,,plato1 ,,and ,,the ,,other ,,companions ,,of ,,sokrates4 ,,plato1 ,,and ,,the ,,other ,,companions ,,of ,,sokrates4 ,,by ,,george ,,grote1 ,,author ,,of ,,the ',,history ,,of ,,greece'4 ,a ,,new ,,edition4 ,,in ,,four ,,volumes4 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,london3 ,,john ,,murray1 ,,albemarle ,,street4 #ahhh4 ,the right of ,translation is reserved4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,alkibiades ,i4 ,,and ,,ii4 ,situation supposed in the dialogue4 ,persons--,sokrates and ,alkibiades #a ,exorbitant hopes and political ambition of ,alkibiades #b ,questions put by ,sokrates1 in reference to ,alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the ,athenians4 ,what does he intend to advise them upon8 ,what has he learnt1 and what does he know8 ib4 ,alkibiades intends to advise the ,athenians on questions of war and peace4 ,questions of ,sokrates thereupon4 ,we must fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer8 ,to just and unjust #c ,how1 or from whom1 has ,alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish ,just and ,unjust8 ,he never learnt it from any one2 he always knew it1 even as a boy #d ,answer amended4 ,alkibiades learnt it from the multitude1 as he learnt to speak ,greek4--,the multitude cannot teach just and unjust1 for they are at variance among themselves about it4 ,alkibiades is going to advise the ,athenians about what he does not know himself #e ,answer farther amended4 ,the ,athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every one--but about expedient and inexpedient1 which are not coincident with just and unjust4 ,but neither does ,alkibiades know the expedient4 ,he asks ,sokrates to explain4 ,sokrates declines3 he can do nothing but question #f ,comment on the preceding--,sokratic method--the respondent makes the discoveries for himself ib4 ,alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just1 is good1 honourable1 expedient3 and that whoever acts honourably1 both does well1 and procures for himself happiness thereby4 ,equivocal reasoning of ,sokrates #g ,humiliation of ,alkibiades4 ,other ,athenian statesmen are equally ignorant4 ,but the real opponents1 against whom ,alkibiades is to measure himself1 are1 the kings of ,sparta and ,persia4 ,eulogistic description of those kings4 ,to match them1 ,alkibiades must make himself as good as possible #h ,but good--for what end1 and under what circumstances8 ,abundant illustrative examples #i ,alkibiades1 puzzled and humiliated1 confesses his ignorance4 ,encouragement given by ,sokrates4 ,it is an advantage to make such discovery in youth #aj ,platonic ,dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth #aa ,know ,thyself--,delphian maxim--its urgent importance--,what is myself8 ,my mind is myself ib4 ,i cannot know myself1 except by looking into another mind4 ,self-knowledge is temperance4 ,temperance and ,justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom #aa ,alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free1 and declares that he will never quit ,sokrates #ab ,second ,alkibiades--situation supposed ib4 ,danger of mistake in praying to the ,gods for gifts which may prove mischievous4 ,most men are unwise4 ,unwise is the generic word3 madmen1 a particular variety under it ib4 ,relation between a generic term1 and the specific terms comprehended under it1 was not then familiar #ac ,frequent cases1 in which men pray for supposed benefits1 and find that when obtained1 they are misfortunes4 ,every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial3 mischiefs of ignorance #ad ,mistake in predications about ignorance generally4 ,we must discriminate4 ,ignorance of what8 ,ignorance of good1 is always mischievous3 ignorance of other things1 not always ib4 ,wise public counsellors are few4 ,upon what ground do we call these few wise8 ,not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments1 but because they know besides1 upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used #ae ,special accomplishments1 without the knowledge of the good or profitable1 are oftener hurtful than beneficial #af ,it is unsafe for ,alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice1 until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the ,gods4 ,he renounces his sacrifice1 and throws himself upon the counsel of ,sokrates ib4 ,different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues #ag ,grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the ,second than against the ,first #ah ,the supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority ib4 ,the two dialogues may probably be among ,plato's earlier compositions #bj ,analogy with various dialogues in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia--,purpose of ,sokrates to humble presumptuous young men #ba ,fitness of the name and character of ,alkibiades for idealising this feature in ,sokrates ib4 ,plato's manner of replying to the accusers of ,sokrates4 ,magical influence ascribed to the conversation of ,sokrates #bb ,the purpose proclaimed by ,sokrates in the ,apology is followed out in ,alkibiades ,i4 ,warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge #bd ,difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing ,alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance #be ,sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties4 ,he exhorts to ,justice and ,virtue--but these are acknowledged ,incognita #bf ,prolixity of ,alkibiads ,i4--,extreme multiplication of illustrative examples--,how explained ib4 ,alkibiads ,,ii4 leaves its problem avowedly undetermined #bg ,sokrates commends the practice of praying to the ,gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular1 semi-irregular agency of the ,gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings #bh ,comparison of ,alkibiads ,,ii4 with the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 especially the conversation of ,sokrates with ,euthydemus4 ,sokrates not always consistent with himself #bi ,remarkable doctrine of ,alkibiads ,,ii4--that knowledge is not always ,good4 ,the knowledge of ,good itself is indispensable3 without that1 the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial ib4 ,knowledge of ,good--appears postulated and divined1 in many of the ,platonic dialogues1 under different titles #ca ,the ,good--the ,profitable--what is it8--,how are we to know it8 ,plato leaves this undetermined ib4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,hippias ,,major--,,hippias ,,minor4 ,hippias ,major--situation supposed--character of the dialogue4 ,sarcasm and mockery against ,hippias #cc ,real debate between the historical ,sokrates and ,hippias in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia--subject of that debate #cd ,opening of the ,hippias ,major9999--,hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through ,greece1 and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures #ce ,hippias had met with no success at ,sparta4 ,why the ,spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids ib4 ,question1 ,what is law8 ,the law-makers always aim at the ,profitable1 but sometimes fail to attain it4 ,when they fail1 they fail to attain law4 ,the lawful is the ,profitable3 the ,unprofitable is also unlawful #cf ,comparison of the argument of the ,platonic ,sokrates with that of the ,xenophontic ,sokrates #cg ,the ,just or ,good is the beneficial or profitable4 ,this is the only explanation which ,plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere #ch ,lectures of ,hippias at ,sparta not upon geometry1 or astronomy1 c41 but upon the question--,what pursuits are beautiful1 fine1 and honourable for youth8 #ci ,question put by ,sokrates1 in the name of a friend in the background1 who has just been puzzling him with it--,what is the ,beautiful8 ib4 ,hippias thinks the question easy to answer #dj ,justice1 ,wisdom1 ,beauty must each be something4 ,what is ,beauty1 or the ,beautiful8 ib4 ,hippias does not understand the question4 ,he answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object ib4 ,cross-questioning by ,sokrates--,other things also are beautiful2 but each thing is beautiful only by comparison1 or under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful1 sometimes not beautiful #da ,second answer of ,hippias-- ,gold1 is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to the answer4 ,complaint by ,hippias about vulgar analogies ib4 ,third answer of ,hippias--questions upon it--proof given that it fails of universal application #db ,farther answers1 suggested by ,sokrates himself--#a4 ,the ,suitable or ,becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected #dc #b4 ,the useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold #dd #c4 ,the ,beautiful is a variety of the ,pleasurable--that which is received through the eye and the ear #de ,objections to this last--,what property is there common to both sight and hearing1 which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful8 ib4 ,answer--,there is1 belonging to each and to both in common1 the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful #df ,this will not hold--the ,profitable is the cause of ,good1 and is therefore different from ,good--to say that the beautiful is the ,profitable1 is to say that it is different from ,good but this has been already declared inadmissible ib4 ,remarks upon the ,dialogue--the explanations ascribed to ,hippias are special conspicuous examples3 those ascribed to ,sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept #dg ,analogy between the explanations here ascribed to ,sokrates1 and those given by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates in the ,memorabilia #di ,concluding thrust exchanged between ,hippias and ,sokrates #ea ,rhetoric against ,dialectic #eb ,men who dealt with real life1 contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers ib4 ,concrete ,aggregates--abstract or logical ,aggregates4 ,distinct aptitudes required by ,aristotle for the ,dialectician #ec ,antithesis of ,absolute and ,relative1 here brought into debate by ,plato1 in regard to the ,idea of ,beauty #ed ,hippias ,minor--characters and situation supposed #ee ,hippias has just delivered a lecture1 in which he extols ,achilles as better than ,odysseus--the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty #ef ,this is contested by ,sokrates4 ,the veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer truly if he chooses1 is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses1 i4 e4 the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other #eg ,analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses ib4 ,view of ,sokrates respecting ,achilles in the ,iliad4 ,he thinks that ,achilles speaks falsehood cleverly4 ,hippias maintains that if ,achilles ever speaks falsehood1 it is with an innocent purpose1 whereas ,odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose #eh ,issue here taken--,sokrates contends that those who hurt1 or cheat1 or lie wilfully1 are better than those who do the like unwillingly--he entreats ,hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions ib4 ,questions of ,sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special arts4 ,the unskilful artist1 who runs1 wrestles1 or sings badly1 whether he will or not1 is worse than the skilful1 who can sing well when he chooses1 but can also sing badly when he chooses #ei ,it is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design1 than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit #fj ,dissent and repugnance of ,hippias ib4 ,conclusion--,that none but the good man can do evil wilfully3 the bad man does evil unwillingly4 ,hippias cannot resist the reasoning1 but will not accept the conclusion--,sokrates confesses his perplexity #fa ,remarks on the dialogue4 ,if the parts had been inverted1 the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the ,sophists #fb ,polemical purpose of the dialogue--,hippias humiliated by ,sokrates #fc ,philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the ,dialogues of ,search generally1 and of ,knowledge as understood by ,plato ib4 ,the ,hippias is an exemplification of this theory--,sokrates sets forth a case of confusion1 and avows his inability to clear it up4 ,confusion shown up in the ,lesser ,hippias--,error in the ,greater #fd ,the thesis maintained here by ,sokrates1 is also affirmed by the historical ,sokrates in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia #ff ,aristotle combats the thesis4 ,arguments against it #fg ,mistake of ,sokrates and ,plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct ib4 ,they rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--they take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame #fh ,value of a ,dialogue of ,search1 that it shall be suggestive1 and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review #fi ,antithesis between ,rhetoric and ,dialectic #gj ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,hipparchus--,,minos4 ,hipparchus--,question--,what is the definition of ,lover of ,gain8 ,he is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing4 ,sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation4 ,no man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing3 in this sense1 no man is a lover of gain #ga ,gain is good4 ,every man loves good3 therefore all men are lovers of gain #gb ,apparent contradiction4 ,sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him--accusation is retorted upon ,sokrates #gc ,precept inscribed formerly by ,hipparchus the ,peisistratid--never deceive a friend4 ,eulogy of ,hipparchus by ,sokrates ib4 ,sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers4 ,the companion affirms that some gain is good1 other gain is evil #gd ,questions by ,sokrates--bad gain is gain1 as much as good gain4 ,what is the common property1 in virtue of which both are called ,gain8 ,every acquisition1 made with no outlay1 or with a smaller outlay1 is gain4 ,objections--the acquisition may be evil--embarrassment confessed ib4 ,it is essential to gain1 that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity1 but also in value1 than the outlay4 ,the valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good4 ,conclusion comes back4 ,that ,gain is ,good #ge ,recapitulation4 ,the debate has shown that all gain is good1 and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to admit this1 though he declares that he is not persuaded ib4 ,minos4 ,question put by ,sokrates to the companion4 ,what is ,law1 or ,the ,law8 ,all law is the same1 quatenus law3 what is the common constituent attribute8 #gf ,answer--,law is1 #a4 ,the consecrated and binding customs4 #b4 ,the decree of the city4 #c4 ,social or civic opinion ib4 ,cross-examination by ,sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law2 unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law4 ,law is highly honourable and useful3 lawlessness is ruinous4 ,accordingly1 bad decrees of the city--or bad social opinion--cannot be law #gg ,suggestion by ,sokrates--,law is the good opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion1 or the finding out of reality4 ,law therefore wishes 7tends7 to be the finding out of reality1 though it does not always succeed in doing so #gg ,objection taken by the ,companion--,that there is great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length4 ,sokrates reproves his prolixity1 and requests him to confine himself to question or answer #gh ,farther questions by ,sokrates--,things heavy and light1 just and unjust1 honourable and dishonourable1 c41 are so1 and are accounted so everywhere4 ,real things are always accounted real4 ,whoever fails in attaining the real1 fails in attaining the lawful ib4 ,there are laws of health and of cure1 composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects1 and unanimously declared by them4 ,so also there are laws of farming1 gardening1 cookery1 declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits4 ,in like manner1 the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule #gi ,that which is right is the regal law1 the only true and real law--that which is not right1 is not law1 but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant #hj ,minos1 ,king of ,krete--his laws were divine and excellent1 and have remained unchanged from time immemorial ib4 ,question about the character of ,minos--,homer and ,hesiod declare him to have been admirable1 the ,attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant1 because he was an enemy of ,athens #ha ,that ,minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered ib4 ,the question is made more determinate--,what is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind1 as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body8 ,sokrates cannot tell4 ,close #ha ,the ,hipparchus and ,minos are analogous to each other1 and both of them inferior works of ,plato1 perhaps unfinished #hb ,hipparchus--double meaning of ,greek3 philokerds and ,greek3 ke_/rdos ib4 ,state or mind of the agent1 as to knowledge1 frequent inquiry in ,plato4 ,no tenable definition found #hc ,admitting that there is bad gain1 as well as good gain1 what is the meaning of the word gain99998 ,none is found ib4 ,purpose of ,plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the confusion1 and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up #hd ,historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting ,hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious ib4 ,minos4 ,question--,what is the characteristic property connoted by the word ,greek3 ,no_/mos or law8 #hf ,this question was discussed by the historical ,sokrates1 ,memorabilia of ,xenophon ib4 ,definitions of law--suggested and refuted4 ,law includes1 as a portion of its meaning1 justice1 goodness1 usefulness1 c4 ,bad decrees are not laws #hf ,sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared judgment and command of the ,wise man upon the subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality1 found out and certified by him #hg ,reasoning of ,sokrates in the ,minos is unsound1 but ,platonic4 ,the ,good1 ,true1 and ,real1 coalesce in the mind of ,plato--he acknowledges nothing to be ,law1 except what he thinks ought to be ,law #hh ,plato worships the ,ideal of his own mind--the work of systematic constructive theory by the ,wise ,man #hi ,different applications of this general ,platonic view1 in the ,minos1 ,politikus1 ,kratylus1 c4 ,natural ,rectitude of ,law1 ,government1 ,names1 c ib4 ,eulogy on ,minos1 as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude #ij ,the ,minos was arranged by ,aristophanes at first in a ,trilogy along with the ,leges #ia ,explanations of the word ,law--confusion in its meaning ib4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,theages4 ,theags--has been declared spurious by some modern critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient #ih ,persons of the dialogue--,sokrates1 with ,demodokus and ,theags1 father and son4 ,theags 7the son71 eager to acquire knowledge1 desires to be placed under the teaching of a ,sophist #ii ,sokrates questions ,theags1 inviting him to specify what he wants ib4 ,theags desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent #ajj ,incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else4 ,theags requests that ,sokrates will himself teach him ib4 ,sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love4 ,theags maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of ,sokrates #aja ,sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he recites his experience of the divine sign or ,dmon ib4 ,the ,dmon is favourable to some persons1 adverse to others4 ,upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of ,sokrates4 ,aristeides has not learnt anything from ,sokrates1 yet has improved much by being near to him #ajb ,theags expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of ,sokrates #ajc ,remarks on the ,theags--analogy with the ,lachs #ajd ,chief peculiarity of the ,theags--stress laid upon the divine sign or ,dmon ib4 ,plato employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of ,sokrates1 and of his unequal influence upon different companions ib4 ,sokrates1 while continually finding fault with other teachers1 refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal4 ,the ,theags furnishes an excuse #ajf ,plato does not always1 nor in other dialogues1 allude to the divine sign in the same way4 ,its character and working essentially impenetrable4 ,sokrates a privileged person ib4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,erast ,,or ,,anterast--,,rivales4 ,erast--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the palstra #aaa ,two rival ,erast--one of them literary1 devoted to philosophy--the other gymnastic1 hating philosophy ib4 ,question put by ,sokrates--,what is philosophy8 ,it is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge1 so as to make the largest sum total #aab ,in the case of the body1 it is not the maximum of exercise which does good1 but the proper1 measured quantity4 ,for the mind also1 it is not the maximum of knowledge1 but the measured quantity which is good4 ,who is the judge to determine this measure8 ib4 ,no answer given4 ,what is the best conjecture8 ,answer of the literary ,erastes4 ,a man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic1 though not to practise #aac ,the philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts--a ,pentathlus--who talks well upon each ib4 ,on what occasions can such second-best men be useful8 ,there are always regular practitioners at hand1 and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner #aad ,philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements ib4 ,sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put to show that there is one special art1 regal and political1 of administering and discriminating the bad from the good #aae ,in this art the philosopher must not only be second-best1 competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner1 competent to act ib4 ,close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary ,erastes #aaf ,remarks--animated manner of the dialogue ib4 ,definition of philosophy--here sought for the first time--,platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered #aag ,view taken of the second-best critical talking man1 as compared with the special proficient and practitioner #aah ,plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special to himself1 distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal or political art #aai ,philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists #abj ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,ion4 ,ion4 ,persons of the dialogue4 ,difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness #abd ,rhapsodes as a class in ,greece4 ,they competed for prizes at the festivals4 ,ion has been triumphant #abd ,functions of the ,rhapsodes4 ,recitation--exposition of the poets--arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent #abe ,the popularity of the ,rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation--powerful effect which they produced ib4 ,ion both reciter and expositor--,homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet #abf ,plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working ib4 ,ion devoted himself to ,homer exclusively4 ,questions of ,sokrates to him--,how happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets8 ,the poetic art is one #abg ,explanation given by ,sokrates--both the ,rhapsode and the ,poet work1 not by art and system1 but by divine inspiration--fine poets are bereft of their reason1 and possessed by inspiration from some ,god ib4 ,analogy of the ,magnet1 which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings4 ,the ,gods first inspire ,homer1 then act through him and through ,ion upon the auditors #abh ,this comparison forms the central point of the dialogue4 ,it is an expansion of a judgment delivered by ,sokrates in the ,apology #abi ,platonic ,antithesis3 systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic3 which latter was either blind routine1 or madness inspired by the ,gods4 ,varieties of madness1 good and bad #abi ,special inspiration from the ,gods was a familiar fact in ,grecian life--privileged communications from the ,gods to ,sokrates--his firm belief in them #acj ,condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the time withdrawn #aca ,ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind #acb ,homer talks upon all subjects--,is ,ion competent to explain what ,homer says upon all of them8 ,rhapsodic art4 ,what is its province8 ib4 ,the ,rhapsode does not know special matters1 such as the craft of the pilot1 physician1 farmer1 c41 but he knows the business of the general1 and is competent to command soldiers1 having learnt it from ,homer #acc ,conclusion4 ,ion expounds ,homer1 not with any knowledge of what he says1 but by divine inspiration #acd ,the generals in ,greece usually possessed no professional experience--,homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers--,plato's view of the poet1 as pretending to know everything1 but really knowing nothing ib4 ,knowledge1 opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge #acf ,illustration of ,plato's opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises ib4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,laches4 ,lachs4 ,subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms4 ,nikias and ,lachs differ in opinion #ach ,sokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge #aci ,those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge--,sokrates avows his own incompetence #adj ,nikias and ,lachs submit to be cross-examined by ,sokrates #ada ,both of them give opinions offhand1 according to their feelings on the special case--,sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised1 and examined as a branch of education #ada ,appeal of ,sokrates to the judgment of the ,one ,wise ,man--this man is never seen or identified #adb ,we must know what virtue is1 before we give an opinion on education--virtue1 as a whole1 is too large a question--we will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage ib4 ,question--what is courage8 ,laches answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a general explanation #adc ,second answer4 ,courage is a sort of endurance of the mind--,sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect--endurance is not always courage3 even intelligent endurance is not always courage ib4 ,confusion4 ,new answer given by ,nikias4 ,courage is a sort of ,intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible4 ,objections of ,lachs #add ,questions of ,sokrates to ,nikias4 ,it is only future events1 not past or present1 which are terrible2 but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present #ade ,courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally4 ,but this definition would include the whole of virtue1 and we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage #adf ,remarks4 ,warfare of ,sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge4 ,brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is ib4 ,no solution given by ,plato--apparent tendency of his mind1 in looking for a solution4 ,intelligence--cannot be understood without reference to some object or end #adg ,object--is supplied in the answer of ,nikias4 ,intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible4 ,such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists #adh ,postulate of a ,science of ,ends1 or ,teleology1 dimly indicated by ,plato4 ,the ,unknown ,wise ,man--correlates with the undiscovered ,science of ,ends ib4 ,perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one sufficient condition of virtue #adi ,dramatic contrast between ,lachs and ,sokrates1 as cross-examiners #aej ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,charmides4 ,scene and personages of the dialogue4 ,crowded palstra4 ,emotions of ,sokrates #aec ,question1 ,what is ,temperance8 addressed by ,sokrates to the temperate ,charmides4 ,answer1 ,it is a kind of sedateness or slowness #aed ,but ,temperance is a fine or honourable thing1 and slowness is1 in many or most cases1 not fine or honourable1 but the contrary4 ,temperance cannot be slowness ib4 ,second answer4 ,temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame4 ,refuted by ,sokrates ib4 ,third answer4 ,temperance consists in doing one's own business4 ,defended by ,kritias4 ,sokrates pronounces it a riddle1 and refutes it4 ,distinction between making and doing #aee ,fourth answer1 by ,kritias4 ,temperance consists in self-knowledge4 ib4 ,questions of ,sokrates thereupon4 ,what good does self-knowledge procure for us8 ,what is the object known1 in this case8 ,answer3 ,there is no object of knowledge1 distinct from the knowledge itself #aef ,sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge1 without a given cognitum as its object4 ,analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible #aef ,all knowledge must be relative to some object #aeg ,all properties are relative--every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else ib4 ,even if cognition of cognition were possible1 cognition of non-cognition would be impossible4 ,a man may know what he knows1 but he cannot know what he is ignorant of4 ,he knows the fact that he knows3 but he does not know how much he knows1 and how much he does not know #aeh ,temperance1 therefore1 as thus defined1 would be of little or no value #aei ,but even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied1 still ,temperance would be of little value4 ,suppose that all separate work were well performed1 by special practitioners1 we should not attain our end--,happiness ib4 ,which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness8 ,that by which we know good and evil #afj ,without the science of good and evil1 the other special science will be of little or of no service4 ,temperance is not the science of good and evil1 and is of little service #afa ,sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research4 ,he cannot find out what temperance is3 although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified ib4 ,temperance is and must be a good thing3 but ,charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not2 since what temperance is remains unknown #afb ,expressions both from ,charmides and ,kritias of praise and devotion to ,sokrates1 at the close of the dialogue4 ,dramatic ornament throughout ib4 ,the ,charmides is an excellent specimen of ,dialogues of ,search4 ,abundance of guesses and tentatives1 all ultimately disallowed #afc ,trial and ,error1 the natural process of the human mind4 ,plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process4 ,sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance #afd ,familiar words--constantly used1 with much earnest feeling1 but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in human society #afe ,different ethical points of view in different ,platonic dialogues #afg ,self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible ib4 ,in other dialogues1 ,sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable4 ,necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view ib4 ,courage and ,temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning1 except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil #afh ,distinction made between the special sciences and the science of ,good and ,evil4 ,without this last1 the special sciences are of no use ib4 ,knowledge1 always relative to some object known4 ,postulate or divination of a ,science of ,teleology #afi ,courage and ,temperance1 handled both by ,plato and by ,aristotle4 ,comparison between the two #agj ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,lysis4 ,analogy between ,lysis and ,charmides4 ,richness of dramatic incident in both4 ,youthful beauty #agb ,scenery and personages of the ,lysis ib4 ,origin of the conversation4 ,sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth1 for his benefit #agc ,conversation of ,sokrates with ,lysis ib4 ,lysis is humiliated4 ,distress of ,hippothals #agg ,lysis entreats ,sokrates to talk in the like strain to ,menexenus ib4 ,value of the first conversation between ,sokrates and ,lysis1 as an illustration of the ,platonico-,sokratic manner #agg ,sokrates begins to examine ,menexenus respecting friendship4 ,who is to be called a friend8 ,halt in the dialogue #agh ,questions addressed to ,lysis4 ,appeal to the maxims of the poets4 ,like is the friend of like4 ,canvassed and rejected ib4 ,other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion2 unlikeness1 of friendship4 ,reasons pro and con4 ,rejected #agi ,confusion of ,sokrates4 ,he suggests1 ,that the ,indifferent 7neither good nor evil7 is friend to the ,good #ahj ,suggestion canvassed4 ,if the ,indifferent is friend to the ,good1 it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil1 from which it is anxious to escape #ahj ,principle illustrated by the philosopher4 ,his intermediate condition--not wise1 yet painfully feeling his own ignorance #aha ,sokrates dissatisfied4 ,he originates a new suggestion4 ,the ,primum ,amabile1 or object originally dear to us1 per se3 by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear ib4 ,the cause of love is desire4 ,we desire that which is akin to us or our own #ahb ,good is of a nature akin to every one1 evil is alien to every one4 ,inconsistency with what has been previously laid down #ahc ,failure of the enquiry4 ,close of the dialogue #ahd ,remarks4 ,no positive result4 ,sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge ib4 ,subject of ,lysis4 ,suited for a ,dialogue of ,search4 ,manner of ,sokrates1 multiplying defective explanations1 and showing reasons why each is defective #ahe ,the process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result4 ,usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds #ahf ,subject of friendship1 handled both by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates1 and by ,aristotle ib4 ,debate in the ,lysis partly verbal1 partly real4 ,assumptions made by the ,platonic ,sokrates1 questionable1 such as the real ,sokrates would have found reason for challenging #ahh ,peculiar theory about friendship broached by ,sokrates4 ,persons neither good nor evil by nature1 yet having a superficial tinge of evil1 and desiring good to escape from it #ahi ,this general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom4 ,painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher4 ,value set by ,sokrates and ,plato upon this attribute #aij ,another theory of ,sokrates4 ,the ,primum ,amabile1 or original and primary object of ,love4 ,particular objects are loved through association with this4 ,the object is ,good #aia ,statement by ,plato of the general law of mental association ib4 ,theory of the ,primum ,amabile1 here introduced by ,sokrates1 with numerous derivative objects of love4 ,platonic ,idea4 ,generic communion of ,aristotle1 distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion #aib ,primum ,amabile of ,plato1 compared with the ,prima ,amicitia of ,aristotle4 ,each of them is head of an analogical aggregate1 not member of a generic family #aid ,the ,good and ,beautiful1 considered as objects of attachment ib4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,euthydemus4 ,dramatic and comic exuberance of the ,euthydmus4 ,judgments of various critics #aie ,scenery and personages ib4 ,the two ,sophists1 ,euthydemus and ,dionysodorus3 manner in which they are here presented #aif ,conversation carried on with ,kleinias1 first by ,sokrates1 next by the two ,sophists ib4 ,contrast between the two different modes of interrogation #aig ,wherein this contrast does not consist #aih ,wherein it does consist #aii ,abuse of fallacies by the ,sophists--their bidding for the applause of the by-standers ibid4 ,comparison of the ,euthydmus with the ,parmenids #bjj ,necessity of settling accounts with the negative1 before we venture upon the affirmative1 is common to both3 in the one the process is solitary and serious2 in the other1 it is vulgarised and ludicrous #bja ,opinion of ,stallbaum and other critics about the ,euthydmus1 that ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus represent the way in which ,protagoras and ,gorgias talked to their auditors #bjb ,that opinion is unfounded4 ,sokrates was much more ,eristic than ,protagoras1 who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture ib4 ,sokrates in the ,euthydmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that dialogue #bjc ,the two ,sophists in the ,euthydmus are not to be taken as real persons1 or representatives of real persons #bjd ,colloquy of ,sokrates with ,kleinias--possession of good things is useless1 unless we also have intelligence how to use them ib4 ,but intelligence--of what8 ,it must be such intelligence1 or such an art1 as will include both the making of what we want1 and the right use of it when made #bje ,where is such an art to be found8 ,the regal or political art looks like it2 but what does this art do for us8 ,no answer can be found4 ,ends in puzzle #bjf ,review of the cross-examination just pursued by ,sokrates4 ,it is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for #bjg ,comparison with other dialogues--,republic1 ,philbus1 ,protagoras4 ,the only distinct answer is found in the ,protagoras #bjh ,the talk of the two ,sophists1 though ironically admired while it is going on1 is shown at the end to produce no real admiration1 but the contrary ib4 ,mistaken representations about the ,sophists--,aristotle's definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the ,sophist and the ,dialectician #baj ,philosophical purpose of the ,euthydmus--exposure of fallacies1 in ,plato's dramatic manner1 by multiplication of particular examples #baa ,aristotle 7,soph4 ,elench47 attempts a classification of fallacies3 ,plato enumerates them without classification #bab ,fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two ,sophists in the ,euthydmus ib4 ,fallacies-- dicto secundum quid1 ad dictum simpliciter--in the ,euthydmus #bac ,obstinacy shown by the two ,sophists in their replies--determination not to contradict themselves #bad ,farther verbal equivocations ib4 ,fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction is impossible4--,to speak falsely is impossible #bae ,plato's ,euthydmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases1 in which the conclusion proved is known aliunde to be false and absurd #baf ,mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by ,athenian ,sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error1 in the ordinary process of thinking4 ,formal debate affords the best means of correcting them #bag ,wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief1 misguided by one or other of these fallacies1 attested by ,sokrates1 ,plato1 ,bacon1 c41--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by ,mill #bah ,value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies #bba ,without the habit of formal debate1 ,plato could not have composed his ,euthydmus1 nor ,aristotle the treatise ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis ib4 ,probable popularity of the ,euthydmus at ,athens--welcomed by all the enemies of ,dialectic #bbb ,epilogue of ,plato to the ,dialogue1 trying to obviate this inference by opponents--,conversation between ,sokrates and ,kriton #bbc ,altered tone in speaking of ,euthydmus--,disparagement of persons half-philosophers1 half-politicians #bbd ,kriton asks ,sokrates for advice about the education of his sons--,sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for himself #bbe ,euthydmus is here cited as representative of ,dialectic and philosophy #bbf ,who is the person here intended by ,plato1 half-philosopher1 half-politician8 ,is it ,isokrates8 #bbg ,variable feeling at different times1 between ,plato and ,isokrates #bbh ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,menon4 ,persons of the ,dialogue #bcb ,question put by ,menon--,is virtue teachable8 ,sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is4 ,surprise of ,menon ib4 ,sokrates stands alone in this confession4 ,unpopularity entailed by it #bcc ,answer of ,menon--plurality of virtues1 one belonging to each different class and condition4 ,sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them ib4 ,analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour #bce ,importance at that time of bringing into conscious view1 logical subordination and distinctions--,neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system ib4 ,definition of virtue given by ,menon3 ,sokrates pulls it to pieces #bcf ,menon complains that the conversation of ,sokrates confounds him like an electric shock--,sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance4 ,he urges continuance of search by both #bcg ,but how is the process of search available to any purpose8 ,no man searches for what he already knows3 and for what he does not know1 it is useless to search1 for he cannot tell when he has found it ib4 ,theory of reminiscence propounded by ,sokrates--anterior immortality of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life1 but forgotten ib4 ,illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught4 ,sokrates questions the slave of ,menon #bch ,enquiry taken up--,whether virtue is teachable8 without determining what virtue is #bci ,virtue is knowledge--no possessions1 no attributes1 either of mind or body1 are good or profitable1 except under the guidance of knowledge ib4 ,virtue1 as being knowledge1 must be teachable4 ,yet there are opposing reasons1 showing that it cannot be teachable4 ,no teachers of it can be found #bci ,conversation of ,sokrates with ,anytus1 who detests the ,sophists1 and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue #bdj ,confused state of the discussion4 ,no way of acquiring virtue is shown ib4 ,sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same ib4 ,right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind1 and can never give rational explanations1 nor teach others--good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the ,gods #bda ,all the real virtue that there is1 is communicated by special inspiration from the ,gods #bdb ,but what virtue itself is1 remains unknown ib4 ,remarks on the dialogue4 ,proper order for examining the different topics1 is pointed out by ,sokrates ib4 ,mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled ib4 ,doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,menon--desire of good alleged to be universally felt--in what sense this is true #bdc ,sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue1 but does not determine knowledge1 of what8 #bdd ,subject of ,menon2 same as that of the ,protagoras--diversity of handling--,plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it #bde ,anxiety of ,plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research #bdf ,great question discussed among the ,grecian philosophers--criterion of truth--,wherein consists the process of verification8 ib4 ,none of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by ,plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience #bdg ,plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference between the ,menon1 ,phdrus1 and ,phdon #bdi ,doctrine of ,plato1 that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct8 ib4 ,plato's doctrine about priori reasonings--different from the modern doctrine #bea ,plato's theory about pre-natal experience4 ,he took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience #beb ,little or nothing is said in the ,menon about the ,platonic ,ideas or ,forms #bec ,what ,plato meant by ,causal ,reasoning--his distinction between knowledge and right opinion ib4 ,this distinction compared with modern philosophical views #bed ,manifestation of ,anytus--intense antipathy to the ,sophists and to philosophy generally #bee ,the enemy of ,sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists--practical statesmen #bef ,the ,menon brings forward the point of analogy between ,sokrates and the ,sophists1 in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen #beg ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,protagoras4 ,scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue #bei ,introduction4 ,eagerness of the youthful ,hippokrates to become acquainted with ,protagoras #bfj ,sokrates questions ,hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from ,protagoras ib4 ,danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a ,sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach #bfb ,remarks on the ,introduction4 ,false persuasion of knowledge brought to light #bfc ,sokrates and ,hippokrates go to the house of ,kallias4 ,company therein4 ,respect shown to ,protagoras #bfd ,questions of ,sokrates to ,protagoras4 ,answer of the latter1 declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession1 and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist ib4 ,protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company #bff ,answers of ,protagoras4 ,he intends to train young men as virtuous citizens ib4 ,sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable4 ,reasons for such doubt4 ,protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not4 ib4 ,explanation of ,protagoras4 ,he begins with a mythe #bfg ,mythe4 ,first fabrication of men by the ,gods4 ,prometheus and ,epimetheus4 ,bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter4 ,it is partly amended by ,prometheus #bfg ,prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants1 but could not give them the social art--,mankind are on the point of perishing1 when ,zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society #bfh ,protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse4 ,justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes1 but are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all #bfi ,constant teaching of virtue4 ,theory of punishment #bgj ,why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent #bga ,teaching by parents1 schoolmaster1 harpist1 laws1 dikastery1 c4 ib4 ,all learn virtue from the same teaching by all4 ,whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it1 depends upon his own individual aptitude #bgb ,analogy of learning vernacular ,greek4 ,no special teacher thereof4 ,protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others #bgc ,the sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists #bgd ,remarks upon the mythe and discourse4 ,they explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself #bgd ,antithesis of ,protagoras and ,sokrates4 ,whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art #bge ,procedure of ,sokrates in regard to the discourse of ,protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition1 and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions #bgf ,one purpose of the dialogue4 ,to contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer #bgg ,questions by ,sokrates--,whether virtue is one and indivisible1 or composed of different parts8 ,whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous8 ib4 ,whether justice is just1 and holiness holy8 ,how far justice is like to holiness8 ,sokrates protests against an answer1 ,if you please #bgh ,intelligence and moderation are identical1 because they have the same contrary #bgi ,insufficient reasons given by ,sokrates4 ,he seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term ib4 ,protagoras is puzzled1 and becomes irritated #bhj ,sokrates presses ,protagoras farther4 ,his purpose is1 to test opinions and not persons4 ,protagoras answers with angry prolixity ib4 ,remonstrance of ,sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue4 ,protagoras persists4 ,sokrates rises to depart #bha ,interference of ,kallias to get the debate continued4 ,promiscuous conversation4 ,alkibiades declares that ,protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of ,sokrates in dialogue #bhb ,claim of a special locus standi and professorship for ,dialectic1 apart from ,rhetoric ib4 ,sokrates is prevailed upon to continue1 and invites ,protagoras to question him ib4 ,protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets1 and questions about parts of a song of ,simonides4 ,dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song #bhc ,long speech of ,sokrates1 expounding the purpose of the song1 and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at ,krete and ,sparta1 masters of short speech #bhc ,character of this speech--its connection with the dialogue1 and its general purpose4 ,sokrates inferior to ,protagoras in continuous speech #bhd ,sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets4 ,their meaning is always disputed1 and you can never ask from themselves what it is4 ,protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering #bhe ,purpose of ,sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind4 ,importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose #bhg ,the interrupted debate is resumed4 ,protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue #bhh ,sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence4 ,protagoras does not admit this4 ,sokrates changes his attack ib4 ,identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful with the evil4 ,sokrates maintains it4 ,protagoras denies4 ,debate #bhi ,enquiry about knowledge4 ,is it the dominant agency in the mind8 ,or is it overcome frequently by other agencies1 pleasure or pain8 ,both agree that knowledge is dominant #bij ,mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge4 ,we never call pleasures evils1 except when they entail a preponderance of pain1 or a disappointment of greater pleasures #bia ,pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil4 ,no man does evil voluntarily1 knowing it to be evil4 ,difference between pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain #bib ,necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it #bic ,to do wrong1 overcome by pleasure1 is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance #bid ,reasoning of ,sokrates assented to by all4 ,actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain1 are honourable #bie ,explanation of courage4 ,it consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible ib4 ,reluctance of ,protagoras to continue answering4 ,close of the discussion4 ,sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion1 and that he wishes to debate it again with ,protagoras4 ,amicable reply of ,protagoras #big ,remarks on the dialogue4 ,it closes without the least allusion to ,hippokrates #bih ,two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited3 one under the name of ,protagoras2 the other1 under that of ,sokrates #bii ,order of ethical problems1 as conceived by ,sokrates ib4 ,difference of method between him and ,protagoras flows from this difference of order4 ,protagoras assumes what virtue is1 without enquiry #cjj ,method of ,protagoras4 ,continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony #cja ,method of ,sokrates4 ,dwells upon that part of the problem which ,protagoras had left out ib4 ,antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner #cjc ,protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong1 though he is described as brought to a contradiction ib4 ,affirmation of ,protagoras about courage is affirmed by ,plato himself elsewhere ib4 ,the harsh epithets applied by critics to ,protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue4 ,he stands on the same ground as the common consciousness #cjd ,aversion of ,protagoras for dialectic4 ,interlude about the song of ,simonides #cje ,ethical view given by ,sokrates worked out at length clearly4 ,good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent ib4 ,protagoras is at first opposed to this theory #cjf ,reasoning of ,sokrates #cjg ,application of that reasoning to the case of courage ib4 ,the theory which ,plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues #cjh ,remarks on the theory here laid down by ,sokrates4 ,it is too narrow1 and exclusively prudential #cji ,comparison with the ,republic #caj ,the discourse of ,protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case1 which is omitted in the analysis by ,sokrates #caa ,the ,ethical ,end1 as implied in the discourse of ,protagoras1 involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself #cab ,plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory1 especially about courage #cac ,doctrine of ,stallbaum and other critics is not correct4 ,that the analysis here ascribed to ,sokrates is not intended by ,plato as serious1 but as a mockery of the sophists #cad ,grounds of that doctrine4 ,their insufficiency #cae ,subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue #caf ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,gorgias4 ,persons who debate in the ,gorgias4 ,celebrity of the historical ,gorgias #cag ,introductory circumstances of the dialogue4 ,polus and ,kallikls #cah ,purpose of ,sokrates in questioning4 ,conditions of a good definition ib4 ,questions about the definition of ,rhetoric4 ,it is the artisan of persuasion #cai ,the ,rhetor produces belief without knowledge4 ,upon what matters is he competent to advise8 #cai ,the ,rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter1 even against the opinion of the special expert4 ,he appears to know1 among the ignorant #cbj ,gorgias is now made to contradict himself4 ,polus takes up the debate with ,sokrates #cba ,polemical tone of ,sokrates4 ,at the instance of ,polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric4 ,it is no art1 but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers1 analogous to cookery4 ,it is a branch under the general head flattery ib4 ,distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts1 which pretend to the same1 but in reality aim at immediate pleasure #cbb ,questions of ,polus4 ,sokrates denies that the ,rhetors have any real power1 because they do nothing which they really wish #cbc ,all men wish for what is good for them4 ,despots and ,rhetors1 when they kill any one1 do so because they think it good for them4 ,if it be really not good1 they do not do what they will1 and therefore have no real power #cbd ,comparison of ,archelaus1 usurping despot of ,macedonia--,polus affirms that ,archelaus is happy1 and that every one thinks so--,sokrates admits that every one thinks so1 but nevertheless denies it #cbe ,sokrates maintains--#a4 ,that it is a greater evil to do wrong1 than to suffer wrong4 #b4 ,that if a man has done wrong1 it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished #cbf ,sokrates offers proof--,definition of ,pulchrum and ,turpe--,proof of the first point #cbg ,proof of the second point ib4 ,the criminal labours under a mental distemper1 which though not painful1 is a capital evil4 ,punishment is the only cure for him4 ,to be punished is best for him #cbh ,misery of the ,despot who is never punished4 ,if our friend has done wrong1 we ought to get him punished3 if our enemy1 we ought to keep him unpunished #cbi ,argument of ,sokrates paradoxical--,doubt expressed by ,kallikls whether he means it seriously #ccj ,principle laid down by ,sokrates--,that every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery ib4 ,peculiar view taken by ,plato of ,good--,evil--,happiness #cca ,contrast of the usual meaning of these words1 with the ,platonic meaning ib4 ,examination of the proof given by ,sokrates--,inconsistency between the general answer of ,polus and his previous declarations--,law and ,nature #ccb ,the definition of ,pulchrum and ,turpe1 given by ,sokrates1 will not hold #ccd ,worse or better--for whom8 ,the argument of ,sokrates does not specify4 ,if understood in the sense necessary for his inference1 the definition would be inadmissible ib4 ,plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself4 ,his view about the conduct of ,archelaus is just1 but he does not give the true reasons for it #cce ,if the reasoning of ,plato were true1 the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed #ccf ,plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper--,material difference between the two--,distemper must be felt by the distempered persons #ccg ,kallikls begins to argue against ,sokrates--he takes a distinction between ,just by ,law and ,just by nature--,reply of ,sokrates1 that there is no variance between the two1 properly understood #cch ,what ,kallikls says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of ,athenian sophists4 ,kallikls--rhetor and politician #cci ,uncertainty of referring to ,nature as an authority4 ,it may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories4 ,the theory of ,kallikls is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it #cdj ,sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others4 ,kallikls defends the negative #cdc ,whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man1 provided he has the means of satisfying them8 ,whether all varieties of desire are good8 ,whether the pleasurable and the good are identical8 #cdd ,kallikls maintains that pleasurable and good are identical4 ,sokrates refutes him4 ,some pleasures are good1 others bad4 ,a scientific adviser is required to discriminate them #cde ,contradiction between ,sokrates in the ,gorgias1 and ,sokrates in the ,protagoras ib4 ,views of critics about this contradiction #cdf ,comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of ,sokrates in both dialogues ib4 ,distinct statement in the ,protagoras4 ,what are good and evil1 and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them4 ,no such distinct statement in the ,gorgias #cdg ,modern ethical theories4 ,intuition4 ,moral sense--not recognised by ,plato in either of the dialogues #cdh ,in both dialogues the doctrine of ,sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent3 not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons1 so far as affected by the agent #cdi ,points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same1 but differing in classification ib4 ,kallikls1 whom ,sokrates refutes in the ,gorgias1 maintains a different argument from that which ,sokrates combats in the ,protagoras #cej ,the refutation of ,kallikls by ,sokrates in the ,gorgias1 is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras #cea ,permanent elements--and transient elements--of human agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues #cec ,in the ,protagoras ib4 ,in the ,gorgias #ced ,character of the ,gorgias generally--discrediting all the actualities of life #cee ,argument of ,sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of flattery1 aiming at immediate pleasure #ceg ,the ,rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the best past ,rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great ,rhetors by ,kallikles #ceg ,necessity for temperance1 regulation1 order4 ,this is the condition of virtue and happiness #ceh ,impossible to succeed in public life1 unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force #cei ,danger of one who dissents from the public1 either for better or for worse ib4 ,sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to study permanent good1 and not immediate satisfaction #cfj ,sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at ,athens1 who follows out the true political art4 ,danger of doing this #cfa ,mythe respecting ,hades1 and the treatment of deceased persons therein1 according to their merits during life--the philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs1 will then be rewarded ib4 ,peculiar ethical views of ,sokrates--,rhetorical or dogmatical character of the ,gorgias #cfb ,he merges politics in ,ethics--he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community id4 ,idal of ,plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer1 on scientific principles1 fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own #cfc ,platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference ib4 ,sokrates in the ,gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits4 ,impossible that a dissenter1 on important points1 should acquire any public influence #cfd ,sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen4 ,he is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic #cfe ,antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric ib4 ,position of one who dissents1 upon material points1 from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen #cff ,probable feelings of ,plato on this subject--,claim put forward in the ,gorgias of an independent locus standi for philosophy1 but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by ,sokrates #cfg ,importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion4 ,tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance #cfh ,issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily handled by ,plato4 ,injustice done to rhetoric4 ,ignoble manner in which it is presented by ,polus and ,kallikls #cfi ,perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric1 as ,plato has put it into the mouth of ,gorgias #cgj ,the ,athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the good3 but not the same as that which ,plato conceived #cga ,rhetoric was employed at ,athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions4 ,erroneous inferences raised by the ,kallikls of ,plato #cgc ,the ,platonic ,idal exacts1 as good1 some order1 system1 discipline4 ,but order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good4 ,divergent ideas about virtue #cgd ,how to discriminate the right order from the wrong4 ,plato does not advise us #cge ,the ,gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher ib4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,ph,,don4 ,the ,phdon is affirmative and expository #cgg ,situation and circumstances assumed in the ,phdon4 ,pathetic interest which they inspire ib4 ,simmias and ,kebs1 the two collocutors with ,sokrates4 ,their feelings and those of ,sokrates #cgh ,emphasis of ,sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate1 active exercise of reason1 and independent judgment for each reasoner #cgi ,anxiety of ,sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall follow only the convictions of their own reason #chj ,remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent #cha ,phdon and ,symposion--points of analogy and contrast #chb ,phdon--compared with ,republic and ,timus4 ,no recognition of the triple or lower souls4 ,antithesis between soul and body #chc ,different doctrines of ,plato about the soul4 ,whether all the three souls are immortal1 or the rational soul alone #che ,the life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body4 ,death alone enables him to do this completely #chf ,souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals4 ,the philosopher alone is relieved from all communion with body #chg ,special privilege claimed for philosophers in the ,phdon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers #chh ,simmias and ,kebs do not admit readily the immortality of the soul1 but are unwilling to trouble ,sokrates by asking for proof4 ,unabated interest of ,sokrates in rational debate #cij ,simmias and ,kebs believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul1 but not in its post-existence4 ,doctrine--,that the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by ,sokrates ib4 ,sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed #cia ,first doctrine of ,sokrates as to cause4 ,reasons why he rejected it ib4 ,second doctrine4 ,hopes raised by the treatise of ,anaxagoras #cic ,disappointment because ,anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail4 ,distinction between causes efficient and causes co-efficient #cid ,sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself1 nor find any teacher thereof4 ,he renounced it1 and embraced a third doctrine about cause #cie ,he now assumes the separate existence of ideas4 ,these ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes #cif ,procedure of ,sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned4 ,he insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences #cig ,exposition of ,sokrates welcomed by the hearers4 ,remarks upon it #cih ,the philosophical changes in ,sokrates all turned upon different views as to a true cause ib44 ,problems and difficulties of which ,sokrates first sought solution #cii ,expectations entertained by ,sokrates from the treatise of ,anaxagoras4 ,his disappointment4 ,his distinction between causes and co-efficients #djj ,sokrates imputes to ,anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of mental4 ,this is the same which ,aristophanes and others imputed to ,sokrates #dja ,the supposed theory of ,anaxagoras cannot be carried out1 either by ,sokrates himself or any one else4 ,sokrates turns to general words1 and adopts the theory of ideas #djc ,vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word ,cause4 ,that is a cause1 to each man1 which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings #djd ,dissension and perplexity on the question4--,what is a cause8 revealed by the picture of ,sokrates--no intuition to guide him #djg ,different notions of ,plato and ,aristotle about causation1 causes regular and irregular4 ,inductive theory of causation1 elaborated in modern times ib4 ,last transition of the mind of ,sokrates from things to words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas4 ,great multitude of ideas assumed1 each fitting a certain number of particulars #daj ,ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality #daa ,plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests upon the assumption of the ,platonic ideas4 ,reasoning to prove this #dab ,the soul always brings life1 and is essentially living4 ,it cannot receive death3 in other words1 it is immortal #dac ,the proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or translation of the soul from one body to another #dad ,after finishing his proof that the soul is immortal1 ,sokrates enters into a description1 what will become of it after the death of the body4 ,he describes a ,greek3 ,nekui_/a #dae ,sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest4 ,reply to ,kriton about burying his body #daf ,preparations for administering the hemlock4 ,sympathy of the gaoler4 ,equanimity of ,sokrates ib4 ,sokrates swallows the poison4 ,conversation with the gaoler #dag ,ungovernable sorrow of the friends present4 ,self-command of ,sokrates4 ,last words to ,kriton1 and death ib4 ,extreme pathos1 and probable trustworthiness of these personal details #dai ,contrast between the ,platonic ,apology and the ,phdon ib44 ,abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the ,phdon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the ,apology #dba ,total renunciation and discredit of the body in the ,phdon4 ,different feeling about the body in other ,platonic dialogues #dbb ,plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the soul4 ,even if it did prove that1 yet the mode of pre-existence and the mode of post-existence1 of the soul1 would be quite undetermined #dbc ,the philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul unattached to any body #dbe ,plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers4 ,the question remained debated and problematical #dbf ,,plato4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,alkibiades ,i4 ,,and ,,ii4 ,,alkibiades ,i4--,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,man4 ,side-note3 ,situation supposed in the dialogue4 ,persons--,sokrates and ,alkibiades4 ,this dialogue is carried on between ,sokrates and ,alkibiades4 ,it introduces ,alkibiades as about twenty years of age1 having just passed through the period of youth1 and about to enter on the privileges and duties of a citizen4 ,the real dispositions and circumstances of the historical ,alkibiades 7magnificent personal beauty1 stature1 and strength1 high family and connections1 great wealth already possessed1 since his father had died when he was a child1--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together with exorbitant ambition and insolence1 derived from such accumulated advantages7 are brought to view in the opening address of ,sokrates4 ,alkibiades1 during the years of youth which he had just passed1 had been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable to him1 but whom he repelled with indifference1 and even with scorn4 ,sokrates had been among them1 constantly present and near to ,alkibiades1 but without ever addressing a word to him4 ,the youthful beauty being now exchanged for manhood1 all these admirers had retired1 and ,sokrates alone remains4 ,his attachment is to ,alkibiades himself3 to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person4 ,sokrates has been always hitherto restrained1 by his divine sign or ,dmon1 from speaking to ,alkibiades4 ,but this prohibition has now been removed2 and he accosts him for the first time1 in the full belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel1 essential to the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to enter4#a ,footnote #a3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #ajc1 #ajd1 #aje4 ,perikles is supposed to be still alive and political leader of ,athens--#ajd ,b4 ,i have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this dialogue is made to apply4 ,the circumstances of it belong to ,athenian manners of the ,platonic age4 ,some of the critics1 considering that the relation supposed between ,sokrates and ,alkibiades is absurd and unnatural1 allege this among their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue4 ,but if any one reads the concluding part of the ,symposion--the authenticity of which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about ,sokrates and ,alkibiades4 ,in a dialogue composed by schines ,socraticus 7cited by the rhetor ,aristeides--,greek3 ,peri ,r7toriks1 ,or4 xlv4 p4 #bc-bd71 expressions of intense love for ,alkibiades are put into the mouth of ,sokrates4 schines was ,greek3 gn_/sios e7tairos ,skra_/tous1 not less than ,plato4 ,the different companions of ,sokrates thus agreed in their picture of the relation between him and ,alkibiades4 ,side-note3 ,exorbitant hopes and political ambition of ,alkibiades4 ,you are about to enter on public life 7says ,sokrates to ,alkibiades7 with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement4 ,you not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as ,perikles possesses at ,athens1 but your ambition will not be satisfied unless you fill ,asia with your renown1 and put yourself upon a level with ,cyrus and ,xerxes4 ,now such aspirations cannot be gratified except through my assistance4 ,i do not deal in long discourses such as you have been accustomed to hear from others3 ,i shall put to you only some short interrogatories1 requiring nothing more than answers to my questions4#b ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #ajf ,b4 ,greek3 ,a7ra e7rttas ei7_/ tina e7_/ch ei7pein lo_/gon makro_/n1 oi7_/ous d a7kou_/ein ei7_/thisai8 ou7 ga_/r e7sti toiouton to e7mo_/n4 ,i give here1 as elsewhere1 not an exact translation1 but an abstract4 ,side-note3 ,questions put by ,sokrates1 in reference to ,alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the ,athenians4 ,what does he intend to advise them upon8 ,what has he learnt1 and what does he know8 ,sokr4--,you are about to step forward as adviser of the public assembly4 ,upon what points do you intend to advise them8 ,upon points which you know better than they8 ,alk4--,of course4 ,sokr4--,all that you know1 has been either learnt from others or found out by yourself4 ,alk4--,certainly4 ,sokr4--,but you would neither have learnt any thing1 nor found out any thing1 without the desire to learn or find out3 and you would have felt no such desire1 in respect to that which you believed yourself to know already4 ,that which you now know1 therefore1 there was a time when you believed yourself not to know8 ,alk4--,necessarily so4 ,sokr4--,now all that you have learnt1 as ,i am well aware1 consists of three things--letters1 the harp1 gymnastics4 ,do you intend to advise the ,athenians when they are debating about letters1 or about harp-playing1 or about gymnastics8 ,alk4--,neither of the three4 ,sokr4--,upon what occasions1 then1 do you propose to give advice8 ,surely1 not when the ,athenians are debating about architecture1 or prophetic warnings1 or the public health3 for to deliver opinions on each of these matters1 belongs not to you but to professional men--architects1 prophets1 physicians2 whether they be poor or rich1 high-born or low-born8 ,if not then1 upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel8 ,alk4--,when they are debating about affairs of their own4 ,side-note3 ,alkibiades intends to advise the ,athenians on questions of war and peace4 ,questions of ,sokrates thereupon4 ,we must fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer8 ,to just and unjust4 ,sokr4--,but about what affairs of their own8 ,not about affairs of shipbuilding3 for of that you know nothing4 ,alk4--,when they are discussing war and peace1 or any other business concerning the city4 ,sokr4--,you mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace1 and in what manner8 ,but it is certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also when it is best--and as long as it is best4 ,alk4--,certainly4 ,sokr4--,now1 if the ,athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with1 and when or how long it was best which of the two would be most competent to advise them1 you or the professional trainer8 ,alk4--,the trainer1 undoubtedly4 ,sokr4--,so1 too1 about playing the harp or singing4 ,but when you talk about better1 in wrestling or singing1 what standard do you refer to8 ,is it not to the gymnastic or musical art8 ,alk4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,answer me in like manner about war or peace1 the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen1 whom1 and at what periods1 it is better to fight1 and better not to fight8 ,what in this last case do you mean by better8 ,to what standard1 or to what end1 do you refer8#c ,alk4--,i cannot say4 ,sokr4--,but is it not a disgrace1 since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war1--not to be able to say to what end your better refers8 ,do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken8 ,alk4--,yes3 complaints of having been cheated1 or robbed1 or injured4 ,sokr4--,under what circumstances8 ,alk4--,you mean1 whether justly or unjustly8 ,that makes all the difference4 ,sokr4--,do you mean to advise the ,athenians to fight those who behave justly1 or those who behave unjustly8 ,alk4--,the question is monstrous4 ,certainly not those who behave justly4 ,it would be neither lawful nor honourable4 ,sokr4--,then when you spoke about better1 in reference to war or peace1 what you meant was juster--you had in view justice and injustice8 ,alk4--,it seems so4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #ajh ,e--#aji ,a4 ,greek3 i7_/thi d_/1 kai to en t polemein be_/ltion kai to en t ei7r_/nn a7_/gein1 touto to be_/ltion ti_/ o7noma_/zeis8 7_/sper e7kei e7ph' e7ka_/st e7_/leges to a7_/meinon1 o7_/ti mousik_/teron1 kai e7pi t e7ter1 o7_/ti gumnastik_/teron2 peir d kai e7ntautha le_/gein to be_/ltion 4 4 4 4 4 pros ti_/ teinei to e7n t ei7r_/nn te a7_/gein a7_/meinon kai to e7n t polemein oi7s dei8 ,alkib4 ,greek3 ,a7lla skopn ou7 du_/namai e7nnosai4 ,side-note3 ,how1 or from whom1 has ,alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish ,just and ,unjust8 ,he never learnt it from any one2 he always knew it1 even as a boy4 ,sokr4--,how is this8 ,how do you know1 or where have you learnt1 to distinguish just from unjust8 ,have you frequented some master1 without my knowledge1 to teach you this8 ,if you have1 pray introduce me to him1 that ,i also may learn it from him4 ,alk4--,you are jesting4 ,sokr4--,not at all3 ,i love you too well to jest4 ,alk4--,but what if ,i had no master8 ,cannot ,i know about justice and injustice1 without a master8 ,sokr4--,certainly3 you might find out for yourself1 if you made search and investigated4 ,but this you would not do1 unless you were under the persuasion that you did not already know4 ,alk4--,was there not a time when ,i really believed myself not to know it8 ,sokr4--,perhaps there may have been3 tell me when that time was4 ,was it last year8 ,alk4--,no3 last year ,i thought that ,i knew4 ,sokr4--,well1 then two years1 three years1 c41 ago8 ,alk4--,no3 the case was the same then1 also1 ,i thought that ,i knew4 ,sokr4--,but before that1 you were a mere boy2 and during your boyhood you certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust2 for ,i well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys1 for acting unjustly towards you4 ,alk4--,certainly3 ,i was not then ignorant on the point3 ,i knew distinctly that they were acting unjustly towards me4 ,sokr4--,you knew1 then1 even in your boyhood1 what was just and what was unjust8 ,alk4--,certainly3 ,i knew even then4 ,sokr4--,at what moment did you first find it out8 ,not when you already believed yourself to know3 and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know8 ,alk4--,upon my word1 ,i cannot say4 ,side-note3 ,answer amended4 ,alkibiades learnt it from the multitude1 as he learnt to speak ,greek4--,the multitude cannot teach just and unjust1 for they are at variance among themselves about it4 ,alkibiades is going to advise the ,athenians about what he does not know himself4 ,sokr4--,since1 accordingly1 you neither found it out for yourself1 nor learnt it from others1 how come you to know justice or injustice at all1 or from what quarter8 ,alk4--,i was mistaken in saying that ,i had not learnt it4 ,i learnt it1 as others do1 from the multitude4#d ,sokr4--,your teachers are none of the best3 no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at draughts3 much less1 what is just and unjust4 ,alk4--,i learnt it from them as ,i learnt to speak ,greek1 in which1 too1 ,i never had any special teacher4 ,sokr4--,of that the multitude are competent teachers1 for they are all of one mind4 ,ask which is a tree or a stone1--a horse or a man1--you get the same answer from every one4 ,but when you ask not simply which are horses1 but also which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely about which are men1 but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are the multitude all of one mind1 or all competent to answer8 ,alk4--,assuredly not4 ,sokr4--,when you see the multitude differing among themselves1 that is a clear proof that they are not competent to teach others4 ,alk4--,it is so4 ,sokr4--,now1 about the question1 ,what is just and unjust--are the multitude all of one mind1 or do they differ among themselves8 ,alk4--,they differ prodigiously3 they not only dispute1 but quarrel and destroy each other1 respecting justice and injustice1 far more than about health and sickness4#e ,sokr4 ,how1 then1 can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust1 when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves8 ,alk4--,i now perceive that we cannot say so4 ,sokr4--,how can we say1 therefore1 that they are fit to teach others3 and how can you pretend to know1 who have learnt from no other teachers8 ,alk4--,from what you say1 it is impossible4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aaj ,d-,e4 ,greek3 e7_/mathon1 oi7mai1 kai e7g 7_/sper kai oi7 a7_/lloi 4 4 4 4 para tn polln4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aab ,a4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ de d8 nun peri tn dikai_/n kai a7di_/kn a7nthr_/pn kai pragma_/tn1 oi7 polloi dokousi_/ soi o7mologein au7toi e7autois 7 a7ll_/lois8 ,alkib4 ,greek3 7_/kista1 n ,di_/'1 7 ,s_/krates4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ de_/8 ma_/lista peri au7tn diaphe_/resthai8 ,alkib4 ,greek3 polu_/ ge4 ,sokr4--,no3 not from what ,i say1 but from what you say yourself4 ,i merely ask questions3 it is you who give all the answers4#f ,and what you have said amounts to this--that ,alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust1 but believes himself to know1 and is going to advise the ,athenians about what he does not know himself8 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aab-aac4 ,side-note3 ,answer farther amended4 ,the ,athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every one--but about expedient and inexpedient1 which are not coincident with just and unjust4 ,but neither does ,alkibiades know the expedient4 ,he asks ,sokrates to explain4 ,sokrates declines3 he can do nothing but question4 ,alk4--,but1 ,sokrates1 the ,athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust4 ,they think that question self-evident2 they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient4 ,justice and expediency do not do not always coincide4 ,many persons commit great crimes1 and are great gainers by doing so3 others again behave justly1 and suffer from it4#g ,sokr--,do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient8 ,from whom have you learnt--or when did you find out for yourself8 ,i might ask you the same round of questions1 and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner4 ,but we will pass to a different point4 ,you say that justice and expediency are not coincident4 ,persuade me of this1 by interrogating me as ,i interrogated you4 ,alk4--,that is beyond my power4 ,sokr4--,but when you rise to address the assembly1 you will have to persuade them4 ,if you can persuade them1 you can persuade me4 ,assume me to be the assembly1 and practise upon me4#h ,alk4--,you are too hard upon me1 ,sokrates4 ,it is for you to speak and prove the point4 ,sokr--,no3 ,i can only question3 you must answer4 ,you will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers4#i ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aac ,d4 ,greek3 ,oi7mai men o7liga_/kis ,a7thnai_/ous bouleu_/esthai po_/tera dikaio_/tera 7 a7diktera2 ta men gar toiauta 7gountai dla ei7nai1 c4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aad ,b-,c4 ,this same argument is addressed by ,sokrates to ,glaukon1 in ,xenoph4 ,memor4 iii4 #f1 #ad-ae4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aad ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun ei7 le_/geis o7_/ti tauth' ou7_/ts e7_/chei1 ma_/list' a7n ei7_/s pepeisme_/nos8 ,side-note3 ,comment on the preceding--,sokratic method--the respondent makes the discoveries for himself4 ,such is the commencing portion 7abbreviated or abstracted7 of ,plato's ,first ,alkibiads4 ,it exhibits a very characteristic specimen of the ,sokratico-,platonic method3 both in its negative and positive aspect4 ,by the negative1 false persuasion of knowledge is exposed4 ,alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and unjust1 which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated for himself--which he has picked up from the multitude1 and supposes to be clear to every one1 but about which nevertheless there is so much difference of appreciation among the multitude1 that fierce and perpetual quarrels are going on4 ,on the positive side1 ,sokrates restricts himself to the function of questioning3 he neither affirms nor denies any thing4 ,it is ,alkibiades who affirms or denies every thing1 and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own mind1 instigated indeed1 but not taught1 by the questions of his companion4 ,side-note3 ,alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just1 is good1 honourable1 expedient3 and that whoever acts honourably1 both does well1 and procures for himself happiness thereby4 ,equivocal reasoning of ,sokrates4 ,by a farther series of questions1 ,sokrates next brings ,alkibiades to the admission that what is just1 is also honourable1 good1 expedient--what is unjust1 is dishonourable1 evil1 inexpedient3 and that whoever acts justly1 and honourably1 thereby acquires happiness4 ,admitting1 first1 that an act which is good1 honourable1 just1 expedient1 c41 considered in one aspect or in reference to some of its conditions--may be at the same time bad1 dishonourable1 unjust1 considered in another aspect or in reference to other conditions2 ,sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit1 that every act1 in so far as it is just and honourable1 is also good and expedient4#aj ,and he contends farther1 that whoever acts honourably1 does well3 now every man who does well1 becomes happy1 or secures good things thereby3 therefore the just1 the honourable1 and the good or expedient1 coincide4#aa ,the argument1 whereby this conclusion is here established1 is pointed out by ,heindorf1 ,stallbaum1 and ,steinhart1 as not merely inconclusive1 but as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which1 however1 we find elsewhere in ,plato4#ab ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aae ,b--#aaf ,a4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun tn toiau_/tn bothei_/an kaln men le_/geis kata tn e7pichei_/rsin tou ssai ou7s e7_/dei2 touto d' e7stin a7ndri_/a2 4 4 4 4 kakn de_/ ge kata tous thana_/tous te kai ta e7_/lk4 4 4 4 ,ou7koun 7de di_/kaion prosagoreu_/ein e7ka_/stn tn pra_/xen2 ei7_/per 7 kakon a7perga_/zetai kakn kaleis1 kai 7 a7gathon a7gathn klte_/on4 ,a7r' ou7n kai 7 a7gathon kalo_/n1--7 de kakon ai7schro_/n8 ,nai_/4 ,compare ,plato1 ,republic1 v4 p4 #dgi1 where he maintains that in every particular case1 what is just1 honourable1 virtuous1 c41 is also unjust1 dishonourable1 vicious1 c4 ,nothing remains unchanged1 nor excludes the contrary1 except the pure1 self-existent1 ,idea or general ,concept4--,greek3 au7to-dikaiosu_/n1 c4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aaf ,e4 ,footnote #ab3 ,the words ,greek3 eu7 pra_/ttein--eu7pragi_/a have a double sense1 like our doing well4 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 p4 #age2 ,steinhart1 ,einl4 p4 #adi4 ,we have1 p4 #aaf ,b1 the equivocation between ,greek3 kals pra_/ttein and ,greek3 eu7 pra_/ttein1 also with ,greek3 kaks pra_/ttein1 p4 #acd ,a1 #ace ,a2 compare ,heindorf ad ,platon4 ,charmid4 p4 #agb ,a1 p4 #agd ,b2 also ,platon4 ,gorgias1 p4 #ejg ,c1 where similar equivocal meanings occur4 ,side-note3 ,humiliation of ,alkibiades4 ,other ,athenian statesmen are equally ignorant4 ,but the real opponents1 against whom ,alkibiades is to measure himself1 are1 the kings of ,sparta and ,persia4 ,eulogistic description of those kings4 ,to match them1 ,alkibiades must make himself as good as possible4 ,alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment1 and stands convicted1 by his own contradictions and confession1 of ignorance in its worst form3 that is1 of being ignorant1 and yet believing himself to know4#ac ,but other ,athenian statesmen are no wiser4 ,even ,perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else1 not even his own sons and those whom he loved best4#ad ,at any rate 7contends ,alkibiades7 ,i am as good as my competitors1 and can hold my ground against them4 ,but ,sokrates reminds him that the real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself1 are foreigners1 liable to become the enemies of ,athens1 and against whom he1 if he pretends to lead ,athens1 must be able to contend4 ,in an harangue of unusual length1 ,sokrates shows that the kings of ,sparta and ,persia are of nobler breed1 as well as more highly and carefully trained1 than the ,athenian statesmen4#ae ,alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance1 and exalted1 so as to be capable of competing with these kings3 which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary interposition of ,sokrates4 ,not that ,sokrates professes to be himself already on this elevation1 and to stand in need of no farther improvement4 ,but he can1 nevertheless1 help others to attain it for themselves1 through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories4#af ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #aah4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #aah-aai4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abj-abd4 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abd4 ,side-note3 ,but good--for what end1 and under what circumstances8 ,abundant illustrative examples4 ,the dialogue then continues4 ,sokr4--,we wish to become as good as possible4 ,but in what sort of virtue8 ,alk4--,in that virtue which belongs to good men4 ,sokr4--,yes1 but good1 in what matters8 ,alk4--,evidently1 to men who are good in transacting business4 ,sokr4--,ay1 but what kind of business8 business relating to horses1 or to navigation8 ,if that be meant1 we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners8 ,alk4--,no1 ,i mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in ,athens4 ,sokr4--,you mean the intelligent men4 ,every man is good1 in reference to that which he understands3 every man is bad1 in reference to that which he does not understand4 ,alk4--,of course4 ,sokr4--,the cobbler understands shoemaking1 and is therefore good at that3 he does not understand weaving1 and is therefore bad at that4 ,the same man thus1 in your view1 will be both good and bad8#ag ,alk4--,no3 that cannot be4 ,sokr4--,whom then do you mean1 when you talk of the good8 ,alk4--,i mean those who are competent to command in the city4 ,sokr4--,but to command whom or what--horses or men8 ,alk4--,to command men4 ,sokr4--,but what men1 and under what circumstances8 sick men1 or men on shipboard1 or labourers engaged in harvesting1 or in what occupations8 ,alk4--,i mean1 men living in social and commercial relation with each other1 as we live here2 men who live in common possession of the same laws and government4 ,sokr4--,when men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship1 how do we name the art of commanding them1 and to what purpose does it tend8 ,alk4--,it is the art of the pilot2 and the purpose towards which it tends1 is1 bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea4 ,sokr4--,when men are in social and political communion1 to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend8 ,alk4--,towards the better preservation and administration of the city4#ah ,sokr4--,but what do you mean by better8 ,what is that1 the presence or absence of which makes better or worse8 ,if in regard to the management of the body1 you put to me the same question1 ,i should reply1 that it is the presence of health1 and the absence of disease4 ,what reply will you make1 in the case of the city8 ,alk4--,i should say1 when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present1 and when discord and antipathy are absent4 ,sokr4--,this unanimity1 of what nature is it8 ,respecting what subject8 ,what is the art or science for realising it8 ,if ,i ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures1 you will say the arithmetical and the metrtic art4 ,alk4--,i mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives1 father and son1 husband and wife4 ,sokr4--,but how can there be unanimity between any two persons1 respecting subjects which one of them knows1 and the other does not know8 ,for example1 about spinning and weaving1 which the husband does not know1 or about military duties1 which the wife does not know1 how can there be unanimity between the two8 ,alk4--,no3 there cannot be4 ,sokr4--,nor friendship1 if unanimity and friendship go together8 ,alk4--,apparently there cannot4 ,sokr4--,then when men and women each perform their own special duties1 there can be no friendship between them4 ,nor can a city be well administered1 when each citizen performs his own special duties8 or 7which is the same thing7 when each citizen acts justly8 ,alk4--,not so3 ,i think there may be friendship1 when each person performs his or her own business4 ,sokr4--,just now you said the reverse4 ,what is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise1 in order to become good men8 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abe ,b4 ,greek3 ,o7 au7tos a7_/ra tou_/t ge t lo_/g kako_/s te kai a7gatho_/s4 ,plato slides unconsciously here1 as in other parts of his reasonings1 dicto secundum quid1 ad dictum simpliciter4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abf ,a4 ,greek3 ti_/ de_/8 7n su kaleis eu7bouli_/an1 ei7s ti_/ e7stin8 ,alk4 ,greek3 ,ei7s to a7_/meinon tn po_/lin dioikein kai s_/zesthai4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,a7meinon de dioikeitai kai s_/zetai ti_/nos paragignome_/nou 7 a7pogignomenou8 ,side-note3 ,alkibiades1 puzzled and humiliated1 confesses his ignorance4 ,encouragement given by ,sokrates4 ,it is an advantage to make such discovery in youth4 ,alk4--,in truth1 ,i am puzzled myself to say4 ,i find myself in a state of disgraceful ignorance1 of which ,i had no previous suspicion4 ,sokr4--,do not be discouraged4 ,if you had made this discovery when you were fifty years old1 it would have been too late for taking care of yourself and applying a remedy3 but at your age1 it is the right time for making the discovery4 ,alk4--,what am ,i to do1 now that ,i have made it8 ,sokr4--,you must answer my questions4 ,if my auguries are just1 we shall soon be both of us better for the process4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #abg ,d-,e4 ,alk4 ,greek3 ,a7lla ma tous theou_/s1 ou7d' au7tos oi7da o7_/ ti le_/g1 kinduneu_/ de kai pa_/lai lelthe_/nai e7mauton ai7_/schist' e7_/chn4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,a7lla chr thar7r7ein2 ei7 men gar au7to 7sthou peponths pentkontae_/ts1 chalepon a7n 7n soi e7pimelthnai sautou2 nun de 7n e7_/cheis 7liki_/an1 au7_/t e7sti_/n1 e7n 7 dei au7to ai7sthe_/sthai4 ,alk4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ ou7n ton ai7stho_/menon chr poiein8 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,a7pokri_/nesthai ta e7rt_/mena1 kai e7an touto pois1 a7n theos e7the_/l1 ei7_/ ti dei kai t e7m mantei_/a pisteu_/ein1 su_/ te ka7g beltio_/ns sch_/somen4 ,side-note3 ,platonic ,dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth4 ,here we have again1 brought into prominent relief1 the dialectic method of ,plato1 under two distinct aspects3 #a4 ,its actual effects1 in exposing the false supposition of knowledge1 in forcing upon the respondent the humiliating conviction1 that he does not know familiar topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others4 #b4 ,its anticipated effects1 if continued1 in remedying such defect3 and in generating out of the mind of the respondent1 real and living knowledge4 ,lastly1 it is plainly intimated that this shock of humiliation and mistrust1 painful but inevitable1 must be undergone in youth4 ,side-note3 ,know ,thyself--,delphian maxim--its urgent importance--,what is myself8 ,my mind is myself4 ,the dialogue continues1 in short questions and answers1 of which the following is an abstract4 ,sokr4--,what is meant by a man taking care of himself8 ,before ,i can take care of myself1 ,i must know what myself is3 ,i must know myself1 according to the ,delphian motto4 ,i cannot make myself better1 without knowing what myself is4#bj ,that which belongs to me is not myself3 my body is not myself1 but an instrument governed by myself4#ba ,my mind or soul only1 is myself4 ,to take care of myself is1 to take care of my mind4 ,at any rate1 if this be not strictly true1#bb my mind is the most important and dominant element within me4 ,the physician who knows his own body1 does not for that reason know himself3 much less do the husbandman or the tradesman1 who know their own properties or crafts1 know themselves1 or perform what is truly their own business4 ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #abi ,b4 ,greek3 ti_/n' a7n tro_/pon eu7rethei_/ au7to to au7to_/8 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #abh-acj4 ,all this is greatly expanded in the dialogue--p4 #abh ,d3 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7_/ra o7_/tan tn sautou e7pimel1 sautou e7pime_/lei8 ,this same antithesis is employed by ,isokrates1 ,de ,permutatione1 sect4 #cji1 p4 #dib1 ,bekker4 ,he recommends ,greek3 au7tou pro_/teron 7 tn au7tou poieisthai tn e7pime_/leian4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato considers this point to be not clearly made out4 ,alkib4 i4 #acj4 ,side-note3 ,i cannot know myself1 except by looking into another mind4 ,self-knowledge is temperance4 ,temperance and ,justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom4 ,since temperance consists in self-knowledge1 neither of these professional men1 as such1 is temperate3 their professions are of a vulgar cast1 and do not belong to the virtuous life4#bc ,how are we to know our own minds8 ,we know it by looking into another mind1 and into the most rational and divine portion thereof3 just as the eye can only know itself by looking into another eye1 and seeing itself therein reflected4#bd ,it is only in this way that we can come to know ourselves1 or become temperate3 and if we do not know ourselves1 we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves1 or what belongs to others3 all these are branches of one and the same cognition4 ,we can have no knowledge of affairs1 either public or private3 we shall go wrong1 and shall be unable to secure happiness either for ourselves or for others4 ,it is not wealth or power which are the conditions of happiness1 but justice and temperance4 ,both for ourselves individually1 and for the public collectively1 we ought to aim at justice and temperance1 not at wealth and power4 ,the evil and unjust man ought to have no power1 but to be the slave of those who are better than himself4#be ,he is fit for nothing but to be a slave3 none deserve freedom except the virtuous4 ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #aca ,b4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #acc4 ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #acd-ace ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ,prin de_/ ge a7retn e7_/chein1 to a7_/rchesthai a7_/meinon u7po tou belti_/onos 7 to a7_/rchein a7ndri1 ou7 mo_/non paidi_/ 4 4 4 4 ,pre_/pei a7_/ra t kak douleu_/ein2 a7_/meinon ga_/r4 ,side-note3 ,alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free1 and declares that he will never quit ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,how do you feel your own condition now1 ,alkibiades4 ,are you worthy of freedom8 ,alk4--,i feel but too keenly that ,i am not4 ,i cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and help4 ,from this time forward ,i shall never leave you4#bf ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 #ace4 ,,alkibiades ,,ii4 ,side-note3 ,second ,alkibiades--situation supposed4 ,the other ,platonic dialogue1 termed the ,second ,alkibiades1 introduces ,alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the ,gods4 ,side-note3 ,danger of mistake in praying to the ,gods for gifts which may prove mischievous4 ,most men are unwise4 ,unwise is the generic word3 madmen1 a particular variety under it4 ,sokr4--,you seem absorbed in thought1 ,alkibiades1 and not unreasonably4 ,in supplicating the ,gods1 caution is required not to pray for gifts which are really mischievous4 ,the ,gods sometimes grant men's prayers1 even when ruinously destructive2 as they granted the prayers of ,oedipus1 to the destruction of his own sons4 ,alk4--,oedipus was mad3 what man in his senses would put up such a prayer8 ,sokr4--,you think that madness is the opposite of good sense or wisdom4 ,you recognise men wise and unwise3 and you farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two1--just as every man must be either healthy or sick3 there is no third alternative possible8 ,alk4--,i think so4 ,sokr4--,but each thing can have but one opposite3#bg to be unwise1 and to be mad1 are therefore identical8 ,alk4--,they are4 ,sokr4--,wise men are only few1 the majority of our citizens are unwise3 but do you really think them mad8 ,how could any of us live safely in the society of so many mad-men8 ,alk4--,no3 it cannot be so3 ,i was mistaken4 ,sokr4--,here is the illustration of your mistake4 ,all men who have gout1 or fever1 or ophthalmia are sick2 but all sick men have not gout1 or fever1 or ophthalmia4 ,so1 too1 all carpenters1 or shoemakers1 or sculptors1 are craftsmen2 but all craftsmen are not carpenters1 or shoemakers1 or sculptors4 ,in like manner1 all mad men are unwise2 but all unwise men are not mad4 ,unwise comprises many varieties and gradations of which the extreme is1 being mad3 but these varieties are different among themselves1 as one disease differs from another1 though all agree in being disease and one art differs from another1 though all agree in being art4#bh ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #aci ,b4 ,greek3 ,kai mn du_/o ge u7penanti_/a e7ni pra_/gmati ps a7n ei7_/8 ,that each thing has one opposite1 and no more1 is asserted in the ,protagoras also1 p4 #aib-aic4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #aci-adj ,a-,b4 ,greek3 ,kai gar oi7 pure_/ttontes pa_/ntes nosousin1 ou7 me_/nntoioi7 nosountes pa_/ntes pure_/ttousin ou7de podagrsin ou7de_/ ge o7phthalmisin2 a7lla no_/sos men pan to toiouto_/n e7sti1 diaphe_/rein de_/ phasin ou7s d kaloumen i7atros tn a7pergasi_/an au7tn2 ou7 gar pasai ou7_/te o7_/moiai ou7_/te o7moi_/s diapra_/ttontai1 a7lla kata tn au7ts du_/namin e7ka_/st4 ,side-note3 ,relation between a generic term1 and the specific terms comprehended under it1 was not then familiar4 7,we may remark that ,plato here1 as in the ,euthyphron1 brings under especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific terms comprehended under it4 ,possessing as yet no technical language for characterising this distinction1 he makes it understood by an induction of several separate but analogous cases4 ,because the distinction is familiar now to instructed men1 we must not suppose that it was familiar then47 ,side-note3 ,frequent cases1 in which men pray for supposed benefits1 and find that when obtained1 they are misfortunes4 ,every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial3 mischiefs of ignorance4 ,sokr4--,whom do you call wise and unwise8 ,is not the wise man1 he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man1 he who does not know8 ,alk4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,the unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done8 ,though not mad like ,oedipus1 he will nevertheless pray to the ,gods for gifts1 which will be hurtful to him if obtained4 ,you1 for example1 would be overjoyed if the ,gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over ,athens1 but also over ,greece4 ,alk4--,doubtless ,i should3 and every one else would feel as ,i do4 ,sokr4--,but what if you were to purchase it with your life1 or to damage yourself by the employment of it8 ,alk4--,not on those conditions4#bi ,sokr4--,but you are aware that many ambitious aspirants1 both at ,athens and elsewhere 7among them1 the man who just now killed the ,macedonian ,king ,archelaus1 and usurped his throne71 have acquired power and aggrandisement1 so as to be envied by every one3 yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition4 ,so1 also1 many persons pray that they may become fathers2 but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them1 that they wish themselves again childless4 ,nevertheless1 though such reverses are perpetually happening1 every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits1 but importunate with the ,gods in asking for them4 ,you see that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered to you1 much less to pray for boons to be conferred4#cj ,alk4--,i see now how much mischief ignorance produces4 ,every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself2 but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #ada4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #ada-adb4 ,side-note3 ,mistake in predications about ignorance generally4 ,we must discriminate4 ,ignorance of what8 ,ignorance of good1 is always mischievous3 ignorance of other things1 not always4 ,sokr4--,you ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified manner4 ,you must distinguish and specify4 ,ignorance of what8 and under what modifications of persons and circumstances8 ,alk4--,how8 ,are there any matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant1 than to know8 ,sokr4--,you will see that there are such4 ,ignorance of good1 or ignorance of what is best1 is always mischievous3 moreover1 assuming that a man knows what is best1 then all other knowledge will be profitable to him4 ,in his special case1 ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than hurtful4 ,but if a man be ignorant things of good1 or of what is best1 in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful than profitable4 ,to a man like ,orestes1 so misguided on the question1 ,what is good8 as to resolve to kill his mother1 it would be a real benefit1 if for the time he did not know his mother4 ,ignorance on that point1 in his state of mind1 would be better for him than knowledge4#ca ,alk4--,it appears so4 ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #add4 ,side-note3 ,wise public counsellors are few4 ,upon what ground do we call these few wise8 ,not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments1 but because they know besides1 upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used4 ,sokr4--,follow the argument farther4 ,when we come forward to say or do any thing1 we either know what we are about to say and do1 or at least believe ourselves to know it4 ,every statesman who gives counsel to the public1 does so in the faith of such knowledge4 ,most citizens are unwise1 and ignorant of good as well as of other things4 ,the wise are but few1 and by their advice the city is conducted4 ,now upon what ground do we call these few1 wise and useful public counsellors8 ,if a statesman knows war1 but does not know whether it is best to go to war1 or at what juncture it is best--should we call him wise8 ,if he knows how to kill men1 or dispossess them1 or drive them into exile1--but does not know upon whom1 or on what occasions1 it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor8 ,if he can ride1 or shoot1 or wrestle1 well1--we give him an epithet derived from this special accomplishment3 we do not call him wise4 ,what would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen1 horsemen1 wrestlers1 rhetors1 c41 accomplished and excellent each in his own particular craft1 yet none of them knowing what is good1 nor when1 nor on what occasions1 it is good to employ their craft8 ,when each man pushes forward his own art and speciality1 without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for himself or for the city1 will not affairs thus conducted be reckless and disastrous8#cb ,alk4--,they will be very bad indeed4 ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #ade4 ,side-note3 ,special accomplishments1 without the knowledge of the good or profitable1 are oftener hurtful than beneficial4 ,sokr4--,if1 then1 a man has no knowledge of good or of the better--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without reason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be oftener hurtful than profitable to him2 because it will make him more forward in action1 without any good result4 ,possessing many arts and accomplishments1 and prosecuting one after another1 but without the knowledge of good1--he will only fall into greater trouble1 like a ship sailing without a pilot4 ,knowledge of good is1 in other words1 knowledge of what is useful and profitable4 ,in conjunction with this1 all other knowledge is valuable1 and goes to increase a man's competence as a counsellor3 apart from this1 all other knowledge will not render a man competent as a counsellor1 but will be more frequently hurtful than beneficial4#cc ,towards right living1 what we need is1 the knowledge of good3 just as the sick stand in need of a physician1 and the ship's crew of a pilot4 ,alk4--,i admit your reasoning4 ,my opinion is changed4 ,i no longer believe myself competent to determine what ,i ought to accept from the ,gods1 or what ,i ought to pray for4 ,i incur serious danger of erring1 and of asking for mischiefs1 under the belief that they are benefits4 ,footnote #cc3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 #ade ,c3 ,greek3 ,o7_/stis a7_/ra ti tn toiou_/tn oi7den1 e7an men pare_/ptai au7t 7 tou belti_/stou e7pist_/m--au7_/t d' 7n 7 au7t d_/pou 7_/per kai 7 tou 7pheli_/mou--phro_/nimo_/n ge au7ton ph_/somen kai a7pochrnta xu_/mboulou kai t po_/lei kai au7ton au7t2 ton de m toiouton1 ta7nanti_/a tou_/tn4 7,greek3 ,tououton is ,schneider's emendation for ,greek3 poiounta47 ,ibid4 #adf ,c3 ,greek3 ,ou7koun phamen pa_/lin tous pollous dimartke_/nai tou belti_/stou1 7s ta polla_/ ge1 oi7mai1 a7_/neu nou do_/x pepisteuko_/tas8 ,ibid4 #adf ,e3 ,greek3 ,o7ras ou7n1 o7_/te g' e7_/phn kinduneu_/ein to_/ ge tn a7_/lln e7pistmn ktma1 e7a_/n tis a7_/neu ts tou belti_/stou e7pist_/ms kektme_/nos 71 o7liga_/kis men 7phelein bla_/ptein de ta plei_/ ton e7_/chont' au7to_/4 ,ibid4 #adg ,a3 ,greek3 ,o7 de d tn kaloume_/nn poluma_/theia_/n te kai polutechni_/an kektme_/nos1 o7rphanos de 7n tau_/ts ts e7pist_/ms1 a7go_/menos de u7po mias e7ka_/sts tn a7_/lln1 a7r' ou7chi t o7_/nti dikai_/s poll cheimni chr_/setai1 a7_/t'1 oi7mai1 a7_/neu kubern_/tou diateln e7n pela_/gei1 c4 ,side-note3 ,it is unsafe for ,alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice1 until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the ,gods4 ,he renounces his sacrifice1 and throws himself upon the counsel of ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,the ,lacedmonians1 when they offer sacrifice1 pray simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good1 without farther specification4 ,this language is acceptable to the ,gods1 more acceptable than the costly festivals of ,athens4 ,it has procured for the ,spartans more continued prosperity than the ,athenians have enjoyed4#cd ,the ,gods honour wise and just men1 that is1 men who know what they ought to say and do both towards ,gods and towards men--more than numerous and splendid offerings4#ce ,you see1 therefore1 that it is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice1 until you have learnt what is the proper language to be used1 and what are the really good gifts to be prayed for4 ,otherwise your sacrifice will not prove acceptable1 and you may even bring upon yourself positive mischief4#cf ,alk4--,when shall ,i be able to learn this1 and who is there to teach me8 ,i shall be delighted to meet him4 ,sokr4--,there is a person at hand most anxious for your improvement4 ,what he must do is1 first to disperse the darkness from your mind1 next1 to impart that which will teach you to discriminate evil from good1 which at present you are unable to do4 ,alk4--,i shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object4 ,until then1 ,i postpone my intended sacrifice3 and ,i tender my sacrificial wreath to you1 in gratitude for your counsel4#cg ,sokr4--,i accept the wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation between us1 to help us out of the present embarrassment4 ,footnote #cd3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #adh4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #aej4 ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #aej4 ,footnote #cg3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #aea4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues4 ,the two dialogues1 called ,first and ,second ,alkibiads1 of which ,i have just given some account1 resemble each other more than most of the ,platonic dialogues1 not merely in the personages introduced1 but in general spirit1 in subject1 and even in illustrations4 ,the ,first ,alkibiads was recognised as authentic by all critics without exception1 until the days of ,schleiermacher4 ,nay1 it was not only recognised1 but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of all the ,platonic compositions2 proper to be studied first1 as a key to all the rest4 ,such was the view of ,jamblichus and ,proklus1 transmitted to modern times2 until it received a harsh contradiction from ,schleiermacher1 who declared the dialogue to be both worthless and spurious4 ,the ,second ,alkibiads was also admitted both by ,thrasyllus1 and by the general body of critics in ancient times3 but there were some persons 7as we learn from ,athenus7#ch who considered it to be a work of ,xenophon2 perceiving probably 7what is the fact7 that it bears much analogy to several conversations which ,xenophon has set down4 ,but those who held this opinion are not to be considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a forgery or imitation of ,plato4 ,compositions emanating from ,xenophon are just as much ,sokratic1 probably even more ,sokratic1 than the most unquestioned ,platonic dialogues1 besides that they must of necessity be contemporary also4 ,schleiermacher has gone much farther3 declaring the ,second as well as the ,first to be an unworthy imitation of ,plato4#ci ,footnote #ch3 ,athenus1 xi4 p4 #ejf4 ,footnote #ci3 ,see the ,einleitung of ,schleiermacher to ,alkib4 i4 part ii4 vol4 iii4 p4 #bic seq4 ,einleitung to ,alkib4 ii4 part i4 vol4 ii4 p4 #cfe seq4 ,his notes on the two dialogues contain various additional reasons1 besides what is urged in his ,introduction4 ,side-note3 ,grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the ,second than against the ,first4 ,here ,ast agrees with ,schleiermacher fully1 including both the ,first and ,second ,alkibiades in his large list of the spurious4 ,most of the subsequent critics go with ,schleiermacher only half-way3 ,socher1 ,hermann1 ,stallbaum1 ,steinhart1 ,susemihl1 recognise the ,first ,alkibiads1 but disallow the ,second4#dj ,in my judgment1 ,schleiermacher and ,ast are more consistently right1 or more consistently wrong1 in rejecting both1 than the other critics who find or make so capital a distinction between the two4 ,the similarity of tone and topics between the two is obvious1 and is indeed admitted by all4 ,moreover1 if ,i were compelled to make a choice1 ,i should say that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the ,second than against the ,first2 and that ,schleiermacher1 reasoning upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against the ,second1 would have no difficulty in showing that his own objections against the ,first were still more forcible4 ,the long speech assigned in the ,first ,alkibiads to ,sokrates1 about the privileges of the ,spartan and ,persian kings1#da including the mention of ,zoroaster1 son of ,oromazes1 and the ,magian religion1 appears to me more unusual with ,plato than anything which ,i find in the ,second ,alkibiads4 ,it is more ,xenophontic#db than ,platonic4 ,footnote #dj3 ,socher1 ,ueber ,platon's ,schriften1 p4 #aab4 ,stallbaum1 ,prolegg4 to ,alkib4 i4 and ii4 vol4 v4 pp4 #aga-cjd4 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 ,gesch4 und ,syst4 der ,platon4 ,philos4 p4 #dbj-dci4 ,steinhart1 ,einleitungen to ,alkib4 i4 and ii4 in ,hieronymus ,mller's ,uebersetzung des ,platon's ,werke1 vol4 i4 pp4 #ace-eji4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #aba-abd4 ,whoever reads the objections in ,steinhart's ,einleitung 7p4 #adh-aej7 against the ,first ,alkibiads1 will see that they are quite as forcible as what he urges against the ,second2 only1 that in the case of the ,first1 he gives these objections their legitimate bearing1 allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue1 but not against its authenticity4 ,footnote #db3 ,see ,xenoph4 ,oekonom4 c4 #d2 ,cyropd4 vii4 #e1 #eh-fd1 viii4 #a1 #e-h-de2 ,laced4 ,repub4 c4 #ae4 ,side-note3 ,the supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority4 ,but ,i must here repeat1 that because ,i find1 in this or any other dialogue1 some peculiarities not usual with ,plato1 ,i do not feel warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious4 ,in my judgment1 we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various dialogues2 and ,i think it an injudicious novelty1 introduced by ,schleiermacher1 to set up a canonical type of ,platonism1 all deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries4 ,both the ,first and the ,second ,alkibiads appear to me genuine1 even upon the showing of those very critics who disallow them4 ,schleiermacher1 ,stallbaum1 and ,steinhart1 all admit that there is in both the dialogues a considerable proportion of ,sokratic and ,platonic ideas3 but they maintain that there are also other ideas which are not ,sokratic or ,platonic1 and that the texture1 style1 and prolixity of the ,second ,alkibiads 7,schleiermacher maintains this about the ,first also7 are unworthy of ,plato4 ,but if we grant these premisses1 the reasonable inference would be1 not to disallow it altogether1 but to admit it as a work by ,plato1 of inferior merit2 perhaps of earlier days1 before his powers of composition had attained their maturity4 ,to presume that because ,plato composed many excellent dialogues1 therefore all that he composed must have been excellent1 is a pretension formally disclaimed by many critics1 and asserted by none4#db ,steinhart himself allows that the ,second ,alkibiads1 though not composed by ,plato1 is the work of some other author contemporary1 an untrained ,sokratic disciple attempting to imitate ,plato4#dd ,but we do not know that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate ,plato3 though ,theopompus accused him of imitating others1 and called most of his dialogues useless as well as false3 while ,plato himself1 in his inferior works1 will naturally appear like an imitator of his better self4 ,footnote #dc3 ,stallbaum 7,prolegg4 ad ,alcib4 i4 p4 #ahf7 makes this general statement very justly1 but he as well as other critics are apt to forget it in particular cases4 ,footnote #dd3 ,steinhart1 ,einleitung1 p4 #eaf-eai4 ,stallbaum and ,boeckh indeed assign the dialogue to a later period4 ,heindorf 7ad ,lysin1 p4 #baa7 thinks it the work antiqui auctoris1 sed non ,platonis4 ,steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the ,second ,alkibiads insist much 7p4 #eah7 upon the enormity of the chronological blunder1 whereby ,sokrates and ,alkibiads are introduced as talking about the death of ,archelaus king of ,macedonia1 who was killed in #cii ,b4,c41 in the same year as ,sokrates1 and four years after ,alkibiades4 ,such an anachronism 7,steinhart urges7 ,plato could never allow himself to commit4 ,but when we read the ,symposion1 we find ,aristophanes in a company of which ,sokrates1 ,alkibiades1 and ,agathon form a part1 alluding to the ,greek3 dioi_/kisis of ,mantineia1 which took place in #chf ,b4,c4 ,no one has ever made this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the ,symposion4 ,steinhart says that the style of the ,second ,alkibiads copies ,plato too closely 7die ngstlich platonisirende ,sprache des ,dialogs1 p4 #eae71 yet he agrees with ,stallbaum that in several places it departs too widely from ,plato4 ,side-note3 ,the two dialogues may probably be among ,plato's earlier compositions4 ,i agree with ,schleiermacher and the other recent critics in considering the ,first and ,second ,alkibiads to be inferior in merit to ,plato's best dialogues2 and ,i contend that their own premisses justify no more4 ,they may probably be among his earlier productions1 though ,i do not believe that the ,first ,alkibiads was composed during the lifetime of ,sokrates1 as ,socher1 ,steinhart1 and ,stallbaum endeavour to show4#de ,i have already given my reasons1 in a previous chapter1 for believing that ,plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of ,sokrates2 still less in that of ,alkibiads1 who died four years earlier4 ,there is certainly nothing in either ,alkibiads ,i4 or ,,ii4 to shake this belief4 ,footnote #de3 ,stallbaum refers the composition of ,alkib4 i4 to a time not long before the accusation of ,sokrates1 when the enemies of ,sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy with ,alkibiades 7who had before that time been killed in #djd ,b4,c47 and when ,plato was anxious to defend his master 7,prolegg4 p4 #ahf74 ,socher and ,steinhart 7p4 #baj7 remark that such writings would do little good to ,sokrates under his accusation4 ,they place the composition of the dialogue earlier1 in #djf ,b4,c4 7,steinhart1 p4 #aea-aeb71 and they consider it the first exercise of ,plato in the strict dialectic method4 ,both ,steinhart and ,hermann 7,gesch4 ,plat4 ,phil4 p4 #ddj7 think that the dialogue has not only a speculative but a political purpose2 to warn and amend ,alkibiades1 and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the democracy4 ,i cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in #djf ,b4,c4 7when ,plato was twenty-one years of age1 at most twenty-two71 nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real historical ,alkibiades1 who left ,athens in #dae ,b4,c4 at the head of the armament against ,syracuse1 was banished three months afterwards1 and never came back to ,athens until ,may #djg ,b4,c4 7,xenoph4 ,hellen4 i4 #d1 #ac2 i4 #e1 #ag74 ,he then enjoyed four months of great ascendancy at ,athens1 left it at the head of the fleet to ,asia in ,oct4 #djg ,b4,c41 remained in command of the fleet for about three months or so1 then fell into disgrace and retired to ,chersonese1 never revisiting ,athens4 ,in #djf ,b4,c4 ,alkibiades was again in banishment1 out of the reach of all such warnings as ,hermann and ,steinhart suppose that ,plato intended to address to him in ,alkib4 i4 ,steinhart says 7p4 #aeb71 ,in dieser ,zeit also1 wenige ,jahre nach seiner triumphirenden ,rckkehr1 wo ,alkibiades1 c4 ,now ,alkibiades left the ,athenian service1 irrevocably1 within less than one year after his triumphant return4 ,steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and chronological conditions of the period4 ,side-note3 ,analogy with various dialogues in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia--,purpose of ,sokrates to humble presumptuous young men4 ,if we compare various colloquies of ,sokrates in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 we shall find ,alkibiads ,i4 and ,,ii4 very analogous to them both in purpose and spirit4 ,in ,alkibiads ,i4 the situation conceived is the same as that of ,sokrates and ,glaukon1 in the third book of the ,memorabilia4 ,xenophon recounts how the presumptuous ,glaukon1 hardly twenty years of age1 fancied himself already fit to play a conspicuous part in public affairs1 and tried to force himself1 in spite of rebuffs and humiliations1 upon the notice of the assembly4#df ,no remonstrances of friends could deter him1 nor could anything1 except the ingenious dialectic of ,sokrates1 convince him of his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation4 ,probably ,plato 7,glaukon's elder brother7 had heard of this conversation1 but whether the fact be so or not1 we see the same situation idealised by him in ,alkibiads ,i41 and worked out in a way of his own4 ,again1 we find in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia another colloquy1 wherein ,sokrates cross-questions1 perplexes1 and humiliates1 the studious youth ,euthydemus1#dg whom he regards as over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with himself4 ,it was among the specialties of ,sokrates to humiliate confident young men1 with a view to their future improvement4 ,he made his conversation an instrument of chastisement1 in the language of ,xenophon3 or 7to use a phrase of ,plato himself in the ,lysis7 he conceived4 that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love1 was1 not to exalt and puff them up1 but to subdue and humiliate them4#dh ,footnote #df3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 iii4 #f4 ,footnote #dg3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 iv4 #b4 ,footnote #dh3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 i4 #d1 #a4 ,greek3 skepsa_/menoi m mo_/non a7 e7keinos 7,sokrates7 ,greek3 kolastri_/ou e7_/neka tou_/s pa_/nt' oi7ome_/nous ei7de_/nai e7rtn 7_/legchen1 a7lla kai a7 le_/gn sunme_/reue tois sundiatri_/bousin1 c4 ,so in the ,platonic ,lysis1 the youthful ,lysis says to ,sokrates ,talk to ,menexenus1 ,greek3 i7_/n' au7ton kola_/ss 7,plat4 ,lysis1 #baa ,b74 ,and ,sokrates himself says1 a few lines before 7#baj ,e71 ,greek3 ,ou7_/t chr tois paidikois diale_/gesthai1 tapeinounta kai suste_/llonta1 kai m 7_/sper su chaunounta kai diathru_/ptonta4 ,side-note3 ,fitness of the name and character of ,alkibiades for idealising this feature in ,sokrates4 ,if ,plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of ,sokrates1 no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of ,alkibiades3 who1 having possessed as a youth the greatest personal beauty 7to which ,sokrates was exquisitely sensible7 had become in his mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and insolence1 than for energy and ability4 ,we know the real ,alkibiads both from ,thucydides and ,xenophon1 and we also know that ,alkibiades had in his youth so far frequented the society of ,sokrates as to catch some of that dialectic ingenuity1 which the latter was expected and believed to impart4#di ,the contrast1 as well as the companionship1 between ,sokrates and ,alkibiades was eminently suggestive to the writers of ,sokratic dialogues1 and nearly all of them made use of it1 composing dialogues in which ,alkibiades was the principal name and figure4#ej ,it would be surprising indeed if ,plato had never done the same3 which is what we must suppose1 if we adopt ,schleiermacher's view1 that both ,alkibiads ,i4 and ,,ii4 are spurious4 ,in the ,protagoras as well as in the ,symposion1 ,alkibiades figures2 but in neither of them is he the principal person1 or titular hero1 of the piece4 ,in ,alkibiads ,i4 and ,,ii41 he is introduced as the solitary respondent to the questions of ,sokrates--,greek3 kolastri_/ou e7_/neka3 to receive from ,sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as the ,xenophontic ,sokrates administers to ,glaukon and ,euthydemus1 taking care to address the latter when alone4#ea ,footnote #di3 ,the sensibility of ,sokrates to youthful beauty is as strongly declared in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia 7i4 #c1 #h-ad71 as in the ,platonic ,lysis1 ,charmids1 or ,symposion4 ,the conversation reported by ,xenophon between ,alkibiades1 when not yet twenty years of age1 and his guardian ,perikles1 the first man in ,athens--wherein ,alkibiades puzzles ,perikles by a ,sokratic cross-examination--is likely enough to be real1 and was probably the fruit of his sustained society with ,sokrates 7,xen4 ,memor4 i4 #b1 #dj74 ,footnote #ej3 ,stallbaum observes 7,prolegg4 ad ,alcib4 i4 p4 #bae1 #bnd ed471 ,ceterum etiam schines1 ,euclides1 ,phdon1 et ,antisthenes1 dialogos ,alcibiadis nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur4 ,respecting the dialogues composed by schines1 see the first note to this chapter4 ,footnote #ea3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 iv4 #b1 #h4 ,side-note3 ,plato's manner of replying to the accusers of ,sokrates4 ,magical influence ascribed to the conversation of ,sokrates4 ,i conceive ,alkibiads ,i4 and ,,ii4 as composed by ,plato among his earlier writings 7perhaps between #cii-cij ,b4,c47#eb giving an imaginary picture of the way in which ,sokrates handled every respondent just as he chose 7to use the literal phrase of ,xenophon#ec73 taming even that most overbearing youth1 whom ,aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp4#ed ,in selecting ,alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process1 ,plato rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which ,xenophon answers with prosaic directness--the charge made against ,sokrates by his enemies1 that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety2 and that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of ,alkibiades4#ee ,when ,schleiermacher1 and others who disallow the dialogue1 argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to ,alkibiades1 and the submissive deference towards ,sokrates also ascribed to him1 are incongruous and incompatible attributes1--,i reply that such a conjunction is very improbable in any real character4 ,but this does not hinder ,plato from combining them in one and the same ideal character1 as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation of ,alkibiades in the ,symposion3 in which dialogue we find a combination of the same elements1 still more extravagant and high-coloured4 ,both here and there we are made to see that ,sokrates1 far from encouraging ,alkibiades1 is the only person who ever succeeded in humbling him4 ,plato attributes to the personality and conversation of ,sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman3 which ,cicero and ,plutarch1 proceeding probably upon the evidence of the ,platonic dialogues1 describe as if it were historical fact4 ,they represent ,alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame1 and entreating ,sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably painful4#ef ,now ,xenophon mentions ,euthydemus and other young men as having really experienced these profound and distressing emotions4#ef ,but he does not at all certify the same about ,alkibiades1 whose historical career is altogether adverse to the hypothesis4 ,the ,platonic picture is an idal1 drawn from what may have been actually true about other interlocutors of ,sokrates1 and calculated to reply to ,meltus and his allies4 ,footnote #eb3 ,the date which ,i here suppose for the composition of ,alkib4 i4 7i4e4 after the death of ,sokrates1 but early in the literary career of ,plato71 is farther sustained 7against those critics who place it in #djf ,b4,c4 or #djb ,b4,c4 before the death of ,sokrates7 by the long discourse 7p4 #aba-abd7 of ,sokrates about the ,persian and ,spartan kings4 ,in reference to the ,persian monarchy ,sokrates says 7p4 #abc ,b71 ,greek3 e7pei_/ pot' e7g 7_/kousa a7ndros a7xiopi_/stou tn a7nabebko_/tn para basile_/a1 o7s e7_/ph parelthein ch_/ran pa_/nu polln kai a7gath_/n--7n kalein tous e7pichri_/ous z_/nn ts basile_/s gunaiko_/s1 c4 ,olympiodorus and the ,scholiast both suppose that ,plato here refers to ,xenophon and the ,anabasis1 in which a statement very like this is found 7i4 #d1 #i74 ,it is plain1 therefore1 that they did not consider the dialogue to have been composed before the death of ,sokrates4 ,i think it very probable that ,plato had in his mind ,xenophon 7either his ,anabasis1 or personal communications with him72 but at any rate visits of ,greeks to the ,persian court became very numerous between #cii-cij ,b4,c41 whereas ,plato can hardly have seen any such visitors at ,athens in #djf ,b4,c4 7before the close of the war71 nor probably in #djb ,b4,c41 when ,athens1 though relieved from the oligarchy1 was still in a state of great public prostration4 ,between #cii ,b4,c4 and the peace of ,antalkidas 7#chg ,b4,c471 visitors from ,greece to the interior of ,persia became more and more frequent1 the ,persian kings interfering very actively in ,grecian politics4 ,plato may easily have seen during these years intelligent ,greeks who had been up to the ,persian court on military or political business4 ,both the ,persian kings and the ,spartan kings were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy--it is no wonder therefore that ,sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their prodigious dignity in his discourse with ,alkibiades4 ,steinhart 7,einl4 p4 #aej7 feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue with his hypothesis that it was composed in #djf ,b4,c43 yet he and ,stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the death of ,sokrates1 for which they really produce no grounds at all4 ,footnote #ec3 ,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #b1 #ad4 ,greek3 tois de dialegome_/nois au7t pasi chr_/menon e7n tois lo_/gois o7_/ps bou_/loito4 ,footnote #ed3 ,aristoph4 ,ran4 #adca4 ,greek3 ou7 chr le_/ontos sku_/mnon e7n po_/lei tre_/phein4 ,thucyd4 vi4 #ae4 ,greek3 phobthe_/ntes gar au7tou 7,alkib47 ,greek3 oi7 polloi to me_/gethos ts te kata to e7autou sma paranomi_/as e7s tn di_/aitan1 kai ts dianoi_/as 7n kath' e7n e7_/kaston1 e7n o7_/t gi_/gnoito1 e7_/prassen1 7s turanni_/dos e7pithumounti pole_/mioi kathe_/stasan1 c4 ,footnote #ee3 ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 i4 #b1 #ag4 ,footnote #ef3 ,cicero1 ,tusc4 ,disp4 iii4 #cb1 #gg2 ,plutarch1 ,alkib4 c4 #d-f4 ,compare ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abg ,d1 #ace ,c2 ,symposion1 p4 #bae-baf4 ,footnote #eg3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 iv4 #b1 #ci-dj4 ,side-note3 ,the purpose proclaimed by ,sokrates in the ,apology is followed out in ,alkib4 ,i4 ,warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge4 ,looking at ,alkibiads ,i4 and ,,ii4 in this point of view1 we shall find them perfectly ,sokratic both in topics proclaimed and in manner--whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place here and there4 ,the leading ideas of ,alkibiads ,i4 may be found1 nearly all1 in the ,platonic ,apology4 ,that warfare1 which ,sokrates proclaims in the ,apology as having been the mission of his life1 against the false persuasion of knowledge1 or against beliefs ethical and sthetical1 firmly entertained without having been preceded by conscious study or subjected to serious examination--is exemplified in ,alkibiads ,i4 and ,,ii4 as emphatically as in any ,platonic composition4 ,in both these dialogues1 indeed 7especially in the first71 we find an excessive repetition of specialising illustrations1 often needless and sometimes tiresome3 a defect easily intelligible if we assume them to have been written when ,plato was still a novice in the art of dialogic composition4 ,but both dialogues are fully impregnated with the spirit of the ,sokratic process1 exposing1 though with exuberant prolixity1 the firm and universal belief1 held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood1 without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition1 and amidst angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another4 ,the emphasis too with which ,sokrates insists upon his own single function of merely questioning1 and upon the fact that ,alkibiades gives all the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own mouth#eh--;is remarkable in this dialogue3 as well as the confidence with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only1 but effective1 cure4#ei ,the ignorance of which ,alkibiades stands unexpectedly convicted1 is expressly declared to be common to him with the other ,athenian politicians3 an exception being half allowed to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical ,perikles1 whom ,plato judges here with less severity than elsewhere#fj--;and a decided superiority being claimed for the ,spartan and ,persian kings1 who are extolled as systematically trained from childhood4 ,footnote #eh3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #aab-aac4 ,footnote #ei3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abg ,e4 ,footnote #fj3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #aah-abj4 ,side-note3 ,difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing ,alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance4 ,the main purpose of ,sokrates is to drive ,alkibiades into self-contradictions1 and to force upon him a painful consciousness of ignorance and mental defect1 upon grave and important subjects1 while he is yet young enough to amend it4 ,towards this purpose he is made to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real ,sokrates announces in the ,apology#fa ,a number of perplexing questions and difficulties are accumulated3 it is not meant that these difficulties are insoluble1 but that they cannot be solved by one who has never seriously reflected on them--by one who 7as the ,xenophontic ,sokrates says to ,euthydemus71#fb is so confident of knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all4 ,the disheartened ,alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and supplicates the assistance of ,sokrates3#fc who reminds him that he must first determine what ,himself is4 ,here again we find ourselves upon the track of ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,apology1 and under the influence of the memorable inscription at ,delphi--,nosce teipsum4 ,your mind is yourself2 your body is a mere instrument of your mind3 your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or adjuncts4 ,to know yourself1 which is genuine ,sophrosyn or temperance1 is to know your mind3 but this can only be done by looking into another mind1 and into its most intelligent compartment3 just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of vision of another eye4#fd ,footnote #fa3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abd ,c-#abg ,e4 ,footnote #fb3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 iv4 #b1 #cf4 ,greek3 ,a7lla tauta me_/n1 e7_/ph o7 ,skra_/ts1 i7_/ss1 dia to spho_/dra posteu_/ein ei7de_/nai1 ou7d' e7_/skepsai4 ,footnote #fc3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #abh-acb ,a4 ,footnote #fd3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #acc4 ,a ,platonic metaphor1 illustrating the necessity for two separate minds co-operating in dialectic colloquy4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties4 ,he exhorts to ,justice and ,virtue--but these are acknowledged ,incognita4 ,at the same time1 when1 after having convicted ,alkibiades of deplorable ignorance1 ,sokrates is called upon to prescribe remedies--all distinctness of indication disappears4 ,it is exacted only when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view3 it is dispensed with1 when the purpose is to solve them4 ,the conclusion is1 that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end1#fe ,alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city1 by striving for wealth and power1 private or public3 he can only secure it by acquiring for himself1 and implanting in his country-men1 justice1 temperance1 and virtue4 ,this is perfectly ,sokratic1 and conformable to what is said by the real ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,apology4 ,but coming at the close of ,alkibiads ,i41 it presents no meaning and imparts no instruction3 because ,sokrates had shown in the earlier part of the dialogue1 that neither he himself1 nor ,alkibiades1 nor the general public1 knew what justice and virtue were4 ,the positive solution which ,sokrates professes to give1 is therefore illusory4 ,he throws us back upon those old1 familiar1 emotional1 associations1 unconscious products and unexamined transmissions from mind to mind--which he had already shown to represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality--deep-seated belief without any assignable intellectual basis1 or outward standard of rectitude4 ,footnote #fe3 ,plat4 ,alkibiad4 i4 p4 #acd4 ,side-note3 ,prolixity of ,alkibiads ,i4--,extreme multiplication of illustrative examples--,how explained4 ,throughout the various ,platonic dialogues1 we find alternately two distinct and opposite methods of handling--the generalising of the special1 and the specialising of the general4 ,in ,alkibiads ,i1 the specialising of the general preponderates--as it does in most of the conversations of the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia3 the number of exemplifying particulars is unusually great4 ,sokrates does not accept as an answer a general term1 without illustrating it by several of the specific terms comprehended under it3 and this several times on occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and tiresome3 hence1 partly1 the inclination of some modern critics to disallow the dialogue4 ,but we must recollect that though a modern reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at once1 an ,athenian youth of the ,platonic age would not be sure of doing the same4 ,no conscious analysis had yet been applied to general terms3 no grammar or logic then entered into education4 ,confident affirmation1 without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed1 is the besetting sin against which ,plato here makes war3 and his precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness4 ,so1 too1 in the ,sophists and ,politikus1 when he wishes to illustrate the process of logical division and subdivision1 he applies it to cases so trifling and so multiplied1 that ,socher is revolted and rejects the dialogues altogether4 ,but ,plato himself foresees and replies to the objection2 declaring expressly that his main purpose is1 not to expound the particular subject chosen1 but to make manifest and familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying process--and that prolixity cannot be avoided4#ff ,we must reckon upon a similar purpose in ,alkibiads ,i4 ,the dialogue is a specimen of that which ,aristotle calls ,inductive ,dialectic1 as distinguished from ,syllogistic3 the ,inductive he considers to be plainer and easier1 suitable when you have an ordinary collocutor--the ,syllogistic is the more cogent1 when you are dealing with a practised disputant4#fg ,footnote #ff3 ,plato1 ,politikus1 #bhe-bhf4 ,footnote #fg3 ,aristotel4 ,topic4 i4 #ajd1 a4 #af4 ,greek3 ,po_/sa tn lo_/gn ei7_/d tn dialektikn--e7_/sti de to men e7pagg_/1 to de sullogismo_/s 4 4 4 4 e7_/sti d' 7 men e7pagg pithan_/teron kai saphe_/steron kai kata tn ai7_/sthsin gnrim_/teron kai tois pollois koino_/n2 o7 de sullogismos biastik_/teron kai pros tous a7ntilogikous e7nerge_/steron4 ,side-note3 ,alkibiads ,,ii4 leaves its problem avowedly undetermined4 ,it has been seen that ,alkibiads ,i1 though professing to give something like a solution1 gives what is really no solution at all4 ,alkibiads ,,ii41 similar in many respects1 is here different1 inasmuch as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been raised4 ,the general mental defect--false persuasion of knowledge without the reality--is presented in its application to a particular case4 ,alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he ought to pray to the ,gods for3 neither what is good1 to be granted1 nor what is evil1 to be averted4 ,he relies upon ,sokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind3 which ,sokrates promises to do1 but adjourns for another occasion4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates commends the practice of praying to the ,gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular1 semi-irregular agency of the ,gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings4 ,sokrates here ascribes to the ,spartans1 and to various philosophers1 the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language1 for good and honourable things generally4 ,he commends that practice4 ,xenophon tells us that the historical ,sokrates observed it3#fh but he tells us also that the historical ,sokrates1 though not praying for any special presents from the ,gods1 yet prayed for and believed himself to receive special irregular revelations and advice as to what was good to be done or avoided in particular cases4 ,he held that these special revelations were essential to any tolerable life3 that the dispensations of the ,gods1 though administered upon regular principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point1 were kept by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point3 but that the ,gods would1 if properly solicited1 afford premonitory warnings to any favoured person1 such as would enable him to keep out of the way of evil1 and put himself in the way of good4 ,he declared that to consult and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a duty of piety3 for himself1 he was farther privileged through his divine sign or monitor1 which he implicitly followed4#fi ,such premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it suitable to pray for--besides good things generally4 ,for special presents he did not pray1 because he professed not to know whether any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad4 ,he proves in his conversation with ,euthydmus1 that all those acquisitions which are usually accounted means of happiness--beauty1 strength1 wealth1 reputation1 nay1 even good health and wisdom--are sometimes good or causes of happiness1 sometimes evil or causes of misery2 and therefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or absolutely the other4#gj ,footnote #fh3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 i4 #c1 #b2 ,plat4 ,alk4 ii4 p4 #adc-adh4 ,footnote #fi3 ,these opinions of ,sokrates are announced in various passages of the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 i4 #a1 #a-aj--;,greek3 e7_/ph de dein1 a7 men matho_/ntas poiein e7_/dkan oi7 theoi_/1 mantha_/nein2 a7 de m dla tois a7nthr_/pois e7sti_/1 peirasthai dia mantiks para tn then puntha_/nesthai2 tous theous ga_/r1 oi7s a7n 7sin i7_/le1 smai_/nein--i4 #c1 #d2 i4 #d1 #b-ae2 iv4 #c1 #ab2 iv4 #g1 #aj2 iv4 #h1 #e-aa4 ,footnote #gj3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 iv4 #b1 #ca-cb-cf4;,greek3 ,tauta ou7n pote men 7phelounta pote de bla_/ptonta1 ti_/ mallon a7gatha 7 kaka_/ e7stin8 ,side-note3 ,comparison of ,alkibiads ,,ii4 with the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 especially the conversation of ,sokrates with ,euthydemus4 ,sokrates not always consistent with himself4 ,this impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil1 in consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the ,gods and in human affairs--is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates in his discourse with ,euthydmus1 and much akin to the ,platonic ,alkibiads ,,ii41 being applied to the special case of prayer4 ,but we must not suppose that ,sokrates adheres to this doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia3 on the contrary1 we find him1 in other places1 reasoning upon such matters1 as health1 strength1 and wisdom1 as if they were decidedly good4#ga ,the fact is1 that the arguments of ,sokrates1 in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 vary materially according to the occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing3 and the case is similar with the ,platonic dialogues3 illustrating farther the questionable evidence on which ,schleiermacher and other critics proceed1 when they declare one dialogue to be spurious1 because it contains reasoning inconsistent with another4 ,footnote #ga3 ,for example1 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #e1 #f--;,greek3 sophi_/an to me_/giston a7gatho_/n1 c4 ,we find in ,alkibiads ,,ii4 another doctrine which is also proclaimed by ,sokrates in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia3 that the ,gods are not moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice1 according to the circumstances of the offerer3#gb they attend only to the mind of the offerer1 whether he be just and wise3 that is1 whether he knows what ought to be done both towards ,gods and towards men4#gc ,footnote #gb3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #adi-aej2 ,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #c4 ,compare ,plato1 ,legg4 x4 p4 #hhe2 ,isokrat4 ad ,nikok4 ,footnote #gc3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #adi ,e1 #aej ,b4 ,side-note3 ,remarkable doctrine of ,alkibiads ,,ii4--that knowledge is not always ,good4 ,the knowledge of ,good itself is indispensable3 without that1 the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial4 ,but we find also in ,alkibiads ,,ii4 another doctrine1 more remarkable4 ,sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good1 and that ignorance is evil4 ,in some cases1 he contends1 ignorance is good2 and he discriminates which the cases are4 ,that which we are principally interested in knowing1 is ,good1 or ,the ,best--,the ,profitable3#gd phrases used as equivalent4 ,the knowledge of this is good1 and the ignorance of it mischievous1 under all supposable circumstances4 ,and if a man knows good1 the more he knows of everything else1 the better2 since he will sure to make a good use of his knowledge4 ,but if he does not know good1 the knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to him4 ,to be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments1 under the capital mental deficiency supposed1 will render him an instrument of evil and not of good4 ,the more he knows--and the more he believes himself to know--the more forward will he be in acting1 and therefore the greater amount of harm will he do4 ,it is better that he should act as little as possible4 ,such a man is not fit to direct his own conduct1 like a freeman3 he must be directed and controlled by others1 like a slave4 ,the greater number of mankind are fools of this description--ignorant of good3 the wise men who know good1 and are fit to direct1 are very few4 ,the wise man alone1 knowing good1 follows reason3 the rest trust to opinion1 without reason4#ge ,he alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the society4 ,footnote #gd3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #ade ,c4 ,greek3 ,o7_/stis a7_/ra ti tn toiou_/tn oi7den1 e7an men pare_/ptai au7t 7 tou belti_/stou e7pist_/m--au7t d' 7n 7 au7t d_/pou 7per kai 7 tou 7pheli_/mou--also #adf ,b4 ,footnote #ge3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #adf ,a-,d4 ,greek3 a7_/neu nou do_/x pepisteuko_/tas4 ,the stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good1 as distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge--the identification of the good with the profitable1 and of the knowledge of good with reason 7,greek3 nous71 while other varieties of knowledge are ranked with opinion 7,greek3 do_/xa7--these are points which1 under one phraseology or another1 pervade many of the ,platonic dialogues4 ,the old phrase of ,herakleitus--,greek3 ,polumathi_/ no_/on ou7 dida_/skei--much learning does not teach reason--seems to have been present to the mind of ,plato in composing this dialogue4 ,the man of much learning and art1 without the knowledge of good1 and surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his accomplishments1 is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a pilot4#gf ,footnote #gf3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #adg ,a4 ,greek3 o7 de d tn kaloume_/nn poluma_/theia_/n te kai polutechni_/an kektme_/nos1 o7rphanos de 7n tau_/ts ts e7pist_/ms1 a7go_/menos de u7po mias e7ka_/sts tn a7_/lln1 c4 ,side-note3 ,knowledge of ,good--appears postulated and divined1 in many of the ,platonic dialogues1 under different titles4 ,what ,plato here calls the knowledge of ,good1 or ,reason--the just discrimination and comparative appreciation of ,ends and ,means--appears in the ,politikus and ,euthydmus1 under the title of the ,regal or ,political ,art1 of employing or directing#gg the results of all other arts1 which are considered as subordinate3 in the ,protagoras1 under the title of art of calculation or mensuration3 in the ,philbus1 as measure and proportion3 in the ,phdrus 7in regard to rhetoric7 as the art of turning to account1 for the main purpose of persuasion1 all the special processes1 stratagems1 decorations1 c41 imparted by professional masters4 ,in the ,republic1 it is personified in the few venerable ,elders who constitute the ,reason of the society1 and whose directions all the rest 7,guardians and ,producers7 are bound implicitly to follow3 the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience4 ,in the ,leges1 it is defined as the complete subjection in the mind1 of pleasures and pains to right ,reason1#gh without which1 no special aptitudes are worth having4 ,in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 it stands as a ,sokratic authority under the title of ,sophrosyn or ,temperance3#gi and the ,profitable is declared identical with the ,good1 as the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings4#hj ,footnote #gg3 ,plato1 ,politikus1 #bib ,b1 #cjd ,b1 #cje ,a2 ,euthydmus1 #bia ,b1 #bib ,b4 ,compare ,xenophon1 ,oekonomicus1 i4 #h1 #ac4 ,footnote #gh3 ,leges1 iii4 #fhi ,a-,d1 #fia ,a4 ,footnote #gi3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 i4 #b4 #ag2 iv4 #c4 #a4 ,footnote #hj3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 iv4 #f1 #h2 iv4 #g1 #g4 ,side-note3 ,the ,good--the ,profitable--what is it8--,how are we to know it8 ,plato leaves this undetermined4 ,but what are we to understand by the ,good1 about which there are so many disputes1 according to the acknowledgment of ,plato as well as of ,sokrates8 ,and what are we to understand by the ,profitable8 ,in what relation does it stand to the ,pleasurable and the ,painful8 ,these are points which ,plato here leaves undetermined4 ,we shall find him again touching them1 and trying different ways of determining them1 in the ,protagoras1 the ,gorgias1 the ,republic1 and elsewhere4 ,we have here the title and the postulate1 but nothing more1 of a comprehensive ,teleology1 or right comparative estimate of ends and means one against another1 so as to decide when1 how far1 under what circumstances1 c41 each ought to be pursued4 ,we shall see what ,plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and postulate with a more definite meaning4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,hippias ,,major--,,hippias ,,minor4 ,side-note3 ,hippias ,major--situation supposed--character of the dialogue4 ,sarcasm and mockery against ,hippias4 ,both these two dialogues are carried on between ,sokrates and the ,eleian ,sophist ,hippias4 ,the general conception of ,hippias--described as accomplished1 eloquent1 and successful1 yet made to say vain and silly things--is the same in both dialogues3 in both also the polemics of ,sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit1 of affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm4 ,indeed the figure assigned to ,hippias is so contemptible1 that even an admiring critic like ,stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the petulans pene et proterva in ,hippiam oratio1 and intimating that ,plato has handled ,hippias more coarsely than any one else4 ,such petulance ,stallbaum attempts to excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of ,plato3#a while ,schleiermacher numbers it among the reasons for suspecting the dialogue1 and ,ast1 among the reasons for declaring positively that ,plato is not the author4#b ,this last conclusion ,i do not at all accept3 nor even the hypothesis of ,stallbaum1 if it be tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone3 for ,i believe that the earliest of ,plato's dialogues was composed after he was twenty-eight years of age--that is1 after the death of ,sokrates4 ,it is however noway improbable1 that both the ,greater and ,lesser ,hippias may have been among ,plato's earlier compositions4 ,we see by the ,memorabilia of ,xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious controversy between ,sokrates and ,hippias3 so that we may probably suppose feelings of special dislike1 determining ,plato to compose two distinct dialogues1 in which an imaginary ,hippias is mocked and scourged by an imaginary ,sokrates4 ,footnote #a3 ,stallbaum1 ,prolegg4 in ,hipp4 ,maj4 p4 #adi-aej2 also ,steinhart 7,einleitung1 p4 #db-dc71 who says1 after an outpouring of his usual invective against the ,sophist3 ,nevertheless the coarse jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit of comic effect1 c4 ,again1 p4 #ej1 ,steinhart talks of the banter which ,sokrates carries on with ,hippias1 in a way not less cruel 7grausam7 than purposeless1 tormenting him with a string of successive new propositions about the definition of the ,beautiful1 which propositions1 as fast as ,hippias catches at them1 he again withdraws of his own accord1 and thus at last dismisses him 7as he had dismissed ,ion7 uninstructed and unimproved1 without even leaving behind in him the sting of anger1 c4 ,it requires a powerful hatred against the persons called ,sophists1 to make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous speeches are fastened upon the name of one of them1 in his own day not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by remarkable and varied accomplishments--and to make the critic describe the historical ,hippias 7whom we only know from ,plato and ,xenophon--see ,steinhart1 note #g1 p4 #hi2 ,socher1 p4 #bba7 as if he had really delivered these speeches1 or something equally absurd4 ,how this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of individual taste4 ,for my part1 ,i agree with ,ast in thinking it misplaced and unbecoming3 and ,i am not surprised that he wishes to remove the dialogue from the ,platonic canon1 though ,i do not concur either in this inference1 or in the general principle on which it proceeds1 viz41 that all objections against the composition of a dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its genuineness as a work of ,plato4 ,the ,nubes of ,aristophanes1 greatly superior as a comedy to the ,hippias of ,plato1 is turned to an abusive purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the character of the real ,sokrates4 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 in my judgment1 takes a more rational view of the ,hippias ,major 7,gesch4 und ,syst4 der ,plat4 ,phil4 p4 #dhg-fdg74 ,instead of expatiating on the glory of ,plato in deriding an accomplished contemporary1 he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which the dialogue brings to view2 and he reminds us justly of the intellectual condition of the age1 when even elementary distinctions