection but which nevertheless furnishes the existential meaning and status of them all4 ,intuition1 mysticism1 philosophized or sophisticated monism1 are all of them aberrant ways of protesting against the consequences which result from failing to note what is conveyed by words which are not terms4 ,were ,i rewriting these essays in toto ,i should try to take advantage of these and other indispensable considerations advanced by ,mr4 ,klyce2 but as the essays must stand substantially as they were originally written1 and as an ,introduction to them must1 in order to be intelligible1 be stated in not incongruous phraseology1 ,i wish simply to ask the reader to bear in mind this radical difference between such words as experience1 reality1 universe1 situation1 and such terms as typewriter1 me1 consciousness1 existence1 when used 7as they must be used if they are to be terms7 in a differential sense4 ,the term reality is particularly treacherous1 for the careless tradition of philosophy 7a carelessness fostered1 ,i am sure1 by failure to make verbally explicit the distinction to which ,mr4 ,klyce has called attention7 uses reality both as a term of indifferent reference1 equivalent to everything taken together or referred to en masse as over against some discrimination1 and also as a discriminative term with a highly eulogistic flavor3 as real money in distinction from counterfeit money4 ,then1 although every inquiry in daily life1 whether technological or scientific1 asks whether a thing is real only in the sense of asking what thing is real1 philosophy concludes to a wholesale distinction between the real and the unreal1 the real and the apparent1 and so creates a wholly artificial problem4 ,if the philosopher1 whether idealistic or realistic1 who holds that it is self-contradictory to criticize purely intellectualistic conceptions of the world1 because the criticism itself goes on intellectualistic terms1 so that its validity depends upon intellectual 7or cognitive7 conditions1 will but think of the very brute doings in which a chemist engages to fix the meanings of his terms and to test his theories and conceptions1 he will perceive that all intellectual knowing is but a method for conducting an experiment1 and that arguments and objections are but stimuli to induce somebody to try a certain experiment--to have recourse1 that is1 to a non-logical non-intellectual affair4 ,or again1 the argument is an invitation to him to note that at the very time in which he is thinking1 his thinking is set in a continuum which is not an object of thought4 ,the importance attached to the word experience1 then1 both in the essays and in this ,introduction1 is to be understood as an invitation to employ thought and discriminative knowledge as a means of plunging into something which no argument and no term can express2 or rather as an invitation to note the fact that no plunge is needed1 since one's own thinking and explicit knowledge are already constituted by and within something which does not need to be expressed or made explicit4 ,and finally1 there is nothing mystical about this1 though mysticism doubtless roots in this fact4 ,its import is only to call notice to the meaning of1 say1 formulae communicated by a chemist to others as the result of his experiment4 ,all that can be communicated or expressed is that one believes such and such a thing4 ,the communication has scientific instead of merely social significance because the communicated formula is a direction to other chemists to try certain procedures and see what they get4 ,the direction is capable of expression2 the result of the experiment1 the experience1 to which the propositions refer and by which they are tested1 is not expressible4 7,poetry1 of course1 is a more competent organ of suggesting it than scientific prose47 ,the word experience is1 ,i repeat1 a notation of an inexpressible as that which decides the ultimate status of all which is expressed2 inexpressible not because it is so remote and transcendent1 but because it is so immediately engrossing and matter of course4 #b ,there are certain points of similarity between this doctrine and that of ,holt regarding contradictions and that of ,montague regarding consciousness as a case of potential energy4 ,but the latter doctrine seems to me to suffer1 first1 from an isolation of the brain from the organism1 which leads to ignoring the active doing1 and1 secondly1 from an isolation of the moment of reduction of actual to potential energy4 ,it appears as a curiously isolated and self-sufficient event1 instead of as the focus of readjustment in an organized activity at the pivotal point of maximum tension--that is1 of greatest inhibition in connection with greatest tendency to discharge4 ,and while ,i think ,holt is wholly right in connecting the possibility of error with objectively plural and conflicting forces1 ,i should hardly regard it as linguistically expedient to call counterbalancing forces contradictory4 ,the counterbalancing forces of the vaulting do not seem to me contradictory in the arch4 ,but if their presence led me to attempt to say up and down at the same time there would be contradiction4 ,but even admitting that contradictory propositions are merely about forces which are contradictory--heating and cooling--it is still a long way to error4 ,for propositions about such contradictions are obviously true propositions4 ,it is only when we make that reaction to one factor which is appropriate to dealing with the other that there is error2 and this can happen where there are no contradictory forces at all beyond the fact that the agent is pulled two incompatible and opposed ways at the same time4 #c ,for emphasis ,i am here exaggerating by condensing into a single decisive act an operation which is continuously going on4 #d ,i would remark in passing that a recognition that a thing may be continuous in one respect and discrete in another would obviate a good many difficulties4 #e ,in effect1 the fallacy is the same as that of an idealistic theory which holds that all objects are really associations of sensations4 #f ,this statement is meant literally4 ,the sensations of color1 sound1 etc41 to which appeal is made in a scientific inquiry are nothing mental in structure or stuff2 they are actual1 extra-organic things analyzed down to what is so indubitably there that it may safely be taken as a basis of inference4 #g ,a term is not of course a mere word2 a mere word is non-sense1 for a sound by itself is not a word at all4 ,nor is it a mere meaning1 which is not even natural non-sense1 being 7if it be at all7 supernatural or transcendental nonsense4 ,terms signify that certain absent existences are indicated by certain given existences1 in the respect that they are abstracted and fixed for intellectual use by some physically convenient means1 such as a sound or a muscular contraction of the vocal organs4 #h ,this distinction of indication as existential and implication as conceptual or essential1 ,i owe to ,mr4 ,alfred ,sidgwick4 ,see his ,fallacies1 p4 #ej4 #i ,james1 ,psychology1 ,,ii1 #ffe4 #aj ,i have even seen1 in a criticism of the essays1 the method of genesis opposed to the method of experimentation--as if experimentation were anything but the generation of some special object6 ,,ii ,,the ,,relationship ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,its ,,subject-,,matter ,no one doubts that thought1 at least reflective as distinct from what is sometimes called constitutive thought1 is derivative and secondary4 ,it comes after something and out of something1 and for the sake of something4 ,no one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is of this reflective type4 ,we think about2 we reflect over4 ,if we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought2 if we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought intervenes2 if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a derived procedure1 we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the logical problem3 the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent1 truth1 and the relation of truth to reality4 ,yet from the nave point of view no difficulty attaches to these questions4 ,the antecedents of thought are our universe of life and love2 of appreciation and struggle4 ,we think about anything and everything3 snow on the ground2 the alternating clanks and thuds that rise from below2 the relation of the ,monroe ,doctrine to the embroglio in ,venezuela2 the relation of art to industry2 the poetic quality of a painting by ,botticelli2 the battle of ,marathon2 the economic interpretation of history2 the proper definition of cause2 the best method of reducing expenses2 whether and how to renew the ties of a broken friendship2 the interpretation of an equation in hydrodynamics1 etc4 ,through the madness of this miscellaneous citation there appears so much of method3 anything--event1 act1 value1 ideal1 person1 or place--may be an object of thought4 ,reflection busies itself alike with physical nature1 the record of social achievement1 and the endeavors of social aspiration4 ,it is with reference to such affairs that thought is derivative2 it is with reference to them that it intervenes or mediates4 ,taking some part of the universe of action1 of affection1 of social construction1 under its special charge1 and having busied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented1 thought releases that topic and enters into further more direct experience4 ,sticking for a moment to this nave standpoint1 we recognize a certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory2 of primary construction and of secondary criticism2 of living appreciation and of abstract description2 of active endeavor and of pale reflection4 ,we find that every more direct primary attitude passes upon occasion into its secondary deliberative and discursive counterpart4 ,we find that when the latter has done its work it passes away and passes on4 ,from the nave standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter of course4 ,there is no attempt either to state the nature of the occasion which demands the thinking attitude1 or to formulate a theory of the standard by which is judged its success4 ,no general theory is propounded as to the exact relationship between thinking and what antecedes and succeeds it4 ,much less do we ask how empirical circumstances can generate rationality of thought2 nor how it is possible for reflection to lay claim to power of determining truth and thereby of constructing further reality4 ,if we were to ask the thinking of nave life to present1 with a minimum of theoretical elaboration1 its conception of its own practice1 we should get an answer running not unlike this3 ,thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need1 just as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity3 as converse with a friend2 draw a plan for a house2 take a walk2 eat a dinner2 purchase a suit of clothes1 etc4 ,in general1 its material is anything in the wide universe which seems to be relevant to this need--anything which may serve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in suggesting modes of dealing effectively with it4 ,the measure of its success1 the standard of its validity1 is precisely the degree in which the thinking actually disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed with more direct modes of experiencing1 that are forthwith possessed of more assured and deepened value4 ,if we inquire why the nave attitude does not go on to elaborate these implications of its own practice into a systematic theory1 the answer1 on its own basis1 is obvious4 ,thought arises in response to its own occasion4 ,and this occasion is so exacting that there is time1 as there is need1 only to do the thinking which is needed in that occasion--not to reflect upon the thinking itself4 ,reflection follows so naturally upon its appropriate cue1 its issue is so obvious1 so practical1 the entire relationship is so organic1 that once grant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific demand1 and there is not the particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not the practical demand for reflection of that sort4 ,our attention is taken up with particular questions and specific answers4 ,what we have to reckon with is not the problem of1 ,how can ,i think berhaupt8 but1 ,how shall ,i think right here and now8 ,not what is the test of thought at large1 but what validates and confirms this thought8 ,in conformity with this view1 it follows that a generic account of our thinking behavior1 the generic account termed logical theory1 arises at historic periods in which the situation has lost the organic character above described4 ,the general theory of reflection1 as over against its concrete exercise1 appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is blocked4 ,again1 it shows itself when practical affairs are so multifarious1 complicated1 and remote from control that thinking is held off from successful passage into them4 ,anyhow 7sticking to the nave standpoint71 it is true that the stimulus to that particular form of reflective thinking termed logical theory is found when circumstances require the act of thinking and nevertheless impede clear and coherent thinking in detail2 or when they occasion thought and then prevent the results of thinking from exercising directive influence upon the immediate concerns of life4 ,under these conditions we get such questions as the following3 ,what is the relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience8 ,what is the relation of thought to reality8 ,what is the barrier which prevents reason from complete penetration into the world of truth8 ,what is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction1 and in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and ideal8 ,it is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical inquiry thus suggested4 ,indeed1 the point would not be mentioned did it not serve to fix attention upon the nature of the logical problem4 ,it is in dealing with this latter type of question that logical theory has taken a turn which separates it widely from the theoretical implications of practical deliberation and of scientific research4 ,the two latter1 however much they differ from each other in detail1 agree in a fundamental principle4 ,they both assume that every reflective problem and operation arises with reference to some specific situation1 and has to subserve a specific purpose dependent upon its own occasion4 ,they assume and observe distinct limits--limits from which and to which4 ,there is the limit of origin in the needs of the particular situation which evokes reflection4 ,there is the limit of terminus in successful dealing with the particular problem presented--or in retiring1 baffled1 to take up some other question4 ,the query that at once faces us regarding the nature of logical theory is whether reflection upon reflection shall recognize these limits1 endeavoring to formulate them more exactly and to define their relationships to each other more adequately2 or shall it abolish limits1 do away with the matter of specific conditions and specific aims of thought1 and discuss thought and its relation to empirical antecedents and rational consequents 7truth7 at large8 ,at first blush1 it might seem as if the very nature of logical theory as generalization of the reflective process must of necessity disregard the matter of particular conditions and particular results as irrelevant4 ,how1 the implication runs1 could reflection become generalized save by elimination of details as irrelevant8 ,such a conception in fixing the central problem of logic fixes once for all its future career and material4 ,the essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss the relation of thought as such to reality as such4 ,it may1 indeed1 involve much psychological material1 particularly in the discussion of the processes which antecede thinking and which call it out4 ,it may involve much discussion of the concrete methods of investigation and verification employed in the various sciences4 ,it may busily concern itself with the differentiation of various types and forms of thought--different modes of conceiving1 various conformations of judgment1 various types of inferential reasoning4 ,but it concerns itself with any and all of these three fields1 not on their own account or as ultimate1 but as subsidiary to the main problem3 the relation of thought as such1 or at large1 to reality as such1 or at large4 ,some of the detailed considerations referred to may throw light upon the terms under which thought transacts its business with reality2 upon1 say1 certain peculiar limitations it has to submit to as best it may4 ,other considerations throw light upon the ways in which thought gets at reality4 ,still other considerations throw light upon the forms which thought assumes in attacking and apprehending reality4 ,but in the end all this is incidental4 ,in the end the one problem holds3 ,how do the specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such8 ,in fine1 logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead up to its solution4 ,from this point of view various aspects of logical theory are well stated by an author whom later on we shall consider in some detail4 ,lotze#aa refers to universal forms and principles of thought which hold good everywhere both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility1 irrespective of any difference in the objects4 ,this defines the business of pure logic4 ,this is clearly the question of thought as such--of thought at large or in general4 ,then we have the question of how far the most complete structure of thought 444 can claim to be an adequate account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our ideas4 ,this is clearly the question of the relation of thought at large to reality at large4 ,it is epistemology4 ,then comes applied logic1 having to do with the actual employment of concrete forms of thought with reference to investigation of specific topics and subjects4 ,this applied logic would1 if the standpoint of practical deliberation and of scientific research were adopted1 be the sole genuine logic4 ,but the existence of thought in itself having been agreed upon1 we have in this applied logic only an incidental inquiry of how the particular resistances and oppositions which pure thought meets from particular matters may best be discounted4 ,it is concerned with methods of investigation which obviate defects in the relationship of thought at large to reality at large1 as these present themselves under the limitations of human experience4 ,it deals merely with hindrances1 and with devices for overcoming them2 it is directed by considerations of utility4 ,when we reflect that this field includes the entire procedure of practical deliberation and of concrete scientific research1 we begin to realize something of the significance of the theory of logic which regards the limitations of specific origination and specific outcome as irrelevant to its main problem1 which assumes an activity of thought pure or in itself1 that is1 irrespective of any difference in its objects4 ,this suggests1 by contrast1 the opposite mode of stating the problem of logical theory4 ,generalization of the nature of the reflective process certainly involves elimination of much of the specific material and contents of the thought-situations of daily life and of critical science4 ,quite compatible with this1 however1 is the notion that it seizes upon certain specific conditions and factors1 and aims to bring them to clear consciousness--not to abolish them4 ,while eliminating the particular material of particular practical and scientific pursuits1 7#a7 it may strive to hit upon the common denominator in the various situations which are antecedent or primary to thought and which evoke it2 7#b7 it may attempt to show how typical features in the specific antecedents of thought call out diverse typical modes of thought-reaction2 7#c7 it may attempt to state the nature of the specific consequences in which thought fulfils its career4 7#a7 ,it does not eliminate dependence upon specific occasions as provocative of thought1 but endeavors to define what in the various occasions renders them thought-provoking4 ,the specific occasion is not eliminated1 but insisted upon and brought into the foreground4 ,consequently1 empirical considerations are not subsidiary incidents1 but are of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace the generation of the thought-situation4 7#b7 ,from this point of view the various types and modes of conceiving1 judging1 and inference are treated1 not as qualifications of thought per se or at large1 but of reflection engaged in its specific1 most economic1 effective response to its own particular occasion2 they are adaptations for control of stimuli4 ,the distinctions and classifications that have been accumulated in formal logic are relevant data2 but they demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents and stimuli4 7#c7 ,finally the question of validity1 or ultimate objective of thought1 is relevant2 but relevant as a matter of the specific issue of the specific career of a thought-function4 ,all the typical investigatory and verificatory procedures of the various sciences indicate the ways in which thought actually brings to successful fulfilment its dealing with various types of problems4 ,while the epistemological type of logic may1 as we have seen1 leave 7under the name of applied logic7 a subsidiary place open for the instrumental type1 the type which deals with thinking as a specific procedure relative to a specific antecedent occasion and to a subsequent specific fulfilment is not able to reciprocate the favor4 ,from its point of view1 an attempt to discuss the antecedents1 data1 forms1 and objectives of thought1 apart from reference to particular position occupied and particular part played in the growth of experience1 is to reach results which are not so much either true or false as they are radically meaningless--because they are considered apart from limits4 ,its results are not only abstractions 7for all theorizing ends in abstractions71 but abstractions without possible reference or bearing4 ,from this point of view1 the taking of something 7whether that something be a thinking activity1 its empirical stimulus1 or its objective goal71 apart from the limits of a historic or developing situation1 is the essence of metaphysical procedure--in that sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it and science4 ,as the reader has doubtless anticipated1 it is the object of this chapter to present the problem and industry of reflective thought from the standpoint of nave experience1 using the term in a sense wide enough to cover both practical procedure and concrete scientific research4 ,i resume by saying that this point of view knows no fixed distinction between the empirical things and values of unreflective life and the most abstract process of rational thought4 ,it knows no fixed gulf between the highest flight of theory and a control of the details of practical construction and behavior4 ,it passes1 according to the occasion and opportunity of the moment1 from the attitude of loving and struggling and doing to that of thinking and the reverse4 ,its contents or material shift their values back and forth from technological or utilitarian to aesthetic1 ethical1 or affectional4 ,it utilizes data of perception1 of meaning or of discursive ideation as need calls1 just as an inventor now utilizes heat1 now mechanical strain1 now electricity1 according to the demands set by his aim4 ,anything from past experience may be taken which appears to be an element in either the statement or the solution of the present problem4 ,thus we understand the coexistence1 without contradiction1 of an indeterminate possible field and a limited actual field4 ,the undefined range of possible materials becomes specific through reference to an end4 ,in all this1 there is no difference of kind between the methods of science and those of the plain man4 ,the difference is the greater control by science of the statement of the problem1 and of the selection and use of relevant material1 both sensible and conceptual4 ,the two are related to each other just as the hit-or-miss1 trial-and-error inventions of uncivilized man stand to the deliberate and consecutively persistent efforts of a modern inventor to produce a certain complicated device for doing a comprehensive piece of work4 ,neither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is aware1 as he engages in his reflective activity1 of any transition from one sphere of existence to another4 ,he knows no two fixed worlds--reality on one side and mere subjective ideas on the other2 he is aware of no gulf to cross4 ,he assumes uninterrupted1 free1 and fluid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking1 from thought to fact1 from things to theories and back again4 ,observation passes into development of hypothesis2 deductive methods pass into use in description of the particular2 inference passes into action1 all with no sense of difficulty save those found in the particular task in question4 ,the fundamental assumption is continuity4 ,this does not mean that fact is confused with idea1 or observed datum with voluntary hypothesis1 theory with doing1 any more than a traveler confuses land and water when he journeys from one to the other4 ,it simply means that each is placed and used with reference to service rendered the other1 and with reference to the future use of the other4 ,only the epistemological spectator of traditional controversies is aware of the fact that the everyday man and the scientific man in this free and easy intercourse are rashly assuming the right to glide over a cleft in the very structure of reality4 ,this fact raises a query not favorable to the epistemologist4 ,why is it that the scientific man1 who is constantly plying his venturous traffic of exchange of facts for ideas1 of theories for laws1 of real things for hypotheses1 should be so wholly unaware of the radical and generic 7as distinct from specific7 difficulty of the undertakings in which he is engaged8 ,we thus come afresh to our inquiry3 ,does not the epistemological logician unwittingly transfer the specific difficulty which always faces the scientific man--the difficulty in detail of correct and adequate translation back and forth of this set of facts and this group of reflective consideration--into a totally different problem of the wholesale relation of thought at large to reality in general8 ,if such be the case1 it is clear that the very way in which the epistemological type of logic states the problem of thinking1 in relation both to empirical antecedents and to objective truth1 makes that problem insoluble4 ,working terms1 terms which as working are flexible and historic1 relative and methodological1 are transformed into absolute1 fixed1 and predetermined properties of being4 ,we come a little closer to the problem when we recognize that every scientific inquiry passes historically through at least four stages4 7a7 ,the first of these stages is1 if ,i may be allowed the bull1 that in which scientific inquiry does not take place at all1 because no problem or difficulty in the quality of the experience presents itself to provoke reflection4 ,we have only to cast our eye back from the existing status of any science1 or back from the status of any particular topic in any science1 to discover a time when no reflective or critical thinking busied itself with the matter--when the facts and relations were taken for granted and thus were lost and absorbed in the net meaning which accrued from the experience4 7b7 ,after the dawning of the problem there comes a period of occupation with relatively crude and unorganized facts--hunting for1 locating1 and collecting raw material4 ,this is the empiric stage1 which no existing science1 however proud in its attained rationality1 can disavow as its own progenitor4 7c7 ,then there is also a speculative stage3 a period of guessing1 of making hypotheses1 of framing ideas which later on are labeled and condemned as only ideas4 ,there is a period of distinction-making and classification-making which later on is regarded as only mentally gymnastic in character4 ,and no science1 however proud in its present security of experimental assurance1 can disavow a scholastic ancestor4 7d7 ,finally1 there comes a period of fruitful interaction between the mere ideas and the mere facts3 a period when observation is determined by experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain guiding conceptions2 when reflection is directed and checked at every point by the use of experimental data1 and by the necessity of finding such a form for itself as will enable it to serve in a deduction leading to evolution of new meanings1 and ultimately to experimental inquiry which brings to light new facts4 ,in the emerging of a more orderly and significant region of fact1 and of a more coherent and self-luminous system of meaning1 we have the natural limit of evolution of the logic of a given science4 ,but consider what has happened in this historic record4 ,unanalyzed experience has broken up into distinctions of facts and ideas2 the factual side has been developed by indefinite and almost miscellaneous descriptions and cumulative listings2 the conceptual side has been developed by unchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions1 classifications1 etc4 ,then there has been a relegation of accepted meanings to the limbo of mere ideas2 there has been a passage of some of the accepted facts into the region of mere hypothesis and opinion4 ,conversely1 there has been a continued issuing of ideas from the region of hypotheses and theories into that of facts1 of accepted objective and meaningful objects4 ,out of a world of only seeming facts1 and of only doubtful ideas1 there emerges a world continually growing in definiteness1 order1 and luminosity4 ,this progress1 verified in every record of science1 is an absolute monstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemology which assumes a thought in general1 on one side1 and a reality in general1 on the other4 ,the reason that it does not present itself as such a monster and miracle to those actually concerned with it is because continuity of reference and of use controls all diversities in the modes of existence specified and the types of significance assigned4 ,the distinction of meaning and fact is treated in the growth of a science1 or of any particular scientific problem1 as an induced and intentional practical division of labor2 as assignments of relative position with reference to performance of a task2 as deliberate distribution of forces at command for their more economic use4 ,the absorption of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the formation of a single world of scientific apprehension and comprehension is but the successful achieving of the aim on account of which the distinctions in question were instituted4 ,thus we come back to the problem of logical theory4 ,to take the distinctions of thought and fact1 etc41 as ontological1 as inherently fixed in the makeup of the structure of being1 results in treating the actual technique of scientific inquiry and scientific control as a mere subsidiary topic--ultimately of only utilitarian worth4 ,it also states the terms upon which thought and being transact business in a way so totally alien to concrete experience that it creates a problem which can be discussed only in terms of itself--not in terms of the conduct of life4 ,as against this1 the logic which aligns itself with the origin and employ of reflective thought in everyday life and critical science follows the natural history of thinking as a life-process having its own generating antecedents and stimuli1 its own states and career1 and its own specific objective or limit4 ,this point of view makes it possible for logical theory to come to terms with psychology4 ,when logic is considered as having to do with the wholesale activity of thought per se1 the question of the historic process by which this or that particular thought came to be1 of how its object happens to present itself as sensory1 or perceptual1 or conceptual1 is quite irrelevant4 ,these things are mere temporal accidents4 ,the psychologist 7not lifting his gaze from the realm of the changeable7 may find in them matters of interest4 ,his whole industry is just with natural history--to trace events as they mutually excite and inhibit one another4 ,but the logician1 we are told1 has a deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon4 ,he deals with the question of the eternal nature of thought and its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality4 ,he is concerned1 not with genesis1 but with value1 not with a historic cycle1 but with absolute entities and relations4 ,still the query haunts us3 ,is this so in truth8 ,or has the logician of a certain type arbitrarily made it so by taking his terms apart from reference to the specific occasions in which they arise and situations in which they function8 ,if the latter1 then the very denial of historic relationship1 the denial of the significance of historic method1 is indicative of the unreal character of his own abstraction4 ,it means in effect that the affairs under consideration have been isolated from the conditions in which alone they have determinable meaning and assignable worth4 ,it is astonishing that1 in the face of the advance of the evolutionary method in natural science1 any logician can persist in the assertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin and of nature2 between genesis and analysis2 between history and validity4 ,such assertion simply reiterates as final a distinction which grew up and had meaning in pre-evolutionary science4 ,it asserts1 against the most marked advance which scientific method has yet made1 a survival of a crude period of logical scientific procedure4 ,we have no choice save either to conceive of thinking as a response to a specific stimulus1 or else to regard it as something in itself1 having just in and of itself certain traits1 elements1 and laws4 ,if we give up the last view1 we must take the former4 ,in this case it will still possess distinctive traits1 but they will be traits of a specific response to a specific stimulus4 ,the significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ1 structure1 or formation1 every grouping of cells or elements1 is to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation4 ,its meaning1 its character1 its force1 is known when1 and only when1 it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation4 ,this analysis is carried out by tracing successive stages of development--by endeavoring to locate the particular situation in which each structure has its origin1 and by tracing the successive modifications through which1 in response to changing media1 it has reached its present conformation4#ab ,to persist in condemning natural history from the standpoint of what natural history meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary process is not so much to exclude the natural-history standpoint from philosophic consideration as it is to evince ignorance of what it signifies4 ,psychology as the natural history of the various attitudes and structures through which experiencing passes1 as an account of the conditions under which this or that attitude emerges1 and of the way in which it influences1 by stimulation or inhibition1 production of other states or conformations of reflection1 is indispensable to logical evaluation the moment we treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a response to its own generating conditions1 and consequently judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in meeting its problems4 ,the historical point of view describes the sequence2 the normative follows the history to its conclusion1 and then turns back and judges each historical step by viewing it in reference to its own outcome4 ,in the course of changing experience we keep our balance in moving from situations of an affectional quality to those which are practical or appreciative or reflective1 because we bear constantly in mind the context in which any particular distinction presents itself4 ,as we submit each characteristic function and situation of experience to our gaze1 we find it has a dual aspect4 ,wherever there is striving there are obstacles2 wherever there is affection there are persons who are attached2 wherever there is doing there is accomplishment2 wherever there is appreciation there is value2 wherever there is thinking there is material-in-question4 ,we keep our footing as we move from one attitude to another1 from one characteristic quality to another1 because of the position occupied in the whole movement by the particular function in which we are engaged4 ,the distinction between each attitude and function and its predecessor and successor is serial1 dynamic1 operative4 ,the distinctions within any given operation or function are structural1 contemporaneous1 and distributive4 ,thinking follows1 we will say1 striving1 and doing follows thinking4 ,each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its successor4 ,but coincident1 simultaneous1 and correspondent within doing is the distinction of doer and of deed2 within the function of thought1 of thinking and material thought upon2 within the function of striving1 of obstacle and aim1 of means and end4 ,we keep our paths straight because we do not confuse the sequential and functional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous and structural distinctions of elements within a given function4 ,in the seeming maze of endless confusion and unlimited shiftings1 we find our way by the means of the stimulations and checks occurring within the process in which we are actually engaged4 ,operating within empirical situations we do not contrast or confuse a condition which is an element in the formation of one operation with the status which is one of the distributive terms of another function4 ,when we ignore these specific empirical clues and limitations1 we have at once an insoluble1 because meaningless1 problem upon our hands4 ,now the epistemological logician deliberately shuts himself off from those cues and checks upon which the plain man instinctively relies1 and which the scientific man deliberately searches for and adopts as constituting his technique4 ,consequently he is likely to set the attitude which has place and significance only in one of the serial functional situations of experience over against the active attitude which describes part of the structural constitution of another situation2 or with equal lack of justification to assimilate materials characteristic of different stages to one another4 ,he sets the agent1 as he is found in the intimacy of love or appreciation1 over against the externality of the fact1 as that is defined within the reflective process4 ,he takes the material which thought selects as its problematic data as identical with the significant content which results from successful pursuit of inquiry2 and this in turn he regards as the material which was presented before thinking began1 whose peculiarities were the means of awakening thought4 ,he identifies the final deposit of the thought-function with its own generating antecedent1 and then disposes of the resulting surd by reference to some metaphysical consideration1 which remains when logical inquiry1 when science 7as interpreted by him71 has done its work4 ,he does this1 not because he prefers confusion to order1 or error to truth1 but simply because1 when the chain of historic sequence is cut1 the vessel of thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without soundings or moorings4 ,there are but two alternatives3 either there is an object in itself of mind in itself1 or else there are a series of situations where elements vary with the varying functions to which they belong4 ,if the latter1 the only way in which the characteristic terms of situations can be defined is by discriminating the functions to which they belong4 ,and the epistemological logician1 in choosing to take his question as one of thought which has its own form just as thought1 apart from the limits of the special work it has to do1 has deprived himself of these supports and stays4 ,the problem of logic has a more general and a more specific phase4 ,in its generic form1 it deals with this question3 ,how does one type of functional situation and attitude in experience pass out of and into another2 for example1 the technological or utilitarian into the aesthetic1 the aesthetic into the religious1 the religious into the scientific1 and this into the socio-ethical and so on8 ,the more specific question is3 ,how does the particular functional situation termed the reflective behave8 ,how shall we describe it8 ,what in detail are its diverse contemporaneous distinctions1 or divisions of labor1 its correspondent statuses2 in what specific ways do these operate with reference to each other so as to effect the specific aim which is proposed by the needs of the affair8 ,this chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference to the more ultimate value of the logic of experience1 of logic taken in its wider sense2 that is1 as an account of the sequence of the various typical functions or situations of experience in their determining relations to one another4 ,philosophy1 defined as such a logic1 makes no pretense to be an account of a closed and finished universe4 ,its business is not to secure or guarantee any particular reality or value4 ,per contra1 it gets the significance of a method4 ,the right relationship and adjustment of the various typical phases of experience to one another is a problem felt in every department of life4 ,intellectual rectification and control of these adjustments cannot fail to reflect itself in an added clearness and security on the practical side4 ,it may be that general logic cannot become an instrument in the immediate direction of the activities of science or art or industry2 but it is of value in criticizing and organizing tools of immediate research4 ,it also has direct significance in the valuation for social or life-purposes of results achieved in particular branches4 ,much of the immediate business of life is badly done because we do not know the genesis and outcome of the work that occupies us4 ,the manner and degree of appropriation of the goods achieved in various departments of social interest and vocation are partial and faulty because we are not clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of one function of experience in reference to others4 ,the value of research for social progress2 the bearing of psychology upon educational procedure2 the mutual relations of fine and industrial art2 the question of the extent and nature of specialization in science in comparison with the claims of applied science2 the adjustment of religious aspirations to scientific statements2 the justification of a refined culture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the mass2 the relation of organization to individuality--such are a few of the many social questions whose answer depends upon the possession and use of a general logic of experience as a method of inquiry and interpretation4 ,i do not say that headway cannot be made in such questions apart from the method indicated3 a logic of experience4 ,but unless we have a critical and assured view of the juncture in which and with reference to which a given attitude or interest arises1 unless we know the service it is thereby called upon to perform1 and hence the organs or methods by which it best functions in that service1 our progress is impeded and irregular4 ,we take a part for a whole1 a means for an end2 or we attack wholesale some interest because it interferes with the deified sway of the one we have selected as ultimate4 ,a clear and comprehensive consensus of social conviction and a consequent concentrated and economical direction of effort are assured only as there is some way of locating the position and rle of each typical interest and occupation4 ,the domain of opinion is one of conflict2 its rule is arbitrary and costly4 ,only intellectual method affords a substitute for opinion4 ,a general logic of experience alone can do for social qualities and aims what the natural sciences after centuries of struggle are doing for activity in the physical realm4 ,this does not mean that systems of philosophy which have attempted to state the nature of thought and of reality at large1 apart from limits of particular situations in the movement of experience1 have been worthless--though it does mean that their industry has been somewhat misapplied4 ,the unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large contributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations and relationships of experience--even when its conscious intention has been quite otherwise4 ,every system of philosophy is itself a mode of reflection2 consequently 7if our main contention be true71 it too has been evoked out of specific social antecedents1 and has had its use as a response to them4 ,it has effected something in modifying the situation within which it found its origin4 ,it may not have solved the problem which it consciously put itself2 in many cases we may freely admit that the question put has been found afterward to be so wrongly put as to be insoluble4 ,yet exactly the same thing is true1 in precisely the same sense1 in the history of science4 ,for this reason1 if for no other1 it is impossible for the scientific man to cast the first stone at the philosopher4 ,the progress of science in any branch continually brings with it a realization that problems in their previous form of statement are insoluble because put in terms of unreal conditions2 because the real conditions have been mixed up with mental artifacts or misconstructions4 ,every science is continually learning that its supposed solutions are only apparent because the solution solves1 not the actual problem1 but one which has been made up4 ,but the very putting of the question1 the very giving of the wrong answer1 induces modification of existing intellectual habits1 standpoints1 and aims4 ,wrestling with the problem1 there is evolution of new technique to control inquiry1 there is search for new facts1 institution of new types of experimentation2 there is gain in the methodic control of experience4 ,and all this is progress4 ,it is only the worn-out cynic1 the de-vitalized sensualist1 and the fanatical dogmatist who interpret the continuous change of science as proving that1 since each successive statement is wrong1 the whole record is error and folly2 and that the present truth is only the error not yet found out4 ,such draw the moral of caring naught for all these things1 or of flying to some external authority which will deliver once for all the fixed and unchangeable truth4 ,but historic philosophy even in its aberrant forms has proved a factor in the valuation of experience2 it has brought problems to light1 it has provoked intellectual conflicts without which values are only nominal2 even through its would-be absolutistic isolations it has secured recognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal reinforcements4 ,yet if it can define its work more clearly1 it can concentrate its energy upon its own characteristic problem3 the genesis and functioning in experience of various typical interests and occupations with reference to one another4 ,,footnotes3 #aa ,logic 7translation1 ,oxford1 #ahhh71 ,i1 #aj1 #aa4 ,italics mine4 #ab ,see ,philosophical ,review1 ,,xi1 #aag-bj4 ,,iii ,,the ,,antecedents ,,and ,,stimuli ,,of ,,thinking ,we have discriminated logic in its wider sense--concerned with the sequence of characteristic functions and attitudes in experience--from logic in its stricter meaning1 concerned with the function of reflective thought4 ,we must avoid yielding to the temptation of identifying logic with either of these to the exclusion of the other2 or of supposing that it is possible to isolate one finally from the other4 ,the more detailed treatment of the organs and methods of reflection cannot be carried on with security save as we have a correct idea of the position of reflection amid the typical functions of experience4 ,yet it is impossible to determine this larger placing1 save as we have a defined and analytic1 as distinct from a merely vague and gross1 view of what we mean by reflection--what is its actual constitution4 ,it is necessary to work back and forth between the larger and the narrower fields1 transforming every increment upon one side into a method of work upon the other1 and thereby testing it4 ,the evident confusion of existing logical theory1 its uncertainty as to its own bounds and limits1 its tendency to oscillate from larger questions of the meaning of judgment and the validity of inference over to details of scientific technique1 and to translate distinctions of formal logic into acts in an investigatory or verificatory process1 are indications of the need of this double movement4 ,in the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some of the considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the narrower conceptions of logical theory4 ,i shall discuss the locus of the function of thought in experience so far as such locus enables us to characterize some of the most fundamental distinctions1 or divisions of labor1 within the reflective process4 ,in taking up the problem of the subject-matter of thought1 ,i shall try to make clear that it assumes three quite distinct forms according to the epochal moment reached in control of experience4 ,i shall attempt to show that we must consider subject-matter from the standpoint1 first1 of the antecedents or conditions that evoke thought2 secondly1 of the datum or immediate material presented to thought2 and1 thirdly1 of the proper objective of thought4 ,of these three distinctions the first1 that of antecedent and stimulus1 clearly refers to the situation that is immediately prior to the thought-function as such4 ,the second1 that of datum or immediately given matter1 refers to a distinction which is made within the thought-process as a part of and for the sake of its own modus operandi4 ,it is a status in the scheme of thinking4 ,the third1 that of content or object1 refers to the progress actually made in any thought-function2 material which is organized by inquiry so far as inquiry has fulfilled its purpose4 ,this chapter will get at the matter of preliminary conditions of thought indirectly rather than directly1 by indicating the contradictory positions into which one of the most vigorous and acute of modern logicians1 ,lotze1 has been forced through failing to define logical distinctions in terms of the history of readjustment and control of things in experience1 and being thereby compelled to interpret certain notions as absolute instead of as historic and methodological4 ,before passing directly to the exposition and criticism of ,lotze1 it will be well1 however1 to take the matter in a somewhat freer way4 ,we cannot approach logical inquiry in a wholly direct and uncompromised manner4 ,of necessity we bring to it certain distinctions--distinctions partly the outcome of concrete experience2 partly due to the logical theory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in current intellectual habits2 partly results of deliberate scientific and philosophic inquiry4 ,these more or less ready-made results are resources2 they are the only weapons with which we can attack the new problem4 ,yet they are full of unexamined assumptions2 they commit us to all sorts of logically predetermined conclusions4 ,in one sense our study of the new subject-matter1 let us say logical theory1 is in truth only a review1 a retesting and criticizing of the intellectual standpoints and methods which we bring with us to the study4 ,nowadays everyone comes with certain distinctions already made between the subjective and the objective1 between the physical and the mental1 between the intellectual and the factual4 7#a7 ,we have learned to regard the region of emotional disturbance1 of uncertainty and aspiration1 as belonging peculiarly to ourselves2 we have learned to set over against this the world of observation and of valid thought as something unaffected by our moods1 hopes1 fears1 and opinions4 7#b7 ,we have also come to distinguish between what is immediately present in our experience and the past and the future2 we contrast the realms of memory and anticipation with that of sense perception2 more generally we contrast the given with the inferential4 7#c7 ,we are confirmed in a habit of distinguishing between what we call actual fact and our mental attitude toward that fact--the attitude of surmise or wonder or reflective investigation4 ,while one of the aims of logical theory is precisely to make us critically conscious of the significance and bearing of these various distinctions1 to change them from ready-made assumptions into controlled conceptions1 our mental habits are so set that they tend to have their own way with us2 we read into logical theory conceptions that were formed before we had even dreamed of the logical undertaking which after all has for its business to assign to the terms in question their proper meaning4 ,our conclusions are thus controlled by the very notions which need criticism and revision4 ,we find in ,lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these various preliminary distinctions1 and an unusually serious effort to deal with the problems which arise from introducing them into the structure of logical theory4 7#a7 ,he expressly separates the matter of logical worth from that of psychological genesis4 ,he consequently abstracts the subject-matter of logic as such wholly from the question of historic locus and situs4 7#b7 ,he agrees with common-sense in holding that logical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given material4 ,he occupies himself with the nature of the antecedent conditions4 7#c7 ,he wrestles with the problem of how a material formed prior to thought and irrespective of it can yet afford stuff upon which thought may exercise itself4 7#d7 ,he expressly raises the question of how thought working independently and from without upon a foreign material can shape the latter into results which are valid--that is1 objective4 ,if this discussion is successful2 if ,lotze can provide the intermediaries which span the gulf between the exercise of logical functions by thought upon a material wholly external to it2 if he can show that the question of the origin of subject-matter of thought and of thought-activity is irrelevant to the question of its meaning and validity1 we shall have to surrender the position already taken4 ,but if we find that ,lotze's elaborations only elaborate the fundamental difficulty1 presenting it now in this light and now in that1 but always presenting the problem as if it were its own solution1 we shall be confirmed in our idea of the need of considering logical questions from a different point of view4 ,if we find that1 whatever his formal treatment1 he always1 as a matter of fact1 falls back upon some organized situation or function as the source of both the material and the process of inquiry1 we shall have in so far an elucidation and even a corroboration of our theory4 ,we begin with the question of the material antecedents of thought--antecedents which condition reflection1 and which call it out as reaction or response1 by giving its cue4 ,lotze differs from many logicians of the same type in furnishing an explicit account of these antecedents4 #a4 ,the ultimate material antecedents of thought are found in impressions which are due to external objects as stimuli4 ,taken in themselves1 these impressions are mere psychical states or events4 ,they exist in us side by side1 or one after the other1 according as the objects which excite them operate simultaneously or successively4 ,the occurrence of these various psychical states is not1 however1 entirely dependent upon the presence of the exciting thing4 ,after a state has once been excited1 it gets the power of reawakening other states which have accompanied it or followed it4 ,the associative mechanism of revival plays a part4 ,if we had a complete knowledge of both the stimulating object and its effects1 and of the details of the associative mechanism1 we should be able from given data to predict the whole course of any given train or current of ideas 7for the impressions as conjoined simultaneously or successively become ideas and a current of ideas74 ,taken in itself1 a sensation or impression is nothing but a state of our consciousness1 a mood of ourselves4 ,any given current of ideas is a necessary sequence of existences 7just as necessary as any succession of material events71 happening in some particular sensitive soul or organism4 ,just because1 under their respective conditions1 every such series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity and law as every other1 there would be no ground for making any such distinction of value as that between truth and untruth1 thus placing one group in opposition to all the others4#ac #b4 ,thus far1 as the last quotation clearly indicates1 there is no question of reflective thought1 and hence no question of logical theory4 ,but further examination reveals a peculiar property of the current of ideas4 ,some ideas are merely coincident1 while others may be termed coherent4 ,that is to say1 the exciting causes of some of our simultaneous and successive ideas really belong together2 while in other cases they simply happen to act at the same time1 without there being a real connection between them4 ,by the associative mechanism1 however1 both the coherent and the merely coincident combinations recur4 ,the first type of recurrence supplies positive material for knowledge2 the second gives occasion for error4 #c4 ,it is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the coherent which sets the peculiar problem of reflective thought4 ,the business of thought is to recover and confirm the coherent1 the really connected1 adding to its reinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real ground of coherence1 while it eliminates the coincident as such4 ,while the mere current of ideas is something which just happens within us1 the process of elimination and of confirmation by means of statement of real ground and basis of connection is an activity which mind1 as such1 exercises4 ,this distinction marks off thought as activity from any psychical event and from the associative mechanism as mere happenings4 ,one is concerned with mere de facto coexistences and sequences2 the other with the cognitive worth of these combinations4#ad ,consideration of the peculiar work of thought in going over1 sorting out1 and determining various ideas according to a standard of value will occupy us in our next chapter4 ,here we are concerned with the material antecedents of thought as they are described by ,lotze4 ,at first glance1 he seems to propound a satisfactory theory4 ,he avoids the extravagancies of transcendental logic1 which assumes that all the matter of experience is determined from the very start by rational thought2 and he also avoids the pitfall of purely empirical logic1 which makes no distinction between the mere occurrence and association of ideas and the real worth and validity of the various conjunctions thus produced4 ,he allows unreflective experience1 defined in terms of sensations and their combinations1 to provide material conditions for thinking1 while he reserves for thought a distinctive work and dignity of its own4 ,sense experience furnishes the antecedents2 thought has to introduce and develop systematic connection--rationality4 ,a further analysis of ,lotze's treatment may1 however1 lead us to believe that his statement is riddled through and through with inconsistencies and self-contradictions2 that1 indeed1 any one part of it can be maintained only by the denial of some other portion4 #a4 ,the impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest or crudest form 7according to the angle from which one views it74 ,it is that which has never felt1 for good or for bad1 the influence of thought4 ,combined into ideas1 these impressions stimulate or arouse the activities of thought1 which are forthwith directed upon them4 ,as the recipient of the activity which they have excited and brought to bear upon themselves1 they furnish also the material content of thought--its actual stuff4 ,as ,lotze says over and over again3 ,it is the relations themselves already subsisting between impressions1 when we become conscious of them1 by which the action of thought which is never anything but reaction1 is attracted2 and this action consists merely in interpreting relations which we find existing between our passive impressions into aspects of the matter of impressions4#ae ,and again3 ,thought can make no difference where it finds none already in the matter of the impressions4#af ,and again3 ,the possibility and the success of thought's procedure depends upon this original constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas1 a constitution which1 though not necessary in thought1 is all the more necessary to make thinking possible4#ag ,the impressions and ideas thus play a versatile rle2 they now assume the part of ultimate antecedents and provocative conditions2 of crude material2 and somehow1 when arranged1 of content for thought4 ,this very versatility awakens suspicion4 ,while the impression is merely subjective and a bare state of our own consciousness1 yet it is determined1 both as to its existence and as to its relation to other similar existences1 by external objects as stimuli1 if not as causes4 ,it is also determined by a psychical mechanism so thoroughly objective or regular in its workings as to give the same necessary character to the current of ideas that is possessed by any physical sequence4 ,thus that which is nothing but a state of our consciousness turns out straightway to be a specifically determined objective fact in a system of facts4 ,that this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no clearer than that just such a contradiction is indispensable to ,lotze4 ,if impressions were nothing but states of consciousness1 moods of ourselves1 bare psychical existences1 it is sure enough that we should never even know them to be such1 to say nothing of conserving them as adequate conditions and material for thought4 ,it is only by treating them as real facts in a real world1 and only by carrying over into them1 in some assumed and unexplained way1 the capacity of representing the cosmic facts which cause them1 that impressions or ideas come in any sense within the scope of thought4 ,but if the antecedents are really impressions-in-their-objective-setting1 then ,lotze's whole way of distinguishing thought-worth from mere existence or event without objective significance must be radically modified4 ,the implication that impressions have actually a quality or meaning of their own becomes explicit when we refer to ,lotze's theory that the immediate antecedent of thought is found in the matter of ideas4 ,when thought is said to take cognizance of relations which its own activity does not originate1 but which have been prepared for it by the unconscious mechanism of the psychic states1#ah the attribution of objective content1 of reference and meaning to ideas1 is unambiguous4 ,the idea forms a most convenient halfway house for ,lotze4 ,on one hand1 as absolutely prior to thought1 as material antecedent condition1 it is merely psychical1 bald subjective event4 ,but as subject-matter for thought1 as antecedent which affords stuff for thought's exercise1 it characteristically qualifies content4 ,although we have been told that the impression is a mere receptive irritation without participation of mental activity1 we are not surprised1 in view of this capacity of ideas1 to learn that the mind actually has a determining share in both the reception of stimuli and in their further associative combinations4 ,the subject always enters into the presentation of any mental object1 even the sensational1 to say nothing of the perceptional and the imaged4 ,the perception of a given state of things is possible only on the assumption that the perceiving subject is at once enabled and compelled by its own nature to combine the excitations which reach it from objects into those forms which it is to perceive in the objects1 and which it supposes itself simply to receive from them4#ai ,it is only by continual transition from impression and ideas as mental states and events to ideas as logical objects or contents1 that ,lotze bridges the gulf from bare exciting antecedent to concrete material conditions of thought4 ,this contradiction1 again1 is necessary to ,lotze's standpoint4 ,to set out frankly with objects as antecedents would demand reconsideration of the whole viewpoint1 which supposes that the difference between the logical and its antecedent is a matter of the difference between worth and mere existence or occurrence4 ,it would indicate that since meaning or value is already there1 the task of thought must be that of the transformation or reconstruction of meaning through an intermediary process4 ,on the other hand1 to stick by the standpoint of mere existence is not to get anything which can be called even antecedent of thought4 #b4 ,why is there a task of transformation8 ,consideration of the material in its function of evoking thought1 giving it its cue1 will serve to complete the picture of the contradiction and of the real facts4 ,it is the conflict between ideas as merely coincident and ideas as coherent which constitutes the need that provokes the response of thought4 ,here ,lotze vibrates 7a7 between considering both coincidence and coherence as psychical events2 7b7 considering coincidence as purely psychical and coherence as at least quasi-logical1 and 7c7 making them both determinations within the sphere of reflective thought4 ,in strict accordance with his own premises1 coincidence and coherence ought both to be mere peculiarities of the current of ideas as events within ourselves4 ,but so taken the distinction becomes absolutely meaningless4 ,events do not cohere2 at the most certain sets of them happen more or less frequently than other sets2 the only intelligible difference is one of frequency of coincidence4 ,and even this attributes to an event the supernatural trait of reappearing after it has disappeared4 ,even coincidence has to be defined in terms of relation of the objects which are supposed to excite the psychical events that happen together4 ,as recent psychological discussion has made clear enough1 it is the matter1 meaning1 or content of ideas that is associated1 not the ideas as states or existences4 ,take such an idea as sun-revolving-about-earth4 ,we may say it means the conjunction of various sense impressions1 but it is connection1 or mutual reference1 of attributes that we have in mind in the assertion4 ,it is absolutely certain that our psychical image of the sun is not psychically engaged in revolving about our psychical image of the earth4 ,it would be amusing if such were the case2 theaters and all dramatic representations would be at a discount4 ,but in truth1 sun-revolving-about-earth is a single meaning or intellectual object2 it is a unified subject-matter within which certain distinctions of reference appear4 ,it is concerned with what we intend when we think earth and sun1 and think them in their relation to each other4 ,it is a rule1 specification1 or direction of how to think when we have occasion to think a certain subject-matter4 ,to treat this mutual reference as if it were simply a case of conjunction of mental events produced by psycho-physical irritation and association is a profound case of the psychological fallacy4 ,we may1 indeed1 analyze an experience involving belief in an object of a certain kind and find that it had its origin in certain conditions of the sensitive organism1 in certain peculiarities of perception and of association1 and hence conclude that the belief involved in it was not justified by the facts themselves4 ,but the significance of the belief in sun-revolving-about-earth by those who held it1 consisted precisely in the fact that it was taken not as a mere association of feelings1 but as a definite portion of the whole structure of objective experience1 guaranteed by other parts of the fabric1 and lending its support and giving its tone to them4 ,it was to them part of the experienced frame of things--of the real world4 ,put the other way1 if such an instance meant a mere conjunction of psychical states1 there would be in it absolutely nothing to evoke thought4 ,each idea as event1 as ,lotze himself points out 7,i1 #b71 may be regarded as adequately and necessarily determined to the place it occupies4 ,there is absolutely no