,the ,world ,as ,will ,and ,idea ,by ,arthur ,schopenhauer ,translated ,from ,the ,german ,by ,r4 ,b4 ,haldane1 ,m4,a4 ,and ,j4 ,kemp1 ,m4,a4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,containing the ,criticism of the ,kantian ,philosophy1 and the ,supplements to the ,first and ,part of the ,second ,book of ,vol4 ,i4 8,paucis natus est1 qui populum tatis su cogitat40--,,sen4 ,sixth ,edition ,london ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench1 ,trbner ,co4 #aiji ,,contents ,appendix3 ,criticism of the ,kantian ,philosophy4 ,supplements to the ,first ,book4 ,first ,half4 ,the ,doctrine ,of ,the ,idea ,of ,perception4 7,to #a-g of the ,first ,volume47 ,chapter ,i4 ,the ,standpoint of ,idealism4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,doctrine of ,perception or ,knowledge ,of ,the ,understanding4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,on ,the ,senses4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,on ,knowledge ,a ,priori4 ,second ,half4 ,the ,doctrine of the ,abstract ,idea1 or ,thinking4 ,chapter ,v4 ,on ,the ,irrational ,intellect4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,on ,the ,doctrine of ,abstract or ,rational ,knowledge4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,on ,the ,relation of the ,concrete ,knowledge of ,perception to ,abstract ,knowledge4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,on ,the ,theory ,of ,the ,ludicrous4 ,chapter ,,ix4 ,on ,logic ,in ,general4 ,chapter ,x4 ,on ,the ,syllogism4 ,chapter ,,xi4 ,on ,rhetoric4 ,chapter ,,xii4 ,on ,the ,doctrine ,of ,science4 ,chapter ,,xiii4 ,on ,the ,methods ,of ,mathematics4 ,chapter ,,xiv4 ,on ,the ,association ,of ,ideas4 ,chapter ,,xv4 ,on ,the ,essential ,imperfections ,of ,the ,intellect4 ,chapter ,,xvi4 ,on ,the ,practical ,use ,of ,reason ,and ,on ,stoicism4 ,chapter ,,xvii4 ,on ,man's ,need ,of ,metaphysics4 ,supplements to the ,second ,book4 ,chapter ,,xviii4 ,on ,the ,possibility ,of ,knowing ,the ,thing ,in ,itself4 ,chapter ,,xix4 ,on ,the ,primacy ,of ,the ,will ,in ,self-,consciousness4 ,chapter ,,xx4 ,objectification ,of ,the ,will ,in ,the ,animal ,organism4 ,note ,on ,what ,has ,been ,said ,about ,bichat4 ,footnotes ,,appendix3 ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,kantian ,,philosophy4 ,c'est le privilge du vrai gnie1 et surtout du gnie qui ouvre une carrire1 de faire impunment de grandes fautes4--,voltaire4 ,it is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the work of a great mind than to give a distinct and full exposition of its value4 ,for the faults are particular and finite1 and can therefore be fully comprehended2 while1 on the contrary1 the very stamp which genius impresses upon its works is that their excellence is unfathomable and inexhaustible4 ,therefore they do not grow old1 but become the instructor of many succeeding centuries4 ,the perfected masterpiece of a truly great mind will always produce a deep and powerful effect upon the whole human race1 so much so that it is impossible to calculate to what distant centuries and lands its enlightening influence may extend4 ,this is always the case2 for however cultivated and rich the age may be in which such a masterpiece appears1 genius always rises like a palm-tree above the soil in which it is rooted4 ,but a deep-reaching and widespread effect of this kind cannot take place suddenly1 because of the great difference between the genius and ordinary men4 ,the knowledge which that one man in one lifetime drew directly from life and the world1 won and presented to others as won and arranged1 cannot yet at once become the possession of mankind2 for mankind has not so much power to receive as the genius has power to give4 ,but even after a successful battle with unworthy opponents1 who at its very birth contest the life of what is immortal and desire to nip in the bud the salvation of man 7like the serpents in the cradle of ,hercules71 that knowledge must then traverse the circuitous paths of innumerable false constructions and distorted applications1 must overcome the attempts to unite it with old errors1 and so live in conflict till a new and unprejudiced generation grows up to meet it4 ,little by little1 even in youth1 this new generation partially receives the contents of that spring through a thousand indirect channels1 gradually assimilates it1 and so participates in the benefit which was destined to flow to mankind from that great mind4 ,so slowly does the education of the human race1 the weak yet refractory pupil of genius1 advance4 ,thus with ,kant's teaching also2 its full strength and importance will only be revealed through time1 when the spirit of the age1 itself gradually transformed and altered in the most important and essential respects by the influence of that teaching1 will afford convincing evidence of the power of that giant mind4 ,i have1 however1 no intention of presumptuously anticipating the spirit of the age and assuming here the thankless rle of ,calchas and ,cassandra4 ,only ,i must be allowed1 in accordance with what has been said1 to regard ,kant's works as still very new1 while many at the present day look upon them as already antiquated1 and indeed have laid them aside as done with1 or1 as they express it1 have left them behind2 and others1 emboldened by this1 ignore them altogether1 and with brazen face go on philosophising about ,god and the soul on the assumption of the old realistic dogmatism and its scholastic teaching1 which is as if one sought to introduce the doctrines of the alchemists into modern chemistry4 ,for the rest1 the works of ,kant do not stand in need of my feeble eulogy1 but will themselves for ever praise their author1 and though perhaps not in the letter1 yet in the spirit they will live for ever upon earth4 ,certainly1 however1 if we look back at the first result of his teaching1 at the efforts and events in the sphere of philosophy during the period that has elapsed since he wrote1 a very depressing saying of ,goethe obtains confirmation3 8,as the water that is displaced by a ship immediately flows in again behind it1 so when great minds have driven error aside and made room for themselves1 it very quickly closes in behind them again by the law of its nature0 7,wahrheit und ,dichtung1 ,theil #c1 s4 #eba74 ,yet this period has been only an episode1 which is to be reckoned as part of the lot referred to above that befalls all new and great knowledge2 an episode which is now unmistakably near its end1 for the bubble so long blown out yet bursts at last4 ,men generally are beginning to be conscious that true and serious philosophy still stands where ,kant left it4 ,at any rate1 ,i cannot see that between ,kant and myself anything has been done in philosophy2 therefore ,i regard myself as his immediate successor4 ,what ,i have in view in this ,appendix to my work is really only a defence of the doctrine ,i have set forth in it1 inasmuch as in many points that doctrine does not agree with the ,kantian philosophy1 but indeed contradicts it4 ,a discussion of this philosophy is1 however1 necessary1 for it is clear that my train of thought1 different as its content is from that of ,kant1 is yet throughout under its influence1 necessarily presupposes it1 starts from it2 and ,i confess that1 next to the impression of the world of perception1 ,i owe what is best in my own system to the impression made upon me by the works of ,kant1 by the sacred writings of the ,hindus1 and by ,plato4 ,but ,i can only justify the contradictions of ,kant which are nevertheless present in my work by accusing him of error in these points1 and exposing mistakes which he committed4 ,therefore in this ,appendix ,i must proceed against ,kant in a thoroughly polemical manner1 and indeed seriously and with every effort2 for it is only thus that his doctrine can be freed from the error that clings to it1 and its truth shine out the more clearly and stand the more firmly4 ,it must not1 therefore1 be expected that the sincere reverence for ,kant which ,i certainly feel shall extend to his weaknesses and errors also1 and that ,i shall consequently refrain from exposing these except with the most careful indulgence1 whereby my language would necessarily become weak and insipid through circumlocution4 ,towards a living writer such indulgence is needed1 for human frailty cannot endure even the most just refutation of an error1 unless tempered by soothing and flattery1 and hardly even then2 and a teacher of the age and benefactor of mankind deserves at least that the human weakness he also has should be indulged1 so that he may not be caused pain4 ,but he who is dead has thrown off this weakness2 his merit stands firm2 time will purify it more and more from all exaggeration and detraction4 ,his mistakes must be separated from it1 rendered harmless1 and then given over to oblivion4 ,therefore in the polemic against ,kant ,i am about to begin1 ,i have only his mistakes and weak points in view4 ,i oppose them with hostility1 and wage a relentless war of extermination against them1 always mindful not to conceal them indulgently1 but rather to place them in the clearest light1 in order to extirpate them the more surely4 ,for the reasons given above1 ,i am not conscious either of injustice or ingratitude towards ,kant in doing this4 ,however1 in order that1 in the eyes of others also1 ,i may remove every appearance of malice1 ,i wish first to bring out clearly my sincere reverence for ,kant and gratitude to him1 by expressing shortly what in my eyes appears to be his chief merit2 and ,i shall do this from a standpoint so general that ,i shall not require to touch upon the points in which ,i must afterwards controvert him4 ,kant's greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing in itself1 based upon the proof that between things and us there still always stands the intellect1 so that they cannot be known as they may be in themselves4 ,he was led into this path through ,locke 7see ,prolegomena zu jeder ,metaph41 #ac1 ,anm4 #b74 ,the latter had shown that the secondary qualities of things1 such as sound1 smell1 colour1 hardness1 softness1 smoothness1 and the like1 as founded on the affections of the senses1 do not belong to the objective body1 to the thing in itself4 ,to this he attributed only the primary qualities1 i4e41 such as only presuppose space and impenetrability2 thus extension1 figure1 solidity1 number1 mobility4 ,but this easily discovered ,lockeian distinction was1 as it were1 only a youthful introduction to the distinction of ,kant4 ,the latter1 starting from an incomparably higher standpoint1 explains all that ,locke had accepted as primary qualities1 i4e41 qualities of the thing in itself1 as also belonging only to its phenomenal appearance in our faculty of apprehension1 and this just because the conditions of this faculty1 space1 time1 and causality1 are known by us a priori4 ,thus ,locke had abstracted from the thing in itself the share which the organs of sense have in its phenomenal appearance2 ,kant1 however1 further abstracted the share of the brain-functions 7though not under that name74 ,thus the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself now received an infinitely greater significance1 and a very much deeper meaning4 ,for this end he was obliged to take in hand the important separation of our a priori from our a posteriori knowledge1 which before him had never been carried out with adequate strictness and completeness1 nor with distinct consciousness4 ,accordingly this now became the principal subject of his profound investigations4 ,now here we would at once remark that ,kant's philosophy has a threefold relation to that of his predecessors4 ,first1 as we have just seen1 to the philosophy of ,locke1 confirming and extending it2 secondly1 to that of ,hume1 correcting and making use of it1 a relation which is most distinctly expressed in the 8,prolegomena0 7that most beautiful and comprehensible of all ,kant's important writings1 which is far too little read1 for it facilitates immensely the study of his philosophy72 thirdly1 a decidedly polemical and destructive relation to the ,leibnitz-,wolfian philosophy4 ,all three systems ought to be known before one proceeds to the study of the ,kantian philosophy4 ,if now1 according to the above1 the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing in itself1 thus the doctrine of the complete diversity of the ideal and the real1 is the fundamental characteristic of the ,kantian philosophy1 then the assertion of the absolute identity of these two which appeared soon afterwards is a sad proof of the saying of ,goethe quoted above2 all the more so as it rested upon nothing but the empty boast of intellectual intuition1 and accordingly was only a return to the crudeness of the vulgar opinion1 masked under bombast and nonsense1 and the imposing impression of an air of importance4 ,it became the fitting starting-point for the still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and stupid ,hegel4 ,now as ,kant's separation of the phenomenon from the thing in itself1 arrived at in the manner explained above1 far surpassed all that preceded it in the depth and thoughtfulness of its conception1 it was also exceedingly important in its results4 ,for in it he propounded1 quite originally1 in a perfectly new way1 found from a new side and on a new path1 the same truth which ,plato never wearies of repeating1 and in his language generally expresses thus3 ,this world which appears to the senses has no true being1 but only a ceaseless becoming2 it is1 and it is not1 and its comprehension is not so much knowledge as illusion4 ,this is also what he expresses mythically at the beginning of the seventh book of the ,republic1 the most important passage in all his writings1 which has already been referred to in the third book of the present work4 ,he says3 ,men1 firmly chained in a dark cave1 see neither the true original light nor real things1 but only the meagre light of the fire in the cave and the shadows of real things which pass by the fire behind their backs2 yet they think the shadows are the reality1 and the determining of the succession of these shadows is true wisdom4 ,the same truth1 again quite differently presented1 is also a leading doctrine of the ,vedas and ,puranas1 the doctrine of ,my1 by which really nothing else is understood than what ,kant calls the phenomenon in opposition to the thing in itself2 for the work of ,my is said to be just this visible world in which we are1 a summoned enchantment1 an inconstant appearance without true being1 like an optical illusion or a dream1 a veil which surrounds human consciousness1 something of which it is equally false and true to say that it is and that it is not4 ,but ,kant not only expressed the same doctrine in a completely new and original way1 but raised it to the position of proved and indisputable truth by means of the calmest and most temperate exposition2 while both ,plato and the ,indian philosophers had founded their assertions merely upon a general perception of the world1 had advanced them as the direct utterance of their consciousness1 and presented them rather mythically and poetically than philosophically and distinctly4 ,in this respect they stand to ,kant in the same relation as the ,pythagoreans ,hicetas1 ,philolaus1 and ,aristarchus1 who already asserted the movement of the earth round the fixed sun1 stand to ,copernicus4 ,such distinct knowledge and calm1 thoughtful exposition of this dream-like nature of the whole world is really the basis of the whole ,kantian philosophy2 it is its soul and its greatest merit4 ,he accomplished this by taking to pieces the whole machinery of our intellect by means of which the phantasmagoria of the objective world is brought about1 and presenting it in detail with marvellous insight and ability4 ,all earlier ,western philosophy1 appearing in comparison with the ,kantian unspeakably clumsy1 had failed to recognise that truth1 and had therefore always spoken just as if in a dream4 ,kant first awakened it suddenly out of this dream2 therefore the last sleepers 7,mendelssohn7 called him the 8all-destroyer40 ,he showed that the laws which reign with inviolable necessity in existence1 i4e41 in experience generally1 are not to be applied to deduce and explain existence itself that thus the validity of these laws is only relative1 i4e41 only arises after existence2 the world of experience in general is already established and present2 that consequently these laws cannot be our guide when we come to the explanation of the existence of the world and of ourselves4 ,all earlier ,western philosophers had imagined that these laws1 according to which the phenomena are combined1 and all of which--time and space1 as well as causality and inference--,i comprehend under the expression 8the principle of sufficient reason10 were absolute laws conditioned by nothing1 tern veritates2 that the world itself existed only in consequence of and in conformity with them2 and therefore that under their guidance the whole riddle of the world must be capable of solution4 ,the assumptions made for this purpose1 which ,kant criticises under the name of the ,ideas of the reason1 only served to raise the mere phenomenon1 the work of ,my1 the shadow world of ,plato1 to the one highest reality1 to put it in the place of the inmost and true being of things1 and thereby to make the real knowledge of this impossible2 that is1 in a word1 to send the dreamers still more soundly to sleep4 ,kant exhibited these laws1 and therefore the whole world1 as conditioned by the form of knowledge belonging to the subject2 from which it followed1 that however far one carried investigation and reasoning under the guidance of these laws1 yet in the principal matter1 i4e41 in knowledge of the nature of the world in itself and outside the idea1 no step in advance was made1 but one only moved like a squirrel in its wheel4 ,thus1 all the dogmatists may be compared to persons who supposed that if they only went straight on long enough they would come to the end of the world2 but ,kant then circumnavigated the world and showed that1 because it is round1 one cannot get out of it by horizontal movement1 but that yet by perpendicular movement this is perhaps not impossible4 ,we may also say that ,kant's doctrine affords the insight that we must seek the end and beginning of the world1 not without1 but within us4 ,all this1 however1 rests on the fundamental distinction between dogmatic and critical or transcendental philosophy4 ,whoever wishes to make this quite clear to himself1 and realise it by means of an example1 may do so very briefly by reading1 as a specimen of dogmatic philosophy1 an essay of ,leibnitz entitled 8,de ,rerum ,originatione ,radicali10 and printed for the first time in the edition of the philosophical works of ,leibnitz by ,erdmann 7vol4 i4 p4 #adg74 ,here the origin and excellence of the world is demonstrated a priori1 so thoroughly in the manner of realistic-dogmatism1 on the ground of the veritates tern and with the assistance of the ontological and cosmological proofs4 ,it is indeed once admitted1 by the way1 that experience shows the exact opposite of the excellence of the world here demonstrated2 but experience is therefore given to understand that it knows nothing of the matter1 and ought to hold its tongue when philosophy has spoken a priori4 ,now1 with ,kant1 the critical philosophy appeared as the opponent of this whole method4 ,it takes for its problem just these veritates tern1 which serve as the foundation of every such dogmatic structure1 investigates their origin1 and finds it in the human mind1 where they spring from the peculiar forms which belong to it1 and which it carries in itself for the purpose of comprehending an objective world4 ,thus1 here1 in the brain1 is the quarry which supplies the material for that proud dogmatic edifice4 ,but because the critical philosophy1 in order to attain to this result1 was obliged to go beyond the veritates tern upon which all the preceding dogmatism was founded1 and make these truths themselves the objects of investigation1 it became transcendental philosophy4 ,from this1 then1 it also follows that the objective world1 as we know it1 does not belong to the true being of the thing in itself1 but is merely its phenomenal appearance conditioned by those very forms which lie a priori in the intellect 7i4e41 the brain71 therefore it cannot contain anything but phenomena4 ,kant1 indeed1 did not attain to the knowledge that the phenomenon is the world as idea1 and the thing in itself is the will4 ,but he showed that the phenomenal world is conditioned just as much through the subject as through the object1 and because he isolated the most universal forms of its phenomenal appearance1 i4e41 of the idea1 he proved that we may know these forms and consider them in their whole constitution1 not only by starting from the object1 but also just as well by starting from the subject1 because they are really the limits between object and subject which are common to them both2 and he concluded that by following these limits we never penetrate to the inner nature either of the object or of the subject1 consequently never know the true nature of the world1 the thing in itself4 ,he did not deduce the thing in itself in the right way1 as ,i shall show presently1 but by means of an inconsistency1 and he had to pay the penalty of this in frequent and irresistible attacks upon this important part of his teaching4 ,he did not recognise the thing in itself directly in the will2 but he made a great initial step towards this knowledge in that he explained the undeniable moral significance of human action as quite different from and not dependent upon the laws of the phenomenon1 nor even explicable in accordance with them1 but as something which touches the thing in itself directly3 this is the second important point of view for estimating his services4 ,we may regard as the third the complete overthrow of the ,scholastic philosophy1 a name by which ,i wish here to denote generally the whole period beginning with ,augustine1 the ,church ,father1 and ending just before ,kant4 ,for the chief characteristic of ,scholasticism is1 indeed1 that which is very correctly stated by ,tennemann1 the guardianship of the prevailing national religion over philosophy1 which had really nothing left for it to do but to prove and embellish the cardinal dogmas prescribed to it by religion4 ,the ,schoolmen proper1 down to ,suarez1 confess this openly2 the succeeding philosophers do it more unconsciously1 or at least unavowedly4 ,it is held that ,scholastic philosophy only extends to about a hundred years before ,descartes1 and that then with him there begins an entirely new epoch of free investigation independent of all positive theological doctrine4 ,such investigation1 however1 is in fact not to be attributed to ,descartes and his successors17#a7 but only an appearance of it1 and in any case an effort after it4 ,descartes was a man of supreme ability1 and if we take account of the age he lived in1 he accomplished a great deal4 ,but if we set aside this consideration and measure him with reference to the freeing of thought from all fetters and the commencement of a new period of untrammelled original investigation with which he is credited1 we are obliged to find that with his doubt still wanting in true seriousness1 and therefore surrendering so quickly and so entirely1 he has1 indeed1 the appearance of wishing to throw off at once all the early implanted opinions belonging to his age and nation1 but does so only apparently and for a moment1 to assume them again immediately and hold them all the more firmly2 and so is it with all his successors down to ,kant4 ,goethe's lines are1 therefore1 very applicable to a free independent thinker of this kind3 8,saving ,thy gracious presence1 he to me ,a long-legged grasshopper appears to be1 ,that springing flies1 and flying springs1 ,and in the grass the same old ditty sings407#b7 ,kant had reasons for assuming the air of also intending nothing more4 ,but the pretended spring1 which was permitted because it was known that it leads back to the grass1 this time became a flight1 and now those who remain below can only look after him1 and can never catch him again4 ,kant1 then1 ventured to show by his teaching that all those dogmas which had been so often professedly proved were incapable of proof4 ,speculative theology1 and the rational psychology connected with it1 received from him their deathblow4 ,since then they have vanished from ,german philosophy1 and one must not allow oneself to be misled by the fact that here and there the word is retained after the thing has been given up1 or some wretched professor of philosophy has the fear of his master in view1 and lets truth take care of itself4 ,only he who has observed the pernicious influence of these conceptions upon natural science1 and upon philosophy in all1 even the best writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 can estimate the extent of this service of ,kant's4 ,the change of tone and of metaphysical background which has appeared in ,german writing upon natural science since ,kant is remarkable2 before him it was in the same position as it still occupies in ,england4 ,this merit of ,kant's is connected with the fact that the unreflecting pursuit of the laws of the phenomenon1 the elevation of these to the position of eternal truths1 and thus the raising of the fleeting appearance to the position of the real being of the world1 in short1 realism undisturbed in its illusion by any reflection1 had reigned throughout all preceding philosophy1 ancient1 medival1 and modern4 ,berkeley1 who1 like ,malebranche before him1 recognised its one-sidedness1 and indeed falseness1 was unable to overthrow it1 for his attack was confined to one point4 ,thus it was reserved for ,kant to enable the idealistic point of view to obtain the ascendancy in ,europe1 at least in philosophy2 the point of view which throughout all non-,mohammedan ,asia1 and indeed essentially1 is that of religion4 ,before ,kant1 then1 we were in time2 now time is in us1 and so on4 ,ethics also were treated by that realistic philosophy according to the laws of the phenomenon1 which it regarded as absolute and valid also for the thing in itself4 ,they were therefore based now upon a doctrine of happiness1 now upon the will of the ,creator1 and finally upon the conception of perfection2 a conception which1 taken by itself1 is entirely empty and void of content1 for it denotes a mere relation that only receives significance from the things to which it is applied4 8,to be perfect0 means nothing more than 8to correspond to some conception which is presupposed and given10 a conception which must therefore be previously framed1 and without which the perfection is an unknown quantity1 and consequently has no meaning when expressed alone4 ,if1 however1 it is intended tacitly to presuppose the conception 8humanity10 and accordingly to make it the principle of morality to strive after human perfection1 this is only saying3 8,men ought to be as they ought to be10--and we are just as wise as before4 ,in fact 8perfect0 is very nearly a mere synonym of 8complete10 for it signifies that in one given case or individual1 all the predicates which lie in the conception of its species appear1 thus are actually present4 ,therefore the conception 8perfection10 if used absolutely and in the abstract1 is a word void of significance1 and this is also the case with the talk about the 8most perfect being10 and other similar expressions4 ,all this is a mere jingle of words4 ,nevertheless last century this conception of perfection and imperfection had become current coin2 indeed it was the hinge upon which almost all speculation upon ethics1 and even theology1 turned4 ,it was in every one's mouth1 so that at last it became a simple nuisance4 ,we see even the best writers of the time1 for example ,lessing1 entangled in the most deplorable manner in perfections and imperfections1 and struggling with them4 ,at the same time1 every thinking man must at least dimly have felt that this conception is void of all positive content1 because1 like an algebraical symbol1 it denotes a mere relation in abstracto4 ,kant1 as we have already said1 entirely separated the undeniably great ethical significance of actions from the phenomenon and its laws1 and showed that the former directly concerned the thing in itself1 the inner nature of the world1 while the latter1 i4e41 time1 space1 and all that fills them1 and disposes itself in them according to the law of causality1 is to be regarded as a changing and unsubstantial dream4 ,the little ,i have said1 which by no means exhausts the subject1 may suffice as evidence of my recognition of the great merits of ,kant1--a recognition expressed here both for my own satisfaction1 and because justice demands that those merits should be recalled to the memory of every one who desires to follow me in the unsparing exposure of his errors to which ,i now proceed4 ,it may be inferred1 upon purely historical grounds1 that ,kant's great achievements must have been accompanied by great errors4 ,for although he effected the greatest revolution in philosophy and made an end of ,scholasticism1 which1 understood in the wider sense we have indicated1 had lasted for fourteen centuries1 in order to begin what was really the third entirely new epoch in philosophy which the world has seen1 yet the direct result of his appearance was only negative1 not positive4 ,for since he did not set up a completely new system1 to which his disciples could only have adhered for a period1 all indeed observed that something very great had happened1 but yet no one rightly knew what4 ,they certainly saw that all previous philosophy had been fruitless dreaming1 from which the new age had now awakened1 but what they ought to hold to now they did not know4 ,a great void was felt2 a great need had arisen2 the universal attention even of the general public was aroused4 ,induced by this1 but not urged by inward inclination and sense of power 7which find utterance even at unfavourable times1 as in the case of ,spinoza71 men without any exceptional talent made various weak1 absurd1 and indeed sometimes insane1 attempts1 to which1 however1 the now interested public gave its attention1 and with great patience1 such as is only found in ,germany1 long lent its ear4 ,the same thing must once have happened in ,nature1 when a great revolution had altered the whole surface of the earth1 land and sea had changed places1 and the scene was cleared for a new creation4 ,it was then a long time before ,nature could produce a new series of lasting forms all in harmony with themselves and with each other4 ,strange and monstrous organisations appeared which did not harmonise either with themselves or with each other1 and therefore could not endure long1 but whose still existing remains have brought down to us the tokens of that wavering and tentative procedure of ,nature forming itself anew4 ,since1 now1 in philosophy1 a crisis precisely similar to this1 and an age of fearful abortions1 was1 as we all know1 introduced by ,kant1 it may be concluded that the services he rendered were not complete1 but must have been negative and one-sided1 and burdened with great defects4 ,these defects we now desire to search out4 ,first of all we shall present to ourselves clearly and examine the fundamental thought in which the aim of the whole 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 lies4 ,kant placed himself at the standpoint of his predecessors1 the dogmatic philosophers1 and accordingly he started with them from the following assumptions3--7#a47 ,metaphysics is the science of that which lies beyond the possibility of all experience4 7#b47 ,such a science can never be attained by applying principles which must first themselves be drawn from experience 7,prolegomena1 #a72 but only what we know before1 and thus independently of all experience1 can reach further than possible experience4 7#c47 ,in our reason certain principles of this kind are actually to be found3 they are comprehended under the name of ,knowledge of pure reason4 ,so far ,kant goes with his predecessors1 but here he separates from them4 ,they say3 8,these principles1 or this knowledge of pure reason1 are expressions of the absolute possibility of things1 tern veritates1 sources of ontology2 they stand above the system of the world1 as fate stood above the gods of the ancients40 ,kant says1 they are mere forms of our intellect1 laws1 not of the existence of things1 but of our idea of them2 they are therefore valid merely for our apprehension of things1 and hence they cannot extend beyond the possibility of experience1 which1 according to assumption #a1 is what was aimed at2 for the a priori nature of these forms of knowledge1 since it can only rest on their subjective origin1 is just what cuts us off for ever from the knowledge of the nature of things in themselves1 and confines us to a world of mere phenomena1 so that we cannot know things as they may be in themselves1 even a posteriori1 not to speak of a priori4 ,accordingly metaphysics is impossible1 and criticism of pure reason takes its place4 ,as opposed to the old dogmatism1 ,kant is here completely victorious2 therefore all dogmatic attempts which have since appeared have been obliged to pursue an entirely different path from the earlier systems2 and ,i shall now go on to the justification of my own system1 according to the expressed intention of this criticism4 ,a more careful examination1 then1 of the reasoning given above will oblige one to confess that its first fundamental assumption is a petitio principii4 ,it lies in the proposition 7stated with particular clearness in the ,prolegomena1 #a73 8,the source of metaphysics must throughout be non-empirical2 its fundamental principles and conceptions must never be taken from either inner or outer experience40 ,yet absolutely nothing is advanced in proof of this cardinal assertion except the etymological argument from the word metaphysic4 ,in truth1 however1 the matter stands thus3 ,the world and our own existence presents itself to us necessarily as a riddle4 ,it is now assumed1 without more ado1 that the solution of this riddle cannot be arrived at from a thorough understanding of the world itself1 but must be sought in something entirely different from the world 7for that is the meaning of 8beyond the possibility of all experience072 and that everything must be excluded from that solution of which we can in any way have immediate knowledge 7for that is the meaning of possible experience1 both inner and outer72 the solution must rather be sought only in that at which we can arrive merely indirectly1 that is1 by means of inferences from universal principles a priori4 ,after the principal source of all knowledge has in this way been excluded1 and the direct way to truth has been closed1 we must not wonder that the dogmatic systems failed1 and that ,kant was able to show the necessity of this failure2 for metaphysics and knowledge a priori had been assumed beforehand to be identical4 ,but for this it was first necessary to prove that the material for the solution of the riddle absolutely cannot be contained in the world itself1 but must be sought for only outside the world in something we can only attain to under the guidance of those forms of which we are conscious a priori4 ,but so long as this is not proved1 we have no grounds for shutting ourselves off1 in the case of the most important and most difficult of all questions1 from the richest of all sources of knowledge1 inner and outer experience1 in order to work only with empty forms4 ,i therefore say that the solution of the riddle of the world must proceed from the understanding of the world itself2 that thus the task of metaphysics is not to pass beyond the experience in which the world exists1 but to understand it thoroughly1 because outer and inner experience is at any rate the principal source of all knowledge2 that therefore the solution of the riddle of the world is only possible through the proper connection of outer with inner experience1 effected at the right point1 and the combination thereby produced of these two very different sources of knowledge4 ,yet this solution is only possible within certain limits which are inseparable from our finite nature1 so that we attain to a right understanding of the world itself without reaching a final explanation of its existence abolishing all further problems4 ,therefore est quadam prodire tenus1 and my path lies midway between the omniscience of the earlier dogmatists and the despair of the ,kantian ,critique4 ,the important truths1 however1 which ,kant discovered1 and through which the earlier metaphysical systems were overthrown1 have supplied my system with data and materials4 ,compare what ,i have said concerning my method in chap4 xvii4 of the ,supplements4 ,so much for the fundamental thought of ,kant2 we shall now consider his working out of it and its details4 ,kant's style bears throughout the stamp of a pre-eminent mind1 genuine strong individuality1 and quite exceptional power of thought4 ,its characteristic quality may perhaps be aptly described as a brilliant dryness1 by virtue of which he was able to grasp firmly and select the conceptions with great certainty1 and then to turn them about with the greatest freedom1 to the astonishment of the reader4 ,i find the same brilliant dryness in the style of ,aristotle1 though it is much simpler4 ,nevertheless ,kant's language is often indistinct1 indefinite1 inadequate1 and sometimes obscure4 ,its obscurity1 certainly1 is partly excusable on account of the difficulty of the subject and the depth of the thought2 but he who is himself clear to the bottom1 and knows with perfect distinctness what he thinks and wishes1 will never write indistinctly1 will never set up wavering and indefinite conceptions1 compose most difficult and complicated expressions from foreign languages to denote them1 and use these expressions constantly afterwards1 as ,kant took words and formulas from earlier philosophy1 especially ,scholasticism1 which he combined with each other to suit his purposes2 as1 for example1 8transcendental synthetic unity of apperception10 and in general 8unity of synthesis0 7,einheit der ,synthesis71 always used where 8union0 7,vereinigung7 would be quite sufficient by itself4 ,moreover1 a man who is himself quite clear will not be always explaining anew what has once been explained1 as ,kant does1 for example1 in the case of the understanding1 the categories1 experience1 and other leading conceptions4 ,in general1 such a man will not incessantly repeat himself1 and yet in every new exposition of the thought already expressed a hundred times leave it in just the same obscure condition1 but he will express his meaning once distinctly1 thoroughly1 and exhaustively1 and then let it alone4 8,quo enim melius rem aliquam concipimus eo magis determinati sumus ad eam unico modo exprimendam10 says ,descartes in his fifth letter4 ,but the most injurious result of ,kant's occasionally obscure language is1 that it acted as exemplar vitiis imitabile2 indeed1 it was misconstrued as a pernicious authorisation4 ,the public was compelled to see that what is obscure is not always without significance2 consequently1 what was without significance took refuge behind obscure language4 ,fichte was the first to seize this new privilege and use it vigorously2 ,schelling at least equalled him2 and a host of hungry scribblers1 without talent and without honesty1 soon outbade them both4 ,but the height of audacity1 in serving up pure nonsense1 in stringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words1 such as had previously only been heard in madhouses1 was finally reached in ,hegel1 and became the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification that has ever taken place1 with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity1 and will remain as a monument of ,german stupidity4 ,in vain1 meanwhile1 ,jean ,paul wrote his beautiful paragraph1 8,higher criticism of philosophical madness in the professorial chair1 and poetical madness in the theatre0 7sthetische ,nachschule72 for in vain ,goethe had already said-- 8,they prate and teach1 and no one interferes2 ,all from the fellowship of fools are shrinking2 ,man usually believes1 if only words he hears1 ,that also with them goes material for thinking407#c7 ,but let us return to ,kant4 ,we are compelled to admit that he entirely lacks grand1 classical simplicity1 navet1 ingnuit1 candeur4 ,his philosophy has no analogy with ,grecian architecture1 which presents large simple proportions revealing themselves at once to the glance2 on the contrary1 it reminds us strongly of the ,gothic style of building4 ,for a purely individual characteristic of ,kant's mind is a remarkable love of symmetry1 which delights in a varied multiplicity1 so that it may reduce it to order1 and repeat this order in subordinate orders1 and so on indefinitely1 just as happens in ,gothic churches4 ,indeed1 he sometimes carries this to the extent of trifling1 and from love of this tendency he goes so far as to do open violence to truth1 and to deal with it as ,nature was dealt with by the old-fashioned gardeners1 whose work we see in symmetrical alleys1 squares1 and triangles1 trees shaped like pyramids and spheres1 and hedges winding in regular curves4 ,i will support this with facts4 ,after he has treated space and time isolated from everything else1 and has then dismissed this whole world of perception which fills space and time1 and in which we live and are1 with the meaningless words 8the empirical content of perception is given us10 he immediately arrives with one spring at the logical basis of his whole philosophy1 the table of judgments4 ,from this table he deduces an exact dozen of categories1 symmetrically arranged under four heads1 which afterwards become the fearful procrustean bed into which he violently forces all things in the world and all that goes on in man1 shrinking from no violence and disdaining no sophistry if only he is able to repeat everywhere the symmetry of that table4 ,the first that is symmetrically deduced from it is the pure physiological table of the general principles of natural science--the axioms of intuition1 anticipations of perception1 analogies of experience1 and postulates of empirical thought in general4 ,of these fundamental principles1 the first two are simple2 but each of the last two sends out symmetrically three shoots4 ,the mere categories were what he calls conceptions2 but these principles of natural science are judgments4 ,in accordance with his highest guide to all wisdom1 symmetry1 the series must now prove itself fruitful in the syllogisms1 and this1 indeed1 is done symmetrically and regularly4 ,for1 as by the application of the categories to sensibility1 experience with all its a priori principles arose for the understanding1 so by the application of syllogisms to the categories1 a task performed by the reason in accordance with its pretended principle of seeking the unconditioned1 the ,ideas of the reason arise4 ,now this takes place in the following manner3 ,the three categories of relation supply to syllogistic reasoning the three only possible kinds of major premisses1 and syllogistic reasoning accordingly falls into three kinds1 each of which is to be regarded as an egg out of which the reason hatches an ,idea2 out of the categorical syllogism the ,idea of the soul1 out of the hypothetical the ,idea of the world1 and out of the disjunctive the ,idea of ,god4 ,in the second of these1 the ,idea of the world1 the symmetry of the table of the categories now repeats itself again1 for its four heads produce four theses1 each of which has its antithesis as a symmetrical pendant4 ,we pay the tribute of our admiration to the really exceedingly acute combination which produced this elegant structure1 but we shall none the less proceed to a thorough examination of its foundation and its parts4 ,but the following remarks must come first4 ,it is astonishing how ,kant1 without further reflection1 pursues his way1 following his symmetry1 ordering everything in accordance with it1 without ever taking one of the subjects so handled into consideration on its own account4 ,i will explain myself more fully4 ,after he has considered intuitive knowledge in a mathematical reference only1 he neglects altogether the rest of knowledge of perception in which the world lies before us1 and confines himself entirely to abstract thinking1 although this receives the whole of its significance and value from the world of perception alone1 which is infinitely more significant1 generally present1 and rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge4 ,indeed1 and this is an important point1 he has nowhere clearly distinguished perception from abstract knowledge1 and just on this account1 as we shall afterwards see1 he becomes involved in irresolvable contradictions with himself4 ,after he has disposed of the whole sensible world with the meaningless 8it is given10 he makes1 as we have said1 the logical table of judgments the foundation-stone of his building4 ,but here again he does not reflect for a moment upon that which really lies before him4 ,these forms of judgment are indeed words and combinations of words2 yet it ought first to have been asked what these directly denote3 it would have been found that they denote conceptions4 ,the next question would then have been as to the nature of conceptions4 ,it would have appeared from the answer what relation these have to the ideas of perception in which the world exists2 for perception and reflection would have been distinguished4 ,it would now have become necessary to examine1 not merely how pure and merely formal intuition or perception a priori1 but also how its content1 the empirical perception1 comes into consciousness4 ,but then it would have become apparent what part the understanding has in this1 and thus also in general what the understanding is1 and1 on the other hand1 what the reason properly is1 the critique of which is being written4 ,it is most remarkable that he does not once properly and adequately define the latter1 but merely gives incidentally1 and as the context in each case demands1 incomplete and inaccurate explanations of it1 in direct contradiction to the rule of ,descartes given above47#d7 ,for example1 at p4 #aa2 ,v4 #bd1 of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 it is the faculty of principles a priori2 but at p4 #bii2 ,v4 #cef1 it is said that reason is the faculty of principles1 and it is opposed to the understanding1 which is the faculty of rules6 ,one would now think that there must be a very wide difference between principles and rules1 since it entitles us to assume a special faculty of knowledge for each of them4 ,but this great distinction is made to lie merely in this1 that what is known a priori through pure perception or through the forms of the understanding is a rule1 and only what results from mere conceptions is a principle4 ,we shall return to this arbitrary and inadmissible distinction later1 when we come to the ,dialectic4 ,on p4 #ccj2 ,v4 #chf1 reason is the faculty of inference2 mere judging 7p4 #fi2 ,v4 #id7 he often explains as the work of the understanding4 ,now1 this really amounts to saying3 ,judging is the work of the understanding so long as the ground of the judgment is empirical1 transcendental1 or metalogical 7,essay on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 #ca1 #cb1 #cc72 but if it is logical1 as is the case with the syllogism1 then we are here concerned with a quite special and much more important faculty of knowledge--the reason4 ,nay1 what is more1 on p4 #cjc2 ,v4 #cfj1 it is explained that what follows directly from a proposition is still a matter of the understanding1 and that only those conclusions which are arrived at by the use of a mediating conception are the work of the reason1 and the example given is this3 ,from the proposition1 8,all men are mortal10 the inference1 8,some mortals are men10 may be drawn by the mere understanding4 ,on the other hand1 to draw the conclusion1 8,all the learned are mortal10 demands an entirely different and far more important faculty--the reason4 ,how was it possible for a great thinker to write the like of this6 ,on p4 #eec2 ,v4 #eha1 reason is all at once the constant condition of all voluntary action4 ,on p4 #fad2 ,v4 #fdb1 it consists in the fact that we can give an account of our assertions2 on pp4 #fdc1 #fdd2 ,v4 #fga1 #fgb1 in the circumstance that it brings unity into the conceptions of the understanding by means of ,ideas1 as the understanding brings unity into the multiplicity of objects by means of conceptions4 ,on p4 #fdf2 ,v4 #fgd1 it is nothing else than the faculty which deduces the particular from the general4 ,the understanding also is constantly being explained anew4 ,in seven passages of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 it is explained in the following terms4 ,on p4 #ea2 ,v4 #ge1 it is the faculty which of itself produces ideas of perception4 ,on p4 #fi2 ,v4 #id1 it is the faculty of judging1 i4e41 of thinking1 i4e41 of knowing through conceptions4 ,on p4 #acg of the fifth edition1 it is the faculty of knowledge generally4 ,on p4 #acb2 ,v4 #aga1 it is the faculty of rules4 ,on p4 #aeh2 ,v4 #aig1 however1 it is said3 8,it is not only the faculty of rules1 but the source of principles 7,grundstze7 according to which everything comes under rules20 and yet above it was opposed to the reason because the latter alone was the faculty of principles 7,principien74 ,on p4 #afj2 ,v4 #aii1 the understanding is the faculty of conceptions2 but on p4 #cjb2 ,v4 #cei1 it is the faculty of the unity of phenomena by means of rules4 ,against such really confused and groundless language on the subject 7even though it comes from ,kant7 ,i shall have no need to defend the explanation which ,i have given of these two faculties of knowledge--an explanation which is fixed1 clearly defined1 definite1 simple1 and in full agreement with the language of all nations and all ages4 ,i have only quoted this language as a proof of my charge that ,kant follows his symmetrical1 logical system without sufficiently reflecting upon the subject he is thus handling4 ,now1 as ,i have said above1 if ,kant had seriously examined how far two such different faculties of knowledge1 one of which is the specific difference of man1 may be known1 and what1 in accordance with the language of all nations and all philosophers1 reason and understanding are1 he would never1 without further authority than the intellectus theoreticus and practicus of the ,schoolmen1 which is used in an entirely different sense1 have divided the reason into theoretical and practical1 and made the latter the source of virtuous conduct4 ,in the same way1 before ,kant separated so carefully conceptions of the understanding 7by which he sometimes means his categories1 sometimes all general conceptions7 and conceptions of the reason 7his so-called ,ideas71 and made them both the material of his philosophy1 which for the most part deals only with the validity1 application1 and origin of all these conceptions2--first1 ,i say1 he ought to have really examined what in general a conception is4 ,but this very necessary investigation has unfortunately been also neglected1 and has contributed much to the irremediable confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge which ,i shall soon refer to4 ,the same want of adequate reflection with which he passed over the questions3 what is perception8 what is reflection8 what is conception8 what is reason8 what is understanding8 allowed him to pass over the following investigations1 which were just as inevitably necessary3 what is it that ,i call the object1 which ,i distinguish from the idea8 what is existence8 what is object8 what is subject8 what is truth1 illusion1 error8 ,but he follows his logical schema and his symmetry without reflecting or looking about him4 ,the table of judgments ought to1 and must1 be the key to all wisdom4 ,i have given it above as the chief merit of ,kant that he distinguished the phenomenon from the thing in itself1 explained the whole visible world as phenomenon1 and therefore denied all validity to its laws beyond the phenomenon4 ,it is certainly remarkable that he did not deduce this merely relative existence of the phenomenon from the simple undeniable truth which lay so near him1 8,no object without a subject10 in order thus at the very root to show that the object1 because it always exists merely in relation to a subject1 is dependent upon it1 conditioned by it1 and therefore conditioned as mere phenomenon1 which does not exist in itself nor unconditioned4 ,berkeley1 to whose merits ,kant did not do justice1 had already made this important principle the foundation-stone of his philosophy1 and thereby established an immortal reputation4 ,yet he himself did not draw the proper conclusions from this principle1 and so he was both misunderstood and insufficiently attended to4 ,in my first edition ,i explained ,kant's avoidance of this ,berkeleian principle as arising from an evident shrinking from decided idealism2 while1 on the other hand1 ,i found idealism distinctly expressed in many passages of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 and accordingly ,i charged ,kant with contradicting himself4 ,and this charge was well founded1 if1 as was then my case1 one only knew the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 in the second or any of the five subsequent editions printed from it4 ,but when later ,i read ,kant's great work in the first edition1 which is already so rare1 ,i saw1 to my great pleasure1 all these contradictions disappear1 and found that although ,kant does not use the formula1 8,no object without a subject10 he yet explains1 with just as much decision as ,berkeley and ,i do1 the outer world lying before us in space and time as the mere idea of the subject that knows it4 ,therefore1 for example1 he says there without reserve 7p4 #chc73 8,if ,i take away the thinking subject1 the whole material world must disappear1 for it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our subject1 and a class of its ideas40 ,but the whole passage from p4 #cdh-cib1 in which ,kant expounded his pronounced idealism with peculiar beauty and clearness1 was suppressed by him in the second edition1 and instead of it a number of remarks controverting it were introduced4 ,in this way then the text of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 as it has circulated from the year #aghg to the year #ahch1 was disfigured and spoilt1 and it became a self-contradictory book1 the sense of which could not therefore be thoroughly clear and comprehensible to any one4 ,the particulars about this1 and also my conjectures as to the reasons and the weaknesses which may have influenced ,kant so to disfigure his immortal work1 ,i have given in a letter to ,professor ,rosenkranz1 and he has quoted the principal passage of it in his preface to the second volume of the edition of ,kant's collected works edited by him1 to which ,i therefore refer4 ,in consequence of my representations1 ,professor ,rosenkranz was induced in the year #ahch to restore the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 to its original form1 for in the second volume referred to he had it printed according to the first edition of #agha1 by which he has rendered an inestimable service to philosophy2 indeed1 he has perhaps saved from destruction the most important work of ,german literature2 and this should always be remembered to his credit4 ,but let no one imagine that he knows the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 and has a distinct conception of ,kant's teaching if he has only read the second or one of the later editions4 ,that is altogether impossible1 for he has only read a mutilated1 spoilt1 and to a certain extent ungenuine text4 ,it is my duty to say this here decidedly and for every one's warning4 ,yet the way in which ,kant introduces the thing in itself stands in undeniable contradiction with the distinctly idealistic point of view so clearly expressed in the first edition of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 and without doubt this is the chief reason why1 in the second edition1 he suppressed the principal idealistic passage we have referred to1 and directly declared himself opposed to the ,berkeleian idealism1 though by doing so he only introduced inconsistencies into his work1 without being able to remedy its principal defect4 ,this defect1 as is known1 is the introduction of the thing in itself in the way chosen by him1 the inadmissibleness of which was exposed at length by ,g4 ,e4 ,schulze in 8nesidemus10 and was soon recognised as the untenable point of his system4 ,the matter may be made clear in a very few words4 ,kant based the assumption of the thing in itself1 though concealed under various modes of expression1 upon an inference from the law of causality--an inference that the empirical perception1 or more accurately the sensation1 in our organs of sense1 from which it proceeds1 must have an external cause4 ,but according to his own account1 which is correct1 the law of causality is known to us a priori1 consequently is a function of our intellect1 and is thus of subjective origin2 further1 sensation itself1 to which we here apply the law of causality1 is undeniably subjective2 and finally1 even space1 in which1 by means of this application1 we place the cause of this sensation as object1 is a form of our intellect given a priori1 and is consequently subjective4 ,therefore the whole empirical perception remains always upon a subjective foundation1 as a mere process in us1 and nothing entirely different from it and independent of it can be brought in as a thing in itself1 or shown to be a necessary assumption4 ,the empirical perception actually is and remains merely our idea3 it is the world as idea4 ,an inner nature of this we can only arrive at on the entirely different path followed by me1 by means of calling in the aid of self-consciousness1 which proclaims the will as the inner nature of our own phenomenon2 but then the thing in itself will be one which is toto genere different from the idea and its elements1 as ,i have explained4 ,the great defect of the ,kantian system in this point1 which1 as has been said1 was soon pointed out1 is an illustration of the truth of the beautiful ,indian proverb3 8,no lotus without a stem40 ,the erroneous deduction of the thing in itself is here the stem2 yet only the method of the deduction1 not the recognition of a thing in itself belonging to the given phenomenon4 ,but this last was ,fichte's misunderstanding of it1 which could only happen because he was not concerned with truth1 but with making a sensation for the furtherance of his individual ends4 ,accordingly he was bold and thoughtless enough to deny the thing in itself altogether1 and to set up a system in which1 not1 as with ,kant1 the mere form of the idea1 but also the matter1 its whole content1 was professedly deduced a priori from the subject4 ,in doing this1 he counted with perfect correctness upon the want of judgment and the stupidity of the public1 which accepted miserable sophisms1 mere hocus-pocus and senseless babble1 for proofs2 so that he succeeded in turning its attention from ,kant to himself1 and gave the direction to ,german philosophy in which it was afterwards carried further by ,schelling1 and ultimately reached its goal in the mad sophistry of ,hegel4 ,i now return to the great mistake of ,kant1 already touched on above1 that he has not properly separated perceptible and abstract knowledge1 whereby an inextricable confusion has arisen which we have now to consider more closely4 ,if he had sharply separated ideas of perception from conceptions merely thought in abstracto1 he would have held these two apart1 and in every case would have known with which of the two he had to do4 ,this1 however1 was unfortunately not the case1 although this accusation has not yet been openly made1 and may thus perhaps be unexpected4 ,his 8object of experience10 of which he is constantly speaking1 the proper object of the categories1 is not the idea of perception2 neither is it the abstract conception1 but it is different from both1 and yet both at once1 and is a perfect chimera4 ,for1 incredible as it may seem1 he lacked either the wisdom or the honesty to come to an understanding with himself about this1 and to explain distinctly to himself and others whether his 8object of experience1 i4e41 the knowledge produced by the application of the categories10 is the idea of perception in space and time 7my first class of ideas71 or merely the abstract conception4 ,strange as it is1 there always runs in his mind something between the two1 and hence arises the unfortunate confusion which ,i must now bring to light4 ,for this end ,i must go through the whole theory of elements in a general way4 ,the 8,transcendental sthetic0 is a work of such extraordinary merit that it alone would have been sufficient to immortalise the name of ,kant4 ,its proofs carry such perfect conviction1 that ,i number its propositions among incontestable truths1 and without doubt they are also among those that are richest in results1 and are1 therefore1 to be regarded as the rarest thing in the world1 a real and great discovery in metaphysics4 ,the fact1 strictly proved by him1 that a part of our knowledge is known to us a priori1 admits of no other explanation than that this constitutes the forms of our intellect2 indeed1 this is less an explanation than merely the distinct expression of the fact itself4 ,for a priori means nothing else than 8not gained on the path of experience1 thus not come into us from without40 ,but what is present in the intellect1 and has not come from without1 is just what belongs originally to the intellect itself1 its own nature4 ,now if what is thus present in the intellect itself consists of the general mode or manner in which it must present all its objects to itself1 this is just saying that what is thus present is the intellect's forms of knowing1 i4e41 the mode1 fixed once for all1 in which it fulfils this its function4 ,accordingly1 8knowledge a priori0 and 8the intellect's own forms0 are at bottom only two expressions for the same things thus to a certain extent synonyms4 ,therefore from the doctrine of the ,transcendental sthetic ,i knew of nothing to take away1 only of something to add4 ,kant did not carry out his thought to the end1 especially in this respect1 that he did not reject ,euclid's whole method of demonstration1 even after having said on p4 #hg2 ,v4 #abj1 that all geometrical knowledge has direct evidence from perception4 ,it is most remarkable that one of ,kant's opponents1 and indeed the acutest of them1 ,g4 ,e4 ,schulze 7,kritik der theoretischen ,philosophie1 ii4 #bda71 draws the conclusion that from his doctrine an entirely different treatment of geometry from that which is actually in use would arise2 and thus he thought to bring an apagogical argument against ,kant1 but1 in fact1 without knowing it1 he only began the war against the method of ,euclid4 ,let me refer to #ae of the first book of this work4 ,after the full exposition of the universal forms of perception given in the ,transcendental sthetic1 one necessarily expects to receive some explanation as to its content1 as to the way in which the empirical perception comes into our consciousness1 how the knowledge of this whole world1 which is for us so real and so important1 arises in us4 ,but the whole teaching of ,kant contains really nothing more about this than the oft-repeated meaningless expression3 8,the empirical element in perception is given from without40 ,consequently here also from the pure forms of perception ,kant arrives with one spring at thinking at the ,transcendental ,logic4 ,just at the beginning of the ,transcendental ,logic 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 p4 #ej2 ,v4 #gd71 where ,kant cannot avoid touching upon the content of the empirical perception1 he takes the first false step2 he is guilty of the 4 8,our knowledge10 he says1 8has two sources1 receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of conceptions3 the first is the capacity for receiving ideas1 the second that of knowing an object through these ideas3 through the first an object is given us1 through the second it is thought40 ,this is false2 for according to it the impression1 for which alone we have mere receptivity1 which thus comes from without and alone is properly 8given10 would be already an idea1 and indeed an object4 ,but it is nothing more than a mere sensation in the organ of sense1 and only by the application of the understanding 7i4e41 of the law of causality7 and the forms of perception1 space and time1 does our intellect change this mere sensation into an idea1 which now exists as an object in space and time1 and cannot be distinguished from the latter 7the object7 except in so far as we ask after the thing in itself1 but apart from this is identical with it4 ,i have explained this point fully in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ba4 ,with this1 however1 the work of the understanding and of the faculty of perception is completed1 and no conceptions and no thinking are required in addition2 therefore the brute also has these ideas4 ,if conceptions are added1 if thinking is added1 to which spontaneity may certainly be attributed1 then knowledge of perception is entirely abandoned1 and a completely different class of ideas comes into consciousness1 non-perceptible abstract conceptions4 ,this is the activity of the reason1 which yet obtains the whole content of its thinking only from the previous perception1 and the comparison of it with other perceptions and conceptions4 ,but thus ,kant brings thinking into the perception1 and lays the foundation for the inextricable confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge which ,i am now engaged in condemning4 ,he allows the perception1 taken by itself1 to be without understanding1 purely sensuous1 and thus quite passive1 and only through thinking 7category of the understanding7 does he allow an object to be apprehended3 thus he brings thought into the perception4 ,but then1 again1 the object of thinking is an individual real object2 and in this way thinking loses its essential character of universality and abstraction1 and instead of general conceptions receives individual things as its object3 thus again he brings perception into thinking4 ,from this springs the inextricable confusion referred to1 and the consequences of this first false step extend over his whole theory of knowledge4 ,through the whole of his theory the utter confusion of the idea of perception with the abstract idea tends towards a something between the two which he expounds as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories1 and calls this knowledge experience4 ,it is hard to believe that ,kant really figured to himself something fully determined and really distinct in this object of the understanding2 ,i shall now prove this through the tremendous contradiction which runs through the whole ,transcendental ,logic1 and is the real source of the obscurity in which it is involved4 ,in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 p4 #fg-fi2 ,v4 #ib-id2 p4 #hi1 #ij2 ,v4 #abb1 #abc2 further1 ,v4 #ace1 #aci1 #aec1 he repeats and insists3 the understanding is no faculty of perception1 its knowledge is not intuitive but discursive2 the understanding is the faculty of judging 7p4 #fi2 ,v4 #id71 and a judgment is indirect knowledge1 an idea of an idea 7p4 #fh2 ,v4 #ic72 the understanding is the faculty of thinking1 and thinking is knowledge through conceptions 7p4 #fi2 ,v4 #id72 the categories of the understanding are by no means the conditions under which objects are given in perception 7p4 #hi2 ,v4 #abb71 and perception in no way requires the functions of thinking 7p4 #ia2 ,v4 #abc72 our understanding can only think1 not perceive 7,v4 pp4 #ace1 #aci74 ,further1 in the 8,prolegomena10 #bj1 he says that perception1 sensation1 perceptio1 belongs merely to the senses2 judgment to the understanding alone2 and in #bb1 that the work of the senses is to perceive1 that of the understanding to think1 i4e41 to judge4 ,finally1 in the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 fourth edition1 p4 #bdg2 ,rosenkranz's edition1 p4 #bha1 he says that the understanding is discursive2 its ideas are thoughts1 not perceptions4 ,all this is in ,kant's own words4 ,from this it follows that this perceptible world would exist for us even if we had no understanding at all2 that it comes into our head in a quite inexplicable manner1 which he constantly indicates by his strange expression the perception is given1 without ever explaining this indefinite and metaphorical expression further4 ,now all that has been quoted is contradicted in the most glaring manner by the whole of the rest of his doctrine of the understanding1 of its categories1 and of the possibility of experience as he explains it in the ,transcendental ,logic4 ,thus 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 p4 #gi2 ,v4 #aje71 the understanding through its categories brings unity into the manifold of perception1 and the pure conceptions of the understanding refer a priori to objects of perception4 ,p4 #id2 ,v4 #abf1 the 8categories are the condition of experience1 whether of perception1 which is found in it1 or of thought40 ,v4 p4 #abg1 the understanding is the originator of experience4 ,v4 p4 #abh1 the categories determine the perception of objects4 ,v4 p4 #acj1 all that we present to ourselves as connected in the object 7which is yet certainly something perceptible and not an abstraction71 has been so connected by an act of the understanding4 ,v4 p4 #ace1 the understanding is explained anew as the faculty of combining a priori1 and of bringing the multiplicity of given ideas under the unity of apperception2 but according to all ordinary use of words1 apperception is not the thinking of a conception1 but is perception4 ,v4 p4 #acf1 we find a first principle of the possibility of all perception in connection with the understanding4 ,v4 p4 #adc1 it stands as the heading1 that all sense perception is conditioned by the categories4 ,at the same place the logical function of the judgment also brings the manifold of given perceptions under an apperception in general1 and the manifold of a given perception stands necessarily under the categories4 ,v4 p4 #add1 unity comes into perception1 by means of the categories1 through the understanding4 ,v4 p4 #ade1 the thinking of the understanding is very strangely explained as synthetically combining1 connecting1 and arranging the manifold of perception4 ,v4 p4 #afa1 experience is only possible through the categories1 and consists in the connection of sensations1 which1 however1 are just perceptions4 ,v4 p4 #aei1 the categories are a priori knowledge of the objects of perception in general4 ,further1 here and at ,v4 p4 #afc and #afe1 a chief doctrine of ,kant's is given1 this3 that the understanding first makes ,nature possible1 because it prescribes laws for it a priori1 and ,nature adapts itself to the system of the understanding1 and so on4 ,nature1 however1 is certainly perceptible and not an abstraction2 therefore1 the understanding must be a faculty of perception4 ,v4 p4 #afh1 it is said1 the conceptions of the understanding are the principles of the possibility of experience1 and the latter is the condition of phenomena in space and time in general2 phenomena which1 however1 certainly exist in perception4 ,finally1 p4 #ahi-baa2 ,v4 #bcb-bfe1 the long proof is given 7the incorrectness of which is shown in detail in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bc7 that the objective succession and also the coexistence of objects of experience are not sensuously apprehended1 but are only brought into ,nature by the understanding1 and that ,nature itself first becomes possible in this way4 ,yet it is certain that ,nature1 the course of events1 and the coexistence of states1 is purely perceptible1 and no mere abstract thought4 ,i challenge every one who shares my respect towards ,kant to reconcile these contradictions and to show that in his doctrine of the object of experience and the way it is determined by the activity of the understanding and its twelve functions1 ,kant thought something quite distinct and definite4 ,i am convinced that the contradiction ,i have pointed out1 which extends through the whole ,transcendental ,logic1 is the real reason of the great obscurity of its language4 ,kant himself1 in fact1 was dimly conscious of the contradiction1 inwardly combated it1 but yet either would not or could not bring it to distinct consciousness1 and therefore veiled it from himself and others1 and avoided it by all kinds of subterfuges4 ,this is perhaps also the reason why he made out of the faculties of knowledge such a strange complicated machine1 with so many wheels1 as the twelve categories1 the transcendental synthesis of imagination1 of the inner sense1 of the transcendental unity of apperception1 also the schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding1 c41 c4 ,and notwithstanding this great apparatus1 not even an attempt is made to explain the perception of the external world1 which is after all the principal fact in our knowledge2 but this pressing claim is very meanly rejected1 always through the same meaningless metaphorical expression3 8,the empirical perception is given us40 ,on p4 #ade of the fifth edition1 we learn further that the perception is given through the object2 therefore the object must be something different from the perception4 ,if1 now1 we endeavour to investigate ,kant's inmost meaning1 not clearly expressed by himself1 we find that in reality such an object1 different from the perception1 but which is by no means a conception1 is for him the proper object for the understanding2 indeed that it must be by means of the strange assumption of such an object1 which cannot be presented in perception1 that the perception first becomes experience4 ,i believe that an old deeply-rooted prejudice in ,kant1 dead to all investigation1 is the ultimate reason of the assumption of such an absolute object1 which is an object in itself1 i4e41 without a subject4 ,it is certainly not the perceived object1 but through the conception it is added to the perception by thought1 as something corresponding to it2 and now the perception is experience1 and has value and truth1 which it thus only receives through the relation to a conception 7in diametrical opposition to my exposition1 according to which the conception only receives value and truth from the perception74 ,it is then the proper function of the categories to add on in thought to the perception this directly non-perceptible object4 8,the object is given only through perception1 and is afterwards thought in accordance with the category0 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 first edition1 p4 #cii74 ,this is made specially clear by a passage on p4 #abe of the fifth edition3 8,now the question arises whether conceptions a priori do not also come first as conditions under which alone a thing can be1 not perceived certainly1 but yet thought as an object in general10 which he answers in the affirmative4 ,here the source of the error and the confusion in which it is involved shows itself distinctly4 ,for the object as such exists always only for perception and in it2 it may now be completed through the senses1 or1 when it is absent1 through the imagination4 ,what is thought1 on the contrary1 is always an universal non-perceptible conception1 which certainly can be the conception of an object in general2 but only indirectly by means of conceptions does thought relate itself to objects1 which always are and remain perceptible4 ,for our thinking is not able to impart reality to perceptions2 this they have1 so far as they are capable of it 7empirical reality7 of themselves2 but it serves to bring together the common element and the results of perceptions1 in order to preserve them1 and to be able to use them more easily4 ,but ,kant ascribes the objects themselves to thought1 in order to make experience and the objective world dependent upon understanding1 yet without allowing understanding to be a faculty of perception4 ,in this relation he certainly distinguishes perception from thought1 but he makes particular things sometimes the object of perception and sometimes the object of thought4 ,in reality1 however1 they are only the object of the former2 our empirical perception is at once objective1 just because it proceeds from the causal nexus4 ,things1 not ideas different from them1 are directly its object4 ,particular things as such are perceived in the understanding and through the senses2 the one-sided impression upon the latter is at once completed by the imagination4 ,but1 on the contrary1 as soon as we pass over to thought1 we leave the particular things1 and have to do with general conceptions1 which cannot be presented in perception1 although we afterwards apply the results of our thought to particular things4 ,if we hold firmly to this1 the inadmissibleness of the assumption becomes evident that the perception of things only obtains reality and becomes experience through the thought of these very things applying its twelve categories4 ,rather in perception itself the empirical reality1 and consequently experience1 is already given2 but the perception itself can only come into existence by the application to sensation of the knowledge of the causal nexus1 which is the one function of the understanding4 ,perception is accordingly in reality intellectual1 which is just what ,kant denies4 ,besides in the passages quoted1 the assumption of ,kant here criticised will be found expressed with admirable clearness in the 8,critique of ,judgment10 #cf1 just at the beginning2 also in the 8,metaphysical ,principles of ,natural ,science10 in the note to the first explanation of 8,phenomenology40 ,but with a navet which ,kant ventured upon least of all with reference to this doubtful point1 it is to be found most distinctly laid down in the book of a ,kantian1 ,kiesewetter's 8,grundriss einer algemeinen ,logik10 third edition1 part i41 p4 #dcd of the exposition1 and part ii41 #eb and #ec of the exposition2 similarly in ,tieftrunk's 8,denklehre in rein ,deutschem ,gewande0 7#ahbe74 ,it there appears so clearly how those disciples who do not themselves think become a magnifying mirror of the errors of every thinker4 ,once having determined his doctrine of the categories1 ,kant was always cautious when expounding it1 but his disciples on the contrary were quite bold1 and thus exposed its falseness4 ,according to what has been said1 the object of the categories is for ,kant1 not indeed the thing in itself1 but yet most closely akin to it4 ,it is the object in itself2 it is an object that requires no subject2 it is a particular thing1 and yet not in space and time1 because not perceptible2 it is an object of thought1 and yet not an abstract conception4 ,accordingly ,kant really makes a triple division3 7#a47 the idea2 7#b47 the object of the idea2 7#c47 the thing in itself4 ,the first belongs to the sensibility1 which in its case1 as in that of sensation1 includes the pure forms of perception1 space and time4 ,the second belongs to the understanding1 which thinks it through its twelve categories4 ,the third lies beyond the possibility of all knowledge4 7,in support of this1 cf4 ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 first edition1 p4 #ajh and #aji47 ,the distinction of the idea from the object of the idea is however unfounded2 this had already been proved by ,berkeley1 and it appears from my whole exposition in the first book1 especially chap4 i4 of the supplements2 nay1 even from ,kant's own completely idealistic point of view in the first edition4 ,but if we should not wish to count the object of the idea as belonging to the idea and identify it with the idea1 it would be necessary to attribute it to the thing in itself3 this ultimately depends on the sense which is attached to the word object4 ,this1 however1 always remains certain1 that1 when we think clearly1 nothing more can be found than idea and thing in itself4 ,the illicit introduction of that hybrid1 the object of the idea1 is the source of ,kant's errors2 yet when it is taken away1 the doctrine of the categories as conceptions a priori also falls to the ground2 for they bring nothing to the perception1 and are not supposed to hold good of the thing in itself1 but by means of them we only think those 8objects of the ideas10 and thereby change ideas into experience4 ,for every empirical perception is already experience2 but every perception which proceeds from sensation is empirical3 this sensation is related by the understanding1 by means of its sole function 7knowledge a priori of the law of causality71 to its cause1 which just on this account presents itself in space and time 7forms of pure perception7 as object of experience1 material object1 enduring in space through all time1 yet as such always remains idea1 as do space and time themselves4 ,if we desire to go beyond this idea1 then we arrive at the question as to the thing in itself1 the answer to which is the theme of my whole work1 as of all metaphysics in general4 ,kant's error here explained is connected with his mistake1 which we condemned before1 that he gives no theory of the origin of empirical perception1 but1 without saying more1 treats it as given1 identifying it with the mere sensation1 to which he only adds the forms of intuition or perception1 space and time1 comprehending both under the name sensibility4 ,but from these materials no objective idea arises3 this absolutely demands the relation of the idea to its cause1 thus the application of the law of causality1 and thus understanding2 for without this the sensation still remains always subjective1 and does not take the form of an object in space1 even if space is given with it4 ,but according to ,kant1 the understanding must not be assigned to perception2 it is supposed merely to think1 so as to remain within the transcendental logic4 ,with this again is connected another mistake of ,kant's3 that he left it to me to adduce the only valid proof of the a priori nature of the law of causality which he rightly recognised1 the proof from the possibility of objective empirical perception itself1 and instead of it gives a palpably false one1 as ,i have already shown in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bc4 ,from the above it is clear that ,kant's 8object of the idea0 7#b7 is made up of what he has stolen partly from the idea 7#a71 and partly from the thing in itself 7#c74 ,if1 in reality1 experience were only brought about by the understanding applying its twelve different functions in order to think through as many conceptions a priori1 the objects which were previously merely perceived1 then every real thing would necessarily as such have a number of determinations1 which1 as given a priori1 absolutely could not be thought away1 just like space and time1 but would belong quite essentially to the existence of the thing1 and yet could not be deduced from the properties of space and time4 ,but only one such determination is to be found--that of causality4 ,upon this rests materiality1 for the essence of matter consists in action1 and it is through and through causality 7cf4 ,bk4 ,,ii4 ch4 iv47 ,but it is materiality alone that distinguishes the real thing from the picture of the imagination1 which is then only idea4 ,for matter1 as permanent1 gives to the thing permanence through all time1 in respect of its matter1 while the forms change in conformity with causality4 ,everything else in the thing consists either of determinations of space or of time1 or of its empirical properties1 which are all referable to its activity1 and are thus fuller determinations of causality4 ,but causality enters already as a condition into the empirical perception1 and this is accordingly a thing of the understanding1 which makes even perception possible1 and yet apart from the law of causality contributes nothing to experience and its possibility4 ,what fills the old ontologies is1 with the exception of what is given here1 nothing more than relations of things to each other1 or to our reflection1 and a farrago of nonsense4 ,the language in which the doctrine of the categories is expressed affords an evidence of its baselessness4 ,what a difference in this respect between the ,transcendental sthetic and the ,transcendental ,analytic6 ,in the former1 what clearness1 definiteness1 certainty1 firm conviction which is freely expressed and infallibly communicates itself6 ,all is full of light1 no dark lurking-places are left3 ,kant knows what he wants and knows that he is right4 ,in the latter1 on the other hand1 all is obscure1 confused1 indefinite1 wavering1 uncertain1 the language anxious1 full of excuses and appeals to what is coming1 or indeed of suppression4 ,moreover1 the whole second and third sections of the ,deduction of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding are completely changed in the second edition1 because they did not satisfy ,kant himself1 and they have become quite different from the first edition1 though not clearer4 ,we actually see ,kant in conflict with the truth in order to carry out his hypothesis which he has once fixed upon4 ,in the ,transcendental sthetic all his propositions are really proved from undeniable facts of consciousness1 in the ,transcendental ,analytic1 on the contrary1 we find1 if we consider it closely1 mere assertions that thus it is and must be4 ,here1 then1 as everywhere1 the language bears the stamp of the thought from which it has proceeded1 for style is the physiognomy of the mind4 ,we have still to remark1 that whenever ,kant wishes to give an example for the purpose of fuller explanation1 he almost always takes for this end the category of causality1 and then what he has said turns out correct2 for the law of causality is indeed the real form of the understanding1 but it is also its only form1 and the remaining eleven categories are merely blind windows4 ,the deduction of the categories is simpler and less involved in the first edition than in the second4 ,he labours to explain how1 according to the perception given by sensibility1 the understanding produces experience by means of thinking the categories4 ,in doing so1 the words recognition1 reproduction1 association1 apprehension1 transcendental unity of apperception1 are repeated to weariness1 and yet no distinctness is attained4 ,it is well worth noticing1 however1 that in this explanation he does not once touch upon what must nevertheless first occur to every one--the relation of the sensation to its external cause4 ,if he did not intend this relation to hold good1 he ought to have expressly denied it2 but neither does he do this4 ,thus in this way he evades the point1 and all the ,kantians have in like manner evaded it4 ,the secret motive of this is1 that he reserves the causal nexus1 under the name 8ground of the phenomenon10 for his false deduction of the thing in itself2 and also that perception would become intellectual through the relation to the cause1 which he dare not admit4 ,besides this1 he seems to have been afraid that if the causal nexus were allowed to hold good between sensation and object1 the latter would at once become the thing in itself1 and introduce the empiricism of ,locke4 ,but this difficulty is removed by reflection1 which shows us that the law of causality is of subjective origin1 as well as the sensation itself2 and besides this1 our own body also1 inasmuch as it appears in space1 already belongs to ideas4 ,but ,kant was hindered from confessing this by his fear of the ,berkeleian idealism4 8,the combination of the manifold of perception0 is repeatedly given as the essential operation of the understanding1 by means of its twelve categories4 ,yet this is never adequately explained1 nor is it shown what this manifold of perception is before it is combined by the understanding4 ,but time and space1 the latter in all its three dimensions1 are continua1 i4e41 all their parts are originally not separate but combined4 ,thus1 then1 everything that exhibits itself in them 7is given7 appears originally as a continuum1 i4e41 its parts appear already combined and require no adventitious combination of a manifold4 ,if1 however1 some one should seek to interpret that combining of the manifold of perception by saying that ,i refer the different sense-impressions of one object to this one only--thus1 for example1 perceiving a bell1 ,i recognise that what affects my eye as yellow1 my hand as smooth and hard1 my ear as sounding1 is yet only one and the same body1--then ,i reply that this is rather a consequence of the knowledge a priori of the causal nexus 7this actual and only function of the understanding71 by virtue of which all those different effects upon my different organs of sense yet lead me only to one common cause of them1 the nature of the body standing before me1 so that my understanding1 in spite of the difference and multiplicity of the effects1 still apprehends the unity of the cause as a single object1 which just on that account exhibits itself in perception4 ,in the beautiful recapitulation of his doctrine which ,kant gives at p4 #gai-gbf or ,v4 #gdg-ged of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 he explains the categories1 perhaps more distinctly than anywhere else1 as 8the mere rule of the synthesis of that which empirical apprehension has given a posteriori40 ,it seems as if here he had something in his mind1 such as that1 in the construction of the triangle1 the angles give the rule for the composition of the lines2 at least by this image one can best explain to oneself what he says of the function of the categories4 ,the preface to the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science0 contains a long note which likewise gives an explanation of the categories1 and says that they 8differ in no respect from the formal acts of the understanding in judging10 except that in the latter subject and predicate can always change places2 then the judgment in general is defined in the same passage as 8an act through which given ideas first become knowledge of an object40 ,according to this1 the brutes1 since they do not judge1 must also have no knowledge of objects4 ,in general1 according to ,kant1 there are only conceptions of objects1 no perceptions4 ,i1 on the contrary1 say3 ,objects exist primarily only for perception1 and conceptions are always abstractions from this perception4 ,therefore abstract thinking must be conducted exactly according to the world present in perception1 for it is only their relation to this that gives content to conceptions2 and we must assume for the conceptions no other a priori determined form than the faculty of reflection in general1 the nature of which is the construction of conceptions1 i4e41 of abstract non-perceptible ideas1 which constitutes the sole function of the reason1 as ,i have shown in the first book4 ,i therefore require that we should reject eleven of the categories1 and only retain that of causality1 and yet that we should see clearly that its activity is indeed the condition of empirical perception1 which accordingly is not merely sensuous but intellectual1 and that the object so perceived1 the object of experience1 is one with the idea1 from which there remains nothing to distinguish except the thing in itself4 ,after repeated study of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 at different periods of my life1 a conviction has forced itself upon me with regard to the origin of the ,transcendental ,logic1 which ,i now impart as very helpful to an understanding of it4 ,kant's only discovery1 which is based upon objective comprehension and the highest human thought1 is the apperu that time and space are known by us a priori4 ,gratified by this happy hit1 he wished to pursue the same vein further1 and his love of architectonic symmetry afforded him the clue4 ,as he had found that a pure intuition or perception a priori underlay the empirical perception as its condition1 he thought that in the same way certain pure conceptions as presuppositions in our faculty of knowledge must lie at the foundation of the empirically obtained conceptions1 and that real empirical thought must be only possible through a pure thought a priori1 which1 however1 would have no objects in itself1 but would be obliged to take them from perception4 ,so that as the ,transcendental sthetic establishes an a priori basis of mathematics1 there must1 he supposed1 also be a similar basis for logic2 and thus1 then for the sake of symmetry1 the former received a pendant in a ,transcendental ,logic4 ,from this point onwards ,kant was no more free1 no more in the position of purely1 investigating and observing what is present in consciousness2 but he was guided by an assumption and pursued a purpose--the purpose of finding what he assumed1 in order to add to the ,transcendental sthetic so happily discovered a ,transcendental ,logic analogous to it1 and thus symmetrically corresponding to it1 as a second storey4 ,now for this purpose he hit upon the table of judgments1 out of which he constructed1 as well as he could1 the table of categories1 the doctrine of twelve pure a priori conceptions1 which are supposed to be the conditions of our thinking those very things the perception of which is conditioned by the two a priori forms of sensibility3 thus a pure understanding now corresponded symmetrically to a pure sensibility4 ,then another consideration occurred to him1 which offered a means of increasing the plausibility of the thing1 by the assumption of the schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding4 ,but just through this the way in which his procedure had1 unconsciously indeed1 originated betrayed itself most distinctly4 ,for because he aimed at finding something a priori analogous to every empirical function of the faculty of knowledge1 he remarked that between our empirical perception and our empirical thinking1 conducted in abstract non-perceptible conceptions1 a connection very frequently1 though not always1 takes place1 because every now and then we try to go back from abstract thinking to perception2 but try to do so merely in order really to convince ourselves that our abstract thought has not strayed far from the safe ground of perception1 and perhaps become exaggeration1 or1 it may be1 mere empty talk2 much in the same way as1 when we are walking in the dark1 we stretch out our hand every now and then to the guiding wall4 ,we go back1 then1 to the perception only tentatively and for the moment1 by calling up in imagination a perception corresponding to the conceptions which are occupying us at the time--a perception which can yet never be quite adequate to the conception1 but is merely a temporary representative of it4 ,i have already adduced what is needful on this point in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bh4 ,kant calls a fleeting phantasy of this kind a schema1 in opposition to the perfected picture of the imagination4 ,he says it is like a monogram of the imagination1 and asserts that just as such a schema stands midway between our abstract thinking of empirically obtained conceptions1 and our clear perception which comes to us through the senses1 so there are a priori schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding between the faculty of perception a priori of pure sensibility and the faculty of thinking a priori of the pure understanding 7thus the categories74 ,these schemata1 as monograms of the pure imagination a priori1 he describes one by one1 and assigns to each of them its corresponding category1 in the wonderful 8,chapter on the ,schematism of the ,pure ,conceptions of the ,understanding10 which is noted as exceedingly obscure1 because no man has ever been able to make anything out of it4 ,its obscurity1 however1 vanishes if it is considered from the point of view here indicated1 but there also comes out more clearly in it than anywhere else the intentional nature of ,kant's procedure1 and of the determination formed beforehand of finding what would correspond to the analogy1 and could assist the architectonic symmetry2 indeed this is here the case to such a degree as to be almost comical4 ,for when he assumes schemata of the pure 7empty7 a priori conceptions of the understanding 7categories7 analogous to the empirical schemata 7or representatives through the fancy of our actual conceptions71 he overlooks the fact that the end of such schemata is here entirely wanting1 ,for the end of the schemata in the case of empirical 7real7 thinking is entirely connected with the material content of such conceptions4 ,for since these conceptions are drawn from empirical perception1 we assist and guide ourselves when engaged in abstract thinking by now and then casting a momentary glance back at the perception out of which the conceptions are framed1 in order to assure ourselves that our thought has still real content4 ,this1 however1 necessarily presupposes that the conceptions which occupy us are sprung from perception1 and it is merely a glance back at their material content1 indeed a mere aid to our weakness4 ,but in the case of a priori conceptions which as yet have no content at all1 clearly this is necessarily omitted4 ,for these conceptions are not sprung from perception1 but come to it from within1 in order to receive a content first from it4 ,thus they have as yet nothing on which they could look back4 ,i speak fully upon this point1 because it is just this that throws light upon the secret origin of the ,kantian philosophising1 which accordingly consists in this1 that ,kant1 after the happy discovery of the two forms of intuition or perception a priori1 exerted himself1 under the guidance of the analogy1 to prove that for every determination of our empirical knowledge there is an a priori analogue1 and this finally extended1 in the schemata1 even to a mere psychological fact4 ,here the apparent depth and the difficulty of the exposition just serve to conceal from the reader that its content remains a wholly undemonstrable and merely arbitrary assumption4 ,but he who has penetrated at last to the meaning of such an exposition is then easily induced to mistake this understanding so painfully attained for a conviction of the truth of the matter4 ,if1 on the contrary1 ,kant had kept himself here as unprejudiced and purely observant as in the discovery of a priori intuition or perception1 he must have found that what is added to the pure intuition or perception of space and time1 if an empirical perception arises from it1 is on the one hand the sensation1 and on the other hand the knowledge of causality1 which changes the mere sensation into objective empirical perception1 but just on this account is not first derived and learned from sensation1 but exists a priori1 and is indeed the form and function of the pure understanding4 ,it is also1 however1 its sole form and function1 yet one so rich in results that all our empirical knowledge rests upon it4 ,if1 as has often been said1 the refutation of an error is only complete when the way it originated has been psychologically demonstrated1 ,i believe ,i have achieved this1 with regard to ,kant's doctrine of the categories and their schemata1 in what ,i have said above4 ,after ,kant had thus introduced such great errors into the first simple outlines of a theory of the faculty of perception1 he adopted a variety of very complicated assumptions4 ,to these belongs first of all the synthetic unity of apperception3 a very strange thing1 very strangely explained4 8,the ,i think must be able to accompany all my ideas40 ,must--be able3 this is a problematic-apodictic enunciation2 in plain ,english1 a proposition which takes with one hand what it gives with the other4 ,and what is the meaning of this carefully balanced proposition8 ,that all knowledge of ideas is thinking8 ,that is not the case3 and it would be dreadful2 there would then be nothing but abstract conceptions1 or at any rate a pure perception free from reflection and will1 such as that of the beautiful1 the deepest comprehension of the true nature of things1 i4e41 of their ,platonic ,ideas4 ,and besides1 the brutes would then either think also1 or else they would not even have ideas4 ,or is the proposition perhaps intended to mean3 no object without a subject8 ,that would be very badly expressed by it1 and would come too late4 ,if we collect ,kant's utterances on the subject1 we shall find that what he understands by the synthetic unity of apperception is1 as it were1 the extensionless centre of the sphere of all our ideas1 whose radii converge to it4 ,it is what ,i call the subject of knowing1 the correlative of all ideas1 and it is also that which ,i have fully described and explained in the #bb;d chapter of the ,supplements1 as the focus in which the rays of the activity of the brain converge4 ,therefore1 to avoid repetition1 ,i now refer to that chapter4 ,that ,i reject the whole doctrine of the categories1 and reckon it among the groundless assumptions with which ,kant burdened the theory of knowledge1 results from the criticism given above2 and also from the proof of the contradictions in the ,transcendental ,logic1 which had their ground in the confusion of perception and abstract knowledge2 also further from the proof of the want of a distinct and definite conception of the nature of the understanding and of the reason1 instead of which we found in ,kant's writings only incoherent1 inconsistent1 insufficient1 and incorrect utterances with regard to these two faculties of the mind4 ,finally1 it results from the explanations which ,i myself have given of these faculties of the mind in the first book and its ,supplements1 and more fully in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ba1 #bf1 and #cd1--;explanations which are very definite and distinct1 which clearly follow from the consideration of the nature of our knowledge1 and which completely agree with the conceptions of those two faculties of knowledge that appear in the language and writings of all ages and all nations1 but were not brought to distinctness4 ,their defence against the very different exposition of ,kant has1 for the most part1 been given already along with the exposure of the errors of that exposition4 ,since1 however1 the table of judgments1 which ,kant makes the foundation of his theory of thinking1 and indeed of his whole philosophy1 has1 in itself1 as a whole1 its correctness1 it is still incumbent upon me to show how these universal forms of all judgment arise in our faculty of knowledge1 and to reconcile them with my exposition of it4 ,in this discussion ,i shall always attach to the concepts understanding and reason the sense given them in my explanation1 which ,i therefore assume the reader is familiar with4 ,an essential difference between ,kant's method and that which ,i follow lies in this1 that he starts from indirect1 reflected knowledge1 while ,i start from direct or intuitive knowledge4 ,he may be compared to a man who measures the height of a tower by its shadow1 while ,i am like him who applies the measuring-rule directly to the tower itself4 ,therefore1 for him philosophy is a science of conceptions1 but for me it is a science in conceptions1 drawn from knowledge of perception1 the one source of all evidence1 and comprehended and made permanent in general conceptions4 ,he passes over this whole world of perception which surrounds us1 so multifarious and rich in significance1 and confines himself to the forms of abstract thinking2 and1 although he never expressly says so1 this procedure is founded on the assumption that reflection is the ectype of all perception1 that1 therefore1 all that is essential in perception must be expressed in reflection1 and expressed in very contracted forms and outlines1 which are thus easily surveyed4 ,according to this1 what is essential and conformable to law in abstract knowledge would1 as it were1 place in our hands all the threads by which the varied puppet-show of the world of perception is set in motion before our eyes4 ,if ,kant had only distinctly expressed this first principle of his method1 and then followed it consistently1 he would at least have been obliged to separate clearly the intuitive from the abstract1 and we would not have had to contend with inextricable contradictions and confusions4 ,but from the way in which he solves his problem we see that that fundamental principle of his method was only very indistinctly present to his mind1 and thus we have still to arrive at it by conjecture even after a thorough study of his philosophy4 ,now as concerns the specified method and fundamental maxim itself1 there is much to be said for it1 and it is a brilliant thought4 ,the nature of all science indeed consists in this1 that we comprehend the endless manifold of perceptible phenomena under comparatively few abstract conceptions1 and out of these construct a system by means of which we have all those phenomena completely in the power of our knowledge1 can explain the past and determine the future4 ,the sciences1 however1 divide the wide sphere of phenomena among them according to the special and manifold classes of the latter4 ,now it was a bold and happy thought to isolate what is absolutely essential to the conceptions as such and apart from their content1 in order to discover from these forms of all thought found in this way what is essential to all intuitive knowledge also1 and consequently to the world as phenomenon in general2 and because this would be found a priori on account of the necessity of those forms of thought1 it would be of subjective origin1 and would just lead to the ends ,kant had in view4 ,here1 however1 before going further1 the relation of reflection to knowledge of perception ought to have been investigated 7which certainly presupposes the clear separation of the two1 which was neglected by ,kant74 ,he ought to have inquired in what way the former really repeats and represents the latter1 whether quite pure1 or changed and to some extent disguised by being taken up into its special forms 7forms of reflection72 whether the form of abstract reflective knowledge becomes more determined through the form of knowledge of perception1 or through the nature or constitution which unalterably belongs to itself1 i4e41 to reflective knowledge1 so that even what is very heterogeneous in intuitive knowledge can no longer be distinguished when it has entered reflective knowledge1 and conversely many distinctions of which we are conscious in the reflective method of knowledge have also sprung from this knowledge itself1 and by no means point to corresponding differences in intuitive knowledge4 ,as the result of this investigation1 however1 it would have appeared that knowledge of perception suffers very nearly as much change when it is taken up into reflection as food when it is taken into the animal organism whose forms and compounds are determined by itself1 so that the nature of the food can no longer be recognised from the result they produce4 ,or 7for this is going a little too far7 at least it would have appeared that reflection is by no means related to knowledge of perception as the reflection in water is related to the reflected objects1 but scarcely even as the mere shadow of these objects stands to the objects themselves2 which shadow repeats only a few external outlines1 but also unites the most manifold in the same form and presents the most diverse through the same outline2 so that it is by no means possible1 starting from it1 to construe the forms of things with completeness and certainty4 ,the whole of reflective knowledge1 or the reason1 has only one chief form1 and that is the abstract conception4 ,it is proper to the reason itself1 and has no direct necessary connection with the world of perception1 which therefore exists for the brutes entirely without conceptions1 and indeed1 even if it were quite another world from what it is1 that form of reflection would suit it just as well4 ,but the combination of conceptions for the purpose of judging has certain definite and normal forms1 which have been found by induction1 and constitute the table of judgments4 ,these forms are for the most part deducible from the nature of reflective knowledge itself1 thus directly from the reason1 because they spring from the four laws of thought 7called by me metalogical truths7 and the dictum de omni et nullo4 ,certain others of these forms1 however1 have their ground in the nature of knowledge of perception1 thus in the understanding2 yet they by no means point to a like number of special forms of the understanding1 but can all be fully deduced from the sole function which the understanding has--the direct knowledge of cause and effect4 ,lastly1 still others of these forms have sprung from the concurrence and combination of the reflective and intuitive modes of knowledge1 or more properly from the assumption of the latter into the former4 ,i shall now go through the moments of the judgment one by one1 and point out the origin of each of them in the sources referred to2 and from this it follows of itself that a deduction of categories from them is wanting1 and the assumption of this is just as groundless as its exposition was found to be entangled and self-conflicting4 #a4 ,the so-called ,quantity of judgments springs from the nature of concepts as such4 ,it thus has its ground in the reason alone1 and has absolutely no direct connection with the understanding and with knowledge of perception4 ,it is indeed1 as is explained at length in the first book1 essential to concepts1 as such1 that they should have an extent1 a sphere1 and the wider1 less determined concept includes the narrower and more determined4 ,the latter can therefore be separated from the former1 and this may happen in two ways1--either the narrower concept may be indicated as an indefinite part of the wider concept in general1 or it may be defined and completely separated by means of the addition of a special name4 ,the judgment which carries out this operation is in the first case called a particular1 and in the second case an universal judgment4 ,for example1 one and the same part of the sphere of the concept tree may be isolated through a particular and through an universal judgment1 thus--8,some trees bear gall-nuts10 or 8,all oaks bear gall-nuts40 ,one sees that the difference of the two operations is very slight2 indeed1 that the possibility of it depends upon the richness of the language4 ,nevertheless1 ,kant has explained this difference as disclosing two fundamentally different actions1 functions1 categories of the pure understanding which determines experience a priori through them4 ,finally1 a concept may also be used in order to arrive by means of it at a definite particular idea of perception1 from which1 as well as from many others1 this concept itself is drawn2 this happens in the singular judgment4 ,such a judgment merely indicates the boundary-line between abstract knowledge and knowledge of perception1 and passes directly to the latter1 8,this tree here bears gall-nuts40 ,kant has made of this also a special category4 ,after all that has been said there is no need of further polemic here4 #b4 ,in the same way the ,quality of the judgment lies entirely within the province of reason1 and is not an adumbration of any law of that understanding which makes perception possible1 i4e41 it does not point to it4 ,the nature of abstract concepts1 which is just the nature of the reason itself objectively comprehended1 carries with it the possibility of uniting and separating their spheres1 as was already explained in the first book1 and upon this possibility1 as their presupposition1 rest the universal laws of thought of identity and contradiction1 to which ,i have given the name of metalogical truths1 because they spring purely from the reason1 and cannot be further explained4 ,they determine that what is united must remain united1 and what is separated must remain separate1 thus that what is established cannot at the same time be also abolished1 and thus they presuppose the possibility of the combination and separation of spheres1 i4e41 of judgment4 ,this1 however1 lies1 according to its form1 simply and solely in the reason1 and this form has not1 like the content of the judgments1 been brought over from the perceptible knowledge of the understanding1 and therefore there is no correlative or analogue of it to be looked for there4 ,after the perception has been brought about through the understanding and for the understanding1 it exists complete1 subject to no doubt nor error1 and therefore knows neither assertion nor denial2 for it expresses itself1 and has not1 like the abstract knowledge of the reason1 its value and content in its mere relation to something outside of it1 according to the principle of the ground of knowing4 ,it is1 therefore1 pure reality2 all negation is foreign to its nature1 can only be added on through reflection1 and just on this account remains always in the province of abstract thought4 ,to the affirmative and negative ,kant adds the infinite judgment1 making use of a crotchet of the old scholastics1 an ingeniously invented stop-gap1 which does not even require to be explained1 a blind window1 such as many others he made for the sake of his architectonic symmetry4 #c4 ,under the very wide conception of ,relation ,kant has brought three entirely different properties of judgments1 which we must1 therefore1 examine singly1 in order to recognise their origin4 7a47 ,the hypothetical judgment in general is the abstract expression of that most universal form of all our knowledge1 the principle of sufficient reason4 ,in my essay on this principle1 ,i already showed in #ahac that it has four entirely different meanings1 and in each of these originally originates in a different faculty of knowledge1 and also concerns a different class of ideas4 ,it clearly follows from this1 that the source of the hypothetical judgment in general1 of that universal form of thought1 cannot be1 as ,kant wishes to make it1 merely the understanding and its category of causality2 but that the law of causality which1 according to my exposition1 is the one form of knowledge of the pure understanding1 is only one of the forms of that principle which embraces all pure or a priori knowledge--the principle of sufficient reason--which1 on the other hand1 in each of its meanings has this hypothetical form of judgment as its expression4 ,we see here1 however1 very distinctly how kinds of knowledge which are quite different in their origin and significance yet appear1 if thought in abstracto by the reason1 in one and the same form of combination of concepts and judgments1 and then in this form can no longer be distinguished1 but1 in order to distinguish them1 we must go back to knowledge of perception1 leaving abstract knowledge altogether4 ,therefore the path which was followed by ,kant1 starting from the point of view of abstract knowledge1 to find the elements and the inmost spring of intuitive knowledge also1 was quite a wrong one4 ,for the rest1 my whole introductory essay on the principle of sufficient reason is1 to a certain extent1 to be regarded merely as a thorough exposition of the significance of the hypothetical form of judgment2 therefore ,i do not dwell upon it longer here4 7b47 ,the form of the categorical judgment is nothing but the form of judgment in general1 in its strictest sense4 ,for1 strictly speaking1 judging merely means thinking1 the combination of1 or the impossibility of combining1 the spheres of the concepts4 ,therefore the hypothetical and the disjunctive combination are properly no special forms of the judgment2 for they are only applied to already completed judgments1 in which the combination of the concepts remains unchanged the categorical4 ,but they again connect these judgments1 for the hypothetical form expresses their dependence upon each other1 and the disjunctive their incompatibility4 ,mere concepts1 however1 have only one class of relations to each other1 those which are expressed in the categorical judgment4 ,the fuller determination1 or the sub-species of this relation1 are the intersection and the complete separateness of the concept-spheres1 i4e41 thus affirmation and negation2 out of which ,kant has made special categories1 under quite a different title1 that of quality4 ,intersection and separateness have again sub-species1 according as the spheres lie within each other entirely1 or only in part1 a determination which constitutes the quantity of the judgments2 out of which ,kant has again made a quite special class of categories4 ,thus he separates what is very closely related1 and even identical1 the easily surveyed modifications of the one possible relation of mere concepts to each other1 and1 on the other hand1 unites what is very different under this title of relation4 ,categorical judgments have as their metalogical principle the laws of thought of identity and contradiction4 ,but the ground of the connection of the concept-spheres which gives truth to the judgment1 which is nothing but this connection1 may be of very different kinds2 and1 according to this1 the truth of the judgment is either logical1 or empirical1 or metaphysical1 or metalogical1 as is explained in the introductory essay1 #cj-cc1 and does not require to be repeated here4 ,but it is apparent from this how very various the direct cognitions may be1 all of which exhibit themselves in the abstract1 through the combination of the spheres of two concepts1 as subject and predicate1 and that we can by no means set up the sole function of the understanding as corresponding to them and producing them4 ,for example1 the judgments1 8,water boils1 the sine measures the angle1 the will resolves1 business distracts1 distinction is difficult10 express through the same logical form the most different kinds of relations2 but from this we obtain the right1 however irregular the beginning may be1 of placing ourselves at the standpoint of abstract knowledge to analyse direct intuitive knowledge4 ,for the rest1 the categorical judgment springs from knowledge of the understanding proper1 in my sense1 only when causation is expressed by it2 this is1 however1 the case in all judgments which refer to a physical quality4 ,for if ,i say1 8,this body is heavy1 hard1 fluid1 green1 sour1 alkaline1 organic1 c41 c410 this always refers to its effect1 and thus is knowledge which is only possible through the pure understanding4 ,now1 after this1 like much which is quite different from it 7for example1 the subordination of very abstract concepts71 has been expressed in the abstract through subject and predicate1 these mere relations of concepts have been transferred back to knowledge of perception1 and it has been supposed that the subject and predicate of the judgment must have a peculiar and special correlative in perception1 substance and accident4 ,but ,i shall show clearly further on that the conception substance has no other true content than that of the conception matter4 ,accidents1 however1 are quite synonymous with kinds of effects1 so that the supposed knowledge of substance and accident is never anything more than the knowledge of cause and effect by the understanding4 ,but the special manner in which the idea of matter arises is explained partly in #d of the first book1 and still more clearly in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason at the end of #ba1 p4 #gg 7#c;d ed41 p4 #hb71 and in some respects we shall see it still more closely when we investigate the principle of the permanence of substance4 7c47 ,disjunctive judgments spring from the law of thought of excluded third1 which is a metalogical truth2 they are1 therefore1 entirely the property of the reason1 and have not their origin in the understanding4 ,the deduction of the category of community or reciprocity from them is1 however1 a glaring example of the violence which ,kant sometimes allowed to be done to truth1 merely in order to satisfy his love of architectonic symmetry4 ,the illegitimacy of that deduction has already often been justly condemned and proved upon various grounds1 especially by ,g4 ,e4 ,schulze in his 8,kritik der theoretischen ,philosophie10 and by ,berg in his 8,epikritik der ,philosophie40 ,what real analogy is there1 indeed1 between the problematical determination of a concept by disjunctive predicates and the thought of reciprocity8 ,the two are indeed absolutely opposed1 for in the disjunctive judgment the actual affirmation of one of the two alternative propositions is also necessarily the negation of the other2 if1 on the other hand1 we think two things in the relation of reciprocity1 the affirmation of one is also necessarily the affirmation of the other1 and vice versa4 ,therefore1 unquestionably1 the real logical analogue of reciprocity is the vicious circle1 for in it1 as nominally in the case of reciprocity1 what is proved is also the proof1 and conversely4 ,and just as logic rejects the vicious circle1 so the conception of reciprocity ought to be banished from metaphysics4 ,for ,i now intend1 quite seriously1 to prove that there is no reciprocity in the strict sense1 and this conception1 which people are so fond of using1 just on account of the indefiniteness of the thought1 is seen1 if more closely considered1 to be empty1 false1 and invalid4 ,first of all1 the reader must call to mind what causality really is1 and to assist my exposition1 see upon this subject #bj of the introductory essay1 also my prize-essay on the freedom of the will1 chap4 iii4 p4 #bg seq41 and lastly the fourth chapter of the second book of this work4 ,causality is the law according to which the conditions or states of matter which appear determine their position in time4 ,causality has to do merely with conditions or states1 indeed1 properly1 only with changes1 and neither with matter as such1 nor with permanence without change4 ,matter1 as such1 does not come under the law of causality1 for it neither comes into being nor passes away2 thus neither does the whole thing1 as we commonly express ourselves1 come under this law1 but only the conditions or states of matter4 ,further1 the law of causality has nothing to do with permanence1 for where nothing changes there is no producing of effects and no causality1 but a continuing quiet condition or state4 ,but if1 now1 such a state is changed1 then the new state is either again permanent or it is not1 but immediately introduces a third state1 and the necessity with which this happens is just the law of causality1 which is a form of the principle of sufficient reason1 and therefore cannot be further explained1 because the principle of sufficient reason is the principle of all