,transcriber's note3 #a4 ,text enclosed by underscores is in italics 7italics74 #b4 ,in the mathematical expressions in this text the carat character represents 'raised to the power' 7example3 #acbb74 #c4 ,the original text includes ,greek characters4 ,for this text file version these letters have been replaced with their transliterations1 with the exception of ,greek letter 'pi' which is represented as pi4 ,,studies ,,in ,,logical ,,theory by ,,john ,,dewey ,professor of ,philosophy ,with the ,co-,operation of ,members and ,fellows of the ,department of ,philosophy ,the ,decennial ,publications ,second ,series ,volume ,xi ,chicago ,the ,university of ,chicago ,press #aijc ,copyright1 #aijc ,by the ,university of ,chicago ,,preface ,this volume presents some results of the work done in the matter of logical theory in the ,department of ,philosophy of the ,university of ,chicago in the first decade of its existence4 ,the eleven ,studies are the work of eight different hands1 all1 with the exception of the editor1 having at some period held ,fellowships in this ,university1 ,dr4 ,heidel in ,greek1 the others in ,philosophy4 ,their names and present pursuits are indicated in the ,table of ,contents4 ,the editor has occasionally1 though rarely1 added a footnote or phrase which might serve to connect one ,study more closely with another4 ,the pages in the discussion of ,hypothesis1 on ,mill and ,whewell1 are by him4 ,with these exceptions1 each writer is individually and completely responsible for his own ,study4 ,the various ,studies present1 the editor believes1 about the relative amount of agreement and disagreement that is natural in view of the conditions of their origin4 ,the various writers have been in contact with one another in ,seminars and lecture courses in pursuit of the same topics1 and have had to do with shaping one another's views4 ,there are several others1 not represented in this volume1 who have also participated in the evolution of the point of view herein set forth1 and to whom the writers acknowledge their indebtedness4 ,the disagreements proceed from the diversity of interests with which the different writers approach the logical topic2 and from the fact that the point of view in question is still 7happily7 developing and showing no signs of becoming a closed system4 ,if the ,studies themselves do not give a fair notion of the nature and degree of the harmony in the different writers' methods1 a preface is not likely to succeed in so doing4 ,a few words may be in place1 however1 about a matter repeatedly touched upon1 but nowhere consecutively elaborated--the more ultimate philosophical bearing of what is set forth4 ,all agree1 the editor takes the liberty of saying1 that judgment is the central function of knowing1 and hence affords the central problem of logic2 that since the act of knowing is intimately and indissolubly connected with the like yet diverse functions of affection1 appreciation1 and practice1 it only distorts results reached to treat knowing as a self-inclosed and self-explanatory whole--hence the intimate connections of logical theory with functional psychology2 that since knowledge appears as a function within experience1 and yet passes judgment upon both the processes and contents of other functions1 its work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or transformatory2 that since ,reality must be defined in terms of experience1 judgment appears accordingly as the medium through which the consciously effected evolution of ,reality goes on2 that there is no reasonable standard of truth 7or of success of the knowing function7 in general1 except upon the postulate that ,reality is thus dynamic or self-evolving1 and1 in particular1 except through reference to the specific offices which knowing is called upon to perform in readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life4 ,and all agree that this conception gives the only promising basis upon which the working methods of science1 and the proper demands of the moral life1 may co-operate4 ,all this1 doubtless1 does not take us very far on the road to detailed conclusions1 but it is better1 perhaps1 to get started in the right direction than to be so definite as to erect a dead-wall in the way of farther movement of thought4 ,in general1 the obligations in logical matters of the writers are roughly commensurate with the direction of their criticisms4 ,upon the whole1 most is due to those whose views are most sharply opposed4 ,to ,mill1 ,lotze1 ,bosanquet1 and ,bradley the writers then owe special indebtedness4 ,the editor acknowledges personal indebtedness to his present colleagues1 particularly to ,mr4 ,george ,h4 ,mead1 in the ,faculty of ,philosophy1 and to a former colleague1 ,dr4 ,alfred ,h4 ,lloyd1 of the ,university of ,michigan4 ,for both inspiration and the forging of the tools with which the writers have worked there is a pre-eminent obligation on the part of all of us to ,william ,james1 of ,harvard ,university1 who1 we hope1 will accept this acknowledgment and this book as unworthy tokens of a regard and an admiration that are coequal4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,i4 ,thought and its ,subject-,matter #a ,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,ii4 ,thought and its ,subject-,matter3 ,the ,antecedents of ,thought #bc ,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,iii4 ,thought and its ,subject-,matter3 ,the ,datum of ,thinking #di ,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,iv4 ,thought and its ,subject-,matter3 ,the ,content and ,object of ,thought #fe ,by ,,john ,,dewey ,v4 ,bosanquet's ,theory of ,judgment #hf ,by ,,helen ,,bradford ,,thompson1 ,ph4,d41 ,director of the ,psychological ,laboratory of ,mount ,holyoke ,college ,,vi4 ,typical ,stages in the ,development of ,judgment #abg ,by ,,simon ,,fraser ,,mclennan1 ,ph4,d41 ,professor of ,philosophy in ,oberlin ,college ,,vii4 ,the ,nature of ,hypothesis #adb ,by ,,myron ,,lucius ,,ashley1 ,ph4,d41 ,instructor1 ,american ,correspondence ,school ,,viii4 ,image and ,idea in ,logic #ahc ,by ,,willard ,,clark ,,gore1 ,ph4,d41 ,assistant ,professor of ,psychology in the ,university of ,chicago ,,ix4 ,the ,logic of the ,pre-,socratic ,philosophy #bjc ,by ,,william ,,arthur ,,heidel1 ,ph4,d41 ,professor of ,latin in ,iowa ,college ,x4 ,valuation as a ,logical ,process #bbg ,by ,,henry ,,waldgrave ,,stuart1 ,ph4,d41 ,instructor in ,philosophy in the ,state ,university of ,iowa ,,xi4 ,some ,logical ,aspects of ,purpose #cda ,by ,,addison ,,webster ,,moore1 ,ph4,d41 ,assistant ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,chicago ,i ,,thought ,,and ,,its ,,subject-,,matter3 ,,the ,,general ,,problem ,,of ,,logical ,,theory ,no one doubts that thought1 at least reflective1 as distinct from what is sometimes called constitutive1 thought1 is derivative and secondary4 ,it comes after something and out of something1 and for the sake of something4 ,no one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is of this reflective type4 ,we think about2 we reflect over4 ,if we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought2 if we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought intervenes2 if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a derived procedure1 we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the logical problem3 the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent1 truth1 and the relation of truth to reality4 ,yet from the nave point of view no difficulty attaches to these questions4 ,the antecedents of thought are our universe of life and love2 of appreciation and struggle4 ,we think about anything and everything3 snow on the ground2 the alternating clanks and thuds that rise from below2 the relation of the ,monroe ,doctrine to the embroglio in ,venezuela2 the relation of art to industry2 the poetic quality of a painting by ,botticelli2 the battle of ,marathon2 the economic interpretation of history2 the proper definition of cause2 the best method of reducing expenses2 whether and how to renew the ties of a broken friendship2 the interpretation of an equation in hydrodynamics2 etc4 ,through the madness of this miscellaneous citation there appears so much of method3 anything--event1 act1 value1 ideal1 person1 or place--may be an object of thought4 ,reflection busies itself alike with physical nature1 the record of social achievement1 and the endeavors of social aspiration4 ,it is with reference to such affairs that thought is derivative2 it is with reference to them that it intervenes or mediates4 ,taking some part of the universe of action1 of affection1 of social construction1 under its special charge1 and having busied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special difficulty presented1 thought releases that topic and enters upon further more direct experience4 ,sticking for a moment to this nave standpoint1 we recognize a certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory2 of primary construction and of secondary criticism2 of living appreciation and of abstract description2 of active endeavor and of pale reflection4 ,we find that every more direct primary attitude passes upon occasion into its secondary deliberative and discursive counterpart4 ,we find that when the latter has done its work it passes away and passes on4 ,from the nave standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter of course4 ,there is no attempt to state either the nature of the occasion which demands the thinking attitude1 nor to formulate a theory of the standard by which is judged its success4 ,no general theory is propounded as to the exact relationship between thinking and what antecedes and succeeds it4 ,much less do we ask how empirical circumstances can generate rationality of thought2 nor how it is possible for reflection to lay claim to power of determining truth and thereby of constructing further reality4 ,if we were to ask the thinking of nave life to present1 with a minimum of theoretical elaboration1 its conception of its own practice1 we should get an answer running not unlike this3 ,thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need1 just as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity3 as converse with a friend2 draw a plan for a house2 take a walk2 eat a dinner2 purchase a suit of clothes2 etc41 etc4 ,in general1 its material is anything in the wide universe which seems to be relevant to this need--anything which may serve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in suggesting modes of dealing effectively with it4 ,the measure of its success1 the standard of its validity1 is precisely the degree in which the thinking actually disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed with more direct modes of experiencing1 that are forthwith possessed of more assured and deepened value4 ,if we inquire why the nave attitude does not go on to elaborate these implications of its own practice into a systematic theory1 the answer1 on its own basis1 is obvious4 ,thought arises in response to its own occasion4 ,and this occasion is so exacting that there is time1 as there is need1 only to do the thinking which is needed in that occasion--not to reflect upon the thinking itself4 ,reflection follows so naturally upon its appropriate cue1 its issue is so obvious1 so practical1 the entire relationship is so organic1 that once grant the position that thought arises in reaction to specific demand1 and there is not the particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not the practical demand for reflection of that sort4 ,our attention is taken up with particular questions and specific answers4 ,what we have to reckon with is not the problem of1 ,how can ,i think berhaupt8 but1 ,how shall ,i think right here and now8 ,not what is the test of thought at large1 but what validates and confirms this thought8 ,in conformity with this view1 it follows that a generic account of our thinking behavior1 the generic account termed logical theory1 arises at historic periods in which the situation has lost the organic character above described4 ,the general theory of reflection1 as over against its concrete exercise1 appears when occasions for reflection are so overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate response in thought is blocked4 ,again1 it shows itself when practical affairs are so multifarious1 complicated1 and remote from control that thinking is held off from successful passage into them4 ,anyhow 7sticking to the nave standpoint71 it is true that the stimulus to that particular form of reflective thinking termed logical theory is found when circumstances require the act of thinking and nevertheless impede clear and coherent thinking in detail2 or when they occasion thought and then prevent the results of thinking from exercising directive influence upon the immediate concerns of life4 ,under these conditions we get such questions as the following3 ,what is the relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience8 ,what is the relation of thought to reality8 ,what is the barrier which prevents reason from complete penetration into the world of truth8 ,what is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete world of experience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction1 and in a world of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and ideal8 ,it is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical inquiry thus suggested4 ,indeed1 the point would not be mentioned did it not serve to fix attention upon the nature of the logical problem4 ,it is in dealing with this latter type of questions that logical theory has taken a turn which separates it widely from the theoretical implications of practical deliberation and of scientific research4 ,the two latter1 however much they differ from each other in detail1 agree in a fundamental principle4 ,they both assume that every reflective problem and operation arises with reference to some specific situation1 and has to subserve a specific purpose dependent upon its own occasion4 ,they assume and observe distinct limits--limits from which and to which4 ,there is the limit of origin in the needs of the particular situation which evokes reflection4 ,there is the limit of terminus in successful dealing with the particular problem presented--or in retiring1 baffled1 to take up some other question4 ,the query that at once faces us regarding the nature of logical theory is whether reflection upon reflection shall recognize these limits1 endeavoring to formulate them more exactly and to define their relationships to each other more adequately2 or shall it abolish limits1 do away with the matter of specific conditions and specific aims of thought1 and discuss thought and its relation to empirical antecedents and rational consequents 7truth7 at large8 ,at first blush1 it might seem as if the very nature of logical theory as generalization of the reflective process must of necessity disregard the matter of particular conditions and particular results as irrelevant4 ,how1 the implication runs1 could reflection become generalized save by elimination of details as irrelevant8 ,such a conception in fixing the central problem of logic fixes once for all its future career and material4 ,the essential business of logic is henceforth to discuss the relation of thought as such to reality as such4 ,it may1 indeed1 involve much psychological material1 particularly in the discussion of the processes which antecede thinking and which call it out4 ,it may involve much discussion of the concrete methods of investigation and verification employed in the various sciences4 ,it may busily concern itself with the differentiation of various types and forms of thought--different modes of conceiving1 various conformations of judgment1 various types of inferential reasoning4 ,but it concerns itself with any and all of these three fields1 not on their own account or as ultimate1 but as subsidiary to the main problem3 the relation of thought as such1 or at large1 to reality as such1 or at large4 ,some of the detailed considerations referred to may throw light upon the terms under which thought transacts its business with reality2 upon1 say1 certain peculiar limitations it has to submit to as best it may4 ,other considerations throw light upon the ways in which thought gets at reality4 ,still other considerations throw light upon the forms which thought assumes in attacking and apprehending reality4 ,but in the end all this is incidental4 ,in the end the one problem holds3 ,how do the specifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such8 ,in fine1 logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and to lead up to its solution4 ,from this point of view various aspects of logical theory are well stated by an author whom later on we shall consider in some detail4 ,lotze#a refers to universal forms and principles of thought which hold good everywhere both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility1 irrespective of any difference in the objects4 ,this defines the business of pure logic4 ,this is clearly the question of thought as such--of thought at large or in general4 ,then we have the question of how far the most complete structure of thought 444 can claim to be an adequate account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our ideas4 ,this is clearly the question of the relation of thought at large to reality at large4 ,it is epistemology4 ,then comes applied logic1 having to do with the actual employment of concrete forms of thought with reference to investigation of specific topics and subjects4 ,this applied logic would1 if the standpoint of practical deliberation and of scientific research were adopted1 be the sole genuine logic4 ,but the existence of thought in itself having been agreed upon1 we have in this applied logic only an incidental inquiry of how the particular resistances and oppositions which pure thought meets from particular matters may best be discounted4 ,it is concerned with methods of investigation which obviate defects in the relationship of thought at large to reality at large1 as these present themselves under the limitations of human experience4 ,it deals merely with hindrances1 and with devices for overcoming them2 it is directed by considerations of utility4 ,when we reflect that this field includes the entire procedure of practical deliberation and of concrete scientific research1 we begin to realize something of the significance of the theory of logic which regards the limitations of specific origination and specific outcome as irrelevant to its main problem1 which assumes an activity of thought pure or in itself1 that is1 irrespective of any difference in its objects4 ,this suggests1 by contrast1 the opposite mode of stating the problem of logical theory4 ,generalization of the nature of the reflective process certainly involves elimination of much of the specific material and contents of the thought-situations of daily life and of critical science4 ,quite compatible with this1 however1 is the notion that it seizes upon certain specific conditions and factors1 and aims to bring them to clear consciousness--not to abolish them4 ,while eliminating the particular material of particular practical and scientific pursuits1 7#a7 it may strive to hit upon the common denominator in the various situations which are antecedent or primary to thought and which evoke it2 7#b7 it may attempt to show how typical features in the specific antecedents of thought call out to diverse typical modes of thought-reaction2 7#c7 it may attempt to state the nature of the specific consequences in which thought fulfils its career4 7#a7 ,it does not eliminate dependence upon specific occasions as provocative of thought2 but endeavors to define what in the various situations constitutes them thought-provoking4 ,the specific occasion is not eliminated1 but insisted upon and brought into the foreground4 ,consequently psychological considerations are not subsidiary incidents1 but of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace the generation of the thought-situation4 7#b7 ,so from this point of view the various types and modes of conceiving1 judging1 and inference are treated1 not as qualifications of thought per se or at large1 but of thought engaged in its specific1 most economic1 effective response to its own particular occasion2 they are adaptations for control of stimuli4 ,the distinctions and classifications that have been accumulated in formal logic are relevant data2 but they demand interpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to material antecedents and stimuli4 7#c7 ,finally the question of validity1 or ultimate objective of thought1 is relevant2 but is such as a matter of the specific issue of the specific career of a thought-function4 ,all the typical investigatory and verificatory procedures of the various sciences are inherently concerned as indicating the ways in which thought actually brings itself to its own successful fulfilment in dealing with various types of problems4 ,while the epistemological type of logic may1 as we have seen1 leave 7under the name of applied logic71 a subsidiary place open for the instrumental type1 the type which deals with thinking as a specific procedure relative to a specific antecedent occasion and to a subsequent specific fulfilment1 is not able to reciprocate the favor4 ,from its point of view1 an attempt to discuss the antecedents1 data1 forms1 and objective of thought1 apart from reference to particular position occupied1 and particular part played in the growth of experience is to reach results which are not so much either true or false as they are radically meaningless--because they are considered apart from limits4 ,its results are not only abstractions 7for all theorizing ends in abstractions71 but abstractions without possible reference or bearing4 ,from this point of view1 the taking of something1 whether that something be thinking activity1 its empirical condition1 or its objective goal1 apart from the limits of a historic or developing situation1 is the essence of metaphysical procedure--in the sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it and science4 ,as the reader has doubtless anticipated1 it is the object of this chapter to present the problem and industry of reflective thought from this latter point of view4 ,i recur again to the standpoint of nave experience1 using the term in a sense wide enough to cover both practical procedure and concrete scientific research4 ,i resume by saying that this point of view knows no fixed distinction between the empirical values of unreflective life and the most abstract process of rational thought4 ,it knows no fixed gulf between the highest flight of theory and control of the details of practical construction and behavior4 ,it passes1 according to the occasion and opportunity of the moment1 from the attitude of loving and struggling and doing to that of thinking and the reverse4 ,its contents or material shift their values back and forth from technological or utilitarian to sthetic1 ethic1 or affectional4 ,it utilizes data of perception or of discursive ideation as need calls1 just as an inventor now utilizes heat1 now mechanical strain1 now electricity1 according to the demands set by his aim4 ,from this point of view1 more definite logical import is attached to our earlier statements 7p4 #b7 regarding the possibility of taking anything in the universe of experience as subject-matter of thought4 ,anything from past experience may be taken which appears to be an element in either the statement or the solution of the present problem4 ,thus we understand the coexistence without contradiction of an indeterminate possible field and a limited actual field4 ,the undefined set of means becomes specific through reference to an end4 ,in all this1 there is no difference of kind between the methods of science and those of the plain man4 ,the difference is the greater control in science of the statement of the problem1 and of the selection and use of relevant material1 both sensible or ideational4 ,the two are related to each other just as the hit-or-miss1 trial-and-error inventions of uncivilized man stand to the deliberate and consecutively persistent efforts of a modern inventor to produce a certain complicated device for doing a comprehensive piece of work4 ,neither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is aware1 as he engages in his reflective activity1 of any transition from one sphere of existence to another4 ,he knows no two fixed worlds--reality on one side and mere subjective ideas on the other2 he is aware of no gulf to cross4 ,he assumes uninterrupted1 free1 and fluid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking1 from thought to fact1 from things to theories and back again4 ,observation passes into development of hypothesis2 deductive methods pass to use in description of the particular2 inference passes into action with no sense of difficulty save those found in the particular task in question4 ,the fundamental assumption is continuity in and of experience4 ,this does not mean that fact is confused with idea1 or observed datum with voluntary hypothesis1 theory with doing1 any more than a traveler confuses land and water when he journeys from one to the other4 ,it simply means that each is placed and used with reference to service rendered the other1 and with reference to future use of the other4 ,only the epistemological spectator is aware of the fact that the everyday man and the scientific man in this free and easy intercourse are rashly assuming the right to glide over a cleft in the very structure of reality4 ,this fact raises a query not favorable to the epistemologist4 ,why is it that the scientific man1 who is constantly plying his venturous traffic of exchange of facts for ideas1 of theories for laws1 of real things for hypotheses1 should be so wholly unaware of the radical and generic 7as distinct from specific7 difficulty of the undertakings in which he is engaged8 ,we thus come afresh to our inquiry3 ,does not the epistemological logician unwittingly transfer the specific difficulty which always faces the scientific man--the difficulty in detail of correct and adequate translation back and forth of this set of facts and this group of ideas--into a totally different problem of the wholesale relation of thought at large with reality in general8 ,if such be the case1 it is clear that the very way in which the epistemological type of logic states the problem of thinking1 in relation both to empirical antecedents and to objective truth1 makes that problem insoluble4 ,working terms1 terms which as working are flexible and historic1 relative1 are transformed into absolute1 fixed1 and predetermined forms of being4 ,we come a little closer to the problem when we recognize that every scientific inquiry passes historically through at least four stages4 7a7 ,the first of these stages is1 if ,i may be allowed the bull1 that in which scientific inquiry does not take place at all1 because no problem or difficulty in the quality of the experience has presented itself to provoke reflection4 ,we have only to cast our eye back from the existing status of any science1 or back from the status of any particular topic in any science1 to discover a time when no reflective or critical thinking busied itself with the matter--when the facts and relations were taken for granted and thus were lost and absorbed in the value which accrued from the experience4 7b7 ,after the dawning of the problem1 there comes a period of occupation with relatively crude and unorganized facts--the hunting for1 locating1 and collecting of raw material4 ,this is the empiric stage1 which no existing science1 however proud in its attained rationality1 can disavow as its own progenitor4 7c7 ,then there is also a speculative stage3 a period of guessing1 of making hypotheses1 of framing ideas which later on are labeled and condemned as only ideas4 ,there is a period of distinction and classification-making which later on is regarded as only mentally-gymnastic in character4 ,and no science1 however proud in its present security of experimental assurance1 can disavow a scholastic ancestor4 7d7 ,finally1 there comes a period of fruitful interaction between the mere ideas and the mere facts3 a period when observation is determined by experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain guiding conceptions2 when reflection is directed and checked at every point by the use of experimental data1 and by the necessity of finding such form for itself as will enable it to serve as premise in a deduction leading to evolution of new meanings1 and ultimately to experimental inquiry1 which brings to light new facts4 ,in the emerging of a more orderly and significant region of fact1 and of a more coherent and self-luminous system of meaning1 we have the natural limit of evolution of the logic of a given science4 ,but consider what has happened in this historic record4 ,unanalyzed experience has broken up into distinctions of facts and ideas2 the factual side has been developed by indefinite and almost miscellaneous descriptions and cumulative listings2 the conceptual side has been developed by unchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions1 classifications1 etc4 ,there has been a relegation of accepted meanings to the limbo of mere ideas2 there has been a passage of some of the accepted facts into the region of mere hypothesis and opinion4 ,conversely1 there has been a continued issuing of ideas from the region of hypotheses and theories into that of facts1 of accepted objective and meaningful contents4 ,out of a world of only seeming facts1 and of only doubtful ideas1 there emerges a universe continually growing in definiteness1 order1 and luminosity4 ,this progress1 verified in every record of science1 is an absolute monstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemology which assumes a thought in general1 on one side1 and a reality in general1 on the other4 ,the reason that it does not present itself as such a monster and miracle to those actually concerned with it is because there is a certain homogeneity or continuity of reference and of use which controls all diversities in both the modes of existence specified and the grades of value assigned4 ,the distinction of thought and fact is treated in the growth of a science1 or of any particular scientific problem1 as an induced and intentional practical division of labor2 as relative assignments of position with reference to performance of a task2 as deliberate distribution of forces at command for their more economic use4 ,the interaction of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the outcome of a single world of scientific apprehension and comprehension is but the successful achieving of the aim on account of which the distinctions in question were instituted4 ,thus we come back to the problem of logical theory4 ,to take the distinctions of thought and fact1 etc41 as ontological1 as inherently fixed in the make-up of the structure of being1 is to treat the actual development of scientific inquiry and scientific control as a mere subsidiary topic ultimately of only utilitarian worth4 ,it is also to state the terms upon which thought and being transact business in a way so totally alien to the use made of these distinctions in concrete experience as to create a problem which can be discussed only in terms of itself--not in terms of the conduct of life--metaphysics again in the bad sense of that term4 ,as against this1 the problem of a logic which aligns itself with the origin and employ of reflective thought in everyday life and in critical science1 is to follow the natural history of thinking as a life-process having its own generating antecedents and stimuli1 its own states and career1 and its own specific objective or limit4 ,this point of view makes it possible for logical theory to come to terms with psychology4#b ,when logic is considered as having to do with the wholesale activity of thought per se1 the question of the historic process by which this or that particular thought came to be1 of how its object happens to present itself as sensation1 or perception1 or conception1 is quite irrelevant4 ,these things are mere temporal accidents4 ,the psychologist 7not lifting his gaze from the realm of the changeable7 may find in them matters of interest4 ,his whole industry is just with natural history--to trace series of psychical events as they mutually excite and inhibit one another4 ,but the logician1 we are told1 has a deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon4 ,he deals with the question of the eternal nature of thought and its eternal validity in relation to an eternal reality4 ,he is concerned1 not with genesis1 but with value1 not with a historic cycle1 but with absolute distinctions and relations4 ,still the query haunts us3 ,is this so in truth8 ,or has the logician of a certain type arbitrarily made it thus by taking his terms apart from reference to the specific occasions in which they arise and situations in which they function8 ,if the latter1 then the very denial of historic relationship and of the significance of historic method1 is indicative only of the unreal character of his own abstraction4 ,it means in effect that the affairs under consideration have been isolated from the conditions in which alone they have determinable meaning and assignable worth4 ,it is astonishing that1 in the face of the advance of the evolutionary method in natural science1 any logician can persist in the assertion of a rigid difference between the problem of origin and of nature2 between genesis and analysis2 between history and validity4 ,such assertion simply reiterates as final a distinction which grew up and had meaning in pre-evolutionary science4 ,it asserts against the most marked advance which scientific method has yet made a survival of a crude period of logical scientific procedure4 ,we have no choice save either to conceive of thinking as a response to a specific stimulus1 or else to regard it as something in itself1 having just in and of itself certain traits1 elements1 and laws4 ,if we give up the last view1 we must take the former4 ,the entire significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social history is that every distinct organ1 structure1 or formation1 every grouping of cells or elements1 has to be treated as an instrument of adjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation4 ,its meaning1 its character1 its value1 is known when1 and only when1 it is considered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in some specific situation4 ,this analysis of value is carried out in detail by tracing successive stages of development--by endeavoring to locate the particular situation in which each structure has its origin1 and by tracing the successive modifications through which1 in response to changing media1 it has reached its present conformation4#c ,to persist in condemning natural history from the standpoint of what natural history meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary process is not so much to exclude the natural-history standpoint from philosophic consideration as it is to evince ignorance of what it signifies4 ,psychology as the natural history of the various attitudes and structures through which experiencing passes1 as an account of the conditions under which this or that state emerges1 and of the way in which it influences1 by stimulation or inhibition1 production of other states or conformations of consciousness1 is indispensable to logical evaluation1 the moment we treat logical theory as an account of thinking as a mode of adaptation to its own generating conditions1 and judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in meeting its problems4 ,the historical point of view describes the sequence2 the normative follows the sequence to its conclusion1 and then turns back and judges each historical step by viewing it in reference to its own outcome4#d ,in the course of changing experience we keep our balance as we move from situations of an affectional quality to those which are practical or appreciative or reflective1 because we bear constantly in mind the context in which any particular distinction presents itself4 ,as we submit each characteristic function and situation of experience to our gaze1 we find it has a dual aspect4 ,wherever there is striving there are obstacles2 wherever there is affection there are persons who are attached2 wherever there is doing there is accomplishment2 wherever there is appreciation there is value2 wherever there is thinking there is material-in-question4 ,we keep our footing as we move from one attitude to another1 from one characteristic quality to another1 because we know the position occupied in the whole growth by the particular function in which we are engaged1 and the position within the function of the particular element that engages us4 ,the distinction between each attitude and function and its predecessor and successor is serial1 dynamic1 operative4 ,the distinctions within any given operation or function are structural1 contemporaneous1 and distributive4 ,thinking follows1 we will say1 striving1 and doing follows thinking4 ,each in the fulfilment of its own function inevitably calls out its successor4 ,but coincident1 simultaneous1 and correspondent within doing1 is the distinction of doer and of deed2 within the function of thought1 of thinking and material thought upon2 within the function of striving1 of obstacle of aim1 of means and end4 ,we keep our paths straight because we do not confuse the sequential1 efficient1 and functional relationship of types of experience with the contemporaneous1 correlative1 and structural distinctions of elements within a given function4 ,in the seeming maze of endless confusion and unlimited shiftings1 we find our way by the means of the stimulations and checks occurring within the process we are actually engaged with4 ,we do not contrast or confuse a condition or state which is an element in the formation of one operation with the status or element which is one of the distributive terms of another function4 ,if we do1 we have at once an insoluble1 because meaningless1 problem upon our hands4 ,now the epistemological logician deliberately shuts himself off from those cues and checks upon which the plain man instinctively relies1 and which the scientific man deliberately searches for and adopts as constituting his technique4 ,consequently he is likely to set the sort of object or material which has place and significance only in one of the serial functional situations of experience1 over against the active attitude which describes part of the structural constitution of another situation2 or with equal lack of justification to assimilate terms characteristic of different stages to one another4 ,he sets the agent1 as he is found in the intimacy of love or appreciation1 over against the externality of the fact1 as that is defined within the reflective process4 ,he takes the material which thought selects as its own basis for further procedure to be identical with the significant content which it secures for itself in the successful pursuit of its aim2 and this in turn he regards as the material which was presented at the outset1 and whose peculiarities were the express means of awakening thought4 ,he identifies the final deposit of the thought-function with its own generating antecedent1 and then disposes of the resulting surd by reference to some metaphysical consideration1 which remains when logical inquiry1 when science 7as interpreted by him71 has done its work4 ,he does this1 not because he prefers confusion to order1 or error to truth1 but simply because1 when the chain of historic sequence is cut1 the vessel of thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without soundings or moorings4 ,there are but two alternatives3 either there is an object in itself of thought in itself1 or else there are a series of values which vary with the varying functions to which they belong4 ,if the latter1 the only way these values can be defined is by discriminating the functions to which they belong4 ,it is only conditions relative to a specific period or epoch of development in a cycle of experience which-enables one to tell what to do next1 or to estimate the value and meaning of what is already done4 ,and the epistemological logician1 in choosing to take his question as one of thought which has its own form just as thought1 apart from the limits of the special work it has to do1 has deprived himself of these supports and stays4 ,the problem of logic has a more general and a more specific phase4 ,in its generic form1 it deals with this question3 ,how does one type of functional situation and attitude in experience pass out of and into another2 for example1 the technological or utilitarian into the sthetic1 the sthetic into the religious1 the religious into the scientific1 and this into the socio-ethical and so on8 ,the more specific question is3 ,how does the particular functional situation termed the reflective behave8 ,how shall we describe it8 ,what in detail are its diverse contemporaneous distinctions1 or divisions of labor1 its correspondent statuses2 in what specific ways do these operate with reference to each other so as to effect the specific aim which is proposed by the needs of the affair8 ,this chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference to the more alternate value of the logic of experience1 of logic taken in its wider sense2 that is1 as an account of the sequence of the various typical functions or situations of experience in their determining relations to one another4 ,philosophy1 defined as such a logic1 makes no pretense to be an account of a closed and finished universe4 ,its business is not to secure or guarantee any particular reality or value4 ,per contra1 it gets the significance of a method4 ,the right relationship and adjustment of the various typical phases of experience to one another is a problem felt in every department of life4 ,intellectual rectification and control of these adjustments cannot fail to reflect itself in an added clearness and security on the practical side4 ,it may be that general logic can not become an instrument in the immediate direction of the activities of science or art or industry2 but it is of value in criticising and in organizing the tools of immediate research in these lines4 ,it also has direct significance in the valuation for social or life-purposes of results achieved in particular branches4 ,much of the immediate business of life is badly done because we do not know in relation to its congeners the organic genesis and outcome of the work that occupies us4 ,the manner and degree of appropriation of the values achieved in various departments of social interest and vocation are partial and faulty because we are not clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of one function of experience in reference to others4 ,the value of research for social progress2 the bearing of psychology upon educational procedure2 the mutual relations of fine and industrial art2 the question of the extent and nature of specialization in science in comparison with the claims of applied science2 the adjustment of religious aspirations to scientific statements2 the justification of a refined culture for a few in face of economic insufficiency for the mass--such are a few of the many social questions whose final answer depends upon the possession and use of a general logic of experience as a method of inquiry and interpretation4 ,i do not say that headway cannot be made in such questions apart from the method indicated3 a logic of genetic experience4 ,but unless we have a critical and assured view of the juncture in which and with reference to which a given attitude or interest arises1 unless we know the service it is thereby called upon to perform and hence the organs or methods by which it best functions in that service1 our progress is impeded and irregular4 ,we take a part for a whole1 a means for an end1 or attack wholesale some other interest because it interferes with the deified sway of the one we have selected as ultimate4 ,a clear and comprehensive consensus of social conviction1 and a consequent concentrated and economical direction of effort1 are assured only as there is some way of locating the position and rle of each typical interest and occupation in experience4 ,the domain of opinion is one of conflict2 its rule is arbitrary and costly4 ,only intellectual method affords a substitute for opinion4 ,the general logic of experience can alone do for the region of social values and aims what the natural sciences after centuries of struggle are doing for activity in the physical realm4 ,this does not mean that systems of philosophy which have attempted to state the nature either of thought and of reality at large1 apart from limits of particular crises in the growth of experience1 have been worthless--though it does mean that their industry has been somewhat misapplied4 ,the unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large contributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations and relationships of experience--even when its conscious intention has been quite otherwise4 ,every system of philosophy is itself a mode of reflection2 consequently 7if our main contention be true71 it too has been evoked out of specific social antecedents1 and has had its use as a response to them4 ,it has effected something in modifying the situation within which it found its origin4 ,it may not have solved the problem which it consciously put itself2 in many cases we may freely admit that the question put has afterward been found to be so wrongly put as to be insoluble4 ,yet exactly the same thing is true1 in precisely the same sense1 in the history of science4 ,for this reason1 if for no other1 it is impossible for the scientific man to cast the first stone at the philosopher4 ,the progress of science in any branch continually brings with it a realization that problems in their previous form of statement are insoluble because put in terms of unreal conditions2 because the real conditions have been mixed up with mental artifacts or misconstructions4 ,every science is continually learning that its supposed solutions are only apparent1 because the solution solves1 not the actual problem1 but one which has been made up4 ,but the very putting of the question1 the very giving of the wrong answer1 induces modification of existing intellectual habits1 standpoints1 and aims4 ,wrestling with the problem1 there is evolution of new forms of technique to control its treatment1 there is search for new facts1 institution of new types of experimentation2 there is gain in the methodic control of experience4 ,and all this is progress4 ,it is only the worn-out cynic1 the devitalized sensualist1 and the fanatical dogmatist who interpret the continuous change of science as proving that1 since each successive statement is wrong1 the whole record is error and folly2 and that the present truth is only the error not yet found out4 ,such draw the moral of caring naught for all these things1 or of flying to some external authority which will deliver once for all the fixed and unchangeable truth4 ,but historic philosophy even in its aberrant forms has proved a factor in the valuation of experience2 it has brought problems to light1 it has provoked intellectual conflicts without which values are only nominal2 even through its would-be absolutistic isolations1 it has secured recognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal reinforcements4 ,yet if it can define its work more clearly1 it can concentrate its energy upon its own characteristic problem3 the genesis and functioning in experience of various typical interests and occupations with reference to one another4 ,,ii ,,thought ,,and ,,its ,,subject-,,matter3 ,,the ,,antecedent ,,conditions ,,and ,,cues ,,of ,,the ,,thought-,,function ,we have discriminated logic in its wider sense1 concerned with the sequence of characteristic functions and attitudes in experience1 from logic in its stricter meaning1 concerned in particular with description and interpretation of the function of reflective thought4 ,we must avoid yielding to the temptation of identifying logic with either of these to the exclusion of the other2 or of supposing that it is possible to isolate one finally from the other4 ,the more detailed treatment of the organs and methods of reflection cannot be carried on with security save as we have a correct idea of the historic position of reflection in the evolving of experience4 ,yet it is impossible to determine this larger placing1 save as we have a defined and analytic1 as distinct from a merely vague and gross1 view of what we mean by reflection--what is its actual constitution4 ,it is necessary to work back and forth between the larger and the narrower fields1 transforming every increment upon one side into a method of work upon the other1 and thereby testing it4 ,the apparent confusion of existing logical theory1 its uncertainty as to its own bounds and limits1 its tendency to oscillate from larger questions of the inherent worth of judgment and validity of inference over to details of scientific technique1 and to translation of distinctions of formal logic into terms of an investigatory or verificatory process1 are indications of the need of this double movement4 ,in the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some of the considerations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the narrower conceptions of logical theory4 ,i shall discuss the locus of the function of thought1 so far as such locus enables us to select and characterize some of the most fundamental distinctions1 or divisions of labor1 within the reflective process4 ,in taking up the problem of the subject-matter of thought1 ,i shall try to make clear that it assumes three quite distinct forms according to the epochal moment reached in transformation of experience2 and that continual confusion and inconsistency are introduced when these respective meanings are not identified and described according to their respective geneses and places4 ,i shall attempt to show that we must consider subject-matter from the standpoint1 first1 of the antecedents or conditions that evoke thought2 second1 of the datum or immediate material presented to thought2 and1 third1 of the proper content of thought4 ,of these three distinctions the first1 that of antecedent and stimulus1 clearly refers to the situation that is immediately prior to the thought-function as such4 ,the second1 that of datum or immediately given matter1 refers to a distinction which is made within the thought-process as a part of and for the sake of its own modus operandi4 ,it is a status in the scheme of thinking4 ,the third1 that of content or object1 refers to the progress actually made in any thought-function2 the material which is organized into the thought-situation1 so far as this has fulfilled its purpose4 ,it goes without saying that these are to be discriminated as stages of a life-process in the natural history of experience1 not as ready-made or ontological2 it is contended that1 save as they are differentiated in connection with well-defined historical stages1 they are either lumped off as equivalents1 or else treated as absolute divisions--or as each by turns1 according to the exigencies of the particular argument4 ,in fact1 this chapter will get at the matter of preliminary conditions of thought indirectly rather than directly1 by indicating the contradictory positions into which one of the most vigorous and acute of modern logicians1 ,lotze1 has been forced through failing to define logical distinctions in terms of the history of readjustment of experience1 and therefore endeavoring to interpret certain notions as absolute instead of as periodic and methodological4 ,before passing directly to the exposition and criticism of ,lotze1 it will be well1 however1 to take the matter in a somewhat freer way4 ,we cannot approach logical inquiry in a wholly direct and uncompromised manner4 ,of necessity we bring to it certain distinctions--distinctions partly the outcome of concrete experience2 partly due to the logical theory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in current intellectual habits2 partly results of deliberate scientific and philosophic inquiry4 ,these more or less ready-made results are resources2 they are the only weapons with which we can attack the new problem4 ,yet they are full of unexamined assumptions2 they commit us to all sorts of logically predetermined conclusions4 ,in one sense our study of the new subject-matter1 let us say logical theory1 is in truth only a review1 a re-testing and criticising of the intellectual standpoints and methods which we bring with us to the study4 ,everyone comes with certain distinctions already made between the subjective and the objective1 between the physical and the psychical1 between the intellectual and the factual4 7#a7 ,we have learned to regard the region of emotional disturbance1 of uncertainty and aspiration1 as belonging somehow peculiarly to ourselves2 we have learned to set over against this a world of observation and of valid thought as something unaffected by our moods1 hopes1 fears1 and opinions4 7#b7 ,we have also come to distinguish between what is immediately present in our experience and the past and the future2 we contrast the realms of memory and anticipation of sense-perception2 the given with the ideal4 7#c7 ,we are confirmed in a habit of distinguishing between what we call actual fact and our mental attitude toward that fact--the attitude of surmise or wonder or reflective investigation4 ,while one of the aims of logical theory is precisely to make us critically conscious of the significance and bearing of these various distinctions1 to change them from ready-made assumptions into controlled constructs1 our mental habits are so set that they tend to have their own way with us2 and we read into logical theory conceptions that were formed before we had even dreamed of the logical undertaking which after all has for its business to assign to the terms in question their proper meaning4 ,we find in ,lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these various preliminary distinctions2 and an unusually serious effort to deal with the problems which arise from introducing them into the structure of logical theory4 7#a7 ,he expressly separates the matter of logical worth from that of psychological genesis4 ,he consequently abstracts the subject-matter of logic as such wholly from the question of historic locus and situs4 7#b7 ,he agrees with common-sense in holding that logical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given material4 ,he occupies himself with the nature of the antecedent conditions4 7#c7 ,he wrestles with the problem of how a material formed prior to thought and irrespective of it can yet afford it stuff upon which to exercise itself4 7#d7 ,he expressly raises the question of how thought working independently and from without upon a foreign material can shape the latter into results which are valid--that is1 objective4 ,if his discussion is successful2 if ,lotze can provide the intermediaries which span the gulf between an independent thought-material and an independent thought-activity2 if he can show that the question of the origin of thought-material and of thought-activity is irrelevant to the question of its worth1 we shall have to surrender the position already taken4 ,but if we find that ,lotze's elaborations only elaborate the same fundamental difficulty1 presenting it now in this light and now in that1 but never effecting more than presenting the problem as if it were its own solution1 we shall be confirmed in our idea of the need of considering logical questions from a different point of view4 ,if we find that1 whatever his formal treatment1 he always1 as matter of fact1 falls back upon some organized situation or function as the source of both the specific thought-material and the specific thought-activity in correspondence with each other1 we shall have in so far an elucidation and even a corroboration of our theory4 #a4 ,we begin with the question of the material antecedents of thought--antecedents which condition reflection1 and which call it out as reaction or response1 by giving it its cue4 ,lotze differs from many logicians of the same type in affording us an explicit account of these antecedents4 ,the ultimate material antecedents of thought are found in impressions1 which are due to external objects as stimuli4 ,taken in themselves1 these impressions are mere psychical states or events4 ,they exist in us side by side1 or one after the other1 according as the objects which excite them operate simultaneously or successively4 ,the occurrence of these various psychical states is not1 however1 entirely dependent upon the presence of the exciting thing4 ,after a state has once been excited1 it gets the power of reawakening other states which have accompanied it or followed it4 ,the associative mechanism of revival plays a part4 ,if we had a complete knowledge of both the stimulating object and its effects1 and of the details of the associative mechanism1 we should be able from given data to predict the whole course of any given train or current of ideas 7for the impressions as conjoined simultaneously or successively become ideas and a current of ideas74 ,taken in itself1 a sensation or impression is nothing but a state of our consciousness1 a mood of ourselves4 ,any given current of ideas is a necessary sequence of existences 7just as necessary as any succession of material events71 happening in some particular sensitive soul or organism4 ,just because1 under their respective conditions1 every such series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity and law as every other1 there would be no ground for making any such distinction of value as that between truth and untruth1 thus placing one group in opposition to all the others4#e #b4 ,thus far1 as the last quotation clearly indicates1 there is no question of reflective thought1 and hence no question of logical theory4 ,but further examination reveals a peculiar property of the current of ideas4 ,some ideas are merely coincident1 while others may be termed coherent4 ,that is to say1 the exciting causes of some of our simultaneous and successive ideas really belong together2 while in other cases they simply happen to act at the same time1 without there being a real connection between them4 ,by the associative mechanism1 however1 both the coherent and the merely coincident combinations recur4 ,the first type of recurrence supplies positive material for knowledge2 the second gives occasion for error4 #c4 ,it is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the coherent which sets the peculiar problem of reflective thought4 ,the business of thought is to recover and confirm the coherent1 the really connected1 adding to its reinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real ground of coherence1 while it eliminates the coincident as such4 ,while the mere current of ideas is something which just happens within us1 the process of elimination and of confirmation by means of statement of real ground and basis of connection is an activity which mind as such exercises4 ,it is this distinction which marks off thought as activity from any psychical event and from the associative mechanism as receptive happenings4 ,one is concerned with mere de facto coexistences and sequences2 the other with the worth of these combinations4#f ,consideration of the peculiar work of thought in going over1 sorting out1 and determining various ideas according to a standard of value will occupy us in our next chapter4 ,here we are concerned with the material antecedents of thought as they are described by ,lotze4 ,at first glance1 he seems to propound a satisfactory theory4 ,he avoids the extravagancies of transcendental logic1 which assumes that all the matter of experience is determined from the very start by rational thought2 and he also avoids the pitfall of purely empirical logic1 which makes no distinction between the mere occurrence and association of ideas and the real worth and validity of the various conjunctions thus produced4 ,he allows unreflective experience1 defined in terms of sensations and their combinations1 to provide material conditions for thinking1 while he reserves for thought a distinctive work and dignity of its own4 ,sense-experience furnishes the antecedents2 thought has to introduce and develop systematic connection--rationality4 ,a further analysis of ,lotze's treatment may1 however1 lead us to believe that his statement is riddled through and through with inconsistencies and self-contradictions2 that1 indeed1 any one part of it can be maintained only by the denial of some other portion4 #a4 ,the impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest or crudest form 7according to the angle from which one views it74 ,it is that which has never felt1 for good or for bad1 the influence of thought4 ,combined into ideas1 these impressions stimulate or arouse the activities of thought1 which are forthwith directed upon them4 ,as the recipient of the activity which they have excited and brought to bear upon themselves1 they furnish also the material content of thought--its actual stuff4 ,as ,lotze says over and over again3 ,it is the relations themselves already subsisting between impressions1 when we become conscious of them1 by which the action of thought which is never anything but reaction1 is attracted2 and this action consists merely in interpreting relations which we find existing between our passive impressions into aspects of the matter of impressions4#g ,and again3#h ,thought can make no difference where it finds none already in the matter of the impressions4 ,and again3#i ,the possibility and the success of thought's procedure depends upon this original constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas1 a constitution which1 though not necessary in thought1 is all the more necessary to make thinking possible4 ,the impressions and ideas play a versatile rle2 they now assume the part of ultimate antecedents and provocative conditions2 of crude material2 and somehow1 when arranged1 of content for thought4 ,this very versatility awakens suspicion4 ,while the impression is merely subjective and a bare state of our own consciousness1 yet it is determined1 both as to its existence and as to its relation to other similar existences1 by external objects as stimuli1 if not as causes4 ,it is also determined by a psychical mechanism so thoroughly objective or regular in its workings as to give the same necessary character to the current of ideas that is possessed by any physical sequence4 ,thus that which is nothing but a state of our consciousness turns out straightway to be a specifically determined objective fact in a system of facts4 ,that this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no clearer than that just such a contradiction is indispensable to ,lotze4 ,if the impressions were nothing but states of consciousness1 moods of ourselves1 bare psychical existences1 it is sure enough that we should never even know them to be such1 to say nothing of conserving them as adequate conditions and material for thought4 ,it is only by treating them as real facts in a real world1 and only by carrying over into them1 in some assumed and unexplained way1 the capacity of representing the cosmic facts which arouse them1 that impressions or ideas come in any sense within the scope of thought4 ,but if the antecedents are really impressions-in-their-objective-setting1 then ,lotze's whole way of distinguishing thought-worth from mere existence or event without objective significance must be radically modified4 ,the implication that impressions have actually a matter or quality or meaning of their own becomes explicit when we refer to ,lotze's theory that the immediate antecedent of thought is found in the matter of ideas4 ,when thought is said to take cognizance of relations which its own activity does not originate1 but which have been prepared for it by the unconscious mechanism of the psychic states1#aj the attribution of objective content1 of reference and meaning to ideas1 is unambiguous4 ,the idea forms a most convenient half-way house for ,lotze4 ,on one hand1 as absolutely prior to thought1 as material antecedent condition1 it is merely psychical1 a bald subjective event4 ,but as subject-matter for thought1 as antecedent which affords stuff for thought's exercise1 it is meaning1 characteristic quality of content4 ,although we have been told that the impression is a mere receptive irritation without participation of mental activity1 we are not surprised1 in view of this capacity of ideas1 to learn that the mind actually has a determining share in both the reception of stimuli and in their further associative combinations4 ,the subject always enters into the presentation of any mental object1 even the sensational1 to say nothing of the perceptional and the imaged4 ,the perception of a given state of things is possible only on the assumption that the perceiving subject is at once enabled and compelled by its own nature to combine the excitations which reach it from objects into those forms which it is to perceive in the objects1 and which it supposes itself simply to receive from them4#aa ,it is only by continual transition from impression and ideas as mental states and events to ideas as cognitive 7or logical7 objects or contents1 that ,lotze bridges the gulf from bare exciting antecedent to concrete material conditions of thought4 ,this contradiction1 again1 is necessary to ,lotze's standpoint4 ,to set out frankly with meanings as antecedents would demand reconsideration of the whole view-point1 which supposes that the difference between the logical and its antecedent is a matter of the difference between worth and mere existence or occurrence4 ,it would indicate that since meaning or value is already there1 the task of thought must be that of the transformation or reconstruction of worth through an intermediary process of valuation4 ,on the other hand1 to stick by the standpoint of mere existence is not to get anything which can be called even antecedent of thought4 #b4 ,why is there a task of transformation8 ,consideration of the material in its function of evoking thought1 giving it its cue1 will serve to complete the picture of the contradiction and of the real facts4 ,it is the conflict between ideas as merely coincident and ideas as coherent that constitutes the need which provokes the response of thought4 ,here ,lotze vibrates 7a7 between considering coincidence and coherence as both affairs of existence of psychical events2 7b7 considering coincidence as purely psychical and coherence as at least quasi-logical1 and 7c7 the inherent logic which makes them both determinations within the sphere of reflective thought4 ,in strict accordance with his own premises1 coincidence and coherence both ought to be mere peculiarities of the current of ideas as events within ourselves4 ,but so taken the distinction becomes absolutely meaningless4 ,events do not cohere2 at the most certain sets of them happen more or less frequently than other sets2 the only intelligible difference is one of repetition of coincidence4 ,and even this attributes to an event the supernatural trait of reappearing after it has disappeared4 ,even coincidence has to be defined in terms of relation of the objects which are supposed to excite the psychical events that happen together4 ,as recent psychological discussion has made clear enough1 it is the matter1 meaning1 or content1 of ideas that is associated1 not the ideas as states or existences4 ,take such an idea as sun-revolving-about-earth4 ,we may say it means the conjunction of various sense-impressions1 but it is conjunction1 or mutual reference1 of attributes that we have in mind in the assertion4 ,it is absolutely certain that our psychical image of the sun is not psychically engaged in revolving about our psychical image of the earth4 ,it would be amusing if such were the case2 theaters and all dramatic representations would be at a discount4 ,in truth1 sun-revolving-about-earth is a single meaning or idea2 it is a unified subject-matter within which certain distinctions of reference appear4 ,it is concerned with what we intend when we think earth and sun1 and think them in their relation to each other4 ,it is really a specification or direction of how to think when we have occasion to think a certain subject-matter4 ,to treat the origin of this mutual reference as if it were simply a case of conjunction of ideas produced by conditions of original psycho-physical irritation and association is a profound case of the psychological fallacy4 ,we may1 indeed1 analyze an experience and find that it had its origin in certain conditions of the sensitive organism1 in certain peculiarities of perception and of association1 and hence conclude that the belief involved in it was not justified by the facts themselves4 ,but the significance of the belief in sun-revolving-about-earth as an item of the experience of those who meant it1 consisted precisely in the fact that it was taken not as a mere association of feelings1 but as a definite portion of the whole structure of objective experience1 guaranteed by other parts of the fabric1 and lending its support and giving its tone to them4 ,it was to them part of the experience-frame of things--of the real universe4 ,put the other way1 if such an instance meant a mere conjunction of psychical states1 there would be in it absolutely nothing to evoke thought4 ,each idea as event1 as ,lotze himself points out 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #b71 may be regarded as adequately and necessarily determined to the place it occupies4 ,there is absolutely no question on the side of events of mere coincidence versus genuine connection4 ,as event1 it is there and it belongs there4 ,we cannot treat something as at once bare fact of existence and as problematic subject-matter of logical inquiry4 ,to take the reflective point of view is to consider the matter in a totally new light2 as ,lotze says1 it is to raise the question of rightful claims to a position or relation4 ,the point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence with connection4 ,to consider coincidence as simply psychical1 and coherence as at least quasi-logical1 is to put the two on such different bases that no question of contrasting them can arise4 ,the coincidence which precedes a valid or grounded coherence 7the conjunction which as coexistence of objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate7 never is1 as antecedent1 the coincidence which is set over against coherence4 ,the side-by-sideness of books on my bookshelf1 the succession of noises that rise through my window1 do not as such trouble me logically4 ,they do not appear as errors or even as problems4 ,one coexistence is just as good as any other until some new point of view1 or new end1 presents itself4 ,if it is a question of the convenience of arrangement of books1 then the value of their present collocation becomes a problem4 ,then ,i may contrast their present bare conjunction with a scheme of possible coherence4 ,if ,i regard the sequence of noises as a case of articulate speech1 their order becomes important--it is a problem to be determined4 ,the inquiry whether a given combination means only apparent or real connection1 shows that reflective inquiry is already going on4 ,does this phase of the moon really mean rain1 or does it just happen that the rain-storm comes when the moon has reached this phase8 ,to ask such questions shows that a certain portion of the universe of experience is subjected to critical analysis for purposes of definitive restatement4 ,the tendency to regard one combination as bare conjunction or mere coincidence is absolutely a part of the movement of mind in its search for the real connection4 ,if coexistence as such is to be set over against coherence as such1 as the non-logical against the logical1 then1 since our whole spatial universe is one of collocation1 and since thought in this universe can never get farther than substituting one collocation for another1 the whole realm of space-experience is condemned off-hand and in perpetuity to anti-rationality4 ,but1 in truth1 coincidence as over against coherence1 conjunction as over against connection1 is just suspected coherence1 one which is under the fire of active inquiry4 ,the distinction is one which arises only within the grasp of the logical or reflective function4 #c4 ,this brings us explicitly to the fact that there is no such thing as either coincidence or coherence in terms of the elements or meanings contained in any couple or pair of ideas taken by itself4 ,it is only when they are co-factors in a situation or function which includes more than either the coincident or the coherent and more than the arithmetical sum of the two1 that thought's activity can be evoked4 ,lotze is continually in this dilemma3 ,thought either shapes its own material or else just accepts it4 ,in the first case 7since ,lotze cannot rid himself of the presumption that thought must have a fixed ready-made antecedent7 its activity can only alter this stuff and thus lead the mind farther away from reality4 ,but if thought just accepts its material1 how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of thought at all8 ,as we have seen1 ,lotze endeavors to escape this dilemma by supposing that1 while thought receives its material1 it yet checks it up3 it eliminates certain portions of it and reinstates others1 plus the stamp and seal of its own validity4 ,lotze objects most strenuously to the notion that thought awaits its subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of apprehension4 ,this notion would raise the insoluble question of how thought contrives to bring the matter of each impression under that particular form which is appropriate to it 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bd74 ,but he has not really avoided the difficulty4 ,how does thought know which of the combinations are merely coincident and which are merely coherent8 ,how does it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as grounded8 ,either this evaluation is an imposition of its own1 or else gets its cue and clue from the subject-matter4 ,now1 if the coincident and the coherent taken in and of themselves are competent to give this direction1 they are already practically labeled4 ,the further work of thought is one of supererogation4 ,it has at most barely to note and seal the material combinations that are already there4 ,such a view clearly renders thought's work as unnecessary in form as it is futile in force4 ,but there is no alternative in this dilemma except to recognize that an entire situation of experience1 within which are both that afterward found to be mere coincidence and that found to be real connection1 actually provokes thought4 ,it is only as an experience previously accepted comes up in its wholeness against another one equally integral2 and only as some larger experience dawns which requires each as a part of itself and yet within which the required factors show themselves mutually incompatible1 that thought arises4 ,it is not bare coincidence1 or bare connection1 or bare addition of one to the other1 that excites thought4 ,it is a situation which is organized or constituted as a whole1 and which yet is falling to pieces in its parts--a situation which is in conflict within itself--that arouses the search to find what really goes together and a correspondent effort to shut out what only seemingly belongs together4 ,and real coherence means precisely capacity to exist within the comprehending whole4 ,it is a case of the psychologist's fallacy to read back into the preliminary situation those distinctions of mere conjunction of material and of valid relationship which get existence1 to say nothing of fixation1 only within the thought-process4 ,we must not leave this phase of the discussion1 however1 until it is quite clear that our objection is not to ,lotze's position that reflective thought arises from an antecedent which is not reflectional in character2 nor yet to his idea that this antecedent has a certain structure and content of its own setting the peculiar problem which evokes thought and gives the cue to its specific activities4 ,on the contrary1 it is this latter point upon which we would insist2 and1 by insisting1 point out1 negatively1 that this view is absolutely inconsistent with ,lotze's theory that psychical impressions and ideas are the true antecedents of thought2 and1 positively1 that it is the situation as a whole1 and not any one isolated part of it1 or distinction within it1 that calls forth and directs thinking4 ,we must beware the fallacy of assuming that some one element in the prior situation in isolation or detachment induces the thought which in reality comes forth only from the whole disturbed situation4 ,on the negative side1 characterizations of impression and idea 7whether as mental contents or as psychical existences7 are distinctions which arise only within reflection upon the situation which is the genuine antecedent of thought2 while the distinction of psychical existences from external existences arises only within a highly elaborate technical reflection--that of the psychologist as such4#ab ,positively1 it is the whole dynamic experience with its qualitative and pervasive identity of value1 and its inner distraction1 its elements at odds with each other1 in tension against each other1 contending each for its proper placing and relationship1 that generates the thought-situation4 ,from this point of view1 at this period of development1 the distinctions of objective and subjective have a characteristic meaning4 ,the antecedent1 to repeat1 is a situation in which the various factors are actively incompatible with each other1 and which yet in and through the striving tend to a re-formation of the whole and to a restatement of the parts4 ,this situation as such is clearly objective4 ,it is there2 it is there as a whole2 the various parts are there2 and their active incompatibility with one another is there4 ,nothing is conveyed at this point by asserting that any particular part of the situation is illusory or subjective1 or mere appearance2 or that any other is truly real4 ,it is the further work of thought to exclude some of the contending factors from membership in experience1 and thus to relegate them to the sphere of the merely subjective4 ,but just at this epoch the experience exists as one of vital and active confusion and conflict4 ,the conflict is not only objective in a de facto sense 7that is1 really existent71 but is objective in a logical sense as well2 it is just this conflict which effects the transition into the thought-situation--this1 in turn1 being only a constant movement toward a defined equilibrium4 ,the conflict has objective logical value because it is the antecedent condition and cue of thought4 ,every reflective attitude and function1 whether of nave life1 deliberate invention1 or controlled scientific research1 has risen through the medium of some such total objective situation4 ,the abstract logician may tell us that sensations or impressions1 or associated ideas1 or bare physical things1 or conventional symbols1 are antecedent conditions4 ,but such statements cannot be verified by reference to a single instance of thought in connection with actual practice or actual scientific research4 ,of course1 by extreme mediation symbols may become conditions of evoking thought4 ,they get to be objects in an active experience4 ,but they are stimuli only in case their manipulation to form a new whole occasions resistance1 and thus reciprocal tension4 ,symbols and their definitions develop to a point where dealing with them becomes itself an experience1 having its own identity2 just as the handling of commercial commodities1 or arrangement of parts of an invention1 is an individual experience4 ,there is always as antecedent to thought an experience of some subject-matter of the physical or social world1 or organized intellectual world1 whose parts are actively at war with each other--so much so that they threaten to disrupt the entire experience1 which accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate re-definition and re-relation of its tensional parts4 ,this is the reconstructive process termed thinking3 the reconstructive situation1 with its parts in tension and in such movement toward each other as tends to a unified experience1 is the thought-situation4 ,this at once suggests the subjective phase4 ,the situation1 the experience as such1 is objective4 ,there is an experience of the confused and conflicting tendencies4 ,but just what in particular is objective1 just what form the situation shall take as an organized harmonious whole1 is unknown2 that is the problem4 ,it is the uncertainty as to the what of the experience together with the certainty that there is such an experience1 that evokes the thought-function4 ,viewed from this standpoint of uncertainty1 the situation as a whole is subjective4 ,no particular content or reference can be asserted off-hand4 ,definite assertion is expressly reserved--it is to be the outcome of the procedure of reflective inquiry now undertaken4 ,this holding off of contents from definitely asserted position1 this viewing them as candidates for reform1 is what we mean at this stage of the natural history of thought by the subjective4 ,we have followed ,lotze through his tortuous course of inconsistencies4 ,it is better1 perhaps1 to run the risk of vain repetition1 than that of leaving the impression that these are mere self-contradictions4 ,it is an idle task to expose contradictions save we realize them in relation to the fundamental assumption which breeds them4 ,lotze is bound to differentiate thought from its antecedents4 ,he is intent to do this1 however1 through a preconception that marks off the thought-situation radically from its predecessor1 through a difference that is complete1 fixed1 and absolute1 or at large4 ,it is a total contrast of thought as such to something else as such that he requires1 not a contrast within experience of one phase of a process1 one period of a rhythm1 from others4 ,this complete and rigid difference ,lotze finds in the difference between an experience which is mere existence or occurrence1 and one which has to do with worth1 truth1 right relationship4 ,now things1 objects1 have already1 implicitly at least1 determinations of worth1 of truth1 reality1 etc4 ,the same is true of deeds1 affections1 etc41 etc4 ,only states of feelings1 bare impressions1 etc41 seem to fulfil the prerequisite of being given as existence1 and yet without qualification as to worth1 etc4 ,then the current of ideas offers itself1 a ready-made stream of events1 of existences1 which can be characterized as wholly innocent of reflective determination1 and as the natural predecessor of thought4 ,but this stream of existences is no sooner there than its total incapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of thought appears4 ,it is about as relevant as are changes that may be happening on the other side of the moon4 ,so1 one by one1 the whole series of determinations of value or worth already traced are introduced into the very make-up1 the inner structure1 of what was to be mere existence3 viz41 7#a7 value as determined by things of whose spatial and temporal relations the things are somehow representative2 7#b7 hence1 value in the shape of meaning--the idea as significant1 possessed of quality1 and not a mere event2 7#c7 distinguished values of coincidence and coherence within the stream4 ,all these kinds of value are explicitly asserted1 as we have seen2 underlying and running through them all is the recognition of the supreme value of a situation which is organized as a whole1 yet conflicting in its inner constitution4 ,these contradictions all arise in the attempt to put thought's work1 as concerned with value or validity over against experience as a mere antecedent happening1 or occurrence4 ,since this contrast arises because of the deeper attempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in general which yet1 in our experience1 is specifically dependent1 the sole radical avoiding of the contradictions can be found in the endeavor to characterize thought as a specific mode of valuation in the evolution of significant experience1 having its own specific occasion or demand1 and its own specific place4 ,the nature of the organization and value that the antecedent conditions of the thought-function possess is too large a question here to enter upon in detail4 ,lotze himself suggests the answer4 ,he speaks of the current of ideas1 just as a current1 supplying us with the mass of well-grounded information which regulates daily life 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #d74 ,it gives rise to useful combinations1 correct expectations1 seasonable reactions 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #g74 ,he speaks of it1 indeed1 as if it were just the ordinary world of nave experience1 the so-called empirical world1 as distinct from the world as critically revised and rationalized in scientific and philosophic inquiry4 ,the contradiction between this interpretation and that of a mere stream of psychical impressions is only another instance of the difficulty already discussed4 ,but the phraseology suggests the type of value possessed by it4 ,the unreflective world is a world of practical values2 of ends and means1 of their effective adaptations2 of control and regulation of conduct in view of results4 ,even the most purely utilitarian of values are nevertheless values2 not mere existences4 ,but the world of uncritical experience is saved from reduction to just material uses and worths2 for it is a world of social aims and means1 involving at every turn the values of affection and attachment1 of competition and co-operation4 ,it has incorporate also in its own being the surprise of sthetic values--the sudden joy of light1 the gracious wonder of tone and form4 ,i do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflective world of experience over against the critical thought-situation--such a contrast implies the very wholesale1 at large1 consideration of thought which ,i am striving to avoid4 ,doubtless many and many an act of thought has intervened in effecting the organization of our commonest practical-affectional-sthetic region of values4 ,i only mean to indicate that thought does take place in such a world2 not after a world of bare existences lacking value-specifications2 and that the more systematic reflection we call organized science1 may1 in some fair sense1 be said to come after1 but to come after affectional1 artistic1 and technological interests which have found realization and expression in building up a world of values4 ,having entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be followed out1 ,i venture one other digression4 ,the notion that value or significance as distinct from mere existentiality is the product of thought or reason1 and that the source of ,lotze's contradictions lies in the effort to find any situation prior or antecedent to thought1 is a familiar one--it is even possible that my criticisms of ,lotze have been interpreted by some readers in this sense4#ac ,this is the position frequently called neo-,hegelian 7though1 ,i think1 with questionable accuracy71 and has been developed by many writers in criticising ,kant4 ,this position and that taken in this chapter do indeed agree in certain general regards4 ,they are at one in denial of the factuality and the possibility of developing fruitful reflection out of antecedent bare existence or mere events4 ,they unite in denying that there is or can be any such thing as mere existence--phenomenon unqualified as respects meaning1 whether such phenomenon be psychic or cosmic4 ,they agree that reflective thought grows organically out of an experience which is already organized1 and that it functions within such an organism4 ,but they part company when a fundamental question is raised3 ,is all organized meaning the work of thought8 ,does it therefore follow that the organization out of which reflective thought grows is the work of thought of some other type--of ,pure ,thought1 ,creative or ,constitutive ,thought1 ,intuitive ,reason1 etc48 ,i shall indicate briefly the reasons for divergence at this point4 ,to cover all the practical-social-sthetic values involved1 the term thought has to be so stretched that the situation might as well be called by any other name that describes a typical value of experience4 ,more specifically1 when the difference is minimized between the organized and arranged scheme of values out of which reflective inquiry proceeds1 and reflective inquiry itself 7and there can be no other reason for insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought is itself somehow thought71 exactly the same type of problem recurs that presents itself when the distinction is exaggerated into one between bare unvalued existences and rational coherent meanings4 ,for the more one insists that the antecedent situation is constituted by thought1 the more one has to wonder why another type of thought is required2 what need arouses it1 and how it is possible for it to improve upon the work of previous constitutive thought4 ,this difficulty at once forces us from a logic of experience as it is concretely experienced into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical experience4 ,constitutive thought precedes our conscious thought-operations2 hence it must be the working of some absolute universal thought which1 unconsciously to our reflection1 builds up an organized world4 ,but this recourse only deepens the difficulty4 ,how does it happen that the absolute constitutive and intuitive ,thought does such a poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive activity to patch up its products8 ,here more metaphysic is called for3 ,the ,absolute ,reason is now supposed to work under limiting conditions of finitude1 of a sensitive and temporal organism4 ,the antecedents of reflective thought are not1 therefore1 determinations of thought pure and undefiled1 but of what thought can do when it stoops to assume the yoke of change and of feeling4 ,i pass by the metaphysical problem left unsolved by this flight into metaphysic3 ,why and how should a perfect1 absolute1 complete1 finished thought find it necessary to submit to alien1 disturbing1 and corrupting conditions in order1 in the end1 to recover through reflective thought in a partial1 piecemeal1 wholly inadequate way what it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfactory way8 ,i confine myself to the logical difficulty4 ,how can thought relate itself to the fragmentary sensations1 impressions1 feelings1 which1 in their contrast with and disparity from the workings of constitutive thought1 mark it off from the latter2 and which in their connection with its products give the cue to reflective thinking8 ,here we have again exactly the problem with which ,lotze has been wrestling3 we have the same insoluble question of the reference of thought-activity to a wholly indeterminate unrationalized1 independent1 prior existence4 ,the absolute rationalist who takes up the problem at this point will find himself forced into the same continuous seesaw1 the same scheme of alternate rude robbery and gratuitous gift1 that ,lotze engaged in4 ,the simple fact is that here is just where ,lotze himself began2 he saw that previous transcendental logicians had left untouched the specific question of relation of our supposedly finite1 reflective thought to its own antecedents1 and he set out to make good the defect4 ,if reflective thought is required because constitutive thought works under externally limiting conditions of sense1 then we have some elements which are1 after all1 mere existences1 events1 etc4 ,or1 if they have organization from some other source1 and induce reflective thought not as bare impressions1 etc41 but through their place in some whole1 then we have admitted the possibility of organic unity in experience1 apart from ,reason1 and the ground for assuming ,pure ,constitutive ,thought is abandoned4 ,the contradiction appears equally when viewed from the side of thought-activity and its characteristic forms4 ,all our knowledge1 after all1 of thought as constitutive is gained by consideration of the operations of reflective thought4 ,the perfect system of thought is so perfect that it is a luminous1 harmonious whole1 without definite parts or distinctions--or1 if there are such1 it is only reflection that brings them out4 ,the categories and methods of constitutive thought itself must therefore be characterized in terms of the modus operandi of reflective thought4 ,yet the latter takes place just because of the peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions under which it arises4 ,its work is progressive1 reformatory1 reconstructive1 synthetic1 in the terminology made familiar by ,kant4 ,we are not only not justified1 accordingly1 in transferring its determinations over to constitutive thought1 but we are absolutely prohibited from attempting any such transfer4 ,to identify logical processes1 states1 devices1 results that are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to thought as constitutive with the structure of such thought is as complete an instance of the fallacy of recourse from one genus to another as could well be found4 ,constitutive and reflective thought are1 first1 defined in terms of their dissimilarity and even opposition1 and then without more ado the forms of the description of the latter are carried over bodily to the former6#ad ,this is not meant for a merely controversial criticism4 ,it is meant to point positively toward the fundamental thesis of these chapters3 ,all the distinctions of the thought-function1 of conception as over against sense-perception1 of judgment in its various modes and forms1 of inference in its vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions come within the thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formation of experience2 and have for their purpose the solution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the thought-function is generated or evolved3 the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen4 ,the failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as the failure of the empiristic 7whether taken pure or in the mixed form in which ,lotze presents it74 ,it makes absolute and fixed certain distinctions of existence and meaning1 and of one kind of meaning and another kind1 which are wholly historic and relative in their origin and their significance4 ,it views thought as attempting to represent or state reality once for all1 instead of trying to determine some phases or contents of it with reference to their more effective and significant reciprocal employ--instead of as reconstructive4 ,the rock against which every such logic splits is that either reality already has the statement which thought is endeavoring to give it1 or else it has not4 ,in the former case1 thought is futilely reiterative2 in the latter1 it is falsificatory4 ,the significance of ,lotze for critical purposes is that his peculiar effort to combine a transcendental view of thought 7i4 e41 of ,thought as active in forms of its own1 pure in and of themselves7 with certain obvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific empirical antecedents1 brings to light fundamental defects in both the empiristic and the transcendental logics4 ,we discover a common failure in both3 the failure to view logical terms and distinctions with respect to their necessary function in the redintegration of experience4 ,,iii ,,thought ,,and ,,its ,,subject-,,matter3 ,,the ,,datum ,,of ,,thinking ,we have now reached a second epochal stage in the evolution of the thought-situation1 a crisis which forces upon us the problem of the distinction and mutual reference of the datum or presentation1 and the ideas or thoughts4 ,it will economize and perhaps clarify discussion if we start from the relatively positive and constructive result just reached1 and review ,lotze's treatment from that point of regard4 ,we have reached the point of conflict in the matters or contents of an experience4 ,it is in this conflict and because of it that the matters or contents1 or significant quales1 stand out as such4 ,as long as the sun revolves about earth without tension or question1 this content1 or fact1 is not in any way abstracted as content or object4 ,its very distinction as content from the form or mode of experience as such is the result of post-reflection4 ,the same conflict makes other experiences assume conscious objectification2 they1 too1 cease to be ways of living1 and become distinct objects of observation and consideration4 ,the movements of planets1 eclipses1 etc41 are cases in point4#ae ,the maintenance of a unified experience has become a problem1 an end4 ,it is no longer secure4 ,but this involves such restatement of the conflicting elements as will enable them to take a place somewhere in the new experience2 they must be disposed of somehow1 and they can be disposed of finally only as they are provided for4 ,that is1 they cannot be simply denied or excluded or eliminated2 they must be taken into the fold of the new experience2 such introduction1 on the other hand1 clearly demands more or less modification or transformation on their part4 ,the thought-situation is the conscious maintenance of the unity of experience1 with a critical consideration of the claims of the various conflicting contents to a place within itself1 and a deliberate final assignment of position4 ,the conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself4 ,there is somewhat which is untouched in the contention of incompatibles4 ,there is something which remains secure1 unquestioned4 ,on the other hand1 there are elements which are rendered doubtful and precarious4 ,this gives the framework of the general distribution of the field into facts1 the given1 the presented1 the ,datum2 and ideas1 the ideal1 the conceived1 the ,thought4 ,for there is always something unquestioned in any problematic situation at any stage of its process1#af even if it be only the fact of conflict or tension4 ,for this is never mere tension at large4 ,it is thoroughly qualified1 or characteristically toned and colored1 by the particular elements which are in strife4 ,hence it is this conflict1 unique and irreplaceable4 ,that it comes now means precisely that it has never come before2 that it is now passed in review and some sort of a settlement reached1 means that just this conflict will never recur4 ,in a word1 the conflict as such is immediately expressed1 or felt1 as of just this and no other sort1 and this immediately apprehended quality is an irreducible datum4 ,it is fact1 even if all else be doubtful4 ,as it is subjected to examination1 it loses vagueness and assumes more definite form4 ,only in very extreme cases1 however1 does the assured1 unquestioned element reduce to as low terms as we have here imagined4 ,certain things come to stand forth as facts1 no matter what else may be doubted4 ,there are certain apparent diurnal changes of the sun2 there is a certain annual course or track4 ,there are certain nocturnal changes in the planets1 and certain seasonal rhythmic paths4 ,the significance of these may be doubted3 ,do they mean real change in the sun or in the earth8 ,but change1 and change of a certain definite and numerically determinate character is there4 ,it is clear that such out-standing facts 7ex-istences7 constitute the data1 the given or presented1 of the thought-function4 ,it is obvious that