in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to4 ,both ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann and ,socher consider the ,hippias to be not a juvenile production of ,plato1 but to belong to his middle age4 ,footnote #b3 ,schleierm4 ,einleitung4 p4 #dja2 ,ast1 ,platon's ,leben und ,schriften1 p4 #deg-dei4 ,side-note3 ,real debate between the historical ,sokrates and ,hippias in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia--subject of that debate4 ,one considerable point in the ,hippias ,major appears to have a bearing on the debate between ,sokrates and ,hippias in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia3 in which debate1 ,hippias taunts ,sokrates with always combating and deriding the opinions of others1 while evading to give opinions of his own4 ,it appears that some antecedent debates between the two had turned upon the definition of the ,just1 and that on these occasions ,hippias had been the respondent1 ,sokrates the objector4 ,hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates1 and to be now prepared with a definition which neither ,sokrates nor any one else can successfully assail1 but he will not say what the definition is1 until ,sokrates has laid down one of his own4 ,in reply to this challenge1 ,sokrates declares the ,just to be equivalent to the ,lawful or ,customary3 he defends this against various objections of ,hippias1 who concludes by admitting it4#c ,probably this debate1 as reported by ,xenophon1 or something very like it1 really took place4 ,if so1 we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of ,hippias1 in a case where ,sokrates1 if he had been the objector1 would have found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by ,sokrates1 whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties1 not in solving them4#d ,among the remarks which ,sokrates makes in illustration to ,hippias1 one is--that ,lykurgus had ensured superiority to ,sparta by creating in the ,spartans a habit of implicit obedience to the laws4#e ,such is the character of the ,xenophontic debate4 ,footnote #c3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 iv4 #d1 #ab-be4 ,footnote #d3 ,compare the puzzling questions which ,alkibiades when a youth is reported to have addressed to ,perikles1 and which he must unquestionably have heard from ,sokrates himself1 respecting the meaning of the word ,greek3 ,no_/mos 7,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #b1 #db74 ,all the difficulties in determining the definition of ,greek3 ,no_/mos1 occur also in determining that of ,greek3 ,no_/mimon1 which includes both ,jus ,scriptum and ,jus ,moribus ,receptum4 ,footnote #e3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #d1 #ae4 ,side-note3 ,opening of the ,hippias ,major--,hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through ,greece1 and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures4 ,here1 in the beginning of the ,hippias ,major1 the ,platonic ,sokrates remarks that ,hippias has been long absent from ,athens3 which absence1 the latter explains1 by saying that he has visited many cities in ,greece1 giving lectures with great success1 and receiving high pay3 and that especially he has often visited ,sparta1 partly to give lectures1 but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his countrymen the ,eleians1 who trusted him more than any one else for such duties4 ,his lectures 7he says7 were eminently instructive and valuable for the training of youth3 moreover they were so generally approved1 that even from a small ,sicilian town called ,inykus1 he obtained a considerable sum in fees4 ,side-note3 ,hippias had met with no success at ,sparta4 ,why the ,spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids4 ,upon this ,sokrates asks--,in which of the cities were your gains the largest3 probably at ,sparta8 ,hip4--,no2 ,i received nothing at all at ,sparta4 ,sokr4--,how8 ,you amaze me6 ,were not your lectures calculated to improve the ,spartan youth8 or did not the ,spartans desire to have their youth improved8 or had they no money8 ,hip4--,neither one nor the other4 ,the ,spartans1 like others1 desire the improvement of their youth3 they also have plenty of money3 moreover my lectures were very beneficial to them as well as to the rest4#f ,sokr4--,how could it happen then1 that at ,sparta1 a city great and eminent for its good laws1 your valuable instructions were left unrewarded2 while you received so much at the inconsiderable town of ,inykus8 ,hip4--,it is not the custom of the country1 ,sokrates1 for the ,spartans to change their laws1 or to educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine4 ,sokr4--,how say you8 ,it is not the custom of the country for the ,spartans to do right1 but to do wrong8 ,hip4--,i shall not say that1 ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,but surely they would do right1 in educating their children better and not worse8 ,hip4--,yes1 they would do right3 but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode of education4 ,if any one could have obtained payment there for education1 ,i should have obtained a great deal2 for they listen to me with delight and applaud me3 but1 as ,i told you1 their law forbids4 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhc-bhd4 ,side-note3 ,question1 ,what is law8 ,the law-makers always aim at the ,profitable1 but sometimes fail to attain it4 ,when they fail1 they fail to attain law4 ,the lawful is the ,profitable3 the ,unprofitable is also unlawful4 ,sokr4--,do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city8 ,hip4--,law is enacted with a view to benefit3 but it sometimes hurts if it be badly enacted4#g ,sokr4--,but what8 ,do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good1 without which the citizens cannot live a regulated life8 ,hip4--,certainly3 they do so4 ,sokr4--,therefore1 when those who try to enact laws miss the attainment of good1 they also miss the lawful and law itself4 ,how say you8 ,hip4--,they do so1 if you speak with strict propriety3 but such is not the language which men commonly use4 ,sokr4--,what men8 the knowing8 or the ignorant8 ,hip4--,the ,many4 ,sokr4--,the ,many2 is it they who know what truth is8 ,hip4--,assuredly not4 ,sokr4--,but surely those who do know1 account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the unprofitable1 to all men4 ,don't you admit this8 ,hip4--,yes1 ,i admit they account it so in truth4 ,sokr4--,well1 and it is so1 too3 the truth is as the knowing men account it4 ,hip4--,most certainly4 ,sokr4--,now you affirm1 that it is more profitable to the ,spartans to be educated according to your scheme1 foreign as it is1 than according to their own native scheme4 ,hip4--,i affirm it1 and with truth too4 ,sokr4--,you affirm besides1 that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful8 ,hip4--,i said so4 ,sokr4--,according to your reasoning1 then1 it is more lawful for the ,spartan children to be educated by ,hippias1 and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers-- if in reality they will be more benefited by you8 ,hip4--,but they will be more benefited by me4 ,sokr4--,the ,spartans therefore act unlawfully1 when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons8 ,hip4--,i admit that they do3 indeed your reasoning seems to make in my favour1 so that ,i am noway called upon to resist it4 ,sokr4--,we find then1 after all1 that the ,spartans are enemies of law1 and that too in the most important matters--though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of law4#h ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhd ,c-,b4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhe4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,comparison of the argument of the ,platonic ,sokrates with that of the ,xenophontic ,sokrates4 ,perhaps ,plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against the ,sophist ,hippias1 for being vain enough to think his own tuition better than that of the ,spartan community4 ,if such was his intention1 the argument might have been retorted against ,plato himself1 for his propositions in the ,republic and ,leges3 and we know that the enemies of ,plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes adopted in any actual community4 ,but the argument becomes interesting when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia1 where ,sokrates maintains against ,hippias that the ,just is equivalent to the ,lawful4 ,in that ,xenophontic dialogue1 all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are kept out of sight1 and ,sokrates is represented as gaining an easy victory over ,hippias4 ,in this ,platonic dialogue1 the equivocal use of the word ,greek3 no_/mimon is expressly adverted to1 and ,sokrates reduces ,hippias to a supposed absurdity1 by making him pronounce the ,spartans to be enemies of law3 ,greek3 paranomou_/s bearing a double sense1 and the proposition being true in one sense1 false in the other4 ,in the argument of the ,platonic ,sokrates1 a law which does not attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community1 is no law at all1--not lawful3#i so that we are driven back again upon the objections of ,alkibiades against ,perikles 7in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia7 in regard to what constitutes a law4 ,in the argument of the ,xenophontic ,sokrates1 law means a law actually established1 by official authority or custom--and the ,spartans are produced as eminent examples of a lawfully minded community4 ,as far as we can assign positive opinion to the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,hippias ,major1 he declares that the profitable or useful 7being that which men always aim at in making law7 is ,the ,lawful1 whether actually established or not3 and that the unprofitable or hurtful 7being that which men always intend to escape7 is ,the ,unlawful1 whether prescribed by any living authority or not4 ,this 7he says7 is the opinion of the wise men who know3 though the ignorant vulgar hold the contrary opinion4 ,the explanation of ,greek3 to di_/kaion given by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates 7,greek3 to di_/kaion to no_/mimon71 would be equivalent1 if we construe ,greek3 to no_/mimon in the sense of the ,platonic ,sokrates 7in ,hippias ,major7 as an affirmation that ,the ,just was the generally useful--,greek3 ,to di_/kaion to koin su_/mphoron4 ,footnote #i3 ,compare a similar argument of ,sokrates against ,thrasymachus--,republic1 i4 #cci4 ,side-note3 ,the ,just or ,good is the beneficial or profitable4 ,this is the only explanation which ,plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere4 ,there exists however in all this1 a prevalent confusion between ,law 7or the ,lawful7 as actually established1 and ,law 7or the ,lawful7 as it ought to be established1 in the judgment of the critic1 or of those whom he follows3 that is 7to use the phrase of ,mr4 ,austin in his ',province of ,jurisprudence'7 ,law as it would be1 if it conformed to its assumed measure or test4 ,in the first of these senses1 ,greek3 to no_/mimon is not one and the same1 but variable according to place and time--one thing at ,sparta1 another thing elsewhere3 accordingly it would not satisfy the demand of ,plato's mind1 when he asks for an explanation of ,greek3 to di_/kaion4 ,it is an explanation in the second of the two senses which ,plato seeks--a common measure or test applicable universally1 at all times and places4 ,in so far as he ever finds one1 it is that which ,i have mentioned above as delivered by the ,platonic ,sokrates in this dialogue3 viz41 the ,just or ,good1 that which ought to be the measure or test of ,law and ,positive ,morality1 is1 the beneficial or profitable4 ,this 7,i repeat7 is the only approach to a solution which we ever find in ,plato4 ,but this is seldom clearly enunciated1 never systematically followed out1 and sometimes1 in appearance1 even denied4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,lectures of ,hippias at ,sparta not upon geometry1 or astronomy1 c41 but upon the question--,what pursuits are beautiful1 fine1 and honourable for youth4 ,i resume the thread of the ,hippias ,major4 ,sokrates asks ,hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at ,sparta8 ,the ,spartans 7,hippias replies7 knew nothing and cared nothing about letters1 geometry1 arithmetic1 astronomy3 but they took delight in hearing tales about heroes1 early ancestors1 foundation-legends of cities1 c41 which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to deliver4#aj ,the ,spartans delight in you 7observes ,sokrates7 as children delight in old women's tales4 ,yes 7replies ,hippias71 but that is not all3 ,i discoursed to them also1 recently1 about fine and honourable pursuits1 much to their admiration3 ,i supposed a conversation between ,nestor and ,neoptolemus1 after the capture of ,troy1 in which the veteran1 answering a question put by his youthful companion1 enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine1 honourable1 beautiful for a young man to engage in4 ,my discourse is excellent1 and obtained from the ,spartans great applause4 ,i am going to deliver it again here at ,athens1 in the school-room of ,pheidostratus1 and ,i invite you1 ,sokrates1 to come and hear it1 with as many friends as you can bring4#aa ,footnote #aj3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhe ,e4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhf ,a-,b4 ,side-note3 ,question put by ,sokrates1 in the name of a friend in the background1 who has just been puzzling him with it--,what is the ,beautiful8 ,i shall come willingly 7replied ,sokrates74 ,but first answer me one small question1 which will rescue me from a present embarrassment4 ,just now1 ,i was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend1 to whom ,i had been praising some things as honourable and beautiful1--blaming other things as mean and ugly4 ,he surprised me by the interrogation--,how do you know1 ,sokrates1 what things are beautiful1 and what are ugly8 ,come now1 can you tell me1 ,what is the ,beautiful8 ,i1 in my stupidity1 was altogether puzzled1 and could not answer the question4 ,but after ,i had parted from him1 ,i became mortified and angry with myself2 and ,i vowed that the next time ,i met any wise man1 like you1 ,i would put the question to him1 and learn how to answer it2 so that ,i might be able to renew the conversation with my friend4 ,your coming here is most opportune4 ,i entreat you to answer and explain to me clearly what the ,beautiful is2 in order that ,i may not again incur the like mortification4 ,you can easily answer3 it is a small matter for you1 with your numerous attainments4 ,side-note3 ,hippias thinks the question easy to answer4 ,oh--yes--a small matter 7replies ,hippias72 the question is easy to answer4 ,i could teach you to answer many questions harder than that3 so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhf ,c-,d4 ,sokrates then proceeds to interrogate ,hippias1 in the name of the absentee1 starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by this unknown prompter1 and pretending to be himself under awe of so impracticable a disputant4 ,side-note3 ,justice1 ,wisdom1 ,beauty must each be something4 ,what is ,beauty1 or the ,beautiful8 ,all persons are just1 through ,justice--wise1 through ,wisdom--good1 through ,goodness or the ,good--beautiful1 through ,beauty or the ,beautiful4 ,now ,justice1 ,wisdom1 ,goodness1 ,beauty or the ,beautiful1 must each be something4 ,tell me what the ,beautiful is8 ,side-note3 ,hippias does not understand the question4 ,he answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object4 ,hippias does not conceive the question4 ,does the man want to know what is a beautiful thing8 ,sokr4--,no2 he wants to know what is ,the ,beautiful4 ,hip4--,i do not see the difference4 ,i answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing4 ,no one can deny that4#ac ,footnote #ac3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhg ,a4 ,sokr4--,my disputatious friend will not accept your answer4 ,he wants you to tell him1 ,what is the ,self-,beautiful8--that ,something through which all beautiful things become beautiful4 ,am ,i to tell him1 it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing8 ,he will say--,is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also8 and a beautiful lyre as well8 ,hip4--,yes2--both of them are so4 ,sokr4--,ay1 and a beautiful pot1 my friend will add1 well moulded and rounded by a skilful potter1 is a beautiful thing too4 ,hip4--,how1 ,sokrates8 ,who can your disputatious friend be8 ,some ill-taught man1 surely2 since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified debate4 ,sokr4--,yes2 that is his character3 not polite1 but vulgar1 anxious for nothing else but the truth4 ,hip4--,a pot1 if it be beautifully made1 must certainly be called beautiful2 yet still1 all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful1 if compared with a maiden1 a mare1 or a lyre4 ,side-note3 ,cross-questioning by ,sokrates--,other things also are beautiful2 but each thing is beautiful only by comparison1 or under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful1 sometimes not beautiful4 ,sokr4--,i understand4 ,you follow the analogy suggested by ,herakleitus in his dictum--,that the most beautiful ape is ugly1 if compared with the human race4 ,so you say1 the most beautiful pot is ugly1 when compared with the race of maidens4 ,hip--,yes4 ,that is my meaning4 ,sokr4--,then my friend will ask you in return1 whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of ,gods1 as the pot to the maiden8 whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly1 when compared to a ,goddess8 whether the wisest of men will not appear an ape1 when compared to the ,gods1 either in beauty or in wisdom4#ad ,hip4--,no one can dispute it4 ,sokr4--,my friend will smile and say--,you forget what was the question put4 ,i asked you1 ,what is the ,beautiful8--the ,self-,beautiful3 and your answer gives me1 as the ,self-,beautiful1 something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly8 ,if ,i had asked you1 from the first1 what it was that was both beautiful and ugly1 your answer would have been pertinent to the question4 ,can you still think that the ,self-,beautiful1--that ,something1 by the presence of which all other things become beautiful1--is a maiden1 or a mare1 or a lyre8 ,footnote #ad3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhi4 ,side-note3 ,second answer of ,hippias--,gold1 is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to the answer4 ,complaint by ,hippias about vulgar analogies4 ,hip4--,i have another answer to which your friend can take no exception4 ,that1 by the presence of which all things become beautiful1 is ,gold4 ,what was before ugly1 will 7we all know71 when ornamented with gold1 appear beautiful4 ,sokr4--,you little know what sort of man my friend is4 ,he will laugh at your answer1 and ask you--,do you think1 then1 that ,pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor8 ,how came he not to make the statue of ,athn all gold1 instead of making 7as he has done7 the face1 hands1 and feet of ivory1 and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone8 ,is not ivory also beautiful1 and particular kinds of stone8 ,hip4--,yes1 each is beautiful1 where it is becoming4 ,sokr4--,and ugly1 where it is not becoming4#ae ,hip4--,doubtless4 ,i admit that what is becoming or suitable1 makes that to which it is applied appear beautiful3 that which is not becoming or suitable1 makes it appear ugly4 ,sokr4--,my friend will next ask you1 when you are boiling the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now1 full of beautiful soup1 what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming--one made of gold1 or of fig-tree wood8 ,will not the golden ladle spoil the soup1 and the wooden ladle turn it out good8 ,is not the wooden ladle1 therefore1 better than the golden8 ,hip4--,by ,hrakls1 ,sokrates6 what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is6 ,i cannot continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters4 ,sokr4--,i am not surprised that you1 with your fine attire and lofty reputation1 are offended with these low allusions4 ,but ,i have nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man2 and ,i entreat you to persevere1 as a favour to me4 ,he will ask you whether a wooden soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold1--since it is more suitable and becoming8 ,so that though you said--,the ,self-,beautiful is ,gold--you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig-tree wood8 ,footnote #ae3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bij4 ,side-note3 ,third answer of ,hippias--questions upon it--proof given that it fails of universal application4 ,hip4--,i acknowledge that it is so4 ,but ,i have another answer ready which will silence your friend4 ,i presume you wish me to indicate as ,the ,beautiful1 something which will never appear ugly to any one1 at any time1 or at any place4#af ,sokr4--,that is exactly what ,i desire4 ,hip4--,well1 ,i affirm1 then1 that to every man1 always1 and everywhere1 the following is most beautiful4 ,a man being healthy1 rich1 honoured by the ,greeks1 having come to old age and buried his own parents well1 to be himself buried by his own sons well and magnificently4 ,sokr4--,your answer sounds imposing2 but my friend will laugh it to scorn1 and will remind me again1 that his question pointed to the ,beautiful itself#ag--something which1 being present as attribute in any subject1 will make that subject 7whether stone1 wood1 man1 ,god1 action1 study1 c47 beautiful4 ,now that which you have asserted to be beautiful to every one everywhere1 was not beautiful to ,achilles1 who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his father--nor is it so to the heroes1 or to the sons of ,gods1 who do not survive or bury their fathers4 ,to some1 therefore1 what you specify is beautiful--to others it is not beautiful but ugly3 that is1 it is both beautiful and ugly1 like the maiden1 the lyre1 the pot1 on which we have already remarked4 ,hip4--,i did not speak about the ,gods or ,heroes4 ,your friend is intolerable1 for touching on such profanities4#ah ,sokr4--,however1 you cannot deny that what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men1 and not for the sons of ,gods4 ,my friend will thus make good his reproach against your answer4 ,he will tell me1 that all the answers1 which we have as yet given1 are too absurd4 ,and he may perhaps at the same time himself suggest another1 as he sometimes does in pity for my embarrassment4 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bia ,c-,d4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bib ,d4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bic ,b4 ,side-note3 ,farther answers1 suggested by ,sokrates himself--#a4 ,the ,suitable or ,becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected4 ,sokrates then mentions1 as coming from hints of the absent friend1 three or four different explanations of the ,self-,beautiful3 each of which1 when first introduced1 he approves1 and ,hippias approves also3 but each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn4 ,it is to be remarked that all of them are general explanations3 not consisting in conspicuous particular instances1 like those which had come from ,hippias4 ,his explanations are the following3-- #a4 ,the suitable or becoming 7which had before been glanced at74 ,it is the suitable or becoming which constitutes the ,beautiful4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bic ,e4 ,to this ,sokrates objects3 ,the suitable1 or becoming1 is what causes objects to appear beautiful--not what causes them to be really beautiful4 ,now the latter is that which we are seeking4 ,the two conditions do not always go together4 ,those objects1 institutions1 and pursuits which are really beautiful 7fine1 honourable7 very often do not appear so1 either to individuals or to cities collectively2 so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject4 ,the suitable or becoming1 therefore1 as it is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful1 so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bid ,b-,e4 ,side-note3 #b4 ,the useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold4 #b4 ,the useful or profitable4--,we call objects beautiful1 looking to the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve3 the human body1 with a view to running1 wrestling1 and other exercises--a horse1 an ox1 a cock1 looking to the service required from them--implements1 vehicles on land and ships at sea1 instruments for music and other arts all upon the same principle1 looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish4 ,laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way4 ,in each of these1 we give the name ,beautiful to the useful1 in so far as it is useful1 when it is useful1 and for the purpose to which it is useful4 ,to that which is useless or hurtful1 in the same manner1 we give the name ,ugly4#ba ,footnote #ba3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bie ,c-,d4 ,now that which is capable of accomplishing each end1 is useful for such end3 that which is incapable1 is useless4 ,it is therefore capacity1 or power1 which is beautiful3 incapacity1 or impotence1 is ugly4#bb ,footnote #bb3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bie ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun to dunaton e7_/kaston a7perga_/zesthai1 ei7s o7_/per dunato_/n1 ei7s touto kai chr_/simon2 to de a7du_/naton a7_/chrston8 4 4 4 4 ,du_/namis men a7_/ra kalo_/n--a7dunami_/a de ai7schro_/n8 ,most certainly 7replies ,hippias73 this is especially true in our cities and communities1 wherein political power is the finest thing possible1 political impotence1 the meanest4 ,yet1 on closer inspection 7continues ,sokrates71 such a theory will not hold4 ,power is employed by all men1 though unwillingly1 for bad purposes3 and each man1 through such employment of his power1 does much more harm than good1 beginning with his childhood4 ,now power1 which is useful for the doing of evil1 can never be called beautiful4#bc ,footnote #bc3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bif ,c-,d4 ,you cannot therefore say that ,power1 taken absolutely1 is beautiful4 ,you must add the qualification--,power used for the production of some good1 is beautiful4 ,this1 then1 would be the profitable--the cause or generator of good4#bd ,but the cause is different from its effect3 the generator or father is different from the generated or son4 ,the beautiful would1 upon this view1 be the cause of the good4 ,but then the beautiful would be different from the good1 and the good different from the beautiful8 ,who can admit this8 ,it is obviously wrong3 it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit upon4#be ,footnote #bd3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #big ,b4 ,footnote #be3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #big ,d-,e4 ,greek3 ei7 oi7o_/n t' e7sti_/n1 e7kei_/nn ei7nai 7kinduneu_/ei7 geloio_/teros tn pr_/tn4 ,side-note3 #c4 ,the ,beautiful is a variety of the ,pleasurable--that which is received through the eye and the ear4 #c4 ,the ,beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or pleasurable3 that which characterises those things which cause pleasure to us through sight and hearing4 ,thus the men1 the ornaments1 the works of painting or sculpture1 upon which we look with admiration1#bf are called beautiful3 also songs1 music1 poetry1 fable1 discourse1 in like manner2 nay even laws1 customs1 pursuits1 which we consider beautiful1 might be brought under the same head4#bg ,footnote #bf3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bih ,a-,b4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bih ,d4 ,professor ,bain observes3--,the eye and the ear are the great avenues to the mind for the sthetic class of influences2 the other senses are more or less in the monopolist interest4 ,the blue sky1 the green woods1 and all the beauties of the landscape1 can fill the vision of a countless throng of admirers4 ,so with the pleasing sounds1 c4 ',the ,emotions and the ,will4' ch4 xiv4 7,the sthetic ,emotions71 sect4 #b1 p4 #bbf1 #crd ed4 ,side-note3 ,objections to this last--,what property is there common to both sight and hearing1 which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful8 ,the objector1 however1 must now be dealt with4 ,he will ask us--,upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing1 and other pleasures8 ,do you deny that these others 7those of taste1 smell1 eating1 drinking1 sex7 are really pleasures8 ,no1 surely 7we shall reply72 we admit them to be pleasures1--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful3 especially the pleasures of sex1 which as pleasures are the greatest of all1 but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold4 ,he will answer--,i understand you3 you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful1 because they do not seem so to the multitude3 but ,i did not ask you1 what seems beautiful to the multitude--,i asked you1 what is beautiful4#bh ,you mean to affirm1 that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing1 are not beautiful3 ,do you mean1 all which do not belong to both8 or all which do not belong to one or the other8 ,we shall reply--,to either one of the two--or to both the two4 ,well6 but1 why 7he will ask7 do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing1 as beautiful exclusively8 ,what is there peculiar in them1 which gives them a title to such distinction8 ,all pleasures are alike1 so far forth as pleasures1 differing only in the more or less4 ,next1 the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing3 nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing4#bi ,we must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing1 common to both1 and peculiar to them1--which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each4 ,any attribute of one1 which does not also belong to the other1 will not be sufficient for our purpose4#cj ,beauty must depend upon some essential characteristic which both have in common4#ca ,we must therefore look out for some such characteristic1 which belongs to both as well as to each separately4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bih ,e1 #bii ,a4 ,greek3 ,mantha_/n1 a7n i7_/ss phai_/1 kai e7g_/1 o7_/ti pa_/lai ai7schu_/nesthe tau_/tas tas 7donas pha_/nai kalas ei7nai1 o7_/ti ou7 dokei tois a7nthr_/pois2 a7ll' e7g ou7 touto 7r_/tn1 o7 dokei tois pollois kalon ei7nai1 a7ll' o71 ti e7_/stin4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bii ,d-,e4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjj ,b4 ,a separate argument between ,sokrates and ,hippias is here as it were interpolated2 ,hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either separately4 ,sokrates points out that two men are ,both1 even in number1 while each is ,one1 an odd number4 ,you cannot say of the two that they are one1 nor can you say of either that he is ,both4 ,there are two classes of predicates2 some which are true of either but not true of the two together1 or vice vers2 some again which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as just1 wise1 handsome1 c4 p4 #cja-cjc ,b4 ,footnote #ca3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjb ,c4 ,greek3 t ou7si_/a t e7p' a7mpho_/tera e7pome_/n 7mn1 ei7_/per a7mpho_/tera_/ e7sti kala_/1 tau_/t dein au7ta kala ei7nai1 t de kata ta e7_/tera a7poleipome_/n m_/4 kai e7_/ti nun oi7omai4 ,side-note3 ,answer--,there is1 belonging to each and to both in common1 the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful4 ,now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve4 ,the pleasures of sight and hearing1 both and each1 are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best4#cb ,it is for this reason that we call them beautiful4 ,the ,beautiful1 then1 is profitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable is1 that which produces good4#cc ,footnote #cb3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjc ,e4 ,greek3 o7_/ti a7sine_/statai au7tai tn 7donn ei7si kai be_/ltistai1 kai a7mpho_/terai kai e7kate_/ra4 ,footnote #cc3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjc ,e4 ,greek3 le_/gete d to kalon ei7nai1 7donn 7phe_/limon4 ,side-note3 ,this will not hold--the ,profitable is the cause of ,good1 and is therefore different from ,good--to say that the beautiful is the ,profitable1 is to say that it is different from ,good but this has been already declared inadmissible4 ,nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this4 ,he will tell us--,you declare the ,beautiful to be ,pleasure producing good4 ,but we before agreed1 that the producing agent or cause is different from what is produced or the effect4 ,accordingly1 the ,beautiful is different from the good3 or1 in other words1 the ,beautiful is not good1 nor is the ,good beautiful--if each of them is a different thing4#cd ,now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible1 so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding4 ,footnote #cd3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjc ,e--#cjd ,a4 ,greek3 ,ou7_/koun 7phe_/limon1 ph_/sei1 to poioun ta7gatho_/n1 to de poioun kai to poiou_/menon1 e7_/teron nun d e7pha_/n1 kai ei7s ton pro_/teron lo_/gon 7_/kei u7min o7 lo_/gos8 ou7_/te gar to a7gathon a7n ei7_/ kalon ou7_/te to kalon a7gatho_/n1 ei7_/per a7_/llo au7tn e7ka_/tero_/n e7stin4 ,these last words deserve attention1 because they coincide with the doctrine ascribed to ,antisthenes1 which has caused so many hard words to be applied to him 7as well as to ,stilpon7 by critics1 from ,koltes downwards4 ,the general principle here laid down by ,plato is--,a is something different from ,b1 therefore ,a is not ,b and ,b is not ,a4 ,in other words1 ,a cannot be predicated of ,b nor ,b of ,a4 ,antisthenes said in like manner--,greek3 ,a7_/nthrpos and ,greek3 ,a7gathos are different from each other1 therefore you cannot say ,greek3 ,a7_/nthrpos e7stin a7gatho_/s4 ,you can only say ,greek3 ,a7_/nthrpos e7stin ,a7_/nthrpos--,a7gatho_/s e7stin a7gatho_/s4 ,i have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon ,antisthenes and the other ,viri ,sokratici4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks upon the ,dialogue--the explanations ascribed to ,hippias are special conspicuous examples3 those ascribed to ,sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept4 ,thus finish the three distinct explanations of ,greek3 ,to kalon1 which ,plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by ,sokrates1 successively accepted by ,hippias1 and successively refuted by ,sokrates4 ,in comparing them with the three explanations which he puts into the mouth of ,hippias1 we note this distinction3 ,that the explanations proposed by ,hippias are conspicuous particular exemplifications of the ,beautiful1 substituted in place of the general concept3 as we remarked1 in the ,dialogue ,euthyphron1 that the explanations of the ,holy given by ,euthyphron in reply to ,sokrates1 were of the same exemplifying character4 ,on the contrary1 those suggested by ,sokrates keep in the region of abstractions1 and seek to discover some more general concept1 of which the ,beautiful is only a derivative or a modification1 so as to render a definition of it practicable4 ,to illustrate this difference by the language of ,dr4 ,whewell respecting many of the classifications in ,natural ,history1 we may say--,that according to the views here represented by ,hippias1 the group of objects called beautiful is given by ,type1 not by ,definition3#ce while ,sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some common characteristic attribute may be found1 on which to rest a ,definition4 ,to search for ,definitions of general words1 was 7as ,aristotle remarks7 a novelty1 and a valuable novelty1 introduced by ,sokrates4 ,his contemporaries1 the ,sophists among them1 were not accustomed to it3 and here the ,sophist ,hippias 7according to ,plato's frequent manner7 is derided as talking nonsense1#cf because1 when asked for an explanation of ,the ,self-,beautiful1 he answers by citing special instances of beautiful objects4 ,but we must remember1 first1 that ,sokrates1 who is introduced as trying several general explanations of the ,self-,beautiful1 does not find one which will stand3 next1 that even if one such could be found1 particular instances can never be dispensed with1 in the way of illustration2 lastly1 that there are many general terms 7the ,beautiful being one of them7 of which no definitions can be provided1 and which can only be imperfectly explained1 by enumerating a variety of objects to which the term in question is applied4#cg ,plato thought himself entitled to objectivise every general term1 or to assume a substantive ,ens1 called a ,form or ,idea1 corresponding to it4 ,this was a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been committed by ,hippias or any other ,sophist4 ,the assumption that wherever there is a general term1 there must also be a generic attribute corresponding to it--is one which ,aristotle takes much pains to negative3 he recognises terms of transitional analogy1 as well as terms equivocal3 while he also especially numbers the ,beautiful among equivocal terms4#ch ,footnote #ce3 ,see ,dr4 ,whewell's ',history of the ,inductive ,sciences1' ii4 #abj seq42 and ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's ',system of ,logic1' iv4 #h1 #c4 ,i shall illustrate this subject farther when ,i come to the dialogue called ,lysis4 ,footnote #cf3 ,stallbaum1 in his notes1 bursts into exclamations of wonder at the incredible stupidity of ,hippias--,en hominis stuporem prorsus admirabilem1 p4 #bhi ,e4 ,footnote #cg3 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill observes in his ,system of ,logic1 i4 #a1 #e3 ,one of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained connotation1 and with no more precise notion of their meaning than can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to denote4 ,it is in this manner that we all acquire1 and inevitably so1 our first knowledge of our vernacular language4 ,a child learns the meaning of ,man1 ,white1 c41 by hearing them applied to a number of individual objects1 and finding out1 by a process of generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious1 what those different objects have in common4 ,in many cases objects bear a general resemblance to each other1 which leads to their being familiarly classed together under a common name1 while it is not immediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance depends4 ,in this manner names creep on from subject to subject until all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear1 and the word comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any common attribute1 but which have actually no attribute in common1 or none but what is shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused4 ,it would be well if this degeneracy of language took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar2 but some of the most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art1 and among technically educated persons1 such as ,english lawyers4 ,felony1 e4g41 is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar3 but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony is1 otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called4 ,originally the word felony had a meaning2 it denoted all offences1 the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods1 but subsequent ,acts of ,parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining that penalty1 and have taken away that penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called felonies1 insomuch that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable4 ,footnote #ch3 ,aristot4 ,topic1 i4 #ajf1 a4 #ba4 ,greek3 ,ta pollachs lego_/mena--ta pleonachs lego_/mena--are perpetually noted and distinguished by ,aristotle4 ,side-note3 ,analogy between the explanations here ascribed to ,sokrates1 and those given by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates in the ,memorabilia4 ,we read in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia a dialogue between ,sokrates and ,aristippus1 on this same subject--,what is the ,beautiful1 which affords a sort of contrast between the ,dialogues of ,search and those of ,exposition4 ,in the ,hippias ,major1 we have the problem approached on several different sides1 various suggestions being proposed1 and each successively disallowed1 on reasons shown1 as failures3 while in the ,xenophontic dialogue1 ,sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine1 and stands to it--but no pains are taken to bring out the objections against it and rebut them4 ,the doctrine is1 that the ,beautiful is coincident with the ,good1 and that both of them are resolvable into the ,useful3 thus all beautiful objects1 unlike as they may be to the eye or touch1 bear that name because they have in common the attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose--the security1 advantage1 or gratification1 of man1 in some form or other4 ,this is one of the three explanations broached by the ,platonic ,sokrates1 and afterwards refuted by him1 in the ,hippias3 while his declaration 7which ,hippias puts aside as unseemly7--that a pot and a wooden soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful is perfectly in harmony with that of the ,xenophontic ,sokrates1 that a basket for carrying dung is beautiful1 if it performs its work well4#ci ,we must moreover remark1 that the objections whereby the ,platonic ,sokrates1 after proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour1 finds himself compelled at last to disallow it--these objections are not produced and refuted1 but passed over without notice1 in the ,xenophontic dialogue1 wherein ,sokrates affirms it decidedly4#dj ,the affirming ,sokrates1 and the objecting ,sokrates1 are not on the stage at once4 ,footnote #ci3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iii4 #f1 #b1 #g2 iv4 #f1 #h4 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhh ,d1 #bij ,d4 ,i am obliged to translate the words ,greek3 to ,kalo_/n by the ,beautiful or beauty1 to avoid a tiresome periphrasis4 ,but in reality the ,greek words include more besides3 they mean also the fine1 the honourable or that which is worthy of honour1 the exalted1 c4 ,if we have difficulty in finding any common property connoted by the ,english word1 the difficulty in the case of the ,greek word is still greater4 ,footnote #dj3 ,in regard to the question1 ,wherein consists ,greek3 ,to ,kalo_/n8 and objections against the theory of the ,xenophontic ,sokrates1 it is worth while to compare the views of modern philosophers4 ,dugald ,stewart says 7on the ,beautiful1 ',philosophical ,essays1' p4 #bad seq471 ,it has long been a favourite problem with philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which entitle a thing to the denomination of ,beautiful4 ,but the success of their speculations has been so inconsiderable1 that little can be inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed4 ,the speculations which have given occasion to these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages4 ,that when a word admits of a variety of significations1 these different significations must all be species of the same genus1 and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied4 ,of this principle1 which has been an abundant source of obscurity and mystery in the different sciences1 it would be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility4 ,socrates1 whose plain good sense appears1 on this as on other occasions1 to have fortified his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical subtleties which misled his successors1 was evidently apprised fully of the justice of the foregoing remarks1 if any reliance can be placed on the account given by ,xenophon of his conversation with ,aristippus about the ,good and the ,beautiful1 c4 ,stewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the ,xenophontic dialogue 7,memorab4 iii4 #h74 ,but unfortunately he does not translate the whole of it4 ,if he had he would have seen that he has misconceived the opinion of ,sokrates1 who maintains the very doctrine here disallowed by ,stewart1 viz41 ,that there is an essential idea common to all beautiful objects1 the fact of being conducive to human security1 comfort1 or enjoyment4 ,this is unquestionably an important common property1 though the multifarious objects which possess it may be unlike in all other respects4 ,as to the general theory ,i think that ,stewart is right3 it is his compliment to ,sokrates1 on this occasion1 which ,i consider misplaced4 ,he certainly would not have agreed with ,sokrates 7nor should ,i agree with him7 in calling by the epithet beautiful a basket for carrying dung when well made for its own purpose1 or a convenient boiling-pot1 or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood1 as the ,platonic ,sokrates affirms in the ,hippias 7#bhh ,d1 #bij ,d74 ,the ,beautiful and the ,useful sometimes coincide2 more often or at least very often1 they do not4 ,hippias is made to protest1 in this dialogue1 against the mention of such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle2 and this is apparently intended by ,plato as a defective point in his character1 denoting silly affectation and conceit1 like his fine apparel4 ,but ,dugald ,stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to ,hippias--that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry into the ,beautiful2 and that they belong1 when well-formed for their respective purposes1 to the category of the ,useful4 ,the ,xenophontic ,sokrates in the ,memorabilia is mistaken in confounding the ,beautiful with the ,good and the ,useful4 ,but his remarks are valuable in another point of view1 as they insist most forcibly on the essential relativity both of the ,beautiful and the ,good4 ,the doctrine of ,dugald ,stewart is supported by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7',system of ,logic1' iv4 #d1 #e1 p4 #bbj seq4729999 and ,professor ,bain has expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter 7xiv4 p4 #bbe seq41 on the sthetic ,emotions7 of his work on the ,emotions and the ,will4 ,the concluding observations of this dialogue1 interchanged between ,hippias and ,sokrates1 are interesting as bringing out the antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic--between the concrete and exemplifying1 as contrasted with the abstract and analytical4 ,immediately after ,sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an inextricable embarrassment1 ,hippias remarks-- ,side-note3 ,concluding thrust exchanged between ,hippias and ,sokrates4 ,well1 ,sokrates1 what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours8 ,they are what ,i declared them to be just now1--scrapings and parings of discourse1 divided into minute fragments4 ,but the really beautiful and precious acquirement is1 to be able to set out well and finely a regular discourse before the ,dikastery or the public assembly1 to persuade your auditors1 and to depart carrying with you not the least but the greatest of all prizes--safety for yourself1 your property1 and your friends4 ,these are the real objects to strive for4 ,leave off your petty cavils1 that you may not look like an extreme simpleton1 handling silly trifles as you do at present4#da ,my dear ,hippias1 7replies ,sokrates7 you are a happy man1 since you know what pursuits a man ought to follow1 and have yourself followed them1 as you say1 with good success4 ,but ,i1 as it seems1 am under the grasp of an unaccountable fortune3 for ,i am always fluctuating and puzzling myself1 and when ,i lay my puzzle before you wise men1 ,i am requited by you with hard words4 ,i am told just what you have now been telling me1 that ,i busy myself about matters silly1 petty1 and worthless4 ,when on the contrary1 overborne by your authority1 ,i declare as you do1 that it is the finest thing possible to be able to set out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public assembly1 and bring it to successful conclusion--then there are other men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches3 especially that one man1 my nearest kinsman and inmate1 who never omits to convict me4 ,when on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me1 he asks1 if ,i am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful 7honourable7 pursuits1 when ,i am so manifestly convicted upon this subject1 of not even knowing what the ,beautiful 7,honourable7 is4 ,how can you 7he says71 being ignorant what the ,beautiful is1 know who has set out a discourse beautifully and who has not--who has performed a beautiful exploit and who has not8 ,since you are in a condition so disgraceful1 can you think life better for you than death8 ,such then is my fate--to hear disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side1 and from him on the other4 ,necessity however perhaps requires that ,i should endure all these discomforts3 for it will be nothing strange if ,i profit by them4 ,indeed ,i think that ,i have already profited both by your society1 ,hippias1 and by his3 for ,i now think that ,i know what the proverb means--,beautiful 7,honourable7 things are difficult4#db ,footnote #da3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjd ,a4 ,footnote #db3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cjd ,d-,e4 ,side-note3 ,rhetoric against ,dialectic4 ,here is a suitable termination for one of the ,dialogues of ,search3 ,my mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled1 but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement4 ,we have moreover an interesting passage of arms between ,rhetoric and ,dialectic3 two contemporaneous and contending agencies1 among the stirring minds of ,athens1 in the time of ,plato and ,isokrates4 ,the ,rhetor accuses the ,dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality--of breaking up the integrity of those concretes1 which occur in nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes4 ,each of the analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself1 which may be compared with the others1 but cannot be taken to pieces1 and studied in separate fragments4#dc ,the ,dialectician on his side treats the ,abstract 7,greek3 to kalon7 as the real ,integer1 and the highest abstraction as the first of all integers1 containing in itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers3 the various accompaniments1 which go along with each ,abstract to make up a concrete1 he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises4 ,footnote #dc3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #cja ,b4 ,greek3 ,a7lla gar d su_/1 7 ,s_/krates1 ta men o7_/la tn pragma_/tn ou7 skopeis1 ou7d' e7keinoi1 oi7s su ei7_/thas diale_/gesthai1 krou_/ete de a7polamba_/nontes to kalon kai e7_/kaston tn o7_/ntn e7n tois lo_/gois katate_/mnontes2 dia tauta ou7_/t mega_/la u7mas lantha_/nei kai dianek s_/mata ts ou7si_/as pephuko_/ta4 ,compare #cja ,e4 ,the words ,greek3 dianek s_/mata ts ou7si_/as pephuko_/ta correspond as nearly as can be to the logical term ,concrete1 opposed to ,abstract4 ,nature furnishes only ,concreta1 not ,abstracta4 ,side-note3 ,men who dealt with real life1 contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers4 ,hippias accuses ,sokrates of never taking into his view ,wholes1 and of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments1 obtained by logical analysis and subdivision4 ,aristophanes1 when he attacks the ,dialectic of ,sokrates1 takes the same ground1 employing numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable fragments handled1 and the subtle transpositions which they underwent in the reasoning4 ,isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of dialectic debate1 contrasting it with discussions 7in his opinion7 more useful2 wherein entire situations1 each with its full clothing and assemblage of circumstances1 were reviewed and estimated4#dd ,all these are protests1 by persons accustomed to deal with real life1 and to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace1 against that conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms1 which ,sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples4 ,on the other side1 we have the emphatic declaration made by the ,platonic ,sokrates 7and made still earlier by the ,xenophontic#de or historical ,sokrates7--,that a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in the concrete--that he had no right to affirm or deny that attribute1 with respect to any given subject--that he was not9999 even fit to live unless he could explain what was meant by ,the ,beautiful1 or ,beauty in the abstract4 ,here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual habits1 the antithesis between which1 indicated in this dialogue1 is described at large and forcibly in the ,thettus4#df ,footnote #dd3 ,aristophan4 ,nubes1 #acj4 ,greek3 lo_/gn a7kribn schindala_/mous--paipa_/l4 ,nub4 #bfa1 ,aves1 #dcj4 ,greek3 leptota_/tn l_/rn i7ereu1 ,nub4 #cei4 ,greek3 gn_/mais leptais1 ,nub4 #adjd4 ,greek3 skariphismoisi l_/rn1 ,ran4 #adig4 ,greek3 smileu_/mata--id4 #hai4 ,isokrates1 ,greek3 ,pros ,nikokle_/a1 s4 #fi1 antithesis of the ,greek3 lo_/goi politikoi and ,greek3 lo_/goi e7ristikoi_/--ma_/lista men kai a7po tn kairn therein sumbouleu_/ontas1 ei7 de m1 kath' o7_/ln tn pragma_/tn le_/gontas--which is almost exactly the phrase ascribed to ,hippias by ,plato in this ,hippias ,major4 ,also ,isokrates1 ,contra ,sophistas1 s4 #bd-be1 where he contrasts the useless ,greek3 logi_/dia1 debated by the contentious dialecticians 7,sokrates and ,plato being probably included in this designation71 with his own ,greek3 lo_/goi politikoi_/4 ,compare also ,isokrates1 ,or4 xv4 ,de ,permutatione1 s4 #baa-bac-bhe-bhg4 ,footnote #de3 ,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #a1 #af4 ,footnote #df3 ,plato1 ,thett4 pp4 #agc-agd-age4 ,side-note3 ,concrete ,aggregates--abstract or logical ,aggregates4 ,distinct aptitudes required by ,aristotle for the ,dialectician4 ,when ,hippias accuses ,sokrates of neglecting to notice ,wholes or ,aggregates1 this is true in the sense of ,concrete ,wholes--the phenomenal sequences and co-existences1 perceived by sense or imagined4 ,but the ,universal 7as ,aristotle says7#dg is one kind of ,whole3 a ,logical ,whole1 having logical parts4 ,in the minds of ,sokrates and ,plato1 the ,logical ,whole separable into its logical parts and into them only1 were preponderant4 ,footnote #dg3 ,aristot4 ,physic4 i4 #a4 ,greek3 to gar o7_/lon kata tn ai7_/sthsin gnrim_/teron1 to de katho_/lou o7_/lon ti e7sti2 polla gar perilamba_/nei 7s me_/r to katho_/lou4 ,compare ,simplikius1 ,schol4 ,brandis ad loc4 p4 #cbd1 a4 #aj-bf4 ,side-note3 ,antithesis of ,absolute and ,relative1 here brought into debate by ,plato1 in regard to the ,idea of ,beauty4 ,one other point deserves peculiar notice1 in the dialogue under our review4 ,the problem started is1 ,what is the ,beautiful--the ,self-,beautiful1 or ,beauty per se3 and it is assumed that this must be ,something1#dh that from the accession of which1 each particular beautiful thing becomes beautiful4 ,but ,sokrates presently comes to make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that which appears to be beautiful4 ,some things 7he says7 appear beautiful1 but are not so in reality3 some are beautiful1 but do not appear so4 ,the problem1 as he states it1 is1 to find1 not what that is which makes objects appear beautiful1 but what it is that makes them really beautiful4 ,this distinction1 as we find it in the language of ,hippias1 is one of degree only3#di that is beautiful which appears so to every one and at all times4 ,but in the language of ,sokrates1 the distinction is radical3 to be beautiful is one thing1 to appear beautiful is another2 whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality1 is a mere engine of deceit1 and not what ,sokrates is enquiring for4#ej ,the ,self-,beautiful or real ,beauty is so1 whether any one perceives it to be beautiful or not3 it is an ,absolute1 which exists per se1 having no relation to any sentient or percipient subject4#ea ,at any rate1 such is the manner in which ,plato conceives it1 when he starts here as a problem to enquire1 ,what it is4 ,footnote #dh3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bhf ,k4 ,greek3 au7to to kalon o7_/1 ti e7_/stin4 ,also #bhg ,d1 #bhi ,d4 ,footnote #di3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bia ,d1 #bib ,e4 ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,maj4 #bid ,a-,b1 #bii ,a4 ,footnote #ea3 ,dr4 ,hutcheson1 in his inquiry into the ,original of our ,ideas of ,beauty and ,virtue1 observes 7sect4 i4 and ii4 p4 #ad-af73-- ,beauty is either original or comparative1 or1 if any like the terms better1 absolute or relative2 only let it be observed1 that by absolute or original1 is not understood any quality supposed to be in the object1 which should of itself be beautiful1 without relation to any mind which perceives it4 ,for ,beauty1 like other names of sensible ideas1 properly denotes the perception of some mind4 4 4 4 4 ,our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men1 or about the foundation of their sense of beauty1 for 7as above hinted7 ,beauty has always relation to the sense of some mind2 and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that occur to us are beautiful1 we mean that such objects are agreeable to the sense of men1 c4 ,the same is repeated1 sect4 iv4 p4 #dj2 sect4 vi4 p4 #gb4 ,herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between ,plato and his master3 for ,sokrates 7in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia7 affirms distinctly that ,beauty is altogether relative to human wants and appreciations4 ,the ,real and ,absolute1 on the one hand1 wherein alone resides truth and beauty--as against the phenomenal and relative1 on the other hand1 the world of illusion and meanness--this is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in ,plato4 ,i shall take it up more at large1 when ,i come to discuss his argument against ,protagoras in the ,thettus4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,hippias ,minor--characters and situation supposed4 ,i now come to the ,lesser ,hippias3 in which 7as we have already seen in the ,greater7 that ,sophist is described by epithets1 affirming varied and extensive accomplishments1 as master of arithmetic1 geometry1 astronomy1 poetry 7especially that of ,homer71 legendary lore1 music1 metrical and rhythmical diversities1 c4 ,his memory was prodigious1 and he had even invented for himself a technical scheme for assisting memory4 ,he had composed poems1 epic1 lyric1 and tragic1 as well as many works in prose3 he was1 besides1 a splendid lecturer on ethical and political subjects1 and professed to answer any question which might be asked4 ,furthermore1 he was skilful in many kinds of manual dexterity3 having woven his own garments1 plaited his own girdle1 made his own shoes1 engraved his own seal-ring1 and fabricated for himself a curry-comb and oil-flask4#eb ,lastly1 he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel4 ,what he is made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character1 than with the preceding4 ,he talks with silliness and presumption1 so as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of ,sokrates1 ,there is a third interlocutor1 ,eudikus3 but he says very little1 and other auditors are alluded to generally1 who say nothing4#ec ,footnote #eb3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cfh4 ,footnote #ec3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cfi ,d1 #cgc ,b4 ,ast rejects both the dialogues called by the name of ,hippias1 as not composed by ,plato4 ,schleiermacher doubts about both1 and rejects the ,hippias ,minor 7which he considers as perhaps worked up by a ,platonic scholar from a genuine sketch by ,plato himself7 but will not pass the same sentence upon the ,hippias ,major 7,schleierm4 ,einleit4 vol4 ii4 pp4 #bic-bif2 vol4 v4 #cii-djc4 ,ast1 ,platon's ,leben und ,schriften1 pp4 #deg-dfd74 ,stallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of ,plato1 and in my judgment with good reason 7,prolegg4 ad ,hipp4 ,maj4 vol4 iv4 pp4 #ade-aej2 ad ,hipp4 ,minor1 pp4 #bbg-bce74 ,steinhart 7,einleit4 p4 #ii7 and ,socher 7,ueber ,platon1 p4 #add seq41 #bae seq47 maintain the same opinion on these dialogues as ,stallbaum4 ,it is to be remarked that ,schleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the genuineness of the dialogues2 and ,i think that even in his own statement the reasons for preponderate4 ,the reasons which both ,schleiermacher and ,ast produce as proving the spuriousness1 are in my view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion4 ,there is bad taste1 sophistry1 an overdose of banter and derision 7they say very truly71 in the part assigned to ,sokrates3 there are also differences of view1 as compared with ,sokrates in other dialogues2 various other affirmations 7they tell us7 are not ,platonic4 ,i admit much of this1 but ,i still do not accept their conclusion4 ,these critics cannot bear to admit any ,platonic work as genuine unless it affords to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the author4 ,this postulate ,i altogether contest2 and ,i think that differences of view1 as between ,sokrates in one dialogue and ,sokrates in another1 are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested 7witness the ,protagoras and ,gorgias74 ,moreover ,ast designates 7p4 #djd7 a doctrine as durchaus unsokratisch which ,stallbaum justly remarks 7p4 #bcc7 to have been actually affirmed by ,sokrates in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia4 ,stallbaum thinks that both the two dialogues 7,socher1 that the ,hippias ,minor only7 were composed by ,plato among his earlier works1 and this may probably be true4 ,the citation and refutation of the ,hippias ,minor by ,aristotle 7,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 #ajbe1 a4 #f7 counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the dialogue is ,plato's work4 ,schleiermacher and ,ast set this evidence aside because ,aristotle does not name ,plato as the author4 ,but if the dialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than ,plato1 ,aristotle would have named the author4 ,mention by ,aristotle1 though without ,plato's name1 is of greater value to support the genuineness than the purely internal grounds stated by ,ast and ,schleiermacher against it4 ,side-note3 ,hippias has just delivered a lecture1 in which he extols ,achilles as better than ,odysseus--the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty4 ,in the ,hippias ,minor1 that ,sophist appears as having just concluded a lecture upon ,homer1 in which he had extolled ,achilles as better than ,odysseus3 ,achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward1 ,odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks4 ,sokrates1 who had been among the auditors1 cross-examines ,hippias upon the subject of this affirmation4 ,homer 7says ,hippias7 considers veracious men1 and mendacious men1 to be not merely different1 but opposite3 and ,i agree with him4 ,permit me 7,sokrates remarks7 to ask some questions about the meaning of this from you1 since ,i cannot ask any from ,homer himself4 ,you will answer both for yourself and him4#ed ,footnote #ed3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cfe ,c-,d4 ,the remark here made by ,sokrates--,the poet is not here to answer for himself1 so that you cannot put any questions to him is a point of view familiar to ,plato3 insisted upon forcibly in the ,protagoras 7#cdg ,e71 and farther generalised in the ,phdrus1 so as to apply to all written matter compared with personal converse 7,phdrus1 p4 #bge ,d74 ,this ought to count1 so far as it goes1 as a fragment of proof that the ,hippias ,minor is a genuine work of ,plato1 instead of which ,schleiermacher treats it 7p4 #bie7 as evincing a poor copy1 made by some imitator of ,plato1 from the ,protagoras4 ,mendacious men 7answers ,hippias1 to a string of questions1 somewhat prolix7 are capable1 intelligent1 wise3 they are not incapable or ignorant4 ,if a man be incapable of speaking falsely1 or ignorant1 he is not mendacious4 ,now the capable man is one who can make sure of doing what he wishes to do1 at the time and occasion when he does wish it1 without let or hindrance4#ee ,footnote #ee3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cff ,b-,c4 ,side-note3 ,this is contested by ,sokrates4 ,the veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer truly if he chooses1 is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses1 i4e4 the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other4 ,you1 ,hippias 7says ,sokrates71 are expert on matters of arithmetic3 you can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the subject4 ,you are better on the subject than the ignorant man1 who cannot make sure of doing the same4 ,but as you can make sure of answering truly1 so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely1 whenever you choose to do so4 ,now the ignorant man cannot make sure of answering falsely4 ,he may1 by reason of his ignorance1 when he wishes to answer falsely1 answer truly without intending it4 ,you1 therefore1 the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic1 are better than the ignorant and the bad for both purposes--for speaking falsely1 and for speaking truly4#ef ,footnote #ef3 ,plato1 ,hippias ,minor1 #cff ,e4 ,greek3 ,po_/teron su a7n ma_/lista pseu_/doio kai a7ei kata tau7ta pseud le_/gois peri tou_/tn1 boulo_/menos pseu_/desthai kai mde_/pote a7lth a7pokri_/nesthai8 7_/ o7 a7maths ei7s logismous du_/nait' a7n sou mallon pseu_/desthai boulome_/nou8 7 o7 men a7maths polla_/kis a7n boulo_/menos pseud le_/gein ta7lth a7n ei7_/poi a7_/kn1 ei7 tu_/choi1 dia to m ei7de_/nai--su de o7 sopho_/s1 ei7_/per bou_/loio pseu_/desthai1 a7ei a7n kata ta au7ta pseu_/doio8 ,side-note3 ,analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses4 ,what is true about arithmetic1 is true in other departments also4 ,the only man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses is the man who can speak truly whenever he chooses4 ,now1 the mendacious man1 as we agreed1 is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses4 ,accordingly1 the mendacious man1 and the veracious man1 are the same4 ,they are not different1 still less opposite3 nay1 the two epithets belong only to one and the same person4 ,the veracious man is not better than the mendacious--seeing that he is one and the same4#eg ,footnote #eg3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cfg ,c1 #cfh ,e1 #cfi ,a-,b4 ,you see1 therefore1 ,hippias1 that the distinction1 which you drew and which you said that ,homer drew1 between ,achilles and ,odysseus1 will not hold4 ,you called ,achilles veracious1 and ,odysseus1 mendacious3 but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them1 the other must belong to him also4#eh ,footnote #eh3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cfj ,b4 ,side-note3 ,view of ,sokrates respecting ,achilles in the ,iliad4 ,he thinks that ,achilles speaks falsehood cleverly4 ,hippias maintains that if ,achilles ever speaks falsehood1 it is with an innocent purpose1 whereas ,odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose4 ,sokrates then tries to make out that ,achilles speaks falsehood in the ,iliad1 and speaks it very cleverly1 because he does so in a way to escape detection from ,odysseus himself4 ,to this ,hippias replies1 that if ,achilles ever speaks falsehood1 he does it innocently1 without any purpose of cheating or injuring any one2 whereas the falsehoods of ,odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent4#ei ,it is impossible 7he contends7 that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully and intentionally1 should be better than those who do so unwillingly and without design4 ,the laws deal much more severely with the former than with the latter4#fj ,footnote #ei3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cgj ,e4 ,footnote #fj3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cgb ,a4 ,side-note3 ,issue here taken--,sokrates contends that those who hurt1 or cheat1 or lie wilfully1 are better than those who do the like unwillingly--he entreats ,hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions4 ,upon this point1 ,hippias 7says ,sokrates71 ,i dissent from you entirely4 ,i am1 unhappily1 a stupid person1 who cannot find out the reality of things3 and this appears plainly enough when ,i come to talk with wise men like you1 for ,i always find myself differing from you4 ,my only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put questions and learn from you1 and in my gratitude for your answers and teaching4 ,i think that those who hurt mankind1 or cheat1 or lie1 or do wrong1 wilfully--are better than those who do the same unwillingly4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 from my stupidity1 the opposite view presents itself to me1 and ,i become confused3 but now1 after talking with you1 the fit of confidence has come round upon me again1 to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong unwillingly1 as worse than those who do wrong wilfully4 ,i entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind4 ,you will do me much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper4 ,but it will be useless for you to give me one of your long discourses3 for ,i warn you that ,i cannot follow it4 ,the only way to confer upon me real service1 will be to answer my questions again1 as you have hitherto done4 ,assist me1 ,eudikus1 in persuading ,hippias to do so4 ,assistance from me 7says ,eudikus7 will hardly be needed1 for ,hippias professed himself ready to answer any man's questions4 ,yes--,i did so 7replies ,hippias7--but ,sokrates always brings trouble into the debate1 and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief4 ,eudikus repeats his request1 and ,hippias1 in deference to him1 consents to resume the task of answering4#fa ,footnote #fa3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cgc ,b4 ,side-note3 ,questions of ,sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special arts4 ,the unskilful artist1 who runs1 wrestles1 or sings badly1 whether he will or not1 is worse than the skilful1 who can sing well when he chooses1 but can also sing badly when he chooses4 ,sokrates then produces a string of questions1 with a view to show that those who do wrong wilfully1 are better than those who do wrong unwillingly4 ,he appeals to various analogies4 ,in running1 the good runner is he who runs quickly1 the bad runner is he who runs slowly4 ,what is evil and base in running is1 to run slowly4 ,it is the good runner who does this evil wilfully3 it is the bad runner who does it unwillingly4#fb ,the like is true about wrestling and other bodily exercises4 ,he that is good in the body1 can work either strongly or feebly1--can do either what is honourable or what is base2 so that when he does what is base1 he does it wilfully4 ,but he that is bad in the body does what is base unwillingly1 not being able to help it4#fc ,footnote #fb3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cgc ,d-,e4 ,footnote #fc3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cgd ,b4 ,what is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength1 is not less true about those depending on grace and elegance4 ,to be wilfully ungraceful1 belongs only to the well-constituted body3 none but the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it4 ,the same1 also1 about the feet1 voice1 eyes1 ears1 nose3 of these organs1 those which act badly through will and intention1 are preferable to those which act badly without will or intention4 ,lameness of feet is a misfortune and disgrace3 feet which go lame only by intention are much to be preferred4#fd ,footnote #fd3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cgd ,c-,d4 ,again1 in the instruments which we use1 a rudder or a bow1--or the animals about us1 horses or dogs1--those are better with which we work badly when we choose2 those are worse1 with which we work badly without design1 and contrary to our own wishes4 ,side-note3 ,it is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design1 than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit4 ,it is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by design1 than that of one who misses when he tries to hit4 ,the like about all other arts--the physician1 the harper1 the flute-player4 ,in each of these artists1 that mind is better1 which goes wrong only wilfully--that mind is worse1 which goes wrong unwillingly1 while wishing to go right4 ,in regard to the minds of our slaves1 we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they choose1 to those which go wrong without their own choice4#fe ,footnote #fe3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cgf ,b-,d4 ,having carried his examination through this string of analogous particulars1 and having obtained from ,hippias successive answers--,yes--true in that particular case1 ,sokrates proceeds to sum up the result3-- ,sokr4--,well6 should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible8 ,hip4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,we have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully1 than if they do so unwillingly8 ,hip4--,but it will be dreadful1 ,sokrates1 if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than the unwilling4 ,side-note3 ,dissent and repugnance of ,hippias4 ,sokr4--,nevertheless--it seems so3 from what we have said4 ,hip4--,it does not seem so to me4 ,sokr4--,i thought that it would have seemed so to you1 as it does to me4 ,however1 answer me once more--,is not justice either a certain mental capacity8 or else knowledge8 or both together8#ff ,hip4--,yes6 it is4 ,sokr4--,if justice be a capacity of the mind1 the more capable mind will also be the juster3 and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better4 ,hip4--,we have4 ,sokr4--,if it be knowledge1 the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be the juster3 if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge1 that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing1--will be the juster that which is less capable and less knowing1 will be the more unjust4 ,hip4--,so it appears4 ,sokr4--,now we have shown that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind1 and more competent to exert itself both ways--to do what is honourable as well as what is base--in every employment4 ,hip4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,when1 therefore1 such a mind does what is base1 it does so wilfully1 through its capacity or intelligence1 which we have seen to be of the nature of justice8 ,hip4--,it seems so4 ,sokr4--,doing base things1 is acting unjustly3 doing honourable things1 is acting justly4 ,accordingly1 when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly1 it will do so wilfully2 while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it8 ,hip4--,apparently4 ,footnote #ff3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cge ,d4 ,greek3 7 dikaiosu_/n ou7chi 7 du_/nami_/s ti_/s e7stin1 7 e7pist_/m1 7 a7mpho_/tera8 ,side-note3 ,conclusion--,that none but the good man can do evil wilfully3 the bad man does evil unwillingly4 ,hippias cannot resist the reasoning1 but will not accept the conclusion--,sokrates confesses his perplexity4 ,sokr4--,now the good man is he that has the good mind3 the bad man is he that has the bad mind4 ,it belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong wilfully1 to the bad man1 to do wrong without wishing it--that is1 if the good man be he that has the good mind8 ,hip4--,but that is unquestionable--that he has it4 ,sokr4--,accordingly1 he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things wilfully1 if there be any such character--can be no other than the good man4 ,hip4--,i do not know how to concede that to you1 ,sokrates4#fg ,sokr4--,nor ,i1 how to concede it to myself1 ,hippias3 yet so it must appear to us1 now at least1 from the past debate4 ,as ,i told you long ago1 ,i waver hither and thither upon this matter2 my conclusions never remain the same4 ,no wonder indeed that ,i and other vulgar men waver2 but if you wise men waver also1 that becomes a fearful mischief even to us1 since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment4#fh ,footnote #fg3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cge ,e1 #cgf ,b4 ,footnote #fh3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cgf ,c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i will here again remind the reader1 that in this1 as in the other dialogues1 the real speaker is ,plato throughout3 and that it is he alone who prefixes the different names to words determined by himself4 ,side-note3 ,remarks on the dialogue4 ,if the parts had been inverted1 the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the ,sophists4 ,now1 if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the parts inverted1 and with the reasoning of ,sokrates assigned to ,hippias1 most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of sophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the ,athenian ,sophists--as persons who considered truth and falsehood to be on a par--subverters of morality--and corruptors of the youth of ,athens4#fi ,but as we read it1 all that1 which in the mouth of ,hippias would have passed for sophistry1 is here put forward by ,sokrates2 while ,hippias not only resists his conclusions1 and adheres to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously1 even when he is unable to defend it1 but hates the propositions forced upon him1 protests against the perverse captiousness of ,sokrates1 and requires much pressing to induce him to continue the debate4 ,upon the views adopted by the critics1 ,hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct1 as a friend of virtue and morality4 ,to me1 such reluctance to debate appears a defect rather than a merit2 but ,i cite the dialogue as illustrating what ,i have already said in another place--that ,sokrates and ,plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical doctrine1 than either ,hippias or ,protagoras1 or any of the other persons denounced as ,sophists4 ,footnote #fi3 ,accordingly one of the ,platonic critics1 ,schwalbe 7,oeuvres de ,platon1 p4 #aaf71 explains ,plato's purpose in the ,hippias ,minor by saying1 that ,sokrates here serves out to the ,sophists a specimen of their own procedure1 and gives them an example of sophistical dialectic1 by defending a sophistical thesis in a sophistical manner3 ,that he chooses and demonstrates at length the thesis--the liar is not different from the truth-teller--as an exposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given proposition1 and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false morality of ,hippias1 who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough4 ,schwalbe1 while he affirms that this is the purpose of ,plato1 admits that the part here assigned to ,sokrates is unworthy of him2 and ,steinhart maintains that ,plato never could have had any such purpose1 however frequently 7,steinhart says71 sophistical artifices may occur in this conversation of ,sokrates1 which artifices ,sokrates no more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of that day 7so hufig auch in seinen ,errterungen sophistische ,kunstgriffe vorkommen mgen1 die ,sokrates eben so wenig verschmaht hat1 als irgend ein ,philosoph oder ,redeknstler dieser ,zeit74 ,steinhart1 ,einleitung zum ,hipp4 ,minor1 p4 #aji4 ,i do not admit the purpose here ascribed to ,plato by ,schwalbe1 but ,i refer to the passage as illustrating what ,platonic critics think of the reasoning assigned to ,sokrates in the ,hippias ,minor1 and the hypotheses which they introduce to colour it4 ,the passage cited from ,steinhart also--that ,sokrates no more disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher or rhetorician of the age--is worthy of note1 as coming from one who is so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the persons called ,sophists1 of which we have no specimens left4 ,side-note3 ,polemical purpose of the dialogue--,hippias humiliated by ,sokrates4 ,that ,plato intended to represent this accomplished ,sophist as humiliated by ,sokrates1 is evident enough3 and the words put into his mouth are suited to this purpose4 ,the eloquent lecturer1 so soon as his admiring crowd of auditors has retired1 proves unable to parry the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind1 upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident1 and upon which every one 7from ,homer downward7 agrees with him4 ,besides this1 however1 ,plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple and absurd things4 ,all this is the personal1 polemical1 comic scope of the dialogue4 ,it lends 7whether well-placed or not7 a certain animation and variety1 which the author naturally looked out for1 in an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man and society4 ,but though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain1 its philosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably4 ,they do not like to see ,sokrates employing sophistry against the ,sophists3 that is1 as they think1 casting out devils by the help of ,beelzebub4 ,and certainly1 upon the theory which they adopt1 respecting the relation between ,plato and ,sokrates on one side1 and the ,sophists on the other1 ,i think this dialogue is very difficult to explain4 ,but ,i do not think it is difficult1 upon a true theory of the ,platonic writings4 ,side-note3 ,philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the ,dialogues of ,search generally1 and of ,knowledge as understood by ,plato4 ,in a former chapter1 ,i tried to elucidate the general character and purpose of those ,dialogues of ,search1 which occupy more than half the ,thrasyllean ,canon1 and of which we have already reviewed two or three specimens--,euthyphron1 ,alkibiads1 c4 ,we have seen that they are distinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion3 that they prove nothing1 but only1 at the most1 disprove one or more supposable solutions3 that they are not processes in which one man who knows communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers1 but in which all are alike ignorant1 and all are employed1 either in groping1 or guessing1 or testing the guesses of the rest4 ,we have farther seen that the value of these ,dialogues depends upon the ,platonic theory about knowledge2 that ,plato did not consider any one to know1 who could not explain to others all that he knew1 reply to the cross-examination of a ,sokratic ,elenchus1 and cross-examine others to test their knowledge3 that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by hearing1 or reading1 or committing to memory a theorem1 together with the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it3--but that there was required1 besides1 an acquaintance with many counter-theorems1 each having more or less appearance of truth2 as well as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions on the subject1 which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge4 ,unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can devise1 you cannot be said to know4 ,moreover1 it is in this last portion of the conditions of knowledge1 that most aspirants are found wanting4 ,side-note3 ,the ,hippias is an exemplification of this theory--,sokrates sets forth a case of confusion1 and avows his inability to clear it up4 ,confusion shown up in the ,lesser ,hippias--,error in the ,greater4 ,now the ,greater and ,lesser ,hippias are peculiar specimens of these ,dialogues of ,search1 and each serves the purpose above indicated4 ,the ,greater ,hippias enumerates a string of tentatives1 each one of which ends in acknowledged failure3 the ,lesser ,hippias enunciates a thesis1 which ,sokrates proceeds to demonstrate1 by plausible arguments such as ,hippias is forced to admit4 ,but though ,hippias admits each successive step1 he still mistrusts the conclusion1 and suspects that he has been misled--a feeling which ,plato#gj describes elsewhere as being frequent among the respondents of ,sokrates4 ,nay1 ,sokrates himself shares in the mistrust--presents himself as an unwilling propounder of arguments which force themselves upon him1#ga and complains of his own mental embarrassment4 ,now you may call this sophistry1 if you please2 and you may silence its propounders by calling them hard names4 ,but such ethical prudery--hiding all the uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to analyse an established sentiment1 and treating them as non-existent because you refuse to look at them--is not the way1 to attain what ,plato calls knowledge4 ,if there be any argument1 the process of which seems indisputable1 while yet its conclusion contradicts1 or seems to contradict1 what is known1 upon other evidence--the full and patient analysis of that argument is indispensable1 before you can become master of the truth and able to defend it4 ,until you have gone through such analysis1 your mind must remain in that state of confusion which is indicated by ,sokrates at the end of the ,lesser ,hippias4 ,as it is a part of the process of ,search1 to travel in the path of the ,greater ,hippias--that is1 to go through a string of erroneous solutions1 each of which can be proved1 by reasons shown1 to be erroneous3 so it is an equally important part of the same process1 to travel in the path of the ,lesser ,hippias--that is1 to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments1 bearing on the case1 in which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly demonstrated1 and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which of them is erroneous--or whether both are not erroneous4 ,the ,greater ,hippias exhibits errors1--the ,lesser ,hippias puts before us confusion4 ,with both these enemies the ,searcher for truth must contend3 and ,bacon tells us1 that confusion is the worst enemy of the two--,citius emergit veritas ex errore1 quam ex confusione4 ,plato1 in the ,lesser ,hippias1 having in hand a genuine ,sokratic thesis1 does not disdain to invest ,sokrates with the task 7sophistical1 as some call it1 yet not the less useful and instructive7 of setting forth at large this case of confusion1 and avowing his inability to clear it up4 ,it is enough for ,sokrates that he brings home the painful sense of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own4 ,in that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther intellectual effort4#gb ,the dialogue ends but the process of search1 far from ending along with it1 is emphatically declared to be unfinished1 and1 to be in a condition not merely unsatisfactory but intolerable1 not to be relieved except by farther investigation1 which thus becomes a necessary sequel4 ,footnote #gj3 ,plato1 ,republ4 vi4 #dhg ,b4 ,greek3 ,kai o7 ,a7dei_/mantos1 7 ,s_/krates1 e7_/ph1 pros men tauta_/ soi ou7deis a7n oi7os t' ei7_/ a7nteipein2 a7lla gar toio_/nde ti pa_/schousin oi7 a7kou_/ontes e7ka_/stote a7 nun le_/geis2 7gountai di' a7peiri_/an tou e7rtan kai a7pokri_/nesthai u7po tou lo_/gou par' e7_/kaston to e7r_/tma smikron parago_/menoi1 a7throisthe_/ntn tn smikrn e7pi teleuts tn lo_/gn1 me_/ga to spha_/lma kai e7nanti_/on tois pr_/tois a7naphai_/nesthai 4 4 4 e7pei to_/ ge a7lthes ou7de_/n ti mallon tau_/t e7_/chein4 ,this passage1 attesting the effect of the ,sokratic examination upon the minds of auditors1 ought to be laid to heart by those ,platonic critics who denounce the ,sophists for generating scepticism and uncertainty4 ,footnote #ga3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,minor1 #cgc ,b2 also the last sentence of the dialogue4 ,footnote #gb3 ,see the passage in ,republic1 vii4 #ebc-ebd1 where the ,greek3 to parakltikon kai e7gertikon ts no_/ses is declared to arise from the pain of a felt contradiction4 ,there are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this dialogue--,hippias ,minor4 #a4 ,that the thesis out of which the confusion arises1 is one which we know to have been laid down by the historical ,sokrates himself4 #b4 ,that ,aristotle expressly notices this thesis1 as well as the dialogue in which it is contained1 and combats it4 ,side-note3 ,the thesis maintained here by ,sokrates1 is also affirmed by the historical ,sokrates in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia4 ,sokrates in his conversation with the youthful ,euthydemus 7in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia7 maintains1 that of two persons1 each of whom deceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief1 the one who does so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so unwillingly4#gc ,euthydemus 7like ,hippias in this dialogue7 maintains the opposite1 but is refuted by ,sokrates2 who argues that justice is a matter to be learnt and known like letters2 that the lettered man1 who has learnt and knows letters1 can write wrongly when he chooses1 but never writes wrongly unless he chooses--while it is only the unlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending it3 that in like manner the just man1 he that has learnt and knows justice1 never commits injustice unless when he intends it--while the unjust man1 who has not learnt and does not know justice1 commits injustice whether he will or not4 ,it is the just man therefore1 and none but the just man 7,sokrates maintains71 who commits injustice knowingly and wilfully3 it is the unjust man who commits injustice without wishing or intending it4#gd ,footnote #gc3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #b1 #ai4 ,greek3 tn de d tous phi_/lous e7xapat_/ntn e7pi blab 7i7_/na mde touto paralei_/pmen a7_/skepton7 po_/teros a7dik_/tero_/s e7stin1 o7 e7kn 7 o7 a7_/kn8 ,the natural meaning of ,greek3 e7pi blab would be1 for the purpose of mischief2 and ,schneider1 in his ,index1 gives nocendi caus4 ,but in that meaning the question would involve an impossibility1 for the words ,greek3 o7 a7_/kn exclude any such purpose4 ,footnote #gd3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #b1 #ai-bb4 ,this is the same view which is worked out by the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,hippias ,minor3 beginning with the antithesis between the veracious and mendacious man 7as ,sokrates begins in ,xenophon72 and concluding with the general result--that it belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully1 to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly4 ,side-note3 ,aristotle combats the thesis4 ,arguments against it4 ,aristotle1#ge in commenting upon this doctrine of the ,hippias ,minor1 remarks justly1 that ,plato understands the epithets veracious and mendacious in a sense different from that which they usually bear4 ,plato understands the words as designating one who can tell the truth if he chooses--one who can speak falsely if he chooses3 and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together1 and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious4 ,aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied1 not to the power itself1 but to the habitual and intentional use of that power4 ,the power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets1 and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets3 but the distinction1 which they are intended to draw1 regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed4 ,so also ,aristotle observes that ,plato's conclusion--,he that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly1 is falsely collected from induction or analogy4 ,the analogy of the special arts and accomplishments1 upon which the argument is built1 is not applicable4 ,better has reference1 not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions2 though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable4 ,footnote #ge3 ,aristotel4 ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,d4 p4 #ajbe1 a4 #h2 compare ,ethic4 ,nikomach4 iv4 p4 #aabg1 b4 #af4 ,side-note3 ,mistake of ,sokrates and ,plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct4 ,both ,sokrates and ,plato 7in many of his dialogues7 commit the error of which the above is one particular manifestation--that of dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct1#gf and omitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional1 as essentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of ethical attributes4 ,the reasoning ascribed to the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,hippias ,minor exemplifies this one-sided view4 ,what he says is true1 but it is only a part of the truth4 ,when he speaks of a person who does wrong unwillingly1 he seems to have in view one who does wrong without knowing that he does so3 one whose intelligence is so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he speaks falsehood4 ,now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be regarded as half-witted or imbecile1 coming under the head which the ,xenophontic ,sokrates called madness3#gg unfit to perform any part in society1 and requiring to be placed under tutelage4 ,compared with such a person1 the opinion of the ,platonic ,sokrates may be defended--that the mendacious person1 who can tell truth when he chooses1 is the better of the two in the sense of less mischievous or dangerous4 ,but he is the object of a very different sentiment2 moreover1 this is not the comparison present to our minds when we call one man veracious1 another man mendacious4 ,we always assume1 in every one1 a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the admissible minimum2 under such assumption1 we compare two persons1 one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief1 the other1 contrary to his knowledge and belief4 ,we approve the former and disapprove the latter1 according to the different intention and purpose of each 7as ,aristotle observes72 that is1 looking at them under the point of view of emotion and volition--which is logically distinguishable from the intelligence1 though always acting in conjunction with it4 ,footnote #gf3 ,aristotle has very just observations on these views of ,sokrates1 and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all virtue into knowledge1 all vice into ignorance4 ,see1 among other passages1 ,aristot4 ,ethica ,magna1 i4 #aahb1 a4 #af2 #aahc1 b4 #i2 #aaij1 b4 #bh2 ,ethic4 ,eudem4 i4 #abaf1 b1 #d4 ,the remarks of ,aristotle upon ,sokrates and ,plato evince a real progress in ethical theory4 ,footnote #gg3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iii4 #i1 #g4 ,greek3 tous dimartko_/tas1 7n oi7 polloi gign_/skousi1 mainome_/nous kalein1 c4 ,side-note3 ,they rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--,they take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame4 ,again1 the analogy of the special arts1 upon which the ,platonic ,sokrates dwells in the ,hippias ,minor1 fails in sustaining his inference4 ,by a good runner1 wrestler1 harper1 singer1 speaker1 c41 we undoubtedly mean one who can1 if he pleases1 perform some one of these operations well2 although he can also1 if he pleases1 perform them badly4 ,but the epithets good or bad1 in this case1 consider exclusively that element which was left out1 and leave out that element which was exclusively considered1 in the former case4 ,the good singer is declared to stand distinguished from the bad singer1 or from the ,greek3 i7di_/ts1 who1 if he sings at all1 will certainly sing badly1 by an attribute belonging to his intelligence and vocal organs4 ,to sing well is a special accomplishment1 which is possessed only by a few1 and which no man is blamed for not possessing4 ,the distinction between such special accomplishments1 and justice or rectitude of behaviour1 is well brought out in the speech which ,plato puts into the mouth of the ,sophist ,protagoras4#gh ,the special artists 7he says7 are few in number3 one of them is sufficient for many private citizens4 ,but every citizen1 without exception1 must possess justice and a sense of shame3 if he does not1 he must be put away as a nuisance--otherwise1 society could not be maintained4 ,the special artist is a citizen also2 and as such1 must be subject to the obligations binding on all citizens universally4 ,in predicating of him that he is good or bad as a citizen1 we merely assume him to possess the average intelligence1 of the community2 and the epithet declares whether his emotional and volitional attributes exceed1 or fall short of1 the minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his social obligations4 ,it is thus that the words good or bad when applied to him as a citizen1 have a totally different bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in his character of special artist4 ,footnote #gh3 ,plato1 ,protagoras1 #cbb4 ,side-note3 ,value of a ,dialogue of ,search1 that it shall be suggestive1 and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review4 ,the value of these debates in the ,platonic dialogues consists in their raising questions like the preceding1 for the reflection of the reader--whether the ,platonic ,sokrates may or may not be represented as taking what we think the right view of the question4 ,for a ,dialogue of ,search1 the great merit is1 that it should be suggestive2 that it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite for a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets1 and the state of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses them4 ,no man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar epithets1 which he has been using all his life--unless the process be forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings home to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and contradiction4 ,if a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical or political theory1 he must render himself master1 not only of the sound arguments and the guiding analogies but also of the unsound arguments and the misleading analogies1 which bear upon each portion of it4 ,side-note3 ,antithesis between ,rhetoric and ,dialectic4 ,there is one other point of similitude deserving notice1 between the ,greater and ,lesser ,hippias4 ,in both of them1 ,hippias makes special complaint of ,sokrates1 for breaking the question in pieces and picking out the minute puzzling fragments--instead of keeping it together as a whole1 and applying to it the predicates which it merits when so considered4#gi ,here is the standing antithesis between ,rhetoric and ,dialectic3 between those unconsciously acquired mental combinations which are poured out in eloquent1 impressive1 unconditional1 and undistinguishing generalities--and the logical analysis which resolves the generality into its specialities1 bringing to view inconsistencies1 contradictions1 limits1 qualifications1 c4 ,i have already touched upon this at the close of the ,greater ,hippias4 ,footnote #gi3 ,plato1 ,hipp4 ,min4 #cfi ,b-,c4 ,greek3 7 ,s_/krates1 a7ei su_/ tinas toiou_/tous ple_/keis lo_/gous1 kai a7polamba_/nn o7_/ a7n 7 duschere_/staton tou lo_/gou1 tou_/tou e7_/chei kata smikron e7phapto_/menos1 kai ou7ch o7_/l a7gni_/zei t pra_/gmati1 peri o7_/tou a7n o7 lo_/gos 71 c4 ,a remark of ,aristotle 7,topica1 viii4 #afd1 b4 #b7 illustrates this dissecting function of the ,dialectician4 ,greek3 e7_/sti ga_/r1 7s a7pls ei7pein1 dialektikos o7 protatikos kai e7nstatiko_/s2 e7_/sti de to men protei_/nesthai1 e7n poiein ta plei_/ 7dei gar e7n o7_/l lphthnai pros o7 o7 lo_/gos71 to d' e7ni_/stasthai1 to e7n polla_/2 7 gar diairei1 7 a7nairei1 to men didou_/s1 to de ou7_/1 tn proteinome_/nn4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,hipparchus--,,minos4 ,in these two dialogues1 ,plato sets before us two farther specimens of that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search after reasoned truth4 ,sokrates forces upon the attention of a companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place1 to see whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained4 ,side-note3 ,hipparchus--,question--,what is the definition of ,lover of ,gain8 ,he is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing4 ,sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation4 ,no man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing3 in this sense1 no man is a lover of gain4 ,in the dialogue called ,hipparchus1 the debate turns on the definition of ,greek3 to philokerdes or ,greek3 o7 philokerd_/s--the love of gain or the lover of gain4 ,sokrates asks his ,companion to define the word4 ,the ,companion replies--,he is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing4#a ,does he do this 7asks ,sokrates7 knowing that the things are worth nothing8 or not knowing8 ,if the latter1 he is simply ignorant4 ,he knows it perfectly well 7is the reply74 ,he is cunning and wicked2 and it is because he cannot resist the temptation of gain1 that he has the impudence to make profit by such things1 though well aware that they are worth nothing4 ,sokr4--,suppose a husbandman1 knowing that the plant which he is tending is worthless--and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it3 does not that correspond to your description of the lover of gain8 ,comp4--,the lover of gain1 ,sokrates1 thinks that he ought to gain from every thing4 ,sokr4--,do not answer in that reckless manner1#b as if you had been wronged by any one2 but answer with attention4 ,you agree that the lover of gain knows the value of that from which he intends to derive profit2 and that the husbandman is the person cognizant of the value of plants4 ,comp4--,yes3 ,i agree4 ,sokr4--,do not therefore attempt1 you are so young1 to deceive an old man like me1 by giving answers not in conformity with your own admissions2 but tell me plainly1 ,do you believe that the experienced husbandman1 when he knows that he is planting a tree worth nothing1 thinks that he shall gain by it8 ,comp4--,no1 certainly3 ,i do not believe it4 ,footnote #a3 ,plato1 ,hipparch4 #bbe ,a4 ,greek3 oi7 a7n kerdai_/nein a7xisin a7po tn mdenos a7xi_/n4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,hipparch4 #bbe ,c4 ,sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general point4 ,the good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food given to his horse3 the good pilot1 by worthless tackle put into his ship3 the good commander1 by worthless arms delivered to his soldiers3 the good fifer1 harper1 bowman1 by employing worthless instruments of their respective arts1 if they know them to be worthless4 ,side-note3 ,gain is good4 ,every man loves good3 therefore all men are lovers of gain4 ,none of these persons 7concludes ,sokrates7 correspond to your description of the lover of gain4 ,where then can you find a lover of gain8 ,on your explanation1 no man is so4#c ,comp4--,i mean1 ,sokrates1 that the lovers of gain are those1 who1 through greediness1 long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless2 and thus display a love of gain4#d ,sokr4--,not surely knowing them to be worthless--for this we have shown to be impossible--but ignorant that they are worthless1 and believing them to be valuable4 ,comp4--,it appears so4 ,sokr4--,now gain is the opposite of loss3 and loss is evil and hurt to every one3 therefore gain 7as the opposite of loss7 is good4 ,comp4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,it appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain8 ,comp4--,yes3 it appears so4 ,sokr4--,do not you yourself love good--all good things8 ,comp4--,certainly4 ,sokr4--,and ,i too1 and every one else4 ,all men love good things1 and hate evil4 ,now we agreed that gain was a good3 so that by this reasoning1 it appears that all men are lovers of gain while by the former reasoning1 we made out that none were so4#e ,which of the two shall we adopt1 to avoid error4 ,comp4--,we shall commit no error1 ,sokrates1 if we rightly conceive the lover of gain4 ,he is one who busies himself upon1 and seeks to gain from1 things from which good men do not venture to gain4 ,footnote #c3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bbf ,d4 ,footnote #d3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bbf ,d4 ,greek3 ,a7ll' e7g1 7 ,s_/krates1 bou_/lomai le_/gein tou_/tous philokerdeis ei7nai1 oi7 e7ka_/stote u7po a7plsti_/as kai panu smikra kai o7li_/gou a7_/xia kai ou7denos gli_/chontai u7perphus kai philokerdousin4 ,footnote #e3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bbg ,c4 ,side-note3 ,apparent contradiction4 ,sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him4 ,accusation is retorted upon ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,but1 my friend1 we agreed just now1 that gain was a good1 and that all men always love good4 ,it follows therefore1 that good men as well as others love all gains1 if gains are good things4 ,comp4--,not1 certainly1 those gains by which they will afterwards be hurt4 ,sokr4--,be hurt3 you mean1 by which they will become losers4 ,comp4--,i mean that and nothing else4 ,sokr4--,do they become losers by gain1 or by loss8 ,comp4--,by both3 by loss1 and by evil gain4 ,sokr4--,does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil8 ,comp4--,no4 ,sokr4--,well6 we agreed just now that gain was the opposite of loss1 which was evil2 and that1 being the opposite of evil1 gain was good4 ,comp4--,that was what we agreed4 ,sokr4--,you see how it is3 you are trying to deceive me3 you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon4 ,comp4--,not at all1 by ,zeus3 on the contrary1 it is you1 ,sokrates1 who deceive me1 wriggling up and down in your talk1 ,i cannot tell how4#f ,sokr4--,be careful what you say3 ,i should be very culpable1 if ,i disobeyed a good and wise monitor4 ,comp4--,whom do you mean3 and what do you mean8 ,sokr4--,hipparchus1 son of ,peisistratus4 ,footnote #f3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bbh ,a4 ,sokr4--,greek3 ,o7ras ou7n8 e7picheireis me e7xapatan1 e7pi_/tdes e7nanti_/a le_/gn oi7s a7_/rti 7molog_/samen4 ,comp4 ,greek3 ,ou7 ma ,di_/'1 7 ,s_/krates2 a7lla tou7nanti_/on su e7me e7xapatas1 kai ou7k oi7da o7p e7n tois lo_/gois a7_/n kai ka_/t stre_/pheis4 ,side-note3 ,precept inscribed formerly by ,hipparchus the ,peisistratid--,never deceive a friend4 ,eulogy of ,hipparchus by ,sokrates4 ,sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of ,hipparchus3 his beneficent rule1 his wisdom1 his anxiety for the moral improvement of the ,athenians3 the causes1 different from what was commonly believed1 which led to his death2 and the wholesome precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on various busts of ,hermes throughout ,attica4 ,one of these busts or ,herm bore the words--,do not deceive a friend4#g ,footnote #g3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bbh ,b-#bbi ,d4 ,the picture here given of ,hipparchus deserves notice4 ,we are informed that he was older than his brother ,hippias1 which was the general belief at ,athens1 as ,thucydides 7i4 #bj1 vi4 #eh7 affirms1 though himself contradicting it1 and affirming that ,hippias was the elder brother4 ,plato however agrees with ,thucydides in this point1 that the three years after the assassination of ,hipparchus1 during which ,hippias ruled alone1 were years of oppression and tyranny2 and that the hateful recollection of the ,peisistratid1 which always survived in the minds of the ,athenians1 was derived from these three last years4 ,the picture which ,plato here gives of ,hipparchus is such as we might expect from a philosopher4 ,he dwells upon the pains which ,hipparchus took to have the recitation of the ,homeric poems made frequent and complete3 also upon his intimacy with the poets ,anakreon and ,simonides4 ,the colouring which ,plato gives to the intimacy between ,aristogeiton and ,harmodius is also peculiar4 ,the ,greek3 e7rasts is represented by ,plato as eager for the education and improvement of the ,greek3 e7r_/menos2 and the jealousy felt towards ,hipparchus is described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities of ,hipparchus1 which rendered him so much superior and more effective as an educator4 ,the ,companion resumes3 ,apparently1 ,sokrates1 either you do not account me your friend1 or you do not obey ,hipparchus3 for you are certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk4 ,you cannot persuade me to the contrary4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers4 ,the companion affirms that some gain is good1 other gain is evil4 ,sokr4--,well then6 in order that you may not think yourself deceived1 you may take back any move that you choose1 as if we were playing at draughts4 ,which of your admissions do you wish to retract--,that all men desire good things8 ,that loss 7to be a loser7 is evil8 ,that gain is the opposite of loss3 that to gain is the opposite of to lose8 ,that to gain1 as being the opposite of evil is a good thing8 ,comp4--,no4 ,i do not retract any one of these4 ,sokr4--,you think then1 it appears1 that some gain is good1 other gain evil8 ,comp4--,yes1 that is what ,i do think4#h ,sokr4--,well1 ,i give you back that move3 let it stand as you say4 ,some gain is good3 other gain is bad4 ,but surely the good gain is no more gain1 than the bad gain3 both are gain1 alike and equally4 ,comp4--,how do you mean8 ,footnote #h3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bbi ,e1 #bcj ,a4 ,side-note3 ,questions by ,sokrates--bad gain is gain1 as much as good gain4 ,what is the common property1 in virtue of which both are called ,gain8 ,every acquisition1 made with no outlay1 or with a smaller outlay1 is gain4 ,objections--the acquisition may be evil--embarrassment confessed4 ,sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies4 ,bad food is just as much food1 as good food3 bad drink1 as much drink as good drink3 a good man is no more man than a bad man4#i ,footnote #i3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bcj ,c4 ,sokr4--,in like manner1 bad gain1 and good gain1 are 7both of them7 gain alike--neither of them more or less than the other4 ,such being the case1 what is that common quality possessed by both1 which induces you to call them by the same name ,gain8#aj ,would you call ,gain any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all8#aa ,comp4--,yes4 ,i should call that gain4 ,sokr4--,for example1 if after being at a banquet1 not only without any outlay1 but receiving an excellent dinner1 you acquire an illness8 ,comp4--,not at all3 that is no gain4 ,sokr4--,but if from the banquet you acquire health1 would that be gain or loss8 ,comp4--,it would be gain4 ,sokr4--,not every acquisition therefore is gain1 but only such acquisitions as are good and not evil3 if the acquisition be evil1 it is loss4 ,comp4--,exactly so4 ,sokr4--,well1 now1 you see1 you are come round again to the very same point3 ,gain is good4 ,loss is evil4 ,comp4--,i am puzzled what to say4#ab ,sokr4--,you have good reason to be puzzled4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bcj ,e4 ,greek3 dia ti_/ pote a7mpho_/tera au7ta ke_/rdos kaleis8 ti_/ tau7ton e7n a7mphote_/rois o7rn8 ,footnote #aa3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bca ,a4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bca ,c4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,o7ras ou7n1 7s pa_/lin au7 peritre_/cheis ei7s to au7to--to men ke_/rdos a7gathon phai_/netai1 7 de zmi_/a kako_/n8 ,comp4 ,greek3 ,a7por e7_/gge o71 ti ei7_/p4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7di_/ks ge su a7porn4 ,side-note3 ,it is essential to gain1 that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity1 but also in value1 than the outlay4 ,the valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good4 ,conclusion comes back4 ,that ,gain is ,good4 ,but tell me3 you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much1 that is gain8 ,comp4--,yes3 but not if it be evil3 it is gain1 if it be good1 like gold or silver4 ,sokr4--,i will ask you about gold and silver4 ,suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver1 is it gain or loss8 ,comp4--,it is loss1 decidedly1 ,sokrates3 gold is twelve times the value of silver4 ,sokr4--,nevertheless he has acquired more3 double is more than half4 ,comp4--,not in value3 double silver is not more than half gold4 ,sokr4--,it appears then that we must include value as essential to gain1 not merely quantity4 ,the valuable is gain3 the valueless is no gain4 ,the valuable is that which is valuable to possess3 is that the profitable1 or the unprofitable8 ,comp4--,it is the profitable4 ,sokr4--,but the profitable is good8 ,comp4--,yes3 it is4 ,sokr4--,why then1 here1 the same conclusion comes back to us as agreed1 for the third or fourth time4 ,the gainful is good4 ,comp4--,it appears so4#ac ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,hipparch4 #bca ,d-,e1 #bcb ,a4 ,side-note3 ,recapitulation4 ,the debate has shown that all gain is good1 and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man ought to be reproached for being so4 ,the companion is compelled to admit this1 though he declares that he is not persuaded4 ,sokr4--,let me remind you of what has passed4 ,you contended that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain1 but only such as were good1 and not such as were evil4 ,but now1 the debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good1 whether small or great4 ,comp4--,as for me1 ,sokrates1 the debate has compelled me rather than persuaded me4#ad ,sokr4--,presently1 perhaps1 it may even persuade you4 ,but now1 whether you have been persuaded or not1 you at least concur with me in affirming that all gains1 whether small or great1 are good4 ,that all good men wish for all good things4 ,comp4--,i do concur4 ,sokr4--,but you yourself stated that evil men love all gains1 small and great8 ,comp4--,i said so4 ,sokr4--,according to your doctrine then1 all men are lovers of gain1 the good men as well as the evil8 ,comp4--,apparently so4 ,sokr4--,it is therefore wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain3 for the person who reproaches is himself a lover of gain1 just as much4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plat4 ,hipparch4 #bcb ,a-,b4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun nun pa_/nta ta ke_/rd o7 lo_/gos 7mas 7na_/gkake kai smikra kai mega_/la o7mologein a7gatha ei7nai8 ,comp4 ,greek3 7na_/gkake ga_/r1 7 ,s_/krates1 mallon e7me_/ ge 7 pe_/peiken4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,a7ll' i7_/ss meta touto kai pei_/seien a7n4 ,side-note3 ,minos4 ,question put by ,sokrates to the companion4 ,what is ,law1 or ,the ,law8 ,all law is the same1 quatenus law3 what is the common constituent attribute8 ,the ,minos1 like the ,hipparchus1 is a dialogue carried on between ,sokrates and a companion not named4 ,it relates to ,law1 or ,the ,law-- ,sokr4--,what is ,law 7asks ,sokrates78 ,comp4--,respecting what sort of ,law do you enquire 7replies the ,companion78 ,sokr4--,what6 is there any difference between one law and another law1 as to that identical circumstance1 of being ,law8 ,gold does not differ from gold1 so far as the being gold is concerned--nor stone from stone1 so far as being stone is concerned4 ,in like manner1 one law does not differ from another1 all are the same1 in so far as each is ,law alike3--not1 one of them more1 and another less4 ,it is about this as a whole that ,i ask you--,what is ,law8 ,side-note3 ,answer--,law is1 #a4 ,the consecrated and binding customs4 #b4 ,the decree of the city4 #c4 ,social or civic opinion4 ,comp4--,what should ,law be1 ,sokrates1 other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs8#ae ,sokr4--,do you think1 then1 that discourse is1 the things spoken3 that sight is1 the things seen8 that hearing is1 the things heard8 ,or are they not distinct1 in each of the three cases--and is not ,law also one thing1 the various customs and beliefs another8 ,comp4--,yes6 ,i now think that they are distinct4#af ,sokr4--,law is that whereby these binding customs become binding4 ,what is it8 ,comp4--,law can be nothing else than the public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us4 ,law is the decree of the city4#ag ,sokr4--,you mean1 that ,law is social opinion4 ,comp4--,yes ,i do4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cac ,b4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ ou7n a7_/llo no_/mos ei7_/ a7n a7ll' 7 ta nomizo_/mena8 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cac ,b-,c4 ,i pass over here an analogy started by ,sokrates in his next question2 as ,greek3 o7_/psis to ,greek3 ta o7r_/mena1 so ,greek3 no_/mos to ,greek3 ta nomizo_/mena1 c4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #had ,a4 ,greek3 e7peid no_/m ta nomizo_/mena nomi_/zetai1 ti_/ni o7_/nti t no_/m nomi_/zetai8 ,side-note3 ,cross-examination by ,sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law2 unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law4 ,law is highly honourable and useful3 lawlessness is ruinous4 ,accordingly1 bad decrees of the city--or bad social opinion--cannot be law4 ,sokr4--,perhaps you are right3 but let us examine4 ,you call some persons wise3--they are wise through wisdom4 ,you call some just3--they are just through justice4 ,in like manner1 the lawfully-behaving men are so through law3 the lawless men are so through lawlessness4 ,now the lawfully-behaving men are just3 the lawless men are unjust4 ,comp4--,it is so4 ,sokr4--,justice and ,law1 are highly honourable3 injustice and lawlessness1 highly dishonourable3 the former preserves cities1 the latter ruins them4 ,comp4--,yes--it does4 ,sokr4--,well1 then6 we must consider law as something honourable2 and seek after it1 under the assumption that it is a good thing4 ,you defined law to be the decree of the city3 ,are not some decrees good1 others evil8 ,comp4--,unquestionably4 ,sokr4--,but we have already said that law is not evil4 ,comp4--,i admit it4 ,sokr4--,it is incorrect therefore to answer1 as you did broadly1 that law is the decree of the city4 ,an evil decree cannot be law4 ,comp4--,i see that it is incorrect4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cad ,b-,c-,d4 ,side-note3 ,suggestion by ,sokrates--,law is the good opinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion1 or the finding out of reality4 ,law therefore wishes 7tends7 to be the finding out of reality1 though it does not always succeed in doing so4 ,sokr4--,still--,i think1 myself1 that law is opinion of some sort2 and since it is not evil opinion1 it must be good opinion4 ,now good opinion is true opinion3 and true opinion is1 the finding out of reality4 ,comp4--,i admit it4 ,sokr4--,law therefore wishes or tends to be1 the finding out of reality4#ai ,comp4--,but1 ,sokrates1 if law is the finding out of reality--if we have therein already found out realities--how comes it that all communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same matters8 ,sokr4--,the law does not the less wish or tend to find out realities2 but it is unable to do so4 ,that is1 if the fact be true as you state--that we change our laws1 and do not all of us use the same4 ,comp4--,surely1 the fact as a fact is obvious enough4#bj ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cae ,a4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun 7 a7lths do_/xa tou o7_/ntos e7stin e7xeu_/resis8 4 4 4 o7 no_/mos a7_/ra bou_/letai tou o7_/ntos ei7nai e7xeu_/resis8 ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cae ,a-,b4 ,side-note3 ,objection taken by the ,companion--,that there is great discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length4 ,sokrates reproves his prolixity1 and requests him to confine himself to question or answer4 7,the ,companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites1 venerable in one place1 abhorrent in another1 such as the human sacrifices at ,carthage1 c41 thus lengthening his answer much beyond what it had been before4 ,sokrates then continues73 ,sokr4--,perhaps you are right1 and these matters have escaped me4 ,but if you and ,i go on making long speeches each for ourselves1 we shall never come to an agreement4 ,if we are to carry on our research together1 we must do so by question and answer4 ,question me1 if you prefer3--if not1 answer me4 ,comp4--,i am quite ready1 ,sokrates1 to answer whatever you ask4 ,side-note3 ,farther questions by ,sokrates--,things heavy and light1 just and unjust1 honourable and dishonourable1 c41 are so1 and are accounted so everywhere4 ,real things are always accounted real4 ,whoever fails in attaining the real1 fails in attaining the lawful4 ,sokr4--,well1 then6 do you think that just things are just and unjust things are unjust8 ,comp4--,i think they are4 ,sokr4--,do not all men in all communities1 among the ,persians as well as here1 now as well as formerly1 think so too8 ,comp4--,unquestionably they do4 ,sokr4--,are not things which weigh more1 accounted heavier2 and things which weigh less1 accounted lighter1 here1 at ,carthage1 and everywhere else8#ba ,comp4--,certainly4 ,sokr4--,it seems1 then1 that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere1 and dishonourable things dishonourable8 not the reverse4 ,comp4--,yes1 it is so4 ,sokr4--,then1 speaking universally1 existent things or realities 7not non-existents7 are accounted existent and real1 among us as well as among all other men8 ,comp4--,i think they are4 ,sokr4--,whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in attaining the lawful4#bb ,comp4--,as you now put it1 ,sokrates1 it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at all times1 and by all the rest of mankind besides4 ,but when ,i reflect that we are perpetually changing our laws1 ,i cannot persuade myself of what you affirm4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #caf ,a4 ,greek3 ,po_/teron de ta pleion e7_/lkonta baru_/tera nomi_/zetai e7ntha_/de1 ta de e7_/latton1 koupho_/tera1 7 tou7nanti_/on8 ,the verb ,greek3 nomi_/zetai deserves attention here1 being the same word as has been employed in regard to law1 and derived from ,greek3 no_/mos4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #caf ,b4 ,greek3 ou7koun1 7s kata pa_/ntn ei7pein1 ta o7_/nta nomi_/zetai ei7nai1 ou7 ta m o7_/nta1 kai par' 7min kai para tois a7_/llois a7_/pasin4 ,comp4 ,greek3 ,e7_/moige dokei4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,o7s a7n a7_/ra tou o7_/ntos a7marta_/n1 tou nomi_/mou a7marta_/nei4 ,side-note3 ,there are laws of health and of cure1 composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects1 and unanimously declared by them4 ,so also there are laws of farming1 gardening1 cookery1 declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits4 ,in like manner1 the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule4 ,sokr4--,perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board1 when their position is changed1 still remain the same4 ,you know medical treatises3 you know that physicians are the really knowing about matters of health3 and that they agree with each other in writing about them4 ,comp4--,yes--,i know that4 ,sokr4--,the case is the same whether they be ,greeks or not ,greeks3 ,those who know1 must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other1 on matters which they know3 always and everywhere4 ,comp4--,yes--always and everywhere4 ,sokr4--,physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true1 and these writings of theirs are the medical laws8 ,comp4--,certainly they are4 ,sokr4--,the like is true respecting the laws of farming--the laws of gardening--the laws of cookery4 ,all these are the writings of persons1 knowing in each of the respective pursuits8 ,comp4--,yes4#bc ,sokr4--,in like manner1 what are the laws respecting the government of a city8 ,are they not the writings of those who know how to govern--kings1 statesmen1 and men of superior excellence8 ,comp4--,truly so4 ,sokr4--,knowing men like these will not write differently from each other about the same things1 nor change what they have once written4 ,if1 then1 we see some doing this1 are we to declare them knowing or ignorant8 ,comp4--,ignorant--undoubtedly4 ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #caf ,d-,e4 ,side-note3 ,that which is right is the regal law1 the only true and real law--that which is not right1 is not law1 but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant4 ,sokr4--,whatever is right1 therefore1 we may pronounce to be lawful2 in medicine1 gardening1 or cookery3 whatever is not right1 not to be lawful but lawless4 ,and the like in treatises respecting just and unjust1 prescribing how the city is to be administered3 ,that which is right1 is the regal law--that which is not right1 is not so1 but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant--being in truth lawless4 ,comp4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,we were correct therefore in declaring ,law to be the finding out of reality4 ,comp4--,it appears so4#bd ,sokr4--,it is the skilful husbandman who gives right laws on the sowing of land3 the skilful musician on the touching of instruments3 the skilful trainer1 respecting exercise of the body3 the skilful king or governor1 respecting the minds of the citizens4 ,comp4--,yes--it is4#be ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cag ,c4 ,greek3 to men o7rthon no_/mos e7sti basiliko_/s2 to de m o7rtho_/n ou7_/1 o7 dokei no_/mos ei7nai tois ei7do_/sin2 e7_/sti gar a7_/nomon4 ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cah ,a4 ,side-note3 ,minos1 ,king of ,krete--his laws were divine and excellent1 and have remained unchanged from time immemorial4 ,sokr4--,can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the glory of having been a good lawgiver1 so that his laws still remain in force as divine institutions8 ,comp4--,i cannot tell4 ,sokr4--,but can you not say which among the ,greeks have the most ancient laws8 ,comp4--,perhaps you mean the ,lacedmonians and ,lykurgus8 ,sokr4--,why1 the ,lacedmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old3 besides1 whence is it that the best of them come8 ,comp4--,from ,krete1 they say4 ,sokr4--,then it is the ,kretans who have the most ancient laws in ,greece8 ,comp4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,do you know those good kings of ,krete1 from whom these laws are derived--,minos and ,rhadamanthus1 sons of ,zeus and ,europa8 ,comp4--,rhadamanthus certainly is said to have been a just man1 ,sokrates2 but ,minos quite the reverse--savage1 ill-tempered1 unjust4 ,sokr4--,what you affirm1 my friend1 is a fiction of the ,attic tragedians4 ,it is not stated either by ,homer or ,hesiod1 who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put together4 ,comp4--,what is it that ,homer and ,hesiod say about ,minos8#bf ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cah ,e4 ,side-note3 ,question about the character of ,minos--,homer and ,hesiod declare him to have been admirable1 the ,attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant1 because he was an enemy of ,athens4 ,sokrates replies by citing1 and commenting upon1 the statements of ,homer and ,hesiod respecting ,minos1 as the cherished son1 companion1 and pupil1 of ,zeus2 who bestowed upon him an admirable training1 teaching him wisdom and justice1 and thus rendering him consummate as a lawgiver and ruler of men4 ,it was through these laws1 divine as emanating from the teaching of ,zeus1 that ,krete 7and ,sparta as the imitator of ,krete7 had been for so long a period happy and virtuous4 ,as ruler of ,krete1 ,minos had made war upon ,athens1 and compelled the ,athenians to pay tribute4 ,hence he had become odious to the ,athenians1 and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the great teachers and charmers of the crowd4 ,these poets1 whom every one ought to be cautious of offending1 had calumniated ,minos as the old enemy of ,athens4#bg ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cai-cbj4 ,side-note3 ,that ,minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered4 ,but that these tales are mere calumny 7continues ,sokrates71 and that ,minos was truly a good lawgiver1 and a good shepherd 7,greek3 nomeus a7gatho_/s7 of his people--we have proof through the fact1 that his laws still remain unchanged3 which shows that he has really found out truth and reality respecting the administration of a city4#bh ,comp4--,your view seems plausible1 ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,if ,i am right1 then1 you think that the ,kretans have more ancient laws than any other ,greeks8 and that ,minos and ,rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers1 rulers1 and shepherds of mankind8 ,comp4--,i think they are4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cba ,b4 ,greek3 touto me_/giston smeion1 o7_/ti a7ki_/ntoi au7tou oi7 no_/moi ei7si_/n1 a7_/te tou o7_/ntos peri po_/les oi7k_/ses e7xeuro_/ntos eu7 tn a7l_/theian4 ,side-note3 ,the question is made more determinate--,what is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind1 as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body8 ,sokrates cannot tell4 ,close4 ,sokr4--,now take the case of the good lawgiver and good shepherd for the body--,if we were asked1 what it is that he prescribes for the body1 so as to render it better8 we should answer1 at once1 briefly1 and well1 by saying--food and labour3 the former to sustain the body1 the latter to exercise and consolidate it4 ,comp4--,quite correct4 ,sokr4--,and if after that we were asked1 ,what are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes for the mind to make it better1 what should we say1 so as to avoid discrediting ourselves8 ,comp4--,i really cannot tell4 ,sokr4--,but surely it is discreditable enough both for your mind and mine--to confess1 that we do not know upon what it is that good and evil for our minds depends1 while we can define upon what it is that the good or evil of our bodies depends8#bi ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cba ,c-,b4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,the ,hipparchus and ,minos are analogous to each other1 and both of them inferior works of ,plato1 perhaps unfinished4 ,i have put together the two dialogues ,hipparchus and ,minos1 partly because of the analogy which really exists between them1 partly because that analogy is much insisted on by ,boeckh1 ,schleiermacher1 ,stallbaum1 and other recent critics2 who not only strike them both out of the list of ,platonic works1 but speak of them with contempt as compositions4 ,on the first point1 ,i dissent from them altogether3 on the second1 ,i agree with them thus far--that ,i consider the two dialogues inferior works of ,plato3--much inferior to his greatest and best compositions1--certainly displaying both less genius and less careful elaboration--probably among his early performances--perhaps even unfinished projects1 destined for a farther elaboration1 which they never received1 and not published until after his decease4 ,yet in ,hipparchus as well as in ,minos1 the subjects debated are important as regards ethical theory4 ,several questions are raised and partially canvassed3 no conclusion is finally attained4 ,these characteristics they have in common with several of the best ,platonic dialogues4 ,side-note3 ,hipparchus--,double meaning of ,greek3 philokerds and ,greek3 ke_/rdos4 ,in ,hipparchus1 the question put by ,sokrates is1 about the definition of ,greek3 o7 philokerds 7the lover of gain71 and of ,greek3 ke_/rdos itself--gain4 ,the first of these two words 7like many in ,greek as well as in ,english7 is used in two senses4 ,in its plain1 etymological sense1 it means an attribute belonging to all men3 all men love gain1 hate loss4 ,but since this is predicable of all1 there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or knot of men in particular4 ,accordingly1 when you employ the epithet as a predicate of ,a or ,b1 what you generally mean is1 to assert something more than its strict etymological meaning3 to declare that he has the attribute in unusual measure2 or that he has shown himself1 on various occasions1 wanting in other attributes1 which on those occasions ought1 in your judgment1 to have countervailed it4 ,the epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach1 in the mind of the speaker4#cj ,footnote #cj3 ,aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets1 connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an unfavourable sentiment in the speaker 7,ethic4 ,nikom4 ii4 #f1 p4 #aajg1 a4 #i74 ,greek3 ,ou7 pasa d' e7pide_/chetai praxis1 ou7de pan pa_/thos1 tn meso_/tta2 e7_/nia gar eu7thus 7no_/mastai suneilmme_/na meta ts phaulo_/ttos1 oi7on1 c4 ,side-note3 ,state or mind of the agent1 as to knowledge1 frequent inquiry in ,plato4 ,no tenable definition found4 ,the ,companion or ,collocutor1 being called upon by ,sokrates to explain ,greek3 to philokerdes1 defines it in this last sense1 as conveying or connoting a reproach4 ,he gives three different explanations of it 7always in this sense71 each of which ,sokrates shows to be untenable4 ,a variety of parallel cases are compared1 and the question is put 7so constantly recurring in ,plato's writings71 what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge8 ,the cross-examination makes out1 that if the agent be supposed to know1--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a ,greek3 philokerd_/s3 if the agent be supposed not to know--then1 on the contrary1 every man will come under the definition4 ,the ,companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as love of gain in the blamable sense4 ,yet he cannot find any tenable definition1 to discriminate it from love of gain in the ordinary or innocent sense4 ,side-note3 ,admitting that there is bad gain1 as well as good gain1 what is the meaning of the word gain8 ,none is found4 ,the same question comes back in another form1 after ,sokrates has given the liberty of retractation4 ,the ,collocutor maintains that there is bad gain1 as well as good gain4 ,but what is that common1 generic1 quality1 designated well as good by the word gain1 apart from these two distinctive epithets8 ,he cannot find it out or describe it4 ,he gives two definitions1 each of which is torn up by ,sokrates4 ,to deserve the name of gain1 that which a man acquires must be good2 and it must surpass1 in value as well as in quantity1 the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it4 ,but when thus understood1 all gains are good4 ,there is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains3 all men are lovers of gain4 ,side-note3 ,purpose of ,plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the confusion1 and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up4 ,with this confusion1 the dialogue closes4 ,the ,sokratic notion of good1 as what every one loves--evil as what every one hates--also of evil-doing1 as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent4 ,but it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity1 without clearing up any thing4 ,herein1 so far as ,i can see1 lies ,plato's purpose in the dialogue4 ,the respondent is made aware of the confusion1 which he did not know before2 and this1 in ,plato's view1 is a progress4 ,the respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers1 under an acute cross-examination3 but he does not adopt any new belief4 ,he says to ,sokrates at the close--,the debate has constrained rather than persuaded me4#ca ,this is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by ,sokrates upon his collocutors2 and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds1 with a view to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction4 ,if such effort be provoked1 ,plato's purpose is attained4 ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,hipparch4 #bcb ,b4 ,greek3 7na_/gkake gar 7o7 lo_/gos7 mallon e7me_/ ge 7 pe_/peiken4 ,one peculiarity there is1 analogous to what we have already seen in the ,hippias ,major4 ,it is not merely the ,collocutor who charges ,sokrates1 but also ,sokrates who accuses the ,collocutor--each charging the other with attempts to deceive a friend4#cb ,this seems intended by ,plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say about ,hipparchus--apropos of the motto on the ,hipparchean ,hermes--,greek3 m phi_/lon e7xapa_/ta4 ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,hipparch4 #bbe ,e1 #bbh ,a4 ,side-note3 ,historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting ,hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious4 ,the modern critics1 who proclaim the ,hipparchus not to be the work of ,plato1 allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness1 the occurrence of this long narrative and comment upon the historical ,hipparchus and his behaviour2 which narrative 7the critics maintain7 ,plato would never have introduced1 seeing that it contributes nothing to the settlement of the question debated4 ,but to this we may reply1 first1 ,that there are other dialogues#cc 7not to mention the ,minos7 in which ,plato introduces recitals of considerable length1 historical or quasi-historical recitals2 bearing remotely1 or hardly bearing at all1 upon the precise question under discussion2 next1--,that even if no such analogies could be cited1 and if the case stood single1 no modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted with ,plato's views and the surrounding circumstances1 as to put a limit on the means which ,plato might choose to take1 for rendering his dialogues acceptable and interesting4 ,plato's political views made him disinclined to popular government generally1 and to the democracy of ,athens in particular4 ,conformably with such sentiment1 he is disposed to surround the rule of the ,peisistratid with an ethical and philosophical colouring3 to depict ,hipparchus as a wise man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens2 and to discredit the renown of ,harmodius and ,aristogeiton1 by affirming them to have been envious of ,hipparchus1 as a philosopher who surpassed themselves by his own mental worth4 ,all this lay perfectly in the vein of ,plato's sentiment2 and we may say the same about the narrative in the ,minos1 respecting the divine parentage and teaching of ,minos1 giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and ruler4 ,it is surely very conceivable1 that ,plato1 as a composer of ethical dialogues or dramas1 might think that such recitals lent a charm or interest to some of them4 ,moreover1 something like variety1 or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another1 was a point of no inconsiderable moment4 ,i am of opinion that ,plato did so conceive these narratives4 ,but at any rate1 what ,i here contend is1 that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did not4 ,footnote #cc3 ,see ,alkibiad4 ii4 pp4 #adb-adi-aej2 ,alkibiad4 i4 pp4 #aba-abb3 ,protagoras1 #cdb-cdd2 ,politikus1 #bfh ,d41 ,greek3 schedon paidian e7gkerasame_/nous and the two or three pages which follow4 ,f4 ,a4 ,wolf1 and various critics after him1 contend that the genuineness of the ,hipparchus was doubted in antiquity1 on the authority of lian1 ,v4 ,h4 viii4 #b4 ,but ,i maintain that this is not the meaning of the passage1 unless upon the supposition that the word ,greek3 mathts is struck out of the text conjecturally4 ,the passage may be perfectly well construed1 leaving ,greek3 mathts in the text3 we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an assertion historically erroneous3 but this is nowise impossible in the case of lian4 ,if you construe the passage as it stands1 without such conjectural alteration1 it does not justify ,wolf's inference4 ,side-note3 ,minos4 ,question--,what is the characteristic property connoted by the word ,greek3 ,no_/mos or law8 ,i now come to the ,minos4 ,the subject of this dialogue is1 the explanation or definition of ,law4 ,sokrates says to his ,companion or ,collocutor1--,tell me what is the generic constituent of ,law3 ,all ,laws are alike quatenus ,law4 ,take no note of the difference between one law and another1 but explain to me what characteristic property it is1 which is common to all ,law1 and is implied in or connoted by the name ,law4 ,this question is logically the same as that which ,sokrates asks in the ,hipparchus with reference to ,greek3 ke_/rdos or gain4 ,side-note3 ,this question was discussed by the historical ,sokrates1 ,memorabilia of ,xenophon4 ,that the definition of ,greek3 ,no_/mos or ,law was discussed by ,sokrates1 we know1 not only from the general description of his debates given in ,xenophon1 but also from the interesting description 7in that author7 of the conversation between the youthful ,alkibiades and ,perikles4#cd ,the interrogations employed by ,alkibiades on that occasion are ,sokratic1 and must have been derived1 directly or indirectly1 from ,sokrates4 ,they are partially analogous to the questions of ,sokrates in the dialogue ,minos1 and they end by driving ,perikles into a confusion1 left unexplained1 between ,law and ,lawlessness4 ,footnote #cd3 ,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #a1 #af2 i4 #b1 #db-df4 ,side-note3 ,definitions of law--suggested and refuted4 ,law includes1 as a portion of its meaning1 justice1 goodness1 usefulness1 c4 ,bad decrees are not laws4 ,definitions of ,greek3 ,no_/mos are here given by the ,companion1 who undergoes a cross-examination upon them4 ,first1 he says1 that ,greek3 ,no_/mos ta nomizo_/mena4 ,but this is rejected by ,sokrates1 who intimates that ,law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs held binding3 but that which lies behind these laws and customs1 imparting to them their binding force4#ce ,we are to enquire what this is4 ,the ,companion declares that it is the public decree of the city3 political or social opinion4 ,but this again ,sokrates contests3 putting questions to show that ,law includes1 as a portion of its meaning1 justice1 goodness1 beauty1 and preservation of the city with its possessions2 while lawlessness includes injustice1 evil1 ugliness1 and destruction4 ,there can be no such thing as bad or wicked law4#cf ,but among decrees of the city1 some are bad1 some are good4 ,therefore to define ,law as a decree of the city1 thus generally1 is incorrect4 ,it is only the good decree1 not the bad decree1 which is ,law4 ,now the good decree or opinion1 is the true opinion3 that is1 it is the finding out of reality4 ,law therefore wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality3 and if there are differences between different nations1 this is because the power to find out does not always accompany the wish to find out4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cad ,a4 ,greek3 e7peid no_/m ta nomizo_/mena nomi_/zetai1 ti_/ni o7_/nti t no_/m nomi_/zetai8 ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cad ,e4 ,greek3 kai mn no_/mos ge ou7k 7n ponro_/s4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared judgment and command of the ,wise man upon the subject to which it refers--it is truth and reality1 found out and certified by him4 ,as to the assertion--that ,law is one thing here1 another thing there1 one thing at one time1 another thing at another--,sokrates contests it4 ,just things are just 7he says7 everywhere and at all times2 unjust things are unjust also4 ,heavy things are heavy1 light things light1 at one time1 as well as at another4 ,so also honourable things are everywhere honourable1 base things everywhere base4 ,in general phrase1 existent things are everywhere existent1#cg non-existent things are not existent4 ,whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real1 fails to attain the lawful and just4 ,it is only the man of art and knowledge1 in this or that department1 who attains the existent1 the real1 the right1 true1 lawful1 just4 ,thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine1 are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject1 all of whom agree in what they lay down3 the laws of cookery1 the laws of agriculture and of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects4 ,so also about ,just and ,unjust1 about the political and social arrangements of the city--the authoritative rescripts or laws are1 those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department1 all of whom agree in laying down the same3 that is1 all the men of art called kings or lawgivers4 ,it is only the right1 the true1 the real--that which these artists attain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called4 ,that which is not right is not a law1--ought not to be so called--and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men4#ch ,footnote #cg3 ,m4 ,boeckh remarks justly in his note on this passage--neque enim illud demonstratum est1 eadem omnibus legitima esse--sed tantum1 notionem 7rather the sentiment or emotion7 legitimi omnibus eandem esse4 ,sed omnia scriptor hic confundit4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cag ,c4 ,side-note3 ,reasoning of ,sokrates in the ,minos is unsound1 but ,platonic4 ,the ,good1 ,true1 and ,real1 coalesce in the mind of ,plato--he acknowledges nothing to be ,law1 except what he thinks ought to be ,law4 ,that the reasoning of ,sokrates in this dialogue is confused and unsound 7as ,m4 ,boeckh and other critics have remarked71 ,i perfectly agree4 ,but it is not the less completely ,platonic2 resting upon views and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by ,plato4 ,the dialogue ,minos presents1 in a rude and awkward manner1 without explanation or amplification1 that worship of the ,abstract and the ,ideal1 which ,plato1 in other and longer dialogues1 seeks to diversify as well as to elaborate4 ,the definitions of ,law here combated and given by ,sokrates1 illustrate this4 ,the good1 the true1 the right1 the beautiful1 the real--all coalesce in the mind of ,plato4 ,there is nothing 7in his view7 real1 except ,the ,good1 ,the ,just1 c4 7,greek3 to au7to-a7gathon2 ,greek3 au7to-di_/kaion--,absolute ,goodness and ,justice73 particular good and just things have no reality1 they are no more good and just than bad and unjust--they are one or the other1 according to circumstances--they are ever variable1 floating midway between the real and unreal4#ci ,the real alone is knowable1 correlating with knowledge or with the knowing ,intelligence ,greek3 ,nous4 ,as ,sokrates distinguishes elsewhere ,greek3 to di_/kaion or ,greek3 au7to-di_/kaion from ,greek3 ta di_/kaia--so here he distinguishes 7,greek3 no_/mos from ,greek3 ta nomizo_/mena7 ,law1 from the assemblage of actual commands or customs received as laws among mankind4 ,these latter are variable according to time and place2 but ,law is always one and the same4 ,plato will acknowledge nothing to be ,law1 except that which 7he thinks7 ought to be ,law3 that which emanates from a lawgiver of consummate knowledge1 who aims at the accomplishment of the good and the real1 and knows how to discover and realise that end4 ,so far as the decree of the city coincides with what would have been enacted by this lawgiver 7i4 e4 so far as it is good and right71 ,sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of ,law2 but no farther4 ,he considers the phrase bad law to express a logical impossibility1 involving a contradiction in adjecto4#dj ,what others call a bad law1 he regards as being no real law1 but only a fallacious image1 mistaken for such by the ignorant4 ,he does not consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge3 he recognises only the judgment of the knowing one or few1 among whom he affirms that there can be no difference of opinion4 ,every one admits just things to be just1--unjust things to be unjust1--heavy things to be heavy1--the existent and the real1 to be the existent and the real4 ,if then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality1 he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law3#da i4 e4 his pretended law is no law at all4 ,footnote #ci3 ,see the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the ,republic1 pp4 #dgi-dhj2 compare vii4 #ech ,e4 ,footnote #dj3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cad ,d4 ,the same argument is brought to bear by the ,platonic ,sokrates against ,hippias in the ,hippias ,major1 #bhd-bhe4 ,if the laws are not really profitable1 which is the only real purpose for which they were established1 they are no laws at all4 ,the ,spartans are ,greek3 para_/nomoi4 ,some of the answers assigned to ,hippias 7#bhd ,d7 are pertinent enough2 but he is overborne4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #caf ,b4 ,greek3 ,o7s a7n a7_/ra tou o7_/ntos a7marta_/n1 tou nomi_/mou a7marta_/nei4 ,side-note3 ,plato worships the ,ideal of his own mind--the work of systematic constructive theory by the ,wise ,man4 ,by ,law then1 ,plato means--not the assemblage of actual positive rules1 nor any general property common to and characteristic of them1 nor the free determination of an assembled ,demos as distinguished from the mandates of a despot--but the ,type of ,law as it ought to be1 and as it would be1 if prescribed by a perfectly wise ruler1 aiming at good and knowing how to realise it4 ,this1 which is the ideal of his own mind1 ,plato worships and reasons upon as if it were the only reality2 as ,law by nature1 or natural ,law1 distinguished from actual positive laws3 which last have either been set by some ill-qualified historical ruler1 or have grown up insensibly4 ,knowledge1 art1 philosophy1 systematic and constructive1 applied by some one or few exalted individuals1 is 7in his view7 the only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true1 good1 real1 permanent1 and worthy of the generic name4 ,side-note3 ,different applications of this general ,platonic view1 in the ,minos1 ,politikus1 ,kratylus1 c4 ,natural ,rectitude of ,law1 ,government1 ,names1 c4 ,in the ,minos1 this general ,platonic view is applied to ,law3 in the ,politikus1 to government and social administration3 in the ,kratylus1 to naming or language4 ,in the ,politikus1 we find the received classification of governments 7monarchy1 aristocracy1 and democracy7 discarded as improper2 and the assertion advanced1 ,that there is only one government right1 true1 genuine1 really existing--government by the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted intelligence3 he who is master in the art of governing1 whether such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not4 ,all other governments are degenerate substitutes for this type1 some receding from it less1 some more4#db ,again1 in the ,kratylus1 where names and name-giving are discussed1 ,sokrates#dc maintains that things can only be named according to their true and real nature--that there is1 belonging to each thing1 one special and appropriate ,name-,form1 discernible only by the sagacity of the intelligent ,lawgiver3 who alone is competent to bestow upon each thing its right1 true1 genuine1 real name1 possessing rectitude by nature 7,greek3 o7rtho_/ts phu_/sei74#dd ,this ,name-,form 7according to ,sokrates7 is the same in all languages in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent ,lawgivers1 although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the ,form are very different4#de ,if names be not thus apportioned by the systematic purpose of an intelligent ,lawgiver1 but raised up by insensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes for the genuine type1 though they are the best which actual societies possess2 according to the opinion announced by ,kratylus in that same dialogue1 they will not be names at all4#df ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,politikus1 #bic ,c-,e4 ,greek3 tau_/tn o7rthn diaphero_/nts ei7nai kai mo_/nn politei_/an1 e7n 7 tis a7n eu7_/riskoi tous a7_/rchontas a7lths e7pist_/monas kai ou7 dokountas mo_/non 4 4 4 to_/te kai kata tous toiou_/tous o7_/rous 7min mo_/nn o7rthn politei_/an ei7nai r7te_/on4 o7_/sas de a7_/llas le_/gomen1 ou7 gnsi_/as ou7d' o7_/nts ou7_/sas lekte_/on1 a7lla memimme_/nas tau_/tn1 a7_/s men eu7no_/mous le_/gomen1 e7pi ta kalli_/1 tas de a7_/llas e7pi ta ai7schi_/ona memimsthai4 ,the historical 7,xenophontic7 ,sokrates asserts this same position in ,xenophon's ,memorabilia 7iii4 #i1 #aj74 ,sokrates said that ,kings and ,rulers were those who knew how to command1 not those who held the sceptre or were chosen by election or lot1 or had acquired power by force or fraud1 c4 ,the ,kings of ,sparta and ,macedonia1 the ,greek3 ,boul and ,greek3 ,dmos of ,athens1 the ,despot of ,syracuse or ,pher are here declared to be not real rulers at all4 ,footnote #dc3 ,plato1 ,kratylus1 #chg ,d4 ,footnote #dd3 ,plato1 ,kratyl4 #chh ,a-,e4 ,footnote #de3 ,plato1 ,kratyl4 #chi ,e1 #cij ,a1 #dcb ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun ou7_/ts a7xi_/seis kai ton nomothe_/tn to_/n te e7ntha_/de kai ton e7n tois barba_/rois1 e7_/s a7n to tou o7no_/matos ei7dos a7podid to proskon e7ka_/st e7n o7poiaisoun sullabais1 ou7den chei_/r nomothe_/tn ei7nai ton e7ntha_/de 7 ton o7pououn a7_/llothi8 ,compare this with the ,minos1 #cae ,e1 #caf ,d1 where ,sokrates evades1 by an hypothesis very similar1 the objection made by the collocutor1 that the laws in one country are very different from those in another--,greek3 i7_/ss gar ou7k e7nnoeis tauta metapetteuo_/mena o7_/ti tau7ta_/ e7stin4 ,footnote #df3 ,plato1 ,kratyl4 #dcj ,a1 #dcb ,a1 #dcc ,d1 #dce ,c4 ,kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all2 just as ,sokrates says in the ,minos that a bad law is no law at all4 ,side-note3 ,eulogy on ,minos1 as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude4 ,the ,kretan ,minos 7we here find it affirmed71 son1 companion1 and pupil of ,zeus1 has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or natural rectitude3 the proof of which is1 that the ancient ,kretan laws have for immemorial ages remained1 and still do remain1#dg unchanged4 ,but when ,sokrates tries to determine1 ,wherein consists this ,law-,type8 ,what is it that the wise ,lawgiver prescribes for the minds of the citizens--as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies8--the question is left unanswered4 ,sokrates confesses with shame that he cannot answer it3 and the dialogue ends in a blank4 ,the reader--according to ,plato's manner--is to be piqued and shamed into the effort of meditating the question for himself4 ,footnote #dg3 ,plato1 ,minos1 #cai ,b1 #cba ,a4 ,side-note3 ,the ,minos was arranged by ,aristophanes at first in a ,trilogy along with the ,leges4 ,an attempt to answer this question will be found in ,plato's ,treatise ,de ,legibus--in the projected ,kretan colony1 of which he there sketches the fundamental laws4 ,aristophanes of ,byzantium very naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the ,minos2 second in the ,trilogy of which the ,minos was first4#dh ,footnote #dh3 ,i reserve for an ,appendix some further remarks upon the genuineness of ,hipparchus and ,minos4 ,side-note3 ,explanations of the word ,law--confusion in its meaning4 ,whoever has followed the abstract of the ,minos1 which ,i have just given1 will remark the different explanations of the word ,law--both those which are disallowed1 and that which is preferred1 though left incomplete1 by ,sokrates4 ,on this same subject1 there are in many writers1 modern as well an ancient1 two distinct modes of confusion traceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists1 such as ,mr4 ,bentham1 ,mr4 ,austin1 and ,mr4 ,maine4 #a4 ,between ,law as it is1 and ,law as it ought to be4 #b4 ,between ,laws ,imperative1 set by intelligent rulers1 and enforced by penal sanction--and ,laws signifying uniformities of fact expressed in general terms1 such as the ,law of ,gravitation1 ,crystallisation1 c4--,we can hardly say that in the dialogue ,minos1 ,plato falls into the first of these two modes of confusion3 for he expressly says that he only recognises the ,ideal of ,law1 or ,law as it ought to be 7actual ,laws everywhere being disallowed1 except in so far as they conform thereunto74 ,but he does fall into the second1 when he identifies the ,lawful with the ,real or ,existent4 ,his ,ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact4 ,there is also much confusion1 if we compare the ,minos with other dialogues2 wherein ,plato frequently talks of ,laws as the laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state--,athens1 ,sparta1 or elsewhere 7,greek3 ,no_/mos ta nomizo_/mena1 according to the first words in the ,minos74 ,for example1 in the harangue which he supposes to be addressed to ,sokrates in the ,kriton1 and which he invests with so impressive a character--the ,laws of ,athens are introduced as speakers3 but according to the principles laid down in the ,minos1 three-fourths of the ,laws of ,athens could not be regarded as laws at all4 ,if therefore we take ,plato's writings throughout1 we shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word ,law1 or that he escapes the frequent confusion between ,law as it actually exists and ,law as it ought to be4#di ,footnote #di3 ,the first explanation of ,greek3 ,no_/mos advanced by the ,companion in reply to ,sokrates 7viz4 ,greek3 ,no_/mos ta nomizo_/mena1 coincides substantially with the meaning of ,greek3 ,no_/mos basileus in ,pindar and ,herodotus 7see above1 chap4 viii471 who is an imaginary ruler1 occupying a given region1 and enforcing ,greek3 ta nomizo_/mena4 ,it coincides also with the precept ,greek3 ,no_/m po_/les1 as