explanation and of all necessity4 ,from this it is clear that cause and effect stand in intimate connection with1 and necessary relation to1 the course of time4 ,only because the state ,a4 precedes in time the state ,b41 and their succession is necessary and not accidental1 i4e41 no mere sequence but a consequence--only because of this is the state ,a4 cause and the state ,b4 effect4 ,the conception reciprocity1 however1 contains this1 that both are cause and both are effect of each other2 but this really amounts to saying that each of the two is the earlier and also the later2 thus it is an absurdity4 ,for that both states are simultaneous1 and indeed necessarily simultaneous1 cannot be admitted1 because1 as necessarily belonging to each other and existing at the same time1 they constitute only one state4 ,for the permanence of this state there is certainly required the continued existence of all its determinations1 but we are then no longer concerned with change and causality1 but with duration and rest1 and nothing further is said than that if one determination of the whole state be changed1 the new state which then appears cannot continue1 but becomes the cause of the change of all the other determinations of the first state1 so that a new third state appears2 which all happens merely in accordance with the simple law of causality1 and does not establish a new law1 that of reciprocity4 ,i also definitely assert that the conception reciprocity cannot be supported by a single example4 ,everything that one seeks to pass off as such is either a state of rest1 to which the conception of causality1 which has only significance with reference to changes1 finds no application at all1 or else it is an alternating succession of states of the same name which condition each other1 for the explanation of which simple causality is quite sufficient4 ,an example of the first class is afforded by a pair of scales brought to rest by equal weights4 ,here there is no effect produced1 for there is no change2 it is a state of rest2 gravity acts1 equally divided1 as in every body which is supported at its centre of gravity1 but it cannot show its force by any effect4 ,that the taking away of one weight produces a second state1 which at once becomes the cause of the third1 the sinking of the other scale1 happens according to the simple law of cause and effect1 and requires no special category of the understanding1 and not even a special name4 ,an example of the second class is the continuous burning of a fire4 ,the combination of oxygen with the combustible body is the cause of heat1 and heat1 again1 is the cause of the renewed occurrence of the chemical combination4 ,but this is nothing more than a chain of causes and effects1 the links of which have alternately the same name4 ,the burning1 ,a41 produces free heat1 ,b41 this produces new burning1 ,c4 7i4e41 a new effect which has the same name as the cause ,a41 but is not individually identical with it71 this produces new heat1 ,d4 7which is not really identical with the effect ,b41 but only according to the concept1 i4e41 it has the same name71 and so on indefinitely4 ,a good example of what in ordinary life is called reciprocity is afforded by a theory about deserts given by ,humboldt 7,ansichten der ,natur1 #b;d ed41 vol4 ii4 p4 #gi74 ,in the sandy deserts it does not rain1 but it rains upon the wooded mountains surrounding them4 ,the cause is not the attraction of the clouds by the mountains2 but it is the column of heated air rising from the sandy plain which prevents the particles of vapour from condensing1 and drives the clouds high into the heavens4 ,on the mountains the perpendicular rising stream of air is weaker1 the clouds descend1 and the rainfall ensues in the cooler air4 ,thus1 want of rain and the absence of plants in the desert stand in the relation of reciprocity2 it does not rain because the heated sand-plain sends out more heat2 the desert does not become a steppe or prairie because it does not rain4 ,but clearly we have here again1 as in the example given above1 only a succession of causes and effects of the same names1 and throughout nothing essentially different from simple causality4 ,this is also the case with the swinging of the pendulum1 and indeed also with the self-conservation of the organised body1 in which case likewise every state introduces a new one1 which is of the same kind as that by which it was itself brought about1 but individually is new4 ,only here the matter is complicated1 because the chain no longer consists of links of two kinds1 but of many kinds1 so that a link of the same name only recurs after several others have intervened4 ,but we always see before us only an application of the single and simple law of causality which gives the rule to the sequence of states1 but never anything which must be comprehended by means of a new and special function of the understanding4 ,or is it perhaps advanced in support of the conception of reciprocity that action and reaction are equal8 ,but the reason of this is what ,i urge so strongly and have fully explained in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 that the cause and the effect are not two bodies1 but two successive states of bodies1 consequently each of the two states implicates all bodies concerned2 thus the effect1 i4e41 the newly appearing state1 for example1 in the case of an impulse1 extends to both bodies in the same proportion2 therefore the body impelled produces just as great a change in the body impelling as it itself sustains 7each in proportion to its mass and velocity74 ,if one pleases to call this reciprocity1 then absolutely every effect is a reciprocal effect1 and no new conception is introduced on this account1 still less does it require a new function of the understanding1 but we only have a superfluous synonym for causality4 ,but ,kant himself1 in a moment of thoughtlessness1 exactly expressed this view in the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science0 at the beginning of the proof of the fourth principle of mechanics3 8,all external effect in the world is reciprocal effect40 ,how then should different functions lie a priori in the understanding for simple causality and for reciprocity1 and1 indeed1 how should the real succession of things only be possible and knowable by means of the first1 and their co-existence by means of the second8 ,according to this1 if all effect is reciprocal effect1 succession and simultaneity would be the same thing1 and therefore everything in the world would take place at the same moment4 ,if there were true reciprocity1 then perpetual motion would also be possible1 and indeed a priori certain2 but it is rather the case that the a priori conviction that there is no true reciprocity1 and no corresponding form of the understanding1 is the ground of the assertion that perpetual motion is impossible4 ,aristotle also denies reciprocity in the strict sense2 for he remarks that two things may certainly be reciprocal causes of each other1 but only if this is understood in a different sense of each of them2 for example1 that one acts upon the other as the motive1 but the latter acts upon the former as the cause of its movement4 ,we find in two passages the same words3 ,physic41 lib4 ii4 c4 #c1 and ,metaph41 lib4 v4 c4 #b4 2 1 2 1 1 4 7,sunt prterea qu sibi sunt mutuo caus1 ut exercitium bon habitudinis1 et hc exercitii3 at non eodem modo1 sed hc ut finis1 aliud ut principium motus47 ,if1 besides this1 he had accepted a reciprocity proper1 he would have introduced it here1 for in both passages he is concerned with enumerating all the possible kinds of causes4 ,in the ,analyt4 post41 lib4 ii4 c4 #aa1 he speaks of a circle of causes and effects1 but not of reciprocity4 #d4 ,the categories of ,modality have this advantage over all others1 that what is expressed through each of them really corresponds to the form of judgment from which it is derived2 which with the other categories is scarcely ever the case1 because for the most part they are deduced from the forms of judgment with the most capricious violence4 ,thus that it is the conceptions of the possible1 the actual1 and the necessary which occasion the problematic1 assertatory1 and apodictic forms of judgment1 is perfectly true2 but that those conceptions are special1 original forms of knowledge of the understanding which cannot be further deduced is not true4 ,on the contrary1 they spring from the single original form of all knowledge1 which is1 therefore1 known to us a priori1 the principle of sufficient reason2 and indeed out of this the knowledge of necessity springs directly4 ,on the other hand1 it is only because reflection is applied to this that the conceptions of contingency1 possibility1 impossibility1 and actuality arise4 ,therefore all these do not by any means spring from one faculty of the mind1 the understanding1 but arise through the conflict of abstract and intuitive knowledge1 as will be seen directly4 ,i hold that to be necessary and to be the consequent of a given reason are absolutely interchangeable notions1 and completely identical4 ,we can never know1 nor even think1 anything as necessary1 except so far as we regard it as the consequent of a given reason2 and the conception of necessity contains absolutely nothing more than this dependence1 this being established through something else1 and this inevitable following from it4 ,thus it arises and exists simply and solely through the application of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,therefore1 there is1 according to the different forms of this principle1 a physical necessity 7the effect from the cause71 a logical 7through the ground of knowing1 in analytical judgments1 syllogisms1 c471 a mathematical 7according to the ground of being in time and space71 and finally a practical necessity1 by which we intend to signify not determination through a pretended categorical imperative1 but the necessary occurrence of an action according to the motives presented1 in the case of a given empirical character4 ,but everything necessary is only so relatively1 that is1 under the presupposition of the reason from which it follows2 therefore absolute necessity is a contradiction4 ,with regard to the rest1 ,i refer to #di of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason4 ,the contradictory opposite1 i4e41 the denial of necessity1 is contingency4 ,the content of this conception is1 therefore1 negative--nothing more than this3 absence of the connection expressed by the principle of sufficient reason4 ,consequently the contingent is also always merely relative4 ,it is contingent in relation to something which is not its reason4 ,every object1 of whatever kind it may be--for example1 every event in the actual world--is always at once necessary and contingent1 necessary in relation to the one condition which is its cause3 contingent in relation to everything else4 ,for its contact in time and space with everything else is a mere coincidence without necessary connection3 hence also the words chance1 1 contingens4 ,therefore an absolute contingency is just as inconceivable as an absolute necessity4 ,for the former would be simply an object which stood to no other in the relation of consequent to its reason4 ,but the inconceivability of such a thing is just the content of the principle of sufficient reason negatively expressed1 and therefore this principle must first be upset before we can think an absolute contingency2 and even then it itself would have lost all significance1 for the conception of contingency has meaning only in relation to that principle1 and signifies that two objects do not stand to each other in the relation of reason and consequent4 ,in nature1 which consists of ideas of perception1 everything that happens is necessary2 for it proceeds from its cause4 ,if1 however1 we consider this individual with reference to everything else which is not its cause1 we know it as contingent2 but this is already an abstract reflection4 ,now1 further1 let us abstract entirely from a natural object its causal relation to everything else1 thus its necessity and its contingency2 then this kind of knowledge comprehends the conception of the actual1 in which one only considers the effect1 without looking for the cause1 in relation to which one would otherwise have to call it necessary1 and in relation to everything else contingent4 ,all this rests ultimately upon the fact that the modality of the judgment does not indicate so much the objective nature of things as the relation of our knowledge to them4 ,since1 however1 in nature everything proceeds from a cause1 everything actual is also necessary1 yet only so far as it is at this time1 in this place2 for only so far does determination by the law of causality extend4 ,let us leave1 however1 concrete nature and pass over to abstract thinking2 then we can present to ourselves in reflection all the natural laws which are known to us partly a priori1 partly only a posteriori1 and this abstract idea contains all that is in nature at any time1 in any place1 but with abstraction from every definite time and place2 and just in this way1 through such reflection1 we have entered the wide kingdom of the possible4 ,but what finds no place even here is the impossible4 ,it is clear that possibility and impossibility exist only for reflection1 for abstract knowledge of the reason1 not for knowledge of perception2 although it is the pure forms of perception which supply the reason with the determination of the possible and impossible4 ,according as the laws of nature1 from which we start in the thought of the possible and impossible1 are known a priori or a posteriori1 is the possibility or impossibility metaphysical or physical4 ,from this exposition1 which requires no proof because it rests directly upon the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason and upon the development of the conceptions of the necessary1 the actual1 and the possible1 it is sufficiently evident how entirely groundless is ,kant's assumption of three special functions of the understanding for these three conceptions1 and that here again he has allowed himself to be disturbed by no reflection in the carrying out of his architectonic symmetry4 ,to this1 however1 we have to add the other great mistake1 that1 certainly according to the procedure of earlier philosophy1 he has confounded the conceptions of necessity and contingency with each other4 ,that earlier philosophy has applied abstraction to the following mistaken use4 ,it was clear that that of which the reason is given inevitably follows1 i4e41 cannot not be1 and thus necessarily is4 ,but that philosophy held to this last determination alone1 and said that is necessary which cannot be otherwise1 or the opposite of which is impossible4 ,it left1 however1 the ground and root of such necessity out of account1 overlooked the relativity of all necessity which follows from it1 and thereby made the quite unthinkable fiction of an absolute necessity1 i4e41 of something the existence of which would be as inevitable as the consequent of a reason1 but which yet was not the consequent of a reason1 and therefore depended upon nothing2 an addition which is an absurd petitio1 for it conflicts with the principle of sufficient reason4 ,now1 starting from this fiction1 it explained1 in diametrical opposition to the truth1 all that is established by a reason as contingent1 because it looked at the relative nature of its necessity and compared this with that entirely imaginary absolute necessity1 which is self-contradictory in its conception47#e7 ,now ,kant adheres to this fundamentally perverse definition of the contingent and gives it as explanation4 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,v4 p4 #bhi-bia1 #bdc4 ,v4 #cja1 #dai4 ,v4 #ddg1 #dhf1 #dhh47 ,he falls indeed into the most evident contradiction with himself upon this point1 for on p4 #cja he says3 8,everything contingent has a cause10 and adds1 8,that is contingent which might possibly not be40 ,but whatever has a cause cannot possibly not be3 thus it is necessary4 ,for the rest1 the source of the whole of this false explanation of the necessary and the contingent is to be found in ,aristotle in 8,de ,generatione et ,corruptione10 lib4 ii4 c4 #i et #aa1 where the necessary is explained as that which cannot possibly not be3 there stands in opposition to it that which cannot possibly be1 and between these two lies that which can both be and not be1--thus that which comes into being and passes away1 and this would then be the contingent4 ,in accordance with what has been said above1 it is clear that this explanation1 like so many of ,aristotle's1 has resulted from sticking to abstract conceptions without going back to the concrete and perceptible1 in which1 however1 the source of all abstract conceptions lies1 and by which therefore they must always be controlled4 8,something which cannot possibly not be0 can certainly be thought in the abstract1 but if we go with it to the concrete1 the real1 the perceptible1 we find nothing to support the thought1 even as possible1--as even merely the asserted consequent of a given reason1 whose necessity is yet relative and conditioned4 ,i take this opportunity of adding a few further remarks on these conceptions of modality4 ,since all necessity rests upon the principle of sufficient reason1 and is on this account relative1 all apodictic judgments are originally1 and according to their ultimate significance1 hypothetical4 ,they become categorical only through the addition of an assertatory minor1 thus in the conclusion4 ,if this minor is still undecided1 and this indecision is expressed1 this gives the problematical judgment4 ,what in general 7as a rule7 is apodictic 7a law of nature71 is in reference to a particular case only problematical1 because the condition must actually appear which brings the case under the rule4 ,and conversely1 what in the particular as such is necessary 7apodictic7 7every particular change necessary through the cause71 is again in general1 and predicated universally1 only problematical2 because the causes which appear only concern the particular case1 and the apodictic1 always hypothetical judgment1 always expresses merely the general law1 not the particular case directly4 ,all this has its ground in the fact that possibility exists only in the province of reflection and for the reason2 the actual1 in the province of perception and for the understanding2 the necessary1 for both4 ,indeed1 the distinction between necessary1 actual1 and possible really exists only in the abstract and according to the conception2 in the real world1 on the other hand1 all three fall into one4 ,for all that happens1 happens necessarily1 because it happens from causes2 but these themselves have again causes1 so that the whole of the events of the world1 great and small1 are a strict concatenation of necessary occurrences4 ,accordingly everything actual is also necessary1 and in the real world there is no difference between actuality and necessity1 and in the same way no difference between actuality and possibility2 for what has not happened1 i4e41 has not become actual1 was also not possible1 because the causes without which it could never appear have not themselves appeared1 nor could appear1 in the great concatenation of causes2 thus it was an impossibility4 ,every event is therefore either necessary or impossible4 ,all this holds good only of the empirically real world1 i4e41 the complex of individual things1 thus of the whole particular as such4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we consider things generally1 comprehending them in abstracto1 necessity1 actuality1 and possibility are again separated2 we then know everything which is in accordance with the a priori laws which belong to our intellect as possible in general2 that which corresponds to the empirical laws of nature as possible in this world1 even if it has never become actual2 thus we distinguish clearly the possible from the actual4 ,the actual is in itself always also necessary1 but is only comprehended as such by him who knows its cause2 regarded apart from this1 it is and is called contingent4 ,this consideration also gives us the key to that contentio between the ,megaric ,diodorus and ,chrysippus the ,stoic which ,cicero refers to in his book ,de ,fato4 ,diodorus says3 8,only what becomes actual was possible1 and all that is actual is also necessary40 ,chrysippus on the other hand says3 8,much that is possible never becomes actual2 for only the necessary becomes actual40 ,we may explain this thus3 ,actuality is the conclusion of a syllogism to which possibility gives the premises4 ,but for this is required not only the major but also the minor2 only the two give complete possibility4 ,the major gives a merely theoretical1 general possibility in abstracto1 but this of itself does not make anything possible1 i4e41 capable of becoming actual4 ,for this the minor also is needed1 which gives the possibility for the particular case1 because it brings it under the rule1 and thereby it becomes at once actual4 ,for example3 ,maj4 ,all houses 7consequently also my house7 can be destroyed by fire4 ,min4 ,my house is on fire4 ,concl4 ,my house is being destroyed by fire4 ,for every general proposition1 thus every major1 always determines things with reference to actuality only under a presupposition1 therefore hypothetically2 for example1 the capability of being burnt down has as a presupposition the catching fire4 ,this presupposition is produced in the minor4 ,the major always loads the cannon1 but only if the minor brings the match does the shot1 i4e41 the conclusion1 follow4 ,this holds good throughout of the relation of possibility to actuality4 ,since now the conclusion1 which is the assertion of actuality1 always follows necessarily1 it is evident from this that all that is actual is also necessary1 which can also be seen from the fact that necessity only means being the consequent of a given reason3 this is in the case of the actual a cause3 thus everything actual is necessary4 ,accordingly1 we see here the conceptions of the possible1 the actual1 and the necessary unite1 and not merely the last presuppose the first1 but also the converse4 ,what keeps them apart is the limitation of our intellect through the form of time2 for time is the mediator between possibility and actuality4 ,the necessity of the particular event may be fully seen from the knowledge of all its causes2 but the concurrence of the whole of these different and independent causes seems to us contingent2 indeed their independence of each other is just the conception of contingency4 ,since1 however1 each of them was the necessary effect of its causes1 the chain of which has no beginning1 it is evident that contingency is merely a subjective phenomenon1 arising from the limitation of the horizon of our understanding1 and just as subjective as the optical horizon at which the heavens touch the earth4 ,since necessity is the same thing as following from given grounds1 it must appear in a special way in the case of every form of the principle of sufficient reason1 and also have its opposite in the possibility and impossibility which always arises only through the application of the abstract reflection of the reason to the object4 ,therefore the four kinds of necessity mentioned above stand opposed to as many kinds of impossibility1 physical1 logical1 mathematical and practical4 ,it may further be remarked that if one remains entirely within the province of abstract concepts1 possibility is always connected with the more general1 and necessity with the more limited concept2 for example1 8,an animal may be a bird1 a fish1 an amphibious creature1 c40 8,a nightingale must be a bird1 a bird must be an animal1 an animal must be an organism1 an organism must be a body40 ,this is because logical necessity1 the expression of which is the syllogism1 proceeds from the general to the particular1 and never conversely4 ,in the concrete world of nature 7ideas of the first class71 on the contrary1 everything is really necessary through the law of causality2 only added reflection can conceive it as also contingent1 comparing it with that which is not its cause1 and also as merely and purely actual1 by disregarding all causal connection4 ,only in this class of ideas does the conception of the actual properly occur1 as is also shown by the derivation of the word from the conception of causality4 ,in the third class of ideas1 that of pure mathematical perception or intuition1 if we confine ourselves strictly to it1 there is only necessity4 ,possibility occurs here also only through relation to the concepts of reflection3 for example1 8,a triangle may be right-angled1 obtuse-angled1 or equiangular2 its three angles must be equal to two right-angles40 ,thus here we only arrive at the possible through the transition from the perceptible to the abstract4 ,after this exposition1 which presupposes the recollection of what was said both in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason and in the first book of the present work1 there will1 it is hoped1 be no further doubt as to the true and very heterogeneous source of those forms which the table of judgments lays before us1 nor as to the inadmissibility and utter groundlessness of the assumption of twelve special functions of the understanding for the explanation of them4 ,the latter point is also supported by a number of special circumstances very easily noted4 ,thus1 for example1 it requires great love of symmetry and much trust in a clue derived from it1 to lead one to assume that an affirmative1 a categorical1 and an assertatory judgment are three such different things that they justify the assumption of an entirely special function of the understanding for each of them4 ,kant himself betrays his consciousness of the untenable nature of his doctrine of the categories by the fact that in the third chapter of the ,analytic of ,principles 7phnomena et noumena7 several long passages of the first edition 7p4 #bda1 #bdb1 #bdd-bdf1 #bdh-bec7 are omitted in the second--passages which displayed the weakness of that doctrine too openly4 ,so1 for example1 he says there 7p4 #bda7 that he has not defined the individual categories1 because he could not define them even if he had wished to do so1 inasmuch as they were susceptible of no definition4 ,in saying this he forgot that at p4 #hb of the same first edition he had said3 8,i purposely dispense with the definition of the categories although ,i may be in possession of it40 ,this then was1 sit venia verbo1 wind4 ,but this last passage he has allowed to stand4 ,and so all those passages wisely omitted afterwards betray the fact that nothing distinct can be thought in connection with the categories1 and this whole doctrine stands upon a weak foundation4 ,this table of the categories is now made the guiding clue according to which every metaphysical1 and indeed every scientific inquiry is to be conducted 7,prolegomena1 #ci74 ,and1 in fact1 it is not only the foundation of the whole ,kantian philosophy and the type according to which its symmetry is everywhere carried out1 as ,i have already shown above1 but it has also really become the procrustean bed into which ,kant forces every possible inquiry1 by means of a violence which ,i shall now consider somewhat more closely4 ,but with such an opportunity what must not the imitatores servum pecus have done6 ,we have seen4 ,that violence then is applied in this way4 ,the meaning of the expressions denoted by the titles1 forms of judgment and categories1 is entirely set aside and forgotten1 and the expressions alone are retained4 ,these have their source partly in ,aristotle's ,analyt4 priora1 i4 #bc 7 3 de qualitate et quantitate terminorum syllogismi71 but are arbitrarily chosen2 for the extent of the concepts might certainly have been otherwise expressed than through the word quantity1 though this word is more suited to its object than the rest of the titles of the categories4 ,even the word quality has obviously been chosen on account of the custom of opposing quality to quantity2 for the name quality is certainly taken arbitrarily enough for affirmation and negation4 ,but now in every inquiry instituted by ,kant1 every quantity in time and space1 and every possible quality of things1 physical1 moral1 c41 is brought by him under those category titles1 although between these things and those titles of the forms of judgment and of thought there is absolutely nothing in common except the accidental and arbitrary nomenclature4 ,it is needful to keep in mind all the respect which in other regards is due to ,kant to enable one to refrain from expressing in hard terms one's repugnance to this procedure4 ,the nearest example is afforded us at once by the pure physiological table of the general principles of natural science4 ,what in all the world has the quantity of judgments to do with the fact that every perception has an extensive magnitude8 ,what has the quality of judgments to do with the fact that every sensation has a degree8 ,the former rests rather on the fact that space is the form of our external perception1 and the latter is nothing more than an empirical1 and1 moreover1 entirely subjective feeling1 drawn merely from the consideration of the nature of our organs of sense4 ,further1 in the table which gives the basis of rational psychology 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 p4 #cdd2 ,v4 #djb71 the simplicity of the soul is cited under quality2 but this is just a quantitative property1 and has absolutely no relation to the affirmation or negation in the judgment4 ,but quantity had to be completed by the unity of the soul1 which is1 however1 already included in its simplicity4 ,then modality is forced in in an absurd way2 the soul stands in connection with possible objects2 but connection belongs to relation1 only this is already taken possession of by substance4 ,then the four cosmological ,ideas1 which are the material of the antinomies1 are referred to the titles of the categories2 but of this we shall speak more fully further on1 when we come to the examination of these antinomies4 ,several1 if possible1 still more glaring examples are to be found in the table of the ,categories of ,freedom6 in the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason20 also in the first book of the 8,critique of ,judgment10 which goes through the judgment of taste according to the four titles of the categories2 and1 finally1 in the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science10 which are entirely adapted to the table of the categories1 whereby the false that is mingled here and there with what is true and excellent in this important work is for the most part introduced4 ,see1 for example1 at the end of the first chapter how the unity1 the multiplicity1 and the totality of the directions of lines are supposed to correspond to the categories1 which are so named according to the quantity of judgments4 ,the principle of the ,permanence of ,substance is deduced from the category of subsistence and inherence4 ,this1 however1 we know only from the form of the categorical judgment1 i4e41 from the connection of two concepts as subject and predicate4 ,with what violence then is that great metaphysical principle made dependent upon this simple1 purely logical form6 ,yet this is only done pro forma1 and for the sake of symmetry4 ,the proof of this principle1 which is given here1 sets entirely aside its supposed origin in the understanding and in the category1 and is based upon the pure intuition or perception of time4 ,but this proof also is quite incorrect4 ,it is false that in mere time there is simultaneity and duration2 these ideas only arise from the union of space with time1 as ,i have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ah1 and worked out more fully in #d of the present work4 ,i must assume a knowledge of both these expositions for the understanding of what follows4 ,it is false that time remains the same through all change2 on the contrary1 it is just time itself that is fleeting2 a permanent time is a contradiction4 ,kant's proof is untenable1 strenuously as he has supported it with sophisms2 indeed1 he falls into the most palpable contradictions4 ,thus1 after he has falsely set up co-existence as a mode of time 7p4 #agg2 ,v4 #bai71 he says1 quite rightly 7p4 #ahc2 ,v4 #bbf71 8,co-existence is not a mode of time1 for in time there are absolutely no parts together1 but all in succession40 ,in truth1 space is quite as much implicated in co-existence as time4 ,for if two things are co-existent and yet not one1 they are different in respect of space2 if two states of one thing are co-existent 7e4g41 the glow and the heat of iron71 then they are two contemporaneous effects of one thing1 therefore presuppose matter1 and matter presupposes space4 ,strictly speaking1 co-existence is a negative determination1 which merely signifies that two things or states are not different in respect of time2 thus their difference is to be sought for elsewhere4 ,but in any case1 our knowledge of the permanence of substance1 i4e41 of matter1 must be based upon insight a priori2 for it is raised above all doubt1 and therefore cannot be drawn from experience4 ,i deduce it from the fact that the principle of all becoming and passing away1 the law of causality1 of which we are conscious a priori1 is essentially concerned only with the changes1 i4e41 the successive states of matter1 is thus limited to the form1 and leaves the matter untouched1 which therefore exists in our consciousness as the foundation of all things1 which is not subject to becoming or passing away1 which has therefore always been and will always continue to be4 ,a deeper proof of the permanence of substance1 drawn from the analysis of our perception of the empirical world in general1 is to be found in the first book of this work1 #d1 where it is shown that the nature of matter consists in the absolute union of space and time1 a union which is only possible by means of the idea of causality1 consequently only for the understanding1 which is nothing but the subjective correlative of causality4 ,hence1 also1 matter is never known otherwise than as producing effects1 i4e41 as through and through causality2 to be and to act are with it one1 which is indeed signified by the word actuality4 ,intimate union of space and time--causality1 matter1 actuality--are thus one1 and the subjective correlative of this one is the understanding4 ,matter must bear in itself the conflicting properties of both factors from which it proceeds1 and it is the idea of causality which abolishes what is contradictory in both1 and makes their co-existence conceivable by the understanding1 through which and for which alone matter is1 and whose whole faculty consists in the knowledge of cause and effect4 ,thus for the understanding there is united in matter the inconstant flux of time1 appearing as change of the accidents1 with the rigid immobility of space1 which exhibits itself as the permanence of substance4 ,for if the substance passed away like the accidents1 the phenomenon would be torn away from space altogether1 and would only belong to time2 the world of experience would be destroyed by the abolition of matter1 annihilation4 ,thus from the share which space has in matter1 i4e41 in all phenomena of the actual--in that it is the opposite and counterpart of time1 and therefore in itself and apart from the union with the latter knows absolutely no change--the principle of the permanence of substance1 which recognises everything as a priori certain1 had to be deduced and explained2 but not from mere time1 to which for this purpose and quite erroneously ,kant has attributed permanence4 ,in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bc1 ,i have fully explained the incorrectness of the following proof of the a priori nature and of the necessity of the law of causality from the mere succession of events in time2 ,i must1 therefore1 content myself here by referring to that passage47#f7 ,this is precisely the case with the proof of reciprocity also1 the concept of which ,i was obliged to explain above as invalid4 ,what is necessary has also been said of modality1 the working out of the principles of which now follows4 ,there are still a few points in the further course of the transcendental analytic which ,i should have to refute were it not that ,i am afraid of trying the patience of the reader2 ,i therefore leave them to his own reflection4 ,but ever anew in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 we meet that principal and fundamental error of ,kant's1 which ,i have copiously denounced above1 the complete failure to distinguish abstract1 discursive knowledge from intuitive4 ,it is this that throws a constant obscurity over ,kant's whole theory of the faculty of knowledge1 and never allows the reader to know what he is really speaking about at any time1 so that instead of understanding1 he always merely conjectures1 for he alternately tries to understand what is said as referring to thought and to perception1 and remains always in suspense4 ,in the chapter 8,on the ,division of all ,objects into ,phenomena and ,noumena10 ,kant carries that incredible want of reflection as to the nature of the idea of perception and the abstract idea1 as ,i shall explain more fully immediately1 so far as to make the monstrous assertion that without thought1 that is1 without abstract conceptions1 there is no knowledge of an object2 and that perception1 because it is not thought1 is also not knowledge1 and1 in general1 is nothing but a mere affection of sensibility1 mere sensation6 ,nay1 more1 that perception without conception is absolutely void2 but conception without perception is yet always something 7p4 #bec2 ,v4 #cji74 ,now this is exactly the opposite of the truth2 for concepts obtain all significance1 all content1 only from their relation to ideas of perception1 from which they have been abstracted1 derived1 that is1 constructed through the omission of all that is unessential3 therefore if the foundation of perception is taken away from them1 they are empty and void4 ,perceptions1 on the contrary1 have in themselves immediate and very great significance 7in them1 indeed1 the thing in itself objectifies itself72 they represent themselves1 express themselves1 have no mere borrowed content like concepts4 ,for the principle of sufficient reason governs them only as the law of causality1 and determines as such only their position in space and time2 it does not1 however1 condition their content and their significance1 as is the case with concepts1 in which it appears as the principle of the ground of knowing4 ,for the rest1 it looks as if ,kant really wished here to set about distinguishing the idea of perception and the abstract idea4 ,he objects to ,leibnitz and ,locke that the former reduced everything to abstract ideas1 and the latter everything to ideas of perception4 ,but yet he arrives at no distinction2 and although ,locke and ,leibnitz really committed these errors1 ,kant himself is burdened with a third error which includes them both--the error of having so mixed up knowledge of perception and abstract knowledge that a monstrous hybrid of the two resulted1 a chimera of which no distinct idea is possible1 and which therefore necessarily only confused and stupefied students1 and set them at variance4 ,certainly thought and perception are separated more in the chapter referred to 8,on the ,division of all ,objects into ,phenomena and ,noumena0 than anywhere else1 but the nature of this distinction is here a fundamentally false one4 ,on p4 #bec2 ,v4 #cji1 it is said3 8,if ,i take away all thought 7through the categories7 from empirical knowledge1 there remains absolutely no knowledge of an object1 for through mere perception nothing at all is thought1 and that this affection of sensibility is in me establishes really no relation of such ideas to any object40 ,this sentence contains1 in some degree1 all the errors of ,kant in a nutshell2 for it brings out clearly that he has falsely conceived the relation between sensation1 perception1 and thought1 and accordingly identifies the perception1 whose form he yet supposes to be space1 and indeed space in all its three dimensions1 with the mere subjective sensation in the organs of sense1 but only allows the knowledge of an object to be given through thought1 which is different from perception4 ,i1 on the contrary1 say3 ,objects are first of all objects of perception1 not of thought1 and all knowledge of objects is originally and in itself perception4 ,perception1 however1 is by no means mere sensation1 but the understanding is already active in it4 ,the thought1 which is added only in the case of men1 not in the case of the brutes1 is mere abstraction from perception1 gives no fundamentally new knowledge1 does not itself establish objects which were not before1 but merely changes the form of the knowledge already won through perception1 makes it abstract knowledge in concepts1 whereby its concrete or perceptible character is lost1 but1 on the other hand1 combination of it becomes possible1 which immeasurably extends the range of its applicability4 ,the material of our thought is1 on the other hand1 nothing else than our perceptions themselves1 and not something which the perceptions did not contain1 and which was added by the thought2 therefore the material of everything that appears in our thought must be capable of verification in our perception1 for otherwise it would be an empty thought4 ,although this material is variously manipulated and transformed by thought1 it must yet be capable of being reduced to perception1 and the thought traced back to this--just as a piece of gold can be reduced from all its solutions1 oxides1 sublimates1 and combinations1 and presented pure and undiminished4 ,this could not happen if thought itself had added something1 and1 indeed1 the principal thing1 to the object4 ,the whole of the chapter on the ,amphiboly1 which follows this1 is merely a criticism of the ,leibnitzian philosophy1 and as such is on the whole correct1 though the form or pattern on which it is constructed is chosen merely for the sake of architectonic symmetry1 which here also is the guiding clue4 ,thus1 to carry out the analogy with the ,aristotelian ,organon1 a transcendental ,topic is set up1 which consists in this1 that every conception is to be considered from four points of view1 in order to make out to which faculty of knowledge it belongs4 ,but these four points of view are quite arbitrarily selected1 and ten others might be added to them with just as much right2 but their fourfold number corresponds to the titles of the categories1 and therefore the chief doctrine of ,leibnitz is divided among them as best it may be4 ,by this critique1 also1 to some extent1 certain errors are stamped as natural to the reason1 whereas they were merely false abstractions of ,leibnitz's1 who1 rather than learn from his great philosophical contemporaries1 ,spinoza and ,locke1 preferred to serve up his own strange inventions4 ,in the chapter on the ,amphiboly of ,reflection it is finally said that there may possibly be a kind of perception entirely different from ours1 to which1 however1 our categories are applicable2 therefore the objects of that supposed perception would be noumena1 things which can only be thought by us2 but since the perception which would give that thought meaning is wanting to us1 and indeed is altogether quite problematical1 the object of that thought would also merely be a wholly indefinite possibility4 ,i have shown above by quotations that ,kant1 in utter contradiction with himself1 sets up the categories now as the condition of knowledge of perception1 now as the function of merely abstract thought4 ,here they appear exclusively in the latter sense1 and it seems quite as if he wished to attribute them merely to discursive thought4 ,but if this is really his opinion1 then necessarily at the beginning of the ,transcendental ,logic1 before specifying the different functions of thought at such length1 he was necessarily bound to characterise thought in general1 and consequently to distinguish it from perception2 he ought to have shown what knowledge is given by mere perception1 and what that is new is added by thought4 ,then we would have known what he was really speaking about2 or rather1 he would then have spoken quite differently1 first of perception1 and then of thought2 instead of which1 as it is1 he is always dealing with something between the two1 which is a mere delusion4 ,there would not then be that great gap between the transcendental sthetic and the transcendental ,logic1 where1 after the exposition of the mere form of perception1 he simply dismisses its content1 all that is empirically apprehended1 with the phrase 8,it is given10 and does not ask how it came about1 whether with or without understanding2 but1 with one spring1 passes over to abstract thought2 and not even to thought in general1 but at once to certain forms of thought1 and does not say a word about what thought is1 what the concept is1 what is the relation of abstract and discursive to concrete and intuitive1 what is the difference between the knowledge of men and that of brutes1 and what is reason4 ,yet it was just this distinction between abstract knowledge and knowledge of perception1 entirely overlooked by ,kant1 which the ancients denoted by and 17#g7 and whose opposition and incommensurability occupied them so much in the philosophemes of the ,eleatics1 in ,plato's doctrine of ,ideas1 in the dialectic of the ,megarics1 and later the ,scholastics in the controversy between ,nominalism and ,realism1 the seed of which1 so late in developing1 was already contained in the opposite mental tendencies of ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,but ,kant1 who1 in an inexcusable manner1 entirely neglected the thing to denote which the words and had already been taken1 took possession of the words1 as if they were still unappropriated1 in order to denote by them his thing in itself and his phenomenon4 ,since ,i have been obliged to reject ,kant's doctrine of the categories1 just as he rejected that of ,aristotle1 ,i wish here to indicate as a suggestion a third way of reaching what is aimed at4 ,what both ,kant and ,aristotle sought for under the name of the categories were the most general conceptions under which all things1 however different1 must be subsumed1 and through which therefore everything that exists would ultimately be thought4 ,just on this account ,kant conceived them as the forms of all thought4 ,grammar is related to logic as clothes to the body4 ,should not1 therefore1 these primary conceptions1 the ground-bass of the reason1 which is the foundation of all special thought1 without whose application1 therefore1 no thought can take place1 ultimately lie in those conceptions which just on account of their exceeding generality 7transcendentalism7 have their expression not in single words1 but in whole classes of words1 because one of them is thought along with every word whatever it may be1 whose designation would therefore have to be looked for1 not in the lexicon but in the grammar8 ,in fact1 should they not be those distinctions of conceptions on account of which the word which expresses them is either a substantive or an adjective1 a verb or an adverb1 a pronoun1 a preposition1 or some other particle--in short1 the parts of speech8 ,for undoubtedly these denote the forms which all thought primarily assumes1 and in which it directly moves2 accordingly they are the essential forms of speech1 the fundamental constituent elements of every language1 so that we cannot imagine any language which would not consist of at least substantives1 adjectives1 and verbs4 ,these fundamental forms would then have subordinated to them those forms of thought which are expressed through their inflections1 that is1 through declension and conjugation1 and it is unessential to the chief concern whether in denoting them we call in the assistance of the article and the pronoun4 ,we will examine the thing1 however1 somewhat more closely1 and ask the question anew3 ,what are the forms of thought8 7#a47 ,thought consists throughout of judging2 judgments are the threads of its whole web1 for without making use of a verb our thought does not move1 and as often as we use a verb we judge4 7#b47 ,every judgment consists in the recognition of the relation between subject and predicate1 which it separates or unites with various restrictions4 ,it unites them from the recognition of the actual identity of the two1 which can only happen in the case of synonyms2 then in the recognition that the one is always thought along with the other1 though the converse does not hold--in the universal affirmative proposition2 up to the recognition that the one is sometimes thought along with the other1 in the particular affirmative proposition4 ,the negative propositions take the opposite course4 ,accordingly in every judgment the subject1 the predicate1 and the copula1 the latter affirmative or negative1 must be to be found2 even although each of these is not denoted by a word of its own1 as is however generally the case4 ,the predicate and the copula are often denoted by one word1 as 8,caius ages20 sometimes one word denotes all three1 as concurritur1 i4e41 8the armies engage40 ,from this it is evident that the forms of thought are not to be sought for precisely and directly in words1 nor even in the parts of speech1 for even in the same language the same judgment may be expressed in different words1 and indeed in different parts of speech1 yet the thought remains the same1 and consequently also its form2 for the thought could not be the same if the form of thought itself were different4 ,but with the same thought and the same form of thought the form of words may very well be different1 for it is merely the outward clothing of the thought1 which1 on the other hand1 is inseparable from its form4 ,thus grammar only explains the clothing of the forms of thought4 ,the parts of speech can therefore be deduced from the original forms of thought themselves which are independent of all language2 their work is to express these forms of thought in all their modifications4 ,they are the instrument and the clothing of the forms of thought1 and must be accurately adapted to the structure of the latter1 so that it may be recognised in them4 7#c47 ,these real1 unalterable1 original forms of thought are certainly those of ,kant's logical table of judgments2 only that in this table are to be found blind windows for the sake of symmetry and the table of the categories2 these must all be omitted1 and also a false arrangement4 ,thus3-- 7a47 ,quality3 affirmation and negation1 i4e41 combination and separation of concepts3 two forms4 ,it depends on the copula4 7b47 ,quantity3 the subject-concept is taken either in whole or in part3 totality or multiplicity4 ,to the first belong also individual subjects3 ,socrates means 8all ,socrateses40 ,thus two forms4 ,it depends on the subject4 7c47 ,modality3 has really three forms4 ,it determines the quality as necessary1 actual1 or contingent4 ,it consequently depends also on the copula4 ,these three forms of thought spring from the laws of thought of contradiction and identity4 ,but from the principle of sufficient reason and the law of excluded middle springs-- 7d47 ,relation4 ,it only appears if we judge concerning completed judgments1 and can only consist in this1 that it either asserts the dependence of one judgment upon another 7also in the plurality of both71 and therefore combines them in the hypothetical proposition2 or else asserts that judgments exclude each other1 and therefore separates them in the disjunctive proposition4 ,it depends on the copula1 which here separates or combines the completed judgments4 ,the parts of speech and grammatical forms are ways of expressing the three constituent parts of the judgment1 the subject1 the predicate1 and the copula1 and also of the possible relations of these2 thus of the forms of thought just enumerated1 and the fuller determinations and modifications of these4 ,substantive1 adjective1 and verb are therefore essential fundamental constituent elements of language in general2 therefore they must be found in all languages4 ,yet it is possible to conceive a language in which adjective and verb would always be fused together1 as is sometimes the case in all languages4 ,provisionally it may be said1 for the expression of the subject are intended the substantive1 the article1 and the pronoun2 for the expression of the predicate1 the adjective1 the adverb1 and the preposition2 for the expression of the copula1 the verb1 which1 however1 with the exception of the verb to be1 also contains the predicate4 ,it is the task of the philosophy of grammar to teach the precise mechanism of the expression of the forms of thought1 as it is the task of logic to teach the operations with the forms of thought themselves4 ,note4--,as a warning against a false path and to illustrate the above1 ,i mention ,s4 ,stern's 8,vorlufige ,grundlage zur ,sprachphilosophie10 #ahce1 which is an utterly abortive attempt to construct the categories out of the grammatical forms4 ,he has entirely confused thought with perception1 and therefore1 instead of the categories of thought1 he has tried to deduce the supposed categories of perception from the grammatical forms1 and consequently has placed the grammatical forms in direct relation to perception4 ,he is involved in the great error that language is immediately related to perception1 instead of being directly related only to thought as such1 thus to the abstract concepts1 and only by means of these to perception1 to which they1 however1 have a relation which introduces an entire change of the form4 ,what exists in perception1 thus also the relations which proceed from time and space1 certainly becomes an object of thought2 thus there must also be forms of speech to express it1 yet always merely in the abstract1 as concepts4 ,concepts are always the primary material of thought1 and the forms of logic are always related to these1 never directly to perception4 ,perception always determines only the material1 never the formal truth of the proposition1 for the formal truth is determined according to the logical rules alone4 ,i return to the ,kantian philosophy1 and come now to the ,transcendental ,dialectic4 ,kant opens it with the explanation of reason1 the faculty which is to play the principal part in it1 for hitherto only sensibility and understanding were on the scene4 ,when considering his different explanations of reason1 ,i have already spoken above of the explanation he gives here that 8it is the faculty of principles40 ,it is now taught here that all the a priori knowledge hitherto considered1 which makes pure mathematics and pure natural science possible1 affords only rules1 and no principles2 because it proceeds from perceptions and forms of knowledge1 and not from mere conceptions1 which is demanded if it is to be called a principle4 ,such a principle must accordingly be knowledge from pure conceptions and yet synthetical4 ,but this is absolutely impossible4 ,from pure conceptions nothing but analytical propositions can ever proceed4 ,if conceptions are to be synthetically and yet a priori combined1 this combination must necessarily be accomplished by some third thing1 through a pure perception of the formal possibility of experience1 just as synthetic judgments a posteriori are brought about through empirical perception2 consequently a synthetic proposition a priori can never proceed from pure conceptions4 ,in general1 however1 we are a priori conscious of nothing more than the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms1 and therefore no other synthetic judgments a priori are possible than those which proceed from that which receives its content from that principle4 ,however1 ,kant finally comes forward with a pretended principle of the reason answering to his demand1 yet only with this one1 from which others afterwards follow as corollaries4 ,it is the principle which ,chr4 ,wolf set up and explained in his 8,cosmologia10 sect4 i4 c4 #b1 #ic1 and in his 8,ontologia10 #agh4 ,as now above1 under the title of the ,amphiboly1 mere ,leibnitzian philosophemes were taken for natural and necessary aberrations of the reason1 and were criticised as such1 so here precisely the same thing happens with the philosophemes of ,wolf4 ,kant still presents this principle of the reason in an obscure light1 through indistinctness1 indefiniteness1 and breaking of it up 7p4 #cjg2 ,v4 #cfa1 and #cbb2 ,v4 #cgi74 ,clearly expressed1 however1 it is as follows3 8,if the conditioned is given1 the totality of its conditions must also be given1 and therefore also the unconditioned1 through which alone that totality becomes complete40 ,we become most vividly aware of the apparent truth of this proposition if we imagine the conditions and the conditioned as the links of a suspended chain1 the upper end of which1 however1 is not visible1 so that it might extend ad infinitum2 since1 however1 the chain does not fall1 but hangs1 there must be above one link which is the first1 and in some way is fixed4 ,or1 more briefly3 the reason desires to have a point of attachment for the causal chain which reaches back to infinity2 it would be convenient for it4 ,but we will examine the proposition1 not in figures1 but in itself4 ,synthetic it certainly is2 for1 analytically1 nothing more follows from the conception of the conditioned than that of the condition4 ,it has not1 however1 a priori truth1 nor even a posteriori1 but it surreptitiously obtains its appearance of truth in a very subtle way1 which ,i must now point out4 ,immediately1 and a priori1 we have the knowledge which the principle of sufficient reason in its four forms expresses4 ,from this immediate knowledge all abstract expressions of the principle of sufficient reason are derived1 and they are thus indirect2 still more1 however1 is this the case with inferences or corollaries from them4 ,i have already explained above how abstract knowledge often unites a variety of intuitive cognitions in one form or one concept in such a way that they can no longer be distinguished2 therefore abstract knowledge stands to intuitive knowledge as the shadow to the real objects1 the great multiplicity of which it presents through one outline comprehending them all4 ,now the pretended principle of the reason makes use of this shadow4 ,in order to deduce from the principle of sufficient reason the unconditioned1 which directly contradicts it1 it prudently abandons the immediate concrete knowledge of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in its particular forms1 and only makes use of abstract concepts which are derived from it1 and have value and significance only through it1 in order to smuggle its unconditioned somehow or other into the wide sphere of those concepts4 ,its procedure becomes most distinct when clothed in dialectical form2 for example1 thus3 8,if the conditioned exists1 its condition must also be given1 and indeed all given1 thus completely1 thus the totality of its conditions2 consequently1 if they constitute a series1 the whole series1 consequently also its first beginning1 thus the unconditioned40 ,here it is false that the conditions of a conditioned can constitute a series4 ,rather must the totality of the conditions of everything conditioned be contained in its nearest ground or reason from which it directly proceeds1 and which is only thus a sufficient ground or reason4 ,for example1 the different determinations of the state which is the cause1 all of which must be present together before the effect can take place4 ,but the series1 for example1 the chain of causes1 arises merely from the fact that we regard what immediately before was the condition as now a conditioned2 but then at once the whole operation begins again from the beginning1 and the principle of sufficient reason appears anew with its claim4 ,but there can never be for a conditioned a properly successive series of conditions1 which exist merely as such1 and on account of that which is at last conditioned2 it is always an alternating series of conditioneds and conditions2 as each link is laid aside the chain is broken1 and the claim of the principle of sufficient reason entirely satisfied1 it arises anew because the condition becomes the conditioned4 ,thus the principle of sufficient reason always demands only the completeness of the immediate or next condition1 never the completeness of a series4 ,but just this conception of the completeness of the condition leaves it undetermined whether this completeness should be simultaneous or successive2 and since the latter is chosen1 the demand now arises for a complete series of conditions following each other4 ,only through an arbitrary abstraction is a series of causes and effects regarded as a series of causes alone1 which exists merely on account of the last effect1 and is therefore demanded as its sufficient reason4 ,from closer and more intelligent consideration1 and by rising from the indefinite generality of abstraction to the particular definite reality1 it appears1 on the contrary1 that the demand for a sufficient reason extends only to the completeness of the determinations of the immediate cause1 not to the completeness of a series4 ,the demand of the principle of sufficient reason is completely extinguished in each sufficient reason given4 ,it arises1 however1 immediately anew1 because this reason is again regarded as a consequent2 but it never demands directly a series of reasons4 ,if1 on the other hand1 instead of going to the thing itself1 we confine ourselves to the abstract concepts1 these distinctions vanish4 ,then a chain of alternating causes and effects1 or of alternating logical reasons and consequents1 is given out as simply a chain of causes of the last effect1 or reasons of the last consequent1 and the completeness of the conditions1 through which alone a reason becomes sufficient1 appears as the completeness of that assumed series of reasons alone1 which only exist on account of the last consequent4 ,there then appears the abstract principle of the reason very boldly with its demand for the unconditioned4 ,but1 in order to recognise the invalidity of this claim1 there is no need of a critique of reason by means of antinomies and their solution1 but only of a critique of reason understood in my sense1 an examination of the relation of abstract knowledge to direct intuitive knowledge1 by means of ascending from the indefinite generality of the former to the fixed definiteness of the latter4 ,from such a critique1 then1 it here appears that the nature of the reason by no means consists in the demand for an unconditioned2 for1 whenever it proceeds with full deliberation1 it must itself find that an unconditioned is an absurdity4 ,the reason as a faculty of knowledge can always have to do only with objects2 but every object for the subject is necessarily and irrevocably subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason1 both a parte ante and a parte post4 ,the validity of the principle of sufficient reason is so involved in the form of consciousness that we absolutely cannot imagine anything objective of which no why could further be demanded2 thus we cannot imagine an absolute absolute1 like a blind wall in front of us4 ,that his convenience should lead this or that person to stop at some point1 and assume such an absolute at pleasure1 is of no avail against that incontestable certainty a priori1 even if he should put on an air of great importance in doing so4 ,in fact1 the whole talk about the absolute1 almost the sole theme of philosophies since ,kant1 is nothing but the cosmological proof incognito4 ,this proof1 in consequence of the case brought against it by ,kant1 deprived of all right and declared outlawed1 dare no longer show itself in its true form1 and therefore appears in all kinds of disguises--now in distinguished form1 concealed under intellectual intuition or pure thought2 now as a suspicious vagabond1 half begging1 half demanding what it wants in more unpretending philosophemes4 ,if an absolute must absolutely be had1 then ,i will give one which is far better fitted to meet all the demands which are made on such a thing than these visionary phantoms2 it is matter4 ,it has no beginning1 and it is imperishable2 thus it is really independent1 and quod per se est et per se concipitur2 from its womb all proceeds1 and to it all returns2 what more can be desired of an absolute8 ,but to those with whom no critique of reason has succeeded1 we should rather say-- 8,are not ye like unto women1 who ever ,return to the point from which they set out1 ,though reason should have been talked by the hour80 ,that the return to an unconditioned cause1 to a first beginning1 by no means lies in the nature of reason1 is1 moreover1 practically proved by the fact that the primitive religions of our race1 which even yet have the greatest number of followers upon earth1 ,brahmanism and ,buddhaism1 neither know nor admit such assumptions1 but carry the series of phenomena conditioning each other into infinity4 ,upon this point1 ,i refer to the note appended to the criticism of the first antinomy1 which occurs further on2 and the reader may also see ,upham's 8,doctrine of ,buddhaism0 7p4 #i71 and in general all genuine accounts of the religions of ,asia4 ,judaism and reason ought not to be identified4 ,kant1 who by no means desires to maintain his pretended principle of reason as objectively valid1 but merely as subjectively necessary1 deduces it even as such only by means of a shallow sophism1 p4 #cjg2 ,v4 #cfd4 ,he says that because we seek to subsume every truth known to us under a more general truth1 as far as this process can be carried1 this is nothing else than the pursuit of the unconditioned1 which we already presuppose4 ,but1 in truth1 in this endeavour we do nothing more than apply reason1 and intentionally make use of it to simplify our knowledge by enabling us to survey it--reason1 which is that faculty of abstract1 general knowledge that distinguishes the reflective1 thinking man1 endowed with speech1 from the brute1 which is the slave of the present4 ,for the use of reason just consists in this1 that we know the particular through the universal1 the case through the rule1 the rule through the more general rule2 thus that we seek the most general points of view4 ,through such survey or general view our knowledge is so facilitated and perfected that from it arises the great difference between the life of the brutes and that of men1 and again between the life of educated and that of uneducated men4 ,now1 certainly the series of grounds of knowledge1 which exist only in the sphere of the abstract1 thus of reason1 always finds an end in what is indemonstrable1 i4e41 in an idea which is not further conditioned according to this form of the principle of sufficient reason1 thus in the a priori or a posteriori directly perceptible ground of the first proposition of the train of reasoning4 ,i have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ej1 that here the series of grounds of knowledge really passes over into grounds of becoming or of being4 ,but one can only desire to make this circumstance hold good as a proof of an unconditioned according to the law of causality1 or even of the mere demand for such an unconditioned1 if one has not yet distinguished the forms of the principle of sufficient reason at all1 but1 holding to the abstract expression1 has confounded them all4 ,kant1 however1 seeks to establish that confusion1 through a mere play upon words1 with ,universalitas and ,universitas1 p4 #cbb2 ,v4 #cgi4 ,thus it is fundamentally false that our search for higher grounds of knowledge1 more general truths1 springs from the presupposition of an object unconditioned in its being1 or has anything whatever in common with this4 ,moreover1 how should it be essential to the reason to presuppose something which it must know to be an absurdity as soon as it reflects8 ,the source of that conception of the unconditioned is rather to be found only in the indolence of the individual who wishes by means of it to get rid of all further questions1 whether his own or of others1 though entirely without justification4 ,now ,kant himself denies objective validity to this pretended principle of reason2 he gives it1 however1 as a necessary subjective assumption1 and thus introduces an irremediable split into our knowledge1 which he soon allows to appear more clearly4 ,with this purpose he unfolds that principle of reason further1 p4 #cbb2 ,v4 #cgi1 in accordance with the method of architectonic symmetry of which he is so fond4 ,from the three categories of relation spring three kinds of syllogisms1 each of which gives the clue for the discovery of a special unconditioned1 of which again there are three3 the soul1 the world 7as an object in itself and absolute totality71 and ,god4 ,now here we must at once note a great contradiction1 of which ,kant1 however1 takes no notice1 because it would be very dangerous to the symmetry4 ,two of these unconditioneds are themselves conditioned by the third1 the soul and the world by ,god1 who is the cause of their existence4 ,thus the two former have by no means the predicate of unconditionedness in common with the latter1 though this is really the point here1 but only that of inferred being according to the principles of experience1 beyond the sphere of the possibility of experience4 ,setting this aside1 we recognise in the three unconditioneds1 to which1 according to ,kant1 reason1 following its essential laws1 must come1 the three principal subjects round which the whole of philosophy under the influence of ,christianity1 from the ,scholastics down to ,christian ,wolf1 has turned4 ,accessible and familiar as these conceptions have become through all these philosophers1 and now also through the philosophers of pure reason1 this by no means shows that1 without revelation1 they would necessarily have proceeded from the development of all reason as a production peculiar to its very nature4 ,in order to prove this it would be necessary to call in the aid of historical criticism1 and to examine whether the ancient and non-,european nations1 especially the peoples of ,hindostan and many of the oldest ,greek philosophers1 really attained to those conceptions1 or whether it is only we who1 by quite falsely translating the ,brahma of the ,hindus and the ,tien of the ,chinese as 8,god10 good-naturedly attribute such conceptions to them1 just as the ,greeks recognised their gods everywhere2 whether it is not rather the case that theism proper is only to be found in the religion of the ,jews1 and in the two religions which have proceeded from it1 whose followers just on this account comprise the adherents of all other religions on earth under the name of heathen1 which1 by the way1 is a most absurd and crude expression1 and ought to be banished at least from the writings of the learned1 because it identifies and jumbles together ,brahmanists1 ,buddhists1 ,egyptians1 ,greeks1 ,romans1 ,germans1 ,gauls1 ,iroquois1 ,patagonians1 ,caribbeans1 ,otaheiteans1 ,australians1 and many others4 ,such an expression is all very well for priests1 but in the learned world it must at once be shown the door3 it can go to ,england and take up its abode at ,oxford4 ,it is a thoroughly established fact that ,buddhism1 the religion which numbers more followers than any other on earth1 contains absolutely no theism1 indeed rejects it4 ,as regards ,plato1 it is my opinion that he owes to the ,jews the theism with which he is periodically seized4 ,on this account ,numenius 7according to ,clem4 ,alex41 ,strom41 i4 c4 #bb1 ,euseb4 prp4 evang41 xiii4 #ab1 and ,suidas under ,numenius7 called him the ,moses grcisans3 1 2 and he accuses him of having stolen 77 his doctrine of ,god and the creation from the ,mosaical writings4 ,clemens often repeats that ,plato knew and made use of ,moses1 e4g41 ,strom41 i4 #be4--v4 c4 #ad1 #ij1 c41 c42 ,pdagog41 ii4 #aj1 and iii4 #aa2 also in the ,cohortatio ad gentes1 c4 #f1 where1 after he has bitterly censured and derided the whole of the ,greek philosophers in the preceding chapter because they were not ,jews1 he bestows on ,plato nothing but praise1 and breaks out into pure exultation that as ,plato had learnt his geometry from the ,egyptians1 his astronomy from the ,babylonians1 magic from the ,thracians1 and much also from the ,assyrians1 so he had learnt his theism from the ,jews3 1 1 444 7,tuos magistros novi1 licet eos celare velis1 444 illa de ,deo sententia suppeditata tibi est ab ,hebris74 ,a pathetic scene of recognition4 ,but ,i see a remarkable confirmation of the matter in what follows4 ,according to ,plutarch 7in ,mario71 and1 better1 according to ,lactantius 7i4 #c1 #ai71 ,plato thanked ,nature that he had been born a human being and not a brute1 a man and not a woman1 a ,greek and not a barbarian4 ,now in ,isaac ,euchel's 8,prayers of the ,jews10 from the ,hebrew1 second edition1 #agii1 p4 #g1 there is a morning prayer in which ,god is thanked and praised that the worshipper was born a ,jew and not a heathen1 a free man and not a slave1 a man and not a woman4 ,such an historical investigation would have spared ,kant an unfortunate necessity in which he now becomes involved1 in that he makes these three conceptions spring necessarily from the nature of reason1 and yet explains that they are untenable and unverifiable by the reason1 and thus makes the reason itself a sophisticator2 for he says1 p4 #cci2 ,v4 #cig3 8,there are sophistications1 not of man1 but of pure reason itself1 from which even the wisest cannot free himself1 and although after much trouble he may be able to avoid error1 yet he never can escape from the illusion which unceasingly torments and mocks him40 ,therefore these ,kantian 8,ideas of the ,reason0 might be compared to the focus in which the converging reflected rays from a concave mirror meet several inches before its surface1 in consequence of which1 by an inevitable process of the understanding1 an object presents itself to us there which is a thing without reality4 ,but the name 8,idea0 is very unfortunately chosen for these pretended necessary productions of the pure theoretical reason1 and violently appropriated from ,plato1 who used it to denote the eternal forms which1 multiplied through space and time1 become partially visible in the innumerable individual fleeting things4 ,plato's 8,ideas0 are accordingly throughout perceptible1 as indeed the word which he chose so definitely signifies1 for it could only be adequately translated by means of perceptible or visible things2 and ,kant has appropriated it to denote that which lies so far from all possibility of perception that even abstract thought can only half attain to it4 ,the word 8,idea10 which ,plato first introduced1 has1 moreover1 since then1 through two-and-twenty centuries1 always retained the significance in which he used it2 for not only all ancient philosophers1 but also all the ,scholastics1 and indeed the ,church ,fathers and the theologians of the ,middle ,ages1 used it only in that ,platonic sense1 the sense of the ,latin word exemplar1 as ,suarez expressly mentions in his twenty-fifth ,disputation1 sect4 #a4 ,that ,englishmen and ,frenchmen were later induced by the poverty of their languages to misuse this word is bad enough1 but not of importance4 ,kant's misuse of the word idea1 by the substitution of a new significance introduced by means of the slender clue of not being object of experience1 which it has in common with ,plato's ideas1 but also in common with every possible chimera1 is thus altogether unjustifiable4 ,now1 since the misuse of a few years is not to be considered against the authority of many centuries1 ,i have always used the word in its old1 original1 ,platonic significance4 ,the refutation of rational psychology is much fuller and more thorough in the first edition of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 than in the second and following editions1 and therefore upon this point we must make use of the first edition exclusively4 ,this refutation has as a whole very great merit and much truth4 ,yet ,i am clearly of the opinion that it was merely from his love of symmetry that ,kant deduced as necessary the conception of the soul from the paralogism of substantiality by applying the demand for the unconditioned to the conception substance1 which is the first category of relation1 and accordingly maintained that the conception of a soul arose in this way in every speculative reason4 ,if this conception really had its origin in the presupposition of a final subject of all predicates of a thing1 one would have assumed a soul not in men alone1 but also just as necessarily in every lifeless thing1 for such a thing also requires a final subject of all its predicates4 ,speaking generally1 however1 ,kant makes use of a quite inadmissible expression when he talks of something which can exist only as subject and not as predicate 7e4g41 ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 p4 #cbc2 ,v4 #dab2 ,prolegomena1 #d and #dg72 though a precedent for this is to be found in ,aristotle's 8,metaphysics10 iv4 ch4 #h4 ,nothing whatever exists as subject and predicate1 for these expressions belong exclusively to logic1 and denote the relations of abstract conceptions to each other4 ,now their correlative or representative in the world of perception must be substance and accident4 ,but then we need not look further for that which exists always as substance and never as accident1 but have it directly in matter4 ,it is the substance corresponding to all properties of things which are their accidents4 ,it is1 in fact1 if one wishes to retain the expression of ,kant which has just been condemned1 the final subject of all predicates of that empirically given thing1 that which remains after the abstraction of all its properties of every kind4 ,and this holds good of man as of a brute1 a plant1 or a stone1 and is so evident1 that in order not to see it a determined desire not to see is required4 ,that it is really the prototype of the conception substance1 ,i will show soon4 ,but subject and predicate are related to substance and accident rather as the principle of sufficient reason in logic to the law of causality in nature1 and the substitution or identification of the former is just as inadmissible as that of the latter4 ,yet in the 8,prolegomena10 #df1 ,kant carries this substitution and identification to its fullest extent in order to make the conception of the soul arise from that of the final subject of all predicates and from the form of the categorical syllogism4 ,in order to discover the sophistical nature of this paragraph1 one only needs to reflect that subject and predicate are purely logical determinations1 which concern abstract conceptions solely and alone1 and that according to their relation in the judgment4 ,substance and accident1 on the other hand1 belong to the world of perception and its apprehension in the understanding1 and are even there only as identical with matter and form or quality4 ,of this more shortly4 ,the antithesis which has given occasion for the assumption of two fundamentally different substances1 body and soul1 is in truth that of objective and subjective4 ,if a man apprehends himself objectively in external perception1 he finds a being extended in space and in general merely corporeal2 but if1 on the other hand1 he apprehends himself in mere self-consciousness1 thus purely subjectively1 he finds himself a merely willing and perceiving being1 free from all forms of perception1 thus also without a single one of the properties which belong to bodies4 ,now he forms the conception of the soul1 like all the transcendental conceptions called by ,kant ,ideas1 by applying the principle of sufficient reason1 the form of all objects1 to that which is not an object1 and in this case indeed to the subject of knowing and willing4 ,he treats1 in fact1 knowing1 thinking1 and willing as effects of which he seeks the cause1 and as he cannot accept the body as their cause1 he assumes a cause of them entirely different from the body4 ,in this manner the first and the last of the dogmatists proves the existence of the soul3 ,plato in the 8,phdrus0 and also ,wolf3 from thinking and willing as the effects which lead to that cause4 ,only after in this way1 by hypostatising a cause corresponding to the effect1 the conception of an immaterial1 simple1 indestructible being had arisen1 the school developed and demonstrated this from the conception of substance4 ,but this conception itself they had previously constructed specially for this purpose by the following artifice1 which is worthy of notice4 ,with the first class of ideas1 i4e41 the real world of perception1 the idea of matter is also given2 because the law governing this class of ideas1 the law of causality1 determines the change of the states or conditions1 and these conditions themselves presuppose something permanent1 whose changes they are4 ,when speaking above of the principle of the permanence of substance1 ,i showed1 by reference to earlier passages1 that this idea of matter arises because in the understanding1 for which alone it exists1 time and space are intimately united1 and the share of space in this product exhibits itself as the permanence of matter1 while the share of time appears as the change of states4 ,purely in itself1 matter can only be thought in abstracto1 and not perceived2 for to perception it always appears already in form and quality4 ,from this conception of matter1 substance is again an abstraction1 consequently a higher genus1 and arose in this way4 ,of the conception of matter1 only the predicate of permanence was allowed to remain1 while all its other essential properties1 extension1 impenetrability1 divisibility1 c41 were thought away4 ,like every higher genus1 then1 the concept substance contains less in itself than the concept matter1 but1 unlike every other higher genus1 it does not contain more under it1 because it does not include several lower genera besides matter2 but this remains the one true species of the concept substance1 the only assignable thing by which its content is realised and receives a proof4 ,thus the aim with which in other cases the reason produces by abstraction a higher conception1 in order that in it several subordinate species may be thought at once through common determinations1 has here no place2 consequently that abstraction is either undertaken idly and entirely without aim1 or it has a secret secondary purpose4 ,this secret purpose is now brought to light2 for under the conception substance1 along with its true sub-species matter1 a second species is co-ordinated--the immaterial1 simple1 indestructible substance1 soul4 ,but the surreptitious introduction of this last concept arose from the fact that the higher concept substance was framed illogically1 and in a manner contrary to law4 ,in its legitimate procedure the reason always frames the concept of a higher genus by placing together the concepts of several species1 and now comparing them1 proceeds discursively1 and by omitting their differences and retaining the qualities in which they agree1 obtains the generic concept which includes them all but has a smaller content4 ,from this it follows that the concepts of the species must always precede the concept of the genus4 ,but1 in the present case1 the converse is true4 ,only the concept matter existed before the generic concept substance4 ,the latter was without occasion1 and consequently without justification1 as it were aimlessly framed from the former by the arbitrary omission of all its determinations except one4 ,not till afterwards was the second ungenuine species placed beside the concept matter1 and so foisted in4 ,but for the framing of this second concept nothing more was now required than an express denial of what had already been tacitly omitted in the higher generic concept1 extension1 impenetrability1 and divisibility4 ,thus the concept substance was framed merely to be the vehicle for the surreptitious introduction of the concept of the immaterial substance4 ,consequently1 it is very far from being capable of holding good as a category or necessary function of the understanding2 rather is it an exceedingly superfluous concept1 because its only true content lies already in the concept of matter1 besides which it contains only a great void1 which can be filled up by nothing but the illicitly introduced species immaterial substance2 and1 indeed1 it was solely for the purpose of containing this that it was framed4 ,accordingly1 in strictness1 the concept substance must be entirely rejected1 and the concept matter everywhere put in its place4 ,the categories were a procrustean bed for every possible thing1 but the three kinds of syllogisms are so only for the three so-called ,ideas4 ,the ,idea of the soul was compelled to find its origin in the form of the categorical syllogism4 ,it is now the turn of the dogmatic ideas concerning the universe1 so far as it is thought as an object in itself1 between two limits--that of the smallest 7atom71 and that of the largest 7limits of the universe in time and space74 ,these must now proceed from the form of the hypothetical syllogism4 ,nor for this in itself is any special violence necessary4 ,for the hypothetical judgment has its form from the principle of sufficient reason1 and not the cosmological alone but all those so-called ,ideas really have their origin in the inconsiderate and unrestricted application of that principle1 and the laying aside of it at pleasure4 ,for1 in accordance with that principle1 the mere dependence of an object upon another is ever sought for1 till finally the exhaustion of the imagination puts an end to the journey2 and thus it is lost sight of that every object1 and indeed the whole chain of objects and the principle of sufficient reason itself1 stand in a far closer and greater dependence1 the dependence upon the knowing subject1 for whose objects alone1 i4e41 ideas1 that principle is valid1 for their mere position in space and time is determined by it4 ,thus1 since the form of knowledge from which here merely the cosmological ,ideas are derived1 the principle of sufficient reason1 is the source of all subtle hypostases1 in this case no sophisms need be resorted to2 but so much the more is sophistry required in order to classify those ,ideas according to the four titles of the categories4 7#a47 ,the cosmological ,ideas with regard to time and space1 thus of the limits of the world in both1 are boldly regarded as determined through the category of quantity1 with which they clearly have nothing in common1 except the accidental denotation in logic of the extent of the concept of the subject in the judgment by the word quantity1 a pictorial expression instead of which some other might just as well have been chosen4 ,but for ,kant's love of symmetry this is enough4 ,he takes advantage of the fortunate accident of this nomenclature1 and links to it the transcendent dogmas of the world's extension4 7#b47 ,yet more boldly does ,kant link to quality1 i4e41 the affirmation or negation in a judgment1 the transcendent ,ideas concerning matter2 a procedure which has not even an accidental similarity of words as a basis4 ,for it is just to the quantity1 and not to the quality of matter that its mechanical 7not chemical7 divisibility is related4 ,but1 what is more1 this whole idea of divisibility by no means belongs to those inferences according to the principle of sufficient reason1 from which1 however1 as the content of the hypothetical form1 all cosmological ,ideas ought to flow4 ,for the assertion upon which ,kant there relies1 that the relation of the parts to the whole is that of the condition to the conditioned1 thus a relation according to the principle of sufficient reason1 is certainly an ingenious but yet a groundless sophism4 ,that relation is rather based upon the principle of contradiction2 for the whole is not through the part1 nor the parts through the whole1 but both are necessarily together because they are one1 and their separation is only an arbitrary act4 ,it depends upon this1 according to the principle of contradiction1 that if the parts are thought away1 the whole is also thought away1 and conversely2 and by no means upon the fact that the parts as the reason conditioned the whole as the consequent1 and that therefore1 in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason1 we were necessarily led to seek the ultimate parts1 in order1 as its reason1 to understand from them the whole4 ,such great difficulties are here overcome by the love of symmetry4 7#c47 ,the ,idea of the first cause of the world would now quite properly come under the title of relation2 but ,kant must reserve this for the fourth title1 that of modality1 for which otherwise nothing would remain1 and under which he forces this idea to come by saying that the contingent 7i4e41 according to his explanation1 which is diametrically opposed to the truth1 every consequent of its reason7 becomes the necessary through the first cause4 ,therefore1 for the sake of symmetry1 the conception of freedom appears here as the third ,idea4 ,by this conception1 however1 as is distinctly stated in the observations on the thesis of the third conflict1 what is really meant is only that ,idea of the cause of the world which alone is admissible here4 ,the third and fourth conflicts are at bottom tautological4 ,about all this1 however1 ,i find and assert that the whole antinomy is a mere delusion1 a sham fight4 ,only the assertions of the antitheses really rest upon the forms of our faculty of knowledge1 i4e41 if we express it objectively1 on the necessary1 a priori certain1 most universal laws of nature4 ,their proofs alone are therefore drawn from objective grounds4 ,on the other hand1 the assertions and proofs of the theses have no other than a subjective ground1 rest solely on the weakness of the reasoning individual2 for his imagination becomes tired with an endless regression1 and therefore he puts an end to it by arbitrary assumptions1 which he tries to smooth over as well as he can2 and his judgment1 moreover1 is in this case paralysed by early and deeply imprinted prejudices4 ,on this account the proof of the thesis in all the four conflicts is throughout a mere sophism1 while that of the antithesis is a necessary inference of the reason from the laws of the world as idea known to us a priori4 ,it is1 moreover1 only with great pains and skill that ,kant is able to sustain the thesis1 and make it appear to attack its opponent1 which is endowed with native power4 ,now in this regard his first and constant artifice is1 that he does not render prominent the nervus argumentationis1 and thus present it in as isolated1 naked1 and distinct a manner as he possibly can2 but rather introduces the same argument on both sides1 concealed under and mixed up with a mass of superfluous and prolix sentences4 ,the theses and antitheses which here appear in such conflict remind one of the and which ,socrates1 in the 8,clouds0 of ,aristophanes1 brings forward as contending4 ,yet this resemblance extends only to the form and not to the content1 though this would gladly be asserted by those who ascribe to these most speculative of all questions of theoretical philosophy an influence upon morality1 and therefore seriously regard the thesis as the 1 and the antithesis as the 4 ,i shall not1 however1 accommodate myself here with reference to such small1 narrow1 and perverse minds2 and1 giving honour not to them1 but to the truth1 ,i shall show that the proofs which ,kant adduced of the individual theses are sophisms1 while those of the antitheses are quite fairly and correctly drawn from objective grounds4 ,i assume that in this examination the reader has always before him the ,kantian antinomy itself4 ,if the proof of the thesis in the first conflict is to be held as valid1 then it proves too much1 for it would be just as applicable to time itself as to change in time1 and would therefore prove that time itself must have had a beginning1 which is absurd4 ,besides1 the sophism consists in this1 that instead of the beginninglessness of the series of states1 which was at first the question1 suddenly the endlessness 7infinity7 of the series is substituted2 and now it is proved that this is logically contradicted by completeness1 and yet every present is the end of the past1 which no one doubted4 ,the end of a beginningless series can1 however1 always be thought1 without prejudice to the fact that it has no beginning2 just as1 conversely1 the beginning of an endless series can also be thought4 ,but against the real1 true argument of the antithesis1 that the changes of the world necessarily presuppose an infinite series of changes backwards1 absolutely nothing is advanced4 ,we can think the possibility that the causal chain will some day end in an absolute standstill1 but we can by no means think the possibility of an absolute beginning47#h7 ,with reference to the spatial limits of the world1 it is proved that1 if it is to be regarded as a given whole1 it must necessarily have limits4 ,the reasoning is correct1 only it was just the first link of it that was to be proved1 and that remains unproved4 ,totality presupposes limits1 and limits presuppose totality2 but here both together are arbitrarily presupposed4 ,for this second point1 however1 the antithesis affords no such satisfactory proof as for the first1 because the law of causality provides us with necessary determinations only with reference to time1 not to space1 and affords us a priori the certainty that no occupied time can ever be bounded by a previous empty time1 and that no change can be the first change1 but not that an occupied space can have no empty space beside it4 ,so far no a priori decision on the latter point would be possible2 yet the difficulty of conceiving the world in space as limited lies in the fact that space itself is necessarily infinite1 and therefore a limited finite world in space1 however large it may be1 becomes an infinitely small magnitude2 and in this incongruity the imagination finds an insuperable stumbling-block1 because there remains for it only the choice of thinking the world either as infinitely large or infinitely small4 ,this was already seen by the ancient philosophers3 1 1 1 7,metrodorus1 caput schol ,epicuri1 absurdum ait1 in magno campo spicam unam produci1 et unum in infinito mundum7 ,stob4 ,ecl41 i4 c4 #bc4 ,therefore many of them taught 7as immediately follows71 7infinitos mundos in infinito74 ,this is also the sense of the ,kantian argument for the antithesis1 only he has disfigured it by a scholastic and ambiguous expression4 ,the same argument might be used against the limitation of the world in time1 only we have a far better one under the guidance of causality4 ,in the case of the assumption of a world limited in space1 there arises further the unanswerable question1 ,what advantage has the filled part of space enjoyed over the infinite space that has remained empty8 ,in the fifth dialogue of his book1 8,del ,infinito1 ,universo e ,mondi10 ,giordano ,bruno gives a full account of the arguments for and against the finiteness of the world1 which is very well worth reading4 ,for the rest1 ,kant himself asserts seriously1 and upon objective grounds1 the infinity of the world in space in his 8,natural ,history of the ,theory of the ,heavens10 part ii4 ch4 #g4 ,aristotle also acknowledges the same1 8,phys410 iii4 ch4 #d1 a chapter which1 together with the following one1 is very well worth reading with reference to this antinomy4 ,in the second conflict the thesis is at once guilty of a very palpable petitio principii1 for it commences1 8,every compound substance consists of simple parts40 ,from the compoundness here arbitrarily assumed1 no doubt it afterwards very easily proves the simple parts4 ,but the proposition1 8,all matter is compound10 which is just the point1 remains unproved1 because it is simply a groundless assumption4 ,the opposite of simple is not compound1 but extended1 that which has parts and is divisible4 ,here1 however1 it is really tacitly assumed that the parts existed before the whole1 and were brought together1 whence the whole has arisen2 for this is the meaning of the word 8compound40 ,yet this can just as little be asserted as the opposite4 ,divisibility means merely the possibility of separating the whole into parts1 and not that the whole is compounded out of parts and thus came into being4 ,divisibility merely asserts the parts a parte post2 compoundness asserts them a parte ante4 ,for there is essentially no temporal relation between the parts and the whole2 they rather condition each other reciprocally1 and thus always exist at the same time1 for only so far as both are there is there anything extended in space4 ,therefore what ,kant says in the observations on the thesis1 8,space ought not to be called a compositum1 but a totum10 c41 holds good absolutely of matter also1 which is simply space become perceptible4 ,on the other hand1 the infinite divisibility of matter1 which the antithesis asserts1 follows a priori and incontrovertibly from that of space1 which it fills4 ,this proposition has absolutely nothing against it2 and therefore ,kant also 7p4 #eac2 ,v4 #eda71 when he speaks seriously and in his own person1 no longer as the mouthpiece of the 1 presents it as objective truth2 and also in the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science0 7p4 #ajh1 first edition71 the proposition1 8,matter is infinitely divisible10 is placed at the beginning of the proof of the first proposition of mechanics as established truth1 having appeared and been proved as the fourth proposition in the ,dynamics4 ,but here ,kant spoils the proof of the antithesis by the greatest obscurity of style and useless accumulation of words1 with the cunning intention that the evidence of the antithesis shall not throw the sophisms of the thesis too much into the shade4 ,atoms are no necessary thought of the reason1 but merely an hypothesis for the explanation of the difference of the specific gravity of bodies4 ,but ,kant himself has shown1 in the dynamics of his 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science10 that this can be otherwise1 and indeed better and more simply explained than by atomism4 ,in this1 however1 he was anticipated by ,priestley1 8,on ,matter and ,spirit10 sect4 i4 ,indeed1 even in ,aristotle1 8,phys40 iv4 #i1 the fundamental thought of this is to be found4 ,the argument for the third thesis is a very fine sophism1 and is really ,kant's pretended principle of pure reason itself entirely unadulterated and unchanged4 ,it tries to prove the finiteness of the series of causes by saying that1 in order to be sufficient1 a cause must contain the complete sum of the conditions from which the succeeding state1 the effect1 proceeds4 ,for the completeness of the determinations present together in the state which is the cause1 the argument now substitutes the completeness of the series of causes by which that state itself was brought to actuality2 and because completeness presupposes the condition of being rounded off or closed in1 and this again presupposes finiteness1 the argument infers from this a first cause1 closing the series and therefore unconditioned4 ,but the juggling is obvious4 ,in order to conceive the state ,a4 as the sufficient cause of the state ,b41 ,i assume that it contains the sum of the necessary determinations from the co-existence of which the estate ,b4 inevitably follows4 ,now by this my demand upon it as a sufficient cause is entirely satisfied1 and has no direct connection with the question how the state ,a4 itself came to be2 this rather belongs to an entirely different consideration1 in which ,i regard the said state ,a4 no more as cause1 but as itself an effect2 in which case another state again must be related to it1 just as it was related to ,b4 ,the assumption of the finiteness of the series of causes and effects1 and accordingly of a first beginning1 appears nowhere in this as necessary1 any more than the presentness of the present moment requires us to assume a beginning of time itself4 ,it only comes to be added on account of the laziness of the speculating individual4 ,that this assumption lies in the acceptance of a cause as a sufficient reason is thus unfairly arrived at and false1 as ,i have shown at length above when considering the ,kantian principle of pure reason which coincides with this thesis4 ,in illustration of the assertion of this false thesis1 ,kant is bold enough in his observations upon it to give as an example of an unconditioned beginning his rising from his chair2 as if it were not just as impossible for him to rise without a motive as for a ball to roll without a cause4 ,i certainly do not need to prove the baselessness of the appeal which1 induced by a sense of weakness1 he makes to the philosophers of antiquity1 by quoting from ,ocellus ,lucanus1 the ,eleatics1 c41 not to speak of the ,hindus4 ,against the proof of this antithesis1 as in the case of the previous ones1 there is nothing to advance4 ,the fourth conflict is1 as ,i have already remarked1 really tautological with the third2 and the proof of the thesis is also essentially the same as that of the preceding one4 ,his assertion that every conditioned presupposes a complete series of conditions1 and therefore a series which ends with an unconditioned1 is a petitio principii1 which must simply be denied4 ,everything conditioned presupposes nothing but its condition2 that this is again conditioned raises a new consideration which is not directly contained in the first4 ,a certain appearance of probability cannot be denied to the antinomy2 yet it is remarkable that no part of the ,kantian philosophy has met so little contradiction1 indeed has found so much acceptance1 as this exceedingly paradoxical doctrine4 ,almost all philosophical parties and text-books have regarded it as valid1 and have also repeatedly reconstructed it2 while nearly all ,kant's other doctrines have been contested1 and indeed there have never been wanting some perverse minds which rejected even the transcendental sthetic4 ,the undivided assent which the antinomy1 on the other hand1 has met with may ultimately arise from the fact that certain persons regard with inward satisfaction the point at which the understanding is so thoroughly brought to a standstill1 having hit upon something which at once is and is not1 so that they actually have before them here the sixth trick of ,philadelphia in ,lichtenberg's broadsheet4 ,if we examine the real meaning of ,kant's ,critical ,solution of the cosmological problem which now follows1 we find that it is not what he gives it out to be1 the solution of the problem by the disclosure that both sides1 starting from false assumptions1 are wrong in the first and second conflicts1 and that in the third and fourth both are right4 ,it is really the confirmation of the antitheses by the explanation of their assertions4 ,first ,kant asserts1 in this solution1 obviously wrongly1 that both sides started from the assumption1 as their first principle1 that with the conditioned the completed 7thus rounded off7 series of its conditions is given4 ,only the thesis laid down this proposition1 ,kant's principle of pure reason1 as the ground of its assertions2 the antithesis1 on the other hand1 expressly denied it throughout1 and asserted the contrary4 ,further1 ,kant charges both sides with this assumption1 that the world exists in itself1 i4e41 independently of being known and of the forms of this knowledge1 but this assumption also is only made by the thesis2 indeed1 it is so far from forming the ground of the assertions of the antithesis that it is absolutely inconsistent with them4 ,for that it should all be given is absolutely contradictory of the conception of an infinite series4 ,it is therefore essential to it that it should always exist only with reference to the process of going through it1 and not independently of this4 ,on the other hand1 in the assumption of definite limits also lies that of a whole which exists absolutely and independently of the process of completely measuring it4 ,thus it is only the thesis that makes the false assumption of a self-existent universe1 i4e41 a universe given prior to all knowledge1 and to which knowledge came as to something external to itself4 ,the antithesis from the outset combats this assumption absolutely2 for the infinity of the series which it asserts merely under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason can only exist if the regressus is fully carried out1 but not independently of it4 ,as the object in general presupposes the subject1 so also the object which is determined as an endless chain of conditions necessarily presupposes in the subject the kind of knowledge corresponding to this1 that is1 the constant following of the links of that chain4 ,but this is just what ,kant gives as the solution of the problem1 and so often repeats3 8,the infinity of the world is only through the regressus1 not before it40 ,this his solution of the conflict is thus really only the decision in favour of the antithesis in the assertion of which this truth already lies1 while it is altogether inconsistent with the assertions of the thesis4 ,if the antithesis had asserted that the world consisted of infinite series of reasons and consequents1 and yet existed independently of the idea and its regressive series1 thus in itself1 and therefore constituted a given whole1 it would have contradicted not only the thesis but also itself4 ,for an infinite can never be given as a whole1 nor an endless series exist1 except as an endless progress2 nor can what is boundless constitute a whole4 ,thus this assumption1 of which ,kant asserts that it led both sides into error1 belongs only to the thesis4 ,it is already a doctrine of ,aristotle's that an infinity can never be actu1 i4e41 actual and given1 but only potenti4 444 7infinitum non potest esse actu3 444 sed impossibile1 actu esse infinitum71 ,metaph4 ,k4 #aj4 ,further3 1 7nihil enim actu infinitum est1 sed potentia tantum1 nempe divisione ipsa74 ,de generat4 et corrupt41 i41 #c4 ,he develops this fully in the 8,physics10 iii4 #e and #f1 where to a certain extent he gives the perfectly correct solution of the whole of the antinomies4 ,he expounds the antinomies in his short way1 and then says1 8,a mediator 77 is required20 upon which he gives the solution that the infinite1 both of the world in space and in time and in division1 is never before the regressus1 or progressus1 but in it4 ,this truth lies then in the rightly apprehended conception of the infinite4 ,thus one misunderstands himself if he imagines that he can think the infinite1 of whatever kind it may be1 as something objectively present and complete1 and independent of the regressus4 ,indeed if1 reversing the procedure1 we take as the starting-point what ,kant gives as the solution of the conflict1 the assertion of the antithesis follows exactly from it4 ,thus3 if the world is not an unconditioned whole and does not exist absolutely but only in the idea1 and if its series of reasons and consequents do not exist before the regressus of the ideas of them but only through this regressus1 then the world cannot contain determined and finite series1 because their determination and limitation would necessarily be independent of the idea1 which would then only come afterwards2 but all its series must be infinite1 i4e41 inexhaustible by any idea4 ,on p4 #ejf2 ,v4 #ecd1 ,kant tries to prove from the falseness of both sides the transcendental ideality of the phenomenon1 and begins1 8,if the world is a whole existing by itself1 it is either finite or infinite40 ,but this is false2 a whole existing of itself cannot possibly be infinite4 ,that ideality may rather be concluded from the infinity of the series in the world in the following manner3--,if the series of reasons and consequents in the world are absolutely without end1 the world cannot be a given whole independent of the idea2 for such a world always presupposes definite limits1 just as on the contrary infinite series presuppose an infinite regressus4 ,therefore1 the presupposed infinity of the series must be determined through the form of reason and consequent1 and this again through the form of knowledge of the subject2 thus the world as it is known must exist only in the idea of the subject4 ,now whether ,kant himself was aware or not that his critical solution of the problem is really a decision in favour of the antithesis1 ,i am unable to decide4 ,for it depends upon whether what ,schelling has somewhere very happily called ,kant's system of accommodation extended so far2 or whether ,kant's mind was here already involved in an unconscious accommodation to the influence of his time and surroundings4 ,the solution of the third antinomy1 the subject of which was the ,idea of freedom1 deserves a special consideration1 because it is for us very well worth notice that it is just here in connection with the ,idea of freedom that ,kant is obliged to speak more fully of the thing in itself1 which was hitherto only seen in the background4 ,this is very explicable to us since we have recognised the thing in itself as the will4 ,speaking generally1 this is the point at which the ,kantian philosophy leads to mine1 or at which mine springs out of his as its parent stem4 ,one will be convinced of this if one reads with attention pp4 #ecf and #ecg2 ,v4 #efd and #efe1 of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 and1 further1 compares these passages with the introduction to the 8,critique of ,judgment10 pp4 xviii4 and xix4 of the third edition1 or p4 #ac of ,rosenkranz's edition1 where indeed it is said3 8,the conception of freedom can in its object 7that is then the will7 present to the mind a thing in itself1 but not in perception2 the conception of nature1 on the other hand1 can present its object to the mind in perception1 but not as a thing in itself40 ,but specially let any one read concerning the solution of the antinomies the fifty-third paragraph of the ,prolegomena1 and then honestly answer the question whether all that is said there does not sound like a riddle to which my doctrine is the answer4 ,kant never completed his thought2 ,i have merely carried out his work4 ,accordingly1 what ,kant says only of the human phenomenon ,i have extended to all phenomena in general1 as differing from the human phenomenon only in degree1 that their true being is something absolutely free1 i4e41 a will4 ,it appears from my work how fruitful this insight is in connection with ,kant's doctrine of the ideality of space1 time1 and causality4 ,kant has nowhere made the thing in itself the subject of a special exposition or distinct deduction2 but1 whenever he wants it1 he introduces it at once by means of the conclusion that the phenomenon1 thus the visible world1 must have a reason1 an intelligible cause1 which is not a phenomenon1 and therefore belongs to no possible experience4 ,he does this after having assiduously insisted that the categories1 and thus causality also1 had a use which was absolutely confined to possible experience2 that they were merely forms of the understanding1 which served to spell out the phenomena of the world of sense1 beyond which1 on the other hand1 they had no significance1 c41 c4 ,therefore1 he denies in the most uncompromising manner their application to things beyond experience1 and rightly explains and at once rejects all earlier dogmatism as based upon the neglect of this law4 ,the incredible inconsistency which ,kant here fell into was soon noticed1 and used by his first opponents to make attacks on his philosophy to which it could offer no resistance4 ,for certainly we apply the law of causality entirely a priori and before all experience to the changes felt in our organs of sense4 ,but1 on this very account1 this law is just as much of subjective origin as these sensations themselves1 and thus does not lead to a thing in itself4 ,the truth is1 that upon the path of the idea one can never get beyond the idea2 it is a rounded-off whole1 and has in its own resources no clue leading to the nature of the thing in itself1 which is toto genere different from it4 ,if we were merely perceiving beings1 the way to the thing in itself would be absolutely cut off from us4 ,only the other side of our own being can disclose to us the other side of the inner being of things4 ,this path ,i have followed4 ,but ,kant's inference to the thing in itself1 contrary as it is to his own teaching1 obtains some excuse from the following circumstance4 ,he does not say1 as truth required1 simply and absolutely that the object is conditioned by the subject1 and conversely2 but only that the manner of the appearance of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject1 which1 therefore1 also come a priori to consciousness4 ,but that now which in opposition to this is only known a posteriori is for him the immediate effect of the thing in itself1 which becomes phenomenon only in its passage through these forms which are given a priori4 ,from this point of view it is to some extent explicable how it could escape him that objectivity in general belongs to the form of the phenomenon1 and is just as much conditioned by subjectivity in general as the mode of appearing of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject2 that thus if a thing in itself must be assumed1 it absolutely cannot be an object1 which however he always assumes it to be1 but such a thing in itself must necessarily lie in a sphere toto genere different from the idea 7from knowing and being known71 and therefore could least of all be arrived at through the laws of the combination of objects among themselves4 ,with the proof of the thing in itself it has happened to ,kant precisely as with that of the a priori nature of the law of causality4 ,both doctrines are true1 but their proof is false4 ,they thus belong to the class of true conclusions from false premises4 ,i have retained them both1 but have proved them in an entirely different way1 and with certainty4 ,the thing in itself ,i have neither introduced surreptitiously nor inferred according to laws which exclude it1 because they really belong to its phenomenal appearance2 nor1 in general1 have ,i arrived at it by roundabout ways4 ,on the contrary1 ,i have shown it directly1 there where it lies immediately1 in the will1 which reveals itself to every one directly as the in-itself of his own phenomenal being4 ,and it is also this immediate knowledge of his own will out of which in human consciousness the conception of freedom springs2 for certainly the will1 as world-creating1 as thing in itself1 is free from the principle of sufficient reason1 and therewith from all necessity1 thus is completely independent1 free1 and indeed almighty4 ,yet1 in truth1 this only holds good of the will in itself1 not of its manifestations1 the individuals1 who1 just through the will itself1 are unalterably determined as its manifestations in time4 ,but in the ordinary consciousness1 unenlightened by philosophy1 the will is at once confused with its manifestation1 and what belongs only to the former is attributed to the latter1 whence arises the illusion of the unconditioned freedom of the individual4 ,therefore ,spinoza says rightly that if the projected stone had consciousness1 it would believe that it flew of its own free will4 ,for certainly the in-itself of the stone also is the will1 which alone is free2 but1 as in all its manifestations1 here also1 where it appears as a stone1 it is already fully determined4 ,but of all this enough has already been said in the text of this work4 ,kant fails to understand and overlooks this immediate origin of the conception of freedom in every human consciousness1 and therefore he now places 7p4 #ecc2 ,v4 #efa7 the source of that conception in a very subtle speculation1 through which the unconditioned1 to which the reason must always tend1 leads us to hypostatise the conception of freedom1 and it is only upon this transcendent ,idea of freedom that the practical conception of it is supposed to be founded4 ,in the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 #f1 and p4 #aeh of the fourth and #bce of ,rosenkranz's edition1 he yet deduces this last conception differently by saying that the categorical imperative presupposes it4 ,the speculative ,idea is accordingly only the primary source of the conception of freedom for the sake of this presupposition1 but here it obtains both significance and application4 ,neither1 however1 is the case4 ,for the delusion of a perfect freedom of the individual in his particular actions is most lively in the conviction of the least cultivated man who has never reflected1 and it is thus founded on no speculation1 although often assumed by speculation from without4 ,thus only philosophers1 and indeed only the most profound of them1 are free from it1 and also the most thoughtful and enlightened of the writers of the ,church4 ,it follows1 then1 from all that has been said1 that the true source of the conception of freedom is in no way essentially an inference1 either from the speculative ,idea of an unconditioned cause1 nor from the fact that it is presupposed by the categorical imperative4 ,but it springs directly from the consciousness in which each one recognises himself at once as the will1 i4e41 as that which1 as the thing in itself1 has not the principle of sufficient reason for its form1 and which itself depends upon nothing1 but on which everything else rather depends4 ,every one1 however1 does not recognise himself at once with the critical and reflective insight of philosophy as a determined manifestation of this will which has already entered time1 as we might say1 an act of will distinguished from that will to live itself2 and1 therefore1 instead of recognising his whole existence as an act of his freedom1 he rather seeks for freedom in his individual actions4 ,upon this point ,i refer the reader to my prize-essay on the freedom of the will4 ,now if ,kant1 as he here pretends1 and also apparently did in earlier cases1 had merely inferred the thing in itself1 and that with the great inconsistency of an inference absolutely forbidden by himself1 what a remarkable accident would it then be that here1 where for the first time he approaches the thing in itself more closely and explains it1 he should recognise in it at once the will1 the free will showing itself in the world only in temporal manifestations6 ,i therefore really assume1 though it cannot be proved1 that whenever ,kant spoke of the thing in itself1 in the obscure depths of his mind he already always indistinctly thought of the will4 ,this receives support from a passage in the preface to the second edition of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 pp4 xxvii4 and xxviii41 in ,rosenkranz's edition1 p4 #fgg of the ,supplement4 ,for the rest1 it is just this predetermined solution of the sham third conflict that affords ,kant the opportunity of expressing very beautifully the deepest thoughts of his whole philosophy4 ,this is the case in the whole of the 8,sixth ,section of the ,antinomy of ,pure ,reason20 but1 above all1 in the exposition of the opposition between the empirical and the intelligible character1 p4 #ecd-eej2 ,v4 #efb-egh1 which ,i number among the most admirable things that have ever been said by man4 7,as a supplemental explanation of this passage1 compare a parallel passage in the ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 p4 #afi-agi of the fourth edition1 or p4 #bbd-bca of ,rosenkranz's edition47 ,it is yet all the more to be regretted that this is here not in its right place1 partly because it is not found in the way which the exposition states1 and therefore could be otherwise deduced than it is1 partly because it does not fulfil the end for which it is there--the solution of the sham antinomy4 ,the intelligible character1 the thing in itself1 is inferred from the phenomenon by the inconsistent use of the category of causality beyond the sphere of all phenomena1 which has already been sufficiently condemned4 ,in this case the will of man 7which ,kant entitles reason1 most improperly1 and with an unpardonable breach of all use of language7 is set up as the thing in itself1 with an appeal to an unconditioned ought1 the categorical imperative1 which is postulated without more ado4 ,now1 instead of all this1 the plain open procedure would have been to start directly from the will1 and prove it to be the in-itself of our own phenomenal being1 recognised without any mediation2 and then to give that exposition of the empirical and the intelligible character to explain how all actions1 although necessitated by motives1 yet1 both by their author and by the disinterested judge1 are necessarily and absolutely ascribed to the former himself and alone1 as depending solely upon him1 to whom therefore guilt and merit are attributed in respect of them4 ,this alone was the straight path to the knowledge of that which is not phenomenon1 and therefore will not be found by the help of the laws of the phenomenon1 but is that which reveals itself through the phenomenon1 becomes knowable1 objectifies itself--the will to live4 ,it would then have had to be exhibited merely by analogy as the inner nature of every phenomenon4 ,then1 however1 it certainly could not have been said that in lifeless or even animal nature no faculty can be thought except as sensuously conditioned 7p4 #edf2 ,v4 #egd71 which in ,kant's language is simply saying that the explanation1 according to the law of causality1 exhausts the inner nature of these phenomena1 and thus in their case1 very inconsistently1 the thing in itself disappears4 ,through the false position and the roundabout deduction according with it which the exposition of the thing in itself has received from ,kant1 the whole conception of it has also become falsified4 ,for the will or the thing in itself1 found through the investigation of an unconditioned cause1 appears here related to the phenomenon as cause to effect4 ,but this relation exists only within the phenomenal world1 therefore presupposes it1 and cannot connect the phenomenal world itself with what lies outside it1 and is toto genere different from it4 ,further1 the intended end1 the solution of the third antinomy by the decision that both sides1 each in a different sense1 are right1 is not reached at all4 ,for neither the thesis nor the antithesis have anything to do with the thing in itself1 but entirely with the phenomenon1 the objective world1 the world as idea4 ,this it is1 and absolutely nothing else1 of which the thesis tries to show1 by means of the sophistry we have laid bare1 that it contains unconditioned causes1 and it is also this of which the antithesis rightly denies that it contains such causes4 ,therefore