this is only one correspondent1 or status1 in the total situation4 ,with the consciousness of this as certain1 as given to be reckoned with1 goes the consciousness of uncertainty as to what it means--of how it is to be understood or interpreted4 ,the facts qua presentation or existences are sure2 qua meaning 7position and relationship in an experience yet to be secured7 they are doubtful4 ,yet doubt does not preclude memory or anticipation4 ,indeed1 it is possible only through them4 ,the memory of past experience makes sun-revolving-about-earth an object of attentive regard4 ,the recollection of certain other experiences suggests the idea of earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and revolving-annually-about-sun4 ,these contents are as much present as is the observation of change1 but as respects worth1 they are only possibilities4 ,accordingly1 they are categorized or disposed of as just ideas1 meanings1 thoughts1 ways of conceiving1 comprehending1 interpreting facts4 ,correspondence of reference here is as obvious as correlation of existence4 ,in the logical process1 the datum is not just real existence1 and the idea mere psychical unreality4 ,both are modes of existence--one of given existence1 the other of mental existence4 ,and if the mental existence is in such cases regarded1 from the standpoint of the unified experience aimed at1 as having only possible value1 the datum also is regarded1 from the value standpoint1 as incomplete and unassured4 ,the very existence of the idea or meaning as separate is the partial1 broken up1 and hence objectively unreal 7from the validity standpoint7 character of the datum4 ,or1 as we commonly put it1 while the ideas are impressions1 suggestions1 guesses1 theories1 estimates1 etc41 the facts are crude1 raw1 unorganized1 brute4 ,they lack relationship1 that is1 assured place in the universe2 they are deficient as to continuity4 ,mere change of apparent position of sun1 which is absolutely unquestioned as datum1 is a sheer abstraction from the standpoint either of the organized experience left behind1 or of the reorganized experience which is the end--the objective4 ,it is impossible as a persistent object in experience or reality4 ,in other words1 datum and ideatum are divisions of labor1 co-operative instrumentalities1 for economical dealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity of experience4 ,once more1 and briefly1 both datum and ideatum may 7and positively1 veritably1 do7 break up1 each for itself1 into physical and psychical4 ,in so far as the conviction gains ground that the earth revolves about the sun1 the old fact is broken up into a new cosmic existence1 and a new psychological condition--the recognition of a mental process in virtue of which movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote larger bodies are interpreted in a reverse sense4 ,we do not just eliminate as false the source of error in the old content4 ,we reinterpret it as valid in its own place1 viz41 a case of the psychology of apperception1 although invalid as a matter of cosmic structure4 ,in other words1 with increasing accuracy of determination of the given1 there comes a distinction1 for methodological purposes1 between the quality or matter of the sense-experience and its form--the sense-perceiving1 as itself a psychological fact1 having its own place and laws or relations4 ,moreover1 the old experience1 that of sun-revolving1 abides4 ,but it is regarded as belonging to me--to this experiencing individual1 rather than to the cosmic world4 ,it is psychic4 ,here1 then1 within the growth of the thought-situation and as a part of the process of determining specific truth under specific conditions1 we get for the first time the clue to that distinction with which1 as ready-made and prior to all thinking1 ,lotze started out1 namely1 the separation of the matter of impression from impression as psychical event4 ,the separation which1 taken at large1 engenders an insoluble problem1 appears within a particular reflective inquiry1 as an inevitable differentiation of a scheme of values4 ,the same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought1 or meaning4 ,the meaning or idea which is growing in acceptance1 which is gaining ground as meaning-of-datum1 gets logical or intellectual or objective force2 that which is losing standing1 which is increasingly doubtful1 gets qualified as just a notion1 a fancy1 a pre-judice1 mis-conception--or finally just an error1 a mental slip4 ,evaluated as fanciful in validity it becomes mere image--subjective2#ag and finally a psychical existence4 ,it is not eliminated1 but receives a new reference or meaning4 ,thus the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is not one between meaning as such and datum as such4 ,it is a specification that emerges1 correspondently1 in both datum and ideatum1 as affairs of the direction of logical movement4 ,that which is left behind in the evolution of accepted meaning is characterized as real1 but only in a psychical sense2 that which is moved toward is regarded as real in an objective1 cosmic sense4#ah ,the implication of the psychic and the logical within both the given presentation and the thought about it1 appears in the continual shift to which logicians of ,lotze's type are put4 ,when the psychical is regarded as existence over against meaning as just ideal1 reality seems to reside in the psychical2 it is there anyhow1 and meaning is just a curious attachment--curious because as mere meaning it is non-existent as event or state--and there seems to be nothing by which it can be even tied to the psychical state as its bearer or representative4 ,but when the emphasis falls on thought as content1 as significance1 then the psychic event1 the idea as image#ai 7as distinct from idea as meaning7 appears as an accidental but necessary evil1 the unfortunate irrelevant medium through which our thinking has to go on4#bj #a4 ,the data of thought4--,when we turn to ,lotze1 we find that he makes a clear distinction between the presented material of thought1 its datum1 and the typical characteristic modes of thinking in virtue of which the datum gets organization or system4 ,it is interesting to note also that he states the datum in terms different from those in which the antecedents of thought are defined4 ,from the point of view of the material upon which ideas exercise themselves1 it is not coincidence1 collocation1 or succession that counts2 but gradation of degrees in a scale4 ,it is not things in spatial or temporal grouping that are emphasized1 but qualities as mutually distinguished1 yet classed--as differences of a common somewhat4 ,there is no inherent inconceivability in the idea that every impression should be as incomparably different from every other as sweet is from warm4 ,but by a remarkable circumstance such is not the case4 ,we have series1 and networks of series4 ,we have diversity of a common--diverse colors1 sounds1 smells1 tastes1 etc4 ,in other words1 the datum is sense-qualities which1 fortunately for thought1 are given arranged1 as shades1 degrees1 variations1 or qualities of somewhat that is identical4#ba ,all this is given1 presented1 to our ideational activities4 ,even the universal1 the common-color which runs through the various qualities of blue1 green1 white1 etc41 is not a product of thought1 but something which thought finds already in existence4 ,it conditions comparison and reciprocal distinction4 ,particularly all mathematical determinations1 whether of counting 7number71 degree 7more or less71 and quantity 7greatness and smallness71 come back to this peculiarity of the datum of thought4 ,here ,lotze dwells at considerable length upon the fact that the very possibility1 as well as the success1 of thought is due to this peculiar universalization or prima facie ordering with which its material is given to it4 ,such pre-established fitness in the meeting of two things that have nothing to do with each other is certainly cause enough for wonder and congratulation4 ,it should not be difficult to see why ,lotze uses different categories in describing the given material of thought from those employed in describing its antecedent conditions1 even though1 according to him1 the two are absolutely the same4#bb ,he has different functions in mind4 ,in one case1 the material must be characterized as evoking1 as incentive1 as stimulus--from this point of view the peculiar combination of coincidence and coherence is emphasized4 ,but in the other case the material must be characterized as affording stuff1 actual subject-matter4 ,data are not only what is given to thought1 but they are also the food1 the raw material1 of thought4 ,they must be described as1 on the one hand1 wholly outside of thought4 ,this clearly puts them into the region of sense-perception4 ,they are matter of sensation given free from all inferring1 judging1 relating influence4 ,sensation is just what is not called up in memory or in anticipated projection--it is the immediate1 the irreducible4 ,on the other hand1 sensory-matter is qualitative1 and quales are made up on a common basis4 ,they are degrees or grades of a common quality4 ,thus they have a certain ready-made setting of mutual distinction and reference which is already almost1 if not quite1 the effect of comparing1 of relating1 and these are the express traits of thinking4 ,it is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in the light of what has been said4 ,the data are in truth precisely that which is selected and set aside as present1 as immediate4 ,thus they are given to further thought4 ,but the selection has occurred in view of the need for thought2 it is a listing of the capital in the way of the undisturbed1 the undiscussed1 which thought can count upon in this particular problem4 ,hence it is not strange that it has a peculiar fitness of adaptation for thought's further work4 ,having been selected with precisely that end in view1 the wonder would be if it were not so fitted4 ,a man may coin counterfeit money for use upon others1 but hardly with the intent of passing it off upon himself4 ,our only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from the logical interpretation of sense-datum to a ready-made notion of it brought over from abstract psychological inquiry4 ,the belief in sensory quales as somehow forced upon us1 and forced upon us at large1 and thus conditioning thought wholly ab extra1 instead of determining it as instrumentalities or elements in its own scheme1 is too fixed4 ,such qualities are forced upon us1 but not at large4 ,the sensory data of experience1 as distinct from the psychologists' constructs1 always come in a context2 they always appear as variations in a continuum of values4 ,even the thunder which breaks in upon me 7to take the extreme of apparent discontinuity and irrelevancy7 disturbs me because it is taken as a part of the same space-world as that in which my chair and room and house are located2 and it is taken as an influence which interrupts and disturbs1 because it is part of my common world of causes and effects4 ,the solution of continuity is itself practical or teleological1 and thus presupposes and affects continuity of purpose1 occupations1 and means in a life-process4 ,it is not metaphysics1 it is biology which enforces the idea that actual sensation is not only determined as an event in a world of events1#bc but is an occurrence occurring at a certain period in the evolution of experience1 marking a certain point in its cycle1 and1 consequently--having always its own conscious context and bearings--is a characteristic function of reconstruction in experience4#bd #b4 ,forms of thinking data4--,as sensory datum is material set for the work of thought1 so the ideational forms with which thought does its work are apt and prompt to meet the needs of the material4 ,the accessory#be notion of ground of coherence turns out1 in truth1 not to be a formal1 or external1 addition to the data1 but a requalification of them4 ,thought is accessory as accomplice1 not as addendum4 ,thought is to eliminate mere coincidence1 and to assert grounded coherence4 ,lotze makes it absolutely clear that he does not at bottom conceive of thought as an activity in itself imposing a form of coherence2 but that the organizing work of thought is only the progressive realization of an inherent unity1 or system1 in the material experience4 ,the specific modes in which thought brings its accessory power to bear--names1 conception1 judgment1 and inference--are successive stages in the adequate organization of the matter which comes to us first as datum2 they are successive stages of the effort to overcome the original defects of the datum4 ,conception starts from the given universal 7the common element7 of sense4 ,yet 7and this is the significant point7 it does not simply abstract this common element1 and consciously generalize it as over against its own differences4 ,such a universal is not coherence1 just because it does not include and dominate the temporal and local heterogeneity4 ,the true concept 7see ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ch7 is a system of attributes1 held together on the basis of some ground1 or determining1 dominating principle--a ground which so controls all its own instances as to make them into an inwardly connected whole1 and so specifies its own limits as to be exclusive of all else4 ,if we abstract color as the common element of various colors1 the result is not a scientific idea or concept4 ,discovery of a process of light-waves whose various rates constitute the various colors of the spectrum gives the concept4 ,and when we get such a concept1 the former mere temporal abruptness of color experiences gives way to organic parts of a color system4 ,the logical product--the concept1 in other words--is not a formal seal or stamp2 it is a thoroughgoing transformation of data in a given sense4 ,the form or mode of thought which marks the continued transformation of the data and the idea in reference to each other is judgment4 ,judgment makes explicit the assumption of a principle which determines connection within an individualized whole4 ,it definitely states red as this case or instance of the law or process of color1 and thus overcomes further the defect in subject-matter or data still left by conception4#bf ,now judgment logically terminates in disjunction4 ,it gives a universal which may determine any one of a number of alternative defined particulars1 but which is arbitrary as to what one is selected4 ,systematic inference brings to light the material conditions under which the law1 or dominating universal1 applies to this1 rather than that alternative particular1 and so completes the ideal organization of the subject-matter4 ,if this act were complete1 we should finally have present to us a whole on which we should know the determining and effective or authorizing elements1 and the order of development or hierarchy of dependence1 in which others follow from them4#bg ,in this account by ,lotze of the operations of the forms of thought1 there is clearly put before us the picture of a continuous correlative determination of datum on one side and of idea or meaning on the other1 till experience is again integral1 data thoroughly defined and corrected1 and ideas completely incarnate as the relevant meaning of subject-matter4 ,that we have here in outline a description of what actually occurs there can be no doubt4 ,but there is as little doubt that it is thoroughly inconsistent with ,lotze's supposition that the material or data of thought is precisely the same as the antecedents of thought2 or that ideas1 conceptions1 are purely mental somewhats brought to bear1 as the sole essential characteristics of thought1 extraneously upon a material provided ready-made4 ,it means but one thing3 ,the maintenance of unity and wholeness in experience through conflicting contents occurs by means of a strictly correspondent setting apart of fact to be accurately described and properly related1 and meaning to be adequately construed and properly referred4 ,the datum is given in the thought-situation1 and to further qualification of ideas or meanings4 ,but even in this aspect it presents a problem4 ,to find out what is given is an inquiry which taxes reflection to the uttermost4 ,every important advance in scientific method means better agencies1 more skilled technique for simply detaching and describing what is barely there1 or given4 ,to be able to find out what can safely be taken as there1 as given in any particular inquiry1 and hence be taken as material for orderly and verifiable thinking1 for fruitful hypothesis-making1 for entertaining of explanatory and interpretative ideas1 is one phase of the effort of systematic scientific inquiry4 ,it marks its inductive phase4 ,to take what is given in the thought-situation1 for the sake of accomplishing the aim of thought 7along with a correlative discrimination of ideas or meanings71 as if it were given absolutely1 or apart from a particular historic situs and context1 is the fallacy of empiricism as a logical theory4 ,to regard the thought-forms of conception1 judgment1 and inference as qualifications of pure thought1 apart from any difference in objects1 instead of as successive dispositions in the progressive organization of the material 7or objects7 is the fallacy of rationalism4 ,lotze attempts to combine the two1 thinking thereby to correct each by the other4 ,lotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense-data are final1 if they alone are real1 the truly existent1 self-justificatory and valid4 ,he sees that1 if the empiricist were right in his assumption as to the real worth of the given data1 thinking would be a ridiculous pretender1 either toilfully and poorly doing over again what needs no doing1 or making a wilful departure from truth4 ,he realizes that thought really is evoked because it is needed1 and that it has a work to do which is not merely formal1 but which effects a modification of the subject-matter of experience4 ,consequently he assumes a thought-in-itself1 with certain forms and modes of action of its own1 a realm of meaning possessed of a directive and normative worth of its own--the root-fallacy of rationalism4 ,his attempted compromise between the two turns out to be based on the assumption of the indefensible ideas of both--the notion of an independent matter of thought1 on one side1 and of an independent worth or value of thought-forms1 on the other4 ,this pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and unprofitable save as we bring them back into connection with their root-origin--the erection of distinctions that are genetic and historic1 and working or instrumental divisions of labor1 into rigid and ready-made differences of structural reality4 ,lotze clearly recognizes that thought's nature is dependent upon its aim1 its aim upon its problem1 and this upon the situation in which it finds its incentive and excuse4 ,its work is cut out for it4 ,it does not what it would1 but what it must4 ,as ,lotze puts it1 ,logic has to do with thought1 not as it would be under hypothetical conditions1 but as it is 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #cc71 and this statement is made in explicit combination with statements to the effect that the peculiarity of the material of thought conditions its activity4 ,similarly he says in a passage already referred to3 ,the possibility and the success of thought's production in general depends upon this original constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas1 a constitution which1 though not necessary in thought1 is all the more necessary to make thought possible4#bh ,as we have seen1 the essential nature of conception1 judgment1 and inference is dependent upon peculiarities of the propounded material1 they being forms dependent for their significance upon the stage of organization in which they begin4 ,from this only one conclusion is suggested4 ,if thought's nature is dependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances1 the primary logical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning2 it is to detect the crisis within which thought and its subject-matter present themselves in their mutual distinction and cross-reference4 ,but ,lotze is so thoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some sort1 that this genetic consideration is of no account to him4 ,the historic method is a mere matter of psychology1 and has no logical worth 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #b74 ,we must presuppose a psychological mechanism and psychological material1 but logic is concerned not with origin or history1 but with authority1 worth1 value 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #aj74 ,again3 ,logic is not concerned with the manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into existence1 but their value after they have somehow come into existence1 for the carrying out of intellectual operations 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #cd74 ,and finally3 ,i have maintained throughout my work that logic cannot derive any serious advantage from a discussion of the conditions under which thought as a psychological process comes about4 ,the significance of logical forms 444 is to be found in the utterances of thought1 the laws which it imposes1 after or during the act of thinking1 not in the conditions which lie back of and which produce thought4#bi ,lotze1 in truth1 represents a halting-stage in the evolution of logical theory4 ,he is too far along to be contented with the reiteration of the purely formal distinctions of a merely formal thought-by-itself4 ,he recognizes that thought as formal is the form of some matter1 and has its worth only as organizing that matter to meet the ideal demands of reason2 and that reason is in truth only an ideal systematization of the matter or content4 ,consequently he has to open the door to admit psychical processes which furnish this material4 ,having let in the material1 he is bound to shut the door again in the face of the processes from which the material proceeded--to dismiss them as impertinent intruders4 ,if thought gets its data in such a surreptitious manner1 there is no occasion for wonder that the legitimacy of its dealings with the material remains an open question4 ,logical theory1 like every branch of the philosophic disciplines1 waits upon a surrender of the obstinate conviction that1 while the work and aim of thought is conditioned by the material supplied to it1 yet the worth of its performances is something to be passed upon in complete abstraction from conditions of origin and development4 ,,iv ,,thought ,,and ,,its ,,subject-,,matter3 ,,the ,,content ,,and ,,object ,,of ,,thought ,in the foregoing discussion1 particularly in the last chapter1 we were led repeatedly to recognize that thought has its own content4 ,at times ,lotze gives way to the tendency to define thought entirely in terms of modes and forms of activity which are exercised by it upon a strictly foreign material4 ,but two motives continually push him in the other direction4 7#a7 ,thought has a distinctive work to do1 one which involves a qualitative transformation of 7at least7 the relationships of the presented matter2 as fast as it accomplishes this work1 the subject-matter becomes somehow thought's own4 ,as we have just seen1 the data are progressively organized to meet thought's ideal of a complete whole1 with its members interconnected according to a determining principle4 ,such progressive organization throws backward doubt upon the assumption of the original total irrelevancy of the data and thought-form to each other4 7#b7 ,a like motive operates from the side of the subject-matter4 ,as merely foreign and external1 it is too heterogeneous to lend itself to thought's exercise and influence4 ,the idea1 as we saw in the first chapter1 is the convenient medium through which ,lotze passes from the purely heterogeneous psychical impression or event1 which is totally irrelevant to thought's purpose and working1 over to a state of affairs which can reward thought4 ,idea as meaning forms the bridge from the brute factuality of the psychical impression over to the coherent value of thought's own content4 ,we have1 in this chapter1 to consider the question of the idea or content of thought from two points of view3 first1 the possibility of such a content--its consistency with ,lotze's fundamental premises2 secondly1 its objective character--its validity and test4 ,i4 ,the question of the possibility of a specific content of thought is the question of the nature of the idea as meaning4 ,meaning is the characteristic content of thought as such4 ,we have thus far left unquestioned ,lotze's continual assumption of meaning as a sort of thought-unit2 the building-stone of thought's construction4 ,in his treatment of meaning1 ,lotze's contradictions regarding the antecedents1 data1 and content of thought reach their full conclusion4 ,he expressly makes meaning to be the product of thought's activity and also the unreflective material out of which thought's operations grow4 ,this contradiction has been worked out in accurate and complete detail by ,professor ,jones4#cj ,he summarizes it as follows 7p4 #ii73 ,no other way was left to him ,lotze excepting this of first attributing all to sense and afterwards attributing all to thought1 and1 finally of attributing it to thought only because it was already in its material4 ,this seesaw is essential to his theory2 the elements of knowledge as he describes them can subsist only by the alternate robbery of each other4 ,we have already seen how strenuously ,lotze insists upon the fact that the given subject-matter of thought is to be regarded wholly as the work of a physical mechanism1 without any action of thought4#ca ,but ,lotze also states that if the products of the psychical mechanism are to admit of combination in the definite form of a thought1 they each require some previous shaping to make them into logical building-stones and to convert them from impressions into ideas4 ,nothing is really more familiar to us than this first operation of thought2 the only reason why we usually overlook it is that in the language which we inherit1 it is already carried out1 and it seems1 therefore1 to belong to the self-evident presuppositions of thought1 not to its own specific work4#cb ,and again 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bc7 judgments can consist of nothing but combinations of ideas which are no longer mere impressions3 every such idea must have undergone at least the simple formation mentioned above4 ,such ideas are1 ,lotze goes on to urge1 already rudimentary concepts--that is to say1 logical determinations4 ,the obviousness of the logical contradiction of attributing to a preliminary specific work of thought exactly the condition of affairs which is elsewhere explicitly attributed to a psychical mechanism prior to any thought-activity1 should not blind us to its meaning and relative necessity4 ,the impression1 it will be recalled1 is a mere state of our own consciousness--a mood of ourselves4 ,as such it has simply de facto relations as an event to other similar events4 ,but reflective thought is concerned with the relationship of a content or matter to other contents4 ,hence the impression must have a matter before it can come at all within the sphere of thought's exercise4 ,how shall it secure this8 ,why1 by a preliminary activity of thought which objectifies the impression4 ,blue as a mere sensuous irritation or feeling is given a quality1 the meaning blue--blueness2 the sense-impression is objectified2 it is presented no longer as a condition which we undergo1 but as a something which has its being and its meaning in itself1 and which continues to be what it is1 and to mean what it means whether we are conscious of it or not4 ,it is easy to see here the necessary beginning of that activity which we above appropriated to thought as such3 it has not yet got so far as converting coexistence into coherence4 ,it has first to perform the previous task of investing each single impression with an independent validity1 without which the later opposition of their real coherence to mere coexistence could not be made in any intelligible sense4#cc ,this objectification1 which converts a sensitive state into a sensible matter to which the sensitive state is referred1 also gives this matter position1 a certain typical character4 ,it is not objectified in a merely general way1 but is given a specific sort of objectivity4 ,of these kinds of objectivity there are three mentioned3 that of a substantive content2 that of an attached dependent content2 that of an active relationship connecting the various contents with each other4 ,in short1 we have the types of meaning embodied in language in the form of nouns1 adjectives1 and verbs4 ,it is through this preliminary formative activity of thought that reflective or logical thought has presented to it a world of meanings ranged in an order of relative independence and dependence1 and ranged as elements in a complex of meanings whose various constituent parts mutually influence each other's meanings4#cd ,as usual1 ,lotze mediates the contradiction between material constituted by thought and the same material just presented to thought1 by a further position so disparate to each that1 taken in connection with each in a pair1 and by turns1 it seems to bridge the gulf4 ,after describing the prior constitutive work of thought as above1 he goes on to discuss a second phase of thought which is intermediary between this and the third phase1 viz41 reflective thought proper4 ,this second activity is that of arranging experienced quales in series and groups1 thus ascribing a sort of universal or common somewhat to various instances 7as already described2 see p4 #ee74 ,on one hand1 it is clearly stated that this second phase of thought's activity is in reality the same as the first phase3 since all objectification involves positing1 since positing involves distinction of one matter from others1 and since this involves placing it in a series or group in which each is measurably marked off1 as to the degree and nature of its diversity1 from every other4 ,we are told that we are only considering a really inseparable operation of thought from two different sides3 first1 as to the effect which objectifying thought has upon the matter as set over against the feeling subject1 secondly1 the effect which this objectification has upon the matter in relation to other matters4#ce ,afterward1 however1 these two operations are declared to be radically different in type and nature4 ,the first is determinant and formative2 it gives ideas the shape without which the logical spirit could not accept them4 ,in a way it dictates its own laws to its object-matter4#cf ,the second activity of thought is rather passive and receptive4 ,it simply recognizes what is already there4 ,thought can make no difference where it finds none already in the matter of impressions4#cg ,the first universal1 as we saw1 can only be experienced in immediate sensation4 ,it is no product of thought1 but something that thought finds already in existence4#ch ,the obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled only by its inevitableness4 ,thought is in the air1 is arbitrary and wild in dealing with meanings1 unless it gets its start and cue from actual experience4 ,hence the necessity of insisting upon thought's activity as just recognizing the contents already given4 ,but1 on the other hand1 prior to the work of thought there is to ,lotze no content or meaning4 ,it requires a work of thought to detach anything from the flux of sense-irritations and invest it with a meaning of its own4 ,this dilemma is inevitable to any writer who declines to consider as correlative the nature of thought-activity and thought-content from the standpoint of their generating conditions in the movement of experience4 ,viewed from such a standpoint the principle of solution is clear enough4 ,as we have already seen 7p4 #ec71 the internal dissension of an experience leads to detaching certain values previously absorptively integrated into the concrete experience as part of its own qualitative coloring2 and to relegating them1 for the time being1 7pending integration into further immediate values of a reconstituted experience7 into a world of bare meanings1 a sphere qualified as ideal throughout4 ,these meanings then become the tools of thought in interpreting the data1 just as the sense-qualities which define the presented situation are the immediate object to thought4 ,the two as mutually referred are content4 ,that is1 the datum and the thought-mode or idea as connected are the object of thought4 ,to reach this unification is thought's objective or goal4 ,exactly the same value is idea1 as either tool or content1 according as it is taken as instrumental or as accomplishment4 ,every successive cross-section of the thought-situation presents what may be taken for granted as the outcome of previous thinking1 and consequently as the determinant of further reflective procedure4 ,taken as defining the point reached in the thought-function and serving as constituent unit of further thought1 it is content4 ,lotze's instinct is sure in identifying and setting over against each other the material given to thought and the content which is thought's own building-stone4 ,his contradictions arise simply from the fact that his absolute1 non-historic method does not permit him to interpret this joint identity and distinction in a working1 and hence relative1 sense4 ,,ii4 ,the question of how the possibility of meanings1 or thought-contents1 is to be understood merges imperceptibly into the question of the real objectivity or validity of such contents4 ,the difficulty for ,lotze is the now familiar one3 ,so far as his logic compels him to insist that these meanings are the possession and product of thought 7since thought is an independent activity71 the ideas are merely ideas2 there is no test of objectivity beyond the thoroughly unsatisfactory and formal one of their own mutual consistency4 ,in reaction from this ,lotze is thrown back upon the idea of these contents as the original matter given in the impressions themselves4 ,here there seems to be an objective or external test by which the reality of thought's operations may be tried2 a given idea is verified or found false according to its measure of correspondence with the matter of experience as such4 ,but now we are no better off4 ,the original independence and heterogeneity of impressions and of thought is so great that there is no way to compare the results of the latter with the former4 ,we cannot compare or contrast distinctions of worth with bare differences of factual existence 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #b74 ,the standard or test of objectivity is so thoroughly external that by original definition it is wholly outside the realm of thought4 ,how can thought compare its own contents with that which is wholly outside itself8 ,or again1 the given material of experience apart from thought is precisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized2 it even reduces itself to a mere sequence of psychical events4 ,what rational meaning is there in directing us to compare the highest results of scientific inquiry with the bare sequence of our own states of feeling2 or even with the original data whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the exact motive for entering upon scientific inquiry8 ,how can the former in any sense give a check or test of the value of the latter8 ,this is professedly to test the validity of a system of meanings by comparison with that whose defects and errors call forth the construction of the system of meanings by which to rectify and replace themselves4 ,our subsequent inquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases of the characteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns of the now familiar dilemma3 either thought is separate from the matter of experience1 and then its validity is wholly its own private business2 or else the objective results of thought are already in the antecedent material1 and then thought is either unnecessary1 or else has no way of checking its own performances4 #a4 ,lotze assumes1 as we have seen1 a certain independent validity in each meaning or qualified content1 taken in and of itself4 ,blue has a certain validity1 or meaning1 in and of itself2 it is an object for consciousness as such4 ,after the original sense-irritation through which it was mediated has entirely disappeared1 it persists as a valid idea1 as a meaning4 ,moreover1 it is an object or content of thought for others as well4 ,thus it has a double mark of validity3 in the comparison of one part of my own experience with another1 and in the comparison of my experience as a whole with that of others4 ,here we have a sort of validity which does not raise at all the question of metaphysical reality 7,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #ad1 #ae74 ,lotze thus seems to have escaped from the necessity of employing as check or test for the validity of ideas any reference to a real outside the sphere of thought itself4 ,such terms as conjunction1 franchise1 constitution1 algebraic zero1 etc41 etc41 claim to possess objective validity4 ,yet none of these professes to refer to a reality beyond thought4 ,generalizing this point of view1 validity or objectivity of meaning means simply that which is identical for all consciousness 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #c72 it is quite indifferent whether certain parts of the world of thought indicate something which has beside an independent reality outside of thinking minds1 or whether all that it contains exists only in the thoughts of those who think it1 but with equal validity for them all 7,vol4 ,i1 p4 #af74 ,so far it seems clear sailing4 ,difficulties1 however1 show themselves1 the moment we inquire what is meant by a self-identical content for all thought4 ,is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way8 ,that is to say3 ,does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is de facto presented to the consciousness of all alike8 ,does this coequal presence guarantee an objectivity8 ,or does validity attach to a given meaning or content in so far as it directs and controls the further exercise of thinking1 and thus the formation of further new contents of consciousness8 ,the former interpretation is alone consistent with ,lotze's notion that the independent idea as such is invested with a certain validity or objectivity4 ,it alone is consistent with his assertion that concepts precede judgments4 ,it alone1 that is to say1 is consistent with the notion that reflective thinking has a sphere of ideas or meanings supplied to it at the outset4 ,but it is impossible to entertain this belief4 ,the stimulus which1 according to ,lotze1 goads thought on from ideas or concepts to judgments and inferences1 is in truth simply the lack of validity1 of objectivity in its original independent meanings or contents4 ,a meaning as independent is precisely that which is not invested with validity1 but which is a mere idea1 a notion1 a fancy1 at best a surmise which may turn out to be valid 7and of course this indicates possible reference72 a standpoint to have its value determined by its further active use4 ,blue as a mere detached floating meaning1 an idea at large1 would not gain in validity simply by being entertained continuously in a given consciousness2 or by being made at one and the same time the persistent object of attentive regard by all human consciousnesses4 ,if this were all that were required1 the chimera1 the centaur1 or any other subjective construction1 could easily gain validity4 ,christian ,science has made just this notion the basis of its philosophy4 ,the simple fact is that in such illustrations as blue1 franchise1 conjunction1 ,lotze instinctively takes cases which are not mere independent and detached meanings1 but which involve reference to a region of cosmic experience1 or to a region of mutually determining social activities4 ,the conception that reference to a social activity does not involve the same sort of reference of thought beyond itself that is involved in physical matters1 and hence may be taken quite innocent and free of the metaphysical problem of reference to reality beyond meaning1 is one of the strangest that has ever found lodgment in human thinking4 ,either both physical and social reference or neither1 is metaphysical2 if neither1 then it is because the meaning functions1 as it originates1 in a specific situation which carries with it its own tests 7see p4 #ag74 ,lotze's conception is made possible only by unconsciously substituting the idea of object as content of thought for a large number of persons 7or a de facto somewhat for every consciousness71 for the genuine definition of object as a determinant in a scheme of experience4 ,the former is consistent with ,lotze's conception of thought1 but wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent4 ,the latter is the test used experimentally in all concrete thinking1 but involves a radical transformation of all ,lotze's assumptions4 ,a given idea of the conjunction of the franchise1 or of blue1 is valid1 not because everybody happens to entertain it1 but because it expresses the factor of control or direction in a given movement of experience4 ,the test of validity of idea#ci is its functional or instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one4 ,if ,lotze's view were correct1 blue valid once would be valid always--even when red or green were actually called for to fulfil specific conditions4 ,this is to say validity always refers to rightfulness or adequacy of performance in an asserting of connection--not to the meaning as detached and contemplated4 ,if we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent of thought is a situation which is tensional as regards its existing status1 or disorganized in its structural elements1 yet organized as emerging out of the unified experience of the past and as striving as a whole1 or equally in all its phases1 to reinstate an experience harmonized in make-up1 we can easily understand how certain contents may be detached and held apart as meanings or references1 actual or possible 7according as they are viewed with reference to the past or to the future74 ,we can understand how such detached contents may be of use in effecting a review of the entire experience1 and as affording standpoints and methods of a reconstruction which will maintain the integrity of experience4 ,we can understand how validity of meaning is measured by reference to something which is not mere meaning2 by reference to something which lies beyond the idea as such--viz41 the reconstitution of an experience into which thought enters as mediator4 ,that paradox of ordinary experience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is given alike to matter of perception and to conceived relations--to facts and to laws--affords no peculiar difficulty1 because we see that the test of objectivity is everywhere the same3 anything is objective in so far as1 through the medium of conflict1 it controls the movement of experience in its reconstructive transition from one unified form to another4 ,there is not first an object1 whether of sense-perception or of conception1 which afterward somehow exercises this controlling influence2 but the objective is such in virtue of the exercise of function of control4 ,it may only control the act of inquiry2 it may only set on foot doubt1 but this is direction of subsequent experience1 and1 in so far1 is a token of objectivity4 ,so much for the thought-content or meaning as having a validity of its own4 ,it does not have it as isolated or given or static2 it has it in its dynamic reference1 its use in determining further movement of experience4 ,in other words1 the meaning or idea as such1 having been selected and made-up with reference to performing a certain office in the evolution of a unified experience1 can be tested in no other way than by discovering whether it does what it was intended to do and what it purports to do4#dj #b4 ,lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a further aspect3 ,what constitutes the objectivity of thinking as a total attitude1 activity1 or function8 ,according to his own statement1 the meanings or valid ideas are after all only building-stones for logical thought4 ,validity is thus not a question of them in their independent existences1 but of their mutual reference to each other4 ,thinking is the process of instituting these mutual references2 of building up the various scattered and independent building-stones into the coherent system of thought4 ,what is the validity of the various forms of thinking which find expression in the various types of judgment and in the various forms of inference8 ,categorical1 hypothetical1 disjunctive judgment2 inference by induction1 by analogy1 by mathematical equation2 classification1 theory of explanation--all these are processes of reflection by which mutual connection in an individualized whole is given to the fragmentary meanings or ideas with which thought as it sets out is supplied4 ,what shall we say of the validity of such processes8 ,on one point ,lotze is quite clear4 ,these various logical acts do not really enter into the constitution of the valid world4 ,the logical forms as such are maintained only in the process of thinking4 ,the world of valid truth does not undergo a series of contortions and evolutions1 paralleling in any way the successive steps and missteps1 the succession of tentative trials1 withdrawals1 and retracings1 which mark the course of our own thinking4#da ,lotze is explicit upon the point that it is only the thought-content in which the process of thinking issues that has objective validity2 the act of thinking is purely and simply an inner movement of our own minds1 made necessary to us by reason of the constitution of our nature and of our place in the world 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bgi74 ,here the problem of validity presents itself as the problem of the relation of the act of thinking to its own product4 ,in his solution ,lotze uses two metaphors3 one derived from building operations1 the other from traveling4 ,the construction of a building requires of necessity certain tools and extraneous constructions1 stagings1 scaffoldings1 etc41 which are necessary to effect the final construction1 but yet which do not enter into the building as such4 ,the activity has an instrumental1 though not a constitutive1 value as regards its product4 ,similarly1 in order to get a view from the top of a mountain--this view being the objective--the traveler has to go through preliminary movements along devious courses4 ,these again are antecedent prerequisites1 but do not constitute a portion of the attained view4 ,the problem of thought as activity1 as distinct from thought as content1 opens up altogether too large a question to receive complete consideration at this point4 ,fortunately1 however1 the previous discussion enables us to narrow the point which is in issue just here4 ,it is once more the question whether the activity of thought is to be regarded as an independent function supervening entirely from without upon antecedents1 and directed from without upon data2 or whether it marks merely a phase of the transformation which the course of experience 7whether practical1 or artistic1 or socially affectional or whatever7 undergoes in entering into a tensional status where the maintenance of its harmony of content is problematic and hence an aim4 ,if it be the latter1 a thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to the proposition that the activity of thinking is instrumental1 and that its worth is found1 not in its own successive states as such1 but in the result in which it comes to conclusion4 ,but the conception of thinking as an independent activity somehow occurring after an independent antecedent1 playing upon an independent subject-matter1 and finally effecting an independent result1 presents us with just one miracle the more4 ,i do not question the strictly instrumental character of thinking4 ,the problem lies not here1 but in the interpretation of the nature of the organ and instrument4 ,the difficulty with ,lotze's position is that it forces us into the assumption of a means and an end which are simply and only external to each other1 and yet necessarily dependent upon each other--a position which1 whenever found1 is so thoroughly self-contradictory as to necessitate critical reconsideration of the premises which lead to it4 ,lotze vibrates between the notion of thought as a tool in the external sense1 a mere scaffolding to a finished building in which it has no part nor lot1 and the notion of thought as an immanent tool1 as a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very operation of building1 and set up for the sake of the building-activity which is carried on effectively only with and through a scaffolding4 ,only in the former case can the scaffolding be considered as a mere tool4 ,in the latter case the external scaffolding is not itself the instrumentality2 the actual tool is the action of erecting the building1 and this action involves the scaffolding as a constituent part of itself4 ,the work of erecting is not set over against the completed building as mere means to an end2 it is the end taken in process or historically1 longitudinally viewed4 ,the scaffolding1 moreover1 is not an external means to the process of erecting1 but an organic member of it4 ,it is no mere accident of language that building has a double sense--meaning at once the process and the finished product4 ,the outcome of thought is the thinking activity carried on to its own completion2 the activity1 on the other hand1 is the outcome taken anywhere short of its own realization1 and thereby still going on4 ,the only consideration which prevents easy and immediate acceptance of this view is the notion of thinking as something purely formal4 ,it is strange that the empiricist does not see that his insistence upon a matter extraneously given to thought only strengthens the hands of the rationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent activity1 separate from the actual make-up of the affairs of experience4 ,thinking as a merely formal activity exercised upon certain sensations or images or objects sets forth an absolutely meaningless proposition4 ,the psychological identification of thinking with the process of association is much nearer the truth4 ,it is1 indeed1 on the way to the truth4 ,we need only to recognize that association is of contents or matters or meanings1 not of ideas as bare existences or events2 and that the type of association we call thinking differs from the associations of casual fancy and revery in an element of control by reference to an end which determines the fitness and thus the selection of the associates1 to apprehend how completely thinking is a reconstructive movement of actual contents of experience in relation to each other1 and for the sake of a redintegration of a conflicting experience4 ,there is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are adapted to each other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion4 ,were they external in origin to each other and to the result1 the whole affair would1 indeed1 present an insoluble problem--so insoluble that1 if this were the true condition of affairs1 we never should even know that there was a problem4 ,but1 in truth1 both material and tool have been secured and determined with reference to economy and efficiency in effecting the end desired--the maintenance of a harmonious experience4 ,the builder has discovered that his building means building tools1 and also building material4 ,each has been slowly evolved with reference to its fit employ in the entire function2 and this evolution has been checked at every point by reference to its own correspondent4 ,the carpenter has not thought at large on his building and then constructed tools at large1 but has thought of his building in terms of the material which enters into it1 and through that medium has come to the consideration of the tools which are helpful4 ,life proposes to maintain at all hazards the unity of its own process4 ,experience insists on being itself1 on securing integrity even through and by means of conflict4 ,this is not a formal question1 but one of the placing and relations of the matters or values actually entering into experience4 ,and this in turn determines the taking up of just those mental attitudes1 and the employing of just those intellectual operations1 which most effectively handle and organize the material4 ,thinking is adaptation to an end through the adjustment of particular objective contents4 ,the thinker1 like the carpenter1 is at once stimulated and checked in every stage of his procedure by the particular situation which confronts him4 ,a person is at the stage of wanting a new house3 well then1 his materials are available resources1 the price of labor1 the cost of building1 the state and needs of his family1 profession1 etc42 his tools are paper and pencil and compass1 or possibly the bank as a credit instrumentality1 etc4 ,again1 the work is beginning4 ,the foundations are laid4 ,this in turn determines its own specific materials and tools4 ,again1 the building is almost ready for occupancy4 ,the concrete process is that of taking away the scaffolding1 clearing up the grounds1 furnishing and decorating rooms1 etc4 ,this specific operation again determines its own fit or relevant materials and tools4 ,it defines the time and mode and manner of beginning and ceasing to use them4 ,logical theory will get along as well as does reflective practice1 when it sticks close by and observes the directions and checks inherent in each successive phase of the evolution of the cycle of experiencing4 ,the problem in general of validity of the thinking process as distinct from the validity of this or that process arises only when thinking is isolated from its historic position and its material context4 #c4 ,but ,lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity1 even from his own standpoint4 ,the ground shifts again under his feet4 ,it is no longer a question of the validity of the idea or meaning with which thought is supposed to set out2 it is no longer a question of the validity of the process of thinking in reference to its own product2 it is the question of the validity of the product4 ,supposing1 after all1 that the final meaning1 or logical idea1 is thoroughly coherent and organized2 supposing it is an object for all consciousness as such4 ,once more arises the question3 ,what is the validity of even the most coherent and complete idea8--a question which rises and will not down4 ,we may reconstruct our notion of the chimera until it ceases to be an independent idea and becomes a part of the system of ,greek mythology4 ,has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent myth1 in becoming an element in systematized myth8 ,myth it was and myth it remains4 ,mythology does not get validity by growing bigger4 ,how do we know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the product of our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry8 ,the reference again to the content as the self-identical object of all consciousness proves nothing2 the matter of a hallucination does not gain worth in proportion to its social contagiousness4 ,or the reference proves that we have not as yet reached any conclusion1 but are entertaining a hypothesis--since social validity is not a matter of mere common content1 but of securing participation in a commonly adjudged social experience through action directed thereto and directed by consensus of judgment4 ,according to ,lotze1 the final product is1 after all1 still thought4 ,now1 ,lotze is committed once for all to the notion that thought1 in any form1 is directed by and at an outside reality4 ,the ghost haunts him to the last4 ,how1 after all1 does even the ideally perfect valid thought apply or refer to reality8 ,its genuine subject is still beyond itself4 ,at the last ,lotze can dispose of this question only by regarding it as a metaphysical1 not a logical1 problem 7,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bha1 #bhb74 ,in other words1 logically speaking1 we are at the end just exactly where we were at the beginning--in the sphere of ideas1 and of ideas only1 plus a consciousness of the necessity of referring these ideas to a reality which is beyond them1 which is utterly inaccessible to them1 which is out of reach of any influence which they may exercise1 and which transcends any possible comparison with their results4 ,it is vain1 says ,lotze1 to shrink from acknowledging the circle here involved 444 all we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which are within us 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ahe74 ,it is then this varied world of ideas within us which forms the sole material directly given to us 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ahf74 ,as it is the only material given to us1 so it is the only material with which thought can end4 ,to talk about knowing the external world through ideas which are merely within us is to talk of an inherent self-contradiction4 ,there is no common ground in which the external world and our ideas can meet4 ,in other words1 the original implication of a separation between an independent thought-material and an independent thought-function and purpose lands us inevitably in the metaphysics of subjective idealism1 plus a belief in an unknown reality beyond1 which unknowable is yet taken as the ultimate test of the value of our ideas as just subjective4 ,the subjectivity of the psychical event infects at the last the meaning or ideal object4 ,because it has been taken to be something in itself1 thought is also something in itself1 and at the end1 after all our maneuvering we are where we began3--with two separate disparates1 one of meaning1 but no existence1 the other of existence1 but no meaning4 ,the other aspect of ,lotze's contradiction which completes the circle is clear when we refer to his original propositions1 and recall that at the outset he was compelled to regard the origination and conjunctions of the impressions1 the elements of ideas1 as themselves the effects exercised by a world of things already in existence 7see p4 #ca74 ,he sets up an independent world of thought1 and yet has to confess that both at its origin and termination it points with absolute necessity to a world beyond itself4 ,only the stubborn refusal to take this initial and terminal reference of thought beyond itself as having a historic meaning1 indicating a particular place of generation and a particular point of fulfilment in the drama of evolving experience1 compels ,lotze to give such bifold objective reference a purely metaphysical turn4 ,when ,lotze goes on to say 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aia7 that the measure of truth of particular parts of experience is found in asking whether1 when judged by thought1 they are in harmony with other parts of experience2 when he goes on to say that there is no sense in trying to compare the entire world of ideas with a reality which is non-existent1 excepting as it itself should become an idea1 ,lotze lands where he might better have frankly commenced4#dc ,he saves himself from utter skepticism only by claiming that the explicit assumption of skepticism1 the need of agreement of a ready-made idea as such1 with an extraneous independent material as such1 is meaningless4 ,he defines correctly the work of thought as consisting in harmonizing the various portions of experience with each other3 a definition which has meaning only in connection with the fact that experience is continually integrating itself into a wholeness of coherent meaning deepened in significance by passing through an inner distraction in which by means of conflict certain contents are rendered partial and hence objectively conscious4 ,in this case the test of thought is the harmony or unity of experience actually effected4 ,in that sense the test of reality is beyond thought1 as thought1 just as at the other limit thought originates out of a situation which is not reflectional in character4 ,interpret this before and beyond in a historic sense1 as an affair of the place occupied and rle played by thinking as a function in experience in relation to other functions1 and the intermediate and instrumental character of thought1 its dependence upon unreflective antecedents for its existence1 and upon a consequent experience for its test of final validity1 becomes significant and necessary4 ,taken at large1 it plunges us in the depths of a hopelessly complicated and self-revolving metaphysic4 ,v ,a ,,critical ,,study ,,of ,,bosanquet',s ,,theory ,,of ,,judgment#dd ,bosanquet's theory of the judgment1 in common with all such theories of the judgment1 necessarily involves the metaphysical problem of the nature of reality and of the relation of thought to reality4 ,that the judgment is the function by which knowledge is attained is a proposition which would meet with universal acceptance4 ,but knowledge is itself a relation of some sort between thought and reality4 ,the view which any logician adopts as to the nature of the knowledge-process is accordingly conditioned by his metaphysical presuppositions as to the nature of reality4 ,it is equally true that the theory of the judgment developed from any metaphysical standpoint serves as a test of the validity of that standpoint4 ,we shall attempt in the present paper to show how ,bosanquet's theory of the judgment develops from his view of the nature of reality1 and to inquire whether the theory succeeds in giving such an account of the knowledge-process as to corroborate the presupposition underlying it4 ,bosanquet defines judgment as the intellectual function which defines reality by significant ideas and in so doing affirms the reality of those ideas 7p4 #ajd74de ,the form of the definition suggests the nature of his fundamental problem4 ,there is1 on the one hand1 a world of reality which must be regarded as having existence outside of and independently of the thoughts or ideas we are now applying to it2 and there is1 on the other hand1 a world of ideas whose value is measured by the possibility of applying them to reality1 of qualifying reality by them4 ,the judgment is the function which makes the connection between these two worlds4 ,if judgment merely brought one set of ideas into relation with another set1 then it could never give us anything more than purely hypothetical knowledge whose application to the real world would remain forever problematic4 ,it would mean that knowledge is impossible1 a result which seems to be contradicted by the existence of knowledge4 ,the logician must1 therefore1 as ,bosanquet tells us1 regard it as an essential of the act of judgment that it always refers to a reality which goes beyond and is independent of the act itself 7p4 #ajd74 ,his central problem thus becomes that of understanding what the nature of reality is which permits of being defined by ideas1 and what the nature of an idea is that it can ever be affirmed to be real4 ,how does the real world get representation in experience1 and what is the guarantee that the representation1 when obtained1 is correct8 ,the defining of the problem suggests the view of the nature of reality out of which ,bosanquet's theory of the judgment grows4 ,the real world is to him a world which has its existence quite independently of the process by which it is known4 ,the real world is there to be known1 and is in no wise modified by the knowledge which we obtain of it4 ,the work of thought is to build up a world of ideas which shall represent1 or correspond to1 the world of reality4 ,the more complete and perfect the correspondence1 the greater our store of knowledge4 ,translated into terms of the judgment1 this representational view means that the subject of the judgment must always be reality1 while the predicate is an idea4 ,but when we examine the content of any universal judgment1 or even of an ordinary judgment of perception1 the subject which appears in the judgment is evidently not reality at all1 if by reality we mean something which is in no sense constituted by the thought-process4 ,when ,i say1 ,the tree is green1 the subject1 tree1 cannot be regarded as a bit of reality which is given ready-made to the thought-process4 ,the ability to perceive a tree1 to distinguish it from other objects and single it out for the application of an idea1 evidently implies a long series of previous judgments4 ,the content tree is itself ideal4 ,as ,bosanquet forcibly states it3 ,if a sensation or elementary perception is in consciousness 7and if not we have nothing to do with it in logic71 it already bears the form of thinking 7p4 #cc74 ,how1 then1 can it serve as the subject of a judgment8 ,bosanquet's solution of the problem is to say that the real subject of a judgment is not the grammatical subject which appears in a proposition1 but reality itself4 ,in the more complex forms of judgment the reference to reality is disguised by the introduction of explicit ideas to designate the portion of reality to which reference is made 7pp4 #gh1 #gi74 ,in the simplest type of judgment known1 however1 the qualitative judgment of perception1 the reference to reality appears within the judgment itself4 ,the relations of thought to reality and of the elements of the judgment to one another can1 accordingly1 most readily be seen in the consideration of this rudimentary form of judgment in which the various parts lie bare before us4 ,bosanquet describes it as follows3 ,if ,i say1 pointing to a particular house1 ,that is my home1 it is clear that in this act of judgment the reference conveyed by the demonstrative is indispensable4 ,the significant idea my home is affirmed1 not of any other general significant idea in my mind1 but of something which is rendered unique by being present to me in perception4 ,in making the judgment1 ,that is my home1 ,i extend the present sense-perception of a house in a certain landscape by attaching to it the ideal content or meaning of home2 and moreover1 in doing this1 ,i pronounce the ideal content to be1 so to speak1 of one and the same tissue with what ,i have before me in my actual perception4 ,that is to say1 ,i affirm the meaning of the idea1 or the idea considered as a meaning1 to be a real quality of that which ,i perceive in my perception4 ,the same account holds good of every perceptive judgment2 when ,i see a white substance on a plate and judge that it is bread ,i affirm the reference1 or general meaning which constitutes the symbolic idea bread in my mind1 to be a real quality of the spot or point in present perception which ,i attempt to designate by the demonstrative this4 ,the act defines the given but indefinite real by affirmation of a quality1 and affirms reality of the definite quality by attaching it to the previously undefined real4 ,reality is given for me in present sensuous perception1 and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it4 7,pp4 #gf1 #gg47 ,again1 he says that the general features of the judgment of perception are as follows3 ,there is a presence of a something in contact with our sensitive self1 which1 as being so in contact1 has the character of reality2 and there is the qualification of this reality by the reference to it of some meaning such as can be symbolized by a name 7p4 #gg74 ,our point of contact with reality1 the place where reality gets into the thought-process1 is1 according to this view1 to be found in the simplest1 most indefinite type of judgment of perception4 ,we meet with reality in the mere undefined this of primitive experience4 ,but each such elementary judgment about an undefined this is an isolated bit of experience4 ,each this could give us only a detached bit of reality at best1 and the further problem now confronts us of how we ever succeed in piecing our detached bits of reality together to form a real world4 ,bosanquet's explanation is1 in his words1 this3 ,the real world1 as a definite organized system1 is for me an extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of judgment1 and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension 7p4 #gg74 ,again he says3 ,the subject in every judgment of ,perception is some given spot or point in sensuous contact with the percipient self4 ,but1 as all reality is continuous1 the subject is not merely this given spot or point4 ,it is impossible to confine the real world within this or that presentation4 ,every definition or qualification of a point in present perception is affirmed of the real world which is continuous with present perception4 ,the ultimate subject of the perceptive judgment is the real world as a whole1 and it is of this that1 in judging1 we affirm the qualities or characteristics4 7,p4 #gh47 ,the problem is the same as that with which ,bradley struggles in his treatment of the subject of the judgment1 and the solution is also the same4 ,bradley's treatment of the point is perhaps somewhat more explicit4 ,like ,bosanquet1 he starts with the proposition that the subject of the judgment must be reality itself and not an idea1 because1 if it were the latter1 judgment could never give us anything but a union of ideas1 and a union of ideas remains forever universal and hypothetical4 ,it can never acquire the uniqueness1 the singularity1 which is necessary to make it refer to the real4 ,uniqueness can be found only in our contact with the real4 ,but just where does our contact with the real occur8 ,bradley recognizes the fact that it cannot be the content--even in the case of a simple sensation--which gives us reality4 ,the content of a sensation is a thing which is in my consciousness1 and which has the form which it presents because it is in my consciousness4 ,reality is precisely something which is not itself sensation1 and cannot be in my consciousness4 ,if ,i say1 ,this is white1 the this has a content which is a sensation of whiteness4 ,but the sensation of whiteness is not reality4 ,the experience brings with it an assurance of reality1 not because its content is the real1 but because it is my direct encounter in sensible presentation with the real world4#df ,to make the matter clearer1 ,bradley draws a distinction between the this and the thisness4 ,in every experience1 however simple1 there is a content--a thisness--which is not itself unique4 ,considered merely as content1 it is applicable to an indefinite number of existences2 in other words1 it is an idea4 ,but there is also in every experience a this which is unique1 but which is not a content4 ,it is a mere sign of existence which gives the experience uniqueness1 but nothing else4 ,the thisness falls on the side of the content1 and the this on the side of existence4 ,it is exactly the distinction which ,bosanquet has in mind in the passages quoted in which he tells us that reality is given for me in present sensuous perception1 and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence which goes with it2 and again when he says3 ,there is a presence of a something in contact with our sensitive self1 which1 as being so in contact1 has the character of reality4 ,the same point is made somewhat more explicitly in his introduction when he says that the individual's present perception is not1 indeed1 reality as such1 but is his present point of contact with reality as such 7p4 #c74 ,but has this distinction between the content of an experience and its existence solved the problem of how we know reality8 ,when ,bosanquet talks of knowing reality1 he means possessing ideas which are an accurate reproduction of reality4 ,it is still far from clear how1 according to his own account1 we could ever have any assurance that our ideas do represent reality accurately1 if we can nowhere find a point at which the content of an experience can be held to give us reality4 ,the case is still worse when we go beyond the problem of how any particular bit of reality can be known1 and ask ourselves how reality as a whole can be known4 ,the explanation offered by both ,bradley and ,bosanquet is that by means of judgment we extend the bit of reality of whose existence we get a glimpse through a peep-hole in the curtain of sensuous perception1 and thus build up the organized system of reality4 ,in a passage previously quoted1 ,bosanquet tells us that all reality is continuous1 and therefore the real subject of a judgment cannot be the mere spot or point which is given in sensuous perception1 but must be the real world as a whole4 ,but how does he know that reality is continuous1 and that the real world is an organized system8 ,our only knowledge of reality comes through judgment1 and judgment brings us into contact with reality only at isolated points4 ,when he tells us that reality is a continuous whole1 he does so on the basis of a metaphysical presupposition which is not justifiable by his theory of the judgment4 ,the only statement about reality which could be maintained on the basis of his theory is that some sort of a reality exists1 but the theory furnishes equal justification for the assurance that this reality is of such a nature that we can never know anything more about it than the bare fact of its existence4 ,moreover1 the bare fact of the existence of reality comes to us merely in the form of a feeling of our own sentient existence which goes with sense-perception4 ,but the mere assurance that somewhere behind the curtain of sensuous perception reality exists 7even if this could go unchallenged71 accompanied by the certainty that we can never by any possibility know anything more about it1 is practically equivalent to the denial of the possibility of knowledge4#dg ,although the denial of the possibility of knowledge seems to be the logical outcome of the premises1 it is not the conclusion reached by ,bosanquet4 ,at the outset of his treatise1 ,bosanquet propounds the fundamental question we have been considering in these words3 ,how does the analysis of knowledge as a systematic function1 or system of functions1 explain that relationship in which truth appears to consist1 between the human intelligence on the one hand1 and fact or reality on the other8 ,his answer is3 ,to this difficulty there is only one reply4 ,if the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought1 not only our analysis1 but thought itself1 would be unable to lay hold of reality4 7,pp4 #b1 #c47 ,the statement is an explicit recognition of the impossibility of bridging the chasm between a reality outside the content of knowledge and a known real world4 ,it brings before us the dilemma contained in ,bosanquet's treatment of the subject of the judgment4 ,on the one hand the subject of the judgment must be outside the realm of my thoughts4 ,if it were not1 judgment would merely establish a relation between my ideas and would give me no knowledge of the real world4 ,on the other hand1 the subject of the judgment must be within the realm of my thoughts4 ,if it were not1 ,i could never assert anything of it2 could never judge1 or know it4 ,the stress he lays on the first horn of the dilemma has been shown4 ,it remains to show his recognition of the second horn1 and to find out whether or not he discovers any real reconciliation between the two4 ,bosanquet sums up the section of the introduction on knowledge and its content1 truth1 with the following paragraph3 ,the real world for every individual is thus emphatically his world2 an extension and determination of his present perception1 which perception is to him not indeed reality as such1 but his point of contact with reality as such4 ,thus in the enquiry which will have to be undertaken as to the logical subject of the judgment1 we shall find that the subject1 however it may shift1 contract1 and expand1 is always in the last resort some greater or smaller element of this determinate reality1 which the individual has constructed by identifying significant ideas with that world of which he has assurance through his own perceptive experience4 ,in analyzing common judgment it is ultimately one to say that ,i judge and that the real world for me1 my real world1 extends itself1 or maintains its organized extension4 ,this is the ultimate connection by which the distinction of subject and predication is involved in the act of affirmation or enunciation which is the differentia of judgment4 7,pp4 #c1 #d74 ,here the subject of the judgment appears as an element of a reality which the individual has constructed by identifying significant ideas with that world of which he has assurance through his own perceptive experience4 ,but the very point with reference to the subject of the judgment previously emphasized is that it is not and cannot be something which the individual has constructed4 ,the subject of the judgment must be reality1 and reality does not consist of ideas1 even if it be determined by them4 ,it does not mend matters to explain that the individual has constructed his real world by identifying significant ideas with that world of which he has assurance through his own perceptive experiences1 because1 as we have seen1 the individual's perceptive experiences either turn out to be merely similar mental constructions made at a prior time1 so that nothing is gained by attaching to them1 or else they mean once more the mere shock of contact which is supposed to give assurance that some sort of reality exists1 but which gives no assurance of what it is4 ,that and what1 this and thisness still remain detached4 ,when he talks of the real world for any individual we are left entirely in the dark as to what the relation between the real world as it is for any individual and the real world as it is for itself may be1 or how the individual is to gain any assurance that the real world as it is for him represents the real world as it is for itself4 ,another attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing views leaves us no better satisfied4 ,the passage is as follows3 ,the real world1 as a definite organized system1 is for me an extension of this present sensation and self-feeling by means of judgment1 and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension4 ,it makes no essential difference whether the ideas whose content is pronounced to be an attribute of reality appear to fall within what is given in perception1 or not4 ,we shall find hereafter that it is vain to attempt to lay down boundaries between the given and its extension4 ,the moment we try to do this we are on the wrong track4 ,the given and its extension differ not absolutely but relatively2 they are continuous with each other1 and the metaphor by which we speak of an extension conceals from us that the so-called given is no less artificial than that by which it is extended4 ,it is the character and quality of being directly in contact with sense-perception1 not any fixed datum of content1 that forms the constantly shifting center of the individual's real world1 and spreads from that center over every extension which the system of reality receives from judgment4 7,p4 #gg47 ,in this passage by the given he evidently means the content of sensory experience1 the thisness1 the what4 ,it is1 as he says1 of the same stuff as that by which it is extended4 ,both the given and that by which it is extended are artificial in the sense of not being real according to ,bosanquet's interpretation of reality2 they are ideas4 ,but if all this is admitted1 what becomes of the possibility of knowledge8 ,bosanquet undertakes to rescue it by assuring us again that it is the character and quality of being directly in contact with sense-perception1 not any fixed datum of content1 that forms the center of the individual's real world and gives the stamp of reality to his otherwise ideal extension of this center4 ,here again we find ourselves with no evidence that the content of our knowledge bears any relation to reality4 ,we have merely the feeling of vividness attached to sensory experience which seems to bring us the certainty that there is some sort of a reality behind it1 but this is not to give assurance that our ideal content even belongs rightfully to that against which we have bumped1 much less of how it belongs--and only this deserves the title knowledge4 ,in the chapter on ,quality and ,comparison1 in which he takes up the more detailed treatment of the simplest types of judgment of perception1 he comes back to the same contradiction1 and again attempts to explain how both horns of his dilemma must be true4 ,the passage is this3 ,the ,reality to which we ascribe the predicate is undoubtedly self-existent2 it is not merely in my mind or in my act of judgment2 if it were1 the judgment would only be a game with my ideas4 ,it is well to make this clear in the case before us1 for in the later forms of the judgment it will be much disguised4 ,still the reality which attracts my concentrated attention is also within my act of judgment2 it is not even the whole reality present to my perception2 still less of course the whole self-existent ,reality which ,i dimly presuppose4 ,the immediate subject of the judgment is a mere aspect1 too indefinite to be described by explicit ideas except in as far as the qualitative predication imposes a first specification upon it4 ,this ,reality is in my judgment2 it is the point at which the actual world impinges upon my consciousness as real1 and it is only by judging with reference to this point that ,i can refer the ideal content before my mind to the whole of reality which ,i at once believe to exist1 and am attempting to construct4 ,the ,subject is both in and out of the ,judgment1 as ,reality is both in and out of my consciousness4 7,pp4 #aac1 #aad47 ,the conclusion he reaches is a mere restatement of the difficulty4 ,the problem he is trying to solve is how the subject can be both in and out of the judgment1 and how the subject without is related to the subject within4 ,the mere assertion that it is so does not help us to understand it4 ,his procedure seems like taking advantage of two meanings of sense-perception1 its conscious quality and its brute abrupt immediacy1 and then utilizing this ambiguity to solve a problem which grows out of the conception of judgment as a reference of idea to reality4 ,turning from his treatment of the world of fact to his discussion of the world of idea1 from the subject to the predicate1 as it appears in his theory of the judgment we find again a paradox which must be recognized and cannot be obviated4 ,an idea is essentially a meaning4 ,it is not a particular existence whose essence is uniqueness as is the case with the subject of the judgment1 but is a meaning whose importance is that it may apply to an indefinite number of unique existences4 ,its characteristic is universality4 ,and yet an idea regarded as a psychical existence1 an idea as a content in my mind1 is just as particular and unique as any other existence4 ,how1 then1 does it obtain its characteristic of universality8 ,bosanquet's answer is that it must be universal by means of a reference to something other than itself4 ,its meaning resides1 not in its existence as a psychical image1 but in its reference to something beyond itself4 ,now1 any idea that is affirmed is referred to reality1 but do ideas exist which are not being affirmed8 ,if so1 their reference cannot be to reality4 ,bosanquet discusses the question in the second section of his introduction as follows3 ,it is not easy to deny that there is a world of ideas or of meanings1 which simply consists in that identical reference of symbols by which mutual understanding between rational beings is made possible4 ,a mere suggestion1 a mere question1 a mere negation1 seem all of them to imply that we sometimes entertain ideas without affirming them of reality1 and therefore without affirming their reference to be a reference to something real or their meaning to be fact4 ,we may be puzzled indeed to say what an idea can mean1 or to what it can refer1 if it does not mean or refer to something real--to some element in the fabric continuously sustained by the judgment which is our consciousness4 ,on the other hand1 it would be shirking a difficulty to neglect the consideration that an idea1 while denied of reality1 may nevertheless1 or even must1 possess an identical and so intelligible reference--a symbolic value--for the rational beings who deny it4 ,a reference1 it may be argued1 must be a reference to something4 ,but it seems as if in this case the something were the fact of reference itself1 the rational convention between intelligent beings1 or rather the world which has existence1 whether for one rational being or for many1 merely as contained in and sustained by such intellectual reference4 ,i only adduce these considerations in order to explain that transitional conception of an objective world or world of meanings1 distinct from the real world or world of facts1 with which it is impossible wholly to dispense in an account of thought starting from the individual subject4 ,the paradox is that the real world or world of fact thus seems for us to fall within and be included in the objective world or world of meanings1 as if all that is fact were meaning1 but not every meaning were fact4 ,this results in the contradiction that something is objective1 which is not real4 7,pp4 #d1 #e47 ,in the seventh section of the introduction ,bosanquet explains his meaning further by what the reader is privileged to regard as a flight of the imagination--a mere simile--which he thinks may1 nevertheless1 make the matter clearer4 ,we might try to think that the world1 as known to each of us1 is constructed and sustained by his individual consciousness2 and that every other individual also frames for himself1 and sustains by the action of his intelligence1 the world in which he in particular lives and moves4 ,of course such a construction is to be taken as a reconstruction1 a construction by way of knowledge only2 but for our present purpose this is indifferent4 ,thus we might think of the ideas and objects of our private world rather as corresponding to than as from the beginning identical with those which our fellow-men are occupied in constructing each within his own sphere of consciousness4 ,and the same would be true even of the objects and contents within our own world1 in as far as an act or effort would be required to maintain them1 of the same kind with that which was originally required to construct them4444 ,thus the paradox of reference would become clearer4 ,we should understand that we refer to a correspondence by means of a content4 ,we should soften down the contradiction of saying that a name to meet which we have and can get nothing but an idea1 nevertheless does not stand for that idea but for something else4 ,we should be able to say that the name stands for those elements in the idea which correspond in all our separate worlds1 and in our own world of yesterday and of today1 considered as so corresponding4 7,pp4 #de1 #df47 ,according to this view1 the idea obtains the universality which constitutes it an idea by a sort of process of elimination4 ,it is like a composite photograph4 ,it selects only the common elements in a large number of particular existences1 and thus succeeds in representing1 or referring to1 all the particular existences which have gone to make it up4 ,but when we come to consider the bearing which this view of universality1 or generalized significance1 has on our estimate of the knowledge-process1 we feel that it has not solved the problem for us4 ,in the first place1 the idea in its existence is just as particular when regarded as made up of the common elements of many ideas as is any of the ideas whose elements are taken4 ,a composite photograph is just as much a single photograph as any one of the photographs which are taken to compose it4 ,the chasm between the particularity of the psychical image and the universality of its meaning is not bridged by regarding the content of the image as made up by eliminating unlike elements in a number of images4 ,the stuff with which thought has to work is still nothing more than a particular psychical image1 and the problem of what gives it its logical value as a general significance is still unsolved4 ,nor does it seem possible to find anything in the existence of the image which could account for its reference to something outside of itself4 ,the fact of reference itself becomes an ultimate mystery4#dh ,but even waiving this difficulty1 the judgment must still appear truncated1 if it really totally disregard a part of its content--i4 e41 the particular existence of the image as part of the judging consciousness4 ,the theory holds that the particular existence of the image has no logical value4 ,it is only its meaning1 or general reference1 which has logical value4 ,but the image qua image is just as real as that to which it is supposed to refer4 ,if the judgment really does ignore its existence1 then it ignores a portion of the reality it attempts to represent1 and stands self-confessed as a failure4#di ,at still another point1 ideas1 as ,bosanquet represents them1 prove to be unsatisfactory tools to use in the work of building up reality4 ,in ,bosanquet's words3 ,the meaning tyrannizes over the psychical image in another respect4 ,besides crushing out of sight its particular and exclusive existence1 it also crushes out part of its content 7p4 #gd74 ,the idea1 as we use it1 is not1 as to content1 a complete or accurate representation of anything real4 ,to take ,bosanquet's illustration3 ,some one speaks to me of the gean sea1 which ,i have never seen4 ,he tells me that it is a deep blue sea under a cloudless sky1 studded with rocky islands4 ,the meanings of these words are a problem set to my thought4 ,i have to meet him in the world of objective references1 which as intelligent beings we have in common4 ,how ,i do this is my own affair1 and the precise images at my command will vary from day to day1 and from minute to minute4 ,it sounds simple to say that ,i combine my recollections of sea and sky at ,torbay with those of the island-studded waters of ,orkney or the ,hebrides4 ,even so1 there is much to adjust and to neglect2 the red cliffs of ,torbay1 and the cloudy skies of the north4 ,but then again1 my recollections are already themselves symbolic ideas2 the reference to ,torbay or the ,hebrides is itself a problem set to thought1 and puts me upon the selection of index-elements in fugitive images that are never twice the same4 ,i have first to symbolize the color of ,torbay1 using for the purpose any blue that ,i can call to mind1 and fixing1 correcting1 subtracting from1 the color so recalled1 till ,i reduce it to a mere index quality2 and then ,i have to deal in the same way with the meaning or significant idea so obtained1 clipping and adjusting the qualities of ,torbay till it seems to serve as a symbol of the gean4 7,pp4 #gd1 #ge47 ,and by the time all this is performed what sort of a representation of reality is the idea8 ,evidently a very poor and meager and fragmentary one4 ,it is so poor and fragmentary1 that it cannot itself be that which is affirmed of reality4 ,it must be some other fuller existence to be found in the world of meanings which is affirmed4 ,and yet how the meager content of the idea succeeds in referring to the world of meanings1 and acting as the instrument for referring a meaning to reality1 is not at all clear4 ,it seems impossible to explain reference intelligibly by the concept of a correspondence of contents4 ,the fundamental difficulty in the interpretation of the predicate is the same one that we encountered in the interpretation of the subject4 ,if the predicate is to be affirmed of reality 7and if it be not1 it has no logical value71 then it must1 when affirmed1 be in some sense an accurate representation of reality4 ,but the predicate is an idea1 and1 moreover1 an idea which is1 both in its existence and in its meaning palpably the outcome of transformations wrought upon given sensory contents by the individual consciousness4 ,since the one point of contact with reality is in sensory experience1 the more simple sensory experiences are reacted upon and worked over1 the farther they recede from reality4 ,the idea seems1 therefore1 in its very essence1 a thing which never can be affirmed of reality4 ,as image it is itself a reality1 but not affirmed2 as meaning it is that reality 7the image7 manipulated for individual ends4 ,why suppose that by distorting reality we get it in shape to affirm of reality8 ,moreover1 the farther an idea is removed from immediate sensory experience--in other words1 the more abstract it becomes--the less is the possibility of affirming it of reality4 ,the final outcome of this point of view1 if we adhere rigorously to its logic is that the more thinking we do1 the less we know about the real world4 ,bosanquet avoids this conclusion by a pure act of faith4 ,if knowledge is to be rescued1 we must believe that the work done by consciousness upon the bits of reality given in sensory experience really does succeed in building up a knowledge of reality for us4 ,as ,bosanquet puts it3 ,the presentation of ,reality1 qualified by an ideal content1 is one aspect of ,subject and ,predication2 and my individual percipient consciousness determining itself by a symbolic idea is the other4 ,that the latter is identified with the former follows from the claim of conscious thought that its nature is to know4#ej 7,p4 #hc47 ,to sum up the situation1 ,bosanquet starts out with the assumption that by knowledge we must mean knowledge of a world entirely independent of our ideas4 ,if we fail to make this assumption1 knowledge becomes merely a relation between ideas4 ,but its whole importance seems to us to rest on the conviction that it does give us knowledge of a world which is what it is quite independently of our ideas about it1 and cannot in any sense be modified by what we think about it4 ,what knowledge does is to give us a copy or representation of the real world1 whose value depends on the accuracy of the representation4 ,and yet when we examine any individual knowing consciousness1 the subject which appears within the judgment is never some portion of the world which exists outside of the knowing consciousness1 but always some portion of the world which exists within the knowing consciousness1 and which is constituted by the knowledge process4 ,the predicate which is affirmed of reality is constantly found to derive its meaning1 its generalized significance1 not from its correspondence with1 or reference to1 the real world outside of the knowing consciousness1 but from reference to a world of meanings1 which consists in a sort of convention among rational beings--a world whose existence is distinctly within the knowing consciousness and not outside of it4#ea ,between the real world1 as ,bosanquet conceives it1 and the world of knowledge1 we find inserted on the side of the subject1 the world as known to each of us1 and on the side of the predicate1 the objective world of meanings4 ,neither of these is the real world4 ,both of them are ideal1 i4 e41 are constructions of the individual consciousness4 ,we nowhere find any satisfactory explanation of how these ideal worlds are related to the real world4 ,there is merely the assertion that we must believe that they represent the real world in order that we may believe that knowledge exists4 ,but the fact remains that whenever we try to analyze and explain any particular judgment1 what we find ourselves dealing with is always the world as it exists to us as subject1 and the objective world of meanings as predicate4 ,if we stop here1 then knowledge turns out to be just what ,bosanquet asserted at the outset that it was not1 i4 e41 a relation between ideas4 ,when we demand a justification for going farther than this1 we find none except the claim of conscious thought that its nature is to know--a claim whose justice we have no possible means of testing1 and which would not1 even if admitted1 be of the slightest value in deciding which particular judgment is true and which false4 ,bosanquet's development of his subject has proved to be throughout the necessary logical outcome of the presuppositions with reference to reality from which he starts4 ,the fundamental difficulty of erecting a theory of the knowledge-process upon such a basis is recognized by him at the start in a passage already quoted3 ,if the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought1 not only our analysis1 but thought itself1 would be unable to lay hold of reality 7p4 #b74 ,but1 in spite of this assertion1 his fundamental conception of reality remains that of a system which does lie outside the thought-process4 ,his theory is an attempt to reconcile the essentially irreconcilable views that reality is outside of the thought-process1 and that it is inside of the thought-process1 and he succeeds only by calling upon our faith that so it is4 ,if it be true1 as it seems to him to be1 that we are compelled to adhere to both of these views of reality1 then surely there is no other outcome4 ,it means1 however1 that we finally resign all hope of knowing reality4 ,we may have faith in its existence1 but we have no way of deciding what particular judgment has reality in it as it should have it1 and what as it should not4 ,all stand 7and fall7 on the same basis4 ,but does not ,bosanquet himself point out a pathway which1 if followed farther1 would reach a more satisfactory view of the realm of knowledge8 ,he has shown us that the only sort of reality we know1 or can know1 is the reality which appears within our judgment-process--the reality as known to us4 ,would it not be possible to drop the presupposed reality outside of the judgment-process 7with which judgment is endeavoring to make connections7 and content ourselves with the sort of reality which appears within the judgment-process8 ,in other words1 may there not be a satisfactory view of reality which frankly recognizes its organic relation to the knowledge-process1 without at the same time destroying its value as reality8 ,is it possible to admit that reality is in a sense constituted in the judgment without making it at the same time the figment of the individual imagination--a game with ideas8 ,let us assume for the moment that the real difficulty with ,mr4 ,bosanquet's conception1 the error that keeps him traveling in his hopeless circles1 is the notion that truth is a matter of reference of ideas as such to reality as such1 leading us to oscillate between the alternatives that either all ideas have such reference1 and so are true1 constitute knowledge2 or else none have such reference1 and so are false2 or else are mere ideas to which neither truth nor falsity can be attributed4 ,let us ask if truth is not rather some specific relation within experience1 something which characterizes one idea rather than another1 so that our problem is not how an idea can refer to a reality beyond itself1 but what are the marks by which we discriminate a true reference from a false one4 ,then let us ask for the criterion used in daily life and in science by which to test reality4 ,if we ask the philosophically unsophisticated individual why he believes that his house still exists when he is away from it and has no immediate evidence of the fact1 he will tell you it is because he has found that he can go back to it time and again and see it and walk into it4 ,it never fails him when he acts upon the assumption that it is there4 ,he would never tell you that he believed in its existence when he was not experiencing it because his mental picture of his house stood for and represented accurately an object in the real world which was nevertheless of a different order of existence from his mental picture4 ,when you ask