prescribed by the ,pythian priestess to applicants who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship 7,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #c1 #a72 though this precept1 when ,cicero comes to report it 7,legg4 ii4 #af1 #dj71 appears divested of its simplicity1 and over-clouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text4 ,aristotle does not keep clear of the confusion 7compare ,ethic4 ,nikom4 i4 #a1 #ajid1 b4 #af1 and v4 #e1 #aacj1 b4 #bd74 ,i shall revert again to the distinction between ,greek3 no_/mos and ,greek3 phu_/sis1 in touching on other ,platonic dialogues4 ,cicero expressly declares 7,legg4 ii4 #e1 #aa71 conformably to what is said by the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,minos1 that a bad law1 however passed in regular form1 is no law at all2 and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same phraseology1 but he perpetually uses1 in other places1 the words ,lex and ,leges to signify laws actually in force at ,rome1 good or bad4 ,mr4 ,bentham gives an explanation of ,law or ,the ,law1 which coincides with ,greek3 ,no_/mos ta nomizo_/mena4 ,he says 7,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 vol4 ii4 ch4 #ag1 p4 #beg1 ed4 #ahbc71 ,now ,law1 or ,the ,law1 taken indefinitely1 is an abstract and collective term1 which1 when it means anything1 can mean neither more nor less than the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together4 ,mr4 ,austin in his ,lectures1 ',the ,province of ,jurisprudence ,determined'1 has explained more clearly and copiously than any antecedent author1 the confused meanings of the word ,law adverted to in my text4 ,see especially his first lecture and his fifth1 pp4 #hh seq4 and #aga seq41 #dth ed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,appendix4 ,in continuing to recognise ,hipparchus and ,minos as ,platonic works1 contrary to the opinion of many modern critics1 ,i have to remind the reader1 not only that both are included in the ,canon of ,thrasyllus1 but that the ,minos was expressly acknowledged by ,aristophanes of ,byzantium1 and included by him among the ,trilogies3 showing that it existed then 7#bbj ,b4,c47 in the ,alexandrine ,museum as a ,platonic work4 ,the similarity between the ,hipparchus and ,minos is recognised by all the ,platonic critics1 most of whom declare that both of them are spurious4 ,schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this opinion in his ,einleitung and notes3 but it will be convenient to take the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness1 as they are set forth by ,m4 ,boeckh1 in his ,comment4 in ,platonis qui vulgo fertur ,minoem3 in which treatise1 though among his early works1 the case is argued with all that copious learning and critical ability1 which usually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of philology4 ,m4 ,boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of ,hipparchus and ,minos to be considered as works of ,plato1 but advances an affirmative hypothesis to show what they are4 ,he considers these two dialogues1 together with those ,de ,justo1 and ,de ,virtute 7two short dialogues in the pseudo-,platonic list1 not recognised by ,thrasyllus7 as among the dialogues published by ,simon2 an ,athenian citizen and a shoemaker by trade1 in whose shop ,sokrates is said to have held many of his conversations4 ,simon is reported to have made many notes of these conversations1 and to have composed and published1 from them1 a volume of thirty-three dialogues 7,diog4 ,l4 ii4 #abb71 among the titles of which there are two--,greek3 ,peri ,philkerdous and ,greek3 ,peri ,no_/mou4 ,simon was1 of course1 contemporary with ,plato2 but somewhat older in years4 ,with this part of ,m4 ,boeckh's treatise1 respecting the supposed authorship of ,simon1 ,i have nothing to do4 ,i only notice the arguments by which he proposes to show that ,hipparchus and ,minos are not works of ,plato4 ,in the first place1 ,i notice that ,m4 ,boeckh explicitly recognises them as works of an author contemporary with ,plato1 not later than #chj ,b4,c4 7p4 #df74 ,hereby many of the tests1 whereby we usually detect spurious works1 become inapplicable4 ,in the second place1 he admits that the dialogues are composed in good ,attic ,greek1 suitable to the ,platonic age both in character and manners--,at veteris esse et ,attici scriptoris1 probus sermo1 antiqui mores1 totus denique character1 spondeat1 p4 #cb4 ,the reasons urged by ,m4 ,boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the ,minos1 are first1 that it is unlike ,plato--next1 that it is too much like ,plato4 ,dupliciter dialogus a ,platonis ingenio discrepat3 partim quod parum1 partim quod nimium1 similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit4 ,parum similis est in rebus permultis4 ,nam cum ,plato adhuc vivos ac videntes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines1 ut scenicus poeta actores1 moribus ingeniisque accurate descriptis1 nominatim producat in medium--in isto opusculo cum ,socrate colloquens persona plan incerta est ac nomine carens3 quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset artis illius colloquiis suis dulcissimas veneres illas inferendi1 qu ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis redundant1 atque ,platone ut flores per amplos dialogorum hortos sunt disseminat 7pp4 #g-h73 again1 p4 #i1 it is complained that there is an infinitus secundarius collocutor in the ,hipparchus4 ,now the sentence1 just transcribed from ,m4 ,boeckh1 shows that he had in his mind as standard of comparison1 a certain number of the ,platonic works1 but that he did not take account of all of them4 ,the ,platonic ,protagoras begins with a dialogue between ,sokrates and an unknown1 nameless person2 to whom ,sokrates1 after a page of conversation with him1 recounts what has just passed between himself1 ,protagoras1 and others4 ,next1 if we turn to the ,sophists and ,politikus1 we find that in both of them1 not simply the secundarius collocutor1 but even the principal speaker1 is an unknown and nameless person1 described only as a ,stranger from ,elea1 and never before seen by ,sokrates4 ,again1 in the ,leges1 the principal speaker is only an ,greek3 ,a7thnaios xe_/nos1 without a name4 ,in the face of such analogies1 it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule1 that no dialogue can be the work of ,plato1 which acknowledges as collocutor an unnamed person4 ,then again--when ,m4 ,boeckh complains that the ,hipparchus and ,minos are destitute of those flores et dulcissim ,veneres which ,plato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues--,i ask1 ,where are the dulcissim ,veneres in the ,parmenids1 ,sophists1 ,politikus1 ,leges1 ,timus1 ,kritias8 ,i find none4 ,the presence of dulcissim ,veneres is not a condition sine qu non1 in every composition which pretends to ,plato as its author3 nor can the absence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing ,hipparchus and ,minos4 ,the analogy of the ,sophists and ,politikus 7besides ,symposium1 ,republic1 and ,leges7 farther shows1 that there is nothing wonderful in finding the titles of ,hipparchus and ,minos derived from the subjects 7,greek3 ,peri ,philkerdous and ,greek3 ,peri ,no_/mou71 not from the name of one of the collocutors3--whether we suppose the titles to have been bestowed by ,plato himself1 or by some subsequent editor 7,boeckh1 p4 #aj74 ,to illustrate his first ground of objection--,dissimilarity between the ,minos and the true ,platonic writings--,m4 ,boeckh enumerates 7pp4 #ab-bc7 several passages of the dialogue which he considers unplatonic4 ,moreover1 he includes among them 7p4 #ab7 examples of confused and illogical reasoning4 ,i confess that to me this evidence is noway sufficient to prove that ,plato is not the author4 ,that certain passages may be picked out which are obscure1 confused1 inelegant--is certainly no sufficient evidence4 ,if ,i thought so1 ,i should go along with ,ast in rejecting the ,euthydmus1 ,menon1 ,lachs1 ,charmids1 ,lysis1 c41 against all which ,ast argues as spurious1 upon evidence of the same kind4 ,it is not too much to say1 that against almost every one of the dialogues1 taken severally1 a case of the same kind1 more or less plausible1 might be made out4 ,you might in each of them find passages peculiar1 careless1 awkwardly expressed4 ,the expression ,greek3 tn a7nthrpei_/an a7ge_/ln tou s_/matos1 which ,m4 ,boeckh insists upon so much as improper1 would probably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text1 if it had occurred in any other dialogue3 and so it may fairly be considered in the ,minos4 ,moreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning1 most certainly these cannot be held as proving the ,minos not to be ,plato's work4 ,i would engage to produce1 from most of his dialogues1 defects of reasoning quite as grave as any which the ,minos exhibits4 ,on the principle assumed by ,m4 ,boeckh1 every one who agreed with ,pantius in considering the elaborate proof given in the ,phdon1 of the immortality of the soul1 as illogical and delusive--would also agree with ,pantius in declaring that the ,phdon was not the work of ,plato4 ,it is one question1 whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or bad3 it is another question1 whether the dialogue be written by ,plato or not4 ,unfortunately1 the ,platonic critics often treat the first question as if it determined the second4 ,m4 ,boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from dissimilarity 7upon which ,i have just dwelt7 is not the strongest part of his case4 ,he relies more upon the evidence arising from too much similarity1 as proving still more clearly the spuriousness of the ,minos4 ,jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostr argumentationis1 eamque etiam firmiorem1 de nimia similitudine ,platonicorum aliquot locorum1 qu imitationem doceat subesse4 ,nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos1 ,platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari3 nisi si quis dubitet de san ejus mente 7p4 #bc74 ,again1 p4 #bf1 ,jam vero in nostro colloquio ,symposium1 ,politicum1 ,euthyphronem1 ,protagoram1 ,gorgiam1 ,cratylum1 ,philbum1 dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperies4 ,and ,m4 ,boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the ,minos1 which he considers to have been imitated1 and badly imitated1 from one or other of these dialogues4 ,i cannot agree with ,m4 ,boeckh in regarding this nimia similitudo as the strongest part of his case4 ,on the contrary1 ,i consider it as the weakest3 because his own premisses 7in my judgment7 not only do not prove his conclusion1 but go far to prove the opposite4 ,when we find him insisting1 in such strong language1 upon the great analogy which subsists between the ,minos and seven of the incontestable ,platonic dialogues1 this is surely a fair proof that its author is the same as their author4 ,to me it appears as conclusive as internal evidence ever can be2 unless there be some disproof aliunde to overthrow it4 ,but ,m4 ,boeckh produces no such disproof4 ,he converts these analogies into testimony in his own favour1 simply by bestowing upon them the name imitatio1--stulta imitatio 7p4 #bg74 ,this word involves an hypothesis1 whereby the point to be proved is assumed--viz43 difference of authorship4 ,plato cannot have imitated himself 7,m4 ,boeckh observes74 ,i cannot admit such impossibility1 even if you describe the fact in that phrase3 but if you say ,plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like ,plato in another--you describe the same fact in a different phrase1 and it then appears not merely possible but natural and probable4 ,those very real analogies1 to which ,m4 ,boeckh points in the word imitatio1 are in my judgment cases of the ,platonic thought in one dialogue being like the ,platonic thought in another4 ,the similitudo1 between ,minos and these other dialogues1 can hardly be called nimia1 for ,m4 ,boeckh himself points out that it is accompanied with much difference4 ,it is a similitude1 such as we should expect between one ,platonic dialogue and another3 with this difference1 that whereas1 in the ,minos1 ,plato gives the same general views in a manner more brief1 crude1 abrupt--in the other dialogues he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and illustration1 and some degree of change not unimportant4 ,that there should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of ,plato and another appears to me perfectly natural4 ,on the other hand--that there should have been a contemporary falsarius 7scriptor miser1 insulsus1 vilissimus1 to use phrases of ,m4 ,boeckh71 who studied and pillaged the best dialogues of ,plato1 for the purpose of putting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them--and who contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognised by the ,byzantine ,aristophanes among the genuine dialogues notwithstanding the existence of the ,platonic school--this1 ,i think highly improbable4 ,i cannot therefore agree with ,m4 ,boeckh in thinking1 that ubique se prodens ,platonis imitatio 7p4 #ca7 is an irresistible proof of spuriousness3 nor can ,i think that his hypothesis shows itself to advantage1 when he says1 p4 #aj--;,ipse autem dialogus 7,minos7 quum post ,politicum compositus sit1 quod qudam in eo dicta rebus ibi expositis manifest nitantur1 ut paullo post ostendemus--quis est qui artificiosissimum philosophum1 postquam ibi 7in ,politico7 accuratius de natur legis egisset1 de e iterum putet negligenter egisse8--,i do not think it so impossible as it appears to ,m4 ,boeckh1 that a philosopher1 after having written upon a given subject accuratius1 should subsequently write upon it negligenter4 ,but if ,i granted this ever so fully1 ,i should still contend that there remains another alternative4 ,the negligent workmanship may have preceded the accurate3 an alternative which ,i think is probably the truth1 and which has nothing to exclude it except ,m4 ,boeckh's pure hypothesis1 that the ,minos must have been copied from the ,politikus4 ,while ,i admit then that the ,hipparchus and ,minos are among the inferior and earlier compositions of ,plato1 ,i still contend that there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works4 ,though the ,platonic critics of this century are for the most part of an adverse opinion1 ,i have with me the general authority of the critics anterior to this century--from ,aristophanes of ,byzantium down to ,bentley and ,ruhnken--see ,boeckh1 pp4 #g-cb4 ,yxem defends the genuineness of the ,hipparchus--7,ueber ,platon's ,kleitophon1 p4 #h4 ,berlin1 #ahdf74 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,theages4 ,side-note3 ,theags--has been declared spurious by some modern critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient4 ,this is among the dialogues declared by ,schleiermacher1 ,ast1 ,stallbaum1 and various other modern critics1 to be spurious and unworthy of ,plato3 the production of one who was not merely an imitator1 but a bad and silly imitator4#a ,socher on the other hand defends the dialogue against them1 reckoning it as a juvenile production of ,plato4#b ,the arguments which are adduced to prove its spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient4 ,it has some features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other dialogues--these the above-mentioned critics call un-,platonic3 it has other features of similarity--these they call bad imitation by a falsarius3 lastly1 it is inferior1 as a performance1 to the best of the ,platonic dialogues4 ,but ,i am prepared to expect 7and have even the authority of ,schleiermacher for expecting7 that some dialogues will be inferior to others4 ,i also reckon with certainty1 that between two dialogues1 both genuine1 there will be points of similarity as well as points of dissimilarity4 ,lastly1 the critics find marks of a bad1 recent1 un-,platonic style3 but ,dionysius of ,halikarnassus--a judge at least equally competent upon such a matter--found no such marks4 ,he expressly cites the dialogue as the work of ,plato1#c and explains the peculiar phraseology assigned to ,demodokus by remarking1 that the latter is presented as a person of rural habits and occupations4 ,footnote #a3 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 pp4 #bbj-bbe1 ineptus tenebrio1 c4 ,schleiermacher1 ,einleitung1 part ii4 v4 iii4 pp4 #bdg-beb4 ,ast1 ,platon's ,leben und ,schriften1 pp4 #die-dig4 ,ast speaks with respect 7differing in this respect from the other two7 of the ,theags as a composition1 though he does not believe it to be the work of ,plato4 ,schleiermacher also admits 7see the end of his ,einleitung7 that the style in general has a good ,platonic colouring1 though he considers some particular phrases as un-,platonic4 ,footnote #b3 ,socher1 ,ueber ,platon1 pp4 #ib-ajb4 ,m4 ,cobet also speaks of it as a work of ,plato 7,nov ,lectiones1 c41 p4 #fbd4 ,lugd4 ,bat4 #aheh74 ,footnote #c3 ,dionys4 ,hal4 ,ars ,rhetor4 p4 #dje1 ,reiske4 ,compare ,theags1 #aba ,d4 ,greek3 ei7s to a7_/stu katabai_/nontes4 ,in general1 in discussions on the genuineness of any of the ,platonic dialogues1 ,i can do nothing but reply to the arguments of those critics who consider them spurious4 ,but in the case of the ,theags there is one argument which tends to mark ,plato positively as the author4 ,in the ,theags1 p4 #abe1 the senarius ,greek3 sophoi tu_/rannoi tn sophn sunousi_/a is cited as a verse of ,euripides4 ,now it appears that this is an error of memory1 and that the verse really belongs to ,sophokles1 ,greek3 e7n ,ai7_/anti ,lokr4 ,if the error had only appeared in this dialogue1 ,stallbaum would probably have cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the ineptus tenebrio whom he supposes to have written the dialogue4 ,but unfortunately the error does not belong to the ,theags alone4 ,it is found also in the ,republic 7viii4 #efh ,b71 the most unquestionable of all the ,platonic compositions4 ,accordingly1 ,schleiermacher tells us in his note that the falsarius of the ,theags has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the ,republic of ,plato 7notes1 p4 #ejj74 ,this last supposition of ,schleiermacher appears to me highly improbable4 ,since we know that the mistake is one made by ,plato himself1 surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two distinct compositions4 ,in other words1 the occurrence of the same exact mistake in the ,republic and the ,theags affords strong presumption that both are by the same author--,plato4 ,side-note3 ,persons of the dialogue--,sokrates1 with ,demodokus and ,theags1 father and son4 ,theags 7the son71 eager to acquire knowledge1 desires to be placed under the teaching of a ,sophist4 ,demodokus1 an elderly man 7of rank and landed property71 and his youthful son ,theags1 have come from their ,deme to ,athens1 and enter into conversation with ,sokrates3 to whom the father explains1 that ,theags has contracted1 from the conversation of youthful companions1 an extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom4 ,the son has importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the ,sophists1 who profess to teach wisdom4 ,the father1 though not unwilling to comply with the request1 is deterred by the difficulty of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one4 ,he entreats the advice of ,sokrates1 who invites the young man to explain what it is that he wants1 over and above the usual education of an ,athenian youth of good family 7letters1 the harp1 wrestling1 c471 which he has already gone through4#d ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abb4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates questions ,theags1 inviting him to specify what he wants4 ,sokr4--,you desire wisdom3 but what kind of wisdom8 ,that by which men manage chariots8 or govern horses8 or pilot ships8 ,theag4--,no3 that by which men are governed4 ,sokr4--,but what men8 those in a state of sickness--or those who are singing in a chorus--or those who are under gymnastic training8 ,each of these classes has its own governor1 who bears a special title1 and belongs to a special art by itself--the medical1 musical1 gymnastic1 c4 ,theag4--,no3 ,i mean that wisdom by which we govern1 not these classes alone1 but all the other residents in the city along with them--professional as well as private--men as well as women4#e ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abd ,a-,b4 ,schleiermacher 7,einleit4 p4 #bej7 censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this dialogue1 and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a general proposition obvious enough without proof4 ,let us grant this to be true2 we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work of ,plato4 ,by very similar arguments ,socher endeavours to show that the ,sophists and the ,politikus are not works of ,plato1 because in both these dialogues logical division and differentiation is accumulated with tiresome prolixity1 and applied to most trivial subjects4 ,but ,plato himself 7in ,politikus1 pp4 #bhe-bhf7 explains why he does so1 and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers with logical subdivision and classification as a process4 ,in like manner ,i maintain that prolixity in the ,greek3 lo_/goi e7paktikoi_/ is not to be held as proof of spurious authorship1 any more than prolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification4 ,i noticed the same objection in the case of the ,first ,alkibiads4 ,side-note3 ,theags desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent4 ,sokrates now proves to ,theags1 that this function and power which he is desirous of obtaining1 is1 the function and power of a despot3 and that no one can aid him in so culpable a project4 ,i might yearn 7says ,theags7 for such despotic power over all3 so probably would you and every other man4 ,but it is not that to which ,i now aspire4 ,i aspire to govern freemen1 with their own consent2 as was done by ,themistokles1 ,perikles1 ,kimon1 and other illustrious statesmen1#f who have been accomplished in the political art4 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abf ,a4 ,sokr4--,well1 if you wished to become accomplished in the art of horsemanship1 you would put yourself under able horsemen3 if in the art of darting the javelin1 under able darters4 ,by parity of reasoning1 since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship1 you must frequent able statesmen4#g ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abf ,c4 ,side-note3 ,incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else4 ,theags requests that ,sokrates will himself teach him4 ,theag4--,no1 ,sokrates4 ,i have heard of the language which you are in the habit of using to others4 ,you pointed out to them that these eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all better than curriers3 of course therefore they cannot do me any good4#h ,sokr4--,but what can your father do for you better than this1 ,theags8 ,what ground have you for complaining of him8 ,he is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most excellent men of ,athens1 whichever of them you prefer4 ,theag4--,why will not you take me yourself1 ,sokrates8 ,i look upon you as one of these men1 and ,i desire nothing better4#i ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abf ,d4 ,here again ,stallbaum 7p4 #bbb7 urges1 among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be spurious--,how absurd to represent the youthful ,theags as knowing what arguments ,sokrates had addressed to others6 ,but the youthful ,thettus is also represented as having heard from others the cross-examinations made by ,sokrates 7,thett4 #adh ,e74 ,so likewise the youthful sons of ,lysimachus--7,lachs1 #aha ,a72 compare also ,lysis1 #baa ,a4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abg ,a4 ,demodokus joins his entreaties with those of ,theags to prevail upon ,sokrates to undertake this function4 ,but ,sokrates in reply says that he is less fit for it than ,demodokus himself1 who has exercised high political duties1 with the esteem of every one2 and that if practical statesmen are considered unfit1 there are the professional ,sophists1 ,prodikus1 ,gorgias1 ,polus1 who teach many pupils1 and earn not merely good pay1 but also the admiration and gratitude of every one--of the pupils as well as their senior relatives4#aj ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abg ,d-,e1 #abh ,a4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love4 ,theags maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,i know nothing of the fine things which these ,sophists teach3 ,i wish ,i did know4 ,i declare everywhere1 that ,i know nothing whatever except one small matter--what belongs to love4 ,in that1 ,i surpass every one else1 past as well as present4#aa ,theag4--,sokrates is only mocking us4 ,i know youths 7of my own age and somewhat older71 who were altogether worthless and inferior to every one1 before they went to him2 but who1 after they had frequented his society1 became in a short time superior to all their former rivals4 ,the like will happen with me1 if he will only consent to receive me4#ab ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abh ,b4 ,greek3 a7lla kai le_/g d_/pou a7ei_/1 o7_/ti e7g tugcha_/n1 7s e7_/pos ei7pein1 ou7den e7pista_/menos pl_/n ge smikrou tinos math_/matos1 tn e7rtikn1 touto me_/ntoi to ma_/thma par' o7ntinoun poioumai deinos ei7nai1 kai tn progegono_/tn a7nthr_/pn kai tn nun4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abh ,c4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he recites his experience of the divine sign or ,dmon4 ,sokr4--,you do not know how this happens2 ,i will explain it to you4 ,from my childhood1 ,i have had a peculiar superhuman something attached to me by divine appointment3 a voice1 which1 whenever it occurs1 warns me to abstain from that which ,i am about to do1 but never impels me4#ac ,moreover1 when any one of my friends mentions to me what he is about to do1 if the voice shall then occur to me it is a warning for him to abstain4 ,the examples of ,charmides and ,timarchus 7here detailed by ,sokrates7 prove what ,i say3 and many persons will tell you how truly ,i forewarned them of the ruin of the ,athenian armament at ,syracuse4#ad ,my young friend ,sannion is now absent1 serving on the expedition under ,thrasyllus to ,ionia3 on his departure1 the divine sign manifested itself to me1 and ,i am persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abh ,d4 ,greek3 e7sti ga_/r ti thei_/a moi_/ra parepo_/menon e7moi e7k paidos a7rxa_/menon daimo_/nion2 e7_/sti de touto phn_/1 7 o7_/tan ge_/ntai1 a7ei_/ moi smai_/nei1 o7 a7n me_/ll pra_/ttein1 tou_/tou a7potrop_/n1 protre_/pei de ou7de_/pote4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #abi4 ,side-note3 ,the ,dmon is favourable to some persons1 adverse to others4 ,upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of ,sokrates4 ,aristeides has not learnt anything from ,sokrates1 yet has improved much by being near to him4 ,these facts ,i mention to you 7,sokrates continues7 because it is that same divine power which exercises paramount influence over my intercourse with companions4#ae ,towards many1 it is positively adverse2 so that ,i cannot even enter into companionship with them4 ,towards others1 it does not forbid1 yet neither does it co-operate3 so that they derive no benefit from me4 ,there are others again in whose case it co-operates2 these are the persons to whom you allude1 who make rapid progress4#af ,with some1 such improvement is lasting3 others1 though they improve wonderfully while in my society1 yet relapse into commonplace men when they leave me4 ,aristeides1 for example 7grandson of ,aristeides the ,just71 was one of those who made rapid progress while he was with me4 ,but he was forced to absent himself on military service2 and on returning1 he found as my companion ,thucydides 7son of ,melesias71 who however had quarrelled with me for some debate of the day before4 ,i understand 7said ,aristeides to me7 that ,thucydides has taken offence and gives himself airs2 he forgets what a poor creature he was1 before he came to you4#ag ,i myself1 too1 have fallen into a despicable condition4 ,when ,i left you1 ,i was competent to discuss with any one and make a good figure1 so that ,i courted debate with the most accomplished men4 ,now1 on the contrary1 ,i avoid them altogether--so thoroughly am ,i ashamed of my own incapacity4 ,did the capacity 7,i1 ,sokrates1 asked ,aristeides7 forsake you all at once1 or little by little8 ,little by little1 he replied4 ,and when you possessed it 7,i asked71 did you get it by learning from me8 or in what other way8 ,i will tell you1 ,sokrates 7he answered71 what seems incredible1 yet is nevertheless true4#ah ,i never learnt from you any thing at all4 ,you yourself well know this4 ,but ,i always made progress1 whenever ,i was along with you1 even if ,i were only in the same house without being in the same room2 but ,i made greater progress1 if ,i was in the same room--greater still1 if ,i looked in your face1 instead of turning my eyes elsewhere--and the greatest of all1 by far1 if ,i sat close and touching you4 ,but now 7continued ,aristeides7 all that ,i then acquired has dribbled out of me4#ai ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,theags1 #abi ,e4 ,greek3 tauta d pa_/nta ei7_/rka_/ soi1 o7_/ti 7 du_/namis au7_/t tou daimoni_/ou tou_/tou kai ei7s tas sunousi_/as tn met' e7mou sundiatribo_/ntn to a7_/pan du_/natai4 pollois men gar e7nantioutai1 kai ou7k e7_/sti tou_/tois 7phelthnai met' e7mou diatri_/bousin4 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #abi ,e4 ,greek3 oi7s d' a7n sulla_/btai ts sunousi_/as 7 tou daimo_/niou du_/namis1 ou7toi ei7sin 7n kai su 7_/sthsai2 tachu gar parachrma e7pidido_/asin4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #acj ,a-,b4 ,greek3 ,ti_/ dai_/8 ou7k oi7den1 e7_/ph1 prin soi suggene_/sthai1 oi7on 7n to a7ndra_/podon8 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #acj ,d4 ,greek3 7ni_/ka de_/ soi parege_/neto 77 du_/namis71 po_/teron matho_/nti par' e7mou ti parege_/neto1 7_/ tini a7_/ll tro_/p8 ,e7g_/ soi1 e7_/ph1 e7r1 7 ,s_/krates1 a7_/piston men n tous theou_/s1 a7lthes de_/4 e7g gar e7_/mathon men para sou ou7den p_/pote1 7s au7tos oi7stha2 e7pedi_/doun de o7pote soi sunei_/n1 ka7n ei7 e7n t au7t mo_/non oi7ki_/a ei7_/n1 m e7n t au7t de oi7k_/mati1 c4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #acj ,e4 ,greek3 polu de ma_/lista kai pleiston e7pedi_/doun1 o7po_/te par' au7to_/n se kathoi_/mn e7cho_/meno_/s sou kai a7pto_/menos4 nun de_/1 7 d' o7_/s1 pasa e7kei_/n 7 e7_/xis e7xer7r7u_/ken4 ,side-note3 ,theags expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,i have now explained to you1 ,theags1 what it is to become my companion4 ,if it be the pleasure of the ,god1 you will make great and rapid progress3 if not1 not4 ,consider1 therefore1 whether it is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who are themselves masters of the benefits which they impart1 rather than to take your chance of the result with me4#bj ,theag4--,i shall be glad1 ,sokrates1 to become your companion1 and to make trial of this divine coadjutor4 ,if he shows himself propitious1 that will be the best of all3 if not1 we can then take counsel1 whether ,i shall try to propitiate him by prayer1 sacrifice1 or any other means which the prophets may recommend or whether ,i shall go to some other teacher4#ba ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #acj ,e4 ,greek3 o7_/ra ou7n m_/ soi a7sphale_/steron 7 par' e7kei_/nn tini paideu_/esthai1 oi7 e7gkrateis au7toi_/ ei7si ts 7phelei_/as1 7n 7phelousi tous a7nthr_/pous1 mallon 7 par' e7mou o7_/1 ti a7n tu_/ch1 touto praxai4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,theag4 #aca ,a4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks on the ,theags--analogy with the ,lachs4 ,the ,theags figured in the list of ,thrasyllus as first in the fifth ,tetralogy3 the other three members of the same ,tetralogy being ,charmids1 ,lachs1 ,lysis4 ,some persons considered it suitable to read as first dialogue of all4#bb ,there are several points of analogy between the ,theags and the ,lachs1 though with a different turn given to them4 ,aristeides and ,thucydides are mentioned in both of them3 ,sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher4 ,the ardour of the young ,theags to acquire wisdom reminds us of ,hippokrates at the beginning of the ,protagoras4 ,the string of questions put by ,sokrates to ,theags1 requiring that what is called wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised1 has its parallel in many of the ,platonic dialogues4 ,moreover the declaration of ,sokrates1 that he knows nothing except about matters of love1 but that in them he is a consummate master--is the same as what he explicitly declares both in the ,symposion and other dialogues4#bc ,footnote #bb3 ,diog4 ,l4 iii4 #ei-fa4 ,footnote #bc3 ,symposion1 #agg ,e4 ,greek3 ou7_/te gar a7_/n pou e7g a7poph_/saimi1 o7s ou7de_/n phmi a7_/llo e7pi_/stasthai 7 ta e7rtika_/4 ,compare the same dialogue1 p4 #bab ,b1 #baf ,c4 ,phdrus1 #bbg ,e1 #beg ,a2 ,lysis1 #bjd ,b4 ,compare also ,xenoph4 ,memor4 ii4 #f1 #bh2 ,xenoph4 ,sympos4 iv4 #bg4 ,it is not reasonable to treat this declaration of ,sokrates1 in the ,theags1 as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a falsarius1 when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to ,sokrates in other ,platonic dialogues4 ,side-note3 ,chief peculiarity of the ,theags--stress laid upon the divine sign or ,dmon4 ,but the chief peculiarity of the ,theags consists in the stress which is laid upon the ,dmon1 the divine voice1 the inspiration of ,sokrates4 ,this divine auxiliary is here described1 not only as giving a timely check or warning to ,sokrates1 when either he or his friends contemplated any inauspicious project--but also as intervening1 in the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed1 to promote the improvement of one1 to obstruct that of others2 so that whether ,sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one1 depends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient1 but upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency4#bd ,footnote #bd3 ,see some remarks on this point in ,appendix4 ,side-note3 ,plato employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of ,sokrates1 and of his unequal influence upon different companions4 ,plato employs the ,sokratic ,dmon1 in the ,theags1 for a philosophical purpose1 which1 ,i think1 admits of reasonable explanation4 ,during the eight 7perhaps ten7 years of his personal communion with ,sokrates1 he had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable effect produced by the ,sokratic conversation upon different hearers3 a fact which is also attested by the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia4 ,this difference of effect was in no way commensurate to the unequal intelligence of the hearers4 ,chrephon1 ,apollodrus1 ,kriton1 seem to have been ordinary men3--#be while ,kritias and ,alkibiades1 who brought so much discredit both upon ,sokrates and his teaching1 profited little by him1 though they were among the ablest pupils that he ever addressed3 moreover ,antisthenes1 and ,aristippus1 probably did not appear to ,plato 7since he greatly dissented from their philosophical views7 to have profited much by the common companionship with ,sokrates4 ,other companions there must have been also personally known to ,plato1 though not to us3 for we must remember that ,sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all listeners4 ,now when ,plato in after life came to cast the ministry of ,sokrates into dramatic scenes1 and to make each scene subservient to the illustration of some philosophical point of view1 at least a negative--he was naturally led to advert to the ,dmon or divine inspiration1 which formed so marked a feature in the character of his master4 ,the concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary served to explain why it was that the seed1 sown broadcast by ,sokrates1 sometimes fructified1 and sometimes did not fructify1 or speedily perished afterwards--when no sufficient explanatory peculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it fell4 ,it gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course pursued by ,sokrates3 for his preternatural acuteness in one direction1 and his avowed incapacity in another3 for his mastery of the ,elenchus1 convicting men of ignorance1 and his inability to supply them with knowledge3 for his refusal to undertake the duties of a teacher4 ,all these are mysterious features of the ,sokratic character4 ,the intervention of the ,dmon appears to afford an explanation1 by converting them into religious mysteries3 which1 though it be no explanation at all1 yet is equally efficacious by stopping the mouth of the questioner1 and by making him believe that it is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation--as ,sokrates himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena1 and as ,herodotus feels1 when his narrative is crossed by strange religious legends4#bf ,footnote #be3 ,xenophon1 ,apol4 ,sokr4 #bh4 ,greek3 ,a7pollo_/dros--e7pithum_/ts men i7schurs au7tou1 a7_/lls d' eu7_/ths4--,plat4 ,phdon1 #aag ,d4 ,footnote #bf3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #g1 #e-f2 ,herodot4 ii4 #c1 #de-df4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates1 while continually finding fault with other teachers1 refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal4 ,the ,theags furnishes an excuse4 ,in this manner1 the ,theags is made by ,plato to exhibit one way of parrying the difficulty frequently addressed to ,sokrates by various hearers3 ,you tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach their own sons1 and that the ,sophists teach nothing worth having3 you perpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers1 without telling us where such are to be found4 ,we entreat you to teach us yourself1 conformably to your own views4 ,if a leader of political opposition1 after years employed in denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous1 refuses1 when invited1 to take upon himself the business of administration--an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence to colour the refusal4 ,such a pretence is found for ,sokrates in the ,theags3 ,i am not my own master on this point4 ,i am the instrument of a divine ally1 without whose active working ,i can accomplish nothing3 who forbids altogether my teaching of one man--tolerates1 without assisting1 my unavailing lessons to another--assists efficaciously in my teaching of a third1 in which case alone the pupil receives any real benefit4 ,the assistance of this divine ally is given or withheld according to motives of his own1 which ,i cannot even foretell1 much less influence4 ,i should deceive you therefore if ,i undertook to teach1 when ,i cannot tell whether ,i shall do good or harm4 ,the reply of ,theags meets this scruple4 ,he asks permission to make the experiment1 and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by prayer and sacrifice2 under which reserve ,sokrates gives consent4 ,side-note3 ,plato does not always1 nor in other dialogues1 allude to the divine sign in the same way4 ,its character and working essentially impenetrable4 ,sokrates a privileged person4 ,it is in this way that the ,dmon or divine auxiliary serves the purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in the proceedings of ,sokrates4 ,i mean1 that such is the purpose served in this dialogue3 ,i know perfectly that ,plato deals with the case differently elsewhere3 but ,i am not bound 7as ,i have said more than once7 to force upon all the dialogues one and the same point of view4 ,that the agency of the ,gods was often and in the most important cases1 essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable1 and that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give special warnings to favoured persons--were doctrines which the historical ,sokrates in ,xenophon asserts with emphasis4#bg ,the ,dmon of ,sokrates was believed1 both by himself and his friends1 to be a special privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and communication to him4#bh ,it was perfectly applicable to the scope of the ,theags1 though ,plato might not choose always to make the same employment of it4 ,it is used in the same general way in the ,thettus2#bi doubtless with less expansion1 and blended with another analogy 7that of the mid-wife7 which introduces a considerable difference4#cj ,footnote #bg3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 i4 #a1 #h-i-ai4 ,euripid4 ,hecub4 #idd4 ,greek3 phu_/rousi d' au7ta theoi pa_/lin te kai pro_/s1 taragmon e7ntithe_/ntes1 7s a7gnsi_/a se_/bmen au7tou_/s4 ,footnote #bh3 ,xenoph4 ,mem4 iv4 #c1 #ab4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,thett4 #aej ,d-,e4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,apolog4 ,sokr4 #cc ,c4 ,greek3 e7moi de touto1 7s e7g_/ phmi1 proste_/taktai u7po toou theou pra_/ttein kai e7k mantein kai e7x e7nupni_/n kai panti tro_/p1 7pe_/r ti_/s pote kai a7_/ll thei_/a moio_/ra a7nthr_/p kai o7tioun prose_/taxe pra_/ttein4 #dj ,a4 ,greek3 7 gar ei7thuia_/ moi mantik 7 tou daimoni_/ou e7n men t pro_/sthen chro_/n panti pa_/nu pukn a7ei 7n kai pa_/nu e7pi smikrois e7nantioume_/n1 ei7_/ ti me_/lloimi m o7rths pra_/xein4 ,compare ,xenophon1 ,memor4 iv4 #h1 #e2 ,apol4 ,sokr4 c4 #ac4 ,,appendix4 ,greek3 ,to daimo_/nion smeion4 ,here is one of the points most insisted on by ,schleiermacher and ,stallbaum1 as proving that the ,theags is not the work of ,plato4 ,these critics affirm 7to use the language of ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 p4 #bbj7 ,quam ,plato alias de ,socratis dmonio prodidit sententiam1 ea longissim recedit ab ill ratione1 qu in hoc sermone exposita est4 ,he says that the representation of the ,dmon of ,sokrates1 given in the ,theags1 has been copied from a passage in the ,thettus1 by an imitator who has not understood the passage1 p4 #aej1 ,d1 ,e4 ,but ,socher 7p4 #ig7 appears to me to have shown satisfactorily1 that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the ,thettus and the ,theags4 ,in the ,thettus1 ,sokrates declares1 that none of his companions learnt any thing from him1 but that all of them ,greek3 oi7sper a7n o7 theos parei_/k 7the very same term is used at the close of the ,theags--#aca ,a1 ,greek3 e7an men parei_/k 7min--to daimo_/nion7 made astonishing progress and improvement in his company4 ,stallbaum says1 ,itaque ,greek3 o7 theos1 qui ibi memoratur1 non est ,socratis dmonium1 sed potius deus i4e4 sors divina4 ,quod non perspiciens noster tenebrio protenus illud dmonium1 quod ,socrates sibi semper adesse dictitabat1 ad eum dignitatis et potenti gradum evexit1 ut1 c4 ,i agree with ,socher in thinking that the phrase ,greek3 o7 theos in the ,thettus has substantially the same meaning as ,greek3 to daimo_/nion in the ,theags4 ,both ,schleiermacher 7,notes on the ,apology1 p4 #dcb7 and ,ast 7p4 #dhb71 have notes on the phrase ,greek3 to daimo_/nion--and ,i think the note of ,ast is the more instructive of the two4 ,in ,plato and ,xenophon1 the words ,greek3 to daimo_/nion1 ,greek3 to theion1 are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from ,greek3 o7 dai_/mn1 ,greek3 o7 theo_/s4 ,compare the ,phdrus1 #bdb ,e1 about ,greek3 theos and ,greek3 theio_/n ti4 ,sokrates1 in his argument against ,meletus in the ,apology 7p4 #bg7 emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing ,greek3 daimo_/nion1 without also believing in ,greek3 daimo_/nes4 ,the special ,greek3 theio_/n ti kai daimo_/nion 7,apol4 p4 #ca ,c71 which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings1 was only one of the many modes in which 7as he believed7 ,greek3 o7 theo_/s commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the ,athenians3--,greek3 e7moi de touto1 7s e7g_/ phmi1 proste_/taktai u7po tou theou pra_/ttein kai e7k mantein kai e7x e7nupni_/n kai panti tro_/p1 7pe_/r ti_/s pote kai a7_/ll thei_/a moira a7nthr_/p kai o7tioun prose_/taxe pra_/ttein 7,apol4 p4 #cc ,c74 ,so again in ,apol4 p4 #dj ,a1 ,b1 ,greek3 7 ei7thuia_/ moi mantik 7 tou daimoni_/ou--and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words1 ,greek3 to tou theou smeion1 where ,sokratis dmonium--and ,deus--are identified3 thus refuting the argument above cited from ,stallbaum4 ,there is therefore no such discrepancy1 in reference to ,greek3 to daimo_/nion1 as ,stallbaum and ,schleiermacher contend for4 ,we perceive indeed this difference between them--that in the ,thettus1 the simile of the obstetric art is largely employed1 while it is not noticed in the ,theags4 ,but we should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon ,plato's fancy1 if we hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of metaphors1 and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor predominant with him at the time4 ,moreover1 in respect to what is called the ,dmon of ,sokrates1 we ought hardly to expect that either ,plato or ,xenophon would always be consistent even with themselves4 ,it is unsafe for a modern critic to determine beforehand1 by reason or feelings of his own1 in what manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject4 ,the belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part of both1 but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate3 and there was1 throughout all the proceedings of ,sokrates1 a mixture of the serious and the playful1 of the sublime and the eccentric1 of ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition--which it is difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation4 ,such heterogeneous mixture is forcibly described in the ,platonic ,symposium1 pp4 #bae-bbb4 ,when we consider how undefined1 and undefinable1 the idea of this ,greek3 daimo_/nion was1 we cannot wonder if ,plato ascribes to it different workings and manifestations at different times4 ,stallbaum affirms that it is made ridiculous in the ,theags3 and ,khner declares that ,plutarch makes it ridiculous1 in his treatise ,de ,genio ,sokratia 7,comm4 ad4 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 p4 #bc74 ,but this is because its agency is described more in detail4 ,you can easily present it in a ridiculous aspect1 by introducing it as intervening on petty and insignificant matters4 ,now it is remarkable1 that in the ,apology1 we are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most trifling occasions--,greek3 pa_/nu e7pi smikrois e7nantioume_/n4 ,the business of an historian of philosophy is1 to describe it as it was really felt and believed by ,sokrates and ,plato--whether a modern critic may consider the description ridiculous or not4 ,when ,schleiermacher says 7,einleitung1 p4 #bdh71 respecting the falsarius whom he supposes to have written the ,theags--,damit ist ihm begegnet1 auf eine hchst verkehrte ,art wunderbar zusammenzurhren diese gttliche ,schickung1 und jenes persnliche ,vorgefhl welches dem ,sokrates zur gttlichen ,stimme ward4--,i contend that the mistake is chargeable to ,schleiermacher himself1 for bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the ,apology as the same phenomenon under two different names--,greek3 to daimo_/nion--,greek3 to tou theou smeion4 ,besides1 to treat the ,dmon as a mere personal presentiment of ,sokrates1 may be a true view3--but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious atmosphere as ,sokrates1 ,plato1 and ,xenophon4 ,it cannot therefore be properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings4 ,khner1 who treats the ,theags as not composed by ,plato1 grounds this belief partly on the assertion1 that the ,greek3 daimo_/nion of ,sokrates is described therein as something peculiar to ,sokrates2 which1 according to ,khner1 was the fiction of a subsequent time4 ,by ,sokrates and his contemporaries 7,khner says7 it was considered non sibi soli tanquam proprium quoddam beneficium a ,diis tributum1 sed commune sibi esse cum cteris hominibus 7pp4 #bj-ba74 ,i dissent entirely from this view1 which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by ,khner himself4 ,it is at variance with the ,platonic ,apology1 as well as with the ,thettus 7#aej ,d71 and ,republic 7vi4 #dif ,c74 ,xenophon does indeed try1 in the first ,chapter of the ,memorabilia1 as the defender of ,sokrates1 to soften the invidia against ,sokrates1 by intimating that other persons had communications from the ,gods as well as he4 ,but we see plainly1 even from other passages of the ,memorabilia1 that this was not the persuasion of ,sokrates himself1 nor of his friends1 nor of his enemies4 ,they all considered it 7as it is depicted in the ,theags also7 to be a special privilege and revelation4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,erast ,,or ,,anterast--,,rivales4 ,the main subject of this short dialogue is--,what is philosophy8 ,greek3 7 philosophi_/a--to philosophein4 ,how are we to explain or define it8 ,what is its province and purport8 ,side-note3 ,erast--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the palstra4 ,instead of the simple1 naked1 self-introducing1 conversation1 which we read in the ,menon1 ,hipparchus1 ,minos1 c4 ,sokrates recounts a scene and colloquy1 which occurred when he went into the house of ,dionysius the grammatist or school-master1#a frequented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils4 ,two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem1 in the presence of various spectators2 and especially of two young men1 rivals for the affection of one of them4 ,of these rivals1 the one is a person devoted to music1 letters1 discourse1 philosophy3--the other hates and despises these pursuits1 devoting himself to gymnastic exercise1 and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force4#b ,it is much the same contrast as that between the brothers ,amphion and ,zethus in the ,antiop of ,euripides--which is beautifully employed as an illustration by ,plato in the ,gorgias4#c ,footnote #a3 ,plato1 ,erast1 #acb4 ,greek3 ei7s ,dionusi_/ou tou grammatistou ei7slthon1 kai ei7don au7to_/thi tn te ne_/n tous e7pieikesta_/tous dokountas ei7nai tn i7de_/an kai pate_/rn eu7doki_/mn kai tou_/tn e7rasta_/s4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #acb ,e4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 #dhe-dhf4 ,compare ,cicero ,de ,oratore1 ii4 #cg1 #aef4 ,side-note3 ,two rival ,erast--one of them literary1 devoted to philosophy--the other gymnastic1 hating philosophy4 ,as soon as ,sokrates begins his interrogatories1 the two youths relinquish#d their geometrical talk1 and turn to him as attentive listeners4 ,their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those of the ,erastes4 ,he first enquires from the athletic ,erastes1 ,what is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon8 ,it must surely be something very fine1 to judge by the eagerness which they display8 ,how do you mean fine 7replies the athlete78 ,they are only prosing about astronomical matters--talking nonsense--philosophising6 ,the literary rival1 on the contrary1 treats this athlete as unworthy of attention1 speaks with enthusiastic admiration of philosophy1 and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant are degraded specimens of humanity4 ,footnote #d3 ,the powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to ,sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as a point in his character4 ,compare the beginning of the ,charmids and the ,lysis4 ,side-note3 ,question put by ,sokrates--,what is philosophy8 ,it is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge1 so as to make the largest sum total4 ,sokr4--,you think philosophy a fine thing8 ,but you cannot tell whether it is fine or not1 unless you know what it is4#e ,pray explain to me what philosophy is4 ,erast4--,i will do so readily4 ,philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's knowledge--in his going on perpetually acquiring something new1 both in youth and in old age1 so that he may learn as much as possible during life4 ,philosophy is polymathy4#f ,sokr4--,you think philosophy not only a fine thing1 but good8 ,erast4--,yes--very good4 ,sokr4--,but is the case similar in regard to gymnastic8 ,is a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise1 or as much nourishment1 as possible8 ,is such very great quantity good for the body8#g ,footnote #e3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #acc ,a-,b4 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #acc ,d4 ,greek3 tn philosophi_/an--poluma_/theian4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #acc ,e4 ,side-note3 ,in the case of the body1 it is not the maximum of exercise which does good1 but the proper1 measured quantity4 ,for the mind also1 it is not the maximum of knowledge1 but the measured quantity which is good4 ,who is the judge to determine this measure8 ,it appears after some debate 7in which the other or athletic ,erastes sides with ,sokrates#h7 that in regard to exercise and food it is not the great quantity or the small quantity1 which is good for the body--but the moderate or measured quantity4#i ,for the mind1 the case is admitted to be similar4 ,not the much1 nor the little1 of learning is good for it but the right or measured amount4 ,sokr4--,and who is the competent judge1 how much of either is right measure for the body8 ,erast4--,the physician and the gymnastic trainer4 ,sokr4--,who is the competent judge1 how much seed is right measure for sowing a field8 ,erast4--,the farmer4 ,sokr4--,who is the competent judge1 in reference to the sowing and planting of knowledge in the mind1 which varieties are good1 and how much of each is right measure8 ,footnote #h3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #acd ,b-,c4 ,the literary ,erastes says to ,sokrates1 ,to you1 ,i have no objection to concede this point1 and to admit that my previous answer must be modified4 ,but if ,i were to debate the point only with him 7the athletic rival71 ,i could perfectly well have defended my answer1 and even worse answer still1 for he is quite worthless 7,greek3 ou7den ga_/r e7sti74 ,this is a curious passage1 illustrating the dialectic habits of the day1 and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,erast1 #acd ,b-,d4 ,greek3 ta me_/tria ma_/lista 7phelein1 a7lla m ta polla mde ta o7li_/ga4 ,side-note3 ,no answer given4 ,what is the best conjecture8 ,answer of the literary ,erastes4 ,a man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic1 though not to practise4 ,the question is one which none of the persons present can answer4#aj ,none of them can tell who is the special referee1 about training of mind2 corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases4 ,sokrates then puts a question somewhat different3 ,sokr4--,since we have agreed1 that the man who prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many things1 still less all things--what is the best conjecture that we can make1 respecting the matters which he ought to learn8 ,erast4--,the finest and most suitable acquirements for him to aim at1 are those which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher4 ,he ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science1 or at least in all the more important2 and with that view1 to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to know3--that is1 what belongs to the intelligent critic1 as distinguished from the manual operative3 to the planning and superintending architect1 as distinguished from the working carpenter4#aa ,sokr4--,but you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent--much less several considerable arts4 ,erast4--,i do not of course mean that the philosopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately1 like the artist himself--but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen4 ,that is1 he shall be able to appreciate1 better than other hearers1 the observations made by the artist3 and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own1 so as to be accounted1 by all the hearers1 more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves4#ab ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #acd ,e1 #ace ,a4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #ace ,b4 ,greek3 o7_/sa xune_/ses e7_/chetai1 m o7_/sa cheirourgi_/as4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #ace ,d4 ,side-note3 ,the philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts--a ,pentathlus--who talks well upon each4 ,sokr4--,you mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in several distinct pursuits3 like the ,pentathlus1 who is not expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own separate departments1 but only to surpass competitors in the five matches taken together4#ac ,erast4--,yes--,i mean what you say4 ,he is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter1 nor works out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others3 he attends to all of them in reasonable measure4#ad ,footnote #ac3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #ace ,e1 #acf ,a4 ,greek3 kai ou7_/ts gi_/gnesthai peri pa_/nta u7_/pakro_/n tina a7_/ndra ton pephilosophko_/ta4 ,the five matches were leaping1 running1 throwing the quoit and the javelin1 wrestling4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #acf ,b4 ,greek3 a7lla pa_/ntn metri_/s e7phphthai4 ,side-note3 ,on what occasions can such second-best men be useful8 ,there are always regular practitioners at hand1 and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner4 ,upon this answer ,sokrates proceeds to cross-examine3 ,sokr4--,do you think that good men are useful1 bad men useless8 ,erast4--,yes ,i do4 ,sokr4--,you think that philosophers1 as you describe them1 are useful8 ,erast4--,certainly3 extremely useful4 ,sokr4--,but tell me on what occasions such second-best men are useful3 for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist4 ,if you fall sick will you send for one of them1 or for a professional physician8 ,erast4--,i should send for both4 ,sokr4--,that is no answer3 ,i wish to know1 which of the two you will send for first and by preference8 ,erast4--,no doubt ,i shall send for the professional physician4 ,sokr4--,the like also1 if you are in danger on shipboard1 you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher3 and so as to all other matters1 as long as a professional man is to be found1 the philosopher is of no use8 ,erast4--,so it appears4 ,sokr4--,our philosopher then is one of the useless persons3 for we assuredly have professional men at hand4 ,now we agreed before1 that good men were useful1 bad men useless4#ae ,erast4--,yes2 that was agreed4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plat4 ,erast4 #acf ,c-,d4 ,side-note3 ,philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements4 ,sokr4--,if then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects1 he is useless so long as there exist professional artists on each subject4 ,your definition cannot therefore be correct4 ,philosophy must be something quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with different professional subjects1 or this multiplication of learned acquirements4 ,indeed ,i fancied1 that to be absorbed in professional subjects and in variety of studies1 was vulgar and discreditable rather than otherwise4#af ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #acg ,b4 ,let us now1 however 7continues ,sokrates71 take up the matter in another way4 ,in regard to horses and dogs1 those who punish rightly are also those who know how to make them better1 and to discriminate with most exactness the good from the bad8 ,erast4--,yes3 such is the fact4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put to show that there is one special art1 regal and political1 of administering and discriminating the bad from the good4 ,sokr4--,is not the case similar with men8 ,is it not the same art1 which punishes men rightly1 makes them better1 and best distinguishes the good from the bad8 whether applied to one1 few1 or many8 ,erast4--,it is so4#ag ,sokr4--,the art or science1 whereby men punish evil-doers rightly1 is the judicial or justice3 and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad1 either one or many4 ,if any man be a stranger to this art1 so as not to know good men apart from bad1 is he not also ignorant of himself1 whether he be a good or a bad man8 ,erast4--,yes3 he is4 ,sokr4--,to be ignorant of yourself1 is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance2 to know yourself is to be sober or temperate4 ,but this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly--or justice4 ,therefore justice and temperance are the same3 and the ,delphian rescript1 ,know thyself1 does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety4#ah ,erast4--,so it appears4 ,sokr4--,now it is by this same art1 when practised by a king1 rightly punishing evil-doers1 that cities are well governed2 it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master1 that the house is well-governed3 so that this art1 justice or sobriety1 is at the same time political1 regal1 economical2 and the just and sober man is at once the true king1 statesman1 house-master4#ai ,erast4--,i admit it4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #acg ,c-,d4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #ach ,a4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #ach ,c4 ,side-note3 ,in this art the philosopher must not only be second-best1 competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner1 competent to act4 ,sokr4--,now let me ask you4 ,you said that it was discreditable for the philosopher1 when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about matters of his own craft1 not to be able to follow what he said and comment upon it4 ,would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher1 when listening to any king1 judge1 or house-master1 about professional affairs1 not to be able to understand and comment8 ,erast4--,assuredly it would be most discreditable upon matters of such grave moment4 ,sokr4--,shall we say then1 that upon these matters also1 as well as all others1 the philosopher ought to be a ,pentathlus or second-rate performer1 useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand8 or shall we not rather affirm1 that he must not confide his own house to any one else1 nor be the second-best within it1 but must himself judge and punish rightly1 if his house is to be well administered8 ,erast4--,that too ,i admit4#bj ,sokr4--,farther1 if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes1--if the city shall command him to act as ,dikast or to settle any difficulty1--in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to stand second or third1 and not to be first-rate8 ,erast4--,i think it will be4 ,sokr4--,you see then1 my friend1 philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences4#ba ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #ach ,e4 ,greek3 ,po_/teron ou7n kai peri tauta le_/gmen1 pe_/ntathlon au7ton dein ei7nai kai u7_/pakron1 ta deutereia e7_/chonta pa_/ntn1 ton philo_/sophon1 kai a7chreion ei7nai1 e7_/s a7n tou_/tn tis 78 7 prton men tn au7tou oi7ki_/an ou7k a7ll e7pitrepte_/on ou7de ta deutereia e7n tou_/t e7kte_/on1 a7ll' au7ton kolaste_/on dika_/zonta o7rths1 ei7 me_/llei eu7 oi7keisthai au7tou 7 oi7ki_/a8 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,erast4 #aci ,a4 ,greek3 ,pollou a7_/ra dei 7min1 7 be_/ltiste1 to philosophein poluma_/theia_/ te ei7nai kai 7 peri tas te_/chnas pragmatei_/a4 ,side-note3 ,close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary ,erastes4 ,upon my saying this 7so ,sokrates concludes his recital of the conversation7 the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held his peace2 while the gymnastic rival declared that ,i was in the right1 and the other hearers also commended what ,i had said4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks--animated manner of the dialogue4 ,the antithesis between the philo-gymnast1 hater of philosophy1--and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy1 who nevertheless cannot explain what it is--gives much point and vivacity to this short dialogue4 ,this last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and confident2 thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating cross-examination put upon him by ,sokrates to the satisfaction of his stupid rival4 ,moreover1 the dramatic introduction is full of animation1 like that of the ,charmids and ,lysis4 ,besides the animated style of the dialogue1 the points raised for discussion in it are of much interest4 ,the word philosophy has at all times been vague and ambiguous4 ,certainly no one before ,sokrates--probably no one before ,plato--ever sought a definition of it4 ,in no other ,platonic dialogue than this1 is the definition of it made a special topic of research4 ,side-note3 ,definition of philosophy--here sought for the first time--,platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered4 ,it is here handled in ,plato's negative1 elenchtic1 tentative1 manner4 ,by some of his contemporaries1 philosophy was really considered as equivalent to polymathy1 or to much and varied knowledge3 so at least ,plato represents it as being considered by ,hippias the ,sophist1 contrary to the opinion of ,protagoras4#bb ,the exception taken by ,sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity1 without any standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be measured1 introduces that governing idea of ,greek3 to me_/trion 7the moderate1 that which conforms to a standard measure7 upon which ,plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues4 ,the conception of a measure1 of a standard of measurement--and of conformity thereunto1 as the main constituent of what is good and desirable--stands prominent in his mind1#bc though it is not always handled in the same way4 ,we have seen it1 in the ,second ,alkibiads1 indicated under another name as knowledge of ,good or of the ,best3 without which1 knowledge on special matters was declared to be hurtful rather than useful4#bd ,plato considers that this ,measure is neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained intelligence4 ,in the ,erast as elsewhere1 such an intelligence is called for in general terms3 but when it is asked1 ,where is the person possessing such intelligence1 available in the case of mental training--neither ,sokrates nor any one else can point him out4 ,to suggest a question1 and direct attention to it1 yet still to leave it unanswered--is a practice familiar with ,plato4 ,in this respect the ,erast is like other dialogues4 ,the answer1 if any1 intended to be understood or divined1 is1 that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 #cah ,e4 ,compare too1 the ,platonic dialogues1 ,hippias ,major and ,minor4 ,footnote #bc3 ,see about ,greek3 7 tou metri_/ou phu_/sis as ,greek3 ou7si_/a--as ,greek3 o7_/nts gigno_/menon4--,plato1 ,politikus1 #bhc-bhd4 ,compare also the ,philbus1 p4 #fd ,d1 and the ,protagoras1 pp4 #cef-ceg1 where ,greek3 7 metrtik te_/chn is declared to be the principal saviour of life and happiness4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 #ade-adf2 supra1 ch4 xii4 p4 #af4 ,side-note3 ,view taken of the second-best critical talking man1 as compared with the special proficient and practitioner4 ,the second explanation of philosophy here given--that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many departments1 and a good talker upon all1 but inferior to the special master in each--was supposed by ,thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at ,demokritus4 ,by many ,platonic critics1 it is referred to those persons whom they single out to be called ,sophists4 ,i conceive it to be applicable 7whether intended or not7 to the literary men generally of that age1 the persons called ,sophists included4 ,that which ,perikles expressed by the word1 when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the ,athenian citizen--referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion1 the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing before it was done1 yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act4#be ,speech1 ready and pertinent1 free conflict of opinion on many different topics--was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired4 ,sokrates passed his life in talking1 with every one indiscriminately1 and upon each man's particular subject2 often perplexing the artist himself4 ,xenophon recounts conversations with various professional men--a painter1 a sculptor1 an armourer--and informs us that it was instructive to all of them1 though ,sokrates was no practitioner in any craft4#bf ,it was not merely ,demokritus1 but ,plato and ,aristotle also1 who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in contemporary observation4 ,the voluminous works of ,aristotle1--the ,timus1 ,republic1 and ,leges1 of ,plato1--embrace a large variety of subjects1 on each of which1 severally taken1 these two great men were second-best or inferior to some special proficient4 ,yet both of them had judgments to give1 which it was important to hear1 upon all subjects3#bg and both of them could probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself4 ,aristotle1 for example1 would write better upon rhetoric than ,demosthenes--upon tragedy1 than ,sophokles4 ,undoubtedly1 if an oration or a tragedy were to be composed--if resolution or action were required on any real state of particular circumstances--the special proficient would be called upon to act3 but it would be a mistake to infer from hence1 as the ,platonic ,sokrates intimates in the ,erast1 that the second-best1 or theorizing reasoner1 was a useless man4 ,the theoretical and critical point of view1 with the command of language apt for explaining and defending it1 has a value of its own2 distinct from1 yet ultimately modifying and improving1 the practical4 ,and such comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects1 without having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of them1 deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it be adopted as the definition of a philosopher1 or not4 ,footnote #be3 ,thucyd4 ii4 #ci fin4--#dj4 ,greek3 kai e7_/n te tou_/tois tn po_/lin a7xi_/an ei7nai thauma_/zesthai1 kai e7_/ti e7n a7_/llois4 philokaloumen gar met' eu7telei_/as kai philosophoumen a7_/neu malaki_/as1 c41 and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic action in the ,athenian character4 ,footnote #bf3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iii4 #aj2 iii4 #aa2 iii4 #ab4 ,footnote #bg3 ,the ,greek3 pe_/ntathlos or ,greek3 u7_/pakros whom ,plato criticises in this dialogue1 coincides with what ,aristotle calls the man of universal education or culture4--,ethic4 ,nikom4 ,i4 i4 #ajie1 a4 #a4 ,greek3 e7_/kastos de kri_/nei kals a7 gign_/skei1 kai tou_/tn e7stin a7gathos krit_/s2 kath' e7_/kaston a7_/ra1 o7 pepaideume_/nos2 a7pls de_/1 o7 peri pan pepaideume_/nos4 ,side-note3 ,plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special to himself1 distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal or political art4 ,plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher in the same way as ,sokrates4 ,the close of the ,erast is employed in opening a distant and dim view of the ,platonic conception4 ,we are given to understand1 that the philosopher has a province of his own1 wherein he is not second-best1 but a first-rate actor and adviser4 ,to indicate1 in many different ways1 that there is or must be such a peculiar1 appertaining to philosophy--distinct from1 though analogous to1 the peculiar of each several art--is one leading purpose in many ,platonic dialogues4 ,but what is the peculiar of the philosopher8 ,here1 as elsewhere1 it is marked out in a sort of misty outline1 not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it1 but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded4 ,here1 we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil1 governing1 and applying penal sanctions rightly4 ,this is the supreme art or science1 of which the philosopher is the professor2 and in which1 far from requiring advice from others1 he is the only person competent both to advise and to act3 the art which exercises control over all other special arts1 directing how far1 and on what occasions1 each of them comes into appliance4 ,it is philosophy1 looked at in one of its two aspects3 not as a body of speculative truth1 to be debated1 proved1 and discriminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved--but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life1 prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases1 with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends1 recognised as expetenda4#bh ,this is what ,plato understands by the measuring or calculating art1 the regal or political art1 according as we use the language of the ,protagoras1 ,politikus1 ,euthydmus1 ,republic4 ,both justice and sobriety are branches of this art2 and the distinction between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a whole--as we find both in the ,erast and in the ,republic4#bi ,footnote #bh3 ,the difference between the second explanation of philosophy and the third explanation1 suggested in the ,erast1 will be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which ,aristotle takes much pains to draw between ,greek3 sophi_/a and ,greek3 phro_/nsis4--,ethic4 ,nikomach4 vi4 #e1 pp4 #aadj-aada2 also ,ethic4 ,magn4 i4 pp4 #aaig-aaih4 ,footnote #bi3 ,see ,republic1 iv4 #dcc ,a2 ,gorgias1 #ebf ,c2 ,charmids #afd ,b2 and ,heindorf's note on the passage in the ,charmids4 ,side-note3 ,philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists4 ,here1 in the ,erast1 this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists1 is darkly indicated and crudely sketched4 ,we shall find the same conception more elaborately illustrated in other dialogues2 yet never passing out of that state4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,appendix4 ,this is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by ,schleiermacher1 ,ast1 ,socher1 and ,stallbaum1 all of them critics of the present century4 ,in my judgment1 their grounds for such declaration are altogether inconclusive4 ,they think the dialogue an inferior composition1 unworthy of ,plato2 and they accordingly find reasons1 more or less ingenious1 for relieving ,plato from the discredit of it4 ,i do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do2 but even if ,i did1 ,i should not pronounce it to be spurious1 without some evidence bearing upon that special question4 ,no such evidence1 of any value1 is produced4 ,it is indeed contended1 on the authority of a passage in ,diogenes 7ix4 #cg71 that ,thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the ,erast4 ,the passage is as follows1 in his life of ,demokritus--,greek3 ei7_/per oi7 ,a7nterastai ,pla_/tno_/s ei7si1 phsi ,thra_/sullos1 ou7tos a7n ei7_/ o7 parageno_/menos a7n_/numos1 tn peri ,oi7nopi_/dn kai ,a7naxago_/ran e7_/teros1 e7n t pros ,skra_/tn o7mili_/a dialego_/menos peri philosophi_/as2 71 phsi_/n1 7s penta_/thl e7_/oiken o7 philo_/sophos2 kai 7n 7s a7lths e7n philosophi_/a pe_/ntathlos 7,demokritus74 ,now in the first place1 ,schleiermacher and ,stallbaum both declare that ,thrasyllus can never have said that which ,diogenes here makes him say 7,schleierm4 p4 #eaj2 ,stallbaum1 ,prolegg4 ad4 ,erast4 p4 #bff1 and not4 p4 #bgc74 ,next1 it is certain that ,thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted work of ,plato1 for he enrolled it in his classification1 as the third dialogue in the fourth tetralogy 7,diog4 ,l4 iii4 #ei74 ,yxem1 who defends the genuineness of the ,erast 7,ueber ,platon's ,kleitophon1 pp4 #f-g1 ,berlin1 #ahdf71 insists very properly on this point2 not merely as an important fact in itself1 but as determining the sense of the words ,greek3 ei7_/per oi7 ,a7nterastai ,pla_/tno_/s ei7si1 and as showing that the words rather affirm1 than deny1 the authenticity of the dialogue4 ,if the ,anterast are the work of ,plato1 as they are universally admitted to be4 ,you must supply the parenthesis in this way1 in order to make ,thrasyllus consistent with himself4 ,yxem cites a passage from ,galen1 in which ,greek3 ei7_/per is used1 and in which the parenthesis must be supplied in the way indicated3 no doubt at all being meant to be hinted4 ,and ,i will produce another passage out of ,diogenes himself1 where ,greek3 ei7_/per is used in the same way2 not as intended to convey the smallest doubt1 but merely introducing the premiss for a conclusion immediately following4 ,diogenes says1 respecting the ,platonic ,ideas1 ,greek3 ei7_/per e7sti mn_/m1 tas i7de_/as e7n tois ou7sin u7pa_/rchein 7iii4 #ae74 ,he does not intend to suggest any doubt whether there be such a fact as memory4 ,greek3 ,ei7_/per is sometimes the equivalent of ,greek3 e7peid_/per3 as we learn from ,hermann ad ,viger4 ,,viii4 #f1 p4 #eab4 ,there is therefore no fair ground for supposing that ,thrasyllus doubted the genuineness of the ,erast4 ,and when ,i read what modern critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation1 ,i feel the more authorised in dissenting from it4 ,i will cite a passage or two from ,stallbaum4 ,stallbaum begins his ,prolegomena as follows1 pp4 #bje-bjf3 ,quanquam hic libellus genus dicendi habet purum1 castum1 elegans1 nihil ut inveniri queat quod ,platonis aut ,xenophontis eleganti1 abhorreat--tamen quin ,boeckhio1 ,schleiermachero1 ,astio1 ,sochero1 ,knebelio1 aliis jure meritoque pro suppositicio habitus sit1 haudquaquam dubitamus4 ,est enim materia operis adeo non ad ,platonis mentem rationemque elaborata1 ut potius cuivis alii ,socraticorum quam huic rect adscribi posse videatur4 ,after stating that the ,erast may be divided into two principal sections1 ,stallbaum proceeds3--,neutra harum partium ita tractata est1 ut nihil desideretur1 quod ad justam argumenti explicationem merito requiras--nihil inculcatum reperiatur1 quod vel alio modo illustratum vel omnino omissum esse cupias4 ,i call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds upon which the ,platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues out of the ,platonic ,canon4 ,if there be anything wanting in it which is required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the argument--if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted or otherwise illustrated--this is with them a reason for deciding that it is not ,plato's work4 ,that is1 if there be any defects in it of any kind1 it cannot be admitted as ,plato's work2--his genuine works have no defects4 ,i protest altogether against this ratio decidendi4 ,if ,i acknowledged it and applied it consistently ,i should strike out every dialogue in the ,canon4 ,certainly1 the presumption in favour of the ,catalogue of ,thrasyllus must be counted as nil1 if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments as these4 ,one reason given by ,stallbaum for considering the ,erast as spurious is1 that the ,sophists are not derided in it4 ,quis est igitur1 qui ,platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigaturum1 et omnino non significaturum1 quinam illi essent1 adversus quos hanc disputationem instituisset8 ,it is strange to be called on by learned men to strike out all dialogues from the ,canon in which there is no derision of the ,sophists4 ,such derision exists already in excess3 we hear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for lecturing4 ,again1 ,stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are here attacked are not specified by name4 ,but who are the ,greek3 ei7dn phi_/loi1 attacked in the ,sophists8 ,they are not specified by name1 and critics differ as to the persons intended4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,ion4 ,side-note3 ,ion4 ,persons of the dialogue4 ,difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness4 ,the dialogue called ,ion is carried on between ,sokrates and the ,ephesian rhapsode ,ion4 ,it is among those disallowed by ,ast1 first faintly defended1 afterwards disallowed1 by ,schleiermacher1#a and treated contemptuously by both4 ,subsequent critics1 ,hermann1#b ,stallbaum1 ,steinhart1 consider it as genuine1 yet as an inferior production1 of little worth1 and belonging to ,plato's earliest years4 ,footnote #a3 ,schleiermacher1 ,einleit4 zum ,ion1 p4 #bfa-bff2 ,ast1 ,leben und ,schriften des ,platon1 p4 #djf4 ,footnote #b3 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 ,gesch4 und ,syst4 der ,plat4 ,phil4 pp4 #dcg-dch2 ,steinhart1 ,einleitung1 p4 #ae4 ,side-note3 ,rhapsodes as a class in ,greece4 ,they competed for prizes at the festivals4 ,ion has been triumphant4 ,i hold it to be genuine1 and it may be comparatively early2 but ,i see no ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied to it4 ,the personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the cross-examination of ,sokrates is a rhapsode of celebrity2 one among a class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed4 ,they recited or sang1#c with appropriate accent and gesture1 the compositions of ,homer and of other epic poets3 thus serving to the ,grecian epic1 the same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic1 and the harp-singers 7,greek3 kithardoi7 to the lyric4 ,there were various solemn festivals such as that of sculapius at ,epidaurus1 and 7most especially7 the ,panathena at ,athens1 where prizes were awarded for the competition of the rhapsodes4 ,ion is described as having competed triumphantly in the festival at ,epidaurus1 and carried off the first prize4 ,he appeared there in a splendid costume1 crowned with a golden wreath1 amidst a crowd which is described as containing more than #bj1jjj persons4#d ,footnote #c3 ,the word ,greek3 a7_/dein is in this very dialogue 7#ecb ,d1 #ece ,a7 applied to the rhapsoding of ,ion4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ece ,d4 ,side-note3 ,functions of the ,rhapsodes4 ,recitation--,exposition of the poets4 ,arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent4 ,much of the acquaintance of cultivated ,greeks with ,homer and the other epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such rhapsodes2 the best of whom contended at the festivals1 while others1 less highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation1 gave separate declamations and lectures of their own1 and even private lessons to individuals4#e ,euthydmus1 in one of the ,xenophontic conversations with ,sokrates1 and ,antisthenes in the ,xenophontic ,symposion1 are made to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly4 ,this1 if true at all1 can apply only to the expositions and comments with which they accompanied their recital of ,homer and other poets4 ,moreover we cannot reasonably set it down 7though some modern critics do so7 as so much incontestable truth3 we must consider it as an opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation1 but not necessarily well founded4#f ,unquestionably1 the comments made upon ,homer 7both in that age and afterwards7 were often fanciful and misleading4 ,metrodorus1 ,anaxagoras1 and others1 resolved the ,homeric narrative into various allegories1 physical1 ethical1 and theological3 and most men who had an opinion to defend1 rejoiced to be able to support or enforce it by some passages of ,homer1 well or ill-explained--just as texts of the ,bible are quoted in modern times4 ,in this manner1 ,homer was pressed into the service of every disputant2 and the ,homeric poems were presented as containing1 or at least as implying1 doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they were composed4#g ,footnote #e3 ,xen4 ,sympos4 iii4 #f4 ,nikratus says that he heard the rhapsodes nearly every day4 ,he professes to be able to repeat both the ,iliad and the ,odyssey from memory4 ,footnote #f3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #b1 #aj2 ,sympos4 iii4 #f2 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecj ,e4 ,steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been pronounced by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates himself1 which is not the fact 7,steinhart1 ,einleitung p4 #c74 ,footnote #g3 ,diogenes ,laert4 ii4 #aa2 ,nitzsch1 ,die ,heldensage des ,griechen1 pp4 #gd-gh2 ,lobeck1 ,agloaphamus1 p4 #aeg4 ,seneca1 ,epistol4 #hh3 modo ,stoicum ,homerum faciunt--modo ,epicureum 4 4 4 modo ,peripateticum1 tria genera bonorum inducentem3 modo ,academicum1 incerta omnia dicentem4 ,apparet nihil horum esse in illo1 cui omnia insunt3 ista enim inter se dissident4 ,side-note3 ,the popularity of the ,rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation4 ,powerful effect which they produced4 ,the ,rhapsodes1 in so far as they interpreted ,homer1 were probably not less disposed than others to discover in him their own fancies4 ,but the character in which they acquired most popularity1 was1 not as expositors1 but as reciters1 of the poems4 ,the powerful emotion which1 in the process of reciting1 they both felt themselves and communicated to their auditors1 is declared in this dialogue3 ,when that which ,i recite is pathetic 7says ,ion71 my eyes are filled with tears3 when it is awful or terrible1 my hair stands on end1 and my heart leaps4 ,moreover ,i see the spectators also weeping1 sympathising with my emotions1 and looking aghast at what they hear4#h ,this assertion of the vehement emotional effect produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the rhapsode1 deserves all the more credit--because ,plato himself1 far from looking upon it favourably1 either derides or disapproves it4 ,accepting it as a matter of fact1 we see that the influence of rhapsodes1 among auditors generally1 must have been derived more from their efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ece ,c-,e4 ,the description here given is the more interesting because it is the only intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these rhapsodic representations4 ,side-note3 ,ion both reciter and expositor--,homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet4 ,ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the two functions of reciter and expositor3 a partnership like that of ,garrick and ,johnson1 in regard to ,shakspeare4 ,it is in the last of the two functions1 that ,sokrates here examines him3 considering ,homer1 not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers1 but as a teacher administering lessons and imparting instruction4 ,such was the view of ,homer entertained by a large proportion of the ,hellenic world4 ,in that capacity1 his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes1 as well as for various philosophers and ,sophists who were not rhapsodes1 nor accomplished reciters4 ,side-note3 ,plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working4 ,the reader must keep in mind1 in following the questions put by ,sokrates1 that this pdagogic and edifying view of ,homer is the only one present to the men of the ,sokratic school--and especially to ,plato4 ,of the genuine functions of the gifted poet1 who touches the chords of strong and diversified emotion--qui pectus inaniter angit1 ,irritat1 mulcet1 falsis terroribus implet 7,horat4 ,epist4 ,,ii4 #a1 #bab7--,plato takes no account3 or rather1 he declares open war against them1 either as childish delusions#i1 or as mischievous stimulants1 tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind1 and to overthrow the sovereign authority of reason4 ,we shall find farther manifestations on this point in the ,republic and ,leges4 ,footnote #i3 ,the question of ,sokrates 7,ion1 #ece ,d71 about the emotion produced in the hearers by the recital of ,homer's poetry1 bears out what is here asserted4 ,side-note3 ,ion devoted himself to ,homer exclusively4 ,questions of ,sokrates to him--,how happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets8 ,the poetic art is one4 ,ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of ,homer exclusively1 neglecting other poets3 so that he can interpret the thoughts1 and furnish reflections upon them1 better than any other expositor4#aj ,how does it happen 7asked ,sokrates7 that you have so much to say about ,homer1 and nothing at all about other poets8 ,homer may be the best of all poets3 but he is still only one of those who exercise the poetic art1 and he must necessarily talk about the same subjects as other poets4 ,now the art of poetry is ,one altogether--like that of painting1 sculpture1 playing on the flute1 playing on the harp1 rhapsodizing1 c4#aa ,whoever is competent to judge and explain one artist1--what he has done well and what he has done ill1--is competent also to judge any other artist in the same profession4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecf ,e4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #eca ,a1 #ecb ,c-,d4 ,greek3 poitik pou_/ e7sti to o7_/lon4 4 4 ,ou7koun e7peidan la_/b tis kai a7_/lln te_/chnn 7ntinoun o7_/ln1 o7 au7tos tro_/pos ts ske_/pse_/s e7sti peri a7pasn tn technn8 #ecc ,a4 ,i cannot explain to you how it happens 7replies ,ion73 ,i only know the fact incontestably--that when ,i talk about ,homer1 my thoughts flow abundantly1 and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent4 ,quite the reverse1 when ,i talk of any other poet4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecc ,c4 ,side-note3 ,explanation given by ,sokrates4 ,both the ,rhapsode and the ,poet work1 not by art and system1 but by divine inspiration4 ,fine poets are bereft of their reason1 and possessed by inspiration from some ,god4 ,i can explain it 7says ,sokrates74 ,your talent in expounding ,homer is not an art1 acquired by system and method--otherwise it would have been applicable to other poets besides4 ,it is a special gift1 imparted to you by divine power and inspiration4 ,the like is true of the poet whom you expound4 ,his genius does not spring from art1 system1 or method3 it is a special gift emanating from the inspiration of the ,muses4#ac ,a poet is a light1 airy1 holy1 person1 who cannot compose verses at all so long as his reason remains within him4#ad ,the ,muses take away his reason1 substituting in place of it their own divine inspiration and special impulse1 either towards epic1 dithyramb1 encomiastic hymns1 hyporchemata1 c41 one or other of these4 ,each poet receives one of these special gifts1 but is incompetent for any of the others3 whereas1 if their ability had been methodical or artistic1 it would have displayed itself in all of them alike4 ,like prophets1 and deliverers of oracles1 these poets have their reason taken away1 and become servants of the ,gods4#ae ,it is not they who1 bereft of their reason1 speak in such sublime strains3 it is the ,god who speaks to us1 and speaks through them4 ,you may see this by ,tynnichus of ,chalkis2 who composed his ,pan1 the finest of all ,pans1 which is in every one's mouth1 telling us himself1 that it was the invention of the ,muses--but who never composed anything else worth hearing4 ,it is through this worthless poet that the ,god has sung the most sublime hymn3#af for the express purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human performances at all1 but divine3 and that the poet is only an interpreter of the ,gods1 possessed by one or other of them1 as the case may be4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecc ,e--#ecd ,a4 ,greek3 pa_/ntes gar oi7_/ te tn e7pn poitai oi7 a7gathoi ou7k e7k te_/chns a7ll' e7_/ntheoi o7_/ntes kai katecho_/menoi pa_/nta tauta ta kala le_/gousi poi_/mata1 kai oi7 melopoioi oi7 a7gathoi 7sau_/ts2 7_/sper oi7 korubantintites ou7k e7_/mphrones o7_/ntes o7rchountai1 ou7_/t kai oi7 melopoioi ou7k e7_/mphrones o7_/ntes ta kala me_/l tauta poiousin1 c4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecd ,b4 ,greek3 kouphon gar chrma poit_/s e7sti kai ptnon kai i7ero_/n1 kai ou7 pro_/teron oi7o_/s te poiein prin a7n e7_/ntheo_/s te ge_/ntai kai e7_/kphrn kai o7 nous mke_/ti e7n au7t e7n2 e7_/s d' a7n touti e7_/ch to ktma1 a7du_/natos pas poiein e7stin a7_/nthrpos kai chrsmdein4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato4 ,ion1 #ecd ,c-,d4 ,greek3 dia tauta de o7 theos e7xairou_/menos tou_/tn ton noun tou_/tois chrtai u7pre_/tais kai tois chrsmdois kai tois ma_/ntesi tois thei_/ois1 i7_/na 7meis oi7 a7kou_/ontes ei7dmen1 o7_/ti ou7ch ou7toi_/ ei7sin oi7 tauta le_/gontes ou7_/t pollou a7_/xia1 a7ll' o7 theos au7to_/s e7stin o7 le_/gn1 dia tou_/tn de phthe_/ggetai pros 7mas4 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,ion4 #ecd ,e4 ,greek3 tauta e7ndeiknu_/menos o7 theos e7xepi_/tdes dia tou phaulota_/tou poitou to ka_/lliston me_/los 7sen4 ,side-note3 ,analogy of the ,magnet1 which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings4 ,the ,gods first inspire ,homer1 then act through him and through ,ion upon the auditors4 ,homer is thus 7continues ,sokrates7 not a man of art or reason1 but the interpreter of the ,gods2 deprived of his reason1 but possessed1 inspired1 by them4 ,you1 ,ion1 are the interpreter of ,homer3 and the divine inspiration1 carrying away your reason1 is exercised over you through him4 ,it is in this way that the influence of the ,magnet is shown1 attracting and holding up successive stages of iron rings4#ag ,the first ring is in contact with the ,magnet itself3 the second is suspended to the first1 the third to the second1 and so on4 ,the attractive influence of the ,magnet is thus transmitted through a succession of different rings1 so as to keep suspended several which are a good way removed from itself4 ,so the influence of the ,gods is exerted directly and immediately upon ,homer3 through him1 it passes by a second stage to you3 through him and you1 it passes by a third stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight1 becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecc ,d-,e4 ,side-note3 ,this comparison forms the central point of the dialogue4 ,it is an expansion of a judgment delivered by ,sokrates in the ,apology4 ,the passage and comparison here given by ,sokrates--remarkable as an early description of the working of the ,magnet--forms the central point or kernel of the dialogue called ,ion4 ,it is an expansion of a judgment delivered by ,sokrates himself in his ,apology to the ,dikasts1 and it is repeated in more than one place by ,plato4#ah ,sokrates declares in his ,apology that he had applied his testing cross-examination to several excellent poets2 and that finding them unable to give any rational account of their own compositions1 he concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own1 under the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles4 ,in the dialogue before us1 this thought is strikingly illustrated and amplified4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokr4 p4 #bb ,d2 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ii ,d4 ,side-note3 ,platonic ,antithesis3 systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic3 which latter was either blind routine1 or madness inspired by the ,gods4 ,varieties of madness1 good and bad4 ,the contrast between systematic1 professional1 procedure1 deliberately taught and consciously acquired1 capable of being defended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon scientific theory1 and enabling the person so qualified to impart his qualification to others--and a different procedure purely impulsive and unthinking1 whereby the agent1 having in his mind a conception of the end aimed at1 proceeds from one intermediate step to another1 without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so1 and without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to impart it to others--this contrast is a favourite one with ,plato4 ,the last-mentioned procedure--the unphilosophical or irrational--he conceives under different aspects3 sometimes as a blind routine or insensibly acquired habit1#ai sometimes as a stimulus applied from without by some ,god1 superseding the reason of the individual4 ,such a condition ,plato calls madness1 and he considers those under it as persons out of their senses4 ,but he recognises different varieties of madness1 according to the ,god from whom it came3 the bad madness was a disastrous visitation and distemper--the good madness was a privilege and blessing1 an inspiration superior to human reason4 ,among these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets2 another variety under the same genus1 is1 that mental love1 between a well-trained adult1 and a beautiful1 intelligent1 youth1 which he regards as the most exalted of all human emotions4#bj ,in the ,ion1 this idea of a privileged madness--inspiration from the ,gods superseding reason--is applied not only to the poet1 but also to the rhapsode who recites the poem1 and even to the auditors whom he addresses4 ,the poet receives the inspiration directly from the ,gods3 he inoculates the rhapsode with it1 who again inoculates the auditors--the fervour is1 at each successive communication1 diminished4 ,the auditor represents the last of the rings2 held in suspension1 through the intermediate agency of other rings1 by the inherent force of the magnet4#ba ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 #hb ,a2 ,gorgias1 #dfc ,a1 #dhf ,a4 ,footnote #bj3 ,this doctrine is set forth at length by ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,phdrus1 in the second discourse of ,sokrates about ,eros1 pp4 #bdd-bde-bdi ,d4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ece ,e4 ,greek3 ou7to_/s e7stin o7 theats tn daktuli_/n o7 e7_/schatos 4 4 4 4 o7 de me_/sos su o7 r7apsdos kai u7pokrits1 o7 de prtos1 au7tos o7 poit_/s4 ,side-note3 ,special inspiration from the ,gods was a familiar fact in ,grecian life4 ,privileged communications from the ,gods to ,sokrates--his firm belief in them4 ,we must remember1 that privileged communications from the ,gods to men1 and special persons recipient thereof1 were acknowledged and witnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of ,grecian life4 ,there were not only numerous oracular temples1 which every one could visit to ask questions in matters of doubt--but also favoured persons who had received from the ,gods the gift of predicting the future1 of interpreting omens1 of determining the good or bad indications furnished by animals sacrificed4#bb ,in every town or village--or wherever any body of men were assembled--there were always persons who prophesied or delivered oracles1 and to whom special revelations were believed to be vouchsafed1 during periods of anxiety4 ,no one was more familiar with this fact than the ,sokratic disciples3 for ,sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special communications from the ,gods than any man of his age3 his divine sign having begun when he was a child1 and continuing to move him frequently1 even upon small matters1 until his death3 though the revelations were for the most part negative1 not affirmative--telling him often what was not to be done--seldom what was to be done--resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons4 ,moreover ,sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically1 that they ought to have constant recourse to prophecy3 that none but impious men neglected to do so3 that the benevolence of the ,gods was nowhere more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations and warnings1 to persons whom they favoured3 that the ,gods administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of regular sequence1 so that men by diligent study might learn what they were to expect1--but partly also1 and by design1 in a manner irregular and undecypherable1 such that it could not be fathomed by any human study1 and could not be understood except through direct and special revelation from themselves4#bc ,footnote #bb3 ,not only the ,greek3 chrsmolo_/goi1 ma_/nteis oracular temples1 c41 are often mentioned in ,herodotus1 ,thucydides1 ,xenophon1 c41 but ,aristotle also recognises ,greek3 oi7 numpho_/lptoi kai theo_/lptoi tn a7nthr_/pn1 e7pipnoi_/a daimoni_/ou tinos 7_/sper e7nthousia_/zontes1 as a real and known class of persons4 ,see ,ethic4 ,eudem4 i4 p4 #abad1 a4 #bc2 ,ethic4 ,magna1 ii4 p4 #abjg1 b4 #h4 ,the ,greek3 ma_/ntis is a recognised profession1 the gift of ,apollo1 not merely according to ,homer1 but according to ,solon 7,frag4 xi4 #eb1 ,schn473 ,greek3 ,a7_/llon ma_/ntin e7_/thken a7_/nax e7ka_/ergos ,a7po_/lln1 e7_/gn d' a7ndri kakon tlo_/then e7rcho_/menon1 c4 ,footnote #bc3 ,these views of ,sokrates are declared in the ,memorabilia of ,xenophon1 i4 #a1 #f-aj2 i4 #d1 #b-ah2 iv4 #c1 #ab4 ,it is plain from ,xenophon 7,mem4 i4 #a1 #c7 that many persons were offended with ,sokrates because they believed1--or at least because he affirmed--that he received more numerous and special revelations from the ,gods than any one else4 ,side-note3 ,condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the time withdrawn4 ,here1 as well as elsewhere1 ,plato places inspiration1 both of the prophet and the poet1 in marked contrast with reason and intelligence4 ,reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or abolished1 and inspiration is introduced by the ,gods into its place4 ,when ,monarch ,reason sleeps1 this mimic wakes4 ,the person inspired 7prophet or poet7 becomes for the time the organ of an extraneous agency1 speaking what he neither originates nor understands4 ,the genuine gift of prophecy#bd 7,plato says7 attaches only to a disabled1 enfeebled1 distempered1 condition of the intelligence2 the gift of poetry is conferred by the ,gods upon the most inferior men1 as we see by the case of ,tynnichus--whose sublime pan shows us1 that it is the ,gods alone who utter fine poetry through the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,timus1 #ga ,e4 ,greek3 i7kanon de smeion 7s mantikn a7phrosu_/n theos a7nthrpi_/n de_/dken2 ou7deis gar e7_/nnous e7pha_/ptetai mantiks e7nthe_/ou kai a7lthous1 a7ll' 7 kath' u7_/pnon tn ts phron_/ses pedtheis du_/namin1 7 dia no_/son 7_/ tina e7nthousiasmon paralla_/xas4 ,compare ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #ii-ajj4 ,greek3 oi7 chrsmdoi_/ te kai oi7 theoma_/nteis 4 4 4 4 le_/gousi men a7lth kai polla i7_/sasi de ou7den 7n le_/gousi4 ,compare ,plato1 ,legg4 iv4 #gai4 ,side-note3 ,ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind4 ,it is thus that ,plato1 setting before himself a process of systematised reason1--originating in a superior intellect1 laying down universal principles and deducing consequences from them--capable of being consistently applied1 designedly taught1 and defended against objections--enumerates the various mental conditions opposed to it1 and ranks inspiration as one of them4 ,in this dialogue1 ,sokrates seeks to prove that the success of ,ion as a rhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired4 ,but ,ion does not accept the compliment3 ,ion4--,you speak well1 ,sokrates2 but ,i should be surprised if you spoke well enough to create in me the new conviction1 that ,i am possessed and mad when ,i eulogize ,homer4 ,i do not think that you would even yourself say so1 if you heard me discourse on the subject4#be ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ecf ,e4 ,side-note3 ,homer talks upon all subjects--,is ,ion competent to explain what ,homer says upon all of them8 ,rhapsodic art4 ,what is its province8 ,sokr4--,but ,homer talks upon all subjects4 ,upon which of them can you discourse8 ,ion4--,upon all4 ,sokr4--,not surely on such as belong to special arts1 professions4 ,each portion of the matter of knowledge is included under some special art1 and is known through that art by those who possess it4 ,thus1 you and ,i1 both of us1 know the number of our fingers2 we know it through the same art1 which both of us possess--the arithmetical4 ,but ,homer talks of matters belonging to many different arts or occupations1 that of the physician1 the charioteer1 the fisherman1 c4 ,you cannot know these2 since you do not belong to any of these professions1 but are a rhapsode4 ,describe to me what are the matters included in the rhapsodic art4 ,the rhapsodic art is one art by itself1 distinct from the medical and others3 it cannot know every thing2 tell me what matters come under its special province4#bf ,ion4--,the rhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other special arts3 but that of which it takes cognizance1 and that which ,i know1 is1 what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character described by ,homer3 to a man or woman--to a freeman or slave--to the commander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them1 c4 ,this is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode to appreciate and understand4#bg ,sokr4--,will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his seamen1 during a dangerous storm1 better than the pilot8 ,will the rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the treatment of a sick man1 better than the physician8 ,will the rhapsode know what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are savage and distracted1 or to the female slaves when busy in spinning8 ,ion4--,no3 the rhapsode will not know these things so well as the pilot1 the physician1 the grazier1 the mistress1 c4#bh ,sokr4--,will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the military commander to say1 when he is exhorting his soldiers8 ,ion4--,yes3 the rhapsode will know this well3 at least ,i know it well4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #ech-eci4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #edj ,a4 ,greek3 a7 t r7apsd pros_/kei kai skopeisthai kai diakri_/nein para tous a7_/llous a7nthr_/pous1 #eci ,e4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #edj ,b-,c4 ,side-note3 ,the ,rhapsode does not know special matters1 such as the craft of the pilot1 physician1 farmer1 c41 but he knows the business of the general1 and is competent to command soldiers1 having learnt it from ,homer4 ,sokr4--,perhaps1 ,ion1 you are not merely a rhapsode1 but possess also the competence for being a general4 ,if you know matters belonging to military command1 do you know them in your capacity of general1 or in your capacity of rhapsode8 ,ion4--,i think there is no difference4 ,sokr4--,how say you8 ,do you affirm that the rhapsodic art1 and the strategic art1 are one8 ,ion4--,i think they are one4 ,sokr4--,then whosoever is a good rhapsode1 is also a good general8 ,ion4--,unquestionably4 ,sokr4--,and of course1 whoever is a good general1 is also a good rhapsode8 ,ion4--,no3 ,i do not think that4 ,sokr4--,but you do maintain1 that whosoever is a good rhapsode1 is also a good general8 ,ion4--,decidedly4 ,sokr4--,you are yourself the best rhapsode in ,greece8 ,ion4--,by far4 ,sokr4--,are you then also the best general in ,greece8 ,ion4--,certainly ,i am1 ,sokrates3 and that too1 by having learnt it from ,homer4#bi ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #edj ,d--#eda ,b4 ,after putting a question or two1 not very forcible1 to ask how it happens that ,ion1 being an excellent general1 does not obtain a military appointment from ,athens1 ,sparta1 or some other city1 ,sokrates winds up the dialogue as follows3-- ,side-note3 ,conclusion4 ,ion expounds ,homer1 not with any knowledge of what he says1 but by divine inspiration4 ,well1 ,ion1 if it be really true that you possess a rational and intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of ,homer1 you wrong and deceive me1 because after promising to deliver to me a fine discourse about ,homer1 you will not even comply with my preliminary entreaty--that you will first tell me what those matters are1 on which your superiority bears4 ,you twist every way like ,proteus1 until at last you slip through my fingers and appear as a general4 ,if your powers of expounding ,homer depend on art and intelligence1 you are a wrong-doer and deceiver1 for not fulfilling9999 your promise to me4 ,but you are not chargeable with wrong1 if the fact be as ,i say2 that is1 if you know nothing about ,homer1 but are only able to discourse upon him finely and abundantly1 through a divine inspiration with which you are possessed by him4 ,choose whether you wish me to regard you as a promise-breaker1 or as a divine man4 ,ion4--,i choose the last3 it is much better to be regarded as a divine man4#cj ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,ion1 #eda ,e--#edb ,a4 ,greek3 ei7 men a7lth_/ le_/geis1 7s te_/chn kai e7pist_/m oi7o_/s te ei7 ,o7_/mrou e7painein1 a7dikeis 4 4 4 ei7 de m technikos ei71 a7lla thei_/a moi_/ra katecho_/menos e7x ,o7m_/rou mden ei7ds polla kai kala le_/geis peri tou poitou1 7_/sper e7g ei7pon peri sou1 ou7den a7dikeis2 e7lou ou7n1 po_/tera bou_/lei nomi_/zesthai u7ph' 7mn a7_/dikos a7nr ei7nai 7 theios4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,the generals in ,greece usually possessed no professional experience--,homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers--,plato's view of the poet1 as pretending to know everything1 but really knowing nothing4 ,it seems strange to read such language put into ,ion's mouth 7we are not warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say71 as the affirmation--that every good rhapsode was also a good general1 and that he had become the best of generals simply through complete acquaintance with ,homer4 ,but this is only a caricature of a sentiment largely prevalent at ,athens1 according to which the works of the poets1 especially the ,homeric poems1 were supposed to be a mine of varied instruction1 and were taught as such to youth4#ca ,in ,greece1 the general was not often required 7except at ,sparta1 and not always even there7 to possess professional experience4#cb ,sokrates1 in one of the ,xenophontic conversations1 tries to persuade ,nikomachides1 a practised soldier 7who had failed in getting himself elected general1 because a successful ,chorgus had been preferred to him71 how much the qualities of an effective ,chorgus coincided with those of an effective general4#cc ,the poet ,sophokles was named by the ,athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for reconquering ,samos3 though ,perikles1 one of his colleagues1 as well as his contemporary declared that he was an excellent poet1 but knew nothing of generalship4#cd ,plato frequently seeks to make it evident how little the qualities required for governing numbers1 either civil or military1 were made matter of professional study or special teaching4 ,the picture of ,homer conveyed in the tenth book of the ,platonic ,republic is1 that of a man who pretends to know everything1 but really knows nothing3 an imitative artist1 removed by two stages from truth and reality1--who gives the shadows of shadows1 resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd4 ,this is the picture there presented of poets generally1 and of ,homer as the best among them4 ,the rhapsode ,ion is here brought under the same category as the poet ,homer1 whom he has by heart and recites4 ,the whole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various specialties1 not one of which either of the two can claim4 ,accordingly1 both of them under the mask of universal knowledge1 conceal the reality of universal ignorance4 ,footnote #ca3 ,aristophan4 ,ran1 #ajcb4 ,greek3 ,o7rpheus men gar teleta_/s th' 7min kate_/deixe pho_/nn t' a7pe_/chesthai ,mousaios d' e7xake_/seis te no_/sn kai chrsmou_/s1 7si_/odos de ,gs e7rgasi_/as1 karpn 7_/ras1 a7ro_/tous2 o7 de theios ,o7_/mros ,a7po tou timn kai kle_/os e7_/schein1 pln toud'1 o7_/ti chr_/st' e7di_/daxe4 ,ta_/xeis1 a7reta_/s1 o7pli_/seis a7ndrn8 4 4 4 4 ,a7ll' a7_/llous toi pollous a7gathous 7e7di_/daxen71 7n 7n kai ,la_/machos 7_/rs4 ,see these views combated by ,plato1 ,republ4 x4 #eii-fjj-fjf ,e4 ,the exaggerated pretension here ascribed to ,ion makes him look contemptible--like the sentiment ascribed to him1 #ece ,e1 ,if ,i make the auditors weep1 ,i myself shall laugh and pocket money1 c4 ,footnote #cb3 ,xenoph4 ,memor4 iii4 #e1 #ba1 in the conversation between the younger ,perikles and ,sokrates--,greek3 tn de stratgn oi7 pleistoi au7toschedia_/zousin4 ,also iii4 #e1 #bd4 ,compare1 respecting the generals1 the striking lines of ,euripides1 ,androm4 #fih1 and the encomium of ,cicero 7,academ4 ,prior4 #b1 #a7 respecting the quickness and facility with which ,lucullus made himself an excellent general4 ,footnote #cc3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iii4 #d1 especially iii4 #d1 #f1 where ,nikomachides asks with surprise1 ,greek3 le_/geis su_/1 7 ,s_/krates1 7s tou au7tou a7ndro_/s e7sti chorgein te kals kai stratgein8 ,footnote #cd3 ,see the very curious extract from the contemporary ,ion of ,chios1 in ,athenus1 xiii4 #fjd4 ,aristophanes of ,byzantium says that the appointment of ,sophokles to this military function arose from the extra-ordinary popularity of his tragedy ,antigon1 exhibited a little time before4 ,see ,boeckh's valuable ',dissertation on the ,antigon1' appended to his edition thereof1 pp4 #aba-abd4 ,side-note3 ,knowledge1 opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge4 ,ion is willing enough 7as he promises7 to exhibit before ,sokrates one of his eloquent discourses upon ,homer4 ,but ,sokrates never permits him to arrive at it3 arresting him always by preliminary questions1 and requiring him to furnish an intelligible description of the matter which his discourse is intended to embrace1 and thus to distinguish it from other matters left untouched4 ,a man who cannot comply with this requisition1--who cannot 7to repeat what ,i said in a previous chapter7 stand a ,sokratic cross-examination on the subject--possesses no rational intelligence of his own proceedings3 no art1 science1 knowledge1 system1 or method4 ,if as a practitioner he executes well what he promises 7which is often the case71 and attains success--he does so either by blind imitation of some master1 or else under the stimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself--of the ,gods or ,fortune4 ,this is the ,platonic point of view2 developed in several different ways and different dialogues1 but hardly anywhere more conspicuously than in the ,ion4 ,side-note3 ,illustration of ,plato's opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises4 ,i have observed that in this dialogue1 ,ion is anxious to embark on his eloquent expository discourse1 but ,sokrates will not allow him to begin3 requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary difficulties shall first be cleared up4 ,here we have an illustration of ,plato's doctrine1 to which ,i adverted in a former chapter1#ce--that no written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of geometry to one ignorant thereof4 ,the geometrical writer begins by laying down a string of definitions and axioms2 and then strikes out boldly in demonstrating his theorems4 ,but ,plato would refuse him the liberty of striking out1 until he should have cleared up the preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves4 ,this the geometrical treatise does not even attempt4#cf ,footnote #ce3 ,chap4 viii4 p4 #cec4 ,footnote #cf3 ,compare ,plato1 ,republic1 vi4 #eaj ,c2 vii4 #ech ,c-,d4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,laches4 ,the main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion1 carried on by ,sokrates with ,nikias and ,lachs1 respecting ,courage4 ,each of the two latter proposes an explanation of ,courage3 ,sokrats criticises both of them1 and reduces each to a confessed contradiction4 ,side-note3 ,lachs4 ,subject and persons of the dialogue1 ,whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms4 ,nikias and ,lachs differ in opinion4 ,the discussion is invited1 or at least dramatically introduced1 by two elderly men--,lysimachus1 son of ,aristeides the ,just1--and ,melsias1 son of ,thucydides the rival of ,perikles4 ,lysimachus and ,melsias1 confessing with shame that they are inferior to their fathers1 because their education has been neglected1 wish to guard against the same misfortune in the case of their own sons3 respecting the education of whom1 they ask the advice of ,nikias and ,lachs4 ,the question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue4 ,nikias and ,lachs1 both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also commanders of ,athenian armies1 are assumed to be well qualified to give advice4 ,accordingly they deliver their opinions3 ,nikias approving such lessons as beneficial1 in exalting the courage of a young man1 and rendering him effective on the field of battle3 while ,lachs takes an opposite view1 disparages the masters of arms as being no soldiers1 and adds that they are despised by the ,lacedmonians1 to whose authority on military matters general deference was paid in ,greece4#a ,sokrats1--commended greatly by ,nikias for his acuteness and sagacity1 by ,lachs for his courage in the battle of ,delium1--is invited to take part in the consultation4 ,being younger than both1 he waits till they have delivered their opinions1 and is then called upon to declare with which of the two his own judgment will concur4#b ,footnote #a3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahb-ahc4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahd ,d4 ,nikias is made to say that ,sokrates has recently recommended to him ,damon1 as a teacher of ,greek3 mousik to his sons1 and that ,damon had proved an admirable teacher as well as companion 7#ahj ,d74 ,damon is mentioned by ,plato generally with much eulogy4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates is invited to declare his opinion4 ,he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge4 ,sokr4--,the question must not be determined by a plurality of votes1 but by superiority of knowledge4#c ,if we were debating about the proper gymnastic discipline for these young men1 we should consult a known artist or professional trainer1 or at least some one who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the trainer4 ,the first thing to be enquired therefore is1 whether1 in reference to the point now under discussion1 there be any one of us professionally or technically competent1 who has studied under good masters1 and has proved his own competence as a master by producing well-trained pupils4 ,the next thing is1 to understand clearly what it is1 with reference to which such competence is required4#d ,nikias4--,surely the point before us is1 whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms8 ,that is what we want to know4 ,sokr4--,doubtless it is3 but that is only one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry4 ,when you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your eyes1 it is your eyes1 and their general benefit1 which form the subject of investigation--not the ointment simply4 ,the person to assist you will be1 he who understands professionally the general treatment of the eyes4 ,so in this case1 you are enquiring whether lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your sons4 ,look out therefore for some one who is professionally competent1 from having studied under good masters1 in regard to the general treatment of the mind4#e ,lachs4--,but there are various persons who1 without ever having studied under masters1 possess greater technical competence than others who have so studied4 ,sokr4--,there are such persons3 but you will never believe it upon their own assurance1 unless they can show you some good special work actually performed by themselves4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahd ,e4 ,greek3 e7pist_/m dei kri_/nesthai a7ll' ou7 pl_/thei to me_/llon kals krith_/sesthai4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahe ,c4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahe ,e4 ,greek3 ei7_/ tis 7mn technikos peri psuchs therapei_/an1 kai oi7o_/s te kals touto therapeusai1 kai o7_/t dida_/skaloi a7gathoi gego_/nasi1 touto skepte_/on4 ,side-note3 ,those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge--,sokrates avows his own incompetence4 ,sokr4--,now then1 ,lysimachus1 since you have invited ,lachs and ,nikias1 as well as me1 to advise you on the means of most effectively improving the mind of your son1 it is for us to show you that we possess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the youthful mind4 ,we must declare to you who are the masters from whom we have learnt1 and we must prove their qualifications4 ,or if we have had no masters1 we must demonstrate to you our own competence by citing cases of individuals1 whom we have successfully trained1 and who have become incontestably good under our care4 ,if we can fulfil neither of these two conditions1 we ought to confess our incompetence and decline advising you4 ,we must not begin to try our hands upon so precious a subject as the son of a friend1 at the hazard of doing him more harm than good4#f ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahf ,b4 ,as to myself1 ,i frankly confess that ,i have neither had any master to impart to me such competence1 nor have ,i been able to acquire it by my own efforts4 ,i am not rich enough to pay the ,sophists1 who profess to teach it4 ,but as to ,nikias and ,lachs1 they are both older and richer than ,i am3 so that they may well have learnt it from others1 or acquired it for themselves4 ,they must be thoroughly satisfied of their own knowledge on the work of education2 otherwise they would hardly have given such confident opinions1 pronouncing what pursuits are good or bad for youth4 ,for my part1 ,i trust them implicitly3 the only thing which surprises me1 is1 that they dissent from each other4#g ,it is for you therefore1 ,lysimachus1 to ask ,nikias and ,lachs1--,who have been their masters8 ,who have been their fellow-pupils8 ,if they have been their own masters1 what proof can they produce of previous success in teaching1 and what examples can they cite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good8#h ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahf ,c-,d4 ,greek3 dokousi d_/ moi dunatoi ei7nai paideusai a7_/nthrpon2 ou7 gar a7n pote a7des a7pephai_/nonto peri e7pitdeuma_/tn ne_/ chrstn te kai ponrn1 ei7 m au7tois e7pi_/steuon i7kans ei7de_/nai4 ta men ou7n a7_/lla1 e7_/gge tou_/tois pisteu_/1 o7_/ti de diaphe_/resthon a7ll_/loin1 e7thau_/masa4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahf-ahg4 ,side-note3 ,nikias and ,lachs submit to be cross-examined by ,sokrates4 ,nikias4--,i knew from the beginning that we should both of us fall under the cross-examination of ,sokrates1 and be compelled to give account of our past lives4 ,for my part1 ,i have already gone through this scrutiny before1 and am not averse to undergo it again4 ,lachs4--,and ,i1 though ,i have never experienced it before1 shall willingly submit to learn from ,sokrates1 whom ,i know to be a man thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions4 ,i hate men whose lives are inconsistent with their talk4#i--,thus speak both of them4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahh4 ,ego odi homines ignav oper et philosophi sententi1 is a line cited by ,cicero out of one of the ,latin comic writers4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,both of them give opinions offhand1 according to their feelings on the special case--,sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised1 and examined as a branch of education4 ,this portion of the dialogue1 which forms a sort of preamble to the main discussion1 brings out forcibly some of the ,platonic points of view4 ,we have seen it laid down in the ,kriton--,that in questions about right and wrong1 good and evil1 c41 we ought not to trust the decision of the ,many1 but only that of the ,one ,wise ,man4 ,here we learn something about the criteria by which this ,one man may be known4 ,he must be one who has gone through a regular training under some master approved in ethical or educational teaching3 or1 if he cannot produce such a certificate1 he must at least cite sufficient examples of men whom he has taught well himself4 ,this is the ,sokratic comparison1 assimilating the general art of living well to the requirements of a special profession1 which a man must learn through express teaching1 from a master who has proved his ability1 and through conscious application of his own4 ,nikias and ,lachs give their opinions offhand and confidently1 upon the question whether lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not4 ,plato1 on the contrary1 speaking through ,sokrates1 points out that this is only one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education generally--,what are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted to youth by training8 ,what is the proper treatment of the mind8 ,no one is competent to decide the special question1 except he who has professionally studied the treatment of the mind4 ,to deal with the special question1 without such preliminary general preparation1 involves rash and unverified assumptions1 which render any opinion so given dangerous to act upon4 ,such is the judgment of the ,platonic ,sokrates1 insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions in their most comprehensive aspect4 ,side-note3 ,appeal of ,sokrates to the judgment of the ,one ,wise ,man--this man is never seen or identified4 ,consequent upon this preamble1 we should expect that ,lachs and ,nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their masters2 or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by themselves4 ,this would bring us a step nearer to that ,one ,wise ,man--often darkly indicated1 but nowhere named or brought into daylight--from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment4 ,but here1 as in the ,kriton and so many other ,platonic dialogues1 we get only a ,pisgah view of our promised adviser--nothing more4 ,the discussion takes a different turn4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,we must know what virtue is1 before we give an opinion on education4 ,virtue1 as a whole1 is too large a question4 ,we will enquire about one branch of virtue--courage4 ,sokr4--,we will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the same result2 and which starts even more decidedly from the beginning4#aj ,we are called upon to advise by what means virtue can be imparted to these youths1 so as to make them better men4 ,of course1 this implies that we know what virtue is3 otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of acquiring it8 ,lachs4--,we could give no advice at all4 ,sokr4--,we affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is8 ,lachs4--,we do4 ,sokr4--,since therefore we know1 we can farther declare what it is4#aa ,lachs4--,of course we can4 ,sokr4--,still1 we will not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue1 which might be an arduous task1 but as to a part of it--,courage3 that part to which the lessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend4 ,we will first enquire what courage is3 after that has been determined1 we will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #ahi ,e4 ,greek3 kai 7 toia_/de ske_/psis ei7s tau7ton phe_/rei1 schedon de_/ ti kai mallon e7x a7rchs ei7_/ a7n4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aij ,c4 ,greek3 phamen a7_/ra1 7 ,la_/chs1 ei7de_/nai au7to 7tn a7retn7 o7_/1 ti e7_/sti4 ,phamen me_/ntoi4 ,ou7koun o7_/ ge i7_/smen1 ka7n ei7_/poimen d_/pou1 ti_/ e7_/sti4 ,ps gar ou7_/8 ,try then if you can tell me1 ,lachs1 what courage is4 ,lachs4--,there is no difficulty in telling you that4 ,whoever keeps his place in the rank1 repels the enemy1 and does not run away1 is a courageous man4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aij ,d-,e4 ,side-note3 ,question--what is courage8 ,lachs answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage4 ,mistake of not giving a general explanation4 ,here is the same error in replying1 as was committed by ,euthyphron when asked1 ,what is the ,holy8 and by ,hippias1 about the ,beautiful4 ,one particular case of courageous behaviour1 among many1 is indicated1 as if it were an explanation of the whole3 but the general feature common to all acts of courage is not declared4 ,sokrates points out that men are courageous1 not merely among hoplites who keep their rank and fight1 but also among the ,scythian horsemen who fight while running away2 others also are courageous against disease1 poverty1 political adversity1 pain and fear of every sort2 others moreover1 against desires and pleasures4 ,what is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes ,courage8 ,if you asked me what is quickness--common to all those cases when a man runs1 speaks1 plays1 learns1 c41 quickly--,i should tell you that it was that which accomplished much in a little time4 ,tell me in like manner1 what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage8 ,lachs at first does not understand the question3#ac and ,sokrates elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 ,plato takes great pains to impress the conception in its full generality1 and he seems to have found difficulty in making others follow him4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aia-aib4 ,greek3 pa_/lin ou7n peir ei7pein a7ndrei_/an prton1 ti_/ o7n e7n pasi tou_/tois tau7to_/n e7stin4 7 ou7_/p katamantha_/neis o7 le_/g8 ,lachs4 ,greek3 ,ou7 pa_/nu ti4 4 4 4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 peir d tn a7ndrei_/an ou7_/ts ei7pein1 ti_/s ou7sa du_/namis 7 au7t e7n 7don kai e7n lu_/p kai e7n a7_/pasin oi7s nun d e7le_/gomen au7tn ei7nai1 e7_/peit' a7ndrei_/a ke_/kltai4 ,side-note3 ,second answer4 ,courage is a sort of endurance of the mind4 ,sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect4 ,endurance is not always courage3 even intelligent endurance is not always courage4 ,lachs then gives a general definition of courage4 ,it is a sort of endurance of the mind4#ad ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aib ,b4 ,greek3 karteri_/a tis ts psuchs4 ,surely not all endurance 7rejoins ,sokrates78 ,you admit that courage is a fine and honourable thing4 ,but endurance without intelligence is hurtful and dishonourable3 it cannot therefore be courage4 ,only intelligent endurance1 therefore1 can be courage4 ,and then what is meant by intelligent8 ,intelligent--of what--or to what end8 ,a man1 who endures the loss of money1 understanding well that he will thereby gain a larger sum1 is he courageous8 ,no4 ,he who endures fighting1 knowing that he has superior skill1 numbers1 and all other advantages on his side1 manifests more of intelligent endurance1 than his adversary who knows that he has all these advantages against him1 yet who nevertheless endures fighting4 ,nevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two4#ae ,unintelligent endurance is in this case courage3 but unintelligent endurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful1 and courage to be a fine thing4 ,we have entangled ourselves in a contradiction4 ,we must at least show our own courage1 by enduring until we can get right4 ,for my part 7replies ,lachs7 ,i am quite prepared for such endurance4 ,i am piqued and angry that ,i cannot express what ,i conceive4 ,i seem to have in my mind clearly what courage is3 but it escapes me somehow or other1 when ,i try to put it in words4#af ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aib ,d-,e4 ,greek3 7 phro_/nimos karteri_/a 4 4 4 i7_/dmen d_/1 7 ei7s ti_/ phro_/nimos2 7 7 ei7s a7_/panta kai ta mega_/la kai ta smikra_/8 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aic ,c1 #aid ,b4 ,sokrates now asks aid from ,nikias4 ,nikias4--,my explanation of courage is1 that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence4 ,sokr4--,but what sort of intelligence8 ,not certainly intelligence of piping or playing the harp4 ,intelligence of what8 ,side-note3 ,confusion4 ,new answer given by ,nikias4 ,courage is a sort of intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible4 ,objections of ,lachs4 ,nikias4--,courage is intelligence of things terrible1 and things not terrible1 both in war and in all other conjunctures4 ,lachs4--,what nonsense6 ,courage is a thing totally apart from knowledge or intelligence4#ag ,the intelligent physician knows best what is terrible1 and what is not terrible1 in reference to disease3 the husbandman1 in reference to agriculture4 ,but they are not for that reason courageous4 ,nikias4--,they are not2 but neither do they know what is terrible1 or what is not terrible4 ,physicians can predict the result of a patient's case3 they can tell what may cure him1 or what will kill him4 ,but whether it be better for him to die or to recover--that they do not know1 and cannot tell him4 ,to some persons1 death is a less evil than life3--defeat1 than victory3--loss of wealth1 than gain4 ,none except the person who can discriminate these cases1 knows what is really terrible and what is not so4 ,he alone is really courageous4#ah ,lachs4--,where is there any such man8 ,it can be only some ,god4 ,nikias feels himself in a puzzle1 and instead of confessing it frankly as ,i have done1 he is trying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before the ,dikastery4#ai ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aie ,a4 ,greek3 tn tn deinn kai thar7r7ale_/n e7pist_/mn kai e7n pole_/m kai e7n tois a7_/llois a7_/pasin4 ,lachs4--,greek3 7s a7_/topa le_/gei6--chris d_/ pou sophi_/a e7stin a7ndrei_/as4 ,it appears from two other passages 7#aie ,e1 and #aih ,b7 that ,greek3 thar7r7a_/leos here is simply the negation of ,greek3 deinos and cannot be translated by any affirmative word4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aie-aif4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aif ,b4 ,side-note3 ,questions of ,sokrates to ,nikias4 ,it is only future events1 not past or present1 which are terrible2 but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present4 ,sokr4--,you do not admit1 then1 ,nikias1 that lions1 tigers1 boars1 c41 and such animals1 are courageous8 ,nikias4--,no3 they are without fear--simply from not knowing the danger--like children3 but they are not courageous1 though most people call them so4 ,i may call them bold1 but ,i reserve the epithet courageous for the intelligent4 ,lachs4--,see how ,nikias strips those1 whom every one admits to be courageous1 of this honourable appellation6 ,nikias4--,not altogether1 ,lachs3 ,i admit you1 and ,lamachus1 and many other ,athenians1 to be courageous1 and of course therefore intelligent4 ,lachs4--,i feel the compliment3 but such subtle distinctions befit a ,sophist rather than a general in high command4#bj ,sokr4--,the highest measure of intelligence befits one in the highest command4 ,what you have said1 ,nikias1 deserves careful examination4 ,you remember that in taking up the investigation of courage1 we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue3 you are aware that there are other portions of virtue1 such as justice1 temperance1 and the like4 ,now you define courage to be1 intelligence of what is terrible or not terrible3 of that which causes fear1 or does not cause fear4 ,but nothing causes fear1 except future or apprehended evils3 present or past evils cause no fear4 ,hence courage1 as you define it1 is intelligence respecting future evils1 and future events not evil4 ,but how can there be intelligence respecting the future1 except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past8 ,in every special department1 such as medicine1 military proceedings1 agriculture1 c41 does not the same man1 who knows the phenomena of the future1 know also the phenomena of present and past8 ,are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind8#ba ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aig4 ,greek3 ,kai gar pre_/pei1 7 ,s_/krates1 sophist ta toiauta mallon kompseu_/esthai 7 a7ndri o7n 7 po_/lis a7xioi au7ts proista_/nai4 ,assuredly the distinctions which here ,plato puts into the mouth of ,nikias are nowise more subtle than those which he is perpetually putting into the mouth of ,sokrates4 ,he cannot here mean to distinguish the ,sophists from ,sokrates1 but to distinguish the dialectic talkers1 including both one and the other1 from the active political leaders4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aih ,d4 ,greek3 peri o7_/sn e7stin e7pist_/m1 ou7k a7_/ll men ei7nai peri gegono_/tos1 ei7de_/nai o7_/p ge_/gonen1 a7_/ll de peri gignome_/nn1 o7_/p gi_/gnetai1 a7_/ll de o7_/p a7n ka_/llista ge_/noito kai gen_/setai to m_/p gegono_/s--a7ll' 7 au7t_/4 oi7on peri to u7gieinon ei7s a7_/pantas tous chro_/nous ou7k a7_/ll tis 7 7 i7atrik_/1 mi_/a ou7sa1 e7phora kai gigno_/mena kai gegono_/ta kai genso_/mena1 o7_/p gen_/setai4 #aii ,b4 ,greek3 7 de_/ g' au7t e7pist_/m tn au7tn kai mello_/ntn kai pa_/nts e7cho_/ntn ei7nai 7molo_/gtai4 ,side-note3 ,courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally4 ,but this definition would include the whole of virtue1 and we declared that courage was only a part thereof4 ,it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage4 ,since therefore courage1 according to your definition1 is the knowledge of futurities evil and not evil1 or future evil and good--and since such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good and evil generally--it follows that courage is the knowledge of good and evil generally4#bb ,but a man who knows thus much1 cannot be destitute of any part of virtue4 ,he must possess temperance and justice as well as courage4 ,courage1 therefore1 according to your definition1 is not only a part of virtue1 it is the whole4 ,now we began the enquiry by stating that it was only a part of virtue1 and that there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise4 ,it is plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise1 and cannot be sustained4 ,we have not yet discovered what courage is4#bc ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aii ,c4 ,greek3 kata ton son lo_/gon ou7 mo_/non deinn te kai thar7r7ale_/n 7 e7pist_/m a7ndrei_/a e7sti_/n1 a7lla schedo_/n ti 7 peri pa_/ntn a7gathn te kai kakn kai pa_/nts e7cho_/ntn1 c4 ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aii ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7_/ra eu7r_/kamen1 a7ndrei_/a o7_/1 ti e7_/stin4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks4 ,warfare of ,sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge4 ,brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is4 ,here ends the dialogue called ,lachs1 without any positive result4 ,nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name ,courage3 which nevertheless they are known to possess1 and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly2 so that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it4 ,i am unaccustomed to debates like these 7says ,lachs73 but ,i am piqued and mortified--because ,i feel that ,i know well what ,courage is1 yet somehow or other ,i cannot state my own thoughts in words4 ,here is a description#bd of the intellectual deficiency which ,sokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness1 instead of suffering it to remain latent and unknown1 as it is in the ordinary mind4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 he impugns the false persuasion of knowledge1 and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects1 which have become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations1 but have never been studied under a master1 nor carefully analysed and discussed1 nor looked at in their full generality4 ,this is a mental defect which he pronounces to be universal3 belonging not less to men of action like ,nikias and ,lachs1 than to ,sophists and ,rhetors like ,protagoras and ,gorgias4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aid4 ,greek3 ,kai_/toi a7_/ths g' ei7mi 7,lachs7 ,greek3 tn toiou_/tn lo_/gn2 a7lla_/ ti_/s me kai philoneiki_/a ei7_/lphe pros ta ei7rme_/na1 kai 7s a7lths a7ganakt1 ei7 ou7tsi a7 no m oi7o_/s t' ei7mi ei7pein2 noein men gar e7_/moige dok peri a7ndrei_/as o7_/1 ti e7_/stin1 ou7k oi7da d' o7_/p me a7_/rti die_/phugen1 7_/ste m xullabein t lo_/g au7tn kai ei7pein o7_/1 ti e7_/stin4 ,compare the ,charmids p4 #aei ,a1 #afj ,d1 where ,sokrates professes to tell ,charmides1 ,if temperance is really in you1 you can of course inform us what it is4 ,side-note3 ,no solution given by ,plato4 ,apparent tendency of his mind1 in looking for a solution4 ,intelligence--cannot be understood without reference to some object or end4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 ,plato 7or the ,platonic ,sokrates7 exposes the faulty solutions of others1 but proposes no better solution of his own1 and even disclaims all ability to do so4 ,we may nevertheless trace1 in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory explanations1 hints guiding the mind into that direction in which ,plato looks to supply the deficiency4 ,thus when ,lachs1 after having given as his first answer 7to the question1 ,what is ,courage87 a definition not even formally sufficient1 is put by ,sokrates upon giving his second answer1--,that ,courage is intelligent endurance3 ,sokrates asks him#be--,yes1 intelligent3 but intelligent to what end8 ,do you mean1 to all things alike1 great as well as little8 ,we are here reminded that intelligence1 simply taken1 is altogether undefined2 that intelligence must relate to something--and when human conduct is in question1 must relate to some end2 and that the ,something1 and the ,end1 to which it relates1 must be set forth1 before the proposition can be clearly understood4 ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,lachs1 #aib ,d4 ,greek3 7 phro_/nimos karteri_/a 4 4 4 i7_/dmen d_/1 7 ei7s ti phro_/nimos2 7 7 ei7s a7_/panta kai ta mega_/la kai ta smikra_/8 ,side-note3 ,object--is supplied in the answer of ,nikias4 ,intelligence--of things terrible and not terrible4 ,such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists4 ,coming to the answer given by ,nikias1 we perceive that this deficiency is in a certain manner supplied4 ,courage is said to consist in knowledge3 in knowledge of things terrible1 and things not terrible4 ,when ,lachs applies his cross-examination to the answer1 the manner in which ,nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction often brought to view1 though not always adhered to1 in the ,platonic writings4 ,there can be no doubt that death1 distemper1 loss of wealth1 defeat1 c4 are terrible things 7i4e4 the prospect of them inspires fear7 in the estimation of mankind generally4 ,correct foresight of such contingencies1 and of the antecedents tending to produce or avert them1 is possessed by the physician and other professional persons3 who would therefore1 it should seem1 possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible4 ,but ,nikias denies this4 ,he does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated are1 always or necessarily1 proper objects of fear4 ,in some cases1 he contends1 they are the least of two evils4 ,before you can be said to possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible1 you must be able to take correct measure not only of the intervening antecedents or means1 but also of the end itself as compared with other alternative ends3 whether1 in each particular case1 it be the end most to be feared1 or the real evil under the given circumstances4 ,the professional man can do the former1 but he cannot do the latter4 ,he advises as to means1 and executes3 but he assumes his own one end as an indisputable datum4 ,the physician seeks to cure his patient1 without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil for such patient to die than to survive4 ,side-note3 ,postulate of a ,science of ,ends1 or ,teleology1 dimly indicated by ,plato4 ,the ,unknown ,wise ,man--correlates with the undiscovered ,science of ,ends4 ,the ulterior1 yet not less important1 estimate of the comparative worth of different ends1 is reserved for that unknown master whom ,nikias himself does not farther specify1 and whom ,lachs sets aside as nowhere to be found1 under the peculiar phrase of some ,god4 ,subjectively considered1 this is an appeal to the judgment of that ,one ,wise ,man1 often alluded to by ,plato as an absent ,expert who might be called into court--yet never to be found at the exact moment1 nor produced in visible presence3 ,objectively considered1 it is a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered ,teleology or ,science of ,ends3 that ,science of the ,good1 which 7as we have already noticed in ,alkibiads ,,ii47 ,plato pronounces to be the crowning and capital science of all--and without which he there declared1 that knowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than useless4#bf ,the ,one ,wise ,man--the ,science of ,good--are the ,subject and ,object corresponding to each other1 and postulated by ,plato4 ,none but the ,one ,wise ,man can measure things terrible and not terrible3 none else can estimate the good or evil1 or the comparative value of two alternative evils1 in each individual case4 ,the items here directed to be taken into the calculation1 correspond with what is laid down by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 not with that laid down in the ,gorgias3 we find here none of that marked antithesis between pleasure and good--between pain and evil--upon which ,sokrates expatiates in the ,gorgias4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,alkib4 ii4 #adf-adg4 ,see above1 ch4 xii4 p4 #af4 ,side-note3 ,perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one sufficient condition of virtue4 ,this appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by ,sokrates instead of by ,lachs4 ,we are then made to perceive1 that the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part1 but an inseparable part1 of the knowledge of good and evil generally3 the lesser cannot be had without the greater--and the greater carries with it not merely courage1 but all the other virtues besides4 ,none can know good or evil generally except the perfectly ,wise ,man4 ,the perfect condition of the ,intelligence1 is the sole and all-sufficient condition of virtue4 ,none can possess one mode of virtue separately4 ,this is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the ,lachs points1 though the question debated is confessedly left without solution4 ,it is a doctrine which seems to have been really maintained by the historical ,sokrates1 and is often implied in the reasonings of the ,platonic ,sokrates1 but not always nor consistently4 ,side-note3 ,dramatic contrast between ,lachs and ,sokrates1 as cross-examiners4 ,in reference to this dialogue1 the dramatic contrast is very forcible1 between the cross-examination carried on by ,lachs1 and that carried on by ,sokrates4 ,the former is pettish and impatient1 bringing out no result1 and accusing the respondent of cavil and disingenuousness3 the latter takes up the same answer patiently1 expands it into the full generality wrapped up in it1 and renders palpable its inconsistency with previous admissions4 ,,appendix4 ,ast is the only critic who declares the ,lachs not to be ,plato's work 7,platon's ,leben und ,schr4 pp4 #dea-def74 ,he indeed even finds it difficult to imagine how ,schleiermacher can accept it as genuine 7p4 #ded74 ,he justifies this opinion by numerous reasons--pointing out what he thinks glaring defects1 absurdity1 and bad taste1 both in the ratiocination and in the dramatic handling1 also dicta alleged to be un-,platonic4 ,compare ,schleiermacher's ,einleitung zum ,lachs1 p4 #cbd seq4 ,i do not concur with ,ast in the estimation of those passages which serve as premisses to his conclusion4 ,but even if ,i admitted his premisses1 ,i still should not admit his conclusion4 ,i should conclude that the dialogue was an inferior work of ,plato1 but ,i should conclude nothing beyond4 ,stallbaum 7,prolegg4 ad ,lachet4 p4 #bi-cj1 #bnd ed47 and ,socher discover adolescenti vestigia in it1 which are not apparent to me4 ,socher1 ,stallbaum1 and ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann pass lightly over the objections of ,ast2 and ,steinhart 7,einleit4 p4 #cee7 declares them to be unworthy of a serious answer4 ,for my part1 ,i draw from these dissensions among the ,platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon which all of them proceed4 ,each has his own belief as to what ,plato must say1 ought to say1 and could not have said2 and each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which surprises me4 ,the grounds upon which ,ast rejects ,lachs1 ,charmids1 and ,lysis1 though inconclusive1 appear to me not more inconclusive than those on which he and other critics reject the ,erast1 ,theags4 ,hippias ,major1 ,alkibiads ,,ii41 c4 ,the dates which ,stallbaum1 ,schleiermacher1 ,socher1 and ,steinhart assign to the ,lachs 7about #djf-djd ,b4,c47 are in my judgment erroneous4 ,i have already shown my reasons for believing that not one of the ,platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of ,sokrates4 ,the hypotheses also of ,steinhart 7p4 #ceg7 as to the special purposes of ,plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any evidence2 and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as to the date4 ,so also ,schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the ,lachs is intended by ,plato as a defence of himself against accusations which had been brought against him1 a young man1 for impertinence in having attacked ,lysias in the ,phdrus1 and ,protagoras in the ,protagoras1 both of them much older than ,plato4 ,but ,steinhart justly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit ,schleiermacher's theory that the ,phdrus and the ,protagoras are earlier compositions than the ,lachs1 which theory ,steinhart and most of the others deny4 ,steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his own idea of the date of the ,lachs3 and he is open to the same remark as he himself makes upon ,schleiermacher4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,charmides4 ,as in ,lachs1 we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of ,courage--so in ,charmids1 we find an examination of ,temperance1 ,sobriety1 ,moderation4#a ,both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable explanation4 ,in both there is an abundant introduction--in ,charmids1 there is even the bustle of a crowded palstra1 with much dramatic incident--preluding to the substantive discussion4 ,i omit the notice of this dramatic incident1 though it is highly interesting to read4 ,footnote #a3 ,i translate ,greek3 sphrosu_/n ,temperance1 though it is very inadequate1 but ,i know no single ,english word better suited4 ,side-note3 ,scene and personages of the dialogue4 ,crowded palstra4 ,emotions of ,sokrates4 ,the two persons with whom ,sokrates here carries on the discussion1 are ,charmides and ,kritias2 both of whom1 as historical persons1 were active movers in the oligarchical government of the ,thirty1 with its numerous enormities4 ,in this dialogue1 ,charmides appears as a youth just rising into manhood1 strikingly beautiful both in face and stature3 ,kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature age4 ,the powerful emotion which ,sokrates describes himself as experiencing1#b from the sight and close neighbourhood of the beautiful ,charmides1 is remarkable1 as a manifestation of ,hellenic sentiment4 ,the same exaltation of the feelings and imagination1 which is now produced only by beautiful women1 was then excited chiefly by fine youths4 ,charmides is described by ,kritias as exhibiting dispositions at once philosophical and poetical3#c illustrating the affinity of these two intellectual veins1 as ,plato conceived them4 ,he is also described as eminently temperate and modest3#d from whence the questions of ,sokrates take their departure4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aed ,c4 ,ficinus1 in his ,argumentum to this dialogue 7p4 #gfg71 considers it as mainly allegorical1 especially the warm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein1 which he compares to the ,song of ,solomon4 ,etsi omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam habeant allegoriam1 amatoria maxime1 non aliter quam ,cantica ,salomonis--mutavi tamen nonnihil--nonnihil etiam prtermisi4 ,qu enim consonabant castigatissimis auribus ,atticorum1 rudioribus fort auribus minim consonarent4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aee ,a4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aeg ,d4 ,about the diffidence of ,charmides in his younger years1 see ,xen4 ,mem4 iii4 #g1 #a4 ,side-note3 ,question1 ,what is ,temperance8 addressed by ,sokrates to the temperate ,charmides4 ,answer1 ,it is a kind of sedateness or slowness4 ,you are said to be temperate1 ,charmides 7says ,sokrates74 ,if so1 your temperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way1 so as to enable you to form and deliver an opinion1 ,what ,temperance is4 ,tell us in plain language what you conceive it to be4 ,temperance1 replies ,charmides 7after some hesitation71#e consists in doing every thing in an orderly and sedate manner1 when we walk in the highway1 or talk1 or perform other matters in the presence of others4 ,it is1 in short1 a kind of sedateness or slowness4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aei ,b4 ,greek3 to kosmi_/s pa_/nta pra_/ttein kai 7such1 e7_/n te tais o7dois badi_/zein kai diale_/gesthai 4 4 4 sull_/bdn 7suchio_/ts tis4 ,side-note3 ,but ,temperance is a fine or honourable thing1 and slowness is1 in many or most cases1 not fine or honourable1 but the contrary4 ,temperance cannot be slowness4 ,sokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer1 in the same manner as he had begun it with ,laches in respect to courage4 ,sokr4--,is not temperance a fine and honourable thing8 ,does it not partake of the essence and come under the definition1 of what is fine or and honourable8#f ,char4--,undoubtedly it does4 ,sokr4--,but if we specify in detail our various operations1 either of body or mind--such as writing1 reading1 playing on the harp1 boxing1 running1 jumping1 learning1 teaching1 recollecting1 comprehending1 deliberating1 determining1 c4--we shall find that to do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them slowly4 ,slowness does not1 except by accident1 belong to the fine and honourable3 therefore temperance1 which does so belong to it1 cannot be a kind of slowness4#g ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aei ,c--#afj ,d4 ,greek3 ou7 tn kaln me_/ntoi 7 sphrosu_/n e7sti_/n8 4 4 4 e7peid e7n t lo_/g tn kaln ti 7min 7 sphrosu_/n u7pete_/th4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afj ,c4 ,side-note3 ,second answer4 ,temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame4 ,refuted by ,sokrates4 ,charmides next declares ,temperance to be a variety of the feeling of shame or modesty4 ,but this 7observes ,sokrates7 will not hold more than the former explanation3 since ,homer has pronounced shame not to be good1 for certain persons and under certain circumstances4#h ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afa ,a4 ,side-note3 ,third answer4 ,temperance consists in doing one's own business4 ,defended by ,kritias4 ,sokrates pronounces it a riddle1 and refutes it4 ,distinction between making and doing4 ,temperance consists in doing one's own business4 ,here we have a third explanation1 proposed by ,charmides and presently espoused by ,kritias4 ,sokrates professes not to understand it1 and pronounces it to be like a riddle4#i ,every tradesman or artisan does the business of others as well as his own4 ,are we to say for that reason that he is not temperate8 ,i distinguish 7says ,kritias7 between making and doing3 the artisan makes for others1 but he does not do for others1 and often cannot be said to do at all4 ,to do1 implies honourable1 profitable1 good1 occupation3 this alone is a man's own business1 and this ,i call temperance4 ,when a man acts so as to harm himself1 he does not do his own business4#aj ,the doing of good things1 is temperance4#aa ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afa ,c--#afb ,b4 ,greek3 sphrosu_/n--to ta au7tou pra_/ttein 4 4 4 ai7ni_/gmati_/ tini e7_/oiken4 ,there is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue3 ,charmids gives this last answer1 which he has heard from ,kritias1 who is at first not forward to defend it1 until ,charmides forces him to come forward1 by hints and side-insinuations4 ,this is the dramatic art and variety of ,plato1 charming to read1 but not bearing upon him as a philosopher4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afc ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ta kals kai 7pheli_/ms poiou_/mena 4 4 4 oi7keia mo_/na ta toiauta 7geisthai1 ta de blabera pa_/nta a7llo_/tria 4 4 4 o7_/ti ta oi7keia te kai ta au7tou a7gatha kaloi_/s1 kai tas tn a7gathn poi_/seis pra_/xeis4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afc ,e4 ,greek3 tn tn a7gathn praxin sphrosu_/nn ei7nai saphs soi diori_/zomai4 ,side-note3 ,fourth answer1 by ,kritias4 ,temperance consists in self-knowledge4 ,sokr4--,perhaps it is4 ,but does the well-doer always and certainly know that he is doing well8 ,does the temperate man know his own temperance8 ,krit4--,he certainly must4 ,indeed ,i think that the essence of temperance is1 ,self-knowledge4 ,know thyself is the precept of the ,delphian ,god1 who means thereby the same as if he had said--,be temperate4 ,i now put aside all that ,i have said before1 and take up this new position1 ,that temperance consists in a man's knowing himself4 ,if