the whole exposition of the transcendental freedom of the will1 so far as it is a thing in itself1 which is given here in justification of the thesis1 excellent as it is in itself1 is yet here entirely a 4 ,for the transcendental freedom of the will which is expounded is by no means the unconditioned causality of a cause1 which the thesis asserts1 because it is of the essence of a cause that it must be a phenomenon1 and not something which lies beyond all phenomena and is toto genere different4 ,if what is spoken of is cause and effect1 the relation of the will to the manifestation 7or of the intelligible character to the empirical7 must never be introduced1 as happens here3 for it is entirely different from causal relation4 ,however1 here also1 in this solution of the antinomy1 it is said with truth that the empirical character of man1 like that of every other cause in nature1 is unalterably determined1 and therefore that his actions necessarily take place in accordance with the external influences2 therefore also1 in spite of all transcendental freedom 7i4e41 independence of the will in itself of the laws of the connection of its manifestation71 no man has the power of himself to begin a series of actions1 which1 however1 was asserted by the thesis4 ,thus also freedom has no causality2 for only the will is free1 and it lies outside nature or the phenomenon1 which is just its objectification1 but does not stand in a causal relation to it1 for this relation is only found within the sphere of the phenomenon1 thus presupposes it1 and cannot embrace the phenomenon itself and connect it with what is expressly not a phenomenon4 ,the world itself can only be explained through the will 7for it is the will itself1 so far as it manifests itself71 and not through causality4 ,but in the world causality is the sole principle of explanation1 and everything happens simply according to the laws of nature4 ,thus the right lies entirely on the side of the antithesis1 which sticks to the question in hand1 and uses that principle of explanation which is valid with regard to it2 therefore it needs no apology4 ,the thesis1 on the other hand1 is supposed to be got out of the matter by an apology1 which first passes over to something quite different from the question at issue1 and then assumes a principle of explanation which is inapplicable to it4 ,the fourth conflict is1 as has already been said1 in its real meaning tautological with the third4 ,in its solution ,kant develops still more the untenable nature of the thesis2 while for its truth1 on the other hand1 and its pretended consistency with the antithesis1 he advances no reason1 as conversely he is able to bring no reason against the antithesis4 ,the assumption of the thesis he introduces quite apologetically1 and yet calls it himself 7p4 #efb2 ,v4 #eij7 an arbitrary presupposition1 the object of which might well in itself be impossible1 and shows merely an utterly impotent endeavour to find a corner for it somewhere where it will be safe from the prevailing might of the antithesis1 only to avoid disclosing the emptiness of the whole of his once-loved assertion of the necessary antinomy in human reason4 ,now follows the chapter on the transcendental ideal1 which carries us back at once to the rigid ,scholasticism of the ,middle ,ages4 ,one imagines one is listening to ,anselm of ,canterbury himself4 ,the ens realissimum1 the essence of all realities1 the content of all affirmative propositions1 appears1 and indeed claims to be a necessary thought of the reason4 ,i for my part must confess that to my reason such a thought is impossible1 and that ,i am not able to think anything definite in connection with the words which denote it4 ,moreover1 ,i do not doubt that ,kant was compelled to write this extraordinary chapter1 so unworthy of him1 simply by his fondness for architectonic symmetry4 ,the three principal objects of the ,scholastic philosophy 7which1 as we have said1 if understood in the wider sense1 may be regarded as continuing down to ,kant71 the soul1 the world1 and ,god1 are supposed to be deduced from the three possible major propositions of syllogisms1 though it is plain that they have arisen1 and can arise1 simply and solely through the unconditioned application of the principle of sufficient reason4 ,now1 after the soul had been forced into the categorical judgment1 and the hypothetical was set apart for the world1 there remained for the third ,idea nothing but the disjunctive major4 ,fortunately there existed a previous work in this direction1 the ens realissimum of the ,scholastics1 together with the ontological proof of the existence of ,god set up in a rudimentary form by ,anselm of ,canterbury and then perfected by ,descartes4 ,this was joyfully made use of by ,kant1 with some reminiscence also of an earlier ,latin work of his youth4 ,however1 the sacrifice which ,kant makes to his love of architectonic symmetry in this chapter is exceedingly great4 ,in defiance of all truth1 what one must regard as the grotesque idea of an essence of all possible realities is made an essential and necessary thought of the reason4 ,for the deduction of this ,kant makes use of the false assertion that our knowledge of particular things arises from a progressive limitation of general conceptions2 thus also of a most general conception of all which contains all reality in itself4 ,in this he stands just as much in contradiction with his own teaching as with the truth1 for exactly the converse is the case4 ,our knowledge starts with the particular and is extended to the general1 and all general conceptions arise by abstraction from real1 particular things known by perception1 and this can be carried on to the most general of all conceptions1 which includes everything under it1 but almost nothing in it4 ,thus ,kant has here placed the procedure of our faculty of knowledge just upside down1 and thus might well be accused of having given occasion to a philosophical charlatanism that has become famous in our day1 which1 instead of recognising that conceptions are thoughts abstracted from things1 makes1 on the contrary the conceptions first1 and sees in things only concrete conceptions1 thus bringing to market the world turned upside down as a philosophical buffoonery1 which of course necessarily found great acceptance4 ,even if we assume that every reason must1 or at least can1 attain to the conception of ,god1 even without revelation1 this clearly takes place only under the guidance of causality4 ,this is so evident that it requires no proof4 ,therefore ,chr4 ,wolf says 7,cosmologia ,generalis1 prf41 p4 #a73 ,sane in theologia naturali existentiam ,numinis e principiis cosmologicis demonstramus4 ,contingentia universi et ordinis natur1 una cum impossibilitate casus1 sunt scala1 per quam a mundo hoc adspectabili ad ,deum ascenditur4 ,and1 before him1 ,leibnitz said1 in connection with the law of causality3 ,sans ce grand principe on ne saurait venir la preuve de l'existence de ,dieu4 ,on the other hand1 the thought which is worked out in this chapter is so far from being essential and necessary to reason1 that it is rather to be regarded as a veritable masterpiece of the monstrous productions of an age which1 through strange circumstances1 fell into the most singular aberrations and perversities1 such as the age of the ,scholastics was--an age which is unparalleled in the history of the world1 and can never return again4 ,this ,scholasticism1 as it advanced to its final form1 certainly derived the principal proof of the existence of ,god from the conception of the ens realissimum1 and only then used the other proofs as accessory4 ,this1 however1 is mere methodology1 and proves nothing as to the origin of theology in the human mind4 ,kant has here taken the procedure of ,scholasticism for that of reason--a mistake which indeed he has made more than once4 ,if it were true that according to the essential laws of reason the ,idea of ,god proceeds from the disjunctive syllogism under the form of an ,idea of the most real being1 this ,idea would also have existed in the philosophy of antiquity2 but of the ens realissimum there is nowhere a trace in any of the ancient philosophers1 although some of them certainly teach that there is a ,creator of the world1 yet only as the giver of form to the matter which exists without him1 1 a being whom they yet infer simply and solely in accordance with the law of causality4 ,it is true that ,sextus ,empiricus 7adv4 ,math41 ix4 #hh7 quotes an argument of ,cleanthes1 which some have held to be the ontological proof4 ,this1 however1 it is not1 but merely an inference from analogy2 because experience teaches that upon earth one being is always better than another1 and man1 indeed1 as the best1 closes the series1 but yet has many faults2 therefore there must exist beings who are still better1 and finally one being who is best of all 71 71 and this would be ,god4 ,on the detailed refutation of speculative theology which now follows ,i have only briefly to remark that it1 and in general the whole criticism of the three so-called ,ideas of reason1 thus the whole ,dialectic of ,pure ,reason1 is indeed to a certain extent the goal and end of the whole work3 yet this polemical part has not really an absolutely universal1 permanent1 and purely philosophical interest1 such as is possessed by the preceding doctrinal part1 i4e41 the sthetic and analytic2 but rather a temporary and local interest1 because it stands in a special relation to the leading points of the philosophy which prevailed in ,europe up till the time of ,kant1 the complete overthrow of which was yet1 to his immortal credit1 achieved by him through this polemic4 ,he has eliminated theism from philosophy2 for in it1 as a science and not a system of faith1 only that can find a place which is either empirically given or established by valid proofs4 ,naturally we only mean here the real seriously understood philosophy which is concerned with the truth1 and nothing else2 and by no means the jest of philosophy taught in the universities1 in which1 after ,kant as before him1 speculative theology plays the principal part1 and where1 also1 after as before him1 the soul appears without ceremony as a familiar person4 ,for it is the philosophy endowed with salaries and fees1 and1 indeed1 also with titles of ,hofrath1 which1 looking proudly down from its height1 remains for forty years entirely unaware of the existence of little people like me1 and would be thoroughly glad to be rid of the old ,kant with his ,critiques1 that they might drink the health of ,leibnitz with all their hearts4 ,it is further to be remarked here1 that as ,kant was confessedly led to his doctrine of the a priori nature of the conception of causality by ,hume's scepticism with regard to that conception1 it may be that in the same way ,kant's criticism of all speculative theology had its occasion in ,hume's criticism of all popular theology1 which he had given in his 8,natural ,history of ,religion10 a book so well worth reading1 and in the 8,dialogues on ,natural ,religion40 ,indeed1 it may be that ,kant wished to a certain extent to supplement this4 ,for the first-named work of ,hume is really a critique of popular theology1 the pitiable condition of which it seeks to show2 while1 on the other hand1 it points to rational or speculative theology as the genuine1 and that which is worthy of respect4 ,but ,kant now discloses the groundlessness of the latter1 and leaves1 on the other hand1 popular theology untouched1 nay1 even establishes it in a nobler form as a faith based upon moral feeling4 ,this was afterwards distorted by the philosophasters into rational apprehensions1 consciousness of ,god1 or intellectual intuitions of the supersensible1 of the divine1 c41 c42 while ,kant1 as he demolished old and revered errors1 and knew the danger of doing so1 rather wished through the moral theology merely to substitute a few weak temporary supports1 so that the ruin might not fall on him1 but that he might have time to escape4 ,now1 as regards the performance of the task1 no critique of reason was necessary for the refutation of the ontological proof of the existence of ,god2 for without presupposing the sthetic and analytic1 it is quite easy to make clear that that ontological proof is nothing but a subtle playing with conceptions which is quite powerless to produce conviction4 ,there is a chapter in the 8,organon0 of ,aristotle which suffices as fully for the refutation of the ontological proof as if it had been written intentionally with that purpose4 ,it is the seventh chapter of the second book of the 8,analyt4 ,post40 ,among other things1 it is expressly said there3 8 10 i4e41 existentia nunquam ad essentiam rei pertinet4 ,the refutation of the cosmological proof is an application to a given case of the doctrine of the ,critique as expounded up to that point1 and there is nothing to be said against it4 ,the physico-theological proof is a mere amplification of the cosmological1 which it presupposes1 and it finds its full refutation only in the 8,critique of ,judgment40 ,i refer the reader in this connection to the rubric1 8,comparative ,anatomy10 in my work on the ,will in ,nature4 ,in the criticism of this proof ,kant has only to do1 as we have already said1 with speculative theology1 and limits himself to the ,school4 ,if1 on the contrary1 he had had life and popular theology also in view1 he would have been obliged to add a fourth proof to the three he has considered--that proof which is really the effective one with the great mass of men1 and which in ,kant's technical language might best be called the keraunological4 ,it is the proof which is founded upon the needy1 impotent1 and dependent condition of man as opposed to natural forces1 which are infinitely superior1 inscrutable1 and for the most part threatening evil2 to which is added man's natural inclination to personify everything1 and finally the hope of effecting something by prayers and flattery1 and even by gifts4 ,in every human undertaking there is something which is not in our power and does not come within our calculations2 the wish to win this for oneself is the origin of the gods4 8,primus in orbe ,deos fecit timor0 is an old and true saying of ,petronius4 ,it is principally this proof which is criticised by ,hume1 who throughout appears as ,kant's forerunner in the writings referred to above4 ,but those whom ,kant has placed in a position of permanent embarrassment by his criticism of speculative theology are the professors of philosophy4 ,salaried by ,christian governments1 they dare not give up the chief article of faith47#i7 ,now1 how do these gentlemen help themselves8 ,they simply declare that the existence of ,god is self-evident4 ,indeed6 ,after the ancient world1 at the expense of its conscience1 had worked miracles to prove it1 and the modern world1 at the expense of its understanding1 had brought into the field ontological1 cosmological1 and physico-theological proofs--to these gentlemen it is self-evident4 ,and from this self-evident ,god they then explain the world3 that is their philosophy4 ,till ,kant came there was a real dilemma between materialism and theism1 i4e41 between the assumption that a blind chance1 or that an intelligence working from without in accordance with purposes and conceptions1 had brought about the world1 neque dabatur tertium4 ,therefore atheism and materialism were the same2 hence the doubt whether there really could be an atheist1 i4e41 a man who really could attribute to blind chance the disposition of nature1 so full of design1 especially organised nature4 ,see1 for example1 ,bacon's ,essays 7sermones fideles71 ,essay #af1 on ,atheism4 ,in the opinion of the great mass of men1 and of the ,english1 who in such things belong entirely to the great mass 7the mob71 this is still the case1 even with their most celebrated men of learning4 ,one has only to look at ,owen's 8,ostologie ,compare10 of #ahee1 preface1 p4 #aa1 #ab1 where he stands always before the old dilemma between ,democritus and ,epicurus on the one side1 and an intelligence on the other1 in which la connaissance d'un tre tel que l'homme a exist avant que l'homme fit son apparition4 ,all design must have proceeded from an intelligence2 he has never even dreamt of doubting this4 ,yet in the lecture based upon this now modified preface1 delivered in the ,acadmie des ,sciences on the #eth ,september #ahec1 he says1 with childish naivete3 8,la tlologie1 ou la thologie scientifique0 7,comptes ,rendus1 ,sept4 #ahec71 that is for him precisely the same thing6 ,is anything in nature designed8 then it is a work of intention1 of reflection1 of intelligence4 ,yet1 certainly1 what has such an ,englishman and the ,acadmie des ,sciences to do with the 8,critique of ,judgment10 or1 indeed1 with my book upon the ,will in ,nature8 ,these gentlemen do not see so far below them4 ,these illustres confrres disdain metaphysics and the philosophie allemande3 they confine themselves to the old woman's philosophy4 ,the validity of that disjunctive major1 that dilemma between materialism and theism1 rests1 however1 upon the assumption that the present given world is the world of things in themselves2 that consequently there is no other order of things than the empirical4 ,but after the world and its order had through ,kant become mere phenomenon1 the laws of which rest principally upon the forms of our intellect1 the existence and nature of things and of the world no longer required to be explained according to the analogy of the changes perceived or effected by us in the world2 nor must that which we comprehend as means and end have necessarily arisen as the consequence of a similar knowledge4 ,thus1 inasmuch as ,kant1 through his important distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself1 withdrew the foundation from theism1 he opened1 on the other hand1 the way to entirely different and more profound explanations of existence4 ,in the chapter on the ultimate aim of the natural dialectic of reason it is asserted that the three transcendent ,ideas are of value as regulative principles for the advancement of the knowledge of nature4 ,but ,kant can barely have been serious in making this assertion4 ,at least its opposite1 that these assumptions are restrictive and fatal to all investigation of nature1 is to every natural philosopher beyond doubt4 ,to test this by an example1 let any one consider whether the assumption of the soul as an immaterial1 simple1 thinking substance would have been necessarily advantageous or in the highest degree impeding to the truths which ,cabanis has so beautifully expounded1 or to the discoveries of ,flourens1 ,marshall ,hall1 and ,ch4 ,bell4 ,indeed ,kant himself says 7,prolegomena1 #dd71 8,the ,ideas of the reason are opposed and hindering to the maxims of the rational knowledge of nature40 ,it is certainly not the least merit of ,frederick the ,great1 that under his ,government ,kant could develop himself1 and dared to publish the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason40 ,hardly under any other ,government would a salaried professor have ventured such a thing4 ,kant was obliged to promise the immediate successor of the great king that he would write no more4 ,i might consider that ,i could dispense with the criticism of the ethical part of the ,kantian philosophy here because ,i have given a detailed and thorough criticism of it twenty-two years later than the present work in the 8,beiden ,grundproblemen der ,ethik40 ,however1 what is here retained from the first edition1 and for the sake of completeness must not be omitted1 may serve as a suitable introduction to that later and much more thorough criticism1 to which in the main ,i therefore refer the reader4 ,on account of ,kant's love of architectonic symmetry1 the theoretical reason had also to have a pendant4 ,the intellectus practicus of the ,scholastics1 which again springs from the of ,aristotle 7,de ,anima1 iii4 #aj1 and ,polit41 vii4 c4 #ad3 1 71 provides the word ready made4 ,yet here something quite different is denoted by it--not as there1 the reason directed to technical skill4 ,here the practical reason appears as the source and origin of the undeniable ethical significance of human action1 and of all virtue1 all nobleness1 and every attainable degree of holiness4 ,all this accordingly should come from mere reason1 and demand nothing but this4 ,to act rationally and to act virtuously1 nobly1 holily1 would be one and the same2 and to act selfishly1 wickedly1 viciously1 would be merely to act irrationally4 ,however1 all times and peoples and languages have distinguished the two1 and held them to be quite different things2 and so does every one even at the present day who knows nothing of the language of the new school1 i4e41 the whole world1 with the exception of a small company of ,german savants4 ,every one but these last understands by virtuous conduct and a rational course of life two entirely different things4 ,to say that the sublime founder of the ,christian religion1 whose life is presented to us as the pattern of all virtue1 was the most rational of all men would be called a very unbecoming and even a blasphemous way of speaking2 and almost as much so if it were said that ,his precepts contained all the best directions for a perfectly rational life4 ,further1 that he who1 in accordance with these precepts1 instead of taking thought for his own future needs1 always relieves the greater present wants of others1 without further motive1 nay1 gives all his goods to the poor1 in order then1 destitute of all means of subsistence1 to go and preach to others also the virtue which he practises himself2 this every one rightly honours2 but who ventures to extol it as the highest pitch of reasonableness8 ,and finally1 who praises it as a rational deed that ,arnold von ,winkelried1 with surpassing courage1 clasped the hostile spears against his own body in order to gain victory and deliverance for his countrymen8 ,on the other hand1 if we see a man who from his youth upwards deliberates with exceptional foresight how he may procure for himself an easy competence1 the means for the support of wife and children1 a good name among men1 outward honour and distinction1 and in doing so never allows himself to be led astray or induced to lose sight of his end by the charm of present pleasures or the satisfaction of defying the arrogance of the powerful1 or the desire of revenging insults and undeserved humiliations he has suffered1 or the attractions of useless aesthetic or philosophical occupations of the mind1 or travels in interesting lands1 but with great consistency works towards his one end1--who ventures to deny that such a philistine is in quite an extraordinary degree rational1 even if he has made use of some means which are not praiseworthy but are yet without danger8 ,nay1 more1 if a bad man1 with deliberate shrewdness1 through a well-thought-out plan attains to riches and honours1 and even to thrones and crowns1 and then with the acutest cunning gets the better of neighbouring states1 overcomes them one by one1 and now becomes a conqueror of the world1 and in doing so is not led astray by any respect for right1 any sense of humanity1 but with sharp consistency tramples down and dashes to pieces everything that opposes his plan1 without compassion plunges millions into misery of every kind1 condemns millions to bleed and die1 yet royally rewards and always protects his adherents and helpers1 never forgetting anything1 and thus reaches his end1--who does not see that such a man must go to work in a most rational manner8--that1 as a powerful understanding was needed to form the plans1 their execution demanded the complete command of the reason1 and indeed properly of practical reason8 ,or are the precepts which the prudent and consistent1 the thoughtful and far-seeing ,machiavelli prescribes to the prince irrational87#aj7 ,as wickedness is quite consistent with reason1 and indeed only becomes really terrible in this conjunction1 so1 conversely1 nobleness is sometimes joined with want of reason4 ,to this may be attributed the action of ,coriolanus1 who1 after he had applied all his strength for years to the accomplishment of his revenge upon the ,romans1 when at length the time came1 allowed himself to be softened by the prayers of the ,senate and the tears of his mother and wife1 gave up the revenge he had so long and so painfully prepared1 and indeed1 by thus bringing on himself the just anger of the ,volscians1 died for those very ,romans whose thanklessness he knew and desired so intensely to punish4 ,finally1 for the sake of completeness1 it may be mentioned that reason may very well exist along with want of understanding4 ,this is the case when a foolish maxim is chosen1 but is followed out consistently4 ,an example of this is afforded by the case of the ,princess ,isabella1 daughter of ,philip ,,ii41 who vowed that she would not put on a clean chemise so long as ,ostend remained unconquered1 and kept her word through three years4 ,in general all vows are of this class1 whose origin is a want of insight as regards the law of causality1 i4e41 want of understanding2 nevertheless it is rational to fulfil them if one is of such narrow understanding as to make them4 ,in agreement with what we have said1 we see the writers who appeared just before ,kant place the conscience1 as the seat of the moral impulses1 in opposition to the reason4 ,thus ,rousseau1 in the fourth book of 8,emile10 says3 8,la raison nous trompe1 mais la conscience ne trompe jamais20 and further on3 8,il est impossible d'expliquer par les consquences de notre nature le principe immdiat de la conscience indpendant de la raison mme40 ,still further3 8,mes sentimens naturels parlaient pour l'intrt commun1 ma raison rapportait tout a moi4444 ,on a beau vouloir etablir la vertu par la raison seul1 quelle solide base peut-on lui donner80 ,in the 8,rveries du ,promeneur10 prom4 #d me1 he says3 8,dans toutes les questions de morale difficiles je me suis tojours bien trouv de les rsoudre par le dictamen de la conscience1 plutt que par les lumires de la raison40 ,indeed ,aristotle already says expressly 7,eth4 ,magna1 i4 #e7 that the virtues have their seat in the 7in parte irrationali animi71 and not in the 7in parte rationali74 ,in accordance with this1 ,stobus says 7,ecl41 ii1 c4#g71 speaking of the ,peripatetics3 8 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 40 7,ethicam virtutem circa partem anim ratione carentem versari putant1 cam duplicem1 ad hanc disquisitionem1 animam ponant1 ratione prditam1 et ea carentem4 ,in parte vero ratione prdita collocant ingenuitatem1 prudentiam1 perspicacitatem1 sapientiam1 docilitatem1 memoriam et reliqua2 in parte vero ratione destituta temperantiam1 justitiam1 fortitadinem1 et reliquas virtutes1 quas ethicas vocant47 ,and ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor41 iii41 c4 #bf-ca7 explains at length that reason is the necessary means1 the tool1 of all crime4 ,i have explained reason to be the faculty of framing concepts4 ,it is this quite special class of general non-perceptible ideas1 which are symbolised and fixed only by words1 that distinguishes man from the brutes and gives him the pre-eminence upon earth4 ,while the brute is the slave of the present1 and knows only immediate sensible motives1 and therefore when they present themselves to it is necessarily attracted or repelled by them1 as iron is by the magnet1 in man1 on the contrary1 deliberation has been introduced through the gift of reason4 ,this enables him easily to survey as a whole his life and the course of the world1 looking before and after2 it makes him independent of the present1 enables him to go to work deliberately1 systematically1 and with foresight1 to do evil as well as to do good4 ,but what he does he does with complete self-consciousness2 he knows exactly how his will decides1 what in each case he chooses1 and what other choice was in the nature of the case possible2 and from this self-conscious willing he comes to know himself and mirrors himself in his actions4 ,in all these relations to the conduct of men reason is to be called practical2 it is only theoretical so far as the objects with which it is concerned have no relation to the action of the thinker1 but have purely a theoretical interest1 which very few men are capable of feeling4 ,what in this sense is called practical reason is very nearly what is signified by the ,latin word prudentia1 which1 according to ,cicero 7,de ,nat4 ,deor4 ii41 #bb71 is a contraction of providentia2 while1 on the other hand1 ratio1 if used of a faculty of the mind1 signifies for the most part theoretical reason proper1 though the ancients did not observe the distinction strictly4 ,in nearly all men reason has an almost exclusively practical tendency2 but if this also is abandoned thought loses the control of action1 so that it is then said1 8,scio meliora1 proboque1 deteriora sequor10 or 8,le matin je fais des projets1 et le soir je fais des sottises40 ,thus the man does not allow his conduct to be guided by his thought1 but by the impression of the moment1 after the manner of the brute2 and so he is called irrational 7without thereby imputing to him moral turpitude71 although he is not really wanting in reason1 but in the power of applying it to his action2 and one might to a certain extent say his reason is theoretical and not practical4 ,he may at the same time be a really good man1 like many a one who can never see any one in misfortune without helping him1 even making sacrifices to do so1 and yet leaves his debts unpaid4 ,such an irrational character is quite incapable of committing great crimes1 because the systematic planning1 the discrimination and self-control1 which this always requires are quite impossible to him4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 he will hardly attain to a very high degree of virtue1 for1 however much inclined to good he may be by nature1 those single vicious and wicked emotions to which every one is subject cannot be wanting2 and where reason does not manifest itself practically1 and oppose to them unalterable maxims and firm principles1 they must become deeds4 ,finally1 reason manifests itself very specially as practical in those exceedingly rational characters who on this account are called in ordinary life practical philosophers1 and who are distinguished by an unusual equanimity in disagreeable as in pleasing circumstances1 an equable disposition1 and a determined perseverance in resolves once made4 ,in fact1 it is the predominance of reason in them1 i4e41 the more abstract than intuitive knowledge1 and therefore the survey of life by means of conceptions1 in general and as a whole1 which has enabled them once for all to recognise the deception of the momentary impression1 the fleeting nature of all things1 the shortness of life1 the emptiness of pleasures1 the fickleness of fortune1 and the great and little tricks of chance4 ,therefore nothing comes to them unexpectedly1 and what they know in the abstract does not surprise nor disturb them when it meets them in the actual and in the particular case1 though it does so in the case of those less reasonable characters upon whom the present1 the perceptible1 the actual1 exerts such an influence that the cold1 colourless conceptions are thrown quite into the background of consciousness1 and forgetting principles and maxims1 they are abandoned to emotions and passions of every kind4 ,i have already explained at the end of the first book that in my opinion the ethics of ,stoicism were simply a guide to a truly reasonable life1 in this sense4 ,such a life is also repeatedly praised by ,horace in very many passages4 ,this is the significance of his nil admirari1 and also of the ,delphic 4 ,to translate nil admirari 8to admire nothing0 is quite wrong4 ,this ,horatian maxim does not concern the theoretical so much as the practical1 and its real meaning is3 8,prize no object unconditionally4 ,do not fall in love with anything2 do not believe that the possession of anything can give you happiness4 ,every intense longing for an object is only a delusive chimera1 which one may just as well1 and much more easily1 get quit of by fuller knowledge as by attained possession40 ,cicero also uses admirari in this sense 7,de ,divinatione1 ii4 #b74 ,what ,horace means is thus the and 1 also 1 which ,democritus before him prized as the highest good 7see ,clem4 ,alex4 ,strom41 ii4 #ba1 and cf4 ,strabo1 i4 p4 #ih and #aje74 ,such reasonableness of conduct has properly nothing to do with virtue and vice2 but this practical use of reason is what gives man his pre-eminence over the brute1 and only in this sense has it any meaning and is it permissible to speak of a dignity of man4 ,in all the cases given1 and indeed in all conceivable cases1 the distinction between rational and irrational action runs back to the question whether the motives are abstract conceptions or ideas of perception4 ,therefore the explanation which ,i have given of reason agrees exactly with the use of language at all times and among all peoples--a circumstance which will not be regarded as merely accidental or arbitrary1 but will be seen to arise from the distinction of which every man is conscious1 of the different faculties of the mind1 in accordance with which consciousness he speaks1 though certainly he does not raise it to the distinctness of an abstract definition4 ,our ancestors did not make the words without attaching to them a definite meaning1 in order1 perhaps1 that they might lie ready for philosophers who might possibly come centuries after and determine what ought to be thought in connection with them2 but they denoted by them quite definite conceptions4 ,thus the words are no longer unclaimed1 and to attribute to them an entirely different sense from that which they have hitherto had means to misuse them1 means to introduce a licence in accordance with which every one might use any word in any sense he chose1 and thus endless confusion would necessarily arise4 ,locke has already shown at length that most disagreements in philosophy arise from a false use of words4 ,for the sake of illustration just glance for a moment at the shameful misuse which philosophers destitute of thoughts make at the present day of the words substance1 consciousness1 truth1 and many others4 ,moreover1 the utterances and explanations concerning reason of all philosophers of all ages1 with the exception of the most modern1 agree no less with my explanation of it than the conceptions which prevail among all nations of that prerogative of man4 ,observe what ,plato1 in the fourth book of the ,republic1 and in innumerable scattered passages1 calls the 1 or 1 what ,cicero says 7,de ,nat4 ,deor41 iii4 #bf-ca71 what ,leibnitz and ,locke say upon this in the passages already quoted in the first book4 ,there would be no end to the quotations here if one sought to show how all philosophers before ,kant have spoken of reason in general in my sense1 although they did not know how to explain its nature with complete definiteness and distinctness by reducing it to one point4 ,what was understood by reason shortly before ,kant's appearance is shown in general by two essays of ,sulzer in the first volume of his miscellaneous philosophical writings1 the one entitled 8,analysis of the ,conception of ,reason10 the other1 8,on the ,reciprocal ,influence of ,reason and ,language40 ,if1 on the other hand1 we read how reason is spoken about in the most recent times1 through the influence of the ,kantian error1 which after him increased like an avalanche1 we are obliged to assume that the whole of the wise men of antiquity1 and also all philosophers before ,kant1 had absolutely no reason at all2 for the immediate perceptions1 intuitions1 apprehensions1 presentiments of the reason now discovered were as utterly unknown to them as the sixth sense of the bat is to us4 ,and as far as ,i am concerned1 ,i must confess that ,i also1 in my weakness1 cannot comprehend or imagine that reason which directly perceives or apprehends1 or has an intellectual intuition of the super-sensible1 the absolute1 together with long yarns that accompany it1 in any other way than as the sixth sense of the bat4 ,this1 however1 must be said in favour of the invention or discovery of such a reason1 which at once directly perceives whatever you choose1 that it is an incomparable expedient for withdrawing oneself from the affair in the easiest manner in the world1 along with one's favourite ideas1 in spite of all ,kants1 with their ,critiques of ,reason4 ,the invention and the reception it has met with do honour to the age4 ,thus1 although what is essential in reason 7 1 1 ratio1 raison1 ,vernunft7 was1 on the whole and in general1 rightly understood by all philosophers of all ages1 though not sharply enough defined nor reduced to one point1 yet it was not so clear to them what the understanding 71 1 intellectus1 esprit1 ,verstand7 is4 ,therefore they often confuse it with reason1 and just on this account they did not attain to a thoroughly complete1 pure1 and simple explanation of the nature of the latter4 ,with the ,christian philosophers the conception of reason received an entirely extraneous1 subsidiary meaning through the opposition of it to revelation4 ,starting1 then1 from this1 many are justly of opinion that the knowledge of the duty of virtue is possible from mere reason1 i4e41 without revelation4 ,indeed this aspect of the matter certainly had influence upon ,kant's exposition and language4 ,but this opposition is properly of positive1 historical significance1 and is therefore for philosophy a foreign element1 from which it must keep itself free4 ,we might have expected that in his critiques of theoretical and practical reason ,kant would have started with an exposition of the nature of reason in general1 and1 after he had thus defined the genus1 would have gone on to the explanation of the two species1 showing how one and the same reason manifests itself in two such different ways1 and yet1 by retaining its principal characteristic1 proves itself to be the same4 ,but we find nothing of all this4 ,i have already shown how inadequate1 vacillating1 and inconsistent are the explanations of the faculty he is criticising1 which he gives here and there by the way in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason40 ,the practical reason appears in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 without any introduction1 and afterwards stands in the 8,critique0 specially devoted to itself as something already established4 ,no further account of it is given1 and the use of language of all times and peoples1 which is treated with contempt1 and the definitions of the conception given by the greatest of earlier philosophers1 dare not lift up their voices4 ,in general1 we may conclude from particular passages that ,kant's opinion amounts to this3 the knowledge of principles a priori is the essential characteristic of reason3 since now the knowledge of the ethical significance of action is not of empirical origin1 it also is an a priori principle1 and accordingly proceeds from the reason1 and therefore thus far the reason is practical4 ,i have already spoken enough of the incorrectness of this explanation of reason4 ,but1 independently of this1 how superficial it is1 and what a want of thoroughness it shows1 to make use here of the single quality of being independent of experience in order to combine the most heterogeneous things1 while overlooking their most essential and immeasurable difference in other respects4 ,for1 even assuming1 though we do not admit it1 that the knowledge of the ethical significance of action springs from an imperative lying in us1 an unconditioned ought1 yet how fundamentally different would such an imperative be from those universal forms of knowledge of which1 in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 ,kant proves that we are conscious a priori1 and by virtue of which consciousness we can assert beforehand an unconditioned must1 valid for all experience possible for us4 ,but the difference between this must1 this necessary form of all objects which is already determined in the subject1 and that ought of morality is so infinitely great and palpable that the mere fact that they agree in the one particular that neither of them is empirically known may indeed be made use of for the purpose of a witty comparison1 but not as a philosophical justification for regarding their origin as the same4 ,moreover1 the birthplace of this child of practical reason1 the absolute ought or the categorical imperative1 is not in the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 but in that of 8,pure ,reason10 p4 #hjb2 ,v4 #hcj4 ,the birth is violent1 and is only accomplished by means of the forceps of a therefore1 which stands boldly and audaciously1 indeed one might say shamelessly1 between two propositions which are utterly foreign to each other and have no connection1 in order to combine them as reason and consequent4 ,thus1 that not merely perceptible but also abstract motives determine us1 is the proposition from which ,kant starts1 expressing it in the following manner3 8,not merely what excites1 i4e41 what affects the senses directly1 determines human will1 but we have a power of overcoming the impressions made upon our sensuous appetitive faculty through ideas of that which is itself in a more remote manner useful or hurtful4 ,these deliberations as to what is worthy of desire1 with reference to our whole condition1 i4e41 as to what is good and useful1 rest upon reason40 7,perfectly right2 would that he only always spoke so rationally of reason67 8,reason therefore gives6 also laws1 which are imperatives1 i4e41 objective laws of freedom1 and say what ought to take place1 though perhaps it never does take place06 ,thus1 without further authentication1 the categorical imperative comes into the world1 in order to rule there with its unconditioned ought--a sceptre of wooden iron4 ,for in the conception 8ought0 there lies always and essentially the reference to threatened punishment1 or promised reward1 as a necessary condition1 and cannot be separated from it without abolishing the conception itself and taking all meaning from it4 ,therefore an unconditioned ought is a contradictio in adjecto4 ,it was necessary to censure this mistake1 closely as it is otherwise connected with ,kant's great service to ethics1 which consists in this1 that he has freed ethics from all principles of the world of experience1 that is1 from all direct or indirect doctrines of happiness1 and has shown in a quite special manner that the kingdom of virtue is not of this world4 ,this service is all the greater because all ancient philosophers1 with the single exception of ,plato1 thus the ,peripatetics1 the ,stoics1 and the ,epicureans1 sought by very different devices either to make virtue and happiness dependent on each other in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason1 or to identify them in accordance with the principle of contradiction4 ,this charge applies with equal force to all modern philosophers down to ,kant4 ,his merit in this respect is therefore very great2 yet justice demands that we should also remember here first that his exposition and elaboration often does not correspond with the tendency and spirit of his ethics1 and secondly that1 even so1 he is not really the first who separated virtue from all principles of happiness4 ,for ,plato1 especially in the 8,republic10 the principal tendency of which is just this1 expressly teaches that virtue is to be chosen for itself alone1 even if unhappiness and ignominy are inevitably connected with it4 ,still more1 however1 ,christianity preaches a perfectly unselfish virtue1 which is practised not on account of the reward in a life after death1 but quite disinterestedly from love to ,god1 for works do not justify1 but only faith1 which accompanies virtue1 so to speak1 as its symptom1 and therefore appears quite irrespective of reward and of its own accord4 ,see ,luther's 8,de ,libertate ,christiana40 ,i will not take into account at all the ,indians1 in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for our works is everywhere described as the way of darkness1 which can never lead to blessedness4 ,kant's doctrine of virtue1 however1 we do not find so pure2 or rather the exposition remains far behind the spirit of it1 and indeed falls into inconsistency4 ,in his highest good1 which he afterwards discussed1 we find virtue united to happiness4 ,the ought originally so unconditioned does yet afterwards postulate one condition1 in order to escape from the inner contradiction with which it is affected and with which it cannot live4 ,happiness in the highest good is not indeed really meant to be the motive for virtue2 yet there it is1 like a secret article1 the existence of which reduces all the rest to a mere sham contract4 ,it is not really the reward of virtue1 but yet it is a voluntary gift for which virtue1 after work accomplished1 stealthily opens the hand4 ,one may convince oneself of this from the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason0 7p4 #bbc-bff of the fourth1 or p4 #bfd-bie of ,rosenkranz's1 edition74 ,the whole of ,kant's moral theology has also the same tendency1 and just on this account morality really destroys itself through moral theology4 ,for ,i repeat that all virtue which in any way is practised for the sake of a reward is based upon a prudent1 methodical1 far-seeing egoism4 ,the content of the absolute ought1 the fundamental principle of the practical reason1 is the famous3 8,so act that the maxim of your will might always be also valid as the principle of a universal legislation40 ,this principle presents to him who desires a rule for his own will the task of seeking such a rule for the wills of all4 ,then the question arises how such a rule is to be found4 ,clearly1 in order to discover the rule of my conduct1 ,i ought not to have regard to myself alone1 but to the sum of all individuals4 ,then1 instead of my own well-being1 the well-being of all without distinction becomes my aim4 ,yet the aim still always remains well-being4 ,i find1 then1 that all can be equally well off only if each limits his own egoism by that of others4 ,from this it certainly follows that ,i must injure no one1 because1 since this principle is assumed to be universal1 ,i also will not be injured4 ,this1 however1 is the sole ground on account of which ,i1 who do not yet possess a moral principle1 but am only seeking one1 can wish this to be a universal law4 ,but clearly in this way the desire of well-being1 i4e41 egoism1 remains the source of this ethical principle4 ,as the basis of politics it would be excellent1 as the basis of ethics it is worthless4 ,for he who seeks to establish a rule for the wills of all1 as is demanded by that moral principle1 necessarily stands in need of a rule himself2 otherwise everything would be alike to him4 ,but this rule can only be his own egoism1 since it is only this that is affected by the conduct of others2 and therefore it is only by means of this egoism1 and with reference to it1 that each one can have a will concerning the conduct of others1 and that it is not a matter of indifference to him4 ,kant himself very naively intimates this 7p4 #abc of the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason20 ,rosenkranz's edition1 p4 #aib71 where he thus prosecutes the search for maxims for the will3 8,if every one regarded the need of others with complete indifference1 and thou also didst belong to such an order of things1 wouldst thou consent thereto80 ,quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam6 would be the rule of the consent inquired after4 ,so also in the 8,fundamental ,principles of the ,metaphysic of ,morals0 7p4 #ef of the third1 and p4 #ej of ,rosenkranz's1 edition73 8,a will which resolved to assist no one in distress would contradict itself1 for cases might arise in which it required the love and sympathy of others10 c4 c4 ,this principle of ethics1 which when light is thrown upon it is therefore nothing else than an indirect and disguised expression of the old1 simple principle1 8,quod tibi fieri non vis1 alteri ne feceris10 is related first and directly to passivity1 suffering1 and then only by means of this to action4 ,therefore1 as we have said1 it would be thoroughly serviceable as a guide for the constitution of the ,state1 which aims at the prevention of the suffering of wrong1 and also desires to procure for all and each the greatest sum of well-being4 ,but in ethics1 where the object of investigation is action as action1 and in its direct significance for the actor--not its consequences1 suffering1 or its relation to others--in this reference1 ,i say1 it is altogether inadmissible1 because at bottom it really amounts to a principle of happiness1 thus to egoism4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 share ,kant's satisfaction that his principle of ethics is not a material one1 i4e41 one which sets up an object as a motive1 but merely formal1 whereby it corresponds symmetrically to the formal laws with which the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 has made us familiar4 ,certainly it is1 instead of a law1 merely a formula for finding such a law4 ,but1 in the first place1 we had this formula already more briefly and clearly in the 8,quod tibi fieri non vis1 alteri ne feceris20 and1 secondly1 the analysis of this formula shows that it is simply and solely the reference to one's own happiness that gives it content1 and therefore it can only be serviceable to a rational egoism1 to which also every legal constitution owes its origin4 ,another mistake which1 because it offends the feelings of every one1 has often been condemned1 and was satirised by ,schiller in an epigram1 is the pedantic rule that for an act to be really good and meritorious it must be done simply and solely out of respect for the known law and the conception of duty1 and in accordance with a maxim known to the reason in abstracto1 and not from any inclination1 not from benevolence felt towards others1 not from tender-hearted compassion1 sympathy1 or emotion of the heart1 which 7according to the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 p4 #bac2 ,rosenkranz's edition1 p4 #beg7 to right-thinking persons are indeed very burdensome1 as confusing their deliberate maxims4 ,the act must be performed unwillingly and with self-compulsion4 ,remember that nevertheless the hope of reward is not allowed to enter1 and estimate the great absurdity of the demand4 ,but1 what is saying more1 this is directly opposed to the true spirit of virtue2 not the act1 but the willingness to do it1 the love from which it proceeds1 and without which it is a dead work1 constitutes its merit4 ,therefore ,christianity rightly teaches that all outward works are worthless if they do not proceed from that genuine disposition which consists in true goodwill and pure love1 and that what makes blessed and saves is not the works done 7opera operata71 but the faith1 the genuine disposition1 which is the gift of the ,holy ,ghost alone1 and which the free1 deliberative will1 having only the law in view1 does not produce4 ,this demand of ,kant's1 that all virtuous conduct shall proceed from pure1 deliberate respect for the law and in accordance with its abstract maxims1 coldly and without inclination1 nay1 opposed to all inclination1 is just the same thing as if he asserted that every work of art must be accomplished by a well-considered application of sthetical rules4 ,the one is just as perverse as the other4 ,the question1 already handled by ,plato and ,seneca1 whether virtue can be taught1 is to be answered in the negative4 ,we must finally make up our minds to see1 what indeed was the source of the ,christian doctrine of election by grace1 that as regards its chief characteristic and its inner nature1 virtue1 like genius1 is to a certain extent inborn2 and that just as little as all the professors of sthetics could impart to any one the power of producing works of genius1 i4e41 genuine works of art1 so little could all the professors of ethics and preachers of virtue transform an ignoble into a virtuous and noble character1 the impossibility of which is very much more apparent than that of turning lead into gold4 ,the search for a system of ethics and a first principle of the same1 which would have practical influence and would actually transform and better the human race1 is just like the search for the philosopher's stone4 ,yet ,i have spoken at length at the end of the fourth book of the possibility of an entire change of mind or conversion of man 7new birth71 not by means of abstract 7ethics7 but of intuitive knowledge 7the work of grace74 ,the contents of that book relieve me generally of the necessity of dwelling longer upon this point4 ,that ,kant by no means penetrated to the real significance of the ethical content of actions is shown finally by his doctrine of the highest good as the necessary combination of virtue and happiness1 a combination indeed in which virtue would be that which merits happiness4 ,he is here involved in the logical fallacy that the conception of merit1 which is here the measure or test1 already presupposes a theory of ethics as its own measure1 and thus could not be deducible from it4 ,it appeared in our fourth book that all genuine virtue1 after it has attained to its highest grade1 at last leads to a complete renunciation in which all willing finds an end4 ,happiness1 on the other hand1 is a satisfied wish2 thus the two are essentially incapable of being combined4 ,he who has been enlightened by my exposition requires no further explanation of the complete perverseness of this ,kantian view of the highest good4 ,and1 independent of my positive exposition1 ,i have no further negative exposition to give4 ,kant's love of architectonic symmetry meets us also in the 8,critique of ,practical ,reason10 for he has given it the shape of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 and has again introduced the same titles and forms with manifest intention1 which becomes specially apparent in the table of the categories of freedom4 ,the 8,philosophy of ,law0 is one of ,kant's latest works1 and is so poor that1 although ,i entirely disagree with it1 ,i think a polemic against it is superfluous1 since of its own weakness it must die a natural death1 just as if it were not the work of this great man1 but the production of an ordinary mortal4 ,therefore1 as regards the 8,philosophy of ,law10 ,i give up the negative mode of procedure and refer to the positive1 that is1 to the short outline of it given in the fourth book4 ,just one or two general remarks on ,kant's 8,philosophy of ,law0 may be made here4 ,the errors which ,i have condemned in considering the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 as clinging to ,kant throughout1 appear in the 8,philosophy of ,law0 in such excess that one often believes he is reading a satirical parody of the ,kantian style1 or at least that he is listening to a ,kantian4 ,two principal errors1 however1 are these4 ,he desires 7and many have since then desired7 to separate the ,philosophy of ,law sharply from ethics1 and yet not to make the former dependent upon positive legislation1 i4e41 upon arbitrary sanction1 but to let the conception of law exist for itself pure and a priori4 ,but this is not possible2 because conduct1 apart from its ethical significance1 and apart from the physical relation to others1 and thereby from external sanction1 does not admit even of the possibility of any third view4 ,consequently1 when he says1 8,legal obligation is that which can be enforced10 this can is either to be understood physically1 and then all law is positive and arbitrary1 and again all arbitrariness that achieves its end is law2 or the can is to be understood ethically1 and we are again in the province of ethics4 ,with ,kant the conception of legal right hovers between heaven and earth1 and has no ground on which to stand2 with me it belongs to ethics4 ,secondly1 his definition of the conception law is entirely negative1 and thereby inadequate47#aa7 ,legal right is that which is consistent with the compatibility of the respective freedom of individuals together1 according to a general law4 ,freedom 7here the empirical1 i4e41 physical1 not the moral freedom of the will7 signifies not being hindered or interfered with1 and is thus a mere negation2 compatibility1 again1 has exactly the same significance4 ,thus we remain with mere negations and obtain no positive conception1 indeed do not learn at all1 what is really being spoken about1 unless we know it already from some other source4 ,in the course of the exposition the most perverse views afterwards develop themselves1 such as that in the state of nature1 i4e41 outside the ,state1 there is no right to property at all1 which really means that all right or law is positive1 and involves that natural law is based upon positive law1 instead of which the case ought to be reversed4 ,further1 the founding of legal acquisition on possession2 the ethical obligation to establish the civil constitution2 the ground of the right of punishment1 c41 c41 all of which1 as ,i have said1 ,i do not regard as worth a special refutation4 ,however1 these ,kantian errors have exercised a very injurious influence4 ,they have confused and obscured truths long known and expressed1 and have occasioned strange theories and much writing and controversy4 ,this certainly cannot last1 and we see already how truth and sound reason again make way for themselves4 ,of the latter1 the 8,naturrecht0 of ,j4 ,c4 ,f4 ,meister specially bears evidence1 and is thus a contrast to many a preposterous theory1 though ,i do not regard it as on this account a pattern of perfection4 ,on the 8,critique of ,judgment0 also1 after what has been said1 ,i must be very short4 ,we cannot but be surprised that ,kant1 to whom art certainly was very foreign1 and who to all appearance had little susceptibility for the beautiful1 indeed probably never had the opportunity of seeing an important work of art1 and who seems1 finally1 to have had no knowledge of ,goethe1 the only man of his century and nation who was fit to be placed by his side as his giant equal1--it is1 ,i say1 surprising how1 notwithstanding all this1 ,kant was able to render a great and permanent service to the philosophical consideration of art and the beautiful4 ,his merit lies in this1 that much as men had reflected upon the beautiful and upon art1 they had yet really always considered it only from the empirical point of view1 and had investigated upon a basis of facts what quality distinguished the object of any kind which was called beautiful from other objects of the same kind4 ,on this path they first arrived at quite special principles1 and then at more general ones4 ,they sought to separate true artistic beauty from false1 and to discover marks of this genuineness1 which could then serve again as rules4 ,what gives pleasure as beautiful and what does not1 what therefore is to be imitated1 what is to be striven against1 what is to be avoided1 what rules1 at least negative rules1 are to be established1 in short1 what are the means of exciting sthetic satisfaction1 i4e41 what are the conditions of this residing in the object--this was almost exclusively the theme of all treatises upon art4 ,this path was followed by ,aristotle1 and in the most recent times we find it chosen by ,home1 ,burke1 ,winckelmann1 ,lessing1 ,herder1 and many others4 ,it is true that the universality of the sthetical principles discovered finally led back to the subject1 and it was observed that if the effect upon the subject were adequately known we would then also be able to determine a priori the causes of this which lie in the object1 and thus alone this method of treatment could attain to the certainty of a science4 ,this occasioned once and again psychological disquisitions4 ,specially however1 ,alexander ,baumgarten produced with this intention a general sthetic of all beauty1 in which he started from the conception of the perfection of sensuous knowledge1 that is1 of knowledge of perception4 ,with him also1 however1 the subjective part is done with as soon as this conception has been established1 and he passes on to the objective part and to the practical1 which is connected with it4 ,but here also the merit was reserved for ,kant of investigating seriously and profoundly the feeling itself1 in consequence of which we call the object occasioning it beautiful1 in order to discover1 wherever it was possible1 the constituent elements and conditions of it in our nature4 ,his investigation1 therefore1 took an entirely subjective direction4 ,this path was clearly the right one1 for in order to explain a phenomenon which is given in its effects1 one must know accurately this effect itself1 if one is to determine thoroughly the nature of the cause4 ,yet ,kant's merit in this regard does not really extend much further than this1 that he has indicated the right path1 and by a provisional attempt has given an example of how1 more or less1 it is to be followed4 ,for what he gave cannot be regarded as objective truth and as a real gain4 ,he gave the method for this investigation1 he broke ground in the right direction1 but otherwise he missed the mark4 ,in the 8,critique of sthetical ,judgment0 the observation first of all forces itself upon us that ,kant retains the method which is peculiar to his whole philosophy1 and which ,i have considered at length above--,i mean the method of starting from abstract knowledge in order to establish knowledge of perception1 so that the former serves him1 so to speak1 as a camera obscura in which to receive and survey the latter4 ,as in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 the forms of judgment are supposed to unfold to him the knowledge of our whole world of perception1 so in this 8,critique of sthetical ,judgment0 he does not start from the beautiful itself1 from the perceptible and immediately beautiful1 but from the judgment of the beautiful1 the so-called1 and very badly so-called1 judgment of taste4 ,this is his problem4 ,his attention is especially aroused by the circumstance that such a judgment is clearly the expression of something that takes place in the subject1 but yet is just as universally valid as if it concerned a quality of the object4 ,it is this that struck him1 not the beautiful itself4 ,he starts always merely from the assertions of others1 from the judgment of the beautiful1 not from the beautiful itself4 ,it is therefore as if he knew it simply from hearsay1 not directly4 ,a blind man of high understanding could almost in the same way make up a theory of colours from very accurate reports which he had heard concerning them4 ,and really we can only venture to regard ,kant's philosophemes concerning the beautiful as in almost the same position4 ,then we shall find that his theory is very ingenious indeed1 that here and there telling and true observations are made2 but his real solution of the problem is so very insufficient1 remains so far below the dignity of the subject1 that it can never occur to us to accept it as objective truth4 ,therefore ,i consider myself relieved from the necessity of refuting it2 and here also ,i refer to the positive part of my work4 ,with regard to the form of his whole book1 it is to be observed that it originated in the idea of finding in the teleological conception the key to the problem of the beautiful4 ,this inspiration is deduced1 which is always a matter of no difficulty1 as we have learnt from ,kant's successors4 ,thus there now arises the strange combination of the knowledge of the beautiful with that of the teleology of natural bodies in one faculty of knowledge called judgment1 and the treatment of these two heterogeneous subjects in one book4 ,with these three powers of knowledge1 reason1 judgment1 and understanding1 a variety of symmetrical-architectonic amusements are afterwards undertaken1 the general inclination to which shows itself in many ways in this book2 for example1 in the forcible adaptation of the whole of it to the pattern of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 and very specially in the antinomy of the sthetical judgment1 which is dragged in by the hair4 ,one might also extract a charge of great inconsistency from the fact that after it has been incessantly repeated in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 that the understanding is the faculty of judgment1 and after the forms of its judgment have been made the foundation-stone of all philosophy1 a quite special faculty of judgment now appears1 which is completely different from the former4 ,for the rest1 what ,i call the faculty of judgment1 the capacity for translating knowledge of perception into abstract knowledge1 and again of applying the latter correctly to the former1 is explained in the positive part of my work4 ,by far the best part of the 8,critique of sthetical ,judgment0 is the theory of the sublime4 ,it is incomparably more successful than that of the beautiful1 and does not only give1 as that does1 the general method of investigation1 but also a part of the right way to it--so much so that even though it does not give the real solution of the problem1 it yet touches very closely upon it4 ,in the 8,critique of the ,teleological ,judgment10 on account of the simplicity of the matter1 we can recognise perhaps more than anywhere else ,kant's rare talent of turning a thought this way and that way1 and expressing it in a multitude of different ways1 until out of it there grows a book4 ,the whole book is intended to say this alone3 although organised bodies necessarily appear to us as if they were constructed in accordance with a conceived design of an end which preceded them1 yet we are not justified in assuming that this is objectively the case4 ,for our intellect1 to which things are given from without and indirectly1 which thus never knows their inner nature through which they arise and exist1 but merely their outward side1 cannot otherwise comprehend a certain quality peculiar to organised productions of nature than by analogy1 for it compares it with the intentionally accomplished works of man1 the nature of which is determined by a design and the conception of this design4 ,this analogy is sufficient to enable us to comprehend the agreement of all the parts with the whole1 and thus indeed to give us the clue to their investigation2 but it must by no means on this account be made the actual ground of explanation of the origin and existence of such bodies4 ,for the necessity of so conceiving them is of subjective origin4 ,somewhat in this way ,i would epitomise ,kant's doctrine on this question4 ,in its most important aspect he had expounded it already in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 p4 #fib-gjb2 ,v41 #gbj-gcj4 ,but in the knowledge of this truth also we find ,david ,hume to be ,kant's worthy forerunner4 ,he also had keenly controverted that assumption in the second part of his 8,dialogues concerning ,natural ,religion40 ,the difference between ,hume's criticism of that assumption and ,kant's is principally this1 that ,hume criticised it as an assumption based upon experience1 while ,kant1 on the other hand1 criticised it as an a priori assumption4 ,both are right1 and their expositions supplement each other4 ,indeed what is really essential in the ,kantian doctrine on this point we find already expressed in the commentary of ,simplicius on ,aristotle's ,physics3 8 1 1 40 7,error iis ortus est ex eo1 quod credebant1 omnia1 qu propter finem aliquem fierent1 ex proposito et ratiocinio fieri1 dum videbant1 natur opera non ita fieri47 ,schol4 in ,arist41 ex edit4 ,berol41 p4 #ced4 ,kant is perfectly right in the matter2 and it was necessary that after it had been shown that the conception of cause and effect is inapplicable to the whole of nature in general1 in respect of its existence1 it should also be shown that in respect of its qualities it is not to be thought of as the effect of a cause guided by motives 7designs74 ,if we consider the great plausibility of the physico-theological proof1 which even ,voltaire held to be irrefragable1 it was clearly of the greatest importance to show that what is subjective in our comprehension1 to which ,kant had relegated space1 time1 and causality1 extends also to our judgment of natural bodies2 and accordingly the compulsion which we feel to think of them as having arisen as the result of premeditation1 according to designs1 thus in such a way that the idea of them preceded their existence1 is just as much of subjective origin as the perception of space1 which presents itself so objectively1 and that therefore it must not be set up as objective truth4 ,kant's exposition of the matter1 apart from its tedious prolixity and repetitions1 is excellent4 ,he rightly asserts that we can never succeed in explaining the nature of organised bodies from merely mechanical causes1 by which he understands the undesigned and regular effect of all the universal forces of nature4 ,yet ,i find here another flaw4 ,he denies the possibility of such an explanation merely with regard to the teleology and apparent adaptation of organised bodies4 ,but we find that even where there is no organisation the grounds of explanation which apply to one province of nature cannot be transferred to another1 but forsake us as soon as we enter a new province1 and new fundamental laws appear instead of them1 the explanation of which is by no means to be expected from the laws of the former province4 ,thus in the province of the mechanical1 properly so called1 the laws of gravitation1 cohesion1 rigidity1 fluidity1 and elasticity prevail1 which in themselves 7apart from my explanation of all natural forces as lower grades of the objectification of will7 exist as manifestations of forces which cannot be further explained1 but themselves constitute the principles of all further explanation1 which merely consists in reduction to them4 ,if we leave this province and come to the phenomena of chemistry1 of electricity1 magnetism1 crystallisation1 the former principles are absolutely of no use1 indeed the former laws are no longer valid1 the former forces are overcome by others1 and the phenomena take place in direct contradiction to them1 according to new laws1 which1 just like the former ones1 are original and inexplicable1 i4e41 cannot be reduced to more general ones4 ,thus1 for example1 no one will ever succeed in explaining even the dissolving of a salt in water in accordance with the laws proper to mechanics1 much less the more complicated phenomena of chemistry4 ,all this has already been explained at length in the second book of the present work4 ,an exposition of this kind would1 as it seems to me1 have been of great use in the 8,critique of the ,teleological ,judgment10 and would have thrown much light upon what is said there4 ,such an exposition would have been especially favourable to his excellent remark that a more profound knowledge of the real being1 of which the things of nature are the manifestation1 would recognise both in the mechanical 7according to law7 and the apparently intentional effects of nature one and the same ultimate principle1 which might serve as the more general ground of explanation of them both4 ,such a principle ,i hope ,i have given by establishing the will as the real thing in itself2 and in accordance with it generally in the second book and the supplements to it1 but especially in my work 8,on the ,will in ,nature10 the insight into the inner nature of the apparent design and of the harmony and agreement of the whole of nature has perhaps become clearer and deeper4 ,therefore ,i have nothing more to say about it here4 ,the reader whom this criticism of the ,kantian philosophy interests should not neglect to read the supplement to it which is given in the second essay of the first volume of my 8,parerga and ,paralipomena10 under the title 8,noch einige ,erluterungen zur ,kantischen ,philosophie0 7,some ,further ,explanations of the ,kantian ,philosophy74 ,for it must be borne in mind that my writings1 few as they are1 were not composed all at once1 but successively1 in the course of a long life1 and with long intervals between them4 ,accordingly1 it must not be expected that all ,i have said upon one subject should stand together in one place4 ,,supplements ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,book4 8 #8,warum willst du dich von uns ,allen ,und unsrer ,meinung entfernen8' ,ich schreibe nicht euch zu gefallen1 ,ihr sollt was lernen40 --,,goethe4 ,first ,half4 ,the ,doctrine ,of ,the ,idea ,of ,perception4 7,to #a-g of the ,first ,volume47 ,chapter ,i4 ,the ,standpoint of ,idealism4 ,in boundless space countless shining spheres1 about each of which1 and illuminated by its light1 there revolve a dozen or so of smaller ones1 hot at the core and covered with a hard1 cold crust1 upon whose surface there have been generated from a mouldy film beings which live and know--this is what presents itself to us in experience as the truth1 the real1 the world4 ,yet for a thinking being it is a precarious position to stand upon one of those numberless spheres moving freely in boundless space without knowing whence or whither1 and to be only one of innumerable similar beings who throng and press and toil1 ceaselessly and quickly arising and passing away in time1 which has no beginning and no end2 moreover1 nothing permanent but matter alone and the recurrence of the same varied organised forms1 by means of certain ways and channels which are there once for all4 ,all that empirical science can teach is only the more exact nature and law of these events4 ,but now at last modern philosophy especially through ,berkeley and ,kant1 has called to mind that all this is first of all merely a phenomenon of the brain1 and is affected with such great1 so many1 and such different subjective conditions that its supposed absolute reality vanishes away1 and leaves room for an entirely different scheme of the world1 which consists of what lies at the foundation of that phenomenon1 i4e41 what is related to it as the thing in itself is related to its mere manifestation4 8,the world is my idea0 is1 like the axioms of ,euclid1 a proposition which every one must recognise as true as soon as he understands it2 although it is not a proposition which every one understands as soon as he hears it4 ,to have brought this proposition to clear consciousness1 and in it the problem of the relation of the ideal and the real1 i4e41 of the world in the head to the world outside the head1 together with the problem of moral freedom1 is the distinctive feature of modern philosophy4 ,for it was only after men had spent their labour for thousands of years upon a mere philosophy of the object that they discovered that among the many things that make the world so obscure and doubtful the first and chiefest is this1 that however immeasurable and massive it may be1 its existence yet hangs by a single thread2 and this is the actual consciousness in which it exists4 ,this condition1 to which the existence of the world is irrevocably subject1 marks it1 in spite of all empirical reality1 with the stamp of ideality1 and therefore of mere phenomenal appearance4 ,thus on one side at least the world must be recognised as akin to dreams1 and indeed to be classified along with them4 ,for the same function of the brain which1 during sleep1 conjures up before us a completely objective1 perceptible1 and even palpable world must have just as large a share in the presentation of the objective world of waking life4 ,both worlds1 although different as regards their matter1 are yet clearly moulded in the one form4 ,this form is the intellect1 the function of the brain4 ,descartes was probably the first who attained to the degree of reflection which this fundamental truth demands1 and consequently he made it the starting-point of his philosophy1 though provisionally only in the form of a sceptical doubt4 ,when he took his cogito ergo sum as alone certain1 and provisionally regarded the existence of the world as problematical1 he really discovered the essential and only right starting-point of all philosophy1 and at the same time its true foundation4 ,this foundation is essentially and inevitably the subjective1 the individual consciousness4 ,for this alone is and remains immediate2 everything else1 whatever it may be1 is mediated and conditioned through it1 and is therefore dependent upon it4 ,therefore modern philosophy is rightly regarded as starting with ,descartes1 who was the father of it4 ,not long afterwards ,berkeley followed the same path further1 and attained to idealism proper1 i4e41 to the knowledge that the world which is extended in space1 thus the objective1 material world in general1 exists as such simply and solely in our idea1 and that it is false1 and indeed absurd1 to attribute to it1 as such1 an existence apart from all idea and independent of the knowing subject1 thus to assume matter as something absolute and possessed of real being in itself4 ,but his correct and profound insight into this truth really constitutes ,berkeley's whole philosophy2 in it he had exhausted himself4 ,thus true philosophy must always be idealistic2 indeed1 it must be so in order to be merely honest4 ,for nothing is more certain than that no man ever came out of himself in order to identify himself directly with things which are different from him2 but everything of which he has certain1 and therefore immediate1 knowledge lies within his own consciousness4 ,beyond this consciousness1 therefore1 there can be no immediate certainty2 but the first principles of a science must have such certainty4 ,for the empirical standpoint of the other sciences it is quite right to assume the objective world as something absolutely given2 but not so for the standpoint of philosophy1 which has to go back to what is first and original4 ,only consciousness is immediately given2 therefore the basis of philosophy is limited to facts of consciousness1 i4e41 it is essentially idealistic4 ,realism which commends itself to the crude understanding1 by the appearance which it assumes of being matter-of-fact1 really starts from an arbitrary assumption1 and is therefore an empty castle in the air1 for it ignores or denies the first of all facts1 that all that we know lies within consciousness4 ,for that the objective existence of things is conditioned through a subject whose ideas they are1 and consequently that the objective world exists only as idea1 is no hypothesis1 and still less a dogma1 or even a paradox set up for the sake of discussion2 but it is the most certain and the simplest truth2 and the knowledge of it is only made difficult by the fact that it is indeed so simple1 and that it is not every one who has sufficient power of reflection to go back to the first elements of his consciousness of things4 ,there can never be an absolute and independent objective existence2 indeed such an existence is quite unintelligible4 ,for the objective1 as such1 always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject1 is thus the idea of this subject1 and consequently is conditioned by it1 and also by its forms1 the forms of the idea1 which depend upon the subject and not on the object4 ,that the objective world would exist even if there existed no conscious being certainly seems at the first blush to be unquestionable1 because it can be thought in the abstract1 without bringing to light the contradiction which it carries within it4 ,but if we desire to realise this abstract thought1 that is1 to reduce it to ideas of perception1 from which alone 7like everything abstract7 it can have content and truth1 and if accordingly we try to imagine an objective world without a knowing subject1 we become aware that what we then imagine is in truth the opposite of what we intended1 is in fact nothing else than the process in the intellect of a knowing subject who perceives an objective world1 is thus exactly what we desired to exclude4 ,for this perceptible and real world is clearly a phenomenon of the brain2 therefore there lies a contradiction in the assumption that as such it ought also to exist independently of all brains4 ,the principal objection to the inevitable and essential ideality of all objects1 the objection which1 distinctly or indistinctly1 arises in every one1 is certainly this3 ,my own person also is an object for some one else1 is thus his idea1 and yet ,i know certainly that ,i would continue to exist even if he no longer perceived me4 ,but all other objects also stand in the same relation to his intellect as ,i do2 consequently they also would continue to exist without being perceived by him4 ,the answer to this is3 ,that other being as whose object ,i now regard my person is not absolutely the subject1 but primarily is a knowing individual4 ,therefore1 if he no longer existed1 nay1 even if there existed no other conscious being except myself1 yet the subject1 in whose idea alone all objects exist1 would by no means be on that account abolished4 ,for ,i myself indeed am this subject1 as every conscious being is4 ,consequently1 in the case assumed1 my person would certainly continue to exist1 but still as idea1 in my own knowledge4 ,for even by me myself it is always known only indirectly1 never immediately2 because all existence as idea is indirect4 ,as object1 i4e41 as extended1 occupying space and acting1 ,i know my body only in the perception of my brain4 ,this takes place by means of the senses1 upon data supplied by which the percipient understanding performs its function of passing from effect to cause1 and thereby1 in that the eye sees the body or the hands touch it1 it constructs that extended figure which presents itself in space as my body4 ,by no means1 however1 is there directly given me1 either in some general feeling of bodily existence or in inner self-consciousness1 any extension1 form1 or activity1 which would then coincide with my nature itself1 which accordingly1 in order so to exist1 would require no other being in whose knowledge it might exhibit itself4 ,on the contrary1 that general feeling of bodily existence1 and also self-consciousness1 exists directly only in relation to the will1 that is1 as agreeable or disagreeable1 and as active in the acts of will1 which for external perception exhibit themselves as actions of the body4 ,from this it follows that the existence of my person or body as something extended and acting always presupposes a knowing being distinct from it2 because it is essentially an existence in apprehension1 in the idea1 thus an existence for another4 ,in fact1 it is a phenomenon of brain1 just as much whether the brain in which it exhibits itself is my own or belongs to another person4 ,in the first case one's own person divides itself into the knowing and the known1 into object and subject1 which here as everywhere stand opposed to each other1 inseparable and irreconcilable4 ,if1 then1 my own person1 in order to exist as such1 always requires a knowing subject1 this will at least as much hold good of the other objects for which it was the aim of the above objection to vindicate an existence independent of knowledge and its subject4 ,however1 it is evident that the existence which is conditioned through a knowing subject is only the existence in space1 and therefore that of an extended and active being4 ,this alone is always something known1 and consequently an existence for another4 ,on the other hand1 every being that exists in this way may yet have an existence for itself1 for which it requires no subject4 ,yet this existence for itself cannot be extension and activity 7together space-occupation71 but is necessarily a being of another kind1 that of a thing in itself1 which1 as such1 can never be an object4 ,this1 then1 would be the answer to the leading objection set forth above1 which accordingly does not overthrow the fundamental truth that the objectively given world can only exist in the idea1 thus only for a subject4 ,we have further to remark here that ,kant also1 so long at least as he remained consistent1 can have thought no objects among his things in themselves4 ,for this follows from the fact that he proves that space1 and also time1 are mere forms of our perception1 which consequently do not belong to things in themselves4 ,what is neither in space nor in time can be no object2 thus the being of things in themselves cannot be objective1 but of quite a different kind1 a metaphysical being4 ,consequently that ,kantian principle already involves this principle also1 that the objective world exists only as idea4 ,in spite of all that one may say1 nothing is so persistently and ever anew misunderstood as ,idealism1 because it is interpreted as meaning that one denies the empirical reality of the external world4 ,upon this rests the perpetual return to the appeal to common sense1 which appears in many forms and guises2 for example1 as an 8irresistible conviction0 in the ,scotch school1 or as ,jacobi's faith in the reality of the external world4 ,the external world by no means presents itself1 as ,jacobi declares1 upon credit1 and is accepted by us upon trust and faith4 ,it presents itself as that which it is1 and performs directly what it promises4 ,it must be remembered that ,jacobi1 who set up such a credit or faith theory of the world1 and had the fortune to impose it upon a few professors of philosophy1 who for thirty years have philosophised upon the same lines lengthily and at their ease1 is the same man who once denounced ,lessing as a ,spinozist1 and afterwards denounced ,schelling as an atheist1 and who received from the latter the well-known and well-deserved castigation4 ,in keeping with such zeal1 when he reduced the external world to a mere matter of faith he only wished to open the door to faith in general1 and to prepare belief for that which was afterwards really to be made a matter of belief2 as if1 in order to introduce a paper currency1 one should seek to appeal to the fact that the value of the ringing coin also depends merely on the stamp which the ,state has set upon it4 ,jacobi1 in his doctrine that the reality of the external world is assumed upon faith1 is just exactly 8the transcendental realist who plays the empirical idealist0 censured by ,kant in the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 first edition1 p4 #cfi4 ,the true idealism1 on the contrary1 is not the empirical but the transcendental4 ,this leaves the empirical reality of the world untouched1 but holds fast to the fact that every object1 thus the empirically real in general1 is conditioned in a twofold manner by the subject2 in the first place materially or as object generally1 because an objective existence is only conceivable as opposed to a subject1 and as its idea2 in the second place formally1 because the mode of existence of an object1 i4e41 its being perceived 7space1 time1 causality71 proceeds from the subject1 is pre-arranged in the subject4 ,therefore with the simple or ,berkeleian idealism1 which concerns the object in general1 there stands in immediate connection the ,kantian idealism1 which concerns the specially given mode or manner of objective existence4 ,this proves that the whole material world1 with its bodies1 which are extended in space and1 by means of time1 have causal relations to each other1 and everything that depends upon this--that all this is not something which is there independently of our head1 but essentially presupposes the functions of our brain by means of which and in which alone such an objective arrangement of things is possible4 ,for time1 space1 and causality1 upon which all those real and objective events rest1 are themselves nothing more than functions of the brain2 so that thus the unchangeable order of things which affords the criterion and clue to their empirical reality itself proceeds only from the brain1 and has its credentials from this alone4 ,all this ,kant has expounded fully and thoroughly2 only he does not speak of the brain1 but calls it 8the faculty of knowledge40 ,indeed he has attempted to prove that when that objective order in time1 space1 causality1 matter1 c41 upon which all the events of the real world ultimately rest1 is properly considered1 it cannot even be conceived as a self-existing order1 i4e41 an order of the thing in itself1 or as something absolutely objective and unconditionally given1 for if one tries to think this out it leads to contradictions4 ,to accomplish this was the object of the antinomies1 but in the appendix to my work ,i have proved the failure of the attempt4 ,on the other hand1 the ,kantian doctrine1 even without the antinomies1 leads to the insight that things and the whole mode of their existence are inseparably bound up with our consciousness of them4 ,therefore whoever has distinctly grasped this soon attains to the conviction that the assumption that things also exist as such1 apart from and independently of our consciousness1 is really absurd4 ,that we are so deeply involved in time1 space1 causality1 and the whole regular process of experience which rests upon them1 that we 7and indeed the brutes7 are so perfectly at home1 and know how to find our way from the first--this would not be possible if our intellect were one thing and things another1 but can only be explained from the fact that both constitute one whole1 the intellect itself creates that order1 and exists only for things1 while they1 on the other hand1 exist only for it4 ,but even apart from the deep insight1 which only the ,kantian philosophy gives1 the inadmissibility of the assumption of absolute realism which is so obstinately clung to may be directly shown1 or at least made capable of being felt1 by the simple exhibition of its meaning in the light of such considerations as the following4 ,according to realism1 the world is supposed to exist1 as we know it1 independently of this knowledge4 ,let us once1 then1 remove all percipient beings from it1 and leave only unorganised and vegetable nature4 ,rock1 tree1 and brook are there1 and the blue heaven2 sun1 moon1 and stars light this world1 as before2 yet certainly in vain1 for there is no eye to see it4 ,let us now in addition place in it a percipient being4 ,now that world presents itself again in his brain1 and repeats itself within it precisely as it was formerly without it4 ,thus to the first world a second has been added1 which1 although completely separated from it1 resembles it to a nicety4 ,and now the subjective world of this perception is precisely so constituted in subjective1 known space as the objective world in objective1 infinite space4 ,but the subjective world has this advantage over the objective1 the knowledge that that space1 outside there1 is infinite2 indeed it can also give beforehand most minutely and accurately the whole constitution or necessary properties of all relations which are possible1 though not yet actual1 in that space1 and does not require to examine them4 ,it can tell just as much with regard to the course of time1 and also with regard to the relation of cause and effect which governs the changes in that external world4 ,i think all this1 when closely considered1 turns out absurd enough1 and hence leads to the conviction that that absolute objective world outside the head1 independent of it and prior to all knowledge1 which at first we imagined ourselves to conceive1 is really no other than the second1 the world which is known subjectively1 the world of idea1 as which alone we are actually able to conceive it4 ,thus of its own accord the assumption forces itself upon us1 that the world1 as we know it1 exists also only for our knowledge1 therefore in the idea alone1 and not a second time outside of it47#ab7 ,in accordance1 then1 with this assumption1 the thing in itself1 i4e41 that which exists independently of our knowledge and of every knowledge1 is to be regarded as something completely different from the idea and all its attributes1 thus from objectivity in general4 ,what this is will be the subject of our second book4 ,on the other hand1 the controversy concerning the reality of the external world considered in #e of the first volume rests upon the assumption1 which has just been criticised1 of an objective and a subjective world both in space1 and upon the impossibility which arises in connection with this presupposition of a transition from one to the other1 a bridge between the two4 ,upon this controversy ,i have still to add the following remarks4 ,the subjective and the objective do not constitute a continuous whole4 ,that of which we are immediately conscious is bounded by the skin1 or rather by the extreme ends of the nerves which proceed from the cerebral system4 ,beyond this lies a world of which we have no knowledge except through pictures in our head4 ,now the question is1 whether and how far there is a world independent of us which corresponds to these pictures4 ,the relation between the two could only be brought about by means of the law of causality2 for this law alone leads from what is given to something quite different from it4 ,but this law itself has first of all to prove its validity4 ,now it must either be of objective or of subjective origin2 but in either case it lies upon one or the other side1 and therefore cannot supply the bridge between them4 ,if1 as ,locke and ,hume assume1 it is a posteriori1 thus drawn from experience1 it is of objective origin1 and belongs then itself to the external world which is in question4 ,therefore it cannot attest the reality of this world1 for then1 according to ,locke's method1 causality would be proved from experience1 and the reality of experience from causality4 ,if1 on the contrary1 it is given a priori1 as ,kant has more correctly taught us1 then it is of subjective origin1 and in that case it is clear that with it we remain always in the subjective sphere4 ,for all that is actually given empirically in perception is the occurrence of a sensation in the organ of sense2 and the assumption that this1 even in general1 must have a cause rests upon a law which is rooted in the form of our knowledge1 i4e41 in the functions of our brain4 ,the origin of this law is therefore just as subjective as that of the sensation itself4 ,the cause of the given sensation1 which is assumed in consequence of this law1 presents itself at once in perception as an object1 which has space and time for the form of its manifestation4 ,but these forms themselves again are entirely of subjective origin2 for they are the mode or method of our faculty of perception4 ,that transition from the sensation to its cause which1 as ,i have repeatedly pointed out1 lies at the foundation of all sense-perception is certainly sufficient to give us the empirical presence in space and time of an empirical object1 and is therefore quite enough for the practical purposes of life2 but it is by no means sufficient to afford us any conclusion as to the existence and real nature1 or rather as to the intelligible substratum1 of the phenomena which in this way arise for us4 ,thus that on the occasion of certain sensations occurring in my organs of sense there arises in my head a perception of things which are extended in space1 permanent in time1 and causally efficient by no means justifies the assumption that they also exist in themselves1 i4e41 that such things with these properties belonging absolutely to themselves exist independently and outside of my head4 ,this is the true outcome of the ,kantian philosophy4 ,it coincides with an earlier result of ,locke's1 which is just as true1 but far more easily understood4 ,for although1 as ,locke's doctrine permits1 external things are absolutely assumed as the causes of sensations1 yet there can be no resemblance between the sensation in which the effect consists and the objective nature of the cause which occasions it4 ,for the sensation1 as organic function1 is primarily determined by the highly artificial and complicated nature of our organs of sense4 ,it is therefore merely excited by the external cause1 but is then perfected entirely in accordance with its own laws1 and thus is completely subjective4 ,locke's philosophy was the criticism of the functions of sense2 ,kant has given us the criticism of the functions of the brain4 ,but to all this we have yet to add the ,berkeleian result1 which has been revised by me1 that every object1 whatever its origin may be1 is as object already conditioned by the subject1 is in fact merely its idea4 ,the aim of realism is indeed the object without subject2 but it is impossible even to conceive such an object distinctly4 ,from this whole inquiry it follows with certainty and distinctness that it is absolutely impossible to attain to the comprehension of the inner nature of things upon the path of mere knowledge and perception4 ,for knowledge always comes to things from without1 and therefore must for ever remain outside them4 ,this end would only be reached if we could find ourselves in the inside of things1 so that their inner nature would be known to us directly4 ,now1 how far this is actually the case is considered in my second book4 ,but so long as we are concerned1 as in this first book1 with objective comprehension1 that is1 with knowledge1 the world is1 and remains for us1 a mere idea1 for here there is no possible path by which we can cross over to it4 ,but1 besides this1 a firm grasp of the point of view of idealism is a necessary counterpoise to that of materialism4 ,the controversy concerning the real and the ideal may also be regarded as a controversy concerning the existence of matter4 ,for it is the reality or ideality of this that is ultimately in question4 ,does matter1 as such1 exist only in our idea1 or does it also exist independently of it8 ,in the latter case it would be the thing in itself2 and whoever assumes a self-existent matter must also1 consistently1 be a materialist1 i4e41 he must make matter the principle of explanation of all things4 ,whoever1 on the contrary1 denies its existence as a thing in itself is eo ipso an idealist4 ,among the moderns only ,locke has definitely and without ambiguity asserted the reality of matter2 and therefore his teaching led1 in the hands of ,condillac1 to the sensualism and materialism of the ,french4 ,only ,berkeley directly and without modifications denies matter4 ,the complete antithesis is thus that of idealism and materialism1 represented in its extremes by ,berkeley and the ,french materialists 7,hollbach74 ,fichte is not to be mentioned here3 he deserves no place among true philosophers2 among those elect of mankind who1 with deep earnestness1 seek not their own things but the truth1 and therefore must not be confused with those who1 under this pretence1 have only their personal advancement in view4 ,fichte is the father of the sham philosophy1 of the disingenuous method which1 through ambiguity in the use of words1 incomprehensible language1 and sophistry1 seeks to deceive1 and tries1 moreover1 to make a deep impression by assuming an air of importance--in a word1 the philosophy which seeks to bamboozle and humbug those who desire to learn4 ,after this method had been applied by ,schelling1 it reached its height1 as every one knows1 in ,hegel1 in whose hands it developed into pure charlatanism4 ,but whoever even names this ,fichte seriously along with ,kant shows that he has not even a dim notion of what ,kant is4 ,on the other hand1 materialism also has its warrant4 ,it is just as true that the knower is a product of matter as that matter is merely the idea of the knower2 but it is also just as one-sided4 ,for materialism is the philosophy of the subject that forgets to take account of itself4 ,and1 accordingly1 as against the assertion that ,i am a mere modification of matter1 this must be insisted upon1 that all matter exists merely in my idea2 and it is no less right4 ,a knowledge1 as yet obscure1 of these relations seems to have been the origin of the saying of ,plato1 8 0 7materia mendacium verax74 ,realism necessarily leads1 as we have said1 to materialism4 ,for if empirical perception gives us things in themselves1 as they exist independently of our knowledge1 experience also gives us the order of things in themselves1 i4e41 the true and sole order of the world4 ,but this path leads to the assumption that there is only one thing in itself1 matter2 of which all other things are modifications2 for the course of nature is here the absolute and only order of the world4 ,to escape from these consequences1 while realism remained in undisputed acceptance1 spiritualism was set up1 that is1 the assumption of a second substance outside of and along with matter1 an immaterial substance4 ,this dualism and spiritualism1 equally unsupported by experience and destitute of proof and comprehensibility1 was denied by ,spinoza1 and was proved to be false by ,kant1 who dared to do so because at the same time he established idealism in its rights4 ,for with realism materialism1 as the counterpoise of which spiritualism had been devised1 falls to the ground of its own accord1 because then matter and the course of nature become mere phenomena1 which are conditioned by the intellect1 as they have their existence only in its idea4 ,accordingly spiritualism is the delusive and false safeguard against materialism1 while the real and true safeguard is idealism1 which1 by making the objective world dependent upon us1 gives the needed counterpoise to the position of dependence upon the objective world1 in which we are placed by the course of nature4 ,the world from which ,i part at death is1 in another aspect1 only my idea4 ,the centre of gravity of existence falls back into the subject4 ,what is proved is not1 as in spiritualism1 that the knower is independent of matter1 but that all matter is dependent on him4 ,certainly this is not so easy to comprehend or so convenient to handle as spiritualism1 with its two substances2 but 4 ,in opposition to the subjective starting-point1 8the world is my idea10 there certainly stands provisionally with equal justification the objective starting-point1 8the world is matter10 or 8matter alone is absolute0 7since it alone is not subject to becoming and passing away71 or 8all that exists is matter40 ,this is the starting-point of ,democritus1 ,leucippus1 and ,epicurus4 ,but1 more closely considered1 the departure from the subject retains a real advantage2 it has the start by one perfectly justified step4 ,for consciousness alone is the immediate3 but we pass over this if we go at once to matter and make it our starting-point4 ,on the other hand1 it would certainly be possible to construct the world from matter and its properties if these were correctly1 completely1 and exhaustively known to us 7which is far from being the case as yet74 ,for all that has come to be has become actual through causes1 which could operate and come together only by virtue of the fundamental forces of matter4 ,but these must be perfectly capable of demonstration at least objectively1 even if subjectively we never attain to a knowledge of them4 ,but such an explanation and construction of the world would not only have at its foundation the assumption of an existence in itself of matter 7while in truth it is conditioned by the subject71 but it would also be obliged to allow all the original qualities in this matter to pass current and remain absolutely inexplicable1 thus as qualitates occult4 7,cf4 #bf1 #bg of the first volume47 ,for matter is only the vehicle of these forces1 just as the law of causality is only the arranger of their manifestations4 ,therefore such an explanation of the world would always remain merely relative and conditioned1 properly the work of a physical science1 which at every step longed for a metaphysic4 ,on the other hand1 there is also something inadequate about the subjective starting-point and first principle1 8the world is my idea10 partly because it is one-sided1 since the world is far more than that 7the thing in itself1 will71 and indeed its existence as idea is to a certain extent only accidental to it2 but partly also because it merely expresses the fact that the object is conditioned by the subject1 without at the same time saying that the subject1 as such1 is also conditioned by the object4 ,for the assertion1 8the subject would still remain a knowing being if it had no object1 i4e41 if it had absolutely no idea10 is just as false as the assertion of the crude understanding1 8the world1 the object1 would still exist1 even if there were no subject40 ,a consciousness without an object is no consciousness4 ,a thinking subject has conceptions for its object2 a subject of sense perception has objects with the qualities corresponding to its organisation4 ,if we rob the subject of all special characteristics and forms of its knowledge1 all the properties of the object vanish also1 and nothing remains but matter without form and quality1 which can just as little occur in experience as a subject without the forms of its knowledge1 but which remains opposed to the naked subject as such1 as its reflex1 which can only disappear along with it4 ,although materialism pretends to postulate nothing more than this matter--for instance1 atoms--yet it unconsciously adds to it not only the subject1 but also space1 time1 and causality1 which depend upon special properties of the subject4 ,the world as idea1 the objective world1 has thus1 as it were1 two poles2 the simple knowing subject without the forms of its knowledge1 and crude matter without form and quality4 ,both are completely unknowable2 the subject because it is that which knows1 matter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived4 ,yet both are fundamental conditions of all empirical perception4 ,thus the knowing subject1 merely as such1 which is a presupposition of all experience1 stands opposed as its pure counterpart to the crude1 formless1 and utterly dead 7i4e41 will-less7 matter1 which is given in no experience1 but which all experience presupposes4 ,this subject is not in time1 for time is only the more definite form of all its ideas4 ,the matter which stands over against it is1 like it1 eternal and imperishable1 endures through all time1 but is1 properly speaking1 not extended1 for extension gives form1 thus it has no spatial properties4 ,everything else is involved in a constant process of coming into being and passing away1 while these two represent the unmoved poles of the world as idea4 ,the permanence of matter may therefore be regarded as the reflex of the timelessness of the pure subject1 which is simply assumed as the condition of all objects4 ,both belong to phenomena1 not to the thing in itself1 but they are the framework of the phenomenon4 ,both are arrived at only by abstraction1 and are not given immediately1 pure and for themselves4 ,the fundamental error of all systems is the failure to understand this truth4 ,intelligence and matter are correlates1 i4e41 the one exists only for the other1 both stand and fall together1 the one is only the reflex of the other4 ,indeed they are really one and the same thing regarded from two opposite points of view2 and this one thing1 ,i am here anticipating1 is the manifestation of the will1 or the thing in itself4 ,consequently both are secondary1 and therefore the origin of the world is not to be sought in either of the two4 ,but because of their failure to understand this1 all systems 7with the exception perhaps of that of ,spinoza7 sought the origin of all things in one of these two4 ,some of them1 on the one hand1 suppose an intelligence1 1 as the absolutely ,first and 1 and accordingly in this allow an idea of things and of the world to precede their actual existence2 consequently they distinguish the real world from the world of idea2 which is false4 ,therefore matter now appears as that through which the two are distinguished1 as the thing in itself4 ,hence arises the difficulty of procuring this matter1 the 1 so that when added to the mere idea of the world it may impart reality to it4 ,that original intelligence must now either find it ready to hand1 in which case it is just as much an absolute ,first as that intelligence itself1 and we have then two absolute ,firsts1 the and the 2 or the absolute intelligence must create this matter out of nothing1 an assumption which our understanding refuses to make1 for it is only capable of comprehending changes in matter1 and not that matter itself should come into being or pass away4 ,this rests ultimately upon the fact that matter is essential1 the correlate of the understanding4 ,on the other hand1 the systems opposed to these1 which make the other of the two correlates1 that is1 matter1 the absolute ,first1 suppose a matter which would exist without being perceived2 and it has been made sufficiently clear by all that has been said above that this is a direct contradiction1 for by the existence of matter we always mean simply its being perceived4 ,but here they encounter the difficulty of bringing to this matter1 which alone is their absolute ,first1 the intelligence which is finally to experience it4 ,i have shown this weak side of materialism in #g of the first volume4 ,for me1 on the contrary1 matter and intelligence are inseparable correlates1 which exist only for each other1 and therefore merely relatively4 ,matter is the idea of the intelligence2 the intelligence is that in whose idea alone matter exists4 ,the two together constitute the world as idea1 which is just ,kant's phenomenon1 and consequently something secondary4 ,what is primary is that which manifests itself1 the thing in itself1 which we shall afterwards discover is the will4 ,this is in itself neither the perceiver nor the perceived1 but is entirely different from the mode of its manifestation4 ,as a forcible conclusion of this important and difficult discussion ,i shall now personify these two abstractions1 and present them in a dialogue after the fashion of ,prabodha ,tschandro ,daya4 ,it may also be compared with a similar dialogue between matter and form in the 8,duodecim ,principia ,philosophi0 of ,raymund ,lully1 c4 #a and #b4 ,the ,subject4 ,i am1 and besides me there is nothing4 ,for the world is my idea4 ,matter4 ,presumptuous delusion6 ,i1 ,i am1 and besides me there is nothing1 for the world is my fleeting form4 ,thou art a mere result of a part of this form and altogether accidental4 ,the ,subject4 ,what insane arrogance6 ,neither thou nor thy form would exist without me2 ye are conditioned by me4 ,whosoever thinks me away1 and believes he can still think ye there1 is involved in gross delusion1 for your existence apart from my idea is a direct contradiction1 a meaningless form of words4 ,ye are simply means ye are perceived by me4 ,my idea is the sphere of your existence2 therefore ,i am its first condition4 ,matter4 ,fortunately the audacity of your assertion will soon be put to silence in reality and not by mere words4 ,yet a few moments and thou actually art no more4 ,with all thy boasting thou hast sunk into nothing1 vanished like a shadow1 and shared the fate of all my transitory forms4 ,but ,i1 ,i remain1 unscathed and undiminished1 from age to age1 through infinite time1 and behold unshaken the play of my changing form4 ,the ,subject4 ,this infinite time through which thou boastest that thou livest1 like the infinite space which thou fillest1 exists only in my idea4 ,indeed it is merely the form of my idea which ,i bear complete in myself1 and in which thou exhibitest thyself1 which receives thee1 and through which thou first of all existest4 ,but the annihilation with which thou threatenest me touches me not2 were it so1 then wouldst thou also be annihilated4 ,it merely affects the individual1 which for a short time is my vehicle1 and which1 like everything else1 is my idea4 ,matter4 ,and if ,i concede this1 and go so far as to regard thy existence1 which is yet inseparably linked to that of these fleeting individuals1 as something absolute1 it yet remains dependent upon mine4 ,for thou art subject only so far as thou hast an object2 and this object ,i am4 ,i am its kernel and content1 that which is permanent in it1 that which holds it together1 and without which it would be as disconnected1 as wavering1 and unsubstantial as the dreams and fancies of thy individuals1 which have yet borrowed from me even the illusive content they possess4 ,the ,subject4 ,thou dost well to refrain from contesting my existence on the ground that it is linked to individuals2 for1 as inseparably as ,i am joined to them1 thou art joined to thy sister1 ,form1 and hast never appeared without her4 ,no eye hath yet seen either thee or me naked and isolated2 for we are both mere abstractions4 ,it is in reality one being that perceives itself and is perceived by itself1 but whose real being cannot consist either in perceiving or in being perceived1 since these are divided between us two4 ,both4 ,we are1 then1 inseparably joined together as necessary parts of one whole1 which includes us both and exists through us4 ,only a misunderstanding can oppose us two hostilely to each other1 and hence draw the false conclusion that the one contests the existence of the other1 with which its own existence stands or falls4 ,this whole1 which comprehends both1 is the world as idea1 or the world of phenomena4 ,when this is taken away there remains only what is purely metaphysical1 the thing in itself1 which in the second book we shall recognise as the will4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,doctrine of ,perception or ,knowledge ,of ,the ,understanding4 ,with all transcendental ideality the objective world retains empirical reality2 the object is indeed not the thing in itself1 but as an empirical object it is real4 ,it is true that space is only in my head2 but empirically my head is in space4 ,the law of causality can certainly never enable us to get quit of idealism by building a bridge between things in themselves and our knowledge of them1 and thus certifying the absolute reality of the world1 which exhibits itself in consequence of its application2 but this by no means does away with the causal relation of objects to each other1 thus it does not abolish the causal relation which unquestionably exists between the body of each knowing person and all other material objects4 ,but the law of causality binds together only phenomena1 and does not lead beyond them4 ,with that law we are and remain in the world of objects1 i4e41 the world of phenomena1 or more properly the world of ideas4 ,yet the whole of such a world of experience is primarily conditioned by the knowledge of a subject in general as its necessary presupposition1 and then by the special forms of our perception and apprehension1 thus necessarily belongs to the merely phenomenal1 and has no claim to pass for the world of things in themselves4 ,indeed the subject itself 7so far as it is merely the knowing subject7 belongs to the merely phenomenal1 of which it constitutes the complementary half4 ,without application of the law of causality1 however1 perception of an objective world could never be arrived at2 for this perception is1 as ,i have often explained1 essentially matter of the intellect1 and not merely of the senses4 ,the senses afford us mere sensation1 which is far from being perception4 ,the part played by sensations of the senses in perception was distinguished by ,locke under the name secondary qualities1 which he rightly refused to ascribe to things in themselves4 ,but ,kant1 carrying ,locke's method further1 distinguished also1 and refused to ascribe to things in themselves what belongs to the working up of this material 7the sensations7 by the brain4 ,the result was1 that in this was included all that ,locke had left to things in themselves as primary qualities--extension1 form1 solidity1 c4--so that with ,kant the thing in itself was reduced to a completely unknown quantity x4 ,with ,locke accordingly the thing in itself is certainly without colour1 sound1 smell1 taste1 neither warm nor cold1 neither soft nor hard1 neither smooth nor rough2 yet it has still extension and form1 it is impenetrable1 at rest or in motion1 and has mass and number4 ,with ,kant1 on the other hand1 it has laid aside all these latter qualities also1 because they are only possible by means of time1 space1 and causality1 and these spring from an intellect 7brain71 just as colours1 tones1 smells1 c41 originate in the nerves of the organs of sense4 ,the thing in itself has with ,kant become spaceless1 unextended1 and incorporeal4 ,thus what the mere senses bring to the perception1 in which the objective world exists1 stands to what is supplied by the functions of the brain 7space1 time1 causality7 as the mass of the nerves of sense stand to the mass of the brain1 after subtracting that part of the latter which is further applied to thinking proper1 i4e41 to abstract ideas1 and is therefore not possessed by the brutes4 ,for as the nerves of the organs of sense impart to the phenomenal objects colour1 sound1 taste1 smell1 temperature1 c41 so the brain imparts to them extension1 form1 impenetrability1 the power of movement1 c41 in short all that can only be presented in perception by means of time1 space1 and causality4 ,how small is the share of the senses in perception1 compared with that of the intellect1 is also shown by a comparison of the nerve apparatus for receiving impressions with that for working them up4 ,the mass of the nerves of sensation of the whole of the organs of sense is very small compared with that of the brain1 even in the case of the brutes1 whose brain1 since they do not1 properly speaking1 i4e41 in the abstract1 think1 is merely used for effecting perception1 and yet when this is complete1 thus in the case of mammals1 has a very considerable mass1 even after the cerebellum1 whose function is the systematic guidance of movements1 has been taken away4 ,that excellent book by ,thomas ,reid1 the 8,inquiry into the ,human ,mind0 7first edition1 #agfd2 #fth edition1 #ahaj71 as a negative proof of the ,kantian truths1 affords us a very thorough conviction of the inadequacy of the senses to produce the objective perception of things1 and also of the non-empirical origin of the perception of space and time4 ,reid refutes ,locke's doctrine that perception is a product of the senses1 by a thorough and acute demonstration that the collective sensations of the senses do not bear the least resemblance to the world as known in perception1 and especially that the five primary qualities of ,locke 7extension1 form1 solidity1 movement1 and number7 absolutely could not be afforded us by any sensation of the senses4 ,accordingly he gives up the question as to the mode of origination and the source of perception as completely insoluble2 and although altogether unacquainted with ,kant1 he gives us1 as it were1 according to the regula falsi1 a thorough proof of the intellectual nature of perception 7really first explained by me as a consequence of the ,kantian doctrine71 and also of the a priori source1 discovered by ,kant1 of its constituent elements1 space1 time1 and causality1 from which those primary qualities of ,locke first proceed1 but by means of which they are easily constructed4 ,thomas ,reid's book is very instructive and well worth reading--ten times more so than all the philosophy together that has been written since ,kant4 ,another indirect proof of the same doctrine1 though in the way of error1 is afforded by the ,french sensational philosophers1 who1 since ,condillac trod in the footsteps of ,locke1 have laboured to show once for all that the whole of our perception and thinking can be referred to mere sensations 7penser c'est sentir71 which1 after ,locke's example1 they call ides simples1 and through the mere coming together and comparison of which the whole objective world is supposed to build itself up in our heads4 ,these gentlemen certainly have des ides bien simples4 ,it is amusing to see how1 lacking alike the profundity of the ,german and the honesty of the ,english philosopher1 they turn the poor material of sensation this way and that way1 and try to increase its importance1 in order to construct out of it the deeply significant phenomena of the world of perception and thought4 ,but the man constructed by them would necessarily be an ,anencephalus1 a ,tte de crapaud1 with only organs of sense and without a brain4 ,to take only a couple of the better attempts of this sort out of a multitude of others1 ,i may mention as examples ,condorcet at the beginning of his book1 8,des ,progrs de l',esprit ,humain10 and ,tourtual on ,sight1 in the second volume of the 8,scriptures ,ophthalmologici ,minores10 edidit ,justus ,radius 7#ahbh74 ,the feeling of the insufficiency of a purely sensationalistic explanation of perception is in like manner shown in the assertion which was made shortly before the appearance of the ,kantian philosophy1 that we not only have ideas of things called forth by sensation1 but apprehend the things themselves directly1 although they lie outside us--which is certainly inconceivable4 ,and this was not meant in some idealistic sense1 but was said from the point of view of common realism4 ,this assertion is well and pointedly put by the celebrated ,euler in his 8,letters to a ,german ,princess10 vol4 ii4 p4 #fh4 ,he says3 8,i therefore believe that the sensations 7of the senses7 contain something more than philosophers imagine4 ,they are not merely empty perceptions of certain impressions made in the brain4 ,they do not give the soul mere ideas of things1 but actually place before it objects which exist outside it1 although we cannot conceive how this really happens40 ,this opinion is explained by the following facts4 ,although1 as ,i have fully proved1 perception is brought about by application of the law of causality1 of which we are conscious a priori1 yet in sight the act of the understanding1 by means of which we pass from the effect to the cause1 by no means appears distinctly in consciousness2 and therefore the sensation does not separate itself clearly from the idea which is constructed out of it1 as the raw material1 by the understanding4 ,still less can a distinction between object and idea1 which in general does not exist1 appear in consciousness2 but we feel the things themselves quite directly1 and indeed as lying outside us1 although it is certain that what is immediate can only be the sensation1 and this is confined to the sphere of the body enclosed by our skin4 ,this can be explained from the fact that outside us is exclusively a spatial determination4 ,but space itself is a form of our faculty of perception1 i4e41 a function of our brain4 ,therefore that externality to us to which we refer objects1 on the occasion of sensations of sight1 is itself really within our heads2 for that is its whole sphere of activity4 ,much as in the theatre we see the mountains1 the woods1 and the sea1 but yet everything is inside the house4 ,from this it becomes intelligible that we perceive things in the relation of externality1 