the physicist why he believes that the laws of motion are true1 he will tell you that it is because he finds that bodies always do behave according to them4 ,he can predict just what a body will do under given circumstances4 ,he is never disappointed however long he takes it for granted that the laws of motion are true and that bodies behave according to them4 ,the only thing that could make him question their truth would be to find some body which did not prove to behave in accordance with them4 ,the criterion is the same in both cases4 ,it is the practical criterion of what as a matter of fact will work4 ,that which can safely be taken for granted as a basis for further action is regarded as real and true4 ,it remains real so long1 and only so long1 as it continues to fulfil this condition4 ,as soon as it ceases to do so1 it ceases to be regarded as real4 ,when a man finds that he can no longer obtain the accustomed experience of seeing and entering his house1 he ceases to regard it as real4 ,it has burned down1 or been pulled down4 ,when a physicist finds that a body does not1 as a matter of fact1 behave as a given law leads him to expect it would behave1 he ceases to regard the law as true4 ,the contrast between the nave view of the criterion of reality and the one we have just been discussing may be brought out by considering how we should have to interpret from each standpoint the constant succession of facts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts4 ,for illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat4 ,it ceased to be a fact1 says the theory we have been reviewing1 because further thought-constructions of the real world convinced us that there is no reality which the idea flat-world represents4 ,the idea round-world alone reproduces reality4 ,it ceased to be a fact1 says the nave view1 because it ceased to be a safe guide for action4 ,men found they could sail around the world4 ,correspondence in one case is pictorial1 and its existence or non-existence can1 as we have seen1 never be ascertained4 ,in the other1 correspondence is response1 adjustment1 the co-meeting of specific conditions in further constituting of experience4 ,in actual life1 therefore1 the criterion of reality which we use is a practical one4 ,the test of reality does not consist in ascertaining the relationship between an idea and an x which is not idea1 but in ascertaining what experience can be taken for granted as a safe basis for securing other experiences4 ,the evident advantage of the latter view1 leaving aside for the moment the question of its adequacy in other respects1 is that it avoids the fundamental skepticism at once suggested by the former4 ,how can we ever be sure that the fact which we have discovered will stand the test of further thought-constructions8 ,perhaps it comes no nearer to reality than the discarded one4 ,obviously we never can be sure that any particular content of thought represents reality so accurately and perfectly that it will never be subject to revision4 ,if1 however1 the test of reality is the adequacy of a given content of consciousness as a stimulus to action1 as a mode of control1 we have an applicable standard4 ,a given content of consciousness is real--is a fact--so long as the act resulting from it is adequate in adaptation to other contents4 ,it ceases to be real as soon as the act it stimulates proves to be inadequate4 ,the view which places the ultimate test of facts1 not in any relationship of contents or existences1 but in the practical outcome of thought1 is the one which seems to follow necessarily from a thoroughgoing conception of the judgment as a function--an act4 ,our fundamental biological conception of the activities of living organisms is that acts exist for the sake of their results4 ,acts are always stimulated by some definite set of conditions1 and their value is always tested by the adequacy with which they meet this set of conditions4 ,the judgment is no exception to the rule4 ,it is always an act stimulated by some set of conditions which needs readjusting4 ,its outcome is a readjustment whose value is and can be tested only by its adequacy4 ,it is accordingly entirely in line with our reigning biological conceptions to expect to find the ultimate criterion of truth and reality in the practical outcome of thought1 and to seek for an understanding of the nature of the real and of the ideal within the total activity of judgment4 ,one difficulty besets us at the outset of such an investigation--that of being sure that we have a genuine judgment under examination4 ,a large portion of the so-called judgments considered by logicians1 even by those who emphasize the truth that a judgment is an act1 are really not judgments at all1 but contents of thought which are the outcome of judgments--what might be called dead judgments1 instead of live judgments4 ,when we analyze a real act of judgment1 as it occurs in a living process of thought1 we find given elements which are always present4 ,there is always a certain situation which demands a reaction4 ,the situation is always in part determined and taken for granted1 and in part questioned4 ,it is determined in so far as it is a definite situation of some sort2 it is undetermined in so far as it furnishes an inadequate basis for further action and therefore comes to consciousness as a problem4 ,for example1 take one of the judgments ,bosanquet uses4 ,this is bread4 ,we have first to inquire when such a judgment actually occurs in the living process of thought4 ,a man does not make such a judgment in the course of his thinking unless there is some instigation to do so4 ,perhaps he is in doubt as to whether the white object he perceives is bread or cake4 ,he wants some bread1 but does not want cake4 ,a closer inspection convinces him that it is bread1 and the finished judgment is formulated in the proposition3 ,this is bread4 ,what is the test of the reality of the bread1 and the truth of the judgment8 ,evidently the act based on it4 ,he eats the bread4 ,if it tastes like bread and affects him like bread1 then the bread was real and the judgment true4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it does not taste like bread1 or if it makes him violently ill1 then the bread was not real and the judgment was false4 ,in either case1 the this--the experience to be interpreted--is unquestioned4 ,the man does not question the fact that he has a perception of a white object4 ,so much is taken for granted and is unquestioned within that judgment4 ,but there is another part of the experience which is questioned1 and which remains tentative up to the conclusion of the act of judgment2 that is the doubt as to whether the perceived white object is bread or something else4 ,every live judgment1 every judgment as it normally occurs in the vital process of thought1 must have these phases4 ,it is only when a judgment is taken out of its context and reduced to a mere memorandum of past judgments that it fails to reveal such parts4 ,the man may1 of course1 go farther back4 ,he may wonder whether this is really white or not4 ,but he falls back then on something else which he takes unquestioningly--a this experience of some sort or other4 ,so far we have considered the practical criterion of reality merely as the one which is actually operative in everyday life1 and as the one suggested by our biological theory of the functions of living organisms4 ,it also offers a suggestion for the modified view of the nature of reality for which we are in search4 ,our previous discussion brought out incidentally a contradiction in the traditional theory of the nature of reality which it will be worth while to consider further4 ,in dealing with the subject of the judgment1 reality seemed to be made synonymous with fact4 ,in this sense fact1 or the real1 was set off against the ideal4 ,knowledge was viewed as the correspondence between real and ideal4 ,when we came to deal with the ideal itself--with the predicate of the judgment--there appeared in it an element of fact or reality which proved a serious stumbling-block for the theory4 ,as image in my mind1 the idea is just as real as the so-called facts2 but this sort of reality according to the theory in question is neither the reality about which we are judging nor a real quality of it4 ,both ,bradley and ,bosanquet are forced to admit that the judgment ignores it1 and is in so far by nature inadequate to its appointed task of knowing reality4 ,the suggestion which the situation offers for a new theory is that the view of reality has been too narrow4 ,reality must evidently be a broad enough term to cover both fact and idea4 ,if so1 the reality must be nothing more nor less than the total process of experience with its continual opposition of fact and idea1 and their continual resolution through activity4 ,that which previous theory has been calling the real is not the total reality1 but merely one aspect of it4 ,the problem of relation of fact and idea is thus the problem of the relation of one form of reality to another1 and so a determinate soluble one1 not a merely metaphysical or general one4 ,granting this1 does it still remain true that reality in the narrower sense1 reality as fact1 can be regarded as a different order of existence from the ideal1 and set over against the thought-process8 ,evidently not4 ,fact and idea become merely two aspects of a total reality4 ,the way in which fact and idea are distinguished has already been suggested by the practical and biological criterion of fact1 or reality in the narrower sense4 ,from this point of view1 fact is not a different order of existence from idea1 but is merely a part of the total process of experience which functions in a given way4 ,it is merely that part of experience which is taken as given1 and which serves as a stimulus to action4 ,thus the essential nature of fact1 or reality in the popular sense1 falls not at all on the side of its content1 but on the side of its function4 ,similarly the ideal is merely that part of the total experience which is taken as tentative4 ,there is no problem as to how either of them is related to reality4 ,in this relationship they are reality4 ,that which previous theories had been calling the whole of reality now appears as merely one aspect of it--the fact aspect--artificially isolated from the rest4 ,when we translate this view of the nature of reality into terms of a theory of the judgment1 we find that we can agree with ,bosanquet in his definition of a judgment4 ,it is an act1 and an act which refers an ideal content to reality4 ,the judgment must be an act1 because it is essentially an adaptation--a reaction toward a given situation4 ,the subject of the judgment is that part of the content of experience which represents the situation to be reacted to4 ,it is that which is taken for granted as given in each case4 ,now this is1 as we have seen1 reality--in the narrower sense of that term4 ,what ,bosanquet has been calling reality now appears merely as the subject of the judgment taken out of its normal function and considered as an isolated thing4 ,it is an artificial abstraction4 ,it is accordingly true1 as ,bosanquet insists1 that the subject of the judgment must always be reality--both in his sense of the term and in ours4 ,this reality is not real1 however1 by virtue of its independence from the judgment1 but by virtue of its function within the judgment4 ,his fundamental problem with reference to the subject of the judgment is disposed of from this point of view4 ,the subject is wholly within the judgment1 not in any sense outside of it2 but it is at the same time true that the subject of the judgment is reality4 ,the fact that the subjects of all judgments--even those of the most elementary type--bear evident marks of the work done by thought upon them1 ceases to be a problem4 ,the subject is essentially a thing constituted by the doubt-inquiry process1 and functioning within it4 ,the necessity for an intermediate real world as it is to me between the real world and the knowing process disappears1 because the real world as it is to me is the only real world of which the judgment can take account4 ,there is no longer any divorce between the content of the subject and its existence4 ,reality in his sense of the term--reality as fact--does not fall on the side of existence in distinction from content1 but on the side of function in distinction from content4 ,the predicate of the judgment is that part of the total experience which is taken as doubtful1 or tentative4 ,as we have seen1 every act of adaptation involves a definite situation to be reacted to 7subject7 and an indefinite or tentative material with which to react 7predicate74 ,we have pointed out that a situation which demands a judgment never appears in consciousness as mere questioned or questionable situation4#eb ,there is always present1 as soon as the doubt arises1 some sort of tentative solution4 ,this is the predicate or idea4 ,just as the fact1 or real in the narrower sense1 is that which is taken as given in the situation1 so the ideal is that which is taken as tentative4 ,its ideality does not consist in its reference to another order of existence1 the objective world of meanings1 but in its function within the judgment1 the estimate of the whole situation as leading up to the adequate act4 ,just as we no longer have any need for the mediation of the real world as known to me between subject and reality1 so we no longer need the objective world of meanings to bridge the chasm between the predicate and reality4 ,the difficulty of understanding how ideas can be used to build up facts disappears when we regard fact and idea1 not as different orders of existence1 but as contents marking different phases of a total function4 ,ideas1 as ,bosanquet represented them1 proved to be extremely unsatisfactory tools to use in building up a knowledge of reality4 ,in the first place1 their value as instruments of thought depends upon their universality4 ,we have already reviewed ,bosanquet's difficulties in attempting to explain the universality of ideas4 ,the universality of an idea cannot reside in its mere existence as image4 ,its existence is purely particular4 ,its universality must reside in its reference to something outside of itself4 ,but no explanation of how the particular existence--image--could refer to another and fuller content of a different order of existence could be discovered4 ,the fact of reference remained an ultimate mystery4 ,from the new point of view the image gains its universality through its organizing function4 ,it represents an organized habit which may be brought to bear upon the present situation1 and which serves1 by directing action1 to organize and unify experience as a whole4 ,it is only as function that the concept of reference can be made intelligible4 ,of course1 considered as content1 the idea is just as particular from this point of view as from any other4 ,we still have to discuss the question as to whether or not the particularity of the idea has a logical value4 ,the fact that it had none in ,bosanquet's theory sets a limit to the validity of thought4 ,but if the real test of the validity of a judgment is the act in which it issues1 then the existential aspect of the idea must have logical value4 ,the existential aspect of the idea is the my side of it4 ,it is as my personal experience that it exists4 ,but it is only as my idea that it has any impulsive power1 or can issue in action4 ,far from being ignored1 therefore1 the existential aspect is essential to the logical1 the determinative1 value of an idea4 ,ideas1 according to the representational theory of knowledge1 proved to be a poor medium for knowing reality in still another respect4 ,they are in their very nature contents that have been reduced from the fulness of experience to mere index-signs4 ,even though their reference to a fuller content in the objective world of meanings presented no problem1 still this objective world of meanings is far removed from reality4 ,and yet1 in order to know1 we must be able to affirm ideas of reality4 ,on the functional theory of ideas1 their value does not rest at all upon their representational nature4 ,they are not taken either in their existence or in their meaning as representations of any other content4 ,they are taken as contents which mark a given function1 and their value is determined entirely by the adequacy of the function of which they are the conscious expression4 ,their content may be as meager as you please4 ,it may have been obtained by a long process of reducing and transforming sensory experience1 but if it serve to enable its possessor to meet the situation which called it up with the appropriate act1 then it has truth and value in the fullest sense4 ,the reduction of the idea to a mere index-sign presents no problem when we realize that it is the tool of a given function1 not the sign for a different and fuller content4 ,the idea thus becomes a commendable economy in the thought-process1 rather than a reprehensible departure from reality4 ,we have already upon general considerations criticised the point of view which holds that ideality consists in reference to another content4 ,in arguing that this reference cannot be primarily to reality itself1 but rather to an intermediate world of meanings1 ,bosanquet cites the question and the negative judgment4 ,in the question ideas are not affirmed of reality1 and in negation they are definitely denied of reality1 hence their reference cannot be to reality4 ,it must therefore be to an objective world of meanings4 ,it may be worth while to point out in passing that1 from the functional point of view1 the part played by ideas in the question and in negative judgment is the same that it is in affirmation4 ,we have brought out the fact that all judgment arises in a doubt4 ,the earliest stage of judgment is accordingly a question4 ,whether the process stops at that point1 or is carried on to an affirmation or negation1 depends upon the particular conditions4 ,the ideas which appear in questions present no other problem than those of affirmation4 ,they are ideas1 not by virtue of their reference to another content in the world of meanings1 but by virtue of their function1 i4 e41 that of constituting that part of the total experience which is taken as doubtful1 and hence as in process4 ,in order to make this point clear with reference to negative judgments1 it will be necessary to consider the relation of negative and positive judgments somewhat more in detail4 ,all judgment is in its earliest stages a question1 but a question is never mere question4 ,there are always present some suggestions of an answer1 which make the process really a disjunctive judgment4 ,a question might be defined as a disjunctive judgment in which one member of the disjunction is expressed and the others implied4 ,if the process goes on to take the form of affirmation or negation1 one of the suggested answers is selected4 ,to follow out the illustration of the bread used above1 the judgment arises in a doubt as to the nature of the white object perceived1 but the doubt never takes the form of a blank question4 ,it at once suggests certain possible solutions drawn from the mass of organized experience at the command of the person judging4 ,at this stage the judgment is disjunctive4 ,in the illustration it would probably take the form3 ,this is either bread or cake4 ,the further course of the judgment rejects the cake alternative1 and selects the bread1 and the final outcome of the judgment is formulated in the proposition3 ,this is bread4 ,but how did it happen that it did not take the form3 ,this is not cake8 ,that proposition is also involved in the outcome1 and implied in the judgment made4 ,the answer is that the form taken by the final outcome depends entirely on the direction of interest of the person making the judgment4 ,if his interest happened to lie in obtaining bread1 then the outcome would naturally take the form3 ,this is bread1 and his act would consist in eating it4 ,if he happened to want cake1 the natural form would be1 ,this is not cake1 and his act would consist in refraining from eating4 ,in other words1 the question as to whether a judgment turns out to be negative or positive is a question of whether the stress of interest happens to fall on the selected or on the rejected portions of the original disjunction4 ,every determination of a subject through a predicate includes both4 ,the selection of one or the other according to interest affects the final formulation of the process1 but does not change the relations of its various phases4 ,an idea in a negative judgment is just what it is in a positive judgment4 ,in neither case is it constituted an idea by reference to some other content4 ,so far we have outlined ,bosanquet's theory of the judgment2 have noted the apparently insoluble problems inherent in his system1 and have sketched a radically different theory which offered a possible solution for his difficulties4 ,it now remains to develop the implications of the new theory further by comparing its application to some of the more important problems of logic with that of ,bosanquet4 ,in closing we shall have to inquire to what extent the new theory of the judgment with its metaphysical implications has proved more satisfactory than that of ,bosanquet4 ,the special problems to be considered are 7#a7 the relation of judgment to inference2 7#b7 the parts of the judgment and their relationship2 7#c7 the time element in the judgment2 and 7#d7 the way in which one judgment can be separated from another4 #a4 ,the discussion of the relation between judgment and inference comes up incidentally in ,bosanquet's treatment of the distinction between a judgment and a proposition 7p4 #gi74 ,the proposition1 he says1 is merely the enunciative sentence which represents the act of thought called judgment4 ,with this distinction we should agree4 ,in his discussion of the point1 however1 he criticises ,hegel's doctrine that a judgment is distinguished from a proposition in that a judgment maintains itself against a doubt1 while a proposition is a mere temporal affirmation1 not implying the presence of a doubt4 ,the ground of his criticism is that judgment must be regarded as operative before the existence of a conscious doubt1 and that1 while it is true1 as ,hegel suggests1 that judgment and inference begin together1 they both begin farther back than the point at which conscious doubt arises4 ,doubt marks the point at which inference becomes conscious of its ground4 ,now1 it is undoubted that inferences in which the ground is implicit exist at an earlier stage of experience than those in which it is explicit4 ,the former we usually call simple apprehension1 and the latter judgment4 ,what ,bosanquet wishes to do is to make the term judgment cover both the implicit and the explicit activities4 ,the question at once arises whether such a use of terms is accurate4 ,there is certainly a wide difference between an inference which is conscious of its ground1 and one which is not4 ,it is conceivably a distinction of philosophic importance4 ,to slur the difference by applying one name to both accomplishes nothing4 ,it will be remembered that the presence of a conscious doubt is the criterion of judgment adopted in the standpoint from which we have been criticising ,bosanquet's theory4 ,we should accordingly make the term inference a wider one than the term judgment4 ,a judgment is an inference which is conscious of its ground4 ,since fact and idea have been represented as constituted in and through judgment1 the question which at once suggests itself is3 ,what1 from such a standpoint1 is the criterion of fact and idea in the stage of experience previous to the appearance of judgment8 ,the answer is that the question involves the psychological fallacy4 ,there is no such distinction as fact and idea in experience previous to the appearance of judgment4 ,the distinction between fact and idea arises only at the higher level of experience at which inference becomes conscious of its grounds4 ,to ask what they were previous to that is to ask what they were before they were--a question which1 of course1 cannot be answered4 ,our reason for not adopting ,hegel's distinction between a judgment and a proposition would accordingly not be the same as ,bosanquet's4 ,the question has already been touched upon in the distinction between dead and live judgments4 ,what ,hegel calls a proposition is really nothing but a dead judgment4 ,his illustration of a temporal affirmation is the sentence3 ,a carriage is passing the house4 ,that sentence would be a judgment1 he says1 only in case there were some doubt as to whether or not a carriage was passing4 ,but the question to be answered first is3 ,when would such a statement occur in the course of our experience8 ,it is impossible to conceive of any circumstances in which it would naturally occur1 unless there were some doubt to be solved either of our own or of another4 ,perhaps one is expecting a friend1 and does not know at first whether it is a carriage or a cart which is passing4 ,perhaps some one has been startled1 and asks3 ,what is this noise8 ,what ,hegel wishes to call a proposition is1 accordingly1 nothing but a judgment taken out of its setting4 #b4 ,in dealing with the traditional three parts of the judgment--subject1 predicate1 and copula--,bosanquet disposes of the copula at once1 by dividing the judgment into subject and predication4 ,but the two terms subject and predication are not co-ordinate4 ,subject1 as he uses it1 is a static term indicating a content4 ,predication is a dynamic term indicating the act of predicating4 ,it implies something which is predicated of something else1 i4 e41 two contents and the act of bringing them into relation4 ,now1 if what we understand by the copula is the act of predicating abstracted from the content which is predicated of another content1 then it does not dispose of the copula as a separate factor in judgment to include thing predicated and act of predicating under the single term predication4 ,the term predication might just as reasonably be made to absorb the subject as well1 and would then appear--as it really is--synonymous with the term judgment4 ,but ,bosanquet's difficulties with the parts of the judgment are not disposed of even by the reduction to subject and predication4 ,he goes on to say3 ,it is plain that the judgment1 however complex1 is a single idea4 ,the relations within it are not relations between ideas1 but are themselves a part of the idea which is predicated4 ,in other words1 the subject must be outside the judgment in order that the content of the judgment may be predicated of it4 ,if not1 we fall back into my idea of the earth goes round my idea of the sun1 and this1 as we have seen1 is never the meaning of ,the earth goes round the sun4 ,what we want is1 ,the real world has in it as a fact what ,i mean by earth-going-round-sun4 7,p4 #ha47 ,we have already pointed out the difficulties into which ,bosanquet's presupposition as to the nature of reality plunges him4 ,this is but another technical statement of the same problem4 ,if the subject is really outside of judgment1 then the entire content of the judgment must fall on the side of predicate1 or idea4 ,in the paragraphs that follow1 ,bosanquet brings out the point that the judgment must nevertheless contain the distinction of subject and predicate1 since it is impossible to affirm without introducing a distinction into the content of the affirmation4 ,yet he considers this distinction to be merely a difference within an identity4 ,it serves to mark off the grammatical subject and predicate1 but cannot be the essential distinction of subject and predicate4 ,his solution of the puzzle is really the one for which we have been contending1 i4 e41 that the real world is primarily and emphatically my world1 but he still cannot be satisfied with that kind of a real world as ultimate4 ,behind the subject which presents my world he postulates a real world which is not my world1 but which my world represents4 ,it is the relation between this real world and the total content of a judgment which he considers the essential relation of judgment4 ,this leaves him--as we have pointed out--as far as ever from a theory of the relation of thought to reality1 and1 moreover1 with no criterion for the distinction of subject and predicate within the judgment4 ,to say that it is a difference within an identity does not explain how1 on a mere basis of content1 such a difference is distinguished within an identity or how it assumes the importance it actually has4 ,he vibrates between taking the whole intellectual content as predicate1 the reality to be represented as subject 7in which case the copula would be the contact of sense-perception7 and a distinction appearing without reasonable ground or bearing within the intellectual content4 ,when subject and predicate are regarded as the contents in which phases of a function appear1 this difficulty no longer exists4 #c4 ,in discussing the time relations within judgment 7p4 #he7 ,bosanquet first disposes of the view which holds that the subject is prior to the predicate in time1 and is distinguished from the predicate by its priority4 ,he emphasizes the fact that no content of consciousness can have the significance of a subject1 except with reference to something already referred to it as predicate4 ,but while it cannot be true that the parts of the judgment fall outside of one another in time1 it is yet evident that in one sense at least the judgment is in time4 ,to make this clear1 ,bosanquet draws a provisional distinction between the process of arriving at a judgment and the completed judgment4 ,the process of arriving at a judgment is a process of passing from a subject with an indefinite provisional predicate--a sort of disjunctive judgment--to a subject with a defined predicate4 ,this process is evidently in time1 but it is as evidently not a transition from subject to predicate4 ,it is1 as he says1 a modification1 pari passu1 of both subject and predicate4 ,the same distinction1 he thinks1 must hold of the judgment when completed4 ,but this throws us into a dilemma with reference to the time-factor in judgment4 ,time either is or is not an essential factor in judgment4 ,if it is not essential1 then how explain the evident fact that the judgment as an intellectual process does have duration8 ,if it is essential1 then how explain the fact that its parts do not fall outside one another in time8 ,bosanquet evidently regards the former problem as the easier of the two4 ,his solution is that1 while the judgment is an intellectual process in time1 still this is a purely external aspect4 ,the essential relation between subject and predicate is not in time1 since they are coexistent2 therefore time is not an essential element in judgment4 ,the first point at which we take issue with this treatment of time in relation to judgment is in the distinction between the process of arriving at the judgment and the completed judgment4 ,bosanquet himself defines judgment as an intellectual act by which an ideal content is referred to reality4 ,now1 at what point does this act begin8 ,certainly at the point where an ideal content is first applying to reality1 and this1 as he points out1 is at the beginning of the process which he describes as the process of arriving at a judgment4 ,it is nothing to the point that at this stage the predicate is tentative1 while later it becomes defined4 ,his process of arriving at the judgment is exactly the process we have been describing as the early stages of any and every judgment4 ,when he talks about the judgment as completed1 he has apparently shifted from the dynamic view of judgment implied in his definition to a static view4 ,all he could mean by a completed judgment--in distinction to the total activity of arriving at a judgment--is the new content of which we find ourselves possessed when the total process of predication is complete4 ,but this content is not a judgment at all4 ,it is a new construction of reality which may serve either as subject or as predicate in future judgments4 ,now1 if we regard the judgment as the total activity by which an ideal content is referred to reality1 then must we not regard time as an essential element8 ,bosanquet answers this question in the negative1 because he believes that if time is an essential element1 then the parts of the judgment must necessarily fall outside one another in time4 ,but is this necessary8 ,if the essence of judgment is the very modification1 pari passu1 of subject and predicate1 then time must be an essential element in it1 but it is not at all necessary that its elements should fall outside of one another in time4 ,in other words1 the dilemma which ,bosanquet points out on p4 #hg is not a genuine one4 ,there is no difficulty involved in admitting that the judgment is a transition in time1 and still holding that its parts do not fall outside one another in time4 ,his own solution of the problem--i4 e41 that1 although judgment is an intellectual process in time1 still time is not an essential feature of it1 because subject and predicate are coexistent and judgment is a relation between them--involves a desertion of his dynamic view of judgment4 ,he defines judgment1 not as a relation between subject and predicate1 but as an intellectual act4#ec #d4 ,the discussion of the time-element in judgment leads up to the next puzzle--that as to the way in which one judgment can be marked off from another in the total activity of thought4 ,bosanquet has pointed out that subject and predicate are both of them present at every stage of the judging process1 and are undergoing progressive modification4 ,if1 therefore1 we take a cross-section of the process at any point1 we find both subject and predicate present2 but a cross-section at one point would not reveal quite the same subject and predicate as the cross-section at another point4 ,he comes to the conclusion that judgment breaks up into judgments as rhomboidal spar into rhomboids 7p4 #hh74 ,it is1 accordingly1 quite arbitrary to mark out any limits for a single judgment4 ,the illustration he gives of the point is as follows3 ,take such an every-day judgment of mixed perception and inference as1 ,he is coming down stairs and going into the street4 ,it is the merest chance whether ,i break up the process thus1 into two judgments as united by a mere conjunction1 or1 knowing the man's habits1 say1 when ,i hear him half way down stairs1 ,he is going out4 ,in the latter case ,i summarize a more various set of observations and inferences in a single judgment2 but the judgment is as truly single as each of the two which were before separated by a conjunction2 for each of them was also a summary of a set of perceptions1 which might1 had ,i chosen1 have been subdivided into distinct propositions expressing separate judgments2 e4 g41 ,he has opened his door1 and is going toward the staircase1 and is half way down1 and is in the passage1 etc4 ,if ,i simply say1 ,he is going out1 ,i am not a whit the less conscious that ,i judge all these different relations1 but ,i then include them all in a single systematic content going out4 7,p4 #hi47 ,but is it a question of merest chance which of these various possibilities is actualized8 ,is ,bosanquet really looking--as he thinks--at the actual life of thought1 or is he considering1 not what as a matter of fact does take place under a concrete set of circumstances1 but what might take place under slightly differing sets of circumstances8 ,if it is true that judgment is a crisis developing through adequate interaction of stimulus and response into a definite situation1 beginning with doubt and ending with a solution of the doubt1 then it is not true that its limits are purely arbitrary4 ,it begins with the appearance of the problem and its tentative solutions1 and ends with the solution of a final response4 ,it does1 of course1 depend upon momentary interest1 but this does not make its limits arbitrary1 for the interest is inherent1 not external4 ,in the case of ,bosanquet's illustration1 the question of whether one judgment or half a dozen is made is not a question of merest chance4 ,it depends upon where the interest of the person making the judgment is centered--in other words1 upon what is the particular doubt to be solved4 ,if the real doubt is as to whether the man will stay in his room or go out1 then when he is heard leaving his room the solution comes in the form3 ,he is going out4 ,but if the doubt is as to whether he will stay in his room1 go out1 or go into some other room1 then the succession of judgments occurs1 each of which solves a problem4 ,he has opened his door--then he is not going to stay in his room2 ,he is going toward the staircase--then he is not going into a room in the opposite direction1 etc4 ,it is impossible to conceive of such a series of judgments as actually being made1 unless each one represents a problematic situation and its determination4 ,the only time that a man would1 as a matter of fact1 choose to break up the judgment1 ,he is going out1 into such a series1 would be the time when each member of the series had its own special interest as representing a specific uncertain aim or problem4 ,nor is it altogether true that in making the judgment1 ,he is going out1 one is not a whit the less conscious that he judges all these different relations4 ,he judges only such relations as are necessary to the solution of the problem in hand4 ,if hearing the man open his door is a sufficient basis for the solution1 then that is the only one which consciously enters into the formation of the judgment4 ,we have attempted to bring out in the preceding pages what seem to be the contradictions and insoluble problems involved in ,bosanquet's theory of the judgment1 and to exhibit them as the logical outcome of his metaphysical presuppositions4 ,we have also tried to develop another theory of the judgment involving a different view of the nature of reality1 and to show that the new theory is able to avoid the difficulties inherent in ,bosanquet's system4 ,the change in view-point briefly is this3 ,instead of regarding the real world as self-existent1 independently of the judgments we make about it1 we viewed it as the totality of experience which is assured1 i4 e41 determined as to certainty or specific availability1 through the instrumentality of judgment4 ,we thus avoided the essentially insoluble problem of how a real world whose content is self-existent quite outside of knowledge can ever be correctly represented by ideas4 ,the difficulty in understanding the relation of the subject and the predicate of judgment to reality disappears when we cease to regard reality as self-existent outside of knowledge4 ,subject and predicate become instrumentalities in the process of building up reality4 ,thought no longer seems to carry us farther and farther from reality as ideas become abstract and recede from the immediate sensory experience in which contact with the real occurs4 ,on the contrary1 thought carries us constantly toward reality4 ,finally1 we avoid the fundamental skepticism about the possibility of knowledge which1 from the other standpoint1 is forced upon us by the long succession of facts which have faded into the realm of false opinions1 and the lack of any guarantee that our present so-called knowledge of reality shall not meet the same fate4 ,from that point of view1 reality seems to be not only unknown1 but unknowable4 ,the criticism sure to be passed upon the alternative view developed is that the solution of ,bosanquet's problems which it affords is not a real solution1 but rather the abandonment of an attempt at a solution4 ,it represents reality as a thing which is itself in process of development4 ,it would force us to admit that the reality of a hundred years ago1 or even of yesterday1 was not in content the reality of today4 ,a growing1 developing reality is1 it will be said1 an imperfect reality1 while we must conceive of reality as complete and perfect in itself4 ,the only answer which can be made is to insist again that we have no right to assume that reality is such an already completed existence1 unless such an assumption enables us to understand experience and organize it into a consistent whole4 ,the attempt of this paper has been to show that such a conception of reality really makes it inherently impossible to give an intelligible account of experience as a whole1 while the view which regards reality as developing in and through judgment does enable us to build up a consistent and understandable view of the world4 ,this suggests that the perfect may not after all be that which is finished and ended1 but that whose reality is so abundant and vital as to issue in continuous self-modification4 ,the ,reality that evolves and moves may be more perfect1 less finite1 than that which has exhausted itself4 ,moreover1 only the view that ,reality is developmental in quality1 and that the instrument of its development is judgment involving the psychical in its determination of subject and predicate gives the psychical as such any significant place in knowledge or in reality4 ,according to the view of knowledge as representation of an eternal content1 the psychical is a mere logical surd4 ,,vi ,,typical ,,stages ,,in ,,the ,,development ,,of ,,judgment ,logic aims at investigating the general function of knowing4 ,but knowing1 it is commonly asserted1 is constituted as judgment4 ,furthermore1 there is reason to believe that judgment undergoes well-marked changes in its development4 ,consequently1 an understanding of the judgment-function and of its epochs in development is of prime importance4 ,in carrying through the investigation we shall endeavor1 first1 to state and to defend a certain presupposition with reference to the character of the judgment-function2 second1 to exhibit the application of this presupposition in the typical stages of judgment4 ,i ,judgment is essentially instrumental4 ,this is the presupposition which we must explain and make good4 ,and we shall accomplish this by way of an analysis of judgment as meaning4 ,it cannot be denied that what we call knowledge is concerned with the discrimination of valid meaning4 ,to know is to appreciate the meaning of things and the meaning of things is the same with valid meaning4 ,judging determines knowledge1 and in the same act develops meaning4 ,to put it otherwise1 knowledge is a matter of content2 content is meaning1 and we have knowledge when we have meaning satisfactorily determined4 ,it is evident1 therefore1 that if we would understand the judging-function1 we must first make clear to ourselves the nature and rle of meaning4 ,meaning is universally embodied in ideas4 ,to know1 to understand the meaning1 to get ideas1 are the same4 ,now1 in ideas two factors may be distinguished4 ,first1 every idea has as its base an image or emphasized portion of experience4 ,in some forms of ideation we are more immediately aware of the presence of images than in others1 but no idea--even the most abstract--can exist apart from an ultimate base4 ,second1 every idea is equally a function of reference and control4 ,as reference1 the idea projects in the mind's view an anticipation of experiences and of the conditions upon which these experiences depend for their realization2 as control1 ideas are agencies in turning anticipations into realizations4#ed ,to be more specific on both points3 ,since the days of ,galton it has been almost a commonplace in psychology that ideas are embodied in forms of imagery which vary for and in different individuals4 ,it has been maintained1 it is true1 that in abstract forms of thought1 imagery disappears4 ,this objection is met in two ways4 ,for one1 words--the vehicle of many abstract ideas--involve imagery of a most pronounced type3 for another1 every idea1 when examined closely1 discloses an image1 no matter how much for the time being this has been driven into obscurity by the characteristics of reference and control4 ,furthermore1 when we examine the anticipatory aspect of ideas1 the presence of imagery both with reference to outcome and to conditions is so evident that its presence will scarcely be denied4 ,the second point may be illustrated in several ways4 ,in everyday life anticipation and realization are inseparable from the nature and use of ideas4 ,hat means anticipation of protection to the head and the tendency toward setting in motion the conditions appropriate to the realization of this anticipation4 ,the same factors are evident in the boy's definition of a knife as something to whittle with4 ,again it is maintained that intelligence is an essential factor in human self-consciousness4 ,by this is meant that human beings are universally aware in some degree of what they are about4 ,and this awareness consists in understanding the meaning of their actions1 of forecasting the outcome of various kinds of activity1 of apprehending beforehand the conditions connected with determinate results4 ,within this sphere we speak of certain men as being pre-eminently intelligent1 meaning that for such men outcomes are previewed and connected with their appropriate conditions far beyond the range of ordinary foresight4 ,finally1 scientific intelligence is essentially of this kind4 ,it aims at understanding the varying types of process which operate in nature and thus at possessing itself of information with reference to results to be expected under determinate conditions4 ,for example1 the knowledge acquired in his researches by ,louis ,pasteur enabled him to predict the life or death of animals inoculated with charbon virus according as they had or had not been vaccinated previously4 ,his information1 in other words1 became an instrument for the control and eradication of the disease4 ,and what is true of this case is true of all science4 ,to the scientist ideas are working hypotheses and have their value only as they enable him to predict1 and to control4 ,and while it is true that the scientist usually overlooks the so-called practical value of his discoveries1 it is none the less true that in due time the inventor follows the investigator4 ,the investigator is content to construct and show the truth of his idea4 ,the inventor assumes the truth of the investigator's work and carries his idea as a constructive principle into the complications of life4 ,to both men knowledge is power1 although the power may be realized in connection with different interests4 ,but if this be true1 ideas can no longer be regarded as copies in individual experience of some pre-existing reality4 ,they are rather instruments for transforming and directing experience1 by way of constructing anticipations and the conditions appropriate to their realization4 ,herein also consists their truth or falsity4 ,the true idea is reliable1 carrying us from anticipation to realization2 the false idea is unreliable1 and fails in bringing the promised result4 ,now1 in the development of instruments generally1 we may distinguish a rule-of-thumb or more or less unreflective stage of construction1 and one entirely reflective4 ,as to use there is the distinction of inexpert and expert control4 ,this leads us to expect that in the thought-function also certain typical stages of construction and of control may be found4 ,to the investigation of this point we shall next direct attention4 ,,ii ,in its development from crude to expert forms judgment exhibits three typical stages--the impersonal1 the reflective1 and the intuitive4 ,these we shall consider in order of development4 ,but first it is to be noticed that these stages of judgment are not to be regarded as hard and fast distinctions of the kind that no indications of the higher are to be found in the lower types1 but rather as working distinctions within a process of continuous development4 #a4 ,the impersonal judgment4--,ever since the days of the ,greek grammarians the impersonal judgment has been considered an anomaly in logic4 ,and the reason is not far to seek4 ,from the time of ,aristotle it has been customary to maintain that judgments1 when analyzed1 disclose a subject and a predicate4 ,logically considered1 these appear to be entirely correlative1 for1 as ,erdmann puts it1#ee an event without a substrate1 a quality without a subject1 is altogether unpresentable4 ,but there is in all languages a class of judgments1 such as1 ,it rains1 ,it snows1 ,fire6 in which no directly asserted subject is discoverable4 ,to these the name impersonal and subjectless has been given4 ,here then is the difficulty4 ,if we admit that the impersonal expression involves predication1 we must1 in all consistency1 search for a subject1 while at the same time the subject refuses to disclose itself4 ,in ancient days the orthodox logician confined his search to language and to the spoken or written proposition4 ,the unorthodox critic maintained1 in opposition to this1 that a subject was provided only by warping and twisting the natural sense of the impersonal expression4 ,and thus the matter stood until the development of modern comparative philology4 ,it was then demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that the it 7or its equivalent7 of the impersonal is a purely contentless form word4 ,language provides no subject whatsoever4 ,so strong1 however1 is the hold of tradition that the search has been renewed4 ,attention has been turned upon the mental processes involved1 and this time with more apparent result4 ,although there has been no general agreement with reference to the subject1 a classification of the different views may still be made4 7a7 ,the subject is universal and undetermined2 7b7 it is individual and more or less determined2 7c7 between these extremes lies almost every intermediate degree conceivable4 ,ueberweg maintains that the subject of the impersonal is the actual totality of present experience4 ,when we ask1 ,what rains8 we must understand a reference to our general environment1 in which no special element is singled out4 ,sigwart1 on the other hand1 maintains that the subject can be construed only as the actual sense-impression4 ,this diversity of opinion might seem to indicate that1 were it not for the constraining power of theory1 a subject would scarcely be thought of for the impersonal4 ,still it must be admitted that when we examine the impersonal expression closely we can discover a sense-impression1 whether definite or indefinite1 combined with an idea4 ,this would seem to give the case to the orthodox logician1 for he will at once claim the sense-impression as the subject and the idea as the predicate of the judgment4 ,but we must have a care4 ,predication is usually held to consist in a reference of predicate to subject4 ,the factors of the judgment are1 as it were1 held apart4 ,in the impersonal no such thing as this can be discovered4 ,the meaning is so close a unity that impression and idea are entirely fused4 ,we may analyze the expression and find them there1 but by so doing we destroy the immediacy which is an essential characteristic of the impersonal4 ,in other words1 the impersonal does not analyze itself4 ,it is entirely unconscious of its make-up4 ,and yet it is definite and applies itself with precision3 ,if ,i am in a lecture-hall and hear the fire-alarm1 the thought ,fire6 which enters my mind leads to an immediate change in my conduct4 ,i arise1 move quietly out1 and prepare for duty4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,i open the street door and the rain strikes my face1 ,i ejaculate ,raining6 turn1 reach for my umbrella1 and pass out protected4 ,in both cases ,i act knowingly and with meaning1 but ,i do not analyze the movement either of thought or of action4 ,a correlate to the unreflective impersonal judgment is found in early custom4 ,custom embodies social ideas and is an instrument for the determination and control of action4 ,individuals moved by custom know what they are about and act with precision according as custom may demand4 ,but it is notorious that custom is direct and unreflective4 ,it represents social instruments of control which have grown up without method and which represent the slow accretion of rule-of-thumb activities through many ages4 ,so in the impersonal judgment we have a type of intellectual instrument which has been brought to a high degree of precision in use1 but which still retains the simplicity and certainty of an unquestioned instrument of action4 ,for this reason1 whatever complexity of elements the impersonal may present to a reflective view1 it does not contain to itself4 ,consequently it may be best to say that to the impersonal there is neither subject1 predicate1 nor reference of the one to the other4 ,these are distinctions which arise only when the instrument of action has been questioned and the mind turns back upon the meaning which it has unhesitatingly used1 analyzing1 investigating1 constructing1 laying bare the method and function of its tools4 ,thus arises a new and distinctive type of judgment1 viz41 the reflective4 #b4 ,the reflective judgment4--,by the reflective judgment is to be understood that form of meaning whose structure and function have become a problem to itself4 ,the days of nave trust and spontaneous action have gone by4 ,inquiry1 criticism1 aloofness1 stay the tendency to immediate action4 ,meaning has grown worldly wise and demands that each situation shall explain itself and that the general principles and concrete applications of its own instruments shall be made manifest4 ,hence in the various forms of reflective thought we find the progressive steps in which meaning comes to full consciousness of its function in experience4 ,the demonstrative judgment 7the simplest of the reflective type7 carries doubt1 criticism1 construction1 and assertion written on the face of it4 ,for example1 in the expression1 ,that is hot1 we do not find the directness and immediacy of response characteristic of the simpler impersonal hot4 ,instead1 we note a clash of tendencies1 a suspension of the proposed action1 a demand for and a carrying out of a reconsideration of the course of action1 the emergence of a new meaning1 and the consequent redirection of activities4 ,an iron lies upon the hearth2 ,i stretch out my hand to return it to its place2 ,i stop suddenly1 having become conscious of signs of warmth2 the thought arises in my mind1 ,that is hot2 ,i experiment and find my judgment correct2 ,i search for a cloth1 and thus protected carry out my first intention4 ,again1 a hunter notes a movement in the thicket1 quickly raises his gun1 and is about to fire4 ,something in the movement of the object arrests him4 ,he stops1 thinking1 ,that is a man1 perhaps4 ,what has caught the eye has arrested his action1 has become a demand1 and not until the situation has become clear can the hunter determine what to do4 ,in other words1 he must reflectively assure himself what the object is before he can satisfy himself as to how he should act4 ,subject and predicate have arisen and have consciously played their parts in the passage from doubt to decision4 ,under the heading individual judgments are classed such expressions as1 ,that ship is a man-o'-war1 ,russia opposes the policy of the open door in ,china4 ,in both these cases it is evident that an advance in definiteness of conception and of complexity of meaning has been made1 while at the same time we recognize that the instrumental characteristics of the thought-movement remain the same4 ,in considering the subject of the judgment we note that the stimulus presents itself partly as a determinate factor and partly as a problem--an insistent demand4 ,the expression1 ,that ship is a man-o'-war1 might be written1 ,that is a ship and of the kind man-o'-war1 and it thus constitutes what ,sigwart calls a double synthesis4 ,as used in actual judgment1 however1 the two are held together and constitute the statement of a single stimulus of which a certain portion is evident and a certain portion is in doubt4 ,the working out of the difficulty is given in the predicate is a man-o'-war1 in which we at once detect the instrumental characteristics fundamental to all judgment4 ,to illustrate3 ,at the close of the battle of ,santiago1 in the ,spanish-,american war1 smoke appeared upon the horizon revealing the presence of a strange ship4 ,instantly attention was directed to it1 and it became a problem for action--a demand for instrumental information4 ,soon it was identified as a man-o'-war1 and the ,american ships were cleared for action4 ,closer approach raised a further question with reference to its nationality4 ,after some debate this also was resolved1 and hostile demonstrations were abandoned4 ,the universal judgment is sometimes said to exhibit two distinct forms4 ,investigation1 however1 has proved this statement to be incorrect4 ,instances taken in themselves and apart from their character are of no logical significance4 ,advance is made by weighing instances and not by counting them4 ,in short1 the true universal is the hypothetical judgment1 and the reason for this may be readily shown4 ,the hypothetical judgment is essentially double-ended4 ,on the one hand1 it is a statement of the problem of action in terms of the conditions which will turn the problem into a solution4 ,on the other hand1 it is an assertion that once the conditions of action have been determined the result desired may be attained4 ,here we note that the judgment has come to clear consciousness of itself and of the part which it plays in experience4 ,it has now obtained an insight into the criterion of its legitimate employment1 i4 e41 of its truth and falsity4 ,and this insight makes the justification of its claim almost self-evident4 ,for1 inasmuch as the hypothetical judgment says1 ,if such and such conditions be realized1 such and such a result will be obtained1 the test of the claim is made by putting the conditions into effect and watching whether the promised experience is given4 ,and further1 since it has been found that the judgment formulated as a hypothesis actually accomplishes what it promises1 we must admit that the hypothetical judgment is also categorical4 ,these two factors cannot be separated from each other4 ,it is true that the hypothetical judgment reduces every valid meaning to the form1 ,if certain conditions be realized1 but it as plainly and positively asserts1 such and such results will be obtained4 ,when we grasp the absolute correlativity of the hypothetical and categorical aspects of judgment1 we realize at once the essentially instrumental character of judgment1 when it comes to consciousness of its structure and function4 ,it arises in the self-conscious realization of a problem4 ,this it reflects upon and sizes up4 ,when the difficulty has been apprehended1 the judgment emerges as the consciousness of the conditions which will attain the desired end of action freed and unimpeded4 ,this may be illustrated by reference to the work of ,pasteur cited above4 ,his investigations began in a problem set for him by agricultural conditions in ,france4 ,a certain disease had made the profitable rearing of sheep and cattle almost an impossibility4 ,after long and careful examination he discovered the beneficial effects of vaccination4 ,to him the conditions which governed the presence of the disease became apparent1 and this knowledge furnished him with an instrument by means of which one difficulty was removed from the path of the stock-raiser4 ,in this illustration we have an epitome of the work accomplished everywhere by the scientist4 ,it is his task to develop and to reduce to exact terms instruments of control for the varied activities of life4 ,in its parts and as a whole each instrument is intelligently constructed and tested so that its make-up and function are exactly known4 ,because of this1 reasoned belief now takes the place of unreflective trust as that was experienced in the impersonal stage of judgment4 ,what at first hand might appear to be a loss was in reality a gain2 the breakdown of the impersonal was the first step in the development of an instrument of action conscious of its reason for being1 its methods and conditions of action4 ,these latter constitute the distinctive subject and predicate of the reflective judgment4 ,this brings us to the connection between the hypothetical character of this form of judgment and its universality4 ,and this perhaps will now be quite apparent4 ,the reflective judgment lays bare an objective connection between the conditions and outcomes of actions4 ,it proves its point by actually constructing the event4 ,such being the case1 universality is no more than a statement of identical results being predictable wherever like conditions are realized4 ,if it be true that man is mortal1 then it is an identical statement to insist that1 ,wherever we find men there we shall also find mortality4 ,and this point brings us naturally to the treatment of the disjunctive judgment3 ,a is either ,b or ,c or ,d4 ,in the disjunctive judgment the demand is not for the construction of a reliable instrument of action1 but for the resolution of a doubt as to which instrument is precisely fitted to the circumstances4 ,in fact1 the disjunctive judgment involves the identification of the practical problem4 ,when we say of a man1 ,he is either very simple or very deep1 we have no doubt as to our proper course of action in either case4 ,if he is simple1 then we shall do so and so2 if he is deep1 then another course of action follows4 ,we can lay out alternative courses beforehand1 but the point of difficulty lies here3 ,but just which is he8 ,in short1 the disjunctive judgment is the demand for and the attempt at a precise diagnosis of a concrete problem4 ,to illustrate3 ,a patient afflicted with aphasia is brought to a physician4 ,the fact that the trouble is aphasia may be quite evident4 ,but what precisely is the form and seat of the aphasia8 ,to the mind of the educated physician the problem will take on the disjunctive form3 ,this is either subcortical or cortical aphasia4 ,if subcortical1 intelligence will not be impaired2 if cortical1 the sensor and motor tracts will be in good condition4 ,appropriate tests are made and the subcortical possibilities are shut out4 ,the disjunction disappears and the judgment emerges3 ,this is a case of cortical aphasia4 ,but now a new disjunction arises4 ,it is either the sensory or motor form of cortical aphasia1 and1 whichever one of these1 it is again one of several possibilities4 ,as the alternatives arise1 the means for discriminating them arise also2 determinate symptoms are observed1 and in due time the physician arrives at the final conclusion3 ,this is sensory cortical aphasia of the visual type4 ,having determined this1 his method of action is assured1 and he proceeds to the appropriate operation4 ,thus1 finally1 we are brought to a form of judgment aware not only of its motive1 method1 and justification1 but also to one aware of its specific application to individual cases4 ,thus it would seem as though judgment had returned upon itself and had completed the determination of its sphere of action4 ,and in one sense this is true4 ,in the disjunctive judgment1 as inclusive of the motives of the hypothetical and categorical forms1 the reflective judgment would appear to have come to its limit of development4 ,one thing1 however1 remains to be considered1 viz41 the development from crude to expert uses of intellectual instruments4 #c4 ,the intuitive judgment4--,as stated above1 the intuitive type of judgment depends upon efficiency in the use of judgment4 ,in this regard there is a great similarity between the impersonal and the intuitive judgments4 ,both are immediate and precise4 ,but there is a radical and essential difference4 ,the impersonal judgment knows nothing of the strict analysis1 insight1 and constructive power of the reflective judgment4 ,the intuitive judgment1 on the other hand1 includes the results of reflection and brings them to their highest power4 ,paradoxically put1 in the intuitive judgment there is so much reflection that there is no need for it at all4 ,to the intuitive judgment there is no hesitation1 no aloofness4 ,action is direct1 but entirely self-conscious4 ,that such a type of judgment as the intuitive exists there can be no doubt4 ,there is all the difference in the world between the quality of consciousness of a mere layman and that of an expert1 no matter what the line4 ,the layman must size up a situation4 ,it is a process whose parts are successive1 whether much or little difficulty be experienced4 ,for the expert situations are taken in at a glance1 parts and whole are simultaneous and immediate4 ,yet the meaning is entirely exact4 ,the expert judgment is self-conscious to the last degree4 ,while other individuals are thinking out what to do1 the expert has it1 sees the advantage1 adjusts1 and moves4 ,demand and solution jump together4 ,how otherwise can we explain1 for example1 the action of an expert ball-player8 ,witness his rapid reactions1 his instantaneous adjustments4 ,mistakes of opponents which would never be noticed by the average player are recognized and seized upon4 ,on the instant the new opening is seen1 the adjustment is evident1 the movement made4 ,illustrations to the same effect could be drawn from other modes of life1 e4 g41 music1 the military life1 etc4 ,that intuitive judgments are not more common is a proof in itself of their distinctive character and value4 ,only in so far as we become experts in our special fields of experience and have reduced our instruments of action to precise control1 can we expect the presence of intuitive judgments4 ,they remain1 therefore1 as the final outcome of the judgment-function made perfect in its technique and use4 ,in conclusion we shall make a brief summary of our investigation and a criticism of certain current theories of judgment4 ,judgment is essentially instrumental4 ,its function is to construct1 justify1 and refine experience into exact instruments for the direction and control of future experience through action4 ,it exhibits itself first in the form of instruments developed unsystematically in response to the hard necessities of life4 ,in a higher stage of development the instrumental process itself is taken into account1 and systematically developed until in the methodical procedure of science the general principles of knowledge are laid bare and efficient instruments of action constructed4 ,finally1 constant1 intelligent use results in complete control1 so that within certain spheres doubt and hesitancy would seem to disappear as to the character of the tools used1 and remain only as a moment in determining their wisest or most appropriate employ4 ,the criticism indicated is based upon the instrumental character of judgment and is directed against all theories which contend that knowledge is a copying or reproducing of reality4 ,in whatever form this copy theory be stated1 the question inevitably arises how we can compare our ideas with reality and thus know their truth4 ,on this theory1 what we possess is ever the copy2 the reality is beyond4 ,in other words1 such a theory logically carried out leads to the breakdown of knowledge4 ,only a theory which contains and constructs its criterion within its own specific movement can verify its constructions4 ,such a theory is the instrumental4 ,judgment constructs a situation in consciousness4 ,the values assigned in this situation have a determining influence upon values further appreciated4 ,the construction arrived at concerns future weal and woe4 ,thus gradually a sense of truth and falsity attaches to the construing of situations4 ,one sees that he must look beyond this situation1 because the way he estimates this situation is fraught with meaning beyond itself4 ,hence the critically reflective judgment in which hesitancy and doubt direct themselves at the attitude1 elements1 and tools involved in defining and identifying the situation1 instead of at the situation itself in toto4 ,instead of developing a complex of experience through assigning qualities and meanings to the situation as such1 some one of the quales is selected1 to have its significance determined4 ,it becomes1 pro tempore1 the situation judged4 ,or the same thing takes place as regards some idea or value hitherto immediately fastened upon and employed4 ,in either case we get the reflective judgment1 the judgment of pure relationship as distinct from the constructive judgment4 ,but the judgment of relation1 employing the copula to refer a specified predicate to a specified object1 is after all only for the sake of controlling some immediate judgment of constructive experience4 ,it realizes itself in forming the confident habit of prompt and precise mental adjustment to individualized situations4 ,,vii ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,hypothesis ,in the various discussions of the hypothesis which have appeared in works on inductive logic and in writings on scientific method1 its structure and function have received considerable attention1 while its origin has been comparatively neglected4 ,the hypothesis has generally been treated as that part of scientific procedure which marks the stage where a definite plan or method is proposed for dealing with new or unexplained facts4 ,it is regarded as an invention for the purpose of explaining the given1 as a definite conjecture which is to be tested by an appeal to experience to see whether deductions made in accordance with it will be found true in fact4 ,the function of the hypothesis is to unify1 to furnish a method of dealing with things1 and its structure must be suitable to this end4 ,it must be so formed that it will be likely to prove valid1 and writers have formulated various rules to be followed in the formation of hypotheses4 ,these rules state the main requirements of a good hypothesis1 and are intended to aid in a general way by pointing out certain limits within which it must fall4 ,in respect to the origin of the hypothesis1 writers have usually contented themselves with pointing out the kind of situations in which hypotheses are likely to appear4 ,but after this has been done1 after favorable external conditions have been given1 the rest must be left to genius1 for hypotheses arise as happy guesses1 for which no rule or law can be given4 ,in fact1 the genius differs from the ordinary plodding mortal in just this ability to form fruitful hypotheses in the midst of the same facts which to other less gifted individuals remain only so many disconnected experiences4 ,this unequal stress which has been laid on the structure and function of the hypothesis in comparison with its origin may be attributed to three reasons3 7#a7 ,the facts1 or data1 which constitute the working material of hypotheses are regarded as given to all alike1 and all alike are more or less interested in systematizing and unifying experience4 ,the purpose of the hypothesis and the opportunity for forming it are thus practically the same for all1 and hence certain definite rules can be laid down which will apply to all cases where hypotheses are to be employed4 7#b7 ,but beyond this there seems to be no clue that can be formulated4 ,there is apparently a more or less open acceptance of the final answer of the boy ,zerah ,colburn1 who1 when pressed to give an explanation of his method of instantaneous calculation1 exclaimed in despair3 ,god put it into my head1 and ,i can't put it into yours4#ef 7#c7 ,and1 furthermore1 there is very often a strong tendency to disregard investigation into the origin of that which is taken as given1 for1 since it is already present1 its origin1 whatever it may have been1 can have nothing to do with what it is now4 ,the facts1 the data1 are here1 and must be dealt with as they are4 ,their past1 their history or development1 is entirely irrelevant4 ,so1 even if we could trace the hypothesis farther back on the psychological side1 the investigation would be useless1 for the rules to which a good hypothesis must conform would remain the same4 ,whether or not it can be shown that ,zerah ,colburn's ultimate explanation is needed in logic as little as ,laplace asserted a similar one to be required in his celestial mechanics1 it may at least be possible to defer it to some extent by means of a further psychological inquiry4 ,it will be found that psychological inquiry into the origin of the hypothesis is not irrelevant in respect to an understanding of its structure and function2 for origin and function cannot be understood apart from each other1 and1 since structure must be adapted to function1 it cannot be independent of origin4 ,in fact1 origin1 structure1 and function are organically connected1 and each loses its meaning when absolutely separated from each other4 ,it will be found1 moreover1 that the data which are commonly taken as the given material are not something to which the hypothesis is subsequently applied1 but that1 instead of this external relation between data and hypothesis1 the hypothesis exercises a directive function in determining what are the data4 ,in a word1 the main object of this discussion will be to contend against making a merely convenient and special way of regarding the hypothesis a full and adequate one4 ,though we speak of facts and of hypotheses that may be applied to them1 it must not be forgotten that there are no facts which remain the same whatever hypothesis be applied to them2 and that there are no hypotheses which are hypotheses at all except in reference to their function in dealing with our subject-matter in such a way as to facilitate its factual apprehension4 ,data are selected in order to be determined1 and hypotheses are the ways in which this determination is carried on4 ,if1 as we shall attempt to show1 the relation between data and hypothesis is not external1 but strictly correlative1 it is evident that this fact must be taken into account in questions concerning deduction and induction1 analytic and synthetic judgments1 and the criterion of truth4 ,its bearing must be recognized in the investigation of metaphysical problems as well1 for reality cannot be independent of the knowing process4 ,in a word1 the purpose of this discussion of the hypothesis is to determine its nature a little more precisely through an investigation of its rather obscure origin1 and to call attention to certain features of its function which have not generally been accorded their due significance4 ,i ,the hypothesis as predicate4--,it is generally admitted that the function of the hypothesis is to provide a way of dealing with the data or subject-matter which we need to organize4 ,in this use of the hypothesis it appears in the rle of predicate in a judgment of which the data1 or facts1 to be construed constitute the subject4 ,in his attempts to reduce the movements of the planets about the sun to some general formula1 ,kepler finally hit upon the law since known as ,kepler's law1 viz41 that the squares of the periodic times of the several planets are proportional to the cubes of their mean distances from the sun4 ,this law was first tentatively advanced as a hypothesis4 ,kepler was not certain of its truth till it had proved its claim to acceptance4 ,neither did ,newton have at first any great degree of assurance in regard to his law of gravitation1 and was ready to give it up when he failed in his first attempt to test it by observation of the moon4 ,and the same thing may be said about the caution of ,darwin and other investigators in regard to accepting hypotheses4 ,the only reason for their extreme care in not accepting at once their tentative formulations or suggestions was the fear that some other explanation might be the correct one4 ,this rejection of other possibilities is the negative side of the matter4 ,we become confident that our hypothesis is the right one as we lose confidence in other possible explanations2 and it might be added1 without falling into a circle1 that we lose confidence in the other possibilities as we become more convinced of our hypothesis4 ,it appears that such may be the relation of the positive and negative sides in case of such elaborate hypotheses as those of ,kepler and ,newton2 but is it true where our hypotheses are more simple8 ,it is not easy to understand why the fact that the hypothesis is more simple1 and the time required for its formulation and test a good deal shorter1 should materially change the state of affairs4 ,the question remains3 ,why1 if there is no opposition1 should there be any uncertainty8 ,in all instances1 then1 the hypothesis appears as one among other possible predicates which may be applied to our data taken as subject-matter of a judgment4 ,the predicate as hypothesis4--,suppose1 then1 the hypothesis is a predicate2 is the predicate necessarily a hypothesis8 ,this is the next question we are called upon to answer1 and1 since the predicate cannot very well be taken aside from the judgment1 our question involves the nature of the judgment4 ,while it will not be necessary to give a very complete account of the various definitions of the judgment that might be adduced1 still the mention of a few of the more prominent ones may serve to indicate that something further is needed4 ,in definitions of the judgment sometimes the subjective side is emphasized1 sometimes the objective side1 and in other instances there are attempts to combine the two4 ,for instance1 ,lotze regards the judgment as the idea of a unity or relation between two concepts1 with the further implication that this connection holds true of the object referred to4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill says that every proposition either affirms or denies existence1 coexistence1 sequence1 causation1 or resemblance4 ,trendelenburg regards the judgment as a form of thought which corresponds to the real connection of things1 while ,ueberweg states the case a little differently1 and says that the essence of judgment consists in recognizing the objective validity of a subjective connection of ideas4 ,royce points to a process of imitation and holds that in the judgment we try to portray by means of the ideas that enter into it4 ,ideas are imitative in their nature4 ,sigwart's view of the judgment is that in it we say something about something4 ,with him the judgment is a synthetic process1 while ,wundt considers its nature analytic and holds that1 instead of uniting1 or combining1 concepts into a whole1 it separates them out of a total idea or presentation4 ,instead of blending parts into a whole1 it separates the whole into its constituent parts4 ,bradley and ,bosanquet both hold that in the judgment an ideal content comes into relation with reality4 ,bradley says that in every judgment reality is qualified by an idea1 which is symbolic4 ,the ideal content is recognized as such1 and is referred to a reality beyond the act4 ,this is the essence of judgment4 ,bosanquet seems to perceive a closer relation between idea and reality1 for although he says that judgment is the intellectual function which defines reality by significant ideas1 he also tells us that the subject is both in and out of the judgment1 as ,reality is both in and out of my consciousness4 ,in all these definitions of judgment the predicate appears as ideal4 ,an ideal content is predicated of something1 whether we regard this something as an idea or as reality beyond1 or as reality partly within and partly without the act of judging2 and it is ideal whether we consider it as one of the three parts into which judgments are usually divided1 or whether we say1 with ,bosanquet and ,bradley1 that subject1 predicate1 and copula all taken together form a single ideal content1 which is somehow applied to reality4 ,moreover1 we not only judge about reality1 but it seems to be quite immaterial to reality whether we judge concerning it or not4 ,many of our judgments prove false4 ,not only do we err in our judgments1 but we often hesitate in making them for fear of being wrong2 we feel there are other possibilities1 and our predication becomes tentative4 ,here we have something very like the hypothesis1 for our ideal content shows itself to be a tentative attempt in the presence of alternatives to qualify and systematize reality4 ,it appears1 then1 on the basis of the views of the judgment that have been mentioned1 that not only do we find the hypothesis taking its place as the predicate of a judgment1 but the predicate is itself essentially of the nature of a hypothesis4 ,in the views of the judgment so far brought out1 reality1 with which it is generally admitted that the judgment attempts to deal in some way1 appears to lie outside the act of judging4 ,now1 everyone would say that we make some advance in judging1 and that we have a better grasp of things after than before4 ,but how is this possible if reality lies without or beyond our act of judging8 ,is the reality we now have the same that we had to begin with8 ,if so1 then we have made no advance as far as the real itself is concerned4 ,if merely our conception of it has changed1 then it is not clear why we may not be even worse off than before4 ,if reality does lie beyond our judgment1 then how1 in the nature of the case1 can we ever know whether we have approached it or have gone still farther away8 ,to make any claim of approximation implies that we do reach reality in some measure1 at least1 and1 if so1 it is difficult to understand how it lies beyond1 and is independent of1 the act of judging4 ,further analysis of judgment4--,it remains to be seen whether a further investigation of the judgment will still show the predicate to be a hypothesis4 ,it is evident that in some cases the judgment appears at the end of a more or less pronounced reflective process1 during which other possible judgments have suggested themselves1 but have been rejected4 ,the history of scientific discovery is filled with cases which illustrate the nature of the process by which a new theory is developed4 ,for instance1 in ,darwin's ,formation of ,vegetable ,mould through the ,action of ,earth ,worms1 we find the record of successive steps in the development of his hypothesis4 ,darwin suspected from his observations that vegetable mold was due to some agency which was not yet determined4 ,he reasoned that if vegetable mold is the result of the life-habits of earthworms1 i4 e41 if earth is brought up by them from beneath the surface and afterward spread out by wind and rain1 then small objects lying on the surface of the ground would tend to disappear gradually below the surface4 ,facts seemed to support his theory1 for layers of red sand1 pieces of chalk1 and stones were found to have disappeared below the surface in a greater or less degree4 ,a common explanation had been that heavy objects tend to sink in soft soil through their own weight1 but the earthworm hypothesis led to a more careful examination of the data4 ,it was found that the weight of the object and the softness of the ground made no marked difference1 for sand and light objects sank1 and the ground was not always soft4 ,in general1 it was shown that where earthworms were found vegetable mold was also present1 and vice versa4 ,in this investigation of ,darwin's the conflicting explanations of sinking stones appear within the main question of the formation of vegetable mold by earthworms4 ,the facts that disagreed with the old theory about sinking stones were approached through this new one4 ,but the theories had something in common1 viz41 the disappearance of the stones or other objects3 they differed in their further determination of this disappearance4 ,in this case it may seem as if the facts which were opposed to the current theory of sinking stones were seen to be discrepant only after the earthworm hypothesis had been advanced2 the conflict between the new facts and the old theory appears to have arisen through the influence of the new theory4 ,there are cases1 however1 where the facts seem clearly to contradict the old theory and thus give rise to a new one4 ,for example1 we find in ,darwin's introduction to his ,origin of ,species the following3 ,in considering the origin of species it is quite conceivable that a naturalist reflecting on the mental affinities of organic beings1 on their embryological relations1 their geographical distribution1 geological succession1 and other such facts1 might come to the conclusion that species had not been independently created but had descended1 like varieties1 from other species4 ,it would seem from this statement that certain data were found for which the older theory of independent creation did not offer an adequate explanation4 ,and yet the naturalist would hardly reflect on all these topics in a comparative way unless some other mode of interpretation were already dawning upon him1 which led him to review the accepted reflections or views4 ,as a more simple illustration1 we may cite the common experience of a person who is uncertain concerning the identity of an approaching object1 say1 another person4 ,at first he may not be sure it is a person at all4 ,he then sees that it is someone1 and as the person approaches he is inclined to believe him to be an acquaintance4 ,as the supposed acquaintance continues to approach1 the observer may distinguish certain features that cause him to doubt1 and then relinquish his supposition that it is an acquaintance4 ,or1 he may conclude at once that the approaching person is another individual he knows1 and the transition may be so readily made from one to the other that it would be difficult to determine whether the discordant features are discordant before the new supposition arises1 or whether they are not recognized as conflicting till this second person is in mind4 ,or1 again1 the identification of the new individual and the discovery of the features that are in conflict with the first supposition may appear to go on together4 ,now1 marked lines of likeness appear between this relatively simple judgment and the far more involved ones of scientific research4 ,in the more extended scientific process we find data contradicting an old theory and a new hypothesis arising to account for them4 ,the hypothesis is tested1 and along with its verification we have the rejection1 or rather the modification1 of the old theory4 ,similarly1 in case of the approaching stranger all these features are present1 though in less pronounced degree4 ,in scientific investigation there is an interval of testing by means of more careful consideration of the data and even actual experimentation4 ,before an explanation is accepted subject to test1 a number of others may have been suggested and rejected4 ,they may not have received even explicit recognition4 ,in case of the identification of the stranger this feature is also present4 ,between two fairly definite attempts to identify the mind does not remain a mere blank or stationary1 but other possible identifications may be suggested which do not have sufficient plausibility to command serious attention2 they are only comparatively brief suggestions or tendencies4 ,it is to be noted that in all these instances the first supposition was not entirely abandoned1 but was modified and more exactly determined4 7,why it could not be wholly false and the new one wholly new1 will be considered later in connection with discussion of the persistence and re-formation of habit47 ,there was such a modification of the old theory as would meet the requirements of the new data1 and the new explanations thus contained both old and new features4 ,we have seen that the predicate of the scientific judgment is a hypothesis which is consciously applied to certain data4 ,if the similarity between the scientific judgment and the more immediate and simple judgment is to be maintained1 it is clear that the predicate of the simple judgment must be of like nature4 ,the structure of the two varieties of judgment differs only in the degree of explicitness which the hypothesis acquires4 ,that is1 the predicate of a judgment1 as such1 is ideal2 it is meaning1 significant quality4 ,if conditions are such as to make the one judging hesitant or doubtful the mind wavers2 the predicate is not applied at once to the determination or qualification of data1 and hence comes to more distinct consciousness on its own account4 ,from being ideal1 it becomes an idea4 ,yet its sole purpose and value remains in its possible use to interpret data4 ,let the idea remain detached1 and let the query whether it be a true predicate 7i4 e41 really fit to be employed in determining the present data7 become more critical1 and the idea becomes clearly a hypothesis4#eg ,in other words1 the hypothesis is just the predicate-function of judgment definitely apprehended and regarded with reference to its nature and adequacy4 ,psychological analysis of judgment4--,this hypothetical nature of the predicate will be even more apparent after a further psychological analysis1 which1 while applying more directly to the simpler and more immediate judgments1 may be extended to the more involved ones as well4 ,in psychological terms1 we may say1 in explanation of the judging process1 that some stimulus to action has failed to function properly as a stimulus1 and that the activity which was going on has thus been interrupted4 ,response in the accustomed way has failed4 ,in such a case there arises a division in experience into sensation content as subject and ideal content as predicate4 ,in other words1 an activity has been going on in accordance with established habits1 but upon failure of the accustomed stimulus to be longer an adequate stimulus this particular activity ceases1 and is resumed in an integral form only when a new habit is set up to which the new or altered stimulus is adequate4 ,it is in this process of reconstruction that subject and predicate appear4 ,sensory quality marks the point of stress1 or seeming arrest1 while the ideal or imaged aspect defines the continuing activity as projected1 and hence that with which start is to be made in coping with the obstacle4 ,it serves as standpoint of regard and mode of indicated behavior4 ,the sensation stands for the interrupted habit1 while the image stands for the new habit1 that is1 the new way of dealing with the subject-matter4#eh ,it appears1 then1 that the purpose of the judgment is to obtain an adequate stimulus in that1 when stimulus and response are adjusted to each other1 activity will be resumed4 ,but if this reconstruction and response were to follow at once1 would there be any clearly defined act of judging at all8 ,in such a case there would be no judgment1 properly speaking1 and no occasion for it4 ,there would be simply a ready transition from one line of activity to another2 we should have changed our method of reaction easily and readily to meet the new requirements4 ,on the one hand1 our subject-matter would not have become a clearly recognized datum with which we must deal2 on the other hand1 there would be no ideal method of construing it4#ei ,activity would have changed without interruption1 and neither subject nor predicate would have arisen4 ,in order that judgment may take place there must be interruption and suspense4 ,under what conditions1 then1 is this suspense and uncertainty possible8 ,our reply must be that we hesitate because of more or less sharply defined alternatives2 we are not sure which predicate1 which method of reaction1 is the right one4 ,the clearness with which these alternatives come to mind depends upon the degree of explicitness of the judgment1 or1 more exactly1 the explicitness of the judgment depends upon the sharpness of these alternatives4 ,alternatives may be carefully weighed one against the other1 as in deliberative judgments2 or they may be scarcely recognized as alternatives1 as in the case in the greater portion of our more simple judgments of daily conduct4 ,the predicate is essentially hypothetical4--,if we review in a brief rsum the types of judgment we have considered1 we find in the explicit scientific judgment a fairly well-defined subject-matter which we seek further to determine4 ,different suggestions present themselves with varying degrees of plausibility4 ,some are passed by as soon as they arise4 ,others gain a temporary recognition4 ,some are explicitly tested with resulting acceptance or rejection4 ,the acceptance of any one explanation involves the rejection of some other explanation4 ,during the process of verification or test the newly advanced supposition is recognized to be more or less doubtful4 ,besides the hypothesis which is tentatively applied there is recognized the possibility of others4 ,in the disjunctive judgment these possible reactions are thought to be limited to certain clearly defined alternatives1 while in the less explicit judgments they are not so clearly brought out4 ,throughout the various forms of judgment1 from the most complex and deliberate down to the most simple and immediate1 we found that a process could be traced which was like in kind and varied only in degree4 ,and1 finally1 in the most immediate judgments where some of these features seem to disappear1 the same account not only appears to be the most reasonable one1 but there is the additional consideration1 from the psychological side1 that were not the judgment of this doubtful1 tentative character1 it would be difficult to understand how there could be judgment as distinct from a reflex4 ,it appears1 then1 that throughout1 the predicate is essentially of the nature of a hypothesis for dealing with the subject-matter4 ,and1 however simple and immediate1 or however involved and prolonged1 the judgment may be1 it is to be regarded as essentially a process of reconstruction which aims at the resumption of an interrupted experience2 and when experience has become itself a consciously intellectual affair1 at the restoration of a unified objective situation4 ,,ii ,criticism of certain views concerning the hypothesis4--,the explanation we have given of the hypothesis will enable us to criticise the treatment it has received from the empirical and the rationalistic schools4 ,we shall endeavor to point out that these schools have1 in spite of their opposed views1 an assumption in common--something given in a fixed1 or non-instrumental way2 and that consequently the hypothesis is either impossible or else futile4 ,bacon is commonly recognized as a leader in the reactionary inductive movement1 which arose with the decline of scholasticism1 and will serve as a good example of the extreme empirical position4 ,in place of authority and the deductive method1 ,bacon advocated a return to nature and induction from data given through observation4 ,the new method which he advanced has both a positive and a negative side4 ,before any positive steps can be taken1 the mind must be cleared of the various false opinions and prejudices that have been acquired4 ,this preliminary task of freeing the mind from phantoms1 or eidola1 which ,bacon likened to the cleansing of the threshing-floor1 having been accomplished1 nature should be carefully interrogated4 ,there must be no hasty generalization1 for the true method collects axioms from sense and particulars1 ascending continuously and by degrees1 so that in the end it arrives at the most general axioms4 ,these axioms of ,bacon's are generalizations based on observation1 and are to be applied deductively1 but the distinguishing feature of ,bacon's induction is its carefully graduated steps4 ,others1 too1 had proceeded with caution 7for instance ,galileo71 but ,bacon laid more stress than they on the subordination of steps4 ,it is evident that ,bacon left very little room for hypotheses1 and this is in keeping with his aversion to anticipation of nature by means of phantoms of any sort2 he even said explicitly that our method of discovery in science is of such a nature that there is not much left to acuteness and strength of genius1 but all degrees of genius and intellect are brought nearly to the same level4#fj ,bacon gave no explanation of the function of the hypothesis2 in his opinion it had no lawful place in scientific procedure and must be banished as a disturbing element4 ,instead of the reciprocal relation between hypothesis and data1 in which hypothesis is not only tested in experience1 but at the same time controls in a measure the very experience which tests it1 ,bacon would have a gradual extraction of general laws from nature through direct observation4 ,he is so afraid of the distorting influence of conception that he will have nothing to do with conception upon any terms4 ,so fearful is he of the influence of pre-judgment1 of prejudice1 that he will have no judging which depends upon ideas1 since the idea involves anticipation of the fact4 ,particulars are somehow to arrange and classify themselves1 and to record or register1 in a mind free from conception1 certain generalizations4 ,ideas are to be registered derivatives of the given particulars4 ,this view is the essence of empiricism as a logical theory4 ,if the views regarding the logic of thought before set forth are correct1 it goes without saying that such empiricism is condemned to self-contradiction4 ,it endeavors to construct judgment in terms of its subject alone2 and the subject1 as we have seen1 is always a co-respondent to a predicate--an idea or mental attitude or tendency of intellectual determination4 ,thus the subject of judgment can be determined only with reference to a corresponding determination of the predicate4 ,subject and predicate1 fact and idea1 are contemporaneous1 not serial in their relations 7see pp4 #aaj-ab74 ,less technically the failure of ,bacon's denial of the worth of hypothesis--which is in such exact accord with empiricism in logic--shows itself in his attitude toward experimentation and toward observation4 ,bacon's neglect of experimentation is not an accidental oversight1 but is bound up with his view regarding the worthlessness of conception or anticipation4 ,to experiment means to set out from an idea as well as from facts1 and to try to construe1 or even to discover1 facts in accordance with the idea4 ,experimentation not only anticipates1 but strives to make good an anticipation4 ,of course1 this struggle is checked at every point by success or failure1 and thus the hypothesis is continuously undergoing in varying ratios both confirmation and transformation4 ,but this is not to make the hypothesis secondary to the fact4 ,it is simply to remain true to the proposition that the distinction and the relationship of the two is a thoroughly contemporaneous one4 ,but it is impossible to draw any fixed line between experimentation and scientific observations4 ,to insist upon the need of systematic observation and collection of particulars is to set up a principle which is as distinct from the casual accumulation of impressions as it is from nebulous speculation4 ,if there is to be observation of a directed sort1 it must be with reference to some problem1 some doubt1 and this1 as we have seen1 is a stimulus which throws the mind into a certain attitude of response4 ,controlled observation is inquiry1 it is search2 consequently it must be search for something4 ,nature cannot answer interrogations excepting as such interrogations are put2 and the putting of a question involves anticipation4 ,the observer does not inquire about anything or look for anything excepting as he is after something4 ,this search implies at once the incompleteness of the particular given facts1 and the possibility--that is ideal--of their completion4 ,it was not long until the development of natural science compelled a better understanding of its actual procedure than ,bacon possessed4 ,empiricism changed to experimentalism4 ,with experimentalism inevitably came the recognition of hypotheses in observing1 collecting1 and comparing facts4 ,it is clear1 for instance1 that ,newton's fruitful investigations are not conducted in accordance with the ,baconian notion4 ,it is quite clear that his celebrated four rules for philosophizing#fa