question on the side of events of mere coincidence versus genuine connection4 ,as event1 it is there and it belongs there4 ,we cannot treat something as at once a bare fact of existence and a problematic subject-matter of logical inquiry4 ,to take the reflective point of view is to consider the matter in a totally new light2 as ,lotze says1 it is to raise the question of rightful claims to a position or relation4 ,the point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence with connection4 ,to consider coincidence as simply psychical1 and coherence as at least quasi-logical1 is to put the two on such different bases that no question of contrasting them can arise4 ,the coincidence which precedes a valid or grounded coherence 7the conjunction which as coexistence of objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate7 never is1 as antecedent1 the coincidence which is set over against coherence4 ,the side-by-sideness of books on my bookshelf1 the succession of noises that rise through my window1 do not trouble me logically4 ,they do not appear as errors or even as problems4 ,one coexistence is just as good as any other until some new point of view1 or new end1 presents itself4 ,if it is a question of the convenience of arrangement of books1 then the value of their present collocation becomes a problem4 ,then ,i contrast their present state as bare conjunction over against another scheme as one which is coherent4 ,if ,i regard the sequence of noises as a case of articulate speech1 their order becomes important--it is a problem to be determined4 ,the inquiry whether a given combination presents apparent or real connection shows that reflective inquiry is already going on4 ,does this phase of the moon really mean rain1 or does it just happen that the rain-storm comes when the moon has reached this phase8 ,to ask such questions shows that a certain portion of the universe of objective experience is subjected to critical analysis for purposes of definitive restatement4 ,the tendency to regard some combination as mere coincidence is absolutely a part of the movement of mind in its search for the real connection4 ,if coexistence as such is to be set against coherence as such1 as the non-logical against the logical1 then1 since our whole spatial universe is one of collocation1 and since thought in this universe can never get farther than substituting one collocation for another1 the whole realm of space-experience is condemned offhand and in perpetuity to anti-rationality4 ,but1 in truth1 coincidence as over against coherence1 conjunction as over against connection1 is just suspected coherence1 one which is under the fire of active inquiry4 ,the distinction is one which arises only within the logical or reflective function4 #c4 ,this brings us explicitly to the fact that there is neither coincidence nor coherence in terms of the elements or meanings contained in any couple or pair of ideas taken by itself4 ,it is only when they are co-factors in a situation or function which includes more than either the coincident or the coherent and more than the arithmetical sum of the two1 that thought's activity can be evoked4 ,lotze is continually in this dilemma3 ,thought either shapes its own material or else just accepts it4 ,in the first case 7since ,lotze cannot rid himself of the presumption that thought must have a fixed ready-made antecedent7 its activity can only alter this stuff and thus lead the mind farther away from reality4 ,but if thought just accepts its material1 how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of thought at all8 ,as we have seen1 ,lotze endeavors to escape this dilemma by supposing that1 while thought receives its material yet checks it up1 it eliminates certain portions of it and reinstates others1 plus the stamp and seal of its own validity4 ,lotze objects most strenuously to the ,kantian notion that thought awaits its subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of apprehension4 ,this notion would raise the insoluble question of how thought contrives to bring the matter of each impression under that particular form which is appropriate to it 7,i1 #bd74 ,but he has not avoided the difficulty4 ,how does thought know which of the combinations are merely coincident and which are merely coherent8 ,how does it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as grounded8 ,either this evaluation is an imposition of its own1 or else gets its cue and clue from the subject-matter4 ,now1 if the coincident and the coherent taken in and of themselves are competent to give this direction1 they are already labeled4 ,the further work of thought is one of supererogation4 ,it has at most barely to note and seal the material combinations that are already there4 ,such a view clearly renders thought's work as unnecessary in form as it is futile in force4 ,but there is no alternative except to recognize that an entire situation or environment1 within which exist both that which is afterward found to be mere coincidence and that found to be real connection1 actually provokes thought4 ,it is only as an experience previously accepted comes up in its wholeness against another one equally integral2 and only as some larger experience dawns which requires each as a part of itself and yet within which the required factors show themselves mutually incompatible1 that thought arises4 ,it is not bare coincidence1 or bare connection1 or bare addition of one to the other1 that excites thought4 ,the stimulus is a situation which is organized or constituted as a whole1 and yet which is falling to pieces in its parts--a situation which is in conflict within itself--that arouses the search to find what really goes together1 and a correspondent effort to shut out what only seemingly goes together4 ,and real coherence means precisely capacity to exist within the comprehending whole4 ,to read back into the preliminary situation those distinctions of mere conjunction of material and of valid coherence which get existence1 to say nothing of fixation1 only within the process of inquiry is a fallacy4 ,we must not leave this phase of the discussion1 however1 until it is quite clear that our objection is not to ,lotze's position that reflective thought arises from an antecedent which is not reflectional in character2 nor yet to his idea that this antecedent has a certain structure and content of its own setting the peculiar problem of thought1 giving the cue to its specific activities and determining its object4 ,on the contrary1 it is this latter point upon which we would insist2 so as 7by insisting7 to point out1 negatively1 that this view is absolutely inconsistent with ,lotze's theory that psychical impressions and ideas are the true antecedents of thought2 and1 positively1 to show that it is the situation as a whole1 and not any one isolated part of it1 or distinction within it1 that calls forth and directs thinking4 ,we must beware the fallacy of assuming that some one element in the prior situation in isolation or detachment induces the reflection which in reality comes forth only from the whole disturbed situation4 ,on the negative side1 characterizations of impression and idea are distinctions which arise only within reflection upon that situation which is the genuine antecedent of thought4 ,positively1 it is the whole dynamic experience with its qualitative and pervasive continuity1 and its inner active distraction1 its elements at odds with each other1 in tension against each other1 each contending for its proper placing and relationship1 which generates the thought-situation4 ,from this point of view1 at this period of development1 the distinctions of objective and subjective have a characteristic meaning4 ,the antecedent1 to repeat1 is a situation in which the various factors are actively incompatible with each other1 and yet in and through the striving tend to a re-formation of the whole and to a restatement of the parts4 ,this situation as such is clearly 'objective4' ,it is there2 it is there as a whole2 the various parts are there2 and their active incompatibility with one another is there4 ,nothing is conveyed at this point by asserting that any particular part of the situation is illusory or subjective1 or mere appearance2 or that any other is truly real4 ,the experience exists as one of vital and active confusion and conflict among its elements4 ,the conflict is not only objective in a de facto sense 7that is1 really existent71 but is objective in a logical sense as well2 it is just this conflict which effects a transition into the thought-situation--this1 in turn1 being only a constant movement toward a defined equilibrium4 ,the conflict has objective worth because it is the antecedent condition and cue of thought4 ,deny an organization of things within which competing incompatible tendencies appear and thinking becomes merely mental4 ,every reflective attitude and function1 whether of nave life1 deliberate invention1 or controlled scientific research1 has risen through the medium of some such total objective situation4 ,the abstract logician may tell us that sensations or impressions1 or associated ideas1 or bare physical things1 or conventional symbols1 are antecedent conditions4 ,but such statements cannot be verified by reference to a single instance of thought in connection with actual practice or actual scientific research4 ,of course1 by extreme mediation symbols may become conditions of evoking thought4 ,they get to be objects in an active experience4 ,but they are stimuli to thinking only in case their manipulation to form a new whole occasions resistance1 and thus reciprocal tension4 ,symbols and their definitions develop to a point where dealing with them becomes itself an experience1 having its own identity2 just as the handling of commercial commodities1 or arrangement of parts of an invention1 is a specific experience4 ,there is always as antecedent to thought an experience of subject-matter of the physical or social world1 or the previously organized intellectual world1 whose parts are actively at war with each other--so much so that they threaten to disrupt the situation1 which accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate redefinition and re-relation of its tensional parts4 ,this redefining and re-relating is the constructive process termed thinking3 the reconstructive situation1 with its parts in tension and in such movement toward each other as tends to a unified arrangement of things1 is the thought-situation4 ,this at once suggests the subjective phase4 ,the situation1 the experience as such1 is objective4 ,there is an experience of the confused and conflicting tendencies4 ,but just what in particular is objective1 just what form the situation shall take as an organized harmonious whole1 is unknown2 that is the problem4 ,it is the uncertainty as to the what of the experience together with the certainty that there is such an experience1 that evokes the thought-function4 ,viewed from this standpoint of uncertainty1 the situation as a whole is subjective4 ,no particular content or reference can be asserted offhand4 ,definite assertion is expressly reserved--it is to be the outcome of the procedure of reflective inquiry now undertaken4 ,this holding off of contents from definitely asserted position1 this viewing them as candidates for reform1 is what we mean1 at this stage of the natural history of thought1 by the subjective4 ,we have followed ,lotze through his tortuous course of inconsistencies4 ,it is better1 perhaps1 to run the risk of vain repetition than that of leaving the impression that these are mere dialectical contradictions4 ,it is an idle task to expose contradictions unless we realize them in relation to the fundamental assumption which breeds them4 ,lotze is bound to differentiate thought from its antecedents4 ,he is intent upon doing this1 however1 through a preconception that marks off the thought-situation radically from its predecessor1 through a difference that is complete1 fixed and absolute1 or at large4 ,it is a total contrast of thought as such to something else as such that he requires1 not a contrast within experience of one temporal phase of a process1 one period of a rhythm1 from others4 ,this complete and rigid difference ,lotze finds in the difference between an experience which is mere existence or occurrence1 and one which has to do with worth1 truth1 right relationship4 ,now things have connection1 organization1 value or force1 practical and aesthetic meaning1 on their own account4 ,the same is true of deeds1 affections1 etc4 ,only states of feelings1 bare impressions1 etc41 seem to fulfil the prerequisite of being given as existence1 and yet without qualification as to worth1 etc4 ,then the current of ideas offers itself1 a ready-made stream of events1 of existences1 which can be characterized as wholly innocent of reflective determination1 and as the natural predecessor of thought4 ,but this stream of existences is no sooner regarded than its total incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of thought appears4 ,it is about as relevant to thinking as are changes that may be happening on the other side of the moon4 ,so1 one by one1 the whole series of determinations of force and worth already traced are introduced into the very make-up1 the inner structure1 of what was to be mere existence3 viz41 7#a7 things of whose spatial and temporal relations the mere impressions are somehow representative2 7#b7 meaning--the idea as significant1 possessed of quality1 and not a mere event2 7#c7 distinguished traits of coincidence and coherence within the stream4 ,all these features are explicitly asserted1 as we have seen2 underlying and running through them all is the recognition of the supreme value of a situation which has been organized as a whole1 yet is now conflicting in its inner constitution4 ,these contradictions all arise in the attempt to put thought's work1 as concerned with objective validity1 over against experience as a mere antecedent happening1 or occurrence4 ,this contrast arises because of the attempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in general which nevertheless1 in our experience1 is dependent upon a raw material of mere impressions given to it4 ,hence the sole radical avoidance of the contradictions can be secured only when thinking is seen to be a specific event in the movement of experienced things1 having its own specific occasion or demand1 and its own specific place4 ,the nature of the organization and force that the antecedent conditions of the thought-function possess is too large a question here to enter upon in detail4 ,lotze himself suggests the answer4 ,he speaks of the current of ideas1 just as a current1 supplying us with the mass of well-grounded information which regulates daily life 7,i1 #d74 ,it gives rise to useful combinations1 correct expectations1 seasonable reactions 7,i1 #g74 ,he speaks of it1 indeed1 as if it were just the ordinary world of nave experience1 the so-called empirical world1 as distinct from the world as critically revised and rationalized in scientific and philosophic inquiry4 ,the contradiction between this interpretation and that of a mere stream of psychical impressions is only another instance of the difficulty already discussed4 ,but the phraseology suggests the real state of things4 ,the unreflective world is a world of practical things2 of ends and means1 of their effective adaptations2 of control and regulation of conduct in view of results4 ,the world of uncritical experience also is a world of social aims and means1 involving at every turn the goods and objects of affection and attachment1 of competition and co-operation4 ,it has incorporate also in its own being the surprise of aesthetic values--the sudden joy of light1 the gracious wonder of tone and form4 ,i do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflective world of experience over against the critical thought-situation--such a contrast implies the very wholesale1 at large1 consideration of thought which ,i am striving to avoid4 ,doubtless many and many an act of thought has intervened in effecting the organization of our commonest practical-affectional-aesthetic environment4 ,i only mean to indicate that thought does take place in such a world2 not after a world of bare existences2 and that while the more systematic reflection we call organized science may1 in some fair sense1 be said to come after1 it comes after affectional1 artistic1 and technological interests which have found realization4 ,having entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be followed out1 ,i venture one other digression4 ,the notion that value or significance as distinct from mere existentiality is the product of thought or reason1 and that the source of ,lotze's contradictions lies in the effort to find any situation prior or antecedent to thought1 is a familiar one--it is even possible that my criticisms of ,lotze have been interpreted by some readers in this sense4#bj ,this is the position frequently called neo-,hegelian 7though1 ,i think1 with questionable accuracy71 and has been developed by many writers in criticizing ,kant4 ,this position and that taken in this chapter do indeed agree in certain general regards4 ,they are at one in denial of the factuality and the possibility of developing fruitful reflection out of antecedent bare existence or mere events4 ,they unite in denying that there is or can be any such thing as mere existence--phenomenon unqualified as respects organization and force1 whether such phenomenon be psychic or cosmic4 ,they agree that reflective thought grows organically out of an experience which is already organized1 and that it functions within such an organism4 ,but they part company when a fundamental question is raised3 ,is all organized meaning the work of thought8 ,does it therefore follow that the organization out of which reflective thought grows is the work of thought of some other type--of ,pure ,thought1 ,creative or ,constitutive ,thought1 ,intuitive ,reason1 etc48 ,i shall indicate briefly the reasons for divergence at this point4 ,to cover all the practical-social-aesthetic objects involved1 the term thought has to be so stretched that the situation might as well be called by any other name that describes a typical form of experience4 ,more specifically1 when the difference is minimized between the organized and arranged scheme out of which reflective inquiry proceeds1 and reflective inquiry itself 7and there can be no other reason for insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought is itself somehow thought71 exactly the same type of problem recurs which presents itself when the distinction is exaggerated into one between bare existences and rational coherent meanings4 ,for the more one insists that the antecedent situation is constituted by thought1 the more one has to wonder why another type of thought is required2 what need arouses it1 and how it is possible for it to improve upon the work of previous constitutive thought4 ,this difficulty at once forces idealists from a logic of experience as it is concretely experienced into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience4 ,constitutive thought precedes our conscious thought-operations2 hence it must be the working of some absolute universal thought which1 unconsciously to our reflection1 builds up an organized world4 ,but this recourse only deepens the difficulty4 ,how does it happen that the absolute constitutive and intuitive ,thought does such a poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products8 ,here more metaphysic is called for3 ,the ,absolute ,reason is now supposed to work under limiting conditions of finitude1 of a sensitive and temporal organism4 ,the antecedents of reflective thought are not1 therefore1 determinations of thought pure and undefiled1 but of what thought can do when it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of feeling4 ,i pass by the metaphysical problem left unsolved by this flight3 ,why and how should a perfect1 absolute1 complete1 finished thought find it necessary to submit to alien1 disturbing1 and corrupting conditions in order1 in the end1 to recover through reflective thought in a partial1 piecemeal1 wholly inadequate way what it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfactory way8 ,i confine myself to the logical difficulty4 ,how can thought relate itself to the fragmentary sensations1 impressions1 feelings1 which1 in their contrast with and disparity from the workings of constitutive thought1 mark it off from the latter2 and which in their connection with its products give the cue to reflective thinking8 ,here we have again exactly the problem with which ,lotze has been wrestling3 we have the same insoluble question of the reference of thought-activity to a wholly indeterminate unrationalized1 independent1 prior existence4 ,the absolute idealist who takes up the problem at this point will find himself forced into the same continuous seesaw1 the same scheme of alternate rude robbery and gratuitous gift1 that ,lotze engaged in4 ,the simple fact is that here is just where ,lotze began2 he saw that previous transcendental logicians had left untouched the specific question of relation of our supposedly finite1 reflective thought to its own antecedents1 and he set out to make good the defect4 ,if reflective thought is required because constitutive thought works under externally limiting conditions of sense1 then we have some elements which are1 after all1 mere existences1 events1 etc4 ,or1 if they have organization from some other source than thought1 and induce reflective thought not as bare impressions1 etc41 but through their place in some whole1 then we have admitted the possibility of organization in experience1 apart from ,reason1 and the ground for assuming ,pure ,constitutive ,thought is abandoned4 ,the contradiction appears equally when viewed from the side of thought-activity and its characteristic forms4 ,all our knowledge1 after all1 of thought as constitutive is gained by consideration of the operations of reflective thought4 ,the perfect system of thought is so perfect that it is a luminous1 harmonious whole1 without definite parts or distinctions--or1 if there are such1 it is only reflection that brings them out4 ,the categories and methods of constitutive thought itself must therefore be characterized in terms of the modus operandi of reflective thought4 ,yet the latter takes place just because of the peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions under which it arises4 ,its work is progressive1 reformatory1 reconstructive1 synthetic1 in the terminology made familiar by ,kant4 ,we are not only not justified1 accordingly1 in transferring its determinations over to constitutive thought1 but are prohibited from attempting any such transfer4 ,to identify logical processes1 states1 devices1 results which are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to thought as constitutive with the structure of constitutive thought is as complete an instance of the fallacy of recourse from one genus to another as could well be found4 ,constitutive and reflective thought are1 first1 defined in terms of their dissimilarity and even opposition1 and then without more ado the forms of the description of the latter are carried over bodily to the former6 ,this is not a merely controversial criticism4 ,it points positively toward the fundamental thesis of these chapters3 ,all the distinctions discovered within thinking1 of conception as over against sense perception1 of various modes and forms of judgment1 of inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions come within the thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formation of experience2 and have for their purpose the solution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the thought-function is generated or evolved3 the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen4 ,the failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as the failure of the empiristic 7whether taken pure or in the mixed form in which ,lotze presents it74 ,it makes into absolute and fixed distinctions of existence and meaning1 and of one kind of meaning and another kind1 things which are historic or temporal in their origin and their significance4 ,it views thought as attempting to represent or state reality once for all1 instead of trying to determine some phases or contents of it with reference to their more effective and significant employ--instead of as reconstructive4 ,the rock against which every such logic splits is that either existence already has the statement which thought is endeavoring to give it1 or else it has not4 ,in the former case1 thought is futilely reiterative2 in the latter1 it is falsificatory4 ,the significance of ,lotze for critical purposes is that his peculiar effort to combine a transcendental view of thought 7i4e41 of ,thought as active in forms of its own1 pure in and of themselves7 with certain obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific empirical antecedents1 brings to light fundamental defects in both the empiristic and the transcendental logics4 ,we discover a common failure in both3 the failure to view logical terms and distinctions with respect to their necessary function in the redintegration of experience4 ,,footnotes3 #ac ,lotze1 ,logic 7translation1 ,oxford1 #ahhh71 ,i1 #b4 ,for the preceding exposition see ,i1 #a1 #b1 #ac1 #ad1 #cg1 #ch2 also ,microkosmus1 ,book ,v1 chap4 iv4 #ad ,lotze1 ,logic1 ,i1 #f1 #g4 #ae ,lotze1 ,logic 7translation1 ,oxford1 #ahhh71 ,i1 #be4 #af ,ibid41 #cf4 #ag ,ibid4 #ah ,microkosmus1 ,book ,v1 chap4 iv4 #ai ,logic1 ,,ii1 #bce2 see the whole discussion1 #cbe-cbg4 #bj ,we have a most acute and valuable criticism of ,lotze from this point of view in ,professor ,henry ,jones1 ,philosophy of ,lotze1 #ahie4 ,my specific criticisms agree in the main with his1 and ,i am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness4 ,but ,i cannot agree in the belief that the business of thought is to qualify reality as such2 its occupation appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or portion of reality1 and to fall within the course of reality itself2 being1 indeed1 the characteristic medium of its activity4 ,and ,i cannot agree that reality as such1 with increasing fulness of knowledge1 presents itself as a thought-system1 though1 as just indicated1 ,i have no doubt that practical existence presents itself in its temporal course as thought-specifications1 just as it does as affectional and aesthetic and the rest of them4 ,,iv ,,data ,,and ,,meanings ,we have reached the point of conflict in the matters of an experience4 ,it is in this conflict and because of it that the matters1 or significant quales1 stand out as matters4 ,as long as the sun revolves about earth without question1 this content is not in any way abstracted4 ,its distinction from the form or mode of experience as its matter is the work of reflection4 ,the same conflict makes other experiences assume discriminated objectification2 they1 too1 cease to be ways of living1 and become distinct objects of observation and consideration4 ,the movements of planets1 eclipses1 etc41 are cases in point4#ba ,the maintenance of a unified experience has become a problem1 an end1 for it is no longer secure4 ,but this involves such restatement of the conflicting elements as will enable them to take a place somewhere in the world of the new experience2 they must be disposed of somehow1 and they can be disposed of finally only as they are provided for4 ,that is1 they cannot be simply denied or excluded or eliminated2 they must be taken into the fold4 ,but such introduction clearly demands more or less modification or transformation on their part4 ,the thought-situation is the deliberate maintenance of an organization in experience1 with a critical consideration of the claims of the various conflicting contents to a place1 and a final assignment of position4 ,the conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself4 ,there is somewhat which is untouched in the contention of incompatibles4 ,there is something which remains secure1 unquestioned4 ,on the other hand1 there are elements which are doubtful and precarious4 ,this gives the framework of the general distribution of the field into facts1 the given1 the presented1 the ,datum2 and ideas1 the ,quaesitum1 the conceived1 the ,inferential4 a7 ,there is always something unquestioned in any problematic situation at any stage of its process1#bb even if it be only the fact of conflict or tension4 ,for this is never mere tension at large4 ,it is thoroughly qualified1 or characteristically toned and colored1 by the particular elements which are in strife4 ,hence it is this conflict1 unique and irreplaceable4 ,that it comes now means precisely that it has never come before2 that it is now passed in review and some sort of a settlement reached1 means that just this conflict will never recur4 ,in a word1 the conflict is immediately of just this and no other sort1 and this immediately given quality is an irreducible datum4 ,it is fact1 even if all else be doubtful4 ,as it is subjected to examination1 it loses vagueness and assumes more definite form4 ,only in very extreme cases1 however1 does the assured1 unquestioned element reduce to terms as low as we have here imagined4 ,certain things come to stand forth as facts1 no matter what else may be doubted4 ,there are certain apparent diurnal changes of the sun2 there is a certain annual course or track4 ,there are certain nocturnal changes in the planets1 and certain seasonal rhythmic paths4 ,the significance of these may be doubted3 ,do they mean real change in the sun or in the earth8 ,but change1 and change of a certain definite and numerically determinate character1 is there4 ,it is clear that such out-standing facts 7ex-istences7 constitute the data1 the given or presented1 in the thought-function4 b7 ,it is obvious that this is only one correspondent1 or status1 in the total situation4 ,with the consciousness of this as certain1 as given to be reckoned with1 goes the consciousness of uncertainty as to what it means--of how it is to be understood or interpreted1 that is1 of its reference and connection4 ,the facts qua presentations or existences are sure2 qua meanings 7position and relationship in an experience yet to be secured7 they are doubtful4 ,yet doubt does not preclude memory or anticipation4 ,indeed1 it is possible only through them4 ,the memory of past experience makes sun-revolving-about-earth an object of attentive regard4 ,the recollection of certain other experiences suggests the idea of earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and revolving-annually-about-sun4 ,these contents are as much present as is the observation of change1 but as respects connection they are only possibilities4 ,accordingly1 they are categorized or disposed of as ideas1 meanings1 thoughts1 ways of conceiving1 comprehending1 interpreting facts4 ,correspondence of reference here is as obvious as correlation of existence4 ,in the logical process1 the datum is not just external existence1 and the idea mere psychical existence4 ,both are modes of existence--one of given existence1 the other of possible1 of inferred existence4 ,and if the latter is regarded1 from the standpoint of the unified experience aimed at1 as having only possible existence1 the datum also is regarded as incomplete and unassured4 ,or1 as we commonly put it1 while the ideas are impressions1 suggestions1 guesses1 theories1 estimates1 etc41 facts are crude1 raw1 unorganized1 brute4 ,they lack relationship1 that is1 assured place2 they are deficient as to continuity4 ,mere change of relative position of sun1 which is absolutely unquestioned as datum1 is a sheer abstraction from the standpoint either of the organized experience left behind1 or of the reorganized experience which is the end--the objective4 ,it is impossible as a persistent object4 ,in other words1 datum and ideatum are divisions of labor1 co-operative instrumentalities1 for economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity of experience4 ,once more1 and briefly1 both datum and ideatum may 7and positively1 veritably1 do7 break up1 each for itself1 into physical and mental4 ,in so far as the conviction gains ground that the earth revolves about the sun1 the old fact is broken up into a new cosmic existence1 and a new psychological condition--the recognition of a process in virtue of which movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote larger bodies are interpreted in a reverse sense4 ,we do not just eliminate the source of error in the old content4 ,we reinterpret it as valid in its own place1 viz41 a case of the psychology of perception1 although invalid as a matter of cosmic structure4 ,until we have detected the source of error as itself a perfectly genuine existence1 we are not1 scientifically1 satisfied4 ,if we decide that the snake is but a hallucination1 our reflection is not1 in purport1 complete until we have found some fact just as existential as the snake would have been had it been there1 which accounts for the hallucination4 ,we never stop1 except temporarily1 with a reference to the mind or knower as source of an error4 ,we hunt for a specific existence4 ,in other words1 with increasing accuracy of determination of the given1 there comes a distinction1 for methodological purposes1 between the quality or matter of the sense experience and its form--the sense perceiving1 as itself a psychological fact1 having its own place and laws or relations4 ,moreover1 the old experience1 that of sun-revolving1 abides4 ,but it is regarded as belonging to me--to this experiencing individual rather than to the cosmic world4 ,here1 then1 within the growth of the thought-situation and as a part of the process of determining specific truth under specific conditions1 we get for the first time the clue to that distinction with which1 as ready-made and prior to all thinking1 ,lotze started out1 namely1 the separation of the matter of impression from impression as a personal event4 ,the separation which1 taken at large1 engenders an insoluble problem1 appears within a particular reflective inquiry1 as an inevitable differentiation of a scheme of existence4 ,the same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought1 or meaning4 ,the meaning or idea which is growing in acceptance1 which is gaining ground as meaning-of-datum1 gets logical or intellectual or objective force2 that which is losing standing1 which is increasingly doubtful1 gets qualified as just a notion1 a fancy1 a prejudice1 misconception--or finally just an error1 a mental slip4 ,evaluated as fanciful in validity it becomes a mere fancy in its existence4#bc ,it is not eliminated1 but receives a new reference or meaning4 ,thus the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such4 ,it is a specification that emerges1 correspondently1 in both datum and ideatum4 ,that which is left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is still characterized as real1 but real now in relation only to a way of experiencing--to a peculiarity of the organism4 ,that which is moved toward is regarded as real in a cosmic or extra-organic sense4 #a4 ,the data of thought4--,when we turn to ,lotze1 we find that he makes a clear distinction between the presented material of thought1 its datum1 and the typical characteristic modes of thinking in virtue of which the datum gets organization or system4 ,it is interesting to note also that he states the datum in terms different from those in which the antecedents of thought are defined4 ,from the point of view of the data or material upon which ideas exercise themselves1 it is not coincidence1 collocation1 or succession that counts1 but gradation of degrees in a scale4 ,it is not things in spatial or temporal arrangement that are emphasized1 but qualities as mutually distinguished1 yet resembling and classed4 ,there is no inherent inconceivability in the idea that every impression should be as incomparably different from every other as sweet is from warm4 ,but by a remarkable circumstance such is not the case4 ,we have series1 and networks of series4 ,we have diversity of a common--diverse colors1 sounds1 smells1 tastes1 etc4 ,in other words1 the data are sense qualities which1 fortunately for thought1 are given arranged as shades1 degrees1 variations1 or qualities of somewhat that is identical4#bd ,all this is given1 presented1 to our ideational activities4 ,even the universal1 the common color which runs through the various qualities of blue1 green1 white1 etc41 is not a product of thought1 but something which thought finds already in existence4 ,it conditions comparison and reciprocal distinction4 ,particularly all mathematical determinations1 whether of counting 7number71 degree 7more or less71 and quantity 7greatness and smallness71 come back to this peculiarity of the datum4 ,here ,lotze dwells at considerable length upon the fact that the very possibility1 as well as the success1 of thought is due to this peculiar universalization or prima facie ordering with which its material is given to it4 ,such pre-established fitness in the meeting of two things that have nothing to do with each other is certainly cause enough for wonder and congratulation4 ,it should not be difficult to see why ,lotze uses different categories in describing the material of thought from those employed in describing its antecedent conditions1 even though1 according to him1 the two are absolutely the same4#be ,he has different functions in mind4 ,in one case1 the material must be characterized as evoking1 as incentive1 as stimulus--from this point of view the peculiar feature of spatial and temporal arrangement in contrast with coherence or connection is emphasized4 ,but in the other case the material must be characterized as affording stuff1 actual subject-matter4 ,data are not only what is given to thought1 but they are also the food1 the raw material1 of thought4 ,they must be described as1 on the one hand1 wholly outside of thought4 ,this clearly puts them into the region of sense perception4 ,they are matters of sensation given free from all inferring1 judging1 relating influence4 ,sensation is just what is not called up in memory or in anticipated projection--it is the immediate1 the irreducible4 ,on the other hand1 sensory-matter is qualitative1 and quales are made up on a common basis4 ,they are degrees or grades of a common quality4 ,thus they have a certain ready-made setting of mutual distinction and reference which is already almost1 if not quite1 the effect of comparing1 of relating1 effects which are the express traits of thinking4 ,it is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in the light of what has been said4 ,the data are in truth precisely that which is selected and set aside as present1 as immediate4 ,thus they are given to further thought4 ,but the selection has occurred in view of the need for thought2 it is a listing of the capital in the way of the undisturbed1 the undiscussed1 which thought can count upon in this particular problem4 ,hence it is not strange that it has a peculiar fitness of adaptation for thought's further work4 ,having been selected with precisely that end in view1 the wonder would be if it were not so fitted4 ,a man may coin counterfeit money for use upon others1 but hardly with the intent of passing it off upon himself4 ,our only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from the logical interpretation of sense datum to a ready-made notion of it brought over from abstract psychological inquiry4 ,the belief in isolated sensory quales which are somehow forced upon us1 and forced upon us at large1 and thus conditioning thought wholly ab extra1 instead of determining it as instrumentalities or elements selected from experienced things for that very purpose1 is too fixed4 ,sensory qualities are forced upon us1 but not at large4 ,the sensory data of experience always come in a context2 they always appear as variations in a continuum4 ,even the thunder which breaks in upon me 7to take the extreme of apparent discontinuity and irrelevancy7 disturbs me because it is taken as thunder3 as a part of the same space-world as that in which my chair and room and house are located2 and it is taken as an influence which interrupts and disturbs1 because it is part of a common world of causes and effects4 ,the solution of continuity is itself practical or teleological1 and thus presupposes and affects continuity of purpose1 occupations1 and means in a life-process4 ,it is not metaphysics1 it is biology which enforces the idea that actual sensation is not only determined as an event in a world of events1#bf but is an occurrence occurring at a certain period in the control and use of stimuli4#bg #b4 ,forms of thinking data4--,as sensory datum is material set for work of thought1 so the ideational forms with which thought does its work are apt and prompt to meet the needs of the material4 ,the accessory#bh notion of ground of coherence turns out1 in truth1 not to be a formal1 or external1 addition to the data1 but a requalification of them4 ,thought is accessory as accomplice1 not as addendum4 ,thought is to eliminate mere coincidence1 and to assert grounded coherence4 ,lotze makes it clear that he does not at bottom conceive of thought as an activity in itself imposing a form of coherence2 but that the organizing work of thought is only the progressive realization of an inherent unity1 or system1 in the material experienced4 ,the specific modes in which thought brings its accessory power to bear--names1 conception1 judgment1 and inference--are successive stages in the adequate organization of the matter which comes to us first as data2 they are successive stages of the effort to overcome the original defects of the data4 ,conception starts from the universal 7the common element7 of sense4 ,yet 7and this is the significant point7 it does not simply abstract this common element1 and consciously generalize it over against its own differences4 ,such a universal is not coherence just because it does not include and dominate the temporal and local heterogeneity4 ,the true concept 7see ,i1 #ch7 is a system of attributes1 held together on the basis of some ground1 or determining1 dominating principle--a ground which so controls all its own instances as to make them into an inwardly connected whole1 and which so specifies its own limits as to be exclusive of all else4 ,if we abstract color as the common element of various colors1 the result is not a scientific idea or concept4 ,discovery of a process of light-waves whose various rates constitute the various colors of the spectrum gives the concept4 ,and when we get such a concept1 the former mere temporal abruptness of color experiences gives way to ordered parts of a color system4 ,the logical product--the concept1 in other words--is not a formal seal or stamp2 it is a thoroughgoing connection of data in a dynamic continuity of existence4 ,the form or mode of thought which marks the continued transformation of the data and the idea in reference to each other is judgment4 ,judgment makes explicit the assumption of a principle which determines connection within an individualized whole4 ,it definitely states red as this case or instance of the law or process of color1 and thus further overcomes the defect in subject-matter or data still left by conception4#bi ,now judgment logically terminates in disjunction4 ,it gives a universal which may determine any one of a number of alternative defined particulars1 but which is arbitrary as to what one is selected4 ,systematic inference brings to light the material conditions under which the law1 or dominating universal1 applies to this1 rather than that alternative particular1 and so completes the ideal organization of the subject-matter4 ,if this act were complete1 we should finally have present to us a whole on which we should know the determining and effective or authorizing elements1 and the order of development or hierarchy of dependence1 in which others follow from them4#cj ,in this account by ,lotze of the operations of the forms of thought1 there is clearly put before us the picture of a continuous correlative determination of datum on one side and of idea or meaning on the other1 till experience is again integral1 data being thoroughly defined and connected1 and ideas being the relevant meanings of subject-matter4 ,that we have here in outline a description of what actually occurs there can be no doubt4 ,but there is as little doubt that the description is thoroughly inconsistent with ,lotze's supposition that the material or data of thought is precisely the same as the antecedent of thought2 or that ideas1 conceptions1 are purely mental somewhats extraneously brought to bear1 as the sole essential characteristics of thought1 upon a material provided ready-made4 ,it means but one thing3 ,the maintenance of unity and wholeness in experience through conflicting contents occurs by means of a strictly correspondent setting apart of facts to be accurately described and properly related1 and meanings to be adequately construed and properly referred4 ,the datum is given in the thought-situation1 and to further qualification of ideas or meanings4 ,but even in this aspect it presents a problem4 ,to find out what is given is an inquiry which taxes reflection to the uttermost4 ,every important advance in scientific method means better agencies1 more skilled technique for simply detaching and describing what is barely there1 or given4 ,to be able to find out what can safely be taken as there1 as given in any particular inquiry1 and hence be taken as material for orderly and verifiable inference1 for fruitful hypothesis-making1 for entertaining of explanatory and interpretative ideas1 is one phase of the effort of systematic scientific inquiry4 ,it marks its inductive phase4 ,to take what is discovered to be reliable evidence within a more complex situation as if it were given absolutely and in isolation1 or apart from a particular historic situs and context1 is the fallacy of empiricism as a logical theory4 ,to regard the thought-forms of conception1 judgment1 and inference as qualifications of pure thought1 apart from any difference in objects1 instead of as successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material 7or objects71 is the fallacy of rationalism4 ,lotze1 like ,kant1 attempts to combine the two1 thinking thereby to correct each by the other4 ,lotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense data as data are final1 if they alone are real1 the truly existent1 self-justificatory and valid4 ,he sees that1 if the empiricist were right in his assumption as to the real worth of the given data1 thinking would be a ridiculous pretender1 either toilfully and poorly doing over again what needs no doing1 or making a wilful departure from truth4 ,he realizes that thought is evoked because it is needed2 and that it has a work to do which is not merely formal1 but which effects a modification of the subject-matter of experience4 ,consequently he assumes a thought-in-itself1 with certain forms and modes of action of its own1 a realm of meaning possessed of a directive and normative worth of its own--the root-fallacy of rationalism4 ,his attempted compromise between the two turns out to be based on the assumption of the indefensible ideas of both--the notion of an independent matter given to thought1 on one side1 and of an independent worth or force of thought-forms1 on the other4 ,this pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and unprofitable save as we bring them back into connection with their root-origin--the erection of distinctions that are genetic and historic1 and working or instrumental divisions of labor1 into rigid and ready-made structural differences of reality4 ,lotze clearly recognizes that thought's nature is dependent upon its aim1 its aim upon its problem1 and this upon the situation in which it finds its incentive and excuse4 ,its work is cut out for it4 ,it does not what it would1 but what it must4 ,as ,lotze puts it1 ,logic has to do with thought1 not as it would be under hypothetical conditions1 but as it is 7,i1 #cc71 and this statement is made in explicit combination with statements to the effect that the peculiarity of the material of thought conditions its activity4 ,similarly he says1 in a passage already referred to3 ,the possibility and the success of thought's production in general depends upon this original constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas1 a constitution which1 though not necessary in thought1 is all the more necessary to make thought possible4#ca ,as we have seen1 the essential nature of conception1 judgment1 and inference is dependent upon peculiarities of the propounded material1 they being forms dependent for their significance upon the stage of organization in which they begin4 ,from this only one conclusion is possible4 ,if thought's nature is dependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances1 the primary logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning2 it is to detect the crisis within which thought and its subject-matter present themselves in their mutual distinction and cross-reference4 ,but ,lotze is so thoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some sort1 that this genetic consideration is of no account to him4 ,the historic method is a mere matter of psychology1 and has no logical worth 7,i1 #b74 ,we must presuppose a psychological mechanism and psychological material1 but logic is concerned not with origin or history1 but with authority1 worth1 value 7,i1 #aj74 ,again3 ,logic is not concerned with the manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into existence1 but their value after they have somehow come into existence1 for the carrying out of intellectual operations 7,i1 #cd74 ,and finally3 ,i have maintained throughout my work that logic cannot derive any serious advantage from a discussion of the conditions under which thought as a psychological process comes about4 ,the significance of logical forms 444 is to be found in the utterances of thought1 the laws which it imposes1 after or during the act of thinking1 not in the conditions which lie back of any which produce thought4#cb ,lotze1 in truth1 represents a halting-stage in the evolution of logical theory4 ,he is too far along to be contented with the reiteration of the purely formal distinctions of a merely formal thought-by-itself4 ,he recognizes that thought as formal is the form of some matter1 and has its worth only as organizing that matter to meet the ideal demands of reason2 and that reason is in truth only an adequate systematization of the matter or content4 ,consequently he has to open the door to admit psychical processes which furnish this material4 ,having let in the material1 he is bound to shut the door again in the face of the processes from which the material proceeded--to dismiss them as impertinent intruders4 ,if thought gets its data in such a surreptitious manner1 there is no occasion for wonder that the legitimacy of its dealings with the material remains an open question4 ,logical theory1 like every branch of the philosophic disciplines1 waits upon a surrender of the obstinate conviction that1 while the work and aim of thought is conditioned by the material supplied to it1 yet the worth of its performances is something to be passed upon in complete abstraction from conditions of origin and development4 ,,footnotes3 #ba ,this is but to say that the presentation of objects as specifically different things in experience is the work of reflection1 and that the discrimination of something experienced from modes of experiencing is also the work of reflection4 ,the latter statement is1 of course1 but a particular case of the first2 for an act of experiencing is one object1 among others1 which may be discriminated out of the original experience4 ,when so discriminated1 it has exactly the same existential status as any other discriminated object2 seeing and thing seen stand on the same level of existentiality4 ,but primary experience is innocent of the discrimination of the what experienced and the how1 or mode1 of experiencing4 ,we are not in it aware of the seeing1 nor yet of objects as something seen4 ,any experience in all of its non-reflective phases is innocent of any discrimination of subject and object4 ,it involves within itself what may be reflectively discriminated into objects located outside the organism and objects referred to the organism4 ,note added in revision4 #bb ,of course1 this very element may be the precarious1 the ideal1 and possibly fanciful of some other situation4 ,but it is to change the historic into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is uncertain1 all at once1 or as such4 ,this gives metaphysical skepticism as distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in all reflection and scientific inquiry4 #bc ,but this is a slow progress within reflection4 ,plato1 who was influential in bringing this general distinction to consciousness1 still thought and wrote as if image were itself a queer sort of objective existence2 it was only gradually that it was disposed of as a phase of personal experiencing4 #bd ,i1 #bh-cd4 #be ,it is interesting to see how explicitly ,lotze is compelled finally to differentiate two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts1 one of which is necessary in order that there may be anything to call out thought 7a lack1 or problem72 the other in order that when thought is evoked it may find data at hand--that is1 material in shape to receive and respond to its exercise4 ,the manifold matter of ideas is brought before us1 not only in the systematic order of its qualitative relationships1 but in the rich variety of local and temporal combinations4444 ,the combinations of heterogeneous ideas 444 form the problems1 in connection with which the efforts of thought to reduce coexistence to coherence will subsequently be made4 ,the homogeneous or similar ideas1 on the other hand1 give occasion to separate1 to connect1 and to count their repetitions 7,i1 #cc1 #cd2 italics mine74 ,without the heterogeneous variety of the local and temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to excite thought4 ,without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be nothing to meet thought and reward it for its efforts4 ,the homogeneity of qualitative relationships1 in the pre-thought material1 gives the tools or instruments by which thought is enabled successfully to tackle the heterogeneity of collocations and conjunctions also found in the same material6 ,one would suppose that when ,lotze reached this point he might have been led to suspect that in his remarkable adjustment of thought-stimuli1 thought-material1 and thought-tools to one another1 he must after all be dealing1 not with something prior to the thought-function1 but with the necessary structures and tools of the thought-situation4 #bf ,supra1 p4 #aac4 #bg ,for the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest strain and stress in conflicting or tensional experience1 see ,the ,reflex ,arc ,concept in ,psychology1 ,psychological ,review1 ,,iii1 #eg4 #bh ,for the accessory character of thought1 see ,lotze1 ,i1 #g1 #be-bg1 #fa1 etc4 #bi ,bosanquet 7,logic1 ,i1 #cj-cd7 and ,jones 7,philosophy of ,lotze1 #ahie1 chap4 iv7 have called attention to a curious inconsistency in ,lotze's treatment of judgment4 ,on one hand1 the statement is as given above4 ,judgment grows out of conception in making explicit the determining relation of universal to its own particular1 implied in conception4 ,but1 on the other hand1 judgment grows not out of conception at all1 but out of the question of determining connection in change4 ,lotze's nominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world is purely static2 since the actual world is one of change1 we need to pass upon what really goes together 7is causal7 in the change as distinct from such as are merely coincident4 ,but1 as ,jones clearly shows1 it is also connected with the fact that1 while ,lotze nominally asserts that judgment grows out of conception1 he treats conception as the result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere explication of the content of an idea1 and hence merely expository or analytic 7in the ,kantian sense7 and so of more than doubtful applicability to reality4 ,the affair is too large to discuss here1 and ,i will content myself with referring to the oscillation between conflicting contents and gradation of sensory qualities already discussed 7p4 #add1 note74 ,it is judgment which grows out of the former1 because judgment is the whole situation as such2 conception is referable to the latter because it is one abstraction within the whole 7the solution of possible meanings of the data7 just as the datum is another4 ,in truth1 since the sensory datum is not absolute1 but comes in a historical context1 the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum simply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation4 ,they are attributives of the contents-in-tension of the colliding things1 not calm untroubled ultimates4 ,on pp4 #cc and #cd of ,vol4 ,i1 ,lotze recognizes 7as we have just seen7 that1 as matter of fact1 it is both sensory qualities in their systematic grading1 or quantitative determinations 7see ,i1 #dc1 for the recognition of the necessary place of the quantitative in the true concept71 and the rich variety of local and temporal combinations1 that provoke thought and supply it with material4 ,but1 as usual1 he treats this simply as a historical accident1 not as furnishing the key to the whole matter4 ,in fine1 while the heterogeneous collocations and successions constitute the problematic element that stimulates thought1 quantitative determination of the sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which thought deals with the problem4 ,it is a reduction of the original colliding contents to a form in which the effort at redintegration gets maximum efficiency4 ,the concept1 as ideal meaning1 is of course the other partner to the transaction4 ,it is getting the various possible meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most useful in construing the data4 ,the bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment cannot be discussed here4 #cj ,see ,i1 #ch1 #ei1 #fa1 #aje1 #abi1 #aig1 for ,lotze's treatment of these distinctions4 #ca ,i1 #cf2 see also ,,ii1 #bij1 #bia4 #cb ,,ii1 #bdf2 the same is reiterated in ,,ii1 #bej1 where the question of origin is referred to as a corruption in logic4 ,certain psychical acts are necessary as conditions and occasions of logical operations1 but the deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought remains unfilled4 ,v ,,the ,,objects ,,of ,,thought ,in the foregoing discussion1 particularly in the last chapter1 we were repeatedly led to recognize that thought has its own distinctive objects4 ,at times ,lotze gives way to the tendency to define thought entirely in terms of modes and forms of activity which are exercised by it upon a strictly foreign material4 ,but two motives continually push him in the other direction4 7#a7 ,thought has a distinctive work to do1 one which involves a qualitative transformation of 7at least7 the relationships of the presented matter2 as fast as it accomplishes this work1 the subject-matter becomes somehow thought's subject-matter4 ,as we have just seen1 the data are progressively organized to meet thought's ideal of a complete whole1 with its members interconnected according to a determining principle4 ,such progressive organization throws backward doubt upon the assumption of the original total irrelevancy of the data and thought-forms to each other4 7#b7 ,a like motive operates from the side of the subject-matter4 ,as merely foreign and external1 it is too heterogeneous to lend itself to thought's exercise and influence4 ,the idea1 as we saw in the first chapter1 is the convenient medium through which ,lotze passes from the purely heterogeneous psychical impression or event1 which is totally irrelevant to thought's purpose and working1 over to a state of affairs which can reward thought4 ,idea as meaning forms the bridge over from the brute factuality of the psychical impression to the coherent value of thought's own content4 ,we have1 in this chapter1 to consider the question of the idea or content of thought from two points of view3 first the possibility of such a content--its consistency with ,lotze's fundamental premises2 secondly1 its objective character--its validity and test4 ,i4 ,the question of the possibility of a specific content of thought is the question of the nature of the idea as meaning4 ,meaning is the characteristic object of thought4 ,we have thus far left unquestioned ,lotze's continual assumption of meaning as a sort of thought-unit2 the building-stone of thought's construction4 ,in his treatment of meaning1 ,lotze's contradictions regarding the antecedents1 data1 and content of thought reach their full conclusion4 ,he expressly makes meaning to be the product of thought's activity and also the unreflective material out of which thought's operations grow4 ,this contradiction has been worked out in accurate and complete detail by ,professor ,jones4#cc ,he summarizes it as follows 7p4 #ii73 ,no other way was left to him ,lotze excepting this of first attributing all to sense and afterwards attributing all to thought1 and1 finally1 of attributing it to thought only because it was already in its material4 ,this seesaw is essential to his theory2 the elements of knowledge as he describes them can subsist only by the alternate robbery of each other4 ,we have already seen how strenuously ,lotze insists upon the fact that the given subject-matter of thought is to be regarded wholly as the work of a physical mechanism1 without any action of thought4#cd ,but ,lotze also states that if the products of the psychical mechanism are to admit of combination in the definite form of a thought1 they each require some previous shaping to make them into logical building-stones and to convert them from impressions into ideas4 ,nothing is really more familiar to us than this first operation of thought2 the only reason why we usually overlook it is that in the language which we inherit1 it is already carried out1 and it seems1 therefore1 to belong to the self-evident presuppositions of thought1 not to its own specific work4#ce ,and again 7,i1 #bc71 judgments can consist of nothing but combinations of ideas which are no longer mere impressions3 every such idea must have undergone at least the simple formation mentioned above4 ,such ideas are1 ,lotze goes on to urge1 already rudimentary concepts--that is to say1 logical determinations4 ,the obviousness of the logical contradiction of attributing to a preliminary specific work of thought exactly the condition of affairs which is elsewhere explicitly attributed to a psychical mechanism prior to any thought-activity1 should not blind us to its import and relative necessity4 ,the impression1 it will be recalled1 is a mere state of our own consciousness--a mood of ourselves4 ,as such it has simply de facto relations as an event to other similar events4 ,but reflective thought is concerned with the relationship of a content or matter to other contents4 ,hence the impression must have a matter before it can come at all within the sphere of thought's exercise4 ,how shall it secure this8 ,why1 by a preliminary activity of thought which objectifies the impression4 ,blue as a mere sensuous irritation or feeling is given a quality1 the meaning blue--blueness2 the sense impression is objectified2 it is presented no longer as a condition which we undergo1 but as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself1 and which continues to be what it is1 and to mean what it means whether we are conscious of it or not4 ,it is easy to see here the necessary beginning of that activity which we above appropriated to thought as such3 it has not yet got so far as converting coexistence into coherence4 ,it has first to perform the previous task of investing each single impression with an independent validity1 without which the later opposition of their real coherence to mere coexistence could not be made in any intelligible sense4#cf ,this objectification1 which converts a sensitive state into a sensible matter to which the sensitive state is referred1 also gives this matter position1 a certain typical character4 ,it is not objectified in a merely general way1 but is given a specific sort of objectivity4 ,of these sorts of objectivity there are three mentioned3 that of a substantive content2 that of an attached dependent content2 that of an active relationship connecting the various contents with each other4 ,in short1 we have the types of meaning embodied in language in the form of nouns1 adjectives1 and verbs4 ,it is through this preliminary formative activity of thought that reflective or logical thought has presented to it a world of meanings ranged in an order of relative independence and dependence1 and arranged as elements in a complex of meanings whose various constituent parts mutually influence one another's meanings4#cg ,as usual1 ,lotze mediates the contradiction between material constituted by thought and the same material just presented to thought1 by a further position so disparate to each that1 taken in connection with each by turns1 it seems to bridge the gulf4 ,after describing the prior constitutive work of thought as above1 he goes on to discuss a second phase of thought which is intermediary between this and the third phase1 viz41 reflective thought proper4 ,this second activity is that of arranging experienced quales in series and groups1 thus ascribing a sort of universal or common somewhat to various instances 7as already described2 see p4 #add74 ,on one hand1 it is clearly stated that this second phase of thought's activity is in reality the same as the first phase3 since all objectification involves positing1 since positing involves distinction of one matter from others1 and since this involves placing it in a series or group in which each is measurably marked off1 as to the degree and nature of its diversity1 from every other4 ,we are told that we are only considering a really inseparable operation of thought from two different sides3 first1 as to the effect which objectifying thought has upon the matter as set over against the feeling subject2 secondly1 the effect which this objectification has upon the matter in relation to other matters4#ch ,afterward1 however1 these two operations are declared to be radically different in type and nature4 ,the first is determinant and formative2 it gives ideas the shape without which the logical spirit could not accept them4 ,in a way it dictates its own laws to its object-matter4#ci ,the second activity of thought is rather passive and receptive4 ,it simply recognizes what is already there4 ,thought can make no difference where it finds none already in the matter of impressions4#dj ,the first universal1 as we saw1 can only be experienced in immediate sensation4 ,it is no product of thought1 but something that thought finds already in existence4#da ,the obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled only by its inevitableness4 ,thought is in the air1 is arbitrary and wild in dealing with meanings1 unless it gets its start and cue from actual experience4 ,hence the necessity of insisting upon thought's activity as just recognizing the contents already given4 ,but1 on the other hand1 prior to the work of thought there is to ,lotze no content or meaning4 ,it requires a work of thought to detach anything from the flux of sense irritations and invest it with a meaning of its own4 ,this dilemma is inevitable to any writer who declines to consider as correlative the nature of thought-activity and thought-content from the standpoint of their generating conditions in the movement of experience4 ,viewed from such a standpoint the principle of solution is clear enough4 ,as we have already seen 7p4 #aba71 the internal dissension of an experience leads to detaching certain factors previously integrated in the concrete experience as aspects of its own qualitative coloring1 and to relegating them1 for the time being 7pending integration into further immediate qualities of a reconstituted experience71 into a world of bare meanings1 a sphere qualified as ideal throughout4 ,these meanings then become the tools of thought in interpreting the data1 just as the sense qualities which define the presented situation are the immediate matter for thought4 ,the two as mutually referred are content4 ,that is1 the datum and the meaning as reciprocally qualified by each other constitute the objective of thought4 ,to reach this unification is thought's objective or goal4 ,every successive cross-section of reflective inquiry presents what may be taken for granted as the outcome of previous thinking1 and as the determinant of further reflective procedure4 ,taken as defining the point