and yet in every respect immediately1 but have not within us an idea of the things which lie outside us1 different from these things4 ,for things are in space1 and consequently also external to us only in so far as we perceive them4 ,therefore those things which to this extent we perceive directly1 and not mere images of them1 are themselves only our ideas1 and as such exist only in our heads4 ,therefore we do not1 as ,euler says1 directly perceive the things themselves which are external to us1 but rather the things which are perceived by us as external to us are only our ideas1 and consequently are apprehended by us immediately4 ,the whole observation given above in ,euler's words1 and which is quite correct1 affords a fresh proof of ,kant's ,transcendental sthetic1 and of my theory of perception which is founded upon it1 as also of idealism in general4 ,the directness and unconsciousness referred to above1 with which in perception we make the transition from the sensation to its cause1 may be illustrated by an analogous procedure in the use of abstract ideas or thinking4 ,when we read or hear we receive mere words1 but we pass from these so immediately to the conceptions denoted by them1 that it is as if we received the conceptions directly2 for we are absolutely unconscious of the transition from the words to the conceptions4 ,therefore it sometimes happens that we do not know in what language it was that we read something yesterday which we now remember4 ,yet that such a transition always takes place becomes apparent if it is once omitted1 that is1 if in a fit of abstraction we read without thinking1 and then become aware that we certainly have taken in all the words but no conceptions4 ,only when we pass from abstract conceptions to pictures of the imagination do we become conscious of the transposition we have made4 ,further1 it is really only in perception in the narrowest sense1 that is1 in sight1 that in empirical apprehension the transition from the sensation to its cause takes place quite unconsciously4 ,in every other kind of sense perception1 on the contrary1 the transition takes place with more or less distinct consciousness2 therefore1 in the case of apprehension through the four coarser senses1 its reality is capable of being established as an immediate fact4 ,thus in the dark we feel a thing for a long time on all sides until from the different effects upon our hands we are able to construct its definite form as their cause4 ,further1 if something feels smooth we sometimes reflect whether we may not have fat or oil upon our hands2 and again1 if something feels cold we ask ourselves whether it may not be that we have very warm hands4 ,when we hear a sound we sometimes doubt whether it was really an affection of our sense of hearing from without or merely an inner affection of it2 then whether it sounded near and weak or far off and strong1 then from what direction it came1 and finally whether it was the voice of a man or of a brute1 or the sound of an instrument2 thus we investigate the cause of each effect we experience4 ,in the case of smell and taste uncertainty as to the objective nature of the cause of the effect felt is of the commonest occurrence1 so distinctly are the two separated here4 ,the fact that in sight the transition from the effect to the cause occurs quite unconsciously1 and hence the illusion arises that this kind of perception is perfectly direct1 and consists simply in the sensation alone without any operation of the understanding--this has its explanation partly in the great perfection of the organ of vision1 and partly in the exclusively rectilineal action of light4 ,on account of the latter circumstance the impression itself leads directly to the place of the cause1 and since the eye is capable of perceiving with the greatest exactness and at a glance all the fine distinctions of light and shade1 colour and outline1 and also the data in accordance with which the understanding estimates distance1 it thus happens that in the case of impressions of this sense the operation of the understanding takes place with such rapidity and certainty that we are just as little conscious of it as of spelling when we read4 ,hence arises the delusion that the sensation itself presents us directly with the objects4 ,yet it is just in sight that the operation of the understanding1 consisting in the knowledge of the cause from the effect1 is most significant4 ,by means of it what is felt doubly1 with two eyes1 is perceived as single2 by means of it the impression which strikes the retina upside down1 in consequence of the crossing of the rays in the pupils1 is put right by following back the cause of this in the same direction1 or as we express ourselves1 we see things upright although their image in the eye is reversed2 and finally by means of the operation of the understanding magnitude and distance are estimated by us in direct perception from five different data1 which are very clearly and beautifully described by ,dr4 ,thomas ,reid4 ,i expounded all this1 and also the proofs which irrefutably establish the intellectual nature of perception1 as long ago as #ahaf1 in my essay 8,on ,sight and ,colour0 7second edition1 #ahed2 third edition1 #ahgj71 and with important additions fifteen years later in the revised ,latin version of it which is given under the title1 8,theoria ,colorum ,physiologica ,eademque ,primaria10 in the third volume of the 8,scriptores ,ophthalmologici ,minores10 published by ,justus ,radius in #ahcj2 yet most fully and thoroughly in the second 7and third7 edition of my essay 8,on the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason10 #ba4 ,therefore on this important subject ,i refer to these works1 so as not to extend unduly the present exposition4 ,on the other hand1 an observation which trenches on the province of sthetics may find its place here4 ,it follows from the proved intellectual nature of perception that the sight of beautiful objects--for example1 of a beautiful view--is also a phenomenon of the brain4 ,its purity and completeness1 therefore1 depends not merely on the object1 but also upon the quality of the brain1 its form and size1 the fineness of its texture1 and the stimulation of its activity by the strength of the pulse of the arteries which supply it4 ,accordingly the same view appears in different heads1 even when the eyes are equally acute1 as different as1 for example1 the first and last impressions of a copper plate that has been much used4 ,this is the explanation of the difference of capacity for enjoying natural beauty1 and consequently also for reproducing it1 i4e41 for occasioning a similar phenomenon of the brain by means of an entirely different kind of cause1 the arrangement of colours on a canvas4 ,the apparent immediacy of perception1 depending on its entire intellectuality1 by virtue of which1 as ,euler says1 we apprehend the thing itself1 and as external to us1 finds an analogy in the way in which we feel the parts of our own bodies1 especially when they suffer pain1 which when we do feel them is generally the case4 ,just as we imagine that we perceive things where they are1 while the perception really takes place in the brain1 we believe that we feel the pain of a limb in the limb itself1 while in reality it also is felt in the brain1 to which it is conducted by the nerve of the affected part4 ,therefore1 only the affections of those parts whose nerves go to the brain are felt1 and not those of the parts whose nerves belong to the sympathetic system1 unless it be that an unusually strong affection of these parts penetrates by some roundabout way to the brain1 where yet for the most part it only makes itself known as a dull sense of discomfort1 and always without definite determination of its locality4 ,hence1 also1 it is that we do not feel injuries to a limb whose nerve-trunk has been severed or ligatured4 ,and hence1 finally1 the man who has lost a limb still sometimes feels pain in it1 because the nerves which go to the brain are still there4 ,thus1 in the two phenomena here compared1 what goes on in the brain is apprehended as outside of it2 in the case of perception1 by means of the understanding1 which extends its feelers into the outer world2 in the case of the feeling of our limbs1 by means of the nerves4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,on ,the ,senses4 ,it is not the object of my writings to repeat what has been said by others1 and therefore ,i only make here some special remarks of my own on the subject of the senses4 ,the senses are merely the channels through which the brain receives from without 7in the form of sensations7 the materials which it works up into ideas of perception4 ,those sensations which principally serve for the objective comprehension of the external world must in themselves be neither agreeable nor disagreeable4 ,this really means that they must leave the will entirely unaffected4 ,otherwise the sensation itself would attract our attention1 and we would remain at the effect instead of passing to the cause1 which is what is aimed at here4 ,for it would bring with it that marked superiority1 as regards our consideration1 which the will always has over the mere idea1 to which we only turn when the will is silent4 ,therefore colours and sounds are in themselves1 and so long as their impression does not pass the normal degree1 neither painful nor pleasurable sensations1 but appear with the indifference that fits them to be the material of pure objective perception4 ,this is as far the case as was possible in a body which is in itself through and through will2 and just in this respect it is worthy of admiration4 ,physiologically it rests upon the fact that in the organs of the nobler senses1 thus in sight and hearing1 the nerves which have to receive the specific outward impression are quite insusceptible to any sensation of pain1 and know no other sensation than that which is specifically peculiar to them1 and which serves the purpose of mere apprehension4 ,thus the retina1 as also the optic nerve1 is insensible to every injury2 and this is also the case with the nerve of hearing4 ,in both organs pain is only felt in their other parts1 the surroundings of the nerve of sense which is peculiar to them1 never in this nerve itself4 ,in the case of the eye such pain is felt principally in the conjunctiva2 in the case of the ear1 in the meatus auditorius4 ,even with the brain this is the case1 for if it is cut into directly1 thus from above1 it has no feeling4 ,thus only on account of this indifference with regard to the will which is peculiar to them are the sensations of the eye capable of supplying the understanding with such multifarious and finely distinguished data1 out of which it constructs in our head the marvellous objective world1 by the application of the law of causality upon the foundation of the pure perceptions of space and time4 ,just that freedom from affecting the will which is characteristic of sensations of colour enables them1 when their energy is heightened by transparency1 as in the glow of an evening sky1 in painted glass1 and the like1 to raise us very easily into the state of pure objective will-less perception1 which1 as ,i have shown in my third book1 is one of the chief constituent elements of the sthetic impression4 ,just this indifference with regard to the will fits sounds to supply the material for denoting the infinite multiplicity of the conceptions of the reason4 ,outer sense1 that is1 receptivity for external impressions as pure data for the understanding1 is divided into five senses1 and these accommodate themselves to the four elements1 i4e41 the four states of aggregation1 together with that of imponderability4 ,thus the sense for what is firm 7earth7 is touch2 for what is fluid 7water71 taste2 for what is in the form of vapour1 i4e41 volatile 7vapour1 exhalation71 smell2 for what is permanently elastic 7air71 hearing2 for what is imponderable 7fire1 light71 sight4 ,the second imponderable1 heat1 is not properly an object of the senses1 but of general feeling1 and therefore always affects the will directly1 as agreeable or disagreeable4 ,from this classification there also follows the relative dignity of the senses4 ,sight has the highest rank1 because its sphere is the widest and its susceptibility the finest4 ,this rests upon the fact that what affects it is an imponderable1 that is1 something which is scarcely corporeal1 but is quasi spiritual4 ,hearing has the second place1 corresponding to air4 ,however1 touch is a more thorough and well-informed sense4 ,for while each of the other senses gives us only an entirely one-sided relation to the object1 as its sound1 or its relation to light1 touch1 which is closely bound up with general feeling and muscular power1 supplies the understanding with the data at once for the form1 magnitude1 hardness1 softness1 texture1 firmness1 temperature1 and weight of bodies1 and all this with the least possibility of illusion and deception1 to which all the other senses are far more subject4 ,the two lowest senses1 smell and taste1 are no longer free from a direct affection of the will1 that is1 they are always agreeably or disagreeably affected1 and are therefore more subjective than objective4 ,sensations of hearing are exclusively in time1 and therefore the whole nature of music consists in degrees of time1 upon which depends both the quality or pitch of tones1 by means of vibrations1 and also their quantity or duration1 by means of time4 ,the sensations of sight1 on the other hand1 are primarily and principally in space2 but secondarily1 by reason of their duration1 they are also in time4 ,sight is the sense of the understanding which perceives2 hearing is the sense of the reason which thinks and apprehends4 ,words are only imperfectly represented by visible signs2 and therefore ,i doubt whether a deaf and dumb man1 who can read1 but has no idea of the sound of the words1 works as quickly in thinking with the mere visible signs of conceptions as we do with the real1 i4e41 the audible words4 ,if he cannot read1 it is well known that he is almost like an irrational animal1 while the man born blind is from the first a thoroughly rational being4 ,sight is an active1 hearing a passive sense4 ,therefore sounds affect our mind in a disturbing and hostile manner1 and indeed they do so the more in proportion as the mind is active and developed2 they distract all thoughts and instantly destroy the power of thinking4 ,on the other hand1 there is no analogous disturbance through the eye1 no direct effect of what is seen1 as such1 upon the activity of thought 7for naturally we are not speaking here of the influence which the objects looked at have upon the will72 but the most varied multitude of things before our eyes admits of entirely unhindered and quiet thought4 ,therefore the thinking mind lives at peace with the eye1 but is always at war with the ear4 ,this opposition of the two senses is also confirmed by the fact that if deaf and dumb persons are cured by galvanism they become deadly pale with terror at the first sounds they hear 7,gilbert's 8,annalen der ,physik10 vol4 x4 p4 #chb71 while blind persons1 on the contrary1 who have been operated upon1 behold with ecstasy the first light1 and unwillingly allow the bandages to be put over their eyes again4 ,all that has been said1 however1 can be explained from the fact that hearing takes place by means of a mechanical vibration of the nerve of hearing which is at once transmitted to the brain1 while seeing1 on the other hand1 is a real action of the retina which is merely stimulated and called forth by light and its modifications2 as ,i have shown at length in my physiological theory of colours4 ,but this whole opposition stands in direct conflict with that coloured-ether1 drum-beating theory which is now everywhere unblushingly served up1 and which seeks to degrade the eye's sensation of light to a mechanical vibration1 such as primarily that of hearing actually is1 while nothing can be more different than the still1 gentle effect of light and the alarm-drum of hearing4 ,if we add to this the remarkable circumstance that although we hear with two ears1 the sensibility of which is often very different1 yet we never hear a sound double1 as we often see things double with our two eyes1 we are led to the conjecture that the sensation of hearing does not arise in the labyrinth or in the cochlea1 but deep in the brain where the two nerves of hearing meet1 and thus the impression becomes simple4 ,but this is where the pons ,varolii encloses the medulla oblongata1 thus at the absolutely lethal spot1 by the injury of which every animal is instantly killed1 and from which the nerve of hearing has only a short course to the labyrinth1 the seat of acoustic vibration4 ,now it is just because its source is here1 in this dangerous place1 in which also all movement of the limbs originates1 that we start at a sudden noise2 which does not occur in the least degree when we suddenly see a light2 for example1 a flash of lightning4 ,the optic nerve1 on the contrary1 proceeds from its thalami much further forward 7though perhaps its source lies behind them71 and throughout its course is covered by the anterior lobes of the brain1 although always separated from them till1 having extended quite out of the brain1 it is spread out in the retina1 upon which1 on stimulation by light1 the sensation first arises1 and where it is really localised4 ,this is shown in my essay upon sight and colour4 ,this origin of the auditory nerve explains1 then1 the great disturbance which the power of thinking suffers from sound1 on account of which thinking men1 and in general all people of much intellect1 are without exception absolutely incapable of enduring any noise4 ,for it disturbs the constant stream of their thoughts1 interrupts and paralyses their thinking1 just because the vibration of the auditory nerve extends so deep into the brain1 the whole mass of which feels the oscillations set up through this nerve1 and vibrates along with them1 and because the brains of such persons are more easily moved than those of ordinary men4 ,on the same readiness to be set in motion1 and capacity for transmission1 which characterises their brains depends the fact that in the case of persons like these every thought calls forth so readily all those analogous or related to it whereby the similarities1 analogies1 and relations of things in general come so quickly and easily into their minds2 that the same occasion which millions of ordinary minds have experienced before brings them to the thought1 to the discovery1 that other people are subsequently surprised they did not reach themselves1 for they certainly can think afterwards1 but they cannot think before4 ,thus the sun shone on all statues1 but only the statue of ,memnon gave forth a sound4 ,for this reason ,kant1 ,gthe1 and ,jean ,paul were highly sensitive to every noise1 as their biographers bear witness47#ac7 ,gthe in his last years bought a house which had fallen into disrepair close to his own1 simply in order that he might not have to endure the noise that would be made in repairing it4 ,thus it was in vain that in his youth he followed the drum in order to harden himself against noise4 ,it is not a matter of custom4 ,on the other hand1 the truly stoical indifference to noise of ordinary minds is astonishing4 ,no noise disturbs them in their thinking1 reading1 writing1 or other occupations1 while the finer mind is rendered quite incapable by it4 ,but just that which makes them so insensible to noise of every kind makes them also insensible to the beautiful in plastic art1 and to deep thought or fine expression in literary art2 in short1 to all that does not touch their personal interests4 ,the following remark of ,lichtenberg's applies to the paralysing effect which noise has upon highly intellectual persons3 8,it is always a good sign when an artist can be hindered by trifles from exercising his art4 ,f---- used to stick his fingers into sulphur if he wished to play the piano4444 ,such things do not interfere with the average mind2444 it acts like a coarse sieve0 7,vermischte ,schriften1 vol4 i4 p4 #cih74 ,i have long really held the opinion that the amount of noise which any one can bear undisturbed stands in inverse proportion to his mental capacity1 and therefore may be regarded as a pretty fair measure of it4 ,therefore1 if ,i hear the dogs barking for hours together in the court of a house without being stopped1 ,i know what to think of the intellectual capacity of the inhabitants4 ,the man who habitually slams the door of a room1 instead of shutting it with his hand1 or allows this to go on in his house1 is not only ill-bred1 but is also a coarse and dull-minded fellow4 ,that in ,english 8sensible0 also means gifted with understanding is based upon accurate and fine observation4 ,we shall only become quite civilised when the ears are no longer unprotected1 and when it shall no longer be the right of everybody to sever the consciousness of each thinking being1 in its course of a thousand steps1 with whistling1 howling1 bellowing1 hammering1 whip-cracking1 barking1 c4 c4 ,the ,sybarites banished all noisy trades without the town2 the honourable sect of the ,shakers in ,north ,america permit no unnecessary noise in their villages1 and the ,moravians have a similar rule4 ,something more is said upon this subject in the thirtieth chapter of the second volume of the 8,parerga40 ,the effect of music upon the mind1 so penetrating1 so direct1 so unfailing1 may be explained from the passive nature of hearing which has been discussed2 also the after effect which sometimes follows it1 and which consists in a specially elevated frame of mind4 ,the vibrations of the tones following in rationally combined numerical relations set the fibre of the brain itself in similar vibration4 ,on the other hand1 the active nature of sight1 opposed as it is to the passive nature of hearing1 makes it intelligible why there can be nothing analogous to music for the eye1 and the piano of colours was an absurd mistake4 ,further1 it is just on account of the active nature of the sense of sight that it is remarkably acute in the case of beasts that hunt1 i4e41 beasts of prey1 while conversely the passive sense of hearing is specially acute in those beasts that are hunted1 that flee1 and are timid1 so that it may give them timely warning of the pursuer that is rushing or creeping upon them4 ,just as we have recognised in sight the sense of the understanding1 and in hearing the sense of the reason1 so we might call smell the sense of the memory1 because it recalls to us more directly than any other the specific impression of an event or a scene even from the most distant past4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,on ,knowledge ,a ,priori4 ,from the fact that we are able spontaneously to assign and determine the laws of relations in space without having recourse to experience1 ,plato concludes 7,meno1 p4 #cec1 ,bip47 that all learning is mere recollection4 ,kant1 on the other hand1 concludes that space is subjectively conditioned1 and merely a form of the faculty of knowledge4 ,how far1 in this regard1 does ,kant stand above ,plato6 ,cogito1 ergo sum1 is an analytical judgment4 ,indeed ,parmenides held it to be an identical judgment3 8 0 7nam intelligere et esse idem est1 ,clem4 ,alex4 ,strom41 vi4 #b1 #bc74 ,as such1 however1 or indeed even as an analytical judgment1 it cannot contain any special wisdom2 nor yet if1 to go still deeper1 we seek to deduce it as a conclusion from the major premise1 non-entis nulla sunt prdicata4 ,but with this proposition what ,descartes really wished to express was the great truth that immediate certainty belongs only to self-consciousness1 to what is subjective4 ,to what is objective1 on the other hand1 thus to everything else1 only indirect certainty belongs2 for it is arrived at through self-consciousness2 and being thus merely at second hand1 it is to be regarded as problematical4 ,upon this depends the value of this celebrated proposition4 ,as its opposite we may set up1 in the sense of the ,kantian philosophy1 cogito1 ergo est1 that is1 exactly as ,i think certain relations in things 7the mathematical71 they must always occur in all possible experience2--this was an important1 profound1 and a late apperu1 which appeared in the form of the problem as to the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori1 and has actually opened up the way to a deeper knowledge4 ,this problem is the watchword of the ,kantian philosophy1 as the former proposition is that of the ,cartesian1 and shows 4 ,kant very fitly places his investigations concerning time and space at the head of all the rest4 ,for to the speculative mind these questions present themselves before all others3 what is time8--what is this that consists of mere movement1 without anything that moves it8--and what is space8 this omnipresent nothing1 out of which nothing that exists can escape without ceasing to be anything at all8 ,that time and space depend on the subject1 are the mode in which the process of objective apperception is brought about in the brain1 has already a sufficient proof in the absolute impossibility of thinking away time and space1 while we can very easily think away everything that is presented in them4 ,the hand can leave go of everything except itself4 ,however1 ,i wish here to illustrate by a few examples and deductions the more exact proofs of this truth which are given by ,kant1 not for the purpose of refuting stupid objections1 but for the use of those who may have to expound ,kant's doctrine in future4 8,a right-angled equilateral triangle0 contains no logical contradiction2 for the predicates do not by any means cancel the subject1 nor are they inconsistent with each other4 ,it is only when their object is constructed in pure perception that the impossibility of their union in it appears4 ,now if on this account we were to regard this as a contradiction1 then so would every physical impossibility1 only discovered to be such after the lapse of centuries1 be a contradiction2 for example1 the composition of a metal from its elements1 or a mammal with more or fewer than seven cervical vertebra17#ad7 or horns and upper incisors in the same animal4 ,but only logical impossibility is a contradiction1 not physical1 and just as little mathematical4 ,equilateral and rectangled do not contradict each other 7they coexist in the square71 nor does either of them contradict a triangle4 ,therefore the incompatibility of the above conceptions can never be known by mere thinking1 but is only discovered by perception--merely mental perception1 however1 which requires no experience1 no real object4 ,we should also refer here to the proposition of ,giordano ,bruno1 which is also found in ,aristotle3 8,an infinitely large body is necessarily immovable0--a proposition which cannot rest either upon experience or upon the principle of contradiction1 since it speaks of things which cannot occur in any experience1 and the conceptions 8infinitely large0 and 8movable0 do not contradict each other2 but it is only pure perception that informs us that motion demands a space outside the body1 while its infinite size leaves no space over4 ,suppose1 now1 it should be objected to the first mathematical example that it is only a question of how complete a conception of a triangle the person judging has3 if the conception is quite complete it will also contain the impossibility of a triangle being rectangular and also equilateral4 ,the answer to this is3 assume that his conception is not so complete1 yet without recourse to experience he can1 by the mere construction of the triangle in his imagination1 extend his conception of it and convince himself for ever of the impossibility of this combination of these conceptions4 ,this process1 however1 is a synthetic judgment a priori1 that is1 a judgment through which1 independently of all experience1 and yet with validity for all experience1 we form and perfect our conceptions4 ,for1 in general1 whether a given judgment is analytical or synthetical can only be determined in the particular case according as the conception of the subject in the mind of the person judging is more or less complete4 ,the conception 8cat0 contains in the mind of a ,cuvier a hundred times more than in that of his servant2 therefore the same judgments about it will be synthetical for the latter1 and only analytical for the former4 ,but if we take the conceptions objectively1 and now wish to decide whether a given judgment is analytical or synthetical1 we must change the predicate into its contradictory opposite1 and apply this to the subject without a copula4 ,if this gives a contradictio in adjecto1 then the judgment was analytical2 otherwise it was synthetical4 ,that ,arithmetic rests on the pure intuition or perception of time is not so evident as that ,geometry is based upon that of space47#ae7 ,it can be proved1 however1 in the following manner4 ,all counting consists in the repeated affirmation of unity4 ,only for the purpose of always knowing how often we have already affirmed unity do we mark it each time with another word3 these are the numerals4 ,now repetition is only possible through succession4 ,but succession1 that is1 being after one another1 depends directly upon the intuition or perception of time4 ,it is a conception which can only be understood by means of this2 and thus counting also is only possible by means of time4 ,this dependence of all counting upon time is also betrayed by the fact that in all languages multiplication is expressed by 8time10 thus by a time-concept3 sexies1 1 six fois1 sex mal4 ,but simple counting is already a multiplication by one1 and for this reason in ,pestalozzi's educational establishment the children are always made to multiply thus3 8,two times two is four times one40 ,aristotle already recognised the close relationship of number and time1 and expounded it in the fourteenth chapter of the fourth book of the 8,physics40 ,time is for him 8the number of motion0 78 074 ,he very profoundly suggests the question whether time could be if the soul were not1 and answers it in the negative4 ,if arithmetic had not this pure intuition or perception of time at its foundation1 it would be no science a priori1 and therefore its propositions would not have infallible certainty4 ,although time1 like space1 is the form of knowledge of the subject1 yet1 just like space1 it presents itself as independent of the subject and completely objective4 ,against our will1 or without our knowledge1 it goes fast or slow4 ,we ask what o'clock it is2 we investigate time1 as if it were something quite objective4 ,and what is this objective existence8 ,not the progress of the stars1 or of the clocks1 which merely serve to measure the course of time itself1 but it is something different from all things1 and yet1 like them1 independent of our will and knowledge4 ,it exists only in the heads of percipient beings1 but the uniformity of its course and its independence of the will give it the authority of objectivity4 ,time is primarily the form of inner sense4 ,anticipating the following book1 ,i remark that the only object of inner sense is the individual will of the knowing subject4 ,time is therefore the form by means of which self-consciousness becomes possible for the individual will1 which originally and in itself is without knowledge4 ,in it the nature of the will1 which in itself is simple and identical1 appears drawn out into a course of life4 ,but just on account of this original simplicity and identity of what thus exhibits itself1 its character remains always precisely the same1 and hence also the course of life itself retains throughout the same key-note1 indeed its multifarious events and scenes are at bottom just like variations of one and the same theme4 ,the a priori nature of the law of causality has1 by ,englishmen and ,frenchmen1 sometimes not been seen at all1 sometimes not rightly conceived of2 and therefore some of them still prosecute the earlier attempts to find for it an empirical origin4 ,maine de ,biran places this in the experience that the act of will as cause is followed by the movement of the body as effect4 ,but this fact itself is untrue4 ,we certainly do not recognise the really immediate act of will as something different from the action of the body1 and the two as connected by the bond of causality2 but both are one and indivisible4 ,between them there is no succession2 they are simultaneous4 ,they are one and the same thing1 apprehended in a double manner4 ,that which makes itself known to inner apprehension 7self-consciousness7 as the real act of will exhibits itself at once in external perception1 in which the body exists objectively as an action of the body4 ,that physiologically the action of the nerve precedes that of the muscle is here immaterial1 for it does not come within self-consciousness2 and we are not speaking here of the relation between muscle and nerve1 but of that between the act of will and the action of the body4 ,now this does not present itself as a causal relation4 ,if these two presented themselves to us as cause and effect their connection would not be so incomprehensible to us as it actually is2 for what we understand from its cause we understand as far as there is an understanding of things generally4 ,on the other hand1 the movement of our limbs by means of mere acts of will is indeed a miracle of such common occurrence that we no longer observe it2 but if we once turn our attention to it we become keenly conscious of the incomprehensibility of the matter1 just because in this we have something before us which we do not understand as the effect of a cause4 ,this apprehension1 then1 could never lead us to the idea of causality1 for that never appears in it at all4 ,maine de ,biran himself recognises the perfect simultaneousness of the act of will and the movement 7,nouvelles ,considrations des ,rapports du ,physique au ,moral1 p4 #cgg1 #cgh74 ,in ,england ,thomas ,reid 7,on the ,first ,principles of ,contingent ,truths1 ,essay ,,iv4 c4 #e7 already asserted that the knowledge of the causal relation has its ground in the nature of the faculty of knowledge itself4 ,quite recently ,thomas ,brown1 in his very tediously composed book1 8,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect10 #dth edit41 #ahce1 says much the same thing1 that that knowledge springs from an innate1 intuitive1 and instinctive conviction2 thus he is at bottom upon the right path4 ,quite unpardonable1 however1 is the crass ignorance on account of which in this book of #dgf pages1 of which #acj are devoted to the refutation of ,hume1 absolutely no mention is made of ,kant1 who cleared up the question more than seventy years ago4 ,if ,latin had remained the exclusive language of science such a thing would not have occurred4 ,in spite of ,brown's exposition1 which in the main is correct1 a modification of the doctrine set up by ,maine de ,biran1 of the empirical origin of the fundamental knowledge of the causal relation1 has yet found acceptance in ,england2 for it is not without a certain degree of plausibility4 ,it is this1 that we abstract the law of causality from the perceived effect of our own body upon other bodies4 ,this was already refuted by ,hume4 ,i1 however1 have shown that it is untenable in my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur0 7p4 #ge of the second edition1 p4 #hb of the third71 from the fact that since we apprehend both our own and other bodies objectively in spatial perception1 the knowledge of causality must already be there1 because it is a condition of such perception4 ,the one genuine proof that we are conscious of the law of causality before all experience lies in the necessity of making a transition from the sensation1 which is only empirically given1 to its cause1 in order that it may become perception of the external world4 ,therefore ,i have substituted this proof for the ,kantian1 the incorrectness of which ,i have shown4 ,a most full and thorough exposition of the whole of this important subject1 which is only touched on here1 the a priori nature of the law of causality and the intellectual nature of empirical perception1 will be found in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ba1 to which ,i refer1 in order to avoid the necessity of repeating here what is said there4 ,i have also shown there the enormous difference between the mere sensation of the senses and the perception of an objective world1 and discovered the wide gulf that lies between the two4 ,the law of causality alone can bridge across this gulf1 and it presupposes for its application the two other forms which are related to it1 space and time4 ,only by means of these three combined is the objective idea attained to4 ,now whether the sensation from which we start to arrive at apprehension arises through the resistance which is suffered by our muscular exertion1 or through the impression of light upon the retina1 or of sound upon the nerves of the brain1 c4 c41 is really a matter of indifference4 ,the sensation always remains a mere datum for the understanding1 which alone is capable of apprehending it as the effect of a cause different from itself1 which the understanding now perceives as external1 i4e41 as something occupying and filling space1 which is also a form inherent in the intellect prior to all experience4 ,without this intellectual operation1 for which the forms must lie ready in us1 the perception of an objective1 external world could never arise from a mere sensation within our skin4 ,how can it ever be supposed that the mere feeling of being hindered in intended motion1 which occurs also in lameness1 could be sufficient for this8 ,we may add to this that before ,i attempt to affect external things they must necessarily have affected me as motives4 ,but this almost presupposes the apprehension of the external world4 ,according to the theory in question 7as ,i have remarked in the place referred to above71 a man born without arms and legs could never attain to the idea of causality1 and consequently could never arrive at the apprehension of the external world4 ,but that this is not the case is proved by a fact communicated in ,froriep's ,notizen1 ,july #ahch1 ,no4 #acc--the detailed account1 accompanied by a likeness1 of an ,esthonian girl1 ,eva ,lauk1 then fourteen years old1 who was born entirely without arms or legs4 ,the account concludes with these words3 8,according to the evidence of her mother1 her mental development had been quite as quick as that of her brothers and sisters2 she attained just as soon as they did to a correct judgment of size and distance1 yet without the assistance of hands4--,dorpat1 #ast ,march #ahch1 ,dr4 ,a4 ,hueck40 ,hume's doctrine also1 that the conception of causality arises from the custom of seeing two states constantly following each other1 finds a practical refutation in the oldest of all successions1 that of day and night1 which no one has ever held to be cause and effect of each other4 ,and the same succession also refutes ,kant's false assertion that the objective reality of a succession is only known when we apprehend the two succeeding events as standing in the relation of cause and effect to each other4 ,indeed the converse of this doctrine of ,kant's is true4 ,we know which of the two connected events is the cause and which the effect1 empirically1 only in the succession4 ,again1 on the other hand1 the absurd assertion of several professors of philosophy in our own day that cause and effect are simultaneous can be refuted by the fact that in cases in which the succession cannot be perceived on account of its great rapidity1 we yet assume it with certainty a priori1 and with it the lapse of a certain time4 ,thus1 for example1 we know that a certain time must elapse between the falling of the flint and the projection of the bullet1 although we cannot perceive it1 and that this time must further be divided between several events that occur in a strictly determined succession--the falling of the flint1 the striking of the spark1 ignition1 the spread of the fire1 the explosion1 and the projection of the bullet4 ,no man ever perceived this succession of events2 but because we know which is the cause of the others1 we thereby also know which must precede the others in time1 and consequently also that during the course of the whole series a certain time must elapse1 although it is so short that it escapes our empirical apprehension2 for no one will assert that the projection of the bullet is actually simultaneous with the falling of the flint4 ,thus not only the law of causality1 but also its relation to time1 and the necessity of the succession of cause and effect1 is known to us a priori4 ,if we know which of two events is the cause and which is the effect1 we also know which precedes the other in time2 if1 on the contrary1 we do not know which is cause and which effect1 but only know in general that they are causally connected1 we seek to discover the succession empirically1 and according to that we determine which is the cause and which the effect4 ,the falseness of the assertion that cause and effect are simultaneous further appears from the following consideration4 ,an unbroken chain of causes and effects fills the whole of time4 7,for if this chain were broken the world would stand still1 or in order to set it in motion again an effect without a cause would have to appear47 ,now if every effect were simultaneous with its cause1 then every effect would be moved up into the time of its cause1 and a chain of causes and effects containing as many links as before would fill no time at all1 still less an infinite time1 but would be all together in one moment4 ,thus1 under the assumption that cause and effect are simultaneous1 the course of the world shrinks up into an affair of a moment4 ,this proof is analogous to the proof that every sheet of paper must have a certain thickness1 because otherwise the whole book would have none4 ,to say when the cause ceases and the effect begins is in almost all cases difficult1 and often impossible4 ,for the changes 7i4e41 the succession of states7 are continuous1 like the time which they fill1 and therefore also1 like it1 they are infinitely divisible4 ,but their succession is as necessarily determined and as unmistakable as that of the moments of time itself1 and each of them is called1 with reference to the one which precedes it1 8effect10 and with reference to the one which follows it1 8cause40 ,every change in the material world can only take place because another has immediately preceded it3 this is the true and the whole content of the law of causality4 ,but no conception has been more misused in philosophy than that of cause1 by means of the favourite trick or blunder of conceiving it too widely1 taking it too generally1 through abstract thinking4 ,since ,scholasticism1 indeed properly since ,plato and ,aristotle1 philosophy has been for the most part a systematic misuse of general conceptions4 ,such1 for example1 are substance1 ground1 cause1 the good1 perfection1 necessity1 and very many others4 ,a tendency of the mind to work with such abstract and too widely comprehended conceptions has shown itself almost at all times4 ,it may ultimately rest upon a certain indolence of the intellect1 which finds it too difficult a task to be constantly controlling thought by perception4 ,by degrees such unduly wide conceptions come to be used almost like algebraical symbols1 and tossed about like them1 and thus philosophy is reduced to a mere process of combination1 a kind of reckoning which 7like all calculations7 employs and demands only the lower faculties4 ,indeed there finally results from this a mere juggling with words1 of which the most shocking example is afforded us by the mind-destroying ,hegelism1 in which it is carried to the extent of pure nonsense4 ,but ,scholasticism also often degenerated into word-juggling4 ,nay even the 8,topi0 of ,aristotle--very abstract principles1 conceived with absolute generality1 which one could apply to the most different kinds of subjects1 and always bring into the field in arguing either pro or contra--have also their origin in this misuse of general conceptions4 ,we find innumerable examples of the way the ,schoolmen worked with such abstractions in their writings1 especially in those of ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,but philosophy really pursued the path which was entered on by the ,schoolmen down to the time of ,locke and ,kant1 who at last bethought themselves as to the origin of conceptions4 ,indeed we find ,kant himself1 in his earlier years1 still upon that path1 in his 8,proof of the ,existence of ,god0 7p4 #aia of the first volume of ,rosenkranz's edition71 where the conceptions substance1 ground1 reality1 are used in such a way as would never have been possible if he had gone back to the source of these conceptions and to their true content which is determined thereby4 ,for then he would have found as the source and content of substance simply matter1 of ground 7if things of the real world are in question7 simply cause1 that is1 the prior change which brings about the later change1 c4 ,it is true that in this case such an investigation would not have led to the intended result4 ,but everywhere1 as here1 such unduly wide conceptions1 under which1 therefore1 more was subsumed than their true content would have justified1 there have arisen false principles1 and from these false systems4 ,spinoza's whole method of demonstration rests upon such uninvestigated and too widely comprehended conceptions4 ,now here lies the great merit of ,locke1 who1 in order to counteract all that dogmatic unreality1 insisted upon the investigation of the origin of the conceptions1 and thus led back to perception and experience4 ,bacon had worked in a similar frame of mind1 yet more with reference to ,physics than to ,metaphysics4 ,kant followed the path entered upon by ,locke1 but in a higher sense and much further1 as has already been mentioned above4 ,to the men of mere show who succeeded in diverting the attention of the public from ,kant to themselves the results obtained by ,locke and ,kant were inconvenient4 ,but in such a case they know how to ignore both the dead and the living4 ,thus without hesitation they forsook the only right path which had at last been found by those wise men1 and philosophised at random with all kinds of indiscriminately collected conceptions1 unconcerned as to their origin and content1 till at last the substance of the ,hegelian philosophy1 wise beyond measure1 was that the conceptions had no origin at all1 but were rather themselves the origin and source of things4 ,but ,kant has erred in this respect4 ,he has too much neglected empirical perception for the sake of pure perception--a point which ,i have fully discussed in my criticism of his philosophy4 ,with me perception is throughout the source of all knowledge4 ,i early recognised the misleading and insidious nature of abstractions1 and in #ahac1 in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 ,i pointed out the difference of the relations which are thought under this conception4 ,general conceptions must indeed be the material in which philosophy deposits and stores up its knowledge1 but not the source from which it draws it2 the terminus ad quem1 not a quo4 ,it is not1 as ,kant defines it1 a science drawn from conceptions1 but a science in conceptions4 ,thus the conception of causality also1 with which we are here concerned1 has always been taken far too widely by philosophers for the furtherance of their dogmatic ends1 and much was imported into it which does not belong to it at all4 ,hence arose propositions such as the following3 8,all that is has its cause0--8the effect cannot contain more than the cause1 thus nothing that was not also in the cause0--8causa est nobilior suo effectu10 and many others just as unwarranted4 ,the following subtilty of that insipid gossip ,proclus affords an elaborate and specially lucid example of this4 ,it occurs in his 8,institutio ,theologica10 #gf3 8 1 2 1 2 1 1 40 7,quidquid ab immobili causa manat1 immutabilem habet essentiam substantiam4 ,quidquid vero a mobili causa manat1 essentiam habet mutabilem4 ,si enim illud1 quod aliquid facit1 est prorsus immobile1 non per motum1 sed per ipsum ,esse producit ipsum secundum ex se ipso47 ,excellent6 ,but just show me a cause which is not itself set in motion3 it is simply impossible4 ,but here1 as in so many cases1 abstraction has thought away all determinations down to that one which it is desired to make use of without regard to the fact that the latter cannot exist without the former4 ,the only correct expression of the law of causality is this3 ,every change has its cause in another change which immediately precedes it4 ,if something happens1 i4e41 if a new state of things appears1 i4e41 if something is changed1 then something else must have changed immediately before1 and something else again before this1 and so on ad infinitum1 for a first cause is as impossible to conceive as a beginning of time or a limit of space4 ,more than this the law of causality does not assert4 ,thus its claims only arise in the case of changes4 ,so long as nothing changes there can be no question of a cause4 ,for there is no a priori ground for inferring from the existence of given things1 i4e41 states of matter1 their previous non-existence1 and from this again their coming into being1 that is to say1 there is no a priori ground for inferring a change4 ,therefore the mere existence of a thing does not justify us in inferring that it has a cause4 ,yet there may be a posteriori reasons1 that is1 reasons drawn from previous experience1 for the assumption that the present state or condition did not always exist1 but has only come into existence in consequence of another state1 and therefore by means of a change1 the cause of which is then to be sought1 and also the cause of this cause4 ,here then we are involved in the infinite regressus to which the application of the law of causality always leads4 ,we said above3 8,things1 i4e41 states or conditions of matter10 for change and causality have only to do with states or conditions4 ,it is these states which we understand by form1 in the wider sense2 and only the forms change1 the matter is permanent4 ,thus it is only the form which is subject to the law of causality4 ,but the form constitutes the thing1 i4e41 it is the ground of the difference of things2 while matter must be thought as the same in all4 ,therefore the ,schoolmen said1 8,forma dat esse rei20 more accurately this proposition would run3 ,forma dat rei essentiam1 materia existentiam4 ,therefore the question as to the cause of a thing always concerns merely its form1 i4e41 its state or quality1 and not its matter1 and indeed only the former so far as we have grounds for assuming that it has not always existed1 but has come into being by means of a change4 ,the union of form and matter1 or of essentia and existentia1 gives the concrete1 which is always particular2 thus1 the thing4 ,and it is the forms whose union with matter1 i4e41 whose appearance in matter by means of a change1 are subject to the law of causality4 ,by taking the conception too widely in the abstract the mistake slipped in of extending causality to the thing absolutely1 that is1 to its whole inner nature and existence1 thus also to matter1 and ultimately it was thought justifiable to ask for a cause of the world itself4 ,this is the origin of the cosmological proof4 ,this proof begins by inferring from the existence of the world its non-existence1 which preceded its existence1 and such an inference is quite unjustifiable2 it ends1 however1 with the most fearful inconsistency1 for it does away altogether with the law of causality1 from which alone it derives all its evidencing power1 for it stops at a first cause1 and will not go further2 thus ends1 as it were1 by committing parricide1 as the bees kill the drones after they have served their end4 ,all the talk about the absolute is referable to a shamefast1 and therefore disguised cosmological proof1 which1 in the face of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 has passed for philosophy in ,germany for the last sixty years4 ,what does the absolute mean8 ,something that is1 and of which 7under pain of punishment7 we dare not ask further whence and why it is4 ,a precious rarity for professors of philosophy6 ,in the case1 however1 of the honestly expressed cosmological proof1 through the assumption of a first cause1 and therefore of a first beginning in a time which has absolutely no beginning1 this beginning is always pushed further back by the question3 ,why not earlier8 ,and so far back indeed that one never gets down from it to the present1 but is always marvelling that the present itself did not occur already millions of years ago4 ,in general1 then1 the law of causality applies to all things in the world1 but not to the world itself1 for it is immanent in the world1 not transcendent2 with it it comes into action1 and with it it is abolished4 ,this depends ultimately upon the fact that it belongs to the mere form of our understanding1 like the whole of the objective world1 which accordingly is merely phenomenal1 and is conditioned by the understanding4 ,thus the law of causality has full application1 without any exception1 to all things in the world1 of course in respect of their form1 to the variation of these forms1 and thus to their changes4 ,it is valid for the actions of men as for the impact of a stone1 yet1 as we have said always1 merely with regard to events1 to changes4 ,but if we abstract from its origin in the understanding and try to look at it as purely objective1 it will be found in ultimate analysis to depend upon the fact that everything that acts does so by virtue of its original1 and therefore eternal or timeless1 power2 therefore its present effect would necessarily have occurred infinitely earlier1 that is1 before all conceivable time1 but that it lacked the temporal condition4 ,this temporal condition is the occasion1 i4e41 the cause1 on account of which alone the effect only takes place now1 but now takes place necessarily2 the cause assigns it its place in time4 ,but in consequence of that unduly wide view in abstract thought of the conception cause1 which was considered above1 it has been confounded with the conception of force4 ,this is something completely different from the cause1 but yet is that which imparts to every cause its causality1 i4e41 the capability of producing an effect4 ,i have explained this fully and thoroughly in the second book of the first volume1 also in 8,the ,will in ,nature10 and finally also in the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #bj1 p4 #dd 7third edition1 p4 #de74 ,this confusion is to be found in its most aggravated form in ,maine de ,biran's book mentioned above1 and this is dealt with more fully in the place last referred to2 but apart from this it is also very common2 for example1 when people seek for the cause of any original force1 such as gravitation4 ,kant himself 7ber den ,einzig ,mglichen ,beweisgrund1 vol4 i4 p4 #baa-bae of ,rosenkranz's edition7 calls the forces of nature 8efficient causes10 and says 8gravity is a cause40 ,yet it is impossible to see to the bottom of his thought so long as force and cause are not distinctly recognised as completely different4 ,but the use of abstract conceptions leads very easily to their confusion if the consideration of their origin is set aside4 ,the knowledge of causes and effects1 always perceptive1 which rests on the form of the understanding1 is neglected in order to stick to the abstraction cause4 ,in this way alone is the conception of causality1 with all its simplicity1 so very frequently wrongly apprehended4 ,therefore even in ,aristotle 78,metaph410 iv4 #b7 we find causes divided into four classes which are utterly falsely1 and indeed crudely conceived4 ,compare with it my classification of causes as set forth for the first time in my essay on sight and colour1 chap4 #a1 and touched upon briefly in the sixth paragraph of the first volume of the present work1 but expounded at full length in my prize essay on the freedom of the will1 p4 #cj-cc4 ,two things in nature remain untouched by that chain of causality which stretches into infinity in both directions2 these are matter and the forces of nature4 ,they are both conditions of causality1 while everything else is conditioned by it4 ,for the one 7matter7 is that in which the states and their changes appear2 the other 7forces of nature7 is that by virtue of which alone they can appear at all4 ,here1 however1 one must remember that in the second book1 and later and more thoroughly in 8,the ,will in ,nature10 the natural forces are shown to be identical with the will in us2 but matter appears as the mere visibility of the will2 so that ultimately it also may in a certain sense be regarded as identical with the will4 ,on the other hand1 not less true and correct is what is explained in #d of the first book1 and still better in the second edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason at the end of #ba1 p4 #gg 7third edition1 p4 #hb71 that matter is causality itself objectively comprehended1 for its entire nature consists in acting in general1 so that it itself is thus the activity 7 reality7 of things generally1 as it were the abstraction of all their different kinds of acting4 ,accordingly1 since the essence1 essentia1 of matter consists in action in general1 and the reality1 existentia1 of things consists in their materiality1 which thus again is one with action in general1 it may be asserted of matter that in it existentia and essentia unite and are one1 for it has no other attribute than existence itself in general and independent of all fuller definitions of it4 ,on the other hand1 all empirically given matter1 thus all material or matter in the special sense 7which our ignorant materialists at the present day confound with matter71 has already entered the framework of the forms and manifests itself only through their qualities and accidents1 because in experience every action is of quite a definite and special kind1 and is never merely general4 ,therefore pure matter is an object of thought alone1 not of perception1 which led ,plotinus 7,enneas ,,ii41 lib4 iv41 c4 #h #i7 and ,giordano ,bruno 7,della ,causa1 dial4 #d7 to make the paradoxical assertion that matter has no extension1 for extension is inseparable from the form1 and that therefore it is incorporeal4 ,yet ,aristotle had already taught that it is not a body although it is corporeal3 8 1 0 7,stob4 ,ecl41 lib4 i41 c4 #ab1 #e74 ,in reality we think under pure matter only action1 in the abstract1 quite independent of the kind of action1 thus pure causality itself2 and as such it is not an object but a condition of experience1 just like space and time4 ,this is the reason why in the accompanying table of our pure a priori knowledge matter is able to take the place of causality1 and therefore appears along with space and time as the third pure form1 and therefore as dependent on our intellect4 ,this table contains all the fundamental truths which are rooted in our perceptive or intuitive knowledge a priori1 expressed as first principles independent of each other4 ,what is special1 however1 what forms the content of arithmetic and geometry1 is not given here1 nor yet what only results from the union and application of those formal principles of knowledge4 ,this is the subject of the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science0 expounded by ,kant1 to which this table in some measure forms the propdutic and introduction1 and with which it therefore stands in direct connection4 ,in this table ,i have primarily had in view the very remarkable parallelism of those a priori principles of knowledge which form the framework of all experience1 but specially also the fact that1 as ,i have explained in #d of the first volume1 matter 7and also causality7 is to be regarded as a combination1 or if it is preferred1 an amalgamation1 of space and time4 ,in agreement with this1 we find that what geometry is for the pure perception or intuition of space1 and arithmetic for that of time1 ,kant's phoronomy is for the pure perception or intuition of the two united4 ,for matter is primarily that which is movable in space4 ,the mathematical point cannot even be conceived as movable1 as ,aristotle has shown 78,physics10 vi4 #aj74 ,this philosopher also himself provided the first example of such a science1 for in the fifth and sixth books of his 8,physics0 he determined a priori the laws of rest and motion4 ,now this table may be regarded at pleasure either as a collection of the eternal laws of the world1 and therefore as the basis of our ontology1 or as a chapter of the physiology of the brain1 according as one assumes the realistic or the idealistic point of view2 but the second is in the last instance right4 ,on this point1 indeed1 we have already come to an understanding in the first chapter2 yet ,i wish further to illustrate it specially by an example4 ,aristotle's book 8,de ,xenophane10 c41 commences with these weighty words of ,xenophanes3 8 1 1 40 7ternum esse1 inquit1 quicquid est1 siquidem fieri non potest1 ut ex nihilo quippiam existat47 ,here1 then1 ,xenophanes judges as to the origin of things1 as regards its possibility1 and of this origin he can have had no experience1 even by analogy2 nor indeed does he appeal to experience1 but judges apodictically1 and therefore a priori4 ,how can he do this if as a stranger he looks from without into a world that exists purely objectively1 that is1 independently of his knowledge8 ,how can he1 an ephemeral being hurrying past1 to whom only a hasty glance into such a world is permitted1 judge apodictically1 a priori and without experience concerning that world1 the possibility of its existence and origin8 ,the solution of this riddle is that the man has only to do with his own ideas1 which as such are the work of his brain1 and the constitution of which is merely the manner or mode in which alone the function of his brain can be fulfilled1 i4e41 the form of his perception4 ,he thus judges only as to the phenomena of his own brain1 and declares what enters into its forms1 time1 space1 and causality1 and what does not4 ,in this he is perfectly at home and speaks apodictically4 ,in a like sense1 then1 the following table of the ,prdicabilia a priori of time1 space1 and matter is to be taken3-- ,prdicabilia ,a ,priori4 ,of ,time4 ,of ,space4 ,of ,matter4 7#a7 ,there is only 7#a7 ,there is only 7#a7 ,there is only one ,time1 and all one ,space1 and all one ,matter1 and different times are different spaces are all different parts of it4 parts of it4 materials are different states of matter2 as such it is called ,substance4 7#b7 ,different times 7#b7 ,different spaces 7#b7 ,different are not simultaneous are not successive matters 7materials7 but successive4 but simultaneous4 are not so through substance but through accidents4 7#c7 ,time cannot be 7#c7 ,space cannot be 7#c7 ,annihilation of thought away1 but thought away1 but matter is everything can be everything can be inconceivable1 but thought away from thought away from annihilation of all it4 it4 its forms and qualities is conceivable4 7#d7 ,time has three 7#d7 ,space has three 7#d7 ,matter exists1 divisions1 the past1 dimensions--height1 i4e41 acts in all the present1 and the breadth1 and length4 the dimensions of future1 which space and throughout constitute two the whole length of directions and a time1 and thus these centre of two are united and indifference4 thereby filled4 ,in this consists the true nature of matter2 thus it is through and through causality4 7#e7 ,time is 7#e7 ,space is 7#e7 ,matter is infinitely infinitely infinitely divisible4 divisible4 divisible4 7#f7 ,time is 7#f7 ,space is 7#f7 ,matter is homogeneous and a homogeneous and a homogeneous and a ,continuum1 i4e41 ,continuum1 i4e41 ,continuum1 i4e41 no one of its parts no one of its parts it does not consist is different from is different from of originally the rest1 nor the rest1 nor different separated from it by separated from it by 7homoiomeria7 or anything that is not anything that is not originally separated time4 space4 parts 7atoms72 it is therefore not composed of parts1 which would necessarily be separated by something that was not matter4 7#g7 ,time has no 7#g7 ,space has no 7#g7 ,matter has no beginning and no limits1 but all origin and no end1 end1 but all limits are in it4 but all coming into beginning and end is being and passing in it4 away are in it4 7#h7 ,by reason of 7#h7 ,by reason of 7#h7 ,by reason of time we count4 space we measure4 matter we weigh4 7#i7 ,rhythm is only 7#i7 ,symmetry is only 7#i7 ,equilibrium is in time4 in space4 only in matter4 7#aj7 ,we know the 7#aj7 ,we know the 7#aj7 ,we know the laws of time a laws of space a laws of the priori4 priori4 substance of all accidents a priori4 7#aa7 ,time can be 7#aa7 ,space is 7#aa7 ,matter can only perceived a immediately be thought a priori1 although perceptible a priori4 only in the form of priori4 a line4 7#ab7 ,time has no 7#ab7 ,space can never 7#ab7 ,the accidents permanence1 but pass away1 but change2 the passes away as soon endures through all substance remains4 as it is there4 time4 7#ac7 ,time never 7#ac7 ,space is 7#ac7 ,matter is rests4 immovable4 indifferent to rest and motion1 i4e41 it is originally disposed towards neither of the two4 7#ad7 ,everything that 7#ad7 ,everything that 7#ad7 ,everything exists in time has exists in space has material has the duration4 a position4 capacity for action4 7#ae7 ,time has no 7#ae7 ,space has no 7#ae7 ,matter is what duration1 but all motion1 but all is permanent in time duration is in it1 motion is in it1 and and movable in and is the it is the change of space2 by the persistence of what position of what is comparison of what is permanent in moved1 in contrast rests with what is contrast with its with its unbroken moved we measure restless course4 rest4 duration4 7#af7 ,all motion is 7#af7 ,all motion is 7#af7 ,all motion is only possible in only possible in only possible to time4 space4 matter4 7#ag7 ,velocity is1 in 7#ag7 ,velocity is1 in 7#ag7 ,the magnitude equal spaces1 in equal times1 in of the motion1 the inverse proportion direct proportion to velocity being to the time4 the space4 equal1 is in direct geometrical proportion to the matter 7mass74 7#ah7 ,time is not 7#ah7 ,space is 7#ah7 ,matter as such measurable directly measurable directly 7mass7 is through itself1 but through itself1 and measurable1 i4e41 only indirectly indirectly through determinable as through motion1 motion1 which is in regards its quantity which is in space time and space only indirectly1 and time together3 together2 hence1 for only through the thus the motion of example1 an hour's amount of the motion the sun and of the journey1 and the which it receives clock measure time4 distance of the and imparts when it fixed stars is repelled or expressed as the attracted4 travelling of light for so many years4 7#ai7 ,time is 7#ai7 ,space is 7#ai7 ,matter is omnipresent4 ,every eternal4 ,every part absolute4 ,that is1 part of time is of it exists always4 it neither comes everywhere1 i4e41 into being nor in all space1 at passes away1 and once4 thus its quantity can neither be increased nor diminished4 7#bj7 ,in time taken 7#bj7 ,in space taken 7#bj1 #ba7 ,matter by itself everything by itself everything unites the ceaseless would be in would be flight of time with succession4 simultaneous4 the rigid immobility of space2 therefore it is the permanent substance of the changing accidents4 ,causality determines this change for every place at every time1 and thereby combines time and space1 and constitutes the whole nature of matter4 7#ba7 ,time makes the 7#ba7 ,space makes the change of accidents permanence of possible4 substance possible4 7#bb7 ,every part of 7#bb7 ,no part of 7#bb7 ,for matter is time contains all space contains the both permanent and parts of matter4 same matter as impenetrable4 another4 7#bc7 ,time is the 7#bc7 ,space is the 7#bc7 ,individuals are principium principium material4 individuationis4 individuationis4 7#bd7 ,the now has no 7#bd7 ,the point has 7#bd7 ,the atom has no duration4 no extension4 reality4 7#be7 ,time in itself 7#be7 ,space in itself 7#be7 ,matter in is empty and without is empty and without itself is without properties4 properties4 form and quality1 and likewise inert1 i4e41 indifferent to rest or motion1 thus without properties4 7#bf7 ,every moment is 7#bf7 ,by the position 7#bf7 ,every change in conditioned by the of every limit in matter can take preceding moment1 space with reference place only on and is only because to any other limit1 account of another the latter has its position with change which ceased to be4 reference to every preceded it2 and 7,principle of possible limit is therefore a first sufficient reason of precisely change1 and thus existence in determined4 also a first state time4--,see my essay 7,principle of of matter1 is just on the principle of sufficient reason of as inconceivable as sufficient reason47 existence in space47 a beginning of time or a limit of space4 7,principle of sufficient reason of becoming47 7#bg7 ,time makes 7#bg7 ,space makes 7#bg7 ,matter1 as that arithmetic possible4 geometry possible4 which is movable in space1 makes phoronomy possible4 7#bh7 ,the simple 7#bh7 ,the simple 7#bh7 ,the simple element in element in geometry element in phoronomy arithmetic is unity4 is the point4 is the atom4 ,notes to the ,annexed ,table4 7#a7 ,to ,no4 #d of ,matter4 ,the essence of matter is acting1 it is acting itself1 in the abstract1 thus acting in general apart from all difference of the kind of action3 it is through and through causality4 ,on this account it is itself1 as regards its existence1 not subject to the law of causality1 and thus has neither come into being nor passes away1 for otherwise the law of causality would be applied to itself4 ,since now causality is known to us a priori1 the conception of matter1 as the indestructible basis of all that exists1 can so far take its place in the knowledge we possess a priori1 inasmuch as it is only the realisation of an a priori form of our knowledge4 ,for as soon as we see anything that acts or is causally efficient it presents itself eo ipso as material1 and conversely anything material presents itself as necessarily active or causally efficient4 ,they are in fact interchangeable conceptions4 ,therefore the word 8actual0 is used as synonymous with 8material20 and also the ,greek 1 in opposition to 1 reveals the same source1 for signifies action in general2 so also with actu in opposition to potentia1 and the ,english 8actually0 for 8wirklich40 ,what is called space-occupation1 or impenetrability1 and regarded as the essential predicate of body 7i4e4 of what is material71 is merely that kind of action which belongs to all bodies without exception1 the mechanical4 ,it is this universality alone1 by virtue of which it belongs to the conception of body1 and follows a priori from this conception1 and therefore cannot be thought away from it without doing away with the conception itself--it is this1 ,i say1 that distinguishes it from any other kind of action1 such as that of electricity or chemistry1 or light or heat4 ,kant has very accurately analysed this space-occupation of the mechanical mode of activity into repulsive and attractive force1 just as a given mechanical force is analysed into two others by means of the parallelogram of forces4 ,but this is really only the thoughtful analysis of the phenomenon into its two constituent parts4 ,the two forces in conjunction exhibit the body within its own limits1 that is1 in a definite volume1 while the one alone would diffuse it into infinity1 and the other alone would contract it to a point4 ,notwithstanding this reciprocal balancing or neutralisation1 the body still acts upon other bodies which contest its space with the first force1 repelling them1 and with the other force1 in gravitation1 attracting all bodies in general4 ,so that the two forces are not extinguished in their product1 as1 for instance1 two equal forces acting in different directions1 or ,e and -,e1 or oxygen and hydrogen in water4 ,that impenetrability and gravity really exactly coincide is shown by their empirical inseparableness1 in that the one never appears without the other1 although we can separate them in thought4 ,i must not1 however1 omit to mention that the doctrine of ,kant referred to1 which forms the fundamental thought of the second part of his 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science10 thus of the ,dynamics1 was distinctly and fully expounded before ,kant by ,priestley1 in his excellent 8,disquisitions on ,matter and ,spirit10 #a and #b1 a book which appeared in #aggg1 and the second edition in #aghb1 while ,kant's work was published in #aghf4 ,unconscious recollection may certainly be assumed in the case of subsidiary thoughts1 flashes of wit1 comparisons1 c41 but not in the case of the principal and fundamental thought4 ,shall we then believe that ,kant silently appropriated such important thoughts of another man8 and this from a book which at that time was new8 ,or that this book was unknown to him1 and that the same thoughts sprang up in two minds within a short time8 ,the explanation1 also1 which ,kant gives1 in the 8,metaphysical ,first ,principles of ,natural ,science0 7first edition1 p4 #hh2 ,rosenkranz's edition1 p4 #chd71 of the real difference between fluids and solids1 is in substance already to be found in ,kaspar ,freidr4 ,wolff's 8,theory of ,generation10 ,berlin #agfd1 p4 #acb4 ,but what are we to say if we find ,kant's most important and brilliant doctrine1 that of the ideality of space and the merely phenomenal existence of the corporeal world1 already expressed by ,maupertuis thirty years earlier8 ,this will be found more fully referred to in ,frauenstdt's letters on my philosophy1 ,letter #ad4 ,maupertuis expresses this paradoxical doctrine so decidedly1 and yet without adducing any proof of it1 that one must suppose that he also took it from somewhere else4 ,it is very desirable that the matter should be further investigated1 and as this would demand tiresome and extensive researches1 some ,german ,academy might very well make the question the subject of a prize essay4 ,now in the same relation as that in which ,kant here stands to ,priestley1 and perhaps also to ,kaspar ,wolff1 and ,maupertuis or his predecessor1 ,laplace stands to ,kant4 ,for the principal and fundamental thought of ,laplace's admirable and certainly correct theory of the origin of the planetary system1 which is set forth in his 8,exposition du ,systme du ,monde10 liv4 v4 c4 #b1 was expressed by ,kant nearly fifty years before1 in #agee1 in his 8,naturgeschichte und ,theorie des ,himmels10 and more fully in #agfc in his 8,einzig mglichen ,beweisgrund des ,daseyns ,gottes10 ch4 #g4 ,moreover1 in the later work he gives us to understand that ,lambert in his 8,kosmologischen ,briefen10 #agfa1 tacitly adopted that doctrine from him1 and these letters at the same time also appeared in ,french 7,lettres ,cosmologiques sur la ,constitution de l',univers74 ,we are therefore obliged to assume that ,laplace knew that ,kantian doctrine4 ,certainly he expounds the matter more thoroughly1 strikingly1 and fully1 and at the same time more simply than ,kant1 as is natural from his more profound astronomical knowledge2 yet in the main it is to be found clearly expressed in ,kant1 and on account of the importance of the matter1 would alone have been sufficient to make his name immortal4 ,it cannot but disturb us very much if we find minds of the first order under suspicion of dishonesty1 which would be a scandal to those of the lowest order4 ,for we feel that theft is even more inexcusable in a rich man than in a poor one4 ,we dare not1 however1 be silent2 for here we are posterity1 and must be just1 as we hope that posterity will some day be just to us4 ,therefore1 as a third example1 ,i will add to these cases1 that the fundamental thoughts of the 8,metamorphosis of ,plants10 by ,goethe1 were already expressed by ,kaspar ,wolff in #agfd in his 8,theory of ,generation10 p4 #adh1 #bbi1 #bdc1 c4 ,indeed1 is it otherwise with the system of gravitation8 the discovery of which is on the ,continent of ,europe always ascribed to ,newton1 while in ,england the learned at least know very well that it belongs to ,robert ,hooke1 who in the year #afff1 in a 8,communication to the ,royal ,society10 expounds it quite distinctly1 although only as an hypothesis and without proof4 ,the principal passage of this communication is quoted in ,dugald ,stewart's 8,philosophy of the ,human ,mind10 and is probably taken from ,robert ,hooke's ,posthumous ,works4 ,the history of the matter1 and how ,newton got into difficulty by it1 is also to be found in the 8,biographie ,universelle10 article ,newton4 ,hooke's priority is treated as an established fact in a short history of astronomy1 ,quarterly ,review1 ,august #ahbh4 ,further details on this subject are to be found in my 8,parerga10 vol4 ii41 #hf 7second edition1 #hh74 ,the story of the fall of an apple is a fable as groundless as it is popular1 and is quite without authority4 7#b7 ,to ,no4 #ah of ,matter4 ,the quantity of a motion 7quantitas motus1 already in ,descartes7 is the product of the mass into the velocity4 ,this law is the basis not only of the doctrine of impact in mechanics1 but also of that of equilibrium in statics4 ,from the force of impact which two bodies with the same velocity exert the relation of their masses to each other may be determined4 ,thus of two hammers striking with the same velocity1 the one which has the greater mass will drive the nail deeper into the wall or the post deeper into the earth4 ,for example1 a hammer weighing six pounds with a velocity #f effects as much as a hammer weighing three pounds with a velocity #ab1 for in both cases the quantity of motion or the momentum #cf4 ,of two balls rolling at the same pace1 the one which has the greater mass will impel a third ball at rest to a greater distance than the ball of less mass can4 ,for the mass of the first multiplied by the same velocity gives a greater quantity of motion1 or a greater momentum4 ,the cannon carries further than the gun1 because an equal velocity communicated to a much greater mass gives a much greater quantity of motion1 which resists longer the retarding effect of gravity4 ,for the same reason1 the same arm will throw a lead bullet further than a stone one of equal magnitude1 or a large stone further than quite a small one4 ,and therefore also a case-shot does not carry so far as a ball-shot4 ,the same law lies at the foundation of the theory of the lever and of the balance4 ,for here also the smaller mass1 on the longer arm of the lever or beam of the balance1 has a greater velocity in falling2 and multiplied by this it may be equal to1 or indeed exceed1 the quantity of motion or the momentum of the greater mass at the shorter arm of the lever4 ,in the state of rest brought about by equilibrium this velocity exists merely in intention or virtually1 potenti1 not actu2 but it acts just as well as actu1 which is very remarkable4 ,the following explanation will be more easily understood now that these truths have been called to mind4 ,the quantity of a given matter can only be estimated in general according to its force1 and its force can only be known in its expression4 ,now when we are considering matter only as regards its quantity1 not its quality1 this expression can only be mechanical1 i4e41 it can only consist in motion which it imparts to other matter4 ,for only in motion does the force of matter become1 so to speak1 alive2 hence the expression vis viva for the manifestation of force of matter in motion4 ,accordingly the only measure of the quantity of a given matter is the quantity of its motion1 or its momentum4 ,in this1 however1 if it is given1 the quantity of matter still appears in conjunction and amalgamated with its other factor1 velocity4 ,therefore if we want to know the quantity of matter 7the mass7 this other factor must be eliminated4 ,now the velocity is known directly2 for it is ,s_/,t4 ,but the other factor1 which remains when this is eliminated1 can always be known only relatively in comparison with other masses1 which again can only be known themselves by means of the quantity of their motion1 or their momentum1 thus in their combination with velocity4 ,we must therefore compare one quantity of motion with the other1 and then subtract the velocity from both1 in order to see how much each of them owed to its mass4 ,this is done by weighing the masses against each other1 in which that quantity of motion is compared which1 in each of the two masses1 calls forth the attractive power of the earth that acts upon both only in proportion to their quantity4 ,therefore there are two kinds of weighing4 ,either we impart to the two masses to be compared equal velocity1 in order to find out which of the two now communicates motion to the other1 thus itself has a greater quantity of motion1 which1 since the velocity is the same on both sides1 is to be ascribed to the other factor of the quantity of motion or the momentum1 thus to the mass 7common balance74 ,or we weigh1 by investigating how much more velocity the one mass must receive than the other has1 in order to be equal to the latter in quantity of motion or momentum1 and therefore allow no more motion to be communicated to itself by the other2 for then in proportion as its velocity must exceed that of the other1 its mass1 i4e41 the quantity of its matter1 is less than that of the other 7steelyard74 ,this estimation of masses by weighing depends upon the favourable circumstance that the moving force1 in itself1 acts upon both quite equally1 and each of the two is in a position to communicate to the other directly its surplus quantity of motion or momentum1 so that it becomes visible4 ,the substance of these doctrines has long ago been expressed by ,newton and ,kant1 but through the connection and the clearness of this exposition ,i believe ,i have made it more intelligible1 so that that insight is possible for all which ,i regarded as necessary for the justification of proposition ,no4 #ah4 ,second ,half4 ,the ,doctrine of the ,abstract ,idea1 or ,thinking4 ,chapter ,v47#af7 ,on ,the ,irrational ,intellect4 ,it must be possible to arrive at a complete knowledge of the consciousness of the brutes1 for we can construct it by abstracting certain properties of our own consciousness4 ,on the other hand1 there enters into the consciousness of the brute instinct1 which is much more developed in all of them than in man1 and in some of them extends to what we call mechanical instinct4 ,the brutes have understanding without having reason1 and therefore they have knowledge of perception but no abstract knowledge4 ,they apprehend correctly1 and also grasp the immediate causal connection1 in the case of the higher species even through several links of its chain1 but they do not1 properly speaking1 think4 ,for they lack conceptions1 that is1 abstract ideas4 ,the first consequence of this1 however1 is the want of a proper memory1 which applies even to the most sagacious of the brutes1 and it is just this which constitutes the principal difference between their consciousness and that of men4 ,perfect intelligence depends upon the distinct consciousness of the past and of the eventual future1 as such1 and in connection with the present4 ,the special memory which this demands is therefore an orderly1 connected1 and thinking retrospective recollection4 ,this1 however1 is only possible by means of general conceptions1 the assistance of which is required by what is entirely individual1 in order that it may be recalled in its order and connection4 ,for the boundless multitude of things and events of the same and similar kinds1 in the course of our life1 does not admit directly of a perceptible and individual recollection of each particular1 for which neither the powers of the most comprehensive memory nor our time would be sufficient4 ,therefore all this can only be preserved by subsuming it under general conceptions1 and the consequent reference to relatively few principles1 by means of which we then have always at command an orderly and adequate survey of our past4 ,we can only present to ourselves in perception particular scenes of the past1 but the time that has passed since then and its content we are conscious of only in the abstract by means of conceptions of things and numbers which now represent days and years1 together with their content4 ,the memory of the brutes1 on the contrary1 like their whole intellect1 is confined to what they perceive1 and primarily consists merely in the fact that a recurring impression presents itself as having already been experienced1 for the present perception revivifies the traces of an earlier one4 ,their memory is therefore always dependent upon what is now actually present4 ,just on this account1 however1 this excites anew the sensation and the mood which the earlier phenomenon produced4 ,thus the dog recognises acquaintances1 distinguishes friends from enemies1 easily finds again the path it has once travelled1 the houses it has once visited1 and at the sight of a plate or a stick is at once put into the mood associated with them4 ,all kinds of training depend upon the use of this perceptive memory and on the force of habit1 which in the case of animals is specially strong4 ,it is therefore just as different from human education as perception is from thinking4 ,we ourselves are in certain cases1 in which memory proper refuses us its service1 confined to that merely perceptive recollection1 and thus we can measure the difference between the two from our own experience4 ,for example1 at the sight of a person whom it appears to us we know1 although we are not able to remember when or where we saw him2 or again1 when we visit a place where we once were in early childhood1 that is1 while our reason was yet undeveloped1 and which we have therefore entirely forgotten1 and yet feel that the present impression is one which we have already experienced4 ,this is the nature of all the recollections of the brutes4 ,we have only to add that in the case of the most sagacious this merely perceptive memory rises to a certain degree of phantasy1 which again assists it1 and by virtue of which1 for example1 the image of its absent master floats before the mind of the dog and excites a longing after him1 so that when he remains away long it seeks for him everywhere4 ,its dreams also depend upon this phantasy4 ,the consciousness of the brutes is accordingly a mere succession of presents1 none of which1 however1 exist as future before they appear1 nor as past after they have vanished2 which is the specific difference of human consciousness4 ,hence the brutes have infinitely less to suffer than we have1 because they know no other pains but those which the present directly brings4 ,but the present is without extension1 while the future and the past1 which contain most of the causes of our suffering1 are widely extended1 and to their actual content there is added that which is merely possible1 which opens up an unlimited field for desire and aversion4 ,the brutes1 on the contrary1 undisturbed by these1 enjoy quietly and peacefully each present moment1 even if it is only bearable4 ,human beings of very limited capacity perhaps approach them in this4 ,further1 the sufferings which belong purely to the present can only be physical4 ,indeed the brutes do not properly speaking feel death3 they can only know it when it appears1 and then they are already no more4 ,thus then the life of the brute is a continuous present4 ,it lives on without reflection1 and exists wholly in the present2 even the great majority of men live with very little reflection4 ,another consequence of the special nature of the intellect of the brutes1 which we have explained is the perfect accordance of their consciousness with their environment4 ,between the brute and the external world there is nothing1 but between us and the external world there is always our thought about it1 which makes us often inapproachable to it1 and it to us4 ,only in the case of children and very primitive men is this wall of partition so thin that in order to see what goes on in them we only need to see what goes on round about them4 ,therefore the brutes are incapable alike of purpose and dissimulation2 they reserve nothing4 ,in this respect the dog stands to the man in the same relation as a glass goblet to a metal one1 and this helps greatly to endear the dog so much to us1 for it affords us great pleasure to see all those inclinations and emotions which we so often conceal displayed simply and openly in him4 ,in general1 the brutes always play1 as it were1 with their hand exposed2 and therefore we contemplate with so much pleasure their behaviour towards each other1 both when they belong to the same and to different species4 ,it is characterised by a certain stamp of innocence1 in contrast to the conduct of men1 which is withdrawn from the innocence of nature by the entrance of reason1 and with it of prudence or deliberation4 ,hence human conduct has throughout the stamp of intention or deliberate purpose1 the absence of which1 and the consequent determination by the impulse of the moment1 is the fundamental characteristic of all the action of the brutes4 ,no brute is capable of a purpose properly so-called4 ,to conceive and follow out a purpose is the prerogative of man1 and it is a prerogative which is rich in consequences4 ,certainly an instinct like that of the bird of passage or the bee1 still more a permanent1 persistent desire1 a longing like that of the dog for its absent master1 may present the appearance of a purpose1 with which1 however1 it must not be confounded4 ,now all this has its ultimate ground in the relation between the human and the brute intellect1 which may also be thus expressed3 ,the brutes have only direct knowledge1 while we1 in addition to this1 have indirect knowledge2 and the advantage which in many things--for example1 in trigonometry and analysis1 in machine work instead of hand work1 c4--indirect has over direct knowledge appears here also4 ,thus again we may say3 ,the brutes have only a single intellect1 we a double intellect1 both perceptive and thinking1 and the operation of the two often go on independently of each other4 ,we perceive one thing1 and we think another4 ,often1 again1 they act upon each other4 ,this way of putting the matter enables us specially to understand that natural openness and naivete of the brutes1 referred to above1 as contrasted with the concealment of man4 ,however1 the law natura non facit saltus is not entirely suspended even with regard to the intellect of the brutes1 though certainly the step from the brute to the human intelligence is the greatest which nature has made in the production of her creatures4 ,in the most favoured individuals of the highest species of the brutes there certainly sometimes appears1 always to our astonishment1 a faint trace of reflection1 reason1 the comprehension of words1 of thought1 purpose1 and deliberation4 ,the most striking indications of this kind are afforded by the elephant1 whose highly developed intelligence is heightened and supported by an experience of a lifetime which sometimes extends to two hundred years4 ,he has often given unmistakable signs1 recorded in well-known anecdotes1 of premeditation1 which1 in the case of brutes1 always astonishes us more than anything else4 ,such1 for instance1 is the story of the tailor on whom an elephant revenged himself for pricking him with a needle4 ,i wish1 however1 to rescue from oblivion a parallel case to this1 because it has the advantage of being authenticated by judicial investigation4 ,on the #bgth of ,august #ahcj there was held at ,morpeth1 in ,england1 a coroner's inquest on the keeper1 ,baptist ,bernhard1 who was killed by his elephant4 ,it appeared from the evidence that two years before he had offended the elephant grossly1 and now1 without any occasion1 but on a favourable opportunity1 the elephant had seized him and crushed him4 7,see the ,spectator and other ,english papers of that day47 ,for special information on the intelligence of brutes ,i recommend ,leroy's excellent book1 8,sur l',intelligence des ,animaux10 nouv4 d4 #ahjb4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,on ,the ,doctrine of ,abstract or ,rational ,knowledge4 ,the outward impression upon the senses1 together with the mood which it alone awakens in us1 vanishes with the presence of the thing4 ,therefore these two cannot of themselves constitute experience proper1 whose teaching is to guide our conduct for the future4 ,the image of that impression which the imagination preserves is originally weaker than the impression itself1 and becomes weaker and weaker daily1 until in time it disappears altogether4 ,there is only one thing which is not subject either to the instantaneous vanishing of the impression or to the gradual disappearance of its image1 and is therefore free from the power of time4 ,this is the conception4 ,in it1 then1 the teaching of experience must be stored up1 and it alone is suited to be a safe guide to our steps in life4 ,therefore ,seneca says rightly1 8,si vis tibi omnia subjicere1 te subjice rationi0 7,ep4 #cg74 ,and ,i add to this that the essential condition of surpassing others in actual life is that we should reflect or deliberate4 ,such an important tool of the intellect as the concept evidently cannot be identical with the word1 this mere sound1 which as an impression of sense passes with the moment1 or as a phantasm of hearing dies away with time4 ,yet the concept is an idea1 the distinct consciousness and preservation of which are bound up with the word4 ,hence the ,greeks called word1 concept1 relation1 thought1 and reason by the name of the first1 4 ,yet the concept is perfectly different both from the word1 to which it is joined1 and from the perceptions1 from which it has originated4 ,it is of an entirely different nature from these impressions of the senses4 ,yet it is able to take up into itself all the results of perception1 and give them back again unchanged and undiminished after the longest period of time2 thus alone does experience arise4 ,but the concept preserves1 not what is perceived nor what is then felt1 but only what is essential in these1 in an entirely altered form1 and yet as an adequate representative of them4 ,just as flowers cannot be preserved1 but their ethereal oil1 their essence1 with the same smell and the same virtues1 can be4 ,the action that has been guided by correct conceptions will1 in the result1 coincide with the real object aimed at4 ,we may judge of the inestimable value of conceptions1 and consequently of the reason1 if we glance for a moment at the infinite multitude and variety of the things and conditions that coexist and succeed each other1 and then consider that speech and writing 7the signs of conceptions7 are capable of affording us accurate information as to everything and every relation when and wherever it may have been2 for comparatively few conceptions can contain and represent an infinite number of things and conditions4 ,in our own reflection abstraction is a throwing off of useless baggage for the sake of more easily handling the knowledge which is to be compared1 and has therefore to be turned about in all directions4 ,we allow much that is unessential1 and therefore only confusing1 to fall away from the real things1 and work with few but essential determinations thought in the abstract4 ,but just because general conceptions are only formed by thinking away and leaving out existing qualities1 and are therefore the emptier the more general they are1 the use of this procedure is confined to the working up of knowledge which we have already acquired4 ,this working up includes the drawing of conclusions from premisses contained in our knowledge4 ,new insight1 on the contrary1 can only be obtained by the help of the faculty of judgment1 from perception1 which alone is complete and rich knowledge4 ,further1 because the content and the extent of the concepts stand in inverse relation to each other1 and thus the more is thought under a concept1 the less is thought in it1 concepts form a graduated series1 a hierarchy1 from the most special to the most general1 at the lower end of which scholastic realism is almost right1 and at the upper end nominalism4 ,for the most special conception is almost the individual1 thus almost real2 and the most general conception1 e4g41 being 7i4e41 the infinitive of the copula71 is scarcely anything but a word4 ,therefore philosophical systems which confine themselves to such very general conceptions1 without going down to the real1 are little more than mere juggling with words4 ,for since all abstraction consists in thinking away1 the further we push it the less we have left over4 ,therefore1 if ,i read those modern philosophemes which move constantly in the widest abstractions1 ,i am soon quite unable1 in spite of all attention1 to think almost anything more in connection with them2 for ,i receive no material for thought1 but am supposed to work with mere empty shells1 which gives me a feeling like that which we experience when we try to throw very light bodies2 the strength and also the exertion are there1 but there is no object to receive them1 so as to supply the other moment of motion4 ,if any one wants to experience this let him read the writings of the disciples of ,schelling1 or still better of the ,hegelians4 ,simple conceptions would necessarily be such as could not be broken up4 ,accordingly they could never be the subject of an analytical judgment4 ,this ,i hold to be impossible1 for if we think a conception we must also be able to give its content4 ,what are commonly adduced as examples of simple conceptions are really not conceptions at all1 but partly mere sensations--as1 for instance1 those of some special colour2 partly the forms of perception which are known to us a priori1 thus properly the ultimate elements of perceptive knowledge4 ,but this itself is for the whole system of our thought what granite is for geology1 the ultimate firm basis which supports all1 and beyond which we cannot go4 ,the distinctness of a conception demands not only that we should be able to separate its predicates1 but also that we should be able to analyse these even if they are abstractions1 and so on until we reach knowledge of perception1 and thus refer to concrete things through the distinct perception of which the final abstractions are verified and reality guaranteed to them1 as well as to all the higher abstractions which rest upon them4 ,therefore the ordinary explanation that the conception is distinct as soon as we can give its predicates is not sufficient4 ,for the separating of these predicates may lead perhaps to more conceptions2 and so on again without there being that ultimate basis of perceptions which imparts reality to all those conceptions4 ,take1 for example1 the conception 8spirit10 and analyse it into its predicates3 8,a thinking1 willing1 immaterial1 simple1 indestructible being that does not occupy space40 ,nothing is yet distinctly thought about it1 because the elements of these conceptions cannot be verified by means of perceptions1 for a thinking being without a brain is like a digesting being without a stomach4 ,only perceptions are1 properly speaking1 clear1 not conceptions2 these at the most can only be distinct4 ,hence also1 absurd as it was1 8clear and confused0 were coupled together and used as synonymous when knowledge of perception was explained as merely a confused abstract knowledge1 because the latter kind of knowledge alone was distinct4 ,this was first done by ,duns ,scotus1 but ,leibnitz has substantially the same view1 upon which his 8,identitas ,indiscernibilium0 depends4 7,see ,kant's refutation of this1 p4 #bge of the first edition of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason47 ,the close connection of the conception with the word1 thus of speech with reason1 which was touched on above1 rests ultimately upon the following ground4 ,time is throughout the form of our whole consciousness1 with its inward and outward apprehension4 ,conceptions1 on the other hand1 which originate through abstraction and are perfectly general ideas1 different from all particular things1 have in this property indeed a certain measure of objective existence1 which does not1 however1 belong to any series of events in time4 ,therefore in order to enter the immediate present of an individual consciousness1 and thus to admit of being introduced into a series of events in time1 they must to a certain extent be reduced again to the nature of individual things1 individualised1 and therefore linked to an idea of sense4 ,such an idea is the word4 ,it is accordingly the sensible sign of the conception1 and as such the necessary means of fixing it1 that is1 of presenting it to the consciousness1 which is bound up with the form of time1 and thus establishing a connection between the reason1 whose objects are merely general universals1 knowing neither place nor time1 and consciousness1 which is bound up with time1 is sensuous1 and so far purely animal4 ,only by this means is the reproduction at pleasure1 thus the recollection and preservation1 of conceptions possible and open to us2 and only by means of this1 again1 are the operations which are undertaken with conceptions possible--judgment1 inference1 comparison1 limitation1 c4 ,it is true it sometimes happens that conceptions occupy consciousness without their signs1 as when we run through a train of reasoning so rapidly that we could not think the words in the time4 ,but such cases are exceptions1 which presuppose great exercise of the reason1 which it could only have obtained by means of language4 ,how much the use of reason is bound up with speech we see in the case of the deaf and dumb1 who1 if they have learnt no kind of language1 show scarcely more intelligence than the ourang-outang or the elephant4 ,for their reason is almost entirely potential1 not actual4 ,words and speech are thus the indispensable means of distinct thought4 ,but as every means1 every machine1 at once burdens and hinders1 so also does language2 for it forces the fluid and modifiable thoughts1 with their infinitely fine distinctions of difference1 into certain rigid1 permanent forms1 and thus in fixing also fetters them4 ,this hindrance is to some extent got rid of by learning several languages4 ,for in these the thought is poured from one mould into another1 and somewhat alters its form in each1 so that it becomes more and more freed from all form and clothing1 and thus its own proper nature comes more distinctly into consciousness1 and it recovers again its original capacity for modification4 ,the ancient languages render this service very much better than the modern1 because1 on account of their great difference from the latter1 the same thoughts are expressed in them in quite another way1 and must thus assume a very different form2 besides which the more perfect grammar of the ancient languages renders a more artistic and more perfect construction of the thoughts and their connection possible4 ,thus a ,greek or a ,roman might perhaps content himself with his own language1 but he who understands nothing but some single modern patois will soon betray this poverty in writing and speaking2 for his thoughts1 firmly bound to such narrow stereotyped forms1 must appear awkward and monotonous4 ,genius certainly makes up for this as for everything else1 for example in ,shakespeare4 ,burke1 in his 8,inquiry into the ,sublime and ,beautiful10 p4 #e1 #d and #e1 has given a perfectly correct and very elaborate exposition of what ,i laid down in #i of the first volume1 that the words of a speech are perfectly understood without calling up ideas of perception1 pictures in our heads4 ,but he draws from this the entirely false conclusion that we hear1 apprehend1 and make use of words without connecting with them any idea whatever2 whereas he ought to have drawn the conclusion that all ideas are not perceptible images1 but that precisely those ideas which must be expressed by means of words are abstract notions or conceptions1 and these from their very nature are not perceptible4 ,just because words impart only general conceptions1 which are perfectly different from ideas of perception1 when1 for example1 an event is recounted all the hearers will receive the same conceptions2 but if afterwards they wish to make the incident clear to themselves1 each of them will call up in his imagination a different image of it1 which differs considerably from the correct image that is possessed only by the eye-witness4 ,this is the primary reason 7which1 however1 is accompanied by others7 why every fact is necessarily distorted by being repeatedly told4 ,the second recounter communicates conceptions which he has abstracted from the image of his own imagination1 and from these conceptions the third now forms another image differing still more widely from the truth1 and this again he translates into conceptions1 and so the process goes on4 ,whoever is sufficiently matter of fact to stick to the conceptions imparted to him1 and repeat them1 will prove the most truthful reporter4 ,the best and most intelligent exposition of the essence and nature of conceptions which ,i have been able to find is in ,thomas ,reid's 8,essays on the ,powers of ,human ,mind10 vol4 ii41 ,essay #e1 ch4 #f4 ,this was afterwards condemned by ,dugald ,stewart in his 8,philosophy of the ,human ,mind40 ,not to waste paper ,i will only briefly remark with regard to the latter that he belongs to that large class who have obtained an undeserved reputation through favour and friends1 and therefore ,i can only advise that not an hour should be wasted over the scribbling of this shallow writer4 ,the princely scholastic ,pico de ,mirandula already saw that reason is the faculty of abstract ideas1 and understanding the faculty of ideas of perception4 ,for in his book1 8,de ,imaginatione10 ch4 #aa1 he carefully distinguishes understanding and reason1 and explains the latter as the discursive faculty peculiar to man1 and the former as the intuitive faculty1 allied to the kind of knowledge which is proper to the angels1 and indeed to ,god4 ,spinoza also characterises reason quite correctly as the faculty of framing general conceptions 7,eth41 ii4 prop4 #dj1 schol4 #b74 ,such facts would not need to be mentioned if it were not for the tricks that have been played in the last fifty years by the whole of the philosophasters of ,germany with the conception reason4 ,for they have tried1 with shameless audacity1 to smuggle in under this name an entirely spurious faculty of immediate1 metaphysical1 so-called super-sensuous knowledge4 ,the reason proper1 on the other hand1 they call understanding1 and the understanding proper1 as something quite strange to them1 they overlook altogether1 and ascribe its intuitive functions to sensibility4 ,in the case of all things in this world new drawbacks or disadvantages cleave to every source of aid1 to every gain1 to every advantage2 and thus reason also1 which gives to man such great advantages over the brutes1 carries with it its special disadvantages1 and opens for him paths of error into which the brutes can never stray4 ,through it a new species of motives1 to which the brute is not accessible1 obtains power over his will4 ,these are the abstract motives1 the mere thoughts1 which are by no means always drawn from his own experience1 but often come to him only through the talk and example of others1 through tradition and literature4 ,having become accessible to thought1 he is at once exposed to error4 ,but every error must sooner or later do harm1 and the greater the error the greater the harm it will do4 ,the individual error must be atoned for by him who cherishes it1 and often he has to pay dearly for it4 ,and the same thing holds good on a large scale of the common errors of whole nations4 ,therefore it cannot too often be repeated that every error wherever we meet it1 is to be pursued and rooted out as an enemy of mankind1 and that there can be no such thing as privileged or sanctioned error4 ,the thinker ought to attack it1 even if humanity should cry out with pain1 like a sick man whose ulcer the physician touches4 ,the brute can never stray far from the path of nature2 for its motives lie only in the world of perception1 where only the possible1 indeed only the actual1 finds room4 ,on the other hand1 all that is only imaginable1 and therefore also the false1 the impossible1 the absurd1 and senseless1 enters into abstract conceptions1 into thoughts and words4 ,since now all partake of reason1 but few of judgment1 the consequence is that man is exposed to delusion1 for he is abandoned to every conceivable chimera which any one talks him into1 and which1 acting on his will as a motive1 may influence him to perversities and follies of every kind1 to the most unheard-of extravagances1 and also to actions most contrary to his animal nature4 ,true culture1 in which knowledge and judgment go hand in hand1 can only be brought to bear on a few2 and still fewer are capable of receiving it4 ,for the great mass of men a kind of training everywhere takes its place4 ,it is effected by example1 custom1 and the very early and firm impression of certain conceptions1 before any experience1 understanding1 or judgment were there to disturb the work4 ,thus thoughts are implanted1 which afterward cling as firmly1 and are as incapable of being shaken by any instruction as if they were inborn2 and indeed they have often been regarded1 even by philosophers1 as such4 ,in this way we can1 with the same trouble1 imbue men with what is right and rational1 or with what is most absurd4 ,for example1 we can accustom them to approach this or that idol with holy dread1 and at the mention of its name to prostrate in the dust not only their bodies but their whole spirit2 to sacrifice their property and their lives willingly to words1 to names1 to the defence of the strangest whims2 to attach arbitrarily the greatest honour or the deepest disgrace to this or that1 and to prize highly or disdain everything accordingly with full inward conviction2 to renounce all animal food1 as in ,hindustan1 or to devour still warm and quivering pieces1 cut from the living animal1 as in ,abyssinia2 to eat men1 as in ,new ,zealand1 or to sacrifice their children to ,moloch2 to castrate themselves1 to fling themselves voluntarily on the funeral piles of the dead--in a word1 to do anything we please4 ,hence the ,crusades1 the extravagances of fanatical sects2 hence ,chiliasts and ,flagellants1 persecutions1 autos da fe1 and all that is offered by the long register of human perversities4 ,lest it should be thought that only the dark ages afford such examples1 ,i shall add a couple of more modern instances4 ,in the year #ahah there went from ,wrtemberg #gjjj ,chiliasts to the neighbourhood of ,ararat1 because the new kingdom of ,god1 specially announced by ,jung ,stilling1 was to appear there47#ag7 ,gall relates that in his time a mother killed her child and roasted it in order to cure her husband's rheumatism with its fat47#ah7 ,the tragical side of error lies in the practical1 the comical is reserved for the theoretical4 ,for example1 if we could firmly persuade three men that the sun is not the cause of daylight1 we might hope to see it soon established as the general conviction4 ,in ,germany it was possible to proclaim as the greatest philosopher of all ages ,hegel1 a repulsive1 mindless charlatan1 an unparalleled scribbler of nonsense1 and for twenty years many thousands have believed it stubbornly and firmly2 and indeed1 outside ,germany1 the ,danish ,academy entered the lists against myself for his fame1 and sought to have him regarded as a summus philosophus4 7,upon this see the preface to my ,grundproblemen der ,ethik47 ,these1 then1 are the disadvantages which1 on account of the rarity of judgment1 attach to the existence of reason4 ,we must add to them the possibility of madness4 ,the brutes do not go mad1 although the carnivora are subject to fury1 and the ruminants to a sort of delirium4 ,chapter ,,vii47#ai7 ,on ,the ,relation of the ,concrete ,knowledge of ,perception to ,abstract ,knowledge4 ,it has been shown that conceptions derive their material from knowledge of perception1 and therefore the entire structure of our world of thought rests upon the world of perception4 ,we must therefore be able to go back from every conception1 even if only indirectly through intermediate conceptions1 to the perceptions from which it is either itself directly derived or those conceptions are derived of which it is again an abstraction4 ,that is to say1 we must be able to support it with perceptions which stand to the abstractions in the relation of examples4 ,these perceptions thus afford the real content of all our thought1 and whenever they are wanting we have not had conceptions but mere words in our heads4 ,in this respect our intellect is like a bank1 which1 if it is to be sound1 must have cash in its safe1 so as to be able to meet all the notes it has issued1 in case of demand2 the perceptions are the cash1 the conceptions are the notes4 ,in this sense the perceptions might very appropriately be called primary1 and the conceptions1 on the other hand1 secondary ideas4 ,not quite so aptly1 the ,schoolmen1 following the example of ,aristotle 7,metaph41 vi4 #aa1 xi4 #a71 called real things substanti prim1 and the conceptions substanti secund4 ,books impart only secondary ideas4 ,mere conceptions of a thing without perception give only a general knowledge of it4 ,we only have a thorough understanding of things and their relations so far as we are able to represent them to ourselves in pure1 distinct perceptions1 without the aid of words4 ,to explain words by words1 to compare concepts with concepts1 in which most philosophising consists1 is a trivial shifting about of the concept-spheres in order to see which goes into the other and which does not4 ,at the best we can in this way only arrive at conclusions2 but even conclusions give no really new knowledge1 but only show us all that lay in the knowledge we already possessed1 and what part of it perhaps might be applicable to the particular case4 ,on the other hand1 to perceive1 to allow the things themselves to speak to us1 to apprehend new relations of them1 and then to take up and deposit all this in conceptions1 in order to possess it with certainty--that gives new knowledge4 ,but1 while almost every one is capable of comparing conceptions with conceptions1 to compare conceptions with perceptions is a gift of the select few4 ,it is the condition1 according to the degree of its perfection1 of wit1 judgment1 ingenuity1 genius4 ,the former faculty1 on the contrary1 results in little more than possibly rational reflections4 ,the inmost kernel of all genuine and actual knowledge is a perception2 and every new truth is the profit or gain yielded by a perception4 ,all original thinking takes place in images1 and this is why imagination is so necessary an instrument of thought1 and minds that lack imagination will never accomplish much1 unless it be in mathematics4 ,on the other hand1 merely abstract thoughts1 which have no kernel of perception1 are like cloud-structures1 without reality4 ,even writing and speaking1 whether didactic or poetical1 has for its final aim to guide the reader to the same concrete knowledge from which the author started2 if it has not this aim it is bad4 ,this is why the contemplation and observing of every real thing1 as soon as it presents something new to the observer1 is more instructive than any reading or hearing4 ,for indeed1 if we go to the bottom of the matter1 all truth and wisdom1 nay1 the ultimate secret of things1 is contained in each real object1 yet certainly only in concreto1 just as gold lies hidden in the ore2 the difficulty is to extract it4 ,from a book1 on the contrary1 at the best we only receive the truth at second hand1 and oftener not at all4 ,in most books1 putting out of account those that are thoroughly bad1 the author1 when their content is not altogether empirical1 has certainly thought but not perceived2 he has written from reflection1 not from intuition1 and it is this that makes them commonplace and tedious4 ,for what the author has thought could always have been thought by the reader also1 if he had taken the same trouble2 indeed it consists simply of intelligent thought1 full exposition of what is implicite contained in the theme4 ,but no actually new knowledge comes in this way into the world2 this is only created in the moment of perception1 of direct comprehension of a new side of the thing4 ,when1 therefore1 on the contrary1 sight has formed the foundation of an author's thought1 it is as if he wrote from a land where the reader has never been1 for all is fresh and new1 because it is drawn directly from the original source of all knowledge4 ,let me illustrate the distinction here touched upon by a perfectly easy and simple example4 ,any commonplace writer might easily describe profound contemplation or petrifying astonishment by saying3 8,he stood like a statue20 but ,cervantes says3 8,like a clothed statue1 for the wind moved his garments0 7,don ,quixote1 book vi4 ch4 #ai74 ,it is thus that all great minds have ever thought in presence of the perception1 and kept their gaze steadfastly upon it in their thought4 ,we recognise this from this fact1 among others1 that even the most opposite of them so often agree and coincide in some particular2 because they all speak of the same thing which they all had before their eyes1 the world1 the perceived reality2 indeed in a certain degree they all say the same thing1 and others never believe them4 ,we recognise it further in the appropriateness and originality of the expression1 which is always perfectly adapted to the subject because it has been inspired by perception1 in the naivete of the language1 the freshness of the imagery1 and the impressiveness of the similes1 all of which qualities1 without exception1 distinguish the works of great minds1 and1 on the contrary1 are always wanting in the works of others4 ,accordingly only commonplace forms of expression and trite figures are at the service of the latter1 and they never dare to allow themselves to be natural1 under penalty of displaying their vulgarity in all its dreary barrenness2 instead of this they are affected mannerists4 ,hence ,buffon says3 8,le style est l'homme mme40 ,if men of commonplace mind write poetry they have certain traditional conventional opinions1 passions1 noble sentiments1 c41 which they have received in the abstract1 and attribute to the heroes of their poems1 who are in this way reduced to mere personifications of those opinions1 and are thus themselves to a certain extent abstractions1 and therefore insipid and tiresome4 ,if they philosophise1 they have taken in a few wide abstract conceptions1 which they turn about in all directions1 as if they had to do with algebraical equations1 and hope that something will come of it2 at the most we see that they have all read the same things4 ,such a tossing to and fro of abstract conceptions1 after the manner of algebraical equations1 which is now-a-days called dialectic1 does not1 like real algebra1 afford certain results2 for here the conception which is represented by the word is not a fixed and perfectly definite quality1 such as are symbolised by the letters in algebra1 but is wavering and ambiguous1 and capable of extension and contraction4 ,strictly speaking1 all thinking1 i4e41 combining of abstract conceptions1 has at the most the recollections of earlier perceptions for its material1 and this only indirectly1 so far as it constitutes the foundation of all conceptions4 ,real knowledge1 on the contrary1 that is1 immediate knowledge1 is perception alone1 new1 fresh perception itself4 ,now the concepts which the reason has framed and the memory has preserved cannot all be present to consciousness at once1 but only a very small number of them at a time4 ,on the other hand1 the energy with which we apprehend what is present in perception1 in which really all that is essential in all things generally is virtually contained and represented1 is apprehended1 fills the consciousness in one moment with its whole power4 ,upon this depends the infinite superiority of genius to learning2 they stand to each other as the text of an ancient classic to its commentary4 ,all truth and all wisdom really lies ultimately in perception4 ,but this unfortunately can neither be retained nor communicated4 ,the objective conditions of such communication can certainly be presented to others purified and illustrated through plastic and pictorial art1 and even much more directly through poetry2 but it depends so much upon subjective conditions1 which are not at the command of every one1 and of no one at all times1 nay1 indeed in the higher degrees of perfection1 are only the gift of the favoured few4 ,only the worst knowledge1 abstract1 secondary knowledge1 the conception1 the mere shadow of true knowledge1 is unconditionally communicable4 ,if perceptions were communicable1 that would be a communication worth the trouble2 but at last every one must remain in his own skin and skull1 and no one can help another4 ,to enrich the conception from perception is the unceasing endeavour of poetry and philosophy4 ,however1 the aims of man are essentially practical2 and for these it is sufficient that what he has apprehended through perception should leave traces in him1 by virtue of which he will recognise it in the next similar case2 thus he becomes possessed of worldly wisdom4 ,thus1 as a rule1 the man of the world cannot teach his accumulated truth and wisdom1 but only make use of it2 he rightly comprehends each event as it happens1 and determines what is in conformity with it4 ,that books will not take the place of experience nor learning of genius are two kindred phenomena4 ,their common ground is that the abstract can never take the place of the concrete4 ,books therefore do not take the place of experience1 because conceptions always remain general1 and consequently do not get down to the particular1 which1 however1 is just what has to be dealt with in life2 and1 besides this1 all conceptions are abstracted from what is particular and perceived in experience1 and therefore one must have come to know these in order adequately to understand even the general conceptions which the books communicate4 ,learning cannot take the place of genius1 because it also affords merely conceptions1 but the knowledge of genius consists in the apprehension of the 7,platonic7 ,ideas of things1 and therefore is essentially intuitive4 ,thus in the first of these phenomena the objective condition of perceptive or intuitive knowledge is wanting2 in the second the subjective2 the former may be attained1 the latter cannot4 ,wisdom and genius1 these two summits of the ,parnassus of human knowledge1 have their foundation not in the abstract and discursive1 but in the perceptive faculty4 ,wisdom proper is something intuitive1 not something abstract4 ,it does not consist in principles and thoughts1 which one can carry about ready in his mind1 as results of his own research or that of others2 but it is the whole manner in which the world presents itself in his mind4 ,this varies so much that on account of it the wise man lives in another world from the fool1 and the genius sees another world from the blockhead4 ,that the works of the man of genius immeasurably surpass those of all others arises simply from the fact that the world which he sees1 and from which he takes his utterances1 is so much clearer1 as it were more profoundly worked out1 than that in the minds of others1 which certainly contains the same objects1 but is to the world of the man of genius as the ,chinese picture without shading and perspective is to the finished oil-painting4 ,the material is in all minds the same2 but the difference lies in the perfection of the form which it assumes in each1 upon which the numerous grades of intelligence ultimately depend4 ,these grades thus exist in the root1 in the perceptive or intuitive apprehension1 and do not first appear in the abstract4 ,hence original mental superiority shows itself so easily when the occasion arises1 and is at once felt and hated by others4 ,in practical life the intuitive knowledge of the understanding is able to guide our action and behaviour directly1 while the abstract knowledge of the reason can only do so by means of the memory4 ,hence arises the superiority of intuitive knowledge in all cases which admit of no time for reflection2 thus for daily intercourse1 in which1 just on this account1 women excel4 ,only those who intuitively know the nature of men as they are as a rule1 and thus comprehend the individuality of the person before them1 will understand how to manage him with certainty and rightly4 ,another may know by heart all the three hundred maxims of ,gracian1 but this will not save him from stupid mistakes and misconceptions if he lacks that intuitive knowledge4 ,for all abstract knowledge affords us primarily mere general principles and rules2 but the particular case is almost never to be carried out exactly according to the rule2 then the rule itself has to be presented to us at the right time by the memory1 which seldom punctually happens2 then the propositio minor has to be formed out of the present case1 and finally the conclusion drawn4 ,before all this is done the opportunity has generally turned its back upon us1 and then those excellent principles and rules serve at the most to enable us to measure the magnitude of the error we have committed4 ,certainly with time we gain in this way experience and practice1 which slowly grows to knowledge of the world1 and thus1 in connection with this1 the abstract rules may certainly become fruitful4 ,on the other hand1 the intuitive knowledge1 which always apprehends only the particular1 stands in immediate relation to the present case4 ,rule1 case1 and application are for it one1 and action follows immediately upon it4 ,this explains why in real life the scholar1 whose pre-eminence lies in the province of abstract knowledge1 is so far surpassed by the man of the world1 whose pre-eminence consists in perfect intuitive knowledge1 which original disposition conferred on him1 and a rich experience has developed4 ,the two kinds of knowledge always stand to each other in the relation of paper money and hard cash2 and as there are many cases and circumstances in which the former is to be preferred to the latter1 so there are also things and situations for which abstract knowledge is more useful than intuitive4 ,if1 for example1 it is a conception that in some case guides our action1 when it is once grasped it has the advantage of being unalterable1 and therefore under its guidance we go to work with perfect certainty and consistency4 ,but this certainty which the conception confers on the subjective side is outweighed by the uncertainty which accompanies it on the objective side4 ,the whole conception may be false and groundless1 or the object to be dealt with may not come under it1 for it may be either not at all or not altogether of the kind which belongs to it4 ,now if in the particular case we suddenly become conscious of something of this sort1 we are put out altogether2 if we do not become conscious of it1 the result brings it to light4 ,therefore ,vauvenargue says3 8,personne n'est sujet plus de fautes1 que ceux qui n'agissent que par rflexion40 ,if1 on the contrary1 it is direct perception of the objects to be dealt with and their relations that guides our action1 we easily hesitate at every step1 for the perception is always modifiable1 is ambiguous1 has inexhaustible details in itself1 and shows many sides in succession2 we act therefore without full confidence4 ,but the subjective uncertainty is compensated by the objective certainty1 for here there is no conception between the object and us1 we never lose sight of it2 if therefore we only see correctly what we have before us and what we do1 we shall hit the mark4 ,our action then is perfectly sure only when it is guided by a conception the right ground of which1 its completeness1 and applicability to the given cause is perfectly certain4 ,action in accordance with conceptions may pass into pedantry1 action in accordance with the perceived impression into levity and folly4 ,perception is not only the source of all knowledge1 but is itself knowledge 1 is the only unconditionally true1 genuine knowledge completely worthy of the name4 ,for it alone imparts insight properly so called1 it alone is actually assimilated by man1 passes into his nature1 and can with full reason be called his2 while the conceptions merely cling to him4 ,in the fourth book we see indeed that true virtue proceeds from knowledge of perception or intuitive knowledge2 for only those actions which are directly called forth by this1 and therefore are performed purely from the impulse of our own nature1 are properly symptoms of our true and unalterable character2 not so those which1 resulting from reflection and its dogmas1 are often extorted from the character1 and therefore have no unalterable ground in us4 ,but wisdom also1 the true view of life1 the correct eye1 and the searching judgment1 proceeds from the way in which the man apprehends the perceptible world1 but not from his mere abstract knowledge1 i4e41 not from abstract conceptions4 ,the basis or ultimate content of every science consists1 not in proofs1 nor in what is proved1 but in the unproved foundation of the proofs1 which can finally be apprehended only through perception4 ,so also the basis of the true wisdom and real insight of each man does not consist in conceptions and in abstract rational knowledge1 but in what is perceived1 and in the degree of acuteness1 accuracy1 and profundity with which he has apprehended it4 ,he who excels here knows the 7,platonic7 ,ideas of the world and life2 every case he has seen represents for him innumerable cases2 he always apprehends each being according to its true nature1 and his action1 like his judgment1 corresponds to his insight4 ,by degrees also his countenance assumes the expression of penetration1 of true intelligence1 and1 if it goes far enough1 of wisdom4 ,for it is pre-eminence in knowledge of perception alone that stamps its impression upon the features also2 while pre-eminence in abstract knowledge cannot do this4 ,in accordance with what has been said1 we find in all classes men of intellectual superiority1 and often quite without learning4 ,natural understanding can take the place of almost every degree of culture1 but no culture can take the place of natural understanding4 ,the scholar has the advantage of such men in the possession of a wealth of cases and facts 7historical knowledge7 and of causal determinations 7natural science71 all in well-ordered connection1 easily surveyed2 but yet with all this he has not a more accurate and profound insight into what is truly essential in all these cases1 facts1 and causations4 ,the unlearned man of acuteness and penetration knows how to dispense with this wealth2 we can make use of much2 we can do with little4 ,one case in his own experience teaches him more than many a scholar is taught by a thousand cases which he knows1 but does not1 properly speaking1 understand4 ,for the little knowledge of that unlearned man is living1 because every fact that is known to him is supported by accurate and well-apprehended perception1 and thus represents for him a thousand similar facts4 ,on the contrary1 the much knowledge of the ordinary scholar is dead1 because even if it does not consist1 as is often the case1 in mere words1 it consists entirely in abstract knowledge4 ,this1 however1 receives its value only through the perceptive knowledge of the individual with which it must connect itself1 and which must ultimately realise all the conceptions4 ,if now this perceptive knowledge is very scanty1 such a mind is like a bank with liabilities tenfold in excess of its cash reserve1 whereby in the end it becomes bankrupt4 ,therefore1 while the right apprehension of the perceptible world has impressed the stamp of insight and wisdom on the brow of many an unlearned man1 the face of many a scholar bears no other trace of his much study than that of exhaustion and weariness from excessive and forced straining of the memory in the unnatural accumulation of dead conceptions4 ,moreover1 the insight of such a man is often so puerile1 so weak and silly1 that we must suppose that the excessive strain upon the faculty of indirect knowledge1 which is concerned with abstractions1 directly weakens the power of immediate perceptive knowledge1 and the natural and clear vision is more and more blinded by the light of books4 ,at any rate the constant streaming in of the thoughts of others must confine and suppress our own1 and indeed in the long run paralyse the power of thought if it has not that high degree of elasticity which is able to withstand that unnatural stream4 ,therefore ceaseless reading and study directly injures the mind--the more so that completeness and constant connection of the system of our own thought and knowledge must pay the penalty if we so often arbitrarily interrupt it in order to gain room for a line of thought entirely strange to us4 ,to banish my own thought in order to make room for that of a book would seem to me like what ,shakespeare censures in the tourists of his time1 that they sold their own land to see that of others4 ,yet the inclination for reading of most scholars is a kind of fuga vacui1 from the poverty of their own minds1 which forcibly draws in the thoughts of others4 ,in order to have thoughts they must read something2 just as lifeless bodies are only moved from without2 while the man who thinks for himself is like a living body that moves of itself4 ,indeed it is dangerous to read about a subject before we have thought about it ourselves4 ,for along with the new material the old point of view and treatment of it creeps into the mind1 all the more so as laziness and apathy counsel us to accept what has already been thought1 and allow it to pass for truth4 ,this now insinuates itself1 and henceforward our thought on the subject always takes the accustomed path1 like brooks that are guided by ditches2 to find a thought of our own1 a new thought1 is then doubly difficult4 ,this contributes much to the want of originality on the part of scholars4 ,add to this that they suppose that1 like other people1 they must divide their time between pleasure and work4 ,now they regard reading as their work and special calling1 and therefore they gorge themselves with it1 beyond what they can digest4 ,then reading no longer plays the part of the mere initiator of thought1 but takes its place altogether2 for they think of the subject just as long as they are reading about it1 thus with the mind of another1 not with their own4 ,but when the book is laid aside entirely different things make much more lively claims upon their interest2 their private affairs1 and then the theatre1 card-playing1 skittles1 the news of the day1 and gossip4 ,the man of thought is so because such things have no interest for him4 ,he is interested only in his problems1 with which therefore he is always occupied1 by himself and without a book4 ,to give ourselves this interest1 if we have not got it1 is impossible4 ,this is the crucial point4 ,and upon this also depends the fact that the former always speak only of what they have read1 while the latter1 on the contrary1 speaks of what he has thought1 and that they are1 as ,pope says3 8,for ever reading1 never to be read40 ,the mind is naturally free1 not a slave2 only what it does willingly1 of its own accord1 succeeds4 ,on the other hand1 the compulsory exertion of a mind in studies for which it is not qualified1 or when it has become tired1 or in general too continuously and invita ,minerva1 dulls the brain1 just as reading by moonlight dulls the eyes4 ,this is especially the case with the straining of the immature brain in the earlier years of childhood4 ,i believe that the learning of ,latin and ,greek grammar from the sixth to the twelfth year lays the foundation of the subsequent stupidity of most scholars4 ,at any rate the mind requires the nourishment of materials from without4 ,all that we eat is not at once incorporated in the organism1 but only so much of it as is digested2 so that only a small part of it is assimilated1 and the remainder passes away2 and thus to eat more than we can assimilate is useless and injurious4 ,it is precisely the same with what we read4 ,only so far as it gives food for thought does it increase our insight and true knowledge4 ,therefore ,heracleitus says3 8 0 7multiscitia non dat intellectum74 ,it seems1 however1 to me that learning may be compared to a heavy suit of armour1 which certainly makes the strong man quite invincible1 but to the weak man is a burden under which he sinks altogether4 ,the exposition given in our third book of the knowledge of the 7,platonic7 ,ideas1 as the highest attainable by man1 and at the same time entirely perceptive or intuitive knowledge1 is a proof that the source of true wisdom does not lie in abstract rational knowledge1 but in the clear and profound apprehension of the world in perception4 ,therefore wise men may live in any age1 and those of the past remain wise men for all succeeding generations4 ,learning1 on the contrary1 is relative2 the learned men of the past are for the most part children as compared with us1 and require indulgence4 ,but to him who studies in order to gain insight books and studies are only steps of the ladder by which he climbs to the summit of knowledge4 ,as soon as a round of the ladder has raised him a step1 he leaves it behind him4 ,the many1 on the other hand1 who study in order to fill their memory do not use the rounds of the ladder to mount by1 but take them off1 and load themselves with them to carry them away1 rejoicing at the increasing weight of the burden4 ,they remain always below1 because they bear what ought to have borne them4 ,upon the truth set forth here1 that the kernel of all knowledge is the perceptive or intuitive apprehension1 depends the true and profound remark of ,helvetius1 that the really characteristic and original views of which a gifted individual is capable1 and the working up1 development1 and manifold application of which is the material of all his works1 even if written much later1 can arise in him only up to the thirty-fifth or at the latest the fortieth year of his life1 and are really the result of combinations he has made in his early youth4 ,for they are not mere connections of abstract conceptions1 but his own intuitive comprehension of the objective world and the nature of things4 ,now1 that this intuitive apprehension must have completed its work by the age mentioned above depends partly on the fact that by that time the ectypes of all 7,platonic7 ,ideas must have presented themselves to the man1 and therefore cannot appear later with the strength of the first impression2 partly on this1 that the highest energy of brain activity is demanded for this quintessence of all knowledge1 for this proof before the letter of the apprehension1 and this highest energy of the brain is dependent on the freshness and flexibility of its fibres and the rapidity with which the arterial blood flows to the brain4 ,but this again is at its strongest only as long as the arterial system has a decided predominance over the venous system1 which begins to decline after the thirtieth year1 until at last1 after the forty-second year1 the venous system obtains the upper hand1 as ,cabanis has admirably and instructively explained4 ,therefore the years between twenty and thirty and the first few years after thirty are for the intellect what ,may is for the trees2 only then do the blossoms appear of which all the later fruits are the development4 ,the world of perception has made its impression1 and thereby laid the foundation of all the subsequent thoughts of the individual4 ,he may by reflection make clearer what he has apprehended2 he may yet acquire much knowledge as nourishment for the fruit which has once set2 he may extend his views1 correct his conceptions and judgments1 it may be only through endless combinations that he becomes completely master of the materials he has gained2 indeed he will generally produce his best works much later1 as the greatest heat begins with the decline of the day1 but he can no longer hope for new original knowledge from the one living fountain of perception4 ,it is this that ,byron feels when he breaks forth into his wonderfully beautiful lament3 8,no more--no more--oh6 never more on me ,the freshness of the heart can fall like dew1 ,which out of all the lovely things we see ,extracts emotions beautiful and new1 ,hived in our bosoms like the bag o' the bee3 ,think'st thou the honey with those objects grew8 ,alas6 'twas not in them1 but in thy power ,to double even the sweetness of a flower40 ,through all that ,i have said hitherto ,i hope ,i have placed in a clear light the important truth that since all abstract knowledge springs from knowledge of perception1 it obtains its whole value from its relation to the latter1 thus from the fact that its conceptions1 or the abstractions which they denote1 can be realised1 i4e41 proved1 through perceptions2 and1 moreover1 that most depends upon the quality of these perceptions4 ,conceptions and abstractions which do not ultimately refer to perceptions are like paths in the wood that end without leading out of it4 ,the great value of conceptions lies in the fact that by means of them the original material of knowledge is more easily handled1 surveyed1 and arranged4 ,but although many kinds of logical and dialectical operations are possible with them1 yet no entirely original and new knowledge will result from these2 that is to say1 no knowledge whose material neither lay already in perception nor was drawn from self-consciousness4 ,this is the true meaning of the doctrine attributed to ,aristotle3 ,nihil est in intellectu1 nisi quod antea fuerit in sensu4 ,it is also the meaning of the ,lockeian philosophy1 which made for ever an epoch in philosophy1 because it commenced at last the serious discussion of the question as to the origin of our knowledge4 ,it is also principally what the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 teaches4 ,it also desires that we should not remain at the conceptions1 but go back to their source1 thus to perception2 only with the true and important addition that what holds good of the perception also extends to its subjective conditions1 thus to the forms which lie predisposed in the perceiving and thinking brain as its natural functions2 although these at least virtualiter precede the actual sense-perception1 i4e41 are a priori1 and therefore do not depend upon sense-perception1 but it upon them4 ,for these forms themselves have indeed no other end1 nor service1 than to produce the empirical perception on the nerves of sense being excited1 as other forms are determined afterwards to construct thoughts in the abstract from the material of perception4 ,the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 is therefore related to the ,lockeian philosophy as the analysis of the infinite to elementary geometry1 but is yet throughout to be regarded as the continuation of the ,lockeian philosophy4 ,the given material of every philosophy is accordingly nothing else than the empirical consciousness1 which divides itself into the consciousness of one's own self 7self-consciousness7 and the consciousness of other things 7external perception74 ,for this alone is what is immediately and actually given4 ,every philosophy which1 instead of starting from this1 takes for its starting-point arbitrarily chosen abstract conceptions1 such as1 for example1 absolute1 absolute substance1 ,god1 infinity1 finitude1 absolute identity1 being1 essence1 c41 c41 moves in the air without support1 and can therefore never lead to a real result4 ,yet in all ages philosophers have attempted it with such materials2 and hence even ,kant sometimes1 according to the common usage1 and more from custom than consistency1 defines philosophy as a science of mere conceptions4 ,but such a science would really undertake to extract from the partial ideas 7for that is what the abstractions are7 what is not to be found in the complete ideas 7the perceptions71 from which the former were drawn by abstraction4 ,the possibility of the syllogism leads to this mistake1 because here the combination of the judgments gives a new result1 although more apparent than real1 for the syllogism only brings out what already lay in the given judgments2 for it is true the conclusion cannot contain more than the premisses4 ,conceptions are certainly the material of philosophy1 but only as marble is the material of the sculptor4 ,it is not to work out of them but in them2 that is to say1 it is to deposit its results in them1 but not to start from them as what is given4 ,whoever wishes to see a glaring example of such a false procedure from mere conceptions may look at the 8,institutio ,theologica0 of ,proclus in order to convince himself of the vanity of that whole method4 ,there abstractions such as 81 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7unum1 multa1 bonum1 producens et productum1 sibi sufficiens1 causa1 melius1 mobile1 immobile1 motum71 c41 are indiscriminately collected1 but the perceptions to which alone they owe their origin and content ignored and contemptuously disregarded4 ,a theology is then constructed from these conceptions1 but its goal1 the 1 is kept concealed2 thus the whole procedure is apparently unprejudiced1 as if the reader did not know at the first page1 just as well as the author1 what it is all to end in4 ,i have already quoted a fragment of this above4 ,this production of ,proclus is really quite peculiarly adapted to make clear how utterly useless and illusory such combinations of abstract conceptions are1 for we can make of them whatever we will1 especially if we further take advantage of the ambiguity of many words1 such1 for example1 as 4 ,if such an architect of conceptions were present in person we would only have to ask naively where all the things are of which he has so much to tell us1 and whence he knows the laws from which he draws his conclusions concerning them4 ,he would then soon be obliged to turn to empirical perception1 in which alone the real world exhibits itself1 from which those conceptions are drawn4 ,then we would only have to ask further why he did not honestly start from the given perception of such a world1 so that at every step his assertions could be proved by it1 instead of operating with conceptions1 which are yet drawn from perception alone1 and therefore can have no further validity than that which it imparts to them4 ,but of course this is just his trick4 ,through such conceptions1 in which1 by virtue of abstraction1 what is inseparable is thought as separate1 and what cannot be united as united1 he goes far beyond the perception which was their source1 and thus beyond the limits of their applicability1 to an entirely different world from that which supplied the material for building1 but just on this account to a world of chimeras4 ,i have here referred to ,proclus because in him this procedure becomes specially clear through the frank audacity with which he carries it out4 ,but in ,plato also we find some examples of this kind1 though not so glaring2 and in general the philosophical literature of all ages affords a multitude of instances of the same thing4 ,that of our own time is rich in them4 ,consider1 for example1 the writings of the school of ,schelling1 and observe the constructions that are built up out of abstractions like finite and infinite--being1 non-being1 other being--activity1 hindrance1 product--determining1 being determined1 determinateness--limit1 limiting1 being limited--unity1 plurality1 multiplicity--identity1 diversity1 indifference--thinking1 being1 essence1 c4 ,not only does all that has been said above hold good of constructions out of such materials1 but because an infinite amount can be thought through such wide abstractions1 only very little indeed can be thought in them2 they are empty husks4 ,but thus the matter of the whole philosophising becomes astonishingly trifling and paltry1 and hence arises that unutterable and excruciating tediousness which is characteristic of all such writings4 ,if indeed ,i now chose to call to mind the way in which ,hegel and his companions have abused such wide and empty abstractions1 ,i should have to fear that both the reader and ,i myself would be ill2 for the most nauseous tediousness hangs over the empty word-juggling of this loathsome philophaster4 ,that in practical philosophy also no wisdom is brought to light from mere abstract conceptions is the one thing to be learnt from the ethical dissertations of the theologian ,schleiermacher1 with the delivery of which he has wearied the ,berlin ,academy for a number of years1 and which are shortly to appear in a collected form4 ,in them only abstract conceptions1 such as duty1 virtue1 highest good1 moral law1 c41 are taken as the starting-point1 without further introduction than that they commonly occur in ethical systems1 and are now treated as given realities4 ,he then discusses these from all sides with great subtilty1 but1 on the other hand1 never makes for the source of these conceptions1 for the thing itself1 the actual human life1 to which alone they are related1 from which they ought to be drawn1 and with which morality has1 properly speaking1 to do4 ,on this account these diatribes are just as unfruitful and useless as they are tedious1 which is saying a great deal4 ,at all times we find persons1 like this theologian1 who is too fond of philosophising1 famous while they are alive1 afterwards soon forgotten4 ,my advice is rather to read those whose fate has been the opposite of this1 for time is short and valuable4 ,now although1 in accordance with all that has been said1 wide1 abstract conceptions1 which can be realised in no perception1 must never be the source of knowledge1 the starting-point or the proper material of philosophy1 yet sometimes particular results of philosophy are such as can only be thought in the abstract1 and cannot be proved by any perception4 ,knowledge of this kind will certainly only be half knowledge2 it will1 as it were1 only point out the place where what is to be known lies2 but this remains concealed4 ,therefore we should only be satisfied with such conceptions in the most extreme case1 and when we have reached the limit of the knowledge possible to our faculties4 ,an example of this might perhaps be the conception of a being out of time2 such as the proposition3 the indestructibility of our true being by death is not a continued existence of it4 ,with conceptions of this sort the firm ground which supports our whole knowledge1 the perceptible1 seems to waver4 ,therefore philosophy may certainly at times1 and in case of necessity1 extend to such knowledge1 but it must never begin with it4 ,the working with wide abstractions1 which is condemned above1 to the entire neglect of the perceptive knowledge from which they are drawn1 and which is therefore their permanent and natural controller1 was at all times the principal source of the errors of dogmatic philosophy4 ,a science constructed from the mere comparison of conceptions1 that is1 from general principles1 could only be certain if all its principles were synthetical a priori1 as is the case in mathematics3 for only such admit of no exceptions4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the principles have any empirical content1 we must keep this constantly at hand1 to control the general principles4 ,for no truths which are in any way drawn from experience are ever unconditionally true4 ,they have therefore only an approximately universal validity2 for here there is no rule without an exception4 ,if now ,i link these principles together by means of the intersection of their concept-spheres1 one conception might very easily touch the other precisely where the exception lies4 ,but if this happens even only once in the course of a long train of reasoning1 the whole structure is loosed from its foundation and moves in the air4 ,if1 for example1 ,i say1 8,the ruminants have no front incisors10 and apply this and what follows from it to the camel1 it all becomes false1 for it only holds good of horned ruminants4 ,what ,kant calls das ,vernnfteln1 mere abstract reasoning1 and so often condemns1 is just of this sort4 ,for it consists simply in subsuming conceptions under conceptions1 without reference to their origin1 and without proof of the correctness and exclusiveness of such subsumption--a method whereby we can arrive by longer or shorter circuits at almost any result we choose to set before us as our goal4 ,hence this mere abstract reasoning differs only in degree from sophistication strictly so called4 ,but sophistication is in the theoretical sphere exactly what chicanery is in the practical4 ,yet even ,plato himself has very frequently permitted such mere abstract reasoning2 and ,proclus1 as we have already mentioned1 has1 after the manner of all imitators1 carried this fault of his model much further4 ,dionysius the ,areopagite1 8,de ,divinis ,nominibus10 is also strongly affected with this4 ,but even in the fragments of the ,eleatic ,melissus we already find distinct examples of such mere abstract reasoning 7especially #b-e in ,brandis' ,comment4 ,eleat47 ,his procedure with the conceptions1 which never touch the reality from which they have their content1 but1 moving in the atmosphere of abstract universality1 pass away beyond it1 resembles blows which never hit the mark4 ,a good pattern of such mere abstract reasoning is the 8,de ,diis et ,mundo0 of the philosopher ,sallustius ,bchelchen2 especially chaps4 #g1 #ab1 and #ag4 ,but a perfect gem of philosophical mere abstract reasoning passing into decided sophistication is the following reasoning of the ,platonist1 ,maximus of ,tyre1 which ,i shall quote1 as it is short3 8,every injustice is the taking away of a good4 ,there is no other good than virtue3 but virtue cannot be taken away3 thus it is not possible that the virtuous can suffer injustice from the wicked4 ,it now remains either that no injustice can be suffered1 or that it is suffered by the wicked from the wicked4 ,but the wicked man possesses no good at all1 for only virtue is a good2 therefore none can be taken from him4 ,thus he also can suffer no injustice4 ,thus injustice is an impossible thing40 ,the original1 which is less concise through repetitions1 runs thus3 8 2 8-- 4 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 4 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 7,sermo #b74 ,i shall add further a modern example of such proofs from abstract conceptions1 by means of which an obviously absurd proposition is set up as the truth1 and ,i shall take it from the works of a great man1 ,giordano ,bruno4 ,in his book1 8,del ,infinito ,universo e ,mondi0 7p4 #hg of the edition of ,a4 ,wagner71 he makes an ,aristotelian prove 7with the assistance and exaggeration of the passage of ,aristotle's ,de ,clo1 i4 #e7 that there can be no space beyond the world4 ,the world is enclosed by the eight spheres of ,aristotle1 and beyond these there can be no space4 ,for if beyond these there were still a body1 it must either be simple or compound4 ,it is now proved sophistically1 from principles which are obviously begged1 that no simple body could be there2 and therefore1 also1 no compound body1 for it would necessarily be composed of simple ones4 ,thus in general there can be no body there--but if not1 then no space4 ,for space is defined as 8that in which bodies can be20 and it has just been proved that no body can be there4 ,thus there is also there no space4 ,this last is the final stroke of this proof from abstract conceptions4 ,it ultimately rests on the fact that the proposition1 8,where no space is1 there can be no body0 is taken as a universal negative1 and therefore converted simply1 8,where no body can be there is no space40 ,but the former proposition1 when properly regarded1 is a universal affirmative3 8,everything that has no space has no body10 thus it must not be converted simply4 ,yet it is not every proof from abstract conceptions1 with a conclusion which clearly contradicts perception 7as here the finiteness of space71 that can thus be referred to a logical error4 ,for the sophistry does not always lie in the form1 but often in the matter1 in the premisses1 and in the indefiniteness of the conceptions and their extension4 ,we find numerous examples of this in ,spinoza1 whose method indeed it is to prove from conceptions4 ,see1 for example1 the miserable sophisms in his 8,ethics10 ,p4 iv41 prop4 #bi-ca1 by means of the ambiguity of the uncertain conceptions convenire and commune habere4 ,yet this does not prevent the neo-,spinozists of our own day from taking all that he has said for gospel4 ,of these the ,hegelians1 of whom there are actually still a few1 are specially amusing on account of their traditional reverence for his principle1 omnis determinatio est negatio1 at which1 according to the charlatan spirit of the school1 they put on a face as if it was able to unhinge the world2 whereas it is of no use at all1 for even the simplest can see for himself that if ,i limit anything by determinations1 ,i thereby exclude and thus negate what lies beyond these limits4 ,thus in all mere reasonings of the above kind it becomes very apparent what errors that algebra with mere conceptions1 uncontrolled by perception1 is exposed to1 and that therefore perception is for our intellect what the firm ground upon which it stands is for our body3 if we forsake perception everything is instabilis tellus1 innabilis unda4 ,the reader will pardon the fulness of these expositions and examples on account of their instructiveness4 ,i have sought by means of them to bring forward and support the difference1 indeed the opposition1 between perceptive and abstract or reflected knowledge1 which has hitherto been too little regarded1 and the establishment of which is a fundamental characteristic of my philosophy4 ,for many phenomena of our mental life are only explicable through this distinction4 ,the connecting link between these two such different kinds of knowledge is the faculty of judgment1 as ,i have shown in #ad of the first volume4 ,this faculty is certainly also active in the province of mere abstract knowledge1 in which it compares conceptions only with conceptions2 therefore every judgment1 in the logical sense of the word1 is certainly a work of the faculty of judgment1 for it always consists in the subsumption of a narrower conception under a wider one4 ,yet this activity of the faculty of judgment1 in which it merely compares conceptions with each other1 is a simpler and easier task than when it makes the transition from what is quite particular1 the perception1 to the essentially general1 the conception4 ,for by the analysis of conceptions into their essential predicates it must be possible to decide upon purely logical grounds whether they are capable of being united or not1 and for this the mere reason which every one possesses is sufficient4 ,the faculty of judgment is therefore only active here in shortening this process1 for he who is gifted with it sees at a glance what others only arrive at through a series of reflections4 ,but its activity in the narrower sense really only appears when what is known through perception1 thus the real experience1 has to be carried over into distinct abstract knowledge1 subsumed under accurately corresponding conceptions1 and thus translated into reflected rational knowledge4 ,it is therefore this faculty which has to establish the firm basis of all sciences1 which always consists of what is known directly and cannot be further denied4 ,therefore here1 in the fundamental judgments1 lies the difficulty of the sciences1 not in the inferences from these4 ,to infer is easy1 to judge is difficult4 ,false inferences are rare1 false judgments are always the order of the day4 ,not less in practical life has the faculty of judgment to give the decision in all fundamental conclusions and important determinations4 ,its office is in the main like that of the judicial sentence4 ,as the burning-glass brings to a focus all the sun's rays1 so when the understanding works1 the intellect has to bring together all the data which it has upon the subject so closely that the understanding comprehends them at a glance1 which it now rightly fixes1 and then carefully makes the result distinct to itself4 ,further1 the great difficulty of judging in most cases depends upon the fact that we have to proceed from the consequent to the reason1 a path which is always uncertain2 indeed ,i have shown that the source of all error lies here4 ,yet in all the empirical sciences1 and also in the affairs of real life1 this way is for the most part the only one open to us4 ,the experiment is an attempt to go over it again the other way2 therefore it is decisive1 and at least brings out error clearly2 provided always that it is rightly chosen and honestly carried out2 not like ,newton's experiments in connection with the theory of colours4 ,but the experiment itself must also again be judged4 ,the complete certainty of the a priori sciences1 logic and mathematics1 depends principally upon the fact that in them the path from the reason to the consequent is open to us1 and it is always certain4 ,this gives them the character of purely objective sciences1 i4e41 sciences with regard to whose truths all who understand them must judge alike2 and this is all the more remarkable as they are the very sciences which rest on the subjective forms of the intellect1 while the empirical sciences alone have to do with what is palpably objective4 ,wit and ingenuity are also manifestations of the faculty of judgment2 in the former its activity is reflective1 in the latter subsuming4 ,in most men the faculty of judgment is only nominally present2 it is a kind of irony that it is reckoned with the normal faculties of the mind1 instead of being only attributed to the monstris per excessum4 ,ordinary men show even in the smallest affairs want of confidence in their own judgment1 just because they know from experience that it is of no service4 ,with them prejudice and imitation take its place2 and thus they are kept in a state of continual non-age1 from which scarcely one in many hundreds is delivered4 ,certainly this is not avowed1 for even to themselves they appear to judge2 but all the time they are glancing stealthily at the opinion of others1 which is their secret standard4 ,while each one would be ashamed to go about in a borrowed coat1 hat1 or mantle1 they all have nothing but borrowed opinions1 which they eagerly collect wherever they can find them1 and then strut about giving them out as their own4 ,others borrow them again from them and do the same thing4 ,this explains the rapid and wide spread of errors1 and also the fame of what is bad2 for the professional purveyors of opinion1 such as journalists and the like1 give as a rule only false wares1 as those who hire out masquerading dresses give only false jewels4 ,chapter ,,viii47#bj7 ,on ,the ,theory ,of ,the ,ludicrous4 ,my theory of the ludicrous also depends upon the opposition explained in the preceding chapters between perceptible and abstract ideas1 which ,i have brought into such marked prominence4 ,therefore what has still to be said in explanation of this theory finds its proper place here1 although according to the order of the text it would have to come later4 ,the problem of the origin1 which is everywhere the same1 and hence of the peculiar significance of laughter1 was already known to ,cicero1 but only to be at once dismissed as insoluble 7,de ,orat41 ii4 #eh74 ,the oldest attempt known to me at a psychological explanation of laughter is to be found in ,hutcheson's 8,introduction into ,moral ,philosophy10 ,bk4 ,i41 ch4 i4 #ad4 ,a somewhat later anonymous work1 8,trait des ,causes ,physiques et ,morals du ,rire10 #agfh1 is not without merit as a ventilation of the subject4 ,platner1 in his 8,anthropology10 #hid1 has collected the opinions of the philosophers from ,hume to ,kant who have attempted an explanation of this phenomenon peculiar to human nature4 ,kant's and ,jean ,paul's theories of the ludicrous are well known4 ,i regard it as unnecessary to prove their incorrectness1 for whoever tries to refer given cases of the ludicrous to them will in the great majority of instances be at once convinced of their insufficiency4 ,according to my explanation given in the first volume1 the source of the ludicrous is always the paradoxical1 and therefore unexpected1 subsumption of an object under a conception which in other respects is different from it1 and accordingly the phenomenon of laughter always signifies the sudden apprehension of an incongruity between such a conception and the real object thought under it1 thus between the abstract and the concrete object of perception4 ,the greater and more unexpected1 in the apprehension of the laughter1 this incongruity is1 the more violent will be his laughter4 ,therefore in everything that excites laughter it must always be possible to show a conception and a particular1 that is1 a thing or event1 which certainly can be subsumed under that conception1 and therefore thought through it1 yet in another and more predominating aspect does not belong to it at all1 but is strikingly different from everything else that is thought through that conception4 ,if1 as often occurs1 especially in witticisms1 instead of such a real object of perception1 the conception of a subordinate species is brought under the higher conception of the genus1 it will yet excite laughter only through the fact that the imagination realises it1 i4e41 makes a perceptible representative stand for it1 and thus the conflict between what is thought and what is perceived takes place4 ,indeed if we wish to understand this perfectly explicitly1 it is possible to trace everything ludicrous to a syllogism in the first figure1 with an undisputed major and an unexpected minor1 which to a certain extent is only sophistically valid1 in consequence of which connection the conclusion partakes of the quality of the ludicrous4 ,in the first volume ,i regarded it as superfluous to illustrate this theory by examples1 for every one can do this for himself by a little reflection upon cases of the ludicrous which he remembers4 ,yet1 in order to come to the assistance of the mental inertness of those readers who prefer always to remain in a passive condition1 ,i will accommodate myself to them4 ,indeed in this third edition ,i wish to multiply and accumulate examples1 so that it may be indisputable that here1 after so many fruitless earlier attempts1 the true theory of the ludicrous is given1 and the problem which was proposed and also given up by ,cicero is definitely solved4 ,if we consider that an angle requires two lines meeting so that if they are produced they will intersect each other2 on the other hand1 that the tangent of a circle only touches it at one point1 but at this point is really parallel to it2 and accordingly have present to our minds the abstract conviction of the impossibility of an angle between the circumference of a circle and its tangent2 and if now such an angle lies visibly before us upon paper1 this will easily excite a smile4 ,the ludicrousness in this case is exceedingly weak2 but yet the source of it in the incongruity of what is thought and perceived appears in it with exceptional distinctness4 ,when we discover such an incongruity1 the occasion for laughter that thereby arises is1 according as we pass from the real1 i4e41 the perceptible1 to the conception1 or conversely from the conception to the real1 either a witticism or an absurdity1 which in a higher degree1 and especially in the practical sphere1 is folly1 as was explained in the text4 ,now to consider examples of the first case1 thus of wit1 we shall first of all take the familiar anecdote of the ,gascon at whom the king laughed when he saw him in light summer clothing in the depth of winter1 and who thereupon said to the king3 8,if your ,majesty had put on what ,i have1 you would find it very warm20 and on being asked what he had put on1 replied3 8,my whole wardrobe60 ,under this last conception we have to think both the unlimited wardrobe of a king and the single summer coat of a poor devil1 the sight of which upon his freezing body shows its great incongruity with the conception4 ,the audience in a theatre in ,paris once called for the 8,marseillaise0 to be played1 and as this was not done1 began shrieking and howling1 so that at last a commissary of police in uniform came upon the stage and explained that it was not allowed that anything should be given in the theatre except what was in the playbill4 ,upon this a voice cried3 8,et vous1 ,monsieur1 tes-vous aussi sur l'affiche80--a hit which was received with universal laughter4 ,for here the subsumption of what is heterogeneous is at once distinct and unforced4 ,the epigramme3 8,bav is the true shepherd of whom the ,bible spake3 ,though his flock be all asleep1 he alone remains awake30 subsumes1 under the conception of a sleeping flock and a waking shepherd1 the tedious preacher who still bellows on unheard when he has sent all the people to sleep4 ,analogous to this is the epitaph on a doctor3 8,here lies he like a hero1 and those he has slain lie around him20 it subsumes under the conception1 honourable to the hero1 of 8lying surrounded by dead bodies10 the doctor1 who is supposed to preserve life4 ,very commonly the witticism consists in a single expression1 through which only the conception is given1 under which the case presented can be subsumed1 though it is very different from everything else that is thought under it4 ,so is it in 8,romeo0 when the vivacious ,mercutio answers his friends who promise to visit him on the morrow3 8,ask for me to-morrow1 and you shall find me a grave man40 ,under this conception a dead man is here subsumed2 but in ,english there is also a play upon the words1 for 8a grave man0 means both a serious man and a man of the grave4 ,of this kind is also the well-known anecdote of the actor ,unzelmann4 ,in the ,berlin theatre he was strictly forbidden to improvise4 ,soon afterwards he had to appear on the stage on horseback1 and just as he came on the stage the horse dunged1 at which the audience began to laugh1 but laughed much more when ,unzelmann said to the horse3 8,what are you doing8 ,don't you know we are forbidden to improvise80 ,here the subsumption of the heterogeneous under the more general conception is very distinct1 but the witticism is exceedingly happy1 and the ludicrous effect produced by it excessively strong4 ,to this class also belongs the following announcement from ,hall in a newspaper of ,march #ahea3 8,the band of ,jewish swindlers to which we have referred were again delivered over to us with obligato accompaniment40 ,this subsuming of a police escort under a musical term is very happy1 though it approaches the mere play upon words4 ,on the other hand1 it is exactly a case of the kind we are considering when ,saphir1 in a paper-war with the actor ,angeli1 describes him as 8,angeli1 who is equally great in mind and body40 ,the small statue of the actor was known to the whole town1 and thus under the conception 8great0 unusual smallness was presented to the mind4 ,also when the same ,saphir calls the airs of a new opera 8good old friends10 and so brings the quality which is most to be condemned under a conception which is usually employed to commend4 ,also1 if we should say of a lady whose favour could be influenced by presents1 that she knew how to combine the utile with the dulci4 ,for here we bring the moral life under the conception of a rule which ,horace has recommended in an sthetical reference4 ,also if to signify a brothel we should call it the 8modest abode of quiet joys40 ,good society1 in order to be thoroughly insipid1 has forbidden all decided utterances1 and therefore all strong expressions4 ,therefore it is wont1 when it has to signify scandalous or in any way indecent things1 to mitigate or extenuate them by expressing them through general conceptions4 ,but in this way it happens that they are more or less incongruously subsumed1 and in a corresponding degree the effect of the ludicrous is produced4 ,to this class belongs the use of utile dulci referred to above1 and also such expressions as the following3 8,he had unpleasantness at the ball0 when he was thrashed and kicked out2 or1 8,he has done too well0 when he is drunk2 and also1 8,the woman has weak moments0 if she is unfaithful to her husband1 c4 ,equivocal sayings also belong to the same class4 ,they are conceptions which in themselves contain nothing improper1 but yet the case brought under them leads to an improper idea4 ,they are very common in society4 ,but a perfect example of a full and magnificent equivocation is ,shenstone's incomparable epitaph on a justice of the peace1 which1 in its high-flown lapidary style1 seems to speak of noble and sublime things1 while under each of their conceptions something quite different is to be subsumed1 which only appears in the very last word as the unexpected key to the whole1 and the reader discovers with loud laughter that he has only read a very obscene equivocation4 ,in this smooth-combed age it is altogether impossible to quote this here1 not to speak of translating it2 it will be found in ,shenstone's poetical works1 under the title 8,inscription40 ,equivocations sometimes pass over into mere puns1 about which all that is necessary has been said in the text4 ,further1 the ultimate subsumption1 ludicrous to all1 of what in one respect is heterogeneous1 under a conception which in other respects agrees with it1 may take place contrary to our intention4 ,for example1 one of the free negroes in ,north ,america1 who take pains to imitate the whites in everything1 quite recently placed an epitaph over his dead child which begins1 8,lovely1 early broken lily40 ,if1 on the contrary1 something real and perceptible is1 with direct intention1 brought under the conception of its opposite1 the result is plain1 common irony4 ,for example1 if when it is raining hard we say1 8,nice weather we are having to-day20 or if we say of an ugly bride1 8,that man has found a charming treasure20 or of a knave1 8,this honest man10 c4 c4 ,only children and quite uneducated people will laugh at such things2 for here the incongruity between what is thought and what is perceived is total4 ,yet just in this direct exaggeration in the production of the ludicrous its fundamental character1 incongruity1 appears very distinctly4 ,this species of the ludicrous is1 on account of its exaggeration and distinct intention1 in some respects related to parody4 ,the procedure of the latter consists in this4 ,it substitutes for the incidents and words of a serious poem or drama insignificant low persons or trifling motives and actions4 ,it thus subsumes the commonplace realities which it sets forth under the lofty conceptions given in the theme1 under which in a certain respect they must come1 while in other respects they are very incongruous2 and thereby the contrast between what is perceived and what is thought appears very glaring4 ,there is no lack of familiar examples of this1 and therefore ,i shall only give one1 from the 8,zobeide0 of ,carlo ,gozzi1 act iv41 scene #c1 where the famous stanza of ,ariosto 7,orl4 ,fur41 i4 #bb71 8,oh gran bont de' cavalieri antichi10 c41 is put word for word into the mouth of two clowns who have just been thrashing each other1 and tired with this1 lie quietly side by side4 ,this is also the nature of the application so popular in ,germany of serious verses1 especially of ,schiller1 to trivial events1 which clearly contains a subsumption of heterogeneous things under the general conception which the verse expresses4 ,thus1 for example1 when any one has displayed a very characteristic trait1 there will rarely be wanting some one to say1 8,from that ,i know with whom ,i have to do40 ,but it was original and very witty of a man who was in love with a young bride to quote to the newly married couple 7,i know not how loudly7 the concluding words of ,schiller's ballad1 8,the ,surety30 8,let me be1 ,i pray you1 ,in your bond the third40 ,the effect of the ludicrous is here strong and inevitable1 because under the conceptions through which ,schiller presents to the mind a moral and noble relation1 a forbidden and immoral relation is subsumed1 and yet correctly and without change1 thus is thought through it4 ,in all the examples of wit given here we find that under a conception1 or in general an abstract thought1 a real thing is1 directly1 or by means of a narrower conception1 subsumed1 which indeed1 strictly speaking1 comes under it1 and yet is as different as possible from the proper and original intention and tendency of the thought4 ,accordingly wit1 as a mental capacity1 consists entirely in a facility for finding for every object that appears a conception under which it certainly can be thought1 though it is very different from all the other objects which come under this conception4 ,the second species of the ludicrous follows1 as we have mentioned1 the opposite path from the abstract conception to the real or perceptible things thought through it4 ,but this now brings to light any incongruity with the conception which was overlooked1 and hence arises an absurdity1 and therefore in the practical sphere a foolish action4 ,since the play requires action1 this species of the ludicrous is essential to comedy4 ,upon this depends the observation of ,voltaire3 8,j'ai cru remarquer aux spectacles1 qu'il ne s'lve presque jamais de ces clats de rire universels1 qu' l'occasion d'une ,m,,prise0 7,preface de ,l',enfant ,prodigue74 ,the following may serve as examples of this species of the ludicrous4 ,when some one had declared that he was fond of walking alone1 an ,austrian said to him3 8,you like walking alone2 so do ,i3 therefore we can go together40 ,he starts from the conception1 8,a pleasure which two love they can enjoy in common10 and subsumes under it the very case which excludes community4 ,further1 the servant who rubbed a worn sealskin in his master's box with ,macassar oil1 so that it might become covered with hair again2 in doing which he started from the conception1 8,macassar oil makes hair grow40 ,the soldiers in the guard-room who allowed a prisoner who was brought in to join in their game of cards1 then quarrelled with him for cheating1 and turned him out4 ,they let themselves be led by the general conception1 8,bad companions are turned out10 and forget that he is also a prisoner1 i4e41 one whom they ought to hold fast4 ,two young peasants had loaded their gun with coarse shot1 which they wished to extract1 in order to substitute fine1 without losing the powder4 ,so one of them put the mouth of the barrel in his hat1 which he took between his legs1 and said to the other3 8,now you pull the trigger slowly1 slowly1 slowly2 then the shot will come first40 ,he starts from the conception1 8,prolonging the cause prolongs the effect40 ,most of the actions of ,don ,quixote are also cases in point1 for he subsumes the realities he encounters under conceptions drawn from the romances of chivalry1 from which they are very different4 ,for example1 in order to support the oppressed he frees the galley slaves4 ,properly all ,mnchhausenisms are also of this nature1 only they are not actions which are performed1 but impossibilities1 which are passed off upon the hearer as having really happened4 ,in them the fact is always so conceived that when it is thought merely in the abstract1 and therefore comparatively a priori1 it appears possible and plausible2 but afterwards1 if we come down to the perception of the particular case1 thus a posteriori the impossibility of the thing1 indeed the absurdity of the assumption1 is brought into prominence1 and excites laughter through the evident incongruity of what is perceived and what is thought4 ,for example1 when the melodies frozen up in the post-horn are thawed in the warm room--when ,mnchhausen1 sitting upon a tree during a hard frost1 draws up his knife which has dropped to the ground by the frozen jet of his own water1 c4 ,such is also the story of the two lions who broke down the partition between them during the night and devoured each other in their rage1 so that in the morning there was nothing to be found but the two tails4 ,there are also cases of the ludicrous where the conception under which the perceptible facts are brought does not require to be expressed or signified1 but comes into consciousness itself through the association of ideas4 ,the laughter into which ,garrick burst in the middle of playing tragedy because a butcher in the front of the pit1 who had taken off his wig to wipe the sweat from his head1 placed the wig for a while upon his large dog1 who stood facing the stage with his fore paws resting on the pit railings1 was occasioned by the fact that ,garrick started from the conception of a spectator1 which was added in his own mind4 ,this is the reason why certain animal forms1 such as apes1 kangaroos1 jumping-hares1 c41 sometimes appear to us ludicrous because something about them resembling man leads us to subsume them under the conception of the human form1 and starting from this we perceive their incongruity with it4 ,now the conceptions whose observed incongruity with the perceptions moves us to laughter are either those of others or our own4 ,in the first case we laugh at others1 in the second we feel a surprise1 often agreeable1 at the least amusing4 ,therefore children and uneducated people laugh at the most trifling things1 even at misfortunes1 if they were unexpected1 and thus convicted their preconceived conception of error4 ,as a rule laughing is a pleasant condition2 accordingly the apprehension of the incongruity between what is thought and what is perceived1 that is1 the real1 gives us pleasure1 and we give ourselves up gladly to the spasmodic convulsions which this apprehension excites4 ,the reason of this is as follows4 ,in every suddenly appearing conflict between what is perceived and what is thought1 what is perceived is always unquestionably right2 for it is not subject to error at all1 requires no confirmation from without1 but answers for itself4 ,its conflict with what is thought springs ultimately from the fact that the latter1 with its abstract conceptions1 cannot get down to the infinite multifariousness and fine shades of difference of the concrete4 ,this victory of knowledge of perception over thought affords us pleasure4 ,for perception is the original kind of knowledge inseparable from animal nature1 in which everything that gives direct satisfaction to the will presents itself4 ,it is the medium of the present1 of enjoyment and gaiety2 moreover it is attended with no exertion4 ,with thinking the opposite is the case2 it is the second power of knowledge1 the exercise of which always demands some1 and often considerable1 exertion4 ,besides1 it is the conceptions of thought that often oppose the gratification of our immediate desires1 for1 as the medium of the past1 the future1 and of seriousness1 they are the vehicle of our fears1 our repentance1 and all our cares4 ,it must therefore be diverting to us to see this strict1 untiring1 troublesome governess1 the reason1 for once convicted of insufficiency4 ,on this account then the mien or appearance of laughter is very closely related to that of joy4 ,on account of the want of reason1 thus of general conceptions1 the brute is incapable of laughter1 as of speech4 ,this is therefore a prerogative and characteristic mark of man4 ,yet it may be remarked in passing that his one friend the dog has an analogous characteristic action peculiar to him alone in distinction from all other brutes1 the very expressive1 kindly1 and thoroughly honest fawning and wagging of its tail4 ,but how favourably does this salutation given him by nature compare with the bows and simpering civilities of men4 ,at least for the present1 it is a thousand times more reliable than their assurance of inward friendship and devotion4 ,the opposite of laughing and joking is seriousness4 ,accordingly it consists in the consciousness of the perfect agreement and congruity of the conception1 or thought1 with what is perceived1 or the reality4 ,the serious man is convinced that he thinks the things as they are1 and that they are as he thinks them4 ,this is just why the transition from profound seriousness to laughter is so easy1 and can be effected by trifles4 ,for the more perfect that agreement assumed by seriousness may seem to be1 the more easily is it destroyed by the unexpected discovery of even a slight incongruity4 ,therefore the more a man is capable of entire seriousness1 the more heartily can he laugh4 ,men whose laughter is always affected and forced are intellectually and morally of little worth2 and in general the way of laughing1 and1 on the other hand1 the occasions of it1 are very characteristic of the person4 ,that the relations of the sexes afford the easiest materials for jokes always ready to hand and within the reach of the weakest wit1 as is proved by the abundance of obscene jests1 could not be if it were not that the deepest seriousness lies at their foundation4 ,that the laughter of others at what we do or say seriously offends us so keenly depends on the fact that it asserts that there is a great incongruity between our conceptions and the objective realities4 ,for the same reason1 the predicate 8ludicrous0 or 8absurd0 is insulting4 ,the laugh of scorn announces with triumph to the baffled adversary how incongruous were the conceptions he cherished with the reality which is now revealing itself to him4 ,our own bitter laughter at the fearful disclosure of the truth through which our firmly cherished expectations are proved to be delusive is the active expression of the discovery now made of the incongruity between the thoughts which1 in our foolish confidence in man or fate1 we entertained1 and the truth which is now unveiled4 ,the intentionally ludicrous is the joke4 ,it is the effort to bring about a discrepancy between the conceptions of another and the reality by disarranging one of the two2 while its opposite1 seriousness1 consists in the exact conformity of the two to each other1 which is at least aimed at4 ,but if now the joke is concealed behind seriousness1 then we have irony4 ,for example1 if with apparent seriousness we acquiesce in the opinions of another which are the opposite of our own1 and pretend to share them with him1 till at last the result perplexes him both as to us and them4 ,this is the attitude of ,socrates as opposed to ,hippias1 ,protagoras1 ,gorgias1 and other sophists1 and indeed often to his collocutors in general4 ,the converse of irony is accordingly seriousness concealed behind a joke1 and this is humour4 ,it might be called the double counterpoint of irony4 ,explanations such as 8,humour is the interpenetration of the finite and the infinite0 express nothing more than the entire incapacity for thought of those who are satisfied with such empty phrases4 ,irony is objective1 that is1 intended for another2 but humour is subjective1 that is1 it primarily exists only for one's own self4 ,accordingly we find the masterpieces of irony among the ancients1 but those of humour among the moderns4 ,for1 more closely considered1 humour depends upon a subjective1 yet serious and sublime mood1 which is involuntarily in conflict with a common external world very different from itself1 which it cannot escape from and to which it will not give itself up2 therefore1 as an accommodation1 it tries to think its own point of view and that external world through the same conceptions1 and thus a double incongruity arises1 sometimes on the one side1 sometimes on the other1 between these concepts and the realities thought through them4 ,hence the impression of the intentionally ludicrous1 thus of the joke1 is produced1 behind which1 however1 the deepest seriousness is concealed and shines through4 ,irony begins with a serious air and ends with a smile2 with humour the order is reversed4 ,the words of ,mercutio quoted above may serve as an example of humour4 ,also in 8,hamlet0--,polonius3 8,my honourable lord1 ,i will most humbly take my leave of you4 ,hamlet3 ,you cannot1 sir1 take from me anything that ,i will more willingly part withal1 except my life1 except my life1 except my life40 ,again1 before the introduction of the play at court1 ,hamlet says to ,ophelia3 8,what should a man do but be merry8 for1 look you1 how cheerfully my mother looks1 and my father died within these two hours4 ,ophelia3 ,nay1 'tis twice two months1 my lord4 ,hamlet3 ,so long8 ,nay1 then let the devil wear black1 for ,i'll have a suit of sables40 ,again1 in ,jean ,paul's 8,titan10 when ,schoppe1 melancholy and now brooding over himself1 frequently looking at his hands1 says to himself1 8,there sits a lord in bodily reality1 and ,i in him2 but who is such80 ,heinrich ,heine appears as a true humourist in his 8,romancero40 ,behind all his jokes and drollery we discern a profound seriousness1 which is ashamed to appear unveiled4 ,accordingly humour depends upon a special kind of mood or temper 7,german1 ,laune1 probably from ,luna7 through which conception in all its modifications1 a decided predominance of the subjective over the objective in the apprehension of the external world1 is thought4 ,moreover1 every poetical or artistic presentation of a comical1 or indeed even a farcical scene1 through which a serious thought yet glimmers as its concealed background1 is a production of humour1 thus is humorous4 ,such1 for example1 is a coloured drawing of ,tischbein's1 which represents an empty room1 lighted only by the blazing fire in the grate4 ,before the fire stands a man with his coat off1 in such a position that his shadow1 going out from his feet1 stretches across the whole room4 ,tischbein comments thus on the drawing3 8,this is a man who has succeeded in nothing in the world1 and who has made nothing of it2 now he rejoices that he can throw such a large shadow40 ,now1 if ,i had to express the seriousness that lies concealed behind this jest1 ,i could best do so by means of the following verse taken from the ,persian poem of ,anwari ,soheili3-- 8,if thou hast lost possession of a world1 ,be not distressed1 for it is nought2 ,or hast thou gained possession of a world1 ,be not o'erjoyed1 for it is nought4 ,our pains1 our gains1 all pass away2 ,get thee beyond the world1 for it is nought40 ,that at the present day the word humorous is generally used in ,german literature in the sense of comical arises from the miserable desire to give things a more distinguished name than belongs to them1 the name of a class that stands above them4 ,thus every inn must be called a hotel1 every money-changer a banker1 every concert a musical academy1 the merchant's counting-house a bureau1 the potter an artist in clay1 and therefore also every clown a humourist4 ,the word humour is borrowed from the ,english to denote a quite peculiar species of the ludicrous1 which indeed1 as was said above1 is related to the sublime1 and which was first remarked by them4 ,but it is not intended to be used as the title for all kinds of jokes and buffoonery1 as is now universally the case in ,germany1 without opposition from men of letters and scholars2 for the true conception of that modification1 that tendency of the mind1 that child of the sublime and the ridiculous1 would be too subtle and too high for their public1 to please which they take pains to make everything flat and vulgar4 ,well1 8high words and a low meaning0 is in general the motto of the noble present1 and accordingly now-a-days he is called a humourist who was formerly1 called a buffoon4 ,chapter ,,ix47#ba7 ,on ,logic ,in ,general4 ,logic1 ,dialectic1 and ,rhetoric go together1 because they make up the whole of a technic of reason1 and under this title they ought also to be taught--,logic as the technic of our own thinking1 ,dialectic of disputing with others1 and ,rhetoric of speaking to many 7concionatio72 thus corresponding to the singular1 dual1 and plural1 and to the monologue1 the dialogue1 and the panegyric4 ,under ,dialectic ,i understand1 in agreement with ,aristotle 7,metaph41 iii4 #b1 and ,analyt4 ,post41 i4 #aa71 the art of conversation directed to the mutual investigation of truth1 especially philosophical truth4 ,but a conversation of this kind necessarily passes more or less into controversy2 therefore dialectic may also be explained as the art of disputation4 ,we have examples and patterns of dialectic in the ,platonic dialogues2 but for the special theory of it1 thus for the technical rules of disputation1 eristics1 very little has hitherto been accomplished4 ,i have worked out an attempt of the kind1 and given an example of it1 in the second volume of the 8,parerga10 therefore ,i shall pass over the exposition of this science altogether here4 ,in ,rhetoric the rhetorical figures are very much what the syllogistic figures are in ,logic2 at all events they are worth considering4 ,in ,aristotle's time they seem to have not yet become the object of theoretical investigation1 for he does not treat of them in any of his rhetorics1 and in this reference we are referred to ,rutilius ,lupus1 the epitomiser of a later ,gorgias4 ,all the three sciences have this in common1 that without having learned them we follow their rules1 which indeed are themselves first abstracted from this natural employment of them4 ,therefore1 although they are of great theoretical interest1 they are of little practical use2 partly because1 though they certainly give the rule1 they do not give the case of its application2 partly because in practice there is generally no time to recollect the rules4 ,thus they teach only what every one already knows and practises of his own accord2 but yet the abstract knowledge of this is interesting and important4 ,logic will not easily have a practical value1 at least for our own thinking4 ,for the errors of our own reasoning scarcely ever lie in the inferences nor otherwise in the form1 but in the judgments1 thus in the matter of thought4 ,in controversy1 on the other hand1 we can sometimes derive some practical use from logic1 by taking the more or less intentionally deceptive argument of our opponent1 which he advances under the garb and cover of continuous speech1 and referring it to the strict form of regular syllogisms1 and thus convicting it of logical errors2 for example1 simple conversion of universal affirmative judgments1 syllogisms with four terms1 inferences from the consequent to the reason1 syllogisms in the second figure with merely affirmative premisses1 and many such4 ,it seems to me that the doctrine of the laws of thought might be simplified if we were only to set up two1 the law of excluded middle and that of sufficient reason4 ,the former thus3 8,every predicate can either be affirmed or denied of every subject40 ,here it is already contained in the 8either1 or0 that both cannot occur at once1 and consequently just what is expressed by the laws of identity and contradiction4 ,thus these would be added as corollaries of that principle which really says that every two concept-spheres must be thought either as united or as separated1 but never as both at once2 and therefore1 even although words are brought together which express the latter1 these words assert a process of thought which cannot be carried out4 ,the consciousness of this infeasibility is the feeling of contradiction4 ,the second law of thought1 the principle of sufficient reason1 would affirm that the above attributing or denying must be determined by something different from the judgment itself1 which may be a 7pure or empirical7 perception1 or merely another judgment4 ,this other and different thing is then called the ground or reason of the judgment4 ,so far as a judgment satisfies the first law of thought1 it is thinkable2 so far as it satisfies the second1 it is true1 or at least in the case in which the ground of a judgment is only another judgment it is logically or formally true4 ,but1 finally1 material or absolute truth is always the relation between a judgment and a perception1 thus between the abstract and the concrete or perceptible idea4 ,this is either an immediate relation or it is brought about by means of other judgments1 i4e41 through other abstract ideas4 ,from this it is easy to see that one truth can never overthrow another1 but all must ultimately agree2 because in the concrete or perceptible1 which is their common foundation1 no contradiction is possible4 ,therefore no truth has anything to fear from other truths4 ,illusion and error have to fear every truth1 because through the logical connection of all truths even the most distant must some time strike its blow at every error4 ,this second law of thought is therefore the connecting link between logic and what is no longer logic1 but the matter of thought4 ,consequently the agreement of the conceptions1 thus of the abstract idea with what is given in the perceptible idea1 is1 on the side of the object truth1 and on the side of the subject knowledge4 ,to express the union or separation of two concept-spheres referred to above is the work of the copula1 8is--is not40 ,through this every verb can be expressed by means of its participle4 ,therefore all judging consists in the use of a verb1 and vice vers4 ,accordingly the significance of the copula is that the predicate is to be thought in the subject1 nothing more4 ,now1 consider what the content of the infinitive of the copula 8to be0 amounts to4 ,but this is a principal theme of the professors of philosophy of the present time4 ,however1 we must not be too strict with them2 most of them wish to express by it nothing but material things1 the corporeal world1 to which1 as perfectly innocent realists at the bottom of their hearts1 they attribute the highest reality4 ,to speak1 however1 of the bodies so directly appears to them too vulgar2 and therefore they say 8being10 which they think sounds better1 and think in connection with it the tables and chairs standing before them4 8,for1 because1 why1 therefore1 thus1 since1 although1 indeed1 yet1 but1 if1 then1 either1 or10 and more like these1 are properly logical particles1 for their only end is to express the form of the thought processes4 ,they are therefore a valuable possession of a language1 and do not belong to all in equal numbers4 ,thus 8zwar0 7the contracted 8es ist wahr07 seems to belong exclusively to the ,german language4 ,it is always connected with an 8aber0 which follows or is added in thought1 as 8if0 is connected with 8then40 ,the logical rule that1 as regards quantity1 singular judgments1 that is1 judgments which have a singular conception 7notio singularis7 for their subject1 are to be treated as universal judgments1 depends upon the circumstance that they are in fact universal judgments1 which have merely the peculiarity that their subject is a conception which can only be supported by a single real object1 and therefore only contains a single real object under it2 as when the conception is denoted by a proper name4 ,this1 however1 has really only to be considered when we proceed from the abstract idea to the concrete or perceptible1 thus seek to realise the conceptions4 ,in thinking itself1 in operating with judgments1 this makes no difference1 simply because between singular and universal conceptions there is no logical difference4 8,immanuel ,kant0 signifies logically1 8all ,immanuel ,kant40 ,accordingly the quantity of judgments is really only of two kinds--universal and particular4 ,an individual idea cannot be the subject of a judgment1 because it is not an abstraction1 it is not something thought1 but something perceived4 ,every conception1 on the other hand1 is essentially universal1 and every judgment must have a conception as its subject4 ,the difference between particular judgments 7propositiones particulares7 and universal judgments often depends merely on the external and contingent circumstance that the language has no word to express by itself the part that is here to be separated from the general conception which forms the subject of such a judgment4 ,if there were such a word many a particular judgment would be universal4 ,for example1 the particular judgment1 8,some trees bear gall-nuts10 becomes a universal judgment1 because for this part of the conception1 8tree10 we have a special word1 8,all oaks bear gall-nuts40 ,in the same way is the judgment1 8,some men are black10 related to the judgment1 8,all negroes are black40 ,or else this difference depends upon the fact that in the mind of him who judges the conception which he makes the subject of the particular judgment has not become clearly separated from the general conception as a part of which he defines it2 otherwise he could have expressed a universal instead of a particular judgment4 ,for example1 instead of the judgment1 8,some ruminants have upper incisors10 this1 8,all unhorned ruminants have upper incisors40 ,the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are assertions as to the relation of two 7in the case of the disjunctive judgment even several7 categorical judgments to each other4 ,the hypothetical judgment asserts that the truth of the second of the two categorical judgments here linked together depends upon the truth of the first1 and the falseness of the first depends upon the falseness of the second2 thus that these two propositions stand in direct community as regards truth and falseness4 ,the disjunctive judgment1 on the other hand1 asserts that upon the truth of one of the categorical judgments here linked together depends the falseness of the others1 and conversely2 thus that these propositions are in conflict as regards truth and falseness4 ,the question is a judgment1 one of whose three parts is left open3 thus either the copula1 8,is ,caius a ,roman--or not80 or the predicate1 8,is ,caius a ,roman--or something else80 or the subject1 8,is ,caius a ,roman--or is it some one else who is a ,roman80 ,the place of the conception which is left open may also remain quite empty2 for example1 8,what is ,caius80--8,who is a ,roman80 ,the 1 inductio1 is with ,aristotle the opposite of the 4 ,the latter proves a proposition to be false by showing that what would follow from it is not true2 thus by the instantia in contrarium4 ,the 1 on the other hand1 proves the truth of a proposition by showing that what would follow from it is true4 ,thus it leads by means of examples to our accepting something while the leads to our rejecting it4 ,therefore the 1 or induction1 is an inference from the consequents to the reason1 and indeed modo ponente2 for from many cases it establishes the rule1 from which these cases then in their turn follow4 ,on this account it is never perfectly certain1 but at the most arrives at very great probability4 ,however1 this formal uncertainty may yet leave room for material certainty through the number of the sequences observed2 in the same way as in mathematics the irrational relations are brought infinitely near to rationality by means of decimal fractions4 ,the 1 on the contrary1 is primarily an inference from the reason to the consequents1 though it is afterwards carried out modo tollente1 in that it proves the non-existence of a necessary consequent1 and thereby destroys the truth of the assumed reason4 ,on this account it is always perfectly certain1 and accomplishes more by a single example in contrarium than the induction does by innumerable examples in favour of the proposition propounded4 ,so much easier is it to refute than to prove1 to overthrow than to establish4 ,chapter ,x4 ,on ,the ,syllogism4 ,although it is very hard to establish a new and correct view of a subject which for more than two thousand years has been handled by innumerable writers1 and which1 moreover1 does not receive additions through the growth of experience1 yet this must not deter me from presenting to the thinker for examination the following attempt of this kind4 ,an inference is that operation of our reason by virtue of which1 through the comparison of two judgments a third judgment arises1 without the assistance of any knowledge otherwise obtained4 ,the condition of this is that these two judgments have one conception in common1 for otherwise they are foreign to each other and have no community4 ,but under this condition they become the father and mother of a child that contains in itself something of both4 ,moreover1 this operation is no arbitrary act1 but an act of the reason1 which1 when it has considered such judgments1 performs it of itself according to its own laws4 ,so far it is objective1 not subjective1 and therefore subject to the strictest rules4 ,we may ask in passing whether he who draws an inference really learns something new from the new proposition1 something previously unknown to him8 ,not absolutely2 but yet to a certain extent he does4 ,what he learns lay in what he knew3 thus he knew it also1 but he did not know that he knew it2 which is as if he had something1 but did not know that he had it1 and this is just the same as if he had it not4 ,he knew it only implicite1 now he knows it explicite2 but this distinction may be so great that the conclusion appears to him a new truth4 ,for example3 ,all diamonds are stones2 ,all diamonds are combustible3 ,therefore some stones are combustible4 ,the nature of inference consequently consists in this1 that we bring it to distinct consciousness that we have already thought in the premisses what is asserted in the conclusion4 ,it is therefore a means of becoming more distinctly conscious of one's own knowledge1 of learning more fully1 or becoming aware of what one knows4 ,the knowledge which is afforded by the conclusion was latent1 and therefore had just as little effect as latent heat has on the thermometer4 ,whoever has salt has also chlorine2 but it is as if he had it not1 for it can only act as chlorine if it is chemically evolved2 thus only1 then1 does he really possess it4 ,it is the same with the gain which a mere conclusion from already known premisses affords3 a previously bound or latent knowledge is thereby set free4 ,these comparisons may indeed seem to be somewhat strained1 but yet they really are not4 ,for because we draw many of the possible inferences from our knowledge very soon1 very rapidly1 and without formality1 and therefore have no distinct recollection of them1 it seems to us as if no premisses for possible conclusions remained long stored up unused1 but as if we already had also conclusions prepared for all the premisses within reach of our knowledge4 ,but this is not always the case2 on the contrary1 two premisses may have for a long time an isolated existence in the same mind1 till at last some occasion brings them together1 and then the conclusion suddenly appears1 as the spark comes from the steel and the stone only when they are struck together4 ,in reality the premisses assumed from without1 both for theoretical insight and for motives1 which bring about resolves1 often lie for a long time in us1 and become1 partly through half-conscious1 and even inarticulate1 processes of thought1 compared with the rest of our stock of knowledge1 reflected upon1 and1 as it were1 shaken up together1 till at last the right major finds the right minor1 and these immediately take up their proper places1 and at once the conclusion exists as a light that has suddenly arisen for us1 without any action on our part1 as if it were an inspiration2 for we cannot comprehend how we and others have so long been in ignorance of it4 ,it is true that in a happily organised mind this process goes on more quickly and easily than in ordinary minds2 and just because it is carried on spontaneously and without distinct consciousness it cannot be learned4 ,therefore ,goethe says3 8,how easy anything is he knows who has discovered it1 he knows who has attained to it40 ,as an illustration of the process of thought here described we may compare it to those padlocks which consist of rings with letters2 hanging on the box of a travelling carriage1 they are shaken so long that at last the letters of the word come together in their order and the lock opens4 ,for the rest1 we must also remember that the syllogism consists in the process of thought itself1 and the words and propositions through which it is expressed only indicate the traces it has left behind it--they are related to it as the sound-figures of sand are related to the notes whose vibrations they express4 ,when we reflect upon something1 we collect our data1 reduce them to judgments1 which are all quickly brought together and compared1 and thereby the conclusions which it is possible to draw from them are instantly arrived at by means of the use of all the three syllogistic figures4 ,yet on account of the great rapidity of this operation only a few words are used1 and sometimes none at all1 and only the conclusion is formally expressed4 ,thus it sometimes happens that because in this way1 or even merely intuitively1 i4e41 by a happy apperu1 we have brought some new truth to consciousness1 we now treat it as a conclusion and seek premisses for it1 that is1 we desire to prove it1 for as a rule knowledge exists earlier than its proofs4 ,we then go through our stock of knowledge in order to see whether we can find some truth in it in which the newly discovered truth was already implicitly contained1 or two propositions which would give this as a result if they were brought together according to rule4 ,on the other hand1 every judicial proceeding affords a most complete and imposing syllogism1 a syllogism in the first figure4 ,the civil or criminal transgression complained of is the minor2 it is established by the prosecutor4 ,the law applicable to the case is the major4 ,the judgment is the conclusion1 which therefore1 as something necessary1 is 8merely recognised0 by the judge4 ,but now ,i shall attempt to give the simplest and most correct exposition of the peculiar mechanism of inference4 ,judging1 this elementary and most important process of thought1 consists in the comparison of two conceptions2 inference in the comparison of two judgments4 ,yet ordinarily in text-books inference is also referred to the comparison of conceptions1 though of three1 because from the relation which two of these conceptions have to a third their relation to each other may be known4 ,truth cannot be denied to this view also2 and since it affords opportunity for the perceptible demonstration of syllogistic relations by means of drawn concept-spheres1 a method approved of by me in the text1 it has the advantage of making the matter easily comprehensible4 ,but it seems to me that here1 as in so many cases1 comprehensibility is attained at the cost of thoroughness4 ,the real process of thought in inference1 with which the three syllogistic figures and their necessity precisely agree1 is not thus recognised4 ,in inference we operate not with mere conceptions but with whole judgments1 to which quality1 which lies only in the copula and not in the conceptions1 and also quantity are absolutely essential1 and indeed we have further to add modality4 ,that exposition of inference as a relation of three conceptions fails in this1 that it at once resolves the judgments into their ultimate elements 7the conceptions71 and thus the means of combining these is lost1 and that which is peculiar to the judgments as such and in their completeness1 which is just what constitutes the necessity of the conclusion which follows from them1 is lost sight of4 ,it thus falls into an error analogous to that which organic chemistry would commit if1 for example1 in the analysis of plants it were at once to reduce them to their ultimate elements1 when it would find in all plants carbon1 hydrogen1 and oxygen1 but would lose the specific differences1 to obtain which it is necessary to stop at their more special elements1 the so-called alkaloids1 and to take care to analyse these in their turn4 ,from three given conceptions no conclusion can as yet be drawn4 ,it may certainly be said3 the relation of two of them to the third must be given with them4 ,but it is just the judgments which combine these conceptions1 that are the expression of this relation2 thus judgments1 not mere conceptions1 are the material of the inference4 ,accordingly inference is essentially a comparison of two judgments4 ,the process of thought in our mind is concerned with these and the thoughts expressed by them1 not merely with three conceptions4 ,this is the case even when this process is imperfectly or not at all expressed in words2 and it is as such1 as a bringing together of the complete and unanalysed judgments1 that we must consider it in order properly to understand the technical procedure of inference4 ,from this there will then also follow the necessity for three really rational syllogistic figures4 ,as in the exposition of syllogistic reasoning by means of concept-spheres these are presented to the mind under the form of circles1 so in the exposition by means of entire judgments we have to think these under the form of rods1 which1 for the purpose of comparison1 are held together now by one end1 now by the other4 ,the different ways in which this can take place give the three figures4 ,since now every premiss contains its subject and its predicate1 these two conceptions are to be imagined as situated at the two ends of each rod4 ,the two judgments are now compared with reference to the two different conceptions in them2 for1 as has already been said1 the third conception must be the same in both1 and is therefore subject to no comparison1 but is that with which1 that is1 in reference to which1 the other two are compared2 it is the middle4 ,the latter is accordingly always only the means and not the chief concern4 ,the two different conceptions1 on the other hand1 are the subject of reflection1 and to find out their relation to each other by means of the judgments in which they are contained is the aim of the syllogism4 ,therefore the conclusion speaks only of them1 not of the middle1 which was only a means1 a measuring rod1 which we let fall as soon as it has served its end4 ,now if this conception which is identical in both propositions1 thus the middle1 is the subject of one premiss1 the conception to be compared with it must be the predicate1 and conversely4 ,here at once is established a priori the possibility of three cases2 either the subject of one premiss is compared with the predicate of the other1 or the subject of the one with the subject of the other1 or1 finally1 the predicate of the one with the predicate of the other4 ,hence arise the three syllogistic figures of ,aristotle2 the fourth1 which was added somewhat impertinently1 is ungenuine and a spurious form4 ,it is attributed to ,galenus1 but this rests only on ,arabian authority4 ,each of the three figures exhibits a perfectly different1 correct1 and natural thought-process of the reason in inference4 ,if in the two judgments to be compared the relation between the predicate of the one and the subject of the other is the object of the comparison1 the first figure appears4 ,this figure alone has the advantage that the conceptions which in the conclusion are subject and predicate both appear already in the same character in the premisses2 while in the two other figures one of them must always change its roll in the conclusion4 ,but thus in the first figure the result is always less novel and surprising than in the other two4 ,now this advantage in the first figure is obtained by the fact that the predicate of the major is compared with the subject of the minor1 but not conversely1 which is therefore here essential1 and involves that the middle should assume both the positions1 i4e41 it is the subject in the major and the predicate in the minor4 ,and from this again arises its subordinate significance1 for it appears as a mere weight which we lay at pleasure now in one scale and now in the other4 ,the course of thought in this figure is1 that the predicate of the major is attributed to the subject of the minor1 because the subject of the major is the predicate of the minor1 or1 in the negative case1 the converse holds for the same reason4 ,thus here a property is attributed to the things thought through a conception1 because it depends upon another property which we already know they possess2 or conversely4 ,therefore here the guiding principle is3 ,nota not est nota rei ipsius1 et repugnans not repugnat rei ipsi4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we compare two judgments with the intention of bringing out the relation which the subjects of both may have to each other1 we must take as the common measure their predicate4 ,this will accordingly be here the middle1 and must therefore be the same in both judgments4 ,hence arises the second figure4 ,in it the relation of two subjects to each other is determined by that which they have as their common predicate4 ,but this relation can only have significance if the same predicate is attributed to the one subject and denied of the other1 for thus it becomes an essential ground of distinction between the two4 ,for if it were attributed to both the subjects this could decide nothing as to their relation to each other1 for almost every predicate belongs to innumerable subjects4 ,still less would it decide this relation if the predicate were denied of both the subjects4 ,from this follows the fundamental characteristic of the second figure1 that the premisses must be of opposite quality2 the one must affirm and the other deny4 ,therefore here the principal rule is3 ,sit altera negans2 the corollary of which is3 ,e meris affirmativis nihil sequitur2 a rule which is sometimes transgressed in a loose argument obscured by many parenthetical propositions4 ,the course of thought which this figure exhibits distinctly appears from what has been said4 ,it is the investigation of two kinds of things with the view of distinguishing them1 thus of establishing that they are not of the same species2 which is here decided by showing that a certain property is essential to the one kind1 which the other lacks4 ,that this course of thought assumes the second figure of its own accord1 and expresses itself clearly only in it1 will be shown by an example3 ,all fishes have cold blood2 ,no whale has cold blood3 ,thus no whale is a fish4 ,in the first figure1 on the other hand1 this thought exhibits itself in a weak1 forced1 and ultimately patched-up form3 ,nothing that has cold blood is a whale2 ,all fishes have cold blood3 ,thus no fish is a whale1 ,and consequently no whale is a fish4 ,take also an example with an affirmative minor3 ,no ,mohamedan is a ,jew2 ,some ,turks are ,jews3 ,therefore some ,turks are not ,mohamedans4 ,as the guiding principle for this figure ,i therefore give1 for the mood with the negative minor3 ,cui repugnat nota1 etiam repugnat notatum2 and for the mood with the affirmative minor3 ,notato repugnat id cui nota repugnat4 ,translated these may be thus combined3 ,two subjects which stand in opposite relations to one predicate have a negative relation to each other4 ,the third case is that in which we place two judgments together in order to investigate the relation of their predicates4 ,hence arises the third figure1 in which accordingly the middle appears in both premisses as the subject4 ,it is also here the tertium comparationis1 the measure which is applied to both the conceptions which are to be investigated1 or1 as it were1 a chemical reagent1 with which we test them both in order to learn from their relation to it what relation exists between themselves4 ,thus1 then1 the conclusion declares whether a relation of subject and predicate exists between the two1 and to what extent this is the case4 ,accordingly1 what exhibits itself in this figure is reflection concerning two properties which we are inclined to regard either as incompatible1 or else as inseparable1 and in order to decide this we attempt to make them the predicates of one subject in two judgments4 ,from this it results either that both properties belong to the same thing1 consequently their compatibility1 or else that a thing has the one but not the other1 consequently their separableness4 ,the former in all moods with two affirmative premisses1 the latter in all moods with one negative2 for example3 ,some brutes can speak2 ,all brutes are irrational3 ,therefore some irrational beings can speak4 ,according to ,kant 7,die ,falsche ,spitzfinigkeit1 #d7 this inference would only be conclusive if we added in thought3 8,therefore some irrational beings are brutes40 ,but this seems to be here quite superfluous and by no means the natural process of thought4 ,but in order to carry out the same process of thought directly by means of the first figure ,i must say3 8,all brutes are irrational2 ,some beings that can speak are brutes10 which is clearly not the natural course of thought2 indeed the conclusion which would then follow1 8,some beings that can speak are irrational10 would have to be converted in order to preserve the conclusion which the third figure gives of itself1 and at which the whole course of thought has aimed4 ,let us take another example3 ,all alkalis float in water2 ,all alkalis are metals3 ,therefore some metals float in water4 ,alkalis and ,metals overlapping circles ,figure #a ,metals circle with ,alkalis circle inside it ,figure #b ,when this is transposed into the first figure the minor must be converted1 and thus runs3 8,some metals are alkalis40 ,it therefore merely asserts that some metals lie in the sphere 8alkalis10 thus ,figure #a1 while our actual knowledge is that all alkalis lie in the sphere 8metals10 thus ,figure #b3 ,it follows that if the first figure is to be regarded as the only normal one1 in order to think naturally we would have to think less than we know1 and to think indefinitely while we know definitely4 ,this assumption has too much against it4 ,thus in general it must be denied that when we draw inferences in the second and third figures we tacitly convert a proposition4 ,on the contrary1 the third1 and also the second1 figure exhibits just as rational a process of thought as the first4 ,let us now consider another example of the other class of the third figure1 in which the separableness of two predicates is the result2 on account of which one premiss must here be negative3 ,no ,buddhist believes in a ,god2 ,some ,buddhists are rational3 ,therefore some rational beings do not believe in a ,god4 ,as in the examples given above the compatibility of two properties is the problem of reflection1 now their separableness is its problem1 which here also must be decided by comparing them with one subject and showing that one of them is present in it without the other4 ,thus the end is directly attained1 while by means of the first figure it could only be attained indirectly4 ,for in order to reduce the syllogism to the first figure we must convert the minor1 and therefore say3 8,some rational beings are ,buddhists10 which would be only a faulty expression of its meaning1 which really is3 8,some ,buddhists are yet certainly rational40 ,as the guiding principle of this figure ,i therefore give3 for the affirmative moods3 ,ejusdem rei not1 modo sit altera universalis1 sibi invicem sunt not particulares2 and for the negative moods3 ,nota rei competens1 not eidem repugnanti1 particulariter repugnat1 modo sit altera universalis4 ,translated3 ,if two predicates are affirmed of one subject1 and at least one of them universally1 they are also affirmed of each other particularly2 and1 on the contrary1 they are denied of each other particularly whenever one of them contradicts the subject of which the other is affirmed2 provided always that either the contradiction or the affirmation be universal4 ,in the fourth figure the subject of the major has to be compared with the predicate of the minor2 but in the conclusion they must both exchange their value and position1 so that what was the subject of the major appears as the predicate of the conclusion1 and what was the predicate of the minor appears as the subject of the conclusion4 ,by this it becomes apparent that this figure is merely the first1 wilfully turned upside down1 and by no means the expression of a real process of thought natural to the reason4 ,on the other hand1 the first three figures are the ectypes of three real and essentially different operations of thought4 ,they have this in common1 that they consist in the comparison of two judgments2 but such a comparison only becomes fruitful when these judgments have one conception in common4 ,if we present the premisses to our imagination under the sensible form of two rods1 we can think of this conception as a clasp that links them to each other2 indeed in lecturing one might provide oneself with such rods4 ,on the other hand1 the three figures are distinguished by this1 that those judgments are compared either with reference to the subjects of both1 or to the predicates of both1 or lastly1 with reference to the subject of the one and the predicate of the other4 ,since now every conception has the property of being subject or predicate only because it is already part of a judgment1 this confirms my view that in the syllogism only judgments are primarily compared1 and conceptions only because they are parts of judgments4 ,in the comparison of two judgments1 however1 the essential question is1 in respect of what are they compared8 not by what means are they compared8 ,the former consists of the concepts which are different in the two judgments2 the latter consists of the middle1 that is1 the conception which is identical in both4 ,it is therefore not the right point of view which ,lambert1 and indeed really ,aristotle1 and almost all the moderns have taken in starting from the middle in the analysis of syllogisms1 and making it the principal matter and its position the essential characteristic of the syllogisms4 ,on the contrary1 its role is only secondary1 and its position a consequence of the logical value of the conceptions which are really to be compared in the syllogism4 ,these may be compared to two substances which are to be chemically tested1 and the middle to the reagent by which they are tested4 ,it therefore always takes the place which the conceptions to be compared leave vacant1 and does not appear again in the conclusion4 ,it is selected according to our knowledge of its relation to both the conceptions and its suitableness for the place it has to take up4 ,therefore in many cases we can change it at pleasure for another without affecting the syllogism4 ,for example1 in the syllogism3 ,all men are mortal2 ,caius is a man3 ,i can exchange the middle 8man0 for 8animal existence40 ,in the syllogism3 ,all diamonds are stones2 ,all diamonds are combustible3 ,i can exchange the middle 8diamond0 for 8anthracite40 ,as an external mark by which we can recognise at once the figure of a syllogism the middle is certainly very useful4 ,but as the fundamental characteristic of a thing which is to be explained1 we must take what is essential to it2 and what is essential here is1 whether we place two propositions together in order to compare their predicates or their subjects1 or the predicate of the one and the subject of the other4 ,therefore1 in order as premisses to yield a conclusion1 two judgments must have a conception in common2 further1 they must not both be negative1 nor both particular2 and lastly1 in the case in which the conceptions to be compared are the subjects of both1 they must not both be affirmative4 ,the voltaic pile may be regarded as a sensible image of the syllogism4 ,its point of indifference1 at the centre1 represents the middle1 which holds together the two premisses1 and by virtue of which they have the power of yielding a conclusion4 ,the two different conceptions1 on the other hand1 which are really what is to be compared1 are represented by the two opposite poles of the pile4 ,only because these are brought together by means of their two conducting wires1 which represent the copulas of the two judgments1 is the spark emitted upon their contact--the new light of the conclusion4 ,chapter ,,xi47#bb7 ,on ,rhetoric4 ,eloquence is the faculty of awakening in others our view of a thing1 or our opinion about it1 of kindling in them our feeling concerning it1 and thus putting them in sympathy with us4 ,and all this by conducting the stream of our thought into their minds1 through the medium of words1 with such force as to carry their thought from the direction it has already taken1 and sweep it along with ours in its course4 ,the more their previous course of thought differs from ours1 the greater is this achievement4 ,from this it is easily understood how personal conviction and passion make a man eloquent2 and in general1 eloquence is more the gift of nature than the work of art2 yet here1 also1 art will support nature4 ,in order to convince another of a truth which conflicts with an error he firmly holds1 the first rule to be observed1 is an easy and natural one3 let the premisses come first1 and the conclusion follow4 ,yet this rule is seldom observed1 but reversed2 for zeal1 eagerness1 and dogmatic positiveness urge us to proclaim the conclusion loudly and noisily against him who adheres to the opposed error4 ,this easily makes him shy1 and now he opposes his will to all reasons and premisses1 knowing already to what conclusion they lead4 ,therefore we ought rather to keep the conclusion completely concealed1 and only advance the premisses distinctly1 fully1 and in different lights4 ,indeed1 if possible1 we ought not to express the conclusion at all4 ,it will come necessarily and regularly of its own accord into the reason of the hearers1 and the conviction thus born in themselves will be all the more genuine1 and will also be accompanied by self-esteem instead of shame4 ,in difficult cases we may even assume the air of desiring to arrive at a quite opposite conclusion from that which we really have in view4 ,an example of this is the famous speech of ,antony in ,shakspeare's 8,julius ,csar40 ,in defending a thing many persons err by confidently advancing everything imaginable that can be said for it1 mixing up together what is true1 half true1 and merely plausible4 ,but the false is soon recognised1 or at any rate felt1 and throws suspicion also upon the cogent and true arguments which were brought forward along with it4 ,give then the true and weighty pure and alone1 and beware of defending a truth with inadequate1 and therefore1 since they are set up as adequate1 sophistical reasons2 for the opponent upsets these1 and thereby gains the appearance of having upset the truth itself which was supported by them1 that is1 he makes argumenta ad hominem hold good as argumenta ad rem4 ,the ,chinese go1 perhaps1 too far the other way1 for they have the saying3 8,he who is eloquent and has a sharp tongue may always leave half of a sentence unspoken2 and he who has right on his side may confidently yield three-tenths of his assertion40 ,chapter ,,xii47#bc7 ,on ,the ,doctrine ,of ,science4 ,from the analysis of the different functions of our intellect given in the whole of the preceding chapters1 it is clear that for a correct use of it1 either in a theoretical or a practical reference1 the following conditions are demanded3 7#a47 ,the correct apprehension through perception of the real things taken into consideration1 and of all their essential properties and relations1 thus of all data4 7#b47 ,the construction of correct conceptions out of these2 thus the connotation of those properties under correct abstractions1 which now become the material of the subsequent thinking4 7#c47 ,the comparison of those conceptions both with the perceived object and among themselves1 and with the rest of our store of conceptions1 so that correct judgments1 pertinent to the matter in hand1 and fully comprehending and exhausting it1 may proceed from them2 thus the right estimation of the matter4 7#d47 ,the placing together or combination of those judgments as the premisses of syllogisms4 ,this may be done very differently according to the choice and arrangement of the judgments1 and yet the actual result of the whole operation primarily depends upon it4 ,what is really of importance here is that from among so many possible combinations of those different judgments which have to do with the matter free deliberation should hit upon the very ones which serve the purpose and are decisive4 ,but if in the first function1 that is1 in the apprehension through perception of the things and relations1 any single essential point has been overlooked1 the correctness of all the succeeding operations of the mind cannot prevent the result from being false2 for there lie the data1 the material of the whole investigation4 ,without the certainty that these are correctly and completely collected1 one ought to abstain1 in important matters1 from any definite decision4 ,a conception is correct2 a judgment is true2 a body is real2 and a relation is evident4 ,a proposition of immediate certainty is an axiom4 ,only the fundamental principles of logic1 and those of mathematics drawn a priori from intuition or perception1 and finally also the law of causality1 have immediate certainty4 ,a proposition of indirect certainty is a maxim1 and that by means of which it obtains its certainty is the proof4 ,if immediate certainty is attributed to a proposition which has no such certainty1 this is a petitio principii4 ,a proposition which appeals directly to the empirical perception is an assertion3 to confront it with such perception demands judgment4 ,empirical perception can primarily afford us only particular1 not universal truths4 ,through manifold repetition and confirmation such truths indeed obtain a certain universality also1 but it is only comparative and precarious1 because it is still always open to attack4 ,but if a proposition has absolute universality1 the perception to which it appeals is not empirical but a priori4 ,thus ,logic and ,mathematics alone are absolutely certain sciences2 but they really teach us only what we already knew beforehand4 ,for they are merely explanations of that of which we are conscious a priori1 the forms of our own knowledge1 the one being concerned with the forms of thinking1 the other with those of perceiving4 ,therefore we spin them entirely out of ourselves4 ,all other scientific knowledge is empirical4 ,a proof proves too much if it extends to things or cases of which that which is to be proved clearly does not hold good2 therefore it is refuted apagogically by these4 ,the deductio ad absurdum properly consists in this1 that we take a false assertion which has been made as the major proposition of a syllogism1 then add to it a correct minor1 and arrive at a conclusion which clearly contradicts facts of experience or unquestionable truths4 ,but by some round-about way such a refutation must be possible of every false doctrine4 ,for the defender of this will yet certainly recognise and admit some truth or other1 and then the consequences of this1 and on the other hand those of the false assertion1 must be followed out until we arrive at two propositions which directly contradict each other4 ,we find many examples in ,plato of this beautiful artifice of genuine dialectic4 ,a correct hypothesis is nothing more than the true and complete expression of the present fact1 which the originator of the hypothesis has intuitively apprehended in its real nature and inner connection4 ,for it tells us only what really takes place here4 ,the opposition of the analytical and synthetical methods we find already indicated by ,aristotle1 yet perhaps first distinctly described by ,proclus1 who says quite correctly3 8 2 2 1 1 4 4440 7,methodi traduntur sequentes3 pulcherrima quidem ea1 qu per analysin qusitum refert ad principium1 de quo jam convenit2 quam etiam ,plato ,laodamanti tradidisse dicitur47 8,in ,primum ,euclidis ,librum10 ,l4 iii4 ,certainly the analytical method consists in referring what is given to an admitted principle2 the synthetical method1 on the contrary1 in deduction from such a principle4 ,they are therefore analogous to the and explained in chapter ix42 only the latter are not used to establish propositions1 but always to overthrow them4 ,the analytical method proceeds from the facts2 the particular1 to the principle or rule2 the universal1 or from the consequents to the reasons2 the other conversely4 ,therefore it would be much more correct to call them the inductive and the deductive methods1 for the customary names are unsuitable and do not fully express the things4 ,if a philosopher tries to begin by thinking out the methods in accordance with which he will philosophise1 he is like a poet who first writes a system of sthetics in order to poetise in accordance with it4 ,both of them may be compared to a man who first sings himself a tune and afterwards dances to it4 ,the thinking mind must find its way from original tendency4 ,rule and application1 method and achievement1 must1 like matter and form1 be inseparable4 ,but after we have reached the goal we may consider the path we have followed4 sthetics and methodology are1 from their nature1 younger than poetry and philosophy2 as grammar is younger than language1 thorough bass younger than music1 and logic younger than thought4 ,this is a fitting place to make1 in passing1 a remark by means of which ,i should like to check a growing evil while there is yet time4 ,that ,latin has ceased to be the language of all scientific investigations has the disadvantage that there is no longer an immediately common scientific literature for the whole of ,europe1 but national literatures4 ,and thus every scholar is primarily limited to a much smaller public1 and moreover to a public hampered with national points of view and prejudices4 ,then he must now learn the four principal ,european languages1 as well as the two ancient languages4 ,in this it will be a great assistance to him that the termini technici of all sciences 7with the exception of mineralogy7 are1 as an inheritance from our predecessors1 ,latin or ,greek4 ,therefore all nations wisely retain these4 ,only the ,germans have hit upon the unfortunate idea of wishing to ,germanise the termini technici of all the sciences4 ,this has two great disadvantages4 ,first1 the foreign and also the ,german scholar is obliged to learn all the technical terms of his science twice1 which1 when there are many--for example1 in ,anatomy--is an incredibly tiresome and lengthy business4 ,if the other nations were not in this respect wiser than the ,germans1 we would have the trouble of learning every terminus technicus five times4 ,if the ,germans carry this further1 foreign men of learning will leave their books altogether unread2 for besides this fault they are for the most part too diffuse1 and are written in a careless1 bad1 and often affected and objectionable style1 and besides are generally conceived with a rude disregard of the reader and his requirements4 ,secondly1 those ,germanised forms of the termini technici are almost throughout long1 patched-up1 stupidly chosen1 awkward1 jarring words1 not clearly separated from the rest of the language1 which therefore impress themselves with difficulty upon the memory1 while the ,greek and ,latin expressions chosen by the ancient and memorable founders of the sciences possess the whole of the opposite good qualities1 and easily impress themselves on the memory by their sonorous sound4 ,what an ugly1 harsh-sounding word1 for instance1 is 8,stickstoff0 instead of azot6 8,verbum10 8substantiv10 8adjectiv10 are remembered and distinguished more easily than 8,zeitwort10 8,nennwort10 8,beiwort10 or even 8,umstandswort0 instead of 8adverbium40 ,in ,anatomy it is quite unsupportable1 and moreover vulgar and low4 ,even 8,pulsader0 and 8,blutader0 are more exposed to momentary confusion than 8,arterie0 and 8,vene20 but utterly bewildering are such expressions as 8,fruchthlter10 8,fruchtgang10 and 8,fruchtleiter0 instead of 8uterus10 8vagina10 and 8tuba ,faloppii10 which yet every doctor must know1 and which he will find sufficient in all ,european languages4 ,in the same way 8,speiche0 and 8,ellenbogenrhre0 instead of 8radius0 and 8ulna10 which all ,europe has understood for thousands of years4 ,wherefore then this clumsy1 confusing1 drawling1 and awkward ,germanising8 ,not less objectionable is the translation of the technical terms in ,logic1 in which our gifted professors of philosophy are the creators of a new terminology1 and almost every one of them has his own4 ,with ,g4 ,e4 ,schulze1 for example1 the subject is called 8,grundbegriff10 the predicate 8,beilegungsbegriff20 then there are 8,beilegungsschlsse10 8,voraussetzungsschlsse10 and 8,entgegensetzungsschlsse20 the judgments have 8,grsse10 8,beschaffenheit10 8,verhltniss10 and 8,zuverlssigkeit10 i4e41 quantity1 quality1 relation1 and modality4 ,the same perverse influence of this ,germanising mania is to be found in all the sciences4 ,the ,latin and ,greek expressions have the further advantage that they stamp the scientific conception as such1 and distinguish it from the words of common intercourse1 and the ideas which cling to them through association2 while1 for example1 8,speisebrei0 instead of chyme seems to refer to the food of little children1 and 8,lungensack0 instead of pleura1 and 8,herzbeutel0 instead of pericardium seem to have been invented by butchers rather than anatomists4 ,besides this1 the most immediate necessity of learning the ancient languages depends upon the old termini technici1 and they are more and more in danger of being neglected through the use of living languages in learned investigations4 ,but if it comes to this1 if the spirit of the ancients bound up with their languages disappears from a liberal education1 then coarseness1 insipidity1 and vulgarity will take possession of the whole of literature4 ,for the works of the ancients are the pole-star of every artistic or literary effort2 if it sets they are lost4 ,even now we can observe from the miserable and puerile style of most writers that they have never written ,latin47#bd7 ,the study of the classical authors is very properly called the study of ,humanity1 for through it the student first becomes a man again1 for he enters into the world which was still free from all the absurdities of the ,middle ,ages and of romanticism1 which afterwards penetrated so deeply into mankind in ,europe that even now every one comes into the world covered with it1 and has first to strip it off simply to become a man again4 ,think not that your modern wisdom can ever supply the place of that initiation into manhood2 ye are not1 like the ,greeks and ,romans1 born freemen1 unfettered sons of nature4 ,ye are first the sons and heirs of the barbarous ,middle ,ages and of their madness1 of infamous priestcraft1 and of half-brutal1 half-childish chivalry4 ,though both now gradually approach their end1 yet ye cannot yet stand on your own feet4 ,without the school of the ancients your literature will degenerate into vulgar gossip and dull philistinism4 ,thus for all these reasons it is my well-intended counsel that an end be put at once to the ,germanising mania condemned above4 ,i shall further take the opportunity of denouncing here the disorder which for some years has been introduced into ,german orthography in an unprecedented manner4 ,scribblers of every species have heard something of conciseness of expression1 but do not know that this consists in the careful omission of everything superfluous 7to which1 it is true1 the whole of their writings belong71 but imagine they can arrive at it by clipping the words as swindlers clip coin2 and every syllable which appears to them superfluous1 because they do not feel its value1 they cut off without more ado4 ,for example1 our ancestors1 with true tact1 said 8,beweis0 and 8,verweis20 but1 on the other hand1 8,nachweisung40 ,the fine distinction analogous to that between 8,versuch0 and 8,versuchung10 8,betracht0 and 8,betrachtung10 is not perceptible to dull ears and thick skulls2 therefore they have invented the word 8,nachweis10 which has come at once into general use1 for this only requires that an idea should be thoroughly awkward and a blunder very gross4 ,accordingly a similar amputation has already been proposed in innumerable words2 for example1 instead of 8,untersuchung0 is written 8,untersuch20 nay1 even instead of 8allmlig10 8mlig20 instead of 8beinahe10 8nahe20 instead of 8bestndig10 8stndig40 ,if a ,frenchman took upon himself to write 8prs0 instead of 8presque10 or if an ,englishman wrote 8most0 instead of 8almost10 they would be laughed at by every one as fools2 but in ,germany whoever does this sort of thing passes for a man of originality4 ,chemists already write 8lslich0 and 8unlslich0 instead of 8unauflslich10 and if the grammarians do not rap them over the knuckles they will rob the language of a valuable word4 ,knots1 shoe-strings1 and also conglomerates of which the cement is softened1 and all analogous things are 8lslich0 7can be loosed72 but what is 8auflslich0 7soluble71 on the other hand1 is whatever vanishes in a liquid1 like salt in water4 8,auflsen0 7to dissolve7 is the terminus ad hoc1 which says this and nothing else1 marking out a definite conception2 