you do not admit it1 ,i challenge your cross-examination4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afd-afe4 ,side-note3 ,questions of ,sokrates thereupon4 ,what good does self-knowledge procure for us8 ,what is the object known1 in this case8 ,answer3 ,there is no object of knowledge1 distinct from the knowledge itself4 ,sokr4--,i cannot tell you whether ,i admit it or not1 until ,i have investigated4 ,you address me as if ,i professed to know the subject3 but it is because ,i do not know1 that ,i examine1 in conjunction with you1 each successive answer4#ac ,if temperance consists in knowing1 it must be a knowledge of something4 ,krit4--,it is so3 it is knowledge of a man's self4 ,sokr4--,what good does this knowledge procure for us8 as medical knowledge procures for us health--architectural knowledge1 buildings1 c48 ,krit4--,it has no object positive result of analogous character3 but neither have arithmetic nor geometry4 ,sokr4--,true1 but in arithmetic and geometry1 we can at least indicate a something known1 distinct from the knowledge4 ,number and proportion are distinct from arithmetic1 the science which takes cognizance of them4 ,now what is that1 of which temperance is the knowledge1--distinct from temperance itself8 ,krit4--,it is on this very point that temperance differs from all the other cognitions4 ,each of the others is knowledge of something different from itself1 but not knowledge of itself3 while temperance is knowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also4#ad ,sokr4--,if this be so1 it will of course be a knowledge of ignorance1 as well as a knowledge of knowledge8 ,krit4--,certainly4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afe ,c4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aff ,c4 ,greek3 ai7 men a7_/llai pasai a7_/llou ei7sin e7pistmai1 e7autn d' ou7_/2 7 de mo_/n tn te a7_/lln e7pistmn e7pist_/m e7sti kai au7t e7auts4 ,so also #aff ,e4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge1 without a given cognitum as its object4 ,analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible4 ,sokr4--,according to your explanation1 then1 it is only the temperate man who knows himself4 ,he alone is able to examine himself1 and thus to find out what he really knows and does not know3 he alone is able to examine others1 and thus to find out what each man knows1 or what each man only believes himself to know without really knowing4 ,temperance1 or self-knowledge1 is the knowledge what a man knows1 and what he does not know4#ae ,now two questions arise upon this3 ,first1 is it possible for a man to know1 that he knows what he does know1 and that he does not know what he does not know8 ,next1 granting it to be possible1 in what way do we gain by it8 ,the first of these two questions involves much difficulty4 ,how can there be any cognition1 which is not cognition of a given cognitum1 but cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions8 ,there is no vision except of some colour1 no audition except of some sound3 there can be no vision of visions1 or audition of auditions4 ,so likewise1 all desire is desire of some pleasure2 there is no desire of desires4 ,all volition is volition of some good2 there is no volition of volitions3 all love applies to something beautiful--there is no love of other loves4 ,the like is true of fear1 opinion1 c4 ,it would be singular therefore1 if contrary to all these analogies1 there were any cognition not of some cognitum1 but of itself and other cognitions4#af ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afg ,a4 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afg-afh4 ,side-note3 ,all knowledge must be relative to some object4 ,it is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something1 and to have its characteristic property with reference to some correlate4#ag ,what is greater1 has its property of being greater in relation to something else1 which is less--not in relation to itself4 ,it cannot be greater than itself1 for then it would also be less than itself4 ,it cannot include in itself the characteristic property of the correlatum as well as that of the relatum4 ,so too about what is older1 younger1 heavier1 lighter3 there is always a something distinct1 to which reference is made4 ,vision does not include in itself both the property of seeing1 and that of being seen3 the videns is distinct from the visum4 ,a movement implies something else to be moved3 a heater something else to be heated4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afh ,b4 ,greek3 e7_/sti men au7t 7 e7pist_/m tinos e7pist_/m1 kai e7_/chei tina toiau_/tn du_/namin 7_/ste tinos ei7nai4 ,side-note3 ,all properties are relative--every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else4 ,in all these cases 7concludes ,sokrates7 the characteristic property is essentially relative1 implying something distinguishable from1 yet correlating with1 itself4 ,may we generalise the proposition1 and affirm1 ,that all properties are relative1 and that every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference1 not to itself1 but to something else8 ,or is this true only of some things and not of all--so that cognition may be something in the latter category8 ,this is an embarrassing question1 which ,i do not feel qualified to decide3 neither the general question1 whether there be any cases of characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond themselves1 and therefore not relative1 but absolute--nor the particular question1 whether cognition be one of those cases1 implying no separate cognitum1 but being itself both relatum and correlatum--cognition of cognition4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afh-afi4 #afi ,a3 ,greek3 mega_/lou d_/ tinos a7ndros dei1 o7_/stis touto kata pa_/ntn i7kans diair_/setai1 po_/teron ou7den tn o7_/ntn tn au7tou du_/namin au7to pros e7auto pe_/phuken e7_/chein1 a7lla pros a7llo--7 ta men1 ta d' ou7_/2 kai ei7 e7_/stin au7 a7_/tina au7ta pros e7auta e7_/chei1 a7r' e7n tou_/tois e7stin e7pist_/m1 7n d 7meis sphrosu_/nn phamen ei7nai4 e7g men ou7 pisteu_/ e7maut i7kanos ei7nai tauta diele_/sthtai4 ,but even if cognition of cognition be possible1 ,i shall not admit it as an explanation of what temperance is1 until ,i have satisfied myself that it is beneficial4 ,for ,i have a presentiment that temperance must be something beneficial and good4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afi ,b4 ,greek3 7phelimo_/n ti ka7gathon manteu_/omai ei7nai4 ,side-note3 ,even if cognition of cognition were possible1 cognition of non-cognition would be impossible4 ,a man may know what he knows1 but he cannot know what he is ignorant of4 ,he knows the fact that he knows3 but he does not know how much he knows1 and how much he does not know4 ,let us concede for the present discussion 7continues ,sokrates7 that cognition of cognition is possible4 ,still how does this prove that there can be cognition of non-cognition8 that a man can know both what he knows and what he does not know8 ,for this is what we declared self-knowledge and temperance to be4#bj ,to have cognition of cognition is one thing3 to have cognition of non-cognition is a different thing1 not necessarily connected with it4 ,if you have cognition of cognition1 you will be enabled to distinguish that which is cognition from that which is not--but no more4 ,now the knowledge or ignorance of the matter of health is known by medical science3 that of justice known by political science4 ,the knowledge of knowledge simply--cognition of cognition--is different from both4 ,the person who possesses this last only1 without knowing either medicine or politics1 will become aware that he knows something and possesses some sort of knowledge1 and will be able to verify so much with regard to others4 ,but what it is that he himself knows1 or that others know1 he will not thereby be enabled to find out3 he will not distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or to politics2 to do this1 special acquirements are needed4 ,you1 a temperate man therefore1 as such1 do not know what you know and what you do not know2 you know the bare fact1 that you know and that you do not know4 ,you will not be competent to cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other particular subject1 so as to ascertain whether the man really possesses what he pretends to possess4 ,there will be no point in common between you and him4 ,you1 as a temperate man1 possess cognition of cognition1 but you do not know any special cognitum3 the special man knows his own special cognitum but is a stranger to cognition generally4 ,you cannot question him1 nor criticise what he says or performs1 in his own specialty--for of that you are ignorant3--no one can do it except some fellow expert4 ,you can ascertain that he possesses some knowledge3 but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to which he lays claim1 or whether he falsely pretends to it1 you cannot ascertain3--since1 as a temperate man1 you know only cognition and non-cognition generally4 ,to ascertain this point1 you must be not only a temperate man1 but a man of special cognition besides4#ba ,you can question and test no one1 except another temperate man like yourself4 ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #afi ,d4 ,greek3 nun men touto xugchr_/smen1 dunaton ei7nai gene_/sthai e7pist_/mn e7pist_/ms--i7_/thi d ou7n1 ei7 o7_/1 ti ma_/lista dunaton touto1 ti_/ mallon oi7o_/n te_/ e7stin ei7de_/nai a7_/ te_/ tis oi7de kai a7 m_/8 touto gar d_/pou e7_/phamen ei7nai to gign_/skein au7ton kai sphronein4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agj-aga4 #aga ,c3 ,greek3 ,pantos a7_/ra mallon1 ei7 7 sphrosu_/n e7pist_/ms e7pis_/m mo_/non e7sti kai a7nepistmosu_/ns1 ou7_/te i7atron diakrinai oi7_/a te e7_/stai e7pista_/menon ta ts te_/chns1 7 m e7pista_/menon prospoiou_/menon de 7 oi7o_/menon1 ou7_/te a7_/_/lon ou7de_/na tn e7pistame_/nn kai o7tioun1 pl_/n ge ton au7tou o7mo_/technon1 7_/sper oi7 a7_/lloi dmiourgoi_/4 ,side-note3 ,temperance1 therefore1 as thus defined1 would be of little or no value4 ,but if this be all that temperance can do1 of what use is it to us 7continues ,sokrates78 ,it is indeed a great benefit to know how much we know1 and how much we do not know3 it is also a great benefit to know respecting others1 how much they know1 and how much they do not know4 ,if thus instructed1 we should make fewer mistakes3 we should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do1--we should commit to others that which they knew how to do1 and which we did not know4 ,but temperance 7meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of non-cognition generally7 does not confer such instruction1 nor have we found any science which does4#bb ,how temperance benefits us1 does not yet appear4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agb ,a4 ,greek3 o7ras1 o7_/ti ou7damou e7pist_/m ou7demi_/a toiau_/t ou7sa pe_/phantai4 ,side-note3 ,but even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied1 still ,temperance would be of little value4 ,suppose that all separate work were well performed1 by special practitioners1 we should not attain our end--,happiness4 ,but let us even concede--what has been just shown to be impossible--that through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what we do not know4 ,even upon this hypothesis1 it will be of little service to us4 ,we have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a great benefit if each of us did only what he knew1 committing to others to do only what they knew4 ,i have an awkward suspicion 7continues ,sokrates7 that after all1 this would be no great benefit4#bc ,it is true that upon this hypothesis1 all operations in society would be conducted scientifically and skilfully4 ,we should have none but competent pilots1 physicians1 generals1 c41 acting for us1 each of them doing the work for which he was fit4 ,the supervision exercised by temperance 7in the sense above defined7 would guard us against all pretenders4 ,let us even admit that as to prediction of the future1 we should have none but competent and genuine prophets to advise us2 charlatans being kept aloof by this same supervision4 ,we should thus have every thing done scientifically and in a workmanlike manner4 ,but should we for that reason do well and be happy8 ,can that be made out1 ,kritias8#bd ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agb-agc4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agc ,c-,d4 ,greek3 kateskeuasme_/non d ou7_/t to a7nthr_/pinon ge_/nos o7_/ti men e7pistmo_/ns a7n pra_/ttoi kai z1 e7_/pomai--o7_/ti d' e7pistmo_/ns a7n pra_/ttontes eu7 a7n pra_/ttoimen kai eu7daimonoimen1 touto de ou7_/p duna_/metha mathein1 7 phi_/le ,kriti_/a4 ,side-note3 ,which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness8 ,that by which we know good and evil4 ,krit4--,you will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere else1 if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or according to knowledge4#be ,sokr4--,but according to knowledge1 of what8 ,of leather-cutting1 brazen work1 wool1 wood1 c48 ,krit4--,no1 none of these4 ,sokr4--,well then1 you see1 we do not follow out consistently your doctrine--,that the happy man is he who lives scientifically1 or according to knowledge4 ,for all these men live according to knowledge1 and still you do not admit them to be happy4 ,your definition of happiness applies only to some portion of those who live according to knowledge1 but not to all4 ,how are we to distinguish which of them8 ,suppose a man to know every thing past1 present1 and future2 which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy8 ,would they all contribute equally8 ,krit4--,by no means4 ,sokr4--,which of them then would contribute most8 ,would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming8 ,krit4--,certainly not4 ,sokr4--,or that by which he knew the art of computing8 ,krit4--,no4 ,sokr4--,or that by which he knew the conditions of health8 ,krit4--,that will suit better4 ,sokr4--,but which of them most of all8 ,krit4--,that by which he knew good and evil4#bf ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agc ,d4 ,greek3 ,a7lla me_/ntoi1 7 d' o7_/s1 ou7 r7adi_/s eu7r_/seis a7_/llo ti te_/los tou eu7 pra_/ttein e7an to e7pistmo_/ns a7tima_/ss4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agd4 ,side-note3 ,without the science of good and evil1 the other special science will be of little or of no service4 ,temperance is not the science of good and evil1 and is of little service4 ,sokr4--,here then1 you have been long dragging me round in a circle1 keeping back the fact1 that well-doing and happiness does not arise from living according to science generally1 not of all other matters taken together--but from living according to the science of this one single matter1 good and evil4 ,if you exclude this last1 and leave only the other sciences1 each of these others will work as before3 the medical man will heal1 the weaver will prepare clothes1 the pilot will navigate his vessel1 the general will conduct his army--each of them scientifically4 ,nevertheless1 that each of these things shall conduce to our well-being and profit1 will be an impossibility1 if the science of good and evil be wanting4#bg ,now this science of good and evil1 the special purpose of which is to benefit us1#bh is altogether different from temperance2 which you have defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition1 and which appears not to benefit us at all4 ,krit4--,surely it does benefit us3 for it presides over and regulates all the other sciences1 and of course regulates this very science1 of good and evil1 among the rest4 ,sokr4--,in what way can it benefit us8 ,it does not procure for us any special service1 such as good health3 that is the province of medicine3 in like manner1 each separate result arises from its own producing art4 ,to confer benefit is1 as we have just laid down1 the special province of the science of good and evil4#bi ,temperance1 as the science of cognition and non-cognition1 cannot work any benefit at all4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agd ,c-,d4 ,greek3 e7pei ei7 the_/leis e7xelein tau_/tn tn e7pist_/mn 7of good and evil7 ,greek3 e7k tn a7_/lln e7pistmn1 7tto_/n ti 7 men i7atrik u7giai_/nein poi_/sei1 7 de skutik u7podede_/sthai1 7 de u7phantik 7mphie_/sthai1 7 de kubberntik klu_/sei e7n t thala_/tt a7pothn_/skein kai 7 stratgik e7n pole_/m8 ,ou7den 7tton1 e7_/ph4 ,a7lla to eu7 te tou_/tn e7_/kasta gi_/gnesthai kai 7pheli_/ms a7poleloipos 7mas e7_/stai tau_/ts a7pou_/ss4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agd ,d4 ,greek3 7s e7_/rgon e7sti to 7phelein 7mas1 c4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #age ,a4 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7_/ra u7giei_/as e7_/stai dmiourgo_/s 77 sphrosu_/n74 ,ou7 dta4 ,a7_/lls gar 7n te_/chns u7giei_/a1 7 ou7_/8 ,a7_/lls4 ,ou7d' a7_/ra 7phelei_/as1 7 e7_/taire2 a7_/ll gar au7 a7pe_/domen touto to e7_/rgon te_/chn nun d_/2 7 ga_/r8 ,pa_/nu ge4 ,ps ou7n 7phe_/limos e7_/stai 7 sphrosu_/n1 ou7demias 7phelei_/as ou7sa dmiourgo_/s8 ,ou7dams1 7 ,s_/krates1 e7_/oike_/ ge4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research4 ,he cannot find out what temperance is3 although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified4 ,thus then1 concludes ,sokrates1 we are baffled in every way3 we cannot find out what temperance is1 nor what that name has been intended to designate4 ,all our tentatives have failed2 although1 in our anxiety to secure some result1 we have accepted more than one inadmissible hypothesis4 ,thus we have admitted that there might exist cognition of cognition1 though our discussion tended to negative such a possibility4 ,we have farther granted1 that this cognition of cognition1 or science of science1 might know all the operations of each separate and special science3 so that the temperate man 7i4e4 he who possesses cognition of cognition7 might know both what he knows and what he does not know3 might know1 namely1 that he knows the former and that he does not know the latter4 ,we have granted this1 though it is really an absurdity to say1 that what a man does not know at all1 he nevertheless does know after a certain fashion4#cj ,yet after these multiplied concessions against strict truth1 we have still been unable to establish our definition of temperance3 for temperance as we defined it has1 after all1 turned out to be thoroughly unprofitable4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #age ,b4 ,greek3 kai gar e7pist_/mn e7pist_/ms ei7nai xunechr_/samen1 ou7k e7ntos tou lo_/gou ou7de pha_/skontos ei7nai2 kai tau_/t au7 t e7pist_/m kai ta tn a7_/lln e7pistmn e7_/rga gign_/skein xunechr_/samen1 ou7de tout' e7ntos tou lo_/gou1 i7_/na d 7min ge_/noito o7 s_/phrn e7pist_/mn 7n te oi7den1 o7_/ti oi7de1 kai 7n m oi7den1 o7_/ti ou7k oi7de4 touto men d kai panta_/pasi megalopreps xunechr_/samen1 ou7d' e7piskepsa_/menoi to a7du_/naton ei7nai a7_/ tis m oi7de mdams1 tauta ei7de_/nai a7ms ge_/ ps2 o7_/ti gar ou7k oi7de1 phsin au7ta ei7de_/nai 7 7mete_/ra o7mologi_/a4 kai_/toi1 7s e7gmai1 ou7denos o7_/tou ou7chi a7log_/teron tout' a7n phanei_/4 ,this would not appear an absurdity to ,aristotle4 ,see ,analyt4 ,priora1 ii4 p4 #fg1 a4 #ba2 ,anal4 ,post4 i4 #ga1 a4 #bh4 ,side-note3 ,temperance is and must be a good thing3 but ,charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not2 since what temperance is remains unknown4 ,it is plain that we have taken the wrong road1 and that ,i 7,sokrates7 do not know how to conduct the enquiry4 ,for temperance1 whatever it may consist in1 must assuredly be a great benefit3 and you1 ,charmides1 are happy if you possess it4 ,how can ,i tell 7rejoins ,charmides7 whether ,i possess it or not3 since even men like you and ,kritias cannot discover what it is8#ca ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agf ,a4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,expressions both from ,charmides and ,kritias of praise and devotion to ,sokrates1 at the close of the dialogue4 ,dramatic ornament throughout4 ,here ends the dialogue called ,charmids#cb after the interchange of a few concluding compliments1 forming part of the great dramatic richness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning4 ,i make no attempt to reproduce this latter attribute2 though it is one of the peculiar merits of ,plato in reference to ethical enquiry1 imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to it4 ,i confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue4 ,according to the express declaration of ,sokrates1 it ends in nothing but disappointment4 ,no positive result is attained4 ,the problem--,what is ,temperance8--remains unsolved1 after four or five different solutions have been successively tested and repudiated4 ,footnote #cb3 ,see ,appendix at end of chapter4 ,side-note3 ,the ,charmides is an excellent specimen of ,dialogues of ,search4 ,abundance of guesses and tentatives1 all ultimately disallowed4 ,the ,charmids 7like the ,lachs7 is a good illustrative specimen of those ,dialogues of ,search1 the general character and purpose of which ,i have explained in my eighth9999 chapter4 ,it proves nothing3 it disproves several hypotheses3 but it exhibits 7and therein consists its value7 the anticipating1 guessing1 tentative1 and eliminating process1 without which no defensible conclusions can be obtained--without which1 even if such be found1 no advocate can be formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner4 ,in most cases1 this tentative process is forgotten or ignored3 even when recognised as a reality1 it is set aside with indifference1 often with ridicule4 ,a writer who believes himself to have solved any problem1 publishes his solution together with the proofs2 and acquires deserved credit for it1 if those proofs give satisfaction4 ,but he does not care to preserve1 nor do the public care to know1 the steps by which such solution has been reached4 ,nevertheless in most cases1 and in all cases involving much difficulty1 there has been a process1 more or less tedious1 of tentative and groping--of guesses at first hailed as promising1 then followed out to a certain extent1 lastly discovered to be untenable4 ,the history of science1#cc astronomical1 physical1 chemical1 physiological1 c41 wherever it has been at all recorded1 attests this constant antecedence of a period of ignorance1 confusion1 and dispute1 even in cases where ultimately a solution has been found commanding the nearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world4 ,but on subjects connected with man and society1 this period of dispute and confusion continues to the present moment4 ,no unanimity has ever been approached1 among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying tolerable liberty of dissent4 ,moreover--apart from the condition of different sciences among mature men--we must remember that the transitive process1 above described1 represents the successive stages by which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy4 ,trial and error--alternate guess and rejection1 generation and destruction of sentiments and beliefs--is among the most widespread facts of human intelligence4#cd ,even those ordinary minds1 which in mature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally prevalent type of orthodoxy1--have all in their earlier years gone through that semi-fluid and indeterminate period1 in which the type to come is yet a matter of doubt--in which the head might have been permanently lengthened or permanently flattened1 according to the direction in which pressure was applied4 ,footnote #cc3 ,it is not often that historians of science take much pains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries4 ,one instance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the ',biography of ,cavendish1' the chemist and natural philosopher1 by ,dr4 ,geo4 ,wilson4 ,the great chemical discovery of the composition of water1 accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century1 has been claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific men--,cavendish1 ,watt1 and ,lavoisier4 ,the controversy on the subject1 voluminous and bitter1 has been the means of recording each successive scientific phase and point of view4 ,it will be found admirably expounded in this biography4 ,wilson sets forth the misconceptions1 confusion of ideas1 approximations to truth seen but not followed out1 c41 which prevailed upon the scientific men of that day1 especially under the misleading influence of the phlogiston theory1 then universally received4 ,to ,plato such a period of mental confusion would have been in itself an interesting object for contemplation and description4 ,he might have dramatised it under the names of various disputants1 with the cross-examining ,elenchus1 personified in ,sokrates1 introduced to stir up the debate1 either by first advocating1 then refuting1 a string of successive guesses and dreams 7,charmids1 #agc ,a7 of his own1 or by exposing similar suggestions emanating from others2 especially in regard to the definition of phlogiston1 an entity which then overspread and darkened all chemical speculation1 but which every theorist thought himself obliged to define4 ,the dialogues would have ended 7as the ,protagoras1 ,lysis1 ,charmids1 c41 now end7 by ,sokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the search for an explanation1 and by his pointing out that while all the theorists talked familiarly about phlogiston as a powerful agent1 none of them could agree what it was4 ,see ,dr4 ,wilson's ',biography of ,cavendish1' pp4 #cf-aih-cbj-cbe1 and elsewhere4 ,footnote #cd3 ,it is strikingly described by ,plato in one of the most remarkable passages of the speech of ,diotima in the ,symposion1 pp4 #bjg-bjh4 ,side-note3 ,trial and ,error1 the natural process of the human mind4 ,plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process4 ,sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance4 ,we shall follow ,plato towards the close of his career 7,treatise ,de ,legibus71 into an imperative and stationary orthodoxy of his own3 but in the dialogues which ,i have already reviewed1 as well as in several others which ,i shall presently notice1 no mention is made of any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at ultimately4 ,plato here concentrates his attention upon the indeterminate period of the mind3 looking upon the mind not as an empty vessel1 requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from without--nor as a blank sheet1 awaiting a foreign hand to write characters upon it--but as an assemblage of latent capacities1 which must be called into action by stimulus and example1 but which can only attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied failures4 ,whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten1 the peculiarity of ,plato consists in his bringing them to view with full detail1 explaining the reasons of each4 ,he illustrates abundantly1 and dramatises with the greatest vivacity1 the intellectual process whereby opinions are broached1 at first adopted1 then mistrusted1 unmade1 and re-made--or perhaps not re-made at all1 but exchanged for a state of conscious ignorance4 ,the great hero and operator in this process is the ,platonic ,sokrates1 who accepts for himself this condition of conscious ignorance1 and even makes it a matter of comparative pride1 that he stands nearly alone in such confession4#ce ,his colloquial influence1 working powerfully and almost preternaturally1#cf not only serves both to spur and to direct the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided1 but also exposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently believe themselves to know4 ,sokrates brings back these latter from the false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious ignorance1 and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind1 in which their opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and guessing process4 ,this tentative process1 prosecuted under the drill of ,sokrates1 is in itself full of charm and interest for ,plato1 whether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a bad one4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,apolog4 ,sokr4 pp4 #ba-bb-bc4 ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,symposion1 #bac ,e1 #bae-baf2 ,menon1 #hj ,a-,b4 ,side-note3 ,familiar words--constantly used1 with much earnest feeling1 but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in human society4 ,the ,charmids is one of the many ,platonic dialogues wherein such intellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive result3 except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread mental fact1--7which has already come before the reader1 in ,euthyphron1 ,alkibiads1 ,hippias1 ,erast1 ,lachs1 c41 as to holiness1 beauty1 philosophy1 courage1 c41 and is now brought to view in the case of temperance also2 all of them words in every one's mouth1 and tacitly assumed by every one as known quantities7 the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are in the habit of delivering--their apportionment of praise and blame1 as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and blame--without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed they know not how1 and without being able to render any rational explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are grouped4 ,no philosopher has done so much as ,plato to depict in detail this important fact--the habitual condition of human society1 modern as well as ancient1 and for that very reason generally unnoticed4#cg ,the emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that ,sokrates determines1 and which indeed he makes his point of departure4 ,temperance is essentially among the fine1 beautiful1 honourable1 things3#ch but its rational or objective value 7i4e41 what is the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons71 he cannot determine4 ,here indeed ,plato is not always consistent with himself3 for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not1 until it be determined what the thing is3#ci and we have already found ,sokrates declaring 7in the ,hippias ,major71 that we cannot determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not1 until we have first determined1 ,what is ,beauty in the ,absolute1 or the ,self-,beautiful8 a problem nowhere solved by ,plato4 ,footnote #cg3 ,whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in his own mind1 or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings among mankind1 will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in human nature--,that most of the misunderstandings and contradictions among men1 most of the controversies and errors both in science and in society1 arise usually from our assuming 7consciously or unconsciously7 fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they were self-evident1 and as if they must be assumed by every one else besides4 ,accordingly we never think of closely examining them1 until at length experience has taught us that these self-evident matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof1 and what form the special root of divergent opinions4--7,l4 ,o4 ,brcker--,untersuchungen ber die ,glaubwrdigkeit der alt-,rmischen ,geschichte1 p4 #dij47 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aei ,b1 #afj ,d4 ,greek3 7 sphrosu_/n--tn kaln ti--e7n t lo_/g tn kaln ti4 ,so also ,sokrates in the ,lachs 7#aib ,c71 assumes that courage is ,greek3 tn pa_/nu kaln pragma_/tn1 though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover what courage is4 ,footnote #ci3 ,see ,gorgias1 #dfb ,b1 #ddh ,e2 ,menon1 #gj ,b4 ,side-note3 ,different ethical points of view in different ,platonic dialogues4 ,among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded1 there is more than one which affords farther example to show how differently ,plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues4 ,here we have the phrase--to do one's own business--treated as an unmeaning puzzle1 and exhibited as if it were analogous to various other phrases1 with which the analogy is more verbal than real4 ,but in the ,republic1 ,plato admits this phrase as well understood1 and sets it forth as the constituent element of justice2 in the ,gorgias1 as the leading mark of philosophical life4#dj ,footnote #dj3 ,plato1 ,republ4 iv4 #dcc1 vi4 #dif ,c1 viii4 #eej ,a2 ,gorgias1 #ebf ,c4 ,compare also ,timus1 #gb ,a1 ,xen1 ,mem4 ii4 #i1 #a4 ,side-note3 ,self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible4 ,again1 another definition given by ,kritias is1 ,that temperance consists in knowing yourself1 or in self-knowledge4 ,in commenting upon this definition1 ,sokrates makes out--first1 that self-knowledge is impossible3 next1 that if possible1 it would be useless4 ,you cannot know yourself1 he argues3 you cannot know what you know1 and what you do not know3 to say that you know what you know1 is either tautological or untrue--to say that you know what you do not know1 is a contradiction4 ,all cognition must be cognition of something distinct from yourself3 it is a relative term which must have some correlate1 and cannot be its own correlate3 you cannot have cognition of cognition1 still less cognition of non-cognition4 ,side-note3 ,in other dialogues1 ,sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable4 ,necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view4 ,this is an important point of view1 which ,i shall discuss more at length when ,i come to the ,platonic ,thetetus4 ,i bring it to view here only as contrasting with different language held by the ,platonic ,sokrates in other dialogues2 where he insists on the great value and indispensable necessity of self-knowledge1 as a preliminary to all other knowledge--upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that false persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally cherished--and upon the importance of forcing them to know their own ignorance as well as their own knowledge4 ,in the face of this last purpose1 so frequently avowed by the ,platonic ,sokrates 7indirectly even in this very dialogue71#da we remark a material discrepancy1 when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible4 ,we must judge every dialogue by itself1 illustrating it when practicable by comparison with others1 but not assuming consistence between them as a postulate priori4 ,it is a part of ,plato's dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out different ethical points of view1 and to have present to his mind one or other of them1 with peculiar force in each different dialogue4 ,the subject is thus brought before us on all its sides1 and the reader is familiarised with what a dialectician might say1 whether capable of being refuted or not4 ,inconsistency between one dialogue and another is not a fault in the ,platonic dialogues of ,search2 but is1 on the contrary1 a part of the training process1 for any student who is destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which ,plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge4 ,it is a puzzle and provocative to the internal meditation of the student4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #aff ,d4 ,side-note3 ,courage and ,temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning1 except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil4 ,in analyzing the ,lachs1 we observed that the definition of courage given by ,nikias was shown by ,sokrates to have no meaning1 except in so far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of good and evil4 ,here1 too1 in the ,charmids1 we are brought in the last result to the same terminus--the general cognition of good and evil4 ,but ,temperance1 as previously good and defined1 is not comprehended under that cognition1 and is therefore pronounced to be unprofitable4 ,side-note3 ,distinction made between the special sciences and the science of ,good and ,evil4 ,without this last1 the special sciences are of no use4 ,this cognition of good and evil--the science of the profitable--is here 7in the ,charmids7 proclaimed by ,sokrates to have a place of its own among the other sciences2 and even to be first among them1 essentially necessary to supervise and direct them1 as it had been declared in ,alkibiads ,,ii4 ,now the same supervising place and directorship had been claimed by ,kritias for ,temperance as he defines it--that is1 self-knowledge1 or the cognition of our cognitions and non-cognitions4 ,but ,sokrates doubts even the reality of such self-knowledge3 and granting for argument's sake that it exists1 he still does not see how it can be profitable4 ,for the utmost which its supervision can ensure would be1 that each description of work shall be scientifically done1 by the skilful man1 and not by the unskilful4 ,but it is not true1 absolutely speaking 7he argues71 that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient for well doing or for happiness3 for the question must next be asked--,knowledge--of what8 ,not knowledge of leather-cutting1 carpenter's or brazier's work1 arithmetic1 or even medicine3 these1 and many others1 a man may possess1 and may act according to them2 but still he will not attain the end of being happy4 ,all cognitions contribute in greater or less proportion towards that end3 but what contributes most1 and most essentially1 is the cognition of good and evil1 without which all the rest are insufficient4 ,of this last-mentioned cognition or science1 it is the special object to ensure profit or benefit3#db to take care that everything done by the other sciences shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end ,happiness4 ,after this1 there is no province left for temperance--i4e41 self-knowledge1 or the knowledge of cognitions and non-cognitions3 no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit4#dc ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agd ,d4 ,greek3 ,ou7ch au7_/t de_/ ge1 7s e7_/oiken1 e7stin 7 sphrosu_/n1 a7ll' 7s e7_/rgon e7sti to 7phelein 7mas4 ,ou7 gar e7pistmn ge kai a7nepistmosunn 7 e7pist_/m e7sti_/n1 a7lla a7gathou te kai kakou4 ,footnote #dc3 ,plato1 ,charm4 #agd ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7_/ra u7giei_/as e7_/stai dmiourgo_/s8 ,ou7 dta4 ,a7_/lls gar 7n te_/chns u7gi_/eia8 7 ou7_/8 ,a7_/lls2 ,ou7d' a7_/ra 7phelei_/as1 7 e7taire2 a7_/ll gar au7 a7pe_/domen touto to e7_/rgon te_/chn nun d_/2 7 gar8 ,pa_/nu ge4 ,ps ou7n 7phe_/limos e7_/stai 7sphrosu_/n1 ou7demias 7phelei_/as ou7sa dmiourgo_/s8 ,ou7dams1 7 ,s_/krates1 e7_/oike_/ ge4 ,side-note3 ,knowledge1 always relative to some object known4 ,postulate or divination of a ,science of ,teleology4 ,two points are here to be noted1 as contained and debated in the handling of this dialogue4 #a4 ,knowledge absolutely1 is a word without meaning3 all knowledge is relative1 and has a definite object or cognitum3 there can be no scientia scientiarum4 #b4 ,among the various objects of knowledge 7cognita or cognoscenda71 one is1 good and evil4 ,there is a science of good and evil1 the function of which is1 to watch over and compare the results of the other sciences1 in order to promote results of happiness1 and to prevent results of misery3 without the supervision of this latter science1 the other sciences might be all exactly followed out1 but no rational comparison could be had between them4#dd ,in other words1 there is a science of ,ends1 estimating the comparative worth of each ,end in relation to other ,ends 7,teleology73 distinct from those other more special sciences1 which study the means each towards a separate ,end of its own4 ,here we fall into the same track as we have already indicated in ,lachs and ,alkibiads ,,ii4 ,footnote #dd3 ,compare what has been said upon the same subject in my remarks on ,alkib4 i4 and ii4 p4 #ca49999 ,side-note3 ,courage and ,temperance1 handled both by ,plato and by ,aristotle4 ,comparison between the two4 ,these matters ,i shall revert to in other dialogues1 where we shall find them turned over and canvassed in many different ways4 ,one farther observation remains to be made on the ,lachs and ,charmids1 discussing as they do ,courage 7which is also again discussed in the ,protagoras7 and ,temperance4 ,an interesting comparison may be made between them and the third book of the ,nikomachean ,ethics of ,aristotle1#de where the same two subjects are handled in the ,aristotelian manner4 ,the direct1 didactic1 systematising1 brevity of ,aristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous prolixity1 the multiplied suggestive comparisons1 the shifting points of view1 which we find in ,plato4 ,each has its advantages3 and both together will be found not more than sufficient1 for any one who is seriously bent on acquiring what ,plato calls knowledge1 with the cross-examining power included in it4 ,aristotle is greatly superior to ,plato in one important attribute of a philosopher3 in the care which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the same word3 the univocal and the equivocal1 the generically identical from the remotely analogical1 the proper from the improper1 the literal from the metaphorical4 ,of such precautions we discover little or no trace in ,plato1 who sometimes seems not merely to neglect1 but even to deride them4 ,yet ,aristotle1 assisted as he was by all ,plato's speculations before us1 is not to be understood as having superseded the necessity for that negative ,elenchus which animates the ,platonic dialogues of ,search3 nor would his affirmative doctrines have held their grounds before a cross-examining ,sokrates4 ,footnote #de3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 iii4 p4 #aaae1 #aaai2 also ,ethic4 ,eudem4 iii4 #abbi-abca4 ,the comments of ,aristotle upon the doctrine of ,sokrates respecting ,courage seem to relate rather to the ,protagoras than to the ,lachs of ,plato4 ,see ,eth4 ,nik4 #aaaf1 #f1 #d2 ,eth4 ,eud4 #abbi1 a4 #ae4 ,,appendix4 ,the dialogue ,charmids is declared to be spurious1 not only by ,ast1 but also by ,socher 7,ast1 ,platon's ,leb4 pp4 #dai-dbh2 ,socher1 ,ueber ,platon1 pp4 #acj-acg74 ,steinhart maintains the genuineness of the dialogue against them2 declaring 7as in regard to the ,lachs7 that he can hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly ,platonic character of it1 though here too1 as in the ,lachs1 he detects adolescenti vestigia 7,steinhart1 ,einleit4 zum ,charmids1 pp4 #bij-bic74 ,schleiermacher considers ,charmids as well as ,lachs to be appendixes to the ,protagoras1 which opinion both ,stallbaum 7,proleg4 ad ,charm1 p4 #aba2 ,proleg4 ad ,lachet4 p4 #cj1 #bnd ed47 and ,steinhart controvert4 ,the views of ,stallbaum respecting the ,charmids are declared by ,steinhart 7p4 #bij7 to be recht usserlich und oberflchlich4 ,to me they appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite meanings1 the far-sighted indirect hints1 which ,steinhart himself perceives or supposes in the words of ,plato4 ,these critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government of the ,thirty at ,athens1 in which opinion ,i do not concur4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,lysis4 ,side-note3 ,analogy between ,lysis and ,charmids4 ,richness of dramatic incident in both4 ,youthful beauty4 ,the ,lysis1 as well as the ,charmids1 is a dialogue recounted by ,sokrates himself1 describing both incidents and a conversation in a crowded ,palstra2 wherein not merely bodily exercises were habitually practised1 but debate was carried on and intellectual instruction given by a ,sophist named ,mikkus1 companion and admirer of ,sokrates4 ,there is a lively dramatic commencement1 introducing ,sokrates into the ,palstra1 and detailing the preparation and scenic arrangements1 before the real discussion opens4 ,it is the day of the ,herma1 or festival of ,hermes1 celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying banquets among the frequenters of gymnasia4 ,side-note3 ,scenery and personages of the ,lysis4 ,lysis1 like ,charmids1 is an ,athenian youth1 of conspicuous beauty1 modesty1 and promise4 ,his father ,demokrates represents an ancient family of the xonian ,deme in ,attica1 and is said to be descended from ,zeus and the daughter of the ,archgets or ,heroic ,founder of that ,deme4 ,the family moreover are so wealthy1 that they have gained many victories at the ,pythian1 ,isthmian1 and ,nemean games1 both with horses and with chariots and four4 ,menexenus1 companion of ,lysis1 is somewhat older1 and is his affectionate friend4 ,the persons who invite ,sokrates into the palstra1 and give occasion to the debate1 are ,ktesippus and ,hippothals3 both of them adults1 yet in the vigour of age4 ,hippothals is the ,erastes of ,lysis1 passionately attached to him4 ,he is ridiculed by ,ktesippus for perpetually talking about ,lysis1 as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose and verse1 full of praise and flattery2 extolling not only his personal beauty1 but also his splendid ancestry and position4#a ,footnote #a3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bjc-bje4 ,side-note3 ,origin of the conversation4 ,sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth1 for his benefit4 ,in reference to these addresses1 ,sokrates remonstrates with ,hippothals on the imprudence and mischief of addressing to a youth flatteries calculated to turn his head4 ,he is himself then invited by ,hippothals to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking to youth2 such as shall be at once acceptable to the person addressed1 and unobjectionable4 ,sokrates agrees to do so1 if an opportunity be afforded him of conversing with ,lysis4#b ,accordingly after some well-imagined incidents1 interesting as marks of ,greek manners--,sokrates and ,ktesippus with others seat themselves in the palstra1 amidst a crowd of listeners4#c ,lysis1 too modest at first to approach1 is emboldened to sit down by seeing ,menexenus seated by the side of ,sokrates3 while ,hippothals1 not daring to put himself where ,lysis can see him1 listens1 but conceals himself behind some of the crowd4 ,sokrates begins the conversation with ,menexenus and ,lysis jointly3 but presently ,menexenus is called away for a moment1 and he talks with ,lysis singly4 ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bjf4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bjf-bjg4 ,side-note3 ,conversation of ,sokrates with ,lysis4 ,sokr4--,well--,lysis--your father and mother love you extremely4 ,lysis4--,assuredly they do4 ,sokr4--,they would wish you therefore to be as happy as possible4 ,lysis4--,undoubtedly4 ,sokr4--,do you think any man happy1 who is a slave1 and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires8 ,lysis4--,i do not think him happy at all4 ,sokr4--,since therefore your father and mother are so anxious that you should be happy1 they of course allow you to do the things which you desire1 and never reprove nor forbid you4 ,lysis4--,not at all1 by ,zeus1 ,sokrates3 there are a great many things that they forbid me4 ,sokr4--,how say you6 they wish you to be happy--and they hinder you from doing what you wish6 ,tell me1 for example1 when one of your father's chariots is going to run a race1 if you wished to mount and take the reins1 would not they allow you to do so8 ,lysis4--,no--certainly3 they would not allow me4 ,sokr4--,but whom do they allow1 then8 ,lysis4--,my father employs a paid charioteer4 ,sokr4--,what6 do they permit a hireling1 in preference to you1 to do what he wishes with the horses8 and do they give him pay besides for doing so8 ,lysis4--,why--to be sure4 ,sokr4--,but doubtless1 ,i imagine1 they trust the team of mules to your direction2 and if you chose to take the whip and flog1 they would allow you8 ,lysis4--,allow me8 not at all4 ,sokr4--,what6 is no one allowed to flog them8 ,lysis4--,yes--certainly--the mule-groom4 ,sokr4--,is he a slave or free8 ,lysis4--,a slave4 ,sokr4--,then1 it seems1 they esteem a slave higher than you their son2 trusting their property to him rather than to you1 letting him do what he pleases1 while they forbid you4 ,but tell me farther3 do they allow you to direct yourself--or do not they even trust you so far as that8 ,lysis4--,how can you imagine that they trust me8 ,sokr4--,but does any one else direct you8 ,lysis4--,yes--this tutor here4 ,sokr4--,is he a slave8 ,lysis4--,to be sure3 belonging to our family4 ,sokr4--,that is shocking3 one of free birth to be under the direction of a slave6 ,but what is it that he does1 as your director8 ,lysis4--,he conducts me to my teacher's house4 ,sokr4--,what6 do they govern you also1 these teachers8 ,lysis4--,undoubtedly they do4 ,sokr4--,then your father certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and governors4 ,but surely1 when you come home to your mother1 she at least1 anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned1 lets you do what you please about the wool or the web1 when she is weaving3 she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of the other instruments of her work8 ,lysis4--,ridiculous6 not only does she forbid me1 but ,i should be beaten if ,i did meddle4 ,sokr4--,how is this1 by ,herakls8 ,have you done any wrong to your father and mother8 ,lysis4--,never at all1 by ,zeus4 ,sokr4--,from what provocation is it1 then1 that they prevent you in this terrible way1 from being happy and doing what you wish8 keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one1 and never your own master8 so that you derive no benefit either from the great wealth of the family1 which is managed by every one else rather than by you--or from your own body1 noble as it is4 ,even that is consigned to the watch and direction of another3 while you1 ,lysis1 are master of nothing1 nor can do any one thing of what you desire4 ,lysis4--,the reason is1 ,sokrates1 that ,i am not yet old enough4 ,sokr4--,that can hardly be the reason2 for to a certain extent your father and mother do trust you1 without waiting for you to grow older4 ,if they want any thing to be written or read for them1 they employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the house3 and you are then allowed to write or read first1 whichever of the letters you think proper4 ,again1 when you take up the lyre1 neither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the strings1 or striking them either with your finger or with the plectrum4 ,lysis4--,they do not4 ,sokr4--,why is it1 then1 that they do not hinder you in this last case1 as they did in the cases before mentioned8 ,lysis4--,i suppose it is because ,i know this last1 but did not know the others4 ,sokr4--,well1 my good friend1 you see that it is not your increase of years that your father waits for2 but on the very day that he becomes convinced that you know better than he1 he will entrust both himself and his property to your management4 ,lysis4--,i suppose that he will4 ,sokr4--,ay--and your neighbour too will judge in the same way as your father4 ,as soon as he is satisfied that you understand house-management better than he does1 which do you think he will rather do--confide his house to you1 or continue to manage it himself8 ,lysis4--,i think he will confide it to me4 ,sokr4--,the ,athenians too3 do not you think that they also will put their affairs into your management1 as soon as they perceive that you have intelligence adequate to the task8 ,lysis4--,yes3 ,i do4 ,sokr4--,what do you say about the ,great ,king also1 by ,zeus6 ,when his meat is being boiled1 would he permit his eldest son who is to succeed to the rule of ,asia1 to throw in any thing that he pleases into the sauce1 rather than us1 if we come and prove to him that we know better than his son the way of preparing sauce8 ,lysis4--,clearly1 he will rather permit us4 ,sokr4--,the ,great ,king will not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt3 while we1 if we chose to take up an entire handful1 should be allowed to throw it in4 ,lysis4--,no doubt4 ,sokr4--,what if his son has a complaint in his eyes2 would the ,great ,king1 knowing him to be ignorant of medicine1 allow him even to touch his own eyes or would he forbid him8 ,lysis4--,he would forbid him4 ,sokr4--,as to us1 on the contrary1 if he accounted us good physicians1 and if we desired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them1 he would not hinder us1 in the conviction that we understood what we were doing4 ,lysis4--,you speak truly4 ,sokr4--,all other matters1 in short1 on which he believed us to be wiser than himself or his son1 he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son8 ,lysis4--,necessarily so1 ,sokrates4 ,sokr4--,this is the state of the case1 then1 my dear ,lysis3 ,on those matters on which we shall have become intelligent1 all persons will put trust in us--,greeks as well as barbarians1 men as well as women4 ,we shall do whatever we please respecting them3 no one will be at all inclined to interfere with us on such matters2 not only we shall be ourselves free1 but we shall have command over others besides4 ,these matters will be really ours1 because we shall derive real good from them4#d ,as to those subjects1 on the contrary1 on which we shall not have acquired intelligence1 no one will trust us to do what we think right3 every one1--not merely strangers1 but father and mother and nearer relatives if there were any1--will obstruct us as much as they can3 we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned2 and they will be really alien to us1 for we shall derive no real good from them4 ,do you admit that this is the case8#e ,lysis4--,i do admit it4 ,sokr4--,shall we then be friends to any one1 or will any one love us1 on those matters on which we are unprofitable ,lysis4--,certainly not4 ,sokr4--,you see that neither does your father love you1 nor does any man love another1 in so far as he is useless8 ,lysis4--,apparently not4 ,sokr4--,if then you become intelligent1 my boy1 all persons will be your friends and all persons will be your kinsmen3 for you will be useful and good3 if you do not1 no one will be your friend1--not even your father nor your mother nor your other relatives4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baj ,b4 ,greek3 kai ou7deis 7mas e7kn ei7nai e7mpodiei1 a7ll' au7toi_/ te e7leu_/theroi e7so_/metha e7n au7tois kai a7_/lln a7_/rchontes1 7me_/tera_/ te tauta e7_/stai2 o7nso_/metha gar a7p' au7tn4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baj ,c4 ,greek3 au7toi_/ te e7n au7tois e7so_/metha a7_/lln u7pkooi1 kai 7min e7_/stai a7llo_/tria2 ou7den gar a7p' au7tn o7nso_/metha4 ,sugchreis ou7_/ts e7_/chein8 ,sugchr4 ,is it possible then1 ,lysis1 for a man to think highly of himself on those matters on which he does not yet think aright8 ,lysis4--,how can it be possible8 ,sokr4--,if you stand in need of a teacher1 you do not yet think aright8 ,lysis4--,true4 ,sokr4--,accordingly1 you are not presumptuous on the score of intelligence1 since you are still without intelligence4 ,lysis4--,by ,zeus1 ,sokrates1 ,i think not4#f ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baj ,d4 ,greek3 ,oi7o_/n te ou7n e7pi tou_/tois1 7 ,lu_/si1 me_/ga phronein1 e7n oi7s tis m_/p phronei8 ,kai ps a7n8 e7_/ph4 ,ei7 d' a7_/ra su didaska_/lou de_/ei1 ou7_/p phroneis4 ,a7lth4 ,ou7d' a7_/ra megalo_/phrn ei71 ei7_/per a7_/phrn e7_/ti4 ,ma ,di_/'1 e7_/ph1 7 ,s_/krates1 ou7_/ moi dokei4 ,there is here a double sense of ,greek3 me_/ga phronein1 megalo_/phrn1 which cannot easily be made to pass into any other language4 ,side-note3 ,lysis is humiliated4 ,distress of ,hippothals4 ,when ,i heard ,lysis speak thus 7continues ,sokrates1 who is here the narrator71 ,i looked towards ,hippothals and ,i was on the point of committing a blunder3 for it occurred to me to say1 ,that is the way1 ,hippothals1 to address a youth whom you love3 you ought to check and humble him1 not puff him up and spoil him1 as you have hitherto done4 ,but when ,i saw him agitated and distressed by what had been said1 ,i called to mind that1 though standing close by1 he wished not to be seen by ,lysis4 ,accordingly1 ,i restrained myself and said nothing of the kind4#g ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baj ,e4 ,side-note3 ,lysis entreats ,sokrates to talk in the like strain to ,menexenus4 ,lysis accepts this as a friendly lesson1 inculcating humility3 and seeing ,menexenus just then coming back1 he says aside to ,sokrates1 ,talk to ,menexenus1 as you have been talking to me4 ,you can tell him yourself 7replies ,sokrates7 what you have heard from me3 you listened very attentively4 ,most certainly ,i shall tell him 7says ,lysis73 but meanwhile pray address to him yourself some other questions1 for me to hear4 ,you must engage to help me if ,i require it 7answers ,sokrates73 for ,menexenus is a formidable disputant1 scholar of our friend ,ktesippus1 who is here ready to assist him4 ,i know he is 7rejoined ,lysis71 and it is for that very reason that ,i want you to talk to him--that you may chasten and punish him4#h ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baa ,b-,c4 ,greek3 a7ll' o7_/ra o7_/ps e7pikour_/seis moi1 e7a_/n me e7le_/gchein e7picheir o7 ,mene_/xenos4 7 ou7k oi7stha o7_/ti e7ristiko_/s e7sti8 ,nai ma ,di_/a1 e7_/ph1 spho_/dra ge4 dia tauta_/ toi kai bou_/lomai_/ se au7t diale_/gesthai--i7_/n' au7ton kola_/ss4 ,compare ,xenophon1 ,memor4 i4 #d1 #a1 where he speaks of the chastising purpose often contemplated by ,sokrates in his conversation--,greek3 a7 e7keinos kolastri_/ou e7_/neka tous pa_/nt' oi7ome_/nous ei7de_/nai e7rtn 7_/legchen4 ,side-note3 ,value of the first conversation between ,sokrates and ,lysis1 as an illustration of the ,platonico-,sokratic manner4 ,i have given at length1 and almost literally 7with some few abbreviations71 this first conversation between ,sokrates and ,lysis1 because it is a very characteristic passage1 exhibiting conspicuously several peculiar features of the ,platonico-,sokratic interrogation4 ,facts common and familiar are placed in a novel point of view1 ingeniously contrasted1 and introduced as stepping-stones to a very wide generality4 ,wisdom or knowledge is exalted into the ruling force with liberty of action not admissible except under its guidance3 the questions are put in an inverted half-ironical tone 7not uncommon with the historical ,sokrates#i71 as if an affirmative answer were expected as a matter of course1 while in truth the answer is sure to be negative3 lastly1 the purpose of checking undue self-esteem is proclaimed4 ,the rest of the dialogue1 which contains the main substantive question investigated1 ,i can report only in brief abridgment1 with a few remarks following4 ,footnote #i3 ,see the conversation of ,sokrates with ,glaukon in ,xenophon1 ,memor4 iii4 #f2 also the conversation with ,perikles1 iii4 #e1 #bc-bd4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates begins to examine ,menexenus respecting friendship4 ,who is to be called a friend8 ,halt in the dialogue4 ,sokrates begins1 as ,lysis requests1 to interrogate ,menexenus--first premising--,different men have different tastes3 some love horses and dogs1 others wealth or honours4 ,for my part1 ,i care little about all such acquisitions3 but ,i ardently desire to possess friends1 and ,i would rather have a good friend than all the treasures of ,persia4 ,you two1 ,menexenus and ,lysis1 are much to be envied1 because at your early age1 each of you has made an attached friend of the other4 ,but ,i am so far from any such good fortune1 that ,i do not even know how any man becomes the friend of another4 ,this is what ,i want to ask from you1 ,menexenus1 as one who must know1#aj having acquired such a friend already4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baa-bab4 ,when one man loves another1 which becomes the friend of which8 ,does he who loves1 become the friend of him whom he loves1 whether the latter returns the affection or not8 ,or is the person loved1 whatever be his own dispositions1 the friend of the person who loves him8 ,or is reciprocity of affection necessary1 in order that either shall be the friend of the other8 ,the speakers cannot satisfy themselves that the title of friend fits either of the three cases2#aa so that this line of interrogating comes to a dead lock4 ,menexenus avows his embarrassment1 while ,lysis expresses himself more hopefully4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bab-bac4 #bac ,c3--,greek3 ei7 m_/te oi7 philountes 7#a7 phi_/loi e7_/sontai1 m_/th' oi7 philou_/menoi 7#b71 m_/th' oi7 philounte_/s te kai philou_/menoi 7#c71 c4 ,sokrates here professes to have shown grounds for rejecting all these three suppositions4 ,but if we follow the preceding argument1 we shall see that he has shown grounds only against the first two1 not against the third4 ,side-note3 ,questions addressed to ,lysis4 ,appeal to the maxims of the poets4 ,like is the friend of like4 ,canvassed and rejected4 ,sokrates now takes up a different aspect of the question1 and turns to ,lysis1 inviting him to consider what has been laid down by the poets1 our fathers and guides in respect of wisdom4#ab ,homer says that the ,gods originate friendship1 by bringing the like man to his like3 ,empedokles and other physical philosophers have also asserted1 that like must always and of necessity be the friend of like4 ,these wise teachers cannot mean 7continues ,sokrates7 that bad men are friends of each other4 ,the bad man can be no one's friend4 ,he is not even like himself1 but ever wayward and insane3--much less can he be like to any one else1 even to another bad man4 ,they mean that the good alone are like to each other1 and friends to each other4#ac ,but is this true8 ,what good1 or what harm1 can like do to like1 which it does not also do to itself8 ,how can there be reciprocal love between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid8 ,is not the good man1 so far forth as good1 sufficient to himself1--standing in need of no one--and therefore loving no one8 ,how can good men care much for each other1 seeing that they thus neither regret each other when absent1 nor have need of each other when present8#ad ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bac ,e3 ,greek3 skopounta kata tous poita_/s2 ou7toi gar 7min 7_/sper pate_/res ts sophi_/as ei7si kai 7gemo_/nes4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bad4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,lysis #bae ,b3 ,greek3 ,o7 de m_/ tou deo_/menos1 ou7de_/ ti a7gap_/ a7n4 4 4 4 ,o7 de m a7gap_/1 ou7d' a7n philoi4 4 4 4 ,ps ou7n oi7 a7gathoi tois a7gathois 7min phi_/loi e7_/sontai tn a7rch_/n1 oi7 m_/te a7po_/ntes potheinoi a7ll_/lois--i7kanoi gar e7autois kai chris o7_/ntes--m_/te paro_/ntes chrei_/an au7tn e7_/chousi8 tous d toiou_/tous ti_/s mchan peri pollou poieisthai a7lllous8 ,side-note3 ,other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion2 unlikeness1 of friendship4 ,reasons pro and con4 ,rejected4 ,it appears1 therefore1 ,lysis 7continues ,sokrates71 that we are travelling in the wrong road1 and must try another direction4 ,i now remember to have recently heard some one affirming--contrary to what we have just said--that likeness is a cause of aversion1 and9999 unlikeness a cause of friendship4 ,he too produced evidence from the poets3 for ,hesiod tells us1 that potter is jealous of potter1 and bard of bard4 ,things most alike are most full of envy1 jealousy and hatred to each other3 things most unlike1 are most full of friendship4 ,thus the poor man is of necessity a friend to the rich1 the weak man to the strong1 for the sake of protection3 the sick man1 for similar reason1 to the physician4 ,in general1 every ignorant man loves1 and is a friend to1 the man of knowledge4 ,nay1 there are also physical philosophers1 who assert that this principle pervades all nature2 that dry is the friend of moist1 cold of hot1 and so forth3 that all contraries serve as nourishment to their contraries4 ,these are ingenious teachers3 but if we follow them1 we shall have the cleverest disputants attacking us immediately1 and asking--,what6 is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite8 ,do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just--temperate of intemperate--good of evil8 ,impossible3 the doctrine cannot be maintained4#ae ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bae-baf4 ,side-note3 ,confusion of ,sokrates4 ,he suggests1 ,that the ,indifferent 7neither good nor evil7 is friend to the ,good4 ,my head turns 7continues ,sokrates7 with this confusion and puzzle--since neither like is the friend of like1 nor contrary of contrary4 ,but ,i will now hazard a different guess of my own4#af ,there are three genera in all3 the good--the evil--and that which is neither good nor evil1 the indifferent4 ,now we have found that good is not a friend to good--nor evil to evil--nor good to evil--nor evil to good4 ,if therefore there exist any friendship at all1 it must be the indifferent that is friend1 either to its like1 or to the good3 for nothing whatever can be a friend to evil4 ,but if the indifferent be a friend at all1 it cannot be a friend to its own like2 since we have already shown that like generally is not friend to like4 ,it remains therefore1 that the indifferent1 in itself neither good nor evil1 is friend to the good4#ag ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baf ,c-,d3 ,greek3 t o7_/nti au7tos i7liggi u7po ts tou lo_/gou a7pori_/as--,le_/g toi_/nun a7pomanteuo_/menos1 c4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baf ,d4 ,side-note3 ,suggestion canvassed4 ,if the ,indifferent is friend to the ,good1 it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil1 from which it is anxious to escape4 ,yet hold6 ,are we on the right scent8 ,what reason is there to determine1 on the part of the indifferent1 attachment to the good8 ,it will only have such attachment under certain given circumstances3 when1 though neither good nor evil in itself1 it has nevertheless evil associated with it1 of which it desires to be rid4 ,thus the body in itself is neither good nor evil3 but when diseased1 it has evil clinging to it1 and becomes in consequence of this evil1 friendly to the medical art as a remedy4 ,but this is true only so long as the evil is only apparent1 and not real3 so long as it is a mere superficial appendage1 and has not become incorporated with the essential nature of the body4 ,when evil has become engrained1 the body ceases to be indifferent 7i4e41 neither good nor evil71 and loses all its attachment to good4 ,thus that which determines the indifferent to become friend of the good1 is1 the contact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own nature1 accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil4#ah ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bag ,e3 ,greek3 ,to m_/te kakon a7_/ra m_/t' a7gathon e7ni_/ote kakou paro_/ntos ou7_/p kako_/n e7stin1 e7_/sti d' o7_/te 7_/d to toiouton ge_/gonen4 ,pa_/nu ge4 ,ou7koun o7_/tan m_/p lalon 7 kakou paro_/ntos1 au7t men 7 parousi_/a a7gathou au7to poiei e7pithumein1 7 de kakon poiousa a7posterei au7to ts t' e7pithumi_/as a7_/ma kai ts phili_/as ta7gathou4 ,ou7 gar e7_/ti e7stin ou7_/te kakon ou7_/t' a7gatho_/n1 a7lla kako_/n2 phi_/lon de a7gath kakon ou7k 7n4 ,side-note3 ,principle illustrated by the philosopher4 ,his intermediate condition--not wise1 yet painfully feeling his own ignorance4 ,under this head comes the explanation of the philosopher--the friend or lover of wisdom4 ,the man already wise is not a lover of wisdom3 nor the man thoroughly bad and stupid1 with whose nature ignorance is engrained4 ,like does not love like1 nor does contrary love contrary4 ,the philosopher is intermediate between the two3 he is not wise1 but neither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable4 ,he has ignorance cleaving to him as an evil1 but he knows his own ignorance1 and yearns for wisdom as a cure for it4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bah ,a4 ,greek3 dia tauta d phaimen a7n kai tous 7_/d sophous mke_/ti philosophein1 ei7_/te theoi ei7_/te a7_/nthrpoi_/ ei7sin ou7toi2 ou7d' au7 e7kei_/nous philosophein tous ou7_/ts a7_/gnoian e7_/chontas 7_/ste kakous ei7nai2 kakon gar kai a7math ou7de_/na philosophein4 lei_/pontai d oi7 e7_/chontes men to kakon touto1 tn a7_/gnoian1 m_/p de u7p' au7tou o7_/ntes a7gn_/mones md' a7matheis1 a7ll' e7_/ti 7gou_/menoi m ei7de_/nai a7 m i7_/sasin4 dio d philosophousin oi7 ou7_/te a7gathoi ou7_/te kakoi_/ p o7_/ntes4 o7_/soi de kakoi1 ou7 philosophousin1 ou7de oi7 a7gathoi_/4 ,compare ,plato1 ,symposion1 #bjd4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates dissatisfied4 ,he originates a new suggestion4 ,the ,primum ,amabile1 or object originally dear to us1 per se3 by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear4 ,the two young collocutors with ,sokrates welcome this explanation heartily1 and ,sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with it4 ,but he presently bethinks himself1 and exclaims1 ,ah6 ,lysis and ,menexenus1 our wealth is all a dream6 we have been yielding again to delusions6 ,let us once more examine4 ,you will admit that all friendship is on account of something and for the sake of something3 it is relative both to some producing cause1 and to some prospective end4 ,thus the body1 which is in itself neither good nor evil1 becomes when sick a friend to the medical art3 on account of sickness1 which is an evil--and for the sake of health1 which is a good4 ,the medical art is dear to us1 because health is dear3 but is there any thing behind1 for the sake of which health also is dear8 ,it is plain that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever1 and that we must come ultimately to something which is dear per se1 not from reference to any ulterior aliud4 ,we must come to some primum amabile1 dear by its own nature1 to which all other dear things refer1 and from which they are derivatives4#bj ,it is this primum amabile which is the primitive1 essential1 and constant1 object of our affections3 we love other things only from their being associated with it4 ,thus suppose a father tenderly attached to his son1 and that the son has drunk hemlock1 for which wine is an antidote2 the father will come by association to prize highly1 not merely the wine which saves his son's life1 but even the cup in which the wine is contained4 ,yet it would be wrong to say that he prizes the wine or the cup as much as his son3 for the truth is1 that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son1 and extends only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup4 ,so about gold and silver3 we talk of prizing highly gold and silver--but this is incorrect1 for what we really prize is not gold1 but the ulterior something1 whatever it be1 for the attainment of which gold and other instrumental means are accumulated4 ,in general terms--when we say that ,b is dear on account of ,a1 we are really speaking of ,a under the name of ,b4 ,what is really dear1 is that primitive object of love1 primum amabile1 towards which all the affections which we bear to other things1 refer and tend4#ba ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bai ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ,a7r' ou7n ou7k a7na_/gk a7peipein 7mas ou7_/ts i7o_/ntas1 kai a7phike_/sthai e7pi_/ tina a7rchn1 7 ou7ke_/t' e7panoi_/sei e7p' a7_/llo phi_/lon1 a7ll' 7_/xei e7p' e7keino o7_/ e7sti prton phi_/lon1 ou7 e7_/neka kai ta7_/lla phamen pa_/nta phi_/la ei7nai8 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 c4 #cg1 p4 #bbj ,b4 ,greek3 ,o7_/sa ga_/r phamen phi_/la ei7nai 7min e7_/neka phi_/lou tino_/s1 e7te_/r r7_/mati phaino_/metha le_/gontes au7to_/2 phi_/lon de t o7_/nti kinduneu_/ei e7keino au7to1 ei7s o7 pasai au7tai ai7 lego_/menai phili_/ai teleutsin4 ,side-note3 ,the cause of love is desire4 ,we desire that which is akin to us or our own4 ,is it then true 7continues ,sokrates7 that good is our primum amabile1 and dear to us in itself8 ,if so1 is it dear to us on account of evil8 that is1 only as a remedy for evil2 so that if evil were totally banished1 good would cease to be prized8 ,is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us8#bb ,this cannot be3 because even if all evil were banished1 the appetites and desires1 such of them as were neither good nor evil1 would still remain3 and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to us4 ,it is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being dear to us4 ,we have just found out another cause for loving and being loved--desire4 ,he who desires1 loves what he desires and as long as he desires3 he desires moreover that of which he is in want1 and he is in want of that which has been taken away from him--of his own4#bc ,it is therefore this own which is the appropriate object of desire1 friendship1 and love4 ,if you two1 ,lysis and ,menexenus1 love each other1 it is because you are somehow of kindred nature with each other4 ,the lover would not become a lover1 unless there were1 between him and his beloved1 a certain kinship or affinity in mind1 disposition1 tastes1 or form4 ,we love1 by necessary law1 that which has a natural affinity to us2 so that the real and genuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his beloved4#bd ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bbj ,d4 ,we may see that in this chapter ,plato runs into a confusion between ,greek3 to dia_/ ti and ,greek3 to e7_/neka_/ tou1 which two he began by carefully distinguishing4 ,thus in #bah ,d he says1 ,greek3 o7 phi_/los e7sti t phi_/los--e7_/neka_/ tou kai dia_/ ti4 ,again #bai ,a1 he says--,greek3 to sma ts i7atriks phi_/lon e7sti_/n1 dia tn no_/son1 e7_/neka ts u7giei_/as4 ,this is a very clear and important distinction4 ,it is continued in #bbj ,d--,greek3 o7_/ti dia to kakon ta7gathon 7gapmen kai e7philoumen1 7s pha_/rmakon o7n tou kakou to a7gatho_/n1 to de kako_/n no_/sma4 ,but in #bbj ,e--,greek3 to de t o7_/nti phi_/lon pan tou7nanti_/on tou_/tou phai_/netai pephuko_/s2 phi_/lon gar 7min a7nepha_/n o7n e7chthrou e7_/neka4 ,to make the reasoning consistent with what had gone before1 these two last words ought to be exchanged for ,greek3 dia to e7chthro_/n4 ,plato had laid down the doctrine that good is loved--,greek3 dia to kako_/n1 not ,greek3 e7_/neka tou kakou4 ,good is loved on account of evil1 but for the sake of obtaining a remedy to or cessation of the evil4 ,steinhart 7in his note on ,hieron4 ,mller's translation of ,plato1 p4 #bfh7 calls this a sophistisches ,rthselspiel2 and he notes other portions of the dialogue which remind us of the deceptive tricks of the ,sophists 7die ,trugspiele der ,sophisten1 see p4 #bbb-bbd-bbg-bcj74 ,he praises ,plato here for his fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts of the ,sophists4 ,admitting that ,plato puts forward sophistical quibbles with the word ,greek3 phi_/los1 he tells us that this is suitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man ,menexenus4 ,the confusion between ,greek3 e7_/neka_/ tou and ,greek3 dia_/ ti 7noticed above7 appears to be numbered by ,steinhart among the fine jests against ,protagoras1 ,prodikus1 or some of the ,sophists4 ,i can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in ,plato's reasoning4 ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bba ,e4 ,greek3 ,to e7pithumoun ou7 a7n e7ndees 71 tou_/tou e7pithumei--e7ndees de gi_/gnetai ou7 a7_/n tis a7phairtai--tou oi7kei_/ou d_/1 7s e7_/oiken1 o7_/ te e7_/rs kai 7 phili_/a kai 7 e7pithumi_/a tugcha_/nei ou7sa4 ,this is the same doctrine as that which we read1 expanded and cast into a myth with comic turn1 in the speech of ,aristophanes in the ,symposion1 pp4 #aia-aib-aic4 ,greek3 e7_/kastos ou7n 7mn e7_/stin a7nthr_/pou su_/mbolon1 a7_/te tetmme_/nos 7_/sper ai7 psttai e7x e7nos du_/o4 ztei d a7ei to au7tou e7_/kastos xu_/mbolon 7#aia ,d7--,greek3 dikai_/s a7n u7mnoimen ,e7_/rta1 o7s e7_/n te t paro_/nti pleista 7mas o7ni_/nsin ei7s to oi7keion a7_/gn1 c4 7#aic ,d74 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bba-bbb4 ,side-note3 ,good is of a nature akin to every one1 evil is alien to every one4 ,inconsistency with what has been previously laid down4 ,but is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like8 ,we must assume that there is3 for we showed before1 that like was useless to like1 and therefore not dear to like4 ,shall we say that good is of a nature akin to every one1 and evil of a nature foreign to every one8 ,if so1 then there can be no friendship except between one good man and another good man4 ,but this too has been proved to be impossible4 ,all our tentatives have been alike unsuccessful4 ,side-note3 ,failure of the enquiry4 ,close of the dialogue4 ,in this dilemma 7continues ,sokrates1 the narrator7 ,i was about to ask assistance from some of the older men around4 ,but the tutors of ,menexenus and ,lysis came up to us and insisted on conveying their pupils home--the hour being late4 ,as the youths were departing ,i said to them--,well1 we must close our dialogue with the confession1 that we have all three made a ridiculous figure in it3 ,i1 an old man1 as well as you two youths4 ,our hearers will go away declaring1 that we fancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two2 but that we have not yet been able to find out what a friend is4#be ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bbc ,b4 ,greek3 ,nun men katage_/lastoi gego_/namen e7g_/ te1 gern a7n_/r1 kai u7meis1 c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks4 ,no positive result4 ,sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge4 ,thus ends the main discussion of the ,lysis3 not only without any positive result1 but with speakers and hearers more puzzled than they were at the beginning3 having been made to feel a great many difficulties which they never felt before4 ,nor can ,i perceive any general purpose running through the dialogue1 except that truly ,sokratic and ,platonic purpose--,to show1 by cross-examination on the commonest words that what every one appears to know1 and talks about most confidently1 no one really knows or can distinctly explain4#bf ,this is the meaning of the final declaration put into the mouth of ,sokrates4 ,we believe ourselves to be each other's friends1 yet we none of us know what a friend is4 ,the question is one1 which no one had ever troubled himself to investigate1 or thought it requisite to ask from others4 ,every one supposed himself to know1 and every one had in his memory an aggregate of conceptions and beliefs which he accounted tantamount to knowledge3 an aggregate generated by the unconscious addition of a thousand facts and associations1 each separately unimportant and often inconsistent with the remainder3 while no rational analysis had ever been applied to verify the consistency of this spontaneous product1 or to define the familiar words in which it is expressed4 ,the reader is here involved in a cloud of confusion respecting ,friendship4 ,no way out of it is shown1 and how is he to find one8 ,he must take the matter into his own active and studious meditation3 which he has never yet done1 though the word is always in his mouth1 and though the topic is among the most common and familiar1 upon which the swain treads daily with his clouted shoon4 ,footnote #bf3 ,among the many points of analogy between the ,lysis and the ,charmids1 one is1 ,that both of them are declared to be spurious and unworthy of ,plato1 by ,socher as well as by ,ast 7,ast1 ,platon's ,leben1 pp4 #dbi-dcd2 ,socher1 ,ueber ,platon1 pp4 #acg-add74 ,schleiermacher ranks the ,lysis as second in his ,platonic series of dialogues1 an appendix to the ,phdrus 7,einl4 p4 #agd seq472 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 ,stallbaum1 and nearly all the other critics dissent from this view3 they place the ,lysis as an early dialogue1 along with ,charmids and ,lachs1 anterior to the ,protagoras 7,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 ,gesch4 und ,syst4 ,plat4 ,phil4 pp4 #ddg-ddh2 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 ad ,lys4 p4 #ij 7#aaj #bnd ed472 ,steinhart1 ,einl4 p4 #bba7 near to or during the government of the ,thirty4 ,all of them profess to discover in the ,lysis adolescenti vestigia4 ,ast and ,socher characterise the dialogue as a tissue of subtle sophistry and eristic contradiction1 such as 7in their opinion7 ,plato cannot have composed4 ,stallbaum concedes the sophistry1 but contends that it is put by ,plato intentionally1 for the purpose of deriding1 exposing1 disgracing1 the ,sophists and their dialectical tricks3 ludibrii caus 7p4 #hh72 ut illustri aliquo exemplo demonstretur dialecticam istam1 quam adolescentes magno quodam studio sectabantur1 nihil esse aliud1 nisi inanem quandam argutiarum captatricem1 c4 7p4 #hg74 ,nevertheless he contends that along with this derisory matter there is intermingled serious reasoning which may be easily distinguished 7p4 #hg71 but which certainly he does not clearly point out4 7,compare pp4 #ajh-i-ad-ae1 #bnd ed47 ,schleiermacher and ,steinhart also 7pp4 #bbb-bbd-bbg7 admit the sophistry in which ,sokrates is here made to indulge4 ,but ,steinhart maintains that there is an assignable philosophical purpose in the dialogue1 which ,plato purposely wrapped up in enigmatical language1 but of which he 7,steinhart7 professes to give the solution 7p4 #bbh74 ,side-note3 ,subject of ,lysis4 ,suited for a ,dialogue of ,search4 ,manner of ,sokrates1 multiplying defective explanations1 and showing reasons why each is defective4 ,this was a proper subject for a dialogue of ,search4 ,in the dialogue ,lysis1 ,plato describes ,sokrates as engaged in one of these searches1 handling1 testing1 and dropping1 one point of view after another1 respecting the idea and foundation of friendship4 ,he speaks1 professedly1 as a diviner or guesser2 following out obscure promptings which he does not yet understand himself4#bg ,in this character1 he suggests several different explanations1 not only distinct but inconsistent with each other2 each of them true to a certain extent1 under certain conditions and circumstances3 but each of them untrue1 when we travel beyond those limits3 other contradictory considerations then interfering4 ,to multiply defective explanations1 and to indicate why each is defective1 is the whole business of the dialogue4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baf ,d4 ,greek3 le_/g toi_/nun a7pomanteuo_/menos1 c4 ,side-note3 ,the process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result4 ,usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds4 ,schleiermacher discovers in this dialogue indications of a positive result not plainly enunciated3 but he admits that ,aristotle did not discover them--nor can ,i believe them to have been intended by the author4#bh ,but most critics speak slightingly of it1 as alike sceptical and sophistical3 and some even deny its authenticity on these grounds4 ,plato might have replied by saying that he intended it as a specimen illustrating the process of search for an unknown qusitum2 and as an exposition of what can be said for1 as well as against1 many different points of view4 ,the process of trial and error1 the most general fact of human intelligence1 is even better illustrated when the search is unsuccessful3 because when a result is once obtained1 most persons care for nothing else and forget the antecedent blunders4 ,to those indeed1 who ask only to hear the result as soon as it is found1 and who wait for others to look for it--such a dialogue as the ,lysis will appear of little value4 ,but to any one who intends to search for it himself1 or to study the same problem for himself1 the report thus presented of a previous unsuccessful search1 is useful both as guidance and warning4 ,every one of the tentative solutions indicated in the ,lysis has something in its favour1 yet is nevertheless inadmissible4 ,to learn the grounds which ultimately compel us to reject what at first appears admissible1 is instruction not to be despised2 at the very least1 it helps to preserve us from mistake1 and to state the problem in the manner most suitable for obtaining a solution4 ,footnote #bh3 ,schleiermacher1 ,einleitung zum ,lysis1 i4 p4 #agg4 ,side-note3 ,subject of friendship1 handled both by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates1 and by ,aristotle4 ,in truth1 no one general solution is attainable1 such as ,plato here professes to search for4#bi ,in one of the three ,xenophontic dialogues wherein the subject of friendship is discussed we find the real ,sokrates presenting it with a juster view of its real complications4#cj ,the same remark may be made upon ,aristotle's manner of handling friendship in the ,ethics4 ,he seems plainly to allude to the ,lysis 7though not mentioning it by name72 and to profit by it at least in what he puts out of consideration1 if not in what he brings forward4#ca ,he discards the physical and cosmical analogies1 which ,plato borrows from ,empedokles and ,herakleitus1 as too remote and inapplicable3 he considers that the question must be determined by facts and principles relating to human dispositions and conduct4 ,in other ways1 he circumscribes the problem1 by setting aside 7what ,plato includes7 all objects of attachment which are not capable of reciprocating attachment4#cb ,the problem1 as set forth here by ,plato1 is conceived in great generality4 ,in what manner does one man become the friend of another8#cc ,how does a man become the object of friendship or love from another8 ,what is that object towards which our love or friendship is determined8 ,these terms are so large1 that they include everything belonging to the ,tender ,emotion generally4#cd ,footnote #bi3 ,turgot has some excellent remarks on the hopelessness of such problems as that which ,plato propounds1 here well as in other dialogues1 to find definitions of common and vague terms4 ,we read in his article ,etymologie1 in the ,encyclopdie 7vol4 iii4 pp4 #gj-gb of his ,oeuvres ,complets73 ,qu'on se rpresente la foule des acceptions du mot esprit1 depuis son sens primitif spiritus1 haleine1 jusqu' ceux qu'on lui donne dans la chimie1 dans la littrature1 dans la jurisprudence1 esprit acide1 esprit de ,montaigne1 esprit des loix1 c4--qu'on essaie d'extraire de toutes ces acceptions une ide qui soit commune toutes--on verra s'vanouir tous les caractres qui distinguent l'esprit de toute autre chose1 dans quelque sens qu'on le prenne4 4 4 4 ,la multitude et l'incompatibilit des acceptions du mot esprit1 sont telles1 que personne n'a t tent de les comprendre toutes dans une seule dfinition1 et de dfinir l'esprit en gnral4 ,mais le vice de cette mthode n'est pas moins rel lorsqu'il n'est pas assez sensible pour empcher qu'on ne la suive4 ,a mesure que le nombre et la diversit des acceptions diminue1 l'absurdit s'affoiblit3 et quand elle disparoit1 il reste encore l'erreur4 ,j'ose dire1 que presque toutes les dfinitions o l'on annonce qu'on va dfinir les choses dans le sens le plus gnral1 ont ce dfaut1 et ne dfinissent vritablement rien3 parceque leurs auteurs1 en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions d'un mot1 ont entrepris une chose impossible3 je veux dire1 de rassembler sous une seule ide gnrale des ides trs diffrentes entre elles1 et qu'un mme nom n'a jamais pu dsigner que successivement1 en cessant en quelque sorte d'tre le mme mot4 ,see also the remarks of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill on the same subject4 ,system of ,logic1 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 #d1 s4 #e4 ,footnote #cj3 ,see ,xenophon1 ,memor4 ii4 #d-e-f4 ,in the last of these three conversations 7s4 #ba-bb71 ,sokrates says to ,kritobulus ,greek3 ,a7ll' e7_/chei men poiki_/ls ps tauta1 7 ,krito_/boule2 phu_/sei gar e7_/chousin oi7 a7_/nthrpoi ta men philika_/2 de_/ontai te gar a7ll_/ln1 kai e7leousi1 kai sunergountes 7phelousi1 kai touto sunie_/ntes cha_/rin e7_/chousin a7ll_/lois1 ta de polemika_/2 ta_/ te gar au7ta kala kai 7de_/a nomi_/zontes u7per tou_/tn ma_/chontai1 kai dichognmonountes e7nantiountai2 polemikon de kai e7_/ris kai o7rg_/2 kai dusmenes men o7 tou pleonektein e7_/rs1 miston de o7 phtho_/nos4 ,this observation of ,sokrates is very true and valuable--that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity are both of them equally natural1 i4e4 equally interwoven with the constant conditions of individual and social life4 ,this is very different from the vague1 partial1 and encomiastic predicates with which ,greek3 to phu_/sei is often decorated elsewhere by ,sokrates himself1 as well as by ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,footnote #ca3 ,aristot4 ,eth4 ,nikom4 viii4 #a1 p4 #aaee b4 ,compare ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bad ,a--#bae ,e4 ,footnote #cb3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nik4 viii4 #b1 p4 #aaee1 b4 #bh2 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bab ,d4 ,footnote #cc3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bab ,a3 ,greek3 o7_/ntina tro_/pon gi_/gnetai phi_/los e7_/teros e7te_/rou4 #bbc ad fin43 ,greek3 o7_/1 ti e7stin o7 phi_/los4 ,footnote #cd3 ,see the chapter on ,tender ,emotion in ,mr4 ,bain's elaborate classification and description of the ,emotions4 ',the ,emotions and the ,will1' ch4 vii4 p4 #id seq4 7#crd ed41 p4 #abd74 ,in the ,lysis1 #baf ,c-,d1 we read1 among the suppositions thrown out by ,sokrates1 about ,greek3 to phi_/lon--kinduneu_/ei kata tn a7rchai_/an paroimi_/an to kalon phi_/lon ei7nai4 e7_/oike goun malak tini kailei_/ kai lipar2 dio kai i7_/ss r7adi_/s diolisthai_/nei kai diadu_/etai 7mas1 a7_/te toiouton o7_/n2 le_/g gar ta7gathon kalon ei7nai4 ,this allusion to the soft and the smooth is not very clear2 a passage in ,mr4 ,bain's chapter serves to illustrate it4 ,among the sensations of the senses we find some that have the power of awakening tender emotion4 ,the sensations that incline to tenderness are1 in the first place1 the effects of very gentle or soft stimulants1 such as soft touches1 gentle sounds1 slow movements1 temperate warmth1 mild sunshine4 ,these sensations must be felt in order to produce the effect1 which is mental and not simply organic4 ,we have seen that an acute sensation raises a vigorous muscular expression1 as in wonder2 a contrast to this is exhibited by gentle pressure or mild radiance4 ,hence tenderness is passive emotion by pre-eminence3 we see it flourishing best in the quiescence of the moving members4 ,remotely there may be a large amount of action stimulated by it1 but the proper outgoing accompaniment of it is organic not muscular4 ,that the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to the ,tender ,emotion is here pointed out as a fact in human nature1 agreeably to the comparison of ,plato4 ,mr4 ,bain's treatise has the rare merit of describing fully the physical as well as the mental characteristics of each separate emotion4 ,side-note3 ,debate in the ,lysis partly verbal1 partly real4 ,assumptions made by the ,platonic ,sokrates1 questionable1 such as the real ,sokrates would have found reason for challenging4 ,the debate in the ,lysis is partly verbal3 i4e41 respecting the word ,greek3 phi_/los1 whether it means the person loving1 or the person loved1 or whether it shall be confined to those cases in which the love is reciprocal1 and then applied to both4 ,herein the question is about the meaning of words--a word and nothing more4 ,the following portions of the dialogue enter upon questions not verbal but real--,whether we are disposed to love what is like to ourselves1 or what is unlike or opposite to ourselves8 ,though both these are occasionally true1 it is shown that as general explanations neither of them will hold4 ,but this is shown by means of the following assumptions1 which not only those whom ,plato here calls the very clever ,disputants1#ce but ,sokrates himself at other times1 would have called in question1 viz43 ,that bad men cannot be friends to each other--that men like to each other 7therefore good men as well as bad7 can be of no use to each other1 and therefore there can be no basis of friendship between them--that the good man is self-sufficing1 stands in need of no one1 and therefore will not love any one4#cf ,all these assumptions ,sokrates would have found sufficient reason for challenging1 if they had been advanced by ,protagoras or any other opponents4 ,they stand here as affirmed by him2 but here1 as elsewhere in ,plato1 the reader must apply his own critical intellect1 and test what he reads for himself4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baf ,a43 ,greek3 oi7 pa_/nsophoi a7_/ndres oi7 a7ntilogikoi_/1 c4 ,yet ,plato1 in the ,phdrus and ,symposion1 indicates colloquial debate as the great generating cause of the most intense and durable friendship4 ,aristeides the ,rhetor says1 ,orat4 xlvii4 7,greek3 ,pros ,kapi_/tna71 p4 #dah1 ,dindorf1 ,greek3 e7pei kai ,pla_/tn to a7lthes a7pantachou tima1 kai tas e7n tois lo_/gois sunousi_/as a7phormn phili_/as a7lthins u7polamba_/nei4 ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bad-bae4 ,the discourse of ,cicero1 ,de ,amiciti1 is composed in a style of pleasing rhetoric2 suitable to ,llius1 an ancient ,roman senator and active politician1 who expressly renounces the accurate subtlety of ,grecian philosophers 7v4 #ah74 ,there is little in it which we can compare with the ,platonic ,lysis2 but ,i observe that he too1 giving expression to his own feelings1 maintains that there can be no friendship except between the good and virtuous3 a position which is refuted by the nefaria vox1 cited by himself as spoken by ,c4 ,blossius1 xi4 #cg4 ,side-note3 ,peculiar theory about friendship broached by ,sokrates4 ,persons neither good nor evil by nature1 yet having a superficial tinge of evil1 and desiring good to escape from it4 ,it is thus shown1 or supposed to be shown1 that the persons who love are neither the ,good1 nor the ,bad3 and that the objects loved1 are neither things or persons similar1 nor opposite1 to the persons loving4 ,sokrates now adverts to the existence of a third category--,persons who are neither good1 nor bad1 but intermediate between the two--,objects which are intermediate between likeness and opposition4 ,he announces as his own conjecture1#cg that the ,subject of friendly or loving feeling1 is1 that which is neither good nor evil3 the ,object of the feeling1 ,good3 and the cause of the feeling1 the superficial presence of evil1 which the subject desires to see removed4#ch ,the evil must be present in a superficial and removable manner--like whiteness in the hair caused by white paint1 not by the grey colour of old age4 ,sokrates applies this to the state of mind of the philosopher1 or lover of knowledge3 who is not yet either thoroughly good or thoroughly bad1--either thoroughly wise or thoroughly unwise--but in a state intermediate between the two3 ignorant1 yet conscious of his own ignorance1 and feeling it as a misfortune which he was anxious to shake off4#ci ,footnote #cg3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baf ,d4 ,greek3 le_/g toi_/nun a7pomanteuo_/menos1 c4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #baf-bag4 ,footnote #ci3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bah ,c4 ,greek3 lei_/pontai d oi7 e7_/chontes men to kako touto1 tn a7_/gnoian1 m_/p de u7p' au7tou o7_/ntes a7gn_/mones md' a7matheis1 a7ll' e7_/ti 7gou_/menoi m ei7de_/nai a7 m i7_/sasi2 dio d philosophousin oi7 ou7_/te a7gathoi ou7_/te kakoi_/ p o7_/ntes2 o7_/soi de kakoi_/1 ou7 philosophousin1 ou7de oi7 a7gathoi_/4 ,compare the phrase of ,seneca1 ,epist4 #ei1 p4 #baa1 ,gronov43 ,elui difficile est3 non enim inquinati sumus1 sed infecti4 ,side-note3 ,this general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom4 ,painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher4 ,value set by ,sokrates and ,plato upon this attribute4 ,this meaning of philosophy1 though it is not always and consistently maintained throughout the ,platonic writings1 is important as expanding and bringing into system the position laid down by ,sokrates in the ,apology4 ,he there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom1 but he announced himself as a philosopher1 in the above literal sense3 that is1 as ignorant1 yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance1 and anxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it3 while most men were equally ignorant1 but were unconscious of their own ignorance1 believed themselves to be already wise1 and delivered confident opinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they spoke4 ,the conversation of ,sokrates 7as ,i have before remarked7 was intended1 not to teach wisdom1 but to raise men out of this false persuasion of wisdom1 which he believed to be the natural state of the human mind1 into that mental condition which he called philosophy4 ,his ,elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance1 anxious to escape from it1 and prepared for mental efforts in search of knowledge3 in which search ,sokrates assisted them1 but without declaring1 and even professing inability to declare1 where that truth lay in which the search was to end4 ,he considered that this change was in itself a great and serious improvement1 converting what was evil1 radical1 and engrained--into evil superficial and removable2 which was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement4 ,the first thing to be done was to create searchers after truth1 men who would look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention1 and make up their own individual convictions4 ,even if nothing ulterior were achieved1 that alone would be a great deal4 ,such was the scope of the ,sokratic conversation2 and such the conception of philosophy 7the capital peculiarity which ,plato borrowed from ,sokrates71 which is briefly noted in this passage of the ,lysis1 and developed in other ,platonic dialogues1 especially in the ,symposion1#dj which we shall reach presently4 ,footnote #dj3 ,plato1 ,sympos4 #bjb-bjc-bjd4 ,phdrus1 #bgh ,d4 ,side-note3 ,another theory of ,sokrates4 ,the ,primum ,amabile1 or original and primary object of ,love4 ,particular objects are loved through association with this4 ,the object is1 ,good4 ,still1 however1 ,sokrates is not fully satisfied with this hypothesis1 but passes on to another4 ,if we love anything1 we must love it 7he says7 for the sake of something4 ,this implies that there must exist1 in the background1 a something which is the primitive and real object of affection4 ,the various things which we actually love1 are not loved for their own sake1 but for the sake of this primum amabile1 and as shadows projected by it3 just as a man who loves his son1 comes to love by association what is salutary or comforting to his son--or as he loves money for the sake of what money will purchase4 ,the primum amabile1 in the view of ,sokrates1 is ,good2 particular things loved1 are loved as shadows of good4 ,side-note3 ,statement by ,plato of the general law of mental association4 ,this is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other dialogues4 ,we note with interest here1 that it appears illustrated1 by a statement of the general law of mental association--the calling up of one idea by other ideas or by sensations1 and the transference of affections from one object to others which have been apprehended in conjunction with it1 either as antecedents or consequents4 ,plato states this law clearly in the ,phdon and elsewhere3#da but he here conceives it imperfectly3 for he seems to believe that1 if an affection be transferred by association from a primitive object ,a1 to other objects1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 c41 ,a always continues to be the only real object of affection1 while ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 c41 operate upon the mind merely by carrying it back to ,a4 ,the affection towards ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 c41 therefore is1 in the view of ,plato1 only the affection for ,a under other denominations and disguises4#db ,now this is doubtless often the case2 but often also1 perhaps even more generally1 it is not the case4 ,after a certain length of repetition and habit1 all conscious reference to the primitive object of affection will commonly be left out1 and the affection towards the secondary object will become a feeling both substantive and immediate4 ,what was originally loved as means1 for the sake of an ulterior end1 will in time come to be loved as an end for itself2 and to constitute a new centre of force1 from whence derivatives may branch out4 ,it may even come to be loved more vehemently than any primitive object of affection1 if it chance to accumulate in itself derivative influences from many of those objects4#dc ,this remark naturally presents itself1 when we meet here for the first time1 distinctly stated by ,plato1 the important psychological doctrine of the transference of affections by association from one object to others4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 #gc-gd4 ,it is declared differently1 and more clearly1 by ,aristotle in the treatise ,greek3 ,peri ,mn_/ms kai ,a7namn_/ses1 pp4 #dea-deb4 ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,lysis1 #bbj ,b4 ,greek3 o7_/sa ga_/r phamen phi_/la ei7nai 7min e7_/neka phi_/lou tino_/s1 e7te_/r r7_/mati phaino_/metha le_/gontes au7to_/2 phi_/lon de t o7_/nti kinduneu_/ei e7keino au7to ei7nai1 ei7s o7 pasai au7tai ai7 lego_/menai phili_/ai teleutsin4 ,footnote #dc3 ,there is no stronger illustration of this than the love of money1 which is the very example that ,plato himself here cites4 ,the important point to which ,i here call attention1 in respect to the law of ,mental ,association1 is forcibly illustrated by ,mr4 ,james ,mill in his ',analysis of the ,human ,mind1' chapters xxi4 and xxii41 and by ,professor ,bain in his works on the ,senses and the ,intellect1--,intellect1 chap4 i4 sect4 #dg-dh1 p4 #djd seq4 ed4 #c2 and on the ,emotions and the ,will1 chap4 iv4 sect4 #d-e1 p4 #dbh seq4 7#crd ed4 p4 #cfc seq474 ,side-note3 ,theory of the ,primum ,amabile1 here introduced by ,sokrates1 with numerous derivative objects of love4 ,platonic ,idea4 ,generic communion of ,aristotle1 distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion4 ,the primum amabile1 here introduced by ,sokrates1 is described in restricted terms1 as valuable merely to correct evil1 and as having no value per se1 if evil were assumed not to exist4 ,in consequence chiefly of this restriction1 ,sokrates discards it as unsatisfactory4 ,such restriction1 however1 is noway essential to the doctrine3 which approaches to1 but is not coincident with1 the ,ideal ,good or ,idea of ,good1 described in other dialogues as what every one yearns after and aspires to1 though without ever attaining it and without even knowing what it is4#dd ,the ,platonic ,idea was conceived as a substantive1 intelligible1 ,ens1 distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name1 and separated from them all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther--yet communicating itself to1 or partaken by1 all of them1 in some inexplicable way4 ,aristotle combated this doctrine1 denying the separate reality of the ,idea1 and admitting only a common generic essence1 dwelling in and pervading the particulars1 but pervading them all equally4 ,the general word connoting this generic unity was said by ,aristotle 7retaining the ,platonic phraseology7 to be ,greek3 lego_/menon kata mi_/an i7de_/an or ,greek3 kath' e7_/n4 ,footnote #dd3 ,plato1 ,republ4 vi4 pp4 #eje-ejf4 ,but apart from and beyond such generic unity1 which implied a common essence belonging to all1 ,aristotle recognised a looser1 more imperfect1 yet more extensive1 communion1 founded upon common relationship towards some ,greek3 ,a7rch--,first ,principle or ,first ,object4 ,such relationship was not always the same in kind3 it might be either resemblance1 concomitance1 antecedence or consequence1 c43 it might also be different in degree1 closer or more remote1 direct or indirect4 ,here1 then1 there was room for graduation1 or ordination of objects as former and latter1 first1 second1 third1 c41 according as1 when compared with each other1 they were more or less related to the common root4 ,this imperfect communion was designated by ,aristotle under the title ,greek3 kat' a7nalogi_/an1 as contrasted with ,greek3 kata ge_/nos3 the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied1 not ,greek3 kata mi_/an i7de_/an or ,greek3 kath' e7_/n1 but ,greek3 pros mi_/an phu_/sin or ,greek3 pros e7_/n3#de it was affirmed neither entirely ,greek3 sunnu_/ms 7which would imply generic communion71 nor entirely ,greek3 o7mnu_/ms 7which would be casual and imply no communion at all71 but midway between the two1 so as to admit of a graduated communion1 and an arrangement as former and later1 first cousin1 or second1 third cousin4 ,members of the same ,genus were considered to be brothers1 all on a par3 but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion 7signified by the words ,former and ,later1 more or less in degree of relationship71 ,aristotle did not admit a common ,genus1 nor did ,plato admit a ,substantive ,idea4#df ,footnote #de3 ,arist4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 #ajgb1 a4 #bf-bi2 ,bonitz1 ,comm4 p4 #dig id4 ,greek3 ,prton o7rekto_/n--,prton voto_/n 7prton o7rekton--quod per se appetibile est et concupiscitur74 ,quod autem primum est in aliqu serie1 id prcipue etiam habet qualitatem1 qu in reliqu cernitur serie1 c4 a4 #iic1 b4 #bd3 ergo prima illa substantia est ,greek3 to a7_/riston--also ,greek3 ,g #ajjd1 a4 #be-bf1 #ajje1 a4 #g1 about the ,greek3 prton e7_/n--prton o7_/n4 ,these were ,greek3 ta pollachs lego_/mena--ta pleonachs lego_/mena--which were something less than ,greek3 sun_/numa and more than ,greek3 o7m_/numa2 intermediate between the two1 having no common ,greek3 lo_/gos or generical unity1 and yet not entirely equivocal1 but designating a ,greek3 koinon kat' a7nalogi_/an3 not ,greek3 kata mi_/an i7de_/an lego_/mena1 but ,greek3 pros e7n or ,greek3 pros mi_/an phu_/sin2 having a certain relation to one common ,greek3 phu_/sis called ,greek3 to prton4 ,see the ,metaphys4 ,greek3 ,g4 #ajjc1 a4 #cc--;,greek3 to_/ de o7_/n le_/getai men pollachs1 a7lla pros e7_/n kai mi_/an tina phu_/sin1 kai ou7ch o7mnu_/ms1 a7ll' 7_/sper to u7gieinon a7_/pan pros u7giei_/an1 to men t phula_/ttein1 to de t poiein1 to de t smeion ei7nai ts u7giei_/as1 to d' o7_/ti dektikon au7ts--kai to i7atrikon pros i7atrik_/n1 c4 ,the ,scholion of ,alexander upon this passage is instructive 7p4 #fch1 a4 ,brandis72 and a very copious explanation of the whole doctrine is given by ,m4 ,brentano1 in his valuable treatise1 ',von der mannigfachen ,bedeutung des ,seienden nach ,aristoteles1' ,freiburg1 #ahfb1 pp4 #he-ajh-adg4 ,compare ,aristotel4 ,politic4 ,,iii4 i4 #i1 p4 #abge1 a4 #ce4 ,the distinction drawn by ,aristotle between ,greek3 to koinon kat' i7de_/an and ,greek3 to koinon kat' a7nalogi_/an--between ,greek3 ta kata mi_/an i7de_/an lego_/mena1 and ,greek3 ta pros e7n or ,greek3 pros mi_/an phu_/sin lego_/mena--this distinction corresponds in part to that which is drawn by ,dr4 ,whewell between classes which are given by ,definition1 and natural groups which are given by ,type4 ,such a natural group 7says ,dr4 ,whewell7 is steadily fixed1 though not precisely limited2 it is given1 though not circumscribed2 it is determined1 not by a boundary but by a central point within1 c4 ,the coincidence between this doctrine and the ,aristotelian is real1 though only partial3 ,greek3 to prton phi_/lon1 to prton o7rekto_/n1 may be considered as types of objects loveable1 objects desirable1 c41 but ,greek3 7 u7giei_/a cannot be considered as a type of ,greek3 ta u7gieina nor ,greek3 7 i7atrik as a type of ,greek3 ta i7atrika_/1 though it is the central point to which all things so called are referred4 ,see ,dr4 ,whewell's doctrine stated in the ,philosophy of the ,inductive ,sciences1 i4 #dgf-dgg2 and the comments of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill on the doctrine--',system of ,logic1' ,book iv4 ch4 #g4 ,i have adverted to this same doctrine in remarking on the ,hippias ,major1 supra1 p4 #dg2 also on the ,philbus1 infra1 chap4 #cb1 vol4 ,,iii4 ,footnote #df3 ,this is attested by ,aristotle1 ,eth4 ,nik4 i4 #fd1 p4 #ajif1 a4 #af4 ,greek3 ,oi7 de komi_/santes tn do_/xan tau_/tn1 ou7k e7poi_/oun i7de_/as e7n oi7s to pro_/teron kai to u7_/steron e7_/legon2 dio_/per ou7de tn a7rithmn i7de_/an kateskeu_/azon3 compare ,ethic4 ,eudem4 i4 #h1 #abah1 a4 #b4 ,he goes on to object that ,plato1 having laid this down as a general principle1 departed from it in recognizing an ,greek3 i7de_/an a7gathou1 because ,greek3 ta7gathon was predicated in all the categories1 in that of ,greek3 ou7si_/a as well as in that of ,greek3 pro_/s ti--to de kath' au7to kai 7 ou7si_/a pro_/teron t phu_/sei tou pro_/s ti--7_/ste ou7k a7n ei7_/ koin_/ tis e7pi tou_/tn i7de_/a4 ,side-note3 ,primum ,amabile of ,plato1 compared with the ,prima ,amicitia of ,aristotle4 ,each of them is head of an analogical aggregate1 not member of a generic family4 ,now the ,greek3 ,prton phi_/lon or ,primum ,amabile which we find in the ,lysis1 is described as the principium or initial root of one of these imperfectly united aggregates2 ramifying into many branches more or less distant1 in obedience to one or other of the different laws of association4 ,aristotle expresses the same idea in another form of words3 instead of a ,primum ,amabile1 he gives us a ,prima ,amicitia--affirming that the diversities of friendship are not species comprehended under the same genus1 but gradations or degeneracies departing in one direction or other from the ,first or pure ,friendship4 ,the ,primum ,amabile1 in ,plato's view1 appears to be the ,good1 though he does not explicitly declare it3 the ,prima ,amicitia1 with ,aristotle1 is friendship subsisting between two good persons1 who have had sufficient experience to know1 esteem1 and trust1 each other4#dg ,footnote #dg3 ,aristotel4 ,eth4 ,nikom4 viii4 #b1 #aaee1 b4 #ab1 viii4 #e1 #aaeg1 a4 #cj1 viii4 #d2 ,eth4 ,eudem4 vii4 #b1 #abcf1 a4 #ae4 ,the statement is more full in the ,eudemian ,ethics than in the ,nikomachean2 he begins the seventh book by saying that ,greek3 phili_/a is not said ,greek3 monachs but ,greek3 pleonachs2 and in p4 #abcf he says ,greek3 ,a7na_/gk a7_/ra tri_/a phili_/as ei7_/d ei7nai1 kai mte kath' e7n a7pa_/sas mth' 7s ei7_/d e7nos ge_/nous1 m_/te pa_/mpan le_/gesthai o7mnu_/ms2 pros mi_/an ga_/r tina le_/gontai kai pr_/tn1 7_/sper to i7atriko_/n1 c4 ,the whole passage is instructive1 but is too long to cite4 ,bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages4 ,observationes ,critic in ,aristotelis qu feruntur ,magna ,moralia et ,eudemia1 pp4 #ee-eg4 ,side-note3 ,the ,good and ,beautiful1 considered as objects of attachment4 ,in regard to the ,platonic ,lysis1 ,i have already observed that no positive result can be found in it1 and that all the hypotheses broached are successively negatived4 ,what is kept before the reader's mind1 however1 more than anything else1 though not embodied in any distinct formula1 is--,the ,good and the ,beautiful considered as objects of love or attachment4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,euthydemus4 ,side-note3 ,dramatic and comic exuberance of the ,euthydmus4 ,judgments of various critics4 ,dramatic vivacity1 and comic force1 holding up various persons to ridicule or contempt1 are attributes which ,plato manifests often and abundantly4 ,but the dialogue in which these qualities reach their maximum1 is1 the ,euthydmus4 ,some portions of it approach to the ,nubes of ,aristophanes3 so that ,schleiermacher1 ,stallbaum1 and other admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining1 to their own satisfaction1#a how ,plato1 the sublime moralist and lawgiver1 can here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery4 ,ast even rejects the dialogue as spurious2 declaring it to be unworthy of ,plato and insisting on various peculiarities1 defects1 and even absurdities1 which offend his critical taste4 ,his conclusion in this case has found no favour3 yet ,i think it is based on reasons quite as forcible as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned3#b upon reasons1 which1 even if admitted1 might prove that the dialogue was an inferior performance1 but would not prove that ,plato was not the author4 ,footnote #a3 ,schleiermacher1 ,einleitung zum ,euthydemos1 vol4 iii4 pp4 #djj-djc-djg2 ,stallbaum4 ,proleg4 in ,euthydem4 p4 #ad4 ,footnote #b3 ,ast1 ,platon's ,leben und ,schriften1 pp4 #djh-dah4 ,side-note3 ,scenery and personages4 ,sokrates recounts 7to ,kriton7 a conversation in which he has just been engaged with two ,sophists1 ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus1 in the undressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the ,lykeium4 ,there were present1 besides1 ,kleinias1 a youth of remarkable beauty and intelligence1 cousin of the great ,alkibiades--,ktesippus1 an adult man1 yet still young1 friend of ,sokrates and devotedly attached to ,kleinias--and a crowd of unnamed persons1 partly friends of ,kleinias1 partly admirers and supporters of the two ,sophists4 ,side-note3 ,the two ,sophists1 ,euthydemus and ,dionysodorus3 manner in which they are here presented4 ,this couple are described and treated throughout by ,sokrates1 with the utmost admiration and respect3 that is1 in terms designating such feelings1 but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature4 ,they are masters of the art of ,contention1 in its three varieties#c--a4 ,arms1 and the command of soldiers4 #b4 ,judicial and political rhetoric1 fighting an opponent before the assembled ,dikasts or people4 #c4 ,contentious ,dialectic--they can reduce every respondent to a contradiction1 if he will only continue to answer their questions--whether what he says be true or false4#d ,all or each of these accomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay the required fee3 the standing sarcasm of ,plato against the paid teacher1 occurring here as in so many other places4 ,lastly1 they are brothers1 old and almost toothless--natives of ,chios1 colonists from thence to ,thurii1 and exiles from ,thurii and resident at ,athens1 yet visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons4#e ,their dialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition1--made during their old age1 only in the preceding year1--and completing their excellence as professors of the tripartite ,eristic4 ,but they now devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts4 ,moreover they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 pp4 #bga-bgb4 ,footnote #d3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #bgb ,b4 ,greek3 e7xele_/gchein to a7ei lego_/menon1 o7moi_/s e7a_/n te pseudos e7a_/n t' a7lthes 73 p4 #bge ,c4 ,greek3 ou7den diaphe_/rei1 e7an mo_/non e7the_/l a7pokri_/nesthai o7 neani_/skos4 ,footnote #e3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #bgc ,b-,c4 quamvis essent tate grandiores et edentuli says ,stallbaum in his ,proleg4 p4 #aj4 ,he seems to infer this from page #bid ,c2 the inference1 though not very certain1 is plausible4 ,steinhart1 in his ,einleitung zum ,euthydemos 7vol4 ii4 p4 #b of ,hieronym4 ,mller's translation of ,plato7 repeats these antecedents of ,euthydemus and ,dionysodorus1 as recited in the dialogue before us1 as if they were matter of real history1 exemplifications of the character of the class called ,sophists4 ,he might just as well produce what is said by the comic poets ,eupolis and ,aristophanes--the proceedings as recounted by the ,sokratic disciple in the ,greek3 phrontist_/rion 7,nubes7--as evidence about the character of ,sokrates4 ,side-note3 ,conversation carried on with ,kleinias1 first by ,sokrates1 next by the two ,sophists4 ,the two ,sophists1 having announced themselves as competent to teach virtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life1 are entreated by ,sokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth ,kleinias1 in whose improvement he as well as ,ktesippus feels the warmest interest4 ,sokrates gives a specimen of what he wishes by putting a series of questions himself4 ,euthydmus follows1 and begins questioning ,kleinias2 who1 after answering three or four successive questions1 is forced to contradict himself4 ,dionysodorus then takes up the last answer of ,kleinias1 puts him through another series of interrogations1 and makes him contradict himself again4 ,in this manner the two ,sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards and forwards to each other1 each contriving to entangle him in some puzzle and contradiction4 ,they even apply the same process to ,sokrates1 who cannot avoid being entangled in the net2 and to ,ktesippus1 who becomes exasperated1 and retorts upon them with contemptuous asperity4 ,the alternate interference of the two ,sophists is described with great smartness and animation2 which is promoted by the use of the dual number1 peculiar to the ,greek language1 employed by ,plato in speaking of them4 ,side-note3 ,contrast between the two different modes of interrogation4 ,this mode of dialectic1 conducted by the two ,sophists1 is interrupted on two several occasions by a counter-exhibition of dialectic on the part of ,sokrates3 who1 under colour of again showing to the couple a specimen of that which he wishes them to do1 puts two successive batches of questions to ,kleinias in his own manner4#f ,the contrast between ,sokrates and the two ,sophists1 in the same work1 carried on respectively by him and by them1 of interrogating ,kleinias1 is evidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in the dialogue4 ,the questions put by the couple are made to turn chiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities3 they are purposely designed to make the respondent contradict himself1 and are proclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result1 provided the respondent will conform to the laws of dialectic--by confining his answer to the special point of the question1 without adding any qualification of his own1 or asking for farther explanation from the questioner1 or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from the actual question of the moment4#g ,sokrates1 on the contrary1 addresses interrogations1 each of which has a clear and substantive meaning1 and most of which ,kleinias is able to answer without embarrassment3 he professes no other design except that of encouraging ,kleinias to virtue1 and assisting him to determine in what virtue consists3 he resorts to no known quibbles or words of equivocal import4 ,the effect of the interrogations is represented as being1 not to confound and silence the youth1 but to quicken and stimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent knowledge3 insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond his years1 exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration1 in ,sokrates as well as in ,kriton4#h ,in this respect1 the youth ,kleinias serves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the ,menon3#i each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of ,sokrates1 into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected1 nor traceable to any teaching4 ,but in the ,menon1 this magical evocation of knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of reminiscence1 pre-existence1 and omniscience1 of the soul3 while in the ,euthydmus1 no allusion is made to any such theory1 nor to any other cause except the stimulus of the ,sokratic cross-questioning4 ,footnote #f3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bgi-bhh4 ,footnote #g3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 pp4 #bge ,e--#bgf ,e4 ,greek3 ,pa_/nta toiauta 7meis e7rtmen a7_/phukta1 pp4 #bhg ,b--#bie ,b--#bif ,a1 c4 ,footnote #h3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bij-bia4 ,the unexpected wisdom1 exhibited by the youth ,kleinias in his concluding answer1 can be understood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of ,sokratic interrogations4 ,see ,winckelmann1 ,proleg4 ad ,euthyd4 pp4 xxxiii4 xxxiv4 ,the words ,greek3 tn kreitto_/nn must have the usual signification1 as recognised by ,routh and ,heindorf1 though ,schleiermacher treats it as absurd1 p4 #eeb1 notes4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #hb-he4 ,side-note3 ,wherein this contrast does not consist4 ,in the dialogue ,euthydmus1 then1 one main purpose of ,plato is to exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning3 one practised by ,euthydemus and ,dionysodorus2 the other1 by ,sokrates4 ,of these two1 it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and elaborate manner3 the second is made subordinate1 serving mainly as a standard of comparison with the first4 ,we must take care however to understand in what the contrast between the two consists1 and in what it does not consist4 ,the contrast does not consist in this--that ,sokrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion1 while ,euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity4 ,such is not the fact4 ,sokrates ends without any result1 and with a confession of his inability to find any4 ,professing earnest anxiety to stimulate ,kleinias in the path of virtue1 he is at the same time unable to define what the capital condition of virtue is4#aj ,on this point1 then1 there is no contrast between ,sokrates and his competitors3 if they land their pupil in embarrassment1 so does he4 ,nor1 again1 does ,sokrates stand distinguished from them by affirming 7or rather implying in his questions7 nothing but what is true and indisputable4#aa ,footnote #aj3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bia ,a--#bic ,a2 ,plat4 ,kleitophon1 pp4 #dji-daj4 ,footnote #aa3 ,see ,plat4 ,euthydm4 p4 #bha ,c-,d1 where undoubtedly the positions laid down by ,sokrates would not have passed without contradiction by an opponent4 ,side-note3 ,wherein it does consist4 ,the real contrast between the competitors1 consists1 first in the pretensions--next in the method4 ,the two ,sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance1 professing to teach virtue1#ab and claiming a fee as if they did teach it3 ,sokrates disdains the fee1 doubts whether such teaching is possible1 and professes only to encourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil4 ,the pupil in this case is a given subject1 ,kleinias1 a modest and intelligent youth3 and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate audience4 ,to such a pupil1 what is needed is1 encouragement and guidance4 ,both of these are really administered by the questions of ,sokrates1 which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in hand1 though failing to reach a satisfactory result3 moreover1 ,sokrates attends only to ,kleinias1 and is indifferent to the effect on the audience around4 ,the two ,sophists1 on the contrary1 do not say a word pertinent to the object desired4 ,far from seeking 7as they promised7 to encourage ,kleinias1#ac they confuse and humiliate him from the beginning3 all their implements for teaching consist only of logical puzzles2 lastly1 their main purpose is to elicit applause from the by-standers1 by reducing both the modest ,kleinias and every other respondent to contradiction and stand-still4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bgc ,d1 #bge ,a1 #cjd ,b4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #bgh ,c4 ,greek3 e7pha_/tn gar e7pidei_/xasthai tn protreptikn sophi_/an4 ,side-note3 ,abuse of fallacies by the ,sophists--their bidding for the applause of the by-standers4 ,such is the real contrast between ,sokrates and the two ,sophists1 and such is the real scene which we read in the dialogue4 ,the presence1 as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the ,lykeium1 are essential features of the drama4#ad ,the point of view which ,plato is working out1 is1 the abusive employment1 the excess1 and the misplacement1 of logical puzzles3 which he brings before us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires opposite treatment1 in the prosecution of an object which they do not really promote and before undiscerning auditors1 for whose applause the two ,sophists are bidding4#ae ,the whole debate upon these fallacies is rendered ridiculous2 and when conducted with ,ktesippus1 degenerates into wrangling and ribaldry4 ,footnote #ad3 ,the ,greek3 o7_/chlos 7surrounding multitude7 is especially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue1 and is perpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of ,sokrates to ,kriton1 pp4 #bgf ,b-,d1 #cjc ,b4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 p4 #cjc ,b4 ,side-note3 ,comparison of the ,euthydmus with the ,parmenids4 ,the bearing of the ,euthydmus1 as ,i here state it1 will be better understood if we contrast it with the ,parmenids4 ,in this last-mentioned dialogue1 the amount of negative dialectic and contradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in the ,euthydmus4 ,one single case of it is elaborately built up in the long ,antinomies at the close of the ,parmenids 7which occupy as much space1 and contain nearly as much sophistry1 as the speeches assigned to the two ,sophists in ,euthydmus71 while we are given to understand that many more remain behind4#af ,these perplexing ,antinomies 7addressed by the veteran ,parmenides to ,sokrates as his junior71 after a variety of other objections against the ,platonic theory of ,ideas1 which theory ,sokrates has been introduced as affirming1--are drawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation1 and of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must be solved1 before affirmation can become justifiable4 ,this task1 though long and laborious1 cannot be evaded 7we are here told7 by aspirants in philosophy4 ,but it is a task which ought only to be undertaken in conjunction with a few select companions4 ,before any large audience1 it would be unseemly and inadmissible3 for the public are not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all directions1 no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence4#ag ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,parmenid4 p4 #acf ,b4 ,i shall revert to this point when ,i notice the ,parmenids4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plat4 ,parmen4 pp4 #ace-acf4 ,greek3 e7_/lkuson de sauton kai gu_/mnasai mallon dia ts dokou_/ss a7chr_/stou ei7nai kai kaloume_/ns u7po tn polln a7doleschi_/as1 e7_/s e7_/ti ne_/os ei7--ei7 men ou7n plei_/ous 7men1 ou7k a7n a7_/xion 7n deisthai1 7to request ,parmenides to give a specimen of dialectic7 ,greek3 a7prep gar ta toiauta polln e7nanti_/on le_/gein1 a7_/lls te kai tlikou_/t2 a7gnoousi gar oi7 polloi o7_/ti a7_/neu tau_/ts ts dia pa_/ntn diexo_/dou te kai pla_/ns1 a7du_/naton e7ntucho_/nta t a7lthei noun schein4 ,side-note3 ,necessity of settling accounts with the negative1 before we venture upon the affirmative1 is common to both3 in the one the process is solitary and serious2 in the other1 it is vulgarised and ludicrous4 ,this important proposition--,that before a man can be entitled to lay down with confidence any affirmative theory1 in the domain of philosophy or reasoned truth1 he must have had before him the various knots tied by negative dialectic1 and must find out the way of untying them--is a postulate which lies at the bottom of ,plato's ,dialogues of ,search1 as ,i have remarked in the eighth chapter of this work4 ,but there is much difference in the time1 manner1 and circumstances1 under which such knots are brought before the student for solution4 ,in the ,parmenids the process is presented as one both serious and indispensable1 yet requiring some precautions3 the public must be excluded1 for they do not understand the purpose3 and the student under examination must be one who is competent or more than competent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him1 as ,sokrates is represented to be in the ,parmenids4#ah ,in the ,euthydmus1 on the contrary1 the process is intended to be made ridiculous2 accordingly these precautions are disregarded4 ,the crowd of indiscriminate auditors are not only present1 but are the persons whose feelings the two ,sophists address--and who either admire what is said as dexterous legerdemain1 or laugh at the interchange of thrusts1 as the duel becomes warmer3 in fact1 the debate ends with general mirth1 in which the couple themselves are among the loudest4#ai ,lastly1 ,kleinias1 the youth under interrogation1 is a modest novice2 not represented1 like ,lysis in the dialogue just reviewed1 as in danger of corruption from the exorbitant flatteries of an ,erastes1 nor as requiring a lowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend4 ,when the ,xenophontic 7historical7 ,sokrates cross-examines and humiliates ,euthydmus 7a youth1 but nevertheless more advanced than ,kleinias in the ,platonic ,euthydmus is represented to be71 we shall see that he not only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions1 but takes especial care to attack ,euthydmus when alone4#bj ,the cross-examination pursued by ,sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished young man the severest distress and humiliation1 and would have been utterly intolerable1 if there had been by-standers clapping their hands 7as we read in the ,platonic ,euthydmus7 whenever the respondent was driven into a corner4 ,we see that it was hardly tolerable even when the respondent was alone with ,sokrates2 for though ,euthydmus bore up against the temporary suffering1 cultivated the society of ,sokrates1 and was handled by him more gently afterwards2 yet there were many other youths whom ,sokrates cross-examined in the same way1 and who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary colloquy1 that they never again came near him 7so ,xenophon expressly tells us7#ba for a second4 ,this is quite enough to show us how important is the injunction delivered in the ,platonic ,parmenids--to carry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors1 in the presence1 at most1 of a few select companions4 ,footnote #ah3 ,see the compliments to ,sokrates1 on his strenuous ardour and vocation for philosophy1 addressed by ,parmenides1 p4 #ace ,d4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #cjc ,b4 ,greek3 ,e7ntautha me_/ntoi1 7 phi_/le ,kri_/tn1 ou7deis o7_/stis ou7 tn paro_/ntn u7perep_/nese ton lo_/gon1 kai t a7_/ndre 7,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus7 ,greek3 gelnte kai krotounte kai chai_/ronte o7li_/gou pareta_/thsan4 ,footnote #bj3 ,xenophon4 ,memor4 iv4 #b1 #e-h4 ,greek3 7s d' 7_/stheto 7,sokrates7 ,greek3 au7ton e7toimo_/teron u7pome_/nonta1 o7_/te diale_/goito1 kai prothumo_/teron a7kou_/onta1 mo_/nos 7lthen ei7s to 7niopoieion2 parakathezome_/non d' au7t tou ,eu7thud_/mou1 ,ei7pe_/ moi1 e7_/ph1 c4 ,footnote #ba3 ,xen4 ,mem4 iv4 #b1 #ci-dj4 ,compare the remarks of ,sokrates in ,plato1 ,thettus1 p4 #aea ,c4 ,side-note3 ,opinion of ,stallbaum and other critics about the ,euthydmus1 that ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus represent the way in which ,protagoras and ,gorgias talked to their auditors4 ,stallbaum1 ,steinhart1 and other commentators denounce in severe terms the ,eristics or controversial ,sophists of ,athens1 as disciples of ,protagoras and ,gorgias1 infected with the mania of questioning and disputing every thing1 and thereby corrupting the minds of youth4 ,they tell us that ,sokrates was the constant enemy of this school1 but that nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic poets1 and others2 from which confusion alone his unpopularity with the ,athenian people arose4#bb ,in the ,platonic dialogue of ,euthydmus the two ,sophists 7according to these commentators7 represent the way in which ,protagoras and ,gorgias with their disciples reasoned3 and the purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which ,sokrates reasoned4 ,footnote #bb3 ,stallbaum1 ,prolegg4 ad ,plat4 ,euthydm4 pp4 #i-aa-ac2 ,winckelmann1 ,proleg4 ad eundem1 pp4 xxxiii4-xxxiv4 ,side-note3 ,that opinion is unfounded4 ,sokrates was much more ,eristic than ,protagoras1 who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture4 ,now1 in this opinion1 ,i think that there is much of unfounded assumption1 as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended in the ,platonic ,euthydmus4 ,comparing ,protagoras with ,sokrates1 ,i maintain that ,sokrates was decidedly the more ,eristic of the two1 and left behind him a greater number of active disciples4 ,in so far as we can trust the picture given by ,plato in the dialogue called ,protagoras1 we learn that the ,sophist of that name chiefly manifested himself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric2 and though he also professed1 if required1 to enter into dialectic colloquy1 in this art he was no match for ,sokrates4#bc ,moreover1 we know by the evidence of ,sokrates himself1 that he was an ,eristic not only by taste1 but on principle1 and by a sense of duty4 ,he tells us1 in the ,platonic ,apology1 that he felt himself under a divine mission to go about convicting men of ignorance1 and that he had prosecuted this vocation throughout many years of a long life4 ,every one of these convictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of his own seeking3 every such dispute1 with occasional exceptions1 made him unpopular1 in the outset at least1 with the person convicted3 the rather1 as his ability in the process is known1 upon the testimony of ,xenophon#bd as well as of ,plato1 to have been consummate4 ,it is therefore a mistake to decry ,protagoras and the ,protagoreans 7if there were any7 as the special ,eristics1 and to represent ,sokrates as a tutelary genius1 the opponent of such habits4 ,if the commentators are right 7which ,i do not think they are7 in declaring the ,athenian mind to have been perverted by ,eristic1 ,sokrates is much more chargeable with the mischief than ,protagoras4 ,and the comic poets1 when they treated ,sokrates as a specimen and teacher of ,eristic1 proceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of him4#be ,footnote #bc3 ,see ,plat4 ,protag41 especially pp4 #cbi and #ccf4 ,about the eristic disposition of ,sokrates1 see the striking passage in ,plato1 ,thett4 #afi ,b-,c2 also ,lachs1 #ahg1 #ahh4 ,footnote #bd3 ,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #b4 ,footnote #be3 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 in ,platon4 ,euthydm4 pp4 #ej-ea4 ,sed hoc utcunque se habet1 illud quidem ex ,aristophane pariter atque ex ipso ,platone evidenter apparet1 ,socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus1 sed etiam ab aliis1 in vanissimorum sophistaram loco habitum fuisse4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates in the ,euthydmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that dialogue4 ,the fact is1 that the ,platonic ,sokrates when he talks with the two ,sophists in the dialogue ,euthydmus1 is a character drawn by ,plato for the purpose of that dialogue1 and is very different from the real historical ,sokrates1 whom the public of ,athens saw and heard in the market-place or gymnasia4 ,he is depicted as a gentle1 soothing1 encouraging talker1 with his claws drawn in1 and affecting inability even to hold his own against the two ,sophists3 such indeed as he sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons 7so ,xenophon#bf takes pains to remind his readers in the ,memorabilia71 but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive ,elenchus for which he himself 7in the ,platonic ,apology7 takes credit1 and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit4 ,footnote #bf3 ,xen4 ,mem4 i4 #d1 #a2 iv4 #b1 #dj4 ,side-note3 ,the two ,sophists in the ,euthydmus are not to be taken as real persons1 or representatives of real persons4 ,this picture1 accurate or not1 suited the dramatic scheme of the ,euthydmus4 ,such1 in my judgment1 is the value and meaning of the ,euthydmus1 as far as regards personal contrasts4 ,one style of reasoning is represented by ,sokrates1 the other by the two ,sophists3 both are the creatures of ,plato1 having the same dramatic reality as ,sokrates and ,strepsiades1 or the ,greek3 ,di_/kaios ,lo_/gos and ,greek3 ,a7_/dikos ,lo_/gos1 of ,aristophanes1 but no more4 ,that they correspond to any actual persons at ,athens1 is neither proved nor probable4 ,the comic poets introduce ,sokrates as talking what was either nonsensical1 or offensive to the feelings of the ,athenians3 and ,sokrates 7in the ,platonic ,apology7 complains that the ,dikasts judged him1 not according to what he had really said or done1 but according to the impression made on them by this dramatic picture4 ,the ,athenian ,sophists would have equal right to complain of those critics1 who not only speak of ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony applicable only to historical persons1 but also describe them as representative types of ,protagoras1 ,gorgias1 and their disciples4#bg ,footnote #bg3 ,the language of ,schleiermacher is more moderate than that of ,stallbaum1 ,steinhart1 and others4 ,he thinks moreover1 that the polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against ,protagoras or ,gorgias1 but against the ,megarics and against ,antisthenes1 who 7so ,schleiermacher supposes7 had brought the attack upon themselves by attacking ,plato first 7,einleitung zum ,euthyd4 p4 #djd seq474 ,schleiermacher cannot make out who the two ,sophists were personally1 but he conceives them as obscure persons1 deserving no notice4 ,this is a conjecture which admits of no proof2 but if any real victim is here intended by ,plato1 we may just as reasonably suppose ,antisthenes as ,protagoras4 ,side-note3 ,colloquy of ,sokrates with ,kleinias--possession of good things is useless1 unless we also have intelligence how to use them4 ,the conversation of ,sokrates with the youth ,kleinias is remarkable for its plainness and simplicity4 ,his purpose is to implant or inflame in the youth the aspiration and effort towards wisdom or knowledge 7,greek3 philosophi_/a1 in its etymological sense74 ,you1 like every one else1 wish to do well or to be happy4 ,the way to be happy is1 to have many good things4 ,every one knows this3 every one knows too1 that among these good things1 wealth is an indisputable item3#bh likewise health1 beauty1 bodily activity1 good birth1 power over others1 honour in our city1 temperance1 justice1 courage1 wisdom1 c4 ,good fortune does not count as a distinct item1 because it resolves itself into wisdom4#bi--;,but it is not enough to have all these good things3 we must not only have them but use them3 moreover1 we must use them not wrongly1 but rightly4 ,if we use them wrongly1 they will not produce their appropriate consequences4 ,they will even make us more miserable than if we had them not1 because the possession of them will prompt us to be active and meddlesome3 whereas1 if we have them not1 we shall keep in the back-ground and do little4#cj ,but to use these good things rightly1 depends upon wisdom1 knowledge1 intelligence4 ,it thus appears that the enumerated items are not really good1 except on the assumption that they are under the guidance of intelligence3 if they are under the guidance of ignorance1 they are not good2 nay1 they even produce more harm than good1 since they are active instruments in the service of a foolish master4#ca ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bgi ,a4 ,greek3 a7gatha de poia a7_/ra tn o7_/ntn tugcha_/nei 7min o7_/nta8 7 ou7 chalepon ou7de semnou a7ndros pa_/nu ti ou7de touto e7_/oiken ei7nai eu7rein8 pas gar a7n 7min ei7_/poi o7_/ti to ploutein a7gatho_/n8 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bgi-bhj4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bha ,c4 ,greek3 7tton de kaks pra_/ttn1 a7_/thlios 7tton a7n ei7_/4 ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4 #bhb ,e4 ,if we compare this with p4 #bgi ,c-,d we shall see that the argument of ,sokrates is open to the exception which he himself takes in the case of ,greek3 eu7tuchi_/a--dis tau7ta le_/gein4 ,wisdom is counted twice over4 ,side-note3 ,but intelligence--of what8 ,it must be such intelligence1 or such an art1 as will include both the making of what we want1 and the right use of it when made4 ,but what intelligence do we want for the purpose8 ,is it all intelligence8 ,or is there any one single variety of intelligence1 by the possession of which we shall become good and happy8#cb ,obviously1 it must be must be such as will be profitable to us4#cc ,we have seen that there is no good in possessing wealth--that we should gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn stones into gold1 unless we at the same time knew how to use it rightly4 ,nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make ourselves healthy1 or even immortal1 unless we knew how to employ rightly our health or immortality4 ,we want knowledge or intelligence1 of such a nature1 as to include both acting1 making1 or construction and rightly using what we have done1 made1 or constructed4#cd ,the makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill1 but they cannot play upon the instruments which they have made3 the logographers compose fine discourses1 but hand them over for others to deliver4 ,even masters in the most distinguished arts--such as military commanders1 geometers1 arithmeticians1 astronomers1 c41 do not come up to our requirement4 ,they are all of them varieties under the general class hunters3 they find and seize1 but hand over what they have seized for others to use4 ,the hunter1 when he has caught or killed game1 hands it over to the cook2 the general1 when he has taken a town1 delivers it to the political leader or minister3 the geometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician or comprehensive philosopher4#ce ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bhb ,e4 ,sokrates here breaks off the string of questions to ,kleinias1 but resumes them1 p4 #bhh ,d4 ,footnote #cc3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bhh ,d4 ,greek3 ti_/na pot' ou7n a7n ktsa_/menoi e7pist_/mn o7rths ktsai_/metha8 a7r' ou7 touto men a7ploun1 o7_/ti tau_/tn 7_/tis 7mas o7n_/sei8 ,footnote #cd3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4 #bhi ,b4 ,greek3 toiau_/ts tinos a7_/r' 7min e7pist_/ms dei1 e7n 7 sumpe_/ptken a7_/ma to_/ te poiein kai to e7pi_/stasthai chrsthai 7 a7n poi4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4#bij ,c-,d4 ,side-note3 ,where is such an art to be found8 ,the regal or political art looks like it2 but what does this art do for us8 ,no answer can be found4 ,ends in puzzle4 ,where then can we find such an art--such a variety of knowledge or intelligence--as we are seeking8 ,the regal or political art looks like it3 that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements of the city4 ,but what is the work which this art performs8 ,what product does it yield1 as the medical art supplies good health1 and the farmer's art1 provision8 ,what good does it effect8 ,you may say that it makes the citizens wealthy1 free1 harmonious in their intercourse4 ,but we have already seen that these acquisitions are not good1 unless they be under the guidance of intelligence3 that nothing is really good1 except some variety of intelligence4#cf ,does the regal art then confer knowledge8 ,if so1 does it confer every variety of knowledge--that of the carpenter1 currier1 c41 as well as others8 ,not certainly any of these1 for we have already settled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad4 ,the regal art can thus impart no knowledge except itself2 and what is itself8 how are we to use it8 ,if we say1 that we shall render other men good--the question again recurs1 ,good--in what respect8 useful--for what purpose8#cg ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4 #bib ,b4 ,greek3 ,a7gathon de_/ ge_/ pou 7molog_/samen a7ll_/lois--ou7den ei7nai a7_/llo 7 e7pist_/mn tina_/4 ,footnote #cg3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 p4 #bib ,d4 ,greek3 ,a7lla ti_/na d e7pist_/mn8 7 ti_/ chrso_/metha8 tn men gar e7_/rgn ou7denos dei au7tn dmiourgon ei7nai tn m_/te kakn m_/te a7gathn1 e7pist_/mn de paradido_/nai mdemi_/an a7_/lln 7 au7tn e7aut_/n2 le_/gmen d ou7n1 ti_/s pote e7_/stin au7t 7 ti_/ chrso_/metha8 ,here then 7concludes ,sokrates71 we come to a dead lock3 we can find no issue4#ch ,we cannot discover what the regal art does for us or gives us3 yet this is the art which is to make us happy4 ,in this difficulty1 ,sokrates turns to the two ,sophists1 and implores their help4 ,the contrast between him and them is thus brought out4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #bib ,e4 ,side-note3 ,review of the cross-examination just pursued by ,sokrates4 ,it is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for4 ,the argument of ,sokrates1 which ,i have thus abridged from the ,euthydmus1 arrives at no solution3 but it is nevertheless eminently suggestive1 and puts the question in a way to receive solution4 ,what is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others8 ,a man has many different impulses1 dispositions1 qualities1 aptitudes1 advantages1 possessions1 c41 which we describe by saying that he is an artist1 a general1 a tradesman1 clever1 just1 temperate1 brave1 strong1 rich1 powerful1 c4 ,but in the course of life1 each particular situation has its different exigencies1 while the prospective future has its exigencies also4 ,the whole man is one1 with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes3 in following one impulse1 he must resist others--in turning his aptitudes to one object1 he must turn them away from others--he must1 as ,plato says1 distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong1 by virtue of knowledge1 intelligence1 reason4 ,such discriminating intelligence1 which in this dialogue is called the ,regal or political art1--what is the object of it8 ,it is intelligence or knowledge1--,but of what8 ,not certainly of the way how each particular act is to be performed--how each particular end is to be attained4 ,each of these separately is the object of some special knowledge4 ,but the whole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts1 each of which is the object of some special knowledge3 what then remains as the object of ,regal or political intelligence1 upon which our happiness is said to depend8 ,or how can it have any object at all8 ,side-note3 ,comparison with other dialogues--,republic1 ,philbus1 ,protagoras4 ,the only distinct answer is found in the ,protagoras4 ,the question here raised is present to ,plato's mind in other dialogues1 and occurs under other words1 as for example1 ,what is good8 ,good is the object of the ,regal or political intelligence2 but what is ,good8 ,in the ,republic he raises this question1 but declines to answer it1 confessing that he could not make it intelligible to his hearers3#ci in the ,gorgias1 he takes pains to tell us what it is not3 in the ,philbus1 he does indeed tell us what it is1 but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which they are brought to explain4 ,there is only one dialogue in which the question is answered affirmatively1 in clear and unmistakable language1 and with considerable development--and that is1 the ,protagoras3 where ,sokrates asserts and proves at length1 that ,good is at the bottom identical with pleasure1 and ,evil with pain3 that the measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life1 upon which the attainment of ,good depends3 and that the object of that intelligence--the items which we are to measure1 calculate1 and compare--is pleasures and pains1 so as to secure to ourselves as much as possible of the former1 and escape as much as possible of the latter4 ,footnote #ci3 ,plato1 ,republic1 vi4 pp4 #eje-ejf4 ,in my remarks on the ,protagoras1 ,i shall state the view which ,i take of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by ,sokrates4 ,persons may think the answer insufficient3 most of the ,platonic critics declare it to be absolutely wrong4 ,but at any rate it is the only distinct answer which ,plato ever gives1 to the question raised by ,sokrates in the ,euthydmus and elsewhere4 ,side-note3 ,the talk of the two ,sophists1 though ironically admired while it is going on1 is shown at the end to produce no real admiration1 but the contrary4 ,from the abstract just given of the argument of ,sokrates in the ,euthydmus1 it will be seen to be serious and pertinent1 though ending with a confession of failure4 ,the observations placed in contrast with it and ascribed to the two ,sophists1 are distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent2 but parodies of debate for the most part1 put together for the express purpose of appearing obviously silly to the reader4 ,plato keeps up the dramatic or ironical appearance1 that they are admired and welcomed not only by the hearers1 but even by ,sokrates himself4 ,nevertheless1 it is made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony1 and that the talk which ,plato ascribes to ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus produced1 according to his own showing1 no sentiment of esteem for their abilities among the by-standers1 but quite the reverse4 ,whether there were individual ,sophists at ,athens who talked in that style1 we can neither affirm nor deny3 but that there were an established class of persons who did so1 and made both money and reputation by it1 we can securely deny4 ,it is the more surprising that the ,platonic commentators should desire us to regard ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus as representative samples of a special class named ,sophists1 since one of the most eminent of those commentators 7,stallbaum71#dj both admits that ,sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and called by the name and affirms also 7incorrectly1 in my opinion7 that the interrogations of ,sokrates1 which in this dialogue stand contrasted with those of the two ,sophists1 do not enunciate the opinions either of ,sokrates or of ,plato himself1 but the opinions of these very ,sophists1 which ,plato adopts and utters for the occasion4#da ,footnote #dj3 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 in ,platon4 ,euthydem4 p4 #ej4 ,illud quidem ex ,aristophane pariter atque ipso ,platone evidenter apparet1 ,socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus1 sed etiam ab aliis in vanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse4 ,ib4 p4 #di 7cited in a previous note74 ,videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio1 qu ,socratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant4 ,again p4 #dd1 where ,stallbaum tells us that ,sokrates was considered by many to belong misellorum ,sophistarum gregi4 ,footnote #da3 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 ad ,plat4 ,euthydem4 p4 #cj4 ,cavendum est magnopere1 ne qu hic ,socrate disputantur1 pro ipsius decretis habeamus3 sunt enim omnia ad mentem ,sophistarum disputata1 quos ille1 reprehensis eorum opinionibus1 sperat eo adductum iri1 ut gravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant4 ,compare p4 #ff4 ,stallbaum says that ,plato often reasons1 adopting for the occasion the doctrine of the ,sophists4 ,see his ,prolegg4 to the ,lachs and ,charmids1 and still more his ,proleg4 to the ,protagoras1 where he tells us that ,plato introduces his spokesman ,sokrates not only as arguing ex mente ,sophistarum1 but also as employing captious and delusive artifice1 such as in this dialogue is ascribed to ,euthydemus and ,dionysodorus4--pp4 #bc-bd4 ,itaque ,socrates1 miss hujus rei disputatione1 repent ad alia progreditur1 scilicet similibus loqueis hominem denuo irretiturus4 ,nemini facil obscurum erit1 hoc quoque loco ,protagoram argutis conclusiunculis deludi 7i4e4 by ,sokrates7 atque callid eo permoveri1 c4 ,quanquam nemo erit1 quin videat1 callid deludi ,protagoram1 ubi ex eo1 quod qui injust faciat1 is neutiquam agat ,greek3 sphro_/ns1 protinus colligitur justitiam et ,greek3 sphrosu_/n unum idemque esse4--p4 #be4 ,disputat enim ,socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius ,protagor4--p4 #cj4 ,platonem ipsum hc non probsse1 sed e vulgi opinione et mente explicasse1 vel illud non obscur significat1 c4--p4 #cc4 ,side-note3 ,mistaken representations about the ,sophists--,aristotle's definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the ,sophist and the ,dialectician4 ,the received supposition that there were at ,athens a class of men called ,sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies employed to bring about contradictions in dialogue--appears to me to pervert the representations given of ancient philosophy4 ,aristotle defines a ,sophist to be one who seeks to make money by apparent wisdom which is not real wisdom3--the ,sophist 7he says7 is an ,eristic who1 besides money-making1 seeks for nothing but victory in debate and humiliation of his opponent3--,distinguishing the ,dialectician from the ,sophist 7he says71 the ,dialectician impugns or defends1 by probable arguments1 probable tenets--that is1 tenets which are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent individuals3--while the ,sophist deals with tenets which are probable only in appearance and not in reality--that is to say1 tenets which almost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false4#db ,this definition is founded1 partly on the personal character and purpose ascribed to the ,sophist3 partly upon the distinction between apparent and real wisdom1 assumed to be known and permanent4 ,now such pseudo-wisdom was declared by ,sokrates to be the natural state of all mankind1 even the most eminent1 which it was his mission to expose3 moreover1 the determination1 what is to be comprised in this description1 must depend upon the judges to whom it is submitted1 since much of the works of ,aristotle and ,plato would come under the category1 in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and instructed4 ,but apart from this relative and variable character of the definition1 when applied to philosophy generally--we may confidently assert1 that there never was any real class of intellectual men1 in a given time or place1 to whom it could possibly apply4 ,of individuals1 the varieties are innumerable3 but no professional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by maintaining theses1 and employing arguments1 which every one could easily detect as false4 ,every man employs sophisms more or less2 every man does so inadvertently1 some do it by design also2 moreover1 almost every reasoner does it largely1 in the estimation of his opponents4 ,no distinct line can be drawn between the ,sophist and the ,dialectician3 the definition given by ,aristotle applies to an ideal in his own mind1 but to no reality without3 ,protagoras and ,prodikus no more correspond to it than ,sokrates and ,plato4 ,aristotle observes1 with great truth1 that all men are dialecticians and testers of reasoning1 up to a certain point3 he might have added that they are all ,sophists also1 up to a certain point4#dc ,moreover1 when he attempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual processes upon a difference in the purposes of different practitioners--whether they employ the same process for money or display1 or beneficence1 or mental satisfaction to themselves--this is altogether unphilosophical4 ,the medical art is the same1 whether employed to advise gratis1 or in exchange for a fee4#dd ,footnote #db3 ,aristotel4 ,topic1 i4 #a1 p4 #ajj1 b4 #ba4 ,greek3 e7_/ndoxa de ta dokounta pasin 7 tois plei_/stois 7 tois sophois1 kai tou_/tois 7 pasin 7 tois plei_/stois 7 tois ma_/lista gnri_/mois kai e7ndo_/xois4 ,e7ristikos de e7_/sti sullogismos o7 e7k phainome_/nn e7ndo_/xn1 m o7_/ntn de--kai o7 e7x e7ndo_/xn 7 phainome_/nn e7ndo_/xn phaino_/menos4 ,ou7then gar tn legome_/nn e7ndo_/xn e7pipolai_/on e7_/chei pantels tn phantasi_/an1 katha_/per peri tas tn e7ristikn lo_/gn a7rchas sumbe_/bken e7_/chein4 ,parachrma gar kai 7s e7pi to polu tois kai mikra sunoran duname_/nois1 kata_/dlos e7n au7tois 7 tou pseu_/dous e7_/sti phu_/sis4 ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis1 i4 p4 #afe1 a4 #ba4 ,greek3 e7_/sti gar 7 sophistik phainome_/n sophi_/a1 ou7sa d' ou7_/2 kai o7 sophists chrmatists a7po phainome_/ns sophi_/as1 a7ll' ou7k ou7_/ss1 p4 #afe1 b4 #aj1 p4 #aga1 b4 #h-bg4 ,greek3 ,oi7 phile_/rides1 e7ristikoi1 a7gnistikoi1 are persons who break the rules of dialectic 7,greek3 a7dikomachi_/a7 for the purpose of gaining victory2 ,greek3 oi7 sophistai are those who do the same thing for the purpose of getting money4 ,see also ,metaphys4 iii4 #ajjd1 b4 #ag4 ,footnote #dc3 ,aristot4 ,sophist4 ,elench4 p4 #agb1 a4 #cj4 ,footnote #dd3 ,aristot4 ,rhetor1 i4 #a1 #acee1 b4 #ah4 ,he here admits that the only difference between the ,dialectician and the ,sophist lies in their purposes--that the mental activity employed by both is the same4 ,greek3 o7 gar sophistikos ou7k e7n t duna_/mei a7ll' e7n t proaire_/sei2 pln e7ntautha men 7in ,rhetoric7 ,greek3 e7_/stai o7 men kata tn e7pist_/mn o7 de kata tn proai_/resin1 r7_/tr1 e7kei de 7in ,dialectic7 ,greek3 sophists men kata tn proai_/resin1 dialektikos de ou7 kata tn proai_/resin1 a7lla kata tn du_/namin4 ,side-note3 ,philosophical purpose of the ,euthydmus--exposure of fallacies1 in ,plato's dramatic manner1 by multiplication of particular examples4 ,though ,i maintain that no class of professional ,sophists 7in the