reached in the thought-function and serving as constituent unit in further thought1 it is content or logical object4 ,lotze's instinct is sure in identifying and setting over against each other the material given to thought and the content which is thought's own building-stone4 ,his contradictions arise simply from the fact that his absolute1 non-historic method does not permit him to interpret this joint identity and distinction in a working1 and hence relative1 sense4 ,,ii4 ,the question of how the existence of meanings1 or thought-contents1 is to be understood merges imperceptibly into the question of the real objectivity or validity of such contents4 ,the difficulty for ,lotze is the now familiar one3 ,so far as his logic compels him to insist that these meanings are the possession and product of thought 7since thought is an independent activity71 the ideas are merely ideas2 there is no test of objectivity beyond the thoroughly unsatisfactory and formal one of their own mutual consistency4 ,in reaction from this ,lotze is thrown back upon the idea of these contents as the original matter given in the impressions themselves4 ,here there seems to be an objective or external test by which the reality of thought's operations may be tried2 a given idea is verified or found false according to its measure of correspondence with the matter of experience as such4 ,but now we are no better off4 ,the original independence and heterogeneity of impressions and of thought is so great that there is no way to compare the results of the latter with the former4 ,we cannot compare or contrast distinctions of worth with bare differences of factual existence 7,i1 #b74 ,the standard or test of objectivity is so thoroughly external that by original definition it is wholly outside the realm of thought4 ,how can thought compare meanings with existences8 ,or again1 the given material of experience apart from thought is precisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized2 it even reduces itself to a mere sequence of psychical events4 ,what sense is there in directing us to compare the highest results of scientific inquiry with the bare sequence of our own states of feeling2 or even with the original data whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the exact motive for entering upon scientific inquiry8 ,how can the former in any sense give a check or test of the value of the latter8 ,this is professedly to test the validity of a system of meanings by comparison with that whose defects call forth the construction of the system of meanings4 ,our subsequent inquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases of the characteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns of the now familiar dilemma3 either thought is separate from the matter of experience1 and then its validity is wholly its own private business1 or else the objective results of thought are already in the antecedent material1 and then thought is either unnecessary or else has no way of checking its own performances4 #a4 ,lotze assumes1 as we have seen1 a certain independent validity in each meaning or qualified content1 taken in and of itself4 ,blue has a certain meaning1 in and of itself2 it is an object for consciousness as such1 not merely its state or mood4 ,after the original sense irritation through which it was mediated has entirely disappeared1 it persists as a valid meaning4 ,moreover1 it is an object or content of thought for others as well4 ,thus it has a double mark of validity3 in the comparison of one part of my own experience with another1 and in the comparison of my experience as a whole with that of others4 ,here we have a sort of validity which does not raise at all the question of metaphysical reality 7,i1 #ad1 #ae74 ,lotze thus seems to have escaped from the necessity of employing as check or test for the validity of ideas any reference to a real outside the sphere of thought itself4 ,such terms as conjunction1 franchise1 constitution1 algebraic zero1 etc41 claim to possess objective validity4 ,yet none of these professes to refer to a reality beyond thought4 ,generalizing this point of view1 validity or objectivity of meaning means simply that which is identical for all consciousness 7,i1 #c72 it is quite indifferent whether certain parts of the world of thought indicate something which has beside an independent reality outside of thinking minds1 or whether all that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who think it1 but with equal validity for them all 7,i1 #af74 ,so far it seems clear sailing4 ,difficulties1 however1 show themselves the moment we inquire what is meant by a self-identical content for all thought4 ,is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way8 ,that is to say3 ,does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is de facto presented to the consciousness of all alike8 ,does this coequal presence guarantee an objectivity8 ,or does validity attach to a given meaning or content in the sense that it directs and controls the further exercise of thinking1 and thus the formation of further new objects of knowledge8 ,the former interpretation is alone consistent with ,lotze's notion that the independent idea as such is invested with a certain validity or objectivity4 ,it alone is consistent with his assertion that concepts precede judgments4 ,it alone1 that is to say1 is consistent with the notion that reflective thinking has a sphere of ideas or meanings supplied to it at the outset4 ,but it is impossible to entertain this belief4 ,the stimulus which1 according to ,lotze1 goads thought on from ideas or concepts to judgments and inferences is in truth simply the lack of validity1 of objectivity in its original independent meanings or contents4 ,a meaning as independent is precisely that which is not invested with validity1 but which is a mere idea1 a notion1 a fancy1 at best a surmise which may turn out to be valid 7and of course this indicates possible reference72 a standpoint to have its value determined by its further active use4 ,blue as a mere detached floating meaning1 an idea at large1 would not gain in validity simply by being entertained continuously in a given consciousness1 or by being made at one and the same time the persistent object of attentive regard by all human consciousnesses4 ,if this were all that were required1 the chimera1 the centaur1 or any other subjective construction could easily gain validity4 ,christian ,science has made just this notion the basis of its philosophy4 ,the simple fact is that in such illustrations as blue1 franchise1 conjunction1 ,lotze instinctively takes cases which are not mere independent and detached meanings1 but which involve reference to a region of experience1 to a region of mutually determining social activities4 ,the conception that reference to a social activity does not involve the same sort of reference of a meaning beyond itself that is found in physical matters1 and hence may be taken quite innocent and free of the problem of reference to existence beyond meaning1 is one of the strangest that has ever found lodgment in human thinking4 ,either both physical and social reference or neither is logical2 if neither1 then it is because the meaning functions1 as it originates1 in a specific situation which carries with it its own tests 7see p4 #if74 ,lotze's conception is made possible only by unconsciously substituting the idea of an object as a content of thought for a large number of persons 7or a de facto somewhat for every consciousness71 for the genuine definition of object as a determinant in a scheme of activity4 ,the former is consistent with ,lotze's conception of thought1 but wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent4 ,the latter is the test used experimentally in all concrete thinking1 but involves a radical transformation of all ,lotze's assumptions4 ,a given idea of the conjunction of the franchise1 or of blue1 is valid1 not because everybody happens to entertain it1 but because it expresses the factor of control or direction in a given movement of experience4 ,the test of validity of idea#db is its functional or instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one4 ,if ,lotze's view were correct1 blue valid once would be valid always--even when red or green were actually called for to fulfil specific conditions4 ,this is to say validity really refers to rightfulness or adequacy of performance in an asserting of connection--not to a meaning as contemplated in detachment4 ,if we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent of thought is a situation which is disorganized in its structural elements1 we can easily understand how certain contents may be detached and held apart as meanings or references1 actual or possible4 ,we can understand how such detached contents may be of use in effecting a review of the entire experience1 and as affording standpoints and methods of a reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of behavior4 ,we can understand how validity of meaning is measured by reference to something which is not mere meaning2 by reference to something which lies beyond it as such--viz41 the reconstitution of an experience into which it enters as method of control4 ,that paradox of ordinary experience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is given alike to matter of perception and to conceived relations--to facts and to laws--affords no peculiar difficulty because the test of objectivity is everywhere the same3 anything is objective in so far as1 through the medium of conflict1 it controls the movement of experience in its reconstructive transition4 ,there is not first an object1 whether of sense perception or of conception1 which afterward somehow exercises this controlling influence2 but the objective is any existence exercising the function of control4 ,it may only control the act of inquiry2 it may only set on foot doubt1 but this is direction of subsequent experience1 and1 in so far1 is a token of objectivity4 ,it has to be reckoned with4 ,so much for the thought-content or meaning as having a validity of its own4 ,it does not have it as isolated or given or static2 it has it in its dynamic reference1 its use in determining further movement of experience4 ,in other words1 the meaning1 having been selected and made up with reference to performing a certain office in the evolution of a unified experience1 can be tested in no other way than by discovering whether it does what it was intended to do and what it purports to do4#dc #b4 ,lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a further respect3 ,what constitutes the objectivity of thinking as a total attitude1 activity1 or function8 ,according to his own statement1 the meanings or valid ideas are after all only building-stones for logical thought4 ,validity is thus not a property of them in their independent existences1 but of their mutual reference to each other4 ,thinking is the process of instituting these mutual references2 of building up the various scattered and independent building-stones into the coherent system of thought4 ,what is the validity of the various forms of thinking which find expression in the various types of judgment and in the various forms of inference8 ,categorical1 hypothetical1 disjunctive judgment2 inference by induction1 by analogy1 by mathematical equation2 classification1 theory of explanation--all these are processes of reflection by which connection in an organized whole is given to the fragmentary meanings with which thought sets out4 ,what shall we say of the validity of such processes8 ,on one point ,lotze is quite clear4 ,these various logical acts do not really enter into the constitution of the valid world4 ,the logical forms as such are maintained only in the process of thinking4 ,the world of valid truth does not undergo a series of contortions and evolutions1 paralleling in any way the successive steps and missteps1 the succession of tentative trials1 withdrawals1 and retracings1 which mark the course of our own thinking4#dd ,lotze is explicit upon the point that only the thought-content in which the process of thinking issues has objective validity2 the act of thinking is purely and simply an inner movement of our own minds1 made necessary to us by reason of the constitution of our nature and of our place in the world 7,,ii1 #bgi74 ,here the problem of validity presents itself as the problem of the relation of the act of thinking to its own product4 ,in his solution ,lotze uses two metaphors3 one derived from building operations1 the other from traveling4 ,the construction of a building requires of necessity certain tools and extraneous constructions1 stagings1 scaffoldings1 etc41 which are necessary to effect the final construction1 but which do not enter into the building as such4 ,the activity has an instrumental1 though not a constitutive1 value as regards its product4 ,similarly1 in order to get a view from the top of a mountain--this view being the objective--the traveler has to go through preliminary movements along devious courses4 ,these again are antecedent prerequisites1 but do not constitute a portion of the attained view4 ,the problem of thought as activity1 as distinct from thought as content1 opens up altogether too large a question to receive complete consideration at this point4 ,fortunately1 however1 the previous discussion enables us to narrow the point which is in issue just here4 ,the question is whether the activity of thought is to be regarded as an independent function supervening entirely from without upon antecedents1 and directed from without upon data1 or whether it marks the phase of the transformation which the course of experience 7whether practical1 or artistic1 or socially affectional or whatever7 undergoes for the sake of its deliberate control4 ,if it be the latter1 a thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to the proposition that the activity of thinking is instrumental1 and that its worth is found1 not in its own successive states as such1 but in the result in which it comes to conclusion4 ,but the conception of thinking as an independent activity somehow occurring after an independent antecedent1 playing upon an independent subject-matter1 and finally effecting an independent result1 presents us with just one miracle the more4 ,i do not question the strictly instrumental character of thinking4 ,the problem lies not here1 but in the interpretation of the nature of the instrument4 ,the difficulty with ,lotze's position is that it forces us into the assumption of a means and an end which are simply and only external to each other1 and yet necessarily dependent upon each other--a position which1 whenever found1 is thoroughly self-contradictory4 ,lotze vibrates between the notion of thought as a tool in the external sense1 a mere scaffolding to a finished building in which it has no part nor lot1 and the notion of thought as an immanent tool1 as a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very operation of building1 and which is set up for the sake of the building-activity which is carried on effectively only with and through a scaffolding4 ,only in the former case can the scaffolding be considered as a mere tool4 ,in the latter case the external scaffolding is not the instrumentality2 the actual tool is the action of erecting the building1 and this action involves the scaffolding as a constituent part of itself4 ,the work of building is not set over against the completed building as mere means to an end2 it is the end taken in process or historically1 longitudinally1 temporally viewed4 ,the scaffolding1 moreover1 is not an external means to the process of erecting1 but an organic member of it4 ,it is no mere accident of language that building has a double sense--meaning at once the process and the finished product4 ,the outcome of thought is the thinking activity carried on to its own completion2 the activity1 on the other hand1 is the outcome taken anywhere short of its own realization1 and thereby still going on4 ,the only consideration which prevents easy and immediate acceptance of this view is the notion of thinking as something purely formal4 ,it is strange that the empiricist does not see that his insistence upon a matter accidentally given to thought only strengthens the hands of the rationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent activity1 separate from the actual make-up of the affairs of experience4 ,thinking as a merely formal activity exercised upon certain sensations or images or objects sets forth an absolutely meaningless proposition4 ,the psychological identification of thinking with the process of association is much nearer the truth4 ,it is1 indeed1 on the way to the truth4 ,we need only to recognize that association is of matters or meanings1 not of ideas as existences or events2 and that the type of association we call thinking differs from casual fancy and revery by control in reference to an end1 to apprehend how completely thinking is a reconstructive movement of actual contents of experience in relation to each other4 ,there is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion4 ,were they external in origin to each other and to the result1 the whole affair would1 indeed1 present an insoluble problem--so insoluble that1 if this were the true condition of affairs1 we never should even know that there was a problem4 ,but1 in truth1 both material and tool have been secured and determined with reference to economy and efficiency in effecting the end desired--the maintenance of a harmonious experience4 ,the builder has discovered that his building means building tools1 and also building material4 ,each has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit employ in the entire function2 and this evolution has been checked at every point by reference to its own correspondent4 ,the carpenter has not thought at large on his building and then constructed tools at large1 but has thought of his building in terms of the material which enters into it1 and through that medium has come to the consideration of the tools which are helpful4 ,this is not a formal question1 but one of the place and relations of the matters actually entering into experience4 ,and they in turn determine the taking up of just those mental attitudes1 and the employing of just those intellectual operations which most effectively handle and organize the material4 ,thinking is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents4 ,the thinker1 like the carpenter1 is at once stimulated and checked in every stage of his procedure by the particular situation which confronts him4 ,a person is at the stage of wanting a new house3 well1 then1 his materials are available resources1 the price of labor1 the cost of building1 the state and needs of his family1 profession1 etc42 his tools are paper and pencil and compass1 or possibly the bank as a credit instrumentality1 etc4 ,again1 the work is beginning4 ,the foundations are laid4 ,this in turn determines its own specific materials and tools4 ,again1 the building is almost ready for occupancy4 ,the concrete process is that of taking away the scaffolding1 clearing up the grounds1 furnishing and decorating rooms1 etc4 ,this specific operation again determines its own fit or relevant materials and tools4 ,it defines the time and mode and manner of beginning and ceasing to use them4 ,logical theory will get along as well as does the practice of knowing when it sticks close by and observes the directions and checks inherent in each successive phase of the evolution of the cycle of experience4 ,the problem in general of validity of the thinking process as distinct from the validity of this or that process arises only when thinking is isolated from its historic position and its material context 7see ante1 p4 #ie74 #c4 ,but ,lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity1 even from his own standpoint4 ,the ground shifts again under his feet4 ,it is no longer a question of the validity of the idea or meaning with which thought is supposed to set out2 it is no longer a question of the validity of the process of thinking in reference to its own product2 it is the question of the validity of the product4 ,supposing1 after all1 that the final meaning1 or logical idea1 is thoroughly coherent and organized2 supposing it is an object for all consciousness as such4 ,once more arises the question3 ,what is the validity of even the most coherent and complete idea8--a question which arises and will not down4 ,we may reconstruct the notion of the chimera until it ceases to be an independent idea and becomes a part of the system of ,greek mythology4 ,has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent myth1 in becoming an element in systematized myth8 ,myth it was and myth it remains4 ,mythology does not get validity by growing bigger4 ,how do we know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the product of our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry8 ,the reference again to the content as the self-identical object of all consciousness proves nothing2 the subject-matter of a hallucination does not gain validity in proportion to its social contagiousness4 ,according to ,lotze1 the final product is1 after all1 still thought4 ,now1 ,lotze is committed once for all to the notion that thought1 in any form1 is directed by and at an outside reality4 ,the ghost haunts him to the last4 ,how1 after all1 does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply or refer to reality8 ,its genuine subject is still beyond itself4 ,at the last ,lotze can dispose of this question only by regarding it as a metaphysical1 not a logical1 problem 7,,ii1 #bha1 #bhb74 ,in other words1 logically speaking1 we are at the end just exactly where we were at the beginning--in the sphere of ideas1 and of ideas only1 plus a consciousness of the necessity of referring these ideas to a reality which is beyond them1 which is utterly inaccessible to them1 which is out of reach of any influence which they may exercise1 and which transcends any possible comparison with their results4 ,it is vain1 says ,lotze1 to shrink from acknowledging the circle here involved 444 all we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are within us 7,,ii1 #ahe74 ,it is then this varied world of ideas within us which forms the sole material directly given to us 7,,ii1 #ahf74 ,as it is the only material given to us1 so it is the only material with which thought can end4 ,to talk about knowing the external world through ideas which are merely within us is to talk of an inherent self-contradiction4 ,there is no common ground in which the external world and our ideas can meet4 ,in other words1 the original separation between an independent thought-material and an independent thought-function and purpose lands us inevitably in the metaphysics of subjective idealism1 plus a belief in an unknown reality beyond1 which although unknowable is yet taken as the ultimate test of the value of our ideas4 ,at the end1 after all our maneuvering we are where we began3 with two separate disparates1 one of meaning1 but no existence1 the other of existence1 but no meaning4 ,the other aspect of ,lotze's contradiction which completes the circle is clear when we refer to his original propositions1 and recall that at the outset he was compelled to regard the origination and conjunctions of the impressions1 the elements of ideas1 as themselves the effects exercised by a world of things already in existence 7see p4 #ca74 ,he sets up an independent world of thought1 and yet has to confess that both at its origin and at its termination it points with absolute necessity to a world beyond itself4 ,only the stubborn refusal to take this initial and terminal reference of thought beyond itself as having a historic or temporal meaning1 indicating a particular place of generation and a particular point of fulfilment1 compels ,lotze to give such objective references a transcendental turn4 ,when ,lotze goes on to say 7,,ii1 #aia7 that the measure of truth of particular parts of experience is found in asking whether1 when judged by thought1 they are in harmony with other parts of experience2 when he goes on to say that there is no sense in trying to compare the entire world of ideas with a reality which is non-existent 7excepting as it itself should become an idea71 he lands where he might better have frankly commenced4#de ,he saves himself from utter skepticism only by claiming that the explicit assumption of skepticism--the need of agreement of a ready-made idea as such with an extraneous ready-made material as such--is meaningless4 ,he defines correctly the work of thought as consisting in harmonizing the various portions of experience with each other4 ,in this case the test of thought is the harmony or unity of experience actually effected4 ,the test of validity of thought is beyond thought1 just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which is not dependent upon thought4 ,interpret this before and beyond in a historic sense1 as an affair of the place occupied and rle played by thinking as a function in experience in relation to other non-intellectual experiences of things1 and then the intermediate and instrumental character of thought1 its dependence upon unreflective antecedents for its existence1 and upon a consequent experience for its final test1 becomes significant and necessary4 ,taken at large1 apart from temporal development and control1 it plunges us in the depths of a hopelessly complicated and self-revolving metaphysic4 ,,footnotes3 #cc ,philosophy of ,lotze1 chap4 iii1 ,thought and the ,preliminary ,process of ,experience4 #cd ,i1 #ch4 #ce ,i1 #ac2 last italics mine4 #cf ,i1 #ad2 italics mine4 #cg ,see ,i1 #af-bj4 ,on p4 #bb this work is declared to be not only the first but the most indispensable of all thought's operations4 #ch ,i1 #bf4 #ci ,i1 #ce4 #dj ,i1 #cf2 see the strong statements already quoted1 p4 #aab4 ,what if this canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above3 the original objectification which transforms the mere state into an abiding quality or meaning8 ,suppose1 that is1 it were said that the first objectifying act cannot make a substantial 7or attached7 quale out of a mere state of feeling2 it must find the distinction it makes there already6 ,it is clear we should at once get a regressus ad infinitum4 ,we here find ,lotze face to face with this fundamental dilemma3 thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions1 or else just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or futile4 ,this same contradiction1 so far as it affects the impression1 has already been discussed4 ,see p4 #aad4 #da ,i1 #ca4 #db ,as we have already seen1 the concept1 the meaning as such1 is always a factor or status in a reflective situation2 it is always a predicate of judgment1 in use in interpreting and developing the logical subject1 or datum of perception4 #dc ,royce1 in his ,world and ,individual1 ,i1 chaps4 vi and vii1 has criticized the conception of meaning as valid1 but in a way which implies that there is a difference between validity and reality1 in the sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real only when it is experienced in direct feeling4 ,the foregoing implies1 of course1 a difference between validity and reality1 but finds the test of validity in exercise of the function of direction or control to which the idea makes pretension or claim4 ,the same point of view would profoundly modify ,royce's interpretation of what he terms inner and outer meaning4 ,see ,moore1 ,university of ,chicago ,decennial ,publications1 ,,iii1 on ,existence1 ,meaning1 and ,reality4 #dd ,,ii1 #beg1 #bfe1 and in general ,book ,,iii1 chap4 iv4 ,it is significant that thought itself1 appearing as an act of thinking over against its own content1 is here treated as psychical rather than as logical4 ,consequently1 as we see in the text1 it gives him one more difficulty to wrestle with3 how a process which is ex officio purely psychical and subjective can yet yield results which are valid in a logical1 to say nothing of an ontological1 sense4 #de ,lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the antithesis between our ideas and the objects to which they are directed is itself a part of the world of ideas 7,,ii1 #aib74 ,barring the phrase world of ideas 7as against world of continuous experience71 he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled straight and arrived somewhere4 ,but it is absolutely impossible to hold both this view and that of the original independent existence of something given to and in thought and an independent existence of a thought-activity1 thought-forms1 and thought-contents4 ,,vi ,,some ,,stages ,,of ,,logical ,,thought ,the man in the street1 when asked what he thinks about a certain matter1 often replies that he does not think at all2 he knows4 ,the suggestion is that thinking is a case of active uncertainty set over against conviction or unquestioning assurance4 ,when he adds that he does not have to think1 but knows1 the further implication is that thinking1 when needed1 leads to knowledge2 that its purpose or object is to secure stable equilibrium4 ,it is the purpose of this paper to show some of the main stages through which thinking1 understood in this way1 actually passes in its attempt to reach its most effective working2 that is1 the maximum of reasonable certainty4 ,i wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking1 easily recognizable in the progress of both the race and the individual1 may be identified and arranged as successive species of the relationship which doubting bears to assurance2 as various ratios1 so to speak1 which the vigor of doubting bears to mere acquiescence4 ,the presumption is that the function of questioning is one which has continually grown in intensity and range1 that doubt is continually chased back1 and1 being cornered1 fights more desperately1 and thus clears the ground more thoroughly4 ,its successive stations or arrests constitute stages of thinking4 ,or to change the metaphor1 just in the degree that what has been accepted as fact--the object of assurance--loses stable equilibrium1 the tension involved in the questioning attitude increases1 until a readjustment gives a new and less easily shaken equilibrium4 ,the natural tendency of man is not to press home a doubt1 but to cut inquiry as short as possible4 ,the practical man's impatience with theory has become a proverb2 it expresses just the feeling that1 since the thinking process is of use only in substituting certainty for doubt1 any apparent prolongation of it is useless speculation1 wasting time and diverting the mind from important issues4 ,to follow the line of least resistance is to cut short the stay in the sphere of doubts and suggestions1 and to make the speediest return into the world where one can act4 ,the result1 of course1 is that difficulties are evaded or surmounted rather than really disposed of4 ,hence1 in spite of the opposition of the would-be practical man1 the needs of practice1 of economy1 and of efficiency have themselves compelled a continual deepening of doubt and widening of the area of investigation4 ,it is within this evolution that we have to find our stages of thinking4 ,the initial stage is where the doubt is hardly endured but not entertained2 it is no welcome guest but an intruder1 to be got rid of as speedily as possible4 ,development of alternative and competitive suggestions1 the forming of suppositions 7of ideas71 goes but a little way4 ,the mind seizes upon the nearest or most convenient instrument of dismissing doubt and reattaining security4 ,at the other end is the definitive and conscious search for problems1 and the development of elaborate and systematized methods of investigation--the industry and technique of science4 ,between these limits come processes which have started out upon the path of doubt and inquiry1 and then halted by the way4 ,in the first stage of the journey1 beliefs are treated as something fixed and static4 ,to those who are using them they are simply another kind of fact4 ,they are used to settle doubts1 but the doubts are treated as arising quite outside the ideas themselves4 ,nothing is further from recognition than that ideas themselves are open to doubt1 or need criticism and revision4 ,indeed1 the one who uses static meanings is not even aware that they originated and have been elaborated for the sake of dealing with conflicts and problems4 ,the ideas are just there1 and they may be used like any providential dispensation to help men out of the troubles into which they have fallen4 ,words are generally held responsible for this fixation of the idea1 for this substantiation of it into a kind of thing4 ,a long line of critics has made us familiar with the invincible habit of supposing that wherever there is a name there is some reality corresponding to it2 of supposing that general and abstract words have their equivalent objects somewhere in rerum natura1 as have also singular and proper names4 ,we know with what simplicity of self-confidence the ,english empirical school has accounted for the ontological speculation of ,plato4 ,words tend to fix intellectual contents1 and give them a certain air of independence and individuality4 ,that some truth is here expressed there can be no question4 ,indeed1 the attitude of mind of which we are speaking is well illustrated in the person who goes to the dictionary in order to settle some problem in morals1 politics1 or science2 who would end some discussion regarding a material point by learning what meaning is attached to terms by the dictionary as authority4 ,the question is taken as lying outside of the sphere of science or intellectual inquiry1 since the meaning of the word--the idea--is unquestionable and fixed4 ,but this petrifying influence of words is after all only a superficial explanation4 ,there must be some meaning present or the word could not fix it2 there must be something which accounts for the disposition to use names as a medium of fossilization4 ,there is1 in truth1 a certain real fact--an existent reality--behind both the word and the meaning it stands for4 ,this reality is social usage4 ,the person who consults a dictionary is getting an established fact when he turns there for the definition of a term4 ,he finds the sense in which the word is currently used4 ,social customs are no less real than physical events4 ,it is not possible to dispose of this fact of common usage by reference to mere convention1 or any other arbitrary device4 ,a form of social usage is no more an express invention than any other social institution4 ,it embodies the permanent attitude1 the habit taken toward certain recurring difficulties or problems in experience4 ,ideas1 or meanings fixed in terms1 show the scheme of values which the community uses in appraising matters that need consideration and which are indeterminate or unassured4 ,they are held up as standards for all its members to follow4 ,here is the solution of the paradox4 ,the fixed or static idea is a fact expressing an established social attitude1 a custom4 ,it is not merely verbal1 because it denotes a force which operates1 as all customs do1 in controlling particular cases4 ,but since it marks a mode of interpretation1 a scheme for assigning values1 a way of dealing with doubtful cases1 it falls within the sphere of ideas4 ,or1 coming to the life of the individual1 the fixed meaning represents1 not a state of consciousness fixed by a name1 but a recognition of a habitual way of belief3 a habit of understanding4 ,we find an apt illustration of fixed ideas in the rules prevalent in primitive communities1 rules which minutely determine all acts in which the community as a whole is felt to have an interest4 ,these rules are facts because they express customs1 and carry with them certain sanctions4 ,their meaning does not cease with judicial utterance4 ,they are made valid at once in a practical way against anyone who departs from them4 ,yet as rules they are ideas1 for they express general ways of defining doubtful matters in experience and of re-establishing certainty4 ,an individual may fail in acknowledgment of them and explicit reference is then necessary4 ,for one who has lost himself in the notion that ideas are psychical and subjective1 ,i know of no better way to appreciate the significance of an idea than to consider that a social rule of judgment is nothing but a certain way of viewing or interpreting facts2 as such it is an idea4 ,the point that is of special interest to us here1 however1 is that these ideas are taken as fixed and unquestionable1 and that the cases to which they are to apply are regarded as in themselves equally fixed4 ,so far as concerns the attitude of those who employ this sort of ideas1 the doubt is simply as to what idea should be in a particular case4 ,even the ,athenian ,greeks1 for instance1 long kept up the form of indicting and trying a tree or implement through which some individual had been killed4 ,there was a rule--a fixed idea--for dealing with all who offended against the community by destroying one of its citizens4 ,the fact that an inanimate object1 a thing without intention or volition1 offended was not a material circumstance4 ,it made no difference in the case2 that is1 there was no doubt as to the nature of the fact4 ,it was as fixed as was the rule4 ,with advance in the complexity of life1 however1 rules accumulate1 and discrimination--that is1 a certain degree of inquiring and critical attitude--enters in4 ,inquiry takes effect1 however1 in seeking among a collection of fixed ideas just the one to be used1 rather than in directing suspicion against any rule or idea as such1 or in an attempt to discover or constitute a new one4 ,it is hardly necessary to refer to the development of casuistry1 or to the multiplication of distinctions within dogmas1 or to the growth of ceremonial law in cumbrous detail1 to indicate what the outcome of this logical stage is likely to be4 ,the essential thing is that doubt and inquiry are directed neither at the nature of the intrinsic fact itself1 nor at the value of the idea as such1 but simply at the manner in which one is attached to the other4 ,thinking falls outside both fact and idea1 and into the sphere of their external connection4 ,it is still a fiction of judicial procedure that there is already in existence some custom or law under which every possible dispute--that is1 every doubtful or unassured case--falls1 and that the judge only declares which law is applicable in the particular case4 ,this point of view has tremendously affected the theory of logic in its historic development4 ,one of the chief1 perhaps the most important1 instrumentalities in developing and maintaining fixed ideas is the need of instruction and the way in which it is given4 ,if ideas were called into play only when doubtful cases actually arise1 they could not help retaining a certain amount of vitality and flexibility2 but the community always instructs its new members as to its way of disposing of these cases before they present themselves4 ,ideas are proffered1 in other words1 separated from present doubt and remote from application1 in order to escape future difficulties and the need of any thinking4 ,in primitive communities this is the main purport of instruction1 and it remains such to a very considerable degree4 ,there is a prejudgment rather than judgment proper4 ,when the community uses its resources to fix certain ideas in the mind--that is1 certain ways of interpreting and regarding experience--ideas are necessarily formulated so as to assume a rigid and independent form4 ,they are doubly removed from the sphere of doubt4 ,the attitude is uncritical and dogmatic in the extreme--so much so that one might question whether it is to be properly designated as a stage of thinking4 ,in this form ideas become the chief instruments of social conservation4 ,judicial decision and penal correction are restricted and ineffective methods of maintaining social institutions unchanged1 compared with instilling in advance uniform ideas--fixed modes of appraising all social questions and issues4 ,these set ideas thus become the embodiment of the values which any group has realized and intends to perpetuate4 ,the fixation supports them against dissipation through attrition of circumstance1 and against destruction through hostile attack4 ,it would be interesting to follow out the ways in which such values are put under the protection of the gods and of religious rites1 or themselves erected into quasi-divinities--as among the ,romans4 ,this1 however1 would hardly add anything to the logic of the discussion1 although it would indicate the importance attached to the fixation of ideas1 and the thoroughgoing character of the means used to secure immobilization4 ,the conserving value of the dogmatic attitude1 the point of view which takes ideas as fixed1 is not to be ignored4 ,when society has no methods of science for protecting and perpetuating its achieved values1 there is practically no other resort than such crystallization4 ,moreover1 with any possible scientific progress1 some equivalent of the fixed idea must remain4 ,the nearer we get to the needs of action the greater absoluteness must attach to ideas4 ,the necessities of action do not await our convenience4 ,emergencies continually present themselves where the fixity required for successful activity cannot be attained through the medium of investigation4 ,the alternative to vacillation1 confusion1 and futility of action is importation to ideas of a positive and secured character1 not in strict logic belonging to them4 ,it is this sort of determination that ,hegel seems to have in mind in what he terms ,verstand--the understanding4 ,apart from ,verstand1 he says1 there is no fixity or accuracy in the region either of theory or practice2 and1 again1 ,verstand sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctions from one another2 it treats every meaning as having a subsistence of its own4 ,in technical terminology1 also1 this is what is meant by positing ideas--hardening meanings4 ,in recognizing1 however1 that fixation of intellectual content is a precondition of effective action1 we must not overlook the modification that comes with the advance of thinking into more critical forms4 ,at the outset fixity is taken as the rightful possession of the ideas themselves2 it belongs to them and is their essence4 ,as the scientific spirit develops1 we see that it is we who lend fixity to the ideas1 and that this loan is for a purpose to which the meaning of the ideas is accommodated4 ,fixity ceases to be a matter of intrinsic structure of ideas1 and becomes an affair of security in using them4 ,hence the important thing is the way in which we fix the idea--the manner of the inquiry which results in definition4 ,we take the idea as if it were fixed1 in order to secure the necessary stability of action4 ,the crisis past1 the idea drops its borrowed investiture1 and reappears as surmise4 ,when we substitute for ideas as uniform rules by which to decide doubtful cases that making over of ideas which is requisite to make them fit1 the quality of thought alters4 ,we may fairly say that we have come into another stage4 ,the idea is now regarded as essentially subject to change1 as a manufactured article needing to be made ready for use4 ,to determine the conditions of this transition lies beyond my purpose1 since ,i have in mind only a descriptive setting forth of the periods through which1 as a matter of fact1 thought has passed in the development of the inquiry function1 without raising the problem of its why and how4 ,at this point we shall not do more than note that1 as the scheduled stock of fixed ideas grows larger1 their application to specific questions becomes more difficult1 prolonged1 and roundabout4 ,there has to be a definite hunting for the specific idea which is appropriate2 there has to be comparison of it with other ideas4 ,this comes to involve a certain amount of mutual compromise and modification before selection is possible4 ,the idea thus gets somewhat shaken4 ,it has to be made over so that it may harmonize with other ideas possessing equal worth4 ,often the very accumulation of fixed ideas commands this reconstruction4 ,the dead weight of the material becomes so great that it cannot sustain itself without a readjustment of the center of gravity4 ,simplification and systematization are required1 and these call for reflection4 ,critical cases come up in which the fiction of an idea or rule already in existence cannot be maintained4 ,it is impossible to conceal that old ideas have to be radically modified before the situation can be dealt with4 ,the friction of circumstance melts away their congealed fixity4 ,judgment becomes legislative4 ,seeking illustrations at large1 we find this change typified in ,hebrew history in the growing importance of the prophet over the judge1 in the transition from a justification of conduct through bringing particular cases into conformity with existent laws1 into that effected by personal right-mindedness enabling the individual to see the law in each case for himself4 ,profoundly as this changed conception of the relation between law and particular case affected moral life1 it did not1 among ,semites1 directly influence the logical sphere4 ,with the ,greeks1 however1 we find a continuous and marked departure from positive declaration of custom4 ,we have assemblies meeting to discuss and dispute1 and finally1 upon the basis of the considerations thus brought to view1 to decide4 ,the man of counsel is set side by side with the man of deed4 ,odysseus was much experienced1 not only because he knew the customs and ways of old1 but even more because from the richness of his experience he could make the pregnant suggestion to meet the new crisis4 ,it is hardly too much to say that it was the emphasis put by the ,greek mind upon discussion--at first as preliminary to decision1 and afterward to legislation--which generated logical theory4 ,discussion is thus an apt name for this attitude of thought4 ,it is bringing various beliefs together2 shaking one against another and tearing down their rigidity4 ,it is conversation of thoughts2 it is dialogue--the mother of dialectic in more than the etymological sense4 ,no process is more recurrent in history than the transfer of operations carried on between different persons into the arena of the individual's own consciousness4 ,the discussion which at first took place by bringing ideas from different persons into contact1 by introducing them into the forum of competition1 and by subjecting them to critical comparison and selective decision1 finally became a habit of the individual with himself4 ,he became a miniature social assemblage1 in which pros and cons were brought into play struggling for the mastery--for final conclusion4 ,in some such way we conceive reflection to be born4 ,it is evident that discussion1 the agitation of ideas1 if judged from the standpoint of the older fixed ideas1 is a destructive process4 ,ideas are not only shaken together and apart1 they are so shaken in themselves that their whole validity becomes doubtful4 ,mind1 and not merely beliefs1 becomes uncertain4 ,the attempt to harmonize different ideas means that in themselves they are discrepant4 ,the search for a conclusion means that accepted ideas are only points of view1 and hence personal affairs4 ,needless to say it was the ,sophists who emphasized and generalized this negative aspect--this presupposition of loss of assurance1 of inconsistency1 of subjectivity4 ,they took it as applying not only to this1 that1 and the other idea1 but to ideas as ideas4 ,since ideas are no longer fixed contents1 they are just expressions of an individual's way of thinking4 ,lacking inherent value1 they merely express the interests that induce the individual to look this way rather than that4 ,they are made by the individual's point of view1 and hence will be unmade if he can be led to change his point of view4 ,where all was fixity1 now all is instability3 where all was certitude1 nothing now exists save opinion based on prejudice1 interest1 or arbitrary choice4 ,the modern point of view1 while condemning sophistry1 yet often agrees with it in limiting the reflective attitude as such to self-involution and self-conceit4 ,from ,bacon down1 the appeal is to observation1 to attention to facts1 to concern with the external world4 ,the sole genuine guaranty of truth is taken to be appeal to facts1 and thinking as such is something different4 ,if reflection is not considered to be merely variable matter1 it is considered to be at least an endless mulling over of things4 ,it is the futile attempt to spin truth out of inner consciousness4 ,it is introspection1 and theorizing1 and mere speculation4 ,such wholesale depreciation ignores the value inherent even in the most subjective reflection1 for it takes the settled estate which is proof that thought is not needed1 or that it has done its work1 as if it supplied the standard for the occasions in which problems are hard upon us1 and doubt is rife4 ,it takes the conditions which come about after and because we have thought to measure the conditions which call out thinking4 ,whenever we really need to reflect1 we cannot appeal directly to the fact1 for the adequate reason that the stimulus to thinking arises just because facts have slipped away from us4 ,the fallacy is neatly committed by ,mill in his discussion of ,whewell's account of the need of mental conception or hypothesis in colligating facts4 ,he insists that the conception is obtained from the facts in which it exists1 is impressed upon us from without1 and also that it is the darkness and confusion of the facts that make us want the conception in order to create light and order4#df ,reflection involves running over various ideas1 sorting them out1 comparing one with another1 trying to get one which will unite in itself the strength of two1 searching for new points of view1 developing new suggestions2 guessing1 suggesting1 selecting1 and rejecting4 ,the greater the problem1 and the greater the shock of doubt and resultant confusion and uncertainty1 the more prolonged and more necessary is the process of mere thinking4 ,it is a more obvious phase of biology than of physics1 of sociology than of chemistry2 but it persists in established sciences4 ,if we take even a mathematical proposition1 not after it has been demonstrated--and is thus capable of statement in adequate logical form--but while in process of discovery and proof1 the operation of this subjective phase is manifest1 so much so1 indeed1 that a distinguished modern mathematician has said that the paths which the mathematical inquirer traverses in any new field are more akin to those of the experimentalist1 and even to those of the poet and artist1 than to those of the ,euclidean geometer4 ,what makes the essential difference between modern research and the reflection of1 say1 the ,greeks1 is not the absence of mere thinking1 but the presence of conditions for testing its results2 the elaborate system of checks and balances found in the technique of modern experimentation4 ,the thinking process does not now go on endlessly in terms of itself1 but seeks outlet through reference to particular experiences4 ,it is tested by this reference2 not1 however1 as if a theory could be tested by directly comparing it with facts--an obvious impossibility--but through use in facilitating commerce with facts4 ,it is tested as glasses are tested2 things are looked at through the medium of specific meanings to see if thereby they assume a more orderly and clearer aspect1 if they are less blurred and obscure4 ,the reaction of the ,socratic school against the ,sophistic may serve to illustrate the third stage of thinking4 ,this movement was not interested in the de facto shaking of received ideas and a discrediting of all thinking4 ,it was concerned rather with the virtual appeal to a common denominator involved in bringing different ideas into relation with one another4 ,in their comparison and mutual modification it saw evidence of the operation of a standard permanent meaning passing judgment upon their conflict1 and revealing a common principle and standard of reference4 ,it dealt not with the shaking and dissolution1 but with a comprehensive permanent ,idea finally to emerge4 ,controversy and discussion among different individuals may result in extending doubt1 manifesting the incoherency of accepted ideas1 and so throwing an individual into an attitude of distrust4 ,but it also involves an appeal to a single thought to be accepted by both parties1 thus putting an end to the dispute4 ,this appeal to a higher court1 this possibility of attaining a total and abiding intellectual object1 which should bring into relief the agreeing elements in contending thoughts1 and banish the incompatible factors1 animated the ,socratic search for the concept1 the elaboration of the ,platonic hierarchy of ,ideas in which the higher substantiate the lower1 and the ,aristotelian exposition of the systematized methods by which general truths may be employed to prove propositions otherwise doubtful4 ,at least1 this historic development will serve to illustrate what is involved in the transition from the second to the third stage2 the transformation of discussion into reasoning1 of subjective reflection into method of proof4 ,discussion1 whether with ourselves or others1 goes on by suggestion of clues1 as the uppermost object of interest opens a way here or there4 ,it is discursive and haphazard4 ,this gives it the devious tendency indicated in ,plato's remark that it needs to be tied to the post of reason4 ,it needs1 that is1 to have the ground or basis of its various component statements brought to consciousness in such a way as to define the exact value of each4 ,the ,socratic contention is the need of compelling the common denominator1 the common subject1 underlying the diversity of views to exhibit itself4 ,it alone gives a sure standard by which the claims of all assertions may be measured4 ,until this need is met1 discussion is a self-deceiving play with unjudged1 unexamined matters1 which1 confused and shifting1 impose themselves upon us4 ,we are familiar enough with the theory that the ,socratic universal1 the ,platonic idea1 was generated by an ignorant transformation of psychological abstractions into self-existent entities4 ,to insist upon this as the key to the ,socratic logic is mere caricature4 ,the objectivity of the universal stood for the sense of something decisive and controlling in all reflection1 which otherwise is just manipulation of personal prejudices4 ,this sense is as active in modern science as it was in the ,platonic dialectic4 ,what ,socrates felt was the opinionated1 conceited quality of the terms used in the moral and political discussion of his day1 as that contrasted with the subject-matter1 which1 if rightly grasped1 would put an end to mere views and argumentations4 ,by ,aristotle's time the interest was not so much in the existence of standards of decision in cases of doubt and dispute as in the technique of their use4 ,the judge was firmly seated on the bench4 ,the parties in controversy recognized his jurisdiction1 and their respective claims were submitted for adjudicature4 ,the need was for rules of procedure by which the judge might1 in an obvious and impartial way1 bring the recognized universal or decisive law to bear upon particular matters4 ,hence the elaboration of those rules of evidence1 those canons of demonstrative force1 which are the backbone of the ,aristotelian logic4 ,there was a code by which to decide upon the admissibility and value of proffered testimony--the rules of the syllogism4 ,the figures and terms of the syllogism provided a scheme for deciding upon the exact bearing of every statement propounded4 ,the plan of arrangement of major and minor premises1 of major1 minor1 and middle terms1 furnished a manifesto of the exact procedure to be followed in determining the probative force of each element in reasoning4 ,the judge knew what testimony to permit1 when and how it should be introduced1 how it could be impeached or have its competence lessened1 and how the evidence was to be arranged so that a summary would also be an exhibit of its value in establishing a conclusion4 ,this means that there now is a distinctive type of thinking marked off from mere discussion and reflection4 ,it may be called either reasoning or proof4 ,it is reasoning when we think of the regularity of the method for getting at and employing the unquestioned grounds which give validity to other statements4 ,it is proof as regards the degree of logical desert thereby measured out to such propositions4 ,proof is the acceptance or rejection justified through the reasoning4 ,to quote from ,mill3 ,to give credence to a proposition as a conclusion from something else is to reason in the most extensive sense of the term4 ,we say of a fact or statement1 it is proved1 when we believe its truth by reason of some other fact or statement from which it is said to follow4#dg ,reasoning is marshaling a series of terms and propositions until we can bind some doubtful fact firmly to an unquestioned1 although remote1 truth2 it is the regular way in which a certain proposition is brought to bear on a precarious one1 clothing the latter with something of the peremptory quality of the former4 ,so far as we reach this result1 and so far as we can exhibit each step in the nexus and be sure it has been rightly performed1 we have proof4 ,but questions still face us4 ,how about that truth upon which we fall back as guaranteeing the credibility of other statements--how about our major premise8 ,whence does it derive its guaranty8 ,quis custodes custodiet8 ,we may1 of course1 in turn subsume it under some further major premise1 but an infinite regress is impossible1 and on this track we are finally left hanging in the air4 ,for practical purposes the unquestioned principle may be taken as signifying mutual concession or agreement--it denotes that as a matter of fact its truth is not called in question by the parties concerned4 ,this does admirably for settling arguments and controversies4 ,it is a good way of amicably arranging matters among those already friends and fellow-citizens4 ,but scientifically the widespread acceptance of an idea seems to testify to custom rather than to truth2 prejudice is strengthened in influence1 but hardly in value1 by the number who share it2 conceit is none the less self-conceit because it turns the heads of many4 ,great interest was indeed afterward taken in the range of persons who hold truths in common4 ,the quod semper ubique omnibus became of great importance4 ,this1 however1 was not1 in theory at least1 because common agreement was supposed to constitute the major premise1 but because it afforded confirmatory evidence of its self-evident and universal character4 ,hence the ,aristotelian logic necessarily assumes certain first or fundamental truths unquestioned and unquestionable1 self-evident and self-evidencing1 neither established nor modified by thought1 but standing firm in their own right4 ,this assumption was not1 as modern dealers in formal logic would sometimes have it1 an external psychological or metaphysical attachment to the theory of reasoning1 to be omitted at will from logic as such4 ,it was an essential factor of knowledge that there should be necessary propositions directly apprehended by reason and particular ones directly apprehended by sense4 ,reasoning could then join them4 ,without the truths we have only the play of subjective1 arbitrary1 futile opinion4 ,judgment has not taken place1 and assertion is without warrant4 ,hence the scheduling of first truths is an organic part of any reasoning which is occupied with securing demonstration1 surety of assent1 or valid conviction4 ,to deny the necessary place of ultimate truths in the logical system of ,aristotle and his followers is to make them players in a game of social convention4 ,it is to overlook1 to invert1 the fact that they were sincerely concerned with the question of attaining the grounds and process of assurance4 ,hence they were obliged to assume primary intuitions1 metaphysical1 physical1 moral1 and mathematical axioms1 in order to get the pegs of certainty to which to tie the bundles of otherwise contingent propositions4 ,it would be going too far to claim that the regard for the authority of the church1 of the fathers1 of the ,scriptures1 of ancient writers1 of ,aristotle himself1 so characteristic of the ,middle ,ages1 was the direct outcome of this presupposition of truths fixed and unquestionable in themselves4 ,but the logical connection is sure4 ,the supply of absolute premises that ,aristotle was able to proffer was scant4 ,in his own generation and situation this paucity made comparatively little difference2 for to the mass of men the great bulk of values was still carried by custom1 by religious belief1 and social institution4 ,it was only in the comparatively small sphere of persons who had come under the philosophic influence that need for the logical mode of confirmation was felt4 ,in the mediaeval period1 however1 all important beliefs required to be concentrated by some fixed principle giving them stay and power1 for they were contrary to obvious common-sense and natural tradition4 ,the situation was exactly such as to call into active use the ,aristotelian scheme of thought4 ,authority supplemented the meagerness of the store of universals known by direct intuition1 the ,aristotelian plan of reasoning afforded the precise instrumentality through which the vague and chaotic details of life could be reduced to order by subjecting them to authoritative rules4 ,it is not enough1 however1 to account for the ultimate major premises1 for the unconditioned grounds upon which credibility is assigned4 ,we have also to report where the other side comes from3 matters so uncertain in themselves as to require that they have their grounds supplied from outside4 ,the answer in the ,aristotelian scheme is an obvious one4 ,it is the very nature of sense1 of ordinary experience1 to supply us with matters which in themselves are only contingent4 ,there is a certain portion of the intellectual sphere1 that derived from experience1 which is infected throughout by its unworthy origin4 ,it stands forever condemned to be merely empirical--particular1 more or less accidental1 inherently irrational4 ,you cannot make gold from dross1 and the best that can be done for and with material of this sort is to bring it under the protection of truth which has warrant and weight in itself4 ,we may now characterize this stage of thinking with reference to our original remark that different stages denote various degrees in the evolution of the doubt-inquiry function4 ,as compared with the period of fixed ideas1 doubt is awake1 and inquiry is active1 but in itself it is rigidly limited4 ,on one side it is bounded by fixed ultimate truths1 whose very nature is that they cannot be doubted1 which are not products or functions in inquiry1 but bases that investigation fortunately rests upon4 ,in the other direction all matters of fact1 all empirical truths belong to a particular sphere or kind of existence1 and one intrinsically open to suspicion4 ,the region is condemned in a wholesale way4 ,in itself it exhales doubt2 it cannot be reformed2 it is to be shunned1 or1 if this is not possible1 to be escaped from by climbing up a ladder of intermediate terms until we lay hold on the universal4 ,the very way in which doubt is objectified1 taken all in a piece1 marks its lack of vitality4 ,it is arrested and cooped up in a particular place4 ,as with any doubtful character1 the less of its company the better4 ,uncertainty is not realized as a necessary instrument in compelling experienced matters to reveal their meaning and inherent order4 ,this limitation upon inquiry settles the interpretation to be given thought at this stage--it is of necessity merely connective1 merely mediating4 ,it goes between the first principles--themselves1 as to their validity1 outside the province of thought--and the particulars of sense--also1 as to their status and worth1 beyond the dominion of thought4 ,thinking is subsumption--just placing a particular proposition under its universal4 ,it is inclusion1 finding a place for some questioned matter within a region taken as more certain4 ,it is use of general truths to afford support to things otherwise shaky--an application that improves their standing1 while leaving their content unchanged4 ,this means that thought has only a formal value4 ,it is of service in exhibiting and arranging grounds upon which any particular proposition may be acquitted or condemned1 upon which anything already current may be assented to1 or upon which belief may reasonably be withheld4 ,the metaphor of the law court is apt4 ,there is assumed some matter to be either proved or disproved4 ,as matter1 as content1 it is furnished4 ,it is not to be found out4 ,in the law court it is not a question of discovering what a man specifically is1 but simply of finding reasons for regarding him as guilty or innocent4 ,there is no all-around play of thought directed to the institution of something as fact1 but a question of whether grounds can be adduced justifying acceptance of some proposition already set forth4 ,the significance of such an attitude comes into relief when we contrast it with what is done in the laboratory4 ,in the laboratory there is no question of proving that things are just thus and so1 or that we must accept or reject a given statement2 there is simply an interest in finding out what sort of things we are dealing with4 ,any quality or change that presents itself may be an object of investigation1 or may suggest a conclusion2 for it is judged1 not by reference to pre-existent truths1 but by its suggestiveness1 by what it may lead to4 ,the mind is open to inquiry in any direction4 ,or we may illustrate by the difference between the auditor and an actuary in an insurance company4 ,one simply passes and rejects1 issues vouchers1 compares and balances statements already made out4 ,the other investigates any one of the items of expense or receipt2 inquires how it comes to be what it is1 what facts1 as regards1 say1 length of life1 condition of money market1 activity of agents1 are involved1 and what further researches and activities are indicated4 ,the illustrations of the laboratory and the expert remind us of another attitude of thought in which investigation attacks matters hitherto reserved4 ,the growth1 for example1 of freedom of thought during the ,renaissance was a revelation of the intrinsic momentum of the thought-process itself4 ,it was not a mere reaction from and against mediaeval scholasticism4 ,it was the continued operation of the machinery which the scholastics had set a-going4 ,doubt and inquiry were extended into the region of particulars1 of matters of fact1 with the view of reconstituting them through discovery of their own structure1 no longer with the intention of leaving that unchanged while transforming their claim to credence by connecting them with some authoritative principles4 ,thought no longer found satisfaction in appraising them in a scale of values according to their nearness to1 or remoteness from1 fixed truths4 ,such work had been done to a nicety1 and it was futile to repeat it4 ,thinking must find a new outlet4 ,it was out of employment1 and set to discover new lands4 ,galileo and ,copernicus were travelers--as much so as the crusader1 ,marco ,polo1 and ,columbus4 ,hence the fourth stage--covering what is popularly known as inductive and empirical science4 ,thought takes the form of inference instead of proof4 ,proof1 as we have already seen1 is accepting or rejecting a given proposition on the ground of its connection or lack of connection with some other proposition conceded or established4 ,but inference does not terminate in any given proposition2 it is after precisely those not given4 ,it wants more facts1 different facts4 ,thinking in the mode of inference insists upon terminating in an intellectual advance1 in a consciousness of truths hitherto escaping us4 ,our thinking must not now pass certain propositions after challenging them1 must not admit them because they exhibit certain credentials1 showing a right to be received into the upper circle of intellectual society4 ,thinking endeavors to compel things as they present themselves1 to yield up something hitherto obscure or concealed4 ,this advance and extension of knowledge through thinking seems to be well designated by the term inference4 ,it does not certify what is otherwise doubtful1 but goes from the known to the unknown4 ,it aims at pushing out the frontiers of knowledge1 not at marking those already attained with signposts4 ,its technique is not a scheme for assigning status to beliefs already possessed1 but is a method for making friends with facts and ideas hitherto alien4 ,inference reaches out1 fills in gaps4 ,its work