but our acute improvers of the language wish to empty it into the general rinsing-pan 8lsen0 7to loosen72 they would therefore in consistency be obliged to make 8lsen0 also take the place everywhere of 8ablsen0 7to relieve1 used of guards71 8auslsen0 7to release71 8einlsen0 7to redeem71 c41 and in these1 as in the former case1 deprive the language of definiteness of expression4 ,but to make the language poorer by a word means to make the thought of the nation poorer by a conception4 ,yet this is the tendency of the united efforts of almost all our writers of books for the last ten or twenty years4 ,for what ,i have shown here by one example can be supported by a hundred others1 and the meanest stinting of syllables prevails like a disease4 ,the miserable wretches actually count the letters1 and do not hesitate to mutilate a word1 or to use one in a false sense1 whenever by doing so they can gain two letters4 ,he who is capable of no new thoughts will at least bring new words to market1 and every ink-slinger regards it as his vocation to improve the language4 ,journalists practise this most shamelessly2 and since their papers1 on account of the trivial nature of their contents1 have the largest public1 indeed a public which for the most part reads nothing else1 a great danger threatens the language through them4 ,i therefore seriously advise that they should be subjected to an orthographical censorship1 or that they should be made to pay a fine for every unusual or mutilated word2 for what could be more improper than that changes of language should proceed from the lowest branch of literature8 ,language1 especially a relatively speaking original language like ,german1 is the most valuable inheritance of a nation1 and it is also an exceedingly complicated work of art1 easily injured1 and which cannot again be restored1 therefore a noli me tangere4 ,other nations have felt this1 and have shown great piety towards their languages1 although far less complete than ,german4 ,therefore the language of ,dante and ,petrarch differs only in trifles from that of to-day2 ,montaigne is still quite readable1 and so also is ,shakspeare in his oldest editions4 ,for a ,german indeed it is good to have somewhat long words in his mouth2 for he thinks slowly1 and they give him time to reflect4 ,but this prevailing economy of language shows itself in yet more characteristic phenomena4 ,for example1 in opposition to all logic and grammar1 they use the imperfect for the perfect and pluperfect2 they often stick the auxiliary verb in their pocket2 they use the ablative instead of the genitive2 for the sake of omitting a couple of logical particles they make such intricate sentences that one has to read them four times over in order to get at the sense2 for it is only the paper and not the reader's time that they care to spare4 ,in proper names1 after the manner of ,hottentots1 they do not indicate the case either by inflection or article3 the reader may guess it4 ,but they are specially fond of contracting the double vowel and dropping the lengthening h1 those letters sacred to prosody2 which is just the same thing as if we wanted to banish and from ,greek1 and make and take their place4 ,whoever writes ,scham1 ,mrchen1 ,mass1 ,spass1 ought also to write ,lon1 ,son1 ,stat1 ,sat1 ,jar1 ,al1 c4 ,but since writing is the copy of speech1 posterity will imagine that one ought to speak as one writes2 and then of the ,german language there will only remain a narrow1 mouth-distorting1 jarring noise of consonants1 and all prosody will be lost4 ,the spelling 8,literatur0 instead of the correct 8,litteratur0 is also very much liked1 because it saves a letter4 ,in defence of this the participle of the verb linere is given as the root of the word4 ,but linere means to smear2 therefore the favoured spelling might actually be correct for the greater part of ,german bookmaking2 so that one could distinguish a very small 8,litteratur0 from a very extensive 8,literatur40 ,in order to write concisely let a man improve his style and shun all useless gossip and chatter1 and then he will not need to cut out syllables and letters on account of the dearness of paper4 ,but to write so many useless pages1 useless sheets1 useless books1 and then to want to make up this waste of time and paper at the cost of the innocent syllables and letters--that is truly the superlative of what is called in ,english being penny wise and pound foolish4 ,it is to be regretted that there is no ,german ,academy to take charge of the language against literary sans-culottism1 especially in an age when even those who are ignorant of the ancient language venture to employ the press4 ,i have expressed my mind more fully on the whole subject of the inexcusable mischief being done at the present day to the ,german language in my 8,parerga10 vol4 ii4 chap4 #bc4 ,in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ea1 ,i already proposed a first classification of the sciences in accordance with the form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in them2 and ,i also touched upon it again in #g and #ae of the first volume of this work4 ,i will give here a small attempt at such a classification1 which will yet no doubt be susceptible of much improvement and perfecting3-- ,i4 ,pure a priori ,sciences4 #a4 ,the doctrine of the ground of being4 7a47 ,in space3 ,geometry4 7b47 ,in time3 ,arithmetic and ,algebra4 #b4 ,the doctrine of the ground of knowing3 ,logic4 ,,ii4 ,empirical or a posteriori ,sciences4 ,all based upon the ground of becoming1 i4e41 the law of causality1 and upon the three modes of that law4 #a4 ,the doctrine of causes4 7a47 ,universal3 ,mechanics1 ,hydrodynamics1 ,physics1 ,chemistry4 7b47 ,particular3 ,astronomy1 ,mineralogy1 ,geology1 ,technology1 ,pharmacy4 #b4 ,the doctrine of stimuli4 7a47 ,universal3 ,physiology of plants and animals1 together with the ancillary science1 ,anatomy4 7b47 ,particular3 ,botany1 ,zoology1 ,zootomy1 ,comparative ,physiology1 ,pathology1 ,therapeutics4 #c4 ,the doctrine of motives4 7a47 ,universal3 ,ethics1 ,psychology4 7b47 ,particular3 ,jurisprudence1 ,history4 ,philosophy or ,metaphysics1 as the doctrine of consciousness and its contents in general1 or of the whole of experience as such1 does not appear in the list1 because it does not at once pursue the investigation which the principle of sufficient reason prescribes1 but first has this principle itself as its object4 ,it is to be regarded as the thorough bass of all sciences1 but belongs to a higher class than they do1 and is almost as much related to art as to science4 ,as in music every particular period must correspond to the tonality to which thorough bass has advanced1 so every author1 in proportion to the line he follows1 must bear the stamp of the philosophy which prevails in his time4 ,but besides this1 every science has also its special philosophy2 and therefore we speak of the philosophy of botany1 of zoology1 of history1 c4 ,by this we must reasonably understand nothing more than the chief results of each science itself1 regarded and comprehended from the highest1 that is the most general1 point of view which is possible within that science4 ,these general results connect themselves directly with general philosophy1 for they supply it with important data1 and relieve it from the labour of seeking these itself in the philosophically raw material of the special sciences4 ,these special philosophies therefore stand as a mediating link between their special sciences and philosophy proper4 ,for since the latter has to give the most general explanations concerning the whole of things1 these must also be capable of being brought down and applied to the individual of every species of thing4 ,the philosophy of each science1 however1 arises independently of philosophy in general1 from the data of its own science itself4 ,therefore it does not need to wait till that philosophy at last be found2 but if worked out in advance it will certainly agree with the true universal philosophy4 ,this1 on the other hand1 must be capable of receiving confirmation and illustration from the philosophies of the particular sciences2 for the most general truth must be capable of being proved through the more special truths4 ,goethe has afforded a beautiful example of the philosophy of zoology in his reflections on ,dalton's and ,pander's skeletons of rodents 7,hefte zur ,morphologie1 #ahbd74 ,and like merit in connection with the same science belongs to ,kielmayer1 ,delamark1 ,geoffroy ,st4 ,hilaire1 ,cuvier1 and many others1 in that they have all brought out clearly the complete analogy1 the inner relationship1 the permanent type1 and systematic connection of animal forms4 ,empirical sciences pursued purely for their own sake and without philosophical tendency are like a face without eyes4 ,they are1 however1 a suitable occupation for men of good capacity who yet lack the highest faculties1 which would even be a hindrance to minute investigations of such a kind4 ,such men concentrate their whole power and their whole knowledge upon one limited field1 in which1 therefore1 on condition of remaining in entire ignorance of everything else1 they can attain to the most complete knowledge possible2 while the philosopher must survey all fields of knowledge1 and indeed to a certain extent be at home in them2 and thus that complete knowledge which can only be attained by the study of detail is necessarily denied him4 ,therefore the former may be compared to those ,geneva workmen of whom one makes only wheels1 another only springs1 and a third only chains4 ,the philosopher1 on the other hand1 is like the watchmaker1 who alone produces a whole out of all these which has motion and significance4 ,they may also be compared to the musicians of an orchestra1 each of whom is master of his own instrument2 and the philosopher1 on the other hand1 to the conductor1 who must know the nature and use of every instrument1 yet without being able to play them all1 or even one of them1 with great perfection4 ,scotus ,erigena includes all sciences under the name ,scientia1 in opposition to philosophy1 which he calls ,sapientia4 ,the same distinction was already made by the ,pythagoreans2 as may be seen from ,stobus 7,floril41 vol4 i4 p4 #bj71 where it is very clearly and neatly explained4 ,but a much happier and more piquant comparison of the relation of the two kinds of mental effort to each other has been so often repeated by the ancients that we no longer know to whom it belongs4 ,diogenes ,laertius 7ii4 #gi7 attributes it to ,aristippus1 ,stobus 7,floril41 tit4 iv4 #aaj7 to ,aristo of ,chios2 the ,scholiast of ,aristotle ascribes it to him 7p4 #h of the ,berlin edition71 but ,plutarch 7,de ,puer4 ,educ41 c4 #aj7 attributes it to ,bio--8,qui ajebat1 sicut ,penelopes proci1 quum non possent cum ,penelope concumbere1 rem cum ejus ancillis habuissent2 ita qui philosophiam nequeunt apprehendere eos in alliis nullius pretii disciplinis sese conterere40 ,in our predominantly empirical and historical age it can do no harm to recall this4 ,chapter ,,xiii47#be7 ,on ,the ,methods ,of ,mathematics4 ,euclid's method of demonstration has brought forth from its own womb its most striking parody and caricature in the famous controversy on the theory of parallels1 and the attempts1 which are repeated every year1 to prove the eleventh axiom4 ,this axiom asserts1 and indeed supports its assertion by the indirect evidence of a third intersecting line1 that two lines inclining towards each other 7for that is just the meaning of 8less than two right angles07 if produced far enough must meet--a truth which is supposed to be too complicated to pass as self-evident1 and therefore requires a demonstration4 ,such a demonstration1 however1 cannot be produced1 just because there is nothing that is not immediate4 ,this scruple of conscience reminds me of ,schiller's question of law3-- 8,for years ,i have used my nose for smelling4 ,have ,i1 then1 actually a right to it that can be proved80 ,indeed it seems to me that the logical method is hereby reduced to absurdity4 ,yet it is just through the controversies about this1 together with the vain attempts to prove what is directly certain as merely indirectly certain1 that the self-sufficingness and clearness of intuitive evidence appears in contrast with the uselessness and difficulty of logical proof--a contrast which is no less instructive than amusing4 ,the direct certainty is not allowed to be valid here1 because it is no mere logical certainty following from the conceptions1 thus resting only upon the relation of the predicate to the subject1 according to the principle of contradiction4 ,that axiom1 however1 is a synthetical proposition a priori1 and as such has the guarantee of pure1 not empirical1 perception1 which is just as immediate and certain as the principle of contradiction itself1 from which all demonstrations first derive their certainty4 ,ultimately this holds good of every geometrical theorem1 and it is quite arbitrary where we draw the line between what is directly certain and what has first to be demonstrated4 ,it surprises me that the eighth axiom is not rather attacked4 8,figures which coincide with each other are equal to each other40 ,for 8coinciding with each other0 is either a mere tautology or something purely empirical which does not belong to pure perception but to external sensuous experience4 ,it presupposes that the figures may be moved2 but only matter is movable in space4 ,therefore this appeal to coincidence leaves pure space--the one element of geometry--in order to pass over to what is material and empirical4 ,the reputed motto of the ,platonic lecture-room1 8 10 of which mathematicians are so proud1 was no doubt inspired by the fact that ,plato regarded the geometrical figures as intermediate existences between the eternal ,ideas and particular things1 as ,aristotle frequently mentions in his 8,metaphysics0 7especially i4 c4 #f1 p4 #hhg1 #iih1 et ,scholia1 p4 #hbg1 ed4 ,berol47 ,moreover1 the opposition between those self-existent eternal forms1 or ,ideas1 and the transitory individual things1 was most easily made comprehensible in geometrical figures1 and thereby laid the foundation of the doctrine of ,ideas1 which is the central point of the philosophy of ,plato1 and indeed his only serious and decided theoretical dogma4 ,in expounding it1 therefore1 he started from geometry4 ,in the same sense we are told that he regarded geometry as a preliminary exercise through which the mind of the pupil accustomed itself to deal with incorporeal objects1 having hitherto in practical life had only to do with corporeal things 7,schol4 in ,aristot41 p4 #ab1 #ae74 ,this1 then1 is the sense in which ,plato recommended geometry to the philosopher2 and therefore one is not justified in extending it further4 ,i rather recommend1 as an investigation of the influence of mathematics upon our mental powers1 and their value for scientific culture in general1 a very thorough and learned discussion1 in the form of a review of a book by ,whewell in the ,edinburgh ,review of ,january #ahcf4 ,its author1 who afterwards published it with some other discussions1 with his name1 is ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics in ,scotland4 ,this work has also found a ,german translator1 and has appeared by itself under the title1 8,ueber den ,werth und ,unwerth der ,mathematik0 aus dem ,englishen1 #ahcf4 ,the conclusion the author arrives at is that the value of mathematics is only indirect1 and lies in the application to ends which are only attainable through them2 but in themselves mathematics leave the mind where they find it1 and are by no means conducive to its general culture and development1 nay1 even a decided hindrance4 ,this conclusion is not only proved by thorough dianoiological investigation of the mathematical activity of the mind1 but is also confirmed by a very learned accumulation of examples and authorities4 ,the only direct use which is left to mathematics is that it can accustom restless and unsteady minds to fix their attention4 ,even ,descartes1 who was yet himself famous as a mathematician1 held the same opinion with regard to mathematics4 ,in the 8,vie de ,descartes par ,baillet10 #afic1 it is said1 ,liv4 ii4 c4 #f1 p4 #ed3 8,sa propre exprience l'avait convaincu du peu d'utilit des mathmatiques1 surtout lorsqu'on ne les cultive que pour elles mmes4444 ,il ne voyait rien de moins solide1 que de s'occuper de nombres tout simples et de figures imaginaires10 c4 ,chapter ,,xiv4 ,on ,the ,association ,of ,ideas4 ,the presence of ideas and thoughts in our consciousness is as strictly subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms as the movement of bodies to the law of causality4 ,it is just as little possible that a thought can appear in the mind without an occasion as that a body can be set in motion without a cause4 ,now this occasion is either external1 thus an impression of the senses1 or internal1 thus itself also a thought which introduces another thought by means of association4 ,this again depends either upon a relation of reason and consequent between the two2 or upon similarity1 even mere analogy2 or lastly upon the circumstance that they were both first apprehended at the same time1 which again may have its ground in the proximity in space of their objects4 ,the last two cases are denoted by the word propos4 ,the predominance of one of these three bonds of association of thoughts over the others is characteristic of the intellectual worth of the man4 ,the first named will predominate in thoughtful and profound minds1 the second in witty1 ingenious1 and poetical minds1 and the third in minds of limited capacity4 ,not less characteristic is the degree of facility with which one thought recalls others that stand in any kind of relation to it3 this constitutes the activeness of the mind4 ,but the impossibility of the appearance of a thought without its sufficient occasion1 even when there is the strongest desire to call it up1 is proved by all the cases in which we weary ourselves in vain to recollect something1 and go through the whole store of our thoughts in order to find any one that may be associated with the one we seek2 if we find the former1 the latter is also found4 ,whoever wishes to call up something in his memory first seeks for a thread with which it is connected by the association of thoughts4 ,upon this depends mnemonics3 it aims at providing us with easily found occasioners or causes for all the conceptions1 thoughts1 or words which are to be preserved4 ,but the worst of it is that these occasioners themselves have first to be recalled1 and this again requires an occasioner4 ,how much the occasion accomplishes in memory may be shown in this way4 ,if we have read in a book of anecdotes say fifty anecdotes1 and then have laid it aside1 immediately afterwards we will sometimes be unable to recollect a single one of them4 ,but if the occasion comes1 or if a thought occurs to us which has any analogy with one of those anecdotes1 it immediately comes back to us2 and so with the whole fifty as opportunity offers4 ,the same thing holds good of all that we read4 ,our immediate remembrance of words1 that is1 our remembrance of them without the assistance of mnemonic contrivances1 and with it our whole faculty of speech1 ultimately depends upon the direct association of thoughts4 ,for the learning of language consists in this1 that once for all we so connect a conception with a word that this word will always occur to us along with this conception1 and this conception will always occur to us along with this word4 ,we have afterwards to repeat the same process in learning every new language2 yet if we learn a language for passive and not for active use--that is1 to read1 but not to speak1 as1 for example1 most of us learn ,greek--then the connection is one-sided1 for the conception occurs to us along with the word1 but the word does not always occur to us along with the conception4 ,the same procedure as in language becomes apparent in the particular case1 in the learning of every new proper name4 ,but sometimes we do not trust ourselves to connect directly the name of this person1 or town1 river1 mountain1 plant1 animal1 c41 with the thought of each so firmly that it will call each of them up of itself2 and then we assist ourselves mnemonically1 and connect the image of the person or thing with any perceptible quality the name of which occurs in that of the person or thing4 ,yet this is only a temporary prop to lean on2 later we let it drop1 for the association of thoughts becomes an immediate support4 ,the search of memory for a clue shows itself in a peculiar manner in the case of a dream which we have forgotten on awaking1 for in this case we seek in vain for that which a few minutes before occupied our minds with the strength of the clearest present1 but now has entirely disappeared4 ,we grasp at any lingering impression by which may hang the clue that by virtue of association would call that dream back again into our consciousness4 ,according to ,kieser1 8,tellurismus10 ,bd4 ii4 #bga1 memory even of what passed in magnetic-somnambular sleep may possibly sometimes be aroused by a sensible sign found when awake4 ,it depends upon the same impossibility of the appearance of a thought without its occasion that if we propose to do anything at a definite time1 this can only take place if we either think of nothing else till then1 or if at the determined time we are reminded of it by something1 which may either be an external impression arranged beforehand or a thought which is itself again brought about in the regular way4 ,both1 then1 belong to the class of motives4 ,every morning when we awake our consciousness is a tabula rasa1 which1 however1 quickly fills itself again4 ,first it is the surroundings of the previous evening which now reappear1 and remind us of what we thought in these surroundings2 to this the events of the previous day link themselves on2 and so one thought rapidly recalls the others1 till all that occupied us yesterday is there again4 ,upon the fact that this takes place properly depends the health of the mind1 as opposed to madness1 which1 as is shown in the third book1 consists in the existence of great blanks in the memory of past events4 ,but how completely sleep breaks the thread of memory1 so that each morning it has to be taken up again1 we see in particular cases of the incompleteness of this operation4 ,for example1 sometimes we cannot recall in the morning a melody which the night before ran in our head till we were tired of it4 ,the cases in which a thought or a picture of the fancy suddenly came into our mind without any conscious occasion seem to afford an exception to what has been said4 ,yet this is for the most part an illusion1 which rests on the fact that the occasion was so trifling and the thought itself so vivid and interesting1 that the former is instantly driven out of consciousness4 ,yet sometimes the cause of such an instantaneous appearance of an idea may be an internal physical impression either of the parts of the brain on each other or of the organic nervous system upon the brain4 ,in general our internal process of thought is in reality not so simple as the theory of it2 for here it is involved in many ways4 ,to make the matter clear to our imagination1 let us compare our consciousness to a sheet of water of some depth4 ,then the distinctly conscious thoughts are merely the surface2 while1 on the other hand1 the indistinct thoughts1 the feelings1 the after sensation of perceptions and of experience generally1 mingled with the special disposition of our own will1 which is the kernel of our being1 is the mass of the water4 ,now the mass of the whole consciousness is more or less1 in proportion to the intellectual activity1 in constant motion1 and what rise to the surface1 in consequence of this1 are the clear pictures of the fancy or the distinct1 conscious thoughts expressed in words and the resolves of the will4 ,the whole process of our thought and purpose seldom lies on the surface1 that is1 consists in a combination of distinctly thought judgments2 although we strive against this in order that we may be able to explain our thought to ourselves and others4 ,but ordinarily it is in the obscure depths of the mind that the rumination of the materials received from without takes place1 through which they are worked up into thoughts2 and it goes on almost as unconsciously as the conversion of nourishment into the humours and substance of the body4 ,hence it is that we can often give no account of the origin of our deepest thoughts4 ,they are the birth of our mysterious inner life4 ,judgments1 thoughts1 purposes1 rise from out that deep unexpectedly and to our own surprise4 ,a letter brings us unlooked-for and important news1 in consequence of which our thoughts and motives are disordered2 we get rid of the matter for the present1 and think no more about it2 but next day1 or on the third or fourth day after1 the whole situation sometimes stands distinctly before us1 with what we have to do in the circumstances4 ,consciousness is the mere surface of our mind1 of which1 as of the earth1 we do not know the inside1 but only the crust4 ,but in the last instance1 or in the secret of our inner being1 what sets in activity the association of thought itself1 the laws of which were set forth above1 is the will1 which urges its servant the intellect1 according to the measure of its powers1 to link thought to thought1 to recall the similar1 the contemporaneous1 to recognise reasons and consequents4 ,for it is to the interest of the will that1 in general1 one should think1 so that one may be well equipped for all cases that may arise4 ,therefore the form of the principle of sufficient reason which governs the association of thoughts and keeps it active is ultimately the law of motivation4 ,for that which rules the sensorium1 and determines it to follow the analogy or other association of thoughts in this or that direction1 is the will of the thinking subject4 ,now just as here the laws of the connection of ideas subsist only upon the basis of the will1 so also in the real world the causal connection of bodies really subsists only upon the basis of the will1 which manifests itself in the phenomena of this world4 ,on this account the explanation from causes is never absolute and exhaustive1 but leads back to forces of nature as their condition1 and the inner being of the latter is just the will as thing in itself4 ,in saying this1 however1 ,i have certainly anticipated the following book4 ,but because now the outward 7sensible7 occasions of the presence of our ideas1 just as well as the inner occasions 7those of association71 and both independently of each other1 constantly affect the consciousness1 there arise from this the frequent interruptions of our course of thought1 which introduce a certain cutting up and confusion of our thinking4 ,this belongs to its imperfections which cannot be explained away1 and which we shall now consider in a separate chapter4 ,chapter ,,xv4 ,on ,the ,essential ,imperfections ,of ,the ,intellect4 ,our self-consciousness has not space but only time as its form1 and therefore we do not think in three dimensions1 as we perceive1 but only in one1 thus in a line1 without breadth or depth4 ,this is the source of the greatest of the essential imperfections of our intellect4 ,we can know all things only in succession1 and can become conscious of only one at a time1 indeed even of this one only under the condition that for the time we forget everything else1 thus are absolutely unconscious of everything else1 so that for the time it ceases to exist as far as we are concerned4 ,in respect of this quality our intellect may be compared to a telescope with a very narrow field of vision2 just because our consciousness is not stationary but fleeting4 ,the intellect apprehends only successively1 and in order to grasp one thing must let another go1 retaining nothing but traces of it1 which are ever becoming weaker4 ,the thought which is vividly present to me now must after a little while have escaped me altogether2 and if a good night's sleep intervene1 it may be that ,i shall never find it again1 unless it is connected with my personal interests1 that is1 with my will1 which always commands the field4 ,upon this imperfection of the intellect depends the disconnected and often fragmentary nature of our course of thought1 which ,i have already touched on at the close of last chapter2 and from this again arises the unavoidable distraction of our thinking4 ,sometimes external impressions of sense throng in upon it1 disturbing and interrupting it1 forcing different kinds of things upon it every moment2 sometimes one thought draws in another by the bond of association1 and is now itself dislodged by it2 sometimes1 lastly1 the intellect itself is not capable of fixing itself very long and continuously at a time upon one thought1 but as the eye when it gazes long at one object is soon unable to see it any more distinctly1 because the outlines run into each other and become confused1 until finally all is obscure1 so through long-continued reflection upon one subject our thinking also is gradually confused1 becomes dull1 and ends in complete stupor4 ,therefore after a certain time1 which varies with the individual1 we must for the present give up every meditation or deliberation which has had the fortune to remain undisturbed1 but yet has not been brought to an end1 even if it concerns a matter which is most important and pertinent to us2 and we must dismiss from our consciousness the subject which interests us so much1 however heavily our anxiety about it may weigh upon us1 in order to occupy ourselves now with insignificant and indifferent things4 ,during this time that important subject no longer exists for us2 it is like the heat in cold water1 latent4 ,if now we resume it again at another time1 we approach it like a new thing1 with which we become acquainted anew1 although more quickly1 and the agreeable or disagreeable impression of it is also produced anew upon our will4 ,we ourselves1 however1 do not come back quite unchanged4 ,for with the physical composition of the humours and tension of the nerves1 which constantly changes with the hours1 days1 and years1 our mood and point of view also changes4 ,moreover1 the different kinds of ideas which have been there in the meantime have left an echo behind them1 the tone of which influences the ideas which follow4 ,therefore the same thing appears to us at different times1 in the morning1 in the evening1 at mid-day1 or on another day1 often very different2 opposite views of it now press upon each other and increase our doubt4 ,hence we speak of sleeping upon a matter1 and for important determinations we demand a long time for consideration4 ,now1 although this quality of our intellect1 as springing from its weakness1 has its evident disadvantages1 yet1 on the other hand1 it affords the advantage that after the distraction and the physical change we return to our subject as comparatively new beings1 fresh and strange1 and thus are able to see it repeatedly in very different lights4 ,from all this it is plain that human consciousness and thought is in its nature necessarily fragmentary1 on account of which the theoretical and practical results which are achieved by piecing together such fragments are for the most part defective4 ,in this our thinking consciousness is like a magic lantern1 in the focus of which only one picture can appear at a time1 and each1 even if it represents the noblest objects1 must yet soon pass away in order to make room for others of a different1 and even most vulgar1 description4 ,in practical matters the most important plans and resolutions are formed in general2 but others are subordinated to these as means to an end1 and others again are subordinated to these1 and so on down to the particular case that has to be carried out in concreto4 ,they do not1 however1 come to be carried out in the order of their dignity1 but while we are occupied with plans which are great and general1 we have to contend with the most trifling details and the cares of the moment4 ,in this way our consciousness becomes still more desultory4 ,in general1 theoretical occupations of the mind unfit us for practical affairs1 and vice vers4 ,in consequence of the inevitably distracted and fragmentary nature of all our thinking1 which has been pointed out1 and the mingling of ideas of different kinds thereby introduced1 to which even the noblest human minds are subject1 we really have only half a consciousness with which to grope about in the labyrinth of our life and the obscurity of our investigations2 bright moments sometimes illuminate our path like lightning4 ,but what is to be expected of heads of which even the wisest is every night the scene of the strangest and most senseless dreams1 and which has to take up its meditations again on awakening from these8 ,clearly a consciousness which is subject to such great limitations is little suited for solving the riddle of the world2 and such an endeavour would necessarily appear strange and pitiful to a being of a higher order whose intellect had not time as its form1 and whose thinking had thus true completeness and unity4 ,indeed it is really wonderful that we are not completely confused by the very heterogeneous mixture of ideas and fragments of thought of every kind which are constantly crossing each other in our minds1 but are yet always able to see our way again and make everything agree together4 ,clearly there must exist a simpler thread upon which everything ranges itself together3 but what is this8 ,memory alone is not sufficient1 for it has essential limitations of which ,i shall speak shortly1 and besides this1 it is exceedingly imperfect and untrustworthy4 ,the logical ego or even the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception are expressions and explanations which will not easily serve to make the matter comprehensible2 they will rather suggest to many3 8',tis true your beard is curly1 yet it will not draw you the bolt40 ,kant's proposition1 8,the ,i think must accompany all our ideas10 is insufficient2 for the 8,i0 is an unknown quantity1 i4e41 it is itself a secret4 ,that which gives unity and connection to consciousness in that it runs through all its ideas1 and is thus its substratum1 its permanent supporter1 cannot itself be conditioned by consciousness1 therefore cannot be an idea4 ,rather it must be the prius of consciousness1 and the root of the tree of which that is the fruit4 ,this1 ,i say1 is the will4 ,it alone is unchangeable and absolutely identical1 and has brought forth consciousness for its own ends4 ,therefore it is also the will which gives it unity and holds together all its ideas and thoughts1 accompanying them like a continuous harmony4 ,without it the intellect would no longer have the unity of consciousness1 as a mirror in which now this and now that successively presents itself1 or at the most only so much as a convex mirror whose rays unite in an imaginary point behind its surface4 ,but the will alone is that which is permanent and unchangeable in consciousness4 ,it is the will which holds together all thoughts and ideas as means to its ends1 and tinges them with the colour of its own character1 its mood1 and its interests1 commands the attention1 and holds in its hand the train of motives whose influence ultimately sets memory and the association of ideas in activity2 at bottom it is the will that is spoken of whenever 8,i0 appears in a judgment4 ,thus it is the true and final point of unity of consciousness1 and the bond of all its functions and acts2 it does not itself1 however1 belong to the intellect1 but is only its root1 source1 and controller4 ,from the form of time and the single dimension of the series of ideas1 on account of which1 in order to take up one1 the intellect must let all the others fall1 there follows not only its distraction1 but also its forgetfulness4 ,most of what it lets fall it never takes up again2 especially since the taking up again is bound to the principle of sufficient reason1 and thus demands an occasion which the association of thoughts and motivation have first to supply2 an occasion1 however1 which may be the more remote and smaller in proportion as our sensibility for it is heightened by our interest in the subject4 ,but memory1 as ,i have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 is not a store-house1 but merely a faculty acquired by practice of calling up ideas at pleasure1 which must therefore constantly be kept in practice by use2 for otherwise it will gradually be lost4 ,accordingly the knowledge even of the learned man exists only virtualiter as an acquired facility in calling up certain ideas2 actualiter1 on the other hand1 it also is confined to one idea1 and is only conscious of this one at a time4 ,hence arises a strange contrast between what he knows potenti and what he knows actu2 that is1 between his knowledge and what he thinks at any moment3 the former is an immense and always somewhat chaotic mass1 the latter is a single distinct thought4 ,the relation resembles that between the innumerable stars of the heavens and the limited field of vision of the telescope2 it appears in a striking manner when upon some occasion he wishes to call distinctly to his remembrance some particular circumstance in his knowledge1 and time and trouble are required to produce it from that chaos4 ,rapidity in doing this is a special gift1 but is very dependent upon day and hour2 therefore memory sometimes refuses us its service1 even in things which at another time it has readily at hand4 ,this consideration calls us in our studies to strive more to attain to correct insight than to increase our learning1 and to lay it to heart that the quality of knowledge is more important than its quantity4 ,the latter imparts to books only thickness1 the former thoroughness and also style2 for it is an intensive quantity1 while the other is merely extensive4 ,it consists in the distinctness and completeness of the conceptions1 together with the purity and accuracy of the knowledge of perception which forms their foundation2 therefore the whole of knowledge in all its parts is penetrated by it1 and in proportion as it is so is valuable or trifling4 ,with a small quantity1 but of good quality1 one achieves more than with a very large quantity of bad quality4 ,the most perfect and satisfactory knowledge is that of perception1 but it is limited absolutely to the particular1 the individual4 ,the combination of the many and the different in one idea is only possible through the conception1 that is1 through the omission of the differences2 therefore this is a very imperfect manner of presenting things to the mind4 ,certainly the particular also can be directly comprehended as a universal1 if it is raised to the 7,platonic7 ,idea2 but in this process1 which ,i have analysed in the third book1 the intellect already passes beyond the limits of individuality1 and therefore of time2 moreover it is only an exception4 ,these inner and essential imperfections of the intellect are further increased by a disturbance which1 to a certain extent1 is external to it1 but yet is unceasing--the influence exerted by the will upon all its operations whenever it is in any way concerned in their result4 ,every passion1 indeed every inclination and aversion1 tinges the objects of knowledge with its colour4 ,of most common occurrence is the falsifying of knowledge which is brought about by wishes and hopes1 for they picture to us the scarcely possible as probable and well nigh certain1 and make us almost incapable of comprehending what is opposed to it3 fear acts in a similar way2 and every preconceived opinion1 every partiality1 and1 as has been said1 every interest1 every emotion and inclination of the will1 acts in an analogous manner4 ,to all these imperfections of the intellect we have finally to add this1 that it grows old with the brain1 that is1 like all physiological functions1 it loses its energy in later years1 whereby all its imperfections are then much increased4 ,the defective nature of the intellect here set forth will not1 however1 surprise us if we look back at its origin and destiny as established by me in the second book4 ,nature has produced it for the service of an individual will4 ,therefore it is only designed to know things so far as they afford the motives of such a will1 but not to fathom them or comprehend their true being4 ,human intellect is only a higher gradation of the intellect of the brutes2 and as this is entirely confined to the present1 our intellect also bears strong traces of this limitation1 ,therefore our memory and recollection is something very imperfect4 ,how little of all that we have done1 experienced1 learnt1 or read1 can we recall6 ,and even this little for the most part only laboriously and imperfectly4 ,for the same reasons is it so very difficult for us to keep ourselves free from the impressions of the present4 ,unconsciousness is the original and natural condition of all things1 and therefore also the basis from which1 in particular species of beings1 consciousness results as their highest efflorescence2 wherefore even then unconsciousness always continues to predominate4 ,accordingly most existences are without consciousness2 but yet they act according to the laws of their nature1 i4e41 of their will4 ,plants have at most a very weak analogue of consciousness2 the lowest species of animals only the dawn of it4 ,but even after it has ascended through the whole series of animals to man and his reason1 the unconsciousness of plants1 from which it started1 still remains the foundation1 and may be traced in the necessity for sleep1 and also in all those essential and great imperfections1 here set forth1 of every intellect produced through physiological functions2 and of another intellect we have no conception4 ,the imperfections here proved to be essential to the intellect are constantly increased1 however1 in particular cases1 by non-essential imperfections4 ,the intellect is never in every respect what it possibly might be4 ,the perfections possible to it are so opposed that they exclude each other4 ,therefore no man can be at once ,plato and ,aristotle1 or ,shakspeare and ,newton1 or ,kant and ,goethe4 ,the imperfections of the intellect1 on the contrary1 consort very well together2 therefore in reality it for the most part remains far below what it might be4 ,its functions depend upon so very many conditions1 which we can only comprehend as anatomical and physiological1 in the phenomenon in which alone they are given us1 that a decidedly excelling intellect1 even in one respect alone1 is among the rarest of natural phenomena4 ,therefore the productions of such an intellect are preserved through thousands of years1 indeed every relic of such a highly favoured individual becomes a most valuable treasure4 ,from such an intellect down to that which approaches imbecility the gradations are innumerable4 ,and primarily1 in conformity with these gradations1 the mental horizon of each of us varies very much from the mere comprehension of the present1 which even the brute has1 to that which also embraces the next hour1 the day1 even the morrow1 the week1 the year1 the life1 the century1 the thousand years1 up to that of the consciousness which has almost always present1 even though obscurely dawning1 the horizon of the infinite1 and whose thoughts therefore assume a character in keeping with this4 ,further1 that difference among intelligences shows itself in the rapidity of their thinking1 which is very important1 and which may be as different and as finely graduated as that of the points in the radius of a revolving disc4 ,the remoteness of the consequents and reasons to which any one's thought can extend seems to stand in a certain relation to the rapidity of his thinking1 for the greatest exertion of thought-power in general can only last quite a short time1 and yet only while it lasts can a thought be thought out in its complete unity4 ,it therefore amounts to this1 how far the intellect can pursue it in so short a time1 thus what length of path it can travel in it4 ,on the other hand1 in the case of some1 rapidity may be made up for by the greater duration of that time of perfectly concentrated thought4 ,probably the slow and lasting thought makes the mathematical mind1 while rapidity of thought makes the genius4 ,the latter is a flight1 the former a sure advance upon firm ground1 step by step4 ,yet even in the sciences1 whenever it is no longer a question of mere quantities1 but of understanding the nature of phenomena1 this last kind of thinking is inadequate4 ,this is shown1 for example1 by ,newton's theory of colour1 and later by ,biot's nonsense about colour rings1 which yet agrees with the whole atomistic method of treating light among the ,french1 with its molcules de lumire1 and in general with their fixed idea of reducing everything in nature to mere mechanical effects4 ,lastly1 the great individual diversity of intelligence we are speaking about shows itself excellently in the degrees of the clearness of understanding1 and accordingly in the distinctness of the whole thinking4 ,to one man that is to understand which to another is only in some degree to observe2 the one is already done and at the goal while the other is only at the beginning2 to the one that is the solution which to the other is only the problem4 ,this depends on the quality of thought and knowledge1 which was already referred to above4 ,as in rooms the degree of light varies1 so does it in minds4 ,we can detect this quality of the whole thought as soon as we have read only a few pages of an author4 ,for in doing so we have been obliged to understand both with his understanding and in his sense2 and therefore before we know all that he has thought we see already how he thinks1 what is the formal nature1 the texture of his thinking1 which remains the same in everything about which he thinks1 and whose expression is the train of thought and the style4 ,in this we feel at once the pace1 the flexibleness and lightness1 even indeed the soaring power of his mind2 or1 on the contrary1 its dulness1 formality1 lameness and leaden quality4 ,for1 as language is the expression of the mind of a nation1 style is the more immediate expression of the mind of an author than even his physiognomy4 ,we throw a book aside when we observe that in it we enter an obscurer region than our own1 unless we have to learn from it mere facts1 not thoughts4 ,apart from mere facts1 only that author will afford us profit whose understanding is keener and clearer than our own1 who forwards our thinking instead of hindering it1 like the dull mind that will force us to keep pace with the toad-like course of its thought2 thus that author with whose mind it gives us sensible relief and assistance sometimes to think1 by whom we feel ourselves borne where we could not have gone alone4 ,goethe once said to me that if he read a page of ,kant he felt as if he entered a brightly lighted room4 ,inferior minds are so not merely because they are distorted1 and therefore judge falsely1 but primarily through the indistinctness of their whole thinking1 which may be compared to seeing through a bad telescope1 when all the outlines appear indistinct and as if obliterated1 and the different objects run into each other4 ,the weak understanding of such minds shrinks from the demand for distinctness of conceptions1 and therefore they do not themselves make this claim upon it1 but put up with haziness2 and to satisfy themselves with this they gladly have recourse to words1 especially such as denote indefinite1 very abstract1 unusual conceptions which are hard to explain2 such1 for example1 as infinite and finite1 sensible and supersensible1 the ,idea of being1 ,ideas of the reason1 the absolute1 the ,idea of the good1 the divine1 moral freedom1 power of spontaneous generation1 the absolute ,idea1 subject-object1 c4 ,the like of these they confidently fling about1 imagine they really express thoughts1 and expect every one to be content with them2 for the highest summit of wisdom which they can see is to have at command such ready-made words for every possible question4 ,this immense satisfaction in words is thoroughly characteristic of inferior minds4 ,it depends simply upon their incapacity for distinct conceptions1 whenever these must rise above the most trivial and simple relations4 ,hence upon the weakness and indolence of their intellect1 and indeed upon the secret consciousness of this1 which in the case of scholars is bound up with the early learnt and hard necessity of passing themselves off as thinking beings1 to meet which demand in all cases they keep such a suitable store of ready-made words4 ,it must really be amusing to see a professor of philosophy of this kind in the chair1 who bon fide delivers such a juggle of words destitute of thoughts1 quite sincerely1 under the delusion that they are really thoughts1 and in front of him the students1 who just as bon fide1 i4e41 under the same delusion1 listen attentively and take notes1 while yet in reality neither the one nor the other goes beyond the words1 but rather these words themselves1 together with the audible scratching of pens1 are the only realities in the whole matter4 ,this peculiar satisfaction in words has more than anything else to do with the perpetuation of errors4 ,for1 relying on the words and phrases received from his predecessors1 each one confidently passes over obscurities and problems1 and thus these are propagated through centuries from book to book2 and the thinking man1 especially in youth1 is in doubt whether it may be that he is incapable of understanding it1 or that there is really nothing here to understand2 and similarly1 whether for others the problem which they all slink past with such comical seriousness by the same path is no problem at all1 or whether it is only that they will not see it4 ,many truths remain undiscovered simply on this account1 that no one has the courage to look the problem in the face and grapple with it4 ,on the contrary1 the distinctness of thought and clearness of conceptions peculiar to eminent minds produces the effect that even known truths when brought forward by them gain new light1 or at least a new stimulus4 ,if we hear them or read them1 it is as if we exchanged a bad telescope for a good one4 ,let one only read1 for example1 in ,euler's 8,letters to the ,princess10 his exposition of the fundamental truths of mechanics and optics4 ,upon this rests the remark of ,diderot in the ,neveu de ,rameau1 that only the perfect masters are capable of teaching really well the elements of a science2 just because it is only they who really understand the questions1 and for them words never take the place of thoughts4 ,but we ought to know that inferior minds are the rule1 good minds the exception1 eminent minds very rare1 and genius a portent4 ,how otherwise could a human race consisting of about eight hundred million individuals have left so much after six thousand years to discover1 to invent1 to think out1 and to say8 ,the intellect is calculated for the support of the individual alone1 and as a rule it is only barely sufficient even for this4 ,but nature has wisely been very sparing of conferring a larger measure2 for the man of limited intelligence can survey the few and simple relations which lie within reach of his narrow sphere of action1 and can control the levers of them with much greater ease than could the eminently intellectual man who commands an incomparably larger sphere and works with long levers4 ,thus the insect sees everything on its stem or leaf with the most minute exactness1 and better than we1 and yet is not aware of the man who stands within three steps of it4 ,this is the reason of the slyness of half-witted persons1 and the ground of the paradox3 ,il y a un mystre dans l'esprit des gens qui n'en ont pas4 ,for practical life genius is about as useful as an astral telescope in a theatre4 ,thus1 with regard to the intellect nature is highly aristocratic4 ,the distinctions which it has established are greater than those which are made in any country by birth1 rank1 wealth1 or caste4 ,but in the aristocracy of intellect1 as in other aristocracies1 there are many thousands of plebeians for one nobleman1 many millions for one prince1 and the great multitude of men are mere populace1 mob1 rabble1 la canaille4 ,now certainly there is a glaring contrast between the scale of rank of nature and that of convention1 and their agreement is only to be hoped for in a golden age4 ,meanwhile those who stand very high in the one scale of rank and in the other have this in common1 that for the most part they live in exalted isolation1 to which ,byron refers when he says3-- 8,to feel me in the solitude of kings ,without the power that makes them bear a crown40 --,proph4 of ,dante1 c4 ,i4 ,for intellect is a differentiating1 and therefore a separating principle4 ,its different grades1 far more than those of mere culture1 give to each man different conceptions1 in consequence of which each man lives to a certain extent in a different world1 in which he can directly meet those only who are like himself1 and can only attempt to speak to the rest and make himself understood by them from a distance4 ,great differences in the grade and in the cultivation of the understanding fix a wide gulf between man and man1 which can only be crossed by benevolence2 for it is1 on the contrary1 the unifying principle1 which identifies every one else with its own self4 ,yet the connection remains a moral one2 it cannot become intellectual4 ,indeed1 when the degree of culture is about the same1 the conversation between a man of great intellect and an ordinary man is like the journey together of two men1 one of whom rides on a spirited horse and the other goes on foot4 ,it soon becomes very trying to both of them1 and for any length of time impossible4 ,for a short way the rider can indeed dismount1 in order to walk with the other1 though even then the impatience of his horse will give him much to do4 ,but the public could be benefited by nothing so much as by the recognition of that intellectual aristocracy of nature4 ,by virtue of such recognition it would comprehend that when facts are concerned1 thus when the matter has to be decided from experiments1 travels1 codes1 histories1 and chronicles1 the normal mind is certainly sufficient2 but1 on the other hand1 when mere thoughts are in question1 especially those thoughts the material or data of which are within reach of every one1 thus when it is really only a question of thinking before others1 decided reflectiveness1 native eminence1 which only nature bestows1 and that very seldom1 is inevitably demanded1 and no one deserves to be heard who does not at once give proofs of this4 ,if the public could be brought to see this for itself1 it would no longer waste the time which is sparingly measured out to it for its culture on the productions of ordinary minds1 thus on the innumerable botches of poetry and philosophy which are produced every day4 ,it would no longer seize always what is newest1 in the childish delusion that books1 like eggs1 must be enjoyed while they are fresh1 but would confine itself to the works of the few select and chosen minds of all ages and nations1 would strive to learn to know and understand them1 and might thus by degrees attain to true culture4 ,and then1 also1 those thousands of uncalled-for productions which1 like tares1 hinder the growth of the good wheat would be discontinued4 ,chapter ,,xvi47#bf7 ,on ,the ,practical ,use ,of ,reason ,and ,on ,stoicism4 ,in the seventh chapter ,i have shown that1 in the theoretical sphere1 procedure based upon conceptions suffices for mediocre achievements only1 while great achievements1 on the other hand1 demand that we should draw from perception itself as the primary source of all knowledge4 ,in the practical sphere1 however1 the converse is the case4 ,here determination by what is perceived is the way of the brutes1 but is unworthy of man1 who has conceptions to guide his conduct1 and is thus emancipated from the power of what is actually perceptibly present1 to which the brute is unconditionally given over4 ,in proportion as a man makes good this prerogative his conduct may be called rational1 and only in this sense can we speak of practical reason1 not in the ,kantian sense1 the inadmissibility of which ,i have thoroughly exposed in my prize essay on the foundation of morals4 ,it is not easy1 however1 to let oneself be determined by conceptions alone2 for the directly present external world1 with its perceptible reality1 intrudes itself forcibly even on the strongest mind4 ,but it is just in conquering this impression1 in destroying its illusion1 that the human spirit shows its worth and greatness4 ,thus if incitements to lust and pleasure leave it unaffected1 if the threats and fury of enraged enemies do not shake it1 if the entreaties of erring friends do not make its purpose waver1 and the delusive forms with which preconcerted plots surround it leave it unmoved1 if the scorn of fools and of the vulgar herd does not disturb it nor trouble it as to its own worth1 then it seems to stand under the influence of a spirit-world1 visible to it alone 7and this is the world of conceptions71 before which that perceptibly present world which lies open to all dissolves like a phantom4 ,but1 on the other hand1 what gives to the external world and visible reality their great power over the mind is their nearness and directness4 ,as the magnetic needle1 which is kept in its position by the combined action of widely distributed forces of nature embracing the whole earth1 can yet be perturbed and set in violent oscillation by a small piece of iron1 if only it comes quite close to it1 so even a great mind can sometimes be disconcerted and perturbed by trifling events and insignificant men1 if only they affect it very closely1 and the deliberate purpose can be for the moment shaken by a trivial but immediately present counter motive4 ,for the influence of the motives is subject to a law which is directly opposed to the law according to which weights act on a balance1 and in consequence of it a very small motive1 which1 however1 lies very near to us1 can outweigh one which in itself is much stronger1 but which only affects us from a distance4 ,but it is this quality of the mind1 by reason of which it allows itself to be determined in accordance with this law1 and does not withdraw itself from it by the strength of actual practical reason1 which the ancients denoted by animi impotentia1 which really signifies ratio regend voluntatis impotens4 ,every emotion 7animi perturbatio7 simply arises from the fact that an idea which affects our will comes so excessively near to us that it conceals everything else from us1 and we can no longer see anything but it1 so that for the moment we become incapable of taking account of things of another kind4 ,it would be a valuable safeguard against this if we were to bring ourselves to regard the present1 by the assistance of imagination1 as if it were past1 and should thus accustom our apperception to the epistolary style of the ,romans4 ,yet conversely we are very well able to regard what is long past as so vividly present that old emotions which have long been asleep are thereby reawakened in their full strength4 ,thus also no one would be irritated or disconcerted by a misfortune1 a disappointment1 if reason always kept present to him what man really is3 the most needy of creatures1 daily and hourly abandoned to innumerable misfortunes1 great and small1 1 who has therefore to live in constant care and fear4 ,herodotus already says1 8 0 7homo totus est calamitas74 ,the application of reason to practice primarily accomplishes this4 ,it reconstructs what is one-sided and defective in knowledge of mere perception1 and makes use of the contrasts or oppositions which it presents1 to correct each other1 so that thus the objectively true result is arrived at4 ,for example1 if we look simply at the bad action of a man we will condemn him2 on the other hand1 if we consider merely the need that moved him to it1 we will compassionate him3 reason1 by means of its conceptions1 weighs the two1 and leads to the conclusion that he must be restrained1 restricted1 and curbed by a proportionate punishment4 ,i am again reminded here of ,seneca's saying3 8,si vis tibi omnia subjicere1 te subjice rationi40 ,since1 however1 as was shown in the fourth book1 the nature of suffering is positive1 and that of pleasure negative1 he who takes abstract or rational knowledge as the rule of his conduct1 and therefore constantly reflects on its consequences and on the future1 will very frequently have to practise sustine et abstine1 for in order to obtain the life that is most free from pain he generally sacrifices its keenest joys and pleasures1 mindful of ,aristotle's 8 1 0 7quod dolore vacat1 non quod suave est1 persequitur vir prudens74 ,therefore with him the future constantly borrows from the present1 instead of the present borrowing from the future1 as is the case with a frivolous fool1 who thus becomes impoverished and finally bankrupt4 ,in the case of the former reason must1 for the most part1 assume the rle of a churlish mentor1 and unceasingly call for renunciations1 without being able to promise anything in return1 except a fairly painless existence4 ,this rests on the fact that reason1 by means of its conceptions1 surveys the whole of life1 whose outcome1 in the happiest conceivable case1 can be no other than what we have said4 ,when this striving after a painless existence1 so far as it might be attainable by the application of and strict adherence to rational reflection and acquired knowledge of the true nature of life1 was carried out with the greatest consistency and to the utmost extreme1 it produced cynicism1 from which stoicism afterwards proceeded4 ,i wish briefly here to bring this out more fully for the sake of establishing more firmly the concluding exposition of our first book4 ,all ancient moral systems1 with the single exception of that of ,plato1 were guides to a happy life4 ,accordingly in them the end of virtue was entirely in this life1 not beyond death4 ,for to them it is only the right path to a truly happy life2 and on this account the wise choose it4 ,hence arise those lengthy debates chiefly preserved for us by ,cicero1 those keen and constantly renewed investigations1 whether virtue quite alone and in itself is really sufficient for a happy life1 or whether this further requires some external condition2 whether the virtuous and wise may also be happy on the rack and the wheel1 or in the bull of ,phalaris2 or whether it does not go as far as this4 ,for certainly this would be the touchstone of an ethical system of this kind2 the practice of it must give happiness directly and unconditionally4 ,if it cannot do this it does not accomplish what it ought1 and must be rejected4 ,it is therefore with truth and in accordance with the ,christian point of view that ,augustine prefaces his exposition of the moral systems of the ancients 7,de ,civ4 ,dei1 ,lib4 xix4 c4 #a7 with the explanation3 8,exponenda sunt nobis argumenta mortalium1 quibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem facere ,,in ,,hujus ,,vit ,,infelicitate moliti sunt2 ut ab eorum rebus vanis spes nostra quid differat clarescat4 ,de finibus bonorum et malorum multa inter se philosophi disputarunt2 quam qustionem maxima intentione versantes1 invenire conati sunt1 quid efficiat hominem beatum3 illud enim est finis bonorum40 ,i wish to place beyond all doubt the eudmonistic end which we have ascribed to all ancient ethics by several express statements of the ancients themselves4 ,aristotle says in the 8,eth4 ,magna10 i4 #d3 8 1 40 7,felicitas in bene vivendo posita est3 verum bene vivere est in eo positum1 ut secundum virtutem vivamus71 with which may be compared 8,eth4 ,nicom410 i4 #e4 8,cic4 ,tusc410 v4 #a3 8,nam1 quum ea causa impulerit eos1 qui primi se ad philosophi studia contulerunt1 ut1 omnibus rebus posthabitis1 totos se in optimo vit statu exquirendo collocarent2 profecto spe beate vivendi tantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt04 ,according to ,plutarch 7,de ,repugn4 ,stoic41 c4 xviii47 ,chrysippus said3 8 40 7,vitiose vivere idem est guod vivere infeliciter47 ,ibid41 c4 #bf3 8 1 40 7,prudentia nihil differt a felicitate1 estque ipsa adeo felicitas47 8,stob4 ,ecl410 ,lib4 ii4 c4 #g3 8 1 40 7,finem esse dicunt felicitatem1 cujus causa fiunt omnia47 8 40 7,finem bonorum et felicitatem synonyma esse dicunt47 8,arrian ,diss4 ,epict410 i4 #d3 8 1 40 7,virtus profitetur1 se felicitatem prstare47 ,sen41 ,ep4 #ij3 8,ceterum 7sapientia7 ad beatum statum tendit1 illo ducit1 illo vias aperit40--,id41 ,ep4 #ajh3 8,illud admoneo auditionem philosophorum1 lectionemque1 ad propositum beat vit trahendum40 ,the ethics of the ,cynics also adopted this end of the happiest life1 as the ,emperor ,julian expressly testifies 7,orat4 vi473 8 1 1 2 1 40 7,cynic philosophi ut etiam omnis philosophi1 scopus et finis est feliciter vivere3 felicitas vit autem in eo posita est1 ut secundum naturam vivatur1 nec vero secundum opiniones multitudinis47 ,only the ,cynics followed quite a peculiar path to this end1 a path directly opposed to the ordinary one--the path of extreme privation4 ,they start from the insight that the motions of the will which are brought about by the objects which attract and excite it1 and the wearisome1 and for the most part vain1 efforts to attain these1 or1 if they are attained1 the fear of losing them1 and finally the loss itself1 produce far greater pain than the want of all these objects ever can4 ,therefore1 in order to attain to the life that is most free from pain1 they chose the path of the extremest destitution1 and fled from all pleasures as snares through which one was afterwards handed over to pain4 ,but after this they could boldly scorn happiness and its caprices4 ,this is the spirit of cynicism4 ,seneca distinctly expresses it in the eighth chapter1 8,de ,tranquilitate ,animi30 8,cogitandum est1 quanto levior dolor sit1 non habere1 quam perdere3 et intelligemus paupertati eo minorem tormentorum1 quo minorem damnorum esse materiam40 ,then3 8,tolerabilius est1 faciliusque1 non acquirere1 quam amittere4444 ,diogenes effecit1 ne quid sibi eripi posset1 444 qui se fortuitis omnibus exuit4444 ,videtur mihi dixisse2 age tuum negotium1 fortuna3 nihil apud ,diogenem jam tuum est40 ,the parallel passage to this last sentence is the quotation of ,stobus 7,ecl4 ii4 #g73 8 2 40 7,diogenes credere se dixit1 videre ,fortunam1 ipsum intuentem1 ac dicentem3 aut hunc non potui tetigisse canem rabiosum47 ,the same spirit of cynicism is also shown in the epitaph on ,diogenes1 in ,suidas1 under the word 1 and in 8,diogenes ,laertius10 vi4 #b3 8 2 1 1 2 1 40 7ra quidem absumit tempus1 sed tempore numquam ,interitura tua est gloria1 ,diogenes3 ,quandoquidem ad vitam miseris mortalibus quam ,monstrata est facilis1 te duce1 et ampla via47 ,accordingly the fundamental thought of cynicism is that life in its simplest and nakedest form1 with the hardships that belong to it by nature1 is the most endurable1 and is therefore to be chosen2 for every assistance1 convenience1 gratification1 and pleasure by means of which men seek to make life more agreeable only brings with it new and greater ills than originally belonged to it4 ,therefore we may regard the following sentence as the expression of the kernel of the doctrine of cynicism3 8 1 1 40 7,diogenes clamabat spius1 hominum vitam facilem a diis dari1 verum occultari illam qurentibus mellita cibaria1 unguenta et his similia47 7,diog41 ,laert41 vi4 #b47 ,and further3 81 1 1 2 4444 1 1 40 7,quum igitur1 repudiatis inutilibus laboribus1 naturales insequi1 ac vivere beate debeamus1 per summam dementiam infelices sumus4444 eandem vit formam1 quam ,hercules1 se vivere affirmans1 nihil libertati prferens4 ,ibid47 ,therefore the old1 genuine ,cynics1 ,antisthenes1 ,diogenes1 ,krates1 and their disciples had once for all renounced every possession1 all conveniences and pleasures1 in order to escape for ever from the troubles and cares1 the dependence and the pains1 which are inevitably bound up with them and are not counterbalanced by them4 ,through the bare satisfaction of the most pressing wants and the renunciation of everything superfluous they thought they would come off best4 ,accordingly they contented themselves with what in ,athens or ,corinth was to be had almost for nothing1 such as lupines1 water1 an old threadbare cloak1 a wallet1 and a staff4 ,they begged occasionally1 as far as was necessary to supply such wants1 but they never worked4 ,yet they accepted absolutely nothing that exceeded the wants referred to above4 ,independence in the widest sense was their aim4 ,they occupied their time in resting1 going about1 talking with all men1 and much mocking1 laughing1 and joking2 their characteristic was carelessness and great cheerfulness4 ,since now in this manner of life they had no aims of their own1 no purposes or ends to pursue1 thus were lifted above the sphere of human action1 and at the same time always enjoyed complete leisure1 they were admirably fitted1 as men of proved strength of mind1 to be the advisers and admonishers of the rest4 ,therefore ,apuleius says 7,florid41 iv473 8,crates1 ut lar familiaris apud homines su tatis cultus est4 ,nulla domus ei unquam clausa erat3 nec erat patrisfamilias tam absconditum secretum1 quin eo tempestive ,crates interveniret1 litium omnium et jurgiorum inter propinquos disceptator et arbiter40 ,thus in this1 as in so many other respects1 they show a great likeness to the mendicant friars of modern times1 that is1 to the better and more genuine among them1 whose ideal may be seen in the ,capucine ,christoforo in ,manzoni's famous romance4 ,yet this resemblance lies only in the effects1 not in the cause4 ,they agree in the result1 but the fundamental thought of the two is quite different4 ,with the friars1 as with the ,sannysis1 who are akin to them1 it is an aim which transcends life2 but with the ,cynics it is only the conviction that it is easier to reduce their wishes and their wants to the minimum1 than to attain to the maximum in their satisfaction1 which indeed is impossible1 for with their satisfaction the wishes and wants grow ad infinitum2 therefore1 in order to reach the goal of all ancient ethics1 the greatest happiness possible in this life1 they took the path of renunciation as the shortest and easiest3 8 40 7,unde ,cynismum dixere compendiosam ad virtutem viam47 ,diog4 ,laert41 vi4 #i4 ,the fundamental difference between the spirit of cynicism and that of asceticism comes out very clearly in the humility which is essential to the ascetic1 but is so foreign to the ,cynic that1 on the contrary1 he is distinguished beyond everything else for pride and scorn3-- 8,sapiens uno minor est ,jove1 dives1 ,liber1 honoratus1 pulcher1 rex denique regum40--,hor4 ,on the other hand1 the view of life held by the ,cynics agrees in spirit with that of ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau as he expounds it in the 8,discours sur l',origine de l',ingalit40 ,for he also would wish to lead us back to the crude state of nature1 and regards the reduction of our wants to the minimum as the surest path to happiness4 ,for the rest1 the ,cynics were exclusively practical philosophers3 at least no account of their theoretical philosophy is known to me4 ,now the ,stoics proceeded from them in this way--they changed the practical into the theoretical4 ,they held that the actual dispensing with everything that can be done without is not demanded1 but that it is sufficient that we should regard possessions and pleasures constantly as dispensable1 and as held in the hand of chance2 for then the actual deprivation of them1 if it should chance to occur1 would neither be unexpected nor fall heavily4 ,one might always have and enjoy everything2 only one must ever keep present the conviction of the worthlessness and dispensableness of these good things on the one hand1 and of their uncertainty and perishableness on the other1 and therefore prize them all very little1 and be always ready to give them up4 ,nay more1 he who must actually dispense with these things in order not to be moved by them1 thereby shows that in his heart he holds them to be truly good things1 which one must put quite out of sight if one is not to long after them4 ,the wise man1 on the other hand1 knows that they are not good things at all1 but rather perfectly indifferent things1 1 in any case 4 ,therefore if they present themselves he will accept them1 but yet is always ready to let them go again1 if chance1 to which they belong1 should demand them back2 for they are 4 ,in this sense1 ,epictetus1 chap4 vii41 says that the wise man1 like one who has landed from a ship1 c41 will also let himself be comforted by a wife or a child1 but yet will always be ready1 whenever the captain calls1 to let them go again4 ,thus the ,stoics perfected the theory of equanimity and independence at the cost of the practice1 for they reduced everything to a mental process1 and by arguments1 such as are presented in the first chapter of ,epictetus1 sophisticated themselves into all the amenities of life4 ,but in doing so they left out of account that everything to which one is accustomed becomes a need1 and therefore can only be given up with pain2 that the will does not allow itself to be played with1 cannot enjoy without loving the pleasures2 that a dog does not remain indifferent if one draws a piece of meat through its mouth1 and neither does a wise man if he is hungry2 and that there is no middle path between desiring and renouncing4 ,but they believed that they satisfied their principles if1 sitting at a luxurious ,roman table1 they left no dish untasted1 yet at the same time protested that they were each and all of them mere 1 not 2 or in plain ,english1 if they eat1 drank1 and were merry1 yet gave no thanks to ,god for it all1 but rather made fastidious faces1 and persisted in boldly asserting that they gained nothing whatever from the whole feast4 ,this was the expedient of the ,stoics2 they were therefore mere braggarts1 and stand to the ,cynics in much the same relation as well-fed ,benedictines and ,augustines stand to ,franciscans and ,capucines4 ,now the more they neglected practice1 the more they refined the theory4 ,i shall here add a few proofs and supplementary details to the exposition of it given at the close of our first book4 ,if we search in the writings of the ,stoics which remain to us1 all of which are unsystematically composed1 for the ultimate ground of that irrefragible equanimity which is unceasingly demanded of us1 we find no other than the knowledge that the course of the world is entirely independent of our will1 and consequently1 that the evil which befalls us is inevitable4 ,if we have regulated our claims by a correct insight into this1 then mourning1 rejoicing1 fearing1 and hoping are follies of which we are no longer capable4 ,further1 especially in the commentaries of ,arrian1 it is surreptitiously assumed that all that is 7i4e41 does not depend upon us7 is at once also 7i4e41 does not concern us74 ,yet it remains true that all the good things of life are in the power of chance1 and therefore whenever it makes use of this power to deprive us of them1 we are unhappy if we have placed our happiness in them4 ,from this unworthy fate we are1 in the opinion of the ,stoics1 delivered by the right use of reason1 by virtue of which we regard all these things1 never as ours1 but only as lent to us for an indefinite time2 only thus can we never really lose them4 ,therefore ,seneca says 7,ep4 #ih73 8,si1 quid humanarum rerum varietas possit1 cogitaverit1 ante quam senserit10 and ,diogenes ,laertius 7vii4 #a4 #hg73 8 40 7,secundum virtutem vivere idem est1 quod secundum experientiam eorum1 qu secundum naturam accidunt1 vivere47 ,the passage in ,arrian's 8,discourses of ,epictetus10 ,b4 iii41 c4 #bd1 #hd-hi1 is particularly in point here2 and especially1 as a proof of what ,i have said in this reference in #af of the first volume1 the passage3 8 10 ,ibid4 iv41 #a4 #db4 7,hc enim causa est hominibus omnium malorum1 quod anticipationes generales rebus singularibus accommodare non possunt47 ,similarly the passage in 8,marcus ,aurelius0 7iv4 #bi73 8 1 20 that is3 8,if he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it1 no less is he a stranger who does not know how things go on in it40 ,also ,seneca's eleventh chapter1 8,de ,tranquilitate ,animi10 is a complete proof of this view4 ,the opinion of the ,stoics amounts on the whole to this1 that if a man has watched for a while the juggling illusion of happiness and then uses his reason1 he must recognise both the rapid changes of the dice and the intrinsic worthlessness of the counters1 and therefore must henceforth remain unmoved4 ,taken generally the ,stoical point of view may be thus expressed3 our suffering always arises from the want of agreement between our wishes and the course of the world4 ,therefore one of these two must be changed and adapted to the other4 ,since now the course of things is not in our power 7 71 we must direct our volitions and desires according to the course of things3 for the will alone is 4 ,this adaptation of volition to the course of the external world1 thus to the nature of things1 is very often understood under the ambiguous 4 ,see the 8,discourses of ,epictetus10 ii4 #ag1 #ba1 #bb4 ,seneca also denotes this point of view 7,ep4 #aai7 when he says3 8,nihil interest1 utrum non desideres1 an habeas4 ,summa rei in utroque est eadem3 non torqueberis40 ,also ,cicero 7,tusc4 iv4 #bf7 by the words3 8,solum habere velle1 summa dementia est40 ,similarly ,arrian 7iv4 #a4 #age73 8 1 40 7,non enim explendis desideriis libertas comparatur1 sed tollenda cupiditate47 ,the collected quotations in the 8,historia ,philosophi ,grco-,roman0 of ,ritter and ,preller may be taken as proofs of what ,i have said1 in the place referred to above1 about the of the ,stoics4 ,also the saying of ,seneca 7,ep4 #ca1 and again ,ep4 #gd73 8,perfecta virtus est qualitas et tenor vit per omnia consonans sibi40 ,the following passage of ,seneca's indicates the spirit of the ,stoa generally 7,ep4 #ib73 8,quid est beata vita8 ,securitas et perpetua tranquillitas4 ,hanc dabit animi magnitudo1 dabit constantia bene judicati tenax40 ,a systematical study of the ,stoics will convince every one that the end of their ethics1 like that of the ethics of ,cynicism from which they sprang1 is really nothing else than a life as free as possible from pain1 and therefore as happy as possible4 ,whence it follows that the ,stoical morality is only a special form of ,eudmonism4 ,it has not1 like the ,indian1 the ,christian1 and even the ,platonic ethics1 a metaphysical tendency1 a transcendental end1 but a completely immanent end1 attainable in this life2 the steadfast serenity 77 and unclouded happiness of the wise man1 whom nothing can disturb4 ,yet it cannot be denied that the later ,stoics1 especially ,arrian1 sometimes lose sight of this end1 and show a really ascetic tendency1 which is to be attributed to the ,christian and ,oriental spirit in general which was then already spreading4 ,if we consider closely and seriously the goal of ,stoicism1 that 1 we find in it merely a hardening and insensibility to the blow of fate which a man attains to because he keeps ever present to his mind the shortness of life1 the emptiness of pleasure1 the instability of happiness1 and has also discerned that the difference between happiness and unhappiness is very much less than our anticipation of both is wont to represent4 ,but this is yet no state of happiness2 it is only the patient endurance of sufferings which one has foreseen as irremediable4 ,yet magnanimity and worth consist in this1 that one should bear silently and patiently what is irremediable1 in melancholy peace1 remaining always the same1 while others pass from rejoicing to despair and from despair to rejoicing4 ,accordingly one may also conceive of ,stoicism as a spiritual hygiene1 in accordance with which1 just as one hardens the body against the influences of wind and weather1 against fatigue and exertion1 one has also to harden one's mind against misfortune1 danger1 loss1 injustice1 malice1 perfidy1 arrogance1 and the folly of men4 ,i remark further1 that the of the ,stoics1 which ,cicero translates officia1 signify as nearly as possible ,obliegenheiten1 or that which it befits the occasion to do2 ,english1 incumbencies2 ,italian1 quel che tocca a me di fare1 o di lasciare1 thus what it behoves a reasonable man to do4 ,cf4 ,diog4 ,laert41 vii4 #a4 #aji4 ,finally1 the pantheism of the ,stoics1 though absolutely inconsistent with many an exhortation of ,arrian1 is most distinctly expressed by ,seneca3 8,quid est ,deus8 ,mens universi4 ,quid est ,deus8 ,quod vides totum1 et quod non vides totum4 ,sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur1 qua nihil majus excogitari potest3 si solus est omnia1 opus suum et extra1 et intra tenet40 7,qust4 ,natur4 #a1 prfatio #ab47 ,chapter ,,xvii47#bg7 ,on ,man's ,need ,of ,metaphysics4 ,with the exception of man1 no being wonders at its own existence2 but it is to them all so much a matter of course that they do not observe it4 ,the wisdom of nature speaks out of the peaceful glance of the brutes2 for in them the will and the intellect are not yet so widely separated that they can be astonished at each other when they meet again4 ,thus here the whole phenomenon is still firmly attached to the stem of nature from which it has come1 and is partaker of the unconscious omniscience of the great mother4 ,only after the inner being of nature 7the will to live in its objectification7 has ascended1 vigorous and cheerful1 through the two series of unconscious existences1 and then through the long and broad series of animals1 does it attain at last to reflection for the first time on the entrance of reason1 thus in man4 ,then it marvels at its own works1 and asks itself what it itself is4 ,its wonder however is the more serious1 as it here stands for the first time consciously in the presence of death1 and besides the finiteness of all existence1 the vanity of all effort forces itself more or less upon it4 ,with this reflection and this wonder there arises therefore for man alone1 the need for a metaphysic2 he is accordingly an animal metaphysicum4 ,at the beginning of his consciousness certainly he also accepts himself as a matter of course4 ,this does not last long however1 but very early1 with the first dawn of reflection1 that wonder already appears1 which is some day to become the mother of metaphysics4 ,in agreement with this ,aristotle also says at the beginning of his metaphysics3 8 40 7,propter admirationem enim et nunc et primo inceperunt homines philosophari47 ,moreover1 the special philosophical disposition consists primarily in this1 that a man is capable of wonder beyond the ordinary and everyday degree1 and is thus induced to make the universal of the phenomenon his problem1 while the investigators in the natural sciences wonder only at exquisite or rare phenomena1 and their problem is merely to refer these to phenomena which are better known4 ,the lower a man stands in an intellectual regard the less of a problem is existence itself for him2 everything1 how it is1 and that it is1 appears to him rather a matter of course4 ,this rests upon the fact that his intellect still remains perfectly true to its original destiny of being serviceable to the will as the medium of motives1 and therefore is closely bound up with the world and nature1 as an integral part of them4 ,consequently it is very far from comprehending the world in a purely objective manner1 freeing itself1 so to speak1 from the whole of things1 opposing itself to this whole1 and so for a while becoming as if self-existent4 ,on the other hand1 the philosophical wonder which springs from this is conditioned in the individual by higher development of the intellect1 yet in general not by this alone2 but without doubt it is the knowledge of death1 and along with this the consideration of the suffering and misery of life1 which gives the strongest impulse to philosophical reflection and metaphysical explanation of the world4 ,if our life were endless and painless1 it would perhaps occur to no one to ask why the world exists1 and is just the kind of world it is2 but everything would just be taken as a matter of course4 ,in accordance with this we find that the interest which philosophical and also religious systems inspire has always its strongest hold in the dogma of some kind of existence after death2 and although the most recent systems seem to make the existence of their gods the main point1 and to defend this most zealously1 yet in reality this is only because they have connected their special dogma of immortality with this1 and regard the one as inseparable from the other3 only on this account is it of importance to them4 ,for if one could establish their doctrine of immortality for them in some other way1 their lively zeal for their gods would at once cool1 and it would give place almost to complete indifference if1 conversely1 the absolute impossibility of immortality were proved to them2 for the interest in the existence of the gods would vanish with the hope of a closer acquaintance with them1 to the residuum which might connect itself with their possible influence on the events of this present life4 ,but if one could prove that continued existence after death is incompatible with the existence of gods1 because1 let us say1 it pre-supposes originality of being1 they would soon sacrifice the gods to their own immortality and become zealous for ,atheism4 ,the fact that the materialistic systems1 properly so-called1 and also absolute scepticism1 have never been able to obtain a general or lasting influence1 depends upon the same grounds4 ,temples and churches1 pagodas and mosques1 in all lands and in all ages1 in splendour and vastness1 testify to the metaphysical need of man1 which1 strong and ineradicable1 follows close upon his physical need4 ,certainly whoever is satirically inclined might add that this metaphysical need is a modest fellow who is content with poor fare4 ,it sometimes allows itself to be satisfied with clumsy fables and insipid tales4 ,if only imprinted early enough1 they are for a man adequate explanations of his existence and supports of his morality4 ,consider1 for example1 the ,koran4 ,this wretched book was sufficient to found a religion of the world1 to satisfy the metaphysical need of innumerable millions of men for twelve hundred years1 to become the foundation of their morality1 and of no small contempt for death1 and also to inspire them to bloody wars and most extended conquests4 ,we find in it the saddest and the poorest form of ,theism4 ,much may be lost through the translations2 but ,i have not been able to discover one single valuable thought in it4 ,such things show that metaphysical capacity does not go hand in hand with the metaphysical need4 ,yet it will appear that in the early ages of the present surface of the earth this was not the case1 and that those who stood considerably nearer than we do to the beginning of the human race and the source of organic nature1 had also both greater energy of the intuitive faculty of knowledge1 and a truer disposition of mind1 so that they were capable of a purer1 more direct comprehension of the inner being of nature1 and were thus in a position to satisfy the metaphysical need in a more worthy manner4 ,thus originated in the primitive ancestors of the ,brahmans1 the ,rishis1 the almost super-human conceptions which were afterwards set down in the ,upanishads of the ,vedas4 ,on the other hand1 there have never been wanting persons who were interested in deriving their living from that metaphysical need1 and in making the utmost they could out of it4 ,therefore among all nations there are monopolists and farmers-general of it--the priests4 ,yet their trade had everywhere to be assured to them in this way1 that they received the right to impart their metaphysical dogmas to men at a very early age1 before the judgment has awakened from its morning slumber1 thus in early childhood2 for then every well-impressed dogma1 however senseless it may be1 remains for ever4 ,if they had to wait till the judgment is ripe1 their privileges could not continue4 ,a second1 though not a numerous class of persons1 who derive their support from the metaphysical need of man1 is constituted by those who live by philosophy4 ,by the ,greeks they were called ,sophists1 by the moderns they are called ,professors of ,philosophy4 ,aristotle 7,metaph41 ii4 #b7 without hesitation numbers ,aristippus among the ,sophists4 ,in ,diogenes ,laertius 7ii4 #fe7 we find that the reason of this is that he was the first of the ,socratics who accepted payment for his philosophy2 on account of which ,socrates also returned him his present4 ,among the moderns also those who live by philosophy are not only1 as a rule1 and with the rarest exceptions1 quite different from those who live for philosophy1 but they are very often the opponents1 the secret and irreconcilable enemies of the latter4 ,for every true and important philosophical achievement will overshadow their own too much1 and1 moreover1 cannot adapt itself to the views and limitations of their guild4 ,therefore it is always their endeavour to prevent such a work from making its way2 and for this purpose1 according to the age and circumstances in each case1 the customary means are suppressing1 concealing1 hushing up1 ignoring and keeping secret1 or denying1 disparaging1 censuring1 slandering and distorting1 or1 finally1 denouncing and persecuting4 ,hence many a great man has had to drag himself wearily through life unknown1 unhonoured1 unrewarded1 till at last1 after his death1 the world became undeceived as to him and as to them4 ,in the meanwhile they had attained their end1 had been accepted by preventing him from being accepted1 and1 with wife and child1 had lived by philosophy1 while he lived for it4 ,but if he is dead1 then the thing is reversed2 the new generation of the former class1 which always exists1 now becomes heir to his achievements1 cuts them down to its own measure1 and now lives by him4 ,that ,kant could yet live both by and for philosophy depended on the rare circumstance that1 for the first time since ,divus ,antoninus and ,divus ,julianus1 a philosopher sat on the throne4 ,only under such auspices could the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason0 have seen the light4 ,scarcely was the king dead than we see that ,kant also1 seized with fear1 because he belonged to the guild1 modified1 expurgated1 and spoiled his masterpiece in the second edition1 and yet was soon in danger of losing his place2 so that ,campe invited him to come to him1 in ,brunswick1 and live with him as the instructor of his family 7,ring41 ,ansichten aus ,kant's ,leben1 p4 #fh74 ,university philosophy is1 as a rule1 mere juggling4 ,its real aim is to impart to the students1 in the deepest ground of their thought1 that tendency of mind which the ministry that appoints to the professorships regards as consistent with its views4 ,the ministry may also be perfectly right in this from a statesman's point of view2 only the result of it is that such philosophy of the chair is a nervis alienis mobile lignum1 and cannot be regarded as serious philosophy1 but as the mere jest of it4 ,moreover1 it is at any rate just that such inspection or guidance should extend only to the philosophy of the chair1 and not to the real philosophy that is in earnest4 ,for if anything in the world is worth wishing for--so well worth wishing for that even the ignorant and dull herd in its more reflective moments would prize it more than silver and gold--it is that a ray of light should fall on the obscurity of our being1 and that we should gain some explanation of our mysterious existence1 in which nothing is clear but its misery and its vanity4 ,but even if this is in itself attainable1 it is made impossible by imposed and compulsory solutions4 ,we shall now subject to a general consideration the different ways of satisfying this strong metaphysical need4 ,by metaphysics ,i understand all knowledge that pretends to transcend the possibility of experience1 thus to transcend nature or the given phenomenal appearance of things1 in order to give an explanation of that by which1 in some sense or other1 this experience or nature is conditioned2 or1 to speak in popular language1 of that which is behind nature1 and makes it possible4 ,but the great original diversity in the power of understanding1 besides the cultivation of it1 which demands much leisure1 makes so great a difference between men1 that as soon as a people has emerged from the state of savages1 no one metaphysic can serve for them all4 ,therefore among civilised nations we find throughout two different kinds of metaphysics1 which are distinguished by the fact that the one has its evidence in itself1 the other outside itself4 ,since the metaphysical systems of the first kind require reflection1 culture1 and leisure for the recognition of their evidence1 they can be accessible only to a very small number of men2 and1 moreover1 they can only arise and maintain their existence in the case of advanced civilisation4 ,on the other hand1 the systems of the second kind exclusively are for the great majority of men who are not capable of thinking1 but only of believing1 and who are not accessible to reasons1 but only to authority4 ,these systems may therefore be called metaphysics of the people1 after the analogy of poetry of the people1 and also wisdom of the people1 by which is understood proverbs4 ,these systems1 however1 are known under the name of religions1 and are found among all nations1 not excepting even the most savage4 ,their evidence is1 as has been said1 external1 and as such is called revelation1 which is authenticated by signs and miracles4 ,their arguments are principally threats of eternal1 and indeed also temporal evils1 directed against unbelievers1 and even against mere doubters4 ,as ultima ratio theologorum1 we find among many nations the stake or things similar to it4 ,if they seek a different authentication1 or if they make use of other arguments1 they already make the transition into the systems of the first kind1 and may degenerate into a mixture of the two1 which brings more danger than advantage1 for their invaluable prerogative of being imparted to children gives them the surest guarantee of the permanent possession of the mind1 for thereby their dogmas grow into a kind of second inborn intellect1 like the twig upon the grafted tree2 while1 on the other hand1 the systems of the first kind only appeal to grown-up people1 and in them always find a system of the second kind already in possession of their convictions4 ,both kinds of metaphysics1 whose difference may be briefly expressed by the words reasoned conviction and faith1 have this in common1 that every one of their particular systems stands in a hostile relation to all the others of its kind4 ,between those of the first kind war is waged only with word and pen2 between those of the second with fire and sword as well4 ,several of the latter owe their propagation in part to this last kind of polemic1 and all have by degrees divided the earth between them1 and indeed with such decided authority that the peoples of the earth are distinguished and separated more according to them than according to nationality or government4 ,they alone reign1 each in its own province4 ,the systems of the first kind1 on the contrary1 are at the most tolerated1 and even this only because1 on account of the small number of their adherents1 they are for the most part not considered worth the trouble of combating with fire and sword--although1 where it seemed necessary1 these also have been employed against them with effect2 besides1 they occur only in a sporadic form4 ,yet in general they have only been endured in a tamed and subjugated condition1 for the system of the second kind which prevailed in the country ordered them to conform their teaching more or less closely to its own4 ,sometimes it not only subjugated them1 but even employed their services and used them as a support1 which is however a dangerous experiment4 ,for these systems of the first kind1 since they are deprived of power1 believe they may advance themselves by craft1 and never entirely lay aside a secret ill-will which at times comes unexpectedly into prominence and inflicts injuries which are hard to heal4 ,for they are further made the more dangerous by the fact that all the real sciences1 not even excepting the most innocent1 are their secret allies against the systems of the second kind1 and without themselves being openly at war with the latter1 suddenly and unexpectedly do great mischief in their province4 ,besides1 the attempt which is aimed at by the enlistment referred to of the services of the systems of the first kind by the second--the attempt to add an inner authentication to a system whose original authentication was external1 is in its nature perilous2 for1 if it were capable of such an authentication1 it would never have required an external one4 ,and in general it is always a hazardous thing to attempt to place a new foundation under a finished structure4 ,moreover1 how should a religion require the suffrage of a philosophy8 ,it has everything upon its side--revelation1 tradition1 miracles1 prophecies1 the protection of the government1 the highest rank1 as is due to the truth1 the consent and reverence of all1 a thousand temples in which it is proclaimed and practised1 bands of sworn priests1 and1 what is more than all1 the invaluable privilege of being allowed to imprint its doctrines on the mind at the tender age of childhood1 whereby they became almost like innate ideas4 ,with such wealth of means at its disposal1 still to desire the assent of poor philosophers it must be more covetous1 or to care about their contradiction it must be more fearful1 than seems to be compatible with a good conscience4 ,to the distinction established above between metaphysics of the first and of the second kind1 we have yet to add the following3--,a system of the first kind1 thus a philosophy1 makes the claim1 and has therefore the obligation1 in everything that it says1 sensu stricto et proprio1 to be true1 for it appeals to thought and conviction4 ,a religion1 on the other hand1 being intended for the innumerable multitude who1 since they are incapable of examination and thought1 would never comprehend the profoundest and most difficult truths sensu proprio1 has only the obligation to be true sensu allegorico4 ,truth cannot appear naked before the people4 ,a symptom of this allegorical nature of religions is the mysteries which are to be found perhaps in them all1 certain dogmas which cannot even be distinctly thought1 not to speak of being literally true4 ,indeed1 perhaps it might be asserted that some absolute contradictions1 some actual absurdities1 are an essential ingredient in a complete religion1 for these are just the stamp of its allegorical nature1 and the only adequate means of making the ordinary mind and the uncultured understanding feel what would be incomprehensible to it1 that religion has ultimately to do with quite a different order of things1 with an order of things in themselves1 in the presence of which the laws of this phenomenal world1 in conformity with which it must speak1 vanish2 and that therefore not only the contradictory but also the comprehensible dogmas are really only allegories and accommodations to the human power of comprehension4 ,it seems to me that it was in this spirit that ,augustine and even ,luther adhered to the mysteries of ,christianity in opposition to ,pelagianism1 which sought to reduce everything to the dull level of comprehensibility4 ,from this point of view it is also conceivable how ,tertullian could say in all seriousness3 8,prorsus credibile est1 quia ineptum est3 444 certum est1 quia impossibile0 7,de ,carne ,christi1 c4 #e74 ,this allegorical nature of religions makes them independent of the proofs which are incumbent on philosophy1 and in general withdraws them from investigation4 ,instead of this they require faith1 that is1 a voluntary admission that such is the state of the case4 ,since1 then1 faith guides action1 and the allegory is always so framed that1 as regards the practical1 it leads precisely to that which the truth sensu proprio would also lead to1 religion is justified in promising to those who believe eternal salvation4 ,thus we see that in the main1 and for the great majority1 who cannot apply themselves to thought1 religions very well supply the place of metaphysics in general1 the need of which man feels to be imperative4 ,they do this partly in a practical interest1 as the guiding star of their action1 the unfurled standard of integrity and virtue1 as ,kant admirably expresses it2 partly as the indispensable comfort in the heavy sorrows of life1 in which capacity they fully supply the place of an objectively true metaphysic1 because they lift man above himself and his existence in time1 as well perhaps as such a metaphysic ever could4 ,in this their great value and indeed necessity shows itself very clearly4 ,for ,plato says1 and says rightly1 8 0 7vulgus philosophum esse impossible est4 ,de ,rep41 vi4 p4 #hi1 ,bip47 ,on the other hand1 the only stumbling-stone is this1 that religions never dare to confess their allegorical nature1 but have to assert that they are true sensu proprio4 ,they thereby encroach on the province of metaphysics proper1 and call forth the antagonism of the latter1 which has therefore expressed itself at all times when it was not chained up4 ,the controversy which is so perseveringly carried on in our own day between supernaturalists and rationalists also rests on the failure to recognise the allegorical nature of all religion4 ,both wish to have ,christianity true sensu proprio2 in this sense the former wish to maintain it without deduction1 as it were with skin and hair2 and thus they have a hard stand to make against the knowledge and general culture of the age4 ,the latter wish to explain away all that is properly ,christian2 whereupon they retain something which is neither sensu proprio nor sensu allegorico true1 but rather a mere platitude1 little better than ,judaism1 or at the most a shallow ,pelagianism1 and1 what is worst1 an abject optimism1 absolutely foreign to ,christianity proper4 ,moreover1 the attempt to found a religion upon reason removes it into the other class of metaphysics1 that which has its authentication in itself1 thus to the foreign ground of the philosophical systems1 and into the conflict which these wage against each other in their own arena1 and consequently exposes it to the light fire of scepticism and the heavy artillery of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason20 but for it to venture there would be clear presumption4 ,it would be most beneficial to both kinds of metaphysics that each of them should remain clearly separated from the other and confine itself to its own province1 that it may there be able to develop its nature fully4 ,instead of which1 through the whole ,christian era1 the endeavour has been to bring about a fusion of the two1 for the dogmas and conceptions of the one have been carried over into the other1 whereby both are spoiled4 ,this has taken place in the most open manner in our own day in that strange hermaphrodite or centaur1 the so-called philosophy of religion1 which1 as a kind of gnosis1 endeavours to interpret the given religion1 and to explain what is true sensu allegorico through something which is true sensu proprio4 ,but for this we would have to know and possess the truth sensu proprio already2 and in that case such an interpretation would be superfluous4 ,for to seek first to find metaphysics1 i4e41 the truth sensu proprio1 merely out of religion by explanation and interpretation would be a doubtful and dangerous undertaking1 to which one would only make up one's mind if it were proved that truth1 like iron and other base metals1 could only be found in a mixed1 not in a pure form1 and therefore one could only obtain it by reduction from the mixed ore4 ,religions are necessary for the people1 and an inestimable benefit to them4 ,but if they oppose themselves to the progress of mankind in the knowledge of the truth1 they must with the utmost possible forbearance be set aside4 ,and to require that a great mind--a ,shakspeare2 a ,goethe--should make the dogmas of any religion implicitly1 bon fide et sensu proprio1 his conviction is to require that a giant should put on the shoe of a dwarf4 ,religions1 being calculated with reference to the power of comprehension of the great mass of men1 can only have indirect1 not immediate truth4 ,to require of them the latter is as if one wished to read the letters set up in the form-chase1 instead of their impression4 ,the value of a religion will accordingly depend upon the greater or less content of truth which it contains under the veil of allegory1 and then upon the greater or less distinctness with which it becomes visible through this veil1 thus upon the transparency of the latter4 ,it almost seems that1 as the oldest languages are the most perfect1 so also are the oldest religions4 ,if ,i were to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth1 ,i would be obliged to concede to ,buddhism the pre-eminence over the rest4 ,in any case it must be a satisfaction to me to see my teaching in such close agreement with a religion which the majority of men upon the earth hold as their own2 for it numbers far more adherents than any other4 ,this agreement1 however1 must be the more satisfactory to me because in my philosophising ,i have certainly not been under its influence4 ,for up till #ahah1 when my work appeared1 there were very few1 exceedingly incomplete and scanty1 accounts of ,buddhism to be found in ,europe1 which were almost entirely limited to a few essays in the earlier volumes of 8,asiatic ,researches10 and were principally concerned with the ,buddhism of the ,burmese4 ,only since then has fuller information about this religion gradually reached us1 chiefly through the profound and instructive essays of the meritorious member of the ,st4 ,petersburg ,academy1 ,j4 ,j4 ,schmidt1 in the proceedings of his ,academy1 and then little by little through several ,english and ,french scholars1 so that ,i was able to give a fairly numerous list of the best works on this religion in my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 under the heading ,sinologie4 ,unfortunately ,csoma ,krsi1 that persevering ,hungarian1 who1 in order to study the language and sacred writings of ,buddhism1 spent many years in ,tibet1 and for the most part in ,buddhist monasteries1 was carried off by death just as he was beginning to work out for us the results of his researches4 ,i cannot1 however1 deny the pleasure with which ,i read1 in his provisional accounts1 several passages cited directly from the ,kahgyur itself2 for example1 the following conversation of the dying ,buddha with ,brahma1 who is doing him homage3 8,there is a description of their conversation on the subject of creation1--by whom was the world made8 ,shakya asks several questions of ,brahma1--whether was it he who made or produced such and such things1 and endowed or blessed them with such and such virtues or properties1--whether was it he who caused the several revolutions in the destruction and regeneration of the world4 ,he denies that he had ever done anything to that effect4 ,at last he himself asks ,shakya how the world was made1--by whom8 ,here are attributed all changes in the world to the moral works of the animal beings1 and it is stated that in the world all is illusion1 there is no reality in the things2 all is empty4 ,brahma1 being instructed in his doctrine1 becomes his follower0 7,asiatic ,researches1 vol4 ,,xx4 p4 #dcd74 ,i cannot place1 as is always done1 the fundamental difference of all religions in the question whether they are monotheistic1 polytheistic1 pantheistic1 or atheistic1 but only in the question whether they are optimistic or pessimistic1 that is1 whether they present the existence of the world as justified by itself1 and therefore praise and value it1 or regard it as something that can only be conceived as the consequence of our guilt1 and therefore properly ought not to be1 because they recognise that pain and death cannot lie in the eternal1 original1 and immutable order of things1 in that which in every respect ought to be4 ,the power by virtue of which ,christianity was able to overcome first ,judaism1 and then the heathenism of ,greece and ,rome1 lies solely in its pessimism1 in the confession that our state is both exceedingly wretched and sinful1 while ,judaism and heathenism were optimistic4 ,that truth1 profoundly and painfully felt by all1 penetrated1 and bore in its train the need of redemption4 ,i turn to a general consideration of the other kind of metaphysics1 that which has its authentication in itself1 and is called philosophy4 ,i remind the reader of its origin1 mentioned above1 in a wonder concerning the world and our own existence1 inasmuch as these press upon the intellect as a riddle1 the solution of which therefore occupies mankind without intermission4 ,here1 then1 ,i wish first of all to draw attention to the fact that this could not be the case if1 in ,spinoza's sense1 which in our own day has so often been brought forward again under modern forms and expositions as pantheism1 the world were an 8absolute substance10 and therefore an absolutely necessary existence4 ,for this means that it exists with so great a necessity that beside it every other necessity comprehensible to our understanding as such must appear as an accident4 ,it would then be something which comprehended in itself not only all actual but also all possible existence1 so that1 as ,spinoza indeed declares1 its possibility and its actuality would be absolutely one4 ,its non-being would therefore be impossibility itself2 thus it would be something the non-being or other-being of which must be completely inconceivable1 and which could therefore just as little be thought away as1 for example1 space or time4 ,and since1 further1 we ourselves would be parts1 modes1 attributes1 or accidents of such an absolute substance1 which would be the only thing that1 in any sense1 could ever or anywhere exist1 our and its existence1 together with its properties1 would necessarily be very far from presenting itself to us as remarkable1 problematical1 and indeed as an unfathomable and ever-disquieting riddle1 but1 on the contrary1 would be far more self-evident than that two and two make four4 ,for we would necessarily be incapable of thinking anything else than that the world is1 and is1 as it is2 and therefore we would necessarily be as little conscious of its existence as such1 i4e41 as a problem for reflection1 as we are of the incredibly fast motion of our planet4 ,all this1 however1 is absolutely not the case4 ,only to the brutes1 who are without thought1 does the world and existence appear as a matter of course2 to man1 on the contrary1 it is a problem1 of which even the most uneducated and narrow-minded becomes vividly conscious in certain brighter moments1 but which enters more distinctly and more permanently into the consciousness of each one of us the clearer and more enlightened that consciousness is1 and the more material for thought it has acquired through culture1 which all ultimately rises1 in minds that are naturally adapted for philosophising1 to ,plato's 81 0 7mirari1 valde philosophicus affectus71 that is1 to that wonder which comprehends in its whole magnitude that problem which unceasingly occupies the nobler portion of mankind in every age and in every land1 and gives it no rest4 ,in fact1 the pendulum which keeps in motion the clock of metaphysics1 that never runs down1 is the consciousness that the non-existence of this world is just as possible as its existence4 ,thus1 then1 the ,spinozistic view of it as an absolutely necessary existence1 that is1 as something that absolutely and in every sense ought to and must be1 is a false one4 ,even simple ,theism1 since in its cosmological proof it tacitly starts by inferring the previous non-existence of the world from its existence1 thereby assumes beforehand that the world is something contingent4 ,nay1 what is more1 we very soon apprehend the world as something the non-existence of which is not only conceivable1 but indeed preferable to its existence4 ,therefore our wonder at it easily passes into a brooding over the fatality which could yet call forth its existence1 and by virtue of which such stupendous power as is demanded for the production and maintenance of such a world could be directed so much against its own interest4 ,the philosophical astonishment is therefore at bottom perplexed and melancholy2 philosophy1 like the overture to 8,don ,juan10 commences with a minor chord4 ,it follows from this that it can neither be ,spinozism nor optimism4 ,the more special nature1 which has just been indicated1 of the astonishment which leads us to philosophise clearly springs from the sight of the suffering and the wickedness in the world1 which1 even if they were in the most just proportion to each other1 and also were far outweighed by good1 are yet something which absolutely and in general ought not to be4 ,but since now nothing can come out of nothing1 these also must have their germ in the origin or in the kernel of the world itself4 ,it is hard for us to assume this if we look at the magnitude1 the order and completeness1 of the physical world1 for it seems to us that what had the power to produce such a world must have been able to avoid the suffering and the wickedness4 ,that assumption 7the truest expression of which is ,ormuzd and ,ahrimines71 it is easy to conceive1 is hardest of all for ,theism4 ,therefore the freedom of the will was primarily invented to account for wickedness4 ,but this is only a concealed way of making something out of nothing1 for it assumes an ,operari that proceeded from no ,esse 7see ,die beiden ,grundprobleme der ,ethik1 p4 #eh1 et seq42 second edition1 p4 #eg et seq447 ,then it was sought to get rid of evil by attributing it to matter1 or to unavoidable necessity1 whereby the devil1 who is really the right ,expediens ad hoc1 was unwillingly set aside4 ,to evil also belongs death2 but wickedness is only the throwing of the existing evil from oneself on to another4 ,thus1 as was said above1 it is wickedness1 evil1 and death that qualify and intensify the philosophical astonishment4 ,not merely that the world exists1 but still more that it is such a wretched world1 is the punctum pruriens of metaphysics1 the problem which awakens in mankind an unrest that cannot be quieted by scepticism nor yet by criticism4 ,we find physics also 7in the widest sense of the word7 occupied with the explanation of the phenomena in the world4 ,but it lies in the very nature of its explanations themselves that they cannot be sufficient4 ,physics cannot stand on its own feet1 but requires a metaphysic to lean upon1 whatever airs it may give itself towards the latter4 ,for it explains the phenomena by something still more unknown than they are themselves2 by laws of nature1 resting upon forces of nature1 to which the power of life also belongs4 ,certainly the whole present condition of all things in the world1 or in nature1 must necessarily be explicable from purely physical causes4 ,but such an explanation--supposing one actually succeeded so far as to be able to give it--must always just as necessarily be tainted with two imperfections 7as it were with two sores1 or like ,achilles with the vulnerable heel1 or the devil with the horse's hoof71 on account of which everything so explained really remains still unexplained4 ,first with this imperfection1 that the beginning of every explanatory chain of causes and effects1 i4e41 of connected changes1 can absolutely never be reached1 but1 just like the limits of the world in space and time1 unceasingly recedes in infinito4 ,secondly with this1 that the whole of the efficient causes out of which everything is explained constantly rest upon something which is completely inexplicable1 the original qualities of things and the natural forces which play a prominent part among them1 by virtue of which they produce a specific kind of effect1 e4g41 weight1 hardness1 impulsive force1 elasticity1 warmth1 electricity1 chemical forces1 c41 and which now remain in every explanation which is given1 like an unknown quantity1 which absolutely cannot be eliminated1 in an otherwise perfectly solved algebraical equation4 ,accordingly there is no fragment of clay1 however little worth1 that is not entirely composed of inexplicable qualities4 ,thus these two inevitable defects in every purely physical1 i4e41 causal1 explanation show that such an explanation can only be relative1 and that its whole method and nature cannot be the only one1 the ultimate and thus the sufficient one1 i4e41 cannot be the method of explanation that can ever lead to the satisfactory solution of the difficult riddle of things1 and to the true understanding of the world and existence2 but that the physical explanation in general and as such requires further a metaphysical explanation1 which affords us the key to all its assumptions1 but just on this account must necessarily follow quite a different path4 ,the first step to this is that one should bring to distinct consciousness and firmly retain the difference of the two1 hence the difference between physics and metaphysics4 ,it rests in general on the ,kantian distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself4 ,just because ,kant held the latter to be absolutely unknowable1 there was1 according to him1 no metaphysics1 but merely immanent knowledge1 i4e41 physics1 which throughout can speak only of phenomena1 and also a critique of the reason which strives after metaphysics4 ,here1 however1 in order to show the true point of connection between my philosophy and that of ,kant1 ,i shall anticipate the second book1 and give prominence to the fact that ,kant1 in his beautiful exposition of the compatibility of freedom and necessity 7,critique of ,pure ,reason1 first edition1 p4 #ecb-eed2 and ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 p4 #bbd-bca of ,rosenkranz's edition71 shows how one and the same action may in one aspect be perfectly explicable as necessarily arising from the character of the man1 the influence to which he has been subject in the course of his life1 and the motives which are now present to him1 but yet in another aspect must be regarded as the work of his free will2 and in the same sense he says1 #ec of the 8,prolegomena30 8,certainly natural necessity will belong to every connection of cause and effect in the world of sense2 yet1 on the other hand1 freedom will be conceded to that cause which is not itself a phenomenon 7though indeed it is the ground of phenomena71 thus nature and freedom may without contradiction be attributed to the same thing1 but in a different reference--in the one case as a phenomenon1 in the other case as a thing in itself40 ,what1 then1 ,kant teaches of the phenomenon of man and his action my teaching extends to all phenomena in nature1 in that it makes the will as a thing in itself their foundation4 ,this proceeding is justified first of all by the fact that it must not be assumed that man is specifically toto genere radically different from the other beings and things in nature1 but rather that he is different only in degree4 ,i turn back from this premature digression to our consideration of the inadequacy of physics to afford us the ultimate explanation of things4 ,i say1 then1 everything certainly is physical1 but yet nothing is explicable physically4 ,as for the motion of the projected bullet1 so also for the thinking of the brain1 a physical explanation must ultimately be in itself possible1 which would make the latter just as comprehensible as is the former4 ,but even the former1 which we imagine we understand so perfectly1 is at bottom as obscure to us as the latter2 for what the inner nature of expansion in space may be--of impenetrability1 mobility1 hardness1 elasticity1 and gravity remains1 after all physical explanations1 a mystery1 just as much as thought4 ,but because in the case of thought the inexplicable appears most immediately1 a spring was at once made here from physics to metaphysics1 and a substance of quite a different kind from all corporeal substances was hypostatised--a soul was set up in the brain4 ,but if one had not been so dull as only to be capable of being struck by the most remarkable of phenomena1 one would have had to explain digestion by a soul in the stomach1 vegetation by a soul in the plant1 affinity by a soul in the reagents1 nay1 the falling of a stone by a soul in the stone4 ,for the quality of every unorganised body is just as mysterious as the life in the living body4 ,in the same way1 therefore1 the physical explanation strikes everywhere upon what is metaphysical1 by which it is annihilated1 i4e41 it ceases to be explanation4 ,strictly speaking1 it may be asserted that no natural science really achieves anything more than what is also achieved by ,botany3 the bringing together of similars1 classification4 ,a physical system which asserted that its explanations of things--in the particular from causes1 and in general from forces--were really sufficient1 and thus exhausted the nature of the world1 would be the true ,naturalism4 ,from ,leucippus1 ,democritus1 and ,epicurus down to the ,systme de la ,nature1 and further1 to ,delamark1 ,cabanis1 and to the materialism that has again been warmed up in the last few years1 we can trace the persistent attempt to set up a system of physics without metaphysics1 that is1 a system which would make the phenomenon the thing in itself4 ,but all their explanations seek to conceal from the explainers themselves and from others that they simply assume the principal matter without more ado4 ,they endeavour to show that all phenomena1 even those of mind1 are physical4 ,and they are right2 only they do not see that all that is physical is in another aspect also metaphysical4 ,but1 without ,kant1 this is indeed difficult to see1 for it presupposes the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing in itself4 ,yet without this ,aristotle1 much as he was inclined to empiricism1 and far as he was removed from the ,platonic hyper-physics1 kept himself free from this limited point of view4 ,he says3 8 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 40 7,si igitur non est aliqua alia substantia1 prter eas1 qu natura consistunt1 physica