,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,foreign ,,policy ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,foreign ,,policy ,a ,,consideration ,,of ,,present ,,dangers ,,and ,,the ,,best ,,methods ,,for ,,meeting ,,them ,,by ,,gilbert ,,murray ,,author ,,of ,,the ,,foreign ,,policy ,,of ,,sir ,,edward ,,grey1 ,,the ,,religion ,,of ,a ,,man ,,of ,,letters1 ,,faith1 ,,war1 ,,and ,,policy1 ,,etc4 ,,boston ,,and ,,new ,,york ,,houghton ,,mifflin ,,company ,the ,riverside ,press ,cambridge #aiba ,,copyright1 #aiba1 ,,by ,,gilbert ,,murray ,,all ,,rights ,,reserved ,,preface ,the publication of this little book was interrupted by an incident which made me realize how easy it is for one who spends much time in trying to study sincerely a political problem to find himself out of touch with average opinion4 ,the discovery has made me re-read what ,i have written4 ,but re-reading has not led to any weakening of my expressions1 rather the reverse4 ,i wish only to make a brief general statement about the point of view from which ,i write4 ,i start from the profound conviction that what the world needs is peace4 ,there has been too much war1 and too much of many things that naturally go with war2 too much force and fraud1 too much intrigue and lying1 too much impatience1 violence1 avarice1 unreasonableness1 and lack of principle4 ,before the war ,i was a ,liberal1 and ,i believe now that nothing but the sincere practice of ,liberal principles will save ,european society from imminent revolution and collapse4 ,but ,i am conscious of a certain change of emphasis in my feeling4 ,before the war ,i was eager for large and sweeping reforms1 ,i was intolerant of ,conservatism and ,i laughed at risks4 ,the social order had then such a margin of strength that risks could safely be taken4 ,now ,i feel a need above all things of the qualities that will preserve civilization4 ,for that preservation1 of course1 ,liberality in the full sense is necessary1 and constant progress and a great development of democracy4 ,but what is needed most is a return to a standard of public conduct which was practised1 or at least recognized1 by the best ,governments of the world before the war1 and which now seems to have been shaken1 if not shattered4 ,i am not demanding in any wild idealist spirit that ,governments should act according to the ,sermon on the ,mount--though they well might study it a good deal more than they do4 ,i am only saying that they must get back to the standard of veracity1 of consistency1 of honesty and economy1 and of intellectual competence1 that we had from ,peel or ,lord ,salisbury or ,gladstone4 ,i do not say that is enough4 ,it is emphatically not enough4 ,we need in foreign policy and home policy a higher standard than we had before1 the standard implied by the ,league of ,nations in international affairs and the ideal of ,coperation in domestic affairs4 ,but the first thing is to recover our wholesome tradition4 ,i think few serious students of public affairs will dispute that the long strain of the war1 confusing our ideas of good and evil1 and at times centring our hopes upon things which a normal civilized man regards with loathing1 has resulted in a widespread degradation of political conduct4 ,things are done now1 in time of peace1 which would have been inconceivable before #aiad4 ,and they are done now because we grew accustomed to worse things during the war4 ,i do not wish to attack any individuals2 but1 as an instance of what ,i mean1 one finds a ,ministerial newspaper complacently remarking that certain country towns sacked by the police in ,ireland were very small and poor places in any case1 and the sacking not nearly so complete as the sacking of ,belgian towns by the ,germans on less provocation4 ,i find to-day 7,november #d1 #aibj7 the ,chief ,secretary for ,ireland announcing in the ,house of ,commons that he has had a court of inquiry into the alleged murder of ,john ,conway by the police1 and presenting an official report that ,conway died from natural causes2 while at the same time the ,times special correspondent writes3 ,i went to the cottage in ,rock ,street of ,john ,conway1 who was shot on ,monday evening1 and saw him lying on his bed with a bullet wound in the temple4 ,this is one case out of dozens4 ,it is not a slip or an isolated crime4 ,i put it to any man who can remember the years before the war that this represents a startling degradation of the standard of government4 ,such things used to happen in ,mexico2 now they happen in ,great ,britain4 ,of course ,i supported the war4 ,i believe it was necessary4 ,i make no self-righteous claim to throw the guilt of it upon others1 who did the fighting by which ,i and mine were saved4 ,let me therefore try to make clear why certain things shock me profoundly1 while ,i supported others which can loosely be called just as bad4 ,one of the worst things about war1 as ,thucydides has remarked1 is that it takes away your freedom and puts you in a region of necessity4 ,you may choose whether or not to fight2 but1 once fighting1 your power of choice has gone4 ,take the treaty with ,italy in #aiae4 ,italy demanded a certain price1 if she was to come into the war on our side4 ,another party in ,italy was negotiating with the ,germans1 to see what inducement could be offered for ,italy to come in on the other side4 7,i make no complaint whatever of the conduct of these ,italian statesmen2 they naturally consulted the interests of their country47 ,the price was high1 and involved the transference to ,italy of territory to which1 on principles of self-determination1 she had little claim4 ,but who could refuse the price8 ,war is a violent master and teaches by compulsion4 ,take the blockade of ,germany4 ,it was a slow and somewhat cruel weapon to employ1 falling most severely on the most innocent classes4 ,but ,germany was trying to blockade us1 and only our superior strength and skill at sea caused her plan to fail4 ,it was part of the normal means of war1 and of course we used it4 ,then came an extension of it4 ,poland1 most unhappy of ,european nations1 was swept by alternate armies1 conquered by the ,germans1 devastated and laid bare4 ,the ,poles were our allies4 ,our newspapers had accounts of the appalling distress in ,poland--the roads strewn with skeletons1 the almost complete blotting-out of children under seven1 and the like4 ,the ,americans proposed to send food for the relief of the ,poles4 ,but we made objection4 ,we did not allow food to go into ,poland1 to save our own allies1 who were starving4 ,why8 ,because the ,germans were still taking from the miserable country all the food they could wring out of it4 ,and if the ,americans brought in more food1 undoubtedly the enemy would take more4 ,there was no choice4 ,we had to refuse the entry of the food ships4 ,but the man who had to sign that order may well have wished he had died before the need came to him4 ,these results and necessities of war1 though ,i have chosen none of a sensational kind1 are very horrible4 ,it is not easy to think of actions much more horrible4 ,but they are not exactly crimes1 they are not marks of degradation in those who order them1 because they are done under the compulsion of war4 ,the alternative in each case is something equivalent to helping the enemy4 ,at the end of the war1 after the signing of an armistice on the basis of the ,fourteen ,points1 there came at last a moment of free choice4 ,it came after five years of unspeakable waste--five years during which the nations of ,europe had become habituated to cruelty and all pity choked with custom of fell deeds4 ,i am anxious to avoid the faintest semblance of heat or exaggeration1 but ,i think it can hardly be disputed that practically every economist agreed that ,europe was on the brink of economic ruin and could only be saved by a quick revival of trade2 every man of conscience1 irrespective of political party1 knew that the first condition for the recovery of civilization was a change from the war mind to the peace mind4 ,such a change could not happen in a night4 ,it must needs be gradual4 ,it could only be brought about by a strong and persistent lead from those who possessed the ear of the world and the confidence of their own people4 ,never in the whole course of modern history has there been a more magnificent opportunity than then lay before the ,british ,prime ,minister1 never has there been a clearer call of plain duty4 ,he was free1 as men in public life are seldom free4 ,great ,britain hung on his lips1 and ,europe was waiting for the lead of ,great ,britain4 ,it was for him to choose plain good or plain evil4 ,and he chose1 deliberately1 evil4 ,he dissolved ,parliament and appealed to the country in a ,general ,election on a programme of frantic war passion1 coupled with promises which he knew to be false1 and which were ridiculed by every educated man among his surroundings4 ,this man had before him a task and an opportunity so glorious that one can scarcely speak of it except in the language of religion4 ,many ordinary men would willingly give their lives if they could save their fellow creatures from sufferings and perils far less terrible than those which then threatened4 ,and he could have saved them without any sacrifice4 ,it needed only a little courage4 ,for a week or ten days he hesitated4 ,then on ,december #aa he proclaimed his programme3 the ,kaiser's head2 the punishment of enemy war-criminals2 ,germany to pay the whole cost of the war2 ,britain for the ,british2 rehabilitation of those whom the war had broken4 ,at the time when this programme was put forward ,i felt bewildered4 ,i did not realize that any one could be1 ,i will not say so wicked1 but so curiously destitute of generous ambition1 so incapable of thinking greatly4 ,and when ,i tried to find out what motive could lie at the back of a failure so incredible1 ,i was told by his supporters that the ,prime ,minister was not thinking about the matters of which ,i was thinking4 ,he was trying to get a very large majority in the ,house of ,commons and to crush his old colleagues1 and conceivable rivals1 entirely out of existence4 ,of course he succeeded4 ,i hope ,i have put this statement forward without any malice or party feeling4 ,the state of the world is far too serious to permit of either4 ,and ,i hope that the profound and burning indignation which ,i undoubtedly feel has not biased my judgment4 ,in any case1 the conclusion that ,i wish to draw is not a personal but a general one4 ,i doubt if such action would have been possible before the war in any constitutional statesman1 not to speak of a clever and humane man like ,mr4 ,george4 ,i doubt if the public opinion of any nation would have endured it4 ,a nation in which such conduct is tolerated1 and even approved1 ought surely to pause and bethink itself4 ,for it is not a particular reckless or unfortunate act which is thus condoned2 it is a way of behaviour4 ,it is a way of behaviour which has its origin in the methods of war1 and of which the characteristic is that it gives the unscrupulous man the advantage over the scrupulous man1 the cheat over the honest player1 the violent and the criminal over those who obey the law4 ,it fosters exactly those things which it is the business of civilized society to prevent4 ,there are always lawless and dishonest men in every large community1 as there are criminals in every army4 ,there are always men who make profit out of their neighbours' extremity1 who use advertisement to stifle truth1 who jeer at all that is higher than themselves4 ,but in a good social order they are not influential4 ,they acquire power only in a society which1 in external conduct1 is losing its traditional standards and inwardly1 in the words of ,tolstoy's great condemnation1 has forgotten ,god4 ,my criticism here is directed against my own country1 and in particular against the ,british ,prime ,minister1 not in the least because ,i have any anti-,british bias4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think that in most of the international problems of ,europe the influence of ,great ,britain1 and in particular of the ,british ,prime ,minister1 is generally an influence for good1 though not nearly such a strong and clear influence as it might be4 ,i confine these criticisms to our own policy because the scolding of foreign countries is a notoriously profitless task4 ,the only criticism that has any chance of being useful is that of matters for which the critic or his readers have some degree of responsibility4 ,i believe profoundly in the traditions of ,liberal ,england4 ,as every one knows who has cared to read my writings1 ,i look to the ,league of ,nations as the main hope of the world1 and to the ,british ,commonwealth as the mainstay of the ,league of ,nations4 ,but1 if it was ever doubtful1 it is surely clear in the present state of the world that the ,commonwealth cannot rest upon any secure foundation except the good-will of its members4 ,and that good-will in its turn depends upon equal law1 good government1 and good faith4 ,it is not a new lesson that we have to learn3 it is an old lesson that good ,englishmen once knew better than any rulers the world has ever seen1 though five years of madness have made it largely forgotten4 ,but1 as ,lord ,grey has said1 the choice now before us is absolute2 we must learn or perish4 ,it is in this belief and this spirit that ,i have written the following pages1 which ,i hope1 except to those who still live in some unsubstantial paradise of war-bred delusions1 will cause no permanent offence1 nor leave the impression that where ,i think others have made mistakes ,i imagine that ,i should make none4 ,readers will see that ,i have aimed throughout at simplicity of outline4 ,i have deliberately focused attention on the one central problem1 how to avoid the causes of international strife4 ,and out of the many and multifarious difficulties that confront our harassed ,foreign ,office to-day1 ,i have concentrated on a few typical cases4 ,i have omitted1 for instance1 any discussion of ,turkey1 ,armenia1 ,persia1 ,ireland1 and the relations between ,great ,britain and the ,united ,states4 ,i have omitted ,africa1 where1 unless the white man's methods of administration are reconsidered1 one of the gravest of the world's future dangers may soon be in fermentation4 ,and ,i have said nothing of the economic problem in ,europe1 especially in ,austria4 ,the ,international ,financial ,commission1 summoned at ,brussels by the ,league of ,nations1 has issued a report on this matter which no government can afford to neglect4 ,its first recommendations are disarmament and freedom of trade1 but they will not be enough without some system of international credits by which production may be set going among those populations which at present have neither food nor raw materials nor the means of buying them4 99 99 99 99 99 ,since an edition of this little book is asked for in ,america ,i feel constrained to add a few words to the ,preface4 ,it will be seen that ,i have said nothing about two subjects of the first importance1 the ,irish ,question and the relations between ,great ,britain and the ,united ,states4 ,the ,irish ,question is1 under present conditions1 a domestic matter1 since ,ireland forms by law part of the ,united ,kingdom and has the right of full representation in the ,british ,parliament4 ,it only touches foreign policy through its effect on foreign opinion4 ,i do not therefore propose to discuss the ,irish ,question here4 ,personally ,i believe that a favourable prospect of settlement is to be found in the policy advocated by ,mr4 ,asquith and ,lord ,grey1 and loosely called ,dominion ,home ,rule4 ,this would put ,ireland roughly in the same position as the self-governing ,british colonies1 and would at once have two very important effects4 ,it would put an end to the present oppressions and would give ,ireland the right to a seat at the ,assembly of the ,league of ,nations4 ,but ,i fear that no settlement whatever is possible in ,ireland until the present ,government is replaced by some other with more sincerity in its purpose and less blood upon its hands4 ,the accounts of ,british misdeeds which ,i read in the ,sinn ,fein ,bulletin and in some ,american newspapers appear to me to be both exaggerated and one-sided4 ,men exasperated by persecution are not as a rule capable of giving a perfectly fair and benevolent account of the behaviour of their persecutors4 ,but in spite of the ,government's policy of rigorous concealment1 the ,irish can now appeal to the evidence of a witness as nearly unimpeachable as can be expected in human affairs1 a ,county ,court ,judge appointed originally by the ,british ,government itself4 ,judge ,bodkin1 in a report submitted to the ,british ,government on cases of crime which came before his ,court in ,clare ,county at the ,hilary ,sessions of #aibj1 states3 ,there were in all #aci cases in which it was proved that the criminal injuries were committed by armed forces of the ,government1 and only in the five cases already mentioned were any witnesses examined to justify1 deny1 or explain4 ,in no case was there any evidence to suggest that the victims had been guilty of any offence4 ,in answer to a report like this the ,government allows no public inquiry1 inflicts1 so far as is known1 no punishment on the criminals1 awards no compensation to the victims1 and yet does not take any legal steps against its accuser4 ,such conduct does not seem compatible with innocence4 ,indeed the complicity of the ,government1 particularly of ,mr4 ,lloyd ,george and ,sir ,hamar ,greenwood1 in the system of illegal outrages called reprisals is no longer disputed1 and has especially been brought out in ,parliament by a conservative member1 ,mr4 ,oswald ,moseley4 ,the exact degree of complicity is1 of course1 open to doubt4 ,if ,i may give my own opinion for what it is worth1 ,i suspect that at some time when the ,irish police forces were disposed to resign or to strike owing to the constant danger of assassination in which the ,government's policy required them to live1 the ,government gave their officers some assurance that1 if they would only stay on1 their own conduct in dealing with ,sinn ,feiners would not be too closely scrutinized4 ,that was the usual method pursued by the ,czar's ,government when arranging pogroms4 ,the defence of the ,british ,ministers is that they were faced from the outset by a very difficult situation1 owing to the irreconcilable differences between the northeast corner of ,ulster and the rest of ,ireland4 ,anxious for ,tory support they gave pledges1 the exact tenor of which has not been divulged1 to ,sir ,edward ,carson1 the ,ulster leader1 and thus tied their own hands4 ,the condition of ,ireland became increasingly embittered1 till1 shortly after ,sir ,hamar ,greenwood's appointment1 the extreme ,sinn ,fein party1 refusing parliamentary action and unable to meet the ,english in battle1 adopted a policy of assassination4 ,the ,government1 much embarrassed1 did just what most bad governments generally have done in other parts of the world4 ,they tried to stamp out the ,sinn ,fein terror by organizing a terror of their own1 meeting crime by still more formidable crime1 and recklessly confusing the innocent with the guilty4 ,at last they have succeeded in uniting all ,catholic ,ireland in such detestation of the ,british name that an ,irishman will now never betray another ,irishman1 however guilty1 to the ,british police1 nor even feel that the killing of an ,englishman is quite the same thing as murder4 ,things being in this state1 the ,government pleads1 how can we be expected to govern ,ireland according to civilized standards8 ,the answer is that they cannot1 and had better make room for another ,government which