meaning given to that term by the ,platonic critics after ,plato and ,aristotle7 ever existed--and though the distinction between the paid and the gratuitous discourser is altogether unworthy to enter into the history of philosophy--yet ,i am not the less persuaded that the ,platonic dialogue ,euthydmus1 and the treatise of ,aristotle ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis1 are very striking and useful compositions4 ,this last-mentioned treatise was composed by ,aristotle very much under the stimulus of the ,platonic dialogue ,euthydmus1 to which it refers several times--and for the purpose of distributing the variety of possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads1 each described by its appropriate characteristic1 and represented by its illustrative type4 ,such attempt at arrangement--one of the many valuable contributions of ,aristotle to the theory of reasoning--is expressly claimed by him as his own4 ,he takes a just pride in having been the first to introduce system where none had introduced it before4#de ,no such system was known to ,plato1 who 7in the ,euthydmus7 enumerates a string of fallacies one after another without any project of classifying them1 and who presents them as it were in concrete1 as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary dialogue4 ,the purpose is1 to make these fallacies appear conspicuously in their character of fallacies3 a purpose which is assisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and contemptible4 ,the lively fancy of ,plato attaches suitable accessories to ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus4 ,they are old men1 who have been all their lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics1 but have recently taken to dialectic1 and acquired perfect mastery thereof without any trouble--who make extravagant promises--and who as talkers play into each other's hands1 making a shuttlecock of the respondent1 a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment4 ,footnote #de3 ,see the last chapter of the treatise ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis4 ,side-note3 ,aristotle 7,soph4 ,elench47 attempts a classification of fallacies3 ,plato enumerates them without classification4 ,thus different is the ,platonic manner1 from the ,aristotelian manner1 of exposing fallacies4 ,but those exhibited in the former appear as members of one or more among the classes framed by the latter4 ,the fallacies which we read in the ,euthydmus are chiefly verbal3 but some are verbal1 and something beyond4 ,side-note3 ,fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two ,sophists in the ,euthydmus4 ,thus1 for example1 if we take the first sophism introduced by the two exhibitors1 upon which they bring the youth ,kleinias1 by suitable questions1 to declare successively both sides of the alternative--,which of the two is it that learns1 the wise or the ignorant8--,sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms used are equivocal3#df ,you might answer it by using the language ascribed to ,dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue--,neither and ,both4#dg ,the like may be said about the fallacy in page #bhd ,d--,are there persons who speak of things as they are8 ,good men speak of things as they are3 they speak of good men well1 of bad men badly3 therefore1 of course1 they speak of stout men stoutly1 and of hot men hotly4 ,ay6 rejoins the respondent ,ktesippus1 angrily--they speak of cold men coldly1 and say that they talk coldly4#dh ,these are fallacies of double meaning of words--or double construction of phrases3 as we read also in page #bhg ,d1 where the same ,greek verb 7,greek3 noein7 may be construed either to think or to mean3 so that when ,sokrates talks about what a predication means--the ,sophists ask him--,does anything think1 except things having a soul8 ,did you ever know any predication that had a soul8 ,footnote #df3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bge ,d--#bgh ,d4 ,aristotle also adverts to this fallacy1 but without naming the ,euthydmus4 ,see ,soph4 ,el4 #d1 #afe1 b4 #cj4 ,footnote #dg3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #cjj ,d4 ,greek3 ,ou7de_/tera kai a7mpho_/tera ,footnote #dh3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bhd ,e4 ,greek3 tous goun psuchrous psuchrs le_/gousi_/ te kai phasi diale_/gesthai4 ,the metaphorical sense of ,greek3 psuchros is pointless1 stupid1 out of taste1 out of place1 c4 ,side-note3 ,fallacies-- dicto secundum quid1 ad dictum simpliciter--in the ,euthydmus4 ,again1 the two ,sophists undertake to prove that ,sokrates1 as well as the youth ,kleinias and indeed every one else1 knows everything4 ,can any existing thing be that which it is1 and at the same time not be that which it is8--,no4--,you know some things8--,yes4--,then if you know1 you are knowing8--,certainly4 ,i am knowing of those particular things4--,that makes no difference3 if you are knowing1 you necessarily know everything4--,oh6 no3 for there are many things which ,i do not know4--,then if there be anything which you do not know1 you are not knowing8--,yes1 doubtless--of that particular thing4--,still you are not knowing3 and just now you said that you were knowing3 and thus1 at one and the same time1 you are what you are1 and you are not what you are4#di ,footnote #di3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bic ,c4 ,aristotle considers know to be an equivocal word2 he admits that in certain senses you may both know and not know the same thing4 ,anal4 ,prior4 ii4 #fg1 b4 #h4 ,anal4 ,post4 i4 #ga1 a4 #be4 ,but you also 7retorts ,sokrates upon the couple71 do not you also know some things1 not know others8--,by no means4--,what6 do you know nothing8--,far from it4--,then you know all things8--,certainly we do1--and you too3 if you know one thing1 you know all things4--,what6 do you know the art of the carpenter1 the currier1 the cobbler--the number of stars in the heaven1 and of grains of sand in the desert1 c48--,yes3 we know all these things4 ,side-note3 ,obstinacy shown by the two ,sophists in their replies--determination not to contradict themselves4 ,the two ,sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the affirmative to each of these successive questions3 though ,ktesippus pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse specialties4#ej ,this is one of the purposes of the dialogue3 to represent the two ,sophists as willing to answer any thing1 however obviously wrong and false1 for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the dispute--as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the position of questioners1 and to evade the position of respondents--and as exacting a categorical answer--,yes or ,no--to every question which they put without any qualifying words1 and without any assurance that the meaning of the question was understood4#ea ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bic-bid4 ,footnote #ea3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bie-bif4 ,the base of these fallacious inferences is1 ,that respecting the same subject1 you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate3 you cannot say1 ,a is knowing--,a is not knowing 7,greek3 e7pist_/mn74 ,this is a fallacy more than verbal3 it is recognised by ,aristotle 7and by all subsequent logicians7 under the name-- dicto secundum quid1 ad dictum simpliciter4 ,it is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed by very competent reasoners1 including both ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,side-note3 ,farther verbal equivocations4 ,again--,sophroniskus was my father--,chredemus was the father of ,patrokles4--,then ,sophroniskus was different from a father3 therefore he was not a father4 ,you are different from a stone1 therefore you are not a stone3 you are different from gold1 therefore you are not gold4 ,by parity of reasoning1 ,sophroniskus is different from a father--therefore he is not a father4 ,accordingly1 you1 ,sokrates1 have no father4#eb ,footnote #eb3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #big-bih4 ,but 7retorts ,ktesippus upon the couple7 your father is different from my father4--,not at all4--,how can that be8--,what6 is your father1 then1 the father of all men and of all animals8--,certainly he is4 ,a man cannot be at the same time a father1 and not a father4 ,he cannot be at the same time a man1 and not a man--gold1 and not gold4#ec ,footnote #ec3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 p4 #bih4 ,some of the fallacies in the dialogue 7,greek3 ,po_/teron o7rsin oi7 a7_/nthrpoi ta dunata o7ran 7 ta a7du_/nata8 4 4 4 7 ou7ch oi7o_/n te signta le_/gein8 p4 #cjj ,a7 are hardly translatable into ,english1 since they depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the ,greek language4 ,aristotle refers them to the general head ,greek3 par' a7mphiboli_/an4 ,the same about ,greek3 pros_/kei ton ma_/geiron katako_/ptein1 p4 #cja ,d4 ,you have got a dog 7,euthydmus says to ,ktesippus74--,yes4--,the dog is the father of puppies8--,yes4--,the dog1 being a father1 is yours8--,certainly4--,then your father is a dog1 and you are brother of the puppies4 ,you beat your dog sometimes8 ,then you beat your father4#ed ,footnote #ed3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #bih4 ,those animals1 and those alone are yours 7sheep1 oxen1 c471 which you can give away1 or sell1 or sacrifice at pleasure4 ,but ,zeus1 ,apollo1 and ,athn are your ,gods4 ,the ,gods have a soul and are animals4 ,therefore your ,gods are your animals4 ,now you told us that those alone were your animals1 which you could give away1 or sell1 or sacrifice at pleasure4 ,therefore you can give away1 or sell1 or sacrifice at pleasure1 ,zeus1 ,apollo1 and ,athn4#ee ,footnote #ee3 ,plat4 ,euthydm4 p4 #cjb4 ,this same fallacy1 in substance1 is given by ,aristotle1 ,de ,sophist4 ,el4 #ag1 #agf a4 #c1 #agi1 a4 #e1 but with different exemplifying names and persons4 ,this fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of yours--one of its different explanations being treated as if it were the only one4 ,side-note3 ,fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction is impossible4--,to speak falsely is impossible4 ,other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper3--,contradiction is impossible--,to speak falsely is impossible4#ef ,these paradoxes were maintained by ,antisthenes and others1 and appear to have been matters of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries4 ,i shall say more of them when ,i speak about the ,megarics and ,antisthenes4 ,here ,i only note1 that in this dialogue1 ,ktesippus is represented as put to silence by them1 and ,sokrates as making an answer which is no answer at all4#eg ,we see how much trouble these paradoxes gave to ,plato1 when we read the ,sophists1 in which he handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate1 but 7to my judgment7 unsatisfactory4 ,footnote #ef3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bhe-bhf4 ,footnote #eg3 ,plato1 ,euthydm4 pp4 #bhf ,b--#bhg ,a4 ,side-note3 ,plato's ,euthydmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases1 in which the conclusion proved is known aliunde to be false and absurd4 ,the ,euthydmus of ,plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as the earliest known attempt to set out1 and exhibit to attention1 a string of fallacious modes of reasoning4 ,plato makes them all absurd and ridiculous4 ,he gives a caricature of a dialectic debate1 not unworthy of his namesake ,plato ,comicus--or of ,aristophanes1 ,swift1 or ,voltaire4 ,the sophisms appear for the most part so silly1 as he puts them1 that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever imposed upon by such a palpable delusion8 ,yet such confidence is by no means justified4 ,a sophism1 perfectly analogous in character to those which ,plato here exposes to ridicule1 may1 in another case1 easily escape detection from the hearer1 and even from the reasoner himself4 ,people are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the same word bearing two senses1 from double construction of the same phrase1 from unconscious application of a dictum secundum quid1 as if it were a dictum simpliciter2 from ,petitio ,principii1 c41 ,ignoratio ,elenchi1 c4 ,neither ,plato himself1 nor ,aristotle1 can boast of escaping them4#eh ,if these fallacies appear1 in the examples chosen by ,plato for the ,euthydmus1 so obviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one--the reason lies not in the premisses themselves1 but in the particular conclusions to which they lead3 which conclusions are known on other grounds to be false1 and never to be seriously maintainable by any person4 ,such conclusions as--,sokrates had no father3 ,sophroniskus1 if father of ,sokrates1 was father of all men and all animals3 ,in beating your dog1 you beat your father3 ,if you know one thing1 you know everything1 c41 being known aliunde to be false1 prove that there has been some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been established4 ,such cases serve as a reductio ad absurdum of the antecedent process4 ,they make us aware of one mode of liability to error1 and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases4 ,this is a valuable service1 and all the more valuable1 because the liability to error is real and widespread1 even from fallacies perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular exemplifications which ,plato selects and exposes4 ,many of the illustrations of the ,platonic ,euthydmus are reproduced by ,aristotle in the ,treatise de ,sophisticis ,elenchis1 together with other fallacies1 discriminated with a certain method and system4#ei ,footnote #eh3 ,see a passage in ,plato's ,charmids1 where ,heindorf remarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words ,greek3 eu7 zn and ,greek3 eu7 pra_/ttein--also the ,gorgias1 p4 #ejg ,d1 with the notes of ,routh and ,heindorf4 ,i have noticed both passages in discussing these two dialogues4 ,footnote #ei3 ,aristotle1 ,de ,sophist4 ,elench42 also ,arist4 ,rhet4 ii4 p4 #adja1 a-b4 ,side-note3 ,mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by ,athenian ,sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error1 in the ordinary process of thinking4 ,formal debate affords the best means of correcting them4 ,the true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by the ,platonic critics1 in their appreciation of the ,euthydmus2 when they point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the persons whom they called ,sophists1 as well as to mischievous corruptions alleged to arise from ,eristic or formal contentious debate4 ,these critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies were the special inventions of ,athenian ,sophists for the purposes of ,athenian ,eristic3 as if such causes of error were inoperative on persons of ordinary honesty or intelligence1 who never consulted or heard the ,sophists4 ,it has been the practice of writers on logic1 from ,aristotle down to ,whately1 to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners1 whose art ,whately assimilates to that of jugglers4 ,this view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading4 ,it substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential4 ,the various sophisms1 of which ,plato in the ,euthydmus gives the reductio ad absurdum1 are not the inventions of ,sophists4 ,they are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process1 frequently incident to human thought and speech3 specimens of those ever-renewed inadvertencies of ordinary thinking 7to recur to a phrase cited in my preface71 which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or reasoned truth to rectify4 ,moreover the practice of formal debate1 which is usually denounced with so much asperity--if it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies1 presents not merely equal opportunity1 but the only effective means1 for exposing and confuting them4 ,whately in his ,logic1#fj like ,plato in the ,euthydmus1 when bringing these fallacies into open daylight in order that every one may detect them1 may enliven the theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a ,sophist4 ,doubtless they are so by accident3 yet their essential character is that of infirmities incident to the intellectus sibi permissus3 operative at ,athens before ,athenian ,sophists existed1 and in other regions also1 where these persons never penetrated4 ,footnote #fj3 ,whately's ,logic1 ch4 v4 sect4 #e4 ,though ,whately1 like other logicians1 keeps the ,sophists in the foreground1 as the fraudulent enemy who sow tares among that which would otherwise come up as a clean crop of wheat--yet he intimates also incidentally how widespread and frequent such fallacies are1 quite apart from dishonest design4 ,he says--,it seems by most persons to be taken for granted1 that a ,fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by a skilful ,sophist3 or1 if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one1 unconsciously1 in the heat of argument--still they seem to suppose1 that where there is no dispute1 there is no cause to dread ,fallacy4 ,whereas there is much danger1 even in what may be called solitary reasoning1 of sliding unawares into some ,fallacy1 by which one may be so far deceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained4 ,by solitary reasoning1 is meant the case in which we are not seeking for arguments to prove a given question1 but labouring to elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference4 ,to speak of all the ,fallacies that have ever been enumerated1 as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned--because the simple instances given in books1 and there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form1 are such as 7in that form7 would deceive no one--this1 surely1 shows either extreme weakness or extreme unfairness4--,aristotle himself makes the same remark as ,whately--,that the man who is easily taken in by a ,fallacy advanced by another1 will be easily misled by the like ,fallacy in his own solitary reasoning4 ,sophist4 ,elench4 #af1 #age1 a4 #aj4 ,side-note3 ,wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief1 misguided by one or other of these fallacies1 attested by ,sokrates1 ,plato1 ,bacon1 c41--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by ,mill4 ,the wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is attested not less by ,sokrates in his last speech1 wherein he declares real want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge1 to be universal1 the mission of his life being to expose them1 though he could not correct them--than by ,bacon in his reformatory projects1 where he enumerates the various ,idola worshipped by the human intellect1 and the false tendencies acquired in prim digestione mentis4 ,the psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief with its different sources1 given in ,mr4 ,alexander ,bain's work on the ,emotions and the ,will1 shows how this takes place2 and exhibits true or sound belief1 in so far as it ever is acquired1 as an acquisition only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error4#fa ,of such error1 and of the different ways in which apparent evidence is mistaken for real evidence1 a comprehensive philosophical exposition is farther given by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 in the fifth book of his ,system of ,logic1 devoted to the subject of ,fallacies4 ,every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more of the general heads of ,fallacy there enumerated4 ,it is the ,fallacies of ,ratiocination1 of which the two ,sophists1 in the ,platonic ,euthydmus1 are made to exhibit specimens3 and when we regard such ,fallacies1 as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme1 we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the ,athenian ,sophists--still less inventions for the purpose of ,eristic or formal debate4 ,for every one of these ,fallacies is of a nature to ensnare men1 and even to ensnare them more easily1 in the common1 informal1 conversation of life--or in their separate thoughts4 ,besides mistakes on matters of fact1 the two main causes which promote the success and encourage the multiplication of ,fallacies generally1 are first1 the emotional bias towards particular conclusions1 which disposes persons to accept any apparent evidence1 favourable to such conclusion1 as if it1 were real evidence3 next1 the careless and elliptical character of common speech1 in which some parts of the evidence are merely insinuated1 and other parts altogether left out4 ,it is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very extensive class of ,fallacies called by ,mr4 ,mill ,fallacies of ,confusion3 a class so large1 that the greater number of ,fallacies might plausibly be brought under it4#fb ,footnote #fa3 ,see the instructive and original chapter on the generation1 sources1 and growth of ,belief1 in ,mr4 ,bain's work1 ',emotions and ,will1' p4 #efh seq4 ,after laying down the fundamental characteristic of ,belief1 as referable altogether to intended action1 either certain to come1 or contingent under supposed circumstances1 and after enumerating the different ,sources of ,belief4--#a4 ,intuitive or ,instinctive4 #b4 ,experience4 #c4 ,the ,influence of the ,emotions 7sect4 x4 p4 #egi7--,mr4 ,bain says3 ,having in our constitution primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary impulses1 we follow the first clue that experience gives us1 and accept the indication with the whole force of these natural promptings4 ,being under the strongest impulses to act somehow1 an animal accepts any lead that is presented1 and if successful1 abides by that lead with unshaken confidence4 ,this is that instinct of credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind4 ,it is not the single instance1 or the repetition of two or three1 that makes up the strong tone of confidence2 it is the mind's own active determination1 finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends1 and abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character1 until the occurrence of some check1 failure1 or contradiction4 ,the force of belief1 therefore1 is not one rising from zero to a full development by slow degrees1 according to the length of the experience4 ,we must treat it rather as a strong primitive manifestation1 derived from the natural activity of the system1 and taking its direction and rectification from experience 7p4 #ehc74 ,the anticipation of nature1 so strenuously repudiated by ,bacon1 is the offspring of this characteristic of the mental system4 ,with the active tendency at its maximum1 and the exercise of intelligence and acquired knowledge at the minimum1 there can issue nothing but a quantity of rash enterprises4 ,the respectable name generalisation1 implying the best products of enlightened scientific research1 has also a different meaning1 expressing one of the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored human nature4 ,to extend some familiar and narrow experience1 so as to comprehend cases the most distant1 is a piece of mere reckless instinct1 demanding severe discipline for its correction4 ,i have mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like our own4 ,the veriest infant has got this length in the career of fallacy4 ,sound belief1 instead of being a pacific and gentle growth1 is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds1 the conquering of a country in hostile occupation4 ,this is a fact common both to the individual and to the race4 ,observation is unanimous on the point4 ,it will probably be long ere the last of the delusions attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards can be eradicated from humanity4 #crd ed41 p4 #eje seq4 ,footnote #fb3 ,mill1 ',system of ,logic1' ,book ,v41 to which is prefixed the following citation from ,hobbes's ',logica'4 ,errare non modo affirmando et negando1 sed etiam in sentiendo1 et in tacit hominum cogitatione1 contingit4 ,mr4 ,mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional bias in perverting the intellect1 and causing sophisms or fallacies to produce conviction2 and the increased chance afforded for the success of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premisses1 which is unavoidable in informal discussions4 ,bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions 7v4 #a-c74 ,we cannot believe a proposition only by wishing1 or only by dreading1 to believe it4 ,bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds of belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes4 ,it makes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction4 ,it operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons1 or apparent reasons1 to support opinions which are conformable1 or resist those which are repugnant1 to his interests or feelings2 and when the interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons1 reasons are accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened to in that character1 if the conclusion had nothing more powerful than its reasons to speak in its behalf4 ,the natural or acquired prejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up philosophical theories1 the sole recommendation of which consists in the premisses which they afford for proving cherished doctrines1 or justifying favourite feelings2 and when any one of these theories has become so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose1 another is always ready to take its place4--,though the opinions of the generality of mankind1 when not dependent upon mere habit and inculcation1 have their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect1 it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the moral bias that it should first pervert the understanding4 ,again in v4 #b1 #c4 ,it is not in the nature of bad reasoning to express itself unambiguously4 ,when a sophist1 whether he is imposing upon himself or attempting to impose upon others1 can be constrained to throw his argument into so distinct a form1 it needs1 in a large number of cases1 no farther exposure4 ,in all arguments1 everywhere but in the schools1 some of the links are suppressed3 fortiori1 when the arguer either intends to deceive1 or is a lame and inexpert thinker1 little accustomed to bring his reasoning processes to any test2 and it is in those steps of the reasoning which are made in this tacit and half-conscious1 or even wholly unconscious1 manner1 that the error oftenest lurks4 ,in order to detect the fallacy the proposition thus silently assumed must be supplied1 but the reasoner1 most likely1 has never really asked himself what he was assuming2 his confuter1 unless permitted to extort it from him by the ,socratic mode of interrogation1 must himself judge what the suppressed premiss ought to be1 in order to support the conclusion4 ,mr4 ,mill proceeds to illustrate this confusion by an excellent passage cited from ,whately's ',logic'4 ,i may add1 that ,aristotle himself makes a remark substantially the same--,that the same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to another1 according to circumstances4 ,sophist4 ,elench4 #cc1 #ahb1 b4 #aj4 ,side-note3 ,value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies4 ,we thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative1 generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and speech1 without being planted by ,athenian ,sophists or watered by ,eristic--but that this very ,eristic affords the best means of restraining their diffusion4 ,it is only in formal debate that the disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare explicitly to others1 without reserve or omission1 all the premisses upon which his conclusion rests--that every part of these premisses becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent--that the question comes distinctly under consideration1 what is or is not sufficient evidence--that the premisses of one argument can be compared with the premisses of another1 so that if in the former you are tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a bias favourable to the conclusion1 in the latter you may be made to feel that they are insufficient1 because the conclusion which they prove is one which you know to be untrue 7reductio ad absurdum74 ,the habit of formal debate 7called by those who do not like it1 ,eristic#fc7 is thus an indispensable condition both for the exposure and confutation of fallacies1 which exist quite independent of that habit--owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated psychological causes4 ,footnote #fc3 ,the ,platonic critics talk about the ,eristics 7as they do about the ,sophists7 as if that name designated a known and definite class of persons4 ,this is altogether misleading4 ,the term is vituperative1 and was applied by different persons according to their own tastes4 ,ueberweg remarks with great justice1 that ,isokrates called all speculators on philosophy by the name of ,eristics4 ,als ob jener ,rhetor nicht 7wie ja doch ,spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat7 alle und jede ,spekulation mit dem ,nahmen der ,eristik bezeichnete4 7,untersuchungen ber die ,zeitfolge der ,plat4 ,schriften1 p4 #beg47 ,in reference to the distinction which ,aristotle attempts to draw between ,dialectic and ,eristic--the former legitimate1 the latter illegitimate--we must remark that even in the legitimate ,dialectic the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an opponent4 ,he enjoins that you are not only to guard against your opponent1 lest he should out-manoeuvre you1 but you are to conceal and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre him4 ,greek3 ,chr d' o7_/per phula_/ttesthai paragge_/llomen a7pokrinome_/nous1 au7tous e7picheirountas peirasthai lantha_/nein4 ,anal4 ,prior4 ii4 #ff1 a4 #cb4 ,compare ,topic4 #ajh1 a4 #be1 #aef1 a4 #bc1 #afd1 b4 #ce4 ,side-note3 ,without the habit of formal debate1 ,plato could not have composed his ,euthydmus1 nor ,aristotle the treatise ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis4 ,without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at ,athens1 ,plato could not have composed his ,euthydmus1 exhibiting a reductio ad absurdum of several verbal fallacies--nor could we have had the logical theories of ,aristotle1 embodied in the ,analytica and ,topica with its annexed treatise ,de ,sophisticis ,elenchis1 in which various fallacies are discriminated and classified4 ,these theories1 and the corollaries connected with them1 do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of ,aristotle3 but he could not have conceived them without previous study of the ratiocinative process4 ,he1 as the first theorizer1 must have had before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out1 and contested1 or open to be contested1 at every step by an opponent4#fd ,towards such habit of formal argumentation1 a strong repugnance was felt by many of the ,athenian public1 as there is among modern readers generally3 but those who felt thus1 had probably little interest in the speculations either of ,plato or of ,aristotle4 ,that the ,platonic critics should themselves feel this same repugnance1 seems to me not consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and logician of antiquity3 nor can ,i at all subscribe to their view1 when they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate1 and by the rapacity of ,protagoras1 ,prodikus1 and others4 ,footnote #fd3 ,mill1 ',system of ,logic4' ,book ,,vi4 #a1 #a4 ,principles of ,evidence and ,theories of ,method1 are not to be constructed priori4 ,the laws of our rational faculty1 like those of every other natural agency1 are only got by seeing the agent at work4 ,side-note3 ,probable popularity of the ,euthydmus at ,athens--welcomed by all the enemies of ,dialectic4 ,i think it probable that the dialogue of ,euthydmus1 as far as the point to which ,i have brought it 7i4e41 where ,sokrates finishes his recital to ,kriton of the conversation which he had had with the two ,sophists71 was among the most popular of all the ,platonic dialogues3 not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and charm of expression1 but because it would be heartily welcomed by the numerous enemies of ,dialectic at ,athens4 ,we must remember that in the estimation of most persons at ,athens1 ,dialectic included ,sokrates and all the viri ,sokratici 7,plato among them71 just as much as the persons called ,sophists4 ,the discreditable picture here given of ,euthydmus and ,dionysodorus1 would be considered as telling against ,dialectic and the ,sokratic ,elenchus generally3 while the rhetors1 and others who dealt in long continuous discourse1 would treat it as a blow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue1 by the professor of the dialogue himself4 ,in ,plato's view1 the dialogue was the special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy4 ,side-note3 ,epilogue of ,plato to the ,dialogue1 trying to obviate this inference by opponents--,conversation between ,sokrates and ,kriton4 ,that the natural effect of the picture here drawn by ,plato1 was1 to justify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy--we may see by the epilogue which ,plato has thought fit to annex3 an epilogue so little in harmony with what has preceded1 that we might almost imagine it to be an afterthought--yet obviously intended to protect philosophy against imputations4 ,sokrates having concluded the recital1 in his ironical way1 by saying that he intended to become a pupil under the two ,sophists1 and by inviting ,kriton to be a pupil along with him--,kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain instruction from any one who can give it1 but that he has no sympathy with ,euthydmus1 and would rather be refuted by him1 than learn from him to refute in such a manner4 ,kriton proceeds to report to ,sokrates the remarks of a by-stander 7an able writer of discourses for the ,dikastery7 who had heard all that passed2 and who expressed his surprise that ,sokrates could have remained so long listening to such nonsense1 and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish men4 ,nevertheless 7continued the by-stander7 this couple are among the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy4 ,this shows you how worthless a thing philosophy is3 prodigious fuss1 with contemptible result--men careless what they say1 and carping at every word that they hear4#fe ,footnote #fe3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 pp4 #cjd-cje4 ,now1 ,sokrates 7concludes ,kriton71 this man is wrong for depreciating philosophy1 and all others who depreciate it are wrong also4 ,but he was right in blaming you1 for disputing with such a couple before a large crowd4 ,sokr4--,what kind of person is this censor of philosophy8 ,is he a powerful speaker himself in the ,dikastery8 ,or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others8 ,krit4--,the latter4 ,i do not think that he has ever spoken in court3 but every one says that he knows judicial practice well1 and that he composes admirable speeches4#ff ,footnote #ff3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #cje4 ,side-note3 ,altered tone in speaking of ,euthydmus--,disparagement of persons half-philosophers1 half-politicians4 ,sokr4--,i understand the man4 ,he belongs to that class whom ,prodikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politics4 ,persons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind1 and think farther that besides being such in reality1 they are also admired as such by many3 insomuch that the admiration for them would be universal1 if it were not for the professors of philosophy4 ,accordingly they fancy1 that if they could once discredit these philosophers1 the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves1 without controversy1 by every one3 they being in truth the wisest men in society1 though liable1 if ever they are caught in dialectic debate1 to be overpowered and humbled by men like ,euthydmus4#fg ,they have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom1 since they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent1 as far as propriety enjoins2 and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom without encountering either dangers or contests4 ,krit4--,what do you say to their reasoning1 ,sokrates8 ,it seems to me specious4 ,sokr4--,yes1 it is specious1 but not well founded4 ,you cannot easily persuade them1 though nevertheless it is true1 that men who take a line mid-way between two pursuits1 are better than either1 if both pursuits be bad--worse than either1 if both pursuits be good1 but tending to different ends--better than one and worse than the other1 if one of the pursuits be bad and the other good--better than both1 if both be bad1 but tending to different ends4 ,such being the case1 if the pursuit of philosophy and that of active politics be both of them good1 but tending to different objects1 these men are inferior to the pursuers of one as well as of the other3 if one be good1 the other bad1 they are worse than the pursuers of the former1 better than the pursuers of the latter3 if both be bad1 they are better than either4 ,now ,i am sure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics to be good4 ,accordingly1 they are inferior both to philosophers and politicians3#fh they occupy only the third rank1 though they pretend to be in the first4 ,while we pardon such a pretension1 and refrain from judging these men severely1 we must nevertheless recognise them for such as they really are4 ,we must be content with every one1 who announces any scheme of life1 whatever it be1 coming within the limits of intelligence1 and who pursues his work with persevering resolution4#fi ,footnote #fg3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #cje ,d4 ,greek3 ei7nai men gar t a7lthei_/a sphas sophta_/tous1 e7n de tois i7di_/ois lo_/gois o7_/tan a7polphthsin1 u7po tn a7mphi ,eu7thu_/dmon kolou_/esthai4 ,greek3 ,oi7 a7mphi ,eu7thu_/dmon may mean ,euthydmus himself and alone2 yet ,i incline to think that it here means ,euthydmus and his like4 ,footnote #fh3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #cjf ,b4 ,footnote #fi3 ,plat4 ,euthyd4 p4 #cjf ,c4 ,greek3 suggign_/skein men ou7n au7tois chr ts e7pithumi_/as kai m chalepai_/nein1 7geisthai me_/ntoi toiou_/tous ei7nai oi7oi_/ ei7si2 pa_/nta gar a7_/ndra chr a7gapan1 o7_/stis kai o7tioun le_/gei e7cho_/menon phron_/ses pragma1 kai a7ndrei_/s diaponeitai4 ,side-note3 ,kriton asks ,sokrates for advice about the education of his sons--,sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for himself4 ,krit4 ,i am always telling you1 ,sokrates1 that ,i too am embarrassed where to seek instructors for my sons4 ,conversation with you has satisfied me1 that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the fortune and position of sons1 and so little upon their instruction4 ,yet when ,i turn my eyes to the men who make profession of instructing1 ,i am really astonished4 ,to tell you the truth1 every one of them appears to me extravagantly absurd1#gj so that ,i know not how to help forward my son towards philosophy4 ,sokr4--,don't you know1 ,kriton1 that in every different pursuit1 most of the professors are foolish and worthless1 and that a few only are excellent and above price8 ,is not this the case with gymnastic1 commercial business1 rhetoric1 military command8 ,are not most of those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly8#ga ,krit4--,unquestionably3 nothing can be more true4 ,sokr4--,do you think that a sufficient reason for avoiding all these pursuits yourself1 and keeping your son out of them also8 ,krit4 ,no3 it would be wrong to do so4 ,sokr4--,well then1 don't do so4 ,take no heed about the professors of philosophy1 whether they are good or bad2 but test philosophy itself1 well and carefully4 ,if it shall appear to you worthless1 dissuade not merely your sons1 but every one else also1 from following it4#gb ,but if it shall appear to you as valuable as ,i consider it to be1 then take courage to pursue and practise it1 you and your children both1 according to the proverb4-- ,footnote #gj3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4 #cjf ,e4 ,greek3 kai_/ moi dokei ei7s e7_/kastos au7tn skopounti pa_/nu a7llo_/kotos ei7nai1 c4 ,footnote #ga3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4 #cjg ,b4 ,greek3 e7n e7ka_/st tou_/tn tous pollous pros e7_/kaston to e7_/rgon ou7 katagela_/stous o7ras8 ,footnote #gb3 ,plato1 ,euthyd4 p4 #cjg ,b4 ,greek3 e7a_/sas chai_/rein tous e7pitdeu_/ontas philosophi_/an1 ei7_/te chrstoi_/ ei7sin ei7_/te ponroi_/1 au7to to pragma basani_/sas kals te kai eu71 e7an me_/n soi phai_/ntai phaulon o7_/n1 c4 ,side-note3 ,euthydmus is here cited as representative of ,dialectic and philosophy4 ,the first part of this epilogue1 which ,i have here given in abridgment1 has a bearing very different from the rest of the dialogue1 and different also from most of the other ,platonic dialogues4 ,in the epilogue1 ,euthydmus is cited as the representative of true dialectic and philosophy3 the opponents of philosophy are represented as afraid of being put down by ,euthydmus3 whereas1 previously1 he had been depicted as contemptible1--as a man whose manner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than to the opponent refuted2 and who had no chance of success except among hearers like himself4 ,we are not here told that ,euthydmus was a bad specimen of philosophers1 and that there were others better1 by the standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged4 ,on the contrary1 we find him here announced by ,sokrates as among those dreaded by men adverse to philosophy1--and as not undeserving of that epithet which the semi-philosopher cited by ,kriton applies to one of the most powerful champions of the day4 ,plato1 therefore1 after having applied his great dramatic talent to make dialectic debate ridiculous1 and thus said much to gratify its enemies--changes his battery1 and says something against these enemies1 without reflecting whether it is consistent or no with what had preceded4 ,before the close1 however1 he comes again into consistency with the tone of the earlier part1 in the observation which he assigns to ,kriton1 that most of the professors of philosophy are worthless2 to which ,sokrates rejoins that this is not less true of all other professions4 ,the concluding inference is1 that philosophy is to be judged1 not by its professors but by itself2 and that ,kriton must examine it for himself1 and either pursue it or leave it alone1 according as his own convictions dictated4 ,this is a valuable admonition1 and worthy of ,sokrates1 laying full stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person examining may form for himself4 ,but it is no answer to the question of ,kriton2 who says that he had already heard from ,sokrates1 and was himself convinced1 that philosophy was of first-rate importance--and that he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward the progress of his son in it4 ,as in so many other dialogues1 ,plato leaves the problem started1 but unsolved4 ,the impulse towards philosophy being assured1 those who feel it ask ,plato in what direction they are to move towards it4 ,he gives no answer4 ,he can neither perform the service himself1 nor recommend any one else1 as competent4 ,we shall find such silence made matter of pointed animadversion1 in the fragment called ,kleitophon4 ,side-note3 ,who is the person here intended by ,plato1 half-philosopher1 half-politician8 ,is it ,isokrates8 ,the person1 whom ,kriton here brings forward as the censor of ,sokrates and the enemy of philosophy1 is peculiarly marked4 ,in general1 the persons whom ,plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and politicians3 but the example here chosen is not comprised in either of these classes3 it is a semi-philosopher1 yet a writer of discourses for others4 ,schleiermacher1 ,heindorf1 and ,spengel1 suppose that ,isokrates is the person intended3 ,winckelmann thinks it is ,thrasymachus3 others refer it to ,lysias1 or ,theodorus of ,byzantium3#gc ,socher and ,stallbaum doubt whether any special person is intended1 or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a class described by attributes4 ,i rather agree with those who refer the passage to ,isokrates4 ,he might naturally be described as one steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric3 which in fact he himself proclaims in the ,oration ,de ,permutatione1 and which agrees with the language of ,plato in the dialogue ,phdrus1 where ,isokrates is mentioned by name along with ,lysias4 ,in the ,phdrus1 moreover1 ,plato speaks of ,isokrates with unusual esteem1 especially as a favourable contrast with ,lysias1 and as a person who1 though not yet a philosopher1 may be expected to improve1 so as in no long time to deserve that appellation4#gd ,we must remember that ,plato in the ,phdrus attacks by name1 and with considerable asperity1 first ,lysias1 next ,theodorus and ,thrasymachus the rhetors--all three persons living and of note4 ,being sure to offend all these1 ,plato might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of ,isokrates at the same time1 and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar professors of rhetoric4 ,in the ,euthydmus 7where the satire is directed not against the rhetors1 but against their competitors the dialecticians or pseudo-dialecticians7 he had no similar motive to address compliments to ,isokrates3 respecting whom he speaks in a manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments1 as the unnamed representative of a certain type of character--a semi-philosopher1 fancying himself among the first men in ,athens1 and assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher2 but entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem1 such as belonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence4 ,footnote #gc3 ,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 ad ,euthyd4 p4 #dg2 ,winckelmann4 ,proleg4 p4 xxxv4 ,heindorf1 in endeavouring to explain the difference between ,plato's language in the ,phdrus and in the ,euthydmus respecting ,isokrates1 assumes as a matter beyond question the theory of ,schleiermacher1 that the ,phdrus was composed during ,plato's early years4 ,i have already intimated my may dissent from this theory4 ,footnote #gd3 ,plato1 ,phdrus1 p4 #bgh ,e4 ,i have already observed that ,i do not agree with ,schleiermacher and the other critics who rank the ,phdrus as the earliest or even among the earliest compositions of ,plato4 ,that it is of much later composition ,i am persuaded1 but of what particular date can only be conjectured4 ,the opinion of ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 ,stallbaum1 and others1 that it was composed about the time when ,plato began his school at ,athens 7#chg-chf ,b4,c47 is sufficiently probable4 ,the ,euthydmus may be earlier or may be later than the ,phdrus4 ,i incline to think it later4 ,the opinion of ,stallbaum 7resting upon the mention of ,alkibiads1 p4 #bge ,a71 that it was composed in or before #djd ,b4,c41 appears to me untenable 7,stallbaum1 ,proleg4 p4 #fd74 ,plato would not be likely to introduce ,sokrates speaking of ,alkibiads as a deceased person1 whatever time the dialogue was composed4 ,nor can ,i agree with ,steinhart1 who refers it to #djb ,b4,c4 7,einleitung1 p4 #bf74 ,ueberweg 7,untersuch4 ber die ,zeitfolge der ,plat4 ,schr4 pp4 #bfe-bfg7 considers the ,euthydmus later 7but not much later7 than the ,phdrus1 subsequent to the establishment of the ,platonic school at ,athens 7#chg-chf ,b4,c47 ,this seems to me more probable than the contrary4 ,schleiermacher1 in arranging the ,platonic dialogues1 ranks the ,euthydmus as an immediate sequel to the ,menon1 and as presupposing both ,gorgias and ,thettus 7,einl4 pp4 #djj-dja74 ,socher agrees in this opinion1 but ,steinhart rejects it 7,einleit4 p4 #bf71 placing the ,euthydmus immediately after the ,protagoras1 and immediately before the ,menon and the ,gorgias2 according to him1 ,euthydmus1 ,menon1 and ,gorgias1 form a well marked ,trilogy4 ,neither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons4 ,the chronological order cannot be determined4 ,side-note3 ,variable feeling at different times1 between ,plato and ,isokrates4 ,that there prevailed at different times different sentiments1 more or less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy1 between ,plato and ,isokrates1 ought not to be matter of surprise4 ,both of them were celebrated teachers of ,athens1 each in his own manner1 during the last forty years of ,plato's life3 both of them enjoyed the favour of foreign princes1 and received pupils from outlying1 sometimes distant1 cities--from ,bosphorus and ,cyprus in the ,east1 and from ,sicily in the ,west4 ,we know moreover that during the years immediately preceding ,plato's death 7#cdg ,b4,c471 his pupil ,aristotle1 then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric1 was engaged in acrimonious literary warfare1 seemingly of his own seeking1 with ,isokrates 7then advanced in years7 and some of the ,isokratean pupils4 ,the little which we learn concerning the literary and philosophical world of ,athens1 represents it as much distracted by feuds and jealousies4 ,isokrates on his part has in his compositions various passages which appear to allude 7no name being mentioned7 to ,plato among others1 in a tone of depreciation4#ge ,footnote #ge3 ,isokrates1 ad ,philipp4 ,or4 v4 s4 #ad1 p4 #hd2 contra ,sophistas1 ,or4 xiii42 ,or4 xiii4 s4 #b-bd1 pp4 #bia-bie2 ,encom4 ,helen1 ,or4 x4 init42 ,panathenaic4 ,or4 xii4 s4 #abf1 p4 #beg2 ,or4 xv4 ,de ,permutatione1 s4 #ij1 p4 #ddj1 ,bekk4 ,isokrates seems1 as far as we can make out1 to have been in early life1 like ,lysias1 a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in the ,dikastery4 ,this lucrative profession was tempting1 since his family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of ,athens at the close of the ,peloponnesian war4 ,having gained reputation by such means1 ,isokrates became in his mature age a teacher of ,rhetoric1 and a composer of discourses1 not for private use by clients1 but for the general reader1 on political or educational topics4 ,in this character1 he corresponded to the description given by ,plato in the ,euthydmus3 being partly a public adviser1 partly a philosopher4 ,but the general principle under which ,plato here attacks him1 though conforming to the doctrine of the ,platonic ,republic1 is contrary to that of ,plato in other dialogues1 ,you must devote yourself either wholly to philosophy1 or wholly to politics3 a mixture of the two is worse than either--this agrees with the ,republic1 wherein ,plato enjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit1 as well as with the doctrine maintained against ,kallikls in the ,gorgias--but it differs from the ,phdrus1 where he ascribes the excellence of ,perikles as a statesmen and rhetor1 to the fact of his having acquired a large tincture of philosophy4#gf ,cicero quotes this last passage as applicable to his own distinguished career1 a combination of philosophy with politics4#gg ,he dissented altogether from the doctrine here laid down by ,plato in the ,euthydmus1 and many other eminent men would have dissented from it also4 ,footnote #gf3 ,see the facts about ,isokrates in a good ,dissertation by ,h4 ,p4 ,schrder1 ,utrecht1 #ahei1 ,qustiones ,isocrate1 p4 #ea1 seq4 ,plato1 ,phdrus1 p4 #bgj2 ,plutarch1 ,perikls1 c4 #bc2 ,plato1 ,republic1 iii4 p4 #cig4 ,footnote #gg3 ,cicero1 ,de ,orator4 iii4 #cd1 #ach2 ,orator4 iv4 #ad2 ,brutus1 #aa1 #dd4 ,as a doctrine of universal application1 in fact1 it cannot be defended4 ,the opposite scheme of life 7which is maintained by ,isokrates in ,de ,permutatione and by ,kallikls in the ,platonic ,gorgias7#gh--that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the earlier years of life as an intellectual training1 to arm the mind with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the active duties of life--is at least equally defensible1 and suits better for other minds of a very high order4 ,not only ,xenophon and other distinguished ,greeks1 but also most of the best ,roman citizens1 held the opinion which ,plato in the ,gorgias ascribes to ,kallikls and reprobates through the organ of ,sokrates--,that philosophical study1 if prolonged beyond what was necessary for this purpose of adequate intellectual training1 and if made the permanent occupation of life1 was more hurtful than beneficial4#gi ,certainly1 a man may often fail in the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics4 ,no one failed in such a career more lamentably than ,dion1 the friend of ,plato--and ,plato himself1 when he visited ,sicily to second ,dion4 ,moreover ,alkibiads and ,kritias were cited by ,anytus and the other accusers of ,sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction4 ,but on the other hand1 ,archytas at ,tarentum 7another friend of ,plato and philosopher7 administered his native city with success1 as long 7seemingly7 as ,perikls administered ,athens4 ,such men as these two are nowise inferior either to the special philosopher or to the special politician4 ,plato has laid down an untenable generality1 in this passage of the ,euthydmus1 in order to suit a particular point which he wished to make against ,isokrates1 or against the semi-philosopher indicated1 whoever else he may have been4 ,footnote #gh3 ,isokrates1 ,de ,permutatione1 ,or4 xv4 sect4 #bgh-bhh1 pp4 #dhe-dhj1 ,bekk42 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dhd-dhe4 ,footnote #gi3 ,the half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom ,sokrates here alludes1 are characterised by one of the ,platonic critics as jene oberflchlichen und schwchlichen ,naturen die sich zwischen beiden ,richtungen stellen1 und zur ,erreichung selbstschtiger und beschrnkter ,zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie verstehen und was ihnen gefllt 7,steinhart1 ,einleit4 p4 #be74 ,on the other hand we find in ,tacitus a striking passage respecting the studies of ,agricola in his youth at ,massilia4 ,memori teneo1 solitum ipsum narrare1 se in prim juvent studium philosophi acrius1 ultra quam concessum ,romano ac senatori1 hausisse--ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset3 ,scilicet sublime et erectum ingenium1 pulchritudinem ac speciem excels magnque glori vehementius quam laut appetebat3 retinuitque1 quod est difficillimum1 ex sapienti modum 7,vit4 ,agr4 c4 #d74 ,tacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with which ,helvidius ,priscus applied himself to philosophy 7,hist4 iv4 #f73 non1 ut plerique1 ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret1 sed quo constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret4 ,compare also the memorable passage in the ,funeral ,oration pronounced by ,perikls 7,thuc4 ii4 #dj7--;,greek3 philosophoumen a7_/neu malaki_/as1 c41 which exhibits the like views4 ,aulus ,gellius 7x4 #bb71 who cites the doctrine which ,plato ascribes to ,kallikls in the ,gorgias 7about the propriety of confining philosophy to the function of training and preparation for active pursuits71 tries to make out that this was ,plato's own opinion4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,menon4 ,side-note3 ,persons of the ,dialogue4 ,this dialogue is carried on between ,sokrates and ,menon1 a man of noble family1 wealth1 and political influence1 in the ,thessalian city of ,larissa4 ,he is supposed to have previously frequented1 in his native city1 the lectures and society of the rhetor ,gorgias4#a ,the name and general features of ,menon are probably borrowed from the ,thessalian military officer1 who commanded a division of the ,ten ,thousand ,greeks1 and whose character ,xenophon depicts in the ,anabasis3 but there is nothing in the ,platonic dialogue to mark that meanness and perfidy which the ,xenophontic picture indicates4 ,the conversation between ,sokrates and ,menon is interrupted by two episodes3 in the first of these1 ,sokrates questions an unlettered youth1 the slave of ,menon3 in the second1 he is brought into conflict with ,anytus1 the historical accuser of the historical ,sokrates4 ,footnote #a3 ,cicero notices ,isokrates as having heard ,gorgias in ,thessaly 7,orator4 #ec1 #agf74 ,the dialogue is begun by ,menon1 in a manner quite as abrupt as the ,hipparchus and ,minos3 ,side-note3 ,question put by ,menon--,is virtue teachable8 ,sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is4 ,surprise of ,menon4 ,menon4--,can you tell me1 ,sokrates1 whether virtue is teachable--or acquirable by exercise--or whether it comes by nature--or in what other manner it comes8 ,sokr4--,i cannot answer your question4 ,i am ashamed to say that ,i do not even know what virtue is3 and when ,i do not know what a thing is1 how can ,i know any thing about its attributes or accessories8 ,a man who does not know1 ,menon1 cannot tell whether he is handsome1 rich1 c41 or the contrary4 ,menon4--,certainly not4 ,but is it really true1 ,sokrates1 that you do not know what virtue is8 ,am ,i to proclaim this respecting you1 when ,i go home8#b ,sokr4--,yes--undoubtedly3 and proclaim besides that ,i have never yet met with any one who did know4 ,menon4--,what6 have you not seen ,gorgias at ,athens1 and did not he appear to you to know8 ,sokr4--,i have met him1 but ,i do not quite recollect what he said4 ,we need not consider what he said1 since he is not here to answer for himself4#c ,but you doubtless recollect1 and can tell me1 both from yourself1 and from him1 what virtue is8 ,menon4--,there is no difficulty in telling you4#d ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ga ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ,a7lla su_/1 7 ,s_/krates1 ou7d' o7_/ ti a7ret_/ e7stin oi7stha1 a7lla tauta peri sou kai oi7_/kade a7pagge_/llmen8 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ga ,d4 ,greek3 a7keinon me_/ntoi nun e7men1 e7peid kai a7_/pestin4 ,sokrates sets little value upon opinions unless where the person giving them is present to explain and defend3 compare what he says about the uselessness of citation from poets1 from whom you can ask no questions1 ,plato1 ,protagor4 p4 #cdg ,e4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ga ,e4 ,greek3 ,a7ll' ou7 chalepo_/n1 7 ,s_/krates1 ei7pein1 c4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates stands alone in this confession4 ,unpopularity entailed by it4 ,many commentators here speak as if such disclaimer on the part of ,sokrates had reference merely to certain impudent pretensions to universal knowledge on the part of the ,sophists4 ,but this 7as ,i have before remarked7 is a misconception of the ,sokratic or ,platonic point of view4 ,the matter which ,sokrates proclaims that he does not know1 is1 what1 not ,sophists alone1 but every one else also1 professes to know well4 ,sokrates stands alone in avowing that he does not know it1 and that he can find no one else who knows4 ,menon treats the question as one of no difficulty--one on which confessed ignorance was discreditable4 ,what6 says ,menon1 am ,i really to state respecting you1 that you do not know what virtue is8 ,the man who makes such a confession will be looked upon by his neighbours with surprise and displeasure--not to speak of probable consequences yet worse4 ,he is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by ,king ,nomos 7which we shall find described more at length in the ,protagoras7 have failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring conformity1 and he is still in process of examination to form a judgment for himself4 ,side-note3 ,answer of ,menon--plurality of virtues1 one belonging to each different class and condition4 ,sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them4 ,menon proceeds to answer that there are many virtues3 the virtue of a man--competence to transact the business of the city1 and in such business to benefit his friends and injure his enemies3 the virtue of a woman--to administer the house well1 preserving every thing within it and obeying her husband3 the virtue of a child1 of an old man1 a slave1 c4 ,there is in short a virtue--and its contrary1 a vice--belonging to each of us in every work1 profession1 and age4#e ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gb ,a4 ,greek3 kath' e7ka_/stn gar tn pra_/xen kai tn 7likn pros e7_/kaston e7_/rgon e7ka_/st 7mn 7 a7ret_/ e7stin4 7sau_/ts de kai 7 kaki_/a4 ,though ,sokrates disapproves this method of answering--,greek3 to e7xarithmein tas a7reta_/s 7to use the expression of ,aristotle7--yet ,aristotle seems to think it better than searching for one general definition4 ,see ,politica1 i4 #ac1 p4 #abfj1 a4 #ae-cj1 where he has the ,platonic ,menon in his mind4 ,but 7replies ,sokrates7 are they not all the same1 quatenus virtue8 ,health1 quatenus ,health1 is the same in a man or a woman3 is not the case similar with virtue8 ,menon4--,not exactly similar4 ,sokr4--,how so8 ,though there are many diverse virtues1 have not all of them one and the same form in common1 through the communion of which they are virtues8 ,in answer to my question1 you ought to declare what this common form is4 ,thus1 both the man who administers the city1 and the woman who administers the house1 must act both of them with justice and moderation4 ,through the same qualities1 both the one and the other are good4 ,there is thus some common constituent3 tell me what it is1 according to you and ,gorgias8 ,menon4--,it is to be competent to exercise command over men4#f ,sokr4--,but that will not suit for the virtue of a child or a slave4 ,moreover1 must we not superadd the condition1 to command justly1 and not unjustly8 ,menon4--,i think so3 justice is virtue4 ,sokr4--,is it virtue--or is it one particular variety of virtue8#g ,menon4--,how do you mean8 ,sokr4--,just as if ,i were to say about roundness1 that it is not figure1 but a particular variety of figure3 because there are other figures besides roundness4 ,menon4--,very true3 ,i say too1 that there are other virtues besides justice--namely1 courage1 moderation1 wisdom1 magnanimity1 and several others also4 ,sokr4--,we are thus still in the same predicament4 ,in looking for one virtue1 we have found many2 but we cannot find that one form which runs through them all4 ,menon4--,i cannot at present tell what that one is4#h ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gc ,d4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gc ,e4 ,greek3 ,po_/teron a7ret_/1 7 ,me_/nn1 7 a7ret_/ tis8 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gd ,a4 ,greek3 ou7 gar du_/namai_/ p1 7 ,s_/krates1 7s su zteis1 mi_/an a7retn labein kata pa_/ntn4 ,side-note3 ,analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour4 ,sokrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by the analogies of figure and colour4 ,you call round a figure1 and square a figure3 you call white and black both colour1 the one as much as the other1 though they are unlike and even opposite4#i ,tell me1 ,what is this same common figure and property in both1 which makes you call both of them figure--both of them colour8 ,take this as a preliminary exercise1 in order to help you in answering my enquiry about virtue4#aj ,menon cannot answer1 and ,sokrates answers his own question4 ,he gives a general definition1 first of figure1 next of colour4 ,he first defines figure in a way which implies colour to be known4 ,this is pointed out2 and he then admits that in a good definition1 suitable to genuine dialectical investigation1 nothing should be implied as known1 except what the respondent admits himself to know4 ,figure and colour are both defined suitably to this condition4#aa ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gd ,d4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,menon1 c4 #g1 pp4 #gd-ge4 ,greek3 ,peir ei7pein1 i7_/na kai ge_/ntai_/ soi mele_/t pros tn peri ts a7rets a7po_/krisin 7#ge ,a74 ,the purpose of practising the respondent is here distinctly announced4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ge ,c-,e4 ,side-note3 ,importance at that time of bringing into conscious view1 logical subordination and distinctions--,neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system4 ,all this preliminary matter seems to be intended for the purpose of getting the question clearly conceived as a general question--of exhibiting and eliminating the narrow and partial conceptions which unconsciously substitute themselves in the mind1 in place of that which ought to be conceived as a generic whole--and of clearing up what is required in a good definition4 ,a generic whole1 including various specific portions distinguishable from each other1 was at that time little understood by any one4 ,there existed no grammar1 nor any rules of logic founded on analysis of the intellectual processes4 ,to predicate of the genus what was true only of the species--to predicate as distinctively characterizing the species1 what is true of the whole genus in which it is contained--to lose the integrity of the genus in its separate parcels or fragments#ab--these were errors which men had never yet been expressly taught to avoid4 ,to assign the one common meaning1 constituent of or connoted by a generic term1 had never yet been put before them as a problem4 ,such preliminary clearing of the ground is instructive even now1 when formal and systematic logic has become more or less familiar3 but in the time of ,plato1 it must have been indispensably required1 to arrive at a full conception of any general question4#ac ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gi ,a4 ,greek3 e7mou dethe_/ntos sou m katagnu_/mai mde kermati_/zein tn a7retn1 c4 #gi ,b3 ,greek3 e7mou dethe_/ntos o7_/ln ei7pein tn a7ret_/n1 c4 ,footnote #ac3 ,these examples of trial1 error1 and exposure1 have great value and reflect high credit on ,plato1 when we regard them as an intellectual or propdeutic discipline1 forcing upon hearers an attention to useful logical distinctions at a time when there existed no systematic grammar or logic4 ,but surely they must appear degraded1 as they are presented in the ,prolegomena of ,stallbaum1 and by some other critics4 ,we are there told that ,plato's main purpose in this dialogue was to mock and jeer the ,sophists and their pupil1 and that for this purpose ,sokrates is made to employ not his own arguments but arguments borrowed from the ,sophists themselves--ut callid suam ipsius rationem occultare existimandus sit1 quo magis illudat ,sophistarum alumnum 7p4 #ae74 ,qu quidem argumentatio 7that of ,sokrates7 admodum cavendum est ne pro ,socratic vel ,platonic accipiatur4 ,est enim prorsus ad mentem ,sophistarum aliorumque id genus hominum comparata1 c4 7p4 #af74 ,compare pp4 #ab-ac seq4 ,the ,sophists undoubtedly had no distinct consciousness1 any more than other persons1 of these logical distinctions1 which were then for the first pressed forcibly upon attention4 ,side-note3 ,definition of virtue given by ,menon3 ,sokrates pulls it to pieces4 ,menon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a definition1 gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some lyric poet--,to delight in1 or desire1 things beautiful1 fine1 honourable--and to have the power of getting them4 ,but ,sokrates remarks that honourable things are good things1 and that every one without exception desires good4 ,no one desires evil except when he mistakes it for good4 ,on this point all men are alike2 the distinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of the definition--in the power of acquiring good things1 such as health1 wealth1 money1 power1 dignities1 c4#ad ,but the acquisition of these things is not virtuous1 unless it be made consistently with justice and moderation3 moreover the man who acts justly is virtuous1 even though he does not acquire them4 ,it appears then that every agent who acts with justice and moderation is virtuous4 ,but this is nugatory as a definition of virtue3 for justice and moderation are only known as parts of virtue1 and require to be themselves defined4 ,no man can know what a part of virtue is1 unless he knows what virtue itself is4#ae ,menon must look for a better definition1 including nothing but what is already known or admitted4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gg ,b4 ,greek3 dokei toi_/nun moi a7ret ei7nai1 katha_/per o7 poits le_/gei1 chai_/rein te kaloisi kai du_/nasthai4 ,kai e7g touto le_/g a7retn e7pithumounta tn kaln dunaton ei7nai pori_/zesthai4 ,whoever this lyric poet was1 his real meaning is somewhat twisted by ,sokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism1 as the song of ,simonides is in the ,protagoras4 ,a person having power1 and taking delight in honourable or beautiful things--is a very intelligible ,hellenic idal1 as an object of envy and admiration4 ,compare ,protagoras1 p4 #cea ,c3 ,greek3 ei7_/per tois kalois z_/ 7do_/menos4 ,a poor man may be ,greek3 philo_/kalos as well as a rich man3 ,greek3 philokaloumen met' eu7telei_/as1 is the boast of ,perikls in the name of the ,athenians1 ,thucyd4 ii4 #dj4 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gh ,c4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,a7gatha de kaleis ou7chi oi7on u7gi_/eia_/n te kai plouton8 kai chrusi_/on le_/g kai a7rgu_/rion ktasthai kai timas e7n po_/lei kai a7rcha_/s8 m a7_/ll' a7_/tta le_/geis ta7gatha 7 ta toiauta8 ,menon4 ,greek3 ,ou7k2 a7lla pa_/nta le_/g ta toiauta4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gi4 ,side-note3 ,menon complains that the conversation of ,sokrates confounds him like an electric shock--,sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance4 ,he urges continuance of search by both4 ,menon4--,your conversation1 ,sokrates1 produces the effect of the shock of the torpedo3 you stun and confound me3 you throw me into inextricable perplexity1 so that ,i can make no answer4 ,i have often discoursed copiously--and1 as ,i thought1 effectively--upon virtue2 but now you have shown that ,i do not even know what virtue is4 ,sokr4--,if ,i throw you into perplexity1 it is only because ,i am myself in the like perplexity and ignorance4 ,i do not know what virtue is1 any more than you3 and ,i shall be glad to continue the search for finding it1 if you will assist me4 ,side-note3 ,but how is the process of search available to any purpose8 ,no man searches for what he already knows3 and for what he does not know1 it is useless to search1 for he cannot tell when he has found it4 ,menon4--,but how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant8 ,even if you do find it1 how can you ever know that you have found it8 ,sokr4--,you are now introducing a troublesome doctrine1 laid down by those who are averse to the labour of thought4 ,they tell us that a man cannot search either for what he knows1 or for what he does not know4 ,for the former1 research is superfluous3 for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless1 since the searcher does not know what he is looking for4 ,side-note3 ,theory of reminiscence propounded by ,sokrates--anterior immortality of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life1 but forgotten4 ,i do not believe this doctrine 7continues ,sokrates74 ,priests1 priestesses1 and poets 7,pindar among them7 tell us1 that the mind of man is immortal and has existed throughout all past time1 in conjunction with successive bodies2 alternately abandoning one body1 or dying--and taking up new life or reviving in another body4 ,in this perpetual succession of existences1 it has seen every thing1--both here and in ,hades and everywhere else--and has learnt every thing4 ,but though thus omniscient1 it has forgotten the larger portion of its knowledge4 ,yet what has been thus forgotten may again be revived4 ,what we call learning1 is such revival4 ,it is reminiscence of something which the mind had seen in a former state of existence1 and knew1 but had forgotten4 ,since then all the parts of nature are analogous1 or cognate--and since the mind has gone through and learnt them all--we cannot wonder that the revival of any one part should put it upon the track of recovering for itself all the rest1 both about virtue and about every thing else1 if a man will only persevere in intent meditation4 ,all research and all learning is thus nothing but reminiscence4 ,in our researches1 we are not looking for what we do not know3 we are looking for what we do know1 but have forgotten4 ,there is therefore ample motive1 and ample remuneration1 for prosecuting enquiries3 and your doctrine which pronounces them to be unprofitable1 is incorrect4#af ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #ha ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ,a7te ou7n 7 psuch a7tha_/nato_/s te ou7sa kai polla_/kis gegonuia1 kai e7rakuia kai ta e7ntha_/de kai ta e7n ,ai7_/dou kai pa_/nta chr_/mata1 ou7k e7_/stin o7_/ ti ou7 mema_/thken2 7_/ste ou7den thaumaston kai peri a7rets kai peri a7_/lln oi7o_/n te ei7nai au7tn a7namnsthnai a7_/ ge kai pro_/teron 7pi_/stato4 ,a7te gar ts phu_/ses a7pa_/ss suggenous ou7_/ss kai memathkui_/as ts psuchs a7_/panta1 ou7den klu_/ei e7n mo_/non a7namnsthe_/nta1 o7 d ma_/thsin kalousin a7_/nthrpoi1 ta7_/lla pa_/nta au7ton a7neurein1 e7a_/n tis a7ndreios 7 kai m a7poka_/mn ztn4 ,to gar ztein a7_/ra kai to mantha_/nein a7na_/mnsis o7_/lon e7sti_/n4 ,side-note3 ,illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught4 ,sokrates questions the slave of ,menon4 ,sokrates proceeds to illustrate the position1 just laid down1 by cross-examining ,menon's youthful slave1 who1 though wholly untaught and having never heard any mention of geometry1 is brought by a proper series of questions to give answers out of his own mind1 furnishing the solution of a geometrical problem4 ,the first part of the examination brings him to a perception of the difficulty1 and makes him feel a painful perplexity1 from which he desires to obtain relief3#ag the second part guides his mind in the efforts necessary for fishing up a solution out of its own pre-existing1 but forgotten1 stores4 ,true opinions1 which he had long had within him without knowing it1 are awakened by interrogation1 and become cognitions4 ,from the fact that the mind thus possesses the truth of things which it has not acquired in this life1 ,sokrates infers that it must have gone through a pre-existence of indefinite duration1 or must be immortal4#ah ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hd ,c4 ,greek3 ,oi7_/ei ou7n a7n au7ton pro_/teron e7picheirsai ztein 7 mantha_/nein touto o7 7eto ei7de_/nai ou7k ei7d_/s1 prin ei7s a7pori_/an kate_/pesen 7gsa_/menos m ei7de_/nai1 kai e7po_/thse to ei7de_/nai8 ,ou7_/ moi dokei4 7_/nto a7_/ra nark_/sas8 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hf4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun ei7 a7ei 7 a7l_/theia 7min tn o7_/ntn e7stin e7n t psuch1 a7tha_/natos a7n 7 psuch ei7_/8 ,side-note3 ,enquiry taken up--,whether virtue is teachable8 without determining what virtue is4 ,the former topic of enquiry is now resumed3 but at the instance of ,menon1 the question taken up1 is not--,what is virtue8 but--,is virtue teachable or not8 ,sokrates1 after renewing his objection against the inversion of philosophical order by discussing the second question without having determined the first1 enters upon the discussion hypothetically1 assuming as a postulate1 that nothing can be taught except knowledge4 ,the question then stands thus--,is virtue knowledge8 ,if it be1 it can be taught3 if not1 it cannot be taught4#ai ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hg4 ,side-note3 ,virtue is knowledge--no possessions1 no attributes1 either of mind or body1 are good or profitable1 except under the guidance of knowledge4 ,sokrates proceeds to prove that virtue is knowledge1 or a mode of knowledge4 ,virtue is good3 all good things are profitable4 ,but none of the things accounted good are profitable1 unless they be rightly employed2 that is1 employed with knowledge or intelligence4 ,this is true not only of health1 wealth1 beauty1 strength1 power1 c41 but also of the mental attributes justice1 moderation1 courage1 quick apprehension1 c4 ,all of these are profitable1 and therefore good1 if brought into action under knowledge or right intelligence2 none of them are profitable or good1 without this condition--which is therefore the distinctive constituent of virtue4#bj ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hi4 ,virtue1 therefore1 being knowledge or a mode of knowledge1 cannot come by nature1 but must be teachable4 ,side-note3 ,virtue1 as being knowledge1 must be teachable4 ,yet there are opposing reasons1 showing that it cannot be teachable4 ,no teachers of it can be found4 ,yet again there are other contrary reasons 7he proceeds7 which prove that it cannot be teachable4 ,for if it were so1 there would be distinct and assignable teachers and learners of it1 and the times and places could be pointed out where it is taught and learnt4 ,we see that this is the case with all arts and professions4 ,but in regard to virtue1 there are neither recognised teachers1 nor learners1 nor years of learning4 ,the ,sophists pretend to be teachers of it1 but are not3#ba the leading and esteemed citizens of the community do not pretend to be teachers of it1 and are indeed incompetent to teach it even to their own sons--as the character of those sons sufficiently proves4#bb ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ib4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ig4 ,isokrates 7adv4 ,sophistas1 s4 #be1 p4 #dja7 expressly declares that he does not believe ,greek3 7_/s e7sti dikaiosu_/n didakto_/n4 ,there is no ,greek3 te_/chn which can teach it1 if a man be ,greek3 kaks pephuk_/s4 ,but if a man be well-disposed1 then education in ,greek3 lo_/goi politikoi_/ will serve ,greek3 sumparakeleu_/sasthai_/ ge kai sunasksai4 ,for a man to announce himself as a teacher of justice or virtue1 was an unpopular and invidious pretension4 ,isokrates is anxious to guard himself against such unpopularity4 ,side-note3 ,conversation of ,sokrates with ,anytus1 who detests the ,sophists1 and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue4 ,here1 a new speaker is introduced into the dialogue--,anytus1 one of the accusers of ,sokrates before the ,dikastery4 ,the conversation is carried on for some time between ,sokrates and him4 ,anytus denies altogether that the ,sophists are teachers of virtue1 and even denounces them with bitter contempt and wrath4 ,but he maintains that the leading and esteemed citizens of the state do really teach it4 ,anytus however presently breaks off in a tone of displeasure and menace towards ,sokrates himself4#bc ,the conversation is then renewed with ,menon1 and it is shown that the leading politicians cannot be considered as teachers of virtue1 any more than the ,sophists4 ,there exist no teachers of it2 and therefore we must conclude that it is not teachable4 ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #id ,e4 ,side-note3 ,confused state of the discussion4 ,no way of acquiring virtue is shown4 ,the state of the discussion as it stands now1 is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms1 as follows3 #a4 ,if virtue is knowledge1 it is teachable3 ,but virtue is knowledge3 ,therefore virtue is teachable4 #b4 ,if virtue is knowledge1 it is teachable3 ,but virtue is not teachable3 ,therefore virtue is not knowledge4 ,the premisses of each of these two syllogisms contradict the conclusion of the other4 ,both cannot be true4 ,if virtue is not acquired by teaching and does not come by nature1 how are there any virtuous men8 ,side-note3 ,sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same4 ,sokrates continues his argument3 ,the second premiss of the first syllogism--that virtue is knowledge--is true1 but not the whole truth4 ,in proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences4 ,but this assumption will not hold4 ,there is something else besides knowledge1 which also guides us to the same useful results4 ,that something is right opinion1 which is quite different from knowledge4 ,the man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to us1 and guides us quite as well to right actions1 as if he knew4 ,right opinions1 so long as they stay in the mind1 are as good as knowledge1 for the purpose of guidance in practice4 ,but the difference is1 that they are evanescent and will not stay in the mind3 while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable4 ,they are exalted into knowledge1 when bound in the mind by a chain of causal reasoning3#bd that is1 by the process of reminiscence1 before described4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #ig ,e--#ih ,a4 ,greek3 kai gar ai7 do_/xai ai7 a7ltheis1 o7_/son men a7n chro_/non parame_/nsin1 kalo_/n ti chrma kai pa_/nta ta7gatha e7rga_/zontai2 polun de chro_/non ou7k e7the_/lousi parame_/nein1 a7lla drapeteu_/ousin e7k ts psuchs tou a7nthr_/pou4 7_/ste ou7 pollou a7_/xiai_/ ei7sin1 e7_/s a7n tis au7tas d_/s ai7ti_/as logism2 touto d' e7stin a7na_/mnsis1 7s e7n tois pro_/sthen 7min 7molo_/gtai4 ,side-note3 ,right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind1 and can never give rational explanations1 nor teach others--good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the ,gods4 ,virtue then 7continues ,sokrates7--that which constitutes the virtuous character and the permanent1 trustworthy1 useful guide--consists in knowledge4 ,but there is also right opinion1 a sort of quasi-knowledge1 which produces in practice effects as good as knowledge1 only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the mind4#be ,it is this right opinion1 or quasi-knowledge1 which esteemed and distinguished citizens possess1 and by means of which they render useful service to the city4 ,that they do not possess knowledge1 is certain2 for if they did1 they would be able to teach it to others1 and especially to their own sons3 and this it has been shown that they cannot do4#bf ,they deliver true opinions and predictions1 and excellent advice1 like prophets and oracular ministers1 by divine inspiration and possession1 without knowledge or wisdom of their own4 ,they are divine and inspired persons1 but not wise or knowing4#bg ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ii ,a4 ,greek3 7 de a7_/nthrpos 7gem_/n e7stin e7pi to o7rtho_/n1 du_/o tauta1 do_/xa a7lths kai e7pist_/m4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ii ,b4 ,greek3 ,ou7k a7_/ra sophi_/a tini ou7de sophoi o7_/ntes oi7 toioutoi a7_/ndres 7gounto tais po_/lesin1 oi7 a7mphi ,themistokle_/a4 4 4 4 dio kai ou7ch oi7oi_/ te a7_/llous poiein toiou_/tous oi7oi au7toi_/ ei7sin1 a7_/te ou7 di' e7pist_/mn o7_/ntes toioutoi4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ii ,d4 ,greek3 kai tous politikous ou7ch 7_/kista tou_/tn phaimen1 a7n thei_/ous te ei7nai kai e7nthousia_/zein1 e7pi_/pnous o7_/ntas kai katechome_/nous e7k tou theou1 o7_/tan katorthsi le_/gontes polla kai mega_/la pra_/gmata1 mden ei7do_/tes 7n le_/gousin4 ,side-note3 ,all the real virtue that there is1 is communicated by special inspiration from the ,gods4 ,and thus 7concludes ,sokrates7 the answer to the question originally started by ,menon--,whether virtue is teachable8--is as follows4 ,virtue in its highest sense1 in which it is equivalent to or coincident with knowledge1 is teachable3 but no such virtue exists4 ,that which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name of virtue1--or at least producing the results of virtue in practice--is not teachable4 ,nor does it come by nature1 but by special inspiration from the ,gods4 ,the best statesmen now existing cannot make any other person like themselves3 if any one of them could do this1 he would be1 in comparison with the rest1 like a real thing compared with a shadow4#bh ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ajj4 ,side-note3 ,but what virtue itself is1 remains unknown4 ,nevertheless the question which we have just discussed--,how virtue arises or is generated8--must be regarded as secondary and dependent1 not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question--,what is virtue8--has been investigated and brought to a solution4#bi ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ajj ,b4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks on the dialogue4 ,proper order for examining the different topics1 is pointed out by ,sokrates4 ,this last observation is repeated by ,sokrates at the end--as it had been stated at the beginning1 and in more than one place during the continuance--of the dialogue4 ,in fact1 ,sokrates seems at first resolved to enforce the natural and necessary priority of the latter question3 but is induced by the solicitation of ,menon to invert the order4#cj ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hf4 ,side-note3 ,mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled4 ,the propriety of the order marked out1 but not pursued1 by ,sokrates is indisputable4 ,before you can enquire how virtue is generated or communicated1 you must be satisfied that you know what virtue is4 ,you must know the essence of the subject--or those predicates which the word connotes 7 the meaning of the term7 before you investigate its accidents and antecedents4#ca ,menon begins by being satisfied that he knows what virtue is3 so satisfied1 that he accounts it discreditable for a man not to know3 although he is made to answer like one who has never thought upon the subject1 and does not even understand the question4 ,sokrates1 on the other hand1 not only confesses that he does not himself know1 but asserts that he never yet met with a man who did know4 ,one of the most important lessons in this1 as in so many other ,platonic dialogues1 is the mischief of proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions1 without having settled the fundamental words and notions3 the false persuasion of knowledge1 common to almost every one1 respecting these familiar ethical and social ideas4 ,menon represents the common state of mind4 ,he begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else knows what virtue is3 and even when he is proved to be ignorant1 he still feels no interest in the fundamental enquiry1 but turns aside to his original object of curiosity--,whether virtue is teachable4 ,nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough sifting of deep-seated1 long familiarised1 notions--,greek3 to gar o7rthousthai gn_/man1 o7duna4 ,footnote #ca3 ,to use the phrase of ,plato himself in the ,euthyphron1 p4 #aa ,a1 the ,greek3 ou7si_/a must be known before the ,greek3 pa_/th are sought--,greek3 kinduneu_/eis1 7 ,eu7thu_/phron1 e7rt_/menos to o7_/sion1 o7_/1 ti_/ pot' e7sti1 tn men ou7si_/an moi au7tou ou7 bou_/lesthai dlsai1 pa_/thos de_/ ti peri au7tou le_/gein1 o7_/1 ti pe_/ponthe touto to o7_/sion1 phileisthai u7po pa_/ntn then2 o7_/ ti de o7_/n1 ou7_/p ei7pes4 ,compare ,lachs1 p4 #aij ,b and ,gorgias1 pp4 #ddh ,e1 #dfb ,c4 ,side-note3 ,doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,menon--desire of good alleged to be universally felt--in what sense this is true4 ,the confession of ,sokrates that neither he nor any other person in his experience knows what virtue is--that it must be made a subject of special and deliberate investigation--and that no man can know what justice1 or any other part of virtue is1 unless he first knows what virtue as a whole is#cb--;are matters to be kept in mind also1 as contrasting with other portions of the ,platonic dialogues1 wherein virtue1 justice1 c41 are tacitly assumed 7according to the received habit7 as matters known and understood4 ,the contributions which we obtain from the ,menon towards finding out the ,platonic notion of virtue1 are negative rather than positive4 ,the comments of ,sokrates upon ,menon's first definition include the doctrine often announced in ,plato--,that no man by nature desires suffering or evil2 every man desires good3 if he seeks or pursues suffering or evil1 he does so merely from error or ignorance1 mistaking it for good4#cc ,this is true1 undoubtedly1 if we mean what is good or evil for himself3 and if by good or evil we mean 7according to the doctrine enforced by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras7 the result of items of pleasure and pain1 rightly estimated and compared by the ,measuring ,reason4 ,every man naturally desires pleasure1 and the means of acquiring pleasure1 for himself3 every man naturally shrinks from pain1 or the causes of pain1 to himself3 every one compares and measures the items of each with more or less wisdom and impartiality4 ,but the proposition is not true1 if we mean what is good or evil for others3 and if by good we mean 7as ,sokrates is made to declare in the ,gorgias7 something apart from pleasure1 and by evil something apart from pain 7understanding pleasure and pain in their largest sense74 ,a man sometimes desires what is good for others1 sometimes what is evil for others1 as the case may be4 ,plato's observation therefore cannot be admitted--,that as to the wish or desire1 all men are alike3 one man is no better than another4#cd ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gi ,b-,c4 ,greek3 tn gar dikaiosu_/nn mo_/rion ph a7rets ei7nai kai e7_/kasta tou_/tn4 4 4 4 oi7_/ei tina ei7de_/nai mo_/rion a7rets o7_/ ti e7_/stin1 au7tn m ei7do_/ta8 ,ou7k e7_/moige dokei4 ,footnote #cc3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gg4 ,footnote #cd3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #gh ,b4 ,greek3 to men bou_/lesthai pasin u7pa_/rchei1 kai tau_/t ge ou7den o7 e7_/teros tou e7te_/rou belti_/n4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue1 but does not determine knowledge1 of what8 ,the second portion of ,plato's theory1 advanced to explain what virtue is1 presents nothing more satisfactory4 ,virtue is useful or profitable3 but neither health1 strength1 beauty1 wealth1 power1 c41 are profitable1 unless rightly used3 nor are justice1 moderation1 courage1 quick apprehension1 good memory1 c41 profitable1 unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or prudence4#ce ,now if by profitable we have reference not to the individual agent alone1 but to other persons concerned also1 the proposition is true1 but not instructive or distinct4 ,for what is meant by right use8 ,to what ends are the gifts here enumerated to be turned1 in order to constitute right use8 ,what again is meant by knowledge8 knowledge of what8#cf ,this is a question put by ,sokrates in many other dialogues1 and necessary to be put here also4 ,moreover1 knowledge is a term which requires to be determined1 not merely to some assignable object1 but also in its general import1 no less than virtue4 ,we shall come presently to an elaborate dialogue 7,thettus7 in which ,plato makes many attempts to determine knowledge generally1 but ends in a confessed failure4 ,knowledge must be knowledge possessed by some one1 and must be knowledge of something4 ,what is it1 that a man must know1 in order that his justice or courage may become profitable8 ,is it pleasures and pains1 with their causes1 and the comparative magnitude of each 7as ,sokrates declares in the ,protagoras71 in order that he may contribute to diminish the sum of pains1 increase that of pleasures1 to himself or to the society8 ,if this be what he is required to know1 ,plato should have said so--or if not1 what else--in order that the requirement of knowledge might be made an intelligible condition4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #hg-hh4 ,footnote #cf3 ,see ,republic1 vi4 p4 #eje ,b1 where this question is put1 but not answered1 respecting ,greek3 phro_/nsis4 ,side-note3 ,subject of ,menon2 same as that of the ,protagoras--diversity of handling--,plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it4 ,though the subject of direct debate in the ,menon is the same as that in the ,protagoras 7whether virtue be teachable87 yet the manner of treating this subject is very different in the two4 ,one point of difference between the two has been just noticed4 ,another difference is1 that whereas in ,menon the teachability of virtue is assumed to be disproved1 because there are no recognised teachers or learners of it--in the ,protagoras this argument is produced by ,sokrates1 but is combated at length 7as we shall presently see7 by a counter-argument on the part of the ,sophists1 without any rejoinder from ,sokrates4 ,of this counter-argument no notice is taken in the ,menon3 although1 if it be well-founded1 it would have served ,anytus no less than ,protagoras1 as a solution of the difficulties raised by ,sokrates4 ,such diversity of handling and argumentative fertility1 are characteristic of the ,platonic procedure4 ,i have already remarked1 that the establishment of positive conclusions1 capable of being severed from their premisses1 registered in the memory1 and used as principles for deduction--is foreign to the spirit of these ,dialogues of ,search4 ,to settle a question and finish with it--to get rid of the debate1 as if it were a troublesome temporary necessity--is not what ,plato desires4 ,his purpose is1 to provoke the spirit of enquiry--to stimulate responsive efforts of the mind by a painful shock of exposed ignorance--and to open before it a multiplicity of new roads with varied points of view4 ,side-note3 ,anxiety of ,plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research4 ,nowhere in the ,platonic writings is this provocative shock more vividly illustrated than in the ,menon1 by the simile of the electrical fish3 a simile as striking as that of the magnet in ,ion4#cg ,nowhere1 again1 is the true character of the ,sokratic intellect more clearly enunciated4 ,you complain1 ,menon1 that ,i plunge your mind into nothing but doubt1 and puzzle1 and conscious ignorance4 ,if ,i do this1 it is only because my own mind is already in that same condition4#ch ,the only way out of it is1 through joint dialectical colloquy and search2 in which ,i invite you to accompany me1 though ,i do not know when or where it will end4 ,and then1 for the purpose of justifying as well as encouraging such prolonged search1 ,sokrates proceeds to unfold his remarkable hypothesis--eternal pre-existence1 boundless past experience1 and omniscience1 of the mind--identity of cognition with recognition1 dependent on reminiscence4 ,research or enquiry 7said some7 is fruitless4 ,you must search either for that which you know1 or for that which you do not know4 ,the first is superfluous--the second impossible3 for if you do not know what a thing is1 how are you to be satisfied that the answer which you find is that which you are looking for8 ,how can you distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue1 but plausible8 ,footnote #cg3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hj ,a4 ,greek3 na_/rk thalassi_/a4 ,compare what ,i have said above about the ,ion1 ch4 ,,xvii41 p4 #abh4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hj ,d4 ,side-note3 ,great question discussed among the ,grecian philosophers--criterion of truth--,wherein consists the process of verification8 ,here we find explicitly raised1 for the first time1 that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in ,greece for the subsequent three centuries--,what is the criterion of truth8 ,wherein consists the process called verification and proof1 of that which is first presented as an hypothesis8 ,this was one of the great problems debated between the ,academics1 the ,stoics1 and the ,sceptics1 until the extinction of the schools of philosophy4#ci ,footnote #ci3 ,sokrates here calls this problem an ,greek3 e7ristikos lo_/gos4 ,stallbaum 7in his ,prolegom4 to the ,menon1 p4 #ad7 describes it as a qustiunculam1 haud dubie e sophistarum disciplin arreptam4 ,if the ,sophists were the first to raise this question1 ,i think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy4 ,the question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted1 if we are to have a body of reasoned truth called philosophy4 ,i dissent from the opinion of ,stallbaum 7p4 #bj71 though it is adopted both by ,socher 7,ueber ,platon1 p4 #ahe7 and by ,steinhart 7,einleitung zum ,menon1 p4 #abc71 that the ,menon was composed by ,plato during the lifetime of ,sokrates4 ,schleiermacher 7,einleitung zum ,gorgias1 p4 #bb2 ,einleitung zum ,menon1 pp4 #cbi-ccj71 ,ueberweg 7,aechth4 ,plat4 ,schr4 p4 #bbf71 and ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann1 on the other hand1 regard the ,menon as composed after the death of ,sokrates1 and on this point ,i agree with them1 though whether it was composed not long after that event 7as ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann thinks7 or thirteen years after it 7as ,schleiermacher thinks71 ,i see no sufficient grounds for deciding4 ,i incline to the belief that its composition is considerably later than ,hermann supposes2 the mention of the ,theban ,ismenias is one among the reasons rendering such later origin probable4 ,plato probably borrowed from the ,xenophontic ,anabasis the name1 country1 and social position of ,menon1 who may have received teaching from ,gorgias1 as we know that ,proxenus did1 ,xen4 ,anab4 ii4 #f1 #af4 ,the reader can compare the ,einleitung of ,schleiermacher 7in which he professes to prove that the ,menon is a corollary to the ,thettus and ,gorgias1 and an immediate antecedent to the ,euthydmus1--that it solves the riddle of the ,protagoras--and that it presupposes and refers back to the ,phdrus7 with the ,einleitung of ,steinhart 7p4 #abj seq471 who contests all these propositions1 saying that the ,menon is decidedly later than the ,euthydmus1 and decidedly earlier than the ,thettus1 ,gorgias1 and ,phdrus2 with the opinions of ,stallbaum and ,hermann1 who recognise an order different from that either of ,steinhart or ,schleiermacher2 and with that of ,ast1 who rejects the ,menon altogether as unworthy of ,plato4 ,every one of these dissentient critics has something to say for his opinion1 while none of them 7in my judgment7 can make out anything like a conclusive case4 ,the mistake consists in assuming that there must have been a peremptory order and intentional interdependence among the ,platonic ,dialogues1 and next in trying to show by internal evidence what that order was4 ,side-note3 ,none of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by ,plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience4 ,not one of these schools was satisfied with the very peculiar answer which the ,platonic ,sokrates here gives to the question4 ,when truth is presented to us 7he intimates71 we recognise it as an old friend after a long absence4 ,we know it by reason of its conformity to our antecedent1 pre-natal1 experience 7in the ,phdon1 such pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial1 intelligible1 ,ideas1 which are not mentioned in the ,menon73 the soul or mind is immortal1 has gone through an indefinite succession of temporary lives prior to the present1 and will go through an indefinite succession of temporary lives posterior to the present--long1 canitis si cognita1 vit ,mors media est4 ,the mind has thus become omniscient1 having seen1 heard1 and learnt every thing1 both on earth and in ,hades3 but such knowledge exists as a confused and unavailable mass1 having been buried and forgotten on the commencement of its actual life4 ,since all nature is in universal kindred1 communion1 or interdependence1 that which we hear or see here1 recalls to the memory1 by association1 portions of our prior forgotten omniscience4#dj ,it is in this recall or reminiscence that search1 learning1 acquisition of knowledge1 consists4 ,teaching and learning are words without meaning3 the only process really instructive is that of dialectic debate1 which1 if indefatigably prosecuted1 will dig out the omniscience buried within4#da ,so vast is the theory generated in ,plato's mind1 by his worship of dialectic1 respecting that process of search to which more than half of his dialogues are devoted4 ,footnote #dj3 ,the doctrine of communion or interdependence pervading all ,nature1 with one continuous cosmical soul penetrating everywhere1 will be found set forth in the kosmology of the ,timus1 pp4 #cg-db-dc4 ,it was held1 with various modifications1 both by the ,pythagoreans and the ,stoics4 ,compare ,cicero1 ,divinat4 ii4 #ad-ae2 ,virgil1 neid vi4 #gae seqq42 ,georgic4 iv4 #bbj2 ,sextus ,empir4 adv4 ,mathem4 ix4 #abg2 ,ekphantus ,pythagoreus ap4 ,stobum1 ,tit4 #dh1 vol4 ii4 p4 #cbj1 ,gaisford4 ,the view here taken by ,plato1 that all nature is cognate and interdependent--,greek3 a7_/te gar ts phu_/ses a7pa_/ss suggenous ou7_/ss--is very similar to the theory of ,leibnitz3--,ubique per materiam disseminata statuo principia vitalia seu percipientia4 ,omnia in natur sunt analogica 7,leibnitz1 ,epist4 ad ,wagnerum1 p4 #dff2 ,leibn4 ,opp4 ,erdmann74 ,farther1 that the human mind by virtue of its interdependence or kindred with all nature1 includes a confused omniscience1 is also a ,leibnitzian view4 ,car comme tout est plein 7ce qui rend toute la matire lie7 et comme dans le plein tout mouvement fait quelqu' effet sur les corps distans mesure de la distance1 de sorte que chaque corps est affect non seulement par ceux qui le touchent1 et se ressent en quelque faon de tout ce qui leur arrive--mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent de ceux qui touchent les premiers dont il est touch immdiatement4 ,il s'ensuit que cette communication va quelque distance que ce soit4 ,et par consequent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l',univers3 tellement que celui1 qui voit tout1 pourroit lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout et mme ce qui s'est fait et se fera1 en remarquant dans le prsent ce qui est loign tant selon les temps que selon les lieux3 ,greek3 su_/mpnoia pa_/nta1 disoit ,hippocrate4 ,mais une me ne peut lire en elle mme que ce qui y est represent distinctement3 elle ne sauroit developper tout d'un coup ses rgles1 car elles vont l'infini4 ,ainsi quoique chaque monade cre reprsente tout l',univers1 elle reprsente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est particulirement affect1 et dont elle fait l',entlchie4 ,et comme ce corps exprime tout l',univers par la connexion de toute la matire dans le plein1 l'me reprsente aussi tout l',univers en reprsentant ce corps qui lui appartient d'une manire particulire 7,leibnitz1 ,monadologie1 sect4 #fa-fb1 ,no4 #hh1 p4 #gaj2 ,opp4 ,leibn4 ed4 ,erdmann74 ,again1 ,leibnitz1 in another ,dissertation3 ,comme cause de la plnitude du monde tout est li1 et chaque corps agit sur chaque autre corps1 plus ou moins1 selon la distance1 et en est affect par la raction--il s'ensuit que chaque monade est un miroir vivant1 ou dou d'action interne1 reprsentatif de l',univers1 suivant son point de vue1 et aussi rgl que l',univers mme 7,principes de la ,nature et de la ,grace1 p4 #gad1 ed4 ,erdmann2 also ,systme ,nouveau1 p4 #abh1 a4 #cf74 ,leibnitz expresses more than once how much his own metaphysical views agreed with those of ,plato4 ,lettre ,m4 ,bourguet1 pp4 #gbc-gbe4 ,he expresses his belief in the pre-existence of the soul3 ,tout ce que je crois pouvoir assurer1 est1 que l'me de tout animal a prexist1 et a t dans un corps organique3 qui enfin1 par beaucoup de changemens1 involutions1 et volutions1 est devenu l'animal prsent 7,lettre ,m4 ,bourguet1 p4 #gca74 ,and in the ,platonic doctrine of reminiscence to a certain point3 ,,ii y a quelque chose de solide dans ce que dit ,platon de la rminiscence 7p4 #acg1 b4 #aj74 ,also ,leibnitz's ,nouveaux ,essais sur l',entendement ,humain1 p4 #aif1 b4 #bh2 and ,epistol4 ad ,hanschium1 p4 #ddf1 a4 #ab4 ,see the elaborate account of the philosophy of ,leibnitz by ,dr4 ,kuno ,fischer--,geschichte der neueren ,philosophie1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #bbf-bcb4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ha ,d4 ,greek3 e7a_/n tis a7ndreios 71 kai m a7poka_/mn ztn4 ,compare also p4 #hf ,b4 ,side-note3 ,plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference between the ,menon1 ,phdrus1 and ,phdon4 ,in various other dialogues of ,plato1 the same hypothesis is found repeated4 ,his conception of the immortality of the soul or mind1 includes pre-existence as well as post-existence3 a perpetual succession of temporary lives1 each in a distinct body1 each terminated by death1 and each followed by renewed life for a time in another body4 ,in fact1 the pre-existence of the mind formed the most important part of ,plato's theory about immortality3 for he employed it as the means of explaining how the mind became possessed of general notions4 ,as the doctrine is stated in the ,menon1 it is made applicable to all minds 7instead of being confined1 as in ,phdrus1 ,phdon1 and elsewhere1 to a few highly gifted minds1 and to commerce with the intelligible substances called ,ideas74 ,this appears from the person chosen to illustrate the alleged possibility of stimulating artificial reminiscence3 that person is an unlettered youth1 taken at hazard from among the numerous slaves of ,menon4#db ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,menon1 pp4 #hb ,a1 #he ,e4 ,greek3 proska_/leson tn polln a7kolou_/thn toutni tn sautou e7_/na1 o7_/ntina bou_/lei1 i7_/na e7n tou_/t soi e7pidei_/xmai4 ,stallbaum says that this allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of ,menon4 ,in my judgment1 it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident--the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon--one among many1 which you please4 ,side-note3 ,doctrine of ,plato1 that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct8 ,it is true1 indeed 7as ,schleiermacher observes71 that the questions put by ,sokrates to this youth are in great proportion leading questions1 suggesting their own answers4 ,they would not have served their purpose unless they had been such4 ,the illustration here furnished1 of the ,sokratic interrogatory process1 is highly interesting1 and his theory is in a great degree true4#dc ,not all learning1 but an important part of learning1 consists in reminiscence--not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent life1 but of past experience and judgments in this life4 ,of such experience and judgments every one has travelled through a large course2 which has disappeared from his memory1 yet not irrevocably4 ,portions of it may be revived1 if new matter be presented to the mind1 fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of association4 ,by suitable interrogations1 a teacher may thus recall to the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been hitherto forgotten3 he may bring into juxtaposition those which have never before been put together in the mind3 and he may thus make them elicit instructive comparisons and inferences4 ,he may provoke the pupils to strike out new results for themselves1 or to follow1 by means of their own stock of knowledge1 in the path suggested by the questions4 ,he may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of erroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible2 and to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing ignorance1 before he puts those questions which indicate the way of escape from it4 ,upon the necessity of producing such painful consciousness of ignorance ,plato insists emphatically1 as is his custom4#dd ,footnote #dc3 ,plutarch 7,fragment4 ,greek3 ,peri psuchs74 ,ei7 a7ph' e7te_/rou e7_/teron e7nnooumen8 ou7k a7_/n1 ei7 m proe_/gnsto4 ,to e7pichei_/rma ,platniko_/n4 ,ei7 prosti_/themen to e7_/lleipon tois ai7sthtois8--kai au7to ,platniko_/n4 ,plutarch1 in the same fragment1 indicates some of the objections made by ,bion and ,straton against the doctrine of ,greek3 a7na_/mnsis4 ,how 7they asked7 does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often what is false or absurd8 7asked ,bion74 ,if such reminiscence exists 7asked ,straton7 how comes it that we require demonstrations to conduct us to knowledge8 and how is it that no man can play on the flute or the harp without practice8 ,greek3 ,o7_/ti ,bi_/n 7po_/rei peri tou pseu_/dous1 ei7 kai au7to kat' a7na_/mnsin1 7s to e7nanti_/on ge1 7 ou7_/8 kai ti_/ 7 a7logi_/a8 ,o7_/ti ,stra_/tn 7po_/rei1 ei7 e7_/stin a7namnsis1 ps a7_/neu a7podei_/xen ou7 gigno_/metha e7pist_/mones8 ps de ou7deis au7lts 7 kitharists ge_/gonen a7_/neu mele_/ts8 ,footnote #dd3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #hd4 ,the sixteenth ,dissertation of ,maximus ,tyrius presents a rhetorical amplification of this doctrine--,greek3 pasa ma_/thsis1 a7na_/mnsis--in which he enters fully into the spirit of the ,menon and the ,phdon--,greek3 au7todi_/dakto_/n ti chrma 7 psuch_/--7 psuchs eu7_/resis1 au7togen_/s tis ou7sa1 kai au7tophus1 kai xu_/mphutos1 ti_/ a7_/llo e7_/stin 7 do_/xai a7ltheis e7geiro_/menai1 7n t e7pege_/rsei te kai xunta_/xei e7pist_/m o7_/noma8 7c4 #f74 ,compare also ,cicero1 ,tusc4 ,d4 i4 #bd4 ,the doctrine has furnished a theme for very elegant poetry3 both in the ,consolatio ,philosophi of ,boethius--the piece which ends with ,ac si ,platonis ,musa personat verum1 ,quod quisque discit1 immemor recordatur-- and in ,wordsworth--,our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting1 c4 ,on the other hand ,aristotle alludes also to the same doctrine and criticises it2 but he does not seem 7so far as ,i can understand this brief allusion7 to seize exactly ,plato's meaning4 ,this is the remark of the ,scholiast on ,aristotle3 and ,i think it just4 ,it is curious to compare the way in which ,greek3 a7na_/mnsis is handled by ,plato in the ,menon and ,phdon1 and by ,aristotle in the valuable little tract--,greek3 ,peri mn_/ns kai a7namn_/ses 7p4 #dea1 b474 ,aristotle has his own way of replying to the difficulty raised in the question of ,menon1 and tries to show that sometimes we know in one sense and do not know in another4 ,see ,aristotel4 ,anal4 ,prior41 ii4 p4 #fg1 a4 #bb2 ,anal4 ,poster4 i4 p4 #ga1 a4 #bg2 and the ,scholia on the former passage1 p4 #aic1 b4 #ba1 ed4 ,brandis4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 in one of the ,appendixes to his edition of ,reid's ,works 7,append4 ,d4 p4 #hij seq471 has given a learned and valuable translation and illustration of the treatise of ,aristotle ,greek3 ,peri ,a7namn_/ses4 ,i note1 however1 with some surprise1 that while collecting many interesting comments from writers who lived after ,aristotle1 he has not adverted to what was said upon this same subject by ,plato1 before ,aristotle4 ,it was the more to be expected that he would do this1 since he insists so emphatically upon the complete originality of ,aristotle4 ,side-note3 ,plato's doctrine about priori reasonings--,different from the modern doctrine4 ,plato does not intend here to distinguish 7as many modern writers distinguish7 geometry from other sciences1 as if geometry were known priori1 and other sciences known posteriori or from experience4 ,he does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that no man can possibly believe the contrary of them2 or that they are different in this respect from the truths of any other science4 ,he here maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught mind1#de but buried1 forgotten1 and confused3 so as to require the skill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness1 but to disentangle truth from error4 ,far from supposing that the untaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical questions1 he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally than true answers1 and as requiring a process of painful exposure before the mind can be put upon the right track4 ,the questioner1 without possessing any knowledge himself1 7so ,plato thinks17 can nevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating1 corrective1 and directive4 ,he stimulates the action of the associative process1 to call up facts1 comparisons1 and analogies1 bearing on the question3 he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer1 creating within him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment3 he directs him by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers4 ,his obstetric aid 7to use the simile in ,plato's ,thetetus71 though presupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind1 is indispensable both to forward the childbirth1 and to throw away any offspring which may happen to be deformed4 ,in the ,thetetus1 the main stress is laid on that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner3 in the ,menon1 upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an untaught respondent4 ,footnote #de3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #he ,e4 ,greek3 ou7tos gar 7the untaught slave7 ,greek3 poi_/sei peri pa_/ss gemetri_/as tau7ta tauta1 kai tn a7_/lln mathma_/tn a7pa_/ntn4 ,the mind of the slave questioned by ,sokrates is discovered to be pregnant4 ,though he has received no teaching from any professed geometer1 he is nevertheless found competent1 when subjected to a skilful interrogatory1 to arrive at last1 through a series of mistakes1 at correct answers1 determining certain simple problems of geometry4 ,he knows nothing about geometry3 nevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that which he does not know4 ,these opinions are called up like a dream by the interrogatories3 which1 if repeated and diversified1 convert the opinions into knowledge1 taken up by the respondent out of himself4#df ,the opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and born with him1 since they have never been taught to him during this life4 ,footnote #df3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #he4 ,greek3 t ou7k eido_/ti a7_/ra peri 7n a7n m ei7d e7_/neisin a7ltheis do_/xai4 4 4 4 kai nun me_/n ge au7t 7_/sper o7_/nar a7_/rti a7nakeki_/nntai ai7 do_/xai au7tai2 ei7 de au7to_/n tis a7ner_/setai polla_/kis ta au7ta tauta kai pollach1 oi7sth' o7_/ti teleutn ou7denos 7tton a7kribs e7pist_/setai peri au7tn4 4 4 4 ,ou7koun ou7denos dida_/xantos a7ll' e7rt_/santos e7pist_/setai1 a7nalabn au7tos e7x au7tou tn e7pist_/mn8 ,side-note3 ,plato's theory about pre-natal experience4 ,he took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience4 ,it is thus that ,plato applies to philosophical theory the doctrine 7borrowed from the ,pythagoreans7 of pre-natal experience and cognitions3 which he considers1 not as inherent appurtenances of the mind1 but as acquisitions made by the mind during various antecedent lives4 ,these ideas 7,plato argues7 cannot have been acquired during the present life1 because the youth has received no special teaching in geometry4 ,but ,plato here takes no account of the multiplicity and diversity of experiences gone through1 comparisons made1 and acquirements lodged1 in the mind of a youthful adult however unlettered4 ,he recognises no acquisition of knowledge except through special teaching4 ,so1 too1 in the ,protagoras1 we shall find him putting into the mouth of ,sokrates the doctrine--,that virtue is not taught and cannot be taught1 because there were no special masters or times of teaching4 ,but in that dialogue we shall also see ,plato furnishing an elaborate reply to this doctrine in the speech of ,protagoras2 who indicates the multifarious and powerful influences which are perpetually operative1 even without special professors1 in creating and enforcing ethical sentiment4 ,if ,plato had taken pains to study the early life of the untaught slave1 with its stock of facts1 judgments1 comparisons1 and inferences suggested by analogy1 c41 he might easily have found enough to explain the competence of the slave to answer the questions appearing in the dialogue4 ,and even if enough could not have been found1 to afford a direct and specific explanation--we must remember that only a very small proportion of the long series of mental phenomena realised in the infant1 the child1 the youth1 ever comes to be remembered or recorded4 ,to assume that the large unknown remainder would be insufficient1 if known1 to afford the explanation sought1 is neither philosophical nor reasonable4 ,this is assumed in every form of the doctrine of innate ideas3 and assumed by ,plato here without even trying any explanation to dispense with the hypothesis3 simply because the youth interrogated had never received any special instruction in geometry4 ,side-note3 ,little or nothing is said in the ,menon about the ,platonic ,ideas or ,forms4 ,i have already observed1 that though great stress is laid in this dialogue upon the doctrine of opinions and knowledge inherited from an antecedent life--upon the distinction between true opinion and knowledge--and upon the identity of the process of learning with reminiscence--yet nothing is said about universal ,ideas or ,forms1 so much dwelt upon in other dialogues4 ,in the ,phdrus and ,phdon1 it is with these universal ,ideas that the mind is affirmed to have had communion during its prior existence1 as contrasted with the particulars of sense apprehended during the present life3 while in the ,menon1 the difference pointed out between true opinions and knowledge is something much less marked and decisive4 ,both the one and the other are said to be1 not acquired during this life1 but inherited from antecedent life3 to be innate1 yet unperceived--revived by way of reminiscence and interrogation4 ,true opinions are affirmed to render as much service as knowledge1 in reference to practice4 ,there is only this distinction between them--that true opinions are transient1 and will not remain in the mind until they are bound in it by causal reasoning1 or become knowledge4 ,side-note3 ,what ,plato meant by ,causal ,reasoning--his distinction between knowledge and right opinion4 ,what ,plato meant by this causal reasoning1 or computation of cause1 is not clearly explained4 ,but he affirms very unequivocally1 first1 that the distinction between true opinion and knowledge is one of the few things of which he feels assured#dg--next1 with somewhat less confidence1 that the distinction consists only in the greater security which knowledge affords for permanent in-dwelling in the mind4 ,this appears substantially the same distinction as what is laid down in other words towards the close of the dialogue--,that those1 who have only true opinions and not knowledge1 judge rightly without knowing how or why2 by an aptitude not their own but supplied to them from without for the occasion1 in the nature of inspiration or prophetic oestrus4 ,hence they are unable to teach others1 or to transfer this occasional inspiration to any one else4 ,they cannot give account of what they affect to know1 nor answer scrutinizing questions to test it4 ,this power of answering and administering cross-examination1 is ,plato's characteristic test of real knowledge--as ,i have already observed in my eighth9999 chapter4 ,footnote #dg3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ih ,b4 ,greek3 o7_/ti de_/ e7sti_/ ti a7lloion o7rth do_/xa kai e7pist_/m1 ou7 pa_/nu moi dok touto ei7ka_/zein2 a7ll' ei7_/per ti a7_/llo phai_/n a7n ei7de_/nai1 o7li_/ga d' a7n phai_/n1 e7n d' ou7n kai touto e7kei_/nn thei_/n a7n 7n oi7da4 ,side-note3 ,this distinction compared with modern philosophical views4 ,to translate the views of ,plato into analogous views of a modern philosopher1 we may say--,that right opinion1 as contrasted with knowledge1 is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment3 inferring only from old particulars to new particulars 7without the intermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly enunciated and interpreted71 but selecting for every new case the appropriate analogies out of the past1 with which it ought to be compared4 ,many persons judge in this manner fairly well1 and some with extreme success4 ,but let them be ever so successful in practice1 they proceed without any conscious method2 they are unable to communicate the grounds of their inferences to others3 and when they are right1 it is only by haphazard--that is 7to use ,plato's language71 through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the ,gods4 ,but when they ascend to knowledge1 and come to judge scientifically1 they then distribute these particular facts into classes--note the constant sequences as distinguished from the occasional--and draw their inferences in every new case according to such general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent4 ,such uniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we have cognizance4 ,they admit of being described in the language which ,plato here uses 7,greek3 ai7ti_/as logism71 and they also serve as reasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others4#dh ,footnote #dh3 ,we have seen that in the ,menon ,plato denies all ,greek3 didach_/1 and recognises nothing but ,greek3 a7na_/mnsis4 ,the doctrine of the ,timus 7p4 #ea ,d-,e7 is very different4 ,he there lays especial stress on the distinction between ,greek3 didach and ,greek3 peith_/--the first belonging to ,greek3 e7pist_/m1 the second to ,greek3 do_/xa4 ,also in ,gorgias1 #ded1 and in ,republic1 v4 pp4 #dgg-dgi1 about ,greek3 do_/xa and ,greek3 e7pist_/m4 ,in those dialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and fundamental1 as if ,greek3 do_/xa alone was fallible and ,greek3 e7pist_/m infallible4 ,in the ,menon the distinction appears as important1 but not fundamental2 the ,platonic ,ideas or ,universals being not recognised as constituting a substantive world by themselves4 ,in this respect the ,menon is nearer to the truth in describing the difference between ,greek3 o7rth do_/xa and ,greek3 e7pist_/m4 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7in the chapter of his ,system of ,logic wherein the true theory of the ,syllogism is for the first time expounded7 has clearly explained what that difference amounts to4 ,all our inferences are from particulars1 sometimes to new particulars directly and at once 7,greek3 do_/xa71 sometimes to generals in the first instance1 and through them to new particulars2 which latter1 or scientific process1 is highly valuable as a security for correctness 7,greek3 e7pist_/m74 ,not only 7says ,mr4 ,mill7 may we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through generals1 but we perpetually do so reason4 ,all our earliest inferences are of this nature4 ,from the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences1 but years elapse before we learn the use of general language4 ,we are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people1 or from one person to another1 without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature4 ,if we have an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly1 we may acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate judgment1 which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of communicating to others4 ,among the higher order of practical intellects1 there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends1 without being able to give any sufficient account of what they did2 and applied1 or seemed to apply1 recondite principles which they were wholly unable to state4 ,this is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars1 and having been accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh particulars1 without practising the habit of stating to one's self or others the corresponding general propositions4 ,the cases of men of talent performing wonderful things they know not how1 are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous forms of the operations of superior minds4 ,it is a defect in them1 and often a source of errors1 not to have generalised as they went on2 but generalisation1 though a help1 the most important indeed of all helps1 is not an essential 7,mill1 ,syst4 of ,logic1 ,book ,,ii4 ch4 iii474 ,compare the first chapter of the ,metaphysica of ,aristotle1 p4 #ihj1 a4 #ae1 b4 #g4 ,side-note3 ,manifestation of ,anytus--intense antipathy to the ,sophists and to philosophy generally4 ,the manner in which ,anytus1 the accuser of ,sokrates before the ,dikastery1 is introduced into this dialogue1 deserves notice4 ,the questions are put to him by ,sokrates--,is virtue teachable8 ,how is ,menon to learn virtue1 and from whom8 ,ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music3 to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher8 ,anytus answers these questions in the affirmative3 but asks1 where such professional teachers of virtue are to be found4 ,there are the ,sophists1 replies ,sokrates4 ,upon this ,anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the ,sophists2 denouncing them as corruptors of youth1 whom none but a madman would consult1 and who ought to be banished by public authority4 ,why are you so bitter against the ,sophists8 asks ,sokrates4 ,have any of them ever injured you8 ,anyt4--,no2 never3 ,i have never been in the company of any one of them1 nor would ,i ever suffer any of my family to be so4 ,sokr4--,then you have no experience whatever about the ,sophists8 ,anyt4--,none3 and ,i hope that ,i never may have4 ,sokr4--,how then can you know about this matter1 how far it is good or bad1 if you have no experience whatever about it8 ,anyt4--,easily4 ,i know what sort of men the ,sophists are1 whether ,i have experience of them or not4 ,sokr4--,perhaps you are a prophet1 ,anytus3 for how else you can know about them1 ,i do not understand1 even on your own statement4#di ,footnote #di3 ,plato1 ,menon1 p4 #ib4 ,anytus then declares1 that the persons from whom ,menon ought to learn virtue are the leading practical politicians2 and that any one of them can teach it4 ,but ,sokrates puts a series of questions1 showing that the leading ,athenian politicians1 ,themistokls1 ,perikls1 c41 have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons3 fortiori1 therefore1 they cannot teach it to any one else4 ,anytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious towards the great men of ,athens4 ,he breaks off the conversation abruptly1 with an angry warning to ,sokrates to be cautious about his language1 and to take care of his own safety4 ,the dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between ,sokrates and ,menon3 and at the close of it1 ,sokrates says--,talk to ,anytus1 and communicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself contracted1#ej in order that he may be more mildly disposed3 for1 if you persuade him1 you will do some good to the ,athenians as well as to himself4 ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,menon1 ad fin4 ,greek3 su de tauta a7_/per au7tos pe_/peisai1 peithe kai ton xe_/non to_/nde ,a7_/nuton1 i7_/na prao_/teros 72 7s e7an pei_/ss touton1 e7_/stin o7_/1 ti kai ,a7thnai_/ous o7n_/seis4 ,side-note3 ,the enemy of ,sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists--,practical statesmen4 ,the enemy and accuser of ,sokrates is here depicted as the bitter enemy of the ,sophists also4 ,and ,plato takes pains to exhibit the enmity of ,anytus to the ,sophists as founded on no facts or experience4 ,without having seen or ascertained anything about them1 ,anytus hates them as violently as if he had sustained from them some personal injury2 a sentiment which many ,platonic critics and many historians of philosophy have inherited from him4#ea ,whether the corruption which these ,sophists were accused of bringing about in the minds of youth1 was intentional or not intentional on their part--how such corruption could have been perpetually continued1 while at the same time the eminent ,sophists enjoyed long and unabated esteem from the youth themselves and from their relatives--are difficulties which ,anytus does not attempt to explain1 though they are started here by ,sokrates4 ,indeed we find the same topics employed by ,sokrates himself1 in his defence before the ,dikasts against the same charge4#eb ,anytus has confidence in no one except the practical statesmen3 and when a question is raised about their power to impart their own excellence to others1 he presently takes offence against ,sokrates also4 ,the same causes which have determined his furious antipathy against the ,sophists1 make him ready to transfer the like antipathy to ,sokrates4 ,he is a man of plain sense1 practical habits1 and conservative patriotism--who worships what he finds accredited as virtue1 and dislikes the talkers and theorisers about virtue in general3 whether they debated in subtle interrogation and dialectics1 like ,sokrates--or lectured in eloquent continuous discourse1 like ,protagoras4 ,he accuses the ,sophists1 in this dialogue1 of corrupting the youth2 just as he and ,meltus1 before the ,dikastery1 accused ,sokrates of the same offence4 ,he understands the use of words1 to discuss actual business before the assembly or dikastery2 but he hates discourse on the generalities of ethics or philosophy4 ,he is essentially ,greek3 miso_/logos4 ,the point which he condemns in the ,sophists1 is that which they have in common with ,sokrates4 ,footnote #ea3 ,upon the bitter antipathy here expressed by ,anytus against the ,sophists1 whom nevertheless he admits that he does not at all know1 ,steinhart remarks as follows3--,gerade so haben zu allen ,zeiten ,orthodoxe und ,fanatiker aller ,arten ber ihre ,gegner abgeurtheilt1 ohne sie zu kennen oder auch nur kennen lernen zu wollen 7,einleit4 zum ,menon1 not4 #ae1 p4 #agc74 ,certainly orthodox and fanatical persons often do what is here imputed to them4 ,but ,steinhart might have found a still closer parallel with ,anytus1 in his own criticisms1 and in those of many other ,platonic critics on the ,sophists2 the same expressions of bitterness and severity1 with the same slender knowledge of the persons upon whom they bear4 ,footnote #eb3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokr4 pp4 #bf ,a1 #cc ,d1 #cd ,b4 ,side-note3 ,the ,menon brings forward the point of analogy between ,sokrates and the ,sophists1 in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen4 ,in many of the ,platonic dialogues we have the antithesis between ,sokrates and the ,sophists brought out1 as to the different point of view from which the one and the other approached ethical questions4 ,but in this portion of the ,menon1 we find exhibited the feature of analogy between them1 in which both one and the other stood upon ground obnoxious to the merely practical politicians4 ,far from regarding hatred against the ,sophists as a mark of virtue in ,anytus1 ,sokrates deprecates it as unwarranted and as menacing to philosophy in all her manifestations4 ,the last declaration ascribed to ,anytus1 coupled with the last speech of ,sokrates in the dialogue1 show us that ,plato conceives the anti-,sophistic antipathy as being anti-,sokratic also1 in its natural consequences4 ,that ,sokrates was in common parlance a ,sophist1 disliked by a large portion of the general public1 and ridiculed by ,aristophanes1 on the same grounds as those whom ,plato calls ,sophists--is a point which ,i have noticed elsewhere4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,protagoras4 ,side-note3 ,scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue4 ,the dialogue called ,protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied and celebrated characters1 with more of dramatic winding1 and more frequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation1 than any dialogue of ,plato--not excepting even ,symposion and ,republic4 ,it exhibits ,sokrates in controversy with the celebrated ,sophist ,protagoras1 in the presence of a distinguished society1 most of whom take occasional part in the dialogue4 ,this controversy is preceded by a striking conversation between ,sokrates and ,hippokrates--a youth of distinguished family1 eager to profit by the instructions of ,protagoras4 ,the two ,sophists ,prodikus and ,hippias1 together with ,kallias1 ,kritias1 ,alkibiades1 ,eryximachus1 ,phdrus1 ,pausanias1 ,agathon1 the two sons of ,perikls 7,paralus and ,xanthippus71 ,charmides1 son of ,glaukon1 ,antimoerus of ,mende1 a promising pupil of ,protagoras1 who is in training for the profession of a ,sophist--these and others are all present at the meeting1 which is held in the house of ,kallias4#a ,sokrates himself recounts the whole--both his conversation with ,hippokrates and that with ,protagoras--to a nameless friend4 ,footnote #a3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cae4 ,this dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical theory than anything in the others hitherto noticed4 ,but it contains also a great deal in which we hardly recognise1 or at least cannot verify1 any distinct purpose1 either of search or exposition4 ,much of it seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view1 to enhance the charm or interest of the composition4 ,the personal characteristics of each speaker--the intellectual peculiarities of ,prodikus and ,hippias--the ardent partisanship of ,alkibiades--are brought out as in a real drama4 ,but the great and marked antithesis is that between the ,sophist ,protagoras and ,sokrates--the ,hektor and ,ajax of the piece3 who stand forward in single combat1 exchange some serious blows1 yet ultimately part as friends4 ,side-note3 ,introduction4 ,eagerness of the youthful ,hippokrates to become acquainted with ,protagoras4 ,an introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the celebrity of the ,great ,sophist1 and the earnest interest excited by his visit to ,athens4 ,hippokrates1 a young man of noble family and eager aspirations for improvement1 having just learnt the arrival of ,protagoras1 comes to the house of ,sokrates and awakens him before daylight1 entreating that ,sokrates will introduce him to the new-comer4 ,he is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he may become wise like ,protagoras4#b ,while they are awaiting a suitable hour for such introduction1 ,sokrates puts a series of questions to test the force of ,hippokrates4#c ,footnote #b3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #caj-caa ,a4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #caa ,b4 ,greek3 kai e7g popeir_/menos tou ,i7ppokra_/tous ts r7_/ms diesko_/poun au7ton kai 7r_/tn1 c4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates questions ,hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from ,protagoras4 ,sokr4--,you are now intending to visit ,protagoras1 and to pay him for something to be done for you--tell me what manner of man it is that you are going to visit--and what manner of man do you wish to become8 ,if you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction to your namesake ,hippokrates of ,kos1 you would tell me that you were going to him as to a physician--and that you wished to qualify yourself for becoming a physician4 ,if you were addressing yourself with the like view to ,pheidias or ,polykleitus1 you would go to them as to sculptors1 and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor4 ,now then that we are to go in all this hurry to ,protagoras1 tell me who he is and what title he bears1 as we called ,pheidias a sculptor8 ,hipp4--,they call him a ,sophist4#d ,sokr4--,we are going to pay him then as a ,sophist8 ,hipp4--,certainly4 ,sokr4--,and what are you to become by going to him8 ,hipp4--,why1 judging from the preceding analogies1 ,i am to become a ,sophist4 ,sokr4--,but would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to the ,grecian public as a ,sophist8 ,hipp4--,yes3 if ,i am to tell you my real opinion4#e ,sokr4--,perhaps however you only propose to visit ,protagoras1 as you visited your schoolmaster and your musical or gymnastical teacher3 not for the purpose of entering that career as a professional man1 but to acquire such instruction as is suitable for a private citizen and a freeman8 ,hipp4--,that is more the instruction which ,i seek from ,protagoras4 ,sokr4--,do you know then what you are going to do8 ,you are consigning your mind to be treated by one whom you call a ,sophist3 but ,i shall be surprised if you know what a ,sophist is#f--;and if you do not know1 neither do you know what it is--good or evil--to which you are consigning your mind4 ,hipp4--,i think ,i do know4 ,the ,sophist is1 as the name implies1 one cognizant of matters wise and able4#g ,sokr4--,that may be said also of painters and carpenters4 ,if we were asked in what special department are painters cognizant of matters wise and able1 we should specify that it was in the workmanship of portraits4 ,answer me the same question about the ,sophist4 ,what sort of workmanship does he direct8 ,hipp4--,that of forming able speakers4#h ,sokr4--,your answer may be correct1 but it is not specific enough3 for we must still ask1 ,about what is it that the ,sophist forms able speakers8 just as the harp-master makes a man an able speaker about harping1 at the same time that he teaches him harping4 ,about what is it that the ,sophist forms able speakers3 of course about that which he himself knows8#i ,hipp4--,probably4 ,sokr4--,what then is that1 about which the ,sophist is himself cognizant1 and makes his pupil cognizant8 ,hipp4--,by ,zeus1 ,i cannot give you any farther answer4#aj ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,protagoras1 p4 #caa4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cab ,a4 ,greek3 su de_/1 7n d' e7g_/1 pros then1 ou7k a7n ai7schu_/noio ei7s tous ,e7_/llnas sauton sophistn pare_/chn8 ,n ton ,di_/'1 7 ,s_/krates1 ei7_/per ge a7 dianooumai chr le_/gein4 ,ast 7,platon's ,leben1 p4 #gh7 and other ,platonic critics treat this ,sophistomanie 7as they call it7 of an ,athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible3 all the more ludicrous because 7they say7 none of them goes to qualify himself for becoming a ,sophist1 but would even be ashamed of the title4 ,yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young ,englishman of rank and fortune 7as ,hippokrates was at ,athens71 ,why do you put yourself under the teaching of ,dr4 ---- at ,eton or ,professor ---- at ,oxford8 ,do you intend to qualify yourself for becoming a schoolmaster or a professor8 ,he will laugh at you for the question2 if he answers it seriously1 he will probably answer as ,hippokrates does4 ,but there is nothing at all in the question to imply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless pretender--or the youth foolish1 for being anxious to obtain instruction from him2 which is the inference that ,ast and other ,platonic critics desire us to draw about the ,athenian ,sophists4 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cab ,c4 ,greek3 o7_/1 ti de_/ pote o7 sophist_/s e7sti1 thauma_/zoim' a7n ei7 oi7stha1 c4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cab ,c4 ,greek3 7_/s per tou7_/noma le_/gei1 ton tn sophn e7pist_/mona4 7,quasi sophistes sit--,greek3 o7 tn sophn i7_/sts1 ,heindorf47 ,if this supposition of ,heindorf be just1 we may see in it an illustration of the etymological views of ,plato1 which ,i shall notice when ,i come to the ,kratylus4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cab ,d4 ,greek3 poi_/as e7rgasi_/as e7pista_/ts8 e7pista_/tn tou poisai deinon le_/gein4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cab ,d-,e4 ,greek3 e7rt_/ses gar e7_/ti 7 a7po_/krisis 7min deitai1 peri o7_/tou o7 sophists deinon poiei le_/gein2 7_/sper o7 kitharists deinon d_/pou poiei le_/gein peri ou7per kai e7pist_/mona1 peri kithari_/ses4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cab ,e4 ,side-note3 ,danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a ,sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach4 ,sokr4--,do you see then to what danger you are going to submit your mind8 ,if the question were about going to trusting your body to any one1 with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound1 you would have thought long1 and taken much advice1 before you decided4 ,but now1 when it is about your mind1 which you value more than your body1 and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn#aa--you are hastening without reflection and without advice1 you are ready to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain1 with a firm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under ,protagoras3 whom you do not know--with whom you have never once talked--whom you call a ,sophist1 without knowing what a ,sophist is8 ,hipp4--,i must admit the case to be as you say4#ab ,sokr4--,perhaps the ,sophist is a man who brings for sale those transportable commodities1 instruction or doctrine1 which form the nourishment of the mind4 ,now the traders in food for the body praise indiscriminately all that they have to sell1 though neither they nor their purchasers know whether it is good for the body2 unless by chance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician4#ac ,so1 too1 these ,sophists1 who carry about food for the mind1 praise all that they have to sell3 but perhaps some of them are ignorant1 and assuredly their purchasers are ignorant1 whether it be good or bad for the mind3 unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge about the mind4 ,now if you1 ,hippokrates1 happen to possess such knowledge of what is good or bad for the mind1 you may safely purchase doctrine from ,protagoras or from any one else3#ad but if not1 you are hazarding and putting at stake your dearest interests4 ,the purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that of eatables or drinkables4 ,as to these latter1 you may carry them away with you in separate vessels1 and before you take them into your body you may invoke the ,expert1 to tell you what you may safely eat and drink1 and when1 and how much4 ,but this cannot be done with doctrines4 ,you cannot carry away them in a separate vessel to be tested2 you learn them and take them into the mind itself2 so that you go away1 after having paid your money1 actually damaged or actually benefited1 as the case may be4#ae ,we will consider these matters in conjunction with our elders4 ,but first let us go and talk with ,protagoras--we can consult the others afterwards4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cac ,a4 ,greek3 o7 de peri plei_/onos tou s_/matos 7gei1 tn psuchn1 kai e7n 7 pa_/nt' e7sti ta sa 7 eu7 7 kals pra_/ttein1 chrstou 7 ponrou au7tou genome_/nou1 c4 ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cac ,c4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cac ,d4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cac ,e4 ,greek3 e7an m_/ tis tu_/ch peri tn psuchn au7 i7atrikos 7_/n4 ei7 men ou7n su tugcha_/neis e7pist_/mn tou_/tn ti_/ chrston kai ponro_/n1 a7sphale_/s soi 7neisthai math_/mata kai para ,prtago_/rou kai par' a7_/llou o7tounoun2 ei7 de m_/1 o7_/ra1 7 phi_/ltate1 m peri tois philta_/tois kubeu_/s te kai kinduneu_/s4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cad ,a4 ,greek3 siti_/a men gar kai pota pria_/menon e7_/xestin e7n a7_/llois a7ggei_/ois a7pophe_/rein1 kai prin de_/xasthai au7ta e7s to sma pio_/nta 7 phago_/nta1 katathe_/menon oi7_/kade e7_/xesti sumbouleu_/sasthai parakale_/santa ton e7pai_/onta1 o7_/1 ti te e7deste_/on 7 pote_/on kai o7_/1 ti m_/1 kai o7po_/son1 kai o7po_/te2 4 4 4 4 math_/mata de ou7k e7_/stin e7n a7_/ll a7ggei_/ a7penegkein1 a7ll' a7na_/gk katathe_/nta tn timn to ma_/thma e7n au7t t psuch labo_/nta kai matho_/nta a7pie_/nai 7 beblamme_/non 7 7phelme_/non4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks on the ,introduction4 ,false persuasion of knowledge brought to light4 ,such is the preliminary conversation of ,sokrates with ,hippokrates1 before the interview with ,protagoras4 ,i have given it 7like the introduction to the ,lysis7 at considerable length1 because it is a very characteristic specimen of the ,sokratico-,platonic point of view4 ,it brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge1 under which men unconsciously act1 especially in what concerns the mind and its treatment4 ,common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most vehement aspirations towards a lecturer1 in one who has never stopped to reflect or enquire what the lecturer does4 ,the pressure applied by ,sokrates in his successive questions1 to get beyond vague generalities into definite particulars--the insufficiency1 thereby exposed1 of the conceptions with which men usually rest satisfied--exhibit the working of his ,elenchus in one of its most instructive ways4 ,the parallel drawn between the body and the mind--the constant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the professional man and to follow his advice in respect both to discipline and nourishment--are in the same vein of sentiment which we have already followed in other dialogues4 ,here too1 as elsewhere1 some similar ,expert1 in reference to the ethical and intellectual training of mind1 is desiderated1 as still more imperatively necessary4 ,yet where is he to be found8 ,how is the business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue without him8 ,or is ,protagoras the man to supply such a demand8 ,we shall presently see4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,sokrates and ,hippokrates go to the house of ,kallias4 ,company therein4 ,respect shown to ,protagoras4 ,sokrates and ,hippokrates proceed to the house of ,kallias1 and find him walking about in the fore-court with ,protagoras1 and some of the other company2 all of whom are described as treating the ,sophist with almost ostentatious respect4 ,prodikus and ,hippias have each their separate hearers1 in or adjoining to the court4 ,sokrates addresses ,protagoras4 ,side-note3 ,questions of ,sokrates to ,protagoras4 ,answer of the latter1 declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession1 and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist4 ,sokr4--,protagoras1 ,i and ,hippokrates here are come to talk to you about something4 ,prot4--,do you wish to tak to me alone1 or in presence of the rest8 ,sokr4--,to us it is indifferent3 but ,i will tell you what we come about1 and you may then determine for yourself4 ,this ,hippokrates is a young man of noble family1 and fully equal to his contemporaries in capacity4 ,he wishes to become distinguished in the city2 and he thinks he shall best attain that object through your society4 ,consider whether you would like better to talk with him alone1 or in presence of the rest4#af ,prot4--,your consideration on my behalf1 ,sokrates1 is reasonable4 ,a person of my profession must be cautious in his proceedings4 ,i1 a foreigner1 visit large cities1 persuading the youth of best family to frequent my society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others2 in the conviction that ,i shall do them good4 ,i thus inevitably become exposed to much jealousy and even to hostile conspiracies4#ag ,the sophistical art is an old one2#ah but its older professors1 being afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were1 have always disguised themselves under other titles4 ,some1 like ,homer1 ,hesiod1 and ,simonides1 called themselves poets3 others1 ,orpheus1 ,musus1 c41 professed to prescribe religious rites and mysteries3 others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or teachers of music4 ,but ,i have departed altogether from this policy2 which indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading men--whom alone it was intended to deceive--and which1 when found out1 entailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered deceivers4 ,the true caution consists in open dealing2 and this is what ,i have always adopted4 ,i avow myself a ,sophist1 educating men4 ,i am now advanced in years1 old enough to be the father of any of you1 and have grown old in the profession3 yet during all these years1 thank ,god1 ,i have suffered no harm either from my practice or my title4#ai ,if therefore you desire to converse with me1 it will be far more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now in the house4#bj ,footnote #af3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #caf4 ,the motive assigned by ,hippokrates1 for putting himself under the teaching of ,protagoras1 is just the same as that which ,xenophon assigns to his friend ,proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to the ,leontine ,gorgias 7,xen4 ,anab4 ii4 #f1 #af74 ,footnote #ag3 ,the jealousy felt by fathers1 mothers1 and relatives against a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over their youthful relatives1 is alluded to by ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,apology 7p4 #cg ,e71 and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the ,cyropdia of ,xenophon1 iii4 #a4 #ad-ch4 ,compare also ,xenophon1 ,memorab4 i4 #b1 #eb4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #caf ,d4 ,greek3 e7g de tn sophistikn te_/chnn phmi men ei7nai palaia_/n4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cag ,c4 ,greek3 7_/ste sun the ei7pein mden deinon pa_/schein dia to o7mologein sophists ei7nai4 ,footnote #bj3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cag ,d4 ,in the ,menon1 the ,platonic ,sokrates is made to say that ,protagoras died at the age of seventy2 that he had practised forty years as a ,sophist2 and that during all that long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation1 even after his death1 down to the present day 7,menon1 p4 #ia ,e74 ,it must be remembered that the speech1 of which ,i have just given an abstract1 is delivered not by the historical1 real1 ,protagoras1 but by the character named ,protagoras1 depicted by ,plato in this dialogue3 i4e4 the speech is composed by ,plato himself4 ,i read1 therefore1 with much surprise1 a note of ,heindorf 7ad p4 #caf ,d71 wherein he says about ,protagoras3 ,callid in postremis reticet1 quod addere poterat1 ,greek3 chr_/mata dido_/ntas4 ,protagoras cunningly keeps back1 what he might have here added1 that people gave him money for his teaching4 ,heindorf must surely have supposed that he was commenting upon a real speech1 delivered by the historical person called ,protagoras4 ,otherwise what can be meant by this charge of cunning reticence or keeping back8 ,protagoras here speaks what ,plato puts into his mouth2 neither more nor less4 ,what makes the remark of ,heindorf the more preposterous is1 that in page #cbh ,b the very fact1 which ,protagoras is here said cunningly to keep back1 appears mentioned by ,protagoras2 and mentioned in the same spirit of honourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the discourse which ,i have just 7freely7 translated4 ,indeed nothing can be more marked than the way in which ,plato makes ,protagoras dwell with emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing3 nothing can be more at variance with the character which critics give us of the ,sophists1 as cheats1 who defrauded pupils of their money while teaching them nothing at all1 or what they themselves knew to be false4 ,side-note3 ,protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company4 ,on hearing this1 ,sokrates--under the suspicion 7he tells us7 that ,protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of ,prodikus and ,hippias--proposes to convene all the dispersed guests1 and to talk in their hearing4 ,this is accordingly done1 and the conversation recommences--,sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had preferred on behalf of ,hippokrates4 ,side-note3 ,answers of ,protagoras4 ,he intends to train young men as virtuous citizens4 ,sokr4--,hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the city1 and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing himself under your instruction4 ,he would gladly learn1 ,protagoras1 what will happen to him1 if he comes into intercourse with you4 ,prot4--,young man1 if you come to me1 on the day of your first visit1 you will go home better than you came1 and on the next day the like3 each successive day you will make progress for the better4#ba ,sokr4--,of course he will2 there is nothing surprising in that3 but towards what1 and about what1 will he make progress8 ,prot4--,your question is a reasonable one1 and ,i am glad to reply to it4 ,i shall not throw him back--as other ,sophists do1 with mischievous effect--into the special sciences1 geometry1 arithmetic1 astronomy1 music1 c41 just after he has completed his course in them4 ,i shall teach him what he really comes to learn3 wisdom and good counsel1 both respecting his domestic affairs1 that he may manage his own family well--and respecting the affairs of the city1 that he may address himself to them most efficaciously1 both in speech and act4 ,sokr4--,you speak of political or social science4 ,you engage to make men good citizens4 ,prot4--,exactly so4#bb ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cah ,a4 ,qui ad philosophorum scholas venit1 quotidie secum aliquid boni ferat3 aut sanior domum redeat1 aut sanabilior4 ,seneca1 ,epistol4 #ajh1 p4 #ecj4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cah-cai4 ,the declaration made by ,protagoras--that he will not throw back his pupils into the special arts--is represented by ,plato as intended to be an indirect censure on ,hippias1 then sitting by4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable4 ,reasons for such doubt4 ,protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not4 ,sokr4--,that is a fine talent indeed1 which you possess1 if you do possess it2 for 7to speak frankly7 ,i thought that the thing had not been teachable1 nor intentionally communicable1 by man to man4#bc ,i will tell you why ,i think so4 ,the ,athenians are universally recognised as intelligent men4 ,now when our public assembly is convened1 if the subject of debate be fortification1 ship-building1 or any other specialty which they regard as learnable and teachable1 they will listen to no one except a professional artist or craftsman4#bd ,if any non-professional man presumes to advise them on the subject1 they refuse to hear him1 however rich and well-born he may be4 ,it is thus that they act in matters of any special art2#be but when the debate turns upon the general administration of the city1 they hear every man alike--the brass-worker1 leather-cutter1 merchant1 navigator1 rich1 poor1 well-born1 low-born1 c4 ,against none of them is any exception taken1 as in the former case--that he comes to give advice on that which he has not learnt1 and on which he has had no master4#bf ,it is plain that the public generally think it not teachable4 ,moreover our best and wisest citizens1 those who possess civic virtue in the highest measure1 cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue1 though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which paid masters can impart4 ,perikls and others1 excellent citizens themselves1 have never been able to make any one else excellent1 either in or out of their own family4 ,these reasons make me conclude that social or political virtue is not teachable4 ,i shall be glad if you can show me that it is so4#bg ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cai ,b4 ,greek3 ou7 didakton ei7nai1 md' u7p' a7nthr_/pn paraskeuaston a7nthr_/pois4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cai ,c4 ,greek3 kai ta7_/lla pa_/nta ou7_/ts1 o7_/sa 7gountai mathta_/ te kai didakta ei7nai4 e7a_/n de_/ tis a7_/llos e7picheir au7tois sumbouleu_/ein o7n e7keinoi m oi7_/ontai dmiourgon ei7nai1 c4 ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cai ,d4 ,greek3 ,peri men ou7n 7n oi7_/ontai e7n te_/chn ei7nai1 ou7_/t diapra_/ttontai4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cai ,d4 ,greek3 kai tou_/tois ou7deis touto e7pipl_/ssei 7sper tois pro_/teron1 o7_/ti ou7damo_/then math_/n1 ou7de o7_/ntos didaska_/lou ou7denos au7t1 e7_/peita sumbouleu_/ein e7picheirei2 dlon gar o7_/ti ou7ch 7gountai didakton ei7nai4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cai-cbj4 ,side-note3 ,explanation of ,protagoras4 ,he begins with a mythe4 ,prot4--,i will readily show you4 ,but shall ,i1 like an old man addressing his juniors1 recount to you an illustrative mythe8#bh or shall ,i go through an expository discourse8 ,the mythe perhaps will be the more acceptable of the two4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbj ,c4 ,greek3 po_/teron u7min1 7s presbu_/teros nete_/rois1 muthon le_/gn e7pidei_/x1 7 lo_/g diexelth_/n8 ,it is probable that the ,sophists often delivered illustrative mythes or fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before an audience4 ,such was the memorable fable called the choice of ,hrakls by ,prodikus4 ,side-note3 ,mythe4 ,first fabrication of men by the ,gods4 ,prometheus and ,epimetheus4 ,bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter4 ,it is partly amended by ,prometheus4 ,there was once a time when ,gods existed1 but neither men nor animals had yet come into existence4 ,at the epoch prescribed by ,fate1 the ,gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the earth1 out of earth1 fire1 and other ingredients3 directing the brothers ,prometheus and ,epimetheus to fit them out with suitable endowments4 ,epimetheus1 having been allowed by his brother to undertake the task of distributing these endowments1 did his work very improvidently1 wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals1 and left nothing for man4 ,when ,prometheus came to inspect what had been done1 he found that other animals were adequately equipped1 but that man had no natural provision for clothing1 shoeing1 bedding1 or defence4 ,the only way whereby ,prometheus could supply the defect was1 by breaking into the common workshop of ,athn and ,hephstus1 and stealing from thence their artistic skill1 together with fire4#bi ,both of these he presented to man1 who was thus enabled to construct for himself1 by