are in truth statements of certain principles which are to be observed in forming hypotheses4 ,they imply that scientific technique had advanced to a point where hypotheses were such regular and indispensable factors that certain uniform conditions might be laid down for their use4 ,the fourth rule in particular is a statement of the relative validity of hypothesis as such until there is ground for entertaining a contrary hypothesis4 ,the subsequent history of logical theory in ,england is conditioned upon its attempt to combine into one system the theories of empiristic logic with recognition of the procedure of experimental science4 ,this attempt finds its culmination in the logic of ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,of his interest in and fidelity to the actual procedure of experimental science1 as he saw it1 there can be no doubt4 ,of his good faith in concluding his ,introduction with the words following there can be no doubt3 ,i can conscientiously affirm that no one proposition laid down in this work has been adopted for the sake of establishing1 or with any reference for its fitness in being employed in establishing1 preconceived opinions in any department of knowledge or of inquiry on which the speculative world is still undecided4 ,yet ,mill was equally attached to the belief that ultimate reality1 as it is for the human mind1 is given in sensations1 independent of ideas2 and that all valid ideas are combinations and convenient ways of using such given material4 ,mill's very sincerity made it impossible that this belief should not determine1 at every point1 his treatment of the thinking process and of its various instrumentalities4 ,in ,book ,,iii1 chap4 #ad1 ,mill discusses the logic of explanation1 and in discussing this topic naturally finds it necessary to consider the matter of the proper use of scientific hypotheses4 ,this is conducted from the standpoint of their use as that is reflected in the technique of scientific discovery4 ,in ,book ,,iv1 chap4 #b1 he discusses ,abstraction or the ,formation of ,conceptions--a topic which obviously involves the forming of hypotheses4 ,in this chapter1 his consideration is conducted in terms1 not of scientific procedure1 but of general philosophical theory1 and this point of view is emphasized by the fact that he is opposing a certain view of ,dr4 ,whewell4 ,the contradiction between the statements in the two chapters will serve to bring out the two points already made1 viz41 the correspondent character of datum and hypothesis1 and the origin of the latter in a problematic situation and its consequent use as an instrument of unification and solution4 ,mill first points out that hypotheses are invented to enable the deductive method to be applied earlier to phenomena2 that it does this by suppressing the first of the three steps1 induction1 ratiocination1 and verification4 ,he states that3 ,the process of tracing regularity in any complicated1 and at first sight confused1 set of appearances is necessarily tentative2 we begin by making any supposition1 even a false one1 to see what consequences will follow from it2 and by observing how these differ from the real phenomena1 we learn what corrections to make in our assumption4444 ,neither induction nor deduction would enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena1 if we did not often commence by anticipating the results2 by making a provisional supposition1 at first essentially conjectural1 as to some of the very notions which constitute the final object of the inquiry4#fb ,if in addition we recognize that1 according to ,mill1 our direct experience of nature always presents us with a complicated and confused set of appearances1 we shall be in no doubt as to the importance of ideas as anticipations of a possible experience not yet had4 ,thus he says3 ,the order of nature1 as perceived at a first glance1 presents at every instant a chaos followed by another chaos4 ,we must decompose each chaos into single facts4 ,we must learn to see in the chaotic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents1 in the chaotic consequent a multitude of distinct consequents4#fc ,in the next section of the same chapter he goes on to state that1 having discriminated the various antecedents and consequents1 we then are to inquire which is connected with which4 ,this requires a still further resolution of the complex and of the confused4 ,to effect this we must vary the circumstances2 we must modify the experience as given with reference to accomplishing our purpose4 ,to accomplish this purpose we have recourse either to observation or to experiment3 ,we may either find an instance in nature suited to our purposes1 or1 by an artificial arrangement of circumstances1 make one 7the italics in suited to our purpose are mine2 the others are ,mill's74 ,he then goes on to say that there is no real logical distinction between observation and experimentation4 ,the four methods of experimental inquiry are expressly discussed by ,mill in terms of their worth in singling out and connecting the antecedents and consequents which actually belong together1 from the chaos and confusion of direct experience4 ,we have only to take these statements in their logical connection with each other 7and this connection runs through the entire treatment by ,mill of scientific inquiry71 to recognize the absolute necessity of hypothesis to undertaking any directed inquiry or scientific operation4 ,consequently we are not surprised at finding him saying that the function of hypotheses is one which must be reckoned absolutely indispensable in science2 and again that the hypothesis by suggesting observations and experiments puts us on the road to independent evidence4#fd ,since ,mill's virtual retraction1 from the theoretical point of view1 of what is here said from the standpoint of scientific procedure1 regarding the necessity of ideas is an accompaniment of his criticism of ,whewell1 it will put the discussion in better perspective if we turn first to ,whewell's views4#fe ,the latter began by stating a distinction which easily might have been developed into a theory of the relation of fact and idea which is in line with that advanced in this chapter1 and indeed in this volume as a whole4 ,he questions 7chap4 #b7 the fixity of the distinction between theory and practice4 ,he points out that what we term facts are in effect simply accepted inferences2 and that what we call theories are describable as facts1 in proportion as they become thoroughly established4 ,a true theory is a fact4 ,all the great theories which have successively been established in the world are now thought of as facts4 ,the most recondite theories when firmly established are accepted as facts2 the simplest facts seem to involve something of the nature of theory4 ,the conclusion is that the distinction is a historic one1 depending upon the state of knowledge at the time1 and upon the attitude of the individual4 ,what is theory for one epoch1 or for one inquirer in a given epoch1 is fact for some other epoch1 or even for some other more advanced inquirer in the same epoch4 ,it is theory when the element of inference involved in judging any fact is consciously brought out2 it is fact when the conditions are such that we have never been led to question the inference involved1 or else1 having questioned it1 have so thoroughly examined into the inferential process that there is no need of holding it further before the mind1 and it relapses into unconsciousness again4 ,if this greater or less consciousness of our own internal act be all that distinguishes fact from theory1 we must allow that the distinction is still untenable 7untenable1 that is to say1 as a fixed separation74 ,again1 fact and theory have no essential difference except in the degree of their certainty and familiarity4 ,theory1 when it becomes firmly established and steadily lodged in the mind becomes fact4 7,p4 #de2 italics mine47 ,and1 of course1 it is equally true that as fast as facts are suspected or doubted1 certain aspects of them are transferred into the class of theories and even of mere opinions4 ,i say this conception might have been developed in a way entirely congruous with the position of this chapter4 ,this would have happened if the final distinction between fact and idea had been formulated upon the basis simply of the points1 relative certainty and familiarity4 ,from this point of view the distinction between fact and idea is one purely relative to the doubt-inquiry function4 ,it has to do with the evolution of an experience as regards its conscious surety4 ,it has its origin in problematic situations4 ,whatever appears to us as a problem appears as contrasted with a possible solution4 ,whatever objects of thought refer particularly to the problematic side are theories1 ideas1 hypotheses2 whatever relates to the solution side is surety1 unquestioned familiarity1 fact4 ,this point of view makes the distinctions entirely relative to the exigencies of the process of reflective transformation of experience4 ,whewell1 however1 had no sooner started in this train of thought than he turns his back upon it4 ,in chap4 #c he transforms what he had proclaimed to be a relative1 historic1 and working distinction into a fixed and absolute one4 ,he distinguishes between sensations and ideas1 not upon a genetic basis with reference to establishing the conditions of further operation2 but with reference to a fundamentally fixed line of demarkation between what is passively given to the mind and the activity put forth by the mind4 ,thus he reinstates in its most generalized and fixed1 and therefore most vicious1 form the separation which he has just rejected4 ,sensations are a brute unchangeable element of fact which exists and persists independent of ideas2 an idea is a mode of mental operation which occurs and recurs in an independent individuality of its own4 ,if he had carried out the line of thought with which he began1 sensation as fact would have been that residuum of familiarity and certainty which cannot be eliminated1 however much else of an experience is dissolved in the inner conflict4 ,idea as hypothesis or theory would have been the corresponding element in experience which is necessary to redintegrate this residuum into a coherent and significant experience4 ,but since ,whewell did not follow out his own line of thought1 choosing rather to fall back on the ,kantian antithesis of sense and thought1 he had no sooner separated his fact and idea1 his given datum and his mental relation1 than he is compelled to get them together again4 ,the idea becomes a general relation which is imposed upon perception by an act of the mind1 and which is different from anything which our senses directly offer to us 7p4 #bf74 ,such conceptions are necessary to connect the facts which we learn from our senses into truths4 ,the ideal conception which the mind itself supplies is superinduced upon the facts as they are originally presented to observation4 ,before the inductive truth is detected1 the facts are there1 but they are many and unconnected4 ,the conception which the discoverer applies to them gives them connection and unity4 7,p4 #db47 ,all induction1 according to ,whewell1 thus depends upon superinduction--imposition upon sensory data of certain ideas or general relations existing independently in the mind4#ff ,we do not need to present again the objections already offered to this view3 the impossibility of any orderly stimulation of ideas by facts1 and the impossibility of any check in the imposition of idea upon fact4 ,facts and conception are so thoroughly separate and independent that any sensory datum is indifferently and equally related to any conceivable idea4 ,there is no basis for superinducing one idea or hypothesis1 rather than any other1 upon any particular set of data4 ,in the chapter already referred to upon abstraction1 or the formation of conceptions1 ,mill seizes upon this difficulty4 ,yet he and ,whewell have one point in common3 they both agree in the existence of a certain subject-matter which is given for logical purposes quite outside of the logical process itself4 ,mill agrees with ,whewell in postulating a raw material of pure sensational data4 ,in criticising ,whewell's theory of superinduction of idea upon fact1 he is therefore led to the opposite assertion of the complete dependence of ideas as such upon the given facts as such--in other words1 he is led to a reiteration of the fundamental ,baconian empiricism2 and thus to a virtual retraction of what he had asserted regarding the necessity of ideas to fruitful scientific inquiry1 whether in the way of observation or experimentation4 ,the following quotation gives a fair notion of the extent of ,mill's retraction3 ,the conceptions then which we employ for the colligation and methodization of facts1 do not develop themselves from within1 but are impressed upon the mind from without2 they are never obtained otherwise than by way of comparison and abstraction1 and1 in the most important and most numerous cases1 are evolved by abstraction from the very phenomena which it is their office to colligate4#fg ,even here ,mill's sense for the positive side of scientific inquiry suffices to reveal to him that the facts are somehow inadequate and defective1 and are in need of assistance from ideas--and yet the ideas which are to help out the facts are to be the impress of the unsure facts6 ,the contradiction comes out very clearly when ,mill says3 ,the really difficult cases are those in which the conception destined to create light and order out of darkness and confusion has to be sought for among the very phenomena which it afterward serves to arrange4#fh ,of course1 there is a sense in which ,mill's view is very much nearer the truth than is ,whewell's4 ,mill at least sees that idea must be relevant to the facts or data which it is to arrange1 which are to have light and order introduced into them by means of the idea4 ,he sees clearly enough that this is impossible save as the idea develops within the same experience in which the dark and confused facts are presented4 ,he goes on to show correctly enough how conflicting data lead the mind to a confused feeling of an analogy between the data of the confused experience and of some other experience which is orderly 7or already colligated and methodized72 and how this vague feeling1 through processes of further exploration and comparison of experiences1 gets a clearer and more adequate form until we finally accept it4 ,he shows how in this process we continually judge of the worth of the idea which is in process of formation1 by reference to its appropriateness to our purpose4 ,he goes so far as to say3 ,the question of appropriateness is relative to the particular object we have in view4#fi ,he sums up his discussion by stating3 ,we cannot frame good general conceptions beforehand4 ,that the conception we have obtained is the one we want can only be known when we have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it4#gj ,this all describes the actual state of the case1 but it is consistent only with a logical theory which makes the distinction between fact and hypothesis instrumental in the transformation of experience from a confused into an organized form2 not with ,mill's notion that sensations are somehow finally and completely given as ultimate facts1 and that ideas are mere re-registrations of such facts4 ,it is perfectly just to say that the hypothesis is impressed upon the mind 7in the sense that any notion which occurs to the mind is impressed7 in the course of an experience4 ,it is well enough1 if one define what he means1 to say that the hypothesis is impressed 7that is to say1 occurs or is suggested7 through the medium of given facts1 or even of sensations4 ,but it is equally true that the facts are presented and that sensations occur within the course of an experience which is larger than the bare facts1 because involving the conflicts among them and the corresponding intention to treat them in some fashion which will secure a unified experience4 ,facts get power to suggest ideas to the mind--to impress--only through their position in an entire experience which is in process of disintegration and of reconstruction--their fringe or feeling of tendency is quite as factual as they are4 ,the fact that the conception we have obtained is the one we want can be known only when we have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it1 is enough to show that it is not bare facts1 but facts in relation to want and purpose and purpose in relation to facts1 which originate the hypothesis4 ,it would be interesting to follow the history of discussion of the hypothesis since the time of ,whewell and of ,mill1 particularly in the writings of ,jevons1 ,venn1 and ,bosanquet4 ,this history would refine the terms of our discussion by introducing more complex distinctions and relations4 ,but it would be found1 ,i think1 only to refine1 not to introduce any fundamentally new principles4 ,in each case1 we find the writer struggling with the necessity of distinguishing between fact and idea2 of giving the fact a certain primacy with respect to testing of idea and of giving the idea a primacy with respect to the significance and orderliness of the fact2 and of holding throughout to a relationship of idea with fact so intimate that the idea develops only by being compared with facts 7that is1 used in construing them71 and facts get to be known only as they are connected through the idea--and we find that what is a maze of paradoxes and inconsistencies from an absolute1 from a non-historic standpoint1 is a matter of course the moment it is looked at from the standpoint of experience engaged in self-transformation of meaning through conflict and reconstitution4 ,but we can only note one or two points4 ,jevons's infinite ballot-box of nature which is absolutely neutral as to any particular conception or idea1 and which accordingly requires as its correlate the formation of every possible hypothesis 7all standing in themselves upon the same level of probability7 is an interesting example of the logical consequences of feeling the need of both fact and hypothesis for scientific procedure and yet regarding them as somehow arising independently of each other4 ,it is an attempt to combine extreme empiricism and extreme rationalism4 ,the process of forming hypotheses and of deducing their rational consequences goes on at random1 because the disconnectedness of facts as given is so ultimate that the facts suggest one hypothesis no more readily than another4 ,mathematics1 in its two forms of measurements as applied to the facts1 and of calculation as applied in deduction1 furnishes ,jevons the bridge by which he finally covers the gulf which he has first himself created4 ,venn's theory requires little or no restatement to bring it into line with the position taken in the text4 ,he holds to the origin of hypothesis in the original practical needs of mankind1 and to its gradual development into present scientific form4#ga ,he states expressly3 ,the distinction between what is known and what is not known is essential to ,logic1 and peculiarly characteristic of it in a degree not to be found in any other science4 ,inference is the process of passing from one to the other2 from facts which we had accepted as premises1 to those which we have not yet accepted1 but are in the act of doing so by the very process in question4 ,no scrutiny of the facts themselves1 regarded as objective1 can ever detect these characteristics of their greater or less familiarity to our minds4 ,we must introduce also the subjective element if we wish to give any adequate explanation of them4#gb ,venn1 however1 does not attempt a thoroughgoing statement of logical distinctions1 relations1 and operations1 as parts of the act of passing from the unknown to the known4 ,he recognizes the relation of reflection to a historic process1 which we have here termed reconstruction1 and the origin and worth of hypothesis as a tool in the movement1 but does not carry his analysis to a systematic form4 ,,iii ,origin of the hypothesis4--,in our analysis of the process of judgment1 we attempted to show that the predicate arises in case of failure of some line of activity going on in terms of an established habit4 ,when the old habit is checked through failure to deal with new conditions 7i4 e41 when the situation is such as to stimulate two habits with distinct aims7 the problem is to find a new method of response--that is1 to co-ordinate the conflicting tendencies by building up a single aim which will function the existing situation4 ,as we saw that1 in case of judgment1 habit when checked became ideal1 an idea1 so the new habit is first formalized as an ideal type of reaction and is the hypothesis by which we attempt to construe new data4 ,in our inquiry as to how this formulation is effected1 i4 e41 how the hypothesis is developed1 it will be convenient to take some of the currently accepted statements as to their origin1 and show how these statements stand in reference to the analysis proposed4 ,enumerative induction and allied processes4--,it is pointed out by ,welton#gc that the various ways in which hypotheses are suggested may be reduced to three classes1 viz41 enumerative induction1 conversion of propositions1 and analogy4 ,under the head of enumeration he reminds us that every observed regularity of connection between phenomena suggests a question as to whether it is universal4 ,there are numerous instances of this in mathematics4 ,for example1 it is noticed that #acbb1 #acecb1 #acegdb1 etc42 and one is led to ask whether there is any general principle involved1 so that the sum of the first n odd numbers will be n#b1 where n is any number1 however great4 ,in this early form of inductive inference there are two divergent tendencies4 ,one is the tendency to complete enumeration4 ,this tendency is clearly ideal--it transcends the facts as given4 ,to look for all the cases is thus itself an experimental inquiry1 based upon a hypothesis which it endeavors to test4 ,but in most cases enumeration can be only incomplete1 and we are able to reach nothing better than probability4 ,hence the other tendency in the direction of an analysis of content in search for a principle of connection in the elements in any one case4 ,for if a characteristic belonging to a number of individuals suggests a class where it belongs to all individuals1 it must be that it is found in every individual as such4 ,the hypothesis of complete class involves a hypothesis as to the character of each individual in the class4 ,thus a hypothesis as to extension transforms itself into one as to intension4 ,but it is analogy which ,welton considers the chief source from which new hypotheses are drawn4 ,in the second tendency mentioned under enumerative induction1 that is1 the tendency to analysis of content or intension1 we are naturally led to analogy1 for in our search for the characteristic feature which determines classification among the concrete particulars our first step will be an inference by analogy4 ,in analogy attention is turned from the number of observed instances to their character1 and1 because particulars have some feature in common1 they are supposed to be the same in still other respects4 ,while the best we can reach in analogy is probability1 the arguments may be such as to result in a high degree of certainty4 ,the form of the argument is valuable in so far as we are able to distinguish between essential and nonessential characteristics on which to base our analogy4 ,what is essential and what nonessential depends upon the particular end we have in view4 ,in addition to enumerative induction1 which ,welton has mentioned1 it is to be noted that there are a number of other processes which are very similar to it in that a number of particulars appear to furnish a basis for a general principle or method4 ,such instances are common in induction1 in instruction1 and in methods of proof4 ,if one is to be instructed in some new kind of labor1 he is supposed to acquire a grasp of the method after having been shown in a few instances how this particular work is to be done2 and1 if he performs the manipulations himself1 so much the better4 ,it is not asked why the experience of a few cases should be of any assistance1 for it seems self-evident that an experienced man1 a man who has acquired the skill1 or knack1 of doing things1 should deal better with all other cases of similar nature4 ,there is something very similar in inductive proofs1 as they are called4 ,the inductive proof is common in algebra4 ,suppose we are concerned in proving the law of expansion of the binomial theorem4 ,we show by actual calculation that1 if the law holds good for the nth power1 it is true for the nfirst power4 ,that is1 if it holds for any power1 it holds for the next also4 ,but we can easily show that it does hold for1 say1 the second power4 ,then it must be true for the third1 and hence for the fourth1 and so on4 ,whether this law1 though discovered by inductive processes1 depends on deduction for the conclusiveness of its proof1 as ,jevons holds2#gd whether1 as ,erdmann#ge contends1 the proof is thoroughly deductive2 or whether ,wundt#gf is right in maintaining that it is based on an exact analogy1 while the fundamental axioms of mathematics are inductive1 it is clear that in such proofs a few instances are employed to give the learner a start in the right direction4 ,something suggests itself1 and is found true in this case1 in the next1 and again in the next1 and so on4 ,it may be questioned whether there is usually a very clear notion of what is involved in the so on4 ,to many it appears to mark the point where1 after having been taken a few steps1 the learner is carried on by the acquired momentum somewhat after the fashion of one of ,newton's laws of motion4 ,whether the few successive steps are an integral part of the proof or merely serve as illustration1 they are very generally resorted to4 ,in fact1 they are often employed where there is no attempt to introduce a general term such as n1 or k1 or l1 but the few individual instances are deemed quite sufficient4 ,such1 for instance1 is the custom in arithmetical processes4 ,we call attention to these facts in order to show that successive cases are utilized in the course of explanation as an aid in establishing the generality of a law4 ,in geometry we find a class of proofs in which the successive steps seem to have great significance4 ,a common proof of the area of the circle will serve as a fair example4 ,a regular polygon is circumscribed about the circle4 ,then as the number of its sides are increased its area will approach that of the circle1 as its perimeter approaches the circumference of the circle4 ,the area of the circle is thus inferred to be pi,r#b1 since the area of the polygon is always 7#a_/b7,r perimeter1 and in case of the circle the circumference #bpi,r4 ,here again we get under such headway by means of the polygon that we arrive at the circle with but little difficulty4 ,had we attempted the transition at once1 say1 from a circumscribed square1 we should doubtless have experienced some uncertainty and might have recoiled from what would seem a rash attempt2 but as the number of the sides of our polygon approach infinity--that mysterious realm where many paradoxical things become possible--the transition becomes so easy that our polygon is often said to have truly become a circle4 ,similarly1 some statements of the infinitesimal calculus rest on the assumption that slight degrees of difference may be neglected4 ,though the more modern theory of limits has largely displaced this attitude in calculus and has also changed the method of proof in such geometrical problems as the area of the circle1 the underlying motive seems to have been to make transitions easy1 and thus to make possible a continued application of some particular method or way of dealing with things4 ,but granted that this is all true1 what has it to do with the origin of the hypothesis8 ,it seems likely that the hypothesis may be suggested by a few successive instances2 but are these to be classed with the successive steps in proof to which we have referred8 ,in the first place1 we attempt to prove our hypothesis because we are not sure it is true2 we are not satisfied that there are no other tenable hypotheses4 ,but if we do test it1 is not such test enough8 ,it depends upon how thorough a grasp we have of the situation2 but1 in general1 each test case adds to its probability4 ,the value of tests lies in the fact that they strengthen and tend to confirm our hypothesis by checking the force of alternatives4 ,one instance is not sufficient because there are other possible incipient hypotheses1 or more properly tendencies1 and the enumeration serves to bring one of these tendencies into prominence in that it diminishes other vague and perhaps subconscious tendencies and strengthens the one which suddenly appears as the mysterious product of genius4 ,the question might arise why the mere repetition of conflicting tendencies would lead to a predominance of one of them4 ,why would they not all remain in conflict and continue to check any positive result8 ,it is probably because there never is any absolute equilibrium4 ,the successive instances tend to intensify and bring into prominence some tendency which is already taking a lead1 so to speak4 ,and it may be said further in this connection that only as seen from the outside1 only as a mechanical view is taken1 does there appear to be an excluding of definitely made out alternatives4 ,in explanation of the part played by analogy in the origin of hypotheses1 ,welton points out that a mere number of instances do not take us very far1 and that there must be some specification of the instances as well as numbering of them1 and goes on to show that the argument by enumerative induction passes readily into one from analogy1 as soon as attention is turned from the number of the observed instances to their character4 ,it is not necessary1 however1 to pass to analogy through enumerative induction4 ,when the instances presented to observation offer immediately the characteristic marks on which we base the inference to the connection of ,s and ,p1 we can proceed at once to an inference from analogy1 without any preliminary enumeration of the instances4#gg ,welton1 and logicians generally1 regard analogy as an inference on the basis of partial identity4 ,because of certain common features we are led to infer a still greater likeness4 ,both enumerative induction and analogy are explicable in terms of habit4 ,we saw in our examination of enumerative induction that a form of reaction gains strength through a series of successful applications4 ,analogy marks the presence of an identical element together with the tendency to extend this partial identity 7as it is commonly called7 still farther4 ,in other words1 in analogy it is suggested that a type of reaction which is the same in certain respects may be made similar in a greater degree4 ,in enumerative induction we lay stress on the number of instances in which the habit is applied4 ,in analogy we emphasize the content side and take note of the partial identity4 ,in fact1 the relation between enumerative induction and analogy is of the same sort as that existing between association by contiguity and association by similarity4 ,in association by contiguity we think of the things associated as merely standing in certain temporal or spatial relations1 and disregard the fact that they were elements in a larger experience4 ,in case of association by similarity we regard the like feature in the things associated as a basis for further correction4 ,in conversion of propositions we try to reverse the direction of the reaction1 so to speak1 and thereby to free the habit1 to get a mode of response so generalized as to act with a minimum cue4 ,for instance1 we can deal with ,a in a way called ,b1 or1 in other words1 in the same way that we did with other things called ,b4 ,if we say1 ,man is an animal1 then to a certain extent the term animal signifies the way in which we regard man4 ,but the question arises whether we can regard all animals as we do man4 ,evidently not1 for the reaction which is fitting in case of animals would be only partially applicable to man4 ,with the animals that are also men we have the beginning of a habit which1 if unchecked1 would lead to a similar reaction toward all animals1 i4 e41 we would say3 ,all animals are men4 ,man may be said to be the richer concept1 in that only a part of the reaction which determines an object to be a man is required to designate it as an animal4 ,on the other hand1 if we start with animal1 then 7except in case of the animals which are men7 there is lacking the subject-matter which would permit the fuller concept to be applied4 ,by supplying the conditions under which animalman we get a reversible habit4 ,the equation of technical science has just this character4 ,it represents the maximum freeing or abstraction of a predicate qua predicate1 and thereby multiplies the possible applications of it to subjects of future judgments1 and lessens the amount of shearing away of irrelevancies and of re-adaptation necessary when so used in any particular case4 ,formation and test of the hypothesis4--,the formation of the hypothesis is commonly regarded as essentially different from the process of testing1 which it subsequently undergoes4 ,we are said to observe facts1 invent hypotheses1 and then test them4 ,the hypothesis is not required for our preliminary observations2 and some writers1 regarding the hypothesis as a formulation which requires a difficult and elaborate test1 decline to admit as hypotheses those more simple suppositions1 which are readily confirmed or rejected4 ,a very good illustration of this point of view is met with in ,wundt's discussion of the hypothesis1 by an examination of which we hope to show that such distinctions are rather artificial than real4 ,the subject-matter of science1 says ,wundt1#gh is constituted by that which is actually given and that which is actually to be expected4 ,the whole content is not limited to this1 however1 for these facts must be supplemented by certain presuppositions1 which are not given in a factual sense4 ,such presuppositions are called hypotheses and are justified by our fundamental demand for unity4 ,however valuable the hypothesis may be when rightly used1 there is constant danger of illegitimately extending it by additions that spring from mere inclinations of fancy4 ,furthermore1 the hypothesis in this proper scientific sense must be carefully distinguished from the various inaccurate uses1 which are prevalent4 ,for instance1 hypotheses must not be confused with expectations of fact4 ,as cases in point ,wundt mentions ,galileo's suppositions that small vibrations of the pendulum are isochronous1 and that the space traversed by a falling body is proportional to the square of the time it has been falling4 ,it is true that such anticipations play an important part in science1 but so long as they relate to the facts themselves or to their connections1 and can be confirmed or rejected any moment through observation1 they should not be classed with those added presuppositions which are used to co-ordinate facts4 ,hence not all suppositions are hypotheses4 ,on the other hand1 not every hypothesis can be actually experienced4 ,for example1 one employs in physics the hypothesis of electric fluid1 but does not expect actually to meet with it4 ,in many cases1 however1 the hypothesis becomes proved as an experienced fact4 ,such was the course of the ,copernican theory1 which was at first only a hypothesis1 but was transformed into fact through the evidence afforded by subsequent astronomical observation4 ,wundt defines a theory as a hypothesis taken together with the facts for whose elucidation it was invented4 ,in thus establishing a connection between the facts which the hypothesis merely suggested1 the theory furnishes at the same time partly the foundation 7,begrndung7 and partly the confirmation 7,besttigung7 of the hypothesis4#gi ,these aspects1 ,wundt insists1 must be sharply distinguished4 ,every hypothesis must have its ,begrndung1 but there can be ,besttigung only in so far as the hypothesis contains elements which are accessible to actual processes of verification4 ,in most cases verification is attainable in only certain elements of the hypothesis4 ,for example1 ,newton was obliged to limit himself to one instance in the verification of his theory of gravitation1 viz41 the movements of the moon4 ,the other heavenly bodies afforded nothing better than a foundation in that the supposition that gravity decreases as the square of the distance increases enabled him to deduce the movements of the planets4 ,the main object of his theory1 however1 lay in the deduction of these movements and not in the proof of universal gravity4 ,with the ,darwinian theory1 on the contrary1 the main interest is in seeking its verification through examination of actual cases of development4 ,thus1 while the ,newtonian and the greater part of the other physical theories lead to a deduction of the facts from the hypotheses1 which can be verified only in individual instances1 the ,darwinian theory is concerned in evolving as far as possible the hypothesis out of the facts4 ,let us look more closely at ,wundt's position4 ,we will ask1 first1 whether the distinction between hypotheses and expectations is as pronounced as he maintains2 and1 second1 whether the relation between ,begrndung and ,besttigung may not be closer than ,wundt would have us believe4 ,as examples of the hypothesis ,wundt mentions the ,copernican hypothesis1 ,newton's hypothesis of gravitation1 and the predictions of the astronomers which led to the discovery of ,neptune4 ,as examples of mere expectations we are referred to ,galileo's experiments with falling bodies and pendulums4 ,in case of ,newton's hypothesis there was the assumption of a general law1 which was verified after much labor and delay4 ,the heliocentric hypothesis of ,copernicus1 which was invented for the purpose of bringing system and unity into the movements of the planets1 has also been fairly well substantiated4 ,in the discovery of ,neptune we have1 apparently1 not the proof of a general law or the discovery of further peculiarities of previously known data1 but rather the discovery of a new object or agent by means of its observed effects4 ,in each of these instances we admit that the hypothesis was not readily suggested or easily and directly tested4 ,if we turn to ,galileo's pendulum and falling bodies1 it is clear first of all that he did not have in mind the discovery of some object1 as was the case in the discovery of ,neptune4 ,did he1 then1 either contribute to the proof of a general law or discover further characteristics of things already known in a more general way8 ,wundt tells us that ,galileo only determined a little more exactly what he already knew1 and that he did this with but little labor or delay4 ,what1 then1 is the real difference between hypothesis and expectation8 ,if we compare ,galileo's determination of the law of falling bodies with ,newton's test of his hypothesis of gravitation1 we see that both expectation and hypothesis were founded on observation and took the form of mathematical formul4 ,each tended to confirm the general law expressed in its formula1 though there was1 of course1 much difference in the time and labor required4 ,if we compare the ,copernican hypothesis with ,galileo's supposition concerning the pendulum1 we find again that they agree in regard to general purpose and method1 and differ in the difficulty of verification4 ,if the experiment with the pendulum only substituted exactness for inexactness1 did the ,copernican theory do anything different in kind8 ,it is true that the more exact statement of the swing of the pendulum was expressed in quantitative form1 but quantitative statement is no criterion of either the presence or the absence of the hypothesis4 ,again1 we may compare the pendulum with ,kepler's laws4 ,what was ,kepler's hypothesis1 that the square of the periodic times of the several planets are proportional to the cubes of their mean distances from the sun1 except a more exact formulation of facts which were already known in a more general way8 ,wundt's position seems to be this3 whenever a supposition or suggestion can be tested readily1 it should not be classed as a hypothesis4 ,this would make the distinction one of degree rather than kind1 and it does not appear how much labor we must expend1 or how long our supposition must evade our efforts to test it1 before it can win the title of hypothesis4 ,in the second place1 we have seen that ,wundt draws a sharp line between ,begrndung and ,besttigung4 ,it is doubtless true that every hypothesis requires a certain justification1 for unless other facts can be found which agree with deductions made in accordance with it1 its only support would be the data from which it is drawn4 ,such support as this would be obtained through a process too clearly circular to be seriously entertained4 ,the distinction which ,wundt draws between ,begrndung and ,besttigung is evidently due to the presence of the experimental element in the latter4 ,for descriptive purposes this distinction is useful1 but is misleading if it is understood to mean that there is mere experience in one case and mere inference in the other4 ,the difference is rather due to the relative parts played by inference and by accepted experience in each4 ,in ,begrndung the inferential feature is the more prominent1 while in ,besttigung the main emphasis is on the experiential aspect4 ,it must not be supposed1 however1 that either of these aspects can be wholly absent4 ,it is difficult to understand how any hypothesis can be entertained at all unless it meets in some measure the demand with reference to which it was invented1 viz41 a unification of conflicts in experience4 ,and1 in so far1 it is confirmed4 ,the motive which casts doubt upon its adequacy is the same that leads to its re-forming as a hypothesis1 as a mental concept4 ,the difficulties in ,wundt's position are thus due to a failure to take account of the reconstructive nature of the judgment4 ,the predicate1 supposition1 or hypothesis1 whatever we may choose to call it1 is formed because of the check of a former habit4 ,the judgment is an ideal application of a new habit1 and its test is the attempt to act in accordance with this ideal reconstruction4 ,it must not be thought1 however1 that our supposition is first fully developed and then tried and accepted or rejected without modification4 ,on the contrary1 its growth is the result of successive minor tests and corresponding minor modifications in its form4 ,formation and test are merely convenient distinctions in a larger process in which forming1 testing1 and re-forming go on together4 ,the activity of experimental verification is not only a testing1 a confirming or weakening of the validity of a hypothesis1 but it is equally well an evolution of the meaning of the hypothesis through bringing it into closer relations with specific data not previously included in defining its import4 ,per contra1 a purely reflective and deductive consideration which develops the idea as hypothesis1 in so far as it introduces the determinateness of previously accepted facts within the scope1 comprehension1 or intension of the idea1 is in so far forth1 a verification4 ,if the view which we have maintained is correct1 the hypothesis is not to be limited to those elaborate formulations of the scientist which he seeks to confirm by crucial tests4 ,the hypothesis of the investigator differs from the comparatively rough conjecture of the plain man only in its greater precision4 ,indeed1 as we have attempted to show1 the hypothesis is not a method which we may employ or not as we choose2 on the contrary1 as predicate of the judgment it is present in a more or less explicit form if we judge at all4 ,whether the time and labor required for its confirmation or rejection is a matter of a lifetime or a moment1 its nature remains the same4 ,its function is identical with that of the predicate4 ,in short1 the hypothesis is the predicate so brought to consciousness and defined that those features which are not noticed in the ordinary judgment are brought into prominence4 ,we then recognize the hypothesis to be what in fact the predicate always is1 viz41 a method of organization and control4 ,,viii ,,image ,,and ,,idea ,,in ,,logic ,the logic of sense-impressions and of ideas as copies of sense-impressions has had its day4 ,it engaged in a conflict with dogmatism1 and scored a decisive victory4 ,it overthrew the dynasty of prescribed formul and innate ideas1 of ideas derived ready-made from custom and social usage1 ancient enough to be lost in the remote obscurity of divine sources2 and enthroned in their place ideas derived from1 and representative of1 the sense-experiences of a very real and present world4 ,it marked a reaction from dogma back to the original meaning of dogma1 back to the seeming1 the appearance1 of things4 ,so thoroughly did ,bacon and ,hobbes1 ,locke and ,hume1 to mention only these four1 do their work1 that many of the problems growing out of the conflict itself1 to say nothing of the scholastic traditions that were combated1 have come to have merely a historical rather than a logical interest4 ,logic no longer concerns itself very eagerly with the content or sensuous qualities of ideas1 with their derivation from sense-impressions1 or with questions as to the relation of copy to original1 of representative to that which is presented4 ,it is concerned rather with the constructive operations of thought1 with meaning1 reference to reality1 inference--with intellectual processes4 ,perhaps in no respect is this shifting of logical standpoint indicated more clearly than in the unregretful way with which the old logical interest in the sense-qualities of ideas is now made over to psychology4 ,states of consciousness as such1 we are told1 are the proper study of psychology2 whereas logic concerns itself with the relation of thought to its object4 ,true1 these states of consciousness include thought-states1 as well as sense-impressions2 ideas and concepts1 as well as feelings and fancies2 and the business of psychology is to observe1 compare and classify1 describe and chronicle1 these states and whatever else is carried along in the stream of consciousness4 ,but logic is concerned1 not with these states of consciousness per se1 least of all with the flotsam and jetsam of the stream1 but with its reference to reality2 not with the true1 but with truth2 not even with what consciousness does1 but with how consciousness is to outdo itself1 transcend itself1 in a rational and universal whole4 ,even an empirical logic has to arrange somehow the way to get from one sense-impression to another4 ,in drawing this distinction between logic and psychology--a distinction which virtually amounts to a separation--two things are overlooked3 first1 that the distinction itself is a logical distinction1 and may properly constitute a problem falling under the province of logical inquiry and theory2 and1 second1 that the rather arbitrary and official setting apart of psychology to look after the task of studying states of consciousness does not carry with it the guarantee that psychology will confine itself exclusively to that task4 ,this last point in particular must be my excuse for discussing the question of image and idea from the psychological rather than from the logical standpoint4 ,the logic of ideas derived from sense-impressions has had its day4 ,but even the very leavings of the past may have been gathered up and reconstructed by psychology in such a way as to anticipate some of the newer developments of logical theory and meet some of its difficulties4 ,one can hardly hope to justify in advance a discussion based on such a sheer possibility4 ,let us begin1 rather1 by noting down from the standpoint of logic some of the distinctions between image and idea1 and the estimate of the logical function and value of mental imagery1 and see in what direction they take us and whether they suggest a resort to an analysis from the standpoint of psychology4 ,proceeding from the standpoint of logic to inquire into the logical function of mental imagery and into the distinction between image and idea1 we shall come upon two opposed but characteristic answers4 ,if the inquiry be directed to a member of the empirical school of logic1 he would be bound to answer in the affirmative1 so far as the question regarding the function of mental imagery is concerned4 ,he would be likely to say1 if he were loyal to the traditions of his school1 that mental imagery is the counterpart of sense-perception1 and is thus the representative of the data with which empirical logic is concerned4 ,mental imagery1 he would continue1 is a representative in a literal sense1 a copy1 a reflection1 of what comes to us through the avenues of sensation4 ,true1 it is not the perfect twin of sense-experience2 else we could not tell them apart2 indeed1 there are times when the copy becomes so much like the original that we are deceived by it1 as in dreams or in hallucinations4 ,ordinarily1 however1 we are able to distinguish one from the other4 ,two criteria are usually present2 7#a7 imagery is fainter1 more fleeting1 than the corresponding sense-experience2 and 7#b71 save in the case of accurate memory-images1 it is subject to a more or less arbitrary rearrangement of its parts1 as when1 for example1 we make over the images of scenes we have actually experienced1 to furnish forth the setting of some remote historical event4 ,barring1 or controlling and rectifying1 its tendencies toward both arbitrary and constructive variations from the original1 mental imagery is on the same level as sense-experience1 and serves the same logical purpose4 ,that is to say1 it contributes to the data which constitute the foundations of empirical logic4 ,it furnishes materials for the operations of observing1 comparing1 abstracting and generalizing4 ,mental imagery helps to piece out the fragments that may be presented to sense-experience4 ,it supplies the entire anatomy when only a single bone1 say1 is actually given4 ,yet1 however useful as a servant of truth1 it has to be carefully watched1 lest its spontaneous tendency to vary the actual order and coexistence of data lead the investigator astray4 ,the copy it presents is1 after all1 a temporary makeshift1 until it can be shown to correspond point for point to the now absent reality4 ,mental imagery furnishes one with an illustrated edition of the book of nature1 but the illustrations await the confirmation of comparison with the originals4 ,mental imagery functions logically when it extends the area of data beyond the range of the immediate sense-perceptions of any given time1 and thus makes possible a more comprehensive application of the empirical methods of observation1 comparison1 abstraction1 and generalization4 ,it functions logically when it acts as a feeder of logical machinery1 though it is not indispensable to this machinery and does not modify its principles4 ,the logical mill could grind up in the same way the pure grain of sense-perceptions1 unmixed with mental images1 but it would have to grind more slowly for lack of material4 ,in other words1 empirical logic could carry on its operations of observing1 comparing1 abstracting1 and generalizing1 solely on the basis of objects or data present to the senses1 and with no extension of this basis in terms of imagery1 or copies of objects not immediately present2 but it would take more time for it to apply and carry through its operations4 ,the logical machinery is the same in each case4 ,the materials fed and the product issuing are the same in each case4 ,imagery simply fulfils the function of providing a more copious grist4 ,the empiricist's answer to our question regarding the logical function of mental imagery leaves that function in an uncertain and parlous state4 ,imagery lacks the security of sense-perception on the one hand1 and it has no part in the operation of thought on the other4 ,it is a sort of hod-carrier1 whose function it is to convey the raw materials of sense-perception to a more exalted position where someone else does all the work4 ,i suppose this could be called a functional interpretation of a logical element4 ,the question1 then1 would be whether an element so functioning is in any sense logical4 ,as an element lying outside of the thought-process it owes no responsibility to logic2 it is not amenable to its regulations4 ,thought simply finds it expedient to operate with an agent over which it has no intrinsic control4 ,the case might be allowed to rest here4 ,yet were this extra-logical element of imagery to abandon thought1 all conscious thinking as opposed to sense-perception would cease4 ,a false alarm1 perhaps4 ,imagery may be so constituted that it is inseparably subordinated to thought and can never abandon it4 ,thought may simply exude imagery4 ,but imagery somehow has to represent sense-perception1 also4 ,it can hardly be a secretion of thought and a copy of sense-perceptions at one and the same time1 unless the empiricist is willing to turn absolute idealist6 ,before taking such a desperate plunge as this1 it might be desirable to see whether there is any other recourse4 ,there is another and a very different answer to the question regarding the logical function of mental imagery4 ,to distinguish this answer from that of the associationist or empiricist1 ,i will call it the answer of the conceptualist4 ,i am not at all positive that this label would stick even to those to whom it might be applied with considerable justification4 ,the terms rationalistic and transcendental might be preferred in opposition to the term empirical4 ,and we have the term apperceptionist in opposition to the term associationist4 ,if the term conceptualist is admissible1 it should be brought down to date1 perhaps1 by making it neo-conceptualist4 ,the present difficulties regarding terminology would be eased considerably if we only had a convenient set of derivatives made from the word meaning4 ,since we have not1 ,i will use derivatives made from the word concept to denote views opposite to those held by the empirical school4 ,the conceptualist could be depended upon to answer our question in the negative4 ,logical functions begin where the image leaves off4 ,they begin with the idea1 with meaning4 ,the conceptualist distinguishes sharply between the image as a psychical existence and the idea1 or concept1 as logical meaning4 ,on the one hand1 you have the image1 not only as a mere psychical existence1 but a mocking existence at that1 fleeting1 inconstant1 shifting1 never perhaps twice alike2 yet1 mind you1 an existence1 a fact--that must be admitted4 ,on the other hand1 you have the idea1 with a fixed content or logical meaning1#hj which is referred by an act of judgment to a reality beyond the act4#ha ,the idea1 the logical meaning1 begins where the image leaves off4 ,does this mean that the idea is wholly independent of the image8 ,yes and no4 ,the idea is independent of that which is ordinarily regarded as the special characteristic of an image1 namely1 its quality1 its sense-content4 ,that is to say1 the idea is independent of any particular image1 any special embodiment of sense-content4 ,any image will do4 ,as ,mr4 ,bosanquet remarks in comparing the psychical images that pass through our minds to a store of signal flags3 ,not only is it indifferent whether your signal flag of today is the same bit of cloth that you hoisted yesterday1 but also1 no one knows or cares whether it is clean or dirty1 thick or thin1 frayed or smooth1 as long as it is distinctly legible as an element of the signal code4 ,part of its content1 of its attributes and relations1 is a fixed index which carries a distinct reference2 all the rest is nothing to us1 and1 except in a moment of idle curiosity1 we are unaware that it exists4#hb ,on the other hand1 the idea could not operate as an idea1 could not be in consciousness1 save as it involves some imagery1 however old1 dirty1 thin1 and frayed4 ,take the statement1 ,the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,if the statement means anything to a given individual1 if it conveys an idea1 it must necessarily involve some form of imagery1 some qualitative or conscious content4 ,but so far as the meaning is concerned1 it is a matter of complete indifference as to what qualities are involved4 ,these qualities may be in terms of visual1 auditory1 tactual1 kinsthetic1 or verbal imagery4 ,the individual may visualize a blackboard drawing of a triangle with its sides produced1 or he may imagine himself to be generating a triangle while revolving through an angle of #ahj4 ,any imagery anyone pleases may be employed1 so long as there goes with it somehow the idea of the relation of equality between the angles of a triangle and two right angles4 ,but the conceptualist does not stop here4 ,the act of judgment comes in to affirm that the idea is no mere idea1 but is a quality of the real4 ,the act of judgment attaches the floating adjective the idea1 the logical meaning to the nature of the world1 and1 at the same time1 tells one it was there already4#hc ,the idea1 the logical meaning1 begins where the image leaves off4 ,yet1 somehow1 the idea could not begin1 unless there were an image to leave off4 ,an image is not an idea1 says the conceptualist4 ,an idea is not an image4 7#a7 ,an image is not an idea1 because an image is a particular1 individual fragment of consciousness4 ,it is so bound up with its own existence that it cannot reach out to the existence of an idea1 or to anything beyond itself4 ,chemically speaking1 it is an avalent atom of consciousness1 if such a thing is thinkable4 ,mr4 ,bosanquet raises the question3 ,are there at all ideas which are not symbolic8444 ,the answer is that 7a7 in judgment itself the idea can be distinguished qua particular in time or psychical fact1 and so far is not symbolic2 and 7b7 in all those human experiences from which we draw our conjectures as to the animal intelligence1 when in languor or in ignorance image succeeds image without conscious judgment1 we feel what it is to have ideas as facts and not as symbols4#hd 7#b7 ,an idea is not an image1 because an idea is meaning1 which consists in a part of the content of the image1 cut off1 and considered apart from the existence of the content or sign itself4#he ,this meaning1 this fragment of psychical existence1 lays down all claim to existence on its own account1 that it may refer through an act of judgment to a reality beyond itself and beyond the act also4 ,an image is not an idea and an idea is not an image1 because an image exists only as a quality1 a sense-content1 whereas an idea exists only as a relation1 a reference to reality beyond4 ,on the one hand1 to recall ,bradley's antinomy1 no possible idea as a psychical image can be that which it means4444 ,on the other hand1 no idea as logical signification is anything but just what it means4 ,there is a significant point of agreement between the conceptualist and the empiricist4 ,both regard imagery as on the level with sense-perception4 ,for the empiricist1 as we have seen1 the fact that imagery may be compelled to serve as a yoke-fellow of sense-experience constitutes its logical value4 ,for the conceptualist1 however1 the association of imagery with sense-experience is of no logical consequence whatsoever1 save as it may help to intensify the distinction between imagery and meaning4 ,to quote again from ,bradley3 ,for logical purposes the psychological distinction of idea and sensation may be said to be irrelevant1 while the distinction of idea and fact is vital4 ,the image1 or psychological idea1 is for logic nothing but a sensible reality4 ,it is on a level with the mere sensations of the senses4 ,for both are facts and neither are meanings4 ,neither are cut from a mutilated presentation and fixed as a connection4 ,neither are indifferent to their place in the stream of psychical events1 their time and their relations to the presented congeries4 ,neither are adjectives to be referred from their existence1 to live on strange soils1 under other skies1 and through changing seasons4 ,the lives of both are so entangled with their environment1 so one with their setting of sensuous particulars1 that their character is destroyed if but one thread is broken4#hf ,this point of agreement between conceptualism and empiricism1 this placing of imagery and sense-experience on a common level1 serves to bring into relief fundamental differences between the two schools of thought2 fundamental1 because they have to do with the nature of reality itself4 ,the conceptualist in his zealous endeavor to distinguish between imagery and logical meaning has come perilously near driving imagery into the arms of reality4 ,it is the opportunity of empiricism to make them one4 ,how can conceptualism prevent the union8 ,has it not disarmed itself8 ,the act of judgment1 which includes within itself logical meaning as predicate1 refers to a reality beyond the act4 ,both imagery and reality1 then1 lie outside of the act of judgment6 ,what alliance1 or msalliance1 may they not form1 one with the other8 ,the difficulties we have noted thus far in the discussion are due to a large extent1 ,i believe1 to incomplete psychological analysis of logical machinery4 ,the empiricist has not carried the psychology of logic as far as the conceptualist1 although the latter might be the loudest to disclaim the honor4 ,i will not try to prove this statement1 but simply give it as a reason why1 in the interest of brevity1 ,i shall pass with little comment over the psychological shortcomings and contributions of empirical logic1 and devote what space remains to the psychology implicitly worked out by conceptual logic1 and to its possible development1 with special reference1 of course1 to the problem of the logical function of imagery4 ,the logical distinction1 which practically amounts to a separation between imagery and meaning1 is the counterpart of the psychological distinction between stimulus and response1 between the two poles of sensori-motor activity1 where the stimulus is defined in consciousness in the form of imagery1 in the form of sense-qualities centrally excited1 and where the response is directed and controlled via this imagery1 so as to function in bringing some end1 project1 purpose1 or ideal1 nearer to realization1 some problem nearer to solution4 ,psychologically1 there is no break between image and response1 between thought and action4 ,the stimulus is a condition of action1 in both senses of the ambiguity of the word condition4 7#a7 ,it is action2 it is a state or condition of action4 7#b7 ,it is also an initiation of action4 ,if the appropriate stimulus1 then the desired action4 ,the response to an image is the meaning of the image4 ,or1 the response to any stimulus via an image--mediated1 controlled or directed by an image--is the meaning of that image4 ,the less imagery involved in any response1 the greater the presumption in favor of the belief that the response is either an instinctive impulse or else has become a habit of mind1 an adequate idea4 ,the reduction and loss of sense-content which an image may undergo--the wearing away of an image1 it is sometimes called--is not a sign that this sense-content has no logical function2 but rather that it has fulfilled a logical function so well that it has made part of itself useless4 ,the husk1 to recall one of ,mr4 ,bradley's comparisons1 that useless husk1 tends to fall away1 to lapse from consciousness1 after it has served the purpose of helping to bring the kernel of truth to fruition4 ,this raises again the original question as to whether the sense-content1 the quality1 the existential quality1 of an image has a logical function4 ,i will ask first whether it has a function from the standpoint of psychology4 ,we will agree with the empiricist that the content of an image is representative1 that it is a return1 a revival1 of a sense-content previously experienced through the activity of sense-organs stimulated from the periphery4 ,what is the function1 then1 of the representative image8 ,sensation1 quality1 as we have implied above1 is the stimulus come to consciousness4 ,to explain how a stimulus can come to consciousness is a problem ,i will not attempt to go into here4 ,i assume as a fact that there are times when we know what we are about2 when we are conscious of the stimuli1 or conditions of action1 which are tending in this direction or in that1 and when through this consciousness we exercise a controlling influence over action by selecting and reinforcing certain stimuli and suppressing or inhibiting others4 ,it is true that we do not always realize to how great an extent our actions are controlled by stimuli which do not come to consciousness1 by reflexes1 instincts1 and habits which do not rise above the threshold of imagery4 ,and when this vast complex of hidden machinery is partly revealed to us1 it may either cause the beholder to take a materialistic1 mechanical1 or fatalistic view of existence1 to say that we are the victims of our own machinery1 or else it may induce the other extreme of more or less mystic pronouncements regarding the province of the subconscious1 of the subliminal self2 thus out of partial views1 out of half-truths1 metaphysical problems arise and arm for mutual conflict4 ,nevertheless1 there is a presumption1 amounting in most minds to a conviction1 that we do at times consciously control some of our actions4 ,and it is only making this conviction a little more explicit to say that we consciously control our actions through becoming aware of the stimuli1 or conditions of action1 and through selecting and reinforcing them4 ,is it begging the question to speak of consciousness as exercising a selective function with reference to stimuli8 ,from the standpoint of psychology1 ,i cannot see that it is4 ,no characteristic of consciousness has been more clearly made out1 both reflectively and experimentally1 than its selective function1 than its ability to pick out and intensify within certain limits the stimuli or conditions of action4 ,the representational image is a stimulus come to consciousness in the same way that a sensation is a stimulus come to consciousness4 ,it is both a direct and an indirect stimulus4 ,the terms direct and indirect are used as relative solely to the demands of the particular situation out of which they arise4 ,by direct stimulus ,i mean a stimulus which initiates with almost no appreciable delay the response or attitude appropriate to the demands of a given situation1 bridging the difficulties1 removing the obstacles1 or solving the problem with the minimum of conscious reflection4 ,as an image becomes more and more of a working symbol1 an idea1 it tends to become simply a direct stimulus4 ,by an indirect stimulus is meant a stimulus initiating a response which1 if not inhibited1 would be irrelevant to the situation1 yet which may represent stimuli which are not found in the immediate field of sense-perception1 and which are essential to the carrying on of the activity4 ,the situation is a problematic one4 ,acquired habits or mental adjustments break down at some point or fail to operate smoothly1 either owing to the absence of customary stimuli or to the presence of new and untried conditions of action4 ,part of the stress of meeting such a situation as this falls on the side of discovering appropriate stimuli and part on the side of developing out of habits already acquired new methods of response4 ,in such a situation as this1 imagery may function on the side of stimulus when1 taking its cue from the stimuli which are actually present1 and which grow out of the strain and friction1 it represents the missing conditions of action sufficiently to direct a search for them4 ,it projects a map1 so to speak1 in which the fragmentary conditions immediately present to sense-perception may find their bearings1 or in which in some way the missing members may be discovered4 ,a familiar instance of this would be the experience one sometimes has in trying to recall the forgotten name of an acquaintance4 ,the images of scenes associated with the acquaintance1 of various letters and sounds of words associated with his name1 which may be called to mind1 do not function so much as direct stimuli as they do as intermediate or indirect stimuli4 ,it is a case of casting about for the image that will function as a direct stimulus in bringing an acquired but temporarily lost adjustment into play4 ,image functions on the side of response1 on the side of developing new habits1 new forms of adjustment1 in so far as the conditions of action which it represents1 or projects1 are not the actual conditions of action1 either because they are so inaccessible as to demand development of new habits for purposes of attaining them1 or else because1 though actually present1 they stimulate relatively uncontrolled sthetic or emotional responses1 whose very expression1 however1 may be translated into a demand for more adequate1 intelligent1 controlled habits or adjustments4 ,the conscious projection of the unattained1 even of the unattainable1 not only marks a certain degree of attainment1 but is the initiation of further development4 ,here we see again that a stimulus is a condition of action in both senses of the ambiguity of the word condition4 ,it is both a state or condition of activity1 and an initiation or condition of further activity4 ,as an indirect stimulus growing out of a problematic situation imagery necessarily brings in more or less irrelevant material4 ,if ,i may be permitted the paradox1 imagery would not be relevant if it did not bring in the irrelevant4 ,the novelty of the situation makes it impossible to say in advance what will be relevant4 ,hence the demand for range and play of imagery4 ,it is only the successful adjustment finally hit upon and worked out that is the test of the relevancy of the imagery which anticipated it4 ,even this test may be unfair1 since it is likely to discount the value of imagery which is now ruled out1 but which may have been indispensable in turning up the proper cues in the course of the process of reflection and experiment4 ,to restate the point in regard to the psychological function of imagery4 ,imagery functions in representing control as ideal1 not as fact4 ,it represents a possible process of reconstructing adjustments and habits2 it is not an actual and complete readjustment4 ,it arises normally in a stress1 in the presence of fresh demands and new problems4 ,it looks forward in every possible direction1 because it is important and difficult to foresee consequences4 ,but suppose the new adjustment to be made with reasonable success--reasonable1 note4 ,suppose the ideal to be realized4 ,with practice the adjustment becomes less problematic1 more under control--that is1 it comes to require less conscious attention to bring it about4 ,the image loses some of its sensuous content4 ,it becomes worn away1 more remote1 until at last it becomes respectably vague and abstract enough to be classed as a concept4 ,imagery is the stimulus of the reconstructive process between habit and habit1 concept and concept1 idea and idea4 ,we now return to the original question regarding the logical function of imagery4 ,there is only one condition1 ,i believe1 on which we can accept the assumption of both empiricist and conceptualist that imagery is on the same level with sense-perception1 and that is the assumption that meaning1 logical meaning1 is on the same level with habit1 habit naming the more obvious1 overt forms of response to stimuli1 logical meaning naming the more internal forms of response or reference4 ,psychical response and logical reference thus become equivalent terms4 ,we have seen that imagery may exercise two functions with reference to habit1 as direct and as indirect stimulus2 so also with reference to logical meaning1 imagery may be the stimulus to a direct reference of the idea to reality1 or it may present1 or mirror1 conditions with regard to which some new meaning is to be worked out4 ,the quality1 the sense-content1 of imagery may per se suffice directly to arouse a habitual attitude1 to call forth an immediate reference to reality4 ,it may cause one to tumble to what is taking place1 to catch on1 to apprehend 7pardon these expressions for the sake of their description of the motor aspect of meaning71 as when we say1 for example3 ,it came over me like a flash what ,i was to do1 and ,i did it4 ,our more abstract and complicated forms of judgment and reasoning1 in which the imagery involved is reduced to the minimum of conscious1 qualitative content1 are of the same order1 though at the other extreme1 so far as immediate overt expression is concerned4 ,we are working along lines of habitual activity so familiar that we can work almost in the dark4 ,we need no elaborate imagery4 ,guided only by the waving of a signal flag or by the shifting gleam of a semaphore1 we thread our way swiftly through the maze of tracks worn smooth by use and habit4 ,but suppose a new line of habit is to be constructed4 ,no signal flags or semaphores will suffice4 ,a detailed survey of the proposed route must be had1 and here is where imagery with a rich and varied yet flexible sensuous content1 growing out of previous surveys1 may function in projecting and anticipating the new set of conditions1 and thus become the stimulus of a new line of habit1 of a new and more far-reaching meaning4 ,as this new line of habit1 of meaning1 gets into working order with the rest of the system1 imagery tends normally to decline again to the rle of signal flags and semaphores4 ,the distinction in logical theory between image and idea which we have been considering is only a half-truth from the point of view of psychology4 ,it virtually limits the idea to a fixed1 unalterable reference of a fragment of a desiccated image to a reality beyond4 ,it indifferently loses the play and richness of imagery to the floating remnants of sense-content1 or to an external reality4 ,it limits itself to an examination of a final stage in thinking1 a stage in which the image acts as a direct stimulus1 a stage in which the sense-content of the image has little or no function per se1 because this content now initiates directly a habitual adjustment1 a worked-out and established adaptation of means to end4 ,it overlooks the process of conscious reflection which logically precedes every such adjustment not purely instinctive or accidental1 a process in which imagery as representational functions indirectly in bringing the resources of past experience1 the fund of acquired habits1 to bear upon the fragmentary and problematic elements of sense-experience actually present1 thus maintaining the flow and continuity of experience4 ,it fails to recognize that in the inseparable association of meaning with quality1 of idea with image1 there goes the possibility of working out and applying new meanings from old1 of developing deeper meanings1 of testing and affirming more inclusive and universal meaning4 ,we are confronted with this alternative4 ,either the image has a logical function in virtue of its sense-content1 or else the image functions logically merely as a symbol1 the sense-content of which is a matter of complete logical indifference4 ,according to the empiricist1 the former is the case1 according to the conceptualist1 the latter4 ,the empiricist would say that he needs the image to piece out the data upon which logical processes operate4 ,having met this need1 the image is retired from active service4 ,for the empiricist the processes of thought1 observing1 comparing1 generalizing1 etc41 are as independent of the data they use as1 for the conceptualist1 logical meaning1 reference1 and idea are independent of the sense-content of the image4 ,in reality he agrees with the conceptualist in excluding the sense-content of the image from the processes of thought1 and hence from the domain of logic4 ,from the standpoint of psychological theory the conceptualist is an improvement over the empiricist4 ,he has gone a step farther in the analysis of thought-processes by showing that they are bound up with some kind of imagery1 however irrelevant1 inconsequential1 and worn down the sense-quality of that imagery may be4 ,his statement of ideas as references to reality lends itself readily1 as we have seen1 to the unitary conception in psychology of ideo-motor1 or sensori-motor1 activity4 ,but is this where logical theory is to stop1 while psychology as a study of states of consciousness takes up the unfinished tale and carries it forward8 ,it seems hardly possible1 unless logic is willing to give over its task of thinking about thinking4 ,reduce the image to a mere symbol4 ,let its sense-quality be a matter of complete indifference4 ,what have you1 then1 but an elementary and primitive type of reflex action8 ,it is of no particular consequence even from what sense-organ it appears to proceed1 or whether it appears to be peripherally or centrally excited4 ,it is simply a case of feel and act2 touch and go4 ,is this thinking8 ,it may be regarded as either the germ or the finality of thinking1 but what most of us are inclined to believe is the true subject-matter of logic is not to be limited to a simple reflex1 or even to a chain of reflexes4 ,it is something more complex1 even if nothing more than an intricate tangle of chains of reflexes4 ,the complexity of the process called thinking does not reside alone in the instinctive or habitual reflexes involved4 ,the more instinctive and habitual any adjustment may be1 the less is it a matter of thought1 as everyone knows1 although its biological complexity is none the less patent to one who looks at it from the outside4 ,the complexity of the thinking process resides in consciousness also2 it resides in the imagery1 the stimuli1 the mere symbols1 if you like1 that have come to consciousness4 ,as soon as the complexity begins to be felt1 as soon as any discrimination whatsoever begins to be introduced or appreciated1 at that instant the sense-content1 the quale1 of imagery begins to have a logical function4 ,conscious discrimination1 however vague and evanescent1 and the logical function of the quale of imagery are born together1 unless one chooses to regard the more obvious and deliberate forms of conscious discrimination as more characteristic of a logical process4 ,it is only as the sense-contents of various images are discriminated and compared that anything like thinking can be conceived to go on4 ,the particular sense-content of an image1 instead of being a matter of logical indifference1 is the condition1 the possibility1 of thinking4 ,the conceptualist has contributed to the data of descriptive psychology by calling attention1 by implication at least1 to the remote and reduced character of the imagery which may characterize thinking4 ,but it by no means follows that the more remote and reduced the sense-content of an image becomes1 the less important is that sense-content for thinking1 the less demand for discrimination4 ,on the contrary1 the sense-content that remains may be of supreme logical importance4 ,it may be the quintessence of meaning4 ,it may be the conscious factor which1 when discriminated from another almost equally sublimated conscious factor1 may determine a whole course of action4 ,the delicacy and rapidity with which these reduced forms of imagery as they hover about the margin of consciousness or flit across its focus are discriminated and caught1 are points in the technique of that long art of thinking1 begun in early childhood4 ,the fact that questionnaire investigations--like that of ,galton's1 for example--have in many instances failed to discover in the minds of scientists and advanced thinkers a rich and varied furniture of imagery does not argue the poverty of imagery in such minds2 it argues1 rather1 a highly developed technique1 a species of virtuosity1 with reference to the sense-content of the types of imagery actually in use4 ,to push a step farther the alternative we have already stated in a preliminary way3 ,either the idea1 or logical meaning1 lies outside of the process of thinking1 as a mere impulse or reflex2 or else1 in virtue of the sense-content of its image1 it enters into that conscious process of discrimination1 comparison1 and selection1 of light and shade1 of doubt and inquiry1 which constitutes the evolution of a judgment1 which makes the life-history of a movement of thought4 ,,ix ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,the ,,pre-,,socratic ,,philosophy#hg ,it is not the purpose of this study to show that the ,pre-,socratics possessed a system of logic which is now for the first time brought to the notice of the modern world4 ,indeed1 there is nothing to indicate that they had reflected on mental processes in such a way as to call for an organized body of canons regulating the forms of concepts and conclusions4 ,aristotle attributed the discovery of the art of dialectic to ,zeno the ,eleatic1 and we shall see in the sequel that there was much to justify the opinion4 ,but logic1 in the technical sense1 is inconceivable without concepts1 and from the days of ,aristotle it has been universally believed that proper definitions owe their origin to ,socrates4 ,a few crude attempts at definition1 if such they may be rightly called1 are referred to ,empedocles and ,democritus4 ,but in so far as they were conceived in the spirit of science1 they essayed to define things materially by giving1 so to speak1 the chemical formula for their production4 ,significant as this very fact is1 it shows that even the rudiments of the canons of thought were not the subjects of reflection4 ,in his ,organon ,aristotle makes it evident that the demand for a regulative art of scientific discourse was created by the eristic logic-chopping of those who were most deeply influenced by the ,eleatic philosophy4 ,indeed1 the case is quite parallel to the rise of the art of rhetoric4 ,aristotle regarded ,empedocles as the originator of that art1 as he referred the beginnings of dialectic to ,zeno4 ,but the formulation of both arts in well-rounded systems came much later4 ,as men conducted lawsuits before the days of ,tisias and ,corax1 so also were the essential principles of logic operative and effective in practice before ,aristotle gave them their abstract formulation4 ,while it is true1 therefore1 that the ,pre-,socratics had no formal logic1 it is equally true1 and far more significant1 that they either received from their predecessors or themselves developed the conceptions and the presuppositions on which the ,aristotelian logic is founded4 ,one of the objects of this study is to institute a search for some of these basic conceptions of ,greek thought1 almost all of which existed before the days of ,socrates1 and to consider their origin as well as their logical significance4 ,the other aim here kept in view is to trace the course of thought in which the logical principles1 latent in all attempts to construct and verify theories1 came into play4 ,it is impossible1 no doubt1 to discover a body of thought which does not ground itself upon presuppositions4 ,they are the warp into which the woof of the system1 itself too often consisting of frayed ends of other fabrics1 is woven with the delight of a supposed creator4 ,rarely is the thinker so conscious of his own mental processes that he is aware of what he takes for granted4 ,ordinarily this retirement to an interior line takes place only when one has been driven back from the advanced position which could no longer be maintained4 ,emerson has somewhere said3 ,the foregoing generations beheld ,god and ,nature face to face2 we through their eyes4 ,why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe8 ,why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition1 and a religion by revelation to us and not the history of theirs8 ,the difficulty lies precisely in our faith in immediate insight and revelation1 which are themselves only short-cuts of induction1 psychological short circuits1 conducted by media we have disregarded4 ,only a fundamentally critical philosophy pushes its doubt to the limit of demanding the credentials of those conceptions which have come to be regarded as axiomatic4 ,the need of going back of ,aristotle in our quest for the truth is well shown by his attitude toward the first principles of the several sciences4 ,to him they are immediately given--,greek3 amesoi protaseis--and hence are ultimate a priori4 ,the historical significance of this fact is already apparent4 ,it means that in his day these first principles1 which sum up the outcome of previous inductive movements of thought1 were regarded as so conclusively established that the steps by which they had been inferred were allowed to lapse from memory4 ,no account of the history of thought can hope to satisfy the demands of reason that does not explain the origin of the convictions thus embodied in principles4 ,the only acceptable explanation would be in terms of will and interest4 ,to give such an account would1 however1 require the knowledge of secular pursuits and ambitions no longer obtainable4 ,it might be fruitful of results if we could discover even the theoretical interests of the age before ,thales2 but we know that in modern times the direction of interest characteristic of the purely practical pursuits manifests its reformative influences in speculation a century or more after it has begun to shape the course of common life4 ,hence we might misinterpret the historical data if they were obtainable4 ,but general considerations1 which we need not now rehearse1 as well as indications contained in the later history of thought1 hereinafter sketched1 point to the primacy of the practical as yielding the direction of interest that determines the course it shall take4 ,it was said above that the principles of science are the result of an inductive movement1 and that the inductive movement is directed by an interest4 ,hence the principles are contained in1 or rather are the express definition of1 the interest that gave them birth4 ,in other words1 there is implied in all induction a process of deduction4 ,every stream of thought embraces not only the main current1 but also an eddy1 which here and there re-enters it4 ,and this is one way of explaining the phenomenon which has long engaged the thought of philosophers1 namely1 the fact of successful anticipations of the discoveries of science or1 more generally still1 the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori4 ,the solution of the problem is ultimately contained in its statement4#hh ,to arrive at a stage of mentality not based on assumptions one would have1 no doubt1 to go back to its beginnings4 ,greek thought1 even in the time of ,thales1 was well furnished with them4 ,we cannot pause to catalogue them1 but it may further our project if we consider a few of the more important4 ,the precondition of thought as of life is that nature be uniform1 or ultimately that the world be rational4 ,this is not even1 as it becomes later1 a conscious demand2 it is the primary ethical postulate which expresses itself in the confidence that it is so4 ,viewed from a certain angle it may be called the principle of sufficient reason4 ,closely associated with it is the universal belief of the early philosophers of ,greece that everything that comes into being is bound up inseparably with that which has been before2 more precisely1 that there is no absolute1 but only relative1 ,becoming4 ,corollaries of this axiom soon appeared in the postulates of the conservation of matter or mass1 and the conservation of energy1 or more properly for the ancients1 of motion4 ,logically these principles appear to signify that the subject1 while under definition1 shall remain just what it is2 and that1 in the system constituted of subject1 predicate1 and copula1 the terms shall stay put while the adjustment of verification is in progress4 ,it is a matter of course that the constants in the great problem should become permanent landmarks4 ,other corollaries derive from this same principle of uniformity4 ,seeing that all that comes to be in some sense already is1 there appears the postulate of the unity of the world2 and this unity manifests itself not only in the integrity and homogeneity of the world-ground1 but also in the more ideal conception of a universal law to which all special modes of procedure in nature are ancillary4 ,in these we recognize the insistent demand for the organization of predicate and copula4 ,side by side with these formul stands the other1 which requires an ordered process of becoming and a graduated scale of existences1 such as can mediate between the extremes of polarity4 ,such series meet us on every hand in early ,greek thought4 ,the process of rarefaction and condensation in ,anaximenes1 the ,greek3 hodos an kat of ,heraclitus1 the regular succession of the four ,empedoclean elements in almost all later systems--these and other examples spontaneously occur to the mind4 ,the significance of this conception1 as the representative of an effective copula1 will presently be seen4 ,more subtle1 perhaps1 than any of these principles1 though not allowed to go so long unchallenged1 is the assumption of a ,greek3 physis1 that is1 the assumption that all nature is instinct with life4 ,the logical interpretation of this postulate would seem to be that the concrete system of things--subject1 predicate1 copula--constitutes a totality complete in itself and needing no jog from without4 ,in this survey of the preconceptions of the early ,greek philosophers ,i have employed the terms of the judgment without apology4 ,the justification for this course must come ultimately1 as for any assumption1 from the success of its application to the facts4 ,but if logic merely formulates in a schematic way that which in life is the manipulation of concrete experience1 with a view to attaining practical ends1 then its forms must apply here as well as anywhere4 ,logical terminology may therefore be assumed to be welcome to this field where judgments are formed1 induction is made from certain facts to defined conceptions1 and deductions are derived from principles or premises assumed4 ,speaking then in these terms we may say that the ,pre-,socratics had three logical problems set for them3 ,first1 there was a demand for a predicate1 or1 in other words1 for a theory of the world4 ,secondly1 there was the need of ascertaining just what should be regarded as the subject1 or1 otherwise stated1 just what it was that required explanation4 ,thirdly1 there arose the necessity of discovering ways and means by which the theory could be predicated of the world and by which1 in turn1 the hypothesis erected could be made to account for the concrete experience of life3 in terms of logic this problem is that of maintaining an efficient copula4 ,it is not assumed that the sequence thus stated was historically observed without crossing and overlapping2 but a survey of the history of the period will show that1 in a general way1 the logical requirements asserted themselves in this order4 #a4 ,greek philosophy began its career with induction4 ,we have already stated that the preconceptions with which it approached its task were the result of previous inductions1 and indeed the epic and theogonic poetry of the ,greeks abounds in thoughts indicative of the consciousness of all of these problems4 ,thus ,homer is familiar with the notion that all things proceed from water1#hi and that1 when the human body decays1 it resolves itself into earth and water4#ij ,other opinions might be enumerated1 but they would add nothing to the purpose4 ,when men began1 in the spirit of philosophy1 to theorize about the world1 they assumed that it--the subject--was sufficiently known4 ,its existence was taken for granted1 and that which engaged their attention was the problem of its meaning4 ,what predicate--so we may formulate their question--should be given to the subject8 ,it is noticeable that their induction was quite perfunctory4 ,but such is always the case until there are rival theories competing for acceptance1 and even then the impulse to gather up evidence derived from a wide field and assured by resort to experiment comes rather with the desire to test a hypothesis than to form it4 ,it is the effort to verify that brings out details and also the negative instances4 ,hence we are not to blame ,thales for rashness in making his generalization that all is ,water4 ,we do not know what indications led to this conclusion4 ,aristotle ventured a guess1 but the motives assumed for ,thales agree too well with those which weighed with ,hippo to admit of ready acceptance4 ,anaximander1 feeling the need of deduction as a sequel to induction1 found his predicate in the ,infinite4 ,we cannot now delay to inquire just what he meant by the term2 but it is not unlikely that its very vagueness recommended it to a man of genius who caught enthusiastically at the skirts of knowledge4 ,anaximenes1 having pushed verification somewhat farther and eliciting some negative instances1 rejected water and the ,infinite and inferred that all was air4 ,his ,greek3 arch must have the quality of infinity1 but1 a copula having been found in the process of rarefaction and condensation1 it must occupy a determinate place in the series of typical forms of existence4 ,the logical significance of this thought will engage our attention later4 ,meanwhile it may be well to note that thus far only one predicate has been offered by each philosopher4 ,this is doubtless due to the preconception of the unity and homogeneity of the world1 of which we have already made mention4 ,although at the beginning its significance was little realized1 the conception was destined to play a prominent part in ,greek thought4 ,it may be regarded from different points of view not necessarily antagonistic4 ,one may say1 as indeed has oftentimes been said1 that it was due to ignorance4 ,men did not know the complexity of the world1 and hence declared its substance to be simple4 ,again1 it may be affirmed that the assumption was merely the nave reflex of the ethical postulate that we shall unify our experience and organize it for the realization of our ideals4 ,while increased knowledge has multiplied the so-called chemical elements1 physics knows nothing of their differences1 and chemistry itself demands their reduction4 ,the extension and enlarged scope of homogeneity came in two ways3 ,first1 it presented itself by way of abstraction from the particular predicates that may be given to things4 ,this was due to the operation of the fundamental assumption that the world must be intelligible4 ,thus1 even in ,anaximander1 the world-ground takes no account of the diversity of things except in the negative way of providing that the contrariety of experience shall arise from it4 ,we are therefore referred for our predicate to a somewhat behind concrete experience4 ,the ,pythagoreans fix upon a single aspect of things as the essential1 and find the meaning of the world in mathematical relations4 ,the ,eleatics press the conception of homogeneity until it is reduced to identity4 ,identity means the absence of difference2 hence1 spatially considered1 it requires the negation of a void and the indivisibility of the world2 viewed temporally1 it precludes the succession of different states and hence the possibility of change4 ,we thus reach the acute stage of the problem of the ,one and the ,many4 ,the ,one is here the predicate1 the subject is the ,many4 ,the solution of the difficulty is the task of the copula1 and we shall recur to the theme in due time4 ,it may be well1 however1 at this point to draw attention to the fact that the ,one is not always identical with the predicate1 nor the ,many with the subject4 ,in the rhythmic movement of erecting and verifying hypotheses the interest shifts and what was but now the predicate1 by taking the place of the premises1 comes to be regarded as the given from which the particular is to be derived or deduced4 ,there is thus likewise a shift in the positions of existence and meaning4 ,the subject1 or the world1 was first assumed as the given means with which to construct the predicate1 its meaning2 once the hypothesis has been erected1 the direction of interest shifts back to the beginning1 and in the process of verification or deduction the quondam predicate1 now the premises1 becomes the given1 and the task set for thought is the derivation of fact4 ,for the moment1 or until the return to the world is accomplished1 the ,one is the only real1 the ,manifold remains mere appearance4 ,the second form in which the sense of the homogeneity of the world embodies itself is not1 like the first1 static1 but is altogether dynamic4 ,that which makes the whole world kin is neither the presence nor the absence of a quality1 but a principle4 ,the law thus revealed is1 therefore1 not a matter of the predicate1 but is the copula itself4 ,hence we must defer a fuller consideration of it for the present4 #b4 ,as has already been said1 the inductive movement implies the deductive1 and not only as something preceding or accompanying it1 but as its inner meaning and ultimate purpose4 ,so too it was with the earliest ,greek thinkers4 ,their object in setting up a predicate was the derivation of the subject from it4 ,in other words their ambition was to discover the ,greek3 arch from which the genesis of the world proceeds4 ,but deduction is really a much more serious task than would at first appear to one who is familiar with the ,aristotelian machinery of premises and middle terms4 ,the business of deduction is to reveal the subject1 and ordinarily the subject quite vanishes from view4 ,induction is rapid1 but deduction lags far behind4 ,it may require but a momentary flash of insight on the part of the physical philosopher to discover a principle2 if it is really significant1 inventors will be engaged for centuries in deducing from it applications to the needs of life by means of contrivances4 ,thus after ages we come to know more of the subject1 which is thereby enriched4 ,the contrivances are the representatives of the copula in practical affairs2 in quasi-theoretical spheres they are the apparatus for experimentation4 ,it has just been remarked that by the application of the principles to life it is enriched2 in other words1 it receives new meaning1 and new meaning signifies a new predicate4 ,theory is at times painfully aware of the multitude of new predicates proposed2 rarely does it realize that there has been created a new heaven and a new earth4 ,without the latter1 the former would be absurd4 ,men take very much for granted and regard almost every achievement as a matter of course4 ,hence they do not become aware of their changed position except as it reflects itself in new schemes and in a larger outlook4 ,the subject receives only a summary glance to discover what new predicate shall be evolved4 ,hence1 while there is in ,greek philosophy a strongly marked deductive movement1 the theoretical results to the subject are insignificant4 ,thales seems1 indeed1 to have had no means to offer for the derivation of the world1 but he evidently had no doubt that it was possible4 ,with him and with others the assumption1 however vaguely understood1 seems to have been that the subject1 like the predicate1 was simple4 ,thus the essential unity of the world1 considered as existence no less than as meaning1 is a foregone conclusion4 ,the sense of a division in the subject seems to arise with ,empedocles when1 reaping the harvest of the ,eleatic definition of substance1 he parted the world1 as subject and as predicate1 into four elements4 ,we may1 perhaps1 