is measured not by the patents of standing it issues1 but by the material increments of knowledge it yields4 ,inventio is more important than judicium1 discovery than proof4 ,with the development of empirical research1 uncertainty or contingency is no longer regarded as infecting in a wholesale way an entire region1 discrediting it save as it can be brought under the protecting aegis of universal truths as major premises4 ,uncertainty is now a matter of detail4 ,it is the question whether the particular fact is really what it has been taken to be4 ,it involves contrast1 not of a fact as a fixed particular over against some fixed universal1 but of the existing mode of apprehension with another possible better apprehension4 ,from the standpoint of reasoning and proof the intellectual field is absolutely measured out in advance4 ,certainty is located in one part1 intellectual indeterminateness or uncertainty in another4 ,but when thinking becomes research1 when the doubt-inquiry function comes to its own1 the problem is just3 ,what is the fact8 ,hence the extreme interest in details as such2 in observing1 collecting1 and comparing particular causes1 in analysis of structure down to its constituent elements1 interest in atoms1 cells1 and in all matters of arrangement in space and time4 ,the microscope1 telescope1 and spectroscope1 the scalpel and microtome1 the kymograph and the camera are not mere material appendages to thinking2 they are as integral parts of investigative thought as were ,barbara1 ,celarent1 etc41 of the logic of reasoning4 ,facts must be discovered1 and to accomplish this1 apparent facts must be resolved into their elements4 ,things must be readjusted in order to be held free from intrusion of impertinent circumstance and misleading suggestion4 ,instrumentalities of extending and rectifying research are1 therefore1 of themselves organs of thinking4 ,the specialization of the sciences1 the almost daily birth of a new science1 is a logical necessity--not a mere historical episode4 ,every phase of experience must be investigated1 and each characteristic aspect presents its own peculiar problems which demand1 therefore1 their own technique of investigation4 ,the discovery of difficulties1 the substitution of doubt for quiescent acceptance1 are more important than the sanctioning of belief through proof4 ,hence the importance of noting apparent exceptions1 negative instances1 extreme cases1 anomalies4 ,the interest is in the discrepant because that stimulates inquiry1 not in the fixed universal which would terminate it once for all4 ,hence the roaming over the earth and through the skies for new facts which may be incompatible with old theories1 and which may suggest new points of view4 ,to illustrate these matters in detail would be to write the history of every modern science4 ,the interest in multiplying phenomena1 in increasing the area of facts1 in developing new distinctions of quantity1 structure1 and form1 is obviously characteristic of modern science4 ,but we do not always heed its logical significance--that it makes thinking to consist in the extension and control of contact with new material so as to lead regularly to the development of new experience4 ,the elevation of the region of facts--the formerly condemned region of the inherently contingent and variable--to something that invites and rewards inquiry1 defines the import1 therefore1 of the larger aspects of modern science4 ,this spirit prides itself upon being positivistic--it deals with the observed and the observable4 ,it will have naught to do with ideas that cannot verify themselves by showing themselves in propria persona4 ,it is not enough to present credentials from more sovereign truths4 ,these are hardly acceptable even as letters of introduction4 ,refutation of ,newton's claim1 that he did not make hypotheses1 by pointing out that no one was busier in this direction than he1 and that scientific power is generally in direct ratio to ability to imagine possibilities1 is as easy as it is irrelevant4 ,the hypotheses1 the thoughts1 that ,newton employed were of and about fact2 they were for the sake of exacting and extending what can be apprehended4 ,instead of being sacrosanct truths affording a redemption by grace to facts otherwise ambiguous1 they were the articulating of ordinary facts4 ,hence the notion of law changes4 ,it is no longer something governing things and events from on high2 it is the statement of their own order4 ,thus the exiling of occult forces and qualities is not so much a specific achievement as it is a demand of the changed attitude4 ,when thinking consists in the detection and determination of observable detail1 forces1 forms1 qualities at large1 are thrown out of employment4 ,they are not so much proved non-existent as rendered nugatory4 ,disuse breeds their degeneration4 ,when the universal is but the order of the facts themselves1 the mediating machinery disappears along with the essences4 ,there is substituted for the hierarchical world in which each degree in the scale has its righteousness imputed from above a world homogeneous in structure and in the scheme of its parts2 the same in heaven1 earth1 and the uttermost parts of the sea4 ,the ladder of values from the sublunary world with its irregular1 extravagant1 imperfect motion up to the stellar universe1 with its self-returning perfect order1 corresponded to the middle terms of the older logic4 ,the steps were graduated1 ascending from the indeterminate1 unassured matter of sense up to the eternal1 unquestionable truths of rational perception4 ,but when interest is occupied in finding out what anything and everything is1 any fact is just as good as its fellow4 ,the observable world is a democracy4 ,the difference which makes a fact what it is is not an exclusive distinction1 but a matter of position and quantity1 an affair of locality and aggregation1 traits which place all facts upon the same level1 since all other observable facts also possess them and are1 indeed1 conjointly responsible for them4 ,laws are not edicts of a sovereign binding a world of subjects otherwise lawless2 they are the agreements1 the compacts of facts themselves1 or1 in the familiar language of ,mill1 the common attributes1 the resemblances4 ,the emphasis of modern science upon control flows from the same source4 ,interest is in the new1 in extension1 in discovery4 ,inference is the advance into the unknown1 the use of the established to win new worlds from the void4 ,this requires and employs regulation--that is1 method--in procedure4 ,there cannot be a blind attack4 ,a plan of campaign is needed4 ,hence the so-called practical applications of science1 the ,baconian knowledge is power1 the ,comteian science is prevision1 are not extra-logical addenda or supererogatory benefits4 ,they are intrinsic to the logical method itself1 which is just the orderly way of approaching new experiences so as to grasp and hold them4 ,the attitude of research is necessarily toward the future4 ,the application of science to the practical affairs of life1 as in the stationary engine1 or telephone1 does not differ in principle from the determination of wave-lengths of light through the experimental control of the laboratory4 ,science lives only in arranging for new contacts1 new insights4 ,the school of ,kant agrees with that of ,mill in asserting that judgment must1 in order to be judgment1 be synthetic or instructive2 it must extend1 inform1 and purvey4 ,when we recognize that this service of judgment in effecting growth of experience is not accidental1 but that judgment means exactly the devising and using of suitable instrumentalities for this end1 we remark that the so-called practical uses of science are only the further and freer play of the intrinsic movement of discovery itself4 99 99 99 99 99 ,we began with the assumption that thought is to be interpreted as a doubt-inquiry function1 conducted for the purpose of arriving at that mental equilibrium known as assurance or knowledge4 ,we assumed that various stages of thinking could be marked out according to the amount of play which they give to doubt1 and the consequent sincerity with which thinking is identified with free inquiry4 ,modern scientific procedure1 as just set forth1 seems to define the ideal or limit of this process4 ,it is inquiry emancipated1 universalized1 whose sole aim and criterion is discovery1 and hence it marks the terminus of our description4 ,it is idle to conceal from ourselves1 however1 that scientific procedure as a practical undertaking1 has not as yet reflected itself into any coherent and generally accepted theory of thinking1 into any accepted doctrine of logic which is comparable to the ,aristotelian4 ,kant's conviction that logic is a complete and settled science1 which with absolutely certain boundaries has gained nothing and lost nothing since ,aristotle1 is startlingly contradicted by the existing state of discussion of logical doctrine4 ,the simple fact of the case is that there are at least three rival theories on the ground1 each claiming to furnish the sole proper interpretation of the actual procedure of thought4 ,the ,aristotelian logic is far from having withdrawn its claim4 ,it still offers its framework as that into which the merely empirical results of observation and experimental inquiry must be fitted if they are to be regarded as really proved4 ,another school of logicians1 starting professedly from modern psychology1 discredits the whole traditional industry and reverses the ,aristotelian theory of validity2 it holds that only particular facts are self-supporting1 and that the authority allowed to general principles is derivative and second hand4 ,a third school of philosophy claims1 by analysis of science and experience1 to justify the conclusion that the universe itself is a construction of thought1 giving evidence throughout of the pervasive and constitutive action of reason1 and holds1 consequently1 that our logical processes are simply the reading off or coming to consciousness of the inherently rational structure already possessed by the universe in virtue of the presence within it of this pervasive and constitutive action of thought4 ,it thus denies both the claim of the traditional logic1 that matters of experienced fact are mere particulars having their rationality in an external ground1 and the claim of the empirical logic1 that thought is just a gymnastic by which we vault from one presented fact to another remote in space and time4 ,which of the three doctrines is to be regarded as the legitimate exponent of the procedure of thought manifested in modern science8 ,while the ,aristotelian logic is willing to waive a claim to be regarded as expounder of the actual procedure1 it still insists upon its right to be regarded as the sole ultimate umpire of the validity or proved character of the results reached4 ,but the empirical and transcendental logics stand face to face as rivals1 each asserting that it alone tells the story of what science does and how it does it4 ,with the consciousness of this conflict my discussion in its present1 or descriptive1 phase must cease4 ,its close1 however1 suggests a further question4 ,in so far as we adopt the conception that thinking is itself a doubt-inquiry process1 must we not deny the claims of all of the three doctrines to be the articulate voicing of the methods of experimental science8 ,do they not all agree in setting up something fixed outside inquiry1 supplying both its material and its limit8 ,that the first principle and the empirical matters of fact of the ,aristotelian logic fall outside the thinking process1 and condemn the latter to a purely external and go-between agency1 has been already sufficiently descanted upon4 ,but it is also true that the fixed particulars1 given facts1 or sensations--whatever the empirical logician starts from--are material given ready-made to the thought-process1 and externally limiting inquiry1 instead of being distinctions arising within and because of search for truth4 ,nor1 as regards this point1 is the transcendental in any position to throw stones at the empirical logic4 ,thought in itself is so far from a process of inquiry that it is taken to be the eternal1 fixed structure of the universe2 our thinking1 involving doubt and investigation1 is due wholly to our finite1 imperfect character1 which condemns us to the task of merely imitating and reinstating thought in itself1 once and forever complete1 ready-made1 fixed4 ,the practical procedure and practical assumptions of modern experimental science1 since they make thinking essentially and not merely accidentally a process of discovery1 seem irreconcilable with both the empirical and transcendental interpretations4 ,at all events there is here sufficient discrepancy to give occasion for further search3 ,does not an account of thinking1 basing itself on modern scientific procedure1 demand a statement in which all the distinctions and terms of thought--judgment1 concept1 inference1 subject1 predicate1 and copula of judgment1 etc41 ad infinitum--shall be interpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process8 ,,footnotes3 #df ,logic1 ,book ,,iv1 chap4 ii1 #b4 #dg ,logic1 ,book ,,ii1 chap4 i1 #a4 ,i have changed the order of the sentences quoted1 and have omitted some phrases4 ,,vii ,,the ,,logical ,,character ,,of ,,ideas ,said ,john ,stuart ,mill3 ,to draw inferences has been said to be the great business of life4444 ,it is the only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged4 ,if this be so1 it seems a pity that ,mill did not recognize that this business identifies what we mean when we say mind4 ,if he had recognized this1 he would have cast the weight of his immense influence not only against the conception that mind is a substance1 but also against the conception that it is a collection of existential states or attributes without any substance in which to inhere2 and he would thereby have done much to free logic from epistemological metaphysics4 ,in any case1 an account of intellectual operations and conditions from the standpoint of the rle played and position occupied by them in the business of drawing inferences is a different sort of thing from an account of them as having an existence per se1 from treating them as making up some sort of existential material distinct from the things which figure in inference-drawing4 ,this latter type of treatment is that which underlies the psychology which itself has adopted uncritically the remnants of the metaphysics of soul substance3 the idea of accidents without the substance4#dh ,this assumption from metaphysical psychology--the assumption of consciousness as an existent stuff or existent process--is then carried over into an examination of knowledge1 so as to make the theory of knowledge not logic 7an account of the ways in which valid inferences or conclusions from things to other things are made71 but epistemology4 ,we have1 therefore1 the result 7so unfortunate for logic7 that logic is not free to go its own way1 but is compromised by the assumption that knowledge goes on not in terms of things 7,i use things in the broadest sense1 as equaling res1 and covering affairs1 concerns1 acts1 as well as things in the narrower sense71 but in terms of a relation between things and a peculiar existence made up of consciousness1 or else between things and functional operations of this existence4 ,if it could be shown that psychology is essentially not a science of states of consciousness1 but of behavior1 conceived as a process of continuous readjustment1 then the undoubted facts which go by the name of sensation1 perception1 image1 emotion1 concept1 would be interpreted to mean peculiar 7i4e41 specifically qualitative7 epochs1 phases1 and crises in the scheme of behavior4 ,the supposedly scientific basis for the belief that states of consciousness inherently define a separate type of existence would be done away with4 ,inferential knowledge1 knowledge involving reflection1 psychologically viewed1 would be assimilated to a certain mode of readaptation of functions1 involving shock and the need of control2 'knowledge' in the sense of direct non-reflective presence of things would be identified 7psychologically7 with relatively stable or completed adjustments4 ,i can not profess to speak for psychologists1 but it is an obvious characteristic of the contemporary status of psychology that one school 7the so-called functional or dynamic7 operates with nothing more than a conventional and perfunctory reference to states of consciousness2 while the orthodox school makes constant concessions to ideas of the behavior type4 ,it introduces the conceptions of fatigue1 practice1 and habituation4 ,it makes its fundamental classifications on the basis of physiological distinctions 7e4g41 the centrally initiated and the peripherally initiated71 which1 from a biological standpoint1 are certainly distinctions of structures involved in the performance of acts4 ,one of the aims of the ,studies in ,logical ,theory was to show1 on the negative or critical side1 that the type of logical theory which professedly starts its account of knowledge from mere states of consciousness is compelled at every crucial juncture to assume things1 and to define its so-called mental states in terms of things2#di and1 on the positive side1 to show that1 logically considered1 such distinctions as sensation1 image1 etc41 mark instruments and crises in the development of controlled judgment1 i4e41 of inferential conclusions4 ,it was perhaps not surprising that this effort should have been criticized not on its own merits1 but on the assumption that this correspondence of the 7functional7 psychological and the logical points of view was intended in terms of the psychology which obtained in the critic's mind--to wit1 the psychology based on the assumption of consciousness as a separate existence or process4 ,these considerations suggest that before we can intelligently raise the question of the truth of ideas we must consider their status in judgment1 judgment being regarded as the typical expression of the inferential operation4 7#a7 ,do ideas present themselves except in situations which are doubtful and inquired into8 ,do they exist side by side with the facts when the facts are themselves known8 ,do they exist except when judgment is in suspense8 7#b7 ,are ideas anything else except the suggestions1 conjectures1 hypotheses1 theories 7,i use an ascending scale of terms7 tentatively entertained during a suspended conclusion8 7#c7 ,do they have any part to play in the conduct of inquiry8 ,do they serve to direct observation1 colligate data1 and guide experimentation1 or are they otiose8#ej 7#d7 ,if the ideas have a function in directing the reflective process 7expressed in judgment71 does success in performing the function 7that is1 in directing to a conclusion which is stable7 have anything to do with the logical worth or validity of the ideas8 7#e7 ,and1 finally1 does validity have anything to do with truth8 ,does truth mean something inherently different from the fact that the conclusion of one judgment 7the known fact1 previously unknown1 in which judging terminates7 is itself applicable in further situations of doubt and inquiry8 ,and is judgment properly more than tentative save as it terminates in a known fact1 i4e41 a fact present without the intermediary of reflection8 ,when these questions--,i mean1 of course1 questions which are exemplified in these queries--are answered1 we shall1 perhaps1 have gone as far as it is possible to go with reference to the logical character of ideas4 ,the question may then recur as to whether the ideas of the epistemologist 7that is1 existences in a purely private stream of consciousness7 remain as something over and above1 not yet accounted for2 or whether they are perversions and misrepresentations of logical characters4 ,i propose to give a brief dogmatic reply in the latter sense4 ,where1 and in so far as1 there are unquestioned objects1 there is no consciousness4 ,there are just things4 ,when there is uncertainty1 there are dubious1 suspected objects--things hinted at1 guessed at4 ,such objects have a distinct status1 and it is the part of good sense to give them1 as occupying that status1 a distinct caption4 ,consciousness is a term often used for this purpose2 and ,i see no objection to that term1 provided it is recognized to mean such objects as are problematic1 plus the fact that in their problematic character they may be used1 as effectively as accredited objects1 to direct observations and experiments which finally relieve the doubtful features of the situation4 ,such objects may turn out to be valid1 or they may not4 ,but1 in any case1 they may be used4 ,they may be internally manipulated and developed through ratiocination into explicit statement of their implications2 they may be employed as standpoints for selecting and arranging data1 and as methods for conducting experiments4 ,in short1 they are not merely hypothetical2 they are working hypotheses4 ,meanwhile1 their aloofness from accredited objectivity may lead us to characterize them as merely ideas1 or even as mental states1 provided once more we mean by mental state just this logical status4 ,we have examples of such ideas in symbols4 ,a symbol1 ,i take it1 is always itself1 existentially1 a particular object4 ,a word1 an algebraic sign1 is just as much a concrete existence as is a horse1 a fire-engine1 or a flyspeck4 ,but its value resides in its representative character3 in its suggestive and directive force for operations that when performed lead us to non-symbolic objects1 which without symbolic operations would not be apprehended1 or at least would not be so easily apprehended4 ,it is1 ,i think1 worth noting that the capacity 7a7 for regarding objects as mere symbols and 7b7 for employing symbols instrumentally furnishes the only safeguard against dogmatism1 i4e41 uncritical acceptance of any suggestion that comes to us vividly2 and also that it furnishes the only basis for intelligently controlled experiments4 ,i do not think1 however1 that we should have the tendency to regard ideas as private1 as personal1 if we stopped short at this point4 ,if we had only words or other symbols uttered by others1 or written1 or printed1 we might call them1 when in objective suspense1 mere ideas4 ,but we should hardly think of these ideas as our own4 ,such extra-organic stimuli1 however1 are not adequate logical devices4 ,they are too rigid1 too objective in their own existential status4 ,their meaning and character are too definitely fixed4 ,for effective discovery we need things which are more easily manipulated1 which are more transitive1 more easily dropped and changed4 ,intra-organic events1 adjustments within the organism1 that is1 adjustments of the organism considered not with reference to the environment but with reference to one another1 are much better suited to stand as representatives of genuinely dubious objects4 ,an object which is really doubted is by its nature precarious and inchoate1 vague4 ,what is a thing when it is not yet discovered and yet is tentatively entertained and tested8 ,ancient logic never got beyond the conception of an object whose logical place1 whose subsumptive position as a particular with reference to some universal1 was doubtful4 ,it never got to the point where it could search for particulars which in themselves as particulars are doubtful4 ,hence it was a logic of proof1 of deduction1 not of inquiry1 of discovery1 and of induction4 ,it was hard up against its own dilemma3 ,how can a man inquire8 ,for either he knows that for which he seeks1 and hence does not seek3 or he does not know1 in which case he can not seek1 nor could he tell if he found4 ,the individualistic movement of modern life detached1 as it were1 the individual1 and allowed personal 7i4e41 intra-organic7 events to have1 transitively and temporarily1 a worth of their own4 ,these events are continuous with extra-organic events 7in origin and eventual outcome72 but they may be considered in temporary displacement as uniquely existential4 ,in this capacity they serve as means for the elaboration of a delayed but more adequate response in a radically different direction4 ,so treated1 they are tentative1 dubious but experimental1 anticipations of an object4 ,they are subjective 7i4e41 individualistic7 surrogates of public1 cosmic things1 which may be so manipulated and elaborated as to terminate in public things which without them would not exist as empirical objects4#ea ,the recognition then of intra-organic events1 which are not merely effects nor distorted refractions of cosmic objects1 but inchoate future cosmic objects in process of experimental construction1 resolves1 to my mind1 the paradox of so-called subjective and private things that have objective and universal reference1 and that operate so as to lead to objective consequences which test their own value4 ,when a man can say3 ,this color is not necessarily the color of the glass nor the picture nor even of an object reflected but is at least an event in my nervous system1 an event which ,i may refer to my organism till ,i get surety of other reference--he is for the first time emancipated from the dogmatism of unquestioned reference1 and is set upon a path of experimental inquiry4 ,i am not here concerned with trying to demonstrate that this is the correct mode of interpretation4 ,i am only concerned with pointing out its radical difference from the view of a critic who1 holding to the two-world theory of existences which from the start are divided into the fixedly objective and the fixedly psychical1 interprets in terms of his own theory the view that the distinction between the objective and the subjective is a logical-practical distinction4 ,whether the logical1 as against the ontological1 theory be true or false1 it can hardly be fruitfully discussed without a preliminary apprehension of it as a logical conception4 ,,footnotes3 #dh ,this conception of consciousness as a sort of reduplicate world of things comes to us1 ,i think1 chiefly from ,hume's conception that the mind is nothing but a heap1 a collection of different perceptions1 united together by certain relations4--,treatise of ,human ,nature1 ,book ,i1 ,part ,,iv1 sec4 #b4 ,for the evolution of this sort of notion out of the immaterial substance notion1 see ,bush1 ,a ,factor in the ,genesis of ,idealism1 in the ,james ,festschrift4 #di ,see1 for example1 p4 #aac4 ,thus that which is 'nothing but a state of our consciousness' turns out straightway to be a specifically determined objective fact in a system of facts1 and1 p4 #adg1 actual sensation is determined as an event in a world of events4 #ej ,when it is said that an idea is a plan of action1 it must be remembered that the term plan of action is a formal term4 ,it throws no light upon what the action is with respect to which an idea is the plan4 ,it may be chopping down a tree1 finding a trail1 or conducting a scientific research in mathematics1 history1 or chemistry4 #ea ,i owe this idea1 both in its historical and in its logical aspects1 to my former colleague1 ,professor ,mead1 of the ,university of ,chicago4 ,,viii ,,the ,,control ,,of ,,ideas ,,by ,,facts ,i ,there is something a little baffling in much of the current discussion regarding the reference of ideas to facts4 ,the not uncommon assumption is that there was a satisfactory and consistent theory of their relation in existence prior to the somewhat impertinent intrusion of a functional and practical interpretation of them4 ,the way the instrumental logician has been turned upon by both idealist and realist is suggestive of the way in which the outsider who intervenes in a family jar is proverbially treated by both husband and wife1 who manifest their unity by berating the third party4 ,i feel that the situation is due partly to various misapprehensions1 inevitable perhaps in the first presentation of a new point of view#eb and multiplied in this instance by the coincidence of the presentation of this logical point of view with that of the larger philosophical movements1 humanism and pragmatism4 ,i wish here to undertake a summary statement of the logical view on its own account1 hoping it may receive clearer understanding on its own merits4 ,in the first place it was 7apart from the frightful confusion of logical theories7 precisely the lack of an adequate and generally accepted theory of the nature of fact and idea1 and of the kind of agreement or correspondence between them which constitutes the truth of the idea1 that led to the development of a functional theory of logic4 ,a brief statement of the difficulties in the traditional views may therefore be pertinent4 ,that fruitful thinking--thought that terminates in valid knowledge--goes on in terms of the distinction of facts and judgment1 and that valid knowledge is precisely genuine correspondence or agreement1 of some sort1 of fact and judgment1 is the common and undeniable assumption4 ,but the discussions are largely carried on in terms of an epistemological dualism1 rendering the solution of the problem impossible in virtue of the very terms in which it is stated4 ,the distinction is at once identified with that between mind and matter1 consciousness and objects1 the psychical and the physical1 where each of these terms is supposed to refer to some fixed order of existence1 a world in itself4 ,then1 of course1 there comes up the question of the nature of the agreement1 and of the recognition of it4 ,what is the experience in which the survey of both idea and existence is made and their agreement recognized8 ,is it an idea8 ,is the agreement ultimately a matter of self-consistency of ideas8 ,then what has become of the postulate that truth is agreement of idea with existence beyond idea8 ,is it an absolute which transcends and absorbs the difference8 ,then1 once more1 what is the test of any specific judgment8 ,what has become of the correspondence of fact and thought8 ,or1 more urgently1 since the pressing problem of life1 of practice and of science1 is the discrimination of the relative1 or superior1 validity of this or that theory1 plan1 or interpretation1 what is the criterion of truth within present non-absolutistic experience1 where the distinction between factual conditions and thoughts and the necessity of some working adjustment persist8 ,putting the problem in yet another way1 either both fact and idea are present all the time or else only one of them is present4 ,but if the former1 why should there be an idea at all1 and why should it have to be tested by the fact8 ,when we already have what we want1 namely1 existence1 reality1 why should we take up the wholly supernumerary task of forming more or less imperfect ideas of those facts1 and then engage in the idle performance of testing them by what we already know to be8 ,but if only ideas are present1 it is idle to speak of comparing an idea with facts and testing its validity by its agreement4 ,the elaboration and refinement of ideas to the uttermost still leaves us with an idea1 and while a self-consistent idea stands a show of being true in a way in which an incoherent one does not1 a self-consistent idea is still but a hypothesis1 a candidate for truth4 ,ideas are not made true by getting bigger4 ,but if only 'facts' are present1 the whole conception of agreement is once more given up--not to mention that such a situation is one in which there is by definition no thinking or reflective factor at all4 ,this suggests that a strictly monistic epistemology1 whether idealistic or realistic1 does not get rid of the problem4 ,suppose for example we take a sensationalistic idealism4 ,it does away with the ontological gulf between ideas and facts1 and by reducing both terms to a common denominator seems to facilitate fruitful discussion of the problem4 ,but the problem of the distinction and reference 7agreement1 correspondence7 of two types or sorts of sensations still persists4 ,if ,i say the box there is square1 and call box one of a group of ideas or sensations and square another sensation or idea1 the old question comes up3 ,is square already a part of the facts of the box1 or is it not8 ,if it is1 it is a supernumerary1 an idle thing1 both as an idea and as an assertion of fact2 if it is not1 how can we compare the two ideas1 and what on earth or in heaven does their agreement or correspondence mean8 ,if it means simply that we experience the two sensations in juxtaposition1 then the same is true1 of course1 of any casual association or hallucination4 ,on the sensational basis1 accordingly1 there is still a distinction of something given1 there1 brutally factual1 the box1 and something else which stands on a different level1 ideal1 absent1 intended1 demanded1 the square1 which is asserted to hold good or be true of the thing box4 ,the fact that both are sensations throws no light on the logical validity of any proposition or belief1 because by theory a like statement holds of every possible proposition4#ec ,the same problem recurs on a realistic basis4 ,for example1 there has recently been propounded#ed the doctrine of the distinction between relations of space and time and relations of meaning or significance1 as a key to the problem of knowledge4 ,things exist in their own characters1 in their temporal and spatial relations4 ,when knowledge intervenes1 there is nothing new of a subjective or psychical sort1 but simply a new relation of the things--the suggesting or signifying of one thing by another4 ,now this seems to be an excellent way of stating the logical problem1 but1 ,i take it1 it states and does not solve4 ,for the characteristic of such situations1 claiming to terminate in knowledge1 is precisely that the meaning-relation is predicated of the other relations2 it is referred to them2 it is not simply a supervention existing side by side with them1 like casual suggestions or the play of phantasy4 ,it is something which the facts1 the qualitative space and time things1 must bear the burden of1 must accept and take unto themselves as part of themselves4 ,until this happens1 we have only thinking1 not accomplished knowledge4 ,hence1 logically1 the existential relations play the rle of fact1 and the relation of signification that of idea1#ee distinguished from fact and yet1 if valid1 to hold of fact4 ,this appears quite clearly in the following quotation3 ,it is the ice which means that it will cool the water1 just as much as it is the ice which does cool the water when put into it4 ,there is1 however1 a possible ambiguity in the statement1 to which we shall return later4 ,that the ice 7the thing regarded as ice7 suggests cooling is as real as is a case of actual cooling4 ,but1 of course1 not every suggestion is valid4 ,the ice may be a crystal1 and it will not cool water at all4 ,so far as it is already certain that this is ice1 and also certain that ice1 under all circumstances1 cools water1 the meaning-relation stands on the same level as the physical1 being not merely suggested1 but part of the facts ascertained4 ,it is not a meaning-relation as such at all4 ,we already have truth2 the entire work of knowing as logical is done2 we have no longer the relation characteristic of reflective situations4 ,here again the implication of the thinking situation is of some correspondence or agreement between two sets of distinguished relations2 the problem of valid determination remains the central question of any theory of knowing in its relation to facts and truth4#ef ,,ii ,i hope this statement of the difficulty1 however inadequate1 will serve at least to indicate that a functional logic inherits the problem in question and does not create it2 that it has never for a moment denied the prima facie working distinction between ideas1 thoughts1 meanings1 and facts1 existences1 the environment1 nor the necessity of a control of meaning by facts4 ,it is concerned not with denying1 but with understanding4 ,what is denied is not the genuineness of the problem of the terms in which it is stated1 but the reality and value of the orthodox interpretation4 ,what is insisted upon is the relative1 instrumental1 or working character of the distinction--that it is a logical distinction1 instituted and maintained in the interests of intelligence1 with all that intelligence imports in the exercise of the life functions4 ,to this positive side ,i now turn4 ,in the analysis it may prove convenient to take an illustration of a man lost in the woods1 taking this case as typical of any reflective situation in so far as it involves perplexity--a problem to be solved4 ,the problem is to find a correct idea of the way home--a practical idea or plan of action which will lead to success1 or the realization of the purpose to get home4 ,now the critics of the experimental theory of logic make the point that this practical idea1 the truth of which is evidenced in the successful meeting of a need1 is dependent for its success upon a purely presentative idea1 that of the existent environment1 whose validity has nothing to do with success but depends on agreement with the given state of affairs4 ,it is said that what makes a man's idea of his environment true is its agreement with the actual environment1 and generally a true idea in any situation consists in its agreement with reality4 ,i have already indicated my acceptance of this formula4 ,but it was long my misfortune not to be possessed offhand of those perfectly clear notions of just what is meant in this formula by the terms idea1 existence1 and agreement which are possessed by other writers on epistemology2 and when ,i analyzed these notions ,i found the distinction between the practical idea and the theoretical not fixed nor final1 and ,i found a somewhat startling similarity between the notions of success and agreement4 ,just what is the environment of which an idea is to be formed3 i4e41 what is the intellectual content or objective detail to be assigned to the term environment8 ,it can hardly mean the actual visible environment--the trees1 rocks1 etc41 which a man is actually looking at4 ,these things are there and it seems superfluous to form an idea of them2 moreover1 the wayfaring man1 though lost1 would have to be an unusually perverse fool if under such circumstances he were unable to form an idea 7supposing he chose to engage in this luxury7 in agreement with these facts4 ,the environment must be a larger environment than the visible facts2 it must include things not within the direct ken of the lost man2 it must1 for instance1 extend from where he is now to his home1 or to the point from which he started4 ,it must include unperceived elements in their contrast with the perceived4 ,otherwise the man would not be lost4 ,now we are at once struck with the facts that the lost man has no alternative except either to wander aimlessly or else to conceive this inclusive environment2 and that this conception is just what is meant by idea4 ,it is not some little psychical entity or piece of consciousness-stuff1 but is the interpretation of the locally present environment in reference to its absent portion1 that part to which it is referred as another part so as to give a view of a whole4 ,just how such an idea would differ from one's plan of action in finding one's way1 ,i do not know4 ,for one's plan 7if it be really a plan1 a method7 is a conception of what is given in its hypothetical relations to what is not given1 employed as a guide to that act which results in the absent being also given4 ,it is a map constructed with one's self lost and one's self found1 whether at starting or at home again1 as its two limits4 ,if this map in its specific character is not also the only guide to the way home1 one's only plan of action1 then ,i hope ,i may never be lost4 ,it is the practical facts of being lost and desiring to be found which constitute the limits and the content of the environment4 ,then comes the test of agreement of the idea and the environment4 ,supposing the individual stands still and attempts to compare his idea with the reality1 with what reality is he to compare it8 ,not with the presented reality1 for that reality is the reality of himself lost2 not with the complete reality1 for at this stage of proceedings he has only the idea to stand for the complete theory4 ,what kind of comparison is possible or desirable then1 save to treat the mental layout of the whole situation as a working hypothesis1 as a plan of action1 and proceed to act upon it1 to use it as a director and controller of one's divagations instead of stumbling blindly around until one is either exhausted or accidentally gets out8 ,now suppose one uses the idea--that is to say1 the present facts projected into a whole in the light of absent facts--as a guide of action4 ,suppose1 by means of its specifications1 one works one's way along until one comes upon familiar ground--finds one's self4 ,now1 one may say1 my idea was right1 it was in accord with facts2 it agrees with reality4 ,that is1 acted upon sincerely1 it has led to the desired conclusion2 it has1 through action1 worked out the state of things which it contemplated or intended4 ,the agreement1 correspondence1 is between purpose1 plan1 and its own execution1 fulfillment2 between a map of a course constructed for the sake of guiding behavior and the result attained in acting upon the indications of the map4 ,just how does such agreement differ from success8 ,,iii ,if we exclude acting upon the idea1 no conceivable amount or kind of intellectualistic procedure can confirm or refute an idea1 or throw any light upon its validity4 ,how does the non-pragmatic view consider that verification takes place8 ,does it suppose that we first look a long while at the facts and then a long time at the idea1 until by some magical process the degree and kind of their agreement become visible8 ,unless there is some such conception as this1 what conception of agreement is possible except the experimental or practical one8 ,and if it be admitted that verification involves action1 how can that action be relevant to the truth of an idea1 unless the idea is itself already relevant to action8 ,if by acting in accordance with the experimental definition of facts1 viz41 as obstacles and conditions1 and the experimental definition of the end or intent1 viz41 as plan and method of action1 a harmonized situation effectually presents itself1 we have the adequate and the only conceivable verification of the intellectual factors4 ,if the action indicated be carried out and the disordered or disturbed situation persists1 then we have not merely confuted the tentative positions of intelligence1 but we have in the very process of acting introduced new data and eliminated some of the old ones1 and thus afforded an opportunity for the resurvey of the facts and the revision of the plan of action4 ,by acting faithfully upon an inadequate reflective presentation1 we have at least secured the elements for its improvement4 ,this1 of course1 gives no absolute guaranty that the reflection will at any time be so performed as to prove its validity in fact4 ,but the self-rectification of intellectual content through acting upon it in good faith is the absolute of knowledge1 loyalty to which is the religion of intellect4 ,the intellectual definition or delimitation assigned to the given is thus as tentative and experimental as that ascribed to the idea4 ,in form both are categorical1 and in content both are hypothetical4 ,facts really exist just as facts1 and meanings exist as meanings4 ,one is no more superfluous1 more subjective1 or less necessitated than the other4 ,in and of themselves as existences both are equally realistic and compulsive4 ,but on the basis of existence1 there is no element in either which may be strictly described as intellectual or cognitional4 ,there is only a practical situation in its brute and unrationalized form4 ,what is uncertain about the facts as given at any moment is whether the right exclusions and selections have been made4 ,since that is a question which can be decided finally only by the experimental issue1 this ascription of character is itself tentative and experimental4 ,if it works1 the characterization and delineation are found to be proper ones2 but every admission prior to inquiry1 of unquestioned1 categorical1 rigid objectivity1 compromises the probability that it will work4 ,the character assigned to the datum must be taken as hypothetically as possible in order to preserve the elasticity needed for easy and prompt reconsideration4 ,any other procedure virtually insists that all facts and details anywhere happening to exist and happening to present themselves 7all being equally real7 must all be given equal status and equal weight1 and that their outer ramifications and internal complexities must be indefinitely followed up4 ,the worthlessness of this sheer accumulation of realities1 its total irrelevancy1 the lack of any way of judging the significance of the accumulations1 are good proofs of the fallacy of any theory which ascribes objective logical content to facts wholly apart from the needs and possibilities of a situation4 ,the more stubbornly one maintains the full reality of either his facts or his ideas1 just as they stand1 the more accidental is the discovery of relevantly significant facts and of valid ideas--the more accidental1 the less rational1 is the issue of the knowledge situation4 ,due progress is reasonably probable in just the degree in which the meaning1 categorical in its existing imperativeness1 and the fact1 equally categorical in its brute coerciveness1 are assigned only a provisional and tentative nature with reference to control of the situation4 ,that this surrender of a rigid and final character for the content of knowledge on the sides both of fact and of meaning1 in favor of experimental and functioning estimations1 is precisely the change which has marked the development of modern from mediaeval and ,greek science1 seems undoubted4 ,to learn the lesson one has only to contrast the rigidity of phenomena and conceptions in ,greek thought 7,platonic ideas1 ,aristotelian forms7 with the modern experimental selection and determining of facts and experimental employment of hypotheses4 ,the former have ceased to be ultimate realities of a nondescript sort and have become provisional data2 the latter have ceased to be eternal meanings and have become working theories4 ,the fruitful application of mathematics and the evolution of a technique of experimental inquiry have coincided with this change4 ,that realities exist independently of their use as intellectual data1 and that meanings exist apart from their utilization as hypotheses1 are the permanent truths of ,greek realism as against the exaggerated subjectivism of modern philosophy2 but the conception that this existence is to be defined in the same way as are contents of knowledge1 so that perfect being is object of perfect knowledge and imperfect being object of imperfect knowledge1 is the fallacy which ,greek thought projected into modern4 ,science has advanced in its methods in just the degree in which it has ceased to assume that prior realities and prior meanings retain fixedly and finally1 when entering into reflective situations1 the characters they had prior to this entrance1 and in which it has realized that their very presence within the knowledge situation signifies that they have to be redefined and revalued from the standpoint of the new situation4 ,,iv ,this conception does not1 however1 commit us to the view that there is any conscious situation which is totally non-reflective4 ,it may be true that any experience which can properly be termed such comprises something which is meant over and against what is given or there4 ,but there are many situations into which the rational factor--the mutual distinction and mutual reference of fact and meaning--enters only incidentally and is slurred1 not accentuated4 ,many disturbances are relatively trivial and induce only a slight and superficial redefinition of contents4 ,this passing tension of facts against meaning may suffice to call up and carry a wide range of meaningful facts which are quite irrelevant to the intellectual problem4 ,such is the case where the individual is finding his way through any field which is upon the whole familiar1 and which1 accordingly1 requires only an occasional resurvey and revaluation at moments of slight perplexity4 ,we may call these situations1 if we will1 knowledge situations 7for the reflective function characteristic of knowledge is present71 but so denominating them does not do away with their sharp difference from those situations in which the critical qualification of facts and definition of meanings constitute the main business4 ,to speak of the passing attention which a traveler has occasionally to give to the indications of his proper path in a fairly familiar and beaten highway as knowledge1 in just the same sense in which the deliberate inquiry of a mathematician or a chemist or a logician is knowledge1 is as confusing to the real issue involved as would be the denial to it of any reflective factor4 ,if1 then1 one bears in mind these two considerations--7#a7 the unique problem and purpose of every reflective situation1 and 7#b7 the difference as to range and thoroughness of logical function in different types of reflective situations--one need have no difficulty with the doctrine that the great obstacle in the development of scientific knowing is that facts and meanings enter such situations with stubborn and alien characteristics imported from other situations4 ,this affords an opportunity to speak again of the logical problem to which reference and promise of return were made earlier in this paper4 ,facts may be regarded as existing qualitatively and in certain spatial and temporal relations2 when there is knowledge another relation is added1 that of one thing meaning or signifying another4 ,water exists1 for example1 as water1 in a certain place1 in a certain temporal sequence4 ,but it may signify the quenching of thirst2 and this signification-relation constitutes knowledge4#eg ,this statement may be taken in a way congruous with the account developed in this paper4 ,but it may also be taken in another sense1 consideration of which will serve to enforce the point regarding the tentative nature of the characterization of the given1 as distinct from the intended and absent4 ,water means quenching thirst2 it is drunk1 and death follows4 ,it was not water1 but a poison which looked like water4 ,or it is drunk1 and is water1 but does not quench thirst1 for the drinker is in an abnormal condition and drinking water only intensifies the thirst4 ,or it is drunk and quenches thirst2 but it also brings on typhoid fever1 being not merely water1 but water plus germs4 ,now all these events demonstrate that error may appertain quite as much to the characterization of existing things1 suggesting or suggested1 as to the suggestion qua suggestion4 ,there is no ground for giving the things any superior reality4 ,in these cases1 indeed1 it may fairly be said that the mistake is made because qualitative thing and suggested or meaning-relation were not discriminated4 ,the signifying force was regarded as a part of the direct quality of the given fact1 quite as much as its color1 liquidity1 etc42 it is only in another situation that it is discriminated as a relation instead of being regarded as an element4 ,it is quite as true to say that a thing is called water because it suggests thirst-quenching as to say that it suggests thirst-quenching because it is characterized as water4 ,the knowledge function becomes prominent or dominant in the degree in which there is a conscious discrimination between the fact-relations and the meaning-relations4 ,and this inevitably means that the water ceases to be surely water1 just as it becomes doubtful or hypothetical whether this thing1 whatever it is1 really means thirst-quenching4 ,if it really means thirst-quenching1 it is water2 so far as it may not mean it1 it perhaps is not water4 ,it is now just as much a question what this is as what it means4 ,whatever will resolve one question will resolve the other4 ,in just the degree1 then1 in which an existence or thing gets intellectualized force or function1 it becomes a fragmentary and dubious thing1 to be circumscribed and described for the sake of operating as sign1 or clue of a future reality to be realized through action4 ,only as reality is reduced to a sign1 and questions of its nature as sign are considered1 does it get intellectual or cognitional status4 ,the bearing of this upon the question of practical character of the distinctions of fact and idea is obvious4 ,no one1 ,i take it1 would deny that action of some sort does follow upon judgment2 no one would deny that this action does somehow serve to test the value of the intellectual operations upon which it follows4 ,but if this subsequent action is merely subsequent1 if the intellectual categories1 operations1 and distinctions are complete in themselves1 without inherent reference to it1 what guaranty is there that they pass into relevant action1 and by what miracle does the action manage to test the worth of the idea8 ,but if the intellectual identification and description of the thing are as tentative and instrumental as is the ascription of significance1 then the exigencies of the active situation are operative in all the categories of the knowledge situation4 ,action is not a more or less accidental appendage or afterthought1 but is undergoing development and giving direction in the entire knowledge function4 ,in conclusion1 ,i remark that the ease with which the practical character of these fundamental logical categories1 fact1 meaning1 and agreement1 may be overlooked or denied is due to the organic way in which practical import is incarnate in them4 ,it can be overlooked because it is so involved in the terms themselves that it is assumed at every turn4 ,the pragmatist is in the position of one who is charged with denying the existence of something because1 in pointing out a certain fundamental feature of it1 he puts it in a strange light4 ,such confusion always occurs when the familiar is brought to definition4 ,the difficulties are more psychological--difficulties of orientation and mental adjustment--than logical1 and in the long run will be done away with by our getting used to the different viewpoint1 rather than by argument4 ,,footnotes3 #eb ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 ,university of ,chicago ,press1 #aijc4 #ec ,mill's doctrine of the ambiguity of the copula 7,logic1 ,book ,i1 chap4 ,,iv1 #a7 is an instance of one typical way of evading the problem4 ,after insisting with proper force and clearness upon the objective character of our intellectual beliefs and propositions1 viz41 that when we say fire causes heat we mean actual phenomena1 not our ideas of fire and heat 7,book ,i1 chap4 ,,ii and chap4 ,,xi1 #a1 and chap4 ,v1 #a71 he thinks to dispose of the whole problem of the is in judgment by saying that it is only a sign of affirmation 7chap4 ,i1 #b1 and chap4 ,,iv1 #a74 ,of course it is4 ,but unless the affirmation 7the sign of thought7 agrees or corresponds with the relations of the phenomena1 what becomes of the doctrine of the objective import of propositions8 ,how otherwise shall we maintain with ,mill 7and with common-sense and science7 the difference between asserting a fact of external nature and a fact in my mental history8 #ed ,studies in ,philosophy and ,psychology1 article by ,woodbridge on ,the ,problem of ,consciousness1 especially pp4 #aei-fj4 #ee ,in other words1 ideas is a term capable of assuming any definition which is logically appropriate--say1 meaning4 ,it need not have anything to do with the conception of little subjective entities or psychical stuffs4 #ef ,of course1 the monistic epistemologies have an advantage in the statement of the problem over the dualistic--they do not state it in terms which presuppose the impossibility of the solution4 #eg ,this view was originally advanced in the discussion of quite another problem than the one here discussed1 viz41 the problem of consciousness2 and it may not be quite just to dissever it from that context4 ,but as a formula for knowledge it has enough similarity with the one brought out in this paper to suggest further treatment2 it is not intended that the results reached here shall apply to the problem of consciousness as such4 ,,ix ,,na,,ve ,,realism ,,vs4 ,,presentative ,,realism#eh ,i ,in spite of the elucidations of contemporary realists1 a number of idealists continue to adduce in behalf of idealism certain facts having an obvious physical nature and explanation4 ,the visible convergence of the railway tracks1 for example1 is cited as evidence that what is seen is a mental content4 ,yet this convergence follows from the physical properties of light and a lens1 and is physically demonstrated in a camera4 ,is the photograph1 then1 to be conceived as a psychical somewhat8 ,that the time of the visibility of a light does not coincide with the time at which a distant body emitted the light is employed to support a similar idealistic conclusion1 in spite of the fact that the exact difference in time may be deduced from a physical property of light--its rate4 ,the dislocation in space of the light seen and the astronomical star is used as evidence of the mental nature of the former1 though the exact angular difference is a matter of simple computation from purely physical data4 ,the doubling of images of1 say1 the finger when the eyeball is pressed1 is frequently proffered as a clincher4 ,yet it is a simple matter to take any body that reflects light1 and by a suitable arrangement of lenses to produce not only two but many images1 projected into space4 ,if the fact that under definite physical conditions 7misplacement of lenses71 a finger yields two images proves the psychical character of the latter1 then the fact that under certain conditions a sounding body yields one or more echoes is1 by parity of reasoning1 proof that the echo is made of mental stuff4#ei ,if1 once more1 the differences in form and color of a table to different observers1 occupying different physical positions1 is proof that what each sees is a psychical1 private1 isolated somewhat1 then the fact that one and the same physical body has different effects upon1 or relations with1 different physical media is proof of the mental nature of these effects4 ,take a lump of wax and subject it to the same heat1 located at different positions2 now the wax is solid1 now liquid--it might even be gaseous4 ,how psychical these phenomena6 ,it almost seems as if the transformation of the physical into the mental in the cases cited exemplifies an interesting psychological phenomenon4 ,in each case the beginning is with a real and physical existence4 ,taking the real object1 the astronomical star1 on the basis of its physical reality1 the idealist concludes to a psychical object1 radically different6 ,taking the single object1 the finger1 from the premise of its real singleness1 he concludes to a double mental content1 which then takes the place of the original single thing6 ,taking one-and-the-same-object1 the table1 presenting its different surfaces and reflections of light to different real organisms1 he eliminates the one-table-in-its-different-relations in behalf of a multiplicity of totally separate psychical tables6 ,the logic reminds us of the story of the countryman who1 after gazing at the giraffe1 remarked1 ,there ain't no such animal4 ,it almost seems1 ,i repeat1 as if this self-contradiction in the argument creates in some minds the impression that the object--not the argument--is undergoing the extraordinary reversal of form4 ,however this may be1 the problem indicated in the foregoing cases is simply the good old problem of the many in one1 or1 less cryptically1 the problem of the maintenance of a continuity of process throughout differences4 ,i do not pretend that this situation1 though the most familiar thing in life1 is wholly without difficulties4 ,but its difficulty is not one of epistemology1 that is1 of the relation of known to a knower2 to take it as such1 and then to use it as proof of the psychical nature of a final term1 is also to prove that the trail the rocket stick leaves behind is psychical1 or that the flower which comes in a continuity of process from a seed is mental4 ,,ii ,contemporary realists have so frequently and clearly expounded the physical explanation of such cases as have been cited that one is at a loss as to why idealists go on repeating the cases without even alluding to the realistic explanation4 ,one is moved to wonder whether this neglect is just one of those circumstances which persistently dog philosophical discussions1 or whether something in the realistic position gives ground 7from at least an ad hominem point of view7 for the neglect4 ,there is a reason for adopting the latter alternative4 ,many realists1 in offering the type of explanation adduced above1 have treated the cases of seen light1 doubled imagery1 as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an inherent cognitive status4 ,they have treated the perceptions as cases of knowledge1 instead of as simply natural events having1 in themselves 7apart from a use that may be made of them71 no more knowledge status or worth than1 say1 a shower or a fever4 ,what ,i intend to show is that if perceptions are regarded as cases of knowledge1 the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation4 ,the physical explanation holds of them as long as they are regarded simply as natural events--a doctrine ,i shall call nave realism2 it does not hold of them considered as cases of knowledge--the view ,i call presentative realism4 ,the idealists attribute to the realists the doctrine that the perceived object is the real object4 ,please note the wording2 it assumes that there is the real object1 something which stands in a contrasting relation with objects not real or else less real4 ,since it is easily demonstrable that there is a numerical duplicity between the astronomical star and its effect of visible light1 between the single finger and the doubled images1 the latter evidently1 when the former is dubbed the real object1 stands in disparaging contrast to its reality4 ,if it is a case of knowledge1 the knowledge refers to the star2 and yet not the star1 but something more or less unreal 7that is1 if the star be the real object71 is known4 ,consider how simply the matter stands in what ,i have called nave realism4 ,the astronomical star is a real object1 but not the real object2 the visible light is another real object1 found1 when knowledge supervenes1 to be an occurrence standing in a process continuous with the star4 ,since the seen light is an event within a continuous process1 there is no point of view from which its reality contrasts with that of the star4 ,but suppose that the realist accepts the traditionary psychology according to which every event in the way of a perception is also a case of knowing something4 ,is the way out now so simple8 ,in the case of the doubled fingers or the seen light1 the thing known in perception contrasts with the physical source and cause of the knowledge4 ,there is a numerical duplicity4 ,moreover the thing known by perception is by this hypothesis in relation to a knower1 while the physical cause is not4 ,is not the most plausible account of the difference between the physical cause of the perceptive knowledge and what the latter presents precisely this latter difference--namely1 presentation to a knower8 ,if perception is a case of knowing1 it must be a case of knowing the star2 but since the real star is not known in the perception1 the knowledge relation must somehow have changed the object into a content4 ,thus when the realist conceives the perceptual occurrence as an intrinsic case of knowledge or of presentation to a mind or knower1 he lets the nose of the idealist camel into the tent4 ,he has then no great cause for surprise when the camel comes in--and devours the tent4 ,perhaps it will seem as if in this last paragraph ,i had gone back on what ,i said earlier regarding the physical explanation of the difference between the visible light and the astronomical star4 ,on the contrary1 my point is that this explanation1 though wholly adequate as long as we conceive the perception to be itself simply a natural event1 is not at all available when we conceive it to be an attempt at knowing its cause4 ,in the former case1 we are dealing with a relation between natural events4 ,in the latter case1 we are dealing with the difference between an object as a cause of knowledge and an object as known1 and hence in relation to mind4 ,by the method of difference the sole explanation of the difference between the two objects is then the absence or presence of relation to a knower4 ,in the case of the seen light1#fj reference to the velocity of light is quite adequate to account for its time and space differences from the star4 ,but viewed as a case of what is known 7on the supposition that perception is knowing71 reference to it only increases the contrast between the real object and the object known in perception4 ,for1 being just as much a part of the object that causes the perception as is the star itself1 it 7the velocity of light7 ought logically to be part of what is known in the perception1 while it is not4 ,since the velocity of light is a constituent element in the star1 it should be known in the perception2 since it is not so known1 reference to it only increases the discrepancy between the object of the perception--the seen light--and the real1 astronomical star4 ,the same is true of any physical condition that might be referred to3 ,the very things that1 from the standpoint of perception as a natural event1 are conditions that account for its happening are1 from the standpoint of perception as a case of knowledge1 part of the object which1 if knowledge is to be valid1 ought to be known1 but is not4 ,in this fact we have1 perhaps1 the ground of the idealist's disregard of the oft-proffered physical explanation of the difference between the perceptual event and the 7so-called7 real object4 ,and it is quite possible that some realists who read these lines will feel that in my last paragraphs ,i have been making a covert argument for idealism4 ,not so1 ,i repeat2 they are an argument for a truly nave realism4 ,the presentative realist1 in his appeal to common-sense and the plain man1 first sophisticates the umpire and then appeals4 ,he stops a good way short of a genuine navet4 ,the plain man1 for a surety1 does not regard noises heard1 lights seen1 etc41 as mental existences2 but neither does he regard them as things known4 ,that they are just things is good enough for him4 ,that they are in relation to mind1 or in relation to mind as their knower1 no more occurs to him than that they are mental4 ,by this ,i mean much more than that the formulae of epistemology are foreign to him2 ,i mean that his attitude to these things as things involves their not being in relation to him as a mind or a knower4 ,he is in the attitude of a liker or hater1 a doer or an appreciator4 ,when he takes the attitude of a knower he begins to inquire4 ,once depart from thorough navet1 and substitute for it the psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation to a mind of a causal object1 and the first step is taken on the road which ends in an idealistic system4 ,,iii ,for simplicity's sake1 ,i have written as if my main problem were to show how1 in the face of a supposed difficulty1 a strictly realistic theory of the perceptual event may be maintained4 ,but my interest is primarily in the facts1 and in the theory only because of the facts it formulates4 ,the significance of the facts of the case may1 perhaps1 be indicated by a consideration which has thus far been ignored4 ,in regarding a perception as a case of knowledge1 the presentative realist does more than shove into it a relation to mind which then1 naturally and inevitably1 becomes the explanation of any differences that exist between its subject-matter and some causal object with which it contrasts4 ,in many cases--very important cases1 too1 in the physical sciences--the contrasting real object becomes known by a logical process1 by inference--as the contemporary position of the star is determined by calculations from data1 not by perception4 ,this1 then1 is the situation of the presentative realist3 ,if perception is knowledge of its cause1 it stands in unfavorable contrast with another indirect mode of knowledge2 its object is less valid than the object of inference4 ,i do not adduce these considerations as showing that the case is hopeless for the presentative realist2#fa ,i am willing to concede he can find a satisfactory way out4 ,but the difficulty exists2 and in existing it calls emphatic attention to a case which is certainly and indisputably a case of knowledge--namely1 propositions arrived at through inference1 judgments as logical assertions4 ,with relation to the unquestionable case of knowledge1 the logical