can4 ,i cannot tell how great an effect this ,irish calamity has had in embittering the relations between ,america and ,great ,britain4 ,i would only venture to lay before ,americans of moderate views my conviction that the great mass of educated opinion in ,england joins with the ,free ,liberals and the ,labour ,party in utterly condemning the ,government's ,irish administration4 ,this conclusion is derived from personal conversation with people of various parties1 and from the overwhelming anti-,government votes in the bye-elections1 and the increasing protests and rebellions among the ,government's supporters in ,parliament4 ,i have to admit that this condemnation is not reflected in the ,house of ,commons as a whole1 an utterly abnormal ,house elected in a moment when not only the fever of war1 but many other fevers and corruptions of the body politic were at their height4 ,it is not even reflected adequately in the press4 ,for the press in ,england1 with a few most honourable exceptions1 is in the hands of a small number of individuals who--to say the least of it--were not elected to their present position of power by the confidence of their countrymen nor appointed thereto on grounds of intellect or character or public spirit4 ,england is admittedly not in a very healthy state of mind4 ,but1 even now1 at her worst1 she is a far better and more decent country than could be concluded from either the ,london press or the ,house of ,commons4 ,the picture ,i have given of ,european affairs may1 ,i can well see1 be taken in either of two ways by an ,american4 ,it may well confirm his determination to keep absolutely clear of a world at once so ill-directed and so miserable4 ,the case for ,american isolation is very easy to state and to understand4 ,what is there to attract ,america towards further coperation with any of the larger ,european nations8 ,france8 ,i can imagine no sane statesmen wishing to be drawn into the orbit of ,france in her present mood or with her present prospects4 ,germany8 ,the existing ,german ,government seems good1 but old enmities do not so quickly die down1 and ,germany has still to prove that she is an honest and a peaceful power4 ,russia8 ,to ask the question is to answer it4 ,england8 ,who would wish to coperate with the ,british ,government in holding down ,ireland by competition in crime1 in restablishing her slippery grasp on ,mesopotamia1 laboriously pacifying ,india and ,egypt1 and struggling indefinitely against ,russian conspiracies to destroy her influence in the ,moslem world8 ,how can an ,american wish to remit ,england's debt to ,america when she is at this moment invading ,germany in order to collect to the last farthing a claim which the ,american delegates at the ,peace ,conference rejected as extortionate8 ,and who would wish to increase the wealth of a ,government which1 immediately after the ,war to end ,war1 is lavishing all it can afford1 and more1 on armaments and military expeditions8 ,other less plausible arguments could easily be added4 ,the suggestion1 for instance1 that this country1 or any party or any fraction of a party in this country1 intends or ever intended to use the ,japanese ,alliance for a war against the ,united ,states is the merest moonshine1 and has been repeatedly disproved by the terms of the old treaty and by the public statements of both parties4 ,but1 taking only arguments that have some basis of truth1 the case for ,american isolation is very strong4 ,and yet it is the wrong case4 ,it is based1 ,i venture to think1 first on a misunderstanding1 and next on too narrow a point of view4 ,a misunderstanding2 because it is not coperation in that sense which is asked of her4 ,she is not asked to support the policies of any ,european nation4 ,the ,league of ,nations is not an alliance4 ,she is asked only to sit in council with the other nations--as free and unpledged as they1 or1 if she wishes1 still more so--to help those who have suffered1 and are in part still sick in body and brain with their suffering1 to face the vast problems which now confront mankind1 and which the rest of us have pledged ourselves to face in the spirit of peace and justice and common sense which we thought was characteristically ,american4 ,it is based on too narrow a view1 because all summary judgments of foreign nations are that1 whether they end in praise or blame4 ,la noble1 l'incomparable ,angleterre of ,m4 ,briand is just as remote from fact as the brutal and bloody ,britain of ,mr4 ,hearst4 ,nations are made up of masses of individuals1 who differ among themselves within each nation just about as much as the citizens of one nation differ from those of another4 ,in every nation there are numbers of criminals and numbers of fine men4 ,in every nation's past there are black places and white4 ,only it so happens that just now1 after a time of hideous suffering and wrong-doing1 in the midst of a time of savage resentments and passions and great material difficulties1 the nations of the world are from the depth of their hearts longing for some way of avoiding war and treating one another in future a little more openly and fairly than they have in the past4 ,they know they must have disputes1 and that when the disputes come it is one of two things2 they must either talk them out or fight them out4 ,they are meeting to talk them out4 ,but how can the talk be quite frank and free1 or how can the promises of peace and fair dealing carry full conviction1 while the greatest and the least wounded of all the nations refuses to join in them1 but sits aloof in silence1 from time to time sharpening her sword8 ,g4 ,m4 ,,contents ,,preface v ,i4 ,,germany ,,and ,,france #a ,i4 ,,the ,,predicament ,,of ,,germany #a ,,ii4 ,,the ,,position ,,of ,,france #cc ,,iii4 ,,the ,,solution #db ,,ii4 ,,the ,,east #eh ,i4 ,,syria1 ,,mesopotamia1 ,,egypt1 ,,and ,,india #eh ,,ii4 ,,an ,,eastern ,,policy #gj ,,iii4 ,,russia ,,and ,,its ,,borders #hj ,i4 ,,the ,,civil ,,war #hb ,,ii4 ,,russia',s ,,neighbours #ij ,,iv4 ,,pre-,,war ,,and ,,post-,,war ,,causes ,,of ,,strife #ih ,i4 ,,armaments #ajj ,,ii4 ,,markets ,,and ,,food #ajg ,v4 ,,the ,,league ,,of ,,nations #aad ,,books ,,for ,,further ,,reading #abe ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,foreign ,,policy ,,chapter ,i ,,germany ,,and ,,france ,i4 ,,the ,,predicament ,,of ,,germany ,a friend of mine was recently travelling in ,germany in a third-class railway carriage4 ,the engine was slow and in lack of oil4 ,the carriages1 once so clean1 warm1 and well lighted1 were unlit1 dirty1 and bitterly cold4 ,there was an air of broken nerves and misery among the passengers1 and one woman was still sobbing from some indignity offered to her by a foreign official in the occupied area4 ,presently an old gentleman1 apparently a lawyer of some eminence1 broke out3 ,a reckoning must come4 ,my little grandchildren are drinking in revenge with their mother's milk4 ,in thirty years or thereabouts we shall settle accounts with ,france1 and then we shall make--he swept the air with his hand--tabula rasa6 ,herr ,justizrat1 answered a younger man1 did you take part in the war8 ,i think not--you would be over the age4 ,i was in the war for four years4 4 4 4 ,i agree with you that1 in all probability1 in thirty or forty years we shall settle our account with ,france and make tabula rasa4 ,and in thirty or forty years after that ,france will have her reckoning with us and make tabula rasa of ,germany2 and then we again1 and so on4 ,but1 if you will excuse me1 ,herr ,justizrat1 ,i do not find in the prospect any of the satisfaction which it appears to give you4 ,an incident of this sort may be significant or may not4 ,it may be typical or may be exceptional4 ,but my friend's experience seems exactly to agree with the report made by ,herr ,simons to the ,reichstag in the last week of ,august1 #aibj1 upon the attitude of the ,german ,government towards the war then proceeding between ,poland and ,russia4 ,the ,entente ,powers had invited ,germany to take certain unneutral steps on the side of ,poland2 the ,government had1 as a matter of course1 refused4 ,the ,soviet ,government had also invited ,germany to join in the war on their side1 holding out the hope that such action by ,germany would precipitate a ,bolshevik revolution in ,poland and other parts of eastern ,europe and lead to an alliance capable of defying the ,entente4 ,the ,german ,government1 said ,herr ,simons1 carefully considered these proposals1 as it felt bound to consider any possible prospect of escape for ,germany from the intolerable servitude imposed upon her by the ,peace of ,versailles1 but decided that it was not in the public interest to accept them4 ,thus the ,german ,foreign ,minister1 a man respected by all parties1 expresses in sober and thoughtful language much the same sentiment as the ,justizrat in his passion4 ,the ,peace of ,versailles has1 like most settlements imposed by conquerors upon their beaten enemies1 produced a condition so intolerable that the vanquished must be expected to seize the first favourable opportunity for fighting to free themselves4 ,it has sown the seeds of future war4 ,now1 it was the great hope of ,english ,liberals and those who agreed with them1 that1 contrary to almost all precedent1 this war might be ended by a peace so high-minded and statesmanlike and far-seeing1 so scrupulously fair to the vanquished and so single-mindedly set upon the healing of national wounds and the reconstruction of a shattered society1 that the ordinary motives for a war of revenge would not exist1 and the nations might really coperate with one another to save all ,europe from a common ruin4 ,in #aiad and #aiae1 when war still seemed to ,englishmen an almost incredible horror1 and it was still necessary to appeal to men's consciences if we wished them to fight1 volunteers were invited for a war to end war4 ,the statesmen who1 in those days1 were still the leaders of the country1 were emphatic in stating that we were not engaged in any attempt to destroy or oppress the ,german people1 but only the military domination of ,prussia4 ,even later1 when the ,liberal and idealist elements in the country withered in the poisonous air or were supplanted by more robust forces1 it seemed as if ,president ,wilson was upholding1 with even greater insistence and emphasis1 the banner of ultimate reconciliation as the goal of the war4 ,for the war itself he prescribed ,force1 ,force to the utmost1 ,force without stint or limit1 righteous and triumphant ,force1 which shall make ,right the ,law of the ,world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust 7,april #f1 #aiah72 but1 as soon as the ,hohenzollerns were overthrown1 he was for what he called peace without victory1 a peace with no element of revenge1 a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice 7,february #aa1 #aiah74 ,especial emphasis was laid on our good-will towards the ,german people4 ,we have no quarrel with the ,german people4 ,we have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship 7,april #b1 #aiag74 ,they did not originate or desire this hideous war 4 4 4 we are fighting their cause1 as they will some day see it1 as well as our own 7,flag ,day1 #aiag74 ,it is not clear that this ideal was an impossible one4 ,the war of ,prussia against ,austria in #ahff was unscrupulous and aggressive in its origin2 but ,bismarck meant it to end in a reconciliation after victory1 and so it did4 ,he secured a peace which left no sting of injustice behind it1 ,lincoln did not live to make the settlement with the ,south after the ,american ,civil ,war2 but enough is known of his intentions to make us sure that he intended to carry through at all costs a peace of reconciliation1 extremely different from that which took place when he was gone4 ,the ,british war against the ,boers in #ahii-aijb1 though open to the severest criticism in its origin1 ended in a genuine peace of reconciliation in the settlement of #aijf1 for which the reward came rapidly and in full measure at the outbreak of the ,great ,war4 ,had things been a little different in #aiah1 had ,president ,wilson had the same support from his own people that he had from the best elements in ,europe1 had a ,liberal or ,labour ,government been in power to make a settlement of the ,great ,war like the settlement which followed the ,boer ,war1 had the popular influences of the time been better guided1 ,europe might have had a genuinely ,liberal peace4 ,indeed1 it seemed at the last moment almost certain that a ,liberal peace had been secured4 ,in an address to ,congress on ,january #h1 #aiah1 ,president ,wilson laid down his memorable ,fourteen ,points to be observed in any treaty of peace with ,germany4 ,the first five may be especially noted3 #a4 ,open covenants of peace openly arrived at1 after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind1 but diplomacy shall always proceed frankly and in the public view4 #b4 ,absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters1 alike in peace and in war1 except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants4 #c4 ,the removal as far as possible of all economic barriers1 and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance4 #d4 ,adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety4 #e4 ,a free1 open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims1 based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the ,government whose title is to be determined4#a ,footnote #a3 ,the other points were briefly3 ,evacuation of ,russia3 restoration of ,belgium2 of ,france2 transference of ,alsace-,lorraine2 territorial settlement of ,italy2 autonomy of peoples of ,austria-,hungary2 settlement of ,balkan ,states2 of ,turkey2 restoration of ,poland2 and lastly a ,league of ,nations--though ,president ,wilson never used that somewhat inaccurate phrase4 ,i should like to acknowledge here my indebtedness to the admirable and convenient series of publications issued by the ,american ,association for ,international ,conciliation1 #djg ,west #aagth ,street1 ,new ,york4 ,the ,fourteen ,points were not only acclaimed by ,liberal opinion in ,england3 they were vigorously circulated by our ,government propaganda in ,germany and ,austria1 as were all other statements considered likely to induce the enemy peoples to weaken or surrender4 ,on ,october #e1 #aiah1 the ,german ,republican ,government proposed peace on the basis of the ,fourteen ,points4 ,they requested ,president ,wilson to take into his hands the task of establishing peace on the basis of the ,fourteen ,points contained in his message to ,congress of ,january #h1 #aiah1 and on the basis of his subsequent proclamations1 especially his speech of ,september #bg1 #aiah4 ,later on they asked the ,president to inquire if the ,allied ,governments also agreed to them4 ,in response to his inquiries the ,allied ,governments sent in to him an identical memorandum3 ,the ,allied ,governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the ,president of the ,united ,states and the ,german ,government4 ,subject to the qualifications which follow1 they declare their willingness to make peace with the ,government of ,germany on the terms of peace laid down in the ,president's address to ,congress of ,january #h1 #aiah1 and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses4 ,they must point out1 however1 that what is usually described as the ,freedom of the ,seas is open to various interpretations1 some of which they could not accept4 ,they must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the ,peace ,conference4 ,one further qualification was made by the ,allied ,powers3 by the restoration of the invaded territories they understood that compensation would be made by ,germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the ,allies and their property by the aggression of ,germany by land1 by sea and from the air4 ,thus the ,fourteen ,points were converted into a solemn international agreement4 ,the ,allies agreed that the treaty of peace should consist of the application in detail of that fundamental document4 ,on that understanding the ,germans laid down their arms and surrendered their means of defence4 ,it is always difficult in the affairs of a democratic country to determine the exact point where mere inconsistency and laxity of thought1 or even mere lack of cordination between the various organs of government1 merge into something like deliberate perfidy4 ,it may so easily happen that one set of individuals give the promise and quite another set act in breach of it4 ,but an ,englishman who wishes seriously to understand the present international situation must begin by realizing clearly that the treaty imposed on the ,germans at ,versailles1 after they had surrendered their arms1 appears to them and to a large number of neutral observers as a monstrous breach of faith4 ,it contravened in spirit and in detail much of what they understood by the ,fourteen ,points4 ,i confess that1 after reading carefully the ,german ,protest and the ,allied ,reply1 it seems to me that the ,german reading of ,president ,wilson's terms was in some points the natural one2 and1 apart from the treaty itself1 that the action taken against the ,germans when they were disarmed was not consistent with the language and the pledges addressed to them while they were still in the field4 ,as a matter of fact1 certain of those responsible1 or partly responsible1 for the negotiations on the ,entente side1 when they saw the way things were going1 recalled bitterly the great historic perfidy by which ,rome trapped ,carthage to her doom4 ,a charge of this kind is1 of course1 very serious2 and the results of the action taken at ,versailles have been more than serious4 ,i will ask my readers patiently to consider in broad outlines the causes1 psychological and other1 which seem to have been at work2 for of course it is quite possible and even probable that1 of the main actors concerned1 not one had any intention of trying to trap the ,germans by perjury4 ,some of them doubtless were unscrupulous men1 such as wars habitually throw to the surface2 but they were not men of the ,machiavellian type4 ,two broad facts stand out clearly to one who studies the documents4 ,first1 the ,governments which accepted ,president ,wilson's ,fourteen ,points as the basis of peace with ,germany were from the start quite out of sympathy with his spirit4 ,why1 then1 did they accept them8 ,because they had really no choice4 ,to refuse would not have been only to reject a long delayed and desperately needed peace4 ,it would have been to confess to the world that1 contrary to so many previous professions1 their aims were frankly what is now termed imperialistic4 ,above all1 it would have been to alienate ,mr4 ,wilson1 without whom victory was impossible4 ,they were bound to accept4 ,but ,mr4 ,wilson's language was often rather lacking in definiteness4 ,who knows exactly what justice is1 or what may be regarded as consideration for the true interests of the ,german people8 ,they accepted the terms2 but they were free to use all permissible ingenuity in interpreting a document which they had not drawn up1 and which had been forced upon them in a time of need4 ,furthermore1 one who labours through the four hundred and forty articles of the treaty1 with their innumerable subdivisions1 will find not merely that the treaty represents broadly the victory of the right side over the wrong1 and is a charter of emancipation to large parts of ,europe4 ,he will find also that four hundred or more of the detailed articles are reasonable enough and many of them excellent4 ,the injustice arises in two ways4 ,first1 that on every doubtful point1 and there are many1 the decision is apt to be given against the enemy2 and next1 that behind the respectable structure of