,,reconstruction ,,in ,,philosophy ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,professor of ,philosophy in ,columbia ,university ,illustration ,,new ,,york4 ,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company #aibj ,,copyright1 #aibj1 ,,by ,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company ,the ,quinn ,boden ,company ,,book ,,manufacturers ,,rahway ,,new ,,jersey ,,prefatory ,,note ,being invited to lecture at the ,imperial ,university of ,japan in ,tokyo during ,february and ,march of the present year1 ,i attempted an interpretation of the reconstruction of ideas and ways of thought now going on in philosophy4 ,while the lectures cannot avoid revealing the marks of the particular standpoint of their author1 the aim is to exhibit the general contrasts between older and newer types of philosophic problems rather than to make a partisan plea in behalf of any one specific solution of these problems4 ,i have tried for the most part to set forth the forces which make intellectual reconstruction inevitable and to prefigure some of the lines upon which it must proceed4 ,any one who has enjoyed the unique hospitality of ,japan will be overwhelmed with confusion if he endeavors to make an acknowledgment in any way commensurate to the kindnesses he received4 ,yet ,i must set down in the barest of black and white my grateful appreciation of them1 and in particular record my ineffaceable impressions of the courtesy and help of the members of the department of philosophy of ,tokyo ,university1 and of my dear friends ,dr4 ,ono and ,dr4 ,nitobe4 ,j4 ,d4 ,september1 #aiai4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,,page ,i ,,changing ,,conceptions ,,of ,,philosophy #a ,origin of philosophy in desire and imagination4 ,influence of community traditions and authority4 ,simultaneous development of matter-of-fact knowledge4 ,incongruity and conflict of the two types4 ,respective values of each type4444 ,classic philosophies 7i7 compensatory1 7ii7 dialectically formal1 and 7iii7 concerned with superior ,reality4 ,contemporary thinking accepts primacy of matter-of-fact knowledge and assigns to philosophy a social function rather than that of absolute knowledge4 ,,ii ,,some ,,historical ,,factors ,,in ,,philosophical ,,reconstruction #bh ,francis ,bacon exemplifies the newer spirit4444 ,he conceived knowledge as power4 ,as dependent upon organized cooperative research4444 ,as tested by promotion of social progress4 ,the new thought reflected actual social changes1 industrial1 political1 religious4444 ,the new idealism4 ,,iii ,,the ,,scientific ,,factor ,,in ,,reconstruction ,,of ,,philosophy #ec ,science has revolutionized our conception of ,nature4 ,philosophy has to be transformed because no longer depending upon a science which accepts a closed1 finite world4 ,or1 fixed species4 ,or1 superiority or rest to change and motion4 ,contrast of feudal with democratic conceptions4 ,elimination of final causes4 ,mechanical science and the possibility of control of nature4 ,respect for matter4 ,new temper of imagination4 ,influence thus far technical rather than human and moral4 ,,iv ,,changed ,,conceptions ,,of ,,experience ,,and ,,reason #gg ,traditional conception of nature of experience4 ,limits of ancient civilization4 ,effect of classic idea on modern empiricism4 ,why a different conception is now possible4 ,psychological change emphasizes vital factor using environment4 ,effect upon traditional ideas of sensation and knowledge4 ,factor of organization4 ,socially1 experience is now more inventive and regulative4444 ,corresponding change in idea of ,reason4 ,intelligence is hypothetical and inventive4 ,weakness of historic ,rationalism4 ,kantianism4 ,contrast of ,german and ,british philosophies4 ,reconstruction of empirical liberalism4 ,v ,,changed ,,conceptions ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,,and ,,the ,,real #ajc ,idealization rooted in aversion to the disagreeable4444 ,this fact has affected philosophy4444 ,true reality is ideal1 and hence changeless1 complete4 ,hence contemplative knowledge is higher than experimental4 ,contrast with the modern practise of knowledge4444 ,significance of change4444 ,the actual or realistic signifies conditions effecting change4444 ,ideals become methods rather than goals4 ,illustration from elimination of distance4 ,change in conception of philosophy4444 ,the significant problems for philosophy4444 ,social understanding and conciliation4 ,the practical problem of real and ideal4 ,,vi ,,the ,,significance ,,of ,,logical ,,reconstruction #acb ,present confusion as to logic4 ,logic is regulative and normative because empirical4 ,illustration from mathematics4 ,origin of thinking in conflicts4 ,confrontation with fact4 ,response by anticipation or prediction4 ,importance of hypotheses4 ,impartial inquiry4 ,importance of deductive function4 ,organization and classification4 ,nature of truth4 ,truth is adverbial1 not a thing4 ,,vii ,,reconstruction ,,in ,,moral ,,conceptions #afa ,common factor in traditional theories4 ,every moral situation unique4 ,supremacy of the specific or individualized case4 ,fallacy of general ends4 ,worth of generalization of ends and rules is intellectual4 ,harmfulness of division of goods into intrinsic and instrumental4 ,into natural and moral4 ,moral worth of natural science4 ,importance of discovery in morals4 ,abolishing ,phariseeism4444 ,growth as the end4 ,optimism and pessimism4 ,conception of happiness4 ,criticism of utilitarianism4 ,all life moral in so far as educative4 ,,viii ,,reconstruction ,,as ,,affecting ,,social ,,philosophy #ahg ,defects of current logic of social thought4 ,neglect of specific situations4 ,defects of organic concept of society4 ,evils of notion of fixed self or individual4 ,doctrine of interests4 ,moral and institutional reform4 ,moral test of social institutions4 ,social pluralism4 ,political monism1 dogma of ,national ,state4 ,primacy of associations4 ,international humanism4 ,organization a subordinate conception4 ,freedom and democracy4 ,intellectual reconstruction when habitual will affect imagination and hence poetry and religion4 ,,index #bag ,,reconstruction ,,in ,,philosophy ,,chapter ,i ,,changing ,,conceptions ,,of ,,philosophy ,man differs from the lower animals because he preserves his past experiences4 ,what happened in the past is lived again in memory4 ,about what goes on today hangs a cloud of thoughts concerning similar things undergone in bygone days4 ,with the animals1 an experience perishes as it happens1 and each new doing or suffering stands alone4 ,but man lives in a world where each occurrence is charged with echoes and reminiscences of what has gone before1 where each event is a reminder of other things4 ,hence he lives not1 like the beasts of the field1 in a world of merely physical things but in a world of signs and symbols4 ,a stone is not merely hard1 a thing into which one bumps2 but it is a monument of a deceased ancestor4 ,a flame is not merely something which warms or burns1 but is a symbol of the enduring life of the household1 of the abiding source of cheer1 nourishment and shelter to which man returns from his casual wanderings4 ,instead of being a quick fork of fire which may sting and hurt1 it is the hearth at which one worships and for which one fights4 ,and all this which marks the difference between bestiality and humanity1 between culture and merely physical nature1 is because man remembers1 preserving and recording his experiences4 ,the revivals of memory are1 however1 rarely literal4 ,we naturally remember what interests us and because it interests us4 ,the past is recalled not because of itself but because of what it adds to the present4 ,thus the primary life of memory is emotional rather than intellectual and practical4 ,savage man recalled yesterday's struggle with an animal not in order to study in a scientific way the qualities of the animal or for the sake of calculating how better to fight tomorrow1 but to escape from the tedium of today by regaining the thrill of yesterday4 ,the memory has all the excitement of the combat without its danger and anxiety4 ,to revive it and revel in it is to enhance the present moment with a new meaning1 a meaning different from that which actually belongs either to it or to the past4 ,memory is vicarious experience in which there is all the emotional values of actual experience without its strains1 vicissitudes and troubles4 ,the triumph of battle is even more poignant in the memorial war dance than at the moment of victory2 the conscious and truly human experience of the chase comes when it is talked over and re-enacted by the camp fire4 ,at the time1 attention is taken up with practical details and with the strain of uncertainty4 ,only later do the details compose into a story and fuse into a whole of meaning4 ,at the time of practical experience man exists from moment to moment1 preoccupied with the task of the moment4 ,as he re-surveys all the moments in thought1 a drama emerges with a beginning1 a middle and a movement toward the climax of achievement or defeat4 ,since man revives his past experience because of the interest added to what would otherwise be the emptiness of present leisure1 the primitive life of memory is one of fancy and imagination1 rather than of accurate recollection4 ,after all1 it is the story1 the drama1 which counts4 ,only those incidents are selected which have a present emotional value1 to intensify the present tale as it is rehearsed in imagination or told to an admiring listener4 ,what does not add to the thrill of combat or contribute to the goal of success or failure is dropped4 ,incidents are rearranged till they fit into the temper of the tale4 ,thus early man when left to himself1 when not actually engaged in the struggle for existence1 lived in a world of memories which was a world of suggestions4 ,a suggestion differs from a recollection in that no attempt is made to test its correctness4 ,its correctness is a matter of relative indifference4 ,the cloud suggests a camel or a man's face4 ,it could not suggest these things unless some time there had been an actual1 literal experience of camel and face4 ,but the real likeness is of no account4 ,the main thing is the emotional interest in tracing the camel or following the fortunes of the face as it forms and dissolves4 ,students of the primitive history of mankind tell of the enormous part played by animal tales1 myths and cults4 ,sometimes a mystery is made out of this historical fact1 as if it indicated that primitive man was moved by a different psychology from that which now animates humanity4 ,but the explanation is1 ,i think1 simple4 ,until agriculture and the higher industrial arts were developed1 long periods of empty leisure alternated with comparatively short periods of energy put forth to secure food or safety from attack4 ,because of our own habits1 we tend to think of people as busy or occupied1 if not with doing at least with thinking and planning4 ,but then men were busy only when engaged in the hunt or fishing or fighting expedition4 ,yet the mind when awake must have some filling2 it cannot remain literally vacant because the body is idle4 ,and what thoughts should crowd into the human mind except experiences with animals1 experiences transformed under the influence of dramatic interest to make more vivid and coherent the events typical of the chase8 ,as men in fancy dramatically re-lived the interesting parts of their actual lives1 animals inevitably became themselves dramatized4 ,they were true dramatis person and as such assumed the traits of persons4 ,they too had desires1 hopes and fears1 a life of affections1 loves and hates1 triumphs and defeats4 ,moreover1 since they were essential to the support of the community1 their activities and sufferings made them1 in the imagination which dramatically revived the past1 true sharers in the life of the community4 ,although they were hunted1 yet they permitted themselves after all to be caught1 and hence they were friends and allies4 ,they devoted themselves1 quite literally1 to the sustenance and well-being of the community group to which they belonged4 ,thus were produced not merely the multitude of tales and legends dwelling affectionately upon the activities and features of animals1 but also those elaborate rites and cults which made animals ancestors1 heroes1 tribal figure-heads and divinities4 ,i hope that ,i do not seem to you to have gone too far afield from my topic1 the origin of philosophies4 ,for it seems to me that the historic source of philosophies cannot be understood except as we dwell1 at even greater length and in more detail1 upon such considerations as these4 ,we need to recognize that the ordinary consciousness of the ordinary man left to himself is a creature of desires rather than of intellectual study1 inquiry or speculation4 ,man ceases to be primarily actuated by hopes and fears1 loves and hates1 only when he is subjected to a discipline which is foreign to human nature1 which is1 from the standpoint of natural man1 artificial4 ,naturally our books1 our scientific and philosophical books1 are written by men who have subjected themselves in a superior degree to intellectual discipline and culture4 ,their thoughts are habitually reasonable4 ,they have learned to check their fancies by facts1 and to organize their ideas logically rather than emotionally and dramatically4 ,when they do indulge in reverie and day-dreaming--which is probably more of the time than is conventionally acknowledged--they are aware of what they are doing4 ,they label these excursions1 and do not confuse their results with objective experiences4 ,we tend to judge others by ourselves1 and because scientific and philosophic books are composed by men in whom the reasonable1 logical and objective habit of mind predominates1 a similar rationality has been attributed by them to the average and ordinary man4 ,it is then overlooked that both rationality and irrationality are largely irrelevant and episodical in undisciplined human nature2 that men are governed by memory rather than by thought1 and that memory is not a remembering of actual facts1 but is association1 suggestion1 dramatic fancy4 ,the standard used to measure the value of the suggestions that spring up in the mind is not congruity with fact but emotional congeniality4 ,do they stimulate and reinforce feeling1 and fit into the dramatic tale8 ,are they consonant with the prevailing mood1 and can they be rendered into the traditional hopes and fears of the community8 ,if we are willing to take the word dreams with a certain liberality1 it is hardly too much to say that man1 save in his occasional times of actual work and struggle1 lives in a world of dreams1 rather than of facts1 and a world of dreams that is organized about desires whose success and frustration form its stuff4 ,to treat the early beliefs and traditions of mankind as if they were attempts at scientific explanation of the world1 only erroneous and absurd attempts1 is thus to be guilty of a great mistake4 ,the material out of which philosophy finally emerges is irrelevant to science and to explanation4 ,it is figurative1 symbolic of fears and hopes1 made of imaginations and suggestions1 not significant of a world of objective fact intellectually confronted4 ,it is poetry and drama1 rather than science1 and is apart from scientific truth and falsity1 rationality or absurdity of fact in the same way in which poetry is independent of these things4 ,this original material has1 however1 to pass through at least two stages before it becomes philosophy proper4 ,one is the stage in which stories and legends and their accompanying dramatizations are consolidated4 ,at first the emotionalized records of experiences are largely casual and transitory4 ,events that excite the emotions of an individual are seized upon and lived over in tale and pantomime4 ,but some experiences are so frequent and recurrent that they concern the group as a whole4 ,they are socially generalized4 ,the piecemeal adventure of the single individual is built out till it becomes representative and typical of the emotional life of the tribe4 ,certain incidents affect the weal and woe of the group in its entirety and thereby get an exceptional emphasis and elevation4 ,a certain texture of tradition is built up2 the story becomes a social heritage and possession2 the pantomime develops into the stated rite4 ,tradition thus formed becomes a kind of norm to which individual fancy and suggestion conform4 ,an abiding framework of imagination is constructed4 ,a communal way of conceiving life grows up into which individuals are inducted by education4 ,both unconsciously and by definite social requirement individual memories are assimilated to group memory or tradition1 and individual fancies are accommodated to the body of beliefs characteristic of a community4 ,poetry becomes fixated and systematized4 ,the story becomes a social norm4 ,the original drama which re-enacts an emotionally important experience is institutionalized into a cult4 ,suggestions previously free are hardened into doctrines4 ,the systematic and obligatory nature of such doctrines is hastened and confirmed through conquests and political consolidation4 ,as the area of a government is extended1 there is a definite motive for systematizing and unifying beliefs once free and floating4 ,aside from natural accommodation and assimilation springing from the fact of intercourse and the needs of common understanding1 there is often political necessity which leads the ruler to centralize traditions and beliefs in order to extend and strengthen his prestige and authority4 ,judea1 ,greece1 ,rome1 and ,i presume all other countries having a long history1 present records of a continual working over of earlier local rites and doctrines in the interests of a wider social unity and a more extensive political power4 ,i shall ask you to assume with me that in this way the larger cosmogonies and cosmologies of the race as well as the larger ethical traditions have arisen4 ,whether this is literally so or not1 it is not necessary to inquire1 much less to demonstrate4 ,it is enough for our purposes that under social influences there took place a fixing and organizing of doctrines and cults which gave general traits to the imagination and general rules to conduct1 and that such a consolidation was a necessary antecedent to the formation of any philosophy as we understand that term4 ,although a necessary antecedent1 this organization and generalization of ideas and principles of belief is not the sole and sufficient generator of philosophy4 ,there is still lacking the motive for logical system and intellectual proof4 ,this we may suppose to be furnished by the need of reconciling the moral rules and ideals embodied in the traditional code with the matter of fact positivistic knowledge which gradually grows up4 ,for man can never be wholly the creature of suggestion and fancy4 ,the requirements of continued existence make indispensable some attention to the actual facts of the world4 ,although it is surprising how little check the environment actually puts upon the formation of ideas1 since no notions are too absurd not to have been accepted by some people1 yet the environment does enforce a certain minimum of correctness under penalty of extinction4 ,that certain things are foods1 that they are to be found in certain places1 that water drowns1 fire burns1 that sharp points penetrate and cut1 that heavy things fall unless supported1 that there is a certain regularity in the changes of day and night and the alternation of hot and cold1 wet and dry3--such prosaic facts force themselves upon even primitive attention4 ,some of them are so obvious and so important that they have next to no fanciful context4 ,auguste ,comte says somewhere that he knows of no savage people who had a ,god of weight although every other natural quality or force may have been deified4 ,gradually there grows up a body of homely generalizations preserving and transmitting the wisdom of the race about the observed facts and sequences of nature4 ,this knowledge is especially connected with industries1 arts and crafts where observation of materials and processes is required for successful action1 and where action is so continuous and regular that spasmodic magic will not suffice4 ,extravagantly fantastic notions are eliminated because they are brought into juxtaposition with what actually happens4 ,the sailor is more likely to be given to what we now term superstitions than say the weaver1 because his activity is more at the mercy of sudden change and unforeseen occurrence4 ,but even the sailor while he may regard the wind as the uncontrollable expression of the caprice of a great spirit1 will still have to become acquainted with some purely mechanical principles of adjustment of boat1 sails and oar to the wind4 ,fire may be conceived as a supernatural dragon because some time or other a swift1 bright and devouring flame called before the mind's eye the quick-moving and dangerous serpent4 ,but the housewife who tends the fire and the pots wherein food cooks will still be compelled to observe certain mechanical facts of draft and replenishment1 and passage from wood to ash4 ,still more will the worker in metals accumulate verifiable details about the conditions and consequences of the operation of heat4 ,he may retain for special and ceremonial occasions traditional beliefs1 but everyday familiar use will expel these conceptions for the greater part of the time1 when fire will be to him of uniform and prosaic behavior1 controllable by practical relations of cause and effect4 ,as the arts and crafts develop and become more elaborate1 the body of positive and tested knowledge enlarges1 and the sequences observed become more complex and of greater scope4 ,technologies of this kind give that common-sense knowledge of nature out of which science takes its origin4 ,they provide not merely a collection of positive facts1 but they give expertness in dealing with materials and tools1 and promote the development of the experimental habit of mind1 as soon as an art can be taken away from the rule of sheer custom4 ,for a long time the imaginative body of beliefs closely connected with the moral habits of a community group and with its emotional indulgences and consolations persists side by side with the growing body of matter of fact knowledge4 ,wherever possible they are interlaced4 ,at other points1 their inconsistencies forbid their interweaving1 but the two things are kept apart as if in different compartments4 ,since one is merely super-imposed upon the other their incompatibility is not felt1 and there is no need of reconciliation4 ,in most cases1 the two kinds of mental products are kept apart because they become the possession of separate social classes4 ,the religious and poetic beliefs having acquired a definite social and political value and function are in the keeping of a higher class directly associated with the ruling elements in the society4 ,the workers and craftsmen who possess the prosaic matter of fact knowledge are likely to occupy a low social status1 and their kind of knowledge is affected by the social disesteem entertained for the manual worker who engages in activities useful to the body4 ,it doubtless was this fact in ,greece which in spite of the keenness of observation1 the extraordinary power of logical reasoning and the great freedom of speculation attained by the ,athenian1 postponed the general and systematic employment of the experimental method4 ,since the industrial craftsman was only just above the slave in social rank1 his type of knowledge and the method upon which it depended lacked prestige and authority4 ,nevertheless1 the time came when matter of fact knowledge increased to such bulk and scope that it came into conflict with not merely the detail but with the spirit and temper of traditional and imaginative beliefs4 ,without going into the vexed question of how and why1 there is no doubt that this is just what happened in what we term the sophistic movement in ,greece1 within which originated philosophy proper in the sense in which the western world understands that term4 ,the fact that the sophists had a bad name given them by ,plato and ,aristotle1 a name they have never been able to shake off1 is evidence that with the sophists the strife between the two types of belief was the emphatic thing1 and that the conflict had a disconcerting effect upon the traditional system of religious beliefs and the moral code of conduct bound up with it4 ,although ,socrates was doubtless sincerely interested in the reconciliation of the two sides1 yet the fact that he approached the matter from the side of matter of fact method1 giving its canons and criteria primacy1 was enough to bring him to the condemnation of death as a contemner of the gods and a corrupter of youth4 ,the fate of ,socrates and the ill-fame of the sophists may be used to suggest some of the striking contrasts between traditional emotionalized belief on one hand and prosaic matter of fact knowledge on the other3--the purpose of the comparison being to bring out the point that while all the advantages of what we call science were on the side of the latter1 the advantages of social esteem and authority1 and of intimate contact with what gives life its deeper lying values were on the side of traditional belief4 ,to all appearances1 the specific and verified knowledge of the environment had only a limited and technical scope4 ,it had to do with the arts1 and the purpose and good of the artisan after all did not extend very far4 ,they were subordinate and almost servile4 ,who would put the art of the shoemaker on the same plane as the art of ruling the state8 ,who would put even the higher art of the physician in healing the body1 upon the level of the art of the priest in healing the soul8 ,thus ,plato constantly draws the contrast in his dialogues4 ,the shoemaker is a judge of a good pair of shoes1 but he is no judge at all of the more important question whether and when it is good to wear shoes2 the physician is a good judge of health1 but whether it is a good thing or not to be well or better to die1 he knows not4 ,while the artisan is expert as long as purely limited technical questions arise1 he is helpless when it comes to the only really important questions1 the moral questions as to values4 ,consequently1 his type of knowledge is inherently inferior and needs to be controlled by a higher kind of knowledge which will reveal ultimate ends and purposes1 and thus put and keep technical and mechanical knowledge in its proper place4 ,moreover1 in ,plato's pages we find1 because of ,plato's adequate dramatic sense1 a lively depicting of the impact in particular men of the conflict between tradition and the new claims of purely intellectual knowledge4 ,the conservative is shocked beyond measure at the idea of teaching the military art by abstract rules1 by science4 ,one does not just fight1 one fights for one's country4 ,abstract science cannot convey love and loyalty1 nor can it be a substitute1 even upon the more technical side1 for those ways and means of fighting in which devotion to the country has been traditionally embodied4 ,the way to learn the fighting art is through association with those who have themselves learned to defend the country1 by becoming saturated with its ideals and customs2 by becoming in short a practical adept in the ,greek tradition as to fighting4 ,to attempt to derive abstract rules from a comparison of native ways of fighting with the enemies' ways is to begin to go over to the enemies' traditions and gods3 it is to begin to be false to one's own country4 ,such a point of view vividly realized enables us to appreciate the antagonism aroused by the positivistic point of view when it came into conflict with the traditional4 ,the latter was deeply rooted in social habits and loyalties2 it was surcharged with the moral aims for which men lived and the moral rules by which they lived4 ,hence it was as basic and as comprehensive as life itself1 and palpitated with the warm glowing colors of the community life in which men realized their own being4 ,in contrast1 the positivistic knowledge was concerned with merely physical utilities1 and lacked the ardent associations of belief hallowed by sacrifices of ancestors and worship of contemporaries4 ,because of its limited and concrete character it was dry1 hard1 cold4 ,yet the more acute and active minds1 like that of ,plato himself1 could no longer be content to accept1 along with the conservative citizen of the time1 the old beliefs in the old way4 ,the growth of positive knowledge and of the critical1 inquiring spirit undermined these in their old form4 ,the advantages in definiteness1 in accuracy1 in verifiability were all on the side of the new knowledge4 ,tradition was noble in aim and scope1 but uncertain in foundation4 ,the unquestioned life1 said ,socrates1 was not one fit to be lived by man1 who is a questioning being because he is a rational being4 ,hence he must search out the reason of things1 and not accept them from custom and political authority4 ,what was to be done8 ,develop a method of rational investigation and proof which should place the essential elements of traditional belief upon an unshakable basis2 develop a method of thought and knowledge which while purifying tradition should preserve its moral and social values unimpaired2 nay1 by purifying them1 add to their power and authority4 ,to put it in a word1 that which had rested upon custom was to be restored1 resting no longer upon the habits of the past1 but upon the very metaphysics of ,being and the ,universe4 ,metaphysics is a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor of higher moral and social values--that is the leading theme of the classic philosophy of ,europe1 as evolved by ,plato and ,aristotle--a philosophy1 let us always recall1 renewed and restated by the ,christian philosophy of ,medieval ,europe4 ,out of this situation emerged1 if ,i mistake not1 the entire tradition regarding the function and office of philosophy which till very recently has controlled the systematic and constructive philosophies of the western world4 ,if ,i am right in my main thesis that the origin of philosophy lay in an attempt to reconcile the two different types of mental product1 then the key is in our hands as to the main traits of subsequent philosophy so far as that was not of a negative and heterodox kind4 ,in the first place1 philosophy did not develop in an unbiased way from an open and unprejudiced origin4 ,it had its task cut out for it from the start4 ,it had a mission to perform1 and it was sworn in advance to that mission4 ,it had to extract the essential moral kernel out of the threatened traditional beliefs of the past4 ,so far so good2 the work was critical and in the interests of the only true conservatism--that which will conserve and not waste the values wrought out by humanity4 ,but it was also precommitted to extracting this moral essence in a spirit congenial to the spirit of past beliefs4 ,the association with imagination and with social authority was too intimate to be deeply disturbed4 ,it was not possible to conceive of the content of social institutions in any form radically different from that in which they had existed in the past4 ,it became the work of philosophy to justify on rational grounds the spirit1 though not the form1 of accepted beliefs and traditional customs4 ,the resulting philosophy seemed radical enough and even dangerous to the average ,athenian because of the difference of form and method4 ,in the sense of pruning away excrescences and eliminating factors which to the average citizen were all one with the basic beliefs1 it was radical4 ,but looked at in the perspective of history and in contrast with different types of thought which developed later in different social environments1 it is now easy to see how profoundly1 after all1 ,plato and ,aristotle reflected the meaning of ,greek tradition and habit1 so that their writings remain1 with the writings of the great dramatists1 the best introduction of a student into the innermost ideals and aspirations of distinctively ,greek life4 ,without ,greek religion1 ,greek art1 ,greek civic life1 their philosophy would have been impossible2 while the effect of that science upon which the philosophers most prided themselves turns out to have been superficial and negligible4 ,this apologetic spirit of philosophy is even more apparent when ,medieval ,christianity about the twelfth century sought for a systematic rational presentation of itself and made use of classic philosophy1 especially that of ,aristotle1 to justify itself to reason4 ,a not unsimilar occurrence characterizes the chief philosophic systems of ,germany in the early nineteenth century1 when ,hegel assumed the task of justifying in the name of rational idealism the doctrines and institutions which were menaced by the new spirit of science and popular government4 ,the result has been that the great systems have not been free from party spirit exercised in behalf of preconceived beliefs4 ,since they have at the same time professed complete intellectual independence and rationality1 the result has been too often to impart to philosophy an element of insincerity1 all the more insidious because wholly unconscious on the part of those who sustained philosophy4 ,and this brings us to a second trait of philosophy springing from its origin4 ,since it aimed at a rational justification of things that had been previously accepted because of their emotional congeniality and social prestige1 it had to make much of the apparatus of reason and proof4 ,because of the lack of intrinsic rationality in the matters with which it dealt1 it leaned over backward1 so to speak1 in parade of logical form4 ,in dealing with matters of fact1 simpler and rougher ways of demonstration may be resorted to4 ,it is enough1 so to say1 to produce the fact in question and point to it--the fundamental form of all demonstration4 ,but when it comes to convincing men of the truth of doctrines which are no longer to be accepted upon the say-so of custom and social authority1 but which also are not capable of empirical verification1 there is no recourse save to magnify the signs of rigorous thought and rigid demonstration4 ,thus arises that appearance of abstract definition and ultra-scientific argumentation which repels so many from philosophy but which has been one of its chief attractions to its devotees4 ,at the worst1 this has reduced philosophy to a show of elaborate terminology1 a hair-splitting logic1 and a fictitious devotion to the mere external forms of comprehensive and minute demonstration4 ,even at the best1 it has tended to produce an overdeveloped attachment to system for its own sake1 and an over-pretentious claim to certainty4 ,bishop ,butler declared that probability is the guide of life2 but few philosophers have been courageous enough to avow that philosophy can be satisfied with anything that is merely probable4 ,the customs dictated by tradition and desire had claimed finality and immutability4 ,they had claimed to give certain and unvarying laws of conduct4 ,very early in its history philosophy made pretension to a similar conclusiveness1 and something of this temper has clung to classic philosophies ever since4 ,they have insisted that they were more scientific than the sciences--that1 indeed1 philosophy was necessary because after all the special sciences fail in attaining final and complete truth4 ,there have been a few dissenters who have ventured to assert1 as did ,william ,james1 that philosophy is vision and that its chief function is to free men's minds from bias and prejudice and to enlarge their perceptions of the world about them4 ,but in the main philosophy has set up much more ambitious pretensions4 ,to say frankly that philosophy can proffer nothing but hypotheses1 and that these hypotheses are of value only as they render men's minds more sensitive to life about them1 would seem like a negation of philosophy itself4 ,in the third place1 the body of beliefs dictated by desire and imagination and developed under the influence of communal authority into an authoritative tradition1 was pervasive and comprehensive4 ,it was1 so to speak1 omnipresent in all the details of the group life4 ,its pressure was unremitting and its influence universal4 ,it was then probably inevitable that the rival principle1 reflective thought1 should aim at a similar universality and comprehensiveness4 ,it would be as inclusive and far-reaching metaphysically as tradition had been socially4 ,now there was just one way in which this pretension could be accomplished in conjunction with a claim of complete logical system and certainty4 ,all philosophies of the classic type have made a fixed and fundamental distinction between two realms of existence4 ,one of these corresponds to the religious and supernatural world of popular tradition1 which in its metaphysical rendering became the world of highest and ultimate reality4 ,since the final source and sanction of all important truths and rules of conduct in community life had been found in superior and unquestioned religious beliefs1 so the absolute and supreme reality of philosophy afforded the only sure guaranty of truth about empirical matters1 and the sole rational guide to proper social institutions and individual behavior4 ,over against this absolute and noumenal reality which could be apprehended only by the systematic discipline of philosophy itself stood the ordinary empirical1 relatively real1 phenomenal world of everyday experience4 ,it was with this world that the practical affairs and utilities of men were connected4 ,it was to this imperfect and perishing world that matter of fact1 positivistic science referred4 ,this is the trait which1 in my opinion1 has affected most deeply the classic notion about the nature of philosophy4 ,philosophy has arrogated to itself the office of demonstrating the existence of a transcendent1 absolute or inner reality and of revealing to man the nature and features of this ultimate and higher reality4 ,it has therefore claimed that it was in possession of a higher organ of knowledge than is employed by positive science and ordinary practical experience1 and that it is marked by a superior dignity and importance--a claim which is undeniable if philosophy leads man to proof and intuition of a ,reality beyond that open to day-by-day life and the special sciences4 ,this claim has1 of course1 been denied by various philosophers from time to time4 ,but for the most part these denials have been agnostic and sceptical4 ,they have contented themselves with asserting that absolute and ultimate reality is beyond human ken4 ,but they have not ventured to deny that such ,reality would be the appropriate sphere for the exercise of philosophic knowledge provided only it were within the reach of human intelligence4 ,only comparatively recently has another conception of the proper office of philosophy arisen4 ,this course of lectures will be devoted to setting forth this different conception of philosophy in some of its main contrasts to what this lecture has termed the classic conception4 ,at this point1 it can be referred to only by anticipation and in cursory fashion4 ,it is implied in the account which has