pause a moment to consider the significance of the assumption of four elements which plays so large a part in subsequent philosophies4 ,there is no need of enlarging on the importance of the association of multiple elements with the postulate that nothing is absolutely created and nothing absolutely passes away4 ,these are indeed the pillars that support chemical science1 and they further imply the existence of qualities of different rank2 but that implication1 as we shall see1 lay even in the process of rarefaction and condensation introduced by ,anaximenes4 ,the four elements concern us here chiefly as testifying to the fact that certain practical interests had summed up the essential characteristics of nature in forms sufficiently significant to have maintained themselves even to our day4 ,in regard to fire1 air1 and water this is not greatly to be wondered at2 it is a somewhat different case with earth4 ,if metallurgy and other pursuits which deal with that which is roughly classed as earth had been highly enough developed to have reacted upon the popular mind1 this element could not possibly have been assumed to be so homogeneous4 ,the conception clearly reflects the predominantly agricultural interest of the ,greeks in their relation to the earth4 ,this further illustrates the slow progress which deduction makes in the reconstitution of the subject4 ,it is different1 however1 with ,anaxagoras and the ,atomists4 ,apparently the movement begun by ,empedocles soon ran its extreme course4 ,instead of four elements there is now an infinite number of substances1 each differentiated from the other4 ,the meaning of this wide swing of the pendulum is not altogether clear2 but it is evident from the system of ,anaxagoras that the metals1 for example1 possessed a significance which they can not have had for ,empedocles4 ,the opposite swing of the pendulum is seen in the later course of the ,eleatics4 ,given a predicate as fixed and unified as they assumed1 the subject cannot possibly be conceived in terms of it and hence it is denied outright4 ,in the dialectic of ,zeno and ,melissus1 dealing with the problems of the ,one and the ,many1 there is much that suggests the solution offered by the ,atomists2 but it is probably impossible now to ascertain whether these passages criticise a doctrine already propounded or pointed the way for successors4 ,while the ,eleatics asserted the sole reality of the ,one1 ,anaxagoras and the ,atomists postulated a multiplicity without essential unity4 ,but the human mind seems to be incapable of resting in that decision2 it demands that the world shall have not meanings1 but a meaning4 ,this demand calls not only for a unified predicate1 but also for an effective copula4 #c4 ,we have already remarked that the steps by which the predicate was inferred are for the most part unknown4 ,certain suggestions are contained in the reports of ,aristotle1 but it is safe to say that they are generally guesses well or ill founded4 ,the summary inductive mediation has left few traces2 and the process of verification1 in the course of which hypotheses were rejected and modified1 can be followed only here and there in the records4 ,almost our only source of information is the dialectic of systems4 ,fortunately for our present purpose we do not need to know the precise form which a question assumed to the minds of the several philosophers2 the efforts which they made to meet the imperious demands of logic here speak for themselves4 ,at first there was no scheme for the mediation of the predicate back to the subject4 ,indeed there seems not to have existed in the mind of ,thales a sense of its need4 ,anaximander raised the question1 but the process of segregation or separation 7,greek3 ekkrinesthai7 which he propounded was so vaguely conceived that it has created more problems than it solved4 ,anaximenes first proposed a scheme that has borne fruits4 ,he said that things are produced from air by rarefaction and condensation4 ,this process offers not only a principle of difference1 but also a regulative conception1 the evaluation of which engaged the thought of almost all the later ,pre-,socratics4 ,it implies that extension and mass constitute the essential characters of substance1 and1 fully apprehended1 contains in germ the whole materialistic philosophy from ,parmenides at one extreme to ,democritus and ,anaxagoras at the other4 ,the difficulties inherent in the view were unknown to ,anaximenes2 for1 having a unitary predicate1 he assumed also a homogeneous subject4 ,the logical position of ,heraclitus is similar to that of ,anaximenes4 ,he likewise posits a simple predicate and further signalizes its functional character by naming it ,fire4 ,without venturing upon debatable ground we may say that it was the restless activity of the element that caused him to single it out as best expressing the meaning of things4 ,its rhythmic libration typified to him the principle of change in existence and of existence in change4 ,it is the ever-living copula1 devouring subject and predicate alike and re-creating them functionally as co-ordinate expressions of itself4 ,that which alone is1 the abiding1 is not the physical composition of a thing1 but the law of reciprocity by which it maintains a balance4 ,this he calls variously by the names of ,harmony1 ,logos1 ,necessity1 ,justice4 ,in this system of functional co-ordinates nothing escapes the accounting on ',change2#ia all things are in continuous flux1 only the nodes of the rhythm remaining constant4 ,it is not surprising therefore that ,heraclitus has been the subject of so much speculation and comment in modern times2 for the functional character of all distinctions in his system marks the affinity of his doctrines for those of modern psychology and logic4#ib ,the ,pythagoreans1 having by abstraction obtained a predicate1 acknowledged the existence of the subject1 but did not feel the need of a copula in the theoretical sphere1 except as it concerned the inner relation of the predicate4 ,to them the world was number1 but number itself was pluralistic1 or let us rather say dualistic4 ,the odd and the even1 the generic constituents of number1 had somehow to be brought together4 ,the bond was found in ,unity1 or1 again1 in ,harmony4 ,when they inquired how numbers constituted the world1 their answer was in general only a nugatory exercise of an unbridled fancy4#ic ,such and such a number was ,justice1 such another1 ,man4 ,it was only in the wholly practical sphere of experiment that they reached a conclusion worth recording4 ,its significance they themselves did not perceive4 ,here1 by the application of mathematical measurements to sounds1 they discovered how to produce tones of a given pitch1 and thus successfully demonstrated the efficiency of their copula4 ,the ,eleatics followed the same general course of abstraction2 but with them the sense of the unity of the world effaced its rich diversity4 ,xenophanes does not appear to have pressed the conception so far as to deny all change within the world4 ,parmenides1 however1 bated no jot of the legitimate consequences of his logical position1 interpreting1 as he did1 the predicate1 originally conceived as meaning1 in terms of existence4 ,that which is simply is4 ,thus there is left only a one-time predicate1 now converted into a subject of which only itself1 as a brute fact1 can be predicated4 ,stated logically1 ,parmenides is capable only of uttering identical propositions3 ,a,a4 ,the fallacious character of the report of the senses and the impossibility of ,becoming followed as a matter of course4 ,where the logical copula is a mere sign of equation there can be neither induction nor deduction4 ,we are caught in a theoretical cul-de-sac4 ,we are not now concerned to know in what light the demand for a treatise on the world of ,opinion may have appeared to ,parmenides himself4 ,the avenues by which men reach conclusions which are capable of simplification and syllogistic statement are too various to admit of plausible conjecture in the absence of specific evidence4 ,but it is clear that his resort to the expedient reflected a consciousness of the state of deadlock4 ,in that part of his philosophical poem he dealt with many questions of detail in a rather more practical spirit4 ,following the lead of ,heraclitus and the ,pythagoreans he was more successful here than in the field of metaphysics4 ,thus we see once more that the wounds of theory are healed by practice4 ,but1 as usual1 even though the metaphysician does receive the answer to his doubts by falling into a severely practical pit and extricating himself by steps which he fashions with his hands1 his mental habit is not thereby reconstructed4 ,the fixed predicate of the ,eleatics was bequeathed to the ,platonic-,aristotelian formal logic1 and induction and deduction remained for centuries in theory a race between the hedgehog and the hare4#id ,the true significance of the destructive criticism brought to bear by ,zeno and ,melissus on the concepts of unity1 plurality1 continuity1 extension1 time1 and motion is simply this3 that when by a shift of the attention a predicate becomes subject or meaning fossilizes as existence1 the terms of the logical process lose their functional reference and grow to be unmeaning and self-contradictory4 ,we have already remarked that ,empedocles1 ,anaxagoras1 and the ,atomists sought to solve the problem of the ,one and the ,many1 of the subject and the predicate1 by shattering the unitary predicate and thus leaving the field to plurality in both spheres4 ,but obviously they were merely postponing the real question4 ,thought1 as well as action1 demands a unity somewhere4 ,hence the absorbing task of these philosophers is to disclose or contrive such a bond of unity4 ,the form which their quest assumed was the search for a basis for physical interaction4#ie ,empedocles clearly believed that he was solving the difficulty in one form when he instituted the rhythmic libration between unity under the sway of ,love and multiplicity under the domination of ,hate4 ,but even he was not satisfied with that4 ,while ,love brought all the elements together into a sphere and thus produced a unity1 it was a unity constituted of a mixture of elements possessing inalienable characters not only different but actually antagonistic4 ,on the other hand1 ,hate did indeed separate the confused particles1 but it effected a sort of unity in that1 by segregating the particles of the several elements from the others1 it brought like and like together4 ,in so far ,aristotle was clearly right in attributing to ,love the power to separate as well as to unite4 ,moreover1 it would seem that there never was a moment in which both agencies were not conceived to be operative1 to however small an extent4 ,empedocles asserted1 however1 that a world could arise only in the intervals between the extremes of victory in the contest between ,love and ,hate1 when1 so to speak1 the battle was drawn and there was a general mle of the combatants4 ,it may be questioned1 perhaps1 whether he distinctly stated that in our world everything possessed its portion of each of the elements2 but so indispensable did he consider this mixture that its function of providing a physical unity is unmistakable4 ,a further evidence of his insistent demand for unity--the copula--is found in his doctrine that only like can act on like2 and the scheme of pores and effluvia which he contrived bears eloquent testimony to the earnest consideration he gave to this matter4 ,for he conceived that all interaction took place by means of them4 ,empedocles1 then1 may be said to have annulled the decree of divorce he had issued for the elements at the beginning4 ,but the solution here too is found1 not in the theoretical1 but in the practical1 sphere2 for he never retracts his assertion that the elements are distinct and antagonistic4 ,but even so his problem is defined rather than solved2 for after the elements have been brought within microscopic distance of each other in the mixture1 since like can act only on like1 the narrow space that separates them is still an impassable gulf4#if ,anaxagoras endowed his infinitely numerous substances with the same characters of fixity and contrariety that mark the four elements of ,empedocles4 ,for him1 therefore1 the difficulty of securing unity and co-operation in an effective copula is1 if that be possible1 further aggravated4 ,his grasp of the problem1 if we may judge from the relatively small body of documentary evidence1 was not so sure as that of ,empedocles1 though he employed in general the same means for its solution4 ,he too postulates a mixture of all substances1 more consciously and definitely indeed than his predecessor4 ,believing that only like can act on like1#ig he is led to assume not only an infinite multiplicity of substances1 but also their complete mixture1 so that everything1 however small1 contains a portion of every other4 ,food1 for example1 however seeming-simple1 nourishes the most diverse tissues of the body4 ,thus we discover in the universal mixture of substances the basis for co-operation and interaction4 ,anaxagoras1 therefore1 like ,empedocles1 feels the need of bridging the chasm which he has assumed to exist between his distinct substances4 ,their failure is alike great1 and is due to the presuppositions they inherited from the ,eleatic conception of a severe homogeneity which implies an absolute difference from everything else4 ,the embarrassment of ,anaxagoras increases with the introduction of the ,greek3 ,nous4 ,this agency was conceived with a view to explaining the formation of the world2 that is1 with a view to mediating between the myriad substances in their essential aloofness and effecting the harmonious concord of concrete things4 ,while1 even on the basis of a universal mixture1 the function of the ,greek3 ,nous was foredoomed to failure1 its task was made more difficult still by the definition given to its nature4 ,according to ,anaxagoras it was the sole exception to the composite character of things2 it is absolutely pure and simple in nature4#ih ,by its definition1 then1 it is prevented from accomplishing the work it was contrived to do2 and hence we cannot be surprised at the lamentations raised by ,plato and ,aristotle about the failure of ,anaxagoras to employ the agency he had introduced4 ,to be sure1 the ,greek3 ,nous is no more a deus ex machina than were the ideas of ,plato or the ,god of ,aristotle4 ,they all labored under the same restrictions4 ,the ,atomists followed with the same recognition of the ,many1 in the infinitely various kinds of atoms2 but it was tempered by the assumption of an essential homogeneity4 ,one atom is distinguished from another by characteristics due to its spatial relations4 ,mass and weight are proportional to size4 ,aristotle reports that1 though things and atoms have differences1 it is not in virtue of their differences1 but in virtue of their essential identity1 that they interact4#ii ,there is thus introduced a distinction which runs nearly1 but not quite1 parallel to that between primary and secondary qualities4#ajj ,primary qualities are those of size1 shape1 and perhaps#aja position2 all others are secondary4 ,on the other hand1 that which is common to all atoms is their corporeity1 which does indeed define itself with reference to the primary 7spatial7 qualities1 but not alike in all4 ,the atoms of which the world is constituted are alike in essential nature1 but they differ most widely in position4 ,it is the void that breaks up the unity of the world--atomizes it1 if we may use the expression4 ,it is the basis of all discontinuity4 ,atoms and void are thus polar extremes reciprocally exclusive4 ,the atoms in their utter isolation in space are incapable of producing a world4 ,in order to bridge the chasm between atom and atom1 recourse is had to motion eternal1 omnipresent1 and necessary4 ,this it is that annihilates distances4 ,in the course of their motion atoms collide1 and in their impact one upon the other the ,atomists find the precise mode of co-operation by which the world is formed4#ajb ,to this agency are due what ,lucretius happily called generating motions4 ,the problem1 however1 so insistently pursued the philosophers of this time that the ,atomists did not content themselves with this solution1 satisfactory as modern science has pretended to consider it4 ,they followed the lead of ,empedocles and ,anaxagoras in postulating a widespread1 if not absolutely universal1 mixture4 ,having on principle excluded essential differences among the atoms1 the impossibility of finally distinguishing essential and non-essential had its revenge4 ,important as the device of mixture was to ,empedocles and ,anaxagoras1 just so unmeaning ought it to have been in the ,atomic philosophy1 provided that the hypothesis could accomplish what was claimed for it4 ,it is not necessary to reassert that the assumption of individua1 utterly alienated one from the other by a void1 rendered the problem of the copula insoluble for the ,atomists4 ,diogenes of ,apollonia is commonly treated contemptuously as a mere reactionary who harked back to ,anaximenes and had no significance of his own4 ,the best that can be said of such an attitude is that it regards philosophical theories as accidental utterances of individuals1 naturally well or ill endowed1 who happen to express conclusions with which men in after times agree or disagree4 ,a philosophical tenet is an atom1 set somewhere in a vacuum1 utterly out of relation to everything else4 ,but it is impossible to see how1 on this theory1 any system of thought should possess any significance for anybody1 or how there should be any progress even1 or retardation4 ,viewed entirely from without1 the doctrine of ,diogenes would seem to be substantially a recrudescence of that of ,anaximenes4 ,air is once more the element or ,greek3 arch out of which all proceeds and into which all returns4 ,again the process of transformation is seen in rarefaction and condensation2 and the attributes of substance are those which were common to the early hylozoists4 ,but there is present a keen sense of a problem unknown to ,anaximenes4 ,what the early philosopher asserted in the innocence of the youth of thought1 the later physiologist reiterates with emphasis because he believes that the words are words of life4 ,the motive for recurring to the earlier system is supplied by the imperious demand for a copula which had so much distressed ,empedocles1 ,anaxagoras1 and the ,atomists4 ,and here we are not left to conjecture1 but are able to refer to the ipsissima verba of our philosopher4 ,after a brief prologue1 in which he stated that one's starting-point must be beyond dispute1 he immediately#ajc turned to his theme in these words3#ajd ,in my opinion1 to put the whole matter in a nutshell1 all things are derived by alteration from the same substance1 and indeed all are one and the same4 ,and this is altogether evident4 ,for if the things that now exist in the world--earth and water and air and fire and whatsoever else appears to exist in this world--if1 ,i say1 any one of these were different from the other1 different that is to say in its proper peculiar nature1 and did not rather1 being one and the same1 change and alter in many ways1 then in no-wise would things be able to mix with one another1 nor would help or harm come to one from the other1 nor would any plant spring from the earth1 nor any other living thing come into being1 if things were not so constituted as to be one and the same4 ,these words contain a singularly interesting expression of the need of restoring the integrity of the process which had been lost in the effort to solve the problem of the ,one and the ,many without abandoning the point of view won by the ,eleatics4 ,aristotle and ,theophrastus paraphrase and sum up the passage above quoted by saying#aje that interaction is impossible except on the assumption that all the world is one and the same4 ,hence it is manifest1 as was said above1 that the return of ,diogenes to the monistic system of ,anaximenes had for its conscious motive the avoidance of the dualism that had sprung up in the interval and had rendered futile the multiplied efforts to secure an effective copula4 ,we should note1 however1 that in the attempt thus made to undo the work of several generations ,diogenes retained the principle which had wrought the mischief4 ,we have before remarked that the germ of the ,atomic philosophy was contained in the process of rarefaction and condensation4 ,hence1 in accepting it along with the remainder of ,anaximenes's theory1 the fatal assumption was reinstated4 ,it is the story of human systems in epitome4 ,the superstructure is overthrown1 and with the dbris a new edifice is built upon the old foundations4 ,in the entire course of philosophical thought from ,thales onward the suggestion of an opposition between the subject and the predicate had appeared4 ,it has often been said that it was expressed by the search for a ,greek3 physis1 or a true nature1 in contrast with the world as practically accepted4 ,there is a certain truth in this view2 for the effort to attain a predicate which does not merely repeat the subject does imply that there is an opposition4 ,but the efforts made to return from the predicate to the subject1 in a deductive movement1 shows that the difference was not believed to be absolute4 ,this is true1 however1 only of those fields of speculation that lie next to the highways of practical life1 which lead equally in both directions1 or1 let us rather say1 which unite while they mark separation4 ,in the sphere of abstract ideas the sense of embarrassment was deep and constantly growing deeper4 ,the reconstruction1 accomplished on lower levels1 did not attain unto those heights4 ,men doubted conclusions1 but did not think to demand the credentials of their common presuppositions4 ,side by side with the later philosophers whom we have mentioned there walked men whom we are wont to call the ,sophists4 ,they were the journalists and pamphleteers of those days1 men who1 without dealing profoundly with any special problem1 familiarized themselves with the generalizations of workers in special fields and combined these ideas for the entertainment of the public4 ,they were neither philosophers nor physicists1 but1 like some men whom we might cite from our own times1 endeavored to popularize the teachings of both4 ,naturally they seized upon the most sweeping generalizations and the preconceptions which disclosed themselves in manifold forms4 ,just as naturally they had no eyes with which to detect the significance of the besetting problems at which1 in matters more concrete1 the masters were toiling4 ,hence the contradictions1 revealed in the analysis we have just given of the philosophy of the age1 stood out in utter nakedness4 ,the result was inevitable4 ,the inability to discover a unitary predicate1 more still1 the failure to attain a working copula1 led directly to the denial of the possibility of predication4 ,there was no truth4 ,granted that it existed1 it could not be known4 ,even if known1 it could not be communicated4 ,in these incisive words of ,gorgias the conclusion of the ineffectual effort to establish a logic of science is clearly stated4 ,but the statement is happily only the half-truth1 which is almost a complete falsehood4 ,it takes no account of the indications1 everywhere present1 of a needed reconstruction4 ,least of all does it catch the meaning of such a demand4 ,the ,sophists did not1 however1 merely repeat in abstract from the teachings of the philosophers4 ,it matters not whether they originated the movement or not2 at all events they were pioneers in the field of moral philosophy4 ,here it was that they chiefly drew the inferences from the distinction between ,greek3 physei and ,greek3 nom4 ,nothing could have been more effective in disengaging the firmly rooted moral pre-possessions and rendering them amenable to philosophy4 ,just here1 at last1 we catch a hint of the significance of the logical process4 ,in a striking passage in ,plato's ,protagoras1#ajf which one is fain to regard as an essentially true reproduction of a discourse by that great man1 ,justice and ,reverence are accorded true validity4 ,on inquiring to what characteristic this honorable distinction is due1 we find that it does not reside in themselves2 it is due to the assumption that a state must exist4 ,here1 then1 in a word1 is the upshot of the logical movement4 ,logical predicates are essentially hypothetical1 deriving their validity from the interest that moves men to affirm them4 ,when they lose this hypothetical character1 as terms within a volitional system1 and set up as entities at large1 they cease to function and forfeit their right to exist4 ,x ,,valuation ,,as ,a ,,logical ,,process ,the purpose of this discussion is to supply the main outlines of a theory of value based upon analysis of the valuation-process from the logical point of view4 ,the general principle which we shall seek to establish is that judgments of value1 whether passed upon things or upon modes of conduct1 are essentially objective in import1 and that they are reached through a process of valuation which is essentially of the same logical character as the judgment-process whereby conclusions of physical fact are established--in a word1 that the valuation-process1 issuing in the finished judgment of value expressive of the judging person's definitive attitude toward the thing in question1 is constructive of an order of reality in the same sense as1 in current theories of knowledge1 is the judgment of sense-perception and science4 ,our method of procedure to this end will be that of assuming1 and adhering to as consistently as possible1 the standpoint of the individual in the process of deliberating upon an ethical or economic problem 7for1 as we shall hold1 all values properly so called are either ethical or economic71 and of ascertaining1 as accurately as may be1 the meaning of the deliberative or evaluating process and of the various factors in it as these are presented in the individual's apprehension4 ,it is in this sense that our procedure will be logical rather than psychological4 ,we shall be concerned to determine the meaning of the object of valuation as object1 of the standard of value as standard1 and of the valued object as valued1 in terms of the individual's own apprehension of these1 rather than to ascertain the nature and conditions of his apprehensions of these considered as psychical events4 ,our attention will throughout be directed to these factors or phases of the valuation-process in their functional aspect of determinants of the valuing agent's practical attitude1 and never1 excepting for purposes of incidental illustration and in a very general and tentative way1 as events in consciousness mediated by more elementary psychical processes4 ,the results which we shall gain by adhering to this method will enable us to see not merely that our judgments of value are in function and meaning objective1 but also that our judgments of sense-perception and science are1 as such1 capable of satisfactory interpretation only as being incidental to the attainment and progressive reconstruction of judgments of value4 ,the first three main divisions will be given over to establishing the objectivity of content and function of judgments of value4 ,the fourth division will present a detailed analysis of the two types of judgment of value1 the ethical and economic1 defining them and relating them to each other1 and correlating them in the manner just suggested with judgment of the physical type4 ,after considering1 in the fifth part1 certain general objections to the positions thus stated1 we shall proceed in the sixth and concluding division to define the function of the consciousness of value in the economy of life4#ajg ,i ,the system of judgments which defines what one calls the objective order of things is inevitably unique for each particular individual4 ,no two men can view the world from the standpoint of the same theoretical and practical interests1 nor can any two proceed in the work of gaining for themselves knowledge of the world with precisely equal degrees of skill and accuracy4 ,each must be prompted and guided1 in the construction of his knowledge of single things and of the system in which they have their being1 by his own particular interests and aims2 and even when one person in a measure shares in the interests and aims of another1 the rate and manner of procedure will not be the same for both1 nor will the knowledge gained be for both equally systematic in arrangement or in interrelation of its parts4 ,each man lives in a world of his own--a world1 indeed1 identical in certain fundamental respects with the worlds which his fellow-men have constructed for themselves1 but one nevertheless necessarily unique through and through because each man is a unique individual4 ,there is1 doubtless1 a social currency of objects which implies a certain identity of meaning in objects as experienced by different individuals4 ,the existence of society presupposes1 and its evolution in turn develops and extends1 a system of generally accepted objects and relations4 ,nevertheless1 the socially current object is1 as such1 an abstraction just as the uniform social individual is likewise an abstraction4 ,the only concrete object ever actually known or in any wise experienced by any person is the object as constructed by that person in accordance with his own aims and purposes1 and in which there is1 therefore1 a large and important share of meaning which is significant to no one else4 ,it is needless in this discussion to dwell at length upon the general principle of recent functional psychology1 that practical ends are the controlling factors in the acquisition of our knowledge of objective things4 ,we shall take for granted the truth of the general proposition that cognition1 in whatever sphere of science or of practical life1 is essentially teleological in the sense of being incidental always1 more or less directly1 to the attainment of ends4 ,cognition1 as the apperceptive or attentive process1 is essentially the process of scrutinizing a situation 7whether theoretical or practical7 with a view to determining the availability for one's intended purpose of such objects and conditions as the situation may present4 ,the objects and conditions thus determined will be made use of or ignored1 counted upon as advantageous or guarded against as unfavorable--in a word1 responded to--in ways suggested by their character as ascertained through reference to the interest in question4 ,in this sense1 then1 objective things as known by individual persons are essentially complex stimuli whose proper function and reason for being it is to elicit useful responses in the way of conduct--responses conducive to the realization of ends4 ,from this point of view1 then1 the difference between one person's knowledge of a particular object and another's signifies 7#a7 a difference between these persons' original purposes in setting out to gain knowledge of the object1 and 7#b7 consequently a difference between their present ways of acting with reference to the object4 ,the bare object as socially current is1 at best1 for each individual simply a ground upon which subsequent construction may be made2 and the subsequent construction which each individual is prompted by his circumstances and is able to work out in judgment first makes the object1 for this individual1 real and for his purposes complete4 ,now1 it is our primary intention to show that objects are1 in cases of a certain important class1 not yet ready to serve the person who knows them in their proper character of stimuli1 when they have been1 even exhaustively1 defined in merely physical terms4 ,it is very often not enough that the dimensions of an object and its physical properties1 even the more recondite ones as well as those more commonly understood--it is often not enough for the purposes of an agent that these characters should make up the whole sum of his knowledge of the object in question4 ,a measure of knowledge in terms of physical categories is often only a beginning--the result of a preliminary stage of the entire process of teleological determination1 which must be carried through before the object of attention can be satisfactorily known4 ,in the present study of the logic of valuation we shall be occupied exclusively with the discussion of cases of this kind4 ,in our judgments of sense-perception and physical science we have presented to us material objects in their physical aspect4 ,when these latter are inadequate to suggest or warrant overt conduct1 our knowledge of them must be supplemented and reconstructed in ways presently to be specified4 ,it is in the outcome of judgment-processes in which this work of supplementing and reconstructing is carried through that the consciousness of value1 in the proper sense1 arises1 and these processes1 then1 are those which we shall here consider under the name of processes of valuation4 ,they will therefore best be approached through specification of the ways in which our physical judgments may be inadequate4 ,let us1 then1 assume1 as has been indicated1 that the process of acquiring knowledge--that is to say1 the process of judgment or attention--is in every case of its occurrence incidental to the attainment of an end4 ,we must make this assumption without attempting formally to justify it--though in the course of our discussion it will be abundantly illustrated4 ,let us1 in accordance with this view1 think of the typical judgment-process as proceeding1 in the main1 as follows3 ,first of all must come a sense of need or deficiency1 which may1 on occasion1 be preceded by a more or less violent and sudden shock to the senses1 forcibly turning one's attention to the need of immediate action4 ,by degrees this sense of need will grow more definite and come to express itself in a more or less clear and distinct image of an end1 toward which end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he looks with much or little of emotion4 ,the emergence of the end into consciousness immediately makes possible and occasions definite analysis of the situation in which the end must be worked out4 ,salient features of the situation forthwith are noticed--whether useful things or favoring conditions1 or1 on the other hand1 the absence of any such4 ,thus predicates and then subjects for many subsidiary judgments in the comprehensive judgment-process emerge together in action and interaction upon each other4 ,the predicates1 developed out of the general end toward which the agent strives1 afford successive points of view for fresh analyses of the situation4 ,the logical subjects thus discovered--objects of attention and knowledge--require1 on the other hand1 as they are scrutinized and judged1 modification and re-examination of the end4 ,the end grows clearer and fuller of detail as the predicates or implied 7constituent7 ideas which are developed out of it are distinguished from each other and used in making one's inventory of the objective situation4 ,conversely1 the situation loses its first aspect of confusion and takes on more and more the aspect of an orderly assemblage of objects and conditions1 useful1 indifferent1 and adverse1 by means of which the end may in greater or less measure be attained or must1 in however greatly modified a form1 be defeated4 ,now1 in this development of the judgment-process1 it must be observed1 the end must be more or less clearly and consistently conceived throughout as an activity1 if the objective means of action which have been determined in the process are not to be1 at the last1 separate and unrelated data still requiring co-ordination4 ,if the end has been so conceived1 the means will inevitably be known as members of a mechanical system1 since the predicates by which they have been determined have at every point involved this factor of amenability to co-ordination4 ,the judgment-process1 if properly conducted and brought to a conclusion1 must issue at the end in the functional unity of a finished plan of conduct with a perfected mechanical co-ordination of the available means4 ,we have now to see that much more may be involved in such a process as this than has been explicitly stated in our brief analysis4 ,for the end itself may be a matter of deliberation1 just as must be the physical means of accomplishing it2 and1 again1 the means may call for scrutiny and determination from other points of view than the physical and mechanical4 ,the final action taken at the end may express the outcome of deliberate ethical and economic judgment as well as of judgments in the sphere of sense-perception and physical science4 ,let us consider1 for example1 that one's end is the construction of a house upon a certain plot of ground4 ,this end expresses the felt need of a more comfortable or more reputable abode1 and has so much of general presumption in its favor4 ,there may1 however1 be many reasons for hesitation4 ,the cost in time or money or materials on hand may tax one's resources and injuriously curtail one's activities along other lines4 ,and there may be ethical reasons why the plan should not be carried out4 ,the house may shut off a pleasing prospect from the view of the entire neighborhood and serve no better end than the gratification of its owner's selfish vanity4 ,it will cost a sum of money which might be used in paying just1 though outlawed1 debts4 ,now1 from the standpoint of such problems as these the fullest possible preliminary knowledge of the physical and mechanical fitness of our means must still be very abstract and general4 ,it would be of use in any undertaking like the one we have supposed1 but it is not sufficient in so far as the problem is one's own problem1 concrete1 particular1 and so unique4 ,one may1 of course1 proceed to the stage of physical judgment without having settled the ethical problems which may have presented themselves at the outset4 ,the end may be entertained tentatively as a hypothesis until certain mechanical problems have been dealt with4 ,but manifestly this is only postponement of the issue4 ,the agent is still quite unprepared1 even after the means have been so far determined1 to take the first step in the execution of the plan2 indeed1 his uncertainty is probably only the more harassing than before4 ,moreover1 the economic problems in the case are now more sharply defined1 and these for the time being still further darken counsel4 ,manifestly the need for deliberation is at this point quite as urgent as the need for physical determination can ever be1 and the need is evidenced in the same way by the actual arrest and postponement of overt conduct4 ,the agent1 despite his physical knowledge1 is not yet free to embrace the end and1 having done so1 use thereto the means at his disposal4 ,it is plainly impossible to use the physical means until one knows in terms of ,substance and ,attribute or ,cause and ,effect1 or whatever other physical categories one may please1 what manner of behavior may be expected of them4 ,so likewise is it as truly impossible1 for one intellectually and morally capable of appreciating problems of a more advanced and complex sort1 to exploit the physical properties thus discovered until ethical determination of the end and economic determination of the means have been completed4#ajh ,there are1 then1 we conclude1 cases in which physical determination of the means is by itself not a sufficient preparation for conduct--in which there are ethical and economic problems which delay the application of the physical means to the end to which they may be physically adapted4 ,indeed1 so much as this may well appear as sufficiently obvious without extended illustration4 ,everyone knows that it is nearly always necessary1 in undertaking any work in which material things are used as means1 to count the cost2 and everyone knows likewise that not every end that is in any way attractive and within one's reach may without more ado be taken as an object of settled desire and effort4 ,it is indeed needless to elaborate these commonplaces in the sense in which they are commonly understood4 ,however1 such is not our present purpose4 ,our purpose is the more specific one of showing that the meaning of ,objectivity must be widened so as to include 7#a7 the universe of ends in their ethical aspect and 7#b7 the economic aspect of the means of action1 as well as 7#c7 the physical aspect to which the character of ,objectivity is commonly restricted4 ,we shall maintain that these are parts or phases of a complete conception of ,reality1 and that of them1 consequently1 ,objectivity must be predicated for every essential reason connoted by such characterization of the world of things external to the senses4 ,it has been with this conclusion in mind1 then1 that we have sought to emphasize the frequent serious inadequacy1 for practical purposes1 of the merely physical determination of the means in one's environment4 ,the principle thus suggested would imply that the ethical and economic stages in the one inclusive process of reflective attention should be regarded as involving1 when they occur1 the same logical function of judgment as is operative in the sphere of sense-perception and the sciences generally4 ,ethical and economic factors must on occasion be present at the final choice and shaping of one's course of conduct1 along with the physical determinations of environing means and conditions which one has made in sense-perception4 ,there is1 then1 it would appear1 at least a fair presumption1 though not indeed an a priori certainty1 that these ethical and economic factors or conditions have1 like the physical1 taken form in a judgment-process which will admit of profitable analysis in accordance with whatever general theory of judgment one may hold as valid elsewhere in the field of knowledge4 ,this presumption we shall seek to verify4 ,now1 our interest in thus determining1 first of all1 the logical character of these processes will readily be understood from this1 that1 in the present view1 these are the processes1 and the only ones in our experience1 which are properly to be regarded as processes of ,valuation4 ,we shall hold that ,valuation1 and so all consciousness of ,value1 properly so called1 must be either ethical or economic2 that the only conscious processes in which ,values can come to definition are these processes of ethical and economic judgment4 ,the present theory of ,value is1 then1 essentially a logical one1 in the sense of holding that ,values are determined in and by a logical--that is1 a judgmental--valuation-process and in its details is closely dependent upon the general conception of judgment of which the outlines have been sketched above4 ,accordingly1 the exposition must proceed in the following general order3 ,assuming the conception of judgment which has been presented 7which our discussion will in several ways further illustrate and so tend to confirm71 we shall seek to show that the determinations made in ethical and economic judgment are in the proper sense objective4 ,this will involve1 first of all1 a statement of the conditions under which the ethical and economic judgments respectively arise--which statement will serve to distinguish the two types of judgment from each other4 ,we shall then proceed to the special analysis of the ethical and economic forms from the standpoint of our general theory of judgment1 thereby establishing in detail the judgmental character of these parts of the reflective process4 ,this analysis will serve to introduce our interpretation of the consciousness of ,value as a factor in the conduct and economy of life4 ,,ii ,let us then define the problem of the objective reference of the valuational judgments by stating1 as distinctly as may be1 the conditions by which ethical and economic deliberation1 respectively1 are prompted4 ,a study of these conditions will make it easier to see in what way the judgments reached in dealing with them can be objective4 ,when will an end1 presenting itself in consciousness in the manner indicated in our brief analysis of the judgment-process1 become the center of attention1 thereby checking the advance1 through investigation of the possible means1 to final overt action8 ,this is the general statement of the problem of the typical ethical situation4 ,manifestly there will be no ethical deliberation if the imaged end at once turns the attention toward the environment of possible means1 instead of first of all itself becoming the object instead of the director of attention2 there will be no suspension of progress toward final action1 excepting such as may later come through difficulty in the discovery and co-ordination of the means4 ,however1 there are cases in which the emergence of the end forthwith is followed by a check to the reflective process1 and the agent shrinks from the end presented in imagination as being1 let us say1 one forbidden by authority or one repugnant to his own established standards4 ,the end may in such a case disappear at once2 very often it will insistently remain4 ,on this latter supposition1 the simplest possibility will be the development of a mere mechanical tension1 a pull and haul between the end1 or properly the impulses which it represents1 and the agent's habit of suppressing impulses of the class to which the present one is1 perhaps intuitively1 recognized as belonging4 ,the case is the common one of temptation on the one side and principle or conscience on the other1 and so long as the two forces remain thus in hard-and-fast opposition to each other there can be no ethical deliberation or judgment in a proper sense4 ,the standard or habit may gain the day by sheer mechanical excess of power1 or the new impulse1 the temptation1 may prevail because its onset can break down the mechanical resistance4 ,out of such a situation as this1 however1 genuine ethical deliberation may arise on condition that standard and temptation can lose something of their abstractness and their hard-and-fast opposition1 and develop into terms of concrete meaning4 ,the agent may come to see that the end is in some definite way of really vital interest and too important to be put aside without consideration4 ,he may1 of course1 in this fall into gross self-sophistication1 like the drunkard in the classical instance who takes another glass to test his self-control and thereby gain assurance1 or he may act with wisdom and with full sincerity1 like ,dorothea ,casaubon when she renounced the impossible task imposed by her departed husband4 ,in the moral life one can ask or hope for complete exemption from the risk of self-deception with as little reason as in scientific research4 ,but however this may be1 our present interest is in the method1 not in particular results of ethical reflection4 ,whether properly so in a particular case or not1 the imaged end may come to seem at least plausibly defensible on grounds of principle which serve to sanction certain other modes of conduct to which a place is given in the accepted scheme of life2 or the end may simply press for a relatively independent recognition on the very general ground that its emergence represents an enlargement and new development of the personality4#aji ,the end may thus cease to stand in the character of blind self-assertive impulse1 and press its claim as a positive means of future moral growth1 as bringing freedom from repressive and enfeebling restraints and as tending to the reinforcement of other already valued modes of conduct4 ,on the other hand1 the standard will cease to stand as mere resistance and negation1 and may discover something of its hidden meaning as a product of long experience and slow growth1 and as perhaps a vital part of the organization of one's present life1 not to be touched without grave risk4 ,now1 on whichever side the development may first commence1 a like development must soon follow on the other1 and it is the action and reaction of standard and prospective or problematic end upon each other that constitutes the process of ethical deliberation or judgment4 ,just as in the typical judgment-process1 as sketched above1 so also here predicate and subject develop each other1 when once they have given over their first antagonism and come to the attitude of reasoning together4 ,the predicate explains itself that the subject or new end may be searchingly and fairly tested2 and under this scrutiny the subject develops its full meaning as a course of conduct1 thereby prompting further analysis and reinterpretation of the standard4 ,but this is not the place for detailed analysis of the process2#aaj here we are concerned only to define the type of situation1 and this we may now do in the following terms3 ,the indispensable condition of ethical judgment is the presence in the agent's mind of at least two rival interesting ends or systems of such ends4 ,in the foregoing1 the subject of the judgment is the new end that has arisen2 the predicate or standard is the symbol for the old ends or values which in the tension of the judgment-process must be brought to more or less explicit enumeration--and1 we must add1 reconstruction also4 ,indeed1 it is important1 even at this stage of our discussion1 to observe that ,predicate and ,standard are not equivalent in meaning4 ,the predicate1 or predicative side1 of judgment is the imagery of control in the process1 which1 as we have seen1 develops with the subject side2 while the term ,standard connotes the rigid fixity which belongs to the inhibiting concept or ideal in the stage before the judgment-process proper can begin4 ,the ethical judgment-process is1 in a word1 just the process of reconstructing standards--as in its other and corresponding aspect it is the process of interpreting new ends4 ,those who oppose measures of social reform or new modes of conduct or belief on alleged grounds of immorality instinctively feel in doing so that the change may make its way more easily against a resistance that will candidly explain itself2 and1 on the other side of the social judgment-process1 the more fanatical know how to turn to good advantage for their propaganda the bitterness or contempt of those who represent the established order4 ,on both sides there are those who trust more in mechanical pull and haul than in the intrinsic merits of their cause4 ,thus it is by encountering some rival end or entire system of ends1 as symbolized by an ideal1 that a new end emerging out of impulse comes to stand for an agent1 as the center of a problem of conduct1 and so to occupy the center of attention4 ,and it thereby becomes an ,object1 as we shall hold1 which must be more fully defined in order that it may be valued1 and accordingly be held to warrant a determinate attitude toward itself on the agent's part4 ,we have now to define in the same general terms the typical economic situation4 ,in economic theory as in common thought it is not the contemplated act of applying certain means to the attainment of an end regarded as desirable that functions as the logical subject of valuation4 ,the thing or object valued in the economic situation is one's present wealth1 whether material or immaterial1 one's services or labor--whatever one gives in exchange or otherwise sets apart for the attainment of a desired end or1 proximately1 to secure possession of the necessary and sufficient means to the attainment of a desired end4 ,the object of attention in the valuing process is here not itself an end of action4 ,in this respect the economic type of judgment is like the physical1 for in both the object to be valued is a certain means which one is seeking to adapt to some more or less definitely imaged purpose2 or a condition of which one wishes1 likewise for some special purpose1 to take advantage4 ,the ultimate goal of all judgment is the determination of a course of conduct looking toward an end1 and our present problem may accordingly be stated in the following terms3 ,under what circumstances in the judgment-process does it become necessary to the definition and attainment of an end as yet vague and indeterminate that the requisite means1 as in part already physically determined1 should be further scrutinized in attention and determined from the economic point of view8 ,or1 in a word3 ,what is the jurisdiction of the economic point of view8 ,for ordinary judgements of sense-perception the presence in consciousness of a single unquestioned end is the adequate occasion1 as our analysis 7assuming its validity7 has shown4 ,for ethical judgment we have seen that the presence of conflicting ends is necessary2 and we shall now hold that this condition is necessary1 though not1 without a certain qualification1 adequate1 for the economic type as well4 ,if an imaged end can hold its place in consciousness without a rival1 and the physical means of attaining it have been found and co-ordinated1 then the use or consumption of the means must inevitably follow1 without either ethical or economic judgement2 for1 to paraphrase the saying of ,professor ,james1 nothing but an end can displace or inhibit effort toward another end4 ,the economic situation differs1 then1 from the ethical in this1 that the end or system of ends entering into competition with the one for the time being of chief and primary interest has been brought to consciousness through reference to those physical means which already have been determined as necessary to this latter end4 ,the conflict of ends in the economic situation1 that is to say1 is not due to a direct and intrinsic incompatibility between them4 ,where there manifestly is such incompatibility1 judgment will be of the ethical type--as when building the house involves the foreclosure of a mortgage1 and so1 in working an injury to the holder of the site1 may do violence to one's ideal of friendship or of more special obligation2 or when an impulse to intemperate self-indulgence is met by one's ideal of social usefulness4 ,in cases such as these one clearly sees1 or can on reflection come to see1 in what way an evil result to personal character will follow upon the imminent misdeed1 and in what way suppression of the momentary impulse will conserve the entire approved and established way of life4 ,very often1 however1 the conflicting ends are related in no such mutually exclusive way4 ,each may be in itself permissible and compatible with the other1 and1 so far as any possible ethical discrimination can determine1 there is no ground for choice between them4 ,thus it is only through the fact that both ends are dependent upon a limited supply of means that one would1 for example1 ever bring together and deliberately oppose in judgment the purpose of making additions to his library and the necessity of providing a store of fuel for the winter4 ,both ends in such a case are in themselves indeed permissible in a general way1 but they may very well not both of them be economically possible1 and hence1 for the person in question and in the presence of the economic conditions which confront him1 not1 in the last analysis1 both ethically possible4 ,when there is a conflict between two ends that stand in close organic relation in the sense explained above1 the problem is an ethical one2 when the conflict is1 in the sense explained1 one of competition between ends ethically permissible--not at variance1 either one1 that is1 with other ends directly--for the whole or for a share of one's supply of means1 the problem is of the economic type4#aaa ,there are three typical cases in which economic judgment or valuation of the means is necessary1 and the enumeration of these will make clear the relation between the ethical and the economic types of judgment3 7#a7 ,first may be mentioned the case in which ethical deliberation has apparently reached its end in the formation of a plan of action which1 so far as one can see1 on ethical grounds is unobjectionable4 ,a definite temptation may have been overcome1 or out of a more complex situation a satisfactory ethical compromise or readjustment may have been developed with much difficulty4 ,now1 there are very often cases in which such a course of action still may not be entered on without further hesitation2 for1 if the plan be one requiring for its working out the use of material means1 the fact of an existing limitation of one's supply of means must bring hitherto unthought of ends into conflict with it4 ,there are doubtless many situations in which one's moral choice may be carried into practice without consideration of ways and means1 as when one forgives an injury or holds his instinctive nature under discipline in the effort to attain an ascetic or a genuinely social ideal of character4 ,but more often than the moral rigorist cares to see1 questions of an economic nature must be raised after the ethical evidence is all in--questions which are probably more trying to a sensitive moral nature than those more dramatic situations in which the real perils of self-sophistication are vastly less1 and the simpler1 sharper definition of the issue makes possible a less difficult1 though a more decisive and edifying1 victory4 7#b7 ,in the second place are those cases in which the end that has emerged is without conspicuous moral quality1 because1 although it may represent some worthy impulse1 it has not been obliged to make its way to acceptance against the resistance of desires less worthy than itself4 ,this is the ideal case of economic theory in which moral distinctions are irrelevant1 and the economic man is free1 according to the myth1 to perform his hedonistic calculations without thought of moral scruple4 ,the end ethically acceptable in itself1 like the enriching of one's library1 must1 when the means are limited1 divert a portion of the means from other uses1 and will thus1 through reference to the indispensable means1 engage in conflict with other ends quite remotely1 if in the agent's knowledge at all1 related with itself4 7#c7 ,finally we reach the limit of apparent freedom from ethical considerations in the operations of business institutions1 and perhaps especially in those of large business corporations4 ,apart from the routine operations of a business which involve no present exercise of the valuing judgment1 there are constantly in such institutions new projects which must be considered1 and which commonly must involve revaluation of the means4 ,in this revaluation the principle of greatest revenue is supposed to be the sole criterion1 regardless of other personal or social points of view from which confessedly the measure might be considered4 ,but such a supposition1 however true to the facts of current business practice it may be1 we must hold to be an abstraction when viewed from the standpoint of the social life at large1 and hence no real exception to our general principle4 ,the economic and the ethical situations differ1 as types1 only in the closeness of relation between the ends that are in conflict and in the manner in which the ends are first brought into conflict--not in respect of the intrinsic nature of the ends which are involved in them4#aab ,it is this difference which1 as we shall see1 explains why ethical valuation must be of ends1 and economic valuation1 on the other hand1 of means4 ,we have yet to see in what way valuation of the means of action can serve to resolve a difficulty of the type which has thus been designated as ,economic4 ,the question must be deferred until a more detailed analysis of the economic judgment-process can be undertaken4 ,it is enough for our present purpose to note that the subject of valuation in this process is the means1 and to see that under the typical conditions which have been described some further determination of the means than the merely physical one of their factual availability for the competing ends is needed4#aac ,physically and mechanically the means are available for each one of the ends or groups of ends in question2 the pressing problem is to determine for which one of the ends1 if any1 or to what compromise or readjustment of certain of the ends or all of them1 the means at hand are in an economic sense most properly available4#aad ,from this preliminary discussion of the ethical and economic situations we must now pass to discuss the objectivity of the judgments by which the agent meets the difficulties which such situations as these present4 ,we shall seek to show that these judgments are constructive of an objective order of reality4 ,it will be necessary in the first place to determine the psychological conditions of the more commonly recognized experience of ,objectivity in the restricted sphere of sense-perception4 ,there might otherwise remain a certain antecedent presumption against the thesis which we wish to establish even after the direct argument had been presented4#aae ,,iii ,common-sense and natural science certainly tend to identify the objectively real with the existent in space and time4 ,the physical universe is held to be palpably real in a way in which nothing not presented in sensuous terms can be4 ,to most minds doubtless it is difficult to understand why ,plato should have ascribed to the ,ideas a higher degree of reality than that possessed by the particular objects of sense-perception1 and still more difficult to understand his ascription of real existence to such ,ideas as those of ,beauty1 ,justice1 and the ,good4 ,there is a certain apparent stability in a universe presented in immediate sense-perception--a universe with which we are in constant bodily intercourse--that seems not to belong to a mere order of relations which1 if known in any sense1 is not known to us through the senses4 ,moreover1 knowledge of the physical world is felt to possess a higher degree of certainty than does any knowledge we can have of supposed economic or moral truth1 or of economic or moral standards4 ,of such knowledge one is disposed to say1 as ,mr4 ,spencer does of metaphysics1 that at the best it presupposes a long and elaborate inferential process which1 as long1 is likely to be faulty2 whereas physical truth is immediate or else1 when inference is involved in it1 easy to be tested by appeal to immediate facts4 ,physical reality is a reality that can be seen and handled and felt as offering resistance1 and this is evidence of objectivity of a sort not to be found in other spheres of knowledge for which the like claim is made4 ,the force of these impressions 7and it would not be difficult to find stronger statements in the history of scientific and ethical nominalism7 diminishes if one tries to determine in what consists that objectivity which they uncritically assume as given in sense-perception4 ,for one must recognize that not all our possible modes of sense-experience are equally concerned in the presentation of this perceived objective world4 ,certain sensory quales are immediately referred to outward objects as belonging to them4 ,certain others are1 in a way1 inward1 either not more definitely localized at all or merely localized in the sense-organ which mediates them4 ,now1 the reason for this difference cannot lie in the content of the various sense-qualities abstractly taken4 ,a visual sensation1 apart from the setting in which it occurs in common experience1 can be no more objective in its reference--indeed1 can have no more reference of any kind--than the least definite and instructive organic sensation4 ,for the degree of distinctness with which one discriminates sense-qualities depends upon the number and importance of the interpretative associations which it is important from time to time to connect with them2 or1 conversely1 the sense-qualities are not self-discriminating in virtue of an intrinsic objective reference or meaning which each possesses and which drives it apart from all the rest4 ,indeed1 an intrinsic meaning1 if a sensation could possess one1 would not only be superfluous in the development of knowledge1 but1 as likely to be mistaken for the acquired or functional meaning1 even seriously confusing4#aaf ,now1 it must be granted that1 if the simple idea of sensation is without objective reference1 no association with it of similarly abstract sensations can supply the lack4 ,a movement sensation1 or a tactual1 having in itself no such meaning1 cannot merely by being associated with a similarly meaningless visual sensation endow this latter with reference to an object4 ,objective reference is1 in fact1 not a sensuous thing2 it is not a conscious element1 nor does it arise from any combination or fusion of such4 ,it is neither in the association of ideas as a constituent member1 nor does it belong to the association considered as a sequence of psychical states4 ,instead1 in our present view1 it belongs to or arises out of the activity through which and with reference to which associations are first of all established4 ,it is an aspect or kind of reference or category under which any sense-quality or datum is apperceived when it is held apart from the stream of consciousness in order that it may receive new meaning as a stimulus2 and a sensation functioning in such a state of consciousness#aag is a psychical phenomenon very different from the conscious element of analytical psychology4 ,the extent to which it is true that the objective world of sense-perception is pre-eminently visual and tactual is then merely an evidence of the extent to which the exigencies of the life-process have required finer sense-discrimination for the sake of more refined reaction within these spheres as compared with others4 ,our conclusion1 then1 must be that the consciousness of objectivity is not as such sensuous1 even as given in our perception of the material world4 ,the world1 as viewed from the standpoint of a particular1 practical emergency1 is an objective world1 not in virtue of its having a sensuous or a material aspect as something existent per se1 but because it is a world of stimuli in course of definition for the guidance of activity4#aah ,it will be well to give further positive exposition of the meaning of the view thus stated4 ,to return once more to our fundamental psychological conception1 knowledge is essentially relevant to the solution of particular problems of more or less urgency and of various kinds and figures in the solution of such problems as the assemblage of consciously recognized symbols or stimuli by which various actions are suggested4 ,the object as known is therefore not the same as the object as apprehended in other possible modes of being conscious of it4 ,the workman who is actually using his tool in shaping his material1 or the warrior who is actually using his weapon in the thick of combat1 is1 if conscious of these objects at all 7and doubtless he may be conscious of them at such times71 not conscious of them as objects--as the one might be1 for example1 in adjusting the tool for a particular kind of use1 and the other in giving a keen edge to his blade4 ,under these latter circumstances the tool or weapon is an object1 and its observed condition1 viewed in the light of a purpose of using the object in a certain way1 is regarded as properly suggesting certain changes or improvements4 ,and likewise will the tool or the weapon have an objective character in the agent's apprehension in the moment of identifying and selecting it from among a number of others1 or even in the act of reaching for it1 especially if it is inconveniently placed4 ,but in the act of freely using one's objective means the category of the objective plays no part in consciousness1 because at such times there is no judgment respecting the means--because there is no sufficient occasion for the isolation of certain conscious elements from the rest of the stream of conscious experience to be defined as stimuli to certain needed responses4 ,such isolation will not normally take place so long as the reactions suggested by the conscious contents involved in the experience are fully adequate to the situation4 ,objects are not normally held apart as such from the stream of consciousness in which they are presented and recognized as possessing qualities warranting certain modes of conduct1 excepting as it has become necessary to the attainment of the agent's purposes to modify or reconstruct his activity4#aai ,are things1 then1 apprehended as objective in virtue of the agent's attitude toward them1 or is the agent's attitude in a typical case grounded upon an antecedent determination of the objectivity of the things in question8 ,we must answer1 in the first place1 that there can be no such antecedent determination4 ,we may1 it is true1 speak of believing1 on the evidence of sight or touch1 that a certain object is really present before us4 ,but neither sight nor touch possesses in itself1 as a particular sense-quality1 any objective meaning4 ,if touch is par excellence the sense of the objective and the appeal to touch the test of objectivity1 this can only be because touch is the sense most closely and intimately connected in our experience with action4 ,after any interval of hesitation and judgment1 action begins with contact with and manipulation of the physical means which have been under investigation4 ,not only is touch the proximate stimulus and guide to manipulation1 but all relevant knowledge which has been gained in any judgment-process1 through the other senses1 and especially through sight1 must ultimately be reducible to terms of touch or other contact sense4 ,the alleged tactual evidence of objectivity is1 then1 rather a confirmation than a difficulty for our present view4 ,in short1 we must dismiss as impossible the hypothesis that there can be a consciousness of objectivity which is not dependent upon and an expression of primary antecedent tendencies toward motor response to the presented stimulus4 ,it is our attitude toward the prospective stimulus that mediates the consciousness of an object standing over against us4 ,so far1 indeed1 is it from being true that objectivity is a matter for special determination antecedently to action that by common testimony the conviction of objectivity comes to us quite irresistibly4 ,the object forces itself upon us1 as we say1 and whether we will or no we must recognize its presence there before us and its independence of any choice of ours or of our knowledge4 ,in the cautious manipulation of an instrument1 in the laborious shaping of some refractory material1 in the performance of any delicate or difficult task1 one's sense of the objectivity of the thing with which one works is as obtrusive as remorse or grief1 and as little to be shaken off4 ,we shall revert to this suggested analogy at a later stage in our discussion4 ,we are now in a position to define more precisely the nature of the conditions in which the sense of objectivity emerges1 and this will bring us to the point at which the objective import of our economic and ethical judgments can profitably be discussed4 ,we have said that the world of the physical is objective1 not in virtue of the sensuous terms in which it is presented1 but because it is a world of stimuli for the guidance of human conduct4 ,under what circumstances1 then1 are we conscious of stimuli in their capacity of guides or incentives or grounds of conduct8 ,and the answer must be that stimuli are interpreted as such1 and so take on the character of objectivity1 when their precise character as stimuli is still in doubt1 and they must therefore receive further definition4 ,for example1 a man pursued by a wild beast must find some means of escape or defense1 and1 seeing a tree which he may climb or a stone which he may hurl1 will inspect these as well as may be with reference to their fitness for the intended purpose4 ,it is at just such moments as these1 then1 that physical things become things for knowledge and take on their stubbornly objective character--that is to say1 when they are essentially problematic4 ,now1 in order that any physical thing may be thus problematic and so possess objective character for knowledge1 it must 7#a7 be in part understood1 and so prompt certain more or less indiscriminate responses2 and 7#b7 be in part as yet not understood--in such wise that1 while there are certain indefinite or unmeasured tendencies on the agent's part to respond to the object--climb the tree or hurl the stone--there is also a certain failure of complete unity in the co-ordination of these activities1 a certain contradiction between different suggestions of conduct which different observed qualities of the tree or stone may give1 and so hesitation and arrest of final action4 ,the pursued man views the tree suspiciously before trusting himself to its doubtful strength1 or weighs well the stone and tests its rough edges before pausing to throw it4 ,thus1 to state the matter negatively1 there are two possible situations in which the sense of objectivity1 if it emerge into consciousness at all1 cannot long continue4 ,an object---as1 for example1 some strange shrub or flower--which1 in the case we are supposing1 may attract the pursued wayfarer's notice1 may awaken no responses relevant to the emergency in which the agent finds himself2 and it will therefore forthwith lapse from consciousness4 ,or1 on the other hand1 the object1 as the tree or stone1 may rightly or wrongly seem to the agent so completely satisfactory1 or1 rather1 in effect may be so1 as instantly to prompt the action which otherwise would come1 if at all1 only after a period of more or less prolonged attention4 ,in neither of these cases1 then1 is there a problematic object4 ,in the one the thing in question is wholly apart from any present interest1 and therefore lapses4 ,in the other case the thing seen is comprehended on the instant with reference to its general use and merges immediately into the main stream of the agent's consciousness without having been an object of express attention4 ,in neither case1 therefore1 is there hesitation with reference to the thing in question--any conflict between inconsiderate positive responses prompted by certain features of the object and inhibitions due to recognition of its shortcomings4 ,in a word1 in neither case is there any judgment or possibility of judgment1 and hence no sense of objectivity4 ,we can have consciousness of an object1 in the strict sense of the term1 only when some part or general aspect of the total situation confronting an agent excites or seems to warrant responses which must be held in check for further determination4 ,in terms of consciousness1 an object is always an object of attention--that is1 an object which is under process of development and reconstruction with reference to an end4 ,an inhibited impulse to react in a more or less definite way to a stimulus is1 then1 the adequate condition of the emergence in consciousness of the sense of objectivity4 ,so long as an activity is proceeding without check or interruption1 and no conflict develops between motor responses prompted by different parts or aspects of the situation1 the agent's consciousness will not present the distinction of ,objective and ,subjective4 ,the mode of being conscious which accompanies free and harmonious activity of this sort may be exemplified by such experiences as sthetic appreciation1 sensuous enjoyment1 acquiescent absorption in pleasurable emotion1 or even intellectual processes of the mechanical sort1 such as easy computation or the solution of simple algebraic problems--processes in which no more serious difficulty is encountered than suffices to stimulate a moderate degree of interest4 ,if1 however1 reverting to the illustration1 our present need for a stone calls for some property which the stone we have seized appears to lack1 consciousness must pass over into the reflective or attentive phase4 ,the stone will now figure as an object possessing certain qualities which render it in a general way relevant to the emergency before us4 ,a needed quality is missing1 and this defect must hold in check all the imminent responses until discovery of the missing quality can set them free4 ,in a word1 the stone as known to us has assumed the station of subject in a judgment-process1 and our effort is1 if possible1 to assign to it a new predicate relevant to our present situation4 ,psychologically speaking1 the stone is an object1 a stimulus to which we are endeavoring to find warrant for responding in some new or reconstructed way4 ,in this process we must assume1 then1 first of all1 an interest on the agent's part in the situation as a whole1 which in the first place1 in terms of the illustration1 makes the pursued one note the tree or stone--which might otherwise have escaped his notice as completely as any passing cloud or falling leaf--and suggests what particular qualities or adaptabilities should be looked for in it4 ,given this interest in making something out of the total situation as explaining the recognition of the stone and the impulse to seize and hurl it1 we find the sense of the stone's objectivity emerging just in the arrest of the undiscriminating impulse4 ,the stone must have a certain meaning as a stimulus first of all1 but it must be a meaning not yet quite defined and certain of acceptance4 ,the stone will be an object only if1 and so long as1 the undiscriminating impulses suggested by these elements of meaning are held in check in order that they may be ordered1 supplemented1 or made more definite4 ,it is1 then1 the essence of the present contention that physical things are objective in our experience in virtue of their recognized inadequacy as means or incentives of action--an inadequacy which1 in turn1 is felt as such in so far as we are seeking to use them as means or grounds of conduct1 or to avail ourselves of them as conditions1 in coping with the general situation from which our attention has abstracted them4 ,from this analysis of the conditions of the consciousness of objectivity we must now proceed to inquire whether in the typical ethical and economic situations1 as they have been described1 essentially these same conditions are present4 ,in the ethical situation1 according to our statement1 the subject of the judgment 7the object of attention7 is the new end which has just been presented in imagination1 and we have now to see that the agent's attitude toward this end is for our present purpose essentially the same as toward a physical object which is under scrutiny4 ,for just as the physical object is such for consciousness because it is partly relevant 7whether in the way of furthering or of hindering7 to the agent's purpose1 but as yet partly not understood from this point of view1 so the imaged end may likewise be ambiguous4 ,the agent's moral purpose may be the 7very likely mythical7 primitive one of which we read in associational discussions of the moral consciousness--that of avoiding punishment4 ,it may be that of imitative1 sympathetic obedience to authority--a sentiment whose fundamental importance for ethical psychology has long remained without due recognition4#abj ,it may be loyalty to an ideal of conscience1 or yet again a purpose of enlargement and development of personality4 ,but on either supposition the compatibility of the end with the prevailing standard or principle of decision may be a matter of doubt and so call for judgment4 ,the problem will1 of course1 be a problem in the full logical sense as involving judgment of the type described in our discussion of the ethical situation only when the attitudes of obedience to authority and to fixed ideals have been outgrown2 but1 on the other hand1 as might be shown1 it is just the inevitable increasing use of judgment with reference to these formulations of the moral life which gradually undermines them and1 by a kind of internal dialectic of the moral consciousness1 brings the agent to recognition as well as to more perfect practice of a logical or deliberative method4 ,the end1 then1 is1 in the typical ethical situation1 an object which one must determine by analysis and reconstruction as a means or condition of moral integrity and progress4 ,it is1 accordingly1 in the second place1 an object upon whose determination a definite activity of the agent is regarded by him as depending4 ,just as in the physical judgment-process the object is set off over against the self and regarded as a given thing which1 when once completely defined1 will prompt certain movements of the body1 so here the contemplated act is an object which1 when fully defined in all its relevant psychological and sociological bearings1 will prompt a definite act of rejection or acceptance by the self4 ,now1 it might be shown1 as we believe1 that the complete psychological and sociological definition of the course of conduct is in truth the full explanation of the choice2 there is no separate reaction of the moral self to which the course of conduct is1 as defined1 an external stimulus4 ,so also in the sphere of physical judgment complete definition passes over into action--or the appreciative mode of consciousness which accompanies action--without breach of continuity4 ,but within the judgment-process in all its forms there is in the agent's apprehension this characteristic feature of apparent separation between the subject as an objective thing presently to be known and used or responded to1 and the predicate as a response yet to be perfected in details1 but at the right time1 when one has proper warrant1 to be set free4 ,it is not our purpose here to speak of metaphysical interpretations or misinterpretations of this functional distinction2 but only to argue from the presence of the distinction in the ethical type of judgment as in the physical as genuine an objectivity for the ethical type as can be ascribed to the other4 ,the ethical judgment is objective in the sense that in it an object--an imaged mode of conduct taken as such--is presented for development to a degree of adequacy at which one can accept it or reject it as a mode of conduct4 ,the ethical predicates ,right and ,wrong1 ,good and ,bad1 each pair representing a particular standpoint1 as we shall later see1 signify this accepting or rejecting movement of the self1 this act of will1 of which1 as an act in due time to be performed1 the agent is more or less acutely conscious in the course of moral judgment4 ,in the economic situation also1 as above described1 there is present the requisite condition of the consciousness of objectivity4 ,here1 as in the ethical situation1 an object is presented which one must redetermine1 and toward which one must presently act in a way likewise to be determined in detail in judgment4 ,we shall defer until a later stage discussion of the reason why this subject of the economic judgment is the means in the activity that is in progress4 ,we are not yet ready to show that the means must be the center of attention under the conditions which have been specified4 ,here we need only note the fact of common experience that economic judgment does center upon the means1 and show that in this fact is given the objective status of the means in the judgment-process2 for the economic problem is essentially that of withdrawing a portion1 a marginal increment1 of the means from some use or set of uses to which they are at present set apart1 and applying it to the new end that has come to seem1 on ethical grounds at least1 desirable2 and we may regard this diversion as the essentially economic act which1 in the agent's apprehension during judgment1 is contingent upon the determination of the means4 ,the object as economic is accordingly the means1 or a marginal portion of the means1 which is to be thus diverted 7or1 so to speak1 exposed to the likelihood of such diversion71 and its determination must be of such a nature as to show the economic urgency1 or at least the permissibility1 of this diversion4 ,into this determination1 manifestly1 the results of much auxiliary inquiry into physical properties of the means must enter--such properties1 for example1 as have to do with its technological fitness for its present use as compared with possible substitutes1 and its adaptability for the new use proposed4 ,taking the word in the broad sense of object of thought1 it is always an object in space and time to which the economic judgment assigns an economic value2 and it is true here 7just the same is true1 mutatis mutandis1 of the psychological and sociological determinations necessary to the fixation of ethical value7 that the economically motivated physical determination of the objective means from the standpoint of the emergency in hand is the full causal explanation of the economic act4 ,it must1 however1 be carefully observed that this physical determination is in the typical case altogether incidental1 from the agent's standpoint1 to the assignment of an economic character or value to the means--a value which will at the close of the judgment come to conscious recognition4 ,as we shall see1 the process is directed throughout by reference to economic principles and standards1 and what shall be an adequate determination in the case depends upon the precision with which these are formulated and the strenuousness with which they are applied4 ,in a word1 the economic judgment assigns to the physical object1 as known at the outset1 a new non-physical character4 ,throughout the judgment-process this character is gaining in distinctness1 and at the end it is accepted as the ,value of the means1 as warrant for the diversion of them to the new use which has been decided on4#aba ,we have now to consider whether in the actual ethical and economic experience of men there is any direct evidence confirming the conclusions which our logical analysis of the respective situations would appear to require4 ,can any phases of the total experience of working out a satisfactory course of conduct in these typical emergencies be appealed to as actually showing at least some tacit recognition that these types of judgment present each one an order of reality or an aspect of the one reality8 ,in the first place1 then1 one must recognize that in the agent's own apprehension a judgment of value has something more than a purely subjective meaning4 ,it is never offered1 by one who has taken the trouble to work it out more or less laboriously and then to express it in terms which are certainly objective1 as a mere announcement of de facto determination or a registration of arbitrary whim and caprice4 ,one no more means to announce a groundless choice or a choice based upon pleasure felt in contemplation of the imaged end than in his judgments concerning the physical universe he means to affirm coexistences and sequences1 agreements and disagreements1 of ideas as psychical happenings4 ,that there is an ethical or economic truth to which one can appeal in doubtful cases is1 indeed1 the tacit assumption in all criticism of another's deliberate conduct2 the contrary assumption1 that criticism is merely the opposition of one's own private prejudice or desire to the equally private prejudice or desire of another1 would render all criticism and mutual discussion of ethical problems meaningless and futile in the plain man's apprehension as in the philosopher's4 ,for the plain man has a spontaneous confidence in his knowledge of the material world which makes him look askance at any alleged analysis of his sense-perceptions and scientific judgments into associations of ideas1 and the same confidence1 or something very like it1 attaches to judgments of these other types4 ,it may perhaps be easier 7though the concession is a very doubtful one7 to destroy a nave confidence in the objectivity of moral truth than a like confidence in scientific knowledge1 but it must be remembered that the plain man's sense of the urgency1 at least of ethical problems1 if not of economic1 is commonly less acute than for the physical4 ,in the plain man's experience serious moral problems are infrequent--problems of the true type1 that is1 which cannot be disposed of as mere cases of temptation2 one must have attained a considerable capacity for sympathy and a considerable knowledge of social relations before either the recognition of such problems or proper understanding of their significance is possible4 ,moral and economic crises are not vividly presented in sensuous imagery excepting in minds of developed intelligence1 experience1 and imaginative power2 and the judgments reached in coping with them do not1 as a rule1 obviously call for nicely measured1 calculated1 and adjusted bodily movements4 ,the immediate act of executing an important economic judgment may be a very commonplace performance1 like the dictation of a letter1 and an ethical decision may1 however great its importance for future overt conduct1 be expressed by no immediate visible movements of the body4 ,but this possible difference of impressiveness between physical and other types of judgments is from our present standpoint unessential2 and indeed1 after all1 it cannot be denied that there are persons whose sense of moral obligation is quite as distinct and influential1 and even sensuously vivid1 as their conviction of the real existence of an external world4 ,to the average man it certainly is clear that1 as ,dr4 ,martineau declares1 it is an inversion of moral truth to say 444 that honour is higher than appetite because we feel it so2 we feel it so because it is so4 ,this 'is' we know to be not contingent on our apprehension1 not to arise from our constitution of faculty1 but to be a reality irrespective of us in adaptation to which our nature is constituted1 and for the recognition of which the faculty is given4#abb ,and the impressiveness1 to most minds1 of likening the sublimity of the moral law to the visible splendor of the starry heavens would seem to suggest that the apprehension of moral truth is a mode of consciousness1 in form at least1 so far akin to sense-perception as to be capable of illustration and even reinforcement from that type of experience4 ,at this point we must revert to a suggestion which presented itself above in another connection1 but which at the time could not be further developed4 ,this was1 in a word1 that there is often a feeling of obtrusiveness in our appreciation of the objectivity of the things before us in ordinary sense-perception 7or physical judgment7 which is not unlike the felt insistence of remorse and grief4#abc ,this feeling is so conspicuous a feature of the state of consciousness in physical judgment as frequently to serve the plain man as his last and irrefragable evidence of the metaphysical independence of the material world1 and it is indeed a feature whose explanation does throw much light upon the meaning of the consciousness of objectivity as a factor within experience4 ,now1 there is another common feeling--or1 as we do not scruple to call it1 another emotion--which is perhaps quite as often appealed to in this way2 though1 as we believe1 never in quite the same connection in any argument in which the two experiences are called upon to do service to the same end4 ,material objects1 we are told1 are reliable and stable as distinguished from the fleeting illusive images of a dream--they have a solidity in virtue of which one can depend upon them1 are hard and fast remaining faithfully where one deposits them for future use or1 if they change and disappear1 doing so in accordance with fixed laws which make the changes calculable in advance4 ,the material realm is the realm of solid fact in which one can work with assurance that causes will infallibly produce their right and proper effects1 and to which one willingly returns from the dream-world in which his adversary1 the idealist1 would hold him spellbound4 ,we propose now briefly to consider these two modes of apprehension of external physical reality in the light of the general analysis of judgment given above--from which it will appear that they are1 psychologically1 emotional expressions of what have been set forth as the essential features of the judgment-situation1 whether in its physical1 ethical1 or economic forms4 ,from this we shall argue that there should actually be in the ethical and economic spheres similar1 or essentially identical1 emotions of reality1 and we shall then proceed to verify the hypothesis by pointing to those ethical and economic experiences which answer the description4 ,we have seen that the center of attention or subject in the judgment-process is as such problematic--in the sense that there are certain of its observed and recognized attributes which make it in some sense relevant and useful to the purpose in hand1 while yet other of its attributes 7or absences of certain attributes7 suggest conflicting activities4 ,the object which one sees is certainly a stone and of convenient size for hurling at the pursuing animal4 ,the situation has been analyzed and found to demand a missile1 and this demand has led to search for and recognition of a stone4 ,the stone1 however1 may be of a color suggesting a soft and crumbling texture1 or its form may appear from a distance to be such as to make it practically certain to miss the mark1 however carefully it may be aimed and thrown4 ,until these points of difficulty have been ascertained1 the stone is wanting still in certain essential determinations4 ,so far as it has been certainly determined1 it prompts to the response directly suggested by one's general end of defense and escape1 but there are these other indications which hold this response in check and which1 if verified1 will cause the stone to be let lie unused4 ,now1 we have1 in this situation of conflict or tension between opposed incitements given by the various discriminated characters of the object1 the explanation of the aspect of obtrusiveness1 of arbitrary resistance to and independence of one's will1 which for the time being seems the unmistakable mark or coefficient of the thing's objectivity4 ,for it is not the object as a whole that is obtrusive2 indeed1 clearly1 there could be no obtrusiveness on the part of an object as a whole1 and in such a case there could also be no judgment4 ,the obtrusion in the case before us is not a sense of the energy of a recalcitrant metaphysical object put forth upon a coerced and helpless human will1 but simply a conscious interpretation of the inhibition of certain of the agent's motor tendencies by certain others prompted by the object's suspicious and as yet undetermined appearances or possible attributes4 ,the object as amenable to use--those of its qualities which taken by themselves are unquestionable and clearly conducive to the agent's purpose--needs no attention for the moment1 let us say4 ,the attention is rather upon the dubious and to all appearance unfavorable qualities1 and these for the time being make up the sum and content of the agent's knowledge of the object4 ,on the other hand1 the agent as an active self is identified with the end and with those modes of response to the object which promise to contribute directly to its realization4 ,it is in this direction that his interest is set and he strains with all his powers of mind to move1 and it is upon the self as identified with1 and for the time being expressed in1 the effort of the agent's will that the object as resistant1 refusing to be misconstrued1 obtrudes4 ,one must see the object and must acknowledge its apparent1 or in the end its ascertained1 unfitness4 ,one is coerced4 ,the situation is one of conflict1 and it is out of the conflict that the essentially emotional experience of resistance emerges4#abd ,the more special emotions of impatience1 anger1 or discouragement may in a given case not be present or may be suppressed1 but the emotion of objectivity will still remain4#abe ,on the same general principles the other of our two coefficients of reality may be explained4 ,let us assume that the stone in our illustration has at last been cleared of all ambiguity in its suggestion1 having been taken as a missile1 and that the man in flight now holds it ready awaiting the most favorable moment for hurling it at his pursuer4 ,it will hardly be maintained that under these conditions the coefficient of the stone's reality as an object consists in its obtrusiveness1 in its resistance to or coercion of the self4 ,the stone is now regarded as a fixed and determinate feature of the situation--a condition which can be counted on1 whatever else may fail4 ,over against other still uncertain aspects of the situation 7which are now in their turn real because resistant1 coercive1 and obtrusive7 stands the stone as a reassuring fact upon and about which the agent can build up the whole plan of conduct which may1 if all goes well1 bring him safely out of his predicament4 ,the stone has1 so to speak1 passed over to the end side of the situation1 and although it may have to be rejected for some other means of defense1 as the definition of the situation proceeds and the plan of action accordingly changes 7as in some degree it probably must71 nevertheless for the time being the imaged activities as stimulus to which the stone is now accepted are a fixed part of the plan and guide in further judgment of the means still undefined4 ,the agent can hardly recur to the stone1 when1 after attending for a time to the bewildering perplexities of the situation1 he pauses once more to take an inventory of his certain resources1 without something of an emotional thrill of assurance and encouragement4 ,in this emotional appreciation of the solidity and dependability of the object the second of our coefficients of reality consists4 ,this might be termed the ,recognition1 the other the ,perception1 coefficient4 ,classifying them as emotions1 because both are phenomena of tension in activity1 we should group the ,perception coefficient with emotions of the ,contraction type1 like grief and anger1 and the ,recognition coefficient with the ,expansion emotions1 like joy and triumph4 ,now1 in the foregoing interpretation no reference has been made to any conditions peculiar to the physical type of judgment-situation4 ,the ground of explanation has been the feature of arrest of activity for the sake of reconstruction1 and this1 if our analyses have been correct1 is the essence of the ethical and economic situations as well as of the physical4 ,can there then be found in these two spheres experiences of the same nature and emerging under the same general conditions as our ,perception and ,recognition coefficients of reality8 ,if so1 then our case for the objective significance and value of ethical and economic judgment is in so far strengthened4 7#a7 ,in the first place1 then1 the object in its economic character is problematic1 assuming a desire on the agent's part to apply it1 as means1 to some new or freshly interesting end1 because it has already been1 and accordingly now is1 set apart for other uses and cannot thoughtlessly be withdrawn from them4 ,extended illustration is not needed to remind one that these established and hitherto unquestioned uses will haunt the economic conscience as obtrusively and inhibit the desired course of economic conduct with as much energy of resistance as in the other case will any of the contrary promptings of a physical object4 ,moreover1 the ,recognition coefficient may as easily be identified in this connection4 ,if one's scruples gain the day1 in such a case one has at least a sense of comforting assurance in the conservatism of his choice and its accordance with the facts1 however unreconciled in another way one may be to the deprivation that has thus seemed to be necessary4 ,if1 however1 the new end in a measure makes good its case and the modes of expenditure which the scruples represented have been readjusted in accordance with it1 then the means1 no less than before the new interpretation had been placed upon them1 will enjoy the status of ,reality in the economic sense4 ,they will be real now1 however1 not in the obtrusive way1 as presenting aspects which inhibit the leading tendency in the judgment-process1 but1 instead1 as means having a fixed and certain character in one's economic life1 which1 after the hesitation and doubt just