the treaty there existed in fact a flood of white-hot war-passion--revenge1 hate1 terror1 suspicion1 and raging covetousness--which poisoned the atmosphere and here and there made a breach in the protecting wall4 ,a great ,english military critic somewhat shocked public opinion by saying at the time of the armistice1 ,this armistice is wrong4 ,we have got them down1 and now we ought to kick them till we have had enough4 ,the ,french1 he said1 ought to have continued the war and marched on to ,berlin1 plundering and ravaging till they had satisfied their revenge4 ,the words sound like insanity1 but the speaker explained them later on4 ,a war of revenge1 he argued1 is within the limits of pardonable human nature4 ,and it comes to an end4 ,but1 being cheated of their decisive campaign of victory1 the ,french were making a peace of revenge2 and that is a thing which is apt to admit of no forgiveness and no finish4 ,i quote these words not because ,i agree with them in practical policy1 but because of the profound psychological truth that they express4 ,behind the statesmen who had pledged their words1 however unwillingly1 remained masses of ignorant1 violent1 and war-maddened people1 many of them with terrible wrongs to avenge and no guide or leader to help them against themselves4 ,we need not recall1 though few sensitive people will ever forget1 the horrors of the propaganda of hate4 ,it is only worth realizing that the mob-inspired journalists and journalist-inspired mobs who clamoured for an utter and all-devouring peace of revenge1 including the starvation and enslavement of half ,europe for thirty or fifty or a hundred years1 had never themselves signed the ,fourteen ,points and felt no personal inconsistency or turpitude if they compelled the ,supreme ,council of the ,allies to break its faith4 ,the first step in this policy lay outside the treaty4 ,the third of the ,fourteen ,points established equality of trade conditions and the removal of economic barriers between all the nations consenting to the peace4 ,immediately after the armistice a proposal was made1 and met with strong ,american support1 that the ,allies should set themselves at once to attempting to cope with the threatened famine and the lack of raw materials in ,central ,europe1 and thus get ,european trade on its legs again as early as possible4 ,this would relieve a vast amount of distress1 serve as a stepping-stone to reconciliation1 save many nations from the danger of irremediable collapse1 and also make far more possible the restoration of the invaded areas and the payment of large reparations by ,germany4 ,it was proposed to follow the analogy of the peace of #ahga2 to draw up a preliminary peace agreement1 stating principles and limits but not details4 ,for example1 it might be agreed that ,germany must surrender some territory in the ,west and in ,poland1 but not beyond certain geographical lines2 must pay an indemnity to be fixed on certain principles1 but not to exceed a certain sum1 and the like4 ,the territorial agreement1 again1 might be based on the elaborate statement of war aims issued by the ,british ,government on ,january #aj1 #aiag4 ,the ,germans could have accepted this1 and the work of reconstruction been begun immediately4 ,incalculable distress and suffering would thus have been saved4 ,but another view prevailed4 ,with the short-sightedness that so often accompanies brutality1 the ,german ,high ,command had1 in the very last months of the war1 when their defeat was certain1 tried systematically to cripple the industry of ,belgium and ,france by destroying mines1 breaking machinery1 carrying off movable plant1 and the like4 ,their own manufacturing plant was undamaged1 and they indulged in the fatuous expectation that they might recapture their lost markets and spring into prosperity1 while ,france and ,belgium were still too crippled to commence work4 ,of course1 this could not be allowed4 ,the obvious alternatives1 such as allocating certain ,german factories to ,french or ,belgian companies whose plant had been destroyed1 or simply allocating the profits to purposes of reparation1 appear not to have been considered4 ,the blinder motives were too strong1 and no statesman arose to give guidance4 ,all ,germany must be punished4 ,she had not been invaded and ravaged4 ,she must be made to suffer the pains of invasion4 ,she must be ravaged in cold blood4 ,the complete ruin of ,germany1 argued certain ,french journalists and politicians1 was demanded by all considerations both of justice and of safety1 and it had not by any means been attained4 ,russia was paralyzed and wrecked by ,bolshevism4 ,but the ,german ,revolution had been carried successfully through4 ,the people were not yet demoralized1 and the problem was how to demoralize them4 ,perhaps starvation would do it4 ,hence was started the policy of deliberately ruining ,germany1 after her surrender1 by a long blockade in time of what1 to the ordinary man1 appeared to be peace1 and immediately after a promise of the removal of economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions4 ,this was not a technical breach of faith2 technically we were still at war with ,germany1 and we had never promised not to starve our enemies after their surrender4 ,the promise of equality of trade conditions only applied to conditions after the peace4 ,nevertheless1 a historian will probably regard the establishment and continuance of this blockade of the enemy lands after their surrender as one of those many acts of almost incredible inhumanity which have made the recent ,great ,war conspicuous in the annals of mankind and shaken thoughtful men's faith in the reality of modern civilization4 ,certain articles in the ,matin discussing the exact dose of famine desirable in order to create the maximum of individual suffering and public weakness in the ,boche are difficult to parallel in the literature of morbid hate1 except among some of the ,german war pamphlets4 ,thus the ,fourteen ,points1 besides a regrettable indefiniteness of phrasing1 had the fatal fault of being utterly out of touch with the feeling of most of the belligerents4 ,as the time wore on this feeling asserted its influence on the terms of the treaty4 ,the ,boche had deliberately and treacherously plunged ,europe into war2 he had waged the war with revolting cruelty2 he had inflicted unheard-of suffering on the innocent1 and1 by a miracle1 he had been beaten4 ,now let him pay the penalty6 ,president ,wilson had pledged the ,allies to be just to the ,german people as to all others4 4 4 4 ,to propose anything but justice to ,germany at any time would be to renounce our own cause4 ,very good1 answered the dominant voices of #aiah2 the criminal asks for justice1 and so far as our power reaches1 justice he shall have6 ,the total of wrongs done by ,germany1 in plotting the war1 in waging it1 and in the destruction of life and property1 could easily be regarded as an almost infinite sum1 and ,justice surely demanded for that an almost infinite punishment4 ,the first concession to this insistent pressure was on a point of form4 ,the language of the ,fourteen ,points and the accompanying documents implied that the treaty would be a matter of discussion and negotiation4 ,the basis was agreed upon2 it seemed natural to suppose that the next step was to negotiate4 ,but popular feeling had caught at the phrase unconditional surrender2 and1 though nothing could be clearer than the fact that the ,german army had surrendered on perfectly explicit conditions1 signed and agreed to by every ,government concerned1 it was decided that terms were not to be negotiated but imposed4 ,mr4 ,keynes has shown in an interesting way how great was the effect of this decision4 ,terms were drawn up with a view to bargaining1 leaving a margin for possible concessions2 and then there was no bargaining4 ,the whole demand was suddenly enforced4 ,questions of territory outside ,europe were decided purely by conquest4 ,immense areas in ,asia and ,africa were seized as spoil by the strongest ,powers1 though the conditions of their tenure were1 so it was hoped1 to be regulated by the ,league of ,nations4 ,in some cases there was a pretence of consulting the wishes of the inhabitants2 in most cases this was not practicable4 ,in ,syria and ,south ,tyrol the wishes of the inhabitants were notoriously overridden4 ,in ,europe as a whole1 however1 the decisions were made on ,wilsonian principles4 ,true1 they told heavily against ,germany4 ,but as a matter of fact the ,germans and ,german ,austrians1 by reason of their great strength and high organizing power1 had an imperial position in ,europe1 and any liberation of subject or quasi-subject nationalities was bound to be at the expense of the ,germans4 ,the territorial settlement1 in spite of the great and needless distress produced by the break-up of the ,austro-,hungarian system1 is on principles of nationality juster than that which preceded it4 ,the more extreme anti-,german claims were successfully resisted4 ,france was not allowed to annex ,germany up to the ,elbe1 as ,m4 ,hanotaux wished2 nor even up to the ,rhine4 ,no partition of ,germany by force was permitted1 though an agitation for that purpose still continues in ,france and the prohibition of any future union between ,german-,austria and the rest of ,germany was actually embodied in the treaty4 ,the treaty of ,berlin had in just the same way attempted to forbid the unity of ,bulgaria4 ,as regards the penal clauses1 it may be convincingly argued that the great crimes and cruelties and breaches of law which have signalized this war ought emphatically to meet with judgment and punishment from some tribunal representing the conscience of civilized mankind4 ,on grounds of justice the presence of such penal clauses in the treaty could be amply justified1 though considerations of policy make it more questionable4 ,but all thoughts of equal justice disappeared in derision when it was found that only crimes committed by the enemies of the ,entente were to be punished2 crimes committed by ,british1 ,french1 ,italian1 ,serbian or ,american criminals were privileged acts1 to which ,justice had nothing to say4 ,this absurd clause has1 of course1 given rise to suspicions1 more absurd than itself1 of dark crimes committed by ,entente generals which must be concealed at any cost4 ,such suggestions are nonsense4 ,indefensible as it is1 the clause was dictated by no more sinister passion than ordinary national vanity4 ,the economic clauses were open to graver suspicions4 ,it was whispered that trade interests of not quite unimpeachable character had some influence with members of the ,french1 the ,italian1 and even the ,english ,government2 and the old ,german accusation that ,england entered the war in order to destroy a trade rival1 utterly untrue at the time1 seemed to receive some colour by the terms of peace4 ,germany depended for her prosperity on her industry and her overseas trade4 ,her industry was wrecked by an immense demand upon her coal4 ,the mines of ,lorraine1 the ,saar ,valley1 and1 subject to plebiscite1 of ,silesia1 were handed over to other states2 and out of the remainder ,germany was condemned to pay an amount of coal which proved1 on investigation at ,spa1 two years later1 to be beyond her powers4 ,her overseas trade was annihilated at a blow by the seizure of all the vessels of her mercantile marine exceeding #afjj tons gross and a large proportion of her small vessels and fishing-boats1 combined with a demand upon such ships as she might build in future4 ,her voice was stifled by the seizure of all her telegraphic cables3 news henceforth was to be a monopoly of the conquerors4 ,at the same time all her colonies were taken from her4 ,she was forbidden to set up any tariffs for her own protection4 ,her navigable rivers were put under the control of international commissions on which the ,germans or ,austrians were a small minority4 ,and while it was somewhat unctuously explained to ,germany that in a virtuous world trade would be free and untrammelled1 and that the commissions only intended to see that she did not erect barriers against her innocent neighbours1 there was no provision whatever made to debar the ,allies from erecting what barriers they pleased against ,germany4 ,it would appear to be a fundamental fallacy1 declared the ,allied ,reply1 that the political control of a country is essential in order to procure a reasonable share of its products4 ,such a proposal finds no foundation in economic law or history4 ,it has found some foundation in history since4 ,the triumph of penal ingenuity1 however1 was the indefinite indemnity4 ,it was agreed on both sides that ,germany was to pay an indemnity4 ,she did not demur4 ,indeed1 her mouth was closed by the monstrously oppressive and inhuman proposals various ,germans had themselves put forward when they expected to win the war4 ,she had openly intended to bleed ,france and ,england white4 ,now that she was beaten she was prepared to pay4 ,she accepted the duty of restoring the invaded territories4 ,this was defined as reparation for all damage done to the civil population of the ,allies by ,german aggression4 ,the ,germans probably understood this to mean the damage done to civilian life and property by invasions or raids2 but they were told that this view was too narrow4 ,every soldier killed or wounded had civilians dependent on him2 nay1 he himself was really a civilian forced by ,german aggression to desert his business4 ,all his business losses1 the separation allowances to his wife1 the pensions to ex-soldiers or to their dependents1 all damage to any one's health or honour1 were ultimately due to ,german aggression and should be paid by ,germany4 ,no such terms had ever been heard of before1 true2 but the ,british electors had been promised that ,germany should pay the whole cost of the war2 and the sense of the solemn contract was distorted to suit the election cry4 ,after #ahga the ,germans had imposed on ,france what was then considered the extremely severe indemnity of two hundred million pounds sterling4 ,some experts now proposed two thousand million sterling as an adequate indemnity to be paid by ,germany1 others three thousand million4 ,that was emended by popular orators to ten thousand million2 thirty thousand million2 fifty thousand million4 ,absurd to say that ,germany could not pay6 ,if all ,german property were confiscated and all ,germans for seventy-five years were made to work for the ,allies at a bare subsistence wage1 a well-known ,english public man was prepared to get more than fifty thousand million out of them4 ,the ,americans bluntly refused to endorse demands which they considered extortionate4 ,the indemnity was left unspecified4 ,it should depend on ,germany's capacity to pay4 ,let the ,germans get to work at once and do their best4 ,the more they produced1 the more the ,allies would take2 and if1 after two years or so1 it became necessary to fix the sum1 the less the ,germans had produced in those two years the less they would eventually have to pay4 ,it is said that some of the ,british ,ministers1 secretly anxious to be more reasonable than was consistent with popularity at the moment1 wished to postpone the fixing of the indemnity until the rage of their own ,khaki ,election should have cooled down4 ,but their calculation was a bad one4 ,as the ,german delegation observed3 ,the ,german people would feel themselves condemned in slavery1 because everything they accomplished would benefit neither themselves nor even their children1 but merely strangers4 ,but the system of slave labour has never been successful4 ,for the purpose of raising money the proposal was merely fatuous4 ,it took away from the ,germans every possible motive for producing wealth4 ,but its object in some minds was not money3 its object was the permanent ruin of ,germany4 ,it was feared in ,france that1 though the ,germans were now exhausted and beggared1 their notorious industry and ingenuity might in time enable them to pay off their indemnity and rise again to affluence and strength4 ,so it was arranged that1 for some years at least1 they should be deprived of every motive for industry4 ,lastly1 a new provision was made about private property4 ,the rule hitherto observed in the land wars of civilized states was that enemy private property was respected1 and if seized during the war was restored at the conclusion of peace4 ,this rule was1 of course1 enforced in favour of any property belonging to nationals of the ,entente countries situated in enemy lands2 but reciprocity was not admitted4 ,the private property of any ,german situate in any part of the world which was under the control of the ,ententes was ipso facto confiscated4 ,the ,allied and ,associated ,powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all such property4 ,every ,german1 however innocent1 who had settled in our territory before the war was thus exposed to be robbed of everything he possessed4 ,nay1 it seems almost incredible1 but in the original form of the treaty which was put before the enemy for signature the stipulation seems actually to have been laid down that any property which a ,german might hereafter make or acquire in ,entente territory should be liable to confiscation at the will of the ,entente ,governments6 ,this clause was too much even for the atmosphere of ,versailles1 and in response to the ,german protest the stipulation about the future was dropped4#b ,for the rest of the confiscation1 the ,entente ,reply brazens it out with the remark that the property is not really taken from the individual1 as his own ,government can always pay him back6 ,and in case the private property of ,germans in neutral countries should have an unfair advantage1 the ,reparation ,commission obtained special powers for confiscating that too1 up to the limit of #ajj1jjj1jjj4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,keynes1 pp4 #fj-ajb4 ,a provision was kept enabling all such private property to be confiscated in case the ,german ,government should voluntarily fail to fulfil its engagements4 ,but this also was dropped by the ,british ,government in ,october1 #aibj4 ,we need not stop to consider whether there was any extraordinary exhibition of ,teutonic insolence in the action of certain ,german officials who resigned their offices rather than sign this treaty2 nor need we swell the chorus of ,english1 ,french1 ,italian1 and ,american newspapers in expressing the natural horror of those refined nations at the bad manners of ,count ,brockdorf-,rantzau in actually breaking a paper-knife in the stress of his emotion1 when1 under protest1 he consented to sign4 ,there was one man among the ,british representatives who had known what it was to be conquered after a desperate war4 ,general ,smuts was a man of imagination as well as a soldier and a statesman4 ,he hesitated long before signing the treaty2 and when1 in the end1 he decided that it was necessary to do so1 he immediately published a statement of protest4 ,i have signed the peace treaty1 not because ,i consider it a satisfactory document1 but because it is imperatively necessary to close the war4 4 4 4 ,the six months since the armistice was signed have perhaps been as upsetting1 unsettling1 and ruinous to ,europe as the previous four years of war4 ,i look upon the peace treaty as the close of those two chapters of war and armistice1 and only on that ground do ,i sign it4 ,liberal opinion in ,england muttered assent4 ,some important officials resigned4 ,but the fear of upsetting peace altogether prevented any open protest in ,parliament4 ,we need not lose ourselves in speculations as to the strange devices to which public men can sink when their self-interest is clear and their responsibility can be denied or evaded2 