been given of the origin of philosophy out of the background of an authoritative tradition2 a tradition originally dictated by man's imagination working under the influence of love and hate and in the interest of emotional excitement and satisfaction4 ,common frankness requires that it be stated that this account of the origin of philosophies claiming to deal with absolute ,being in a systematic way has been given with malice prepense4 ,it seems to me that this genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining this type of philosophic theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation could be4 ,if this lecture succeeds in leaving in your minds as a reasonable hypothesis the idea that philosophy originated not out of intellectual material1 but out of social and emotional material1 it will also succeed in leaving with you a changed attitude toward traditional philosophies4 ,they will be viewed from a new angle and placed in a new light4 ,new questions about them will be aroused and new standards for judging them will be suggested4 ,if any one will commence without mental reservations to study the history of philosophy not as an isolated thing but as a chapter in the development of civilization and culture2 if one will connect the story of philosophy with a study of anthropology1 primitive life1 the history of religion1 literature and social institutions1 it is confidently asserted that he will reach his own independent judgment as to the worth of the account which has been presented today4 ,considered in this way1 the history of philosophy will take on a new significance4 ,what is lost from the standpoint of would-be science is regained from the standpoint of humanity4 ,instead of the disputes of rivals about the nature of reality1 we have the scene of human clash of social purpose and aspirations4 ,instead of impossible attempts to transcend experience1 we have the significant record of the efforts of men to formulate the things of experience to which they are most deeply and passionately attached4 ,instead of impersonal and purely speculative endeavors to contemplate as remote beholders the nature of absolute things-in-themselves1 we have a living picture of the choice of thoughtful men about what they would have life to be1 and to what ends they would have men shape their intelligent activities4 ,any one of you who arrives at such a view of past philosophy will of necessity be led to entertain a quite definite conception of the scope and aim of future philosophizing4 ,he will inevitably be committed to the notion that what philosophy has been unconsciously1 without knowing or intending it1 and1 so to speak1 under cover1 it must henceforth be openly and deliberately4 ,when it is acknowledged that under disguise of dealing with ultimate reality1 philosophy has been occupied with the precious values embedded in social traditions1 that it has sprung from a clash of social ends and from a conflict of inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies1 it will be seen that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day4 ,its aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts4 ,that which may be pretentiously unreal when it is formulated in metaphysical distinctions becomes intensely significant when connected with the drama of the struggle of social beliefs and ideals4 ,philosophy which surrenders its somewhat barren monopoly of dealings with ,ultimate and ,absolute ,reality will find a compensation in enlightening the moral forces which move mankind and in contributing to the aspirations of men to attain to a more ordered and intelligent happiness4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,some ,,historical ,,factors ,,in ,,philosophical ,,reconstruction ,francis ,bacon of the ,elizabethan age is the great forerunner of the spirit of modern life4 ,though slight in accomplishment1 as a prophet of new tendencies he is an outstanding figure of the world's intellectual life4 ,like many another prophet he suffers from confused intermingling of old and new4 ,what is most significant in him has been rendered more or less familiar by the later course of events4 ,but page after page is filled with matter which belongs to the past from which ,bacon thought he had escaped4 ,caught between these two sources of easy disparagement1 ,bacon hardly receives his due as the real founder of modern thought1 while he is praised for merits which scarcely belong to him1 such as an alleged authorship of the specific methods of induction pursued by science4 ,what makes ,bacon memorable is that breezes blowing from a new world caught and filled his sails and stirred him to adventure in new seas4 ,he never himself discovered the land of promise1 but he proclaimed the new goal and by faith he descried its features from afar4 ,the main traits of his thought put before our mind the larger features of a new spirit which was at work in causing intellectual reconstruction4 ,they may suggest the social and historical forces out of which the new spirit was born4 ,the best known aphorism of ,bacon is that ,knowledge is ,power4 ,judged by this pragmatic criterion1 he condemned the great body of learning then extant as not-knowledge1 as pseudo- and pretentious-knowledge4 ,for it did not give power4 ,it was otiose1 not operative4 ,in his most extensive discussion he classified the learning of his day under three heads1 delicate1 fantastic and contentious4 ,under delicate learning1 he included the literary learning which through the influence of the revival of ancient languages and literatures occupied so important a place in the intellectual life of the ,renaissance4 ,bacon's condemnation is the more effective because he himself was a master of the classics and of all the graces and refinements which this literary study was intended to convey4 ,in substance he anticipated most of the attacks which educational reformers since his time have made upon one-sided literary culture4 ,it contributed not to power but to ornament and decoration4 ,it was ostentatious and luxurious4 ,by fantastic learning he meant the quasi-magical science that was so rife all over ,europe in the sixteenth century--wild developments of alchemy1 astrology1 etc4 ,upon this he poured his greatest vials of wrath because the corruption of the good is the worst of evils4 ,delicate learning was idle and vain1 but fantastic learning aped the form of true knowledge4 ,it laid hold of the true principle and aim of knowledge--control of natural forces4 ,but it neglected the conditions and methods by which alone such knowledge could be obtained1 and thus deliberately led men astray4 ,for our purposes1 however1 what he says about contentious learning is the most important4 ,for by this1 he means the traditional science which had come down1 in scanty and distorted measure to be sure1 from antiquity through scholasticism4 ,it is called contentious both because of the logical method used and the end to which it was put4 ,in a certain sense it aimed at power1 but power over other men in the interest of some class or sect or person1 not power over natural forces in the common interest of all4 ,bacon's conviction of the quarrelsome1 self-displaying character of the scholarship which had come down from antiquity was of course not so much due to ,greek science itself as to the degenerate heritage of scholasticism in the fourteenth century1 when philosophy had fallen into the hands of disputatious theologians1 full of hair-splitting argumentativeness and quirks and tricks by which to win victory over somebody else4 ,but ,bacon also brought his charge against the ,aristotelian method itself4 ,in its rigorous forms it aimed at demonstration1 and in its milder forms at persuasion4 ,but both demonstration and persuasion aim at conquest of mind rather than of nature4 ,moreover they both assume that some one is already in possession of a truth or a belief1 and that the only problem is to convince some one else1 or to teach4 ,in contrast1 his new method had an exceedingly slight opinion of the amount of truth already existent1 and a lively sense of the extent and importance of truths still to be attained4 ,it would be a logic of discovery1 not a logic of argumentation1 proof and persuasion4 ,to ,bacon1 the old logic even at its best was a logic for teaching the already known1 and teaching meant indoctrination1 discipling4 ,it was an axiom of ,aristotle that only that which was already known could be learned1 that growth in knowledge consisted simply in bringing together a universal truth of reason and a particular truth of sense which had previously been noted separately4 ,in any case1 learning meant growth of knowledge1 and growth belongs in the region of becoming1 change1 and hence is inferior to possession of knowledge in the syllogistic self-revolving manipulation of what was already known--demonstration4 ,in contrast with this point of view1 ,bacon eloquently proclaimed the superiority of discovery of new facts and truths to demonstration of the old4 ,now there is only one road to discovery1 and that is penetrating inquiry into the secrets of nature4 ,scientific principles and laws do not lie on the surface of nature4 ,they are hidden1 and must be wrested from nature by an active and elaborate technique of inquiry4 ,neither logical reasoning nor the passive accumulation of any number of observations--which the ancients called experience--suffices to lay hold of them4 ,active experimentation must force the apparent facts of nature into forms different to those in which they familiarly present themselves2 and thus make them tell the truth about themselves1 as torture may compel an unwilling witness to reveal what he has been concealing4 ,pure reasoning as a means of arriving at truth is like the spider who spins a web out of himself4 ,the web is orderly and elaborate1 but it is only a trap4 ,the passive accumulation of experiences--the traditional empirical method--is like the ant who busily runs about and collects and piles up heaps of raw materials4 ,true method1 that which ,bacon would usher in1 is comparable to the operations of the bee who1 like the ant1 collects material from the external world1 but unlike that industrious creature attacks and modifies the collected stuff in order to make it yield its hidden treasure4 ,along with this contrast between subjugation of nature and subjection of other minds and the elevation of a method of discovery above a method of demonstration1 went ,bacon's sense of progress as the aim and test of genuine knowledge4 ,according to his criticisms1 the classic logic1 even in its ,aristotelian form1 inevitably played into the hands of inert conservatism4 ,for in accustoming the mind to think of truth as already known1 it habituated men to fall back on the intellectual attainments of the past1 and to accept them without critical scrutiny4 ,not merely the medieval but the renaissance mind tended to look back to antiquity as a ,golden ,age of ,knowledge1 the former relying upon sacred scriptures1 the latter upon secular literatures4 ,and while this attitude could not fairly be charged up against the classic logic1 yet ,bacon felt1 and with justice1 that any logic which identified the technique of knowing with demonstration of truths already possessed by the mind1 blunts the spirit of investigation and confines the mind within the circle of traditional learning4 ,such a logic could not avoid having for its salient features definition of what is already known 7or thought to be known71 and its systematization according to recognized canons of orthodoxy4 ,a logic of discovery on the other hand looks to the future4 ,received truth it regards critically as something to be tested by new experiences rather than as something to be dogmatically taught and obediently received4 ,its chief interest in even the most carefully tested ready-made knowledge is the use which may be made of it in further inquiries and discoveries4 ,old truth has its chief value in assisting the detection of new truth4 ,bacon's own appreciation of the nature of induction was highly defective4 ,but his acute sense that science means invasion of the unknown1 rather than repetition in logical form of the already known1 makes him nevertheless the father of induction4 ,endless and persistent uncovering of facts and principles not known--such is the true spirit of induction4 ,continued progress in knowledge is the only sure way of protecting old knowledge from degeneration into dogmatic doctrines received on authority1 or from imperceptible decay into superstition and old wives' tales4 ,ever-renewed progress is to ,bacon the test as well as the aim of genuine logic4 ,where1 ,bacon constantly demands1 where are the works1 the fruits1 of the older logic8 ,what has it done to ameliorate the evils of life1 to rectify defects1 to improve conditions8 ,where are the inventions that justify its claim to be in possession of truth8 ,beyond the victory of man over man in law courts1 diplomacy and political administration1 they are nil4 ,one had to turn from admired sciences to despised arts to find works1 fruits1 consequences of value to human kind through power over natural forces4 ,and progress in the arts was as yet intermittent1 fitful1 accidental4 ,a true logic or technique of inquiry would make advance in the industrial1 agricultural and medical arts continuous1 cumulative and deliberately systematic4 ,if we take into account the supposed body of ready-made knowledge upon which learned men rested in supine acquiescence and which they recited in parrot-like chorus1 we find it consists of two parts4 ,one of these parts is made up of the errors of our ancestors1 musty with antiquity and organized into pseudo-science through the use of the classic logic4 ,such truths are in fact only the systematized mistakes and prejudices of our ancestors4 ,many of them originated in accident2 many in class interest and bias1 perpetuated by authority for this very reason--a consideration which later actuated ,locke's attack upon the doctrine of innate ideas4 ,the other portion of accepted beliefs comes from instinctive tendencies of the human mind that give it a dangerous bias until counteracted by a conscious and critical logic4 ,the mind of man spontaneously assumes greater simplicity1 uniformity and unity among phenomena than actually exists4 ,it follows superficial analogies and jumps to conclusions2 it overlooks the variety of details and the existence of exceptions4 ,thus it weaves a web of purely internal origin which it imposes upon nature4 ,what had been termed science in the past consisted of this humanly constructed and imposed web4 ,men looked at the work of their own minds and thought they were seeing realities in nature4 ,they were worshipping1 under the name of science1 the idols of their own making4 ,so-called science and philosophy consisted of these anticipations of nature4 ,and the worst thing that could be said about traditional logic was that instead of saving man from this natural source of error1 it had1 though attributing to nature a false rationality of unity1 simplicity and generality1 sanctioned these sources of delusion4 ,the office of the new logic would be to protect the mind against itself3 to teach it to undergo a patient and prolonged apprenticeship to fact in its infinite variety and particularity3 to obey nature intellectually in order to command it practically4 ,such was the significance of the new logic--the new tool or organon of learning1 so named in express opposition to the organon of ,aristotle4 ,certain other important oppositions are implied4 ,aristotle thought of reason as capable of solitary communion with rational truth4 ,the counterpart of his celebrated saying that man is a political animal1 is that ,intelligence1 ,nous1 is neither animal1 human nor political4 ,it is divinely unique and self-enclosed4 ,to ,bacon1 error had been produced and perpetuated by social influences1 and truth must be discovered by social agencies organized for that purpose4 ,left to himself1 the individual can do little or nothing2 he is likely to become involved in his own self-spun web of misconceptions4 ,the great need is the organization of co-operative research1 whereby men attack nature collectively and the work of inquiry is carried on continuously from generation to generation4 ,bacon even aspired to the rather absurd notion of a method so perfected that differences in natural human ability might be discounted1 and all be put on the same level in production of new facts and new truths4 ,yet this absurdity was only the negative side of his great positive prophecy of a combined and co-operative pursuit of science such as characterizes our own day4 ,in view of the picture he draws in his ,new ,atlantis of a ,state organized for collective inquiry1 we readily forgive him his exaggerations4 ,power over nature was not to be individual but collective2 the ,empire1 as he says1 of ,man over ,nature1 substituted for the ,empire of ,man over ,man4 ,let us employ ,bacon's own words with their variety of picturesque metaphor3 ,men have entered into the desire of learning and knowledge1444 seldom sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason1 to the benefit and use of men1 but as if they sought in knowledge a couch whereon to rest a searching and wandering spirit2 or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect2 or a tower for a proud mind to raise itself upon2 or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention2 or a shop for profit and sale2 and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the creator and the relief of man's estate4 ,when ,william ,james called ,pragmatism a ,new ,name for an ,old ,way of ,thinking1 ,i do not know that he was thinking expressly of ,francis ,bacon1 but so far as concerns the spirit and atmosphere of the pursuit of knowledge1 ,bacon may be taken as the prophet of a pragmatic conception of knowledge4 ,many misconceptions of its spirit would be avoided if his emphasis upon the social factor in both the pursuit and the end of knowledge were carefully observed4 ,this somewhat over-long rsum of ,bacon's ideas has not been gone into as a matter of historic retrospect4 ,the summary is rather meant to put before our minds an authentic document of the new philosophy which may bring into relief the social causes of intellectual revolution4 ,only a sketchy account can be here attempted1 but it may be of some assistance even barely to remind you of the direction of that industrial1 political and religious change upon which ,europe was entering4 ,upon the industrial side1 it is impossible1 ,i think1 to exaggerate the influence of travel1 exploration and new commerce which fostered a romantic sense of adventure into novelty2 loosened the hold of traditional beliefs2 created a lively sense of new worlds to be investigated and subdued2 produced new methods of manufacture1 commerce1 banking and finance2 and then reacted everywhere to stimulate invention1 and to introduce positive observation and active experimentation into science4 ,the ,crusades1 the revival of the profane learning of antiquity and even more perhaps1 the contact with the advanced learning of the ,mohammedans1 the increase of commerce with ,asia and ,africa1 the introduction of the lens1 compass and gunpowder1 the finding and opening up of ,north and ,south ,america--most significantly called ,the ,new ,world--these are some of the obvious external facts4 ,contrast between peoples and races previously isolated is always1 ,i think1 most fruitful and influential for change when psychological and industrial changes coincide with and reinforce each other4 ,sometimes people undergo emotional change1 what might almost be called a metaphysical change1 through intercourse4 ,the inner set of the mind1 especially in religious matters1 is altered4 ,at other times1 there is a lively exchange of goods1 an adoption of foreign tools and devices1 an imitation of alien habits of clothing1 habitation and production of commodities4 ,one of these changes is1 so to speak1 too internal and the other too external to bring about a profound intellectual development4 ,but when the creation of a new mental attitude falls together with extensive material and economic changes1 something significant happens4 ,this coincidence of two kinds of change was1 ,i take it1 characteristic of the new contacts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries4 ,clash of customs and traditional beliefs dispelled mental inertia and sluggishness2 it aroused a lively curiosity as to different and new ideas4 ,the actual adventure of travel and exploration purged the mind of fear of the strange and unknown3 as new territories geographically and commercially speaking were opened up1 the mind was opened up4 ,new contacts promoted the desire for still more contacts2 the appetite for novelty and discovery grew by what it fed upon4 ,conservative adherence to old beliefs and methods underwent a steady attrition with every new voyage into new parts and every new report of foreign ways4 ,the mind became used to exploration and discovery4 ,it found a delight and interest in the revelations of the novel and the unusual which it no longer took in what was old and customary4 ,moreover1 the very act of exploration1 of expedition1 the process of enterprising adventure into the remote1 yielded a peculiar joy and thrill4 ,this psychological change was essential to the birth of the new point of view in science and philosophy4 ,yet alone it could hardly have produced the new method of knowing4 ,but positive changes in the habits and purposes of life gave objective conformation and support to the mental change4 ,they also determined the channels in which the new spirit found exercise4 ,newfound wealth1 the gold from the ,americas and new articles of consumption and enjoyment1 tended to wean men from preoccupation with the metaphysical and theological1 and to turn their minds with newly awakened interest to the joys of nature and this life4 ,new material resources and new markets in ,america and ,india undermined the old dependence upon household and manual production for a local and limited market1 and generated quantitative1 large scale production by means of steam for foreign and expanding markets4 ,capitalism1 rapid transit1 and production for exchange against money and for profit1 instead of against goods and for consumption1 followed4 ,this cursory and superficial reminder of vast and complicated events may suggest the mutual interdependence of the scientific revolution and the industrial revolution4 ,upon the one hand1 modern industry is so much applied science4 ,no amount of desire to make money1 or to enjoy new commodities1 no amount of mere practical energy and enterprise1 would have effected the economic transformation of the last few centuries and generations4 ,improvements in mathematical1 physical1 chemical and biological science were prerequisites4 ,business men through engineers of different sorts1 have laid hold of the new insights gained by scientific men into the hidden energies of nature1 and have turned them to account4 ,the modern mine1 factory1 railway1 steamship1 telegraph1 all of the appliances and equipment of production1 and transportation1 express scientific knowledge4 ,they would continue unimpaired even if the ordinary pecuniary accompaniments of economic activity were radically altered4 ,in short1 through the intermediary of invention1 ,bacon's watchword that knowledge is power and his dream of continuous empire over natural forces by means of natural science have been actualized4 ,the industrial revolution by steam and electricity is the reply to ,bacon's prophecy4 ,on the other hand1 it is equally true that the needs of modern industry have been tremendous stimuli to scientific investigation4 ,the demands of progressive production and transportation have set new problems to inquiry2 the processes used in industry have suggested new experimental appliances and operations in science2 the wealth rolled up in business has to some extent been diverted to endowment of research4 ,the uninterrupted and pervasive interaction of scientific discovery and industrial application has fructified both science and industry1 and has brought home to the contemporary mind the fact that the gist of scientific knowledge is control of natural energies4 ,these four facts1 natural science1 experimentation1 control and progress have been inextricably bound up together4 ,that up to the present the application of the newer methods and results has influenced the means of life rather than its ends2 or1 better put1 that human aims have so far been affected in an accidental rather than in an intelligently directed way1 signifies that so far the change has been technical rather than human and moral1 that it has been economic rather than adequately social4 ,put in the language of ,bacon1 this means that while we have been reasonably successful in obtaining command of nature by means of science1 our science is not yet such that this command is systematically and pre-eminently applied to the relief of human estate4 ,such applications occur and in great numbers1 but they are incidental1 sporadic and external4 ,and this limitation defines the specific problem of philosophical reconstruction at the present time4 ,for it emphasizes the larger social deficiencies that require intelligent diagnosis1 and projection of aims and methods4 ,it is hardly necessary to remind you however that marked political changes have already followed upon the new science and its industrial applications1 and that in so far some directions of social development have at least been marked out4 ,the growth of the new technique of industry has everywhere been followed by the fall of feudal institutions1 in which the social pattern was formed in agricultural occupations and military pursuits4 ,wherever business in the modern sense has gone1 the tendency has been to transfer power from land to financial capital1 from the country to the city1 from the farm to factory1 from social titles based on personal allegiance1 service and protection1 to those based on control of labor and exchange of goods4 ,the change in the political centre of gravity has resulted in emancipating the individual from bonds of class and custom and in producing a political organization which depends less upon superior authority and more upon voluntary choice4 ,modern states1 in other words1 are regarded less as divine1 and more as human works than they used to be2 less as necessary manifestations of some supreme and over-ruling principles1 and more as contrivances of men and women to realize their own desires4 ,the contract theory of the origin of the state is a theory whose falsity may easily be demonstrated both philosophically and historically4 ,nevertheless this theory has had great currency and influence4 ,in form1 it stated that some time in the past men voluntarily got together and made a compact with one another to observe certain laws and to submit to certain authority and in that way brought the state and the relation of ruler and subject into existence4 ,like many things in philosophy1 the theory1 though worthless as a record of fact1 is of great worth as a symptom of the direction of human desire4 ,it testified to a growing belief that the state existed to satisfy human needs and could be shaped by human intention and volition4 ,aristotle's theory that the state exists by nature failed to satisfy the thought of the seventeenth century because it seemed by making the state a product of nature to remove its constitution beyond human choice4 ,equally significant was the assumption of the contract theory that individuals by their personal decisions expressing their personal wishes bring the state into existence4 ,the rapidity with which the theory gained a hold all over western ,europe showed the extent to which the bonds of customary institutions had relaxed their grip4 ,it proved that men had been so liberated from absorption in larger groups that they were conscious of themselves as individuals having rights and claims on their own account1 not simply as members of a class1 guild or social grade4 ,side by side with this political individualism went a religious and moral individualism4 ,the metaphysical doctrine of the superiority of the species to the individual1 of the permanent universal to the changing particular1 was the philosophic support of political and ecclesiastical institutionalism4 ,the universal church was the ground1 end and limit of the individual's beliefs and acts in spiritual matters1 just as the feudal hierarchical organization was the basis1 law and fixed limit of his behavior in secular affairs4 ,the northern barbarians had never completely come under the sway of classic ideas and customs4 ,that which was indigenous where life was primarily derived from ,latin sources was borrowed and more or less externally imposed in ,germanic ,europe4 ,protestantism marked the formal breaking away from the domination of ,roman ideas4 ,it effected liberation of individual conscience and worship from control by an organized institution claiming to be permanent and universal4 ,it cannot truly be said that at the outset the new religious movement went far in promoting freedom of thought and criticism1 or in denying the notion of some supreme authority to which individual intelligence was absolutely in bonds4 ,nor at first did it go far in furthering tolerance or respect for divergency of moral and religious convictions4 ,but practically it did tend to disintegration of established institutions4 ,by multiplying sects and churches it encouraged at least a negative toleration of the right of individuals to judge ultimate matters for themselves4 ,in time1 there developed a formulated belief in the sacredness of individual conscience and in the right to freedom of opinion1 belief and worship4 ,it is unnecessary to point out how the spread of this conviction increased political individualism1 or how it accelerated the willingness of men to question received ideas in science and philosophy--to think and observe and experiment for themselves4 ,religious individualism served to supply a much needed sanction to initiative and independence of thought in all spheres1 even when religious movements officially were opposed to such freedom when carried beyond a limited point4 ,the greatest influence of ,protestantism was1 however1 in developing the idea of the personality of every human being as an end in himself4 ,when human beings were regarded as capable of direct relationship with ,god1 without the intermediary of any organization like the ,church1 and the drama of sin1 redemption and salvation was something enacted within the innermost soul of individuals rather than in the species of which the individual was a subordinate part1 a fatal blow was struck at all doctrines which taught the subordination of personality--a blow which had many political reverberations in promoting democracy4 ,for when in religion the idea of the intrinsic worth of every soul as such was proclaimed1 it was difficult to keep the idea from spilling over1 so to say1 into secular relationships4 ,the absurdity is obvious of trying in a few paragraphs to summarize movements in industry1 politics and religion whose influence is still far from exhausted and about which hundreds and thousands of volumes have been written4 ,but ,i shall count upon your forbearance to recall that these matters are alluded to only in order to suggest some of the forces that operated to mark out the channels in which new ideas ran4 ,first1 there is the transfer of interest from the eternal and universal to what is changing and specific1 concrete--a movement that showed itself practically in carrying over of attention and thought from another world to this1 from the supernaturalism characteristic of the ,middle ,ages to delight in natural science1 natural activity and natural intercourse4 ,secondly1 there is the gradual decay of the authority of fixed institutions and class distinctions and relations1 and a growing belief in the power of individual minds1 guided by methods of observation1 experiment and reflection1 to attain the truths needed for the guidance of life4 ,the operations and results of natural inquiry gained in prestige and power at the expense of principles dictated from high authority4 ,consequently principles and alleged truths are judged more and more by criteria of their origin in experience and their consequences of weal and woe in experience1 and less by criteria of sublime origin from beyond everyday experience and independent of fruits in experience4 ,it is no longer enough for a principle to be elevated1 noble1 universal and hallowed by time4 ,it must present its birth certificate1 it must show under just what conditions of human experience it was generated1 and it must justify itself by its works1 present and potential4 ,such is the inner meaning of the modern appeal to experience as an ultimate criterion of value and validity4 ,in the third place1 great store is set upon the idea of progress4 ,the future rather than the past dominates the imagination4 ,the ,golden ,age lies ahead of us not behind us4 ,everywhere new possibilities beckon and arouse courage and effort4 ,the great ,french thinkers of the later eighteenth century borrowed this idea from ,bacon and developed it into the doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of mankind on earth4 ,man is capable1 if he will but exercise the required courage1 intelligence and effort1 of shaping his own fate4 ,physical conditions offer no insurmountable barriers4 ,in the fourth place1 the patient and experimental study of nature1 bearing fruit in inventions which control nature and subdue her forces to social uses1 is the method by which progress is made4 ,knowledge is power and knowledge is achieved by sending the mind to school to nature to learn her processes of change4 ,in this lecture as in the previous one1 ,i can hardly close better than by reference to the new responsibilities imposed upon philosophy and the new opportunities opened to it4 ,upon the whole1 the greatest effect of these changes up to date has been to substitute an ,idealism based on epistemology1 or the theory of knowledge1 for the ,idealism based on the metaphysics of classic antiquity4 ,earlier modern philosophy 7even though unconsciously to itself7 had the problem of reconciling the traditional theory of the rational and ideal basis1 stuff and end of the universe with the new interest in individual mind and the new confidence in its capacities4 ,it was in a dilemma4 ,on the one hand1 it had no intention of losing itself in a materialism which subordinated man to physical existence and mind to matter--especially just at the moment when in actual affairs man and mind were beginning to achieve genuine rule over nature4 ,on the other hand1 the conception that the world as it stood was an embodiment of a fixed and comprehensive ,mind or ,reason was uncongenial to those whose main concern was with the deficiencies of the world and with an attempt to remedy them4 ,the effect of the objective theological idealism that had developed out of classic metaphysical idealism was to make the mind submissive and acquiescent4 ,the new individualism chafed under the restrictions imposed upon it by the notion of a universal reason which had once and for all shaped nature and destiny4 ,in breaking away from antique and medieval thought1 accordingly1 early modern thought continued the older tradition of a ,reason that creates and constitutes the world1 but combined it with the notion that this ,reason operates through the human mind1 individual or collective4 ,this is the common note of idealism sounded by all the philosophies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 whether belonging to the ,british school of ,locke1 ,berkeley and ,hume or the ,continental school of ,descartes4 ,in ,kant as everybody knows the two strains came together2 and the theme of the formation of the knowable world by means of a thought that operated exclusively through the human knower became explicit4 ,idealism ceased to be metaphysical and cosmic in order to become epistemological and personal4 ,it is evident that this development represents merely a transitional stage4 ,it tried1 after all1 to put the new wine in the old bottles4 ,it did not achieve a free and unbiased formulation of the meaning of the power to direct nature's forces through knowledge--that is1 purposeful1 experimental action acting to reshape beliefs and institutions4 ,the ancient tradition was still strong enough to project itself unconsciously into men's ways of thinking1 and to hamper and compromise the expression of the really modern forces and aims4 ,essential philosophic reconstruction represents an attempt to state these causes and results in a way freed from incompatible inherited factors4 ,it will regard intelligence not as the original shaper and final cause of things1 but as the purposeful energetic re-shaper of those phases of nature and life that obstruct social well-being4 ,it esteems the individual not as an exaggeratedly self-sufficient ,ego which by some magic creates the world1 but as the agent who is responsible through initiative1 inventiveness and intelligently directed labor for re-creating the world1 transforming it into an instrument and possession of intelligence4 ,the train of ideas represented by the ,baconian ,knowledge is ,power thus failed in getting an emancipated and independent expression4 ,these become hopelessly entangled in standpoints and prepossessions that embodied a social1 political and scientific tradition with which they were completely incompatible4 ,the obscurity1 the confusion of modern philosophy is the product of this attempt to combine two things which cannot possibly be combined either logically or morally4 ,philosophic reconstruction for the present is thus the endeavor to undo the entanglement and to permit the ,baconian aspirations to come to a free and unhindered expression4 ,in succeeding lectures we shall consider the needed reconstruction as it affects certain classic philosophic antitheses1 like those of experience and reason1 the real and the ideal4 ,but first we shall have to consider the modifying effect exercised upon philosophy by that changed conception of nature1 animate and inanimate1 which we owe to the progress of science4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,scientific ,,factor ,,in ,,reconstruction ,,of ,,philosophy ,philosophy starts from some deep and wide way of responding to the difficulties life presents1 but it grows only when material is at hand for making this practical response conscious1 articulate and communicable4 ,accompanying the economic1 political and ecclesiastical changes which were alluded to in an earlier lecture1 was a scientific revolution enormous in scope and leaving unchanged almost no detail of belief about nature1 physical and human4 ,in part this scientific transformation was produced by just the change in practical attitude and temper4 ,but as it progressed1 it furnished that change an appropriate vocabulary1 congenial to its needs1 and made it articulate4 ,the advance of science in its larger generalizations and in its specific detail of fact supplied precisely that intellectual equipment of ideas and concrete fact that was needed in order to formulate1 precipitate1 