now superseded1 one may safely count upon and will do well to keep in view henceforth4 7#b7 ,in the second place1 mere mention of the corresponding ethical experiences must suffice1 since only extended illustration from literature and life would be fully adequate3 on the one hand1 the still small voice of ,conscience or the authoritativeness of ,duty1 stern daughter of the voice of ,god2 and1 on the other1 the restful assurance with which1 from the vantage-ground of a satisfying decision1 one may look back in wonder at the possibility of so serious a temptation or in rejoicing over the new-won freedom from a burdensome and repressive prejudice4 ,this must for the present serve as positive exposition of our view as to the objective significance of the valuational types of judgment4 ,there are certain essential points which have as yet not been touched upon1 and there are certain objections to the general view the consideration of which will serve further to explain it2 but the discussion of these various matters will more conveniently follow the special analysis of the valuational judgments1 to which we shall now proceed4 ,,iv ,in the last analysis the ultimate motive of all reflective thought is the progressive determination of the ends of conduct4 ,physical judgment1 or1 in psychological terms1 reflective attention to objects in the physical world1 is at every turn directed and controlled by reference to a gradually developing purpose1 so that the process may also be described as one of bringing to fulness of definition an at first vaguely conceived purpose through ascertainment and determination of the means at hand4 ,the problematic situation in which reflection takes its rise inevitably develops in this two-sided way into consciousness of a definite end on the one side1 and of the means or conditions of attaining it on the other4 ,it has been shown that there may be involved in any finally satisfactory determination of a situation an explicit reflection upon and definition of the controlling end which is present and gives point and direction to the physical determination4 ,but very often such is not the case4 ,when a child sees a bright object at a distance and makes toward it1 availing himself more or less skilfully of such assistance as intervening articles of furniture may afford1 there is of course no consciousness on his part of any definite purpose as such1 and this is to say that the child does not subject his conduct to criticism from the standpoint of the value or its ends4 ,there is simply strong desire for the distant red ball1 controlling all the child's movements for the time being and prompting a more or less critical inspection of the intervening territory with reference to the easiest way of crossing it4 ,the purpose is implicitly accepted1 not explicitly determined1 as a preliminary to physical determination of the situation4 ,if one may speak of a development of the purpose in such a case as this1 one must say that the development into details comes through judgment of the environing conditions4 ,to change the illustration in order not to commit ourselves to the ascription of too developed a faculty of judgment to the child1 this is true likewise of any process of reflective attention in the mind of an adult in which a general purpose is accepted at the outset and is carried through to execution without reflection upon its ethical or economic character as a purpose4 ,the specific purpose as executed is certainly not the same as the general purpose with which the reflective process took its rise4 ,it is filled out with details1 or may perhaps even be quite different in its general outlines4 ,there has necessarily been development and perhaps even transformation1 but our contention is that all this has been effected in and through a process of judgment in which the conditions of action1 and not the purpose itself1 have been the immediate objects of determination4 ,upon these the attention has been centered1 though of course the attention was directed to them by the purpose4 ,to state the case in logical terms1 it has been only through selection and determination of the means and conditions of action from the standpoint of predicates suggested by the general purpose accepted at the outset that this purpose itself had been rendered definite and practical and possible of execution4 ,probably such cases are seldom to be found in the adult experience4 ,as a rule1 the course of physical or technological judgment will almost always bring to light implications involved in the accepted purpose which must inevitably raise ethical and economic questions2 and the resolution of these latter will in turn afford new points of view for further physical determination of the situation4 ,in such processes the logical points of the problem of ethical and economic valuation come clearly into view4 ,in our earlier account of the matter it was more convenient to use language which implied that ethical and economic judgment must be preceded by implicit or explicit acceptance of a definite situation presented in sense-perception1 and that these evaluating judgments could be carried through to their goal only upon the basis of such an inventory of fixed conditions4 ,thus the ultimate ethical quality of the general purpose of building a house would seem to depend upon the precise form which this purpose comes to assume after the actual presence and the quality of the means of building have been ascertained and the economic bearings of the proposed expenditure have been considered4 ,surely it is a waste of effort to debate with oneself upon the ethical rightness of a project which is physically impossible or else out of the question from the economic point of view4 ,we are1 however1 now in a position to see that this way of looking at the matter is both inaccurate and self-contradictory4 ,in the actual development of our purposes there is no such orderly and inflexible arrangement of stages2 and if it is a waste of effort to deliberate upon a purpose that is physically impossible1 it may1 with still greater force1 be argued that we cannot find1 and judge the fitness of1 the necessary physical means until we know what1 precisely1 it is that we wish to do4 ,the truth is that there is constant interplay and interaction between the various phases of the inclusive judgment-process1 or rather1 more than this1 that there is a complete and thoroughgoing mutual implication4 ,it is indeed true that our ethical purposes cannot take form in a vacuum apart from consideration of their physical and economic possibility1 but it is also true that our physical and economic problems are ultimately meaningless and impossible1 whether of statement or of solution1 except as they are interpreted as arising in the course of ethical conflict4 ,we have1 then1 to do1 in the present division1 with situations in which1 whether at the outset or from time to time during the course of the reflective process1 there is explicit conflict between ends of conduct4 ,these situations are the special province of the judgment of valuation4 ,our line of argument may be briefly indicated in advance as follows3 #a4 ,the judgment of valuation1 whether expressed in terms of the individual experience or in terms of social evolution1 is essentially the process of the explicit and deliberate resolution of conflict between ends4 ,as an incidental1 though nearly always indispensable1 step to the final resolution of such conflict1 physical judgment1 or1 in general1 the judgment of fact or existence1 plays its part1 this part being to define the situation in terms of the means necessary for the execution of the end that is gradually taking form4 ,the two modes of judgment mutually incite and control each other1 and neither could continue to any useful purpose without this incitement and control of the other4 ,both modes of judgment are objective in content and significance4 ,at the end of the reflective process and immediately upon the verge of execution of the end or purpose which has taken form the result may be stated or apprehended in either of two ways3 7#a7 directly1 in terms of the end1 and 7#b7 indirectly1 in terms of the ordered system of existent means which have been discovered1 determined1 and arranged4 ,if such final survey of the result be taken by way of preparation for action1 or for whatever reason1 the end will be apprehended as possessing ethical value and the means1 under conditions later to be specified1 as possessing economic value4 #b4 ,what then is the nature and source of this apprehension of end or means as valuable8 ,the consciousness of end or means as valuable is an emotional consciousness expressive of the agent's practical attitude as determined in the just completed judgment of ethical or economic valuation and arising in consequence of the inhibition placed upon the activities which constitute the attitude by the effort of apprehending or imaging the valued object4 ,ethical and economic value are thus strictly correlative2 psychologically they are emotional incidents of apprehending in the two respective ways just indicated the same total result of the inclusive complex judgment-process4 ,finally1 as the moment of action comes on1 the consciousness of the ethically valued end lapses first2 then the consciousness of economic value is lost in a purely physical1 i4 e41 technological1 consciousness of the means and their properties and interrelations in the ordered system which has been arranged2 and this finally merges into the immediate and undifferentiated consciousness of activity as use of the means becomes sure and unhesitating4 ,when we say that the ends which oppose each other in an ethical situation 7that is1 a situation for the time being seen in an ethical aspect7 are related1 and the ends in an economic situation are not1 we by no means wish to imply that in the one case we have in this fact of relatedness a satisfactory solution at hand which is wanting in the other4 ,to feel1 for example1 that there is a direct and inherent relationship between a cherished purpose of self-culture and an ideal of social service which seems now to require the abandonment of the purpose does not mean that one yet knows just how the two ends should be related in his life henceforth2 and again1 to say that one can see no inherent relation between a desire for books and pictures and the need of food1 excepting in so far as both ends depend for their realization upon a limited supply of means1 is not to say that the issue of the conflict is not of ethical significance4 ,such a view as we here reject would amount to a denial of the possibility of genuinely problematic ethical situations#abf and would accord with the opinion that economic judgment as such lies apart from the sphere of ethics and is at most subject only to occasional revision and control in the light of ethical considerations4 ,by the relatedness of the ends in a situation we mean the fact1 more or less explicitly recognized by the agent1 that the new1 and as yet undefined1 purpose which has arisen belongs in the same system with the end1 or group of ends1 which the standard inhibiting immediate action represents4 ,the standard inhibits action in obedience to the impulse that has come to consciousness1 and the image of the new end is1 on its part1 definite and impressive enough to inhibit action in obedience to the standard4 ,the relatedness of the two factors is shown in a practical way by the fact that1 in the first instance at least1 they are tacitly expected to work out their own adjustment4 ,by the process already described in outline1 subject and predicate begin to develop and thereby to approach each other1 and a provisional or partial solution of the problem may thus be reached without resort to any other method than that of direct comparison and adjustment of the ends involved on either side4 ,the standard which has been called in question has enough of congruence with the new imaged purpose to admit of at least some progress toward a solution through this method4 ,we can best come to an understanding of this recognition of the relatedness of the ends in ethical valuation by pausing to examine somewhat carefully into the conditions involved in the acceptance or reflective acknowledgment of a defined end of conduct as being one's own4 ,any new end in coming to consciousness encounters some more or less firmly established habit represented in consciousness by a sign or symbolic image of some sort1 the habit being itself the outcome of past judgment-process4 ,our present problem is the significance of the agent's recognition of a relatedness between his new impulsive end and the end which represents the habit1 and we shall best approach its solution by considering the various factors and conditions involved in the agent's conscious recognition of the established end as being such4 ,in any determinate end there is inevitably implied a number of groups of factual judgments in which are presented the objective conditions under which execution of the end or purpose must take place4 ,there is in the first place a general view of environing conditions1 physical and social1 presented in a group of judgments 7#a7 descriptive of the means at hand1 of the topography of the region in which the purpose is to be carried out1 of climatic conditions1 and the like1 and 7#b7 descriptive of the habits of thought and feeling of the people with whom one is to deal1 their prejudices1 their tastes1 and their institutions4 ,the project decided on may1 let us say1 be an individual or a national enterprise1 whether philanthropic or commercial1 which is to be launched in a distant country peopled by partly civilized races4 ,in addition to these groups of judgments upon the physical and sociological conditions under which the work must proceed1 there will also be a more or less adequate and impartial knowledge of one's own physical and mental fitness for the enterprise1 since the work as projected may promise to tax one's physical powers severely and to require1 for its successful conduct1 large measure of industry1 devotion1 patience1 and wisdom4 ,indeed any determinate purpose whatever inevitably implies a more or less varied and comprehensive inventory of conditions4 ,further illustration is not necessary for our present purpose4 ,we may say that in a general way the conditions relevant to a practical purpose will group themselves naturally under four heads of classification1 as physical1 sociological1 physiological1 and psychological4 ,all four classes are objective1 though the last two embrace conditions peculiar to the agent as an individual over against the environment to which for purposes of his present activity he stands in a sense opposed4 ,now our present interest is not so much in the enumeration and classification of possible relevant conditions in a typical situation as in the significance of these relevant conditions in the agent's apprehension of them4 ,perhaps this significance cannot better be described than by saying that essentially and impressively the conditions are apprehended as1 taken together1 warranting the purpose that has been determined4 ,we appeal1 in support of this account of the matter1 to an impartial introspection of the way in which the means and conditions of action stand related to the formed purpose in the moment of survey of a situation4 ,the various details presented in the survey of a situation are apprehended1 not as bare facts such as one might find set down in a scientist's notebook1 but as warranting--as closely1 uniquely1 and vitally relevant to--the action that is about to be taken4 ,this1 as we believe1 is a fair account of the situation in even the commoner and simpler emergencies that confront the ordinary man4 ,quite conspicuously is it true of cases in which the purpose is a purely technological one that has been worked out with considerable difficulty and is therefore not executed until after a somewhat careful survey of conditions has been taken4 ,it is often true likewise in cases of express ethical judgment2 if the ethical phases of the reflective process have not been excessively long and difficult1 our definite sense of the ethical value of the act we are about to do lapses quite easily1 and the factual aspects and features of the situation as given in one or more of the four classes which we have distinguished take on an access of significance in their character of warranting1 confirming1 or even compelling the act determined upon4 ,of our ordinary sense-perception in the moments of its actual functioning no less than of conscience in its aspect of a moral perceptive faculty are the words of ,bishop ,butler sensibly true that to preside and govern1 from the very economy and constitution of man1 belongs to it4#abg ,i ,even in cases of more serious moral difficulty this sanctioning aspect of the means and conditions of action is not overshadowed4 ,if the situation is one in which by reason of their complexity these play a conspicuous rle and must be surveyed1 by way of preparation on the agents' part1 for performance of the act1 they inevitably assume1 for the agent1 their proper functional character4 ,in general1 the conditions presented in the system of factual judgments have a certain rightful authority which they seem to lend to the purpose or end with reference to which they were worked out to their present degree of factual detail4 ,the conditions can thus seem to sanction the end because conditions and end have been worked out together4 ,gradual development on the one side prompts analytical inquiry upon the other and is in turn directed and advanced by the results of this inquiry4 ,in the end the result may be read off either in terms of end or in terms of conditions and means4#abh ,the two readings must be in accord and the agent's apprehension of the conditions as warrant for the end is expression in consciousness of this agreement4#abi ,now in this mode of apprehension of factual conditions there is a highly important logical implication--an implication which inevitably comes more and more clearly into view with the continued exercise of judgment1 even though the agent's habit of interest in the scrutiny of perplexing situations may still remain1 by reason of the want of trained capacity for a broader view1 limited in its range quite strictly to the physical sphere4 ,this implication is1 we shall declare at once1 that of an endeavoring1 striving1 active principle or self which can be helped or hindered in its unfolding by particular purposes and sets of corresponding conditions--can lose or gain1 through devotion to particular purposes1 in the breadth1 fulness1 and energy of its life4 ,the agent's apprehension of and reference to this active principle of course varies in all degrees of explicitness1 according to circumstances1 from the vague awareness that is present in a simple case of physical judgment to the clear recognition and endeavor at definition that are characteristic of serious ethical crises4 ,that the situation should develop and bring to light this factor is what should be expected on general grounds of logic--for to say that a set of conditions warrants or sanctions or confirms a given purpose implies that our purposes can stand in need of warrant1 and this would seem to be impossible apart from reference to a process whose maintenance and development in and through our purposes are assumed as being as a matter of course desirable4 ,it is of the essence of our contention that the apprehension of the conditions of action as warranting the end is a primordial and necessary feature of the situation--indeed1 its constitutive feature4 ,if our concern were with the psychological development of self-consciousness as a phase of reflective experience1 we should endeavor to show that this development is mediated in the first instance by the subjective phenomena of feeling1 emotion1 and desire which find their place in the course of the judgment-process4 ,we should then hold that1 with the conclusion of the judgment-process and the accompanying sense of the known conditions as reassuring and confirmatory of the end1 comes the earliest possibility of a discriminative recognition of the self as having been all along a necessary factor in the process4 ,we should hold that outside of the process of reflective attention there can be no psychical or elementary beginnings of self-consciousness1 and then that1 except as a development out of the experience to which we have referred as marking the conclusion of the attentive process1 there can be no recognized specific and in any degree definable consciousness of self4 ,all this1 however1 lies rather beside our present purpose4 ,we wish simply to insist that it is out of the apprehension of conditions as reassuring and confirmatory1 out of this primordial germ1 that the agent's definite recognition of himself as a center of development and expenditure of energy takes its rise4 ,here are the beginnings of the possibility of self-conscious ethical and economic valuation4 ,this apprehension of the means as warranting is1 we have held1 a fact even when the means surveyed are wholly of the physical sort1 and we have thereby implied that consciousness of the self as energetic may take its rise in situations of this type or during the physical stage in the development of a more complex total situation4 ,it would be an interesting speculation to consider to what extent and in what way the development of the sciences of sociology and physiology may have been essentially facilitated by the emergence of this form of self-consciousness4 ,but however the case may stand with these sciences or with the rise of real interest in them in the mind of a given individual1 interest in the objective psychological conditions of a contemplated act is certainly very closely dependent upon interest in that subjective self which one has learned to know through the past exercise of judgment in definition and contemplation of conditions of the three other kinds4 ,the more diversified and complex the array of physical and social conditions with reference to which one is to act1 the more important becomes not simply a clearly articulated knowledge of these1 but also a knowledge of oneself4 ,the self that is warranted in its purpose by the surveyed conditions must hold itself in a steady and consistent attitude during the performance on pain of falling short of its opportunity and thereby rendering nugatory the reflective process in which the purpose was worked out4 ,experience abundantly shows how easily the assurance that comes with the survey of conditions may come to grief1 though there may have been on the side of the conditions1 so far as defined1 no visible change2 and in so far as self-consciousness has already emerged as a distinguishable factor in such situations1 failures of the sort we here refer to are the more easily identified and interpreted4 ,some sudden impulse may have broken in upon the execution of the chosen purpose2 there may have been an unexpected shift of interest away from that general phase of life which the purpose represented2 or in any one of a number of other ways may have come about a wavering and a slackening in the resolution which marked the commencement of action4 ,the energetic self forthwith 7if we may so express it7 recognizes that the sanction which the conditions so far as then known gave to its purpose was a misleading because an incomplete one1 and it proceeds to develop within itself a new range of objective fact in which may be worked out the explanation1 and thereby a method of control1 of these new disturbing phenomena4 ,the qualities of patience under disappointment1 courage in encountering resistance1 steadiness and self-control in sustained and difficult effort--these qualities and others of like nature come to be discriminated from each other by introspective analysis and may be as accurately measured1 and in general as objectively studied1 as any of the conditions to a saving knowledge and respect of which one may already have attained1 and these newly determined psychological conditions will henceforth play the same part in affording sanction to one's purposes as do the rest4 ,an ordered system of psychological categories or points of view comes to be developed1 and an accurate statement of conditions of personal disposition and capacity relevant to each emergency as it arises will hereafter be worked out--over against and in tension with one's gradually forming purposes in like manner as are statements of all the other relevant objective aspects of the situation4#acj ,in the energetic self1 we shall now seek to show1 we have the common and essential principle of both ethical and economic valuation which marks these off from other and subordinate types of judgment4 ,let us determine as definitely as possible the nature and function of this principle4 ,the recognition of the chosen purpose as one favorable or otherwise to the self1 and so the recognition of the self as capable of furtherance or retardation by its chosen purposes1 is not always a feature of the state of mind which may ensue upon completed judgment4 ,in the commoner situations of the everyday life of normal persons1 as practically always in the lives of persons of relatively undeveloped reflective powers1 it is quite wanting as a separate distinguished phase of the experience4 ,in such cases it is present1 if present at all1 merely as the vaguely felt implicit meaning of the recognition that the known conditions sanction and confirm the purpose4 ,such situations yield easily to attack and threaten none of those dangers1 none of those possible occasions for regret or remorse1 of which complex situations make the person of developed reflective capacity and long experience so keenly apprehensive4 ,they are disposed of with comparatively little of conscious reconstruction on either the subject or the predicate side1 and when a conclusion has been reached the agent's recognition of the conditions carries with it the comfortable though too often delusive assurance of the complete and perfect eligibility of the purpose4 ,if the question of eligibility is raised at all1 the answer is given on the tacit principle that whatever purpose is1 is right4 ,to the plain man1 and to all of us on certain sides of our lives1 every purpose for which the requisite means and factual conditions are found to be at hand is1 just as our purpose1 therefore right4 ,the same experience of failure and disappointment which proves our purpose to have been1 from the standpoint of enlargement and enrichment of the self1 a mistaken one brings a clearer consciousness of the logic implicit in our first confident belief in the purpose1 and at the same time emphasizes the need of making this logic explicit4 ,the purpose1 as warranted to us by the conditions and assembled means that lay before us1 was our own1 and as our own was implicitly a purpose of furtherance of the self4 ,the disappointment that has come brings this implication more clearly into view1 and likewise the need of methodical procedure1 not as before in the determination of conditions1 but in the determination of purposes as such2 for the essence of the situation is that the execution of the purpose has brought to light some unforeseen consequence now recognized as having been all the while in the nature of things involved in the purpose4 ,this consequence or group of consequences consists 7in general terms7 in the abatement or arrest of desirable modes of activity which find their motivation elsewhere in the agent's system of accepted ends1 and it is registered in consciousness in that sense of restriction or repression from without which is a notable phase of all emotional experience1 particularly in its early stages4 ,the consequences are as undesirable as they are unexpected1 and the reaction against them1 at first emotional1 presently passes over into the form of a reflective interpretation of the situation to the effect that the self has suffered a loss by reason of its thoughtless haste in identifying itself with so unsafe a purpose4#aca ,it is the essential logical function of the consciousness of self to stimulate the valuation processes which take their rise in the stage of reflective thought thus attained4 ,the consciousness of self is a peculiarly baffling theme for discussion from whatever point of view1 because one finds its meaning shifting constantly between the two extremes of a subjectivity to which all objects of all thought are external and an objective thing or system of energies which is known just as other things are--known in a sense by itself1 to be sure1 but known nevertheless1 and thought of as an object standing in possible relations to other objects4 ,now1 it is of the subjective self that we are speaking when we say that its essential function is the stimulation or incitement of the valuation processes1 but manifestly in order to serve thus it must nevertheless be presented in some sort of sensuous imagery4 ,the subjective self may1 in fact1 be thought of in many ways--presented in many different sorts of imagery--but in all its forms it must be distinguished carefully from that objective self which1 as described in psychology1 is the assemblage of conditions under which the subjective or energetic self works out its purposes4 ,it may be the pale1 attenuated double of the body1 or a personal being standing in need of deliverance from sin1 or an atom of soul-substance1 or1 in our present terminology1 a center of developing and unfolding energy4 ,the significant fact is that1 however different in content and in motive these various presentations of the subjective self may be1 they are1 one and all1 as presentations and as in so far objective1 stimuli to some definite response4 ,the savage warrior deposits his double in a tree or stone for safety while he goes into battle2 the self that is to be saved from sin is a self that prompts certain acceptable acts in satisfaction of the quasi-legal obligations that the fact of sin has laid upon the agent4 ,the presented self1 whatever the form it may assume as presentation1 has its function1 and this function is in general that of stimulus to the conservation and increase1 in some sense1 of the self that is not presented1 but for whom the presentation is4 ,now our own present description of the self as energetic1 as a center or source of developing and unfolding energy is in its way a presentation4 ,it consists of sensuous imagery and suggests a mechanical process1 or the growth of a plant perhaps1 which if properly safeguarded will go on satisfactorily--a process which one must not allow to be perturbed or hindered by external resistance or internal friction or to run down4 ,to many persons doubtless such an account would seem arbitrary and fantastic in the extreme1 but no great importance need be attached to its details4 ,the kind and number and sensuous vividness of the details in which this essential content of presentation may be clothed must of course depend1 for each person1 upon his psychical idiosyncrasy4 ,indeed1 as the habit of reflection upon purposes comes to be more firmly fixed1 and the procedure of valuation to be consciously methodical and orderly1 the sensuous content of the presented self must grow constantly more and more attenuated until it has declined into a mere unexpressed principle or maxim or tacit presumption1 prescribing the free and impartial application of the method of valuation to particular practical emergencies as these arise4 ,for a self1 consisting of presented content of whatever sort1 which one seeks to further through attentive deliberation upon concrete purposes1 must1 just in so far as it has content1 determine the outcome of ethical judgment in definite ways4 ,thus the soul that must be saved from sin 7if this be the content of the presented self7 is one that has transgressed the law in certain ways and the right relations that should subsist between creature and ,creator1 and has thereby incurred a more or less technically definable guilt4 ,this guilt can only be removed and the self rehabilitated in its normal relations to the law by an appropriate response to the situation--by a choice on the agent's part1 first1 of a certain technical procedure of repentance1 and then of a settled purpose of living as the law prescribes4#acb ,so also our own image of the self as energetic after the manner of a growing organism may well seem1 if taken too seriously as to its presentational details1 to foster a bias in favor of over-conservative adherence to the established and the accredited as such4#acc ,the argument of the last few paragraphs may be restated in the following way in terms of the evolution of the individual's moral attitude or technique of self-control3 #a4 ,in the stage of moral evolution in which custom and authority are the controlling principles of conduct1 moral judgment in the proper sense of self-conscious1 critical1 and reconstructive valuation of purposes is wanting4 ,such judgment as finds here a place is at best of the merely casuistical type1 looking to a determination of particular cases as falling within the scope of fixed and definite concepts4 ,there is no self-consciousness except such as may be mediated by the sentiment of willing obedience4 ,it is1 at this stage1 not the particular sort of conduct which the law prescribes that in the agent's apprehension enlarges and develops the self2 so far as any thought of enlargement and development of the self plays a part in influencing conduct1 these effects are such as1 in the agent's trusting faith1 will come from an entire and willing acceptance of the law as such4 ,if any man will do ,his will1 he shall know of the doctrine4 ,moreover1 the stage of custom and authority goes along with1 in social evolution1 either very simple social conditions or else conditions which1 though very complex1 are stable1 so that in either case the conditions of conduct are in general in harmony with the conduct which custom and authority prescribe4 ,the law1 therefore1 can be absolute and takes no account of possible inability to obey4 ,the divine justice punishes infraction of the law simply as objective infraction2 not as sin1 in proportion to the sinner's responsibility4 #b4 ,but inevitably custom and authority come to be inadequate4 ,as social conditions change1 custom becomes antiquated and authority blunders1 wavers1 contradicts itself in the endeavor to prescribe suitable modes of individual conduct4 ,obedience no longer is the way to light4 ,the self becomes self-conscious through feeling more and more the repression and the misdirection of its energies that obedience now involves4 ,this is the stage of subjective morality or conscience2 and the rise of conscience1 the attitude of appeal to conscience1 means the beginning of endeavor at methodical solution of those new problematic situations in the attempt to deal with which authority as such has palpably collapsed4 ,we say1 however1 that conscience is the beginning of this endeavor2 for conscience is1 in fact1 an ambiguous and essentially transitional phenomenon4 ,on the one hand conscience is the inner nature of a man speaking within him1 and so the self furthers its own growth in listening to this expression of itself4 ,in this aspect conscience is methodological4 ,but on the other hand conscience speaks1 and1 speaking1 must say something determinate1 however general this something may be4 ,in this aspect conscience is a rsum of the generic values realized under the system of custom and authority1 but to the present continued attainment of which the particular prescriptions of custom and authority are no longer adequate guides4 ,conscience is thus at once an inward prompting to the application of logical method to the case in hand and a body of general or specific rules under some one of which the case can be subsumed4 ,in ethical theory we accordingly find no unanimity as to the nature of conscience4 ,at the one extreme it is the voice of ,god speaking in us or through us1 in detailed and specific terms--and so1 virtually1 custom and authority in disguise4 ,at the other it is an empty abstract intuition that the right is binding upon us--and1 so1 simply the hypostasis of demand for a logical procedure4 ,the history of ethics presents us with all possible intermediate conceptions in which these extreme motives are more or less skilfully interwoven or combined in varying proportions4 ,the truth is that conscience is essentially a transitional conception1 and so necessarily looks before and after4 ,in one of its aspects it is a self which has come to miss 7and therefore to image for itself7 the values and1 it may be1 a certain dawning sense of vitality and growth which obedience to authority once afforded4#acd ,in its other aspect it is a self that is looking forward in a self-reliant way to the determination on its own account of its purposes and values4 ,and finally1 as for the environing world of means and conditions1 clearly this is not necessarily harmonious with and amenable to conscience2 indeed1 in the nature of things it can be only partially so4 ,the morality of conscience is1 therefore1 either mystical1 a morality that seeks to escape the world in the very moment of its affirmation that the world is unreal 7because worthless71 or else it takes refuge in a virtual distinction between absolute and relative morality 7to borrow a terminology from a system in which properly it should have no place71 perhaps setting up as an intermediary between heaven and earth a machinery of special dispensation4#ace #c4 ,conscience professes in general1 that is1 to be autonomous1 and the profession is1 strictly speaking1 a contradiction in terms4 ,moreover1 apart from considerations of the logic of the situation1 theories of conscience have1 as a matter of fact1 always lent themselves kindly to theological purposes just as the theory of self-realization in its classic modern statement rests upon a metaphysical doctrine of the ,absolute4#acf ,inevitably the movement concealed within this essentially unstable conception must have its legitimate outcome 7#a7 in a clearing of the presented self of its fixed elements of content1 thus setting it free in its character of a non-presentational principle of valuation1 and 7#b7 a setting apart of these elements of content from the principle of valuation as standards for reference and consultation rather than as law to be obeyed4 ,we have thus correlated our account of the logic whereby the energetic self comes to explicit recognition as stimulus to the valuation-process with the three main stages in the moral evolution of the individual and the race4 ,we were brought to this first-mentioned part of our discussion by our endeavor to find out the factors involved in the first acceptance of a conscious purpose 7or1 indifferently1 the subsequent recognition of it as a standard7--an endeavor prompted by the need of distinguishing1 with a view to their special analysis1 the two types of valuation-process4 ,we now return to this problem4 ,the following illustration will serve our present undertaking3 ,a lawyer or man of business is struck by the great need of honest men in public office1 or has had his attention in some impressive way called to the fact of great inequality in the present distribution of wealth1 and to the diverse evils resulting therefrom4 ,these facts hold his attention1 perhaps against his will1 and at last suggest the thought of his making some personal endeavor toward improvement of conditions1 political or social1 as the case may be4 ,on the other hand1 however1 the man has before him the promise of a successful or even brilliant career in his chosen occupation1 and is already in the enjoyment of a substantial income1 which is rapidly increasing4 ,moreover1 he has a family growing up about him1 and he is not simply strongly interested in the early training and development of his children1 and desirous of having himself some share in conducting it1 but he sees that the suitable higher education of his children will in a few years make heavy demands upon his pecuniary means4 ,here1 then1 we have a situation the analysis of which will enable us to distinguish and define the provinces of ethical and economic judgment4 ,it is easy to see that we have here a conflict between ends4 ,on the one side is the thought of public service in some important office or1 let us say1 the thought of bettering society in a more fundamental way by joining the propaganda of some proposed social reform4 ,this end rests upon certain social impulses in the man's nature and appeals to him as strongly1 we may fairly assume1 as would any purpose of immediate self-interest or self-indulgence1 so that it stands before him and urges him with an insistent pertinacity that at first even puts him on his guard against it as a temptation4 ,over against this concrete end or subject of moral valuation stand other ends comprehended or symbolized in the ideals of regular and steady industry1 of material provision for family1 of paternal duty toward children1 of scholarly achievement as lawyer or judge1 and the like--ideals which are indeed practical and personal1 but which1 as they now function1 are general or universal in character1 are lacking in the concreteness and emotional quality which belong to the new purpose which has just come to imagination and has brought these ideals into action on the predicate side4 ,will this life of social agitation really be quite respectable1 and befitting the character of a sober and industrious man8 ,will it enable me to support and educate my family8 ,will it permit me to devote sufficient attention to their present care and training8 ,and will it not so warp my nature1 so narrow and concentrate my interests1 as in a measure to disqualify me for the right exercise of paternal authority over them in years to come8 ,moreover1 will not a life of agitation1 of constant intercourse with minds and natures in many ways inferior to my own and those of my present professional associates1 lower my intellectual and moral standards1 and so make of me in the end a less useful member of society than ,i am at present8 ,these and other questions like them present the issue in its earlier aspect4 ,presently1 however1 the tentative purpose puts in its defense1 appealing to yet other recognized ideals or standards of self-sacrifice1 benevolence1 or social justice as witnesses in its favor4 ,the conflict thus takes on the subject-predicate form1 as has already been explained4 ,on the one hand we have the undefined but strongly insistent concrete purpose2 on the other hand we have a number of symbolic concepts or universals standing for accepted and accredited habitual modes of conduct4 ,the problem is that of working the two sides of the situation together into a unified and harmonious plan of conduct which shall be at once concrete and particular1 as a plan chosen by way of solution of a given present emergency1 and universal1 as having due regard for past modes of conduct1 and as itself worthy of consideration in coping with future emergencies4 ,now1 how shall we discriminate the ethical and the economic aspects of the situation which we have described8 ,we shall most satisfactorily do this through a consideration of the various sorts of conditions and means of which account must be taken in working the situation through to a solution1 or 7to express it more accurately7 the various sorts of conditions and means which need to be defined over against the purpose as the purpose gradually develops into detailed form4 ,we may say1 first of all1 that there are psychological conditions which must be taken into consideration in the case before us4 ,our thesis is that in so far as a situation gives rise to the determination of psychological conditions and is advanced along the way toward final solution through determination of these1 the situation is an ethical one4 ,in other words1 we hold that the ends at issue in the situation are related in so far as they depend upon the same set of psychological conditions4 ,in so far as these statements are not true of the situation there must be a resort to economic judgment4 ,by the general questions suggested above as presenting themselves to the agent we have indicated in what way the course of action taken must have regard to certain psychological considerations4 ,entering upon the new way of life will inevitably lessen the agent's interest in his present professional pursuits and so make difficult1 and in the end even irksome1 any attempt at continuing in them either as a partial means of livelihood or as a recreation4 ,the new work will be absorbing--as indeed it must be if it is to be worth while4 ,in the same way the man must recognize that his nature is not one of the rare ones so richly endowed in capacity for sympathy that constant familiarity with general conditions of misery and suffering does not dull their fineness of sensibility to the special concerns and interests of particular individuals4 ,if he takes his suffering fellow-men at large for his children1 his own children will probably suffer just in so far the loss of a father's special sympathy and understanding care4 ,and likewise he must be drawn away and isolated from his friends1 for it will be hard for him1 he must foresee1 to hold free and intimate converse with men whose ways of thinking lie apart from his own controlling interest and for whose insensibility to the things that move him so profoundly he must come more and more to feel a certain impatience if not contempt4 ,not to enlarge upon these possibilities and others of like nature1 we must see that reflection upon the situation must presently bring to consciousness these various consequences of the kind of action which is proposed and a recognition that the ground of relation between them and the action proposed lies in certain qualities and limitations of his own nature4 ,these latter are for him the general psychological conditions of action1 his empirical self1 the general nature of which he has doubtless already come to be familiar with in many former situations perhaps wholly different in superficial aspect from from the present one4 ,now1 just in so far as there is this relation of mutual exclusiveness between the end proposed and certain of the standard ends or modes of conduct which are involved1 judgment will be by the direct or ethical method of adjustment presently to be described4 ,let us assume accordingly that a tentative solution of the problem has been reached to the effect that a portion of the lawyer's time shall be given to his profession and to his family life1 and that the remainder shall be given to a moderate participation in the social propaganda4 ,over against this tentative ethical solution1 as its warrant in the sense explained above1 will stand in the survey of the situation that may now be taken a certain fairly definite disposition or ,anlage of the capacities and functions of the empirical self4#acg ,now on the basis of the ethical solution thus reached there will be further study of the situation1 perhaps as a result of failure in the attempt to carry the solution into practice1 but more probably as a further preparation for overt action4 ,forthwith it develops that the compromise proposed will be impossible4 ,participation in the social agitation will excite hostility on the part of the classes from which possible clients would come and will cause distrust and a suspicion of inattention to details of business among the lawyer's present clientage4 ,there are1 in a word1 a whole assemblage of external sociological conditions 7and we need not stop to speak of physical conditions which co-operate with these and contribute to their effect7 which effectually veto the plan proposed4 ,in general these external conditions are such as to deprive the agent of the means of living in the manner which the ethical determination of the end proposes4 ,in the present case1 unless some other more feasible compromise can be devised1 either the one extreme or the other must be chosen--either continuance in the profession and the corresponding general scheme of life or the social propaganda and reliance upon such scant and precarious income as it may incidentally afford4 ,we can now define the economic aspect of a situation in terms of our present illustration4 ,the end which the lawyer had in view in a vague and tentative way was1 as we saw1 defined with reference to his ethical standards--that is to say1 a certain measure of participation in the new work was determined as satisfactory at once to his ideals of devotion to the cause of social justice and to his sense of obligation to himself and to his family4 ,in this sense1 logically speaking1 a subject was defined to which a system of predicates1 comprehended perhaps under the general predicate of right or good1 applies4 ,now1 however1 it appears1 from the inspection of the material and social environment1 that the execution of this purpose1 perfectly in accord though it may be with the spiritual capacities and powers of the agent1 is possible only on pain of certain other consequences1 certain other sacrifices1 which have not hitherto been considered4 ,that a half-hearted interest in his profession would still not prevent his earning a moderate income from it was never questioned in the ethical first approximation to a final decision1 but now the issue is fairly presented1 and1 as we must see1 in a very difficult and distressing way2 for the essence of the situation is that the ends now in conflict1 that of earning a living and caring for his family and that of laboring for the social good1 are not intrinsically 7that is1 from the standpoint of the empirical self7 incompatible4 ,on the contrary1 these two ends are psychologically quite compatible1 as the outcome of the ethical judgment shows2 only the external conditions oppose them to each other4 ,the difficulty of the case lies1 then1 just in the fact that the conflicting ends1 both standing1 as they do1 for strong personal interests of the self1 nevertheless cannot be brought to an adjustment by the direct method of an apportionment between them of the spiritual resources or energies of the self4 ,instead1 the case is one calling for an apportionment of the external means1 and so1 proximately1 not for immediate determination of the final end1 but for economic determination of the means4 ,we come now to the task of describing1 so far as this may be possible1 the judgment or valuation-processes which correspond to the types of situation thus distinguished4 ,we are able now to see that these must be constructive processes1 in the sense that in and through them courses of conduct adapted to unique situations are shaped by the concourse of established standards with a new end which has arisen and put in its claim for recognition4 ,we can see1 moreover1 that these valuation-processes effect a construction of a different order from that given in factual judgment4 ,factual judgment determines external objects as means or conditions of action from standpoints suggested by the analysis and development of ends4 ,judgments of valuation determine concrete purposes from standpoints given in recognized general purposes of the self--purposes which are general in virtue of their having been taken by abstraction from concrete cases1 in which they have received particular formulation as purposes1 and set apart as typical modes of conduct in general serviceable to the energetic self4#ach ,logically factual judgment is at all times subordinate to valuational2 when valuational judgment has become consciously deliberate1 this logical subordination becomes explicit and factual judgment appears in its true character4 ,its essential function is that of presenting the conditions which sanction and stimulate our ethically and economically determined purposes4#aci ,finally1 in the construction of purposes and reconstruction of standards in valuation the ideal of the expansion and development of the energetic self controls--not as a presented or contentual self prescribing particular modes of conduct1 but as a principle prescribing the greatest possible openness to suggestion and an impartial application of the method of valuation to the case in hand4 ,as we have said1 in whatever sensuous image we figure the energetic self1 its essential character lies in its function of stimulating methodical valuation4 ,in place of the two-faced and ambiguous presented self1 which is characteristic of the stage of conscience1 we now have in the stage of valuation the energetic self on the one hand and standards on the other4#adj ,we have now to consider the actual procedure of valuation1 and first the ethical form as above defined4 ,bearing in mind that we are not concerned with cases of obedience to authority or deference to conscience1 let us take a case of genuine moral conflict such as we were considering some time since4 ,suppose that one has the impulse to indulge in some form of amusement which he has been in the habit of considering frivolous or absolutely wrong4 ,the end1 as soon as imaged1 or rather as the condition of its being imaged1 encounters past habits of conduct symbolized by standards--standards which may be presented under a variety of forms1 a maxim learned in early childhood1 the ideal of a ,stoic sage or ,christian saint1 the example of some friend1 or a precept put in abstract terms1 but which1 however presented1 are essentially symbolic of established habits of thought or action4#ada ,solution of such a problem proceeds1 in general1 along two closely interwoven lines3 7#a7 collation and comparison of cases recognized as conforming to the standard1 with a view to determining the standard type of conduct in a less ambiguous way1 and 7#b7 definition of the relations between this type of conduct and other recognized types in the catalogue of virtues4 ,now1 these two movements are in fact inseparable1 for1 without reference to the entire system of virtues of which the one now asserting itself is a member1 the comparison of cases with a view to definition of the virtue would be blind and hopeless of any outcome4 ,the agent in the case before us desires to be temperate in amusement and to make profitable use of leisure time1 but after all he may wonder whether these ideals really require the austerities of certain medival saints or the ,stoic ataraxy4 ,the saint's feats of spiritual athletics may have served a useful purpose1 in ruder times1 as evidence of human power to lead a virtuous and thoughtful life1 but can such self-denial now be required of the moral man8 ,it is apparent1 in short1 that the superficially conceived ideal must be analyzed4 ,we must consider the spirit of our saint or hero1 not the letter of his conduct1 as we say1 and in interpreting it make due allowance for the conditions of the time in which he lived and the grade of general intelligence of those he sought to edify4 ,whether our standard is a person or a parable or an abstractly formulated precept1 the logic of the situation is the same in every case of judgment4 ,the analysis of a standard cannot proceed without the synthesis or co-ordination of the type of conduct thereby defined with other distinguishable recognized types of conduct into a comprehensive ideal of life as a whole4 ,in the last resort the implicit relations of all the virtues will be made explicit in the process of defining accurately any one of them4 ,in the last resort1 then1 the predicate of the ethical judgment is the whole system of the recognized habits of the agent1 and each judgment-process is in its outcome a readjustment of the system to accommodate the new habit that has been seeking admission4 ,both the old habits and the new impulse have been modified in the process just as the intension of a class term and the particular subsumed under the class are reciprocally modified in the ordinary judgment of sense-perception4 ,we are once more able to see that the process of ethical judgment or valuation is not a process of subsumption or classification1 of ascertaining the value of particular modes of conduct1 but on the contrary a process of determining or assigning value4 ,each judgment process means a new and more or less thoroughgoing redetermination of the self and hence a fixation of the ethical value of the conduct whose emergence as a purpose gave rise to the process4 ,the moral experience is not essentially and in its typical emergencies a recognition of values with a view to shaping one's course accordingly1 but rather a determining or a fixation of values which shall serve for the time being1 but be subject at all times to re-appraisal4 ,if the present discussion were primarily intended as a contribution to general ethical theory1 it would be a part of our purpose to show in detail that any formulation of an ethical ideal in contentual material terms must always be inadequate for practical purposes and hence theoretically indefensible4 ,this1 as we believe1 could be shown true of the popularly current ideal of self-realization as well as of hedonism in its various forms and the older systems of conscience or the moral sense4 ,these all are essentially fixed ideals admitting of more or less complete specification in point of content and regarded as tests or canons by appeal to which the moral quality of any concrete act can be deductively ascertained4 ,they are the ethical analogues of such metaphysical principles as the ,cartesian ,god or the ,substance of ,spinoza1 and the logic implied in regarding them as adequate standards for the valuation of conduct is the logic whereby the ,rationalist sought to deduce from concepts the world of particular things4 ,the present desideratum in ethical theory would appear to be1 not further attempts at definition of a moral ideal of any sort1 but the development of a logical method for the valuation of ideals and ends in which the results of more modern researches in the theory of knowledge should be made use of--in which the concept of self should play the part1 not of the concept of ,substance in a rationalistic metaphysics1#adb but of such a principle as that of the conservation of energy1 for example1 in scientific inference4#adc ,we have1 then1 in each readjustment of the activities of the self a reconstruction in knowledge of ethical reality--a reconstruction which at the same time involves the assignment of a definite value to the new mode of conduct which has been worked out in the readjustment4 ,we conclude1 then1 that the ethical experience is one of continuous construction and reconstruction of an order of objective reality1 within which the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world of more or less refractory means to the attainment of ethical purposes4 ,in this process of construction of ethical reality current moral standards play the same part as concepts already defined--that is to say1 the agent's present habits--do in the typical judgment of sense-perception4 ,they play the part of symbols suggestive of recognized and heretofore habitual modes of action with reference to conduct of the type of the particular instance that is under consideration1 serving thus to bring to bear upon the subject of the judgment sooner or later the entire moral self4 ,the outcome is a new self1 and so for the future a new standard1 in which the past self as represented by the former standard and the new impulse have been brought to mutual adjustment4 ,our position is that this adjustment is essentially experimental and that in it the general principle of the unity and expansion of the self must be presupposed1 as in inductive inference general principles of teleology1 of the conservation of energy1 and of organic interconnection of parts in living things are presupposed4 ,the unity and increase of the self is not a test or canon1 but a principle of moral experimentation4#add ,finally1 we must note one further parallel between ethical judgment and the judgment of sense-perception and science4 ,however the man of science may1 as a nominalist1 regard the laws of nature as mere observed uniformities of fact and particulars as the true realities1 these same laws will nevertheless on occasion have a distinctly objective character in his actual apprehension of them4 ,the stubbornness with which a certain material may refuse to lend itself to a desired purpose will commonly be reinforced1 as a matter of apprehension1 by one's recognition of the scientific necessity of the phenomenon4 ,as offering resistance the thing itself1 as we have seen1 becomes objective2 so also does the law of which this case may be recognized as only a particular example--and the other type of objectivity experience we need not here do more than mention as likewise possible in one's apprehension of the law as well as of the facts of nature4 ,both types of objectivity attach to the moral law as well4 ,the standard that restrains is one above us or beyond us4 ,even ,kant1 as the similitude of the starry heavens would suggest1 was not incapable of a faint emotion of the heteronomous1 and authority in one form or another is a moral force whose objective validity as moral1 both in its inhibiting and in its sanctioning aspects1 human nature is prone to acknowledge4 ,the apprehension of objectivity is everywhere1 as we have held1 emotional4 ,one type of situation in which the moral law takes on this character is found in the interposition of the law to check a forward tendency2 the other is found in the instant of transition from doubt to the new adjustment that has been reached4 ,in the one case the law is inexorable in its demands4 ,in the other case there are two possibilities3 ,if the adjustment has been essentially a rejection of the new temptation1 the law which one obeys is one no longer inexorable1 but sustaining1 as a rock of salvation4 ,if the adjustment is a distinctly new attitude1 the sense of the objectivity of the principle embodied in it will commonly be less strong1 if not for the time being almost wholly wanting2 but in the moment of overt action it will in some degree wear the character of a firm truth upon which one has taken his stand4 ,this general view of the logical constitution of the moral experience may suggest a comparison with the fundamental doctrine of the ,british ,intellectualist school4 ,the ,intellectualist writers were very largely guided in their expositions by the desire of refuting on the one hand ,hobbes and on the other ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson4 ,against ,hobbes they wished to establish the obligatory character of the moral law entirely apart from sanction or enactment by political authority4 ,against the ,sentimentalists they wished to vindicate its objectivity and permanence4 ,this twofold purpose they accomplished by holding that the morality of conduct lies in its conformity to the objective nature of things1 the knowledge of which1 in its moral aspects1 is logically deducible from certain moral axioms1 self-evident like those of mathematics4 ,now this mathematical analogy is the key to the whole position of the ,intellectualist writers4 ,by so conceiving the nature of knowledge these men seriously weakened their strong general position4 ,mathematics is just that species of knowledge which is most remote from and apparently independent of any reference to conduct1 and the ,intellectualists1 by choosing it as their ideal1 were thereby rendered incapable of explaining the obligatoriness of the moral law4 ,an adequate psychology of knowledge would have obviated this difficulty in their system4 ,the occasion for economic judgment is given1 as we have seen1 in a conflict between ends not incompatible1 in view of any ascertainable conditions of the agent's nature as an empirical self1 but inhibitory of each other in view of what we have described as conditions external to the agent4 ,thus the lawyer in our illustration found his plan of compromise thwarted by the existence of such sociological conditions as would make the practice of his profession1 in the manner intended1 impossible1 and so cut off his income4 ,similarly the peasant in a ,european country finds that 7for reasons which1 more probably1 he does not understand7 he can no longer earn a living in the accustomed way1 and emigrates to a country in which his capital and his physical energies may be more profitably employed4 ,so also in the everyday lives of all of us ends and interests quite disparate1 so far as any relation to each other through our psychical capacities is concerned1 stand very frequently in opposition1 nevertheless1 and calling for adjustment4 ,we must make a choice between amusement or intellectual pursuits or the means of sthetic culture1 on the one hand1 and the common necessaries of life on the other1 and the difficulty of the situation lies just in absence of any sort of spiritual affinity between these ends4 ,there is no necessary ratio between the satisfaction of the common needs of life and the cultivation of the higher faculties--no ratio for which the individual can ever find a sanction in the constitution of his empirical self through the direct method of ethical valuation4 ,the common needs must have their measure of recognition1 but no attempted ethical valuation of them can ever come to a result convincingly warranted to the energetic self by psychological conditions4 ,the economic situation as such is in this sense 7that is1 from the standpoint of any recognized ethical standards7 unintelligible4 ,it is this ethical unintelligibility that often lends a genuine element of tragedy to situations which press urgently and in which the ends at issue are of great ethical moment4 ,it is no small matter to the emigrant1 for example1 that he must cut the very roots by which he has grown to the sort of man he finds himself to be4 ,his whole nature protests against this violence1 and questions its necessity1 though the necessity is unmistakable and it would be quite impossible for him not to act accordingly4 ,nevertheless1 tragic as such a conflict may well be1 it does not differ in any logically essential way1 does not differ in its degree of strictly logical difficulty1 from the ethically much less serious economic problems of our everyday life4 ,now1 we have already defined the economic act for which economic judgment is preparatory as being1 in general terms1 the diversion of certain means from a present use to which they have been devoted to a new use which has come to seem in a general way desirable4#ade ,thus1 in the cases just mentioned1 the lawyer contemplates the virtual purchase of his new career by the income which his profession might in years to come afford him1 the emigrant seeks a better market for his labor1 and the pleasure-seeker and the ambitious student and the buyer of a commodity in the market propose to themselves1 each one1 the diversion from some hitherto intended use of a sum of money4 ,manifestly it is immaterial from our logical point of view whether the means in question which one proposes to apply in some new way are in the nature of physical and mental strength1 or materials and implements of manufacture ready to be used1 or means of purchase of some sort wherewith the desired service or commodity may be obtained at once4 ,the economic problem1 to state it technically1 is the problem of the reapplicability of the means1 interpreting the category of means quite broadly4 ,in a word1 then1 the method of procedure adapted to the economic type of situation is that of valuation of the means1 not that of direct valuation of the ends4 ,this method is one of valuation since1 like the ethical method1 it is determinative of a purpose1 but it accomplishes this result in its own distinctive way4 ,the problem of our present analysis will accordingly be how this method of valuation of the means is able to help toward an adjustment of disparate or unrelated ends which the ethical method is inadequate to effect4 ,let us assume that a vague purpose of foreign travel1 for example1 has presented itself in imagination1 and that the preliminary stage of ethical judgment has been passed through1 with the result that the purpose1 in a more definite form than it could have at first1 is now ready for economic consideration4 ,in the first place the cost of the journey must be determined1 and this step1 in terms of our present point of view1 is simply a methodological device whereby certain ends which the standards involved in the stage of ethical judgment could not suggest or could not effectually take into co-operation with themselves in their determination of the end are brought into play4 ,ascertaining the means suggests these disparate ends1 these established modes of use of the means1 with the result that the agent's forward tendency is checked4 ,shall the necessary sums be spent in foreign travel or shall they be spent in the present ways--in providing various physical necessities and comforts1 or for various forms of amusement1 or in increasing investments in business enterprises8 ,these modes of use do not admit of ethical comparison with the plan of foreign travel1 and the agent's interest must therefore now be centered on the means4 ,it is in this check to the agent's forward tendency that the logical status of the means is evinced4 ,as merely so much money the means could only serve to further the execution of the purpose that is forming1 since under the circumstances it could only prompt immediate expenditure4 ,like the subject in factual judgment1 the means in economic judgment have their problematic aspect which as effectually hinders the desired use of them as could any palpable physical defect4 ,this problematic aspect consists in the fact of the present established mode of use which the now-forming purpose threatens to disturb1 and it is the agent's interest in this mode of use that turns his attention to the valuation of the means4 ,it need hardly be pointed out that in the economic life we find situations exactly corresponding to those of conscience and temptation and mechanical pull and haul which were discriminated in the ethical sphere and marked off from judgment properly so called4 ,indeed it seems reasonable to think1 on general grounds of introspection1 that these methods of decision 7if they deserve the name7 are1 relatively speaking1 more frequently relied upon in the economic than in the moral life4 ,the economic method of true judgment is roundabout and more complex and more difficult than ethical1 and involves a more express recourse to those abstract conceptions which for the most part are only implicitly involved in valuation of the other type4 ,the economic type of valuation1 in fact1 differs from the ethical1 not in an absolute or essential way1 but rather in the explicitness with which it brings to light and lays bare the vital elements in valuation as such4 ,in general1 then1 the economic process would seem necessarily to embrace three stages1 which will first of all be enumerated and then very briefly explained and discussed4 ,these are3 7#a7 a preliminary consideration of the means necessary to attain the end--which must be vague and tentative1 of course1 for the reason that the end as imagined is so1 as compared with the fulness of detail which must belong to it before it can be finally accepted2 7#b7 a consideration of the means1 as thus provisionally taken1 in the light of their present devotion to other purposes1 this present devotion of them being the outcome1 in some degree at least1 of past valuation2 7#c7 final definition of the means with reference to the proposed use through an adjustment effected between this and the factors involved in the past valuation4 #a4 ,in the first stage as throughout1 it must be carefully noted1 the means are under consideration not primarily in their physical aspect1 but simply as subject to a possible redisposition4 ,thus it is not money as lawful currency receivable at the steamship office for an ocean passage1 nor tools and materials and labor-power technically suitable for the production of a desired object1 that is the subject of the economic judgment4 ,the problem of redisposition would of course not be raised were the means not technically adaptable to the purpose1 nor on the other hand can the means in the course of economic judgment1 as a rule1 escape some measure of further 7factual7 inquiry into their technical properties2 but the standpoints are nevertheless distinct4 ,again1 it must be noted that the means in this first stage will be only roughly measured4 ,the length of one's stay abroad1 the size of the house one wishes to build1 the purpose whatever it may be1 is still undefined--these are in fact the very matters which the process must determine--and in the first instance it is money in general or a large sum of money with reference to which we raise the economic problem4 ,the category of quantity is in fact essentially an economic one2 it is essentially a standpoint for determining the means of action in such a way as to facilitate their economic valuation4 ,the reader familiar with the writings of the ,austrian school of economists will easily recall how uniformly in their discussions of the principle of marginal utility these writers assume outright in the first place the division of the stock of goods into definite units1 and then raise the question of how the value of a unit is measured4 ,the stock contains already a hundred bushels of wheat or ten loaves of bread--apparently as a matter of metaphysical necessity--whereas in fact the essential economic problem is this very one of how wheat at large comes to be put in sacks of a certain size and bread in general to be baked in twelve-ounce loaves4 ,the subdivision of the stock and the valuation of the unit are not successive stages1 but inseparably correlative phases of the valuation-process as a whole4 ,the outcome may be stated either way1 in accordance with one's interest in the situation4 #b4 ,but the unmeasured means as redisposable in an as yet undetermined way bring to consciousness established measured uses to which the means have been heretofore assigned in definite amounts4 ,in this way the process of determining a definite quantum as redisposable 7which is to say1 of attaining to a definite acceptable plan of conduct7 can begin4 ,how1 then1 does this fact of past assignment to uses still recognized as desirable figure in the situation8 ,in the first place the past assignment may have been 7#a7 an outcome of past economic valuation1 7#b7 an unhesitating or non-economic act executive of an ethical decision1 or 7#c7 an act of more or less conscious obedience to conscience or authority4 ,in either case it now stands as a course of conduct which at the time was1 in the way explained above1 sanctioned to the agent1 to the energetic self1 by the means and conditions recognized as bearing upon it4 ,in this sense1 then1 we have1 in this recognition of the past adjustment and of the economic character which the means now have in virtue of it1 what we may term a judgment of energy-equivalence between the means and their established uses4 ,for to the agent it was the essential meaning of the sense of sanction felt when the means were assigned to these uses that the energetic self would on the whole be furthered thereby--and this in view of all the sacrifices that this use would entail1 or in view of the sacrifices required for the production of the means1 if the case were one in which the means were not at hand and could only be secured by a more or less extended production process4 ,in the illustration we have been considering1 it will be observed1 there is an extensive schedule of present uses which the new project calls in question and from which the means must be diverted4 ,this is in fact the commoner case4 ,a new use of money will affect1 as a rule1 not simply a single present mode of expenditure1 but will very probably involve a readjustment throughout the whole schedule of expenditure which our separate past valuations of money have in effect co-operated in establishing4 ,so likewise if we wish to use part of a store of building materials or of food1 or of any other subdivisible commodity1 we encounter an ordered system of consumption rather than a single predetermined use which we have not yet enjoyed4 ,where this is the case the whole process of valuation is greatly facilitated1 but this is not essential4 ,the means in cases of true economic valuation may be capable of but a single use1 like a railroad ticket or a perishable piece of fruit1 or of a virtually endless series of uses1 like a painting or a literary masterpiece4 ,whether the means figure as representing but a single use or stand for the conservation of an extensive system1 their economic significance is the same4 ,they are the energy-equivalent of this use or system of uses considered as an act or system of acts of consumption in furtherance of the self4 ,their past assignment meant then and means now simply this1 that the energetic self would thereby gain more than it would lose through the inevitable sacrifices4 ,this is the economic significance of the means in virtue of which they are now problematic to the extent of checking1 for a time at least1 forward tendency toward the desired end4#adf #c4 ,the judgment of energy-equivalence1 then1 defines the inhibiting economic aspect of the means1 and moreover defines it for the means as subdivided and set apart for a schedule of uses if this was the form of the past adjustments to which reference is made4 ,the problem of the third stage of the process is that of bringing subject and predicate together1 as we have elsewhere expressed it--that is1 of determining1 in the light of the economic character of the means as just ascertained1 what measure of satisfaction1 if any1 may be accorded to the new and as yet undefined desire4 ,the new disposition of the means1 if one is to be made1 must bring to the energetic self a degree of furtherance and development which shall be sensibly as great as would come from the established method of consumption4 ,the means1 as economic1 are means to the conservation of the old adjustment1 and any new disposal of them or of any portion of them for a full or partial execution of the new purpose must make out at least as good a case4 ,it must appear that the new disposition is not only physically possible1 but also economically necessary in the light of the same principle of expansion of the self as sanctioned the disposition now in force4 ,it must make the self in some way more efficient--whether more strong and symmetrical in body1 more skilled in work1 more clear of brain1 or more efficient in whatever other concrete way may be desired4 ,psychologically the sanction of any course of action which is taken as evidence of conformity to the general rule thus inadequately stated is the more or less strong sense of relaxation of attentive strain which comes with the shift of attention1 in the final survey1 from means to end4 ,we may accordingly1 for the sake of greater definiteness1 restate in the following terms the process which has just been sketched3 ,the ends in conflict at the outset are ends which do not sensibly bear upon each other through their dependence upon a common fund of psychical capacities or energies4 ,they are related in the agent's experience solely through their dependence upon a common stock of physical means1 and they do not therefore admit of adjustment through the ethical type of process4 ,the economic process consists essentially of a revival in imagination of the experiences accompanying the former disposition of the means and a re-enforcement by these of the means in their adherence to that former and still recognized disposition4 ,if an adapted form of the new end can be imagined which will mediate a like experience of relaxation when the attention shifts from the means1 thus emotionally re-enforced in their economic status1 to the end as thus conceived1 the means will be recognized as economically redisposable4 ,thus the method of valuation of the means makes possible1 through appeal to the sensibly invariable experience of relaxation or assurance in the outcome of judgment1 a co-ordination of disparate ends which the ethical method of direct adjustment could not effect4#adg ,the economic process thus presents on analysis the same factors as does the ethical4 ,on the subject side we have the means--which as economic are problematic as to their reapplicability4 ,on the predicate side we have the suggested mode of reapplication in tension against conservative ideals of application to established purposes4 ,just as it may be held that the general ethical predicate is that of ,right or ,good--that is1 deserving of adoption into the system of one's ends--so the economic predicate applied to the means as these come in the end to be defined is the general concept ,reappliable4 ,and in general the distinction of the types is not an ultimate one1 for the more deliberately and rigorously the method of economic valuation is pursued--in such a case1 for example1 as that of the prospective emigrant--the stronger will be the agent's sense of a genuinely ethical sanction as belonging to the decision which is in the end worked out4 ,the more certain and sincere1 therefore1 will be the agent's judgment that the means must be reapplied1 for on the sense of sanction of which we speak rests the explicit judgment that the purpose formed is expansive of the self4 ,from the analysis thus presented it must appear1 therefore1 that the economic type of judgment is in our sense a constructive process4 ,its function is to determine a particular commodity or portion of a stock of some commodity in its economic character as disposable1 and in performing this function it presents a definite reality in the economic order4 ,moreover1 in thus defining the particular1 recourse is had to more or less distinctively namable economic standards which are in the last resort symbols representing established habits of consumption in the light of which the means1 prima facie1 seem not to be available for any other purposes4 ,these economic standards1 like ethical standards and the class concepts of science and our ordinary perceptual experience1 are1 with all due respect to nominalism1 constitutive of a real world--a world which is real because it lends form and significance to our knowledge of particulars as stimuli to conduct4 ,we have now before us sufficient reason for our thesis that the valuation-process in both its forms is constructive of an order of reality1 and we have sufficiently explained the relation which the economic order bears to the inclusive and logically prior order of ethical objects and relations4 ,we are now in a position to see that in being thus constructive of reality 7taking the conception in its proper functional meaning7 they are at the same time constructive of the self1 since the reality which they construct is in its functional aspect the assemblage of means and conditions1 of stimuli1 in short1 for the development and expansion of the self4 ,we shall bring this main division of our study to a close with a series of remarks in explanation and illustration of this view4 ,let us consider once more the factors present in the agent's final survey of the situation after the completion of the judgment-process and on the verge of action4 ,these factors are1 as we have seen1 7#a7 recognition of conditions sanctioning the purpose formed1 7#b7 recognition of the purpose as1 in view of this sanction1 warranted to the energetic self as an eligible method of expansion and development1 and 7#c7 recognition of the energetic self1 conversely1 as in possession1 in virtue of the favorable conditions given in factual judgment1 of this new method of furtherance4 ,these three factors are manifestly not so much factors co-operating in the situation as inseparable aspects of it distinguishable from each other and admitting of discriminative emphasis in accordance with the degree of reflective power which the individual may possess or choose to exercise4 ,strictly speaking these three aspects are present in every conscious recognition of a purpose as one's own and as presently to be carried into effect1 but they are not always present in equal conspicuousness1 and never with equal logical importance for the individual4 ,in fact this enumeration of aspects coincides with our enumeration of the three stages in the evolution of the individual's conscious moral attitude toward new purposes given in impulse--in the third of which the last named of these aspects comes to the fore with the others in logical or functional subordination to it4 ,now it will be apparent on grounds of logic1 as on the evidence of simple introspection1 that in this third type of attitude--in the attitude of true valuation1 that is to say--the energetic self cannot be identified with the chosen purpose4 ,the purpose is a determinate specified act to be performed subject to recognized conditions1 and with the use of the co-ordinated means2 the self1 on the other hand1 is a process to which this particular purpose is1 indeed1 from the standpoint of the self's conservation and increase1 indispensable1 but which is nevertheless apart from the purpose in the sense that without the purpose it would still be a self1 though perhaps a narrower and less developed one4 ,our standpoint here as elsewhere1 the reader must remember1 is the logical4 ,it is the standpoint of the agent's own interpretation of his experience of judgment during the judgment-process and at its close1 and not the standpoint of the psychological mediation of this experience as a series of occurrences4 ,thus we are here far from wishing to deny the general proposition that a man's purposes are an expression of his nature1 as the psychologist might describe it1 or the proposition that a man's conduct and his character are one and the same thing viewed from different points of view4 ,we wish merely to insist upon the fact that these psychological propositions are not a true account of the agent's own experience of himself and of his purposes while these latter are in the making or are on the verge of execution4 ,there is indeed no conflict between this inside view of the judgment-process and of the final survey and the psychological propositions just mentioned4 ,the identity of conduct and character means not simply that as the man is so does he act1 but quite as much1 and in a more important way1 that as he acts so is he and so does he become4 ,it is1 then1 the essence of the agent's own view of the situation that his character is in the making and that the purpose is the method to be taken4 ,to the agent the self is not1 indeed1 independent of the purpose1 for plainly it is recognized that upon just this purpose the self is1 in the sense explained1 in a vital way dependent4 ,nevertheless the self is in the agent's apprehension essentially beyond the purpose1 and larger than the purpose1 and even1 we may say1 metaphysically apart from it4 ,now the conclusion which we wish to draw from this examination of the agent's attitude in judgment is that no formulation of an ideal self can ever be adequate to his purposes1 not simply because any such formulation must1 as ,green allows1 inevitably be incomplete and inconsistent1 but because the self as a process is in the agent's own apprehension of it inherently incapable of formulation4 ,any formulation that might be attempted must be in terms of particular purposes 7since in a modern ethical theory the self must be a concrete and not an abstract universal71 and it is easy to see that any such would be1 to the agent in the attitude of true ethical judgment1 worse than useless4 ,it could as contentual and concrete only be a composite of existing standards1 more or less coherently put together1 offered to the agent as a substitute for the new standard which he is trying to work out4 ,if there were not need of a new standard there would be no judgment-process2 the agent must be1 to say the least1 embarrassed1 even if the unwitting imposture does not deceive him1 when such a composite1 useful and indeed indispensable in its proper place as a standard of reference and a source of suggestion1 is urged upon him as suitable for a purpose which in the very nature of the case it is logically incapable of serving4#adh ,to the agent1 then1 the energetic self can never be represented as an ideal--can never be expressed in terms of purpose--since it is in its very nature logically incongruous with any possible particular purpose or generalization of such purposes4 ,it is commonly imaged by the agent in some manner of sensuous terms1 but it is imaged1 in so far as the case is one of judgment in a proper sense1 for use as a stimulus to the methodical process of valuation--not as a standard1 which if really adequate would make valuation unnecessary4 ,the agent's consciousness of himself as energetic cannot be an ideal2 it comes to consciousness only through the endeavor1 first to follow1 and then1 in a later stage of moral development1 to use ideals1 and has for its function1 as a presentation1 the incitement of the process of methodical use of standards in the control of the agent's impulsive ends4 ,it is not an anticipatory vision of the final goal of life1 but the agent's coming to consciousness of the general impulse and movement of the life that is4 ,it is an inevitable consequence of acceptance of a contentual view of the energetic self as one's ideal that reflective morality should tend to degenerate into an introspective conscientiousness constantly in unstable equilibrium between a pharisaical selfishness on the one hand and a morally scarcely more dangerous hypocrisy on the other4 ,there is certainly much justice in the stinging characterization of ,neo-,hegelian ,egoism which ,mr4 ,taylor somewhere in his unsearchable book applies to the currently prevailing conventionalized type of idealistic ethics4 ,if the self of the valuation-process is an ultimate goal of effort1 then there must certainly be an irreconcilable contrast to the disadvantage of the latter between the plain man's objective desire for right conduct1 as such1 and for the welfare of his fellow-beings1 and the moralist's anxious questionings of the rectitude of the motives by which his conformity to the fixed moral standard are prompted4#adi ,into the value and significance of the attitude of conscientious examination of one's moral motives we are not here concerned to inquire1 but need only insist1 in accordance with our present view1 that its value must be distinctly subordinate and incidental to the general course and outcome of the valuation-process4 ,in the valuation-process1 consciousness of self is not an object of solicitude1 but simply1 we repeat1 a pure presentation of stimulus1 having for its office the incitement1 and if need be the reincitement1 of the attitude of deference to the suggestions of old standards and openness to the petitions of new impulse1 and of methodically bringing these to bear upon each other4 ,the outcome of such a process1 of course1 cannot be predicted--and for the same reasons as make unpredictable the scientist's factual hypothesis4 ,just as the scientist's data are incomplete and ill-assorted and unorganized1 for the reason that they have1 of necessity1 been collected1 and must at the outset be interpreted1 in the light of present concepts1 whose inadequacy the very existence of the problem at issue demonstrates1 so the final moral purpose that shall be developed is not to be deduced from any possible inventory of the situation as it stands4 ,the process in both cases is one of reconstruction1 and the test of the validity of the reconstruction must in both cases be of the same essentially practical character4 ,in both cases the process is constructive of reality1 in the functional signification of the term4 ,in both1 the judgment process is constructive also of the self1 in the sense that upon the determination of the agent's future attitude the cumulative outcome of his past attitudes is methodically brought to bear4#aej ,v ,judgments of value are1 then1 objective in their import in the same sense as are the factual judgments in which the conditions of action are presented4 ,the ideal problematic situation is1 in the last resort1 ethical1 in the sense of requiring for its solution determination of the new end that has arisen with reference to existing standards4 ,in structure and in function the judgment in which the outcome of this process is presented is knowledge1 and objective in the only valid acceptation of the term4 ,but1 after all1 it may be urged1 is it not the essential mark of the objective that it should be accessible to all men1 and not in the nature of the case valid for only a single individual8 ,at best the objectivity of content which has been made out for the judgment of value is purely functional1 and not such as can be verified by appeal to the consensus of other persons4 ,the agent's assurance of the reality of the economic or ethical subject-matter which he is endeavoring to determine1 and his sense of the objectivity of the results which he reaches1 need not be denied4 ,these may well enough be illusions of personal prejudice or passion1 or even normal illusions of the reflective faculty1 like that of interpreting the secondary qualities of bodies as objective in the same sense as are the bulk1 figure1 extension1 number1 and motion of their solid parts4#aea ,any man can see the physical object to which ,i point1 and verify with his own eyes the qualities which ,i ascribe to it1 but no man can either understand or verify my judgment that the purpose ,i have formed is in accord with rational ideals of industry and self-denial1 or that this portion of my winter's fuel may be given to a neighbor who has none4 ,but this line of objection proves too much1 for1 made consistent with itself1 it really amounts to a denial that the very judgment of sense-perception1 to which it appeals so confidently as a criterion1 has objective import4 ,the first division of this study was intended to show that every object in the experience of each individual is for the individual a unique construction of his own1 determined in form and in details by individual interests and purposes1 and therefore different from that object in the experience of any other individual which in social intercourse passes current as the same4 ,the real object is for me the object which functions in my experience1 presenting problematic aspects for solution1 and lending itself more or less serviceably to my purposes2 and this object is1 we hold1 not the object as socially current1 but the complete object which1 as complete in its determination with reference to my unique purposes1 cannot possibly have social currency4 ,the objection as stated cuts away the very ground on which it rests1 since the shortcoming which it finds in the judgment of ethical or economic value is present in the particular judgment of sense-perception also4 ,the object about which ,i can assure myself by an immediate appeal to other persons is the object in its bare conceptual aspects--the object as a dictionary might define it1 the commodity as it might be described in a trade catalogue1 or the ethical act as defined by the criminal code or in the treatise of a moral philosopher4 ,it is an object consisting of a central core or fixed deposit of meaning1 which renders it significant in a certain general way to a number of persons1 or even to all men1 but which is not yet adequately known by me from the standpoint of my present forming purpose4 ,in virtue of these conceptual characters it is adaptable to my purpose1 which is as yet general and indeterminate2 but in the nature of the case it cannot yet be known to me as applicable to my prospective concrete purpose1 as this shall come to be through judgment4 ,thus1 if the test of objectivity of import is to be that the judgment shall present an object or a fact which1 as presented1 is socially current among men and not shut away in the individual intelligence apart from the possibility of social verification1 then the apparent nominalism of the objection we are considering turns out to be the uttermost extreme of realism4 ,such a test amounts to a virtual affirmation that the sole objective reality is the conceptual1 and that the accidents of one's particular object of sense-perception are the arbitrary play of private preference or fancy4 ,at this point1 however1 the objection may shift its ground and take refuge in some such position as the following3 ,the real object is indeed the object which the individual knows in relation to his particular purpose1 and it is indeed impossible that the individual's judgment should be limited in its content to coincidence with the conceptual elements of meaning which are socially current4 ,the building-stone which one has judged precisely fit for a special purpose1 the specimen which the mineralogist or the botanist examines under his microscope1 the tool whose peculiarity of working one has learned to make allowance for in use--these all are1 of course1 highly individual objects1 possessing for the person in question an indefinite number of objective aspects of which no other person can possibly be conscious at the time4 ,and1 more than this1 even though the individual may1 in his scrutiny of the object1 have discovered no conspicuous new qualities in it which were not present in the socially current meaning1 the object will still possess an individuality making it genuinely unique merely through its co-ordination with other objects in the mechanical process of working out the purpose in hand4 ,it is at least an object standing here at just this time1 a tool cutting this particular piece of stone and striking at this instant with this particular ringing sound1 and these perhaps wholly nonessential facts will nevertheless serve to individualize the object 7if one chances to think of them7 in the sense of making it such a one as no other person knows4 ,all this may be granted1 the objection may allow1 and yet the vital point remains2 for this is not what it was intended1 even in the first place1 to deny4 ,the vital point at issue is not whether the object which ,i know is known as ,i know it by any other person1 but whether1 in the nature of things1 it is one that can be so known4 ,herein1 then1 lies the difference between judgments of fact and judgments of value4 ,the mineralogist can train his pupil to see precisely what he himself sees2 and so likewise in any case of sense-perception1 the object1 however recondite may be the qualities or features which one may see in it1 can nevertheless be seen by any other person in precisely the same way on the single1 more often not insuperably difficult1 condition that the discoverer shall point these out or otherwise prepare the other for seeing them4 ,but with the ton of coal which one may judge economically disposable for a charitable purpose the case stands differently1 since it is not in its visible or other physical aspects that the ton of coal is here the subject of the judgment4 ,it is as having been set apart by oneself exclusively for other uses that the ton of coal now functions as an object and now possesses the character which the economic judgment has given it2 and the case stands similarly with a contemplated act1 of telling the truth in a trying situation4 ,the valuation placed upon the commodity or upon the moral act depends essentially upon psychological conditions of temperament1 disposition1 mood1 or whim into which it would be impossible for another person to enter1 and these depend upon conditions of past training and native endowment which can never occur or be combined in future in precisely the same way for any other individual4 ,in short1 the physical object is describable and can be made socially current1 though doubtless with more or less of difficulty1 if other persons will attend to it and learn to see it as ,i see it2 but the value of an economic object or a moral act depends upon my desires and feelings1 and therefore must remain a matter of my private appreciation4 ,in answering this amended