nor yet as to the infinite ramifications by which war spreads its poison through human society1 a thing twice-cursed1 cursing him that strikes and him that suffers4 ,the old ,german ,government had committed a vast crime against humanity2 its people had backed it up1 as all ,european peoples back up their own ,governments1 and could not expect to escape heavy punishment4 ,the one question we need ask ourselves is this3 ,is it not as certain1 as anything in human nature can be1 that a treaty of such a character1 imposed on a conquered nation by force1 if not also by treachery1 will1 as a matter of course and without the faintest scruple1 be broken as soon as there is a favourable opportunity for breaking it8 ,of course the ,germans will break it if they can2 and of course they will make another war1 call it a war of revenge or a war for freedom as you please1 as soon as there is any chance of winning it4 ,so said the ,justizrat in the train4 ,so1 in effect1 says ,herr ,simons2 so almost ad nauseam repeat all the ,german ,conservative and patriotic newspapers4 ,it is difficult to see how any ,german who is not a convinced pacifist should do otherwise than prepare with all his energies for the next war1 unless some other way is made possible of escape from a tormenting servitude4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,position ,,of ,,france ,if that is so1 what is the position of ,france8 ,france in #aiad was forced into a war which she tried hard to avoid4 ,the ,french suffered horribly and fought heroically4 ,they sacrificed everything to the war4 ,and we1 who know what our own people paid in broken nerve1 in bitterness1 and in economic dislocation1 cannot be surprised that ,france has paid a heavier price4 ,they escaped defeat by the help of ,england1 ,russia1 ,italy1 and ,america2 without these powerful allies they would certainly have been defeated4 ,we need not try to estimate exactly what their fate would have been if they had lost the late war1 because if they lose the next their treatment will be infinitely worse4 ,it will be1 as far as possible1 tabula rasa4 ,it will be the passing of the horse-hoofs of ,attila4 ,meantime ,france's allies are1 naturally enough1 going home and attending to their own businesses2 her population is much smaller than ,germany's and increases even more slowly4 ,a ,french statesman of the type of ,m4 ,poincar or ,m4 ,hanotaux makes himself no illusions4 ,germany is the enemy4 ,germany will fight again as soon as she is strong enough4 ,therefore she must never be allowed to become strong enough4 ,m4 ,hanotaux1 who was ,foreign ,minister during the years #ahid-ih1 when ,french foreign policy was more ably managed than now1 has recently published a book in criticism of the ,treaty of ,versailles4 ,he does not deal in any ,wilsonian phrases about justice or humanity2 he considers the treaty solely with a view to the security of ,france1 and he finds it sadly wanting4 ,and a large mass of opinion1 probably the prevailing opinion1 in ,france supports him4 ,first of all1 it must be remembered1 ,france wanted1 and thought she had received1 a special guarantee against future ,german attacks in the form of a defensive ,alliance between ,france1 ,england1 and ,america4 ,the representatives at ,paris had agreed to this treaty1 which definitely pledged ,england and ,america to come again to the help of ,france in case of another unprovoked attack by ,germany4 ,the ,english ,parliament1 amid some protests1 ratified the treaty1 but the ,united ,states ,senate threw it out1 and therewith the treaty ceased to be binding on ,england4 ,i think1 after considerable hesitation1 that the rejection of the treaty was a misfortune4 ,formally1 no doubt1 it was open to objection4 ,it seemed like an unnecessary excrescence upon the ,covenant of the ,league of ,nations1 which already gave guarantees against war4 ,it contravened one of ,mr4 ,wilson's principles1 and a very sound one1 laid down on ,september #bg1 #aiah3 ,thirdly1 there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the ,league of ,nations4 ,yet the practical importance of reassuring ,france was so urgent that a little formal incorrectness might have been worth incurring2 and even formal incorrectness could have been avoided by the simple expedient of making this guarantee to ,france take the form of a special rider to ,article ,,xvi of the ,covenant4 ,that article provides3 ,should any member of the ,league resort to war in disregard of its covenants under ,articles ,,xii1 ,,xiii1 or ,,xv1 it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the ,league1 which hereby undertake immediately to 4 4 4 ,to do what8 ,one expects that they will undertake to declare war1 and this is what the ,french wanted4 ,but no4 ,they only undertake to apply an economic boycott to the offending state1 while the ,council may recommend to the several ,governments concerned what effective military1 naval1 or air force they shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the ,league4 ,in case of a future attack by ,germany on ,france1 ,france's late allies are bound to boycott ,german trade1 but are not explicitly bound to give military help to ,france4 ,i suggest that it would have been possible for ,great ,britain and ,america to add a rider stating specifically that in one of the cases contemplated by this article1 namely1 an unprovoked attack on ,france by ,germany1 they would not merely proclaim a blockade and consider what to do next1 but would immediately and unconditionally declare war4 ,such an undertaking would involve some risk and be contrary to our usual policy2 but ,i am inclined to suggest that the risk would have been worth taking4 ,however1 this was not done4 ,france was left with the impression that if attacked she could not count with confidence on the military support of her late allies or of the other ,powers of the ,league4 ,the result was disastrous4 ,while the rest of ,europe1 supported by a small but generous and brilliant band of ,french radicals and ,socialists1 considered the ,treaty of ,versailles intolerably harsh1 the dominant ,french policy complained that it was inadequate for her protection4 ,the line of criticism was somewhat as follows3 #a4 ,germany should have been broken up4 ,no peace should have been made with ,germany as a whole1 but separate treaties of peace with ,saxony1 ,bavaria1 ,westphalia1 ,prussia1 etc4 ,these states should have been provided with separate systems of coinage1 postage1 tariffs1 laws1 etc41 so as to make the diversity stable and permanent4 ,they should be forbidden ever to unite4 ,also1 ,france should have annexed a large part of ,germany2 not up to the ,rhine--which was the view of ,marshal ,foch--but up to the ,elbe4 ,the occupation of this territory might impose a burden on ,france1 but burdens must be borne when such important purposes are involved4 ,and after all the cost could be charged to the ,germans6 4 4 4 ,as this simple precaution was not taken1 the next best thing is to keep ,germany weak4 ,starve her by the blockade till sheer misery produces a ,bolshevik revolution and society collapses in common ruin4 ,then apply the indefinite indemnity1 not from the desire to get money1 but to prevent ,germany again raising her head4 #b4 ,since ,france's late allies cannot be relied upon1 she must make by diplomacy new allies whose hands she can force1 and who occupy a convenient geographical situation4 ,poland is in just the right place4 ,let ,france help ,poland and stimulate ,polish ambitions4 ,she too is a nation maddened by suffering and now dazzled by success4 ,a great imperialist ,poland1 on bad terms with her neighbours1 but backed by ,france1 will need a large and effective army1 and will be ready to strike at ,germany's rear the moment she attempts to move westward4 ,unfortunately1 ,poland is apt to be on bad terms with ,russia2 and as things now are ,russia is so much the enemy of the ,entente that she is thrown into the arms of ,germany4 ,that is deplorable and must not be allowed to continue4 ,the ,bolsheviks must be overthrown and a ,government set up in ,russia which is dependent for its existence on ,french support4 ,as an additional safeguard1 perhaps it will be necessary to secure a pro-,french ,hungary1 to back up the pro-,french ,poland4 ,but we must not despair yet of overthrowing the ,bolsheviks4 #c4 ,lastly1 ,france herself needs more soldiers4 ,and she knows where to get them6 ,the late ,king ,leopold of ,belgium once said to ,m4 ,hanotaux1 ,qu'est-ce que vous cherchez en ,afrique1 vous autres ,franais8 and ,m4 ,hanotaux replied1 ,sire1 des soldats6 ,france during the war established conscription in her ,african territories and1 in spite of a somewhat bloody rebellion by the ignorant savages1 who thought the slave trade was being restablished1 succeeded in importing to ,france a black army which at one time numbered #fjj1jjj fighting men4 ,with a little more energy and greatly increased territories1 that number might be trebled4 ,france is a smaller nation than ,germany2 but ,france plus ,algeria1 ,tunis1 ,morocco1 ,senegambia1 ,french ,congo1 and the new ,german territories is a much larger nation than ,germany without colonies4 ,and blacks fortunately have not the same rights as white men6 ,a permanently wrecked ,germany1 vast black armies for ,france1 armed allies always ready on ,germany's eastern frontier2 with these conditions fulfilled1 ,france1 it is hoped by these politicians1 may at last breathe freely4 99 99 99 99 99 ,what is wrong with this policy8 ,you may call it devilish1 if you will1 since it is based on the deliberate and artificial creation of human misery2 but is it bad policy8 ,after all1 air-bombs and poison gas and the like may be called devilish4 ,but1 devilish or not1 they have sometimes to be used4 ,if ,germany is certainly and confessedly looking out for the next opportunity of escaping from the consequences of the treaty and retrieving her fortunes on the battlefield1 is not ,france bound to take every precaution to see that ,germany shall never be strong enough to do so with success8 ,the next war will be far worse than the last4 ,the terms imposed on the beaten party will be even more desolating and destructive4 ,france is probably a less vigorous plant than her enemy4 ,she has failed to kill ,germany1 but ,germany might succeed in killing her4 ,it seems that ,germany is absolutely bound to fight1 if there is no other way of recovering her freedom and her right to live1 while ,france is absolutely bound to hold her enemy down mercilessly1 if there is no other way of securing her own safety4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,solution ,but perhaps after all there is4 ,last among the ,fourteen ,points came the proposal to found ,a general ,association of ,nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to small and great states alike4 ,the ,treaty of ,versailles has after all two faces4 ,it had to express two great waves of feeling and two international necessities4 ,mr4 ,wilson was not so utterly bamboozled as ,mr4 ,keynes would have us believe4 ,general ,smuts and ,lord ,robert ,cecil were not so utterly without influence on the settlement4 ,the least depressing paragraphs in the ,allied ,reply to the ,german delegation are those in which they explain that the terrific severity of the greater part of the treaty applies only to a transition period of punishment1 of reparation and of trial1 at the end of which they see the realization of ,mr4 ,wilson's promises4 ,the conditions of peace contain some provisions for the future which may outlast the transition period during which the economic balance--between ,germany and the invaded countries--is to be restored2 and a reciprocity is foreseen after that period which is very clearly that equality of trade conditions for which ,president ,wilson has stipulated4 ,the phrasing of the paragraph is awkward1 but the main drift is clear4 ,the ,fourteen ,points are accepted1 but adjourned2 when ,germany has been punished and reparation made1 they will come into force4 ,the ,allied and ,associated ,powers look forward to the time when the ,league of ,nations established by this treaty shall extend its membership to all peoples4 ,they see no reason why ,germany should not become a member of the ,league in the early future1 provided she satisfies certain tests4 ,it has never been their intention that ,germany or any other ,power should be indefinitely excluded from the ,league of ,nations4 ,they are convinced that the ,covenant of the ,league introduces an element of progress into the relations of peoples which will develop and strengthen to the advantage of justice and of peace4 ,this is as it should be2 but the world does not stand still while ,germany is making reparation and being taught gradually to love her chastisers4 ,if the ,league introduces an element of progress1 the sooner it gets to work the better4 ,it is only too clear that every month which passes with the ,league entirely dominated by ,england1 ,france1 and ,italy encourages and deepens the suspicion with which the ,league is regarded by its critics4 ,i say nothing of ,american criticisms1 in which many factors coperate4 ,but the ,swiss ,federal ,council1 in the very able and persuasive message which it issued to the ,assembly on ,february #ag1 #aibj1 in favour of joining the ,league1 has to deal with this suspicion4 ,one has been tempted at times to consider the ,league as an alliance of the conquerors against the conquered4 ,the fact that ,germany1 ,austria1 and the former ,russian ,empire remain provisionally excluded from the ,league may have given a semblance of truth to this manner of thinking4 ,the suspicion is afterwards described as this apparently accurate criticism4 ,switzerland as a whole has fortunately rejected the suspicion and by a small majority joined the ,league4 ,but in most of ,central ,europe the ,league of ,nations movement is strangled in its birth by the general feeling that the present ,league means merely the ,entente ,powers and their clients1 and the elements for starting a counter-league are consolidating month by month4 ,this counter-league would probably not be an open and confessed alliance4 ,but ,russia1 ,germany1 and the ,united ,states are still outside1 and there are many unpaid grudges amongst the ,moslems of ,asia4 ,the test which is exacted by ,article ,i from any new state desiring to become a member of the ,league is that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations4 ,interpreted with theological strictness1 this would probably result in the rejection of all candidates1 to say nothing of the expulsion of many of the original members4 ,perfect sincerity in observing unpleasant obligations is not a common characteristic of human societies4 ,but in the ordinary sense of the words the test is already satisfied by ,germany and ,austria and most of the succession states4 ,the ,assembly of the ,league meets for the first time on ,november #ae1 #aibj4 ,it ought not to dissolve without admitting to its membership ,germany and ,austria1 as well as several other candidates who have already applied4 ,at the moment of writing 7,november1 #aibj71 ,lord ,grey1 ,lord ,selborne1 and ,mr4 ,barnes have issued a joint appeal for the immediate admission of ,germany1 which has long been the accepted policy of the ,league of ,nations ,union4 ,there are many obstacles1 but the result will doubtless be known before these words are in print4 ,fortunately1 the admission of new members is decided by a two-thirds majority of the ,assembly and does not require a unanimous vote4 ,once the ,league is established on a broad base1 including the conquered nations on equal terms with the victorious1 the prospect of that war of revenge which has hitherto seemed almost inevitable will dwindle and become remote4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the hope expressed above has not been realized4 ,austria1 ,bulgaria1 and many less important states applied for admission to the ,league and were accepted1 but ,french feeling was known to be very strong1 and ,germany did not even apply4 ,had she done so she would probably have had a majority in her favour1 and it was considered until the beginning of ,march1 #aiba1 that she was certain of admission at the next meeting of the ,assembly in ,september4 ,but in the meantime untoward events have taken place4 ,the ,french ,government1 like the ,english1 obtained success at the elections by wild promises to make ,germany pay all the costs of the war4 ,as ,m4 ,poincar has observed1 the ,french people will not understand how the victors in a great war can be on the verge of bankruptcy4 ,consequently they think their rulers are cheating them4 ,educated people1 in ,france as in ,england1 have long since ceased to expect much from ,german indemnities1 but the ,governments still depend on their appeal to mob-psychology2 and it was believed that if ,m4 ,briand ventured to make any concessions in the direction of reason or moderation he would lose his majority in the ,chamber4 ,the proposals made at the ,inter-,allied ,conference at ,brussels and drawn up by the ,french expert1 ,m4 ,seydoux1 had been silently dropped as unsatisfying2 the subsequent ,british proposals made at ,boulogne had been rejected for the same reason4 ,it was necessary1 however1 to make some definite proposals to ,germany without much further delay1 since the treaty had laid down ,may #a1 #aiba1 as the time for a settlement4 ,germany was by that time to have paid a thousand million pounds on account1 and was to learn the extent1 finite or infinite1 of the total bill4 ,mr4 ,lloyd ,george1 as might have been expected1 showed much sympathy with ,m4 ,briand in his awkward position1 and agreed to a demand for reparations on a scale which was obviously fantastic4 ,it began1 reasonably enough1 with a system of annuities1 though the first figure was probably too high and the last figures can scarcely have been meant seriously4 ,germany was to pay #aej1jjj1jjj a year for the first five years2 then the annual sum was to increase at intervals for the extraordinary period of forty-two years1 towards the end of which time ,germany was expected to pay annually #cjj1jjj1jjj1 or half as much again every year as the total indemnity exacted from ,france after the war of #ahgj4 ,even that was not enough for a population which had been sedulously fed on lies by a class of politician who at times seem to possess among them no single sane and honest man4 ,and an additional payment was demanded of a yearly sum equivalent to a duty of twelve per cent ad valorem on all ,german exports4 ,opinion in ,germany was sharply divided4 ,all they had to pay with was an enormous deficit on the ,budget1 with the prospect of presently losing the ,silesian coal-mines and having prohibitive duties placed by the ,allies upon their exports4 ,one party insisted that the ,government should make no promise which it could not expect to perform2 another1 that what ,germany wanted was peace1 and that they had better sign anything required of them4 ,the first party1 on the whole1 carried the day4 ,the ,german delegation in ,london made a counter-proposal based1 very sensibly1 on the idea of finding the present value of the forty-two-year annuities and raising that sum by means of a loan2 but as they worked out the idea they favoured ,germany on every detailed calculation to an extent which they must have known to be unacceptable4 ,apparently they expected a long and serious bargaining march4 ,but1 to most people's surprise1 ,mr4 ,george leapt with alacrity at the prospect of a rupture4 ,the proposal was rejected with every semblance of virtuous indignation4 ,no time was allowed for the delegation to consult the ,german ,government4 ,a hurried second proposal1 to pay the terms