art1 all that other animals received from nature and more besides4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cba-cbb4 ,greek3 a7pori_/a ou7n e7cho_/menos o7 ,promtheus 7_/ntina stri_/an t a7nthr_/p eu7_/roi1 kle_/ptei 7phai_/stou kai ,a7thnas tn e7_/ntechnon sophi_/an sun puri_/4 4 4 4 ,tn men ou7n peri ton bi_/on sophi_/an a7_/nthrpos tau_/t e7_/sche1 tn de politikn ou7k ei7chen2 7n gar para t ,di_/i1 c4 ,if the reader will compare this with the doctrine delivered in the ,platonic ,timus--that the inferior animals spring from degenerate men--he will perceive the entire variance between the two 7,timus1 pp4 #ia-ib74 ,side-note3 ,prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants1 but could not give them the social art4 ,mankind are on the point of perishing1 when ,zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society4 ,still however1 mankind did not possess the political or social art2 which ,zeus kept in his own custody1 where ,prometheus could not reach it4 ,accordingly1 though mankind could provide for themselves as individuals1 yet when they attempted to form themselves into communities1 they wronged each other so much1 from being destitute of the political or social art1 that they were presently forced again into dispersion4#cj ,the art of war1 too1 being a part of the political art1 which mankind did not possess--they could not get up a common defence against hostile animals3 so that the human race would have been presently destroyed1 had not ,zeus interposed to avert such a consummation4 ,he sent ,herms to mankind1 bearing with him ,justice and the sense of ,shame 7or ,moderation71 as the bonds and ornaments of civic society1 coupling men in friendship4#ca ,herms asked ,zeus--,upon what principle shall ,i distribute these gifts among mankind8 ,shall ,i distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is distributed1 only to a small number--a few accomplished physicians1 navigators1 c41 being adequate to supply the wants of the entire community8 ,or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every man8 ,undoubtedly1 to every man 7was the command of ,zeus74 ,all without exception must be partakers in them4 ,if they are confined exclusively to a few1 like artistic or professional skill1 no community can exist4#cb ,ordain1 by my authority1 that every man1 who cannot take a share of his own in justice and the sense of shame1 shall be slain1 as a nuisance to the community4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbb ,b4 ,greek3 e7z_/toun d a7throi_/zesthai kai s_/zesthai kti_/zontes po_/leis2 o7_/t' ou7n a7throistheien1 7di_/koun a7ll_/lous1 a7_/te ou7k e7_/chontes tn politikn te_/chnn1 7_/ste pa_/lin skedannu_/menoi diephthei_/ronto4 ,compare ,plato1 ,republic1 i4 p4 #cea ,c1 p4 #ceb ,b1 where ,sokrates sets forth a similar argument4 ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,protagor4 p4 #cbb ,c4 ,greek3 ,e7rmn pe_/mpei a7_/gonta ei7s a7nthr_/pous ai7d te kai di_/kn1 i7_/n' ei7en po_/len ko_/smoi te kai desmoi phili_/as sunaggoi_/4 ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbb ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ei7s e7_/chn i7atrikn pollois i7kanos i7di_/tais1 kai oi7 a7_/lloi dmiourgoi_/4 kai di_/kn d kai ai7d ou7_/t th e7n tois a7nthr_/pois1 7 e7pi pa_/ntas nei_/m8 ,e7pi pa_/ntas1 e7_/ph o7 ,zeu_/s1 kai pa_/ntes metecho_/ntn2 ou7 gar a7n ge_/nointo po_/leis1 ei7 o7li_/goi au7tn mete_/choien 7_/sper a7_/lln technn4 kai no_/mon ge thes par' e7mou1 ton m duna_/menon ai7doous kai di_/ks mete_/chein1 ktei_/nein 7s no_/son po_/les4 ,we see by p4 #cbc ,a that ,greek3 sphrosu_/n is employed as substitute or equivalent for ,greek3 ai7d_/s3 yet still ,greek3 ai7ds is the proper word to express ,plato's meaning1 as it denotes a distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others--a feeling of pain in each man's mind1 when he discovers or believes that he is disapproved by his comrades4 ,hom4 ,il4 ,o4 #efa--;,greek3 ai7d the_/sth' e7ni thum ,a7ll_/lous t' ai7deisthe kata krateras u7smi_/nas4 ,side-note3 ,protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse4 ,justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes1 but are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all4 ,this fable will show you1 therefore1 ,sokrates 7continues ,protagoras71 that the ,athenians have good reason for making the distinction to which you advert4 ,when they are discussing matters of special art1 they will hear only the few to whom such matters are known4 ,but when they are taking counsel about social or political virtue1 which consists altogether in justice and moderation1 they naturally hear every one2 since every one is presumed1 as a condition of the existence of the commonwealth1 to be a partaker therein4#cc ,moreover1 even though they know a man not to have these virtues in reality1 they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to have them1 and make profession of virtue3 whereas1 in the case of the special arts1 if a man makes proclamation of his own skill as a physician or musician1 they censure or ridicule him4#cd ,footnote #cc3 ,plat4 ,prot4 pp4 #cbb-cbc4 ,footnote #cd3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbc ,c4 ,side-note3 ,constant teaching of virtue4 ,theory of punishment4 ,nevertheless1 though they account this political or social virtue an universal endowment1 they are far from thinking that it comes spontaneously or by nature4 ,they conceive it to be generated by care and teaching4 ,for in respect of all those qualities which come by nature or by accident1 no one is ever angry with another or blames another for being found wanting4 ,an ugly1 dwarfish1 or sickly man is looked upon simply with pity1 because his defects are such as he cannot help4 ,but when any one manifests injustice or other qualities the opposite of political virtue1 then all his neighbours visit him with indignation1 censure1 and perhaps punishment3 implying clearly their belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and learning4#ce ,indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other meaning4 ,it is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be acquirable and acquired4 ,for no rational man ever punishes malefactors because they have done wrong1 or simply with a view to the past3--since what is already done cannot be undone4 ,he punishes with a view to the future1 in order that neither the same man1 nor others who see him punished1 may be again guilty of similar wrong4 ,this opinion plainly implies the belief1 that virtue is producible by training1 since men punish for the purpose of prevention4#cf ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cbc-cbd4 ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbd ,a-,b4 ,greek3 ou7deis gar kola_/zei tous a7dikountas pros tou_/t ton noun e7_/chn kai tou_/tou e7_/neka o7_/ti 7di_/ksen1 o7_/stis m 7_/sper thri_/on a7logi_/sts timreitai2 o7 de meta lo_/gou e7picheirn kola_/zein ou7 tou parellutho_/tos e7_/neka a7dik_/matos timreitai--ou7 gar a7n to_/ ge prachthen a7ge_/nton thei_/--a7lla tou me_/llontos cha_/rin1 i7_/na m au7this a7dik_/s m_/te au7tos ou7tos m_/te a7_/llos o7 touton i7dn kolasthe_/nta4 kai toiau_/tn ei7nai a7ret_/n2 a7potrops goun e7_/neka kola_/zei4 ,this clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one of the most memorable passages in ,plato1 or in any ancient author4 ,and if we are to believe the words which immediately follow1 it was the theory universally accepted at that time--,greek3 tau_/tn ou7n tn do_/xan pa_/ntes e7_/chousin1 o7_/soi per timrountai kai i7di_/a kai dmosi_/a4 ,compare ,plato1 ,legg4 xi4 p4 #icc1 where the same doctrine is announced3 ,seneca1 ,de ,ir1 i4 #af4 ,nam1 ut ,plato ait1 nemo prudens punit1 quia peccatum est1 sed ne peccetur4 ,revocari enim prterita non possunt3 futura prohibentur4 ,steinhart 7,einleit4 zum ,protag4 p4 #dbc7 pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of punishment1 which1 as he truly observes1 combines together the purposes declared in the two modern theories--,reforming and ,deterring4 ,he says further1 however1 that the same theory of punishment reappears in the ,gorgias1 which ,i do not think exact4 ,the purpose of punishment1 as given in the ,gorgias1 is simply to cure a distempered patient of a terrible distemper1 and thus to confer great benefit on him--but without any allusion to tutelary results as regards society4 ,side-note3 ,why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent4 ,i come now to your remaining argument1 ,sokrates4 ,you urge that citizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to their own sons1 to whom nevertheless they secure all the accomplishments which masters can teach4 ,now ,i have already shown you that civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful1#cg which every man without exception must possess1 on pain of punishment or final expulsion1 if he be without it4 ,i have shown you1 moreover that every one believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention4 ,how can you believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other things1 but do not teach them this1 the want of which entails such terrible penalties8 ,footnote #cg3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbd ,e4 ,greek3 ,po_/teron e7_/sti ti e7_/n1 7 ou7k e7_/stin1 ou7 a7nagkaion pa_/ntas tous poli_/tas mete_/chein1 ei7_/per me_/llei po_/lis ei7nai8 e7n tou_/t gar au7_/t lu_/etai 7 a7pori_/a 7n su a7poreis4 ,side-note3 ,teaching by parents1 schoolmaster1 harpist1 laws1 dikastery1 c4 ,the fact is1 they do teach it3 and that too with great pains4#ch ,they begin to admonish and lecture their children1 from the earliest years4 ,father1 mother1 tutor1 nurse1 all vie with each other to make the child as good as possible3 by constantly telling him on every occasion which arises1 ,this is right--,that is wrong--,this is honourable--,that is mean--,this is holy--,that is unholy--,do these things1 abstain from those4#ci ,if the child obeys them1 it is well3 if he do not1 they straighten or rectify him1 like a crooked piece of wood1 by reproof and flogging4 ,next1 they send him to a schoolmaster1 who teaches him letters and the harp2 but who is enjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly behaviour4 ,here the youth is put to read1 learn by heart1 and recite1 the compositions of able poets2 full of exhortations to excellence and of stirring examples from the good men of past times4#dj ,on the harp also1 he learns the best songs1 his conduct is strictly watched1 and his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and regular measure4 ,while his mind is thus trained to good1 he is sent besides to the gymnastic trainer1 to render his body a suitable instrument for it1#da and to guard against failure of energy under the obligations of military service4 ,if he be the son of a wealthy man1 he is sent to such training sooner1 and remains in it longer4 ,as soon as he is released from his masters1 the city publicly takes him in hand1 compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old and good lawgivers1#db to live according to their prescriptions1 and to learn both command and obedience1 on pain of being punished4 ,such then being the care bestowed1 both publicly and privately1 to foster virtue1 can you really doubt1 ,sokrates1 whether it be teachable8 ,you might much rather wonder if it were not so4#dc ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbe ,b4 ,footnote #ci3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbe ,d4 ,greek3 par' e7_/kaston kai e7_/rgon kai lo_/gon dida_/skontes kai e7ndeiknu_/menoi o7_/ti to men di_/kaion1 to de a7_/dikon1 kai to_/de men kalo_/n1 to_/de de ai7schro_/n1 c4 ,footnote #dj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbe ,e--#cbf ,a4 ,greek3 paratithe_/asin au7tois e7pi tn ba_/thrn a7nagin_/skein poitn a7gathn poi_/mata kai e7kmantha_/nein a7nagka_/zousin1 e7n oi7s pollai men nouthet_/seis e7_/neisi1 pollai de die_/xodoi kai e7_/painoi kai e7gk_/mia palain a7ndrn a7gathn1 i7_/na o7 pais zln mimtai kai o7re_/gtai toioutos gene_/sthai4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbf ,b4 ,greek3 i7_/na ta s_/mata belti_/ e7_/chontes u7pretsi t dianoi_/a chrst ou7_/s1 c4 ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbf ,d4 ,greek3 no_/mous u7pogra_/psasa1 a7gathn kai palain nomothetn eu7r_/mata1 c4 ,footnote #dc3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbf ,e4 ,side-note3 ,all learn virtue from the same teaching by all4 ,whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it1 depends upon his own individual aptitude4 ,how does it happen1 then1 you ask1 that excellent men so frequently have worthless sons1 to whom1 even with all virtue from these precautions1 they cannot teach their own virtue8 ,this is not surprising1 when you recollect what ,i have just said--,that in regard to social virtue1 every man must be a craftsman and producer2 there must be no non-professional consumers4#dd ,all of us are interested in rendering our neighbours just and virtuous1 as well as in keeping them so4 ,accordingly1 every one1 instead of being jealous1 like a professional artist1 of seeing his own accomplishments diffused1 stands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one else1 and in reproving all short-comers4#de ,every man is a teacher of virtue to others3 every man learns his virtue from such general teaching1 public and private4 ,the sons of the best men learn it in this way1 as well as others4 ,the instruction of their fathers counts for comparatively little1 amidst such universal and paramount extraneous influence2 so that it depends upon the aptitude and predispositions of the sons themselves1 whether they turn out better or worse than others4 ,the son of a superior man will often turn out ill2 while the son of a worthless man will prove meritorious4 ,so the case would be1 if playing on the flute were the one thing needful for all citizens2 if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon all others1 and every one learnt it from the teaching of all others4#df ,you would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players would turn out good or bad1 not in proportion to the skill of their fathers1 but according to their own natural aptitudes4 ,you would find however also1 that all of them1 even the most unskilful1 would be accomplished flute-players1 if compared with men absolutely untaught1 who had gone through no such social training4 ,so too1 in regard to justice and virtue4#dg ,the very worst man brought up in your society and its public and private training1 would appear to you a craftsman in these endowments1 if you compared him with men who had been brought up without education1 without laws1 without dikasteries1 without any general social pressure bearing on them1 to enforce virtue3 such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of ,pherekrates at the ,lenan festival4 ,if you were thrown among such men1 you1 like the chorus of misanthropes in that play1 would look back with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which you had left1 such as ,eurybatus and ,phrynondas4#dh ,footnote #dd3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbf ,e4 ,greek3 o7_/ti tou_/tou tou pra_/gmatos1 ts a7rets1 ei7 me_/llei po_/lis ei7nai1 ou7de_/na dei i7diteu_/ein4 ,it is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate exactly the useful antithesis between ,greek3 i7di_/ts and ,greek3 techni_/ts or ,greek3 dmiourgo_/s4 ,footnote #de3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbg ,a4 ,greek3 ei7 kai touto kai i7di_/a kai dmosi_/a pas pa_/nta kai e7di_/daske kai e7pe_/pltte ton m kals au7lounta1 kai m e7phtho_/nei tou_/tou1 7_/sper nun tn dikai_/n kai tn nomi_/mn ou7deis phthonei ou7d' a7pokru_/ptetai1 7_/sper tn a7_/lln technma_/tn--lusitelei gar1 oi7mai1 7min 7 a7ll_/ln dikaiosu_/n kai a7ret2 dia tauta pas panti prothu_/ms le_/gei kai dida_/skei kai ta di_/kaia kai ta no_/mima4 ,footnote #df3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbg ,c4 ,footnote #dg3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbg ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ,o7_/stis soi a7dik_/tatos phai_/netai a7_/nthrpos tn e7n no_/mois kai a7nthr_/pois tethramme_/nn1 di_/kaion au7ton ei7nai kai dmiourgon tou_/tou tou pra_/gmatos1 ei7 de_/oi au7ton kri_/nesthai pros a7nthr_/pous1 oi7s m_/te paidei_/a e7sti m_/te dikast_/ria m_/te no_/moi m_/te a7na_/gk mdemi_/a dia pantos a7nagka_/zoousa a7rets e7pimeleisthai4 ,footnote #dh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbg ,d4 ,side-note3 ,analogy of learning vernacular ,greek4 ,no special teacher thereof4 ,protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others4 ,but now1 ,sokrates1 you are over-nice1 because all of us are teachers of virtue1 to the best of every man's power2 while no particular individual appears to teach it specially and ex professo#di ,by the same analogy1 if you asked who was the teacher for speaking our vernacular ,greek1 no one special person could be pointed out3#ej nor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons of craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own fathers--while if the son of any non-professional person learns a craft1 it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught4#ea ,so it is in respect to virtue4 ,all of us teach and enforce virtue to the best of our power2 and we ought to be satisfied if there be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest1 in the power of teaching it4 ,of such men ,i believe myself to be one4#eb ,i can train a man into an excellent citizen1 better than others1 and in a manner worthy not only of the fee which ,i ask1 but even of a still greater remuneration1 in the judgment of the pupil himself4 ,this is the stipulation which ,i make with him3 when he has completed his course1 he is either to pay me the fee which ,i shall demand--or if he prefers1 he may go into a temple1 make oath as to his own estimate of the instruction imparted to him1 and pay me according to that estimate4#ec ,footnote #di3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbg ,e4 ,greek3 nun de truphas1 7 ,s_/krates1 dio_/ti pa_/ntes dida_/skaloi_/ ei7sin a7rets1 kath' o7_/son du_/natai e7_/kastos1 kai ou7dei_/s soi phai_/netai4 ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbg ,e4 ,greek3 ei7th' 7_/s per a7n ei7 ztois ti_/s dida_/skalos tou e7llni_/zein1 ou7d' a7n ei7s phanei_/4 ,footnote #ea3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbh ,a4 ,footnote #eb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbh ,b4 ,greek3 ,a7lla ka7n ei7 o7li_/gon e7_/sti tis o7_/stis diaphe_/rei 7mn probiba_/sai ei7s a7ret_/n1 a7gapto_/n4 7n d e7g oi7mai ei7s ei7nai1 c4 ,footnote #ec3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbh ,b4 ,side-note3 ,the sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists4 ,i have thus proved to you1 ,sokrates--,that virtue is teachable--,that the ,athenians account it to be teachable--,that there is nothing wonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless1 and the sons of worthless men good4 ,indeed this is true no less about the special professions1 than about the common accomplishment1 virtue4 ,the sons of ,polykltus the statuary1 and of many other artists1 are nothing as compared with their fathers4#ed ,footnote #ed3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbh ,c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks upon the mythe and discourse4 ,they explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself4 ,such is the discourse composed by ,plato and attributed to the ,platonic ,protagoras--showing that virtue is teachable1 and intended to remove the difficulties proposed by ,sokrates4 ,it is an exposition of some length3 and because it is put into the mouth of a ,sophist1 many commentators presume1 as a matter of course1 that it must be a manifestation of some worthless quality3#ee that it is either empty verbiage1 or ostentatious self-praise1 or low-minded immorality4 ,i am unable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerits4 ,i think it one of the best parts of the ,platonic writings1 as an exposition of the growth and propagation of common sense--the common1 established1 ethical and social sentiment1 among a community3 sentiment neither dictated in the beginning1 by any scientific or artistic lawgiver1 nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen apart from the remaining community--nor inculcated by any formal professional teachers--nor tested by analysis--nor verified by comparison with any objective standard3 but self-sown and self-asserting1 stamped1 multiplied1 and kept in circulation1 by the unpremeditated conspiracy of the general#ef public--the omnipresent agency of ,king ,nomos and his numerous volunteers4 ,footnote #ee3 ,so ,serranus 7ad #cbf ,e71 who has been followed by many later critics4 ,qustio est1 ,virtusne doceri possit8 ,quod instituit demonstrare ,sophista1 sed ineptissimis argumentis et qu contra seipsum faciant4 ,to me this appears the reverse of the truth4 ,but even if it were true1 no blame could fall on ,protagoras4 ,we should only be warranted in concluding that it suited the scheme of ,plato here to make him talk nonsense4 ,footnote #ef3 ,this is what the ,platonic ,sokrates alludes to in the ,phdon and elsewhere4 ,greek3 oi7 tn dmotikn te kai politikn a7retn e7pitetdeuko_/tes1 7n d kalousi sphrosu_/nn te kai dikaiosu_/nv1 e7x e7_/thous te kai mele_/ts gegonuian1 a7_/neu philosophi_/as te kai nou4 ,phdon1 p4 #hb ,b2 compare the same dialogue1 p4 #fh ,c2 also ,republic1 x4 p4 #fai ,c--,greek3 e7_/thei a7_/neu philosophi_/as a7rets meteilpho_/ta4 ,the account given by ,mr4 ,james ,mill 7,fragment on ,mackintosh1 p4 #bei-bfj7 of the manner in which the established morality of a society is transmitted and perpetuated1 coincides completely with the discourse of the ,platonic ,protagoras4 ,the passage is too long to be cited3 ,i give here only the concluding words1 which describe the ,greek3 dmotik a7ret a7_/neu philosophi_/as-- ,in this manner it is that men1 in the social state1 acquire the habits of moral acting1 and certain affections connected with it1 before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which recommend the acts either to praise or blame4 ,nearly at this point the greater part of them remain3 continuing to perform moral acts and to abstain from the contrary1 chiefly from the habits which they have acquired1 and the authority upon which they originally acted3 though it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing of reason1 without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general way1 the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one another in one way rather than another4 ,side-note3 ,antithesis of ,protagoras and ,sokrates4 ,whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art4 ,in many of the ,platonic dialogues1 ,sokrates is made to dwell upon the fact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue2 and to ground upon this fact a doubt1 whether virtue be really teachable4 ,but the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact is accounted for1 and the doubt formally answered4 ,there are neither special teachers1 nor professed pupils1 nor determinate periods of study1 nor definite lessons or stadia1 for the acquirement of virtue1 as there are for a particular art or craft3 the reason being1 that in that department every man must of necessity be a practitioner1 more or less perfectly3 every man has an interest in communicating it to his neighbour3 hence every man is constantly both teacher and learner4 ,herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue and the special arts2 an answer to the view most frequently espoused by the ,platonic ,sokrates1 assimilating virtue to a professional craft1 which ought to have special teachers1 and a special season of apprenticeship1 if it is to be acquired at all4 ,the speech is censured by some critics as prolix4 ,but to me it seems full of matter and argument1 exceedingly free from superfluous rhetoric4 ,the fable with which it opens presents of course the poetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling4 ,it is however fully equal1 in point of perspicuity as well as charm--in my judgment1 it is even superior to any other fable in ,plato4 ,side-note3 ,procedure of ,sokrates in regard to the discourse of ,protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition1 and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions4 ,when the harangue1 lecture1 or sermon1 of ,protagoras is concluded1 ,sokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it1 and admits the conclusion--,that virtue is teachable--to be made out1 as well as it can be made out by any continuous exposition4#eg ,in fact1 the speaker has done all that could be done by ,perikles or the best orator of the assembly4 ,he has given a long series of reasonings in support of his own case1 without stopping to hear the doubts of opponents4 ,he has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public sentiment1 accepting all the established beliefs--appealing to his hearers with all those familiar phrases1 round which the most powerful associations are grouped--and taking for granted that justice1 virtue1 good1 evil1 c41 are known1 indisputable1 determinate data1 fully understood1 and unanimously interpreted4 ,he has shown that the community take great pains1 both publicly and privately1 to inculcate and enforce virtue3 that is1 what they believe in and esteem as virtue4 ,but is their belief well founded8 ,is that which they esteem1 really virtue8 ,do they and their elegant spokesman ,protagoras1 know what virtue is8 ,if so1 how do they know it1 and can they explain it8 ,footnote #eg3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cbh-cbi4 ,very different indeed is the sentiment of the principal ,platonic commentators4 ,schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of ,protagoras to be counted among the ,platonic mythes3 he says that it is composed in the style of ,protagoras1 and perhaps copied from some real composition of that ,sophist4 ,he finds in it nothing but a grobmaterialistiche ,denkungsart1 die ber die sinnliche ,erfahrung nicht hinaus philosophirt 7,einleitung zum ,protagoras1 vol4 i4 pp4 #bcc-bcd74 ,to the like purpose ,ast 7,plat4 ,leb4 p4 #ga7--who tells us that what is expressed in the mythus is1 the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner of thought of the ,sophist3 for it deduces every thing1 both arts and the social union itself1 from human wants and necessity4 ,apparently these critics1 when they treat this as a proof of meanness and vulgarity1 have forgotten that the ,platonic ,sokrates himself does exactly the same thing in the ,republic--deriving the entire social union from human necessities 7,republ4 ii4 #cfi ,c74 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann is hardly less severe upon the ,protagorean discourse 7,gesch4 und ,syst4 der ,plat4 ,phil4 p4 #dfj74 ,for my part1 ,i take a view altogether opposed to these learned persons4 ,i think the discourse one of the most striking and instructive portions of the ,platonic writings3 and if ,i could believe that it was the composition of ,protagoras himself1 my estimation of him would be considerably raised4 ,steinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than ,ast and ,schleiermacher1 upon the discourse of ,protagoras 7,einleitung zum ,prot4 pp4 #dbb-dbc74 ,side-note3 ,one purpose of the dialogue4 ,to contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer4 ,this is the point upon which ,sokrates now brings his ,elenchus to bear3 his method of short question and answer4 ,we have seen what long continuous speaking can do3 we have now to see what short cross-questioning can do4 ,the antithesis between the two is at least one main purpose of ,plato--if it be not even the purpose 7as ,schleiermacher supposes it to be7 in this memorable dialogue4 ,side-note3 ,questions by ,sokrates--,whether virtue is one and indivisible1 or composed of different parts8 ,whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous8 ,after your copious exposition1 ,protagoras 7says ,sokrates71 ,i have only one little doubt remaining1 which you will easily explain4#eh ,you have several times spoken of justice1 moderation1 holiness1 c41 as if they all1 taken collectively1 made up virtue4 ,do you mean that virtue is a ,whole1 and that these three names denote distinct parts of it8 ,or are the three names all equivalent to virtue1 different names for one and are the same thing8 ,prot4--,they are names signifying distinct parts of virtue4 ,sokr4--,are these parts like the parts of the face1--eyes1 nose1 mouth1 ears--each part not only distinct from the rest1 but having its own peculiar properties8 ,or are they like the parts of gold1 homogeneous with each other and with the whole1 differing only in magnitude8 ,prot4--,the former4 ,sokr4--,then some men may possess one part1 some another4 ,or is it necessary that he who possesses one part1 should possess all8 ,prot4--,by no means necessary4 ,some men are courageous1 but unjust3 others are just1 but not intelligent4 ,sokr4--,wisdom and courage then1 both of them1 are parts of virtue8 ,prot4--,they are so4 ,wisdom is the greatest of the parts3 but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another3 each of them has its own peculiar property4#ei ,footnote #eh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cbh ,e--#cbi ,b4 ,greek3 pln smikro_/n ti_/ moi e7mpod_/n1 o7 dlon o7_/ti ,prtago_/ras r7adi_/s e7pekdida_/xei4 4 4 4 smikrou tinos e7nde_/s ei7mi pa_/nt' e7_/chein1 c4 ,footnote #ei3 ,plato1 ,protag1 pp4 #cbi-ccj4 ,side-note3 ,whether justice is just1 and holiness holy8 ,how far justice is like to holiness8 ,sokrates protests against an answer1 ,if you please4 ,sokr4--,now let us examine what sort of thing each of these parts is4 ,tell me--is justice some thing1 or no thing8 ,i think it is some thing3 are you of the same opinion8#fj ,prot4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,now this thing which you call justice3 is it itself just or unjust8 ,i should say that it was just3 what do you say8#fa ,prot4--,i think so too4 ,sokr4--,holiness also is some thing3 is the thing called holiness1 itself holy or unholy8 ,as for me1 if any one were to ask me the question1 ,i should reply--,of course it is3 nothing else can well be holy1 if holiness itself be not holy4 ,would you say the same8 ,prot4--,unquestionably4 ,sokr4--,justice being admitted to be just1 and holiness to be holy--do not you think that justice also is holy1 and that holiness is just8 ,if so1 how can you reconcile that with your former declaration1 that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part8 ,prot4--,i do not altogether admit that justice is holy1 and that holiness is just4 ,but the matter is of little moment3 if you please1 let both of them stand as admitted4 ,sokr4--,not so3#fb ,i do not want the debate to turn upon an ,if you please3 ,you and ,i are the debaters1 and we shall determine the debate best without ,ifs4 ,prot4--,i say then that justice and holiness are indeed1 in a certain way1 like each other2 so also there is a point of analogy between white and black1#fc hard and soft1 and between many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally4 ,sokr4--,do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them8 ,prot4--,not exactly so3 but ,i do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the other4 ,sokr4--,well then6 since you seem to follow with some repugnance this line of argument1 let us enter upon another4#fd ,footnote #fj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccj ,b4 ,greek3 koin skeps_/metha poio_/n ti au7tn e7stin e7_/kaston4 prton men to toio_/nde2 7 dikaiosu_/n pragma_/ ti_/ e7stin8 7 ou7den pragma8 e7moi men gar dokei2 ti_/ de soi_/8 ,footnote #fa3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccj ,c4 ,greek3 touto to pragma o7_/ 7noma_/sate a7_/rti1 7 dikaiosu_/n1 au7to touto di_/kaio_/n e7stin 7 a7_/dikon8 ,footnote #fb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cca ,c4 ,greek3 ei7 gar bou_/lei1 e7_/st 7min kai dikaiosu_/n o7_/sion kai o7sio_/ts di_/kaion4 ,m_/ moi1 7n d' e7g_/2 ou7den gar de_/omai to ei_/ bou_/lei touto kai ei7 soi dokei e7le_/gchesthai1 a7ll' e7me_/ te kai se_/4 ,this passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of ,protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion4 ,the ,greek3 a7kribologi_/a of ,sokrates and ,plato was not merely unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men4 ,protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions drawn by ,sokrates too nice1 not worth attending to4 ,many of the contemporaries of both shared this opinion4 ,one purpose of our dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view4 ,footnote #fc3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cca ,d4 ,footnote #fd3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #ccb ,a4 ,side-note3 ,intelligence and moderation are identical1 because they have the same contrary4 ,sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are identical with each other 7,greek3 sophi_/a and ,greek3 sphrosu_/n74 ,the proof which he produces1 elicited by several questions1 is--that both the one and the other are contrary to folly 7,greek3 a7phrosu_/n71 and1 that as a general rule1 nothing can have more than one single contrary4#fe ,footnote #fe3 ,plat4 ,protag4 p4 #ccb4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,insufficient reasons given by ,sokrates4 ,he seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term4 ,sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same thing4 ,moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same3 justice and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same3#ff though we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by ,protagoras4 ,it must be confessed however that neither the one nor the other is proved by any conclusive reasons4 ,in laying down the maxim--that nothing can have more than one single contrary--,plato seems to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different senses4 ,because the term folly 7,greek3 a7phrosu_/n71 is used sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation 7,greek3 sphrosu_/n71 sometimes the opposite of intelligence 7,greek3 sophi_/a71 it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are the same thing4#fg ,nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of the other point1 viz43 ,that holiness and justice are the same1 or as much alike as possible4 ,the intermediate position which is assumed to form the proof1 viz43 ,that holiness is holy1 and that justice is just--is either tautological1 or unmeaning2 and cannot serve as a real proof of any thing4 ,it is indeed so futile1 that if it were found in the mouth of ,protagoras and not in that of ,sokrates1 commentators would probably have cited it as an illustration of the futilities of the ,sophists4 ,as yet therefore little has been done to elucidate the important question to which ,sokrates addresses himself--,what is the extent of analogy between the different virtues8 ,are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names8 ,in what does the analogy or the sameness consist8 ,footnote #ff3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cch ,b4 ,greek3 sche_/don ti tau7ton o7_/n4 ,footnote #fg3 ,aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as this4 ,one important point 7as ,i have already remarked1 vol4 ii4 p4 #agj7 in which he is superior to ,plato is1 in being far more careful to distinguish the different meanings of the same word--,greek3 ta pollachs lego_/mena4 ,plato rarely troubles himself to notice such distinction1 and seems indeed generally unaware of it4 ,he constantly ridicules ,prodikus1 who tried to distinguish words apparently synonymous4 ,side-note3 ,protagoras is puzzled1 and becomes irritated4 ,but though little progress has been made in determining the question mooted by ,sokrates1 enough has been done to discompose and mortify ,protagoras4 ,the general tenor of the dialogue is1 to depict this man1 so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition1 as destitute of the analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination1 and of promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case1 on the very subjects which form the theme of his eloquence4 ,he finds himself brought round1 by a series of short questions1 to a conclusion which--whether conclusively proved or not--is proved in a manner binding upon him1 since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses4 ,he becomes dissatisfied with himself1 answers with increasing reluctance1#fh and is at last so provoked as to break out of the limits imposed upon a respondent4 ,footnote #fh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #ccc ,b1 #cce ,a4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,sokrates presses ,protagoras farther4 ,his purpose is1 to test opinions and not persons4 ,protagoras answers with angry prolixity4 ,meanwhile ,sokrates pursues his examination1 with intent to prove that justice 7,greek3 dikaiosu_/n7 and moderation 7,greek3 sphrosu_/n7 are identical4 ,does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation8 ,i should be ashamed 7replies ,protagoras7 to answer in the affirmative1 though many people say so4 ,sokr4--,it is indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not1 provided only you consent to make answer4 ,what ,i principally examine is the opinion itself3 though it follows perhaps as a consequence1 that ,i the questioner1 and the respondent along with me1 undergo examination at the same time4#fi ,you answer then 7though without adopting the opinion7 that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation1 or with intelligence3 that is1 that they follow a wise policy in committing injustice4 ,prot4--,be it so4 ,sokr4--,you admit too that there exist certain things called good things4 ,are those things good1 which are profitable to mankind8 ,prot4--,by ,zeus1 ,i call some things good1 even though they be not profitable to men 7replies ,protagoras1 with increasing acrimony74#gj ,sokr4--,do you mean those things which are not profitable to any man1 or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever8 ,do you call these latter good also8 ,prot4--,not at all3 but there are many things profitable to men1 yet unprofitable or hurtful to different animals4 ,good is of a character exceedingly diversified and heterogeneous4#ga ,footnote #fi3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccc ,c4 ,greek3 ton gar lo_/gon e7_/gge ma_/lista e7xeta_/z1 sumbai_/nei me_/ntoi i7_/ss kai e7me ton e7rtnta kai ton e7rt_/menon e7xeta_/zesthai4 ,here again we find ,plato drawing special attention to the conditions of dialectic debate4 ,footnote #gj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccc ,e4 ,footnote #ga3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccd ,b4 ,greek3 ,ou7_/t de poiki_/lon ti_/ e7sti to a7gathon kai pantodapo_/n1 c4 ,the explanation here given by ,protagoras of good is the same as that which is given by the historical ,sokrates himself in the ,xenophontic ,memorabilia 7iii4 #h74 ,things called good are diverse in the highest degree2 but they are all called good because they all contribute in some way to human security1 relief1 comfort1 or prosperity4 ,to one or other of these ends good1 in all its multifarious forms1 is relative4 ,side-note3 ,remonstrance of ,sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue4 ,protagoras persists4 ,sokrates rises to depart4 ,protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable length1 and in a rhetorical manner1 so as to elicit applause from the hearers4#gb ,upon this ,sokrates replies1 ,i am a man of short memory1 and if any one speaks at length1 ,i forget what he has said4 ,if you wish me to follow you1 ,i must entreat you to make shorter answers4 ,prot4--,what do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers8 ,do you mean shorter than the case requires8 ,sokr4--,no1 certainly not4 ,prot4--,but who is to be judge of the brevity necessary1 you or ,i8 ,sokr4--,i have understood that you profess to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech3 what ,i beg is1 that you will employ only short speech1 if you expect me to follow you4 ,prot4--,why1 ,sokrates1 ,i have carried on many debates in my time2 and if1 as you ask me now1 ,i had always talked just as my opponent wished1 ,i should never have acquired any reputation at all4 ,sokr4--,be it so3 in that case ,i must retire2 for as to long speaking1 ,i am incompetent3 ,i can neither make long speeches1 nor follow them4#gc ,footnote #gb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccd ,d4 ,footnote #gc3 ,plato1 ,prot4 pp4 #ccd ,e1 #cce ,a-,c4 ,side-note3 ,interference of ,kallias to get the debate continued4 ,promiscuous conversation4 ,alkibiades declares that ,protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of ,sokrates in dialogue4 ,here ,sokrates rises to depart2 but ,kallias1 the master of the house1 detains him1 and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be continued4 ,a promiscuous conversation ensues1 in which most persons present take part4 ,alkibiades1 as the champion of ,sokrates1 gives1 what seems really to be the key of the dialogue1 when he says--,sokrates admits that he has no capacity for long speaking1 and that he is no match therein for ,protagoras4 ,but as to dialectic debate1 or administering and resisting cross-examination1 ,i should be surprised if any one were a match for him4 ,if ,protagoras admits that on this point he is inferior1 ,sokrates requires no more3 if he does not1 let him continue the debate3 but he must not lengthen his answers so that hearers lose the thread of the subject4 ,side-note3 ,claim of a special locus standi and professorship for ,dialectic1 apart from ,rhetoric4 ,this remark of ,alkibiades1 speaking altogether as a vehement partisan of ,sokrates1 brings to view at least one purpose--if not the main purpose--of ,plato in the dialogue4 ,sokrates acknowledges the superiority of ,protagoras in rhetoric3 if ,protagoras acknowledges the superiority of ,sokrates in dialectic1 ,sokrates is satisfied4#gd ,an express locus standi is here claimed for dialectic1 and a recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground4 ,protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short speech3 but in the last he must recognise a superior4 ,footnote #gd3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #ccf ,c-,d4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates is prevailed upon to continue1 and invites ,protagoras to question him4 ,kritias1 ,prodikus1 and ,hippias all speak 7each in a manner of his own7 deprecating marked partisanship on either side1 exhorting both parties to moderation1 and insisting that the conversation shall be continued4 ,at length ,sokrates consents to remain1 yet on condition that ,protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the dialectic procedure4 ,protagoras 7he says7 shall first question me as long as he pleases3 when he has finished1 ,i will question him4 ,the ,sophist1 though at first reluctant1 is constrained1 by the instance of those around1 to accede to this proposition4#ge ,footnote #ge3 ,plat4 ,prot4 pp4 #ccg-cch4 ,side-note3 ,protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets1 and questions about parts of a song of ,simonides4 ,dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song4 ,for the purpose of questioning1 ,protagoras selects a song of ,simonides3 prefacing it with a remark1 that the most important accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master of the works of the poets1 so as to understand and appreciate them correctly1 and answer all questions respecting them4#gf ,sokrates intimates that he knows and admires the song3 upon which ,protagoras proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other1 and asks how ,sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction4#gg ,the latter is at first embarrassed1 and invokes the aid of ,prodikus2 who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen ,simonides1 but is made to speak 7as elsewhere by ,plato7 in a stupid and ridiculous manner4 ,after a desultory string of remarks1#gh with disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the song1 but without promise of any result--,sokrates offers to give an exposition of the general purpose of the whole song1 in order that the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment which ,protagoras had so emphatically extolled--complete mastery of the works of the poets4#gi ,footnote #gf3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cci ,a4 ,greek3 7goumai e7g a7ndri paidei_/as me_/giston me_/ros ei7nai1 peri e7pn deinon ei7nai4 ,footnote #gg3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cci ,c-,d4 ,footnote #gh3 ,plat4 ,prot4 pp4 #cdj-cda4 ,footnote #gi3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cdb ,a4 ,greek3 ei7 bou_/lei labein mou peiran o7_/ps e7_/ch1 o7 su le_/geis touto1 peri e7pn4 ,side-note3 ,long speech of ,sokrates1 expounding the purpose of the song1 and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at ,krete and ,sparta1 masters of short speech4 ,he then proceeds to deliver a long harangue1 the commencement of which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first speech delivered by ,protagoras in this dialogue4 ,that ,sophist had represented that the sophistical art was ancient3#hj and that the poets1 from ,homer downward1 were ,sophists1 but dreaded the odium of the name1 and professed a different avocation with another title4 ,sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in ,krete and ,sparta1 and that there were more ,sophists 7he does not distinguish between the ,sophist and the philosopher71 female as well as male1 in those regions1 than anywhere else3 but that they concealed their name and profession1 for fear that others should copy them and acquire the like eminence3#ha that they pretended to devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic--a pretence whereby 7he says7 all the other ,greeks were really deluded4 ,the special characteristic of these philosophers or ,sophists was1 short and emphatic speech--epigram shot in at the seasonable moment1 and thoroughly prostrating an opponent4#hb ,the ,seven ,wise ,men1 among whom ,pittakus was one1 were philosophers on this type1 of supreme excellence3 which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief aphorisms at ,delphi4 ,so great was the celebrity which ,pittakus acquired by his aphorism1 that ,simonides the poet became jealous1 and composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him4 ,having stated this general view1 ,sokrates illustrates it by going through the song1 with exposition and criticism of several different passages4#hc ,as soon as ,sokrates has concluded1 ,hippias#hd compliments him1 and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on the same song3 which he would willingly deliver3 but ,alkibiades and the rest beg him to postpone it4 ,footnote #hj3 ,plat4 ,prot4 pp4 #caf-cag4 ,footnote #ha3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cdb4 ,footnote #hb3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cdb ,e1 #cdc ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ,o7_/ti ou7tos o7 tro_/pos 7n tn palain ts philosophi_/as1 brachulogi_/a tis ,laknik_/4 ,footnote #hc3 ,plat4 ,prot4 pp4 #cdd-cdg4 ,footnote #hd3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cdg4 ,side-note3 ,character of this speech--its connection with the dialogue1 and its general purpose4 ,sokrates inferior to ,protagoras in continuous speech4 ,no remark is made by any one present1 either upon the circumstance that ,sokrates1 after protesting against long speeches1 has here delivered one longer by far than the first speech of ,protagoras1 and more than half as long as the second1 which contains a large theory--nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the ,simonidean song4 ,that interpretation is so strange and forced--so violent in distorting the meaning of the poet--so evidently predetermined by the resolution to find ,platonic metaphysics in a lyric effusion addressed to a ,thessalian prince#he--that if such an exposition had been found under the name of ,protagoras1 critics would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest perversions by the ,sophists4#hf ,it appears as if ,plato1 intending in this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous speech 7sophistical1 rhetorical1 poetical7 represented by ,protagoras1 and short1 interrogatory speech 7dialectical7 represented by ,sokrates--having moreover composed for ,protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue1 an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own accomplishment--has thought it right to compose for ,sokrates a pleading with like purpose1 to put the two accomplishments on a par4 ,and if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced comparisons 7especially what is said about the ,spartans7--we must remember that ,sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with ,protagoras in continuous speech1 and that he is here handling the weapon in which he is confessedly inferior4 ,plato secures a decisive triumph to dialectic1 and to ,sokrates as representing it3 but he seems content here to leave ,sokrates on the lower ground as a rhetorician4 ,footnote #he3 ,especially his explanation of ,greek3 e7kn e7rd 7p4 #cde ,d474 ,heyne 7,opuscula1 i4 p4 #afj7 remarks upon the strange interpretation given by ,sokrates of the ,simonidean song4 ,compare ,plato in ,lysis1 p4 #bab ,e1 and in ,alkib4 ii4 p4 #adg ,d4 ,in both these cases1 ,sokrates cites passages of poetry1 assigning to them a sense which their authors plainly did not intend them to bear4 ,heindorf in his note on the ,lysis 7l4 c47 observes--,videlicet1 ut exeat sententia1 quam ,solon ne somniavit quidem1 versuum horum structuram1 neglecto plan sermonis usu1 hanc statuit4--,cujusmodi interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in ,alcib4 ii4 p4 #adg ,d4 ,see also ,heindorf's notes on the ,charmids1 p4 #afc ,b2 ,lachs1 p4 #aia ,b2 and ,lysis1 p4 #bad ,d4 ,m4 ,boeckh observes 7ad ,pindar4 ,isthm4 v4 p4 #ebh7 respecting an allusion made by ,pindar to ,hesiod-- ,num mal intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba ,hesiodi8 ,non credo3 sed bene sciens1 consulto alium sensum intulit1 suo consilio accommodatum6 ,simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor ,plato ,thetet4 p4 #aee ,d4 ,stallbaum in his note on the ,thettus adopts this remark of ,boeckh4 ,groen van ,prinsterer gives a similar opinion4 7,prosopographia ,platonica1 p4 #ag47 ,footnote #hf3 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann observes 7,gesch4 der ,plat4 ,philos1 p4 #dfj7 that ,sokrates1 in his interpretation of the ,simonidean song1 shows that he can play the ,sophist as well as other people can4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets4 ,their meaning is always disputed1 and you can never ask from themselves what it is4 ,protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering4 ,moreover1 when ,sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of poetical lore 7,greek3 peri e7pn deinos71 he at the same time claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way4 ,he considers the poets either as persons divinely inspired1 who speak fine things without rational understanding 7we have seen this in the ,apology and the ,ion7--or as men of superior wisdom1 who deliver valuable truth lying beneath the surface1 and not discernible by vulgar eyes4 ,both these views differ from that of literal interpretation1 which is here represented by ,protagoras and ,prodikus4 ,and these two ,sophists are here contrasted with ,sokrates as interpreters of the poets4 ,protagoras and ,prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of instruction3 and seek to interpret them literally1 as an intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or recited for the first time4 ,towards that end1 discrimination of the usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable4 ,sokrates1 on the contrary1 disregards the literal interpretation1 derides verbal distinctions as useless1 or twists them into harmony with his own purpose3 ,simonides and other poets are considered as superior men1 and even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be embodied and discoverable#hg--only that they are given in an obscure and enigmatical manner3 requiring to be extracted by the divination of the philosopher1 who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are4 ,it is for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of them4 ,this is what ,sokrates does with the song of ,simonides4 ,he discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts 7,greek3 u7ponoi_/as73#hh distinctions of ,platonic ,metaphysics 7between ,greek3 ei7nai and ,greek3 gene_/sthai71 and principles of ,platonic ,ethics 7,greek3 ou7deis e7_/k kako_/s7--he proceeds to point out passages in which they are to be found1 and explains the song conformably to them1 in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning and verbal structure4#hi ,but though ,sokrates accepts1 when required1 the task of discussing what is said by the poets1 and deals with them according to his own point of view--yet he presently lets us see that they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by himself4 ,alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted shall be resumed and ,sokrates himself requests ,protagoras to consent4 ,to debate about the compositions of poets 7says ,sokrates71 is to proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets3 where they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls4 ,noble and well-educated guests1 on the contrary1 can find enough to interest them in their own conversation1 even if they drink ever so much wine4#ij ,men such as we are1 do not require to be amused by singers nor to talk about the poets1 whom no one can ask what they mean2 and who1 when cited by different speakers1 are affirmed by one to mean one thing1 and by another to mean something else1 without any decisive authority to appeal to4 ,such men as you and ,i ought to lay aside the poets1 and test each other by colloquy of our own4 ,if you wish to persist in questioning1 ,i am ready to answer3 if not1 consent to answer me1 and let us bring the interrupted debate to a close4#ia ,footnote #hg3 ,see ,plato1 ,phdrus1 p4 #bde ,a-,b2 ,apol4 p4 #bb ,b-,c2 ,ion1 pp4 #ecc-ecd4 ,compare the distinction drawn in ,timus1 p4 #gb ,a-,b1 between the ,greek3 ma_/ntis and the ,greek3 proph_/ts4 ,footnote #hh3 ,about the ,greek3 u7po_/noiai ascribed to the poets1 see ,repub4 ii4 p4 #cgh ,d42 ,xen4 ,sympos4 iii4 #f2 and ,f4 ,a4 ,wolf1 ,prolegom4 ,homer4 p4 clxii4-clxiv4 ,f4 ,a4 ,wolf remarks1 respecting the various allegorical interpretations of ,homer and other ,greek poets-- ,sed nec prioribus illis1 sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua ipsi crediderunt1 sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt1 idonea deest excusatio4 ,ita enim ratio comparata est1 ut libris1 quos a teneris statim annis cognoscimus1 omnes prop nostras nostrque tatis opiniones subjiciamus3 ac si illi jampridem populari usu consecrati sunt1 ipsa obstat veneratio1 quominus in iis absurda et ridicula inesse credamus4 ,lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus interpretando1 quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur4 ,atque ita factum est omni tempore in libris iis1 qui pro sacris habiti sunt4 ,the distinction was similar in character1 and even more marked in respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy1 between the different schools of the ,jews in ,alexandria and ,palestine about the interpretation of the ,pentateuch4 #a4 ,those who interpreted literally1 ,greek3 kata tn r7tn dia_/noian4 #b4 ,those who set aside the literal interpretation1 and explained the text upon a philosophy of their own1 above the reach of the vulgar 7,eusebius1 ,prp4 ,ev4 viii4 #aj74 ,some admitted both the two interpretations1 side by side4 ,respecting these allegorising schools of the ,hellenistic ,jews1 from ,aristobulus 7#aej ,b4,c47 down to ,philo1 see the learned and valuable work of ,gfrrer--,philo und die ,jdisch4-,alexandr4 ,theosophie1 vol4 i4 pp4 #hd-hf1 ii4 p4 #cef seq4 ,footnote #hi3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cde4 ,footnote #ij3 ,plato1 ,prot4 p4 #cdg ,d4 ,greek3 ka7n ma_/nu polun oi7non pi_/sin--a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated by the persistent dialectic of ,sokrates1 even at the close of the ,platonic ,symposion1 after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of wine4 ,footnote #ia3 ,plat4 ,prot4 pp4 #cdg-cdh4 ,this remark--that the poet may be interpreted in many different ways1 and that you cannot produce him in court to declare or defend his own meaning--is highly significant1 in regard to the value set by ,sokrates on living conversation and dialectic4 ,side-note3 ,purpose of ,sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind4 ,importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose4 ,in spite of this appeal1 ,protagoras is still unwilling to resume1 and is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from ,alkibiades1 enforced by requests from ,kallias and others4 ,he is depicted as afraid of ,sokrates1 who1 as soon as consent is given1 recommences the discussion by saying--,do not think1 ,protagoras1 that ,i have any other purpose in debating1 except to sift through and through1 in conjunction with you1 difficulties which puzzle my own mind4 ,two of us together can do more in this way than any one singly4#ib ,footnote #ib3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cdh ,c4 ,greek3 m oi7_/ou diale_/gesthai me_/ soi a7_/llo ti boulo_/menon 7 a7 au7tos a7por1 e7ka_/stote tauta diaske_/psasthai4 ,the remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the ,sokratic frame of mind4 ,the cross-examination which he bestows1 is not that of one who himself knows--and who only gets up artificial difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does4 ,on the contrary1 it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled2 and that which puzzles him he states to others1 and debates with others1 as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and obtaining a solution4 ,the grand purpose with ,sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or reasoned truth1 and to sift them thoroughly1 instead of slurring them over or hiding them4 ,we are all more fertile and suggestive1 with regard to thought1 word1 and deed1 when we act in couples4 ,if a man strikes out anything new by himself1 he immediately goes about looking for a companion to whom he can communicate it1 and with whom he can jointly review it4 ,moreover1 you are the best man that ,i know for this purpose1 especially on the subject of virtue3 for you are not only virtuous yourself1 but you can make others so likewise1 and you proclaim yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done before4 ,whom can ,i find so competent as you1 for questioning and communication on these very subjects8#ic ,footnote #ic3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cdh-cdi4 ,side-note3 ,the interrupted debate is resumed4 ,protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue4 ,after this eulogy on dialectic conversation 7illustrating still farther the main purpose of the dialogue71 ,sokrates resumes the argument as it stood when interrupted4 ,sokr4--,you1 ,protagoras1 said that intelligence1 moderation1 justice1 holiness1 courage1 were all parts of virtue2 but each different from the others1 and each having a separate essence and properties of its own4 ,do you still adhere to that opinion8 ,prot4--,i now think that the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other1 but that courage is very greatly different from all the four4 ,the proof is1 that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage1 but thoroughly unjust1 unholy1 intemperate1 and stupid4#id ,sokr4--,do you consider that all virtue1 and each separate part of it1 is fine and honourable8 ,prot4--,i consider it in the highest degree fine and honourable3 ,i must be mad to think otherwise4#ie ,footnote #id3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p1 #cdi ,d4 ,greek3 ta men te_/ttara au7tn e7pieiks parapl_/sia a7ll_/lois e7sti_/n1 7 de a7ndrei_/a pa_/nu polu diaphe_/ron pa_/ntn tou_/tn4 ,footnote #ie3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cdi ,e4 ,greek3 ka_/lliston men ou7n1 ei7 m mai_/nomai_/ ge4 o7_/lon pou kalon 7s oi7o_/n te ma_/lista4 ,it is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this1 put by ,plato into the mouth of ,protagoras4 ,they tend to show that ,plato did not seek 7as many of his commentators do7 to depict ,protagoras as a corruptor of the public mind4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence4 ,protagoras does not admit this4 ,sokrates changes his attack4 ,sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men1 forward in dashing at dangers1 which people in general will not affront3 that men who dive with confidence into the water1 are those who know how to swim2 men who go into battle with confidence as horse-soldiers or light infantry1 are those who understand their profession as such4 ,if any men embark in these dangers1 without such preliminary knowledge1 do you consider them men of courage8 ,not at all 7says ,protagoras71 they are madmen3 courage would be a dishonourable thing1 if they were reckoned courageous4#if ,then 7replies ,sokrates7 upon this reasoning1 those who face dangers confidently1 with preliminary knowledge1 are courageous3 those who do so without it1 are madmen4 ,courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence8#ig ,protagoras declines to admit this1 drawing a distinction somewhat confused3#ih upon which ,sokrates approaches the same argument from a different point4 ,footnote #if3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cej ,b4 ,greek3 ,ai7schron me_/nt' a7n1 e7_/ph1 ei7_/1 7 a7ndrei_/a2 e7pei ou7toi_/ ge maino_/menoi_/ ei7sin4 ,footnote #ig3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cej ,c4 ,footnote #ih3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cej-cea4 ,side-note3 ,identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful with the evil4 ,sokrates maintains it4 ,protagoras denies4 ,debate4 ,sokr4--,you say that some men live well1 others badly4 ,do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress8 ,prot4--,no4 ,sokr4--,but if he passes his life pleasurably until its close1 does he not then appear to you to have lived well8 ,prot4--,i think so4 ,sokr4--,to live pleasurably therefore is good3 to live disagreeably is evil4 ,prot4--,yes3 at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things4#ii ,sokr4--,what6 do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil1 and some painful things good8 ,prot4--,that is my opinion4 ,sokr4--,but are not all pleasurable things1 so far forth as pleasurable1 to that extent good1 unless some consequences of a different sort result from them8 ,and again1 subject to the like limitation1 are not all painful things evil1 so far forth as they are painful8 ,prot4--,to that question1 absolutely as you put it1 ,i do not know whether ,i can reply affirmatively--that all pleasurable things are good1 and all painful things evil4 ,i think it safer--with reference not merely to the present answer1 but to my manner of life generally--to say1 that there are some pleasurable things which are good1 others which are not good--some painful things which are evil1 others which are not evil3 again1 some which are neither1 neither good nor evil4#ajj ,sokr4--,you call those things pleasurable1 which either partake of the nature of pleasure1 or cause pleasure8 ,prot4--,unquestionably4 ,sokr4--,when ,i ask whether pleasurable things are not good1 in so far forth as pleasurable--,i ask in other words1 whether pleasure itself be not good8 ,prot4--,as you observed before1 ,sokrates1#aja let us examine the question on each side1 to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same4 ,footnote #ii3 ,plat4 ,prot4 p4 #cea ,c4 ,greek3 ,to men a7_/ra 7de_/s zn1 a7gatho_/n1 to d' a7ds1 kako_/n8 ,ei7_/per tois kalois g'1 e7_/ph1 z_/ 7do_/menos4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cea ,d4 ,greek3 a7lla_/ moi dokei ou7 mo_/non pros tn nun a7po_/krisin e7moi a7sphale_/steron ei7nai a7pokri_/nasthtai1 a7lla kai pros pa_/nta ton a7_/llon bi_/on ton e7mo_/n1 o7_/ti e7_/sti men a7 tn 7de_/n ou7k e7_/stin a7gatha_/1 e7_/sti d' au7 kai a7 tn a7niarn ou7k e7sti kaka_/1 e7_/sti d' a7 e7_/sti1 kai tri_/ton a7 ou7de_/tera1 ou7_/te kaka ou7_/t' a7gatha_/4 ,these words strengthen farther what ,i remarked in a recent note1 about the character which ,plato wished to depict in ,protagoras1 so different from what is imputed to that ,sophist by the ,platonic commentators4 ,footnote #aja3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cea ,e4 ,greek3 7_/sper su le_/geis1 e7ka_/stote1 7 ,s_/krates1 skop_/metha au7to_/4 ,this is an allusion to the words used by ,sokrates not long before1--,greek3 a7 au7tos a7por e7ka_/stote tauta diaske_/psasthai1 p4 #cdh ,c4 ,side-note3 ,enquiry about knowledge4 ,is it the dominant agency in the mind8 ,or is it overcome frequently by other agencies1 pleasure or pain8 ,both agree that knowledge is dominant4 ,sokr4--,let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question4#ajb ,what is your opinion about knowledge8 ,do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it1 as you do about pleasure and pain8 ,mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant4 ,often 7they say71 when knowledge is in a man1 it is not knowledge which governs him1 but something else--passion1 pleasure1 pain1 love1 fear--all or any of which overpower knowledge1 and drag it round about in their train like a slave4 ,are you of the common opinion on this point also8#ajc ,or do you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing1 and made to govern man3 and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are1 he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever1 so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge--his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him8#ajd ,prot4--,the last opinion is what ,i hold4 ,to me1 above all others1 it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceb ,a4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceb ,b-,c4 ,greek3 po_/teron kai touto_/ soi dokei 7_/sper tois pollois a7nthr_/pois 7 a7_/lls8 4 4 4 dianoou_/menoi peri ts e7pist_/ms 7_/sper peri a7ndrapo_/don1 perielkome_/ns u7po tn a7_/lln a7pa_/ntn4 ,aristotle in the ,nikomachean ,ethics cites and criticises the opinion of ,sokrates1 wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge1 when really possessed1 over all passions and desires4 ,aristotle cites it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this passage of the ,protagoras4 ,greek3 ,e7pista_/menon men ou7n ou7_/ phasi_/ tines oi7o_/n te ei7nai a7krateu_/esthai4 deinon ga_/r1 e7pist_/ms e7nou_/ss1 7s 7_/eto ,skra_/ts1 a7_/llo ti kratein1 kai perie_/lkein au7tn 7_/sper a7ndra_/podon4 ,skra_/ts men gar o7_/ls e7ma_/cheto pros ton lo_/gon1 7s ou7k ou7_/ss a7krasi_/as2 ou7the_/na gar u7polamba_/nonta1 pra_/ttein para to be_/ltiston1 a7lla di' a7_/gnoian 7,ethic4 ,n4 vii4 #b1 vii4 #c1 p4 #aade1 b4 #bd74 ,the same metaphor ,greek3 perie_/lketai e7pist_/m is again ascribed to ,sokrates by ,aristotle1 a little farther on in the same treatise1 p4 #aadg1 b4 #ae4 ,we see from hence that when ,aristotle comments upon the doctrine of ,sokrates1 what he here means is1 the doctrine of the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,protagoras2 the citation of this particular metaphor establishes the identity4 ,in another passage of the ,nikom4 ,eth41 ,aristotle also cites a fact respecting the ,sophist ,protagoras1 which fact is mentioned in the ,platonic dialogue ,protagoras--respecting the manner in which that ,sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching 7,ethic4 ,nik4 ix4 #a1 #aafd1 a4 #be74 ,footnote #ajd3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceb ,c4 ,greek3 a7ll' i7kann ei7nai tn phro_/nsin bothein t a7nthr_/p4 ,side-note3 ,mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge4 ,we never call pleasures evils1 except when they entail a preponderance of pain1 or a disappointment of greater pleasures4 ,sokr4--,you speak well and truly4 ,but you are aware that most men are of a different opinion4 ,they affirm that many who know what is best1 act against their own knowledge1 overcome by pleasure or by pain4 ,prot4--,most men think so3 incorrectly1 in my judgment1 as they say many other things besides4#aje ,sokr4--,when they say that a man1 being overcome by food or drink or other temptations1 will do things which he knows to be evil1 we must ask them1 ,on what ground do you call these things evil8 ,is it because they impart pleasure at the moment1 or because they prepare disease1 poverty1 and other such things1 for the future8#ajf ,most men would reply1 ,i think1 that they called these things evil not on account of the present pleasure which the things produced1 but on account of their ulterior consequences--poverty and disease being both of them distressing8 ,prot4--,most men would say this4 ,sokr4--,it would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other reason1 than because they ended in pain and in privation of pleasure4#ajg ,prot4--,certainly4 ,sokr4--,again1 when it is said that some good things are painful1 such things are meant as gymnastic exercises1 military expeditions1 medical treatment4 ,now no one will say that these things are good because of the immediate suffering which they occasion1 but because of the ulterior results of health1 wealth1 and security1 which we obtain by them4 ,thus1 these also are good for no other reason1 than because they end in pleasures1 or in relief or prevention of pain4#ajh ,or can you indicate any other end1 to which men look when they call these matters evil8 ,prot4--,no other end can be indicated4 ,footnote #aje3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #ceb-cec4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cec ,d4 ,greek3 ponra de au7ta p phate ei7nai8 po_/teron o7_/ti tn 7donn tau_/tn e7n t parachrma pare_/chei kai 7du_/ e7stin e7_/kaston au7tn1 7 o7_/ti ei7s ton u7_/steron chro_/non no_/sous te poiei kai peni_/as kai a7_/lla toiauta polla paraskeua_/zei8 ,footnote #ajg3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cec ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun phai_/netai4 4 4 4 di' ou7den a7_/llo tauta kaka o7_/nta1 7 dio_/ti ei7s a7ni_/as te a7poteleuta kai a7_/lln 7donn a7posterei8 ,footnote #ajh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ced ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ,tauta de a7gatha_/ e7sti di' a7_/llo ti 7 o7_/ti ei7s 7donas a7poteleuta kai lupn a7pallagas kai a7potropa_/s8 7 e7_/chete_/ ti a7_/llo te_/los le_/gein1 ei7s o7 a7poble_/psantes au7ta a7gatha kaleite1 a7ll' 7 7dona_/s te kai lu_/pas8 ou7k a7n phaien1 7s e7g7mai4 4 4 4 ,ou7koun tn men 7donn di_/kete 7s a7gathon o7_/n1 tn de lu_/pn pheu_/gete 7s kako_/n8 ,side-note3 ,pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil4 ,no man does evil voluntarily1 knowing it to be evil4 ,difference between pleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain4 ,sokr4--,it thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good1 and avoid pain as evil4 ,pleasure is what you think good3 pain is what you think evil3 for even pleasure itself appears to you evil1 when it either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself1 or entails upon you pains outweighing itself4 ,is there any other reason1 or any other ulterior end1 to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil8 ,if there be any other between reason1 or any other end1 tell us what it is4#aji ,prot4--,there is none whatever4 ,sokr4--,the case is similar about pains3 you call pain good1 when it preserves you from greater pains1 or procures for you a future balance of pleasure4 ,if there be any other end to which you look when you call pain good1 tell us what it is4 ,prot4--,you speak truly4 ,sokr4--,if ,i am asked why ,i insist so much on the topic now before us1 ,i shall reply1 that it is no easy matter to explain what is meant by being overcome by pleasure2 and that the whole proof hinges upon this point--whether there is any other good than pleasure1 or any other evil than pain2 and whether it be not sufficient1 that we should go through life pleasurably and without pains4#aaj ,if this be sufficient1 and if no other good or evil can be pointed out1 which does not end in pleasures and pains1 mark the consequences4 ,good and evil being identical with pleasurable and painful1 it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily1 knowing it to be evil1 under the overpowering influence of pleasure3 that is1 under the overpowering influence of good4#aaa ,how can it be wrong1 that a man should yield to the influence of good8 ,it never can be wrong1 except in this case--when the good obtained is of smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent evil entailed4 ,what other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains1 except in the ratio of quantity--greater or less1 more or fewer8#aab ,if an objector tells me that there is a material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment1 and pleasures and pains postponed to a future time1 ,i ask him in reply1 ,is there any other difference1 except in pleasure and pain8 ,an intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale1 the pleasures and the pains1 the present and the future1 so as to determine the balance4 ,weighing pleasures against pleasures1 he ought to prefer the more and the greater3 weighing pains against pains1 the fewer and the less4 ,if pleasures against pains1 then when the latter outweigh the former1 reckoning distant as well as near1 he ought to abstain from the act3 when the pleasures outweigh1 he ought to do it4 ,prot4--,the objectors could have nothing to say against this4#aac ,footnote #aji3 ,plato1 ,protag1 p4 #ced ,d4 ,greek3 e7pei ei7 kat' a7_/llo ti au7to to chai_/rein kakon kaleite kai ei7s a7_/llo ti te_/los a7poble_/psantes1 e7_/choite a7n kai 7min ei7pein2 a7ll' ou7ch e7_/xete4 ,ou7d' e7moi dokousin1 e7_/ph o7 ,prtago_/ras4 ,footnote #aaj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ced ,e4 ,greek3 e7_/peita e7n tou_/t ei7si pasai ai7 a7podei_/xeis2 a7ll' e7_/ti kai nun a7nathe_/sthai e7_/xestin1 ei7 p e7_/chete a7_/llo ti pha_/nai ei7nai to a7gathon 7 tn 7don_/n1 7 to kakon a7_/llo ti 7 tn a7ni_/an1 7 a7rkei u7min to 7de_/s katabinai ton bi_/on a7_/neu lupn8 ,footnote #aaa3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cee ,c4 ,footnote #aab3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cef ,a4 ,greek3 kai ti_/s a7_/ll a7xi_/a 7don pros lu_/pn e7stin a7ll' 7 u7perbol a7ll_/ln kai e7_/lleipsis8 tauta d' e7sti mei_/z te kai smikro_/tera gigno_/mena a7ll_/ln1 kai plei_/ kai e7la_/tt1 kai mallon kai 7tton4 ,footnote #aac3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cef ,c4 ,side-note3 ,necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it4 ,sokr4--,well then--,i shall tell them farther--you know that the same magnitude1 and the same voice1 appears to you greater when near than when distant4 ,now1 if all our well-doing depended upon our choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really less1 where would the security of our life be found8 ,in the art of mensuration1 or in the apparent impression8#aad ,would not the latter lead us astray1 causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice between great and little1 with frequent repentance afterwards8 ,would not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances1 and by revealing to us the truth1 impart tranquillity to our minds and security to our lives8 ,would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety1 except in the art of mensuration8 ,prot4--,they would acknowledge it4 ,sokr4--,again1 ,if the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd and even1 and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less1 whether far or near1 would not our safety reside in knowledge1 and in a certain knowledge of mensuration too1 in ,arithmetic8 ,prot4--,they would concede to you that also4 ,sokr4--,well then1 my friends1 since the security of our lives has been found to depend on the right choice of pleasure and pain--between the more and fewer1 greater and less1 nearer and farther--does it not come to a simple estimate of excess1 deficiency1 and equality between them8 in other words1 to mensuration1 art1 or science8#aae ,what kind of art or science it is1 we will enquire another time3 for the purpose of our argument1 enough has been done when we have shown that it is science4 ,footnote #aad3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cef ,d4 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n e7n tou_/t 7min 7n to eu7 pra_/ttein1 e7n t ta men mega_/la m_/k kai pra_/ttein kai lamba_/nein1 ta de smikra kai pheu_/gein kai m pra_/ttein1 ti_/s a7n 7min stri_/a e7pha_/n tou bi_/ou8 a7ra 7 metrtik te_/chn1 7 7 tou phainome_/nou du_/namis8 4 4 4 ,a7r' a7n o7mologoien oi7 a7_/nthrpoi pros tauta 7mas tn metrtikn s_/zein a7n te_/chnn1 7 a7_/lln8 ,footnote #aae3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceg ,a-v4 ,greek3 e7peid de 7dons te kai lu_/ps e7n o7rth t ai7re_/sei e7pha_/n 7min 7 stri_/a tou bi_/ou ou7sa1 tou te ple_/onos kai e7la_/ttonos kai mei_/zonos kai smikrote_/ron kai por7r7te_/r kai e7ggute_/r1 a7ra prton men ou7 metrtik phai_/netai1 u7perbols te kai e7ndei_/as ou7sa kai i7so_/ttos pros a7ll_/las ske_/psis8 ,a7ll' a7na_/gk4 ,e7pei de metrtik_/1 a7na_/gk d_/pou te_/chn kai e7pist_/m4 ,side-note3 ,to do wrong1 overcome by pleasure1 is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance4 ,for when we 7,protagoras and ,sokrates7 affirmed1 that nothing was more powerful than science or knowledge1 and that this1 in whatsoever minds it existed1 prevailed over pleasure and every thing else--you 7the supposed objectors7 maintained1 on the contrary1 that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the instructed man3 and you called upon us to explain1 upon our principles1 what that mental affection was1 which people called1 being overcome by the seduction of pleasure4 ,we have now shown you that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance1 and the gravest ignorance4 ,you have admitted that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasures and pains--that is1 in the choice of good and evil things--go wrong from want of knowledge1 of the knowledge or science of mensuration4 ,the wrong deed done from want of knowledge1 is done through ignorance4 ,what you call being overcome by pleasure is thus1 the gravest ignorance2 which these ,sophists1 ,protagoras1 ,prodikus1 and ,hippias1 engage to cure3 but you 7the objectors whom we now address7 not believing it to be ignorance1 or perhaps unwilling to pay them their fees1 refuse to visit them1 and therefore go on doing ill1 both privately and publicly4#aaf ,footnote #aaf3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceg ,e4 ,side-note3 ,reasoning of ,sokrates assented to by all4 ,actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain1 are honourable4 ,now then1 ,protagoras1 ,prodikus1 and ,hippias 7continues ,sokrates71 ,i turn to you1 and ask1 whether you account my reasoning true or false8 7,all of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true47 ,sokr4--,you all agree1 then1 all three1 that the pleasurable is good1 and that the painful is evil3#aag for ,i take no account at present of the verbal distinctions of ,prodikus1 discriminating between the pleasurable1 the delightful1 and the enjoyable4 ,if this be so1 are not all those actions1 which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain1 honourable8 and is not the honourable deed1 good and profitable8#aah 7,in this1 all persons present concurred47 ,if then the pleasurable is good1 no one ever does anything1 when he either knows or believes other things in his power to be better4 ,to be inferior to yourself is nothing else than ignorance3 to be superior to yourself1 is nothing else than wisdom4 ,ignorance consists in holding false opinions1 and in being deceived respecting matters of high importance4 7,agreed by all47 ,accordingly1 no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil1 or which he believes to be evil2 nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon what he thinks evil courses1 in preference to good4 ,when a man is compelled to make choice between two evils1 no one will take the greater when he might take the less4#aai 7,agreed to by all three47 ,farther1 no one will affront things of which he is afraid1 when other things are open to him1 of which he is not afraid3 for fear is an expectation of evil1 so that what a man fears1 he of course thinks to be an evil1--and will not approach it willingly4 7,agreed47#abj ,footnote #aag3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceh ,a4 ,greek3 u7perphus e7do_/kei a7_/pasin a7lth ei7nai ta ei7rme_/na4 ,o7mologeite a7_/ra1 7n d' e7g_/1 to men 7du a7gathon ei7nai1 to de a7niaron kako_/n4 ,footnote #aah3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceh ,b4 ,greek3 ai7 e7pi tou_/tou pra_/xeis a7_/pasai e7pi tou a7lu_/ps zn kai 7de_/s1 a7r' ou7 kalai_/8 kai to kalon e7_/rgon1 a7gatho_/n te kai 7phe_/limon8 ,footnote #aai3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceh ,c-,d4 ,greek3 e7pi_/ ge ta kaka ou7deis e7kn e7_/rchetai1 ou7de e7pi a7 oi7_/etai kaka ei7nai1 ou7d' e7sti touto1 7s e7_/oiken1 e7n a7nthr_/pou phu_/sei1 e7pi a7 oi7_/etai kaka ei7nai e7the_/lein i7e_/nai a7nti tn a7gathn2 o7_/tan te a7nagka_/sth duoin kakoin to e7_/teron ai7reisthai1 ou7deis to meizon ai7r_/setai1 e7xon to e7_/latton4 ,footnote #abj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceh ,e4 ,side-note3 ,explanation of courage4 ,it consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible4 ,sokr4--,let us now revert to the explanation of courage1 given by ,protagoras4 ,he said that four out of the five parts of virtue were tolerably similar2 but that courage differed greatly from all of them4 ,and he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage2 yet at the same time eminently unjust1 immoderate1 unholy1 and stupid4 ,he said1 too1 that the courageous men were men to attempt things which timid men would not approach4 ,now1 ,protagoras1 what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt8 ,will they attempt terrible things1 believing them to be terrible8 ,prot4--,that is impossible1 as you have shown just now4 ,sokr4--,no one will enter upon that which he believes to be terrible1--or1 in other words1 will go into evil knowing it to be evil3 a man who does so is inferior to himself--and this1 as we have agreed1 is ignorance1 or the contrary of knowledge4 ,all men1 both timid and brave1 attempt things upon which they have a good heart3 in this respect1 the things which the timid and the brave go at1 are the same4#aba ,prot4--,how can this be8 ,the things which the timid and the brave go at or affront1 are quite contrary3 for example1 the latter are willing to go to war1 which the former are not4 ,sokr4--,is it honourable to go to war1 or dishonourable8 ,prot4--,honourable4 ,sokr4--,if it be honourable1 it must also be good3#abb for we have agreed1 in the preceding debate1 that all honourable things were good4 ,prot4--,you speak truly4#abc ,i at least always persist in thinking so4 ,sokr4--,which of the two is it1 who 7you say7 are unwilling to go into war2 it being an honourable and good thing8 ,prot4--,the cowards4 ,sokr4--,but if going to war be an honourable and good thing1 it is also pleasurable8 ,prot4--,certainly that has been admitted4#abd ,sokr4--,is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war1 which is both more honourable1 better1 and more pleasurable8 ,prot4--,we cannot say so1 without contradicting our preceding admissions4 ,sokr4--,what about the courageous man8 does not he affront or go at what is more honourable1 better1 and more pleasurable8 ,prot4--,it cannot be denied4 ,sokr4--,courageous men then1 generally1 are those whose fears1 when they are afraid1 are honourable and good--not dishonourable or bad3 and whose confidence1 when they feel confident1 is also honourable and good8#abe ,on the contrary1 cowards1 impudent men1 and madmen1 both fear1 and feel confidence1 on dishonourable occasions8 ,prot4--,agreed4 ,sokr4--,when they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil1 is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity8 ,are they not cowards from stupidity1 or a stupid estimate of things terrible8 ,and is it not in this ignorance1 or stupid estimate of things terrible1 and things not terrible--that cowardice consists8 ,lastly1#abf--;courage being the opposite of cowardice--is it not in the knowledge1 or wise estimate1 of things terrible and things not terrible1 that courage consists8 ,footnote #aba3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cei ,d4 ,greek3 e7pi men a7 deina 7geitai ei7nai ou7deis e7_/rchetai1 e7peid to 7_/tt ei7nai e7autou eu7re_/th a7mathi_/a ou7sa4 7molo_/gei4 ,a7lla mn e7pi a7_/ ge thar7r7ousi pa_/ntes au7 e7_/rchontai1 kai deiloi kai a7ndreioi1 kai tau_/t ge e7pi ta au7ta e7_/rchontai oi7 deiloi_/ te kai oi7 a7ndreioi4 ,footnote #abb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cei ,e4 ,greek3 po_/teron kalon o7n i7e_/nai 7ei7s ton po_/lemon7 7 ai7schro_/n8 ,kalo_/n1 e7_/ph4 ,ou7koun1 ei7_/per kalo_/n1 kai a7gathon 7molog_/samen e7n tois e7_/mprosthen2 tas gar kalas pra_/xeis a7pa_/sas a7gathas 7molog_/samen8 ,footnote #abc3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cei ,e4 ,greek3 ,a7lth le_/geis1 kai a7ei e7_/moige dokei ou7_/ts4 ,this answer1 put into the mouth of ,protagoras1 affords another proof that ,plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many commentators impute4 ,footnote #abd3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfj ,a4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun1 7n d' e7g_/1 ei7_/per kalon kai a7gatho_/n1 kai 7du_/8 7molo_/gtai goun1 e7_/ph4 ,footnote #abe3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfj ,b4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun o7_/ls oi7 a7ndreioi ou7k ai7schrous pho_/bous phobountai1 o7_/tav phobntai1 ou7de ai7schra tha_/r7r7 tha_/r7r7ousin8 4 4 4 ,ei7 de m ai7schra_/1 a7r' ou7 kala_/8 4 4 4 ,ei7 de kala_/1 kai a7gatha_/8 ,footnote #abf3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfj ,d4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun 7 tn deinn kai m deinn a7mathi_/a deili_/a a7n ei7_/8 4 4 4 7 sophi_/a a7_/ra tn deinn kai m deinn1 a7ndrei_/a e7sti_/n1 e7nanti_/a ou7sa t tou_/tn a7mathi_/a8 ,side-note3 ,reluctance of ,protagoras to continue answering4 ,close of the discussion4 ,sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion1 and that he wishes to debate it again with ,protagoras4 ,amicable reply of ,protagoras4 ,protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with increasing reluctance4 ,but at this final question1 he declines altogether to answer1 or even to imply assent by a gesture4#abg ,sokr4--,why will you not answer my question1 either affirmatively or negatively8 ,prot4--,finish the exposition by yourself4 ,sokr4--,i will only ask you one more question4 ,do you still think1 as you said before1 that there are some men extremely stupid1 but extremely courageous8 ,prot4--,you seem to be obstinately bent on making me answer3 ,i will therefore comply with your wish3 ,i say that according to our previous admissions1 it appears to me impossible4 ,sokr4--,i have no other motive for questioning you thus1 except the wish to investigate how the truth stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself4#abh ,to determine this1 is the way to elucidate the question which you and ,i first debated at length3--,i1 affirming that virtue was not teachable--you1 that it was teachable4 ,the issue of our conversation renders both of us ridiculous4 ,for ,i1 who denied virtue to be teachable1 have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge1 which is the most teachable of all things3 while ,protagoras1 who affirmed that it was teachable1 has tried to show that it consisted in every thing rather than knowledge3 on which supposition it would be hardly teachable at all4 ,i therefore1 seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down1 am beyond measure anxious to clear them up2#abi and should be glad1 conjointly with you1 to go through the whole investigation--,first1 what ,virtue is1--,next1 whether it is teachable or not4 ,it is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of my own life that ,i undertake this research1 and ,i should be delighted to have you as a coadjutor4#acj ,prot4--,i commend your earnestness1 ,sokrates1 and your manner of conducting discussion4 ,i think myself not a bad man in other respects3 and as to jealousy1 ,i have as little of it as any one4 ,for ,i have always said of you1 that ,i admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance--decidedly more than any man of your own age4 ,it would not surprise me1 if you became one day illustrious for wisdom4 ,footnote #abg3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfj ,d4 ,greek3 ou7ke_/ti e7ntautha ou7_/t' e7pineusai 7the_/lsen1 e7si_/ga te4 ,footnote #abh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfj-cfa4 ,greek3 ,ou7_/toi a7_/llou e7_/neka e7rt pa_/nta tauta1 7 ske_/psasthai boulo_/menos ps pot' e7_/chei ta peri ts a7rets1 kai ti_/ pot' e7stin au7to 7 a7ret_/4 ,oi7da gar o7_/ti tou_/tou phanerou genome_/nou ma_/list' a7n kata_/dlon ge_/noito e7keino1 peri ou7 e7g_/ te kai su makron lo_/gon e7ka_/teros a7petei_/namen1 e7g men le_/gn1 7s ou7 didakton a7ret_/1 su d'1 7s didakto_/n4 ,footnote #abi3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfa ,c4 ,greek3 e7g ou7n pa_/nta tauta kathorn a7_/n ka_/t taratto_/mena deins1 pasan prothumi_/an e7_/ch kataphan au7ta gene_/sthai1 kai bouloi_/mn a7n tauta diexeltho_/ntas 7mas e7xelthein kai e7pi tn a7retn o7_/ ti e7_/stin4 ,footnote #acj3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfa ,d4 ,greek3 promthou_/menos u7per tou bi_/ou tou e7mautou panto_/s4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,remarks on the dialogue4 ,it closes without the least allusion to ,hippokrates4 ,such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue4#aca ,we remark with some surprise that it closes without any mention of ,hippokrates1 and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request for admission to the society of ,protagoras3 though such request had been presented at the beginning1 with much emphasis1 as the sole motive for the intervention of ,sokrates4 ,upon this point#acb the dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which ,plato 7in the ,phdrus7 bestows on the discourse of ,lysias3 requiring that every discourse shall be like a living organism1 neither headless nor footless1 but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each other4 ,footnote #aca3 ,most critics treat the ,protagoras as a composition of ,plato's younger years--what they call his first period--before the death of ,sokrates4 ,they fix different years1 from #djg ,b4,c4 7,ast7 down to #djb ,b4,c4 ,i do not agree with this view4 ,i can admit no dialogue earlier than #cii ,b4,c43 and ,i consider the ,protagoras to belong to ,plato's full maturity4 ,footnote #acb3 ,plato1 ,phdrus1 p4 #bfd ,c4 ,greek3 dein pa_/nta lo_/gon 7_/sper zon sunesta_/nai1 sma_/ ti e7_/chonta au7ton au7tou1 _/ste m_/te a7ke_/phalon ei7nai m_/te a7_/poun1 c4 ,side-note3 ,two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited3 one under the name of ,protagoras2 the other1 under that of ,sokrates4 ,in our review of this dialogue1 we have found first1 towards the beginning1 an expository discourse from ,protagoras1 describing the maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community3 next1 towards the close1 an expository string of interrogatories by ,sokrates1 destined to establish the identity of ,good with ,pleasurable1 ,evil with ,painful2 and the indispensable supremacy of the calculating or measuring science1 as the tutelary guide of human life4 ,of the first1 ,i speak 7like other critics7 as the discourse of ,protagoras3 of the second1 as the theory of ,sokrates4 ,but ,i must again remind the reader1 that both the one and the other are compositions of ,plato2 both alike are offspring of his ingenious and productive imagination4 ,protagoras is not the author of that which appears here under his name3 and when we read the disparaging epithets which many critics affix to his discourse1 we must recollect that these epithets1 if they were well-founded1 would have no real application to the historical ,protagoras1 but only to ,plato himself4 ,he has set forth two aspects1 distinct and in part opposing1 of ethics and politics3 and he has provided a worthy champion for each4 ,philosophy1 or reasoned truth1 if it be attainable at all1 cannot most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling3 still less can that which ,plato calls knowledge be attained--or such command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a ,sokratic cross-examination in it4 ,side-note3 ,order of ethical problems1 as conceived by ,sokrates4 ,in the last speech of ,sokrates in the dialogue1#acc we find him proclaiming1 that the first of all problems to be solved was1 ,what virtue really is8 upon which there prevails serious confusion of opinions4 ,it was a second question--important1 yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first--,whether virtue is teachable8 ,we noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two questions delivered by ,sokrates in the ,menon4#acd ,footnote #acc3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cfa ,c4 ,footnote #acd3 ,see the last preceding chapter of this volume1 p4 #bdb49999 ,upon this order1 necessarily required1 of the two questions1 ,schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general ,einleitung to the works of ,plato1 p4 #bf4 ,eberhard 7he says7 affirms that the end proposed by ,plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble ,athenian youth1 so as to make them virtuous citizens4 ,schleiermacher controverts the position of ,eberhard2 maintaining that this is far too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy1--besides that it is reasoning in a circle1 since philosophy has first to determine what the virtue of a citizen is4 ,side-note3 ,difference of method between him and ,protagoras flows from this difference of order4 ,protagoras assumes what virtue is1 without enquiry4 ,now the conception of ethical questions in this order--the reluctance to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and settled--is one fundamental characteristic of ,sokrates4 ,the difference of method1 between him and ,protagoras1 flows from this prior difference between them in fundamental conception4 ,what virtue is1 ,protagoras neither defines nor analyses1 nor submits to debate4 ,he manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis3 he accepts the ground already prepared for him by ,king ,nomos3 he thus proceeds as if the first step had been made sure1 and takes his departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account--as the ,platonic ,sokrates complains of the geometers for doing4#ace ,to ,protagoras1 social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum1 about which no one can mistake3 which must be possessed1 in greater or less measure1 by every man1 as a condition of the existence of society3 which every individual has an interest in promoting in all his neighbours3 and which every one therefore teaches and enforces upon every one else4 ,it is a matter of common sense or common sentiment1 and thus stands in contrast with the special professional accomplishments2 which are confined only to a few--and the possessors1 teachers1 and learners of which are each an assignable section of the society4 ,the parts or branches of virtue are1 in like manner1 assumed by him as known1 in their relations to each other and to the whole4 ,this persuasion of knowledge1 without preliminary investigation1 he adopts from the general public1 with whom he is in communion of sentiment4 ,what they accept and enforce as virtue1 he accepts and enforces also4 ,footnote #ace3 ,see supr1 vol4 i4 ch4 viii4 p4 #ceh and ch4 xvii49999 p4 #acf1 respecting these remarks of ,plato on the geometers4 ,side-note3 ,method of ,protagoras4 ,continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony4 ,again1 the method pursued by ,protagoras1 is one suitable to a teacher who has jumped over this first step2 who assumes virtue1 as something fixed in the public sentiments--and addresses himself to those sentiments1 ready-made as he finds them4 ,he expands and illustrates them in continuous lectures of some length1 which fill both the ears and minds of the listener--,spartam nactus es1 hanc exorna3 he describes their growth1 propagation1 and working in the community3 he gives interesting comments on the poets1 eulogising the admired heroes who form the theme of their verses1 and enlarging on their admonitions4 ,moreover1 while resting altogether upon the authority of ,king ,nomos1 he points out the best jewel in the crown of that potentate2 the great social fact of punishment prospective1 rationally apportioned1 and employed altogether for preventing and deterring--instead of being a mere retrospective impulse1 vindictive or retributive for the past4 ,he describes instructively the machinery operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think right3 he teaches1 in his eloquent expositions and interpretations1 the same morality1 public and private1 that every one else teaches3 while he can perform the work of teaching1 somewhat more effectively than they4 ,lastly1 his method is essentially showy and popular2 intended for numerous assemblies1 reproducing the established creeds and sentiments of those assemblies1 to their satisfaction and admiration4 ,he is prepared to be met and answered in his own way1 by opposing speakers2 and he conceives himself more than a match for such rivals4 ,he professes also to possess the art of short conversation or discussion4 ,but in the exercise of this art1 he runs almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of continuous speech3 besides that the points which he raises for discussion assume all the fundamental principles1 and turn only upon such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons to be open questions1 not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy4 ,side-note3 ,method of ,sokrates4 ,dwells upon that part of the problem which ,protagoras had left out4 ,upon all these points1 ,sokrates is the formal antithesis of ,protagoras4 ,he disclaims altogether the capacities to which that ,sophist lays claim4 ,not only he cannot teach virtue1 but he professes not to know what it is1 nor whether it be teachable at all1 ,he starts from a different point of view3 not considering virtue as a known datum1 or as an universal postulate1 but assimilating it to a special craft or accomplishment1 in which a few practitioners suffice for the entire public3 requiring that in this capacity it shall be defined1 and its practitioners and teachers pointed out4 ,he has no common ground with ,protagoras2 for the difficulties which he moots are just such as the common consciousness 7and ,protagoras along with it7 overleaps or supposes to be settled4 ,his first requirement1 advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt#acf which ,protagoras must certainly be competent to remove1 is1 to know--,what virtue is8 ,what are the separate parts of virtue--justice1 moderation1 holiness1 c48 ,what is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole--virtue8 ,are they homogeneous1 differing only in quantity or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity8#acg ,respecting virtue as a whole1 we must recollect1 ,protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently1 as of a matter perfectly known4 ,he is now called back as it were to meet an attack in the rear3 to answer questions which he had never considered1 and which had never even presented themselves to him as questions4 ,at first he replies as if the questions offered no difficulty2#ach sometimes he does not feel their importance1 so that it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the affirmative or negative4#aci ,but he finds himself brought round1 by a series of questions1 to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless thinks untrue1 and which are certainly unwelcome4 ,accordingly1 he becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical interrogation3 and at length answers with such impatience and prolixity1 that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted4 ,here comes in the break--the remonstrance of ,sokrates--and the mediation of the by-standers4 ,footnote #acf3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbh ,e4 ,greek3 pln smikro_/n ti_/ moi e7mpod_/n1 o7_/ dlon o7_/ti ,prtago_/ras r7adi_/s e7pekdida_/xei1 c4 ,footnote #acg3 ,respecting ,ariston of ,chios1 ,diogenes ,laertius tells us--,greek3 ,a7retas d' ou7_/te pollas ei7sgen1 7s o7 ,z_/nn1 ou7_/te mi_/an pollois o7no_/masin kaloume_/nn--a7lla kai to pros ti_/ ps e7_/chein 7,diog4 ,laert4 vii4 #afa74 ,footnote #ach3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbi ,d4 ,greek3 ,a7lla r7a_/dion touto_/ g'1 e7_/ph1 a7pokri_/nasthai1 c4 ,footnote #aci3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cba ,d4 ,greek3 ei7 gar bou_/lei1 e7_/st 7min kai dikaiosu_/n o7_/sion kai o7sio_/ts di_/kaion4 ,m_/ moi1 7n d' e7g_/2 ou7den gar de_/omai to ei7 bou_/lei touto kai ei7 soi dokei e7le_/gchesthai1 a7ll' e7me_/ te kai se_/4 ,side-note3 ,antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner4 ,it is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer1 and the analytical enquirer and cross-examiner1 which the dialogue seems mainly intended to set forth4 ,protagoras professes to know that which he neither knows1 nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom4 ,upon this false persuasion of knowledge1 the ,sokratic ,elenchus is brought to bear4 ,we are made to see how strange1 repugnant1 and perplexing1 is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor3 how incompetent he is to go through it without confusion3 how little he can define his own terms1 or determine the limits of those notions on which he is perpetually descanting4 ,side-note3 ,protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong1 though he is described as brought to a contradiction4 ,it is not that ,protagoras is proved to be wrong 7,i speak now of this early part of the conversation1 between chapters #ea-fb--pp4 #cbi-cce7 in the substantive ground which he takes4 ,i do not at all believe 7as many critics either affirm or imply7 that ,plato intended all which he in the composed under the name of ,protagoras to be vile perversion of truth1 with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions4 ,i do not even believe that ,plato intended all those observations1 to which the name of ,protagoras is prefixed1 to be accounted silly--while all that is assigned to ,sokrates1#adj is admirable sense and acuteness4 ,it is by no means certain that ,plato intended to be understood as himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to ,sokrates3 and it is quite certain that he does not always make the ,sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the ,sokrates of another4 ,for the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy the exigencies of analysis1 we need not necessarily suppose that the conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one4 ,if the respondent be brought1 through his own admissions1 to a contradiction1 this is enough to prove that he did not know the subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions4 ,footnote #adj3 ,schne1 in his ,commentary on the ,protagoras1 is of opinion that a good part of ,plato's own doctrine is given under the name of ,protagoras 7,ueber den ,protag4 von ,platon1 p4 #ahj seq474 ,side-note3 ,affirmation of ,protagoras about courage is affirmed by ,plato himself elsewhere4 ,but whatever may have been the intention of ,plato1 if we look at the fact1 we shall find that what he has assigned to ,sokrates is not always true1 nor what he has given to ,protagoras1 always false4 ,the positions laid down by the latter--,that many men are courageous1 but unjust3 that various persons are just1 without being wise and intelligent3 that he who possesses one virtue1 does not of necessity possess all3#ada--;are not only in conformity with the common opinion1 but are quite true1 though ,sokrates is made to dispute them4 ,moreover1 the arguments employed by ,sokrates 7including in those arguments the strange propositions that justice is just1 and that holiness is holy7 are certainly noway conclusive4#adb ,though ,protagoras1 becoming entangled in difficulties1 and incapable of maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing cross-examination1 is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he professes to know--the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue in itself1 nor even shown to be apparently untrue4 ,footnote #ada3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbi ,e4 ,protagoras is here made to affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just1 nor temperate1 nor virtuous in other respects4 ,sokrates contradicts the position4 ,but in the ,treatise ,de ,legibus 7i4 p4 #fcj ,b71 ,plato himself says same thing as ,protagoras is here made to say3 at least assuming that the ,athenian speaker in ,de ,legg4 represents the sentiment of ,plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise4 ,footnote #adb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ccj ,c1 p4 #ccc ,b4 ,to say ,justice is just1 or ,holiness is holy1 is indeed either mere tautology1 or else an impropriety of speech4 ,dr4 ,hutcheson observes on an analogous case3 ,none can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities3 or call his moral ,sense morally ,good or ,evil1 any more than he calls the power of tasting1 sweet or bitter--or the power of seeing1 straight or crooked1 white or black 7,hutcheson on the ,passions1 sect4 i4 p4 #bcd74 ,side-note3 ,the harsh epithets applied by critics to ,protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue4 ,he stands on the same ground as the common consciousness4 ,as to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the ,platonic commentators ascribe to ,protagoras1 more is said than the reality justifies4 ,he pretends to know what virtue1 justice1 moderation1 courage1 c41 are1 and he is proved not to know4 ,but this is what every one else pretends to know also1 and what every body else teaches as well as he--,hc ,janus summus ab imo ,perdocet3 hc recinunt juvenes dictata senesque4 ,what he pretends to do1 beyond the general public1 he really can do4 ,he can discourse1 learnedly and eloquently1 upon these received doctrines and sentiments3 he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public in favour of that which he1 in common with the public1 believes to be good--and against that which he and they believe to be bad3 he can thus teach virtue more effectively than others4 ,but whether that which is received as virtue1 be really such--he has never analysed or verified3 nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis4 ,here again he is in harmony with the general public2 for they hate1 as much as he does1 to be dragged back to fundamentals1 and forced to explain1 defend1 revise1 or modify1 their established sentiments and maxims3 which they apply as principia for deduction to particular cases1 and which they recognise as axioms whereby other things are to be tried1 not as liable to be tried themselves4 ,protagoras is one of the general public1 in dislike of1 and inaptitude for1 analysis and dialectic discussion3 while he stands above them in his eloquence and his power of combining1 illustrating1 and adorning1 received doctrines4 ,these are points of superiority1 not pretended1 but real4 ,side-note3 ,aversion of ,protagoras for dialectic4 ,interlude about the song of ,simonides4 ,the aversion of ,protagoras for dialectic discussion--after causing an interruption of the ethical argument1 and an interlude of comment on the poet ,simonides--is at length with difficulty overcome1 and the argument is then resumed4 ,the question still continues1 ,what is virtue8 ,what are the five different parts of virtue8 ,yet it is so far altered that ,protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue which ,sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical1 really are tolerably alike3 but he nevertheless contends that courage is very different from all of them1 repeating his declaration that many men are courageous1 but unjust and stupid at the same time4 ,this position ,sokrates undertakes to refute4 ,in doing so1 he lays out one of the largest1 most distinct1 and most positive theories of virtue1 which can be found in the ,platonic writings4 ,side-note3 ,ethical view given by ,sokrates worked out at length clearly4 ,good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent4 ,virtue1 according to this theory1 consists in a right measurement and choice of pleasures and pains3 in deciding correctly1 wherever we have an alternative1 on which side lies the largest pleasure or the least pain--and choosing the side which presents this balance4 ,to live pleasurably1 is pronounced to be good3 to live without pleasure or in pain1 is evil4 ,moreover1 nothing but pleasure1 or comparative mitigation of pain1 is good3 nothing but pain is evil4#adc ,good1 is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain3 evil1 with greatest pain3 meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when looked at along with its consequences and concomitants4 ,the grand determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge3 the knowledge1 science1 or art1 of correctly measuring the comparative value of different pleasures and pains4 ,such knowledge 7the theory affirms71 wherever it is possessed1 will be sure to command the whole man1 to dictate all his conduct1 and to prevail over every temptation of special appetite or aversion4 ,to say that a man who knows on which side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies1 will act against his knowledge--is a mistake4 ,if he acts in this way1 it is plain that he does not possess the knowledge1 and that he sins through ignorance4 ,footnote #adc3 ,the substantial identity of ,good with ,pleasure1 of ,evil with ,pain1 was the doctrine of the historical ,sokrates as declared in ,xenophon's ,memorabilia4 ,see1 among other passages1 i4 #f1 #h4 ,greek3 ,tou de m douleu_/ein gastri mde u7_/pn kai lagnei_/a1 oi7_/ei ti a7_/llo ai7ti_/teron ei7nai1 7 to e7_/tera e7_/chein tou_/tn 7di_/1 a7 ou7 mo_/non e7n chrei_/a o7_/nta eu7phrai_/nei1 a7lla kai e7lpi_/das pare_/chonta 7phel_/sein a7ei_/8 ,kai mn touto_/ ge oi7stha1 o7_/ti oi7 men oi7o_/menoi mden eu7 pra_/ttein ou7k eu7phrai_/nontai1 oi7 de 7gou_/menoi kals prochrein e7autois1 7 gergi_/an 7 nauklri_/an 7 a7_/ll' o7_/1 ti a7n tugcha_/nsin e7rgazo_/menoi1 7s eu7 pra_/ttontes eu7phrai_/nontai4 ,oi7_/ei ou7n a7po pa_/ntn tou_/tn tosau_/tn 7donn ei7nai1 o7_/sn a7po tou e7auto_/n te 7geisthai belti_/ gi_/gnesthai kai phi_/lous a7mei_/nous ktasthai8 ,e7g toi_/nun diatel tauta nomi_/zn4 ,locke says1 ',essay on ,human ,understanding1' ,book ii4 ch4 #bh1 ,good or ,evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us--or that which procures pleasure or pain to us4 ,moral good or evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law1 whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker2 which good or evil1 pleasure or pain1 attending our observance or breach of the law1 is that we call reward or punishment4 ,the formal distinction here taken by ,locke between pleasure and that which procures pleasure--both the one and the other being called ,good--7the like in regard to pain and evil7 is not distinctly stated by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 though he says nothing inconsistent with it3 but it is distinctly stated in the ,republic1 ii4 p4 #ceg1 where ,good is distributed under three heads4 #a4 ,that which we desire immediately and for itself--such as ,enjoyment1 ,innocuous pleasure4 #b4 ,that which we desire both for itself and for its consequences--health1 intelligence1 good sight or hearing1 c4 #c4 ,that which we do not desire 7perhaps even shun7 for itself1 but which we accept by reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring greater pleasures4 ,this discrimination of the varieties of ,good1 given in the ,republic1 is quite consistent with what is stated by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 though it is more full and precise4 ,but it is not consistent with what ,sokrates says in the ,gorgias1 where he asserts a radical dissimilarity of nature between ,greek3 7du and ,greek3 a7gatho_/n4 ,side-note3 ,protagoras is at first opposed to this theory4 ,protagoras agrees with ,sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge3 but does not at first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure1 and evil with pain4 ,upon this point1 too1 he is represented as agreeing in opinion with the ,many4 ,he does not admit that to live pleasurably is good1 unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things4 ,he thinks it safer1 and more consistent with his own whole life1 to maintain--,that pleasurable things1 or painful things1 may be either good1 or evil1 or indifferent1 according to the particular case4 ,side-note3 ,reasoning of ,sokrates4 ,this doctrine ,sokrates takes much pains to refute4 ,he contends that pleasurable things1 so far forth as pleasurable1 are always good--and painful things1 so far forth as painful1 always evil4 ,when some pleasures are called evil1 that is not on account of any thing belonging to the pleasure itself1 but because of its ulterior consequences and concomitants1 which are painful or distressing in a degree more than countervailing the pleasure4 ,so too1 when some pains are pronounced to be good1 this is not from any peculiarity in the pain itself1 but because of its consequences and concomitants3 such pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health1 security1 wealth1 and other pleasures or satisfactions more than counter-balancing4 ,sokrates challenges opponents to name any other end1 with reference to which things are called good1 except their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of pleasure3 he challenges them to name any other end1 with reference to which things are called evil1 except their tendency to produce pains and to intercept or destroy pleasures4 ,in measuring pleasures and pains against each other1 there is no other difference to be reckoned except that of greater or less1 more or fewer4 ,the difference between near and distant1 does indeed obtrude itself upon us as a misleading element4 ,but it is the special task of the measuring science to correct this illusion--and to compare pleasures or pains1 whether near or distant1 according to their real worth3 just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in regard to near and distant objects4 ,side-note3 ,application of that reasoning to the case of courage4 ,sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the explanation of courage given by ,protagoras4 ,he shows1 or tries to show1 that courage1 like all the other branches of virtue1 consists in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains4 ,no man affronts evil1 or the alternative of greater pain1 knowing it to be such3 no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible enterprise1 knowing it to be so3 neither the brave nor the timid do this4 ,both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not terrible1 or the least terrible of two alternatives3 but they estimate differently what is such4 ,the former go readily to war when required1 the latter evade it4 ,now to go into war when required1 is honourable3 being honourable1 it is good3 being honourable and good1 it is pleasurable4 ,the brave know this1 and enter upon it willingly3 the timid not only do not know it1 but entertain the contrary opinion1 looking upon war as painful and terrible1 and therefore keeping aloof4 ,the brave men fear what it is honourable to fear1 the cowards what it is dishonourable to fear3 the former act upon the knowledge of what is really terrible1 the latter are misled by their ignorance of it4 ,courage is thus1 like the other virtues1 a case of accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains1 or of good and evil4#add ,footnote #add3 ,compare1 respecting ,courage1 a passage in the ,republic1 iv4 pp4 #dbi ,c1 #dcj ,b1 which is better stated there 7though substantially the same opinion7 than here in the ,protagoras4 ,the opinion of the ,platonic ,sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence from the funeral oration delivered by ,perikls1 ,thucyd4 ii4 #dc1 fin4 ,greek3 ,a7lgeinote_/ra gar a7ndri_/ ge phro_/nma e7_/chonti 7 e7n t meta tou malakisthnai ka_/ksis1 7 o7 meta r7_/ms kai koins e7lpi_/dos a7_/ma gigno_/menos a7nai_/sthtos tha_/natos--which ,dr4 ,arnold thus translates in his note3 ,for more grievous to a man of noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice1 than the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and hopes for the common welfare4 ,so again in the ,phdon 7p4 #fh7 ,sokrates describes the courage of the ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from fear of greater evils 7which is the same view as that of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras71 while the philosopher is courageous on a different principle2 aspiring only to reason and intelligence1 with the pleasures attending it1 he welcomes death as releasing his mind from the obstructive companionship of the body4 ,the fear of disgrace and dishonour1 in his own eyes and in those of others1 is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds and death in the service of his country4 ,see ,plato1 ,leg4 i4 pp4 #fdf-fdg4 ,he is ,greek3 phoberos meta no_/mou1 meta di_/ks1 p4 #fdg ,e4 ,such is the way in which both ,plato and ,thucydides conceive the character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward4 ,it is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different estimate of prospective pains2 the case being one in which pleasure is not concerned4 ,that the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom1 need hardly be remarked4 ,at the same time the sentiments here conceived embrace a wide field of sympathy1 comprising the interests1 honour1 and security1 of others as well as of the individual agent4 ,side-note3 ,the theory which ,plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues4 ,such is the ethical theory which the ,platonic ,sokrates enunciates in this dialogue1 and which ,protagoras and others accept4 ,it is positive and distinct1 to a degree very unusual with ,plato4 ,we shall find that he theorises differently in other dialogues2 whether for the better or the worse1 will be hereafter seen4 ,he declares here explicitly that pleasure1 or happiness1 is the end to be pursued2 and pain1 or misery1 the end to be avoided3 and that there is no other end1 in reference to which things can be called good or evil1 except as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering1 on the one side--to entail pain or suffering on the other4 ,he challenges objectors to assign any other end4 ,and thus much is certain--that in those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present doctrine1 he has not complied with his own challenge4 ,nowhere has he specified a different end4 ,in other dialogues1 as well as in the ,protagoras1 ,plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art of calculation3 but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly what are the items to be calculated4 ,side-note3 ,remarks on the theory here laid down by ,sokrates4 ,it is too narrow1 and exclusively prudential4 ,i perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 that pain or suffering is the ,end to be avoided or lessened as far as possible--and pleasure or happiness the ,end to be pursued as far as attainable--by intelligent forethought and comparison3 that there is no other intelligible standard of reference1 for application of the terms ,good and ,evil1 except the tendency to produce happiness or misery3 and that if this standard be rejected1 ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion1 and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments1 authoritative and self-justifying1 prevalent in each community4 ,but the ,end just mentioned is highly complex1 and care must be taken to conceive it in its full comprehension4 ,herein ,i conceive the argument of ,sokrates 7in the ,protagoras7 to be incomplete4 ,it carries attention only to a part of the truth1 keeping out of sight1 though not excluding1 the remainder4 ,it considers each man as an individual1 determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures and pains3 as a prudent1 temperate1 and courageous agent1 but neither as just nor beneficent4 ,it omits to take account of him as a member of a society1 composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with himself4 ,now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner 7such as ,plato both professes to be and really is7 to study the means of happiness1 not simply for the agent himself1 but for that agent together with others around him--for the members of the community generally4#ade ,the ,platonic ,sokrates says this himself in the ,republic3 and accordingly1 he there treats of other points which are not touched upon by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras4 ,he proclaims that the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent with the security1 and to a certain extent with the happiness1 of others3 he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their pleasures and pains from the same causes3 common pleasures1 and common pains1 to all4#adf ,the doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important elements4 ,since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of others1 he must be called upon to take account of its consequences under both aspects1 especially where it goes to inflict hurt or privation upon others4 ,good and evil depend upon that scientific computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which ,sokrates in the ,protagoras prescribes3 but the computation must include1 to a certain extent1 the pleasures and pains 7security and rightful expectations7 of others besides the agent himself1 implicated in the consequences of his acts4#adg ,footnote #ade3 ,plato1 ,republ4 iv4 pp4 #dbj-dba1 v4 p4 #dff ,a4 ,footnote #adf3 ,plato1 ,republ4 v4 pp4 #dfb ,a-,b-,d1 #dfd ,a-,d4 ,throughout the first of these passages we see ,greek3 a7gathon used as the equivalent of ,greek3 7don_/1 ,greek3 kakon as the equivalent of ,greek3 lu_/p4 ,footnote #adg3 ,see1 especially on this point1 the brief but valuable ,tract on ,utilitarianism by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,in page #af of that work attention is called to the fact1 that in ,utilitarianism the standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone1 but the greatest amount of happiness altogether4 ,so that we cannot with exactness call the doctrine of ,sokrates1 in his conversation with ,protagoras1 the theory of ,utilitarianism1 as ,mr4 ,mill calls it in page #a4 ,side-note3 ,comparison with the ,republic4 ,as to this point1 we shall find the ,platonic ,sokrates not always correct1 nor even consistent with himself4 ,this will appear especially when we come to see the account which he gives of ,justice in the ,republic4 ,in that branch of the ,ethical ,end1 a direct regard to the security of others comes into the foreground4 ,for in an act of injustice1 the prominent characteristic is that of harm1 done to others--though that is not the whole1 since the security of the agent himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment of these obligations4 ,it is this primary regard to others1 and secondary regard to self1 implicated in one complex feeling--which distinguishes justice from prudence4 ,the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,republic 7though his language is not always clear7 does not admit this2 but considers justice as a branch of prudence1 necessary to ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself4 ,side-note3 ,the discourse of ,protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case1 which is omitted in the analysis by ,sokrates4 ,now in the ,protagoras1 what the ,platonic ,sokrates dwells upon 7in the argument which ,i have been considering7 is prudence1 temperance1 courage3 little or nothing is said about justice3 there was therefore the less necessity for insisting on that prominent reference to the security of others 7besides the agent himself7 which justice involves4 ,if1 however1 we turn back to the earlier part of the dialogue1 to the speech delivered by ,protagoras1 we see justice brought into the foreground4 ,it is not indeed handled analytically 7which is not the manner of that ,sophist71 nor is it resolved into regard to pleasure and pain1 happiness and misery3 but it is announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally necessary from every man towards every other 7,greek3 di_/k--ai7ds71 distinguishable from those endowments which supply the wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself4 ,the very existence of the social union requires1 that each man should feel a sentiment of duties on his part towards others1 and duties on their parts towards him3 or 7in other words7 of rights on his part to have his interests considered by others1 and rights on their parts to have their interests considered by him4 ,unless this sentiment of reciprocity--reciprocal duty and right--exist in the bosom of each individual citizen1 or at least in the large majority--no social union could subsist4 ,there are doubtless different degrees of the sentiment3 moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better or worse1 more or less fairly1 among the individuals of a society2 thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable4 ,but without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual bosom1 even the worst constituted society could not hold together4 ,and it is this sentiment of reciprocity which ,protagoras 7in the dialogue before us7 is introduced as postulating in his declaration1 that justice and the sense of shame 7unlike to professional aptitudes7 must be distributed universally and without exception among all the members of a community4 ,each man must feel them1 in his conduct towards others3 each man must also be able to reckon that others will feel the like1 in their behaviour towards him4#adh ,footnote #adh3 ,professor ,bain 7in his work on the ,emotions and the ,will1 ch4 xv4 ,on the ,ethical ,emotions1 pp4 #bga-c7 has given remarks extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which ,plato has here placed under the name of ,protagoras4 ,the supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into the two following particulars4 ,first1 the common end of public security1 which is also individual preservation1 demands certain precautions that are everywhere very much alike1 and can in no case be dispensed with4 ,some sort of constituted authority to control the individual impulses and to protect each man's person and property1 must exist wherever a number of human beings live together4 ,the duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially the same in all societies4 4 4 ,they have a pretty uniform character all over the globe4 ,if the sense of the common safety were not sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some common regulations1 society could not exist4 4 4 4 ,it is no proof of the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral distinctions1 but of a certain rational appreciation of what is necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the company of others3 ,doubtless1 if the sad history of the human race had been preserved in all its details1 we should have many examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception of a social system1 or to the restraints imposed by it4 ,we know enough of the records of anarchy1 to see how difficult it is for human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of security2 but if this were not complied with at all1 the result would be mutual and swift destruction4 4 4 4 ,in the second place1 mankind have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon individual members of societies some observances or restraints of purely sentimental origin1 having no reference1 direct or indirect1 to the maintenance of the social tie1 with all the safeguards implied in it4 ,certain maxims founded in taste1 liking1 aversion1 or fancy1 have1 in every community known to us1 been raised to the dignity of authoritative morality2 being rendered 7so to speak7 'terms of communion1' and have been enforced by punishment4 4 4 4 ,in the rules1 founded on men's sentiments1 likings1 aversions1 and antipathies1 there is nothing common but the fact that some one or other of these are carried to the length of public requirement1 and mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society together4 ,the postulate of the ,platonic ,protagoras--that ,greek3 di_/k and ,greek3 ai7ds must be felt to a certain extent in each man's bosom1 as a condition to the very existence of society--agrees with the first of the two elements here distinguished by ,mr4 ,bain1 and does not necessarily go beyond it4 ,but the unsystematic teaching and universal propagandism1 which ,protagoras describes as the agency whereby virtue is communicated1 applies alike to both the two elements distinguished by ,mr4 ,bain3 to the factitious exigencies of ,king ,nomos1 as well as to his tutelary control4 ,it is this mixed mass that the ,sokratic analysis is brought to examine4 ,side-note3 ,the ,ethical ,end1 as implied in the discourse of ,protagoras1 involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself4 ,if we thus compare the ,ethical ,end1 as implied1 though not explicitly laid down1 by ,protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue1--and as laid down by ,sokrates in the later part--we shall see that while ,sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and pleasures of the agent himself1 ,protagoras enlarges it so as to include a direct reference to those of others also1 coupled with an expectation of the like reference on the part of others4#adi ,sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating prudence for his own pleasures and pains3 while ,protagoras proclaims that after this attribute had been obtained by man1 and individual wants supplied1 still there was a farther element necessary in the calculation--the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted in every one's bosom3 without this the human race would have perished4 ,prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence2 but if men are to live and act in social communion1 the services as well as the requirements of each man must be shaped1 in a certain measure1 with a direct view to the security of others as well as to his own4 ,footnote #adi3 ,plato1 ,protag4 pp4 #cba-cbb4 ,in my judgment1 the ,ethical ,end1 exclusively self-regarding1 here laid down by ,sokrates1 is too narrow4 ,and if we turn to other ,platonic dialogues1 we shall find ,sokrates still represented as proclaiming a self-regarding ,ethical ,end1 though not the same as what we read in the ,protagoras4 ,in the ,gorgias1 ,republic1 ,phdon1 c41 we shall find him discountenancing the calculation 7recommended in the ,protagoras7 of pleasures and pains against each other1 as greater1 more certain1 durable1 c41 and insisting that all shall be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or health of the mind1 which he assimilates to the general condition or health of the body4 ,the health of the body1 considered as an ,end to be pursued1 is essentially self-regarding3 so also is the health of the mind4 ,i shall touch upon this farther when ,i consider the above-mentioned dialogues3 at present1 ,i only remark that they agree with the ,sokrates of the ,protagoras in assuming a self-regarding ,ethical ,end1 though they do not agree with him in describing what that ,end should be4 ,side-note3 ,plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory1 especially about courage4 ,the application which ,sokrates makes 7in the ,protagoras7 of his own assumed ,ethical ,end to the explanation of courage1 is certainly confused and unsatisfactory4 ,and indeed1 we may farther remark that the general result at which ,plato seems to be aiming in this dialogue1 viz43 ,that all the different virtues are at the bottom one and the same1 and that he who possesses one of them must also possess the remainder--cannot be made out even upon his own assumptions4 ,though it be true that all the virtues depend upon correct calculation1 yet as each of them applies to a different set of circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes1 the same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances1 may calculate badly under others4 ,the position laid down by ,protagoras1 that men are often courageous but unjust--just1 but not wise--is noway refuted by ,plato4 ,nor is it even inconsistent with ,plato's own theory1 though he seems to think it so4 ,side-note3 ,doctrine of ,stallbaum and other critics is not correct4 ,that the analysis here ascribed to ,sokrates is not intended by ,plato as serious1 but as a mockery of the sophists4 ,some of the ,platonic commentators maintain1#aej that the doctrine here explicitly laid down and illustrated by ,sokrates1 viz43 the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good1 of the painful with the evil--is to be regarded as not serious1 but as taken up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating ,protagoras4 ,such an hypothesis appears to me untenable2 contradicted by the whole tenor of the dialogue4 ,throughout all the ,platonic compositions1 there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct1 more serious1 and more elaborate1 than that by which ,sokrates here proves the identity of good with pleasure1 of pain with evil 7p4 #cea to end74 ,protagoras begins by denying it1 and is only compelled to accept the conclusion against his own will1 by the series of questions which he cannot otherwise answer4#aea ,sokrates admits that the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it3 but he establishes it with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the hearers around4#aeb ,the commentators are at liberty to impeach the reasoning as unsound2 but to set it aside as mere banter and mockery1 is preposterous4 ,assume it even to be intended as mockery--assume that ,sokrates is mystifying the hearers1 by a string of delusive queries1 to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue and silly--how can the mockery fall upon ,protagoras1 who denies the thesis from the beginning8#aec ,the irony1 if it were irony1 would be misplaced and absurd4 ,footnote #aej3 ,see ,brandis1 ,gesch4 d4 ,griech4-,rm41 ,phil4 ,part ii4 sect4 #aad1 note #c p4 #deh2 ,stallbaum1 ,prolegom4 ad ,protag4 pp4 #ae-cc-cd4 ,so too ,ficinus says in his ,argumentum to the ,protagoras3 7p4 #gfe7 ,tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur4 ,siquidem prudentia est scientia eligendi boni1 malique vitandi4 ,ambigitur autem utrum bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor4 ,neque affirmatur id quidem omnino1 neque manifest omnino negatur4 ,de hoc enim in ,gorgi ,phileboque et alibi1 c4 ,when a critic composes an ,argument to the ,protagoras1 he is surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 whether it be consistent or not with the ,gorgias and ,philbus4 ,yet here we find ,ficinus misrepresenting the ,protagoras1 in order to force it into harmony with the other two4 ,footnote #aea3 ,this is so directly stated that ,i am surprised to find ,zeller 7among many other critics7 announcing that ,plato here accepts for the occasion the ,standpunkt of his enemies 7,philos4 der ,griech4 vol4 ii4 p4 #chj1 ed4 #bnd74 ,footnote #aeb3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceh ,a4 ,greek3 u7perphus e7do_/kei a7_/pasin a7lth ei7nai ta ei7rme_/na4 ,footnote #aec3 ,when ,stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by ,sokrates as one which was maintained by ,protagoras and the other ,sophists 7,proleg4 p4 #cc71 he says what is distinctly at variance with the dialogue1 p4 #cea4 ,schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis 7the fundamental identity of good with pleasure1 evil with pain7 is altogether unsokratic and unplatonic2 that it is handled here by ,sokrates in a manner visibly ironical 7sichtbar ironisch72 that the purpose of the argument is to show the stupidity of ,protagoras1 who is puzzled and imposed upon by such obvious fallacies 7,einleitung zum ,protag4 #bcj1 bottom of p4 #bcb71 and who is made to exhibit 7so ,schleiermacher says1 ,einl4 zum ,gorgias1 p4 #ad7 a string of ludicrous absurdities4 ,upon this ,i have to remark first1 that if the stupidity of ,protagoras is intended to be shown up1 that of all the other persons present must be equally manifested2 for all of them assent emphatically1 at the close1 to the thesis as having been proved 7,prot4 p4 #ceh ,a73 next1 that ,i am unable to see either the absurdities of ,protagoras or the irony of ,sokrates1 which ,schleiermacher asserts to be so visible4 ,the argument of ,sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing which we read in ,plato4 ,schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive altogether 7not only here but also in his ,einleitung zum ,gorgias1 p4 #aj7 the concluding argument of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras4 ,to describe the identity between ,greek3 7du and ,greek3 a7gathon as a scheinbare ,voraussetzung is to depart from the plain meaning of words4 ,again1 ,steinhart contends that ,sokrates assumes this doctrine 7identity of pleasure with good1 pain with evil71 not as his own opinion1 but only hypothetically1 with a sarcastic side-glance at the absurd consequences which many deduced from it--only as the received world-morality1 as the opinion of the majority 7,einleit4 zum ,protag4 p4 #dai74 ,how ,steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue1 ,i am at a loss to understand4 ,the dialogue presents to us ,sokrates introducing the opinion as his own1 against that of ,protagoras and against that of the multitude 7p4 #cea ,c74 ,on hearing this opposition from ,protagoras1 ,sokrates invites him to an investigation1 whether the opinion be just2 ,sokrates then conducts the investigation himself1 along with ,protagoras1 at considerable length1 and ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved1 with the assent of all present4 ,these forced interpretations are resorted to1 because the critics cannot bear to see the ,platonic ,sokrates maintaining a thesis substantially the same as that of ,eudoxus and ,epikurus4 ,upon this point1 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann is more moderate than the others2 he admits the thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue--states that it was really the opinion of the historical ,sokrates--and adds that it was also the opinion of ,plato himself during his early ,sokratic stadium1 when the ,protagoras 7as he thinks7 was composed 7,gesch4 und ,syst4 der ,plat4 ,phil4 pp4 #dfb-dfc74 ,most of the critics agree in considering the ,protagoras to be one of ,plato's earlier dialogues1 about #djc ,b4,c4 ,ast even refers it to #djg ,b4,c4 when ,plato was about twenty-one years of age4 ,i have already given my reasons for believing that none of the ,platonic dialogues were composed before #cii ,b4,c4 ,the ,protagoras belongs1 in my opinion1 to ,plato's most perfect and mature period4 ,side-note3 ,grounds of that doctrine4 ,their insufficiency4 ,the commentators resort to this hypothesis1 partly because the doctrine in question is one which they disapprove--partly because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other ,platonic dialogues4 ,these are the same two reasons upon which1 in other cases1 various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine works of ,plato4 ,the first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant3 we must accept what ,plato gives us1 whether we assent to it or not4 ,the second reason also1 ,i think1 proves little4 ,the dialogues are distinct compositions1 written each with its own circumstances and purpose3 we have no right to require that they shall be all consistent with each other in doctrine1 especially when we look to the long philosophical career of ,plato4 ,to suppose that the elaborate reasoning of ,sokrates in the latter portion of the ,protagoras is mere irony1 intended to mystify both ,protagoras himself and all the by-standers1 who accept it as earnest and convincing--appears to me far less reasonable than the admission1 that the dialectic pleading ascribed to ,sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that assigned to him in another4 ,side-note3 ,subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue4 ,though there is every mark of seriousness1 and no mark of irony1 in this reasoning of ,sokrates1 yet we must remember that he does not profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue4 ,on the contrary1 he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and perplexity4 ,the question1 proposed at the outset1 ,whether virtue is teachable8 remains undecided4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,gorgias4 ,side-note3 ,persons who debate in the ,gorgias4 ,celebrity of the historical ,gorgias4 ,aristotle1 in one of his lost dialogues1 made honourable mention of a ,corinthian cultivator1 who1 on reading the ,platonic ,gorgias1 was smitten with such vehement admiration1 that he abandoned his fields and his vines1 came to ,athens forthwith1 and committed himself to the tuition of ,plato4#a ,how much of reality there may be in this anecdote1 we cannot say3 but the ,gorgias itself is well calculated to justify such warm admiration4 ,it opens with a discussion on the nature and purpose of ,rhetoric1 but is gradually enlarged so as to include a comparison of the various schemes of life1 and an outline of positive ethical theory4 ,it is carried on by ,sokrates with three distinct interlocutors--,gorgias1 ,polus1 and ,kallikls2 but ,i must again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted by ,plato himself4#b ,it may indeed be considered almost as three distinct dialogues1 connected by a loose thread4 ,the historical ,gorgias1 a native of ,leontini in ,sicily1 was the most celebrated of the ,grecian rhetors2 an elderly man during ,plato's youth4 ,he paid visits to different cities in all parts of ,greece1 and gave lessons in rhetoric to numerous pupils1 chiefly young men of ambitious aspirations4#c ,footnote #a3 ,themistius1 ,or4 xxiii4 p4 #cef1 ,dindorf4 ,greek3 ,o7 de gergos o7 ,kori_/nthios t ,gorgi_/a xuggeno_/menos--ou7k au7t e7kei_/n ,gorgi_/a1 a7lla t lo_/g o7n ,pla_/tn e7_/grapsen e7p' e7le_/gch tou sophistou--au7ti_/ka a7pheis ton a7_/gron kai tous a7mpe_/lous1 ,pla_/tni u7pe_/thke tn psuchn kai ta e7kei_/nou e7spei_/reto kai e7phuteu_/eto2 kai ou7to_/s e7stin o7n tima ,a7ristote_/ls e7n t dialo_/g t ,korinthi_/4 ,footnote #b3 ,aristeides1 ,orat4 xlvi4 p4 #chg1 ,dindorf4 ,greek3 ,ti_/s gar ou7k oi7den1 o7_/ti kai o7 ,skra_/ts kai o7 ,kallikls kai o7 ,gorgi_/as kai o7 ,plos1 pa_/nta taut' e7sti ,pla_/tn1 pros to dokoun au7t tre_/pn tous lo_/gous8 ,though ,aristeides asks reasonably enough1 ,who is ignorant of this8--the remarks of ,stallbaum and others often imply forgetfulness of it4 ,footnote #c3 ,schleiermacher 7,einleitung zum ,gorgias1 vol4 iii4 p4 #bb7 is of opinion that ,plato composed the ,gorgias shortly after returning from his first voyage to ,sicily1 #chg ,b4,c4 ,i shall not contradict this3 but ,i see nothing to prove it4 ,at the same time1 ,schleiermacher assumes as certain that ,aristophanes in the ,ekklesiazus alludes to the doctrines published by ,plato in his ,republic 7,einleitung zum ,gorgias1 p4 #bj74 ,putting these two statements together1 the ,gorgias would be later in date of composition than the ,republic1 which ,i hardly think probable4 ,however1 ,i do not at all believe that ,aristophanes in the ,ekklesiazus makes any allusion to the ,republic of ,plato4 ,nor shall ,i believe1 until some evidence is produced1 that the ,republic was composed at so early a date as #cij ,b4,c4 ,side-note3 ,introductory circumstances of the dialogue4 ,polus and ,kallikls4 ,sokrates and ,chrephon are described as intending to come to a rhetorical lecture of ,gorgias1 but as having been accidentally detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished1 with brilliant success4 ,kallikls1 however1 the host and friend of ,gorgias1 promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions put by ,sokrates2 which ,gorgias himself confirms1 observing at the same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years past4#d ,sokrates accordingly asks ,gorgias what his profession is8 what it is that he teaches8 what is the definition of rhetoric8 ,not receiving a satisfactory answer1 ,sokrates furnishes a definition of his own3 out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing3 carried on by ,sokrates1 the first against ,polus1 the second against ,kallikls4 ,both these two are represented as voluble speakers1 of confident temper1 regarding the acquisition of political power and oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life4 ,polus had even composed a work on ,rhetoric1 of which we know nothing3 but the tone of this dialogue would seem to indicate 7as far as we can judge from such evidence7 that the style of the work was affected1 and the temper of the author flippant4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,gorg4 pp4 #ddg-ddh ,a4 ,the dialogue is supposed to be carried on in the presence of many persons1 seemingly belonging to the auditory of the lecture which ,gorgias has just finished1 p4 #dee ,c4 ,side-note3 ,purpose of ,sokrates in questioning4 ,conditions of a good definition4 ,here1 as in the other dialogues above noticed1 the avowed aim of ,sokrates is--first1 to exclude long speaking--next1 to get the question accurately conceived1 and answered in an appropriate manner4 ,specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers1 which ,sokrates corrects4 ,the conditions of a good definition are made plain by contrast with bad ones2 which either include much more than the thing defined1 or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place of what is essential and constant4 ,these tentatives and gropings to find a definition are always instructive1 and must have been especially so in the ,platonic age1 when logical distinctions had never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis4 ,side-note3 ,questions about the definition of ,rhetoric4 ,it is the artisan of persuasion4 ,about what is ,rhetoric as a cognition concerned1 ,gorgias8 ,gorg4--,about words or discourses4 ,sokr4--,about what discourses8 such as inform sick men how they are to get well8 ,gorg4--,no4 ,sokr4--,it is not about all discourses8 ,gorg4--,it makes men competent to speak3 of course therefore also to think1 upon the matters on which they speak4#e ,sokr4--,but the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise1 each with reference to its respective subject3 what then is the difference between them and ,rhetoric8 ,gorg4--,the difference is1 that each of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or performance1 to which the discourses1 when required at all1 are subsidiary3 but ,rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses alone4#f ,sokr4--,but the same may be said about arithmetic1 geometry1 and other sciences4 ,how are they distinguished from ,rhetoric8 ,you must tell me upon what matters the discourses with which ,rhetoric is conversant turn2 just as you would tell me1 if ,i asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy4 ,gorg4--,the discourses1 with which ,rhetoric is conversant1 turn upon the greatest of all human affairs4 ,sokr4--,but this too1 ,gorgias1 is indistinct and equivocal4 ,every man1 the physician1 the gymnast1 the money-maker1 thinks his own object and his own affairs the greatest of all4#g ,gorg4--,the function of ,rhetoric1 is to persuade assembled multitudes1 and thus to secure what are in truth the greatest benefits3 freedom to the city1 political command to the speaker4#h ,sokr4--,rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion4 ,its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers8 ,gorg4--,it is so4 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ddi ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun peri 7nper le_/gein1 kai phronein8 ,ps gar ou7_/8 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dej ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ts r7toriks 4 4 4 4 pasa 7 praxis kai 7 ku_/rsis dia lo_/gn e7sti_/n 4 4 4 4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dea-deb4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #deb ,d4 ,greek3 ,o7_/per e7_/sti t a7lthei_/a me_/giston a7gatho_/n1 kai ai7_/tion1 a7_/ma men e7leutheri_/as au7tois tois a7nthr_/pois1 a7_/ma de tou a7_/lln a7_/rchein e7n t au7tou po_/lei e7ka_/st4 ,side-note3 ,the ,rhetor produces belief without knowledge4 ,upon what matters is he competent to advise8 ,sokr4--,but are there not other persons besides the ,rhetor1 who produce persuasion8 ,does not the arithmetical teacher1 and every other teacher1 produce persuasion8 ,how does the ,rhetor differ from them8 ,what mode of persuasion does he bring about8 ,persuasion about what8 ,gorg4--,i reply--it is that persuasion which is brought about in ,dikasteries1 and other assembled multitudes--and which relates to just and unjust4#i ,sokr4--,you recognise that to have learnt and to know any matter1 is one thing--to believe it1 is another3 that knowledge and belief are different--knowledge being always true1 belief sometimes false8 ,gorg4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,we must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion3 one carrying with it knowledge--the other belief without knowledge4 ,which of the two does the ,rhetor bring about8 ,gorg4--,that which produces belief without knowledge4 ,he can teach nothing4 ,sokr4--,well1 then1 ,gorgias1 on what matters will the ,rhetor be competent to advise8 ,when the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or physicians1 about the construction of docks1 about practical questions of any kind--there will be in each case a special man informed and competent to teach or give counsel1 while the ,rhetor is not competent4 ,upon what then can the ,rhetor advise--upon just and unjust--nothing else8#aj ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ded ,b4 ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dee ,d4 ,side-note3 ,the ,rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter1 even against the opinion of the special expert4 ,he appears to know1 among the ignorant4 ,the ,rhetor 7says ,gorgias7 or accomplished public speaker1 will give advice about all the matters that you name1 and others besides4 ,he will persuade the people and carry them along with him1 even against the opinion of the special ,expert4 ,he will talk more persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own business4 ,the power of the ,rhetor is thus very great3 but he ought to use it1 like all other powers1 for just and honest purposes2 not to abuse it for wrong and oppression4 ,if he does the latter1 the misdeed is his own1 and not the fault of his teacher1 who gave his lessons with a view that they should be turned to proper use4 ,if a man1 who has learnt the use of arms1 employs them to commit murder1 this abuse ought not to be imputed to his master of arms4#aa ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #def-deg4 ,you mean 7replies ,sokrates7 that he1 who has learnt ,rhetoric from you1 will become competent not to teach1 but to persuade the multitude3--that is1 competent among the ignorant4 ,he has acquired an engine of persuasion2 so that he will appear1 when addressing the ignorant1 to know more than those who really do know4#ab ,footnote #ab3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dei ,b4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun kai peri tas a7_/llas a7pa_/sas te_/chnas 7sau_/ts e7_/chei o7 r7_/tr kai 7 r7torik_/2 au7ta men ta pra_/gmata ou7den dei au7tn ei7de_/nai o7_/ps e7_/chei1 mchann de_/ tina peithous eu7rke_/nai1 7_/ste phai_/nesthai tois ou7k ei7do_/si mallon ei7de_/nai tn ei7do_/tn4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,gorgias is now made to contradict himself4 ,polus takes up the debate with ,sokrates4 ,thus far1 the conversation is carried on between ,sokrates and ,gorgias4 ,but the latter is now made to contradict himself--apparently rather than really--for the argument whereby ,sokrates reduces him to a contradiction1 is not tenable1 unless we admit the ,platonic doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust1 may be relied on to act as a just man2#ac in other words1 that virtue consists in knowledge4 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfj ,b4 ,greek3 o7 ta di_/kaia memathk_/s1 di_/kaios4 ,aristotle notices this confusion of ,sokrates1 who falls into it also in the conversation with ,euthydemus1 ,xenoph4 ,memorab4 iv4 #b1 #bj1 iii4 #i1 #e4 ,side-note3 ,polemical tone of ,sokrates4 ,at the instance of ,polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric4 ,it is no art1 but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers1 analogous to cookery4 ,it is a branch under the general head flattery4 ,polus now interferes and takes up the conversation3 challenging ,sokrates to furnish what he thinks the proper definition of ,rhetoric4 ,sokrates obeys1 in a tone of pungent polemic4 ,rhetoric 7he says7 is no art at all1 but an empirical knack of catering for the pleasure and favour of hearers2 analogous to cookery4#ad ,it is a talent falling under the general aptitude called ,flattery2 possessed by some bold spirits1 who are forward in divining and adapting themselves to the temper of the public4#ae ,it is not honourable1 but a mean pursuit1 like cookery4 ,it is the shadow or false imitation of a branch of the political art4#af ,in reference both to the body and the mind1 there are two different conditions3 one1 a condition really and truly good--the other1 good only in fallacious appearance1 and not so in reality4 ,to produce1 and to verify1 the really good condition of the body1 there are two specially qualified professions1 the gymnast or trainer and the physician3 in regard to the mind1 the function of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power1 that of the physician by the judicial power4 ,law-making1 and adjudicating1 are both branches of the political art1 and when put together make up the whole of it4 ,gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body towards its really best condition3 law-making and adjudicating do the same in regard to the mind4 ,to each of the four1 there corresponds a sham counterpart or mimic1 a branch under the general head flattery--taking no account of what is really best1 but only of that which is most agreeable for the moment1 and by this trick recommending itself to a fallacious esteem4#ag ,thus ,cosmetic1 or ,ornamental ,trickery1 is the counterfeit of ,gymnastic2 and ,cookery the counterfeit of ,medicine4 ,cookery studies only what is immediately agreeable to the body1 without considering whether it be good or wholesome3 and does this moreover1 without any truly scientific process of observation or inference1 but simply by an empirical process of memory or analogy4 ,but ,medicine examines1 and that too by scientific method1 only what is good and wholesome for the body1 whether agreeable or not4 ,amidst ignorant men1 ,cookery slips in as the counterfeit of medicine2 pretending to know what food is good for the body1 while it really knows only what food is agreeable4 ,in like manner1 the artifices of ornament dress up the body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry1 which ,gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfb ,c4 ,greek3 e7mpeiri_/a 4 4 4 4 cha_/rito_/s tinos kai 7dons a7pergasi_/as4 ,in the ,philbus 7pp4 #ee-ef7 ,sokrates treats ,greek3 i7atrik differently1 as falling short of the idea of ,greek3 te_/chn1 and coming much nearer to what is here called ,greek3 e7mpeiri_/a or ,greek3 stochastik_/4 ,asklepiades was displeased with the ,thracian ,dionysius for calling ,greek3 grammatik by the name of ,greek3 e7mpeiri_/a instead of ,greek3 te_/chn3 see ,sextus ,empiric4 adv4 ,grammat4 s4 #eg-gb1 p4 #fae1 ,bekk4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfc ,a4 ,greek3 dokei moi ei7nai_/ ti e7pit_/deuma1 technikon men ou7_/1 psuchs de stochastiks kai a7ndrei_/as kai phu_/sei deins prosomilein tois a7nthr_/pois2 kal de au7tou e7g to kepha_/laion kolakei_/an4 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfc ,d4 ,greek3 politiks mori_/ou ei7_/dlon4 ,footnote #ag3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfd ,c4 ,greek3 tetta_/rn d tou_/tn ou7sn1 kai a7ei pros to be_/ltiston therapeuousn1 tn men to sma1 tn de tn psuch_/n1 7 kolakeutik ai7sthome_/n1 ou7 gnousa le_/g a7lla stochasame_/n1 te_/tracha e7autn dianei_/masa1 u7podusa u7po e7_/kaston tn mori_/n1 prospoieitai ei7nai touto o7_/per u7pe_/du2 kai tou men belti_/stou ou7den phronti_/zei1 t de a7ei 7di_/st threu_/etai tn a7_/noian kai e7xapata1 7_/ste dokei plei_/stou a7xi_/a ei7nai4 ,side-note3 ,distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts1 which pretend to the same1 but in reality aim at immediate pleasure4 ,the same analogies hold in regard to the mind4 ,sophistic is the shadow or counterfeit of law-giving3 ,rhetoric1 of judging or adjudicating4 ,the lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the mind3 the ,sophist and the ,rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it4 ,this distinction between them 7continues ,sokrates7 is true and real3 though it often happens that the ,sophist is1 both by himself and by others1 confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver1 because he deals with the same topics and occurrences3 and the ,rhetor1 in the same manner1 is confounded with the judge4#ah ,the ,sophist and the ,rhetor1 addressing themselves to the present relish of an undiscerning public1 are enabled to usurp the functions and the credit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals4 ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfe ,c4 ,greek3 die_/stke men ou7_/t phu_/sei2 a7_/te de e7ggus o7_/ntn1 phu_/rontai e7n t au7t kai peri tau7ta sophistai kai r7_/tores1 kai ou7k e7_/chousin o7_/1 ti chr_/sntai ou7_/te au7toi e7autois ou7_/te oi7 a7_/lloi a7_/nthrpoi tou_/tois4 ,it seems to me that the persons whom ,plato here designates as being confounded together are1 the ,sophist with the lawgiver1 the ,rhetor with the judge or dikast2 which is shown by the allusion1 three lines farther on1 to the confusion between the cook and the physician4 ,heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded are1 the ,sophist with the ,rhetor2 which ,i cannot think to be the meaning of ,plato4 ,side-note3 ,questions of ,polus4 ,sokrates denies that the ,rhetors have any real power1 because they do nothing which they really wish4 ,this is the definition given by ,sokrates of ,rhetoric and of the ,rhetor4 ,polus then asks him3 ,you say that ,rhetoric is a branch of ,flattery3 ,do you think that good ,rhetors are considered as flatterers in their respective cities8 ,sokr4--,i do not think that#ai they are considered at all4 ,polus4--,how6 not considered8 ,do not good ,rhetors possess great power in their respective cities8 ,sokr4--,no3 if you understand the possession of power as a good thing for the possessor4 ,polus4--,i do understand it so4 ,sokr4--,then ,i say that the ,rhetors possess nothing beyond the very minimum of power4 ,polus4--,how can that be8 ,do not they1 like despots1 kill1 impoverish1 and expel any one whom they please8 ,sokr4--,i admit that both ,rhetors and ,despots can do what seems good to themselves1 and can bring penalties of death1 poverty1 or exile upon others3 but ,i say that nevertheless they have no power1 because they can do nothing which they really wish4#bj ,footnote #ai3 ,plat4 ,gorg4 p4 #dff ,b4 ,polus4 ,greek3 ,a7r' ou7n dokousi_/ soi 7s ko_/lakes e7n tais po_/lesi phauloi nomi_/zesthai oi7 a7gathoi r7_/tores8 4 4 4 4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ou7de nomi_/zesthai e7_/moige dokousin4 ,the play on words here--for ,i see nothing else in it--can be expressed in ,english as well as in ,greek4 ,it has very little pertinence2 because1 as a matter of fact1 the ,rhetors certainly had considerable importance1 whether they deserved it or not4 ,how little ,plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact1 may be seen by what immediately follows--where he compares the ,rhetors to ,despots8 and puts in the mouth of ,polus the assertion that they kill or banish any one whom they choose4 ,footnote #bj3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dff ,e4 ,greek3 ou7den gar poiein 7n bou_/lontai1 7s e7_/pos ei7pein2 poiein me_/ntoi o71 ti a7n au7tois do_/x be_/ltiston ei7nai4 ,side-note3 ,all men wish for what is good for them4 ,despots and ,rhetors1 when they kill any one1 do so because they think it good for them4 ,if it be really not good1 they do not do what they will1 and therefore have no real power4 ,that which men wish 7,sokrates lays down as a general proposition7 is to obtain good1 and to escape evil4 ,each separate act which they perform1 is performed not with a view to its own special result1 but with a view to these constant and paramount ends4 ,good things1 or profitable things 7for ,sokrates alternates the phrases as equivalent71 are wisdom1 health1 wealth1 and other such things4 ,evil things are the contraries of these4#ba ,many things are in themselves neither good nor evil1 but may become one or the other1 according to circumstances--such as stones1 wood1 the acts of sitting still or moving1 c4 ,when we do any of these indifferent acts1 it is with a view to the pursuit of good1 or to the avoidance of evil3 we do not wish for the act1 we wish for its good or profitable results4 ,we do every thing for the sake of good3 and if the results are really good or profitable1 we accomplish what we wish3 if the contrary1 not4 ,now1 ,despots and ,rhetors1 when they kill or banish or impoverish any one1 do so because they think it will be better for them1 or profitable4#bb ,if it be good for them1 they do what they wish3 if evil for them1 they do the contrary of what they wish and therefore have no power4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfg ,e4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun le_/geis ei7nai a7gathon men sophi_/an te kai u7gi_/eian kai plouton kai ta7_/lla ta toiauta1 kaka de ta7nanti_/a tou_/tn8 ,e7_/gge4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfh ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ou7koun kai a7pokti_/nnumen1 ei7_/ tin' a7pokti_/nnumen1 4 4 4 4 oi7o_/menoi a7_/meinon ei7nai 7min tauta 7 m_/8 4 4 4 e7_/nek' a7_/ra tou a7gathou a7_/panta tauta poiousin oi7 poiountes 4 4 4 4 e7an men 7phe_/lima 7 tauta1 boulo_/metha pra_/ttein au7ta_/2 blabera de o7_/nta1 ou7 boulo_/metha4 4 4 4 4 ta gar a7gatha boulo_/metha1 7s phs su_/1 c4 ,to do evil 7continues ,sokrates71 is the worst thing that can happen to any one2 the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men4 ,the person who suffers evil is unfortunate1 and is to be pitied2 but much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer4 ,if ,i have a concealed dagger in the public market-place1 ,i can kill any one whom ,i choose3 but this is no good to me1 nor is it a proof of great power1 because ,i shall be forthwith taken up and punished4 ,the result is not profitable1 but hurtful3 therefore the act is not good1 nor is the power to do it either good or desirable4#bc ,it is sometimes good to kill1 banish1 or impoverish--sometimes bad4 ,it is good when you do it justly3 bad1 when you do it unjustly4#bd ,footnote #bc3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dfi-dgj4 ,footnote #bd3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgj ,c4 ,side-note3 ,comparison of ,archelaus1 usurping despot of ,macedonia--,polus affirms that ,archelaus is happy1 and that every one thinks so--,sokrates admits that every one thinks so1 but nevertheless denies it4 ,polus4--,a child can refute such doctrine4 ,you have heard of ,archelaus ,king of ,macedonia4 ,is he1 in your opinion1 happy or miserable8 ,sokr4--,i do not know3 ,i have never been in his society4 ,polus4--,cannot you tell without that1 whether he is happy or not8 ,sokr4--,no1 certainly not4 ,polus4--,then you will not call even the ,great ,king happy8 ,sokr4--,no3 ,i do not know how he stands in respect to education and justice4 ,polus4--,what6 does all happiness consist in that8 ,sokr4--,i say that it does4 ,i maintain that the good and honourable man or woman is happy3 the unjust and wicked1 miserable4#be ,polus4--,then ,archelaus is miserable1 according to your doctrine8 ,sokr4--,assuredly1 if he is wicked4 ,polus4--,wicked1 of course2 since he has committed enormous crimes3 but he has obtained complete kingly power in ,macedonia4 ,is there any ,athenian1 yourself included1 who would not rather be ,archelaus than any other man in ,macedonia8#bf ,sokr4--,all the public1 with ,nikias1 ,perikles1 and the most eminent men among them1 will agree with you in declaring ,archelaus to be happy4 ,i alone do not agree with you4 ,you1 like a ,rhetor1 intend to overwhelm me and gain your cause1 by calling a multitude of witnesses3 ,i shall prove my case without calling any other witness than yourself4#bg ,do you think that ,archelaus would have been a happy man1 if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished8 ,polus4--,certainly not3 he would then have been very miserable4 ,sokr4--,here again ,i differ from you3 ,i think that ,archelaus1 or any other wicked man1 is under all circumstances miserable2 but he is less miserable1 if afterwards punished1 than he would be if unpunished and successful4#bh ,polus4--,how say you8 ,if a man1 unjustly conspiring to become despot1 be captured1 subjected to torture1 mutilated1 with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages inflicted1 not only upon himself but upon his wife and children--do you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his enterprise1 and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority over his city--envied and extolled as happy1 by citizens and strangers alike8#bi ,sokr4--,more happy1 ,i shall not say3 for in both cases he will be miserable2 but he will be less miserable on the former supposition4 ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgj ,e4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dga ,b-,c4 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgb ,b4 ,greek3 ,a7ll' e7g_/ soi ei7s 7n ou7ch o7molog4 4 4 4 e7g de a7n m se au7ton e7_/na o7_/nta ma_/rtura para_/schmai o7mologounta peri 7n le_/g1 ou7den oi7mai a7_/xion lo_/gou pepera_/nthai peri 7n a7n 7min o7 lo_/gos 72 oi7mai de ou7de soi_/1 e7an m e7g_/ soi martur ei7s 7n mo_/nos1 tous d' a7_/llous pa_/ntas tou_/tous chai_/rein e7as4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgc ,c4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgc ,d4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates maintains--#a4 ,that it is a greater evil to do wrong1 than to suffer wrong4 #b4 ,that if a man has done wrong1 it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished4 ,sokr4--,which of the two is worst3 to do wrong1 or to suffer wrong8 ,polus4--,to suffer wrong4 ,sokr4--,which of the two is the most disgraceful8 ,polus4--,to do wrong4 ,sokr4--,if more ugly and disgraceful1 is it not then worse8 ,polus4--,by no means4 ,sokr4--,you do not think then that the good--and the fine or honourable--are one and the same2 nor the bad--and the ugly or disgraceful8 ,polus4--,no3 certainly not4 ,sokr4--,how is this8 ,are not all fine or honourable things1 such as bodies1 colours1 figures1 voices1 pursuits1 c41 so denominated from some common property8 ,are not fine bodies said to be fine1 either from rendering some useful service1 or from affording some pleasure to the spectator who contemplates them8#cj ,and are not figures1 colours1 voices1 laws1 sciences1 c41 called fine or honourable for the same reason1 either for their agreeableness or their usefulness1 or both8 ,polus4--,certainly3 your definition of the fine or honourable1 by reference to pleasure1 or to good1 is satisfactory4 ,sokr4--,of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary1 by reference to pain or to evil8 ,polus4--,doubtless4#ca ,sokr4--,if therefore one thing be finer or more honourable than another1 this is because it surpasses the other either in pleasure1 or in profit3 if one thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another1 it must surpass that other either in pain1 or in evil8 ,polus4--,yes4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plat4 ,gorg4 p4 #dgd ,d4 ,greek3 e7an e7n t thereisthai chai_/rein poi tous therountas8 ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgd ,e4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,kai mn ta_/ ge kata tous no_/mous kai ta e7pitdeu_/mata1 ou7 d_/pou e7ktos tou_/tn e7sti ta kala_/1 tou 7 7phe_/lima ei7nai 7 7de_/a 7 a7mpho_/tera4 ,pol4 ,greek3 ,ou7k e7_/moige dokei4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun kai tn mathma_/tn ka_/llos 7sau_/ts8 ,pol4 ,greek3 ,pa_/nu ge2 kai kals ge nun o7rizei1 7don te kai a7gath o7rizo_/menos to kalo_/n4 ,sokr4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun to ai7schron t e7nanti_/1 lu_/p te kai kak8 ,pol4 ,greek3 ,a7na_/gk4 ,a little farther on ,greek3 blab is used as equivalent to ,greek3 kako_/n4 ,these words--,greek3 kalo_/n1 ai7schro_/n--7very difficult to translate properly7 introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment of spectators1 or of an undefined public1 not concerned either as agents or sufferers4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates offers proof--,definition of ,pulchrum and ,turpe--,proof of the first point4 ,sokr4--,well1 then6 what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong8 ,you said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the two1 but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful4 ,now1 if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong1 this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil8 ,polus4--,undoubtedly4 ,sokr4--,has it a preponderance of pain8 ,does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer8 ,polus4--,certainly not4 ,sokr4--,then it must have a preponderance of evil8 ,polus4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,to do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong1 as well as more disgraceful8 ,polus4--,it appears so4 ,sokr4--,since therefore it is both worse and more disgraceful1 ,i was right in affirming that neither you1 nor ,i1 nor any one else1 would choose to do wrong in preference to suffering wrong4 ,polus4--,so it seems4#cb ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dge ,c-,d4 ,side-note3 ,proof of the second point4 ,sokr4--,now let us take the second point--,whether it be the greatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished1 or whether it be not a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished4 ,if punished1 the wrong-doer is of course punished justly2 and are not all just things fine or honourable1 in so far as they are just8 ,polus4--,i think so4 ,sokr4--,when a man does anything1 must there not be some correlate which suffers2 and must it not suffer in a way corresponding to what the doer does8 ,thus if any one strikes1 there must also be something stricken3 and if he strikes quickly or violently1 there must be something which is stricken quickly or violently4 ,and so1 if any one burns or cuts1 there must be something burnt or cut4 ,as the agent acts1 so the patient suffers4 ,polus4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,now if a man be punished for wrong doing1 he suffers what is just1 and the punisher does what is just8 ,polus4--,he does4 ,sokr4--,you admitted that all just things were honourable3 therefore the agent does what is honourable1 the patient suffers what is honourable4#cc ,but if honourable1 it must be either agreeable--or good and profitable4 ,in this case1 it is certainly not agreeable3 it must therefore be good and profitable4 ,the wrong-doer therefore1 when punished1 suffers what is good and is profited4 ,polus4--,yes4#cd ,sokr4--,in what manner is he profited8 ,it is1 as ,i presume1 by becoming better in his mind--by being relieved from badness of mind4 ,polus4--,probably4 ,sokr4--,is not this badness of mind the greatest evil8 ,in regard to wealth1 the special badness is poverty3 in regard to the body1 it is weakness1 sickness1 deformity1 c43 in regard to the mind1 it is ignorance1 injustice1 cowardice1 c4 ,is not injustice1 and other badness of mind1 the most disgraceful of the three8 ,polus4--,decidedly4 ,sokr4--,if it be most disgraceful1 it must therefore be the worst4 ,polus4--,how8 ,sokr4--,it must 7as we before agreed7 have the greatest preponderance either of pain1 or of hurt and evil4 ,but the preponderance is not in pain3 for no one will say that the being unjust and intemperate and ignorant1 is more painful than being poor and sick4 ,the preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil4 ,mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty1 or disease and bodily deformity4 ,it is the greatest of human evils4 ,polus4--,it appears so4#ce ,footnote #cc3 ,see ,aristotle1 ,rhet4 i4 #i1 p4 #acff1 b4 #cj1 where the contrary of this opinion is maintained1 and maintained with truth4 ,footnote #cd3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgf ,d-,e4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgg ,e4 ,side-note3 ,the criminal labours under a mental distemper1 which though not painful1 is a capital evil4 ,punishment is the only cure for him4 ,to be punished is best for him4 ,sokr4--,the money-making art is1 that which relieves us from poverty3 the medical art1 from sickness and weakness3 the judicial or punitory1 from injustice and wickedness of mind4 ,of these three relieving forces1 which is the most honourable8 ,polus4--,the last1 by far4 ,sokr4--,if most honourable1 it confers either most pleasure or most profit8 ,polus4--,yes4 ,sokr4--,now1 to go through medical treatment is not agreeable2 but it answers to a man to undergo the pain1 in order to get rid of a great evil1 and to become well4 ,he would be a happier man1 if he were never sick3 he is less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well1 than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick4 ,just so the man who is mentally bad3 the happiest man is he who never becomes so2 but if a man has become so1 the next best course for him is1 to undergo punishment and to get rid of the evil4 ,the worst lot of all is1 that of him who remains mentally bad1 without ever getting rid of badness4#cf ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgh ,d-,e4 ,side-note3 ,misery of the ,despot who is never punished4 ,if our friend has done wrong1 we ought to get him punished3 if our enemy1 we ought to keep him unpunished4 ,this last1 ,polus 7continues ,sokrates71 is the condition of ,archelaus1 and of despots and ,rhetors generally4 ,they possess power which enables them1 after they have committed injustice1 to guard themselves against being punished3 which is just as if a sick man were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being cured4 ,they see the pain of the cure1 but they are blind to the profit of it2 they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body4#cg ,there is therefore little use in ,rhetoric3 for our first object ought to be1 to avoid doing wrong3 our next object1 if we have done wrong1 not to resist or elude punishment by skilful defence1 but to present ourselves voluntarily and invite it3 and if our friends or relatives have done wrong1 far from helping to defend them1 we ought ourselves to accuse them1 and to invoke punishment upon them also4#ch ,on the other hand1 as to our enemy1 we ought undoubtedly to take precautions against suffering any wrong from him ourselves3 but if he has done wrong to others1 we ought to do all we can1 by word or deed1 not to bring him to punishment1 but to prevent him from suffering punishment or making compensation3 so that he may live as long as possible in impunity4#ci ,these are the purposes towards which rhetoric is serviceable4 ,for one who intends to do no wrong1 it seems of no great use4#dj ,footnote #cg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dgi ,b4 ,greek3 to a7lgeinon au7tou kathoran1 pros de to 7phe_/limon tuphls e7_/chein1 kai a7gnoein o7_/s a7thli_/tero_/n e7sti m u7gious s_/matos m u7giei psuch sunoikein1 a7lla sathra kai a7di_/k kai a7nosi_/4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dhj ,c1 #ejh ,b4 ,greek3 katgorte_/on ei7_/ kai au7tou kai ui7e_/os kai e7tai_/ron1 e7a_/n ti a7dik1 c4 ,plato might have put this argument into the mouth of ,euthyphron as a reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder3 as ,i have already observed in reviewing the ,euthyphron1 which see above1 vol4 i4 ch4 xi41 p4 #ddb4 ,footnote #ci3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dha ,a4 ,greek3 e7an de a7_/llon a7dik o7 e7chthro_/s1 panti tro_/p paraskeuaste_/on kai pra_/ttonta kai le_/gonta1 o7_/ps m d di_/kn4 4 4 4 e7a_/n te chrusi_/on 7rpaks 7 polu_/1 m a7podid touto1 a7ll' e7_/chn a7nali_/sktai 4 4 4 a7di_/ks kai a7the_/s1 c4 ,footnote #dj3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dha4 99 99 99 99 99 ,this dialogue between ,sokrates and ,polus exhibits a representation of ,platonic ,ethics longer and more continuous than is usual in the dialogues4 ,i have therefore given a tolerably copious abridgment of it1 and shall now proceed to comment upon its reasoning4 ,side-note3 ,argument of ,sokrates paradoxical--,doubt expressed by ,kallikles whether he means it seriously4 ,the whole tenor of its assumptions1 as well as the conclusions in which it ends1 are so repugnant to received opinions1 that ,polus1 even while compelled to assent1 treats it as a paradox3 while ,kallikles1 who now takes up the argument1 begins by asking from ,chrephon--,is ,sokrates really in earnest1 or is he only jesting8#da ,sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone4 ,he has nothing to rely upon1 except the consistency of his dialectics--and the verdict of philosophy4#db ,this however is a matter of little moment1 in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning1 except in so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a matter of fact4 ,plato follows out the train of reasoning--which at the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive1 or at least as plausible--whether he may agree or disagree with others4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dha4 ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhb4 ,side-note3 ,principle laid down by ,sokrates--,that every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery4 ,plato has ranked the ,rhetor in the same category as the ,despot3 a classification upon which ,i shall say something presently4 ,but throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted1 he treats the original question about ,rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical question4#dc ,every one 7argues ,sokrates7 wishes for the attainment of good and for the avoidance of evil4 ,every one performs each separate act with a view not to its own immediate end1 but to one or other of these permanent ends4 ,in so far as he attains them1 he is happy3 in so far as he either fails in attaining the good1 or incurs the evil1 he is unhappy or miserable4 ,the good and honourable man or woman is happy1 the unjust and wicked is miserable4 ,power acquired or employed unjustly1 is no boon to the possessor3 for he does not thereby obtain what he really wishes1 good or happiness2 but incurs the contrary1 evil and misery4 ,the man who does wrong is more miserable than he who suffers wrong3 but the most miserable of all is he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it4#dd ,footnote #dc3 ,i may be told that this comparison is first made by ,polus 7p4 #dff ,c71 and that ,sokrates only takes it up from him to comment upon4 ,true1 but the speech of ,polus is just as much the composition of ,plato as that of ,sokrates4 ,many readers of ,plato are apt to forget this4 ,footnote #dd3 ,isokrates1 in his ,panathenaic ,oration 7,or4 xii4 sect4 #abf1 pp4 #beg-cdg71 alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced by ,plato1 treating it as one which all men of sense would reject1 and which none but a few men pretending to be wise would proclaim--,greek3 a7_/per a7_/pantes men a7n oi7 noun e7_/chontes e7_/lointo kai boultheien1 o7li_/goi de_/ tines tn prospoioume_/nn ei7nai sophn1 e7rtthe_/ntes ou7k a7n ph_/saien4 ,in this last phrase ,isokrates probably has ,plato in his mind1 though without pronouncing the name4 ,polus1 on the other hand1 contends1 that ,archelaus1 who has waded through slaughter to the throne of ,macedonia1 is a happy man both in his own feelings and in those of every one else1 envied and admired by the world generally3 ,that to say--,archelaus would have been more happy1 or less miserable1 if he had failed in his enterprise and had been put to death under cruel torture--is an untenable paradox4 ,side-note3 ,peculiar view taken by ,plato of ,good--,evil--,happiness4 ,the issue here turns1 and the force of ,plato's argument rests 7assuming ,sokrates to speak the real sentiments of ,plato71 upon the peculiar sense which he gives to the words ,good--,evil--,happiness3--different from the sense in which they are conceived by mankind generally1 and which is here followed by ,polus4 ,it is possible that to minds like ,sokrates and ,plato1 the idea of themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be the most intolerable of all ideas1 worse to contemplate than any amount of suffering3 moreover1 that if they could conceive themselves as having been thus guilty1 the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would be one of expiatory pain4 ,this1 taken as the personal sentiment of ,plato1 admits of no reply4 ,but when he attempts to convert this subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all1 he fails of success1 and misleads himself by equivocal language4 ,side-note3 ,contrast of the usual meaning of these words1 with the ,platonic meaning4 ,plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire1 and two of human aversion4 #a4 ,the immediate1 and generally transient1 object--,pleasure or the ,pleasurable--,pain or the ,painful4 #b4 ,the distant1 ulterior1 and more permanent object--,good or the profitable--,evil or the hurtful4--,in the attainment of ,good and avoidance of ,evil consists happiness4 ,but now comes the important question--,in what sense are we to understand the words ,good and ,evil8 ,what did ,plato mean by them8 ,did he mean the same as mankind generally8 ,have mankind generally one uniform meaning8 ,in answer to this question1 we must say1 that neither ,plato1 nor mankind generally1 are consistent or unanimous in their use of the words3 and that ,plato sometimes approximates to1 sometimes diverges from1 the more usual meaning4 ,plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by ,good and ,evil3 he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it3 we learn only1 that ,good is a mental perfection--,evil a mental taint--answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in ,plato's own mind1 and only negatively determined by this circumstance--,that they have no reference either to pleasure or pain4 ,in the vulgar sense1 ,good stands distinguished from pleasure 7or relief from pain71 and ,evil from pain 7or loss of pleasure71 as the remote1 the causal1 the lasting from the present1 the product1 the transient4 ,good and ,evil are explained by enumerating all the things so called1 of which enumeration ,plato gives a partial specimen in this dialogue3 elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the ,idea of ,good1 of which ,i shall speak more fully hereafter4 ,having said that all men aim at good1 he gives1 as examples of good things--,wisdom1 ,health1 ,wealth1 and other such things3 while the contrary of these1 ,stupidity1 ,sickness1 ,poverty1 are evil things3 the list of course might be much enlarged4 ,taking ,good and ,evil generally to denote the common property of each of these lists1 it is true that men perform a large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and avoid the latter3--that the approach which they make to happiness depends1 speaking generally1 upon the success which attends their exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent ends3 and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to each man's own feelings4 ,but this meaning of ,good is no longer preserved1 when ,sokrates proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper ,archelaus is the most miserable of men1 and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest of all evils4 ,side-note3 ,examination of the proof given by ,sokrates--,inconsistency between the general answer of ,polus and his previous declarations--,law and ,nature4 ,sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking ,polus1#de which of the two is most disgraceful--,to do wrong--or to suffer wrong8 ,polus answers--,to do wrong3 and this answer is inconsistent with what he had previously said about ,archelaus4 ,that prince1 though a wrong-doer on the largest scale1 has been declared by ,polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration3 while ,sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all mankind1 except himself4 ,to be consistent with such an assertion1 ,polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer1 when the general question is afterwards put to him3 or at least he ought to have said--,sometimes the one1 sometimes the other4 ,but this he is ashamed to do1 as we shall find ,kallikles intimating at a subsequent stage of the dialogue3#df because of ,king ,nomos1 or the established habit of the community--who feel that society rests upon a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one1 and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with censure in general words1 however widely the critical feeling may depart from such censure in particular cases4#dg ,polus is forced to make profession of a faith1 which neither he nor others 7except ,sokrates with a few companions7 universally or consistently apply4 ,to bring such a force to bear upon the opponent1 was one of the known artifices of dialecticians3#dh and ,sokrates makes it his point of departure1 to prove the unparalleled misery of ,archelaus4 ,footnote #de3 ,plat4 ,gorg4 p4 #dgd ,c4 ,footnote #df3 ,plat4 ,gorg4 p4 #dhb ,c4 ,to maintain that ,greek3 to a7dikein be_/ltion tou a7dikeisthai was an ,greek3 a7_/doxos u7po_/thesis--one which it was ,greek3 chei_/ronos 7_/thous e7le_/sthai3 which therefore ,aristotle advises the dialectician not to defend 7,aristot4 ,topic4 viii4 #aef1 #f-ae74 ,footnote #dg3 ,this portion of the ,gorgias may receive illustration from the third chapter 7pp4 #ii-aja7 of ,adam ,smith's ,theory of ,moral ,sentiments1 entitled1 ,of the corruption of our moral sentiments1 which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great1 and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition4 ,he says--,the disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and the powerful1 and to despise1 or at least to neglect1 persons of poor and mean condition1 though necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society1 is1 at the same time1 the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments4 4 4 4 ,they are the wise and the virtuous chiefly--a select1 though ,i am afraid1 a small party--who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue4 ,the great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers--and what may seem more extraordinary1 most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers--of wealth and greatness4 4 4 4 4 ,it is scarce agreeable to good morals1 or even to good language1 perhaps1 to say that mere wealth and greatness1 abstracted from merit and virtue1 deserve our respect4 ,we must acknowledge1 however1 that they almost constantly obtain it3 and that they may therefore in a certain sense be considered as the natural objects of it4 ,now ,archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of the mass of mankind to worship and admire1 disinterestedly1 power and greatness3 and the language used by ,adam ,smith in the last sentence illustrates the conversation of ,sokrates1 ,polus1 and ,kallikls4 ,adam ,smith admits that energetic proceedings1 ending in great power1 such as those of ,archelaus1 obtain honour and worship from the vast majority of disinterested spectators3 and that1 therefore they are in a certain sense the natural objects of such a sentiment 7,greek3 kata phu_/sin74 ,but if the question be put to him1 ,whether such proceedings1 with such a position1 are worthy of honour1 he is constrained by good morals 7,greek3 kata no_/mon7 to reply in the negative4 ,it is true that ,adam ,smith numbers himself with the small minority1 while ,polus shares the opinion of the large majority4 ,but what is required by ,king ,nomos must be professed even by dissentients1 unless they possess the unbending resolution of ,sokrates4 ,footnote #dh3 ,aristot4 ,de ,soph4 ,elench4 pp4 #agb-agc1 where he contrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding1 with those which they really do--,greek3 ai7 phanerai do_/xai--ai7 a7phaneis1 a7pokekrumme_/nai1 do_/xai4 ,side-note3 ,the definition of ,pulchrum and ,turpe1 given by ,sokrates1 will not hold4 ,he proceeds to define ,pulchrum and ,turpe 7,greek3 kalon-ai7schro_/n74 ,when we recollect the ,hippias ,major1 in which dialogue many definitions of ,pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected1 so that the search ended in total disappointment--we are surprised to see that ,sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to himself and ,polus3 and we are the more surprised1 because the definition here admitted without a remark1 is in substance one of those shown to be untenable in the ,hippias ,major4#di ,it depends upon the actual argumentative purpose which ,plato has in hand1 whether he chooses to multiply objections and give them effect--or to ignore them altogether4 ,but the definition which he here proposes1 even if assumed as incontestable1 fails altogether to sustain the conclusion that he draws from it4 ,he defines ,pulchrum to be that which either confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it1 or produces ulterior profit or good--we must presume profit to the spectator1 or to him along with others--at any rate it is not said to whom4 ,he next defines the ugly and disgraceful 7,greek3 to ai7schron7 as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or evil4 ,if then 7he argues7 to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful than to suffer wrong1 this must be either because it is more painful--or because it is more hurtful1 more evil 7worse74 ,it certainly is not more painful3 therefore it must be worse4 ,footnote #di3 ,plat4 ,hipp4 ,maj4 pp4 #de-df4 ,see above1 vol4 ii4 ch4 xiii4 ,side-note3 ,worse or better--for whom8 ,the argument of ,sokrates does not specify4 ,if understood in the sense necessary for his inference1 the definition would be inadmissible4 ,but worse1 for whom8 ,for the spectators1 who declare the proceedings of ,archelaus to be disgraceful8 ,for the persons who suffer by his proceedings8 ,or for ,archelaus himself8 ,it is the last of the three which ,sokrates undertakes to prove3 but his definition does not help him to the proof4 ,turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator1 or ulterior hurt--to whom8 ,if we say to the spectator--the definition will not serve as a ground of inference to the condition of the agent contemplated4 ,if on the other hand1 we say--to the agent--the definition so understood becomes inadmissible3 as well for other reasons1 as because there are a great many ,turpia which are not agents at all1 and which the definition therefore would not include4 ,either therefore the definition given by ,sokrates is a bad one--or it will not sustain his conclusion4 ,and thus1 on this very important argument1 where ,sokrates admits that he stands alone1 and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly cogent--an argument too where the great cause 7so ,adam ,smith terms it7 of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be combated--,sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike far-fetched and irrelevant4 ,what increases our regret is1 that the real arguments establishing the turpitude of ,archelaus and his acts are obvious enough1 if you look for them in the right direction4 ,you discover nothing while your eye is fixed on ,archelaus himself3 far from presenting any indications of misery1 which ,sokrates professes to discover1 he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they see it4 ,but when you turn to the persons whom he has killed1 banished1 or ruined--to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted--and to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful iniquity spread through all societies where they become known--there is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man4 ,this argument however is here altogether neglected by ,plato4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 he looks only at the self-regarding side of ,ethics4 ,side-note3 ,plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself4 ,his view about the conduct of ,archelaus is just1 but he does not give the true reasons for it4 ,sokrates proceeds next to prove--,that the wrong-doer who remains unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished4 ,the wrong-doer 7he argues7 when punished suffers what is just3 but all just things are honourable3 therefore he suffers what is honourable4 ,but all honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable1 or profitable1 or both together4 ,punishment is certainly not agreeable3 it must therefore be profitable or good4 ,accordingly the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good4 ,he is benefited1 by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness1 which is a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty4 ,in proportion to the magnitude of this evil1 is the value of the relief which removes it1 and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who continues to live under it4#ej ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dgg-dgh4 ,upon this argument1 ,i make the same remark as upon that immediately preceding4 ,we are not expressly told1 whether good1 evil1 happiness1 misery1 c41 refer to the agent alone or to others also3 but the general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant4 ,and in this sense1 ,plato does not make out his case4 ,he establishes an arbitrary standard of his own1 recognised only by a few followers1 and altogether differing from the ordinary standard1 to test and compare happiness and misery4 ,the successful criminal1 ,archelaus himself1 far from feeling any such intense misery as ,plato describes1 is satisfied and proud of his position1 which most others also account an object of envy4 ,this is not disputed by ,plato himself4 ,and in the face of this fact1 it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove1 by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning1 that ,archelaus must be miserable4 ,that step of ,plato's reasoning1 in which he asserts1 that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good--is only true if you take in 7what ,plato omits to mention7 the interests of society as well as those of the agent4 ,his punishment is certainly profitable to 7conducive to the security and well being of7 society3 it may possibly be also profitable to himself1 but very frequently it is not so4 ,the conclusion brought out by ,plato1 therefore1 while contradicted by the fact1 involves also a fallacy in the reasoning process4 ,side-note3 ,if the reasoning of ,plato were true1 the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed4 ,throughout the whole of this dialogue1 ,plato intimates decidedly how great a paradox the doctrine maintained by ,sokrates must appear3 how diametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less informed multitude1 but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen--even such a man as ,nikias4 ,indeed it is literally exact--what ,plato here puts into the mouth of ,kallikles--that if the doctrine here advocated by ,sokrates were true1 the whole of social life would be turned upside down4#ea ,if1 for example1 it were true1 as ,plato contends1--,that every man who commits a crime1 takes upon him thereby a terrible and lasting distemper1 incurable except by the application of punishment1 which is the specific remedy in the case--every theory of punishment would1 literally speaking1 be turned upside down4 ,the great discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of that formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to inoculate himself3 and punishment1 instead of being 7as it is now considered1 and as ,plato himself represents it in the ,protagoras7 the great discouragement to the commission of crime1 would operate in the contrary direction4 ,it would be the means of removing or impairing the great real discouragement to crime3 and a wise legislator would hesitate to inflict it4 ,this would be nothing less than a reversal of the most universally accepted political or social precepts 7as ,kallikles is made to express himself74 ,footnote #ea3 ,plato1 ,gorg4 p4 #dha ,c4 ,kall4--,greek3 ei7 men gar spouda_/zeis te kai tugcha_/nei tauta a7lth o7_/nta a7 le_/geis1 a7_/llo ti 7 7mn o7 bi_/os a7natetramme_/nos a7n ei7_/ tn a7nthr_/pn1 kai pa_/nta ta e7nanti_/a pra_/ttomen1 7 a7 dei8 ,side-note3 ,plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper--,material difference between the two--,distemper must be felt by the distempered persons4 ,it will indeed be at once seen1 that the taint or distemper with which ,archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself1 when he commits signal crime--is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of ,plato himself4#eb ,a distemper must imply something painful1 enfeebling1 disabling1 to the individual who feels it3 there is no other meaning3 we cannot recognise a distemper1 which does not make itself felt in any way by the distempered person4 ,plato is misled by his ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health3 real1 on some points--not real on others4 ,when a man is in bad bodily health1 his sensations warn him of it at once4 ,he suffers pain1 discomfort1 or disabilities1 which leave no doubt as to the fact3 though he may not know either the precise cause1 or the appropriate remedy4 ,conversely1 in the absence of any such warnings1 and in the presence of certain positive sensations1 he knows himself to be in tolerable or good health4 ,if ,sokrates and ,archelaus were both in good bodily health1 or both in bad bodily health1 each would be made aware of the fact by analogous evidences4 ,but by what measure are we to determine when a man is in a good or bad mental state8 ,by his own feelings8 ,in that case1 ,archelaus and ,sokrates are in a mental state equally good3 each is satisfied with his own4 ,by the judgment of by-standers8 ,archelaus will then be the better of the two3 at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of ,sokrates4 ,by my judgment8 ,if my opinion is asked1 ,i agree with ,sokrates3 though not on the grounds which he here urges1 but on other grounds4 ,who is to be the ultimate referee--the interests or security of other persons1 who have suffered or are likely to suffer by ,archelaus1 being by the supposition left out of view8 ,footnote #eb3 ,the disposition of ,plato to build argument on a metaphor is often shown4 ,aristotle remarks it of him in respect to his theory of ,ideas2 and ,aristotle in his ,topica gives several precepts in regard to the general tendency--precepts enjoining disputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion 7,topica1 iv4 #abc1 a4 #cc1 vi4 #aci-adj7--;,greek3 pan gar a7saphes to kata metaphoran lego_/menon1 c4 ,polus is now dismissed as vanquished1 after having been forced1 against his will1 to concede--,that the doer of wrong is more miserable than the sufferer3 ,that he is more miserable1 if unpunished1--less so1 if punished3 ,that a triumphant criminal on a great scale1 like ,archelaus1 is the most miserable of men4 ,side-note3 ,kallikles begins to argue against ,sokrates--he takes a distinction between ,just by ,law and ,just by nature--,reply of ,sokrates1 that there is no variance between the two1 properly understood4 ,here1 then1 we commence with ,kallikles3 who interposes1 to take up the debate with ,sokrates4 ,polus 7says ,kallikles71 from deference to the opinions of mankind1 has erroneously conceded the point--,that it is more disgraceful to do wrong1 than to suffer wrong4 ,this is indeed true 7continues ,kallikles71 according to what is just by law or convention1 that is1 according to the general sentiment of mankind3 but it is not true1 according to justice by nature1 or natural justice4 ,nature and ,law are here opposed4#ec ,the justice of ,nature is1 that among men 7as among other animals7 the strong individual should govern and strip the weak1 taking and keeping as much as he can grasp4 ,but this justice will not suit the weak1 who are the many1 and who defeat it by establishing a different justice--justice according to law--to curb the strong man1 and prevent him from having more than his fair share4#ed ,the many1 feeling their own weakness1 and thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division1 make laws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own protection1 in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment and oppression to which he is disposed4 ,the just according to law is thus a tutelary institution1 established by the weak to defend themselves against the just according to nature4 ,nature measures right by might1 and by nothing else3 so that according to the right of nature1 suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing wrong4 ,hrakls takes from ,geryon his cattle1 by the right of nature or of the strongest1 without either sale or gift4#ee ,footnote #ec3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhb ,e4 ,greek3 7s ta polla de tauta e7nanti_/a a7ll_/lois e7sti_/n1 7_/ te phu_/sis kai o7 no_/mos4 ,footnote #ed3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhc ,b4 ,greek3 a7ll'1 oi7mai1 oi7 tithe_/menoi tous no_/mous oi7 a7stheneis a7_/nthrpoi_/ ei7si kai oi7 polloi4 ,pros au7tous ou7n kai to au7tois sumphe_/ron tou_/s te no_/mous ti_/thentai kai tous e7pai_/nous e7painousi kai tous pso_/gous pse_/gousin1 e7kphobounte_/s te tous e7r7r7meneste_/rous tn a7nthr_/pn kai dunatous o7_/ntas ple_/on e7_/chein1 i7_/na m au7tn ple_/on e7_/chsin1 le_/gousin 7s ai7schron kai a7_/dikon to pleonektein1 kai touto e7sti to a7dikein1 to ztein tn a7_/lln ple_/on e7_/chein2 a7gapsi ga_/r1 oi7mai1 au7toi a7n to i7_/son e7_/chsi phaulo_/teroi o7_/ntes4 ,footnote #ee3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dhd-dhh4 ,but 7rejoins ,sokrates7 the many are by nature stronger than the one2 since1 as you yourself say1 they make and enforce laws to restrain him and defeat his projects4 ,therefore1 since the many are the strongest1 the right which they establish is the right of 7or by7 nature4 ,and the many1 as you admit1 declare themselves in favour of the answer given by ,polus--,that to do wrong is more disgraceful than to suffer wrong4#ef ,right by nature1 and right by institution1 sanction it alike4 ,footnote #ef3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhh ,d-,e4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,what ,kallikls says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of ,athenian sophists4 ,kallikls--rhetor and politician4 ,several commentators have contended1 that the doctrine which ,plato here puts into the mouth of ,kallikls was taught by the ,sophists at ,athens3 who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true wisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the strongest and taking whatever they could get1 without any regard to law or justice4 ,i have already endeavoured to show1 in my ,history of ,greece1 that the ,sophists cannot be shown to have taught either this doctrine1 or any other common doctrine3 that one at least among them 7,prodikus7 taught a doctrine inconsistent with it3 and that while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical accomplishments1 or the power of handling political1 ethical1 judicial1 matters in a manner suitable for the ,athenian public--each had his own way of doing this4 ,kallikls is not presented by ,plato as a ,sophist1 but as a ,rhetor aspiring to active political influence2 and taking a small dose of philosophy1 among the preparations for that end4#eg ,he depreciates the ,sophists as much as the philosophers1 and in fact rather more4#eh ,moreover ,plato represents him as adapting himself1 with accommodating subservience1 to the ,athenian public assembly1 and saying or unsaying exactly as they manifested their opinion4#ei ,now the ,athenian public assembly would repudiate indignantly all this pretended right of the strongest1 if any orator thought fit to put it forward as over-ruling established right and law4 ,any aspiring or subservient orator1 such as ,kallikls is described1 would know better than to address them in this strain4 ,the language which ,plato puts into the mouth of ,kallikls is noway consistent with the attribute which he also ascribes to him--slavish deference to the judgments of the ,athenian ,dmos4 ,footnote #eg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhg ,c1 #dhe4 ,footnote #eh3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ebj ,a4 ,footnote #ei3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dha-dhb4 ,side-note3 ,uncertainty of referring to ,nature as an authority4 ,it may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories4 ,the theory of ,kallikls is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it4 ,kallikls is made to speak like one who sympathises with the right of the strongest1 and who decorates such iniquity with the name and authority of that which he calls ,nature4 ,but this only shows the uncertainty of referring to ,nature as an authority4#fj ,it may be pleaded in favour of different and opposite theories4 ,nature prompts the strong man to take from weaker men what will gratify his desires3 ,nature also prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect themselves by the best means in their power4 ,the many are weaker1 taken individually--stronger taken collectively3 hence they resort to defensive combination1 established rules1 and collective authority4#fa ,the right created on one side1 and the opposite right created on the other1 flow alike from ,nature3 that is1 from propensities and principles natural1 and deeply seated1 in the human mind4 ,the authority of ,nature1 considered as an enunciation of actual and wide-spread facts1 may be pleaded for both alike4 ,but a man's sympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other2 and he may choose to stamp that which he approves1 with the name of ,nature as a personified law-maker4 ,this is what is here done by ,kallikls as ,plato exhibits him4#fb ,he sympathises with1 and approves1 the powerful individual4 ,now the greater portion of mankind are1 and always have been1 governed upon this despotic principle1 and brought up to respect it3 while many1 even of those who dislike ,kallikls because they regard him as the representative of ,athenian democracy 7to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand pointedly opposed71 when they come across a great man or so-called hero1 such as ,alexander or ,napoleon1 applaud the most exorbitant ambition if successful1 and if accompanied by military genius and energy--regarding communities as made for little else except to serve as his instruments1 subjects1 and worshippers4 ,such are represented as the sympathies of ,kallikls3 but those of the ,athenians went with the second of the two rights--and mine go with it also4 ,and though the language which ,plato puts into the mouth of ,kallikls1 in describing this second right1 abounds in contemptuous rhetoric1 proclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude#fc--yet this very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable foundation on which rights and obligations can be based4 ,the establishment of them is indispensable1 and is felt as indispensable1 to procure security for the community3 whereby the strong man whom ,kallikls extols as the favourite of ,nature1 may be tamed by discipline and censure1 so as to accommodate his own behaviour to this equitable arrangement4#fd ,plato himself1 in his ,republic1#fe traces the generation of a city to the fact that each man individually taken is not self-sufficing1 but stands in need of many things3 it is no less true1 that each man stands also in fear of many things1 especially of depredations from animals1 and depredations from powerful individuals of his own species4 ,in the mythe of ,protagoras1#ff we have fears from hostile animals--in the speech here ascribed to ,kallikls1 we have fears from hostile strong men--assigned as the generating cause1 both of political communion and of established rights and obligations to protect it4 ,footnote #fj3 ,aristotle 7,sophist4 ,elench4 #ab1 p4 #agc1 a4 #aj7 makes allusion to this argument of ,kallikls in the ,gorgias1 and notices it as a frequent point made by disputants in ,dialectics--to insist on the contradiction between the ,just according to ,nature and the ,just according to ,law3 which contradiction 7,aristotle says7 all the ancients recognised as a real one 7,greek3 oi7 a7rchaioi pa_/ntes 7_/onto sumbai_/nein74 ,it was doubtless a point on which the ,dialectician might find much to say on either side4 ,footnote #fa3 ,in the conversation between ,sokrates and ,kritobulus1 one of the best in ,xenophon's ,memorabilia 7ii4 #f1 #ba71 respecting the conditions on which friendship depends1 we find ,sokrates clearly stating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity1 though different and opposite1 nevertheless both exist by nature4 ,greek3 ,a7ll' e7_/chei me_/n1 e7_/ph o7 ,skra_/ts1 poiki_/ls ps tauta3 ,phu_/sei gar e7_/chousin oi7 a7_/nthrpoi ta men philika_/--de_/ontai_/ te gar a7ll_/ln1 kai e7leousi1 kai sunergountes 7phelountai1 kai touto sunie_/ntes cha_/rin e7_/chousin a7ll_/lois--ta de polemika_/--ta_/ te gar au7ta kala kai 7de_/a nomi_/zontes u7per tou_/tn ma_/chontai kai dichognmonountes e7nantiountai2 polemikon de kai e7_/ris kai o7rg_/1 kai dusmenes men o7 tou pleonektein e7_/rs1 miston de o7 phtho_/nos4 ,a7ll' o7_/ms dia tou_/tn pa_/ntn 7 phili_/a diaduome_/n suna_/ptei tous kalou_/s te ka7gathou_/s1 c4 ,we read in the speech of ,hermokrates the ,syracusan1 at the congress of ,gela in ,sicily1 when exhorting the ,sicilians to unite for the purpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of ,athens1 ,thucyd4 iv4 #fa3 ,greek3 kai tous men ,a7thnai_/ous tauta pleonektein te kai pronoeisthai poll xuggn_/m1 kai ou7 tois a7_/rchein boulome_/nois me_/mphomai a7lla tois u7pakou_/ein e7toimote_/rois ou7si2 pe_/phuke gar to a7nthr_/peion dia pantos a7_/rchein men tou ei7_/kontos1 phula_/ssesthai de to e7pio_/n4 o7_/soi de gign_/skontes au7ta m o7rths proskopoumen1 mde touto_/ tis presbu_/taton 7_/kei kri_/nas1 to koins phoberon a7_/pantas eu7 the_/sthai1 a7marta_/nomen4 ,a like sentiment is pronounced by the ,athenian envoys in their debate with the ,melians1 ,thuc4 v4 #aje3 ,greek3 7gou_/metha gar to_/ te theion do_/x1 to a7nthr_/peio_/n te saphs dia panto_/s1 u7po phu_/ses a7nagkai_/as1 ou7 a7n krat1 a7_/rchein4 ,some of the ,platonic critics would have us believe that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt teaching of ,athenian ,sophists3 but ,hermokrates the ,syracusan had nothing to do with ,athenian ,sophists4 ,footnote #fb3 ,respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases--,natural ,justice1 ,natural ,right1 ,law of ,nature--see ,mr4 ,austin's ,province of ,jurisprudence ,determined1 p4 #afj1 ed4 #bnd4 ,jurisp41 #dth ed1 pp4 #agi1 #eia-b1 and ,sir ,h4 ,s4 ,maine's ,ancient ,law1 chapters iii4 and iv4 ,among the assertions made about the ,athenian ,sophists1 it is said by some commentators that they denied altogether any ,just or ,unjust by nature--that they recognised no ,just or ,unjust1 except by law or convention4 ,to say that the ,sophists 7speaking of them collectively7 either affirmed or denied anything1 is1 in my judgment1 incorrect4 ,certain persons are alluded to by ,plato 7,thett4 #agb ,b7 as adopting partially the doctrine of ,protagoras 7,homo ,mensura7 and as denying altogether the ,just by nature4 ,in another ,platonic passage 7,protagor4 #ccg7 which is also cited as contributing to prove that the ,sophists denied ,greek3 to di_/kaion phu_/sei--nothing at all is said about ,greek3 to di_/kaion4 ,hippias the ,sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry feeling between ,protagoras and ,sokrates by reminding them1 ,i am of opinion that we all 7i4e4 men of literature and study7 are kinsmen1 friends1 and fellow-citizens by nature though not by law3 for law1 the despot of mankind1 carries many things by force1 contrary to nature4 ,the remark is very appropriate from one who is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants3 and the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a theme1 that ,i am surprised to find ,heindorf 7in his note7 making it an occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the ,sophist1 because some of them distinguished ,nature from the ,laws1 and despised the latter in comparison with the former4 ,kallikls here1 in the ,gorgias1 maintains an opinion not only different from1 but inconsistent with1 the opinion alluded to above in the ,thettus1 #agb ,b4 ,the persons noticed in the ,thettus said--,there is no ,natural ,justice3 no ,justice1 except ,justice by ,law4 ,kallikls says--,there is a ,natural ,justice quite distinct from 7and which he esteems more than7 ,justice by ,law3 he then explains what he believes ,natural ,justice to be--,that the strong man should take what he pleases from the weak4 ,though these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other1 yet we see ,plato in the ,leges 7x4 #hhi ,e1 #hij ,a7 alluding to them both as the same creed1 held and defended by the same men2 whom he denounces with extreme acrimony4 ,who they were1 he does not name2 he does not mention ,greek3 sophistai_/1 but calls them ,greek3 a7ndrn sophn1 i7ditn te kai poitn4 ,we see1 in the third chapter of ,sir ,h4 ,s4 ,maine's excellent work on ,ancient ,law1 the meaning of these phrases--,natural ,justice1 ,law of ,nature4 ,it designated or included a set of legal principles entitled to supersede the existing laws1 on the ground of intrinsic superiority4 ,it denoted an ideal condition of society1 supposed to be much better than what actually prevailed4 ,this at least seems to have been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,what this ideal perfection of human society was1 varied in the minds of different speakers4 ,in each speaker's mind the word and sentiment was much the same1 though the objects to which it attached were often different4 ,empedokles proclaims in solemn and emphatic language that the ,law of ,nature peremptorily forbids us to kill any animal4 7,aristot4 ,rhetor4 i4 #ac1 #acgc b4 #ae47 ,plato makes out to his own satisfaction1 that his ,republic is thoroughly in harmony with the ,law of ,nature3 and he insists especially on this harmony1 in the very point which even the ,platonic critics admit to be wrong--that is1 in regard to the training of women and the relations of the sexes 7,republic1 v4 #def ,c1 #dff ,d74 ,we learn from ,plato himself that the propositions of the ,republic were thoroughly adverse to what other persons reverenced as the ,law of ,nature4 ,in the notes of ,beck and ,heindorf on ,protagor4 p4 #ccg we read1 ,hippias pr cteris ,sophistis contempsit leges1 iisque opposuit ,naturam4 ,naturam legibus plures cert ,sophistarum opposuisse1 easque pr ill contempsisse1 multis veterum locis constat4 ,now this allegation is more applicable to ,plato than to the ,sophists4 ,plato speaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and their laws3 the scheme of his ,republic1 radically departing from them as it does1 shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of human nature4 ,both the ,stoics and the ,epikureans extolled what they called the ,law of ,nature above any laws actually existing4 ,the other charge made against the ,sophists 7quite opposite1 yet sometimes advanced by the same critics7 is1 that they recognised no ,just by ,nature1 but only ,just by ,law3 i4e4 all the actual laws and customs considered as binding in each different community4 ,this is what ,plato ascribes to some persons 7,sophists or not7 in the ,thettus1 p4 #agb4 ,but in this sense it is not exact to call ,kallikls 7as ,heindorf does1 ,protagor4 p4 #ccg7 germanus ille ,sophistarum alumnus in ,gorgi ,callicles1 nor to affirm 7with ,schleiermacher1 ,einleit4 zum ,thett4 p4 #ahc7 that ,plato meant to refute ,aristippus under the name of ,kallikles1 ,aristippus maintaining that there was no ,just by ,nature1 but only ,just by ,law or ,convention4 ,footnote #fc3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhc ,b1 p4 #dib ,a4 ,greek3 oi7 polloi1 a7pokrupto_/menoi tn e7autn a7dunami_/an1 c4 ,footnote #fd3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhc ,e4 ,footnote #fe3 ,plato1 ,republic1 ii4 p4 #cfi ,b4 ,greek3 o7_/ti tugcha_/nei 7mn e7_/kastos ou7k au7tarks 7_/n1 a7lla polln e7nde_/s4 ,footnote #ff3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #cbb ,b4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others4 ,kallikls defends the negative4 ,kallikls now explains1 that by stronger men1 he means better1 wiser1 braver men4 ,it is they 7he says7 who ought1 according to right by nature1 to rule over others and to have larger shares than others4 ,sokr4--,ought they not to rule themselves as well as others3#fg to control their own pleasures and desires3 to be sober and temperate8 ,kall4--,no1 they would be foolish if they did4 ,the weak multitude must do so2 and there grows up accordingly among them a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all4 ,but it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this necessity4 ,the right of nature authorises them to have the largest desires1 since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the desires4 ,it would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen must be content2 and worse than silly if he did not enrich his friends in preference to his enemies4 ,he need not care for that public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among the many4 ,a full swing of enjoyment1 if a man has power to procure and maintain it1 is virtue as well as happiness4#fh ,footnote #fg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dia ,d4 ,footnote #fh3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dib ,a-,c4 ,side-note3 ,whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man1 provided he has the means of satisfying them8 ,whether all varieties of desire are good8 ,whether the pleasurable and the good are identical8 ,sokr4--,i think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life1 regulated according to present means and circumstances1 is better than a life of immoderate indulgence4#fi ,kall4--,the man who has no desires will have no pleasure1 and will live like a stone4 ,the more the desires1 provided they can all be satisfied1 the happier a man will be4 ,sokr4--,you mean that a man shall be continually hungry1 and continually satisfying his hunger3 continually thirsty1 and satisfying his thirst2 and so forth4 ,kall4--,by having and by satisfying those and all other desires1 a man will enjoy happiness4 ,sokr4--,do you mean to include all varieties of desire and satisfaction of desire3 such for example as itching and scratching yourself3#gj and other bodily appetites which might be named8 ,kall4--,such things are not fit for discussion4 ,sokr4--,it is you who drive me to mention them1 by laying down the principle1 that men who enjoy1 be the enjoyment of what sort it may1 are happy2 and by not distinguishing what pleasures are good and what are evil4 ,tell me again1 do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical8 ,or are there any pleasurable things which are not good8#ga ,kall4--,i think that the pleasurable and the good are the same4 ,footnote #fi3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dic ,c4 ,greek3 e7a_/n ps oi7o_/s t' 7 peisai metathe_/sthai kai a7nti tou a7pl_/sts kai a7kola_/sts e7_/chontos bi_/ou ton kosmi_/s kai tois a7ei parousin i7kans kai e7xarkou_/nts e7_/chonta bi_/on e7le_/sthai4 ,footnote #gj3 ,plato1 ,gorg4 p4 #did ,e4 ,footnote #ga3 ,plato1 ,gorg4 pp4 #did-die4 ,greek3 7 gar e7g a7_/g e7ntautha1 7 e7keinos o7s a7n ph a7ne_/dn ou7_/t tous chai_/rontas1 o7_/ps a7n chairsin1 eu7dai_/monas ei7nai1 kai m diori_/ztai tn 7donn o7poiai a7gathai kai kakai_/8 a7ll' e7_/ti kai nun le_/ge1 po_/teron ph ei7nai to au7to 7du kai a7gatho_/n1 7 ei7nai ti tn 7de_/n o7 ou7k e7_/stin a7gatho_/n8 ,side-note3 ,kallikls maintains that pleasurable and good are identical4 ,sokrates refutes him4 ,some pleasures are good1 others bad4 ,a scientific adviser is required to discriminate them4 ,upon this question the discussion now turns3 whether pleasure and good are the same1 or whether there are not some pleasures good1 others bad4 ,by a string of questions much protracted1 but subtle rather than conclusive1 ,sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same as good--that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains4 ,and ,kallikls admits that some pleasures are better1 others worse4#gb ,profitable pleasures are good3 hurtful pleasures are bad4 ,thus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good1 if they impart to us health and strength--bad1 if they produce sickness and weakness4 ,we ought to choose the good pleasures and pains1 and avoid the bad ones4 ,it is not every man who is competent to distinguish what pleasures are good1 and what are bad4 ,a scientific and skilful adviser1 judging upon general principles1 is required to make this distinction4#gc ,footnote #gb3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dif-dii4 ,footnote #gc3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dii-ejj4 ,greek3 ,a7r' ou7n pantos a7ndro_/s e7stin e7kle_/xasthai poia a7gatha tn 7de_/n e7sti kai o7poia kaka_/1 7 technikou dei ei7s e7_/kaston8 ,technikou4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,contradiction between ,sokrates in the ,gorgias1 and ,sokrates in the ,protagoras4 ,this debate between ,sokrates and ,kallikls1 respecting the ,quomodo vivendum est1#gd deserves attention on more than one account4 ,in the first place1 the relation which ,sokrates is here made to declare between the two pairs of general terms1 ,pleasurable--,good3 ,painful--,evil3 is the direct reverse of that which he both declares and demonstrates in the ,protagoras4 ,in that dialogue1 the ,sophist ,protagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which is maintained by ,sokrates in the ,gorgias4 ,but ,sokrates 7in the ,protagoras7 refutes him by an elaborate argument2 and demonstrates that pleasure and good 7also pain and evil7 are names for the same fundamental ideas under different circumstances3 pleasurable and painful referring only to the sensation of the present moment--while good and evil include1 besides1 an estimate of its future consequences and accompaniments1 both pleasurable and painful1 and represent the result of such calculation4 ,in the ,gorgias1 ,sokrates demonstrates the contrary1 by an argument equally elaborate but not equally convincing4 ,he impugns a doctrine advocated by ,kallikls1 and in impugning it1 proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance between the pleasurable and the good1 the painful and the evil3 rejecting the fundamental identity of the two1 which he advocates in the ,protagoras1 as if it were a disgraceful heresy4 ,footnote #gd3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dib ,d4 ,greek3 i7_/na t o7_/nti kata_/dlon ge_/ntai1 ps bite_/on1 c4 #ejj ,c3 ,greek3 o7_/ntina chr tro_/pon zn4 ,side-note3 ,views of critics about this contradiction4 ,the subject evidently presented itself to ,plato in two different ways at different times4 ,which of the two is earliest1 we have no means of deciding4 ,the commentators1 who favour generally the view taken in the ,gorgias1 treat the ,protagoras as a juvenile and erroneous production3 sometimes1 with still less reason1 they represent ,sokrates as arguing in that dialogue1 from the principles of his opponents1 not from his own4 ,for my part1 without knowing whether the ,protagoras or the ,gorgias is the earliest1 ,i think the ,protagoras an equally finished composition1 and ,i consider that the views which ,sokrates is made to propound in it1 respecting pleasure and good1 are decidedly nearer to the truth4 ,side-note3 ,comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of ,sokrates in both dialogues4 ,that in the list of pleasures there are some which it is proper to avoid1--and in the list of pains1 some which it is proper to accept or invite--is a doctrine maintained by ,sokrates alike in both the dialogues4 ,why8 ,because some pleasures are good1 others bad3 some pains bad1 others good--says ,sokrates in the ,gorgias4 ,the same too is said by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras2 but then1 he there explains what he means by the appellation4 ,all pleasure 7he there says71 so far as it goes1 is good--all pain is bad4 ,but there are some pleasures which cannot be enjoyed without debarring us from greater pleasures or entailing upon us greater pains3 on that ground therefore1 such pleasures are bad4 ,so again1 there are some pains1 the suffering of which is a condition indispensable to our escaping greater pains1 or to our enjoying greater pleasures3 such pains therefore are good4 ,thus this apparent exception does not really contradict1 but confirms1 the general doctrine--,that there is no good but the pleasurable1 and the elimination of pain--and no evil except the painful1 or the privation of pleasure4 ,good and evil have no reference except to pleasures and pains2 but the terms imply1 in each particular case1 an estimate and comparison of future pleasurable and painful consequences1 and express the result of such comparison4 ,you call enjoyment itself evil 7says ,sokrates in the ,protagoras71#ge when it deprives us of greater pleasures or entails upon us greater pains4 ,if you have any other ground1 or look to any other end1 in calling it evil1 you may tell us what that end is2 but you will not be able to tell us4 ,so too1 you say that pain is a good1 when it relieves us from greater pains1 or when it is necessary as the antecedent cause of greater pleasures4 ,if you have any other end in view1 when you call pain good1 you may tell us what that end is2 but you will not be able to tell us4#gf ,footnote #ge3 ,plato1 ,protagoras19999 p4 #ced ,d4 ,greek3 e7pei_/1 ei7 kat' a7_/llo ti au7to to chai_/rein kakon kaleite kai ei7s a7_/llo ti te_/los a7poble_/psantes1 e7_/choite a7n kai 7min ei7pein2 a7ll' ou7ch e7_/xete4 4 4 4 e7pei ei7 pros a7_/llo ti te_/los a7poble_/pete1 o7_/tan kalte au7to to lupeisthai a7gatho_/n1 7 pros o7 e7g le_/g1 e7_/chete 7min ei7pein2 a7ll' ou7ch e7_/xete4 ,footnote #gf3 ,in a remarkable passage of the ,de ,legibus1 ,plato denies all essential distinction between ,good and ,pleasure1 and all reality of ,good apart from ,pleasure 7,legg4 ii4 pp4 #ffb-ffc74 ,greek3 ei7 d' au7 ton dikaio_/taton eu7daimone_/staton a7pophai_/noito bi_/on ei7nai1 ztoi pou pas a7n o7 a7kou_/n1 oi7mai1 ti_/ pot' e7n au7t to ts 7dons kreitton a7gatho_/n te kai kalon o7 no_/mos e7non e7painei8 ti_/ gar d dikai_/ chrizo_/menon 7dons a7gathon a7n ge_/noito8 ,plato goes on to argue as follows3 ,even though it were not true1 as ,i affirm it to be1 that the life of justice is a life of pleasure1 and the life of injustice a life of pain--still the law-giver must proclaim this proposition as a useful falsehood1 and compel every one to chime in with it4 ,otherwise the youth will have no motive to just conduct4 ,for no one will willingly consent to obey any recommendation from which he does not expect more pleasure than pain2 ,greek3 ou7deis gar a7n e7_/kn e7_/theloi pei_/thesthai pra_/ttein touto o7_/1 t m to chai_/rein tou lupeisthai ple_/on e7_/petai 7#ffc ,b74 ,side-note3 ,distinct statement in the ,protagoras4 ,what are good and evil1 and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them4 ,no such distinct statement in the ,gorgias4 ,in the ,gorgias1 too1 ,sokrates declares that some pleasures are good1 others bad--some pains bad1 others good4 ,but here he stops4 ,he does not fulfil the reasonable demand urged by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras--,if you make such a distinction1 explain the ground on which you make it1 and the end to which you look4 ,the distinction in the ,gorgias stands without any assigned ground or end to rest upon4 ,and this want is the more sensibly felt1 when we read in the same dialogue1 that--,it is not every man who can distinguish the good pleasures from the bad3 a scientific man1 proceeding on principle1 is needed for the purpose4#gg ,but upon what criterion is the scientific man to proceed8 ,of what properties is he to take account1 in pronouncing one pleasure to be bad1 another good--or one pain to be bad and another good--the estimate of consequences1 measured in future pleasures and pains1 being by the supposition excluded8 ,no information is given4 ,the problem set to the scientific man is one of which all the quantities are unknown4 ,now ,sokrates in the ,protagoras#gh also lays it down1 that a scientific or rational calculation must be had1 and a mind competent to such calculation must be postulated1 to decide which pleasures are bad or fit to be rejected--which pains are good1 or proper to be endured4 ,but then he clearly specifies the elements which alone are to be taken into the calculation--viz41 the future pleasures and pains accompanying or dependent upon each with the estimate of their comparative magnitude and durability4 ,the theory of this calculation is clear and intelligible3 though in many particular cases1 the data necessary for making it1 and the means of comparing them1 may be very imperfectly accessible4 ,footnote #gg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ejj ,a4 ,greek3 ,a7r' ou7n pantos a7ndro_/s9999 e7stin e7kle_/xasthai poia a7_/gatha tn 7de_/n e7sti kai o7poia kaka_/8 7 technikou dei ei7s e7_/kaston8 ,technikou4 ,footnote #gh3 ,plato1 ,protagoras1 pp4 #ceg ,b1 #cef ,e4 ,side-note3 ,modern ethical theories4 ,intuition4 ,moral sense--not recognised by ,plato in either of the dialogues4 ,according to various ethical theories1 which have chiefly obtained currency in modern times1 the distinction--between pleasures good or fit to be enjoyed1 and pleasures bad or unfit to be enjoyed--is determined for us by a moral sense or intuition3 by a simple1 peculiar1 sentiment of right and wrong1 or a conscience1 which springs up within us ready-made1 and decides on such matters without appeal2 so that a man has only to look into his own heart for a solution4 ,we need not take account of this hypothesis1 in reviewing ,plato's philosophy3 for he evidently does not proceed upon it4 ,he expressly affirms1 in the ,gorgias as well as in the ,protagoras1 that the question is one requiring science or knowledge to determine it1 and upon which none but the man of science or expert 7,greek3 technikos7 is a competent judge4 ,side-note3 ,in both dialogues the doctrine of ,sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent3 not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons1 so far as affected by the agent4 ,moreover1 there is another point common to both the two dialogues1 deserving of notice4 ,i have already remarked when reviewing the doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 that it appears to me seriously defective1 inasmuch as it takes into account the pleasures and pains of the agent only1 and omits the pleasures and pains of other persons affected by his conduct4 ,but this is not less true respecting the doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,gorgias3 for whatever criterion he may there have in his mind to determine which among our pleasures are bad1 it is certainly not this--that the agent in procuring them is obliged to hurt others4 ,for the example which ,sokrates cites as specially illustrating the class of bad pleasures--viz41 the pleasure of scratching an itching part of the body#gi--;is one in which no others besides the agent are concerned4 ,as in the ,protagoras1 so in the ,gorgias--,plato in laying down his rule of life1 admits into the theory only what concerns the agent himself1 and makes no direct reference to the happiness of others as affected by the agent's behaviour4 ,footnote #gi3 ,the ,sokrates of the ,protagoras would have reckoned this among the bad pleasures1 because the discomfort and distress of body out of which it arises more than countervail the pleasure4 ,side-note3 ,points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same1 but differing in classification4 ,there are however various points of analogy between the ,protagoras and the ,gorgias1 which will enable us1 after tracing them out1 to measure the amount of substantial difference between them2 ,i speak of the reasoning of ,sokrates in each4 ,thus1 in the ,protagoras1#hj ,sokrates ranks health1 strength1 preservation of the community1 wealth1 command1 c41 under the general head of ,good things1 but expressly on the ground that they are the producing causes and conditions of pleasures and of exemption from pains3 he also ranks sickness and poverty under the head of ,evil things1 as productive causes of pain and suffering4 ,in the ,gorgias also1 he numbers wisdom1 health1 strength1 perfection of body1 riches1 c41 among ,good things or profitable things#ha--7which two words he treats as equivalent7--and their contraries as ,evil things4 ,now he does not expressly say here 7as in the ,protagoras7 that these things are good1 because they are productive causes of pleasure or exemption from pain3 but such assumption must evidently be supplied in order to make the reasoning valid4 ,for upon what pretence can any one pronounce strength1 health1 riches1 to be good--and helplessness1 sickness1 poverty1 to be evil--if no reference be admitted to pleasures and pains8 ,sokrates in the ,gorgias#hb declares that the pleasures of eating and drinking are good1 in so far as they impart health and strength to the body--evil1 in so far as they produce a contrary effect4 ,sokrates in the ,protagoras reasons in the same way--but with this difference--that he would count the pleasure of the repast itself as one item of good3 enhancing the amount of good where the future consequences are beneficial1 diminishing the amount of evil where the future consequences are ,unfavourable3 while ,sokrates in the ,gorgias excludes immediate pleasure from the list of good things1 and immediate pain from the list of evil things4 ,footnote #hj3 ,plato1 ,protagor4 pp4 #cec ,d1 #ced ,a4 ,footnote #ha3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dfg-dfh-dii4 ,footnote #hb3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dii ,d4 ,this last exclusion renders the theory in the ,gorgias untenable and inconsistent4 ,if present pleasure be not admitted as an item of good so far as it goes--then neither can the future and consequent aggregates of pleasure1 nor the causes of them1 be admitted as good4 ,so likewise1 if present pain be no evil1 future pain cannot be allowed to rank as an evil4#hc ,footnote #hc3 ,compare a passage in the ,republic 7ii4 p4 #ceg7 where ,sokrates gives 7or accepts1 as given by ,glaukon7 a description of ,good much more coincident with the ,protagoras than with the ,gorgias4 ,the common property of all ,good is to be desired or loved2 and there are three varieties of it--#a4 ,that which we desire for itself1 and for its own sake1 apart from all ulterior consequences1 such as innocuous pleasures or enjoyments4 #b4 ,that which we desire both for itself and for its ulterior consequences1 such as good health1 good vision1 good sense1 c4 #c4 ,that which we do not desire--nay1 which we perhaps hate or shun1 per se3 but which we nevertheless desire and invite1 in connection with and for the sake of ulterior consequences3 such as gymnastic training1 medical treatment when we are sick1 labour in our trade or profession4 ,here ,plato admits the immediately pleasurable per se as one variety of good1 always assuming that it is not countervailed by consequences or accompaniments of a painful character4 ,this is the doctrine of the ,protagoras1 as distinguished from the ,gorgias1 where ,sokrates sets pleasure in marked opposition to good4 ,side-note3 ,kallikls1 whom ,sokrates refutes in the ,gorgias1 maintains a different argument from that which ,sokrates combats in the ,protagoras4 ,each of the two dialogues1 which ,i am now comparing1 is in truth an independent composition3 in each1 ,sokrates has a distinct argument to combat2 and in the latest of the two 7whichever that was71 no heed is taken of the argumentation in the earlier4 ,in the ,protagoras1 he exalts the dignity and paramount force of knowledge or prudence3 if a man knows how to calculate pleasures and pains1 he will be sure to choose the result which involves the greater pleasure or the less pain1 on the whole3 to say that he is overpowered by immediate pleasure or pain into making a bad choice1 is a wrong description--the real fact being1 that he is deficient in the proper knowledge how to choose4 ,in the ,gorgias1 the doctrine assigned to ,kallikls and impugned by ,sokrates is something very different4 ,that justice1 temperance1 self-restraint1 are indeed indispensable to the happiness of ordinary men2 but if there be any one individual1 so immensely superior in force as to trample down and make slaves of the rest1 this one man would be a fool if he restrained himself3 having the means of gratifying all his appetites1 the more appetites he has1 the more enjoyments will he have and the greater happiness4#hd ,observe--that ,kallikls applies this doctrine only to the one omnipotent despot3 to all other members of society1 he maintains that self-restraint is essential4 ,this is the doctrine which ,sokrates in the ,gorgias undertakes to refute1 by denying community of nature between the pleasurable and the good--between the painful and the evil4 ,footnote #hd3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dib ,b4 ,side-note3 ,the refutation of ,kallikls by ,sokrates in the ,gorgias1 is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras4 ,to me his refutation appears altogether unsuccessful1 and the position upon which he rests it incorrect4 ,the only parts of the refutation really forcible1 are those in which he unconsciously relinquishes this position1 and slides into the doctrine of the ,protagoras4 ,upon this latter doctrine1 a refutation might be grounded3 you may show that even an omnipotent despot 7regard for the comfort of others being excluded by the hypothesis7 will gain by limiting the gratification of his appetites to-day so as not to spoil his appetites of tomorrow4 ,even in his case1 prudential restraint is required1 though his motives for it would be much less than in the case of ordinary social men4 ,but ,good1 as laid down by ,plato in the ,gorgias1 entirely disconnected from pleasure--and ,evil1 entirely disconnected from pain--have no application to this supposed despot4 ,he has no desire for such ,platonic ,good--no aversion for such ,platonic ,evil4 ,his happiness is not diminished by missing the former or incurring the latter4 ,in fact1 one of the cardinal principles of ,plato's ethical philosophy1 which he frequently asserts both in this dialogue and elsewhere1#he--,that every man desires ,good1 and acts for the sake of obtaining ,good1 and avoiding ,evil--becomes untrue1 if you conceive ,good and ,evil according to the ,gorgias1 as having no reference to pleasure or the avoidance of pain3 untrue1 not merely in regard to a despot under these exceptional conditions1 but in regard to the large majority of social men4 ,they desire to obtain ,good and avoid ,evil1 in the sense of the ,protagoras3 but not in the sense of the ,gorgias4#hf ,sokrates himself proclaims in this dialogue3 ,i and philosophy stand opposed to ,kallikls and the ,athenian public4 ,what ,i desire is1 to reason consistently with myself4 ,that is1 to speak the language of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras--,to me1 ,sokrates1 the consciousness of inconsistency with myself and of an unworthy character1 the loss of my own self-esteem and the pungency of my own self-reproach1 are the greatest of all pains3 greater than those which you1 ,kallikls1 and the ,athenians generally1 seek to avoid at all price and urge me also to avoid at all price--poverty1 political nullity1 exposure to false accusation1 c4#hg ,the noble scheme of life1 here recommended by ,sokrates1 may be correctly described according to the theory of the ,protagoras3 without any resort to the paradox of the ,gorgias1 that ,good has no kindred or reference to ,pleasure1 nor ,evil to ,pain4 ,footnote #he3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dfg ,c1 #dii ,e4 ,footnote #hf3 ,the reasoning of ,plato in the ,gorgias1 respecting this matter1 rests upon an equivocal phrase4 ,the ,greek phrase ,greek3 eu7 pra_/ttein has two meanings2 it means rect agere1 to act rightly2 and it also means felicem esse1 to be happy4 ,there is a corresponding double sense in ,greek3 kaks pra_/ttein4 ,heindorf has well noticed the fallacious reasoning founded by ,plato on this double sense4 ,we read in the ,gorgias1 p4 #ejg ,c3 ,greek3 a7na_/gk ton s_/phrona1 di_/kaion o7_/nta kai a7ndreion kai o7_/sion1 a7gathon a7_/ndra ei7nai tele_/s1 ton de a7gathon ei7 te kai kals pra_/ttein a7 a7n pra_/tt1 ton d' eu7 pra_/ttonta maka_/rio_/n te kai eu7dai_/mona ei7nai1 ton de ponron kai kaks pra_/ttonta a7_/thlion4 ,upon which ,heindorf remarks1 citing a note of ,routh1 who says1 ,vix enim potest credi1 ,platonem duplici sensu verborum ,greek3 eu7 pra_/ttein ad argumentum probandum abuti voluisse1 qu fallacia esset amphiboli4 ,non meminerat 7says ,heindorf7 vir doctus ceteros in ,platone locos1 ubi eodem modo ex duplici ill potestate argumentatio ducitur1 cujusmodi plura attulimus ad ,charmidem1 #db1 p4 #agb ,a4 ,heindorf observes1 on the ,charmids l4 c43 ,argumenti hujus vim positam apparet in duplici dictionis ,greek3 eu7 pra_/ttein significatu3 quum vulgo sit felicem esse1 non rect facere4 ,hoc aliaque ejusdem generis spius sic ansam prbuerunt sophismatis magis quam justi syllogismi4 ,heindorf then refers to analogous passages in ,plato1 ,repub4 i4 p4 #ced ,a3 ,alkib4 i4 p4 #aaf ,b1 p4 #acd ,a4 ,a similar fallacy is found in ,aristotle1 ,politic4 vii4 i4 p4 #acbc1 a4 #ag1 b4 #cb--;,greek3 a7_/rista gar pra_/ttein pros_/kei tous a7_/rista politeuome_/nous--a7du_/naton de kals pra_/ttein tois m ta kala pra_/ttousin4 ,this fallacy is recognised and properly commented on as a logisches ,wortspiel1 by ,bernays1 in his instructive volume1 ,die9999 ,dialoge des ,aristoteles1 pp4 #hj-ha 7,berlin1 #ahfc74 ,footnote #hg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #dha ,d1 #dhb ,b4 ,side-note3 ,permanent elements--and transient elements--of human agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues4 ,lastly ,i will compare the ,protagoras and the ,gorgias 7meaning always1 the reasoning of ,sokrates in each of them7 under one more point of view4 ,how does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent elements1 and the transient elements1 involved in human agency8 ,what function does each of them assign to the permanent element8 ,the distinction of these two is important in its ethical bearing4 ,the whole life both of the individual and of society consists of successive moments of action or feeling4 ,but each individual 7and the society as an aggregate of individuals7 has within him embodied and realised an element more or less permanent--an established character1 habits1 dispositions1 intellectual acquirements1 c4--a sort of capital accumulated from the past4 ,this permanent element is of extreme importance4 ,it stands to the transient element in the same relation as the fixed capital of a trader or manufacturer to his annual produce4 ,the whole use and value of the fixed capital1 of which the skill and energy of the trader himself make an important part1 consists in the amount of produce which it will yield3 but at the same time the trader must keep it up in its condition of fixed capital1 in order to obtain such amount3 he must set apart1 and abstain from devoting to immediate enjoyment1 as much of the annual produce as will suffice to maintain the fixed capital unimpaired--and more1 if he desires to improve his condition4 ,the capital cannot be commuted into interest2 yet nevertheless its whole value depends upon1 and is measured by1 the interest which it yields4 ,doubtless the mere idea of possessing the capital is pleasurable to the possessor1 because he knows that it can and will be profitably employed1 so long as he chooses4 ,side-note3 ,in the ,protagoras4 ,now in the ,protagoras1 the permanent element is very pointedly distinguished from the transient1 and is called ,knowledge--the ,science or ,art of ,calculation4 ,its function also is clearly announced--to take comparative estimate and measurement of the transient elements2 which are stated to consist of pleasures and pains1 present and future--near and distant--certain and uncertain--faint and strong4 ,to these elements1 manifold yet commensurable1 the calculation is to apply4 ,the safety of life 7says ,sokrates#hh7 resides in our keeping up this science or art of calculation4 ,no present enjoyment must be admitted1 which would impair it2 no present pain must be shunned1 which is essential to uphold it4 ,yet the whole of its value resides in its application to the comparison of the pleasures and pains4 ,footnote #hh3 ,plato1 ,protag4 p4 #ceg ,a4 ,greek3 e7peid de 7dons te kai lu_/ps e7n o7rth t ai7re_/sei e7pha_/n 7min 7 stri_/a tou bi_/ou ou7sa1 tou te ple_/onos kai e7lattonos kai mei_/zonos kai smikrote_/rou kai por7r7te_/r kai e7ggute_/r1 c4 ,side-note3 ,in the ,gorgias4 ,in the ,gorgias the same two elements are differently described1 and less clearly explained4 ,the permanent is termed1 ,order1 arrangement1 discipline1 a lawful1 just1 and temperate1 cast of mind 7opposed to the doctrine ascribed to ,kallikls1 which negatived this element altogether1 in the mind of the despot71 parallel to health and strength of body3 the unordered mind is again the parallel of the corrupt1 distempered1 helpless1 body2 life is not worth having until this is cured4#hi ,this corresponds to the knowledge or ,calculating ,science in the ,protagoras2 but we cannot understand what its function is1 in the ,gorgias1 because the calculable elements are incompletely enumerated4 ,footnote #hi3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #ejd ,b-,c1 #ejf ,d-,e4 ,greek3 ,ta_/xis--ko_/smos--psuch kosmi_/a a7mei_/nn tou a7kosm_/tou4 ,in the ,protagoras1 these calculable elements are two-fold--immediate pleasures and pains--and future or distant pleasures and pains4 ,between these two there is intercommunity of nature1 so that they are quite commensurable2 and the function of the calculating reason is1 to make a right estimate of the one against the other4#ij ,but in the ,gorgias1 no mention is made of future or distant pleasures and pains3 the calculable element is represented only by immediate pleasure or pain--and from thence we pass at once to the permanent calculator--the mind1 sound or corrupt4 ,you must abstain from a particular enjoyment1 because it will taint the soundness of your mind3 this is a pertinent reason 7and would be admitted as such by ,sokrates in the ,protagoras1 who instead of sound mind would say1 calculating intelligence71 but it is neither the ultimate reason 7since this soundness of mind is itself valuable with a view to future calculations71 nor the only reason3 for you must also abstain1 if it will bring upon yourself 7or upon others7 preponderating pains in the particular case--if the future pains would preponderate over the present pleasure4 ,of this last calculation no notice is taken in the ,gorgias3 which exhibits only the antithesis 7not merely marked but even over-done#ia7 between the immediate pleasure or pain and the calculating efficacy of mind1 but leaves out the true function which gives value to the sound mind as distinguished from the unsound and corrupt4 ,that function consists in its application to particular cases3 in right dealing with actual life1 as regards the agent himself and others3 in ,greek3 e7nergei_/a1 as distinguished from ,greek3 e7_/xis1 to use ,aristotelian language4#ib ,i am far from supposing that this part of the case was absent from ,plato's mind4 ,but the theory laid out in the ,gorgias 7as compared with that in the ,protagoras7 leaves no room for it2 giving exclusive prominence to the other elements1 and acknowledging only the present pleasure or pain1 to be set against the permanent condition of mind1 bad or good as it may be4 ,footnote #ij3 ,there would be also the like intercommunity of nature1 if along with the pains and pleasures of the agent himself 7which alone are regarded in the calculation of ,sokrates in the ,protagoras7 you admit into the calculation the pleasures and pains of others concerned1 and the rules established with a view to both the two together with a view to the joint interest both of the agent and of others4 ,footnote #ia3 ,epikurus and his followers assigned the greatest value1 in their ethical theory1 to the permanent element1 or established character of the agent1 intellectual and emotional4 ,but great as they reckoned this value to be1 they resolved it all into the diminution or mitigation of pains1 and1 in a certain though inferior degree1 the multiplication of pleasures4 ,they did not put it in a separate category of its own1 altogether disparate and foreign to pleasures and pains4 ,see the letter of ,epikurus to ,menoekeus1 ,diog4 ,l4 x4 #abh-acb2 ,lucretius1 v4 #ah-de1 vi4 #ab-be2 ,horat4 ,epist4 i4 #b1 #dh-fj4 ,footnote #ib3 ,aristot4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 i4 #g4 ,the remark of ,aristotle in the same treatise1 i4 #e--;,greek3 dokei gar e7nde_/chesthai kai katheu_/dein e7_/chonta tn a7ret_/n1 7 a7praktein dia bi_/ou--might be applied to the theory of the ,gorgias4 ,compare also ,ethic4 ,nik4 vii4 #c 7vii4 #d1 p4 #aadf1 b4 #ca1 p4 #aadg1 a4 #ab74 ,side-note3 ,character of the ,gorgias generally--discrediting all the actualities of life4 ,indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the ,gorgias1 than the manner in which ,sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured1 exorbitant1 maleficent desires1 but also depreciates and degrades all the actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts1 including music and poetry1 tragic as well as dithyrambic--all provision for the most essential wants1 all protection against particular sufferings and dangers1 even all service rendered to another person in the way of relief or of rescue#ic--;all the effective maintenance of public organised force1 such as ships1 docks1 walls1 arms1 c4 ,immediate satisfaction or relief1 and those who confer it1 are treated with contempt1 and presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure4 ,and it is in this point of view that various ,platonic commentators extol in an especial manner the ,gorgias3 as recognising an ,idea of ,good superhuman and supernatural1 radically disparate from pleasures and pains of any human being1 and incommensurable with them3 an ,universal ,idea1 which1 though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its particulars1 is separated from them by an incalculable space1 and is discernible only by the ,platonic telescope4 ,footnote #ic3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #eja-ejb-eaa-eab-eag-eai4 ,greek3 a7_/neu gar dikaiosu_/ns kai sphrosu_/ns lime_/nn kai neri_/n kai teichn kai pho_/rn kai toiou_/tn phluarin e7mpepl_/kasi tn po_/lin4 ,this is applied to the provision of food1 drink1 clothing1 bedding1 for the hunger1 thirst1 c41 of the community 7p4 #eag ,d71 to the saving of life 7p4 #eaa ,d74 ,the boatman between gina and ,peirus 7says ,plato7 brings over his passengers in safety1 together with their families and property1 preserving them from all the dangers of the sea4 ,the engineer1 who constructs good fortifications1 preserves from danger and destruction all the citizens with their families and their property 7p4 #eab ,b74 ,but neither of these persons takes credit for this service3 because both of them know that it is doubtful whether they have done any real service to the persons preserved1 since they have not rendered them any better2 and that it is even doubtful whether they may not have done them an actual mischief4 ,perhaps these persons may be wicked and corrupt2 in that case it is a misfortune to them that their lives should be prolonged2 it would be better for them to die4 ,it is under this conviction 7says ,plato7 that the boatman and the engineer1 though they do preserve our lives1 take to themselves no credit for it4 ,we shall hardly find any greater rhetorical exaggeration than this1 among all the compositions of the rhetors against whom ,plato declares war in the ,gorgias4 ,moreover1 it is a specimen of the way in which ,plato colours and misinterprets the facts of social life1 in order to serve the purpose of the argument of the moment4 ,he says truly that when the passage boat from gina to ,peirus has reached its destination1 the steersman receives his fare and walks about on the shore1 without taking any great credit to himself1 as if he had performed a brilliant deed or conferred an important service4 ,but how does ,plato explain this8 ,by supposing in the steersman's mind feelings which never enter into the mind of a real agent2 feelings which are put into words only when a moralist or a satirist is anxious to enforce a sentiment4 ,the service which the steersman performs is not only adequately remunerated1 but is1 on most days1 a regular and easy one1 such as every man who has gone through a decent apprenticeship can perform4 ,but suppose an exceptional day--suppose a sudden and terrible storm to supervene on the passage--suppose the boat full of passengers1 with every prospect of all on board being drowned--suppose she is only saved by the extraordinary skill1 vigilance1 and efforts of the steersman4 ,in that case he will1 on reaching the land1 walk about full of elate self-congratulation and pride3 the passengers will encourage this sentiment by expressions of the deepest gratitude2 while friends as well as competitors will praise his successful exploit4 ,how many of the passengers there are for whom the preservation of life may be a curse rather than a blessing--is a question which neither they themselves1 nor the steersman1 nor the public1 will ever dream of asking4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,argument of ,sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of flattery1 aiming at immediate pleasure4 ,we have now established 7continues ,sokrates7 that pleasure is essentially different from good1 and pain from evil3 also1 that to obtain good and avoid evil1 a scientific choice is required--while to obtain pleasure and avoid pain1 is nothing more than blind imitation or irrational knack4 ,there are some arts and pursuits which aim only at procuring immediate pleasure--others which aim at attaining good or the best2#id some arts1 for a single person1--others for a multitude4 ,arts and pursuits which aim only at immediate pleasure1 either of one or of a multitude1 belong to the general head of ,flattery4 ,among them are all the musical1 choric1 and dithyrambic representations at the festivals--tragedy as well as comedy--also political and judicial rhetoric4 ,none of these arts aim at any thing except to gratify the public to whom they are addressed3 none of them aim at the permanent good3 none seek to better the character of the public4 ,they adapt themselves to the prevalent desires3 but whether those desires are such as1 if realised1 will make the public worse or better1 they never enquire4#ie ,footnote #id3 ,the ,sokrates of the ,protagoras would have admitted a twofold distinction of aims1 but would have stated the distinction otherwise4 ,two things 7he would say7 may be looked at in regard to any course of conduct3 first1 the immediate pleasure or pain which it yields2 secondly1 this item1 not alone1 but combined with all the other pleasures and pains which can be foreseen as its conditions1 consequences1 or concomitants4 ,to obey the desire of immediate pleasure1 or the fear of immediate pain1 requires no science2 to foresee1 estimate1 and compare the consequences1 requires a scientific calculation often very difficult and complicated--a ,greek3 te_/chn or ,greek3 e7pist_/m metrtik_/4 ,thus we are told not only in what cases the calculation is required1 but what are the elements to be taken into the calculation4 ,in the ,gorgias1 we are not told on what elements the calculation of good and evil is to be based3 we are told that there must be science1 but we learn nothing more4 ,footnote #ie3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #ejb-ejc4 ,side-note3 ,the ,rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the best past ,rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great ,rhetors by ,kallikles4 ,sokr4--,do you know any public speakers who aim at anything more than gratifying the public1 or who care to make the public better8 ,kall4--,there are some who do1 and others who do not4 ,sokr4--,which are those who do8 and which of them has ever made the public better8#if ,kall4--,at any rate1 former statesmen did so2 such as ,miltiades1 ,themistokles1 ,kimon1 ,perikles4 ,sokr4--,none of them4 ,if they had1 you would have seen them devoting themselves systematically and obviously to their one end4 ,as a builder labours to construct a ship or a house1 by putting together its various parts with order and symmetry--so these statesmen would have laboured to implant order and symmetry in the minds and bodies of the citizens3 that is1 justice and temperance in their minds1 health and strength in their bodies4#ig ,unless the statesman can do this1 it is fruitless to supply the wants1 to fulfil the desires and requirements1 to uphold or enlarge the power1 of the citizens4 ,this is like supplying ample nourishment to a distempered body3 the more such a body takes in1 the worse it becomes4 ,the citizens must be treated with refusal of their wishes and with punishment1 until their vices are healed1 and they become good4#ih ,footnote #if3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ejc ,c4 ,footnote #ig3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ejd ,d4 ,footnote #ih3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eje ,b4 ,side-note3 ,necessity for temperance1 regulation1 order4 ,this is the condition of virtue and happiness4 ,we ought to do 7continues ,sokrates7 what is pleasing for the sake of what is good3 not vice vers4 ,but every thing becomes good by possessing its appropriate virtue or regulation4 ,the regulation appropriate to the mind is to be temperate4 ,the temperate man will do what is just--his duty towards men3 and what is holy--his duty towards the ,gods4 ,he will be just and holy4 ,he will therefore also be courageous3 for he will seek only such pleasures as duty permits1 and he will endure all such pains as duty requires4 ,being thus temperate1 just1 brave1 holy1 he will be a perfectly good man1 doing well and honourably throughout4 ,the man who does well1 will be happy3 the man who does ill and is wicked1 will be miserable4#ii ,it ought to be our principal aim1 both for ourselves individually and for the city1 to attain temperance and to keep clear of intemperance3 not to let our desires run immoderately 7as you1 ,kallikles1 advise71 and then seek repletion for them3 which is an endless mischief1 the life of a pirate4 ,he who pursues this plan can neither be the friend of any other man1 nor of the ,gods3 for he is incapable of communion1 and therefore of friendship4#ajj ,footnote #ii3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p1 #ejg ,d 7with ,routh and ,heindorf's notes74 ,footnote #ajj3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ejg ,e4 ,greek3 koinnein gar a7du_/natos2 o7_/t de m e7_/ni koinni_/a1 phili_/a ou7k a7n ei7_/4 ,side-note3 ,impossible to succeed in public life1 unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force4 ,now1 ,kallikles 7pursues ,sokrates71 you have reproached me with standing aloof from public life in order to pursue philosophy4 ,you tell me that by not cultivating public speaking and public action1 ,i am at the mercy of any one who chooses to accuse me unjustly and to bring upon me severe penalties4 ,but ,i tell you1 that it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong2 and that my first business is1 to provide for myself such power and such skill as shall guard me against doing wrong4#aja ,next1 as to suffering wrong1 there is only one way of taking precautions against it4 ,you must yourself rule in the city3 or you must be a friend of the ruling power4 ,like is the friend of like3#ajb a cruel despot on the throne will hate and destroy any one who is better than himself1 and will despise any one worse than himself4 ,the only person who will have influence is1 one of the same dispositions as the despot3 not only submitting to him with good will1 but praising and blaming the same things as he does--accustomed from youth upwards to share in his preferences and aversions1 and assimilated to him as much as possible4#ajc ,now if the despot be a wrong-doer1 he who likens himself to the despot will become a wrong-doer also4 ,and thus1 in taking precautions against suffering wrong1 he will incur the still greater mischief and corruption of doing wrong1 and will be worse off instead of better4 ,footnote #aja3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eji ,c4 ,compare ,leges1 viii4 #hbi ,a1 where ,greek3 to m a7dikein is described as easy of attainment2 ,greek3 to m a7dikeisthai1 as being ,greek3 pagcha_/lepon3 and both equally necessary ,greek3 pros to eu7daimo_/ns zn4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,plat4 ,gorg4 #eaj ,b4 ,greek3 phi_/los--o7 o7_/moios t o7moi_/4 ,we have already seen this principle discussed and rejected in the ,lysis1 p4 #bad4 ,see above1 ch4 xx41 p4 #agi4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eaj ,c4 ,greek3 lei_/petai d e7keinos mo_/nos a7_/xios lo_/gou phi_/los t toiou_/t1 o7s a7n1 o7mo_/ths 7_/n1 tau7ta pse_/gn kai e7painn1 e7the_/l a7_/rchesthai kai u7pokeisthai t a7_/rchonti4 ,ou7tos me_/ga e7n tau_/t t po_/lei dun_/setai1 touton ou7deis chai_/rn a7dik_/sei4 4 4 4 ,au7_/t o7do_/s e7stin1 eu7thus e7k ve_/ou e7thi_/zein au7ton tois au7tois chai_/rein kai a7_/chthesthtai t despo_/t1 kai paraskeua_/zein o7_/ps o7_/ ti ma_/lista o7_/moios e7_/stai e7kei_/n4 ,side-note3 ,danger of one who dissents from the public1 either for better or for worse4 ,kall4--,but if he does not liken himself to the despot1 the despot may put him to death1 if he chooses8 ,sokr4--,perhaps he may3 but it will be death inflicted by a bad man upon a good man4#ajd ,to prolong life is not the foremost consideration1 but to decide by rational thought what is the best way of passing that length of life which the ,fates allot4#aje ,is it my best plan to do as you recommend1 and to liken myself as much as possible to the ,athenian people--in order that ,i may become popular and may acquire power in the city8 ,for it will be impossible for you to acquire power in the city1 if you dissent from the prevalent political character and practice1 be it for the better or for the worse4 ,even imitation will not be sufficient3 you must be1 by natural disposition1 homogeneous with the ,athenians1 if you intend to acquire much favour with them4 ,whoever makes you most like to them1 will help you forward most towards becoming an effective statesman and speaker3 for every assembly delight in speeches suited to their own dispositions1 and reject speeches of an opposite tenor4#ajf ,footnote #ajd3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eaa ,b4 ,footnote #aje3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #eaa ,b1 #eab ,e4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eac ,a4 ,greek3 kai nun de a7_/ra dei se 7s o7moio_/taton gi_/gnesthai t dm t ,a7thnai_/n1 ei7 me_/lleis tou_/t prosphils ei7nai kai me_/ga du_/nasthai e7n t po_/lei4 4 4 4 ei7 de_/ soi oi7_/ei o7ntinoun a7nthr_/pn parad_/sein te_/chnn tina toiau_/tn1 7_/ ti_/s se poi_/sei me_/ga du_/nasthai e7n t po_/lei tde1 a7no_/moion o7_/nta t politei_/a ei7_/t' e7pi to be_/ltion ei7_/t' e7pi to cheiron1 ou7k o7rths bouleu_/ei2 ou7 gar mimtn dei ei7nai1 a7ll' au7tophus o7_/moion toou_/tois1 ei7 me_/lleis ti gn_/sion a7perga_/zesthai ei7s phili_/an t ,a7thnai_/n d_/m4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to study permanent good1 and not immediate satisfaction4 ,such are the essential conditions of political success and popularity4 ,but ,i1 ,kallikls1 have already distinguished two schemes of life2 one aiming at pleasure1 the other aiming at good3 one1 that of the statesman who studies the felt wants1 wishes1 and impulses of the people1 displaying his genius in providing for them effective satisfaction--the other1 the statesman who makes it his chief or sole object to amend the character and disposition of the people4 ,the last scheme is the only one which ,i approve3 and if it be that to which you invite me1 we must examine whether either you1 ,kallikles1 or ,i1 have ever yet succeeded in amending or improving the character of any individuals privately1 before we undertake the task of amending the citizens collectively4#ajg ,none of the past statesmen whom you extol1 ,miltiades1 ,kimon1 ,themistokles1 ,perikles1 has produced any such amendment4#ajh ,considered as ministers1 indeed1 they were skilful and effective2 better than the present statesmen4 ,they were successful in furnishing satisfaction to the prevalent wants and desires of the citizens3 they provided docks1 walls1 ships1 tribute1 and other such follies1 abundantly3#aji but they did nothing to amend the character of the people--to transfer the desires of the people from worse things to better things--or to create in them justice and temperance4 ,they thus did no real good by feeding the desires of the people3 no more good than would be done by a skilful cook for a sick man1 in cooking for him a sumptuous meal before the physician had cured him4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eae ,a4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #eaf1 #eag4 ,footnote #aji3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #eag1 #eai4 ,greek3 a7_/neu gar sphrosu_/ns kai dikaiosu_/ns lime_/nn kai neri_/n kai teichn kai pho_/rn kai toiou_/tn phluarin e7mpepl_/kasi tn po_/lin4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at ,athens1 who follows out the true political art4 ,danger of doing this4 ,i believe myself 7continues ,sokrates7 to be the only man in ,athens1--or certainly one among a very few1--who am a true statesman1 following out the genuine purposes of the political art4#aaj ,i aim at what is best for the people1 not at what is most agreeable4 ,i do not value those captivating accomplishments which tell in the ,dikastery4 ,if ,i am tried1 ,i shall be like a physician arraigned by the confectioner before a jury of children4 ,i shall not be able to refer to any pleasures provided for them by me3 pleasures which they call benefits1 but which ,i regard as worthless4 ,if any one accuses me of corrupting the youth by making them sceptical1 or of libelling the older men in my private and public talk--it will be in vain for me to justify myself by saying the real truth4--,dikasts1 ,i do and say all these things justly1 for your real benefit4 ,i shall not be believed when ,i say this1 and ,i have nothing else to say3 so that ,i do not know what sentence may be passed on me4#aaa ,my only refuge and defence will be1 the innocence of my life4 ,as for death1 no one except a fool or a coward fears that3 the real evil1 and the greatest of all evils1 is to pass into ,hades with a corrupt and polluted mind4#aab ,footnote #aaj3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eba ,d4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #eba-ebb4 ,footnote #aab3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ebb ,e4 ,greek3 au7to men gar to a7pothn_/skein ou7deis phobeitai1 o7_/stis m panta_/pasin a7lo_/gisto_/s te kai a7_/nandro_/s e7sti1 to de a7dikein phobeitai1 c4 ,side-note3 ,mythe respecting ,hades1 and the treatment of deceased persons therein1 according to their merits during life--the philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs1 will then be rewarded4 ,sokrates then winds up the dialogue1 by reciting a ,greek3 ,ne_/kuia1 a mythe or hypothesis about judgment in ,hades after death1 and rewards and punishments to be apportioned to deceased men1 according to their merits during life1 by ,rhadamanthus and ,minos4 ,the greatest sufferers by these judgments 7he says7 will be the kings1 despots1 and men politically powerful1 who have during their lives committed the greatest injustices1--which indeed few of them avoid4#aac ,the man most likely to fare well and to be rewarded1 will be the philosopher1 who has passed through life minding his own business1 and not meddling with the affairs of others4#aad ,footnote #aac3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 pp4 #ebe-ebf4 ,footnote #aad3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ebf ,c4 ,greek3 philoso_/phou ta au7tou pra_/xantos1 kai ou7 polupragmon_/santos e7n t bi_/4 ,it must be confessed that these terms do not correspond to the life of ,sokrates1 as he himself describes it in the ,platonic ,apology4 ,he seems to have fancied that no one was ,greek3 polupra_/gmn except those who spoke habitually in the ,ekklesia and the ,dikastery4 99 99 99 99 99 ,side-note3 ,peculiar ethical views of ,sokrates--,rhetorical or dogmatical character of the ,gorgias4 ,dicuntur ista magnifice1#aae--we may exclaim1 in ,ciceronian words1 on reaching the close of the ,gorgias4 ,it is pre-eminently solemn and impressive2 all the more so1 from the emphasis of ,sokrates1 when proclaiming the isolation in which he stands at ,athens1 and the contradiction between his ethico-political views and those of his fellow-citizens4 ,in this respect it harmonises with the ,apology1 the ,kriton1 ,republic1 and ,leges3 in all which1 the peculiarity of his ethical points of view stands proclaimed--especially in the ,kriton1 where he declares that his difference with his opponents is fundamental1 and that there can be between them no common ground for debate--nothing but reciprocal contempt4#aaf ,footnote #aae3 ,cicero1 ,de ,finib4 iii4 #c1 #aa4 ,footnote #aaf3 ,plato1 ,kriton1 p4 #di ,d4 ,side-note3 ,he merges politics in ,ethics--he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community4 ,the argument of ,sokrates in the ,gorgias is interesting1 not merely as extolling the value of ethical self-restraint1 but also as considering political phenomena under this point of view3 that is1 merging politics in ethics4 ,the proper and paramount function of statesmen 7we find it eloquently proclaimed7 is to serve as spiritual teachers in the community3 for the purpose of amending the lives and characters of the citizens1 and of converting them from bad dispositions to good4 ,we are admonished that until this is effected1 more is lost than gained by realising the actual wants and wishes of the community1 which are disorderly and distempered3 like the state of a sick man1 who would receive harm and not benefit from a sumptuous banquet4 ,side-note3 ,idal of ,plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer1 on scientific principles1 fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own4 ,this is the conception of ,plato in the ,gorgias1 speaking through the person of ,sokrates1 respecting the ends for which the political magistrate ought to employ his power4 ,the magistrate1 as administering law and justice1 is to the minds of the community what the trainer and the physician are to their bodies3 he produces goodness of mind1 as the two latter produce health and strength of body4 ,the ,platonic idal is that of a despotic law-giver and man-trainer1 wielding the compulsory force of the secular arm for what he believes to be spiritual improvement4 ,however instructive it is to study the manner in which a mind like that of ,plato works out such a purpose in theory1 there is no reason for regret that he never had an opportunity of carrying it into practice4 ,the manner in which he always keeps in view the standing mental character1 as an object of capital importance to be attended to1 and as the analogon of health in the body--deserves all esteem4 ,but when he assumes the sceptre of ,king ,nomos 7as in ,republic and ,leges7 to fix by unchangeable authority what shall be the orthodox type of character1 and to suppress all the varieties of emotion and intellect1 except such as will run into a few predetermined moulds--he oversteps all the reasonable aims and boundaries of the political office4 ,side-note3 ,platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference4 ,plato forgets two important points of difference1 in that favourite and very instructive analogy which he perpetually reproduces1 between mental goodness and bodily health4 ,first1 good health and strength of the body 7as ,i have observed already7 are states which every man knows when he has got them4 ,though there is much doubt and dispute about causes1 preservative1 destructive1 and restorative1 there is none about the present fact4 ,every sick man derives from his own sensations an anxiety to get well4 ,but virtue is not a point thus fixed1 undisputed1 indubitable3 it is differently conceived by different persons1 and must first be discovered and settled by a process of enquiry2 the ,platonic ,sokrates himself1 in many of the dialogues--after declaring that neither he nor any one else within his knowledge1 knows what it is--tries to find it out without success4 ,next1 the physician1 who is the person actively concerned in imparting health and strength1 exercises no coercive power over any one3 those who consult him have the option whether they will follow the advice given1 or not4 ,to put himself upon the same footing with the physician1 the political magistrate ought to confine himself to the function of advice2 a function highly useful1 but in which he will be called upon to meet argumentative opposition1 and frequent failure1 together with the mortification of leaving those whom he cannot convince1 to follow their own mode of life4 ,here are two material differences1 modifying the applicability of that very analogy on which ,plato so frequently rests his proof4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates in the ,gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits4 ,impossible that a dissenter1 on important points1 should acquire any public influence4 ,in ,plato's two imaginary commonwealths1 where he is himself despotic law-giver1 there would have been no tolerable existence possible for any one not shaped upon the ,platonic spiritual model4 ,but in the ,gorgias1 ,plato 7speaking in the person of ,sokrates7 is called upon to define his plan of life in a free state1 where he was merely a private citizen4 ,sokrates receives from ,kallikles the advice1 to forego philosophy and to aspire to the influence and celebrity of an active public speaker4 ,his reply is instructive1 as revealing the interior workings of every political society4 ,no man 7he says7 can find favour as an adviser--either of a despot1 where there is one1 or of a people where there is free government--unless he be in harmony with the sentiments and ideas prevalent1 either with the ruling ,many or the ruling ,one4 ,he must be moulded1 from youth upwards1 on the same spiritual pattern as they are3#aag his love and hate1 his praise and blame1 must turn towards the same things3 he must have the same tastes1 the same morality1 the same idal1 as theirs3 he must be no imitator1 but a chip of the same block4 ,if he be either better than they or worse than they1#aah he will fail in acquiring popularity1 and his efforts as a competitor for public influence will be not only abortive1 but perhaps dangerous to himself4 ,footnote #aag3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eaj ,c-,d4 ,greek3 o7mo_/ths 7_/n1 tau7ta pse_/gn kai e7painn t a7_/rchonti4 4 4 4 eu7thus e7k ne_/ou e7thi_/zein au7ton tois au7tois chai_/rein kai a7_/chthesthai t despo_/t1 kai paraskeua_/zein o7_/ps o7_/ ti ma_/lista o7_/moios e7_/stai e7kei_/n4 #eac ,b3 ,greek3 ou7 mimtn dei ei7nai a7ll' au7tophus o7_/moion tou_/tois4 ,footnote #aah3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #eac ,a4 ,greek3 ei7_/t' e7pi to be_/ltion ei7_/t' e7pi to cheiron4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen4 ,he is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic4 ,the reasons which ,sokrates gives here 7as well as in the ,apology1 and partly also in the ,republic7 for not embarking in the competition of political aspirants1 are of very general application4 ,he is an innovator in religion2 and a dissenter from the received ethics1 politics1 social sentiment1 and estimate of life and conduct4#aai ,whoever dissents upon these matters from the governing force 7in whatever hands that may happen to reside7 has no chance of being listened to as a political counsellor1 and may think himself fortunate if he escapes without personal hurt or loss4 ,whether his dissent be for the better or for the worse1 is a matter of little moment3 the ruling body always think it worse1 and the consequences to the dissenter are the same4 ,footnote #aai3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #ebb ,b2 ,thettus1 p4 #agi2 ,menon1 p4 #gi4 ,side-note3 ,antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric4 ,herein consists the real antithesis between ,sokrates1 ,plato1 and philosophy1 on the one side--,perikles1 ,nikias1 ,kleon1 ,demosthenes1 and rhetoric1 on the other4 ,you1 7says ,sokrates to ,kallikls71#abj are in love with the ,athenian people1 and take up or renounce such opinions as they approve or discountenance3 ,i am in love with philosophy1 and follow her guidance4 ,you and other active politicians do not wish to have more than a smattering of philosophy2 you are afraid of becoming unconsciously corrupted1 if you carry it beyond such elementary stage4#aba ,each of these orators1 discussing political measures before the public assembly1 appealed to general maxims borrowed from the received creed of morality1 religion1 taste1 politics1 c4 ,his success depended mainly on the emphasis which his eloquence could lend to such maxims1 and on the skill with which he could apply them to the case in hand4 ,but ,sokrates could not follow such an example4 ,anxious in his research after truth1 he applied the test of analysis to the prevalent opinions--found them1 in his judgment1 neither consistent nor rational--constrained many persons to feel this1 by an humiliating cross-examination--but became disqualified from addressing1 with any chance of assent1 the assembled public4 ,footnote #abj3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p1 #dha ,e4 ,footnote #aba3 ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhg ,c4 ,greek3 e7ni_/ka e7s u7min toia_/de tis do_/xa1 m prothumeisthai ei7s tn a7kribei_/an philosophein1 a7lla eu7labeisthai4 4 4 4 o7_/ps m pe_/ra tou de_/ontos soph_/teroi geno_/menoi l_/sete diaphthare_/ntes4 ,the view here advocated by ,kallikles3--,that philosophy is good and useful1 to be studied up to a point in the earlier years of life1 in order to qualify persons for effective discharge of the duties of active citizenship1 but that it ought not to be made the main occupation of mature life1 nor be prosecuted up to the pitch of accurate theorising3 this view1 since ,plato here assigns it to ,kallikles1 is denounced by most of the ,platonic critics as if it were low and worthless4 ,yet it was held by many of the most respectable citizens of antiquity2 and the question is1 in point of fact1 that which has always been in debate between the life of theoretical speculation and the life of action4 ,isokrates urges the same view both in ,orat4 xv4 ,de ,permutatione1 sect4 #bhb-bhg1 pp4 #dhe-dhf1 ,bekker2 and ,orat4 xii4 ,panathenaic4 sect4 #bi-cb1 p4 #cba1 ,bekker4 ,greek3 diatri_/psai men ou7n peri tas paidei_/as tau_/tas chro_/non tina sumbouleu_/saim' a7n tois nete_/rois1 m me_/ntoi periidein tn phu_/sin tn au7tn kataskeleteutheisan e7pi tou_/tois1 c4 ,cicero quotes a similar opinion put by ,ennius the poet into the mouth of ,neoptolemus1 ,tusc4 ,d4 ii4 #a1 #a2 ,aulus ,gell4 v4 #af--;degustandum ex philosophi censet1 non in eam ingurgitandum4 ,tacitus1 in describing the education of ,agricola1 who was taken by his mother in his earlier years to study at ,massilia1 says1 c4 #d3--,memori teneo1 solitum ipsum narrare1 se in prim juvent studium philosophi1 ultra quam concessum ,romano et senatori1 hausisse2 ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum coercuisset4 ,i have already cited this last passage1 and commented upon the same point1 in my notes at the end of the ,euthydmus1 p4 #bcj4 ,side-note3 ,position of one who dissents1 upon material points1 from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen4 ,that in order to succeed politically1 a man must be a genuine believer in the creed of ,king ,nomos or the ruling force--cast in the same spiritual mould--7,i here take the word creed not as confined to religion1 but as embracing the whole of a man's critical idal1 on moral or social practice1 politics1 or taste--the ends which he deems worthy of being aspired to1 or proper to be shunned1 by himself or others7 is laid down by ,sokrates as a general position3 and with perfect truth4 ,in disposing of the force or influence of government1 whoever possesses that force will use it conformably to his own maxims4 ,a man who dissents from these maxims will find no favour in the public assembly2 nor1 probably1 if his dissent be grave and wide1 will he ever be able to speak out his convictions aloud in it1 without incurring dangerous antipathy4 ,but what is to become of such a dissenter#abb--the man who frequents the same porticos with the people1 but does not hold the same creed1 nor share their judgments respecting social expetenda and fugienda8 ,how is he to be treated by the government1 or by the orthodox majority of society in their individual capacity8 ,debarred1 by the necessity of the case1 from influence over the public councils--what latitude of pursuit1 profession1 or conduct1 is to be left to him as a citizen8 ,how far is he to question1 or expose1 or require to be proved1 that which the majority believe without proof8 ,shall he be required to profess1 or to obey1 or to refrain from contradicting1 religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined and rejected8 ,shall such requirement be enforced by threat of legal penalties1 or of ill-treatment from individuals1 which is not less intolerable than legal penalties8 ,what is likely to be his character1 if compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed1 and to act and speak as if he were believer in another8 ,footnote #abb3 ,horat4 ,epist4 i4 #a1 #gj-- ,quod si me populus ,romanus fort roget1 cur ,non ut porticibus1 sic judiciis fruar iisdem1 ,nec sequar aut fugiam qu diligit ipse vel odit3 ,olim quod vulpes groto cauta leoni ,respondit1 referam3 ,quia me vestigia terrent ,omnia te adversum spectantia1 nulla retrorsum4 ,side-note3 ,probable feelings of ,plato on this subject4 ,claim put forward in the ,gorgias of an independent locus standi for philosophy1 but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by ,sokrates4 ,the questions here suggested must have impressed themselves forcibly on the mind of ,plato when he recollected the fate of ,sokrates4 ,in spite of a blameless life1 ,sokrates had been judicially condemned and executed for publicly questioning received opinions1 innovating upon the established religion1 and instilling into young persons habits of doubt4 ,to dissent only for the better1 afforded no assurance of safety3 and ,plato knew well that his own dissent from the ,athenian public was even wider and more systematic than that of his master4 ,the position and plan of life for an active-minded reasoner1 dissenting from the established opinions of the public1 could not but be an object of interesting reflection to him4#abc ,the ,gorgias 7written1 in my judgment1 long after the death of ,sokrates1 probably after the ,platonic school was established7 announces the vocation of the philosopher1 and claims an open field for speculation1 apart from the actualities of politics--for the self-acting reason of the individual doubter and investigator1 against the authority of numbers and the pressure of inherited tradition4 ,a formal assertion to this effect was worthy of the founder of the ,academy--the earliest philosophical school at ,athens4 ,yet we may observe that while the ,platonic ,sokrates in the ,gorgias adopts the life of philosophy1 he does not renew that farther demand with which the historical ,sokrates had coupled it in his ,apology--the liberty of oral and aggressive cross-examination1 addressed to individuals personally and indiscriminately#abd--to the primores populi as well as to the populum tributim4 ,the fate of ,sokrates rendered ,plato more cautious1 and induced him to utter his ethical interrogations and novelties of opinion in no other way except that of lectures to chosen hearers and written dialogue3 borrowing the name of ,sokrates or some other speaker1 and refraining upon system 7as his letters#abe tell us that he did7 from publishing any doctrines in his own name4 ,footnote #abc3 ,i have already referred to the treatise of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill ,on ,liberty1 where this important topic is discussed in a manner equally profound and enlightened4 ,the co-existence of individual reasoners enquiring and philosophising for themselves1 with the fixed opinions of the majority1 is one of the main conditions which distinguish a progressive from a stationary community4 ,footnote #abd3 ,plat4 ,apol4 ,sokr4 pp4 #ba-bb-bc-bh ,e4 ,greek3 tou de theou ta_/ttontos1 7s e7g 7_/thn te kai u7pe_/labon1 philophounta me dein zn kai e7xeta_/zonta e7mauto_/n te kai tous a7_/llous1 c4 ,footnote #abe3 ,plat4 ,epist4 ii4 #cad ,b4 ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann 7,ueber ,platon's ,schriftstellerische ,motive1 p4 #bij7 treats any such prudential discretion1 in respect to the form and mode of putting forward unpopular opinions1 as unworthy of ,plato1 and worthy only of ,protagoras and other ,sophists4 ,i dissent from this opinion altogether4 ,we know that ,protagoras was very circumspect as to form 7,timon ap4 ,sext4 ,emp4 adv4 ,mathemat4 ix4 s4 #eg72 but the passage of ,plato cited by ,hermann does not prove it4 ,side-note3 ,importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion4 ,tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance4 ,as a man dissenting from received opinions1 ,sokrates had his path marked out in the field of philosophy or individual speculation4 ,to such a mind as his1 the fullest liberty ought to be left1 of professing and defending his own opinions1 as well as of combating other opinions1 accredited or not1 which he may consider false or uncertified4#abf ,the public guidance of the state thus falls to one class of minds1 the activity of speculative discussion to another2 though accident may produce1 here and there1 a superior individual1 comprehensive or dexterous enough to suffice for both4 ,but the main desideratum is that this freedom of discussion should exist3 that room shall be made1 and encouragement held out1 to the claims of individual reason1 and to the full publication of all doubts or opinions1 be they what they may3 that the natural tendency of all ruling force1 whether in few or in many hands1 to perpetuate their own dogmas by proscribing or silencing all heretics and questioners1 may be neutralised as far as possible4 ,the great expansive vigour of the ,greek mind--the sympathy felt among the best varieties of ,greeks for intellectual superiority in all its forms--and the privilege of free speech 7,greek3 par7r7si_/a71 on which the democratical citizens of ,athens prided themselves--did in fact neutralise very considerably these tendencies in ,athens4 ,a greater and more durable liberty of philosophising was procured for ,athens1 and through ,athens for ,greece generally1 than had ever been known before in the history of mankind4 ,footnote #abf3 ,so ,sokrates also says in the ,platonic ,apology1 pp4 #ca-cb4 ,greek3 ,ou7 gar e7_/stin o7_/stis a7nthr_/pn sth_/setai ou7_/te u7min ou7_/te a7_/ll pl_/thei ou7deni gnsi_/s e7nantiou_/menos1 kai diaklu_/n polla a7_/dika kai para_/noma e7n t po_/lei gi_/gnesthai2 a7ll' a7nagkaio_/n e7sti ton t o7_/nti machou_/menon u7per tou dikai_/ou1 kai ei7 me_/llei o7li_/gon chro_/non sth_/sesthai1 i7diteu_/ein a7lla m dmosieu_/ein4 ,the reader will find the speculative individuality of ,sokrates illustrated in the sixty-eighth chapter of my ,history of ,greece4 ,the antithesis of the philosophising or speculative life1 against the rhetorical1 political1 forensic life--which is put so much to the advantage of the former by ,plato in the ,gorgias1 ,thettus 7p4 #agc1 seq471 and elsewhere was the theme of ,cicero's lost dialogue called ,hortensius3 wherein ,hortensius was introduced pleading the cause against philosophy1 7see ,orelli1 ,fragm4 ,ciceron4 pp4 #dgi-dhj71 while the other speakers were provided by ,cicero with arguments mainly in defence of philosophy1 partly also against rhetoric4 ,the competition between the teachers of rhetoric and the teachers of philosophy continued to be not merely animated but bitter1 from ,plato downward throughout the ,ciceronian age4 7,cicero1 ,de ,orat4 i4 #de-df-dg-ge1 c47 ,we read in the treatise of ,plutarch against the ,epikurean ,koltes1 an acrimonious invective against ,epikurus and his followers1 for recommending a scheme of life such as to withdraw men from active political functions 7,plutarch1 adv4 ,kolt4 pp4 #aabe ,c1 #aabg-aabh72 the like also in his other treatise1 ,non ,posse ,suaviter ,vivi secundum ,epicurum4 ,but ,plutarch at the same time speaks as if ,epikurus were the only philosopher who had recommended this1 and as if all the other philosophers had recommended an active life2 nay1 he talks of ,plato among the philosophers actively engaged in practical reformatory legislation1 through ,dion and the pupils of the ,academy 7p4 #aabf1 ,b1 ,c74 ,here ,plutarch mistakes3 the ,platonic tendencies were quite different from what he supposes4 ,the ,gorgias and ,thettus enforce upon the philosopher a life quite apart from politics1 pursuing his own course1 and not meddling with others--,greek3 philoso_/phou ta au7tou pra_/xantos kai ou7 polupragmon_/santos e7n t bi_/ 7,gorg4 #ebf ,c72 which is the same advice as ,epikurus gave4 ,it is set forth eloquently in the poetry of ,lucretius1 but it had been set forth previously1 not less eloquently1 in the rhetoric of ,plato4 ,side-note3 ,issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily handled by ,plato4 ,injustice done to rhetoric4 ,ignoble manner in which it is presented by ,polus and ,kallikls4 ,this antithesis of the philosophical life to the rhetorical or political1 constitutes one of the most interesting features of the ,platonic ,gorgias4 ,but when we follow the pleadings upon which ,plato rests this grand issue1 and the line which he draws between the two functions1 we find much that is unsatisfactory4 ,since ,plato himself pleads both sides of the case1 he is bound in fairness to set forth the case which he attacks 7that of rhetoric71 as it would be put by competent and honourable advocates--by ,perikles1 for example1 or ,demosthenes1 or ,isokrates1 or ,quintilian4 ,he does this1 to a certain extent1 in the first part of the dialogue1 carried on by ,sokrates with ,gorgias4 ,but in the succeeding portions--carried on with ,plus and ,kallikls1 and occupying three-fourths of the whole--he alters the character of the defence1 and merges it in ethical theories which ,perikles1 had he been the defender1 would not only have put aside as misplaced1 but disavowed as untrue4 ,perikles would have listened with mixed surprise and anger1 if he had heard any one utter the monstrous assertion which ,plato puts into the mouth of ,polus--,that rhetors1 like despots1 kill1 impoverish1 or expel any citizen at their pleasure4 ,though ,perikles was the most powerful of all ,athenian rhetors1 yet he had to contend all his life against fierce opposition from others1 and was even fined during his last years4 ,he would hardly have understood how an ,athenian citizen could have made any assertion so completely falsified by all the history of ,athens1 respecting the omnipotence of the rhetors4 ,again1 if he had heard ,kallikls proclaiming that the strong giant had a natural right to satiate all his desires at the cost of the weaker ,many--and that these latter sinned against ,nature when they took precautions to prevent him--,perikles would have protested against the proclamation as emphatically as ,plato4#abg ,footnote #abg3 ,perikles might indeed have referred to his own panegyrical oration in ,thucydides1 ii4 #cg4 ,side-note3 ,perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric1 as ,plato has put it into the mouth of ,gorgias4 ,if we suppose ,perikles to have undertaken the defence of the rhetorical element at ,athens1 against the dialectic element represented by ,sokrates1 he would have accepted it1 though not a position of his own choosing1 on the footing on which ,plato places it in the mouth of ,gorgias3 ,rhetoric is an engine of persuasion addressed to numerous assembled auditors3 it ensures freedom to the city 7through the free exercise of such a gift by many competing orators7 and political ascendency or command to the ablest rhetor4 ,it thus confers great power on him who possesses it in the highest measure3 but he ought by no means to employ that power for unjust purposes4 ,it is very probable that ,perikles might have recommended rhetorical study to ,sokrates1 as a means of defending himself against unjust accusations1 and of acquiring a certain measure of influence on public affairs4#abh ,but he would have distinguished carefully 7as ,horace does7 between defending yourself against unjust attacks1 and making unjust attacks upon others3 though the same weapon may suit for both4 ,footnote #abh3 ,horat4 ,satir4 ii4 #a1 #ci-- ,hic stilus haud petet ultro ,quemquam animantem2 et me veluti custodiet ensis ,vagin tectus2 quem cur destringere coner1 ,tutus ab infestis latronibus8 ,oh pater et rex ,jupiter6 ut pereat positum rubigine telum1 ,nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis6 ,at ille ,qui me commrit 7melius non tangere6 clamo7 ,flebit1 et insignis tot cantabitur urbe4 ,we need only read the ,memorabilia of ,xenophon 7ii4 #i71 to see that the historical ,sokrates judged of these matters differently from the ,platonic ,sokrates of the ,gorgias4 ,kriton complained to ,sokrates that life was difficult at ,athens for a quiet man who wished only to mind his own business 7,greek3 ta e7autou pra_/ttein72 because there were persons who brought unjust actions at law against him1 for the purpose of extorting money to buy them off4 ,the ,platonic ,sokrates of the ,gorgias would have replied to him3 ,never mind3 you are just1 and these assailants are unjust3 they are by their own conduct entailing upon themselves a terrible distemper1 from which1 if you leave them unpunished1 they will suffer all their lives3 they injure themselves more than they injure you4 ,but the historical ,sokrates in ,xenophon replies in quite another spirit4 ,he advises ,kriton to look out for a clever and active friend1 to attach this person to his interest by attention and favours1 and to trust to him for keeping off the assailants4 ,accordingly1 a poor but energetic man named ,archedemus is found1 who takes ,kriton's part against the assailants1 and even brings counterattacks against them1 which force them to leave ,kriton alone1 and to give money to ,archedemus himself4 ,the advice given by the ,xenophontic ,sokrates to ,kriton is the same in principle as the advice given by ,kallikles to the ,platonic ,sokrates4 ,side-note3 ,the ,athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the good3 but not the same as that which ,plato conceived4 ,farther1 neither ,perikles1 nor any defender of free speech1 would assent to the definition of rhetoric--,that it is a branch of the art of flattery1 studying the immediately pleasurable1 and disregarding the good4#abi ,this indeed represents ,plato's own sentiment1 and was true in the sense which the ,platonic ,sokrates assigns 7in the ,gorgias1 though not in the ,protagoras7 to the words good and evil4 ,but it is not true in the sense which the ,athenian people and the ,athenian public men assigned to those words4 ,both the one and the other used the words pleasurable and good as familiarly as ,plato1 and had sentiments corresponding to both of them4 ,the pleasurable and painful referred to present and temporary causes3 the ,good and ,evil to prospective causes and permanent situations1 involving security against indefinite future suffering1 combined with love of national dignity and repugnance to degradation1 as well as with a strong sense of common interests and common obligations to each other4 ,to provide satisfaction for these common patriotic feelings--to sustain the dignity of the city by effective and even imposing public establishments1 against foreign enemies--to protect the individual rights of citizens by an equitable administration of justice--counted in the view of the ,athenians as objects good and honourable3 while the efforts and sacrifices necessary for these permanent ends1 were1 so far as they went1 a renunciation of what they would call the pleasurable4 ,when1 at the beginning of the ,peloponnesian war1 the ,athenians1 acting on the advice of ,perikles1 allowed all ,attica to be ravaged1 and submitted to the distress of cooping the whole population within the long walls1 rather than purchase peace by abnegating their ,hellenic dignity1 independence1 and security--they not only renounced much that was pleasurable1 but endured great immediate distress1 for the sake of what they regarded as a permanent good4#acj ,eighty years afterwards1 when ,demosthenes pointed out to them the growing power and encroachments of the ,macedonian ,philip1 and exhorted them to the efforts requisite for keeping back that formidable enemy1 while there was yet time--they could not be wound up to the pitch requisite for affronting so serious an amount of danger and suffering4 ,they had lost that sense of ,hellenic dignity1 and that association of self-respect with active personal soldiership and sailorship1 which rendered submission to an enemy the most intolerable of all pains1 at the time when ,perikles had addressed them4 ,they shut their eyes to an impending danger1 which ultimately proved their ruin4 ,on both these occasions1 we have the pleasurable and the good brought into contrast in the ,athenian mind2 in both we have the two most eminent orators of ,grecian antiquity enforcing the good in opposition to the pleasurable3 the first successfully1 the last vainly1 in opposition to other orators4 ,footnote #abi3 ,the reply composed by the rhetor ,aristeides to the ,gorgias of ,plato is well deserving of perusal1 though 7like all his compositions7 it is very prolix and wordy4 ,see ,aristeides1 ,orationes xlv4 and xlvi4--,greek3 ,perei ,r7toriks1 and ,greek3 ,u7per tn ,tetta_/rn4 ,in the last of the two orations he defends the four eminent ,athenians 7,miltiades1 ,themistokls1 ,perikls1 ,kimon7 whom ,plato disparages in the ,gorgias4 ,aristeides insists forcibly on the partial and narrow view here taken by ,plato of persuasion1 as a working force both for establishing laws and carrying on government4 ,he remarks truly that there are only two forces between which the choice must be made1 intimidation and persuasion3 that the substitution of persuasion in place of force is the great improvement which has made public and private life worth having 7,greek3 mo_/n biton 7min pepoi_/ke ton bi_/on1 ,orat4 xlv4 p4 #fd1 ,dindorf72 that neither laws could be discussed and passed1 nor judicial trial held under them1 without ,greek3 r7torik as the engine of persuasion 7pp4 #ff-fg-acf72 that ,plato in attacking ,rhetoric had no right to single out despots and violent conspirators as illustrations of it--,greek3 ei7t' e7le_/gchein men bou_/letai tn r7torik_/n1 katgorei de tn tura_/nnn kai dunastn1 ta a7_/mikta mignu_/s--ti_/s gar ou7k oi7den1 o7_/ti r7torik kai turannis tosouton a7ll_/ln kechri_/stai1 o7_/son to pei_/thein tou bia_/zesthai 7p4 #ii74 ,he impugns the distinction which ,plato has drawn between ,greek3 i7atrik_/1 gumnastik_/1 kuberntik_/1 nomothetik_/1 c41 on the one side1 which ,plato calls ,greek3 te_/chnai1 arts or sciences1 and affirms to rest on scientific principles--and ,greek3 r7torik_/1 mageirik_/1 c41 on the other side1 which ,plato affirms to be only guess work or groping1 resting on empirical analogies4 ,aristeides says that ,greek3 i7atrik and ,greek3 r7torik are in this respect both on a par2 that both are partly reducible to rule1 but partly also driven by necessity to conjectures and analogies1 and the physician not less than the rhetor 7pp4 #de-dh-di72 which the ,platonic ,sokrates himself affirms in another dialogue1 ,philbus1 p4 #ef ,a4 ,the most curious part of the argument of ,aristeides is where he disputes the prerogative which ,plato had claimed for ,greek3 i7atrik_/1 gumnastik_/ c41 on the ground of their being arts or reducible to rules4 ,the effects of human art 7says ,aristeides7 are much inferior to those of ,greek3 thei_/a moira or divine inspiration4 ,many patients are cured of disease by human art2 but many more are cured by the responses and directions of the ,delphian oracle1 by the suggestion of dreams1 and by other varieties of the divine prompting1 delivered through the ,pythian priestess1 a woman altogether ignorant 7p4 #aa74 ,greek3 kai_/toi mikra men 7 pa_/ntas ei7duia lo_/gous i7atrik pros tas e7k ,delphn du_/natai lu_/seis1 o7_/sai kai i7di_/a kai koin kai no_/sn kai pathma_/tn a7pantn a7nthrpi_/nn e7pha_/nthsan4 ,patients who are cured in this way by the ,gods without medical art1 acquire a natural impulse which leads them to the appropriate remedy--,greek3 e7pithumi_/a au7tous a7_/gei e7pi to o7_/nson 7p4 #bj74 ,aristeides says that he can himself depose--from his own personal experience as a sick man seeking cure1 and from personal knowledge of many other such--how much more efficacious in healing is aid from the ,gods1 given in dreams and other ways1 than advice from physicians2 who might well shudder when they heard the stories which he could tell 7pp4 #ba-bb74 ,to undervalue science and art 7he says7 is the principle from which men start1 when they flee to the ,gods for help--,greek3 tou kataphugein e7pi tous theous schedon a7rch_/1 to ts te_/chns u7peridein e7_/stin4 ,footnote #acj3 ,nothing can be more at variance with the doctrine which ,plato assigns to ,kallikls in the ,gorgias1 than the three memorable speeches of ,perikles in ,thucydides1 i4 #add1 ii4 #ce1 ii4 #fj1 seq4 ,all these speeches are penetrated with the deepest sense of that ,greek3 koinni_/a and ,greek3 phili_/a which the ,platonic ,sokrates extols3 not one of them countenances ,greek3 pleonexi_/an1 which the ,platonic ,sokrates forbids 7,gorg4 #ejh ,e74 ,greek3 ,to prostalaiprein t do_/xanti kal 7to use the expressive phrase of ,thucydides1 ii4 #ec7 was a remarkable feature in the character of the ,athenians of that day3 it was subdued for the moment by the overwhelming misery of pestilence and war combined4 ,side-note3 ,rhetoric was employed at ,athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions4 ,erroneous inferences raised by the ,kallikls of ,plato4 ,lastly1 it is not merely the political power of the ,athenians that ,perikles employs his eloquence to uphold4 ,he dwells also with emphasis on the elegance of taste1 on the intellectual force and activity1 which warranted him in decorating the city with the title of ,preceptress of ,hellas4#aca ,all this belongs1 not to the pleasurable as distinguished from the good1 but to good 7whether immediately pleasurable or not7 in its most comprehensive sense1 embracing the improvement and refinement of the collective mind4 ,if ,perikles1 in this remarkable funeral harangue1 flattered the sentiments of the people--as he doubtless did--he flattered them by kindling their aspirations towards good4 ,and ,plato himself does the same 7though less nobly and powerfully71 adopting the received framework of ,athenian sentiment1 in his dialogue called ,menexenus1 which we shall come to in a future chapter4 ,footnote #aca3 ,thucyd4 ii4 #da-db4 ,greek3 xunel_/n te le_/g t_/n te pasan po_/lin ts ,e7lla_/dos pai_/deusin ei7nai1 c4 ,side-note3 ,the ,platonic ,idal exacts1 as good1 some order1 system1 discipline4 ,but order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good4 ,divergent ideas about virtue4 ,the issue1 therefore1 which ,plato here takes against ,rhetoric1 must stand or fall with the ,platonic ,idal of ,good and ,evil4 ,but when he thus denounces both the general public and the most patriotic rhetors1 to ensure exclusive worship for his own ,idal of ,good--we may at least require that he shall explain1 wherein consists that ,good--by what mark it is distinguishable--and on what authority pre-eminence is claimed for it4 ,so far1 indeed1 we advance by the help of ,plato's similes#acb--order1 discipline1 health and strength of body--that we are called upon to recognise1 apart from all particular moments of enjoyment or suffering1 of action or quiescence1 a certain permanent mental condition and habit--a certain order1 regulation1 discipline--as an object of high importance to be attained4 ,this 7as ,i have before remarked7 is a valuable idea which pervades1 in one form or another1 all the ,hellenic social views1 from ,sokrates downward1 and even before ,sokrates2 an idea1 moreover1 which was common to ,peripatetics1 ,stoics1 ,epikureans4 ,but mental order and discipline is not in itself an end3 it may be differently cast1 and may subserve many different purposes4 ,the ,pythagorean brotherhood was intensely restrictive in its canons4 ,the ,spartan system exhibited the strictest order and discipline--an assemblage of principles and habits predetermined by authority and enforced upon all--yet neither ,plato nor ,aristotle approve of its results4 ,order and discipline attained full perfection in the armies of ,julius ,caesar and the ,french ,emperor ,napoleon2 in the middle ages1 also1 several of the monastic orders stood high in respect to finished discipline pervading the whole character3 and the ,jesuits stood higher than any4 ,each of these systems has included terms equivalent to justice1 temperance1 virtue1 vice1 c41 with sentiments associated therewith1 yet very different from what ,plato would have approved4 ,the question--,what is ,virtue8--,vir bonus est quis8--will be answered differently in each4 ,the ,spartans--when they entrapped 7by a delusive pretence of liberation and military decoration7 two thousand of their bravest ,helot warriors1 and took them off by private assassinations1#acc--;did not offend against their own idea of virtue1 or against the ,platonic exigency of ,order--,measure--,system4 ,footnote #acb3 ,plat4 ,gorg4 p4 #ejd4 ,footnote #acc3 ,thucydid4 iv4 #hj4 ,side-note3 ,how to discriminate the right order from the wrong4 ,plato does not advise us4 ,it is therefore altogether unsatisfactory1 when ,plato--professing to teach us how to determine scientifically1 which pleasures are bad1 and which pains are good--refers to a durable mental order and discipline4 ,of such order there existed historically many varieties2 and many more are conceivable1 as ,plato himself has shown in the ,republic and ,leges4 ,by what tests is the right order to be distinguished from the wrong8 ,if by its results1 by what results8--calculations for minimising pains1 and maximising pleasures1 being excluded by the supposition8 ,here the ,sokrates of the ,gorgias is at fault4 ,he has not told us by what scientific test the intelligent ,expert proceeds in determining what pleasures are bad1 and what pains are good4 ,he leaves such determination to the unscientific sentiment of each society and each individual4 ,he has not1 in fact1 responded to the clear and pertinent challenge thrown out by the ,sokrates of the ,protagoras4 ,side-note3 ,the ,gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher4 ,i think1 for these reasons1 that the logic of the ,gorgias is not at all on a par with its eloquence4 ,but there is one peculiar feature which distinguishes it among all the ,platonic dialogues4 ,nowhere in ancient literature is the title1 position1 and dignity of individual dissenting opinion1 ethical and political--against established ethical and political orthodoxy--so clearly marked out and so boldly asserted4 ,the ,athenians will judge as they think right3 none but those speakers who are in harmony with them1 have any chance of addressing their public assemblies with effect1 and acquiring political influence4 ,i1 ,sokrates1 dissent from them1 and have no chance of political influence3 but ,i claim the right of following out1 proclaiming1 and defending1 the conclusions of my own individual reason1 until debate satisfies me that ,i am wrong4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,ph,,don4 ,side-note3 ,the ,phdon is affirmative and expository4 ,the ,phdon is characterised by ,proklus as a dialogue wherein ,sokrates unfolds fully his own mental history1 and communicates to his admirers the complete range of philosophical cognition4#a ,this criticism is partly well founded4 ,the dialogue generally is among the most affirmative and expository in the ,platonic list4 ,sokrates undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul1 delivers the various reasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction1 and confutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others4 ,in regard to the exposition1 however1 we must consider ourselves as listening to ,plato under the name of ,sokrates3 and we find it so conducted as to specify both certain stages through which the mind of ,plato had passed1 and the logical process which 7at that time7 appeared to him to carry conviction4 ,footnote #a3 ,proklus1 in ,platon4 ,republ4 p4 #cib4 ,greek3 e7n ,phai_/dni men gar o7_/pou diaphero_/nts o7 ,skra_/ts tn e7autou zn a7naploi1 kai pan to ts e7pist_/ms plthos a7noi_/gei tois e7autou zltais1 c4 ,wyttenbach thinks 7note1 ad p4 #ajh ,e7 that ,plato was young when he composed the ,phdon4 ,but no sufficient grounds are given for this3 and the concluding sentence of the dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years after the death of ,sokrates--,greek3 7_/de 7 teleut_/1 7 ,e7che_/krates1 tou e7tai_/rou 7min e7ge_/neto1 a7ndro_/s1 7s 7meis phaimen a7_/n1 tn to_/te 7n e7peira_/thmen a7ri_/stou1 kai a7_/lls phronimta_/tou kai dikaiota_/tou4 ,the phrase ,greek3 tn to_/te which may probably have slipped unconsciously from ,plato1 implies that ,sokrates belonged to the past generation4 ,the beginning of the dialogue undoubtedly shows that ,plato intended to place it shortly after the death of ,sokrates2 but the word ,greek3 to_/te at the end is inconsistent with this supposition1 and comes out unconsciously as a mark of the real time4 ,side-note3 ,situation and circumstances assumed in the ,phdon4 ,pathetic interest which they inspire4 ,the interest felt by most readers in the ,phdon1 however1 depends1 not so much on the argumentative exposition 7which ,wyttenbach#b justly pronounces to be obscure and difficult as well as unsatisfactory7 as on the personality of the expounding speaker1 and the irresistible pathos of the situation4 ,sokrates had been condemned to death by the ,dikastery on the day after the sacred ship1 memorable in connection with the legendary voyage of ,theseus to ,krete1 had been dispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island of ,delos4 ,the ,athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded from putting any one to death by public authority1 during the absence of the ship on this mission4 ,thirty days elapsed between her departure and her return3 during all which interval1 ,sokrates remained in the prison1 yet with full