profecto prima scientia esset3 quodsi autem est aliqua substantia immobilis1 hc prior et philosophia prima1 et universalis sic1 quod prima2 et de ente1 prout ens est1 speculari hujus est71 8,metaph410 ,v4 #a4 ,such an absolute system of physics as is described above1 which leaves room for no metaphysics1 would make the ,natura naturata into the ,natura naturans2 it would be physics established on the throne of metaphysics1 yet it would comport itself in this high position almost like ,holberg's theatrical would-be politician who was made burgomaster4 ,indeed behind the reproach of atheism1 in itself absurd1 and for the most part malicious1 there lies1 as its inner meaning and truth1 which gives it strength1 the obscure conception of such an absolute system of physics without metaphysics4 ,certainly such a system would necessarily be destructive of ethics2 and while ,theism has falsely been held to be inseparable from morality1 this is really true only of metaphysics in general1 i4e41 of the knowledge that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things4 ,therefore we may set up this as the necessary ,credo of all just and good men3 8,i believe in metaphysics40 ,in this respect it is important and necessary that one should convince oneself of the untenable nature of an absolute system of physics1 all the more as this1 the true naturalism1 is a point of view which of its own accord and ever anew presses itself upon a man1 and can only be done away with through profound speculation4 ,in this respect1 however1 all kinds of systems and faiths1 so far and so long as they are accepted1 certainly serve as a substitute for such speculation4 ,but that a fundamentally false view presses itself upon man of its own accord1 and must first be skilfully removed1 is explicable from the fact that the intellect is not originally intended to instruct us concerning the nature of things1 but only to show us their relations1 with reference to our will2 it is1 as we shall find in the second book1 only the medium of motives4 ,now1 that the world schematises itself in the intellect in a manner which exhibits quite a different order of things from the absolutely true one1 because it shows us1 not their kernel1 but only their outer shell1 happens accidentally1 and cannot be used as a reproach to the intellect2 all the less as it nevertheless finds in itself the means of rectifying this error1 in that it arrives at the distinction between the phenomenal appearance and the inner being of things1 which distinction existed in substance at all times1 only for the most part was very imperfectly brought to consciousness1 and therefore was inadequately expressed1 indeed often appeared in strange clothing4 ,the ,christian mystics1 when they call it the light of nature1 declare the intellect to be inadequate to the comprehension of the true nature of things4 ,it is1 as it were1 a mere surface force1 like electricity1 and does not penetrate to the inner being4 ,the insufficiency of pure naturalism appears1 as we have said1 first of all1 on the empirical path itself1 through the circumstance that every physical explanation explains the particular from its cause2 but the chain of these causes1 as we know a priori1 and therefore with perfect certainty1 runs back to infinity1 so that absolutely no cause could ever be the first4 ,then1 however1 the effect of every cause is referred to a law of nature1 and this finally to a force of nature1 which now remains as the absolutely inexplicable4 ,but this inexplicable1 to which all phenomena of this so clearly given and naturally explicable world1 from the highest to the lowest1 are referred1 just shows that the whole nature of such explanation is only conditional1 as it were only ex concessis1 and by no means the true and sufficient one2 therefore ,i said above that physically everything and nothing is explicable4 ,that absolutely inexplicable element which pervades all phenomena1 which is most striking in the highest1 e4g41 in generation1 but yet is just as truly present in the lowest1 e4g41 in mechanical phenomena1 points to an entirely different kind of order of things lying at the foundation of the physical order1 which is just what ,kant calls the order of things in themselves1 and which is the goal of metaphysics4 ,but1 secondly1 the insufficiency of pure naturalism comes out clearly from that fundamental philosophical truth1 which we have fully considered in the first half of this book1 and which is also the theme of the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason20 the truth that every object1 both as regards its objective existence in general and as regards the manner 7forms7 of this existence1 is throughout conditioned by the knowing subject1 hence is merely a phenomenon1 not a thing in itself4 ,this is explained in #g of the first volume1 and it is there shown that nothing can be more clumsy than that1 after the manner of all materialists1 one should blindly take the objective as simply given in order to derive everything from it without paying any regard to the subjective1 through which1 however1 nay1 in which alone the former exists4 ,samples of this procedure are most readily afforded us by the fashionable materialism of our own day1 which has thereby become a philosophy well suited for barbers' and apothecaries' apprentices4 ,for it1 in its innocence1 matter1 assumed without reflection as absolutely real1 is the thing in self1 and the one capacity of a thing in itself is impulsive force1 for all other qualities can only be manifestations of this4 ,with naturalism1 then1 or the purely physical way of looking at things1 we shall never attain our end2 it is like a sum that never comes out4 ,causal series without beginning or end1 fundamental forces which are inscrutable1 endless space1 beginningless time1 infinite divisibility of matter1 and all this further conditioned by a knowing brain1 in which alone it exists just like a dream1 and without which it vanishes--constitute the labyrinth in which naturalism leads us ceaselessly round4 ,the height to which in our time the natural sciences have risen in this respect entirely throws into the shade all previous centuries1 and is a summit which mankind reaches for the first time4 ,but however great are the advances which physics 7understood in the wide sense of the ancients7 may make1 not the smallest step towards metaphysics is thereby taken1 just as a plane can never obtain cubical content by being indefinitely extended4 ,for all such advances will only perfect our knowledge of the phenomenon2 while metaphysics strives to pass beyond the phenomenal appearance itself1 to that which so appears4 ,and if indeed it had the assistance of an entire and complete experience1 it would1 as regards the main point1 be in no way advantaged by it4 ,nay1 even if one wandered through all the planets and fixed stars1 one would thereby have made no step in metaphysics4 ,it is rather the case that the greatest advances of physics will make the need of metaphysics ever more felt2 for it is just the corrected1 extended1 and more thorough knowledge of nature which1 on the one hand1 always undermines and ultimately overthrows the metaphysical assumptions which till then have prevailed1 but1 on the other hand1 presents the problem of metaphysics itself more distinctly1 more correctly1 and more fully1 and separates it more clearly from all that is merely physical2 moreover1 the more perfectly and accurately known nature of the particular thing more pressingly demands the explanation of the whole and the general1 which1 the more correctly1 thoroughly1 and completely it is known empirically1 only presents itself as the more mysterious4 ,certainly the individual1 simple investigator of nature1 in a special branch of physics1 does not at once become clearly conscious of all this2 he rather sleeps contentedly by the side of his chosen maid1 in the house of ,odysseus1 banishing all thoughts of ,penelope 7cf4 ch4 #ab at the end74 ,hence we see at the present day the husk of nature investigated in its minutest details1 the intestines of intestinal worms and the vermin of vermin known to a nicety4 ,but if some one comes1 as1 for example1 ,i do1 and speaks of the kernel of nature1 they will not listen2 they even think it has nothing to do with the matter1 and go on sifting their husks4 ,one finds oneself tempted to call that over-microscopical and micrological investigator of nature the cotquean of nature4 ,but those persons who believe that crucibles and retorts are the true and only source of all wisdom are in their own way just as perverse as were formerly their antipodes the ,scholastics4 ,as the latter1 absolutely confined to their abstract conceptions1 used these as their weapons1 neither knowing nor investigating anything outside them1 so the former1 absolutely confined to their empiricism1 allow nothing to be true except what their eyes behold1 and believe they can thus arrive at the ultimate ground of things1 not discerning that between the phenomenon and that which manifests itself in it1 the thing in itself1 there is a deep gulf1 a radical difference1 which can only be cleared up by the knowledge and accurate delimitation of the subjective element of the phenomenon1 and the insight that the ultimate and most important conclusions concerning the nature of things can only be drawn from self-consciousness2 yet without all this one cannot advance a step beyond what is directly given to the senses1 thus can get no further than to the problem4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 it is to be observed that the most perfect possible knowledge of nature is the corrected statement of the problem of metaphysics4 ,therefore no one ought to venture upon this without having first acquired a knowledge of all the branches of natural science1 which1 though general1 shall be thorough1 clear1 and connected4 ,for the problem must precede its solution4 ,then1 however1 the investigator must turn his glance inward2 for the intellectual and ethical phenomena are more important than the physical1 in the same proportion as1 for example1 animal magnetism is a far more important phenomenon than mineral magnetism4 ,the last fundamental secret man carries within himself1 and this is accessible to him in the most immediate manner2 therefore it is only here that he can hope to find the key to the riddle of the world and gain a clue to the nature of all things4 ,the special province of metaphysics thus certainly lies in what has been called mental philosophy4 8,the ranks of living creatures thou dost lead ,before me1 teaching me to know my brothers ,in air and water and the silent wood3 ,then to the cave secure thou leadest me1 ,then show'st me mine own self1 and in my breast ,the deep1 mysterious miracles unfold407#bh7 ,finally1 then1 as regards the source or the foundation of metaphysical knowledge1 ,i have already declared myself above to be opposed to the assumption1 which is even repeated by ,kant1 that it must lie in mere conceptions4 ,in no knowledge can conceptions be what is first2 for they are always derived from some perception4 ,what has led1 however1 to that assumption is probably the example of mathematics4 ,mathematics can leave perception altogether1 and1 as is especially the case in algebra1 trigonometry1 and analysis1 can operate with purely abstract conceptions1 nay1 with conceptions which are represented only by signs instead of words1 and can yet arrive at a perfectly certain result1 which is still so remote that any one who adhered to the firm ground of perception could not arrive at it4 ,but the possibility of this depends1 as ,kant has clearly shown1 on the fact that the conceptions of mathematics are derived from the most certain and definite of all perceptions1 from the a priori and yet intuitively known relations of quantity1 and can therefore be constantly realised again and controlled by these1 either arithmetically1 by performing the calculations which are merely indicated by those signs1 or geometrically1 by means of what ,kant calls the construction of the conceptions4 ,this advantage1 on the other hand1 is not possessed by the conceptions out of which it was believed metaphysics could be built up2 such1 for example1 as essence1 being1 substance1 perfection1 necessity1 reality1 finite1 infinite1 absolute1 ground1 c4 ,for such conceptions are by no means original1 as fallen from heaven1 or innate2 but they also1 like all conceptions1 are derived from perceptions2 and as1 unlike the conceptions of mathematics1 they do not contain the mere form of perception1 but more1 empirical perceptions must lie at their foundation4 ,thus nothing can be drawn from them which the empirical perceptions did not also contain1 that is1 nothing which was not a matter of experience1 and which1 since these conceptions are very wide abstractions1 we would receive with much greater certainty at first hand from experience4 ,for from conceptions nothing more can ever be drawn than the perceptions from which they are derived contain4 ,if we desire pure conceptions1 i4e41 such as have no empirical source1 the only ones that can be produced are those which concern space and time1 i4e41 the merely formal part of perception1 consequently only the mathematical conceptions1 or at most also the conception of causality1 which indeed does not originate in experience1 but yet only comes into consciousness by means of it 7first in sense-perception72 therefore experience indeed is only possible by means of it2 but it also is only valid in the sphere of experience1 on which account ,kant has shown that it only serves to communicate the connection of experience1 and not to transcend it2 that thus it admits only of physical application1 not of metaphysical4 ,certainly only its a priori origin can give apodictic certainty to any knowledge2 but this limits it to the mere form of experience in general1 for it shows that it is conditioned by the subjective nature of the intellect4 ,such knowledge1 then1 far from taking us beyond experience1 gives only one part of experience itself1 the formal part1 which belongs to it throughout1 and therefore is universal1 consequently mere form without content4 ,since now metaphysics can least of all be confined to this1 it must have also empirical sources of knowledge2 therefore that preconceived idea of a metaphysic to be found purely a priori is necessarily vain4 ,it is really a petitio principii of ,kant's1 which he expresses most distinctly in #a of the ,prolegomena1 that metaphysics must not draw its fundamental conceptions and principles from experience4 ,in this it is assumed beforehand that only what we knew before all experience can extend beyond all possible experience4 ,supported by this1 ,kant then comes and shows that all such knowledge is nothing more than the form of the intellect for the purpose of experience1 and consequently can never lead beyond experience1 from which he then rightly deduces the impossibility of all metaphysics4 ,but does it not rather seem utterly perverse that in order to discover the secret of experience1 i4e41 of the world which alone lies before us1 we should look quite away from it1 ignore its content1 and take and use for its material only the empty forms of which we are conscious a priori8 ,is it not rather in keeping with the matter that the science of experience in general1 and as such1 should also be drawn from experience8 ,its problem itself is given it empirically2 why should not the solution of it call in the assistance of experience8 ,is it not senseless that he who speaks of the nature of things should not look at things themselves1 but should confine himself to certain abstract conceptions8 ,the task of metaphysics is certainly not the observation of particular experiences1 but yet it is the correct explanation of experience as a whole4 ,its foundation must therefore1 at any rate1 be of an empirical nature4 ,indeed the a priori nature of a part of human knowledge will be apprehended by it as a given fact1 from which it will infer the subjective origin of the same4 ,only because the consciousness of its a priori nature accompanies it is it called by ,kant transcendental as distinguished from transcendent1 which signifies 8passing beyond all possibility of experience10 and has its opposite in immanent1 i4e41 remaining within the limits of experience4 ,i gladly recall the original meaning of this expression introduced by ,kant1 with which1 as also with that of the ,categories1 and many others1 the apes of philosophy carry on their game at the present day4 ,now1 besides this1 the source of the knowledge of metaphysics is not outer experience alone1 but also inner4 ,indeed1 what is most peculiar to it1 that by which the decisive step which alone can solve the great question becomes possible for it1 consists1 as ,i have fully and thoroughly proved in 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 under the heading1 8,physische ,astronomie10 in this1 that at the right place it combines outer experience with inner1 and uses the latter as a key to the former4 ,the origin of metaphysics in empirical sources of knowledge1 which is here set forth1 and which cannot fairly be denied1 deprives it certainly of that kind of apodictic certainty which is only possible through knowledge a priori4 ,this remains the possession of logic and mathematics--sciences1 however1 which really only teach what every one knows already1 though not distinctly4 ,at most the primary elements of natural science may also be deduced from knowledge a priori4 ,by this confession metaphysics only surrenders an ancient claim1 which1 according to what has been said above1 rested upon misunderstanding1 and against which the great diversity and changeableness of metaphysical systems1 and also the constantly accompanying scepticism1 in every age has testified4 ,yet against the possibility of metaphysics in general this changeableness cannot be urged1 for the same thing affects just as much all branches of natural science1 chemistry1 physics1 geology1 zoology1 c41 and even history has not remained exempt from it4 ,but when once1 as far as the limits of human intellect allow1 a true system of metaphysics shall have been found1 the unchangeableness of a science which is known a priori will yet belong to it2 for its foundation can only be experience in general1 and not the particular and special experiences by which1 on the other hand1 the natural sciences are constantly modified and new material is always being provided for history4 ,for experience as a whole and in general will never change its character for a new one4 ,the next question is3 ,how can a science drawn from experience pass beyond it and so merit the name of metaphysics8 ,it cannot do so perhaps in the same way as we find a fourth number from three proportionate ones1 or a triangle from two sides and an angle4 ,this was the way of the pre-,kantian dogmatism1 which1 according to certain laws known to us a priori1 sought to reason from the given to the not given1 from the consequent to the reason1 thus from experience to that which could not possibly be given in any experience4 ,kant proved the impossibility of a metaphysic upon this path1 in that he showed that although these laws were not drawn from experience1 they were only valid for experience4 ,he therefore rightly taught that in such a way we cannot transcend the possibility of all experience4 ,but there are other paths to metaphysics4 ,the whole of experience is like a cryptograph1 and philosophy the deciphering of it1 the correctness of which is proved by the connection appearing everywhere4 ,if this whole is only profoundly enough comprehended1 and the inner experience is connected with the outer1 it must be capable of being interpreted1 explained from itself4 ,since ,kant has irrefutably proved to us that experience in general proceeds from two elements1 the forms of knowledge and the inner nature of things1 and that these two may be distinguished in experience from each other1 as that of which we are conscious a priori and that which is added a posteriori1 it is possible1 at least in general1 to say1 what in the given experience1 which is primarily merely phenomenal1 belongs to the form of this phenomenon1 conditioned by the intellect1 and what1 after deducting this1 remains over for the thing in itself4 ,and although no one can discern the thing in itself through the veil of the forms of perception1 on the other hand every one carries it in himself1 indeed is it himself2 therefore in self-consciousness it must be in some way accessible to him1 even though only conditionally4 ,thus the bridge by which metaphysics passes beyond experience is nothing else than that analysis of experience into phenomenon and thing in itself in which ,i have placed ,kant's greatest merit4 ,for it contains the proof of a kernel of the phenomenon different from the phenomenon itself4 ,this can indeed never be entirely separated from the phenomenon and regarded in itself as an ens extramundanum1 but is always known only in its relations to and connections with the phenomenon itself4 ,but the interpretation and explanation of the latter1 in relation to the former1 which is its inner kernel1 is capable of affording us information with regard to it which does not otherwise come into consciousness4 ,in this sense1 then1 metaphysics goes beyond the phenomenon1 i4e41 nature1 to that which is concealed in or behind it 7 71 always regarding it1 however1 merely as that which manifests itself in the phenomenon1 not as independent of all phenomenal appearance2 it therefore remains immanent1 and does not become transcendent4 ,for it never disengages itself entirely from experience1 but remains merely its interpretation and explanation1 since it never speaks of the thing in itself otherwise than in its relation to the phenomenon4 ,this at least is the sense in which ,i1 with reference throughout to the limitations of human knowledge proved by ,kant1 have attempted to solve the problem of metaphysics4 ,therefore his ,prolegomena to future metaphysics will be valid and suitable for mine also4 ,accordingly it never really goes beyond experience1 but only discloses the true understanding of the world which lies before it in experience4 ,it is neither1 according to the definition of metaphysics which even ,kant repeats1 a science of mere conceptions1 nor is it a system of deductions from a priori principles1 the uselessness of which for the end of metaphysics has been shown by ,kant4 ,but it is rational knowledge1 drawn from perception of the external actual world and the information which the most intimate fact of self-consciousness affords us concerning it1 deposited in distinct conceptions4 ,it is accordingly the science of experience2 but its subject and its source is not particular experiences1 but the totality of all experience4 ,i completely accept ,kant's doctrine that the world of experience is merely phenomenal1 and that the a priori knowledge is valid only in relation to phenomena2 but ,i add that just as phenomenal appearance1 it is the manifestation of that which appears1 and with him ,i call this the thing in itself4 ,this must therefore express its nature and character in the world of experience1 and consequently it must be possible to interpret these from this world1 and indeed from the matter1 not the mere form1 of experience4 ,accordingly philosophy is nothing but the correct and universal understanding of experience itself1 the true exposition of its meaning and content4 ,to this the metaphysical1 i4e41 that which is merely clothed in the phenomenon and veiled in its forms1 is that which is related to it as thought to words4 ,such a deciphering of the world with reference to that which manifests itself in it must receive its confirmation from itself1 through the agreement with each other in which it places the very diverse phenomena of the world1 and which without it we do not perceive4 ,if we find a document the alphabet of which is unknown1 we endeavour to make it out until we hit upon an hypothesis as to the significance of the letters in accordance with which they make up comprehensible words and connected sentences4 ,then1 however1 there remains no doubt as to the correctness of the deciphering1 because it is not possible that the agreement and connection in which all the letters of that writing are placed by this explanation is merely accidental1 and that by attributing quite a different value to the letters we could also recognise words and sentences in this arrangement of them4 ,in the same way the deciphering of the world must completely prove itself from itself4 ,it must throw equal light upon all the phenomena of the world1 and also bring the most heterogeneous into agreement1 so that the contradiction between those which are most in contrast may be abolished4 ,this proof from itself is the mark of genuineness4 ,for every false deciphering1 even if it is suitable for some phenomena1 will conflict all the more glaringly with the rest4 ,so1 for example1 the optimism of ,leibnitz conflicts with the palpable misery of existence2 the doctrine of ,spinoza1 that the world is the only possible and absolutely necessary substance1 is incompatible with our wonder at its existence and nature2 the ,wolfian doctrine1 that man obtains his ,existentia and ,essentia from a will foreign to himself1 is contradicted by our moral responsibility for the actions which proceed with strict necessity from these1 in conflict with the motives2 the oft-repeated doctrine of the progressive development of man to an ever higher perfection1 or in general of any kind of becoming by means of the process of the world1 is opposed to the a priori knowledge that at any point of time an infinite time has already run its course1 and consequently all that is supposed to come with time would necessarily have already existed2 and in this way an interminable list might be given of the contradictions of dogmatic assumptions with the given reality of things4 ,on the other hand1 ,i must deny that any doctrine of my philosophy could fairly be added to such a list1 because each of them has been thought out in the presence of the perceived reality1 and none of them has its root in abstract conceptions alone4 ,there is yet in it a fundamental thought which is applied to all the phenomena of the world as their key2 but it proves itself to be the right alphabet at the application of which all words and sentences have sense and significance4 ,the discovered answer to a riddle shows itself to be the right one by the fact that all that is said in the riddle is suitable to it4 ,in the same way my doctrine introduces agreement and connection into the confusion of the contrasting phenomena of this world1 and solves the innumerable contradictions which1 when regarded from any other point of view1 it presents4 ,therefore1 so far1 it is like a sum that comes out right1 yet by no means in the sense that it leaves no problem over to solve1 no possible question unanswered4 ,to assert anything of that sort would be a presumptuous denial of the limits of human knowledge in general4 ,whatever torch we may kindle1 and whatever space it may light1 our horizon will always remain bounded by profound night4 ,for the ultimate solution of the riddle of the world must necessarily be concerned with the things in themselves1 no longer with the phenomena4 ,but all our forms of knowledge are adapted to the phenomena alone2 therefore we must comprehend everything through coexistence1 succession1 and causal relations4 ,these forms1 however1 have meaning and significance only with reference to the phenomenon2 the things in themselves and their possible relations cannot be apprehended by means of those forms4 ,therefore the actual1 positive solution of the riddle of the world must be something that human intellect is absolutely incapable of grasping and thinking2 so that if a being of a higher kind were to come and take all pains to impart it to us1 we would be absolutely incapable of understanding anything of his expositions4 ,those1 therefore1 who profess to know the ultimate1 i4e41 the first ground of things1 thus a primordial being1 an absolute1 or whatever else they choose to call it1 together with the process1 the reasons1 motives1 or whatever it may be1 in consequence of which the world arises from it1 or springs1 or falls1 or is produced1 set in existence1 8discharged10 and ushered forth1 are playing tricks1 are vain boasters1 when indeed they are not charlatans4 ,i regard it as a great excellence of my philosophy that all its truths have been found independently of each other1 by contemplation of the real world2 but their unity and agreement1 about which ,i had been unconcerned1 has always afterwards appeared of itself4 ,hence also it is rich1 and has wide-spreading roots in the ground of perceptible reality1 from which all nourishment of abstract truths springs2 and hence1 again1 it is not wearisome--a quality which1 to judge from the philosophical writings of the last fifty years1 one might regard as essential to philosophy4 ,if1 on the other hand1 all the doctrines of a philosophy are merely deduced the one out of the other1 and ultimately indeed all out of one first principle1 it must be poor and meagre1 and consequently wearisome1 for nothing can follow from a proposition except what it really already says itself4 ,moreover1 in this case everything depends upon the correctness of one proposition1 and by a single mistake in the deduction the truth of the whole would be endangered4 ,still less security is given by the systems which start from an intellectual intuition1 i4e41 a kind of ecstasy or clairvoyance4 ,all knowledge so obtained must be rejected as subjective1 individual1 and consequently problematical4 ,even if it actually existed it would not be communicable1 for only the normal knowledge of the brain is communicable2 if it is abstract1 through conceptions and words2 if purely perceptible or concrete1 through works of art4 ,if1 as so often happens1 metaphysics is reproached with having made so little progress1 it ought also to be considered that no other science has grown up like it under constant oppression1 none has been so hampered and hindered from without as it has always been by the religion of every land1 which1 everywhere in possession of a monopoly of metaphysical knowledge1 regards metaphysics as a weed growing beside it1 as an unlicensed worker1 as a horde of gipsies1 and as a rule tolerates it only under the condition that it accommodates itself to serve and follow it4 ,for where has there ever been true freedom of thought8 ,it has been vaunted sufficiently2 but whenever it wishes to go further than perhaps to differ about the subordinate dogmas of the religion of the country1 a holy shudder seizes the prophets of tolerance1 and they say3 8,not a step further60 ,what progress of metaphysics was possible under such oppression8 ,nay1 this constraint which the privileged metaphysics exercises is not confined to the communication of thoughts1 but extends to thinking itself1 for its dogmas are so firmly imprinted in the tender1 plastic1 trustful1 and thoughtless age of childhood1 with studied solemnity and serious airs1 that from that time forward they grow with the brain1 and almost assume the nature of innate thoughts1 which some philosophers have therefore really held them to be1 and still more have pretended to do so4 ,yet nothing can so firmly resist the comprehension of even the problem of metaphysics as a previous solution of it intruded upon and early implanted in the mind4 ,for the necessary starting-point for all genuine philosophy is the deep feeling of the ,socratic3 8,this one thing ,i know1 that ,i know nothing40 ,the ancients were in this respect in a better position than we are1 for their national religions certainly limited somewhat the imparting of thoughts2 but they did not interfere with the freedom of thought itself1 because they were not formally and solemnly impressed upon children1 and in general were not taken so seriously4 ,therefore in metaphysics the ancients are still our teachers4 ,whenever metaphysics is reproached with its small progress1 and with not having yet reached its goal in spite of such sustained efforts1 one ought further to consider that in the meanwhile it has constantly performed the invaluable service of limiting the boundless claims of the privileged metaphysics1 and yet at the same time combating naturalism and materialism proper1 which are called forth by it as an inevitable reaction4 ,consider to what a pitch the arrogance of the priesthood of every religion would rise if the belief in their doctrines was as firm and blind as they really wish4 ,look back also at the wars1 disturbances1 rebellions1 and revolutions in ,europe from the eighth to the eighteenth century2 how few will be found that have not had as their essence1 or their pretext1 some controversy about beliefs1 thus a metaphysical problem1 which became the occasion of exciting nations against each other4 ,yet is that whole thousand years a continual slaughter1 now on the battlefield1 now on the scaffold1 now in the streets1 in metaphysical interests6 ,i wish ,i had an authentic list of all crimes which ,christianity has really prevented1 and all good deeds it has really performed1 that ,i might be able to place them in the other scale of the balance4 ,lastly1 as regards the obligations of metaphysics1 it has only one2 for it is one which endures no other beside it--the obligation to be true4 ,if one would impose other obligations upon it besides this1 such as to be spiritualistic1 optimistic1 monotheistic1 or even only to be moral1 one cannot know beforehand whether this would not interfere with the fulfilment of that first obligation1 without which all its other achievements must clearly be worthless4 ,a given philosophy has accordingly no other standard of its value than that of truth4 ,for the rest1 philosophy is essentially world-wisdom3 its problem is the world4 ,it has to do with this alone1 and leaves the gods in peace--expects1 however1 in return1 to be left in peace by them4 ,,supplements ,,to ,,the ,,second ,,book4 8,ihr folget falscher ,spur1 ,denkt nicht1 wir scherzen6 ,ist nicht der ,kern der ,natur ,menschen im ,herzen80 --,goethe4 ,chapter ,,xviii47#bi7 ,on ,the ,possibility ,of ,knowing ,the ,thing ,in ,itself4 ,in #ahcf ,i already published1 under the title 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur0 7second ed41 #ahed2 third ed41 #ahfg71 the most essential supplement to this book1 which contains the most peculiar and important step in my philosophy1 the transition from the phenomenon to the thing in itself1 which ,kant gave up as impossible4 ,it would be a great mistake to regard the foreign conclusions with which ,i have there connected my expositions as the real material and subject of that work1 which1 though small as regards its extent1 is of weighty import4 ,these conclusions are rather the mere occasion starting from which ,i have there expounded that fundamental truth of my philosophy with so much greater clearness than anywhere else1 and brought it down to the empirical knowledge of nature4 ,and indeed this is done most exhaustively and stringently under the heading 8,physische ,astronomie20 so that ,i dare not hope ever to find a more correct or accurate expression of that core of my philosophy than is given there4 ,whoever desires to know my philosophy thoroughly and to test it seriously must therefore give attention before everything to that section4 ,thus1 in general1 all that is said in that little work would form the chief content of these supplements1 if it had not to be excluded on account of having preceded them2 but1 on the other hand1 ,i here take for granted that it is known1 for otherwise the very best would be wanting4 ,i wish now first of all to make a few preliminary observations from a general point of view as to the sense in which we can speak of a knowledge of the thing in itself and of its necessary limitation4 ,what is knowledge8 ,it is primarily and essentially idea4 ,what is idea8 ,a very complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal1 the result of which is the consciousness of a picture there4 ,clearly the relation between such a picture and something entirely different from the animal in whose brain it exists can only be a very indirect one4 ,this is perhaps the simplest and most comprehensible way of disclosing the deep gulf between the ideal and the real4 ,this belongs to the things of which1 like the motion of the earth1 we are not directly conscious2 therefore the ancients did not observe it1 just as they did not observe the motion of the earth4 ,once pointed out1 on the other hand1 first by ,descartes1 it has ever since given philosophers no rest4 ,but after ,kant had at last proved in the most thorough manner the complete diversity of the ideal and the real1 it was an attempt1 as bold as it was absurd1 yet perfectly correctly calculated with reference to the philosophical public in ,germany1 and consequently crowned with brilliant results1 to try to assert the absolute identity of the two by dogmatic utterances1 on the strength of a pretended intellectual intuition4 ,in truth1 on the contrary1 a subjective and an objective existence1 a being for self and a being for others1 a consciousness of one's own self1 and a consciousness of other things1 is given us directly1 and the two are given in such a fundamentally different manner that no other difference can compare with this4 ,about himself every one knows directly1 about all others only very indirectly4 ,this is the fact and the problem4 ,whether1 on the other hand1 through further processes in the interior of a brain1 general conceptions 7,universalia7 are abstracted from the perceptible ideas or images that have arisen within it1 for the assistance of further combinations1 whereby knowledge becomes rational1 and is now called thinking--this is here no longer the essential question1 but is of subordinate significance4 ,for all such conceptions receive their content only from the perceptible idea1 which is therefore primary knowledge1 and has consequently alone to be taken account of in an investigation of the relation between the ideal and the real4 ,it therefore shows entire ignorance of the problem1 or at least it is very inept1 to wish to define that relation as that between being and thinking4 ,thinking has primarily only a relation to perceiving1 but perception has a relation to the real being of what is perceived1 and this last is the great problem with which we are here concerned4 ,empirical being1 on the other hand1 as it lies before us1 is nothing else than simply being given in perception2 but the relation of the latter to thinking is no riddle1 for the conceptions1 thus the immediate materials of thought1 are obviously abstracted from perception1 which no reasonable man can doubt4 ,it may be said in passing that one can see how important the choice of expressions in philosophy is from the fact that that inept expression condemned above1 and the misunderstanding which arose from it1 became the foundation of the whole ,hegelian pseudo-philosophy1 which has occupied the ,german public for twenty-five years4 ,if1 however1 it should be said3 8,the perception is itself the knowledge of the thing in itself3 for it is the effect of that which is outside of us1 and as this acts1 so it is3 its action is just its being20 to this we reply3 7#a47 that the law of causality1 as has been sufficiently proved1 is of subjective origin1 as well as the sensation from which the perception arises2 7#b47 that at any rate time and space1 in which the object presents itself1 are of subjective origin2 7#c47 that if the being of the object consists simply in its action1 this means that it consists merely in the changes which it brings about in others2 therefore itself and in itself it is nothing at all4 ,only of matter is it true1 as ,i have said in the text1 and worked out in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 at the end of #ba1 that its being consists in its action1 that it is through and through only causality1 thus is itself causality objectively regarded2 hence1 however1 it is also nothing in itself 7 1 materia mendacium verax71 but as an ingredient in the perceived object1 is a mere abstraction1 which for itself alone can be given in no experience4 ,it will be fully considered later on in a chapter of its own4 ,but the perceived object must be something in itself1 and not merely something for others4 ,for otherwise it would be altogether merely idea1 and we would have an absolute idealism1 which would ultimately become theoretical egoism1 with which all reality disappears and the world becomes a mere subjective phantasm4 ,if1 however1 without further question1 we stop altogether at the world as idea1 then certainly it is all one whether ,i explain objects as ideas in my head or as phenomena exhibiting themselves in time and space2 for time and space themselves exist only in my head4 ,in this sense1 then1 an identity of the ideal and the real might always be affirmed2 only1 after ,kant1 this would not be saying anything new4 ,besides this1 however1 the nature of things and of the phenomenal world would clearly not be thereby exhausted2 but with it we would always remain still upon the ideal side4 ,the real side must be something toto genere different from the world as idea1 it must be that which things are in themselves2 and it is this entire diversity between the ideal and the real which ,kant has proved in the most thorough manner4 ,locke had denied to the senses the knowledge of things as they are in themselves2 but ,kant denied this also to the perceiving understanding1 under which name ,i here comprehend what he calls the pure sensibility1 and1 as it is given a priori1 the law of causality which brings about the empirical perception4 ,not only are both right1 but we can also see quite directly that a contradiction lies in the assertion that a thing is known as it is in and for itself1 i4e41 outside of knowledge4 ,for all knowing is1 as we have said1 essentially a perceiving of ideas2 but my perception of ideas1 just because it is mine1 can never be identical with the inner nature of the thing outside of me4 ,the being in and for itself1 of everything1 must necessarily be subjective2 in the idea of another1 however1 it exists just as necessarily as objective--a difference which can never be fully reconciled4 ,for by it the whole nature of its existence is fundamentally changed2 as objective it presupposes a foreign subject1 as whose idea it exists1 and1 moreover1 as ,kant has shown1 has entered forms which are foreign to its own nature1 just because they belong to that foreign subject1 whose knowledge is only possible by means of them4 ,if ,i1 absorbed in this reflection1 perceive1 let us say lifeless bodies1 of easily surveyed magnitude and regular1 comprehensible form1 and now attempt to conceive this spatial existence1 in its three dimensions1 as their being in itself1 consequently as the existence which to the things is subjective1 the impossibility of the thing is at once apparent to me1 for ,i can never think those objective forms as the being which to the things is subjective1 rather ,i become directly conscious that what ,i there perceive is only a picture produced in my brain1 and existing only for me as the knowing subject1 which cannot constitute the ultimate1 and therefore subjective1 being in and for itself of even these lifeless bodies4 ,but1 on the other hand1 ,i must not assume that even these lifeless bodies exist only in my idea1 but1 since they have inscrutable qualities1 and1 by virtue of these1 activity1 ,i must concede to them a being in itself of some kind4 ,but this very inscrutableness of the properties1 while1 on the one hand1 it certainly points to something which exists independently of our knowledge1 gives also1 on the other hand1 the empirical proof that our knowledge1 because it consists simply in framing ideas by means of subjective forms1 affords us always mere phenomena1 not the true being of things4 ,this is the explanation of the fact that in all that we know there remains hidden from us a certain something1 as quite inscrutable1 and we are obliged to confess that we cannot thoroughly understand even the commonest and simplest phenomena4 ,for it is not merely the highest productions of nature1 living creatures1 or the complicated phenomena of the unorganised world that remain inscrutable to us1 but even every rock-crystal1 every iron-pyrite1 by reason of its crystallographical1 optical1 chemical1 and electrical properties1 is to the searching consideration and investigation an abyss of incomprehensibilities and mysteries4 ,this could not be the case if we knew things as they are in themselves2 for then at least the simpler phenomena1 the path to whose qualities was not barred for us by ignorance1 would necessarily be thoroughly comprehensible to us1 and their whole being and nature would be able to pass over into our knowledge4 ,thus it lies not in the defectiveness of our acquaintance with things1 but in the nature of knowledge itself4 ,for if our perception1 and consequently the whole empirical comprehension of the things that present themselves to us1 is already essentially and in the main determined by our faculty of knowledge1 and conditioned by its forms and functions1 it cannot but be that things exhibit themselves in a manner which is quite different from their own inner nature1 and therefore appear as in a mask1 which allows us merely to assume what is concealed beneath it1 but never to know it2 hence1 then1 it gleams through as an inscrutable mystery1 and never can the nature of anything entire and without reserve pass over into knowledge2 but much less can any real thing be construed a priori1 like a mathematical problem4 ,thus the empirical inscrutableness of all natural things is a proof a posteriori of the ideality and merely phenomenal-actuality of their empirical existence4 ,according to all this1 upon the path of objective knowledge1 hence starting from the idea1 one will never get beyond the idea1 i4e41 the phenomenon4 ,one will thus remain at the outside of things1 and will never be able to penetrate to their inner nature and investigate what they are in themselves1 i4e41 for themselves4 ,so far ,i agree with ,kant4 ,but1 as the counterpart of this truth1 ,i have given prominence to this other truth1 that we are not merely the knowing subject1 but1 in another aspect1 we ourselves also belong to the inner nature that is to be known1 we ourselves are the thing in itself2 that therefore a way from within stands open for us to that inner nature belonging to things themselves1 to which we cannot penetrate from without1 as it were a subterranean passage1 a secret alliance1 which1 as if by treachery1 places us at once within the fortress which it was impossible to take by assault from without4 ,the thing in itself can1 as such1 only come into consciousness quite directly1 in this way1 that it is itself conscious of itself3 to wish to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory4 ,everything objective is idea1 therefore appearance1 mere phenomenon of the brain4 ,kant's chief result may in substance be thus concisely stated3 8,all conceptions which have not at their foundation a perception in space and time 7sensuous intuition71 that is to say then1 which have not been drawn from such a perception1 are absolutely empty1 i4e41 give no knowledge4 ,but since now perception can afford us only phenomena1 not things in themselves1 we have also absolutely no knowledge of things in themselves40 ,i grant this of everything1 with the single exception of the knowledge which each of us has of his own willing3 this is neither a perception 7for all perception is spatial7 nor is it empty2 rather it is more real than any other4 ,further1 it is not a priori1 like merely formal knowledge1 but entirely a posteriori2 hence also we cannot anticipate it in the particular case1 but are hereby often convicted of error concerning ourselves4 ,in fact1 our willing is the one opportunity which we have of understanding from within any event which exhibits itself without1 consequently the one thing which is known to us immediately1 and not1 like all the rest1 merely given in the idea4 ,here1 then1 lies the datum which alone is able to become the key to everything else1 or1 as ,i have said1 the single narrow door to the truth4 ,accordingly we must learn to understand nature from ourselves1 not conversely ourselves from nature4 ,what is known to us immediately must give us the explanation of what we only know indirectly1 not conversely4 ,do we perhaps understand the rolling of a ball when it has received an impulse more thoroughly than our movement when we feel a motive8 ,many may imagine so1 but ,i say it is the reverse4 ,yet we shall attain to the knowledge that what is essential in both the occurrences just mentioned is identical2 although identical in the same way as the lowest audible note of harmony is the same as the note of the same name ten octaves higher4 ,meanwhile it should be carefully observed1 and ,i have always kept it in mind1 that even the inward experience which we have of our own will by no means affords us an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing in itself4 ,this would be the case if it were entirely an immediate experience2 but it is effected in this way3 the will1 with and by means of the corporisation1 provides itself also with an intellect 7for the sake of its relations to the external world71 and through this now knows itself as will in self-consciousness 7the necessary counterpart of the external world72 this knowledge therefore of the thing in itself is not fully adequate4 ,first of all1 it is bound to the form of the idea1 it is apprehension1 and as such falls asunder into subject and object4 ,for even in self-consciousness the ,i is not absolutely simple1 but consists of a knower1 the intellect1 and a known1 the will4 ,the former is not known1 and the latter does not know1 though both unite in the consciousness of an ,i4 ,but just on this account that ,i is not thoroughly intimate with itself1 as it were transparent1 but is opaque1 and therefore remains a riddle to itself1 thus even in inner knowledge there also exists a difference between the true being of its object and the apprehension of it in the knowing subject4 ,yet inner knowledge is free from two forms which belong to outer knowledge1 the form of space and the form of causality1 which is the means of effecting all sense-perception4 ,on the other hand1 there still remains the form of time1 and that of being known and knowing in general4 ,accordingly in this inner knowledge the thing in itself has indeed in great measure thrown off its veil1 but still does not yet appear quite naked4 ,in consequence of the form of time which still adheres to it1 every one knows his will only in its successive acts1 and not as a whole1 in and for itself3 therefore no one knows his character a priori1 but only learns it through experience and always incompletely4 ,but yet the apprehension1 in which we know the affections and acts of our own will1 is far more immediate than any other4 ,it is the point at which the thing in itself most directly enters the phenomenon and is most closely examined by the knowing subject2 therefore the event thus intimately known is alone fitted to become the interpreter of all others4 ,for in every emergence of an act of will from the obscure depths of our inner being into the knowing consciousness a direct transition occurs of the thing in itself1 which lies outside time1 into the phenomenal world4 ,accordingly the act of will is indeed only the closest and most distinct manifestation of the thing in itself2 yet it follows from this that if all other manifestations or phenomena could be known by us as directly and inwardly1 we would be obliged to assert them to be that which the will is in us4 ,thus in this sense ,i teach that the inner nature of everything is will1 and ,i call will the thing in itself4 ,kant's doctrine of the unknowableness of the thing in itself is hereby modified to this extent1 that the thing in itself is only not absolutely and from the very foundation knowable1 that yet by far the most immediate of its phenomena1 which by this immediateness is toto genere distinguished from all the rest1 represents it for us2 and accordingly we have to refer the whole world of phenomena to that one in which the thing in itself appears in the very thinnest of veils1 and only still remains phenomenon in so far as my intellect1 which alone is capable of knowledge1 remains ever distinguished from me as the willing subject1 and moreover does not even in inner perfection put off the form of knowledge of time4 ,accordingly1 even after this last and furthest step1 the question may still be raised1 what that will1 which exhibits itself in the world and as the world1 ultimately and absolutely is in itself8 i4e41 what it is1 regarded altogether apart from the fact that it exhibits itself as will1 or in general appears1 i4e41 in general is known4 ,this question can never be answered3 because1 as we have said1 becoming known is itself the contradictory of being in itself1 and everything that is known is as such only phenomenal4 ,but the possibility of this question shows that the thing in itself1 which we know most directly in the will1 may have1 entirely outside all possible phenomenal appearance1 ways of existing1 determinations1 qualities1 which are absolutely unknowable and incomprehensible to us1 and which remain as the nature of the thing in itself1 when1 as is explained in the fourth book1 it has voluntarily abrogated itself as will1 and has therefore retired altogether from the phenomenon1 and for our knowledge1 i4e41 as regards the world of phenomena1 has passed into empty nothingness4 ,if the will were simply and absolutely the thing in itself this nothing would also be absolute1 instead of which it expressly presents itself to us there as only relative4 ,i now proceed to supplement with a few considerations pertinent to the subject the exposition given both in our second book and in the work 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 of the doctrine that what makes itself known to us in the most immediate knowledge as will is also that which objectifies itself at different grades in all the phenomena of this world2 and ,i shall begin by citing a number of psychological facts which prove that first of all in our own consciousness the will always appears as primary and fundamental1 and throughout asserts its superiority to the intellect1 which1 on the other hand1 always presents itself as secondary1 subordinate1 and conditioned4 ,this proof is the more necessary as all philosophers before me1 from the first to the last1 place the true being or the kernel of man in the knowing consciousness1 and accordingly have conceived and explained the ,i1 or1 in the case of many of them1 its transcendental hypostasis called soul1 as primarily and essentially knowing1 nay1 thinking1 and only in consequence of this1 secondarily and derivatively1 as willing4 ,this ancient and universal radical error1 this enormous and fundamental 1 must before everything be set aside1 and instead of it the true state of the case must be brought to perfectly distinct consciousness4 ,since1 however1 this is done here for the first time1 after thousands of years of philosophising1 some fulness of statement will be appropriate4 ,the remarkable phenomenon1 that in this most essential point all philosophers have erred1 nay1 have exactly reversed the truth1 might1 especially in the case of those of the ,christian era1 be partly explicable from the fact that they all had the intention of presenting man as distinguished as widely as possible from the brutes1 yet at the same time obscurely felt that the difference between them lies in the intellect1 not in the will2 whence there arose unconsciously within them an inclination to make the intellect the essential and principal thing1 and even to explain volition as a mere function of the intellect4 ,hence also the conception of a soul is not only inadmissible1 because it is a transcendent hypostasis1 as is proved by the 8,critique of ,pure ,reason10 but it becomes the source of irremediable errors1 because in its 8simple substance0 it establishes beforehand an indivisible unity of knowledge and will1 the separation of which is just the path to the truth4 ,that conception must therefore appear no more in philosophy1 but may be left to ,german doctors and physiologists1 who1 after they have laid aside scalpel and spattle1 amuse themselves by philosophising with the conceptions they received when they were confirmed4 ,they might certainly try their luck in ,england4 ,the ,french physiologists and zootomists have 7till lately7 kept themselves free from that reproach4 ,the first consequence of their common fundamental error1 which is very inconvenient to all these philosophers1 is this3 since in death the knowing consciousness obviously perishes1 they must either allow death to be the annihilation of the man1 to which our inner being is opposed1 or they must have recourse to the assumption of a continued existence of the knowing consciousness1 which requires a strong faith1 for his own experience has sufficiently proved to every one the thorough and complete dependence of the knowing consciousness upon the brain1 and one can just as easily believe in digestion without a stomach as in a knowing consciousness without a brain4 ,my philosophy alone leads out of this dilemma1 for it for the first time places the true being of man not in the consciousness but in the will1 which is not essentially bound up with consciousness1 but is related to consciousness1 i4e41 to knowledge1 as substance to accident1 as something illuminated to the light1 as the string to the resounding-board1 and which enters consciousness from within as the corporeal world does from without4 ,now we can comprehend the indestructibleness of this our real kernel and true being1 in spite of the evident ceasing of consciousness in death1 and the corresponding non-existence of it before birth4 ,for the intellect is as perishable as the brain1 whose product or rather whose action it is4 ,but the brain1 like the whole organism1 is the product or phenomenon1 in short1 the subordinate of the will1 which alone is imperishable4 ,chapter ,,xix47#cj7 ,on ,the ,primacy ,of ,the ,will ,in ,self-,consciousness4 ,the will1 as the thing in itself1 constitutes the inner1 true1 and indestructible nature of man2 in itself1 however1 it is unconscious4 ,for consciousness is conditioned by the intellect1 and the intellect is a mere accident of our being2 for it is a function of the brain1 which1 together with the nerves and spinal cord connected with it1 is a mere fruit1 a product1 nay1 so far1 a parasite of the rest of the organism2 for it does not directly enter into its inner constitution1 but merely serves the end of self-preservation by regulating the relations of the organism to the external world4 ,the organism itself1 on the other hand1 is the visibility1 the objectivity1 of the individual will1 the image of it as it presents itself in that very brain 7which in the first book we learned to recognise as the condition of the objective world in general71 therefore also brought about by its forms of knowledge1 space1 time1 and causality1 and consequently presenting itself as extended1 successively acting1 and material1 i4e41 as something operative or efficient4 ,the members are both directly felt and also perceived by means of the senses only in the brain4 ,according to this one may say3 ,the intellect is the secondary phenomenon2 the organism the primary phenomenon1 that is1 the immediate manifestation of the will2 the will is metaphysical1 the intellect physical2--the intellect1 like its objects1 is merely phenomenal appearance2 the will alone is the thing in itself4 ,then1 in a more and more figurative sense1 thus by way of simile3 ,the will is the substance of man1 the intellect the accident2 the will is the matter1 the intellect is the form2 the will is warmth1 the intellect is light4 ,we shall now first of all verify and also elucidate this thesis by the following facts connected with the inner life of man2 and on this opportunity perhaps more will be done for the knowledge of the inner man than is to be found in many systematic psychologies4 #a4 ,not only the consciousness of other things1 i4e41 the apprehension of the external world1 but also self-consciousness1 contains1 as was mentioned already above1 a knower and a known2 otherwise it would not be consciousness4 ,for consciousness consists in knowing2 but knowing requires a knower and a known2 therefore there could be no self-consciousness if there were not in it also a known opposed to the knower and different from it4 ,as there can be no object without a subject1 so also there can be no subject without an object1 i4e41 no knower without something different from it which is known4 ,therefore a consciousness which is through and through pure intelligence is impossible4 ,the intelligence is like the sun1 which does not illuminate space if there is no object from which its rays are reflected4 ,the knower himself1 as such1 cannot be known2 otherwise he would be the known of another knower4 ,but now1 as the known in self-consciousness we find exclusively the will4 ,for not merely willing and purposing in the narrowest sense1 but also all striving1 wishing1 shunning1 hoping1 fearing1 loving1 hating1 in short1 all that directly constitutes our own weal and woe1 desire and aversion1 is clearly only affection of the will1 is a moving1 a modification of willing and not-willing1 is just that which1 if it takes outward effect1 exhibits itself as an act of will proper47#ca7 ,in all knowledge1 however1 the known is first and essential1 not the knower2 for the former is the 1 the latter the 4 ,therefore in self-consciousness also the known1 thus the will1 must be what is first and original2 the knower1 on the other hand1 only what is secondary1 that which has been added1 the mirror4 ,they are related very much as the luminous to the reflecting body2 or1 again1 as the vibrating strings to the resounding-board1 in which case the note produced would be consciousness4 ,we may also regard the plant as a like symbol of consciousness4 ,it has1 we know1 two poles1 the root and the corona3 the former struggling into darkness1 moisture1 and cold1 the latter into light1 dryness1 and warmth2 then1 as the point of indifference of the two poles1 where they part asunder1 close to the ground1 the collum 7rhizoma1 le collet74 ,the root is what is essential1 original1 perennial1 the death of which involves that of the corona1 is thus the primary2 the corona1 on the other hand1 is the ostensible1 but it has sprung from something else1 and it passes away without the root dying2 it is thus secondary4 ,the root represents the will1 the corona the intellect1 and the point of indifference of the two1 the collum1 would be the ,i1 which1 as their common termination1 belongs to both4 ,this ,i is the pro tempore identical subject of knowing and willing1 whose identity ,i called in my very first essay 7on the principle of sufficient reason71 and in my first philosophical wonder1 the miracle 4 ,it is the temporal starting-point and connecting-link of the whole phenomenon1 i4e41 of the objectification of the will3 it conditions indeed the phenomenon1 but is also conditioned by it4 ,this comparison may even be carried to the individual nature of men4 ,as a large corona commonly springs only from a large root1 so the greatest intellectual capabilities are only found in connection with a vehement and passionate will4 ,a genius of a phlegmatic character and weak passions would resemble those succulent plants that1 with a considerable corona consisting of thick leaves1 have very small roots2 will not1 however1 be found4 ,that vehemence of will and passionateness of character are conditions of heightened intelligence exhibits itself physiologically through the fact that the activity of the brain is conditioned by the movement which the great arteries running towards the basis cerebri impart to it with each pulsation2 therefore an energetic pulse1 and even1 according to ,bichat1 a short neck1 is a requisite of great activity of the brain4 ,but the opposite of the above certainly occurs3 vehement desires1 passionate1 violent character1 along with weak intellect1 i4e41 a small brain of bad conformation in a thick skull4 ,this is a phenomenon as common as it is repulsive3 we might perhaps compare it to beetroot4 #b4 ,but in order not merely to describe consciousness figuratively1 but to know it thoroughly1 we have first of all to find out what appears in the same way in every consciousness1 and therefore1 as the common and constant element1 will also be the essential4 ,then we shall consider what distinguishes one consciousness from another1 which accordingly will be the adventitious and secondary element4 ,consciousness is positively only known to us as a property of animal nature2 therefore we must not1 and indeed cannot1 think of it otherwise than as animal consciousness1 so that this expression is tautological4 ,now1 that which in every animal consciousness1 even the most imperfect and the weakest1 is always present1 nay1 lies at its foundation1 is an immediate sense of longing1 and of the alternate satisfaction and non-satisfaction of it1 in very different degrees4 ,this we know to a certain extent a priori4 ,for marvellously different as the innumerable species of animals are1 and strange as some new form1 never seen before1 appears to us1 we yet assume beforehand its inmost nature1 with perfect certainty1 as well known1 and indeed fully confided to us4 ,we know that the animal wills1 indeed also what it wills1 existence1 well-being1 life1 and propagation2 and since in this we presuppose with perfect certainty identity with us1 we do not hesitate to attribute to it unchanged all the affections of will which we know in ourselves1 and speak at once of its desire1 aversion1 fear1 anger1 hatred1 love1 joy1 sorrow1 longing1 c4 ,on the other hand1 whenever phenomena of mere knowledge come to be spoken of we fall at once into uncertainty4 ,we do not venture to say that the animal conceives1 thinks1 judges1 knows3 we only attribute to it with certainty ideas in general2 because without them its will could not have those emotions referred to above4 ,but with regard to the definite manner of knowing of the brutes and the precise limits of it in a given species1 we have only indefinite conceptions1 and make conjectures4 ,hence our understanding with them is also often difficult1 and is only brought about by skill1 in consequence of experience and practice4 ,here then lie distinctions of consciousness4 ,on the other hand1 a longing1 desiring1 wishing1 or a detesting1 shunning1 and not wishing1 is proper to every consciousness3 man has it in common with the polyp4 ,this is accordingly the essential element in and the basis of every consciousness4 ,the difference of the manifestations of this in the different species of animal beings depends upon the various extension of their sphere of knowledge1 in which the motives of those manifestations lie4 ,we understand directly from our own nature all actions and behaviour of the brutes which express movements of the will2 therefore1 so far1 we sympathise with them in various ways4 ,on the other hand1 the gulf between us and them results simply and solely from the difference of intellect4 ,the gulf which lies between a very sagacious brute and a man of very limited capacity is perhaps not much greater than that which exists between a blockhead and a man of genius2 therefore here also the resemblance between them in another aspect1 which springs from the likeness of their inclinations and emotions1 and assimilates them again to each other1 sometimes appears with surprising prominence1 and excites astonishment4 ,this consideration makes it clear that in all animal natures the will is what is primary and substantial1 the intellect again is secondary1 adventitious1 indeed a mere tool for the service of the former1 and is more or less complete and complicated1 according to the demands of this service4 ,as a species of animals is furnished with hoofs1 claws1 hands1 wings1 horns1 or teeth according to the aims of its will1 so also is it furnished with a more or less developed brain1 whose function is the intelligence necessary for its endurance4 ,the more complicated the organisation becomes1 in the ascending series of animals1 the more numerous also are its wants1 and the more varied and specially determined the objects which are capable of satisfying them2 hence the more complicated and distant the paths by which these are to be obtained1 which must now be all known and found3 therefore in the same proportion the ideas of the animal must be more versatile1 accurate1 definite1 and connected1 and also its attention must be more highly strung1 more sustained1 and more easily roused1 consequently its intellect must be more developed and perfect4 ,accordingly we see the organ of intelligence1 the cerebral system1 together with all the organs of sense1 keep pace with the increasing wants and the complication of the organism2 and the increase of the part of consciousness that has to do with ideas 7as opposed to the willing part7 exhibits itself in a bodily form in the ever-increasing proportion of the brain in general to the rest of the nervous system1 and of the cerebrum to the cerebellum2 for 7according to ,flourens7 the former is the workshop of ideas1 while the latter is the disposer and orderer of movements4 ,the last step which nature has taken in this respect is1 however1 disproportionately great4 ,for in man not only does the faculty of ideas of perception1 which alone existed hitherto1 reach the highest degree of perfection1 but the abstract idea1 thought1 i4e41 reason1 and with it reflection1 is added4 ,through this important advance of the intellect1 thus of the secondary part of consciousness1 it now gains a preponderance over the primary part1 in so far as it becomes henceforward the predominantly active part4 ,while in the brute the immediate sense of its satisfied or unsatisfied desire constitutes by far the most important part of its consciousness1 and the more so indeed the lower the grade of the animal1 so that the lowest animals are only distinguished from plants by the addition of a dull idea1 in man the opposite is the case4 ,vehement as are his desires1 even more vehement than those of any brute1 rising to the level of passions1 yet his consciousness remains continuously and predominantly occupied and filled with ideas and thoughts4 ,without doubt this has been the principal occasion of that fundamental error of all philosophers on account of which they make thought that which is essential and primary in the so-called soul1 i4e41 in the inner or spiritual life of man1 always placing it first1 but will1 as a mere product of thought1 they regard as only a subordinate addition and consequence of it4 ,but if willing merely proceeded from knowing1 how could the brutes1 even the lower grades of them1 with so very little knowledge1 often show such an unconquerable and vehement will8 ,accordingly1 since that fundamental error of the philosophers makes1 as it were1 the accident the substance1 it leads them into mistaken paths1 which there is afterwards no way of getting out of4 ,now this relative predominance of the knowing consciousness over the desiring1 consequently of the secondary part over the primary1 which appears in man1 may1 in particular exceptionally favoured individuals1 go so far that at the moments of its highest ascendancy1 the secondary or knowing part of consciousness detaches itself altogether from the willing part1 and passes into free activity for itself1 i4e41 untouched by the will1 and consequently no longer serving it4 ,thus it becomes purely objective1 and the clear mirror of the world1 and from it the conceptions of genius then arise1 which are the subject of our third book4 #c4 ,if we run through the series of grades of animals downwards1 we see the intellect always becoming weaker and less perfect1 but we by no means observe a corresponding degradation of the will4 ,rather it retains everywhere its identical nature and shows itself in the form of great attachment to life1 care for the individual and the species1 egoism and regardlessness of all others1 together with the emotions that spring from these4 ,even in the smallest insect the will is present1 complete and entire2 it wills what it wills as decidedly and completely as the man4 ,the difference lies merely in what it wills1 i4e41 in the motives1 which1 however1 are the affair of the intellect4 ,it indeed1 as the secondary part of consciousness1 and bound to the bodily organism1 has innumerable degrees of completeness1 and is in general essentially limited and imperfect4 ,the will1 on the contrary1 as original and the thing in itself1 can never be imperfect1 but every act of will is all that it can be4 ,on account of the simplicity which belongs to the will as the thing in itself1 the metaphysical in the phenomenon1 its nature admits of no degrees1 but is always completely itself4 ,only its excitement has degrees1 from the weakest inclination to the passion1 and also its susceptibility to excitement1 thus its vehemence from the phlegmatic to the choleric temperament4 ,the intellect1 on the other hand1 has not merely degrees of excitement1 from sleepiness to being in the vein1 and inspiration1 but also degrees of its nature1 of the completeness of this1 which accordingly rises gradually from the lowest animals1 which can only obscurely apprehend1 up to man1 and here again from the fool to the genius4 ,the will alone is everywhere completely itself4 ,for its function is of the utmost simplicity2 it consists in willing and not willing1 which goes on with the greatest ease1 without effort1 and requires no practice4 ,knowing1 on the contrary1 has multifarious functions1 and never takes place entirely without effort1 which is required to fix the attention and to make clear the object1 and at a higher stage is certainly needed for thinking and deliberation2 therefore it is also capable of great improvement through exercise and education4 ,if the intellect presents a simple1 perceptible object to the will1 the latter expresses at once its approval or disapproval of it1 and this even if the intellect has laboriously inquired and pondered1 in order from numerous data1 by means of difficult combinations1 ultimately to arrive at the conclusion as to which of the two seems to be most in conformity with the interests of the will4 ,the latter has meanwhile been idly resting1 and when the conclusion is arrived at it enters1 as the ,sultan enters the ,divan1 merely to express again its monotonous approval or disapproval1 which certainly may vary in degree1 but in its nature remains always the same4 ,this fundamentally different nature of the will and the intellect1 the essential simplicity and originality of the former1 in contrast to the complicated and secondary character of the latter1 becomes still more clear to us if we observe their remarkable interaction within us1 and now consider in the particular case1 how the images and thoughts which arise in the intellect move the will1 and how entirely separated and different are the parts which the two play4 ,we can indeed perceive this even in actual events which excite the will in a lively manner1 while primarily and in themselves they are merely objects of the intellect4 ,but1 on the one hand1 it is here not so evident that this reality primarily existed only in the intellect2 and1 on the other hand1 the change does not generally take place so rapidly as is necessary if the thing is to be easily surveyed1 and thereby become thoroughly comprehensible4 ,both of these conditions1 however1 are fulfilled if it is merely thoughts and phantasies which we allow to act on the will4 ,if1 for example1 alone with ourselves1 we think over our personal circumstances1 and now perhaps vividly present to ourselves the menace of an actually present danger and the possibility of an unfortunate issue1 anxiety at once compresses the heart1 and the blood ceases to circulate in the veins4 ,but if then the intellect passes to the possibility of an opposite issue1 and lets the imagination picture the long hoped for happiness thereby attained1 all the pulses quicken at once with joy and the heart feels light as a feather1 till the intellect awakes from its dream4 ,thereupon1 suppose that an occasion should lead the memory to an insult or injury once suffered long ago1 at once anger and bitterness pour into the breast that was but now at peace4 ,but then arises1 called up by accident1 the image of a long-lost love1 with which the whole romance and its magic scenes is connected2 then that anger will at once give place to profound longing and sadness4 ,finally1 if there occurs to us some former humiliating incident1 we shrink together1 would like to sink out of sight1 blush with shame1 and often try forcibly to distract and divert our thoughts by some loud exclamation1 as if to scare some evil spirit4 ,one sees1 the intellect plays1 and the will must dance to it4 ,indeed the intellect makes the will play the part of a child which is alternately thrown at pleasure into joyful or sad moods by the chatter and tales of its nurse4 ,this depends upon the fact that the will is itself without knowledge1 and the understanding which is given to it is without will4 ,therefore the former is like a body which is moved1 the latter like the causes which set it in motion1 for it is the medium of motives4 ,yet in all this the primacy of the will becomes clear again1 if this will1 which1 as we have shown1 becomes the sport of the intellect as soon as it allows the latter to control it1 once makes its supremacy in the last instance felt by prohibiting the intellect from entertaining certain ideas1 absolutely preventing certain trains of thought from arising1 because it knows1 i4e41 learns from that very intellect1 that they would awaken in it some one of the emotions set forth above4 ,it now bridles the intellect1 and compels it to turn to other things4 ,hard as this often may be1 it must yet be accomplished as soon as the will is in earnest about it1 for the resistance in this case does not proceed from the intellect1 which always remains indifferent1 but from the will itself1 which in one respect has an inclination towards an idea that in another respect it abhors4 ,it is in itself interesting to the will simply because it excites it1 but at the same time abstract knowledge tells it that this idea will aimlessly cause it a shock of painful or unworthy emotion3 it now decides in conformity with this abstract knowledge1 and compels the obedience of the intellect4 ,this is called 8being master of oneself40 ,clearly the master here is the will1 the servant the intellect1 for in the last instance the will always keeps the upper hand1 and therefore constitutes the true core1 the inner being of man4 ,in this respect the title would belong to the will2 yet it seems1 on the other hand1 to apply to the intellect1 because it is the leader and guide1 like the valet de place who conducts a stranger4 ,in truth1 however1 the happiest figure of the relation of the two is the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders the lame man who can see4 ,the relation of the will to the intellect here explained may also be further recognised in the fact that the intellect is originally entirely a stranger to the purposes of the will4 ,it supplies the motives to the will1 but it only learns afterwards1 completely a posteriori1 how they have affected it1 as one who makes a chemical experiment applies the reagents and awaits the result4 ,indeed the intellect remains so completely excluded from the real decisions and secret purposes of its own will that sometimes it can only learn them like those of a stranger1 by spying upon them and surprising them1 and must catch the will in the act of expressing itself in order to get at its real intentions4 ,for example1 ,i have conceived a plan1 about which1 however1 ,i have still some scruple1 but the feasibleness of which1 as regards its possibility1 is completely uncertain1 for it depends upon external and still undecided circumstances4 ,it would therefore certainly be unnecessary to come to a decision about it at present1 and so for the time ,i leave the matter as it is4 ,now in such a case ,i often do not know how firmly ,i am already attached to that plan in secret1 and how much1 in spite of the scruple1 ,i wish to carry it out3 that is1 my intellect does not know4 ,but now only let me receive news that it is practicable1 at once there rises within me a jubilant1 irresistible gladness1 that passes through my whole being and takes permanent possession of it1 to my own astonishment4 ,for now my intellect learns for the first time how firmly my will had laid hold of that plan1 and how thoroughly the plan suited it1 while the intellect had regarded it as entirely problematical1 and had with difficulty been able to overcome that scruple4 ,or in another case1 ,i have entered eagerly into a contract which ,i believed to be very much in accordance with my wishes4 ,but as the matter progresses the disadvantages and burdens of it are felt1 and ,i begin to suspect that ,i even repent of what ,i so eagerly pursued2 yet ,i rid myself of this feeling by assuring myself that even if ,i were not bound ,i would follow the same course4 ,now1 however1 the contract is unexpectedly broken by the other side1 and ,i perceive with astonishment that this happens to my great satisfaction and relief4 ,often we don't know what we wish or what we fear4 ,we may entertain a wish for years without even confessing it to ourselves1 or even allowing it to come to clear consciousness2 for the intellect must know nothing about it1 because the good opinion which we have of ourselves might thereby suffer4 ,but if it is fulfilled we learn from our joy1 not without shame1 that we have wished this4 ,for example1 the death of a near relation whose heir we are4 ,and sometimes we do not know what we really fear1 because we lack the courage to bring it to distinct consciousness4 ,indeed we are often in error as to the real motive from which we have done something or left it undone1 till at last perhaps an accident discovers to us the secret1 and we know that what we have held to be the motive was not the true one1 but another which we had not wished to confess to ourselves1 because it by no means accorded with the good opinion we entertained of ourselves4 ,for example1 we refrain from doing something on purely moral grounds1 as we believe1 but afterwards we discover that we were only restrained by fear1 for as soon as all danger is removed we do it4 ,in particular cases this may go so far that a man does not even guess the true motive of his action1 nay1 does not believe himself capable of being influenced by such a motive2 and yet it is the true motive of his action4 ,we may remark in passing that in all this we have a confirmation and explanation of the rule of ,larochefoucauld3 8,l'amour-propre est plus habile que le plus habile homme du monde20 nay1 even a commentary on the ,delphic and its difficulty4 ,if now1 on the contrary1 as all philosophers imagine1 the intellect constituted our true nature and the purposes of the will were a mere result of knowledge1 then only the motive from which we imagined that we acted would be decisive of our moral worth2 in analogy with the fact that the intention1 not the result1 is in this respect decisive4 ,but really then the distinction between imagined and true motive would be impossible4 ,thus all cases here set forth1 to which every one who pays attention may observe analogous cases in himself1 show us how the intellect is so strange to the will that it is sometimes even mystified by it3 for it indeed supplies it with motives1 but does not penetrate into the secret workshop of its purposes4 ,it is indeed a confidant of the will1 but a confidant that is not told everything4 ,this is also further confirmed by the fact1 which almost every one will some time have the opportunity of observing in himself1 that sometimes the intellect does not thoroughly trust the will4 ,if we have formed some great and bold purpose1 which as such is yet really only a promise made by the will to the intellect1 there often remains within us a slight unconfessed doubt whether we are quite in earnest about it1 whether in carrying it out we will not waver or draw back1 but will have sufficient firmness and persistency to fulfil it4 ,it therefore requires the deed to convince us ourselves of the sincerity of the purpose4 ,all these facts prove the absolute difference of the will and the intellect1 the primacy of the former and the subordinate position of the latter4 #d4 ,the intellect becomes tired2 the will is never tired4 ,after sustained work with the head we feel the tiredness of the brain1 just like that of the arm after sustained bodily work4 ,all knowing is accompanied with effort2 willing1 on the contrary1 is our very nature1 whose manifestations take place without any weariness and entirely of their own accord4 ,therefore1 if our will is strongly excited1 as in all emotions1 thus in anger1 fear1 desire1 grief1 c41 and we are now called upon to know1 perhaps with the view of correcting the motives of that emotion1 the violence which we must do ourselves for this purpose is evidence of the transition from the original natural activity proper to ourselves to the derived1 indirect1 and forced activity4 ,for the will alone is 1 and therefore 7lassitudinis et senii expers in sempiternum74 ,it alone is active without being called upon1 and therefore often too early and too much1 and it knows no weariness4 ,infants who scarcely show the first weak trace of intelligence are already full of self-will3 through unlimited1 aimless roaring and shrieking they show the pressure of will with which they swell1 while their willing has yet no object1 i4e41 they will without knowing what they will4 ,what ,cabanis has observed is also in point here3 8,toutes ces passions1 qui se succdent d'une mannire si rapide1 et se peignent avec tant de navet1 sur le visage mobile des enfants4 ,tandis que les faibles muscles de leurs bras et de leurs jambes savent encore a peine former quelque mouvemens indcis1 les muscles de la face expriment dj par des mouvemens distincts presque toute la suite des affections gnrales propres a la nature humaine3 et l'observateur attentif reconnait facilement dans ce tableau les traits caractristiques de l'homme futur0 7,rapports du ,physique et ,moral1 vol4 i4 p4 #abc74 ,the intellect1 on the contrary1 develops slowly1 following the completion of the brain and the maturity of the whole organism1 which are its conditions1 just because it is merely a somatic function4 ,it is because the brain attains its full size in the seventh year that from that time forward children become so remarkably intelligent1 inquisitive1 and reasonable4 ,but then comes puberty2 to a certain extent it affords a support to the brain1 or a resounding-board1 and raises the intellect at once by a large step1 as it were by an octave1 corresponding to the lowering of the voice by that amount4 ,but at once the animal desires and passions that now appear resist the reasonableness that has hitherto prevailed and to which they have been added4 ,further evidence is given of the indefatigable nature of the will by the fault which is1 more or less1 peculiar to all men by nature1 and is only overcome by education--precipitation4 ,it consists in this1 that the will hurries to its work before the time4 ,this work is the purely active and executive part1 which ought only to begin when the explorative and deliberative part1 thus the work of knowing1 has been completely and thoroughly carried out4 ,but this time is seldom waited for4 ,scarcely are a few data concerning the circumstances before us1 or the event that has occurred1 or the opinion of others conveyed to us1 superficially comprehended and hastily gathered together by knowledge1 than from the depths of our being the will1 always ready and never weary1 comes forth unasked1 and shows itself as terror1 fear1 hope1 joy1 desire1 envy1 grief1 zeal1 anger1 or courage1 and leads to rash words and deeds1 which are generally followed by repentance when time has taught us that the hegemonicon1 the intellect1 has not been able to finish half its work of comprehending the circumstances1 reflecting on their connection1 and deciding what is prudent1 because the will did not wait for it1 but sprang forward long before its time with 8,now it is my turn60 and at once began the active work1 without the intellect being able to resist1 as it is a mere slave and bondman of the will1 and not1 like it1 1 nor active from its own power and its own impulse2 therefore it is easily pushed aside and silenced by a nod of the will1 while on its part it is scarcely able1 with the greatest efforts1 to bring the will even to a brief pause1 in order to speak4 ,this is why the people are so rare1 and are found almost only among ,spaniards1 ,turks1 and perhaps ,englishmen1 who even under circumstances of provocation keep the head uppermost1 imperturbably proceed to comprehend and investigate the state of affairs1 and when others would already be beside themselves1 con mucho sosiego1 still ask further questions1 which is something quite different from the indifference founded upon apathy and stupidity of many ,germans and ,dutchmen4 ,iffland used to give an excellent representation of this admirable quality1 as ,hetmann of the ,cossacks1 in ,benjowski1 when the conspirators have enticed him into their tent and hold a rifle to his head1 with the warning that they will fire it if he utters a cry1 ,iffland blew into the mouth of the rifle to try whether it was loaded4 ,of ten things that annoy us1 nine would not be able to do so if we understood them thoroughly in their causes1 and therefore knew their necessity and true nature2 but we would do this much oftener if we made them the object of reflection before making them the object of wrath and indignation4 ,for what bridle and bit are to an unmanageable horse the intellect is for the will in man2 by this bridle it must be controlled by means of instruction1 exhortation1 culture1 c41 for in itself it is as wild and impetuous an impulse as the force that appears in the descending waterfall1 nay1 as we know1 it is at bottom identical with this4 ,in the height of anger1 in intoxication1 in despair1 it has taken the bit between its teeth1 has run away1 and follows its original nature4 ,in the ,mania sine delirio it has lost bridle and bit altogether1 and shows now most distinctly its original nature1 and that the intellect is as different from it as the bridle from the horse4 ,in this condition it may also be compared to a clock which1 when a certain screw is taken away1 runs down without stopping4 ,thus this consideration also shows us the will as that which is original1 and therefore metaphysical2 the intellect1 on the other hand1 as something subordinate and physical4 ,for as such the latter is1 like everything physical1 subject to vis inerti1 consequently only active if it is set agoing by something else1 the will1 which rules it1 manages it1 rouses it to effort1 in short1 imparts to it the activity which does not originally reside in it4 ,therefore it willingly rests whenever it is permitted to do so1 often declares itself lazy and disinclined to activity2 through continued effort it becomes weary to the point of complete stupefaction1 is exhausted1 like the voltaic pile1 through repeated shocks4 ,hence all continuous mental work demands pauses and rest1 otherwise stupidity and incapacity ensue1 at first of course only temporarily2 but if this rest is persistently denied to the intellect it will become excessively and continuously fatigued1 and the consequence is a permanent deterioration of it1 which in an old man may pass into complete incapacity1 into childishness1 imbecility1 and madness4 ,it is not to be attributed to age in and for itself1 but to long-continued tyrannical over-exertion of the intellect or brain1 if this misfortune appears in the last years of life4 ,this is the explanation of the fact that ,swift became mad1 ,kant became childish1 ,walter ,scott1 and also ,wordsworth1 ,southey1 and many minorum gentium1 became dull and incapable4 ,goethe remained to the end clear1 strong1 and active-minded1 because he1 who was always a man of the world and a courtier1 never carried on his mental occupations with self-compulsion4 ,the same holds good of ,wieland and of ,kuebel1 who lived to the age of ninety-one1 and also of ,voltaire4 ,now all this proves how very subordinate and physical and what a mere tool the intellect is4 ,just on this account it requires1 during almost a third part of its lifetime1 the entire suspension of its activity in sleep1 i4e41 the rest of the brain1 of which it is the mere function1 and which therefore just as truly precedes it as the stomach precedes digestion1 or as a body precedes its impulsion1 and with which in old age it flags and decays4 ,the will1 on the contrary1 as the thing in itself1 is never lazy1 is absolutely untiring1 its activity is its essence1 it never ceases willing1 and when1 during deep sleep1 it is forsaken of the intellect1 and therefore cannot act outwardly in accordance with motives1 it is active as the vital force1 cares the more uninterruptedly for the inner economy of the organism1 and as vis natur medicatrix sets in order again the irregularities that have crept into it4 ,for it is not1 like the intellect1 a function of the body2 but the body is its function2 therefore it is1 ordine rerum1 prior to the body1 as its metaphysical substratum1 as the in-itself of its phenomenal appearance4 ,it shares its unwearying nature1 for the time that life lasts1 with the heart1 that primum mobile of the organism1 which has therefore become its symbol and synonym4 ,moreover1 it does not disappear in the old man1 but still continues to will what it has willed1 and indeed becomes firmer1 more inflexible1 than it was in youth1 more implacable1 self-willed1 and unmanageable1 because the intellect has become less susceptible3 therefore in old age the man can perhaps only be matched by taking advantage of the weakness of his intellect4 ,moreover1 the prevailing weakness and imperfection of the intellect1 as it is shown in the want of judgment1 narrow-mindedness1 perversity1 and folly of the great majority of men1 would be quite inexplicable if the intellect were not subordinate1 adventitious1 and merely instrumental1 but the immediate and original nature of the so-called soul1 or in general of the inner man3 as all philosophers have hitherto assumed it to be4 ,for how could the original nature in its immediate and peculiar function so constantly err and fail8 ,the truly original in human consciousness1 the willing1 always goes on with perfect success2 every being wills unceasingly1 capably1 and decidedly4 ,to regard the immorality in the will as an imperfection of it would be a fundamentally false point of view4 ,for morality has rather a source which really lies above nature1 and therefore its utterances are in contradiction with it4 ,therefore morality is in direct opposition to the natural will1 which in itself is completely egoistic2 indeed the pursuit of the path of morality leads to the abolition of the will4 ,on this subject ,i refer to our fourth book and to my prize essay1 8,ueber das ,fundament der ,moral40 #e4 ,that the will is what is real and essential in man1 and the intellect only subordinate1 conditioned1 and produced1 is also to be seen in the fact that the latter can carry on its function with perfect purity and correctness only so long as the will is silent and pauses4 ,on the other hand1 the function of the intellect is disturbed by every observable excitement of the will1 and its result is falsified by the intermixture of the latter2 but the converse does not hold1 that the intellect should in the same way be a hindrance to the will4 ,thus the moon cannot shine when the sun is in the heavens1 but when the moon is in the heavens it does not prevent the sun from shining4 ,a great fright often deprives us of our senses to such an extent that we are petrified1 or else do the most absurd things2 for example1 when fire has broken out run right into the flames4 ,anger makes us no longer know what we do1 still less what we say4 ,zeal1 therefore called blind1 makes us incapable of weighing the arguments of others1 or even of seeking out and setting in order our own4 ,joy makes us inconsiderate1 reckless1 and foolhardy1 and desire acts almost in the same way4 ,fear prevents us from seeing and laying hold of the resources that are still present1 and often lie close beside us4 ,therefore for overcoming sudden dangers1 and also for fighting with opponents and enemies1 the most essential qualifications are coolness and presence of mind4 ,the former consists in the silence of the will so that the intellect can act2 the latter in the undisturbed activity of the intellect under the pressure of events acting on the will2 therefore the former is the condition of the latter1 and the two are nearly related2 they are seldom to be found1 and always only in a limited degree4 ,but they are of inestimable advantage1 because they permit the use of the intellect just at those times when we stand most in need of it1 and therefore confer decided superiority4 ,he who is without them only knows what he should have done or said when the opportunity has passed4 ,it is very appropriately said of him who is violently moved1 i4e41 whose will is so strongly excited that it destroys the purity of the function of the intellect1 he is disarmed2 for the correct knowledge of the circumstances and relations is our defence and weapon in the conflict with things and with men4 ,in this sense ,balthazar ,gracian says3 8,es la passion enemiga declarada de la cordura0 7,passion is the declared enemy of prudence74 ,if now the intellect were not something completely different from the will1 but1 as has been hitherto supposed1 knowing and willing had the same root1 and were equally original functions of an absolutely simple nature1 then with the rousing and heightening of the will1 in which the emotion consists1 the intellect would necessarily also be heightened2 but1 as we have seen1 it is rather hindered and depressed by this2 whence the ancients called emotion animi perturbatio4 ,the intellect is really like the reflecting surface of water1 but the water itself is like the will1 whose disturbance therefore at once destroys the clearness of that mirror and the distinctness of its images4 ,the organism is the will itself1 is embodied will1 i4e41 will objectively perceived in the brain4 ,therefore many of its functions1 such as respiration1 circulation1 secretion of bile1 and muscular power1 are heightened and accelerated by the pleasurable1 and in general the healthy1 emotions4 ,the intellect1 on the other hand1 is the mere function of the brain1 which is only nourished and supported by the organism as a parasite4 ,therefore every perturbation of the will1 and with it of the organism1 must disturb and paralyse the function of the brain1 which exists for itself and for no other wants than its own1 which are simply rest and nourishment4 ,but this disturbing influence of the activity of the will upon the intellect can be shown1 not only in the perturbations brought about by emotions1 but also in many other1 more gradual1 and therefore more lasting falsifications of thought by our inclinations4 ,hope makes us regard what we wish1 and fear what we are apprehensive of1 as probable and near1 and both exaggerate their object4 ,plato 7according to lian1 ,v4,h41 #ac1 #bh7 very beautifully called hope the dream of the waking4 ,its nature lies in this1 that the will1 when its servant the intellect is not able to produce what it wishes1 obliges it at least to picture it before it1 in general to undertake the roll of comforter1 to appease its lord with fables1 as a nurse a child1 and so to dress these out that they gain an appearance of likelihood4 ,now in this the intellect must do violence to its own nature1 which aims at the truth1 for it compels it1 contrary to its own laws1 to regard as true things which are neither true nor probable1 and often scarcely possible1 only in order to appease1 quiet1 and send to sleep for a while the restless and unmanageable will4 ,here we see clearly who is master and who is servant4 ,many may well have observed that if a matter which is of importance to them may turn out in several different ways1 and they have brought all of these into one disjunctive judgment which in their opinion is complete1 the actual result is yet quite another1 and one wholly unexpected by them3 but perhaps they will not have considered this1 that this result was then almost always the one which was unfavourable to them4 ,the explanation of this is1 that while their intellect intended to survey the possibilities completely1 the worst of all remained quite invisible to it2 because the will1 as it were1 covered it with its hand1 that is1 it so mastered the intellect that it was quite incapable of glancing at the worst case of all1 although1 since it actually came to pass1 this was also the most probable case4 ,yet in very melancholy dispositions1 or in those that have become prudent through experience like this1 the process is reversed1 for here apprehension plays the part which was formerly played by hope4 ,the first appearance of danger throws them into groundless anxiety4 ,if the intellect begins to investigate the matter it is rejected as incompetent1 nay1 as a deceitful sophist1 because the heart is to be believed1 whose fears are now actually allowed to pass for arguments as to the reality and greatness of the danger4 ,so then the intellect dare make no search for good reasons on the other side1 which1 if left to itself1 it would soon recognise1 but is obliged at once to picture to them the most unfortunate issue1 even if it itself can scarcely think this issue possible3 8,such as we know is false1 yet dread in sooth1 ,because the worst is ever nearest truth40 --,,byron 7,lara1 c4 #a74 ,love and hate falsify our judgment entirely4 ,in our enemies we see nothing but faults--in our loved ones nothing but excellences1 and even their faults appear to us amiable4 ,our interest1 of whatever kind it may be1 exercises a like secret power over our judgment2 what is in conformity with it at once seems to us fair1 just1 and reasonable2 what runs contrary to it presents itself to us1 in perfect seriousness1 as unjust and outrageous1 or injudicious and absurd4 ,hence so many prejudices of position1 profession1 nationality1 sect1 and religion4 ,a conceived hypothesis gives us lynx-eyes for all that confirms it1 and makes us blind to all that contradicts it4 ,what is opposed to our party1 our plan1 our wish1 our hope1 we often cannot comprehend and grasp at all1 while it is clear to every one else2 but what is favourable to these1 on the other hand1 strikes our eye from afar4 ,what the heart opposes the head will not admit4 ,we firmly retain many errors all through life1 and take care never to examine their ground1 merely from a fear1 of which we ourselves are conscious1 that we might make the discovery that we had so long believed and so often asserted what is false4 ,thus then is the intellect daily befooled and corrupted by the impositions of inclination4 ,this has been very beautifully expressed by ,bacon of ,verulam in the words3 ,intellectus ,,luminis ,,sicci non est2 sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus3 id quod generat ad quod vult scientias3 quod enim mavult homo1 id potius credit4 ,innumeris modis1 iisque interdum imperceptibilibus1 affectus intellectum imbuit et inficit 7,org4 ,nov41 i4 #ad74 ,clearly it is also this that opposes all new fundamental opinions in the sciences and all refutations of sanctioned errors1 for one will not easily see the truth of that which convicts one of incredible want of thought4 ,it is explicable1 on this ground alone1 that the truths of ,goethe's doctrine of colours1 which are so clear and simple1 are still denied by the physicists2 and thus ,goethe himself has had to learn what a much harder position one has if one promises men instruction than if one promises them amusement4 ,hence it is much more fortunate to be born a poet than a philosopher4 ,but the more obstinately an error was held by the other side1 the more shameful does the conviction afterwards become4 ,in the case of an overthrown system1 as in the case of a conquered army1 the most prudent is he who first runs away from it4 ,a trifling and absurd1 but striking example of that mysterious and immediate power which the will exercises over the intellect1 is the fact that in doing accounts we make mistakes much oftener in our own favour than to our disadvantage1 and this without the slightest dishonest intention1 merely from the unconscious tendency to diminish our ,debit and increase our ,credit4 ,lastly1 the fact is also in point here1 that when advice is given the slightest aim or purpose of the adviser generally outweighs his insight1 however great it may be2 therefore we dare not assume that he speaks from the latter when we suspect the existence of the former4 ,how little perfect sincerity is to be expected even from otherwise honest persons whenever their interests are in any way concerned we can gather from the fact that we so often deceive ourselves when hope bribes us1 or fear befools us1 or suspicion torments us1 or vanity flatters us1 or an hypothesis blinds us1 or a small aim which is close at hand injures a greater but more distant one2 for in this we see the direct and unconscious disadvantageous influence of the will upon knowledge4 ,accordingly it ought not to surprise us if in asking advice the will of the person asked directly dictates the answer even before the question could penetrate to the forum of his judgment4 ,i wish in a single word to point out here what will be fully explained in the following book1 that the most perfect knowledge1 thus the purely objective comprehension of the world1 i4e41 the comprehension of genius1 is conditioned by a silence of the will so profound that while it lasts even the individuality vanishes from consciousness and the man remains as the pure subject of knowing1 which is the correlative of the ,idea4 ,the disturbing influence of the will upon the intellect1 which is proved by all these phenomena1 and1 on the other hand1 the weakness and frailty of the latter1 on account of which it is incapable of working rightly whenever the will is in any way moved1 gives us then another proof that the will is the radical part of our nature1 and acts with original power1 while the intellect1 as adventitious and in many ways conditioned1 can only act in a subordinate and conditional manner4 ,there is no direct disturbance of the will by the intellect corresponding to the disturbance and clouding of knowledge by the will that has been shown4 ,indeed we cannot well conceive such a thing4 ,no one will wish to construe as such the fact that motives wrongly taken up lead the will astray1 for this is a fault of the intellect in its own function1 which is committed quite within its own province1 and the influence of which upon the will is entirely indirect4 ,it would be plausible to attribute irresolution to this1 for in its case1 through the conflict of the motives which the intellect presents to the will1 the latter is brought to a standstill1 thus is hindered4 ,but when we consider it more closely1 it becomes very clear that the cause of this hindrance does not lie in the activity of the intellect as such1 but entirely in external objects which are brought about by it1 for in this case they stand in precisely such a relation to the will1 which is here interested1 that they draw it with nearly equal strength in different directions4 ,this real cause merely acts through the intellect as the medium of motives1 though certainly under the assumption that it is keen enough to comprehend the objects in their manifold relations4 ,irresolution1 as a trait of character1 is just as much conditioned by qualities of the will as of the intellect4 ,it is certainly not peculiar to exceedingly limited minds1 for their weak understanding does not allow them to discover such manifold qualities and relations in things1 and moreover is so little fitted for the exertion of reflection and pondering these1 and then the probable consequences of each step1 that they rather decide at once according to the first impression1 or according to some simple rule of conduct4 ,the converse of this occurs in the case of persons of considerable understanding4 ,therefore1 whenever such persons also possess a tender care for their own well-being1 i4e41 a very sensitive egoism1 which constantly desires to come off well and always to be safe1 this introduces a certain anxiety at every step1 and thereby irresolution4 ,this quality therefore indicates throughout not a want of understanding but a want of courage4 ,yet very eminent minds survey the relations and their probable developments with such rapidity and certainty1 that if they are only supported by some courage they thereby acquire that quick decision and resolution that fits them to play an important part in the affairs of the world1 if time and circumstances afford them the opportunity4 ,the only decided1 direct restriction and disturbance which the will can suffer from the intellect as such may indeed be the quite exceptional one1 which is the consequence of an abnormally preponderating development of the intellect1 thus of that high endowment which has been defined as genius4 ,this is decidedly a hindrance to the energy of the character1 and consequently to the power of action4 ,hence it is not the really great minds that make historical characters1 because they are capable of bridling and ruling the mass of men and carrying out the affairs of the world2 but for this persons of much less capacity of mind are qualified when they have great firmness1 decision1 and persistency of will1 such as is quite inconsistent with very high intelligence4 ,accordingly1 where this very high intelligence exists we actually have a case in which the intellect directly restricts the will4 #f4 ,in opposition to the hindrances and restrictions which it has been shown the intellect suffers from the will1 ,i wish now to show1 in a few examples1 how1 conversely1 the functions of the intellect are sometimes aided and heightened by the incitement and spur of the will2 so that in this also we may recognise the primary nature of the one and the secondary nature of the other1 and it may become clear that the intellect stands to the will in the relation of a tool4 ,a motive which affects us strongly1 such as a yearning desire or a pressing need1 sometimes raises the intellect to a degree of which we had not previously believed it capable4 ,difficult circumstances1 which impose upon us the necessity of certain achievements1 develop entirely new talents in us1 the germs of which were hidden from us1 and for which we did not credit ourselves with any capacity4 ,the understanding of the stupidest man becomes keen when objects are in question that closely concern his wishes2 he now observes1 weighs1 and distinguishes with the greatest delicacy even the smallest circumstances that have reference to his wishes or fears4 ,this has much to do with the cunning of half-witted persons1 which is often remarked with surprise4 ,on this account ,isaiah rightly says1 vexatio dat intellectum1 which is therefore also used as a proverb4 ,akin to it is the ,german proverb1 8,die ,noth ist die ,mutter der ,knste0 78,necessity is the mother of the arts072 when1 however1 the fine arts are to be excepted1 because the heart of every one of their works1 that is1 the conception1 must proceed from a perfectly will-less1 and only thereby purely objective1 perception1 if they are to be genuine4 ,even the understanding of the brutes is increased considerably by necessity1 so that in cases of difficulty they accomplish things at which we are astonished4 ,for example1 they almost all calculate that it is safer not to run away when they believe they are not seen2 therefore the hare lies still in the furrow of the field and lets the sportsman pass close to it2 insects1 when they cannot escape1 pretend to be dead1 c4 ,we may obtain a fuller knowledge of this influence from the special history of the self-education of the wolf1 under the spur of the great difficulty of its position in civilised ,europe2 it is to be found in the second letter of ,leroy's excellent book1 8,lettres sur l'intelligence et la perfectibilit des animaux40 ,immediately afterwards1 in the third letter1 there follows the high school of the fox1 which in an equally difficult position has far less physical strength4 ,in its case1 however1 this is made up for by great understanding2 yet only through the constant struggle with want on the one hand and danger on the other1 thus under the spur of the will1 does it attain that high degree of cunning which distinguishes it especially in old age4 ,in all these enhancements of the intellect the will plays the part of a rider who with the spur urges the horse beyond the natural measure of its strength4 ,in the same way the memory is enhanced through the pressure of the will4 ,even if it is otherwise weak1 it preserves perfectly what has value for the ruling passion4 ,the lover forgets no opportunity favourable to him1 the ambitious man forgets no circumstance that can forward his plans1 the avaricious man never forgets the loss he has suffered1 the proud man never forgets an injury to his honour1 the vain man remembers every word of praise and the most trifling distinction that falls to his lot4 ,and this also extends to the brutes3 the horse stops at the inn where once long ago it was fed2 dogs have an excellent memory for all occasions1 times1 and places that have afforded them choice morsels2 and foxes for the different hiding-places in which they have stored their plunder4 ,self-consideration affords opportunity for finer observations in this regard4 ,sometimes1 through an interruption1 it has entirely escaped me what ,i have just been thinking about1 or even what news ,i have just heard4 ,now if the matter had in any way even the most distant personal interest1 the after-feeling of the impression which it made upon the will has remained4 ,i am still quite conscious how far it affected me agreeably or disagreeably1 and also of the special manner in which this happened1 whether1 even in the slightest degree1 it vexed me1 or made me anxious1 or irritated me1 or depressed me1 or produced the opposite of these affections4 ,thus the mere relation of the thing to my will is retained in the memory after the thing itself has vanished1 and this often becomes the clue to lead us back to the thing itself4 ,the sight of a man sometimes affects us in an analogous manner1 for we remember merely in general that we have had something to do with him1 yet without knowing where1 when1 or what it was1 or who he is4 ,but the sight of him still recalls pretty accurately the feeling which our dealings with him excited in us1 whether it was agreeable or disagreeable1 and also in what degree and in what way4 ,thus our memory has preserved only the response of the will1 and not that which called it forth4 ,we might call what lies at the foundation of this process the memory of the heart2 it is much more intimate than that of the head4 ,yet at bottom the connection of the two is so far-reaching that if we reflect deeply upon the matter we will arrive at the conclusion that memory in general requires the support of a will as a connecting point1 or rather as a thread upon which the memories can range themselves1 and which holds them firmly together1 or that the will is1 as it were1 the ground to which the individual memories cleave1 and without which they could not last2 and that therefore in a pure intelligence1 i4e41 in a merely knowing and absolutely will-less being1 a memory cannot well be conceived4 ,accordingly the improvement of the memory under the spur of the ruling passion1 which has been shown above1 is only the higher degree of that which takes place in all retention and recollection2 for its basis and condition is always the will4 ,thus in all this also it becomes clear how very much more essential to us the will is than the intellect4 ,the following facts may also serve to confirm this4 ,the intellect often obeys the will2 for example1 if we wish to remember something1 and after some effort succeed2 so also if we wish now to ponder something carefully and deliberately1 and in many such cases4 ,sometimes1 again1 the intellect refuses to obey the will2 for example1 if we try in vain to fix our minds upon something1 or if we call in vain upon the memory for something that was intrusted to it4 ,the anger of the will against the intellect on such occasions makes its relation to it and the difference of the two very plain4 ,indeed the intellect1 vexed by this anger1 sometimes officiously brings what was asked of it hours afterwards1 or even the following morning1 quite unexpectedly and unseasonably4 ,on the other hand1 the will never really obeys the intellect2 but the latter is only the ministerial council of that sovereign2 it presents all kinds of things to the will1 which then selects what is in conformity with its nature1 though in doing so it determines itself with necessity1 because this nature is unchangeable and the motives now lie before it4 ,hence no system of ethics is possible which moulds and improves the will itself4 ,for all teaching only affects knowledge1 and knowledge never determines the will itself1 i4e41 the fundamental character of willing1 but only its application to the circumstances present4 ,rectified knowledge can only modify conduct so far as it proves more exactly and judges more correctly what objects of the will's choice are within its reach2 so that the will now measures its relation to things more correctly1 sees more clearly what it desires1 and consequently is less subject to error in its choice4 ,but over the will itself1 over the main tendency or fundamental maxim of it1 the intellect has no power4 ,to believe that knowledge really and fundamentally determines the will is like believing that the lantern which a man carries by night is the primum mobile of his steps4 ,whoever1 taught by experience or the admonitions of others1 knows and laments a fundamental fault of his character1 firmly and honestly forms the intention to reform and give it up2 but in spite of this1 on the first opportunity1 the fault receives free course4 ,new repentance1 new intentions1 new transgressions4 ,when this has been gone through several times he becomes conscious that he cannot improve himself1 that the fault lies in his nature and personality1 indeed is one with this4 ,now he will blame and curse his nature and personality1 will have a painful feeling1 which may rise to anguish of consciousness1 but to change these he is not able4 ,here we see that which condemns and that which is condemned distinctly separate3 we see the former as a merely theoretical faculty1 picturing and presenting the praiseworthy1 and therefore desirable1 course of life1 but the other as something real and unchangeably present1 going quite a different way in spite of the former3 and then again the first remaining behind with impotent lamentations over the nature of the other1 with which1 through this very distress1 it again identifies itself4 ,will and intellect here separate very distinctly4 ,but here the will shows itself as the stronger1 the invincible1 unchangeable1 primitive1 and at the same time as the essential thing in question1 for the intellect deplores its errors1 and finds no comfort in the correctness of the knowledge1 as its own function4 ,thus the intellect shows itself entirely secondary1 as the spectator of the deeds of another1 which it accompanies with impotent praise and blame1 and also as determinable from without1 because it learns from experience1 weighs and alters its precepts4 ,special illustrations of this subject will be found in the 8,parerga10 vol4 ii4 #aah 7second ed41 #aai47 ,accordingly1 a comparison of our manner of thinking at different periods of our life will present a strange mixture of permanence and changeableness4 ,on the one hand1 the moral tendency of the man in his prime and the old man is still the same as was that of the boy2 on the other hand1 much has become so strange to him that he no longer knows himself1 and wonders how he ever could have done or said this and that4 ,in the first half of life to-day for the most part laughs at yesterday1 indeed looks down on it with contempt2 in the second half1 on the contrary1 it more and more looks back at it with envy4 ,but on closer examination it will be found that the changeable element was the intellect1 with its functions of insight and knowledge1 which1 daily appropriating new material from without1 presents a constantly changing system of thought1 while1 besides this1 it itself rises and sinks with the growth and decay of the organism4 ,the will1 on the contrary1 the basis of this1 thus the inclinations1 passions1 and emotions1 the character1 shows itself as what is unalterable in consciousness4 ,yet we have to take account of the modifications that depend upon physical capacities for enjoyment1 and hence upon age4 ,thus1 for example1 the eagerness for sensuous pleasure will show itself in childhood as a love of dainties1 in youth and manhood as the tendency to sensuality1 and in old age again as a love of dainties4 #g4 ,if1 as is generally assumed1 the will proceeded from knowledge1 as its result or product1 then where there is much will there would necessarily also be much knowledge1 insight1 and understanding4 ,this1 however1 is absolutely not the case2 rather1 we find in many men a strong1 i4e41 decided1 resolute1 persistent1 unbending1 wayward1 and vehement will1 combined with a very weak and incapable understanding1 so that every one who has to do with them is thrown into despair1 for their will remains inaccessible to all reasons and ideas1 and is not to be got at1 so that it is hidden1 as it were1 in a sack1 out of which it wills blindly4 ,brutes have often violent1 often stubborn wills1 but yet very little understanding4 ,finally1 plants only will without any knowledge at all4 ,if willing sprang merely from knowledge1 our anger would necessarily be in every case exactly proportionate to the occasion1 or at least to our relation to it1 for it would be nothing more than the result of the present knowledge4 ,this1 however1 is rarely the case2 rather1 anger generally goes far beyond the occasion4 ,our