communicate and propagate the new disposition4 ,today1 accordingly1 we shall deal with those contrasting conceptions of the structure and constitution of ,nature1 which when they are accepted on the authority of science 7alleged or real71 form the intellectual framework of philosophy4 ,contrasting conceptions of ancient and modern science have been selected4 ,for ,i see no way in which the truly philosophic import of the picture of the world painted by modern science can be appreciated except to exhibit it in contrast with that earlier picture which gave classic metaphysics its intellectual foundation and confirmation4 ,the world in which philosophers once put their trust was a closed world1 a world consisting internally of a limited number of fixed forms1 and having definite boundaries externally4 ,the world of modern science is an open world1 a world varying indefinitely without the possibility of assignable limit in its internal make-up1 a world stretching beyond any assignable bounds externally4 ,again1 the world in which even the most intelligent men of olden times thought they lived was a fixed world1 a realm where changes went on only within immutable limits of rest and permanence1 and a world where the fixed and unmoving was1 as we have already noted1 higher in quality and authority than the moving and altering4 ,and in the third place1 the world which men once saw with their eyes1 portrayed in their imaginations and repeated in their plans of conduct1 was a world of a limited number of classes1 kinds1 forms1 distinct in quality 7as kinds and species must be distinct7 and arranged in a graded order of superiority and inferiority4 ,it is not easy to recall the image of the universe which was taken for granted in the world tradition4 ,in spite of its dramatic rendering 7as in ,dante71 of the dialectical elaborations of ,aristotle and ,st4 ,thomas1 in spite of the fact that it held men's minds captive until the last three hundred years1 and that its overthrow involved a religious upheaval1 it is already dim1 faded and remote4 ,even as a separate and abstract thing of theory it is not easy to recover4 ,as something pervasive1 interwoven with all the details of reflection and observation1 with the plans and rules of behavior1 it is impossible to call it back again4 ,yet1 as best we can1 we need to put before our minds a definitely enclosed universe1 something which can be called a universe in a literal and visible sense1 having the earth at its fixed and unchanging centre and at a fixed circumference the heavenly arch of fixed stars moving in an eternal round of divine ether1 hemming in all things and keeping them forever at one and in order4 ,the earth1 though at the centre1 is the coarsest1 grossest1 most material1 least significant and good 7or perfect7 of the parts of this closed world4 ,it is the scene of maximum fluctuation and vicissitude4 ,it is the least rational1 and therefore the least notable1 or knowable2 it offers the least to reward contemplation1 provoke admiration and govern conduct4 ,between this grossly material centre and the immaterial1 spiritual and eternal heavens lie a definite series of regions of moon1 planets1 sun1 etc41 each of which gains in rank1 value1 rationality and true being as it is farther from earth and nearer the heavens4 ,each of these regions is composed of its own appropriate stuff of earth1 water1 air1 fire in its own dominant degree1 until we reach the heavenly firmament which transcends all these principles1 being constituted1 as was just said1 of that immaterial1 inalterable energy called ether4 ,within this tight and pent in universe1 changes take place of course4 ,but they are only of a small number of fixed kinds2 and they operate only within fixed limits4 ,each kind of stuff has its own appropriate motion4 ,it is the nature of earthly things to be heavy1 since they are gross1 and hence to move downward4 ,fire and superior things are light and hence move upward to their proper place2 air rises only to the plane of the planets1 where it then takes its back and forth motion which naturally belongs to it1 as is evident in the winds and in respiration4 ,ether being the highest of all physical things has a purely circular movement4 ,the daily return of the fixed stars is the closest possible approximation to eternity1 and to the self-involved revolution of mind upon its own ideal axis of reason4 ,upon the earth in virtue of its earthly nature--or rather its lack of virtue--is a scene of mere change4 ,mere flux1 aimless and meaningless1 starts at no definite point and arrives at nothing1 amounts to nothing4 ,mere changes of quantity1 all purely mechanical changes1 are of this kind4 ,they are like the shiftings of the sands by the sea4 ,they may be sensed1 but they cannot be noted or understood2 they lack fixed limits which govern them4 ,they are contemptible4 ,they are casual1 the sport of accident4 ,only changes which lead to some defined or fixed outcome of form are of any account and can have any account--any logos or reason--made of them4 ,the growth of plants and animals illustrates the highest kind of change which is possible in the sublunary or mundane sphere4 ,they go from one definite fixed form to another4 ,oaks generate only oaks1 oysters only oysters1 man only man4 ,the material factor of mechanical production enters in1 but enters in as accident to prevent the full consummation of the type of the species1 and to bring about the meaningless variations which diversify various oaks or oysters from one another2 or in extreme cases to produce freaks1 sports1 monsters1 three-handed or four-toed men4 ,aside from accidental and undesirable variations1 each individual has a fixed career to pursue1 a fixed path in which to travel4 ,terms which sound modern1 words like potentiality and development abound in ,aristotelian thought1 and have misled some into reading into his thought modern meanings4 ,but the significance of these words in classic and medieval thought is rigidly determined by their context4 ,development holds merely of the course of changes which takes place within a particular member of the species4 ,it is only a name for the predetermined movement from the acorn to the oak tree4 ,it takes place not in things generally but only in some one of the numerically insignificant members of the oak species4 ,development1 evolution1 never means1 as in modern science1 origin of new forms1 a mutation from an old species1 but only the monotonous traversing of a previously plotted cycle of change4 ,so potentiality never means1 as in modern life1 the possibility of novelty1 of invention1 of radical deviation1 but only that principle in virtue of which the acorn becomes the oak4 ,technically1 it is the capacity for movement between opposites4 ,only the cold can become hot2 only the dry can become wet2 only the babe can become a man2 the seed the full-grown wheat and so on4 ,potentiality instead of implying the emergence of anything novel means merely the facility with which a particular thing repeats the recurrent processes of its kind1 and thus becomes a specific case of the eternal forms in and through which all things are constituted4 ,in spite of the almost infinite numerical diversity of individuals1 there are only a limited number of species1 kinds or sorts4 ,and the world is essentially a world which falls into sorts2 it is pre-arranged into distinct classes4 ,moreover1 just as we naturally arrange plants and animals into series1 ranks and grades1 from the lower to the highest1 so with all things in the universe4 ,the distinct classes to which things belong by their very nature form a hierarchical order4 ,there are castes in nature4 ,the universe is constituted on an aristocratic1 one can truly say a feudal1 plan4 ,species1 classes do not mix or overlap--except in cases of accident1 and to the result of chaos4 ,otherwise1 everything belongs in advance to a certain class1 and the class has its own fixed place in the hierarchy of ,being4 ,the universe is indeed a tidy spot whose purity is interfered with only by those irregular changes in individuals which are due to the presence of an obdurate matter that refuses to yield itself wholly to rule and form4 ,otherwise it is a universe with a fixed place for everything and where everything knows its place1 its station and class1 and keeps it4 ,hence what are known technically as final and formal causes are supreme1 and efficient causes are relegated to an inferior place4 ,the so-called final cause is just a name for the fact that there is some fixed form characteristic of a class or sort of things which governs the changes going on1 so that they tend toward it as their end and goal1 the fulfilment of their true nature4 ,the supralunar region is the end or final cause of the proper movements of air and fire2 the earth of the motions of crass1 heavy things2 the oak of the acorn2 the mature form in general of the germinal4 ,the efficient cause1 that which produces and instigates a movement is only some external change as it accidentally gives a kind of push to an immature1 imperfect being and starts it moving toward its perfected or fulfilled form4 ,the final cause is the perfected form regarded as the explanation or reason of prior changes4 ,when it is not taken in reference to the changes completed and brought to rest in it1 but in itself it is the formal cause3 ,the inherent nature or character which makes or constitutes a thing what it is so far as it truly is1 namely1 what it is so far as it does not change4 ,logically and practically all of the traits which have been enumerated cohere4 ,attack one and you attack all4 ,when any one is undermined1 all go4 ,this is the reason why the intellectual modification of the last few centuries may truly be called a revolution4 ,it has substituted a conception of the world differing at every point4 ,it makes little matter at what point you commence to trace the difference1 you find yourself carried into all other points4 ,instead of a closed universe1 science now presents us with one infinite in space and time1 having no limits here or there1 at this end1 so to speak1 or at that1 and as infinitely complex in internal structure as it is infinite in extent4 ,hence it is also an open world1 an infinitely variegated one1 a world which in the old sense can hardly be called a universe at all2 so multiplex and far-reaching that it cannot be summed up and grasped in any one formula4 ,and change rather than fixity is now a measure of reality or energy of being2 change is omnipresent4 ,the laws in which the modern man of science is interested are laws of motion1 of generation and consequence4 ,he speaks of law where the ancients spoke of kind and essence1 because what he wants is a correlation of changes1 an ability to detect one change occurring in correspondence with another4 ,he does not try to define and delimit something remaining constant in change4 ,he tries to describe a constant order of change4 ,and while the word constant appears in both statements1 the meaning of the word is not the same4 ,in one case1 we are dealing with something constant in existence1 physical or metaphysical2 in the other case1 with something constant in function and operation4 ,one is a form of independent being2 the other is a formula of description and calculation of interdependent changes4 ,in short1 classic thought accepted a feudally arranged order of classes or kinds1 each holding from a superior and in turn giving the rule of conduct and service to an inferior4 ,this trait reflects and parallels most closely the social situation we were considering at the last hour4 ,we have a fairly definite notion of society as organized upon the feudal basis4 ,the family principle1 the principle of kinship is strong1 and especially is this true as we ascend in the social scale4 ,at the lower end1 individuals may be lost more or less in the mass4 ,since all are parts of the common herd1 there is nothing especial to distinguish their birth4 ,but among the privileged and ruling class the case is quite different4 ,the tie of kinship at once marks a group off externally and gives it distinction1 and internally holds all its members together4 ,kinship1 kind1 class1 genus are synonymous terms1 starting from social and concrete facts and going to the technical and abstract4 ,for kinship is a sign of a common nature1 of something universal and permanent running through all particular individuals1 and giving them a real and objective unity4 ,because such and such persons are kin they are really1 and not merely conventionally1 marked off into a class having something unique about it4 ,all contemporary members are bound into an objective unity which includes ancestors and descendants and excludes all who belong to another kin or kind4 ,assuredly this parcelling out of the world into separate kinds1 each having its qualitatively distinct nature in contrast with other species1 binding numerically distinct individuals together1 and preventing their diversities from exceeding fixed bounds1 may without exaggeration be called a projection of the family principle into the world at large4 ,in a feudally organized society1 moreover1 each kinship group or species occupies a definite place4 ,it is marked by the possession of a specific rank higher or lower with respect to other grades4 ,this position confers upon it certain privileges1 enabling it to enforce certain claims upon those lower in the scale and entailing upon it certain services and homage to be rendered to superiors4 ,the relationship of causation1 so to speak1 is up and down4 ,influence1 power1 proceeds from above to below2 the activities of the inferior are performed with respect1 quite literally1 to what is above4 ,action and reaction are far from being equal and in opposite directions4 ,all action is of one sort1 of the nature of lordship1 and proceeds from the higher to the lower4 ,reaction is of the nature of subjection and deference and proceeds from lower to higher4 ,the classic theory of the constitution of the world corresponds point by point to this ordering of classes in a scale of dignity and power4 ,a third trait assigned by historians to feudalism is that the ordering of ranks centres about armed service and the relationship of armed defense and protection4 ,i am afraid that what has already been said about the parallelism of ancient cosmology with social organization may seem a fanciful analogy2 and if a comparison is also drawn in this last regard1 there will be no doubt in your minds that a metaphor is being forced4 ,such is truly the case if we take the comparison too literally4 ,but not so1 if we confine our attention to the notion of rule and command implied in both4 ,attention has already been called to the meaning that is now given the term law--a constant relationship among changes4 ,nevertheless1 we often hear about laws which govern events1 and it often seems to be thought that phenomena would be utterly disorderly were there not laws to keep them in order4 ,this way of thinking is a survival of reading social relationships into nature--not necessarily a feudal relationship1 but the relation of ruler and ruled1 sovereign and subject4 ,law is assimilated to a command or order4 ,if the factor of personal will is eliminated 7as it was in the best ,greek thought7 still the idea of law or universal is impregnated with the sense of a guiding and ruling influence exerted from above on what is naturally inferior to it4 ,the universal governs as the end and model which the artisan has in mind governs his movements4 ,the ,middle ,ages added to this ,greek idea of control the idea of a command proceeding from a superior will2 and hence thought of the operations of nature as if they were a fulfilment of a task set by one who had authority to direct action4 ,the traits of the picture of nature drawn by modern science fairly spring by contrast into high relief4 ,modern science took its first step when daring astronomers abolished the distinction of high1 sublime and ideal forces operating in the heavens from lower and material forces actuating terrestrial events4 ,the supposed heterogeneity of substances and forces between heaven and earth was denied4 ,it was asserted that the same laws hold everywhere1 that there is homogeneity of material and process everywhere throughout nature4 ,the remote and esthetically sublime is to be scientifically described and explained in terms of homely familiar events and forces4 ,the material of direct handling and observation is that of which we are surest2 it is the better known4 ,until we can convert the grosser and more superficial observations of far-away things in the heavens into elements identical with those of things directly at hand1 they remain blind and not understood4 ,instead of presenting superior worth1 they present only problems4 ,they are not means of enlightenment but challenges4 ,the earth is not superior in rank to sun1 moon and stars1 but it is equal in dignity1 and its occurrences give the key to the understanding of celestial existences4 ,being at hand1 they are also capable of being brought under our hand2 they can be manipulated1 broken up1 resolved into elements which can be managed1 combined at will in old and new forms4 ,the net result may be termed1 ,i think1 without any great forcing1 the substitution of a democracy of individual facts equal in rank for the feudal system of an ordered gradation of general classes of unequal rank4 ,one important incident of the new science was the destruction of the idea that the earth is the centre of the universe4 ,when the idea of a fixed centre went1 there went with it the idea of a closed universe and a circumscribing heavenly boundary4 ,to the ,greek sense1 just because its theory of knowing was dominated by esthetic considerations1 the finite was the perfect4 ,literally1 the finite was the finished1 the ended1 the completed1 that with no ragged edges and unaccountable operations4 ,the infinite or limitless was lacking in character just because it was in-finite4 ,being everything1 it was nothing4 ,it was unformed and chaotic1 uncontrolled and unruly1 the source of incalculable deviations and accidents4 ,our present feeling that associates infinity with boundless power1 with capacity for expansion that knows no end1 with the delight in a progress that has no external limit1 would be incomprehensible were it not that interest has shifted from the esthetic to the practical2 from interest in beholding a harmonious and complete scene to interest in transforming an inharmonious one4 ,one has only to read the authors of the transition period1 say ,giordano ,bruno1 to realize what a pent-in1 suffocating sensation they associated with a closed1 finite world1 and what a feeling of exhilaration1 expansion and boundless possibility was aroused in them by the thought of a world infinite in stretch of space and time1 and composed internally of infinitesimal infinitely numerous elements4 ,that which the ,greeks withdrew from with repulsion they welcomed with an intoxicated sense of adventure4 ,the infinite meant1 it was true1 something forever untraversed even by thought1 and hence something forever unknown--no matter how great attainment in learning4 ,but this forever unknown instead of being chilling and repelling was now an inspiring challenge to ever-renewed inquiry1 and an assurance of inexhaustible possibilities of progress4 ,the student of history knows well that the ,greeks made great progress in the science of mechanics as well as of geometry4 ,at first sight1 it appears strange that with this advance in mechanics so little advance was made in the direction of modern science4 ,the seeming paradox impels us to ask why it was that mechanics remained a separate science1 why it was not used in description and explanation of natural phenomena after the manner of ,galileo and ,newton4 ,the answer is found in the social parallelism already mentioned4 ,socially speaking1 machines1 tools1 were devices employed by artisans4 ,the science of mechanics had to do with the kind of things employed by human mechanics1 and mechanics were base fellows4 ,they were at the lower end of the social scale1 and how could light on the heavens1 the highest1 be derived from them8 ,the application of considerations of mechanics to natural phenomena would moreover have implied an interest in the practical control and utilization of phenomena which was totally incompatible with the importance attached to final causes as fixed determiners of nature4 ,all the scientific reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries strikingly agree in regarding the doctrine of final causes as the cause of the failure of science4 ,why8 ,because this doctrine taught that the processes of nature are held in bondage to certain fixed ends which they must tend to realize4 ,nature was kept in leading strings2 it was cramped down to production of a limited number of stereotyped results4 ,only a comparatively small number of things could be brought into being1 and these few must be similar to the ends which similar cycles of change had effected in the past4 ,the scope of inquiry and understanding was limited to the narrow round of processes eventuating in the fixed ends which the observed world offered to view4 ,at best1 invention and production of new results by use of machines and tools must be restricted to articles of transient dignity and bodily1 not intellectual1 use4 ,when the rigid clamp of fixed ends was taken off from nature1 observation and imagination were emancipated1 and experimental control for scientific and practical purposes enormously stimulated4 ,because natural processes were no longer restricted to a fixed number of immovable ends or results1 anything might conceivably happen4 ,it was only a question of what elements could be brought into juxtaposition so that they would work upon one another4 ,immediately1 mechanics ceased to be a separate science and became an organ for attacking nature4 ,the mechanics of the lever1 wheel1 pulley and inclined plane told accurately what happens when things in space are used to move one another during definite periods of time4 ,the whole of nature became a scene of pushes and pulls1 of cogs and levers1 of motions of parts or elements to which the formulae of movements produced by well-known machines were directly applicable4 ,the banishing of ends and forms from the universe has seemed to many an ideal and spiritual impoverishment4 ,when nature was regarded as a set of mechanical interactions1 it apparently lost all meaning and purpose4 ,its glory departed4 ,elimination of differences of quality deprived it of beauty4 ,denial to nature of all inherent longings and aspiring tendencies toward ideal ends removed nature and natural science from contact with poetry1 religion and divine things4 ,there seemed to be left only a harsh1 brutal despiritualized exhibition of mechanical forces4 ,as a consequence1 it has seemed to many philosophers that one of their chief problems was to reconcile the existence of this purely mechanical world with belief in objective rationality and purpose--to save life from a degrading materialism4 ,hence many sought to re-attain by way of an analysis of the process of knowing1 or epistemology1 that belief in the superiority of ,ideal ,being which had anciently been maintained on the basis of cosmology4 ,but when it is recognized that the mechanical view is determined by the requirements of an experimental control of natural energies1 this problem of reconciliation no longer vexes us4 ,fixed forms and ends1 let us recall1 mark fixed limits to change4 ,hence they make futile all human efforts to produce and regulate change except within narrow and unimportant limits4 ,they paralyze constructive human inventions by a theory which condemns them in advance to failure4 ,human activity can conform only to ends already set by nature4 ,it was not till ends were banished from nature that purposes became important as factors in human minds capable of reshaping existence4 ,a natural world that does not subsist for the sake of realizing a fixed set of ends is relatively malleable and plastic2 it may be used for this end or that4 ,that nature can be known through the application of mechanical formulae is the prime condition of turning it to human account4 ,tools1 machines are means to be utilized4 ,only when nature is regarded as mechanical1 is systematic invention and construction of machines relevant to nature's activities4 ,nature is subdued to human purpose because it is no longer the slave of metaphysical and theological purpose4 ,bergson has pointed out that man might well be called ,homo ,faber4 ,he is distinguished as the tool-making animal4 ,this has held good since man was man2 but till nature was construed in mechanical terms1 the making of tools with which to attack and transform nature was sporadic and accidental4 ,under such circumstances it would not have occurred even to a ,bergson that man's tool-making capacity was so important and fundamental that it could be used to define him4 ,the very things that make the nature of the mechanical-physical scientist esthetically blank and dull are the things which render nature amenable to human control4 ,when qualities were subordinated to quantitative and mathematical relationships1 color1 music and form disappeared from the object of the scientist's inquiry as such4 ,but the remaining properties of weight1 extension1 numerable velocity of movement and so on were just the qualities which lent themselves to the substitution of one thing for another1 to the conversion of one form of energy into another2 to the effecting of transformations4 ,when chemical fertilizers can be used in place of animal manures1 when improved grain and cattle can be purposefully bred from inferior animals and grasses1 when mechanical energy can be converted into heat and electricity into mechanical energy1 man gains power to manipulate nature4 ,most of all he gains power to frame new ends and aims and to proceed in regular system to their actualization4 ,only indefinite substitution and convertibility regardless of quality render nature manageable4 ,the mechanization of nature is the condition of a practical and progressive idealism in action4 ,it thus turns out that the old1 old dread and dislike of matter as something opposed to mind and threatening it1 to be kept within the narrowest bounds of recognition2 something to be denied so far as possible lest it encroach upon ideal purposes and finally exclude them from the real world1 is as absurd practically as it was impotent intellectually4 ,judged from the only scientific standpoint1 what it does and how it functions1 matter means conditions4 ,to respect matter means to respect the conditions of achievement2 conditions which hinder and obstruct and which have to be changed1 conditions which help and further and which can be used to modify obstructions and attain ends4 ,only as men have learned to pay sincere and persistent regard to matter1 to the conditions upon which depends negatively and positively the success of all endeavor1 have they shown sincere and fruitful respect for ends and purposes4 ,to profess to have an aim and then neglect the means of its execution is self-delusion of the most dangerous sort4 ,education and morals will begin to find themselves on the same road of advance that say chemical industry and medicine have found for themselves when they too learn fully the lesson of wholehearted and unremitting attention to means and conditions--that is1 to what mankind so long despised as material and mechanical4 ,when we take means for ends we indeed fall into moral materialism4 ,but when we take ends without regard to means we degenerate into sentimentalism4 ,in the name of the ideal we fall back upon mere luck and chance and magic or exhortation and preaching2 or else upon a fanaticism that will force the realization of preconceived ends at any cost4 ,i have touched in this lecture upon many things in a cursory way4 ,yet there has been but one point in mind4 ,the revolution in our conceptions of nature and in our methods of knowing it has bred a new temper of imagination and aspiration4 ,it has confirmed the new attitude generated by economic and political changes4 ,it has supplied this attitude with definite intellectual material with which to formulate and justify itself4 ,in the first lecture it was noted that in ,greek life prosaic matter of fact or empirical knowledge was at a great disadvantage as compared with the imaginative beliefs that were bound up with special institutions and moral habitudes4 ,now this empirical knowledge has grown till it has broken its low and limited sphere of application and esteem4 ,it has itself become an organ of inspiring imagination through introducing ideas of boundless possibility1 indefinite progress1 free movement1 equal opportunity irrespective of fixed limits4 ,it has reshaped social institutions1 and in so far developed a new morale4 ,it has achieved ideal values4 ,it is convertible into creative and constructive philosophy4 ,convertible1 however1 rather than already converted4 ,when we consider how deeply embedded in customs of thought and action the classic philosophy came to be and how congenial it is to man's more spontaneous beliefs1 the throes that attended its birth are not to be wondered at4 ,we should rather wonder that a view so upsetting1 so undermining1 made its way without more persecutions1 martyrdoms and disturbances4 ,it certainly is not surprising that its complete and consistent formulation in philosophy has been long delayed4 ,the main efforts of thinkers were inevitably directed to minimizing the shock of change1 easing the strains of transition1 mediating and reconciling4 ,when we look back upon almost all of the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 upon all excepting those who were avowedly sceptical and revolutionary1 what strikes us is the amount of traditional subject-matter and method that is to be found even among those who were regarded as most advanced4 ,men cannot easily throw off their old habits of thinking1 and never can throw off all of them at once4 ,in developing1 teaching and receiving new ideas we are compelled to use some of the old ones as tools of understanding and communication4 ,only piecemeal1 step-by-step1 could the full import of the new science be grasped4 ,roughly speaking1 the seventeenth century witnessed its application in astronomy and general cosmology2 the eighteenth century in physics and chemistry2 the nineteenth century undertook an application in geology and the biological sciences4 ,it was said that it has now become extremely difficult to recover the view of the world which universally obtained in ,europe till the seventeenth century4 ,yet after all we need only recur to the science of plants and animals as it was before ,darwin and to the ideas which even now are dominant in moral and political matters to find the older order of conceptions in full possession of the popular mind4 ,until the dogma of fixed unchangeable types and species1 of arrangement in classes of higher and lower1 of subordination of the transitory individual to the universal or kind had been shaken in its hold upon the science of life1 it was impossible that the new ideas and method should be made at home in social and moral life4 ,does it not seem to be the intellectual task of the twentieth century to take this last step8 ,when this step is taken the circle of scientific development will be rounded out and the reconstruction of philosophy be made an accomplished fact4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,changed ,,conceptions ,,of ,,experience ,,and ,,reason ,what is experience and what is ,reason1 ,mind8 ,what is the scope of experience and what are its limits8 ,how far is it a sure ground of belief and a safe guide of conduct8 ,can we trust it in science and in behavior8 ,or is it a quagmire as soon as we pass beyond a few low material interests8 ,is it so shaky1 shifting1 and shallow that instead of affording sure footing1 safe paths to fertile fields1 it misleads1 betrays1 and engulfs8 ,is a ,reason outside experience and above it needed to supply assured principles to science and conduct8 ,in one sense1 these questions suggest technical problems of abstruse philosophy2 in another sense1 they contain the deepest possible questionings regarding the career of man4 ,they concern the criteria he is to employ in forming his beliefs2 the principles by which he is to direct his life and the ends to which he is to direct it4 ,must man transcend experience by some organ of unique character that carries him into the super-empirical8 ,failing this1 must he wander sceptical and disillusioned8 ,or is human experience itself worth while in its purposes and its methods of guidance8 ,can it organize itself into stable courses or must it be sustained from without8 ,we know the answers of traditional philosophy4 ,they do not thoroughly agree among themselves1 but they agree that experience never rises above the level of the particular1 the contingent1 and the probable4 ,only a power transcending in origin and content any and all conceivable experience can attain to universal1 necessary and certain authority and direction4 ,the empiricists themselves admitted the correctness of these assertions4 ,they only said that since there is no faculty of ,pure ,reason in the possession of mankind1 we must put up with what we have1 experience1 and make the most possible out of it4 ,they contented themselves with sceptical attacks upon the transcendentalist1 with indications of the ways in which we might best seize the meaning and good of the passing moment2 or like ,locke1 asserted that in spite of the limitation of experience1 it affords the light needed to guide men's footsteps modestly in conduct4 ,they affirmed that the alleged authoritative guidance by a higher faculty had practically hampered men4 ,it is the function of this lecture to show how and why it is now possible to make claims for experience as a guide in science and moral life which the older empiricists did not and could not make for it4 ,curiously enough1 the key to the matter may be found in the fact that the old notion of experience was itself a product of experience--the only kind of experience which was then open to men4 ,if another conception of experience is now possible1 it is precisely because the quality of experience as it may now be lived has undergone a profound social and intellectual change from that of earlier times4 ,the account of experience which we find in ,plato and ,aristotle is an account of what ,greek experience actually was4 ,it agrees very closely with what the modern psychologist knows as the method of learning by trial and error as distinct from the method of learning by ideas4 ,men tried certain acts1 they underwent certain sufferings and affections4 ,each of these in the time of its occurrence is isolated1 particular--its counterpart is transient appetite and transient sensation4 ,but memory preserves and accumulates these separate incidents4 ,as they pile up1 irregular variations get cancelled1 common features are selected1 reinforced and combined4 ,gradually a habit of action is built up1 and corresponding to this habit there forms a certain generalized picture of an object or situation4 ,we come to know or note not merely this particular which as a particular cannot strictly be known at all 7for not being classed it cannot be characterized and identified7 but to recognize it as man1 tree1 stone1 leather--an individual of a certain kind1 marked by a certain universal form characteristic of a whole species of thing4 ,along with the development of this common-sense knowledge1 there grows up a certain regularity of conduct4 ,the particular incidents fuse1 and a way of acting which is general1 as far as it goes1 builds up4 ,the skill develops which is shown by the artisan1 the shoemaker1 the carpenter1 the gymnast1 the physician1 who have regular ways of handling cases4 ,this regularity signifies1 of course1 that the particular case is not treated as an isolated particular1 but as one of a kind1 which therefore demands a kind of action4 ,from the multitude of particular illnesses encountered1 the physician in learning to class some of them as indigestion learns also to treat the cases of the class in a common or general way4 ,he forms the rule of recommending a certain diet1 and prescribing a certain remedy4 ,all this forms what we call experience4 ,it results1 as the illustration shows1 in a certain general insight and a certain organized ability in action4 ,but needless to insist1 the generality and the organization are restricted and fallible4 ,they hold1 as ,aristotle was fond of pointing out1 usually1 in most cases1 as a rule1 but not universally1 of necessity1 or as a principle4 ,the physician is bound to make mistakes1 because individual cases are bound to vary unaccountably3 such is their very nature4 ,the difficulty does not arise in a defective experience which is capable of remedy in some better experience4 ,experience itself1 as such1 is defective1 and hence default is inevitable and irremediable4 ,the only universality and certainty is in a region above experience1 that of the rational and conceptual4 ,as the particular was a stepping-stone to image and habit1 so the latter may become a stepping-stone to conceptions and principles4 ,but the latter leave experience behind1 untouched2 they do not react to rectify it4 ,such is the notion which still lingers in the contrast of empirical and rational as when we say that a certain architect or physician is empirical1 not scientific in his procedures4 ,but the difference between the classic and the modern notion of experience is revealed in the fact that such a statement is now a charge1 a disparaging accusation1 brought against a particular architect or physician4 ,with ,plato1 ,aristotle and the ,scholastic1 it was a charge against the callings1 since they were modes of experience4 ,it was an indictment of all practical action in contrast with conceptual contemplation4 ,the modern philosopher who has professed himself an empiricist has usually had a critical purpose in mind4 ,like ,bacon1 ,locke1 ,condillac and ,helvetius1 he stood face to face with a body of beliefs and a set of institutions in which he profoundly disbelieved4 ,his problem was the problem of attack upon so much dead weight carried uselessly by humanity1 crushing and distorting it4 ,his readiest way of undermining and disintegrating was by appealing to experience as a final test and criterion4 ,in every case1 active reformers were empiricists in the philosophical sense4 ,they made it their business to show that some current belief or institution that claimed the sanction of innate ideas or necessary conceptions1 or an origin in an authoritative revelation of reason1 had in fact proceeded from a lowly origin in experience1 and had been confirmed by accident1 by class interest or by biased authority4 ,the philosophic empiricism initiated by ,locke was thus disintegrative in intent4 ,it optimistically took it for granted that when the burden of blind custom1 imposed authority1 and accidental associations was removed1 progress in science and social organization would spontaneously take place4 ,its part was to help in removing the burden4 ,the best way to liberate men from the burden was through a natural