form of the objection it is entirely unnecessary to discuss the issue of fact which it has raised as to whether or not complete description of a physical object or event is a practical or theoretical possibility4 ,it need only be pointed out that at best such complete description can only be successful in its purpose on condition that the individual upon whom the experiment is tried be willing to attend and have the requisite apperceptive background4 ,the accuracy with which another person's knowledge shall copy the knowledge which ,i endeavor to impart to him must manifestly depend upon these two leading conditions1 not to mention also the measure of my own pedagogical and literary skill4 ,any consideration of such a purely psychological problem as is here suggested would be entirely out of place in a discussion the purpose of which is not that of analyzing the process of judgment1 but that of interpreting its meaning aspects4 ,let us grant the entire psychological possibility of making socially current in the manner here suggested the most highly individual and concrete cognition of an object one may please1 and let us grant1 moreover1 that this possibility has been actually realized4 ,this concurrent testimony of the witness will doubtless confirm one's impression of the accuracy of the process of observation and inference whereby the knowledge which has been imparted was first gained1 but we must deny that it can do more than this4 ,for indeed1 apart from some independent self-reliant conviction of the objective validity of the knowledge in question1 how should another's assent be taken as confirmation and not rather as evidence of one's own mere skill in suggestion and of the other's susceptibility thereto8 ,we must deny that even in the improved form the criterion of social currency is a valid one4 ,in a word1 the social currency of knowledge to the extent to which it can exist requires as its condition1 and is evidence of1 the equal social currency of certain interests1 purposes1 or points of view for predication2 and if it be possible to make socially current an item of concrete knowledge1 with all its concrete fulness of detail1 then a fortiori it must be possible to make socially current the concrete individual purpose with reference to which this item of knowledge first of all took form4 ,whether such a thing be psychologically possible at all the reader may decide2 but if it be possible in the sphere of knowledge of fact1 then it must be possible in the sphere of valuation4 ,in short1 judgment in either field1 in definition of a certain object or commodity or moral act as1 for the agent1 an objective fact possessing certain characters1 involves the tacit assumption of social verifiability as a matter of course2 but it does not rest upon this assumption1 nor is this assumption the essence of its meaning4 ,to say that my judgment is socially verifiable1 that my concrete object of perception or of valuation would be seen as ,i see it by any person in precisely my place1 is merely a tautological way of formally announcing that ,i have made the judgment and have now a definite object which to me has a certain definite functional meaning4 ,thus1 instead of drawing a distinction between the realms of fact and value1 as between what is or can be common to all intelligent beings and what must be unique for each individual one1 we must hold that the two realms are coextensive4 ,the socially current object answers to a certain general type of conscious purpose or interest active in the individual and so to a general habit of valuation1 and the concrete object to a special determination of this type of purpose with reference to others in the recognized working system of life4 ,the agent's final attitude1 on the conclusion of the judgment-process1 may be expressed in either sort of judgment--in a judgment of the value of commodity or moral purpose1 or in a judgment of concrete fact setting forth the external conditions which warrant the purpose to the energetic self4 ,throughout the judgment-process there is a correlation between the movement whereby the socially current object develops into the adapted means and that whereby the socially current type of conduct develops into the defined and valued purpose4#aeb ,at this point1 however1 a second general objection presents itself4 ,however individual the content of my knowledge of physical fact may be1 and however irrelevant1 from the logical point of view1 to my confidence in its objective validity may be the possibility of sharing it with other persons1 nevertheless it refers to an object which is in some sense permanent1 and therein differs from my valuations4 ,in economic valuation ,i reach a definition of a certain commodity and am confirmed in it by all the conditions that enter into my final survey of the situation4 ,but my desire for the new sort of consumption may fail1 and so expose my valuation to easy attack from any new desire that may arise2 or my supply of the commodity in question may be suddenly increased or diminished1 and my valuation of the unit quantity thereby changed4 ,likewise my ethical valuation may have to be reversed 7as ,mr4 ,taylor has insisted7 by reason of a change of disposition or particular desire which makes impossible1 except in obedience to some other and inclusive valuation1 further adherence to it4 ,and these changes take place without any accompanying sense of their doing violence to objective fact or1 on the other hand1 any judgment of their being in the nature of corrections of previous errors in valuation1 and so more closely in accordance with the truth4 ,moreover1 a new valuation1 taking the place of an old1 does not supplement its predecessor as one set of judgments about a physical object may supplement another1 made from a different point of view1 but does literally take its place1 and this without necessarily condemning it as having been erroneous4 ,this general objection rests upon a number of fairly obvious misconceptions1 and its strength is apparent only4 ,in the first place1 the question of the objectivity of any type of judgment must in the end1 as we have seen1 reduce itself to a question of the judgment's import to the agent4 ,however the agent's valuations may shift from time to time1 each several one will be sanctioned to the agent by the changed conditions exhibited in the inventory which the agent takes at the close of judgment which has formed it4 ,the conditions have changed1 and the valuation of the earlier purpose has likewise changed2 but the new purpose is sanctioned by the new conditions1 and the test of the presumed validity of the new valuation can only be in the manner already discussed#aec the test of actual execution of the purpose4 ,in the change1 as the agent interprets the situation1 there is no violation of the former purpose nor a nearer approach to truth4 ,each valuation is true for the situation to which it corresponds4 ,we are obviously not here considering the case of error4 ,an error in valuation is evidenced to the agent1 not by the need of a new valuation answering to changed conditions1 but by the failure of a given valuation to make good its promise1 although to all appearance conditions have remained unchanged4 ,if the conditions have changed1 then the purpose and the conditions must be redetermined1 if the expansion of the energetic self is to continue2 but the former valuation does not thereby become untrue4 ,these brief remarks should suffice by way of answer1 but it will serve advantageously to illustrate our general position if we pursue the objection somewhat farther4 ,the physical object is1 nevertheless1 permanent1 it will be said1 and this surely distinguishes it from the object 7now freely acknowledged as such7 of the value-judgment4 ,to one man gold may be soluble in aqua regia and to another worth so many pence an ounce1 but different and individual as are these judgments and the standpoints they respectively imply1 the gold is one1 impartially admitting at the same time of both characterizations4 ,on the other hand1 one cannot judge an act good and bad at once4 ,the purpose of deception that may be good is one controlled and shaped by ideals quite different from those which permit deception of the evil sort--is1 in truth1 taken as a total act1 altogether different from the purpose of deception which one condemns1 and not1 like the parcel of matter in the two judgments about gold1 the subject of both valuations4 ,a brief consideration of the meaning of this parcel of matter will easily expose the weakness of the plea4 ,in the last analysis the parcel of matter must for the agent reduce itself1 let us say1 to certain controllable energies centering about certain closely contiguous points in space and capable1 in their exercise1 of setting free or checking other energies in the system of nature4 ,thus1 put in aqua regia the gold will dissolve1 but in the atmosphere it retains its brilliant color1 and in the photographer's solution its energies have still a different mode of manifestation4 ,and thus it would appear that the various predicates which are applied to gold imply1 each one1 a unique set of conditions4 ,gold is soluble in aqua regia1 but not if it is to retain its yellow luster2 which predicate is to be true of it depends upon the conditions under which the energies resident in the gold are to be set free1 just as the moral character of an act depends upon the social conditions obtaining at the time of its performance--that is1 upon the ideals with reference to which it has been shaped in judgment4 ,how can one maintain that in a literal and concrete physical sense gold in process of solution is the same as gold entering into chemical combination8 ,surely the energy conditions which constitute the gold in the two processes are not the same--and can one nowadays hope to find sameness in unchangeable atoms8#aed ,in a word1 the permanent substance or real essence that admits of various mutually supplementary determinations corresponding to diverse points of view is1 strictly speaking1 a convenient abstraction1 and not an existent fact in time--and we shall maintain that the same species of abstraction has its proper place1 and in fact occurs1 in the sphere of moral judgment4 ,the type of moral conduct that in every actual case of its occurrence in the moral order is determined in some unique and special way by relation to other standards is precisely analogous to the substance that is now dissolved in aqua regia and now made to pass in the form of current coin1 but cannot be treated in both ways at once4 ,both are abstractions4 ,the gold is a name for the general possibility of attaining any one of a certain set of particular ends by appropriately co-ordinating certain energies1 resident elsewhere in the physical system1 with those at present stored in this particular parcel of matter2 the result to be attained depends not alone upon the parcel of matter1 but also upon the particular energies brought to bear upon it from without4 ,now let us take a type of conduct which is sometimes judged good and sometimes bad4 ,deception1 for example1 is such a type--and as a type it simply stands for the general possibility of furtherance or detriment to the energetic self according as it is determined in the concrete instance by ideals of social well-being or by considerations of immediate personal advantage4 ,for the type-form of conduct--when considered1 not as a type of mere physical performance1 but as conduct in the technical sense of a possible purpose of the self--is1 in the sense we have explained1 a symbol for the general possibility of access or dissipation of spiritual energy--energy which must be set free by the bringing to bear of other energies upon it1 and which furthers or works counter to the enlargement and development of the self according to the mode of its co-ordination with other energies which the self has already turned to its purposes4#aee ,but actual conduct is concrete always and never typical2 and so likewise1 we have sought to show1 actual substance1 the objective thing referred to in the factual judgment1 is always concrete and never an essence4 ,it is not a fixed thing admitting of a simultaneous variety of conflicting determinations and practical uses1 but absolutely unique and already determined to its unique character by the whole assemblage of physical conditions which affect it at the time and which it in turn reacts upon4 ,in the moral as in the physical sphere the fundamental category would1 on our present account1 appear to be that of energy4 ,the particular physical object given in judgment is a concrete realization1 in the form of a particular means or instrument1 of that general possibility of attaining ends which the concept of a fixed fund of energy1 interpreted as a logical postulate or principle of inference1 expresses4 ,the particular moral or economic act is a particular way in which the energy of the self may be increased or diminished4 ,in both spheres the reality presented in the finished judgment is objective as being a stimulus to the setting free of the energies for which it stands4 ,once more1 then1 our answer to the objection we have been considering must be that the object as the permanent substrate is merely an abstract symbol standing for the indeterminate means in general set over against the self4 ,corresponding to it we have1 on the other side1 the concept of the energetic self--the self that is purposive in general1 expansive somehow or other4 ,the function of completed factual judgment in the development of experience is1 we have held1 that of warranting to the agent the completed purpose which his judgment of value expresses4 ,this view calls for some further comment and illustration in closing the present division4 ,in the first place the statement implies that the conditions which factual judgment presents in the final survey as sanctioning the purpose have not determined the purpose1 since prior to the determination of the purpose the conditions were not1 and could not be1 so presented4 ,the question1 therefore1 naturally arises whether our meaning is that in the formation of our purposes in valuation the recognition of existing conditions plays no part4 ,our answer can be indicated only in the barest outline as follows3 ,the agent must1 of course1 in an economic judgment-process1 recognize and take account of such facts as the technical adaptability of the means he is proposing to use to the new purpose that is forming1 as also of environing conditions which may affect the success which he may meet with in applying them4 ,he must consider also his own physical strength and qualities of mind with a view to this same technical problem4 ,and similarly in ethical valuation1 as we have seen1 the psychology of the empirical ego must play its part4 ,but the conditions thus recognized are1 as we might seek to show more in detail1 explainable as the outcome of past factual judgment-processes1 and on the occasion of their original definition in the form in which they now are known played the sanctioning part of which we have so often spoken4 ,they therefore correspond to the agent's accepted practical ideals1 so that the control which his past experience exercises over his present conduct may be stated equally well in either sort of terms--in terms of his prevailing recognized standards1 or in terms of his present knowledge of the conditions which his new purpose must respect4 ,thus1 in general1 the concept of a physical order conditioning the conduct of all men and presented in a definite body of socially current knowledge is the logical correlate of the moral law conceived as a categorical imperative prescribing certain types of conduct4 ,thus the error of regarding the agent's conduct in a present emergency as an outcome of existing determining conditions is logically identical with the corresponding error of the ethical theory of self-realization4 ,the latter holds the logical possibility of a determinate descriptive ideal 7already realized in the unchanging ,absolute ,self7 which is adequate to the solution of all possible ethical problems4 ,the former holds that all conduct must be subject to the determining force of external conditions which1 if not at present completely known1 are at least in theory knowable4 ,the physical universe in its original nebulous state contained the promise and potency of all that has been in the way of human conduct and of all that is to be4 ,into the fixed mechanical system no new energy can enter and from it none of the original fund of energy can be lost4 ,this mechanical theory of conduct is the essential basis of the hedonistic theory of ethics2 and it would not be difficult to show that ,green's criticism of this latter and his own affirmative theory of the moral ideal 7as also the current conventional criticism of hedonism in the same tenor by the school of ,green7 are in a logical sense identical with it4 ,for the assumption that conduct is determined by existing objective conditions is precisely the logical correlate of the concept of a contentual and realizable ideal moral self4#aef ,we may now interpret1 in the light of our general view of the function of factual judgment1 the concept of the empirical self referred to in our discussion of the various types of sanctioning condition which may enter into the final survey4 ,the empirical self of psychological science is a construction gradually put together by psychologist or introspective layman as an interpretation of the way in which accepted concrete modes of conduct1 in the determination of which standards have been operative1 have worked out in practice to the furtherance or impoverishment of the energetic self4 ,we have seen that the ambiguous presented self which functions in the moral attitude of obedience to authority or to conscience gives place in the attitude of conscious valuation to apprehension of the energetic self1 on the one hand1 and descriptive concepts of particular types of conduct1 on the other4 ,the empirical self at the same time makes its appearance as a constantly expanding inventory of the spiritual resources which the energetic self has at its disposal4 ,these are the functions of the soul which a functional psychology shows us in operation--powers of attention1 strength of memory1 fertility in associative recall1 and the like--and these are the resources wherewith the energetic self may execute1 and so exploit to its own furtherance1 the purposes which1 in particular emergencies1 new end and recognized standards may work out in co-operation4#aeg ,,vi ,in the foregoing pages we have consistently used the expressions ethical and economic judgment and judgment of valuation as synonymous4 ,this may have seemed to the reader something very like a begging of the question from the outset1 as taking for granted that very judgmental character of our valuational experience which it was the professed object of our discussion to establish4 ,we are thus called upon very briefly to consider1 first of all1 the relations which subsist between the consciousness of value and the process which we have described as that of valuation4 ,this will enable us1 in the second place1 to determine the logical function which belongs to the consciousness of value in the general economy of life4 ,the consciousness of value is a perfectly definite and distinctive psychical fact mediated by a doubtless highly complex set of psychical or ultimately physiological conditions4 ,as such it admits of descriptive analysis1 and in a complete theory of value such descriptive analysis should certainly find a place4 ,it would doubtless throw much light upon the origin of valuation as a process1 and of valuing as an attitude1 and admirably illustrate the view of the function of the consciousness of value to which a logical study of valuation as a process seems to lead us4 ,this problem in analysis belongs1 however1 to psychology1 and therefore lies apart from our present purpose2 nor is it necessary to the establishment of our present view to undertake it4 ,it is necessary for our purpose only to suggest1 for purposes of identification1 a brief description of the value-consciousness1 and to indicate its place in the process of reflective thought4 ,the consciousness of value may best be described1 by way of first approximation1 in the language of the ,austrian economists as a sense of the importance to oneself of a commodity or defined moral purpose4 ,it belongs to the agent's attitude of survey or recapitulation which ensues upon the completion of the judgment-process and is mediated by attention to the ethical or economic object in its newly defined character of specific conduciveness to the well-being of the self4 ,the commodity1 in virtue of its ascertained physical properties1 is adapted to certain modes of use or consumption which1 through valuation of the commodity1 have come to be accepted as desirable4 ,the moral act likewise has been approved by virtue of its having certain definite sociological tendencies1 or being conducive to the welfare and happiness of a friend4 ,thus commodity or moral act1 as the case may be1 has a determinate complexity of meaning which has been judged as1 in one sense1 expansive of the self1 and the value-consciousness we may identify as that sense of the valued object's importance which is mediated by recognition of it as the bearer of this complexity of concrete meaning4 ,the meaning is1 as we may say1 condensed or compacted into the object as given in sense-perception1 and because the meaning stands for expansion of the self1 the object in taking it up into itself receives the character of importance as a valued object4 ,the sense of importance thus is expressive of an attitude upon the agent's part4 ,the concrete meanings which make up the content of the object's importance would inevitably1 if left to themselves1 prompt overt action4 ,the commodity would forthwith be applied to its new use or the moral act would be performed4 ,the self would1 as we may express it1 possess itself of the spiritual energies resident in the chosen purpose4 ,the attitude of survey1 however1 inhibits this action of the self and the sense of importance is the resulting emotional apprehension of the value of the object hereby brought to recognition4 ,now1 it should be carefully observed that the particular concrete emotions appropriate to the details of the valued purpose are not what we here intend4 ,the purpose may spring from some impulse of self-interest1 hatred1 patriotism1 or love1 and the psychical material of its presentation during the agent's survey will be the varied complex of qualitative emotion that comes from inhibition of the detailed activities which make up the purpose as a whole4 ,so also the apprehension of the physical object of economic valuation is largely1 if not altogether1 emotional in its psychical constitution4 ,psychologically these emotions are the purpose--they are the stuff of which the purpose as a psychical fact occurring in time is made4 ,but we must bear in mind that it is not the purpose as a psychical fact that is the object of the agent's valuing--any more than is the tool with which one cuts perceived as a molecular mass or as an aggregation of centers of ether-stress4 ,as a cognized object of value the purpose is1 in our schematic terminology1 a source of energy for the increase of the self1 and thus the consciousness of value is the perfectly specific emotion arising from restraint put upon the self in its movement of appropriation of this energy4 ,in contrast with the concrete emotions which are the substance of the purpose as presented1 the consciousness of value may be called a formal emotion or the emotion of a typical reflective attitude4 ,the valuing attitude we may then describe as that of resolution on the part of the self to adhere to the finished purpose which it now surveys1 with a view to exploitation of the purpose4 ,the connection between the valuation-process and the consciousness of value may be stated thus3 ,the valuation-process works out 7and necessarily in cognitive1 objective terms7 the purpose which is valued in the agent's survey4 ,but this development of the purpose is at the same time determination of the energetic self to acceptance of the purpose that shall be worked out4 ,thus the valuation-process is the source of the consciousness of value in the twofold way 7#a7 of defining the object valued1 and 7#b7 of determining the self to the attitude of resolution to adhere to it and exploit it4#aeh ,the consciousness of value is the apprehension of an object in its complete functional character as a factor in experience4 ,the function of the consciousness of value must now be very briefly considered4 ,the phenomenon is a striking one1 and apparently1 as the economists especially have insisted1 of much practical importance in the conduct of life4#aei ,and yet on our account of the phenomenon1 as it may appear1 the problem of assigning to it a function must be1 to say the least1 difficult4 ,for the consciousness of value is1 we have held1 emotional1 and1 on the conception of emotion in general which we have taken for granted throughout our present discussion1 this mode of being conscious is merely a reflex of a state of tension in activity4 ,as such it merely reports in consciousness a process of motor co-ordination already going on and in the nature of the case can contribute nothing to the outcome4 ,now if it were in a direct way as immediately felt emotion that the consciousness of value must be functional if functional at all1 then the problem might well be given up2 but it would be a serious blunder to conceive the problem in this strictly psychological way4 ,a logical statement of the problem would raise a different issue--not the question of whether emotion as emotion can in any sense be functional in experience1 but whether the consciousness of value and emotion in general may not receive reflective interpretation and thereby1 becoming objective1 play a part as a factor in subsequent valuation-processes4 ,indeed1 the psychological statement of the problem misses the entire point at issue and leads directly to the wholly irrelevant general problem of whether any mode of consciousness whatever can1 as consciousness1 put forth energy and be a factor in controlling conduct4 ,the present problem is properly a logical one4 ,what is the agent's apprehension of the matter8 ,in his subsequent reflective processes of valuation does the consciousness of value1 which was a feature of the survey on a past occasion1 receive recognition in any way and so play a part8 ,this is simply a question of fact and clearly1 as a question relating to the logical content of the agent's reflective process1 has no connection with or interest in the problem of a possible dynamic efficacy of consciousness as such4 ,the question properly is logical1 not psychological or metaphysical4 ,thus stated1 then1 the problem seems to admit of answer--and along the line already suggested in our account of economic valuation4#afj ,recognition of the fact that the consciousness of value was experienced in the survey of a certain purpose on an earlier occasion confirms this purpose1 holding the means1 in an economic situation1 to their appointed use and strengthening adherence to the standard in the ethical case4 ,this recognition serves as stimulus to a reproduction1 in memory1 of the cognitive details of the earlier survey1 and so in the ideal case to a more or less complete and recognizably adequate reinstatement of the earlier valuing attitude1 and so to a reinstatement of the consciousness of value itself4 ,the result is a strengthening of the established valuation1 a more efficacious control of the new end claiming recognition1 and an assured measure of continuity of ethical development from the old valuation to the new4 ,the function thus assigned to the consciousness of value finds abundant illustration elsewhere in the field of emotion4 ,the stated festivals of antiquity commemorative of regularly recurrent phases of agricultural and pastoral life1 as also the festivals in observance of signal events in the private and political life of the individual1 would appear to find1 more or less distinctly1 here their explanation4 ,these festivals must have been prompted by a more or less conscious recognition of the social value inherent in the important functions making up the life of the community1 and of the individual citizen as a member of the community and as an individual4 ,they secured the end of a sustained and enhanced interest in these normal functions by effecting1 through a symbolic reproduction of these1 an intensified and glorified experience of the emotional meaning normally and inherently belonging to them4#afa ,in the same way the rites of the religious cults of ,greece1 not to mention kindred phenomena so abundantly to be found in lower civilizations as well as in our own1 served to fortify the individual in a certain consistent and salutary course of institutional and private life4#afb ,it has been taken for granted throughout that there are but two forms of valuation-process1 the ethical and the economic4 ,the reason for this limitation may already be sufficiently apparent1 but it will further illustrate our general conception of the valuation-process briefly to indicate it in detail4 ,what shall be said1 for example1 of the common use of the term value in such expressions as the value of life1 the emotional value of an object or a moral act1 the natural value of a type of impulsive activity8 ,in these uses of the word the reference is apparently to one's own incommunicable inner experience of living1 of perception of the object1 or of the impulse1 which cannot be suggested to any other person who has not himself had the experience4 ,my pleasure1 my color-sensation in its affective aspect1 my emotion1 are inner and subjective1 and ,i distinguish them by such expressions as the above from the visible1 tangible object to which ,i ascribe them as constituting its immediate or natural value to me4 ,this broader use of the term value has not found recognition in the foregoing pages1 and it requires here a word of comment4 ,so long as these phases of the experience of the object are not recognized as separable in thought from the object viewed as an external condition or means1 they would apparently be better characterized in some other way4 ,if1 however1 they are so recognized1 and are thereby taken as determinative of the agent's practical attitude toward the thing1 we have merely our typical situation of ethical valuation of some implied purpose as conducive to the self and economic valuation of the means as requisites for execution of the purpose4 ,our general criterion for the propriety of terming any mode of consciousness the value of an object must be that it shall perform a logical function and not simply be referred to in its aspect of psychical fact4 ,the feeling or emotion1 or whatever the mode of consciousness in question may be1 must play the recognized part1 in the agent's survey of the situation1 of prompting and supporting a definite practical attitude with reference to the object4 ,if1 in short1 the experience in question enters in any way into a conscious purpose of the agent1 it may properly be termed a value4#afc sthetic value also has not been recognized1 and for the opposite reason4 ,the sense of beauty would appear to be a correlate of relatively perfect attained adjustment between the agent and his natural environment or the conditions suggested more or less impressively by the work of art4 ,there must1 indeed1 be present in the sthetic experience an element of unsatisfied curiosity sufficient to stimulate an interest in the changing or diverse aspects of the beautiful object1 but this must not be sufficient to prompt reflective judgment of the details presented4 ,on the whole1 the sthetic experience would appear to be essentially post-judgmental and appreciative4 ,it comes on the particular occasion1 not as the result of a judgment-process of the valuational type1 but as an immediate appreciation4 ,as an immediate appreciation it has no logical function and on our principles must be denied the name of value4 ,our standpoint must be that of the experiencing individual4 ,the sthetic experience as a type may well be a development out of the artistic and so find its ultimate explanation in the psychology of man's primitive technological occupations in the ordinary course of life4 ,it is1 as we have said1 of the post-judgmental type1 and so may very probably be but the cumulative outcome of closer and closer approximations along certain lines to a perfected adjustment with the conditions of life4 ,it may thus have its origin in past processes of the reflective valuational type4 ,nevertheless1 viewed in the light of its actual present character and status in experience1 the sthetic must be excluded from the sphere of values4 ,thus the realms of fact and value are both real1 but that of value is logically prior and so the more real4 ,the realm of fact is that of conditions warranting the purposes of the self2 as a separate order1 complete and absolute in itself1 it is an abstraction that has forgotten the reason for which it was made4 ,reality in the logical sense is that which furthers the development of the self4 ,the purpose that falls short of its promise in this regard is unreal--not1 indeed1 in the psychological sense that it never existed in imagination1 but in the logical sense that it is no longer valued4 ,within the inclusive realm of reality the realm of fact is that of the means which serve the concrete purposes which the self accepts4 ,the completed purpose1 however1 is not means1 since still behind and beyond it there can be no other concrete valued purpose which it can serve4 ,nor is it an ultimate end1 since in its character of accepted and valued end the self adheres to it1 and it therefore cannot express the whole purpose of the self to whose unspecifiable fulness and increase of activity it is but a temporary probational contributor4 ,it is rather in the nature of a formula or method of behavior to which the self ascribes reality by recognizing and accepting it as its own4 ,,xi ,,some ,,logical ,,aspects ,,of ,,purpose ,,introductory ,whenever and wherever it was discovered that the content of experience as given in immediate perception could be reconstructed through ideas1 then and there began to emerge such questions as these3 ,what is the significance of this reconstructive power8 ,what is the relation between it and the immediate experience8 ,what is the relative value of each in experience as a whole8 ,what is their relation to truth and error8 ,if thinking leads to truth1 and thought must yet get its material from perception1 how then shall the product of thought escape infection from the material8 ,on the other hand1 if truth is to be found in the immediate experience1 can it here be preserved from the blighting effects of thought8 ,for so insistent and pervasive is this activity of thought that it appears to penetrate into the sanctum of perception itself4 ,turning to a third possibility1 if it should be found that truth and error are concerned with both--that they are products of the combined activity of perception and reflection--then just what does each do8 ,and what in their operations marks the difference between truth and error8 ,or still again1 if truth and error cannot be found in the operations of perception and reflection as such1 then they must be located in the relation of these processes to something else4 ,if so1 what is this something else8 ,out of such questions as these is logic born4 ,there may be those who will object to some of these questions as logical problems--those who would limit logic to a description of the forms and processes of reconstruction1 relegating the question of the criterion of truth and error to epistemology4 ,this objection we must here dismiss summarily by saying that1 by whatever name it is called1 a treatment of the forms and processes of thought must deal with the criterion of truth and error1 since these different forms are just those which thought assumes in attempting to reach truth under different conditions4 ,certainly in the beginning the ,greeks regarded their newly discovered power of thought as anything but formal4 ,indeed1 it soon became so substantial that it was regarded as simply a new world of fact1 of existence alongside of1 or rather above1 the world of perception4 ,but ,socrates hailed ideas as deliverers from the contradictions and paradoxes into which experience interpreted in terms of immediate sense-perception had fallen4 ,in the concept ,socrates found a solution for the then pressing problems of social life4 ,the ,socratic universal is not a mere empty form which thought imposes upon the world4 ,it is something which thought creates in order that a life of social interaction and reciprocity may go on4 ,this need not mean that the ,greeks were reflectively conscious of this1 but that this was the way the concept was actually used and developed by ,socrates4 ,in attempting to formulate the relation between this new world of ideas and immediate sense-experience1 ,plato constructed his scheme of substantiation and participation4 ,the ,platonic doctrine of substantiation and participation is an expression of the conviction that anything so valuable as ,socrates had shown ideas to be could not be merely formal or unreal4 ,up to the discovery of these ideas reality lay in the substances of perception4 ,hence in order to have that reality to which their worth1 their value in life1 entitled them1 the ideas must be substantiated4 ,this introduction of the newly discovered ideas into the world of substances and reality wrought1 of course1 a change in the conception of the latter--a change which has well-nigh dominated the entire philosophic development ever since4 ,let us recall that the aim of ,socrates was to find something that would prevent society from going to pieces under the influence of the disintegrating conception of experience as a mere flux of given immediate content4 ,now1 in the concepts ,socrates discovered the basis for just this much-needed wholeness and stability4 ,moreover1 the fact that unity and stability were the actual social needs of the hour led not only to the concepts which furnished them being conceived as substantial and real1 but to their being regarded as a higher type of reality1 as more real than the given1 immediate experiences of perception4 ,they were higher and more real because1 just then1 they answered the pressing social need4 ,the ideas supplied this unity because they furnished ends1 purposes1 to the given material of perception4 ,the given is now given for something2 for something more1 too1 than mere contemplation4 ,socrates also showed1 by the most acute analysis1 that the content of these ends1 these purposes1 was social through and through4 ,from the ethical standpoint this teleological character of the idea is clearly recognized4 ,but as real1 the ideas must be stated in the metaphysical terms of substance and attribute4 ,here the social need is abstracted from and lost to sight4 ,the fundamental attributes of the ideas are now a metaphysical unity and stability4 ,hence unity and stability1 wholeness and completeness1 are the very essence of reality1 while multiplicity and change constitute the nature of appearance4 ,thus does ,plato's reality become1 as ,windelband says1 an immaterial eleaticism which seeks true being in the ideas without troubling itself about the world of generation and occurrence which it leaves to perception and opinion4#afd ,now it is the momentum of this conception of reality as a stable and complete system of absolute ideas1 the development of which we have just roughly sketched1 that is so important historically4 ,why this conception of reality1 which apparently grew out of a particular historical situation1 should have dominated philosophic theory for over two thousand years appears at first somewhat puzzling4 ,those who still hold and defend it will of course say that this survival is evidence of its validity4 ,but1 after all1 our human world may be yet very young4 ,it may be that a thousand years are but as yesterday4 ,at any rate philosophy has never been in a hurry to reconstruct conceptions which served their day and generation with such distinction as did the ,platonic conception of reality4 ,and this is true to the evolutionary instinct that experience has only its own products as material for further construction4 ,on the other hand1 the principle of evolution with equal force demands that only as material1 not as final forms of experience1 shall these products continue4 ,it may be that philosophy has not yet taken the conception of evolution quite seriously4 ,at all events it is certain that long after it has been found that1 instead of being eternal and complete1 the concept undergoes change1 that it has simply the stability and wholeness demanded by a particular and concrete situation2 after it has been discovered1 in other words1 that the stability and wholeness1 instead of attaching to the content of an idea1 are simply the functions of any content used as a purpose--after all this has been accepted in psychology1 the conception of truth and reality which arose under an entirely different conception of the nature of thought still survives4 ,this change in the conception of the character of the ideas1 with no corresponding change in the conception of reality1 marks the divorce of thought and reality and the rise of the epistemological problem4 ,let us recall that in ,plato the relation between the higher and ultimate reality1 as constituted by the complete and ,eternal ,ideas1 and the lower reality of perception1 is that of archetype and ectype4 ,perceptions attempt to imitate and copy the ideas4 ,now1 when the ideas are found to be changing1 and when further the interpenetration of perception and conception is discovered1 reality as fixed and complete must be located elsewhere4 ,and just as in the old system it was the business of perception to imitate the ,eternal ,ideas1 so here it is still assumed that thought is to imitate the reality wherever now it is to be located4 ,and as regards the matter of location1 the old conception is not abandoned4 ,the elder ,plato is mighty yet4 ,reality must still be a completed system of fixed and eternal things in themselves1 relations1 or noumena of some sort which our ideas1 now constituted by both perception and conceptional processes1 are still to imitate1 copy1 reflect1 represent1 or at least symbolize in some fashion4 ,from this point on1 then1 thought has two functions3 one1 to help experience meet and reorganize into itself the results of its own past activity2 the other1 to reflect or represent in some sense the absolute system of reality4 ,for a very long time the latter has continued to constitute the logical problem1 the former being relegated to the realm of psychology4 ,but this discovery of the reconstructive function of the idea and its assignment to the jurisdiction of psychology did not leave logic where it was before1 nor did it lighten its task4 ,logic could not shut its eyes to this psychological character of the idea4#afe ,indeed1 logic had to take the idea as psychology described it1 then do the best it could with it for its purpose4 ,the embarrassment of logic by this reconstructive character of the idea even ,aristotle discovered to some extent in the relation of the ,platonic perceptions to the eternal ideas4 ,he found great difficulty in getting a flowing stream of consciousness to imitate or even symbolize an eternally fixed and completed reality4 ,and since we have discovered1 in addition1 that the idea is so palpably a reconstructive activity1 the difficulties have not diminished4 ,in such a situation it could only be a question of time until solutions of the problem should be sought by attempting to bring together these two functions of the idea4 ,perhaps after all the representation of objects in an absolute system is involved in the reconstruction of our experience4 ,or perhaps what appears as reconstructions of our experience--as desiring1 struggling1 deliberating1 choosing1 willing1 as sorrows and joys1 failures and triumphs--are but the machinery by which the absolute system is represented4 ,at any rate1 these two functions surely cannot be regarded as belonging to the idea as color and form belong to a stone4 ,we should never be satisfied with such a brute dualism as this4 ,without any further historical sketch of attempts at this synthesis1 ,i desire to pass at once to a consideration of what ,i am sure everyone will agree must stand as one of the most brilliant and in every way notable efforts in this direction--,mr4 ,royce's ,aberdeen lectures on ,the ,world and the ,individual4 ,it is the purpose here to examine that part of these lectures1 and it is the heart of the whole matter1 in which the key to the solution of the problem of the relation between ideas and reality is sought precisely in the purposive character of the idea4 ,this will be found especially in the ,introduction and in the chapter on ,internal and ,external ,meaning of ,ideas4#aff ,i4 ,,the ,,purposive ,,character ,,of ,,ideas ,with his unerring sense for fundamentals1 ,mr4 ,royce begins by telling us that the first thing called for by the problem of the relation of ideas to reality is a discussion of the nature of ideas4 ,here ,mr4 ,royce says he shall be guided by certain psychological analyses of the mere contents of our consciousness1 which have become prominent in recent discussion4#afg ,your intelligent ideas of things never consist of mere imagery of the thing1 but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act toward the thing of which you have ideas4444 ,complex scientific ideas viewed as to their conscious significance are1 as ,professor ,stout has well said1 plans of action1 ways of constructing the object of your scientific consciousness4444 ,by the word idea1 then1 as we shall use it1 when1 after having criticised opposing theory1 we come to state in these lectures our own thesis1 ,i shall mean in the end any state of consciousness1 whether simple or complex1 which when present is then and there viewed as at least a partial expression1 or embodiment of a single conscious purpose4444 ,in brief1 an idea in my present definition may1 and in fact always does1 if you please1 appear to be representative of a fact existent beyond itself4 ,but the primary character which makes it an idea is not its representative character1 is not its vicarious assumption of the responsibility of standing for a being beyond itself1 but is its inner character as relatively fulfilling the purpose1 that is as presenting the partial fulfilment of the purpose which is in the consciousness of the moment wherein the idea takes place4#afh444 ,now this purpose1 just in so far as it gets a present conscious embodiment in the contents1 and in the form of the complex state called the idea1 constitutes what ,i shall hereafter call the internal meaning of the idea4#afi444 ,but ideas often seem to have a meaning2 yes1 as one must add1 finite ideas always undertake or appear to have a meaning that is not exhausted by this conscious internal meaning presented and relatively fulfilled at the moment when the idea is there for our finite view4 ,the melody sung1 the artists' idea1 the thought of your absent friend1 a thought on which you love to dwell1 all these not merely have their obvious internal meaning as meeting a conscious purpose by their very presence1 but also they at least appear to have that other sort of meaning1 that reference beyond themselves to objects1 that cognitive relation to outer facts1 that attempted correspondence with outer facts1 which many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary inexplicable and ultimate character4 ,i call this second1 and for me still problematic1 and derived aspect of the nature of ideas1 their apparently external meaning4#agj ,from all this it is quite evident that ,mr4 ,royce accepts and welcomes the results of the work of modern psychology on the nature of the idea4 ,the difficulty will come in making the connection between these accepted results and the ,platonic conception of ultimate reality as stated in the following3 ,to be means simply to express1 to embody the complete internal meaning of a certain absolute system of ideas4 ,a system1 moreover1 which is genuinely implied in the true internal meaning or purpose of every finite idea1 however fragmentary4#aga ,it may be well to note here in passing that1 notwithstanding the avowed subordination here of the representative to the reconstructive character of the ideas1 the former becomes very important in the chapter on the relation of internal to external meaning1 where the problem of truth and error is considered4 ,in this account of the two meanings of the idea1 which ,i have tried to state as nearly as possible in the author's own words1 there appear some conceptions of idea1 of purpose1 and of their relation to each other1 that play an important part in the further treatment and in determining the final outcome4 ,in the description of the internal meaning there appear to be two quite different conceptions of the relation of idea to purpose4 ,one regards the idea as itself constituting the purpose or plan of action2 the other describes the idea as the partial fulfilment of the purpose4 7#a7 ,complex scientific ideas1 viewed as to their conscious significance1 are1 as ,professor ,stout has well said1 plans of action4 7#b7 ,you sing to yourself a melody2 you are then and there conscious that the melody1 as you hear yourself singing it1 partially fulfils and embodies a purpose4#agb ,when we come to the problem of the relation between the internal and external meaning1 we shall find that the idea as internal meaning comes into a third relation to purpose1 viz41 that of having the further purpose to agree or correspond to the external meaning4 ,is the correspondence reached between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended8 ,if it is1 the idea is true4444 ,thus it is not mere agreement1 but intended agreement1 that constitutes truth4#agc ,thus the idea is 7#a7 the purpose1 7#b7 the partial fulfilment of the purpose1 and 7#c7 has a further purpose--to correspond to an object in the absolute system of ideas4 ,the first statement of the internal meaning as constituting the plan or purpose is1 ,i take it1 the conception of the internal meaning as an ideal construction which gives a working form1 a definition to the indefinite sort of restlessness and blind feeling of dissatisfaction out of which the need of and demand for thought arises4#agd ,this accords with the scientific conception of the idea as a working hypothesis4 ,if this interpretation of idea were steadily followed throughout1 it is difficult to see how it could fail to lead to a conception of reality quite different from that described as a certain absolute system of ideas4 ,the second definition of internal meaning is the one in which it is stated as the partial expression1 embodiment1 and fulfilment of a single conscious purpose1 and in which subsequently and consequently the idea is identified with any conscious act1 for example1 singing4 ,the first part of the statement appears to say that the idea of a melody is in partial fulfilment of the idea regarded as the purpose to sing the melody4 ,but1 as the first statement of internal meaning implies1 how can one have a purpose to sing the melody except in and through the idea8 ,it is precisely the construction of an idea that transforms the vague indefinite restlessness and dissatisfaction into a purpose4 ,the idea is the defining1 the sharpening of the blind activity of mere sensation1 mere want1 into a plan of action4 ,however1 ,mr4 ,royce meets this difficulty at once by the statement that the term idea here not only covers the activity involved in forming the idea1 e4 g41 the idea of singing1 but includes the action of singing1 which fulfils this purpose4 ,in the same sense any conscious act at the moment when you perform it not merely expresses1 but is1 in my present sense1 an idea4#age ,but this sort of an adjustment between the idea as the purpose and as the fulfilment of the purpose raises a new question4 ,what here becomes of the distinction between immediate and mediating experience8 ,surely there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a purposive idea and the experience which fulfils this purpose4 ,to call them both ideas is at least confusing1 and indeed it appears that it is just this confusion that obscures the fundamental difficulty in dealing1 later on1 with the problem of truth and error4 ,to be sure1 the very formation of the idea as the purpose1 the plan of action1 is the beginning of the relief from the indefinite restlessness4 ,on the other hand1 it defines and sharpens the dissatisfaction4 ,when this vague unrest takes the form of a purpose to attain food or shelter1 or to sing in tune1 it is of course the first step toward solution4 ,but this very definition of the dissatisfaction intensifies it4 ,the idea as purpose1 then1 instead of being the fulfilment1 appears to be the plan1 the method of fulfilment4 ,the fulfilling experience is the further experience to which the idea points and leads4 ,to follow a little farther this relation between the purposive and fulfilling aspects of experience1 it is of course apparent that the idea as the purpose1 the plan of action1 must as a function go over into the fulfilling experience4 ,my purpose to sing the melody must remain1 in so far as the action is a conscious one1 until the melody is sung4 ,i say as a function1 for the specific content of this purpose is continuously changing4 ,the purpose is certainly not the same in content after half the melody has been sung as it is at the beginning4 ,this means that the purpose is being progressively fulfilled2 and as part of the purpose is fulfilled each moment1 so a part of the original content of the idea drops out2 and when the fulfilling process of this particular purpose is complete1 or is suspended--for1 in ,mr4 ,royce's view1 it never is complete in human experience--that purpose then gives way to some other1 perhaps one growing out of it1 but still one regarded as another4 ,a purpose realized1 fulfilled1 cannot persist as a purpose4 ,we may desire to repeat the experience in memory2 i4 e41 instead of singing aloud1 simply1 as ,mr4 ,royce says1 silently recall and listen to its imagined presence4 ,but here we must remember that the memory experience1 as such1 is not an idea in the logical sense at all4 ,it is an immediate experience that is fulfilling the idea of the song which constitutes the purpose to recall it1 just as truly as the singing aloud fulfils the idea of singing aloud4 ,shouting1 whistling1 or listening in memory to the silent notes may all be equally immediate1 fulfilling experiences4 ,doubtless the idea as purpose involves memory1 as ,mr4 ,royce says4#agf ,but it is a memory used as a purpose1 and it is just this use of the memory material as a purpose that makes it a logical idea4 ,in its content the purposive idea is just as immediate and as mechanical as any other part of experience4 ,psychology explains the presence and the partial present efficacy of this purpose by the laws of motor processes1 of habit1 or of what is often called association4#agg ,here idea1 however1 simply means1 as ,mr4 ,royce takes it in his second statement1 conscious content of any sort4 ,but this is not the meaning of idea in the logical sense4 ,the logical idea is a conscious content used as an organizer1 as a plan of action1 to get other contents4 ,if1 for example1 in the course of writing a paper one wishes to recall an abstract distinction1 as the distinction dawns in consciousness1 it is not an idea in the logical sense4 ,it is just as truly an immediate fulfilling experience as is a good golf stroke4 ,so in the mathematician's most abstruse processes1 which ,mr4 ,royce so admirably portrays1 the results for which he watches as empirically as the astronomer alone with his star are not ideas in the logical sense2 they are immediate1 fulfilling experiences4#agh ,the distinction between the idea as the mediating experience--that is1 the logical idea--and the immediate fulfilling experience is therefore not one of content1 but of use4 ,there is a sense1 however1 in which the idea as a purpose can be taken as the partial fulfilment of another purpose2 in the sense that any purpose is the outgrowth of activity involving previous purposes4 ,this becomes evident when we inquire into the indefinite restlessness and dissatisfaction out of which the idea as purpose springs4 ,dissatisfaction presupposes some activity already going on in attempted fulfilment of some previous purpose4 ,if one is dissatisfied with his singing1 or with not singing1 it is because one has already purposed to participate in the performance of a company of people which now he finds singing a certain melody1 or one has rashly contracted to entertain a strenuous infant who is vociferously demanding his favorite ditty4 ,this is only saying that any given dissatisfaction and the purpose to which it gives rise grow out of activity involving previous purposing4 ,but this does not do away with the distinction between the idea as a purpose and the immediate fulfilling experience4 ,if the discussion appears at this point to be growing somewhat captious1 let us pass to a consideration of the relation between internal and external meanings1 where the problem of truth and error appears1 and where the vital import of these distinctions becomes more obvious4 ,,ii4 ,,purpose ,,and ,,the ,,judgment ,mr4 ,royce begins with the traditional definition of truth1 which he then proceeds to reinterpret3 ,truth is very frequently defined in terms of external meaning as that about which we judge4444 ,in the second place1 truth has been defined as the correspondence between our ideas and their objects#agi4444 ,when we undertake to express the objective validity of any truth1 we use judgment4 ,these judgments1 if subjectively regarded1 that is1 if viewed merely as processes of our own present thinking1 whose objects are external to themselves1 involve in all their more complex forms1 combinations of ideas1 devices whereby we weave already present ideas into more manifold structure1 thereby enriching our internal meaning2 but the act of judgment has always its other1 its objective aspect4 ,the ideas when we judge are also to possess external meaning4444 ,it is true1 as ,mr4 ,bradley has well said1 that the intended subject of every judgment is reality itself4 ,the ideas that we combine when we judge about external meanings are to have value for us as truth only in so far as they not only possess internal meaning1 but also imitate1 by their structure1 what is at once other than themselves1 and1 in significance1 something above themselves4 ,that1 at least1 is the natural view of our consciousness1 just in so far as1 in judging1 we conceive our thought as essentially other than its external object1 and as destined merely to correspond thereto4 ,now we have by this time come to feel how hard it is to define the ,reality to which our ideas are thus to conform1 and about which our judgments are said to be made1 so long as we thus sunder external and internal meanings4#ahj ,the universal judgment4--,the problem is1 then1 to discover just the nature and ground of this relation between the internal and external meaning1 between the idea and its object4 ,this relation is established in the act of judgment4 ,taking first the universal judgment1 we find here that the internal meaning has at best only a negative relation to the external meaning4 ,to say that all ,a is ,b is in fact merely to assert that the real world contains no objects that are ,a1 but that fail to be of the class ,b4 ,to say that no ,a is ,b is to assert that the real world contains no objects that are at once ,a and ,b4#aha ,the universal judgments then tell us indirectly what is in the realm of external meaning2 but only by first telling us what is not4#ahb ,however1 these universal judgments have after all a positive value in the realm of internal meaning2 that is1 as mere thought4 ,this negative character of the universal judgments holds true of them1 as we have just said1 just in so far as you sunder the external and internal meaning1 and just in so far as you view the real as the beyond1 and as the merely beyond4 ,if you turn your attention once more to the realm of ideas1 viewed as internal meaning1 you see1 indeed1 that they are constantly becoming enriched in their inner life by all this process4 ,to know by inner demonstration that #bbd and that this is necessarily so1 is not yet to know that the external world1 taken merely as the ,beyond1 contains any true or finally valid variety of objects at all1 any two or four objects that can be counted4444 ,on the other hand1 so far as your internal meaning goes1 to have experienced within that which makes you call this judgment necessary1 is indeed to have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very positive4#ahc ,this passage deserves especial attention4 ,in the light of ,kant1 and in view of ,mr4 ,royce's general definition of the judgment as the reference of internal to external meanings1 one is puzzled to find that for the mathematician the positive value of the judgment two and two are four is confined to the realm of internal meaning4 ,to be sure1 ,mr4 ,royce says that this limitation of the positive value of the universal judgment to the world of internal meaning occurs only when the external and internal meaning are sundered4 ,but the point is3 ,does the mathematician or anyone else ever so sunder as to regard the judgment two and two are four as of positive value only as internal meaning8 ,indeed1 in another connection ,mr4 ,royce himself shows most clearly that mathematical results are as objective and as empirical as the astronomer's star4#ahd ,nor would it appear competent for anyone to say here3 ,of course1 they are not internal meanings after we come to see1 through the kind offices of the epistemologist1 that the internal meanings are valid of the external world4 ,we are insisting that they are never taken by the mathematician and scientists at first as merely internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be established4 ,surely the mathematical judgment1 or any other1 does not require an epistemological midwife to effect the passage from internal to external meaning4 ,the external meaning is there all the while in the form of the diagrams and motor tensions and images with which the mathematician works4 ,the difficulty here again seems to be that the distinction above discussed between the idea in the logical sense1 as purpose1 and the immediate fulfilling experience is lost sight of4 ,the relation between two and four is not first discovered as a merely internal meaning4 ,it is discovered in the process of fulfilling some purpose involving the working out of this relation4 ,so the sum of the angles of a triangle is not discovered as a mere internal meaning whose external meaning is then to be found4 ,it is found in working with the triangle4 ,it is discovered in the triangle4 ,and1 once more1 it matters not if the triangle here is a mere memory image4 ,in relation to the purpose1 to the logical idea1 it is as truly external and objective as pine sticks or chalk marks4 ,the streams of motor1 etc41 images that flow spontaneously under the stimulus of the purpose are just as immediate fulfilling experiences as the manipulation of sticks or chalk lines4 ,the difficulty in keeping the universal judgment1 as a judgment1 in terms of merely internal meaning may be seen from the following3 ,as to these two types of judgments1 the universal and the particular1 they both1 as we have seen1 make use of experience4 ,the universal judgments arise in the realm where experience and idea have already fused into one whole2 and this is precisely the realm of internal meanings4 ,here one constructs and observes the consequences of one's construction4 ,but the construction is at once an experience of fact and an idea4444 ,upon the basis of such ideal constructions one makes universal judgments4 ,these in a fashion still to us1 at this stage1 mysterious1 undertake to be valid of that other world--the world of external meaning4#ahe ,one is somewhat puzzled to know just what is meant by the fusion of experience and idea4 ,we must infer that it means the fusion of some aspect of experience which can be set over against idea1 and this has always meant the external meaning1 and this interpretation seems further warranted by the statement immediately following which describes the fusion as one of fact and idea4 ,the situation then seems to be this3 ,an internal and an external meaning1 a fact and an idea1 fuse into one whole and thus constitute that which is yet precisely the realm of internal meanings1 which aims to be valid of still another world of external meanings4 ,and this waives the question of how experience fused into one whole can be an internal meaning1 since as such it must be in opposition and reference to an external meaning2 or conversely1 how experience can be at once fact and idea and still be fused into one whole4 ,nor does the difficulty disappear when we turn to the aspects of universality and necessity4 ,what is the significance and basis of universality and necessity as confined merely to the realm of internal meaning8 ,so far as your internal meaning goes1 to have experienced within that which makes you call this judgment necessary is1 indeed1 to have observed a character about your own ideas which rightly seems to you very positive4#ahf ,but what is it that we experience within which makes us call this judgment necessary8 ,in the discussion of the relation of the universal judgment to the disjunctive judgment1 through which the former is shown to get even its negative force1 there is an interesting statement3 ,one who inquires into a matter upon which he believes himself able to decide in universal terms1 e4 g41 in mathematics1 has present to his mind1 at the outset1 questions such as admit of alternative answers4 ,a1 he declares1 in case it exists at all1 is either ,b or ,c4 ,further research shows universally1 perhaps1 that ,no ,a is ,b4 ,the last sentence is the statement referred to4 ,what is meant by further research shows universally1 perhaps1 that ,no ,a is ,b8 ,what kind of research1 internal or external1 can show this8 ,in short1 there appears to be as much difficulty with universality and necessity in the realm of internal meaning as in the reference of internal to external meaning4#ahg ,instead1 however1 of discussing this point1 ,mr4 ,royce pursues the problem of the relation of the external and internal meaning1 and finds that regarded as sundered there is no basis so far for even the negative universality and necessity in the reference of the internal meaning to the external4 ,for at this point arises the ancient question1 ,how can you know at all that your judgment is universally valid1 even in this ideal and negative way1 about that external realm of validity1 in so far as it is external1 and is merely your ,other1--the ,beyond8 ,must you not just dogmatically say that that world must agree with your negations8 ,this judgment is indeed positive4 ,but how do you prove it8 ,the only answer has to be in terms which already suggest how vain is the very sundering in question4 ,if you can predetermine1 even if but thus negatively1 what cannot exist in the object1 the object then cannot be merely foreign to you4 ,it must be somewhat predetermined by your ,meaning4#ahh ,but in the universal judgment this determination1 as referred to the external meaning1 is only negative4 ,the particular judgment4--,it is then through the particular judgment that the universal judgment is to get any positive value in its reference to the external meaning4 ,as has been repeatedly pointed out in the discussions on recent ,logic1 the particular judgments--whose form is ,some ,a is ,b1 or ,some ,a is not ,b--are the typical judgments that positively assert ,being in the object viewed as external4 ,this fact constitutes their essential contrast with the universal judgments4 ,they undertake to cross the chasm that is said to sunder internal and external meanings2 and the means by which they do so is always what is called external experience4 ,it is now high time to ask why the internal meaning seeks this external meaning4 ,why does it seek an object8 ,why does it want to cross the chasm8 ,in other words1 what is the significance of the demand for the particular judgment8 ,in the introduction we have been told1 as a matter of description1 that the internal meanings do seek the external meaning1 but why do they8 ,we have also been told that universal judgments develop and enrich the realm of internal meaning4 ,why1 then1 should there be a demand for the external meaning1 for a further object8 ,the answer is3 ,we have our internal meanings4 ,we develop them in inner experience4 ,there they get presented as something of universal value1 but always in fragments4 ,they1 therefore1 so far dissatisfy4 ,we conceive of the ,other wherein these meanings shall get some sort of final fulfilment4#ahi ,it is1 then1 the incomplete and fragmentary character of the internal meaning that demands the particular judgment4 ,the particular judgment is to further complete and determine the incomplete and indeterminate internal meaning4 ,and yet no sooner is this particular judgment made than we are told that it is a form at once positive1 and very unsatisfactorily indeterminate4 ,again3#aij ,the judgments of experience1 the particular judgments1 express a positive but still imperfect determination of internal meaning through external experience4 ,the limit or goal of this process would be an individual judgment wherein the will expressed its own final determination4#aia ,apparently1 then1 the particular judgment to which the internal meaning appeals for completion and determination only succeeds in increasing the fragmentary and indeterminate character4 ,this brings us to another previous question4 ,just what are we to understand by this fragmentary and indeterminate character of the internal meaning8 ,in what sense1 with reference to what1 is it incomplete and fragmentary8 ,later we shall be told that it is with reference to its own final and completely individual expression4 ,this is to be reached in the individual judgment4 ,and if we ask what is meant by this final1 complete1 and individual expression--which1 by the way1 no human being can experience--we read1 wondering all the while how it can be known1 that it is simply the expression that seeks no other1 that is satisfied1 that is conclusive of the search for perfection4#aib ,waiving for the present questions concerning the basis of this satisfaction and perfection1 all this leaves unanswered our query concerning the other end of the matter1 viz41 the meaning and criterion of the fragmentary and indeterminate character of these internal meanings4 ,if we here return to the first definition of internal meaning of the idea as a purpose in the sense of a plan of action1 such as singing in tune1 or getting the properties of a geometrical figure1 it does not seem difficult to find a basis and meaning for this fragmentary and indeterminate character4 ,first we may note in a general way that it is of the very essence of a plan or purpose to lead on to a fulfilling experience such as singing in tune1 or reaching a mathematical equation4 ,but here this fulfilling experience to which the plan points is not a mere working out of detail inside the plan itself1 although1 indeed1 this does take place4 ,if this were all the fulfilling experience meant1 it is difficult to see how we should escape subjective idealism4#aic ,we start with a relatively indeterminate idea and end with a more determinate idea1 though1 indeed1 there is yet no criterion for this increased determination4 ,to be sure1 the idea as a plan of action1 as has already been stated1 does undergo change and does become1 if you please1 more definite and complete as a plan2 but this does not constitute its fulfilment4 ,its fulfilment surely is to be found in the immediate experiences of singing1 etc41 to which the idea points and leads4 ,the fragmentary and incomplete character of the internal meaning as a plan of action does not1 then1 after all1 so much describe the plan itself as it does the general condition of experience out of which the idea arises4 ,experience takes on the form of a plan1 of an idea1 precisely because it has fallen apart1 has become fragmentary4 ,it is just the business of the internal meaning1 as ,mr4 ,royce so well shows1 to form a plan1 an ideal1 an hypothetical synthesis that shall stimulate an activity1 which shall satisfactorily heal the breach4 ,fragmentary is a quality1 then1 that belongs1 not to the idea in itself considered1 but to the general condition of experience1 of which the idea as a plan is an expression4 ,if1 now1 the fragmentary character of the internal meaning is determined simply with relation to the fulfilling experiences1 such as singing in tune1 adjustments of geometrical figures1 etc41 to which it points and leads1 it seems as if the completion of the internal meaning must be defined in the same terms4 ,and this would appear to open a pretty straight path to the redefinition of truth and error4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,criterion ,,of ,,truth ,,and ,,error ,at the outset1 truth was defined as the correspondence or agreement of an idea with its object4 ,but we have seen that correspondence or agreement with an object means the completion and determination of the idea itself1 and since the idea is here a specific plan of action1 it would seem that the true idea would be the one that can complete itself by stimulating a satisfying activity4 ,the false idea would be one that cannot complete itself in a satisfying activity1 such as singing in tune1 constructing a mathematical equation1 etc41 and just this solution is very clearly expounded by our author4 ,in the case of mathematical inquiry1 ,in just so far as we pause satisfied we observe that there is no other mathematical fact to be sought in the direction of the particular inquiry in hand4 ,satisfaction of purpose by means of presented fact and such determinate satisfaction as sends us to no other experience for further light and fulfillment1 precisely this outcome is itself the ,other that is sought when we begin our inquiry4#aid ,so when other facts of experience are sought1 if ,i watch for stars or for a chemical precipitate1 or for a turn in the stock market1 or in the sickness of a friend1 my ideas are true when they are satisfied with the presented facts4 ,again1 ,it follows that the finally determinate form of the object of any finite idea is that form which the idea itself would assume whenever it became individuated1 or in other words1 became a completely determined idea1 an idea or will fulfilled by a wholly adequate empirical content1 for which no other content need be substituted or from the point of view of the satisfied idea1 could be substituted4#aie ,in such passages as these it seems clear that the test of the truth of an idea is its power to bring us to the point where we pause satisfied1 where no other content need be substituted1 etc4 ,nor in such passages does there seem to be any doubt of reaching satisfaction in particular cases4 ,here1 it appears1 we may sing in tune1 we may get the desired precipitate1 and possibly even interpret the stock market correctly4 ,of course1 the discord1 the hunger1 the loss1 will come again2 but so will new ideas1 new truths4 ,man thinks in order to get control of his world and thereby of himself4#aif ,then the control actually gained must measure the value1 the truth of his thought4 ,do you wish to sing in tune1 then your musical ideas are false if they lead you to strike what are then called false notes4#aig ,it should also be noticed that here this desired determination does not consist in a further determination of the mere idea as such4 ,it is found in the presented fact1 in the immediate activity of singing1 of getting precipitates1 etc4 ,as has already been pointed out1 it is only by using the term idea for both the purpose and the fulfilling act of singing that this pause of satisfaction can be ascribed to the further determination of the idea4 ,as such1 as also before remarked1 the sort of determination that the idea here gets means its termination1 its disappearance in the immediate experiences of singing1 etc41 to which it leads4 ,the indefinite restlessness of hunger and cold would scarcely be satisfied by getting more determinate and specific ideas only of food and shelter4 ,the satisfaction comes when the ideas are realized1 when the plans are swallowed up in fulfilment4 ,but in all this nothing has been said about the certain absolute system of ideas1 nor does there appear to be here any demand for it4 ,to be sure1 in the passages just considered1 experience has been found to become fragmentary1 but it has also been found capable of healing1 of wholing itself1 not of course into any final whole1 but into the unity of satisfaction as regards the particular inquiry in hand4 ,there is of course failure as well1 but this also is not final4 ,it means simply that we must look farther for the pause of satisfaction1 that we must construct another idea1 another plan of action4 ,but1 after having shown that the idea as a plan of action may lead to satisfaction in the particular case1 and that its success or failure so to do is one measure of its truth or falsity1 we are now suddenly aroused to the fact that after all thought does not lead us to the completed absolute system of ideas1 to a final stage of eternal unbroken satisfaction4 ,but never in our human process of experience do we reach that determination4 ,it is for us the object of love and of hope1 of desire and of will1 of faith and of work1 but never of present finding4#aih ,if at this point one asks3 ,whence this absolute system of ideas8 ,why have we to reckon with it at all8 there appears to be little that is satisfying4 ,indeed1 it seems difficult to get rid of the impression that this certain absolute system of ideas is on our hands as a philosophical heirloom from the time of ,plato1 so hallowed by time and so established by centuries of acceptance that we have ceased to ask for its credentials4 ,to ground it in the essentially fragmentary character of human experience appears to be a petitio1 for experience does not appear essentially fragmentary in this sense until after the absolute system has been posited4 ,and this brings to notice that at this point both the fragmentary and unitary characters of experience take on new meaning4 ,so far this fragmentary character has been defined with reference to the particular inquiry in hand4 ,now1 since the distinction between absolute and human experience has emerged1 the fragmentary character becomes an absolute quality of the latter in contrast with the former4 ,so1 mutatis mutandis1 of unity4 ,up to this point unity1 wholeness1 has been possible within human experience in the case of particular problems1 such as singing in tune1 etc4 ,but with the appearance of the absolute system of ideas1 wholeness is now the exclusive quality of the latter1 as incompleteness is of human experience1 though of course the working unity1 the unity resulting in pauses of satisfaction1 must still remain in the latter4 ,the problem now is to somehow work the absolute system of ideas into connection with the conception of the idea as a purpose1 as a concrete plan of action4 ,here is where the third conception of the relation between idea and purpose1 described at the beginning1 comes into play--the conception in which the idea1 instead of being the purpose1 or the fulfilment of a purpose1 has the purpose to correspond with1 or represent its own final and completely individual expression1 contained in the absolute system4 ,from the previous standpoint the idea's own final and completely individual expression has been found in the fulfilling experiences of singing in tune1 getting mathematical equations1 chemical precipitates1 etc4 ,here this complete individual experience can never be found in finite1 human experience1 but must be sought in the absolute system--and this can be only the object of love and hope1 of desire and will1 never of present finding4 ,notwithstanding the many previous protestations that the purposive function of the idea is its primary and most essential character1 we are here forced to fall back upon correspondence--representation as the primary1 the essential1 and indeed1 it appears at times1 as the sole function4 ,for in the attempt to bring these two functions together the purposive function is swallowed up in the representative4 ,the idea still is1 or has a purpose1 a plan of action1 but this purpose1 this plan1 is now nothing but to represent and correspond with its own final and completed form in the absolute system4 ,by this simple coup is the purposive function of the idea reduced at once to the representative4 ,nor is it pertinent to urge at this point that every purpose involves representation1 that the plan must be some sort of an image or scheme which symbolizes and stimulates the thing to be done4 ,this no one would question1 but now the sole thing to be done apparently is to perfect this representation of the complete and individual form in the absolute system4#aii ,once more1 an array of passages could be marshaled from almost every page refuting any such interpretation as this1 but they would be passages expounding the part played by the idea in such concrete experiences as singing1 measuring1 etc41 not in representing an absolute system of ideas4 ,even as regards the latter one might urge that1 by insisting on the active character of the idea1 we could after all regard this absolute system as a life of will after the fashion of our own1 were it not at once described as the complete embodiment1 the final fulfilment1 of finite ideas4 ,a life consisting of mere fulfilment seems a baffling paradox4 ,and its timeless character only adds to the difficulty4 ,moreover1 if we regard the system as constituted by such concrete activities as measuring and singing1 etc41 while we have saved will1 we shall now have to fallback upon our first conception of truth as found in the idea which unifies the fragmentary condition of experience as related to specific problems1 not fragmentary as related to an absolute system4 ,this brings us to the final and crucial point of the discussion1 the part which purpose plays in the determination of truth and error from the standpoint of the absolute system of ideas4 ,when is this purpose of the idea to correspond with its absolute1 final1 and completed form fulfilled1 or partially fulfilled8 ,and here at the very outset is a difficulty4 ,we have read repeatedly that the idea is itself the partial fulfilment of a purpose4 ,it is now to seek an object which shall increase this degree of fulfilment1 but still this fulfilment shall be incomplete4 ,and when we come to consider error1 it too will be found to consist in a partial fulfilment4 ,so it appears that there are three stages of partial fulfilment to be discriminated1 one belonging to the idea itself1 another to finite truth1 and still another to error4 ,returning to the problem1 from this point on we find the two standpoints1 that of the specific situation and that of the absolute system1 so closely interwoven and entangled that they are followed with great difficulty4 ,we have already seen that the idea seeks correspondence with its object1 because it is fragmentary1 incomplete1 indetermined4 ,and there we found that this indeterminate and fragmentary character belonged to the idea as a purpose1 a plan of seeking relief from some sort of restlessness and dissatisfaction1 such as singing out of tune1 etc4 ,here it is the incompleteness of an imperfect representation of its object in the absolute system that is the motif1 and how it is to effect an improvement in its imperfect condition is now the problem4 ,here again the appeal is to purpose4 ,whatever may constitute the absolute system1 one thing is assured3 nothing in it can be an object except as the finite idea intends it1 purposes it1 to be its object4 ,again must we ask3 ,on what basis is this object in the absolute system selected at all8 ,in general the answer is3 ,on the basis of a need of further determination2 but when we further analyze this1 we find it means on the basis of a specific want or need1 such as food1 shelter1 measuring1 singing1 etc4 ,the basis of the selection1 then1 is entirely on the side of the concrete1 finite situation4 ,here1 too1 we might ask3 ,whence the confidence that there will be found something in the absolute system that will fulfil the purpose generated on the side of the finite8 ,must we not here fall back on something like a pre-established harmony8 ,to this our author would say3 ,yea1 verily4 ,the fact that the absolute system responds to the finite needs does precisely show that the finite and the absolute cannot be sundered4 ,but when we try to state how the purpose generated on the side of the finite can be met by the absolute system1 the account again seems to run so much in terms of the finite experience that to call it a system of final1 completed1 and fulfilled ideas does not seem accurate4 ,we must note here1 too1 the shifting in the sense of purpose4 ,the idea selects its object on the basis of the material needed to relieve the unrest and dissatisfaction of singing out of tune1 etc4 ,but now it is to be satisfied by increasing the extent of its representation of its object in the absolute system4 ,and now1 finally1 what shall mark the attainment of this purpose of the idea to correspond and represent its own completed form8 ,when is the correspondence and representation true8 ,simply at the point where we pause satisfied1 where no other content need be substituted1 or from the point of view of the satisfied idea could be substituted4 ,that is all2 there is no other answer4 ,there are other statements1 but they all come to the same thing4 ,for instance3 ,it is true--this instant's idea--if1 in its own measure1 and on its own plan1 it corresponds1 even in its vagueness1 to its own final and completely individual expression4#bjj ,but the moment we ask what this final and individual expression is1 and what is meant by in its own measure1 and on its own plan1 we are thrown back at once upon the preceding statement4 ,the next sentence following the passage just quoted does indeed define this individual expression4 ,its expression would be the very life of fulfilment of purpose which this present idea already fragmentarily begins1 as it were1 to express4 ,but how can we know that the expression is fragmentary unless we have some experience of wholeness8 ,and here perhaps is the place to say1 what has been implied all along1 that this absolutely fragmentary character of human experience is an abstraction of the relatively disintegrated condition into which experience temporarily falls1 which abstraction is then reinstated as a fixed quality1 overlooking the fact that experience becomes fragmentary only that it may again become whole4 ,the absolute system1 the final fulfilment1 is in the same case4 ,it too is but the hypostatized abstraction of the function of becoming whole1 of wholing and fulfilling1 which manifests itself in the pauses of satisfaction4 ,but1 ,mr4 ,royce would say1 the wholeness of the particular instance is after all not a true and perfect wholeness1 because we can always think of the fulfilling experience as possibly different1 as having a possibly different embodiment4 ,but this implies also a different purpose4 ,moreover1 it abstracts the purpose from the specific conditions under which the purpose develops4 ,thus in singing in tune one doubtless could easily imagine himself singing another tune1 on another occasion1 in another key1 in a clear tenor instead of a cracked bass1 etc4 ,but if on this occasion1 in this song1 and with this cracked bass voice one1 accepting all these conditions1 does1 with malice aforethought1 purpose to strike the tune1 and happily succeeds1 why1 for that purpose formed under the known and accepted conditions1 is not the accomplishment final and absolute8 ,nor is the case any different1 so far as ,i can see1 in mathematical experience4 ,to quote again3 ,you think of numbers1 and accordingly count one1 two1 three4 ,your idea of these numbers is abstract1 a mere generality4 ,why8 ,because there could be other cases of counting1 and other numbers counted than the present counting process shows you1 and why so8 ,because your purpose in counting is not wholly fulfilled by the numbers now counted4#bja ,i confess ,i cannot see here in what respect the purpose is not fulfilled4 ,doubtless there could be other cases of counting1 and other numbers1 but these may not be included in my present purpose1 which is simply to count here and now4 ,in this passage the purpose is not very fully defined4 ,one's counting is usually for something1 if for nothing more than merely to illustrate the process4 ,in this latter case one's purpose would be completely fulfilled by just the numbers used when he should pause satisfied with the illustration4 ,or1 if ,i wish to show the properties of numbers1 then the discovery that there can always be more of them fulfils my purpose1 since this endless progression is one of the properties4 ,or yet again1 if one should suddenly become enamored of the process of counting1 and forthwith should purpose to devote the rest of his days to it1 it would still be fortunate that there were always other numbers to be counted4 ,in other words1 the idea as a purpose is formed with reference to1 and out of1 specific conditions4 ,in the last analysis the problem always is3 ,what is to be done here and now with the actual material at hand1 under the present conditions8 ,as the purpose is determined by these specific conditions1 so is the fulfilment4 ,to say that the fulfilment might be different is virtually to say that the purpose might have been different1 or indeed that the universe might have been different4 ,this necessity of falling back upon the character of the idea as a purpose in the sense of the specific plan of action comes into still bolder relief in the consideration of error from the standpoint of the absolute system of ideas4 ,as already mentioned1 the initial and persistent problem here is to distinguish at all between truth and error in our experience from this standpoint4 ,all our efforts at representing the absolute system must fall short4 ,what can we mean1 then1 by calling some of our ideas true and others false8 ,the definition of error is as follows3 ,an error is an error about a specific object1 only in case the purpose1 imperfectly defined by the vague idea at the instant when the error is made1 is better defined1 is in fact1 better fulfilled by an object whose determinate character in some wise1 although never absolutely1 opposes the fragmentary efforts first made to define them4#bjb ,but in relation to the absolute system the later part of this statement holds of all our ideas4 ,there always is the absolute object which would better define and better fulfil our purposes4 ,hence it is only in reference to the specific instances of singing1 measuring1 etc41 that a basis for the distinction can be found4 ,here our plan is not true so long as its mission of relieving the specific unrest and dissatisfaction1 the specific discord or hunger1 is unfulfilled4 ,the only criterion1 then1 which we have been able to find for the fulfilment of the purpose1 for the truth of the idea as representing an object in the absolute system1 is the sense of wholeness1 the pause of satisfaction1 which we experience in realizing such specific purposes as singing in tune4 ,and if it be said again3 ,precisely so2 this only shows how intimate is the relation between our experience and the absolute system of ideas2 then must it also be said once more1 either that the absolute system can be nothing more than an abstraction of the element of wholeness or wholing in our experience1 or that thus far the relation appears to rest upon sheer assumption4 ,again1 it may be insisted1 as suggested at the outset of this discussion1 that the idea can well have two purposes3 one to help constitute and solve the specific problems of daily life2 the other to represent the absolute system4 ,very well1 we must then make out a case for the latter4 ,if the purposes are to be different1 the purpose to represent the ,absolute should have a criterion of its own4 ,this we have not been able to find4 ,on the contrary1 whenever pushed to the point of stating a criterion for the representation of the absolute system1 we have had to appeal1 in every case1 to the fulfilment of a specific finite purpose4 ,and even if this purpose to represent the absolute system had some apparent standard of its own1 we should not be content to leave the matter so4 ,we should scarcely be satisfied to observe as a mere matter of fact that the idea has a reconstructive function1 and also a representative function4 ,such a brute dualism would be intolerable4 ,,iv4 ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusions ,in the end1 the outcome of the endeavor to establish a connection between the relation of the idea to human experience and its relation to the absolute system does not appear satisfying4 ,the idea is left either with two independent purposes--one to reconstruct finite experience1 the other to represent and symbolize the absolute system--or one of these purposes is merged in the other4 ,when the attempt is made from the standpoint of the absolute system1 the reconstructive purpose is swallowed up in the representative4 ,when1 on the other hand1 the need for a basis of distinction between truth and error here on this bank and shoal of time is felt1 the representative disappears in the reconstructive function4 ,nowhere are we able to discover a true unification4 ,to be sure1 we have been told again and again that the representation of the absolute object1 if only we could accomplish it1 would be the final fulfilment1 completion1 and realization of the human1 finite purpose4 ,but besides a confessed impotency at the very start1 this involves1 as we have seen1 either a sudden transformation of the specific purpose of singing in tune1 etc41 into that of representing the absolute system1 or a sheer assumption that the representation of the absolute object does somehow help in the realization of the specific finite purpose4 ,nowhere is there any account of how this help would be given4 ,and this suggests that if the analysis of the idea as purpose1 given at the outset of ,mr4 ,royce's lecture1 had been developed further1 if the conditions and origin of purpose had been examined1 it is difficult to see how this discrepancy could have escaped disclosure4 ,mr4 ,royce starts his account by simply accepting from psychology a general description of the purposive character of the idea4 ,even in the more detailed passages on purpose we have nothing but descriptions of purpose after it is formed4 ,nothing is said of the origin of this purposiveness4 ,the purposive character of experience is of course very manifest1 but what is the significance of this purposing in experience as a whole8 ,what is the source and the material of the purposes8 ,it is this uncritical acceptance of the purposive quality of the idea that obscures the irrelevancy of its relation to the absolute system4 ,if the idea must merely be or have a purpose1 then it may as well be that of representing the absolute system as any other4 ,of course1 there are troublesome questions as to how our finite ideas ever got such a purpose2 but1 after all1 if it is simply a matter of having any sort of a purpose1 representing the absolute system may answer as well as anything4 ,but when now we come to deal with the problem of fulfilment1 with the question of truth and error1 we have to reckon with this neglect of the source of this purposiveness4 ,it is this unanalyzed ground of the purpose that makes the matter of fulfilment so ambiguous4 ,such an analysis1 we believe1 would have shown that the conditions out of which the idea as a purpose arises determine also the sort of fulfilment possible4 ,there are1 indeed1 one or two very general1 but very significant1 statements in this direction1 if they were only followed up4 ,for instance3 ,in doing what we often call making up our minds we pass from a vague to a definite state of will and of resolution4 ,in such cases we begin with perhaps a very indefinite sort of restlessness which arouses the question3 ,what is it that ,i want1 what do ,i desire1 what is my real purpose8 ,in other words1 what does this restlessness mean8 ,what is the matter8 ,what is to be done8 ,purpose is born1 then1 out of restlessness and dissatisfaction4 ,but whence comes this restlessness and dissatisfaction8 ,surely we cannot at this point charge it to a discrepancy between our finite idea and the absolute object1 since it is just this restlessness that is giving birth to the purposive idea4 ,one thing1 at any rate1 appears pretty certain3 this indefinite restlessness presupposes some sort of activity already going on4 ,the restlessness is not generated in a vacuum4 ,but why should this activity get into a condition to be described as indefinite restlessness and dissatisfaction8 ,repugnant as it will be to many to have psycho-physical1 to say nothing of biological1 doctrines introduced into a logical discussion1 ,i confess that1 at this point facing the issue squarely1 ,i see no other way4 ,and it appears to me that just at this point it is the fear of phenomenalistic giants that has kept logic wandering so many years in the wilderness4 ,what1 then1 in this action already going on is responsible for this restlessness8 ,first let us note that indefinite restlessness and dissatisfaction are terms descriptive of what ,mr4 ,james calls the first thing in the way of consciousness4 ,this assumes consciousness as a factor in activity4 ,so that our question now becomes3 ,what is the significance of this factor of restless1 dissatisfied consciousness in activity8 ,now1 there appears no way of getting at the part which consciousness plays different from that of discovering the function of anything else4 ,and this way is simply that of observing1 as best we may1 the conditions under which consciousness operates1 and what it does4 ,here the biologist and psychologist with one voice inform us that this indefinite restlessness which marks the point of the operation of consciousness arises where1 in a co-ordinated system of activities1 there develop out of the continuation of the activity itself new conditions calling for a readjustment and reconstruction of the activity1 if it is to go on4 ,consciousness then appears to be the function which makes possible the reorganization of the results of a process back into the process itself1 thus constituting and preserving the continuity of activity4 ,so interpreted1 consciousness appears to be an essential element in the conception of a self-sustaining activity4 ,this indefinite restlessness1 in which consciousness begins1 marks1 then1 the operation of the function of reconstruction without which activity would utterly break down4 ,precisely because1 then1 the idea as a plan is projected and constructed in response to this restlessness must its fulfilment be relevant to it4 ,it is when the idea as a purpose1 a plan1 born out of this matrix of restlessness1 begins to aspire to the absolute system1 and attempts to ignore or repudiate its lowly antecedents1 that the difficulties concerning fulfilment begin4 ,they are the difficulties that beset every ambition which