fury and rage1 the furor brevis1 often upon small occasions1 and without error regarding them1 is like the raging of an evil spirit which1 having been shut up1 only waits its opportunity to dare to break loose1 and now rejoices that it has found it4 ,this could not be the case if the foundation of our nature were a knower1 and willing were merely a result of knowledge2 for how came there into the result what did not lie in the elements8 ,the conclusion cannot contain more than the premisses4 ,thus here also the will shows itself as of a nature quite different from knowledge1 which only serves it for communication with the external world1 but then the will follows the laws of its own nature without taking from the intellect anything but the occasion4 ,the intellect1 as the mere tool of the will1 is as different from it as the hammer from the smith4 ,so long as in a conversation the intellect alone is active it remains cold4 ,it is almost as if the man himself were not present4 ,moreover1 he cannot then1 properly speaking1 compromise himself1 but at the most can make himself ridiculous4 ,only when the will comes into play is the man really present3 now he becomes warm1 nay1 it often happens1 hot4 ,it is always the will to which we ascribe the warmth of life2 on the other hand1 we say the cold understanding1 or to investigate a thing coolly1 i4e41 to think without being influenced by the will4 ,if we attempt to reverse the relation1 and to regard the will as the tool of the intellect1 it is as if we made the smith the tool of the hammer4 ,nothing is more provoking1 when we are arguing against a man with reasons and explanations1 and taking all pains to convince him1 under the impression that we have only to do with his understanding1 than to discover at last that he will not understand2 that thus we had to do with his will1 which shuts itself up against the truth and brings into the field wilful misunderstandings1 chicaneries1 and sophisms in order to intrench itself behind its understanding and its pretended want of insight4 ,then he is certainly not to be got at1 for reasons and proofs applied against the will are like the blows of a phantom produced by mirrors against a solid body4 ,hence the saying so often repeated1 8,stat pro ratione voluntas40 ,sufficient evidence of what has been said is afforded by ordinary life4 ,but unfortunately proofs of it are also to be found on the path of the sciences4 ,the recognition of the most important truths1 of the rarest achievements1 will be looked for in vain from those who have an interest in preventing them from being accepted1 an interest which either springs from the fact that such truths contradict what they themselves daily teach1 or else from this1 that they dare not make use of them and teach them2 or if all this be not the case they will not accept them1 because the watchword of mediocrity will always be1 ,si quelqu'un excelle parmi nous1 qu'il aille exceller ailleurs1 as ,helvetius has admirably rendered the saying of the ,ephesian in the fifth book of ,cicero's 8,tusculan0 7c4 #cf71 or as a saying of the ,abyssinian ,fit ,arari puts it1 8,among quartzes adamant is outlawed40 ,thus whoever expects from this always numerous band a just estimation of what he has done will find himself very much deceived1 and perhaps for a while he will not be able to understand their behaviour1 till at last he finds out that while he applied himself to knowledge he had to do with the will1 thus is precisely in the position described above1 nay1 is really like a man who brings his case before a court the judges of which have all been bribed4 ,yet in particular cases he will receive the fullest proof that their will and not their insight opposed him1 when one or other of them makes up his mind to plagiarism4 ,then he will see with astonishment what good judges they are1 what correct perception of the merit of others they have1 and how well they know how to find out the best1 like the sparrows1 who never miss the ripest cherries4 ,the counterpart of the victorious resistance of the will to knowledge here set forth appears if in expounding our reasons and proofs we have the will of those addressed with us4 ,then all are at once convinced1 all arguments are telling1 and the matter is at once clear as the day4 ,this is well known to popular speakers4 ,in the one case1 as in the other1 the will shows itself as that which has original power1 against which the intellect can do nothing4 #h4 ,but now we shall take into consideration the individual qualities1 thus excellences and faults of the will and character on the one hand1 and of the intellect on the other1 in order to make clear1 in their relation to each other1 and their relative worth1 the complete difference of the two fundamental faculties4 ,history and experience teach that the two appear quite independently of each other4 ,that the greatest excellence of mind will not easily be found combined with equal excellence of character is sufficiently explained by the extraordinary rarity of both1 while their opposites are everywhere the order of the day2 hence we also daily find the latter in union4 ,however1 we never infer a good will from a superior mind1 nor the latter from the former1 nor the opposite from the opposite1 but every unprejudiced person accepts them as perfectly distinct qualities1 the presence of which each for itself has to be learned from experience4 ,great narrowness of mind may coexist with great goodness of heart1 and ,i do not believe ,balthazar ,gracian was right in saying 7,discreto1 p4 #djf71 8,no ay simple1 que no sea malicioso0 78,there is no simpleton who would not be malicious071 though he has the ,spanish proverb in his favour1 8,nunca la necedad anduvo sin malicia0 78,stupidity is never without malice074 ,yet it may be that many stupid persons become malicious for the same reason as many hunchbacks1 from bitterness on account of the neglect they have suffered from nature1 and because they think they can occasionally make up for what they lack in understanding through malicious cunning1 seeking in this a brief triumph4 ,from this1 by the way1 it is also comprehensible why almost every one easily becomes malicious in the presence of a very superior mind4 ,on the other hand1 again1 stupid people have very often the reputation of special good-heartedness1 which yet so seldom proves to be the case that ,i could not help wondering how they had gained it1 till ,i was able to flatter myself that ,i had found the key to it in what follows4 ,moved by a secret inclination1 every one likes best to choose for his more intimate intercourse some one to whom he is a little superior in understanding1 for only in this case does he find himself at his ease1 because1 according to ,hobbes1 8,omnis animi voluptas1 omnisgue alacritas in eo sita est1 quod quis habeat1 quibuscum conferens se1 possit magnifice sentire de se ipso0 7,de ,cive1 i4 #e74 ,for the same reason every one avoids him who is superior to himself2 wherefore ,lichtenberg quite rightly observes3 8,to certain men a man of mind is a more odious production than the most pronounced rogue40 ,and similarly ,helvetius says3 8,les gens mdiocres ont un instinct sr et prompt1 pour connatre et fuir les gens d'esprit40 ,and ,dr4 ,johnson assures us that 8there is nothing by which a man exasperates most people more than by displaying a superior ability of brilliancy in conversation4 ,they seem pleased at the time1 but their envy makes them curse him in their hearts0 7,boswell2 aet4 anno #gd74 ,in order to bring this truth1 so universal and so carefully concealed1 more relentlessly to light1 ,i add the expression of it by ,merck1 the celebrated friend of ,goethe's youth1 from his story 8,lindor30 8,he possessed talents which were given him by nature and acquired by himself through learning2 and thus it happened that in most society he left the worthy members of it far behind40 ,if1 in the moment of delight at the sight of an extraordinary man1 the public swallows these superiorities also1 without actually at once putting a bad construction upon them1 yet a certain impression of this phenomenon remains behind1 which1 if it is often repeated1 may on serious occasions have disagreeable future consequences for him who is guilty of it4 ,without any one consciously noting that on this occasion he was insulted1 no one is sorry to place himself tacitly in the way of the advancement of this man4 ,thus on this account great mental superiority isolates more than anything else1 and makes one1 at least silently1 hated4 ,now it is the opposite of this that makes stupid people so generally liked2 especially since many can only find in them what1 according to the law of their nature referred to above1 they must seek4 ,yet this the true reason of such an inclination no one will confess to himself1 still less to others2 and therefore1 as a plausible pretext for it1 will impute to those he has selected a special goodness of heart1 which1 as we have said1 is in reality only very rarely and accidentally found in combination with mental incapacity4 ,want of understanding is accordingly by no means favourable or akin to goodness of character4 ,but1 on the other hand1 it cannot be asserted that great understanding is so2 nay1 rather1 no scoundrel has in general been without it4 ,indeed even the highest intellectual eminence can coexist with the worst moral depravity4 ,an example of this is afforded by ,bacon of ,verulam3 8,ungrateful1 filled with the lust of power1 wicked and base1 he at last went so far that1 as ,lord ,chancellor and the highest judge of the realm1 he frequently allowed himself to be bribed in civil actions4 ,impeached before his peers1 he confessed himself guilty1 was expelled by them from the ,house of ,lords1 and condemned to a fine of forty thousand pounds and imprisonment in the ,tower0 7see the review of the latest edition of ,bacon's ,works in the ,edinburgh ,review1 ,august #ahcg74 ,hence also ,pope called him 8the wisest1 brightest1 meanest of mankind0 78,essay on ,man10 iv4 #bhb74 ,a similar example is afforded by the historian ,guicciardini1 of whom ,rosini says in the ,notizie ,storiche1 drawn from good contemporary sources1 which is given in his historical romance 8,luisa ,strozzi30 8,da coloro1 che pongono l'ingegno e il sapere al di sopra di tutte le umane qualit1 questo uomo sar riguardato come fra i pi grandi del suo secolo3 ma da quelli1 che reputano la virt dovere andare innanzi a tutto1 non potra esecrarsi abbastanza la sua memoria4 ,esso fu il pi crudele fra i cittadini a perseguitare1 uccidere e confinare10 c47#cb7 ,if now it is said of one man1 8,he has a good heart1 though a bad head10 but of another1 8,he has a very good head1 yet a bad heart10 every one feels that in the first case the praise far outweighs the blame--in the other case the reverse4 ,answering to this1 we see that if some one has done a bad deed his friends and he himself try to remove the guilt from the will to the intellect1 and to give out that faults of the heart were faults of the head2 roguish tricks they will call errors1 will say they were merely want of understanding1 want of reflection1 light-mindedness1 folly2 nay1 if need be1 they will plead a paroxysm1 momentary mental aberration1 and if a heavy crime is in question1 even madness1 only in order to free the will from the guilt4 ,and in the same way1 we ourselves1 if we have caused a misfortune or injury1 will before others and ourselves willingly impeach our stultitia1 simply in order to escape the reproach of malitia4 ,in the same way1 in the case of the equally unjust decision of the judge1 the difference1 whether he has erred or been bribed1 is so infinitely great4 ,all this sufficiently proves that the will alone is the real and essential1 the kernel of the man1 and the intellect is merely its tool1 which may be constantly faulty without the will being concerned4 ,the accusation of want of understanding is1 at the moral judgment-seat1 no accusation at all2 on the contrary1 it even gives privileges4 ,and so also1 before the courts of the world1 it is everywhere sufficient to deliver a criminal from all punishment that his guilt should be transferred from his will to his intellect1 by proving either unavoidable error or mental derangement1 for then it is of no more consequence than if hand or foot had slipped against the will4 ,i have fully discussed this in the appendix1 8,ueber die ,intellektuelle ,freiheit10 to my prize essay on the freedom of the will1 to which ,i refer to avoid repetition4 ,everywhere those who are responsible for any piece of work appeal1 in the event of its turning out unsatisfactorily1 to their good intentions1 of which there was no lack4 ,hereby they believe that they secure the essential1 that for which they are properly answerable1 and their true self2 the inadequacy of their faculties1 on the other hand1 they regard as the want of a suitable tool4 ,if a man is stupid1 we excuse him by saying that he cannot help it2 but if we were to excuse a bad man on the same grounds we would be laughed at4 ,and yet the one1 like the other1 is innate4 ,this proves that the will is the man proper1 the intellect merely its tool4 ,thus it is always only our willing that is regarded as depending upon ourselves1 i4e41 as the expression of our true nature1 and for which we are therefore made responsible4 ,therefore it is absurd and unjust if we are taken to task for our beliefs1 thus for our knowledge3 for we are obliged to regard this as something which1 although it changes in us1 is as little in our power as the events of the external world4 ,and here1 also1 it is clear that the will alone is the inner and true nature of man2 the intellect1 on the contrary1 with its operations1 which go on as regularly as the external world1 stands to the will in the relation of something external to it1 a mere tool4 ,high mental capacities have always been regarded as the gift of nature or the gods2 and on that account they have been called ,gaben1 ,begabung1 ingenii dotes1 gifts 7a man highly gifted71 regarding them as something different from the man himself1 something that has fallen to his lot through favour4 ,no one1 on the contrary1 has ever taken this view of moral excellences1 although they also are innate2 they have rather always been regarded as something proceeding from the man himself1 essentially belonging to him1 nay1 constituting his very self4 ,but it follows now from this that the will is the true nature of man2 the intellect1 on the other hand1 is secondary1 a tool1 a gift4 ,answering to this1 all religions promise a reward beyond life1 in eternity1 for excellences of the will or heart1 but none for excellences of the head or understanding4 ,virtue expects its reward in that world2 prudence hopes for it in this2 genius1 again1 neither in this world nor in that2 it is its own reward4 ,accordingly the will is the eternal part1 the intellect the temporal4 ,connection1 communion1 intercourse among men is based1 as a rule1 upon relations which concern the will1 not upon such as concern the intellect4 ,the first kind of communion may be called the material1 the other the formal4 ,of the former kind are the bonds of family and relationship1 and further1 all connections that rest upon any common aim or interest1 such as that of trade or profession1 of the corporation1 the party1 the faction1 c4 ,in these it merely amounts to a question of views1 of aims2 along with which there may be the greatest diversity of intellectual capacity and culture4 ,therefore not only can any one live in peace and unity with any one else1 but can act with him and be allied to him for the common good of both4 ,marriage also is a bond of the heart1 not of the head4 ,it is different1 however1 with merely formal communion1 which aims only at an exchange of thought2 this demands a certain equality of intellectual capacity and culture4 ,great differences in this respect place between man and man an impassable gulf3 such lies1 for example1 between a man of great mind and a fool1 between a scholar and a peasant1 between a courtier and a sailor4 ,natures as heterogeneous as this have therefore trouble in making themselves intelligible so long as it is a question of exchanging thoughts1 ideas1 and views4 ,nevertheless close material friendship may exist between them1 and they may be faithful allies1 conspirators1 or men under mutual pledges4 ,for in all that concerns the will alone1 which includes friendship1 enmity1 honesty1 fidelity1 falseness1 and treachery1 they are perfectly homogeneous1 formed of the same clay1 and neither mind nor culture make any difference here2 indeed here the ignorant man often shames the scholar1 the sailor the courtier4 ,for at the different grades of culture there are the same virtues and vices1 emotions and passions2 and although somewhat modified in their expression1 they very soon mutually recognise each other even in the most heterogeneous individuals1 upon which the similarly disposed agree and the opposed are at enmity4 ,brilliant qualities of mind win admiration1 but never affection2 this is reserved for the moral1 the qualities of the character4 ,every one will choose as his friend the honest1 the good-natured1 and even the agreeable1 complaisant man1 who easily concurs1 rather than the merely able man4 ,indeed many will be preferred to the latter1 on account of insignificant1 accidental1 outward qualities which just suit the inclination of another4 ,only the man who has much mind himself will wish able men for his society2 his friendship1 on the other hand1 he will bestow with reference to moral qualities2 for upon this depends his really high appreciation of a man in whom a single good trait of character conceals and expiates great want of understanding4 ,the known goodness of a character makes us patient and yielding towards weaknesses of understanding1 as also towards the dulness and childishness of age4 ,a distinctly noble character along with the entire absence of intellectual excellence and culture presents itself as lacking nothing2 while1 on the contrary1 even the greatest mind1 if affected with important moral faults1 will always appear blamable4 ,for as torches and fireworks become pale and insignificant in the presence of the sun1 so intellect1 nay1 genius1 and also beauty1 are outshone and eclipsed by the goodness of the heart4 ,when this appears in a high degree it can make up for the want of those qualities to such an extent that one is ashamed of having missed them4 ,even the most limited understanding1 and also grotesque ugliness1 whenever extraordinary goodness of heart declares itself as accompanying them1 become as it were transfigured1 outshone by a beauty of a higher kind1 for now a wisdom speaks out of them before which all other wisdom must be dumb4 ,for goodness of heart is a transcendent quality2 it belongs to an order of things that reaches beyond this life1 and is incommensurable with any other perfection4 ,when it is present in a high degree it makes the heart so large that it embraces the world1 so that now everything lies within it1 no longer without2 for it identifies all natures with its own4 ,it then extends to others also that boundless indulgence which otherwise each one only bestows on himself4 ,such a man is incapable of becoming angry2 even if the malicious mockery and sneers of others have drawn attention to his own intellectual or physical faults1 he only reproaches himself in his heart for having been the occasion of such expressions1 and therefore1 without doing violence to his own feelings1 proceeds to treat those persons in the kindest manner1 confidently hoping that they will turn from their error with regard to him1 and recognise themselves in him also4 ,what is wit and genius against this8--what is ,bacon of ,verulam8 ,our estimation of our own selves leads to the same result as we have here obtained by considering our estimation of others4 ,how different is the self-satisfaction which we experience in a moral regard from that which we experience in an intellectual regard6 ,the former arises when1 looking back on our conduct1 we see that with great sacrifices we have practised fidelity and honesty1 that we have helped many1 forgiven many1 have behaved better to others than they have behaved to us2 so that we can say with ,king ,lear1 8,i am a man more sinned against than sinning20 and to its fullest extent if perhaps some noble deed shines in our memory4 ,a deep seriousness will accompany the still peace which such a review affords us2 and if we see that others are inferior to us here1 this will not cause us any joy1 but we will rather deplore it1 and sincerely wish that they were as we are4 ,how entirely differently does the knowledge of our intellectual superiority affect us6 ,its ground bass is really the saying of ,hobbes quoted above3 ,omnis animi voluptas1 omnisque alacritas in eo sita est1 quad quis habeat1 quibuscum conferens se1 possit magnifice sentire de se ipso4 ,arrogant1 triumphant vanity1 proud1 contemptuous looking down on others1 inordinate delight in the consciousness of decided and considerable superiority1 akin to pride of physical advantages1--that is the result here4 ,this opposition between the two kinds of self-satisfaction shows that the one concerns our true inner and eternal nature1 the other a more external1 merely temporal1 and indeed scarcely more than a mere physical excellence4 ,the intellect is in fact simply the function of the brain2 the will1 on the contrary1 is that whose function is the whole man1 according to his being and nature4 ,if1 looking without us1 we reflect that 1 7vita brevis1 ars longa71 and consider how the greatest and most beautiful minds1 often when they have scarcely reached the summit of their power1 and the greatest scholars1 when they have only just attained to a thorough knowledge of their science1 are snatched away by death1 we are confirmed in this1 that the meaning and end of life is not intellectual but moral4 ,the complete difference between the mental and moral qualities displays itself lastly in the fact that the intellect suffers very important changes through time1 while the will and character remain untouched by it4 ,the new-born child has as yet no use of its understanding1 but obtains it within the first two months to the extent of perception and apprehension of the things in the external world--a process which ,i have described more fully in my essay1 8,ueber das ,sehn und die ,farben10 p4 #aj of the second 7and third7 edition4 ,the growth of reason to the point of speech1 and thereby of thought1 follows this first and most important step much more slowly1 generally only in the third year2 yet the early childhood remains hopelessly abandoned to silliness and folly1 primarily because the brain still lacks physical completeness1 which1 both as regards its size and texture1 it only attains in the seventh year4 ,but then for its energetic activity there is still wanting the antagonism of the genital system2 it therefore only begins with puberty4 ,through this1 however1 the intellect has only attained to the capacity for its psychical improvement2 this itself can only be won by practice1 experience1 and instruction4 ,thus as soon as the mind has escaped from the folly of childhood it falls into the snares of innumerable errors1 prejudices1 and chimeras1 sometimes of the absurdest and crudest kind1 which it obstinately sticks to1 till experience gradually removes them1 and many of them also are insensibly lost4 ,all this takes many years to happen1 so that one grants it majority indeed soon after the twentieth year1 yet has placed full maturity1 years of discretion1 not before the fortieth year4 ,but while this psychical education1 resting upon help from without1 is still in process of growth1 the inner physical energy of the brain already begins to sink again4 ,this has reached its real culminating point about the thirtieth year1 on account of its dependence upon the pressure of blood and the effect of the pulsation upon the brain1 and through this again upon the predominance of the arterial over the venous system1 and the fresh tenderness of the brain fibre1 and also on account of the energy of the genital system4 ,after the thirty-fifth year a slight diminution of the physical energy of the brain becomes noticeable1 which1 through the gradually approaching predominance of the venous over the arterial system1 and also through the increasing firmer and drier consistency of the brain fibre1 more and more takes place1 and would be much more observable if it were not that1 on the other hand1 the psychical perfecting1 through exercise1 experience1 increase of knowledge1 and acquired skill in the use of it1 counteracts it--an antagonism which fortunately lasts to an advanced age1 for the brain becomes more and more like a worn-out instrument4 ,but yet the diminution of the original energy of the intellect1 resting entirely upon organic conditions1 continues1 slowly indeed1 but unceasingly3 the faculty of original conception1 the imagination1 the plastic power1 the memory1 become noticeably weaker2 and so it goes on step by step downwards into old age1 garrulous1 without memory1 half-unconscious1 and ultimately quite childish4 ,the will1 on the contrary1 is not affected by all this becoming1 this change and vicissitude1 but is from beginning to end unalterably the same4 ,willing does not require to be learned like knowing1 but succeeds perfectly at once4 ,the new-born child makes violent movements1 rages1 and cries2 it wills in the most vehement manner1 though it does not yet know what it wills4 ,for the medium of motives1 the intellect1 is not yet fully developed4 ,the will is in darkness concerning the external world1 in which its objects lie1 and now rages like a prisoner against the walls and bars of his dungeon4 ,but little by little it becomes light3 at once the fundamental traits of universal human willing1 and1 at the same time1 the individual modification of it here present1 announce themselves4 ,the already appearing character shows itself indeed at first in weak and uncertain outline1 on account of the defective service of the intellect1 which has to present it with motives2 but to the attentive observer it soon declares its complete presence1 and in a short time it becomes unmistakable4 ,the characteristics appear which last through the whole of life2 the principal tendencies of the will1 the easily excited emotions1 the ruling passion1 declare themselves4 ,therefore the events at school stand to those of the future life for the most part as the dumb-show in 8,hamlet0 that precedes the play to be given at the court1 and foretells its content in the form of pantomime1 stands to the play itself4 ,but it is by no means possible to prognosticate in the same way the future intellectual capacities of the man from those shown in the boy2 rather as a rule the ingenia prcocia1 prodigies1 turn out block-heads2 genius1 on the contrary1 is often in childhood of slow conception1 and comprehends with difficulty1 just because it comprehends deeply4 ,this is how it is that every one relates laughing and without reserve the follies and stupidities of his childhood4 ,for example1 ,goethe1 how he threw all the kitchen crockery out of the window 7,dichtung und ,wahrheit1 vol4 i4 p4 #g72 for we know that all this only concerns what changes4 ,on the other hand1 a prudent man will not favour us with the bad features1 the malicious or deceitful actions1 of his youth1 for he feels that they also bear witness to his present character4 ,i have been told that when ,gall1 the phrenologist and investigator of man1 had to put himself into connection with a man as yet unknown to him1 he used to get him to speak about his youthful years and actions1 in order1 if possible1 to gather from these the distinctive traits of his character2 because this must still be the same now4 ,this is the reason why we are indifferent to the follies and want of understanding of our youthful years1 and even look back on them with smiling satisfaction1 while the bad features of character even of that time1 the ill-natured actions and the misdeeds then committed exist even in old age as inextinguishable reproaches1 and trouble our consciences4 ,now1 just as the character appears complete1 so it remains unaltered to old age4 ,the advance of age1 which gradually consumes the intellectual powers1 leaves the moral qualities untouched4 ,the goodness of the heart still makes the old man honoured and loved when his head already shows the weaknesses which are the commencement of second childhood4 ,gentleness1 patience1 honesty1 veracity1 disinterestedness1 philanthropy1 c41 remain through the whole life1 and are not lost through the weaknesses of old age2 in every clear moment of the worn-out old man they come forth undiminished1 like the sun from the winter clouds4 ,and1 on the other hand1 malice1 spite1 avarice1 hard-heartedness1 infidelity1 egoism1 and baseness of every kind also remain undiminished to our latest years4 ,we would not believe but would laugh at any one who said to us1 8,in former years ,i was a malicious rogue1 but now ,i am an honest and noble-minded man40 ,therefore ,sir ,walter ,scott1 in the 8,fortunes of ,nigel10 has shown very beautifully1 in the case of the old usurer1 how burning avarice1 egoism1 and injustice are still in their full strength1 like a poisonous plant in autumn1 when the intellect has already become childish4 ,the only alterations that take place in our inclinations are those which result directly from the decrease of our physical strength1 and with it of our capacities for enjoyment4 ,thus voluptuousness will make way for intemperance1 the love of splendour for avarice1 and vanity for ambition2 just like the man who before he has a beard will wear a false one1 and later1 when his own beard has become grey1 will dye it brown4 ,thus while all organic forces1 muscular power1 the senses1 the memory1 wit1 understanding1 genius1 wear themselves out1 and in old age become dull1 the will alone remains undecayed and unaltered3 the strength and the tendency of willing remains the same4 ,indeed in many points the will shows itself still more decided in age3 thus1 in the clinging to life1 which1 it is well known1 increases2 also in the firmness and persistency with regard to what it has once embraced1 in obstinacy2 which is explicable from the fact that the susceptibility of the intellect for other impressions1 and thereby the movement of the will by motives streaming in upon it1 has diminished4 ,hence the implacable nature of the anger and hate of old persons-- 8,the young man's wrath is like light straw on fire1 ,but like red-hot steel is the old man's ire40 --,old ,ballad4 ,from all these considerations it becomes unmistakable to the more penetrating glance that1 while the intellect has to run through a long series of gradual developments1 but then1 like everything physical1 must encounter decay1 the will takes no part in this1 except so far as it has to contend at first with the imperfection of its tool1 the intellect1 and1 again1 at last with its worn-out condition1 but itself appears perfect and remains unchanged1 not subject to the laws of time and of becoming and passing away in it4 ,thus in this way it makes itself known as that which is metaphysical1 not itself belonging to the phenomenal world4 #i4 ,the universally used and generally very well understood expressions heart and head have sprung from a true feeling of the fundamental distinction here in question2 therefore they are also apt and significant1 and occur in all languages4 ,nec cor nec caput habet1 says ,seneca of the ,emperor ,claudius 7,ludus de morte ,claudii ,csaris1 c4 #h74 ,the heart1 this primum mobile of the animal life1 has with perfect justice been chosen as the symbol1 nay1 the synonym1 of the will1 as the primary kernel of our phenomenon1 and denotes this in opposition to the intellect1 which is exactly identical with the head4 ,all that1 in the widest sense1 is matter of the will1 as wish1 passion1 joy1 grief1 goodness1 wickedness1 also what we are wont to understand under 8,gemth10 and what ,homer expresses through 1 is attributed to the heart4 ,accordingly we say3 ,he has a bad heart2--his heart is in the thing2--it comes from his heart2--it cut him to the heart2--it breaks his heart2--his heart bleeds2--the heart leaps for joy2--who can see the heart of man8--it is heart-rending1 heart-crushing1 heart-breaking1 heart-inspiring1 heart-touching2--he is good-hearted1 hard-hearted1 heartless1 stout-hearted1 faint-hearted1 c4 c4 ,quite specially1 however1 love affairs are called affairs of the heart1 affaires de cur2 because the sexual impulse is the focus of the will1 and the selection with reference to it constitutes the chief concern of natural1 human volition1 the ground of which ,i shall show in a full chapter supplementary to the fourth book4 ,byron in 8,don ,juan10 c4 xi4 v4 #cd1 is satirical about love being to women an affair of the head instead of an affair of the heart4 ,on the other hand1 the head denotes everything that is matter of knowledge4 ,hence a man of head1 a good head1 a fine head1 a bad head1 to lose one's head1 to keep one's head uppermost1 c4 ,heart and head signifies the whole man4 ,but the head is always the second1 the derived2 for it is not the centre but the highest efflorescence of the body4 ,when a hero dies his heart is embalmed1 not his brain2 on the other hand1 we like to preserve the skull of the poet1 the artist1 and the philosopher4 ,so ,raphael's skull was preserved in the ,academia di ,s4 ,luca at ,rome1 though it has lately been proved not to be genuine2 in ,stockholm in #ahbj the skull of ,descartes was sold by auction47#cc7 ,a true feeling of the real relation between will1 intellect1 and life is also expressed in the ,latin language4 ,the intellect is mens1 2 the will again is animus1 which comes from anima1 and this from 4 ,anima is the life itself1 the breath1 2 but animus is the living principle1 and also the will1 the subject of inclinations1 intentions1 passions1 emotions2 hence also est mihi animus1--fert animus1--for 8,i have a desire to10 also animi causa1 c42 it is the ,greek 1 the ,german 8,gemth10 thus the heart but not the head4 ,animi perturbatio is an emotion2 mentis perturbatio would signify insanity4 ,the predicate immortalis is attributed to animus1 not to mens4 ,all this is the rule gathered from the great majority of passages2 though in the case of conceptions so nearly related it cannot but be that the words are sometimes interchanged4 ,under the ,greeks appear primarily and originally to have understood the vital force1 the living principle1 whereby at once arose the dim sense that it must be something metaphysical1 which consequently would not be reached by death4 ,among other proofs of this are the investigations of the relation between and preserved by ,stobus 7,ecl41 ,lib4 i4 c4 #ea1 #g1 #h74 #aj4 ,upon what depends the identity of the person8 ,not upon the matter of the body2 it is different after a few years4 ,not upon its form1 which changes as a whole and in all its parts2 all but the expression of the glance1 by which1 therefore1 we still know a man even after many years2 which proves that in spite of all changes time produces in him something in him remains quite untouched by it4 ,it is just this by which we recognise him even after the longest intervals of time1 and find the former man entire4 ,it is the same with ourselves1 for1 however old we become1 we yet feel within that we are entirely the same as we were when we were young1 nay1 when we were still children4 ,this1 which unaltered always remains quite the same1 and does not grow old along with us1 is really the kernel of our nature1 which does not lie in time4 ,it is assumed that the identity of the person rests upon that of consciousness4 ,but by this is understood merely the connected recollection of the course of life2 hence it is not sufficient4 ,we certainly know something more of our life than of a novel we have formerly read1 yet only very little4 ,the principal events1 the interesting scenes1 have impressed themselves upon us2 in the remainder a thousand events are forgotten for one that has been retained4 ,the older we become the more do things pass by us without leaving any trace4 ,great age1 illness1 injury of the brain1 madness1 may deprive us of memory altogether1 but the identity of the person is not thereby lost4 ,it rests upon the identical will and the unalterable character of the person4 ,it is it also which makes the expression of the glance unchangeable4 ,in the heart is the man1 not in the head4 ,it is true that1 in consequence of our relation to the external world1 we are accustomed to regard as our real self the subject of knowledge1 the knowing ,i1 which wearies in the evening1 vanishes in sleep1 and in the morning shines brighter with renewed strength4 ,this is1 however1 the mere function of the brain1 and not our own self4 ,our true self1 the kernel of our nature1 is what is behind that1 and really knows nothing but willing and not willing1 being content and not content1 with all the modifications of this1 which are called feelings1 emotions1 and passions4 ,this is that which produces the other1 does not sleep with it when it sleeps1 and in the same way when it sinks in death remains uninjured4 ,everything1 on the contrary1 that belongs to knowledge is exposed to oblivion2 even actions of moral significance can sometimes1 after years1 be only imperfectly recalled1 and we no longer know accurately and in detail how we acted on a critical occasion4 ,but the character itself1 to which the actions only testify1 cannot be forgotten by us2 it is now still quite the same as then4 ,the will itself1 alone and for itself1 is permanent1 for it alone is unchangeable1 indestructible1 not growing old1 not physical1 but metaphysical1 not belonging to the phenomenal appearance1 but to that itself which so appears4 ,how the identity of consciousness also1 so far as it goes1 depends upon it ,i have shown above in chapter #ae1 so ,i need not dwell upon it further here4 #aa4 ,aristotle says in passing1 in his book on the comparison of the desirable1 8,to live well is better than to live0 7 1 ,top4 iii4 #b74 ,from this we might infer1 by double contraposition1 not to live is better than to live badly4 ,this is also evident to the intellect2 yet the great majority live very badly rather than not at all4 ,this clinging to life cannot therefore have its ground in the object of life1 since life1 as was shown in the fourth book1 is really a constant suffering1 or at the least1 as will be shown further on in the #bhth chapter1 a business which does not cover its expenses2 thus that clinging to life can only be founded in the subject of it4 ,but it is not founded in the intellect1 it is no result of reflection1 and in general is not a matter of choice2 but this willing of life is something that is taken for granted3 it is a prius of the intellect itself4 ,we ourselves are the will to live1 and therefore we must live1 well or ill4 ,only from the fact that this clinging to a life which is so little worth to them is entirely a priori and not a posteriori can we explain the excessive fear of death that dwells in every living thing1 which ,rochefoucauld has expressed in his last reflection1 with rare frankness and navet1 and upon which the effect of all tragedies and heroic actions ultimately rest1 for it would be lost if we prized life only according to its objective worth4 ,upon this inexpressible horror mortis is also founded the favourite principle of all ordinary minds1 that whosoever takes his own life must be mad2 yet not less the astonishment1 mingled with a certain admiration1 which this action always excites even in thinking minds1 because it is so opposed to the nature of all living beings that in a certain sense we are forced to admire him who is able to perform it4 ,for suicide proceeds from a purpose of the intellect1 but our will to live is a prius of the intellect4 ,thus this consideration also1 which will be fully discussed in chapter #bh1 confirms the primacy of the will in self-consciousness4 #ab4 ,on the other hand1 nothing proves more clearly the secondary1 dependent1 conditioned nature of the intellect than its periodical intermittance4 ,in deep sleep all knowing and forming of ideas ceases4 ,but the kernel of our nature1 the metaphysical part of it which the organic functions necessarily presuppose as their primum mobile1 must never pause if life is not to cease1 and1 moreover1 as something metaphysical and therefore incorporeal1 it requires no rest4 ,therefore the philosophers who set up a soul as this metaphysical kernel1 i4e41 an originally and essentially knowing being1 see themselves forced to the assertion that this soul is quite untiring in its perceiving and knowing1 therefore continues these even in deep sleep2 only that we have no recollection of this when we awake4 ,the falseness of this assertion1 however1 was easy to see whenever one had rejected that soul in consequence of ,kant's teaching4 ,for sleep and waking prove to the unprejudiced mind in the clearest manner that knowing is a secondary function and conditioned by the organism1 just like any other4 ,only the heart is untiring1 because its beating and the circulation of the blood are not directly conditioned by nerves1 but are just the original manifestation of the will4 ,also all other physiological functions governed merely by ganglionic nerves1 which have only a very indirect and distant connection with the brain1 are carried on during sleep1 although the secretions take place more slowly2 the beating of the heart itself1 on account of its dependence upon respiration1 which is conditioned by the cerebral system 7medulla oblongata71 becomes with it a little slower4 ,the stomach is perhaps most active in sleep1 which is to be attributed to its special consensus with the now resting brain1 which occasions mutual disturbances4 ,the brain alone1 and with it knowing1 pauses entirely in deep sleep4 ,for it is merely the minister of foreign affairs1 as the ganglion system is the minister of the interior4 ,the brain1 with its function of knowing1 is only a vedette established by the will for its external ends1 which1 up in the watch-tower of the head1 looks round through the windows of the senses and marks where mischief threatens and where advantages are to be looked for1 and in accordance with whose report the will decides4 ,this vedette1 like every one engaged on active service1 is then in a condition of strain and effort1 and therefore it is glad when1 after its watch is completed1 it is again withdrawn1 as every watch gladly retires from its post4 ,this withdrawal is going to sleep1 which is therefore so sweet and agreeable1 and to which we are so glad to yield2 on the other hand1 being roused from sleep is unwelcome1 because it recalls the vedette suddenly to its post4 ,one generally feels also after the beneficent systole the reappearance of the difficult diastole1 the reseparation of the intellect from the will4 ,a so-called soul1 which was originally and radically a knowing being1 would1 on the contrary1 necessarily feel on awaking like a fish put back into water4 ,in sleep1 when merely the vegetative life is carried on1 the will works only according to its original and essential nature1 undisturbed from without1 with no diminution of its power through the activity of the brain and the exertion of knowing1 which is the heaviest organic function1 yet for the organism merely a means1 not an end2 therefore1 in sleep the whole power of the will is directed to the maintenance and1 where it is necessary1 the improvement of the organism4 ,hence all healing1 all favourable crises1 take place in sleep2 for the vis natur medicatrix has free play only when it is delivered from the burden of the function of knowledge4 ,the embryo which has still to form the body therefore sleeps continuously1 and the new-born child the greater part of its time4 ,in this sense ,burdach 7,physiologie1 vol4 iii4 p4 #dhd7 quite rightly declares sleep to be the original state4 ,with reference to the brain itself1 ,i account to myself for the necessity of sleep more fully through an hypothesis which appears to have been first set up in ,neumann's book1 8,von den ,krankheiten des ,menschen10 #ahcd1 vol4 #d1 #baf4 ,it is this1 that the nutrition of the brain1 thus the renewal of its substance from the blood1 cannot go on while we are awake1 because the very eminent organic function of knowing and thinking would be disturbed or put an end to by the low and material function of nutrition4 ,this explains the fact that sleep is not a purely negative condition1 a mere pausing of the activity of the brain1 but also shows a positive character4 ,this makes itself known through the circumstance that between sleep and waking there is no mere difference of degree1 but a fixed boundary1 which1 as soon as sleep intervenes1 declares itself in dreams which are completely different from our immediately preceding thoughts4 ,a further proof of this is that when we have dreams which frighten us we try in vain to cry out1 or to ward off attacks1 or to shake off sleep2 so that it is as if the connecting-link between the brain and the motor nerves1 or between the cerebrum and the cerebellum 7as the regulator of movements7 were abolished2 for the brain remains in its isolation and sleep holds us fast as with brazen claws4 ,finally1 the positive character of sleep can be seen in the fact that a certain degree of strength is required for sleeping4 ,therefore too great fatigue or natural weakness prevent us from seizing it1 capere somnum4 ,this may be explained from the fact that the process of nutrition must be introduced if sleep is to ensue3 the brain must1 as it were1 begin to feed4 ,moreover1 the increased flow of blood into the brain during sleep is explicable from the nutritive process2 and also the position of the arms laid together above the head1 which is instinctively assumed because it furthers this process3 also why children1 so long as their brain is still growing1 require a great deal of sleep1 while in old age1 on the other hand1 when a certain atrophy of the brain1 as of all the parts1 takes place1 sleep is short2 and finally why excessive sleep produces a certain dulness of consciousness1 the consequence of a certain hypertrophy of the brain1 which in the case of habitual excess of sleep may become permanent and produce imbecility3 7nox est etiam multus somnus71 ,od4 #ae1 #cid4 ,the need of sleep is therefore directly proportionate to the intensity of the brain-life1 thus to the clearness of the consciousness4 ,those animals whose brain-life is weak and dull sleep little and lightly2 for example1 reptiles and fishes3 and here ,i must remind the reader that the winter sleep is sleep almost only in name1 for it is not an inaction of the brain alone1 but of the whole organism1 thus a kind of apparent death4 ,animals of considerable intelligence sleep deeply and long4 ,men also require more sleep the more developed1 both as regards quantity and quality1 and the more active their brain is4 ,montaigne relates of himself that he had always been a long sleeper1 that he had passed a large part of his life in sleeping1 and at an advanced age still slept from eight to nine hours at a time 7,liv4 iii41 chap4 #ac74 ,descartes also is reported to have slept a great deal 7,baillet1 ,vie de ,descartes1 #afic1 p4 #bhh74 ,kant allowed himself seven hours for sleep1 but it was so hard for him to do with this that he ordered his servant to force him against his will1 and without listening to his remonstrances1 to get up at the set time 7,jachmann1 ,immanuel ,kant1 p4 #afb74 ,for the more completely awake a man is1 i4e41 the clearer and more lively his consciousness1 the greater for him is the necessity of sleep1 thus the deeper and longer he sleeps4 ,accordingly much thinking or hard brain-work increases the need of sleep4 ,that sustained muscular exertion also makes us sleepy is to be explained from the fact that in this the brain continuously1 by means of the medulla oblongata1 the spinal marrow1 and the motor nerves1 imparts the stimulus to the muscles which affects their irritability1 and in this way it exhausts its strength4 ,the fatigue which we observe in the arms and legs has accordingly its real seat in the brain2 just as the pain which these parts feel is really experienced in the brain2 for it is connected with the motor nerves1 as with the nerves of sense4 ,the muscles which are not actuated from the brain--for example1 those of the heart--accordingly never tire4 ,the same grounds explain the fact that both during and after great muscular exertion we cannot think acutely4 ,that one has far less energy of mind in summer than in winter is partly explicable from the fact that in summer one sleeps less2 for the deeper one has slept1 the more completely awake1 the more lively1 is one afterwards4 ,this1 however1 must not mislead us into extending sleep unduly1 for then it loses in intension1 i4e41 in deepness and soundness1 what it gains in extension2 whereby it becomes mere loss of time4 ,this is what ,goethe means when he says 7in the second part of 8,faust07 of morning slumber3 8,sleep is husk3 throw it off40 ,thus in general the phenomenon of sleep most specially confirms the assertion that consciousness1 apprehension1 knowing1 thinking1 is nothing original in us1 but a conditioned and secondary state4 ,it is a luxury of nature1 and indeed its highest1 which it can therefore the less afford to pursue without interruption the higher the pitch to which it has been brought4 ,it is the product1 the efflorescence of the cerebral nerve-system1 which is itself nourished like a parasite by the rest of the organism4 ,this also agrees with what is shown in our third book1 that knowing is so much the purer and more perfect the more it has freed and severed itself from the will1 whereby the purely objective1 the sthetic comprehension appears4 ,just as an extract is so much the purer the more it has been separated from that out of which it is extracted and been cleared of all sediment4 ,the opposite is shown by the will1 whose most immediate manifestation is the whole organic life1 and primarily the untiring heart4 ,this last consideration is related to the theme of the following chapter1 to which it therefore makes the transition3 yet the following observation belongs to it4 ,in magnetic somnambulism the consciousness is doubled3 two trains of knowledge1 each connected in itself1 but quite different from each other1 arise2 the waking consciousness knows nothing of the somnambulent4 ,but the will retains in both the same character1 and remains throughout identical2 it expresses in both the same inclinations and aversions4 ,for the function may be doubled1 but not the true nature4 ,chapter ,,xx47#cd7 ,objectification ,of ,the ,will ,in ,the ,animal ,organism4 ,by objectification ,i understand the self-exhibition in the real corporeal world4 ,however1 this world itself1 as was fully shown in the first book and its supplements1 is throughout conditioned by the knowing subject1 thus by the intellect1 and therefore as such is absolutely inconceivable outside the knowledge of this subject2 for it primarily consists simply of ideas of perception1 and as such is a phenomenon of the brain4 ,after its removal the thing in itself would remain4 ,that this is the will is the theme of the second book1 and is there proved first of all in the human organism and in that of the brutes4 ,the knowledge of the external world may also be defined as the consciousness of other things1 in opposition to self-consciousness4 ,since we have found in the latter that its true object or material is the will1 we shall now1 with the same intention1 take into consideration the consciousness of other things1 thus objective knowledge4 ,now here my thesis is this3 that which in self-consciousness1 thus subjectively is the intellect1 presents itself in the consciousness of other things1 thus objectively1 as the brain2 and that which in self-consciousness1 thus subjectively1 is the will1 presents itself in the consciousness of other things1 thus objectively1 as the whole organism4 ,to the evidence which is given in support of this proposition1 both in our second book and in the first two chapters of the treatise 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 ,i add the following supplementary remarks and illustrations4 ,nearly all that is necessary to establish the first part of this thesis has already been brought forward in the preceding chapter1 for in the necessity of sleep1 in the alterations that arise from age1 and in the differences of the anatomical conformation1 it was proved that the intellect is of a secondary nature1 and depends absolutely upon a single organ1 the brain1 whose function it is1 just as grasping is the function of the hand2 that it is therefore physical1 like digestion1 not metaphysical1 like the will4 ,as good digestion requires a healthy1 strong stomach1 as athletic power requires muscular sinewy arms1 so extraordinary intelligence requires an unusually developed1 beautifully formed brain of exquisitely fine texture and animated by a vigorous pulse4 ,the nature of the will1 on the contrary1 is dependent upon no organ1 and can be prognosticated from none4 ,the greatest error in ,gall's phrenology is that he assigns organs of the brain for moral qualities also4 ,injuries to the head1 with loss of brain substance1 affect the intellect as a rule very disadvantageously3 they result in complete or partial imbecility or forgetfulness of language1 permanent or temporary1 yet sometimes only of one language out of several which were known1 also in the loss of other knowledge possessed1 c41 c4 ,on the other hand1 we never read that after a misfortune of this kind the character has undergone a change1 that the man has perhaps become morally worse or better1 or has lost certain inclinations or passions1 or assumed new ones2 never4 ,for the will has not its seat in the brain1 and moreover1 as that which is metaphysical1 it is the prius of the brain1 as of the whole body1 and therefore cannot be altered by injuries of the brain4 ,according to an experiment made by ,spallanzani and repeated by ,voltaire17#ce7 a snail that has had its head cut off remains alive1 and after some weeks a new head grows on1 together with horns2 with this consciousness and ideas again appear2 while till then the snail had only given evidence of blind will through unregulated movements4 ,thus here also we find the will as the substance which is permanent1 the intellect1 on the contrary1 conditioned by its organ1 as the changing accident4 ,it may be defined as the regulator of the will4 ,it was perhaps ,tiedemann who first compared the cerebral nervous system to a parasite 7,tiedemann und ,trevirann's ,journal fr ,physiologie1 ,bd4 i4 #fb74 ,the comparison is happy2 for the brain1 together with the spinal cord and nerves which depend upon it1 is1 as it were1 implanted in the organism1 and is nourished by it without on its part directly contributing anything to the support of the economy of the organism2 therefore there can be life without a brain1 as in the case of brainless abortions1 and also in the case of tortoises1 which live for three weeks after their heads have been cut off2 only the medulla oblongata1 as the organ of respiration1 must be spared4 ,indeed a hen whose whole brain ,flourens had cut away lived for ten months and grew4 ,even in the case of men the destruction of the brain does not produce death directly1 but only through the medium of the lungs1 and then of the heart 7,bichat1 ,sur la ,vie et la ,mort1 ,part ii41 art4 ii4 #a74 ,on the other hand1 the brain controls the relations to the external world2 this alone is its office1 and hereby it discharges its debt to the organism which nourishes it1 since its existence is conditioned by the external relations4 ,accordingly the brain alone of all the parts requires sleep1 because its activity is completely distinct from its support2 the former only consumes both strength and substance1 the latter is performed by the rest of the organism as the nurse of the brain3 thus because its activity contributes nothing to its continued existence it becomes exhausted1 and only when it pauses in sleep does its nourishment go on unhindered4 ,the second part of our thesis1 stated above1 will require a fuller exposition even after all that ,i have said about it in the writings referred to4 ,i have shown above1 in chapter #ah1 that the thing in itself1 which must lie at the foundation of every phenomenon1 and therefore of our own phenomenal existence also1 throws off in self-consciousness one of its phenomenal forms--space1 and only retains the other--time4 ,on this account it presents itself here more immediately than anywhere else1 and we claim it as will1 according to its most undisguised manifestation4 ,but no permanent substance1 such as matter is1 can present itself in time alone1 because1 as #d of the first volume showed1 such a substance is only possible through the intimate union of space and time4 ,therefore1 in self-consciousness the will is not apprehended as the enduring substratum of its impulses1 therefore is not perceived as a permanent substance2 but only its individual acts1 such as purposes1 wishes1 and emotions1 are known successively and during the time they last1 directly1 yet not perceptibly4 ,the knowledge of the will in self-consciousness is accordingly not a perception of it1 but a perfectly direct becoming aware of its successive impulses4 ,on the other hand1 for the knowledge which is directed outwardly1 brought about by the senses and perfected in the understanding1 which1 besides time1 has also space for its form1 which two it connects in the closest manner by means of the function of the understanding1 causality1 whereby it really becomes perception--this knowledge presents to itself perceptibly what in inner immediate apprehension was conceived as will1 as organic body1 whose particular movements visibly present to us the acts1 and whose parts and forms visibly present to us the sustained efforts1 the fundamental character1 of the individually given will1 nay1 whose pain and comfort are perfectly immediate affections of this will itself4 ,we first become aware of this identity of the body with the will in the individual actions of the two1 for in these what is known in self-consciousness as an immediate1 real act of will1 at the same time and unseparated1 exhibits itself outwardly as movement of the body2 and every one beholds the purposes of his will1 which are instantaneously brought about by motives which just as instantaneously appear at once as faithfully copied in as many actions of his body as his body itself is copied in his shadow2 and from this1 for the unprejudiced man1 the knowledge arises in the simplest manner that his body is merely the outward manifestation of his will1 i4e41 the way in which his will exhibits itself in his perceiving intellect1 or his will itself under the form of the idea4 ,only if we forcibly deprive ourselves of this primary and simple information can we for a short time marvel at the process of our own bodily action as a miracle1 which then rests on the fact that between the act of will and the action of the body there is really no causal connection1 for they are directly identical1 and their apparent difference only arises from the circumstance that here what is one and the same is apprehended in two different modes of knowledge1 the outer and the inner4 ,actual willing is1 in fact1 inseparable from doing and in the strictest sense only that is an act of will which the deed sets its seal to4 ,mere resolves of the will1 on the contrary1 till they are carried out1 are only intentions1 and are therefore matter of the intellect alone2 as such they have their place merely in the brain1 and are nothing more than completed calculations of the relative strength of the different opposing motives4 ,they have1 therefore1 certainly great probability1 but no infallibility4 ,they may turn out false1 not only through alteration of the circumstances1 but also from the fact that the estimation of the effect of the respective motives upon the will itself was erroneous1 which then shows itself1 for the deed is untrue to the purpose3 therefore before it is carried out no resolve is certain4 ,the will itself1 then1 is operative only in real action2 hence in muscular action1 and consequently in irritability4 ,thus the will proper objectifies itself in this4 ,the cerebrum is the place of motives1 where1 through these1 the will becomes choice1 i4e41 becomes more definitely determined by motives4 ,these motives are ideas1 which1 on the occasion of external stimuli of the organs of sense1 arise by means of the functions of the brain1 and are also worked up into conceptions1 and then into resolves4 ,when it comes to the real act of will these motives1 the workshop of which is the cerebrum1 act through the medium of the cerebellum upon the spinal cord and the motor nerves which proceed from it1 which then act upon the muscles1 yet merely as stimuli of their irritability2 for galvanic1 chemical1 and even mechanical stimuli can effect the same contraction which the motor nerve calls forth4 ,thus what was motive in the brain acts1 when it reaches the muscle through the nerves1 as mere stimulus4 ,sensibility in itself is quite unable to contract a muscle4 ,this can only be done by the muscle itself1 and its capacity for doing so is called irritability1 i4e41 susceptibility to stimuli4 ,it is exclusively a property of the muscle1 as sensibility is exclusively a property of the nerve4 ,the latter indeed gives the muscle the occasion for its contraction1 but it is by no means it that1 in some mechanical way1 draws the muscle together2 but this happens simply and solely on account of the irritability1 which is a power of the muscle itself4 ,apprehended from without this is a ,qualitas occulta1 and only self-consciousness reveals it as the will4 ,in the causal chain here briefly set forth1 from the effect of the motive lying outside us to the contraction of the muscle1 the will does not in some way come in as the last link of the chain2 but it is the metaphysical substratum of the irritability of the muscle3 thus it plays here precisely the same part which in a physical or chemical chain of causes is played by the mysterious forces of nature which lie at the foundation of the process--forces which as such are not themselves involved as links in the causal chain1 but impart to all the links of it the capacity to act1 as ,i have fully shown in #bf of the first volume4 ,therefore we would ascribe the contraction of the muscle also to a similar mysterious force of nature1 if it were not that this contraction is disclosed to us by an entirely different source of knowledge--self-consciousness as will4 ,hence1 as was said above1 if we start from the will our own muscular movement appears to us a miracle2 for indeed there is a strict causal chain from the external motive to the muscular action2 but the will itself is not included as a link in it1 but1 as the metaphysical substratum of the possibility of an action upon the muscle through brain and nerve1 lies at the foundation of the present muscular action also2 therefore the latter is not properly its effect but its manifestation4 ,as such it enters the world of idea1 the form of which is the law of causality1 a world which is entirely different from the will in itself3 and thus1 if we start from the will1 this manifestation has1 for attentive reflection1 the appearance of a miracle1 but for deeper investigation it affords the most direct authentication of the great truth that what appears in the phenomenon as body and its action is in itself will4 ,if now perhaps the motor nerve that leads to my hand is severed1 the will can no longer move it4 ,this1 however1 is not because the hand has ceased to be1 like every part of my body1 the objectivity1 the mere visibility1 of my will1 or in other words1 that the irritability has vanished1 but because the effect of the motive1 in consequence of which alone ,i can move my hand1 cannot reach it and act on its muscles as a stimulus1 for the line of connection between it and the brain is broken4 ,thus really my will is1 in this part1 only deprived of the effect of the motive4 ,the will objectifies itself directly1 in irritability1 not in sensibility4 ,in order to prevent all misunderstandings about this important point1 especially such as proceed from physiology pursued in a purely empirical manner1 ,i shall explain the whole process somewhat more thoroughly4 ,my doctrine asserts that the whole body is the will itself1 exhibiting itself in the perception of the brain2 consequently1 having entered into its forms of knowledge4 ,from this it follows that the will is everywhere equally present in the whole body1 as is also demonstrably the case1 for the organic functions are its work no less than the animal4 ,but how1 then1 can we reconcile it with this1 that the voluntary actions1 those most undeniable expressions of the will1 clearly originate in the brain1 and thus only through the spinal cord reach the nerve fibres1 which finally set the limbs in motion1 and the paralysis or severing of which therefore prevents the possibility of voluntary movement8 ,this would lead one to think that the will1 like the intellect1 has its seat only in the brain1 and1 like it1 is a mere function of the brain4 ,yet this is not the case3 but the whole body is and remains the exhibition of the will in perception1 thus the will itself objectively perceived by means of the functions of the brain4 ,that process1 however1 in the case of the acts of will1 depends upon the fact that the will1 which1 according to my doctrine1 expresses itself in every phenomenon of nature1 even in vegetable and inorganic phenomena1 appears in the bodies of men and animals as a conscious will4 ,a consciousness1 however1 is essentially a unity1 and therefore always requires a central point of unity4 ,the necessity of consciousness is1 as ,i have often explained1 occasioned by the fact that in consequence of the increased complication1 and thereby more multifarious wants1 of an organism1 the acts of its will must be guided by motives1 no longer1 as in the lower grades1 by mere stimuli4 ,for this purpose it had at this stage to appear provided with a knowing consciousness1 thus with an intellect1 as the medium and place of the motives4 ,this intellect1 if itself objectively perceived1 exhibits itself as the brain1 together with its appendages1 spinal cord1 and nerves4 ,it is the brain now in which1 on the occasion of external impressions1 the ideas arise which become motives for the will4 ,but in the rational intellect they undergo besides this a still further working up1 through reflection and deliberation4 ,thus such an intellect must first of all unite in one point all impressions1 together with the working up of them by its functions1 whether to mere perception or to conceptions1 a point which will be1 as it were1 the focus of all its rays1 in order that that unity of consciousness may arise which is the the theoretical ego1 the supporter of the whole consciousness1 in which it presents itself as identical with the willing ego1 whose mere function of knowledge it is4 ,that point of unity of consciousness1 or the theoretical ego1 is just ,kant's synthetic unity of apperception1 upon which all ideas string themselves as on a string of pearls1 and on account of which the 8,i think10 as the thread of the string of pearls1 8must be capable of accompanying all our ideas407#cf7 ,this assembling-place of the motives1 then1 where their entrance into the single focus of consciousness takes place1 is the brain4 ,here1 in the non-rational consciousness1 they are merely perceived2 in the rational consciousness they are elucidated by conceptions1 thus are first thought in the abstract and compared2 upon which the will chooses1 in accordance with its individual and immutable character1 and so the purpose results which now1 by means of the cerebellum1 the spinal cord1 and the nerves1 sets the outward limbs in motion4 ,for although the will is quite directly present in these1 inasmuch as they are merely its manifestation1 yet when it has to move according to motives1 or indeed according to reflection1 it requires such an apparatus for the apprehension and working up of ideas into such motives1 in conformity with which its acts here appear as resolves3 just as the nourishment of the blood with chyle requires a stomach and intestines1 in which this is prepared1 and then as such is poured into the blood through the ductus thoracicus1 which here plays the part which the spinal cord plays in the former case4 ,the matter may be most simply and generally comprehended thus3 the will is immediately present as irritability in all the muscular fibres of the whole body1 as a continual striving after activity in general4 ,now if this striving is to realise itself1 thus to manifest itself as movement1 this movement must as such have some direction2 but this direction must be determined by something1 i4e41 it requires a guide1 and this is the nervous system4 ,for to the mere irritability1 as it lies in the muscular fibres and in itself is pure will1 all directions are alike2 thus it determines itself in no direction1 but behaves like a body which is equally drawn in all directions2 it remains at rest4 ,since the activity of the nerves comes in as motive 7in the case of reflex movements as a stimulus71 the striving force1 i4e41 the irritability1 receives a definite direction1 and now produces the movements4 ,yet those external acts of will which require no motives1 and thus also no working up of mere stimuli into ideas in the brain1 from which motives arise1 but which follow immediately upon stimuli1 for the most part inward stimuli1 are the reflex movements1 starting only from the spinal cord1 as1 for example1 spasms and cramp1 in which the will acts without the brain taking part4 ,in an analogous manner the will carries on the organic life1 also by nerve stimulus1 which does not proceed from the brain4 ,thus the will appears in every muscle as irritability1 and is consequently of itself in a position to contract them1 yet only in general2 in order that some definite contraction should take place at a given moment1 there is required here1 as everywhere1 a cause1 which in this case must be a stimulus4 ,this is everywhere given by the nerve which goes into the muscle4 ,if this nerve is in connection with the brain1 then the contraction is a conscious act of will1 i4e41 takes place in accordance with motives1 which1 in consequence of external impressions1 have arisen as ideas in the brain4 ,if the nerve is not in connection with the brain1 but with the sympathicus maximus1 then the contraction is involuntary and unconscious1 an act connected with the maintenance of the organic life1 and the nerve stimulus which causes it is occasioned by inward impressions2 for example1 by the pressure upon the stomach of the food received1 or of the chyme upon the intestines1 or of the in-flowing blood upon the walls of the heart1 in accordance with which the act is digestion1 or motus peristalticus1 or beating of the heart1 c4 ,but if now1 in this process1 we go one step further1 we find that the muscles are the product of the blood1 the result of its work of condensation1 nay1 to a certain extent they are merely solidified1 or1 as it were1 clotted or crystallised blood2 for they have taken up into themselves1 almost unaltered1 its fibrin 7cruor7 and its colouring matter 7,burdach's ,physiologie1 ,bd4 v4 #fhf74 ,but the force which forms the muscle out of the blood must not be assumed to be different from that which afterwards moves it as irritability1 upon nerve stimulus1 which the brain supplies2 in which case it then presents itself in self-consciousness as that which we call will4 ,the close connection between the blood and irritability is also shown by this1 that where1 on account of imperfection of the lesser circulation1 part of the blood returns to the heart unoxidised1 the irritability is also uncommonly weak1 as in the batrachia4 ,moreover1 the movement of the blood1 like that of the muscle1 is independent and original2 it does not1 like irritation1 require the influence of the nerve1 and is even independent of the heart1 as is shown most clearly by the return of the blood through the veins to the heart2 for here it is not propelled by a vis a tergo1 as in the case of the arterial circulation2 and all other mechanical explanations1 such as a power of suction of the right ventricle of the heart1 are quite inadequate4 7,see ,burdach's ,physiologie1 ,bd4 #d1 #gfc1 and ,rsch1 ,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,blutes1 ,,ii1 seq47 ,it is remarkable to see how the ,french1 who recognise nothing but mechanical forces1 controvert each other with insufficient grounds upon both sides2 and ,bichat ascribes the flowing back of the blood through the veins to the pressure of the walls of the capillary tubes1 and ,magendie1 on the other hand1 to the continue action of the impulse of the heart 7,prcis de ,physiologie par ,magendie1 vol4 ii4 p4 #chi74 ,that the movement of the blood is also independent of the nervous system1 at least of the cerebral nervous system1 is shown by the fetus1 which 7according to ,mller's ,physiologie71 without brain and spinal cord1 has yet circulation of the blood4 ,and ,flourens also says3 8,le mouvement du cur1 pris en soi1 et abstraction faite de tout ce qui n'est pas essentiellement lui1 comme sa dure1 son nergie1 ne dpend ni immdiatement1 ni coinstantanment1 du systme nerveux central1 et consquemment c'est dans tout autre point de ce systme que dans les centres nerveux eux-mmes1 qu'il faut chercher le principe primitif et immdiat de ce mouvement0 7,annales des sciences naturelles p4 ,audouin et ,brougniard1 #ahbh1 vol4 #ac74 ,cuvier also says3 8,la circulation survit la dstruction de tout l'encphale et de toute la molle piniaire 7,mm4 de l'acad4 d4 sc41 #ahbc1 vol4 #f2 ,hist4 d4 l'acad4 p4 ,cuvier10 p4 cxxx74 8,cor primum vivens et ultimum moriens10 says ,haller4 ,the beating of the heart ceases at last in death4 ,the blood has made the vessels themselves2 for it appears in the ovum earlier than they do2 they are only its path1 voluntarily taken1 then beaten smooth1 and finally gradually condensed and closed up2 as ,kaspar ,wolff has already taught3 8,theorie der ,generation10 #cj-ce4 ,the motion of the heart also1 which is inseparable from that of the blood1 although occasioned by the necessity of sending blood into the lungs1 is yet an original motion1 for it is independent of the nervous system and of sensibility1 as ,burdach fully shows4 8,in the heart10 he says1 8appears1 with the maximum of irritability1 a minimum of sensibility0 7loc4 cit41 #gfi74 ,the heart belongs to the muscular system as well as to the blood or vascular system2 from which1 however1 it is clear that the two are closely related1 indeed constitute one whole4 ,since now the metaphysical substratum of the force which moves the muscle1 thus of irritability1 is the will1 the will must also be the metaphysical substratum of the force which lies at the foundation of the movement and the formations of the blood1 as that by which the muscles are produced4 ,the course of the arteries also determines the form and size of all the limbs2 consequently the whole form of the body is determined by the course of the blood4 ,thus in general the blood1 as it nourishes all the parts of the body1 has also1 as the primary fluidity of the organism1 produced and framed them out of itself4 ,and the nourishment which confessedly constitutes the principal function of the blood is only the continuance of that original production of them4 ,this truth will be found thoroughly and excellently explained in the work of ,rsch referred to above3 8,ueber die ,bedeutung des ,blutes10 #ahci4 ,he shows that the blood is that which first has life and is the source both of the existence and of the maintenance of all the parts2 that all the organs have sprung from it through secretion1 and together with them1 for the management of their functions1 the nervous system1 which appears now as plastic1 ordering and arranging the life of the particular parts within1 now as cerebral1 controlling the relation to the external world4 8,the blood10 he says1 p4 #be1 8was flesh and nerve at once1 and at the same moment at which the muscle freed itself from it the nerve1 severed in like manner1 remained opposed to the flesh40 ,here it is a matter of course that the blood1 before those solid parts have been secreted from it1 has also a somewhat different character from afterwards2 it is then1 as ,rsch defines it1 the chaotic1 animated1 slimy1 primitive fluid1 as it were an organic emulsion1 in which all subsequent parts are implicite contained3 moreover1 it has not the red colour quite at the beginning4 ,this disposes of the objection which might be drawn from the fact that the brain and the spinal cord begin to form before the circulation of the blood is visible or the heart appears4 ,in this reference also ,schultz says 7,system der ,circulation1 #big73 8,we do not believe that the view of ,bamgrten1 according to which the nervous system is formed earlier than the blood1 can consistently be carried out2 for ,bamgrten reckons the appearance of the blood only from the formation of the corpuscles1 while in the embryo and in the series of animals blood appears much earlier in the form of a pure plasma40 ,the blood of invertebrate animals never assumes the red colour2 but we do not therefore1 with ,aristotle1 deny that they have any4 ,it is well worthy of note that1 according to the account of ,justinus ,kerner 7,geschichte zweier ,somnambulen1 #gh71 a somnambulist of a very high degree of clairvoyance1 says3 8,i am as deep in myself as ever a man can be led2 the force of my mortal life seems to me to have its source in the blood1 whereby1 through the circulation in the veins1 it communicates itself1 by means of the nerves1 to the whole body1 and to the brain1 which is the noblest part of the body1 and above the blood itself40 ,from all this it follows that the will objectifies itself most immediately in the blood as that which originally makes and forms the organism1 perfects it by growth1 and afterwards constantly maintains it1 both by the regular renewal of all the parts and by the extraordinary restoration of any part that may have been injured4 ,the first productions of the blood are its own vessels1 and then the muscles1 in the irritability of which the will makes itself known to self-consciousness2 but with this also the heart1 which is at once vessel and muscle1 and therefore is the true centre and primum mobile of the whole life4 ,but for the individual life and subsistence in the external world the will now requires two assistant systems3 one to govern and order its inner and outer activity1 and another for the constant renewal of the mass of the blood2 thus a controller and a sustainer4 ,it therefore makes for itself the nervous and the intestinal systems2 thus the functiones animales and the functiones naturales associate themselves in a subsidiary manner with the functiones vitales1 which are the most original and essential4 ,in the nervous system1 accordingly1 the will only objectifies itself in an indirect and secondary way2 for this system appears as a mere auxiliary organ1 as a contrivance by means of which the will attains to a knowledge of those occasions1 internal and external1 upon which1 in conformity with its aims1 it must express itself2 the internal occasions are received by the plastic nervous system1 thus by the sympathetic nerve1 this cerebrum abdominale1 as mere stimuli1 and the will thereupon reacts on the spot without the brain being conscious2 the outward occasions are received by the brain1 as motives1 and the will reacts through conscious actions directed outwardly4 ,therefore the whole nervous system constitutes1 as it were1 the antenn of the will1 which it stretches towards within and without4 ,the nerves of the brain and spinal cord separate at their roots into sensory and motory nerves4 ,the sensory nerves receive the knowledge from without1 which now accumulates in the thronging brain1 and is there worked up into ideas1 which arise primarily as motives4 ,but the motory nerves bring back1 like couriers1 the result of the brain function to the muscle1 upon which it acts as a stimulus1 and the irritability of which is the immediate manifestation of the will4 ,presumably the plastic nerves also divide into sensory and motory1 although on a subordinate scale4 ,the part which the ganglia play in the organism we must think of as that of a diminutive brain1 and thus the one throws light upon the other4 ,the ganglia lie wherever the organic functions of the vegetative system require care4 ,it is as if there the will was not able by its direct and simple action to carry out its aims1 but required guidance1 and consequently control2 just as when in some business a man's own memory is not sufficient1 and he must constantly take notes of what he does4 ,for this end mere knots of nerves are sufficient for the interior of the organism1 because everything goes on within its own compass4 ,for the exterior1 on the other hand1 a very complicated contrivance of the same kind is required4 ,this is the brain with its feelers1 which it stretches into the outer world1 the nerves of sense4 ,but even in the organs which are in communication with this great nerve centre1 in very simple cases the matter does not need to be brought before the highest authority1 but a subordinate one is sufficient to determine what is needed2 such is the spinal cord1 in the reflex actions discovered by ,marshall ,hall1 such as sneezing1 yawning1 vomiting1 the second half of swallowing1 c4 c4 ,the will itself is present in the whole organism1 since this is merely its visible form2 the nervous system exists everywhere merely for the purpose of making the direction of an action possible by a control of it1 as it were to serve the will as a mirror1 so that it may see what it does1 just as we use a mirror to shave by4 ,hence small sensoria arise within us for special1 and consequently simple1 functions1 the ganglia2 but the chief sensorium1 the brain1 is the great and skilfully contrived apparatus for the complicated and multifarious functions which have to do with the ceaselessly and irregularly changing external world4 ,wherever in the organism the nerve threads run together in a ganglion1 there1 to a certain extent1 an animal exists for itself and shut off1 which by means of the ganglion has a kind of weak knowledge1 the sphere of which is1 however1 limited to the part from which these nerves directly come4 ,but what actuates these parts to such quasi knowledge is clearly the will2 indeed we are utterly unable to conceive it otherwise4 ,upon this depends the vita propria of each part1 and also in the case of insects1 which1 instead of a spinal cord1 have a double string of nerves1 with ganglia at regular intervals1 the capacity of each part to continue alive for days after being severed from the head and the rest of the trunk2 and finally also the actions which in the last instance do not receive their motives from the brain1 i4e41 instinct and natural mechanical skill4 ,marshall ,hall1 whose discovery of the reflex movements ,i have mentioned above1 has given us in this the theory of involuntary movements4 ,some of these are normal or physiological2 such are the closing of the places of ingress to and egress from the body1 thus of the sphincteres vesic et ani 7proceeding from the nerves of the spinal cord72 the closing of the eyelids in sleep 7from the fifth pair of nerves71 of the larynx 7from ,n4 vagus7 if food passes over it or carbonic acid tries to enter2 also swallowing1 from the pharynx1 yawning and sneezing1 respiration1 entirely in sleep and partly when awake2 and1 lastly1 the erection1 ejaculation1 as also conception1 and many more4 ,some1 again1 are abnormal and pathological2 such are stammering1 hiccoughing1 vomiting1 also cramps and convulsions of every kind1 especially in epilepsy1 tetanus1 in hydrophobia and otherwise2 finally1 the convulsive movements produced by galvanic or other stimuli1 and which take place without feeling or consciousness in paralysed limbs1 i4e41 in limbs which are out of connection with the brain1 also the convulsions of beheaded animals1 and1 lastly1 all movements and actions of children born without brains4 ,all cramps are a rebellion of the nerves of the limbs against the sovereignty of the brain2 the normal reflex movements1 on the other hand1 are the legitimate autocracy of the subordinate officials4 ,these movements are thus all involuntary1 because they do not proceed from the brain1 and therefore do not take place in accordance with motives1 but follow upon mere stimuli4 ,the stimuli which occasion them extend only to the spinal cord or the medulla oblongata1 and from there the reaction directly takes place which effects the movement4 ,the spinal cord has the same relation to these involuntary movements as the brain has to motive and action1 and what the sentient and voluntary nerve is for the latter the incident and motor nerve is for the former4 ,that yet1 in the one as in the other1 that which really moves is the will is brought all the more clearly to light because the involuntarily moved muscles are for the most part the same which1 under other circumstances1 are moved from the brain in the voluntary actions1 in which their primum mobile is intimately known to us through self-consciousness as the will4 ,marshall ,hall's excellent book 8,on the ,diseases of the ,nervous ,system0 is peculiarly fitted to bring out clearly the difference between volition and will1 and to confirm the truth of my fundamental doctrine4 ,for the sake of illustrating all that has been said1 let us now call to mind that case of the origination of an organism which is most accessible to our observation4 ,who makes the chicken in the egg8 ,some power and skill coming from without1 and penetrating through the shell8 ,oh no6 ,the chicken makes itself1 and the force which carries out and perfects this work1 which is complicated1 well calculated1 and designed beyond all expression1 breaks through the shell as soon as it is ready1 and now performs the outward actions of the chicken1 under the name of will4 ,it cannot do both at once2 previously occupied with the perfecting of the organism1 it had no care for without4 ,but after it has completed the former1 the latter appears1 under the guidance of the brain and its feelers1 the senses1 as a tool prepared beforehand for this end1 the service of which only begins when it grows up in self-consciousness as intellect1 which is the lantern to the steps of the will1 its 1 and also the supporter of the objective external world1 however limited the horizon of this may be in the consciousness of a hen4 ,but what the hen is now able to do in the external world1 through the medium of this organ1 is1 as accomplished by means of something secondary1 infinitely less important than what it did in its original form1 for it made itself4 ,we became acquainted above with the cerebral nervous system as an assistant organ of the will1 in which it therefore objectifies itself in a secondary manner4 ,as thus the cerebral system1 although not directly coming within the sphere of the life-functions of the organism1 but only governing its relations to the outer world1 has yet the organism as its basis1 and is nourished by it in return for its services2 and as thus the cerebral or animal life is to be regarded as the production of the organic life1 the brain and its function1 knowledge1 thus the intellect1 belong indirectly and in a subordinate manner to the manifestation of the will4 ,the will objectifies itself also in it1 as will to apprehend the external world1 thus as will to know4 ,therefore great and fundamental as is the difference in us between willing and knowing1 the ultimate substratum of both is yet the same1 the will1 as the real inner nature of the whole phenomenon4 ,but knowing1 the intellect1 which presents itself in self-consciousness entirely as secondary1 is to be regarded not only as the accident of the will1 but also as its work1 and thus1 although in a circuitous manner1 is yet to be referred to it4 ,as the intellect presents itself physiologically as the function of an organ of the body1 metaphysically it is to be regarded as a work of the will1 whose objectification or visible appearance is the whole body4 ,thus the will to know1 objectively perceived1 is the brain2 as the will to go1 objectively perceived1 is the foot2 the will to grasp1 the hand2 the will to digest1 the stomach2 the will to beget1 the genitals1 c4 ,this whole objectification certainly ultimately exists only for the brain1 as its perception3 in this the will exhibits itself as organised body4 ,but so far as the brain knows1 it is itself not known1 but is the knower1 the subject of all knowledge4 ,so far1 however1 as in objective perception1 i4e41 in the consciousness of other things1 thus secondarily1 it is known1 it belongs1 as an organ of the body1 to the objectification of the will4 ,for the whole process is the self-knowledge of the will2 it starts from this and returns to it1 and constitutes what ,kant has called the phenomenon in opposition to the thing in itself4 ,therefore that which is known1 that which is idea1 is the will2 and this idea is what we call body1 which1 as extended in space and moving in time1 exists only by means of the functions of the brain1 thus only in it4 ,that1 on the other hand1 which knows1 which has that idea1 is the brain1 which yet does not know itself1 but only becomes conscious of itself subjectively as intellect1 i4e41 as the knower4 ,that which when regarded from within is the faculty of knowledge is when regarded from without the brain4 ,this brain is a part of that body1 just because it itself belongs to the objectification of the will1 the will's will to know is objectified in it1 its tendency towards the external world4 ,accordingly the brain1 and therefore the intellect1 is certainly conditioned immediately by the body1 and this again by the brain1 yet only indirectly1 as spatial and corporeal1 in the world of perception1 not in itself1 i4e41 as will4 ,thus the whole is ultimately the will1 which itself becomes idea1 and is that unity which we express by ,i4 ,the brain itself1 so far as it is perceived--thus in the consciousness of other things1 and hence secondarily--is only idea4 ,but in itself1 and so far as it perceives1 it is the will1 because this is the real substratum of the whole phenomenon2 its will to know objectifies itself as brain and its functions4 ,we may take the voltaic pile as an illustration1 certainly imperfect1 but yet to some extent throwing light upon the nature of the human phenomenon1 as we here regard it4 ,the metals1 together with the fluid1 are the body2 the chemical action1 as the basis of the whole effect1 is the will1 and the electric current resulting from it1 which produces shock and spark1 is the intellect4 ,but omne simile claudicat4 ,quite recently the physiatrica point of view has at last prevailed in pathology4 ,according to it diseases are themselves a curative process of nature1 which it introduces to remove1 by overcoming its causes1 a disorder which in some way has got into the organism4 ,thus in the decisive battle1 the crisis1 it is either victorious and attains its end1 or else is defeated4 ,this view only gains its full rationality from our standpoint1 which shows the will in the vital force1 that here appears as vis natur medicatrix1 the will which lies at the foundation of all organic functions in a healthy condition1 but now1 when disorder has entered1 threatening its whole work1 assumes dictatorial power in order to subdue the rebellious forces by quite extraordinary measures and entirely abnormal operations 7the disease71 and bring everything back to the right track4 ,on the other hand1 that the will itself is sick1 as ,brandis repeatedly expresses himself in his book1 8,ueber die ,anwendung der ,klte10 which ,i have quoted in the first part of my essay1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 is a gross misunderstanding4 ,when ,i weigh this1 and at the same time observe that in his earlier book1 8,ueber die ,lebenskraft10 of #agie1 ,brandis betrayed no suspicion that this force is in itself the will1 but1 on the contrary1 says there1 page #ac3 8,it is impossible that the vital force can be that which we only know through our consciousness1 for most movements take place without our consciousness4 ,the assertion that this1 of which the only characteristic known to us is consciousness1 also affects the body without consciousness is at the least quite arbitrary and unproved20 and page #ad3 8,haller's objections to the opinion that all living movements are the effect of the soul are1 as ,i believe1 quite unanswerable20 when ,i further reflect that he wrote his book1 8,ueber die ,anwendung der ,klte10 in which all at once the will appears so decidedly as the vital force1 in his seventieth year1 an age at which no one as yet has conceived for the first time original fundamental thoughts2 when1 lastly1 ,i bear in mind that he makes use of my exact expressions1 8will and idea10 and not of those which are far more commonly used by others1 8the faculties of desire and of knowledge10 ,i am now convinced1 contrary to my earlier supposition1 that he borrowed his fundamental thought from me1 and with the usual honesty which prevails at the present day in the learned world1 said nothing about it4 ,the particulars about this will be found in the second 7and third7 edition of my work1 8,ueber den ,willen in der ,natur10 p4 #ad4 ,nothing is more fitted to confirm and illustrate the thesis with which we are occupied in this chapter than ,bichat's justly celebrated book1 8,sur la vie et la mort40 ,his reflections and mine reciprocally support each other1 for his are the physiological commentary on mine1 and mine are the philosophical commentary on his1 and one will best understand us both by reading us together4 ,this refers specially to the first half of his work1 entitled 8,recherches physiologiques sur la vie40 ,he makes the foundation of his expositions the opposition of the organic to the animal life1 which corresponds to mine of the will to the intellect4 ,whoever looks at the sense1 not at the words1 will not allow himself to be led astray by the fact that he ascribes the will to the animal life2 for by will1 as is usual1 he only understands conscious volition1 which certainly proceeds from the brain1 where1 however1 as was shown above1 it is not yet actual willing1 but only deliberation upon and estimation of the motives1 the conclusion or product of which at last appears as the act of will4 ,all that ,i ascribe to the will proper he ascribes to the organic life1 and all that ,i conceive as intellect is with him the animal life3 the latter has with him its seat in the brain alone1 together with its appendages3 the former1 again1 in the whole of the remainder of the organism4 ,the complete opposition in which he shows that the two stand to each other corresponds to that which with me exists between the will and the intellect4 ,as anatomist and physiologist he starts from the objective1 that is1 from the consciousness of other things2 ,i1 as a philosopher1 start from the subjective1 self-consciousness2 and it is a pleasure to see how1 like the two voices in a duet1 we advance in harmony with each other1 although each expresses something different4 ,therefore1 let every one who wishes to understand me read him2 and let every one who wishes to understand him1 better than he understood himself1 read me4 ,bichat shows us1 in article #d1 that the organic life begins earlier and ends later than the animal life2 consequently1 since the latter also rests in sleep1 has nearly twice as long a duration2 then1 in articles #h and #i1 that the organic life performs everything perfectly1 at once1 and of its own accord2 the animal life1 on the other hand1 requires long practice and education4 ,but he is most interesting in the sixth article1 where he shows that the animal life is completely limited to the intellectual operations1 therefore goes on coldly and indifferently1 while the emotions and passions have their seat in the organic life1 although the occasions of them lie in the animal1 i4e41 the cerebral1 life4 ,here he has ten valuable pages which ,i wish ,i could quote entire4 ,on page #ej he says3 8,il est sans doute tonnant1 que les passions n'ayent jamais leur terme ni leur origine dans les divers organs de la vie animale2 qu'au contraire les parties servant aux fonctions internes1 soient constamment affectes par elles1 et mme les dterminent suivant l'tat o elles se trouvent4 ,tel est cependant ce que la stricte observation nous prouve4 ,je dis d'abord que l'effet de toute espce de passion1 constamment tranger la vie animale1 est de faire natre un changement1 une altration quelconque dans la vie organique40 ,then he shows in detail how anger acts on the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart1 then how joy acts1 and lastly how fear2 next1 how the lungs1 the stomach1 the intestines1 the liver1 glands1 and pancreas are affected by these and kindred emotions1 and how grief diminishes the nutrition2 and then how the animal1 that is1 the brain life1 is untouched by all this1 and quietly goes on its way4 ,he refers to the fact that to signify intellectual operations we put the hand to the head1 but1 on the contrary1 we lay it on the heart1 the stomach1 the bowels1 if we wish to express our love1 joy1 sorrow1 or hatred2 and he remarks that he must be a bad actor who when he spoke of his grief would touch his head1 and when he spoke of his mental effort would touch his heart2 and also that while the learned make the so-called soul reside in the head1 the common people always indicate the well-felt difference between the affections of the intellect and the will by the right expression1 and speak1 for example1 of a capable1 clever1 fine head2 but1 on the other hand1 say a good heart1 a feeling heart1 and also 8,anger boils in my veins10 8,stirs my gall10 8,my bowels leap with joy10 8,jealousy poisons my blood10 c4 8,les chants sont le langage des passions1 de la vie organique1 comme la parole ordinaire est celui de l'entendement1 de la vie animale3 la dclamation1 tient le milieu1 elle anime la langue froide du cerveau par la langue expressive des organes intrieurs1 du cur1 du foie1 de l'estomac10 c4 ,his conclusion is3 8,la vie organique est le terme o aboutissent1 et le centre d'o partent les passions40 ,nothing is better fitted than this excellent and thorough book to confirm and bring out clearly that the body is only the embodied 7i4e41 perceived by means of the brain functions1 time1 space1 and causality7 will itself1 from which it follows that the will is the primary and original1 the intellect1 as mere brain function1 the subordinate and derived4 ,but that which is most worthy of admiration1 and to me most pleasing1 in ,bichat's thought is1 that this great anatomist1 on the path of his purely physiological investigations1 actually got so far as to explain the unalterable nature of the moral character from the fact that only the animal life1 thus the functions of the brain1 are subject to the influence of education1 practice1 culture1 and habit1 but the moral character belongs to the organic life1 i4e41 to all the other parts1 which cannot be modified from without4 ,i cannot refrain from giving the passage2 it occurs in article #i1 #b3 8,telle est donc la grande diffrence des deux vies de l'animal0 7cerebral or animal and organic life7 8par rapport l'ingalit de perfection des divers systmes de fonctions1 dont chacune rsulte2 savoir1 que dans l'une la prdominance ou l'infriorit d'un systme relativement aux autres1 tient presque toujours l'activit ou l'inertie plus grandes de ce systme1 l'habitude d'agir ou de ne pas agir2 que dans l'autre1 au contraire1 cette prdominance ou cette infriorit sont immdiatement lies a la texture des organes1 et jamais leur ducation4 ,voil pourquoi le temprament physique et le ,,charact,,re ,,moral ne sont point susceptible de changer par l'ducation1 qui modifie si prodigieusement les actes de la vie animale2 car1 comme nous l'avons vu1 tous deux ,,appartiennent ,,la ,,vie ,,organique4 ,la charactre est1 si je puis m'exprimer ainsi1 la physionomie des passions2 le temprament est celle des fonctions internes3 or les unes et les autres tant toujours les mmes1 ayant une direction que l'habitude et l'exercice ne drangent jamais1 il est manifeste que le temprament et le charactre doivent tre aussi soustraits l'empire de l'ducation4 ,elle peut modrer l'influence du second1 perfectionner assez le jugement et la rflection1 pour rendre leur empire suprieur au sien1 fortifier la vie animal afin qu'elle rsiste aux impulsions de l'organique4 ,mais vouloir par elle dnaturer le charactre1 adoucir ou exalter les passions dont il est l'expression habituelle1 agrandir ou resserrer leur sphre1 c'est une entreprise analogue a celle d'un mdecin qui essaierait d'lever ou d'abaisser de quelque degrs1 et pour toute la vie1 la force de contraction ordinaire au cur dans l'tat de sant1 de prcipiter ou de ralentir habituellement le mouvement naturel aux artres1 et qui est ncessaire leur action1 etc4 ,nous observerions ce mdecin1 que la circulation1 la respiration1 etc41 ne sont point sous le domaine de la volont 7volition71 quelles ne peuvent tre modifies par l'homme1 sans passer l'tat maladif1 etc4 ,faisons la mme observation ceux qui croient qu'on change le charactre1 et par-l1 mme les ,,passions1 puisque celles-ci sont un ,,produit ,,de ,l',,action ,,de ,,tous ,,les ,,organes ,,internes1 ou qu'elles y ont au moins spcialement leur sige40 ,the reader who is familiar with my philosophy may imagine how great was my joy when ,i discovered1 as it were1 the proof of my own convictions in those which were arrived at upon an entirely different field1 by this extraordinary man1 so early taken from the world4 ,a special authentication of the truth that the organism is merely the visibility of the will is also afforded us by the fact that if dogs1 cats1 domestic cocks1 and indeed other animals1 bite when violently angry1 the wounds become mortal2 nay1 if they come from a dog1 may cause hydrophobia in the man who is bitten1 without the dog being mad or afterwards becoming so4 ,for the extremest anger is only the most decided and vehement will to annihilate its object2 this now appears in the assumption by the saliva of an injurious1 and to a certain extent magically acting1 power1 and springs from the fact that the will and the organism are in truth one4 ,this also appears from the fact that intense vexation may rapidly impart to the mother's milk such a pernicious quality that the sucking child dies forthwith in convulsions 7,most1 ,ueber sympathetische ,mittel1 p4 #af74 ,note ,on ,what ,has ,been ,said ,about ,bichat4 ,bichat has1 as we have shown above1 cast a deep glance into human nature1 and in consequence has given an exceedingly admirable exposition1 which is one of the most profound works in the whole of ,french literature4 ,now1 sixty years later1 ,m4 ,flourens suddenly appears with a polemic against it in his work1 8,de la vie et de l'intelligence10 and makes so bold as to declare without ceremony that all that ,bichat has brought to light on this important subject1 which was quite his own1 is false4 ,and what does he oppose to him in the field8 ,counter reasons8 ,no1 counter assertions7#cg7 and authorities1 indeed1 which are as inadmissible as they are remarkable--,descartes and ,gall6 ,m4 ,flourens is by conviction a ,cartesian1 and to him ,descartes1 in the year #aheh1 is still 8le philosophe par excellence40 ,now ,descartes was certainly a great man1 yet only as a forerunner4 ,in the whole of his dogmas1 on the other hand1 there is not a word of truth2 and to appeal to these as authorities at this time of day is simply absurd4 ,for in the nineteenth century a ,cartesian in philosophy is just what a follower of ,ptolemy would be in astronomy1 or a follower of ,stahl in chemistry4 ,but for ,m4 ,flourens the dogmas of ,descartes are articles of faith4 ,descartes has taught1 les volonts sont des penses3 therefore this is the case1 although every one feels within himself that willing and thinking are as different as white and black4 ,hence ,i have been able above1 in chapter #ai1 to prove and explain this fully and thoroughly1 and always under the guidance of experience4 ,but above all1 according to ,descartes1 the oracle of ,m4 ,flourens1 there are two fundamentally different substances1 body and soul4 ,consequently ,m4 ,flourens1 as an orthodox ,cartesian1 says3 8,le premier point est de sparer1 mme par les mots1 ce qui est du corps de ce qui est de l'me0 7i4 #gb74 ,he informs us further that this 8me rside uniquement et exclusivement dans le cerveau0 7ii4 #acg72 from whence1 according to a passage of ,descartes1 it sends the spiritus animales as couriers to the muscles1 yet can only itself be affected by the brain2 therefore the passions have their seat 7sige7 in the heart1 which is altered by them1 yet their place 7place7 in the brain4 ,thus1 really thus1 speaks the oracle of ,m4 ,flourens1 who is so much edified by it1 that he even utters it twice after him 7i4 #cc and ii4 #ace71 for the unfailing conquest of the ignorant ,bichat1 who knows neither soul nor body1 but merely an animal and an organic life1 and whom he then here condescendingly informs that we must thoroughly distinguish the parts where the passions have their seat 7sigent7 from those which they affect4 ,according to this1 then1 the passions act in one place while they are in another4 ,corporeal things are wont to act only where they are1 but with an immaterial soul the case may be different4 ,but what in general may he and his oracle really have thought in this distinction of place and sige1 of siger and affecter8 ,the fundamental error of ,m4 ,flourens and ,descartes springs really from the fact that they confound the motives or occasions of the passions1 which1 as ideas1 certainly lie in the intellect1 i4e41 in the brain1 with the passions themselves1 which1 as movements of the will1 lie in the whole body1 which 7as we know7 is the perceived will itself4 ,m4 ,flourens' second authority is1 as we have said1 ,gall4 ,i certainly have said1 at the beginning of this twentieth chapter 7and already in the earlier edition73 8,the greatest error in ,gall's phrenology is1 that he makes the brain the organ of moral qualities also40 ,but what ,i censure and reject is precisely what ,m4 ,flourens praises and admires1 for he bears in his heart the doctrine of ,descartes3 8,les volonts sont des penses40 ,accordingly he says1 p4 #add3 8,le premier service que ,gall a rendu la physiologie 787 a te de rammener le moral l'intellectuel1 et de faire voir que les facults morales et les facults intellectuelles sont du mme ordre1 et de les placer toutes1 autant les unes que les autres1 uniquement et exclusivement dans le cerveau40 ,to a certain extent my whole philosophy1 but especially the nineteenth chapter of this volume1 consists of the refutation of this fundamental error4 ,m4 ,flourens1 on the contrary1 is never tired of extolling this as a great truth and ,gall as its discoverer2 for example1 p4 #adg3 8,si j'en tais classer les services que nous a rendu ,gall1 je dirais que le premier a t de rammener les qualits morales au cerveau20--p4 #aec3 8,le cerveau seul est l'organe de l'me1 et de l'me dans toute la plnitude de ses fonctions0 7we see the simple soul of ,descartes still always lurks in the background1 as the kernel of the matter72 8il est le sige de toutes les facults intellectuelles4444 ,gall a rammen ,,le ,,moral ,a ,l',,intellectuel1 il a rammen les qualits morales au mme sige1 au mme organe1 que les facults intellectuelles40 ,oh how must ,bichat and ,i be ashamed of ourselves in the presence of such wisdom6 ,but1 to speak seriously1 what can be more disheartening1 or rather more shocking1 than to see the true and profound rejected and the false and perverse extolled2 to live to find that important truths1 deeply hidden1 and extracted late and with difficulty1 are to be torn down1 and the old1 stale1 and late conquered errors set up in their place2 nay1 to be compelled to fear that through such procedure the advances of human knowledge1 so hardly achieved1 will be broken off6 ,but let us quiet our fears2 for magma est vis veritatis et prvalebit4 ,m4 ,flourens is unquestionably a man of much merit1 but he has chiefly acquired it upon the experimental path4 ,just those truths1 however1 which are of the greatest importance cannot be brought out by experiments1 but only by reflection and penetration4 ,now ,bichat by his reflection and penetration has here brought a truth to light which is of the number of those which are unattainable by the experimental efforts of ,m4 ,flourens1 even if1 as a true and consistent ,cartesian1 he tortures a hundred more animals to death4 ,but he ought betimes to have observed and thought something of this3 8,take care1 friend1 for it burns40 ,the presumption and self-sufficiency1 however1 such as is only imparted by superficiality combined with a false obscurity1 with which ,m4 ,flourens undertakes to refute a thinker like ,bichat by counter assertions1 old wives' beliefs1 and futile authorities1 indeed to reprove and instruct him1 and even almost to mock at him1 has its origin in the nature of the ,academy and its fauteuils4 ,throned upon these1 and saluting each other mutually as illustre confrre1 gentlemen cannot avoid making themselves equal with the best who have ever lived1 regarding themselves as oracles1 and therefore fit to decree what shall be false and what true4 ,this impels and entitles me to say out plainly for once1 that the really superior and privileged minds1 who now and then are born for the enlightenment of the rest1 and to whom certainly ,bichat belongs1 are so 8by the grace of ,god10 and accordingly stand to the ,academy 7in which they have generally occupied only the forty-first fauteuil7 and to its illustres confrres1 as born princes to the numerous representatives of the people1 chosen from the crowd4 ,therefore a secret awe should warn these gentlemen of the ,academy 7who always exist by the score7 before they attack such a man1--unless they have most cogent reasons to present1 and not mere contradictions and appeals to placita of ,descartes1 which at the present day is quite absurd4 ,,footnotes #a ,bruno and ,spinoza are here entirely to be excepted4 ,they stand each for himself and alone1 and belong neither to their age nor their quarter of the globe1 which rewarded the one with death and the other with persecution and insult4 ,their miserable existence and death in this ,western world is like that of a tropical plant in ,europe4 ,the banks of the sacred ,ganges were their true spiritual home2 there they would have led a peaceful and honoured life among men of like mind4 ,in the following lines1 with which ,bruno begins his book ,della ,causa ,principio et ,uno1 for which he was brought to the stake1 he expresses clearly and beautifully how lonely he felt himself in his age1 and he also shows a presentiment of his fate which led him to delay the publication of his views1 till that inclination to communicate what one knows to be true1 which is so strong in noble minds1 prevailed3 8,ad partum properare tuum1 mens gra1 quid obstat2 ,seclo hc indigno sint tribuenda licet8 ,umbrarum fluctu terras mergente1 cacumen ,adtolle in clarum1 noster ,olympe1 ,jovem40 ,whoever has read this his principal work1 and also his other ,italian writings1 which were formerly so rare1 but are now accessible to all through a ,german edition1 will find1 as ,i have done1 that he alone of all philosophers in some degree approaches to ,plato1 in respect of the strong blending of poetical power and tendency along with the philosophical1 and this he also shows especially in a dramatic form4 ,imagine the tender1 spiritual1 thoughtful being1 as he shows himself to us in this work of his1 in the hands of coarse1 furious priests as his judges and executioners1 and thank ,time which brought a brighter and a gentler age1 so that the after-world whose curse was to fall on those fiendish fanatics is the world we now live in4 #b ,bayard ,taylor's translation of 8,faust10 vol4 i4 p4 #ad4--,,trs4 #c 8,faust10 scene vi41 ,bayard ,taylor's translation1 vol4 i4 p4 #acd4--,,trs4 #d ,observe here that ,i always quote the 8,kritik der reinen ,vernunft0 according to the paging of the first edition1 for in ,rosenkranz's edition of ,kant's collected works this paging is always given in addition4 ,besides this1 ,i add the paging of the fifth edition1 preceded by a ,v42 all the other editions1 from the second onwards1 are the same as the fifth1 and so also is their paging4 #e ,cf4 ,christian ,wolf's 8,vernnftige ,gedanken von ,gott1 ,welt und ,seele10 #egg-egi4 ,it is strange that he only explains as contingent what is necessary according to the principle of sufficient reason of becoming1 i4e41 what takes place from causes1 and on the contrary recognises as necessary that which is so according to the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason2 for example1 what follows from the essentia 7definition71 thus analytical judgments1 and further also mathematical truths4 ,the reason he assigns for this is1 that only the law of causality gives infinite series1 while the other kinds of grounds give only finite series4 ,yet this is by no means the case with the forms of the principle of sufficient reason in pure space and time1 but only holds good of the logical ground of knowledge2 but he held mathematical necessity to be such also4 ,compare the essay on the principle of sufficient reason1 #ej4 #f ,with my refutation of the ,kantian proof may be compared the earlier attacks upon it by ,feder1 ,ueber ,zeit1 ,raum und ,kausalitt1 #bh2 and by ,g4 ,e4 ,schulze1 ,kritik der theoretischen ,philosophie1 ,bd4 ii4 ,s4 #dbb-ddb4 #g ,see ,sext4 ,empir4 ,pyrrhon4 hypotyp41 lib4 i4 c4 #ac1 7intelligibilia apparentibus opposuit ,anaxagoras74 #h ,that the assumption of a limit of the world in time is certainly not a necessary thought of the reason may be also proved historically1 for the ,hindus teach nothing of the kind1 even in the religion of the people1 much less in the ,vedas1 but try to express mythologically by means of monstrous chronology the infinity of this phenomenal world1 this fleeting and baseless web of ,my1 for they at once bring out very ingeniously the relativity of all periods of time in the following mythus 7,polier1 ,mythologie des ,indous1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ehe74 ,the four ages1 in the last of which we live1 embrace together #d1cbj1jjj years4 ,each day of the creating ,brahma has #ajjj such periods of four ages1 and his nights have also #ajjj4 ,his year has #cfe days and as many nights4 ,he lives #ajj of his years1 always creating2 and if he dies1 at once a new ,brahma is born1 and so on from eternity to eternity4 ,the same relativity of time is also expressed in the special myth which is quoted in ,polier's work1 vol4 ii4 p4 #eid1 from the ,puranas4 ,in it a ,rajah1 after a visit of a few seconds to ,vishnu in his heaven1 finds on his return to earth that several millions of years have elapsed1 and a new age has begun2 for every day of ,vishnu is #ajj recurrences of the four ages4 #i ,kant said1 8,it is very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason1 and yet to prescribe to her beforehand which side she must necessarily take0 78,critique of ,pure ,reason10 p4 #gdg2 ,v4 #gge74 ,on the other hand1 the following is the naive assertion of a professor of philosophy in our own time3 8,if a philosophy denies the reality of the fundamental ideas of ,christianity1 it is either false1 or1 even if true1 it is yet useless40 ,that is to say1 for professors of philosophy4 ,it was the late ,professor ,bachmann who1 in the ,jena ,litteraturzeitung for ,july #ahdj1 ,no4 #abf1 so indiscreetly blurted out the maxim of all his colleagues4 ,however1 it is worth noticing1 as regards the characteristics of the ,university philosophy1 how here the truth1 if it will not suit and adapt itself1 is shown the door without ceremony1 with1 8,be off1 truth6 we cannot make use of you4 ,do we owe you anything8 ,do you pay us8 ,then be off60 #aj ,by the way1 ,machiavelli's problem was the solution of the question how the prince1 as a prince1 was to keep himself on the throne in spite of internal and external enemies4 ,his problem was thus by no means the ethical problem whether a prince1 as a man1 ought to will such things1 but purely the political one how1 if he so wills1 he can carry it out4 ,and the solution of this problem he gives just as one writes directions for playing chess1 with which it would be folly to mix up the answer to the question whether from an ethical point of view it is advisable to play chess at all4 ,to reproach ,machiavelli with the immorality of his writing is just the same as to reproach a fencing-master because he does not begin his instructions with a moral lecture against murder and slaughter4 #aa ,although the conception of legal right is properly negative in opposition to that of wrong1 which is the positive starting-point1 yet the explanation of these conceptions must not on this account be entirely negative4 #ab ,i specially recommend here the passage in ,lichtenberg's 8,miscellaneous ,writings0 7,gthingen1 #ahja1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ab73 8,euler says1 in his letters upon various subjects in connection with natural science 7vol4 ii4 p4 #bbh71 that it would thunder and lighten just as well if there were no man present whom the lightning might strike4 ,it is a very common expression1 but ,i must confess that it has never been easy for me completely to comprehend it4 ,it always seems to me as if the conception being were something derived from our thought1 and thus1 if there are no longer any sentient and thinking creatures1 then there is nothing more whatever40 #ac ,lichtenberg says in his 8,nachrichten und ,bemerkungen von und ber sich selbst0 7,vermischte ,schriften1 ,gttingen1 #ahjj1 vol4 i4 p4 #dc73 8,i am extremely sensitive to all noise1 but it entirely loses its disagreeable character as soon as it is associated with a rational purpose40 #ad ,that the three-toed sloth has nine must be regarded as a mistake2 yet ,owen still states this1 8,ostologie ,comp410 p4 #dje4 #ae ,this1 however1 does not excuse a professor of philosophy who1 sitting in ,kant's chair1 expresses himself thus3 8,that mathematics as such contains arithmetic and geometry is correct4 ,it is incorrect1 however1 to conceive arithmetic as the science of time1 really for no other reason than to give a pendant 7sic7 to geometry as the science of space0 7,rosenkranz in the 8,deutschen ,museum10 #aheg1 ,may #ad1 ,no4 #bj74 ,this is the fruit of ,hegelism4 ,if the mind is once thoroughly debauched with its senseless jargon1 serious ,kantian philosophy will no longer enter it4 ,the audacity to talk at random about what one does not understand has been inherited from the master1 and one comes in the end to condemn without ceremony the fundamental teaching of a great genius in a tone of peremptory decision1 just as if it were ,hegelian foolery4 ,we must not1 however1 fail to notice that these little people struggle to escape from the track of great thinkers4 ,they would therefore have done better not to attack ,kant1 but to content themselves with giving their public full details about ,god1 the soul1 the actual freedom of the will1 and whatever belongs to that sort of thing1 and then to have indulged in a private luxury in their dark back-shop1 the philosophical journal2 there they may do whatever they like without constraint1 for no one sees it4 #af ,this chapter1 along with the one which follows it1 is connected with #h and #i of the first book4 #ag ,illgen's 8,zeitschrift fr ,historische ,theologie10 #ahci1 part i1 p4 #ahb4 #ah ,gall et ,spurzheim1 8,des ,dispositions ,innes10 #ahaa1 p4 #bec4 #ai ,this chapter is connected with #ab of the first volume4 #bj ,this chapter is connected with #ac of the first volume4 #ba ,this chapter and the one which follows it are connected with #i of the first volume4 #bb ,this chapter is connected with the conclusion of #i of the first volume4 #bc ,this chapter is connected with #ad of the first volume4 #bd ,a principal use of the study of the ancients is that it preserves us from verbosity2 for the ancients always take pains to write concisely and pregnantly1 and the error of almost all moderns is verbosity1 which the most recent try to make up for by suppressing syllables and letters4 ,therefore we ought to pursue the study of the ancients all our life1 although reducing the time devoted to it4 ,the ancients knew that we ought not to write as we speak4 ,the moderns1 on the other hand1 are not even ashamed to print lectures they have delivered4 #be ,this chapter is connected with #ae of the first volume4 #bf ,this chapter is connected with #af of the first volume4 #bg ,this chapter is connected with #ae of the first volume4 #bh ,bayard ,taylor's translation of ,faust1 vol4 i4 #ahj4 ,trs4 #bi ,this chapter is connected with #ah of the first volume4 #cj ,this chapter is connected with #ai of the first volume4 #ca ,it is remarkable that ,augustine already knew this4 ,in the fourteenth book1 8,de ,civ4 ,dei10 c4 #f1 he speaks of the affectionibus animi1 which in the preceding book he had brought under four categories1 cupiditas1 timor1 ltitia1 tristitia1 and says3 8,voluntas est quippe in omnibus1 imo omnes nihil aliud1 quam voluntates sunt3 nam quid est cupiditas et ltitia1 nisi voluntas in eorum consensionem1 qu volumus8 et quid est metus atque tristitia1 nisi voluntas in dissensionem ab his1 qu nolumus8 cet40 #cb ,by those who place mind and learning above all other human qualities this man will be reckoned the greatest of his century4 ,but by those who let virtue take precedence of everything else his memory can never be execrated enough4 ,he was the cruelest of the citizens in persecuting1 putting to death1 and banishing4 #cc ,the ,times of #ahth ,october #ahde2 from the ,athenum4 #cd ,this chapter is connected with #bj of the first volume4 #ce ,spallanzani1 ,risultati di esperienze sopra la riproduzione della testa nelle lumache terrestri3 in the ,memorie di matematica e fisica della ,societ ,italiana1 ,tom4 i4 p4 #eha4 ,voltaire1 ,les colimaons du rvrend pre l'escarbotier4 #cf ,cf4 ,ch4 #bb4 #cg ,tout ce qui est relatif l'entendement appartient la vie animale1 dit ,bichat1 et jusque-l point de doute2 tout ce qui est relatif aux passions appartient la vie organique1 --et ceci est absolument faux4 ,indeed6--decrevit ,florentius magnus4