or inferential case1 perceptions occupy a unique status1 one which readily accounts for their being regarded as cases of knowledge1 although in themselves they are natural events4 7#a7 ,they are the sole ultimate data1 the sole media1 of inference to all natural objects and processes4 ,while we do not1 in any intelligible or verifiable sense1 know them1 we know all things that we do know with or by them4 ,they furnish the only ultimate evidence of the existence and nature of the objects which we infer1 and they are the sole ultimate checks and tests of the inferences4 ,the visible light is a necessary part of the evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence1 place1 and structure of the astronomical star1 and some other perception is the verifying check on the value of the inference4 ,because of this characteristic use of perceptions1 the perceptions themselves acquire1 by second intention1 a knowledge status4 ,they become objects of minute1 accurate1 and experimental scrutiny4 ,since the body of propositions that forms natural science hangs upon them1 for scientific purposes their nature as evidence1 as signs1 entirely overshadows their natural status1 that of being simply natural events4 ,the scientific man1 as scientific1 cares for perceptions not in themselves1 but as they throw light upon the nature of some object reached by evidence4 ,and since every such inference tries to terminate in a further perception 7as its test of validity71 the value of inferential knowing depends on perception4 7#b7 ,independently of science1 daily life uses perceptions as signs of other perceptions4 ,when a perception of a certain kind frequently recurs and is constantly used as evidence of some other impending perceptual event1 the function of habit 7a natural function1 be it noted1 not a psychical or epistemological function7 often brings it about that the perception loses its original quality in acquiring a sign-value4 ,language is1 of course1 the typical case4 ,noises1 in themselves mere natural events1 through habitual use as signs of other natural events become integrated with what they mean4 ,what they stand for is telescoped1 as it were1 into what they are4 ,this happens also with other natural events1 colors1 tastes1 etc4 ,thus1 for practical purposes1 many perceptual events are cases of knowledge2 that is1 they have been used as such so often that the habit of so using them is established or automatic4 ,in this brief reference to facts that are perfectly familiar1 ,i have tried to suggest three points of crucial importance for a nave realism3 first1 that inferential or evidential knowledge 7that involving logical relation7 is in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of knowledge2 second1 that this function1 although embodying the logical relation1 is itself a natural and specifically detectable process among natural things--it is not a non-natural or epistemological relation2 third1 that the use1 practical and scientific1 of perceptual events in the evidential or inferential function is such as to make them become objects of inquiry and limits of knowledge1 and to such a degree that this acquired characteristic quite overshadows1 in many cases1 their primary nature4 ,if we add to what has been said the fact that1 like every natural function1 the inferential function turns out better in some cases and worse in others1 we get a naturalistic or navely realistic conception of the problem of knowledge3 ,control of the conditions of inference--the only type of knowledge detectable in direct existence--so as to guide it toward better conclusions4 ,,iv ,i do not flatter myself that ,i will receive much gratitude from realists for attempting to rescue them from that error of fact which exposes their doctrine to an idealistic interpretation4 ,the superstition1 growing up in a false physics and physiology and perpetuated by psychology1 that sensations-perceptions are cases of knowledge1 is too ingrained4 ,but--crede experto--let them try the experiment of conceiving perceptions as pure natural events1 not as cases of awareness or apprehension1 and they will be surprised to see how little they miss--save the burden of carrying traditionary problems4 ,meantime1 while philosophic argument1 such as this1 will do little to change the state of belief regarding perceptions1 the development of biology and the refinement of physiology will1 in due season1 do the work4 ,in concluding my article1 ,i ought to refer1 in order to guard against misapprehension1 to a reply that the presentative realist might make to my objection4 ,he might say that while the seen light is a case of knowledge or presentative awareness1 it is not a case of knowledge of the star1 but simply of the seen light1 just as it is4 ,in this case the appeal to the physical explanations of the difference of the seen light from its objective source is quite legitimate4 ,at first sight1 such a position seems innocent and tenable4 ,even if innocent1 it would1 however1 be ungrounded1 since there is no evidence of the existence of a knower1 and of its relation to the seen light4 ,but further consideration will reveal that there is a most fundamental objection4 ,if the notion of perception as a case of adequate knowledge of its own object-matter be accepted1 the knowledge relation is absolutely ubiquitous2 it is an all-inclusive net4 ,the ego-centric predicament is inevitable4 ,this result of making perception a case of knowing will now occupy us4 ,,footnotes3 #eh ,i am indebted to ,dr4 ,bush's article on ,knowledge and ,perception1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,vi1 p4 #cic1 and to ,professor ,woodbridge's article on ,perception and ,epistemology in the ,james ,memorial ,volume1 as well as to his paper on ,sensations1 read at the #aiaj meeting of the ,american ,philosophical ,association4 ,since my point of departure and aim are somewhat different1 ,i make this general acknowledgment in lieu of more specific references4 #ei ,plato's use of shadows1 of reflections in the water1 and other images or imitations to prove the presence in nature of non-being was1 considering the state of physical science in his day1 a much more sensible conclusion than the modern use of certain images as proof that the object in perception is a psychical content4 ,hobbes expressly treats all images as physical1 as on the same plane as reflections in the water and echoes2 the comparison is his4 #fj ,it is impossible1 in this brief treatment1 to forestall every misapprehension and objection4 ,yet to many the use of the term seen will appear to be an admission that a case of knowledge is involved4 ,but is smelling a case of knowledge8 ,or 7if the superstition persists as to smell7 is gnawing or poking a case of knowledge8 ,my point1 of course1 is that seen involves a relation to organic activity1 not to a knower1 or mind4 #fa ,this is the phase of the matter1 of course1 which the rationalistic or objective realist1 the realist of the type of ,t4 ,h4 ,green1 emphasizes4 ,put in terms of systems1 the difficulty is that in escaping the subjectivism latent in treating perception as a case of knowledge1 the realist runs into the waiting arms of the objective idealist4 ,x ,,epistemological ,,realism3 ,,the ,,alleged ,,ubiquity ,,of ,,the ,,knowledge ,,relation ,i have pointed out that if perception be treated as a case of knowledge1 knowledge of every form and kind must be treated as a case of a presentation to a knower4 ,the alleged discipline of epistemology is then inevitable4 ,in common usage1 the term knowledge tends to be employed eulogistically2 its meaning approaches the connotation of the term science4 ,more loosely1 it is used1 of course1 to designate all beliefs and propositions that are held with assurance1 especially with the implication that the assurance is reasonable1 or grounded4 ,in its practical sense1 it is used as the equivalent of knowing how1 of skill or ability involving such acquaintance with things and persons as enables one to anticipate how they behave under certain conditions and to take steps accordingly4 ,such usages of the term are all differential2 they all involve definite contrasts--with ungrounded conviction1 or with doubt and mere guesswork1 or with the inexpertness that accompanies lack of familiarity4 ,in its epistemological use1 the term knowledge has a blanket value which is absolutely unknown in common life4 ,it covers any and every presentation of any and every thing to a knower1 to an awarer1 if ,i may coin a word for the sake of avoiding some of the pitfalls of the term consciousness4 ,and1 ,i repeat1 this indiscriminate use of the term knowledge1 so foreign to science and daily life1 is absolutely unavoidable if perception be regarded as1 in itself1 a mode of knowledge4 ,and then--and only then--the problem of the possibility1 nature1 and extent of knowledge in general is also inevitable4 ,i hope ,i shall not be regarded as offensively pragmatic if ,i suggest that this undesirable consequence is a good reason for not accepting the premise from which it follows1 unless that premise be absolutely forced upon us4 ,at all events1 upon the supposition of the ubiquity of the knowledge relation in respect to a self1 presentative realism is compelled to accept the genuineness of the epistemological problem1 and thus to convert itself into an epistemological realism1 getting one more step away from both nave and naturalistic realism4 ,the problem is especially acute for a presentative realism because idealism has made precisely this ubiquity of relationship its axiom1 its short-cut4 ,one sample is as good as a thousand4 ,says ,bain3 ,there is no possible knowledge of a world except in relation to our minds4 ,knowledge means a state of mind2 the notion of material things is a mental fact4 ,we are incapable even of discussing the existence of an independent material world2 the very act is a contradiction4 ,we can speak only of a world presented to our own minds4 ,on the supposition of the ubiquity of the relation1 realism and idealism exhaust the alternatives2 if the ubiquity of the relation is a myth1 both doctrines are unreal1 because there is no problem of which they are the solution4 ,my first step in indicating the unreality of both solutions is formal4 ,i shall try to show that if the knowledge relation of things to a self is the exhaustive and inclusive relation1 there is no intelligible point at issue between idealism and realism2 the differences between them are either verbal or else due to a failure on the part of one or the other to stick to their common premise4 ,i ,to my mind1 ,professor ,perry rendered philosophic discussion a real service when he coined the phrase ego-centric predicament4 ,the phrase designated something which1 whether or no it be real in itself1 is very real in current discussion1 and designating it rendered it more accessible to examination4 ,in terming the alleged uniform complicity of a knower a predicament1 it is intended1 ,i take it1 to suggest1 among other things1 that we have here a difficulty with which all schools of thought alike must reckon1 so that it is a difficulty that cannot be used as an argument in behalf of one school and against another4 ,if the relation be ubiquitous1 it affects alike every view1 every theory1 every object experienced2 it is no respecter of persons1 no respecter of doctrines4 ,since it cannot make any difference to any particular object1 to any particular logical assertion1 or to any particular theory1 it does not support an idealistic as against a realistic theory4 ,being a universal common denominator of all theories1 it cancels out of all of them alike4 ,it leaves the issue one of subject-matter1 to be decided on the basis of that subject-matter1 not on the basis of an unescapable attendant consideration that the subject-matter must be known in order to be discussed4 ,in short1 the moral is quite literally1 ,forget it1 or ,cut it out4 ,but the idealist may be imagined to reply somewhat as follows3 ,if the ubiquity were of any kind other than precisely the kind it is1 the advice to disregard it as a mere attendant circumstance of discussion would be relevant4 ,thus1 for example1 we disregard gravitation when we are considering a particular chemical reaction2 there is no ground for supposing that it affects a reaction in any way that modifies it as a chemical reaction4 ,and if the 'ego-centric' relation were cited when the point at issue is something about one group of facts in distinction from another group1 it ought certainly to be canceled from any statement about them4 ,but since the point at issue is precisely the most universally defining trait of existence as known1 the invitation deliberately to disregard the most universal trait is nothing more or less than an invitation to philosophic suicide4 ,if the idealist ,i have imagined as making the foregoing retort were up in recent realistic literature1 he might add the following argument ad hominem3 ,you1 my realistic opponent1 say that the doctrine of the external relation of terms expresses a ubiquitous mark of every genuine proposition or relational complex1 and that this ubiquity is a strong presumption in favor of realism4 ,why so uneven1 so partial1 in your attitude toward ubiquitous relations8 ,is it perchance that you were so uneasy at our possession of a ubiquitous relation that gives a short cut to idealism that you felt you must also have a short cut to realism8 ,if ,i terminate the controversy at this point1 it is not because ,i think the realist is unable to come back4 ,on the contrary1 ,i stop here because ,i believe 7for reasons that will come out shortly7 that both realist and idealist1 having the same primary assumption1 can come back at each other indefinitely4 ,consequently1 ,i wish to employ the existence of this tu quoque controversy to raise the question3 ,under what conditions is the relation of knower to known an intelligible question8 ,and ,i wish to show that it is not intelligible1 if the knowledge relation be ubiquitous and homogeneous4 ,the controversy back and forth is in fact a warning of each side by the other not to depart from their common premise4 ,if the idealist begins to argue 7as he constantly does7 as if the relation to mind or to consciousness made some difference of a specific sort1 like that between error and fact1 or between sound perception and hallucination1 he may be reminded that1 since this relation is uniform1 it substantiates and nullifies all things alike4 ,and the realist is quite within the common premise when he points out that every special fact must be admitted for what it is specifically known to be2 no idealistic doctrine can turn the edge of the fact that knowledge has evolved historically out of a state in which there was no mind1 or of the fact that knowledge is even now dependent on the brain1 provided that specific evidence shows these to be facts4 ,the realist1 on the other hand1 must admit that1 after all1 the entire body of known facts1 or of science1 including such facts as the above1 is held fast and tight in the net of relation to a mind or consciousness4 ,in specific cases this relation may be ignored1 but the exact ground for such an ignoring is precisely that the relation is not a specific fact1 but a uniform relation of facts4 ,and to call it an external relation makes no practical difference if it is universal and uniform4 ,so the idealist might reply4 ,imagine a situation like the following3 ,the sole relation an organism bears to things is that of eater2 the sole relation the environment bears to the organism is that of food1 that is1 things-to-eat4 ,this relation1 then1 is exhaustive4 ,it defines1 or identifies1 each term in relation to the other4 ,but this means that there are not1 as respects organism and environment1 two terms at all4 ,eater-of-food and food-being-eaten are two names for one and the same situation4 ,could there be imagined a greater absurdity than to set to work to discuss the relation of eater to food1 of organism to the environment1 or to argue as to whether one modifies the other or not8 ,given the premise1 the statements in such a discussion could have only a verbal difference from one another4 ,suppose1 however1 the discussion has somehow got under way4 ,sides have been taken2 the philosophical world is divided into two great camps1 foodists and eaterists4 ,the eaterists 7idealists7 contend that no object exists except in relation to eating2 hence that everything is constituted a thing by its relation to eating4 ,special sciences exist indeed which discuss the nature of various sorts of things in relation to one another1 and hence in legitimate abstraction from the fact that they are all foods4 ,but the discussion of their nature an sich depends upon eatology1 which deals primarily with the problem of the possibility1 nature1 and extent 7or limits7 of eating food in general1 and thereby determines what food in general1 berhaupt1 is and means4 ,nay1 replies the foodist 7realist74 ,since the eating relation is uniform1 it is negligible4 ,all propositions which have any intelligible meaning are about objects just as they are1 and in the relations they bear to one another4 ,foods pass in and out of the relation to eater with no change in their own traits4 ,moreover1 the position of the eaterists is self-contradictory4 ,how can a thing be eaten unless it is1 in and of itself1 a food8 ,to suppose that a food is constituted by eating is to presuppose that eating eats eating1 and so on in infinite regress4 ,in short1 to be an eater is to be an eater of food2 take away the independent existence of foods1 and you deny the existence and the possibility of an eater4 ,i respectfully submit that there is no terminus to such a discussion4 ,for either both sides are saying the same thing in different words1 or else both of them depart from their common premise1 and unwittingly smuggle in some relations between the organism and environment other than that of food-eater4 ,if to be an eater means that an organism which is more and other than an eater is doing something distinctive1 because contrasting with its other functions1 in eating then1 and then only1 is there an issue4 ,in this latter case1 the thing which is food may1 of course1 be proved to be something besides food1 because of some different relation to the organism than that of eating4 ,but if both stick consistently to their common premise1 we get the following trivial situation4 ,the idealist says3 ,every philosophy purports to be knowledge1 knowledge of objects2 all knowledge implies relation to mind2 therefore every object with which philosophy deals is object-in-relation-to-mind4 ,the realist says3 ,to be a mind is to be a knower2 to be a knower is to be a knower-of-objects4 ,without the objects to be known1 mind1 the knower1 is and means nothing4 ,the difficulties attending the discussion of epistemology are in no way attendant upon the special subject-matter of epistemology4 ,they are found wherever any reciprocal relation is taken to define1 exclusively and exhaustively1 all the connections between any pair of things4 ,if there are two things that stand solely as buyer and seller to each other1 or as husband and wife1 then that relation is unique1 and undefinable2 to discuss the relation of the relation to the terms of which it is the relation1 is an obvious absurdity2 to assert that the relation does not modify the seller1 the wife1 or the object known1 is to discuss the relation of the relation just as much as to assert the opposite4 ,the only reason1 ,i think1 why anyone has ever supposed the case of knower-known to differ from any case of an alleged exhaustive and exclusive correlation is that while the knower is only one--just knower--the objects known are obviously many1 and sustain many relations to one another which vary independently of their relation to the knower4 ,this is the undoubted fact at the bottom of epistemological realism4 ,but the idealist is entitled to reply that the objects in their variable relations to one another nevertheless fall within a relation to a knower1 as long as that relation is regarded by both as exhaustive or ubiquitous4 ,,ii ,nevertheless1 ,i do not conceive that the realistic assertion and the idealistic assertion in this dilemma stand on the same level1 or have the same value4 ,the fact that objects vary in relation to one another independently of their relation to the knower is a fact1 and a fact recognized by all schools4 ,the idealistic assertion rests simply upon the presupposition of the ubiquity of the knowledge relation1 and consequently has only an ad hominem force1 that is a force as against epistemological realists--against those who admit that the sole and exhaustive relation of the self or ego to objects is that of knower of them4#fb ,the relation of buyer and seller is a discussable relation2 for buyer does not exhaust one party and seller does not exhaust the other4 ,each is a man or a woman1 a consumer or a producer or a middleman1 a green-grocer or a dry-goods merchant1 a taxpayer or a voter1 and so on indefinitely4 ,nor is it true that such additional relations are borne merely to other things2 the buyer-sellers are more than and other than buyer-seller to each other4 ,they may be fellow-clubmen1 belong to opposite political parties1 dislike each other's looks1 and be second cousins4 ,hence the buyer-seller relation stands in intelligent connection and contrast with other relations1 so that it can be discriminated1 defined1 analyzed4 ,moreover1 there are specific differences in the buying-selling relation4 ,because it is not ubiquitous1 it is not homogeneous4 ,if wealthy and a householder1 the one who buys is a different buyer--i4e41 buys differently--than if poor and a boarder4 ,consequently1 the seller sells differently1 has more or less goods left to sell1 more or less income to expend on other things1 and so on indefinitely4 ,moreover1 in order to be a buyer the man has to have been other things2 i4e41 he is not a buyer per se1 but becomes a buyer because he is an eater1 wears clothes1 is married1 etc4 ,it is also quite clear that the organism is something else than an eater1 or something in relation to food alone4 ,i will not again call the roll of perfectly familiar facts2 ,i will lessen my appeal to the reader's patience by confining my reiteration to one point4 ,even in relation to the things that are food1 the organism is something more than their eater4 ,he is their acquirer1 their pursuer1 their cultivator1 their beholder1 taster1 etc42 he becomes their eater only because he is so many other things1 and his becoming an eater is a natural episode in the natural unfolding of these other things4 ,precisely the same sort of assertions may be made about the knower-known relation4 ,if the one who is knower is something else and more than the knower of objects1 and if objects are1 in relation to the one who knows them1 something else and other than things in a knowledge relation1 there is somewhat to define and discuss2 otherwise we are raising1 as we have already seen1 the quite foolish question as to what is the relation of a relation to itself1 or the equally foolish question of whether being a thing modifies the thing that it is4 ,and1 moreover1 epistemological realism and idealism both say the same thing3 realism that a thing does not modify itself1 idealism that1 since the thing is what it is1 it stands in the relation that it does stand in4 ,there are many facts which1 prima facie1 support the claim that knowing is a connection of things which depends upon other and more primary connections between a self and things2 a connection which grows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates in their interests at specifiable crises4 ,i will not repeat what is so generally admitted and so little taken into account1 that knowing is1 biologically1 a differentiation of organic behavior1 but will cite some facts that are even more obvious and even more neglected4 #a4 ,if we take a case of perception1 we find upon analysis that1 so far as a self or organism is concerned in it at all1 the self is1 so to say1 inside of it rather than outside of it4 ,it would be much more correct to say that a self is contained in a perception than that a perception is presented to a self4 ,that is to say1 the organism is involved in the occurrence of the perception in the same sort of way that hydrogen is involved in the happening--producing--of water4 ,we might about as well talk of the production of a specimen of water as a presentation of water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too accustomed to talk about perceptions and the organism4 ,when we consider a perception as a case of apperception1 the same thing holds good4 ,habits enter into the constitution of the situation2 they are in and of it1 not1 so far as it is concerned1 something outside of it4 ,here1 if you please1 is a unique relation of self and things1 but it is unique not in being wholly incomparable to all natural relations among events1 but in the sense of being distinctive or just the relation that it is4 #b4 ,taking the many cases where the self may be said1 in an intelligible sense1 to lie outside a thing and hence to have dealings with it1 we find that they are extensively and primarily cases where the self is agent-patient1 doer1 sufferer1 and enjoyer4 ,this means1 of course1 that things1 the things that later come to be known1 are primarily not objects of awareness1 but causes of weal and woe1 things to get and things to avoid1 means and obstacles1 tools and results4 ,to a nave spectator1 the ordinary assumption that a thing is in experience only when it is an object of awareness 7or even only when a perception71 is nothing less than extraordinary4 ,the self experiences whatever it undergoes1 and there is no fact about life more assured or more tragic than that what we are aware of is determined by things that we are undergoing but of which we are not conscious and which we cannot be conscious of under the particular conditions4 #c4 ,so far as the question of the relation of the self to known objects is concerned1 knowing is but one special case of the agent-patient1 of the behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation4 ,it is1 however1 the case constantly increasing in relative importance4 ,the connections of the self with things by way of weal or woe are progressively found to depend upon the connections established in knowing things2 on the other hand1 the progress1 the advance1 of science is found to depend more and more upon the courage and patience of the agent in making the widening and buttressing of knowledge a business4 ,it is impossible to overstate the significance1 the reality1 of the relation of self as knower to things when it is thought of as a moral relation1 a deliberate and responsible undertaking of a self4 ,ultimately the modern insistence upon the self in reference to knowledge 7in contrast with the classic ,greek view7 will be found to reside precisely here4 ,my purpose in citing the foregoing facts is not to prove a positive point1 viz41 that there are many relations of self and things1 of which knowing is but one differentiated case4 ,it concerns something less obvious3 viz41 showing what is meant by saying that the problems at issue concern matters of fact1 and are not matters to be decided by assumption1 definition1 and deduction4 ,i mean also to suggest what kind of matters of fact would naturally be adduced as evidential in such a discussion4 ,negatively put1 my point is that the whole question of the relation of knower to known is radically misconceived in what passes as epistemology1 because of an underlying unexamined assumption1 an assumption which1 moreover1 when examined1 makes the controversy verbal or absurd4 ,positively put1 my point is that since1 prima facie1 plenty of connections other than the knower-known one exist between self and things1 there is a context in which the problem of their relation concerns matters of fact capable of empirical determination by matter-of-fact inquiry4 ,the point about a difference being made 7or rather making7 in things when known is precisely of this sort4 ,,iii ,that question is not1 save upon the assumption of the ubiquity of the knowledge relation1 the absurd question of whether knowledge makes any difference to things already known or to things as knowledge-objects1 as facts or truths4 ,until the epistemological realists have seriously considered the main propositions of the pragmatic realists1 viz41 that knowing is something that happens to things in the natural course of their career1 not the sudden introduction of a unique non-natural type of relation--that to a mind or consciousness--they are hardly in a position to discuss the second and derived pragmatic proposition that1 in this natural continuity1 things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable qualitative change4 ,i had occasion earlier to remark that if one identifies knowledge with situations involving the function of inference1 the problem of knowledge means the art of guiding this function most effectively4 ,that statement holds when we take knowledge as a relation of the things in the knowledge situation4 ,if we are once convinced of the artificiality of the notion that the knowledge relation is ubiquitous1 there will be an existential problem as to the self and knowledge2 but it will be a radically different problem from that discussed in epistemology4 ,the relation of knowing to existence will be recognized to form the subject-matter of no problem1 because involving an ungrounded and even absurd preconception4 ,but the problem of the relation of an existence in the way of knowing to other existences--or events--with which it forms a continuous process will then be seen to be a natural problem to be attacked by natural methods4 ,,footnote3 #fb ,professor ,perry says 7,the ,new ,realism1 p4 #aae73 ,professor ,dewey is mistaken in supposing that realism assumes 'the ubiquity of the knowledge-relation4' ,realism does not argue from the 'ego-centric predicament1' i4e41 from the bare presence of the knowledge-relation in all cases of knowledge4 ,if the text has not made my point clear1 it is probably too much to expect that a footnote will do so4 ,but ,i have not accused the realist of arguing from the ego-centric predicament4 ,i have said that if any realist holds that the sole and exclusive relation of the one who is knower to things is that of being their knower1 then the realist cannot escape the impact of the predicament4 ,but if the one who knows things also stands in other connections with them1 then it is possible to make an intelligible contrast between things as known and things as loved or hated or appreciated1 or seen or heard or whatever4 ,the argument1 it should be noted1 stands in connection with that of the last section as to whether hearing a sound and seeing a color are of themselves 7apart from the use made of them in inference7 cases of knowledge4 ,it is significant that ,perry holds 7,new ,realism1 p4 #aej7 that sensing is per se a case of knowing4 ,hence it must be in relation to a knower2 it must fall within the predicament1 for it makes the mind aware of a characteristic of the environment4 ,that it is used 7or may be used7 to make us aware of some characteristic of the environment1 ,i of course hold4 ,to say that it is an awareness by the mind of a characteristic of the environment is at once to involve a philosopher immediately in the discussion of whether red qualities1 or only certain vibrations1 are really characteristics of the environment4 ,then1 when the authority of physics is invoked in behalf of the latter proposition1 the epistemologist 7however realistic in his intention7 is forced to consider color as a misapprehension of the environment1 a case of error or illusion1 while the idealist triumphantly flourishes it as a case of the transformative or constitutive efficacy of mind in knowing4 ,but if the color is simply a natural event1 and if mind does not enter except when color is made the basis of inference to some characteristic of the environment1 then there is no predicament2 and there is no problem of error save as a false inference is made4 ,moreover1 since errors in inference are an undoubted fact1 the principle that entities are not to be multiplied beyond need gives a prima facie superiority to any theory which connects all error with inference till adequate evidence to the contrary is produced4 ,,xi ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,the ,,world ,,as ,a ,,logical ,,problem ,of the two parts of this paper the first is a study in formal analysis4 ,it attempts to show that there is no problem1 logically speaking1 of the existence of an external world4 ,its point is to show that the very attempt to state the problem involves a self-contradiction3 that the terms cannot be stated so as to generate a problem without assuming what is professedly brought into question4 ,the second part is a summary endeavor to state the actual question which has given rise to the unreal problem and the conditions which have led to its being misconstrued4 ,so far as subject-matter is concerned1 it supplements the first part2 but the argument of the first part in no way depends upon anything said in the second4 ,the latter may be false and its falsity have no implications for the first4 ,i ,there are many ways of stating the problem of the existence of an external world4 ,i shall make that of ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell the basis of my examinations1 as it is set forth in his recent book ,our ,knowledge of the ,external ,world as a ,field for ,scientific ,method in ,philosophy4 ,i do this both because his statement is one recently made in a book of commanding importance1 and because it seems to me to be a more careful statement than most of those in vogue4 ,if my point can be made out for his statement1 it will apply1 a fortiori1 to other statements4 ,even if there be those to whom this does not seem to be the case1 it will be admitted that my analysis must begin somewhere4 ,i cannot take the space to repeat the analysis in application to differing modes of statement with a view to showing that the method employed will yield like results in all cases4 ,but ,i take the liberty of throwing the burden upon the reader and asking him to show cause why it does not so apply4 ,after rejecting certain familiar formulations of the question because they employ the not easily definable notions of the self and independence1 ,mr4 ,russell makes the following formulation3 ,can we know that objects of sense 444 exist at times when we are not perceiving them8 7op4 cit41 p4 #ge74 ,or1 in another mode of statement3 ,can the existence of anything other than our own#fc hard data be inferred from the existence of those data8 7pp4 #gc and #hc74 ,i shall try to show that identification of the data of sense as the sort of term which will generate the problem involves an affirmative answer to the question--that it must have been answered in the affirmative before the question can be asked4 ,and this1 ,i take it1 is to say that it is not a question at all4 ,a point of departure may be found in the following passage3 ,i think it must be admitted as probable that the immediate objects of sense depend for their existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves1 and that1 for example1 the colored surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut our eyes 7p4 #fd74 ,i have not quoted the passage for the sake of gaining an easy victory by pointing out that this statement involves the existence of physiological conditions4 ,for ,mr4 ,russell himself affirms that fact4 ,as he points out1 such arguments assume precisely the common sense world of stable objects professedly put in doubt 7p4 #he74 ,my purpose is to ask what justification there is for calling immediate data objects of sense4 ,statements of this type always call color visual1 sound auditory1 and so on4 ,if it were merely a matter of making certain admissions for the sake of being able to play a certain game1 there would be no objection4 ,but if we are concerned with a matter of serious analysis1 one is bound to ask1 ,whence come these adjectives8 ,that color is visual in the sense of being an object of vision is certainly admitted in the common-sense world1 but this is the world we have left4 ,that color is visual is a proposition about color and it is a proposition which color itself does not utter4 ,visible or visual color is already a synthetic proposition1 not a term nor an analysis of a single term4 ,that color is seen1 or is visible1 ,i do not call in question2 but ,i insist that fact already assumes an answer to the question which ,mr4 ,russell has put4 ,it presupposes existence beyond the color itself4 ,to call the color a sensory object involves another assumption of the same kind but even more complex--involving1 that is1 even more existence beyond the color4 ,i see no reply to this statement except to urge that the terms visual and sensory as applied to the object are pieces of verbal supererogation having no force in the statement4 ,this supposititious answer brings the matter to a focus4 ,is it possible to institute even a preliminary disparaging contrast between immediate objects and a world external to them unless the term sensory has a definite effect upon the meaning assigned to immediate data or objects8 ,before taking up this question ,i shall1 however1 call attention to another implication of the passage quoted4 ,it appears to be implied that existence of color and being seen are equivalent terms4 ,at all events1 in similar arguments the identification is frequently made4 ,but by description all that is required for the existence of color is certain physiological conditions4 ,they may be present and color exist and yet not be seen4 ,things constantly act upon the optical apparatus in a way which fulfils the conditions of the existence of color without color being seen4 ,this statement does not involve any dubious psychology about an act of attention4 ,i only mean that the argument implies over and above the existence of color something called seeing or perceiving--noting is perhaps a convenient neutral term4 ,and this clearly involves an assumption of something beyond the existence of the datum--and this datum is by definition an external world4 ,without this assumption the term immediate could not be introduced4 ,is the object immediate or is it the object of an immediate noting8 ,if the latter1 then the hard datum already stands in connection with something beyond itself4 ,and this brings us to a further point4 ,the sense objects are repeatedly spoken of as known4 ,for example3 ,it is obvious that since the senses give knowledge of the latter kind believed on their own account1 without the support of any outside evidence the immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do not need to be proved by argument but are completely self-evident 7p4 #fh74 ,again1 they are spoken of as facts of sense#fd 7p4 #gj71 and as facts going along1 for knowledge1 with the laws of logic 7p4 #gb74 ,i do not know what belief or knowledge means here3 nor do ,i understand what is meant by a fact being evidence for itself4#fe ,but obviously ,mr4 ,russell knows1 and knows their application to the sense object4 ,and here is a further assumption of what1 by definition1 is a world external to the datum4 ,again1 we have assumed in getting a question stated just what is professedly called into question4 ,and the assumption is not made the less simple in that ,mr4 ,russell has defined belief as a case of a triadic relation1 and said that without the recognition of the three-term relation the difference between perception and belief is inexplicable 7p4 #ej74 ,we come to the question passed over4 ,can such terms as visual1 sensory1 be neglected without modifying the force of the question--that is1 without affecting the implications which give it the force of a problem8 ,can we know that objects of sense1 or very similar objects1 exist at times when we are not perceiving them8 ,secondly1 if this cannot be known1 can we know that other objects1 inferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them1 exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any other time 7p4 #ge78 ,i think a little reflection will make it clear that without the limitation of the term perceiving by the term sense no problem as to existence at other times can possibly arise4 ,for neither 7a7 reference to time nor 7b7 limitation to a particular time is given either in the fact of existence of color or of perceiving color4 ,mr4 ,russell1 for example1 makes allusion to a patch of color which is momentarily seen 7p4 #gf74 ,this is the sort of thing that may pass without challenge in the common-sense world1 but hardly in an analysis which professes to call that world in question4 ,mr4 ,russell makes the allusion in connection with discriminating between sensation as signifying the mental event of our being aware and the sensation as object of which we are aware--the sense object4 ,he can hardly be guilty1 then1 in the immediate context1 of proceeding to identify the momentariness of the event with the momentariness of the object4 ,there must be some grounds for assuming the temporal quality of the object--and that immediateness belongs to it in any other way than as an object of immediate seeing4 ,what are these grounds8 ,how is it1 moreover1 that even the act of being aware is describable as momentary8 ,i know of no way of so identifying it except by discovering that it is delimited in a time continuum4 ,and if this be the case1 it is surely superfluous to bother about inference to other times4 ,they are assumed in stating the question--which thus turns out again to be no question4 ,it may be only a trivial matter that ,mr4 ,russell speaks of that patch of color which is momentarily seen when we look at the table 7p4 #gf1 italics mine74 ,i would not attach undue importance to such phrases4 ,but the frequency with which they present themselves in discussions of this type suggests the question whether as matter of fact the patch of color is not determined by reference to an object--the table--and not vice versa4 ,as we shall see later1 there is good ground for thinking that ,mr4 ,russell is really engaged1 not in bringing into question the existence of an object beyond the datum1 but in redefining the nature of an object1 and that the reference to the patch of color as something more primitive than the table is really relevant to this reconstruction of traditional metaphysics4 ,in other words1 it is relevant to defining an object as a constant correlation of variations in qualities1 instead of defining it as a substance in which attributes inhere--or a subject of predicates4 a7 ,if anything is an eternal essence1 it is surely such a thing as color taken by itself1 as by definition it must be taken in the statement of the question by ,mr4 ,russell4 ,anything more simple1 timeless1 and absolute than a red can hardly be thought of4 ,one might question the eternal character of the received statement of1 say1 the law of gravitation on the ground that it is so complex that it may depend upon conditions not yet discovered and the discovery of which would involve an alteration in the statement4 ,if #b plus #b equal #d be taken as an isolated statement1 it might be conceived to depend upon hidden conditions and to be alterable with them4 ,but by conception we are dealing in the case of the colored surface with an ultimate1 simple datum4 ,it can have no implications beyond itself1 no concealed dependencies4 ,how then can its existence1 even if its perception be but momentary1 raise a question of other times at all8 b7 ,suppose a perceived blue surface to be replaced by a perceived red surface--and it will be conceded that the change1 or replacement1 is also perceived4 ,there is still no ground for a belief in the temporally limited duration of either the red or the blue surface4 ,anything that leads to this conclusion would lead to the conclusion that the number two ceases when we turn to think of an atom4 ,there is no way then of escaping the conclusion that the adjective sense in the term sense object is not taken innocently4 ,it is taken as qualifying 7for the purposes of statement of the problem7 the nature of the object4 ,aside from reference to the momentariness of the mental event--a reference which is expressly ruled out--there is no way of introducing delimited temporal existence into the object save by reference to one and the same object which is perceived at different times to have different qualities4 ,if the same object--however object be defined--is perceived to be of one color at one time and of another color at another time1 then as a matter of course the color-datum of either the earlier or later time is identified as of transitory duration4 ,but equally1 of course1 there is no question of inference to other times4 ,other times have already been used to describe1 define1 and delimit this 7brief7 time4 ,a moderate amount of unbiased reflection will1 ,i am confident1 convince anyone that apart from a reference to the same existence perduring through different times while changing in some respect1 no temporal delimitation of the existence of such a thing as sound or color can be made4 ,even ,plato never doubted the eternal nature of red2 he only argued from the fact that a thing is red at one time and blue at another to the unstable1 and hence phenomenal1 character of the thing4 ,or1 put in a different way1 we can know that a red is a momentary or transitory existence only if we know of other things which determine its beginning and cessation4 ,mr4 ,russell gives a specific illustration of what he takes to be the correct way of stating the question in an account of what1 in the common-sense universe of discourse1 would be termed walking around a table4 ,if we exclude considerations to which we have 7apart from assuming just the things which are doubtful7 no right1 the datum turns out to be something to be stated as follows3 ,what is really known#ff is a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations 7p4 #gg74 ,by sensations must be meant sensible objects1 not mental events4 ,this statement repeats the point already dealt with3 muscular1 visual1 and other bodily are all terms which are indispensable and which also assume the very thing professedly brought into question3 the external world as that was defined4 ,really known assumes both noting and belief1 with whatever complex implications they may involve--implications which1 for all that appears to the contrary1 may be indefinitely complex1 and which1 by ,mr4 ,russell's own statement1 involve relationship to at least two other terms besides the datum4 ,but in addition there appears the new term correlation4 ,i cannot avoid the conclusion that this term involves an explicit acknowledgment of the external world4 ,note1 in the first place1 that the correlation in question is not simple3 it is threefold1 being a correlation of correlations4 ,the changes in visual sensations 7objects7 must be correlated in a temporal continuum2 the muscular and other bodily sensations 7objects7 must also constitute a connected series4 ,one set of changes belongs to the serial class visual2 the other set to the serial class muscular4 ,and these two classes sustain a point-to-point correspondence to each other--they are correlated4 ,i am not raising the old question of how such complex correlations can be said to be either given or known in sense1 though it is worth a passing notice that it was on account of this sort of phenomenon that ,kant postulated his threefold intellectual synthesis of apprehension1 reproduction1 and recognition in conception2 and that it is upon the basis of necessity for such correlations that the rationalists have always criticized sensationalist empiricism4 ,personally ,i agree that temporal and spatial qualities are quite as much given in experience as are particulars--in fact1 as ,i have been trying to show1 particulars can be identified as particulars only in a relational complex4 ,my point is rather 7i7 that any such given is already precisely what is meant by the world2 and 7ii7 that such a highly specified correlation as ,mr4 ,russell here sets forth is in no case a psychological1 or historical1 primitive1 but is a logical primitive arrived at by an analysis of an empirical complex4 7i7 ,the statement involves the assumption of two temporal spreads which1 moreover1 are determinately specified as to their constituent elements and as to their order4 ,and these sustain to each other a correlation1 element to element4 ,the elements1 moreover1 are all specifically qualitative and some of them1 at least1 are spatial4 ,how this differs from the external world of common-sense ,i am totally unable to see4 ,it may not be a very big external world1 but having begged a small external world1 ,i do not see why one should be too squeamish about extending it over the edges4 ,the reply1 ,i suppose1 is that this complex defined and ordered object is by conception the object of a single perception1 so that the question remains as to the possibility of inferring from it to something beyond4#fg ,but the reply only throws us back upon the point previously made4 ,a particular or single event of perceptual awareness can be determined as to its ingredients and structure only in a continuum of objects4 ,that is1 the series of changes in color and shape can be determined as just such and such an ordered series of specific elements1 with a determinate beginning and end1 only in respect to a temporal continuum of things anteceding and succeeding4 ,moreover1 the determination involves an analysis which disentangles qualities and shapes from contemporaneously given objects which are irrelevant4 ,in a word1 ,mr4 ,russell's object already extends beyond itself2 it already belongs to a larger world4 7ii7 ,a sensible object which can be described as a correlation of an ordered series of shapes and colors with an ordered series of muscular and other bodily objects presents a definition of an object1 not a psychological datum4 ,what is stated is the definition of an object1 of any object in the world4 ,barring ambiguities#fh in the terms muscular and bodily1 it seems to be an excellent definition4 ,but good definition or poor1 it states what a datum is known to be as an object in a known system2 viz41 definite correlations of specified and ordered elements4 ,as a definition1 it is general4 ,it is not made from the standpoint of any particular percipient4 ,it says3 ,if there be any percipient at a specified position in a space continuum1 then the object may be perceived as such and such4 ,and this implies that a percipient at any other position in the space continuum can deduce from the known system of correlations just what the series of shapes and colors will be from another position4 ,for1 as we have seen1 the correlation of the series of changes of shape assumes a spatial continuum2 hence one perspective projection may be correlated with that of any position in the continuum4 ,i have no direct concern with ,mr4 ,russell's solution of his problem4 ,but if the prior analysis is correct1 one may anticipate in advance that it will consist simply in making explicit the assumptions which have tacitly been made in stating the problem--subject to the conditions involved in failure to recognize that they have been made4 ,and ,i think an analytic reading of the solution will bear out the following statement4 ,his various peculiar1 private points of view and their perspectives are nothing but names for the positions and projectional perspectives of the ordinary space of the public worlds4 ,their correlation by likeness is nothing but the explicit recognition that they are all defined and located1 from the start1 in one common spatial continuum4 ,one quotation must suffice4 ,if two men are sitting in a room1 two somewhat similar worlds are perceived by them2 if a third man enters and sits between them1 a third world1 intermediate between the two others1 begins to be perceived 7pp4 #hg-hh74 ,pray what is this room and what defines the position 7standpoint and perspective7 of the two men and the standpoint intermediate between them8 ,if the room and all the positions and perspectives which they determine are only within1 say1 ,mr4 ,russell's private world1 that private world is interestingly complex1 but it gives only the original problem over again1 not a solution of it4 ,it is a long way from likenesses within a private world to likenesses between private worlds4 ,and if the worlds are all private1 pray who judges their likeness or unlikeness8 ,this sort of thing makes one conclude that ,mr4 ,russell's actual procedure is the reverse of his professed one4 ,he really starts with one room as a spatial continuum within which different positions and projections are determined1 and which are readily correlated with one another just because they are projections from positions within one and the same space-room4 ,having employed this1 he1 then1 can assign different positions to different percipients and institute a comparison between what each perceives and pass upon the extent of the likeness which exists between them4 ,what is the bearing of this account upon the empirical datum8 ,just this3 ,the correlation of correlative series of changes which defines the object of sense perception is in no sense an original historic or psychologic datum4 ,it signifies the result of an analysis of the usual crude empirical data1 and an analysis which is made possible only by a very complex knowledge of the world4 ,it marks not a primitive psychologic datum but an outcome1 a limit1 of analysis of a vast amount of empirical objects4 ,the definition of an object as a correlation of various subcorrelations of changes represents a great advance--so it seems to me--over the definition of an object as a number of adjectives stuck into a substantive2 but it represents an improved definition made possible by the advance of scientific knowledge about the common-sense world4 ,it is a definition not only wholly independent of the context in which ,mr4 ,russell arrives at it1 but is one which 7once more and finally7 assumes extensive and accurate knowledge of just the world professedly called into question4 ,,ii ,i have come to the point of transition to the other part of my paper4 ,a formal analysis is necessarily dialectical in character4 ,as an empiricist ,i share in the dissatisfaction which even the most correct dialectical discussion is likely to arouse when brought to bear on matters of fact4 ,i do not doubt that readers will feel that some fact of an important character in ,mr4 ,russell's statement has been left untouched by the previous analysis--even upon the supposition that the criticisms are just4 ,particularly will it be felt1 ,i think1 that psychology affords to his statement of the problem a support of fact not affected by any logical treatment4 ,for this reason ,i append a summary statement as to the facts which are misconstrued by any statement which makes the existence of the world problematic4 ,i do not believe a psychologist would go as far as to admit that a definite correlation of elements as specific and ordered as that of ,mr4 ,russell's statement is a primitive psychological datum4 ,many would doubtless hold that patches of colored extensity1 sounds1 kinaesthetic qualities1 etc41 are psychologically much more primitive than1 say1 a table1 to say nothing of a group of objects in space or a series of events in time2 they would say1 accordingly1 that there is a real problem as to how we infer or construct the latter on the basis of the former4 ,at the same time ,i do not believe that they would deny that their own knowledge of the existence and nature of the ultimate and irreducible qualities of sense is the product of a long1 careful1 and elaborate analysis to which the sciences of physiology1 anatomy1 and controlled processes of experimental observation have contributed4 ,the ordinary method of reconciling these two seemingly inconsistent positions is to assume that the original sensible data of experience1 as they occurred in infancy1 have been overlaid by all kinds of associations and inferential constructions so that it is now a work of intellectual art to recover them in their innocent purity4 ,now ,i might urge that as matter of fact the reconstruction of the experience of infancy is itself an inference from present experience of an objective world1 and hence cannot be employed to make a problem out of the knowledge of the existence of that world4 ,but such a retort involves just the dialectic excursus which ,i am here anxious to avoid4 ,i am on matter-of-fact ground when ,i point out that the assumption that even infancy begins with such highly discriminated particulars as those enumerated is not only highly dubious but has been challenged by eminent psychologists4 ,according to ,mr4 ,james1 for example1 the original datum is large but confused1 and specific sensible qualities represent the result of discriminations4 ,in this case1 the elementary data1 instead of being primitive empirical data1 are the last terms1 the limits1 of the discriminations we have been able to make4 ,that knowledge grows from a confusedly experienced external world to a world experienced as ordered and specified would then be the teaching of psychological science1 but at no point would the mind be confronted with the problem of inferring a world4 ,into the arguments in behalf of such a psychology of original experience ,i shall not go1 beyond pointing out the extreme improbability 7in view of what is known about instincts and about the nervous system7 that the starting-point is a quality corresponding to the functioning of a single sense organ1 much less of a single neuronic unit of a sense organ4 ,if one adds1 as a hypothesis1 that even the most rudimentary conscious experience contains within itself the element of suggestion or expectation1 it will be granted that the object of conscious experience even with an infant is homogeneous with the world of the adult4 ,one may be unwilling to concede the hypothesis4 ,but no one can deny that inference from one thing to another is itself an empirical event1 and that just as soon as such inference occurs1 even in the simplest form of anticipation and prevision1 a world exists like in kind to that of the adult4 ,i cannot think that it is a trivial coincidence that psychological analysis of sense perception came into existence along with that method of experimentally controlled observation which marks the beginning of modern science4 ,modern science did not begin with discovery of any new kind of inference4 ,it began with the recognition of the need of different data if inference is to proceed safely4 ,it was contended that starting with the ordinary--or customary--objects of perception hopelessly compromised in advance the work of inference and classification4 ,hence the demand for an experimental resolution of the common-sense objects in order to get data less ambiguous1 more minute1 and more extensive4 ,increasing knowledge of the structure of the nervous system fell in with increased knowledge of other objects to make possible a discrimination of specific qualities in all their diversity2 it brought to light that habits1 individual and social 7through influence on the formation of individual habits71 were large factors in determining the accepted or current system of objects4 ,it was brought to light1 in other words1 that factors of chance1 habit1 and other non-rational factors were greater influences than intellectual inquiry in determining what men currently believed about the world4 ,what psychological analysis contributed was1 then1 not primitive historic data out of which a world had somehow to be extracted1 but an analysis of the world which had been previously thought of and believed in1 into data making possible better inferences and beliefs about the world4 ,analysis of the influences customarily determining belief and inference was a powerful force in the movement to improve knowledge of the world4 ,this statement of matters of fact bears out1 it will be observed1 the conclusions of the dialectical analysis4 ,that brought out the fact that the ultimate and elementary data of sense perception are identified and described as limiting elements in a complex world4 ,what is now added is that such an identification of elements marks a significant addition to the resources of the technique of inquiry devoted to improving knowledge of the world4 ,when these data are isolated from their logical status and office1 they are inevitably treated as self-sufficient1 and they leave upon our hands the insoluble1 because self-contradictory1 problem of deriving from them the world of common-sense and science4 ,taken for what they really are1 they are elements detected in the world and serving to guide and check our inferences about it4 ,they are never self-inclosed particulars2 they are always--even as crudely given--connected with other things in experience4 ,but analysis gets them in the form where they are keys to much more significant relations4 ,in short1 the particulars of perception1 taken as complete and independent1 make nonsense4 ,taken as objects discriminated for the purposes of improving1 reorganizing1 and testing knowledge of the world they are invaluable assets4 ,the material fallacy lying behind the formal fallacy which the first part of this paper noted is the failure to recognize that what is doubtful is not the existence of the world but the validity of certain customary yet inferential beliefs about things in it4 ,it is not the common-sense world which is doubtful1 or which is inferential1 but common-sense as a complex of beliefs about specific things and relations in the world4 ,hence never in any actual procedure of inquiry do we throw the existence of the world into doubt1 nor can we do so without self-contradiction4 ,we doubt some received piece of knowledge about some specific thing of that world1 and then set to work1 as best we can1 to rectify it4 ,the contribution of psychological science to determining unambiguous data and eliminating the irrelevant influences of passion and habit which control the inferences of common-sense is an important aid in the technique of such rectifications4 ,,footnotes3 #fc ,i shall pass over the terms our own so far as specific reference is concerned1 but the method employed applies equally to them4 ,who are the we1 and what does own mean1 and how is ownership established8 #fd ,contrast the statement3 ,when ,i speak of a fact1 ,i do not mean one of the simple things of the world1 ,i mean that a certain thing has a certain quality1 or that certain things have a certain relation 7p4 #ea74 #fe ,in view of the assumption1 shared by ,mr4 ,russell1 that there is such a thing as non-inferential knowledge1 the conception that a thing offers evidence for itself needs analysis4 ,self-evidence is merely a convenient term for disguising the difference between the indubitably given and the believed in4 ,hypotheses1 for example1 are self-evident sometimes1 that is1 obviously present for just what they are1 but they are still hypotheses1 and to offer their self-evident character as evidence would expose one to ridicule4 ,meanings may be self-evident 7the ,cartesian clear and distinct7 and truth dubious4 #ff ,really known is an ambiguous term4 ,it may signify understood1 or it may signify known to be there or given4 ,either meaning implies reference beyond4 #fg ,the reply implies that the exhaustive1 all-at-once perception of the entire universe assumed by some idealistic writers does not involve any external world4 ,i do not make this remark for the sake of identifying myself with this school of thinkers1 but to suggest that the limited character of empirical data is what occasions inference4 ,but it is a fallacy to suppose that the nature of the limitations is psychologically given4 ,on the contrary1 they have to be determined by descriptive identifications which involve reference to the more extensive world4 ,hence no matter how self-evident the existence of the data may be1 it is never self-evident that they are rightly delimited with respect to the specific inference in process of making4 #fh ,the ambiguities reside in the possibility of treating the muscular and other bodily sensations as meaning something other than data of motion and corporealness--however these be defined4 ,muscular sensation may be an awareness of motion of the muscles1 but the phrase of the muscles does not alter the nature of motion as motion2 it only specifies what motion is involved4 ,and the long controversy about the existence of immediate muscular sensations testifies to what a complex cognitive determination we are here dealing with4 ,anatomical directions and long experimentation were required to answer the question4 ,were they psychologically primitive data no such questions could ever have arisen4 ,,xii ,,what ,,pragmatism ,,means ,,by ,,practical ,pragmatism1 according to ,mr4 ,james1 is a temper of mind1 an attitude2 it is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth2 and1 finally1 it is a theory about reality4 ,it is pragmatism as method which is emphasized1 ,i take it1 in the subtitle1 a new name for some old ways of thinking4#fi ,it is this aspect which ,i suppose to be uppermost in ,mr4 ,james's own mind2 one frequently gets the impression that he conceives the discussion of the other two points to be illustrative material1 more or less hypothetical1 of the method4 ,the briefest and at the same time the most comprehensive formula for the method is3 ,the attitude of looking away from first things1 principles1 'categories1' supposed necessities2 and of looking towards last things1 fruits1 consequences1 facts 7pp4 #ed-ee74 ,and as the attitude looked away from is the rationalistic1 perhaps the chief aim of the lectures is to exemplify some typical differences resulting from taking one outlook or the other4 ,but pragmatism is used in a still wider sense1 as meaning also a certain theory of truth 7p4 #ee72 it is a genetic theory of what is meant by truth 7p4 #fe74 ,truth means1 as a matter of course1 agreement1 correspondence1 of idea and fact 7p4 #aih71 but what do agreement1 correspondence1 mean8 ,with rationalism they mean a static1 inert relation1 which is so ultimate that of it nothing more can be said4 ,with pragmatism they signify the guiding or leading power of ideas by which we dip into the particulars of experience again1 and if by its aid we set up the arrangements and connections among experienced objects which the idea intends1 the idea is verified2 it corresponds with the things it means to square with 7pp4 #bje-f74 ,the idea is true which works in leading us to what it purports 7p4 #hj74gj ,or1 any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of experience to any other part1 linking things satisfactorily1 working securely1 simplifying1 saving labor1 is true for just so much1 true in so far forth 7p4 #eh74 ,this notion presupposes that ideas are essentially intentions 7plans and methods71 and that what they1 as ideas1 ultimately intend is prospective--certain changes in prior existing things4 ,this contrasts again with rationalism1 with its copy theory1 where ideas1 as ideas1 are ineffective and impotent1 since they mean only to mirror a reality 7p4 #fi7 complete without them4 ,thus we are led to the third aspect of pragmatism4 ,the alternative between rationalism and pragmatism concerns the structure of the universe itself 7p4 #beh74 ,the essential contrast is that reality 444 for pragmatism is still in the making 7p4 #beg74 ,and in a recent number of the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1#ga he says3 ,i was primarily concerned in my lectures with contrasting the belief that the world is still in the process of making with the belief that there is an eternal edition of it ready-made and complete4 ,i ,it will be following ,mr4 ,james's example1 ,i think1 if we here regard pragmatism as primarily a method1 and treat the account of ideas and their truth and of reality somewhat incidentally so far as the discussion of them serves to exemplify or enforce the method4 ,regarding the attitude of orientation which looks to outcomes and consequences1 one readily sees that it has1 as ,mr4 ,james points out1 points of contact with historic empiricism1 nominalism1 and utilitarianism4 ,it insists that general notions shall cash in as particular objects and qualities in experience2 that principles are ultimately subsumed under facts1 rather than the reverse2 that the empirical consequence rather than the a priori basis is the sanctioning and warranting factor4 ,but all of these ideas are colored and transformed by the dominant influence of experimental science3 the method of treating conceptions1 theories1 etc41 as working hypotheses1 as directors for certain experiments and experimental observations4 ,pragmatism as attitude represents what ,mr4 ,peirce has happily termed the laboratory habit of mind extended into every area where