demanded for five years and then have the matter reconsidered1 was tossed aside without consideration1 and ,french and ,british troops proceeded to invade ,germany1 occupy more territory1 and set up a new and artificial customs-barrier in the most unsuitable places1 at which they proceeded themselves to collect the ,german customs4 ,the plan is very expensive1 and utterly unprofitable4 ,it involves a straining if not a breach of the treaty1#c and it is likely1 if any untoward event occurs1 to provoke a war of the most humiliating and embittered kind--the war of a desperate and helpless population trying to rid themselves of foreign oppressors4 ,but it has saved ,m4 ,briand's ,government4 ,if he had agreed to accept any ,german terms whatever1 he would have been upset for not exacting more4 ,but if he marches ,french and ,british troops into the heart of ,germany no one can accuse him of lack of spirit4 ,so for the present all is well2 and as for the future1 it is conceivable that the ,germans will give way and make some impossible promise4 ,that will increase ,m4 ,briand's prestige4 ,it is more likely that they will simply sit still and let the ,allied armies do their worst4 ,then there will be a chance of carrying out one of the darling aims of the ,french chauvinists1 and annexing1 or at least separating from ,germany1 all the ,german provinces which they occupy4 ,footnote #c3 ,the ,allies are apparently acting under ,part ,,viii1 clause #ah1 of the treaty4 ,this gives them the right to take such other measures as the respective ,governments may determine to be necessary in case of voluntary default by ,germany in the payment of her dues under ,part ,,viii 7,reparations74 ,a failure by ,germany to disarm sufficiently gives the ,allies no right to increase the area of their occupation1 since the present occupation is specifically laid down in the treaty negotiations as the means of enforcing disarmament4 ,nor has ,germany yet actually committed a voluntary default in the payment of her reparations1 since the first payment1 #ajj1jjj1jjj1 is not to be completed until ,may #a1 #aiba4 ,i am informed on high authority that the ,allied case probably rests on the point that they judge by their debtor's manner and by statements which she has made that she intends not to pay by ,may #a2 according to ,english law this would apparently give them some right of taking immediate action4 ,in face of these lunatic proceedings the ,german ,government has behaved with considerable dignity and good sense1 though naturally the ,german newspapers are running a little wild4 ,it has announced its intention of appealing to the ,assembly of the ,league of ,nations1 and although1 not being a member1 ,germany cannot herself raise the subject1 it may be taken as certain that some member will take it up on her behalf4 ,this produces a most critical situation4 ,according to the ,covenant1 ,article ,,iii1 the ,assembly may be summoned to meet from time to time as occasion may require4 ,but presumably it is the ,council which decides whether occasion does require it or not1 and no one can expect the ,council to favour ,germany's appeal4 ,the appeal will only be considered when the ,assembly has its next regular meeting in ,september4 ,we shall then see whether the ,assembly possesses the force and courage necessary to discuss freely and1 if necessary1 to condemn the actions of the two leading ,european ,powers2 or if the two can successfully silence all criticism4 ,for my own part ,i think the discussion will take place2 and that1 for the first time since the war1 the voice of an impartial third party wilt be heard in discussing the terms imposed on ,germany by her conquerors4 ,that does not mean the realization of the enthronement of public right on the common law of nations1 but it is one of the first steps toward it4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,league of ,nations is in a position to say to ,france3 ,you are afraid of another attack by ,germany2 and to avert that danger you propose in various ways to follow a policy which will plunge ,europe into continued distress4 ,we hereby guarantee you against attack4 ,thirty-nine nations at present1 who will shortly be increased to fifty-one1 if not more1 have signed a definite and unqualified contract to preserve your 'existing political independence and territorial integrity' against any 'external aggression'2 and further1 if you are attacked in such a way as not actually to threaten your territory or independence1 all the ,states of the ,league will consider that an act of war has been committed against themselves1 will apply the complete economic boycott to your enemy1 and arrange plans for giving you immediate military support4 ,we offer you here a far more effective guarantee of safety than you can possibly attain by your own diplomacy4 ,but we demand in return that your foreign policy shall be frankly and sincerely a ,league of ,nations policy2 that you shall not make secret treaties1 not set up inequitable tariffs1 not plot the ruin of your late enemies or any other people2 but work as a loyal member of the ,league with a view to the welfare of the whole4 ,the ,league says to ,germany3 ,you complain of the undue severity of the treaty and the impossibility of carrying out its economic provisions4 ,commissions already exist1 and you have taken part in them1 for discussing these latter and fixing the terms of the reparation which you owe4 ,but1 beyond that1 if there is any clause in the treaty which appears to any member of the ,league as 'threatening to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends1' it will1 under ,article ,,xi1 be brought before the ,league and considered4 ,further1 if any clause in the treaty appears to 'have become inapplicable' or to give rise to 'international conditions which might endanger the peace of the world1' under ,article ,,xxiii the ,assembly of the ,league may at any time 'advise their reconsideration4' ,you complain that the terms of the present treaty were imposed upon you1 without discussion1 by implacable enemies who had you at their mercy2 that you have been made a sort of outlaw nation1 without freedom1 without colonies1 without ships1 sitting apart while the world is administered by your enemies4 ,but at our ,assembly table you will sit as an equal and free member1 with the same rights as those who were lately your conquerors4 ,we submit to you that this gives you a far better chance of improving your condition than another war could4 ,your lot must be for some time a hard one4 ,that is inevitable1 and we cannot think it unjust4 ,you challenged the ,entente to war1 you staked all on victory1 and you were beaten4 ,now you have to make reparation4 ,but the recuperative power of a great nation is immense2 and wherever you have been subjected to a definitely unjust or dangerous condition1 we offer you a remedy4 ,wherever you may have a dispute with any other ,power1 we offer you a ,court of ,arbitration as impartially constituted as the wit of man could devise4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at present neither party quite believes this guarantee4 ,if they did1 it would probably be enough for them4 ,it used to be said of ,sir ,edward ,grey in the ,balkan ,conferences that he was not only sincere2 he had the power of making other people see that he was sincere4 ,if ,europe is to be saved from new ,great ,wars1 the ,powers of the ,league must first of all be sincere in their undertakings1 and next1 they must convince the world in general of their sincerity4 ,to that subject we must return later4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,east ,but the world is not merely threatened by the prospect of future wars4 ,it is filled with wars at the present moment4 ,there are quarrels and bickerings between most of the newly liberated states in eastern ,europe2 there is a war1 sometimes avowed and sometimes underground1 between ,communist ,russia and all her neighbours and rivals1 a war whose tentacles reach far throughout ,europe and ,asia2 and there are wars against the ,british and ,french in various parts of the ,east4 ,let us briefly touch upon a few sample cases4 ,i4 ,,syria1 ,,mesopotamia1 ,,egypt1 ,,and ,,india ,the simplest case is ,syria4 ,in #aiae1 during the war1 a ,syrian ,national ,committee1 including representatives from ,damascus and ,mosul1 negotiated with us through ,sherif ,husein1 and we signed a document promising to recognize and uphold ,arab independence in an area including the whole of ,arabia1 ,palestine1 ,syria1 and ,mesopotamia1 except 7#a7 ,aden and 7#b7 the ,syrian coast4 ,within the independent area we merely claimed for ourselves a measure of administrative control in ,bagdad and ,bosra--not in ,mosul--and reserved any special interests of ,france4 ,the ,french were informed of the negotiations immediately4 ,they expressed themselves content with the possession of the ,syrian coast1 and agreed in our promises to ,husein4 ,on the strength of this agreement the ,hejaz revolted1 and ,feisul's army1 consisting mainly of ,syrian and ,mesopotamian soldiers who had formerly been in the ,turkish service1 fought as our allies to the end of the war4 ,an attempted rising in ,syria proper was crushed with great severity by the ,turks4 ,in #aiah the ,syrians welcomed the ,entente armies as liberators1 and were again promised their national independence1 though this time it was to be under the guidance of one of the ,entente ,powers as mandatory4 ,they asked that the mandatory should be ,england1 but ,england had too much on her hands4 ,the ,syrians next asked for ,america2 but ,america refused all mandates4 ,france1 meantime1 had always claimed special rights in ,syria1 and ,england by a treaty made during the war had recognized ,syria as a ,french interest4 ,if they must be under ,france1 the ,syrian representatives specially demanded pledges that the government should be a civil government1 that a certain degree of independence should be allowed to the natives1 and that the country should not be occupied by ,french troops4 ,how far these pledges were given and broken by the ,french2 how far it was only we ourselves who gave assurances which we had neither the right nor the power to carry out1 and thus unconsciously deceived ,feisul1 these are questions still in dispute4 ,it seems unfortunately certain that the ,syrians considered themselves betrayed4 ,in the end1 ,syria was occupied by ,french troops2 the native government was not recognized1 but dispersed2 there were raids and pitched battles1 and the ,emir ,feisul1 one of our most popular heroes during the ,great ,war1 was expelled from his throne and country4 ,he is now an exile1 and was for a time officially forbidden to land in ,england4 ,france so far has neither accepted nor asked for any mandate from the ,league of ,nations1 and appears not fully to realize the obligations undertaken by her in signing the ,covenant of the ,league1 or the pledge repeated in the ,reply of the ,allied ,powers to ,germany1 that the ,mandatory ,powers1 in so far as they may be appointed trustees by the ,league of ,nations1 will derive no benefits from such trusteeship4 ,in ,mesopotamia the ,british established themselves during the war after a long and chequered campaign by defeating the ,turks and capturing ,bagdad4 ,the ,indian soldiers and officials who were in command showed the most praiseworthy zeal and energy in proceeding at once to develop the country3 to drain and irrigate1 to plant crops1 to establish order and good government in regions which had not known such things since a remote antiquity4 ,the ,english were welcomed as liberators and made explicit promises to set up an independent ,arab kingdom under a measure of ,british administrative control4 ,so much propagandist literature was poured forth on the glories of the independent ,arab nation which the ,english were to create1 that serious discontent was caused in ,egypt4 ,is a half-naked ,arab to have independence1 and am ,i not good enough to have even self-government8 wrote a highly educated ,egyptian to a ,british official4 ,meantime the actual government of ,mesopotamia became more and more severely effective1 and remained entirely concentrated in the hands of the ,british4 ,the expenses were enormous and the rate of taxation per head appears to have risen to four times what it had been under the ,turks4 ,the productivity of the country1 however1 was so great as to hold out a prospect of almost making up the loss1 and the important oil-wells at ,mosul were expected to do so completely4 ,the native cultivators profited by the improved harvests and the increased area of cultivation1 and the expenses of government were in part to be met out of the future oil profits4 ,and the best ,british administrators were certainly beloved by their people4 ,the educated classes in ,bagdad1 the sheikhs and the ex-,turkish officials1 became restive at the high taxation and the indefinite delay of ,arab independence4 ,the turbulent desert tribes and the disorderly elements in general were disgusted at the good policing4 ,but there was no general discontent1 because personal assurances were given to leading ,arabs that the ,covenant of the ,league of ,nations1 which ,great ,britain had signed1 laid down definitely that ,mesopotamia was to be recognized provisionally as an independent nation and that the mandate was to be given to ,great ,britain4 ,there would be1 it was promised1 a native ,government with a ,british ,resident to advise it1 as in an ,indian native state4 ,doubtless the ,government would also ask for other help from ,england1 especially in the matter of public works1 irrigation1 and the engineering of the oil-wells4 ,but the ,league issued no mandate4 ,according to rumour1 it had offered a scheme of mandate to the ,great ,powers concerned1 and one at least of them had refused the terms4 ,the precious oil1 it was discovered1 had already been divided by a private treaty between ,france and ,england1 which left only a small fraction for the ,mesopotamians and none for the rest of the world4 ,there was no attempt to set up an ,arab ,government4 ,some beginnings were occasionally made of associating ,arab officials with the ,englishmen who did the real work of governing4 ,but they were not whole-hearted4 ,a letter was accidentally divulged in which an ,english soldier said of the high ,arab official attached to him1 ,i will soon make him lick my boots4 ,there were symptoms of disaffection1 non-payment of taxes1 the resurgence of old discredited ,turkish and ,german agents1 open rebellions4 ,and the ,government replied by numerous executions and punitive expeditions4 ,the bombing aeroplane1 which had revealed itself as a very convenient weapon of war1 proved an utterly disastrous instrument of police4 ,the ,british liberators1 who had come by the special desire of the population to establish a free ,arab nation helped by friendly advice from ,british ,residents1 ended1 according to ,colonel ,lawrence's estimate1 in killing ten thousand ,arabs and setting the whole country in a blaze of war4 ,an army of over one hundred thousand men is now reconquering it4 ,and at the same time1 perhaps at the eleventh hour and perhaps too late altogether1 that section in the ,british ,government which believed in the ,league of ,nations and wished scrupulously to carry out in victory the pledges it had given in time of distress1 prevailed to bring about a definite change of policy4 ,sir ,percy ,cox and ,mr4 ,philby were sent to ,mesopotamia with instructions1 so it was stated1 to reverse the previous policy and try to set up that independent ,arab ,government which we had promised in #aiae and again in #aiag1 and ought to have set working before the end of #aiai4 ,the rebellion will doubtless be crushed1 and the native ,government may or not be successfully organized4 ,there is a strong desire among the ,arab leaders to have it based on a treaty of alliance with ,great ,britain after the ,egyptian model1 and not on ,article ,,xxii of the ,covenant4 ,in any case the task is infinitely more difficult than it was before so much blood was shed1 and the original friendship of the ,arabs turned to hatred4 ,on simple men executive action makes a much deeper impression than policy4 ,in ,mesopotamia our policy itself was bad because it was not consistent4 ,it was a muddle of two contradictory policies1 resulting in confusion and hypocrisy4 ,but the executive action seems to have been such as to make the chances of even the best policy very precarious4 ,a government which multiplies the taxes by four and shoots and hangs its subjects in batches is seldom excused because of its good drainage or its progressive ideas4 ,the story in ,egypt is shorter and perhaps less unhappy1 but essentially similar4 ,early in the war1 when ,turkey joined the enemy1 we declared a ,british protectorate over ,egypt1 accompanied by a promise to give the country independence or free institutions at the end of the war4 ,this in itself was a perfectly good and defensible policy1 though1 to be correct1 it should have had the concurrence of ,egypt4 ,but in the course of the war ,egypt became full of discontent4 ,experienced officials were wanted elsewhere1 and inexperienced substitutes made mistakes4 ,labour in great quantities was required for the ,army1 and was obtained through native contractors or headmen1 who practised the ordinary ,oriental methods of extortion and corruption while professing to act by orders of the ,english4 ,the peasant who was dragged off to forced labour1 or compelled to buy his freedom by heavy bribes1 blamed the ,british for both4 ,at one time ,egypt was garrisoned by large numbers of ,australian troops1 who had the habit of thinking of all ,asiatics as blackfellows1 and whose ways of dealing with blackfellows were not of the gentlest4 ,the seed was thus sown of a passionate hatred1 partly just and partly unjust2 and feeling was already ripe for explosion when it transpired at the end of the war that the ,british ,government had no apparent intention of fulfilling their promise to confer on ,egypt free institutions4 ,open rebellion was impossible1 owing to the presence of overpowering numbers of ,british troops2 but a time of danger and infinite trouble1 well controlled by ,lord ,allenby1 led at last to the appointment of a ,commission under ,lord ,milner1 which grasped its almost desperate problem with great courage and skill4 ,among other curious misfortunes1 it turned out that the word protectorate had been translated into ,arabic by a term which denoted the sort of protection that is extended to an outcast or a person with no national rights4 ,the ,commissioners were met on their arrival by a universal boycott1 and by constant threats of assassination4 ,they lived in considerable danger1 and no ,egyptian would be seen speaking to them4 ,but tact and patience gradually broke down the boycott2 and a much larger measure of agreement was obtained with ,zaghlul and the moderate ,nationalists than had at the outset seemed possible4 ,after inquiry1 the ,commission has taken the line of recommending1 first1 the cancellation of the ,capitulations1 or special privileges granted to ,european states1 which have paralyzed the progress of ,egypt for several generations2 the separation from ,egypt of the ,canal zone1 as a special ,british interest and of vital importance to the ,empire2 the retention of ,british advisers in two posts1 the ministries of ,justice and of ,finance--a safeguard without which the ,european ,powers would not consent to forgo the special protection of the ,capitulations2 and in other respects the establishment of ,egypt as an independent national state4 ,as far as is possible to forecast1 it looks as if this settlement would succeed4 ,the history of recent