permission to his friends to visit him4 ,they passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his conversation4#c ,in the ,phdon1 we read the last of these conversations1 after the sacred vessel had returned1 and after the ,eleven magistrates had announced to ,sokrates that the draught of hemlock would be administered to him before sunset4 ,on communicating this intelligence1 the magistrates released ,sokrates from the fetters with which he had hitherto been bound4 ,it is shortly after such release that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last time4 ,one of the number1 ,phdon1 recounts to ,echekrats not only the conduct and discourse of ,sokrates during the closing hours of his life1 but also the swallowing of the poison1 and the manner of his death4 ,footnote #b3 ,see the ,prolegomena prefixed to ,wyttenbach's edition of the ,phdon1 p4 xxi4 p4 #aj4 ,footnote #c3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #eh-ej4 ,it appears that ,kriton became bail before the ,dikasts1 in a certain sum of money1 that ,sokrates should remain in prison and not escape 7,plat4 ,phdon1 p4 #aae ,d2 ,kriton1 #de ,b74 ,kriton would have been obliged to pay this money if ,sokrates had accepted his proposition to escape1 noticed already in chap4 x4 ,side-note3 ,simmias and ,kebs1 the two collocutors with ,sokrates4 ,their feelings and those of ,sokrates4 ,more than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at this last scene3 but the only two who take an active part in the debate1 are1 two young ,thebans named ,kebs and ,simmias4#d ,these friends1 though deeply attached to ,sokrates1 and full of sorrow at the irreparable loss impending over them1 are represented as overawed and fascinated by his perfect fearlessness1 serenity and dignity4#e ,they are ashamed to give vent to their grief1 when their master is seen to maintain his ordinary frame of mind1 neither disquieted nor dissatisfied4 ,the fundamental conception of the dialogue is1 to represent ,sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial2 unmoved by the situation--not feeling that any misfortune is about to happen to him--equally delighting in intellectual debate--equally fertile in dialectic invention4 ,so much does he care for debate1 and so little for the impending catastrophe1 that he persists in a great argumentative effort1 notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by ,kriton from the gaoler1 that if he heated himself with talking1 the poison might perhaps be languid in its operation1 so that two or three draughts of it would be necessary instead of one4#f ,sokrates even advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit rather than a misfortune1 and that every true philosopher ought to prefer death to life1 assuming it to supervene without his own act--suicide being forbidden by the ,gods4 ,he is represented as placidus ore1 intrepidus verbis2 intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens--to borrow a phrase from ,tacitus's striking picture of the last hours of the ,emperor ,otho4#g ,to see him thus undisturbed1 and even welcoming his approaching end1 somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled friends1 who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so soon losing him4 ,sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as he had done before the ,dikasts2 and to show good grounds for his belief1 that death is not a misfortune1 but a benefit1 to the philosopher4#h ,simmias and ,kebs1 though at first not satisfied with the reasonings1 are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts1 from fear of mortifying him in his last moments3 but ,sokrates protests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his existing frame of mind4#i ,he is now the same man as he was before1 and he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired4 ,footnote #d3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #ei ,b1 #hi ,a4 ,greek3 tn neani_/skn ton lo_/gon1 c4 7p4 #hi ,a74 ,footnote #e3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #eh-ei4 ,footnote #f3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #fc ,d4 ,footnote #g3 ,tacitus1 ,hist4 ii4 #dh4 ,footnote #h3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #fc4 ,footnote #i3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #hd ,d-,e4 ,side-note3 ,emphasis of ,sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate1 active exercise of reason1 and independent judgment for each reasoner4 ,indeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search--the paramount value of reasoned truth--the necessity of keeping up the force of individual reason by constant argumentative exercise--and the right of independent judgment for hearer as well as speaker--stand emphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher4 ,he does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of imperative orthodoxy2 which men1 whether satisfied with the proofs or not1 must believe1 or must make profession of believing1 on pain of being shunned as a moral pestilence1 and disqualified from giving testimony in a court of justice4 ,he sets forth his own conviction1 with the grounds on which he adopts it4 ,but he expressly recognises the existence of dissentient opinions3 he invites his companions to bring forward every objection3 he disclaims all special purpose of impressing his own conclusions upon their minds3 nay1 he expressly warns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies1 then wound up to the highest pitch1 towards himself4 ,he entreats them to preserve themselves from becoming tinged with misology1 or the hatred of free argumentative discussion3 and he ascribes this mental vice to the early habit of easy1 uninquiring1 implicit1 belief3 since a man thus ready of faith1 embracing opinions without any discriminative test1 presently finds himself driven to abandon one opinion after another1 until at last he mistrusts all opinions1 and hates the process of discussing them1 laying the blame upon philosophy instead of upon his own intellect4#aj ,footnote #aj3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #hi ,c-,d1 #ij4 ,greek3 ,prton eu7labthme_/n ti pa_/thos m pa_/thmen4 ,to poion1 7n d' e7g_/8 ,m gen_/metha1 7 d' o7_/s1 miso_/logoi1 7_/sper oi7 misa_/nthrpoi gigno_/menoi2 7s ou7k e7_/stin1 e7_/ph1 o7_/1 ti a7_/n tis meizon tou_/tou kakon pa_/thoi 7 lo_/gous mis_/sas4 p4 #ij ,b4 ,greek3 e7peida_/n tis pisteu_/s lo_/g tini a7lthei ei7nai1 a7_/neu ts peri tous lo_/gous te_/chns1 ka7_/peita o7li_/gon u7_/steron au7t do_/x pseuds ei7nai1 e7ni_/ote men 7_/n1 e7ni_/ote d' ou7k 7_/n1 kai au7this e7_/teros kai e7_/teros1 c4 ,side-note3 ,anxiety of ,sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall follow only the convictions of their own reason4 ,for myself 7says ,sokrates7 ,i fear that in these my last hours ,i depart from the true spirit of philosophy--like unschooled men1 who1 when in debate1 think scarcely at all how the real question stands1 but care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the auditors4 ,between them and me there is only thus much of difference4 ,i regard it as a matter of secondary consequence1 whether my conclusions appear true to my hearers2 but ,i shall do my best to make them appear as much as possible true to myself4#aa ,my calculation is as follows3 mark how selfish it is4 ,if my conclusion as to the immortality of the soul is true1 ,i am better off by believing it3 if ,i am in error1 and death be the end of me1 even then ,i shall avoid importuning my friends with grief1 during these few remaining hours3 moreover my error will not continue with me--which would have been a real misfortune--but will be extinguished very shortly4 ,such is the frame of mind1 ,simmias and ,kebs1 with which ,i approach the debate4 ,do you follow my advice3 take little thought of ,sokrates1 but take much more thought of the truth4 ,if ,i appear to you to affirm any thing truly1 assent to me3 but if not1 oppose me with all your powers of reasoning3 ,be on your guard lest1 through earnest zeal1 ,i should deceive alike myself and you1 and should leave the sting in you1 like a bee1 at this hour of departure4 ,footnote #aa3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ia ,a-,c4 ,greek3 ,ou7 gar o7_/ps tois parousin a7 e7g le_/g do_/xei a7lth ei7nai1 prothum_/somai1 ei7 m ei7_/ pa_/rergon1 a7_/ll' o7_/ps au7t e7moi o7_/ ti ma_/lista do_/zei ou7_/ts e7_/chein4 logi_/zomai ga_/r1 7 phi_/le e7_/taire--kai the_/asai 7s pleonektiks--ei7 men tugcha_/nei a7lth o7_/nta a7 le_/g1 kals d e7_/chei to peisthnai2 ei7 de mde_/n e7sti teleut_/santi1 a7ll' ou7n touto_/n ge ton chro_/non au7ton ton pro tou thana_/tou 7tton tois parousin a7ds e7_/somai o7duro_/menos 4 4 4 u7meis me_/ntoi1 a7n e7moi pei_/thsthe1 smikron phronti_/santes ,skra_/tous1 ts de a7lthei_/as polu mallon1 e7an me_/n ti u7min dok a7lthes le_/gein1 xunomolog_/sate2 ei7 de m_/1 panti lo_/g a7ntitei_/nete1 eu7labou_/menoi o7_/ps m e7g u7po prothumi_/as a7_/ma e7mauto_/n te kai u7mas e7xapat_/sas1 7_/sper me_/litta to ke_/ntron e7gkatalipn oi7ch_/somai4 ,side-note3 ,remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent4 ,this is a remarkable passage1 as illustrating the spirit and purpose of ,platonic dialogues4 ,in my preceding ,chapters1 ,i have already shown1 that it is no part of the aim of ,sokrates to thrust dogmas of his own into other men's minds as articles of faith4 ,but then1 most of these ,chapters have dwelt upon ,dialogues of ,search1 in which ,sokrates has appeared as an interrogator1 or enquirer jointly with others3 scrutinising their opinions1 but disclaiming knowledge or opinions of his own4 ,here1 however1 in the ,phdon1 the case is altogether different4 ,sokrates is depicted as having not only an affirmative opinion1 but even strong conviction1 on a subject of great moment3 which conviction1 moreover1 he is especially desirous of preserving unimpaired1 during his few remaining hours of life4 ,yet even here1 he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction into the minds of his friends1 except as a result of their own independent scrutiny and self-working reason4 ,not only he does not attempt to terrify them into believing1 by menace of evil consequences if they do not--but he repudiates pointedly even the gentler machinery of conversion1 which might work upon their minds through attachment to himself and reverence for his authority4 ,his devotion is to reasoned truth3 he challenges his friends to the fullest scrutiny by their own independent reason3 he recognises the sentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid for them1 whether concurrent with himself or adverse4 ,their reason is for them1 what his reason is for him3 requiring1 both alike 7as ,sokrates here proclaims71 to be stimulated as well as controlled by all-searching debate--but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one of the debaters4 ,the stress laid by ,plato upon the full liberty of dissenting reason1 essential to philosophical debate--is one of the most memorable characteristics of the ,phdon4 ,when we come to the treatise ,de ,legibus 7where ,sokrates does not appear71 we shall find a totally opposite view of sentiment4 ,in the tenth book of that treatise ,plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox persecutor1 who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all4 ,side-note3 ,phdon and ,symposion--points of analogy and contrast4 ,the natural counterpart and antithesis to the ,phdon1 is found in the ,symposion4#ab ,in both1 the personality of ,sokrates stands out with peculiar force3 in the one1 he is in the fulness of life and enjoyment1 along with festive comrades--in the other1 he is on the verge of approaching death1 surrounded by companions in deep affliction4 ,the point common to both1 is1 the perfect self-command of ,sokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances4 ,in the ,symposion1 we read of him as triumphing over heat1 cold1 fatigue1 danger1 amorous temptation1 unmeasured potations of wine1 c43#ac in the ,phdon1 we discover him rising superior to the fear of death1 and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him4 ,still1 his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of absorbing meditation1 which seize him at moments sudden and unaccountable1 and chain him to the spot for a long time4 ,there is moreover1 in both dialogues1 a streak of eccentricity in his character1 which belongs to what ,plato calls the philosophical inspiration and madness1 rising above the measure of human temperance and prudence4#ad ,the ,phdon depicts in ,sokrates the same intense love of philosophy and dialectic debate1 as the ,symposion and ,phdrus3 but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment1 and passionate admiration of youthful beauty1 with which1 according to those two dialogues1 the mental fermentation of the philosophical aspirant is asserted to begin4#ae ,sokrates in the ,phdon describes the initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study3#af but the process is one purely intellectual1 without reference to personal converse with beloved companions1 as a necessity of the case4 ,his discourse is that of a man on the point of death--abruptis vit blandimentis#ag--;and he already looks upon his body1 not as furnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by gymnastic discipline 7as it appears in the ,republic71 but as an importunate and depraving companion1 of which he is glad to get rid3 so that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free expansion and fellowship with the intelligible world1 apart from sense and its solicitations4 ,footnote #ab3 ,thus far ,i agree with ,schleiermacher 7,einleitung zum ,phdon1 p4 #i1 c472 though ,i do not think that he has shown sufficient ground for his theory regarding the ,symposion and the ,phdon1 as jointly intended to depict the character of the philosopher1 promised by ,plato as a sequel to the ,sophist and the ,statesman4 7,plato1 ,sophist4 p4 #bag2 ,politic4 p4 #beg47 ,footnote #ac3 ,plato1 ,symposion1 pp4 #bad ,a1 #bai ,d1 #bbj-bba-bbc ,d3 compare ,phdon1 p4 #aaf1 c4 #aag4 ,marcus ,antoninus 7i4 #af7 compares on this point his father ,antoninus ,pius to ,sokrates3 both were capable of enjoyment as well as of abstinence1 without ever losing their self-command4 ,greek3 ,e7pharmo_/seie d' a7n au7t 7,antoninus ,p47 ,greek3 to peri tou ,skra_/tous mnmoneuo_/menon1 o7_/ti kai a7pe_/chesthai kai a7polau_/ein e7du_/nato tou_/tn1 7n polloi pro_/s te tas a7pochas a7sthens1 kai pros tas a7polau_/seis e7ndotiks1 e7_/chousin4 ,to de i7schu_/ein1 kai e7_/ti karterein kai e7nn_/phein e7kate_/r1 a7ndros e7_/stin a7_/rtion kai a7ttton psuchn e7_/chontos4 ,footnote #ad3 ,plato1 ,symposion1 pp4 #agd-age-bbj ,c-,d4 ,compare ,phdon1 pp4 #hd ,c1 #ie ,e4 ,footnote #ae3 ,plato1 ,sympos4 p4 #bae ,a1 p4 #bba ,d4 ,greek3 oi7os de ou7tosi ge_/gone tn a7topi_/an a7_/nthrpos1 kai au7tos kai oi7 lo_/goi au7tou1 ou7d' e7ggus a7n eu7_/roi tis ztn1 c4 p4 #bah ,b3 ,greek3 pa_/ntes gar kekoinn_/kate ts philoso_/phou mani_/as te kai bakchei_/as1 c4 ,about the ,greek3 philo_/sophos mani_/a1 compare ,plato1 ,phdrus1 pp4 #bde-bej4 ,plato1 ,phdrus1 pp4 #bea-bec4 ,symposion1 pp4 #baj-baa4 ,greek3 o7_/tan tis a7po tnde dia to o7rths paiderastein e7panin e7keino to kalon a7_/rchtai kathoran1 c4 7#baa ,b74 ,footnote #af3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #if ,a4 ,greek3 e7g ou7n soi di_/eimi peri au7tn ta_/ g' e7ma pa_/th1 c4 ,footnote #ag3 ,tacitus1 ,hist4 ii4 #ec4 ,othonis libertus1 habere se suprema ejus mandata respondit3 ipsum viventem quidem relictum1 sed sol posteritatis cur1 et abruptis vit blandimentis4 ,side-note3 ,phdon--compared with ,republic and ,timus4 ,no recognition of the triple or lower souls4 ,antithesis between soul and body4 ,we have here one peculiarity of the ,phdon1 whereby it stands distinguished both from the ,republic and the ,timus4 ,the antithesis on which it dwells is that of the soul or mind1 on one hand--the body on the other4 ,the soul or mind is spoken of as one and indivisible3 as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned in the body4 ,it is not distributed into distinct parts1 kinds1 or varieties3 no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which is so much insisted on in the ,republic and ,timus3--the rational or intellectual 7encephalic7 soul1 located in the head--the courageous or passionate 7thoracic71 between the neck and the diaphragm--the appetitive 7abdominal71 between the diaphragm and the navel4 ,in the ,phdon1 the soul is noted as the seat of reason1 intellect1 the love of wisdom or knowledge1 exclusively3 all that belongs to passion and appetite1 is put to account of the body3#ah this is distinctly contrary to the ,philbus1 in which dialogue ,sokrates affirms that desire or appetite cannot belong to the body1 but belongs only to the soul4 ,in ,phdon1 nothing is said about the location of the rational soul1 in the head1--nor about the analogy between its rotations in the cranium and the celestial rotations 7a doctrine which we read both in the ,timus and in the ,republic73 on the contrary1 the soul is affirmed to have lost1 through its conjunction with the body1 that wisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of pre-existence1 while completely apart from the body1 and while in commerce with those invisible ,ideas to which its own separate nature was cognate4#ai ,that controul which in the ,republic is exercised by the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls1 is in the ,phdon exercised 7though imperfectly7 by the one and only soul over the body4#bj ,in the ,republic and ,timus1 the soul is a tripartite aggregate1 a community of parts1 a compound3 in the ,phdon1 ,sokrates asserts it to be uncompounded1 making this fact a point in his argument4#ba ,again1 in the ,phdon1 the soul is pronounced to be essentially uniform and incapable of change3 as such1 it is placed in antithesis with the body1 which is perpetually changing3 while we read1 on the contrary1 in the ,symposion1 that soul and body alike are in a constant and unremitting variation1 neither one nor the other ever continuing in the same condition4#bb ,footnote #ah3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ff4 ,compare ,plato1 ,philbus1 p4 #ce1 ,c-,d4 ,footnote #ai3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #gf4 ,footnote #bj3 ,compare ,phdon1 p4 #id ,c-,e1 with ,republic1 iv4 pp4 #dci ,c1 #ddj ,a1 #dda ,e1 #ddb ,c4 ,footnote #ba3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #gh4 ,greek3 a7xu_/ntheton1 monoeides 7p4 #hj ,b71 contrasted with the ,greek3 tri_/a ei7d ts psuchs 7,republic1 p4 #dci74 ,in the abstract given by ,alkinous of the ,platonic doctrine1 we read in cap4 #bd ,greek3 o7_/ti trimer_/s e7stin 7 psuch kata tas duna_/meis1 kai kata lo_/gon ta me_/r au7ts to_/pois i7di_/ois dianene_/mtai3 in cap4 #be that the ,greek3 psuch is ,greek3 a7su_/nthetos1 a7dia_/lutos1 a7ske_/dastos4 ,footnote #bb3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #gi-hj2 ,symposion1 pp4 #bjg-bjh4 ,side-note3 ,different doctrines of ,plato about the soul4 ,whether all the three souls are immortal1 or the rational soul alone4 ,the difference which ,i have here noted shows how ,plato modified his doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue4 ,the tripartite soul would have been found inconvenient in the ,phdon1 where the argument required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as possible4 ,assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to the soul1 as well as reason--,sokrates will not shake them off when he becomes divorced from the body4 ,he believes and expects that the post-existence of the soul will be1 as its pre-existence has been1 a rational existence--a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce with the eternal ,ideas3 in this there is no place for passion and appetite1 which grow out of its conjunction with the body4 ,the soul here represents ,reason and ,intellect1 in commerce with their correlates1 the objective ,entia ,rationis3 the body represents passion and appetite as well as sense1 in implication with their correlates1 the objects of sensible perception4#bc ,such is the doctrine of the ,phdon2 but ,plato is not always consistent with himself on the point4 ,his ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed1 whether1 when he vindicated the immortality of the soul1 he meant to speak of the rational soul only1 or of the aggregate soul with its three parts as above described4 ,there are passages which countenance both suppositions4#bd ,plato seems to have leaned sometimes to the one view1 sometimes to the other3 besides which1 the view taken in the ,phdon is a third1 different from both--viz43 ,that the two non-rational souls1 the passionate and appetitive1 are not recognised as existing4 ,footnote #bc3 ,this is the same antithesis as we read in ,xenophon1 ascribed to ,cyrus in his dying address to his sons--,greek3 o7 a7_/kratos kai katharos nous--to a7_/phron sma1 ,cyropd4 viii4 #g1 #bj4 ,footnote #bd3 ,alkinous1 ,introduct4 c4 #be4 ,greek3 o7_/ti men ou7n ai7 logikai psuchai a7tha_/natoi u7pa_/rchousi kata ton a7_/ndra touton1 bebai_/sait' a7_/n tis2 ei7 de kai ai7 a7_/logoi1 touto tn a7mphisbtoume_/nn u7pa_/rchei4 ,galen considers ,plato as affirming that the two inferior souls are mortal--,greek3 ,peri tn ts psuchs 7thn1 ,t4 iv4 p4 #ggc1 ,khn4 ,this subject is handled in an instructive ,dissertation of ,k4 ,f4 ,hermann--,de ,partibus ,anim ,immortalibus secundum ,platonem--delivered at ,gttingen in the winter ,session1 #ahej-ahea4 ,he inclines to the belief that ,plato intended to represent only the rational soul as immortal1 and the other two souls as mortal 7p4 #i74 ,but the passages which he produces are quite sufficient to show1 that ,plato sometimes held one language1 sometimes the other2 and that ,galen1 who wrote an express treatise 7now lost7 to prove that ,plato was inconsistent with himself in respect to the soul1 might have produced good reasons for his opinion4 ,the inconstantia ,platonis 7,cicero1 ,nat4 ,deor4 i4 #ab7 must be admitted here as on other matters4 ,we must take the different arguments and doctrines of ,plato as we find them in their respective places4 ,hermann 7p4 #d7 says about the commentators--,de irrationali anim1 alii ancipites hserunt1 alii claris verbis mortalem prdicarunt3 quumque ,neoplatonic sect principes1 ,numenius et ,plotinus1 non modo brutorum1 sed ne plantarum quidem1 animas immortalitate privare ausi sunt1--mox insequentes in alia omnia digressi aut plane perire irrationales partes affirmarunt1 aut medi qudam vi ingressi1 quamvis corporum fato exemptis1 mortalitatem tamen et ipsi tribuerunt4 ,it appears that the divergence of opinion on this subject began as early as ,xenokrates and ,speusippus--see ,olympiodorus1 ,scholia in ,phdonem1 #age4 ,the large construction adopted by ,numenius and ,plotinus is completely borne out by a passage in the ,phdon1 p4 #gj ,e4 ,i must here remark that ,hermann does not note the full extent of discrepancy between the ,phdon and ,plato's other dialogues1 consisting in this--,that in the ,phdon1 ,plato suppresses all mention of the two non-rational souls1 the passionate and appetitive3 insomuch that if we had only the ,phdon remaining1 we should not have known that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul1 or the co-existence of the three souls4 ,i transcribe an interesting passage from ,m4 ,degrando1 respecting the belief in different varieties of soul1 and partial immortality4 ,degrando--,histoire ,compare des ,systmes de ,philosophie1 vol4 i4 p4 #bac4 ,les habitans du ,thibet1 du ,grenland1 du nord de l',amrique admettent deux mes3 les ,caribes en admettent trois1 dont une1 disent-ils1 celle qui habite dans la tte1 remonte seule au pays des mes4 ,les habitans du ,grenland croient d'ailleurs les mes des hommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux3 ils supposent que les divers individus peuvent changer d'mes entre eux pendant la vie1 et qu'aprs la vie ces mes excutent de grands voyages1 avec toutes sortes de fatigues et de prils4 ,les peuples du ,canada se reprsentent les mes sous la forme d'ombres errantes3 les ,patagons1 les habitans du ,sud de l',asie1 croient entendre leurs voix dans l'cho3 et les anciens ,romains eux-mmes n'taient pas trangers cette opinion4 ,les ,ngres s'imaginent que la destine de l'me aprs la vie est encore lie celle du corps1 et fondent sur cette ide une foule de pratiques4 ,side-note3 ,the life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body4 ,death alone enables him to do this completely4 ,the philosopher 7contends ,sokrates7 ought to rejoice when death comes to sever his soul altogether from his body3 because he is1 throughout all his life1 struggling to sever himself from the passions1 appetites1 impulses and aspirations1 which grow out of the body2 and to withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses1 which teach no truth1 and lead only to deceit or confusion3 ,he is constantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing completely--to prosecute pure mental contemplation1 as the only way of arriving at truth3 to look at essences or things in themselves1 by means of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body4#be ,until his mind be purified from all association with the body1 it cannot be brought into contact with pure essence1 nor can his aspirations for knowledge be satisfied4#bf ,hence his whole life is really a training or approximative practice for death1 which alone will enable him to realise such aspirations4#bg ,knowledge or wisdom is the only money in which he computes1 and which he seeks to receive in payment4#bh ,he is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary sense3 for the courageous man1 while holding death to be a great evil1 braves it from fear of greater evils--and the temperate man abstains from various pleasures1 because they either shut him out from greater pleasures1 or entail upon him disease and poverty4 ,the philosopher is courageous and temperate1 but from a different motive3 his philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities1 and makes him indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body3 each of which1 in proportion to its intensity1 corrupts his perception of truth and falsehood1 and misguides him in the search for wisdom or knowledge4#bi ,while in the body1 he feels imprisoned1 unable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by the deceptive media of sense4 ,from this durance philosophy partially liberates him1--purifying his mind1 like the ,orphic or ,dionysiac religious mysteries1 from the contagion of body#cj and sense3 disengaging it1 as far as may be during life1 from sympathy with the body3 and translating it out of the world of sense1 uncertainty1 and mere opinion1 into the invisible region of truth and knowledge4 ,if such purification has been fully achieved1 the mind of the philosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the body1 and passes clean away by itself1 into commerce with the intelligible ,entities or realities4 ,footnote #be3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ff ,e4 ,greek3 ei7 me_/llome_/n pote kathars ti ei7_/sesthai1 a7pallakte_/on au7tou 7tou s_/matos7 kai au7t t psuch theate_/on au7ta ta pra_/gmata4 ,footnote #bf3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #fg ,b4 ,greek3 m kathar gar katharou e7pha_/ptesthai m ou7 themiton 74 ,footnote #bg3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #fd ,a4 ,greek3 kinduneu_/ousi gar o7_/soi tugcha_/nousin o7rths a7pto_/menoi philosophi_/as lelthe_/nai tous a7_/llous o7_/ti ou7den a7_/llo au7toi e7pitdeu_/ousin 7 a7pothn_/skein te kai tethna_/nai4 ,p4 #fg ,e ,greek3 oi7 o7rths philosophountes a7pothn_/skein meletsin4 ,footnote #bh3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #fi ,a4 ,greek3 a7ll' 7 e7keino mo_/non to no_/misma o7rtho_/n1 a7nth' ou7 dei a7_/panta tauta katalla_/ttesthai1 phro_/nsis4 ,footnote #bi3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #fi-hc-hd4 ,footnote #cj3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #hb ,e4 ,side-note3 ,souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals4 ,the philosopher alone is relieved from all communion with body4 ,on the contrary1 the soul or mind of the ordinary man1 which has undergone no purification and remains in close implication with the body1 cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death1 but remains encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments1 so as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally belongs4 ,such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which haunt tombs2 and which become visible1 because they cling to the visible world1 and hate the invisible4#ca ,not being fit for separate existence1 they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh bodies1 of different species of men or animals1 according to the particular temperament which they carry away with them4#cb ,the souls of despots1 or of violent and rapacious men1 will pass into the bodies of wolves or kites3 those of the gluttonous and drunkards1 into asses and such-like animals4 ,a better fate will be reserved for the just and temperate men1 who have been socially and politically virtuous1 but simply by habit and disposition1 without any philosophy or pure intellect3 for their souls will pass into the bodies of other gentle and social animals1 such as bees1 ants1 wasps1#cc c41 or perhaps they may again return into the human form1 and may become moderate men4 ,it is the privilege only of him who has undergone the purifying influence of philosophy1 and who has spent his life in trying to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the body--to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh embodiment1 that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its own separate nature3 passing out of the world of sense1 of transient phenomena1 and of mere opinion1 into a distinct world where it will be in full presence of the eternal ,ideas1 essences1 and truth2 in companionship with the ,gods1 and far away from the miseries of humanity4#cd ,footnote #ca3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ha ,c-,d4 ,greek3 o7 d kai e7_/chousa 7 toiau_/t psuch baru_/netai_/ te kai e7_/lketai pa_/lin ei7s ton o7raton to_/pon1 pho_/b tou a7eidous te kai ,a7_/idou1 7_/sper le_/getai1 peri ta mn_/mata_/ te kai tous ta_/phous kulindoume_/n1 peri a7 d kai 7_/phth a7_/tta psuchn skotoeid pha_/smata al4 ,greek3 skioeod phanta_/smata1 ,greek3 oi7a pare_/chontai ai7 toiautai psuchai ei7_/dla1 ai7 m kathars a7polutheisai a7lla tou o7ratou mete_/chousai1 dio kai o7rntai4 ,footnote #cb3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #hb-hd4 ,footnote #cc3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #hb ,a4 ,greek3 ,ou7koun eu7daimone_/statoi kai tou_/tn ei7si kai ei7s be_/ltiston to_/pon i7o_/ntes oi7 tn dmotikn te kai politikn a7retn e7pitetdeuko_/tes1 7n d kalousi sphrosu_/nn te kai dikaiosu_/nn1 e7x e7_/thous te kai mele_/ts gegonuian a7_/neu philosophi_/as te kai nou8 4 4 4 ,o7_/ti tou_/tous ei7ko_/s e7stin ei7s toiouton pa_/lin a7phikneisthai politiko_/n te kai 7_/meron ge_/nos1 7_/pou melittn 7 sphkn 7 murm_/kn1 c4 ,footnote #cd3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #hb ,b1 #hc ,b1 #hd ,b4 ,compare p4 #aad ,c3 ,greek3 tou_/tn de au7tn oi7 philosophi_/a i7kans kathra_/menoi a7_/neu te sma_/tn zsi to para_/pan ei7s ton e7_/peita chro_/non1 c4 ,also p4 #aae ,d4 ,side-note3 ,special privilege claimed for philosophers in the ,phdon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers4 ,such is the creed which ,sokrates announces to his friends in the ,phdon1 as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction with which he welcomes death4 ,it is upon the antithesis between soul 7or mind7 and body1 that the main stress is laid4 ,the partnership between the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief3 and the only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the partnership altogether1 so as to attain a distinct1 disembodied1 existence4 ,conformably to this doctrine1 the line is chiefly drawn between the philosopher1 and the multitude who are not philosophers--not between good and bad agents1 when the good agents are not philosophers4 ,this last distinction is indeed noticed1 but is kept subordinate4 ,the unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to pass after death into the body of a bee1 or an ant1 instead of that of a kite or ass2#ce but he does not attain the privilege of dissolving connection altogether with body4 ,moreover the distinction is one not easily traceable3 since ,sokrates#cf expressly remarks that the large majority of mankind are middling persons1 neither good nor bad in any marked degree4 ,philosophers stand in a category by themselves3 apart from the virtuous citizens1 as well as from the middling and the vicious4 ,their appetites and ambition are indeed deadened1 so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from injustice3 but this is not their characteristic feature4 ,philosophy is asserted to impart to them a special purification1 like that of the ,orphic mysteries to the initiated3 detaching the soul from both the body and the world of sense1 except in so far as is indispensable for purposes of life3 replunging the soul1 as much as possible1 in the other world of intelligible essences1 real forms or ,ideas1 which are its own natural kindred and antecedent companions4 ,the process whereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical4 ,it is the process of learning1 or 7in the sense of ,sokrates7 the revival in the mind of those essences or ,ideas with which it had been familiar during its anterior and separate life3 accompanied by the total abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations4#cg ,only by such love of learning1 which is identical with philosophy 7,greek3 philo_/sophon1 philomathes71 is the mind rescued from the ignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense4 ,footnote #ce3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #ha-hb4 ,footnote #cf3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ij ,a4 ,footnote #cg3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #hb-aae4--;,greek3 tas de 77donas7 peri to mantha_/nein e7spou_/dase1 c4 7p4 #aad ,e74 ,these doctrines1 laid down by ,plato in the ,phdon1 bear great analogy to the ,sanskrit philosophy called ,sankhy1 founded by ,kapila1 as expounded and criticised in the treatise of ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire 7,mmoire sur le ,sankhy1 ,paris1 #aheb1 pp4 #bgc-bgh7--;and the other work1 ,du ,bouddhisme1 by the same author 7,paris1 #ahee71 pp4 #aaf-acg1 #ahg-aid1 c4 ,side-note3 ,simmias and ,kebs do not admit readily the immortality of the soul1 but are unwilling to trouble ,sokrates by asking for proof4 ,unabated interest of ,sokrates in rational debate4 ,in thus explaining his own creed1 ,sokrates announces a full conviction that the soul or mind is immortal1 but he has not yet offered any proof of it3 and ,simmias as well as ,kebs declare themselves to stand in need of proof4 ,both of them however are reluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts4 ,an opportunity is thus provided1 that ,sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity--his unimpaired argumentative readiness--his keen anxiety not to relax the grasp of a subject until he has brought it to a satisfactory close--without the least reference to his speedily approaching death4 ,this last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue1 remarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality4#ch ,we are thus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon which ,sokrates relies4 ,footnote #ch3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #hi ,b-,c1--the remark made by ,sokrates1 when stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of ,phdon1 in allusion to the cutting off of all this hair1 which would be among the acts of mourning performed by ,phdon on the morrow1 after the death of ,sokrates3 and the impressive turn given to this remark1 in reference to the solution of the problem then in debate4 ,side-note3 ,simmias and ,kebs believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul1 but not in its post-existence4 ,doctrine--,that the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by ,sokrates4 ,if the arguments whereby ,sokrates proves the immortality of the soul are neither forcible nor conclusive1 not fully satisfying even ,simmias#ci to whom they are addressed--the adverse arguments1 upon the faith of which the doctrine was denied 7as we know it to have been by many philosophers of antiquity71 cannot be said to be produced at all4 ,simmias and ,kebs are represented as ,sokratic companions1 partly ,pythagoreans2 desirous to find the doctrine true1 yet ignorant of the proofs4 ,both of them are earnest believers in the pre-existence of the soul1 and in the objective reality of ,ideas or intelligible essences4 ,simmias however adopts in part the opinion1 not very clearly explained1 ,that the soul is a harmony or mixture3 which opinion ,sokrates refutes1 partly by some other arguments1 partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the supposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body1 and that ,simmias must make his election between the two4 ,simmias elects without hesitation1 in favour of the pre-existence3 which he affirms to be demonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust3 while the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy1 not certified by conclusive reasons4#dj ,kebs again1 while admitting that the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body1 and that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with many different bodies--still expresses his apprehension that though durable1 it is not eternal4 ,accordingly1 no man can be sure that his present body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be linked2 so that immediately on his death1 it will pass away into nothing4 ,the opinion of ,kebs is remarkable1 inasmuch as it shows how constantly the metempsychosis1 or transition of the soul from one body to another1 was included in all the varieties of ancient speculation on this subject4#da ,footnote #ci3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ajg ,b4 ,footnote #dj3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ib4 ,footnote #da3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #hf-ie4 ,greek3 krasin kai a7rmoni_/an1 c4 ,animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant1 sed aliam alii1 et divers ratione1 says ,wyttenbach ad ,phdon4 p4 #hf4 ,lucretius as well as ,plato impugns the doctrine1 iii4 #ig4 ,galen1 a great admirer of ,plato1 though not pretending to determine positively wherein the essence of the soul consists1 maintains a doctrine substantially the same as what is here impugned--that it depends upon a certain ,greek3 krasis of the elements and properties in the bodily organism--,greek3 ,peri tn ts psuchs 7thn1 vol4 iv4 pp4 #ggd-gge1 #ggi-ghb1 ed4 ,khn4 ,he complains much of the unsatisfactory explanations of ,plato on this point4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed4 ,before replying to ,simmias and ,kebs1 ,sokrates is described as hesitating and reflecting for a long time4 ,he then enters into a sketch of#db his own intellectual history4 ,how far the sketch as it stands depicts the real ,sokrates1 or ,plato himself1 or a supposed mind not exactly coincident with either--we cannot be certain3 the final stage however must belong to ,plato himself4 ,footnote #db3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #if-ajb4 ,the following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of thought and argument pursued by ,sokrates2 not adhering to the exact words1 nor even preserving the interlocutory form4 ,i could not have provided room for a literal translation4 ,side-note3 ,first doctrine of ,sokrates as to cause4 ,reasons why he rejected it4 ,you compel me 7says ,sokrates7 to discuss thoroughly the cause of generation and destruction4#dc ,i will tell you1 if you like1 my own successive impressions on these subjects4 ,when young1 ,i was amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the investigation of ,nature4 ,i thought it matter of pride to know the causes of every thing--through what every thing is either generated1 or destroyed1 or continues to exist4 ,i puzzled myself much to discover first of all such matters as these--,is it a certain putrefaction of the ,hot and the ,cold in the system 7as some say71 which brings about the nourishment of animals8 ,is it the blood through which we think--or air1 or fire8 ,or is it neither one nor the other1 but the brain1 which affords to us sensations of sight1 hearing1 and smell1 out of which memory and opinion are generated3 then1 by a like process1 knowledge is generated out of opinion and memory when permanently fixed8#dd ,i tried to understand destructions as well as generations1 celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena4 ,but ,i accomplished nothing1 and ended by fancying myself utterly unfit for the enquiry4 ,nay--,i even lost all the knowledge of that which ,i had before believed myself to understand4 ,for example--,from what cause does a man grow8 ,at first1 ,i had looked upon this as evident--that it was through eating and drinking3 flesh being thereby added to his flesh1 bone to his bone1 c4 ,so too1 when a tall and a short man were standing together1 it appeared to me that the former was taller than the latter by the head--that ten were more than eight because two were added to them#de--that a rod of two cubits was greater than a rod of one cubit1 because it projected beyond it by a half4 ,now--,i am satisfied that ,i do not know the cause of any of these matters4 ,i cannot explain why1 when one is added to one1 such addition makes them two2 since in their separated state each was one4 ,in this case1 it is approximation or conjunction which is said to make the two3 in another case1 the opposite cause1 disjunction1 is said also to make two--when one body is bisected4#df ,how two opposite causes can produce the same effect--and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two1 where there were not two before--,i do not understand4 ,in fact1 ,i could not explain to myself1 by this method of research1 the generation1 or destruction1 or existence1 of any thing2 and ,i looked out for some other method4 ,footnote #dc3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #ie ,e--#if4 ,greek3 ,ou7 phaulon pragma zteis2 o7_/ls gar dei peri gene_/ses kai phthoras tn ai7ti_/an diapragmateu_/sasthai4 e7g ou7n soi di_/eimi1 e7an bou_/l1 ta_/ g' e7ma pa_/th1 c4 ,footnote #dd3 ,phdon1 p4 #if ,b4 ,greek3 e7k de mn_/ms kai do_/xs1 labou_/ss to 7remein1 kata tauta gi_/gnesthai e7pist_/mn4 ,this is the same distinction between ,greek3 do_/xa and ,greek3 e7pist_/m1 as that which ,sokrates gives in the ,menon1 though not with full confidence 7,menon1 pp4 #ig-ih74 ,see supr1 chap4 xxii4 p4 #bda4 ,footnote #de3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #if ,e4 ,greek3 kai e7_/ti ge tou_/tn e7narge_/stera1 ta de_/ka moi e7do_/kei tn o7kt plei_/ona ei7nai1 dia to du_/o au7tois proseinai1 kai to di_/pchu tou pchuai_/ou meizon ei7nai dia to 7mi_/sei au7tou u7pere_/chein4 ,footnote #df3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ig ,b4 ,side-note3 ,second doctrine4 ,hopes raised by the treatise of ,anaxagoras4 ,it was at this time that ,i heard a man reading out of a book1 which he told me was the work of ,anaxagoras1 the affirmation that ,nous 7,reason1 ,intelligence7 was the regulator and cause of all things4 ,i felt great satisfaction in this cause2 and ,i was convinced1 that if such were the fact1 ,reason would ordain every thing for the best3 so that if ,i wanted to find out the cause of any generation1 or destruction1 or existence1 ,i had only to enquire in what manner it was best that such generation or destruction should take place4 ,thus a man was only required to know1 both respecting himself and respecting other things1 what was the best3 which knowledge1 however1 implied that he must also know what was worse--the knowledge of the one and of the other going together4#dg ,i thought ,i had thus found a master quite to my taste1 who would tell me1 first whether the earth was a disk or a sphere1 and would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity why it must be so1 by showing me how such arrangement was the best3 next1 if he said that the earth was in the centre1 would proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in the centre4 ,respecting the ,sun1 ,moon1 and ,stars1 ,i expected to hear the like explanation of their movements1 rotations1 and other phenomena3 that is1 how it was better that each should do and suffer exactly what the facts show4 ,i never imagined that ,anaxagoras1 while affirming that they were regulated by ,reason1 would put upon them any other cause than this--that it was best for them to be exactly as they are4 ,i presumed that1 when giving account of the cause1 both of each severally and all collectively1 he would do it by setting forth what was best for each severally and for all in common4 ,such was my hope1 and ,i would not have sold it for a large price4#dh ,i took up eagerly the book of ,anaxagoras1 and read it as quickly as ,i could1 that ,i might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse4 ,footnote #dg3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ig ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ei7 ou7n tis bou_/loito tn ai7ti_/an eu7rein peri e7ka_/stou1 o7_/p gi_/gnetai 7 a7po_/llutai 7 e7_/sti1 touto dein peri au7tou eu7rein1 o7_/p be_/ltiston au7t e7stin 7 ei7nai 7 a7_/llo o7tioun pa_/schein 7 poiein2 e7k de d tou lo_/gou tou_/tou ou7den a7_/llo skopein pros_/kein a7nthr_/p kai peri au7tou kai peri tn a7_/lln1 a7ll' 7 to a7_/riston kai to be_/ltiston2 a7nagkaion de ei7nai ton au7ton touton kai to cheiron ei7de_/nai2 tn au7tn gar ei7nai e7pist_/mn peri au7tn4 ,footnote #dh3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ih ,b4 ,greek3 kai ou7k a7n a7pedo_/mn pollou tas e7lpi_/das1 a7lla pa_/nu spoud labn tas bi_/blous 7s ta_/chista oi7o_/s t' 7n a7negi_/gnskon1 i7_/n' 7s ta_/chista ei7dei_/n to be_/ltiston kai to cheiron4 ,side-note3 ,disappointment because ,anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail4 ,distinction between causes efficient and causes co-efficient4 ,great indeed was my disappointment when1 as ,i proceeded with the perusal1 ,i discovered that the author never employed ,reason at all1 nor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally3 that the causes which he indicated were1 air1 ther1 water1 and many other strange agencies4 ,the case seemed to me the same as if any one1 while announcing that ,sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason1 should next attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings severally3#di ,as if he affirmed1 for example1 that the cause why ,i am now sitting here is1 that my body is composed of bones and ligaments--that my bones are hard1 and are held apart by commissures1 and my ligaments such as to contract and relax1 clothing the bones along with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together--that when the bones are lifted up at their points of junction1 the contraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my limbs--and that this is the reason why ,i am now seated here in my present crumpled attitude3 or again--as if1 concerning the fact of my present conversation with you1 he were to point to other causes of a like character--varieties of speech1 air1 and hearing1 with numerous other similar facts--omitting all the while to notice the true causes1 viz4#ej--,that inasmuch as the ,athenians have deemed it best to condemn me1 for that reason ,i too have deemed it best and most righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence which they impose4 ,for1 by the ,dog1 these bones and ligaments would have been long ago carried away to ,thebes or ,megara1 by my judgment of what is best--if ,i had not deemed it more righteous and honourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence1 rather than to run away4 ,it is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name of causes4 ,certainly1 if a man affirms that unless ,i possessed such joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me1 ,i should not be able to execute what ,i have determined on1 he will state no more than the truth4 ,but to say that these are the causes why ,i1 a rational agent1 do what ,i am now doing1 instead of saying that ,i do it from my choice of what is best--this would be great carelessness of speech3 implying that a man cannot see the distinction between that which is the cause in reality1 and that without which the cause can never be a cause4#ea ,it is this last which most men1 groping as it were in the dark1 call by a wrong name1 as if it were itself the cause4 ,thus one man affirms that the earth is kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around it3 another contends that the air underneath supports the earth1 like a pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough3 but none of them ever look out for a force such as this--,that all these things now occupy that position which it is best that they should occupy4 ,these enquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force1 believing that they can find some other ,atlas stronger1 more everlasting1 and more capable of holding all things together3 they think that the ,good and the ,becoming have no power of binding or holding together any thing4 ,footnote #di3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ih ,c4 ,greek3 kai moi e7_/doxen o7moio_/taton peponthe_/nai 7_/sper a7n ei7_/ tis le_/gn o7_/ti ,skra_/ts pa_/nta o7_/sa pra_/ttei n pra_/ttei1 ka7_/peita e7picheir_/sas le_/gein tas ai7ti_/as e7ka_/stn 7n pra_/tt1 le_/goi prton men o7_/ti dia tauta nun e7ntha_/de ka_/thmai1 o7_/ti xugkeitai_/ mou to sma e7x o7stn kai neu_/rn1 kai ta men o7sta e7sti sterea kai diaphuas e7_/chei chris a7p' a7ll_/ln1 c4 ,footnote #ej3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ih ,e4 ,greek3 a7mel_/sas tas 7s a7lths ai7ti_/as le_/gein1 o7_/ti e7pei_/d ,a7thnai_/ois e7_/doxe be_/ltion ei7nai e7mou katapsphi_/sasthai1 dia tauta d kai e7moi be_/ltion au7 de_/doktai e7ntha_/de kathsthai1 c4 ,footnote #ea3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ii ,a4 ,greek3 a7ll' ai7_/tia men ta toiauta kalein li_/an a7_/topon2 ei7 de_/ tis le_/goi1 o7_/ti a7_/neu tou ta toiauta e7_/chein kai o7sta kai neura kai o7_/sa a7_/lla e7_/ch1 ou7k a7n oi7o_/s t' 7n poiein ta do_/xanta_/ moi1 a7lth a7n le_/goi2 7s me_/ntoi dia tauta poi1 kai tau_/t n pra_/tt1 a7ll' ou7 t tou belti_/stou ai7re_/sei1 poll a7n kai makra r7athumi_/a ei7_/ tou lo_/gou4 to gar m diele_/sthai oi7o_/n t' ei7nai1 o7_/ti a7_/llo me_/n ti_/ e7sti to ai7_/tion t o7_/nti1 a7_/llo d' e7keino a7_/neu ou7 to ai7_/tion ou7k a7_/n pot' ei7_/ ai7_/tion1 c4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself1 nor find any teacher thereof4 ,he renounced it1 and embraced a third doctrine about cause4 ,now1 it is this sort of cause which ,i would gladly put myself under any one's teaching to learn4 ,but ,i could neither find any teacher1 nor make any way by myself4 ,having failed in this quarter1 ,i took the second best course1 and struck into a new path in search of causes4#eb ,fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and perceptions of sense1 ,i looked out for images or reflections of them1 and turned my attention to words or discourses4#ec ,this comparison is indeed not altogether suitable3 for ,i do not admit that he who investigates things through general words1 has recourse to images1 more than he who investigates sensible facts3 but such1 at all events1 was the turn which my mind took4 ,laying down such general assumption or hypothesis as ,i considered to be the strongest1 ,i accepted as truth whatever squared with it1 respecting cause as well as all other matters4 ,in this way ,i came upon the investigation of another sort of cause4#ed ,footnote #eb3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ii ,c-,d4 ,greek3 e7peid de tau_/ts e7ster_/thn1 kai ou7_/t' au7tos eu7rein ou7_/te par' a7_/llou mathein oi7o_/s te e7geno_/mn1 ton deu_/teron ploun e7pi tn ts ai7ti_/as z_/tsin 7 pepragma_/teumai1 bou_/lei soi e7pi_/deixin poi_/smai8 ,footnote #ec3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ii ,e4 ,greek3 i7_/ss men ou7n 7 ei7ka_/z1 tro_/pon tina ou7k e7_/oiken2 ou7 gar pa_/nu xugchr ton e7n tois lo_/gois skopou_/menon ta o7_/nta e7n ei7ko_/si mallon skopein 7 ton e7n tois e7_/rgois4 ,footnote #ed3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ajj ,b4 ,greek3 e7_/rchomai gar d e7picheirn soi e7pidei_/xasthai ts ai7ti_/as to ei7dos o7 pepragma_/teumai1 c4 ,side-note3 ,he now assumes the separate existence of ideas4 ,these ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes4 ,i now assumed the separate and real existence of ,ideas by themselves--,the ,good in itself or the ,self-,good1 ,self-,beautiful1 ,great1 and all such others4 ,look what follows next upon this assumption4 ,if any thing else be beautiful1 besides the ,self-,beautiful1 that other thing can only be beautiful because it partakes of the ,self-,beautiful3 and the same with regard to other similar ,ideas4 ,this is the only cause that ,i can accept3 ,i do not understand those other ingenious causes which ,i hear mentioned4#ee ,when any one tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a showy colour or figure1 ,i pay no attention to him1 but adhere simply to my own affirmation1 that nothing else causes it to be beautiful1 except the presence or participation of the ,self-,beautiful4 ,in what way such participation may take place1 ,i cannot positively determine4 ,but ,i feel confident in affirming that it does take place3 that things which are beautiful1 become so by partaking in the ,self-,beautiful2 things which are great or little1 by partaking in ,greatness or ,littleness4 ,if ,i am told that one man is taller than another by the head1 and that this other is shorter than the first by the very same 7by the head71 ,i should not admit the proposition1 but should repeat emphatically my own creed1--,that whatever is greater than another is greater by nothing else except by ,greatness and through ,greatness--whatever is less than another is less only by ,littleness and through ,littleness4 ,for ,i should fear to be entangled in a contradiction1 if ,i affirmed that the greater man was greater and the lesser man less by the head--,first1 in saying that the greater was greater and that the lesser was less1 by the very same--,next1 in saying that the greater man was greater by the head1 which is itself small3 it being absurd to maintain that a man is great by something small4#ef ,again1 ,i should not say that ten is more than eight by two1 and that this was the cause of its excess2#eg my doctrine is1 that ten is more than eight by ,multitude and through ,multitude3 so the rod of two cubits is greater than that of one1 not by half1 but by ,greatness4 ,again1 when ,one is placed alongside of ,one1--or when one is bisected--,i should take care not to affirm1 that in the first case the juxtaposition1 in the last case the bisection1 was the cause why it became two4#eh ,i proclaim loudly that ,i know no other cause for its becoming two except participation in the essence of the ,dyad4 ,what is to become two1 must partake of the ,dyad3 what is to become one1 of the ,monad4 ,i leave to wiser men than me these juxtapositions and bisections and other such refinements3 ,i remain entrenched within the safe ground of my own assumption or hypothesis 7the reality of these intelligible9999 and eternal ,ideas74 ,footnote #ee3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ajj ,c4 ,greek3 ou7 toi_/nun e7_/ti mantha_/n1 ou7de du_/namai tas a7_/llas ai7ti_/as tas sophas tau_/tas gign_/skein4 ,footnote #ef3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aja ,a4 ,greek3 phobou_/menos m_/ ti_/s soi e7nanti_/os lo_/gos a7pant_/s1 e7an t kephal mei_/zona_/ tina phs ei7nai kai e7la_/tt1 prton men t au7t to meizon meizon ei7nai kai to e7_/latton e7_/latton1 e7_/peita t kephal smikra ou7_/s ton mei_/z mei_/z ei7nai1 kai touto d te_/ras ei7nai1 to smikr tini me_/gan tina ei7nai4 ,footnote #eg3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aja ,b4 ,greek3 ,ou7_/koun ta de_/ka tn o7kt duoin plei_/ ei7nai1 kai dia tau_/tn tn ai7ti_/an u7perba_/llein1 phoboio a7n le_/gein1 a7lla m pl_/thei kai dia to plthos8 kai to di_/pchu tou pchuai_/ou 7mi_/sei meizon ei7nai1 a7ll' ou7 mege_/thei8 ,footnote #eh3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aja ,b-,c4 ,greek3 ti_/ de_/8 e7ni e7nos prostethe_/ntos1 tn pro_/sthesin ai7ti_/an ei7nai tou du_/o gene_/sthai1 7 diaschisthe_/ntos tn schi_/sin1 ou7k eu7laboio a7n le_/gein1 kai me_/ga a7n bo_/s o7_/ti ou7k oi7stha a7_/lls ps e7_/kaston gigno_/menon 7 metaschon ts i7di_/as ou7si_/as e7kastou ou7 a7n meta_/sch2 kai e7n tou_/tois ou7k e7_/cheis a7_/lln tina ai7ti_/an tou du_/o gene_/sthai a7ll' 7 tn ts dua_/dos meta_/schesin1 c4 ,side-note3 ,procedure of ,sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned4 ,he insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences4 ,suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself8 ,i should make no reply to him until ,i had followed out fully the consequences of it3 in order to ascertain whether they were consistent with1 or contradictory to1 each other4 ,i should1 when the proper time came1 defend the hypothesis by itself1 assuming some other hypothesis yet more universal1 such as appeared to me best1 until ,i came to some thing fully sufficient4 ,but ,i would not permit myself to confound together the discussion of the hypothesis itself1 and the discussion of its consequences4#ei ,this is a method which cannot lead to truth3 though it is much practised by litigious disputants1 who care little about truth1 and pride themselves upon their ingenuity when they throw all things into confusion4-- ,footnote #ei3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aja ,e4 ,greek3 e7peid de e7kei_/ns au7ts 7ts u7pothe_/ses7 de_/oi se dido_/nai lo_/gon1 7sau_/ts a7n didoi_/s1 a7_/lln au7 u7po_/thesin u7pothe_/menos1 7_/tis tn a7_/nthen belti_/st phai_/noito 4 4 4 4 a7_/ma de ou7k a7n phu_/roio1 7_/sper oi7 a7ntilogikoi_/1 peri_/ te ts a7rchs dialego_/menos kai tn e7x e7kei_/ns 7rmme_/nn1 ei7_/per bou_/loio_/ ti tn o7_/ntn eu7rein4 ,side-note3 ,exposition of ,sokrates welcomed by the hearers4 ,remarks upon it4 ,the exposition here given by ,sokrates of successive intellectual tentatives 7whether of ,sokrates or ,plato1 or partly one1 partly the other71 and the reasoning embodied therein1 is represented as welcomed with emphatic assent and approbation by all his fellow-dialogists4#fj ,it deserves attention on many grounds4 ,it illustrates instructively some of the speculative points of view1 and speculative transitions1 suggesting themselves to an inquisitive intellect of that day4 ,footnote #fj3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ajb ,a4 ,such approbation is peculiarly signified by the intervention of ,echekrates4 ,side-note3 ,the philosophical changes in ,sokrates all turned upon different views as to a true cause4 ,if we are to take that which precedes as a description of the philosophical changes of ,plato himself1 it differs materially from ,aristotle3 for no allusion is here made to the intercourse of ,plato with ,kratylus and other advocates of the doctrines of ,herakleitus3 which intercourse is mentioned by ,aristotle#fa as having greatly influenced the early speculations of ,plato4 ,sokrates describes three different phases of his 7or ,plato's7 speculative point of view3 all turning upon different conceptions of what constituted a true ,cause4 ,his first belief on the subject was1 that which he entertained before he entered on physical and physiological investigations4 ,it seemed natural to him that eating and drinking should be the cause why a young man grew taller3 new bone and new flesh was added out of the food4 ,so again1 when a tall man appeared standing near to a short man1 the former was tall by the head1 or because of the head3 ten were more than eight1 because two were added on3 the measure of two cubits was greater than that of one cubit1 because it stretched beyond by one half4 ,when one object was added on to another1 the addition was the cause why they became two3 when one object was bisected1 this bisection was the cause why the one became two4 ,footnote #fa3 ,aristotel4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 #ihg1 a4 #cb4 ,this was his first conception of a true ,cause1 which for the time thoroughly satisfied him4 ,but when he came to investigate physiology1 he could not follow out the same conception of ,cause1 so as to apply it to more novel and complicated problems2 and he became dissatisfied with it altogether1 even in regard to questions on which he had before been convinced4 ,new difficulties suggested themselves to him4 ,how can the two objects1 which when separate were each one1 be made two1 by the fact that they are brought together8 ,what alteration has happened in their nature8 ,then again1 how can the very same fact1 the change from one to two1 be produced by two causes perfectly contrary to each other--in the first case1 by juxtaposition--in the last case1 by bisection8#fb ,footnote #fb3 ,sextus ,empiricus embodies this argument of ,plato among the difficulties which he starts against the ,dogmatists1 adv4 ,mathematicos1 x4 s4 #cjb-cjh4 ,side-note3 ,problems and difficulties of which ,sokrates first sought solution4 ,that which is interesting here to note1 is the sort of ,cause which first gave satisfaction to the speculative mind of ,sokrates4 ,in the instance of the growing youth1 he notes two distinct facts1 the earliest of which is 7assuming certain other facts as accompanying conditions7 the cause of the latest4 ,but in most of the other instances1 the fact is one which does not admit of explanation4 ,comparisons of eight men with ten men1 of a yard with half a yard1 of a tall man with a short man1 are mental appreciations1 beliefs1 affirmations1 not capable of being farther explained or accounted for3 if any one disputes your affirmation1 you prove it to him1 by placing him in a situation to make the comparison for himself1 or to go through the computation which establishes the truth of what you affirm4 ,it is not the juxtaposition of eight men which makes them to be eight 7they were so just as much when separated by ever so wide an interval73 though it may dispose or enable the spectator to count them as eight4 ,we may count the yard measure 7whether actually bisected or not71 either as one yard1 or as two half yards1 or as three feet1 or thirty-six inches4 ,whether it be one1 or two1 or three1 depends upon the substantive which we choose to attach to the numeral1 or upon the comparison which we make 7the unit which we select7 on the particular occasion4 ,side-note3 ,expectations entertained by ,sokrates from the treatise of ,anaxagoras4 ,his disappointment4 ,his distinction between causes and co-efficients4 ,with this description of ,cause ,sokrates grew dissatisfied when he extended his enquiries into physical and physiological problems4 ,is it the blood1 or air1 or fire1 whereby we think8 and such like questions4 ,such enquiries--into the physical conditions of mental phenomena--did really admit of some answer1 affirmative1 or negative4 ,but ,sokrates does not tell us how he proceeded in seeking for an answer3 he only says that he failed so completely1 as even to be disabused of his supposed antecedent knowledge4 ,he was in this perplexity when he first heard of the doctrine of ,anaxagoras4 ,nous or ,reason is the regulator and the cause of all things4 ,sokrates interpreted this to mean 7what it does not appear that ,anaxagoras intended to assert7#fc that the ,kosmos was an animal or person#fd having mind or ,reason analogous to his own3 that this ,reason was an agent invested with full power and perpetually operative1 so as to regulate in the best manner all the phenomena of the ,kosmos2 and that the general cause to be assigned for every thing was one and the same--,it is best thus2 requiring that in each particular case you should show how it was for the best4 ,sokrates took the type of ,reason from his own volition and movements2 supposing that all the agencies in the ,kosmos were stimulated or checked by cosmical ,reason for her purposes1 as he himself put in motion his own bodily members4 ,this conception of ,cause1 borrowed from the analogy of his own rational volition1 appeared to ,sokrates very captivating1 though it had not been his own first conception4 ,but he found that ,anaxagoras1 though proclaiming the doctrine as a principium or initiatory influence1 did not make applications of it in detail2 but assigned as causes1 in most of the particular cases1 those agencies which ,sokrates considered to be subordinate and instrumental1 as his own muscles were to his own volition4 ,sokrates will not allow such agencies to be called ,causes3 he says that they are only co-efficients indispensable to the efficacy of the single and exclusive ,cause--,reason4 ,but he tells us himself that most enquirers considered them as ,causes2 and that ,anaxagoras himself produced them as such4 ,moreover we shall see ,plato himself in the ,timus1 while he repeats this same distinction between ,causes ,efficient and ,causes ,co-efficient--yet treats these latter as ,causes also1 though inferior in regularity and precision to the ,demiurgic ,nous4#fe ,footnote #fc3 ,i have given 7in chap4 i4 p4 #dh seq47 an abridgment and explanation of what seems to have been the doctrine of ,anaxagoras4 ,footnote #fd3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #cj ,d4 ,greek3 to_/nde ton ko_/smon1 zon e7_/mpsuchon e7_/nnoun te1 c4 ,footnote #fe3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #df ,c-,d4 ,greek3 ai7_/tia--xunai_/tia--xummetai_/tia4 ,he says that most persons considered the ,greek3 xunai_/tia as ,greek3 ai7_/tia4 ,and he himself registers them as such 7,timus1 p4 #fh ,e74 ,he there distinguishes the ,greek3 ai7_/tia and ,greek3 xunai_/tia as two different sorts of ,greek3 ai7_/tia1 the divine and the necessary1 in a remarkable passage3 where he tells us that we ought to study the divine causes1 with a view to the happiness of life1 as far as our nature permits--and the necessary causes for the sake of the divine3 for that we cannot in any way apprehend1 or understand1 or get sight of the divine causes alone1 without the necessary causes along with them 7#fi ,a74 ,in ,timus1 pp4 #dg-dh1 we find again ,greek3 nous and ,greek3 a7na_/gk noted as two distinct sorts of causes co-operating to produce the four elements4 ,it is farther remarkable that ,necessity is described as the wandering or irregular description of ,cause--,greek3 to ts planme_/ns ei7dos ai7ti_/as4 ,eros and ,greek3 ,a7na_/gk are joined as co-operating--in ,symposion1 pp4 #aie ,c1 #aig ,b4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates imputes to ,anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of mental4 ,this is the same which ,aristophanes and others imputed to ,sokrates4 ,in truth1 the complaint which ,sokrates here raises against ,anaxagoras--that he assigned celestial ,rotation as the cause of phenomena1 in place of a quasi-human ,reason--is just the same as that which ,aristophanes in the ,clouds advances against ,sokrates himself4#ff ,the comic poet accuses ,sokrates of displacing ,zeus to make room for ,dinos or ,rotation4 ,according to the popular religious belief1 all or most of the agencies in ,nature were personified1 or supposed to be carried on by persons--,gods1 ,goddesses1 ,dmons1 ,nymphs1 c41 which army of independent agents were conceived1 by some thinkers1 as more or less systematised and consolidated under the central authority of the ,kosmos itself4 ,the causes of natural phenomena1 especially of the grand and terrible phenomena1 were supposed agents1 conceived after the model of man1 and assumed to be endowed with volition1 force1 affections1 antipathies1 c43 some of them visible1 such as ,helios1 ,seln1 the ,stars2 others generally invisible1 though showing themselves whenever it specially pleased them4#fg ,sokrates1 as we see by the ,platonic ,apology1 was believed by his countrymen to deny these animated agencies1 and to substitute instead of them inanimate forces1 not put in motion by the quasi-human attributes of reason1 feeling and volition4 ,the ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,phdon1 taken at this second stage of his speculative wanderings1 not only disclaims such a doctrine1 but protests against it4 ,he recognises no cause except a ,nous or ,reason borrowed by analogy from that of which he was conscious within himself1 choosing what was best for himself in every special situation4#fh ,he tells us however that most of the contemporary philosophers dissented from this point of view4 ,to them1 such inanimate agencies were the sole and real causes1 in one or other of which they found what they thought a satisfactory explanation4 ,footnote #ff3 ,aristophan4 ,nubes1 #cgi-hae4 ,greek3 ,dinos basileu_/ei1 ton ,di_/' e7xellak_/s4 ,we find ,proklus making this same complaint against ,aristotle1 that he deserted theological principia1 and indulged too much in physical reasonings--,greek3 tn men theologikn a7rchn a7phista_/menos1 tois de phusikois lo_/gois pe_/ra tou de_/ontos e7ndiatri_/bn 7,proklus ad ,timum1 ii4 #ij ,e1 p4 #bab1 ,schneider74 ,pascal also expresses the like displeasure against the ,cartesian theory of the vortices4 ,descartes recognised ,god as having originally established rotatory motion among the atoms1 together with an equal1 unvarying quantity of motion3 these two points being granted1 ,descartes considered that all cosmical facts and phenomena might be deduced from them4 ,sur la philosophie de ,descartes1 ,pascal tait de son sentiment sur l'automate2 et n'en tait point sur la matire subtile1 dont il se moquait fort4 ,mais il ne pouvait souffrir sa manire d'expliquer la formation de toutes choses2 et il disait trs souvent1--,je ne puis pardonner ,descartes3 il voudrait bien1 dans toute sa philosophie1 pouvoir se passer de ,dieu3 mais il n'a pu s'empcher de lui accorder une chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement3 aprs cela1 il n'a que faire de ,dieu4 7,pascal1 ,penses1 ch4 xi4 p4 #bcg1 edition de ,louandre1 citation from ,mademoiselle ,prier1 ,paris1 #ahed47 ,again1 ,lord ,monboddo1 in his ,ancient ,metaphysics 7bk4 ii4 ch4 #ai1 p4 #bgf71 cites these remarks of ,plato and ,aristotle on the deficiencies of ,anaxagoras1 and expresses the like censure himself against the cosmical theories of ,newton3--,sir ,isaac puts me in mind of an ancient philosopher ,anaxagoras1 who maintained1 as ,sir ,isaac does1 that mind was the cause of all things2 but when he came to explain the particular phnomena of nature1 instead of having recourse to mind1 employed airs and thers1 subtle spirits and fluids1 and ,i know not what--in short1 any thing rather than mind3 a cause which he admitted to exist in the universe2 but rather than employ it1 had recourse to imaginary causes1 of the existence of which he could give no proof4 ,the ,tragic poets of old1 when they could not otherwise untie the knot of their fable1 brought down a god in a machine1 who solved all difficulties3 but such philosophers as ,anaxagoras will not1 even when they cannot do better1 employ mind or divinity4 ,our philosophers1 since ,sir ,isaac's time1 have gone on in the same track1 and still1 ,i think1 farther4 ,lord ,monboddo speaks with still greater asperity about the ,cartesian theory1 making a remark on it similar to what has been above cited from ,pascal4 7,see his ,dissertation on the ,newtonian ,philosophy1 ,appendix to ,ancient ,metaphysics1 pp4 #dih-dii47 ,footnote #fg3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #da ,a4 ,greek3 pa_/ntes o7_/soi te peripolousi phaners kai o7_/soi phai_/nontai kath' o7_/son a7n e7the_/lsi theoi1 c4 ,footnote #fh3 ,what ,sokrates understands by the theory of ,anaxagoras1 is evident from his language--,phdon1 pp4 #ih-ii4 ,he understands an indwelling cosmical ,reason or ,intelligence1 deliberating and choosing1 in each particular conjuncture1 what was best for the ,kosmos2 just as his own 7,sokrates7 ,reason deliberated and chose what was best for him 7,greek3 t tou belti_/stou ai7re_/sei71 in consequence of the previous determination of the ,athenians to condemn and punish him4 ,this point deserves attention1 because it is altogether different from ,aristotle's conception of ,nous or ,reason in the ,kosmos3 in which he recognises no consciousness1 no deliberation1 no choice1 no reference to any special situation3 but a constant1 instinctive1 undeliberating1 movement towards ,good as a determining ,end--i4e4 towards the reproduction and perpetuation of regular ,forms4 ,hegel1 in his ,geschichte der ,philosophie 7,part i4 pp4 #cee1 #cfh-cfi1 #bnd edit471 has given very instructive remarks1 in the spirit of the ,aristotelian ,realism1 both upon the principle announced by ,anaxagoras1 and upon the manner in which ,anaxagoras is criticised by ,sokrates in the ,platonic ,phdon4 ,hegel observes3-- ,along with this principle 7that of ,anaxagoras7 there comes in the recognition of an ,intelligence1 or of a self-determining agency which was wanting before4 ,herein we are not to imagine thought1 subjectively considered3 when thought is spoken of1 we are apt to revert to thought as it passes in our consciousness3 but here1 on the contrary1 what is meant is1 the ,idea1 considered altogether objectively1 or ,intelligence as an effective agent3 7,n4,b4 ,intellectum1 or ,cogitatum--not ,intellectio1 or ,cogitatio1 which would mean the conscious process--see this distinction illustrated by ,trendelenburg ad ,aristot4 ,de ,anim1 i4 #b1 #e1 p4 #bai3 also ,marbach1 ,gesch4 der ,phil4 s4 #ed1 #ii not4 #b73 as we say1 that there is reason in the world1 or as we speak of ,genera in nature1 which are the ,universal4 ,the ,genus ,animal is the ,essential of the ,dog--it is the ,dog himself3 the laws of nature are her immanent ,essence4 ,nature is not formed from without1 as men construct a table3 the table is indeed constructed intelligently1 but by an ,intelligence extraneous to this wooden material4 ,it is this extraneous form which we are apt to think of as representing ,intelligence1 when we hear it talked of3 but what is really meant is1 the ,universal--the immanent nature of the object itself4 ,the ,greek3 ,nous is not a thinking ,being without1 which has arranged the world3 by such an interpretation the ,idea of ,anaxagoras would be quite perverted and deprived of all philosophical value4 ,for to suppose an individual1 particular1 ,something without1 is to descend into the region of phantasms and its dualism3 what is called1 a thinking ,being1 is not an ,idea1 but a ,subject4 ,nevertheless1 what is really and truly ,universal is not for that reason ,abstract3 its characteristic property1 qu ,universal1 is to determine in itself1 by itself1 and for itself1 the particular accompaniments4 ,while it carries on this process of change1 it maintains itself at the same time as the ,universal1 always the same2 this is a portion of its self-determining efficiency4--,what ,hegel here adverts to seems identical with that which ,dr4 ,henry ,more calls an ,emanative ,cause 7,immortality of the ,soul1 ch4 vi4 p4 #ah71 the notion of a thing possible4 ,an ,emanative ,effect is co-existent with the very substance of that which is said to be the ,cause thereof4 ,that which emanes1 if ,i may so speak1 is the same in reality with its ,emanative ,cause4 ,respecting the criticism of ,sokrates upon ,anaxagoras1 ,hegel has further acute remarks which are too long to cite 7p4 #cfh seq47 ,side-note3 ,the supposed theory of ,anaxagoras cannot be carried out1 either by ,sokrates himself or any one else4 ,sokrates turns to general words1 and adopts the theory of ideas4 ,it is however singular1 that ,sokrates1 after he has extolled ,anaxagoras for enunciating a grand general cause1 and has blamed him only for not making application of it in detail1 proceeds to state that neither he himself1 nor any one else within his knowledge1 could find the way of applying it1 any more than ,anaxagoras had done4 ,if ,anaxagoras had failed1 no one else could do better4 ,the facts before ,sokrates could not be reconciled1 by any way that he could devise1 with his assumed principle of rational directing force1 or constant optimistic purpose1 inherent in the ,kosmos4 ,accordingly he abandoned this track1 and entered upon another3 seeking a different sort of cause 7,greek3 ts ai7ti_/as to ei7dos71 not by contemplation of things1 but by propositions and ratiocinative discourse4 ,he now assumed as a principle an universal axiom or proposition1 from which he proceeds to deduce consequences4 ,the principle thus laid down is1 ,that there exist substantial ,ideas--universal ,entia4 ,each of these ,ideas communicates or imparts its own nature to the particulars which bear the same name3 and such communion or participation is the cause why they are what they are4 ,the cause why various objects are beautiful or great1 is1 because they partake of the ,self-,beautiful or the ,self-,great3 the cause why they are two or three is1 because they partake of the ,dyad or the ,triad4 ,side-note3 ,vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word ,cause4 ,that is a cause1 to each man1 which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings4 ,here then we have a third stage or variety of belief1 in the speculative mind of ,sokrates1 respecting ,causes4 ,the self-existent ,ideas 7propria ,platonis supellex1 to use the words of ,seneca#fi7 are postulated as ,causes3 and in this belief ,sokrates at last finds satisfaction4 ,but these ,causative ,ideas1 or ,ideal ,causes1 though satisfactory to ,plato1 were accepted by scarcely any one else4 ,they were transformed--seemingly even by ,plato himself before his death1 into ,ideal ,numbers1 products of the ,one implicated with ,great and ,little or the undefined ,dyad--and still farther transformed by his successors ,speusippus and ,xenokrates3 they were impugned in every way1 and emphatically rejected1 by ,aristotle4 ,footnote #fi3 ,seneca1 ,epistol4 ,about this disposition1 manifested by many philosophers1 and in a particular manner by ,plato1 to embrace logical phantoms as real causes1 ,i transcribe a good passage from ,malebranche4 ,je me sens encore extrmement port dire que cette colonne est dure par sa nature2 ou bien que les petits liens dont sont composs les corps durs1 sont des atmes1 dont les parties ne se peuvent diviser1 comme tant les parties essentieles et dernires des corps--et qui sont essentiellement crochues ou branchues4 ,mais je reconnois franchement1 que ce n'est point expliquer la difficult2 et que1 quittant les proccupations et les illusions de mes sens1 j'aurais tort de recourir une forme abstraite1 et d'embrasser un fantme de logique pour la cause que je cherche4 ,je veux dire1 que j'aurois tort de conevoir1 comme quelque chose de rel et de distinct1 l'ide vague de nature et d'essence1 qui n'exprime que ce que l'on sait3 et de prendre ainsi une forme abstraite et universelle1 comme une cause physique d'un effet trs rel4 ,car il y a deux choses dont je ne saurais trop dfier4 ,la premire est1 l'impression de mes sens3 et l'autre est1 la facilit que j'ai de prendre les natures abstraites et les ides gnrales de logique1 pour celles qui sont relles et particulires3 et je me souviens d'avoir t plusieurs fois sduit par ces deux principes d'erreur4 7,malebranche--,recherche de la ,vrit1 vol4 iii41 liv4 vi41 ch4 #h1 p4 #bde1 ed4 #aggb47 ,the foregoing picture given by ,sokrates of the wanderings of his mind 7,greek3 tas e7mas pla_/nas7 in search of ,causes1 is interesting1 not only in reference to the ,platonic age1 but also to the process of speculation generally4 ,almost every one talks of a ,cause as a word of the clearest meaning1 familiar and understood by all hearers4 ,there are many who represent the ,idea of ,cause as simple1 intuitive1 self-originated1 universal2 one and the same in all minds4 ,these philosophers consider the maxim that every phenomenon must have a ,cause--as self-evident1 known priori apart from experience3 as something which no one can help believing as soon as it is stated to him4#gj ,the gropings of ,sokrates are among the numerous facts which go to refute such a theory3 or at least to show in what sense alone it can be partially admitted4 ,there is no fixed1 positive1 universal ,idea1 corresponding to the word ,cause4 ,there is a wide divergence1 as to the question what a ,cause really is1 between different ages of the same man 7exemplified in the case of ,sokrates73 much more between different philosophers at one time and another4 ,plato complains of ,anaxagoras and other philosophers for assigning as ,causes that which did not truly deserve the name3 ,aristotle also blames the defective conceptions of his predecessors 7,plato included7 on the same subject4 ,if there be an intuitive idea corresponding to the word ,cause1 it must be a different intuition in ,plato and ,aristotle--in ,plato himself at one age and at another age3 in other philosophers1 different from both and from each other4 ,the word is equivocal--,greek3 pollachs lego_/menon1 in ,aristotelian phrase--men use it familiarly1 but vary much in the thing signified4 ,that is a ,cause1 to each man1 which gives satisfaction to the inquisitive feelings--curiosity1 anxious perplexity1 speculative embarrassment of his own mind4 ,now doubtless these inquisitive feelings are natural and widespread3 they are emotions of our nature1 which men seek 7in some cases7 to appease by some satisfactory hypothesis4 ,that answer which affords satisfaction1 looked at in one of its aspects1 is called ,cause2 ,beginning or ,principle--,element--represent other aspects of the same ,qusitum3-- ,felix1 qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas1 ,atque metus omnes et inexorabile ,fatum ,subjecit pedibus strepitumque ,acherontis avari1 is the exclamation of that sentiment of wonder and uneasiness out of which1 according to ,plato and ,aristotle1 philosophy springs4#ga ,but though the appetite or craving is common1 in greater or less degree1 to most persons--the nourishment calculated to allay it is by no means the same to all4 ,good 7says ,aristotle7 is that which all men desire3#gb but all men do not agree in their judgment1 what ,good is4 ,the point of communion between mankind is here emotional rather than intellectual3 in the painful feeling of difficulty to be solved1 not in the manner of conceiving what the difficulty is1 nor in the direction where solution is to be sought1 nor in the solution itself when suggested4#gc ,footnote #gj3 ,dugald ,stewart1 ,elem4 ,philos4 ,hum4 ,mind1 vol4 i4 ch4 #a1 sect4 #b1 pp4 #ih-ii1 ed4 ,hamilton1 also note c same volume4 ,several modern philosophers 7especially ,dr4 ,reid1 ,on the ,intell4 ,powers7 have been at pains to illustrate that law of our nature which leads us to refer every change we perceive in the universe to the operation of an efficient cause4 ,this reference is not the result of reasoning1 but necessarily accompanies the perception1 so as to render it impossible for us to see the change1 without feeling a conviction of the operation of some cause by which it is produced2 much in the same manner in which we find it impossible to conceive a sensation1 without being impressed with a belief of the existence of a sentient being4 ,hence ,i conceive it is that when we see two events constantly conjoined1 we are led to associate the idea of causation or efficiency with the former1 and to refer to it that power or energy by which the change is produced2 in consequence of which association we come to consider philosophy as the knowledge of efficient causes1 and lose sight of the operation of mind in producing the phenomena of nature4 ,it is by an association somewhat similar that we connect our sensations of colour with the primary qualities of body4 ,a moment's reflection must satisfy any one that the sensation of colour can only reside in a mind4 4 4 4 ,in the same way we are led to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of power1 force1 energy1 causation1 which are all attributes of mind1 and can exist in a mind only4 ,footnote #ga3 ,virgil1 ,georg4 ii4 #dij-ib4 ,compare ,lucretius1 vi4 #ej-fe1 and the letter of ,epikurus to ,herodotus1 p4 #be1 ed4 ,orelli4 ,plato1 ,thett4 p4 #aee ,d4 ,greek3 ma_/la gar philoso_/phou touto to pa_/thos1 to thauma_/zein2 ou7 gar a7rch a7_/ll philosophi_/as1 7 au7_/t3--,aristotel4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #ihb1 b4 #aj-bj4 ,greek3 dia gar to thauma_/zein oi7 a7_/nthrpoi kai nun kai to prton 7rxanto philosophein1 o7 de a7porn kai thauma_/zn oi7_/etai a7gnoein4 ,footnote #gb3 ,aristotel4 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 i4 #a4 ,greek3 dio kals a7peph_/nanto ta7gatho_/n1 ou7 pa_/ntes e7phi_/entai4 ,plato1 ,republ4 vi4 p4 #eje ,e4 ,greek3 ,o7_/ d di_/kei men a7pasa psuch kai tou_/tou e7_/neka pa_/nta pra_/ttei1 a7pomanteuome_/n ti ei7nai1 a7porousa de kai ou7k e7_/chousa labein i7kans ti_/ pot' e7sti_/n1 c4 ,seneca1 ,epistol4 #aah4 ,bonum est1 quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet4 ,footnote #gc3 ,aristotle recognises the different nature of the difficulties and problems which present themselves to the speculative mind3 he looks back upon the embarrassments of his predecessors as antiquated and even silly1 ,metaphysic4 ,n4 #ajhi1 a4 #b4 ,greek3 ,polla men ou7n ta ai7_/tia ts e7pi tau_/tas tas ai7ti_/as e7ktrops1 ma_/lista de to a7porsai a7rchaiks1 which ,alexander of ,aphrodisias paraphrases by ,greek3 a7rchaiks kai eu7ths4 ,compare ,a #iic1 a4 #ae4 ,in another passage of the same book1 ,aristotle notes and characterises the emotion experienced by the mind in possessing what is regarded as truth--the mental satisfaction obtained when a difficulty is solved1 #ajij1 a4 #ch4 ,greek3 ,oi7 de christon poiountes 7ton a7rithmo_/n71 o7_/ti e7pi tn ai7sthtn ou7k e7_/stai ta a7xi_/mata1 a7lth de ta lego_/mena kai sai_/nei tn psuch_/n1 ei7nai_/ te u7polamba_/nousi kai christa ei7nai2 o7moi_/s de ta mege_/th ta mathmatika_/4 ,the subjective origin of philosophy--the feelings which prompt to the theorising process1 striking out different hypotheses and analogies--are well stated by ,adam ,smith1 ',history of ,astronomy1' sect4 ii4 and iii4 ,side-note3 ,dissension and perplexity on the question4--,what is a cause8 revealed by the picture of ,sokrates--no intuition to guide him4 ,when ,sokrates here tells us that as a young man he felt anxious curiosity to know what the cause of every phenomenon was1 it is plain that at this time he did not know what he was looking for3 that he proceeded only by successive steps of trial1 doubt1 discovered error1 rejection3 and that each trial was adapted to the then existing state of his own mind4 ,the views of ,anaxagoras he affirms to have presented themselves to him as a new revelation3 he then came to believe that the only true ,cause was1 a cosmical reason and volition like to that of which he was conscious in himself4 ,yet he farther tells us1 that others did not admit this ,cause1 but found other causes to satisfy them3 that even ,anaxagoras did not follow out his own general conception1 but recognised ,causes quite unconnected with it3 lastly1 that neither could he 7,sokrates7 trace out the conception for himself4#gd ,he was driven to renounce it1 and to turn to another sort of ,cause--the hypothesis of self-existent ,ideas1 in which he then acquiesced4 ,and this last hypothesis1 again1 was ultimately much modified in the mind of ,plato himself1 as we know from ,aristotle4 ,all this shows that the ,idea of ,cause--far from being one and the same to all1 like the feeling of uneasiness which prompts the search for it--is complicated1 diverse1 relative1 and modifiable4 ,footnote #gd3 ,the view of ,cause1 which ,sokrates here declares himself to renounce from inability to pursue it1 is substantially the same as what he lays down in the ,philbus1 pp4 #bc ,d1 #bg ,a1 #cj ,e4 ,in the ,timus ,plato assigns to ,timus the task 7to which ,sokrates in the ,phdon had confessed himself incompetent7 of following into detail the schemes and proceedings of the ,demiurgic or optimising ,greek3 ,nous4 ,but he also assumes the ,greek3 ei7_/d or ,ideas as co-ordinate and essential conditions4 ,side-note3 ,different notions of ,plato and ,aristotle about causation1 causes regular and irregular4 ,inductive theory of causation1 elaborated in modern times4 ,the last among the various revolutions which ,sokrates represents himself to have undergone--the transition from designing and volitional agency of the ,kosmos conceived as an animated system1 to the sovereignty of universal ,ideas--is analogous to that transition which ,auguste ,comte considers to be the natural progress of the human mind3 to explain phenomena at first by reference to some personal agency1 and to pass from this mode of explanation to that by metaphysical abstractions4 ,it is true that these are two distinct modes of conceiving ,causation2 and that in each of them the human mind1 under different states of social and individual instruction1 finds satisfaction4 ,but each of the two theories admits of much diversity in the mode of conception4 ,plato seems to have first given prominence to these metaphysical causes2 and ,aristotle in this respect follows his example3 though he greatly censures the incomplete and erroneous theories of ,plato4 ,it is remarkable that both these two philosophers recognised ,causes irregular and unpredictable1 as well as ,causes regular and predictable4 ,neither of them included even the idea of regularity1 as an essential part of the meaning of ,cause4#ge ,lastly1 there has been elaborated in modern times1 owing to the great extension of inductive science1 another theory of ,causation1 in which unconditional regularity is the essential constituent3 recognising no true ,causes except the phenomenal causes certified by experience1 as interpreted inductively and deductively--the assemblage of phenomenal antecedents1 uniform and unconditional1 so far as they can be discovered and verified4 ,certain it is that these are the only causes obtainable by induction and experience3 though many persons are not satisfied without looking elsewhere for transcendental or ontological causes of a totally different nature4 ,all these theories imply--what ,sokrates announces in the passage just cited--the deep-seated influence of speculative curiosity1 or the thirst for finding the ,why of things and events1 as a feeling of the human mind3 but all of them indicate the discrepant answers with which1 in different enquirers1 this feeling is satisfied1 though under the same equivocal name ,cause4 ,and it would have been a proceeding worthy of ,plato's dialectic1 if he had applied to the word ,cause the same cross-examining analysis which we have seen him applying to the equally familiar words--,virtue--,courage--,temperance--, friendship1 c4 ,first1 let us settle what a ,cause really is3 then1 and not till then1 can we succeed in ulterior enquiries respecting it4#gf ,footnote #ge3 ,monboddo1 ,ancient ,metaphysics1 ,b4 #a4 ch4 iv4 p4 #cb4 ,plato appears to have been the first of the ,ionic ,school that introduced formal causes into natural philosophy4 ,these he called ,ideas1 and made the principles of all things4 ,and the reason why he insists so much upon this kind of cause1 and so little upon the other three1 is given us by ,aristotle in the end of his first book of ,metaphysics1 viz41 that he studied mathematics too much1 and instead of using them as the handmaid of philosophy1 made them philosophy itself4 4 4 4 ,plato1 however1 in the ,phdon says a good deal about final causes2 but in the system of natural philosophy which is in the ,timus1 he says very little of it4 ,i have already observed that ,plato in the ,timus 7#dh ,a7 recognises erratic or irregular ,causation--,greek3 7 planme_/n ai7ti_/a4 ,aristotle recognises ,greek3 ,ai7ti_/a among the equivocal words ,greek3 pollachs lego_/mena2 and he enumerates ,greek3 ,tu_/ch and ,greek3 ,au7to_/maton--irregular causes or causes by accident--among them 7,physic4 ii4 #aie-aih2 ,metaphys4 ,k4 #ajfe1 a47 ,schwegler1 ad ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 vi4 #d1 #c1 ,das ,zufllige ist ein nothwendiges ,element alles ,geschehens4 ,alexander of ,aphrodisias1 the best of the ,aristotelian commentators1 is at pains to defend this view of ,greek3 ,tu_/ch--,causation by accident1 or irregular4 ,proklus1 in his ,commentary on the ,timus 7ii4 #hj-ha1 p4 #ahh1 ,schneider71 notices the labour and prolixity with which the commentators before him set out the different varieties of ,cause2 distinguishing sixty-four according to ,plato1 and forty-eight according to ,aristotle4 ,proklus adverts also 7ad ,timum1 iii4 p4 #agf7 to an animated controversy raised by ,theophrastus against ,plato1 about ,causes and the speculations thereupon4 ,an enumeration1 though very incomplete1 of the different meanings assigned to the word ,cause1 may be seen in ,professor ,fleming's ,vocabulary of ,philosophy4 ,footnote #gf3 ,see ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 ,discussions on ,philosophy1 ,appendix1 p4 #ehe4 ,the debates about what was meant in philosophy by the word ,cause are certainly older than ,plato4 ,we read that it was discussed among the philosophers who frequented the house of ,perikles2 and that that eminent statesman was ridiculed by his dissolute son ,xanthippus for taking part in such useless refinements 7,plutarch1 ,perikles1 c4 #cf74 ,but the ,platonic dialogues are the oldest compositions in which any attempts to analyse the meaning of the word are preserved to us4 ,greek3 ,ai7_/tiai1 ,a7rchai_/1 ,stoicheia 7,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,greek3 ,d471 were the main objects of search with the ancient speculative philosophers4 ,while all of them set to themselves the same problem1 each of them hit upon a different solution4 ,that which gave mental satisfaction to one1 appeared unsatisfactory and even inadmissible to the rest4 ,the first book of ,aristotle's ,metaphysica gives an instructive view of this discrepancy4 ,his own analysis of ,cause will come before us hereafter4 ,compare the long discussions on the subject in ,sextus ,empiricus1 ,pyrrhon4 ,hypo4 iii4 #ac-cj2 and adv4 ,mathemat4 ix4 #aie-bej4 ,the discrepancy was so great among the dogmatical philosophers1 that he pronounces the reality of the causal sequence to be indeterminable--,greek3 o7_/son men ou7n e7pi tois legome_/nois u7po tn dogmatikn1 ou7d' a7n e7nnosai_/ tis to ai7_/tion du_/naito1 ei7_/ ge pros t diaph_/nous kai a7lloko_/tous 7a7podido_/nai7 e7nnoi_/as tou ai7ti_/ou e7_/ti kai tn u7po_/stasin au7tou pepoi_/kasin a7neu_/reton dia tn peri au7to diaphni_/an4 ,seneca 7,epist4 #fe7 blends together the ,platonic and the ,aristotelian views1 when he ascribes to ,plato a quintuple variety of ,causa4 ,the quadruple variety of ,causation established by ,aristotle governed the speculations of philosophers during the middle ages4 ,but since the decline of the ,aristotelian philosophy1 there are few subjects which have been more keenly debated among metaphysicians than the ,idea of ,cause4 ,it is one of the principal points of divergence among the different schools of philosophy now existing4 ,a volume1 and a very instructive volume1 might be filled with the enumeration and contrast of the different theories on the subject4 ,upon the view which a man takes on this point will depend mainly the scope or purpose which he sets before him in philosophy4 ,many seek the solution of their problem in transcendental1 ontological1 extra-phenomenal causes1 lying apart from and above the world of fact and experience2 ,reid and ,stewart1 while acknowledging the existence of such causes as the true efficient causes1 consider them as being out of the reach of human knowledge2 others recognise no true cause except personal1 quasi-human1 voluntary1 agency1 grounded on the type of human volition4 ,others1 again1 with whom my own opinion coincides1 following out the analysis of ,hume and ,brown1 understand by causes nothing more than phenomenal antecedents constant and unconditional1 ascertainable by experience and induction4 ,see the copious and elaborate chapter on this subject in ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's ',system of ,logic1' ,book iii4 ch4 #e1 especially as enlarged in the fourth1 fifth1 and sixth editions of that work1 including the criticism on the opposite or volitional theory of ,causation2 also the work of ,professor ,bain1 ',the ,emotions and the ,will1' pp4 #dgb-ehd4 ,the opposite view1 in which ,causes are treated as something essentially distinct from ,laws1 and as ultra-phenomenal1 is set forth by ,dr4 ,whewell1 ',novum ,organon ,renovatum1' ch4 vii4 p4 #aah seq4 ,side-note3 ,last transition of the mind of ,sokrates from things to words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas4 ,great multitude of ideas assumed1 each fitting a certain number of particulars4 ,there is yet another point which deserves attention in this history given by ,sokrates of the transitions of his own mind4 ,his last transition is represented as one from things to words1 that is1 to general propositions3#gg to the assumption in each case of an universal proposition or hypothesis calculated to fit that case4 ,he does not seem to consider the optimistic doctrine1 which he had before vainly endeavoured to follow out1 as having been an hypothesis1 or universal proposition assumed as true and as a principle from which to deduce consequences4 ,even if it were so1 however1 it was one and the same assumption intended to suit all cases3 whereas the new doctrine to which he passed included many distinct assumptions1 each adapted to a certain number of cases and not to the rest4#gh ,he assumed an untold multitude of self-existent ,ideas--,the ,self-,beautiful1 ,self-,just1 ,self-,great1 ,self-,equal1 ,self-,unequal1 c4--each of them adapted to a certain number of particular cases3 the ,self-,beautiful was assumed as the cause why all particular things were beautiful--as that1 of which all and each of them partakes--and so of the rest4#gi ,plato then explains his procedure4 ,he first deduced various consequences from this assumed hypothesis1 and examined whether all of them were consistent or inconsistent with each other4 ,if he detected inconsistencies 7as e4g4 in the last half of the ,parmenids71 we must suppose 7though ,plato does not expressly say so7 that he would reject or modify his fundamental assumption3 if he found none1 he would retain it4 ,the point would have to be tried by dialectic debate with an opponent3 the logical process of inference and counter-inference is here assumed to be trustworthy4 ,but during this debate ,plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally4 ,if the opponent chose to impugn the latter1 he must open a distinct debate on that express subject4 ,plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis1 shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself4 ,from the language employed1 he seems to have had in view certain disputants known to him1 by whom the two were so blended together as to produce much confusion in the reasoning4 ,footnote #gg3 ,aristotle 7,metaphysic4 ,a4 #ihg1 b4 #ca1 ,greek3 ,th4 #ajej1 b4 #ce7 calls the ,platonici ,greek3 oi7 e7n tois lo_/gois3 see the note of ,bonitz4 ,footnote #gh3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ajj ,a4 ,greek3 a7ll' ou7n d tau_/t ge 7_/rmsa1 kai u7pothe_/menos e7ka_/stote lo_/gon o7n a7n kri_/n e7r7r7mene_/staton ei7nai1 a7 men a7n moi dok tou_/t xumphnein1 ti_/thmi 7s a7lth o7_/nta1 kai peri ai7ti_/as kai peri tn a7_/lln a7pa_/ntn2 a7 d' a7n m_/1 7s ou7k a7lth4 ,footnote #gi3 ,aristotle controverts this doctrine of ,plato in a pointed manner1 ,de ,gen4 et ,corrupt4 ii4 #i1 p4 #cce1 b4 #aj1 also ,metaphys4 ,a4 #iia1 b4 #c4 ,the former passage is the most animated in point of expression1 where ,aristotle says--,greek3 7_/sper o7 e7n t ,phai_/dni ,skra_/ts2 kai gar e7keinos1 e7pitim_/sas tois a7_/llois 7s ou7den ei7rko_/sin1 u7poti_/thetai--which is very true about the ,platonic dialogue ,phdon1 c4 ,but in both the two passages1 ,aristotle distinctly maintains that the ,ideas cannot be ,causes of any thing4 ,this is another illustration of what ,i have observed above1 that the meaning of the word ,cause has been always fluctuating and undetermined4 ,we see that1 while ,aristotle affirmed that the ,ideas could not be ,causes of anything1 ,plato here maintains that they are the only true ,causes4 ,side-note3 ,ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality4 ,but if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself1 how are you to defend it8 ,plato here tells us3 by means of some other hypothesis or assumption1 yet more universal than itself4 ,you must ascend upwards in the scale of generality1 until you find an assumption suitable and sufficient4#hj ,footnote #hj3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aja ,e4 ,we here see where it was that ,plato looked for full1 indisputable1 self-recommending and self-assuring1 certainty and truth4 ,among the most universal propositions4 ,he states the matter here as if we were to provide defence for an hypothesis less universal by ascending to another hypothesis more universal4 ,this is illustrated by what he says in the ,timus--,propositions are cognate with the matter which they affirm3 those whose affirmation is purely intellectual1 comprising only matter of the intelligible world1 or of genuine ,essence1 are solid and inexpugnable3 those which take in more or less of the sensible world1 which is a mere copy of the intelligible exemplar1 become less and less trustworthy--mere probabilities4 ,here we have the ,platonic worship of the most universal propositions1 as the only primary and evident truths4#ha ,but in the sixth and seventh books of the ,republic1 he delivers a precept somewhat different1 requiring the philosopher not to rest in any hypothesis as an ultimatum1 but to consider them all as stepping-stones for enabling him to ascend into a higher region1 above all hypothesis--to the first principle of every thing3 and he considers geometrical reasoning as defective because it takes its departure from hypothesis or assumptions of which no account is rendered4#hb ,in the ,republic he thus contemplates an intuition by the mind of some primary1 clear1 self-evident truth1 above all hypotheses or assumptions even the most universal1 and transmitting its own certainty to every thing which could be logically deduced from it3 while in the ,phdon1 he does not recognise any thing higher or more certain than the most universal hypothesis--and he even presents the theory of self-existent ,ideas as nothing more than an hypothesis1 though a very satisfactory one4 ,in the ,republic1 ,plato has come to imagine the ,idea of ,good as distinguished from and illuminating all the other ,ideas3 in the ,timus1 it seems personified in the ,demiurgus2 in the ,phdon1 that ,idea of ,good appears to be represented by the ,nous or ,reason of ,anaxagoras4 ,but ,sokrates is unable to follow it out1 so that it becomes included1 without any pre-eminence1 among the ,ideas generally3 all of them transcendental1 co-ordinate1 and primary sources of truth to the intelligent mind--yet each of them exercising a causative influence in its own department1 and bestowing its own special character on various particulars4 ,footnote #ha3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #bi ,b4 ,greek3 7de ou7n peri_/ te ei7ko_/nos kai tou paradei_/gmatos dioriste_/on1 7s a7_/ra tous lo_/gous1 7npe_/r ei7sin e7xgtai_/1 tou_/tn au7tn kai xuggeneis o7_/ntas4 tou men ou7n moni_/mou kai bebai_/ou kai meta nou kataphanous1 moni_/mous kai a7metapt_/tous 4 4 4 tous de tou pros men e7keino a7peikasthe_/ntos1 o7_/ntos de ei7ko_/nos1 ei7ko_/tas a7na lo_/gon te e7kei_/nn o7_/ntas2 o7_/1 tiper pros ge_/nesin ou7si_/a1 touto pros pi_/stin a7lthei_/a4 ,footnote #hb3 ,plato1 ,republic1 vi4 p4 #eaa4 ,greek3 tn u7pothe_/sen a7nte_/r e7kbai_/nein 4 4 4 4 to e7_/teron tmma tou notou1 ou7 au7tos o7 lo_/gos a7_/ptetai t tou diale_/gesthai duna_/mei1 tas u7pothe_/seis poiou_/menos ou7k a7rchas a7lla t o7_/nti u7pothe_/seis1 oi7on e7piba_/seis te kai o7rma_/s1 i7_/na me_/chri tou a7nupothe_/tou e7pi tn tou pantos a7rchn i7_/n1 a7psa_/menos au7ts1 pa_/lin au7 e7cho_/menos tn e7kei_/ns e7chome_/nn1 ou7_/ts e7pi teleutn katabai_/n1 ai7stht panta_/pasin ou7deni proschr_/menos1 a7ll' ei7_/desin au7tois di' au7tn ei7s au7ta_/1 kai teleuta ei7s ei7_/d4 ,compare vii4 p4 #ecc4 ,side-note3 ,plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests upon the assumption of the ,platonic ideas4 ,reasoning to prove this4 ,it is from the assumption of these ,ideas as eternal ,essences1 that ,plato undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul4 ,one ,idea or ,form will not admit1 but peremptorily excludes1 the approach of that other ,form which is opposite to it4 ,greatness will not receive the form of littleness3 nor will the greatness which is in any particular subject receive the form of littleness4 ,if the form of littleness be brought to bear1 greatness will not stay to receive it1 but will either retire or be destroyed4 ,the same is true likewise respecting that which essentially has the form3 thus fire has essentially the form of heat1 and snow has essentially the form of cold4 ,accordingly fire1 as it will not receive the form of cold1 so neither will it receive snow3 and snow1 as it will not receive the form of heat1 so neither will it receive fire4 ,if fire comes1 snow will either retire or will be destroyed4 ,the ,triad has always the ,form of ,oddness1 and will never receive that of ,evenness3 the ,dyad has always the ,form of ,evenness1 and will never receive that of ,oddness--upon the approach of this latter it will either disappear or will be destroyed3 moreover the ,dyad1 while refusing to receive the ,form of ,oddness1 will refuse also to receive that of the ,triad1 which always embodies that ,form--although three is not in direct contrariety with two4 ,if then we are asked1 ,what is that1 the presence of which makes a body hot8 we need not confine ourselves to the answer--,it is the ,form of ,heat--which1 though correct1 gives no new information3 but we may farther say--,it is ,fire1 which involves the ,form of ,heat4 ,if we are asked1 ,what is that1 the presence of which makes a number odd1 we shall not say--,it is ,oddness3 but we shall say--,it is the ,triad or the ,pentad--both of which involve ,oddness4 ,side-note3 ,the soul always brings life1 and is essentially living4 ,it cannot receive death3 in other words1 it is immortal4 ,in like manner1 the question being asked1 ,what is that1 which1 being in the body1 will give it life8 we must answer--,it is the soul4 ,the soul1 when it lays hold of any body1 always arrives bringing with it life4 ,now death is the contrary of life4 ,accordingly the soul1 which always brings with it life1 will never receive the contrary of life4 ,in other words1 it is deathless or immortal4#hc ,footnote #hc3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aje ,c-,e4 ,greek3 ,a7pokri_/nou d_/1 7 a7n ti_/ e7gge_/ntai s_/mati1 zn e7_/stai8 7i a7n psuch_/1 e7_/ph4 ,ou7koun a7ei touto ou7_/ts e7_/chei8 ,ps gar ou7chi_/8 7 d' o7_/s4 7 psuch a7_/ra o7_/1 ti a7n au7t kata_/sch1 a7ei 7_/kei e7p' e7keino phe_/rousa z_/n8 7_/kei me_/ntoi1 e7_/ph4 ,po_/teron d' e7_/sti ti z e7nanti_/on1 7 ou7de_/n8 ,e7_/stin1 e7_/ph4 ,ti_/8 ,tha_/natos4 ou7koun 7 psuch to e7nanti_/on 7 au7t e7piphe_/rei a7ei ou7 m_/ pote de_/xtai1 7s e7k tn pro_/sthen 7molo_/gtai8 ,kai ma_/la spho_/dra1 e7_/ph o7 ,ke_/bs4 4 4 4 ,o7 d' a7n tha_/naton m de_/chtai1 ti_/ kaloumen8 ,a7tha_/naton1 e7_/ph4 ,a7tha_/naton a7_/ra 7 psuch_/8 ,a7tha_/naton4 ,nemesius1 the ,christian bishop of ,emesa1 declares that the proofs given by ,plato of the immortality of the soul are knotty and difficult to understand1 such as even adepts in philosophical study can hardly follow4 ,his own belief in it he rests upon the inspiration of the ,christian ,scriptures 7,nemesius de ,nat4 ,homin4 c4 #b4 p4 #ee1 ed4 #aefe74 ,side-note3 ,the proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or translation of the soul from one body to another4 ,such is the ground upon which ,sokrates rests his belief in the immortality of the soul4 ,the doctrine reposes1 in ,plato's view1 upon the assumption of eternal1 self-existent1 unchangeable1 ,ideas or ,forms3#hd upon the congeniality of nature1 and inherent correlation1 between these ,ideas and the ,soul3 upon the fact1 that the soul knows these ,ideas1 which knowledge must have been acquired in a prior state of existence3 and upon the essential participation of the soul in the ,idea of life1 so that it cannot be conceived as without life1 or as dead4#he ,the immortality of the soul is conceived as necessary and entire1 including not merely post-existence1 but also pre-existence4 ,in fact the reference to an anterior time is more essential to ,plato's theory than that to a posterior time2 because it is employed to explain the cognitions of the mind1 and the identity of learning with reminiscence3 while ,simmias1 who even at the close is not without reserve on the subject of the post-existence1 proclaims an emphatic adhesion on that of the pre-existence4#hf ,the proof1 moreover1 being founded in great part on the ,idea of ,life1 embraces every thing living1 and is common to animals#hg 7if not to plants7 as well as to men3 and the metempsychosis--or transition of souls not merely from one human body to another1 but also from the human to the animal body1 and vice vers--is a portion of the ,platonic creed4 ,footnote #hd3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #gf ,d-,e1 #ajj ,b-,c4 ,it is remarkable that in the ,republic also1 ,sokrates undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul3 and that in doing so he does not make any reference or allusion to the arguments used in the ,phdon1 but produces another argument totally distinct and novel3 an argument which ,meiners remarks truly to be quite peculiar to ,plato1 ,republic1 x4 pp4 #fji ,e1 #faa ,c2 ,meiners1 ,geschichte der ,wissenschaften1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ghj4 ,footnote #he3 ,zeller1 ,philosophie der ,griech4 ,part ii4 p4 #bfg4 ,die ,seele ist ihrem ,begriffe nach dasjenige1 zu dessen ,wesen es gehrt zu leben--sie kann also in keinem ,augenblicke als nicht lebend gedacht werden3 ,in diesem ontologischen ,beweis fr die ,unsterblichkeit1 laufen nicht bloss alle die einzelnen ,beweise des ,phdon zusammen1 sondern derselbe wird auch schon im ,phaedrus vorgetragen1 c4 ,compare ,phdrus1 p4 #bde4 ,hegel1 in his ,geschichte der ,philosophie 7,part ii4 pp4 #ahf-ahg-ahi1 ed4 #b71 maintains that ,plato did not conceive the soul as a separate thing or reality--that he did not mean to affirm1 in the literal sense of the words1 its separate existence either before or after the present life--that he did not descend to so crude a conception 7zu dieser ,rohheit herabzusinken7 as to represent to himself the soul as a thing1 or to enquire into its duration or continuance after the manner of a thing--that ,plato understood the soul to exist essentially as the ,universal ,notion or ,idea1 the comprehensive aggregate of all other ,ideas1 in which sense he affirmed it to be immortal--that the descriptions which ,plato gives of its condition1 either before life or after death1 are to be treated only as poetical metaphors4 ,there is ingenuity in this view of ,hegel1 and many separate expressions of ,plato receive light from it3 but it appears to me to refine away too much4 ,plato had in his own mind and belief both the soul as a particular thing--and the soul as an universal4 ,his language implies sometimes the one sometimes the other4 ,footnote #hf3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #ib1 #ajg ,b4 ,footnote #hg3 ,see what ,sokrates says about the swans1 ,phdon1 p4 #he ,a-,b4 ,side-note3 ,after finishing his proof that the soul is immortal1 ,sokrates enters into a description1 what will become of it after the death of the body4 ,he describes a ,greek3 ,nekui_/a4 ,having completed his demonstration of the immortality of the soul1 ,sokrates proceeds to give a sketch of the condition and treatment which it experiences after death4 ,the ,greek3 ,nekui_/a here following is analogous1 in general doctrinal scope1 to those others which we read in the ,republic and in the ,gorgias3 but all of them are different in particular incidents1 illustrative circumstances1 and scenery4 ,the sentiment of belief in ,plato's mind attaches itself to general doctrines1 which appear to him to possess an evidence independent of particulars4 ,when he applies these doctrines to particulars1 he makes little distinction between such as are true1 or problematical1 or fictitious3 he varies his mythes at pleasure1 provided that they serve the purpose of illustrating his general view4 ,the mythe which we read in the ,phdon includes a description of the ,earth which to us appears altogether imaginative and poetical3 yet it is hardly more so than several other current theories1 proposed by various philosophers antecedent and contemporary1 respecting ,earth and ,sea4 ,aristotle criticises the views expressed in the ,phdon1 as he criticises those of ,demokritus and ,empedokles4#hh ,each soul of a deceased person is conducted by his ,genius to the proper place1 and there receives sentence of condemnation to suffering1 greater or less according to his conduct in life1 in the deep chasm called ,tartarus1 and in the rivers of mud and fire1 ,styx1 ,kokytus1 ,pyriphlegethon4#hi ,to those who have passed their lives in learning1 and who have detached themselves as much as they possibly could from all pleasures and all pursuits connected with the body--in order to pursue wisdom and virtue--a full reward is given4 ,they are emancipated from the obligation of entering another body1 and are allowed to live ever afterwards disembodied in the pure regions of ,ideas4#ij ,footnote #hh3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #ajg-aaa4 ,olympiodorus pronounces the mythe to be a good imitation of the truth1 ,republ4 x4 #fbj seq42 ,gorgias1 p4 #ebj2 ,aristotle1 ,meteorol4 ii4 pp4 #cee-cef4 ,compare also #cef1 b4 #aj1 #ceg1 a4 #be1 where he states and canvasses the doctrines of ,demokritus and ,empedokles2 also #ceb1 a4 #ce1 about the ,greek3 a7rchaioi theo_/logoi4 ,he is rather more severe upon these others than upon ,plato4 ,he too considers1 like ,plato1 that the amount of evidence which you ought to require for your belief depends upon the nature of the subject2 and that there are various subjects on which you ought to believe on slighter evidence3 see ,metaphysic4 ,a4 #iie1 a4 #b-af3 ,ethic4 ,nikom4 i4 #a1 #ajid1 b4 #ab-ad4 ,footnote #hi3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #aaa-aab4 ,compare ,eusebius1 ,prp4 ,ev4 xiii4 #ac1 and ,arnobius adv4 ,gentes1 ii4 #ad4 ,arnobius blames ,plato for inconsistency in saying that the soul is immortal in its own nature1 and yet that it suffers pain after death--,rem inenodabilem suscipit 7,plato7 ut cum animas dicat immortales1 perpetuas1 et ex corporali soliditate privatas1 puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris afficiat sensu4 ,quis autem hominum non videt quod sit immortale1 quod simplex1 nullum posse dolorem admittere2 quod autem sentiat dolorem1 immortalitatem habere non posse8 ,footnote #ij3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aad ,c-,e4 ,greek3 toutn de au7tn oi7 philosophi_/a i7kans kathra_/menoi a7_/neu te sma_/tn zsi to para_/pan ei7s ton e7_/peita chro_/non1 c4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest4 ,reply to ,kriton about burying his body4 ,such1 or something like it1 ,sokrates confidently expects will be the fate awaiting himself4#ia ,when asked by ,kriton1 among other questions1 how he desired to be buried1 he replies with a smile--,you may bury me as you choose1 if you can only catch me4 ,but you will not understand me when ,i tell you1 that ,i1 ,sokrates1 who am now speaking1 shall not remain with you after having drunk the poison1 but shall depart to some of the enjoyments of the blest4 ,you must not talk about burying or burning ,sokrates1 as if ,i were suffering some terrible operation4 ,such language is inauspicious and depressing to our minds4 ,keep up your courage1 and talk only of burying the body of ,sokrates3 conduct the burial as you think best and most decent4#ib ,footnote #ia3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aae ,a4 ,footnote #ib3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aae ,d4 ,greek3 7s e7peidan pi_/ to pha_/rmakon ou7ke_/ti u7min paramen1 a7ll' oi7ch_/somai a7pin ei7s maka_/rn d_/ tinas eu7daimoni_/as4 ,side-note3 ,preparations for administering the hemlock4 ,sympathy of the gaoler4 ,equanimity of ,sokrates4 ,sokrates then retires with ,kriton into an interior chamber to bathe1 desiring that the women may be spared the task of washing his body after his decease4 ,having taken final leave of his wife and children1 he returns to his friends as sunset is approaching4 ,we are here made to see the contrast between him and other prisoners under like circumstances4 ,the attendant of the ,eleven ,magistrates comes to warn him that the hour has come for swallowing the poison2 expressing sympathy and regret for the necessity of delivering so painful a message1 together with admiration for the equanimity and rational judgment of ,sokrates1 which he contrasts forcibly with the discontent and wrath of other prisoners under similar circumstances4 ,as he turned away with tears in his eyes1 ,sokrates exclaimed--,how courteous the man is to me and has been from the beginning6 how generously he now weeps for me6 ,let us obey him1 and let the poison be brought forthwith1 if it be prepared3 if not1 let him prepare it4 ,do not hurry 7interposed ,kriton73 there is still time1 for the sun is not quite set4 ,i have known others who1 even after receiving the order1 deferred drinking the poison until they had had a good supper and other enjoyments4 ,it is natural that they should do so 7replied ,sokrates74 ,they think that they are gainers by it3 for me1 it is natural that ,i should not do so--for ,i shall gain nothing but contempt in my own eyes1 by thus clinging to life1 and saving up when there is nothing left4#ic ,footnote #ic3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aag ,a4 ,greek3 glicho_/menos tou zn1 kai pheido_/menos ou7denos e7_/ti e7no_/ntos4 ,hesiod4 ,opp4 et ,dies1 #cfg4 ,greek3 deil d' e7ni puthme_/ni pheid_/4 ,side-note3 ,sokrates swallows the poison4 ,conversation with the gaoler4 ,kriton accordingly gave orders1 and the poison1 after a certain interval1 was brought in4 ,sokrates1 on asking for directions1 was informed1 that after having swallowed it1 he must walk about until his legs felt heavy3 he must then lie down and cover himself up3 the poison would do its work4 ,he took the cup without any symptom of alarm or change of countenance3 then looking at the attendant with his usual full and fixed gaze1 he asked whether there was enough to allow of a libation4 ,we prepare as much as is sufficient 7was the answer71 but no more4 ,i understand 7said ,sokrates73 but at least ,i may pray1 and ,i must pray1 to the ,gods1 that my change of abode from here to there may be fortunate4 ,he then put the cup to his lips1 and drank it off with perfect ease and tranquillity4#id ,footnote #id3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aag ,c4 ,side-note3 ,ungovernable sorrow of the friends present4 ,self-command of ,sokrates4 ,last words to ,kriton1 and death4 ,his friends1 who had hitherto maintained their self-control1 were overpowered by emotion on seeing the cup swallowed1 and broke out into violent tears and lamentation4 ,no one was unmoved1 except ,sokrates himself3 who gently remonstrated with them1 and exhorted them to tranquil resignation3 reminding them that nothing but good words was admissible at the hour of death4 ,the friends1 ashamed of themselves1 found means to repress their tears4 ,sokrates walked about until he felt heavy in the legs1 and then lay down in bed4 ,after some interval1 the attendant of the prison came to examine his feet and legs1 pinched his foot with force1 and enquired whether he felt it4 ,sokrates replied in the negative4 ,presently the man pinched his legs with similar result1 and showed to the friends in that way that his body was gradually becoming chill and benumbed3 adding that as soon as this should get to the heart1 he would die4#ie ,the chill had already reached his belly1 when ,sokrates uncovered his face1 which had been hitherto concealed by the bed-clothes1 and spoke his last words3#if ,kriton1 we owe a cock to sculapius3 pay the debt without fail4 ,it shall be done 7answered ,kriton72 have you any other injunctions8 ,sokrates made no reply1 but again covered himself up4#ig ,after a short interval1 he made some movement3 the attendant presently uncovered him1 and found him dead1 with his eyes stiff and fixed4 ,kriton performed the last duty of closing both his eyes and his mouth4 ,footnote #ie3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aah4 ,these details receive interesting confirmation from the remarkable scene described by ,valerius ,maximus1 as witnessed by himself at ,julis in the island of ,keos1 when he accompanied ,sextus ,pompeius into ,asia 7,val4 ,m4 ii4 #f1 #h74 ,a ,keian lady of rank1 ninety years of age1 well in health1 comfortable1 and in full possession of her intelligence1 but deeming it prudent 7according to the custom in ,keos1 ,strabo1 x4 p4 #dhf7 to retire from life while she had as yet nothing to complain of--took poison1 by her own deliberate act1 in the presence of her relatives and of ,sextus ,pompeius1 who vainly endeavoured to dissuade her4 ,cupido haustu mortiferam traxit potionem1 ac sermone significans quasnam subind partes corporis sui rigor occupret1 cum jam visceribus eum et cordi imminere esset elocuta1 filiarum manus ad supremum opprimendorum oculorum officium advocavit4 ,nostros autem1 tametsi novo spectaculo obstupefacti erant1 suffusos tamen lacrimis dimisit4 ,footnote #if3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #aah4 ,greek3 7_/d ou7n schedo_/n ti au7tou 7n ta peri to 7tron psucho_/mena1 kai e7kkalupsa_/menos 7e7nekeka_/lupto gar7 ei7pen1 o7 d teleutaion e7phthe_/gxato1 7 ,kri_/tn1 e7_/ph1 t ,a7sklpi o7phei_/lomen a7lektru_/ona2 a7ll' a7po_/dote kai m a7mel_/ste4 ,cicero1 after recovering from a bilious attack1 writes to his wife ,terentia 7,epist4 ,famil4 xiv4 #g73 ,omnes molestias et solicitudines deposui et ejeci4 ,quid caus autem fuerit1 postridi intellexi quam vobis discessi4 ,greek3 ,choln a7_/kraton noctu ejeci3 statim ita sum levatus1 ut mihi ,deus aliquis medicinam fecisse videatur4 ,cui quidem ,deo1 quemadmodum tu soles1 pi et cast satisfacies3 id est1 ,apollini et sculapio4 ,compare the rhetor ,aristeides1 ,orat4 xlv4 pp4 #bb-bc-aee1 ed4 ,dindorf4 ,about the habit of sacrificing a cock to sculapius1 see also a passage in the ,greek3 ,i7ern ,lo_/goi of the rhetor ,aristeides 7,orat4 xxvii4 p4 #ede1 ed4 ,dindorf1 at the top of the page74 ,i will add that the five ,greek3 ,i7ern ,lo_/goi of that ,rhetor 7,oratt4 xxiii4-xxvii47 are curious as testifying the multitude of dreams and revelations vouchsafed to him by sculapius2 also the implicit faith with which he acted upon them in his maladies1 and the success which attended the curative prescriptions thus made known to him4 ,aristeides declares himself to place more confidence in these revelations than in the advice of physicians1 and to have often acted on them in preference to such advice 7,orat4 xlv4 pp4 #bj-bb1 ,dind474 ,the direction here given by ,sokrates to ,kriton 7though some critics1 even the most recent1 see ,krische1 ,lehren der ,griechischen ,denker1 p4 #bbg1 interpret it in a mystical sense7 is to be understood simply and literally1 in my judgment4 ,on what occasion1 or for what1 he had made the vow of the cock1 we are not told4 ,sokrates was a very religious man1 much influenced by prophecies1 oracles1 dreams1 and special revelations 7,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokr4 pp4 #ba-bi-cc2 also ,phdon1 p4 #fj74 ,footnote #ig3 ,euripid4 ,hippol4 #adee ,greek3 ,kekarte_/rtai ta7_/m'2 o7_/lla ga_/r1 pate_/r4 ,krupson de_/ mou pro_/spon 7s ta_/chos pe_/plois4 ,side-note3 ,extreme pathos1 and probable trustworthiness of these personal details4 ,the pathetic details of this scene--arranged with so much dramatic beauty1 and lending imperishable interest to the ,phdon of ,plato--may be regarded as real facts1 described from the recollection of an eye-witness1 though many years after their occurrence4 ,they present to us the personality of ,sokrates in full harmony with that which we read in the ,platonic ,apology4 ,the tranquil ascendancy of resolute and rational conviction1 satisfied with the past1 and welcoming instead of fearing the close of life--is exhibited as triumphing in the one case over adverse accusers and judges1 in the other case over the unnerving manifestations of afflicted friends4 ,side-note3 ,contrast between the ,platonic ,apology and the ,phdon4 ,but though the personal incidents of this dialogue are truly ,sokratic--the dogmatic emphasis1 and the apparatus of argument and hypothesis1 are essentially ,platonic4 ,in these respects1 the dialogue contrasts remarkably with the ,apology4 ,when addressing the ,dikasts1 ,sokrates not only makes no profession of dogmatic certainty1 but expressly disclaims it4 ,nay more--he considers that the false persuasion of such dogmatic certainty1 universally prevalent among his countrymen1 is as pernicious as it is illusory3 and that his own superiority over others consists merely in consciousness of his own ignorance1 while they are unconscious of theirs4#ih ,to dissipate such false persuasion of knowledge1 by perpetual cross-examination of every one around1 is the special mission imposed upon him by the ,gods3 in which mission1 indeed1 he has the firmest belief--but it is a belief1 like that in his ,dmon or divine sign1 depending upon oracles1 dreams1 and other revelations peculiar to himself1 which he does not expect that the ,dikasts will admit as genuine evidence4#ii ,one peculiar example1 whereby ,sokrates exemplifies the false persuasion of knowledge where men have no real knowledge1 is borrowed from the fear of death4 ,no man knows 7he says7 what death is1 not even whether it may not be a signal benefit3 yet every man fears it as if he well knew that it was the greatest evil4#ajj ,death must be one of two things3 either a final extinction--a perpetual and dreamless sleep--or else a transference of the soul to some other place4 ,sokrates is persuaded that it will be in either case a benefit to him1 and that the ,gods will take care that he1 a good man1 shall suffer no evil1 either living or dead3 the proof of which is1 to him1 that the divine sign has never interposed any obstruction in regard to his trial and sentence4 ,if 7says he7 ,i am transferred to some other abode1 among those who have died before me1 how delightful will it be to see ,homer and ,hesiod1 ,orpheus and ,musus1 ,agamemnon1 ,ajax or ,palamdes--and to pass my time in cross-examining each as to his true or false knowledge6#aja ,lastly1 so far as he professes to aim at any positive end1 it is the diffusion of political1 social1 human virtue1 as distinguished from acquisitions above the measure of humanity4 ,he tells men that it is not wealth which produces virtue1 but virtue which produces wealth and other advantages1 both public and private4#ajb ,footnote #ih3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokr4 pp4 #ba-bi4 ,greek3 kai touto ps ou7k a7mathi_/a e7stin au7_/t 7 e7ponei_/distos1 7 tou oi7_/esthai ei7de_/nai a7 ou7k oi7den8 7#bi ,a-,b74 ,footnote #ii3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,sokr4 pp4 #ba-bc1 #ca ,d2 #cc ,c3 ,greek3 e7moi de touto1 7s e7g_/ phmi1 proste_/taktai u7po tou theou pra_/ttein kai e7k mantein kai e7x e7nupni_/n kai panti tro_/p1 7pe_/r ti_/s pote kai a7_/ll thei_/a moira a7nthr_/p kai o7tioun prose_/taxe pra_/ttein4 p4 #cg ,e3 ,greek3 e7a_/n te gar le_/g o7_/ti t the a7peithein tout' e7sti kai dia tout' a7du_/naton 7suchi_/an a7_/gein1 ou7 pei_/sesthe_/ moi 7s ei7rneuome_/n4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,s4 p4 #bi ,b4 ,in the ,xenophontic ,apology of ,sokrates1 no allusion is made to the immortality of the soul4 ,sokrates is there described as having shaped his defence under a belief that he had arrived at a term when it was better for him to die than to live1 and that prolonged life would only expose him to the unavoidable weaknesses and disabilities of senility4 ,it is a proof of the benevolence of the ,gods that he is withdrawn from life at so opportune a moment4 ,this is the explanation which ,xenophon gives of the haughty tone of the defence 7sects4 #f-ae-bc-bg74 ,in the ,xenophontic ,cyropdia1 ,cyrus1 on his death-bed1 addresses earnest exhortations to his two sons3 and to give greater force to such exhortations1 reminds them that his own soul will still survive and will still exercise a certain authority after his death4 ,he expresses his own belief not only that the soul survives the body1 but also that it becomes more rational when disembodied2 because--#a4 ,murderers are disturbed by the souls of murdered men4 #b4 ,honours are paid to deceased persons1 which practice would not continue1 unless the souls of the deceased had efficacy to enforce it4 #c4 ,the souls of living men are more rational during sleep than when awake1 and sleep affords the nearest analogy to death 7viii4 #g1 #ag-ba74 7,much the same arguments were urged in the dialogues of ,aristotle4 ,bernays1 ,dialog4 ,aristot4 pp4 #bc-aje47 ,he however adds1 that even if he be mistaken in this point1 and if his soul perish with his body1 still he conjures his sons1 in the name of the gods1 to obey his dying injunctions 7s4 #bb74 ,again1 he says 7s4 #bg71 ,invite all the ,persians to my tomb1 to join with me in satisfaction that ,i shall now be in safety1 so as to suffer no farther harm1 whether ,i am united to the divine element1 or perish altogether 7,greek3 sunsthsome_/nous e7moi_/1 o7_/ti e7n t a7sphalei 7_/d e7_/somai1 7s mden a7n e7_/ti kakon pathein1 m_/te 7n meta tou thei_/ou ge_/nmai1 m_/te 7n mden e7_/ti 774 ,the view taken here by ,cyrus1 of death in its analogy with sleep 7,greek3 u7_/pn kai thana_/t diduma_/osin1 ,iliad1 xvi4 #fgb7 as a refuge against impending evil for the future1 is much the same as that taken by ,sokrates in his ,apology4 ,sokrates is not less proud of his past life1 spent in dialectic debate1 than ,cyrus of his glorious exploits4 ,greek3 ,o7 tha_/natos1 limn kakn tois dusdaimonousin1 ,longinus1 de ,subl4 c4 #i1 p4 #bc4 ,compare also the ,oration of ,julius ,csar in ,sallust1 ,bell4 ,catilin4 c4 #ea--;in luctu atque miseriis1 mortem rumnarum requiem1 non cruciatum esse3 illam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere3 ultra neque cur neque gaudio locum esse4 ,footnote #aja3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,s4 pp4 #dj-da4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,plato1 ,apol4 ,s4 pp4 #bj ,c1 #bi-cj4 ,greek3 le_/gn o7_/ti ou7k e7k chrma_/tn a7ret gi_/gnetai1 a7ll' e7x a7rets chr_/mata1 kai ta7lla a7gatha tois a7nthr_/pois a7_/panta1 kai i7di_/a kai dmosi_/a 7#cj ,b74 ,compare ,xenophon1 ,memorab4 i4 #b1 #h-i4 ,side-note3 ,abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the ,phdon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the ,apology4 ,if from the ,apology we turn to the ,phdon1 we seem to pass1 not merely to the same speaker after the interval of one month 7the ostensible interval indicated7 but to a different speaker and over a long period4 ,we have ,plato speaking through the mouth of ,sokrates1 and ,plato too at a much later time4#ajc ,though the moral character 7,greek3 7thos7 of ,sokrates is fully maintained and even strikingly dramatised--the intellectual personality is altogether transformed4 ,instead of a speaker who avows his own ignorance1 and blames others only for believing themselves to know when they are equally ignorant--we have one who indulges in the widest range of theory and the boldest employment of hypothesis4 ,plato introduces his own dogmatical and mystical views1 leaning in part on the ,orphic and ,pythagorean creeds4#ajd ,he declares the distinctness of nature1 the incompatibility1 the forced temporary union and active conflict1 between the soul and the body4 ,he includes this in the still wider and more general declaration1 which recognises antithesis between the two worlds3 the world of ,ideas1 ,forms1 ,essences1 not perceivable but only cogitable1 eternal1 and unchangeable1 with which the soul or mind was in kindred and communion--the world of sense1 or of transient and ever-changing appearances or phenomena1 never arriving at permanent existence1 but always coming and going1 with which the body was in commerce and harmony4 ,the philosopher1 who thirsts only after knowledge and desires to look at things#aje as they are in themselves1 with his mind by itself--is represented as desiring1 throughout all his life1 to loosen as much as possible the implication of his soul with his body1 and as rejoicing when the hour of death arrives to divorce them altogether4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,in reviewing the ,apology 7supra1 vol4 i4 ch4 ix4 p4 #daj7 ,i have already noticed this very material discrepancy1 which is insisted upon by ,ast as an argument for disallowing the genuineness of the ,apology4 ,footnote #ajd3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 pp4 #fi ,c1 #gj ,c1 #ha ,c1 #fb ,b4 ,footnote #aje3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ff ,e4 ,greek3 a7pallakte_/on au7tou 7tou s_/matos7 kai au7t t psuch theate_/on au7ta ta pra_/gmata4 ,side-note3 ,total renunciation and discredit of the body in the ,phdon4 ,different feeling about the body in other ,platonic dialogues4 ,such total renunciation of the body is put1 with dramatic propriety1 into the mouth of ,sokrates during the last hour of his life4 ,but it would not have been in harmony with the character of ,sokrates as other ,platonic dialogues present him--in the plenitude of life--manifesting distinguished bodily strength and soldierly efficiency1 proclaiming gymnastic training for the body to be co-ordinate with musical training for the mind1 and impressed with the most intense admiration for the personal beauty of youth4 ,the human body1 which in the ,phdon is discredited as a morbid incumbrance corrupting the purity of the soul1 is presented to us by ,sokrates in the ,phdrus as the only sensible object which serves as a mirror and reflection of the beauty of the ideal world3#ajf while the ,platonic ,timus proclaims 7in language not unsuitable to ,locke7 that sight1 hearing1 and speech are the sources of our abstract ,ideas1 and the generating causes of speculative intellect and philosophy4#ajg ,of these1 and of the world of sense generally1 an opposite view was appropriate in the ,phdon2 where the purpose of ,sokrates is to console his distressed friends by showing that death was no misfortune1 but relief from a burthen4 ,and ,plato has availed himself of this impressive situation1#ajh to recommend1 with every charm of poetical expression1 various characteristic dogmas respecting the essential distinction between ,ideas and the intelligible world on one side--,perceptions and the sensible world on the other3 respecting the soul1 its nature akin to the intelligible world1 its pre-existence anterior to its present body1 and its continued existence after the death of the latter3 respecting the condition of the soul before birth and after death1 its transition1 in the case of most men1 into other bodies1 either human or animal1 with the condition of suffering penalties commensurate to the wrongs committed in this life3 finally1 respecting the privilege accorded to the souls of such as have passed their lives in intellectual and philosophical occupation1 that they shall after death remain for ever disembodied1 in direct communion with the world of ,ideas4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,plato1 ,charmids1 p4 #aee ,d4 ,protagoras1 init4 ,phdrus1 p4 #bej ,d4 ,symposion1 pp4 #agg ,c1 #baj ,a4 schines1 one of the ,socratici viri or fellow disciples of ,sokrates along with ,plato1 composed dialogues 7of the same general nature as those of ,plato7 wherein ,sokrates was introduced conversing or arguing4 schines placed in the mouth of ,sokrates the most intense expressions of passionate admiration towards the person of ,alkibiades4 ,see the ,fragments cited by the ,rhetor ,aristeides1 ,orat4 xlv4 pp4 #bj-bc1 ed4 ,dindorf4 ,aristeides mentions 7p4 #bd7 that various persons in his time mistook these expressions ascribed to ,sokrates for the real talk of ,sokrates himself4 ,compare also the ,symposion of ,xenophon1 iv4 #bg4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,plato1 ,timus1 p4 #dg1 ,a-,d4 ,consult also the same dialogue1 pp4 #hg-hh1 where ,plato insists on the necessity of co-ordinate attention both to mind and to body1 and on the mischiefs of highly developed force in the mind unless it be accompanied by a corresponding development of force in the body4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,compare the description of the last discourse of ,ptus ,thrasea4 ,tacitus1 ,annal4 xvi4 #cd4 ,side-note3 ,plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the soul4 ,even if it did prove that1 yet the mode of pre-existence and the mode of post-existence1 of the soul1 would be quite undetermined4 ,the main part of ,plato's argumentation1 drawn from the general assumptions of his philosophy1 is directed to prove the separate and perpetual existence of the soul1 before as well as after the body4 ,these arguments1 interesting as specimens of the reasoning which satisfied ,plato1 do not prove his conclusion4#aji ,but even if that conclusion were admitted to be proved1 the condition of the soul1 during such anterior and posterior existence1 would be altogether undetermined1 and would be left to the free play of sentiment and imagination4 ,there is no subject upon which the poetical genius of ,plato has been more abundantly exercised4#aaj ,he has given us two different descriptions of the state of the soul before its junction with the body 7,timus1 and ,phdrus71 and three different descriptions of its destiny after separation from the body 7,republic1 ,gorgias1 ,phdon74 ,in all the three1 he supposes an adjudication and classification of the departed souls1 and a better or worse fate allotted9999 to each according to the estimate which he forms of their merits or demerits during life3 but in each of the three1 this general idea is carried out by a different machinery4 ,the ,hades of ,plato is not announced even by himself as anything more than approximation to the truth3 but it embodies his own ethical and judicial sentence on the classes of men around him--as the ,divina ,commedia embodies that of ,dante on antecedent individual persons4 ,plato distributes rewards and penalties in the measure which he conceives to be deserved3 he erects his own approbation and disapprobation1 his own sympathy and antipathy1 into laws of the unknown future state3 the ,gods1 whom he postulates1 are imaginary agents introduced to execute the sentences which he dictates4 ,while others1 in their conceptions of posthumous existence1 assured the happiest fate1 sometimes even divinity itself1 to great warriors and law-givers--to devoted friends and patriots like ,harmodius and ,aristogeiton--to the exquisite beauty of ,helen--or to favourites of the ,gods like ,ganymdes or ,pelops#aaa--,plato claims that supreme distinction for the departed philosopher4 ,footnote #aji3 ,wyttenbach has annexed to his edition of the ,phdon an instructive review of the argumentation contained in it respecting the ,immortality of the soul4 ,he observes justly--,videamus jam de ,phdone1 qui ab omni antiquitate is habitus est liber1 in quo rationes immortalitatis animarum gravissim luculentissimque exposita essent4 ,qu quidem libro laus et auctoritas conciliata est1 non tam firmitate argumentorum1 quam eloquenti ,platonis1 c4 7,disputat4 ,de ,placit4 ,immort4 ,anim4 p4 #aj74 ,the same feeling1 substantially1 is expressed by one of the disputants in ,cicero's ,tusculan ,disputations1 who states that he assented to the reasoning while he was reading the dialogue1 but that as soon as he had laid down the book1 his assent all slipped away from him4 ,i have already mentioned that ,pantius1 an extreme admirer of ,plato on most points1 dissented from him about the immortality of the soul 7,cicero1 ,tusc4 ,disp4 i4 #aa1 #bd--;i4 #cb1 #gi71 and declared the ,phdon to be spurious4 ,galen also mentions 7,de ,format4 ,foets1 vol4 iv4 pp4 #gjj-gjb4 ,khn7 that he had written a special treatise 7now lost7 to prove that the reasonings in the ,phdon were self-contradictory1 and that he could not satisfy himself1 either about the essence of the soul1 or whether it was mortal or immortal4 ,compare his treatise ,greek3 ,peri ,ou7si_/as tn phusikn duna_/men--iv4 pp4 #gfb-gfc--;and ,greek3 ,peri tn ts ,psuchs 7thn1 iv4 #ggc4 ,in this last passage1 he represents the opinion of ,plato to be--,that the two inferior souls1 the courageous and the appetitive1 are mortal1 in which he 7,galen7 agrees1 and that the rational soul alone is immortal1 of which he 7,galen7 is not persuaded4 ,now this view of ,plato's opinion is derived from the ,republic and ,timus1 not from the ,phdon1 in which last the triple soul is not acknowledged4 ,we may thus partly understand the inconsistencies1 which ,galen pointed out in his lost ,treatise1 in the argumentation of the ,phdon3 wherein one of the proofs presented to establish the immortality of the soul is--,that the soul is inseparably and essentially identified with life1 and cannot admit death 7p4 #aje ,d74 ,this argument1 if good at all1 is just as good to prove the immortality of the two inferior souls1 as of the superior and rational soul4 ,galen might therefore remark that it did not consist with the conclusion which he drew from the ,timus and the ,republic4 ,footnote #aaj3 ,wyttenbach1 l4 c4 p4 #ai4 ,vidimus de philosoph hujus loci parte1 qu demonstratur1 ,animos esse immortales4 ,altera pars1 qu ostenditur1 qualis sit ille post hanc vitam status1 fabulos et poetic ,platone tractata est4 c4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,skolion of ,kallistratus1 ,antholog4 ,grc4 p4 #aee4 ,isokrates1 ,encomium ,helen1 ,or4 x4 s4 #gj-gb4 ,compare the ,greek3 ,ne_/kuia of the ,odyssey and that of the neid1 respecting the heroes-- ,qu gratia currm ,armorumque fuit vivis1 qu cura nitentes ,pascere equos1 eadem sequitur tellure repostos4 7n4 vi4 #fec-e47 ,side-note3 ,the philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul unattached to any body4 ,the ,philosopher1 as a recompense for having detached himself during life as much as possible from the body and all its functions1 will be admitted after death to existence as a soul pure and simple1 unattached to any body4 ,the souls of all other persons1 dying with more or less of the taint of the body attached to each of them1#aab and for that reason haunting the tombs in which the bodies are buried1 so as to become visible there as ghosts--are made subject1 in the ,platonic ,hades1 to penalty and purification suitable to the respective condition of each2 after which they become attached to new bodies1 sometimes of men1 sometimes of other animals4 ,of this distributive scheme it is not possible to frame any clear idea1 nor is ,plato consistent with himself except in a few material features4 ,but one feature there is in it which stands conspicuous--the belief in the metempsychosis1 or transfer of the same soul from one animal body to another3 a belief very widely diffused throughout the ancient world1 associated with the immortality of the soul1 pervading the ,orphic and ,pythagorean creeds1 and having its root in the ,egyptian and ,oriental religions4#aac ,footnote #aab3 ,plato1 ,phdon1 p4 #ha ,c-,d4 ,greek3 o7 d kai e7_/chousa 7 toiau_/t psuch baru_/netai te kai e7_/lketai pa_/lin ei7s ton o7raton to_/pon1 pho_/b tou a7eidous te kai ,a7_/idou1 7_/sper le_/getai1 peri ta mn_/mata_/ te kai tous ta_/phous kalindoume_/n2 peri a7 d kai 7_/phth a7_/tta psuchn skioeid phanta_/smata oi7a pare_/chontai ai7 toiautai psuchai ei7_/dla1 ai7 m kathars a7polutheisai1 a7lla tou o7ratou mete_/chousai1 dio kai o7rntai4 ,lactantius--in replying to the arguments of ,demokritus1 ,epikurus1 and ,dikarchus against the immortality of the soul--reminded them that any ,magus would produce visible evidence to refute them2 by calling up before them the soul of any deceased person to give information and predict the future--qui profecto non auderent de animarum interitu mago praesente disserere1 qui sciret certis carminibus cieri ab infernis animas et adesse et prbere se videndas et loqui et futura prdicere3 et si auderent1 re ips et documentis prsentibus vincerentur 7,lactant4 ,inst4 vii4 #ac74 ,see ,cicero1 ,tusc4 ,disp4 i4 #ca4 ,footnote #aac3 ,compare the closing paragraph of the ,platonic ,timus3 ,virgil1 neid vi4 #gac1 ,herodot4 ii4 #abc1 ,pausanias1 iv4 #cb1 #d1 ,sextus ,empiric4 adv4 ,math4 ix4 #abg1 with the citation from ,empedokles3-- ,tum pater ,anchises3 ',anim quibus altera fato ,corpora debentur1 ,lethi ad fluminis undam ,securos latices et longa oblivia potant'4 ,the general doctrine1 upon which the ,metempsychosis rests1 is set forth by ,virgil in the fine lines which follow1 #gbc-gea2 compare ,georgic iv4 #bah4 ,the souls of men1 beasts1 birds1 and fishes1 are all of them detached fragments or portions from the universal soul1 mind1 or life1 therial or igneous1 which pervades the whole ,kosmos4 ,the soul of each individual thus detached to be conjoined with a distinct body1 becomes tainted by such communion2 after death it is purified by penalties1 measured according to the greater or less taint1 and becomes then fit to be attached to a new body1 yet not until it has drunk the water of ,lth 7,plato1 ,philbus1 p4 #cj ,a2 ,timus1 p4 #cj ,b74 ,the statement of ,nemesius is remarkable1 that all ,greeks who believed the immortality of the soul1 believed also in the metempsychosis--,greek3 ,koin men ou7n pa_/ntes ,e7_/llnes1 oi7 tn psuchn a7tha_/naton a7pophna_/menoi1 tn metensma_/tsin dogmati_/zousin 7,de ,natur ,hominis1 cap4 ii4 p4 #ej1 ed4 #aefe74 ,plato accepted the ,egyptian and ,pythagorean doctrine1 continued in the ,orphic mysteries 7,arnob4 adv4 ,gentes1 ii4 #af71 making no essential distinction between the souls of men and those of animals1 and recognising reciprocal interchange from the one to the other4 ,the ,platonists adhered to this doctrine fully1 down to the third century ,a4,d41 including ,plotinus1 ,numenius1 and others4 ,but ,porphyry1 followed by ,jamblichus1 introduced a modification of this creed1 denying the possibility of transition of a human soul into the body of another animal1 or of the soul of any other animal into the body of a man1--yet still recognising the transition from one human body to another1 and from one animal body to another4 7,see ,alkinous1 ,introd4 in ,platon4 c4 #be47 ,this subject is well handled in a learned work published in #agab by a ,jesuit of ,toulouse1 ,michel ,mourgues4 ,he shows 7in opposition to ,dacier and others1 who interpreted the doctrine in a sense merely spiritual and figurative7 that the metempsychosis was a literal belief of the ,platonists down to the time of ,proklus4 ,les quatre ,platoniciens qui ont tenu la ,transmigration borne 7i4e4 from one human body into another human body7 n'ont pas laiss d'admettre la pluralit d'animations ou de vies d'une mme me3 et cela sans figure et sans mtaphore4 ,cet article1 qui est l'essentiel1 n'a jamais trouv un seul contradicteur dans les sectes qui ont cru l'me immortelle3 ni ,porphyre1 ni ,hirocle1 ni ,procle1 ni ,salluste1 n'ont jamais touch ce point que pour l'approuver4 ,d'o il suit que la ralit de la ,mtempsychose est indubitable2 c'est dire1 qu'il est indubitable que tous les sectateurs de ,pythagore et de ,platon l'ont soutenue dans un sens trs rel quant la pluralit des vies et d'animations 7,tom4 i4 p4 #ebe3 also ,tom4 ii4 p4 #dcb7 ,m4 ,cousin and ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st ,hilaire are of the same opinion4 ,m4 ,barthlemy ,st4 ,hilaire observes in his ,premier ,mmoire sur le ,sankhy p4 #daf1 ,paris1 #aheb4 ,voil donc la transmigration dans les plus grands dialogues de ,platon--le ,time1 la ,rpublique1 le ,phdre1 le ,phdon4 ,on peut en retrouver la trace manifeste dans d'autres dialogues moins considrables1 le ,menon et le ,politique1 par exemple4 ,la transmigration est mme positivement indique dans le dixime ,livre des ,lois1 o ,platon traite avec tant de force et de solennit de la providence et de la justice divines4 ,en prsence de tmoignages si srieux1 et de tant de persistance revenir sur des opinions qui ne varient pas1 je crois que tout esprit sens ne peut que partager l'avis de ,m4 ,cousin4 ,il est impossible que ,platon ne se fasse de l'exposition de ces opinions qu'un pur badinage4 ,il les a rpetes1 sans les modifier en rien1 au milieu des discussions les plus graves et les plus tendues4 ,ajoutez que ces doctrines tiennent intimment toutes celles qui sont le fond mme du platonisme1 et qu'elles s'y entrelacent si troitement1 que les en dtacher1 c'est le mutiler et l'amoindrir4 ,le systme des ,ides ne se comprend pas tout entier sans la rminiscence3 et la rminiscence elle mme implique necessairement l'existence antrieure de l'me4 ,dr4 ,henry ,more1 in his ',treatise on the ,immortality of the ,soul1' argues at considerable length in defence of pre-existence of each soul1 as a part of the doctrine4 ,he considers himself to have clearly proved--,that the pre-existence of the soul is an opinion both in itself the most rational that can be maintained1 and has had the suffrage of the most renowned philosophers in all ages of the world4 ,of these last-mentioned philosophers he gives a list1 as follows--,moses1 on the authority of the ,jewish ,cabbala--,zoroaster1 ,pythagoras1 ,epicharmus1 ,empedocles1 ,cebs1 ,euripides1 ,plato1 ,euclid1 ,philo1 ,virgil1 ,marcus ,cicero1 ,plotinus1 ,jamblichus1 ,proclus1 ,boethius1 c4 ,see chapters xii4 and xiii4 pages #aaf1 #aag1 #aba of his ,treatise4 ,compare also what he says in ,sect4 #ah of his ,preface ,general1 page xx4-xxiv4 ,side-note3 ,plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers4 ,the question remained debated and problematical4 ,we are told that one vehement admirer of ,plato--the ,ambrakiot ,kleombrotus--was so profoundly affected and convinced by reading the ,phdon1 that he immediately terminated his existence by leaping from a high wall2 though in other respects well satisfied with life4 ,but the number of persons who derived from it such settled conviction1 was certainly not considerable4 ,neither the doctrine nor the reasonings of ,plato were adopted even by the immediate successors in his school3 still less by ,aristotle and the ,peripatetics--or by the ,stoics--or by the ,epikureans4 ,the ,epikureans denied altogether the survivorship of soul over body3 ,aristotle gives a definition of the soul which involves this same negation1 though he admits as credible the separate existence of the rational soul1 without individuality or personality4 ,the ,stoics1 while affirming the soul to be material as well as the body1 considered it as a detached fragment of the all-pervading cosmical or mundane soul1 which was re-absorbed after the death of the individual into the great whole to which it belonged4 ,none of these philosophers were persuaded by the arguments of ,plato4 ,the popular orthodoxy1 which he often censures harshly1 recognised some sort of posthumous existence as a part of its creed2 and the uninquiring multitude continued in the teaching and traditions of their youth4 ,but literary and philosophical men1 who sought to form some opinion for themselves without altogether rejecting 7as the ,epikureans rejected7 the basis of the current traditions--were in no better condition for deciding the question with the assistance of ,plato1 than they would have been without him4 ,while the knowledge of the bodily organism1 and of mind or soul as embodied therein1 received important additions1 from ,aristotle down to ,galen--no new facts either were known or could become known1 respecting soul per se1 considered as pre-existent or post-existent to body4 ,galen expressly records his dissatisfaction with ,plato on this point1 though generally among his warmest admirers4 ,questions of this kind remained always problematical1 standing themes for rhetoric or dialectic4#aad ,every man could do1 though not with the same exuberant eloquence1 what ,plato had done--and no man could do more4 ,every man could coin his own hopes and fears1 his own sthetical preferences and repugnances1 his own ethical aspiration to distribute rewards and punishments among the characters around him--into affirmative prophecies respecting an unknowable future1 where neither verification nor ,elenchus were accessible4 ,the state of this discussion throughout the ,pagan world bears out the following remark of ,lord ,macaulay1 with which ,i conclude the present chapter3--,there are branches of knowledge with respect to which the law of the human mind is progress4 4 4 4 ,but with theology1 the case is very different4 ,as respects natural religion--revelation being for the present altogether left out of the question--it is not easy to see that a philosopher of the present day is more favourably situated than ,thales or ,simonides4 4 4 4 ,as to the other great question--the question1 what becomes of man after death--we do not see that a highly educated ,european1 left to his unassisted reason1 is more likely to be in the right than a ,blackfoot ,indian4 ,not a single one of the many sciences in which we surpass the ,blackfoot ,indians1 throws the smallest light on the state of the soul after the animal life is extinct4 ,in truth1 all the philosophers1 ancient and modern1 who have attempted1 without the help of revelation1 to prove the immortality of man--from ,plato down to ,franklin--appear to us to have failed deplorably4 ,then again1 all the great enigmas which perplex the natural theologian are the same in all ages4 ,the ingenuity of a people just emerging from barbarism1 is quite sufficient to propound them4 ,the genius of ,locke or ,clarke is quite unable to solve them4 4 4 4 ,natural ,theology1 then1 is not a progressive science4#aae ,footnote #aad3 ,seneca says1 ,epist4 #hh4 ,innumerabiles sunt qustiones de animo3 unde sit1 qualis sit1 quando esse incipiat1 quamdiu sit2 an aliunde ali transeat1 et domicilium mutet1 ad alias animalium formas aliasque conjectus1 an non amplius quam semel serviat1 et emissus evagetur in toto2 utrum corpus sit1 an non sit3 quid sit facturus1 quum per nos aliquid facere desierit3 quomodo libertate usurus1 cum ex hc exierit cave3 an obliviscatur priorum et illic nosse incipiat1 postquam de corpore abductus in sublime secessit4 ,compare ,lucretius1 i4 #aac4 ,footnote #aae3 ,macaulay1 ,ranke's ,history of the ,popes 7,crit4 and ,hist4 ,essays1 vol4 iii4 p4 #baj74 ,sir ,wm4 ,hamilton observes 7,lectures on ,logic1 ,lect4 #bf1 p4 #ee73 ,thus ,plato1 in the ,phdon1 demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its simplicity3 in the ,republic1 he demonstrates its simplicity from its immortality4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 9999999999999999999999999999999999999999 9999999999999999999999999999999999 ,transcriber's ,note ,the text is based on versions made available by the ,internet ,archive4 ,for the ,greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used3 7 is for smooth breathing2 7 for hard2 for diaeresis2 _/ for acute accent2 for grave2 for circumflex2 for iota subscript4 ch is used for chi1 ph for phi1 ps for psi1 th for theta2 for eta and for omega2 u is used for upsilon in all cases4 ,corrections to the text1 indicated in text with 99993 ,location ,text of scan of #crd edition ,correction ,to,c1 ,ch4 #ac s-n #c ,minor ,major ,to,c1 ,ch4 #ad s-n #bd pain gain ,ch4 #ac fn4 #dj iv4 #d1 #e2 iv4 #d1 #e1 p4 #bbj seq472 ,ch4 #ac near fn4 #df he was even fit he was not even fit ,ch4 #ag near fn4 #c fulfiling fulfilling ,ch4 #ai after fn4 #cb sixth eighth ,ch4 #ai fn4 #dd p4 4 p4 #ca4 ,ch4 #bj after fn4 #ac aud and ,ch4 #bb after fn4 #dg sixth eighth ,ch4 #bc fn4 #acd p4 #bdj p4 #bdb ,ch4 #bc fn4 #ace ch4 xviii ch4 xvii ,ch4 #bd fn4 #ge ,pratagoras ,protagoras ,ch4 #bd fn4 #gg a7nro_/s a7ndro_/s ,ch4 #bd fn4 #hf ,die ,dialoge444 ,die ,dialoge444 ,ch4 #be after fn4 #eh intellegible intelligible ,ch4 #be after fn4 #aaj alloted allotted