inquiry may fruitfully be carried on4 ,a scientist would1 ,i think1 wonder not so much at the method as at the lateness of philosophy's conversion to what has made science what it is4 ,nevertheless it is impossible to forecast the intellectual change that would proceed from carrying the method sincerely and unreservedly into all fields of inquiry4 ,leaving philosophy out of account1 what a change would be wrought in the historical and social sciences--in the conceptions of politics and law and political economy6 ,mr4 ,james does not claim too much when he says3 ,the center of gravity of philosophy must alter its place4 ,the earth of things1 long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether1 must resume its rights4444 ,it will be an alteration in the 'seat of authority' that reminds one almost of the ,protestant ,reformation 7p4 #abc74 ,i can imagine that many would not accept this method in philosophy for very diverse reasons1 perhaps among the most potent of which is lack of faith in the power of the elements and processes of experience and life to guarantee their own security and prosperity2 because1 that is1 of the feeling that the world of experience is so unstable1 mistaken1 and fragmentary that it must have an absolutely permanent1 true1 and complete ground4 ,i cannot imagine1 however1 that so much uncertainty and controversy as actually exists should arise about the content and import of the doctrine on the basis of the general formula4 ,it is when the method is applied to special points that questions arise4 ,mr4 ,james reminds us in his preface that the pragmatic movement has found expression from so many points of view1 that much unconcerted statement has resulted4 ,and speaking of his lectures he goes on to say3 ,i have sought to unify the picture as it presents itself to my own eyes1 dealing in broad strokes4 ,the different points of view here spoken of have concerned themselves with viewing pragmatically a number of different things4 ,and it is1 ,i think1 ,mr4 ,james's effort to combine them1 as they stand1 which occasions misunderstanding among ,mr4 ,james's readers4 ,mr4 ,james himself applied it1 for example1 in #ahih to philosophic controversies to indicate what they mean in terms of practical issues at stake4 ,before that1 ,mr4 ,peirce himself 7in #ahgh7 had applied the method to the proper way of conceiving and defining objects4 ,then it has been applied to ideas in order to find out what they mean in terms of what they intend1 and what and how they must intend in order to be true4 ,again1 it has been applied to beliefs1 to what men actually accept1 hold to1 and affirm4 ,indeed1 it lies in the nature of pragmatism that it should be applied as widely as possible2 and to things as diverse as controversies1 beliefs1 truths1 ideas1 and objects4 ,but yet the situations and problems are diverse2 so much so that1 while the meaning of each may be told on the basis of last things1 fruits1 consequences1 facts1 it is quite certain that the specific last things and facts will be very different in the diverse cases1 and that very different types of meaning will stand out4 ,meaning will itself mean something quite different in the case of objects from what it will mean in the case of ideas1 and for ideas something different from truths4 ,now the explanation to which ,i have been led of the unsatisfactory condition of contemporary pragmatic discussion is that in composing these different points of view into a single pictorial whole1 the distinct type of consequence and hence of meaning of practical appropriate to each has not been sufficiently emphasized4 #a4 ,when we consider separately the subjects to which the pragmatic method has been applied1 we find that ,mr4 ,james has provided the necessary formula for each--with his never-failing instinct for the concrete4 ,we take first the question of the significance of an object3 the meaning which should properly be contained in its conception or definition4 ,to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object1 then1 we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare 7pp4 #df-dg74 ,or1 more shortly1 as it is quoted from ,ostwald1 ,all realities influence our practice1 and that influence is their meaning for us 7p4 #dh74 ,here it will be noted that the start is from objects already empirically given or presented1 existentially vouched for1 and the question is as to their proper conception--,what is the proper meaning1 or idea1 of an object8 ,and the meaning is the effects these given objects produce4 ,one might doubt the correctness of this theory1 but ,i do not see how one could doubt its import1 or could accuse it of subjectivism or idealism1 since the object with its power to produce effects is assumed4 ,meaning is expressly distinguished from objects1 not confused with them 7as in idealism71 and is said to consist in the practical reactions objects exact of us or impose upon us4 ,when1 then1 it is a question of an object1 meaning signifies its conceptual content or connotation1 and practical means the future responses which an object requires of us or commits us to4 #b4 ,but we may also start from a given idea1 and ask what the idea means4 ,pragmatism will1 of course1 look to future consequences1 but they will clearly be of a different sort when we start from an idea as idea1 than when we start from an object4 ,for what an idea as idea means1 is precisely that an object is not given4 ,the pragmatic procedure here is to set the idea at work within the stream of experience4 ,it appears less as a solution than as a program for more work1 and particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed4 ,theories1 thus1 become instruments4444 ,we don't lie back on them1 we move forward1 and1 on occasion1 make nature over again by their aid 7p4 #ec74 ,in other words1 an idea is a draft drawn upon existing things1 and intention to act so as to arrange them in a certain way4 ,from which it follows that if the draft is honored1 if existences1 following upon the actions1 rearrange or readjust themselves in the way the idea intends1 the idea is true4 ,when1 then1 it is a question of an idea1 it is the idea itself which is practical 7being an intent7 and its meaning resides in the existences which1 as changed1 it intends4 ,while the meaning of an object is the changes it requires in our attitude1#gb the meaning of an idea is the changes it1 as our attitude1 effects in objects4 #c4 ,then we have another formula1 applicable not to objects nor ideas as objects and ideas1 but to truths--to things1 that is1 where the meaning of the object and of the idea is assumed to be already ascertained4 ,it reads3 ,what difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true8 ,if no practical difference whatever can be traced1 then the alternatives mean practically the same thing1 and all dispute is idle 7p4 #de74 ,there can be no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact1 and in conduct consequent upon the fact1 imposed on somebody 7p4 #ej74gc ,now when we start with something which is already a truth 7or taken to be truth71 and ask for its meaning in terms of its consequences1 it is implied that the conception1 or conceptual significance1 is already clear1 and that the existences it refers to are already in hand4 ,meaning here1 then1 can be neither the connotative nor denotative reference of a term2 they are covered by the two prior formulae4 ,meaning here means value1 importance4 ,the practical factor is1 then1 the worth character of these consequences3 they are good or bad2 desirable or undesirable2 or merely nil1 indifferent1 in which latter case belief is idle1 the controversy a vain and conventional1 or verbal1 one4 ,the term meaning and the term practical taken in isolation1 and without explicit definition from their specific context and problem1 are triply ambiguous4 ,the meaning may be the conception or definition of an object2 it may be the denotative existential reference of an idea2 it may be actual value or importance4 ,so practical in the corresponding cases may mean the attitudes and conduct exacted of us by objects2 or the capacity and tendency of an idea to effect changes in prior existences2 or the desirable and undesirable quality of certain ends4 ,the general pragmatic attitude1 none the less1 is applied in all cases4 ,if the differing problems and the correlative diverse significations of the terms meaning and practical are borne in mind1 not all will be converted to pragmatism1 but the present uncertainty as to what pragmatism is1 anyway1 and the present constant complaints on both sides of misunderstanding will1 ,i think1 be minimized4 ,at all events1 ,i have reached the conclusion that what the pragmatic movement just now wants is a clear and consistent bearing in mind of these different problems and of what is meant by practical in each4 ,accordingly the rest of this paper is an endeavor to elucidate from the standpoint of pragmatic method the importance of enforcing these distinctions4 ,,ii ,first1 as to the problems of philosophy when pragmatically approached1 ,mr4 ,james says3 ,the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me1 at definite instants of our life1 if this world-formula or that world-formula be true 7p4 #ej74 ,here the world-formula is assumed as already given2 it is there1 defined and constituted1 and the question is as to its import if believed4 ,but from the second standpoint1 that of idea as working hypothesis1 the chief function of philosophy is not to find out what difference ready-made formulae make1 if true1 but to arrive at and to clarify their meaning as programs of behavior for modifying the existent world4 ,from this standpoint1 the meaning of a world-formula is practical and moral1 not merely in the consequences which flow from accepting a certain conceptual content as true1 but as regards that content itself4 ,and thus at the very outset we are compelled to face this question3 ,does ,mr4 ,james employ the pragmatic method to discover the value in terms of consequences in life of some formula which has its logical content already fixed2 or does he employ it to criticize and revise and1 ultimately1 to constitute the meaning of that formula8 ,if it is the first1 there is danger that the pragmatic method will be employed only to vivify1 if not validate1 doctrines which in themselves are pieces of rationalistic metaphysics1 not inherently pragmatic4 ,if the last1 there is danger that some readers will think old notions are being confirmed1 when in truth they are being translated into new and inconsistent notions4 ,consider the case of design4 ,mr4 ,james begins with accepting a ready-made notion1 to which he then applies the pragmatic criterion4 ,the traditional notion is that of a seeing force that runs things4 ,this is rationalistically and retrospectively empty2 its being there makes no difference4 7,this seems to overlook the fact that the past world may be just what it is in virtue of the difference which a blind force or a seeing force has already made in it4 ,a pragmatist as well as a rationalist may reply that it makes no difference retrospectively only because we leave out the most important retrospective difference74 ,but returning with it into experience1 we gain a more confiding outlook on the future4 ,if not a blind force1 but a seeing force1 runs things1 we may reasonably expect better issues4 ,this vague confidence in the future is the sole pragmatic meaning at present discernible in the terms design and designer 7p4 #aae1 italics mine74 ,now is this meaning intended to replace the meaning of a seeing force which runs things8 ,or is it intended to superadd a pragmatic value and validation to that concept of a seeing force8 ,or does it mean that1 irrespective of the existence of any such object1 a belief in it has that value8 ,strict pragmatism would seem to require the first interpretation4 ,the same difficulties arise in the discussion of spiritualistic theism versus materialism4 ,compare the two following statements3 ,the notion of ,god 444 guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved 7p4 #ajf74 ,here1 then1 in these different emotional and practical appeals1 in these adjustments of our attitudes of hope and expectation1 and all the delicate consequences which their differences entail1 lie the real meanings of materialism and spiritualism 7p4 #ajg1 italics mine74 ,does the latter method of determining the meaning of1 say1 a spiritual ,god afford the substitute for the conception of him as a superhuman power effecting the eternal preservation of something2 does it1 that is1 define ,god1 supply the content for our notion of ,god8 ,or does it merely superadd a value to a meaning already fixed8 ,and1 if the latter1 does the object1 ,god as defined1 or the notion1 or the belief 7the acceptance of the notion7 effect these consequent values8 ,in either of the latter alternatives1 the good or valuable consequences cannot clarify the meaning or conception of ,god2 for1 by the argument1 they proceed from a prior definition of ,god4 ,they cannot prove1 or render more probable1 the existence of such a being1 for1 by the argument1 these desirable consequences depend upon accepting such an existence2 and not even pragmatism can prove an existence from desirable consequences which themselves exist only when and if that other existence is there4 ,on the other hand1 if the pragmatic method is not applied simply to tell the value of a belief or controversy1 but to fix the meaning of the terms involved in the belief1 resulting consequences would serve to constitute the entire meaning1 intellectual as well as practical1 of the terms2 and hence the pragmatic method would simply abolish the meaning of an antecedent power which will perpetuate eternally some existence4 ,for that consequence flows not from the belief or idea1 but from the existence1 the power4 ,it is not pragmatic at all4 ,accordingly1 when ,mr4 ,james says3 ,other than this practical significance1 the words ,god1 free will1 design1 have none4 ,yet dark though they be in themselves1 or intellectualistically taken1 when we bear them on to life's thicket with us1 the darkness then grows light about us 7p4 #aba1 italics mine71 what is meant8 ,is it meant that when we take the intellectualistic notion and employ it1 it gets value in the way of results1 and hence then has some value of its own2 or is it meant that the intellectual content itself must be determined in terms of the changes effected in the ordering of life's thicket8 ,an explicit declaration on this point would settle1 ,i think1 not merely a point interesting in itself1 but one essential to the determination of what is pragmatic method4 ,for myself1 ,i have no hesitation in saying that it seems unpragmatic for pragmatism to content itself with finding out the value of a conception whose own inherent significance pragmatism has not first determined2 a fact which entails that it be taken not as a truth but simply as a working hypothesis4 ,in the particular case in question1 moreover1 it is difficult to see how the pragmatic method could possibly be applied to a notion of eternal perpetuation1 which1 by its nature1 can never be empirically verified1 or cashed in any particular case4 ,this brings us to the question of truth4 ,the problem here is also ambiguous in advance of definition4 ,does the problem of what is truth refer to discovering the true meaning of something2 or to discovering what an idea has to effect1 and how1 in order to be true2 or to discovering what the value of truth is when it is an existent and accomplished fact8 7#a7 ,we may1 of course1 find the true meaning of a thing1 as distinct from its incorrect interpretation1 without thereby establishing the truth of the true meaning--as we may dispute about the true meaning of a passage in the classics concerning ,centaurs1 without the determination of its true sense establishing the truth of the notion that there are ,centaurs4 ,occasionally this true meaning seems to be what ,mr4 ,james has in mind1 as when1 after the passage upon design already quoted1 he goes on3 ,but if cosmic confidence is right1 not wrong1 better1 not worse1 that vague confidence in the future is a most important meaning4 ,that much at least of possible 'truth' the terms will then have in them 7p4 #aae74 ,truth here seems to mean that design has a genuine1 not merely conventional or verbal1 meaning3 that something is at stake4 ,and there are frequently points where truth seems to mean just meaning that is genuine as distinct from empty or verbal4 7#b7 ,but the problem of the meaning of truth may also refer to the meaning or value of truths that already exist as truths4 ,we have them2 they exist2 now what do they mean8 ,the answer is3 ,true ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini4 ,they lead to consistency1 stability1 and flowing human intercourse 7p4 #bae74 ,this1 referring to things already true1 ,i do not suppose the most case-hardened rationalist would question2 and even if he questions the pragmatic contention that these consequences define the meaning of truth1 he should see that here is not given an account of what it means for an idea to become true1 but only of what it means after it has become true1 truth as fait accompli4 ,it is the meaning of truth as fait accompli which is here defined4 ,bearing this in mind1 ,i do not know why a mild-tempered rationalist should object to the doctrine that truth is valuable not per se1 but because1 when given1 it leads to desirable consequences4 ,the true thought is useful here because the home which is its object is useful4 ,the practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us 7p4 #bjc74 ,and many besides confirmed pragmatists1 any utilitarian1 for example1 would be willing to say that our duty to pursue truth is conditioned upon its leading to objects which upon the whole are valuable4 ,the concrete benefits we gain are what we mean by calling the pursuit a duty 7p4 #bca1 compare p4 #gf74 7#c7 ,difficulties have arisen chiefly because ,mr4 ,james is charged with converting simply the foregoing proposition1 and arguing that since true ideas are good1 any idea if good in any way is true4 ,certainly transition from one of these conceptions to the other is facilitated by the fact that ideas are tested as to their validity by a certain goodness1 viz41 whether they are good for accomplishing what they intend1 for what they claim to be good for1 that is1 certain modifications in prior given existences4 ,in this case1 it is the idea which is practical1 since it is essentially an intent and plan of altering prior existences in a specific situation1 which is indicated to be unsatisfactory by the very fact that it needs or suggests a specific modification4 ,then arises the theory that ideas as ideas are always working hypotheses concerning the attaining of particular empirical results1 and are tentative programs 7or sketches of method7 for attaining them4 ,if we stick consistently to this notion of ideas1 only consequences which are actually produced by the working of the idea in co-operation with1 or application to1 prior existences are good consequences in the specific sense of good which is relevant to establishing the truth of an idea4 ,this is1 at times1 unequivocally recognized by ,mr4 ,james4 7,see1 for example1 the reference to veri-fication1 on p4 #bja2 the acceptance of the idea that verification means the advent of the object intended1 on p4 #bje47 ,but at other times any good which flows from acceptance of a belief is treated as if it were an evidence1 in so far1 of the truth of the idea4 ,this holds particularly when theological notions are under consideration4 ,light would be thrown upon how ,mr4 ,james conceives this matter by statements on such points as these3 ,if ideas terminate in good consequences1 but yet the goodness of the consequences was no part of the intention of an idea1 does the goodness have any verifying force8 ,if the goodness of consequences arises from the context of the idea in belief rather than from the idea itself1 does it have any verifying force8#gd ,if an idea leads to consequences which are good in the one respect only of fulfilling the intent of the idea 7as when one drinks a liquid to test the idea that it is a poison71 does the badness of the consequences in every other respect detract from the verifying force of consequences8 ,since ,mr4 ,james has referred to me as saying truth is what gives satisfaction 7p4 #bcd71 ,i may remark 7apart from the fact that ,i do not think ,i ever said that truth is what gives satisfaction7 that ,i have never identified any satisfaction with the truth of an idea1 save that satisfaction which arises when the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfil what it intends4 ,my final impression 7which ,i cannot adequately prove7 is that upon the whole ,mr4 ,james is most concerned to enforce1 as against rationalism1 two conclusions about the character of truths as faits accomplis3 namely1 that they are made1 not a priori1 or eternally in existence1#ge and that their value or importance is not static1 but dynamic and practical4 ,the special question of how truths are made is not particularly relevant to this anti-rationalistic crusade1 while it is the chief question of interest to many4 ,because of this conflict of problems1 what ,mr4 ,james says about the value of truth when accomplished is likely to be interpreted by some as a criterion of the truth of ideas2 while1 on the other hand1 ,mr4 ,james himself is likely to pass lightly from the consequences that determine the worth of a belief to those which decide the worth of an idea4 ,when ,mr4 ,james says the function of giving satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts is necessary in order to establish truth1 the doctrine is unambiguous4 ,the satisfactory character of consequences is itself measured and defined by the conditions which led up to it2 the inherently satisfactory quality of results is not taken as validating the antecedent intellectual operations4 ,but when he says 7not of his own position1 but of an opponent's#gf7 of the idea of an absolute1 so far as it affords such comfort it surely is not sterile1 it has that amount of value2 it performs a concrete function4 ,as a good pragmatist ,i myself ought to call the absolute true in so far forth then2 and ,i unhesitatingly now do so 7p4 #gc71 the doctrine seems to be as unambiguous in the other direction3 that any good1 consequent upon acceptance of a belief is1 in so far forth1#gg a warrant of truth4 ,in such passages as the following 7which are of the common type7 the two notions seem blended together3 ,ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience 7p4 #eh72 and1 again1 on the same page3 ,any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part1 linking things satisfactorily1 working securely1 simplifying1 saving labor1 is true for just so much 7italics mine74 ,an explicit statement as to whether the carrying function1 the linking of things1 is satisfactory and prosperous and hence true in so far as it executes the intent of an idea2 or whether the satisfaction and prosperity reside in the material consequences on their own account and in that aspect make the idea true1 would1 ,i am sure1 locate the point at issue and economize and fructify future discussion4 ,at present pragmatism is accepted by those whose own notions are thoroughly rationalistic in make-up as a means of refurbishing1 galvanizing1 and justifying those very notions4 ,it is rejected by non-rationalists 7empiricists and naturalistic idealists7 because it seems to them identified with the notion that pragmatism holds that the desirability of certain beliefs overrides the question of the meaning of the ideas involved in them and the existence of objects denoted by them4 ,others 7like myself71 who believe thoroughly in pragmatism as a method of orientation1 as defined by ,mr4 ,james1 and who would apply the method to the determination of the meaning of objects1 the intent and worth of ideas as ideas1 and to the human and moral value of beliefs1 when these various problems are carefully distinguished from one another1 do not know whether they are pragmatists in some other sense1 because they are not sure whether the practical1 in the sense of desirable facts which define the worth of a belief1 is confused with the practical as an attitude imposed by objects1 and with the practical as a power and function of ideas to effect changes in prior existences4 ,hence the importance of knowing which one of the three senses of practical is conveyed in any given passage4 ,it would do ,mr4 ,james an injustice1 however1 to stop here4 ,his real doctrine is that a belief is true when it satisfies both personal needs and the requirements of objective things4 ,speaking of pragmatism1 he says1 ,her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us1 what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands1 nothing being omitted 7p4 #hj1 italics mine74 ,and again1 ,that new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our double urgency 7p4 #fd74 ,it does not appear certain from the context that this double urgency is that of the personal and the objective demands1 respectively1 but it is probable 7see1 also1 p4 #bag1 where consistency with previous truth and novel fact is said to be always the most imperious claimant74 ,on this basis1 the in so far forth of the truth of the absolute because of the comfort it supplies1 means that one of the two conditions which need to be satisfied has been met1 so that if the idea of the absolute met the other one also1 it would be quite true4 ,i have no doubt this is ,mr4 ,james's meaning1 and it sufficiently safeguards him from the charge that pragmatism means that anything which is agreeable is true4 ,at the same time1 ,i do not think1 in logical strictness1 that satisfying one of two tests1 when satisfaction of both is required1 can be said to constitute a belief true even in so far forth4 ,,iii ,at all events this raises a question not touched so far3 the place of the personal in the determination of truth4 ,mr4 ,james1 for example1 emphasizes the doctrine suggested in the following words3 ,we say this theory solves it the problem more satisfactorily than that theory2 but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves1 and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently 7p4 #fa1 italics mine74 ,this opens out into a question which1 in its larger aspects--the place of the personal factor in the constitution of knowledge systems and of reality--,i cannot here enter upon1 save to say that a synthetic pragmatism such as ,mr4 ,james has ventured upon will take a very different form according as the point of view of what he calls the ,chicago ,school or that of humanism is taken as a basis for interpreting the nature of the personal4 ,according to the latter view1 the personal appears to be ultimate and unanalyzable1 the metaphysically real4 ,associations with idealism1 moreover1 give it an idealistic turn1 a translation1 in effect1 of monistic intellectualistic idealism into pluralistic1 voluntaristic idealism4 ,but1 according to the former1 the personal is not ultimate1 but is to be analyzed and defined1 biologically on its genetic side1 ethically on its prospective and functioning side4 ,there is1 however1 one phase of the teaching illustrated by the quotation which is directly relevant here4 ,because ,mr4 ,james recognizes that the personal element enters into judgments passed upon whether a problem has or has not been satisfactorily solved1 he is charged with extreme subjectivism1 with encouraging the element of personal preference to run rough-shod over all objective controls4 ,now the question raised in the quotation is primarily one of fact1 not of doctrine4 ,is or is not a personal factor found in truth evaluations8 ,if it is1 pragmatism is not responsible for introducing it4 ,if it is not1 it ought to be possible to refute pragmatism by appeal to empirical fact1 rather than by reviling it for subjectivism4 ,now it is an old story that philosophers1 in common with theologians and social theorists1 are as sure that personal habits and interests shape their opponents' doctrines as they are that their own beliefs are absolutely universal and objective in quality4 ,hence arises that dishonesty1 that insincerity characteristic of philosophic discussion4 ,as ,mr4 ,james says 7p4 #h71 ,the most potential of all our premises is never mentioned4 ,now the moment the complicity of the personal factor in our philosophic valuations is recognized1 is recognized fully1 frankly1 and generally1 that moment a new era in philosophy will begin4 ,we shall have to discover the personal factors that now influence us unconsciously1 and begin to accept a new and moral responsibility for them1 a responsibility for judging and testing them by their consequences4 ,so long as we ignore this factor1 its deeds will be largely evil1 not because it is evil1 but because1 flourishing in the dark1 it is without responsibility and without check4 ,the only way to control it is by recognizing it4 ,and while ,i would not prophesy of pragmatism's future1 ,i would say that this element which is now so generally condemned as intellectual dishonesty 7perhaps because of an uneasy1 instinctive recognition of the searching of hearts its acceptance would involve7 will in the future be accounted unto philosophy for righteousness' sake4 ,so much in general4 ,in particular cases1 it is possible that ,mr4 ,james's language occasionally leaves the impression that the fact of the inevitable involution of the personal factor in every belief gives some special sanction to some special belief4 ,mr4 ,james says that his essay on the right to believe was unluckily entitled the ,will to believe 7p4 #beh74 ,well1 even the term right is unfortunate1 if the personal or belief factor is inevitable--unfortunate because it seems to indicate a privilege which might be exercised in special cases1 in religion1 for example1 though not in science2 or1 because it suggests to some minds that the fact of the personal complicity involved in belief is a warrant for this or that special personal attitude1 instead of being a warning to locate and define it so as to accept responsibility for it4 ,if we mean by will not something deliberate and consciously intentional 7much less1 something insincere71 but an active personal participation1 then belief as will1 rather than either the right or the will to believe seems to phrase the matter correctly4 ,i have attempted to review not so much ,mr4 ,james's book as the present status of the pragmatic movement which is expressed in the book2 and ,i have selected only those points which seem to bear directly upon matters of contemporary controversy4 ,even as an account of this limited field1 the foregoing pages do an injustice to ,mr4 ,james1 save as it is recognized that his lectures were popular lectures1 as the title-page advises us4 ,we cannot expect in such lectures the kind of explicitness which would satisfy the professional and technical interests that have inspired this review4 ,moreover1 it is inevitable that the attempt to compose different points of view1 hitherto unco-ordinated1 into a single whole should give rise to problems foreign to any one factor of the synthesis1 left to itself4 ,the need and possibility of the discrimination of various elements in the pragmatic meaning of practical1 attempted in this review1 would hardly have been recognized by me were it not for by-products of perplexity and confusion which ,mr4 ,james's combination has effected4 ,mr4 ,james has given so many evidences of the sincerity of his intellectual aims1 that ,i trust to his pardon for the injustice which the character of my review may have done him1 in view of whatever service it may render in clarifying the problem to which he is devoted4 ,as for the book itself1 it is in any case beyond a critic's praise or blame4 ,it is more likely to take place as a philosophical classic than any other writing of our day4 ,a critic who should attempt to appraise it would probably give one more illustration of the sterility of criticism compared with the productiveness of creative genius4 ,even those who dislike pragmatism can hardly fail to find much of profit in the exhibition of ,mr4 ,james's instinct for concrete facts1 the breadth of his sympathies1 and his illuminating insights4 ,unreserved frankness1 lucid imagination1 varied contacts with life digested into summary and trenchant conclusions1 keen perceptions of human nature in the concrete1 a constant sense of the subordination of philosophy to life1 capacity to put things into an ,english which projects ideas as if bodily into space till they are solid things to walk around and survey from different sides--these things are not so common in philosophy that they may not smell sweet even by the name of pragmatism4 ,,footnotes3 #fi ,william ,james1 ,pragmatism4 ,a ,new ,name for ,some ,old ,ways of ,thinking4 7,popular ,lectures on ,philosophy47 ,new ,york3 ,longmans1 ,green1 ,co41 #aijg4 ,pp4 xiii#cji4 #gj ,certain aspects of the doctrine are here purposely omitted1 and will meet us later4 #ga ,vol4 ,,iv1 p4 #edg4 #gb ,only those who have already lost in the idealistic confusion of existence and meaning will take this to mean that the object is those changes in our reactions4 #gc ,i assume that the reader is sufficiently familiar with ,mr4 ,james's book not to be misled by the text into thinking that ,mr4 ,james himself discriminates as ,i have done these three types of problems from one another4 ,he does not2 but1 none the less1 the three formulae for the three situations are there4 #gd ,the idea of immortality1 or the traditional theistic idea of ,god1 for example1 may produce its good consequences1 not in virtue of the idea as idea1 but from the character of the person who entertains the belief2 or it may be the idea of the supreme value of ideal considerations1 rather than that of their temporal duration1 which works4 #ge ,eternal truth is one of the most ambiguous phrases that philosophers trip over4 ,it may mean eternally in existence2 or that a statement which is ever true is always true 7if it is true a fly is buzzing1 it is eternally true that just now a fly buzzed72 or it may mean that some truths1 in so far as wholly conceptual1 are irrelevant to any particular time determination1 since they are non-existential in import--e4g41 the truth of geometry dialectically taken--that is1 without asking whether any particular existence exemplifies them4 #gf ,such statements1 it ought in fairness to be said1 generally come when ,mr4 ,james is speaking of a doctrine which he does not himself believe1 and arise1 ,i think1 in that fairness and frankness of ,mr4 ,james1 so unusual in philosophers1 which cause him to lean over backward--unpragmatically1 it seems to me4 ,as to the claim of his own doctrine1 he consistently sticks to his statement3 ,pent in1 as the pragmatist1 more than any one1 sees himself to be1 between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him1 who1 so well as he1 feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations8 ,if anyone imagines that this law is lax1 let him keep its commandments one day1 says ,emerson 7p4 #bcc74 #gg ,of course1 ,mr4 ,james holds that this in so far goes a very small way4 ,see pp4 #gg-gi4 ,but even the slightest concession is1 ,i think1 non-pragmatic unless the satisfaction is relevant to the idea as intent4 ,now the satisfaction in question comes not from the idea as idea1 but from its acceptance as true4 ,can a satisfaction dependent on an assumption that an idea is already true be relevant to testing the truth of an idea8 ,and can an idea1 like that of the absolute1 which1 if true1 absolutely precludes any appeal to consequences as test of truth1 be confirmed by use of the pragmatic test without sheer self-contradiction8 ,in other words1 we have a confusion of the test of an idea as idea1 with that of the value of a belief as belief4 ,on the other hand1 it is quite possible that all ,mr4 ,james intends by truth here is true 7i4e41 genuine7 meaning at stake in the issue--true not as distinct from false1 but from meaningless or verbal4 ,,xiii ,,an ,,added ,,note ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,practical ,it is easier to start a legend than to prevent its continued circulation4 ,no misconception of the instrumental logic has been more persistent than the belief that it makes knowledge merely a means to a practical end1 or to the satisfaction of practical needs--practical being taking to signify some quite definite utilities of a material or bread-and-butter type4 ,habitual associations aroused by the word pragmatic have been stronger than the most explicit and emphatic statements which any pragmatist has been able to make4 ,but ,i again affirm that the term pragmatic means only the rule of referring all thinking1 all reflective considerations1 to consequences for final meaning and test4 ,nothing is said about the nature of the consequences2 they may be aesthetic1 or moral1 or political1 or religious in quality--anything you please4 ,all that the theory requires is that they be in some way consequences of thinking2 not1 indeed1 of it alone1 but of it acted upon in connection with other things4 ,this is no after-thought inserted to lessen the force of objections4 ,mr4 ,peirce explained that he took the term pragmatic from ,kant1 in order to denote empirical consequences4 ,when he refers to their practical character it is only to indicate a criterion by which to avoid purely verbal disputes4 ,different consequences are alleged to constitute rival meanings of a term4 ,is a difference more than merely one of formulation8 ,the way to get an answer is to ask whether1 if realized1 these consequences would exact of us different modes of behavior4 ,if they do not make such a difference in conduct the difference between them is conventional4 ,it is not that consequences are themselves practical1 but that practical consequences from them may at times be appealed to in order to decide the specific question of whether two proposed meanings differ save in words4 ,mr4 ,james says expressly that what is important is that the consequences should be specific1 not that they should be active4 ,when he said that general notions must cash in1 he meant of course that they must be translatable into verifiable specific things4 ,but the words cash in were enough for some of his critics1 who pride themselves upon a logical rigor unattainable by mere pragmatists4 ,in the logical version of pragmatism termed instrumentalism1 action or practice does indeed play a fundamental rle4 ,but it concerns not the nature of consequences but the nature of knowing4 ,to use a term which is now more fashionable 7and surely to some extent in consequence of pragmatism7 than it was earlier1 instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing4 ,it means that knowing is literally something which we do2 that analysis is ultimately physical and active2 that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints1 attitudes1 and methods of behaving toward facts1 and that active experimentation is essential to verification4 ,put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean any transcendent states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene1 but that the operations of knowing are 7or are artfully derived from7 natural responses of the organism1 which constitute knowing in virtue of the situation of doubt in which they arise and in virtue of the uses of inquiry1 reconstruction1 and control to which they are put4 ,there is no warrant in the doctrine for carrying over this practical quality into the consequences in which action culminates1 and by which it is tested and corrected4 ,a knowing as an act is instrumental to the resultant controlled and more significant situation2 this does not imply anything about the intrinsic or the instrumental character of the consequent situation4 ,that is whatever it may be in a given case4 ,there is nothing novel nor heterodox in the notion that thinking is instrumental4 ,the very word is redolent of an ,organum--whether novum or veterum4 ,the term instrumentality1 applied to thinking1 raises at once1 however1 the question of whether thinking as a tool falls within or without the subject-matter which it shapes into knowledge4 ,the answer of formal logic 7adopted moreover by ,kant and followed in some way by all neo-,kantian logics7 is unambiguous4 ,to call logic formal means precisely that mind or thought supplies forms foreign to the original subject-matter1 but yet required in order that it should have the appropriate form of knowledge4 ,in this regard it deviates from the ,aristotelian ,organon which it professes to follow4 ,for according to ,aristotle1 the processes of knowing--of teaching and learning--which lead up to knowledge are but the actualization through the potentialities of the human body of the same forms or natures which are previously actualized in ,nature through the potentialities of extra-organic bodies4 ,thinking which is not instrumental to truth1 which is merely formal in the modern sense1 would have been a monstrosity inconceivable to him4 ,but the discarding of the metaphysics of form and matter1 of cyclic actualizations and eternal species1 deprived the ,aristotelian thought of any place within the scheme of things1 and left it an activity with forms alien to subject-matter4 ,to conceive of thinking as instrumental to truth or knowledge1 and as a tool shaped out of the same subject-matter as that to which it is applied1 is but to return to the ,aristotelian tradition about logic4 ,that the practice of science has in the meantime substituted a logic of experimental discovery 7of which definition and classification are themselves but auxiliary tools7 for a logic of arrangement and exposition of what is already known1 necessitates1 however1 a very different sort of ,organon4 ,it makes necessary the conception that the object of knowledge is not something with which thinking sets out1 but something with which it ends3 something which the processes of inquiry and testing1 that constitute thinking1 themselves produce4 ,thus the object of knowledge is practical in the sense that it depends upon a specific kind of practice for its existence--for its existence as an object of knowledge4 ,how practical it may be in any other sense than this is quite another story4 ,the object of knowledge marks an achieved triumph1 a secured control--that holds by the very nature of knowledge4 ,what other uses it may have depends upon its own inherent character1 not upon anything in the nature of knowledge4 ,we do not know the origin and nature and the cure of malaria till we can both produce and eliminate malaria2 the value of either the production or the removal depends upon the character of malaria in relation to other things4 ,and so it is with mathematical knowledge1 or with knowledge of politics or art4 ,their respective objects are not known till they are made in course of the process of experimental thinking4 ,their usefulness when made is whatever1 from infinity to zero1 experience may subsequently determine it to be4 ,,xiv ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,judgments ,,of ,,practice ,,their ,,nature ,in introducing the discussion1 ,i shall first say a word to avoid possible misunderstandings4 ,it may be objected that such a term as practical judgment is misleading2 that the term practical judgment is a misnomer1 and a dangerous one1 since all judgments by their very nature are intellectual or theoretical4 ,consequently1 there is a danger that the term will lead us to treat as judgment and knowledge something which is not really knowledge at all and thus start us on the road which ends in mysticism or obscurantism4 ,all this is admitted4 ,i do not mean by practical judgment a type of judgment having a different organ and source from other judgments4 ,i mean simply a kind of judgment having a specific type of subject-matter4 ,propositions exist relating to agenda--to things to do or be done1 judgments of a situation demanding action4 ,there are1 for example1 propositions of the form3 ,m4 ,n4 should do thus and so2 it is better1 wiser1 more prudent1 right1 advisable1 opportune1 expedient1 etc41 to act thus and so4 ,and this is the type of judgment ,i denote practical4 ,it may also be objected that this type of subject-matter is not distinctive2 that there is no ground for marking it off from judgments of the form ,,sp1 or m,rn4 ,i am willing1 again1 to admit that such may turn out to be the fact4 ,but meanwhile the prima facie difference is worth considering1 if only for the sake of reaching a conclusion as to whether or no there is a kind of subject-matter so distinctive as to imply a distinctive logical form4 ,to assume in advance that the subject-matter of practical judgments must be reducible to the form ,,sp or m,rn is assuredly as gratuitous as the contrary assumption4 ,it begs one of the most important questions about the world which can be asked3 the nature of time4 ,moreover1 current discussion exhibits1 if not a complete void1 at least a decided lacuna as to propositions of this type4 ,mr4 ,russell has recently said that of the two parts of logic the first enumerates or inventories the different kinds or forms of propositions4#gh ,it is noticeable that he does not even mention this kind as a possible kind4 ,yet it is conceivable that this omission seriously compromises the discussion of other kinds4 ,additional specimens of practical judgments may be given3 ,he had better consult a physician2 it would not be advisable for you to invest in those bonds2 the ,united ,states should either modify its ,monroe ,doctrine or else make more efficient military preparations2 this is a good time to build a house2 if ,i do that ,i shall be doing wrong1 etc4 ,it is silly to dwell upon the practical importance of judgments of this sort1 but not wholly silly to say that their practical importance arouses suspicion as to the grounds of their neglect in discussion of logical forms in general4 ,regarding them1 we may say3 #a4 ,their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation4 ,this incompleteness is not psychical4 ,something is there1 but what is there does not constitute the entire objective situation4 ,as there1 it requires something else4 ,only after this something else has been supplied will the given coincide with the full subject-matter4 ,this consideration has an important bearing upon the conception of the indeterminate and contingent4 ,it is sometimes assumed 7both by adherents and by opponents7 that the validity of these notions entails that the given is itself indeterminate--which appears to be nonsense4 ,the logical implication is that of a subject-matter as yet unterminated1 unfinished1 or not wholly given4 ,the implication is of future things4 ,moreover1 the incompleteness is not personal4 ,i mean by this that the situation is not confined within the one making the judgment2 the practical judgment is neither exclusively nor primarily about one's self4 ,on the contrary1 it is a judgment about one's self only as it is a judgment about the situation in which one is included1 and in which a multitude of other factors external to self are included4 ,the contrary assumption is so constantly made about moral judgments that this statement must appear dogmatic4 ,but surely the prima facie case is that when ,i judge that ,i should not give money to the street beggar ,i am judging the nature of an objective situation1 and that the conclusion about myself is governed by the proposition about the situation in which ,i happen to be included4 ,the full1 complex proposition includes the beggar1 social conditions and consequences1 a charity organization society1 etc41 on exactly the same footing as it contains myself4 ,aside from the fact that it seems impossible to defend the objectivity of moral propositions on any other ground1 we may at least point to the fact that judgments of policy1 whether made about ourselves or some other agent1 are certainly judgments of a situation which is temporarily unfinished4 ,now is a good time for me to buy certain railway bonds is a judgment about myself only because it is primarily a judgment about hundreds of factors wholly external to myself4 ,if the genuine existence of such propositions be admitted1 the only question about moral judgments is whether or no they are cases of practical judgments as the latter have been defined--a question of utmost importance for moral theory1 but not of crucial import for our logical discussion4 #b4 ,their subject-matter implies that the proposition is itself a factor in the completion of the situation1 carrying it forward to its conclusion4 ,according as the judgment is that this or that should be done1 the situation will1 when completed1 have this or that subject-matter4 ,the proposition that it is well to do this is a proposition to treat the given in a certain way4 ,since the way is established by the proposition1 the proposition is a determining factor in the outcome4 ,as a proposition about the supplementation of the given1 it is a factor in the supplementation--and this not as an extraneous matter1 something subsequent to the proposition1 but in its own logical force4 ,here is found1 prima facie at least1 a marked distinction of the practical proposition from descriptive and narrative propositions1 from the familiar ,,sp propositions and from those of pure mathematics4 ,the latter imply that the proposition does not enter into the constitution of the subject-matter of the proposition4 ,there also is a distinction from another kind of contingent proposition1 namely1 that which has the form3 ,he has started for your house2 ,the house is still burning2 ,it will probably rain4 ,the unfinishedness of the given is implied in these propositions1 but it is not implied that the proposition is a factor in determining their completion4 #c4 ,the subject-matter implies that it makes a difference how the given is terminated3 that one outcome is better than another1 and that the proposition is to be a factor in securing 7as far as may be7 the better4 ,in other words1 there is something objectively at stake in the forming of the proposition4 ,a right or wrong descriptive judgment 7a judgment confined to the given1 whether temporal1 spatial1 or subsistent7 does not affect its subject-matter2 it does not help or hinder its development1 for by hypothesis it has no development4 ,but a practical proposition affects the subject-matter for better or worse1 for it is a judgment as to the condition 7the thing to be done7 of the existence of the complete subject-matter4#gi #d4 ,a practical proposition is binary4 ,it is a judgment that the given is to be treated in a specified way2 it is also a judgment that the given admits of such treatment1 that it admits of a specified objective termination4 ,it is a judgment1 at the same stroke1 of end--the result to be brought about--and of means4 ,ethical theories which disconnect the discussion of ends--as so many of them do--from determination of means1 thereby take discussion of ends out of the region of judgment4 ,if there be such ends1 they have no intellectual status4 ,to judge that ,i should see a physician implies that the given elements of the situation should be completed in a specific way and also that they afford the conditions which make the proposed completion practicable4 ,the proposition concerns both resources and obstacles--intellectual determination of elements lying in the way of1 say1 proper vigor1 and of elements which can be utilized to get around or surmount these obstacles4 ,the judgment regarding the need of a physician implies the existence of hindrances in the pursuit of the normal occupations of life1 but it equally implies the existence of positive factors which may be set in motion to surmount the hindrances and reinstate normal pursuits4 ,it is worth while to call attention to the reciprocal character of the practical judgment in its bearing upon the statement of means4 ,from the side of the end1 the reciprocal nature locates and condemns utopianism and romanticism3 what is sometimes called idealism4 ,from the side of means1 it locates and condemns materialism and predeterminism3 what is sometimes called mechanism4 ,by materialism ,i mean the conception that the given contains exhaustively the entire subject-matter of practical judgment3 that the facts in their givenness are all there is to it4 ,the given is undoubtedly just what it is2 it is determinate throughout4 ,but it is the given of something to be done4 ,the survey and inventory of present conditions 7of facts7 are not something complete in themselves2 they exist for the sake of an intelligent determination of what is to be done1 of what is required to complete the given4 ,to conceive the given in any such way1 then1 as to imply that it negates in its given character the possibility of any doing1 of any modification1 is self-contradictory4 ,as a part of a practical judgment1 the discovery that a man is suffering from an illness is not a discovery that he must suffer1 or that the subsequent course of events is determined by his illness2 it is the indication of a needed and a possible course by which to restore health4 ,even the discovery that the illness is hopeless falls within this principle4 ,it is an indication not to waste time and money on certain fruitless endeavors1 to prepare affairs with respect to death1 etc4 ,it is also an indication of search for conditions which will render in the future similar cases remediable1 not hopeless4 ,the whole case for the genuineness of practical judgments stands or falls with this principle4 ,it is open to question4 ,but decision as to its validity must rest upon empirical evidence4 ,it cannot be ruled out of court by a dialectic development of the implications of propositions about what is already given or what has already happened4 ,that is1 its invalidity cannot be deduced from an assertion that the character of the scientific judgment as a discovery and statement of what is forbids it1 much less from an analysis of mathematical propositions4 ,for this method only begs the question4 ,unless the facts are complicated by the surreptitious introduction of some preconception1 the prima facie empirical case is that the scientific judgment--the determinate diagnosis--favors instead of forbidding the doctrine of a possibility of change of the given4 ,to overthrow this presumption means1 ,i repeat1 to discover specific evidence which makes it impossible4 ,and in view of the immense body of empirical evidence showing that we add to control of what is given 7the subject-matter of scientific judgment7 by means of scientific judgment1 the likelihood of any such discovery seems slight4 ,these considerations throw light upon the proper meaning of 7practical7 idealism and of mechanism4 ,idealism in action does not seem to be anything except an explicit recognition of just the implications we have been considering4 ,it signifies a recognition that the given is given as obstacles to one course of active development or completion and as resources for another course by which development of the situation directly blocked may be indirectly secured4 ,it is not a blind instinct of hopefulness or that miscellaneous obscurantist emotionalism often called optimism1 any more than it is utopianism4 ,it is recognition of the increased liberation and redirection of the course of events achieved through accurate discovery4 ,or1 more specifically1 it is this recognition operating as a ruling motive in extending the work of discovery and utilizing its results4 ,mechanism means the reciprocal recognition on the side of means4 ,it is the recognition of the import within the practical judgment1 of the given1 of fact1 in its determinate character4 ,the facts in their isolation1 taken as complete in themselves1 are not mechanistic4 ,at most1 they just are1 and that is the end of them4 ,they are mechanistic as indicating the mechanism1 the means1 of accomplishing the possibilities which they indicate4 ,apart from a forward look 7the anticipation of the future movement of affairs7 mechanism is a meaningless conception4 ,there is no sense in applying the conception to a finished world1 to any scene which is simply and only done with4 ,propositions regarding a past world1 just as past 7not as furnishing the conditions of what is to be done71 might be complete and accurate1 but they would be of the nature of a complex catalogue4 ,to introduce1 in addition1 the conception of mechanism is to introduce the implication of possibilities of future accomplishment4#hj #e4 ,the judgment of what is to be done implies1 as we have just seen1 a statement of what the given facts of the situation are1 taken as indications of the course to pursue and of the means to be employed in its pursuit4 ,such a statement demands accuracy4 ,completeness is not so much an additional requirement as it is a condition of accuracy4 ,for accuracy depends fundamentally upon relevancy to the determination of what is to be done4 ,completeness does not mean exhaustiveness per se1 but adequacy as respects end and its means4 ,to include too much1 or what is irrelevant1 is a violation of the demand for accuracy quite as well as to leave out--to fail to discover--what is important4 ,clear recognition of this fact will enable one to avoid certain dialectic confusions4 ,it has been argued that a judgment of given existence1 or fact1 cannot be hypothetical2 that factuality and hypothetical character are contradictions in terms4 ,they would be if the two qualifications were used in the same respect4 ,but they are not4 ,the hypothesis is that the facts which constitute the terms of the proposition of the given are relevant and adequate for the purpose in hand--the determination of a possibility to be accomplished in action4 ,the data may be as factual1 as absolute as you please1 and yet in no way guarantee that they are the data of this particular judgment4 ,suppose the thing to be done is the formation of a prediction regarding the return of a comet4 ,the prime difficulty is not in making observations1 or in the mathematical calculations based upon them--difficult as these things may be4 ,it is making sure that we have taken as data the observations really implicated in the doing rightly of this particular thing3 that we have not left out something which is relevant1 or included something which has nothing to do with the further movement of the comet4 ,darwin's hypothesis of natural selection does not stand or fall with the correctness of his propositions regarding breeding of animals in domestication4 ,the facts of artificial selection may be as stated--in themselves there may be nothing hypothetical about them4 ,but their bearing upon the origin of species is a hypothesis4 ,logically1 any factual proposition is a hypothetical proposition when it is made the basis of any inference4 #f4 ,the bearing of this remark upon the nature of the truth of practical judgments 7including the judgment of what is given7 is obvious4 ,their truth or falsity is constituted by the issue4 ,the determination of end-means 7constituting the terms and relations of the practical proposition7 is hypothetical until the course of action indicated has been tried4 ,the event or issue of such action is the truth or falsity of the judgment4 ,this is an immediate conclusion from the fact that only the issue gives the complete subject-matter4 ,in this case1 at least1 verification and truth completely coincide--unless there is some serious error in the prior analysis4 ,this completes the account1 preliminary to a consideration of other matters4 ,but the account suggests another and independent question with respect to which ,i shall make an excursus4 ,how far is it possible and legitimate to extend or generalize the results reached to apply to all propositions of facts8 ,that is to say1 is it possible and legitimate to treat all scientific or descriptive statements of matters of fact as implying indirectly if not directly1 something to be done1 future possibilities to be realized in action8 ,the question as to legitimacy is too complicated to be discussed in an incidental way4 ,but it cannot be denied that there is a possibility of such application1 nor that the possibility is worth careful examination4 ,we may frame at least a hypothesis that all judgments of fact have reference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and to the discovery of means for their realization4 ,in the sense already explained all propositions which state discoveries or ascertainments1 all categorical propositions1 would be hypothetical1 and their truth would coincide with their tested consequences effected by intelligent action4 ,this theory may be called pragmatism4 ,but it is a type of pragmatism quite free from dependence upon a voluntaristic psychology4 ,it is not complicated by reference to emotional satisfactions or the play of desires4 ,i am not arguing the point4 ,but possibly critics of pragmatism would get a new light upon its meaning were they to set out with an analysis of ordinary practical judgments and then proceed to consider the bearing of its result upon judgments of facts and essences4 ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell has remarked#ha that pragmatism originated as a theory about the truth of theories1 but ignored the truths of fact upon which theories rest and by which they are tested4 ,i am not concerned to question this so far as the origin of pragmatism is concerned4 ,philosophy1 at least1 has been mainly a matter of theories2 and ,mr4 ,james was conscientious enough to be troubled about the way in which the meaning of such theories is to be settled and the way in which they are to be tested4 ,his pragmatism was in effect 7as ,mr4 ,russell recognizes7 a statement of the need of applying to philosophic theories the same kinds of test as are used in the theories of the inductive sciences4 ,but this does not preclude the application of a like method to dealing with so-called truths of fact4 ,facts may be facts1 and yet not be the facts of the inquiry in hand4 ,in all scientific inquiry1 however1 to call them facts or data or truths of fact signifies that they are taken as the relevant facts of the inference to be made4 ,if 7as this would seem to indicate7 they are then implicated however indirectly in a proposition about what is to be done1 they are themselves theoretical in logical quality4 ,accuracy of statement and correctness of reasoning would then be factors in truth1 but so also would be verification4 ,truth would be a triadic relation1 but of a different sort from that expounded by ,mr4 ,russell4 ,for accuracy and correctness would both be functions of verifiability4 ,,judgments ,,of ,,value ,i ,it is my purpose to apply the conclusions previously drawn as to the implications of practical judgment to the subject of judgments of value4 ,first1 ,i shall try to clear away some sources of misunderstanding4 ,unfortunately1 however1 there is a deep-seated ambiguity which makes it difficult to dismiss the matter of value summarily4 ,the experience of a good and the judgment that something is a value of a certain kind and amount have been almost inextricably confused4 ,the confusion has a long history4 ,it is found in mediaeval thought2 it is revived by ,descartes2 recent psychology has given it a new career4 ,the senses were regarded as modes of knowledge of greater or less adequacy1 and the feelings were regarded as modes of sense1 and hence as modes of cognitive apprehension4 ,descartes was interested in showing1 for scientific purposes1 that the senses are not organs of apprehending the qualities of bodies as such1 but only of apprehending their relation to the well-being of the sentient organism4 ,sensations of pleasure and pain1 along with those of hunger1 thirst1 etc41 most easily lent themselves to this treatment2 colors1 tones1 etc41 were them assimilated4 ,of them all he says3 ,these perceptions of sense have been placed within me by nature for the purpose of signifying what things are beneficial or harmful4#hb ,thus it was possible to identify the real properties of bodies with their geometrical ones1 without exposing himself to the conclusion that ,god 7or nature7 deceives us in the perception of color1 sound1 etc4 ,these perceptions are only intended to teach us what things to pursue and avoid1 and as such apprehensions they are adequate4 ,his identification of any and every experience of good with a judgment or cognitive apprehension is clear in the following words3 ,when we are given news the mind first judges of it and if it is good it rejoices4#hc ,this is a survival of the scholastic psychology of the vis aestimativa4 ,lotze's theory that the emotions1 as involving pleasure and pain1 are organs of value judgments1 or in more recent terminology1 that they are cognitive appreciations of worth 7corresponding to immediate apprehensions of sensory qualities7 presents the same tradition in a new terminology4 ,as against all this1 the present paper takes its stand with the position stated by ,hume1 in the following words3 ,a passion is an original existence1 or1 if you will1 modification of existence2 and contains not any representative quality1 which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification4 ,when ,i am angry ,i am actually possest with the passion1 and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object1 than when ,i am thirsty1 or sick1 or more than five feet high4#hd ,in so doing1 ,i may seem to some to be begging the question at issue4 ,but such is surely the prima facie fact of the matter4 ,only a prior dogma to the effect that every conscious experience is1 ipso facto1 a form of cognition leads to any obscuration of the fact1 and the burden of proof is upon those who uphold the dogma4#he ,a further word upon appreciation seems specially called for in view of the currency of the doctrine that appreciation is a peculiar kind of knowledge1 or cognitive revelation of reality3 peculiar in having a distinct type of reality for its object and in having for its organ a peculiar mental condition differing from the intelligence of everyday knowledge and of science4 ,actually1 there do not seem to be any grounds for regarding appreciation as anything but an intentionally enhanced or intensified experience of an object4 ,its opposite is not descriptive or explanatory knowledge1 but depreciation--a degraded realization of an object4 ,a man may climb a mountain to get a better realization of a landscape2 he may travel to ,greece to get a realization of the ,parthenon more full than that which he has had from pictures4 ,intelligence1 knowledge1 may be involved in the steps taken to get the enhanced experience1 but that does not make the landscape or the ,parthenon as fully savored a cognitive object4 ,so the fulness of a musical experience may depend upon prior critical analysis1 but that does not necessarily make the hearing of music a kind of non-analytic cognitive act4 ,either appreciation means just an intensified experience1 or it means a kind of criticism1 and then it falls within the sphere of ordinary judgment1 differing in being applied to a work of art instead of to some other subject-matter4 ,the same mode of analysis may be applied to the older but cognate term intuition4 ,the terms acquaintance and familiarity and recognition 7acknowledgment7 are full of like pitfalls of ambiguity4 ,in contemporary discussion of value-judgments1 however1 appreciation is a peculiarly treacherous term4 ,it is first asserted 7or assumed7 that all experiences of good are modes of knowing3 that good is a term of a proposition4 ,then when experience forces home the immense difference between evaluation as a critical process 7a process of inquiry for the determination of a good precisely similar to that which is undertaken in science in the determination of the nature of an event7 and ordinary experience of good and evil1 appeal is made to the difference between direct apprehension and indirect or inferential knowledge1 and appreciation is called in to play the convenient rle of an immediate cognitive apprehension4 ,thus a second error is used to cover up and protect a primary one4 ,to savor a thing fully--as ,arnold ,bennett's heroines are wont to do--is no more a knowing than is the chance savoring which arises when things smelled are found good1 or than is being angry or thirsty or more than five feet high4 ,all the language which we can employ is charged with a force acquired through reflection4 ,even when ,i speak of a direct experience of a good or bad1 one is only too likely to read in traits characterizing a thing which is found in consequence of thinking1 to be good2 one has to use language simply to stimulate a recourse to a direct experiencing in which language is not depended upon4 ,if one is willing to make such an imaginative excursion--no one can be compelled--he will note that finding a thing good apart from reflective judgment means simply treating the thing in a certain way1 hanging on to it1 dwelling