events in ,india is too large and complicated a subject to be dealt with here4 ,but in its main outline it has been curiously similar to that of the other regions of the ,east4 ,a wonderful response from almost the whole continent to the need of ,great ,britain during the war2 blunders of the ,war ,office and reactions of discontent2 ,german propaganda2 ,turkish and ,pan-,islamic intrigue2 repressive ,press ,acts and ,conspiracy ,acts2 passive resistance1 dangerous riots1 and widespread conspiracies2 the severe and sometimes lawless coercion of the ,punjab2 the savage massacre of ,amritsar1 and at last1 amid great obstructions and hesitations1 the passing of the ,montagu-,chelmsford ,act and the conferring of a new and liberal constitution upon ,india4 ,it is the same story as in ,egypt and ,mesopotamia4 ,so much time was wasted in doing the wrong thing1 that when at last resort was had to the right thing the right time was past4 ,the ,indian ,government was faced with great difficulties and very real dangers4 ,its errors have been so signal and notorious that public opinion is apt to forget or ignore the admirable skill and patience with which most officials steered their districts through periods of extreme strain4 ,but reforms long promised were delayed until too late4 ,the executive plunged into excesses which will not be forgotten for centuries4 ,and when the long-hoped-for reforms at last have come1 it may be that they come to a people too exasperated to give them a fair trial4 ,,ii4 ,,an ,,eastern ,,policy ,the policies here described have been so full of errors that it is hard to derive from them a very clear moral4 ,government without principle has many conveniences2 if life consisted of isolated moments it might be entirely successful4 ,but life is continuous1 and human beings have memories and expectations4 ,and almost any policy that is continuous and consistent and true to itself is more likely to succeed in the end than a mixture of momentary expedients and plunges for safety4 ,it is conceivable that a perfectly resolute and unfaltering military coercion of ,india1 ,egypt1 and ,mesopotamia might have succeeded4 ,but such a policy1 if it was ever possible1 is certainly so no longer2 and also it would hardly be a policy for avoiding international strife4 ,and that is the subject we are considering4 ,if we look below the mistakes of policy and administration committed by the ,british or ,french ,governments1 we find underneath the surface a profound and instinctive resentment of the ,moslem ,east against the ,western ,powers4 ,the ,western ,powers1 which for convenience we term ,christian1 have been for some centuries far more efficient than any ,moslem state4 ,the ,west has increasingly taken charge of the ,east2 beaten it1 managed it1 run it1 governed it1 and in some cases exploited it4 ,western government1 or at least ,british government1 has been just1 incorruptible1 impartial1 strong1 intelligent1 far beyond ordinary ,eastern standards4 ,it may have been unsympathetic and grossly expensive2 it may1 in spite of the unexampled personal integrity of the whole governing class1 have led to the presence in ,eastern countries of undesirable money-seekers4 ,but it has been1 on the whole1 essentially and undeniably good1 efficient government1 backed by a military power which committed few excesses1 lived on its own pay1 and never failed in an emergency4 ,no one who studies even superficially the history of average ,oriental governments1 from ,morocco or ,bokhara to ,oudh1 can be surprised or sorry that they have been superseded by the better governments of the ,west4 ,the peoples of the ,east themselves have gained by ,western penetration2 nay1 more1 they are conscious of their need of the ,west4 ,but they have had too much of it2 they resent it1 and they are frightened of it4 ,the ,moslem nations have lost their independence one after another4 ,at the beginning of the ,great ,war only one ,moslem ,power remained free and powerful--the ,turkish ,empire4 ,at the end of the war there was not one4 ,the ,turks were not popular in the ,east4 ,the ,syrians and ,arabs hated them almost as much as their ,christian subjects did4 ,the ,turkish peasants of ,anatolia suffered cruelly under the exactions of ,constantinople1 especially in the matter of military service4 ,but all through the ,moslem ,east ran the consciousness that the ,sultan1 with all his faults1 was their own man4 ,he was the acknowledged ,head of the great majority of ,moslems in the world4 ,he was1 above all1 the last barrier that seemed to protect them from the overwhelming flood of ,western aggression1 and the last great ,moslem figure which enabled them to preserve their self-respect4 ,while the ,turkish ,empire stood1 the ,moslem peoples1 though fallen on evil days1 could think of ,islam as an independent and even an imperial entity4 ,in places1 doubtless1 they had to kiss the feet of dogs2 but their ,caliph still ruled masses of ,christian subject populations and still was master of the capital city of the world4 ,with the fall of ,turkey1 the last free ,moslem state was gone4 ,not here and there1 but everywhere throughout the whole world1 the faithful were set beneath the heel of these rich1 drunken1 pork-eating idolaters with their indecent women1 their three ,gods1 and their terrific material civilization4 ,pan-,islamism1 as ,mr4 ,toynbee says1 is only an extreme example of the feeling at the back of almost any modern ,oriental movement we may examine4 ,it may take aggressive forms1 but the essence of it is a defensive impulse4 ,its appeal is to fear1 and if the fear of the ,west could be lifted from off the minds of the ,oriental peoples1 its mainspring would be gone4 ,the problem of our ,eastern policy is to remove that fear4 ,and that ought not to be so very difficult4 ,the essential fact to grasp is that the ,east needs us far more than we need the ,east4 ,we need markets2 but that idea is only suggested to us by the fact that ,eastern peoples want our goods4 ,we do almost everything better than they do4 ,they want our textiles1 our knives and tools1 our engines and ploughs1 our books1 our learning4 ,they cannot make railways or ships without us4 ,they cannot work their mines or oil-wells except by ,western help4 ,they cannot really govern their countries satisfactorily without ,european advisers4 ,the language of ,article ,,xxii of the ,league of ,nations ,covenant is quite correct when it says that ,certain communities formerly belonging to the ,turkish ,empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized1 subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone4 ,at present they are not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world4 ,they ought to want us1 and if left alone they would want us4 ,we have frightened them into fighting and hating us by forcing ourselves upon them instead of waiting to be asked4 ,we have conferred incalculable benefits on ,india3 the benefit of protection from invasion1 of comparative protection from plague and famine1 of social order1 of administrative justice1 to say nothing of roads and railways1 and the enlivening force of ,western knowledge4 ,we have immensely increased the prosperity of ,egypt1 we have put down all kinds of ,oriental abuses and protected the fellaheen against corves and extortions and tortures4 ,we were in process of beginning to perform the same services for ,mesopotamia4 ,but in the latter regions at any rate--for in ,india our roots are far deeper and the problem is more complex--the people did not want us4 ,we only held them and did them good by force4 ,and the chief reason why they did not want us was fear4 ,we came to them with machine guns and bombing planes as conquerors and masters1 having destroyed the only free ,moslem ,power2 and they found it difficult to believe in our good intentions4 ,we came to them1 most unfortunately1 also with specious promises which we made in time of need and broke in the days of victory4 ,the right policy is something very easy to state and extremely difficult to carry out1 even for a single-minded and clear-headed ,government4 ,it needs first1 perhaps1 an effort of imaginative understanding more far-reaching than has ever yet in history been demanded of an ,imperial ,power4 ,only those who understand the ,east can win the respect and confidence of the ,east4 ,but in the meantime1 if we cannot fully understand1 there is a way at least to make ourselves understood4 ,justice is the passport to confidence all the world over4 ,and our first business is to act quite simply and sincerely up to all our engagements4 ,we undertook certain obligations when we signed ,article ,,xxii of the ,covenant4 ,we should make the wishes of these communities a principal consideration in deciding whether we should go to them at all4 ,we should really treat them as independent nations1 and should honestly give them administrative advice and assistance until they shall be able to stand alone4 ,and we should not allow our minds to be confused by thoughts of gain1 nor our advice to take the form of horse1 foot1 and artillery4 ,two illustrations may make this point clear4 ,an experienced and very successful administrator was asked a few weeks ago whether he would accept the post of adviser to a certain ,moslem ,government4 ,he said1 ,yes1 upon one condition4 ,that there is no ,british army anywhere in the country4 ,that is the right and wise spirit4 ,the second is even simpler4 ,one of the most obvious and matter-of-course obligations laid upon imperial administrators and civil servants is that they shall not embark in trade or in any way make a profit out of the administration of their office4 ,that is the right rule4 ,the ,empire should set an example of the behaviour that it expects from its best servants4 ,when we apportioned to ourselves the ,german colonies1 we specially declined to take over their public debts4 ,and when protest was raised against this proceeding1 we stated definitely in our official ,reply3 ,it would be unjust to make this responsibility rest on the ,mandatory ,powers1 which1 in so far as they may be appointed trustees by the ,league of ,nations1 will derive no benefit from such trusteeship4 ,is it entirely quixotic and idealist to hope that1 even in post-war conditions1 a great nation may remain true to her word8 ,it seems at least as if the only alternative was to hold these ,eastern territories by armed force1 and that is no longer possible4 ,it might be possible to hold by force ,india alone1 or ,egypt alone1 or ,mesopotamia alone4 ,it is not possible so to hold all three4 ,we must govern by consent of the governed or not all4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,russia ,,and ,,its ,,borders ,another group of wars and threats of war has its centre in ,moscow4 ,all the ,states on the borders of ,russia--,finland1 ,lithuania1 ,poland1 the ,ukraine1 ,hungary1 ,rumania1 the new republics of ,georgia1 ,armenia1 and ,azerbaijan1 and the kingdom of ,persia--are either at war or in fear of war or just recovering from war with ,russia1 or from civil war fomented by ,russian agents and propagandists4 ,inside ,russia itself1 civil war has never ceased since the first outbreak of the ,revolution in #aiag4 ,it is true that the civil war has been largely helped by foreign munitions and stirred up by foreign intrigues4 ,but that only shows that--as the world is now organized--there is something in the present ,russian ,government which makes foreigners as well as ,russians wish to take up arms against it4 ,it may have been--,i think strongly that it was--exceedingly unwise for the foreign ,governments to intervene in the domestic troubles of ,russia1 but no one can pretend that the civil war was entirely created by foreigners4 ,the rebellions were there before the foreigners joined in1 and it is even thought by good judges that the opposition to the ,bolsheviks might by this time have been successful if it had not been damned in ,russian eyes by its foreign alliances4 ,for us the question is how the ,russian ,revolution has become such a plenteous and intense cause of strife4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible to pass judgment on the whole of a vast movement with the very inadequate information that is now accessible to an average ,englishman about ,russia4 ,even the ,french ,revolution1 which has been studied by thousands of observers and historians1 is not yet judged4 ,the sum of infamies and high achievements is too complicated to add up4 ,and the ,russian ,revolution is probably even harder to value than the ,french4 ,i4 ,,the ,,civil ,,war ,it would be a mistake to forget the elements of simple early-,christian brotherhood which seem to characterize the ,russian peasant4 ,it was well known before the war how the members of a workmen's artel1 or trade community1 when trade was bad1 would divide their earnings equally and all starve1 if need be1 together1 without any attempt by the luckier workmen to save themselves at the expense of the others4 ,the glowing descriptions of ,mr4 ,stephen ,graham cannot be entirely without any basis in fact4 ,and the people of ,tolstoy and ,dostoievsky have evidently a most rare capacity for sainthood and martyrdom1 as well as for aberration of mind4 ,present-day ,russia has been described by an eminent ,socialist as a nation of artists governed by brutes1 and the phrase is probably true of the old ,russia also1 and the ,russia of centuries back4 ,communism comes easily in ,russia1 and so does submission to tyranny4 ,it must also be remembered that the ,great ,war1 among its many aspects1 involved the most frightful and bewildering oppression of the poor and weak4 ,as was said quite truly3 ,millions of poor men in divers regions of the world have been dragged suddenly and without any previous action of their own into a quarrel which they neither made nor desired nor understood1 and in the course of that quarrel have been subjected again and again to the very extremity of possible human suffering4 ,the war naturally and inevitably created in ,europe a passionate wish for some revolutionary transformation of a world in which rich and clever people in parliaments and governments had the power of inflicting such pains upon the poor4 ,the peculiarity of the ,bolshevik movement was1 as one of its rare ,english admirers puts it1 not so much that it wanted a particular kind of ,socialism or ,communism1 but that it wanted it now4 ,the world has seen many revolutions and many ,socialist governments2 but they have never really established that paradise of the poor which was advertised in their prospectuses and doubtless nursed in their hopes4 ,most failed altogether4 ,and those which succeeded went wrong4 ,they coperated with bourgeois ,liberals4 ,they extended the franchise1 they improved the condition of the working classes1 they established well-to-do workmen and peasants with a stake in the country and a conservative bias2 but they never really did what was wanted4 ,they always stopped short4 ,they developed the middle-class virtues4 ,they left still in existence a capitalist class which preached the merits of thrift and hard work and was interested in trade2 and of course they left always somewhere an oppressed class4 ,the under dog was still under4 ,the ,bolshevik remedy was very direct and simple4 ,it was to disarm everybody who had any share in prosperity1 and distribute firearms to those who had nothing else4 ,only when he was armed and the rest of the people unarmed could the real proletarian--the man who had no savings1 no talent1 no education1 no notable good qualities1 nothing that makes for success in life--hope to beat the men who always outstripped him4 ,it is strange that even in a moment of extreme misery such a theory could have established itself in any country as a principle of government4 ,but the military collapse of ,russia gave it a unique chance4 ,the common soldiers1 anxious to fight no more1 already possessed arms4 ,they had merely to murder their officers and the thing was done4 ,the rest of the population was unarmed and helpless4 ,and meantime the peasants1 though almost untouched by revolutionary ideas1 were amenable to one particular bribe4 ,the revolutionaries offered all the peasants of ,russia their masters' land without any payment4 ,they could simply take the land1 and kill or not kill the owner as they pleased4 ,there was no punishment for such killing4 ,according to strict ,communist principles1 the land was not to remain in the peasants' possession4 ,it was to be the property of the ,state4 ,but this principle had to be dropped in order to induce the peasants to coperate with the revolutionary town workmen4 ,whatever may be said in favour of this revolution1 there can at least be no surprise at what ,lenin calls the frantic resistance of the upper and middle classes of ,russia4 ,the policy of the ,government was announced on ,january #bc1 #aiai3 ,the present is the period of destruction and crushing of the capitalist system of the whole world4 4 4 4 ,in order to establish the dictatorship of the proletariate it is necessary to disarm the bourgeoisie and its agents and to arm the proletariate4 ,it is to be dictatorship in the strict sense3 the power of a man with a gun to do what he likes with those who have no guns4 ,there is to be no democracy or representation of the dispossessed classes4 ,if they were represented they might recover power4 ,only those known to be faithful to the new ,government are to vote4 ,all persons of property must be dispossessed1 from landlords to small shop-keepers4 ,rich peasants must go2 even middle peasants at one time had to go2 only the poorest peasants and the poorest town workmen should rule1 assisted1 of course1 by those educated people who would accept the new rgime and establish by deeds beyond doubt their hatred of the bourgeoisie4 ,the control of a country by a small minority is always difficult4 ,it needs methods of terror4 ,but this minority had first to acquire the control and then to maintain it4 ,its task was more difficult and its methods had to be more violent than those of its predecessors4 ,the terror of the old ,czarist ,government or of the ,french ,revolution must be superseded by the more drastic method of what was called mass terror4 ,the secret police1 whose activities had made hideous the record of the ,czarist ,government1 and who had fled for their lives at the first outbreak of the ,lvof and ,kerensky ,revolution1 returned from their lurking-places to put themselves at the disposal of the ,bolsheviks4 ,this legion of devils had something to sell which the new ,government badly needed4 ,on the analogy of the ,comit de ,salut ,public there was established the ,all-,russian ,extraordinary ,commission for stamping out all trace of resistance to the new order4 ,spies were placed everywhere 7,proclamation1 ,october #ag1 #aiah74 ,no distinction was to be made between ,czarist reactionaries and unorthodox ,socialists1 such as the ,mensheviks and ,social ,revolutionaries 7,russkaya ,zhizn1 ,may #aj1 #aiai74 ,enormous numbers of hostages were arrested4 ,at any sign of conspiracy outside1 large numbers of these were shot4 ,the assassination of the ,bolshevik ,uritzky was repaid by the execution of five hundred citizens4 ,yet1 just as in the most furious days of the ,french ,revolution1 the terrorists were always complaining that there was not enough terror4 ,the continual discovery of conspiracies in our rear 4 4 4 the insignificant extent of serious repressions and mass shootings of ,white ,guards and bourgeoisie on the part of the ,soviets1 show that notwithstanding frequent pronouncements urging mass terror against the ,social ,revolutionaries1 ,white ,guards1 and bourgeoisie1 no real terror exists 7,official ,weekly of the ,all-,russian ,extraordinary ,commission1 ,no4 #a1 ,moscow1 ,september #ba1 #aiah74 ,trotzky in comforting language explained that the object of the mass terror was not really the extermination of all non-communists1 or all ,russians who did not attain the full standard of poverty and orthodoxy4 ,the proletariate says3 ',i shall break your will because my will is stronger than yours1 and ,i shall force you to serve me4' 4 4 4 ,terror as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class is historically justified 7,trotzky in ,izvestia1 ,january #aj1 #aiai74 ,eventually1 of course1 when all ,russia was submissive and all ,europe ,communist1 there would be a gentler rgime1 and the proletariate would show their true beauty of character4 ,and it would be a mistake to ignore the real reforms which seem to have been carried through in certain social services1 notably in the care of children1 the attempt to develop popular education and the putting down of drink4 ,but in the meantime terror was renforced by ingenious petty persecutions and indignities1 renforced by starvation4 ,those who joined the ,red ,army had three times the ration of food allowed to several categories of the civil population4 ,no one can wonder that suicide--that last irrefutable evidence of unbearable oppression--became extraordinarily common1 especially among the educated classes1#d and that frantic resistance broke out where it had any prospect of success4 ,footnote #d3 ,the remnants of the more distinguished intellectuals are now gathered into two or three salvage houses and looked after by ,maxim ,gorky4 ,he has now fled4 ,,ii4 ,,russia',s ,,neighbours ,but what of the war outside ,russia8 ,why could not the ,russians be allowed to conduct their revolution and settle their form of government by themselves8 ,it would be very desirable if they could4 ,and doubtless it is the aim to be striven for4 ,but the trouble is that ,bolshevism is to its adherents a revelation and a new gospel1 and they have the same zeal for converting the rest of the world as had the ,french ,revolutionaries or the followers of ,mohammed4 ,the program of the ,communist ,party is not merely a program of liberating the proletariate of one country2 it is the program of liberating the proletariate of the world 7authorized pamphlet by ,n4 ,bukharin1 ,july #bd1 #aiah74 ,this is to be achieved by a bloody torturing and heroic fight4 ,the methods are to include every known form of intrigue1 corruption1 forgery1 and the like1 and the plan is to be the same in all countries4 ,revolutionary workmen are to be armed1 including common soldiers1 tramps1 prisoners1 and all the utterly dispossessed of the earth1 except1 of course1 those who have ,conservative1 ,liberal1 or ,labour ,party views2 and then are to work their proletarian will on the rest of the community4 ,the national will is to be disregarded3 ,the interests of ,socialism stand far above the interest of the right of nations to self-determination 7,trotzky1 ,izvestia1 ,march #h1 #aiah74 ,all our hopes for the definitive triumph of ,socialism are based on this conviction and on this scientific prevision1 i4e4 that a revolution like the ,russian can be produced in all the nations of ,europe 7ib474 ,in the ,treaty of ,brest-,litovsk the ,bolsheviks were compelled to sign a clause promising not to conduct any agitation against the ,state and military institutions of ,germany4 ,but both the ,russian ,government as a whole and its accredited representative in ,berlin never concealed the fact that they were not observing this article1 and did not intend to do so 7,joffe1 ,izvestia1 ,january #a1 #aiai74 ,the belief that by some single violent change in social1 political1 or economic conditions human life as a whole can be suddenly transfigured is one that clings to many minds1 and by no means the stupidest minds1 of the present age1 in spite of much disillusioning experience4 ,it does seem to them at moments as if only some one thing was wrong with the world1 and as if that one flaw must surely be definite and remediable3 some one bold step is all that is needed--say1 the abolition of the family1 or of property1 or of competition1 or of wages1 or of interest1 or of compulsory law1 or some other of the fundamental institutions of society4 ,to our ancestors it was the abolition of heresy4 ,to the ,turks1 the abolition of all ,christians in ,turkey4 ,to such people at such times the normal method of trying to correct the worst abuses by persuading the majority that they ought to be corrected1 and of seeking individually to live a better life and to help one's neighbours1 seems tedious and ineffective1 if not hypocritical4 ,but one thing that is clear is that revolution means frantic resistance1 and the stronger the faith and energy behind the revolution the more deep-reaching is the resistance likely to be4 ,russia's neighbours see what seems to them the infinite misery and impoverishment and retardation inflicted by ,bolshevism2 and they are naturally indignant and alarmed at the secret propaganda of ,bolshevism within their own borders4 ,in normal times perhaps they need not have been afraid4 ,but since the war every state is unstable2 every state has a large discontented class4 ,the small republics in the ,caucasus1 barely able to support themselves in freedom1 are maddened to find their constitution threatened by ,russian bribes1 their malcontents and bad characters armed with ,russian rifles and machine guns1 and their public men assassinated4 ,georgia and ,armenia are probably doomed4 ,hungary and ,finland have gone ,bolshevik and returned1 each process being accompanied by hideous persecutions and murders1 the reprisals being naturally the worst4 ,germany1 in spite of all treaties1 has been exposed to constant propaganda and has had one or two bad outbreaks of violence4 ,poland has been and still is--whether through her own bad policy or otherwise--on the brink of compulsory ,bolshevism4 ,human nature being what it is1 and human politics a little worse than private human nature1 it is inevitable that ,russia's neighbours should be constantly afraid of her and intensely anxious to see her again under some more normal government2 some government which1 whatever its political bias1 would leave its neighbours to govern themselves and accept the ordinary conventions of civilized society4 ,nay1 one can even understand anti-,russian policies that seem at first sight intolerably aggressive4 ,the ,poles1 among other demands1 are anxious for the independence of ,white ,russia1 the region north of the ,pripet1 of which ,minsk is the chief town4 ,they wish it either annexed to ,poland or else made independent1 but at any rate cut off from ,russia4 ,the claim seems monstrous4 ,but it has its excuse4 ,the ,white ,russian peasantry are said to be peculiarly ignorant and devoid of national feeling2 the land-owners and well-to-do classes are mostly ,poles4 ,is it surprising that the ,poles of ,poland hate the idea of handing their countrymen over to a ,russia which will1 as a matter of course1 set the peasants to burn their houses1 destroy their cattle1 and hunt them themselves down like vermin8 ,and when that is done1 they reflect1 ,bolshevism will only be nearer to ,warsaw4 ,like the early ,moslems1 the true ,bolsheviks care more for their faith than for territory4 ,in dealing with ,lithuania1 which is at present a comparatively quiet little peasant republic1 the ,russians offered her a large slice of territory beyond what she was entitled to or wanted4 ,why8 ,because it was a thoroughly ,bolshevized area1 and might be expected to spread the faith--or the poison--into all ,lithuania4 ,a nation1 or a government1 in that state of mind cannot be surprised if its neighbours regard it with anxiety4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is a curious fact that revolutionists so often regard themselves as pacifists4 ,many were even conscientious objectors during the war1 and there is no reason to doubt that they were sincere4 ,but they do seem to be confused thinkers4 ,to hate your neighbours1 whom you know1 and love your neighbours' enemies1 whom you do not know1 is a consistent and not uncommon frame of mind2 though the element of love in it seems less important and prominent than the hate4 ,but to expect ,european peace and good-will by means of a revolution in all countries argues a lack of understanding not far removed from madness4 ,every revolutionary outburst since the war has been marked by ferocious cruelties and followed by still more ferocious reprisals4 ,revolution leads not to peace1 but to reciprocal reigns of terror1 first ,red and then ,white1 till the exhaustion of suffering produces some sort of equilibrium4 ,the war1 among its many evil lessons1 has inculcated the gospel of impatience and of force4 ,when you want a thing1 take it from some one1 and if he resists1 knock him down4 ,it is the doctrine which destroys human societies as it destroys the peace in men's own hearts4 ,if we want peace1 we must simply unlearn that creed and go back to the old ,liberal doctrine that is at the root of sound politics everywhere3 ,if you think something is right1 try to persuade your fellow citizens of it2 try your hardest1 but remember that you may be wrong1 and until you succeed1 have patience4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,pre-,,war ,,and ,,post-,,war ,,causes ,,of ,,strife ,the war has left behind it a great number of small wars or guerrillas4 ,most of them have their explanation in some ordinary excess of nationalism or revenge or greed4 ,the ,serbs1 intoxicated with their new greatness1 are still causing war in ,albania and ,montenegro4 ,the ,rumanians recently invaded ,hungary1 in spite of all the thunders of the ,peace ,conference1 because they had been robbed by ,austria-,hungary and wanted revenge and reparation4 ,the ,hungarians have alarmed all their neighbours and forced them into a defensive alliance1 which now calls itself the ,little ,entente4 ,the ,lithuanians and ,poles have fought1 but been reconciled by the mediation of the ,league of ,nations4 ,the ,armenians have been massacred again1 under the eyes of the ,french army of occupation in ,cilicia1 where they had gathered under a repeated guarantee of safety given by ,france and ,england4 ,the ,turkish ,nationalists are holding out very unsuccessfully in the centre of ,anatolia against a ,greek army carrying out the directions of the ,supreme ,council4 ,the ,turkish peasants are increasingly reluctant to take arms again4 ,the ,koreans have helplessly declared their right to independence from ,japan1 and are apparently being reduced by a terrible persecution4 ,these are the mere belated effervescence of the passions of the ,great ,war4 ,the hate and pride which are the basis of nationalism and which were so violently stimulated by the events of the war cannot be expected to die out at once4 ,it was calculated a short time ago that there were twenty-seven wars of one sort or another in progress4 ,but they will presumably simmer down as social conditions become more normal4 ,it is interesting to observe that two of the greatest causes of war1 according to the judgment of normal times1 are now not actively operating4 ,before #aiad1 if one was asked to name the main causes of war1 the answer would have been1 first1 competitive armaments1 and1 second1 protective tariffs and the competition for markets4 ,these causes will remain fully as dangerous for the future1 but it so happens that none of the existing wars is directly due to either4 ,i4 ,,armaments ,in one sense1 indeed1 armaments are actually operating now as a cause of war4 ,there are far too many firearms lying about4 ,america1 ,england1 and ,france have made very lavish gifts or sales of lethal weapons to various bodies with whom they sympathized4 ,and the arms have by no means always stayed in the place for which they were intended4 ,guns which we sent to ,denikin were sold by corrupt officials to the ,bolsheviks1 and passed on by them to the ,afghans to use against us on the ,indian frontier4 ,such things cause some deaths and some laughter1 but are not permanent evils4 ,no ,european nation1 except those actually compelled1 has made much progress towards disarmament4 ,it is said that ,great ,britain has actually made the greatest reduction1 but both in numbers of men and in expenditure our standard is fantastically higher than what was forced upon us by ,german competition in #aiad4 ,it is impossible to reduce our forces in a really drastic way as long as our commitments are so large and--perhaps we must add--our policy so inconsistent and provocative4 ,peace with ,russia1 a settlement with ,mesopotamia and ,egypt on the lines laid down by the ,covenant and the ,milner ,report1 the evacuation of ,ireland1 the execution of the ,montagu-,chelmsford reforms in ,india1 and the extension of similar reforms to ,burmah and the much-suffering ,ceylon1 will permit us really to envisage for the first time a satisfactory measure of disarmament4 ,the air force is already greatly reduced4 ,the vast size of the navy appears to be utterly unjustified1 at any rate by conditions in ,europe4 ,the ,french army is far beyond the economic powers of ,france to support4 ,the same seems to be true of ,italy1 and is certainly true of ,serbia1 which is still calling conscripts to the colours4 ,greece is vastly overarmed2 but ,greek policy1 though erring on the ambitious side1 has probably been more sagaciously guided under ,m4 ,venizelos than any in ,europe4 ,the fall of that great man1 due mainly to the prolonged economic distresses of ,greece1 will probably cause a resurgence of ,mustapha ,kemal and the ,turkish nationalists4 ,meantime the ,russian conscript army1 though apparently ill-armed and ill-supplied1 is overwhelming in numbers and is led by officers of the old rgime1 experienced and not absolutely incompetent4 ,the ,russian army is far the greatest and1 in a political sense1 the most dangerous1 in the world4 ,but it is not the actual armaments1 ruinous as they are1 that are the essential poison to civilized society4 ,it is the competition in armaments4 ,that has now been abolished throughout ,europe4 ,slowly1 unequally1 reluctantly1 the armaments which1 in ,lord ,grey's words1 went uphill under the lead of ,germany1 are now1 under the same lead1 groping their way downhill4 ,there is only one great nation which1 if words are to be believed1 thinks seriously of starting a competition in armaments4 ,it has been announced1 more than once1 by the ,american ,government that1 like ,germany in the years before #aiad1 they have arranged a naval programme which will effectually put an end to the ,british command of the seas and give the ,united ,states world primacy 7see speech of ,mr4 ,daniels1 ,secretary of the ,navy1 in the ,times of ,september #a1 #aibj74 ,since the ,british ,empire is a scattered series of communities dependent for their communications upon the sea1 and in particular since the population of ,great ,britain is absolutely dependent for its food on the free use of sea transport1 it has been generally acknowledged in ,europe that the sea-power of ,great ,britain was necessary to its existence4 ,british sea-power has never been challenged except by definite enemies in pursuit of a definite war policy4 ,if the ,united ,states were seriously to embark on the same policy as the late ,german ,government1 it seems as if all other causes of war must sink into insignificance beside this gigantic and deliberate one4 ,but1 in spite of some bewildering symptoms1 it can hardly be believed that this conclusion is possible1 at any rate until ,america has definitely and finally refused to be a member of the ,league of ,nations4 ,relations between ,great ,britain and ,america have of late been dangerously strained1 partly owing to causes outside our ,government's control1 but in part owing to the scandal caused in ,america by certain developments of the ,peace ,treaty1 and by the excesses of the ,government forces in ,ireland4 ,a wise policy may help to heal this growing breach1 and if ,america accepts in some form or other membership of the ,league of ,nations1 it ought to be possible in friendly discussion to arrive at some understanding on the question of naval armaments4 ,the problem of armaments is put in the very forefront of the ,covenant of the ,league1 immediately after the constitution of the ,league itself4 ,by ,article ,,viii-- ,the members of the ,league recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with 7a7 national safety and 7b7 the enforcement by common action of national obligations4 ,the ,council1 taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each ,state1 shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several ,governments4 ,such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years4 ,after these plans shall have been adopted by the several ,governments the limits of armament therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the ,council4 ,the article goes on to recognize that private munition factories are objectionable1 and must somehow be dealt with1 and to lay down that all members must interchange full and frank information about their armaments and programmes4 ,and the next article constitutes a permanent ,commission to advise the ,council on the execution of the provisions of ,article ,,viii and other similar matters4 ,the cautious language of the ,covenant on this subject is due to the inherent difficulty of the subject itself4 ,it would be absurd to lay down that every member of the ,league must disband its forces forthwith2 the ,league could hardly undertake to go to war in order to compel some strong ,power to disarm4 ,and it is obvious that different nations need different degrees of armament4 ,the chief difficulty is that disarmament ought in justice and prudence to be simultaneous all round4 ,it is only by the compulsion of a lost war that ,germany has been compelled to disarm while her enemies stand round her with large armies1 and even in ,germany the process is evidently very difficult to enforce4 ,too many rifles and machine guns have got loose in private hands4 ,no ,league could compel ,poland or ,rumania to disarm while the ,red ,army of ,russia stood waiting across the frontier2 or compel ,great ,britain to disarm while the northwest frontier of ,india is constantly attacked1 while the ,bolsheviks are in ,persia and ,british officials are besieged in ,mesopotamia4 ,this difficulty will remain even when the world begins to settle down and the countries of ,europe are no longer governed by their ,war ,offices4 ,on the other hand1 economic pressure1 as well as ,liberal feeling1 will make for the reduction of armies and navies4 ,it may be difficult to get volunteers for military service1 and it will certainly be dangerous to impress conscripts4 ,there will be a stronger and more genuine popular demand for disarmament than for most of the desirable provisions of the ,league ,covenant1 and ,governments dependent on the popular will may find their hands forced4 ,but in the main disarmament must depend on the restoration of confidence2 though probably it is true in most cases that if the disarmament comes first the confidence will follow4 ,,ii4 ,,markets ,,and ,,food ,the second of these great causes of war1 protection and the competition for markets1 has somewhat changed its aspect since the comparative exhaustion of the world supplies of food and raw material4 ,before the war1 nations chiefly wanted to sell4 ,markets were the great object of ambition1 and tariff walls the great means of offence4 ,great ,britain1 of course1 kept her doors everywhere open to the trade of the world4 ,it is one of the decisive marks to her credit in the apportionment of the comparative guilt of the nations in preparing that international