history of the origin and growth in the mind of the ideas connected with objectionable beliefs and customs4 ,santayana justly calls the psychology of this school a malicious psychology4 ,it tended to identify the history of the formation of certain ideas with an account of the things to which the ideas refer--an identification which naturally had an unfavorable effect on the things4 ,but ,mr4 ,santayana neglects to notice the social zeal and aim latent in the malice4 ,he fails to point out that this malice was aimed at institutions and traditions which had lost their usefulness2 he fails to point out that to a large extent it was true of them that an account of their psychological origin was equivalent to a destructive account of the things themselves4 ,but after ,hume with debonair clarity pointed out that the analysis of beliefs into sensations and associations left natural ideas and institutions in the same position in which the reformers had placed artificial ones1 the situation changed4 ,the rationalists employed the logic of sensationalistic-empiricism to show that experience1 giving only a heap of chaotic and isolated particulars1 is as fatal to science and to moral laws and obligations as to obnoxious institutions2 and concluded that ,reason must be resorted to if experience was to be furnished with any binding and connecting principles4 ,the new rationalistic idealism of ,kant and his successors seemed to be necessitated by the totally destructive results of the new empirical philosophy4 ,two things have rendered possible a new conception of experience and a new conception of the relation of reason to experience1 or1 more accurately1 of the place of reason in experience4 ,the primary factor is the change that has taken place in the actual nature of experience1 its contents and methods1 as it is actually lived4 ,the other is the development of a psychology based upon biology which makes possible a new scientific formulation of the nature of experience4 ,let us begin with the technical side--the change in psychology4 ,we are only just now commencing to appreciate how completely exploded is the psychology that dominated philosophy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries4 ,according to this theory1 mental life originated in sensations which are separately and passively received1 and which are formed1 through laws of retention and association1 into a mosaic of images1 perceptions1 and conceptions4 ,the senses were regarded as gateways or avenues of knowledge4 ,except in combining atomic sensations1 the mind was wholly passive and acquiescent in knowing4 ,volition1 action1 emotion1 and desire follow in the wake of sensations and images4 ,the intellectual or cognitive factor comes first and emotional and volitional life is only a consequent conjunction of ideas with sensations of pleasure and pain4 ,the effect of the development of biology has been to reverse the picture4 ,wherever there is life1 there is behavior1 activity4 ,in order that life may persist1 this activity has to be both continuous and adapted to the environment4 ,this adaptive adjustment1 moreover1 is not wholly passive2 is not a mere matter of the moulding of the organism by the environment4 ,even a clam acts upon the environment and modifies it to some extent4 ,it selects materials for food and for the shell that protects it4 ,it does something to the environment as well as has something done to itself4 ,there is no such thing in a living creature as mere conformity to conditions1 though parasitic forms may approach this limit4 ,in the interests of the maintenance of life there is transformation of some elements in the surrounding medium4 ,the higher the form of life1 the more important is the active reconstruction of the medium4 ,this increased control may be illustrated by the contrast of savage with civilized man4 ,suppose the two are living in a wilderness4 ,with the savage there is the maximum of accommodation to given conditions2 the minimum of what we may call hitting back4 ,the savage takes things as they are1 and by using caves and roots and occasional pools leads a meagre and precarious existence4 ,the civilized man goes to distant mountains and dams streams4 ,he builds reservoirs1 digs channels1 and conducts the waters to what had been a desert4 ,he searches the world to find plants and animals that will thrive4 ,he takes native plants and by selection and cross-fertilization improves them4 ,he introduces machinery to till the soil and care for the harvest4 ,by such means he may succeed in making the wilderness blossom like the rose4 ,such transformation scenes are so familiar that we overlook their meaning4 ,we forget that the inherent power of life is illustrated in them4 ,note what a change this point of view entails in the traditional notions of experience4 ,experience becomes an affair primarily of doing4 ,the organism does not stand about1 ,micawber-like1 waiting for something to turn up4 ,it does not wait passive and inert for something to impress itself upon it from without4 ,the organism acts in accordance with its own structure1 simple or complex1 upon its surroundings4 ,as a consequence the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities4 ,the living creature undergoes1 suffers1 the consequences of its own behavior4 ,this close connection between doing and suffering or undergoing forms what we call experience4 ,disconnected doing and disconnected suffering are neither of them experiences4 ,suppose fire encroaches upon a man when he is asleep4 ,part of his body is burned away4 ,the burn does not perceptibly result from what he has done4 ,there is nothing which in any instructive way can be named experience4 ,or again there is a series of mere activities1 like twitchings of muscles in a spasm4 ,the movements amount to nothing2 they have no consequences for life4 ,or1 if they have1 these consequences are not connected with prior doing4 ,there is no experience1 no learning1 no cumulative process4 ,but suppose a busy infant puts his finger in the fire2 the doing is random1 aimless1 without intention or reflection4 ,but something happens in consequence4 ,the child undergoes heat1 he suffers pain4 ,the doing and undergoing1 the reaching and the burn1 are connected4 ,one comes to suggest and mean the other4 ,then there is experience in a vital and significant sense4 ,certain important implications for philosophy follow4 ,in the first place1 the interaction of organism and environment1 resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter1 is the primary fact1 the basic category4 ,knowledge is relegated to a derived position1 secondary in origin1 even if its importance1 when once it is established1 is overshadowing4 ,knowledge is not something separate and self-sufficing1 but is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved4 ,the senses lose their place as gateways of knowing to take their rightful place as stimuli to action4 ,to an animal an affection of the eye or ear is not an idle piece of information about something indifferently going on in the world4 ,it is an invitation and inducement to act in a needed way4 ,it is a clue in behavior1 a directive factor in adaptation of life in its surroundings4 ,it is urgent not cognitive in quality4 ,the whole controversy between empiricism and rationalism as to the intellectual worth of sensations is rendered strangely obsolete4 ,the discussion of sensations belongs under the head of immediate stimulus and response1 not under the head of knowledge4 ,as a conscious element1 a sensation marks an interruption in a course of action previously entered upon4 ,many psychologists since the time of ,hobbes have dwelt upon what they call the relativity of sensations4 ,we feel or sense cold in transition from warmth rather than absolutely2 hardness is sensed upon a background of less resistance2 a color in contrast with pure light or pure dark or in contrast with some other hue4 ,a continuously unchanged tone or color cannot be attended to or sensed4 ,what we take to be such monotonously prolonged sensations are in truth constantly interrupted by incursions of other elements1 and represent a series of excursions back and forth4 ,this fact was1 however1 misconstrued into a doctrine about the nature of knowledge4 ,rationalists used it to discredit sense as a valid or high mode of knowing things1 since according to it we never get hold of anything in itself or intrinsically4 ,sensationalists used it to disparage all pretence at absolute knowledge4 ,properly speaking1 however1 this fact of the relativity of sensation does not in the least belong in the sphere of knowing4 ,sensations of this sort are emotional and practical rather than cognitive and intellectual4 ,they are shocks of change1 due to interruption of a prior adjustment4 ,they are signals to redirections of action4 ,let me take a trivial illustration4 ,the person who is taking notes has no sensation of the pressure of his pencil on the paper or on his hand as long as it functions properly4 ,it operates merely as stimulus to ready and effective adjustment4 ,the sensory activity incites automatically and unconsciously its proper motor response4 ,there is a preformed physiological connection1 acquired from habit but ultimately going back to an original connection in the nervous system4 ,if the pencil-point gets broken or too blunt and the habit of writing does not operate smoothly1 there is a conscious shock3--the feeling of something the matter1 something gone wrong4 ,this emotional change operates as a stimulus to a needed change in operation4 ,one looks at his pencil1 sharpens it or takes another pencil from one's pocket4 ,the sensation operates as a pivot of readjusting behavior4 ,it marks a break in the prior routine of writing and the beginning of some other mode of action4 ,sensations are relative in the sense of marking transitions in habits of behavior from one course to another way of behaving4 ,the rationalist was thus right in denying that sensations as such are true elements of knowledge4 ,but the reasons he gave for this conclusion and the consequences he drew from it were all wrong4 ,sensations are not parts of any knowledge1 good or bad1 superior or inferior1 imperfect or complete4 ,they are rather provocations1 incitements1 challenges to an act of inquiry which is to terminate in knowledge4 ,they are not ways of knowing things inferior in value to reflective ways1 to the ways that require thought and inference1 because they are not ways of knowing at all4 ,they are stimuli to reflection and inference4 ,as interruptions1 they raise the questions3 ,what does this shock mean8 ,what is happening8 ,what is the matter8 ,how is my relation to the environment disturbed8 ,what should be done about it8 ,how shall ,i alter my course of action to meet the change that has taken place in the surroundings8 ,how shall ,i readjust my behavior in response8 ,sensation is thus1 as the sensationalist claimed1 the beginning of knowledge1 but only in the sense that the experienced shock of change is the necessary stimulus to the investigating and comparing which eventually produce knowledge4 ,when experience is aligned with the life-process and sensations are seen to be points of readjustment1 the alleged atomism of sensations totally disappears4 ,with this disappearance is abolished the need for a synthetic faculty of super-empirical reason to connect them4 ,philosophy is not any longer confronted with the hopeless problem of finding a way in which separate grains of sand may be woven into a strong and coherent rope--or into the illusion and pretence of one4 ,when the isolated and simple existences of ,locke and ,hume are seen not to be truly empirical at all but to answer to certain demands of their theory of mind1 the necessity ceases for the elaborate ,kantian and ,post-,kantian machinery of a priori concepts and categories to synthesize the alleged stuff of experience4 ,the true stuff of experience is recognized to be adaptive courses of action1 habits1 active functions1 connections of doing and undergoing2 sensori-motor co-ordinations4 ,experience carries principles of connection and organization within itself4 ,these principles are none the worse because they are vital and practical rather than epistemological4 ,some degree of organization is indispensable to even the lowest grade of life4 ,even an amoeba must have some continuity in time in its activity and some adaptation to its environment in space4 ,its life and experience cannot possibly consist in momentary1 atomic1 and self-enclosed sensations4 ,its activity has reference to its surroundings and to what goes before and what comes after4 ,this organization intrinsic to life renders unnecessary a super-natural and super-empirical synthesis4 ,it affords the basis and material for a positive evolution of intelligence as an organizing factor within experience4 ,nor is it entirely aside from the subject to point out the extent in which social as well as biological organization enters into the formation of human experience4 ,probably one thing that strengthened the idea that the mind is passive and receptive in knowing was the observation of the helplessness of the human infant4 ,but the observation points in quite another direction4 ,because of his physical dependence and impotency1 the contacts of the little child with nature are mediated by other persons4 ,mother and nurse1 father and older children1 determine what experiences the child shall have2 they constantly instruct him as to the meaning of what he does and undergoes4 ,the conceptions that are socially current and important become the child's principles of interpretation and estimation long before he attains to personal and deliberate control of conduct4 ,things come to him clothed in language1 not in physical nakedness1 and this garb of communication makes him a sharer in the beliefs of those about him4 ,these beliefs coming to him as so many facts form his mind2 they furnish the centres about which his own personal expeditions and perceptions are ordered4 ,here we have categories of connection and unification as important as those of ,kant1 but empirical not mythological4 ,from these elementary1 if somewhat technical considerations1 we turn to the change which experience itself has undergone in the passage from ancient and medieval to modern life4 ,to ,plato1 experience meant enslavement to the past1 to custom4 ,experience was almost equivalent to established customs formed not by reason or under intelligent control but by repetition and blind rule of thumb4 ,only reason can lift us above subjection to the accidents of the past4 ,when we come to ,bacon and his successors1 we discover a curious reversal4 ,reason and its bodyguard of general notions is now the conservative1 mind-enslaving factor4 ,experience is the liberating power4 ,experience means the new1 that which calls us away from adherence to the past1 that which reveals novel facts and truths4 ,faith in experience produces not devotion to custom but endeavor for progress4 ,this difference in temper is the more significant because it was so unconsciously taken for granted4 ,some concrete and vital change must have occurred in actual experience as that is lived4 ,for1 after all1 the thought of experience follows after and is modelled upon the experience actually undergone4 ,when mathematics and other rational sciences developed among the ,greeks1 scientific truths did not react back into daily experience4 ,they remained isolated1 apart and super-imposed4 ,medicine was the art in which perhaps the greatest amount of positive knowledge was obtained1 but it did not reach the dignity of science4 ,it remained an art4 ,in practical arts1 moreover1 there was no conscious invention or purposeful improvement4 ,workers followed patterns that were handed down to them1 while departure from established standards and models usually resulted in degenerate productions4 ,improvements came either from a slow1 gradual1 and unacknowledged accumulation of changes or else from some sudden inspiration1 which at once set a new standard4 ,being the result of no conscious method1 it was fittingly attributed to the gods4 ,in the social arts1 such a radical reformer as ,plato felt that existing evils were due to the absence of such fixed patterns as controlled the productions of artisans4 ,the ethical purport of philosophy was to furnish them1 and when once they were instituted1 they were to be consecrated by religion1 adorned by art1 inculcated by education and enforced by magistrates so that alteration of them would be impossible4 ,it is unnecessary to repeat what has been so often dwelt upon as to the effect of experimental science in enabling man to effect a deliberate control of his environment4 ,but since the impact of this control upon the traditional notion of experience is often overlooked1 we must point out that when experience ceased to be empirical and became experimental1 something of radical importance occurred4 ,aforetime man employed the results of his prior experience only to form customs that henceforth had to be blindly followed or blindly broken4 ,now1 old experience is used to suggest aims and methods for developing a new and improved experience4 ,consequently experience becomes in so far constructively self-regulative4 ,what ,shakespeare so pregnantly said of nature1 it is made better by no mean1 but nature makes that mean1 becomes true of experience4 ,we do not merely have to repeat the past1 or wait for accidents to force change upon us4 ,we use our past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future4 ,the very fact of experience thus includes the process by which it directs itself in its own betterment4 ,science1 reason is not therefore something laid from above upon experience4 ,suggested and tested in experience1 it is also employed through inventions in a thousand ways to expand and enrich experience4 ,although1 as has been so often repeated1 this self-creation and self-regulation of experience is still largely technological rather than truly artistic or human1 yet what has been achieved contains the guaranty of the possibility of an intelligent administering of experience4 ,the limits are moral and intellectual1 due to defects in our good will and knowledge4 ,they are not inherent metaphysically in the very nature of experience4 ,reason as a faculty separate from experience1 introducing us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike us as remote1 uninteresting and unimportant4 ,reason1 as a ,kantian faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience1 strikes us more and more as superfluous--the unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology4 ,concrete suggestions arising from past experiences1 developed and matured in the light of the needs and deficiencies of the present1 employed as aims and methods of specific reconstruction1 and tested by success or failure in accomplishing this task of readjustment1 suffice4 ,to such empirical suggestions used in constructive fashion for new ends the name intelligence is given4 ,this recognition of the place of active and planning thought within the very processes of experience radically alters the traditional status of the technical problems of particular and universal1 sense and reason1 perceptual and conceptual4 ,but the alteration is of much more than technical significance4 ,for reason is experimental intelligence1 conceived after the pattern of science1 and used in the creation of social arts2 it has something to do4 ,it liberates man from the bondage of the past1 due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom4 ,it projects a better future and assists man in its realization4 ,and its operation is always subject to test in experience4 ,the plans which are formed1 the principles which man projects as guides of reconstructive action1 are not dogmas4 ,they are hypotheses to be worked out in practice1 and to be rejected1 corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires4 ,we may call them programmes of action1 but since they are to be used in making our future acts less blind1 more directed1 they are flexible4 ,intelligence is not something possessed once for all4 ,it is in constant process of forming1 and its retention requires constant alertness in observing consequences1 an open-minded will to learn and courage in re-adjustment4 ,in contrast with this experimental and re-adjusting intelligence1 it must be said that ,reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to carelessness1 conceit1 irresponsibility1 and rigidity--in short absolutism4 ,a certain school of contemporary psychology uses the term rationalization to denote those mental mechanisms by which we unconsciously put a better face on our conduct or experience than facts justify4 ,we excuse ourselves to ourselves by introducing a purpose and order into that of which we are secretly ashamed4 ,in like fashion1 historic rationalism has often tended to use ,reason as an agency of justification and apologetics4 ,it has taught that the defects and evils of actual experience disappear in the rational whole of things2 that things appear evil merely because of the partial1 incomplete nature of experience4 ,or1 as was noted by ,bacon1 reason assumes a false simplicity1 uniformity and universality1 and opens for science a path of fictitious ease4 ,this course results in intellectual irresponsibility and neglect3--irresponsibility because rationalism assumes that the concepts of reason are so self-sufficient and so far above experience that they need and can secure no confirmation in experience4 ,neglect1 because this same assumption makes men careless about concrete observations and experiments4 ,contempt for experience has had a tragic revenge in experience2 it has cultivated disregard for fact and this disregard has been paid for in failure1 sorrow and war4 ,the dogmatic rigidity of ,rationalism is best seen in the consequences of ,kant's attempt to buttress an otherwise chaotic experience with pure concepts4 ,he set out with a laudable attempt at restricting the extravagant pretensions of ,reason apart from experience4 ,he called his philosophy critical4 ,but because he taught that the understanding employs fixed1 a priori1 concepts1 in order to introduce connection into experience and thereby make known objects possible 7stable1 regular relationships of qualities71 he developed in ,german thought a curious contempt for the living variety of experience and a curious overestimate of the value of system1 order1 regularity for their own sakes4 ,more practical causes were at work in producing the peculiarly ,german regard for drill1 discipline1 order and docility4 ,but ,kant's philosophy served to provide an intellectual justification or rationalization of subordination of individuals to fixed and ready-made universal1 principles1 laws4 ,reason and law were held to be synonyms4 ,and as reason came into experience from without and above1 so law had to come into life from some external and superior authority4 ,the practical correlate to absolutism is rigidity1 stiffness1 inflexibility of disposition4 ,when ,kant taught that some conceptions1 and these the important ones1 are a priori1 that they do not arise in experience and cannot be verified or tested in experience1 that without such ready-made injections into experience the latter is anarchic and chaotic1 he fostered the spirit of absolutism1 even though technically he denied the possibility of absolutes4 ,his successors were true to his spirit rather than his letter1 and so they taught absolutism systematically4 ,that the ,germans with all their scientific competency and technological proficiency should have fallen into their tragically rigid and superior style of thought and action 7tragic because involving them in inability to understand the world in which they lived7 is a sufficient lesson of what may be involved in a systematical denial of the experimental character of intelligence and its conceptions4 ,by common consent1 the effect of ,english empiricism was sceptical where that of ,german rationalism was apologetic2 it undermined where the latter justified4 ,it detected accidental associations formed into customs under the influence of self- or class-interest where ,german rational-idealism discovered profound meanings due to the necessary evolution of absolute reason4 ,the modern world has suffered because in so many matters philosophy has offered it only an arbitrary choice between hard and fast opposities3 ,disintegrating analysis or rigid synthesis2 complete radicalism neglecting and attacking the historic past as trivial and harmful1 or complete conservatism idealizing institutions as embodiments of eternal reason2 a resolution of experience into atomic elements that afford no support to stable organization or a clamping down of all experience by fixed categories and necessary concepts--these are the alternatives that conflicting schools have presented4 ,they are the logical consequences of the traditional opposition of ,sense and ,thought1 ,experience and ,reason4 ,common sense has refused to follow both theories to their ultimate logic1 and has fallen back on faith1 intuition or the exigencies of practical compromise4 ,but common sense too often has been confused and hampered instead of enlightened and directed by the philosophies proffered it by professional intellectuals4 ,men who are thrown back upon common sense when they appeal to philosophy for some general guidance are likely to fall back on routine1 the force of some personality1 strong leadership or on the pressure of momentary circumstances4 ,it would be difficult to estimate the harm that has resulted because the liberal and progressive movement of the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries had no method of intellectual articulation commensurate with its practical aspirations4 ,its heart was in the right place4 ,it was humane and social in intention4 ,but it had no theoretical instrumentalities of constructive power4 ,its head was sadly deficient4 ,too often the logical import of its professed doctrines was almost anti-social in their atomistic individualism1 anti-human in devotion to brute sensation4 ,this deficiency played into the hands of the reactionary and obscurantist4 ,the strong point of the appeal to fixed principles transcending experience1 to dogmas incapable of experimental verification1 the strong point of reliance upon a priori canons of truth and standards of morals in opposition to dependence upon fruits and consequences in experience1 has been the unimaginative conception of experience which professed philosophic empiricists have entertained and taught4 ,a philosophic reconstruction which should relieve men of having to choose between an impoverished and truncated experience on one hand and an artificial and impotent reason on the other would relieve human effort from the heaviest intellectual burden it has to carry4 ,it would destroy the division of men of good will into two hostile camps4 ,it would permit the co-operation of those who respect the past and the institutionally established with those who are interested in establishing a freer and happier future4 ,for it would determine the conditions under which the funded experience of the past and the contriving intelligence which looks to the future can effectually interact with each other4 ,it would enable men to glorify the claims of reason without at the same time falling into a paralyzing worship of super-empirical authority or into an offensive rationalization of things as they are4 ,,chapter ,v ,,changed ,,conceptions ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,,and ,,the ,,real ,it has been noted that human experience is made human through the existence of associations and recollections1 which are strained through the mesh of imagination so as to suit the demands of the emotions4 ,a life that is humanly interesting is1 short of the results of discipline1 a life in which the tedium of vacant leisure is filled with images that excite and satisfy4 ,it is in this sense that poetry preceded prose in human experience1 religion antedated science1 and ornamental and decorative art while it could not take the place of utility early reached a development out of proportion to the practical arts4 ,in order to give contentment and delight1 in order to feed present emotion and give the stream of conscious life intensity and color1 the suggestions which spring from past experiences are worked over so as to smooth out their unpleasantnesses and enhance their enjoyableness4 ,some psychologists claim that there is what they call a natural tendency to obliviscence of the disagreeable--that men turn from the unpleasant in thought and recollection as they do from the obnoxious in action4 ,every serious-minded person knows that a large part of the effort required in moral discipline consists in the courage needed to acknowledge the unpleasant consequences of one's past and present acts4 ,we squirm1 dodge1 evade1 disguise1 cover up1 find excuses and palliations--anything to render the mental scene less uncongenial4 ,in short1 the tendency of spontaneous suggestion is to idealize experience1 to give it in consciousness qualities which it does not have in actuality4 ,time and memory are true artists2 they remould reality nearer to the heart's desire4 ,as imagination becomes freer and less controlled by concrete actualities1 the idealizing tendency takes further flights unrestrained by the rein of the prosaic world4 ,the things most emphasized in imagination as it reshapes experience are things which are absent in reality4 ,in the degree in which life is placid and easy1 imagination is sluggish and bovine4 ,in the degree in which life is uneasy and troubled1 fancy is stirred to frame pictures of a contrary state of things4 ,by reading the characteristic features of any man's castles in the air you can make a shrewd guess as to his underlying desires which are frustrated4 ,what is difficulty and disappointment in real life becomes conspicuous achievement and triumph in revery2 what is negative in fact will be positive in the image drawn by fancy2 what is vexation in conduct will be compensated for in high relief in idealizing imagination4 ,these considerations apply beyond mere personal psychology4 ,they are decisive for one of the most marked traits of classic philosophy3--its conception of an ultimate supreme ,reality which is essentially ideal in nature4 ,historians have more than once drawn an instructive parallel between the developed ,olympian ,pantheon of ,greek religion and the ,ideal ,realm of ,platonic philosophy4 ,the gods1 whatever their origin and original traits1 became idealized projections of the selected and matured achievements which the ,greeks admired among their mortal selves4 ,the gods were like mortals1 but mortals living only the lives which men would wish to live1 with power intensified1 beauty perfected1 and wisdom ripened4 ,when ,aristotle criticized the theory of ,ideas of his master1 ,plato1 by saying that the ,ideas were after all only things of sense eternalized1 he pointed out in effect the parallelism of philosophy with religion and art to which allusion has just been made4 ,and save for matters of merely technical import1 is it not possible to say of ,aristotle's ,forms just what he said of ,plato's ,ideas8 ,what are they1 these ,forms and ,essences which so profoundly influenced for centuries the course of science and theology1 save the objects of ordinary experience with their blemishes removed1 their imperfections eliminated1 their lacks rounded out1 their suggestions and hints fulfilled8 ,what are they in short but the objects of familiar life divinized because reshaped by the idealizing imagination to meet the demands of desire in just those respects in which actual experience is disappointing8 ,that ,plato1 and ,aristotle in somewhat different fashion1 and ,plotinus and ,marcus ,aurelius and ,saint ,thomas ,aquinas1 and ,spinoza and ,hegel all taught that ,ultimate ,reality is either perfectly ,ideal and ,rational in nature1 or else has absolute ideality and rationality as its necessary attribute1 are facts well known to the student of philosophy4 ,they need no exposition here4 ,but it is worth pointing out that these great systematic philosophies defined perfect ,ideality in conceptions that express the opposite of those things which make life unsatisfactory and troublesome4 ,what is the chief source of the complaint of poet and moralist with the goods1 the values and satisfactions of experience8 ,rarely is the complaint that such things do not exist2 it is that although existing they are momentary1 transient1 fleeting4 ,they do not stay2 at worst they come only to annoy and tease with their hurried and disappearing taste of what might be2 at best they come only to inspire and instruct with a passing hint of truer reality4 ,this commonplace of the poet and moralist as to the impermanence not only of sensuous enjoyment1 but of fame and civic achievements was profoundly reflected upon by philosophers1 especially by ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,the results of their thinking have been wrought into the very fabric of western ideas4 ,time1 change1 movement are signs that what the ,greeks called ,non-,being somehow infect true ,being4 ,the phraseology is now strange1 but many a modern who ridicules the conception of ,non-,being repeats the same thought under the name of the ,finite or ,imperfect4 ,wherever there is change1 there is instability1 and instability is proof of something the matter1 of absence1 deficiency1 incompleteness4 ,these are the ideas common to the connection between change1 becoming and perishing1 and ,non-,being1 finitude and imperfection4 ,hence complete and true ,reality must be changeless1 unalterable1 so full of ,being that it always and forever maintains itself in fixed rest and repose4 ,as ,bradley1 the most dialectially ingenious ,absolutist of our own day1 expresses the doctrine ,nothing that is perfectly real moves4 ,and while ,plato took1 comparatively speaking1 a pessimistic view of change as mere lapse and ,aristotle a complacent view of it as tendency to realization1 yet ,aristotle doubted no more than ,plato that the fully realized reality1 the divine and ultimate1 is changeless4 ,though it is called ,activity or ,energy1 the ,activity knew no change1 the energy did nothing4 ,it was the activity of an army forever marking time and never going anywhere4 ,from this contrast of the permanent with the transient arise other features which mark off the ,ultimate ,reality from the imperfect realities of practical life4 ,where there is change1 there is of necessity numerical plurality1 multiplicity1 and from variety comes opposition1 strife4 ,change is alteration1 or othering and this means diversity4 ,diversity means division1 and division means two sides and their conflict4 ,the world which is transient must be a world of discord1 for in lacking stability it lacks the government of unity4 ,did unity completely rule1 these would remain an unchanging totality4 ,what alters has parts and partialities which1 not recognizing the rule of unity1 assert themselves independently and make life a scene of contention and discord4 ,ultimate and true ,being on the other hand1 since it is changeless is ,total1 ,all-,comprehensive and ,one4 ,since it is ,one1 it knows only harmony1 and therefore enjoys complete and eternal ,good4 ,it is ,perfection4 ,degrees of knowledge and truth correspond with degrees of reality point by point4 ,the higher and more complete the ,reality the truer and more important the knowledge that refers to it4 ,since the world of becoming1 of origins and perishings1 is deficient in true ,being1 it cannot be known in the best sense4 ,to know it means to neglect its flux and alteration and discover some permanent form which limits the processes that alter in time4 ,the acorn undergoes a series of changes2 these are knowable only in reference to the fixed form of the oak which is the same in the entire oak species in spite of the numerical diversity of trees4 ,moreover1 this form limits the flux of growth at both ends1 the acorn coming from the oak as well as passing into it4 ,where such unifying and limiting eternal forms cannot be detected1 there is mere aimless variation and fluctuation1 and knowledge is out of the question4 ,on the other hand1 as objects are approached in which there is no movement at all1 knowledge becomes really demonstrative1 certain1 perfect--truth pure and unalloyed4 ,the heavens can be more truly known than the earth1 ,god the unmoved mover than the heavens4 ,from this fact follows the superiority of contemplative to practical knowledge1 of pure theoretical speculation to experimentation1 and to any kind of knowing that depends upon changes in things or that induces change in them4 ,pure knowing is pure beholding1 viewing1 noting4 ,it is complete in itself4 ,it looks for nothing beyond itself2 it lacks nothing and hence has no aim or purpose4 ,it is most emphatically its own excuse for being4 ,indeed1 pure contemplative knowing is so much the most truly self-enclosed and self-sufficient thing in the universe that it is the highest and indeed the only attribute that can be ascribed to ,god1 the ,highest ,being in the scale of ,being4 ,man himself is divine in the rare moments when he attains to purely self-sufficient theoretical insight4 ,in contrast with such knowing1 the so-called knowing of the artisan is base4 ,he has to bring about changes in things1 in wood and stone1 and this fact is of itself evidence that his material is deficient in ,being4 ,what condemns his knowledge even more is the fact that it is not disinterestedly for its own sake4 ,it has reference to results to be attained1 food1 clothing1 shelter1 etc4 ,it is concerned with things that perish1 the body and its needs4 ,it thus has an ulterior aim1 and one which itself testifies to imperfection4 ,for want1 desire1 affection of every sort1 indicate lack4 ,where there is need and desire--as in the case of all practical knowledge and activity--there is incompleteness and insufficiency4 ,while civic or political and moral knowledge rank higher than do the conceptions of the artisan1 yet intrinsically considered they are a low and untrue type4 ,moral and political action is practical2 that is1 it implies needs and effort to satisfy them4 ,it has an end beyond itself4 ,moreover1 the very fact of association shows lack of self-sufficiency2 it shows dependence upon others4 ,pure knowing is alone solitary1 and capable of being carried on in complete1 self-sufficing independence4 ,in short1 the measure of the worth of knowledge according to ,aristotle1 whose views are here summarized1 is the degree in which it is purely contemplative4 ,the highest degree is attained in knowing ultimate ,ideal ,being1 pure ,mind4 ,this is ,ideal1 the ,form of ,forms1 because it has no lacks1 no needs1 and experiences no change or variety4 ,it has no desires because in it all desires are consummated4 ,since it is perfect ,being1 it is perfect ,mind and perfect ,bliss2--the acme of rationality and ideality4 ,one point more and the argument is completed4 ,the kind of knowing that concerns itself with this ultimate reality 7which is also ultimate ideality7 is philosophy4 ,philosophy is therefore the last and highest term in pure contemplation4 ,whatever may be said for