aspires to things foreign to its inherited powers and equipment4 ,a detailed account at this point of the construction and fulfilment of the idea as a plan of action would contain a consecutive reinterpretation of ,mr4 ,royce's principal rubrics4 ,such an account the limits of this paper forbid4 ,we shall have to be content with pointing out in a general way a few instances by way of illustration4 ,in the first place1 it is in this matrix of indefinite restlessness out of which the idea is born that the fragmentary character of experience1 of which ,mr4 ,royce is so keenly conscious1 appears4 ,but1 once more1 this fragmentary character is discernible only by contrast with the wholeness on both sides of the fragments2 the wholeness that precedes the restlessness1 and the new pause of satisfaction toward which it points4 ,nor must we forget that the habit matrix1 out of the disintegration of which the restlessness is immediately born1 does not exist as some metaphysical ultimate out of which thought as such has evolved4 ,back of it is some previous purpose in whose service habit was enlisted4 ,on the other hand1 this disintegration means that the old purpose1 the old plan1 must be reconstructed2 that it1 along with the disintegrated habit1 becomes the material for a new plan1 a new wholing of experience4 ,in the next place1 the construction of this new plan of action does involve re-presentation4 ,the first step in the transition from the condition of indefinite restlessness toward a plan is the diagnosis1 the definition of the restlessness4 ,this involves the re-presentation in consciousness of the activities1 out of which the restlessness has arisen4 ,this re-presentation is also the beginning of the reconstruction4 ,the diagnosis of the singing activity as being out of tune is the negative side of beginning to sing in tune4 ,it is now a commonplace of psychology that all representation is reconstruction4 ,and this is where ,mr4 ,royce's emphasis of the symbolic1 the algebraic1 as against the copy type of representation1 has its application4 ,all we want here is some sort of an image--visual1 auditory1 motor1 it matters not--that shall serve to focus attention upon the singing activities until they are reconstructed sufficiently to bring us to the pause of satisfaction4#bjc ,but nowhere in all this is there any reference to the idea's object in the absolute system4 ,nor does there appear to be any call or place for such reference4 ,the representation here is a part of the very process of forming the plan of further reconstruction out of the materials of the specific situation4 ,representation is not the plan's own end and aim4 ,this is to stimulate a new set of activities that shall lead out of the present state of unrest and dissatisfaction4 ,it is also true1 as already mentioned1 that in the process of fulfilling the plan1 of realizing the idea1 further determination and specification is produced in the plan itself4 ,the idea as a plan is certainly not formed all at once4 ,nor does it reach and maintain a fixed content4 ,no purpose is ever realized in its original content4 ,but this does not mean that its realization is1 therefore1 partial1 incomplete1 or fragmentary4 ,it is a part of its business to change4 ,the purpose is not there for its own sake4 ,the purpose is there as a means to the reorganization and reconstruction of experience4 ,it exists1 as ,mr4 ,royce says1 as an instrument1 as a tool for introducing control into experience4 ,and as1 in the process of use1 a tool always undergoes modification1 so here1 as an instrument for reconstructing habit1 the plan1 too1 undergoes reconstruction4 ,indeed1 as regards its content1 it is itself1 as ,mr4 ,royce says1 as much a habit1 as much the product of association1 as any part of experience4 ,the purposing function1 the purposing activity1 remains2 its content is constantly shifting4 ,here1 too1 is where the submission of the idea to the object takes place4 ,only1 here1 it is not a submission to an object already constituted as it is in ,mr4 ,royce's conception of the absolute system4 ,the idea as an hypothetical plan of action1 as a trial construction1 must be tested by the activities it is attempting to reconstruct4 ,that is to say1 at this point the question is3 ,does the plan apply to the activities actually involved in the unrest8 ,has it diagnosed the case properly1 and is it therefore one in and through which these activities can operate and come to unity again8 ,the submission here is the submission of the purpose1 the end1 to the material out of which it is formed1 and with which it must work4 ,but again this material to which the idea submits itself is anything but finally fixed and complete in form4 ,on the contrary1 as we have seen1 it is just the fragmentary and incomplete condition of this material that calls for the idea4 ,yet the idea as a plan must be true to its mission1 and to this material1 and in this sense must submit itself to whatever modifications and reconstruction the material dictates as necessary in order that it may function in and through the plan4#bjd ,on the other hand--and this is the point to which ,mr4 ,royce gives most emphasis--it is equally apparent that the idea must determine its object4 ,on this all philosophy1 from ,plato down1 which approaches reality from the side of ideas is at stake4 ,and this does not appear impossible if1 again1 the object is not already and eternally fixed and complete4 ,if the object is one constructed out of the very mass of habit material which the idea is reconstructing1 and if determination means not copying1 but construction1 then1 indeed1 must the idea determine its object4 ,just for that does it have its being4 ,that is its sole mission4 ,here the determination of the object by the idea is not a mere abstract postulate2 it is not based upon a general consideration of the disastrous consequences to our logical and ethical assumptions1 if it were not so determined4 ,here not only the general necessity for it1 but the modus operandi of this determination1 is apparent4 ,but1 at the risk of tedious iteration1 must it again be said that for the determination of the completed and perfected object in the absolute system not only is there nowhere any modus to be found1 but1 even if there were1 it is difficult to see what it would have to do with the kind of determination demanded by such a specific sort of unrest as singing out of tune1 etc4 ,the process of submission is thus a reciprocal one4 ,neither in the object nor in the idea is there a fixed scheme or order to which the other must submit and conform4 ,and this is simply the logical commonplace that submission cannot be a one-sided affair1 that determination must be reciprocal4 ,this brings us to what might as well have been our introductory as our concluding observation4 ,it has just been said that the determination of the object by the idea is a vital matter in any philosophy which approaches reality from the side of ideas4 ,such a way of approach must assert the primacy of the world of ideas over the world as a fact4#bje ,mr4 ,royce thus further states the case3 ,i am one of those who hold that when you ask what is an idea1 and how can ideas stand in any true relation to reality1 you attack the world knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its meshes4 ,this way is of course very ancient4 ,it is the way of ,plato4444 ,it is in a different sense the way of ,kant4 ,if you view philosophy in this fashion1 you subordinate the study of the world as fact to a reflection upon the world as idea4 ,begin by accepting upon faith and tradition the mere brute reality of the world as fact1 and there you are sunk deep in an ocean of mystery4444 ,the world of fact surprises you with all sorts of strange contrasts4444 ,it baffles you with caprices like a charming and yet hopelessly wayward child1 or like a bad fairy4 ,the world of fact daily announces itself to you as a defiant mystery4#bjf ,here we have concisely stated at the outset of the lectures the position which we have seen to be fraught with so many difficulties3 the position1 namely1 which accepts to start with the opposition of the world as idea and the world as fact1 as something given1 instead of something to be accounted for2 and which assumes that this opposition stands in the way of reaching reality1 whereas it possibly may be of the very essence of reality4 ,to be sure1 the above statement of this opposition between the world as fact and as idea is but the expository starting-point4 ,and it is true that the rest of the argument is occupied in the attempt to close this breach4 ,but1 as we have seen1 except where the idea is expounded as a specific purpose1 arising out of a specific experience of unrest1 such as singing out of tune1 etc4--except in this case1 the breach is taken as found and the attempt to heal it is made by working forward from the opposition as given instead of back to its source4 ,this opposition1 of course1 has its forward goal1 but the difficulty is to find it without an exploration of its source4 ,it is back in that matrix out of which the opposition has arisen that the line of direction to the goal is to be found4 ,moreover1 in starting from this opposition of fact and idea as given1 the only method of quelling it seems to be either that of reducing one side to terms of the other1 or of appealing to some new1 and therefore external unifying1 agency4 ,but if the factors in the opposition are found1 not one in submission to the other1 nor having the primacy over the other1 but as co-ordinate and mutually determining functions1 developed from a common matrix and co-operating in the work of reconstructing experience1 some of the difficulties involved in the alternative methods just mentioned appear to drop out4#bjg ,the point may be clearer if we recur to the passage and ask just what is meant by the defiantly mysterious1 baffling1 and capricious character of the world as fact--as brute reality4 ,first1 if by the world as fact2 as brute reality1 we mean experience so brute that it is not yet lighted up with ideas1 it is difficult to see how it could be mysterious or capricious1 since mystery and caprice appear only when experience ceases to be taken merely as it comes and an inquiry for connections and meanings has begun4 ,that is to say1 there can be neither mystery nor caprice except in relation to some sort of order4 ,and order is always a matter of ideas4 ,but it is sufficient to submit ,mr4 ,royce's own statement on this point3 ,we all of us from moment to moment have experience4 ,this experience comes to us in part as brute fact2 light and shade1 sound and silence1 pain and grief and joy4444 ,these given facts flow by2 and were they all1 our world would be too much of a blind problem for us even to be puzzled by its meaningless presence4#bjh ,if next we take the world of fact as in contrast and co-ordinate with the world of ideas1 mystery and caprice here1 certainly1 are not all on the side of the fact4 ,here1 again1 must they be functions of the relation between fact and idea4 ,we have seen that without thought there is neither mystery nor caprice4 ,the idea then cannot take part in the production of mystery and caprice1 and forthwith deny its parenthood4 ,of course1 mystery and caprice are not the final fruits of this co-ordinate opposition of fact and idea4 ,they are but the first fruits--the relatively unorganized embryonic mass which through the further activities of the parent functions shall develop into the symmetry of truth and law4 ,there appears then no ultimate primacy of either idea or fact over the other4 ,nor does either appear as a better way of approach to reality than the other4 ,it is only when we say3 ,lo6 here in the idea1 or ,lo6 there in the fact is reality1 that we find it imperfect1 incomplete1 and fragmentary1 and must straightway look for another4 ,but surely not in a certain absolute system of ideas1 which is the object of love and hope1 of desire and will1 of faith and work1 but never of present finding1 shall we seek it4 ,rather precisely in the loving and hoping1 desiring and willing1 believing and working1 shall we find that reality in which and for which both the ,world as fact and the ,world as idea have their being4 ,,index ,,absolute3 as constituting reality1 #cdh2 as related to truth and error1 #cfc ff42 as a hypostatized abstraction1 #cfi4 ,,absolute ,,self1 #ccj4 ,,accessory3 thought as1 #eh ff4 ,,activity3 as social1 #gd2 thought as1 #gh2 interrupted1 and judgment1 #aed2 and hypothesis1 #agj2 as sensori-motor1 #aic1 #bjj2 7see ,function1 ,reconstruction74 ,,sthetic ,,experience3 appreciative rather than reflective1 #bee2 not a form of valuation1 #cci1 #cdj4 ,,alternatives3 in judgment1 #aee2 7see ,disjunction74 ,,analogy1 #aga1 #agb1 #age2 in relation to habit1 #agf4 ,,anaxagoras3 in relation to the ,one and the ,many1 #bai2 his ,greek3 nous1 #bbj1 #bba4 ,,anaximander3 and the infinite1 #bji2 his process of segregation1 #bad1 #bae4 ,,anaximenes3 his ,greek3 arch1 #bji2 his scheme of rarefaction and condensation1 #bji1 #bac1 #bae1 #bbd4 ,,angell1 ,j4 ,r41 #ad note1 #cde note4 ,,animism1 #di note4 ,,antecedents ,,of ,,thought 7see ,stimulus74 ,,applied ,,logic3 ,lotze's definition1 #f4 ,,appreciation3 distinguished from reflection1 #bee1 #cci2 not to be identified with valuation1 #cbj-bd1 #cch4 ,greek3 ,arch3 meaning of search for1 #baa ff4 ,,association ,,of ,,ideas3 refers to meanings1 #cc1 #cd2 connection with thought1 #hj2 doctrine of3 analogous to subjectivism in ethics1 #bfa2 presupposes a mechanical metaphysics1 #ccj1 #cca note4 ,,atomists3 treatment of the ,one and the ,many1 #bba4 ,,austrian ,,economists1 #cjg1 #ccc4 ,,authority ,,and ,,custom3 logic of attitude of obedience to1 #bhf2 social conditions compatible with dominance of1 #bhf2 failure of1 as moral control1 #bhf4 ,,bacon3 extreme empirical position1 #aef ff42 view of induction1 #aeg1 #aeh4 ,,bad3 practical significance of1 as moral predicate1 #bei2 relation to wrong1 #cce4 ,,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m41 #beg note1 #cgh note4 ,becoming3 as relative1 #bjf4 ,,begr,,ndung ,,and ,,best,,tigung3 ,wundt's distinction of1 #agi2 criticised1 #aha1 #ahb4 ,,biology3 view of sensation1 #eh2 use of1 in logic1 #cgd1 #cge4 ,,bosanquet1 ,b41 #ei note1 #adg1 #ahi1 #aij1 #aia1 #cjj2 7see ,study ,v74 ,,bradley1 ,f4 ,h41 #dg note1 #ed note1 #ij ff41 #adg1 #ahi1 #aij1 #aia1 #aib1 #aid1 #bii note #b1 #cca note1 #ccb note1 #cec4 ,,brentano1 #bej note4 ,,butler1 ,j41 #bgg4 ,,certain1 ,,the3 relation to tension1 #ej1 #ea2 as datum1 #eg4 ,,coefficients ,,of ,,reality1 ,,perception1 ,,and ,,recognition3 defined1 #bfc-g2 present in economic and ethical experience1 #bfg-i4 ,,coexistence1 ,,coincidence1 ,,and ,,coherence1 #bh1 #bi1 #cc-f1 #eh1 #ei1 #fh4 ,,conceptions3 ,lotze's view of1 #ei2 ,bacon's attitude toward1 #aeg2 relation to fact1 #afh2 function in ,greek philosophy1 #cdb2 7see ,idea1 ,image1 ,hypothesis74 ,,conceptual ,,logic3 as related to idea and image1 #ahh-ib4 ,,conscience3 evolution of1 #bhf1 #bhg2 ambiguous and transitional character of1 #bhg2 metaphysical implications of1 as moral standard1 #bhh2 not autonomous1 #bhh4 ,,conscientiousness3 dangers of1 consequent upon ideal of self-realization1 #caf2 ,green's defense of1 referred to1 #caf note4 ,,conservation3 of energy and mass1 #bjf2 7see ,energy74 ,,content ,,of ,,knowledge3 and logical object1 originates in tension1 #di2 thought's own1 #fe2 and datum1 #fi2 as truth1 #gi ff42 as static and dynamic1 #gc1 #ic ff41 #aaj ff42 7see ,study ,,iv2 ,objectivity1 ,validity74 ,,continuity1 #aj1 #ac1 #ee4 ,,control3 idea and1 #ge1 #abi4 ,,conversion ,,of ,,propositions1 #aga2 in relation to habit1 #agf4 ,,copernicus3 his theory1 #agh2 compared with ,galileo's supposition1 #agi-ha4 ,,copula1 #aah ff42 scheme of mediation between subject and predicate1 #bjh1 #bad ff4 ,,correspondence3 of datum and idea1 #ea2 of thought-content and thought-activity1 #gj2 as criterion of truth1 #hb ff41 #cec ff4 ,,darwin1 ,,charles1 #adf1 #aej1 #agi4 ,,datum ,,of ,,thought1 #g1 #h1 #bd2 as fact1 #bf1 #ej1 #eb2 ,lotze's theory of1 stated1 #ee2 criticised1 #ef ff42 relation to induction1 #fa2 and content1 #fj1 #gj2 7see ,study ,,iii2 ,content1 ,fact1 ,stimulus74 ,,deduction1 #baa1 #bab4 ,,definition3 invented by ,socrates1 #bjc4 ,,democritus3 attempts at definition1 #bjc4 ,,demonstrative ,,judgment1 #acd4 ,,determination3 as criterion of truth1 #cfb ff42 impossibility of complete1 in finite experience1 #cfd4 ,,dewey1 ,,john1 #eh note1 #hf note1 #bff note #b1 #caf note1 #cha note4 ,,dialectic3 ,zeno as originator of1 #bjc4 ,,diogenes ,,of ,,apollonia1 #bbb ff4 ,,disjunction3 in judgment1 #aae1 #ach4 ,,dynamic3 ideas as1 and as static1 #gc1 #gf2 reality as1 #abf4 ,,earth3 as an element1 #bac4 ,,economic ,,judgment3 involves same type of process as physical1 #bce2 a process of valuation1 #bcf2 type of situation evoking1 #bda-f1 #bic-e1 #cjb1 #cjc2 distinguished from ethical1 #bdc note1 #bdf note1 #bga1 #cjb1 #cjc2 relation to physical1 #bdf note #c2 subject of1 the means of action1 #bei1 #cjd2 analysis of process of1 #cjd-ab2 distinguished from pull and haul1 #bcg1 #bch2 psychological account of1 #caj1 #caa2 a reconstructive process1 #caa1 #cab4 ,,egoism1 ,,neo-,,hegelian1 #caf4 ,,ehrenfels1 ,c4 ,,von1 #cah note4 ,,eidola3 ,bacon's view of1 #aeg4 ,,eleatics3 their logical position1 #baf ff4 ,,elements3 as four1 #bac2 as infinite1 #bac ff4 ,,emerson1 ,r4 ,w41 #bjd1 #bdf note4 ,,empedocles3 attempts at definition1 #bjc2 treatment of the ,one and the ,many1 #bah ff4 ,,empiricism1 #aa1 #bi1 #dg1 #dh1 #fa ff42 and rationalism1 #hj2 criticised1 #aef2 ,jevons1 #afi2 treatment of imagery1 #ahf-h4 ,,ends3 controlling factors in acquisition of knowledge1 #bbi2 may themselves be objects of attention and judgment1 #bcc2 judgment of1 inseparable from factual judgment1 #bcd2 conflict of1 related1 the occasion for ethical judgment1 #bch-da2 indirect conflict of unrelated1 the occasion for economic judgment1 #bda-c2 the subject-matter of ethical judgment1 #beh1 #bei2 definition of1 the goal of all judgment1 #bfd1 #bgb2 not always explicit in judgment-process1 #bfi1 #bgj2 nature of relation between1 in ethical judgment1 #bgc1 #bgd1 #bia1 #bib2 types of factual condition implied in acceptance of1 #bge1 #bgf2 warranted by factual judgment1 #bgf2 nature of1 unrelatedness of1 in economic judgment1 #bic-e1 #cjb1 #cjc2 7see ,purpose74 ,,energy3 principle of conservation of1 #bjf1 #bii1 #cjj2 not valid in sphere of valuation1 #cbh4 ,,energy-,,equivalence3 principle of1 in economic judgment1 #cjh1 #cji2 meaning of1 #cji note4 ,,epistemology1 #e-g1 #aj1 #aa1 #ac1 #ag1 #ah1 #dg1 #gc1 #cda2 origin of problem of1 #cdd1 #cde4 ,,erdmann1 ,,benno3 concerning induction1 #agc4 ,,error3 criterion of1 #cga4 ,,ethical ,,judgment3 involves same type of process as physical1 #bce2 a process of valuation1 #bcf1 #ccb2 type of situation evoking1 #bcg-da1 #bia-d2 distinguished from mechanical pull and haul between ends1 #bcg1 #bch2 distinguished from economic judgment1 #bdc note1 #bdf note1 #bga1 #cjb1 #cjc2 subject of1 an end of action1 #beh2 analysis of process of1 #bie-cjb2 a reconstructive process1 #bie1 #bii4 ,,existence3 versus meaning1 #baf1 #bag4 ,,experience3 duality of1 #af2 logic of1 #ai-ba2 how organized1 #db2 relation of thought to organization of1 #dc-h2 as disorganized1 #ge2 7see ,absolute1 ,functions74 ,,experiment3 as form of deduction1 #bab4 ,,fact3 as equivalent to datum1 #bf1 #ej ff42 criteria for determining1 #ajf ff42 as reality1 #aaj2 in relation to both idea and reality1 #chj ff42 and theory1 conflict between1 #aej1 #aea2 mutual dependence of1 #afh2 ,whewell's view of1 #afc2 7see ,datum1 ,idea1 ,reality1 ,truth74 ,,factual ,,judgment3 inadequate to complete mediation of conduct1 #bcj-cd2 controlled by ends1 #bfi2 incidental to judgments of valuation1 #bgb1 #bie2 types of1 implied in acceptance of an end1 #bge1 #bgf2 presents warrant for acceptance of ends1 #bgg4 ,,fite1 ,w41 #cca note4 ,,fragmentary1 #gb2 as quality of internal meaning1 #cfj1 #cfa2 as an attribute of finite experience1 #cfd1 #cgf2 7see ,stimulus1 ,tension74 ,,functions3 ,,of ,,experience1 #af2 logic of1 #ah1 #bc2 distinguished from status1 #af2 of thought1 #bc1 #bd1 #gh1 #he2 total1 as stimulus to thought1 #cf-h1 #hj2 different1 and logical distinctions1 #db2 different1 confused by ,lotze1 #ef2 sensations as1 #eh4 ,,genetic3 method1 significance of1 #ad1 #ae1 #ahg2 distinctions1 importance of1 #bd1 #ec1 #fb1 #ga1 #he2 effect of ignoring1 #ec1 #fb1 #ga2 7see ,psychology74 ,,good3 practical significance of1 as moral predicate1 #bei2 relation to right1 #cce4 ,,gore1 ,w4 ,c41 #cgg note4 ,,gorgias1 #bbe4 ,,greek ,,view ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,reality1 #cdb ff4 ,,green1 ,t4 ,h41 #bgd note1 #bhh note #c1 #cae note1 #caf note1 #ccj1 #cca4 ,,habit3 relation of judgment to1 interruption and resumption of1 #aed2 and hypothesis1 #agj2 and analogy1 #agf2 and simple enumeration1 #agf2 and conversion1 #agf2 and logical meaning1 #aih2 logical function of1 #cge1 #cgf4 ,,heraclitus3 his position1 #bae ff4 ,,hippo1 #bji4 ,,hobbes1 ,,thomas1 #cja4 ,,homogeneity3 of the world-ground1 #bjg2 of the world1 #bji1 #baj4 ,,hutcheson1 ,f41 #cja4 ,,hypothesis3 nature of1 ,,vii1 #adc-hc2 unequal stress commonly laid on its origin1 structure1 and function1 #adc-e2 relation of data and hypothesis strictly correlative1 #ade1 #aeb1 #afh2 as predicate1 #adf1 #ahc2 negative and positive sides of1 #adf1 #aee2 came to be recognized with rise of experimentalism1 #aei2 and test1 #agd1 #age1 #agg ff42 origin of1 #agj1 #aga ff42 supposition and1 #agh2 interdependence of formation and test of1 #ahb4 ,,idea3 continuous with fact1 #i1 #aj1 #ab2 distinction from fact1 #ac1 #aaj2 ,lotze's confusion regarding1 #ca1 #cb1 #da1 #fe2 association of1 #cc2 contrast with datum1 #eb-d2 functional conception of1 #gj1 #aab ff42 objective validity of1 #gb-e2 as entire content of judgment1 #aai2 existential aspect of1 #ig1 #ii ff41 #aac2 in relation to reference1 #ig ff41 #ajc1 #abi2 representational theory of1 #ajj ff41 #aac ff41 #ada1 #cdg ff41 #cgb ff42 universality of1 #ig ff41 #aac ff42 as not referred to reality1 #ig ff42 as forms of control1 #abi2 function in judgment1 #aec1 #aed2 distinguished from image1 #ahc-ic2 distinction criticised1 #aii-bjb2 problems accompanying discovery of1 #cda2 in ,greek thought1 #cdb2 instrumental and representative functions of1 #cdf ff41 #cgb ff42 purposive character of1 #cdg ff42 external and internal meaning of1 #cdg ff42 ,royce's absolute system of1 #cdh2 triple relation to purpose in ,royce's account1 #cdi ff42 logical versus memorial1 #cea2 in relation to fact and reality1 #cgi ff42 7see ,hypothesis1 ,image1 ,predicate74 ,,ideas3 ,platonic1 #bdg4 ,,image3 as merely fanciful1 #ec2 in relation to meaning1 #ed2 place of1 in judgment1 #aed2 distinction from idea1 #ahi-ic2 distinction criticised1 #aii-bjb2 as direct and indirect stimulus1 #aie-g4 ,,imagery3 empirical criteria of1 #ahf2 function of1 #ahg2 as representative1 #ahf-h1 #aid2 psychological function of1 #aic-g2 logical function of1 #aih1 #aii4 ,,immediate3 as related to mediation1 #cdb1 #cej ff4 ,,impression3 ,lotze's definition of1 #bg1 #bh1 #bi1 #cb2 objective determination of1 #cj1 #ca2 objective quality of1 #ca1 #fh2 as psychic1 #ec2 as transformed by thought into meanings or ideas1 #fg ff42 7see ,idea1 ,meaning1 ,sensation74 ,,indeterminate3 as quality of finite experience1 #cfd4 ,,induction3 ,bacon's view of1 #aeg2 by enumeration and allied processes1 #aga2 and habit1 #agf2 versus deduction1 #baa1 #bab4 ,,inference3 ,lotze's view of1 #fj2 in relation to judgment1 #aag4 ,,instrumental3 as character of thought1 #gh-hb1 #abh1 #adj1 #cdf ff41 #cgb ff42 7see ,purpose74 ,,interaction3 physical1 #bah ff4 ,,interest3 direction of1 #bje4 ,,invention3 form of deduction1 #bab4 ,,james1 ,,william1 #ha note1 #ceb note1 #cge4 ,,jevons1 ,w4 ,,stanley1 #afi1 #agc4 ,,jones1 ,,henry1 #dc note1 #ei note1 #ff4 ,,judgment3 ,lotze's definition of1 #ei and note2 relation of1 to ideas1 #fj2 structure of1 #ge note2 ,bosanquet's theory of1 #hf ff42 as a function1 #ajg ff42 dead and live1 #ajh2 definition of1 #hf1 #aaa2 relation to inference1 #aaf ff42 limits of single1 #abc ff42 negative1 #aad ff42 of perception1 #hh ff41 #if2 parts of1 #aah ff41 #bjg1 #bjh2 time relations of1 #abj ff42 as individual1 #acf2 as instrumental1 #abh1 #adj2 as categorical and hypothetical1 #acf2 as impersonal1 #aca2 as intuitive1 #aci2 various definitions of1 #adg ff42 analysis of1 #adi ff42 disjunctive1 #aee2 psychology of1 #aec2 purpose of1 #aed2 and interrupted activity1 #aed2 unique system of1 #bbd-cj2 general analysis of1 #bcj-cb2 purposive character of1 #cec ff42 universal1 #ced2 particular1 #ceh2 individual1 #cei1 #cfj2 mathematical1 #ced ff41 #cgj2 7see ,economic1 ,ethical1 ,factual judgments1 ,copula1 ,predicate1 ,reflection1 ,subject74 ,,kant1 ,i41 #dc1 #df1 #fj note1 #afc1 #bfc1 #cja4 ,,kepler1 #adf1 #aha4 ,,knowledge3 in relation to reality1 #ajb ff42 meaning and1 #abh2 copy and instrumental theories of1 #abi1 #adj1 #ada2 7see ,judgment1 ,truth74 ,k,,lpe1 ,o41 #bej note4 ,,logic3 origin of1 #d2 types of1 #e-bb2 as generic and specific1 #ah1 #bc2 relations to psychology1 #ad1 #ae1 #fc1 #fd1 #ahd1 #ahe1 #aib ff42 effect of modern psychology upon1 #cde2 relation to genetic method1 #ae-ah2 problems illustrated1 #ai1 #bj2 social significance of1 #bj2 eristic the source of formal1 #bjc2 pre-,socratic1 #bjc2 and epistemology1 #cda1 #cdb2 7see ,epistemology1 ,psychology74 ,,lotze3 criticised1 ,studies ,,ii1 ,,iii1 ,,iv2 applied logic1 #f2 thought as accessory1 #ef2 view of judgment1 #adg2 similarity between him and ,whewell1 #afe note2 quoted1 #f1 #bh1 #bi1 #cj1 #ca1 #cb1 #db1 #ef note1 #fb1 #fc1 #fd1 #fe1 #ff1 #fg1 #fh1 #fi1 #gc1 #gg1 #hc1 #hd4 ,,many3 the1 and the ,one1 #baj ff41 #bah ff4 ,,marginal ,,utility3 principle of1 #cjg1 #ccg note4 ,martineau1 ,j41 #bfb4 ,,mathematics3 certain forms of proof in1 #agb ff42 judgments of1 #ced ff41 #cgj4 ,,mcgilvary1 ,e4 ,b41 #beg note4 ,,mead1 ,g4 ,h41 #ch note1 #ccg note4 ,,meaning3 and logical idea1 #cj1 #ca1 #cb1 #cc1 #da1 #ig2 as content of thought1 #ff ff42 three types of1 #fh2 as property of independent idea1 #gc-e2 and association of ideas1 #cc1 #hj2 and reference1 #ig2 world of1 #ih1 #ajc1 #aab2 and knowledge1 #hi1 #abh1 #aij2 equivalent to response1 #aih2 versus existence1 #baf-ah2 inner and outer1 #cdg ff42 7see ,content1 ,idea1 ,reference74 ,,means3 as external and constitutive1 #gh2 reapplication of1 the problem of economic valuation1 #bdb1 #bdc1 #bdf1 #bei1 #bfj1 #cjc1 #cjd2 objective in so far as not known adequately for one's purpose1 #bef2 definition of1 incidental to all judgment1 #bgb2 factual determination of1 sometimes determinative of ends also1 #bgj4 ,,mediation3 in relation to the immediate1 #cej ff4 ,,melissus3 his dialectic1 #bad4 ,,metaphysics1 #h1 #i1 #ac1 #ah1 #he2 and logic of experience1 #ac2 as natural history1 #ac-ah2 worth1 #ai-bb2 logical and1 #gb1 #gd2 7see ,epistemology1 ,logic74 ,,mill1 ,j4 ,,stuart1 #adg1 #afj ff41 #afb1 #aff4 ,,mixture3 logical meaning of idea of1 #bai1 #bbj1 #bbb4 ,,monism1 #bbd4 ,,moore1 ,a4 ,w41 #gf note1 #cdf note4 ,,motion3 conservation of1 #bjf4 ,,negation1 #ig1 #aad ff4 ,,neo-,,hegelian1 #dc1 #caf4 ,,newton1 ,i41 #adf1 #aei1 #agi2 his notes for philosophizing1 #aei note4 ,greek3 ,nom versus ,greek3 physei1 #bbf4 ,,normative ,,and ,,genetic1 #af2 7see ,end1 ,purpose1 ,validity1 ,value74 ,,obedience3 a factor in genesis of morality1 #beg 7see also ,authority and ,custom74 ,,object3 how defined1 #ch1 #ci1 #gd1 #gf2 socially current1 #bcj2 real1 individual in significance1 #bcj2 nature of the ethical1 #bdj1 #cbh2 of the economic1 #bei1 #bfj1 #cbh2 7see ,substance74 ,,objectivity3 ,lotze's view of1 #fh 7see ,study ,,iv72 types of1 #fh2 ,lotze's distinction of logical and ontological1 #gb1 #gc2 distinction denied1 #cda1 #cdb2 scope of conception of1 #bce2 commonly denied to other than factual judgments1 #bdg1 #bdh2 not a property of sense-elements as such1 #bdh1 #bdi2 a category of apperception1 #bej2 a mark of the problematic as such1 #bej1 #bea1 #bee2 not ascertainable by any specific method1 #beb2 obtrusiveness as evidence of1 #bec2 reliability as evidence of1 #bfc2 conditions of experience of1 #bec-f2 conditions of1 present in the ethical and economic situations1 #beg-fj2 a real characteristic of ethical and economic judgment1 #bfa-c2 not dependent on social currency1 #cah-bj2 nor on possibility of social currency1 #cbj-bd2 nor on permanence1 #cbd-i2 7see ,reality1 ,validity74 ,,one3 the1 and the ,many1 #baj ff41 #bah ff4 ,,parmenides3 his logical position1 #baf ff42 influence on ,platonic-,aristotelian logic1 #bag4 ,,participation3 significance of1 in ,plato1 #cdb ff4 ,,particularity3 of an idea1 #ii1 #aac2 of a judgment1 #ceh4 ,,perception3 judgments of1 #hh ff41 #if4 ,,perfect1 ,,the1 #abf4 ,,physical ,,judgment 7see ,factual judgment74 ,greek3 ,physei versus ,greek3 nom1 #bbf4 ,greek3 ,physis1 #bjg1 #bbd4 ,,plato1 #ec note2 on ideas and reality1 #cdb ff41 #cgh1 #cgi4 ,,pluralism1 #ha note4 ,,positing3 thought as1 #fh4 ,,predicate3 how constituted1 #ge note2 in relation to reality1 #aja1 #ajc2 as hypothesis1 #adg1 #aec1 #aee1 #aef1 #ahc1 #ahf2 develops out of imaged end1 #bcb2 interaction with subject1 #bcb2 in ethical judgment1 #beh1 #bia-f2 in economic1 #bei1 #bfj1 #cji-aa2 7see ,copula1 ,judgment1 ,hypothesis1 ,idea1 ,image74 ,,predication1 #aah ff4 ,,pre-,,established ,,harmony3 in ,royce's philosophy1 #cfh4 ,,presuppositions1 #bjd1 #bjf4 ,,problematic 7see ,tension74 ,,proof3 inductive1 #agb1 #agc2 of hypothesis1 #agd1 #age2 relation of1 to origin of hypothesis1 #agi-hb2 ,wundt's view of1 #agg1 #agh4 ,,proposition3 and judgment1 #aah4 ,,protagoras1 #bbf4 ,,prudence3 ethical status of1 as a virtue1 #bdf4 ,,pythagoreans1 ,,the3 their logical position1 #baf2 use of experiment1 #baf4 ,,psychical3 distinguished from physical1 #be2 ,lotze's view of impression as barely1 #bg1 #bh1 #cj2 view criticised1 #ca-d1 #da1 #db2 two meanings of1 #ch note2 psychical mechanism1 #ca2 idea as1 #ec2 problem of logical and1 #ed and note1 #fd2 activity of thought also made1 by ,lotze1 #gg and note2 subjective result1 #hd2 7see ,impression74 ,,psychology3 and logic1 #ad-af1 #bf1 #fc1 #fd1 #aec1 #aed1 #ahd1 #ahe1 #aib ff41 #cde1 #cdh2 principle of1 functional1 #bbi1 #bcj2 genesis of1 #bhj1 #bha2 logical value of functional1 #bic4 ,,psychologists' ,,fallacy1 #cg4 ,,purpose3 logical importance of1 #d1 #i1 #aj1 #ac1 #ae1 #bj1 #ce1 #eh1 #gf1 #hj1 #aed2 logical aspects of1 ,study ,,xi2 in an idea1 #cdg ff42 in judgment1 #cec ff42 in criterion of truth and error1 #cfa ff42 origin of1 as idea1 #cgc ff42 as method1 #cgg2 7see ,end1 ,reconstruction74 ,,quales3 of sensation1 #ee1 #ef1 #fj note4 ,,qualities3 primary and secondary1 #bba4 ,,question3 and judgment1 #ig1 #aad ff4 ,,rationalism3 criticised1 #aef ff41 #ahh ff41 #bih ff4 ,,rationality3 of world1 #bjf4 ,,reality3 as constructed by thought1 #id ff41 #ajd2 as developing1 #abf2 as including fact and idea1 #ajh1 #aaj1 #abe1 #chb2 as independent of thought1 #he1 #hg ff41 #ajd2 as subject of subject1 #hh ff42 popular criterion of1 #aje ff42 possibility of knowledge of1 #ia ff41 #ajb ff41 #abe2 for the individual1 #id ff41 #ajc1 #aab1 #bbd ff42 as relative to judging1 #adi2 as given in sensation1 #afj2 perception and recognition coefficients of1 #bfc-g1 #bgg2 these present in ethical and economical experience1 #bfg-i2 apprehension of1 emotional1 #bfc2 scope of complete conception of1 #bce1 #cdj2 degrees of1 #cdj2 ,platonic conception of1 #cdc ff42 ,royce's conception of1 #cdh2 as related to fact and idea1 #cgi ff42 7see ,fact1 ,truth1 ,validity74 ,,reason1 ,,sufficient3 principle of1 #bjf4 ,,reconstruction3 the function of thinking1 #ch1 #dj1 #df1 #ge1 #gf1 #he2 effect of denying this1 #dg1 #ga1 #gb2 data and1 #di ff42 in judgment1 #aed1 #bia1 #bie1 #bii1 #caa1 #cab1 #cdf1 #cdg2 7see ,habit1 ,stimulus1 ,tension74 ,,reference3 as social1 #gd2 problem of reference of ideas1 #hb ff42 as meaning1 #ig ff42 functional conception of1 #aac2 paradox of1 #ii2 idea as1 #abi4 ,,reflection3 as derived1 #a-ab2 nave1 #c1 #i2 subject-matter of1 #g1 #h2 logic and1 #c1 #ah1 #bc2 versus constitutive thought1 #dc-h2 distinguished1 #bee2 general nature of1 #bfi2 end not always explicit in1 #bgj2 outcome of1 statable in terms of end or means1 #bgb2 7see ,judgment1 ,thought74 ,,reflective ,,judgment1 #acd4 ,,representation3 as one of the two functions of an idea1 #cde1 #cdg ff41 #cgb2 significance of1 in ideal reconstruction1 #cgf4 ,,response3 failure of1 and origin of judgment1 #aed4 ,,restlessness3 as source of reflection and purpose1 #cgd ff42 7see ,tension74 ,,rhetoric3 origin of1 #bjc1 #bjd4 ,,right 7see ,good74 ,,royce1 ,,josiah3 referred to1 #gf note1 #adg2 theory of ideas discussed1 #cdf-hb2 quoted1 #cdg1 #cdh1 #cdi1 #cej1 #ceb1 #cec1 #ced1 #cee1 #cef1 #ceg1 #ceh1 #cei1 #cfb1 #cfd1 #cff note1 #cfh1 #cgj1 #cga1 #cgd1 #cgi1 #chj1 #cha4 ,,satisfaction3 pause of1 as marking attainment of truth1 #cfb ff4 ,,schiller1 ,f4 ,c4 ,s41 #cbg note1 #cde note4 ,,science3 relation to nave experience1 #aj1 #aa2 its historic stages1 #aa1 #ab2 distinction of logical procedure from epistemology1 #ac2 same history as philosophy1 #ba1 #bb4 ,,self1 ,,empirical3 genesis and content of concept of1 #bij1 #bib1 #cca1 #ccb note #a4 ,,self1 ,,energetic3 implied in experience of warrant1 #bgg1 #bgh2 stimulus to development of concept of empirical self1 #bgi-ha2 essential principle in all valuation1 #bha-e2 evolution of moral attitude of reference to1 #bhe-i2 logical function of1 in valuation1 #bif2 important place in economic valuation1 #cjh1 #cji2 not capable of being described in terms of purpose or ideal1 #cac-af2 ,bradley's misinterpretation of1 #ccb note4 ,,self-,,realization 7see also ,green1 ,t4 ,h473 theory of1 as moral ideal futile1 #bih2 logically congruous with determinism and hedonism1 #ccj1 #cca4 ,,sensations3 logical import of1 #eg2 as functions of experience1 #eh2 as point of contact with reality1 #ij2 place in judgment1 #aed2 and ideas1 #afd ff42 7see ,impressions1 ,psychical74 ,,sensori-,,motor ,,activity1 #aic1 #bjj4 ,,shaftesbury1 #cja4 ,,sigwart1 ,c43 view of judgment1 #adg4 ,,skepticism1 #ej note1 #he4 ,,social ,,currency3 implies an identity of aspect of an object to different persons1 #bbi2 object having1 an abstraction like social individual1 #bbi2 not a test of objectivity1 #cah-bi4 ,,socrates3 function of concept1 #cdb4 ,,sophists1 ,,the1 #bbe4 ,,spencer1 ,h41 #bdh1 #bej note #a1 #cae note4 ,,standard 7see also ,predicate73 identified with predicate in ethical judgment1 #bch-dj2 function of1 in ethical judgment1 #bgd1 #bii1 #cjj2 morphology and mode of reconstruction of1 #bif1 #big2 an ultimate ethical1 impossible1 #bii2 objectivity of1 #cjj1 #cja4 ,,stimulus3 of thought1 #g1 #h1 #ag1 #bd1 #cg-dj1 #dg1 #ha2 ,lotze's view of1 #bg1 #bi1 #cj2 view criticised1 #cj-cf2 confusion of datum with1 #fa2 defined1 #ge2 and judgment1 #aec-d2 as condition of thinking1 #aic ff42 as direct and indirect1 #aie-g2 of ethical judgment1 #bch-da1 #bia2 of economic1 judgment1 #bda-f1 #cjb2 7see ,content1 ,datum74 ,,stout1 ,g4 ,f43 referred to1 #cdi4 ,,stratton1 ,g4 ,m41 #cah note4 ,,structure1 #ae1 #af1 #ag1 #ah1 #bd1 #ge2 7see ,function74 ,,subject3 of judgment1 how constituted1 #ge note2 as constructed by thought1 #id ff41 #ajc2 as a part of judgment1 #aah ff42 as reality1 #hh ff42 as inside and outside of judgment1 #ic1 #if2 functional theory of1 #aaa1 #abe2 as that requiring explanation1 #bjh1 #baa ff42 as modified by deduction1 #bab2 given by analysis of situation1 #bcb2 interacts with predicate in judgment1 #bcb2 of ethical judgment1 #beh1 #bif-h2 of economic judgment1 #bei1 #bfj1 #cjd1 #cji-aa2 7see ,copula1 ,datum1 ,judgment1 ,predicate74 ,,subjective3 distinguished from objective1 #be2 ,lotze's view of impressions as purely1 #bg1 #bh2 view criticised1 #ca2 definition of1 #ci2 developed only within reflection1 #eb1 #ec2 7see ,psychical74 ,,subjectivism3 in ,lotze1 #hc1 #hd2 in ,royce1 #cfj4 ,,subject-,,matter ,,of ,,thought3 distinguished as stimulus1 datum1 and content1 #g1 #h1 #bd2 confusion of these 7genetic7 distinctions1 #ag1 #ah2 as antecedent1 ,study ,,ii2 as datum1 ,study ,,iii2 as content1 ,study ,,iv4 ,,substance3 ethical theories based on logic involved in rationalistic conception of1 #bih1 #bii2 meaning of concept of1 #cbf1 #cbg2 type-form of conduct analogous to concept of a particular kind of1 #cbg1 #cbh4 ,,substantiation3 significance of ,plato's1 of ideas1 #cdb ff4 ,,supposition ,,and ,,hypothesis1 #agh-ha4 ,,sweet1 ,,henry3 quoted1 #aec note4 ,,synthetic 7see ,reconstruction74 ,,taylor1 ,a4 ,e41 #bii note #b1 #cae note1 #caf1 #cbd4 ,,teleology 7see ,end1 ,purpose74 ,,temptation3 ethical1 #bch1 #cja2 economic1 #cje4 ,,tension3 as stimulus to thought1 #cg1 #ch1 #di1 #ej1 #ec1 #gj1 #he2 in relation to constitution of sensory datum1 #ec1 #eh1 #ei1 #gj2 constitution of meaning as distinct from fact1 #ge1 #he1 #aed1 #bcg-df1 #bej1 #bea1 #bee1 #bia-e1 #cgd ff42 7see ,purpose1 ,reconstruction74 ,,thales3 his ,greek3 arch1 water1 #bji2 in relation to deduction1 #bab1 #bad4 ,,thought3 forms of1 #eh ff42 as modes of organizing data1 #fc2 three kinds according to ,lotze1 #fh1 #fi2 as positing and distinguishing1 #fi2 validity of its function1 #gf-hb2 of its products1 #hb-e2 instrumental character1 #gh-hb2 as discriminating sensory qualities1 #bjj-bjb2 7see ,judgment1 ,reflection74 ,,time3 as involved in judgment1 #abj ff4 ,,transcendentalism1 #bi1 #dc-h4 ,,trendelenburg1 ,a43 view of judgment1 #adg4 ,,truth3 criterion of1 #hd2 ,bosanquet's conception of1 #aje2 popular criterion of1 #aje ff42 and purpose1 ,study ,,xi2 representational versus teleological view of1 #cda ff42 criterion of1 #cfa ff42 7see ,objectivity1 ,validity74 ,,ueberweg3 view of judgment1 #adg4 ,,uniformity3 of nature1 #bjf4 ,,unity3 of the world1 #bjg4 ,,universal3 first and second according to ,lotze1 #ef1 #ei1 #fi2 ideas as1 #ig ff41 #aac2 judgment as1 #acf2 ,mr4 ,royce's treatment of1 #ced ff42 necessity and1 #ceg4 ,,validity3 of thought1 #g1 #h2 relation to genesis1 #ad1 #ae2 test1 #ag1 #ah2 defines content of thought1 #bd2 problem of1 ,study ,,iv2 ,lotze's dilemma regarding1 #ga-he2 of bare object of thought1 #gb-f2 of activity of thought1 #gf-hb2 of product of thought1 #hb-e2 7see ,objectivity1 ,reality1 ,truth74 ,,value3 ,lotze's distinction of1 from existence1 #bh1 #bi2 view criticised1 #ca1 #da1 #de2 organized1 of experience1 #db-h2 determined in and by a logical process1 #bcc2 nature of consciousness of1 #bgc1 #ccc-e2 function of consciousness of1 #cce-g2 properly mediate and functional in character1 #cch-dj4 ,,valuation 7see also ,ethical judgment1 ,economic judgment73 includes only ethical and economic types of judgment1 #bbg1 #bcf1 #cch-dj2 general account of process of1 #bgb1 #bie2 reconstructive of self as well as of reality1 #cab4 ,,venn1 ,,john3 origin of hypothesis1 #afi4 ,,warrant3 consciousness of1 accompanies purely factual as well as valuational judgment processes1 #bgf1 #bgg2 the constitutive feature of survey of factual conditions1 #bgh1 #bgi4 ,,welton1 ,j43 origin of hypothesis1 #aga4 ,,whewell1 ,,william1 #afc2 view of sensations and ideas1 #afd1 #afe2 of induction1 #afe2 a certain agreement between him and ,mill1 #aff4 ,,wieser1 ,f4 ,,von1 #cce note #b4 ,,will3 as related to thought1 #cff note2 7see ,activity1 ,end1 ,purpose74 ,,wundt1 ,w43 view of judgment1 #adg2 view of mathematical induction1 #agc2 formation and proof of hypothesis1 #agg ff42 distinction between supposition and hypothesis1 #agh ff4 ,,wrong 7see ,bad74 ,,xenophanes3 his logical position1 #baf4 ,,zeno3 his dialectic1 #bad4 ,,footnotes #a ,logic 7translation1 ,oxford1 #ahhh71 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #aj1 #aa4 ,italics mine4 #b ,see ,,angell1 ,the ,relations of ,structural and ,functional ,psychology to ,philosophy1 ,the ,decennial ,publications of the ,university of ,chicago1 ,vol4 ,,iii 7#aijc71 ,part ,,ii1 pp4 #fa-f1 #gj-gb4 #c ,see ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 pp4 #aag-bj4 #d ,see statements regarding the psychological and the logical in ,the ,child and the ,curriculum1 pp4 #bh1 #bi4 #e ,,lotze1 ,logic 7translation1 ,oxford1 #ahhh71 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #b4 ,for the preceding exposition see ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #a1 #b1 #ac1 #ad1 #cg1 #ch2 also ,microkosmus1 ,book ,v1 chap4 #d4 #f ,,lotze1 ,logic1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #f1 #g4 #g ,,lotze1 ,logic 7translation1 ,oxford1 #ahhh71 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #be4 #h ,ibid41 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #cf4 #i ,ibid4 #aj ,microkosmus1 ,book ,v1 chap4 #d4 #aa ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bce2 see the whole discussion1 #cbe through #cbg4 #ab ,the emphasis here is upon the term existences1 and in its plural form4 ,doubtless the distinction of some experiences as belonging to me1 as mine in a peculiarly intimate way1 from others as chiefly concerning other persons1 or as having to do with things1 is an early one4 ,but this is a distinction of concern1 of value4 ,the distinction referred to above is that of making an object1 or presentation1 out of this felt type of value1 and thereby breaking it up into distinct events1 etc41 with their own laws of inner connection4 ,this is the work of psychological analysis4 ,upon the whole matter of the psychical ,i am glad to refer to ,,professor ,,george ,h4 ,,mead',s article entitled ,the ,definition of the ,psychical1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,part ,,ii1 of ,the ,decennial ,publications of the ,university of ,chicago4 #ac ,we have a most acute and valuable criticism of ,lotze from this point of view in ,,professor ,,henry ,,jones1 ,philosophy of ,lotze1 #ahie4 ,my specific criticisms agree in the main with his1 and ,i am glad to acknowledge my indebtedness4 ,but ,i cannot agree in the belief that the business of thought is to qualify reality as such2 its occupation appears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or portion of reality1 and to fall within the course of reality itself2 being1 indeed1 the characteristic medium of its activity4 ,and ,i cannot agree that reality as such1 with increasing fulness of knowledge1 presents itself as a thought-system1 though1 as just indicated1 ,i have no doubt that reality appears as thought-specifications or values1 just as it does as affectional and sthetic and the rest of them4 #ad ,bradley's criticisms of rationalistic idealism should have made the force of this point reasonably familiar4 #ae ,the common statement that primitive man projects his own volitions1 emotions1 etc41 into objects is but a back-handed way of expressing the truth that objects1 etc41 have only gradually emerged from their life-matrix4 ,looking back1 it is almost impossible to avoid the fallacy of supposing that somehow such objects were there first and were afterward emotionally appreciated4 #af ,of course1 this very element may be the precarious1 the ideal1 and possibly fanciful of some other situation4 ,but it is to change the historic into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is uncertain1 all at once1 or as such4 ,this gives metaphysical skepticism as distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in all reflection and scientific inquiry4 #ag ,but this is a slow progress within reflection4 ,plato1 who was influential in bringing this general distinction to consciousness1 still thought and wrote as if image were itself a queer sort of objective existence2 it was only gradually that it was disposed of as psychical1 or a phase of immediate experience4 #ah ,of course1 this means that what is excluded and so left behind in the problem of determination of this objective content is regarded as psychical4 ,with reference to other problems and aims this same psychic existence is initial1 not survival4 ,released from its prior absorption in some unanalyzed experience it gains standing and momentum on its own account2 e4 g41 the personal equation represents what is eliminated from a given astronomic time-determination as being purely subjective1 or source-of-error4 ,but it is initiatory in reference to new modes of technique1 re-readings of previous data--new considerations in psychology1 even new socio-ethical judgments4 ,moreover1 it remains a fact1 and even a worthful fact1 as a part of one's own inner experience1 as an immediate psychical reality4 ,that is to say1 there is a region of personal experience 7mainly emotive or affectional7 already recognized as a sphere of value4 ,the source of error is disposed of by making it a fact of this region4 ,the recognition of falsity does not originate the psychic 7p4 #ch1 note74 #ai ,of course1 this is a further reflective distinction4 ,the plain man and the student do not determine the extraneous1 irrelevant1 and misleading matter as image in a psychological sense1 but only as fanciful or fantastic4 ,only to the psychologist and for his purpose does it break up into image and meaning4 #bj ,bradley1 more than any other writer1 has seized upon this double antithesis1 and used it first to condemn the logical as such1 and then turned it around as the impartial condemnation of the psychical also4 ,see ,appearance and ,reality4 ,in chap4 #ae he metes out condemnation to thought because it can never take in the psychical existence or reality which is present2 in chap4 #ai1 he passes similar judgment upon the psychical because it is brutally fragmentary4 ,other epistemological logicians have wrestled--or writhed--with this problem1 but ,i believe ,bradley's position is impregnable--from the standpoint of ready-made differences4 ,when the antithesis is treated as part and lot of the process of defining the truth of a particular subject-matter1 and thus as historic and relative1 the case is quite otherwise4 #ba ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #bh-cd4 #bb ,it is interesting to see how explicitly ,lotze is compelled finally to differentiate two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts1 one of which is necessary in order that there may be anything to call out thought 7a lack1 or problem72 the other in order that when thought is evoked it may find data at hand--that is1 material in shape to receive and respond to its exercise4 ,the manifold matter of ideas is brought before us1 not only in the systematic order of its qualitative relationships1 but in the rich variety of local and temporal combinations4444 ,the combinations of heterogeneous ideas 444 forms the problems1 in connection with which the efforts of thought to reduce coexistence to coherence will subsequently be made4 ,the homogeneous or similar ideas1 on the other hand1 give occasion to separate1 to connect1 and to count their repetitions4 7,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #cc1 #cd2 italics mine47 ,without the heterogeneous variety of the local and temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to excite thought4 ,without the systematic arrangement of quality there would be nothing to meet thought and reward it for its efforts4 ,the homogeneity of qualitative relationships1 in the pre-thought material1 gives the tools or instruments by which thought is enabled successfully to tackle the heterogeneity of collocations and conjunctions also found in the same material6 ,one would suppose that when ,lotze reached this point he might have been led to suspect that in this remarkable adjustment of thought-stimuli1 thought-material1 and thought-tools to one another1 he must after all be dealing1 not with something prior to the thought-function1 but with the necessary elements in and of the thought-situation4 #bc ,supra1 p4 #cj4 #bd ,for the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest strain and stress in conflicting or tensional experience1 see ,the ,reflex ,arc ,concept in ,psychology1 ,psychological ,review1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #eg4 #be ,for the accessory character of thought1 see ,,lotze1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #g1 #be-g1 #fa1 etc4 #bf ,,bosanquet1 ,logic 7,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #cj-cd71 and ,jones 7,philosophy of ,lotze1 #ahie1 chap4 #d7 have called attention to a curious inconsistency in ,lotzes's treatment of judgment4 ,on one hand1 the statement is as given above4 ,judgment grows out of conception in making explicit the determining relation of universal to its own particular1 implied in conception4 ,but1 on the other hand1 judgment grows not out of conception at all1 but out of the question of determining connection in change4 ,lotze's nominal reason for this latter view is that the conceptual world is purely static2 since the actual world is one of change1 we need to pass upon what really goes together 7is causal7 in the change as distinct from such as are merely coincident4 ,but1 as ,jones clearly shows1 it is also connected with the fact that1 while ,lotze nominally asserts that judgment grows out of conception1 he treats conception as the result of judgment since the first view makes judgment a mere explication of the content of an idea1 and hence merely expository or analytic 7in the ,kantian sense7 and so of more than doubtful applicability to reality4 ,the affair is too large to discuss here1 and ,i will content myself with referring to the oscillation between conflicting contents1 and gradation of sensory qualities already discussed 7p4 #ef1 note74 ,it is judgment which grows out of the former1 because judgment is the whole situation as such2 conception is referable to the latter because it is one abstraction within the whole 7the solution of possible meanings of the data7 just as the datum is another4 ,in truth1 since the sensory datum is not absolute1 but comes in a historical context1 the qualities apprehended as constituting the datum simply define the locus of conflict in the entire situation4 ,they are attributives of the contents-in-tension of the colliding things1 not calm untroubled ultimates4 ,on pp4 #cc and #cd of ,vol4 ,i1 ,lotze recognizes 7as we have just seen7 that1 as matter of fact1 it is both sensory qualities in their systematic grading1 or quantitative determinations 7see ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #dc1 for the recognition of the necessary place of the quantitative in the true concept71 and the rich variety of local and temporal combinations1 that provoke thought and supply it with material4 ,but1 as usual1 he treats this simply as a historical accident1 not as furnishing the key to the whole matter4 ,in fine1 while the heterogeneous collocations and successions constitute the problematic element that stimulates thought1 quantitative determination of the sensory quality furnishes one of the two chief means through which thought deals with the problem4 ,it is a reduction of the original colliding contents to a form in which the effort at redintegration gets maximum efficiency4 ,the concept1 as ideal meaning1 is of course the other partner to the transaction4 ,it is getting the various possible meanings-of-the-data into such shape as to make them most useful in construing the data4 ,the bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment cannot be discussed here4 #bg ,see ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #ch1 #ei1 #fa1 #aje1 #abi1 #aig1 for ,lotze's treatment of these distinctions4 #bh ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #cf2 see also ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bij1 #bia4 #bi ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bdf2 the same is reiterated in ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bej1 where the question of origin is referred to as a corruption in logic4 ,certain psychical acts are necessary as conditions and occasions of logical operations1 but the deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought remains unfilled4 #cj ,philosophy of ,lotze1 chap4 #c1 ,thought and the ,preliminary ,process of ,experience4 #ca ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ch4 #cb ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ac2 last italics mine4 #cc ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ad2 italics mine4 #cd ,see ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #af-bj4 ,on p4 #bb this work is declared to be not only the first1 but the most indispensable of all thought's operations4 #ce ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bf4 #cf ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ce4 #cg ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #cf2 see the strong statements already quoted1 p4 #cj4 ,what if this canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above3 the original objectification which transforms the mere state into an abiding quality or meaning8 ,suppose1 that is1 it were said that the first objectifying act cannot make a substantial 7or attached7 quale out of a mere state of feeling2 it must find the distinction it makes there already6 ,it is clear we should at once get a regressus ad infinitum4 ,we here find ,lotze face to face with this fundamental dilemma3 thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions1 or else just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or futile4 ,this same contradiction1 so far as it affects the impression1 has already been discussed4 ,see p4 #ca4 #ch ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ca4 #ci ,as we have already seen1 the concept1 the meaning as such1 is always a factor or status in a reflective situation2 it is always a predicate of judgment1 in use in interpreting and developing the logical subject1 or datum of perception4 ,see ,study ,,vii1 on the ,hypothesis4 #dj ,,royce1 in his ,world and ,individual1 ,vol4 ,i1 chaps4 #f and #g1 has criticised the conception of meaning as valid1 but in a way which implies that there is a difference between validity and reality1 in the sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real only when it is experienced in direct feeling4 ,the above implies1 of course1 a difference between validity and reality1 but finds the test of validity in exercise of the function of direction or control to which the idea makes pretension or claim4 ,the same point of view would profoundly modify ,royce's interpretation of what he terms inner and outer meaning4 ,see ,,moore1 ,the ,university of ,chicago ,decennial ,publications1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 on ,existence1 ,meaning1 and ,reality4 #da ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #beg1 #bfe and in general ,book ,,iii1 chap4 #d4 ,it is significant that thought itself1 appearing as an act of thinking over against its own content1 is here treated as psychical4 ,even this explicit placing of thinking in the psychical sphere1 along with sensations and the associative mechanism1 does not1 however1 lead ,lotze to reconsider his statement that the psychological problem is totally irrelevant and even corrupting as regards the logical4 ,consequently1 as we see in the text1 it only gives him one more difficulty to wrestle with3 how a process which is ex officio purely psychical and subjective can yet yield results which are valid1 in a logical1 to say nothing of an ontological1 sense4 #db ,professor ,james's satisfaction in the contemplation of bare pluralism1 of disconnection1 of radical having-nothing-to-do-with-one-another1 is a case in point4 ,the satisfaction points to an sthetic attitude in which the brute diversity becomes itself one interesting object2 and thus unity asserts itself in its own denial4 ,when discords are hard and stubborn1 and intellectual and practical unification are far to seek1 nothing is commoner than the device of securing the needed unity by recourse to an emotion which feeds on the very brute variety4 ,religion and art and romantic affection are full of examples4 #dc ,lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the antithesis between our ideas and the objects to which they are directed is itself a part of the world of ideas 7,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aib74 ,barring the phrase world of ideas 7as against world of continuous experiencing7 he need only have commenced at this point to have traveled straight and arrived somewhere4 ,but it is absolutely impossible to hold both this view and that of the original independent existence of something given to and in thought and an independent existence of a thought-activity1 thought-forms1 and thought-contents4 #dd ,the criticism of ,bosanquet's theory of the judgment offered in this paper is from the standpoint of the theory of the judgment developed by ,professor ,john ,dewey1 in his lectures on ,the ,theory of ,logic4 ,while the chief interest of the paper1 as the title implies1 is critical1 it has been necessary to devote a portion of it to the exposition of the point of view from which the criticism is made4--,h4 ,b4 ,t4 #de ,the references throughout this paper are to the pages of ,vol4 ,i of ,,bernard ,,bosanquet1 ,logic or the ,morphology of ,knowledge1 ,oxford1 #ahhh4 #df ,f4 ,h4 ,,bradley1 ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #fd4 #dg ,the difficulty1 of course1 is not a merely formal one1 much less a verbal one4 ,instinctively we grant to ,bosanquet his statement that reality is a continuous whole2 we feel it almost captious to question his right to it4 ,but why8 ,because the content of judgment is continuous2 judgment is always engaged with the determination of a related totality4 ,but if all content is ideal1 and judgment is just the application of this content to reality in virtue of an isolated contact1 surely it begs the entire question to say that reality apart from the content applied is continuous1 and then to use this assertion to justify the objective validity of the judgment--its element of permanent truth4 #dh ,there is good reason for believing that ,mr4 ,bosanquet escapes1 in his own mind1 the difficulty by the term correspondence4 ,the name stands for these elements in the idea which correspond in the separate worlds2 we may even be accused of injustice in confusing this correspondence with bare identity of existence4 ,but if one idea corresponds to another in the sense of referring to it1 what is this but the fact to be explained--how an existence can refer beyond itself8 #di ,this conclusion is clearly recognized by ,,bradley1 ,appearance and ,reality1 chap4 #d4 #ej ,it would be suggestive to inquire in what sense conscious thought claims to know4 ,is it a general claim which thought qua thought puts forth1 or is it the claim of the content of some particular thought8 ,the former1 of course1 is a mere pious aspiration having no reference to specific validity or truth2 the latter is precisely the problem under consideration4 #ea ,bosanquet would seem to have followed ,lotze in this insertion of a world of meanings intermediate between the individual idea as such and the real object as such4 ,see the criticism already passed1 pp4 #ic-e4 #eb ,or1 the situation as questioned is itself a fact1 and a perfectly determinate 7though not determined7 one4 ,see pp4 #ch1 #ej4 #ec ,of course1 the distinction between the process of arriving as temporal1 and the essential relation of subject and predicate as eternal1 harks back to the notion of judgment as the process by which we reproduce1 or make real for ourselves1 a reality already real within itself4 ,and it involves just the same difficulties4 ,the relation of subject and predicate--this simultaneous distinction and mutual reference--has meaning only in an act of adjustment1 of attempt to control1 within which we distribute our conditions4 ,when the act is completed1 the relation of subject and predicate1 as subject and predicate1 quite disappears4 ,an eternal relation of the two is meaningless2 we might as well talk of an eternal reaching for the same distant object by the same hand4 ,in such conceptions1 we have only grasped a momentary phase of a situation1 isolated it1 and set it up as an entity4 ,significant results would be reached by considering the synthetic character 7in the ,kantian sense7 of judgment from this point of view4 ,all modern logicians agree that judgment must be ampliative1 must extend knowledge2 that a trifling proposition is no judgment at all4 ,what does this mean save that judgment is developmental1 transitive1 in effect and purport8 ,and yet these same writers conceive of ,reality as a finished system of content in a complete and unchangeable single ,judgment6 ,it is impossible to evade the contradiction save by recognizing that since it is the business of judgment to transform1 its test 7or ,truth7 is successful performance of the particular transformation it has set itself1 and that transformation is temporal4 #ed ,it is worth considering whether this may not be the reality of ,royce's distinction between outer and inner meaning4 ,an anticipation of experience is the working prerequisite of the control which will realize the idea1 i4 e41 the experience anticipated4 ,one is no more inner or outer than the other4 #ee ,logik1 p4 #cjd4 #ef ,,de ,,morgan1 ,budget of ,paradoxes1 pp4 #ee1 #ef2 quoted by ,,welton1 ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #fj4 #eg ,advanced grammarians treat this matter in a way which should be instructive to logicians4 ,the hypothesis1 says ,,sweet 7 #bie of ,a ,new ,english ,grammar1 ,logical and ,historical1 ,oxford1 #ahib71 suggests an affirmation or negation as objects of thought4 ,in fact1 we often say supposing 7that is1 'thinking'7 it is true1 instead of if it is true4 ,in a word1 the hypothetical judgment as such puts explicitly before us the content of thought1 of the predicate or hypothesis2 and in so far is a moment in judgment rather than adequate judgment itself4 #eh ,this carries with it1 of course1 the notion that sensation and image are not distinct psychical existences in themselves1 but are distinguished logical forces4 #ei ,concerning the strict correlativity of subject and predicate1 data and hypothesis1 see p4 #cd4 #fj ,novum ,organum1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #fa4 #fa ,newton's ,rules for ,philosophizing 7,principia1 ,book ,,iii7 are as follows3 ,rule ,i4 ,no more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such as are both true1 and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those things4 ,rule ,,ii4 ,natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as possible to the same causes4 ,rule ,,iii4 ,those qualities of bodies that can neither be increased nor diminished in intensity1 and which are found to belong to all bodies within reach of our experiments are to be regarded as qualities of all bodies whatever4 ,rule ,,iv4 ,in experimental philosophy propositions collected by induction from phenomena are to be regarded either as accurately true or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis1 till other phenomena occur1 by which they are made more accurate or are rendered subject to exceptions4 #fb ,book ,,iii1 chap4 #b1 sec4 #e2 italics mine4 ,the latter part of the passage1 beginning with the words ,if we did not often commence1 etc41 is quoted by ,mill from ,comte4 ,the words neither induction nor deduction would enable us to understand even the simplest phenomena are his own4 #fc ,book ,,iii1 chap4 #g1 sec4 #a4 #fd ,book ,,iii1 chap4 #ad1 secs4 #d and #e4 #fe ,,william ,,whewell1 ,the ,philosophy of the ,inductive ,sciences1 ,london1 #ahdj4 #ff ,the essential similarity between ,whewell's view and that of ,lotze1 already discussed 7see chap4 #c7 is of course explainable on the basis of their common relationship to ,kant4 #fg ,logic1 ,book ,,iv1 chap4 #b1 sec4 #b2 italics mine4 #fh ,ibid4 #fi ,ibid41 sec4 #d2 in sec4 #f he states even more expressly that any conception is appropriate in the degree in which it helps us toward what we wish to understand4 #gj ,ibid41 sec4 #f2 italics mine4 #ga ,,venn1 ,empirical ,logic1 p4 #chc4 #gb ,,venn1 ,empirical ,logic1 p4 #be2 italics mine4 #gc ,,welton1 ,manual of ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 chap4 #c4 #gd ,w4 ,s4 ,,jevons1 ,principles of ,science1 pp4 #bca1 #bcb4 #ge ,b4 ,,erdmann1 ,zur ,theorie des ,syllogismus und der ,induktion1 ,philosophische ,abhandlungen1 ,vol4 ,,vi1 p4 #bcj4 #gf ,,wundt1 ,logik1 #b;d ed41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #aca4 #gg ,,welton1 ,manual of ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #gb4 #gh ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #deb ff4 #gi ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #ded-dfa4 #hj ,,bosanquet1 ,logic1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #df4 #ha ,,bradley1 ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #aj4 #hb ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #gd4 #hc ,,bradley1 ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #aa4 #hd ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #ge1 #gf4 #he ,,bradley1 op4 cit41 pp4 #d-f4 #hf ,op4 cit41 pp4 #g1 #h4 #hg ,this study may be regarded as in some sense a development of pp4 #g-aj of ,the ,necessary and the ,contingent in the ,aristotelian ,system1 published in #ahif by ,the ,university of ,chicago ,press4 ,while quite independent in treatment1 the two papers supplement each other4 #hh ,the best special illustration of this truth with which ,i am acquainted is presented for the science of chemistry in an article by ,f4 ,,wald1 ,die ,genesis der stchiometrischen ,grundgesetze1 in ,zeitschrift fr physikalische ,chemie1 ,vol4 ,,xviii 7#ahie71 pp4 #ccg ff4 #hi ,greek3 ,xi #bja1 #bdf4 #ij ,h #ii4 #ia ,in allusion to fr4 #ij 7,,diels74 ,,diels finds in fr4 #ajh 7fr4 #ah1 ,,bywater71 ,greek3 oti sophon esti pantn kechrismenon the thought that ,god is the ,absolute1 comparing the ,greek3 ,nous of ,anaxagoras and the ,greek3 christ idea of ,plato and the ,greek3 ousia christ of ,aristotle4 ,he assumes that ,greek3 sophon,greek3 logos and concedes great significance to the fragment4 ,but this interpretation is utterly incompatible with everything else that we know of ,heraclitus1 and should be admitted only if it were the only one admissible4 ,,zeller discusses the fragment at length1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #fbi1 #a4 ,if ,diels's interpretation be accepted1 the exposition above given of ,heraclitus's logical position must be abandoned4 #ib ,it has been1 and in some quarters is still1 the fashion to say that ,heraclitus is the originator of the doctrine of relativity2 but ,zeller is quite right in denying the charge4 ,no doubt his teachings lent themselves readily to such a development1 but he did not so express himself4 ,according to him the contrarieties coexist in the process4 #ic ,cf4 ,,ritter-,,preller1 #fe;c4 #id ,this1 in a word1 is the burden of my study of ,the ,necessary and the ,contingent in the ,aristotelian ,system4 #ie ,i have in preparation a study of the problem of physical interaction in ,pre-,socratic philosophy which deals with this question in all its phases4 #if ,this statement is1 of course1 figurative1 since ,empedocles denied the existence of a void4 #ig ,i cannot now undertake a defense of this statement1 which runs counter to certain ancient reports1 but must reserve a full discussion for my account of physical interaction4 #ih ,the motive for making this assumption was clearly the desire to make of the ,greek3 ,nous the prime mover in the world while exempting it from reaction on the part of the world1 which would have been unavoidable if its nature had contained parts of other things4 ,it is the same problem of touching without being touched in return that led ,aristotle to a similar definition of ,god and of the rational soul4 ,the same difficulty besets the absolutely simple soul of ,plato's ,phaedo and the causality of the ,ideas4 #ii ,,aristotle1 ,de ,generatione et ,corruptione1 #cbc;b #aj f4 #ajj ,we have seen that this distinction was latent in ,anaximenes's process of rarefaction and condensation4 ,for other matters see ,,chaignet1 ,histoire de la ,psychologie1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #aad1 whose account1 however1 needs to be corrected in some particulars4 #aja ,i say perhaps because ancient reports differ as to the precise relation of position and arrangement to the distinction between qualities1 primary and secondary4 #ajb ,this is only another instance of what ,,mr4 ,,venn 7,empirical ,logic1 p4 #ef7 has wittily alluded to as screwing up the cause and the effect into close juxtaposition4 #ajc ,simplicius says ,greek3 euthys meta to prooimion2 see ,,diels1 ,die ,fragmente der ,vorsokratiker 7,berlin1 #aijc71 p4 #cdg1 l4 #ah4 #ajd ,fr4 #b1 ,,diels4 #aje ,see ,,diels1 ,fragmente der ,vorsokratiker1 p4 #cdc1 l4 #b2 p4 #cdd1 l4 #bg4 #ajf #cbj ,c f4 #ajg ,considerations of space as well as circumstances attending the immediate preparation of this discussion for the press have precluded any but the most general and casual reference to the recent literature of the subject4 ,much of this literature only imperfectly distinguishes the logical and psychological points of view1 so that critical reference to it1 unaccompanied by detailed restatement and analysis of the positions criticised1 would be useless4 #ajh ,in order to avoid complicating the problems1 we have here employed the common notion that the physical world1 physical object1 and property may be taken for granted as possible adequate contents of judgment1 and that the problem is only as to the objectivity of economic and ethical contents4 ,of course we may1 in the end1 come to believe that the physical object is itself an economic construct1 in the large sense of economic2 that is1 an instrument of an effective or successful experience4 ,thus in terms of the illustration used above1 in the attitude of entertaining in a general way the plan of building a house of some sort or other1 one may have before him various building materials the ascertained qualities of which are1 it may be1 socially recognized as in a general way fitting them for such a use4 ,there is doubtless so much of real foundation for the common notion here referred to4 ,but along with the definition of the plan in ethical and economic judgment1 along with the determination actually to build a house1 and a house of a certain specific kind1 must go further determination of the means in their physical aspects1 a determination which all the while reacts into the process of determination of the end4 ,see below1 p4 #bdf1 note #c4 #aji ,in the moral life1 as elsewhere1 the distinction of deduction and induction is one of degree4 ,there is but one type or method of inference1 though some inferences may approach more closely than do others the limit of pure subsumption4 #aaj ,see ,,iii below4 #aaa ,it is no part of the present view that the ends which enter into economic conflict are incapable of becoming organic and intrinsically interrelated members of the provisional system of life4 ,on the contrary1 the very essence of our contention is that adjustment established between two such conflicting ends in economic judgment is in itself ethical and a member of the provisional system of the individual's ends of life1 and will stand as such1 subject to modification through changes elsewhere in the system1 so long as the economic conditions in view of which it was determined remained unchanged4 ,the mutual exclusiveness of the ends in ethical deliberation is simply the correlate of a relative fixity in certain of the conditions of life4 ,a man's command over the means of obtaining such things as books and fuel varies much and often suddenly in a society like ours from time to time2 but1 on the other hand1 his physical condition1 his intelligence1 his powers of sympathy1 and his spiritual capacity for social service commonly do not4 ,hence there can be and is a certain more or less definite and permanent comprehensive scheme of conduct morally obligatory upon him so far as the exercise of these latter faculties is concerned1 but so far as his conduct depends upon the variable conditions mentioned1 it cannot be prescribed in general terms1 nor will any provisional ideal of moral selfhood admit any such prescriptions as integral elements into itself4 ,the moral self is an ideal construct based upon these fixed conditions of life--conditions so fixed that the spiritual furtherance or deterioration likely to result from certain modes of conduct involving and affecting them can be estimated directly and with relative ease by the ethical method of judgment4 ,implied in such a construct is1 of course1 a reference to certain relatively permanent social and also physical conditions4 ,in so far as society and physical nature1 and for that matter the individual's own nature1 are variable1 these are the subjects of scientific or factual judgments incidental to the determination of problems by the economic method--problems1 that is1 for which no general answer1 through reference to a more or less definite and stable working concept of the self1 can be given4 ,thus our knowledge of the physical universe is largely1 if not chiefly1 incidental to and conditioned by our economic experience4 ,again1 our economic judgments are in every case determinative of the self in situations in which1 as presented by 7perhaps even momentarily7 variable conditions1 physical1 social1 or personal1 the ethical method is inapplicable4 ,in a socialistic state1 in which economic conditions might be more stable than in our present one1 many problems in consumption which now are economic in one sense would be ethical because admitting of solution by reference to the type of self presupposed in the established state program of production and distribution4 ,even now it is not easy to specify an economic situation the solution of which is absolutely indifferent ethically4 ,there is a possibility of intemperance even in so sthetic an indulgence as ,turkish rugs4 #aab ,accordingly there can be no distinction of ends1 some as ethical1 others as economic1 but from an ethical standpoint indifferent1 and yet others as amenable neither to ethical nor to economic judgment4 ,the type of situation and the corresponding mode of judgment employed determines whether an end shall be for the time being ethical1 economic1 or of neither sort conspicuously4 #aac ,the right of ,prudence to rank among the virtues cannot1 on our present view1 be questioned4 ,economic judgment1 though it must be valuation of means1 is essentially choice of ends--and1 as would appear1 choice of a sort peculiarly difficult by reason of the usually slight intrinsic relation between the ends involved and also by reason of the absence of effective points of view for comparison4 ,culture1 as ,emerson remarks1 sees prudence not to be a several faculty1 but a name for wisdom and virtue conversing with the body and its wants4 ,and again1 ,the spurious prudence1 making the senses final1 is the god of sots and cowards1 and is the subject of all comedy4444 ,the true prudence takes the laws of the world whereby man's being is conditioned1 as they are1 and keeps these laws that it may enjoy their proper good 7,essay on ,prudence74 #aad ,here again we purposely use inaccurate language4 ,strictly1 the ends here spoken of as competing are such1 we must say1 only because they are as yet in a measure indeterminate1 wanting in clearness1 and are not yet understood in their true economic character2 likewise the means are wanting in that final shade or degree of physical and mechanical determinateness which they are presently to possess as means to a finally determinate economic end4 ,thus economic judgment1 by which is to be understood determination of an end of action by the economic method and in accordance with economic principles1 involves in general physical re-determination of the means4 ,the means which at the outset of the present economic judgment-process appear as physically available indifferently for either of the tentative ends under consideration are only in a general way the same means for knowledge as they will be when the economic problem has been solved4 ,they are1 so far as now determinate1 the outcome of former physical judgment-processes incidental to the definition of economic ends in former situations like the present4 #aae ,in our discussion of this preliminary question there is no attempt to furnish what might be called an analysis of the consciousness of objectivity4 ,this has been undertaken by various psychologists in recent well-known contributions to the subject4 ,for our purpose it is necessary only to specify the intellectual and practical attitude out of which the consciousness of objectivity arises2 not the sensory elements or factors involved in its production as an experience4 #aaf ,so1 on the other hand1 our vague organic sensations are possibly more instructive as they are1 for their own purpose1 than they would be if more sharply discriminated and complexly referred4 ,for convenience we here meet the view under consideration with its own terminology2 we by no means wish to be understood as indorsing this terminology as psychologically correct4 ,the sense-quality of which we read in structural psychology is1 we hold1 not a structural unit at all1 but in fact a highly abstract development out of that unorganized whole of sensory experience in which reflective attention begins4 ,there is1 for example1 no such thing as the simple unanalyzable sense-quality red in consciousness until judgment has proceeded far enough to have constructed a definite and measured experience which may be symbolized as object-before-me-possessing-the-attribut e-red4 ,in place of the original sensory total-experience we now have a more or less developed perceptual 7i4 e41 judgmental7 total-experience4 ,it is an instance of the psychological fallacy to interpret what are really elements of meaning in a perceived object constructed in judgment 7for this is the true nature of the simple idea of sensation or sense-element7 as so many bits of psychical material which were isolated from each other at the outset1 and have been externally joined together in their present combination4 #aag ,the phrase is ,klpe's and is used in his sense of consciousness taken as a whole1 as1 for example1 attentive1 apperceptive1 volitional1 rather than in the sense made familiar by ,spencer and others4 #aah ,the foregoing discussion is in many ways similar to ,brentano's upon the same subject4 ,in discussing his first class of modes of consciousness1 the ,vorstellungen1 he says3 ,we find no contrasts between presentations excepting those of the objects to which the presentations refer4 ,only in so far as warm and cold1 light and dark1 a high note and a low1 form contrasts can we speak of the corresponding presentations as contrasted2 and1 in general1 there is in any other sense than this no contrast within the entire range of these conscious processes 7,psychologie vom empirischen ,standpunkte1 ,bd4 ,i1 p4 #bi74 ,this may stand as against any attempt to find contrast between abstract sense-qualities taken apart from their objective reference4 ,what is1 however1 the ground of distinction between the presented objects8 ,apparently this must be answered in the last resort as above4 ,in this sense we should need finally to interpret sensuous and material in terms of objectivity as above defined1 rather than the reverse4 ,they are cases in or specifications of the determination of adequate stimuli4 #aai ,in this connection reference may be made to the well-known disturbing effect of the forced introduction of attention to details into established sensori-motor co-ordinations1 such as typewriting1 playing upon the piano1 and the like4 #abj ,cf4 ,,professor ,,baldwin',s ,social and ,ethical ,interpretations1 and ,,professor ,,mcgilvary',s recent paper on ,moral ,obligation1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 especially pp4 #cdi f4 #aba ,manifestly1 as indicated just above1 this accepted value of the object implies fuller physical knowledge of the object than was possessed at the outset of the economic judgment4 ,see above1 p4 #bcd1 note2 p4 #bdf1 note #c2 and p4 #bga1 below4 #abb ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #e4 #abc ,see p4 #bec above4 #abd ,it is not so much the case that the object1 on the one side1 excites in the agent's consciousness1 on the other1 the sensations of resistance which have played such a part in recent controversy on the subject1 as that 7#a7 the object in certain of its promptings is resisting certain other of its promptings1 or that 7#b7 certain positive activities of the agent are being inhibited by certain negative activities1 thereby giving rise to the emotion of resistance4 ,that positive and negative are here used in a teleological way will be apparent4 ,it is surely misleading to speak of sensations of resistance even in deprecatory quotation marks1 except as sensation is used in its everyday meaning1 viz41 experience of strongly sensory quality4 #abe ,the general theory of emotion which is here presupposed1 and indeed is fundamental to the entire discussion1 may be found in ,,professor ,,dewey',s papers on ,the ,theory of ,emotion1 ,psychological ,review1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #eec2 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ac4 #abf ,such is1 in fact1 the teaching of the various forms of ethical intuitionism1 and we find it not merely implied1 but explicitly affirmed1 in a work in many respects so remote from intuitionism in its standpoint as ,,green',s ,prolegomena to ,ethics4 ,see pp4 #agh-ha1 and especially pp4 #cee-i4 #abg ,sermon ,,ii4 #abh ,not to imply of course that psychologically or logically the distinction of conditions and means is other than a convenient superficial one4 #abi ,manifestly we have here been approaching from a new direction the ,recognition coefficient of reality described above4 ,see p4 #bff4 #acj ,this1 if it were intended as an account of the genesis of psychology as a science and of the psychological interest on the part of the individual1 would doubtless be most inadequate4 ,we have1 for one thing1 made no mention of the part which error and resulting practical failure play in stimulating an interest in the judgmental processes of observation and the like1 and in technique of the control of these4 ,here1 as well as in the processes of execution of our purposes1 must be found many of the roots of psychology as a science4 ,moreover1 no explanation has been offered above for the appropriation by the energetic self of these phenomena of interruption and retardation of its energy as being1 in fact1 its own1 or within itself4 ,the problem would appear to be psychological1 and so without our province1 and we gladly pass it by4 #aca ,we can1 of course1 undertake no minute analysis of the psychological mechanism or concatenation of the process here sketched in barest outline4 ,our present purpose is wholly that of description4 ,slight as our account of the process of transition is1 we give it space only because it seems necessary to do so in order to make intelligible the accounts yet to be given of the conscious valuation processes for which the movement here described prepares the way4 ,it will be observed that we assume above that the purpose is successful as planned and by succeeding brings about the undesirable results4 ,failure in execution of the purpose as such could only1 in the manner already outlined1 prompt a more adequate investigation of the factual conditions4 #acb ,the case is not essentially altered in logical character if for the ,levitical law be substituted the general principles of the new dispensation read off details by an authoritative church or by private judgment4 #acc ,a remark may be added here by way of caution4 ,the presented self1 we have said1 attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor of a certain type of logical procedure in dealing with the situation4 ,it must be remembered that the presented self1 like all other presentation1 is and comes to be for the sake of its function in experience1 and so is practical from the start4 ,the process sketched above is therefore not from bare presented content as such to a methodological presumption1 which1 as methodological and not contentual1 is qualitatively different from what preceded it4 #acd ,recognized authority is1 of course1 not the same thing by any means as authority unrecognized because absolutely dominant4 #ace ,we may be pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no illustrations of this slight sketch4 #acf ,in fact1 as suggested above1 the ,prolegomena to ,ethics is in many respects essentially intuitional in spirit1 though its intuitionism is of a modern discreetly attenuated sort4 #acg ,this would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology as a science of mental process4 #ach ,we have already given a slight sketch of the historical process here characterized in the barest logical terms4 #aci ,further consideration of the problem of factual judgment must be deferred to ,part ,v4 #adj ,the relation of the empirical self to the energetic and to standards will come in for statement in ,part ,v in the connection just referred to4 #ada ,it might be possible to construct a logic of these various types of working moral standard in such a way as to show that in each type there is implied the one next higher morphologically1 and ultimately the highest--that is1 some sort of concept of the energetic self4 #adb ,it matters not at all whether1 in ethics or metaphysics1 our universal be abstract or on the other hand concrete1 like ,green's conception of the self1 or a ,hegelian ,absolute4 ,its logical use in the determination of particulars must be essentially the same in either case4 #adc ,in this connection reference may be made to ,,mr4 ,,taylor',s recent work1 ,the ,problem of ,conduct4 ,mr4 ,taylor reduces the moral life to terms of an ultimate conflict between the ideals of egoism and social justice1 holding that the conflict is in theory irreconcilable4 ,with this negative attitude toward current standards in ethical theory one may well be in accord without accepting ,mr4 ,taylor's further contention that a theory of ethics is therefore impossible4 ,because the ethics of subsumption is demonstrably futile it by no means follows that a method of ethics cannot be developed along the lines of modern scientific logic which shall be as valid as the procedure of the investigator in the sciences4 ,mr4 ,taylor's logic is virtually the same as that of the ethical theories which he criticises2 because an ethical ideal is impossible1 a theory of ethics is impossible also4 ,one is reminded of ,,mr4 ,,bradley',s criticism of knowledge in the closing chapters of the ,logic as an interesting parallel4 #add ,,mr4 ,,bosanquet',s discussion of the place of the principle of teleology in analogical inference will be found suggestive in this connection 7,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 chap4 iii74 #ade ,see above1 p4 #bdc and p4 #bei ad fin4 #adf ,we use the expression energy-equivalent because the excess gained by the self through the past adjustment is not of importance at just this point4 ,the essential significance of the means now is not that they cost less than they promised to bring in in energy1 but that because they required sacrifice the self will now lose unless they are allowed to fulfil the promise4 ,they are the logical equivalent of the established modes of consumption from the standpoint of conservation of the energies of the self1 not the mathematical equivalent4 ,it would be desirable1 if there were space1 to present a brief account of the psychological basis of the concepts of energy and energy-equivalence which here come into play1 but this must be omitted4 #adg ,putting it negatively1 the renunciation of the new end involves a greater sacrifice than all the sacrifices which adherence to the present system of consumption can compensate4 #adh ,green1 as is well known1 allows that any formulation of the ideal self must be incomplete1 but holds that it is not for this reason useless4 ,but this is to assume that development in the ideal is never to be radically reconstructive1 that the ideal is to expand and fill out along established and unchangeable lines of growth so that all increase shall be in the nature of accretion4 ,the self as a system is fixed and all individual moral growth is in the nature of approximation to this absolute ideal4 ,this would appear to be essentially identical in a logical sense with ,mr4 ,spencer's hypothesis of social evolution as a process of gradual approach to a condition of perfect adaptation of society and the individual to each other in an environment to which society is perfectly adapted--a condition in which perfectly evolved individuals shall live in a state of blessedness in conformity to the requirements of absolute ethics4 ,for a criticism of this latter type of view see ,,mr4 ,,taylor',s above-mentioned work 7chap4 v1 passim74 #adi ,for ,,green',s cautious defense of conscientiousness as a moral attitude see the ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,book ,,iv1 chap4 i2 and for a statement of the present point of view as bearing upon ,green's difficulty1 see ,,dewey1 ,the ,study of ,ethics3 ,a ,syllabus1 p4 #cg ad fin41 and ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #ffa1 #ffb4 #aej ,along the line thus inadequately suggested might be found an answer to certain criticisms of the attempt to dispense with a metaphysical idea of the self4 ,such criticisms usually urge that without reference to a metaphysical ideal no meaning attaches to such conceptions as adjustment1 expansion1 furtherance1 and the like as predicated of the moral acts of an agent in their effect upon the energetic self4 ,anything that one may do1 it is said1 is expansive of the self1 if it be something new1 except as we judge it by a metaphysical ideal of a rightly expanded self4 ,for an excellent statement of this general line of criticism see ,,stratton1 ,a ,psychological ,test of ,virtue1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #bjj4 #aea ,the polemic of certain recent writers 7as1 for example1 ,,ehrenfels in his ,system der ,werttheorie7 against the objectivity of judgments of value appears to rest upon an uncritical acceptance of the time-honored distinction between primary and secondary qualities as equivalent to the logical distinction of subjective and objective4 ,thus ,,ehrenfels confutes das ,vorurteil von der objectiven ,bedeutung des ,wertbegriffes by explaining it as due to a misleading usage of speech expressive of an impulse1 deep-rooted in the human understanding1 to objectify its presentations and then goes on to say ,we do not desire things because we recognize the presence in them of a mysterious impalpable essence of ,value but we ascribe value to them because we desire them4 7,op4 cit41 ,bd4 ,i1 p4 #b47 ,this may serve to illustrate the easy possibility of confusing the logical and psychological points of view1 as likewise does ,,ehrenfels's formal definition of value4 7,bd4 ,i41 p4 #fe47 #aeb ,the essential dependence of factual judgment upon the rise of economic and ethical conflict is implied in the widely current doctrine of the teleological character of knowledge4 ,it is indeed nowadays something like a commonplace to say in one sense or another that knowledge is relative to ends1 but it is not always recognized by those who hold this view that an end never appears as such in consciousness alone4 ,the end that guides in the construction of factual knowledge is an end in ethical or economic conflict with some other likewise indeterminate end in the manner above discussed4 #aec ,see above1 pp4 #bhb1 #bhc4 #aed ,cf4 ,,schiller1 ,riddles of the ,sphinx1 chap4 vii1 #aj-ad4 #aee ,it would appear that the principle of the conservation of energy is valid only in the physical sphere2 but the logical significance of this limitation cannot be here discussed4 #aef ,that the assumption mentioned is the essential basis of the twin theories of associationism in psychology and hedonism in ethics is shown by ,,dr4 ,,warner ,,fite in his article1 ,the ,associational ,conception of ,experience1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,ix1 pp4 #bhc ff4 ,cf4 ,,mr4 ,,bradley's remarks on the logic of hedonism in his ,principles of ,logic1 pp4 #bdd-i4 #aeg ,the energetic self is apparently ,,mr4 ,,bradley',s fourth meaning of self1 the self as monad--something moving parallel with the life of a man1 or1 rather1 something not moving1 but literally standing in relation to his successive variety 7,appearance and ,reality #ast ed4 p4 #hf1 in chap4 ix1 ,the ,meanings of the ,self74 ,mr4 ,bradley's difficulty appears to come from his desiring a psychological content for what is essentially a logical conception--a confusion 7if we may be permitted the remark7 which runs through the entire chapter to which we refer and is responsible for the undeniable and hopeless incoherency of the various meanings of the self1 as ,mr4 ,bradley therein expounds them4 ,if the monad stands aloof1 says ,mr4 ,bradley1 either with no character at all or a private character apart1 then it may be a fine thing in itself1 but it is a mere mockery to call it the self of a man 7p4 #hg74 ,surely this is to misconstrue and then find fault with that very character of essential logical apartness from any possibility of determination in point of descriptive psychological content which constitutes the whole value of the energetic self as a logical conception stimulative of the valuation-process and so inevitably of factual judgment4 ,see pp4 #beh1 #bei1 above4 ,the reader may find for himself in ,mr4 ,bradley's enumeration of meanings our concept of the empirical self4 ,but surely the energetic and empirical selves would appear on our showing to have no necessary conflict with each other4 #aeh ,in the first of these inseparable aspects valuation is determinative of ,rightness and ,wrongness2 in the second it presents the object as ,good or ,bad4 ,see p4 #bei1 above4 #aei ,see1 for example1 ,,wieser1 ,natural ,value 7,eng4 trans471 p4 #ag4 #afj ,see pp4 #cjg-ab above4 #afa ,the illustration1 as also the general principle which it here is used to illustrate1 was suggested some years since by ,professor ,g4 ,h4 ,mead in a lecture course on the ,history of ,psychology1 which the writer had the advantage of attending4 #afb ,the conservative function of valuation may be further illustrated by reference to the well-known principle of marginal utility of which we have already made mention 7p4 #cjg above71 and which has played so great a part in modern economic theory4 ,the value of the unit quantity of a stock of any commodity is1 according to this principle1 measured by the least important single use in the schedule of uses to which the stock as a whole is to be applied4 ,manifestly1 then1 adherence to this valuation placed upon the unit quantity is in so far conservative of the whole schedule and the marginal value is a short-hand symbol expressive of the value of the whole complex purpose presented in the schedule4 ,moreover1 the increase of marginal value concurrently with diminution of the stock through consumption1 loss1 or reapplication is not indicative so much of a change of purpose as of determination to adhere to so much of the original program of consumption as may still be possible of attainment with the depleted supply of the commodity4 #afc ,thus except on this condition we should deny the propriety of speaking of the value of a friend or of a memento or sacred relic4 ,the purpose of accurate definition of the function of such objects as these in the attainment of one's ends is foreign to the proper attitude of loving1 prizing1 or venerating them4 ,we may ethically value the act of sacrifice for a friend or of solicitous care of the memento1 but the object of our sacrifice or solicitude has simply the direct or immediate qualitative emotional character appropriate to the kinds of activity to which it is the adequate stimulus4 #afd ,history of ,philosophy 7,,tuft's translation71 p4 #aag4 #afe ,cf4 ,,professor ,j4 ,r4 ,,angell's article1 ,relations of ,structural and ,functional ,psychology to ,philosophy1 ,decennial ,publications of the ,university of ,chicago1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #aj-ab2 also ,philosophical ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xii1 ,no4 #c4 ,cf4 also ,,mr4 ,,schiller's essay on ,axioms as ,postulates in ,personal ,idealism4 #aff ,from this point on this paper is an expansion of some paragraphs1 pp4 #aa-ac1 in an article on ,existence1 ,meaning1 and ,reality1 printed from ,vol4 ,,iii of the ,first ,series of the ,decennial ,publications of the ,university of ,chicago4 #afg ,p4 #bb4 #afh ,pp4 #bb1 #bc2 italics mine4 #afi ,p4 #be4 #agj ,p4 #bf4 #aga p4 #cf2 italics mine4 #agb ,pp4 #bb1 #bc2 italics mine4 #agc ,p4 #cjg4 #agd ,p4 #cbg4 #age ,p4 #bc2 italics mine4 #agf ,cf4 p4 #cd2 also p4 #bb4 #agg ,p4 #ce4 #agh ,this warns us that in the phrase1 a plan of action1 the term action must be more inclusive than it is in much current discussion4 ,it must not be limited to gymnastic performance4 ,it must apply to any sort of activity planned for1 and which1 when it arrives1 fulfils the plan4 ,this1 ,i take it1 is the import of the paragraph at the top of p4 #g of ,,professor ,,james's ,philosophical ,conceptions and ,practical ,results4 #agi ,p4 #bgj4 #ahj ,pp4 #bgj1 #bga4 #aha ,p4 #bgf4 #ahb ,p4 #bgg4 #ahc ,pp4 #bhj1 #bha4 #ahd ,see p4 #bef4 #ahe ,p4 #bhi2 italics mine4 #ahf ,p4 #bha2 italics mine4 #ahg ,it is worth noting in passing that here the universal appears to be located in finite experience1 while the ground of the particular is in the absolute4 #ahh ,p4 #bhb4 #ahi ,p4 #bhd2 italics mine4 #aij ,p4 #bhc4 #aia ,p4 #ccb4 #aib ,p4 #cci4 #aic ,this ghost of subjectivism haunts the entire part of the essay in which the final fulfilment of finite ideas is found in a certain absolute system of ideas4 #aid ,p4 #ccj2 italics mine4 #aie ,p4 #ccg4 #aif ,p4 #bhf4 #aig ,p4 #cjg4 #aih ,p4 #big4 #aii ,this reduction of the purposive to the representative function carries with it an interesting implication concerning the whole character and relationship of thought and will4 ,from beginning to end1 on almost every page1 ,mr4 ,royce insists upon the idea as an expression of will4 ,at the outset we read3 ,when we try to define the idea in itself1 as a conscious fact1 our best means is to lay stress upon the sort of will or active meaning which any idea involves for the mind that forms the idea 7p4 #bb74 ,again3 ,the idea is a will seeking its own determination4 ,it is nothing else 7p4 #ccb7--;and so on throughout the lectures4 ,and we have already seen how consistently this is worked out in the analysis of concrete acts1 such as singing1 etc4 ,but now1 as related to the absolute system1 the will1 as embodied in the idea1 is to find its final determination in approximating the certain absolute system of ideas4 ,this would seem to make will but little more than the mere form of representation itself4 ,the idea is a will1 but in its relation to truth its will is to correspond even in its vagueness to its own final and completely individual expression4 #bjj ,p4 #cci4 #bja ,p4 #cch4 #bjb ,p4 #cce4 #bjc ,cf4 ,,mr4 ,,gore',s paper1 above4 #bjd ,cf4 ,,baldwin',s ,development and ,evolution1 pp4 #bej1 #bea1 on the necessity of the submission of the new experience to the test of its ability to utilize habit4 ,interpreted broadly1 habit might here mean the whole mechanical side1 including organism and environment1 and so include ,mr4 ,baldwin's second or extra-organic test4 #bje ,p4 #ai4 #bjf ,pp4 #ag1 #ah4 #bjg ,see1 above1 ,,professor ,,dewey',s ,study ,,iii1 pp4 #di ff4 #bjh ,p4 #ee4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 #a4 ,footnotes have been renumbered and moved from the middle of a chapter to the end of the main text4 #b4 ,other than that1 printer's inconsistencies in spelling1 punctuation1 hyphenation1 and ligature usage have been retained4