upon it1 welcoming it and acting to perpetuate its presence1 taking delight in it4 ,it is a way of behaving toward it1 a mode of organic reaction4 ,a psychologist may1 indeed1 bring in the emotions1 but if his contribution is relevant it will be because the emotions which figure in his account are just part of the primary organic reaction to the object4 ,in contrary fashion1 to find a thing bad 7in a direct experience as distinct from the result of a reflective examination7 is to be moved to reject it1 to try to get away from it1 to destroy or at least to displace it4 ,it connotes not an act of apprehension but an act of repugning1 of repelling4 ,to term the thing good or evil is to state the fact 7noted in recollection7 that it was actually involved in a situation of organic acceptance or rejection1 with whatever qualities specifically characterize the act4 ,all this is said because ,i am convinced that contemporary discussion of values and valuation suffers from confusion of the two radically different attitudes--that of direct1 active1 non-cognitive experience of goods and bads and that of valuation1 the latter being simply a mode of judgment like any other form of judgment1 differing in that its subject-matter happens to be a good or a bad instead of a horse or planet or curve4 ,but unfortunately for discussions1 to value means two radically different things3 to prize and appraise2 to esteem and to estimate3 to find good in the sense described above1 and to judge it to be good1 to know it as good4 ,i call them radically different because to prize names a practical1 non-intellectual attitude1 and to appraise names a judgment4 ,that men love and hold things dear1 that they cherish and care for some things1 and neglect and contemn other things1 is an undoubted fact4 ,to call these things values is just to repeat that they are loved and cherished2 it is not to give a reason for their being loved and cherished4 ,to call them values and then import into them the traits of objects of valuation2 or to import into values1 meaning valuated objects1 the traits which things possess as held dear1 is to confuse the theory of judgments of value past all remedy4 ,and before coming to the more technical discussion1 the currency of the confusion and the bad result consequences may justify dwelling upon the matter4 ,the distinction may be compared to that between eating something and investigating the food properties of the thing eaten4 ,a man eats something2 it may be said that his very eating implies that he took it to be food1 that he judged it1 or regarded it cognitively1 and that the question is just whether he judged truly or made a false proposition4 ,now if anybody will condescend to a concrete experience he will perceive how often a man eats without thinking2 that he puts into his mouth what is set before him from habit1 as an infant does from instinct4 ,an onlooker or anyone who reflects is justified in saying that he acts as if he judged the material to be food4 ,he is not justified in saying that any judgment or intellectual determination has entered in4 ,he has acted2 he has behaved toward something as food3 that is only to say that he has put it in his mouth and swallowed it instead of spewing it forth4 ,the object may then be called food4 ,but this does not mean either that it is food 7namely1 digestible and nourishing material7 or that the eater judged it to be food and so formed a proposition which is true or false4 ,the proposition would arise only in case he is in some doubt1 or if he reflects that in spite of his immediate attitude of aversion the thing is wholesome and his system needs recuperation1 etc4 ,or later1 if the man is ill1 a physician may inquire what he ate1 and pronounce that something not food at all1 but poison4 ,in the illustration employed1 there is no danger of any harm arising from using the retroactive term food2 there is no likelihood of confusing the two senses actually eaten and nourishing article4 ,but with the terms value and good there is a standing danger of just such a confusion4 ,overlooking the fact that good and bad as reasonable terms involve a relationship to other things 7exactly similar to that implied in calling a particular article food or poison71 we suppose that when we are reflecting upon or inquiring into the good or value of some act or object1 we are dealing with something as simple1 as self-inclosed1 as the simple act of immediate prizing or welcoming or cherishing performed without rhyme or reason1 from instinct or habit4 ,in truth just as determining a thing to be food means considering its relations to digestive organs1 to its distribution and ultimate destination in the system1 so determining a thing found good 7namely1 treated in a certain way7 to be good means precisely ceasing to look at it as a direct1 self-sufficient thing and considering it in its consequences--that is1 in its relations to a large set of other things4 ,if the man in eating consciously implies that what he eats is food1 he anticipates or predicts certain consequences1 with more or less adequate grounds for so doing4 ,he passes a judgment or apprehends or knows--truly or falsely4 ,so a man may not only enjoy a thing1 but he may judge the thing enjoyed to be good1 to be a value4 ,but in so doing he is going beyond the thing immediately present and making an inference to other things1 which1 he implies1 are connected with it4 ,the thing taken into the mouth and stomach has consequences whether a man thinks of them or not4 ,but he does not know the thing he eats--he does not make it a term of a certain character--unless he thinks of the consequences and connects them with the thing he eats4 ,if he just stops and says ,oh1 how good this is1 he is not saying anything about the object except the fact that he enjoys eating it4 ,we may if we choose regard this exclamation as a reflection or judgment4 ,but if it is intellectual1 it is asserted for the sake of enhancing the enjoyment2 it is a means to an end4 ,a very hungry man will generally satisfy his appetite to some extent before he indulges in even such rudimentary propositions4#hf ,,ii ,but we must return to a placing of our problem in this context4 ,my theme is that a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical judgment1 a judgment about the doing of something4 ,this conflicts with the assumption that it is a judgment about a particular kind of existence independent of action1 concerning which the main problem is whether it is subjective or objective4 ,it conflicts with every tendency to make the determination of the right or wrong course of action 7whether in morals1 technology1 or scientific inquiry7 dependent upon an independent determination of some ghostly things called value-objects--whether their ghostly character is attributed to their existing in some transcendental eternal realm or in some realm called states of mind4 ,it asserts that value-objects mean simply objects as judged to possess a certain force within a situation temporally developing toward a determinate result4 ,to find a thing good is1 ,i repeat1 to attribute or impute nothing to it4 ,it is just to do something to it4 ,but to consider whether it is good and how good it is1 is to ask how it1 as if acted upon1 will operate in promoting a course of action4 ,hence the great contrast which may exist between a good or an immediate experience and an evaluated or judged good4 ,the rain may be most uncomfortable 7just be it1 as a man is more than five feet tall7 and yet be good for growing crops--that is1 favor or promote their movement in a given direction4 ,this does not mean that two contrasting judgments of value are passed4 ,it means that no judgment has yet taken place4 ,if1 however1 ,i am moved to pass a value-judgment ,i should probably say that in spite of the disagreeableness of getting wet1 the shower is a good thing4 ,i am now judging it as a means in two contrasting situations1 as a means with respect to two ends4 ,i compare my discomfort as a consequence of the rain with the prospective crops as another consequence1 and say let the latter consequence be4 ,i identify myself as agent with it1 rather than with the immediate discomfort of the wetting4 ,it is quite true that in this case ,i cannot do anything about it2 my identification is1 so to speak1 sentimental rather than practical so far as stopping the rain or growing the crops is concerned4 ,but in effect it is an assertion that one would not on account of the discomfort of the rain stop it2 that one would1 if one could1 encourage its continuance4 ,go it1 rain1 one says4 ,the specific intervention of action is obvious enough in plenty of other cases4 ,it occurs to me that this agreeable food which ,i am eating isn't a food for me2 it brings on indigestion4 ,it functions no longer as an immediate good2 as something to be accepted4 ,if ,i continue eating1 it will be after ,i have deliberated4 ,i have considered it as a means to two conflicting possible consequences1 the present enjoyment of eating and the later state of health4 ,one or other is possible1 not both--though of course ,i may solve the problem by persuading myself that in this instance they are congruent4 ,the value-object now means thing judged to be a means of procuring this or that end4 ,as prizing1 esteeming1 holding dear denote ways of acting1 so valuing denotes a passing judgment upon such acts with reference to their connection with other acts1 or with respect to the continuum of behavior in which they fall4 ,valuation means change of mode of behavior from direct acceptance and welcoming to doubting and looking into--acts which involve postponement of direct 7or so-called overt7 action and which imply a future act having a different meaning from that just now occurring--for even if one decides to continue in the previous act its meaning-content is different when it is chosen after reflective examination4 ,a practical judgment has been defined as a judgment of what to do1 or what is to be done3 a judgment respecting the future termination of an incomplete and in so far indeterminate situation4 ,to say that judgments of value fall within this field is to say two things3 one1 that the judgment of value is never complete in itself1 but always in behalf of determining what is to be done2 the other1 that judgments of value 7as distinct from the direct experience of something as good7 imply that value is not anything previously given1 but is something to be given by future action1 itself conditioned upon 7varying with7 the judgment4 ,this statement may appear to contradict the recent assertion that a value-object for knowledge means one investigated as a means to competing ends4 ,for such a means it already is2 the lobster will give me present enjoyment and future indigestion if ,i eat it4 ,but as long as ,i judge1 value is indeterminate4 ,the question is not what the thing will do--,i may be quite clear about that3 it is whether to perform the act which will actualize its potentiality4 ,what will ,i have the situation become as between alternatives8 ,and that means what force shall the thing as means be given8 ,shall ,i take it as means to present enjoyment1 or as a 7negative7 condition of future health8 ,when its status in these respects is determined1 its value is determined2 judgment ceases1 action goes on4 ,practical judgments do not therefore primarily concern themselves with the value of objects2 but with the course of action demanded to carry an incomplete situation to its fulfilment4 ,the adequate control of such judgments may1 however1 be facilitated by judgment of the worth of objects which enter as ends and means into the action contemplated4 ,for example1 my primary 7and ultimate7 judgment has to do1 say1 with buying a suit of clothes3 whether to buy and1 if so1 what8 ,the question is of better and worse with respect to alternative courses of action1 not with respect to various objects4 ,but the judgment will be a judgment 7and not a chance reaction7 in the degree in which it takes for its intervening subject-matter the value-status of various objects4 ,what are the prices of given suits8 ,what are their styles in respect to current fashion8 ,how do their patterns compare8 ,what about their durability8 ,how about their respective adaptability to the chief wearing use ,i have in mind8 ,relative1 or comparative1 durability1 cheapness1 suitability1 style1 aesthetic attractiveness constitute value traits4 ,they are traits of objects not per se1 but as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of the situation4 ,their value is their force in precisely this function4 ,the decision of better and worse is the determination of their respective capacities and intensities in this regard4 ,apart from their status in this office1 they have no traits of value for knowledge4 ,a determination of better value as found in some one suit is equivalent to 7has the force of7 a decision as to what it is better to do4 ,it provided the lacking stimulus so that action occurs1 or passes from its indeterminate-indecisive-state into decision4 ,reference to the terms subjective and objective will1 perhaps1 raise a cloud of ambiguities4 ,but for this very reason it may be worth while to point out the ambiguous nature of the term objective as applied to valuations4 ,objective may be identified1 quite erroneously1 with qualities existing outside of and independently of the situation in which a decision as to a future course of action has to be reached4 ,or1 objective may denote the status of qualities of an object in respect to the situation to be completed through judgment4 ,independently of the situation requiring practical judgment1 clothes already have a given price1 durability1 pattern1 etc4 ,these traits are not affected by the judgment4 ,they exist2 they are given4 ,but as given they are not determinate values4 ,they are not objects of valuation2 they are data for a valuation4 ,we may have to take pains to discover that these given qualities are1 but their discovery is in order that there may be a subsequent judgment of value4 ,were they already definite values1 they would not be estimated2 they would be stimuli to direct response4 ,if a man had already decided that cheapness constituted value1 he would simply take the cheapest suit offered4 ,what he judges is the value of cheapness1 and this depends upon its weight or importance in the situation requiring action1 as compared with durability1 style1 adaptability1 etc4 ,discovery of shoddy would not affect the de facto durability of the goods1 but it would affect the value of cheapness--that is1 the weight assigned that trait in influencing judgment--which it would not do1 if cheapness already had a definite value4 ,a value1 in short1 means a consideration1 and a consideration does not mean an existence merely1 but an existence having a claim upon judgment4 ,value judged is not existential quality noted1 but is the influence attached by judgment to a given existential quality in determining judgment4 ,the conclusion is not that value is subjective1 but that it is practical4 ,the situation in which judgment of value is required is not mental1 much less fanciful4 ,i can but think that much of the recent discussion of the objectivity of value and of value-judgments rests upon a false psychological theory4 ,it rests upon giving certain terms meanings that flow from an introspective psychology which accepts a realm of purely private states of consciousness1 private not in a social sense 7a sense implying courtesy or mayhap secrecy toward others71 but existential independence and separateness4 ,to refer value to choice or desire1 for example1 is in that case to say that value is subjectively conditioned4 ,quite otherwise1 if we have steered clear from such a psychology4 ,choice1 decision1 means primarily a certain act1 a piece of behavior on the part of a particular thing4 ,that a horse chooses to eat hay means only that it eats hay2 that the man chooses to steal means 7at least7 that he tries to steal4 ,this trial may come1 however1 after an intervening act of reflection4 ,it then has a certain intellectual or cognitive quality4 ,but it may mean simply the bare fact of an action which is retrospectively called a choice3 as a man1 in spite of all temptation to belong to another nation1 chooses to be born an ,englishman1 which1 if it has any sense at all1 signifies a choice to continue in a line adopted without choice4 ,taken in this latter sense 7in which case1 terms like choice and desire refer to ways of behavior71 their use is only a specification of the general doctrine that all valuation has to do with the determination of a course of action4 ,choice1 preference1 is originally only a bias in a given direction1 a bias which is no more subjective or psychical than is the fact that a ball thrown is swerving in a particular direction rather than in some other curve4 ,it is just a name for the differential character of the action4 ,but let continuance in a certain line of action become questionable1 let1 that is to say1 it be regarded as a means to a future consequence1 which consequence has alternatives1 and then choice gets a logical or intellectual sense2 a mental status if the term mental is reserved for acts having this intellectualized quality4 ,choice still means the fixing of a course of action2 it means at least a set to be released as soon as physically possible4 ,otherwise man has not chosen1 but has quieted himself into a belief that he has chosen in order to relieve himself of the strain of suspense4 ,exactly the same analysis applies to desire4 ,diverse anticipated ends may provoke divided and competing present reactions2 the organism may be torn between different courses1 each interfering with the completion of the other4 ,this intra-organic pulling and hauling1 this strife of active tendencies1 is a genuine phenomenon4 ,the pull in a given direction measures the immediate hold of an anticipated termination or end upon us1 as compared with that of some other4 ,if one asked after the mechanism of the valuing process1 ,i have no doubt that the answer would be in terms of desires thus conceived4 ,but unless everything relating to the activity of a highly organized being is to be denominated subjective1 ,i see no ground for calling it subjective4 ,so far as ,i can make out1 the emphasis upon a psychological treatment of value and valuation in a subjective sense is but a highly awkward and negative way of maintaining a positive truth3 that value and valuation fall within the universe of action3 that as welcoming1 accepting1 is an act1 so valuation is a present act determining an act to be done1 a present act taking place because the future act is uncertain and incomplete4 ,it does follow from this fact that valuation is not simply a recognition of the force or efficiency of a means with respect to continuing a process4 ,for unless there is question about its continuation1 about its termination1 valuation will not occur4 ,and there is no question save where activity is hesitant in direction because of conflict within it4 ,metaphorically we may say that rain is good to lay the dust1 identifying force or efficiency with value4 ,i do not believe that valuations occur and values are brought into being save in a continuing situation where things have potency for carrying forward processes4 ,there is a close relationship between prevailing1 valiancy1 valency1 and value4 ,but the term value is not a mere reduplication of the term efficiency3 it adds something4 ,when we are moving toward a result and at the same time are stimulated to move toward something else which is incompatible with it 7as in the case of the lobster as a cause of both enjoyment and indigestion71 a thing has a dual potency4 ,not until the end has been established is the value of the lobster settled1 although there need be no doubt about its efficiencies4 ,as was pointed out earlier1 the practical judgment determines means and end at the same time4 ,how then can value be given1 as efficiency is given1 until the end is chosen8 ,the rain is 7metaphorically7 valuable for laying dust4 ,whether it is valuable for us to have the dust laid--and if so1 how valuable--we shall never know until some activity of our own which is a factor in dust-laying comes into conflict with an incompatible activity4 ,its value is its force1 indeed1 but it is its force in moving us to one end rather than to another4 ,not every potency1 in other words1 but potency with the specific qualification of falling within judgment about future action1 means value or valuable thing4 ,consequently there is no value save in situations where desires and the need of deliberation in order to choose are found1 and yet this fact gives no excuse for regarding desire and deliberation and decision as subjective phenomena4 ,to use an ,irish bull1 as long as a man knows what he desires there is no desire2 there is movement or endeavor in a given direction4 ,desire is desires1 and simultaneous desires are incompatible2 they mark1 as we have noted1 competing activities1 movements in directions1 which cannot both be extended4 ,reflection is a process of finding out what we want1 what1 as we say1 we really want1 and this means the formation of new desire1 a new direction of action4 ,in this process1 things get values--something they did not possess before1 although they had their efficiencies4 ,at whatever risk of shock1 this doctrine should be exposed in all its nakedness4 ,to judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given4 ,it is not necessary that antecedently given values should be the data of the valuation2 and where they are given data they are only terms in the determination of a not yet existing value4 ,when a man is ill and after deliberation concludes that it be well to see a doctor1 the doctor doubtless exists antecedently4 ,but it is not the doctor who is judged to be the good of the situation1 but the seeing of the doctor3 a thing which1 by description1 exists only because of an act dependent upon a judgment4 ,nor is the health the man antecedently possessed 7or which somebody has7 the thing which he judges to be a value2 the thing judged to be a value is the restoring of health--something by description not yet existing4 ,the results flowing from his past health will doubtless influence him in reaching his judgment that it will be a good to have restored health1 but they do not constitute the good which forms his subject-matter and object of his judgment4 ,he may judge that they were good without judging that they are now good1 for to be judged now good means to be judged to be the object of a course of action still to be undertaken4 ,and to judge that they were good 7as distinct from merely recalling certain benefits which accrued from health7 is to judge that if the situation had required a reflective determination of a course of action one would have judged health an existence to be attained or preserved by action4 ,there are dialectic difficulties which may be raised about judgments of this sort4 ,for they imply the seeming paradox of a judgment whose proper subject-matter is its own determinate formation4 ,but nothing is gained by obscuring the fact that such is the nature of the practical judgment3 it is a judgment of what and how to judge--of the weight to be assigned to various factors in the determination of judgment4 ,it would be interesting to inquire into the question whether this peculiarity may not throw light upon the nature of consciousness1 but into that field we cannot now go4 ,,iii ,from what has been said1 it immediately follows1 of course1 that a determinate value is instituted as a decisive factor with respect to what is to be done4 ,wherever a determinate good exists1 there is an adequate stimulus to action1 and no judgment of what is to be done or of the value of an object is called for4 ,it is frequently assumed1 however1 that valuation is a process of applying some fixed or determinate value to the various competing goods of a situation2 that valuation implies a prior standard of value and consists in comparing various goods with the standard as the supreme value4 ,this assumption requires examination4 ,if it is sound it deprives the position which has been taken of any validity4 ,for it renders the judgment of what to do a matter of applying a value existing ready-made1 instead of making--as we have done--the valuation a determination within the practical judgment4 ,the argument would run this way3 ,every practical judgment depends upon a judgment of the value of the end to be attained2 this end may be such only proximately1 but that implies something else judged to be good1 and so1 logically1 till we have arrived at the judgment of a supreme good1 a final end or summum bonum4 ,if this statement correctly describes the state of the case there can be no doubt that a practical judgment depends upon a prior recognition of value2 consequently the hypothesis upon which we have been proceeding reverses the actual facts4 ,the first thing by way of critical comment is to point out the ambiguity in the term end4 ,i should like to fall back upon what was said earlier about the thoroughly reciprocal character of means and end in the practical judgment4 ,if this be admitted it is also admitted that only by a judgment of means--things having value in the carrying of an indeterminate situation to a completion--is the end determinately made out in judgment4 ,but ,i fear ,i cannot count upon this as granted4 ,so ,i will point out that end may mean either the de facto limit to judgment1 which by definition does not enter into judgment at all1 or it may mean the last and completing object of judgment1 the conception of that object in which a transitive incompletely given situation would come to rest4 ,of end in the first sense1 it is to be said that it is not a value at all2 of end in the second sense1 that it is identical with a finale of the kind we have just been discussing or that it is determined in judgment1 not a value given by which to control the judgment4 ,it may be asserted that in the illustration used some typical suit of clothes is the value which affords the standard of valuation of all the suits which are offered to the buyer2 that he passes judgment on their value as compared with the standard suit as an end and supreme value4 ,this statement brings out the ambiguity just referred to4 ,the need of something to wear is the stimulus to the judgment of the value of suits offered1 and possession of a suit puts an end to judgment4 ,it is an end of judgment in the objective1 not in the possessive1 sense of the preposition of2 it is an end not in the sense of aim1 but in the sense of a terminating limit4 ,when possession begins1 judgment has already ceased4 ,and if argument ad verucundiam has any weight ,i may point out that this is the doctrine of ,aristotle when he says we never deliberate about ends1 but only about means4 ,that is to say1 in all deliberation 7or practical judgment or inquiry7 there is always something outside of judgment which fixes its beginning and end or terminus4 ,and ,i would add that1 according to ,aristotle1 deliberation always ceases when we have come to the first link in the chain of causes1 which is last in the order of discovery1 and this means when we have traced back the chain of causes means to ourselves4 ,in other words1 the last end-in-view is always that which operates as the direct or immediate means of setting our own powers in operation4 ,the end-in-view upon which judgment of action settles down is simply the adequate or complete means to the doing of something4 ,we do deliberate1 however1 about aims1 about ends-in-view--a fact which shows their radically different nature from ends as limits to deliberation4 ,the aim in the present instance is not the suit of clothes1 but the getting of a proper suit4 ,that is what is precisely estimated or valuated2 and ,i think ,i may claim to have shown that the determination of this aim is identical with the determination of the value of a suit through comparison of the values of cheapness1 durability1 style1 pattern of different suits offered4 ,value is not determined by comparing various suits with an ideal model1 but by comparing various suits with respect to cheapness1 durability1 adaptability with one another--involving1 of course1 reference also to length of purse1 suits already possessed1 etc41 and other specific elements in the situation which demands that something be done4 ,the purchaser may1 of course1 have settled upon something which serves as a model before he goes to buy2 but that only means that his judging has been done beforehand2 the model does not then function in judgment1 but in his act as stimulus to immediate action4 ,and there is a consideration here involved of the utmost importance as to practical judgments of the moral type3 ,the more completely the notion of the model is formed outside and irrespective of the specific conditions which the situation of action presents1 the less intelligent is the act4 ,most men might have their ideals of the model changed somewhat in the face of the actual offering1 even in the case of buying clothes4 ,the man who is not accessible to such change in the case of moral situations has ceased to be a moral agent and become a reacting machine4 ,in short1 the standard of valuation is formed in the process of practical judgment or valuation4 ,it is not something taken from outside and applied within it--such application means there is no judgment4 ,,iv ,nothing has been said thus far about a standard4 ,yet the conception of a standard1 or a measure1 is so closely connected with valuation that its consideration affords a test of the conclusions reached4 ,it must be admitted that the concepts of the nature of a standard pointed to by the course of the prior discussion is not in conformity with current conceptions4 ,for the argument points to a standard which is determined within the process of valuation1 not outside of it1 and hence not capable of being employed ready-made1 therefore1 to settle the valuing process4 ,to many persons1 this will seem absurd to the point of self-contradiction4 ,the prevailing conception1 however1 has been adopted without examination2 it is a preconception4 ,if accepted1 it deprives judgment and knowledge of all significant import in connection with moral action4 ,if the standard is already given1 all that remains is its mechanical application to the case in hand--as one would apply a yard rule to dry-goods4 ,genuine moral uncertainty is then impossible2 where it seems to exist1 it is only a name for a moral unwillingness1 due to inherent viciousness1 to recognize and apply the rules already made and provided1 or else for a moral corruption which has enfeebled man's power of moral apprehension4 ,when the doctrine of standards prior to and independent of moral judgments is accompanied by these other doctrines of original sin and corruption1 one must respect the thoroughgoing logic of the doctrine4 ,such is not1 however1 the case with the modern theories which make the same assumption of standards preceding instead of resulting from moral judgments1 and which ignore the question of uncertainty and error in their apprehension4 ,such considerations do not1 indeed1 decide anything1 but they may serve to get a more unprejudiced hearing for a hypothesis which runs counter to current theories1 since it but formulates the trend of current practices in their increasing tendency to make the act of intelligence the central factor in morals4 ,let us1 accordingly1 consider the alternatives to regarding the standard of value as something evolved in the process of reflective valuation4 ,how can such a standard be known8 ,either by an a priori method of intuition1 or by abstraction from prior cases4 ,the latter conception throws us into the arms of hedonism4 ,for the hedonistic theory of the standard of value derives its logical efficiency from the consideration that the notion of a prior and fixed standard 7one which is not determined within the situation by reflection7 forces us back upon antecedent irreducible pleasures and pains which alone are values definite and certain enough to supply standards4 ,they alone are simple enough to be independent and ultimate4 ,the apparently common-sense alternative would be to take the value of prior situations in toto1 say1 the value of an act of kindness to a sufferer4 ,but any such good is a function of the total unanalyzed situation2 it has1 consequently1 no application to a new situation unless the new exactly repeats the old one4 ,only when the good is resolved into simple and unalterable units1 in terms of which old situations can be equated to new ones on the basis of the number of units contained1 can an unambiguous standard be found4 ,the logic is unimpeachable1 and points to irreducible pleasures and pains as the standard of valuation4 ,the difficulty is not in the logic but in empirical facts1 facts which verify our prior contention4 ,conceding1 for the sake of argument1 that there are definite existences such as are called pleasures and pains1 they are not value-objects1 but are only things to be valued4 ,exactly the same pleasure or pain1 as an existence1 has different values at different times according to the way in which it is judged4 ,what is the value of the pleasure of eating the lobster as compared with the pains of indigestion8 ,the rule tells us1 of course1 to break up the pleasure and pain into elementary units and count4#hg ,such ultimate simple units seem1 however1 to be about as much within the reach of ordinary knowledge as atoms or electrons are within the grasp of the man of the street4 ,their resemblance to the ultimate1 neutral units which analytic psychologists have postulated as a methodological necessity is evident4 ,since the value of even such a definite entity as a toothache varies according to the organization constructed and presented in reflection1 it is clear that ordinary empirical pleasures and pains are highly complex4 ,this difficulty1 however1 may be waived4 ,we may even waive the fact that a theory which set out to be ultra-empirical is now enmeshed in the need for making empirical facts meet dialectical requirements4 ,another difficulty is too insuperable to be waived4 ,in any case the quantity of elementary existences which constitutes the criterion of measurement is dependent upon the very judgment which is assumed to be regulated by it4 ,the standard of valuation is the units which will result from an act2 they are future consequences4 ,now the character of the agent judging is one of the conditions of the production of these consequences4 ,a callous person not only will not foresee certain consequences1 and will not be able to give them proper weight1 but he does not afford the same condition of their occurrence which is constituted by a sensitive man4 ,it is quite possible to employ judgment so as to produce acts which will increase this organic callousness4 ,the analytic conception of the moral criterion provides--logically--for deliberate blunting of susceptibilities4 ,if the matter at issue is simply one of number of units of pleasure over pain1 arrange matters so that certain pains will not1 as matter of fact1 be felt4 ,while this result may be achieved by manipulation of extra-organic conditions1 it may also be effected by rendering the organism insensitive4 ,persistence in a course which in the short run yields uneasiness and sympathetic pangs1 will in the long run eliminate these pains and leave a net pleasure balance4 ,this is a time-honored criticism of hedonism4 ,my present concern with it is purely logical4 ,it shows that the attempt to bring over from past objects the elements of a standard for valuing future consequences is a hopeless one4 ,the express object of a valuation-judgment is to release factors which being new1 cannot be measured on the basis of the past alone4 ,this discussion of the analytic logic as applied in morals would1 however1 probably not be worth while did it not serve to throw into relief the significance of any appeal to fulfilment of a system or organization as the moral good--the standard4 ,such an appeal1 if it is wary1 is an appeal to the present situation as undergoing that reorganization that will confer upon it the unification which it lacks2 to organization as something to be brought about1 to be made4 ,and it is clear that this appeal meets all the specifications of judgments of practice as they have been described4 ,the organization which is to be fulfilled through action is an organization which1 at the time of judging1 is present in conception1 in idea--in1 that is1 reflective inquiry as a phase of reorganizing activity4 ,and since its presence in conception is both a condition of the organization aimed at and a function of the adequacy of the reflective inquiry1 it is evident that there is here a confirmation of our statement that the practical judgment is a judgment of what and how to judge as an integral part of the completion of an incomplete temporal situation4 ,more specifically1 it also appears that the standard is a rule for conducting inquiry to its completion3 it is a counsel to make examination of the operative factors complete1 a warning against suppressing recognition of any of them4 ,however a man may impose upon himself or upon others1 a man's real measure of value is exhibited in what he does1 not in what he consciously thinks or says4 ,for the doing is the actual choice4 ,it is the completed reflection4 ,it is comparatively easy at the present time in moral theory to slam both hedonism and apriorism4 ,it is not so easy to see the logical implications of the alternative to them4 ,the conception of an organization of interests or tendencies is often treated as if it were a conception which is definite in subject-matter as well as clear-cut in form4 ,it is taken not as a rule for procedure in inquiry1 a direction and a warning 7which it is71 but as something all of whose constituents are already given for knowledge1 even though not given in fact4 ,the act of fulfilling or realizing must then be treated as devoid of intellectual import4 ,it is a mere doing1 not a learning and a testing4 ,but how can a situation which is incomplete in fact be completely known until it is complete8 ,short of the fulfilment of a conceived organization1 how can the conception of the proposed organization be anything more than a working hypothesis1 a method of treating the given elements in order to see what happens8 ,does not every notion which implies the possibility of an apprehension of knowledge of the end to be reached#hh also imply either an a priori revelation of the nature of that end1 or else that organization is nothing but a whole composed of elementary parts already given--the logic of hedonism8 ,the logic of subsumption in the physical sciences meant that a given state of things could be compared with a ready-made concept as a model--the phenomena of the heavens with the implications of1 say1 the circle4 ,the methods of experimental science broke down this motion2 they substituted for an alleged regulative model a formula which was the integrated function of the particular phenomena themselves1 a formula to be used as a method of further observations and experiments and thereby tested and developed4 ,the unwillingness to believe that1 in a similar fashion1 moral standards or models can be trusted to develop out of the specific situations of action shows how little the general logical force of the method of science has been grasped4 ,physical knowledge did not as matter of fact advance till the dogma of models or forms as standards of knowledge had been ousted4 ,yet we hang tenaciously to a like doctrine in morals for fear of moral chaos4 ,it once seemed to be impossible that the disordered phenomena of perception could generate a knowledge of law and order2 it was supposed that independent principles of order must be supplied and the phenomena measured by approach to or deviation from the fixed models4 ,the ordinary conception of a standard in practical affairs is a precise analogue4 ,physical knowledge started on a secure career when men had courage to start from the irregular scene and to treat the suggestions to which it gave rise as methods for instituting new observations and experiences4 ,acting upon the suggested conceptions analyzed1 extended1 and ordered phenomena and thus made improved conceptions--methods of inquiry--possible4 ,it is reasonable to believe that what holds moral knowledge back is above all the conception that there are standards of good given to knowledge apart from the work of reflection in constructing methods of action4 ,as the bringer of bad news gets a bad name1 being made to share in the production of the evil which he reports1 so honest acknowledgment of the uncertainty of the moral situation and of the hypothetical character of all rules of moral mensuration prior to acting upon them1 is treated as if it originated the uncertainty and created the skepticism4 ,it may be contended1 however1 that all this does not justify the earlier statement that the limiting situation which occasions and cuts off judgment is not itself a value4 ,why1 it will be asked1 does a man buy a suit of clothes unless that is a value1 or at least a proximate means to a further value8 ,the answer is short and simple3 ,because he has to2 because the situation in which he lives demands it4 ,the answer probably seems too summary4 ,but it may suggest that while a man lives1 he never is called upon to judge whether he shall act1 but simply how he shall act4 ,a decision not to act is a decision to act in a certain way2 it is never a judgment not to act1 unqualifiedly4 ,it is a judgment to do something else--to wait1 for example4 ,a judgment that the best thing to do is to retire from active life1 to become a ,simon ,stylites1 is a judgment to act in a certain way1 conditioned upon the necessity that1 irrespective of judging1 a man will have to act somehow anyway4 ,a decision to commit suicide is not a decision to be dead2 it is a decision to perform a certain act4 ,the act may depend upon reaching the conclusion that life is not worth living4 ,but as a judgment1 this is a conclusion to act in a way to terminate the possibility of further situations requiring judgment and action4 ,and it does not imply that a judgment about life as a supreme value and standard underlies all judgments as to how to live4 ,more specifically1 it is not a judgment upon the value of life per se1 but a judgment that one does not find at hand the specific means of making life worth while4 ,as an act to be done1 it falls within and assumes life4 ,as a judgment upon the value of life1 by definition it evades the issue4 ,no one ever influenced a person considering committing suicide by arguments concerning the value of life1 but only by suggesting or supplying conditions and means which make life worth living2 in other words1 by furnishing direct stimuli to living4 ,however1 ,i fear that all this argument may only obscure a point obvious without argument1 namely1 that all deliberation upon what to do is concerned with the completion and determination of a situation in some respect incomplete and so indeterminate4 ,every such situation is specific2 it is not merely incomplete2 the incompleteness is of a specific situation4 ,hence the situation sets limits to the reflective process2 what is judged has reference to it and that which limits never is judged in the particular situation in which it is limiting4 ,now we have in ordinary speech a word which expresses the nature of the conditions which limit the judgments of value4 ,it is the word invaluable4 ,the word does not mean something of supreme value as compared with other things any more than it means something of zero value4 ,it means something out of the scope of valuation--something out of the range of judgment2 whatever in the situation at hand is not and cannot be any part of the subject-matter of judgment and which yet instigates and cuts short the judgment4 ,it means1 in short1 that judgment at some point runs against the brute act of holding something dear as its limit4 ,v ,the statement that values are determined in the process of judgment of what to do 7that is1 in situations where preference depends upon reflection upon the conditions and possibilities of a situation requiring action7 will be met by the objection that our practical deliberations usually assume precedent specific values and also a certain order or grade among them4 ,there is a sense in which ,i am not concerned to deny this4 ,our deliberate choices go on in situations more or less like those in which we have previously chosen4 ,when deliberation has reached a valuation1 and action has confirmed or verified the conclusion1 the result remains4 ,situations overlap4 ,the m which is judged better than n in one situation is found worse than l in another1 and so on2 thus a certain order of precedence is established4 ,and we have to broaden the field to cover the habitual order of reflective preferences in the community to which we belong4 ,the valu-eds or valuables thus constituted present themselves as facts in subsequent situations4 ,moreover1 by the same kind of operation1 the dominating objects of past valuations present themselves as standardized values4 ,but we have to note that such value-standards are only presumptive4 ,their status depends1 on one hand1 upon the extent in which the present situation is like the past4 ,in a progressive or rapidly altering social life1 the presumption of identical present value is weakened4 ,and while it would be foolish not to avail one's self of the assistance in present valuations of the valuables established in other situations1 we have to remember that habit operates to make us overlook differences and presume identity where it does not exist--to the misleading of judgment4 ,on the other hand1 the contributory worth of past determinations of value is dependent upon the extent in which they were critically made2 especially upon the extent in which the consequences brought about through acting upon them have been carefully noted4 ,in other words1 the presumptive force of a past value in present judgment depends upon the pains taken with its verification4 ,in any case1 so far as judgment takes place 7instead of the reminiscence of a prior good operating as a direct stimulus to present action7 all valuation is in some degree a revaluation4 ,nietzsche would probably not have made so much of a sensation1 but he would have been within the limits of wisdom1 if he had confined himself to the assertion that all judgment1 in the degree in which it is critically intelligent1 is a transvaluation of prior values4 ,i cannot escape recognition that any allusion to modification or transformation of an object through judgment arouses partisan suspicion and hostility4 ,to many it appears to be a survival of an idealistic epistemology4 ,but ,i see only three alternatives4 ,either there are no practical judgments--as judgments they are wholly illusory2 or the future is bound to be but a repetition of the past or a reproduction of something eternally existent in some transcendent realm 7which is the same thing logically71#hi or the object of a practical judgment is some change1 some alteration1 to be brought about in the given1 the nature of the change depending upon the judgment and yet constituting its subject-matter4 ,unless the epistemological realist accepts one of the two first alternatives1 he seems bound1 in accepting the third1 to admit not merely that practical judgments make a difference in things as an after-effect 7this he seems ready enough to admit71 but that the import and validity of judgments is a matter of the difference thus made4 ,one may1 of course1 hold that this is just what marks the distinction of the practical judgment from the scientific judgment4 ,but one who admits this fact as respects a practical judgment can no longer claim that it is fatal to the very idea of judgment to suppose that its proper object is some difference to be brought about in things1 and that the truth of the judgment is constituted by the differences in consequences actually made4 ,and a logical realist who takes seriously the notion that moral good is a fulfilment of an organization or integration must admit that any proposition about such an object is prospective 7for it is something to be attained through action71 and that the proposition is made for the sake of furthering the fulfilment4 ,let one start at this point and carry back the conception into a consideration of other kinds of propositions1 and one will have1 ,i think1 the readiest means of apprehending the intent of the theory that all propositions are but the propoundings of possible knowledge1 not knowledge itself4 ,for unless one marks off the judgment of good from other judgment by means of an arbitrary division of the organism from the environment1 or of the subjective from the objective1 no ground for any sharp line of division in the propositional-continuum will appear4 ,but 7to obviate misunderstanding7 this does not mean that some psychic state or act makes the difference in things4 ,in the first place1 the subject-matter of the judgment is a change to be brought about2 and1 in the second place1 this subject-matter does not become an object until the judgment has issued in act4 ,it is the act which makes the difference1 but nevertheless the act is but the complete object of judgment and the judgment is complete as a judgment only in the act4 ,the anti-pragmatists have been asked 7notably by ,professor ,a4 ,w4 ,moore7 how they sharply distinguish between judgment--or knowledge--and act and yet freely admit and insist that knowledge makes a difference in action and hence in existence4 ,this is the crux of the whole matter4 ,and it is a logical question4 ,it is not a query 7as it seems to have been considered7 as to how the mental can influence a physical thing like action--a variant of the old question of how the mind affects the body4 ,on the contrary1 the implication is that the relation of knowledge to action becomes a problem of the action of a mental 7or logical7 entity upon a physical one only when the logical import of judgment has been misconceived4 ,the positive contention is that the realm of logical propositions presents in a realm of possibility the specific rearrangement of things which overt action presents in actuality4 ,hence the passage of a proposition into action is not a miracle1 but the realization of its own character--its own meaning as logical4 ,i do not profess1 of course1 to have shown that such is the case for all propositions2 that is a matter which ,i have not discussed4 ,but in showing the tenability of the hypothesis that practical judgments are of that nature1 ,i have at least ruled out any purely dialectic proof that the nature of knowledge as such forbids entertaining the hypothesis that the import--indirect if not direct--of all logical propositions is some difference to be brought about4 ,the road is at least cleared for a more unprejudiced consideration of this hypothesis on its own merits4 ,,sense ,,perception ,,as ,,knowledge ,i mentioned incidentally in the first section that it is conceivable that failure to give adequate consideration to practical judgments may have a compromising effect upon the consideration of other types4 ,i now intend to develop this remark with regard to sense perception as a form of knowledge4 ,the topic is so bound up with a multitude of perplexing psychological and epistemological traditions that ,i have first to make it reasonably clear what it is and what it is not which ,i propose to discuss4 ,i endeavored in an earlier series of papers#ij to point out that the question of the material of sense perception is not1 as such1 a problem of the theory of knowledge at all1 but simply a problem of the occurrence of a certain material--a problem of causal conditions and consequences4 ,that is to say1 the problem presented by an image#ia of a bent stick1 or by a dream1 or by secondary sensory qualities is properly a problem of physics--of conditions of occurrence1 and not of logic1 of truth or falsity1 fact or fiction4 ,that the existence of a red quale is dependent upon disturbances of a certain velocity of a medium in connection with certain changes of the organism is not to be confused with the notion that red is a way of knowing1 in some more or less adequate fashion1 some more real object or else of knowing itself4 ,the fact of causation--or functional dependence--no more makes the quale an appearance to the mind of something more real than itself or of itself than it makes bubbles on the water a real fish transferred by some cognitive distortion into a region of appearance4 ,with a little stretching we may use the term appearance in either case1 but the term only means that the red quale or the water-bubble is an obvious or conspicuous thing from which we infer something else not so obvious4 ,this position thus freely resumed here needs to be adequately guarded on all sides4 ,it implies that the question of the existence or presence of the subject-matter of even a complex sense perception may be treated as a question of physics4 ,it also implies that the existence of a sense perception may be treated as a problem of physics4 ,but the position is not that all the problems of sense perception are thereby exhausted4 ,there is still1 on the contrary1 the problem of the cognitive status of sense perception4 ,so far from denying this fact1 ,i mean rather to emphasize it in holding that this knowledge aspect is not to be identified--as it has been in both realistic and idealistic epistemologies--with the simple occurrence of presented subject-matter and with the occurrence of a perceptive act4 ,it is often stated1 for example1 that primitive sense objects when they are stripped of all inferential material cannot possibly be false--but with the implication that they1 therefore1 must be true4 ,well1 ,i meant to go this statement one better--to state that they are neither true nor false--that is1 that the distinction of true-or-false is as irrelevant and inapplicable as to any other existence1 as it is1 say1 to being more than five feet high or having a low blood pressure4 ,this position when taken leaves over the question of sense perception as knowledge1 as capable of truth or falsity4 ,it is this question1 then1 which ,i intend to discuss in this paper4 ,i ,my first point is that some sense perceptions at least 7as matter of fact the great bulk of them71 are without any doubt forms of practical judgment--or1 more accurately1 are terms in practical judgments as propositions of what to do4 ,when in walking down a street ,i see a sign on the lamp-post at the corner1 ,i assuredly see a sign4 ,now in ordinary context 7,i do not say always or necessarily7 this is a sign of what to do--to continue walking or to turn4 ,the other term of the proposition may not be stated or it may be2 it is probably more often tacit4 ,of course1 ,i have taken the case of the sign purposely4 ,but the case may be extended4 ,the lamp-post as perceived is to a lamp-lighter a sign of something else than a turn1 but still a sign of something to be done4 ,to another man1 it may be a sign of a possible support4 ,i am anxious not to force the scope of cases of this class beyond what would be accepted by an unbiased person1 but ,i wish to point out that certain features of the perceived object1 as a cognitive term1 which do not seem at first sight to fall within this conception of the object1 as1 an intellectual sign of what to do1 turn out upon analysis to be covered by it4 ,it may be said1 for example1 that our supposed pedestrian perceives much besides that which serves as evidence of the thing to be done4 ,he perceives the lamp-post1 for example1 and possibly the carbons of the arc4 ,and these assuredly do not enter into the indication of what to do or how to do it4 ,the reply is threefold4 ,in the first place1 it is easy--and usual--to read back into the sense perception more than was actually in it4 ,it is easy to recall the familiar features of the lamp-post2 it is practically impossible--or at least very unusual--to recall what was actually perceived4 ,so we read the former into the latter4 ,the tendency is for actual perception to limit itself to the minimum which will serve as sign4 ,but1 in the second place1 since it is never wholly so limited1 since there is always a surplusage of perceived object1 the fact stated in the objection is admitted4 ,but it is precisely this surplusage which has not cognitive status4 ,it does not serve as a sign1 but neither is it known1 or a term in knowledge4 ,a child1 walking by his father's side1 with no aim and hence no reason for securing indications of what to do1 will probably see more in his idle curiosity than his parent4 ,he will have more presented material4 ,but this does not mean that he is making more propositions1 but only that he is getting more material for possible propositions4 ,it means1 in short1 that he is in an aesthetic attitude of realization rather than in a cognitive attitude4 ,but even the most economical observer has some aesthetic1 non-cognitive surplusage4#ib ,in the third place1 surplusage is necessary for the operation of the signifying function4 ,independently of the fact that surplusage may be required to render the sign specific1 action is free 7its variation is under control7 in the degree in which alternatives are present4 ,the pedestrian has probably the two alternatives in mind3 to go straight on or to turn4 ,the perceived object might indicate to him another alternative--to stop and inquire of a passer-by4 ,and1 as is obvious in a more complicated case1 it is the extent of the perceived object which both multiplies alternative ways of acting and gives the grounds for selecting among them4 ,a physician1 for example1 deliberately avoids such hard-and-fast alternatives as have been postulated in our instance4 ,he does not observe simply to get an indication of whether the man is well or ill2 but in order to determine what to do he extends his explorations over a wide field4 ,much of his perceived object field is immaterial to what he finally does2 that is1 does not serve as sign4 ,but it is all relevant to judging what he is to do4 ,sense perception as a term in practical judgment must include more than the element which finally serves as sign4 ,if it did not1 there would be no perception1 but only a direct stimulus to action4#ic ,the conclusion that such perceptions as we have been considering are terms in an inference is to be carefully discriminated from the loose statement that sense perceptions are unconscious inferences4 ,there is a great difference between saying that the perception of a shape affords an indication for an inference and saying that the perception of shape is itself an inference4 ,that definite shapes would not be perceived1 were it not for neural changes brought about in prior inferences1 is a possibility2 it may be1 for aught ,i know1 an ascertained fact4 ,such telescoping of a perceived object with the object inferred from it may be a constant function2 but in any case the telescoping is not a matter of a present inference going on unconsciously1 but is the result of an organic modification which has occurred in consequence of prior inferences4 ,in similar fashion1 to say that to see a table is to get an indication of something to write on is in no way to say that the perception of a table is an inference from sensory data4 ,to say that certain earlier perceived objects not having as perceived the character of a table have now fused with the results of inferences drawn from them is not to say that the perception of the table is now an inference4 ,suppose we say that the first perception was of colored patches2 that we inferred from this the possibility of reaching and touching1 and that on performing these acts we secured certain qualities of hardness1 smoothness1 etc41 and that these are now all fused with the color-patches4 ,at most this only signifies that certain previously inferred qualities have now become consolidated with qualities from which they were formerly inferred4 ,and such fusion or consolidation is precisely not inference4 ,as matter of fact1 such fusion of qualities1 given and formerly inferred1 is but a matter of speaking4 ,what has really happened is that brain processes which formerly happened successively now happen simultaneously4 ,what we are dealing with is not a fact of cognition1 but a fact of the organic conditions of the occurrence of an act of perception4 ,let us apply the results to the question of sense illusions4 ,the bent reed in the water comes naturally to mind4 ,purely physical considerations account for the refraction of the light which produces an optical image of a bent stick4 ,this has nothing to do with knowledge or with sense perception--with seeing4 ,it is simply and wholly a matter of the properties of light and a lens4 ,such refractions are constantly produced without our noting them4 ,in the past1 however1 light refracted and unrefracted has been a constant stimulus to responsive actions4 ,it is a matter of the native constitution of the organism that light stimulates the eyes to follow and the arms to reach and the hands to clutch and handle4 ,as a consequence1 certain arrangements of reflected and refracted light have become a sign to perform certain specific acts of handling and touching4 ,as a rule1 stimuli and reactions occur in an approximately homogeneous medium--the air4 ,the system of signs or indexes of action set up has been based upon this fact and accommodated to it4 ,a habit or bias in favor of a certain kind of inference has been set up4 ,we infer from a bent ray of light that the hand1 in touching the reflecting object1 will1 at a certain point1 have to change its direction4 ,this habit is carried over to a medium in which the conclusion does not hold4 ,instead of saying that light is bent--which it is--we infer that the stick is bent3 we infer that the hand could not protract a straight course in handling the object4 ,but an expert fisherman never makes such an error in spearing fish4 ,reacting in media of different refractive capacities1 he bases his signs and inferences upon the conditions and results of his media4 ,i see no difference between these cases and that of a man who can read his own tongue4 ,he sees the word pain and infers it means a certain physical discomfort4 ,as matter of fact1 the thing perceived exists in an unfamiliar medium and signifies bread4 ,to the one accustomed to the ,french language the right inference occurs4#id ,there is neither error nor truth in the optical image3 ,it just exists physically4 ,but we take it for something else1 we behave to it as if it were something else4 ,we mis-take it4 ,,ii ,so far as ,i can see1 the pronounced tendency to regard the perceived object as itself the object of a peculiar kind of knowledge instead of as a term in knowledge of the practical kind has two causes4 ,one is the confirmed habit of neglecting the wide scope and import of practical judgments4 ,this leads to overlooking the responsive act as the other term indicated by the perception1 and to taking the perceived object as the whole of the situation just by itself4 ,the other cause is the fact that because perceived objects are constantly employed as evidence of what is to be done--or how to do something--they themselves become the objects of prolonged and careful scrutiny4 ,we pass naturally and inevitably from recognition to observation4 ,inference will usually take care of itself if the datum is properly determined4 ,at the present day1 a skilled physician will have little difficulty in inferring typhoid instead of malaria from certain symptoms provided he can make certain observations--that is1 secure certain data from which to infer4 ,the labor of intelligence is thus transferred from inference to the determination of data1 the data being determined1 however1 in the interests of inference and as parts of an inference4 ,at this point1 a significant complication enters in4 ,the ordinary assumption in the discussion of the relation of perceived objects to knowledge is that the object--the real object--of knowledge in perception is the thing which caused the qualities which are given4 ,it is assumed1 that is1 that the other term of a proposition in which a sense datum is one term must be the thing which produced it4 ,since this producing object does not for the most part appear in ordinary sense perception1 we have on our hands perception as an epistemological problem--the relation of an appearance to some reality which it1 somehow1 conceals rather than indicates4 ,hence also the difficulties of reconciling scientific knowledge in physics where these causes are the terms of the propositions with empirical or sense perception knowledge where they do not even appear4 ,here is where the primary advantage of recognizing that ordinary sense perceptions are forms of practical judgment comes in4 ,in practical judgments1 the other term is as open and aboveboard as is the sensory quality3 it is the thing to be done1 the response to be selected4 ,to borrow an illustration of ,professor ,woodbridge's3 ,a certain sound indicates to the mother that her baby needs attention4 ,if she turns out to be in error1 it is not because sound ought to mean so many vibrations of the air1 and as matter of fact doesn't even suggest air vibrations1 but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be performed4 ,i imagine that if error never occurred in inferences of this practical sort the human race would have gone on quite contented with them4 ,however that may be1 errors do occur and the endeavor to control inference as to consequences 7so as to reduce their likelihood of error7 leads to propositions where the knowledge-object of the perceived thing is not something to be done1 but the cause which produced it4 ,the mother finds her baby peacefully sleeping and says the baby didn't make the noise4 ,she investigates and decides a swinging door made it4 ,instead of inferring a consequence1 she infers a cause4 ,if she had identified the noise in the first place1 she would have concluded that the hinges needed oiling4 ,now where does the argument stand8 ,the proper control of inference in specific cases is found 7a7 to lie in the proper identification of the datum4 ,if the perception is of a certain kind1 the inference takes place as a matter of course2 or else inference can be suspended until more adequate data are found1 and thus error is avoided even if truth be not found4 ,furthermore 7b7 it is discovered that the most effective way of identifying datum 7and securing adequate data7 is by inference to its cause4 ,the mother stops short with the baby and the door as causes4 ,but the same motives which made her transfer her inference from consequences to conditions are the motives which lead others to inferring from sounds to vibrations of air4 ,hence our scientific propositions about sensory data4 ,they are not1 as such1 about things to do1 but about things which have been done1 have happened--facts4 ,but they have reference1 nevertheless1 to inferences regarding consequences to be effected4 ,they are the means of securing data which will prevent errors which would otherwise occur1 and which facilitate an entirely new crop of inferences as to possibilities--means and ends--of action4 ,that scientific men should be conscious of this reference or even interested in it is not at all necessary1 for ,i am talking about the logic of propositions1 not about biography nor psychology4 ,if ,i reverted to psychology1 it would be to point out that there is no reason in the world why the practical activity of some men should not be predominantly directed into the pursuits connected with discovery4 ,the extent in which they actually are so directed depends upon social conditions4 ,,iii ,we are brought to a consideration of the notion of primitive sense data4 ,it was long customary to treat the attempt to define true knowledge in terms derived from sense data as a confusion of psychology--or the history of the growth of knowledge--with logic1 the theory of the character of knowledge as knowledge4 ,as matter of fact1 there is confusion1 but in the opposite direction4 ,the attempt involved a confusion of logic with psychology--that is1 it treated a phase of the technique of inference as if it were a natural history of the growth of ideas and beliefs4 ,the chief source of error in ordinary inference is an unrecognized complexity of data4 ,perception which is not experimentally controlled fails to present sufficiently wide data to secure differentia of possible inferences1 and it fails to present1 even in what is given1 lines of cleavage which are important for proper inference4 ,this is only an elaborate way of saying what scientific inquiry has made clear1 that1 for purposes of inference as to conditions of production of what is present1 ordinary sense perception is too narrow1 too confused1 too vivid as to some quales and too blurred as to some others4 ,let us confine our attention