any other kind of knowledge1 philosophy is self-enclosed4 ,it has nothing to do beyond itself2 it has no aim or purpose or function--except to be philosophy--that is1 pure1 self-sufficing beholding of ultimate reality4 ,there is of course such a thing as philosophic study which falls short of this perfection4 ,where there is learning1 there is change and becoming4 ,but the function of study and learning of philosophy is1 as ,plato put it1 to convert the eye of the soul from dwelling contentedly upon the images of things1 upon the inferior realities that are born and that decay1 and to lead it to the intuition of supernal and eternal ,being4 ,thus the mind of the knower is transformed4 ,it becomes assimilated to what it knows4 ,through a variety of channels1 especially ,neo-,platonism and ,st4 ,augustine1 these ideas found their way into ,christian theology2 and great scholastic thinkers taught that the end of man is to know ,true ,being1 that knowledge is contemplative1 that ,true ,being is pure ,immaterial ,mind1 and to know it is ,bliss and ,salvation4 ,while this knowledge cannot be achieved in this stage of life nor without supernatural aid1 yet so far as it is accomplished it assimilates the human mind to the divine essence and so constitutes salvation4 ,through this taking over of the conception of knowledge as ,contemplative into the dominant religion of ,europe1 multitudes were affected who were totally innocent of theoretical philosophy4 ,there was bequeathed to generations of thinkers as an unquestioned axiom the idea that knowledge is intrinsically a mere beholding or viewing of reality--the spectator conception of knowledge4 ,so deeply engrained was this idea that it prevailed for centuries after the actual progress of science had demonstrated that knowledge is power to transform the world1 and centuries after the practice of effective knowledge had adopted the method of experimentation4 ,let us turn abruptly from this conception of the measure of true knowledge and the nature of true philosophy to the existing practice of knowledge4 ,nowadays if a man1 say a physicist or chemist1 wants to know something1 the last thing he does is merely to contemplate4 ,he does not look in however earnest and prolonged way upon the object expecting that thereby he will detect its fixed and characteristic form4 ,he does not expect any amount of such aloof scrutiny to reveal to him any secrets4 ,he proceeds to do something1 to bring some energy to bear upon the substance to see how it reacts2 he places it under unusual conditions in order to induce some change4 ,while the astronomer cannot change the remote stars1 even he no longer merely gazes4 ,if he cannot change the stars themselves1 he can at least by lens and prism change their light as it reaches the earth2 he can lay traps for discovering changes which would otherwise escape notice4 ,instead of taking an antagonistic attitude toward change and denying it to the stars because of their divinity and perfection1 he is on constant and alert watch to find some change through which he can form an inference as to the formation of stars and systems of stars4 ,change in short is no longer looked upon as a fall from grace1 as a lapse from reality or a sign of imperfection of ,being4 ,modern science no longer tries to find some fixed form or essence behind each process of change4 ,rather1 the experimental method tries to break down apparent fixities and to induce changes4 ,the form that remains unchanged to sense1 the form of seed or tree1 is regarded not as the key to knowledge of the thing1 but as a wall1 an obstruction to be broken down4 ,consequently the scientific man experiments with this and that agency applied to this and that condition until something begins to happen2 until there is1 as we say1 something doing4 ,he assumes that there is change going on all the time1 that there is movement within each thing in seeming repose2 and that since the process is veiled from perception the way to know it is to bring the thing into novel circumstances until change becomes evident4 ,in short1 the thing which is to be accepted and paid heed to is not what is originally given but that which emerges after the thing has been set under a great variety of circumstances in order to see how it behaves4 ,now this marks a much more general change in the human attitude than perhaps appears at first sight4 ,it signifies nothing less than that the world or any part of it as it presents itself at a given time is accepted or acquiesced in only as material for change4 ,it is accepted precisely as the carpenter1 say1 accepts things as he finds them4 ,if he took them as things to be observed and noted for their own sake1 he never would be a carpenter4 ,he would observe1 describe1 record the structures1 forms and changes which things exhibit to him1 and leave the matter there4 ,if perchance some of the changes going on should present him with a shelter1 so much the better4 ,but what makes the carpenter a builder is the fact that he notes things not just as objects in themselves1 but with reference to what he wants to do to them and with them2 to the end he has in mind4 ,fitness to effect certain special changes that he wishes to see accomplished is what concerns him in the wood and stones and iron which he observes4 ,his attention is directed to the changes they undergo and the changes they make other things undergo so that he may select that combination of changes which will yield him his desired result4 ,it is only by these processes of active manipulation of things in order to realize his purpose that he discovers what the properties of things are4 ,if he foregoes his own purpose and in the name of a meek and humble subscription to things as they really are refuses to bend things as they are to his own purpose1 he not only never achieves his purpose but he never learns what the things themselves are4 ,they are what they can do and what can be done with them1--things that can be found by deliberate trying4 ,the outcome of this idea of the right way to know is a profound modification in man's attitude toward the natural world4 ,under differing social conditions1 the older or classic conception sometimes bred resignation and submission2 sometimes contempt and desire to escape2 sometimes1 notably in the case of the ,greeks1 a keen esthetic curiosity which showed itself in acute noting of all the traits of given objects4 ,in fact1 the whole conception of knowledge as beholding and noting is fundamentally an idea connected with esthetic enjoyment and appreciation where the environment is beautiful and life is serene1 and with esthetic repulsion and depreciation where life is troubled1 nature morose and hard4 ,but in the degree in which the active conception of knowledge prevails1 and the environment is regarded as something that has to be changed in order to be truly known1 men are imbued with courage1 with what may almost be termed an aggressive attitude toward nature4 ,the latter becomes plastic1 something to be subjected to human uses4 ,the moral disposition toward change is deeply modified4 ,this loses its pathos1 it ceases to be haunted with melancholy through suggesting only decay and loss4 ,change becomes significant of new possibilities and ends to be attained2 it becomes prophetic of a better future4 ,change is associated with progress rather than with lapse and fall4 ,since changes are going on anyway1 the great thing is to learn enough about them so that we be able to lay hold of them and turn them in the direction of our desires4 ,conditions and events are neither to be fled from nor passively acquiesced in2 they are to be utilized and directed4 ,they are either obstacles to our ends or else means for their accomplishment4 ,in a profound sense knowing ceases to be contemplative and becomes practical4 ,unfortunately men1 educated men1 cultivated men in particular1 are still so dominated by the older conception of an aloof and self-sufficing reason and knowledge that they refuse to perceive the import of this doctrine4 ,they think they are sustaining the cause of impartial1 thorough-going and disinterested reflection when they maintain the traditional philosophy of intellectualism--that is1 of knowing as something self-sufficing and self-enclosed4 ,but in truth1 historic intellectualism1 the spectator view of knowledge1 is a purely compensatory doctrine which men of an intellectual turn have built up to console themselves for the actual and social impotency of the calling of thought to which they are devoted4 ,forbidden by conditions and held back by lack of courage from making their knowledge a factor in the determination of the course of events1 they have sought a refuge of complacency in the notion that knowing is something too sublime to be contaminated by contact with things of change and practice4 ,they have transformed knowing into a morally irresponsible estheticism4 ,the true import of the doctrine of the operative or practical character of knowing1 of intelligence1 is objective4 ,it means that the structures and objects which science and philosophy set up in contrast to the things and events of concrete daily experience do not constitute a realm apart in which rational contemplation may rest satisfied2 it means that they represent the selected obstacles1 material means and ideal methods of giving direction to that change which is bound to occur anyway4 ,this change of human disposition toward the world does not mean that man ceases to have ideals1 or ceases to be primarily a creature of the imagination4 ,but it does signify a radical change in the character and function of the ideal realm which man shapes for himself4 ,in the classic philosophy1 the ideal world is essentially a haven in which man finds rest from the storms of life2 it is an asylum in which he takes refuge from the troubles of existence with the calm assurance that it alone is supremely real4 ,when the belief that knowledge is active and operative takes hold of men1 the ideal realm is no longer something aloof and separate2 it is rather that collection of imagined possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts and realizations4 ,it still remains true that the troubles which men undergo are the forces that lead them to project pictures of a better state of things4 ,but the picture of the better is shaped so that it may become an instrumentality of action1 while in the classic view the ,idea belongs ready-made in a noumenal world4 ,hence1 it is only an object of personal aspiration or consolation1 while to the modern1 an idea is a suggestion of something to be done or of a way of doing4 ,an illustration will1 perhaps1 make the difference clear4 ,distance is an obstacle1 a source of trouble4 ,it separates friends and prevents intercourse4 ,it isolates1 and makes contact and mutual understanding difficult4 ,this state of affairs provokes discontent and restlessness2 it excites the imagination to construct pictures of a state of things where human intercourse is not injuriously affected by space4 ,now there are two ways out4 ,one way is to pass from a mere dream of some heavenly realm in which distance is abolished and by some magic all friends are in perpetual transparent communication1 to pass1 ,i say1 from some idle castle-building to philosophic reflection4 ,space1 distance1 it will then be argued1 is merely phenomenal2 or1 in a more modern version1 subjective4 ,it is not1 metaphysically speaking1 real4 ,hence the obstruction and trouble it gives is not after all real in the metaphysical sense of reality4 ,pure minds1 pure spirits1 do not live in a space world2 for them distance is not4 ,their relationships in the true world are not in any way affected by special considerations4 ,their intercommunication is direct1 fluent1 unobstructed4 ,does the illustration involve a caricature of ways of philosophizing with which we are all familiar8 ,but if it is not an absurd caricature1 does it not suggest that much of what philosophies have taught about the ideal and noumenal or superiorly real world1 is after all1 only casting a dream into an elaborate dialectic form through the use of a speciously scientific terminology8 ,practically1 the difficulty1 the trouble1 remains4 ,practically1 however it may be metaphysically1 space is still real3--it acts in a definite objectionable way4 ,again1 man dreams of some better state of things4 ,from troublesome fact he takes refuge in fantasy4 ,but this time1 the refuge does not remain a permanent and remote asylum4 ,the idea becomes a standpoint from which to examine existing occurrences and to see if there is not among them something which gives a hint of how communication at a distance can be effected1 something to be utilized as a medium of speech at long range4 ,the suggestion or fancy though still ideal is treated as a possibility capable of realization in the concrete natural world1 not as a superior reality apart from that world4 ,as such1 it becomes a platform from which to scrutinize natural events4 ,observed from the point of view of this possibility1 things disclose properties hitherto undetected4 ,in the light of these ascertainments1 the idea of some agency for speech at a distance becomes less vague and floating3 it takes on positive form4 ,this action and reaction goes on4 ,the possibility or idea is employed as a method for observing actual existence2 and in the light of what is discovered the possibility takes on concrete existence4 ,it becomes less of a mere idea1 a fancy1 a wished-for possibility1 and more of an actual fact4 ,invention proceeds1 and at last we have the telegraph1 the telephone1 first through wires1 and then with no artificial medium4 ,the concrete environment is transformed in the desired direction2 it is idealized in fact and not merely in fancy4 ,the ideal is realized through its own use as a tool or method of inspection1 experimentation1 selection and combination of concrete natural operations4 ,let us pause to take stock of results4 ,the division of the world into two kinds of ,being1 one superior1 accessible only to reason and ideal in nature1 the other inferior1 material1 changeable1 empirical1 accessible to sense-observation1 turns inevitably into the idea that knowledge is contemplative in nature4 ,it assumes a contrast between theory and practice which was all to the disadvantage of the latter4 ,but in the actual course of the development of science1 a tremendous change has come about4 ,when the practice of knowledge ceased to be dialectical and became experimental1 knowing became preoccupied with changes and the test of knowledge became the ability to bring about certain changes4 ,knowing1 for the experimental sciences1 means a certain kind of intelligently conducted doing2 it ceases to be contemplative and becomes in a true sense practical4 ,now this implies that philosophy1 unless it is to undergo a complete break with the authorized spirit of science1 must also alter its nature4 ,it must assume a practical nature2 it must become operative and experimental4 ,and we have pointed out what an enormous change this transformation of philosophy entails in the two conceptions which have played the greatest rle in historic philosophizing--the conceptions of the real and ideal respectively4 ,the former ceases to be something ready-made and final2 it becomes that which has to be accepted as the material of change1 as the obstructions and the means of certain specific desired changes4 ,the ideal and rational also ceased to be a separate ready-made world incapable of being used as a lever to transform the actual empirical world1 a mere asylum from empirical deficiencies4 ,they represent intelligently thought-out possibilities of the existent world which may be used as methods for making over and improving it4 ,philosophically speaking1 this is the great difference involved in the change from knowledge and philosophy as contemplative to operative4 ,the change does not mean the lowering in dignity of philosophy from a lofty plane to one of gross utilitarianism4 ,it signifies that the prime function of philosophy is that of rationalizing the possibilities of experience1 especially collective human experience4 ,the scope of this change may be realized by considering how far we are from accomplishing it4 ,in spite of inventions which enable men to use the energies of nature for their purposes1 we are still far from habitually treating knowledge as the method of active control of nature and of experience4 ,we tend to think of it after the model of a spectator viewing a finished picture rather than after that of the artist producing the painting4 ,thus there arise all the questions of epistemology with which the technical student of philosophy is so familiar1 and which have made modern philosophy in especial so remote from the understanding of the everyday person and from the results and processes of science4 ,for these questions all spring from the assumption of a merely beholding mind on one side and a foreign and remote object to be viewed and noted on the other4 ,they ask how a mind and world1 subject and object1 so separate and independent can by any possibility come into such relationship to each other as to make true knowledge possible4 ,if knowing were habitually conceived of as active and operative1 after the analogy of experiment guided by hypothesis1 or of invention guided by the imagination of some possibility1 it is not too much to say that the first effect would be to emancipate philosophy from all the epistemological puzzles which now perplex it4 ,for these all arise from a conception of the relation of mind and world1 subject and object1 in knowing1 which assumes that to know is to seize upon what is already in existence4 ,modern philosophic thought has been so preoccupied with these puzzles of epistemology and the disputes between realist and idealist1 between phenomenalist and absolutist1 that many students are at a loss to know what would be left for philosophy if there were removed both the metaphysical task of distinguishing between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds and the epistemological task of telling how a separate subject can know an independent object4 ,but would not the elimination of these traditional problems permit philosophy to devote itself to a more fruitful and more needed task8 ,would it not encourage philosophy to face the great social and moral defects and troubles from which humanity suffers1 to concentrate its attention upon clearing up the causes and exact nature of these evils and upon developing a clear idea of better social possibilities2 in short upon projecting an idea or ideal which1 instead of expressing the notion of another world or some far-away unrealizable goal1 would be used as a method of understanding and rectifying specific social ills8 ,this is a vague statement4 ,but note in the first place that such a conception of the proper province of philosophy where it is released from vain metaphysics and idle epistemology is in line with the origin of philosophy sketched in the first hour4 ,and in the second place1 note how contemporary society1 the world over1 is in need of more general and fundamental enlightenment and guidance than it now possesses4 ,i have tried to show that a radical change of the conception of knowledge from contemplative to active is the inevitable result of the way in which inquiry and invention are now conducted4 ,but in claiming this1 it must also be conceded1 or rather asserted1 that so far the change has influenced for the most part only the more technical side of human life4 ,the sciences have created new industrial arts4 ,man's physical command of natural energies has been indefinitely multiplied4 ,there is control of the sources of material wealth and prosperity4 ,what would once have been miracles are now daily performed with steam and coal and electricity and air1 and with the human body4 ,but there are few persons optimistic enough to declare that any similar command of the forces which control man's social and moral welfare has been achieved4 ,where is the moral progress that corresponds to our economic accomplishments8 ,the latter is the direct fruit of the revolution that has been wrought in physical science4 ,but where is there a corresponding human science and art8 ,not only has the improvement in the method of knowing remained so far mainly limited to technical and economic matters1 but this progress has brought with it serious new moral disturbances4 ,i need only cite the late war1 the problem of capital and labor1 the relation of economic classes1 the fact that while the new science has achieved wonders in medicine and surgery1 it has also produced and spread occasions for diseases and weaknesses4 ,these considerations indicate to us how undeveloped are our politics1 how crude and primitive our education1 how passive and inert our morals4 ,the causes remain which brought philosophy into existence as an attempt to find an intelligent substitute for blind custom and blind impulse as guides to life and conduct4 ,the attempt has not been successfully accomplished4 ,is there not reason for believing that the release of philosophy from its burden of sterile metaphysics and sterile epistemology instead of depriving philosophy of problems and subject-matter would open a way to questions of the most perplexing and the most significant sort8 ,let me specify one problem quite directly suggested by certain points in this lecture4 ,it has been pointed out that the really fruitful application of the contemplative idea was not in science but in the esthetic field4 ,it is difficult to imagine any high development of the fine arts except where there is curious and loving interest in forms and motions of the world quite irrespective of any use to which they may be put4 ,and it is not too much to say that every people that has attained a high esthetic development has been a people in which the contemplative attitude has flourished--as the ,greek1 the ,hindoo1 the medieval ,christian4 ,on the other hand1 the scientific attitude that has actually proved itself in scientific progress is1 as has been pointed out1 a practical attitude4 ,it takes forms as disguises for hidden processes4 ,its interest in change is in what it leads to1 what can be done with it1 to what use it can be put4 ,while it has brought nature under control1 there is something hard and aggressive in its attitude toward nature unfavorable to the esthetic enjoyment of the world4 ,surely there is no more significant question before the world than this question of the possibility and method of reconciliation of the attitudes of practical science and contemplative esthetic appreciation4 ,without the former1 man will be the sport and victim of natural forces which he cannot use or control4 ,without the latter1 mankind might become a race of economic monsters1 restlessly driving hard bargains with nature and with one another1 bored with leisure or capable of putting it to use only in ostentatious display and extravagant dissipation4 ,like other moral questions1 this matter is social and even political4 ,the western peoples advanced earlier on the path of experimental science and its applications in control of nature than the oriental4 ,it is not1 ,i suppose wholly fanciful1 to believe that the latter have embodied in their habits of life more of the contemplative1 esthetic and speculatively religious temper1 and the former more of the scientific1 industrial and practical4 ,this difference and others which have grown up around it is one barrier to easy mutual understanding1 and one source of misunderstanding4 ,the philosophy which1 then1 makes a serious effort to comprehend these respective attitudes in their relation and due balance1 could hardly fail to promote the capacity of peoples to profit by one another's experience and to co-operate more effectually with one another in the tasks of fruitful culture4 ,indeed1 it is incredible that the question of the relation of the real and the ideal should ever have been thought to be a problem belonging distinctively to philosophy4 ,the very fact that this most serious of all human issues has been taken possession of by philosophy is only another proof of the disasters that follow in the wake of regarding knowledge and intellect as something self-sufficient4 ,never have the real and the ideal been so clamorous1 so self-assertive1 as at the present time4 ,and never in the history of the world have they been so far apart4 ,the world war was carried on for purely ideal ends3--for humanity1 justice and equal liberty for strong and weak alike4 ,and it was carried on by realistic means of applied science1 by high explosives1 and bombing airplanes and blockading marvels of mechanism that reduced the world well nigh to ruin1 so that the serious-minded are concerned for the perpetuity of those choice values we call civilization4 ,the peace settlement is loudly proclaimed in the name of the ideals that stir man's deepest emotions1 but with the most realistic attention to details of economic advantage distributed in proportion to physical power to create future disturbances4 ,it is not surprising that some men are brought to regard all idealism as a mere smoke-screen behind which the search for material profit may be more effectually carried on1 and are converted to the materialistic interpretation of history4 ,reality is then conceived as physical force and as sensations of power1 profit and enjoyment2 any politics that takes account of other factors1 save as elements of clever propaganda and for control of those human beings who have not become realistically enlightened1 is based on illusions4 ,but others are equally sure that the real lesson of the war is that humanity took its first great wrong step when it entered upon a cultivation of physical science and an application of the fruits of science to the improvement of the instruments of life--industry and commerce4 ,they will sigh for the return of the day when1 while the great mass died as they were born in animal fashion1 the few elect devoted themselves not to science and the material decencies and comforts of existence but to ideal things1 the things of the spirit4 ,yet the most obvious conclusion would seem to be the impotency and the harmfulness of any and every ideal that is proclaimed wholesale and in the abstract1 that is1 as something in itself apart from the detailed concrete existences whose moving possibilities it embodies4 ,the true moral would seem to lie in enforcing the tragedy of that idealism which believes in a spiritual world which exists in and by itself1 and the tragic need for the most realistic study of forces and consequences1 a study conducted in a more scientifically accurate and complete manner than that of the professed ,real-politik4 ,for it is not truly realistic or scientific to take short views1 to sacrifice the future to immediate pressure1 to ignore facts and forces that are disagreeable and to magnify the enduring quality of whatever falls in with immediate desire4 ,it is false that the evils of the situation arise from absence of ideals2 they spring from wrong ideals4 ,and these wrong ideals have in turn their foundation in the absence in social matters of that methodic1 systematic1 impartial1 critical1 searching inquiry into real and operative conditions which we call science and which has brought man in the technical realm to the command of physical energies4 ,philosophy1 let it be repeated1 cannot solve the problem of the relation of the ideal and the real4 ,that is the standing problem of life4 ,but it can at least lighten the burden of humanity in dealing with the problem by emancipating mankind from the errors which philosophy has itself fostered--the existence of conditions which are real apart from their movement into something new and different1 and the existence of ideals1 spirit and reason independent of the possibilities of the material and physical4 ,for as long as humanity is committed to this radically false bias1 it will walk forward with blinded eyes and bound limbs4 ,and philosophy can effect1 if it will1 something more than this negative task4 ,it can make it easier for mankind to take the right steps in action by making it clear that a sympathetic and integral intelligence brought to bear upon the observation and understanding of concrete social events and forces1 can form ideals1 that is aims1 which shall not be either illusions or mere emotional compensations4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,significance ,,of ,,logical ,,reconstruction ,logic--like philosophy itself--suffers from a curious oscillation4 ,it is elevated into the supreme and legislative science only to fall into the trivial estate of keeper of such statements as ,a is ,a and the scholastic verses for the syllogistic rules4 ,it claims power to state the laws of the ultimate structure of the universe1 on the ground that it deals with the laws of thought which are the laws according to which ,reason has formed the world4 ,then it limits its pretensions to laws of correct reasoning which is correct even though it leads to no matter of fact1 or even to material falsity4 ,it is regarded by the modern objective idealist as the adequate substitute for ancient ontological metaphysics2 but others treat it as that branch of rhetoric which teaches proficiency in argumentation4 ,for a time a superficial compromise equilibrium was maintained wherein the logic of formal demonstration which the ,middle ,ages extracted from ,aristotle was supplemented by an inductive logic of discovery of truth that ,mill extracted from the practice of scientific men4 ,but students of ,german philosophy1 of mathematics1 and of psychology1 no matter how much they attacked one another1 have made common cause in attack upon the orthodox logics both of deductive proof and inductive discovery4 ,logical theory presents a scene of chaos4 ,there is little agreement as to its subject-matter1 scope or purpose4 ,this disagreement is not formal or nominal but affects the treatment of every topic4 ,take such a rudimentary matter as the nature of judgment4 ,reputable authority can be quoted in behalf of every possible permutation of doctrine4 ,judgment is the central thing in logic2 and judgment is not logical at all1 but personal and psychological4 ,if logical1 it is the primary function to which both conception and inference are subordinate2 and it is an after-product from them4 ,the distinction of subject and predicate is necessary1 and it is totally irrelevant2 or again1 though it is found in some cases1 it is not of great importance4 ,among those who hold that the subject-predicate relationship is essential1 some hold that judgment is an analysis of something prior into them1 and others assert that it is a synthesis of them into something else4 ,some hold that reality is always the subject of judgment1 and others that reality is logically irrelevant4 ,among those who deny that judgment is the attribution of predicate to subject1 who regard it as a relation of elements1 some hold that the relation is internal1 some that it is external1 and others that it is sometimes one and sometimes the other4 ,unless logic is a matter of some practical account1 these contrarieties are so numerous1 so extensive1 and so irreconcilable that they are ludicrous4 ,if logic is an affair of practical moment1 then these inconsistencies are serious4 ,they testify to some deep-lying cause of intellectual disagreement and incoherency4 ,in fact1 contemporary logical theory is the ground upon which all philosophical differences and disputes are gathered together and focussed4 ,how does the modification in the traditional conception of the relation of experience and reason1 the real and ideal affect logic8 ,it affects1 in the first place1 the nature of logic itself4 ,if thought or intelligence is the means of intentional reconstruction of experience1 then logic1 as an account of the procedure of thought1 is not purely formal4 ,it is not confined to laws of formally correct reasoning apart from truth of subject-matter4 ,neither1 on the contrary1 is it concerned with the inherent thought structures of the universe1 as ,hegel's logic would have it2 nor with the successive approaches of human thought to this objective thought structure as the logic of ,lotze1 ,bosanquet1 and other epistemological logicians would have it4 ,if thinking is the way in which deliberate reorganization of experience is secured1 then logic is such a clarified and systematized formulation of the procedures of thinking as will enable the desired reconstruction to go on more economically and efficiently4 ,in language familiar to students1 logic is both a science and an art2 a science so far as it gives an organized and tested descriptive account of the way in which thought actually goes on2 an art1 so far as on the basis of this description it projects methods by which future thinking shall take advantage of the operations that lead to success and avoid those which result in failure4 ,thus is answered the dispute whether logic is empirical or normative1 psychological or regulative4 ,it is both4 ,logic is based on a definite and executive supply of empirical material4 ,men have been thinking for ages4 ,they have observed1 inferred1 and reasoned in all sorts of ways and to all kinds of results4 ,anthropology1 the study of the origin of myth1 legend and cult2 linguistics and grammar2 rhetoric and former logical compositions all tell us how men have thought and what have been the purposes and consequences of different kinds of thinking4 ,psychology1 experimental and pathological1 makes important contributions to our knowledge of how thinking goes on and to what effect4 ,especially does the record of the growth of the various sciences afford instruction in those concrete ways of inquiry and testing which have led men astray and which have proved efficacious4 ,each science from mathematics to history exhibits typical fallacious methods and typical efficacious methods in special subject-matters4 ,logical theory has thus a large1 almost inexhaustible field of empirical study4 ,the conventional statement that experience only tells us how men have thought or do think1 while logic is concerned with norms1 with how men should think1 is ludicrously inept4 ,some sorts of thinking are shown by experience to have got nowhere1 or worse than nowhere--into systematized delusion and mistake4 ,others have proved in manifest experience that they lead to fruitful and enduring discoveries4 ,it is precisely in experience that the different consequences of different methods of investigation and ratiocination are convincingly shown4 ,the parrot-like repetition of the distinction between an empirical description of what is and a normative account of what should be merely neglects the most striking fact about thinking as it empirically is--namely1 its flagrant exhibition of cases of failure and success--that is1 of good thinking and bad thinking4 ,any one who considers this empirical manifestation will not complain of lack of material from which to construct a regulative art4 ,the more study that is given to empirical records of actual thought1 the more apparent becomes the connection between the specific features of thinking which have produced failure and success4 ,out of this relationship of cause and effect as it is empirically ascertained grow the norms and regulations of an art of thinking4 ,mathematics is often cited as an example of purely normative thinking dependent upon a priori canons and supra-empirical material4 ,but it is hard to see how the student who approaches the matter historically can avoid the conclusion that the status of mathematics is as empirical as that of metallurgy4 ,men began with counting and measuring things just as they began with pounding and burning them4 ,one thing1 as common speech profoundly has it1 led to another4 ,certain ways were successful--not merely in the immediately practical sense1 but in the sense of being interesting1 of arousing attention1 of exciting attempts at improvement4 ,the present-day mathematical logician may present the structure of mathematics as if it had sprung all at once from the brain of a ,zeus whose anatomy is that of pure logic4 ,but1 nevertheless1 this very structure is a product of long historic growth1 in which all kinds of experiments have been tried1 in which some men have struck out in this direction and some in that1 and in which some exercises and operations have resulted in confusion and others in triumphant clarifications and fruitful growths2 a history in which matter and methods have been constantly selected and worked over on the basis of empirical success and failure4 ,the structure of alleged normative a priori mathematics is in truth the crowned result of ages of toilsome experience4 ,the metallurgist who should write on the most highly developed method of dealing with ores would not1 in truth1 proceed any differently4 ,he too selects1 refines1 and organizes the methods which in the past have been found to yield the maximum of achievement4 ,logic is a matter of profound human importance precisely because it is empirically founded and experimentally applied4 ,so considered1 the problem of logical theory is none other than the problem of the possibility of the development and employment of intelligent method in inquiries concerned with deliberate reconstruction of experience4 ,and it is only saying again in more specific form what has been said in general form to add that while such a logic has been developed in respect to mathematics and physical science1 intelligent method1 logic1 is still far to seek in moral and political affairs4 ,assuming1 accordingly1 this idea of logic without argument1 let us proceed to discuss some of its chief features4 ,first1 light is thrown by the origin of thinking upon a logic which shall be a method of intelligent guidance of experience4 ,in line with what has already been said about experience being a matter primarily of behavior1 a sensori-motor matter1 is the fact that thinking takes its departure from specific conflicts in experience that occasion perplexity and trouble4 ,men do not1 in their natural estate1 think when they have no troubles to cope with1 no difficulties to overcome4 ,a life of ease1 of success without effort1 would be a thoughtless life1 and so also would a life of ready omnipotence4 ,beings who think are beings whose life is so hemmed in and constricted that they cannot directly carry through a course of action to victorious consummation4 ,men also do not tend to think when their action1 when they are amid difficulties1 is dictated to them by authority4 ,soldiers have difficulties and restrictions in plenty1 but qua soldiers 7as ,aristotle would say7 they are not notorious for being thinkers4 ,thinking is done for them1 higher up4 ,the same is too true of most workingmen under present economic conditions4 ,difficulties occasion thinking only when thinking is the imperative or urgent way out1 only when it is the indicated road to a solution4 ,wherever external authority reigns1 thinking is suspected and obnoxious4 ,thinking1 however1 is not the only way in which a personal solution of difficulties is sought4 ,as we have seen1 dreams1 reveries1 emotional idealizations are roads which are taken to escape the strain of perplexity and conflict4 ,according to modern psychology1 many systematized delusions and