atmosphere which made the war of #aiad possible4 ,but if she had chosen at any moment to close her doors1 she could have injured grievously every other great nation throughout the globe2 and the ,british ,tariff ,reform ,campaign was one of the excuses used by the ,german ,government to frighten their people into a war spirit4 ,when ,austria wished to ruin ,serbia she simply put a prohibitive duty on the import of pigs4 ,now1 since the war1 what most nations want is not in the first place markets2 it is food and raw materials4 ,they have not1 of course1 abolished their tariffs1 but their first anxiety is to be able to buy food4 ,austria does not want to keep out ,serbian pigs4 ,she begs for them1 and ,serbia will not let her have them4 ,the most consistently and narrowly protectionist nations1 like ,france or ,australia1 no longer concentrate on forbidding their neighbours to sell to them4 ,on the contrary1 they refuse to sell food and raw material to their neighbours4 ,the policy of keeping the food and raw materials of the ,british ,empire for ,british consumption is already widely advocated and has powerful champions in the ,government4 ,as long as it is confined to palm kernels1 this policy1 though bad from almost every point of view1 is not fatal4 ,but if ever it were to be carried consistently through1 it would mean war4 ,the ,british ,empire holds such a vast extent of the earth's surface that it has inevitably given hostages to fortune4 ,so huge an empire can only be tolerated if it behaves tolerably4 ,if we keep to ourselves and use for our own profit all the overwhelmingly large stores of food and raw material which by our vast annexations of territory we now control1 thereby reducing other nations first to a stagnation of trade and then to starvation1 the natural and inevitable answer to such a proceeding would seem to be a world crusade for our destruction4 ,this is the chief point1 apparently1 in which the influence of what is called capitalism seems to be a direct cause of war4 ,great capitalists1 or those impersonal organizations of capital which seem likely now to supersede the individual capitalist1 are normally strong influences for peace4 ,they need peace for the success of their undertakings and are in danger of ruin if war breaks out4 ,but they do at times stand to gain enormous sums by concessions and monopolies and by control over materials which are the subject of an intense demand from great masses of people4 ,and no doubt one way in which they will seek to get these monopolies and controls is by putting pressure on ,governments for so-called patriotic reasons to exclude foreign competition4 ,this is a very real danger4 ,the ,covenant of the ,league of ,nations has not dared to insist on free trade4 ,obviously it could not1 since the majority of the member nations are against free trade4 ,but it does lay down certain rules to check aggressive protection4 ,all the territories transferred by the war from the possession of ,germany and ,turkey to their conquerors are subjected to the principle of mandate4 ,they are not held as possessions4 ,they are held as a sacred trust for civilization with the express purpose of securing the well-being and development of the native populations4 ,in particular1 the mandatories agree to guarantee equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the ,league4 ,as the membership of the ,league is increased1 this will practically ensure the open door to all nations in the mandated areas4 ,it seems also clearly to forbid the establishment of national monopolies4 ,if a mandatory finds copper-mines or oil-wells in its territory1 it is bound to develop them as a trust for civilization4 ,any profit it receives must be in the nature of wages for work done4 ,a mandatory may not exclude or hamper the trade of another member of the ,league by tariffs1#e much less keep the oil for the exclusive use of itself and its friends1 as is at present proposed by ,england and ,france in ,mesopotamia4 ,the condemnation of this proposal by the ,assembly of the ,league in ,november1 #aibj1 backed by a vigorous protest from the ,united ,states1 has1 it may be hoped1 made such a violation of the ,covenant impossible4 ,footnote #e3 ,except in ,mandates ,c 7,pacific ,islands1 etc471 where ,australia successfully refused to submit to any economic restrictions4 ,see1 however1 the definite pledge given by the ,allied ,reply1 p4 #gh1 above4 ,in territories not mandated as a result of the war1 but otherwise similar to the mandated areas1 such as the pre-war colonies of the various ,powers1 these rules1 of course1 do not hold4 ,yet it may be hoped that at least they will be recognized as good rules1 to which approximation should be made as circumstances permit4 ,in all their dealings1 moreover1 members of the ,league agree 7,article ,,xxiii7 to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit1 and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the ,league4 ,the language of this article is a little vague4 ,one can trace in it the influence of a struggle4 ,but at least it forbids tariff wars1 and it gives the ,league a handle for interference in case of any very great iniquity4 ,it does not forbid national monopolies2 but a monopoly in foodstuffs which came near to inflicting famine on other members of the ,league would1 under it1 at least give cause for remark4 ,and no clause1 however strong1 could in practice be sure of attaining more4 ,the ,league has to be built out of nations as they already exist1 and the rules of the ,league out of their public opinion4 ,the real danger here1 as in so many other cases1 lies not in the caution and moderation of the language used in the ,covenant1 but first in the questionable sincerity of the nations in carrying out the pledges signed by their representatives1 and secondly in the possibility that1 through ill-will1 or fear1 or self-interest1 or mob-passion1 or some other disastrous influence1 the ex-enemy ,powers be not quickly included in the ,league4 ,not until all ,central ,europe is in the ,league can the world begin to breathe freely4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,league ,,of ,,nations ,we have considered many parts of the world and many aspects of the present world settlement to see what seeds of future war may now be germinating and what means we have of making them harmless4 ,and in every case we are brought back to the one great creative idea which this war has produced1 the ,league of ,nations4 ,the earlier notions of the ,league1 as issued1 for example1 about the year #aiji by certain ,american bodies1 centred upon the development of compulsory mediation or arbitration and the setting up of a recognized permanent ,court of ,international ,law4 ,the flaw in this conception1 operating alone1 is a certain rigidity and barrenness4 ,it left states to work separately until they quarrelled or saw a quarrel approaching1 and only then1 when the atmosphere was already bad1 it expected them to meet and accept arbitration4 ,a great addition to this was ,sir ,edward ,grey's conception1 already put in practice during the ,balkan ,wars1 of an extended entente cordiale embracing all ,europe and ,america4 ,in his time ,france and ,england1 ,england and ,america1 ,england and ,italy1 had formed a habit of cordiality and frank dealing4 ,when any trouble arose1 the ambassadors had the habit of meeting freely and discussing the trouble with perfect frankness1 almost as members of the same ,ministry might do4 ,this tendency was helped by the enormous increase in international conferences1 commissions1 and bureaux4 ,and during the ,balkan crisis of #aiab-ac it was in process of being extended to include ,germany4 ,thus there was the habit of frequent coperation and mutual confidence4 ,unfortunately1 this friendly spirit depended on all parties being generally content with the present condition of affairs2 ,germany was not content1 and so the entente idea was balked4 ,under the ,league the nations are already forming a habit of consultation and coperation on non-controversial matters which should be of immense help in dealing with differences when they arise4 ,another great formative idea was contributed by ,general ,smuts1 the principle of the mandate4 ,he foresaw that there would be at the end of the war an immense appropriation of tropical colonies2 he knew that the rivalry of the ,great ,powers for the possession of such colonies was one of the chief sources of international strife2 and he saw that the right outlet was to put an end to the treatment of colonies as possessions or mere sources of wealth to the colonizing ,power4 ,the populations that are not able to stand alone should be taken in trust by the whole ,league of ,nations1 which should appoint a particular ,power in each particular case to carry out the trust4 ,again1 the great stirring of discontent among the labouring classes in almost all parts of the world led to the formation of a special ,international ,commission on ,labour1 which has so far met with great success4 ,it will in general have the effect of raising the conditions of the most backward peoples to something like the level of the best4 ,and lastly1 when all these things were in train1 the policy for which both ,great ,britain and the late ,czar of ,russia had striven so long and vainly would at last become feasible1 and the nations might consent to disarm4 ,thus the ,covenant of the ,league1 an unpretentious but well-considered document1 the result of repeated criticism and study by many of the best minds in ,europe and ,america1 attempts to meet and check all the visible and predictable causes of war4 ,there should be no wars of ambition4 ,they are to be met by absolute coercion4 ,the ,league can make it certain that deliberate war undertaken for national aggrandizement will end1 not in profit1 but in ruinous loss4 ,there should be no wars caused by the irresistible desire to escape from foreign oppression or intolerable conditions4 ,they are made unnecessary by provisions enabling any oppressed nation to lay its case before the ,assembly or ,council and obtain such redress as the most disinterested tribunal can give4 ,a war which is caused by the emergence of some clash of interest or unforeseen dispute between two states cannot1 in the nature of things1 be made absolutely impossible4 ,the ,league opposes to that danger1 not a blank wall1 but1 as it were1 a series of springs calculated to exhaust its force2 a court for points of law1 mediation for points of policy1 compulsory delay and reconsideration for all disputes whatsoever4 ,it will be a strange dispute which1 given honest intentions on both sides1 lasts through all the checks provided by ,articles ,,xii to ,,xvii and plunges nations into war at the end of them4 ,wars caused by rivalry for the possession of colonies and rebellions caused in colonies by unjust exploitation are1 as far as regards mandated areas1 provided against by ,article ,,xxii2 for the other colonial territories1 which do not come under a mandate1 at least the way of safety is shown4 ,wars caused1 or made more likely1 by the mutual prejudices of nations1 by their habit of working always apart and in secrecy1 are met by the immense field of international coperation which the ,league proposes1 and its absolute insistence upon frank interchange of information4 ,wars caused by exclusive tariffs or national monopolies of material are in part provided against by ,articles ,,xxii and ,,xxiii and in part by ,,xi4 ,wars which might be caused by domestic revolutions1 as in ,russia1 are made less likely by the ,labour ,commission1 which assures a remedy for any labour conditions in a particular country which are so bad as to incur the active condemnation of the world4 ,but it is impossible by mere enumeration to be sure of meeting all the causes from which some new war may start4 ,the ,league1 in the last resort1 falls back on the mutual trust and good-will of its members1 and particularly of its members' representatives1 secured partly by the common interest in peace and partly by the habit of coperation for ordinary affairs4 ,the esprit de corps of the ,league's permanent ,secretariat1 with a professional interest in the preservation of peace and good-will1 is a new and important factor in the world's life4 ,any member of the ,league has the right to bring to the attention of the ,assembly or ,council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends4 ,in ,america the ,covenant of the ,league is apt to be represented as a terribly drastic and tyrannical document4 ,cartoons show ,john ,bull1 or some equally repulsive abstraction1 dressed in khaki1 dragging away ,american youths to fight enemies of the ,league in remote parts of ,asia or ,africa4 ,but on this side of the ,atlantic it is generally criticized for not being drastic enough4 ,it does not make war formally impossible4 ,it does not bind all its members to make war on any ,covenant-breaker4 ,it does not even bind any member of the ,league to accept the decision of the majority4 ,it leaves its members almost as free as if they were outside4 ,they are pledged to accept1 if they ask for it1 a decision of the ,international ,court2 they are pledged to the principle of mandate2 they are pledged to boycott any deliberate war-maker4 ,but that is practically all4 ,the ,league's true weapon is not force1 but publicity4 ,the truth is1 and it is a truth of fundamental importance in political matters1 that no structure can be more rigid than the material of which it is made4 ,engagements between human beings must needs be as elastic as human nature itself4 ,had the ,covenant laid down that every member of the ,league was to make war or peace1 or change its foreign policy1 in obedience to the majority of the ,council or ,assembly and in disregard of the wishes of its own parliament1 the result would have been either that no nations would join such a ,league or that1 if they did1 the ,league would break at the first strain4 ,the principles laid down in the ,covenant are1 in the judgment of the present writer1 principles long recognized and absolutely right4 ,if generally acted on1 they will prevent war4 ,if generally neglected and broken1 they will allow wars to ensue4 ,this fact seems to be pretty generally recognized among the more reputable statesmen of ,europe4 ,but it remains unfortunately true that they are principles implying a considerably higher standard of international morality than has hitherto been consistently observed by any nations1 even the best4 ,if absolute fidelity to the ,covenant by all its signatories were necessary for the peace of the world1 the world would have a very poor prospect before it4 ,what we must aim at is as much fidelity as possible4 ,there are great difficulties4 ,america is absent4 ,germany and ,russia are absent4 ,france cannot yet quite escape from her war psychology4 ,but if ,great ,britain is faithful1 it will be hard for other nations to be obviously and grossly false4 ,the ,european neutrals1 like ,switzerland1 ,holland1 and ,norway1 will be clear voices for justice and fair dealing4 ,the beaten nations1 when once admitted1 will probably be on the same side1 since when wrong-doing begins it is the weak who are first to suffer4 ,and1 after all1 all human beings have a strong dislike of injustice1 when they do not directly gain by it4 ,the great majority of the fifty-one members of the ,league will be disinterested on most questions of dispute1 and will therefore form a good tribunal of opinion4 ,but the mere clash of contrary selfishnesses produces no sound equilibrium4 ,the ,league will not succeed unless in some of the great nations1 above all in ,great ,britain1 there are at the head of affairs statesmen who believe firmly in the principles of the ,league and are capable both of effort and of self-sacrifice for the sake of them1 and behind the statesmen a strong and intelligent determination in the mass of the people to see that the ,league is made genuinely the leading force in international politics4 ,the present disorder of the world is one of those in which the remedy is not obscure1 but perfectly ascertained4 ,the only difficulty lies in applying it4 ,the nations of the world must coperate2 and for that they must trust one another2 and for that the only way is for each ,government separately to be worthy of trust4 ,it will be long1 no doubt1 before this end is consummated or even approached4 ,the foregoing pages have shown how far from perfect is the practice of even the most stable and advanced nations4 ,and the tendencies set up by the war1 with its infinite reactions and ramifications1 are almost all such as to make vastly more difficult in each case the necessary effort towards good faith and good-will4 ,yet1 if the difficulties are greater1 the necessity is greater also2 and after all the war has brought its inspirations as well as its corruptions4 ,the craving for this ,peace which has not come is1 ,i believe1 still the unspoken and often unconscious motive of millions who seem1 at first glance1 to be only brawling for revenges or revolutions2 it lies1 like a mysterious torment1 at the heart of this storm-tossed and embittered world1 crying for it knows not what4 ,,the ,,end ,,books ,,for ,,further ,,reading ,the ,series published by the ,american ,association for ,international ,conciliation1 #a-aej1 comprising the text of all the most important official statements1 treaties1 agreements1 etc41 dealing with ,international ,affairs4 ,the ,league of ,nations ,union pamphlets for ,study ,circles3 ,the ,league and its ,guarantees1 by ,gilbert ,murray2 ,the ,league in the ,east by ,arnold ,toynbee2 ,the ,league and ,labour1 by ,delisle ,burns2 ,economic ,functions of the ,league1 by ,norman ,angell2 ,mandates and ,empire1 by ,leonard ,woolf2 ,the ,future of the ,covenant1 by ,g4 ,lowes ,dickinson4 ,the ,league of ,nations1 ,nine ,essays1 by ,viscount ,grey and others4 ,oxford ,university ,press1 #aiai4 ,the ,idea of a ,league of ,nations1 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells and others1 for the ,research ,committee of the ,league of ,nations ,union4 ,oxford ,press1 #aiag4 ,economic ,foundations of ,peace1 ,j4 ,l4 ,garvin4 ,macmillan1 #aiag4 ,report of the ,international ,financial ,conference1 printed for the ,league of ,nations4 ,brussels1 #aibj4 ,complete ,official ,proceedings of the same1 #c vols4 ,london and ,brussels4 ,report of the ,economic ,conference summoned by the ,fight the ,famine ,council4 ,foreign ,policy of ,sir ,edward ,grey1 ,gilbert ,murray4 ,clarendon ,press1 ,oxford4 ,a ,century of ,british ,foreign ,policy1 ,g4 ,p4 ,gooch and ,canon ,masterman4 ,allen and ,unwin4 ,economic ,consequences of the ,peace ,treaty1 ,j4 ,maynard ,keynes4 ,macmillan1 #aiai4 ,the ,making of the ,reparation and ,economic ,sections of the ,treaty1 ,b4 ,m4 ,baruch4 ,harpers1 #aibj4 ,the ,choice ,before ,us1 ,g4 ,lowes ,dickinson4 ,allen and ,unwin1 #aiah4 ,causes of ,international ,war1 ,g4 ,lowes ,dickinson4 ,swarthmore ,press4 ,international ,politics1 ,delisle ,burns4 ,methuen1 #aibj4 ,international ,government1 ,l4 ,s4 ,woolf4 ,allen and ,unwin4 ,empire and ,commerce in ,africa1 ,l4 ,s4 ,woolf4 ,allen and ,unwin4 ,the ,war of ,steel and ,gold1 ,h4 ,n4 ,brailsford4 #aiac4 ,after the ,peace1 by ,h4 ,n4 ,brailsford4 #aibj4 ,the ,eastern ,question1 ,j4 ,a4 ,r4 ,marriott4 ,oxford ,press1 #aiag4 ,the ,official ,reports of the ,first ,meeting of the ,assembly of the ,league of ,nations1 ,nov4 #ae-;,dec4 #ah1 #aibj1 are most instructive1 and will probably be published in book form4 ,the ,riverside ,press ,,cambridge 4 ,,massachusetts ,u4,s4,a4 ,transcriber's ,notes ,original spelling1 including that of proper names retained4 ,minor punctuation errors and omissions corrected4 ,page #aje for the conside ation for the consideration