for the moment to confusion4 ,it has often been pointed out that sense qualities being just what they are1 it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as obscurity or confusion into them3 a slightly illuminated color is just as irretrievably what it is1 as clearly itself1 as an object in the broad glare of noonday4 ,but the case stands otherwise when the quale is taken as a datum for inference4 ,it is not so easy to identify a perceived object for purposes of inference in the dusk as in bright light4 ,from the standpoint of an inference to be effected1 the confusion is the same as an unjustifiable simplification4 ,this over-simplification has the effect of making the quale1 as a term of inference1 ambiguous4 ,to infer from it is to subject ourselves to the danger of all fallacies of ambiguity which are expounded in the textbooks4 ,the remedy is clearly the resolution1 by experimental means1 of what seems to be a simple datum into its elements4 ,this is a case of analysis2 it differs from other modes of analysis only in the subject-matter upon which it is directed1 viz41 something which had been previously accepted as a simple whole4 ,the result of this analysis is the existence as objects of perception of isolated qualities like the colors of the spectrum scientifically determined1 the tones of the scale in all their varying intensities1 etc41 in short1 the sensations or sense qualities of contemporary psychology textbooks or the simple ideas of sensation of ,locke or the objects of sense of ,russell4 ,they are the material of sense perception discriminated for the purpose of better inferences4 ,note that these simple data or elements are not original1 psychologically or historically2 they are logical primitives--that is1 irreducible for purposes of inference4 ,they are simply the most unambiguous and best defined objects of perception which can be secured to serve as signs4 ,they are experimentally determined1 with great art1 precisely because the naturally given1 the customary1 objects in perception have been ambiguous or confused terms in inference4 ,hence they are replaced1 through experimental means involving the use of wide scientific knowledge deductively employed1 by simpler sense objects4 ,stated in current phraseology1 sensations 7i4e41 qualities present to sense7 are not the elements out of which perceptions are composed1 constituted1 or constructed2 they are the finest1 most carefully discriminated objects of perception4 ,we do not first perceive a single1 thoroughly defined shade1 a tint and hue of red2 its perception is the last refinement of observation4 ,such things are the limits of perception1 but they are final1 not initial1 limits4 ,they are what is perceived to be given under the most favorable possible conditions2 conditions1 moreover1 which do not present themselves accidentally1 but which have to be intentionally and experimentally established1 and detection of which exacts the use of a vast body of scientific propositions4 ,i hope it is now evident what was meant by saying that current logic presents us not with a confusion of psychology with logic1 but with a wholesale mistaking of logical determinations for facts of psychology4 ,the confusion was begun by ,locke--or rather made completely current through the enormous influence exercised by ,locke--and some reference to ,locke may be of aid in clearing up the point4 ,locke's conception of knowledge was logical1 not psychological4 ,he meant by knowledge thoroughly justified beliefs or propositions1 certainty1 and carefully distinguished it from what passed current as knowledge at a given time4 ,the latter he called assent1 opinion1 belief1 or judgment4 ,moreover1 his interest in the latter was logical4 ,he was after an art of controlling the proper degree of assent to be given in matters of probability4 ,in short1 his sole aim was to determine certainty where certainty is possible and to determine the due degree of probability in the much vaster range of cases where only probability is attainable4 ,a natural history of the growth of knowledge in the sense of what happens to pass for knowledge was the last of his interests4 ,but he was completely under the domination of the ruling idea of his time2 namely1 that ,nature is the norm of truth4 ,now the earliest period of human life presents the work of nature in its pure and unadulterated form4 ,the normal is the original1 and the original is the normative4 ,nature is both beneficent and truthful in its work2 it retains all the properties of the ,supreme ,being whose vice-regent it is4 ,to get the logical ultimates we have only1 therefore1 to get back to the natural primitives4 ,under the influence of such deistic ideas1 ,locke writes a mythology of the history of knowledge1 starting from clear and distinct meanings1 each simple1 well defined1 sharply and unambiguously just what it is on its face1 without concealments and complications1 and proceeds by natural compoundings up to the store of complex ideas1 and to the perception of simple relations of agreement among ideas3 a perception always certain if the ideas are simple1 and always controllable in the case of complex ideas if we consider the simple ideas and their compoundings4 ,thus he established the habit of taking logical discriminations as historical or psychological primitives--as sources of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks upon inference and as means of knowing4 ,i hope reference to ,locke will not make a scapegoat4 ,i should not have mentioned him if it were not that this way of looking at things found its way over into orthodox psychology and then back again into the foundations of logical theory4 ,it may be said to be the stock in trade of the school of empiricist logicians1 and 7what is even more important7 of the other schools of logic whenever they are dealing with propositions of perception and observation3 vide ,russell's trusting confidence in atomic propositions as psychological primitives4 ,it led to the supposition that there is a kind of knowledge or simple apprehension 7or sense acquaintance7 implying no inference and yet basic to inference4 ,note1 if you please1 the multitude of problems generated by thinking of whatever is present in experience 7as sensory qualities are present7 as if it were intrinsically and apart from the use made of its subject-matter of knowledge4 a7 ,the mind-body problem becomes an integral part of the problem of knowledge4 ,sense organs1 neurones1 and neuronic connections are certainly involved in the occurrence of a sense quality4 ,if the occurrence of the latter is in and of itself a mode of knowledge1 it becomes a matter of utmost importance to determine just how the sense organs take part in it4 ,if one is an idealist he responds with joy to any intimation that the process of apprehension 7that is1 speaking truly1 the physical conditions of the occurrence of the sensory datum7 transforms the extra-organic stimulus3 the alteration is testimony somehow to the constitutive nature of mind6 ,but if he is a realist he conceives himself under obligation to show that the external stimulus is transmitted without any alteration and is apprehended just as it is2 color must be shown to be simply1 after all1 a compacting of vibrations--or else the validity of knowledge is impugned6 ,recognize that knowledge is something about the color1 whether about its conditions or causes or consequences or whatever1 and that we don't have to identify color itself with a mode of knowing1 and the situation changes4 ,we know a color when we understand1 just as we know a thunder-storm when we understand4 ,more generally speaking1 the relation of brain-change to consciousness is thought to be an essential part of the problem of knowledge4 ,but if the brain is involved in knowing simply as part of the mechanism of acting1 as the mechanism for co-ordinating partial and competing stimuli into a single scheme of response1 as part of the mechanism of actual experimental inquiry1 there is no miracle about the participation of the brain in knowing4 ,one might as well make a problem of the fact that it takes a hammer to drive a nail and takes a hand to hold the hammer as to make a problem out of the fact that it also requires a physical structure to discover and to adapt the particular acts of holding and striking which are needed4 b7 ,the propositions of physical science are not found among the data of apprehension4 ,mathematical propositions may be disposed of by making them purely a priori2 propositions about sense objects by making them purely a posteriori4#ie ,but physical propositions1 such as make up physics1 chemistry1 biology1 to say nothing of propositions of history1 anthropology1 and society1 are neither one nor the other4 ,i cannot state the case better than ,mr4 ,russell has stated it1 although1 ,i am bound to add1 the stating did not arouse in ,mr4 ,russell any suspicion of the premises with which he was operating4 ,men of science1 for the most part1 are willing to condemn immediate data as 'merely subjective1' while yet maintaining the truth of the physics inferred from those data4 ,but such an attitude1 though it may be capable of justification1 obviously stands in need of it2 and the only justification possible must be one which exhibits matter as a logical construction from sense data4444 ,it is therefore necessary to find some way of bridging the gulf between the world of physics and the world of sense4#if ,i do not see how anyone familiar with the two-world schemes which have played such a part in the history of humanity can read this statement without depression4 ,and if it occurred to one that the sole generating condition of these two worlds is the assumption that sense objects are modes of apprehension or knowledge 7are so intrinsically and not in the use made of them71 he might think it a small price to pay to inquire into the standing of this assumption4 ,for it was precisely the fact that sense perception and physical science appeared historically 7in the seventeenth century7 as rival modes of knowing the same world which led to the conception of sense objects as subjective--since they were so different from the objects of science4 ,unless sense and science had both first been thought of as modes of knowing and then as modes of knowing the same things1 there would not have been the slightest reason for regarding immediate data1 as merely subjective4 ,they would have been natural phenomena1 like any other4 ,that they are phenomena which involve the interaction of an organism with other things is just an important discovery about them1 as is also a discovery about starch in plants4 ,physical science is the knowledge of the world by their means4 ,it is a rival1 not of them1 but of the medley of prior dogmas1 superstitions1 and chance opinions about the world--a medley which grew up and nourished precisely because of absence of a will to explore and of a technique for detecting unambiguous data4 ,that ,mr4 ,russell1 who is a professed realist1 can do no better with the problem 7once committed to the notion that sense objects are of themselves objects of knowledge7 than to hold that although the world of physics is not a legitimate inference from sense data1 it is a permissible logical construction from them--permissible in that it involves no logical inconsistencies--suggests that the pragmatic difference between idealist and realist--of this type--is not very great4 ,from necessary ideal constructions to permissible logical constructions involves considerable difference in technique but no perceptible practical difference4 ,and the point of this family likeness is that both views spring from regarding sense perception and science as ways of knowing the same objects1 and hence as rivals until some scheme of conciliation has been devised4 c7 ,it is but a variant of this problem to pass to what may be called either the ego-centric predicament or the private-public problem4 ,sense data differ from individual to individual4 ,if they are recognized to be natural events1 this variation is no more significant than any change depending upon variation of generating conditions4 ,one does not expect two lumps of wax at different distances from a hot body to be affected exactly alike2 the upsetting thing would be if they were4 ,neither does one expect cast-iron to react exactly as does steel4 ,that organisms1 because of different positions or different internal structures1 should introduce differences in the phenomena which they respectively have a share in producing is a fact of the same nature4 ,but make the sense qualities thus produced not natural events 7which may then be made either objects of inquiry or means of inquiry into something else7 but modes of knowing1 and every such deviation marks a departure from true knowing3 it constitutes an anomaly4 ,taken en masse the deviations are so marked as to lead to the conclusion 7even on the part of a realist like ,mr4 ,russell7 that they constitute a world of private existences1 which1 however1 may be correlated without logical inconsistency with other such worlds4 ,not all realists are ,leibnizian monadists as is ,mr4 ,russell2 ,i do not wish to leave the impression that all come to just this solution4 ,but all who regard sense data as apprehensions have on their hands in some form the problem of the seemingly distorting action exercised by the individual knower upon a public or common thing known or believed in4 ,,iv ,i am not trying to discuss or solve these problems4 ,on the contrary1 ,i am trying to show that these problems exist only because of the identification of a datum determined with reference to control of inference with a self-sufficient knowledge-object4 ,as against this assumption ,i point to the following facts4 ,what is actually given as matter of empirical fact may be indefinitely complicated and diffused4 ,as empirically existent1 perceived objects never constitute the whole scope of the given2 they have a context of indefinite extent in which they are set4 ,to control inference it is necessary to analyze this complex situation--to determine what is data for inference and what is irrelevant4 ,this analysis involves discriminative resolution into more ultimate simples4 ,the resources of experimentation1 all sorts of microscopic1 telescopic1 and registering apparatus1 are called in to perform that analysis4 ,as a result we differentiate not merely visual data from auditory--a discrimination effected by experiments within the reach of everybody--but a vast multitude of visual and auditory data4 ,physics and physiology and anatomy all play a part in the analysis4 ,we even carry the analysis to the point of regarding1 say1 a color as a self-included object unreferred to any other object4 ,we may avoid a false inference by conceiving it1 not as a quality of any object1 but as merely a product of a nervous stimulation and reaction4 ,instead of referring it to a ribbon or piece of paper we may refer it to the organism4 ,but this is only as a part of the technique of suspended inference4 ,we avoid some habitual inference in order to make a more careful inference4 ,thus we escape1 by a straightening out of our logic 7by avoiding erecting a system of logical distinctions and checks into a mythological natural history71 the epistemological problems4 ,we also avoid the contradiction which haunts every epistemological scheme so far propounded4 ,as matter of fact every proposition regarding what is given to sensation or perception is dependent upon the assumption of a vast amount of scientific knowledge which is the result of a multitude of prior analyses1 verifications1 and inferences4 ,what a combination of ,tantalus and ,sisyphus we get when we fancy that we have cleared the slate of all these material implications1 fancy that we have really started with simple and independent givens1 and then try to show how from these original givens we can arrive at the very knowledge which we have all the time employed in the discovery and fixation of the simple sense data6#ig ,,science ,,as ,a ,,practical ,,art ,no one will deny that1 as seen from one angle science is a pursuit1 an enterprise--a mode of practice4 ,it is at least that1 no matter how much more or else it is4 ,in course of the practice of knowing distinctive practical judgments will then naturally be made4 ,especially does this hold good when an intellectual class is developed1 when there is a body of persons working at knowing as another body is working at farming or engineering4 ,moreover1 the instrumentalities of this inquiring class gain in importance for all classes in the degree in which it is realized that success in the conduct of the practice of farming or engineering or medicine depends upon use of the successes achieved in the business of knowing4 ,the importance of the latter is thrown into relief from another angle if we consider the enterprises1 like diplomacy1 politics1 and1 to a considerable extent1 morals1 which do not acknowledge a thoroughgoing and constant dependence upon the practice of science4 ,as ,hobbes was wont to say1 the advantages of a science of morals are most obvious in the evils which we suffer from its lack4 ,to say that something is to be learned1 is to be found out1 is to be ascertained or proved or believed1 is to say that something is to be done4 ,every such proposition in the concrete is a practical proposition4 ,every such proposition of inquiry1 discovery and testing will have then the traits assigned to the class of practical propositions4 ,they imply an incomplete situation going forward to completion1 and the proposition as a specific organ of carrying on the movement4 ,i have not the intention of dwelling at length upon this theme4 ,i wish to raise in as definite and emphatic a way as possible a certain question4 ,suppose that the propositions arising within the practice of knowing and functioning as agencies in its conduct could be shown to present all the distinctions and relations characteristic of the subject-matter of logic3 what would be the conclusion8 ,to an unbiased mind the question probably answers itself3 ,all purely logical terms and propositions fall within the scope of the class of propositions of inquiry as a special form of propositions of practice4 ,my further remarks are not aimed at proving that the case accords with the hypothesis propounded1 but are intended to procure hospitality for the hypothesis4 ,if thinking is the art by which knowledge is practiced1 then the materials with which thinking deals may be supposed1 by analogy with the other arts1 to take on in consequence special shapes4 ,the man who is making a boat will give wood a form which it did not have1 in order that it may serve the purposes to which it is to be put4 ,thinking may then be supposed to give its material the form which will make it amenable to its purpose--attaining knowledge1 or1 as it is ordinarily put1 going from the unknown to the known4 ,that physical analysis and synthesis are included in the processes of investigation of natural objects makes them a part of the practice of knowing4 ,and it makes any general traits which result in consequence of such treatment characters of objects as they are involved in knowledge-getting4 ,that is to say1 if there are any features which natural existences assume in order that inference may be more fertile and more safe than it would otherwise be1 those features correspond to the special traits which would be given to wood in process of constructing a boat4 ,they are manufactured1 without being any worse because of it4 ,the question which ,i raised in the last paragraph may then be restated in this fashion3 ,are there such features8 ,if there are1 are they like those characters which books on logic talk about8 ,comparison with language may help us4 ,language--,i confine myself for convenience to spoken language--consists of sounds4 ,but it does not consist simply of those sounds which issue from the human organs prior to the attempt to communicate4 ,it has been said that an ,american baby before talking makes almost every sound found in any language4 ,but elimination takes place4 ,and so does intensification4 ,certain sounds originally slurred over are made prominent2 the baby has to work for them and the work is one which he neither undertakes nor accomplishes except under the incitation of others4 ,language is chiefly marked off1 however1 by articulation2 by the arrangement of what is selected into an orderly sequence of vowels and consonants with certain rules of stress1 etc4 ,it may fairly be said that speech is a manufactured article3 it consists of natural ebullitions of sound which have been shaped for the sake of being effective instrumentalities of a purpose4 ,for the most part the making has gone on under the stress of the necessities of communication with little deliberate control4 ,works on phonetics1 dictionaries1 grammars1 rhetorics1 etc41 mark some participation of deliberate intention in the process of manufacture4 ,if we bring written language into the account1 we should find the conscious factor extended somewhat4 ,but making1 shaping for an end1 there is1 whether with or without conscious control4 ,now while there is something in the antecedent properties of sound which enters into the determination of speech1 the worth of speech is in no way measured by faithfulness to these antecedent properties4 ,it is measured only by its efficiency and economy in realizing the special results for which it is constructed4 ,written language need not look like sounds any more than sounds look like objects4 ,it must represent articulate sounds1 but faithful representation is wholly a matter of carrying the mind to the same outcome1 of exercising the same function1 not of resemblance or copying4 ,original structure limits what may be made out of anything3 one cannot 7at least at present7 make a silk purse out of pigs' bristles4 ,but this conditioning relationship is very different from one in which the antecedent existences are a model or prototype to which the consequent must be servilely faithful4 ,the boatmaker must take account of the grain and strength of his wood4 ,to take account of1 to reckon with1 is a very different matter1 however1 from repetition or literal loyalty4 ,the measure is found in the consequences for which existences are used4 ,i wish1 of course1 to suggest that logical traits are just features of original existences as they have been worked over for use in inference1 as the traits of manufactured articles are qualities of crude materials modified for specific purposes4 ,upon the whole1 past theories have vibrated between treating logical traits as subjective1 something resident in mind 7mind being thought of as an immaterial or psychical existence independent of natural things and events71 and ascribing ontological pre-existence to them4 ,thus far in the history of thought1 each method has flourished awhile and then called out a reaction to its opposite4 ,the reification 7,i use the word here without prejudice7 of logical traits has taken both an ,idealistic form 7because of emphasis upon their spiritual or ideal nature and stuff7 and a ,realistic one1 due to emphasis upon their immediate apprehension and givenness4 ,that mathematics have been from ,plato to ,descartes and contemporary analytic realism the great provocative of ,realistic ,idealisms is a familiar fact4 ,the hypothesis here propounded is a via media4 ,what has been overlooked is the reality and importance of art and its works4 ,the tools and works of art are neither mental1 subjective things1 nor are they antecedent entities like crude or raw material4 ,they are the latter shaped for a purpose4 ,it is impossible to overstate their objectivity from the standpoint of their existence and their efficacy within the operations in question2 nor their objectivity in the sense of their dependence upon prior natural existences whose traits have to be taken account of1 or reckoned with1 by the operations of art4 ,in the case of the art of inference1 the art securely of going from the given to the absent1 the dependence of mind upon inference1 the fact that wherever inference occurs we have a conscious agent--one who recognizes1 plans1 invents1 seeks out1 deliberates1 anticipates1 and who1 reacting to anticipations1 fears1 hates1 desires1 etc4--explains the theories which1 because of misconception of the nature of mind and consciousness1 have labeled logical distinctions psychical and subjective4 ,in short1 the theory shows why logical features have been made into ontological entities and into mental states4 ,to elaborate this thesis would be to repeat what has been said in all the essays of this volume4 ,i wish only to call attention to certain considerations which may focus other discussions upon this hypothesis4 #a4 ,the existence of inference is a fact1 a fact as certain and unquestioned as the existence of eyes or ears or the growth of plants1 or the circulation of the blood4 ,one observes it taking place everywhere where human beings exist4 ,a student of the history of man finds that history is composed of beliefs1 institutions1 and customs which are inexplicable without acts of inference4 ,this fact of inference is as much a datum--a hard fact--for logical theory as any sensory quality whatsoever4 ,it is something men do as they walk1 chew1 or jump4 ,there is nothing a priori or ideological about it4 ,it is just a brute empirically observable event4 #b4 ,its importance is almost as conspicuous as its existence4 ,every act of human life1 not springing from instinct or mechanical habit1 contains it2 most habits are dependent upon some amount of it for their formation1 as they are dependent upon it for their readaptation to novel circumstances4 ,from the humblest act of daily life to the most intricate calculations of science and the determination and execution of social1 legal1 and political policies1 things are used as signs1 indications1 or evidence from which one proceeds to something else not yet directly given4 #c4 ,the act of inferring takes place naturally1 i4e41 without intention4 ,it is at first something we do1 not something which we mean to do4 ,we do it as we breathe or walk or gesture4 ,only after it is done do we notice it and reflect upon it--and the great mass of men no more reflect upon it after its occurrence than they reflect upon the process of walking and try to discover its conditions and mechanism4 ,that an individual1 an animal organism1 a man or a woman performs the acts is to say something capable of direct proof through appeal to observation2 to say that something called mind1 or consciousness does it is itself to employ inference and dubious inference4 ,the fact of inference is much surer1 in other words1 than that of a particular inference1 such as that to something called reason or consciousness1 in connection with it2 save as mind is but another word for the fact of inference1 in which case of course it cannot be re-referred to as its cause1 source1 or author4 ,moreover1 by all principles of science1 inference cannot be referred to mind or consciousness as its condition1 unless there is independent proof of the existence of that mind to which it is referred4 ,prima facie we are conscious or aware of inference precisely as we are of anything else1 not by introspection of something within the very consciousness which is supposed to be its source1 but by observation of something taking place in the world--as we are conscious of walking after we have walked4 ,after it has been done naturally--or unconsciously--it may be done consciously1 that is1 with intent or on purpose4 ,but this means that it is done with consciousness 7whatever consciousness may be discovered to mean71 not that it is done by consciousness4 ,now if other natural events characteristic only 7so far as can be ascertained7 of highly organized beings are marked by unique or by distinctive traits1 there is good ground for the assumption that inference will be so marked4 ,as we do not find the circulation of blood or the stimulation of nerves in a stone1 and as we expect as a matter of course to find peculiar conditions1 qualities1 and consequences in the being where such operations occur1 so we do not find the act of inference in a stone1 and we expect peculiar conditions1 qualities1 and consequences in whatever beings perform the act4 ,unless1 in other words1 all the ordinary canons of inquiry are suspended1 inference is not an isolated nor a merely formal event4 ,as against the latter1 it has its own distinctive structure and properties2 as against the former1 it has specific generating conditions and specific results4 #d4 ,possibly all this seems too obvious for mention4 ,but there is often a virtual conspiracy in philosophy1 not to mention obvious things nor to dwell upon them3 otherwise remote speculations might be brought to a sudden halt4 ,the point of these commonplaces resides in the push they may give anyone to engage in a search for distinctive features in the act of inference4 ,the search may perhaps be best initiated by noting the seeming inconsistency between what has been said about inference as an art and inference as a natural1 unpremeditated occurrence4 ,the obvious function of spontaneous inference is to bring before an agent absent considerations to which he may respond as he otherwise responds to the stimulating force of the given situation4 ,to infer rain is to enable one to behave now as given conditions would not otherwise enable him to conduct himself4 ,this instigation to behave toward the remote in space or time is the primary trait of the inferential act2 descriptively speaking1 the act consists in taking up an attitude of response to an absent thing as if it were present4 ,but just because the thing is absent1 the attitude taken may be either irrelevant and positively harmful or extremely pertinent and advantageous4 ,we may infer rain when rain is not going to happen1 and acting upon the inference be worse off than if there had been no inference4 ,or we may make preparations1 which we would not otherwise have made2 the rain may come1 and the inference save our lives--as the ark saved ,noah4 ,inference brings1 in short1 truth and falsity into the world1 just as definitely as the circulation of the blood brings its distinctive consequences1 both advantages and liabilities into the world1 or as the existence of banking brings with it consequences of business extension and of bankruptcy not previously existent4 ,if the reader objects to the introduction of the terms truth and falsity1 ,i am perfectly willing to leave the choice of words to him1 provided the fact is recognized that through inference men are capable of a kind of success and exposed to a kind of failure not otherwise possible3 dependent upon the fact that inference takes absent things as being in a certain real continuum with present things1 so that our attitude toward the latter is bound up with our reaction to the former as parts of the same situation4 ,and in any event1 ,i wish to protest against a possible objection to the introduction of the terms false and true4 ,it may be said that inference is not responsible for the occurrence of errors and truths1 because these accompany simple apprehensions where there is no inference3 as when ,i see a snake which isn't there--or any other case which may appear to the objector to afford an illustration of his point4 ,the objection illustrates my point4 ,to affirm a snake is to affirm potentialities going beyond what is actually given2 it says that what is given is going to do something--the doing characteristic of a snake1 so that we are to react to the given as to a snake4 ,or if we take the case of a face in the cloud recognized as a phantasy2 then 7to say nothing of in the cloud which involves reference beyond the given7 phantasy1 dream1 equally means a reference to objects and considerations not given as the actual datum is given4 ,we have not got very far with our question of distinctive1 unique traits called into existence by inference1 but we have got far enough to have light upon what is called the transcendence of knowledge4 ,all inference is a going beyond the assuredly present to an absent4 ,hence it is a more or less precarious journey4 ,it is transcending limits of security of immediate response4 ,the stone which reacts only to stimuli of the present1 not of the future1 cannot make the mistakes which a being reacting to a future taken to be connected with the present is sure to make4 ,but it is important to note just what this transcendence consists in4 ,it has nothing to do with transcending mental states to arrive at an external object4 ,it is behaving to the given situation as involving something not given4 ,it is ,robinson ,crusoe going from a seen foot to an unseen man1 not from a mental state to something unmental4 #e4 ,the mistakes and failures resulting from inference constitute the ground for transition from natural spontaneous performance to a technique or deliberate art of inference4 ,there is something humorous about the discussion of the problem of error as if it were a rare or exceptional thing--an anomaly--when the barest glance at human history shows that mistakes have been the rule1 and that truth lies at the bottom of a well4 ,as to inferences bound up with barely keeping alive1 man has had to effect a considerable balance of good guesses over bad4 ,aside from this somewhat narrow field1 the original appearance of inference upon the scene probably added to the interest of life rather than to its efficiency4 ,if the classic definition of man as a rational animal means simply an inferring or guessing animal1 it applies to the natural man1 for it allows for the guesses being mostly wrong4 ,if it is used with its customary eulogistic connotations1 it applies only to man chastened to the use of a hardly won and toilsome art4 ,if it alleges that man has any natural preference for a reasonable inference or that the rationality of an inference is a measure of its hold upon him1 it is grotesquely wrong4 ,to propagate this error is to encourage man in his most baleful illusion1 and to postpone the day of an effective and widespread adoption of a perfected art of knowing4 ,summarily put1 the waste and loss consequent upon the natural happening of inference led man1 slowly and grudgingly1 to the adoption of safeguards in its performance4 ,in some part1 the scope of which is easily exaggerated1 man has come to attribute many of the ills from which he suffers to his own premature1 inept1 and unguarded performing of inference1 instead of to fate1 bad luck1 and accident4 ,in some things1 and to some extent in all things1 he has invented and perfected an art of inquiry3 a system of checks and tests to be used before the conclusion of inference is categorically affirmed4 ,its nature has been considered in many other places in these pages1 but it may prove instructive to restate it in this context4 a7 ,nothing is less adapted to a successful accomplishing of an inference than the subject-matter from which it ordinarily fares forth4 ,that subject-matter is a nest of obscurities and ambiguities4 ,the ordinary warnings against trusting to imagination1 the bad name which has come intellectually to attach to fancy1 are evidences that anything may suggest anything4 ,regarding most of the important happenings in life no inference has been too extravagant to obtain followers and influence action1 because subject-matter was so variegated and complex that any objects which it suggested had a prima facie plausibility4 ,that every advance in knowledge has been effected by using agencies which break up a complex subject-matter into independent variables 7from each of which a distinct inference may be drawn71 and by attacking each one of these things by every conceivable tool for further resolution so as to make sure we are dealing with something so simple as to be unambiguous1 is the report of the history of science4 ,it is sometimes held that knowledge comes ultimately to a necessity of belief1 or acceptance1 which is the equivalent of an incapacity to think otherwise than so and so4 ,well1 even in the case of such an apparently simple self-evident thing as a red1 this inability1 if it is worth anything1 is a residuum from experimental analysis4 ,we do not believe in the thing as red 7whenever there is a need of scientific testing7 till we have exhausted all kinds of active attack and find the red still resisting and persisting4 ,ordinarily we move the head2 we shade the eyes2 we turn the thing over2 we take it to a different light4 ,the use of lens1 prism1 or whatever device1 is simply carrying farther the use of like methods as of physical resolution4 ,whatever endures all these active 7not mental7 attacks1 we accept--pending invention of more effective weapons4 ,to make sure that a given fact is just and such a shade of red is1 one may say1 a final triumph of scientific method4 ,to turn around and treat it as something naturally or psychologically given is a monstrous superstition4 ,when assured1 such a simple datum is for the sake of guarding the act of inference4 ,color may mean a lot of things2 any red may mean a lot of things2 such things are ambiguous2 they afford unreliable evidence or signs4 ,to get the color down to the last touch of possible discrimination is to limit its range of testimony2 ideally1 it is to secure a voice which says but one thing and says that unmistakably4 ,its simplicity is not identical with isolation1 but with specified relationship4 ,thus the hard facts1 the brute data1 the simple qualities or ideas1 the sense elements of traditional and of contemporary logic1 get placed and identified within the art of controlling inference4 ,the allied terms self-evident1 sensory truths1 simple apprehensions have their meanings unambiguously determined in this same context2 while apart from it they are the source of all kinds of error4 ,they are no longer notions to conjure with4 ,they express the last results attainable by present physical methods of discriminative analysis employed in the search for dependable data for inference4 ,improve the physical means of experimentation1 improve the microscope or the registering apparatus or the chemical reagent1 and they may be replaced tomorrow by new1 simple apprehensions of simple and ultimate data4 b7 ,natural or spontaneous inference depends very largely upon the habits of the individual in whom inferring takes place4 ,these habits depend in turn very largely upon the customs of the social group in which he has been brought up4 ,an eclipse suggests very different things according to the rites1 ceremonies1 legends1 traditions1 etc41 of the group to which the spectator belongs4 ,the average layman in a civilized group may have no more personal science than an ,australian ,bushman1 but the legends which determine his reactions are different4 ,his inference is better1 neither because of superior intellectual capacity1 nor because of more careful personal methods of knowing1 but because his instruction has been superior4 ,the instruction of a scientific inquirer in the best scientific knowledge of his day is just as much a part of the control 7or art7 of inference as is the technique of observational analysis which he uses4 ,as the bulk of prior ascertainments increases1 the tendency is to identify this stock of learning1 this store of achieved truth1 with knowledge4 ,there is no objection to this identification save as it leads the logician or epistemologist to ignore that which made it knowledge 7that which gives it a right to the title71 and as a consequence to fall into two errors3 one1 overlooking its function in the guidance and handling of future inferences2 the other1 confusing the mere act of reference to what is known 7known so far as it has accrued from prior tested inquiries7 with knowing4 ,to remind myself of what is known as to the topic with which ,i am dealing is an indispensable performance1 but to call this reminder knowing 7as the presentative realist usually does7 is to confuse a psychological event with a logical achievement4 ,it is from misconception of this act of reminding one's self of what is known1 as a check in some actual inquiry1 that arise most of the fallacies about simple acquaintance1 mere apprehension1 etc4--the fallacies which eliminate inquiry and inferring from knowledge4 c7 ,the art of inference gives rise to specific features characterizing the inferred thing4 ,the natural man reacts to the suggested thing as he would to something present4 ,that is1 he tends to accept it uncritically4 ,the man called up by the footprint on the sand is just as real a man as the footprint is a real footprint4 ,it is a man1 not the idea of a man1 which is indicated4 ,what a thing means is another thing2 it doesn't mean a meaning4 ,the only difference is that the thing indicated is farther off1 or more concealed1 and hence 7probably7 more mysterious1 more powerful and awesome1 on that account4 ,the man indicated to ,crusoe by the footprints was like a man of menacing powers seen at a distance through a telescope4 ,things naturally inferred are accepted1 in other words1 by the natural man on altogether too realistic a basis for adequate control2 they impose themselves too directly and irretrievably4 ,there are no alternatives save either acceptance or rejection in toto4 ,what is needed for control is some device by which they can be treated for just what they are1 namely1 inferred objects which1 however assured as objects of prior experiences1 are uncertain as to their existence in connection with the object from which present inference sets out4 ,while more careful inspection of the given object--to see if it be really a footprint1 how fresh1 etc4--may do much for safe-guarding inference2 and while forays into whatever else is known may help1 there is still need for something else4 ,we need some method of freely examining and handling the object in its status as an inferred object4 ,this means some way of detaching it1 as it were1 from the particular act of inference in which it presents itself4 ,without some such detachment1 ,crusoe can never get into a free and effective relation with the man indicated by the footprint4 ,he can only1 so to speak1 go on repeating1 with continuously increasing fright1 ,there's a man about1 there's a man about4 ,the man needs to be treated1 not as man1 but as something having a merely inferred and hence potential status2 as a meaning or thought1 or idea4 ,there is a great difference between meaning and a meaning4 ,meaning is simply a function of the situation3 this thing means that thing3 meaning is this relationship4 ,a meaning is something quite different2 it is not a function1 but a specific entity1 a peculiar thing1 namely the man as suggested4 ,words are the great instrument of translating a relation of inference existing between two things into a new kind of thing which can be operated with on its own account2 the term of discourse or reflection is the solution of the requirement for greater flexibility and liberation4 ,let me repeat3 ,crusoe's inquiry can play freely around and about the man inferred from the footprint only as he can1 so to say1 get away from the immediate suggestive force of the footprint4 ,as it originally stands1 the man suggested is on the same coercive level as the suggestive footprint4 ,they are related1 tied together4 ,but a gesture1 a sound1 may be used as a substitute for the thing inferred4 ,it exists independently of the footprint and may therefore be thought about and ideally experimented with irrespective of the footprint4 ,it at once preserves the meaning-force of the situation and detaches it from the immediacy of the situation4 ,it is a meaning1 an idea4 ,here we have1 ,i submit1 the explanation of notions1 forms1 essences1 terms1 subsistences1 ideas1 meanings1 etc4 ,they are surrogates of the objects of inference of such a character that they may be elaborated and manipulated exactly as primary things may be1 so far as inference is concerned4 ,they can be brought into relation with one another1 quite irrespective of the things which originally suggested them4 ,without such free play reflective inquiry is mockery1 and control of inference an impossibility4 ,when a speck of light suggests to the astronomer a comet1 he would have nothing to do but either to accept the inferred object as a real one1 or to reject it as a mere fancy unless he could treat comet for the time being not as a thing at all1 but as a meaning1 a conception2 a meaning having1 moreover1 by connection with other meanings1 implications--meanings consequent from it4 ,unless a meaning is an inferred object1 detached and fixed as a term capable of independent development1 what sort of a ghostly ,being is it8 ,except on the basis stated1 what is the transition from the function of meaning to a meaning as an entity in reasoning8 ,and1 once more1 unless there is such a transition1 is reasoning possible8 ,cats have claws and teeth and fur4 ,they do not have implications4 ,no physical thing has implications4 ,the term cat has implications4 ,how can this difference be explained8 ,on the ground that we cannot use the cat object inferred from given indications in such a way as will test the inference and make it fruitful1 helpful1 unless we can detach it from its existential dependence upon the particular things which suggest it4 ,we need to know what a cat would be if it were there2 what other things would also be indicated if the cat is really indicated4 ,we therefore create a new object3 we take something to stand for the cat-in-its-status-as-inferred in contrast with the cat as a live thing4 ,a sound or a visible mark is the ordinary mechanism for producing such a new object4 ,whatever the physical means employed1 we now have a new object2 a term1 a meaning1 a notion1 an essence1 a form or species1 according to the terminology which may be in vogue4 ,it is as much a specific existence as any sound or mark is4 ,but it is a mark which notes1 concentrates1 and records an outcome of an inference which is not yet accepted and affirmed4 ,that is to say1 it designates an object which is not yet to be reacted to as one reacts to the given stimulus1 but which is an object of further examination and inquiry1 a medium of a postponed conclusion and of investigation continued till better grounds for affirming an object 7making a definite1 unified response7 are given4 ,a term is an object so far as that object is undergoing shaping in a directed act of inquiry4 ,it may be called a possible object or a hypothetical object4 ,such objects do not walk or bite or scratch1 but they are nevertheless actually present as the vital agencies of reflection4 ,if we but forget where they live and operate--within the event of controlled inference--we have on our hands all the mysteries of the double world of existence and essence1 particular and universal1 thing and idea1 ordinary life and science4 ,for the world of science1 especially of mathematical science1 is the world of considerations which have approved themselves to be effectively regulative of the operations of inference4 ,it is easier to wash with ordinary water than with ,h#b,o1 and there is a marked difference between falling off a building and #a_/b;gt#b4 ,but ,h#b,o and #a_/b;gt#b are as potent for the distinctive act of inference--as genuine and distinctive an act as washing the hands or rolling down hill--as ordinary water and falling are impotent4 ,scientific men can handle these things-of-inference precisely as the blacksmith handles his tools4 ,they are not thoughts as they are ordinarily used1 not even in the logical sense of thought4 ,they are rather things whose manipulation 7as the blacksmith manipulates his tools7 yield knowledge--or methods of knowledge--with a minimum of recourse to thinking and a maximum of efficiency4 ,when one considers the importance of the enterprise of knowledge1 it is not surprising that appropriate tools have been devised for carrying it on1 and that these tools have no prototypes in pre-existent materials4 ,they are real objects1 but they are just the real objects which they are and not some other objects4 ,,theory ,,and ,,practice ,our last paragraphs have touched upon the nature of science4 ,they contain1 by way of intimation1 an explanation of the distance which lies between the things of daily intercourse and the terms of science4 ,controlled inference is science1 and science is1 accordingly1 a highly specialized industry4 ,it is such a specialized mode of practice that it does not appear to be a mode of practice at all4 ,this high specialization is part of the reason for the current antithesis of theory and practice1 knowledge and conduct1 the other part being the survival of the ancient conception of knowledge as intuitive and dialectical--the conception which is set forth in the ,aristotelian logic4 ,starting from the hypothesis that the art of controlled inference requires for its efficient exercise specially adapted entities1 it follows that the various sciences are the various forms which the industry of controlled inquiry assumes4 ,it follows that the conceptions and formulations of the sciences--physical and mathematical--concern things which have been reshaped in view of the exigencies of regulated and fertile inference4 ,to get things into the estate where such inference is practicable1 many qualities of the water and air1 cats and dogs1 stones and stars1 of daily intercourse with the world have been dropped or depressed4 ,much that was trivial or remote has been elevated and exaggerated4 ,neither the omissions nor the accentuations are arbitrary4 ,they are purposeful4 ,they represent the changes in the things of ordinary life which are needed to safeguard the important business of inference4 ,there is then a great difference between the entities of science and the things of daily life4 ,this may be fully acknowledged4 ,but unless the admission is accompanied by an ignoring of the function of inference1 it creates no problem of conciliation1 no need of apologizing for either one or the other4 ,it generates no problem of the real and the apparent4 ,the real or true objects of science are those which best fulfil the demands of secure and fertile inference4 ,to arrive at them is such a difficult operation1 there are so many specious candidates clamoring for the office1 that it is no wonder that when the objects suitable for inference are constituted1 they tend to impose themselves as the real objects1 in comparison with which the things of ordinary life are but impressions made upon us 7according to much modern thought71 or defective samples of ,being--according to much of ancient thought4 ,but one has only to note that their genuinely characteristic feature is fitness for the aims of inference to awaken from the nightmare of all such problems4 ,they differ from the things of the common world of action and association as the means and ends of one occupation differ from those of another4 ,the difference is not that which exists between reality and appearance1 but is that between the subject-matter of crude occupations and of a highly specialized and difficult art1 upon the success of which 7so it is discovered7 the progress of other occupations ultimately depends4 ,the entities of science are not only from the scientist2 they are also for him4 ,they express1 that is1 not only the outcome of reflective inquiries1 but express them in the particular form in which they can enter most directly and efficiently into subsequent inquiries4 ,the fact that they are sustained within the universe of inquiry accounts for their remoteness from the things of daily life1 the latter being promptly precipitated out of suspense in such solutions4 ,that most of the immediate qualities of things 7including the so-called secondary qualities7 are dropped signifies that such qualities have not turned out to be fruitful for inference4 ,that mathematical1 mechanical1 and primary distinctions and relations have come to constitute the proper subject-matter of science signifies that they represent such qualities of original things as are most manipular for knowledge-getting or assured and extensive inference4 ,consider what a hard time the scientific man had in getting away from other qualities1 and how the more immediate qualities have been pressed upon him from all quarters1 and it is not surprising that he inclines to think of the intellectually useful properties as alone real and to relegate all others to a quasi-illusory field4 ,but his victory is now sufficiently achieved so that this tension may well relax2 it may be acknowledged that the difference between scientific entities and ordinary things is one of function1 the former being selected and arranged for the successful conduct of inferential knowings4 ,i conclude with an attempt to show how bootless the ordinary antithesis between knowledge 7or theory7 and practice becomes when we recognize that it really involves only a contrast between the kinds of judgments appropriate to ordinary modes of practice and those appropriate to the specialized industry of knowledge-getting4 ,it is not true that to insist that scientific propositions fall within the domain of practice is to depreciate them4 ,on its face1 the insistence means simply that all knowledge involves experimentation1 with whatever appliances are suited to the problem in hand1 of an active and physical type4 ,instead of this doctrine leading to a low estimate of knowledge1 the contrary is the case4 ,this art of experimental thinking turns out to give the key to the control and development of other modes of practice4 ,i have touched elsewhere in these essays upon the way in which knowledge is the instrument of regulation of our human undertakings1 and ,i have also pointed out that intrinsic increments of meaning accrue in consequence of thinking4 ,i wish here to point how that mode of practice which is called theorizing emancipates experience--how it makes for steady progress4 ,no matter how much specialized skill improves1 we are restricted in the degree in which our ends remain constant or fixed4 ,significant progress1 progress which is more than technical1 depends upon ability to foresee new and different results and to arrange conditions for their effectuation4 ,science is the instrument of increasing our technique in attaining results already known and cherished4 ,more important yet1 it is the method of emancipating us from enslavement to customary ends1 the ends established in the past4 ,let me borrow from political philosophy a kind of caricature of the facts4 ,as social philosophers used to say that the state came into existence when individuals agreed to surrender some of their native personal rights for the sake of getting the advantages of non-interference and aid from others who made a like surrender1 so we might say that science began when men gave up the claim to form the structure of knowledge each from himself as a center and measure of meaning--when there was an agreement to take an impersonal standpoint4 ,non-scientific modes of practice1 left to their natural growth1 represent1 in other words1 arrangements of objects which cluster about the self1 and which are closely tied down to the habits of the self4 ,science or theory means a system of objects detached from any particular personal standpoint1 and therefore available for any and every possible personal standpoint4 ,even the exigencies of ordinary social life require a slight amount of such detachment or abstraction4 ,i must neglect my own peculiar ends enough to take some account of my neighbor if ,i am going to be intelligible to him4 ,i must at least find common ground4 ,science systematizes and indefinitely extends this principle4 ,it takes its stand1 not with what is common with some particular neighbor living at this especial date in this particular village1 but with any possible neighbor in the wide stretches of time and space4 ,and it does so by the mere fact that it is continually reshaping its peculiar objects with an eye single to availability in inference4 ,the more abstract1 the more impersonal1 the more impartially objective are its objects1 the greater the variety and scope of inference made possible4 ,every street of experience which is laid out by science has its tracks for transportation1 and every line issues transfer checks to every other line4 ,you and ,i may keep running in certain particular ruts1 but conditions are provided for somebody else to foresee--or infer--new combinations and new results4 ,the depersonalizing of the things of everyday practice becomes the chief agency of their repersonalizing in new and more fruitful modes of practice4 ,the paradox of theory and practice is that theory is with respect to all other modes of practice the most practical of all things1 and the more impartial and impersonal it is1 the more truly practical it is4 ,and this is the sole paradox4 ,but lest the man of science1 the man of dominantly reflective habits1 be puffed up with his own conceits1 he must bear in mind that practical application--that is1 experiment--is a condition of his own calling1 that it is indispensable to the institution of knowledge or truth4 ,consequently1 in order that he keep his own balance1 it is needed that his findings be everywhere applied4 ,the more their application is confined within his own special calling1 the less meaning do the conceptions possess1 and the more exposed they are to error4 ,the widest possible range of application is the means of the deepest verification4 ,as long as the specialist hugs his own results they are vague in meaning and unsafe in content4 ,that individuals in every branch of human endeavor should be experimentalists engaged in testing the findings of the theorist is the sole final guaranty for the sanity of the theorist4 ,,footnotes3 #gh ,scientific ,method in ,philosophy1 p4 #eg4 #gi ,the analytic realists have shown a peculiar disinclination to discuss the nature of future consequences as terms of propositions4 ,they certainly are not identical with the mental act of referring to them2 they are objective to it4 ,do they1 therefore1 already subsist in some realm of subsistence8 ,or is subsistence but a name for the fact of logical reference1 leaving the determination of the meaning of subsistence dependent upon a determination of the meaning of logical8 ,more generally1 what is the position of analytic realism about the future8 #hj ,supposing the question to be that of some molten state of the earth in past geologic ages4 ,taken as the complete subject-matter of a proposition--or science--the facts discovered cannot be regarded as causative of1 or a mechanism of1 the appearance of life4 ,for by definition they form a closed system2 to introduce reference to a future event is to deny the definition4 ,contrariwise1 a statement of that past condition of the earth as a mechanical condition of the later emergence of life means that that past stage is taken not merely as past1 but as in process of transition to its future1 as in process of alteration in the direction of life4 ,change in this direction is an integral part of a statement of the early stage of the earth's history4 ,a purely geologic statement may be quite accurate in its own universe of discourse and yet quite incomplete and hence inaccurate in another universe of discourse4 ,that is to say1 a geologist's propositions may accurately set forth a prior state of things1 while ignoring any reference to a later state entailed by them4 ,but a would-be philosophy may not ignore the implied future4 #ha ,philosophical ,essays1 pp4 #ajd1 #aje4 #hb ,sixth ,meditation4 #hc ,principles of ,philosophy1 p4 #ij4 #hd ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 ,part ,,iii1 sec4 iii4 #he ,it is perhaps poor tactics on my part to complicate this matter with anything else4 ,but it is evident that passions and pains and pleasures may be used as evidences of something beyond themselves 7as may the fact of being more than five feet high7 and so get a representative or cognitive status4 ,is there not also a prima facie presumption that all sensory qualities are of themselves bare existences or occurrences without cognitive pretension1 and that they acquire the latter status as signs or evidence of something else8 ,epistemological idealists or realists who admit the non-cognitive character of pleasure and pain would seem to be under special obligations carefully to consider the thesis of the non-cognitive nature of all sensory qualities except as they are employed as indications or indexes of some other thing4 ,this recognition frees logic from the epistemological discussion of secondary qualities4 #hf ,to readers who have grasped the thought of my argument1 it may not be meaningless to say that the typical idealistic fallacy is to import into the direct experience the results of the intellectual or reflective examination1 while that of realism is to treat the reflective operation as dealing with precisely the same subject-matter as the original act was concerned with--taking the good of reason and the good of immediate behavior to be the same sort of things4 ,and both fallacies will result from any assimilation of two different acts to one another through giving them both the title knowledge1 and hence treating the difference between them as simply the difference between a direct apprehension and a mediated one4 #hg ,analytic realism ought to be favorable to such a hedonism2 the fact that present-day analytic realists are not favorable would seem to indicate that they have not taken their logic seriously enough1 but have been restrained1 by practical motives1 from applying it thoroughly4 ,to say that the moral life presents a high degree of organization and integration is to say something which is true1 but is also to say something which by the analytic logic calls for its resolution into ultimate and independent simples4 ,unless they accept the pleasures and pains of ,bentham as such ultimates1 they are bound to present acceptable substitutes4 ,but here they tend to shift their logic and to make the fulfilment of some organization 7variously defined7 the standard good4 ,consistency would then admit the hypothesis that in all cases an eventual organization rather than antecedent simples supply the standard of knowledge4 ,meanwhile the term fulfilment 7or any similar term7 stands as an acknowledgment that the organization in question is not something ontologically prior but is one yet to be achieved4 #hh ,it must not be overlooked that a mere reminder of an end previously settled upon may operate as a sufficient stimulus to action4 ,it is probably this act of calling the end to mind which the realist confuses with knowledge1 and therefore terms apprehension4 ,but there is nothing cognitive about it1 any more than there is in pressing a button to give the signal for an act already decided upon4 #hi ,upholders of this view generally disguise the assumption of repetition by the notion that what is judged is progress in the direction of approximation to an eternal value4 ,but as matter of fact1 progress is never judged 7as ,i have had repeated occasion to point out7 by reference to a transcendent eternal value1 but in reference to the success of the end-in-view in meeting the needs and conditions of the specific situation--a surrender of the doctrine in favor of the one set forth in the text4 ,logically1 the notion of progress as approximation has no place4 ,the thesis should read that we always try to repeat a given value1 but always fail as a matter of fact4 ,and constant failure is a queer name for progress4 #ij ,see ,,ix and ,x ante4 #ia ,i use the term image in the sense of optics1 not of psychology4 #ib ,that something of the cognitive1 something of the sign or term function1 enters in as a catalyzer1 so to speak1 in even the most aesthetic experiences1 seems to be altogether probable1 but that question it is not necessary to raise here4 #ic ,the superstition that whatever influences the action of a conscious being must be an unconscious sensation or perception1 if it is not a conscious one1 should be summarily dismissed4 ,we are active beings from the start and are naturally1 wholly apart from consciousness1 engaged in redirecting our action in response to changes in our surroundings4 ,alternative possibilities1 and hence an indeterminate situation1 change direct response into a response mediated by a perception as a sign of possibilities1 that is1 a physiological stimulus into a perceived quality3 a sensory datum4 #id ,compare ,woodbridge1 ,journal of ,philosophy and ,psychology1 ,x1 #e4 #ie ,see ,russell1 ,scientific ,method in ,philosophy1 p4 #ec4 #if ,ibid41 p4 #aja4 #ig ,see the essay on ,the ,existence of the ,world as a ,logical ,problem4 ,,index ,analysis1 #cg ff41 #dbf ff4 ,see also ,data2 ,sensations4 ,appreciation1 #cea ff41 #cid4 ,apprehension1 simple 7also ,acquaintance71 #ae1 #ceb1 #chj1 #djh1 #dbj1 #dcj4 ,see also ,inference2 ,perception2 ,presentationalism4 ,behavior1 #bba1 #cac1 #ced4 ,see also ,consequences2 ,practical4 ,bosanquet1 ,b41 #adi n4 ,bush1 ,w4 ,t41 #bba n41 #bej n4 ,conflict1 as stimulus to thinking1 #aj ff41 #bj1 #bd1 ,,iii1 #acf ff41 #afc1 #bde1 #cda4 ,see also ,practical4 ,consciousness1 #ah1 #bba1 #bbb1 #bcd1 #bdf4 ,consequences1 #ca1 #bac1 #cjh1 #cba ff41 #ccj ff4 ,constitutive thought1 #acj4 ,data1 #db ff41 #hg1 ,,iv1 ,,viii1 ,,xi1 #cde1 #dja1 #dbg4 ,see also ,sensations4 ,deduction1 #ec1 #dce ff4 ,descartes1 #cej4 ,design1 #cad ff4 ,desire1 #cfd ff4 ,dialectic1 #baf4 ,doubt1 #ahd1 #ahi1 #aie1 #bjf1 #bab1 #baf1 #bdh4 ,see also ,conflict4 ,ego-centric predicament1 #bfc1 #bff1 #daj4 ,see also ,subjectivity4 ,ends and means1 #cdj ff41 #cfg ff41 #cga ff4 ,error1 #cih ff4 ,essence1 #di1 #eh1 #ga1 #bhh1 #dca ff4 ,see also ,meaning4 ,evidence1 #cf1 #ci ff41 #bbf1 #bfj1 #cib1 #djc4 ,see also ,inference4 ,experience1 #b ff41 #aj n41 #fa ff41 #ga ff41 #gi1 #abb1 #acf n41 #bda1 #bih1 #ccd1 #cdi1 #dab4 ,experiment4 ,see ,experience4 ,facts4 ,see ,data4 ,genetic1 #ff1 #ib1 #aec4 ,hedonism1 #cge ff4 ,hegel1 #aia4 ,holt1 ,e4 ,b41 #aa n4 ,hume1 #bba n41 #cej4 ,hypothesis4 ,see ,idea2 ,meaning4 ,idea1 #aab1 #aaf1 #aci1 #agi1 #ahe ff41 ,,vii1 ,,viii1 #bci ff41 #cjd1 #dca4 ,see also ,meaning4 ,idealism1 #bj ff41 #acj ff41 #bcc ff41 #bfg ff41 #cdc1 #ceh n4 ,illusions1 #cif ff4 ,image1 #adb n41 #bea1 #cij4 ,implication1 #eb n41 #dcc4 ,see also ,inference4 ,indeterminate1 #ccd4 ,inference1 #cf1 #bji ff41 #bbj1 #bei1 #bgd n41 #bhj1 #bii1 #djb-ac1 #dai ff41 #dbc4 ,see also ,data2 ,evidence2 ,ideas2 ,thinking4 ,instrumentalism1 #ag1 #cj1 #cb1 #ch1 #dd1 #he1 #age1 #bcj1 #cca4 ,invaluable1 #chd4 ,james1 ,william1 #ef1 ,,xii1 #cca1 #cdh4 ,jones1 ,h41 #abi n41 #aeh1 #aei n4 ,klyce1 ,s41 #h-aj n4 ,knowledge1 #ae ff41 #cc1 #fd ff41 ,v1 #bbb1 #bed ff41 #chb1 #dbi1 #dcg ff4 ,see also ,apprehension2 ,perception2 ,thinking4 ,language1 #ea1 #ahf1 #daf1 #dca1 #dcd4 ,locke1 #dcc ff4 ,logical theory1 #gh1 #ha ff41 #ig ff41 #acd1 #agh1 #bja1 #bbb1 #ccf1 #dae4 ,lotze1 ,,ii-,v1 #cej4 ,mathematics1 #bi1 #ef1 #fd1 #dah1 #dcd4 ,mead1 ,g4 ,h41 #bbh4 ,meaning1 #af ff41 #cc1 #df1 #dh1 #ee1 #ij1 #aae1 ,,iv1 #aeh ff41 #aii1 #bcd1 #cji1 #dca ff4 ,see also ,essence2 ,idea4 ,mechanism1 #cdc4 ,montague1 ,w4 ,p41 #aa n4 ,moore1 ,a4 ,w41 #chh4 ,mill1 ,j4 ,s41 #cf1 #aig1 #bjb1 #bbj1 #bcd n4 ,nature as norm1 #dje4 ,organization1 #e1 #abg1 #bic1 #chj4 ,peirce1 ,c4 ,s41 #cjf1 #ccj4 ,perception1 #bed ff41 #cdi1 #cij-dac4 ,perry1 ,r4 ,b41 #bff1 #bgc n4 ,philosophy1 #ih ff4 ,practical1 ,,xii1 ,,xiii1 ,,xiv4 ,pragmatism1 ,,xii1 #cdf4 ,see also ,conflict2 ,consequences2 ,purpose4 ,presentationalism1 ,,ix4 ,privacy1 #bbh1 #bie4 ,see also ,subjectivity4 ,psychology1 #fg1 #ib1 #id1 #adj1 #aee1 #bba1 #bif ff41 #djd4 ,see also ,logical theory4 ,purpose1 #ab1 #bj1 #db1 #fh ff41 #gg4 ,realism1 #bf ff41 #ci ff41 #fj1 #gb1 #bcd1 ,,ix1 ,x1 #ceh1 #cgg n4 ,reality1 #dcg ff4 ,royce1 ,j41 #agb n4 ,russell1 ,b41 ,,xi1 #ccf1 #cdh1 #djc ff4 ,santayana1 ,g41 #ah1 #eg4 ,self4 ,see ,subjectivity4 ,sensation1 #ade ff41 #afj ff41 #bcc1 ,,xi1 #djb ff41 #dbh4 ,see also ,data4 ,sidgwick1 ,a41 #eb n4 ,sign4 ,see ,evidence4 ,subjectivity1 #ff ff41 #ajf1 #aab1 #abe1 #adb1 #aig1 #bbf1 #bgh1 #cbe1 #ccg1 #cfd4 ,suggestion1 #dg ff41 #dcg ff4 ,temporal place1 #a1 #ai1 #bg1 #ie ff41 #ahb1 #ccg ff41 #cdc4 ,terms1 #ea ff41 #dcd ff4 ,thinking1 #a ff41 #ac1 #ca ff41 #ge ff41 #abh1 #ahc1 #bce1 ,,ii-,,vi4 ,transcendence1 #dbd4 ,truth1 #bd1 #fc1 #aha1 #bbd1 #bca1 #bdj1 #cjd1 #caj1 #caf1 #cdf1 #chg1 #cib1 #dbc4 ,two worlds1 #dji1 #dcd4 ,value1 #cdi-hi4 ,woodbridge1 ,f4 ,j4 ,e41 #bcd n41 #bej n41 #cih n41 #djj4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,obvious printer's errors were repaired4 ,otherwise retained spellings and punctuation 7including hypenation variations7 as in the original4 ,p4 #aef3 philosophic disciplines2 original reads philosophic disciples4 ,p4 #ced3 7in a direct experience2 original reads in direct a experience4 ,transposition corrected4 ,ten cases of lettered paragraph labels with closing but no opening parentheses were retained--a7 on ,p4 #acg1 #bhh1 #djg and #dbf1 b7 on ,p4 #aci1 #bhi1 #djh and #dbi1 and c7 on ,p4 #daj and #dcj4