mental disorders1 probably hysteria itself1 originate as devices for getting freedom from troublesome conflicting factors4 ,such considerations throw into relief some of the traits essential to thinking as a way of responding to difficulty4 ,the short-cut solutions alluded to do not get rid of the conflict and problems2 they only get rid of the feeling of it4 ,they cover up consciousness of it4 ,because the conflict remains in fact and is evaded in thought1 disorders arise4 ,the first distinguishing characteristic of thinking then is facing the facts--inquiry1 minute and extensive scrutinizing1 observation4 ,nothing has done greater harm to the successful conduct of the enterprise of thinking 7and to the logics which reflect and formulate the undertaking7 than the habit of treating observation as something outside of and prior to thinking1 and thinking as something which can go on in the head without including observation of new facts as part of itself4 ,every approximation to such thinking is really an approach to the method of escape and self-delusion just referred to4 ,it substitutes an emotionally agreeable and rationally self-consistent train of meanings for inquiry into the features of the situation which cause the trouble4 ,it leads to that type of ,idealism which has well been termed intellectual somnambulism4 ,it creates a class of thinkers who are remote from practice and hence from testing their thought by application--a socially superior and irresponsible class4 ,this is the condition causing the tragic division of theory and practice1 and leading to an unreasonable exaltation of theory on one side and an unreasonable contempt for it on the other4 ,it confirms current practice in its hard brutalities and dead routines just because it has transferred thinking and theory to a separate and nobler region4 ,thus has the idealist conspired with the materialist to keep actual life impoverished and inequitable4 ,the isolation of thinking from confrontation with facts encourages that kind of observation which merely accumulates brute facts1 which occupies itself laboriously with mere details1 but never inquires into their meaning and consequences--a safe occupation1 for it never contemplates any use to be made of the observed facts in determining a plan for changing the situation4 ,thinking which is a method of reconstructing experience treats observation of facts1 on the other hand1 as the indispensable step of defining the problem1 of locating the trouble1 of forcing home a definite1 instead of a merely vague emotional1 sense of what the difficulty is and where it lies4 ,it is not aimless1 random1 miscellaneous1 but purposeful1 specific and limited by the character of the trouble undergone4 ,the purpose is so to clarify the disturbed and confused situation that reasonable ways of dealing with it may be suggested4 ,when the scientific man appears to observe aimlessly1 it is merely that he is so in love with problems as sources and guides of inquiry1 that he is striving to turn up a problem where none appears on the surface3 he is1 as we say1 hunting for trouble because of the satisfaction to be had in coping with it4 ,specific and wide observation of concrete fact always1 then1 corresponds not only with a sense of a problem or difficulty1 but with some vague sense of the meaning of the difficulty1 that is1 of what it imports or signifies in subsequent experience4 ,it is a kind of anticipation or prediction of what is coming4 ,we speak1 very truly1 of impending trouble1 and in observing the signs of what the trouble is1 we are at the same time expecting1 forecasting--in short1 framing an idea1 becoming aware of meaning4 ,when the trouble is not only impending but completely actual and present1 we are overwhelmed4 ,we do not think1 but give way to depression4 ,the kind of trouble that occasions thinking is that which is incomplete and developing1 and where what is found1 already in existence can be employed as a sign from which to infer what is likely to come4 ,when we intelligently observe1 we are1 as we say apprehensive1 as well as apprehending4 ,we are on the alert for something still to come4 ,curiosity1 inquiry1 investigation1 are directed quite as truly into what is going to happen next as into what has happened4 ,an intelligent interest in the latter is an interest in getting evidence1 indications1 symptoms for inferring the former4 ,observation is diagnosis and diagnosis implies an interest in anticipation and preparation4 ,it makes ready in advance an attitude of response so that we shall not be caught unawares4 ,that which is not already in existence1 that which is only anticipated and inferred1 cannot be observed4 ,it does not have the status of fact1 of something given1 a datum1 but of a meaning1 an idea4 ,so far as ideas are not fancies1 framed by emotionalized memory for escape and refuge1 they are precisely anticipations of something still to come aroused by looking into the facts of a developing situation4 ,the blacksmith watches his iron1 its color and texture1 to get evidence of what it is getting ready to pass into2 the physician observes his patient to detect symptoms of change in some definite direction2 the scientific man keeps his attention upon his laboratory material to get a clue as to what will happen under certain conditions4 ,the very fact that observation is not an end in itself but a search for evidence and signs shows that along with observation goes inference1 anticipatory forecast--in short an idea1 thought or conception4 ,in a more technical context1 it would be worth while to see what light this logical correspondence of observed fact and projected idea or meaning throws upon certain traditional philosophical problems and puzzles1 including that of subject and predicate in judgment1 object and subject in knowledge1 real and ideal generally4 ,but at this time1 we must confine ourselves to pointing out that this view of the correlative origin and function of observed fact and projected idea in experience1 commits us to some very important consequences concerning the nature of ideas1 meanings1 conceptions1 or whatever word may be employed to denote the specifically mental function4 ,because they are suggestions of something that may happen or eventuate1 they are 7as we saw in the case of ideals generally7 platforms of response to what is going on4 ,the man who detects that the cause of his difficulty is an automobile bearing down upon him is not guaranteed safety2 he may have made his observation-forecast too late4 ,but if his anticipation-perception comes in season1 he has the basis for doing something which will avert threatening disaster4 ,because he foresees an impending result1 he may do something that will lead to the situation eventuating in some other way4 ,all intelligent thinking means an increment of freedom in action--an emancipation from chance and fatality4 ,thought represents the suggestion of a way of response that is different from that which would have been followed if intelligent observation had not effected an inference as to the future4 ,now a method of action1 a mode of response1 intended to produce a certain result--that is1 to enable the blacksmith to give a certain form to his hot iron1 the physician to treat the patient so as to facilitate recovery1 the scientific experimenter to draw a conclusion which will apply to other cases1--is by the nature of the case tentative1 uncertain till tested by its results4 ,the significance of this fact for the theory of truth will be discussed below4 ,here it is enough to note that notions1 theories1 systems1 no matter how elaborate and self-consistent they are1 must be regarded as hypotheses4 ,they are to be accepted as bases of actions which test them1 not as finalities4 ,to perceive this fact is to abolish rigid dogmas from the world4 ,it is to recognize that conceptions1 theories and systems of thought are always open to development through use4 ,it is to enforce the lesson that we must be on the lookout quite as much for indications to alter them as for opportunities to assert them4 ,they are tools4 ,as in the case of all tools1 their value resides not in themselves but in their capacity to work shown in the consequences of their use4 ,nevertheless1 inquiry is free only when the interest in knowing is so developed that thinking carries with it something worth while for itself1 something having its own esthetic and moral interest4 ,just because knowing is not self-enclosed and final but is instrumental to reconstruction of situations1 there is always danger that it will be subordinated to maintaining some preconceived purpose or prejudice4 ,then reflection ceases to be complete2 it falls short4 ,being precommitted to arriving at some special result1 it is not sincere4 ,it is one thing to say that all knowing has an end beyond itself1 and another thing1 a thing of a contrary kind1 to say that an act of knowing has a particular end which it is bound1 in advance1 to reach4 ,much less is it true that the instrumental nature of thinking means that it exists for the sake of attaining some private1 one-sided advantage upon which one has set one's heart4 ,any limitation whatever of the end means limitation in the thinking process itself4 ,it signifies that it does not attain its full growth and movement1 but is cramped1 impeded1 interfered with4 ,the only situation in which knowing is fully stimulated is one in which the end is developed in the process of inquiry and testing4 ,disinterested and impartial inquiry is then far from meaning that knowing is self-enclosed and irresponsible4 ,it means that there is no particular end set up in advance so as to shut in the activities of observation1 forming of ideas1 and application4 ,inquiry is emancipated4 ,it is encouraged to attend to every fact that is relevant to defining the problem or need1 and to follow up every suggestion that promises a clue4 ,the barriers to free inquiry are so many and so solid that mankind is to be congratulated that the very act of investigation is capable of itself becoming a delightful and absorbing pursuit1 capable of enlisting on its side man's sporting instincts4 ,just in the degree in which thought ceases to be held down to ends fixed by social custom1 a social division of labor grows up4 ,investigation has become a dominant life occupation for some persons4 ,only superficially1 however1 does this confirm the idea that theory and knowledge are ends in themselves4 ,they are1 relatively speaking1 ends in themselves for some persons4 ,but these persons represent a social division of labor2 and their specialization can be trusted only when such persons are in unobstructed co-operation with other social occupations1 sensitive to others' problems and transmitting results to them for wider application in action4 ,when this social relationship of persons particularly engaged in carrying on the enterprise of knowing is forgotten and the class becomes isolated1 inquiry loses stimulus and purpose4 ,it degenerates into sterile specialization1 a kind of intellectual busy work carried on by socially absent-minded men4 ,details are heaped up in the name of science1 and abstruse dialectical developments of systems occur4 ,then the occupation is rationalized under the lofty name of devotion to truth for its own sake4 ,but when the path of true science is retaken these things are brushed aside and forgotten4 ,they turn out to have been the toyings of vain and irresponsible men4 ,the only guarantee of impartial1 disinterested inquiry is the social sensitiveness of the inquirer to the needs and problems of those with whom he is associated4 ,as the instrumental theory is favorable to high esteem for impartial and disinterested inquiry1 so1 contrary to the impressions of some critics1 it sets much store upon the apparatus of deduction4 ,it is a strange notion that because one says that the cognitive value of conceptions1 definitions1 generalizations1 classifications and the development of consecutive implications is not self-resident1 that therefore one makes light of the deductive function1 or denies its fruitfulness and necessity4 ,the instrumental theory only attempts to state with some scrupulousness where the value is found and to prevent its being sought in the wrong place4 ,it says that knowing begins with specific observations that define the problem and ends with specific observations that test a hypothesis for its solution4 ,but that the idea1 the meaning1 which the original observations suggest and the final ones test1 itself requires careful scrutiny and prolonged development1 the theory would be the last to deny4 ,to say that a locomotive is an agency1 that it is intermediate between a need in experience and its satisfaction1 is not to depreciate the worth of careful and elaborate construction of the locomotive1 or the need of subsidiary tools and processes that are devoted to introducing improvements into its structure4 ,one would rather say that because the locomotive is intermediary in experience1 not primary and not final1 it is impossible to devote too much care to its constructive development4 ,such a deductive science as mathematics represents the perfecting of method4 ,that a method to those concerned with it should present itself as an end on its own account is no more surprising than that there should be a distinct business for making any tool4 ,rarely are those who invent and perfect a tool those who employ it4 ,there is1 indeed1 one marked difference between the physical and the intellectual instrumentality4 ,the development of the latter runs far beyond any immediately visible use4 ,the artistic interest in perfecting the method by itself is strong--as the utensils of civilization may themselves become works of finest art4 ,but from the practical standpoint this difference shows that the advantage as an instrumentality is on the side of the intellectual tool4 ,just because it is not formed with a special application in mind1 because it is a highly generalized tool1 it is the more flexible in adaptation to unforeseen uses4 ,it can be employed in dealing with problems that were not anticipated4 ,the mind is prepared in advance for all sorts of intellectual emergencies1 and when the new problem occurs it does not have to wait till it can get a special instrument ready4 ,more definitely1 abstraction is indispensable if one experience is to be applicable in other experiences4 ,every concrete experience in its totality is unique2 it is itself1 non-reduplicable4 ,taken in its full concreteness1 it yields no instruction1 it throws no light4 ,what is called abstraction means that some phase of it is selected for the sake of the aid it gives in grasping something else4 ,taken by itself1 it is a mangled fragment1 a poor substitute for the living whole from which it is extracted4 ,but viewed teleologically or practically1 it represents the only way in which one experience can be made of any value for another--the only way in which something enlightening can be secured4 ,what is called false or vicious abstractionism signifies that the function of the detached fragment is forgotten and neglected1 so that it is esteemed barely in itself as something of a higher order than the muddy and irregular concrete from which it was wrenched4 ,looked at functionally1 not structurally and statically1 abstraction means that something has been released from one experience for transfer to another4 ,abstraction is liberation4 ,the more theoretical1 the more abstract1 an abstraction1 or the farther away it is from anything experienced in its concreteness1 the better fitted it is to deal with any one of the indefinite variety of things that may later present themselves4 ,ancient mathematics and physics were much nearer the gross concrete experience than are modern4 ,for that very reason they were more impotent in affording any insight into and control over such concretes as present themselves in new and unexpected forms4 ,abstraction and generalization have always been recognized as close kin4 ,it may be said that they are the negative and positive sides of the same function4 ,abstraction sets free some factor so that it may be used4 ,generalization is the use4 ,it carries over and extends4 ,it is always in some sense a leap in the dark4 ,it is an adventure4 ,there can be no assurance in advance that what is extracted from one concrete can be fruitfully extended to another individual case4 ,since these other cases are individual and concrete they must be dissimilar4 ,the trait of flying is detached from the concrete bird4 ,this abstraction is then carried over to the bat1 and it is expected in view of the application of the quality to have some of the other traits of the bird4 ,this trivial instance indicates the essence of generalization1 and also illustrates the riskiness of the proceeding4 ,it transfers1 extends1 applies1 a result of some former experience to the reception and interpretation of a new one4 ,deductive processes define1 delimit1 purify and set in order the conceptions through which this enriching and directive operation is carried on1 but they cannot1 however perfect1 guarantee the outcome4 ,the pragmatic value of organization is so conspicuously enforced in contemporary life that it hardly seems necessary to dwell upon the instrumental significance of classification and systematization4 ,when the existence of qualitative and fixed species was denied to be the supreme object of knowledge1 classification was often regarded1 especially by the empirical school1 as merely a linguistic device4 ,it was convenient for memory and communication to have words that sum up a number of particulars4 ,classes were supposed to exist only in speech4 ,later1 ideas were recognized as a kind of tertium quid between things and words4 ,classes were allowed to exist in the mind as purely mental things4 ,the critical disposition of empiricism is well exemplified here4 ,to assign any objectivity to classes was to encourage a belief in eternal species and occult essences and to strengthen the arms of a decadent and obnoxious science--a point of view well illustrated in ,locke4 ,general ideas are useful in economizing effort1 enabling us to condense particular experiences into simpler and more easily carried bunches and making it easier to identify new observations4 ,so far nominalism and conceptualism--the theory that kinds exist only in words or in ideas--was on the right track4 ,it emphasized the teleological character of systems and classifications1 that they exist for the sake of economy and efficiency in reaching ends4 ,but this truth was perverted into a false notion1 because the active and doing side of experience was denied or ignored4 ,concrete things have ways of acting1 as many ways of acting as they have points of interaction with other things4 ,one thing is callous1 unresponsive1 inert in the presence of some other things2 it is alert1 eager1 and on the aggressive with respect to other things2 in a third case1 it is receptive1 docile4 ,now different ways of behaving1 in spite of their endless diversity1 may be classed together in view of common relationship to an end4 ,no sensible person tries to do everything4 ,he has certain main interests and leading aims by which he makes his behavior coherent and effective4 ,to have an aim is to limit1 select1 concentrate1 group4 ,thus a basis is furnished for selecting and organizing things according as their ways of acting are related to carrying forward pursuit4 ,cherry trees will be differently grouped by woodworkers1 orchardists1 artists1 scientists and merry-makers4 ,to the execution of different purposes different ways of acting and reacting on the part of trees are important4 ,each classification may be equally sound when the difference of ends is borne in mind4 ,nevertheless there is a genuine objective standard for the goodness of special classifications4 ,one will further the cabinetmaker in reaching his end while another will hamper him4 ,one classification will assist the botanist in carrying on fruitfully his work of inquiry1 and another will retard and confuse him4 ,the teleological theory of classification does not therefore commit us to the notion that classes are purely verbal or purely mental4 ,organization is no more merely nominal or mental in any art1 including the art of inquiry1 than it is in a department store or railway system4 ,the necessity of execution supplies objective criteria4 ,things have to be sorted out and arranged so that their grouping will promote successful action for ends4 ,convenience1 economy and efficiency are the bases of classification1 but these things are not restricted to verbal communication with others nor to inner consciousness2 they concern objective action4 ,they must take effect in the world4 ,at the same time1 a classification is not a bare transcript or duplicate of some finished and done-for arrangement pre-existing in nature4 ,it is rather a repertory of weapons for attack upon the future and the unknown4 ,for success1 the details of past knowledge must be reduced from bare facts to meanings1 the fewer1 simpler and more extensive the better4 ,they must be broad enough in scope to prepare inquiry to cope with any phenomenon however unexpected4 ,they must be arranged so as not to overlap1 for otherwise when they are applied to new events they interfere and produce confusion4 ,in order that there may be ease and economy of movement in dealing with the enormous diversity of occurrences that present themselves1 we must be able to move promptly and definitely from one tool of attack to another4 ,in other words1 our various classes and kinds must be themselves classified in graded series from the larger to the more specific4 ,there must not only be streets1 but the streets must be laid out with reference to facilitating passage from any one to any other4 ,classification transforms a wilderness of by-ways in experience into a well-ordered system of roads1 promoting transportation and communication in inquiry4 ,as soon as men begin to take foresight for the future and to prepare themselves in advance to meet it effectively and prosperously1 the deductive operations and their results gain in importance4 ,in every practical enterprise there are goods to be produced1 and whatever eliminates wasted material and promotes economy and efficiency of production is precious4 ,little time is left to speak of the account of the nature of truth given by the experimental and functional type of logic4 ,this is less to be regretted because this account is completely a corollary from the nature of thinking and ideas4 ,if the view held as to the latter is understood1 the conception of truth follows as a matter of course4 ,if it be not understood1 any attempt to present the theory of truth is bound to be confusing1 and the theory itself to seem arbitrary and absurd4 ,if ideas1 meanings1 conceptions1 notions1 theories1 systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment1 to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity1 then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work4 ,if they succeed in their office1 they are reliable1 sound1 valid1 good1 true4 ,if they fail to clear up confusion1 to eliminate defects1 if they increase confusion1 uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon1 then are they false4 ,confirmation1 corroboration1 verification lie in works1 consequences4 ,handsome is that handsome does4 ,by their fruits shall ye know them4 ,that which guides us truly is true--demonstrated capacity for such guidance is precisely what is meant by truth4 ,the adverb truly is more fundamental than either the adjective1 true1 or the noun1 truth4 ,an adverb expresses a way1 a mode of acting4 ,now an idea or conception is a claim or injunction or plan to act in a certain way as the way to arrive at the clearing up of a specific situation4 ,when the claim or pretension or plan is acted upon it guides us truly or falsely2 it leads us to our end or away from it4 ,its active1 dynamic function is the all-important thing about it1 and in the quality of activity induced by it lies all its truth and falsity4 ,the hypothesis that works is the true one2 and truth is an abstract noun applied to the collection of cases1 actual1 foreseen and desired1 that receive confirmation in their works and consequences4 ,so wholly does the worth of this conception of truth depend upon the correctness of the prior account of thinking that it is more profitable to consider why the conception gives offence than to expound it on its own account4 ,part of the reason why it has been found so obnoxious is doubtless its novelty and defects in its statement4 ,too often1 for example1 when truth has been thought of as satisfaction1 it has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction1 a private comfort1 a meeting of purely personal need4 ,but the satisfaction in question means a satisfaction of the needs and conditions of the problem out of which the idea1 the purpose and method of action1 arises4 ,it includes public and objective conditions4 ,it is not to be manipulated by whim or personal idiosyncrasy4 ,again when truth is defined as utility1 it is often thought to mean utility for some purely personal end1 some profit upon which a particular individual has set his heart4 ,so repulsive is a conception of truth which makes it a mere tool of private ambition and aggrandizement1 that the wonder is that critics have attributed such a notion to sane men4 ,as matter of fact1 truth as utility means service in making just that contribution to reorganization in experience that the idea or theory claims to be able to make4 ,the usefulness of a road is not measured by the degree in which it lends itself to the purposes of a highwayman4 ,it is measured by whether it actually functions as a road1 as a means of easy and effective public transportation and communication4 ,and so with the serviceableness of an idea or hypothesis as a measure of its truth4 ,turning from such rather superficial misunderstandings1 we find1 ,i think1 the chief obstacle to the reception of this notion of truth in an inheritance from the classic tradition that has become so deeply engrained in men's minds4 ,in just the degree in which existence is divided into two realms1 a higher one of perfect being and a lower one of seeming1 phenomenal1 deficient reality1 truth and falsity are thought of as fixed1 ready-made static properties of things themselves4 ,supreme ,reality is true ,being1 inferior and imperfect ,reality is false ,being4 ,it makes claims to ,reality which it cannot substantiate4 ,it is deceitful1 fraudulent1 inherently unworthy of trust and belief4 ,beliefs are false not because they mislead us2 they are not mistaken ways of thinking4 ,they are false because they admit and adhere to false existences or subsistences4 ,other notions are true because they do have to do with true ,being--with full and ultimate ,reality4 ,such a notion lies at the back of the head of every one who has1 in however an indirect way1 been a recipient of the ancient and medieval tradition4 ,this view is radically challenged by the pragmatic conception of truth1 and the impossibility of reconciliation or compromise is1 ,i think1 the cause of the shock occasioned by the newer theory4 ,this contrast1 however1 constitutes the importance of the new theory as well as the unconscious obstruction to its acceptance4 ,the older conception worked out practically to identify truth with authoritative dogma4 ,a society that chiefly esteems order1 that finds growth painful and change disturbing1 inevitably seeks for a fixed body of superior truths upon which it may depend4 ,it looks backward1 to something already in existence1 for the source and sanction of truth4 ,it falls back upon what is antecedent1 prior1 original1 a priori1 for assurance4 ,the thought of looking ahead1 toward the eventual1 toward consequences1 creates uneasiness and fear4 ,it disturbs the sense of rest that is attached to the ideas of fixed ,truth already in existence4 ,it puts a heavy burden of responsibility upon us for search1 unremitting observation1 scrupulous development of hypotheses and thoroughgoing testing4 ,in physical matters men have slowly grown accustomed in all specific beliefs to identifying the true with the verified4 ,but they still hesitate to recognize the implication of this identification and to derive the definition of truth from it4 ,for while it is nominally agreed upon as a commonplace that definitions ought to spring from concrete and specific cases rather than be invented in the empty air and imposed upon particulars1 there is a strange unwillingness to act upon the maxim in defining truth4 ,to generalize the recognition that the true means the verified and means nothing else places upon men the responsibility for surrendering political and moral dogmas1 and subjecting to the test of consequences their most cherished prejudices4 ,such a change involves a great change in the seat of authority and the methods of decision in society4 ,some of them1 as first fruits of the newer logic1 will be considered in the following lectures4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,reconstruction ,,in ,,moral ,,conceptions ,the impact of the alteration in methods of scientific thinking upon moral ideas is1 in general1 obvious4 ,goods1 ends are multiplied4 ,rules are softened into principles1 and principles are modified into methods of understanding4 ,ethical theory began among the ,greeks as an attempt to find a regulation for the conduct of life which should have a rational basis and purpose instead of being derived from custom4 ,but reason as a substitute for custom was under the obligation of supplying objects and laws as fixed as those of custom had been4 ,ethical theory ever since has been singularly hypnotized by the notion that its business is to discover some final end or good or some ultimate and supreme law4 ,this is the common element among the diversity of theories4 ,some have held that the end is loyalty or obedience to a higher power or authority2 and they have variously found this higher principle in ,divine ,will1 the will of the secular ruler1 the maintenance of institutions in which the purpose of superiors is embodied1 and the rational consciousness of duty4 ,but they have differed from one another because there was one point in which they were agreed3 a single and final source of law4 ,others have asserted that it is impossible to locate morality in conformity to law-giving power1 and that it must be sought in ends that are goods4 ,and some have sought the good in self-realization1 some in holiness1 some in happiness1 some in the greatest possible aggregate of pleasures4 ,and yet these schools have agreed in the assumption that there is a single1 fixed and final good4 ,they have been able to dispute with one another only because of their common premise4 ,the question arises whether the way out of the confusion and conflict is not to go to the root of the matter by questioning this common element4 ,is not the belief in the single1 final and ultimate 7whether conceived as good or as authoritative law7 an intellectual product of that feudal organization which is disappearing historically and of that belief in a bounded1 ordered cosmos1 wherein rest is higher than motion1 which has disappeared from natural science8 ,it has been repeatedly suggested that the present limit of intellectual reconstruction lies in the fact that it has not as yet been seriously applied in the moral and social disciplines4 ,would not this further application demand precisely that we advance to a belief in a plurality of changing1 moving1 individualized goods and ends1 and to a belief that principles1 criteria1 laws are intellectual instruments for analyzing individual or unique situations8 ,the blunt assertion that every moral situation is a unique situation having its own irreplaceable good may seem not merely blunt but preposterous4 ,for the established tradition teaches that it is precisely the irregularity of special cases which makes necessary the guidance of conduct by universals1 and that the essence of the virtuous disposition is willingness to subordinate every particular case to adjudication by a fixed principle4 ,it would then follow that submission of a generic end and law to determination by the concrete situation entails complete confusion and unrestrained licentiousness4 ,let us1 however1 follow the pragmatic rule1 and in order to discover the meaning of the idea ask for its consequences4 ,then it surprisingly turns out that the primary significance of the unique and morally ultimate character of the concrete situation is to transfer the weight and burden of morality to intelligence4 ,it does not destroy responsibility2 it only locates it4 ,a moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt action4 ,the practical meaning of the situation--that is to say the action needed to satisfy it--is not self-evident4 ,it has to be searched for4 ,there are conflicting desires and alternative apparent goods4 ,what is needed is to find the right course of action1 the right good4 ,hence1 inquiry is exacted3 observation of the detailed makeup of the situation2 analysis into its diverse factors2 clarification of what is obscure2 discounting of the more insistent and vivid traits2 tracing the consequences of the various modes of action that suggest themselves2 regarding the decision reached as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences4 ,this inquiry is intelligence4 ,our moral failures go back to some weakness of disposition1 some absence of sympathy1 some one-sided bias that makes us perform the judgment of the concrete case carelessly or perversely4 ,wide sympathy1 keen sensitiveness1 persistence in the face of the disagreeable1 balance of interests enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the distinctively moral traits--the virtues or moral excellencies4 ,it is worth noting once more that the underlying issue is1 after all1 only the same as that which has been already threshed out in physical inquiry4 ,there too it long seemed as if rational assurance and demonstration could be attained only if we began with universal conceptions and subsumed particular cases under them4 ,the men who initiated the methods of inquiry that are now everywhere adopted were denounced in their day 7and sincerely7 as subverters of truth and foes of science4 ,if they have won in the end1 it is because1 as has already been pointed out1 the method of universals confirmed prejudices and sanctioned ideas that had gained currency irrespective of evidence for them2 while placing the initial and final weight upon the individual case1 stimulated painstaking inquiry into facts and examination of principles4 ,in the end1 loss of eternal truths was more than compensated for in the accession of quotidian facts4 ,the loss of the system of superior and fixed definitions and kinds was more than made up for by the growing system of hypotheses and laws used in classifying facts4 ,after all1 then1 we are only pleading for the adoption in moral reflection of the logic that has been proved to make for security1 stringency and fertility in passing judgments upon physical phenomena4 ,and the reason is the same4 ,the old method in spite of its nominal and esthetic worship of reason discouraged reason1 because it hindered the operation of scrupulous and unremitting inquiry4 ,more definitely1 the transfer of the burden of the moral life from following rules or pursuing fixed ends over to the detection of the ills that need remedy in a special case and the formation of plans and methods for dealing with them1 eliminates the causes which have kept moral theory controversial1 and which have also kept it remote from helpful contact with the exigencies of practice4 ,the theory of fixed ends inevitably leads thought into the bog of disputes that cannot be settled4 ,if there is one summum bonum1 one supreme end1 what is it8 ,to consider this problem is to place ourselves in the midst of controversies that are as acute now as they were two thousand years ago4 ,suppose we take a seemingly more empirical view1 and say that while there is not a single end1 there also are not as many as there are specific situations that require amelioration2 but there are a number of such natural goods as health1 wealth1 honor or good name1 friendship1 esthetic appreciation1 learning and such moral goods as justice1 temperance1 benevolence1 etc4 ,what or who is to decide the right of way when these ends conflict with one another1 as they are sure to do8 ,shall we resort to the method that once brought such disrepute upon the whole business of ethics3 ,casuistry8 ,or shall we have recourse to what ,bentham well called the ipse dixit method3 the arbitrary preference of this or that person for this or that end8 ,or shall we be forced to arrange them all in an order of degrees from the highest good down to the least precious8 ,again we find ourselves in the middle of unreconciled disputes with no indication of the way out4 ,meantime1 the special moral perplexities where the aid of intelligence is required go unenlightened4 ,we cannot seek or attain health1 wealth1 learning1 justice or kindness in general4 ,action is always specific1 concrete1 individualized1 unique4 ,and consequently judgments as to acts to be performed must be similarly specific4 ,to say that a man seeks health or justice is only to say that he seeks to live healthily or justly4 ,these things1 like truth1 are adverbial4 ,they are modifiers of action in special cases4 ,how to live healthily or justly is a matter which differs with every person4 ,it varies with his past experience1 his opportunities1 his temperamental and acquired weaknesses and abilities4 ,not man in general but a particular man suffering from some particular disability aims to live healthily1 and consequently health cannot mean for him exactly what it means for any other mortal4 ,healthy living is not something to be attained by itself apart from other ways of living4 ,a man needs to be healthy in his life1 not apart from it1 and what does life mean except the aggregate of his pursuits and activities8 ,a man who aims at health as a distinct end becomes a valetudinarian1 or a fanatic1 or a mechanical performer of exercises1 or an athlete so one-sided that his pursuit of bodily development injures his heart4 ,when the endeavor to realize a so-called end does not temper and color all other activities1 life is portioned out into strips and fractions4 ,certain acts and times are devoted to getting health1 others to cultivating religion1 others to seeking learning1 to being a good citizen1 a devotee of fine art and so on4 ,this is the only logical alternative to subordinating all aims to the accomplishment of one alone--fanaticism4 ,this is out of fashion at present1 but who can say how much of distraction and dissipation in life1 and how much of its hard and narrow rigidity is the outcome of men's failure to realize that each situation has its own unique end and that the whole personality should be concerned with it8 ,surely1 once more1 what a man needs is to live healthily1 and this result so affects all the activities of his life that it cannot be set up as a separate and independent good4 ,nevertheless the general notions of health1 disease1 justice1 artistic culture are of great importance3 ,not1 however1 because this or that case may be brought exhaustively under a single head and its specific traits shut out1 but because generalized science provides a man as physician and artist and citizen1 with questions to ask1 investigations to make1 and enables him to understand the meaning of what he sees4 ,just in the degree in which a physician is an artist in his work he uses his science1 no matter how extensive and accurate1 to furnish him with tools of inquiry into the individual case1 and with methods of forecasting a method of dealing with it4 ,just in the degree in which1 no matter how great his learning1 he subordinates the individual case to some classification of diseases and some generic rule of treatment1 he sinks to the level of the routine mechanic4 ,his intelligence and his action become rigid1 dogmatic1 instead of free and flexible4 ,moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be done4 ,the fact that something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies1 evils in the existent situation4 ,this ill is just the specific ill that it is4 ,it never is an exact duplicate of anything else4 ,consequently the good of the situation has to be discovered1 projected and attained on the basis of the exact defect and trouble to be rectified4 ,it cannot intelligently be injected into the situation from without4 ,yet it is the part of wisdom to compare different cases1 to gather together the ills from which humanity suffers1 and to generalize the corresponding goods into classes4 ,health1 wealth1 industry1 temperance1 amiability1 courtesy1 learning1 esthetic capacity1 initiative1 courage1 patience1 enterprise1 thoroughness and a multitude of other generalized ends are acknowledged as goods4 ,but the value of this systematization is intellectual or analytic4 ,classifications suggest possible traits to be on the lookout for in studying a particular case2 they suggest methods of action to be tried in removing the inferred causes of ill4 ,they are tools of insight2 their value is in promoting an individualized response in the individual situation4 ,morals is not a catalogue of acts nor a set of rules to be applied like drugstore prescriptions or cook-book recipes4 ,the need in morals is for specific methods of inquiry and of contrivance3 ,methods of inquiry to locate difficulties and evils2 methods of contrivance to form plans to be used as working hypotheses in dealing with them4 ,and the pragmatic import of the logic of individualized situations1 each having its own irreplaceable good and principle1 is to transfer the attention of theory from preoccupation with general conceptions to the problem of developing effective methods of inquiry4 ,two ethical consequences of great moment should be remarked4 ,the belief in fixed values has bred a division of ends into intrinsic and instrumental1 of those that are really worth while in themselves and those that are of importance only as means to intrinsic goods4 ,indeed1 it is often thought to be the very beginning of wisdom1 of moral discrimination1 to make this distinction4 ,dialectically1 the distinction is interesting and seems harmless4 ,but carried into practice it has an import that is tragic4 ,historically1 it has been the source and justification of a hard and fast difference between ideal goods on one side and material goods on the other4 ,at present those who would be liberal conceive intrinsic goods as esthetic in nature rather than as exclusively religious or as intellectually contemplative4 ,but the effect is the same4 ,so-called intrinsic goods1 whether religious or esthetic1 are divorced from those interests of daily life which because of their constancy and urgency form the preoccupation of the great mass4 ,aristotle used this distinction to declare that slaves and the working class though they are necessary for the state--the commonweal--are not constituents of it4 ,that which is regarded as merely instrumental must approach drudgery2 it cannot command either intellectual1 artistic or moral attention and respect4 ,anything becomes unworthy whenever it is thought of as intrinsically lacking worth4 ,so men of ideal interests have chosen for the most part the way of neglect and escape4 ,the urgency and pressure of lower ends have been covered up by polite conventions4 ,or1 they have been relegated to a baser class of mortals in order that the few might be free to attend to the goods that are really or intrinsically worth while4 ,this withdrawal1 in the name of higher ends1 has left1 for mankind at large and especially for energetic practical people the lower activities in complete command4 ,no one can possibly estimate how much of the obnoxious materialism and brutality of our economic life is due to the fact that economic ends have been regarded as merely instrumental4 ,when they are recognized to be as intrinsic and final in their place as any others1 then it will be seen that they are capable of idealization1 and that if life is to be worth while1 they must acquire ideal and intrinsic value4 ,esthetic1 religious and other ideal ends are now thin and meagre or else idle and luxurious because of the separation from instrumental or economic ends4 ,only in connection with the latter can they be woven into the texture of daily life and made substantial and pervasive4 ,the vanity and irresponsibility of values that are merely final and not also in turn means to the enrichment of other occupations of life ought to be obvious4 ,but now the doctrine of higher ends gives aid1 comfort and support to every socially isolated and socially irresponsible scholar1 specialist1 esthete and religionist4 ,it protects the vanity and irresponsibility of his calling from observation by others and by himself4 ,the moral deficiency of the calling is transformed into a cause of admiration and gratulation4 ,the other generic change lies in doing away once for all with the traditional distinction between moral goods1 like the virtues1 and natural goods like health1 economic security1 art1 science and the like4 ,the point of view under discussion is not the only one which has deplored this rigid distinction and endeavored to abolish it4 ,some schools have even gone so far as to regard moral excellencies1 qualities of character as of value only because they promote natural goods4 ,but the experimental logic when carried into morals makes every quality that is judged to be good according as it contributes to amelioration of existing ills4 ,and in so doing1 it enforces the moral meaning of natural science4 ,when all is said and done in criticism of present social deficiencies1 one may well wonder whether the root difficulty does not lie in the separation of natural and moral science4 ,when physics1 chemistry1 biology1 medicine1 contribute to the detection of concrete human woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and relieving the human estate1 they become moral2 they become part of the apparatus of moral inquiry or science4 ,the latter then loses its peculiar flavor of the didactic and pedantic2 its ultra-moralistic and hortatory tone4 ,it loses its thinness and shrillness as well as its vagueness4 ,it gains agencies that are efficacious4 ,but the gain is not confined to the side of moral science4 ,natural science loses its divorce from humanity2 it becomes itself humanistic in quality4 ,it is something to be pursued not in a technical and specialized way for what is called truth for its own sake1 but with the sense of its social bearing1 its intellectual indispensableness4 ,it is technical only in the sense that it provides the technique of social and moral engineering4 ,when the consciousness of science is fully impregnated with the consciousness of human value1 the greatest dualism which now weighs humanity down1 the split between the material1 the mechanical1 the scientific and the moral and ideal will be destroyed4 ,human forces that now waver because of this division will be unified and reinforced4 ,as long as ends are not thought of as individualized according to specific needs and opportunities1 the mind will be content with abstractions1 and the adequate stimulus to the moral or social use of natural science and historical data will be lacking4 ,but when attention is concentrated upon the diversified concretes1 recourse to all intellectual materials needed to clear up the special cases will be imperative4 ,at the same time that morals are made to focus in intelligence1 things intellectual are moralized4 ,the vexatious and wasteful conflict between naturalism and humanism is terminated4 ,these general considerations may be amplified4 ,first3 ,inquiry1 discovery take the same place in morals that they have come to occupy in sciences of nature4 ,validation1 demonstration become experimental1 a matter of consequences4 ,reason1 always an honorific term in ethics1 becomes actualized in the methods by which the needs and conditions1 the obstacles and resources1 of situations are scrutinized in detail1 and intelligent plans of improvement are worked out4 ,remote and abstract generalities promote jumping at conclusions1 anticipations of nature4 ,bad consequences are then deplored as due to natural perversity and untoward fate4 ,but shifting the issue to analysis of a specific situation makes inquiry obligatory and alert observation of consequences imperative4 ,no past decision nor old principle can ever be wholly relied upon to justify a course of action4 ,no amount of pains taken in forming a purpose in a definite case is final2 the consequences of its adoption must be carefully noted1 and a purpose held only as a working hypothesis until results confirm its rightness4 ,mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable accidents to be mourned or moral sins to be expiated and forgiven4 ,they are lessons in wrong methods of using intelligence and instructions as to a better course in the future4 ,they are indications of the need of revision1 development1 readjustment4 ,ends grow1 standards of judgment are improved4 ,man is under just as much obligation to develop his most advanced standards and ideals as to use conscientiously those which he already possesses4 ,moral life is protected from falling into formalism and rigid repetition4 ,it is rendered flexible1 vital1 growing4 ,in the second place1 every case where moral action is required becomes of equal moral importance and urgency with every other4 ,if the need and deficiencies of a specific situation indicate improvement of health as the end and good1 then for that situation health is the ultimate and supreme good4 ,it is no means to something else4 ,it is a final and intrinsic value4 ,the same thing is true of improvement of economic status1 of making a living1 of attending to business and family demands--all of the things which under the sanction of fixed ends have been rendered of secondary and merely instrumental value1 and so relatively base and unimportant4 ,anything that in a given situation is an end and good at all is of equal worth1 rank and dignity with every other good of any other situation1 and deserves the same intelligent attention4 ,we note thirdly the effect in destroying the roots of ,phariseeism4 ,we are so accustomed to thinking of this as deliberate hypocrisy that we overlook its intellectual premises4 ,the conception which looks for the end of action within the circumstances of the actual situation will not have the same measure of judgment for all cases4 ,when one factor of the situation is a person of trained mind and large resources1 more will be expected than with a person of backward mind and uncultured experience4 ,the absurdity of applying the same standard of moral judgment to savage peoples that is used with civilized will be apparent4 ,no individual or group will be judged by whether they come up to or fall short of some fixed result1 but by the direction in which they are moving4 ,the bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate1 to grow less good4 ,the good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better4 ,such a conception makes one severe in judging himself and humane in judging others4 ,it excludes that arrogance which always accompanies judgment based on degree of approximation to fixed ends4 ,in the fourth place1 the process of growth1 of improvement and progress1 rather than the static outcome and result1 becomes the significant thing4 ,not health as an end fixed once and for all1 but the needed improvement in health--a continual process--is the end and good4 ,the end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached4 ,it is the active process of transforming the existent situation4 ,not perfection as a final goal1 but the ever-enduring process of perfecting1 maturing1 refining is the aim in living4 ,honesty1 industry1 temperance1 justice1 like health1 wealth and learning1 are not goods to be possessed as they would be if they expressed fixed ends to be attained4 ,they are directions of change in the quality of experience4 ,growth itself is the only moral end4 ,although the bearing of this idea upon the problem of evil and the controversy between optimism and pessimism is too vast to be here discussed1 it may be worth while to touch upon it superficially4 ,the problem of evil ceases to be a theological and metaphysical one1 and is perceived to be the practical problem of reducing1 alleviating1 as far as may be removing1 the evils of life4 ,philosophy is no longer under obligation to find ingenious methods for proving that evils are only apparent1 not real1 or to elaborate schemes for explaining them away or1 worse yet1 for justifying them4 ,it assumes another obligation3--,that of contributing in however humble a way to methods that will assist us in discovering the causes of humanity's ills4 ,pessimism is a paralyzing doctrine4 ,in declaring that the world is evil wholesale1 it makes futile all efforts to discover the remediable causes of specific evils and thereby destroys at the root every attempt to make the world better and happier4 ,wholesale optimism1 which has been the consequence of the attempt to explain evil away1 is1 however1 equally an incubus4 ,after all1 the optimism that says that the world is already the best possible of all worlds might be regarded as the most cynical of pessimisms4 ,if this is the best possible1 what would a world which was fundamentally bad be like8 ,meliorism is the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment1 be they comparatively bad or comparatively good1 in any event may be bettered4 ,it encourages intelligence to study the positive means of good and the obstructions to their realization1 and to put forth endeavor for the improvement of conditions4 ,it arouses confidence and a reasonable hopefulness as optimism does not4 ,for the latter in declaring that good is already realized in ultimate reality tends to make us gloss over the evils that concretely exist4 ,it becomes too readily the creed of those who live at ease1 in comfort1 of those who have been successful in obtaining this world's rewards4 ,too readily optimism makes the men who hold it callous and blind to the sufferings of the less fortunate1 or ready to find the cause of troubles of others in their personal viciousness4 ,it thus co-operates with pessimism1 in spite of the extreme nominal differences between the two1 in benumbing sympathetic insight and intelligent effort in reform4 ,it beckons men away from the world of relativity and change into the calm of the absolute and eternal4 ,the import of many of these changes in moral attitude focusses in the idea of happiness4 ,happiness has often been made the object of the moralists' contempt4 ,yet the most ascetic moralist has usually restored the idea of happiness under some other name1 such as bliss4 ,goodness without happiness1 valor and virtue without satisfaction1 ends without conscious enjoyment--these things are as intolerable practically as they are self-contradictory in conception4 ,happiness is not1 however1 a bare possession2 it is not a fixed attainment4 ,such a happiness is either the unworthy selfishness which moralists have so bitterly condemned1 or it is1 even if labelled bliss1 an insipid tedium1 a millennium of ease in relief from all struggle and labor4 ,it could satisfy only the most delicate of molly-coddles4 ,happiness is found only in success2 but success means succeeding1 getting forward1 moving in advance4 ,it is an active process1 not a passive outcome4 ,accordingly it includes the overcoming of obstacles1 the elimination of sources of defect and ill4 ,esthetic sensitiveness and enjoyment are a large constituent in any worthy happiness4 ,but the esthetic appreciation which is totally separated from renewal of spirit1 from re-creation of mind and purification of emotion is a weak and sickly thing1 destined to speedy death from starvation4 ,that the renewal and re-creation come unconsciously not by set intention but makes them the more genuine4 ,upon the whole1 utilitarianism has marked the best in the transition from the classic theory of ends and goods to that which is now possible4 ,it had definite merits4 ,it insisted upon getting away from vague generalities1 and down to the specific and concrete4 ,it subordinated law to human achievement instead of subordinating humanity to external law4 ,it taught that institutions are made for man and not man for institutions2 it actively promoted all issues of reform4 ,it made moral good natural1 humane1 in touch with the natural goods of life4 ,it opposed unearthly and other worldly morality4 ,above all1 it acclimatized in human imagination the idea of social welfare as a supreme test4 ,but it was still profoundly affected in fundamental points by old ways of thinking4 ,it never questioned the idea of a fixed1 final and supreme end4 ,it only questioned the current notions as to the nature of this end2 and then inserted pleasure and the greatest possible aggregate of pleasures in the position of the fixed end4 ,such a point of view treats concrete activities and specific interests not as worth while in themselves1 or as constituents of happiness1 but as mere external means to getting pleasures4 ,the upholders of the old tradition could therefore easily accuse utilitarianism of making not only virtue but art1 poetry1 religion and the state into mere servile means of attaining sensuous enjoyments4 ,since pleasure was an outcome1 a result valuable on its own account independently of the active processes that achieve it1 happiness was a thing to be possessed and held onto4 ,the acquisitive instincts of man were exaggerated at the expense of the creative4 ,production was of importance not because of the intrinsic worth of invention and reshaping the world1 but because its external results feed pleasure4 ,like every theory that sets up fixed and final aims1 in making the end passive and possessive1 it made all active operations mere tools4 ,labor was an unavoidable evil to be minimized4 ,security in possession was the chief thing practically4 ,material comfort and ease were magnified in contrast with the pains and risk of experimental creation4 ,these deficiencies1 under certain conceivable conditions1 might have remained merely theoretical4 ,but the disposition of the times and the interests of those who propagated the utilitarian ideas1 endowed them with power for social harm4 ,in spite of the power of the new ideas in attacking old social abuses1 there were elements in the teaching which operated or protected to sanction new social abuses4 ,the reforming zeal was shown in criticism of the evils inherited from the class system of feudalism1 evils economic1 legal and political4 ,but the new economic order of capitalism that was superseding feudalism brought its own social evils with it1 and some of these ills utilitarianism tended to cover up or defend4 ,the emphasis upon acquisition and possession of enjoyments took on an untoward color in connection with the contemporary enormous desire for wealth and the enjoyments it makes possible4 ,if utilitarianism did not actively promote the new economic materialism1 it had no means of combating it4 ,its general spirit of subordinating productive activity to the bare product was indirectly favorable to the cause of an unadorned commercialism4 ,in spite of its interest in a thoroughly social aim1 utilitarianism fostered a new class interest1 that of the capitalistic property-owning interests1 provided only property was obtained through free competition and not by governmental favor4 ,the stress that ,bentham put on security tended to consecrate the legal institution of private property provided only certain legal abuses in connection with its acquisition and transfer were abolished4 ,beati possidentes--provided possessions had been obtained in accord with the rules of the competitive game--without1 that is1 extraneous favors from government4 ,thus utilitarianism gave intellectual confirmation to all those tendencies which make business not a means of social service and an opportunity for personal growth in creative power but a way of accumulating the means of private enjoyments4 ,utilitarian ethics thus afford a remarkable example of the need of philosophic reconstruction which these lectures have been presenting4 ,up to a certain point1 it reflected the meaning of modern thought and aspirations4 ,but it was still tied down by fundamental ideas of that very order which it thought it had completely left behind3 ,the idea of a fixed and single end lying beyond the diversity of human needs and acts rendered utilitarianism incapable of being an adequate representative of the modern spirit4 ,it has to be reconstructed through emancipation from its inherited elements4 ,if a few words are added upon the topic of education1 it is only for the sake of suggesting that the educative process is all one with the moral process1 since the latter is a continuous passage of experience from worse to better4 ,education has been traditionally thought of as preparation3 as learning1 acquiring certain things because they will later be useful4 ,the end is remote1 and education is getting ready1 is a preliminary to something more important to happen later on4 ,childhood is only a preparation for adult life1 and adult life for another life4 ,always the future1 not the present1 has been the significant thing in education3 ,acquisition of knowledge and skill for future use and enjoyment2 formation of habits required later in life in business1 good citizenship and pursuit of science4 ,education is thought of also as something needed by some human beings merely because of their dependence upon others4 ,we are born ignorant1 unversed1 unskilled1 immature1 and consequently in a state of social dependence4 ,instruction1 training1 moral discipline are processes by which the mature1 the adult1 gradually raise the helpless to the point where they can look out for themselves4 ,the business of childhood is to grow into the independence of adulthood by means of the guidance of those who have already attained it4 ,thus the process of education as the main business of life ends when the young have arrived at emancipation from social dependence4 ,these two ideas1 generally assumed but rarely explicitly reasoned out1 contravene the conception that growing1 or the continuous reconstruction of experience1 is the only end4 ,if at whatever period we choose to take a person1 he is still in process of growth1 then education is not1 save as a by-product1 a preparation for something coming later4 ,getting from the present the degree and kind of growth there is in it is education4 ,this is a constant function1 independent of age4 ,the best thing that can be said about any special process of education1 like that of the formal school period1 is that it renders its subject capable of further education3 more sensitive to conditions of growth and more able to take advantage of them4 ,acquisition of skill1 possession of knowledge1 attainment of culture are not ends3 they are marks of growth and means to its continuing4 ,the contrast usually assumed between the period of education as one of social dependence and of maturity as one of social independence does harm4 ,we repeat over and over that man is a social animal1 and then confine the significance of this statement to the sphere in which sociality usually seems least evident1 politics4 ,the heart of the sociality of man is in education4 ,the idea of education as preparation and of adulthood as a fixed limit of growth are two sides of the same obnoxious untruth4 ,if the moral business of the adult as well as the young is a growing and developing experience1 then the instruction that comes from social dependencies and interdependencies are as important for the adult as for the child4 ,moral independence for the adult means arrest of growth1 isolation means induration4 ,we exaggerate the intellectual dependence of childhood so that children are too much kept in leading strings1 and then we exaggerate the independence of adult life from intimacy of contacts and communication with others4 ,when the identity of the moral process with the processes of specific growth is realized1 the more conscious and formal education of childhood will be seen to be the most economical and efficient means of social advance and reorganization1 and it will also be evident that the test of all the institutions of adult life is their effect in furthering continued education4 ,government1 business1 art1 religion1 all social institutions have a meaning1 a purpose4 ,that purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race1 sex1 class or economic status4 ,and this is all one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his possibility4 ,democracy has many meanings1 but if it has a moral meaning1 it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,reconstruction ,,as ,,affecting ,,social ,,philosophy ,how can philosophic change seriously affect social philosophy8 ,as far as fundamentals are concerned1 every view and combination appears to have been formulated already4 ,society is composed of individuals3 this obvious and basic fact no philosophy1 whatever its pretensions to novelty1 can question or alter4 ,hence these three alternatives3 ,society must exist for the sake of individuals2 or individuals must have their ends and ways of living set for them by society2 or else society and individuals are correlative1 organic1 to one another1 society requiring the service and subordination of individuals and at the same time existing to serve them4 ,beyond these three views1 none seems to be logically conceivable4 ,moreover1 while each of the three types includes many subspecies and variations within itself1 yet the changes seem to have been so thoroughly rung that at most only minor variations are now possible4 ,especially would it seem true that the organic conception meets all the objections to the extreme individualistic and extreme socialistic theories1 avoiding the errors alike of ,plato and ,bentham4 ,just because society is composed of individuals1 it would seem that individuals and the associative relations that hold them together must be of coequal importance4 ,without strong and competent individuals1 the bonds and ties that form society have nothing to lay hold on4 ,apart from associations with one another1 individuals are isolated from one another and fade and wither2 or are opposed to one another and their conflicts injure individual development4 ,law1 state1 church1 family1 friendship1 industrial association1 these and other institutions and arrangements are necessary in order that individuals may grow and find their specific capacities and functions4 ,without their aid and support human life is1 as ,hobbes said1 brutish1 solitary1 nasty4 ,we plunge into the heart of the matter1 by asserting that these various theories suffer from a common defect4 ,they are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought4 ,what we want light upon is this or that group of individuals1 this or that concrete human being1 this or that special institution or social arrangement4 ,for such a logic of inquiry1 the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationship to one another4 ,the discussion goes on in terms of the state1 the individual2 the nature of institutions as such1 society in general4 ,we need guidance in dealing with particular perplexities in domestic life1 and are met by dissertations on the ,family or by assertions of the sacredness of individual ,personality4 ,we want to know about the worth of the institution of private property as it operates under given conditions of definite time and place4 ,we meet with the reply of ,proudhon that property generally is theft1 or with that of ,hegel that the realization of will is the end of all institutions1 and that private ownership as the expression of mastery of personality over physical nature is a necessary element in such realization4 ,both answers may have a certain suggestiveness in connection with specific situations4 ,but the conceptions are not proffered for what they may be worth in connection with special historic phenomena4 ,they are general answers supposed to have a universal meaning that covers and dominates all particulars4 ,hence they do not assist inquiry4 ,they close it4 ,they are not instrumentalities to be employed and tested in clarifying concrete social difficulties4 ,they are ready-made principles to be imposed upon particulars in order to determine their nature4 ,they tell us about the state when we want to know about some state4 ,but the implication is that what is said about the state applies to any state that we happen to wish to know about4 ,in transferring the issue from concrete situations to definitions and conceptual deductions1 the effect1 especially of the organic theory1 is to supply the apparatus for intellectual justification of the established order4 ,those most interested in practical social progress and the emancipation of groups from oppression have turned a cold shoulder to the organic theory4 ,the effect1 if not the intention1 of ,german idealism as applied in social philosophy was to provide a bulwark for the maintenance of the political status quo against the tide of radical ideas coming from revolutionary ,france4 ,although ,hegel asserted in explicit form that the end of states and institutions is to further the realization of the freedom of all1 his effect was to consecrate the ,prussian ,state and to enshrine bureaucratic absolutism4 ,was this apologetic tendency accidental1 or did it spring from something in the logic of the notions that were employed8 ,surely the latter4 ,if we talk about the state and the individual1 rather than about this or that political organization and this or that group of needy and suffering human beings1 the tendency is to throw the glamor and prestige1 the meaning and value attached to the general notion1 over the concrete situation and thereby to cover up the defects of the latter and disguise the need of serious reforms4 ,the meanings which are found in the general notions are injected into the particulars that come under them4 ,quite properly so if we once grant the logic of rigid universals under which the concrete cases have to be subsumed in order to be understood and explained4 ,again1 the tendency of the organic point of view is to minimize the significance of specific conflicts4 ,since the individual and the state or social institution are but two sides of the same reality1 since they are already reconciled in principle and conception1 the conflict in any particular case can be but apparent4 ,since in theory the individual and the state are reciprocally necessary and helpful to one another1 why pay much attention to the fact that in this state a whole group of individuals are suffering from oppressive conditions8 ,in reality their interests cannot be in conflict with those of the state to which they belong2 the opposition is only superficial and casual4 ,capital and labor cannot really conflict because each is an organic necessity to the other1 and both to the organized community as a whole4 ,there cannot really be any sex-problem because men and women are indispensable both to one another and to the state4 ,in his day1 ,aristotle could easily employ the logic of general concepts superior to individuals to show that the institution of slavery was in the interests both of the state and of the slave class4 ,even if the intention is not to justify the existing order the effect is to divert attention from special situations4 ,rationalistic logic formerly made men careless in observation of the concrete in physical philosophy4 ,it now operates to depress and retard observation in specific social phenomena4 ,the social philosopher1 dwelling in the region of his concepts1 solves problems by showing the relationship of ideas1 instead of helping men solve problems in the concrete by supplying them hypotheses to be used and tested in projects of reform4 ,meanwhile1 of course1 the concrete troubles and evils remain4 ,they are not magically waived out of existence because in theory society is organic4 ,the region of concrete difficulties1 where the assistance of intelligent method for tentative plans for experimentation is urgently needed1 is precisely where intelligence fails to operate4 ,in this region of the specific and concrete1 men are thrown back upon the crudest empiricism1 upon short-sighted opportunism and the matching of brute forces4 ,in theory1 the particulars are all neatly disposed of2 they come under their appropriate heading and category2 they are labelled and go into an orderly pigeon-hole in a systematic filing cabinet1 labelled political science or sociology4 ,but in empirical fact they remain as perplexing1 confused and unorganized as they were before4 ,so they are dealt with not by even an endeavor at scientific method but by blind rule of thumb1 citation of precedents1 considerations of immediate advantage1 smoothing things over1 use of coercive force and the clash of personal ambitions4 ,the world still survives2 it has therefore got on somehow3--so much cannot be denied4 ,the method of trial and error and competition of selfishnesses has somehow wrought out many improvements4 ,but social theory nevertheless exists as an idle luxury rather than as a guiding method of inquiry and planning4 ,in the question of methods concerned with reconstruction of special situations rather than in any refinements in the general concepts of institution1 individuality1 state1 freedom1 law1 order1 progress1 etc41 lies the true impact of philosophical reconstruction4 ,consider the conception of the individual self4 ,the individualistic school of ,england and ,france in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was empirical in intent4 ,it based its individualism1 philosophically speaking1 upon the belief that individuals are alone real1 that classes and organizations are secondary and derived4 ,they are artificial1 while individuals are natural4 ,in what way then can individualism be said to come under the animadversions that have been passed8 ,to say the defect was that this school overlooked those connections with other persons which are a part of the constitution of every individual is true as far as it goes2 but unfortunately it rarely goes beyond the point of just that wholesale justification of institutions which has been criticized4 ,the real difficulty is that the individual is regarded as something given1 something already there4 ,consequently1 he can only be something to be catered to1 something whose pleasures are to be magnified and possessions multiplied4 ,when the individual is taken as something given already1 anything that can be done to him or for him it can only be by way of external impressions and belongings3 sensations of pleasure and pain1 comforts1 securities4 ,now it is true that social arrangements1 laws1 institutions are made for man1 rather than that man is made for them2 that they are means and agencies of human welfare and progress4 ,but they are not means for obtaining something for individuals1 not even happiness4 ,they are means of creating individuals4 ,only in the physical sense of physical bodies that to the senses are separate is individuality an original datum4 ,individuality in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out4 ,it means initiative1 inventiveness1 varied resourcefulness1 assumption of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct4 ,these are not gifts1 but achievements4 ,as achievements1 they are not absolute but relative to the use that is to be made of them4 ,and this use varies with the environment4 ,the import of this conception comes out in considering the fortunes of the idea of self-interest4 ,all members of the empirical school emphasized this idea4 ,it was the sole motive of mankind4 ,virtue was to be attained by making benevolent action profitable to the individual2 social arrangements were to be reformed so that egoism and altruistic consideration of others would be identified4 ,moralists of the opposite school were not backward in pointing out the evils of any theory that reduced both morals and political science to means of calculating self-interest4 ,consequently they threw the whole idea of interest overboard as obnoxious to morals4 ,the effect of this reaction was to strengthen the cause of authority and political obscurantism4 ,when the play of interest is eliminated1 what remains8 ,what concrete moving forces can be found8 ,those who identified the self with something ready-made and its interest with acquisition of pleasure and profit took the most effective means possible to reinstate the logic of abstract conceptions of law1 justice1 sovereignty1 freedom1 etc4--all of those vague general ideas that for all their seeming rigidity can be manipulated by any clever politician to cover up his designs and to make the worse seem the better cause4 ,interests are specific and dynamic2 they are the natural terms of any concrete social thinking4 ,but they are damned beyond recovery when they are identified with the things of a petty selfishness4 ,they can be employed as vital terms only when the self is seen to be in process1 and interest to be a name for whatever is concerned in furthering its movement4 ,the same logic applies to the old dispute of whether reform should start with the individual or with institutions4 ,when the self is regarded as something complete within itself1 then it is readily argued that only internal moralistic changes are of importance in general reform4 ,institutional changes are said to be merely external4 ,they may add conveniences and comforts to life1 but they cannot effect moral improvements4 ,the result is to throw the burden for social improvement upon free-will in its most impossible form4 ,moreover1 social and economic passivity are encouraged4 ,individuals are led to concentrate in moral introspection upon their own vices and virtues1 and to neglect the character of the environment4 ,morals withdraw from active concern with detailed economic and political conditions4 ,let us perfect ourselves within1 and in due season changes in society will come of themselves is the teaching4 ,and while saints are engaged in introspection1 burly sinners run the world4 ,but when self-hood is perceived to be an active process it is also seen that social modifications are the only means of the creation of changed personalities4 ,institutions are viewed in their educative effect3--with reference to the types of individuals they foster4 ,the interest in individual moral improvement and the social interest in objective reform of economic and political conditions are identified4 ,and inquiry into the meaning of social arrangements gets definite point and direction4 ,we are led to ask what the specific stimulating1 fostering and nurturing power of each specific social arrangement may be4 ,the old-time separation between politics and morals is abolished at its root4 ,consequently we cannot be satisfied with the general statement that society and the state is organic to the individual4 ,the question is one of specific causations4 ,just what response does this social arrangement1 political or economic1 evoke1 and what effect does it have upon the disposition of those who engage in it8 ,does it release capacity8 ,if so1 how widely8 ,among a few1 with a corresponding depression in others1 or in an extensive and equitable way8 ,is the capacity which is set free also directed in some coherent way1 so that it becomes a power1 or its manifestation spasmodic and capricious8 ,since responses are of an indefinite diversity of kind1 these inquiries have to be detailed and specific4 ,are men's senses rendered more delicately sensitive and appreciative1 or are they blunted and dulled by this and that form of social organization8 ,are their minds trained so that the hands are more deft and cunning8 ,is curiosity awakened or blunted8 ,what is its quality3 is it merely esthetic1 dwelling on the forms and surfaces of things or is it also an intellectual searching into their meaning8 ,such questions as these 7as well as the more obvious ones about the qualities conventionally labelled moral71 become the starting-points of inquiries about every institution of the community when it is recognized that individuality is not originally given but is created under the influences of associated life4 ,like utilitarianism1 the theory subjects every form of organization to continual scrutiny and criticism4 ,but instead of leading us to ask what it does in the way of causing pains and pleasures to individuals already in existence1 it inquires what is done to release specific capacities and co-ordinate them into working powers4 ,what sort of individuals are created8 ,the waste of mental energy due to conducting discussion of social affairs in terms of conceptual generalities is astonishing4 ,how far would the biologist and the physician progress if when the subject of respiration is under consideration1 discussion confined itself to bandying back and forth the concepts of organ and organism3--,if for example one school thought respiration could be known and understood by insisting upon the fact that it occurs in an individual body and therefore is an individual phenomenon1 while an opposite school insisted that it is simply one function in organic interaction with others and can be known or understood therefore only by reference to other functions taken in an equally general or wholesale way8 ,each proposition is equally true and equally futile4 ,what is needed is specific inquiries into a multitude of specific structures and interactions4 ,not only does the solemn reiteration of categories of individual and organic or social whole not further these definite and detailed inquiries1 but it checks them4 ,it detains thought within pompous and sonorous generalities wherein controversy is as inevitable as it is incapable of solution4 ,it is true enough that if cells were not in vital interaction with one another1 they could neither conflict nor co-operate4 ,but the fact of the existence of an organic social group1 instead of answering any questions merely marks the fact that questions exist3 ,just what conflicts and what co-operations occur1 and what are their specific causes and consequences8 ,but because of the persistence within social philosophy of the order of ideas that has been expelled from natural philosophy1 even sociologists take conflict or co-operation as general categories upon which to base their science1 and condescend to empirical facts only for illustrations4 ,as a rule1 their chief problem is a purely dialectical one1 covered up by a thick quilt of empirical anthropological and historical citations3 ,how do individuals unite to form society8 ,how are individuals socially controlled8 ,and the problem is justly called dialectical because it springs from antecedent conceptions of individual and social4 ,just as individual is not one thing1 but is a blanket term for the immense variety of specific reactions1 habits1 dispositions and powers of human nature that are evoked1 and confirmed under the influences of associated life1 so with the term social4 ,society is one word1 but infinitely many things4 ,it covers all the ways in which by associating together men share their experiences1 and build up common interests and aims2 street gangs1 schools for burglary1 clans1 social cliques1 trades unions1 joint stock corporations1 villages and international alliances4 ,the new method takes effect in substituting inquiry into these specific1 changing and relative facts 7relative to problems and purposes1 not metaphysically relative7 for solemn manipulation of general notions4 ,strangely enough1 the current conception of the state is a case in point4 ,for one direct influence of the classic order of fixed species arranged in hierarchical order is the attempt of ,german political philosophy in the nineteenth century to enumerate a definite number of institutions1 each having its own essential and immutable meaning2 to arrange them in an order of evolution which corresponds with the dignity and rank of the respective meanings4 ,the ,national ,state was placed at the top as the consummation and culmination1 and also the basis of all other institutions4 ,hegel is a striking example of this industry1 but he is far from the only one4 ,many who have bitterly quarrelled with him1 have only differed as to the details of the evolution or as to the particular meaning to be attributed as essential ,begriff to some one of the enumerated institutions4 ,the quarrel has been bitter only because the underlying premises were the same4 ,particularly have many schools of thought1 varying even more widely in respect to method and conclusion1 agreed upon the final consummating position of the state4 ,they may not go as far as ,hegel in making the sole meaning of history to be the evolution of ,national ,territorial ,states1 each of which embodies more than the prior form of the essential meaning or conception of the ,state and consequently displaces it1 until we arrive at that triumph of historical evolution1 the ,prussian ,state4 ,but they do not question the unique and supreme position of the ,state in the social hierarchy4 ,indeed that conception has hardened into unquestionable dogma under the title of sovereignty4 ,there can be no doubt of the tremendously important rle played by the modern territorial national state4 ,the formation of these states has been the centre of modern political history4 ,france1 ,great ,britain1 ,spain were the first peoples to attain nationalistic organization1 but in the nineteenth century their example was followed by ,japan1 ,germany and ,italy1 to say nothing of a large number of smaller states1 ,greece1 ,servia1 ,bulgaria1 etc4 ,as everybody knows1 one of the most important phases of the recent world war was the struggle to complete the nationalistic movement1 resulting in the erection of ,bohemia1 ,poland1 etc41 into independent states1 and the accession of ,armenia1 ,palestine1 etc41 to the rank of candidates4 ,the struggle for the supremacy of the ,state over other forms of organization was directed against the power of minor districts1 provinces1 principalities1 against the dispersion of power among feudal lords as well as1 in some countries1 against the pretensions of an ecclesiastic potentate4 ,the ,state represents the conspicuous culmination of the great movement of social integration and consolidation taking place in the last few centuries1 tremendously accelerated by the concentrating and combining forces of steam and electricity4 ,naturally1 inevitably1 the students of political science have been preoccupied with this great historic phenomenon1 and their intellectual activities have been directed to its systematic formulation4 ,because the contemporary progressive movement was to establish the unified state against the inertia of minor social units and against the ambitions of rivals for power1 political theory developed the dogma of the sovereignty of the national state1 internally and externally4 ,as the work of integration and consolidation reaches its climax1 the question arises1 however1 whether the national state1 once it is firmly established and no longer struggling against strong foes1 is not just an instrumentality for promoting and protecting other and more voluntary forms of association1 rather than a supreme end in itself4 ,two actual phenomena may be pointed to in support of an affirmative answer4 ,along with the development of the larger1 more inclusive and more unified organization of the state has gone the emancipation of individuals from restrictions and servitudes previously imposed by custom and class status4 ,but the individuals freed from external and coercive bonds have not remained isolated4 ,social molecules have at once recombined in new associations and organizations4 ,compulsory associations have been replaced by voluntary ones2 rigid organizations by those more amenable to human choice and purposes--more directly changeable at will4 ,what upon one side looks like a movement toward individualism1 turns out to be really a movement toward multiplying all kinds and varieties of associations3 ,political parties1 industrial corporations1 scientific and artistic organizations1 trade unions1 churches1 schools1 clubs and societies without number1 for the cultivation of every conceivable interest that men have in common4 ,as they develop in number and importance1 the state tends to become more and more a regulator and adjuster among them2 defining the limits of their actions1 preventing and settling conflicts4 ,its supremacy approximates that of the conductor of an orchestra1 who makes no music himself but who harmonizes the activities of those who in producing it are doing the thing intrinsically worth while4 ,the state remains highly important--but its importance consists more and more in its power to foster and co-ordinate the activities of voluntary groupings4 ,only nominally is it in any modern community the end for the sake of which all the other societies and organizations exist4 ,groupings for promoting the diversity of goods that men share have become the real social units4 ,they occupy the place which traditional theory has claimed either for mere isolated individuals or for the supreme and single political organization4 ,pluralism is well ordained in present political practice and demands a modification of hierarchical and monistic theory4 ,every combination of human forces that adds its own contribution of value to life has for that reason its own unique and ultimate worth4 ,it cannot be degraded into a means to glorify the ,state4 ,one reason for the increased demoralization of war is that it forces the ,state into an abnormally supreme position4 ,the other concrete fact is the opposition between the claim of independent sovereignty in behalf of the territorial national state and the growth of international and what have well been called trans-national interests4 ,the weal and woe of any modern state is bound up with that of others4 ,weakness1 disorder1 false principles on the part of any state are not confined within its boundaries4 ,they spread and infect other states4 ,the same is true of economic1 artistic and scientific advances4 ,moreover the voluntary associations just spoken of do not coincide with political boundaries4 ,associations of mathematicians1 chemists1 astronomers2 business corporations1 labor organizations1 churches are trans-national because the interests they represent are worldwide4 ,in such ways as these1 internationalism is not an aspiration but a fact1 not a sentimental ideal but a force4 ,yet these interests are cut across and thrown out of gear by the traditional doctrine of exclusive national sovereignty4 ,it is the vogue of this doctrine1 or dogma1 that presents the strongest barrier to the effective formation of an international mind which alone agrees with the moving forces of present-day labor1 commerce1 science1 art and religion4 ,society1 as was said1 is many associations not a single organization4 ,society means association2 coming together in joint intercourse and action for the better realization of any form of experience which is augmented and confirmed by being shared4 ,hence there are as many associations as there are goods which are enhanced by being mutually communicated and participated in4 ,and these are literally indefinite in number4 ,indeed1 capacity to endure publicity and communication is the test by which it is decided whether a pretended good is genuine or spurious4 ,moralists have always insisted upon the fact that good is universal1 objective1 not just private1 particular4 ,but too often1 like ,plato1 they have been content with a metaphysical universality or1 like ,kant1 with a logical universality4 ,communication1 sharing1 joint participation are the only actual ways of universalizing the moral law and end4 ,we insisted at the last hour upon the unique character of every intrinsic good4 ,but the counterpart of this proposition is that the situation in which a good is consciously realized is not one of transient sensations or private appetites but one of sharing and communication--public1 social4 ,even the hermit communes with gods or spirits2 even misery loves company2 and the most extreme selfishness includes a band of followers or some partner to share in the attained good4 ,universalization means socialization1 the extension of the area and range of those who share in a good4 ,the increasing acknowledgment that goods exist and endure only through being communicated and that association is the means of conjoint sharing lies back of the modern sense of humanity and democracy4 ,it is the saving salt in altruism and philanthropy1 which without this factor degenerate into moral condescension and moral interference1 taking the form of trying to regulate the affairs of others under the guise of doing them good or of conferring upon them some right as if it were a gift of charity4 ,it follows that organization is never an end in itself4 ,it is a means of promoting association1 of multiplying effective points of contact between persons1 directing their intercourse into the modes of greatest fruitfulness4 ,the tendency to treat organization as an end in itself is responsible for all the exaggerated theories in which individuals are subordinated to some institution to which is given the noble name of society4 ,society is the process of associating in such ways that experiences1 ideas1 emotions1 values are transmitted and made common4 ,to this active process1 both the individual and the institutionally organized may truly be said to be subordinate4 ,the individual is subordinate because except in and through communication of experience from and to others1 he remains dumb1 merely sentient1 a brute animal4 ,only in association with fellows does he become a conscious centre of experience4 ,organization1 which is what traditional theory has generally meant by the term ,society or ,state1 is also subordinate because it becomes static1 rigid1 institutionalized whenever it is not employed to facilitate and enrich the contacts of human beings with one another4 ,the long-time controversy between rights and duties1 law and freedom is another version of the strife between the ,individual and ,society as fixed concepts4 ,freedom for an individual means growth1 ready change when modification is required4 ,it signifies an active process1 that of release of capacity from whatever hems it in4 ,but since society can develop only as new resources are put at its disposal1 it is absurd to suppose that freedom has positive significance for individuality but negative meaning for social interests4 ,society is strong1 forceful1 stable against accident only when all its members can function to the limit of their capacity4 ,such functioning cannot be achieved without allowing a leeway of experimentation beyond the limits of established and sanctioned custom4 ,a certain amount of overt confusion and irregularity is likely to accompany the granting of the margin of liberty without which capacity cannot find itself4 ,but socially as well as scientifically the great thing is not to avoid mistakes but to have them take place under conditions such that they can be utilized to increase intelligence in the future4 ,if ,british liberal social philosophy tended1 true to the spirit of its atomistic empiricism1 to make freedom and the exercise of rights ends in themselves1 the remedy is not to be found in recourse to a philosophy of fixed obligations and authoritative law such as characterized ,german political thinking4 ,the latter1 as events have demonstrated1 is dangerous because of its implicit menace to the free self-determination of other social groups4 ,but it is also weak internally when put to the final test4 ,in its hostility to the free experimentation and power of choice of the individual in determining social affairs1 it limits the capacity of many or most individuals to share effectively in social operations1 and thereby deprives society of the full contribution of all its members4 ,the best guarantee of collective efficiency and power is liberation and use of the diversity of individual capacities in initiative1 planning1 foresight1 vigor and endurance4 ,personality must be educated1 and personality cannot be educated by confining its operations to technical and specialized things1 or to the less important relationships of life4 ,full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person1 in proportion to capacity1 in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs4 ,this fact fixes the significance of democracy4 ,it cannot be conceived as a sectarian or racial thing nor as a consecration of some form of government which has already attained constitutional sanction4 ,it is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common1 things for the sake of which men and women form groups--families1 industrial companies1 governments1 churches1 scientific associations and so on4 ,the principle holds as much of one form of association1 say in industry and commerce1 as it does in government4 ,the identification of democracy with political democracy which is responsible for most of its failures is1 however1 based upon the traditional ideas which make the individual and the state ready-made entities in themselves4 ,as the new ideas find adequate expression in social life1 they will be absorbed into a moral background1 and will the ideas and beliefs themselves be deepened and be unconsciously transmitted and sustained4 ,they will color the imagination and temper the desires and affections4 ,they will not form a set of ideas to be expounded1 reasoned out and argumentatively supported1 but will be a spontaneous way of envisaging life4 ,then they will take on religious value4 ,the religious spirit will be revivified because it will be in harmony with men's unquestioned scientific beliefs and their ordinary day-by-day social activities4 ,it will not be obliged to lead a timid1 half-concealed and half-apologetic life because tied to scientific ideas and social creeds that are continuously eaten into and broken down4 ,but especially will the ideas and beliefs themselves be deepened and intensified because spontaneously fed by emotion and translated into imaginative vision and fine art1 while they are now maintained by more or less conscious effort1 by deliberate reflection1 by taking thought4 ,they are technical and abstract just because they are not as yet carried as matter of course by imagination and feelings4 ,we began by pointing out that ,european philosophy arose when intellectual methods and scientific results moved away from social traditions which had consolidated and embodied the fruits of spontaneous desire and fancy4 ,it was pointed out that philosophy had ever since had the problem of adjusting the dry1 thin and meagre scientific standpoint with the obstinately persisting body of warm and abounding imaginative beliefs4 ,conceptions of possibility1 progress1 free movement and infinitely diversified opportunity have been suggested by modern science4 ,but until they have displaced from imagination the heritage of the immutable and the once-for-all ordered and systematized1 the ideas of mechanism and matter will lie like a dead weight upon the emotions1 paralyzing religion and distorting art4 ,when the liberation of capacity no longer seems a menace to organization and established institutions1 something that cannot be avoided practically and yet something that is a threat to conservation of the most precious values of the past1 when the liberating of human capacity operates as a socially creative force1 art will not be a luxury1 a stranger to the daily occupations of making a living4 ,making a living economically speaking1 will be at one with making a life that is worth living4 ,and when the emotional force1 the mystic force one might say1 of communication1 of the miracle of shared life and shared experience is spontaneously felt1 the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life will be bathed in the light that never was on land or sea4 ,poetry1 art1 religion are precious things4 ,they cannot be maintained by lingering in the past and futilely wishing to restore what the movement of events in science1 industry and politics has destroyed4 ,they are an out-flowering of thought and desires that unconsciously converge into a disposition of imagination as a result of thousands and thousands of daily episodes and contact4 ,they cannot be willed into existence or coerced into being4 ,the wind of the spirit bloweth where it listeth and the kingdom of ,god in such things does not come with observation4 ,but while it is impossible to retain and recover by deliberate volition old sources of religion and art that have been discredited1 it is possible to expedite the development of the vital sources of a religion and art that are yet to be4 ,not indeed by action directly aimed at their production1 but by substituting faith in the active tendencies of the day for dread and dislike of them1 and by the courage of intelligence to follow whither social and scientific changes direct us4 ,we are weak today in ideal matters because intelligence is divorced from aspiration4 ,the bare force of circumstance compels us onwards in the daily detail of our beliefs and acts1 but our deeper thoughts and desires turn backwards4 ,when philosophy shall have co-operated with the course of events and made clear and coherent the meaning of the daily detail1 science and emotion will interpenetrate1 practice and imagination will embrace4 ,poetry and religious feeling will be the unforced flowers of life4 ,to further this articulation and revelation of the meanings of the current course of events is the task and problem of philosophy in days of transition4 ,,index ,absolute reality1 #bc1 #bg ,absolutism1 #ig1 #aij2 ,kant and1 #ii ,abstract definition1 #bj ,abstractions1 #adi-aej1 #agd ,absurdities1 #aj ,achievements1 #aid ,action1 kind of1 #hj ,adult life1 #ahe1 #ahf ,america1 #da ,amoeba1 #ia ,animals1 dramatisation in primitive life of man1 #d ,antiquity1 #cc ,apprehension1 #adb ,aquinas1 #ee1 #ajf ,argumentation1 #ca1 #acb ,aristotle1 #ac1 #ag1 #ai1 #ee2 ,bacon's charge against1 #cj-ca1 #cf2 distinction in ends1 #aga2 experience1 #gi1 #hj2 forms1 #aje2 on change1 #ajg2 on philosophy as contemplation1 #aji1 #aaj2 on slavery1 #aia2 theory of the state1 #dd2 ultimate reality1 #ajf ,art1 #cd1 #ajc1 #baa1 #bab ,artisan1 #ae2 knowledge1 #aaj ,associations1 #bje2 voluntary1 #bjc ,astronomers1 #fe1 #aac ,astronomy1 #ge ,athenians1 #ac1 #ai ,augustine1 ,st41 #aaa ,authority1 #dh1 #aci1 #aie2 final1 #afa2 seat of1 #afj4 ,see also ,final good ,bacon1 ,francis1 #bh1 #ha1 #ig2 criticism of the learning of his day1 #bi-cj2 experience1 #ig-ih2 knowledge is power1 #bi2 summary of ideas1 #bi ,being1 perfect1 #aaa ,being and non-being1 #ajg ,beliefs and facts1 #ab ,bentham1 #aff1 #ahb1 #ahh ,bergson1 #ga ,berkeley1 #ej ,biology1 #ge1 #hd ,bliss1 #aaa1 #aab ,bosanquet1 #acd ,bradley1 #ajg ,bruno1 #ff ,business1 #da1 #dc1 #ahc ,butler1 ,bishop1 #ba ,capital1 #dc ,capital and labour1 #aia ,capitalism1 #da1 #ahb ,castes1 material1 #ei ,casuistry1 #aff ,causation1 #fc ,causes1 #ei1 #fj ,certainty1 #ba1 #bb ,change1 ancient idea of1 #eg2 existing view1 #aac2 law of the universe1 #fa2 ,plato and ,aristotle on1 #ajg2 progress and1 #aaf ,chemistry1 #ge ,child life1 #ia-ib1 #ahd ,christian mediaeval philosophy1 #ag1 #ai ,christian theology1 #aaa ,church1 #dg2 universal1 #de ,classes1 #ge1 #aeb1 #aee2 in the ancient conception of the world1 #ei ,classic conception of philosophy1 #ag1 #bb1 #bd1 #gd1 #aje ,classification1 #aeb1 #afi ,common sense1 #ajj ,communication at a distance1 #aah1 #abj ,comte1 ,auguste1 #aj ,conceptions1 #ha1 #add1 #ade2 reconstruction in1 moral1 #afa2 truth1 #aef ,concrete cases1 in morals1 #afa2 in social philosophy1 #ahh ,concreteness1 #aej ,condillac1 #ha ,conduct1 #hj2 right course1 #afc ,conflict1 #ajh1 #ach1 #adj2 of ends1 #aff ,conscience1 #df ,consequences1 investigating1 #afc-afd ,conservatism1 #ah1 #cc1 #dj1 #ajj ,constant1 #fa ,contemplation1 #aji1 #aaa ,contract theory of the state1 #de ,control1 #db1 #fd ,co-operation in research1 #cg ,cosmogonies and cosmologies1 #i ,cosmology1 #gj1 #ge ,craftsmen1 #ab1 #ac ,criteria1 #gg ,crusades1 #ci ,cults1 #h2 consolidation1 #i ,custom1 #ag1 #afa ,dante1 #ee ,darwin1 #ge ,deduction1 #adh ,delusions1 #aci ,democracy1 #dg1 #ahf1 #bjf2 of facts1 #ff2 significance1 #bji ,demonstration1 #bj1 #ba1 #ca2 discovery vs41 #cb ,descartes1 #ej ,desires1 #aaj1 #aaa2 frustration1 #ajd ,details1 #ada ,development1 ,aristotle's use of term1 #eg1 #eh ,diagnosis1 #adb ,direction1 #agf ,disagreeable1 #ajc ,discipline1 #ajc1 #ajd1 #ahd ,discord1 #ajh ,discovery1 contacts of #afth and #agth centuries1 #ci2 demonstration vs41 #cb2 logic of1 #ca1 #cc2 moral1 #agd ,distance1 #aah-aai1 #abj ,doctrines1 #h2 consolidation1 #i ,dogma1 #ade1 #aei ,dreams1 #aai1 #abj1 #aci2 world of1 #g ,dualism1 #agc ,duties and rights1 #bjg ,earth1 ancient conception1 #ee2 relation to universe1 #ff ,economic ends1 #aga-agb ,education1 #abe1 #ahc1 #bji ,efficient cause1 #ei1 #fj ,emotion1 #ajc1 #baj ,empirical and rational1 #ha1 #hg ,empiricists1 #gh1 #hb ,ends1 conflicting1 #aff2 fixed1 #gj2 intrinsic and instrumental1 #agj1 #agb-agc2 means and1 #gb-gc2 values1 #age ,english empiricism1 #ii ,environment1 #aj2 life and1 #hd ,epistemology1 #di1 #gj1 #abc1 #abf ,errors1 #ce ,esthetic and practical1 #ff ,estheticism1 #aae-aaf1 #aag1 #ahj2 science and1 reconciling1 #abg ,ether1 #ee1 #ef ,ethical theory1 #afa ,europe1 nationalistic movement1 #bja2 social cause of intellectual revolution in #afth and #agth centuries1 #ch-ci ,evil1 problem of1 #agg ,evolution1 in ,aristotle1 #eh2 of the state1 #bjj-bja ,existence1 two realms1 #bb ,experience1 #cb2 as a guide in science and moral life1 #gh2 basis of old notion of1 #gi2 changed conceptions1 #gg2 classic notion and modern1 #ha2 combined doing and suffering1 #hf2 evil result of unimaginative conception of1 #ajj-aja2 ,greek1 #gi2 modern appeal to1 #dh2 new conception1 #hc2 ,plato1 #ib2 principles and1 #dh2 self-regulative1 #id-ie2 true stuff of1 #ia ,experimental method1 #ac ,experimentation1 #db ,exploration1 #ci1 #dj ,facing facts1 #adj1 #ada1 #adc ,facts1 #aj1 #ih ,falsity1 #aeh ,family principle1 #ahi2 in the world at large1 #fa-fb ,fanaticism1 #afh ,fancy4 ,see ,imagination ,fear1 #dj ,feudalism1 #dc1 #de2 of the universe in ancient conception1 #ei1 #fa-fb ,fighting1 #ae ,final cause1 #ei1 #fj1 #fh ,final good1 #afa-afb1 #ahc2 existence of a single good questioned1 #afb ,fine arts1 #abf ,finite1 #ajg ,finite and infinite1 #ff ,fire1 #aa1 #ef1 #hf ,fixed ends1 #afe ,flux1 #eg1 #ajh ,formal cause1 #ei1 #fj ,forms of ,aristotle1 #aje ,free will1 #aif ,freedom1 law and1 #bjg2 religious1 #df ,future1 #dh ,future aim of philosophy1 #bf ,general notions1 in morals1 #afa2 in social philosophy1 #ahh ,generalities1 #agd2 social affairs and1 #aih ,generalisations1 #aj1 #aea ,geology1 #ge ,german political philosophy1 #bjj1 #bjh-bji ,german rationalism1 #ii ,germans1 system1 order1 docility1 #ih-ii ,germany1 #ai ,god1 #aj1 #aji ,golden ,age1 #dh ,good4 ,see ,final good ,goodness1 #agi ,greeks1 #i1 #ac1 #ai1 #ff1 #fg1 #abf2 ethical theory1 #afa2 religion1 #aje2 science and arts1 #ic ,growth1 #ahd2 of knowledge1 #ca2 moral1 #agg ,happiness1 #agi ,healthy living1 #aff1 #afg1 #agg ,heavens1 ancient conception1 #ef ,hegel1 #ai1 #ajf1 #ahi1 #aij2 conception of the state1 #bjj1 #bja2 logic1 #acd ,helvetius1 #ha ,hierarchical order1 #ei ,higher ends1 #agb ,hindoos1 #abf ,history1 ,hegel's conception1 #bja ,history of philosophy1 #be ,hobbes1 #hh1 #ahh ,homo faber1 #ga ,human aims1 #db1 #dc ,human life1 real and ideal1 a live issue1 #abh ,humanism and naturalism1 #agd ,humanity1 #bjf ,hume1 #ej1 #hc1 #hi ,hypotheses1 #bb1 #ade ,hysteria1 #aci ,ideal1 changed conceptions1 #ajc2 problem of relation to the real1 #acj2 real and1 a human issue1 #abh ,ideal realm1 classic and modern conceptions contrasted1 #aah ,idealism1 #abi2 epistemological1 #di1 #ea2 theological1 #ej2 tragic kind1 #abi-acj ,ideality1 one with reality1 #aaa2 philosophic conception1 #ajf ,ideas of ,plato1 #aje ,idols1 #cf ,ills1 #afi2 philosophy and1 #agg-agh ,imagination1 #baa2 empirical knowledge and1 #gc1 #gd2 reshaping power1 #ajc1 #ajf ,independence1 #aaj2 social1 #ahe ,india1 #da ,individual1 #cf1 #de1 #ea2 concept as something given1 #aic2 in social and moral sense1 #aid2 social and1 #aii2 state and1 #aij1 #aia ,individualism1 #ej2 political1 #de1 #df2 religious1 #df2 religious and moral1 #df ,induction1 #cd ,industrial revolution and scientific revolution1 #ch1 #da ,industry1 movements1 #dg2 science and1 #ch1 #da1 #db ,infinite1 #ff1 #fg ,initiative #df1 #bji ,innate ideas1 #ce1 #hb ,inquiry1 #agd2 free1 #adf2 impartial1 #adg2 methods in moral ills1 #agj ,insincerity1 #bj ,instability1 #ajg ,institutions1 #aif2 true starting-points of inquiry about1 #aig ,instrumental ends1 #aga ,intellect1 #f ,intellectual somnambulism1 #adj ,intellectualism1 #aag ,intelligence1 #cf1 #ea2 as inquiry into consequences1 #afc-afd2 definition1 #if ,interest1 #aid-aie ,international interests1 #bjd1 #bje ,intrinsic good1 #agj1 #bjf ,introspection1 #aif ,invention1 #ci1 #db1 #di1 #abb ,investigation1 #adg ,ipse dixit method1 #aff ,irresponsibility1 #ig ,james1 ,william1 #ba2 ,pragmatism1 #ch ,judea1 #i ,judgment1 #acc2 moral1 #agf2 standards1 #age ,kant1 #ej1 #hc1 #ih1 #bjf2 his philosophy and ,german character1 #ih-ii ,kinship1 #fb ,knowledge1 conception as beholding1 #aae2 degrees1 #ajh2 empirical as organ of imagination1 #gc1 #gd2 existing practice1 #aab2 modern view of right way to get it1 #aac2 positive1 #ab2 positive vs4 tradition1 #af2 practical and operative1 #aba1 #abb2 sensations and1 #hg1 #hh1 #hi2 spectator conception1 #aab1 #aag ,knowledge is power1 #bi1 #db1 #ea ,law1 #fa1 #fd2 freedom and1 #bjg2 reason and1 #ih4 ,see also ,final good ,learning1 ,bacon's three kinds1 #bi ,licentiousness1 #afc ,life1 #afg1 #baa2 environment and1 #hd-he ,literary culture1 #ci ,locke1 #ce1 #ej1 #ha1 #hi1 #aeb2 philosophic empiricism1 #hb ,logic1 a science and an art1 #ace2 apparatus1 #bj1 #ba2 character1 #acb1 #acd2 importance1 #ach2 in morals and politics1 #ach2 inconsistencies1 #acd2 new1 #cf2 of discovery1 #cc2 of discovery vs4 that of argumentation1 #ca2 theory1 chaotic state1 #acc ,logical system1 #i ,lotze1 #acd ,making a living1 #baa ,man1 perfectibility1 #di2 primitive1 #d1 #e2 savage and civilized1 #he2 tool-maker1 #ga ,marcus ,aurelius1 #ajf ,materialism1 #ej1 #gj1 #gc1 #aga1 #ahb ,mathematics1 #acg1 #adi ,matter1 #gb1 #baa ,means and ends1 #gb-gc ,mechanics1 #fg1 #fi2 ,greeks and1 #fg ,mechanism1 #baa ,mechanisation of nature1 #ga-gb ,mediaeval ,christianity1 #ag1 #ai1 #abf ,meliorism1 #agh ,memory1 #a1 #f1 #ajc2 emotional character1 #b2 individual and group1 #h2 primitive1 #c ,metaphysics1 #ag1 #abd1 #abf ,methods1 #adi2 social philosophy1 #aic2 true1 #cb ,middle ,ages1 #dg1 #fd1 #acb ,military art1 #ae ,mill1 ,j4 ,s41 #acb ,mind1 pure1 #aaa ,miracles1 #abe ,mistakes1 #age ,modern thought1 #eb2 ,bacon as founder1 #bh2 early1 #di1 #ej4 ,see also ,thought ,mohammedans1 #ci ,moral ends1 #afi ,moral life1 #afe ,moral science4 ,see under ,science ,morality1 pragmatic rule1 #afc2 standard of judgment1 #agf ,morals1 #abf1 #afi2 politics and1 #aig ,national state1 #bjj2 end or instrument1 #bjb-bjc2 rle of the modern1 #bja ,nationalistic movement1 #bja ,natural ,science4 ,see under ,science ,naturalism and humanism1 #agd ,nature1 contrast of ancient and modern conceptions1 #ec-ed2 inquiry into1 #cb1 #cg1 #dh1 #di2 loss of poetry when considered as mechanism1 #fi2 profound change in man's attitude to1 #aae2 value of mechanisation1 #ga-gb2 web imposed on1 #ce-cf ,neglect1 #ig ,neo-,platonism1 #aaa ,new ,world1 #ci ,non-being1 #ajg ,noumenal reality1 #bc ,nous1 #cf ,obliviscence of the disagreeable1 #ajc ,observation1 #adj ,optimism1 #agh ,opportunity1 #baa ,organic society1 #ahg ,organisms1 #hf ,organisation1 #bjf-bjg ,oriental nations1 #abg ,origin of philosophies1 #e1 #ah1 #bd1 #be ,pantheon1 ,greek1 #aje ,past1 #bab ,perfectibility of mankind1 #di ,perfection1 #agg ,personality1 #dg1 #ahi1 #bji ,persuasion1 #ca ,pessimism1 #agh ,phariseeism1 #agf ,phenomenal reality1 #bc ,philosophy1 emancipation1 #abc2 function1 #aaa1 #abb2 future aim and scope1 #bf2 hard and fast alternatives of ,english and ,german schools1 #ii-ajj2 history1 #be2 opportunities1 #di2 origin1 #e1 #ah1 #bd1 #be2 practical nature1 #aba2 proper province1 #ba1 #abd2 work1 #ah ,physician1 #afh ,physics1 #ge ,plato1 #ac1 #ad1 #ag1 #ai1 #ahh1 #bje2 dramatic sense1 #ae2 experience1 #gi1 #ib2 ideas1 ideal realm1 #aje2 on change1 #ajg2 social arts1 #id2 ultimate reality1 #ajf ,pleasure1 #aha ,plotinus1 #ajf ,pluralism1 #bjd ,poetry1 #g1 #h1 #ajc1 #bab ,political changes1 #dc ,political organisation1 #dd ,politics1 #abe2 morals and1 #aig2 movements1 #dg ,possession of knowledge1 #ca ,potentiality1 ,aristotle's use of term1 #eg1 #eh ,practical and esthetic1 #ff ,pragmatism1 #ch ,pretensions1 #ba ,primitive man1 #d ,principles1 #ha1 #afc2 criteria of experience1 #dh ,probability1 #ba ,production1 #aha ,progress1 #db1 #dh1 #aaf1 #baa2 ,bacon and1 #cb1 #cd2 economic and moral1 contrast1 #abe ,proof1 #bj ,property1 #ahb1 #ahi ,protestantism1 #df ,proudhon1 #ahi ,prussian ,state1 #aij1 #bja ,psychology1 #hc1 #ace2 change in1 #hd2 malicious1 #hb ,pure reason1 #gh ,questioning1 #ag4 ,see also ,inquiry ,radicalism1 #ah1 #ai1 #ajj ,rank1 #fc ,rationalism1 #ig2 rigidity1 #ih ,rationalists #hg1 #hh1 #hi ,rationalisation1 #ig1 #ajb ,real1 changed conceptions1 #ajc2 ideal and1 a human issue1 #abh2 problem of relation to the ideal1 #acj ,reality1 #bc1 #bg2 classic conception1 #aje2 nomenal vs4 phenomenal1 #bc2 ultimate1 #ajf2 ultimate1 one with ideality1 #aaa ,reason1 #hc1 #agd2 as a faculty separate from experience1 #ie2 as re-adjusting intelligence1 #if2 changed conceptions1 #gg ,reasoning1 #cb ,reconstruction of philosophy1 #eb2 essential1 #ea2 historical factors1 #bh2 in moral conceptions1 #afa2 scientific factor1 #ec2 social philosophy and1 #ahg2 specific present problem1 #dc2 value of a solution of the dilemma of reason and experience1 #aja ,re-creation1 #ea1 #ahj ,reform1 #agi1 #ahj2 starting-point1 #aif ,relativity of sensations1 #hh ,religion1 #ajc1 #baa1 #bab2 movements1 #dg ,religious freedom1 #df ,religious spirit1 #baj ,renaissance1 #bi ,research1 #db2 co-operative1 #cg ,responsibility1 #afc ,revolution of thought1 #fj ,rights and duties1 #bjg ,rome1 #i ,ruler and subject1 #dd2 in nature1 #fd ,rules of conduct1 #afe ,sailors1 #aa ,salvation1 #aab ,santayana1 ,george1 on ,locke1 #hb ,satisfaction1 #aeg ,savage1 #he1 #agf ,scholasticism1 #cj ,science1 #aa1 #bc2 advance in1 #ec2 co-operative pursuit1 #cg2 estheticism and1 reconciling1 #abg2 human value1 #agc2 industry and1 #ch1 #da1 #db2 natural1 #db1 #dh2 open world of1 #fa2 origin1 #ab2 picture of universe1 #fd-fe2 relation to experience1 #ie2 separation of natural and moral1 #agc2 so-called1 #cf2 traditional1 #cj ,scientific revolution1 #ec ,self-delusion1 #adj ,self-interest1 #aid-aie ,sensations1 #hd2 as points of readjustment1 #hi2 relativity1 #hh ,senses1 #hd1 #hg ,sentimentalism1 #gc ,shakespeare1 #id ,slavery1 #aia ,social belief1 #bf ,social development1 #dc ,social evils1 #ahb4 ,see also ,ills ,social philosophy1 reconstruction1 #ahg2 reconstructive impact1 #aic ,social unit1 real1 #bjd ,social welfare1 #ahj ,sociality1 #ahe ,society1 #bjj1 #bje2 defect of usual theories about1 #ahh2 individuals and1 three views1 #ahg-ahh2 philosophy and1 #abd ,socrates1 #ad1 #ag ,soldiers1 #aci ,sophists1 #ac1 #ad ,space1 #aah-aai1 #abj ,spinoza1 #ajf ,standards1 #age ,state1 ,aristotle's theory1 #dd2 contract theory1 #de2 current conception1 #bjj2 importance1 #bjd2 individual and1 #aij1 #aia2 modern1 #dd2 origin1 #dd2 supremacy1 #bjb1 #bjc ,subject and ruler1 #dd2 in nature1 #fd ,success1 #agi ,suggestions1 #c1 #f1 #g ,summum ,bonum4 ,see ,final good ,supernaturalism1 #dg ,system1 #ih1 #ii ,telegraph1 #abj ,telephone1 #abj ,terminology1 #ba ,theories1 #add1 #ade2 validity1 #aef ,theory and practice1 #adj ,things as they are1 #aae ,thinking1 habits1 #gd1 #ge4 ,see also ,thought ,thomas1 ,st4 ,see ,aquinas ,thought1 #aag2 good and bad thinking1 #acf2 instrumental nature1 #ade-adf2 its origin in difficulties1 #ach-aci2 kinds1 #ace2 logic and1 #acd2 place1 #if2 systems1 #ade ,tolerance1 #df ,tradition1 #ad2 positive knowledge vs41 #af ,transitoriousness1 #ajf ,travel1 #ci1 #dj ,trouble1 #ach1 #adj ,truth1 as utility1 #aeg2 defining1 #aei-afj2 logical conception1 #aef-aeg2 old and new1 #cc1 #cd2 pragmatic conception1 #aef1 #aei2 test of1 nature of1 #aee1 #aff2 why the modern conception is offensive1 #aeg1 #aeh ,unity1 #ajh ,universal1 #fd ,universe1 closed conception1 #ed ,utilitarianism1 defects1 #aha2 merit1 #ahj2 need of reconstruction1 #ahc ,utility1 #aeg ,valves1 #ae ,verification1 #aef ,virtues1 #afd ,vision1 #ba ,war1 #bjd ,war1 world1 lesson1 #abi2 nationalistic phase1 #bja2 real and ideal in1 #abh ,wealth1 #dj1 #db1 #abe ,wind1 #aa ,work1 #aha ,workingmen1 #aci ,world1 closed and open conceptions1 #ed1 #fj-fa2 modern conception as material for change1 #aad2 nomenal and phenomenal1 #bc ,,transcriber',s ,,notes3 ,phrases in italics are indicated by italics4 ,typos corrected3 7,chapter ,,iii7 ,home ,faber to ,homo ,faber 7,index entry7 ,summum ,conum to ,summum ,bonum ,the text is in ,american-,english but the ,index seems to be done in ,british-,english4 ,below are some words in the ,index which are different from the text3 ,,index ,,text ----- ---- dramatisation dramatization labour labor mediaeval medieval ,generalisations ,generalizations mechanisation mechanization 7#b instances7 organisation organization 7#b instances7 ,rationalisation ,rationalization nomenal noumenal 7#b instances7